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Introduction

Women and War: Identity, Citizenship and Security

JENNIFER G. MATHERS

Abstract: The senior executive editor of Minerva Journal of Women and War uses this introduction to summarize the articles in this issue and to highlight the major themes which run through them, in particular the centrality of women (both real women and women as symbols) to the development of conceptions of identity, citizenship, and security.

Keywords: women and war; veterans; Vietnam War; Iraq War; National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies; First World War; Rwanda; genocide; gender; India; Women’s Army Corps; Second World War

On behalf of my fellow editors, I am very pleased to introduce this fourth issue of the relaunched Minerva Journal of Women and War. One significant change for the journal since the publication of the spring 2008 issue is that Lance Janda has now stepped down as book review editor. Although we were very sad to see him go, the extent of his other professional responsibilities meant that he was not able to devote as much attention to the role as he would have liked. We wish Lance all the best for his future endeavors and hope that he will continue to have some association with the journal in the years to come. At the same time we welcome Marie Woodling as the journal’s new reviews editor. Marie is completing her PhD thesis in the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University and is working as my research assistant on a number of projects related to women and war. We have been overwhelmed with the response to the calls for reviewers which Marie issued, and the reviews of many exciting new books about women and war will begin to appear in the Spring 2009 issue of Minerva. As well as commissioning reviews of books in the field, Marie has been organizing the review of relevant films (hence the change in the title of the post from book review editor to reviews editor). There is a tremendous amount of new work appearing about women and war across the range of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, and the editors hope that the reviews section of the journal will help readers keep up with the latest scholarship. A portion of the Minerva Journal of Women and War Web site is now devoted to reviews, and potential reviewers are invited to visit http://www.mcfar

Jennifer G. Mathers is a senior lecturer in the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University and senior executive editor of Minerva Journal of Women and War. She has a particular interest in the role of women in the Russian armed forces and her published work includes “Women, Society and the Military: Women Soldiers in Post-Soviet Russia” in Military and Society in Post-Soviet Russia (Manchester University Press, 2006).
Although this issue does not have a collection of articles formally organized around a common theme, in fact all of the articles in this issue demonstrate the centrality of women (whether as symbols or as real, living beings) to the development of conceptions of identity, citizenship, and security. The relationship between women and the state is a key component of this dynamic. Are women citizens of the state? Are they defenders of the state through military service, and if so are the conditions attached to their service different from those of male soldiers? Do women pose particular threats to the security of the state, either through their presumed sexualized natures or through the need to protect them from external enemies?

In “Navigating Gender Boundaries Inside and Outside the Wire,” Christina Weber draws on published memoirs, archival sources, and interviews which she herself conducted with women veterans to explore the contrasting experiences of U.S. women veterans of the conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq. Weber makes use of the physical and symbolic meanings of “the wire,” as marking the boundaries between the relative safety of the base and the relative danger of combat, as well as between the professional spheres occupied by men and women, to highlight the contested nature of women’s roles in the military during wartime.

At first glance it might seem that these two groups of women veterans would have little in common. Although the conflict in Vietnam encompassed a period when opportunities for women in the U.S. armed forces were beginning to expand, with the abolition of the 2 percent limit on the proportion of women serving in 1971 and the introduction of the all-volunteer force in 1973, few U.S. military women actually served in Vietnam, and the vast majority of those who did were nurses. As Weber demonstrates, the caring roles performed by nurses ensured that the women were not perceived by the men as challenging the latter’s identities as the “true” soldiers. However this also meant that these nurses’ wartime experiences were underestimated, belittled, and even denied by many of the men who had served with them in-country, such as the male Vietnam veteran who told one former military nurse that she should not participate in a Vietnam Veterans Against the War march because she was not really a vet.

American military women serving in Iraq, in contrast, are frequently exposed to conditions that are associated in the public’s mind with combat even though they are formally not appointed to combat positions. The wartime service of women returning to the United States after deployment in Iraq seems to be acknowledged by their families, friends, and by U.S. society more generally, again in contrast with the experience of Vietnam veterans. But Weber finds that the issues of formal combat service continue to shape perceptions of the roles and actions of these women soldiers, including their own perceptions of their achievements.

In an article filled with analysis and important empirical evidence, one scenario is particularly striking. One of Weber’s interview subjects described her confrontation with a group of male infantry soldiers returning to base and their graphic challenge to the legitimacy of her authority over them. In many ways that one image encapsulates not only the argument that Weber is making in this article, but also the uneasy relationship that many women soldiers have with their male colleagues and with their society’s expectations of appropriate behavior for men and women.
The issue of a society’s views of appropriate behavior for men and women in wartime is also prominent in Marc Calvini-Lefebvre’s article, “‘Women! Your Country Needs You!’ Fleeing Feminism or Gendering Citizenship in Great War Britain?” which focuses on the claims to citizenship by British civilian women during the First World War. Through a close reading of two suffragist periodicals, Common Cause and the Englishwoman, Calvini-Lefebvre argues that the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) was engaged in a concerted effort to gender the concept and language of citizenship in order to create a space for women to be acknowledged as citizens. At this point, of course, women in Britain were not regarded by their state or their society as true citizens, and the outbreak of the First World War made the argument, persuasive to many, that liability for military service should be a necessary condition for citizenship. But instead of calling for women to be permitted to serve in the armed forces in order to qualify for citizenship, the NUWSS developed a notion of feminism which identified and celebrated different roles which men and women should perform for their countries and made that the basis for their wartime campaign for full citizenship for women.

