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A Mazzinian Inspired Moral Form of Partiality:

*MfP* Patriotism

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ABSTRACT

The Brexit vote in the UK revealed two tribal views that conceive partiality, change, identity and social trust differently. These are not new and represent two world views of morality, one global, the Anywheres, the other local, the Somewheres. My project seeks to bridge the divide between them by developing a moral form of partiality, best described as a moderate form of patriotism, which I call MfP. Avoiding the standard philosophical approach to justify MfP, I make two interdependent claims. First, my patria and polity, the object of MfP, is a Korsgaardian conditional value that is objectively good when the condition of its objective goodness is satisfied. Secondly, the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot is the best identity to act to satisfy the condition of objective goodness. MfP is about satisfying the desire for human flourishing by acting from the universal principle to reject indifference and neglect in the workable, cooperative, social and political system of my patria and polity. The MfP-patriot is focused on acting to foster and sustain the social fabric, secure the common good and protect the environment. MfP is inspired by the patriotic thoughts of Giuseppe Mazzini who was a nineteenth century Italian revolutionary and prolific writer. It helps make our minds bigger so that we extend our circle of concern to others. Being a MfP-patriot is about sharing in the labour for the good of humanity. MfP is underpinned by a disposition I call ‘connected, poetically present and compassionate’ conservatism; cppc-conservatism. MfP is justified by our rational nature. It is a moral form of partiality that marks it out as worthy of choice and makes the world a better place.
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INTRODUCTION TO THESIS

The following quotations are from Tony Blair (2017) claiming that those who voted remain in the Brexit referendum of the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016 were patriots; Roger Scruton (2017) arguing what Brexit was about; and Anand Menon and Alan Wager (2018) analysing the consequences of the Brexit vote:

How hideously, in this [Brexit] debate, is the mantle of patriotism abused. We do not argue for Britain in Europe because we are citizens of nowhere. We argue for it precisely because we are proud citizens of our country – Britain – who believe that in the 21st century, we should maintain our partnership with the biggest political union and largest commercial market right on our doorstep; not in diminution of our national interest, but in satisfaction of it.

(Blair, 2017)

When David Cameron asked the British people to vote on whether to leave the European Union, […] he assembled teams of experts to warn against the economic cost should we in fact decide to leave. For many ordinary citizens, however, [their] question was not: what will make us better off, but rather: who are we, where are we, what holds us together in a shared political order and on whom have we conferred the right to govern us?

(Scruton, 2017)

[It is] common to hear that Brexit has changed everything. And as with all such clichés, there is both an element of exaggeration and an element of truth to the claim. The decision of British voters to leave the EU has had a fundamental effect in both revealing and deepening existing cleavages in British public opinion, and opening up new ones. […] Opinions about the EU were fundamentally about people’s identity. For the moment […] the referendum has provided each side with a new tribe – Leavers and Remainers. And one thing we know about identities is that they do not easily shift.

(Menon & Wager, 2018, pp.6-8)

Although I start with these quotations my thesis is not about Brexit. I leave to others whether the decision of the UK to leave the EU turns out to be a good or bad thing. It is, however, from Brexit that the motivation for my research came about. During the referendum I experienced two apparently irreconcilable tribal views that conceive morality, partiality, change, identity and social trust differently. Each side, remain and leave, often claimed the moral high ground and to be the true patriots of the country. It was from the ensuing rancorous and divisive debate that I developed the desire to find common ground and some way to unite both sides. This led to my project to develop a moral form of partiality that could heal the divide and be a bridge to common endeavour. This partiality is best described as a moderate form of patriotism. Throughout my thesis I will simply refer to it
as *MfP*, which is the particular moral form of partiality I seek to champion, the object of which is the *patria* and *polity*.

The two tribal views I am talking about can be presented in many different ways. The important point is that they are not new and they are not restricted to the UK or Brexit. Throughout history they have been presented in various pair-wise juxtapositions; for example, *Optimates*/*Populares*; *Oikophobians*/*Oikophilians*; Cosmopolitans/Nationalists; Globalists/Localists; Liberals/Communitarians; Individualists/Collectivists; Partialists/Impartialists; and more recently *Anywheres*/*Somewheres*. This list is by no means exhaustive. The distinctions they draw are often crude and may even misrepresent the complicated and overlapping relationship between them, as well as how they sit with other views and ideologies. Nevertheless, they are useful in setting out the challenge of basically two world views of morality, one global the other local, that I seek to bridge through *MfP*.

To unpack what I mean by these two views take, for example, Roger Scruton’s (2004) *The Need for Nations* in which he classifies two groups of people, *Oikophobians* and *Oikophilians* (Scruton, 2004, pp.33-38).¹ By *Oikophobians*, Scruton means:

Urban elites build trust through career moves, joint projects, cooperation across borders and what John Stuart Mill called “experiments of living.” Like the aristocrats of old they form their networks without reference to national boundaries. They do not, on the whole, depend on a particular place, a particular faith or a particular routine for their sense of membership, and their language is the international language of commerce. In the recent vote they would have experienced little hesitation in saying we should remain in the EU, since it threatens their way of life, if at all, only at the margins.

(Quoted in an article by Scruton, 2016)

Scruton’s (2016) view is that the *Oikophobians’* forgetfulness of local place and home is short-sighted. In contrast, *Oikophilians* are those who constitute a local producer class for whom attachment to a place and its customs is implicit in all that they do. In the context of Brexit, their lives and jobs are intimately tied to the social and civic trust generic to the UK,

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¹ Derived from the ancient Greek word *Oikos*; defined as family which was the basic unit of society in most Greek city-states. Scruton uses the term in relation to country as a sense of love of home and being part of a great family.
along with the customs and traditions that communicate meaning to the present generation.

For Scruton, *Oikophobia* holds the British Europhile elite in its grip, and *Oikophobians* lack of regard for home leads them to undermine the UK’s domestic sovereignty, as well as the prepolitical loyalties that generate the social and civic trust of a modern democracy (Reinsch, 2017, pp.92-95).

This is strong stuff from Scruton and some of his rhetoric is clearly simplistic; nevertheless, whether one agrees with him or not, he serves a useful purpose in showing how these two views are often presented. A more nuanced classification is that used by David Goodhart (2017) in *The Road to Somewhere* where he describes the new tribes shaping British politics as the *Anywheres/ Somewheres*; a group distinction that maps neatly on the Brexit remain/ leave divide:

A large minority group the highly educated and mobile - the *Anywheres* – who tend to value autonomy and openness and comfortably surf social change have recently come to dominate our society and politics. There is also a larger but less influential group – the *Somewheres* – who are more rooted and less well educated, who value security and familiarity and are more connected to group identities than *Anywheres*. *Somewheres* feel that their more socially conservative intuitions have been excluded from the public space in recent decades, [this has destabilised] our politics and led to the Brexit and Trump backlashes.

(Goodhart, 2017, p.vii, *my italics*)

Goodhart goes on to say about the *Anywheres/ Somewheres*:

[The *Somewheres*] are rooted in families and communities, often experience change as loss and feel a hierarchy of attachments and moral obligations to others. Too often in the past generation *Anywhere* liberalism has looked past, or down upon, such people, but their affinities are not obstacles on the road to the good society, they are its foundation stones. [The] holy grail of politics for the next generation must be the quest for a new, more stable settlement between *Anywheres* and *Somewheres* – reconciling the two halves of humanity’s political soul.

(Goodhart, 2017, p.233, *my italics*)

Goodhart’s use of the *Anywheres* and *Somewheres* is helpful to distinguish the two world views in a way that speaks more clearly to the challenge I seek to address in developing *MfP*. My purpose is to reconcile the societal divisions between the tribal instincts of the *Anywheres*, who tend to favour cosmopolitanism, globalism, liberalism, individual rights and autonomy, with the *Somewheres*, who tend to favour partiality, localism,
patriotism, civic virtue and the common good.\(^2\) \(MfP\) is the moral form of partiality that breaks down barriers, builds trust and creates common endeavour between the \textit{Anywheres} and \textit{Somewheres}.

In seeking to bridge the views of \textit{Anywheres} and \textit{Somewheres}, \(MfP\) is focused on reasonable pluralism and reconciliation through two main requirements; that is, the attitude to group identity and change. \(MfP\) is inspired by the nineteenth century Italian revolutionary and writer Giuseppe Mazzini who, although not in these terms, recognises the importance of balancing the \textit{Anywheres} sense of human identity, individual freedom and the need for social change, with the \textit{Somewheres} need for greater stability, sense of rootedness, community and identity with home. In line with Mazzini, \(MfP\) includes a focus on the common good and civic virtue, as well as personal autonomy and individual rights. As will become apparent when developing my thesis, \(MfP\) is compatible with free liberal democracies but not with dictatorships or other forms of authoritarian regimes. The sense of liberalism I adopt is a reflection of two things; first, my rejection of the argument that one’s country should be neutral in the lives of its members; and second, my adoption of civic republican liberalism that seeks to make complementary the ‘good’ with the ‘right’.

Based on a strong Mazzinian-sense of duty and self-sacrifice, \(MfP\) is a sentiment and practical identity involving connection, tradition and common allegiance to a particular historical community and social lineage, which \(MfP\)-patriots value and see as their own. This sense of \(MfP\) aligns with the civic humanist tradition of Charles Taylor (1995) and his view on patriotism:

\begin{quote}
[Patriotism] involves more than converging moral principles; it is a common allegiance to a particular historical community. Cherishing and sustaining this has to be a common goal, and it is more than just consensus on the rule of right. Put differently, patriotism involves, beyond convergent values, a love of the particular. Sustaining this specific historical set of institutions and forms is and must be a socially endorsed common end.
\end{quote}

(Taylor, 1995, pp.197-198)

\(^2\) I associate the common good with equal protection of core civic interests. These interests themselves roughly consist of life, liberty and property (White, 2003, p.255).
A key difference between my argument for MfP and the majority of other contemporary arguments for patriotism, is my claim that it is a moral obligation for those who are members of, and are in the non-voluntary relationship with, their country. In making this claim, I go further than what many are willing to do, even for what is described as ‘loftier’, ‘moderate’ or ‘morally-apt’ patriotism, where it is argued that at best patriotism is morally permissible. My moral end point is different because I see MfP with its nine key features as a sentiment and expression of human social identity to best encourage civic solidarity, trust and responsibility. MfP is a positive social and civic force focused on the universal principle to reject indifference and neglect in order to satisfy the desire for human flourishing. MfP captures the Mazzinian thought that sees the love of and loyalty towards one’s own country, what I call philo-philia, as a steppingstone for achieving the good of all humanity.

Before going any further I will clarify the use of certain terms throughout my thesis. First, philo-philia is a nonce word specific to my project, it comprises two thoughts, love of the patria and loyal association with one’s polity. By patria, I mean one’s own country in the ancient/ traditional sense of ‘homeland’ and not in the sense of ‘fatherland’. By polity, I mean the political community that connects patriots and citizens through citizenship and, in turn, gives a legitimising voice to the patria. Secondly, throughout my project when I say my patria and polity, I use ‘my’ as a convenient way to minimise constantly switching between different pronouns and the definite article. The intent is to use the first-person possessive pronoun only to pick out a particular patria and polity that involves a complex connection between the individual and the patria and the polity, rather than to identify an

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individualistic relation with that *patria* and *polity*. Thirdly, although I connect my *patria* and *polity* as one object, I sometimes refer to them separately. It may appear somewhat artificial to separate them, where I do so it is simply to better focus on the distinctions I want to make. For example, I mainly associate with the *patria* the prepolitical and the sentiment of love, and with the *polity* the political community and loyal association. Fourthly, I equate *special perfect obligations* with associativ *e duties*; the latter often presented as a sub-species of special obligations as, for example, Samuel Scheffler (2002) argues. Fifthly, unlike some Kantian-inspired authors, I use the following terms interchangeably when it comes to the justificatory grounds for *MfP*: maxims and principles, and universal principles and universal laws. And finally, I do not make a distinction between duties and obligations throughout my thesis. Elsewhere, this may be important; for example, as Ronald Dworkin (1986, pp.195-202) does when distinguishing between natural duties and legal obligations, but here, I use the terms interchangeably. Having dealt with these preliminary matters I will now outline my argument for *MfP* that is presented across four chapters.

In Chapter One, I provide the groundwork from which to develop *MfP*. To set the scene, I give a thumbnail history of patriotism to establish what has been lost that I seek to recapture. I then introduce Mazzini and his ideas around love of country. I put forward my interpretation of Mazzini’s patriotism, which provides the initial basis from which I will develop the richer conceptualisation of *MfP*. I then offer a defence of Mazzinian patriotism against the hard cosmopolitan worry that sees partiality to country as morally inappropriate. I do this by adopting William David Ross’s (1930) ‘common sense morality’ deontic approach based on the concept of *prima facie* duties that recognises special duties. I then link these special duties to Samuel Scheffler’s (2002) concept of associativ *e duties*. I argue in favour of soft cosmopolitanism, which is a position that acknowledges universal obligations as well as the importance of local relationships and special obligations. I then address Bernard Williams’ ‘one thought too many’ objection against impartialism and
impersonality through the view of second-order impartialism. My conclusion is that Mazzinian patriotism, as a form of moderate patriotism, is morally permissible.

I then discuss the difficulty of distinguishing patriotism from nationalism to establish my starting point and approach to the development of Mfp. I put forward the case for my patria and polity to be the object of Mfp in order to emphasise the importance of connecting one’s homeland with one’s political community, which gives a sense of community and belonging between Mfp-patriots and their co-citizens. I end the chapter by responding to the cosmopolitan worry that the object of Mfp should be my patria and polity rather than something bigger, such as humanity itself. I do this through what I call my ‘extended human flourishing argument’ that includes: the social group identity claim; the narrative project claim; the security and defence claim; and the ‘basic structure’ claim.

In Chapter Two, I build on Mazzini’s ideas and develop my richer conceptualisation of Mfp. I set out my taxonomy of patriotism based upon three dimensions: (1) inclusive/exclusive and inward/outward patriotism; (2) blind and constructive patriotism; and (3) particularism (Somewheres) and cosmopolitanism (Anywheres). I identify the sweet-spot space for Mfp and those forms of patriotism I use to help develop my moral form of partiality. I then set out my rich conceptualisation of Mfp and put forward the justification for eight of the nine key features of Mfp:

1) The necessity of both love for and loyalty to my patria and polity, what I call philo-philia.
2) A fusion of the political and prepolitical.
3) Adopting the concept of ‘civic republican liberalism’.
4) Mfp seen as the ‘encouraging hand’ for the common good.
5) Having special but not exclusive concern for my patria and polity.
6) A commitment to moral wellbeing.
7) Seeing Mfp as a steppingstone for global justice and the common good of humanity.
8) Being committed to universal principles through basic rights.

I end the chapter by considering John Rawls’ (2005) approach to pluralism in order to set out how Mfp acknowledges and addresses the challenges associated with it. I also discuss the limits on moral partiality and distinguish patriotic attitudes from racist attitudes.
In Chapter Three, I set out my justificatory grounds for *MfP*. I start by outlining a problem with using the concepts of intrinsic value and instrumental value that are traditionally deployed to describe the value and goodness of one’s country. My preference is to describe my *patria* and *polity*, the object of *MfP*, as a conditional value which is objectively good when the condition of its objective goodness is satisfied; an approach I borrow from Christine Korsgaard (1983). I then link the conditional value to the *MfP*-patriot (the subject of *MfP*). The purpose of the strongly normative practical identity of a *MfP*-patriot is to act to meet the condition of objective goodness by applying the principle to reject indifference and neglect. This makes *MfP* a moral obligation. I complete the chapter by setting out the detail behind two of the three actions involved in acting to meet the condition of goodness. From Onora O’Neill (1996) I make the claim that the practical identity of a *MfP*-patriot is best placed to foster and sustain the social fabric of my *patria* and *polity*, by way of a number of vindicable required social virtues and special obligations. I then claim that *MfP* provides the motivation for civic solidarity and social responsibility in order to best act to secure the common good of the *polity*. I do this through Pauline Kleingeld’s (2003) Kantian case for civic patriotism as a moral obligation. I extend her argument by adding the views of Charles Taylor (1995) in regard to his form of ‘democratic and participatory’ patriotism.

In Chapter Four, I set out the ninth key feature of *MfP*. This is the way of thinking that underpins the effort of *MfP*-patriots to sustain my *patria* and *polity* as a workable, connected, social and political system. I call this disposition ‘connected, poetically present and compassionate’ conservatism - *cppc-conservatism*. It is a way of thinking derived from the philosophical beliefs of Edmund Burke (1790), Michael Oakeshott (1962) and Martha Nussbaum (2013). It is founded upon the view of a shared sense of belonging and identity

\[4\] I define the social fabric as the relationships and connections we make with one another that make us all a part of the common thread of society.
to a community ‘extended over time’. Starting with Burke, I support the view that community in a country is an indissoluble social contract which reinforces the importance of tradition and connection. I then link the concept of public goods with social connectiveness through Angela Kallhoff (2011). Following this, I borrow some of Oakeshott’s ideas to claim that MfP is a sentiment that supports my patria and polity as a civic and social association, which is focused on the simple ‘poetic’ pleasures of living peaceably and harmoniously with our compatriots/co-citizens, appreciating Nature⁵ and protecting our environment. The poetic link with Nature is a thought I get from Henry Thoreau (2004 [1854]). This leads to my claim that being ‘poetically present’ involves the practical identity of a MfP-patriot to best act to protect the environment of my patria and polity; the third action to reject indifference and neglect I first introduce in Chapter Three. I conclude by setting out Nussbaum’s understanding of the emotion of compassion to reinforce social bonds that support connection between MfP-patriots, as well as providing a moral check in the form of a public culture of compassion to avoid the potential harms from them.

I end these introductory remarks by clarifying the purpose of the two main moral arguments I put forward in my thesis and how they relate to each other. The first argument, set out in Chapter One, is to demonstrate that Mazzinian moderate patriotism is morally permissible. This involves applying common-sense morality that recognises associative duties within the position of soft cosmopolitanism. This argument, with some variation, is readily understood and is a position that seeks to combine moderate forms of patriotism with cosmopolitanism. By adopting a form of impartialism and impersonality it does, however, face Bernard Williams’ (1981) ‘one thought too many’ objection. I answer this objection by applying the idea of second-order impartialism. Since MfP is a form of moderate patriotism,

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⁵ I use Nature with a capital ‘N’ to emphasise its uniqueness, which I see as some ultimate and pervasive force. Otherwise, I use nature with a small ‘n’ for common use like ‘part of his nature’.
it is reasonable to conclude that it is also morally permissible on these grounds. As far as it goes this is fine. My intent, however, is to build on this to make the stronger claim that MfP is a moral obligation.

The justificatory approach I present for MfP in Chapter Three is consistent with second-order impartialism. It recognises that we are motivated to act through both special concern and certain universal principles in order to satisfy the desire for human flourishing. It is a moral argument firmly grounded in our rational nature. By focusing on desires, reasons and obligations that come from our practical identities, the necessity of action and the choices rational agents make, I offer an original approach in the literature of patriotism. I borrow it from Christine Korsgaard (1983) and I develop it to justify MfP through two interdependent steps:

- First, I establish my patria and polity, the object of MfP, as a conditional value that is objectively good as long as the condition of its objective goodness is satisfied. The condition of objective goodness is to satisfy the desire for human flourishing, which is the central concern of MfP.
- Second, I claim that by having the practical identity of a MfP-patriot, the subject of MfP, we are best placed to act to achieve the condition of objective goodness. This is because what comes with the MfP-patriot is the desire for human flourishing, which is the end the MfP-patriot seeks. In order to achieve this end, the MfP-patriot exercises autonomy by adopting the principle to reject indifference and neglect, which is the universal law that all rational agents in my patria and polity can adopt without contradiction. Encompassed by this universal law are three actions to which the MfP-patriot is committed: to foster and sustain the social fabric, secure the common good, and protect the environment. These actions are best understood as ‘acts-for-the-sake-of-a-specific-end’ and are the objects of choice and bearers of moral value.

When it comes to being a patriot/citizen in the non-voluntary relationship with my patria and polity, it is the identity of a MfP-patriot which we can best fill with integrity and dedication as a fully self-constituted rational agent. Fundamental to rational agency are our practical identities for it is these that give us our justificatory reasons and obligations. Adopting the universal law that encompasses the acts-for-the-sake-of-a-specific-end, which
comes with the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot, gives authority for every rational agent in my patria and polity. It is through this authority, arising from our rational nature, that MfP is a moral obligation and a steppingstone for the good of humanity.

MfP is inspired by Mazzini’s nineteenth century views on patriotism and liberal nationalism. In developing MfP, however, I borrow ideas on patriotism from a range of contemporary philosophers. Although there may be some similarity in the content of MfP to some of the ideas from these thinkers, my conceptualisation of MfP and the way I set out and link its key features offers an interesting and distinct form of moderate patriotism. It does so in the following ways. First, in the development of my multi-dimensional taxonomy to classify different forms of patriotism. Secondly by applying Henry Shue’s ‘basic rights’ as the specific commitment to universal principles for MfP. Thirdly, in the application of Christine Korsgaard’s rationality-based approach to justify the patria and polity as a conditional value and MfP as a moral obligation through the practical identity of a MfP-patriot. This is a novel approach in the literature of patriotism and nationalism. And finally, in the disposition that underpins MfP, what I call cpcc-conservatism, which includes a combination of views relating to community, tradition and connection, being poetically present, and the emotion of compassion. This involves the juxtaposition of authors who would not normally find themselves in such close proximity when talking about patriotism.

In short, MfP is an original form of moderate patriotism focused on satisfying the desire for human flourishing in my patria and polity, which is a Mazzinian-like steppingstone for the good of humanity. This makes it a moral form of partiality that is best placed to bridge the divide between the Anywheres and Somewheres within a free liberal representative democracy of the twenty-first century.
CHAPTER 1

PATRIOTISM AND GIUSEPPE MAZZINI

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I provide the groundwork for my moral form of partiality. As MfP is best described as a moderate form of patriotism, I begin by briefly reviewing the historical context of patriotism to highlight how it has changed over time and, as a result, what has been lost that I seek to recapture. I then turn to a nineteenth century concept of patriotism that is connected to the ancient world and reflected in Giuseppe Mazzini’s writings, which provides the inspiration for MfP. I then defend Mazzinian patriotism against, first, the moral cosmopolitanism and globalist objection that argues against the need for patriotism - even in a moderate form; and secondly, the ‘one thought too many’ objection against impartialism and impersonality. I finish by highlighting the difficulty of distinguishing patriotism from nationalism to establish my starting point and approach to the development of MfP. In doing so, I set out my ‘extended human flourishing argument’ to defend the claim that my patria and polity is the appropriate object of MfP.

1.2 THUMBNAIL HISTORY OF PATRIOTISM

Historically and conceptually patriotism is seen as defining one’s attachment, identification, and the sentiment that underpins love for, or loyalty to, one’s own country and its political community. According to Mary Dietz (1989) patriotism: ‘is a relatively new word but its cognate patriot is older, and their etymological root patria is more ancient still’ (Dietz, 1989, p.202).\(^6\)

\(^6\) Dietz (1989) covers the history of patriotism over the last 2,500 years. For a Greek account see Crowley (2020). For a Roman account see Kapust (2020).
In Greek antiquity *patria* (τὴν πατρίδα) referred chiefly to the city state *polis* (πόλις); such as, Athens, Arcadia, Corinth and Sparta. For Greeks, the attachment to their city-states was deeply emotional but it was not bounded by space or territory. Aristotle once expressed his belief that the essence of a *polis* did not solely rely on its physical boundaries. He emphasised that Greek identity and allegiance did not stem from territorial boundaries alone. Instead, it entailed the active engagement of citizens, both as rulers and the ruled, in the affairs of the *polis*. Aristotle’s philosophy on achieving *eudaimonia* involved a structured social order, in which individuals must participate. By *eudaimonic* flourishing, I mean in the sense that Aristotle understood the concept, where true happiness is found by leading a virtuous life and doing what is worth doing, where human flourishing and realising human potential is the ultimate human goal for a ‘complete life’ (Aristotle, 2009, 1098a15-20). In my project, to satisfy the desire for human flourishing is the fundamental concern of *MfP*.

Jason Crowley (2020) points out that the Greeks themselves recognised two types of patriotism. First, ‘higher’ patriotism that focused on the common identity of the Greeks as a distinct culture group within the *patria*. And second, ‘lower’ patriotism which focused on the narrower political community or *polity* (Crowley, 2020, pp.30-31). As will be seen later, I follow this recognition by making the object of *MfP* my *patria* and *polity*, as well as using it to formulate two of *MfP*’s key features; that is, love of the *patria* and loyalty to the *polity* (what I call *philo-philia*) and the fusion of the prepolitical and political.

For Dietz, the full meaning of *patria* only emerged in the later period of the Roman Republic: ‘The city of Rome represented the *patria* for Romans, and it was the emblem of the moral, religious, and political principles to which all residents pledged loyalty’ (Dietz, 1989, p.202). This view is exemplified by Marcus Cicero, the Roman statesman and philosopher, asking: ‘What good citizen would hesitate to welcome death if it were profitable for the *patria?* […] *Patria mibi vita meu cartir est*: [Homeland] is dearer to me than my life’ (quoted in Dietz, 1989, p.202). Over time, two conceptions of *patria* were present in
Rome. The first was religious and political, with devotion to the Roman empire as the homeland. Second, the Stoic ethico-philosophical one, in which humanity as *communis patria*, a place regarded home to everyone, necessitated that each individual behave themselves in terms of their ethical commitment to others, while simultaneously acknowledging the cosmos as the centre of human membership (Dietz, 1989, pp.201-202). These two conceptions did not so much compete for supremacy as exist in tension; much as patriotism (the *Somewheres*) and cosmopolitanism (the *Anywheres*) exist today and was echoed in the Brexit debate. At the heart of Roman patriotism were civic virtue and the love of glory:

> Courage, piety, and virtue, these qualities would seem to go hand in hand with Rome. The sacrifices they brought about, along with the political liberty they produced, would seem to be the greatest expression of Roman citizens’ love for their country – their patriotism.  
>  
> (Kapust, 2020, p.51)

There was a strong tradition of Romans linking virtue and glory with the military. For my project, however, what is more interesting is that some were concerned about the strength of this link and sought to raise the civic over the military as the source of courage (*virtus*), renown (*gloria*) and reward (*dignitas*). Cicero is one of the most prominent champions of this school of thought but, at the same time, he also acknowledges the tensions within Roman patriotism:

> Cicero sketches out an argument allowing him, on the one hand, to love his native Arpinum and yet to prioritise the Roman republic. This argument is important, in turn, because it mirrors what will be a central tension in Cicero’s own account of love of country: the tension between the individual and the particular, on the one hand, and the common good, on the other. […] Yet he prioritises his [homeland] of citizenship – *patria civitatis*. For Cicero love of country can be rooted in *ius* and the qualities of the *civitas*, just as it can be rooted in birth and ancestry, though the prior exceeds the latter in its normative weight.  
>  
> (Kapust, 2020, p.57)

As will become apparent when I develop my richer conceptualisation of *MfP*, I will capture Cicero’s concept of patriotism linked to certain republican civic principles as another
key feature; that is, civic republican liberalism.\textsuperscript{7} Arguably, the demise of the Roman Republic in 30 BCE as a consequence of three civil wars is partly down to the severance of this link. For example, Dietz observes that the Roman identification with the \textit{patria} and its ancestral values weakened as Rome’s imperium and Roman citizenship expanded. As a result: ‘allegiance to \textit{patria} became an increasingly abstract matter’ (Dietz 1989, p.202). This expansion created numerous tensions and perceived injustices that led to the Roman aristocratic struggles between the \textit{Optimates}, the ‘best’, those that aimed at protecting tradition and justice; and the \textit{Populares}, the ‘others’, those seeking to undermine the traditional aristocracy and their right to govern. At the heart of this conflict was a sense of injustice and the breakdown of tradition, which threatened the existence of Rome as an object worthy of love and as a legitimate \textit{res publica} on normative grounds.\textsuperscript{8} As Daniel Kapust says: ‘love of glory and the \textit{patria} attached to the public good brought about Roman greatness, just as a love of glory and the \textit{patria} detached from the public good brought about its decline’ (Kapust, 2020, pp.60-62).

Setting to one side the time of the Roman Empire, with the demise of the Roman Republic the view of \textit{patria}, at least in the West, was seen through the lens of Christianity: ‘where worldly territory had minimal relevance for the Christians understanding of themselves as members of a shared community’ (Dietz, 1989, p.203). In the Middle Ages, attachment through the power of feudal barons and estates tended towards an immediate location rather than city-state or empire (Dietz, 1989, p.203). According to Dietz, as the mediaeval era drew to a close, subjects were more aware of their status as citizens and more focused on their duty to country. It was around this time that the word patriot, referring originally to fellow-countryman, came into early modern English; for example, in his

\textsuperscript{7} For more on Cicero’s writings regarding civic republicanism see \textit{The Republic and The Laws} (1998) and \textit{On Moral Duties} (2016).
\textsuperscript{8} For a more comprehensive account see Rosenstein’s \textit{A Companion to the Roman Republic} (2006).
comedy play *Volpone - The Sly Fox* (1605-1606) Ben Johnson wrote: ‘such as were known patriots, sound lovers of their country’ (quoted in Dietz, 1989, p.205).

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, patriotism was more associated with opposition, legitimation and revolution through, for example, American independence and the French revolution (Dietz, 1989, pp.205-209). In England, it was associated with progressive patriotic movements; for example, the Chartists, Dissenters, those against slavery, the call for greater rights, and those who resisted the power of a centralising and domineering capitalist and imperial state: ‘Inspired by American and Italian revolutionaries, the patriotic call was for reform, and during this time patriotic clubs were formed and many patriotic publications appeared’ (Dietz, 1989, p.209). This nineteenth century form of patriotism reflected the older tradition of late Roman republicanism, especially that advocated by Cicero. Pauline Kleingeld (2011) says that it took the form of citizens’ commitment to, and love for, their shared political freedom and the institutions that sustain it, expressed as a form of civic activity that ‘became synonymous with public spiritedness and commitment to the common good’ of the *patria* (Kleingeld, 2011, p.21). Instead of blindly supporting the *patria*, this form of patriotism advocated for political rights and principles in opposition to the ruling authorities of the time; it stood for equality and justice (Moland, 2011, pp.48-51).

During the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century nationalism came to the fore and seemed to subsume patriotism. The historian John Hobson argued that imperialism supported by nationalistic pride and sentiment became parasitic on patriotism, successfully ‘colonising patriotic public opinion under its protecting colours’ (Hobson, 1902, p.72):

> Imperialism is a depraved choice of national life, imposed by self-seeking interests which appeal to the lusts of quantitative acquisitiveness and of forceful domination surviving in a nation from early centuries of animal struggle for existence. Its adoption as a policy implies a deliberate renunciation of that cultivation of the higher inner qualities which for a nation as for an individual constitutes the ascendancy of reason over brute impulse.

(Hobson, 1902, p.351)
Under imperialism, the tendency for nationalism to diminish patriotism was captured by G.K. Chesterton (1901) in *The Defendant*:

> Why is it that this recent movement in England, which has honestly appeared to many a renascence of patriotism, seems to us to have none of the marks of patriotism - at least, of patriotism in its highest form? [...] Colonies are things to be proud of, but for a country to be only proud of its extremities is like a man being only proud of his legs. Why is there not a high central intellectual patriotism, a patriotism of the head and heart of the Empire, and not merely of its fists and its boots? (Chesterton, 1901, p.35)

Dietz sums up the reasons for the dominance of nationalism around this time:

> The rise of the state, the growing power of national institutions, a developing world, market and centralised economies, imperialist expansionism, and new forms of social organisation [...] All of these things served to foster what might be loosely called “secular religions” of national identity. A collective spirit rooted in a sense of national supremacy and “ersatz greatness,” as the French political theorist Simone Weil would later observe, reinforced the idea of the nation as the ultimate object of political loyalty and of the state as the embodiment of the nation. (Dietz, 1989, p.210)

Although there are a number of different ways to distinguish patriotism from nationalism, some of which I will briefly mention later, what is of particular interest for my project is the difference based on their origins that, arguably, has had the implication of nationalism effectively capturing patriotism. Patriotism can be traced back to the ancient world and through the progressive movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In contrast, nationalism becomes prominent during the nineteenth century to the present day, primarily on the back of colonisation, imperialism, fascism and more recently the rise of populism. As Dietz concludes: ‘During this time the sentiments of nationalism have been largely transferred into the discourse on patriotism apparent in academic writing, politics and in the ordinary language of citizens’ (Dietz, 1989, p.210). As a result of this blurring between the two concepts, patriotism is often challenged as a virtue and is seen by many as simply another manifestation of destructive nationalism. Tolstoy, for example, in *On Patriotism* (1894) rejects patriotism as a virtue and sees it as requiring an ideal exactly opposite to that of morality; that is, an admission not of the equality and community of all people, but the dominance of one nation over all others (Nathanson, 1993, p.4). Mark Twain
thinks the patriot: ‘he who can holler the loudest without knowing what he is hollering about’ (quoted in Budd, 1992). Oscar Wilde defines patriotism as being immoral and questionable: ‘the virtue of the vicious’, and Samuel Johnson thinks it the: ‘last refuge of a scoundrel’ (both quotes from Sardoč, 2017, p.44). More recent critics of patriotism include Paul Gomberg (1990) who equates it with racism; Simon Keller (2005) who believes it a form of Sartrean bad faith; and George Kateb (2006) who believes it a grave moral mistake and a state of mental confusion.

During the twentieth century the argument that patriotism captured by extreme forms of nationalism is a vice and not a virtue is not easily dismissed. One only has to look at the numerous examples of genocide, ethnic cleansing, bloody civil and unjust wars as ample demonstration of this. In such cases, patriotism is often equated to nationalism in terms of an unquestioning sense of duty and service to the nation, the uncritical support of government policies and acts, and the requirement to see the nation as an absolute good. Unfortunately, this view is still represented in the ongoing rise of nationalism that calls patriotism to nationalistic projects and aggressive acts in the twenty-first century.

What has been lost in much of the modern discourse around patriotism and nationalism, is that concept of patriotism that reaches back to the late Roman Republic, and was expressed during the nineteenth century, especially in, for example, England through social justice, social reform and change; America through the legacy of Independence; and Italy through the Risorgimento.9 This older concept of patriotism is a form of partial sentiment that unquestionably involves a strong sense of social solidarity and commitment to the common good, represented in strong attachment, duty and service to one’s country. But it is a form of patriotism that also incorporates a liberal sense of national identity, defends basic rights, venerates common liberty, fights wrongdoing, is less isolationist, more

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9 *Risorgimento* (Italian: ‘Rising Again’). The nineteenth century movement for Italian unification that culminated in the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861, in which Mazzini played a pivotal role.
inclusive, and strives against the centralised power of the state. It is a form of patriotism that sees one’s country as necessary to satisfy the desire for human flourishing and, ultimately, as a steppingstone to achieve the common good of humanity.

It is this benign and progressive sense of patriotism that interests me. I want to challenge the view that sees patriotism as a dangerous vice associated with exclusivism and chauvinism. My task, then, is to recapture this nineteenth century concept of patriotism as a basis upon which to develop MfP, which is a moral form of partiality not only true to this conception but able to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. I get to this sense of patriotism through the thoughts of Mazzini, and it is to these I now turn.

1.3 GIUSEPPE MAZZINI’S LOVE OF COUNTRY

Giuseppe (Joseph) Mazzini (1805-1872) came to prominence during the nineteenth century. He was a Genoese propagandist and revolutionary, founder of the secret society Young Italy (1832), a champion of the movement for Italian unity, and was known as the ‘soul’ of the Risorgimento.\(^\text{10}\) He was a prolific writer and his most renowned work is The Duties of Man published in 1858.\(^\text{11}\) In his time he became one the most influential advocates of patriotism and liberal nationalism. Mazzini argued for a Europe of free peoples, in which national singularities would be transcended in a pan-European harmony of democratic independent countries; a thought that is sometimes seen as a forerunner for the EU.\(^\text{12}\) Mazzini’s democratic patriotism influenced many people at the time. According to Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (2009) his views have also influenced others; for example, Woodrow Wilson, Gandhi, Nehru, and Sun Yat-sen, as well as inspiring patriotic and anti-colonial

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\(^\text{10}\) The other two major players in the Risorgimento were Camillo Benso, the Count of Cavour known as the ‘brain’, and Giuseppe Garibaldi, the Italian General known as the ‘sword’.
\(^\text{11}\) The book formally entered into the Italian school system in 1903. It ceased to be a recommended schoolbook with the coming to power of Mussolini (Morandini, 2015, pp.67-85).
\(^\text{12}\) For more detailed biographical details see Smith (1994), Recchia & Urbinati (2009), and Arneson & Bowle (2020).
movements throughout Europe, South America, and the Middle East. Mazzini’s primary interest was the welfare of mankind, as well as his ambitions for a world republican federation. He thought that the path to these things was via love of one’s country, which is why he was so dedicated to the establishment of the Italian Kingdom (Recchia & Urbinati, 2009, pp.1-2).

Although Mazzini’s underpinning of patriotism was ‘God, progress and humanity’ (Smith, 1994, pp.12-19) my project does not rely on his nineteenth century religious beliefs. My focus is his political, cultural and normative arguments containing the noble thought that in loving one’s country individuals are part of something greater than themselves. There are those, of course, that hold critical views of Mazzini. Although I do not cover them here, such criticisms mainly fall from a misrepresentation or misreading of Mazzini’s thoughts. For an account that satisfactorily addresses the main criticisms see David Ragazzoni (2018).

Mazzini believes that patriotism provides a strong motivational force for people to move beyond egoism and care more about global concerns:

> You are citizens, you have a country, in order that in a limited sphere, with the concourse of people linked to you by speech, by tendencies, and by habits, you may labour for the benefit of all men whatever they are and may be in the future – a task which each one could ill do by himself weak and lost amid the immense multitude of his fellow-men. Those who teach morality, limiting its obligations to duties towards family and country, teach you more or less a narrow egoism and lead you to what is evil for others and yourselves. Country and family are like two circles drawn within a greater circle which contains them both; like two steps of a ladder without which you could not climb any higher, but upon which it is forbidden you to stay your feet.

(Mazzini, 1858, p.41)

His argument for love of country goes like this. First, Mazzini believes that the ultimate mission of all people is the betterment and good of humanity. He is cosmopolitan, not in its abstract or highly individualistic form, but in the sense of understanding it as the union of all people and the destruction of barriers which separate and give rise to antagonistic interests among all peoples (Mazzini, 1891, p.7). Secondly, he believes that the mere affirmation of these truths is insufficient, what matters is action and what practically can be done to triumph over governments founded upon privilege and egoism (Mazzini, 1858, p.25, p.29, p.75).
Thirdly, he thinks that people are naturally narrow and particularistic in their concerns and are unable to form a strong attachment to all humanity in a meaningful way. Nonetheless, they can develop a connection to their country, which is regarded as a representation of both the remembrance of past challenges and the commitment to a shared destiny (Nussbaum, 2008, p.80). Fourthly, because of this connection the country is the largest unit to which such strong attachments can be directly formed as a basis for global justice (Nussbaum, 2008, p.81). Finally, such enlarged concern requires collective endeavour and organisation, and organisation requires a determinate starting point and definite goal (Mazzini, 2009, p.58). The starting point is one’s country and the goal is the good of humanity, which seeks the amelioration and progress of all through the work of all; that is, the progress of each for the benefit of others (Mazzini, 1891, p.7).

Mazzini has a vision of global concern and freedom that includes the importance of the cultural life of one’s country that, he argues, was compatible with universalist values where all people are at a fundamental level of equal moral worth. In this respect, his view is similar to that of Will Kymlicka in *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995) who makes the claim that: ‘freedom is intimately linked with and dependent on culture’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p.75). Mazzini’s claim, as with Kymlicka’s, is not that my culture is superior to others; rather, as Patti Tamara Lenard and Margaret Moore (2013) argue, it is a much more generalisable claim:

> [My] language, culture, and identity are important to me, just as yours are important to you. The idea was one of the (basic) equality of all nations. Indeed, Mazzini was explicit that the “brotherhood of man” was the basis for the “brotherhood of Italians”. In his view, “the question of nationalities, rightly understood, is the Alliance of the Peoples.” The imperative of [Mazzini’s patriotism], then, was situated within a broader conception of global justice in which different national identities were given due recognition.

(Lenard & Moore, 2013, pp.64-65, n.2)

Mazzini’s idea on the equality of all countries is morally progressive in practice because it helps to challenge the hegemony of existing powers. More importantly, as Lenard and Moore (2013) point out, it is a generalisable principal that assumes that all people are
similarly situated in an important relationship with their own country. Mazzini sees this relationship as inclusive and plural that creates an association which accommodates different religious, linguistic, ethnic, and cultural viewpoints. Leonard and Moore are clear that Mazzini is: ‘not committed to a nationalist view of cultural uniformity or cultural homogeneity, rather his approach reveals a strong component of universalism’ (Lenard & Moore, 2013, p.49). This viewpoint helps define it as a defendable form of patriotism still relevant today.

According to Mazzini, removing the love for one’s country in a harsh way would hinder the advancement of humanity towards progress and fraternity. It would be like breaking the ladder that leads to these ideals. Instead what is required is to harmonise the idea of the country with the idea of humanity based upon the concept of collective effort:

The pact of humanity cannot be signed by individuals, but only by free and equal peoples, possessing a name, a banner, and the consciousness of a distinct individual existence. If you desire that the peoples should become such, you must speak to them of country. I regarded the question of Nationality – as it ought to be regarded by all of us – not as a mere tribute to local pride or local rights, but as a question of […] division of labour.

(Mazzini, 1891, pp.15-17)

This is an important insight from Mazzini as he is not advocating patriotism against moral cosmopolitanism but more a collective requirement of the two. My approach to MfP reflects this because there is a position of cosmopolitanism, soft cosmopolitanism, that can be combined with patriotism, at least patriotism in moderate forms. Not only is this possible, but such a combination is required to properly reflect the two main spheres of moral concern; that is, the global, the Anywheres, and the local, the Somewheres. I adopt the combination view¹³ by recognising that as well as representing different modes of thought and action there are significant connections between them. Neither position alone is adequate and as

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Brett Bowden says: ‘each contains potential dangers, but they also entail important complementary aspects that are essential in bringing about a more stable and innocuous synthesis of the two projects’ (Bowden, 2003, pp.235-246). In this way, I also follow the pluralistic views of Charles Taylor (1996) who argues the need for both cosmopolitanism and patriotism, and sees the debate: ‘between liberals and communitarians as being much more complex and multi-layered than many realise’ (Taylor, 1996, p.120). Rather than seeing them as two antagonistic camps: ‘Taylor wishes to arbitrate between them, using some of the analytical and advocacy features of both traditions to build a more acceptable liberalism’ (Abbey, 2000, pp.127).

Mazzini believed that fostering a deep sense of patriotism was an essential precursor to achieving a more united and interconnected global community. In believing that cosmopolitan ideals and patriotic sentiment are complementary he is best described as a moderate patriot or liberal nationalist. According to Maurizio Viroli (1995) Mazzini’s claim is that: ‘love of one’s country has to be enlarged and ennobled by allegiance to universal principles, where such love is deserved only as long as the country remains a vehicle for the good and progress of all the duties we owe to humanity’ (Viroli, 1995, p.152):

In labouring according to true principles for our country we are labouring for Humanity; our country is the fulcrum of the lever, which we have to wield for the common good. If we give up this fulcrum we run the risk of becoming useless to our country and to Humanity.

(Mazzini, 1858, p.55)

According to Recchia & Urbinati (2009), Mazzini believes that fulfilling our obligations to those in our immediate circle can lead to the eradication of our self-centredness. This belief reinforces the idea that the rationale behind these local obligations should apply to all individuals worldwide (Recchia & Urbinati, 2009, pp.2-7). As will be seen later, it is from these sentiments that two of the most important key features of MfP are inspired. First, the

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14 Bowden talks about nationalism but in this context it is applicable to patriotism. Also, see Tan’s (2004) argument that liberalism must accommodate a form of patriotism to be credible.
pursuit of moral wellbeing through my *patria* and *polity*. And second, the need for MfP to be committed to moderate impartiality resting on the dignity and equal value of all people in the form of universal basic rights.

Mazzini’s patriotism includes a significant political dimension in the form of civic republicanism. Nadia Urbinati (2012) provides a helpful exposition on Mazzini’s political theory. I do not need to set this out here. The key point I take from her is Mazzini’s Cicero-like republican commitment to mobilise citizens through civic virtue, good democratic government, justice and the common good, whilst recognising the rights of others. My approach to MfP follows this concept of civic republicanism. It is a form of moral partiality associated with virtues that foster civic harmony and the nurturing of common values to achieve the common good, whilst being committed to and motivated by basic rights.

Although there is some ambiguity in his writings, Mazzini’s moral justification for his form of patriotism is broadly consequentialist. This approach is one that seeks the good of all people, and in order to make this achievable/ manageable, it is necessary to divide up the task between each country. Partiality, in the form of love of one’s country, is then allowed because it facilitates the effective promotion of overall good. As far as this argument goes, I do not rely on it to establish the moral permissibility of Mazzinian patriotism. As will be seen later in the chapter, I set out an argument based on the position of soft cosmopolitanism that captures the standpoint of second-order impartialism that, for my project, has the advantage of being applicable to moderate patriotism as such.

At the heart of Mazzini’s (1858) *The Duties of Man* are the ideas of duty, association and humanity. This can be seen by summarising some of the principles he sets out in the *Act of Fraternity* for the Committee of Young Europe:

> Every mission constitutes a pledge of duty. Every man is bound to consecrate his every faculty to its fulfilment. Association is the sole means of realising this development. No true association is possible save among free men and equals […] Every people has its special mission, which will co-operate towards the fulfilment of the general mission of humanity.

(Mazzini, 1891, pp.30-35)
Although Mazzini presents an essentially rhetorical device in this *Act of Fraternity*, what I take from these principles and his broader writing is that even though his beliefs of liberty, equality and rights clearly have universal content, he recognises that this is not enough to make a lasting improvement to the good of humanity. To achieve this requires the important step of putting duties on equal standing with that of rights:

> When I say that the knowledge of their *rights* is not enough to enable men to affect any appreciable or lasting improvement, I do not ask you to renounce these rights; I only say that they cannot exist except as a consequence of duties fulfilled, and that one must begin with the latter in order to arrive at the former.

(Mazzini, 1858, p.16)

As Samuel Moyn argues: ‘this was a view that influenced Mohandas Gandhi who when asked by Julian Huxley in 1947 to contribute to a collection of philosophical writings on human rights, declined, replying “I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights to be deserved and preserved come from duty well done”’ (Moyn, 2016, p.1). In the modern era where we have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and numerous other Charters, Treaties and Councils, in which ‘human rights’ politics are everywhere, Mazzini’s view that rights cannot exist except as a consequence of duties fulfilled should not be read as simply downgrading rights in favour of duties. Taking his thoughts as a whole it is clear that he esteems both rights and duties, but it is the latter that, for him, have been neglected.

Known as the nineteenth century ‘apostle’ of duty, Mazzini believes that fixating solely on the desire for entitlements can lead to a harmful sense of self-importance and individualism (Wight, 2004, p.96). Putting duties on an equal footing with rights would correct this by more effectively motivating collective effort:  

> The theory of *rights* enables us to rise and overthrow obstacles, but not to find a strong and lasting accord between all the elements which compose the nation […]. We have therefore to find a principle of education superior to any such theory, which shall guide men to better things, teach them constancy in self-sacrifice and link them with their fellow men, this principle is Duty. We must convince men that […] each one of them must live, not for [themselves], but for others; that the object of their life is not to be more or less happy, but to make themselves and others better […].

(Mazzini, 1858, pp.15-16)

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15 *The Duties of Man* (1858) is often portrayed as a reaction to Thomas Paine’s *Rights of Man* (1999[1791]).
Echoing the patriotism of late Roman republicanism, Mazzini’s intention in emphasising the significance of duties is to defend the individual liberty important to rights theory from selfish individualism and the egoistic impulse to satisfy desires, which he considers so harmful.\footnote{Mazzini had in mind the utilitarian views of Bentham - see Moyn (2016) and Wight (2004).}

Liberty; some have reduced it to a mean immoral \textit{individualism} [where] Ego is everything and that one aim of human labour and social organisation ought to be the satisfaction of its desires; others have declared that \textit{all} government, \textit{all} authority, is an inevitable evil […] that it must be restricted and fettered as much as possible […] that a government has no mission beyond that of preventing one individual from injuring another. Reject these false doctrines […] Your liberty will be sacred so long as it develops under the ruling influence of the Idea of Duty and of Faith in the common perfectibility.\footnote{Taken to an extreme, once everyone claims to have a right to everything, then the appeal to rights will become almost as meaningless: ‘[As in] Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature, in which everyone’s right to everything effectively leaves no one with a right to anything’ (Dagger, 1997, p.4).} (Mazzini, 1858, pp.81-82)

By emphasising duties to one another and to all humanity, Mazzini puts the relationship between individual rights and one’s country in its broader setting. I do not rely solely on Mazzini’s nineteenth century views to make this point. A pervasive theme in Onora O’Neill’s (1996 & 2016) work is the importance of duties in theorising about justice and virtue. According to O’Neill, the majority of moral theories that are widely discussed fail to adequately address the importance of needs. She argues that relying solely on the language of rights is inadequate when it comes to fulfilling the needs of individuals.\footnote{} O’Neill believes that a: ‘shift from the perspective of rights and recipience to that of obligation and agency, does not disable us from talking about human rights; rather, it provides them with more solid foundations’ (O’Neill, 2016, p.56).

Mazzini is committed to the protection of liberty and individual rights, as he demonstrates in the production of a manifesto of rights in the short-lived (three months) republic when acting \textit{Triumvir} of Rome in 1849 (Recchia & Urbinati, 2009, pp.5-6). At the same time, however, he emphasises the importance of duties, because it is duty and self-
sacrifice for the common good that, for him, will secure more meaningful progress in making all people better people. This view is consistent with Kant’s uplifting deontological approach to morality in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (2012), which puts at its heart humanity - the dignity and equal worth of all people. Mazzini himself is not explicit about the Kantian connection, he rarely (if ever) refers to Kant directly, but I will use the connection for the deontic justificatory grounds of *MfP* I set out in Chapter Three. That, however, is yet to come. For now I draw on Mazzini’s ideas to set out a Mazzinian conception of patriotism, at least as it calls to me, and then respond to the moral cosmopolitanism and the ‘one thought too many’ worries against it.

### 1.4 A MAZZINIAN CONCEPTION OF PATRIOTISM

As already discussed, in the late Roman Republic and during the nineteenth century, patriotism is a sentiment attached to one’s country broadly seen as a basic virtue associated with citizenship as a political conception of the person. This is the view that Mazzini takes, but he also claims that love of one’s country has to be enlarged and ennobled for the progress of duties owed to all. Because of this, Mazzini’s love of one’s country is best described as a form of moderate patriotism, which seeks to advance the wellbeing and flourishing of one’s own country as a steppingstone to the good of humanity. By moderate patriotism, I do not mean a form of patriotism that is weak and not deeply felt. I mean one similar to that which Stephen Nathanson (2020) champions. He rejects strong or extreme forms of patriotism that focus on promoting the country’s interests, but dismiss any meaningful external standpoint (universal principle) on the way this exclusive concern is satisfied. Nathanson’s moderate patriotism also promotes the country’s interests, but it only approves of means that are consistent with certain rights people have regardless of the country to which they belong (Nathanson, 2020, pp.142-143).
Mazzini’s love of one’s own country is best described in the following way. The subject of patriotism is the patriot who Mazzini says is a politically associated individual. The object of patriotism is one’s country. Not just the particular geographical area and other prepolitical features such as the history, traditions and culture of one’s country, but also, essentially, its political community. For Mazzini, it is through civic republicanism that patriots are connected to one another and to their own country. This connection is based upon special affection, special concern, mutual support, reciprocity, self-sacrifice and duty between patriots. Mazzini believes that civic republicanism along with the prepolitical are necessary to provide a sense of common identity, unity and solidarity which, in turn, generates the motivation for social and civic concern that, for Mazzini, can be extended to a concern for the good of humanity.

According to Mitja Sardoč (2017) patriotism has a redistributive aspect and a substantive aspect. The redistributive aspect can involve either ‘absolute’ or ‘relative’ advantage. An ‘absolute’ version of the redistributive aspect allows for one’s compatriots and co-citizens to always take precedence over others, as in strong or blind forms of patriotism (Sardoč, 2017, pp.46-47). Mazzinian patriotism adopts a ‘relative’ version that favours compatriots and members of the same political community, but only under specific conditions through the application of certain universal principles. The substantive aspect of Mazzini’s patriotism reflects the relationship of the patriot/citizen with her compatriots as involving special concern and special obligations (Sardoč, 2017, p.47). Mazzini presents this special concern as the lever to meet the challenge of ‘reconciliation’, which is the challenge of how one’s attachment and duties to compatriots can be reconciled with a commitment to equal respect of all others. Figure 1.1 presents a summary of this conception of Mazzini’s patriotism that includes three elements across two dimensions. It forms the basis upon which I will develop my ‘richer’ conceptualisation of MfP.
The main problem in using Mazzini’s approach as the inspiration for MfP is the reconciliation challenge. This comes from the substantive aspect of his patriotism that includes special concern and special obligations to compatriots. Unfortunately, Mazzini does not provide a meaningful defence against the moral cosmopolitanism worry that obligations to others ought not to be weighed against any obligations to compatriots. And as I mentioned earlier, nor does he provide a clear philosophical argument supporting the claim that love of country is the steppingstone for the good of humanity. To address these gaps, I will now put forward the grounds upon which Mazzini’s moderate patriotism is morally permissible. This will provide a firmer normative footing to develop my Korsgaardian moral justification for MfP in Chapter Three.

1.5 THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH MAZZINIAN PATRIOTISM IS MORALLY PERMISSIBLE

To demonstrate how Mazzini’s form of patriotism is morally permissible I adopt a way of thinking best captured by common-sense morality. Common-sense morality and the special duties that arise from it are used by a number of contemporary philosophers who argue in
favour of partialism and patriotism.\textsuperscript{18} Although I broadly follow their approach, the specific steps I take involve the following. First, I highlight what I mean by moral cosmopolitanism and outline the problem with hard cosmopolitanism. Secondly, I give a short account of common-sense morality which recognises both general and special duties. Thirdly, I argue that the relationship with one’s country gives rise to associative duties, which are a sub-species of special duties. Fourthly, I argue in support of soft cosmopolitanism to recognise these associative duties.\textsuperscript{19} The position I adopt for soft cosmopolitanism is not one that simply requires partial principles to be constrained by universal impartial principles. Rather, it is one that captures the concept of second-order impartialism (a two-level theory that is a kind of hybrid or moderate impartialism). The final step I take will be to defend this position against Bernard Williams’ (1981) ‘one thought too many’ objection against impartiality and impersonality.

1.5.1 MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM

By moral cosmopolitanism, I mean in the sense that Thomas Pogge (1994) sees it:

[The] belief that individual human beings are what ultimately matter; they matter equally; and nobody is exempted by distance or lack of shared community from political demands arising out of the counting of everybody equally.

(Pogge, 1994, p.89)

Moral cosmopolitanism holds that each human being has equal moral worth.\textsuperscript{20} This equality of value generates certain moral responsibilities to be exercised impartially, which have universal scope and force. As far as it goes, I do not think many reasonable people would disagree with this view of moral cosmopolitanism; it is certainly a view that I endorse, at

\textsuperscript{18} For those who use common-sense morality and the special duties that arise from it in their arguments see Scheffler (2010) on partialism; Nathanson (1993) on moderate patriotism; Baron (2002) on a two-level theory reconciling patriotism with liberal morality; and Jeske (2019) on special obligations.

\textsuperscript{19} For other attempts to reconcile cosmopolitan justice and particularist relationships see, for example, Goodin (2008), Tan (2004), Abizadeh and Gilabert (2008) and Leonard and Moore (2013).

