Formal eavesdropping and its computational interpretation

Abadi, Martin and Jurjens, Jan (2001). Formal eavesdropping and its computational interpretation. In: Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software: 4th International Symposium, TACS 2001, Sendai, Japan, October 29-31, 2001, Proceedings (Kobayashi, Naoki and Pierce, Benjamin C. eds.), Lecture Notes In Computer Science, Springer, Berlin, pp. 82–94.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45500-0_4

Abstract

We compare two views of symmetric cryptographic primitives in the context of the systems that use them. We express those systems in a simple programming language; each of the views yields a semantics for the language. One of the semantics treats cryptographic operations formally (that is, symbolically). The other semantics is more detailed and computational; it treats cryptographic operations as functions on bitstrings. Each semantics leads to a definition of equivalence of systems with respect to eavesdroppers. We establish the soundness of the formal definition with respect to the computational one. This result provides a precise computational justification for formal reasoning about security against eavesdroppers.

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