Calvini-Lefebvre argues that the suffragists’ focus on the “woman’s sphere” actually expanded the realms of women’s responsibilities as citizens rather than limited women to duties within their homes and immediate families. The article also highlights the suffragists’ attempts to reconcile their approach to feminism and citizenship with the behavior of some women who were problematic for this approach, namely pacifists and prostitutes. With his in-depth examination of primary sources and his engagement with debates among historians about the nature of the British women’s suffrage movement during this period, Marc Calvini-Lefebvre makes an important contribution to the recent burgeoning scholarship about women and the First World War (see de Vries 1994; Grayzel 1999; Grayzel 2002; Gullace 2002; Smith 2005; and Fell and Sharp 2007).

In “The Postcolonial Politics of Militarizing Rwandan Women,” Georgina Holmes draws our attention to aspects of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda that are often overlooked in both popular media accounts and academic studies of that tragedy. Holmes highlights the gendered power relations which developed in the region in the years before the genocide took place and argues that we need to pay closer attention to detail and historical context in order to gain a fuller understanding of the events of 1994. The author also emphasizes the need to confront uncomfortable realities, such as the evidence that some women supported and perpetrated the violence, including violence against women and even genocidal rape.

Holmes argues that the construction of militarized masculinities was central to the development and popularization of the notion of a pure Hutu nation state, and to demonstrate the ways in which this process took place she makes extensive use of articles and cartoons which appeared in Kangura, one of several extremist journals published in Rwanda in the early 1990s. The extent of Kangura’s use of sexualized images is very striking and likely to have had a particularly strong impact in a country such as Rwanda which had high rates of illiteracy or semiliteracy, as Holmes points out. The message being conveyed to Kangura’s readers was that Tutsi women, in their supposed role as temptresses, posed a danger to Hutu men and by extension to the integrity and purity of the Hutu people and indeed to Rwandan state itself. Hutu women, by contrast, were depicted in the pages of Kangura as loyal citizens and victims of violent Tutsi men. An exception to this rule was made, though, for certain high-profile Hutu women who did not support extremist positions. The exam-
ple highlighted by Holmes is that of Madame Agathe Uwilingimana, who served as minister of education and as prime minister. Uwilingimana was presented in Kangura as a particularly dangerous, hypersexualized collaborator with the Tutsi enemy and she was among the first political leaders to be murdered in 1994.

In her article “Nationalism, Gender and (In)Securities in Postcolonial Indian Politics: Ideology and Identity,” Runa Das focuses on the case of India to make an argument about the symbolic roles which women can play in the creation of national identities and the construction and justification of national security threats. A particularly fascinating feature of this article is the discussion of the abduction of Hindu women by Muslims (and Muslim women by Hindus) in the aftermath of the partition of India. Das demonstrates that this episode has shaped the views of generations of Indian politicians and that its legacy is visible in the contemporary rhetoric of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The idea (rather than the actual, lived experiences) of abducted Hindu women is closely linked by BJP activists and political leaders with Indian religious and cultural imagery to make an emotive and argument that Pakistan represents a visceral threat to the India which must be countered, by nuclear weapons if necessary, in order to preserve the nation-state.

In a research note entitled “The Letters of Mollie Weinstein: Experiences of a WAC in Wartime Europe,” Cyndee Schaffer provides extracts from her mother’s wartime letters, which she is currently editing as a book manuscript, together with some commentary to provide context for the events and personalities which the letters mention. Although a great deal of work has been done by historians in recent years to uncover and examine the roles that American women played in the Second World War (see, for example, Bellafaire 1993; Verges 1991; Thomas 1987; Danner 1995; Morden 1990; Soderbergh 1992; Larson 1995), there is still a need to publish the kind of personal, eyewitness accounts of women’s contributions to that conflict which this piece offers. Weinstein’s accounts of her wartime service joins works by other former members of the Women’s Army Corps (WACs), such as Early (1989), Grahn (1993) and Weise (1999), to enrich our understanding of the wartime experiences of these women. Weinstein’s correspondence with her family covers the full range of her time in the WACs, from basic training through various deployments. Unlike many women who volunteered for the U.S. armed forces during the war, Weinstein spent virtually her entire period of military service overseas. As the letters published in this issue make clear, Weinstein’s own Jewish identity made her particularly aware of the persecution of European Jews and the fact that the suffering of Holocaust survivors continued even after their countries were liberated from Nazi control. Mollie Weinstein is a gifted letter writer and we are fortunate that so much of her correspondence has survived.