\textsuperscript{20} See Kleingeld and Brown (2019) for a description of political, economic and cultural forms of cosmopolitanism, all of which have distinctions to be drawn.
least up to a point. Where I draw the line is in regard to hard moral cosmopolitanism that views any form of partiality, such as Mazzini’s patriotism, as problematic. By ruling out particular attachments, hard cosmopolitanism rules out many of the daily experiences of ordinary life which are central to one’s understanding of what is important and how one lives. Given human nature and the reality of our experiences this makes hard cosmopolitanism untenable in that few people could actually live this way.21 Additionally, hard cosmopolitanism may produce other outcomes that work against the social identity that comes from the relationship with one’s own country.22 For example, Stephen Nathanson (1989) argues that pursuing a hard form of cosmopolitanism: ‘may result in an approach that would damage a country’s sovereignty and local cultures, in order to form a unified world culture and political system’ (Nathanson, 1989, pp.79-80). This, of course, is a claim often levelled against the ‘Americanisation’ of local cultures. As hard cosmopolitanism is such a problem to Mazzinian patriotism, actually to any form of particularism, I will say something further about its commitment to strict impartialism before moving on to my preferred solution.

Hard cosmopolitanism is associated with the notion of first order impartialism, that is: ‘impartiality as a maxim of behaviour in everyday life’ (Brock, 2009, pp.267-268). An example is given by William Godwin (1971) who claims that impartiality demands action that is most conducive to the general good, allowing no role for any particular relationships in which one participates (Godwin, 1971, p.70). To demonstrate the point, Godwin gives the example of a burning building with the possibility of saving one of only two people – an

21 Kleingeld and Brown (2019, p.17) points out that among hard cosmopolitans some will argue it may be permissible in some situations to focus on the charitable needs of compatriots, while others deny this possibility.
22 I recognise that ruling out many of the daily experiences of ordinary life, the culture, history and tradition associated with my patria and polity, which are central to one’s sense of self and how one lives is, of course, not an unattractive outcome for the hard cosmopolite.
archbishop who will produce significant social benefit, and a chambermaid who is his mother. Godwin argues he would save the archbishop. What matters, according to him, is the amount of value a person can/ will produce, not whether the chambermaid is one’s mother (or indeed friend or compatriot). For him there is no magic in the pronoun ‘my’ to ‘better the decisions of everlasting truth’ (Godwin, 1971, p.71).

Godwin’s claim for impartiality is very strict. For him when an agent is faced with more demands than she can meet, she may not envisage a self with personal projects or personal commitments and give weight to them; rather, she ought to apply the moral maxim of impartiality that does not privilege such commitments. Godwin’s position is that if he did show preference to his mother, it would not be because she was his mother but because she is a human being that he helps for some reason not related to the maternal relationship. Godwin’s example helps demonstrate what critics of strict impartiality often claim; that is, impartiality requires one to always be non‐partial. Here, my associative duties or personal interests to my mother should not play a role in my decisions and actions; rather, what is best for everyone affected is what is important. Between the archbishop and my mother, I must be non‐partial, and if I am, then I should either toss a coin to decide who to save, or apply something like Godwin’s non‐partiality with a utilitarian tiebreaker for choosing the archbishop over my mother. In Godwin’s example, his evaluation is ‘agent‐neutral’. Faced with ‘archbishop or chambermaid’ the evaluation doesn’t bother about who’s who or who is what to whom in particular. This is his maxim of strict impartiality.23

In both cases, tossing a coin or the kind of impartialism for which Godwin argues, these solutions are found wanting by Bernard Williams (1981). It is Williams’ contention that agents can only: ‘retain their integrity if they do not sacrifice their ground projects and personal attachments on the back of impartial moral demands’ (Kleinig, 2014, p.92):

23 In the broader sense Godwin’s view is clearly ‘partial’ as in this situation it affords different moral weight to each party - evaluating one over the other in terms of social benefit and using utilitarianism as a tiebreaker.
[...] such things as deep attachments to other persons will express themselves in the world in ways which cannot at the same time embody the impartial view, and that they also run the risk of offending against it. They run that risk if they exist at all; yet unless such things exist, there will not be enough substance or conviction in a man’s life to compel his allegiance to life itself. Life has to have substance if anything is to have sense, including adherence to the impartial system; but if it has substance, then it cannot grant supreme importance to the impartial system, and that system's hold on it will be, at the limit, insecure.

(Williams, 1981, p.18)

Williams’ position on impartialism that involves associative duties, duties that I come to shortly, is best captured by his widely known example of a man’s wife drowning. Faced with a situation in which he can save only one of two people, his wife or some stranger, in equal danger of drowning, assuming both are equally within reach, chooses to save his wife. Against the charge that he ought to have been impartial provides, so he argues, the rescuer with ‘one thought too many’:

[It] might have been hoped by some (for instance, by his wife) that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s wife.

(Williams, 1981, p.18)

Williams believes that rationalising his bias towards his spouse would contradict the foundation of their relationship. Their bond depends on prioritising each other’s welfare, even if it means disregarding any ethical responsibility to aid those in desperate circumstances.

Williams’ idea of ‘one thought too many’ is an important objection against impartialism; however, it is addressed by distinguishing strict impartialism, of which I and most reasonable cosmopolitans are sceptical, with a more moderate form of impartialism. The difference between the two concerns being when and how readily it is good to take up a non-relational perspective, and when doing so involves having ‘one thought too many’. The stricter view of impartialism, which is a view I reject, is that justification should always be sought from an impersonal and non-partial perspective. As Marcia Baron says of strict impartialism: ‘This readiness to detach and view things impartially is expressive of alienation from others and from one’s own affective nature’ (Baron, 1989, pp.271-272).
Although Williams does not do so, his argument reinforces the view that most observers, at least in terms of applying common-sense morality, would rule out strict impartialism, but recognise a challenge that still needs to be met arising from the possibility of moral relativism in special and partial relationships. The view I find more reasonable is a moderate form of impartialism, which is not at all opposed to recognising the validity of special relations and concerns, but has doubts about agents who think about their moral commitments only from a partial perspective. Soft cosmopolitanism is the name of a position I use to incorporate this view.

As Williams’ ‘one thought too many’ objection applies to impartialism and impersonality as such, I shall say more to defend the moderate form of impartialism through the concept of second-order impartialism. In preparation for that, I will first set out how I get to soft cosmopolitanism by way of common-sense morality and associate duties, which will help frame my defence in Section 1.5.5.

1.5.2 COMMON-SENSE MORALITY

There are many theories of morality that lay claim to common-sense morality. What interests me, however, is the view of common-sense morality that is based on the shared experience of rational agents who recognise, and choose to act in accordance with, both general and special duties. In his approach to common-sense morality, William David Ross (1930) contends that moral reasons come from general principles, or what he calls ‘prima facie duties’, which he sometimes refers to as ‘conditional duties’ (Ross, 1930, p.19). These duties include ‘fidelity’, ‘reparation’, ‘gratitude’, ‘justice’, ‘beneficence’, ‘self-improvement’, and ‘non-maleficence’ (Ross, 1930, pp.21-22). Ross’s expression of common-sense morality includes both general duties and special duties. The latter come from duties of fidelity, reparation and gratitude, which rest on personal relationships with others and generate special rather than general obligations. According to Ross:
[They create obligation-generating roles]: promisee to promise, of creditor to debtor, of wife to husband, of child to parent, of friend to friend, of fellow countryman to fellow countryman, and the like; and each of these relations is the foundation of a prima facie duty, which is more or less incumbent on me according to the circumstances of the case. When I am in a situation, as perhaps I always am, in which more than one of these prima facie duties is incumbent on me, what I have to do is to study the situation as fully as I can until I form the considered opinion (it is never more) that in the circumstances one of them is more incumbent than any other; then I am bound to think that to do this prima facie duty is my duty sans phrase in the situation.

(Ross, 1930, p.19)

Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer (20145) argue that: ‘Ross’s idea of [prima facie or conditional] duties providing reasons, but not conclusive reasons, for action softens the rigour of an ethic of exceptionless moral rules or duties, and so makes it more plausible’ (de Lazari-Radek & Singer, 2014, p.84). So, unlike hard cosmopolitanism and strict impartialism, Ross’s common-sense morality not only consists of general duties, but also those obligations that arise by virtue of having certain special relationships. Stephen Nathanson (1993) adopts this position. Although he recognises general duties he says that: ‘people [also] have a special obligation to work for a certain outcome or to promote the wellbeing of certain other people that we are connected to’ (Nathanson, 1993, pp.42-44). When it comes to countries, such a view is adopted by David Miller (2003) who believes they are ethical communities that include special duties:

The duties we owe to our fellow [compatriots] are different from, and more extensive than, the duties we owe to human beings as such. This is not to say that we owe no duties to humans as such […]. But it is to claim that a proper account of ethics should give weight to [the boundaries of one’s own country], and that in particular there is no objection in principle to institutional schemes that are designed to deliver benefits exclusively to those who fall within the same boundaries as ourselves.

(Miller, 2003, p.304)

The position I take from Ross is that, like the strong universal morality in hard cosmopolitanism, common-sense morality holds that everyone has certain responsibilities to people as such. At the same time, as in the case of patriotism, common-sense morality

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24 For further detail on Ross’s (1930) approach to common sense morality see Skelton (2012, pp.8-10) and de Lazari-Radek & Singer (2014, pp.82-88). In my project, I use the soft deontic approaches of Ross to recognise prima facie duties that include special duties in special relations, and Onora O’Neill (1996) to build on Ross’s approach when covering required social virtues and special obligations to foster and sustain the social fabric in Chapter Three.
affirms that there are other responsibilities that the members in special relationships have to each other. In the case of one’s country and compatriots, these responsibilities may more specifically be called associative duties, which are duties within the broader classification of special duties, and it is to these I turn to establish that the relationship with one’s country gives rise to duties of this type.

1.5.3 ASSOCIATIVE DUTIES

Samuel Scheffler (2002) describes associative duties: ‘as those that one only has to those particular people to whom one stands, in certain significant sort of relations’ (Scheffler, 2002, p.49). Scheffler identifies which relations give rise to associative duties:

There are many different kinds of groups and relationships participation in which has at least sometimes been seen as giving rise to associative duties. Obviously, individuals are usually thought to have such duties to the members of their immediate families. In addition, however, people have been said to have associative duties to their friends, neighbours, and more distant relatives; to members of the same community, nation, or clan; to colleagues, co-workers and fellow union members; to classmates, compatriots, and comrades; to members of the same religious or racial or ethnic group; and even to members of the same team, gang, or club.

(Scheffler, 2002, p.50)

Relationships are complex. This means that some associative duties are optional, like those in clubs or teams. There are also associative duties that are non-voluntary, such as those based on family or nationality. And people may have multiple relationships with different duties and responsibilities (Scheffler, 2002, pp.50-51). According to Scheffler, whatever the diversity of associative duties they are mostly but not entirely: ‘duties to provide positive benefits for one’s associates […] duties that go beyond whatever [other] duties we may already have toward people in general’ (Scheffler, 2002, p.51).

Scheffler argues that there are three key features of this extensiveness and strength. First: ‘associative duties are less easily nullified or overridden than those for others by

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25 Scheffler recognises that the: ‘same relationships that give rise to associative duties can also create special opportunities for mistreatment and make possible especially intimate forms of mistreatment’ (Scheffler, 2002, p.52).
consideration of the cost to oneself’ (Scheffler, 2002, p.52). For example, in Williams’ thought experiment if two people are drowning I may suffer some cost if assisting a stranger, but I will be expected to bear a greater cost if assisting my spouse (or compatriot). Secondly: ‘my associative duty takes precedence over my duties to strangers where they conflict’ (Scheffler, 2002, p.52). For example, unlike Godwin, if there is a fire and I can only save one person, an archbishop or my mother, I will save my mother even if I would have been required to save the archbishop had that person been the only one in danger. Thirdly: ‘the idea of greater strength may also mean, although this is more controversial, that the threshold at which a positive duty can override a negative duty is sometimes lower if the positive duty is to an associate, than it would be if the positive duty were to a stranger’ (Scheffler, 2002, p.52). For example, imagine a scenario in which there are two people who will die if they do not have water immediately, my daughter and a stranger. I can only provide the last drop of water from a water bowser owned by the stranger and whoever gets the water will survive. The strength of the associative positive duty to assist my daughter outweighs the negative duty not to harm the stranger by taking his water.

Subject to certain limits, associative duties require my compatriots to be given priority over others. Also, again subject to limits, when they conflict with negative duties, the duties owed to my compatriots may take precedence. As Scheffler says: ‘common-sense morality places importance on associative duties as they supply significant substance to morality as it is viewed and understood by most people’ (Scheffler, 2002, pp.53-54). If correct, Mazzinian patriotism that involves associative duties has significant moral value.

The position I describe for associative duties is not without its detractors. As Scheffler says:

Within common-sense moral thought, the precise content of associative duties is often unclear. It may vary depending on the nature of the relationship giving rise to the duty, and, even with respect to a single type of relationship, the duties of the participants are often difficult to delineate with precision. [...] for most types of relationships there is no detailed consensus either about the extent of the positive benefits one must provide or about the degree of precedence that associative duties take.

(Scheffler, 2002, p.53)
We can add to this lack of clarity and consensus the views of those from the hard cosmopolitanism and strict impartialism perspective, who continue to deny the validity of special relationships and the importance of special duties. These concerns are important and I do not set them aside lightly.\textsuperscript{26} Despite the absence of consensus about the content of associative duties, or about which kinds of groups and relationships give rise to them, they remain important. I take the view that in common-sense moral thought associative duties do make a significant contribution to the substance of morality, at least as understood by most people. Saying that, in accepting the claim that Mazzinian patriotism generates associative duties allowed by common-sense morality, they should not be fulfilled in a way that causes significant harm to others. To avoid this worry, Mazzinian patriotism needs to fit with an approach similar to that adopted by Stephen Nathanson, which has two features:

\begin{quote}
[First] some degree of regard for all people. [And second] an acceptance of constraints on what can be done in pursuit of our goals. Adding these features to the egoist would render him immune to moral criticism, without requiring him to forfeit special concern for their own wellbeing.’
\end{quote}
\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{26} Nathanson, 1993, p.40

The challenge from a moral perspective is how to decide what a Mazzinian patriot’s actual duty is when associative duties and general duties conflict. Considering the stringency and responsibilities of both duties, as Ross (1930, p.19) argues we do, may not be morally appropriate to decide one’s actual duty. Resolving this deficiency means systematising the method by which a Mazzinian patriot will choose. Consistent with common-sense morality, the solution involves the position of soft cosmopolitanism.

\textsuperscript{26} Although I do not cover them here there are two major objections to associative duties. First, the ‘voluntarist objection’, which asserts that mere membership in a group or participation in a relationship cannot by itself give rise to any duties at all. And secondly, the ‘distributive objection’, which sees such duties, not as imposing unreasonable burdens on the participants in special relationships, but rather as supplying them with benefits that may be unreasonable by excluding others. See Scheffler (2002) for an account of these and a response. For an argument against associative duties to our countries and compatriots see Robbie Arrell (2021).
1.5.4 SOFT COSMOPOLITANISM

Unlike hard cosmopolitanism, soft cosmopolitanism claims that morality is only cosmopolitan in part and includes principles with a more restricted scope. I may owe certain kinds of treatment to all people whatever the relationship I have with them, while there are other kinds of treatment that I owe only to those to whom I am associated in special ways, with neither sort of obligation being directly dependent on the other. As David Held points out, adopting this view allows for a more: ‘nuanced and layered approach which recognises plurality of value sources and a broader range of moral conceptions of the good’ (Held, 2005, pp.17-18). In this way soft cosmopolitanism acknowledges different spheres of moral reasoning, one global the other local.

Soft cosmopolitanism underpinned by a moderate view of impartialism is a position that makes compatible moderate patriotism and liberal morality. According to Marcia Baron and Taylor Rogers (2020) the argument is that:

Impartial morality requires that we treat people fairly, and generally also holds that we should treat others as equals. This does not, mean, however, that if we do X for one person, we have to do it for everyone else. It requires that our conduct be justifiable by principles applying to everyone. Thus, one important way we treat everyone as equals is that we do not make exceptions for ourselves to general moral principles that we endorse as such. [...] Thus explained, the point is that impartiality should be applied at the level of rules or principles and generally is not required at the ground level, that is, at the level of deciding what to do [...]. Principles enjoining us to help our respective parents in their old age, to care for our children, or to be supportive friends are impartial even though they enjoin us to show special consideration for some people, consideration of a sort we are not expected to show to others. At the ground level we are enjoined by these principles to show special consideration to those with whom we stand in particular relationships (child of A, parent of B, friend of C [or compatriot of D]).

(Baron & Rogers, 2020, pp.414)

What this means in terms of Mazzinian patriotism is that at an individual level, it is permissible to prioritise one’s specific attachment to country and the duties towards one’s compatriots. However, it is necessary to consider these duties from a universal and impartial standpoint to determine their appropriate scope and significance. Therefore, in certain

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27 For a view that challenges the two-level theory on the grounds of moral opportunity costs see Carmen Pavel (2009).
situations and to some extent, it is acceptable and beneficial for individuals such as Mazzini, an Italian, to make judgments based on his nationality and prioritise Italy’s interests. Similarly, as a British citizen, it is acceptable for me to make judgments from a British perspective and prioritise Britain’s interests. From an impartial perspective, such partiality holds value, in the same way one’s preferences and moral responsibilities towards one’s family holds value (Baron & Rogers, 2020, p.414). As Igor Primoratz says: ‘The partiality involved is appropriate, not only for oneself, but for anyone provided that it is kept within certain bounds’ (Primoratz, 2007, p.24). Taking this approach, means that Mazzini’s patriotism and moral cosmopolitanism are compatible. This is because the latter makes the former morally permissible.

Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) who supports a communitarian position, however, objects to such a move. He believes that this type of moderate patriotism is not ‘genuine’ but ‘emasculated’ patriotism as it is restricted to the space left by universal morality (MacIntyre, 1984, p.6). Simon Keller (2007a) expresses sympathy with this viewpoint seeing moderate patriotism as just innocuous partiality. According to him:

Universalism and patriotism are compatible if we can divide the moral territory between them - but this will likely involve a severe curtailment of patriotic ambitions. [They] are compatible if we can show that the existence of patriotism serves universalist goals - but this, probably, is just to deem patriotism a useful mistake. It is no surprise that someone who is drawn to robust and non-ironic patriotism, like MacIntyre, should be suspicious of universalist morality.

(Keller, 2007a, pp.618-623)

MacIntyre’s communitarianism does allow for morality, but the only meaningful route for this is through the community itself. I agree with MacIntyre about the important role community plays for understanding morality and providing an important context to act morally. However, I worry that any position that sees morality as a feature which is exclusively communitarian, particularistic or relational may result in moral relativism.29

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28 I say more about the analogy between patriotism and family in Chapter Two.
29 I take moral relativism to mean that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to the moral standard of some person or group of persons, in my case the patria and polity.
Such a position increases the danger of the pursuit of self-interest above everything else that would undermine the dignity of others. This possibility is something I wish to avoid for the sentiment of MfP and, for this reason, I set aside MacIntyre’s communitarian position.

The worry that remains, however, is MacIntyre’s claim that what we are left with is emasculated patriotism. My response to this is so what? This is only a problem for those who favour strong/robust forms of patriotism and regard only these as legitimate, or view moderate forms of patriotism as being too feeble and weak to be meaningful. I have already been clear that I reject blind, strong or robust patriotism. What I draw on is a nineteenth century moderate and critical form of patriotism linked to that expressed in the late Roman republic. As will be seen when I develop my conceptualisation of MfP, whether some call it ‘emasculated’ or not, one cannot deny that it is a meaningful and valuable form of patriotism. It is inappropriate to label MfP as emasculated merely because it upholds patriotism while acknowledging the dignity and value of every individual, adheres to basic rights, and encourages constructive criticism. I believe that MacIntyre’s perspective of morality is unsuitable for progressive countries that strive to work alongside others towards the advancement of humanity as a whole.

As with Mazzini’s love of country, MfP as a moderate form of patriotism is morally permissible under soft cosmopolitanism, because in working out what one can do for one’s country and compatriots, the MfP-patriot good citizen is guided and motivated by certain principles that apply to all for the good of all. It is important to note that this approach is different to the one arguing that partial principles must be constrained by universal ones. The position of soft cosmopolitanism I favour includes the idea of second-order impartialism. On the one hand, second-order impartialism emphasises the importance of universal moral principles that should guide our actions and decisions. By considering such principles, individuals can avoid the pitfalls of moral partiality by ensuring that their actions are guided by a broader sense of impartiality and fairness. On the other hand, second-order
impartialism is a motivational tool for action in the interest of humanity. Moderate patriots can progress the good of humanity by promoting a society that respects the rights and freedoms of all individuals. By advocating for those values on the global stage, they can inspire other countries to adopt similar principles and create a more just and peaceful world. While universal moral principles are important, a moderate patriot recognises that a sense of national pride, shame and identity with one’s country can be a powerful force for good, as long as our behaviour and actions are tempered by a commitment to the dignity and value of all people. This altruistic view helps to foster a sense of empathy, compassion, and a commitment to act in a way that improves the well-being of others. Importantly, what I do for the love of my country is equally permissible for you in your country. It is in this way that we can best pursue the good of humanity.

There are those, however, who object to any ethical system that incorporates the need for impartialism and impersonality. One of the most well-known critics is Bernard Williams (1985) who does so through his ‘one thought too many’ objection. I will now set out how second-order impartialism deals with this objection.

1.5.5 ‘ONE THOUGHT TOO MANY’ AND SECOND-ORDER IMPARTIALISM

I will start by stating what I view as the major objection to impartialism.30 Secondly, I answer the objection through the thoughts of Marcia Baron (2002) and Stephen Nathanson (1993) who successfully adopt second-order impartialism in their respective arguments for patriotism. Thirdly, I will look at the example of the Covid-19 pandemic and the dilemma of vaccination priority. I do this to demonstrate how second-order impartialism provides a plausible and practical solution to the dispute between partialists and impartialists within the

30 It is beyond my project to detail all the arguments for or against impartiality. What is clear is that much of the criticism arises from misunderstanding and confusion. For an account of these see Baron (1991, 2002 & 2017) and Smyth (2018).
context of patriotism. Thirdly, I will outline the characteristics of moderate patriotism. It is only moderate forms of patriotism that are able to meet the requirements of second-order impartialism in regard to countries, nations and states. I will build on these characteristics when setting out the key features of MfP in Chapter Two. Finally, I will defend the role of the objective and external viewpoint from Williams’ (1985) broader challenge against absolute and universal principles.

It is sometimes difficult to understand what precisely is at issue between partialists and impartialists. For my purpose, I will focus on the complaint that we put too much emphasis on impartiality, and that it asks of us too much by undermining the importance of our special relationships and projects. Bernard Williams (1981) believes that:

The [...] emphasis on moral impartiality [provides] too slim a sense in which any projects are mine at all. This point [...] involves the idea that my present projects are the condition of my existence, in the sense that unless I am propelled forward by the conatus of desire, project and interest, it is unclear why I should go on at all [...]. A man may have, for a lot of his life or even just for some part of it, a ground project or set of projects which are closely related to his existence and which to a significant degree give a meaning to his life.

(Williams, 1981, p.12)

Bernard Williams’ argument is that impartialism results in us abandoning our most basic individual commitments, relationships and projects. This results in distancing ourselves from the very things that motivate and have the most meaning to us.

Peter Railton also makes an important contribution to the ongoing debate on the nature of impartialism and its demands. In his paper ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’ (1984) he explores the concept of alienation, which he argues is the feeling of being disconnected from one’s values, goals, and relationships:

Living up to the demands of morality may bring with it alienation - from one’s personal commitments, from one’s feelings or sentiments, from other people [...] one important form of alienation in moral practice [is] the sense that morality confronts us as an alien set of demands, distant and disconnected from our actual concerns [...].

(Railton, 1984, pp.134-135)

Railton believes that alienation is a common experience in modern societies where people are often forced to make choices that conflict with their deepest commitments and values.
Railton argues, however, that a certain type of consequentialist moral theory can help to alleviate this sense of alienation (Railton, 1984, pp.151-156). He believes this because it can account for the importance of special relationships and duties. Whether consequentialism, of the particular type that Railton argues, is the best moral theory to do so is not something I need consider here. What I am interested in is answering Williams’ ‘one thought too many’ objection against impartialism, and Railton opens the door to do so by recognising the value of special relationships and duties in a way that weighs them against broader moral considerations:

Individuals who will not or cannot allow questions to arise about what they are doing from a broader perspective are in an important way cut off from their society and the larger world. They may not be troubled by this in any very direct way, but even so they may fail to experience that powerful sense of purpose and meaning that comes from seeing oneself as part of something larger and more enduring than oneself or one’s intimate circle. The search for such a sense of purpose and meaning seems to me ubiquitous - surely much of the impulse to religion, to ethnic or regional identification (most strikingly, in the "rediscovery" of such identities), or to institutional loyalty stems from this desire to see ourselves as part of a more general, lasting, and worthwhile scheme of things.

(Railton, 1984, p.151)

The argument against impartiality in regard to the relationship with one’s country, at least in the sense put forward by Williams, is that if morality requires fair and equal treatment for all then this leaves too little room for patriotism. This is a problem because the type of relationship involved in patriotism relies upon special concern and duties that motivate action. Marcia Baron (1991) summarises this dilemma and then usefully clarifies why the perspective of impartialism is important:

Impartiality requires that we see everyone as one person among many and no one as special; by contrast, friendship and other close relationships require seeing our friends as special. But does impartiality require that we see no one as special? No. […] Now critics of impartiality usually acknowledge that there are circumstances in which we really should be impartial […]. But they emphasise, these are very special circumstances. Most of the time, […] it is fine to be partial […] But they emphasise, these are very special circumstances. Most of the time, […] it is fine to be partial [which is a mistake] for two reasons. First, impartiality is often needed with regard to those close to us. […] Second, because the demands of impartiality are so highly contextual, considerable reflection and sensitivity are needed for the agent to judge that treating So-and-So as special, in this way and in this situation, is permissible.

(Baron, 1991, pp.837-838)

Railton (1984) supports Baron’s second reason for the permissibility of partiality:
Bernard Williams has emphasised that many of us have developed certain “ground projects” that give shape and meaning to our lives, and has drawn attention to the damage an individual may suffer if he is alienated from his ground projects by being forced to look at them as potentially overridable by moral considerations. But against this it may be urged that it is crucial for autonomy that one hold one’s commitments up for inspection - even one’s ground projects. […] It may be alienating and even disorienting to call these into question, but to fail to do so is to lose autonomy. (Railton, 1984, p.147)

The answer to Williams’ one thought too many objection is to be clear on the level that we apply the impartial perspective. As Baron (1991) argues, this means taking a two-level impartialism approach. At level 2, when values are selected or confirmed, we should demand objectivity. At level 1, when we are interacting with our special relationships, we have a degree of flexibility in our partial actions. As long as our actions (some not necessarily all) at level one are guided by principles at level 2, impartiality at level 2 is consistent with partiality at level 1 (Baron, 1991, pp.843-844). Baron explains this in the context of friendship but it applies just as well to patriotism:

The notion that impartiality is at odds with friendship loses a great deal of plausibility once it is recognised that impartialists (most impartialists, that is) are principally concerned to emphasise level 2 impartiality. There is no warrant for the suspicion that level 2 impartiality is incompatible with enjoying the company of certain people more than that of others, rejoicing in their happiness and successes in a way in which one does not generally rejoice in others’, doing favours for them that one would be far less willing to do for others, and the like. (Baron, 1991, p.844)

For Baron, partiality seen in this way is clearly not in conflict with the impartial perspective. Stephen Nathanson (1993) adopts this view when arguing in support of his form of moderate patriotism. He also believes that impartiality required by morality allows for particular attachments and special obligations by distinguishing different levels of moral thinking. I agree with Nathanson that there is widespread agreement on two of morality’s fundamental features: (1) ‘it begins by specifying some goal’, such as, universal well-being, human flourishing or happiness of some group; and (2) ‘it places constraints on our actions […] while we may pursue our own goals, there are certain things we must not do to achieve them’ (Nathanson, 1993, p.41). According to this view, the special duties I have that arise
from the relationship with my country must be fulfilled in a way that is consistent with certain universal principles.\[31\]

[\textit{Morality}] does not forbid us from having a special desire that certain people […] flourish, there is nothing about morality that forbids one from seeking the good of his or her country. [However, actions] done on behalf of one’s country are not more exempt from the constraints of morality than actions done on behalf of […] one’s family, one’s team, or one’s religious groups. […] It is this recognition that makes moderate patriotism compatible with […] both the form and substance of universal morality.

(Nathanson, 1993, pp.44-45)

Some of the confusion around Williams’ objection appears to come from a misunderstanding in how morality can be universal. According to Nathanson, morality is typically viewed to be universal in one of two ways: ‘morality is universal if it requires absolutely equal treatment of everyone [or] morality is universal if there are moral standards that apply to everyone’s behaviour’ (Nathanson, 1993, p.70). Nathanson argues that specific obligations may only be taken into account under impartialism by considering morality in the second way. If correct, his approach challenges the legitimacy of Williams’ concern against the impersonal nature of impartialism. Nathanson argues that:

[The] principles that [apply] to everyone [are standards that] are also impersonal in the sense that they do not depend on anyone’s personal commitment to them. […] If the rule were a personal rule, then it might be right for the killer to murder anyone he does not feel personally attached to and wrong for him to kill only in cases where he feels a personal attachment to the victim.

(Nathanson, 1993, p.70)

I agree with Nathanson that morality does not operate in a purely personal sense. Nor can it be based simply on the idea that morality only counts to those we have a special or personal relationship. Nathanson says that once we establish morality in the sense of the: ‘impersonal and universal, then it is easy to see that special preferences and duties may be permitted within a universal moral code’ (Nathanson, 1993, p.70). Take the Ten Commandments (Nathanson’s example) which is a universal code and includes ‘not to kill

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\[31\] This view is consistent with the MJP\textsuperscript{-}patriot’s key purpose which is to satisfy the desire for human flourishing by applying the universal law (principle) to reject indifference and neglect; a Korsgaard Kantian approach of morality I get to in Chapter Three.
or steal’. This rule applies to all people, not just my family and compatriots. The Ten Commandments also includes other types of rule, such as ‘Honour your father and mother’. This is a rule that applies to particular parents; for them to receive special treatment from their children in order to be honoured. It is a universal rule because it applies to all parents: ‘It requires me to honour my parents and you to honour yours’ (Nathanson, 1993, p.70). What is true for parents is true for the duties that we have in relation to our country. Nathanson says we can see this in the rule that ‘everyone ought to support their country’. This rule recognises that because all countries require assistance, not only should I assist my own country but you should assist your own country. It is this rule that acknowledges the value of all individuals in assisting the development of their own country, which acts as a steppingstone for achieving the good of humanity (Nathanson, 1992, pp.74-76).

Like Nathanson, Baron (2002) argues for a form of patriotic partiality that is compatible with liberal morality. She does so whilst broadly accepting the Enlightenment’s view that morality is universal - valid for all not just those in privileged positions; impartial - neutral between competing interests; and impersonal - generic not particularistic (Baron, 2002, p.63). Baron’s position, however, is that:

[It] is plausible to think that impartiality and impersonality are required for some judgements but not others [and that there is no reason] why the morality of liberalism could not recognise the special attachments, including (but not restricted to) a special attachment to one’s own country, and allow that with respect to certain matters and within certain limits, it is good.

(Baron, 2002, p.64)

From the impartial perspective partiality is seen as good but it is a good guided by universal moral principles. When we adopt a universal perspective, we are able to see the interconnections of all individuals and the importance of promoting the common good. This can motivate us to work towards creating more just and fair countries, not just for ourselves and our fellow citizens, but for all people. This is essentially second-order impartialism:

At level one I think, “It’s my country! Of course I will go to war to defend it against the mercenaries trying to overthrow our government.” At this level my thoughts are not impartial, and do not reflect an impartial stance. From level two [however] I reflect on the sort of thoughts I and others have at level one. My thoughts are more abstract, on the order of “Special ties to one’s own country are
morally justifiable, but only in so far as.” These thoughts issue from (what at least aims to be) an impartial stance. Whilst itself “partial” and “personal”, patriotism could, it would seem, be recognised as a virtue by a moral theory that emphasise impartiality and impersonality, as long as that theory doesn’t require impartiality and impersonality at level one.’

(Baron, 2002, p.64)

The point Baron is getting at is that:

[Although] we need to be able to take up the standpoint of the impartial spectator, we need not – and ought not - live in it. Why do we need to be able to take up that standpoint at all? Because the willingness, on the part of those who disagree, to take it up is our only hope of finding a way of living together in harmony, living together in a way that involves respect […] in a world with many communities, it is critical that people are able and willing to view themselves and others as persons, not exclusively as particular persons who are either “us” or “them”.

(Baron, 2002, p.69)

Baron’s argument is plausible. She recognises the importance of special relationships, but she also takes second-order impartialism as a motivational tool for action in the interest of humanity. Baron says:

[It] is consistent with impartiality, i.e., with the requirement that for one’s actions to be permissible, they must be permissible for anyone in relevantly similar circumstances.

(Baron, 2002, p.71)

Take, for example, being a parent. This is a relationship that involves special duties and ties that are particular, but are consistent with impartiality. This is because impartiality does not require that I love all children. What it does mean, however, is that what I do for the love of my children is equally permissible for any parent. It is in this way that we can best pursue the good of all children. The love for my country works in the same way. It does not require that I love all countries. What it does mean, however, is that what I do for the love of my country is equally permissible for others for their country. It is in this way that we can best pursue the good of all countries as a steppingstone for the good of humanity.

To see how second-order impartialism works in practice, take the tragic case of the Covid-19 pandemic. With limited supply, countries had the task of deciding vaccination priority. In this example, we start with the rule that ‘every country should protect its citizens’. The threat of citizens dying in a pandemic is very real, so we must take immediate
action to protect the lives of our citizens. This rule allows partial actions for the benefit of my country’s citizens. It is a universal rule because it applies to all countries. It requires ‘our’ country to protect its citizens and ‘your’ country to protect ‘your’ citizens. Indeed this is what most, if not all, countries did during the pandemic, they followed the rule and prioritised their own citizens. Impartiality at level two, however, also requires us to reflect on our level one actions. This reflection takes the form of ‘every country should protect its citizens but only in so far as…’. What this means is that the priority of the good of vaccinating ‘our’ citizens may be the right initial response, but we must recognise that there will be a point where the immediate threat ends. As our actions are guided by universal principles, instead of administering the fourth, fifth or sixth doses of vaccines for only ‘our’ citizens, we are motivated to reprioritise our effort to include those from other countries who do not have access to such vaccinations. Where second-order impartialism is helpful is that even though it permits us (and all other countries) to deal with the immediate threat at level one, which does not require ‘one thought too many’, by adopting a universal perspective at level two we are motivated through our compassion and empathy to promote the good of others.

What this example demonstrates is that second-order impartialism does not require us to abandon our emotional and personal connections. Rather, it asks us to recognise that these should not be the sole basis of our moral decisions. Instead, we should consider the interests and perspectives of all people affected by our actions. Moreover, second-order impartialism provides a more stable foundation for our moral beliefs. When our moral decisions are based solely on our personal or special connections, they can be easily swayed by parochial grievances and political circumstances, egoistic and selfish goals, and external pressures. However, when we adopt a universal perspective at level two, our decisions are based on principles that are not dependent on our personal biases or interests, which tend to be influenced by such things.
In short, I do not agree with the critics of second-order impartialism who argue that it lacks the motivational force of moral partiality. This is because it provides a more stable and justifiable foundation for our moral beliefs, which can motivate us to work towards creating a more just and fair world for all. I recognise, however, that the successful application of second-order impartialism limits the type of partiality that can be defended. Blind forms of patriotism or being a loyal killer in the mafia will not meet the impartiality test at level two, and neither should they. However, moderate patriotism like Mazzini’s or the one I develop in *MfP* does. They do so because, as Igor Primoratz (2019) points out, moderate patriotism is distinct in several but related respects:

- Moderate patriotism is not unbridled: it does not enjoin the patriot to promote his country’s interests under any circumstances and by any means. It acknowledges the constraints morality imposes on the pursuit of our individual and collective goals. For instance, it may require the patriot to fight for his country, but only in so far as the war is, and remains, just. […]
- Moderate patriotism is not exclusive. Its adherent will show special concern for his country and compatriots, but that will not prevent him from showing concern for other countries and their inhabitants. Moreover, this kind of patriotism allows for the possibility that under certain circumstances the concern for human beings in general will override the concern for one’s country and compatriots. Such patriotism is compatible with a decent degree of humanitarianism. […]
- Finally, moderate patriotism is not uncritical, unconditional, or egocentric. For an adherent of this type of patriotism, it is not enough that the country is her country. She will also expect it to live up to certain standards and thereby deserve her support, devotion, and special concern for its wellbeing. When it fails to do so, she will withhold support.

(Primoratz, 2019, pp.14-15)

Consistent with the concept of second-order impartialism, as will be seen in Chapter Three, I adopt a deontological ethical approach to justify *MfP* as a moral obligation. My approach is focused on our rational agency linked to the strongly normative practical identity of a *MfP*-patriot. It includes the ideas of special reasons and obligations, recognition of the dignity and value of all people, and the rejection of indifference and neglect, which is a principle that can be willed by all rational agents as a universal law. Together, these motivate the *MfP*-patriot to act in order to satisfy the desire for human flourishing through her country, which is a steppingstone for the good of humanity. As will be seen, it is an approach that addresses the criticism of impartiality that it deprives the moral agent of her integrity,
individual character and motivation to act. It does so because it recognises that our actions are guided by our practical identities, which are the source of our desires, our choices, and our commitments to people and projects. Guided by universal principles that encompass actions that are the bearers of moral value, it is our practical identities that make us who we are as individual rational agents.

My focus in this section has been to distinguish second-order impartialism, where patriotism can be justified from a universal standpoint as the best way to promote the welfare of humanity in general, from the position that simply requires partial principles to be constrained by universal principles. Before moving on, I want to say a little more on Bernard Williams broader complaint against the objective standpoint. In *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (1985) he challenges the idea of absolute and universal moral principles. As I understand it, the gist of Williams’ argument is that moral principles are context dependent and cannot be applied mechanically in all situations. The moral agent must use her non-objective viewpoint to navigate conflicting moral principles. This is a potential problem, as second-order impartialism involves some of our actions being guided and motivated by objectivity at level two. When reviewing the merits, or otherwise, of Williams’ argument, Thomas Nagel (1986) says:

> Williams believes that there are truths about how we should live and that they can be known, but he holds that this makes sense only if we take a non-objectivist view of the matter. If we try to ascend to an objective standpoint, we will lose the perspectives from which alone ethical knowledge is possible. If we insist on being moved only by what is a rational consideration for us, we will paint ourselves into an empty corner from which nothing seems to matter. We must start from what we are - not merely what we are as human or rational beings, but rather what we are as particular creatures of a particular culture.

(Nagel, 1986, p.355)

Nagel goes on to argue that Williams position:

> [Implies] a qualified form of relativism […]. It also implies that reflection may actually destroy ethical knowledge, since an external view may undermine the pre-reflective dispositions on which traditional judgments depend, without replacing them by anything more objective.

(Nagel, 1986, pp.355-356)
If correct, the objective standpoint (at level two) may challenge our moral beliefs without actually providing anything better, because it undermines our subjective viewpoint (at level one) that is based on personal experiences actually accessible to us. Williams’ argument is interesting, but I do not think we need to go as far as him in dismissing the need for an objective standpoint. I agree with Nagel in this regard, who argues:

The search for objective ethical principles could be represented more charitably: it need not be so comprehensive or reductive as Williams assumes. [Theoretical] principles may be universal without being totalitarian; they may handle some conflicts of values without handling them all. They can be regulative, allowing room for a great deal of pluralism and culturally determined ethical variation within the framework that they define. The idea that ethical theory is always after the single best form of life for all humans or all rational beings is just a bogeyman.

(Nagel, 1986, p.357)

Second-order impartialism, at least in the form I set out from Baron and Nathanson, fits with Nagel’s view. It recognises the value and importance of our special relationships, but includes an external objective view of ourselves. It is this objective view that supports and inspires the patriot to act for the greater good. However, even though the patriot is motivated and guided by level two principles, she still has to think about context and her obligations to country.

As will be seen later, my deontological justificatory approach for *MfP* is consistent with second-order impartialism. Although it has at its heart the idea of the dignity and value of all people, the objective standard is not totalitarian. This is because I restrict it to a universal principle to reject indifference and neglect, alongside basic rights, which helps deal with some conflict of values but not all. My approach does not diminish the special concern and special obligations that *MfP*-patriots have for their country. Rather, by considering the interests of all people and not just our own, it helps avoid the dangers of nationalistic and extreme patriotic attitudes, which can lead to aggression, intolerance, and discrimination. *MfP*-patriots may be loyal but they will criticise their country when it fails to live up to certain objective standards (basic rights) and work to improve it (reject indifference and
neglect), rather than blindly supporting it at all costs. In this way, MfP is a force for good, promoting the well-being of all individuals, both within and beyond our borders. Despite Williams’ view, second-order impartialism helps to bring greater clarity, consistency and transparency for deciding what to do when moral principles conflict. As Nagel says:

We begin with limited access to the truth, from a limited, personal point of view, and in the course of our explorations we may go astray or get lost. But we can also make discoveries, and those discoveries will alter our motives and expand our perspective as agents. The capacity to appreciate and give weight to the lives of other persons, whoever they are, is a form of understanding. To say that it is in the end still I who must act does nothing to discredit the claim of such objective motives to moral authority.

(Nagel, 1986 p.359)

Having defended Mazzinian moderate patriotism and established the grounds upon which it is morally permissible, I will now set out my starting point to the development of my richer conceptualisation of MfP. In doing so, I first say something about distinguishing nationalism and patriotism. I then identify and provide the justification for the object of MfP, which is my patria and polity.

1.6 PATRIOTISM, NATIONALISM AND THE OBJECT OF MFP

Igor Primoratz (2007) reminds us that when discussing patriotism and nationalism, patriotism is sometimes presented as ‘good’ and ‘our’ viewpoint, which is rational and natural, while nationalism is presented as the ‘other’ viewpoint, which is unfavourable, irrational, and aggressive (Primoratz, 2007, pp.17-18). The poet Richard Aldington in The Colonel’s Daughter expresses this view: ‘Patriotism is a lively sense of collective responsibility. Nationalism is a silly cock crowing on its own dunghill’ (Aldington, 1931, Ch.6). This view is also expressed by George Orwell:

By “patriotism” I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force upon other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality.

(Orwell, 2018 pp.1-2)
Alternatively, patriotism and nationalism are described as little more than positive and negative terms for the same phenomenon. For example, paraphrasing Thomas Hobbes: ‘Nationalism is patriotism disliked and patriotism nationalism liked’ (quoted in Yack, 1998, p.203). Others, argue that patriotism and nationalism can be understood as similar types of beliefs and attitudes, best distinguished in terms of their objects rather than the strength of those beliefs and attitudes. For example, Primoratz states that both are: ‘a species of love and loyalty the difference being that the object of patriotism is a country (patria), the object of nationalism is not a country but a nation (nation) - a people united by a shared ancestry, culture, tradition, language and historical ties’ (Primoratz, 2007, p.8).

I could spend considerable effort trying to add to these and other attempts to distinguish patriotism and nationalism, none of which are fully satisfactory. My position acknowledges that there exists a historical legacy and view that either conflate these concepts or, for example, views patriotism as good and nationalism as bad. Whether these have merit or otherwise is not my starting point. I take the view that there exist good and bad positions that have gone by either name. Hence, putting all the good aspects into patriotism and the bad into nationalism is unwarranted and begs the question. My focus in developing MfP is on a particular sentiment, a practical identity, and the most appropriate object it is associated with.

In principle, MfP with some modification is compatible with certain forms of liberal nationalism; for example, those argued by Yael Tamir (1993), David Miller (1995) and Tim Soutphommasane (2012). Or with moderate forms of patriotism; for example, those argued by Marcia Baron and Taylor Rogers (2020), Stephen Nathanson (1993) and John Kleinig (2015). Or even with certain forms of rooted cosmopolitanism or ‘worldly’ citizenship; for example, those put forward by Kwame Anthony Appiah (2007) and Simon Keller (2013). Although MfP could in principle be compatible with these, this is secondary to my normative claim that it is a moral form of partiality, which should be adopted to support the
requirements of rational agency and choice. I am not interested in MfP being simply seen as a positive vision of love and loyalty that fails to affect our reasoning, choices and actions. I will say more about rational agency and choice later when setting out my justificatory grounds for MfP. For now, it is enough to understand my meaning as involving the desire for human flourishing, to have practical reasons and obligations, make rational choices, and act as a rational agent through the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot.

To avoid this being a trivial claim I must identify what is the most appropriate object of MfP. The main requirement is that my moral form of partiality ought to be connected to a thing that is the best means, over and above one’s close relationships, to act to reject indifference and neglect in order to satisfy the desire for human flourishing and, ultimately, the good of humanity. What this means in practice is to connect MfP-patriots to a thing that makes them more effective in terms of acting to foster and sustain the social fabric, secure the common good and protect the environment in which they live. To achieve this connection I make the object of MfP my patria (homeland) and polity (political community). This is in line with Mazzini who says: ‘the end is humanity; the pivot, or point of support, is the country’ (Mazzini, 2009, p.58).

Making my patria and polity the object of MfP, rather than simply saying one’s country, emphasises it as a conception of partiality that is both identity and value based. It is identity based through the prepolitical, which comes from the relationship with my homeland and the people who inhabit it.\(^{32}\) It is value based through the political, which comes from the common principles and shared values within my political community. In order to vindicate my patria and polity as the object of MfP, I will put forward a number of connected claims that together I call the ‘extended human flourishing argument’. I start by outlining what I mean by human flourishing.

\(^{32}\) I do not restrict the prepolitical to temporal features like history, tradition and ancestry. I use it in a broader way to include language, culture, values, the environment, other characteristics of my homeland and so on.
1.6.1 HUMAN FLOURISHING

My argument is rooted in the claim that my patria and polity is the best means to create the social, civic, environmental and other conditions to satisfy the desire for human flourishing.

As Judith Lichtenberg says about being a member of one’s country:\(^{33}\)

[The belief is] that human beings need to belong to and identify with some group beyond their immediate family, and that they flourish when they do. Here the argument also recognises stronger obligations to compatriots than non-compatriots. People have strong attachments […] and these attachments can provide (for good or bad) significant meaning in their lives. (Lichtenberg, 1997, pp.160-161)

The idea of human flourishing has a long history dating back to at least Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia. A life of eudaimonia is a life in which a person fulfils his or her potential as a human being. Aristotle believes that: ‘if the function of [a person] is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle,’ and if the human good is the good performance of that function, then the ‘human good turns out to be [rational] activity of soul in accordance with virtue, or rational activity performed virtuously or excellently’ for human flourishing (Aristotle, 2009, 1098a5-18).\(^{34}\)

Although I do not cover Aristotle’s ideas in detail, what I take from him is that individuals described as flourishing have a combination of high levels of emotional wellbeing, social wellbeing and physical wellbeing. Flourishing people tend to see their lives as having a purpose; they have a sense of identity and personal growth in that they are always evolving and changing, accompanied by a sense of autonomy and agency. Applied to my project, satisfying the desire for human flourishing is as much about social, political and environment conditions as it is of individual natural predispositions (Kleinig & Evans, 2013, p.541).

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\(^{33}\) Other relations like family, friendship and local communities are also important for human flourishing but my focus is on my patria and polity, on which (arguably) the thriving of these relationships largely depend.

\(^{34}\) I come back to practical reason and rationality but from a Kantian perspective in Chapter Three when setting out the justificatory grounds for MfP.
In MfP, the key role for my patria and polity is to provide a workable, cooperative, social and political system in order to satisfy the desire for human flourishing by fostering the social fabric, securing the common good, and protecting the environment. We are best positioned through my patria and polity to coordinate effort, mobilise appropriate resources and to act to achieve this desire. Where the workable, cooperative, social and political system of my patria and polity is lacking, there may be no meaningful method for achieving this desire, which is the end the MfP-patriot seeks. If I am correct it is very difficult for us to reject or be indifferent to my patria and polity. In order to satisfy the desire for human flourishing we should belong to, identify with, and support, within certain limits, my patria and polity.

Some may worry about this view because as a universal claim it appears mistaken. Empirically, not everyone has this strong sort of identification and sense of belonging with a country. People have multiple relationships, some of which, arguably, enable the satisfaction of the desire for human flourishing in a more meaningful way. If this is so, then as Stephen Nathanson says: ‘the felt need for having a strong relationship [with a country to satisfy the desire for human flourishing] may simply be a false belief driven by sentiment’ (Nathanson, 1997, p.182). To deal with this worry, I will set out four interdependent claims that together give reasons why people have cause to identify with and have a strong sense of belonging to a country. I will start with the need for social group identity and the desire to belong to groups beyond our close relationships to fulfil our obligations.

1.6.2 THE SOCIAL GROUP IDENTITY AND OBLIGATIONS CLAIM

In this section I focus on two things. First, that there is a link between social group identity and the collective relationship with one’s country as a necessary means to satisfy the desire for human flourishing. And secondly, that group identity and the obligations that arise from
our collective relationships may diminish with distance, which is a claim often used to support patriotism and an attachment to one’s country.

Social group identity is analogically extended from identity primarily relating to individuals. Identity refers to those features and relationships that are constitutive of us, which helps define and distinguish us as certain kinds of people. How an individual balances and prioritises different identities is a result of the interaction between an individual’s self-understanding and her social, cultural and political environment. This interaction is key to human flourishing. As Bhiku Parekh (2009) argues, it is challenging to identify ourselves and take action to fulfil the desire for human flourishing independently of the collective affiliations and ties that make up our social and political environment (Parekh, 2009, pp.267-284).

There is significant evidence from a number of social-psychological studies for identifying the importance of social identity and collective relationships for our human flourishing. The overarching theme of these studies is the primacy of relatedness in relationships as a conduit for meaning making and flourishing in various life domains. For example, the Polish social psychologist Henri Tajfel (1974) argues that being part of a group boost peoples’ confidence and happiness, and gives them a sense of purpose and connection which motivates them to act in ways that benefit the group as a whole. In this way social identity can be a source of fulfilment and inspiration for individuals to make positive contributions to society (Tajfel, 1974, pp.65-93). Being a *MfP-patriot* is like being a member of a family. Just as a family looks out for each other’s wellbeing and is invested in each other’s success, *MfP-patriots* are invested in the wellbeing and success of their country. This investment in something greater than oneself helps create a sense of purpose and

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35 For a contemporary social-psychology survey on social group identity and its contribution to wellness and flourishing supported by an extensive reference list, see Wissing, Schutte, Entwisle, Gericke, Liversage, & Keyes (2019).
fulfilment that is associated with *eudaimonic* wellbeing (Wissing & others, 2019, pp.22-23).

This contribution to wellbeing and flourishing is made clear in certain defences of the nation put forward by liberal nationalists:

[Liberal] nationalists defend the nation primarily for its contribution to individual wellbeing; in this view, nations are valuable because individuals’ self-worth and self-respect are tied up with their membership in a given group, and thus the value of the national community ultimately on its contribution to the wellbeing or interests of individual people (for whom national relationships are themselves valuable).

(Lenard & Moore, 2013, p.49)

Related to the importance of the social group identity that comes from one’s country, is the empirical claim that we have stronger obligations to compatriots than non-compatriots, because obligations and the strength of group identity diminish with distance (Lichtenberg, 1997, pp.160-161). This claim is often used to justify arguments for patriotism through the ‘concentric circles’ metaphor, which goes as follows. At the centre, responsibilities and bonds are strong and intimate; for example, families and close friends. Next to this are those inner rings that include relationships which are less close; these can be multiple and move outwards from, for example, my extended family, fellow parishioners in my local community, to my compatriots. The outer rings include others who are more distant in terms of politics, culture and geography; for example, members of the EU or my fellow human beings. As my obligations are foremost to those nearer the centre and diminish as one moves to those furthest from the centre, as part of the inner circle, I have ties to compatriots that entail stronger obligations and a stronger sense of group identity than I have to others.

Arguably, this claim is correct in expressing the view that, for at least the strongest obligations (associative duties or *special perfect obligations*) and the groups we most readily identify with, these will generally be nearer the centre and diminish as one moves outwards.

When writing about Rousseau and ‘extended selfhood’ Frederick Barnard (1988) says that:

According to Rousseau (and general experience), we normally show greater concern for what is near than for what is far. Hence it is necessary to some degree to confine and limit our interest and compassion in order to make it active.

(Barnard, 1988, p.57)
Rousseau, when supporting the *polis* as the focus of his form of patriotism and citizenship, argues that in a greatly extended community, such as very large states or all humanity, our sentiments and attachments are bound to grow feeble and fade away:

> [Small] states have proportionately more vigour than large ones, for public sensitivity does not increase with territory; the more the territory expands, the more the will weakens, the more the movements become feeble, and this great body, overcome by its own weight, sinks down, languishes, and shrivels away.

(Rousseau, 2011, p.261)

Rousseau’s argument reflects the view I mentioned earlier about the demise of the Roman Republic on the back of its great expansion. Herder (1793-7 & 1793-7a) also comes to this ‘diminish with distance’ view but from a different angle. Barnard (1988) points out that Herder is sceptical about moral cosmopolitanism, at least in hard forms, and the idea of world citizenship because they are incapable of fostering an associative culture in which people can feel at home. People cannot feel a sense of belonging or see each other as associates within the abstract of world citizenship, because such a context strains their capacity for extended selfhood (Barnard, 1988, p.56). Extended selfhood is the ability to: ‘act as a social self who has to think and act as part of a wider community [to act as a] moral being that is capable of self-regulation among the community of others’ (Barnard, 1988, p.39).

Although the views of Barnard, Rousseau and Herder appear to support the ‘diminish with distance’ claim, for *MfP* it is necessary to qualify it. This can be seen by applying the concentric circles metaphor but from the cosmopolitan perspective.36 Here, allegiances and relationships may start at the centre, but as we mature our ability to feel compassion and recognise responsibilities for others grows from that centre. From this perspective, the ‘diminish with distance’ claim does not seem quite right, at least for those responsibilities, general duties, that may apply in all rings. As Sissela Bok (1996) argues, the view of: ‘my

36 See Brock (2009, ch.11) and Bok (1996, pp.38-44) who use the ‘concentric circles’ arguments from a cosmopolitan perspective.
station and its duties, according to which responsibilities depend upon situation and role in life, that cannot be overridden by certain obligations to humanity at large, must be rejected’ (Bok, 1996, p.39). I agree with Bok that while one can have different kinds of responsibilities (in the inner rings), there are certain responsibilities (in both the inner and outer rings) that ought not diminish with distance. Accepting this view has the benefit of opening the door for taking the concentric circle view to not only recognise a variety of associations that are stronger nearer the centre, such as one’s country, but allows us to usefully stretch concern outwards beyond the narrowest of personal interests to the legitimate needs of others, including humanity as a whole:

Nor need there be anything wrong with lasting pride in, love for, or identification through particular bonds, communities and cultures. Acknowledging these need not bind one to problems within any of the circles of allegiance or involve exceptionalism or disparagement or dismissal of others. Without learning to understand the uniqueness of cultures, beginning with one’s own, it may well be impossible to honour both human distinctiveness and the shared humanity central to the cosmopolitan ideal. (Bok, 1996, p.44)

For MfP-patriots there is nothing wrong with loving one’s country but, equally, the effective extension of selfhood allows fulfilment of those duties that arise from the basic rights that exist for all people. As I have already argued, under second-order impartialism this approach is consistent with Mazzini who argues that duties are owed to ‘oneself, family, country and humanity’ (Mazzini, 1858, p.119). Having established the psychological need of belonging to groups above our closest associations and that, other than basic rights that apply for all, obligations and attachments may diminish with distance, I turn now to the importance of identity constituted from one’s country which is seen as a narrative project.