Finally, the production of a peer-reviewed journal would be impossible without the contributions of the peer reviewers, who make time in their busy schedules to read articles that have been submitted to Minerva and give the editors and authors the benefit of their expertise. The editors would like to offer their warmest thanks to the following scholars who have provided comments and recommendations on articles submitted to Minerva Journal of Women and War during the period covered by this volume: Sarah Badcock, Marie Coleman, Janet Coryell, Bina D’Acosta, Darlene Iskra, Kimberly Jensen, Rosemary O’Kane, June Purvis, Brooke Rogers, Margaret Rossiter, Anita Rupprecht, Trudi Tate, Regina Titunik, and Emma Vickers.
References


Navigating Gender Boundaries Inside and Outside the Wire

A Qualitative Analysis of U.S. Women Veterans of Vietnam and Iraq

CHRISTINA D. WEBER

Abstract: This article explores the ways in which U.S. military women negotiate gender boundaries within the contexts of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars. Based on interviews conducted by the author, archival oral histories from women in the upper midwestern United States, together with published memoirs of U.S. women who served in the armed forces during these wars, the article provides an intimate portrait of the ways in which these women talk about their experiences in the military during wartime. Although excluded from duties that are officially classed as ground combat, the women provide important insights into the war experience. In spite of the fact that they are more numerous and visible than ever in the U.S. military, women still face a variety of challenges in this highly masculine institution.

Key Words: American military nursing; gender and the military; Iraq War; U.S. National Guard; North Dakota; post-traumatic stress disorder; Vietnam War; women and war

“Exposure to danger is not combat. Being shot at, even being killed, is not combat. Combat is finding ... closing with ... and killing or capturing the enemy. It’s KILLING. And it’s done in an environment that is often as difficult as you can possibly imagine.... It’s ... uncivilized! And WOMEN CAN’T DO IT! Nor should they even be thought of as doing it.... And it may be old-fashioned, but I think the very nature of women disqualifies them from doing it. Women give life. Nurture life. They don’t take it.”—Marine Commandant Gen. Robert H. Barrow [quoted in Holm 1993, 483]

“Women as women must be denied access to ‘the front,’ to ‘combat’ so that men can claim a uniqueness and superiority that will justify their dominant position

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in the social order. And yet because women are in practice often exposed to frontline combat, the military has to constantly redefine ‘the front’ and ‘combat’ as wherever ‘women’ are not.”—Cynthia Enloe [1983, 15]

Introduction: Combat, the Wire and Women in War

Combat is a contentious and gendered concept with a history of ambiguity that filters into women’s position and place in militaries. As Jeanne Holm comments, “When it comes to women in the military, the all-purpose word is combat—it means whatever the services choose it to mean.” As she goes on to clarify, “The one sure-fire justification for barring women from any job, unit, ship, aircraft, or mission was to designate it ‘combat’ or ‘combat related’ no matter how tenuous the connection” (1993, 398). Although a definition of combat was written into U.S. military policy in 1994, combat is not clearly understood as a concept, nor is the policy relating to it universally applied in the U.S. armed forces (Holm 1993 and Skaine 1999). For example, ground combat and air combat have different implications both in practice and in policy. Women have been able to participate in air combat because it is considered less dangerous and removed from the frontlines of ground combat (McSally 2007). The definition of ground combat, though, has serious implications for gender relations in the military and is the threshold experience that maintains important dividing lines between male and female soldiers. Ultimately the relationship between war and gender is fraught with questions about where it is and is not appropriate for women to exist during wartime. There is a desire among many senior officers in the U.S. military to maintain a strict distinction between combat and noncombat support fields, with women confined to the latter. Gender boundaries between men and women in the military during wartime rely on clear boundaries between combat and noncombat or support fields, which are often reinforced by women’s physical location inside the wire, that is, on military bases. In this paper I explore the ways in which women navigate the boundaries between combat and noncombat, outside and inside the wire, and masculinity and femininity in the war contexts of Vietnam and Iraq.

Although it is not my intention to trivialize the realities and inherent dangers of war and ground combat, I do want to emphasize that combat is more than a concept utilized in military strategy and development of war readiness and effectiveness. It is also a gendered concept that defines women’s place in the military, as it simultaneously establishes men’s positions in the military and the patriarchal ordering of the institution itself. It is difficult to understand the constructs of woman and femininity without addressing aspects of man and masculinity, particularly within a highly masculine institution such as the military. The military institution has historically played a significant role in shaping dominant forms of masculinity. As David Morgan explains, “Of all the sites where masculinities are constructed, reproduced, and deployed, those associated with war and the military are some of the most direct. Despite far-reaching political, social, and technological changes, the warrior still seems to be a key symbol of masculinity.... The uniform absorbs individualities into a generalized and timeless masculinity while also connoting a control of emotion and a subordination to a larger rationality” (1994, 165). Women are not factored into the warrior identity and therefore pose a variety of threats to the coherence of militarized masculinity as they take on more diverse roles in the military.
Sandra Whitworth emphasizes that militarized masculinity as a form of masculinity relies heavily on subordinate others to reinforce its superiority (2004). As subordinate others, women and their presence produce problems as they dilute the position of men in the military. “The myth of the male superiority is hard to maintain when military men are obliged to work equally alongside, or for, military females” (Lehr 1999, 123). These points reveal deeper issues behind Commandant General Barrow’s comments, reinforcing questions raised by Holm and Enloe about traditional and essentialized beliefs about gender and how those beliefs relate to the military and its concepts and policies. Barrow’s belief that women are unable to withstand the physical and mental demands of war—especially killing—relies on essentialized views of men and women and establishes the basis for the legitimacy of women’s subordination in the military. Although I concede that there are clear physical differences between males and females, my analysis relies on the work of feminist scholars, together with scholars in the area of masculinity, who point to the way that the military establishes gender hierarchies based on essentialized views of men and women. From my limited sample of women, there is such a diversity of responses and experiences that such views prove problematic and at the very least raise questions about the viability of the containment of combat to the domain of men. Combat, according to Barrow, is not simply exposure to dangerous situations; it is actively participating in the brutality of killing. A 1994 memorandum by U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin established a written rule governing the relationships between women and combat. The memo stated that “[s]ervice members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground” (1994). Direct ground combat was defined by Aspin as, “engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect” (1994). Consistent with Barrow’s definition, this view of ground combat assumes a set of offensive actions and strategies rather than defensive ones. The U.S. armed forces have utilized this rule and it supplements the 1948 Integration Act, which did not explicitly outline or define women’s place in combat. “Because the Army was unable to come up with an acceptable definition of combat, Congress elected to leave this matter to be sorted out by the Secretary of the Army so long as he clearly understood the intent of the Congress, which was no combat for women” (Holm 1993, 118–9).

But the implementation of the combat rule is far more complicated than the definition of combat conveys and the route to the establishment of this rule has been littered with debate and contention. Holm provides the historical groundwork for a complex understanding of combat as a gendered concept that reflects not simply the tensions within the military institution between men and women but also changes at work in the larger society. At the same time Cynthia Enloe’s discussion of women’s relationship to “combat” and “the front” reinforces the point that much more is at stake in these concepts than war readiness. There is a question that silently rests at the margins of her passage: if combat is defined as that which women are not, how do women negotiate their participation in war as women? If combat is a defining component of being a soldier and women are excluded from that experience, how do they articulate their positions in the military? It is important to understand the institutional forms and structures shaping these women’s experiences but what
is most interesting to me is the question of how women shape and define their own positions as they act within the institutional forces of the military. The stories women tell about their experiences in war can help to better understand how women respond to the military institution, combat, and their unique position as women soldiers during wartime.

Contextualizing Women in the U.S. Military: Historical Shifts between Vietnam and Iraq

The changes that have occurred for women in the U.S. military and in American society between the Vietnam War and the present war in Iraq are profound. The purpose of bringing these two eras together, though, is not to highlight the obvious changes in society but to understand how gender continues to be a guiding force in modern warfare. Women and men who serve in the U.S. military relate to it in very different ways, while the military as a social institution responds to and participates in the shaping of gender relations. Although combat has historically been an activity in the military that is off limits to women, the military institution has embraced women’s presence in war efforts with variable levels of tolerance. Societal and institutional changes over time reflect both the level and type of participation by women in war, which in turn has an impact on the ways in which women narrate their wartime experiences.

The research undertaken for this project involved the analysis of several qualitative data sources. The sample for this paper is comprised of original interviews, archived oral histories, published memoirs, and statistical data from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Fifteen women veterans from North Dakota were interviewed, most of whom served with the Air and Army National Guard. Many of these women were veterans of the Iraq War, although five of them served during earlier war eras including the Second World War, Vietnam, and Bosnia. Pseudonyms have been used for these interview subjects and their personal information altered in order to maintain their anonymity. In addition to these interviews, ten oral histories of women from the Vietnam War era deposited in the North Dakota Veterans History Project were analyzed. These women were primarily nurses and medical corps members who served in the United States during the war. Analyses of published memoirs and oral histories of women veterans from the Vietnam and Iraq Wars reinforce this data. In order to contextualize the narrative analysis that comprises the core of this paper, the discussion that follows provides the historical context of women in the U.S. military and wars fought by the United States, together with statistical data from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.

Although the 1948 Integration Act might have marked a victory for women’s rights and indicated a changing tide for women in the U.S. military, it was ultimately overshadowed by efforts during the 1950s to reestablish traditional gender roles. For that reason, by the time the United States embarked on the Vietnam War, women’s position in the military had “retrated” since the 1948 Integration Act (Holm 1993, 178). Rather than setting a precedent for greater integration and equality in the American armed forces, the act was used to create a separate and unequal place for women in the military. By 1967 Congress had modified provisions of the Act to emphasize that “there could not be complete equality between men and women in the matter of military careers” (Holm 1993, 178). At the time this measure went largely unchallenged because most women accepted that their place in the mili-
tary and society at large was subordinate to that of men. As Col. Barbara J. Bishop stated, “It behooves every woman to remember she is not going to be asked to put her life at stake as the men are” (quoted in Holm 1993, 179). By treating combat as the defining feature of true military service, women’s subordinate position in the armed forces can be justified. Yet during both the Vietnam and Iraq Wars the rules governing women’s roles and participation in the military and in war have been ignored.