1.6.3 THE IDENTITY CONSTITUTED AS A NARRATIVE PROJECT CLAIM

By narrative, I mean in the Burkean (1790) sense, which includes the embodiment of both memory of past struggles and achievements with commitments to a common future. By

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37 I cover Edmund Burke’s ideas in more detail in Chapter Four.
project, I take Bernard Williams’ view that a person’s reasons of partiality arise from one’s ‘ground projects’ (Williams, 1981, pp.12-18). My focus is on one’s identity as a person constituted by, or perhaps in or through, one’s narrative of one’s life, specifically by the narrative associated with one’s country. Such a view represents a self-constituting narrative thesis. Charles Taylor (1989) in *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* thinks that: ‘we must inescapably understand our lives in narrative form’ (Taylor, 1989, p.52). Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) in *After Virtue* believes that: ‘we all live out narratives in our lives and [...] understand our own lives in terms of the narratives that we live out’ (MacIntyre, 1981: p.212). MacIntyre also highlights the importance for identity constituted through the narrative associated with one’s own country, where one’s very identity is inseparably bound up with it:

> [If] I do not understand the enacted narrative of my own individual life as embedded in the history of my country [...] I will not understand what I owe to others or what others owe to me, for what crimes of my nation I am bound to make reparation, for what benefits to my nation I am bound to feel gratitude. Understanding what is owed to and by me and understanding the history of the communities of which I am a part is [...] one and the same thing.

(MacIntyre, 1984, p.16)

In my project, one of the most important ways a *MfP-patriot* understands the enacted narrative of her life is rooted in the history and traditions of one’s country. An obvious worry for this view, however, is the ‘fictionalising’ tendency and how such a narrative may twist truth. Although it is beyond my project to detail and respond to the arguments that lead to such a worry, I follow Peter Goldie (2012) who writes on narrative and the main criticisms against it, especially regarding ‘fictionalising’ tendencies and their impact on truth and objectivity. Whilst Goldie accepts the dangers of narrative, he denies that ‘fictionalising’ tendencies vitiate autobiographical narrative thinking; for him it has a central place in our thinking about our past, present and future, expressed in the narrative sense of self (Goldie, 2012, p.151).
If Goldie is correct and narrative thinking is not vitiated by ‘fictionalising’ tendencies, then the claim stands that one of the most important ways a *MfP-patriot* understands the enacted narrative of her life is embedded in the history of one’s country. Indeed, such a narrative is central to the very social group identity bound up with it. This is the view of David Miller (1995) who believes that membership with one’s country embodies a certain historical and narrative continuity. He argues that: ‘members of the country believe their relationship stretches backward and forward across generations. This is expressed in a narrative of a shared past and involves a shared future’ (Miller, 1995, pp.21-27). Miller contends that the national identity associated with this narrative is seen to be:

> [Normatively] valuable and psychologically beneficial to connection and community, ‘national identities, even mythical ones, can perform a moralising role by holding up the virtues of one’s ancestors and encouraging one to live up to them, in order that the ethical character of the relationship can thereby be enhanced.  

(Miller, 1995, pp.35-47)

This moralising role is most visible in myths and tales that strive to promote ideal values and qualities in a culture. This can be seen in, for example, Ancient Greece through Homer’s *Iliad* (2012) and *Odyssey* (2016); or in the Golden Age of Latin literature through the Ciceronian period (70–43 BCE) and the Augustan Age (43 BCE – 18 CE) by such writers as Cicero, Virgil, Horace and Livy. From texts such as these we can see that if one discards a patriotic identity based upon one’s own country’s history and traditions, one can also lose an important grounding for obligations to one another. Miller believes that an appeal to one’s historic identity, especially to sacrifices made by one section of the community for others, is a requirement to substantiate claims we make on one another in the present (Miller, 1995, pp.35-47).

It is through a combination of the history, social lineage and traditions of my *patria* and *polity*, and by adopting the identity involved in the membership of it, that the *MfP-patriot* has a sense of self, which allows her to transcend the narrow confines of her life and is one of the most important ways she can live and flourish as a moral agent:
The fact that he belongs to a community, a country, a polity, rather like the fact that he is a member of a family, has great importance for his sense of self, his very identity: it is a fact he will cite when telling us who and what he is. His country is something he identifies with, and also something others identify him with. [...] It is a special relation: one belongs to one’s country; on the other hand, this sense of belonging to one’s country is part of one’s very identity.

(Primoratz, 2015, pp. 85-86)

In making the claim that narrative is not only crucial for one’s sense of self but also to flourish as a moral agent does, however, raise a concern. The worry is that the narrative forming identity associated with one’s country may focus on those things seen as good while denying the bad. This is a contemporary concern expressed in, for example, the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement over the legacy of colonialism. Like most reasonable people I share the worry about mistakes, deliberate or otherwise, that comes from the narrative we tell about our country. I address this worry by the incorporation of critical examination as a fundamental characteristic of MfP. There is a need for a narrative-forming social identity in the form of a MfP-patriot but, as Martha Nussbaum reminds us, it is one that connects the particularist sentiment with critical loyalty to one’s country through tangible and meaningful imagery:

Patriotic emotion seeks devotion and allegiance through a colourful story of the nation’s past, which points, typically, to a future that still lies in doubt. Indeed, the idea of a nation is, in its very nature, a narrative construct. To say what a given nation is, is to select from all the unordered material of the past and present a story line that emphasises some things and omits others, all in the service of pointing to what the future may hold – if people dedicate themselves sufficiently.

(Nussbaum, 2013, p.210)

I do not argue for a sanitised narrative of my country’s past, on the contrary, the patriotic emotions that come from the sentiment of MfP need continuous critical examination by considering the bad as well as the good. This position is similar to the view of Ernst Renan (1882) expressed in his famous lecture What is a Nation? He argues that a country is not simply a physical location, it is an idea: ‘[…] a spiritual principle resulting from the profound complexities of history’ (Renan, 1882, pp.8-9). Renan believes that a country must have a story of its past that includes not just glory and greatness, but also hardship and pain,
a dedication to the future, and a desire to live together to overcome obstacles for the sake of common aspirations:

These are the essential conditions of being a people: having common glories in the past and a will to continue them in the present [...]. One loves in proportion to the sacrifices that one has committed and the troubles that one has suffered [...]. Having suffered, rejoiced, and hoped together is worth more than common taxes or frontiers that conform to strategic ideas and is independent of racial or linguistic considerations. “Suffered together”, I said, for shared suffering unites more than does joy. In fact, periods of mourning are worth more to national memory than triumphs because they impose duties and require a common effort.

(Renan, 1882, p.9)

Renan’s acknowledgement of the need for a narrative that includes the great as well as the suffering in our country’s past is important; however, for MfP it is insufficient. To confer the cohesive identity of a MfP-patriot means not only conceiving one’s country as an encompassing narrative project that involves good and bad, but one that is connected to broader moral principles and values. In this way the sentiment of MfP is open to certain universal obligations; a view that contrasts with other more closed kinds of patriotism. This approach is one that both Charles Taylor and Mazzini argue. Taylor defines patriotism as a: ‘common identification with a historic community founded in certain values’ (Taylor, 1994, p.199). He argues that duties are owed to both humanity and one’s country. Morally we must acknowledge the universal as well as the local: ‘we have no choice but to be [both] cosmopolitans and patriots’ (Taylor, 1996, p.121). Mazzini argues the same point but in a slightly different way:

I believe [...] through the universal tradition of Humanity [...] that the Family, the country, and Humanity are the three spheres within which the human individual has to labour for the common end, for the moral perfecting of himself and others, or rather of himself through others and for others.

(Mazzini, 1858, p.119)

Having established the role and importance of the MfP-patriot identity, constituted from one’s country seen as a narrative project based on broader moral principles, I turn now to the security and defence claim.
1.6.4 THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE CLAIM

The security and defence claim applies when the existence of one’s country with a territory of its own, has a moral claim to protect it through measures which are necessary in order to defend its people from actual and potential threats, which includes threats to the environment. Stephen Nathanson (1997) states that he cannot see how moral cosmopolitans could possibly reject such a case:

If [cosmopolitans] do reject the legitimacy of defensive [patriotism], they are in the awkward position of beginning with a humane desire to respect all people equally and ending with the rather callous view that some people should simply permit themselves to be slaughtered or deprived of basic rights. Reasonable global humanists must concede, I think, that in some circumstances it is morally permissible for people to [defend countries of their own].

(Nathanson, 1997, p.180)

The security and defence claim challenges the moral cosmopolitan view, at least in a hard version, that there is no more reason to identify with one’s country and its members, than there is to identify as a member of humanity. It challenges this view in two ways. First, by acknowledging that identification with one’s country is a non-voluntary association and not for the majority of people a matter of choice. And secondly, that there are important reasons to identify with country over humanity. These reasons revolve around important aspects of a person’s life including security, order, defence, and environmental protection, which are mostly dependent upon being a member of a country. No greater example of this is in the case of Ukraine and its moral right to defend itself against the brutal and unjustified invasion from the Russian Federation.

From the political community perspective, John Horton (2007) puts forward the view that the main value of such a relationship is the provision of security, and suggests that this can be used to support having a special normative relationship with the polity (Horton, 2007, p.429). Margaret Moore (2009) believes that the good the polity gives, where compatriots are connected through citizenship, is that it enables members to collectively self-determine the conditions of their existence, especially the need for peace and order:
This helps to explain not why I am obligated to the political state, but why I am obligated to my particular state. On this view, the liberal democratic state is valuable in part because it is a fragile political achievement, which has secured important moral goods for its participants. As Hobbes saw, the moral authority of the state rests (at least in part) on the goods that it can provide, which, for him, were basically peace and order […].

(Moore, 2009, p.391)

The view that the moral authority of one’s country rests on the goods that it provides, which includes peace and order, is consistent with John Rawls’ claim that: ‘liberty may be restricted for the sake of liberty and all liberties depend on the existence of public order and security’ (Rawls, 1999, p.186). This position recognises that if one’s country does not take appropriate measures of protection, security and defence there would be chaos and a breakdown of order. If this occurs, everyone will be worse off in terms of basic liberties.

As Joseph Carens (1987) argues, even accepting the worst-case scenario and respecting the primacy of liberty, individuals in Rawls’ ‘original position’ understand the need to protect others from harm, even if it means limiting their own freedom in certain situations (Carens, 1987, p.259).

If one cannot receive the benefit of public order and security through the membership with one’s own country this would be problematic. We can see this through the problem of being a stateless person. When talking about borders, membership and stateless people, Michael Walzer (1983) points out that:

The primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human community. And what we do with regard to membership structures all our other distributive choices: it determines with whom we make those choices, from whom we require obedience and collect taxes, to whom we allocate goods and services. [Stateless people] are cut off from the communal provision of security and welfare. Even those aspects of security and welfare that are, like public health, collectively distributed are not guaranteed to non-members: for they have no guaranteed place in the collectivity and are always liable to expulsion. Statelessness is a condition of infinite danger.

(Walzer, 1983, pp.31-32)

The point Walzer makes is that those without membership to a country are stateless people, and non-members or non-citizens are generally more vulnerable in the world facing barriers to their wellbeing and flourishing. Most people recognise this and want to be protected from such things. As a consequence, these potential barriers to flourishing incentivise them to
help, support and assist their own country, to be more concerned about its wellbeing than for others. Even in cases where people do not wish to have such an identity, most people have no real choice about identifying with one’s country, as this decision is often made by others who ascribe this identity and base crucial decisions about how to treat them upon it.

Ultimately, the security and defence claim shows that if one needs a country to deal with aggressors, or to protect its own citizens from numerous threats, home and abroad, to secure public order and to protect the environment, then a presumptive claim exists for some form of patriotic sentiment and practical identity whose object is one’s country. My point is that threat and risk against a people strengthens the desire and need to primarily identify with one’s country, as the bonds and interests to do so are strong in the face of actual or potential collective threats. This is because it is not possible to satisfy the desire for human flourishing if my country and fellow citizens are subject to aggression or natural/man-made threats to their environment, and cannot defend themselves or protect their land or property. As Nathanson correctly states: ‘It is for this reason that in the modern world significant effort goes into nurturing patriotic identities, still much more so than into the effort of nurturing a human identity’ (Nathanson, 1997, pp.180-181).

Even if more effort were made to make our identity as members of humanity stronger, an endeavour I do not think any reasonable person could argue a bad thing, for the foreseeable future the current reality is unlikely to change. Countries are needed because we still exist in a global context where we are actually or potentially threatened. With this in mind, I now turn to the ‘basic structure’ claim.

1.6.5 THE ‘BASIC STRUCTURE’ CLAIM

From my previous three claims, I have established that one’s country is: (1) a non-voluntary association that includes special bonds from one to another, which involves identity with one’s country as a form of extended selfhood; (2) a special connection involving common
memory understood through narrative and episodes of collective suffering, pride and shame in one’s country; and (3) the means to achieve common hopes for one’s country through its defence and security. The final claim I put forward is the ‘basic structure’ of society that one’s country provides.

There is scepticism regarding the place of countries in the modern world. This is due to factors such as international travel, global and instant communication, boundary-free financial systems, international institutions, multinational enterprises, global NGOs, and high levels of migration caused by factors such as poverty, conflict, and climate change. As Martha Nussbaum (2008) says:

Today, we are much more sceptical about the country. We think of it as smaller, not larger, as confining the mind rather than enlarging it. Many people believe that countries should not exist in a future decent world order, and many more doubt that the country is the largest unit to which human beings are capable of feeling a strong and vivid loyalty.

(Nussbaum, 2008, p.81)

Despite this scepticism and the reality of a more connected world, it is simply not viable to set aside one’s country as the most appropriate large unit for strong attachments to be formed or needed. In making her own argument for patriotism, Nussbaum defends patriotic sentiment and claims that the country is the appropriate object for it. She does so on the back of a Rawlsian perspective for society’s ‘basic structure’ and the requirement of human autonomy:

[A] legitimate country provides people with a role in creating the institutions and laws that govern them. It is thus a key expression of human autonomy. One may have a lot of autonomy elsewhere in one’s life, but if one has no voice in the choice of policies affecting one’s society’s basic structure, i.e., the set of institutions that governs one’s life chances pervasively and from the start of a human life, one is cut off from an extremely important good. […] Of course, other institutions might do this job equally well, or even better: the world state; the large NGO; the United Nations; the multinational corporation; the ethnic group; the state, the city, the family. All of these can be decisively rejected, however, on grounds of access and accountability.

(Nussbaum, 2008, p.82)

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38 For a useful account of world governance and globalisation see Babić and Bojanić (2010).
39 Nussbaum is often quoted as against patriotism, which reflects her position expressed in For Love of Country (1996). Her views have since evolved into support for a form of patriotism that she sets out in Political Emotions (2013).
In *A Theory of Justice* (1999) John Rawls puts forward the concept of the ‘basic structure’ of society, by which he means: ‘the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation [through] the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements’ (Rawls, 1999, p.6). According to Nussbaum, by this Rawls means the collection of social and civic institutions and practices that, aside from individual effort, systematically impact how well our lives may be anticipated to proceed (Nussbaum, 2008, pp.82-84). These plainly include things like the political system and laws, but they also include some less obvious things like economic management, welfare assistance, and, somewhat contrary to Rawls, cultural circumstances. I say contrary to Rawls because he seeks to keep separate the political from the prepolitical. His position is broadly one that believes the only hope to have a constitutional liberal democracy is if we sharply distinguish between a private sphere and a public sphere, or put another way: ‘Between the background culture and the public forum. The idea of public reason applies only to the public forum’ (Dreben, 2003, p.325).

Although I borrow Rawls’ helpful concept of ‘basic structure’, I find it unnecessary and unhelpful to make the sharp distinction he does between the background culture and the public forum. I say more about this in Chapter Two but, for now, it is enough to state that my position recognises the importance of both the political and prepolitical for motivating patriots and citizens in the public sphere of my *patria* and *polity*. Nussbaum holds a similar view:

> [The] moral sentiments on which Rawls relies are a bit too transparently rationalistic to do the job he assigns to them. He fails to consider (although he does not deny) that an essential motivational role, in connection with the love of just institutions, may be played by more indirect appeals to the emotions, using symbols, memories, poetry, narrative. People are sometimes moved by the love of just institutions [and are] more easily able to conceive a strong attachment if these high principles are connected to a particular set of memories, symbols, narrative, and poetry.

(Nussbaum, 2008, p.82)
Nussbaum contends that in a Rawlsian well-ordered and stable society, peoples’ emotions are required to provide meaning and purpose in the political public realm. Which they do through ritual and narratives:

[Attaining stability] not merely a tradition-governed type of stability, [is best achieved] by rituals and narratives of a kind that must be more particular, more uneven, more aesthetic, more tragic […] than anything explicitly envisaged in Rawls's text. These rituals and narratives might possibly be confined to what Rawls calls the ‘background culture’ - but on the other hand, inasmuch as they are essential vehicles of public reason, there is no reason to confine them to that role.

(Nussbaum, 2008, pp.82-83)

Nussbaum argues that because of the ‘complexity and broad array of associational involvements that we all face’, at least for the foreseeable future, the ‘optimum way to practically manage these is through some moral and responsive social order at the level of one’s country’ (Nussbaum, 2008, pp.81-83). By the level of one’s country, I take Nussbaum to mean one that is above multiple, diverse and conflicting group interests, but not be so distant as to be too remote, indifferent and unaccountable to local concerns. If correct, then one’s country is best placed, but only as things stand, to facilitate and coordinate such associations and to respond in situations when normative boundaries have been breached:

As the old social contractarians saw it […] in order to mediate our social interactions and secure them against invasion, it makes good sense that we pursue some form of social organisation [one’s own country] that will both regulate our individual relations and oversee our various associative involvements.

(Kleinig, 2015, p.26)

The four claims I have set out make up my ‘extended human flourishing argument’. They provide the justificatory grounds upon which it is appropriate to make the object of MfP one’s country or, as I prefer to describe it, my patria and polity. As the world currently is and likely to be for the foreseeable future, the best way to satisfy the desire for human flourishing and labour towards the common good of humanity is through my patria and polity. This view is consistent with Mazzini’s sentiment that the individual is fulfilled in the country, and the country fulfils itself in humanity. Mazzini believed that in cosmopolitanism, at least understood as love and fellowship to all, it was not enough to
simply state these truths; rather, it was necessary to organise and act in a division of humanity’s labour through one’s country:

For us, the end is humanity; the pivot, or point of support, is the country. I freely admit that for Cosmopolitans, the end is also humanity; but their pivot or point of support is man, the isolated individual.

(Mazzini, 2009, p.58)

1.7 CONCLUSION

I started the chapter by sketching out the origin of patriotism. I claimed that what has been lost is an older idea of patriotism, prominent in the late Roman Republic and nineteenth century. It is a form of patriotism involving a strong sense of attachment, duty and service to one’s homeland and its political community, but one that also defends constitutional rights, venerates liberty and fights wrongdoing. I then outlined Mazzini’s duty-based conception of patriotism. It is built on the noble thought that individuals are part of something greater than themselves, with a duty to serve the whole and not simply pursue selfish and egoistic desires. It is a form of moderate patriotism that is morally permissible when combined with the position of soft cosmopolitanism that incorporates second-order impartialism. I finished the chapter by acknowledging the historical legacy that either conflates patriotism and nationalism, or sees one as good and the other bad. Such positions are unsatisfactory and I took the view that there exist good and bad forms of both. Through my ‘extended human flourishing argument’ I claimed that the appropriate object of MfP is my patria and polity. Having established this starting point for my project I turn now to the task of setting out my richer conceptualisation of MfP.
CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUALISING MFP

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I present my multi-dimensional taxonomy to classify the main forms of patriotism and identify the sweet-spot space for MFP. I identify those forms of patriotism most helpful to the development of my moral form of partiality. Incorporating the views on patriotism from a range of contemporary philosophers enriches the progressive and inspirational nineteenth century ideas of Mazzini. As a result, MFP is better equipped to meet the challenges of a just and free representative democracy in the twenty-first century. Having mapped out the space for my moral form of partiality I then set out the rich conceptualisation of MFP. I will provide the grounds for eight of its nine key features that taken together distinguish it from other forms of patriotism; I set out the ninth key feature, cppc-conservatism, in Chapter Four. I conclude the chapter by considering how MFP views plurality and different conceptions of the good.

2.2 MY TAXONOMY OF PATRIOTISM

There have been previous attempts to classify patriotism. From a psychological perspective numerous theoretical distinctions have been proposed. For example, a militaristic patriotism, with a civic form of patriotism; a patriotism of imitation and obedience, with a patriotism of innovation and disobedience; a patriotism of ignorance and irrationality, with a patriotism of reason and dissent; a pseudo patriotism, blind attachment and uncritical conformity, with a genuine patriotism, love of country and attachment to national values based on critical understanding - best described as a distinction between blind and constructive patriotism (Schatz, Staub & Lavine, 1999, p.152).
From a philosophical perspective, a number of juxtapositions have been proposed. For example, ‘sentimental/instrumental’ patriotism (Kelman, 1997); ‘inclusive/exclusive’ and ‘inward/outward’ patriotism (Palumbo, 2009); and ‘hard/soft’ patriotism (McCabe, 1997). Other philosophers such as Igor Primoratz (2019) classify patriotism as types; for example, ‘extreme’ - Machiavelli’s strong republican patriotism – see Belliotti (2015); ‘robust’ - MacIntyre’s (1984) communitarian patriotism; ‘moderate’ - Nathanson’s (1993) moderate patriotism; ‘deflated’ - Keller’s (2007) innocuous patriotism, which is neither a moral duty nor a supererogatory virtue; ‘worldly’ and ‘ethical’ - see Primoratz (2019). Although there is significant overlap between these endeavours to classify patriotism, to date, there has not been a satisfactory attempt to place them into a coherent map through a multi-dimensional taxonomy.

To identify what I call the ‘sweet-spot’ space for MfP, my taxonomy moves beyond normative studies resting on contentious unitary pairwise juxtapositions to allow a more considered analysis of patriotism. Taking a multi-dimensional approach helps identify important contributions from certain patriotic forms that would otherwise be overlooked, simply because of comparing the desirability of one form by showing the viciousness of its counterpart. My taxonomy is based upon three inter-related dimensions: (1) the degree the form of patriotism is inclusive or exclusive and inward or outward; (2) the degree the form of patriotism is blind (hard) or constructive (soft); and (3) the strength of particularism (the Somewheres) against the strength of cosmopolitanism (the Anywheres).

2.2.1 DIMENSION 1 – INCLUSIVE/EXCLUSIVE AND INWARD/OUTWARD

According to Antonino Palumbo (2009) patriotism can be considered in terms of how inclusive or exclusive it is. Inclusive patriotism strives to unite people, whilst exclusive patriotism seeks to keep ‘others’ out. To understand patriotism as inclusive is to celebrate the ideas and ideals that we all share, such as democracy, equality, freedom, justice, and
charity. It is to give hope and refuge to those from elsewhere who are most desperate and in need; the sentiment at the heart of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s (1996) ‘cosmopolitan’ patriotism. Exclusive patriotism asserts uniqueness and superiority, that seeks to exclude the ‘other’ beyond our borders. It is often based on fear of the ‘other’, it is not generous or welcoming and is characteristic of the ‘New Right’ patriotism inspired by Maurice Barrès (Orellana & Michelsen, 2019).

Related to inclusive and exclusive patriotism, is the inward and outward focus of patriotism which concerns the perspective from which identity can be viewed:

The inward identity can be represented as a dynamic and interactive process resting on an ongoing reflexive examination of the values and beliefs shared by a group. [Here] social cohesion depends on the power of public institutions to create and sustain networks of solidarity between the groups and subgroups. [The outward identity can be seen from] a relational perspective which focuses on comparison with the out-group occupying adjacent social spaces or alternative political communities. [Here] social cohesion is the outcome of competitive pressures operating between groups [and it is] the relative position occupied by a given group that defines the way in which its members see and perceive themselves.

(Palumbo, 2009, p.329)

Palumbo criss-crosses these variables with the inclusive and exclusive to yield four ideal-types of patriotism – see Figure 2.1.

**Figure 2.1 Palumbo’s Classification of Patriotism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exclusive</th>
<th>Inward</th>
<th>Outward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>Protective</td>
<td>Jingoistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>Patriotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Ethical</td>
<td>Hegemonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>Patriotism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Palumbo, 2009, p.330)
According to Palumbo (2009, pp.329-331) exclusionary types of patriotism come in two forms. First, ‘Protective’ patriotism that is committed to preserving the ethnic cohesion or cultural authenticity of the patria from external influences. It is inward looking and is opposed to lowering the boundaries that separate ‘us’ from ‘them’. Second, ‘Jingoistic’ patriotism, which is exclusive and outwardly focused, believing in the superior or exceptional nature of ‘our’ patria compared to all others. Inclusionary types of patriotism also come in two forms, first, the ‘Hegemonic’ which is outwardly focused but is concerned with internal inclusion. Here, in-group inclusion is seen as a necessary pre-condition for competing against the out-group. It is more concerned with the definition of ‘them’ than with ‘us’ as the main determinant for identification and compliance, insisting on policies of cultural assimilation and political inclusion as a precondition for group fitness in a highly competitive international setting. Second, ‘Ethical’ patriotism which shifts the focus back from ‘them’ to ‘us’ and centres on the development of a shared identity to generate allegiance and compliance. Here, political arrangements and institutions are required to assure the moral integration and the political inclusion of all members.

Palumbo maintains that all four ideal-types have the ability to promote identification and foster some form of compliance, but his preference is ‘Ethical’ patriotism:

Ethical Patriotism […] is the type I wish to endorse. Unlike cosmopolitan approaches [it] recognises both the individual’s need for group identification and the emotive basis of compliance. For it, individual identities are the outcome of dialogical processes taking place at local level and involving the groups the individual is embedded in. Identity is thus, the result of a process of identification with fellow members based on shared (1) sets of values, (2) collective representations, and (3) civic rituals. Moreover, it views individual compliance not as the result of a mere rational evaluation, but as dependent on shared norms and practices which are constitutive of the self.

(Palumbo, 2009, p.332)

MJP more naturally aligns with Palumbo’s concept of ‘Ethical’ patriotism. This view is consistent with my arguments on group identity and identity constituted through my patria and polity seen as a narrative project, where its culture is formed through our historic and
However, unlike Palumbo, as I highlight in Chapter One, I do not seek to distance \textit{MfP} from cosmopolitanism, at least soft cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless, Palumbo’s use of the inclusive/exclusive and inward/outward dimensions provide a helpful categorisation of patriotism. Although I have no principled objection to his approach, I will extend it by adding two further dimensions that, when considered alongside his, results in a richer taxonomy to identify the most suitable space from which I develop \textit{MfP}.

\textbf{2.2.2 DIMENSION 2 – BLIND AND CONSTRUCTIVE PATRIOTISM}

The second dimension is one that differentiates between blind (hard) and constructive (soft) patriotism. There are a relatively large number of studies on blind and constructive patriotism, many from the perspective of social research and psychology. The research of Robert Schatz, Ervin Staub and Howard Lavine (1999) is of particular interest. They evaluated the distinction between blind and constructive patriotism through a number of studies, concluding that the two forms of patriotism represent qualitatively distinct forms of attachment to country. Their main finding was that blind patriotism was positively correlated with nationalism, but no such significant association was identified in the case of constructive patriotism. This is a conclusion in line with the distinction Orwell draws between nationalism and patriotism, but is also one consistent with more recent research involving the philosopher Gina Gustavsson (2019a) on national and patriotic attachment. Her main finding is that such attachment appears to have both a cohesive side, which she calls national identity, and a divisive one, which she calls national pride or national chauvinism (Gustavsson, 2019a, p.60).

\[40\] I say more about social lineage in Chapter Three when responding to Pauline Kleingeld’s (2003) concern of common ancestry related to blood, race and ethnicity.
These findings indicate that a patriotism based on staunch and uncritical attachment to country appears to increase nationalism, whereas a patriotism based in critical loyalty may not (Schatz, Staub & Lavine, 1999, p.169). Constructive patriotism is positively associated with political involvement and redistributive solidarity; that is, a willingness to share resources with other group members (Gustavsson, 2019a, p.59). In contrast, blind patriotism is more associated with political disengagement and disaffection (Schatz, Staub & Lavine, 1999, pp.169-170), as well as being more divisive and less willing to support strong redistributive policies through national pride and national chauvinism (Gustavsson, 2019a, pp.74-75). Taking these observations into account, the distinctions I capture in my taxonomy are shown in Figure 2.2:

**Figure 2.2 Blind Patriotism and Constructive Patriotism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blind Patriotism</th>
<th>Constructive Patriotism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resents most forms of criticism towards the country.</td>
<td>Manifested through questioning whether the patriotic action fits the social group's goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characterised by political disengagement or political ignorance.</td>
<td>Correlates with gathering of information and high levels of political involvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly connected with nationalism and with a sense that national security and culture is at risk.</td>
<td>May alter national identity and deny feelings of national superiority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tends to define attachment through genealogy, ethnicity and primordial origins.</td>
<td>Forms boundaries through social and civic virtues, culture, tradition and institutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Lewin, 2013, p.108)

*MfP* reflects the views of constructive patriotism and not blind patriotism. It is not to be equated with exceptionalism. It emphasises loyal but critical opposition, political engagement, social cooperation, and the common good.

### 2.2.3 DIMENSION 3 – PARTICULARISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM

The third dimension focuses on the relationship between particularism (the *Somewheres*) and cosmopolitanism (the *Anywheres*). As I have already argued, moral cosmopolitanism
emphasises impartiality, universality and showing equal concern to all individuals. Particularism sees patriotism as a morally significant relationship that imposes special concern and obligations for one’s compatriots and fellow citizens. I adopt a combination view of moderate patriotism with soft cosmopolitanism. Key to this standpoint is critical loyalty, which is a position similar to that in the ‘engaged’ or ‘grounded’ cosmopolitanism of Paul James (2014), who brings together both critical particularism and reflexive abstracted cosmopolitanism into a mutually qualifying whole:

[Ethics] however generalising it might be, needs to be engaged in actual on-the-ground dialogue and deliberative debate between individuals, communities, peoples, philosophers and agents on behalf of others - dead and alive and still to be born - who bring their taken-for-granted habitus into reflexive contention.

(James, 2014, p.165)

A lot here turns on the two concepts James uses; that is, the realm of the habitus and the practice of reflexive contention. By habitus I mean as Pierre Bourdieu sees it;41 the socialised norms or tendencies that guide behaviour and thinking in my patria and polity. Habitus is: ‘the way society becomes deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions, or trained capacities and structured propensities to think, feel and act in determinant ways, which then guide them’ (Wacquant, 2005, p.316, quoted in Navarro, 2006, p.16). In the case of the practice of reflexive contention, I take this to be from both the local (Somewheres) and the global (Anywheres). What this means in practice is that: ‘the particularised embodied social relations with known others [in my patria and polity are crucial to] qualifying the potentially thin emptiness of abstracted cosmopolitanism [but at the same time the process of] analytical abstraction in cosmopolitanism is seen as crucial to qualifying the possible parochialisms and self-limiting interests [of patriotism]’ (James, 2014, p.166). Together, the habitus and reflexive connection, are best captured by the MfP-patriot having a critical form of loyalty to my patria and polity and by MfP being committed to basic rights; both of which

41 Habitus is a concept that refers to the norms, values, attitudes, and behaviours of a particular social group (or social class).
are key features of *MfP* that I will come to shortly. The table in Figure 2.3, which is adapted from Stephen Nathanson (1989),\(^{42}\) summarises the differing ways that patriotism and cosmopolitanism differ but overlap with each other. It highlights the scope of negative and positive duties; strength of priorities to groups; constraints on goals; duties recognised; and loyalties to. *MfP* is a combination of moderate partialism with soft cosmopolitanism.

**FIGURE 2.3 PARTICULARISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Particularism (Patriotic – Special Concern – The Somewheres)</th>
<th>Moderate Partialism</th>
<th>Soft Cosmopolitanism</th>
<th>Hard Cosmopolitanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative Duties (Not to harm)</strong></td>
<td>Only to patria/polity</td>
<td>To all</td>
<td>To all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive Duties (To assist &amp; help)</strong></td>
<td>Only to patria/polity</td>
<td>Some special duties to patria/polity, some positive duties to all</td>
<td>To all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Priorities</strong></td>
<td>Exclusive concern to patria/polity</td>
<td>Higher priority to patria/polity, genuine but lesser concern for others</td>
<td>Equal concern for all but some special concern for patria/polity is morally permissible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constraints on pursuit of goals</strong></td>
<td>No moral constraints on pursuit of patria/polity goals</td>
<td>Morally constrained pursuit of patria/polity goals</td>
<td>Morally constrained pursuit of cosmopolitan goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duties recognised</strong></td>
<td>Only to patria/polity, duties to others not recognised</td>
<td>Both to patria/polity, and to others by their citizens</td>
<td>Both cosmopolitan and some citizen duties to patria/polity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loyalties to my patria and polity</strong></td>
<td>Only to the patria and polity</td>
<td>Critical loyalty to the patria and polity</td>
<td>Critical loyalty to humanity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Nathanson, 1989, p.82)

2.2.4 IDENTIFYING THE SPACE FOR MFP

Figure 2.4 identifies the sweet-spot space for *MfP* that comes from mapping different forms of patriotism against the three dimensions in my taxonomy. The forms of patriotism shown are not exhaustive, but they are representative of those discussed within the fields of philosophy, political theory and social psychology. I locate *MfP* amongst those with the most to offer in the development of its key features.

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\(^{42}\) The difference is my use of ‘*patria*’ and ‘*polity*’ and the addition of ‘Loyalties to my *patria* and *polity*’.
Figure 2.4 Mapping the Different Forms of Patriotism

Mapping the different forms of patriotism

Constructive Soft Patriotism

Blind Hard Patriotism

Exclusive Outward Relational

Particularism The Somewheres

Cosmopolitanism The Anywheres

Inclusive Inward Reflexive

Key
Primary Importance to Mfp-patriotism
Secondary Importance to Mfp-patriotism

Moderate Patriotism (Nathanson)

Loftier Patriotism (Baron)

Globally Sensitive Patriotism (Nussbaum)

Virtuous Loyalty Patriotism (Kleinig)

Duty-based Patriotism (Mazzini)

Democratic Patriotism (Taylor)

Liberal National Patriotism (Miller)

Chivalric Patriotism (Burke)

Best Traditions Patriotism (Blum)

Cultural Patriotism (Herder)

Robust Patriotism (MacIntyre)

Extreme Patriotism (Machiavelli)

The ‘New Right’ Patriotism (Barrès & de Benoist)

Civic Patriotism (Kleingeld)

Constitutional Patriotism (Habermas)

Ethical Patriotism (Primoratz)

The ‘Sweetspot’ for Mfp-patriotism

Rooted Cosmopolitanism (Appiah)
The three dimensions in Figure 2.4 overlap and correlate so that (for example) Machiavelli’s patriotism is highly particularistic, is also blind (hard), and is exclusive by prioritising the interests of compatriots over outsiders. This form of patriotism ‘My country, right or wrong’ sets aside certain moral considerations and gives little account, if any, to universal duties and rights. In contrast, a moderate form, such as Nussbaum’s (2013) or Mazzini’s (1858) globally sensitive patriotism, represents a soft cosmopolitan approach that allows for special duties within a universal moral framework, and is also constructive and inclusive. This form of patriotism ‘My country, right or wrong, if right, to be kept right, and if wrong, to be set right’ adopts the view that patriotism can be a fulcrum for moral flourishing, which, in turn, leads to a more global perspective in meeting the common good of humanity.

By mapping the space for patriotism through the three dimensions I am better able to identify those forms of patriotism that have the most to offer in the development of my moral form of partiality. The ones I will primarily use to inform MfP’s key features are:

1. Mazzini’s (1858) ‘duty-based’ patriotism
3. Baron’s & Roger’s (2020) ‘loftier’ patriotism

The form of partiality I am interested in is not situated at the extremes of the three dimensions shown in Figure 3.4. MfP is a constructive form of patriotism; it is more inclusive and inward than exclusive and outward; and it is one that offers a balanced view between cosmopolitanism and particularism - the Anywheres and the Somewheres. Having located the space for MfP and identified those forms of patriotism helpful to its development, I will now set out the rich conceptualisation of my moral form of partiality.

43 From a toast by Decatur, a naval officer, in 1816 (quoted in Jones & Vernon, 2018, p.25).
44 A slogan from Shurz, a US Senator, in 1872 (quoted in Jones & Vernon, 2018, p.25).
2.3 THE RICH CONCEPTUALISATION OF MFP

In developing my rich conceptualisation of MfP, I do not wish to simply replicate Mazzini’s patriotic model. My purpose is to build upon his nineteenth century views to better reflect the needs of a free liberal representative democracy in the twenty-first century. Using my taxonomy, I position MfP as a species of ‘moderate’ patriotism. It is the best sentiment and practical identity one can have to reject indifference and neglect in order to satisfy the desire for human flourishing. Being a MfP-patriot to reject indifference and neglect means acting to foster and sustain the social fabric, secure the common good and protect the environment of my patria and polity. The MfP-patriot is also committed to and motivated by certain basic rights. In this way, following Mazzini, MfP contributes in the labour towards the good of humanity and is a basis to nurture a commitment to global justice. Additionally, by focusing on the protection of the environment of my patria and polity, MfP provides a foundation for addressing global environmental and climate concerns.45

In regard to the first dimension of my taxonomy, MfP is an inclusive form of patriotism that seeks to bind people together. It is associated with celebrating the values and ideals we share. For example, on the political side, democracy, freedom, justice and civic virtues; and on the prepolitical side, history, tradition, geography and the environment. It supports an inward sense of social identity as a dynamic and interactive process resting on the culture, values and beliefs that are shared by, and part of the social lineage of, the members of my patria and polity. In MfP, social cohesion and trust is key, which depends on the power of public institutions to create public goods and sustain networks of civic solidarity between the groups and subgroups composing my patria and polity. By focusing on the development of a shared identity to generate allegiance, compliance, moral wellbeing and human flourishing, MfP is a form of ‘ethical’ patriotism. As MfP arises from a sense of identity and belonging to one’s own patria and polity, which includes both the prepolitical

45 A claim I set out fully in Chapter Four under the ‘poetically present’ element of cppc-conservatism.
and political, it avoids the problem of people not being motivated to care enough. It does this by being based on an understanding of the importance and danger of pride and shame to motivate MfP-patriots into action beyond self-interest and greed.

In regard to the second dimension, MfP is a ‘constructive’ type of patriotism which involves a sentiment and practical identity related to my patria and polity characterised by critical loyalty. This is captured by the view that if my country is wrong, if its actions violate fundamental principles or are contrary to long-term interests, then it must be set right. MfP is the sentiment that involves a critical public culture and respectful dissent. Having critical freedom and not herd-like obedience is the mark of the true MfP-patriot.

In regard to the third dimension, MfP seeks to reconcile local grounding with distance, which is a combination approach accommodating both moderate patriotism and soft cosmopolitanism. The MfP-patriot has special obligations to my patria and polity and fellow compatriots/co-citizens that gives them a degree of priority and special concern. The MfP-patriot, however, also has genuine concern for others through the commitment to universal basic rights. MfP combines the pursuit of the common good with respecting individual autonomy and basic rights.

Accommodating both moderate patriotism and soft cosmopolitanism is compatible with David Miller’s (2020) liberal nationalism.46 There is merit in and much I borrow from Miller’s model; however, my justification for MfP as a moderate form of partiality is different to his liberal nationalism on at least five grounds. First, I focus on my patria and polity as the object of MfP rather than that of nation. I apply the broader concept of homeland, which includes a more prominent concern for Nature and the environment. Secondly, I focus on reconciling MfP with soft moral cosmopolitanism; whereas Miller’s focus is more on reconciling nationalism with internationalism.47 In line with the view of

46 I set out the links between MfP and liberal nationalism in Section 2.3.3.
47 Saying that, I follow Leonard and Moore’s (2013) view that even though Miller is described as a non-cosmopolitan the acceptance into his theory of an idea of human rights is: ‘at its core the acceptance of moral
Paul James (2014), *MfP* and soft cosmopolitanism are not opposed in the manner that nationalism and internationalism are opposed. Rather, these are: ‘distinct orientations characterised by how one’s ethical stance is anchored [that is] who is to be included in the scope of the derived moral principles and what is the reach of these moral principles?’ (James, 2014, pp.157-158). Thirdly, I seek to better reflect the sentiment of moderate patriotism without the baggage of nationalism and the negative connotations, rightly or wrongly, it all too often carries. Fourthly, I argue that the justificatory grounds for *MfP* comes from our rational nature and that my *patria* and *polity* is a conditional value in a Korsgaardian sense, not an intrinsic or instrumental value, which is often the argument in standard approaches when describing the value of one’s country or nation. And fifthly, I give more focus on the way of thinking to best sustain my moral form of partiality, where the sentiment of *MfP* and the practical identity of a *MfP*-patriot is underpinned by what I call ‘connected, poetically present and compassionate’ conservatism (*cppc-conservatism*); the ninth key feature of *MfP*.

Like Mazzinian patriotism, *MfP* includes three elements across two dimensions. My approach here is based on Mitja Sardoč’s (2017, pp.43-45) four separate elements of patriotism. My adaptation only includes his first three elements; the fourth, which relates to his moral justification, I reject and replace with my own in Chapter Three. The first element is the subject of *MfP*, the strongly normative practical identity of a *MfP*-patriot. The second element is the object of *MfP*, my *patria* and *polity*; that is, our homeland a particular territory/geographical area and our political community. Together, these make up the vertical dimension which connects the subject of *MfP* with the object of *MfP*. It is possible to distinguish two versions of the vertical dimension. First, a ‘prepolitical’ version of patriotism where the focus is primarily dedicated to, or love for, the culture, language,
history, geography, and traditions of my patria. And secondly, a ‘political’ version of patriotism where the central object of loyalty are the common principles and civic values of my polity (Sardoč, 2017, p.45). For MfP, the vertical dimension is a fusion of both the prepolitical and the political.

Together, the prepolitical and the political act as an anchor for the social, civic and psychological relationship between MfP-patriots in my patria and polity. This is the third element of MfP and forms the horizontal dimension. It connects MfP-patriots to each other in the polity, and connects the patria to the polity. It does this by providing MfP-patriots with a common identity, a sense of social unity and civic solidarity, which reflects the importance and value of community and belonging that, in turn, generates certain social and civic obligations among members of my patria and polity. Figure 2.5 summarises my model of MfP. It includes the three elements across two dimensions; the disposition that underpins it (cppc-conservatism); and the key features of MfP that I will come to shortly.

FIGURE 2.5 MODEL OF MFP
Underpinning my model of MfP are the following defining characteristics:

- **Being a MfP-patriot** involves a love for one’s country (*patria*) and loyalty to the political community (*polity*), one not typically characterised by choice. It is a non-voluntary relationship grounded in my *patria* and *polity* being one’s own.

- **The object of MfP** is my *patria* (ancestral homeland in the cultural, historical and social lineage sense, not the ethnic or blood sense) and *polity* (where MfP-patriots are connected by citizenship). Being a MfP-patriot means being a good citizen.

- **The MfP-patriot** has special not exclusive concern for my *patria* and *polity*. It is focused on moral wellbeing. Although loyal to my *patria* and *polity*, it is a critical loyalty where the MfP-patriot has the moral courage and desire to put right what is wrong.

- **The MfP-patriot** has a sense of personal identification with my *patria* and *polity*, where such identification is expressed in vicarious feelings; that is, in pride of my *patria* and *polity*’s merits, characteristics, values and achievements, and in shame for its mistakes, failings or misdeeds, when these are acknowledged, rather than denied. The identity of a MfP-patriot is not static but something that evolves, welcoming opportunities to criticise, contest and revise it but only when there is good reason to do so.

- **The MfP-patriot** recognises the need for fellowship and group belonging, to be part of a more encompassing narrative, to be related to a past and a future, that transcend the narrow confines of an individual’s life with its many selfish and mundane concerns.

- **Due to the associative duties**, or *special perfect obligations*, that arise from being a member of my *patria* and *polity*, a MfP-patriot will make sacrifices for it; however, such self-sacrifice ought to be sympathetic to the principles of universal morality, and be compatible with upholding the basic rights of all people.

- **MfP** sees *my patria* and *polity* as a means to satisfy the desire for human flourishing. The MfP-patriot acts to reject indifference and neglect to foster and sustain the social fabric, secure the common good and protect the environment. Achieving this for my *patria* and *polity* is a step on the ladder to achieve the good of humanity.

- **MfP** is underpinned by a disposition I call *cpcc-conservatism*. This is a way of thinking, set out in Chapter Four, that uniquely brings together the ideas of community and connection, living a poetic life by being poetically present, and the emotion of compassion to support social connection.

Some of these characteristics are common to other forms of moderate patriotism. This is unsurprising as *MfP* is influenced by a number of those forms of patriotism I identify through my multi-dimensional taxonomy in Figure 2.4. However, my approach to the
justification of MfP is original to my project. This distinguishes it from other forms of patriotism in the following three ways:

1) In the literature there are several ways used to justify patriotism. These involve a wide array of standard and well understood arguments. For example, virtue arguments, traits-based arguments, instrumental or intrinsic value arguments, associative duty and special obligation arguments, moral well-being arguments, special concern arguments, republican arguments, conservative arguments, liberal arguments, Marxist arguments, constitutional and civic arguments, nationalist arguments, loyalty arguments, emotion and love-based arguments, identity arguments, psychological arguments, and so on. As will been seen shortly, some of these include useful ideas that I capture to help develop the key features of MfP. Nevertheless, my justificatory approach is different. It builds on the position of second-order impartialism that I set out in Chapter One. It is a deontological approach based upon the MfP-patriot’s key purpose which is to satisfy the desire for human flourishing. I specifically link this desire with the adoption of the principle to reject indifference and neglect in my patria and polity, which acts as a steppingstone for the good of humanity. This is a novel angle to describe the core purpose of patriotism. Of course, what is not new is the Kantian argument that when a principle can be willed as a universal law, without contradiction, it has authority for all rational agents. However, the way I construct the principle to encompass the actions to foster the social fabric, secure the common good and protect the environment of my patria and polity (which are Korsgaardian acts-for-the-sake-of-a-specific-end) is new. As will be seen in Chapter Three, the approach I take is borrowed from Christine Korsgaard (1983). It is a rationality-based approach that I use to avoid conflating different distinctions of value. It provides a more meaningful way to describe the goodness of a country, nation or state. I use it to describe my patria and polity as a conditional value that is objectively good when the condition of its objective goodness is met. The condition of goodness is to satisfy the desire for human flourishing that comes with the strongly normative practical identity of the MfP-patriot. Using these Korsgaardian grounds results in an interesting approach, which is clearly distinguishable from other approaches in order to establish the moral justification for patriotic and national identities.

2) In the literature of patriotism it is not common to directly set out, at least in any meaningful detail, the way of thinking to support a particular patriotic identity. In this respect, the disposition that underpins MfP, what I call cppc-conservatism, offers something different. I set this out in Chapter Four by putting together the ideas of ‘the importance of tradition, community and connection’, ‘being poetically present, living poetically through Nature and protecting the environment’, and ‘the emotion of compassion to bolster social connection’. These ideas may not be new but they are rarely, if ever, presented in such close proximity. It is in this way that I offer an interesting angle on the way of thinking to sustain patriotic attitudes and motivate patriots.
Although the use of basic rights is not new and are often included in the arguments for other forms of moderate patriotism and liberal nationalism, the explicit use of Henry Shue’s (1981) model of basic rights as the commitment to certain universal principles for MfP is new. It is a position consistent with second-order impartialism and my deontological approach. I will set out what it amounts to later in the chapter.

Having developed my multi-dimensional taxonomy, located the space for my moral form of partiality, outlined its defining characteristics, and highlighted how it is a distinctive form of moderate patriotism, I turn now to eight of the nine key features that complete my richer conceptualisation of MfP. I combine them in such a way that they build on each other to provide a progressive and innovative form of moderate patriotism, which is distinguishable from other forms of patriotism. I will start with the combination view on love for my patria and loyalty to my polity, what I call philo-philia.

2.3.1 LOVE & LOYALTY

When discussing patriotism some philosophers prefer to focus on love of country whereas others focus on loyalty to country. For example, Marcia Baron & Taylor Rogers (2020) put the feeling of love for one’s country, which manifests as a strong devotion and care, at the heart of patriotism. Martha Nussbaum (2013, p.208) understands patriotism as a strong emotion taking the country as its object, for her it is a form of love, hence different from approving, committing to, or adopting principles. Others, for example, John Kleinig (2015) focus more on admiration or loyalty to country as a less ambiguous phenomenon:

[It] is more helpful to see patriotism as a form of loyalty. Loyalty is inherently particularistic in a way that love is not. [I happen to love] my apartment in New York, though it is not mine in the sense that my country is mine. I identify with my country in a way that I do not identify with my apartment. Loyalty embodies that identification. Further, although love suggests the passion that many patriots feel for their country, such passion is not required for patriotic commitments to be genuine.

(Kleinig, 2015, pp.20-21).

Simon Keller (2007) in his Sartrean inspired ‘bad faith’ argument against patriotism, also conceives it as involving serious loyalty:

To be a patriot is to have a serious loyalty to country, one that is not characterised by the phenomenology of choice, is essentially grounded in the country being yours, and involves reference to what are taken to be valuable defining qualities of the country.

(Keller 2007, p.70)
Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) defends patriotism as a virtue connected to loyalty to a particular nation, which only those possessing that particular nationality can exhibit:

Only Frenchmen can be patriotic about France, while anyone can make the cause of civilisation their own. But it would be all too easy in noticing this to fail to make a second equally important distinction. Patriotism is not to be confused with a mindless loyalty to one's own particular nation which has no regard at all for the characteristics of that particular nation. Patriotism does generally and characteristically involve a peculiar regard not just for one's own nation, but for the particular characteristics and merits and achievements of one's own nation [...] To say this is to draw attention to the fact that patriotism is one of a class of loyalty-exhibiting virtues. (MacIntyre, 1984, p.4)

Although I have no objection to the focus on loyalty, my concern is that individuals who favour loyalty above love overlook the variety of forms love may take that better describe the patriotic sentiment. It also risks underestimating the importance of patriotism as a motivator for self-sacrifice and forgiveness. Few can surely question the power that love has; for example, it is the love for my daughter that drives my sense of service and duty in order to provide the necessary support and environment for her to flourish. The special affection or love for my country is similar. Clearly, the appropriate ways the sentiment of love of country is expressed may be different to my daughter; nevertheless, in answering the call to serve my country, I do so, at least partly, because I love my country.

Another important aspect of love is tolerance. As Tim Soutphommasane sees it, if the definition of patriotism includes feelings of love as well as devotion, it is easy to understand how one may be more tolerant of continuing with one’s country when it makes mistakes, or be more willing to acknowledge flaws in the country one loves. (Soutphommasane, 2012, p.141). As a MfP-patriot, the love I have for my patria and polity appears different to loyalty alone and, as with the love of my daughter, it is not a requirement of love that the love of my patria and polity means it always has to live up to a certain standard. If it does wrong, I will not abandon it but seek to set it right.

There is much that could be argued in favour of love of or loyalty to country, and what each of these concepts mean in terms of different forms of patriotism. However, I bracket these arguments as it is sufficient for my purpose to understand that both concepts
are key if one is to properly understand the type of patriotism advocated by Mazzini. He believes that patriotism involves being part of a community sustained by bonds of love and loyalty. For him, a country is not merely a territory, this is only its foundation; rather, it is the idea that comes from it; that is, the sentiment of love and the sense of loyalty that connects all people in that land (Mazzini, 1858, p.58).

Another way to reinforce the importance of both love and loyalty is to view love of country and patriotic loyalty in fact leading to each other. For example, Victoria Costa (2020) argues that the standard claim for the patriot is that she has a love for country. In this sense, patriotism is viewed as a steady disposition to feel particular emotions in order to urge patriots to act for the sake of their countries but, in this regard, what we actually end up with is loyalty (Costa, 2020, p.215):

This approach involves an appeal to dispositions to feel and to act in a characteristic manner that could easily be described as loyalty. That is, starting with [love of country], we seem to end up with [loyalty]. And the same sort of thing happens when we start with talk of loyalty. Theorists talk about loyalty as resulting from deep feelings of attachment to one’s own country. If pressed, these theorists would deny that patriotic loyalty is fully derivative from an intellectual appreciation of the good qualities that the country has – such as being peaceful, or contributing to international aid, or having a constitution that respects individual rights and freedoms. If loyalty to country were derivative, the patriot would have to be equally loyal to other countries that had similar valuable qualities. (Costa, 2020, pp.214-215)

Costa’s position is that the reverse happens when we start with loyalty. She argues that when considering patriotic loyalty it includes some feelings of attachment to one’s own country not themselves grounded in mere appreciation of some other value. The feelings of attachment that help explain such loyalty could certainly be described as love, or as something very close to love; therefore, even if the patriot starts with loyalty she ends up with love of country. Costa thinks that the views of love and loyalty, which might at first glance appear quite distinct, at least in regard to one’s own country, may actually differ only in emphasis (Costa, 2020, p.2015). If correct, it is unnecessary to argue a preference for either loyalty or love in my conceptualisation of MfP, because both clearly overlap, can lead from one to the other, and they are connected in ways which make both necessary.
The position of having both love and loyalty allows a better alignment with the object of MfP. To capture this, I use the term philo-philia which is a nonce word specific to my project. Philo-philia comprises two thoughts. First, an emotion or sentiment, as in love of country, mainly connected to the prepolitical factors of the patria. And second, as a loyal association with one’s polity, but one that encourages and caters for loyal opposition. When expressed in a healthy and productive way philo-philia underpins and sustains MfP, but may be destructive when expressed as obsessive love or blind loyalty no matter the cost. Of course, I am not saying that one cannot be loyal to country without love, as one can have a loveless but loyal marriage, or vice versa, love one’s country but be disloyal to it, as one can have an unfaithful husband who still loves his wife. I simply say that the sentiment of MfP should be seen as including both love and loyalty. As far as it goes this is fine, but what about when the two are in conflict – how would a MfP-patriot deal with this scenario? It is difficult to be specific as each situation may dictate a particular response. It is possible, however, to suggest three general considerations for the MfP-patriot in navigating such a conflict.

First, the MfP-patriot/ citizen has the option to abandon her country and emigrate. Of course this is only possible if another country will take you in and you are willing to go. In MfP this is not seen as a desirable or practical option unless, that is, one’s life or the life of one’s intimates, or one’s liberty, are under direct threat by one’s own government. In other words, it may be an option but it is the last resort only to be exercised when all over options of resolution have been exhausted.

Secondly, it is the love of my patria that ultimately trumps loyalty to my polity. Although I argue both are necessary, when they are in conflict my obligation is not to abandon my homeland and the people I most care about, but to act to influence, challenge or oppose the government or institutions of my political community. Countries are only bad if the political community they are associated with or their government behaves badly, is in error, has poor values, or bad policies. I am loyal to my polity but this is a critical form of
loyalty based on the sentiment of: ‘My country, right or wrong, if right, to be kept right, and if wrong, to be set right’ (Jones & Vernon, 2018, p.25). To be set right involves actions of political opposition, casting a vote, demonstration and representation, legal challenge, campaigning and getting involved on key issues to change policy, and so on. Love of country often accompanies loyalty to my political community, but not always. For example, when one’s country goes to war the \textit{MfP-patriot} will resist the government’s call to arms if it is not a ‘just’ war. This resistance may be expressed by outrage, attempts to change the policy or government, or even being a conscientious objector and refusing to serve in the military. Although in the latter case the \textit{MfP-patriot} will not abandon her country and the people who mean most to her; she we still serve but in a non-fighting capacity. Of course, this response is only possible in free liberal democracies not despotic or authoritarian regimes. This is a good example of how second-order impartialism, that I set out in Chapter One, motivates the \textit{MfP-patriot}. That is, the \textit{MfP-patriot} would go to war for my country but only on grounds on which it would be reasonable for other patriots in other countries to do the same.\footnote{Another example would be if my country was invaded. The \textit{MfP-patriot} would resist the hostile occupying force and any puppet government, and contribute either directly or indirectly to my country’s resistance movement. A form of resistance permissible to other patriots in other countries in similar circumstances.}

Thirdly, on a more practical level, the \textit{MfP-patriot} will examine what specific aspects of the love for my \textit{patria} and loyalty to my \textit{polity} are in conflict. This will involve gathering information from multiple sources and perspectives to better understand the source of the conflict. The \textit{MfP-patriot} will seek out different viewpoints from her compatriots; something sadly lacking in the Brexit debate. The \textit{MfP-patriot} will think about the potential consequences of her actions. She will reflect on the characteristics and key features of \textit{MfP} that will guide her decision-making. Most of all, as I set out in Chapter Four when talking about public goods, the \textit{MfP-patriot} will engage in respectful and constructive dialogue to
reach deep compromise. It is from such constructive dialogue that she is better able to make a decision and take action.