Holm explains that the service policies leading up to the Vietnam War “transcended the restrictions in the law and the congressional intent relative to combat. They mirrored the stereotypical thinking of the fifties concerning women’s proper roles in society and the workplace” (1993, 179). Holm identifies two key themes that mark women’s position in the military during the period between the Korean and Vietnam Wars: a double-standard elitism that degraded women’s presence in the armed forces and a desire to preserve traditional notions of femininity within women’s military activities (1993, 179). This reflected wider societal shifts after the Second World War that sought to reestablish normative gender roles and bring the traditional nuclear family to the forefront of society (Stacey 1991; Bordo 1999). Ultimately, both of these themes had dramatic implications for women’s presence in the U.S. armed forces during the Vietnam War.

The data provided by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs on women’s military service reflects the historical context of women’s integration process but the data is fragmented and incomplete. The raw data reveals that, as of 30 September 2007, there are 256,047 American women veterans from the Vietnam War era (that is, women comprise 3.2 percent of all U.S. Vietnam-era veterans). Yet this data does not tell us how many women actually served in Vietnam (as opposed to serving stateside on military bases and hospitals). Nor does the data tell us how many of those women were exposed to combat. To get an estimate of the number of women veterans who experienced combat during the Vietnam War, one must go to unofficial documents. Various sources identify anywhere from 7,000 to 7,500 U.S. women serving in country (Holm 1993, 206; Skaine 1999), comprising roughly 3 percent of the total number of women veterans from the Vietnam War era.

The proportion of North Dakotan women veterans from the Vietnam War era closely parallels the national percentages. Veterans Affairs identifies 548 Vietnam War–era women veterans at the census date of 30 September 2007, which constitute 3 percent of all North Dakotan Vietnam War–era veterans. In contrast, the number of North Dakotan women veterans from the Iraq War has already reached 1,921, which means that women make up 17 percent of all veterans of the Iraq War from North Dakota. In addition the North Dakota Veterans History Project includes ten interviews with women from the Vietnam War era. Of those ten women none had served in Vietnam, although one nurse had served in a field hospital in Korea. The experience of women veterans from North Dakota reflects the restrictions on women’s presence in Vietnam as well as the profound changes that have occurred in the intervening thirty years. As one North Dakotan woman who served during the Vietnam War era stated, “I asked about going to ’Nam and they told me that they were not sending female corpsmen. There were some females they sent over but those were more clerical and they weren’t sending the corpsmen” (Helke 4 March 2005).

Yet the effort to contain women’s roles in the U.S. military and reestablish normative gender roles in American society after the end of the Second World War eventually broke down as the conflict in Vietnam continued and personnel waned. The growing women’s movement in the United States also encouraged changes in the military’s policies toward
women. The 1970s saw not only an increase in the number of women in the service and doors opening to women in various career fields, but also further changes that led to the dismantling of support institutions such as the Women’s Air Force (WAF) and Women’s Army Corps (WAC). This led to women’s greater integration into the military with the consolidation of basic training (including weapons training) for men and women and women increasingly filling positions outside of those stereotyped as feminine fields.

Women’s service in the U.S. military and women’s presence in war dramatically increased during the Persian Gulf War and has increased again in the Iraq War. According to Rosemarie Skaine, the Persian Gulf War saw over 33,300 American military women serve in combat-support positions (1999, 64). There are currently 740,558 U.S. women veterans who have served in the armed forces since the Persian Gulf War (roughly 15 percent of the total number of U.S. veterans who have served during this period). As of June 2006, 344,418 women have been on active duty in the Iraq War (roughly 16 percent of the total number of service personnel on active duty in this conflict). Because the data is fragmented and clear statistics showing where women are serving are not centralized, it is difficult to determine precisely how many of those women served in country during the Iraq War, although one source estimates that it could be as many as 155,000 (Holmstedt 2007). This is a dramatic increase from both the Vietnam War era and the Persian Gulf War.

Women’s roles in the U.S. military remained controversial throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with debates focusing in particular on whether women should serve in combat roles and culminating in Secretary Aspin’s 1994 memorandum. Although the memo set specific perimeters around women’s service, at the same time it opened the door to more career fields for women in the armed forces, including air combat positions. The deployment of large numbers of women to Iraq and Afghanistan has given new impetus to the debate about women in combat and especially on collocation policies. Collocation refers to the strategic placement of units in order to support each other. Recent news reports reveal that women have been collocated with direct ground combat units, coming close to breaking the 1994 combat rule.

Regardless of the dramatic changes that have taken place between the conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq, women continue to confound and disrupt traditional notions that war is the sole terrain of men. Even though the involvement of women in combat is likely to remain a contentious topic, the presence of women in war reminds us that men and women (and expressions of masculinity and femininity) do not always conform to institutional ideals.

**Inside and Outside the Wire:**

Women’s Negotiation of Gender in Wartime

“If you ... can’t go out and visit soldiers and put your life on the line then you’re a wimp. I thought that ... if I came to your staff meeting that you should look just as shitty as I do. And not be all pressed and clean.... It was kind of the difference between inside the wire and outside the wire. And I lived my whole experience outside the wire.”—Amy, Iraq War veteran

Women’s negotiation of gender in wartime requires us to look not only at the boundaries between combat and noncombat or support roles, but also at women’s placement in rela-
tion to the wire. The wire is both literal and a figurative construct. It is literal because the wire surrounds the base and marks the boundary that identifies whether a person’s duty takes them outside of the relative safety of the base and places them closer to the frontlines and its dangers. The wire is also figurative and metaphorical in the way that it marks the boundary between men and women in the military, providing a threshold between gender identities. Women serving in the U.S. military in the Iraq War negotiate this boundary differently than their counterparts did during the Vietnam War. To understand the differences between the ways that these two groups of women veterans managed this boundary, I juxtapose two stories told by women who were exposed to the realities of moving inside and outside the wire.

Amy’s statement that she lives “outside the wire” subverts the expectation that women are inside, protected by the wire, and men are outside, defending it. At the same time it conveys something beyond the literal notion of the wire as simply a physical location. Her statement metaphorically encompasses the outsider status she feels as a woman officer who does not neatly fit inside the power structure of the military and who has transgressed gender boundaries in a variety of ways over the course of her career. In her discussion, the roles are reversed as she places her male superiors inside the wire, as they marginalize her and define the line of danger.

Amy’s experiences are not unique; U.S. women serving in the conflict in Iraq frequently experience the war outside the wire. These women construct water lines, build bridges, patrol areas of rivers against enemy attacks, work as administrators on bases, perform gate searches at military bases, and drive in convoys. The U.S. military and U.S. society appears to be willing to recognize women as soldiers and to permit them to be exposed to danger, even if they are unwilling to let women formally cross the line into combat.

During the Vietnam War era, the vast majority (approximately 84 percent) of women who were in Vietnam were nurses (Enloe 1983; Holm 1993; Skaine 1999), with the remaining women serving in supportive and administrative roles. Throughout this analysis the primary emphasis will be on the experience of nurses, simply because the experience of nurses was synonymous with the experience of the vast majority of U.S. women in Vietnam. These women were clearly not regarded as serving in combat roles and were physically contained behind the wire, yet they were exposed to the damage that war and combat inflict on human beings. Often working shifts of twenty hours or longer in the operating room, the nurses routinely cared for severely wounded and dying men. In addition, the dangers they experienced in the field hospitals were often greater than those serving as clerks and personnel (both men and women) stationed in cities such as Saigon and Long Binh (Holm 1993, 207).

Although they were not serving in combat roles, U.S. women stationed in Vietnam were exposed to ground combat situations when they traveled outside their bases. Not fully integrated into the military and serving under separate branches such as the Women’s Army Corps (WAC), the women were not officially trained in the use of weapons and could not carry weapons to defend themselves. Instead they had to rely on male soldiers to protect them. As one nurse explained, “The security police (SP) used to drive me and another nurse out to Cam Ranh City, where we taught a village-nursing class at night. One night, as we drove back, we saw a flash of light and gunfire. We ducked down in the jeep, and one SP lay across us firing his weapon out the back as we sped out of there” (Norman 1990, 92). Although the situation described in this passage would not be regarded as combat under
the 1994 definition of the term, this nurse and her colleague were exposed to enemy attack in an incident that took place outside the relative safety of the military base. The physical boundary of the wire was crossed but this crossing failed to transgress gender boundaries because these men and women continued to conform to traditional gender patterns of men (the SP officers) protecting women (the nurses).

In this specific incident and during the Vietnam conflict in general, moving off the base reinforced women’s position as liabilities and supporting actors who did not participate in war—either defensively or offensively. Although they may have held higher ranks than some of their male comrades, American women were clearly present in Vietnam to support the U.S. war effort and care for the wounded. They were never intended to participate in combat nor even to defend themselves or others. The greatest distinction for these women lay in whether they served in the relative safety of the cities of Vietnam or in field hospitals that were often set up in heavy combat areas such as Pleiku.

In contrast, the complication of negotiating the wire for U.S. women in the Iraq War becomes both literal and metaphorical as they negotiate gender boundaries that exist both on and off the base. Because these women serve outside the wire in nontraditional gender roles, their presence disrupts gender boundaries. One woman’s comments solidify the way in which the literal wire acts as a metaphorical boundary that is extremely sensitive to the transgressions between combat (read men’s) and noncombat (read women’s) experiences. Ellen was the only woman working at the gate of the base where she was stationed and had to clear a group of infantrymen before they could enter the base. She explained,

[A]t one point there was a truck full of twenty infantrymen and in infantry there’s no females there and I got down and I told them, “get out and clear your weapons.” And they said, “no, we’re not going to” and I said, “yes you are... I’m not letting you on base until each and every one of you get off the back of this truck and clear your weapon.” And of course they’re gonna be mad. Everybody got out, cleared their weapons and every single one of ’em turned around, pulled down their pants, and pissed in front of me.