Emphasising love of country to the patria and loyalty to the political association with one’s polity, underpins the importance of the second key feature of MfP; a fusion of the political and prepolitical.

2.3.2 A FUSION OF THE POLITICAL AND PREPOLITICAL

By the political, I mean those things associated with particular political arrangements, civic virtues and institutions. Conceptually, I view prepolitical features not only as trans-historical and cultural, but also to include values, beliefs, a person’s love of natural landscapes, man-made features, environmental concerns, as well as other characteristics associated with a particular patria. Both the political and the prepolitical are essential to the horizontal dimension of MfP; a view I share with Cicero and Mazzini who also understand the relationship between compatriots/ citizens in both senses. In unpacking this view, I will start by briefly saying more about what I mean by the political and what it is to be a good citizen, which I equate with being a MfP-patriot. I will then set out in more detail what the prepolitical means and how essential it is in terms of motivating the MfP-patriot - the good citizen. I will end by using Mazzini to reinforce the importance of both these concepts.

The political, which involves loyalty and attachment to the common principles and values of a polity, acts as an anchor for the social and psychological relationship between citizens and their political community. The political provides a sense of unity and civic solidarity that, in turn, generates certain civic obligations and burdens among members of the polity. As Simon Keller argues:

There can be no [polity] without citizens, and no flourishing [polity] without good citizens. A healthy democratic [polity] is sustained by citizens who, among other things, follow the law, pay their taxes, contribute to the [country’s] political life, work to make the state more just, and are prepared to protect the [country] against other [countries], should the need arise.

(Keller, 2013, pp.239-240)
Being a *MfP-patriot* is directly associated with being a good citizen who is concerned about the wellbeing and flourishing of her *polity*. The *MfP-patriot’s* concern is brought to life by enacting morally upright laws, taking an interest in the rights and responsibilities of participating in the democratic process, swaying public opinion, and advocating for better, more compassionate laws and services for their fellow citizens. In this way, being a *MfP-patriot* includes having the sentiment that fosters, and the practical identity that acts from, the character traits and civic virtues of being a good citizen. I will say more about this idea and the role of the political later when I set out *MfP*’s key feature of ‘civic republican liberalism’. For now, I turn to the prepolitical that calls to the history, language, traditions and culture of my *patria*, which gives *MfP-patriots* a strong sense of identity, solidarity and community, as well as connecting the *polity* and *patria* to create a rooted sense of home and membership.

It is the prepolitical that grounds the political, acting as the necessary motivating force for *MfP-patriots* to fulfil their social responsibilities and civic obligations. Shakespeare uses the prepolitical as a way to convey a sense of home and membership. For example, in *Richard II*, where John of Gaunt is expressing grief that the beautiful, fertile, and divinely favoured country of England has been rented out:

This royal throne of kings, this scepter’d isle,
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
This other Eden, demi-paradise,
[…] This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England.

(Shakespeare, *Richard II*, Act 2, Sc.1:40-51)

George Orwell (2017) in *England your England* also captures the motivational force of the prepolitical in the imagery of home and the attachment to one’s country:

When you come back to England […] you have immediately the sensation of breathing a different air. Even in the first few minutes dozens of small things conspire to give you this feeling. The beer is bitterer, the coins are heavier, the grass is greener, the advertisements are more blatant. The crowds in the big towns, with their mild knobby faces, their bad teeth and gentle manners, are different from a European crowd. […] And the diversity of it, the chaos! The clatter of clogs in the Lancashire mill towns, the to-and-fro of the lorries on the Great North Road, […] the rattle of pintables in the Soho pubs, the old maids biking to Holy Communion through the mists of the autumn morning – all these are not only fragments, but characteristic fragments, of the English scene.

(Orwell, 2017, p.4)
In expressing a view of England as he does, Orwell understands the importance of the prepolitical that links patriotic sentiment with belonging to a culture through its myths, habits and symbols in order to tap into the positive value of patriotic identity, self-sacrificial love and motivation. Orwell felt that patriotism was part of the emotional make-up of the English people and could provide the basis necessary for great civic and social change.49

For *MFP*, although I emphasise the importance of the prepolitical, I do not argue for the preservation of practices and modes of feeling and thinking that are valued above all simply because they distinguish or separate one people from another on the basis of blood, ethnicity, race or genetics. Mine is not a commitment to ethnic nationalism, nor is it a commitment to culture for its own sake. In this sense I follow Alan Patten (2014) who argues:

Critics of culture sometimes suggest that the term is little more than a euphemism for race or ethnicity. They reason that, because cultures clearly do not have the levels of homogeneity, boundedness, and determinacy that are apparently assumed by those who believe in them, there must be something else lurking in the background that is doing the work of individuating cultures. Perhaps the unacknowledged premise behind culture-talk is that members of a culture share biological relationships of blood and genealogy? Needless to say, culture in this view becomes highly problematic. Scepticism about the existence of distinct, biologically defined races and ethnic groups is, if anything, even stronger than it is about cultures. And the reduction of culture to race or ethnicity would drain the former concept of much of the normative appeal it might otherwise possess.

(Patten, 2014, p.58)

For Patten, the solution to this problem is to adopt a social lineage account of culture:

[In] the social lineage account, a group of people share a culture if and only if they were subjected to a common and distinctive socialisation process. And part of what makes a particular process distinctive is that it extends back in time in a lineage that remains isolated from other socialising processes.

(Patten, 2014, p.58)

In my project I adopt Patten’s social lineage account of culture, and I will say more about it in Chapter Three when discussing Pauline Kleingeld’s civic patriotism.

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49 See Stephen Lutman (1967) for a useful account of how Orwell’s views on patriotism developed over the years.
The views of Herder (1793-7 & 1793-7a) and Rousseau (2011) when considered together are helpful in capturing the political and prepolitical sense of MfP.\(^{50}\) Both recognise the importance of cultural properties to establish the congruence between a particular people in a polity and its particular homeland, the patria. Frederick Barnard (2003) in his analysis of cultural nationalism and political romanticism reinforces this view:

> Regarding the questions of what transforms people into a people and, secondly, what enables a people, once founded, to survive […] Herder grappled with the interrelations between institutional-cultural and environmental-natural forces […]. Herder, following Rousseau, was deeply concerned with the normative issue of what might be the most desirable […] form of life for a particular people to live in, and which kind of political association accorded most suitably and least unnaturally, with such a people. In order to establish such a congruence between a people and its national institutions, both Rousseau and Herder search for characteristics that might disclose the most basic features in the customs of a collectivity […]. In these basic features both see causal forces at work in the formation of the “spirit” of a nation’s institutions, its distinctive ethos or “personality”.

(Barnard, 2003, p.41)

These views are also seen in the thinking of Mazzini who is influenced by both Herder and Rousseau (Recchia & Urbinati, 2009, p.4, p.10, p.12, p.14, p.30). Like Herder, Mazzini saw each country as contributing to the life of humanity in its own distinct way. But while Herder mainly focused on prepolitical factors, Mazzini, in line with Rousseau, adds an essentially political meaning to country as: ‘commonwealth or government by the people based on a written constitution’ (Recchia & Urbinati, 2009, p.14). A view that emphasises the importance of connecting the polity to a patria.\(^{51}\)

MfP recognises the importance of culture, history, traditions and language to the identity and cohesiveness of my patria and polity. As with Mazzini, however, the MfP-patriot opposes the view that sees my patria and polity as a defensive project, with some unique characteristics that are to be protected from any alien influence at all costs. As will be seen at the end of this chapter, culture in MfP is not static; rather, it is pluralistic, can accommodate difference and can develop when there is good reason to do so. The

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\(^{50}\) See Frederick Barnard (1998) for a comprehensive comparison of Herder with Rousseau on culture.

\(^{51}\) Mazzini’s main point of difference to Rousseau is that he is more focused on duties (to humanity, country, family and oneself), self-sacrifice and the advancement of the common good of humanity through his focus on global justice, which are also important aspects of MfP.
prepolitical is important for the \textit{MfP}-patriot’s sense of identity, connection, community and a feeling of belonging. It provides the motivation for citizens to secure the common good. The political, however, also plays a decisive normative role in \textit{MfP}, because without it there is little political autonomy and the prepolitical does not have a legitimating voice. Mazzini adopts this position. He said that by praising the purity of a prepolitical entity, patriotism might descend into chauvinism, prejudice and jingoism, which Mazzini aims to prevent via his republican devotion to the political and common welfare of humanity (Recchia & Urbinati, 2009, pp.10-15).

\textit{MfP} recognises the importance of fusing both the political and prepolitical for patriotic identification and action, but also that both are needed for one to justify the other. In my project this combination of the two includes the concept of ‘civic republican liberalism’. This is a type of republicanism that is not only focused on the need to secure the common good, but also personal autonomy\textsuperscript{52} and individual rights. It is this concept that makes up the third key feature of \textit{MfP} to which I now turn.

### 2.3.3 CIVIC REPUBLICAN LIBERALISM

The concept of civic republican liberalism broadly consists of two ideas. The first is that individuals are essentially social and that it is possible to form meaningful forms of agreement based upon a collective identity and significant levels of social harmony, responsibility, and solidarity. Secondly, it is an idea that also seeks to respect personal autonomy, rights, fairness, and justice. Civic republican liberalism aligns with the views of Mazzini who, according to Gina Gustavsson, was a staunch supporter of both:

> [Nationalistic] and liberal-democratic ideals, for the very reason that [he] saw these two causes as closely entwined. Nor [was he] wrong in this conviction […] because the liberal values of social justice, deliberative democracy and individual autonomy all require a shared sense of national identity to begin with - indeed especially so in our contemporary, pluralistic societies.

(Gustavsson, 2019, p.698)

\textsuperscript{52} Personal autonomy refers to the capacity to be one’s own person, to live one’s life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one’s own and not the product of external forces, to be in this way independent (Christman, 2020, p.1).

In Democracy’s Discontent (1996) Michael Sandel argues in favour of civic republican tradition in order to oppose the damaging effects of contemporary liberalism. In his critique of this position, Dagger (1999) agrees with Sandel’s claim that: ‘liberals who embrace the ideals of political neutrality and the unencumbered self are engaged in a self-subverting enterprise, for no society that lives by these ideals can sustain itself’ (Dagger, 1999, p.182).\(^5\) Dagger believes Sandel is right to: ‘endorse the republican emphasis on forming citizens and cultivating civic virtues, but claims that opposing liberalism as vigorously as he does, Sandel engages in a self-subverting enterprise of his own’ (Dagger, 1999, p.182). Although it is not necessary to give a detailed analysis of Sandel’s position I will give a sense of Dagger’s view, which captures the compatibility approach to civic republicanism and liberalism that supports my conception of civic republican liberalism. I do this because individual rights, fair play, and tolerance are as integral to my vision of MJF as is the common good, a sense of community and civic duty.

Dagger believes that: ‘if liberalism is a form of political thinking that values individual rights and personal autonomy, republicanism is distinguished from it by according the highest value to civic virtue, common liberty and responsible self-government’ (Dagger, 1999, p.202). Autonomy and civic virtue are often seen as being in conflict because: ‘the former requires us to look inward so that we may govern ourselves, while the latter demands that we look outward and do what we can to promote the common good’ (Dagger, 1999, p.202). Dagger thinks this need not be the case:

\(^5\) To be ‘unencumbered’ means our identity is not defined or limited by the fundamental relationships into which we are born or the network of relations we inherit. The unencumbered self is defined by the capacity to choose, and in an individualist society, the choices we make must arise from within. We look inside ourselves to define our identity and establish our destiny, not outside to any other source of authority or obligation (Sandel, 1984, p.86).
The two are different from each other, of course; they are even in tension with each other at times. [And] it is certainly possible for someone to exhibit civic virtue without being autonomous, just as it is possible for an autonomous person to act in a thoroughly selfish manner. But this is to say that civic virtue and personal autonomy are different from each other and that they sometimes tug us in different directions, not that they are incompatible. Properly understood, autonomy and civic virtue turn out to be related concepts that can and should complement each other.

(Dagger, 1999, pp.202-204)

There is much I bracket from Dagger’s argument but, in summary, the best way to put his point is to say that autonomy and civic virtue are complementary because both help us to see how independence is related to dependence: ‘a person who is completely dependent on others cannot be independent, and yet even an independent person remains dependent in various ways’ (Dagger, 1999, p.206). For Dagger, seeing our interdependence in this way should enable us to recognise that the tension between autonomy and civic morality leads to a healthy equilibrium:

Interdependent people do not always agree with one another, however, and their relationships are sometimes strained by tension. This is also true of autonomy and civic virtue. They sometimes pull in different directions, with autonomy leaning toward individual rights and civic virtue toward public responsibility. Yet even this tension is healthy. When autonomy pulls too hard in an individualistic direction, the appeal to civic virtue reminds us that both the development and the exercise of autonomy require the assistance and cooperation of others; when appeals to civic virtue threaten to jeopardise individual rights, the claims of autonomy remind us that the body politic ought to be a cooperative enterprise composed of individuals who have a right to lead a self-governed life.

(Dagger, 1999, p.206)

Dagger concludes that:

Sandel is right. Republican self-government does require “a formative politics… that cultivates in citizens the qualities of character that self-government requires.” […] And is also right to remind us against those who believe that the state must be neutral with regard to conceptions of the good life.

(Dagger, 1999, p.207)

For Dagger, however, Sandel is wrong when insisting that we can only make matters right by rejecting liberalism in favour of republicanism:

To take this position is to ignore the ways in which liberalism and republicanism complement one another [...] It is also to ignore those liberals who have also acknowledged the need for “a formative politics” that a commitment to neutrality cannot sustain, such as, Joseph Raz, William Galston, Thomas Spragens, Shelley Burtt, and George Sher.

(Dagger, 1999, p.207)

It is interesting that in replying to Dagger’s critique, Sandel (1999) clarifies his position relating to the hybrid approach of liberalism and republicanism that makes compatible personal autonomy and civic virtue; his position is broadly supportive:
Whether liberalism and republicanism are compatible doctrines depends on how they are conceived. At a certain level of generality, there is no necessary conflict: the liberal tradition stands for toleration and individual rights, while the republican tradition stands for government by the people. Liberal rights support republican self-rule by preventing the majority from oppressing the minority, while the republican emphasis on civic virtue restrains individuals from abusing their rights and ignoring the common good. This is the compatibilist account that Professor Dagger favours, and it is unobjectionable as such. [My] quarrel is not with liberalism as such but with the procedural liberalism prominent in the academy and in the political discourse of our time.

(Sandel, 1999, p.1)

Sandel rejects procedural liberalism and favours the formative project of the republican tradition:

The formative project rejects the idea that government should be neutral toward the values and ends its citizens espouse. It seeks social and political arrangements that cultivate in citizens certain habits and dispositions, or civic virtues. Rather than affirm above all the capacity of persons to choose their own ends, the republican tradition accords the political community an explicit stake in the moral character of its citizens. It makes character a public, not merely private concern.

(Sandel, 1999, pp.1-2)

The main reason for Sandel setting out the distinction between liberalism and republicanism as starkly as he does is to: ‘force liberals to choose between their procedural liberalism and their perfectionist liberalism’ (Sandel, 1999, p.2). Setting to one side what Sandel actually means by ‘forcing liberals to choose’, a confusion I share with Dagger (1999a, p.1), perfectionist liberalism and procedural liberalism are both well-understood positions in their own right, which I need not cover here as they are already comprehensively addressed elsewhere, not least by Raz (1988), Taylor (1995), Courtland, Gaus & Schmidtz (2022). The important point I want to make is that, in the end, Sandel offers no fatal objection to the move to see liberalism and republicanism as being compatible, at least at a certain level of generality, despite his original position set out in Democracy’s Discontent.

For the sake of argument, I accept Dagger’s compatibility position. In doing so, I am reflecting a form of moral contractualism which:

Supposes only that individuals are self-interested and correctly perceive that each person’s ability to effectively pursue her interests is enhanced by a [common] framework of norms that structure social life and divide the fruits of social cooperation.

(Courtland, Gaus & Schmidtz, 2022, p.18)

Moral contractualism is relevant in the sense that it aligns with my concept of civic republican liberalism. By this I mean it is a liberal conception of morality that stems from
the importance of individual freedom but in a common framework. The idea of liberal nationalism also fits with this view. So, to further my case for civic republican liberalism, I turn now to the concept of liberal nationalism as it offers the advantage of being able to highlight the type of national identity that I associate with being a MfP-patriot; that is, a patriotic identity that describes some of its essential characteristics in liberal terms.

Gina Gustavsson (2019) provides a helpful framework to classify national identity in three ideal forms: the liberal type; the conservative type; and constitutional patriotism. Her classification depends on where national identity examples fall on five categories:

(1) whether they rely on a belief in a sense of belonging or not, and if so one consisting in vertical or horizontal ties; (2) whether they require the shared historical experience to be revered, taken as a starting point or critically scrutinised; (3) whether they see the legitimate shared activity by which the national identity is created and recreated as taking place both in private and public, only in the public and political, or even more narrowly only in the political sphere; (4) whether they require any kind of emotional attachment to the homeland or not, and if so whether this amounts to piety or loyalty; and, finally, (5) whether or not they see the shared public culture of the nation as changeable and enforceable.

(Gustavsson, 2019, p.707)

It is not necessary for my project to cover the conservative or constitutional patriotism ideal types of national identity that Gustavsson puts forward.54 What I use is her reference to the liberal ideal type she gets from David Miller (1995).55 Focusing on the liberal ideal type shows how MfP captures a liberal sense of national identity. This is the same sense of national identity as that expressed by Mazzini who, as I have already pointed out, was a strong defender of liberal, democratic and international ideals, as well as patriotic ones. According to Gustavsson, liberal nationalists, at least in the mould of Mazzini and Miller, believe that liberal values of social justice, deliberative democracy and personal autonomy all require a shared sense of national identity, and this is especially so in the pluralistic societies of the twenty-first century. For her, liberal nationalists claim:

[First], that without a shared sense of national identity, and the loyalty to our co-nationals which this provides, citizens will simply not be willing to support a redistributive welfare state […]. The cohesive side to national identity […] is perhaps especially crucial in the increasingly diverse societies

54 Gustavsson gets to conservative nationalism through Scruton (2002), and constitutional patriotism through Habermas (1994).
of today, where sociological evidence suggests that both trust and democratic engagement are waning […] [Second] without a common language and a shared public culture, citizens will be unable to engage in the mutual public deliberation which democracy is held to require […]. [Third] that the liberal ideal of autonomy is dependent on a shared national identity, paradoxical as that may sound. This is both because the alternatives among which we choose must come from somewhere – and this ‘somewhere’, liberal nationalists claim, is often one’s national culture – and because our very idea of what is a meaningful choice is in turn shaped by that national culture […] personal autonomy requires ‘the presence of a cultural context’.

(Gustavsson, 2019, pp.698-699)

Referring back to Gustavsson’s five dimensions to categorise national identity, it is possible to highlight how MfP captures the more precise sense of identity that aligns with liberal nationalism. Beginning with the first dimension, the belief in some kind of shared belonging. Gustavsson says that: ‘liberal nationalism focuses on horizontal ties to our compatriots rather than allegiance to national authority’ (Gustavsson, 2019, p.701). In line with this view, MfP focuses on the special obligations, social and civic ties between the MfP-patriot and her compatriots/ co-citizens, but it is also committed to universal basic rights.

For the second dimension, the experience of historical continuity, liberal nationalism wants the national identity to: ‘take history as a starting point for an on-going process of change; not to be revered, nor to be completely dismissed’ (Gustavsson, 2019, p.703). This balanced approach to tradition with sustainable change is one that MfP adopts as part of cppc-conservatism; the disposition underpinning MfP I set out in Chapter Four.

On the third dimension, shared activity, liberal nationalism: ‘remains committed to keeping the private sphere beyond the reach of political intervention, even for the purposes of strengthening the national identity’ (Gustavsson, 2019, p.703).\textsuperscript{56} I think this view is too restrictive. I do not disconnect the public and private in this way and to this degree. The MfP-patriot identity is sustained by a common culture that also provides the motivation to act. MfP is a fusion of the political and prepolitical, adopts a social lineage view of culture, and seeks to foster social connection through a public culture of compassion.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{56} Liberal nationalism does, however, recognise that diverse: ‘interpretations of national identity [will be discovered] not only in political forums, but in the various associations that make up civil society’ (Miller, 1995, p.128).

\textsuperscript{57} Compassion being the third element of ccppc-conservatism – see Chapter Four.
For the fourth dimension, regarding the emotional attachment we must have to our geographical homeland, liberal nationalism:

Disavows piety, but expects loyalty [...]. The main difference between piety and loyalty is that the latter allows us to question and criticise, although it still demands that we side with and not against the object of our critique.

(Gustavsson, 2019, p.703)

Through philo-philia, MfP is focused on the goal of critical loyalty and constructive dissent captured in the sentiment My country, right or wrong, if right, to be kept right, and if wrong, to be set right. Additionally, the emotional connection to homeland in MfP is reinforced by the desire of the MfP-patriot to act to protect the environment of my patria and polity.

On the fifth dimension, the kind of common public culture that the national identity requires, liberal nationalism recognises that the:

[Shared] common culture may change over time; indeed, in the case of one’s country with a number of sub-communities, change is required, since “existing national identities must be stripped of elements that are repugnant to the self-understanding of one or more component groups”. [Liberal nationalism, however, also sees the] common public culture as something that can be legitimately enforced politically [which] includes both a shared language, certain shared beliefs, and a feeling of like-mindedness, or “a sense of having participated in some common project which might now be regarded as a source of pride or shame”.

(Gustavsson, 2019, p.704, quotes used from Miller, 1995, p.142 & 2008, p.144)

This view is shared in MfP through the ‘identity constituted through narrative project’ claim, which I make as part of my ‘extended human flourishing argument’ in Chapter One, and also in the way MfP deals with the challenge of pluralism, which I set out at the end of this chapter.

Apart from dimension three, where I have a minor disagreement with Gustavsson’s degree of separation between the private and public, MfP aligns well with these five dimensions of an ideal type of liberal national identity. Although I do not have the space to set out in detail the complexity of what this means in practice for the MfP-patriot, I will give some brief examples.

First, in the case of individual rights, the liberal nationalist view is that they: ‘must be respected as important tools for the national identity, but they are not the very fabric from which this identity is made’ (Gustavsson, 2019, p.705). MfP goes further than respecting
rights. A commitment to basic rights is fundamental to the identity of a MfP-patriot. As will be seen shortly, this is a key feature of MfP and is a position consistent with the second-order impartialism view I set out in Chapter One. As with Mazzinian patriotism, however, MfP places duties on an equal footing with them.

Secondly, in the case of immigration:

[The] liberal nationalist believes that immigration is in most cases not a threat to the national identity, since a change in its content is not a problem per se, [but] at the same time insists that immigrants must be willing “to accept current political structures”, as well as “to engage in dialogue with the host community so that a new common identity can be forged”.

(Gustavsson, 2019, p.705, quotes used from Miller, 1995, p.130)

MfP-patriots adopt the same position. As with liberal nationalism, however, the obvious danger in the forging of a new common identity is the possibility: ‘that immigration can become a threat […] when it happens at such a high rate or in such a short period of time that mutual cultural adjustment does not take place’ (Gustavsson, 2019, p.705). An example of this happened in the UK in 2003, with the decision of Prime Minister Blair to open the UK labour market to people from Eastern Europe seven years before the EU required it. As evidenced by subsequent public surveys, the unplanned and substantial influx of immigrants within a brief timeframe caused numerous avoidable strains on local communities, which could have been mitigated with better planning and management (Goodhart, 2017, p.21, pp.25-26).

Thirdly, in terms of cultural and religious minorities, MfP does not perceive minority cultures a threat to the MfP identity such that complete assimilation would be required. As in liberal nationalism, at least in Miller’s and Mazzini’s forms, MfP does not allow the identity constituted by my patria and polity to be something that should completely replace such identities. Indeed, all it can do is to give an important (perhaps the most important) dimension to these (Miller, 2008, p.145). At the same time, however, the identity of a MfP-patriot, in line with Richard Dagger’s perfectionist liberalism, does not commit us to complete neutrality in the public sphere. This is because the shared activity which sustains the MfP identity takes place not only in the political but also in the prepolitical and private
realm. While *MfP*-patriots see public culture as something that can evolve, as with liberal nationalists, they also see it as: ‘something that can legitimately be politically enforced’ (Gustavsson, 2019, p.706). This means that *MfP*-patriots may, subject to the commitment to basic rights, require certain customs, traditions, practices, behaviours, religions, laws, language(s) and so forth in the public sphere in the name of safeguarding the identity of my *patria* and *polity*. *MfP*-patriots agree with Gustavsson when she says: ‘Minority cultures may have to put up with symbols of the national public culture being given precedence in the public sphere, to the extent that these are important carriers of the national identity’ (Gustavsson, 2019, p.706). Examples of this would be the case of abortion rights, euthanasia, or rights for transexuals and homosexuals, or government funding for certain cultural and arts projects, or the use of a certain language for road signs or government publications, or the state institutionalisation of the Anglican Church in England. All of these are included, or have positions of prominence, in the public sphere even though they may be against the religious, moral and other views of certain groups.

Fourthly, in terms of global justice, *MfP* replicates Mazzini’s commitment to the good of humanity, where my *patria* and *polity* is the steppingstone to achieve this. In this sense, the *MfP*-patriot is committed to the type of liberal national identity that recognises wider obligations to others. In ‘National Self-Determination and Global Justice’ (2000) David Miller argues that there are three main obligations of global justice that carry a degree of priority over purely national interests:

> [The] obligation to respect basic human rights world-wide; the obligation to refrain from exploiting vulnerable communities and individuals; and the obligation to provide all political communities with the opportunity to achieve self-determination and social justice. [The] question to ask is how far these obligations set limits to national self-determination within our own community. It seems clear to me that the first two obligations do indeed set such limits. […] As to the third requirement, it seems legitimate for nation-states to give priority to creating regimes of justice among their own citizens before undertaking whatever actions may be necessary to create such regimes elsewhere. This simply expresses the special moral responsibility that compatriots have to one another.

(Miller, 2000, p.177)

Similar to Miller’s liberal nationalism, these types of obligations also apply in the case of *MfP*, which is a form of moral partiality guided by the key features of ‘universal basic rights’,
a focus on ‘moral well-being’, and having a ‘special not exclusive concern’ for my patria and polity. In line with second-order impartialism, MfP seeks the good of humanity, global justice and protection of the environment. It is a moderate form of patriotism committed to self-determination but, as I argue in Chapter One, it is a form of moral partiality that is not only right for ‘us’ but also for ‘others’. This is the view that Mazzini holds. On the one hand, he thinks that the patriot is a member of a specific people who may be differentiated in terms of language and culture from others. For him, this differentiation is central to the patriot’s identity and the institutions/ laws that one’s country is intended to protect. On the other hand, Mazzini believes the notions of liberty, equality and fraternity have universal content:

Young Europe is an association of men believing in a future of liberty, equality and fraternity, for all men; and desirous of consecrating their thoughts and actions to the realisation of that future.  
(Mazzini, 1939, p.91)

MfP aligns with this view in two ways. It is through the key feature of ‘civic republican liberalism’ that MfP is focused on the goals of liberty, equality, individual rights and personal autonomy. What makes it valuable to my project, however, is that it combines this effort with a focus on civic virtue and the common good. To set out how MfP-patriots are motivated to act to achieve the common good, I will now turn to the fourth key feature of MfP: the ‘encouraging hand’ for civic solidarity and social responsibility.

2.3.4 MFP AS THE ENCOURAGING HAND

What I mean by the ‘encouraging hand’ is the motivation to cultivate the social and civic virtues necessary to generate solidarity, trust and social responsibility. Having the identity of a MfP-patriot results in a sense of belonging or attachment to my patria and polity, which

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58 I borrow the term ‘encouraging hand’ from Dagger (2020, p.96). It is not to be confused with Adam Smith’s (1982) ‘invisible hand’ according to which the pursuit of self-interest will lead producers to profit by supplying consumers with the goods/services they want at competitive prices; or Phillip Pettit’s (1997) ‘intangible hand’ providing not only incentives to civic behaviour but sanctions for undesirable conduct, or his ‘iron hand’ associated with the strategy of tough management.
is the driving force to act in a public-spirited way to secure the common good. In setting out my claim, I start by saying something of self-government, freedom and the common good from the civic republican conception.

On civic republicanism, Charles Taylor (1995) contends that: ‘communal attachment to country is a fundamental component of a citizen’s identity and a necessary prerequisite for realising the goods required by citizens for the common good’ (Taylor, 1995, p.192). The communal sentiment and activity that arises from such belonging is a demand that helps both the polity as a whole and the individual agent. The object of this communal sentiment (what Taylor calls patriotism) is one’s polity: ‘constituted of self-government through freedom promoting practices and institutions’ (Taylor, 1995, p.195).

Broadly, the two forms of freedom are that of non-interference and non-domination. Richard Dagger says that the former is a conception of self-government which sees freedom as: ‘participation in the making or generating of the laws that govern one’s polity [the latter] conceives the self-governing citizen as one who is less concerned with this than with testing and checking them to make sure that the laws, and the persons who enact or issue them, are in no position to subject the citizenry to domination’ (Dagger, 2020, p.90). Freedom as non-interference is representative of standard liberal accounts of politics, whilst freedom as non-domination arises more from the Roman civic republican tradition (Thunder, 2009, p.577, n.21). For my project, rather than adopt one or the other, and in line with my conception of civic republican liberalism, I encompass both positions. This allows me to better combine the patriotic sentiment with republicanism in a more coherent way so as to motivate action. By this I mean that my goals are the common good and common liberty, which is best achieved by summoning a sense of civic solidarity from a sentiment akin to patriotism (White, 2003, pp.255-256 and Taylor, 1995, p.192). In my project this civic solidarity is fostered by the encouraging hand of MfP.

This claim, which connects civic solidarity and social responsibility to the sentiment and practical identity of a MfP-patriot, is a connection that was fully understood by
Rousseau when he wrote about patriotism and the general will.\footnote{The general will (Fr., volonté générale) is the will of the people as a whole.} For Rousseau, patriotism, considered within the tradition of civic republicanism, was the motivating force for conforming a person’s will to that of the common good and for carrying out the patriot’s civic duties – here ‘virtue is the conformity of the private to general will’ (Rousseau, 2011, p.32). The good citizen is one whose private interests and concerns are focused on, as far as possible, serving the general will:

> It is not enough to say to the citizens be good. They must be taught to be so; and example itself, which is in this respect the first lesson, is not the only means to be used. Love of country is the most effective, for as I have already said, every man is virtuous when his private will is in conformity with the general will in all things, and we willingly want what is wanted by the people we love. (Rousseau, 2011, p.133)

Broadly, Rousseau’s thesis is that the personal liberty that individuals seek is more achievable in a free state. However, since individual liberties can only be fully enjoyed by maintaining the freedom of the state, all individuals must play their part to defend the common good. This is where Rousseau is helpful to my project. In regard to the general will to defend the common good he warns of ‘free-riding’, which is the selfish desire of people to free themselves from their share of the burden and sever the connection with their compatriots and co-citizens. For example, in Rousseau’s *On the Social Contract* he observes how everyone has a private interest that can speak to them quite differently from the common interest. Under the influence of this private interest the individual will be tempted to view what he owes the common cause as a costly contribution: ‘the loss of which will be less harmful to others than its payment burdensome to him’ (Rousseau, 2011 p.166). In this way, without the conformity of the private will with the general will, the individual might wish to: ‘enjoy the rights of the citizen without wanting to fulfil the duties of a [citizen], an injustice whose growth would bring about the ruin of the body politic’ (Rousseau, 2011 pp.166-167).
To address Rousseau’s worry Richard Dagger says we need an: ‘antidote to the selfish desire to ignore the burdens of common connection when it is personally convenient to ignore them’ (Dagger, 2020, p.103). The sentiment of MfP, seen as the ‘encouraging hand’ that motivates civic solidarity and social responsibility, provides such an antidote, and the: ‘stronger this feeling of common connection is, the weaker will be the selfish desire to evade its demands’ (Dagger, 2020, p.103).

Rousseau’s views in terms of an ideal state and the general will is nowadays seen by some as illiberal.60 It is beyond the scope of my work to give a detailed defence for Rousseau’s ambition here.61 What I do take from him, however, is the importance of the connection between three things: (1) the love of and loyalty to my patria and polity, what I call philo-phia; (2) moral courage, in Rousseau’s terms ‘strength of the soul’; and (3) freedom to secure the common good. This connection is central to MfP being seen as the ‘encouraging hand’ and following the approach of Jason Scorza (2020, p.227) is expressed in the following way:

1) **Philo-phia**, a love of one’s patria and fellow MfP-patriots, and a loyal commitment to the polity and the political freedom one shares with fellow citizens, **inspires moral courage**.

2) **Moral courage**, understood to be the part of civic and social virtue that drives MfP-patriots and citizens to surmount internal fears and confront external dangers in the service of my patria and polity, **defends shared freedom** against both internal and external threats.

3) And **freedom**, encompassing republican principles of civic independence, self-rule, and the rule of law, provides the socio-political conditions in which MfP properly understood motivates MfP-patriots to act **to secure the common good** of my patria and polity.

60 A useful summary of such a view can be found in Apperley (2002). The main worry is over Rousseau’s idea that one can be ‘forced to be free’. Much, however, depends on what he means by freedom. When Rousseau says that one may be ‘forced to be free’, he means that one may be compelled to obey a law to which she has given her consent as a citizen. Rousseau’s distinction between the private will and the general will is important. When the private will (the actual, unique, identifiable person) is in conflict with the general will (citizens as subjects), the person wishes to enjoy the rights of the citizen and the benefits of the social order without wanting to fulfil the duties of a citizen (Dagger, 1981, pp.363-364). In order to deal with the ‘forced to be free’ worry I apply Rousseau’s argument as follows. If the MfP-patriot follows her private will, without just cause and against the majority, she acts against the general will she has as a citizen. Just cause for the MfP-patriot is if her duties as a citizen conflict with the commitment to universal principles in the form of basic rights. In this case the majority view should not rule. Being a MfP-patriot means being a good citizen but the loyalty she has to my patria and polity is a critical form of loyalty.

61 For a more supportive view of Rousseau’s republican credentials and his contemporary importance to republican political theory see de Dijn (2015).
In summary, as set out in the previous section, in \( MfP \) civic republican liberalism makes compatible republicanism and liberalism. It does so by: (1) recognising that individuals are essentially social who, based upon the liberal national identity of a \( MfP \)-patriot, seek greater levels of social harmony, responsibility and solidarity; and (2) by seeking to respect the dignity of all, personal autonomy and individual basic rights. To achieve these things, in this section, I presented \( MfP \) as the ‘encouraging hand’ to motivate \( MfP \)-patriots to act. Having established this link and its importance for action, I want to ensure that the motivation \( MfP \) generates does not lead to an exclusive or aggressive concern for my patria and polity. I avoid this danger through the fifth key feature of \( MfP \); special not exclusive concern.

### 2.3.5 SPECIAL NOT EXCLUSIVE CONCERN

As Igor Primoratz says: ‘If one is a patriot then one has a special concern for one’s country and, therefore, one may favour it over other countries to act and do things for it that one would not do for another’ (Primoratz, 2019, p.5). Arguably, it would be difficult to qualify as a patriot without having such special concern. Special concern for one’s country can be expressed as a concern for its people and interests so that the patriot is committed to their security, flourishing and wellbeing.

Stephen Nathanson (1993) says that from a conceptual viewpoint there are three possible types of concern: a greater degree of concern for ‘us’ than for ‘others’; an exclusive concern coupled with indifference or hostility to ‘others’; and an aggressive concern that requires not only benefits for ‘us’ but power over ‘others’. The wish for ‘our’ wellbeing and flourishing: ‘is common to all three, while the [wish for superiority over ‘others’] is only required by aggressive concern’ (Nathanson, 1993, p.7). Concern is a feature of all forms of patriotism, what separates the different forms is how it is expressed:

Extreme patriots care only about their own country and have no concern for people in other countries. Their patriotic concern is exclusive. Moderate patriots have both a special concern for their own country and some concern for other countries and their citizens. This is an important moral difference.
Moderate patriots recognise that people who are not members of their own country have rights that should be honoured by everyone. (Nathanson, 2017, p.6)

The important moral difference that Nathanson makes is key to *MfP*. As with Mazzini, I believe that patriots can care about their own country while still recognising the humanity of people from other countries. This means acknowledging the moral importance and value of all people; others also have rights and interests. It is this type of greater concern that I capture for *MfP*, which I call special not exclusive concern.

Having made this claim, however, there is a worry that questions an approach that allows special concern for compatriots not shown to others. Marcia Baron and Taylor Rogers (2020) express this when they argue that showing such special concern, simply because they are compatriots, is a form of: ‘bigotry or chauvinism that is difficult to justify’ (Baron & Rogers, 2020, pp.416-418). As will be seen in the next section, Baron and Rogers make an important contribution about what it means to have a moral form of patriotism, but their worry of bigotry or chauvinism goes too far for two reasons. First, is the distinction between special concern with exclusive and aggressive concern. I adopt the view that the distinction matters. As Nathanson says: ‘we can keep special concern but reject exclusive and aggressive concern’ (Nathanson, 1993, pp.38-39). Second, is the imposition of certain universal principles and conditions on the pursuit of special concern and interests. The model of moderate patriotism that Nathanson defends, which has certain features consistent with *MfP*, is characterised by the recognition that other countries also have legitimate rights and interests. These features are:

- Special affection for one’s country.
- A desire that one’s country prosper and flourish.
- Special but not exclusive concern for one’s own country.
- Support of morally constrained pursuit of national goals.
- Conditional support of one’s country’s policies.

(Nathanson, 1993, p.38)

For Nathanson, people who possess these features would be patriots without being bigots or chauvinists:
They would be specially attached to their country without believing it is best, without wanting it to dominate others, and without feeling hostile toward others. However strong their sense of attachment to their own country, their patriotism would be moderated by their recognition of the humanity of people in other countries. […] Without special affection a person would lack the love of country […]. Beyond that, patriots feel a sense of identification with their country a sense of “my-ness” that gives rise to feelings of pride when the country acts well or shame when it acts poorly. (Nathanson, 1993, p.35)

In line with Nathanson, *MfP* includes special concern but it is not committed to exceptionalism; the false belief in the superiority of my *patria* and *polity*. Nor is it immoral. It recognises that those in other *patriae* and *polities* have basic rights, which effectively provides universal principles to guide my *patria* and *polity* in what it may do to promote its own good.

Having dealt with the worry of special concern as a form of bigotry or chauvinism, there is another challenge that could be levelled against the special concern involved in *MfP*. The worry is that demanding attitudes of love of the *patria* and loyalty to the *polity* (*philosophia*) as a requirement of special concern is simply unreasonable. I will deal with this worry by way of the analogy between the partial relationship of family with patriotism. The analogy is relevant because both require a necessary degree of love and loyalty to motivate and sustain the relationship and the special concern it involves. Acceptance of the analogy is important. If the two cases are relevantly analogous, this would be an argument for a special relationship and special concern in the case of my *patria* and *polity*. This is because one could not consistently affirm it in one case and not in the other. Clearly, if they are not relevantly analogous, that would not show that we could not have a special relationship with my *patria* and *polity*, it would only show that this particular argument for such failed.

The view that they are not relevantly analogous is expressed by Baron and Rogers (2020):62

> In each instance the partiality can be justified by impartial moral principles only if suitably constrained by morality, of course, so to that extent the analogy holds up; but there is reason to think that patriotism has moral dangers that are of a greater magnitude than partiality to […] family. Families, after all,

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62 A point also made by Keller (2005 & 2007) and Primoratz (2015, p.93). They argue that a special concern for the well-being of fellow citizens, which is a defining feature of patriotism, is not similar to that of special concern for the well-being of our family and friends.
are not normally massively armed; support for one’s family does not usually carry with it an expectation of being willing to go to war, or in some other way killing and perhaps dying for one’s family. This is not to deny that the institution of the family has its own problems, or that there is no history or indeed current practice of urging, in the name of family, actions that are clearly wrong. (Baron & Rogers, 2020, p.414)

Baron & Rogers’ main worry is that patriotism has the potential for much greater evil by going to war and killing for one’s country than what is possible in the case of families. Their claim on these grounds is indisputable. We do not need to look far to see the scale of such harm where war, fascism and genocide have affected huge numbers of people on the back of so-called nationalism and patriotic duty. I think most reasonable people would support Baron and Rogers’ use of lesser evil considerations to distinguish support or otherwise for the acts of certain countries. My focus for the analogy, however, is not on consequences but on special concern underpinned by love and loyalty, where the potential for doing good sits alongside the potential for doing bad. On this basis the analogy is relevantly analogous.

Clearly, the ever-present danger of partial attachments (that they will lead us to do immoral things) is a weightier matter in the case of my patria and polity than for families because of the possible consequences of these acts. Even so, in reality you have good and bad families, as well as countries with good and bad governments. This, of course, is true of all relationships. They can be good or bad, healthy or unhealthy, being somewhat similar and different in important ways. The potential for my patria and polity, as with other relationships, to do very bad things is balanced by the potential to do very good things. It is on such grounds that it is appropriate to accompany MfP with a rhetoric of special concern, underpinned by love and loyalty, where my patria and polity is thought of as a ‘great’ family. The analogy conjures a feeling of community ‘stretched across time’ and is rooted in a shared history and social lineage, as well as the: ‘security and support of a lasting intergenerational bond that projects itself into the future’ (Kaplan, 2007, pp.2-3). This is something that Baron and Rogers give insufficient attention to when they see family and country as not relevantly analogous.
Both Orwell and Mazzini had an image of one’s country that drew on the ‘great’ family analogy. In Orwell’s case it was to express concerns over how England was being run.

[England] is a family in which the young are generally thwarted and most of the power is in the hands of irresponsible uncles and bedridden aunts. Still, it is a family. It has its private language and its common memories, and at the approach of an enemy it closes its ranks. A family with the wrong members in control – that, perhaps, is as near as one can come to describing England in a phrase.

(Orwell, 1941, p.23)

In Mazzini’s case it was to link them to emphasise the importance and inseparability of duties to both:

The Family is the Country of the heart […] To sanctify the Family more and more and to link it ever closer to the Country; this is your mission. What the Country is to Humanity, the Family must be to Country. I have told you the task of the Country is to Educate men; even so the task of the Family is to educate citizens; Family and Country are the two extreme points of the same line. And where this is not so the Family degenerates into egoism, the more disgusting and brutal the more it prostitutes that most holy thing affection, by diverting it from its true purpose.

(Mazzini, 1858, pp.60-62)

The analogy with family is also relevant in highlighting the importance of managing disagreement; something that was clearly absent during the Brexit debate. If we acknowledge that being a member of a family is an integral aspect of the collective identity of its constituents, then the claim is that this shared identity alleviates the impact of disagreement by facilitating opposition and, consequently, reasoned discourse. For Roger Scruton, the shared relationship with one’s country is supposed to function in the same way as a ‘great’ family: ‘Unless and until people identify themselves with the country, its territory and its cultural inheritance - in something like the way people identify themselves with a family - the politics of compromise will not emerge’ (Scruton, 2014, p.33).

Although I defend the analogy with family I do not use it to justify MfP as a moral obligation; my justificatory grounds for this are set out elsewhere. The role it plays is simply to strengthen the claim that special concern, underpinned by philo-philia, support the desire for my patria and polity to prosper and flourish. This is in the same way as the special concern for one’s family, underpinned by love and loyalty, compromise and managing disagreement, support the desire for the family to prosper and flourish. Seen as a ‘great’
family MfP has the power to inspire. As Martha Nussbaum says of patriotic love: ‘modelled on family or personal love of some type, and, in keeping with that origin or analogy […] The thicker it is in these respects, the more likely it is to inspire’ (Nussbaum, 2013, p.218). In making this claim, however, I do not want to adopt too thick a conception of partiality. To ensure this does not happen I am also concerned with the moral wellbeing of my patria and polity and it is to this, the sixth key feature of MfP, I now turn.

2.3.6 MORAL WELLBEING

In order to establish the grounds for the moral wellbeing of my patria and polity, I will borrow from Marcia Baron and Taylor Rogers (2020) and Igor Primoratz (2015) the idea that the patriot should have a moral focus and be interested in moral integrity. As will be seen I shall endorse their views - up to a point. Where I depart from them is that in their focus on moral wellbeing they desire to exclude the type of special not exclusive concern that I set out in the last section. My position is that both are required for MfP.

Starting with Baron and Rogers, through what they call ‘loftier’ patriotism, their intent is to shift the focus of patriotism from a special concern to promote one’s own country’s interests to a special concern for its moral wellbeing:

Understanding ‘moral’ broadly [a ‘loftier’ form of patriotism] would be a special concern for the moral flourishing of one’s own country. The concern is both greater and qualitatively different from one’s interest in the moral flourishing of other countries. The contrast between our conception of moderate patriotism […] and [other conceptions of moderate patriotism that] understands patriots to be especially concerned to promote their (respective) countries’ interests, [is that] on [our form of patriotism] the focus of the patriot’s concern is her country’s moral wellbeing.

(Baron & Rogers, 2020, p.419)

This patriotic commitment to make one’s country morally better, rather than simply better, may involve a competitive element but need not:

[The] focus is not on competition, and on being morally superior to other countries. That it isn’t matters, because the hope is that [our] patriotism will have a cosmopolitan, and cooperative, aspect to it. The focus is on excelling, not winning.

(Baron & Rogers, 2020, p.421)
What differentiates ‘loftier’ patriotism from other forms of patriotism is ‘a greater concern for the moral wellbeing of one’s own country’, which can be expressed through the ‘cultural vibrancy and particular features or characteristics of one’s country’ (Baron & Rogers, 2020, p.419). For Baron and Rogers, the most significant manifestation of patriotism is the shame one feels when one’s country does something morally wrong, or the pleasure one feels when one endorses one’s country’s acts. These are a reflection of one’s country as one’s own. Shame and pride are not the only ways to convey patriotic sentiments, but they are especially strong ones:63

If one disapproves of what one’s country has done, one feels not just disapproval, but shame; if one approves, one feels not just approval, but (unless it is too small a matter to inspire it) pride.

(Baron & Rogers, 2020, p.421)

Baron & Rogers approach has much in common with Primoratz’s (2015) argument for ‘ethical’ patriotism. Primoratz offers a two-tier position based on a distinction between ‘worldly’ and ‘ethical’ types of patriotism. ‘Worldly’ patriotism describes those types of patriotism that include defending and promoting the worldly political, economic and cultural interests of one’s country and compatriots,64 In contrast, ‘ethical’ patriotism puts aside objectives such as the country’s political power, riches, or cultural vibrancy; that is, those things that, for Primoratz, constitute the country’s wellbeing in a mundane, non-moral sense:

[Ethical patriotism] would be concerned instead with the country’s distinctively moral wellbeing, its moral identity and integrity. A patriot of this sort would not express her love for the patria by seeking to husband her country’s resources and preserve its natural beauty and its historical heritage or make it rich, powerful, culturally preeminent, or influential in world politics. Instead, she would want to see her country live up to moral requirements and promote moral values, both at home and internationally. She would work for a just and humane society at home and seek to make sure that her country acts justly beyond its borders and shows common human solidarity toward those in need, however distant and unfamiliar.

(Primoratz, 2015, p.95).

Primoratz concludes that there is no moral duty to be a ‘worldly’ patriot. He believes that:

‘some versions are far too strong and offend against universal moral considerations [and are


64 Primoratz classifies Machiavelli’s ‘extreme’ patriotism, MacIntyre’s ‘robust’ patriotism, and Nathanson’s ‘moderate’ patriotism, as worldly patriotism. The difference being that the former two will ultimately go to any length when the larger interests of the country are at stake.
Thus morally unacceptable’ (Primoratz, 2015, p.100).

Distinctively ‘ethical’ patriotism is a different matter:

It is, basically, a heightened sense of collective responsibility, when the collective at issue is one’s patria. It is not a moral duty binding everyone, at all times and in all circumstances. But it is a duty under certain circumstances: when our country is ours in a significant sense, that is, when we have much affection for it and identify with it and with our compatriots, and when we are particularly well placed to help safeguard its moral integrity, or when, being its citizens, we accept significant benefits or, lastly, when we take part in our country’s democratic politics. These are fairly common circumstances, and therefore, many of us indeed ought to be ethical patriots.

(Primoratz, 2015, p.177)

The main similarity between Primoratz’s ‘ethical’ patriotism and Baron & Rogers’ ‘loftier’ patriotism is that they both shift focus from promoting one’s country’s wider interests to promoting its moral interests. The main difference is the scope of morality applied. ‘Ethical’ patriotism takes a narrower view of what is ‘moral’ and excludes much of what counts as moderate patriotism, including that in ‘loftier’ patriotism. As Baron and Rogers argue when discussing Primoratz’s ‘ethical’ patriotism:

Primoratz classifies efforts to promote one’s country’s cultural vibrancy or to preserve its natural beauty and its historic monuments or villages as non-moral expressions of love of country. These therefore count, for Primoratz, as expressions of worldly patriotism but not of ethical patriotism. Because he understands ‘moral’ more narrowly than we do, the range of things that count as expressions of ethical patriotism is narrower than the range of expressions of [loftier patriotism].

(Baron & Rogers, 2020, pp.421-422)

Although both versions of patriotism press moral wellbeing as the key goal, ‘loftier’ patriotism does leave more scope for sheer love of my patria and polity than does ‘ethical’ patriotism through the characteristics of one’s country and its cultural vibrancy. Both forms of patriotism, however, are helpful by offering a valuable insight into what the pursuit of moral wellbeing in MfP entails. Nevertheless, by excluding special not exclusive concern and, in Primoratz’s case, taking too narrow a view of ‘moral’ their views are not so helpful. I say this because one would not apply this exclusion of special concern and such a narrow view of moral to other relationships.

65 According to Primoratz worldly patriotism, in the form that Nathanson argues, is committed to or moderated by considerations of justice and humanity; therefore, there is no obstacle to adopting this type of patriotism, if we are attracted to it. Even so, he believes that there is no reason to believe it a moral duty or that it is morally valuable if freely adopted (Primoratz, 2015, pp.176-177).
To help explain what I mean take the relationship of family that, as I argue in the previous section, is relevantly analogous to patriotism. As a parent, I have special concern for my daughter and my obligations to her include but are not restricted to a narrow view of moral wellbeing. I have love for and loyalty to her that involves a desire that she prosper and flourish in the broadest sense - culturally, artistically, intellectually, materially and socially. Even though I have a special concern for her and her wellbeing, it is not exclusive concern nor at any cost, because I recognise that other children have rights and interests. For MfP, it is similarly credible to argue that I have love for and loyalty to my patria and polity; a desire that it prosper and flourish not only in a narrow moral way but also in the broader sense; for example, culturally, artistically, socially and politically. This desire, however, must be guided by certain universal principles in line with the dignity and value of all people. So, even though I have a special concern for my patria and polity, it is not exclusive or aggressive concern, because I recognise that other patriae and polites have rights and interests. Also, focusing on a narrow view of moral wellbeing ignores the need to develop other areas of cultural, artistic, social, security, political, juridical, environmental, economic and educational interventions and institutions, which create the conditions for the moral wellbeing and flourishing of my compatriots and co-citizens. All these matter and need to be balanced to have a successful, healthy and thriving community.66

For MfP, wanting my patria and polity to live up to moral requirements and promote moral values, both at home and internationally, is consistent with philo-philia that seeks to make the best use of its resources, preserve its natural beauty, its historical heritage, its culture based on our social lineage, and the influence it has for achieving good in the world. It is by combining moral wellbeing with special not exclusive concern that MfP offers the

66 Although I do not have the space to expand on this claim I, nevertheless, recognise that my example raises interesting questions around value pluralism. For example, does moral value trump these other values? Are all important values, by definition, moral values? Given limited resources, how do we go about adjudicating the claims that come from different values?
best opportunity to achieve these things. Adopting this position provides the basis for the seventh key feature of MfP; that is, global sensitivity and the common good of humanity.

2.3.7 GLOBAL SENSITIVITY AND THE COMMON GOOD OF HUMANITY

In line with Mazzinian patriotism, MfP is a sentiment that is intended to make the mind of the patriot/good citizen bigger, to call it away from greed and egoism toward a set of values connected to the good of humanity and the need for sacrifices to achieve it. In this regard, MfP is best described as a globally sensitive form of moderate patriotism. To get to this view, I will start by identifying some of the dangers of patriotism Martha Nussbaum identifies that MfP has to navigate along the way. I will follow her use of the idiom of Scylla and Charybdis to do so (Nussbaum, 2013, pp.211-219).

In terms of the many headed monster of Scylla, the first danger of patriotism is that of misplaced values:

> If we are going to whip up strong passions, we want to make sure we don’t generate enthusiasm for the wrong thing. And it is easy to see that patriotic love has served a range of unwise causes [...] It is on such causes that people usually focus when they express horror at the very idea of patriotic love. (Nussbaum, 2013, p.212)

To tackle the potential threat of misplaced values, MfP promotes a mindset of critical awareness regarding the values that MfP-patriots should endorse and strive for. This approach aligns with Nussbaum’s belief in cultivating a critical public culture and adopting a discerning outlook towards history. The goal is to prevent exceptionalism where the narrative of my homeland becomes narrow and biased. The concept of MfP aims to unite rather than divide us from others. It does not seek to belittle others in any way. It is committed to basic rights and, as in John Rawls’ (2005) argument for pluralism, MfP conceives my patria and polity as including a set of ideals that embraces all citizens (Nussbaum, 2013, pp.213-214).

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67 It is derived from Greek mythology in Homer’s Odyssey (Homer, 2016, 12.73-126) and is associated with the project of having to navigate between two hazards - a many headed monster and a whirlpool.
68 See Sub-section 2.3.8 and Section 2.4.
Nussbaum’s second danger of patriotism is the potential for individuals to have their conscience coerced through the imposition of ritualistic practices seen as mandatory or to be strongly endorsed. Examples of these practices may include singing the national anthem, commemorating the King’s coronation, paying respects at war memorials, swearing allegiance, or hoisting the flag. Those who refuse to participate or voice their objections are met with criticism, arrest or punishment. This can result in the stifling of dissent and the imposition of conformity that can cause significant harm. For MfP, the right reply to this danger is critical but respectful loyalty. As Nussbaum says:

Patriotism and respectful dissent are not incompatible. Indeed, our particular tradition emphasises the freedom of dissent, and we should take pride in that defence of liberty. Given values of a particular sort, emphasising individual liberty and the rights of conscience, can be straightforwardly answered: our values preclude such burdens on conscience, unless a national security interest is far stronger and more immediate. [People] may not be burdened against their conscience by required patriotic rituals.

(Nussbaum, 2013, p.217)

According to Nussbaum, the third danger of patriotism lies in the possibility of developing a society that overemphasises patriotic feelings, resulting in a lack of diversity and discouragement of personal expression. This implies that our human tendency to be influenced by our peers and authority figures could lead to a uniformity of thought and behaviour. The MfP-patriot deals with this danger through the key feature of civic republican liberalism, which champions personal autonomy and rights as well as the common good. According to Nussbaum the patriot must stand against coercive and invidious pressures:

[As patriots we] must insist that the truly patriotic attitude is one that repudiates orthodoxy and coercive pressure and celebrates liberties of speech and conscience. [In general] we need to cultivate the critical facilities early and continuously, and to show admiration for them, insisting that critical freedom, not herd-like obedience, is the mark of the true patriot.

(Nussbaum, 2013, p.218)

In opposition to Scylla is Charybdis; the problem of watery motivation:

In short, to make people love something requires making them see it as “their own”, and preferably also as “the only one they have.” [The] major emotions are “eudaimonistic,” tied to a person’s conception of flourishing and the circle of concern that is involved in any such conception. To make people care, you have to make them see the object of potential care as in some way “theirs” […].

(Nussbaum, 2013, p.219)
According to Nussbaum without the cultivation of strong sustaining emotions that comes from patriotic sentiment, which includes pride and shame, there will be the problem of people not being motivated enough to care. Motivating people to act by cultivating the sustaining emotions of pride and shame is a view of patriotism shared by Richard Rorty (1998):

[Patriotic] pride is to countries what self-respect is to individuals: a necessary condition for self-improvement. Too much [patriotic] pride can provide bellicosity and imperialism, just as excessive self-respect makes it difficult for a person to display moral courage, so insufficient [patriotic] pride makes energetic and effective debate about national policy unlikely. Emotional involvement with one’s country – feelings of intense shame or of glowing pride aroused by various parts of its history, and by various present-day national policies – is necessary if political deliberation is to be imaginative and productive. Such deliberation will probably not occur unless pride outweighs shame.

(Rorty, 1998, p.1)

Pride and shame are two of the most important emotions to motivate MfP-patriots. Pride in my patria and polity’s highest ideals is crucial in constructing a narrative that is aspirational and brings to the fore the best values and highest standards to which MfP-patriots are committed. On shame, MfP incorporates the belief that these emotion can also call the MfP-patriot to high ideals. Through pride and shame, as I set out in Chapter One, the MfP-patriot understands her life within my patria and polity in a normative narrative form, which contributes to her sense of identity and belonging to a community ‘extended over time’ (Nussbaum, 2013, p.239):

If altruistic [patriotic sentiment] is to have motivational power [it] needs to hitch itself to the concrete: named individuals (founders, heroes), physical particulars (features of landscape, vivid images and metaphors), and, above all, narratives of struggle, involving suffering and hope. Such an emotion gives strength to moral motives […].

(Nussbaum, 2013, p.209)

In short, MfP’s solutions to the dangers of patriotism, which makes it an altruistic and motivating form of patriotic sentiment, include: (1) the cultivation of a critical public culture and respectful dissent; (2) having critical freedom not herd-like obedience as the mark of the true MfP-patriot; (3) avoiding watery motivation and understanding the importance of pride and shame to motivate action. Taken together these provide the foundation for MfP-patriots to be globally sensitive to work towards the good of humanity.
This position is supported by Mazzini. He believes that to combat peoples’ inclination of greed and self-interest, we need a strong altruistic emotion directed at achieving the common good in ways that involve duty and sacrifice. For Mazzini, it is patriotic sentiment that is sufficiently local and has the solidity to properly motivate people, which is part of humanity’s division of labour to advance the common good of all (Mazzini, 1858, pp.51-52).

Nussbaum (2008) also believes that patriotism in a globally sensitive form can play a valuable role in the good of humanity by creating a decent world culture. Her argument for this goes as follows:

1. The nation-state, including a strong form of national sovereignty, is an important good for all human beings, if the state takes a certain (liberal, democratic) form. Any decent world culture should promote the continued sovereignty and autonomy of (liberal and democratic) nation-states and protect the rights of citizenship associated with them.
2. Nation-states of the sort described cannot remain stable without moral sentiments attached to their institutions and their political culture.
3. The sentiments required cannot be supplied merely by allegiances to smaller units, such as families; cities; regions; and ethnic, racial, or gender groups: they must have the nation (under some description) as their object.
4. So, there is a good reason for nations of the sort described to engender sentiments of love and support in their citizens.
5. National states of the sort described need the moral sentiments even more if they are going to undertake projects that require considerable sacrifice of self-interest, such as substantial internal redistribution or copious foreign aid, the overcoming of discrimination against traditionally marginalised groups, or the protection of allies against unjust domination.
6. Such projects are good projects for nations to undertake. Therefore, we have even stronger reasons for the cultivation of nation-directed moral sentiments.

(Nussbaum, 2008, pp.81-82)

Nussbaum’s argument for the necessity of some form of altruistic and motivating patriotic sentiment may differ from mine (and Mazzini’s) but it comes to the same conclusion. The altruistic patriotic sentiment is necessary to motivate the action necessary for countries to undertake projects that require significant self-sacrifice. In the case of MfP this is to achieve two things. First, for the MfP-patriot to reject indifference and neglect to satisfy the desire for human flourishing by acting to foster the social fabric, secure the common good and protect the environment of my patria and polity. And secondly, support the good of humanity, which includes a commitment to basic rights. Nussbaum and Mazzini
agree with me that we require the first in order to achieve the second, and both require sacrifice to the self-interest:

This is all the more true when a nation pursues not only internal justice but the goal of global justice as well. If people interested in economic equality, justice for minorities, and global justice eschew symbol and rhetoric, fearing all appeals to emotion and imagination as inherently dangerous and irrational, the Right will monopolise these forces, to the detriment of democracy.

(Nussbaum, 2008, p.93)

As a globally sensitive form of moderate patriotism, MfP is the steppingstone from which we are better positioned to support the good of humanity. An important way to support this goal is to be committed to an external objective standpoint that includes certain universal principles. In my project this commitment comes in the form of universal basic rights; the eighth key feature of MfP to which I now turn.

2.3.8 COMMITMENT TO UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES THROUGH BASIC RIGHTS

Throughout my project I identify the need for MfP to be committed to and guided by certain universal principles. I borrow Henry Shue’s (1980) tripartite basic rights approach to fulfil this role. It provides a minimum floor of rights with correlative duties that ought not to be breached. These basic rights are necessary to moderate unacceptable policies and practices, as well as guiding and motivating our actions to ensure the dignity and respect of others within and beyond our borders. I do not argue, however, that it is only through basic rights that this is achieved. Morality and ethical behaviour in relation to both compatriots and others is shaped by many important factors that I do not cover in my project.69 I also recognise that basic rights are not the only rights; other rights and duties may exist arising through the history, tradition and laws of my patria and polity, or through international agreements and arrangements. The key point is that many, if not all, of these non-basic

69 I do, however, argue for a public culture of compassion and the development of certain human capacities to foster the emotion of compassion to strengthen social connection, which also acts as a further moral commitment – see Chapter Four.
rights may be sacrificed in order to secure basic rights. The protection of basic rights, however, as Shue says: ‘may not be sacrificed in order to secure the enjoyment of non-basic rights’ (Shue, 1980, p.19).

What Shue means by ‘enjoyment of a right’ is that: ‘the advantage of the right is not merely declared but secured for whomever it applies’ (Kiper, 2011). He uses the notion of: ‘standard threats as the targets of the social guarantees for the enjoyment of the substance of a right’ (Shue, 1980, p.13). He is interested not in: ‘all possible threats but the notion of common, or ordinary, and serious but remediable threats’ (Shue, 1980, pp.29-34). From this: ‘basic rights can be seen as the minimum reasonable demands upon humanity, providing a rational basis for justified demands the denial of which no self-respecting person can reasonably accept’ (Shue, 1980, p.19). They are basic in the sense that their enjoyment is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights:

This is what is distinctive about a basic right. When a right is genuinely basic, any attempt to enjoy any other right by sacrificing the basic right would be quite literally self-defeating, cutting the ground from beneath itself. [What] is not meant by saying that right is basic is that the right is more valuable or intrinsically more satisfying to enjoy more than other rights. [Whether] a right is basic is independent of whether its enjoyment is also valuable in itself. Intrinsically valuable rights may or may not be basic rights, but intrinsically valuable rights can only be enjoyed only when basic rights are enjoyed. Clearly few rights could be basic in this precise sense.

(Shue, 1980, p.20)

Shue argues for three basic rights: security, subsistence and liberty. In theory they are not the only possible basic rights but for my project they are the ones most relevant for MfP. According to Shue, security and subsistence rights can be viewed as basic because of the role they play for the enjoyment and the protection of all other rights. In their absence one would be vulnerable: ‘security and subsistence must be socially guaranteed, if any rights are to be enjoyed. This makes them basic rights’ (Shue, 1980, p.30). Certain liberty rights are also basic. Shue argues that the same argument which establishes security and subsistence rights as basic rights, also justifies the acknowledgement of certain political liberties, such as, participation and freedom of movement as equally basic.

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70 For example, see Beitz and Goodwin (2009) who argue for an environmental basic right.
For all three basic rights being socially guaranteed is the thing that necessitates correlative duties. Shue’s approach avoids the standard view of separating rights into forbearance (negative rights) and aid (positive rights). For him, it is ‘duties’ not ‘rights’ that are more appropriately divided among forbearance and aid. Every basic right, he argues, involves three types of correlative duties: duties to avoid depriving; duties to protect from deprivation; and duties to aid the deprived (Shue, 1980, p.52). Shue demonstrates this in the example of the basic right to subsistence that involves the fulfilment of three correlative duties:

• Duties not to eliminate a person’s only means of subsistence – duties to avoid depriving.
• Duties to protect people against deprivation of the only available means of subsistence by other people – duties to protect from deprivation.
• Duties to provide for the subsistence of those unable to provide for their own – duties to aid the deprived.

(Shue, 1980, p.53)

It is not necessary to set out in detail Shue’s comprehensive argument for basic rights. It is sufficient for my project to establish three things. First, that a basic right provides the rational basis for a justified demand. Second, the actual enjoyment of the substance of that basic right must be socially guaranteed against standard threats. And third, a basic right provides the rational basis for insisting upon the performance, as needed, of duties to avoid, duties to protect and duties to aid. In accepting Shue’s approach, I do so because it provides the best practical method of a minimum universal moral commitment for MfP. I will test this claim by looking at what appears to me to be the most serious worries to Shue’s approach, which are the ‘too demanding’ and ‘allocation’ claims.71 I start by discussing the

71 There are other possible objections to Shue’s basic rights argument. First, Shue’s definition of a basic moral right and his inclusion of negative duties and positive duties that correlate to all three basic rights - see Pogge (2009), Payne (2008) and Cohen (2004) for challenges against. For a satisfying response, see Kiper’s (2011) defence of Henry Shue on basic rights. Second, Shue’s argument is not demanding enough. For example, see Beitz and Goodwin (2009) who offer a friendly objection in the sense that they seek to extend the reach of Shue’s own insight about the structure of duties. They do this by arguing for an additional basic environmental right. This is an interesting proposal to address relevant environmental concerns and rights; however, I do not pursue it in my project as I get to the protection of the environment through certain special obligations and social virtues - see Chapter Four.
substance of these claims, then offer a response from Shue, and end by outlining two other approaches that help deal with them.

Judith Lichtenberg (2009) provides a good summary of the ‘too demanding’ claim:

If basic rights matter so much - if they represent those moral claims that a person may demand - then simply postulating moral duties corresponding to them seems insufficient. Such duties establish what people and institutions morally ought to do or not do, how they must act to act permissibly. But many individuals and many institutions fail to do what they ought; and if rights are so important it seems there need to be compensations for such failures. We need guarantees. So we posit duties to protect people’s rights. But those entrusted with such duties may also fail, so it seems we need further duties as back-ups. We need guarantees. So we posit duties to aid. Now we have a glut of duties, perhaps even a regress of duties. And that raises concerns about whether Shue’s account demands too much - more of too many people than is realistic or satisfiable.

(Lichtenberg, 2009, p.76)

In terms of the ‘allocation’ claim, this can be explained by the recognition that there is a significant difference between rights for which allocation of duties can be given, and those for which the allocation of duties is necessarily incomplete; a distinction that is particularly relevant to subsistence rights:

Put crudely, the argument is that security rights in particular, and liberty rights more generally, do not face an “allocation problem”: everybody has correlative duties to respect them. By contrast, subsistence rights, and welfare rights more generally, leave the allocation of duties underdetermined. These rights are claims to performances rather than to forbearances, and the mere assertion of a claim is not enough to identify the agents which have duties to satisfy it. That question is simply left open.

(Beitz & Goodin, 2009, pp.13-14)

Or as Lichtenberg puts it:

The question immediately arises for subsistence rights: on whom do the duties fall? The sceptic suggests that the answer would also have to be “everyone,” as it is for negative security rights, or at least everyone who is able to act effectively. And then we immediately encounter two kinds of problems. Most obvious is what may be called Singer-type problems of over-demandingness. [The] second, related problem concerns the specification of duties. If people have duties, it is imperative that they know what these duties are. But exactly what the “duties to avoid depriving” are that correspond to subsistence rights, and (at least as important) to whom they belong, is not obvious as it is for security rights, where all a person has to know, it seems, is “Don’t!”

(Lichtenberg, 2009, p.74)

The heart of the ‘allocation’ problem, especially in regard to subsistence rights, is that it is often difficult to identify the particular agent or group of agents to whom responsibility for fulfilling the duties that come with such rights can be attributed.72 However, even if it were

72 See O’Neill (2005) for a useful discussion on the allocation problem between certain rights and duties.
possible to allocate such duties to such agents, they could prove ‘too demanding’ to fulfil and they would overwhelm the agent. This is especially so in the case of duties that may arise in regard to distant others.

Under Shue, the ‘too demanding’ and ‘allocation’ claims do not just apply for subsistence rights they also apply to security and liberty rights. Faced with the glut of duties that fall from the three basic rights these claims do appear to carry weight. Having said that, Shue offers a way forward that makes such duties less onerous or, at the very least, more manageable. The standard view is that if there exist any duties at all in the case of basic rights they will be imperfect duties in the sense of being incompletely specified. In other words, we may not know to whom the duties are owed and what they require us to do. Shue seeks to address this by arguing that institutions ought to play a mediating (or consolidating) role. Shue argues that they do this through the organisation of social action or the provision of assistance in a way that individuals are enabled to carry out incompletely specified duties to protect and aid those threatened with deprivation (Shue, 1980, pp.166-173). Charles Beitz and Robert Goodin summarise this approach:

Mediating institutions transform “imperfect” duties into “perfect” ones. Pre-institutionally, people have imperfect duties toward others. The rich, for example, have an imperfect duty to assist the poor; but since it is an imperfect duty, no poor person has any claim-right against any given rich person. A mediating institution - a formal collective entity, archetypically a state, embracing rich and poor - serves in effect as a “consolidator” of those imperfect duties. All of the rich have a perfect duty to pay taxes to the state. The state in turn has a perfect duty to provide assistance to all its citizens who are in need. This phenomenon is familiar enough domestically, in contemporary welfare states. We might think about the duties associated with global subsistence rights in the same general way.

(Beitz & Goodin, 2009, p.15)

It is this approach that provides the basis of how to reduce the problems of over-demandingness and allocation through mediating and consolidating institutions associated with my patria and polity. This corresponds with the view that cosmopolitan responsibilities, at least in terms of basic rights, are best: ‘fulfilled by local communities as the most relevant agents of global justice’ (Ypi, 2010, p.594). This is true in the case of MfP, because the associations and institutions involved in my patria and polity proceed from a Mazzinian-like enlightened perspective in sharing the labour of humanity to achieve the
good of all. The concept of mediating institutions offers an effective way, and in most cases the only realistic way, of dealing with the ‘too demanding’ and ‘allocation’ claims. From this perspective (for example) it is understandable why so many citizens in the UK are legitimately concerned about the government reducing the amount allocated to the foreign aid budget; a contemporary concern subject to much debate in the UK despite the cost-of-living crisis.

Of course, this account does not mean MfP-patriots are off the hook. This is because philo-philia involves a critical form of loyalty and, as such, MfP-patriots will have civic duties as citizens when institutions fall short in exercising the values of my patria and polity. Also, under civic republican liberalism, MfP-patriots have continuing indirect duties to foster institutions that directly fulfil basic rights. The fact that these duties are indirect does not make them any less difficult in terms of the time, money, and energy that must be expended. Indirect duties can be just as demanding as direct responsibilities. For example, Lichtenberg (2009) argues that although I am: ‘not obligated to provide a major amount of my money to alleviate suffering, I am expected to pay my taxes and to devote time and effort to influencing or reforming social and civic institutions’ (Lichtenberg, 2009, p.81).

By restricting the universal moral commitment to the basic rights of security, subsistence and liberty, a view consistent with the position of soft cosmopolitanism, still leaves room for MfP to be a meaningful and moral form of partiality, which is unquestionably not ‘emasculated’. The key point is that MfP seeks to balance the requirement of local rights and special duties to meet the needs of my patria and polity, with the recognition of basic rights and general duties that morally safeguard all people against poverty and unacceptable treatment. My view is consistent with David Miller’s (2009) approach to global justice. He argues for the recognition of basic needs in his form of liberal nationalism:

I understand human rights to be rights to those freedoms, resources and bodily states that allow basic human needs to be fulfilled, and basic needs in turn are defined as the conditions that must be met if
a person is to have a minimally decent life in the society to which he or she belongs. […] Global justice, therefore, requires first of all the protection of these basic human rights for people everywhere. (Miller, 2009, p.173)

According to Lenard and Moore (2013), rather than reject universalism and impartialism Miller adopts a split-level theory where: ‘certain principles of justice and equality apply at the domestic level [while other principles such as] securing a basic threshold for a decent life [or ensuring that basic rights are respected] apply at the global level’ (Lenard & Moore, 2013, p.50). Adopting basic rights, whether in Miller’s form or in the form I borrow from Shue, is unavoidable. The relationship associated with my patria and polity, indeed any relationship come to that, cannot rely on the non-objective internal standpoint alone. MfP, or in Miller’s case liberal nationalism, that has no external or objective standpoint is simply morally unacceptable. To avoid the ever-present danger of moral relativism, at least for certain actions if not all, they ought to be subject to the external and objective view – the only question is what form this takes. As a MfP-patriot, I support my patria and polity but if it behaves in a way that undermines basic rights, although I may not abandon it if it is wrong, I will endeavour to set it right. This is not cost free but it is a cost worth bearing.

Even if I am correct regarding the need for mediating institutions and to respect universal basic rights, there still remains the challenge of how to motivate individuals to care enough, to put the effort in and do what they ought to do in terms of supporting basic rights. In MfP this is achieved in two ways; first, by reducing psychological demands to get people to act collectively; and secondly, to upgrade individual capacities to act. In relation to the first way, Judith Lichtenberg (2009) helpfully sums up what is required to reduce demands in order to get people to act together when it comes to basic rights:

How can we downgrade the demands placed on human beings without simply conceding that alleviating others’ suffering is no serious business of theirs? The answer is that there are ways to make what might otherwise be strenuous demands on people less strenuous. The clearest route is to get people to act together rather than as isolated individuals. By definition, most human beings are not saintly or heroic. There is a great deal of plasticity in human behaviour across cultures, but within a society most people do as others around them do.

(Lichtenberg, 2009, p.89)
There are many ways to get people to act together by reducing demands. I will briefly mention three that Lichtenberg covers:

1) **People can happily sacrifice or get along without many things, as long as they need not go it alone but are in it together.** The sacrifice is related to what others around us are doing, which is a consequence of networking effects and the infrastructure of one’s society. This is down to salience or availability; people want to do things because others are doing it or people want things because others have them. The claim is that few people are sufficiently motivated to change behaviour without knowing what others have or have not, or without having assurances, or without knowing that others behave in a certain way too. As this knowledge cannot be generated or gained by a multitude of individuals acting as atomistic beings, what is required is some form of collective intercession. This requires the creation of a socially connected context that visibly and actively promotes the common good, the need to support others, as well as the provision of public goods (Lichtenberg, 2009, pp.89-90).

2) **The suffering of others can be reduced through habit and familiarity.** As much of human behaviour, practices and policies are habitual, once they are seen as the norm or a routine part of our daily life they become less burdensome; certainly less painful if not pain free (Lichtenberg, 2009, p.90). These habits which become norms include, for example, progressive tax policies (to redistribute wealth and fund welfare schemes), annual health checks (NHS screening programmes) or investing in aid for others (appeals such as Children in Need or Poppies for remembrance). For a comprehensive analysis on the link between habit and familiarity see Charles Duhigg (2008).

3) **Behaviour is influenced by the adoption of ‘default positions’ or having ‘opt-out’ schemes rather than ‘opt-in’ schemes.** Essentially, this involves making it harder for people to not be involved and/or simply easier to stay involved. An example of a default position is the automatic request for a donation to charity when purchasing consumer goods or taking out subscriptions. An example of an opt-out scheme is organ donation where consent to donate is presumed unless a person takes the active step of opting out. This is seen as a solution to the low number of donors associated with an opt-in scheme to be a registered donor. For useful sources on default options and decisions see the footnote references in Lichtenberg (2009, p.91, n.46 & n.47).

Lichtenberg believes that by adopting ways like this we can capitalise on what we know about human psychology to get people to act together to better guarantee basic rights:

To make the fulfilment of basic or human rights - whether “negative” or “positive” - more likely, we cannot rely on virtue alone, or even primarily. We must capitalise on what we know of human psychology, including the strong tendencies people have to do what others do. We must, therefore, work to bind people together in groups that act collectively. Since both what harms the world’s poor and what could benefit them mainly depends on the aggregate effects of the behaviour of many people acting within large institutional structures, coordinated action is appropriate not simply for psychological reasons: it offers the only real hope for alleviating global poverty.

(Lichtenberg, 2009, p.91)

The second way of getting people to do what they ought to do relates to the upgrading of peoples’ motives so that they know when to act, how to act and when to stop acting to support basic rights. Neta Crawford (2009) argues that to do this we need to: ‘increase our human capacities by deliberately cultivating dispositions and knowledge at both the institutional and individual levels’ (Crawford, 2009, p.136). At the institutional level, as
with Shue, in order to empower individuals to take action and make decisions on their behalf, it is essential to establish institutions that are capable of providing the necessary support. At the same time, however, it is necessary to focus on strengthening individual moral understanding and ability to take action, so that they are better equipped to navigate complex situations. When seeking to promote basic rights, Crawford (2009) challenges the view that people have fixed moral capacities:

I am not saying that we have to substantially change human “nature”: most humans have all the raw ingredients we need to become better protectors and promoters of basic rights. I am arguing that it is possible to deliberately enhance features of our already existing, if underdeveloped, human capacities. [There] are two aspects of individual capacities that should be deliberately cultivated: dispositions for empathy, respect, critical awareness, and action; and substantive and procedural knowledge, respectively about moral principles and historical context and about how to engage in respectful dialogue.

(Crawford, 2009, pp.142-143)

I do not have the space to pursue the individual capacities argument here. It is sufficient to understand that one of the most important ways to promote and support basic rights is by developing certain human capacities. For MfP, these include compassion, critical awareness, trust, courage and knowledge of moral principles and history. MfP-patriots are committed to developing these along with institutional capacities. As Crawford says:

[Individuals] and institutions all too often assume the role of moral bystanders because individual and institutional moral capacities are underdeveloped. I am thus concerned less with specific moral responsibilities than with how to enhance the capacities for individuals and institutions to discover, understand, and act on those responsibilities in particular situations. In other words, while [agreeing] that we have moral responsibilities to distant others […] and that appropriate institutional arrangements can help us enact them […], I argue that more fundamental work must occur at the individual and institutional level before individuals will be able to see distant others as deserving of their attention and before institutions will be capable of promoting global basic rights.

(Crawford, 2009, p.136)

Reducing psychological demands and upgrading individual capacities are effective ways to incentivise behaviour and make basic rights more palatable. Although I do not underestimate the challenge they, along with the concept of mediating institutions that transform imperfect duties into perfect duties, do provide credible ways for the ‘too demanding’ and ‘allocation’ problems to be addressed.

73 Although I do pick up individual capacities again in Chapter Four when covering the emotion of compassion.
Having established Shue’s basic rights approach as the way to commit to certain universal principles that helps to guide and motivate MfP-patriots, I will turn now to how MfP deals with the problem of different conceptions of the good or, put another way, the challenge of pluralism.

2.4 THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM

David Miller (2020) argues that:

The leading lights of liberalism from the last generation, such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, argued for positions that were close to liberal nationalism even if not explicitly presented under that description. Rawls, for example, introduced the concept of a ‘people’ to describe a body of citizens united not only by shared political institutions but also by ‘common sympathies’ […]. He then asked what a just set of rules would look like for a world made up of peoples in this sense. The concept of a people is often now used in this way, for the purpose of identifying a political community as distinct from a state, but leaving aside the special case of indigenous peoples, the groups picked out as ‘peoples’ are in fact just those groups who would previously have been described as nations. In other words, ‘peoples’ are in effect ‘nations’ minus the accumulated ideological baggage that the latter term carries with it.

(Miller, 2020, p.24)

As a moderate form of patriotism, MfP’s approach to pluralism is consistent with how John Rawls’ (2005) deals with it through his conception of reasonable political liberalism; at least up to a point. Unlike Rawls, however, MfP does not reject the importance of the prepolitical in fostering a shared identity to motivate civic solidarity and social responsibility to advance the common good. In unpacking this position I will start with a brief account of Rawls’ view.

Rawls offers a solution to pluralism not by attempting to eradicate it but by accepting it as a fact of modern life:

Political liberalism assumes the fact of reasonable pluralism as a pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, including both religious and nonreligious doctrines. This pluralism is not seen as disaster but rather the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free associations.

(Rawls, 2005, p.xxiv)

Rawls refers to his political liberalism as reasonable, rather than true. In doing so he seeks to indicate two things:

First, it indicates the more limited point of view of the political conception as articulating political and not all values, while providing at the same time a public basis of justification. Second, it indicates
the principles and ideals of the political conception are based upon principles of practical reason in union with conceptions of society and persons, themselves conceptions of practical reason.

(Rawls, 2005, p.xx)

The conception of practical reason or reasonableness which Rawls advances is specifically a conception of public reason:

Persons are reasonable when [...] they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of co-operation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so.

(Rawls, 2005, p.49)

According to Onora O’Neill (2003) what Rawls means by ‘persons’ are fellow citizens:

Fellow citizens are thought of as sharing a bounded and closed society with basic political institutions, including a democratic constitution: democracy and the bounded states in which democracy may exist are evidently presupposed rather than justified in Rawls’s theory of justice. In Rawls’s work [...] primacy is given not merely to a social (as opposed to an individual) view of reason but very specifically to a political view. He distinguishes his conception of reasonableness from communitarian views, which may count shared social norms as reasons. Since he takes pluralism seriously, he does not assume that social norms will be shared by all fellow citizens, or could provide reasons for action for all. Yet Rawls, too, sees justification between fellow citizens as presupposing a lesser, more political and procedural range of consensus.

(O’Neill, 2003, p.353)

I bracket much in regard to Rawls’ political liberalism. What is important for my project is the link with the citizen and civic virtue that sees pluralism as a natural outcome in the relationship between fellow citizens. This leads to Rawls’ conclusion that:

[The] safety of democratic liberties, including the liberties in non-political life [...] requires the active participation of citizens who have the political virtues needed to sustain a constitutional regime [...] If we are to remain free and equal citizens, we cannot afford a general retreat into private life.

(Rawls, 2001, p.144)

According to Richard Dagger (2014) what we can take from Rawls’ approach is that:

Civic virtue is the disposition that citizens must display if their society is truly to be a fair system of cooperation that will endure over time, “from one generation to the next.” No political society can be a fair system of cooperation over time unless its members, as a rule, do in fact treat one another fairly and cooperate to advance their shared good as a society. When the disposition to act fairly and cooperatively is widespread, then there is “some hope of realising social concord and civic friendship”.

(Dagger, 2014, p.299)

Rawls’ liberal approach is similar to civic republican liberalism in that no political community can be fair unless its citizens treat one another fairly and work to serve the common good. As Dagger says:

Civic virtue is thus intimately connected to Rawls’s fundamental idea of political society as a fair system of cooperation over time from one generation to the next, where those engaged in cooperation
are viewed as free and equal citizens and normal cooperating members of society over a complete life […] Rawls’s republicanism may be of a modest or chastened sort, but his political liberalism clearly has an affinity with the republican ideal of citizenship.

(Dagger, 2014, pp.299-300)

The major difference between MfP and Rawls’ politically focused view that connects public reason with the political community, is that MfP-patriots accept public reason as the reason of people within the broader association and community of my patria and polity. In MfP rationality and shared final ends are associated with the prepolitical as well as the political. Rawls, by contrast, restricts such a view to the political community, arguing that political society is a social good because it entails a shared political final end, the achievement of which calls on the cooperation of all citizens (Rawls, 2001, p.201).

I agree with Rawls’ insight into the political society as a social good that treats pluralism as a natural phenomenon. However, simply focusing on cooperation restricted to political ends is insufficient as it is simply not capable of motivating people to care enough. To make people love something, or to motivate them to act, they need to see their country as their own, and without the cultivation of strong sustaining emotions of pride and shame there will be the problem of watery motivation. My main point of difference with Rawls, therefore, is that in order to be a good citizen, or be sufficiently troubled to go out of my way to do the right thing as a citizen, an attachment to both my patria and polity is required. The civic and social solidarity that MfP generates for compatriots, at least on my conception of civic republican liberalism, is based on a feeling of shared fate, where the sharing itself is of value. Charles Taylor is right when he argues it is this that makes the relationship with my compatriots and co-citizens peculiarly binding and vitalises my civic solidarity (Taylor, 1995, p.239). If correct, it is not hard to see why people identify so strongly with the ‘imagined’ community of my patria and polity, with its history, traditions, social lineage, myths, symbols, literature, land and environment and so forth.74 As Dagger says:

74 Rawls does admit that his first use of such ideas to support political liberalism and his political conception of justice was misleading and led to objections. He claims to have corrected these and cleared up the obscurities
Rawls invests too much in “citizens’ allegiance to public reason and their honouring the duty of civility” [...] but too little in considerations such as patriotism, nationalism, or solidarity. Civic virtue is supposed to inspire people to put the public good ahead of their personal interests, but Rawls’s conception seems too abstract and bloodless to provide such inspiration. (Dagger, 2014, p.308)

This is a concern for the sufficiency of Rawls’ explanation that is limited to political society and political objectives. Rawls, on the other hand, offers a view to which all rational people may adhere, which is a crucial component of the solution to the challenge of pluralism or varied conceptions of the good. *MfP*, however, builds on Rawls’ account in two ways. First, by fusing the prepolitical with the political to create the motivation to sustain a shared identity and common purpose, consistent with the unavoidable pluralism that exists within my *patria* and *polity*. By including the prepolitical this avoids the Rawlsian danger of reducing individuals to their political role as citizens only. *MfP* acknowledges its role toward moral, intellectual, social, cultural and environmental ends that may not immediately serve political interests and ends. And secondly, the danger that Rawls sees in focusing on the prepolitical is somewhat diminished in the sentiment of *MfP*, because my richer conceptualisation provides a sense of country and civic solidarity, which is inclusive and open, and can be shared by all its members. More specifically, *MfP* acknowledges and deals with the challenge of pluralism in the following ways:

- By being a moderate form of patriotism that is inclusive.
- By embracing republican liberalism that supports personal autonomy and individual rights, as well as common liberty and the common good.
- By encouraging a critical form of loyalty through *philo-philia*.
- By focusing on the moral wellbeing of the *patria* and *polity*.
- By being guided and motivated by moral principles that apply to all people in the form of basic rights.

Having outlined how *MfP* deals with the challenge of pluralism, I will end the chapter by dealing with two important matters. First, to establish the limits of moral partiality. And secondly, to challenge the analogy between patriotism and racism, which fails to properly

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in later versions of his work (Rawls, 2005, p.xxx). He also seems, at least by some, to be more accommodating towards the role of culture and tradition in his later work; for example, see O’Neill (2016, pp.81-83).
distinguish patriotic from other kinds of preferential attitudes, especially those expressed by racists.

2.4.1 THE LIMITS OF MORAL PARTIALITY

I think most reasonable people would recognise that there must be some limits on moral partiality. To see this, we only have to look at the level of inequality between the world’s affluent and the global poor who lack basic human necessities. Not only does this appear intuitively bad but from certain moral perspectives is clearly unjust. As I have already argued, MfP is committed to basic rights. MfP-patriots may have special duties to their compatriots, but they also have obligations to those beyond the borders of my patria and polity. To reinforce the position that there must be some limits on moral partiality, I will briefly (1) consider Peter Singer’s consequentialist argument that we have positive obligations to others; (2) link this view to Henry Shue’s concept of universal basic rights; (3) highlight Thomas Pogge’s cosmopolitan argument that we have negative duties not to harm the world’s poor; and (4) acknowledge that even when we give priority to our own country and compatriots we still have obligations to others, especially the global poor.75

Singer (1972) sets out a positive duty to save the lives of strangers when we can do so at relatively little cost to ourselves. By using the example of the Bengal emergency he argues that:

The way people in relatively affluent countries react to a situation like that in Bengal cannot be justified; indeed, the whole way we look at moral issues - our moral conceptual scheme - needs to be altered, and with it, the way of life that has come to be taken for granted in our society.

(Singer, 1972, p.230)

75 See Larry Temkin (2004) for different positions that favour or are against obligations to others. At one end of the spectrum there are those who argue we should do nothing to prevent the world’s poor from dying, claiming that for each person saved many more will die tomorrow (the lifeboat metaphor). Others who state we could help the global poor but that we may also in certain circumstances ignore their plight; there is no right or wrong so failing to help the global poor cannot be wrong. Or those who believe the global poor may have a right not to be attacked, but they have no right to be aided – thus the affluent do not act unjustly if they fail to aid. At the other end of the spectrum a view exists that we must do everything we can to aid the global poor even if the interests of the affluent have to be sacrificed.
He asserts that:

[If] it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it. […] The outcome of this argument is that our traditional moral categories are upset. The traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot be drawn, or at least, not in the place we normally draw it. Giving money to the Bengal Relief Fund is regarded as an act of charity in our society.

(Singer, 1972, p.235)

Rather than relying on charity alone, what Singer offers up is a positive obligation of the affluent that, in effect, places a limit on moral partiality. The obligation is that: ‘we ought to give [a significant proportion of our] money away [to the poor] and it is wrong not to do so’ (Singer, 1972, p.235).

Rather than discussing the obligations of the affluent, Henry Shue (1980) adopts a broader approach to limit moral partiality through the concept of universal basic rights. As I set out earlier in the chapter, Shue’s basic rights are the morality of the depths, they are the line beneath which no one is to be allowed to sink (Shue, 1980, p.19). For example, Shue argues that the basic right to subsistence (unpolluted air, clean environment, adequate food, water, shelter, minimum medical care and so on) includes positive duties to do something for those who do not have these things (Shue, 1980, p.52). If we accept Shue’s assumption that a basic right is the rational basis for a justified demand, then the global poor ought to insist on this demand being fulfilled (Shue, 1980, p.19). So, if the affluent deny basic rights to the global poor they cannot complain when such denial is attacked or challenged. Basic rights, then, also place limits on moral partiality.

The obvious criticism of basic rights and their correlative duties to the global poor is that they may sound impressive and attract broad support, but in reality it is difficult to actually uphold a right and fulfil a duty in the absence of adequate institutions to do so. Of course, this problem along with the challenge of getting the citizens of affluent countries to care enough is a very real worry. Earlier, I dealt with this worry and concluded that Shue’s moral argument for basic rights is a powerful and rational approach for grounding obligations that ‘we’ may have to ‘others’. The idea is that if the global poor have a basic
right to subsistence, then there will be three correlative duties for the affluent; that is, duties
to avoid, protect and aid. These include positive duties as in Singer’s position, but also
negative duties as in Thomas Pogge’s cosmopolitan duty not to harm.

For Pogge (2005) the affluent share responsibility for the plight of the global poor and the radical inequality that exists:

This radical inequality and the continuous misery and death toll it engenders are foreseeably
reproduced under the present global institutional order as we have shaped it. And most of it could be
avoided, I hold, if this global order had been, or were to be, designed differently. [The] global poor
are being harmed by us insofar as they are worse off than anyone would be if the design of the global
order were just.

(Pogge, 2005, p.55)

Remedying this injustice and compensating its victims is a requirement of justice:

I hold that justice requires at least that any institutional order we impose must fulfil the human rights
of those on whom it is imposed insofar as this is reasonably possible. […] That some institutional
order foreseeably reproduces an avoidable human rights deficit is thus on my view merely a sufficient,
not a necessary, condition for this order being unjust and for its imposition being a violation of a
negative duty of justice and hence a harming.

(Pogge, 2005, p.76)

Pogge’s approach to global justice considers the implications not of a strong positive
obligation of assistance (like Singer) but a negative duty not to harm. This harm is their
human rights being violated.

In their different ways, Singer, Shue and Pogge conclude that it is necessary to place
limits on moral partiality. For all of them, citizens of wealthy nations have obligations to
the global poor. Even considering moral partiality from the perspective of the priority thesis,
which recognises special obligations and prioritises my country and compatriots, I come to
the same conclusion. There must be some limits on moral partiality. We can see this in the
type of priority captured in liberal nationalism. Cosmopolitans, at least hard cosmopolitans,
believe obligations to global justice should cross and disregard national boundaries. The
perspective held by liberal nationalists, however, is that the world is a diverse community,
consisting of many nations, each composed of individuals who perceive the world through
the lens of their unique national identity. When talking about national identities, David
Miller (2008) takes it as self-evident:
That ties to community are an important source of [...] trust between individuals who are not personally known to one another [...]. A shared identity carries with it a shared loyalty, and this increases confidence that others will reciprocate one another’s behaviour. [It is the] strength of national identity [...] but also the character of national identity that matters from the point of view of social justice.

(Miller, 1995, pp.92-94)

The position of liberal nationalists is open to challenge. For example, some argue that being born in a wealthy nation is simply an accident of birth, which does not seem to be a proper basis for distributive justice and prioritising compatriots. This may be right on the basis of fate. However, it is hard not to agree with Miller (1995) when he challenges hard cosmopolitanism or international humanism, such as that expressed by (for example) H.G. Wells, which seek to diminish the idea of nationhood:

These attempts seem to me misguided for two reasons. The first is that people are simply too attached to their inherited national identities to make the obliteration an intelligible goal [...]. The idea they should regard their nationality merely as a historic accident, an identity to be sloughed off in favour of humanity at large, carries little appeal. The second reason for not taking the cosmopolitanism of an H.G. Wells to heart is that nationality has served and continues to serve a number of important purposes, when judged by values that most liberals will want to uphold.

(Miller, 1995, p.184)

Miller is correct about the importance of countries for things like identity, trust, collective responsibility, and creating the conditions to maximise life chances. His view leads to a recognition that compatriots from an affluent country may be able to justify sustaining some of the advantages they have and be given priority consideration over others.

Even so, Miller (2005) goes on to claim:

Special duties are generated within groups that are intrinsically valuable and not inherently unjust, where the duties can be shown to be integral to relationships within the group. Since nations can be shown to meet these conditions, acknowledging special obligations towards compatriots is justified. However for such partiality to be reasonable, it must be balanced against recognition of duties of global justice. These duties include duties to respect human rights and duties of fairness towards non-nationals.

(Miller, 2005, p.63)

In the same way that Miller’s liberal nationalism is reasonable, MfP is reasonable because the special concern for my compatriots are balanced against universal basic rights that demand duties to avoid, protect and aid. It is in this way that there are limits on my moral partiality, which are necessary if it is to act as a steppingstone for the good of humanity.
When it comes to the limits on \( MfP \), I accommodate basic rights from a deontological moral stance rather than that of a consequentialist. As will be seen shortly, this is reflected in the Korsgaardian justificatory grounds I will set out in Chapter Three. My view is consistent with that of Thomas Nagel (2021) who says:

The appeal of the consequentialist way of valuing people impartially cannot be denied. It may seem that there is no way to take the points of view of all individuals into account without merging them into a single ocean of benefits and harms, which is then valued as a whole. Yet there is another way. In deontological morality each individual faces us separately, and the inviolability of the individual facing us dominates the rival claims of those we could help by sacrificing him to the general welfare. In a sense the inviolability of that individual stands for the inviolability of all.

(Nagel, 2021, p.18)

He goes on to say:

This individualised moral respect is something that morality can guarantee to everyone equally: the same entitlement to be treated in certain ways, the same status, the same limits or boundaries. It determines the character of our relations with one another. Each person with whom I interact presents me with the same stubborn and impenetrable moral surface that I present to him: there are certain things that may not be done by either of us to the other. And this ‘moral minimum’ is an expression, in the structure of morality, of the demand that moral consideration should respect each individual separately. That is not the case if morality in principle permits the complete subordination of one person’s interests to the greater interests of others.

(Nagel, 2021, p.18)

I follow the view of Nagel by combining a deontological approach with basic rights and their correlative duties, which is \( MfP \)’s (in Nagel’s words) ‘moral minimum’. It is an approach consistent with the second-order impartialism position I set out in Chapter One. As Nagel says:

Ethics always has to deal with the conflict between the personal stand-point of the individual and some requirement of impartiality. […] The requirement of impartiality can take various forms, but it usually involves […] according them all the same rights […] in determining what would be a desirable result or a permissible course of action.

(Nagel, 1987, p.215)

Having established that moral partiality has and should have limits, I will now turn to the distinction between patriotic and other group attitudes such as those held by racists.

2.4.2 DISTINGUISHING PATRIOTISM FROM RACISM

The claim that patriotic attitudes are analogous to racism is made by Paul Gomberg (1990). This claim, if true, would undermine my moral form of partiality, thus it is one I want to
reject. According to Gomberg, patriotism, even in a moderate form, is immoral and ‘no better than racism’ (Gomberg, 1990, p.105). Gomberg questions whether the patriot ought to be more committed to preserving their own traditions over those of other countries (Gomberg, 1990, p.107). He believes that this commitment is based on valuing them more than those of other nations, which: ‘looks a lot like racism, at least in the broad sense [of the word] where it includes ethnic and national chauvinism’ (Gomberg, 1990, p.107). Gomberg argues that patriotism and racism are similar in that they both involve an unwavering loyalty to one’s own group at the expense of others: ‘Both patriotism and racism rely on an “us versus them” mentality, in which the in-group is valued and the out-group is devalued’ (Gomberg, 1998, p.135). He claims that: ‘Patriotism and racism are both forms of group identification that involve a fundamental commitment to one’s own group and a corresponding disregard (or worse) for others’ (Gomberg, 1998, p. 134). Overall, he views patriotism and racism as sharing many similarities and that both involve harmful attitudes that can lead to unjust actions towards others. Gomberg concludes that: ‘patriotism is inherently immoral and that it is immoral because of its bad effect’ (Nathanson, 1992, p.113).

In ‘Is Patriotism Like Racism’ (1992) Stephen Nathanson’s goal is to disprove the claim that: ‘If racism is an inherently evil special tie, then there can be no good forms of racism, and if patriotism is like racism, it too must be rejected’ (Nathanson, 1992, p.114). Nathanson’s conclusion is that patriotism is not inherently racist because it can be based on a love and appreciation for one’s country, culture, and values without rejecting or devaluing other groups. I will explain briefly how he gets to this conclusion. In doing so, I provide plausible grounds for distinguishing patriotic attitudes from those of a racist.

The first step Nathanson takes is to draw a distinction between different forms of patriotism. He says:

[Patriots] may differ among themselves in important ways. In particular, those whom I call **extreme patriots** believe in the superiority of their own country and seek to dominate others. They have little or no concern for persons outside their own country […]. Those that I call **moderate patriots**, however, have a special affection for their country but do not believe in its superiority or seek dominance over others. [They] do have concern for others besides their fellow citizens and want their
country to pursue its good within the limits of various moral constraints. […] I believe that moderate patriotism is morally permissible while extreme patriotism is not.

(Nathanson, 1992, p.114)

From this distinction, he then goes on to present a similar perspective on racism. Nathanson says that Gomberg is correct in arguing that patriotism and racism have some things in common (Nathanson, 1992, p.115). For Nathanson, however, the question is:

Whether we should call [these things in common] ‘racism.’ […] When speaking of racism, we tend to mean not just a positive attitude towards one’s own race but a negative attitude towards other races. […] Racism, as we ordinarily speak of it, is the analogue of extreme patriotism, for it implies not just special regard for one’s own group but a special disregard for other groups. Hence, there is a sense in which racism is necessarily immoral, while patriotism is not similarly immoral by definition because it can take extreme or non-extreme forms.

(Nathanson, 1992, p.115)

Whilst agreeing with Gomberg that racism is analogous with extreme patriotism, Nathanson departs from him by distinguishing not only different forms of patriotism, but also a ‘morally acceptable form of racial loyalty’ that is distinct from racism and is ‘comparable to moderate patriotism’ (Nathanson, 1992, p.115):

While racists believe in the superiority of their own race and seek its dominance over others, moderate racial loyalists have special concern for their own racial group and may devote special efforts for achieving its well-being. Nonetheless, unlike racists, they would recognise and respect the rights of members of other races and would honour moral constraints that limit the actions that may be done to advance their own group’s well-being.

(Nathanson, 1992, p.115)

I do not have the space to unpick the complex distinction between racism and what Nathanson’s type of racial loyalty looks like in practice. Nathanson, however, equates the latter with Martin Luther King’s central mission to promote the rights and well-being of African Americans (Nathanson, 1992, pp.115-117). In King’s case, racial loyalty is morally defensible insofar as it was necessary to fight for equality and redress the injustice of racism. The example of King as a racial loyalist is a credible one which adds considerable weight to Nathanson’s argument. One might argue, however, that we need to defend moderate white racial loyalty as well as King’s, but I do not believe this is necessary. As Nathanson says:

American Blacks have been an oppressed group that has needed special attention. Whites are not similarly oppressed as a group. Thus a person with a special affection and concern might not be equally justified in promoting their interests if their interests are already well served and those in other racial groups are not.

(Nathanson, 1992, p.117)
If correct, Nathanson’s perspective can also be applied to the concept of patriotism. If a country is already in a more favourable position than other nations, it would be inappropriate to prioritise efforts solely for the benefit of one’s own country, particularly if it means disregarding the more urgent needs of other countries (Nathanson, 1992, p.117).

This brief account of the way that Nathanson deals with the patriotism and racism analogy, provides a persuasive way to distinguish patriotic attitudes from racist attitudes. In principle, one could apply this approach to all sorts of group attitudes. For example, I am a Catholic, but I make a distinction between extreme Catholics and moderate ones. As a moderate Catholic I have special concern for the Catholic Church but, unlike extreme Catholics, I recognise and respect the rights of other religions, agnostics and atheists, and through certain universal principles that apply to all, I will pursue the interests of the Catholic Church in a way that is consistent with these. What I conclude from Nathanson is that once we make a distinction between bigoted and non-bigoted forms of group loyalty and attitudes, then, we can see that there are forms of group loyalty that are comparable to moderate patriotism. Patriotism, in Nathanson’s moderate form, or in MfP, is analogous to moderate non-bigoted group loyalty. It is not analogous to bigoted group loyalty and attitudes, because the latter is by definition a non-moderate point of view (Nathanson, 1992, p.116).

2.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I presented my multidimensional taxonomy of patriotism in order to identify the sweet-spot space for MfP. Alongside the thoughts of Mazzini, I identified a number of different forms of patriotism helpful to my project to develop the rich conceptualisation of MfP and eight of its nine key features. I then set out how MfP acknowledges and deals with pluralism. I finished by establishing that there are limits to moral partiality, and I challenged the claim that patriotic attitudes are indistinguishable from racist attitudes. In the next chapter, I will set out the moral justificatory grounds for MfP.
CHAPTER 3

THE JUSTIFICATORY GROUNDS FOR MFP

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In setting out the justificatory grounds for MfP, I start by highlighting the problem with using the standard intrinsic value/instrumental value distinction to describe the goodness of one’s country. The solution I put forward presents my patria and polity as a conditional value that is objectively good when the condition of its objective goodness is met. I then argue that MfP is a moral obligation. The justification for this claim comes from our rational agency, which is an approach I borrow from the Kantian-inspired views of Christine Korsgaard (1983, 1996 & 2009). This involves having the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot. It is from this form of patriot identity we get the principle to reject indifference and neglect. This principle can be willed as a universal law and encompasses a number of acts-for-the-sake-of-a-specific-end; that is, actions to satisfy the condition of objective goodness of my patria and polity. My focus in the rest of the chapter is the detailed grounding for two of the three actions that are encompassed by the universal law. The first involves the MfP-patriot acting to foster and sustain the social fabric. The second involves the MfP-patriot acting to secure the common good. In terms of the third, the MfP-patriot acting to protect the environment of my patria and polity, I set out the detail of this in Chapter Four as part of the ninth key feature of MfP - the disposition that underpins MfP (cppc-conservatism).

3.2 A PROBLEM WITH INTRINSIC/INSTRUMENTAL VALUE

Before setting out my conditional value solution and in order to unpack the issues at hand, I will consider how the valuing of one’s country is typically described. The standard approach is to see one’s country as being either intrinsically valuable or instrumentally valuable, where
intrinsic value and instrumental value are treated as correlatives. Unfortunately, this view that assumes the two ways of valuing are correlative can lead to a debate that either exaggerates the differences or understates the areas of common ground between different arguments about the value of one’s country. It is this way of valuing one’s country that I seek to challenge.

In their book *The Ethics of Patriotism: A Debate* (2015) the discussion between John Kleinig and Simon Keller usefully highlights this problem. The country, on Kleinig’s view, has two crucial roles to play in allowing humans to flourish through their relationships. First, it creates a social order within which various valuable personal and social relationships are attainable and secure. Secondly, it sets the conditions that make particular kinds of good social human lives possible; for example, British lives, Finnish lives and so forth. Although these two roles have important instrumental dimensions, for Kleinig, the significance of the country, understood as an associational object, permeates the character of the goods to which it contributes (Kleinig, 2015, p.26). Kleinig believes that: ‘the life of the individual is framed by her relationship with her country, so that when she thinks of her relationships, her way of life and her identity, her connection with country is always present. It is then natural for the individual to value her country as she values the goods whose character her association with the country permeates’ (Keller, 2015, p.124). Kleinig believes that valuing one’s country intrinsically is not only natural but also correct and admirable. In valuing it intrinsically, we show understanding of our identity and have a commitment to the distinctive prepolitical and political background that makes lives like ours possible (Kleinig, 2015, pp.25-27).

Keller grants that a country characteristically makes significant contributions to human flourishing of the kinds Kleinig describes. He believes, however, that it: ‘does not follow that the individual will naturally come to value one’s country intrinsically and that such valuing, in any case, would be neither right-minded nor desirable’ (Keller, 2015, p.125). That something makes certain intrinsically valued things possible does not mean that it should be intrinsically valued itself. For Keller: ‘someone who values a country for
its contribution to one’s identity and to other independent goods need not be seeing one’s country’s value inaccurately’ (Keller, 2015, p.126). Nevertheless, he believes there is reason to think it is a mistake to value it intrinsically: ‘There are good and bad countries, and whether a country is good or bad depends - surely - upon what it does for individuals’ (Keller, 2015, p.126). For Keller, patriotism leads to bad faith.  

By this he means: ‘In valuing her country intrinsically [a] patriot is likely to treat her country as a kind of grand presence, having a virtuous character and holding an irreducible value that is not to be questioned, and not as a sprawling and complex entity whose character and value are derived entirely from individuals and activities out of which it is comprised’ (Keller, 2015, p.127).

My problem with their debate, at least on these terms, is that Kleinig and Keller clearly conflate different distinctions of value. To avoid the conflation problem and to provide a more meaningful way to describe the value of my patria and polity, over the next two sections I will put forward two interdependent claims. First, in Section 3.3, I will claim that my patria and polity, the object of MfP, is a conditional value that is objectively good as long as the condition of its objective goodness is met. The condition of objective goodness is the desire for human flourishing, which is satisfied by adopting the principle to reject indifference and neglect. Linked to this is my second claim in Section 3.4. I argue that we require a conception of practical identity to provide justificatory reasons, govern the choice of our actions, and to act upon our desires. It is the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot, the subject of MfP, that is the best patriotic/citizen identity to act to satisfy the condition of objective goodness of my patria and polity. Together, the two claims lead to my conclusion that MfP is a moral obligation.

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76 For his Sartrean-inspired ‘bad faith’ argument against patriotism see Keller (2007, pp.71-93).
3.3 MY PATRIA AND POLITY: A CONDITIONAL VALUE

As with Korsgaard, my concern is with the kind of goodness that marks a thing out as worthy of choice. I am interested in the: ‘type of judgment that judges particular things to be good absolutely, meaning that here and now the world is a better place because of this thing’ (Korsgaard, 1983, p.169). With this focus in mind, Korsgaard argues that the familiar instrumental value/intrinsic value distinction conflates two distinctions of goodness, that between instrumental and what she calls final value, and that between intrinsic and extrinsic value. Korsgaard believes that moral philosophy has got confused by failing to observe these two distinctions:

One is the distinction between things valued for their sakes and things valued for the sake of something else - between ends and means, or final and instrumental goods. The other is the distinction between things which have their value in themselves and things which derive their value from some other source: intrinsically good things versus extrinsically good things. Intrinsic and instrumental good should not be treated as correlatives, because they belong to two different distinctions. (Korsgaard, 1983, p.170)

For Korsgaard, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value is about the way things have value: intrinsic value is the value a thing has in itself; extrinsic value is the value a thing has from another source. The distinction between ends and means is about the way we value things: valuing something as an end is to value it for its own sake; to value it as a means (instrumentally) is to value it for the sake of something else. As a consequence of these distinctions, one should not, as is so often done between those debating the value and goodness of patriotism, treat intrinsic and instrumental value as correlatives, since intrinsic comes from the distinction in ways things have value, whereas instrumental comes from the distinction in ways we value things. As Rae Langton (2007) points out a failure to observe these distinctions raises problems about objectivity which are different depending on how the distinctions are brought together:

If we suppose that to have intrinsic value is no more than to be valued as an end, we make goodness subjective - too subjective, […] since whatever we happen to have as an end turns out to be intrinsically valuable. If we go the other way […] and say that the things that have intrinsic value are, or ought to be, treated as ends, we make goodness objective - too objective […], since the possession of goodness turns out to be wholly independent of anyone's valuing it or taking an interest in it. This option [is] obscurely metaphysical and quite mysterious.

(Langton, 2007, p.161)
With these distinctions properly established a more refined picture of value and objectivity becomes available. It does so by considering the circumstances (conditions) in which a thing is objectively good:

For Kant, the end/means distinction can be said to be a distinction in the way we value things. By contrast, the unconditioned/conditioned distinction is a distinction not in the way we value things but in the circumstances (conditions) in which they are objectively good. A thing is unconditionally good if it is good under any and all conditions, if it is good no matter what the context. In order to be unconditionally good, a thing must obviously carry its own value with it - have its goodness in itself (be an end in itself).

(Korsgaard, 1983, p.178)

A thing is conditionally valuable if it is good only when certain conditions are met:

We can say that a thing is good objectively (this is my terminology) either if it is unconditionally good or if it is a thing of conditional value and the conditions of its goodness are met [...] "good objectively" is a judgment applying to real particulars: this woman's knowledge, this man's happiness, and so on. To say of a thing that it is good objectively is not to say that it is the type of thing that is usually good (good kind of things like knowledge or happiness) but that it contributes to the actual goodness of the world: here and now the world is a better place for this.

(Korsgaard, 1983, p.179)

Korsgaard goes on to say:

When a thing is valued as a means or instrumentally [...] it will always be a conditionally or extrinsically valuable thing, and the goodness of the end to which it is a means will be a condition of its goodness. Instruments therefore can only be conditionally valuable. If the conditions of their goodness are met, however, they can be good objectively. The more important point is about things valued as ends. These are also conditionally or extrinsically good.

(Korsgaard, 1983, p.180)

According to Korsgaard, on the Kantian conception of goodness an: ‘end is objectively good either if it is unconditionally good, or if it is conditionally good and the relevant condition of goodness is met [for Kant it is only the] power of our rational nature, which characterises the “good will” or “humanity”, that has unconditional value; everything else is extrinsically or conditionally valuable’ (Korsgaard, 1983, pp.183-184). When I use the terms the ‘good will’ or ‘humanity’, what I mean is acting in accordance with the formal requirements of rational agency: ‘here the foundation of morality is located in the rational nature that we share with all rational beings’ (Wilson & Denis, 2018, pp.3-6).