Ellen is literally on the boundary of the wire, negotiating a position that plays with the gender boundaries in war. It reflects the significance of militarized masculinity in the military institution and the threat that women pose to this construct. In particular the militarized masculinity ethic relies on clear distinctions between the masculine self and others, in this case women. Sandra Whitworth writes, “In order for truths that are fixed through these processes to remain intact, self and other must remain both distinct and separate.... The presence of the ‘other’ makes the strategies of recruitment, basic training, and the inculcation of appropriate militarized masculinity all the more difficult to accomplish” (2004, 162). Ellen’s authoritative presence represents a challenge to men that requires a clear response from them in order for them to maintain a coherent boundary between their masculinized selves and the feminine other. At the same time, Ellen works with this boundary, positioning herself as the other in relation to the infantrymen, even though their disrespect angered her. “I mean, they [the infantrymen] have to be tough and mean to do their job and I understand that. But I guess I don’t appreciate it when I’m serving on their same side. But I understand. They have a dirty job and have to be tough and dirty and grimy and tough and mean and rude to do it. And that’s fine.” Ellen repeatedly asserts that she “understands” and that it is “fine,” which reinforces the boundary between combat and noncombat support personnel, and the difference between herself and the infantrymen. That this happened on the
threshold between outside and inside the wire is not a coincidence. In fact it reinforces how these men distinguish themselves as men as they cross the wire onto the base, a place that arguably dilutes men’s unique place and status in the military in comparison with the sphere of combat from which they have just come.

These two examples are important to consider. One woman is unarmed and relies on the protection of her fellow (male) soldiers to defend her and remove her from danger. The other woman is in a position of authority over her fellow (male) soldiers. She carries a gun and orders the men to disengage their own firearms. Yet the men make it clear to her that they do not accept her authority over them nor do they regard her as their equal. The context of the conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq may be very different, but in each there is a distinct way in which women are positioned as something other than men. The nurse in Vietnam is an object to be protected on the frontlines. The guard in Iraq carries power within military hierarchies but that authority is aggressively undermined as she is reminded of what she is not by the men, who flaunt their manhood and mark their territory in front of her. The boundaries shift over time and space and each example reveals different ways in which gender lines are drawn during war.

Women soldiers do subvert the military’s efforts to enforce the perimeters of combat through their discussions of the frontlines. Stacy, an Iraq War Veteran, was particularly pointed in her comments: “I don’t like when people say ... ‘the frontlines of Iraq.’ [There are] really no frontlines of Iraq. If you want to get technical, the frontlines are driving alongside the road. Because that’s where the most casualties are.... So there were times [when] our weapons—or our convoy—got attacked by an IED [Improvised Explosive Device] right behind my truck. It was my truck and then a Humvee. And I couldn’t see the Humvee because of the mushroom cloud.” Although she was outside the official definition of combat, this woman soldier was obviously exposed to the dangers of war. Stacy spoke of several occasions when she witnessed other vehicles in her convoy getting hit by an IED.

Similarly, Amy, an officer who served in Iraq, had to maneuver around her superior’s determinations of what were and what were not dangerous missions—and, ultimately, what constituted the frontlines. At the beginning of the Iraq War, driving in convoys was not considered as dangerous and as exposed to enemy attack as other duties, and therefore women were often assigned as convoy drivers. Amy’s commanders underestimated the dangers of driving in convoys and as a result took decisions that increased the danger to which Amy and other women soldiers were exposed. For example, Amy explained that when supplies such as flak vests were received, they would be directed to missions where men were assigned “because that’s where the enemy is.” As she went on to explain, “Well, hell, the enemy wasn’t there—we didn’t know the enemy was drivin’ with us. You know what I’m sayin’? We had no idea that we would lose all our soldiers driving convoy.” Amy’s commanders refused her request for flak jackets for the drivers, because, they told her, “Oh, you’re just driving.’ Are you kidding? Driving ... is extremely stressful. Because they started out with, you know, this size [of] IEDs [makes a small ball shape with hands]: pop cans and lunch boxes and things like that. And it grew really fast, you know, into something bigger.” Although women do have the power to tell their experiences, they are subjected to the realities of participating within the military and its rules and decision-making processes. At the same time, Amy’s observations and experiences certainly helped her understand the dangers and perimeters of the frontlines better than some of her male superiors, who were not outside the wire.
U.S. women who served in Vietnam negotiated their presence by conforming to traditional gender roles. It was not until they returned home that this conformity began to take its toll on many of the women Vietnam veterans. This is largely because, while in Vietnam, both women and men identified women as simply nurses and support staff, not soldiers. Thus women found themselves taking part in highly traditional roles while they were in Vietnam. According to Elizabeth Norman, enlisted men felt that they needed to protect women. “In return, they expected nurses to become surrogate mothers, sisters, wives, and girlfriends” (1990, 67). One woman explained that she would sit with men in the hospital and write letters home for them (Stockwell 16 May 2006). Another woman described one of her favorite patients, who had been injured three times and had been in her hospital on each occasion. She had talked with him about his fear of being sent back out and getting killed: “I told a doctor who worked with us and who operated on Danny, ‘You can’t send him back out there. This is the third time. If he really thinks he’s going to get killed, he probably will.’ Meanwhile, I ask[ed] Danny if he wanted me to write a letter to his mother. I told her how we’d been taking care of him. Danny did end up being air-evacked stateside. His mom wrote me a thank-you letter and told me he had made it home safely. I still have that letter” (Walker 1985, 173). What is interesting about this story is that this woman was empowered enough in her position as a nurse to give advice to a doctor and at the same time conforms to a caretaking role when she offered to write a letter home for the soldier. Although nurses had a great deal of responsibility and leverage in their positions in regard to patients, they had very little power within the military structure. They were protected by men and expected to uphold appropriate gender and professional behavior within the war context. “Being protected by men and living in such a male world was both welcome and suffocating. Women had to be ‘on duty’ twenty-four hours a day. Armed escorts accompanied the nurses every time they went off base. One nurse stopped going to orphanages when she realized a soldier might get wounded or killed defending her need to go off base” (Norman, 1990, 68). These types of differences translated into challenges for the women upon their return home as veterans.