Taking Korsgaard’s Kantian-inspired view of unconditional value, which she equates to intrinsic value, and conditional value, which she equates to extrinsic value, has the
advantage of allowing a better description of certain kinds of things in a way that is more
natural and meaningful:

The distinction between a thing that is intrinsically good and a thing that is extrinsically good yet
valuable as an end allows for the possibility that the things that are important to us have an objective
value yet have that value because they are important to us. Objective goodness is not a mysterious
ontological attribute. The things that are important to us can be good: good because of our desires
and interests and loves and because of the physiological, psychological, economic, historical,
symbolic and other conditions under which human beings live.

(Korsgaard, 1983, p.195)

It is helpful to demonstrate how this works by looking at one of the examples Korsgaard
gives; a mink coat that is a common symbol of aspiration:

Is it valuable as a means or an end? One hardly wants to say that it is valuable only as a means to
keep the cold out. The people who want mink coats are not willing to exchange them for plastic
parkas, if those were better protection against the elements. [...] A mink coat can be valued the way
we value things for their own sakes: a person might put it on a list of the things he always wanted, or
aspire to have some day [...]. Yet it is also odd to say it is valued simply for its own sake. A coat is
essentially instrumental: were it not for the ways in which human beings respond to cold, we would
not care about them or ever think about them. To say that the coat is intrinsically or unconditionally
valuable is absurd: its value is dependent upon an enormously complicated set of conditions [...].
What would a coat be? [One] is tempted to say that its instrumentality is one of the elements in the
“intrinsic nature” of a coat, even though it can hardly be said to be a property the coat would have
under any set of laws of nature. If its instrumentality is not one of its intrinsic properties, then one is
regarding the coat as something else - an animal skin sewed into a peculiar shape, perhaps. But then
it seems as if one must strip away the practically relevant properties of the coat in order to ask about
its intrinsic value - and that cannot be right. It is equally absurd to say of such a thing that it is a mere
instrument, just because its value is conditioned. The Kantian distinctions allow us to say that the
cloth is valued in part for its own sake, although only under certain conditions. It even allows us to
say of certain kinds of things, such as luxurious instruments, that they are valued for their own sakes
under the condition of their instrumentality: that is, given the role such things play in our lives.

(Korsgaard, 1996, pp.263-264)

In applying Korsgaard’s Kantian distinction, I describe my patria and polity as a
thing that is extrinsically good. It gets its value from another source; that is, it is valued as
an end to satisfy the desire for human flourishing. I value it in part for its own sake, although
only under the condition of its usefulness – the role it plays in our lives. It is a conditional
value where: ‘the goodness of the end [to which my patria and polity is a means] is the
condition of its objective goodness’ (Korsgaard, 1983, p.180). Under this approach I have
the capacity to freely set up the condition of objective goodness (the desire for human
flourishing) on the basis of practical reason and rational agency, rather than following ends
given by arbitrary endorsement or instinct alone. I will come to rational agency in the next section, but first I will say something about how the condition of objective goodness brings moral authority to my argument. I start by briefly considering the importance of Kant’s and Korsgaard’s approach to morality.

Kant’s approach to grounding moral normativity is a complex matter, but basically it includes the concepts of the categorical imperative, universalisability, autonomy, the free will, and a lack of contradiction. Robert Johnson and Adam Cureton (2016) explain that for Kant:

[The] supreme principle of morality is a standard of rationality that he dubbed the “Categorical Imperative” (CI). Kant characterised the CI as an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we must always follow despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary. All specific moral requirements, according to Kant, are justified by this principle. […] The fundamental principle of morality - the CI - is none other than the law of an autonomous will. Thus, at the heart of Kant’s moral philosophy is a conception of reason whose reach in practical affairs goes well beyond that of a Humean ‘slave’ to the passions. Moreover, it is the presence of this self-governing reason in each person that Kant thought offered decisive grounds for viewing each as possessed of equal worth and deserving of equal respect.

(Johnson & Cureton, 2016, p.1)

Universalisability, through the categorical imperative, means one should act only according to that principle by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law:

Basic moral requirements retain their reason-giving force under any circumstance, they have universal validity. […] Only a universal law could be the content of a requirement that has the reason-giving force of morality. […] This is the principle which motivates a good will, and which Kant holds to be the fundamental principle of all of morality.

(Johnson & Cureton, 2016, p.14)

Autonomy is the self-legislative capacity of a free will and is the source of normativity. It is:

The Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law. [This can be stated as a formula]: Act so that through your maxims you could be a legislator of universal laws. [Autonomy in this sense puts] on display the source of our dignity and worth, our status as free rational agents who are the source of the authority behind the very moral laws that bind us.

(Johnson & Cureton, 2016, p.26)

Kant thought that we could test whether a principle could serve as a law by seeing whether there is any contradiction in willing it as a law which all rational beings could agree to act on together. This is known as the ‘contradiction in conception test’ (Johnson & Cureton,
For Korsgaard, the argument that we are bound by the categorical imperative, by itself, does not show that we are bound by the moral law. For that we need another step which recognises the importance of our social nature:

The agent must think of herself as a Citizen of the Kingdom of Ends [Kant’s utopia of all rational beings]. Kant thought that we could test whether a maxim could serve as a law for the Kingdom of Ends by seeing whether there is any contradiction in willing it as a law which all rational beings could agree to act on together [but in a workable cooperative system].

(Korsgaard, 1996, p.99)

It is not necessary for my project to go into the finer detail of what being a ‘Citizen of the Kingdom of Ends’ involves. What I am interested in is Korsgaard’s recognition of our inherent social nature which entails acting only on principles that all rational agents could agree to act on together, but in a workable, cooperative, and I would add, social and political system. It is this recognition that I use to link my patria and polity (the conditional value and the object of MfP) with the MfP-patriot (the subject of MfP and source of the condition of objective goodness):

- First, for my patria and polity, the conditional value, the MfP-patriot assigns the condition of objective goodness, which is the desire for human flourishing.
- Secondly, the MfP-patriot adopts the universal principle of rejecting indifference and neglect in order to act to satisfy the desire for human flourishing. The universal principle binds us to the moral law because it is a principle that all rational people can agree to act on together without contradiction in the workable, cooperative, social and political system of my patria and polity.
- Consequently, I am able to identify my patria and polity with: ‘the kind of thing that marks it out as worthy of choice; to judge it as a particular thing to be good absolutely, meaning that here and now the world is a better place because of it’ (Korsgaard, 1983, p.169).

This is clearly a better way of describing the value and goodness of my patria and polity. As will become clear in the next section, however, key to my argument is the recognition that as rational agents in order to act we need practical identities. My claim is

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77 For Kant ‘Kingdom of Ends’ means the systematic union of different rational beings under common laws established by the categorical imperative. These represent the measure used to evaluate the worthiness of an individual's actions. When all citizens live by the categorical imperative each one will treat all of her fellow citizens as ends in themselves, instead of means to achieving one’s own selfish goals. Citizens can only belong to the ‘Kingdom of Ends’ when they become subject to these universal laws. Such rational beings must regard themselves simultaneously as sovereign when making laws, and as subject when obeying them. Morality, therefore, is acting out of reverence for all universal laws which make the ‘Kingdom of Ends’ possible. In a true ‘Kingdom of Ends’, acting virtuously will be rewarded with happiness – see Kant’s (2012) *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.  

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that it is the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot which is the best identity to act in my patria and polity. This is because what comes with the MfP-patriot identity is the desire for human flourishing, which is the condition of objective goodness to be assigned to my patria and polity. The MfP-patriot’s purpose is to satisfy this desire by adopting the principle to reject indifference and neglect, which includes the actions to foster the social fabric, secure the common good and protect the environment of my patria and polity. This principle encompasses actions and a desire that are fundamentally related to one another; they are acts-for-the-sake-of-a-specific-end. It is from this combination that the MfP-patriot’s principle can be willed as a universal law without contradiction by all rational agents, which makes it morally good and has authority for all in my patria and polity. This makes being a MfP-patriot a moral obligation. The justification for my claim comes from Korsgaard’s first-person rationality view to which I now turn.

3.4 THE MORAL OBLIGATION CLAIM FOR MFP

In unpacking my moral obligation claim I will do the following. First, I introduce Korsgaard’s view and how it relates to the subject and object of MfP (the MfP-patriot and my patria and polity). Secondly, I explicate Korsgaard’s conception of the nature of action and what makes actions right or wrong. Thirdly, I set out Korsgaard’s view on rational agency, self-constitution and the critical role that practical identities play in giving us our justificatory reasons for the choices we make. A practical identity is a description under which we value ourselves and find our lives worth living and our actions to be worth undertaking. Fourthly, I set out how and why we should choose the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot from among other possible patriot/citizen identities. Finally, I will end by expressing the essential elements of my moral justificatory argument.
Korsgaard’s Kantian views are complex and even contentious for some. It is beyond my project to deal with the possible objections to her approach. Before proceeding, however, I will say why it provides a credible solution from which to justify MF as a moral obligation. It is important to be clear on what I mean by moral obligation. I follow Margaret Moore (2009) who describes it with four features: to act ‘to do something’; is ‘presumptively decisive’; retains its ‘force even when overridden’; and ‘cannot be waived by the duty bearer’ (Moore, 2009, p.388). So, being a MF-patriot is an obligation that involves an action to do something, that is, apply the universal principle to reject indifference and neglect to satisfy the desire for human flourishing. As MF is a moderate form of patriotism based upon critical loyalty, the obligation is defeasible rather than absolute; it can sometimes be outweighed by other considerations. It is, however, an obligation that cannot be waived by the duty bearer which, in my case, are all the rational agents in my patria and polity. Freeriding is frowned upon. There may be consequences for not acting as a MF-patriot the good citizen. For example, these may range from some form of moral remainder (an individual feeling moral pain or anguish) to sanctions imposed for breach of national security, intelligence or defence requirements.

This view is consistent with Korsgaard’s approach that reflects a: ‘normative truth about fundamental human relations [that] what surely matters most is our reason and agency, not merely some abstract truth but a truth with a practical agency-enabling function’ (FitzPatrick, 2005, p.688). Korsgaard’s reason-based theory is the most plausible to meet the needs of rational agency in my project; a need I originally identified when setting out my starting point in Chapter One. It provides a credible, interesting and reason-based approach

78 For those who argue against Korsgaard there is no single complaint. For various challenges to her views on, for example, value, agency, identity and interpretation of Kant, see Langton (2007), Bukoski (2018), FitzPatrick (2005) and Gowan (2002).
79 The possible alternatives I have in mind to Korsgaard’s Kantian-inspired approach include, for example, those from a Humean perspective that, arguably, relegates reason to a subservient role in relation to the passions (Schmitter, 2021). Or from the objectivist perspective of G.E. Moore (1922) who, arguably, believes a thing can have value independently of whether anyone cares about it or not.
for moral justification that can be applied to patriotic and national identities.\(^{80}\) According to Korsgaard, her approach provides moral justification in three ways. (1) It satisfies the person who asks the normative question in the first person. (2) It has ‘transparency’ by allowing us to know the real reasons for our being morally motivated, and it appeals in a deep way to our sense of identity and our sense of integrity. And (3) by knowing that in doing the wrong thing we would face a loss of identity (Korsgaard, 1996, pp.16-17). Korsgaard’s Kantian idea of justificatory adequacy rejects the view that the possession of goodness for a thing is independent of anyone valuing or desiring it. Under this view, whether my patria and polity is valuable or good depends, ultimately, on having the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot which, in my project, is the main source of justificatory moral reasons.

3.4.1 LINKING KORSGAARD’S APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT AND OBJECT OF MFP

As I highlighted in Section 3.3, Kant believes that there can be things or ends that we value for their own sakes that nevertheless have their value because of extrinsic features, such as their relation to our contingent tastes, interests and desires. According to Tamar Schapiro (2015): ‘Kant’s view is that we confer value on the things we contingently like, need and desire, by choosing them in accordance with the formal constraints of rationality’ (Schapiro, 2015, pp.1123-1124). Korsgaard reflects this position by adopting a rationality-based approach that bridges subjectivism and objectivism. Broadly, subjectivism is the view that value comes from the valuer; objectivism is the view that value comes from the object – its intrinsic properties (Schapiro, 2015, p.1125). According to Schapiro, Korsgaard maintains that:

[Subjectivism and objectivism] effectively deny that we can argue rationally about whether a given end is good. In attempting to justify our choice of ends, we can refer either to a brute psychological

\(^{80}\) Clearly, Korsgaard’s Kantian approach is not the only one that could be applied to meet the needs of rational agency; however, for my project it is the most appealing. I also use it for coherency as it better aligns with the other Kantian-inspired writers elsewhere in my project; especially, O’Neill, Kleingeld, Ross and Baron.
state or to an unanalysable, nonnatural property. Rational argument is about the effectiveness of the means, or the compossibility of the ends. But it is not about the worthiness of the ends as such.

(Schapiro, 2015, p.1125)

The approach that Korsgaard takes is based on the belief that: ‘all values and reasons are human creations, and that the materials from which they are created are things like our desires’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.209). She argues that: ‘when I will a certain maxim as a universal law [reject indifference and neglect in my case], when I will to perform a certain act for the sake of a certain end [act to satisfy the desire for human flourishing through my patria and polity, the end I seek in my case], I am also willing a value, for I am declaring this action to be worth doing for its own sake’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.209). If the inspiration I have for performing the action is my desire for the end (human flourishing through my patria and polity in my case) what I am actually doing is setting a value on the end itself:

A value, like everything else, is a form in a matter. In the case of value, the form is the form of universal law, and the matter comes from human psychology: some desire, interest, or taste. In that sense, we can see our values as depending on our desires: the objects of desire, ultimately, provide the matter for our values.

(Korsgaard, 2009, p.209)

The important thing for my project is that, for Korsgaard, values are not created out of nothing, they are creations we invite others to share:

Values are human creations, but they are not created ex nihilo with every action. When we create values, we invite others to share them, not just in the sense of helping us to promote them, but in the sense of interesting themselves in the valued object too. And, because we share a nature, the invitation is often accepted, and then people begin to explore the possibilities, and a tradition begins to take hold.

(Korsgaard, 2009, p.209)

This first-person rationality-based approach offers a way of thinking that links the MfP-patriot’s desire for human flourishing with the value or objective goodness of my patria and polity. My patria and polity gets its objective goodness from satisfying the desire for human flourishing, which is the condition of its objective goodness. However, the measure for achieving this end, in a good way, comes from the MfP-patriot practical identity and what it is trying to do. The purpose of a MfP-patriot is to specifically satisfy the desire for human flourishing (the matter of value that comes from our human psychology). The MfP-patriot does this by adopting the principle to reject indifference and neglect by acting to
foster the social fabric, secure the common good and protect the environment (the form of value which is the universal law). The value that is created from this purpose is not just for the individual MfP-patriot, but is something that ought to be shared and promoted by all compatriots/co-citizens (rational agents) in my patria and polity. According to Korsgaard:

[We all] live inside of such traditions of value that we hope and expect others around us to share [it is in this way we can] better understand our relationship to the projects that are grounded in these values. (Korsgaard, 2009, p.209)

To have a commitment to my patria and polity focused on the desire for human flourishing is not to commit to this because I think it is good for me privately. Rather, it is to stand in a special relationship to others in my patria and polity because I think the desire is good publicly for all those who are in a relationship with it (Korsgaard, 2009, p.211). It is the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot that is the best identity, not only for me but for all my compatriots, to reject indifference and neglect to satisfy the desire for human flourishing through my patria and polity. It is through the MfP-patriot identity that MfP is a moral obligation. Korsgaard says that having such an identity:

[Matters] to you both that it is a particular part - your own part - and that it is a part of the larger human story. What you want is not merely to be me-in-particular nor of course is it just to be a generic human being - what you want is to be a someone, a particular instance of humanity.

(Korsgaard, 2009, p.212)

To understand how I get to this claim for the MfP-patriot identity it is necessary to comprehend Korsgaard’s position on acts and actions.

3.4.2 ACTS AND ACTIONS

Korsgaard does not take the standard philosophical approach to the nature of action in order to establish what makes actions right or wrong. She says:

Nowadays even moral philosophers who are not utilitarians appear to be comfortable only if they can explain moral value in terms of the production of various goods and harms.

(Korsgaard, 2009, p.8)

It is from Aristotle, but more so Kant, that Korsgaard gets her description of an action. From Aristotle she claims:
A good action is one that embodies the orthos logos or right principle - it is done at the right time, in the right way, to the right object, and - importantly for my purposes - with the right aim. […] The key to understanding Aristotle’s view is that the aim is included in the description of the action, and that it is the action as a whole, including the aim, that the agent chooses.

(Korsgaard, 2009, p.10)

In the case of Kant:

Kant thinks that an action is described by a maxim, and a maxim is also normally of the “to-do-this-act-for-the-sake-of-this-end” structure. [The] maxim of an action which is tested by it includes both the act done and the end for the sake of which that act is done. It has to include both, because the question raised by the categorical imperative test is whether there could be a universal policy of pursuing this sort of end by these sorts of means.

(Korsgaard, 2009, pp.10-11)

Korsgaard clarifies what Kant is getting at:

Let’s say that the basic form of a Kantian maxim is “I will do act-A in order to promote end-E.” Call that entire formulation the description of an action. An action, then, involves both an act and an end, an act done for the sake of an end.

(Korsgaard, 2009, p.11)

Korsgaard’s view is that actions are: ‘acts-for-the-sake-of-ends [they are] both the objects of choice and the bearers of moral value’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.12). It is this view that sets her apart from many contemporary philosophers who: ‘tend to think of the reason for an action as something outside of or apart from the action itself, something that perhaps serves as its cause’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.12). According to Korsgaard, often when we think about reasons we think of two types: ‘one for the act and one for the action’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.13). She does not believe this is what we are asking when we ask for the reason why someone did something:

What may be worth asking for is an explication of the action, a complete description of it, which will show us why it seemed worth doing to him. Now normally we already know what the act was, so the missing piece of the description of the action is the purpose or end. […] So when we ask for the reason we are not just asking what purpose was served by the act - we are asking for a purpose that makes sense of the whole action.

(Korsgaard, 2009, pp.13-14)

Korsgaard is clear that:

[The] reason for an action cannot be separated from the action because understanding the action and the reason amounts to the same thing [instead, an action is best understood as] something that embodies a reason in the same way that a sentence embodies a thought.

(Korsgaard, 2009, p.14)

It is from this view we establish moral properties. To do so, Korsgaard relies on Kant’s view that some actions are identified by the categorical imperative. In the categorical imperative
the: ‘parts of an action are the act and the end [the question is] whether the act and the end are so arranged, or related to one another, that the maxim can serve as a universal law’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.15).

In the case of MfP this view applies in the following way. MfP-patriots adopt the principle to reject indifference and neglect to satisfy the desire for human flourishing through my patria and polity by acting to foster the social fabric, secure the common good, and protect the environment. Clearly this principle includes good actions, but what gives them moral properties? Korsgaard says:

The goodness does not rest in the parts, but rather in the way the parts are combined and related; so the goodness does not rest in the matter, but rather in the form, of the maxim. If the action and the purpose are related to one another so that the maxim can be willed as a universal law, then the maxim is good.

(Korsgaard, 2009, p.16)

This is clearly the case for the principle that the MfP-patriot adopts. The principle describes three actions (foster, secure and protect). These actions are good if the principle is fit to be a law in virtue of its form (reject indifference and neglect to satisfy the desire for human flourishing by acting to…). Here: ‘the [principle] itself, and therefore the actions, have the property of lawfulness’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.16). Korsgaard believes that we understand what is meant by lawfulness if we think of two kinds of rightness – permissibility and obligation. In one sense the MfP-patriot’s principle is permissible because: ‘it could function as a law’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.16). However, it is fit to be a law in a stronger sense because it: ‘corresponds to obligation [that is] not only can it be a law but it must be a law’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.16). Korsgaard explains that the way: ‘we ascertain this is by showing that the [principle] of doing the opposite is unfit to be a law, and must be rejected’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.16). We can see this if the MfP-patriot’s principle was set out as ‘act with indifference and neglect…’ instead of ‘act to reject indifference and neglect…’. Clearly, we cannot universalise the former as living in a world based upon such a principle would be, to say at best, highly problematic for fostering and sustaining any relationship. By adopting the principle in the latter form we can universalise it, the idea being that the
three actions encompassed in the principle demand to be done: ‘to omit them would be a violation of duty’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.17). For Korsgaard, these actions are carriers of moral worth, and the duty owed by individuals is the formal characteristic articulated in the principle that encompasses them (Korsgaard, 2009, p.18).

This is an interesting, persuasive and credible argument. Even so, it will be obvious that I am only providing a sketch of the complexity that grounds Korsgaard’s Kantian views. My aim, however, is to provide sufficient grounds to draw out Korsgaard’s central claim for actions and what makes them good or bad. As she says of acts-for-the-sake-of-ends:

\[
\text{[Actions] in this sense are the bearers of moral value, and that moral value, that is, dutifulness, […] is a property internal to actions - a formal property embodied in the principles that describe them […] actions in this sense are chosen for their own sakes, because they embody this property.}
\]

(Korsgaard, 2009, p.18)

Having established Korsgaard’s conception of actions, acts-for-the-sake-of-ends, I will now move on to its importance for rational agency.

### 3.4.3 RATIONAL AGENCY

Korsgaard says that it is essential to the concept of action that an action is performed by an agent. This is a straightforward enough thought:

One must be able to attach the “I do” to the action in the same way that, according to Kant, one must be able to attach the “I think” to a thought. […] an action requires an agent, someone to whom we attribute the movement in question as its author. […] it is essential to the concept of agency that an agent be unified. […] For a movement to be my action, for it to be expressive of myself in the way that an action must be, it must result from my entire nature working as an integrated whole.

(Korsgaard, 2009, pp.18-19)

Korsgaard believes that as a rational agent I am aware of the grounds of my beliefs and actions. This awareness gives me reflective distance from them and, effectively, puts me in control. On the one side I have a desire. On the other I must decide what I am to do to satisfy this desire, this Korsgaard calls our reason. In this respect I am divided into parts. In order to bridge this divide I must, as Korsgaard puts it: ‘pull yourself together by making a choice. And in order to make that, reason needs a principle - not one imposed on it from
outside. For it has no reason to accept such a principle, but one that is its own’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.213):

[You] are called on to act, in that specifically human way, to make a choice, and you can’t escape it. So you need a principle. Where are you to find it? It is implicit in the demands of your agency itself. What is an agent? An agent is the autonomous and efficacious cause of her own movements. In order to be an agent, you have to be autonomous, because the movements you make have to be your own, they have to be under your own control. [...] the constitutive standards of action are autonomy and efficacy, and the constitutive principles of action are the categorical and hypothetical imperatives. (Korsgaard, 2009, p.213)

What Korsgaard means is that when we act, what we are in fact doing is a form of self-constitution: ‘we are trying to constitute ourselves as the authors of our own movements, and at the same time, we are making ourselves into the particular people who we are [...] the function of action is self-constitution’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.xxi). She argues that the only way we can constitute ourselves is by:

[Governing] yourself in accordance with universal principles which you can will as laws for every rational being. [This means] that a commitment to the moral law is built right into the activity that, by virtue of being human, we are necessarily engaged in the activity of making something of ourselves. The moral law is the law of self-constitution, and as such, it is a constitutive principle of human life itself. (Korsgaard, 2009, pp.xxi-xxiii)

For Korsgaard the rational agent must think and act in accordance with universal laws. This point is important to my project, because it is by reasoning in accordance with the principle (reject indifference and neglect…) that brings authority to the public (all my compatriots) from the private (the MfP-patriot identity). As the principle can be willed as a universal law without contradiction, it obligates all rational agents to act in a certain way (adopt the identity of a MfP-patriot which is focused on the actions to foster, secure and protect) within the workable, cooperative, social and political system of my patria and polity. It is worth quoting Korsgaard at length on this matter:

[Every] rational agent must will in accordance with a universal law, because it is the task of every rational agent to constitute his agency. And the law ranges over all rational beings, that is, it commands you to act in a way that any rational being could act, because you could find yourself in anybody’s shoes, anybody’s at all, and the law has to be one that would enable you to maintain your integrity, in any situation, come what may. And the reasons that you legislate when you will the law have to be public, that is, have to have normative force that can be shared by all rational beings, because acting is interacting with yourself - yourself at other times or in other possible situations. You have to make laws for yourself. And unless the laws that you make now bind you at other times and in other situations, and unless the laws that you know you would make at other times and in other
situations bind you now, they won’t hold you together into a unit after all. And in order to do that, the reasons that you legislate must be public. So the laws have to be laws for every rational being, laws whose normative force can be shared.

(Korsgaard, 2009, p.214)

This is not as mysterious as it sounds. To put Korsgaard’s point simply, as it applies to MfP, it is our rational agency that provides us with the capacity to endorse our desires or set ends freely (autonomy) through the exercise of practical reason. As rational agents, my compatriots must act in a way that any rational agent could act in accord with the MfP-patriot’s principle to reject indifference and neglect. This is because the principle is capable of being a universal law without contradiction. It is a law that is public and whose normative force can be shared by all the compatriots/citizens in my patria and polity. In other words, as rational agents my compatriots would have ‘reason’ to fully inhabit the practical identity of a MfP-patriot. For Korsgaard, the normative word ‘reason’ refers to a kind of reflective success that is specifically linked to the necessity of action and the need for justification that comes from our practical identities, which collectively she refers to as rational agency (Korsgaard, 1996, pp.93-94).

Korsgaard argues that there are three elements of rational agency. The first element, as just touched upon, is the reflective structure of consciousness:

The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a reason. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it cannot commit itself or go forward. If the problem springs from reflection then the solution must do so as well. If the problem is that our perceptions and desires might not withstand reflective scrutiny, then the solution is that they might. We need reasons because our impulses must be able to withstand reflective scrutiny. We have reasons if they do.

(Korsgaard, 1996, pp.93-94)

Korsgaard argues that humans are conscious of their own mental states and, consequently, face the question of whether to endorse intuitions and desires as a basis for action or belief. As Michael Bukoski (2018) says: ‘We have the capacity to step back from our desires and reflectively evaluate them, and our mind is such that we must endorse a desire before we can act’ (Bukoski, 2018, p.208). The second element is the necessity of action:

Human beings are condemned to choice [sic] and action. Maybe you think you can avoid it, by resolutely standing still, refusing to act, refusing to move. But it’s no use, for that will be something you have chosen to do, and then you will have acted after all. Choosing not to act makes not acting a
kind of action, makes it something that you do. […] the necessity of action is, by contrast, as Kant would say, unconditional. […] It is our plight: the simple inexorable fact of the human condition.

(Korsgaard, 2009, pp.1-2)

Korsgaard’s third element of rational agency is the need for justification. She claims that we cannot resolve the problem presented by the reflective structure of human consciousness by intuition or randomly endorsing one desire over another. Rather, we must have a justification based upon reasons for supporting a particular desire/ end that we seek. Central to this view is her conception of a practical identity, which is best understood as:

[A] description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. […] for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, […] someone’s lover or friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.

(Korsgaard, 1996, p.101)

I will turn now to Korsgaard’s conception of a practical identity, as it is this in the form of the \textit{MfP-patriot} identity, which gives rise to the reasons and obligations that establish the normative justification we apply in reflection.

3.4.4 PRACTICAL IDENTITIES (REASONS & OBLIGATIONS)

Korsgaard argues that the basis of choice is what she calls a conception of practical identity. She says that in order to: ‘endorse reasons and the obligations that arise from a certain practical identity is to value oneself as the bearer of that form of identity’ (Korsgaard, 1996, pp.101-102). Korsgaard’s claim is that the reflective structure of the mind requires us to have a conception of ourselves that, in turn, functions as our standard. Such a conception gives a description under which: ‘we value ourselves, find our lives to be worth living and our actions to be worth undertaking’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.101). In line with this view she argues that it is our practical identities that give rise to normativity. They do so: ‘positively in that they allow us to turn desires into reasons [and] negatively in that obligations spring from what our practical identities disallow’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.101). In my project it is the \textit{MfP-patriot} identity that brings with it the desire for human flourishing and turns it into
normative reasons for action. The obligations that spring from the MfP-patriot identity involves a combination of special duties and basic rights. Earlier, I highlighted Korsgaard’s view that: ‘a kind of value can be possessed by a whole action – an act done for the sake of an end’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.21). Korsgaard also believes that practical identities confer: ‘a kind of value on whole actions where they define […] contingent forms of duty’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.22).

Conceptions of practical identity include many things; for example, Father, Catholic and MfP-patriot. According to Korsgaard, these conceptions of identity: ‘govern the choice of our actions, for to value yourself in a certain role or under a certain description is at the same time to find it worthwhile to do certain acts for the sake of certain ends, and impossible, even unthinkable, to do others’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.20). It is in this way that Korsgaard concludes that a practical identity can be understood as a set of principles or as a role with a point, which provide criteria for reflection and judgement, and is the source of our justificatory reasons (Korsgaard, 2009, p.21). What I take from Korsgaard is that when we value ourselves under a certain description in the form of a practical identity, this is the way we endorse the reasons and obligations to which that identity gives rise (Korsgaard, 2009, p.24). What Korsgaard has in mind is that:

[In] valuing ourselves as the bearers of contingent practical identities, knowing, as we do, that these identities are contingent, we are also valuing ourselves as rational beings. For by doing that we are endorsing a reason that arises from our rational nature - namely, our need to have reasons. And […] to endorse the reasons that arise from a certain practical identity just is to value yourself as the bearer of that form of identity. We owe it to ourselves, to our own humanity, to find some roles that we can fill with integrity and dedication. But in acknowledging that, we commit ourselves to the value of our humanity just as such.

(Korsgaard, 2009, p.24)

This insightful view leads to the conclusion that in order to be a person and to have reasons, I must establish myself as a particular person. This seems obvious enough but, as I set out in the last section, in order to do that I must commit myself to the value of being a rational agent, or as Korsgaard puts it, a person-in-general: ‘I need to establish myself as the author
of my own actions in the very act of choosing it [action is self-constitution and] what makes actions good or bad is how well they constitute you’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.25):

The task of self-constitution involves finding some roles and fulfilling them with integrity and dedication. It also involves integrating those roles into a single identity, into a coherent life. People are more or less successful at constituting their identities as unified agents, and a good action is one that does this well.

(Korsgaard, 2009, p.25)

For my project, the practical identity of a MfP-patriot is the patriot/citizen role that can be fulfilled with integrity and dedication as part of living a coherent life. It is the role in which all members of my patria and polity can value themselves as self-constituted unified agents. This is because what comes with the practical identity of a MfP-patriot is the desire for human flourishing, and the universal law to reject indifference and neglect that encompasses the acts-for-the-sake-of-a-specific-end (foster, secure and protect). Although these are the main reasons for choosing the MfP-patriot identity, they are not the only ones. To establish the full reasons, I will now turn to the criteria on which my compatriots ought to choose to be MfP-patriots.

3.4.5 CHOOSING THE MFP-PATRIOT PRACTICAL IDENTITY

When it comes to a citizen identity, Korsgaard says that:

[A] citizen of a certain nation values himself under that description is not to say that his purpose is to be a citizen of that nation. It is to say that he ratifies and endorses the reasons and obligations that go with being a citizen of that nation, because that’s how he sees himself.

(Korsgaard, 2009, p.24)

What does this mean for the MfP-patriot as a citizen and why should my compatriots adopt the identity of a MfP-patriot? According to Korsgaard, part of the answer is that my compatriots must take some ways of identifying themselves with their country or they will have no reasons at all. As it is a non-voluntary relationship we have no choice to have some sort of patriotic/citizen relationship with one’s own country. Clearly, the type of patriot/citizen identification we express may be strong for some, or weak and feeble for others. Nevertheless, because different expressions of the patriotic/citizen identity are contingent,
we ought to adopt the version that best allows us to value ourselves as a self-constituted rational agent. As Korsgaard argues, to endorse the reasons that arise from a practical identity and to recognise the special obligations that comes with it: ‘just is to value yourself as the bearer of that form of identity. We owe it to ourselves, to our own humanity, to find some roles that we can fill with integrity and dedication’ (Korsgaard, 2009, p.24).

Christopher Gowans (2002) believes that Korsgaard’s view offers only a partial solution when it comes to choosing a practical identity and distinguishing between strongly normative identities; for example, being a MfP-patriot, or another form of patriot/citizen of the UK, an EU-patriot or a worldly citizen:

[If] practical identities are to provide us with obligations (and reasons) that are normative and sometimes of great strength and importance, [we need] to explain how a contingent practical identity can be strongly normative [...] The problem is that it is difficult to see how this can be explained by Korsgaard’s theory of autonomy that grounds normativity solely in the will. According to this theory, the principle of the will is what can be willed as a law [...] since such a will could will any weakly normative identity, this cannot be a basis for determining which among these identities are strongly normative. [...] It is thus perplexing how there could be a basis in the will alone that explains the strong normativity of an identity (and more generally, how one permissible identity could be better than another).

(Gowans, 2002, pp.551-552)

Gowans concludes that Korsgaard’s introduction of practical identities may have been a promising enrichment of Kant’s moral philosophy, yet it gives rise to new problems concerning the ability of autonomy (the self-legislative capacity of a free will and the source of normativity) to bear the normative burden Korsgaard requires (Gowans, 2002, p.570).

There is merit to the criticism around Korsgaard’s method of how one actually chooses a strongly normative practical identity, at least when it comes to my patria and polity. Korsgaard believes all practical identities are contingent and can be given up if necessary in favour of another, with the exception of the identity of humanity (Korsgaard, 1996, p.121). The problem with this view, however, is that some identities may be easy to give up; for example, a carpet bowler or stamp collector, whereas others are not; for example, father, or the patriotic/citizen identity that comes from the association with my patria and
polity. Such contingent identities which arise from non-voluntary relationships, good or bad, are not easy or even possible in some cases to give up.

Although Korsgaard states we can give up contingent identities we should not misunderstand what she means by this. The reason why contingency is important for Korsgaard is that without it we cannot exercise choice and our free will as rational agents. It is consistent with her position, at least in the case of the patriot/citizen, to say that I may not be able to give up the non-voluntary relationship with my patria and polity, but I can choose, or in Korsgaard’s terms ‘construct’, the form of (patriotic) practical identity and the way in which it is expressed (Korsgaard, 1996, pp.239-240). The key is in her view that our rational nature through our practical identities only establishes the moral underpinning. In other words, it establishes moral criteria but it does not tell us how to act or to choose on all occasions. In this way, Korsgaard acknowledges that there are other political and prepolitical conditions/traditions that play a part in the expression of a particular identity (Korsgaard, 1996, pp.121-122). For example, in the case of a patriot/citizen identity, some versions, such as a Mfp-patriot, may be morally valuable because it is focused on human flourishing, moral wellbeing, is motivated by the emotions of shame and pride, involves special not exclusive concern, and is a critical form of loyalty committed to basic rights. Other types of patriotic identity like blind or robust patriotism, which are focused on exclusive concern, uncritical loyalty and exceptionalism, less so.

In his analysis of her position, Gowans puts forward but ultimately does not pursue, what is a satisfactory extension of Korsgaard’s argument that provides a clearer basis upon which to choose, or how to express, a strongly normative practical identity. Gowans takes the grounding of this extension from John Rawls. Rawls believes that our good is determined by the plan of life that we would adopt with full deliberative rationality, but this requires the person to possess knowledge and awareness of relevant facts and conditions in our reasoning (Rawls, 1999, pp.370-372). According to Gowans, there are two features of note here: ‘[first] it places conditions on what could count as a person’s good [and second]
it makes a person’s good depend on what the person would choose under these conditions’. For Gowans, while: ‘rational principles can focus our judgments and set up guidelines for reflection, we must finally choose for ourselves’ (Gowans, 2002, pp.561-562).

What Gowans takes from Rawls’ theory is a kind of moral criterion and a discretion criterion. The first is needed to meet the requirements for objectivity and normativity. The second is needed because of the prepolitical and political conditions that are directly linked to our identity, our choices and desires, and the ability to act. By applying Gowans’ (2002, pp.561-562) approach the application of the two criteria for MfP goes as follows. The practical identity of a MfP-patriot is strongly normative for a person, if and only if, the following criteria are met: (1) being a MfP-patriot is morally permissible through Korsgaard’s requirements for objectivity and normativity; and (2) if the person was fully rational and adequately informed in regard to the relevant prepolitical and political conditions. If these criteria are met, then being a MfP-patriot is strongly normative and is an identity I choose because it is morally justified. And as a fully rational agent I am adequately informed in regard to all relevant conditions and reasons to, in Korsgaard’s terms, ‘construct’ or fully occupy my patriot/citizen identity in order to best act.

For my project, these relevant conditions and reasons include the following three things. First, the sentiment of MfP and its nine key features which includes: philo-philia, a fusion of the political and prepolitical, civic republican liberalism, special not exclusive concern, the focus on moral wellbeing, critical loyalty, being globally sensitive, the commitment to universal basic rights, and the disposition that underpins it (cppc-conservatism). MfP is a progressive moderate form of patriotism compatible with the position of soft cosmopolitanism, and is a Mazzinian-like steppingstone for the good of humanity. Second, the MfP-patriot’s recognition of the importance of tradition, history and social lineage that results in a common identity, a sense of belonging, and a connection ‘extended over time’ with my patria and polity. This recognition results in a special concern for, and special obligations to, my compatriots/fellow citizens. Being a MfP-patriot means
ratifying and endorsing the reasons and obligations that go with being a citizen of my patria and polity. And third of utmost importance, is the MfP-patriot’s pursuit of a social and publicly endorsable common end, which is to satisfy the desire for human flourishing through my patria and polity.

The MfP-patriot identity provides justificatory reasons of great value and strength that makes it strongly normative. It is the form of patriot/citizen identity my compatriots can adopt with integrity and dedication over other patriotic/citizen identities. As Korsgaard says:

> When we adopt (or come to wholeheartedly inhabit) a conception of practical identity, we also adopt a way of life and a set of projects, and the new desires which this brings in its wake.
> (Korsgaard, 1996, pp.239-240)

Having attended to the challenge about how one chooses the MfP practical identity, and having set out the relevant arguments from Korsgaard that ground my moral obligation claim, I will end by expressing the essential elements for the justification of MfP.

### 3.4.6 THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF MFP

When it comes to my patria and polity, it is the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot that establishes the moral justification we apply in reflection as rational agents. I have established from Korsgaard the following grounds for this claim. First, the basis of the choices we face rests in the conception of practical identity we hold. To endorse the desires, reasons and the obligations that arise from a practical identity is to value ourselves as the bearers of that form of identity. Second, valuing ourselves in this practical identity is at the same time to find it worthwhile to do certain acts-for-the-sake-of-a-certain-end. Third, in order to make a choice and to act we need a principle that can be willed as a universal law. Fourth, a good action is one that supports my self-constitution as a rational agent by acting in accordance with a universal law. The principle that we self-legislate through our rational nature must be public so its normative force can be shared.
The MfP-patriot’s principle is to reject indifference and neglect to satisfy the desire for human flourishing through three actions: to foster the social fabric, secure the common good and protect the environment of my patria and polity. The actions are morally good if the principle is fit to be a law in virtue of its form. The actions and the desire are related to one another so that the principle can be willed as a universal law (this is demonstrated by not being able to universalise its negative form). The universal law encapsulates acts-for-the-sake-of-ends that are both the objects of choice and the bearers of moral value. The universal law comes from the strongly normative practical identity of the MfP-patriot and it demands to be followed. To not do so would be a violation of duty. It has, therefore, authority for all compatriots/ co-citizens in my patria and polity.

My compatriots should adopt the identity of a MfP-patriot because, as Korsgaard argues in the case of a citizen identity, they must take some way of identifying themselves with their country, or they will not have any reasons at all. Endorsing the reasons that arise from the MfP-patriot practical identity and to recognise the obligations that comes with it is to value oneself as the bearer of that form of identity. As will be seen in Section 3.5, these obligations include both special perfect and special imperfect obligations but, as I set out in Chapter Two, they also include a commitment to basic rights. As I argue in Chapter One, MfP is based upon the position of second-order impartialism. Being a MfP-patriot and having special concern for my country is morally justified because it is permissible for people of all countries, at least all free liberal democracies in similar circumstances, to have the same type of special patriotic concern for their country. It is the form of patriot/ citizen identity we can best fill with integrity and dedication.

Whether my patria and polity is objectively good depends ultimately on the practical identity of a MfP-patriot. As a result, we do not need to identify the value that is carried by and comes directly from my patria and polity. Instead, it is better to think of it as a conditional value that is objectively good when the condition of its objective goodness is satisfied. When my compatriots come to wholeheartedly inhabit the MfP-patriot practical
identity, they are determining the rationality of choice and certifying objective moral goodness. They are adopting a relationship with my *patricia* and *polity* based on the desire to satisfy the condition of its objective goodness. The universal law that comes with the *MfP*-patriot identity encompasses acts-for-the-sake-of-a-specific-end that are the bearers of moral value and dutifulness. The universal law is public and has normative authority for all rational agents in my *patricia* and *polity*. It is in this way that *MfP* is a moral obligation. Figure 3.1 provides a simplified representation of the key elements of my argument.
Figure 3.1 The Justificatory Grounds for MFP

The Argument

Our Rational Agency - the three features of rational agency (reflection, action and justification) sets us a problem, which is how can we best act to satisfy the desire for human flourishing above our close relationships?

1) Reasons & Obligations - the MfP-patriot identity is where our normative reasons and obligations come from. They provide the grounds for reflection and justification to endorse and act to achieve the desire.

2) The Means – it is through the workable, cooperative, social and political system of my patria and polity (the conditional value) that we are best able to to satisfy the desire for human flourishing (the condition of objective goodness).

3) The Solution – to achieve the desire we apply the principle to reject indifference and neglect that can be willed as a universal law without contradiction in my patria and polity.

4) The Acts-for-the-sake-of-a-specific-end – these are objects of choice and bearers of moral value. They are encompassed by the universal law. The MfP-patriot must act to foster the social fabric, secure the common good and protect the environment of my patria and polity.

5) Commitment to Universal Principles – although these actions give rise to special perfect and imperfect obligations, the MfP-patriot recognises the value and dignity of all people and applies an objective view in the form of basic rights.

Conclusion - Moral value and dutifullness is conferred by (1) the conditional value of my patria and polity, which is objectively good through its condition of objective goodness. And (2) by the principle and the actions that come from the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot. These are related in such a way that the principle can be willed as a universal law. The universal law has authority for all rational agents within the workable, cooperative, social and political system of my patria and polity. Therefore, MfP is a moral obligation.
My rationality-based approach, which combines duty with basic rights, is consistent with the position of Thomas Nagel (2021). He seeks to defend the deontological approach against the view that sees: ‘our attachment to rights and deontology as an unnecessarily cluttered moral outlook, which grossly magnifies the claims of the person facing us, and limits our rationality’ (Nagel, 2021, p.18). I agree with Nagel’s conclusion that, whatever the merits of other moral theories, deontology, at least in the type of approach I advocate for Mfp, is important to value individuals and is consistent with basic rights:

[By] treating each of them decently come what may, and demanding such treatment for ourselves, is a vital part of our lives. Most important, it is a distinctive way of thinking about how to relate to one another, the source of our constantly developing interpretations of people’s equality of status as the bearers of human rights. Without it the advantages of membership in the moral community would be seriously diminished – not quantitatively but qualitatively. (Nagel, 2021, p.19)

In line with second-order impartialism, my deontological approach is a motivational tool for action in the interests of humanity. It emphasises the importance of adhering to a universal moral principle that prohibits treating people merely as means to an end. It is an approach that increases the feelings of empathy, compassion and moral concern for others. By framing the purpose of the Mfp-patriot in terms of its broader impact on my patria and polity, it motivates the support for actions that satisfy the desire for human flourishing, which is a steppingstone to the good of humanity.

Having summarised the justificatory grounds for Mfp, I will now set out the detail behind the first two actions provided by the practical identity of a Mfp-patriot to reject indifference and neglect. I start with the action to foster and sustain the social fabric.

3.5 MFP AND THE SOCIAL FABRIC

To foster and sustain the social fabric is an act-for-the-sake-of-a-specific-end encompassed by the Mfp-patriot’s universal principle to reject indifference and neglect. The adoption of this principle makes certain required special obligations and social virtues vindicable within the context of my patria and polity. To unpack this claim I will start by saying something
Onora O’Neill’s (1996) approach to justice and virtue, in which she uses the rejection of indifference and neglect to highlight those principles of virtue necessary to foster and sustain the social fabric. I then set out how these principles of virtue are practically applied through *special perfect obligations* and *special imperfect obligations*. I will end by linking these special obligations to the required social virtues as they relate to the strongly normative practical identity of a *MfP-patriot*.

There is much that I bracket in regard to O’Neill’s views on justice and virtue. What is relevant for my project is her claim that: ‘justice and virtue are often discussed in quite different registers, depicted not as allies but as antagonists whose philosophical champions fight over endless issues’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.9). Her concern is that justice and virtue, formerly seen as distinct but complementary, are incompatible:

> Even if justice constrains states, laws and institutions, while virtue informs the characters of men and women and the ethos of communities, might they not be compatible, indeed complementary, as earlier writers supposed? […] Or are recent writers right to depict justice and the virtues as fundamentally incompatible, and to argue that one provides an ethically sound and the other an ethically inadequate orientation to human life? If so, why has the vast majority of past writers on ethics and politics overlooked this fundamental incompatibility?

(O’Neill, 1996, pp.9-10)

O’Neill’s answer is to argue that concern for justice and for the virtues are not only compatible but that they are mutually supporting; a conclusion consistent with my view of civic republican liberalism I set out in Chapter Two. O’Neill believes that it is quite arbitrary to insist that living by principles of justice must be all that is ethically required in action towards others to whom we are connected:

> Just institutions can aim to avert and mitigate many of the injuries to which characteristic and persistent vulnerabilities lay people open, but cannot generally avert or mitigate activity that exploits individuals’ more variable and selective vulnerability.

(O’Neill, 1996, pp.191-192)

While principles of justice take into account the diversity of lives, they pay little attention to how those lives are connected to one another. As a result, they ignore the unique ways that particular relationships give rise to particular forms of vulnerability. To correct this, O’Neill argues that: ‘there is a requirement to underpin practical reasoning with principles which, it is judged, can be principles for all where the scope of all is taken to vary
with context’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.120). This Kantian account of the authority of practical reason identifies it with reliance on followable principles of virtue and action:

Principles of justice can be derived from the requirement of rejecting inclusive principles of injuring, which are not universalisable across the domain of connected others. An analogous pattern of derivation shows that inclusive principles of indifference to and neglect of others also cannot be universalised. The underlying principles of a range of more specific required social virtues that are relevant to particular situations and at particular times can then be derived from the fact that agents have reason to reject principles of indifference or neglect.

(O’Neill, 1996, p.193)

According to O’Neill, justice can be practised in connection to all people, but as no one can always aid and care for everyone, or even simply some people, the rejection of indifference and neglect cannot be shown in action for all people (O’Neill, 1996, p.195):

Those who reject indifference must rather take some care to sustain some others in some ways; they must seek to support some others by sustaining at least some of their capacities and capabilities, their plans and their projects, where and how they can. Systematic indifference to others’ plans and projects must be avoided, but gratuitous indifference to some, indeed many, others and to many of their capacities and capabilities, and of their plans and projects, is unavoidable and not wrong. The social virtues make selective demands: they leave open to whom, or when or in what ways virtue is to be expressed.

(O’Neill, 1996, p.195)

What I take from O’Neill’s argument is, first, the endorsement of the universal principle to reject indifference and neglect; and second, that some obligations and social virtues make selective demands, leaving open to whom, or when, or in what ways, they are to be expressed. So, although: ‘justice forbids systematic and gratuitous action that injures, whether directly or indirectly, certain [special obligations] and social virtues forbid systematic but not gratuitous\(^{81}\) indifference and neglect, whose effects may also be either direct or indirect’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.204). What this means for MfP is that certain special obligations and social virtues only require selective and feasible help, care, compassion, love, loyalty, generosity and support, not generalised or maximal benevolence or

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\(^{81}\) What O’Neill means by this is that indifference for which there is no particular reason is not wrong. Sometimes action is spoken of as gratuitous with the implication that the contrary was in fact required, or that the action was in some ways spiteful or wrong. In speaking of gratuitous indifference as permissible, she intends to set aside such ironic uses of the term (O’Neill, 1996, p.195).
beneficence (O’Neill, 1996, p.195). The difference between the principles of justice to reject
injury and the principles of virtue to reject indifference and neglect is set out in Figure 3.2.

**Figure 3.2 Principles of Rejecting Injury for Justice and Rejecting Indifference and Neglect for Virtue**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Principles of Justice: rejection of injury</th>
<th>1. Rejection of direct injury to others: no systematic or gratuitous violence, coercion and so on.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Rejection of indirect injury:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Rejection of damage to the social fabric: no systematic or gratuitous deceit, fraud, incitement to hatred and so on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Rejection of damage to the material basis of life: no systematic or gratuitous damage to natural or man-made environments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Principles of Virtue: rejection of indifference and neglect</td>
<td>1. Rejection of direct indifference to others: sympathy, beneficence, love, help, care and concern, solidarity, acts of rescue and so on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Rejection of indirect indifference to others:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Rejection of indifference to the social fabric: selective care and support for social life and culture expressed in toleration, participation, loyalty, social reform and so on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Rejection of indifference to the material basis of life: selective care and concern for natural and man-made environments, expressed in cultivation, preservation and conservation and so on.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from O’Neill, 1996, p.205)

I bracket O’Neill’s discussion relating to the principles required of justice which involve: ‘perfect obligations matched by rights whose demands fall on all and are owed to all’ (O’Neill, 1996, pp.154-183). In my project I take this view to be uncontentious. Instead, I focus on the principles of virtue to reject indifference and neglect. This is because they underpin the MfP-patriot’s commitment to foster and sustain the social fabric within my patria and polity. Following O’Neill (1996, p.205) they do so in three ways:

1) MfP is best placed to provide an organising structure for sustained special affection and special concern between the members of my patria and polity. Those MfP-patriots who live with and through this pattern of life will develop deep feelings and complex expectations, including moral expectations, to compatriots. They will also develop stably internalised traits of character that enable them to act and sustain one another within this special association. These are directly expressed required social virtues that involve special perfect obligations and rights.

2) MfP is best placed to create a privileged context for special concern, tolerance, trust, shared work, and shared activities for demanding patterns of collective help, care and compassion. Here, my patria and polity provides the context for MfP-patriots to focus and channel a number of indirectly expressed required social virtues seen as special imperfect obligations.

3) MfP is best placed to reject indifference to the material basis of life in my patria and polity. These principles are expressed in a commitment for the cultivation, preservation and conservation of the
environment that the \textit{MfP-patriot} calls home. In a Mazzinian sense, the focus on the environment of my \textit{patria} and \textit{polity} is also the basis for nurturing global environmental and climate concerns.

The important point about the principles of virtue is that they create a special opportunity for specific forms of help, concern and care within my \textit{patria} and \textit{polity}:

More generally, some patterns of protected dependence and interdependence can create special opportunity and special urgency for quite specific forms of help, care and concern. The genuine rejection of indifference and neglect can therefore be achieved in part through the construction of these sorts of special relationships and associations which can foster special […] obligations and define special contexts for care and help.

(O’Neill, 1996, p.197)

To understand how these principles based upon the rejection of indifference and neglect are practically applied, I will expand on what is meant by special obligations before moving on to how these are linked to the required social virtues in my project. Figure 3.3 summarises the two categories of special obligations that are of interest in my project.

\textbf{FIGURE 3.3 SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS}

1. Special perfect obligations: Held by some; owed to specified others; counterpart special rights; fixed by structure of specific transactions and relationships; can be distributively universal given appropriate institutions and contexts.
2. Special imperfect obligations: Held by some, owed to none; no counterpart rights; embodied in ethos of specific relationships and practices and in characters; often, but not exclusively, expressed in action within special relationships.

(Adapted from O’Neill, 1996, p.152)

\textit{Special perfect obligations} have a strong modal structure; that is, they have counterpart rights which one may think of as completely specified within a specific context, which for \textit{MfP} is the workable, cooperative, political and social system of my \textit{patria} and \textit{polity}. These obligations hold only between identifiable obligation-bearers:

[Special] perfect obligations require social structures or practices that connect specific agents to specified recipients of action, to whom they owe and for whom they are bound to perform, who are the holders of the equivalent special rights. […] Some special perfect obligations can be ‘distributively’ universal (e.g. welfare rights within some restricted domain); others are defined by episodic or continuing special relationships between obligation-bearers and right-holders.

(O’Neill, 1996, pp.147-148)

\textit{MfP}-patriots have certain \textit{special perfect obligations} that presuppose a special association by which \textit{MfP}-patriots as agents act, and are connected to their compatriots within my \textit{patria} and \textit{polity}. These kinds of obligations create a complex web of moral standards that binds
agents and recipients in a web of cooperative relations. They are the associative duties that Scheffler argues and, as I covered them in Chapter One, I say no more here. Instead, I will focus on those obligations that do not exhibit a strong modal structure, but are reflected in a less complete arrangement of ethical requirements, where they are thought of as being virtues as well as obligations. These are *special imperfect obligations* that, according to O’Neill, require ‘no fixed allocation among recipients’ and, as such, they are ‘obligations without counterpart rights or entitlements’; they arise from the ‘background practices, institutions and shared social world’ of my *patria* and *polity* (O’Neill, 1996, p.148). Their role in helping to foster and sustain the social fabric is crucial. This is an important claim so I will say more about why *special imperfect obligations* are so significant for *MfP*.

As Pauline Kleingeld (2000) reminds us, from a Kantian perspective imperfect obligations have considerable latitude for their fulfilment:

> It is impossible to help all the people who are in need, and one cannot help all equally well, and this means that one must make choices. […] Imperfect duties involve a duty to adopt certain policies of action (maxims), not duties to do specific acts. What such a policy would entail in specific circumstances is a matter of moral judgment, and Kant explicitly states that it is not possible for the moral educator (or moral theorist, by implication) to decide how imperfect duties should be discharged. Any further principle in this matter would itself require moral judgment in its application, and hence there is no way around moral judgment.

(Kleingeld, 2000, p.323)

For O’Neill, this latitude leaves a lot of room for moral judgment as to both what and how much to do. The idea here is that our special relationships and roles give opportunities for the practice of *special imperfect obligations* and hence for certain social virtues:

> [Many] sorts of relationship provide particularly rich, or particularly poor, opportunities for the practice of certain special imperfect obligations, hence for certain virtues. When we think of devotion as a virtue of family life, of specific sorts of care as a virtue that responds to human suffering or frailty, or of self-possession as a virtue for weathering misplaced hostility, we think of these virtues as particularly suited to embodiment in some sorts of social roles and relationships, and as more marginal or less useful in others. This perhaps suggests why some have thought of certain virtues solely as features of special relationships.

(O’Neill, 1996, p.149)

My *patria* and *polity*, the object of *MfP*, provides a particularly rich opportunity for the practice of *special imperfect obligations* and hence for certain social virtues. For example, when we think of trust as a virtue of *MfP*-patriots, or compassion as a virtue that responds to the suffering or frailty of their compatriots, or of moral courage as a virtue for
critical loyalty. These virtues are embodied in the social role a \textit{MfP-patriot} has within my \textit{patria} and \textit{polity}. Equating special imperfect obligations with these social virtues means that these obligations are those that \textit{MfP-patriots} see as part of what is required of being good patriots and citizens. Consequently, the practical identity of a \textit{MfP-patriot} is the identity that is focused on developing both directly and indirectly expressed social virtues to genuinely reject indifference and neglect. To support this claim, I will set out what O’Neill means by directly and indirectly expressed social virtues and how they relate to \textit{MfP}.

As already claimed, the vindication for social virtues and special obligations is the principle to reject indifference and neglect. For O’Neill, there are two groups of required substantive social virtues that are linked to special obligations to express this principle.\textsuperscript{82} Referring back to Figure 3.2, the first group, \textit{B1 virtues}, is a set of social virtues which are expressed directly to my compatriots and co-citizens. They are central social virtues that demand directly expressed indifference and neglect of others be rejected:

> In a world of vulnerable beings who rejected only principles of injury in their dealings, yet were wholly indifferent to one another, many capacities and capabilities for action would falter and fail. [These] are always fragile; even the seemingly autonomous may be so only because they are secure in others’ care and concern. Hence systematic indifference to others cannot be a principle for all, and the rejection of systematic indifference is correspondingly required of all.

(O’Neill, 1996, pp.200-201)

For these directly expressed social virtues, \textit{MfP-patriots} owe allegiance, care and support, which their particular compatriots, but not all other people, have a right to receive from them. They are enacted through the \textit{MfP-patriot’s special perfect obligations}, or associative duties, that lead to rejection of direct indifference and neglect to compatriots. The directly expressed social virtues are important for \textit{MfP} as among its key features are \textit{philo-philia} and special not exclusive concern towards my \textit{patria} and \textit{polity} and its members.

\textsuperscript{82} O’Neill (1996) highlights five groups of virtues that can usefully be distinguished. I only focus on what she calls required substantive social virtues.
The second group, *B2(a) virtues*, are those that are expressed indirectly through care or concern for shared social worlds by the rejection of indirect indifference and neglect. O’Neill says that these types of social virtues are seen as *special imperfect obligations* involved in nurturing and indirectly sustaining capabilities for action, cooperation and communication:

Even when unjust institutions or action do not destroy or damage trust, and when support and care for particular others is well expressed, indifference to the social fabric which connects agents will not be universalisable. The fabric of feeling, culture and convention which sustains trust and communication is always fragile and vulnerable. It not only has to be preserved from damage and destruction but to be shielded from mere indifference or neglect. It has constantly to be created and sustained, recreated and renewed, to preserve ‘the food of future generations’; and of the present generation.


The underlying assumption of this argument is that by fostering the social fabric the social circumstances for human life and interaction may be sustained. According to O’Neill, the virtues that help foster the social fabric include a broad range of practices and attitudes:

At most times they will include toleration and trust, openness and patience, and a readiness to cooperate, to participate, to join in, to engage with others. They will also include both loyalty to others and support for achieved practices, cultures and traditions and a readiness to seek and support new ways of living and new forms of connection. [These social virtues] will be most copiously expressed by forming and sustaining, by reforming and renewing special relationships, shared cultures and shared community […].


In conclusion, by having the practical identity of a *MfP-patriot* one can best reject indifference and neglect by acting to foster and sustain the social fabric of my *patria* and *polity*. This is achieved in two ways:

1. Through directly expressed required social virtues that reject direct indifference and neglect to other *MfP*-compatriots, enacted through *special perfect obligations* with corresponding rights.
2. Through indirectly expressed required social virtues that reject indirect indifference to the social fabric of my *patria* and *polity*. These are social virtues that are *special imperfect obligations* with no corresponding rights.

These make up the first action encompassed by the *MfP-patriot’s* universal principle to reject indifference and neglect. In the next section, I will focus on the second action which is to secure the common good of my *patria* and *polity*, which I get to by combining the thoughts

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83 The effect of *B2(b) virtues*, shown in Figure 3.2, are similar to *B2(a) virtues* and they are also relevant to *MfP*. I cover these in Chapter Four as part of the ‘poetically’ present element of *cppc-conservatism*. 

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3.7 MFP AND THE COMMON GOOD

Kleingeld’s (2000) goal is to show that civic patriotism is both compatible with Kantian morality and a moral obligation. I broadly support her argument for civic patriotism, but claim that on its own, this form of patriotism lacks the power of cohesive identity and motivation necessary to properly secure the civic republican concept of the common good. I address this gap through Taylor’s (1995) democratic patriotism which, as in Kleingeld’s case, links patriotism with civic republican ideals, but argues the need for a common identity with one’s country and its members to motivate the solidarity and social responsibility required to act to secure the common good. In my project this common identity is the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot.

Before getting to this, I want to be clear that I do not conceive patriotism in exclusively republican terms. Some do, for example, Maurizio Viroli argues that republican patriotism is the original and only genuine form of patriotism (Viroli, 2002, pp.12-14). By doing so, however, he integrates patriotism into republicanism which, as Richard Dagger says, is a move that is: ‘neither conceptually warranted nor practically desirable. Patriotism has an independent force and the purpose of republicanism is best served by respecting this’ (Dagger, 2020, p.89). My position is not that of championing republican patriotism, but is one that envisions MfP as the ‘encouraging hand’ to motivate civic solidarity and support republican principles exercised within the free and just representative democracy of my patria and polity. The sense of citizenship I adopt for the MfP-patriot, as set out in Chapter Two, is that of civic republican liberalism.
3.7.1 CIVIC PATRIOTISM

It is from the civic republicanism perspective that Kleingeld adopts a ‘compatibilist strategy’, combining cosmopolitan universalism with the attribution of ‘intrinsic significance to state boundaries’, with the aim of showing that ‘patriotism of a particular kind is an obligation on Kantian grounds’ (Kleingeld, 2000, p.313). In making her case, Kleingeld takes from Kant’s work three different forms of patriotism but, for her, the only form that can be a moral obligation is civic patriotism (Kleingeld, 2003, p.316):

[Kant defends] a modified form of civic patriotism found in the republican tradition. ‘Patriotism’ is the term for identification with and civic activity on behalf of the political commonwealth. This can take many different forms and may range from governing the republic or defending it to promoting the wellbeing of its citizens. The republic (res publica, commonwealth) is regarded as serving the common political good of the citizens. The citizens are regarded as free and equal individuals […] Civic patriotism does not imply the notion of a nation in an ethnic sense.

(Kleingeld, 2003, p.304)

According to Kleingeld, Kant is interested in ensuring that people are secure against violence or harm by others. All humans have an:

[Innate] and equal right to external freedom, and there should be a system according to which the freedom of each individual can coexist with the freedom of all others. To achieve this system, what is morally required is that all individuals who interact with others be members of a just state. [On Kant’s view] the just state is a republic where the citizens are free, equal and have certain obligations to the state.

(Kleingeld, 2003, p.307)

The obligations Kleingeld refers to are imperfect obligations which, as I discussed in the last section, allow for latitude as to how and what extent one discharges them. Kleingeld argues that these imperfect obligations are necessary to maintain a republic or to improve an imperfectly just one. The obligation of civic patriotism, therefore, is the obligation of citizens to promote the functioning of the republic as an institution of justice in order to sustain and support it:

[The duty of civic patriotism] is not originally a duty to support one’s compatriots but, rather, a duty to promote the institutionalisation of justice. It is likely that there will be cases in which one’s compatriots receive certain benefits as a result, but this is then not simply because they are one’s compatriots but rather because they are members in the just republic that one ought to sustain and support as an institution of justice. This shows that Kant can indeed consistently defend the view that citizens have special duties towards the just state of which they are citizens, duties they do not have towards other states or their members.

(Kleingeld, 2003, p.309)
It is on this basis that Kleingeld concludes that Kant’s moral and political theories provide for a form of patriotism, namely civic patriotism, that is not only permissible but a moral obligation which, for her, is sufficient to achieve the common good of the polity. I support Kleingeld’s argument that justifies civic patriotism as a moral obligation focused on the institutionalisation of justice, freedom, equality and self-rule. As I set out in Chapter Two, this is a position similar to Rawls’ political conception of justice as fairness and his political liberalism which focuses on political society and political shared ends. However, as with Rawls, there is a problem with Kleingeld’s exclusive political focus on the pursuit of justice and the apolitical attachment to universal principle. The problem is that it sets to one side the element of patriotism that is based on a common identification, or collective identity, which is shaped by the prepolitical and provides the motivation to act. On this basis I have five related reasons for challenging Kleingeld’s position. It is important to give these reasons as they deal with the common worries often expressed against patriotism.

The first reason is one based upon the need to have a collective identity underpinned by the prepolitical to help manage dissent and compromise. As Roger Scruton argues:

In politics, opposition, disagreement, the free expression of dissent and the rule of compromise all presuppose a collective identity. There has to be a first-person plural, a ‘we’, if the many individuals are to stay together, accepting each other’s opinions and desires, regardless of disagreement.

(Scruton, 2014, p.33)

There is significant agreement between Scruton and Kleingeld on the required political features of a civic republic. Their main point of difference, however, comes from Scruton’s belief that political compromise, rights and freedoms, all of which he supports, are dependent on prepolitical features, such as, our history, culture, values and shared territory:

All these features are strengths, since they feed into an adaptable form of prepolitical loyalty. Unless and until people identify themselves with the country, its territory and its cultural inheritance […] the politics of compromise will not emerge.

(Scruton, 2014, pp.33-34)

In my project, prepolitical features are required to sustain and motivate compatriots/citizens to meet the civic, social and political needs of my patria and polity.
The second reason relates to Kant’s argument for three kinds of patriotism, not just civic patriotism. Kleingeld dismisses the possibility that these forms of patriotism are not mutually exclusive but overlap in significant ways. This is important because in totally excluding what she calls Kant’s ‘nationalist’ and ‘traits-based’ forms of patriotism, she dismisses prepolitical factors as having any relevance in motivating patriots and citizens within a just republic. Kleingeld does concede that it is: ‘conceptually coherent to be a civic patriot and also love one’s country because of its characteristics, and argue that one has special duties to the members of one’s country’ (Kleingeld, 2003, p.305). Nevertheless, she rejects such a combination. The problem in doing so, however, is one of watery motivation for civic patriotism. David Miller (2020) when defending liberal nationalism shares my concerns regarding the adoption of a purely civic form of partiality. He argues that national identities should not set aside their cultural features or be purely civic in their focus:

[When] politicians are called on to state what it means to be, for example, British, or what ‘British values’ are, they usually just trot out the familiar list of liberal platitudes - free speech, democracy, the rule of law, etc. But there are two problems with proposals to reconstruct national identity in this way. One is that it inevitably fails to capture how most people actually think of their own identities, which will have large historical, cultural, symbolic, etc. components - so in an attempt to include the previously excluded by redefining the nation in purely civic terms, there is a risk of alienating the majority for whom this is far from being the whole story. Moreover it empties [patriotic] identities of their specific content, since the list of allegedly identity-conferring values will differ very little from one (liberal) society to the next, thereby failing to capture the particular elements that bind people to their compatriots.

Miller (2020, pp.26-27)

Unlike Kleingeld’s civic patriotism, but in line with Miller’s liberal nationalism, the emotive substratum of MfP, which is a result of its nine key features, produces a strong motivational power to act from the pride and shame that comes with my patria and polity’s history, culture, values, characteristics and behaviour.

The third reason relates to Kleingeld’s rejection of the political/ prepolitical combination view because it presupposes that the borders of one’s nation and republic coincide which, according to her, is in most situations not the case (Kleingeld, 2003, p.306). The main problem with her position on this basis is that it takes an overly narrow view of patriotism tied to a singular nation. Arguably, Kleingeld would not see this as such a
problem if she simply acknowledged the diverse and plural nature of patriotism within modern federated democracies. As Charles Taylor argues, diverse and plural patriotism arises from the expression of ‘deep diversity’ understood as diverse modes of patriotic identification (Taylor, 1993, p.183). A good example of this ‘deep diversity’ is in the UK. Here, the English, Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish are British in their own ways by being members of their federated national communities. Freedom of self-determination across the UK: ‘is conceived and exercised from diverse standpoints and through diverse national and other fora […]. [The citizens of the UK] identify with one or more nations and experience multiple, overlapping, federated political communities, through their participation in multiple combinations of self-rule and shared-rule’ (Karmis, 2020, p.851). This means having a form of patriotic identity that captures both one’s Britishness and one’s Englishness or Scottishness, Welshness and Northern Irishness. It is a patriotic identity from both a political and prepolitical perspective; that is, citizenship in the polity of the UK and one’s devolved administration, and being a member of the patria of the UK and its composite nations. Kleingeld’s conclusion that only civic patriotism is a moral obligation, at least on the presupposition that the borders of one’s nation and republic do not coincide, is unwarranted.

The fourth reason relates to Kleingeld’s rejection of Kant’s requirement of common ancestry for patriotism. Although I share Kleingeld’s concern on common ancestry, unlike her, my concern is only where it is defined as to one’s blood, race, ethnicity or genetics. In my project, I adopt a view of patriotism within a historical and social community based upon a common descent related to one’s own culture. MfP does not give any weight to blood, race, ethnicity or genetics. My view aligns with the social lineage account of culture put forward by Alan Patten (2014) in Equal Recognition: The Moral Foundations of Minority Rights. For him people are part of the same cultural group if they have grown up in the same formative cultural circumstances and social institutions. It is an account of culture that steers a middle way between something too strong (blood relations or genetics) and something too
weak (similarity of beliefs). What this means for my project is that members of my patria
and polity can trace back through time a lineage of cultural continuity. MfP-patriots share
something that others do not:

[A] common experience of socialisation that is distinct from, because historically isolated from, the
experiences of socialisation undergone by others. This fact suggests the following solution to the
individuation problem. A distinct culture is the relation that people share when, and to the extent that,
they have shared with one another subjection to a set of formative conditions that are distinct from the
formative conditions that are imposed on others. Culture, in this proposal, is a kind of precipitate. At
any given moment, its content consists in various beliefs, meanings, and practices, but what makes
these the beliefs, meanings, and practices of a shared culture is that the people who hold them share a
common social lineage.

(Patten, 2014, p.51)

As Patten goes on to say:

It is true that what attracts certain people in their own culture is some specific set of essential
characteristics. [The] social lineage account still leaves plenty of room for people to feel an intrinsic
attachment to their own culture. [People] who are socialised as members of a particular culture will
often feel a kind of attachment to the culture itself, and/or to fellow members of the culture. […] An
identification with one another, and with the institutions and practices of their joint socialisation,
grows out of a history of interaction and a common set of experiences and points of reference. In
addition, in the social lineage account, there is a straightforward sense in which a person’s culture
helped to make him or her the individual that he or she is. For people who identify with their culture,
it is difficult, as a result, to distinguish disrespectful treatment of the culture from disrespectful
treatment of them as individuals. In general, […] the social lineage account can help to illuminate an
argument for […] the intrinsic significance that some people attach to their culture.

(Patten, 2014, pp.67-68)

The fifth reason relates to Kleingeld’s view that it is unclear why, for Kant, the
necessary focus of the general love of humans would require a focus on one’s country and
not on some other non-sectarian subset of humanity. According to Kleingeld, Kant: ‘equates
the necessity of giving one’s moral action a focus with giving it a patriotic focus based upon
one’s country [but] this equivalence is unwarranted’ (Kleingeld, 2003, p.312). Essentially,
Kleingeld questions why a country should be the object of one’s love or loyalty rather than
something else bigger or smaller than a country. This is a familiar challenge to patriotism
that I address through my ‘extended human flourishing argument’ in Chapter One. My
conclusion is that the most appropriate object of MfP is my patria and polity. I also argue
that acting as a MfP-patriot involves fulfilling special obligations to ‘our’ compatriots/ co-
citizens. This is a requirement that Kleingeld dismisses because the duty she presents is not
one toward ‘our’ compatriots, but to the just democratic state, and not toward it because it is

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‘ours’, but because it is ‘an institution of justice that requires the participation of citizens’ (Kleingeld, 2000, p.332). As far as the focus on justice goes in free democratic societies I agree with Kleingeld, but I do not agree that we can rely on this alone by excluding special obligations, and neglecting the background social and cultural practices that help foster and sustain the social fabric, secure the common good and protect the environment of my patria and polity. The notion that civic patriotism can provide a complete substitution for the connection to my fellow compatriots and co-citizens, which generates bonds emerging out of the prepolitical dimension of my patria and polity, is simply not persuasive.

My concern over Kleingeld’s civic patriotism is essentially the same as that against Jürgen Habermas’s (1996) constitutional patriotism. As Margaret Canovan (2000) says: ‘the notion that civic/ constitutional patriotism can provide a substitute for prepolitical ties is incoherent’ (Canovan, 2000, p.419). A country must be supported by a trans-generational political, historical, and social cultural group in order to be strong and well-integrated: ‘The members of which recognise their country as our country, and thereby confer upon it the legitimacy and power it needs’ (Canovan, 2000, pp.422). In my project, MfP bolsters the political requirements of civic patriotism and avoids the problem of watery motivation by providing a stronger source of motivation for civic solidarity and social responsibility to secure the common good. This view is one adopted by Charles Taylor (1995) and it is to this I now turn to further develop my argument and build on the concept of civic patriotism.

### 3.7.2 SECURING THE COMMON GOOD

Like Kleingeld’s attempt to reconcile cosmopolitanism with patriotism, Taylor attempts to find a middle way between the extremes of communitarianism and liberalism. Unlike Kleingeld, however, his arguments for the necessity of patriotism are entwined with his views concerning common identity and community. Taylor’s political views that are broadly republican grow out his understanding of human individuality as inextricably social.
According to him, people participate in reciprocal social connections and are connected to one another by shared experiences, beliefs, and moral standards:

> These social relationships are the basis for our ability to understand the world and to act within it. Through participation in communities unified by language, modes of understanding the world, narrating about it and oneself, individuals are able to subsume their actions to aims which are valued because they are held as valuable by the community they are members of. (Dralus, 2009, pp.181-182)

From this point of view it would be easy to think that Taylor supports strong forms of communitarianism. This is not the case. His position is based on a view that questions the very basis of the communitarianism and liberalism debate. It is not necessary for my project to give an account of Taylor’s critique of communitarianism and liberalism, which he approaches at both an ontological level (factors one will invoke to account for social life) and at an advocacy level (the moral stand or policy one adopts). It is sufficient to point out that this results in his rejection of what he calls procedural liberalism in favour of a ‘middle’ way. This is why Taylor is helpful to my project because, like my approach, his is not one of a strict liberal nor a pure communitarian, but takes something of both positions. He does this to avoid the problem of individual rights functioning as a moral trump card. What Taylor seeks is: ‘to emphasise obligation, a sense of belonging, protection of one’s culture and collective ends’ (Marks, 2005, p.128). He adopts a position best described as holistic at the ontological level, and individualistic at the advocacy level. He believes in the ‘social embedding of human agents’ but, at the same time, he ‘prizes liberty and individual differences’ highly (Taylor, 1995, pp.181-203).

Taylor’s position is consistent with civic republican liberalism. He does not argue the strong communitarian case that, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) puts forward when dismissing attempts to reconcile patriotism with cosmopolitanism. In fact, Taylor believes that we have no choice but to be both cosmopolitans and patriots, which means: ‘fighting for a form of patriotism that is open to universal solidarities against other more closed kinds’ (Taylor, 1996, p.121). In this way, Taylor can be said to follow not only Mazzini but also Kant who championed and linked both patriotism and cosmopolitanism:
there is no denying that the great value of human love rests in the general love of humanity as such. [In the case of] dutiful global and local patriotism both are proper to the cosmopolite, who in fealty to his country must have an inclination to promote the wellbeing of the entire world.

(Vigilantius and Kant, 1997, p.406)

Taylor defines patriotism as common allegiance and common identification to a particular historical community founded in certain values. By this, Taylor means patriotism is a matter of: ‘common history, shared fate and ineradicable particularism’ (Canovan, 1996, p.95). For Taylor, without community we have no identity: ‘[there] is no such thing as inward generation, monologically understood […]. My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others’ (Taylor, 1991, pp.47-48). Taylor believes we need patriotism because:

[Modern] democratic states are extremely exigent common enterprises in self-rule, requiring much greater solidarity towards compatriots than towards humanity in general [we cannot] make a success of these enterprises without strong common identification and given the alternatives to democracy, it is not in the interests of humanity that we fail in these enterprises. […] A citizen democracy can only work if most of its members are convinced that their political society is a common venture of considerable moment and believe it to be of such vital importance that they participate in the ways they must keep it functioning as a democracy.

(Taylor, 1996, pp.119-120)

What I take from Taylor is the belief that the community of my patria and polity is a crucial precondition of the MfP-patriot identity and, for this reason, as good citizens MfP-patriots should be willing to concede a degree of their individual freedoms to meet their obligations to society. This is in line with Rousseau who says:

Thus if each citizen is nothing and can do nothing except in concert with all the others, and if the force acquired by the whole is equal or superior to the sum of the natural forces of all the individuals, one can say that the legislation has achieved the highest possible point of perfection.

(Rousseau, 2011, p.181)

Rousseau recognises the strong sense of participation required from citizens, and that participatory institutions are an integral part of the country’s culture. Here, one’s country is likely to be most effective where the principles to which citizens are loyal are seen as ‘our’ principles. If correct, then MfP as a Taylorian form of democratic participatory patriotism works best where it is matter of inheriting our political community and culture (Canovan, 1996, p.95).
Underpinning this view is Taylor’s belief that the atomism of the liberal approach to politics obstructs awareness of what he calls irreducibly social goods:

These shared goods are, at one level, goods for individuals, things that they experience and enjoy. However, Taylor argues that it is a category error to think of them as only individual goods. They are both goods for individuals and goods that can only be generated in common with others. He uses the example of friendship to illustrate this rather abstract claim. When two people are friends, their friendship becomes a good that is shared between them. It is a mistake to understand it as something that could, in theory, be broken down into the sum of two individual goods. The general point he is trying to drive home here is that some things can only be appreciated when they are understood as shared; some goods can only be realised in concert with others.

(Abbey, 2000, pp.118-119)

Some things, such as family, friendship or the sentiment of MfP, can only be appreciated when they are understood as shared and realised with others. For Taylor, these shared goods play an important role in politics, and it is from the civic republican tradition, which values the common good, that they can best be generated, reproduced or commemorated by the citizens acting in common (Abbey, 2000, p.119). Taylor’s view on the common good sees it as the joint property of the community of all citizens, including those of the past and future. Citizens are attached to it because they and their ancestors have played a role in creating and maintaining it. In my project it is this sense of attachment that provides strong motivation for ongoing participation that establishes a virtuous circle between the common good and MfP-patriots, the idea being that: ‘participation promotes attachment, which promotes further participation, which strengthens attachment’ (Abbey, 2000, p.120).

Understanding the importance of the link between MfP-patriots and the common good is best demonstrated by distinguishing irreducibly shared goods from convergent goods:

Some things have value to me and to you, and some things essentially have value to us. That is, their being for us enters into and constitutes their value for us. If we are lovers or close friends, Mozart-with-you is a quite different experience from Mozart-alone. I will call goods of this kind “mediately” common goods. But there are other things we value even more, such as friendship itself, where what centrally matters to us is just that there are common actions and meanings. The good is that we share.

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84 I expand on this idea in Chapter Four when covering those public goods that support social connectiveness as part of the ‘connected’ element of cppc-conservatism.
This I will call “immediately” common goods. These contrast with other goods that we enjoy collectively but that I want to call “convergent,” to mark the difference. (Taylor, 1995, p.190)

What Taylor means is that for a convergent good there is no sense that it is a good ‘we’ have to share; it could belong to a single person, many, or all. An irreducibly shared good, however, could not belong to the property of a single person (Abbey, 2000, p.120). Examples of irreducibly shared goods include, in the private sphere: friendship, love and other close relationships; in the public sphere: public goods, spaces and laws. For MfP the most important irreducibly shared good is the ‘immediately’ common good that the MfP-patriot wishes to secure. The idea being that the MfP-patriot is energised by a sense of shared common good. The identification of the MfP-patriot with my patria and polity as a shared enterprise is the recognition of this common good. As Taylor puts it:

[It] is essential to [republics], that they are animated by a sense of a shared immediate common good. [The] identification of the citizen with the republic as a common enterprise is essentially the recognition of a common good. [A merely convergent good] is based on enlightened self-interest. My (frequently inoperative) moral commitment to the welfare of all humans is altruistic. But the bond of solidarity with my compatriots in a functioning republic is based on a sense of shared fate, where the sharing itself is of value. This is what gives this bond its special importance, what makes my ties with these people and to this enterprise peculiarly binding, what animates my “vertu” or patriotism. (Taylor, 1995, pp.191-192)

What Taylor does is helpfully differentiate between the collective instrumentality of a convergent good (I-identities coming together) with the common action from a common irreducibly shared good (we-identities). MfP-patriots are motivated to secure the common good through their patriotic identification that comes from having a shared culture that is formed through their history and social lineage. As Taylor reminds us, this is in contrast to how it is in a despotic society:

[Participatory] self-government is itself usually carried out in common actions […] The underlying reasoning of this thesis […] is that that the disciplines which would be externally imposed by fear under a despotism have to be self-imposed in its absence, and only patriotic identification can provide the motivation. (Taylor, 1995, pp.192-193)

What this means for my project is that the free, democratic and participatory regime of my patria and polity calls on MfP-patriots as good citizens to provide for themselves and secure the common good; whereas this is a thing that a despotism may provide or impose.
MfP provides the motivation for the ‘self-imposed discipline that is essential for a free regime’ because MfP-patriots are asked to do things that ‘mere subjects in a despotic regime can avoid’ (Taylor, 1995, p.193). It is in this way that the sentiment of MfP is the ‘encouraging hand’ for the MfP-patriot to act to secure the common good; the second action encompassed by the universal principle to reject indifference and neglect to satisfy the desire for human flourishing.

3.8 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I established my patria and polity as a conditional value that is objectively good when the condition of its objective goodness is satisfied. The condition of goodness, to satisfy the desire for human flourishing, comes from having the practical identity of a MfP-patriot, which is justified through our rational agency. It is through the universal law to reject indifference and neglect that the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot has moral authority for all rational agents in my patria and polity. I then gave a detailed exposition of the first two actions that are encompassed by the universal law. These acts-for-the-sake-of-a-specific-end are to foster and sustain the social fabric and secure the common good - I cover the third, protect the environment, in the next chapter.

Having established the claim that my patria and polity is a conditional value that is objectively good, and that MfP is a moral obligation through the strongly normative practical identity of a MfP-patriot, all that remains in my project is to set out the disposition that underpins MfP.
CHAPTER 4

THE DISPOSITION UNDERPINNING MFP

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The way of thinking to underpin MfP is the ninth key feature of my moral form of partiality. I call this disposition ‘connected, poetically present and compassionate’ conservatism: cppc-conservatism. It is inspired by the thoughts of Edmund Burke (1790), Michael Oakeshott (1962) and Martha Nussbaum (2013). In setting out the disposition as a form of conservatism, I do not argue in support of any specific ideology or political party. Rather, I follow Oakeshott who says: ‘To be conservative is to be disposed to think and behave in certain manners; it is to prefer certain kinds of conduct and certain conditions of human circumstances to others; it is to be disposed to make certain kinds of choices’ (Oakeshott, 1962, p.407). And, in terms of party politics, I follow Roger Scruton who says: ‘Conservatism is a stance that may be defined without identifying it with the policies of any party. Indeed, it may be a stance that appeals to a person for whom the whole idea [of identifying with a political party] is distasteful’ (Scruton, 1984, p.15). Before setting out the detail of cppc-conservatism, I will start by briefly saying something of that which links Burke, Oakeshott and Nussbaum.

Although they come to address these matters in different ways, all three thinkers recognise the importance of community, connection and the place of tradition to promote a sense of shared belonging and shared identity that strengthens societal bonds. They all see one’s compatriots as situated selves that are bound by ties not chosen, and implicated in the narratives that shape their identity as moral agents inextricably linked and bound together. Although they may not use the same terminology, they broadly view patriotic sentiment as requiring a shared sense of belonging to a community ‘extended over time’. Michael Sandel captures what such a view means in practice:
To insist that we are, as individuals, responsible only for the choices we make and the acts we perform makes it difficult to take pride in the history and traditions of one’s country. Anyone anywhere can admire the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, the fallen heroes honoured in Arlington National Cemetery, and so on. But patriotic pride requires a sense of belonging to a community extended across time. With belonging comes responsibility. You can’t really take pride in your country and its past if you’re unwilling to acknowledge any responsibility for carrying its story into the present, and discharging the moral burdens that may come with it.

(Sandel, 2009, pp.235-236)

Some may worry whether we need this shared sense of belonging to a community ‘extended over time’. For them, we simply need to rely on individuals’ own judgements, values and desires to appreciate and admire the Declaration of Independence, our fallen heroes and so on. Such a view is based upon liberal individualism that primarily focuses on individual rights and the pursuit of happiness. This is a view I have already rejected by adopting civic republican liberalism as a key feature of MfP. Whilst recognising the importance of individual rights, I take a more balanced Mazzinian approach that also recognises social and civic obligations in the pursuit of the common good. I set aside the liberal individualism worry because it fails to sufficiently acknowledge the importance of social belonging and the ties that bind us in my patria and polity. As Samuel Scheffler (1997) says when recognising the importance of community bonds, the insufficiency of liberal individualism, at least in the way understood here, leads to a view of the individual that in terms of any political theorising appears implausible:

Whether we like it or not, such relations help to define the contours of our lives, and influence the ways that we are seen both by ourselves and by others. Even those who sever or repudiate such ties - insofar as it is possible to do so - can never escape their influence or deprive them of all significance, for to have repudiated a personal tie is not the same as never having had it, and one does not nullify social bonds by rejecting them.

(Scheffler, 1997, p.204)

Charles Taylor (1985) adds weight to Scheffler’s position by speaking of social belonging from a broader view, claiming that it is only through the social and cultural context of one’s country that certain possibilities and self-conceptions for individuals become conceivable. For Taylor, it is not possible for an individual to enjoy autonomy, rights and freedoms unless these goods are available in the wider culture:

Hence Taylor’s claim that even “the free individual or autonomous agent”, so heavily inscribed in the common sense of liberal cultures, “can only achieve and maintain his identity in a certain type of
Together, Sandel, Scheffler and Taylor present a view of individual liberalism that results in anomie. By anomie, I mean as Émile Durkheim describes it, a form of: ‘deprivation, a loss of a sense of community, and a loss of membership in those social institutions and modes in which norms, including the norms of tradition-constituted rationality, are embodied’ (Cohen, 2004a, pp.395-396). Andrew Cohen (2004a) sums up the problem with losing a sense of community associated with anomie:

[The problem] is characterised by a belief that community is necessary for proper belief formation without which we are left in anomie. Life in liberal society is deficient because without a strong - “constitutive” - community one cannot have a proper orientation with which to identify and guide oneself. (Cohen, 2004a, p.396)

Although Cohen goes on to defend liberalism against the anomie claim based on liberal toleration and liberal neutrality, it is not necessary to explore his argument here. My purpose in raising the possibility of anomie is to reinforce the importance of the shared sense of belonging and identity to a community ‘extended over time’ that strengthens social bonds. Such a view provides the common link for the disparate thoughts of Burke, Oakeshott and Nussbaum, which I use to develop *cppc-conservatism* that consists of three elements. First, from Burke an understanding of the importance of tradition and connection. Second, from Oakeshott the desire to seek stability and protection of that which is good and makes life meaningful in a connected community, what I call being ‘poetically present’. And third, from Nussbaum the emotion of compassion to further social connection and societal bonds. Joining these three elements together to create *cppc-conservatism* results in the best way of thinking to underpin *MfP*. In unpacking this claim, I start with Edmund Burke’s thoughts on tradition and connection.
4.2 THE CONNECTED ELEMENT

In *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790) Burke expresses dismay at the manner in which the French destroyed their old state in the expectation of recreating it on the basis of, as he claims, pure reason. It is from this work in particular that we can see Burke’s conservatism being grounded in scepticism towards individualism and abstract rights. As Isaac Kramnick (1999) argues, Burke’s conservatism is shaped by his view that: ‘the smugness of adulterated metaphysics [...] had led Enlightenment thinkers to place faith in reason and abstract ideas, in speculation and *a priori* principles of natural right, freedom, and equality, as the basis on which to reform existing government’ (Kramnick, 1999, loc.135 of 11264).

Although my purpose is not to examine Burke’s scepticism, his distrust of individualism and the exclusive focus on abstract rights provide a useful context for the ‘connected’ element of *cppc-conservatism*. This scepticism is very much in line with Mazzini who believes that focusing on rights alone is not enough; fellowship, duty and the achievement of the common good are just as important. Within this context, my focus relates to Burke’s thoughts on what he refers to as a ‘partnership over many generations’, which I interpret as an idea that seeks to emphasise the importance of the link between tradition and connection at the heart of human experience in my *patria* and *polity*. I will now set out what I mean by this.

Burke believes that community in a country is an indissoluble social contract:

Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure - but the [country] ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee [...] or some other such low concern [...] to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.

(Burke, 1790, p.93)

What Burke means by a ‘partnership over many generations’ is that tradition is an important part of forming and sustaining connection. And, for him, good patriots always consider how
they shall make the most of the existing materials of their country born through tradition. Burke believes that tradition provides a form of knowledge that should not be simply brushed to one side or changed without very good reason (Burke, 1790, p.153). In line with this thought, I take tradition as important but not that it is inviolable. There are clearly good and bad aspects of tradition and when it is bad there must be occasion when we ought to change it.

For Burke, much of the wisdom we have about our way of life is embedded in the tradition of our country which guides us through familiarity. When people make accommodation for change in the present, they must have an eye on conserving the inherited customs, norms and practices that we reproduce going forward as a community (Burke, 1790, p.vii). Essentially, Burke’s plea is to recognise the social collective, not just individual reason, because a failure to do so would have the consequence that: ‘all that is regarded as excellent and venerable, nay society itself, would tumble to ruin, if the practice of all moral duties and the constitution of the social order, rested upon their being submitted to the un-restrained criticism of every individual’ (Burke, 1970, p.viii). This Burkean understanding of tradition gives a sense of connection over time, and a feeling of belonging in a social world, which is constitutive of our identity. I will come back to this idea of social connection shortly but, first, I will set out why Burke’s view on tradition is important to MfP and its object, my patria and polity.

4.2.1 TRADITION

Burke’s view is that good patriots and citizens will make the most out of tradition. They will also have a disposition to preserve and improve their own country, rather than one that seeks to fundamentally alter it through radical change and revolution:85

85 Burke did not deny that a revolution or fundamental change was sometimes necessary. He only insisted that it could not be justified but by reasons that were so obvious and so compelling that they were themselves part of the moral order (Burke, 1790, p.94).
A man full of warm, speculative benevolence may wish his society otherwise constituted than he finds it; but a good patriot, and a true politician, always considers how he shall make the most of the existing materials of his country. A disposition to preserve, and an ability to improve, taken together, would be my standard of a [states-person]. Everything else is vulgar in the conception, perilous in the execution.

(Burke, 1790, p.153)

According to Roger Scruton, Burke views tradition as a contract: ‘between the living, the dead and the unborn, which implies that it is only those who listen to the dead who are the fit guardians of the unborn’ (Scruton, 2006, p.207). Burke expressed this when he wrote: ‘People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors’ (Burke, 1790, p.31). It is in this regard that an important way cppc-conservatism ‘connects’ is by having the desire to conserve tradition, which comes from a sense of belonging to a continuing and pre-existing civic and social order. As Scruton says: ‘For tradition to connect in the present we must have a shared history, and for the future we must broadly agree on the details of the next leg of the journey together’ (Scruton, 1984, p.21). By continuity of the social and civic world I do not just mean institutions but also in regard to customs, practices, norms, values, art, science, literature and so on; a view I argue when setting out the fusion of the political and prepolitical as a key feature of MfP in Chapter Two.

For MfP-patriots, accepting one’s own country’s arrangements, even its shortcomings that have grown through tradition, is the right policy. In MfP, tradition serves to attach MfP-patriots to my patria and polity by providing a sense of continuity, identity and unity. Tradition is the thing that shapes and strengthens the bond between successive generations. This bond, however, does not mean stasis. These arrangements can and ought to be improved but only through cautious and incremental adjustments. They should not be jeopardised by huge or revolutionary changes, the consequences of which no one can completely see:

The conservative response to modernity is to embrace it, but to embrace it critically, in full consciousness that human achievements are rare and precarious, that we have no God-given right to destroy our inheritance, but must always patiently submit to the voice of order, and set an example of orderly living.

(Scruton, 2006, p.208)
The obvious worry with this view, which is also an objection to strong forms of communitarianism, is the danger of moral relativism that locks in privilege, social injustice and unacceptable cultural and political practices. For example, take MacIntyre (1984) who challenges the concept of universal morality, by which I mean impartiality and universal rights, from a communitarian perspective. He believes morality is essentially driven by what is local and not what is global, and that being a moral agent is only possible through the moral sustenance afforded by a person’s community. Being deprived of this community would mean a person would not be able to prosper as a moral agent (MacIntyre, 1984, pp.10-11). Burke shares MacIntyre’s concern about universal rights being applied in a person’s own local civic society. His view is similar although arguably not as strong as MacIntyre’s. Burke thought that although the original rights of people, by which he means certain universal rights or natural rights, are real they must be treated with caution in one’s community:

[As] the liberties and the restrictions vary with times and circumstances, and admit of infinite modifications, they cannot be settled upon any abstract rule; and nothing is so foolish as to discuss them upon that principle. […] These metaphysic rights entering into common life, like rays of light which pierce into a dense medium, are, by the laws of nature, refracted from their straight line. Indeed in the gross and complicated mass of human passions and concerns, the primitive rights of man undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections, that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued in the simplicity of their original direction.

(Burke, 1790, pp.58-59)

Both MacIntyre and Burke, although the latter to a lesser degree, see no or a limited role for the external standpoint (universal morality) in the local community or civic society. Taking such a local and community focus on morality and rights, in the absence of any view beyond the local or community, is problematic. This is because the absence of any sort of commitment to universal principles could lead to a position that locks in disadvantage and privilege, leading to a form of dangerous moral relativism and stasis. This, however, is surely true of any association or relationship; it is fine when what I call self-criticism or self-

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86 I take natural rights to be those that are not dependent on the laws or customs of any particular culture or government, and so are universal, fundamental and so inalienable.
regulation works, but it becomes problematic when self-criticism or self-regulation breaks down or is simply wrong-headed. To help explain what I mean, take parenting as an example. Abusive parents may think their parenting skills are exceptional. But let us take the case where there is a failure or a wrong-headed application of self-criticism and self-regulation, which I recognise are internal aspects of the non-objective view in all relationships. Without some form of external moral standpoint outside of their family unit they will continue abusing their children. In their own mind they have always parented in this way, their parents did it, and their parents’ parents did it to them; the tradition of abuse is well established and it is part of their inheritance. In these circumstances to stop the abuse there must be some external limitation, beyond those failed limitations that operate within that association; for example, certain laws, child protection and social services. What is true for the association of family is true for my patria and polity. And, as set out in Chapters One and Two, the way I address the moral relativism worry for MfP as a moderate form of patriotism, is through the position of soft cosmopolitanism, which includes second-order impartialism with the commitment to universal principles in the form of basic rights.

Having dealt with the moral relativism worry, the Burkean view on tradition is still appealing because it leads to caution about fundamentally changing the customs, norms and practices of my patria and polity that have developed through history without, that is, very good reason. This view, of course, challenges those who believe they should not be bound by what has gone before; for example, certain types of liberals, cosmopolitans, socialists and communists. It also challenges the sovereignty of the individual. For Burke the individual, or at least individual judgement, must be subordinate to the customs, norms and practices of society:

87 Although my example focuses on ‘continuity of practice’, the argument can be presented in terms of structural injustices, not necessarily instances of abuse but structures of hierarchy, inequality of opportunity and so on, where the institution itself replicates the injustice, in my example the (nuclear) family – see Moller Okin (1989).
[Society] is an organic whole in which each mind is a particular growth, conditioned by the rest, and incapable of fully living if it detaches itself from the rest. Hence the great value which [is] set upon custom and traditional opinion, the consensus of thought as opposed to individual judgment.

(Burke, 1790, p.vii)

Whether the individual is sovereign or not, or whether the individual, or individual judgement, is subordinate to society, is not something I need to consider here. These may be important matters but my approach in *MfP* focuses on the interdependent relationship between both the individual and the needs of the community. Each are necessary for the other and it is a question of balancing the requirements of both. My approach is similar to Scruton’s conservatism, at least as I understand it, which is about the maintenance of social ecology: ‘conservation of our shared resources - social, material, political, cultural, environmental and economic - individual freedom is part of that but it is not the sole goal’ (Scruton, 2006, p.ix).

In *MfP*, my *patria* and *polity* is held together by a broad consensus of moral and other values that presuppose a social and civic good focused on the flourishing of all its members. The Burkean idea is that this consensus comes not only from instrumental needs like welfare, security and protection, but (in my words) from a connection ‘extended over time’. This connection has at its heart tradition that helps build trust, familiarity and solidarity. The result is a community linked by constructive patterns of social behaviour and relationships.

It is to this idea of social connection that I now turn in order to clarify what it entails for my *patria* and *polity*.

### 4.2.2 CONNECTION

For Burke, public affections begin with families, then pass on to ‘our neighbourhoods, and our habitual provincial connexions’, which he calls our ‘inns and resting places’ (Burke, 1988).

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88 I recognise, however, that the liberal may think that a political community is held together by a ‘thin’ or minimal conception of the good – basically a sense of justice and a commitment to live in harmony with each other. I, however, mean something thicker, which I get to by not discarding the prepolitical as part of *MfP*. In Chapter Two, I avoid too ‘thick’ a concept of the good by applying the moral commitment to basic rights.
Burke argues that these divisions of country are formed by habit and not by a major shift in authority, and they fill the heart of the patriot which gives special affection to one’s country because they are representations of it. The affection to one’s country is not diminished by this subordinate partiality, instead it gives an insight into the nature of it. One’s country is not one single large tribe but hundreds and thousands of small tribes connected together by tradition and cultural commonalities. In this sense, these subdivisions are: ‘a sort of elemental training to those higher and more large regards, by which alone men come to be affected’ (Burke, 1790, p.193):

To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country, and to mankind. The interest of that portion of social arrangement is a trust in the hands of all those who compose it; and as none but bad men would justify it in abuse, none but traitors would barter it away for their own personal advantage.

(Burke, 1790, p.44)

In the modern era, Burke’s concepts of ‘inns and resting places’ and ‘little platoons’ are supported by what Ray Oldenburg (1999) describes as the ‘Great Good Places’. Oldenburg recognises the importance of social place, what he calls ‘third places’ (after home first and work second) for the wellbeing of both the individual and society at large. These ‘third places’ include, for example, village halls, pubs, coffee shops and other hangouts at the heart of a community. His idea is that ‘third places’ facilitate informal gatherings that function to unite and connect a neighbourhood and community; provide a venue for social mixing and assimilation; act as sorting areas to organise people according to their potential usefulness in collective undertakings; be a staging area in times of need for the community; be a source of information and intelligence on what is happening in the community; and provide a place for meeting, union, entertainment, as well as serving as political and intellectual fora (Oldenburg, 1999, pp.xvii-xxvii).

Although there is a clear link between the two, what Burke does that Oldenburg does not, is explicitly recognise that one’s country succeeds by taking the human desire for a small tribe and connecting this local attachment to a greater body. Burke’s argument is that
our affection for that we hold in common with others in our local communities does not have to make us inward looking and parochial. Rather, it teaches us how to love a community, how to serve a country and, ultimately, it guides our affections to the whole of humanity; a sentiment shared in Mazzinian patriotism. Burke does this by connecting one’s country with the values, symbols, places and public goods with which we have become familiarised in our local context (Burgess, 2019, loc.256 of 3357). Underpinning this Burkean idea of connection are three arguments that are relevant to MfP. These arguments are linked by a sceptical view of abstract and idealistic universal values put forward without proper and practicable regard for local traditions, commitments, loyalties, places, attachments and public goods.

The first argument is that the connection is necessary in order to create a sense of identity for individuals, to know where they come from and what they have in common with certain others. Without this connection individuals would lack an important basis for knowing who they are. I deal with this argument involving the identity conferring power of the attachment to my patria and polity in Chapter One, so I say no more here.

The second argument is that the connection is necessary to: satisfy the need of the individual to belong to something bigger than themselves; satisfy the need for the company of others; have and sustain stable social relations; and feel part of a community to satisfy the need for attachment. This argument, which I also cover in Chapter One, is based on the claim that humans have evolved not to be isolated individuals but to seek out others for numerous reasons relevant to their survival, wellbeing and flourishing. I take it there is sufficient social-psychological and neuroscientific evidence to demonstrate that humans are at essence social animals that seek out attachment by nature.89

The third argument is that the connection is necessary in order to create and sustain common public goods. These are goods that can only be enjoyed through the community

89 For a survey of such contemporary social neuroscience research see Madison and others (2020).
that the individual belongs and by individuals operating cooperatively. Common public
goods are important sources of community, connection and identity. If correct, this
reinforces the reciprocal necessity of community and connection for the creation and sharing
of public goods. I have not yet covered this argument in regard to public goods, so it is to
this I now turn. Before doing so, I should clarify that I will use the term ‘public’ goods
rather than ‘social’ or ‘common’ goods. Others, for example, Walzer (1983) prefer to use
the latter.

4.2.3 PUBLIC GOODS AND CONNECTION

In Chapter Three, I set out the importance of Charles Taylor’s concept of a shared irreducible
good for MfP. I argued in favour of the civic republican tradition that values the common
good, and I claimed that public goods can only be created and sustained by citizens acting
in common. I take the view that these public goods are the joint property of all citizens of
my patria and polity, including those of the past and future. I want to strengthen this claim
by specifically linking the concept of public goods with the enhancement of social
connectiveness in my patria and polity. In doing so, I add weight to Burke’s connection
argument from a contemporary philosophical viewpoint.

According to Angela Kallhoff (2014) public goods differ from private goods in that
they do not possess clear-cut entrance barriers. Instead: ‘they come with conditions of access
that are described as non-rivalry in consumption and as non-excludability regarding potential
beneficiaries’ (Kallhoff, 2014, p.636). There is a difficult distinction to be made about what
the actual difference is between clear-cut entrance barriers and conditions of access, but this
is something I need not get into for my project. The public goods I am interested in are those
accessible by each individual simultaneously and non-discriminately; for example, public
parks, public schools, public buildings like libraries and museums, infrastructure and some
environmental goods such as air, water and green spaces. These public goods are sustained
by communities and are not the property of individuals and, in important respects, they
provide a focus for citizens that includes a sense of connection with others. The central concern, and the one that links these public goods to Burke’s ideas on community and connectivity, is not that they only fulfil the interests of citizens, but that they strengthen those societal structures and bonds which are an integral part of free and just representative democracies.

This view is expressed by the historian Tony Judt (2011) in *Ill Fares the Land*, where he criticises the ‘cult of the private’ when writing about the demise of the ‘public’ in post-war Western Europe and the USA. He argued that: ‘the thick mesh of social interactions and public goods has been reduced to a minimum [as a consequence] we have begun to dismantle the fabric of the state’ (Judt, 2011, p.118). Judt helpfully represents public goods as visible representations of connection. He believed that: ‘the loss of social purpose articulated through the evisceration of public goods, in favour of a network of private providers and interests, contributes significantly to this dismantling of the social fabric of the state’ (Judt, 2011, p.119). Clearly, Judt is sympathetic to the view shared by Burke that any society that destroys the fabric of the state, that involves social connection and social responsibility, would in a few generations, as Burke puts it: ‘crumble away, be disconnected into the dust and powder of individuality, and at length dispersed to all the winds of heaven’ (Burke, 1790, p.93).

In examining the role of public goods in a political community that subscribes to democratic values, Kallhoff (2011) identifies a number of reasons why public goods should be sustained and cultivated. For my project, I am interested in the reason she gives for public goods to: ‘provide a realm in society that strengthens mutual awareness and helps to generate a sense of shared citizenship and social connectivity’ (Kallhoff, 2011, p.9). According to Kallhoff, when public goods are available to all, when they serve to sustain common

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90 Kallhoff also argues that some public goods are particularly well suited for supporting social justice through a public health care system or public education, and others are particularly well suited for supporting identification through goods of cultural heritage (Kallhoff, 2014, pp.639-640).
domains that facilitate interaction and provide a platform for networking, then social connectedness is strengthened:

In short, some public goods serve as connectivity goods because they produce a double effect: they support equity and simultaneously serve as physical structures which – because of equally low entrance barriers – facilitate participation and exchange. [Moreover, public goods provide] a realm for connections between strangers which – nevertheless – are mutually aware of each other as endowed with the same offer to participate in public goods.

(Kallhoff, 2014, p.644)

Before going any further I will deal with an obvious worry. The worry is that different interest groups will often conceive the ‘good’ of public goods in different ways which can lead to conflict. For example, in the case of public statues, their connection with past events and their place in public spaces today. I am sympathetic to the worry. However, unlike other forms of conflict it need not be the type of conflict which is unhealthy to my patria and polity. This is the case as long as its resolution is found through the MfP-patriot’s strong sense of community and connection to realise deep compromise, based upon public discussion and deliberation (Kallhoff, 2014, pp.644-645). Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin (2004) in *Deliberation Day* recognise the need of community and connection to underpin public engagement with the necessity of discussion and debate. They argue that:

[…] discussion leads respondents to take some responsibility for the solution of public problems. They look beyond the most narrow and immediate constructions of their self-interest to support the provision of public goods.

(Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004, p.55)

Without the public spirit and sense of belonging associated with community and connection, reinforced through public goods that foster shared concern and discussion:

[…] one would think poorly of any collective interest, of any objects to be pursued jointly with others but only in competition with them and in some measure at their expense.

(Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004, p.57)

Building on this insight, my argument for dealing with the worry goes as follows.

(1) The *MfP-patriot* recognises that conflict arises from different conceptions of public goods. (2) Conflict leads to public discussion and debate. (3) Resolution of conflict requires deep compromise. (4) Deep compromise is based upon a sense of community and connection. Therefore (5) the resolution of conflict comes from *MfP*’s altruistic sense of
community, solidarity, social responsibility, compassion and connection to realise deep compromise. The MfP-patriot is committed to public discussion and deliberation, and is motivated to compromise by shame and/ or pride to set right what is wrong in my patria and polity. Having provided a plausible basis for dealing with the worry, I will now explain why public goods are important to MfP.

In MfP, public goods are important to underpin my patria and polity as a well-ordered society. The type of public goods that MfP-patriots support are those that contribute to solidarity and a shared sense of citizenry through the use of and benefit from such goods. Kallhoff argues that these type of public goods serve as a material point of identification where people get involved in common affairs. Good citizens (in my case MfP-patriots) engage with: ‘public goods not as disinterested observers but as potential beneficiaries whilst simultaneously being involved in providing that good’ (Kallhoff, 2014, pp.639-640).

Even though these types of public goods range from local to global goods, they are often instantiated locally. For example, take the ancient wood that surrounds the village of Swanton Novers. This is a public space in North Norfolk that local people care about and work together to actively protect and improve. Public spaces like this are particularly important to get people involved in common affairs to identify and connect with their own local communities. However, this commonality, identification and connectivity extends beyond the local, as the commitment to this public good in North Norfolk is mirrored by other citizens’ commitment to their own public goods across the UK. Often they are the same type of public monuments, spaces, museums and buildings that are characteristic of the country. For example, war memorials, public parks and public buildings (flying the national flag), as well as places of worship, local markets, pubs, fetes, warm spaces and village halls; the latter being among Oldenburg’s ‘Great Good Places’. These public goods represent shared interests, common endeavours and common symbols that for MfP ultimately connect MfP-patriots as good citizens to my patria and polity. The interest and
engagement in public goods is a necessary aspect that makes visible the MfP-patriot’s common association. As Kallhoff says:

[Public goods support] connectivity and serve as representations of shared interests and common endeavours of the citizenry. [...] they might also serve as visible representations of a shared sense of citizenship. [...] As goods which are open to the public, the provision of public goods is not only a visible sign of solidarity, but also rather a joint commitment to make collective achievements available to each citizen.

(Kallhoff, 2014, p.648)

This recognition of the importance of public goods for social connectiveness reinforces the arguments of Burke on community, commonality and connection. The way MfP-patriots transcend their tribal instincts (Burke’s ‘small platoons’) and work together to reinforce the connections of community, is based upon the creation, sharing and the maintenance of important public goods in my patria and polity. The result is a more stable and inclusive social order. In turn, this creates the right sort of context for the MfP-patriot to act to satisfy the desire for human flourishing by fostering the social fabric, securing the common good, and protecting the environment.

Having set out the ‘connected’ element of cppc-conservatism, I turn now to Michael Oakeshott to establish the ‘poetically present’ element.

4.3 THE POETICALLY PRESENT ELEMENT

What Oakeshott offers is an approach that focuses on preserving the good things in life, here and now. In exploring this idea, I will start by saying something of Oakeshott’s conservatism from which I establish the idea of being ‘poetically present’. I then expand on what I mean by this through Henry Thoreau’s (2004 [1854]) poetic view of Nature, which I link to the universal principle to reject indifference and neglect through selective care and concern for natural and man-made environments. This principle, that I first introduce in Chapter Three, involves the MfP-patriot acting to protect the environment of my patria and polity. Together, the preservation of the good things in life, the poetic connection to Nature, and the
action to protect the environment make up the ‘poetically present’ element of cppc-conservatism.

4.3.1 PRESERVATION OF THE GOOD THINGS IN LIFE

The general characteristics of Oakeshott’s approach include:

[A] propensity to use and enjoy what is available rather than to wish for or to look for something else; to delight in what is present rather than what was or what may be. Reflection may bring to light an appropriate gratefulness for what is available, and consequently the acknowledgement of a gift or an inheritance from the past; but there is no mere idolising of what is past and gone. What is esteemed is the present: and it is esteemed not on account of its connections with remote antiquity, nor because it is recognised to be more admirable than any possible alternative, but on account of its familiarity.

(Oakeshott, 1962, p.408)

This focus represents a determination to live in the present and not in the past or the future:

To be conservative, then, is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss.

(Oakeshott, 1962, p.408)

Oakeshott’s approach is reflected in his attitude to change. For Oakeshott: ‘changes have to be suffered [but in trying to preserve one’s identity they] should be judged by the disturbance they involve’ (Oakeshott, 1962, pp.409-410). Some changes will offer no difficulty, not because they result in improvement, but because they can be easily absorbed into our wider culture or society. In general, one will accommodate the change if it does not offend expectation, but will not if it leads to: ‘destruction of what seems to have no basis of dissolution within itself’ (Oakeshott, 1962, pp.409-410). This sentiment urges caution in regard to change and is in line with Karl Popper (1957) who observed that in most circumstances: ‘we (whether on the political left or the right) do better with seeking to make incremental improvements rather than wholesale changes, lest the unintended consequences of reconstruction leave us worse off than before’ (Popper, 1957, p.63).

Having in mind Oakeshott’s position on change, his disposition of conservatism is:

[Warm] and positive in respect of enjoyment, and correspondingly cool and critical in respect of change and innovation: these two inclinations support and elucidate one another. The man of conservative temperament believes that a known good is not lightly to be surrendered for an unknown better. [He has] a disposition to enjoy rather than to exploit. He is cautious, and he is disposed to
indicate his assent or dissent, not in absolute, but in graduated terms. He eyes the situation in terms of its propensity to disrupt the familiarity of the features of his world.

(Oakeshott, 1962, p.412)

I describe Oakeshott’s conservatism as ‘poetically present’ because it involves the disposition to enjoy those things and activities where what is sought is present enjoyment, and not a profit, a reward, or a result in addition to the experience itself. Many aspects of day-to-day life, cultural, artistic, pastime, and relationship fall into this category. Indeed, without being ‘poetically present’ enjoyment of these things may not even be possible. It is a kind of attitude, then, to appreciate and make the most of what we have, here and now, a mentality possible only in the present focused on the things that make life worth living.

Some may worry that I refer to Oakeshott’s disposition as being ‘poetically present’, rather than it simply being a disposition to support stability and scepticism against change for the sake of change. Although it would not be unreasonable to define it as such, for my project I want to express the disposition in a richer way to emphasise the importance of connecting with those things that truly make life worth living. So, before returning to Oakeshott’s conservative disposition, I will expand on what I mean by being ‘poetically present’, or to put it another way living poetically, which is a concept that connects Oakeshott’s views to the thoughts of (among others) T.S. Eliot in *Burnt Norton* (1941) and Henry Thoreau in *Walden* (2004 [1854]).

### 4.3.2 LIVING POETICALLY

Being ‘poetically present’ is about bringing the consciousness of the person into what it is that one is already doing. This is not as mysterious as it sounds. It is about experiencing joy or pleasure, which involves stepping outside of oneself in order to view oneself more clearly and in a more meaningful way. This is similar to Oakeshott’s conservative disposition which is: ‘inherently enjoyable and connected to human happiness; it is the disposition to enjoy the present and to delight in it’ (Abel, 2012, p.13). It is also reminiscent of T. S. Eliot’s (1941) ‘still point of the turning world’ in *Burnt Norton*:
At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor fleshless;
Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is,
But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity,
Where past and future are gathered. Neither movement from nor towards,
Neither ascent nor decline. Except for the point, the still point,
There would be no dance, and there is only the dance.

(Eliot, 1941, II)

There are many interpretations of Eliot’s meaning here, but his reference to: ‘Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is’ offers a useful way of describing Oakeshott’s disposition. My interpretation of Eliot is a call to live poetically in the present. It is a bridge between the past to the future, which focuses on those virtues and qualities that we all share as human beings; for example, compassion, loyalty, love, moral sentiment, admiration for Nature, and an appreciation for beauty. Living poetically does not displace but complements reason by helping us be in touch with our emotions in the present, which connects with the past and leads to more meaningful and inclusive possibilities for the future.

This idea of being ‘poetically present’ is also captured in the writings of Thoreau (2004 [1854]) who says in Walden:91

It is something to be able to paint a particular picture, or to carve a statue, and so to make a few objects beautiful; but it is far more glorious to carve and paint the very atmosphere and medium through which we look, which morally we can do. To affect the quality of the day, that is the highest of arts.

(Thoreau, 2004 [1854], p.90)

Thoreau’s focus is about living the poetic life which, for him, became possible through his solitary existence at Walden Pond, where as a kind of living experiment with Nature he lived alone in the wilderness for just over two years:

Thoreau did not see the poetic as lying within any works. Instead, it resided within Nature; poetry, for him, was the song of Nature. Thus, the poet was not one who necessarily created works, but rather one who listened to the poetry of Nature by living a life in harmony with her song. [A task Thoreau] sought for himself at Walden Pond a poetic life.

(Stikkers, 1976, p.1)

Although we do not have to follow Thoreau into the wilderness, his poetic views on Nature from this ‘lived’ experience are helpful to my project. For Thoreau, the poetic, that

91 For a useful account of Thoreau’s ‘poetic voice’ see Robert Bly’s (1992) The Winged Life.
he equates with the ‘song of Nature’, permeates the whole of our existence and is necessary for our human flourishing. As Kenneth Stikkers (1977) says:

[H]uman activity can be considered poetic if Nature is integrated into the whole of one's life, where human activity is carried out according to the ways of Nature for the purpose of supporting human flourishing.

(Stikkers, 1976, p.2)

Martin Heidegger supports such a position by arguing that ‘the good life entails dwelling ‘poetically on the earth’ and ‘under the sky’ (Heidegger, 1977, pp.128-136). Philip Cafaro (2020) also argues that Nature is linked with virtues and human flourishing:

[Virtues] promote the flourishing of the virtuous agent herself, as well as the flourishing of those around her. [Just] as human flourishing involves more than moral excellence; it also involves more than human excellence. People depend on Nature. In particular, our continued existence depends on maintaining key ecosystem services […] and our full flourishing depends on preserving sufficient wild, untamed Nature for our physical, intellectual, and spiritual sustenance. […] For all these reasons, the list of virtues should include environmental virtues such as temperance, stewardship, and respect for Nature: qualities which further ecological sustainability, a necessary ground for human flourishing.

(Cafaro, 2020, p.941)

In MfP, Thoreauvian virtues are important for human flourishing and, as I will come to shortly, in the action to protect the environment that is encompassed by the MfP-patriot’s universal principle to reject indifference and neglect. These virtues include, for example, integrity, sensibility to beauty but of the utmost importance is simplicity:

Thoreau’s “simplicity” is not simplicity of thought or experience [it] is rather a limited use of external goods, combined with a focus on the task at hand. Simplicity […] is a ‘keystone’ virtue for Thoreau. It plays an important role in stabilising and focusing our lives, and allows the development of a rich character manifesting diverse virtues. In a complicated world, such simplicity allows us to understand the effects of our actions and act with integrity.

(Cafaro, 2001, p.7)

In Walden, Thoreau’s views on living a deliberative life where simplicity is a keystone virtue, leads to a joyful and poetic relationship with Nature. As Cafaro argues, by recognising Nature’s value, Thoreau believes that we enrich our own lives and: ‘through simplicity we restrain our gross physical consumption [and] are more likely to lead healthy and enjoyable lives and promote conditions in which future generations can do the same [by] devoting ourselves to higher pursuits than moneymaking, we act in our enlightened self-interest’ (Cafaro, 2004, pp.139-140).
Although they come to their respective positions differently, Thoreau’s focus on simplicity and a lived poetic relationship with Nature adds weight to Oakeshott’s conservative disposition, which is about those things and activities where what is sought is present enjoyment, and not a result in addition to the experience itself. Thoreau’s views are consistent with my project as he does not dismiss the type of moral concern I associate with MfP, which is best captured by C.S Lewis (2015) in Mere Christianity when he identifies morality as being concerned with three elements:

Firstly, with fair play and harmony between individuals. Secondly, with what might be called tidying up or harmonising the things inside each individual. Thirdly, with the general purpose of human life as a whole: what man was made for: what course the whole fleet ought to be on: what tune the conductor of the band wants it to play.

(Lewis, 2015, p.68)

Lewis observes that: ‘You may have noticed that modern people are nearly always thinking about the first thing and forgetting the other two’ (Lewis, 2015, p.68). The way I address this ‘forgetfulness’ is through the ‘poetically present’ element of cppc-conservatism. This move is not only supported by Oakeshott’s conservative disposition, but by his characterisation of the ‘poetic experience’ that he sets out in ‘The Voice of Poetry’ (1962). Oakeshott’s view is useful in attending to Lewis’s observation that morality is also properly concerned with the good order of the self and with the general purpose of life.

According to Glen Worthington (2005), in terms of the good order of the self (Lewis’ second element) Oakeshott views poetic experience as the possession of a moral sensibility rather than some external add on. For Oakeshott the enactments of a self are poetic:

One may represent or misrepresent one’s moral qualities to others, but the enactments of a self refer to whether an authentic representation or misrepresentation has occurred. The enacted self refers to what a self knows itself to be or to what it knows itself to have failed to become. In so far as every self is enacted, every individual is engaged in poetic activity. The poetic dimension of the moral life of a self refers to its moral character in its most comprehensive and intimate terms.

(Worthington, 2005, p.60)

In terms of the concern of morality with the general purpose of life (Lewis’ third element) Oakeshott’s poetic experience is not confined to the way in which a self creates its moral character. As Worthington argues: ‘Beyond the construction of a moral self, poetic experience refers to the creation of the ideals through which moral selves are produced.
within a society [in line with this Oakeshott] advances the notion of the poetic as a critical factor in the formation of values in society’ (Worthington, 2005, pp.61-62):

Oakeshott argued that a consequence of a prosaic view of the moral life has been the emergence of an understanding of morality as ‘the reflective application of a moral criterion’. However, properly understood, moral ideals are derived from habits of behaviour. The reflective application of derivative ideals may contribute a self-consciously critical faculty to a morality of habit. One result of this might be a particularly vigorous tradition of moral controversy. If, however, moral ideals usurp the primacy of the habits of behaviour from which they are derived, morality is robbed of its creative spontaneity and flexibility; it is robbed of its poetic dimension.

(Worthington, 2005, p.63)

According to this view, by excluding the poetic component of life we will be stuck on rigid and uninspiring principles. If correct, this would be to the disadvantage of habits of conduct and virtues that are a basic component of moral behaviour when being ‘poetically present’. In MfP this means that if MfP-patriots are not ‘poetically present’ their moral life will be devoid of the richness of experience that comes from habits of conduct and social virtues. For example, philo-philia, compassion, trust, moral courage, sensibility to beauty, protecting the environment and Thoreau’s keystone virtue of simplicity. When MfP-patriots are ‘poetically present’ they will enjoy those things and activities that make life worth living; they seek enjoyment in the present, not a result in addition to the experience itself. In order to elucidate this claim I will say a little more about Oakeshott’s conservative disposition.

4.3.3 BACK TO OAKESHOTT’S CONSERVATISM

The first point to make is that Oakeshott does not believe the conservative disposition is appropriate for certain relationships; for example, master and slave, seller and purchaser, competitor against competitor. These forms of relationships require another disposition:

To be conservative in such relationships, to enjoy what is present and available regardless of its failure to satisfy any want and merely because it has struck our fancy and become familiar, is conduct which discloses a jusqu’au-batiste [extreme] conservatism, an irrational inclination to refuse all relationships which call for the exercise of any other disposition.

(Oakeshott, 1962, p.416)

Of course, not all relationships are like this. The majority of relationships, or at the very least the ones which are most meaningful and long lasting, are not primarily based on the concept of supply and demand or competition. Instead we are engaged in them for their own
sake, enjoyed for what they are and not only for what they provide. According to Oakeshott, both friendship and patriotism are rooted in a sense of familiarity and are sustained through the reciprocation of personalities. This mutual attachment arises from an innate understanding of one another:

The relationship between friend to friend is dramatic, not utilitarian: the tie is one of familiarity, not usefulness: the disposition engaged is conservative, not ‘progressive’. And what is true of friendship is not less true of other experiences – of patriotism, for example, and of conversation – each of which demands a conservative disposition as a condition of its enjoyment. (Oakeshott, 1962, p.417)

What is true of relationships is true for many activities where the appropriate disposition is the conservative disposition. This is clearly the case for Thoreau’s connection to Nature or, for example, my love of gardening. When it comes to gardening, I could simply aim to outdo my neighbour, using the best tools and fertilisers while discarding unproductive methods. However, gardening can be much more than a competition or a means to grow profitable plants. For me, it is a fulfilling activity in its own right. At the end of a day spent tending to my garden, I am content even if some of my plants are not thriving or my attempts are not perfect. Gardening has become a comforting habit, where the desire to be poetically present is well-suited. I do not need to worry about having the most expensive tools or comparing my garden to my neighbour’s. What is important is the joy of exercising my skills, delighting in my plants, getting my hands dirty, listening to the birds, and simply being outside. These pleasures are available regardless of how my neighbour’s garden looks or what tools I use, so long as they are familiar and fit the task at hand.

What I take from Oakeshott is his belief that for all activities where enjoyment is sought, not necessarily from the success of the enterprise, but the familiarity of the

92 Oakeshott (1962, p.417) uses the fishing example to make the same points. By using the example of gardening I am not asserting that no person becomes competitive with their neighbour, or does not seek out the highest yield of production or even flowering perfection. Such motives, however, I take to be more prevalent for those in the horticultural profession, or those suffering from a particular mentality of one-upmanship, that is generally less prominent for the majority when it comes to their gardens – at least in my village.
engagement, these are symbols of the conservative disposition. In the conduct of activities when the conservative disposition is the most appropriate Oakeshott states:

Whenever stability is more profitable than improvement, whenever certainty is more valuable than speculation, whenever familiarity is more desirable than perfection, [...] whenever the disease is more sufferable than the cure, [...] whenever a rule of some sort is better than the risk of having no rule at all, a disposition to be conservative will be more appropriate than any other [...]. Those who see the man of conservative disposition (even in what is vulgarly called a ‘progressive’ society) as a lonely swimmer battling against the overwhelming current of circumstances must be thought to have adjusted their binoculars to exclude a large field of human occasion.

(Oakeshott, 1962, p.418)

These aspects of Oakeshott’s conservative disposition are relevant to cppc-conservatism. The MfP-patriot is ‘poetically present’ when they are focused on those things which really matter, bring enjoyment, familiarity, and are appreciated for their own sake. The ‘poetically present’ element of cppc-conservatism helps create my patria and polity as a stable association, where MfP-patriots and their fellow citizens focus on and act out a number of virtues. One of these is the virtue of acting to protect the environment of my patria and polity, to which I now turn.

4.3.4 ACTING TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT

Affirming the worth of my patria and polity is a crucial task, for there is so much that is good and valuable to protect and preserve. From its natural wonders to its man-made features, my homeland boasts a wealth of charms and enriching experiences that deserve attention and care, both in the present and for generations to come. MfP-patriots have a strong sense of gratitude for their connection to these things, and display a keen awareness and sensitivity towards their importance. This view is shared not only by Thoreau but by many poets. For example, when it comes to England this can be seen in most of Shakespeare’s works; Elliot’s (1969 [1936-1942]) The Four Quartets; William Wordsworth’s (1977 [1815]) Daffodils; and Robert Browning’s (1989 [1845]) Home Thoughts from Abroad.
Linked to the sense of consciousness and value that these poets express is Onora O’Neill’s (1996) constellation of social virtues that sustain natural and man-made environments on which, according to her, both individual lives and the social fabric depend. For O’Neill: ‘universal indifference to the care and preservation of our environment undermines human life, capacities and capabilities for action’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.203). It is from this view that I get the third action encompassed by the universal principle to reject indifference and neglect. This is part of the justificatory grounds for *MfP* set out in Chapter Three, and it involves the *MfP*-patriot acting to protect the environment of my *patria* and *polity*. In protecting the environment of one’s homeland, the *MfP*-patriot is acting in a way consistent with Oakeshott’s disposition and Thoreau’s connection to Nature, both of which support being ‘poetically present’. To unpack my claim, I will start by saying something of what I understand as environmental patriotism and what this means for *MfP*. I will then expand on O’Neill’s approach for the protection of man-made and natural environments. And I will finish by outlining how the *MfP*-patriot puts the protection of the environment into practice.

The relationship with my *patria* and *polity* is indelibly connected to its landscape, environment and natural resources. *MfP* is committed to the protection of the environment that includes a strong sense of community and a duty to the land. Phillip Cafaro (2020) argues that in order to satisfy the desire for human flourishing people need to respond to the threats against the environment and be committed to its protection:

> A case can be made that environmentalism, rightly understood, is patriotism [that indicates] a general concern to protect the land and the people of one’s homeland, however extensively one defines them. On this view, environmentalists are patriots par excellence, literally committed to protecting the land and all its inhabitants, including its nonhuman inhabitants.

(Cafaro, 2020, p.946)

Cafaro does not argue that people should focus solely on protecting the environment of their own country and be indifferent to what is happening globally. Instead, he believes that someone committed to environmental protection locally is more likely: ‘to explore other places respectfully and support international conservation efforts’ (Cafaro, 2020, p.948).
This idea is in line with the Mazzinian thought that love of one’s country is a steppingstone to the good of humanity. What I mean by this is that a concern for wider climate and environmental issues begins with a local connection to one’s homeland:

[Our] appreciation of Nature typically begins close to home […]. A person can only enjoy and celebrate those aspects of his country that he experiences personally. I might get a thrill hearing Ray Charles sing “America the Beautiful,” but it really means something to me because I have recently seen a sunrise over the Pawnee Buttes east of Fort Collins, or the first swallows of spring cutting the air above a friend’s ranch. I can enjoy Nature and belong locally, in a way that I cannot do elsewhere. (Cafaro, 2020, p.948)

What this means for MfP is that by focusing on protecting the environment, MfP-patriots develop a closer relationship to the land of my patria and polity. As patriots, they strive to know it better, enjoy it more, and work to safeguard it. Working with others to protect what is vital to them is what the Thoreauvian endeavour entails. MfP-patriots find strength and inspiration in one another and being part of a greater cause to conserve my patria and polity’s environment that, in turn, serves as a foundation for broader environmental issues:

[Environmental patriotism] is not something to suppress or be embarrassed about, but rather part of being human. [It] can be put to good environmental uses, to bridge the liberal/conservative divide and achieve environmental protection […]. A patriotism that is fully grounded yet expansive, not drawing lines defensively and saying, “us or them,” but widening the typical circle of moral concern and inviting in Nature. Here is a patriotism that is truly a virtue. (Cafaro, 2020, p.956)

Cafaro warns that without an expansive form of patriotism focused on environmental protection we face the: ‘effective loss of our countries’ (Cafaro, 2020, p.958). Within MfP, there is plenty of scope for this sort of globally sensitive environmental patriotism. For example, by creating new protected and conservation areas, rewilding and biodiversity projects, implementing green initiatives, supporting international climate change and environmental improvement initiatives, and so on. More significantly, environmental patriotism helps motivate MfP-patriots to learn about the people, places, stories, traditions and histories of the place they call home. It helps break down barriers amongst compatriots, which is a view that fits with the identity constituted as a narrative project claim I made in Chapter One.
Onora O’Neill (1996) believes that: ‘refraining from destroying or damaging environments which provide the material basis for socially connected lives amounts to environmental justice’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.203). This view is clearly applicable to MfP. However, where O’Neill is more interesting is in her belief that the environment will remain vulnerable if it is not also cherished or cared for by people (in my case by MfP-patriots). For O’Neill, the conceptual distinction between environmental justice and care for the environment is through environmental virtues that go beyond justice:

Concern and care for natural and man-made environments (like concern and care for other individuals and for the social fabric of life) is not merely inevitably selective, but quite particular. […] Some will express care that goes beyond justice through […] seeking to preserve familiar landscapes and townscape, yet others by conserving uncultivated wilderness, by protecting endangered species or by restoring them to ancestral habitats.[…] These ‘green virtues’ are not to be identified with determinate set of highly specific policies, projects or activities, but rather with the rejection of policies or attitudes that express indifference to natural and man-made environments in ways that are realistic rather than sentimental for actual situations. (O’Neill, 1996, p.204)

The consequence of caring for natural and man-made environments is that we must act to protect the environment (an action encompassed by the principle to reject indifference and neglect):

Vulnerabilities multiply for those who find themselves drawing bare subsistence and shelter from environments they do not understand or care for. They are lessened and limited for those who inhabit a natural and man-made world that flourishes and supports them both materially and spiritually. An ethically sound relation to the environment must then go beyond avoiding systematic and gratuitous damage that injures others’ lives; it must also be expressed in care and concern to sustain and conserve at least some parts or aspects of that environment in a flourishing condition. (O’Neill, 1996, p.203)

Action which rejects indifference and neglect to the environment must be selective, and in the case of MfP this is selective to my patria and polity. Systematic indifference by the MfP-patriot towards the environment of my patria and polity has potentially huge effects. As O’Neill states:

[It] can blight the land, systems of agriculture, our landscapes, ecosystems, as well as degrading cities, towns and villages that shelter and enrich lives. [It can even erode] the possibilities of clean air and water, inflicting permanent damage to biodiversity, the climate and the environment. (O’Neill, 1996, pp.203-204)

Clearly, any reasonable person would wish to avoid these negative effects, but how does MfP deal with them? Anne Marie Todd (2014) provides a useful way to show how
MfP-patriots can practically act to reject indifference and neglect to the environment of my patria and polity. It includes three commitments:

1. MfP is a commitment to conservation. As an MfP-patriot, one’s primary focus is on the well-being of the community as a whole. This involves recognising the importance of preserving resources for future generations, as it is in the best interest of the public. By adopting a long-term perspective, MfP-patriots are able to connect present priorities with potential environmental risks down the line. This, in turn, provides compelling reasons to take action in order to protect our valuable natural resources (Todd, 2014, p.5).

2. Secondly, MfP-patriots have a stewardship commitment. The MfP-patriot’s bond with the environment is underscored by a strong sense of morality, driven by a deep connection to their homeland and community. This connection evokes a profound sense of attachment and responsibility towards safeguarding the natural heritage of their patria (Todd, 2014, p.6).

3. The MfP-patriot draws upon her connection to place to motivate participation in her local communities. In this sense, MfP through its approach to pluralism (see Chapter Two) and the key feature of civic republican liberalism provides a political structure to link varied interests and backgrounds in my patria and polity, which emphasises access to public goods and natural resources as national assets. MfP-patriots are exemplary citizens who connect environmental issues to their everyday experiences, offering a chance for people to connect with one another and work together towards the betterment of their environment (Todd, 2014, p.6).

It is through the commitments of conservation, stewardship and participation that MfP-patriots act to protect the environment of my patria and polity. Richard Nelson (2001) identifies four motivating reasons that fit nicely with these commitments:

[First, protecting one’s] homeland is nothing less than protecting ourselves, our children, our communities, our nation [Secondly] allegiance to the land is allegiance to our community as a whole. [We] have a moral and ethical obligation to protect this living community. [Thirdly] standing up for the protection of our [homeland] is a way to give something back in return for the gifts of sustenance and beauty and living enrichment that they have given us. [And fourthly] working in service of the land is a powerful source of hope and motivation - the kind of hope and motivation that comes from doing something rather than standing by in the face of loss […] to support each other in the bad times as well as good.

(Nelson, 2001, pp.20-21)

In this section I have explored: (1) Oakeshott’s conservative disposition which is to value and enjoy those things and activities that make life worth living, where we should be cautious about innovation and against change for the sake of change; (2) Thoreau’s poetic connection to Nature where we are focused on the keystone virtue of simplicity; and (3) the action to protect the environment of my patria and polity, which, as I set out in Chapter Three, is the third act-for-the-sake-of-a-specific-end (an object of choice and bearer of moral value) encompassed by the principle to reject indifference and neglect. Together, these provide the grounds upon which MfP-patriots are ‘poetically present’ and focused on those
things that are inherently enjoyable, intimately related to the highest human capacities, which are all connected to human flourishing.

Having established the ‘poetically present’ element of cppc-conservatism, I turn now to the emotion of ‘compassion’ which is the third element.

4.4  THE COMPASSION ELEMENT

In this final section of my thesis, I shall present a view of compassion within the political and social realm that assists in reinforcing social bonds and connection. I will begin by briefly saying why compassion is important for MfP. I then set out Martha Nussbaum’s view on compassion and show how it relates to cppc-conservatism. I will end by outlining and responding to some possible problems related to the use of compassion as part of the public culture of my patria and polity. Before getting to this, however, I will deal with three preliminary matters to clarify my use of certain terms.

First, I use the terms compassion and pity interchangeably and present them as a single emotion. Secondly, compassion is not to be understood in the same way as empathy. According to Nussbaum (2013), empathy is defined as the: ‘ability to imagine the situation of the other, taking the other’s perspective’ (Nussbaum, 2013, pp.145-146). Empathy is morally neutral, as Nussbaum points out, compassion may result from it but it is not necessary for it. For example, a sadist or torturer may feel sympathy for another person’s plight yet use it to do them pain, or a performer may feel sympathy for their role but not genuine compassion:

[Empathy] is simply an imaginative reconstruction of another person’s experience, whether that experience is happy or sad, pleasant or painful or neutral, and whether the imaginer thinks the other person's situation good, bad, or indifferent […] one may have empathy with joyful or placid experiences, [but] compassion […] requires its object to be (thought to be) in a bad state.

(Nussbaum, 2001, pp.302-328)

So, unlike empathy:

[Compassion] requires the thought that its object is in a bad state, which creates a bridge between our concerns and a broader set of concerns that is still recognisably ‘us’ and ‘ours’.

(Nussbaum, 2013, pp.145-146)
Thirdly, although there is overlap with seeing compassion as both an emotion and a virtue, here my focus is on the emotion of compassion. Elsewhere in my thesis I mainly get the action of the virtue of compassion, *MfP*-patriots doing the right thing at the right time in the right way, through the three actions encompassed by the universal principle to reject indifference and neglect as part of my justificatory grounds for *MfP*.

### 4.4.1 WHY COMPASSION IS IMPORTANT FOR MFP

For *MfP*, compassion is important because it helps motivate the fulfilment of basic rights and special duties to our compatriots. It is an emotion that assists *MfP*-patriots in seeing others as worthy of genuine concern. If *MfP*-patriots are to properly see or connect to their fellow compatriots and citizens they must undertake a process of what Iris Murdoch calls ‘unselfing’; a process to connect to others beyond the self (quoted in Nussbaum, 2012, p.57). To this end, the emotion of compassion as part of *cppc-conservatism* plays a key social role in connecting *MfP*-patriots to the community of my patria and polity. As Simone Weil (1952) argues it is a form of patriotic sentiment built on compassion (not pride and glory) that really matters when it comes to identifying and connecting with one’s country:

> A patriotism inspired by compassion gives the [...] population a privileged moral position. National glory only acts as a stimulant [...] those who form part of the anonymous mass remain in it more or less, never even seeking to emerge therefrom, the people cannot feel themselves at home in a patriotism formed upon pride and pomp-and-glory. [...] On the other hand, if their country is presented to them as something beautiful and precious, but which is, in the first place, imperfect, and secondly, very frail and liable to suffer misfortune, [and third] necessary to cherish and preserve, they will rightly feel themselves to be more closely identified with it [...].

(Weil, 1952, pp.172-175)

Martha Nussbaum (1996a) argues that there are broadly two rival views of compassion in philosophy; the anti-compassion view and the pro-compassion view. According to her, the anti-compassion view originates with Plato and is represented in the Stoic writings of Epictetus and Seneca. This view holds that reason should command the emotions because emotions are akin to blind urges - an irrational force (Nussbaum, 1996a, p.28). In contrast, the pro-compassion view, which is one that sees our emotions as an
inherent part of our moral reasoning and being finds expression in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and *The Art of Rhetoric* (Gallagher, 2009, p.232). For *cppc-conservatism*, the Aristotelian-inspired pro-compassion view is preferred as it offers a richer approach that recognises compassion as involving feelings, motivations and reason, which are all important for social connection. To establish this claim I turn now to Nussbaum’s thoughts on compassion.

### 4.4.2 NUSSBAUM AND COMPASSION

In my project, compassion offers a way to support *MfP-patriots* in the process of ‘unselfing’ to create a stable and meaningful connection to their compatriots in the community of my *patria* and *polity*. Nussbaum identifies three reasons why the emotion of compassion is important for this end:

First, compassion, in the philosophical tradition, is a central bridge between the individual and the community; it is conceived of as our species’ way of hooking the interests of others to our own personal goods. [Second] some modern moral theories - liberal and individualist moral theories in particular - have treated compassion as an irrational force in human affairs, one that is likely to mislead or distract us when we are trying to think well about social policy. [Third] compassion is, above all, a certain sort of thought about the wellbeing of others. […] If we want a compassionate community, we can have one without sacrificing the Enlightenment’s commitment to reason and reflection - because compassion is a certain sort of reasoning.

(Nussbaum, 1996a, p.28)

Nussbaum gets to her view on compassion through Aristotle who in *The Art of Rhetoric* (1991) defines compassion as follows:

Let pity then, be a certain pain occasioned by an apparently destructive evil or pain’s occurring to one who does not deserve it, which the pitier might expect to suffer himself or that one of his own would, and this whenever it should seem near at hand.

(Aristotle, 1991, 1385b17-20)

Nussbaum sees Aristotle’s compassion as a ‘painful emotion directed at another person’s misfortune or suffering’ which involves three cognitive requirements (Nussbaum, 2001, pp.306-318). The first is the *seriousness requirement* - the evil or pain in question must be seen as significant rather than trivial:

[Compassion], like other major emotions, is concerned with value: it involves the recognition that the situation matters deeply for the life in question. Intuitively we see this easily. We do not go around pitying someone who has lost a trivial item, such as a toothbrush or a paper clip, or even an important
item that is readily replaceable. Internal to our emotional response itself is the judgment that what is at issue is indeed serious - has “size,” as Aristotle puts it.  

(Nussbaum, 1996a, p.31)

The second is the desert requirement - the evil or pain must be seen as undeserved:

Insofar as we believe that a person came to grief through his or her own fault, we will blame and reproach, rather than pitying. Insofar as we do pity, it is either because we believe the person to be without blame for the loss or impediment, or because, though there is some fault, we believe that the suffering is out of proportion to the fault.  

(Nussbaum, 1996a, p.33)

The third is the similar possibilities requirement - the evil or pain must be something which the person experiencing compassion might expect to befall herself or someone close to her:  

This is a judgment of similar possibilities: pity concerns those misfortunes “which the person himself might expect to suffer, either himself or one of his loved ones” [Aristotle, 1991, 1385bl9-20]. This fact is repeatedly stressed in poetic appeals to pity [and] is the focus of the marvellous discussion of that emotion in Rousseau’s Emile. Drawing his account from the classical tradition, Rousseau argues, agreeing with Aristotle, that an awareness of one’s own weakness and vulnerability is a necessary condition for pity; without this, we will have an arrogant harshness.  

(Nussbaum, 1996a, p.34)

Taking these three requirements into account, the central idea of compassion applied to MfP goes as follows. (1) The object of the MfP-patriot’s compassion, her compatriot, has suffered some misfortune. (2) The MfP-patriot must see her compatriot’s misfortune as seriously damaging the compatriot’s wellbeing, she cannot see it as just a minor harm. (3) The MfP-patriot must think her compatriot did not deserve this misfortune, that it was not the fault of her compatriot or due to actions for which her compatriot is to blame. This thought corresponds to one of two possibilities: either her compatriot did not deserve to suffer misfortune, or though her compatriot deserved to suffer some, the misfortune her compatriot suffered was out of proportion to what her compatriot deserved to suffer. And (4) the MfP-patriot must regard herself as similarly vulnerable; she must think the same misfortune could befall her as befell her compatriot. These: ‘cognitive requirements of size, desert, and similar possibilities are necessary elements of the complex judgment Aristotle’s definition specifies as an essential component of compassion’ (Deigh, 2004, pp.467-468).

Nussbaum fully accepts Aristotle’s first two cognitive requirements. However, she finds the similar possibilities requirement too narrow. Her solution is to replace it with a
human flourishing requirement, what she calls the *eudaimonistic judgement requirement*. To explain what this means she refers to the relationship between compassion, vulnerability and fear. She does so through Rousseau who, in *Emile*, argues that an awareness of these things is a necessary condition for compassion, without which one may be unsympathetic and overbearing:

> Why are kings without pity for their subjects? Because they count on never being human beings. Why are the rich so hard toward the poor? It is because they have no fear of being poor. Why does a noble have such contempt for a peasant? It is because he never will be a peasant. [However] each may be tomorrow what the one whom helps is today […] do not, therefore, accustom your pupil to regard the sufferings of the unfortunate and the labours of the poor from the height of his glory; and do not hope to teach him to pity them if he considers them alien to him. Make him understand well that the fate of these unhappy people can be his, that all their ills are there in the ground beneath his feet, that countless unforeseen and inevitable events can plunge him into them from one moment to the next. Teach him to count on neither birth nor health nor riches. Show him all the vicissitudes of fortune.

(Rousseau, 1976, p.224)

Nussbaum explains that what Rousseau is getting at is:

> Whilst 'I' as the pitier retain awareness of my separateness, 'I' at the same time acknowledge that 'I' have possibilities and vulnerabilities similar to those of the sufferer. I make sense of the suffering by thinking about what it would mean to encounter that myself, and I see myself in the process as one to whom such things might in fact happen.

(Nussbaum, 1996a, p.35)

Nussbaum argues that it is in this way that an awareness of one’s own compassion is closely linked to community and a sense of commonness in both philosophical and poetic accounts:

> The point seems to be that the pain of another will be an object of my concern only if I acknowledge some sort of community between myself and the other, understanding what it might be for me to face such pain. Without that sense of commonness, both Aristotle and Rousseau claim, I will react with sublime indifference or mere intellectual curiosity, like an obtuse alien from another world; and I will not care what I do to augment or relieve the suffering. This fact explains why so frequently those who wish to withhold pity and to teach others to do so portray the sufferers as altogether dissimilar in kind and in possibility.

(Nussbaum, 1996a, p.35)

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93 There are a number of objections raised against Nussbaum’s view on compassion. For example, Roger Crisp (2008) who rejects the cognitive approach; John Deigh (2004) who argues it is insufficient to explain non-moral compassion; Aaron Ben-Ze’ev (2000) who rejects Nussbaum’s thesis that emotions are evaluative appraisals. See also Nancy Sherman (2004, p.480) who observes that Nussbaum’s compassion, directed as it is at serious loss, desert, and a proper scope of concern, offers a less neutral gaze, and the exercise of this compassion is not sufficient to guarantee the substantial results Nussbaum hopes for. For a largely satisfying response to these objections see Nussbaum (2004).
An example of what Nussbaum means in her last sentence, which I acknowledge is a danger of patriotism or nationalism without the emotion of compassion, are the Nazis who portrayed Jews as non-human. Instead they described them as insects, vermin, and as inanimate objects, cargo to be transported. For a compelling account of this portrayal see Hannah Arendt’s (2017 [1958]) *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.

The implication of Nussbaum’s position for *MfP* is that instead of only considering *the similar possibilities requirement*, the *MfP*-patriot would also see the flourishing of her compatriot as important. By acknowledging that I may suffer the same misfortunes of my compatriot, the *MfP*-patriot has a deeply felt appreciation for her well-being. I understand that my own goals are entangled with those of my compatriot and, as such, I understand the significance of my compatriot’s flourishing by seeing my compatriot’s ends as my ends. In other words the flourishing of my compatriot is linked to the flourishing of the *MfP*-patriot. As Nussbaum puts it:

> In order for compassion to be present, the person must consider the suffering of another as a significant part of his or her own scheme of goals and ends. She must take that person’s ill as affecting her own flourishing. In effect, she must make herself vulnerable in the person of another. It is that eudaimonistic judgment, not the judgment of similar possibilities, that seems to be a necessary constituent of compassion.

(Nussbaum, 2001, p. 319)

The emotion of compassion as part of *cppc-conservatism* is the thing that helps connect *MfP*-patriots through prudential concern and altruism. As part of the justificatory grounds I set out in Chapter Three, in seeking to satisfy the desire for human flourishing through my *patria* and *polity*, *MfP*-patriots have a sound understanding of conceptions of moral wellbeing and human flourishing. When they see suffering of their compatriots through no fault of their own, in their compassion they acknowledge the special obligations necessary to foster the social fabric, secure the common good and protect the environment of my *patria* and *polity*. However, in doing so they are as Nussbaum says: ‘not certain that they will remain among the advantaged ones to which such things are assured’ (Nussbaum,
As a result, the *MfP-patriot* acknowledges that the fate of her suffering compatriot may be or become hers:

This leads her to turn her thoughts outward, from her own current comfortable situation to the structure of society's allocation of goods and resources. For, given the uncertainty of life, she will be inclined to want a society in which the lot of the worst off - of the poor, of people defeated in war, of women, of servants - is as good as it can be. Self-interest promotes the selection of principles that raise society's floor. [...] Rousseau seems right that, followed through rigorously enough, it supports something like democratic equality: democracy because pity sees the value to each person of having a choice in his or her way of life and in the political conception that governs it; equality because it concerns itself at least with the provision to all of a basic minimum welfare.

(Nussbaum, 1996a, p.36)

What I take from Nussbaum, is that adopting an outward mindset prompts individuals to perceive and acknowledge particular human circumstances in a unique and meaningful manner. This mindset encourages a natural inclination to strive towards improving the quality of life for the most disadvantaged members of society, all things considered. It is crucial for individuals to adopt this perspective, as any one of them could find themselves in the most deprived group at any given time. Nussbaum links this idea with John Rawls’ (1999) widely understood ‘original position’. In this scenario, rational agents who act with prudential reason must choose the principles that will guide their society, armed with all the pertinent information but without any knowledge of their own position within the societal structure that emerges. The difference between Rawls’ rational agents and Nussbaum’s pitiers is that the former are designed to be fair to all ideas of the good that individuals in society may hold; knowledge about their own conceptions of the good is excluded. However, in the case of Nussbaum’s pitiers (or *MfP-patriots*) like an audience to a Shakespearean play: ‘they function with the best broad concepts of moral well-being and human flourishing they can discover’ (Nussbaum, 1996a, pp.36-37).

Notwithstanding this distinction, Nussbaum maintains that there is a strong resemblance to Rawls: ‘as the structure of self-interested prudential reasoning is accessible in both circumstances to provide altruistic principles’ (Nussbaum, 1996a, pp.36-37). Compassion makes patriots: ‘understand the significance of a compatriot's suffering and they are compelled to investigate the claims that such a compatriot may have’ (Nussbaum, 1996a,
It is in this sense that compassion can be a bridge to socially connect a *MfP-patriot* to her compatriots/ co-citizens. Consequently, compassion as part of *cppc-conservatism* is something to be nurtured and sustained. In making this claim, however, it seems to me that there are three problems one might have about the use of compassion in the political and social spheres; problems to which I will now turn.

### 4.4.3 RESPONDING TO PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH COMPASSION

The problems I will focus on are what can be called the *error of compassion problem*, the *dual-level hierarchisation problem* and the *self-deceptive problem*. By the *error of compassion problem*, I mean that compassion is selective and uneven and will go wrong on occasions. Even Nussbaum who is a leading champion of compassion believes it can be a problematic emotion in this way:

> I stress the fact that compassion can go wrong. Indeed, any one of the three constituent beliefs in terms of which I define the emotion can go wrong, because we can make mistakes about what sufferings are really serious, about which misfortunes are the person’s fault and which are not, and, finally and most ubiquitously, about which people are worthy of being included among one’s most important goals (the “eudaimonistic judgement”). […] I argue that “we want not just any and every type of compassion, but, so to speak, compassion within the limits of reason, compassion allied to a reasonable ethical theory in the three areas of judgment”.

(Nussbaum, 1996a, p.480)

Nussbaum’s solution to the *error of compassion* focuses on building a number of human capacities to support the ‘right’ type of compassion. This approach is similar to Neta Crawford’s that I set out in Chapter Two, who advocates the need to increase our human capacities so that we know when and how to act to promote basic rights. This is what is required for compassion. As compassion is related to suffering and tragedy, in order to deal with this in the appropriate way a: ‘liberal polity should describe its basic entitlements as a set of capacities, or opportunities for functioning in certain important areas’ (Nussbaum, 2001, p.416). In *MfP*, this means that my *patria* and polity should secure for its citizens a

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94 See also Nancy Sherman (2004).
basic set of human capacities that are likely to be vital for whatever MfP-patriots seek to achieve throughout their lives. This will help avoid the ‘wrong’ type of compassion. So, along with the three universal basic rights that apply to all people, MfP-patriots ought to be guaranteed a threshold level of the following capacities that Nussbaum suggests:

1) *Senses, Imagination, and Thought.* To use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason in a "truly human" way informed and cultivated by an adequate education. To use experience, imagination and thought to produce works of one's own choice, for example, artistic, religious and literary.

2) *Emotions.* To have attachments to things and people outside us; to love those who love and care for us, and experience grief, longing, gratitude, and justified anger.

3) *Practical Reason.* To form a conception of the good and engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life.

4) *Affiliation.* To live with and toward others, to recognise and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction, to imagine the situation of another. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation and be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others.

5) *Other Species and the Environment.* To live with concern for and in relation to the world of Nature and the environment.

6) *Play.* To laugh, play, and enjoy recreational activities.

7) *Political.* To participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life, having protections of free speech and association. To work, exercise practical reason, and enter into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition.

(Adapted from Nussbaum, 2001, pp.416-418)

These capacities are different from basic rights. I would hope a similar threshold for guaranteeing capacities in my patria and polity could apply to others but, unlike basic rights, I do not make the claim that they should. This is because the threshold level for the capacities are set through the internal political processes in any one patria and polity. This is mainly done through governmental institutions, supported by a local process of justice, which reflects the particular culture, history and social lineage, needs and values of that country. I also recognise that Nussbaum’s list of human capacities is not the final word. Nevertheless, in the case of the judgements that underpin the emotion of compassion (seriousness, desert, similar possibilities and the eudaimonistic judgement) for the MfP-patriot to express the ‘right’ sort of compassion this, or something very much like it, is necessary:

Having a set of constitutional guarantees […] citizens would be informed from the beginning of life that there are certain entitlements that are particularly central, and deprivation of which is particularly tragic. […] The list shapes the judgment in a particular way: for what it tells citizens is not only that certain calamities are particularly grave, but also that they are unjust, wrong. No citizen should have to suffer [the deprivation of these constitutional guarantees] and all have a basic entitlement [to them].

(Nussbaum, 2001, p.418)
I turn now to the dual-level hierarchisation problem. In *MfP*, compassion is the emotion to be employed in the political realm to advance social connection and collective effort aimed at satisfying the desire for human flourishing. Compassion is the emotion that can help overcome social exclusion, provide support for the sacrifices needed for a sense of community, and to secure the common good. A similar view is held by Elisabeth Porter (2006) who supports the promotion of compassion in the political realm, and argues that a politics of compassion is possible and necessary in order to address human wellbeing and security needs. Porter extends the debates on care ethics to develop a politics of compassion by using the example of asylum seekers to demonstrate that politics can practise compassion with: (1) attentiveness to the needs of vulnerable people who are suffering; (2) an active listening to the voices of the vulnerable; and (3) open, compassionate, and appropriate responses to particular needs (Porter, 2006, p.97). Anne-Kathrin Weber (2018), however, identifies a problem with this type of account of compassion.

By referencing the views of Arendt (2016 [1963]) in *On revolution*, Weber argues that such a view threatens to reinforce a dual-level hierarchy via the connection between the emotion of compassion itself and its propensity to direct action:

> In that we feel pity, or are advised to feel it for others on a collective level, according to Arendt, the danger arises that we feel an (immediate) urge to help others, to rescue them, by making politics for them, and not with them. [...] Compassion/pity thus threatens to establish a clear hierarchy between the subject and the object of this emotion. Even though Nussbaum carefully tries to avoid this hierarchy, nevertheless this danger seems to underlie the notion of “a painful emotion directed at the serious suffering of another creature or creatures” - especially so because Nussbaum does not consider the [Aristotelian] condition of “similar possibilities” as a necessary element for compassion [...] Compassion/pity may thus further the societal divide, rather than reduce it.

(Weber, 2018, p.56)

Weber’s claim is that compassion could lock in disadvantage and actually weaken the connection between members of a society, reinforcing a dual-hierarchy status. This would be an unwelcome consequence made worse by Weber’s additional belief that if put into practice it could lead to, or at least the perception of:

> [Forcing] people to feel compassion/pity. It might thus be regarded as inflicted from above and thus fuel resentment of ‘the establishment’ and its policies which is currently prevalent.

(Weber, 2018, p.56)
Arendt expresses this viewpoint by stating that ‘if we feel sympathy for others, or are persuaded to feel compassion for others, there is a danger that we would feel a need to save them, to rescue them, by creating politics for them rather than with them’ (Arendt, 2017[1958], p.180). According to Weber, this may threaten to establish a distinct hierarchy between the subject and the object of compassion, thereby widening rather than closing the societal divide:

A (compassionate) “emotion programme” […] might potentially clash with the pluralistic and diverse (political) interests of each individual. Hence, to some, the political demand to live in and actively shape a compassionate society can indeed resemble a totalising notion of inflicting a single political will in the shape of “rules of feeling” […] onto citizens who may not be provided with the ability to dissent, or to have their dissent heard and incorporated into political decision-making.

(Weber, 2018, p.57)

Related to the dual-level hierarchisation challenge is the self-deceptive magic problem. Weber describes this as the thought that compassion may lure us into an emotion-laden insensitivity. The danger here is a combination of two things. First, we may experience compassionate feelings by visualising ourselves assisting others and perhaps acting for them because we see them as subordinates. Arendt articulates this by showing the risk of compassion’s ‘loss of reality’ that leads to ‘self-deception’ and may even act as a ‘predisposition to totalitarian authority’ (Weber, 2018, pp.57-58). Secondly, the danger is that compassion acclaims moral goodness which, puzzlingly, might actually prevent action to alleviate the sufferer’s pain. For example, take Nussbaum who states: ‘When I feel compassion for a person who is suffering, I often imagine helping that person, and in many cases I do it’ (Nussbaum, 2016, p. 22). This ‘imagining’ can in some cases develop into a powerful deception: ‘that defies reality and thus action that is designed to address this reality’ (Weber, 2018, p.57):

[The] specific “aura” of the lavish imagination of moral goodness that potentially threatens to encapsulate the subject of compassion, shield it from the harsh and “messy” reality of engaging with plural opinions, and potentially lead to inactivity’

(Weber, 2018, p.57).

Although there is a lot more to be said about the problems associated with compassion it is not necessary to do so here. I raise them, not only because they are
interesting, but that they should serve as a warning of the downside of compassion. This does not mean we should reject compassion, only that we should develop the ‘right’ sort of compassion. In her comprehensive study, Nussbaum recognises its limitations and dangers, and goes to some length to argue the normative suitability of compassion in politics and for social connection. Her argument is not for any form of compassion, but one that can be supported through robust institutions that guarantee the minimum threshold for the development of central human capacities. Nussbaum also holds that a vibrant and rich culture, especially through tragic literature, theatre, cinema, the media and the arts, is important for the ‘right’ sort of compassion: ‘if we need a decent theory of value to guide us, compassion, as standardly exemplified and taught in tragic drama, has a pretty good theory to offer’ (Nussbaum, 2001, p.374).

In the end, Nussbaum believes that we cannot do without the emotion of compassion, but it has to be the ‘right’ sort and we need to educate people in it. Although I do not cover them here, Nussbaum goes on to make numerous suggestions about how the public culture and its systems of education might do this (Nussbaum, 2004, p.480). Clearly, there is a fine balance to be struck between the clear benefits and obvious dangers of compassion when made part of a public culture. In fairness to Weber, I think she would not object too strongly to the view of compassion that I borrow from Nussbaum, because her aim is not to claim that a public culture of compassion ought to be refuted:

[There] is a certain appeal, a beauty even, to the “emotion-driven politics” of compassion/pity if employed with decent motives and monitoring. […] What is needed here, it seems, is in fact not the abolition of compassion in our public life but the enlargement of our respective circles of concern. (Weber, 2018, p.60)

Compassion, at least compassion of the ‘wrong’ sort, can be counterproductive to a good society, to social connection and even dangerous in certain forms. However, the importance and need for the ‘right’ sort of compassion in both the political and social spheres is clear. Compassion plays a central role in connecting MfP-patriots to their compatriots and co-citizens within the workable, cooperative, social and political system of my patria
and polity. This connection is necessary for \textit{MfP-patriots} to minimise or respond appropriately to the suffering and tragedy of their compatriots and, in line with Mazzini, to others when advancing the good of humanity. The capability for feeling pain at the suffering of others and imaginatively responding draws \textit{MfP-patriots} together in community; consequently, compassion justly deserves to be the third key element in \textit{cppc-conservatism}.

The final point I will end the chapter on is to be clear why \textit{cppc-conservatism} is so important for \textit{MfP}. Together, the elements of ‘connection’, being ‘poetically present’, and employing the emotion of ‘compassion’ is the disposition of \textit{MfP-patriots}. It is the way of thinking that provides \textit{MfP-patriots} with the means to provide, as Phillip Pettit (2015) puts it, robustly demanding goods for one another as rational agents. Acting from the disposition of \textit{cppc-conservatism} is not only a way of \textit{MfP-patriots} conferring the goods of virtue on their compatriots and co-citizens, but also the best way in which those goods can be delivered reliably and robustly. To act from the disposition of \textit{cppc-conservatism} is inseparable from doing good to others. If it is absent, or \textit{MfP-patriots} do not consistently act from this disposition, then it is significantly more difficult to do good. However, if \textit{MfP-patriots} act from this disposition, they generate associated benefits for their compatriots and co-citizens. These benefits are social stability and solidarity through the social fabric; harmony, peace, security and order through the common good; and wellbeing and care through a healthy environment. \textit{Cppe-conservatism} is the best disposition to sustain \textit{MfP-patriots} when they act together to foster and sustain the social fabric, secure the common good, and protect the environment of my patria and polity. These are acts-for-the-sake-of-a-specific-end, the objects of choice and the bearers of moral value, encompassed by the principle to reject indifference and neglect. This is a principle that can be willed as a universal law without contradiction in order to satisfy the desire for human flourishing. This is the end the \textit{MfP-patriot} seeks, and it is the condition of objective goodness for my patria and polity.
4.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I focused on setting out cppc-conservatism - the disposition best placed to underpin MfP. I established that an important part of cppc-conservatism means being connected and respecting tradition for the continuity and stability of the social and civic world within my patria and polity. I set out the importance of public goods and how these play an important role in socially connecting MfP-patriots to one another. I then claimed that MfP sees my patria and polity as a social and civic association, where the MfP-patriot is ‘poetically present’. When MfP-patriots are ‘poetically present’ they will enjoy those things and activities that make life worth living; they seek enjoyment in the present, not a result in addition to the experience itself. I argued that MfP-patriots are environmental patriots who recognise the importance of Nature and the need to protect their homeland, which acts as a Mazzinian-like steppingstone for addressing wider environmental and climate concerns. Finally, I argued that through the emotion of compassion, MfP-patriots understand the importance of the relationship to their fellow compatriots. The capability for feeling pain at the suffering of others draws MfP-patriots together in community that strengthens social and societal bonds.
CONCLUSION TO THESIS

REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT

My project is about bridging the divide between the *Anywheres* and the *Somewheres*, not just in an abstract way, but in a way that can make a practical difference to how we act and relate to each other. I claim this is best achieved through the sentiment of *MfP* and having the practical identity of a *MfP-patriot* in order to best act. *MfP* is a moral form of partiality aimed at satisfying the desire for human flourishing by adopting the principle to reject indifference and neglect in the workable, cooperative, social and political system of my *patria* and *polity*. This principle is one that can be willed as a universal law without contradiction that has authority for all rational agents in my *patria* and *polity*. The universal law encompasses three actions: foster the social fabric, secure the common good, and protect the environment. These are acts-for-the-sake-of-a-specific-end and are the bearers of moral value. *MfP* is inspired by Mazzini, informed by contemporary views on patriotism, and underpinned by the disposition I call *cppc-conservatism*. It is a moderate form of patriotism that helps us rise above our self-interest and egoism to make our minds bigger so that we extend our circle of concern to others. *MfP* is the steppingstone to global justice. Through the strongly normative practical identity of a *MfP-patriot* we are truly motivated to share in the labour to achieve the good of humanity. It is the best form of patriotic identity for working together in a community ‘extended over time’, which reflects and accommodates both local and global moral considerations.

BREXIT AND MFP

I started my thesis with Brexit and I will end it by returning to this contentious decision. For much of the Brexit debate I was undecided on my vote but in the end I voted leave. Clearly, at that time I was not a *MfP-patriot*. So, the final question I want to pose is this: would having the strongly normative practical identity of a *MfP-patriot* have made any difference
to the way people voted or the way the debate was conducted? In answer, I claim that it would have made a difference in at least two ways.

In the first way, the disposition underpinning *MfP*, *cppc-conservatism*, would have pulled the *MfP-patriot* towards continuity because this is what it means to be ‘poetically present’ and suspicious of major change into the unknown with such uncertain outcomes. Being a *MfP-patriot* is about connection, stability, compassion, familiarisation and making the most of what we have. Even though *MfP-patriots* have special concern to their *patria* and *polity* and special duties to compatriots, they are outward looking, respect the dignity and basic rights of all, and seek to satisfy the desire for human flourishing. These things indicate that, on balance, a vote to remain would have been the choice of a *MfP-patriot*, not least because being connected as a member of the EU had itself become part of the UK’s tradition and history. As Michael Oakeshott states:

> The man of conservative temperament believes that a known good is not lightly to be surrendered for an unknown better. […] He is cautious, and he is disposed to indicate his assent or dissent, not in absolute, but in graduated terms.

(Oakeshott, 1962, p.412)

Having said that the vote of a *MfP-patriot* would have been different, this possibility is qualified when considering some other aspects of *MfP*. The qualification comes from three things that focus on my *patricia* and *polity* not the EU. First, as set out in Chapter One, my ‘extended human flourishing argument’ that established the grounds for my *patricia* and *polity* to be the object of *MfP*, which is the best association beyond one’s family and close associations to act to satisfy the desire for human flourishing. Second, as set out in Chapter Two, *MfP’s* key features and characteristics, especially those relating to *philo-philia*; the importance of the prepolitical as well as the political; having special obligations to one’s compatriots; and the special but not exclusive concern I have for my *patricia* and *polity* and compatriots. And third, as set out in Chapter Three, *MfP’s* central purpose to satisfy the desire for human flourishing by rejecting indifference and neglect, which means acting to
foster the social fabric, secure the common good, and protect the environment of my patria and polity.

Although these three things are intended to act as a steppingstone to the good of humanity they are of necessity focused on, and primarily concerned with, my patria and polity. The EU, as a distant and bureaucratic institution, is more remote, tends to have policies/actions that are too generic, and is often far removed from the local concerns of my patria and polity. As a result, the MfP-patriot would require some degree of reform to better align the EU with the demands of being a MfP-patriot who values the traditions, customs and norms of my patria and polity and its citizens. For the MfP-patriot, then, a vote to remain would have been contingent on a genuine commitment of reform to make the EU more open, accountable, democratic, more respectful and active in protecting and celebrating the diverse culture, customs, histories and traditions of individual member countries. As Antonino Palumbo argues, in order to satisfy the desire for human flourishing, progressive forms of patriotism (what he calls ‘ethical’ patriotism and I call MfP) require:

[A] political milieu where forms of subsidiarity, functional representation and local participation combine to produce a more democratic and decentralised system of governance […]. Applied to a post-national polity like the EU, this conclusion invites [us] to rethink the European constitutional project so as to make it less elitist and more open to influence and participation from below.

(Palumbo, 2009, p.321)

Although protectionism and opaqueness are not unique across the world they are, arguably, plausible accusations levelled against the institution of the EU (Lewis, 2009). A MfP-patriot would, therefore, want the EU to be more open and remove protectionist policies. Doing so would fit with the MfP mindset in making the EU more effective as a mediating institution which, as I argue in Chapter Two when presenting Shue’s position on securing basic rights, turns a MfP-patriot’s imperfect duties to others into perfect duties. In this way, the MfP-patriot’s Mazzinian commitment to the good of humanity could be better fulfilled. Without a genuine commitment to EU reform, or at least the real belief in the possibility of reform, the MfP-patriot would have voted leave and pursued such needs through my patria and polity and sought a different relationship with others to achieve them.
In terms of the second way, being a *MfP-patriot* would have made a significant difference in the way the debate was conducted, and the respect and trust given to those from either side. This is because *MfP-patriots* understand they have special obligations to each other and that they are part of a ‘great’ family. It is through *MfP* as the ‘encouraging hand’, the fusion of the prepolitical with the political, and the disposition that underpins it (*cpcc-conservatism*) that *MfP-patriots* are culturally connected through tradition, history and their social lineage. *MfP-patriots* understand the importance of social and civic responsibility, solidarity, cohesion, trust and compassion, which are necessary for them to act to foster the social fabric, secure the common good and protect the environment. Being a *MfP-patriot* means having moral courage or as Rousseau puts it ‘strength of the soul’. This involves a critical form of loyalty to my *patra* and *polity* where challenge but respectful opposition is encouraged. And, last but not least, for *MfP-patriots* their *philosophia* is a steppingstone to the good of humanity through the recognition of universal basic rights. As a result of all these things, *MfP-patriots* on either side of the debate would have seen each other as true and respected compatriots, part of a ‘great’ family sharing an outward-looking world view and committed to satisfying the desire for human flourishing. As *MfP-patriots*, we would have avoided much of the hostility, rancour and false characterisation that was so sadly emblematic of the Brexit debate.

The Brexit vote is now part of history so, in the end, it is a moot point as to how the *MfP-patriot* would have voted. As I stated at the outset, however, my project is not about Brexit it is about the future, where we can be more connected through *MfP* and the disposition that underpins it. It is by sharing the strongly normative practical identity of a *MfP-patriot* that we best reject indifference and neglect to satisfy the desire for human flourishing through my *patra* and *polity*. Being a *MfP-patriot* means sharing in the Mazzinian labour for the good of humanity. In this respect, *MfP* is a much more powerful and progressive thing than the individual views of either the *Somewheres* or *Anywheres* - at least when they are articulated in opposition to each other.


(1893) e i fratelli Ruffini. Lettere raccolte e annotate, (ed.) Cagnacci, C., Porto Maurizio.


(2016) ‘Who Are We?’, *Prospect*, No. 245, August.