**Coming Home: Women as Veterans**

For women who participated in the Vietnam and Iraq Wars coming home meant dealing with issues of reintegration into the families and communities they left behind. For Vietnam veterans, gender issues surfaced in relation to their status as veterans. Because nurses in Vietnam were not always looked upon as soldiers, they struggled with their veteran status in their civilian communities as well as among the Vietnam veteran community and in their self-identification. In contrast the women I interviewed who served in the Iraq War show little hesitation in identifying themselves as veterans; yet most qualified that status by pointing out that they were noncombat veterans.

The assumption that only men could be soldiers in war dramatically affected the way in which women talked about their service in Vietnam and how they dealt with their post-war lives. For some women it took decades to claim their experiences in Vietnam as war experiences. The silence that pervaded women’s experiences in Vietnam parallels that of their male counterparts. Yet, the women experienced a second layer of silence that was distinct from that experienced by the men. Although both men and women veterans were
reluctant to speak about their war experiences to friends and family as a result of the public opposition to the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, many male veterans found comfort and solace within the Vietnam veteran community and were able to come to terms with their memories with the support of fellow veterans. Women veterans of Vietnam, however, did not have this opportunity. These women were denied a meaningful presence within the Vietnam veteran community and even found themselves silenced by it.

The silence of women veterans upon their return from Vietnam was often a reaction to the unspoken directive from family and friends that the topic of war was off-limits (Norman 1990, 188–223). These details are remarkably similar to men’s accounts of their return home (Kovic 1976; Caputo 1977; Walker 1985). In her book Home Before Morning: The Story of an Army Nurse in Vietnam, Lynda Van Devanter described her first day back home with her family. Van Devanter explained, “I wanted to tell my family what it was like, to make them understand... I wanted them to be a part of every moment, good and bad, so there would be no distance between us, so they could understand the person I had become” (1983, 220). As she was showing them slides of her year in Vietnam, however, her parents became increasingly uncomfortable. The pictures were of the field hospital’s operating room, which were quite graphic. Finally, her mom stopped her. “She got up, touched my shoulder, and looked at me with sadness. I could see that those pictures had given her the idea of how much I had suffered. It hurt her to know that. ‘I don’t think you really want to show those slides,’ she said sorrowfully. ‘Maybe it would be wise to put them away’” (Van Devanter 1983, 221). Another female Vietnam veteran commented, “I went to see friends and they didn’t want to hear about Vietnam. I couldn’t relate to them. I thought people had to know what was going on over there but people didn’t want to hear it. I started to feel really alienated” (Norman 1990, 121).

Issues around gender boundaries arise as women discuss the second level of silence they experienced from within the Vietnam veteran community. Van Devanter stands out as one of the first women to break the silence of women Vietnam veterans. Throughout her book she discusses her struggle to be considered a veteran. Van Devanter tells the story of going to a march organized by Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). “As I made my way through the room, I could hear guys talking about their tours and some of the things they saw in ’Nam. I felt at home with these men. They had been through the same experiences as me” (Van Devanter 1983, 231). Yet when she went to join the men in the march her presence was refused. As she describes the exchange with a male Vietnam veteran, it becomes clear that she does not fit the image of the Vietnam veteran:

“Well,” he said uncomfortably, “I ... uh ... don’t think you’re supposed to march.”
“But you told me it was for vets.”
“It is,” he said. “But you’re not a vet.”
“I don’t understand.”
“You don’t look like a vet,” he said [1983, 231].

Van Devanter did not fit societal expectations of a Vietnam veteran because she was a woman. Men returning from Vietnam felt their own gender identities breaking down with the stigma of the war and the actions they may have participated in during the war. Militarized masculinity is particularly fragile. As Sandra Whitworth has pointed out, “The kinds of promises made through the processes of military indoctrination, moreover, are fundamentally an illusion, and eventually many soldiers come to recognize this” (Whitworth
Examples of the fragility of militarized masculinity can be found in numerous memoirs and research on male Vietnam veterans (Kovic 1976; Karner 1995; Karner 1996; Caputo 1977). The point is not to excuse the treatment of women Vietnam veterans, but to understand how men’s and women’s gender roles are complicated by institutional forces that promise clear paths, identification markers, and gender roles, but cannot deliver them. Ultimately the discrepancy between those promises and the realities which male and female soldiers experience can create a host of problems for men and have serious implications for women.

Through their published memoirs and oral histories, women veterans of Vietnam repeatedly reveal their feelings that they were not truly veterans and that this perception often undermined their memories and responses to their war experiences. Many of these women discuss their alienation from other veterans, both male and female, recounting a long struggle to develop the willingness to talk to others about their service. One woman explained, “I received a Bronze Star for my work and I showed it to an infantryman when I got home. He looked at it and began to lecture me. I got a big long story about why they gave out medals to people who were not in combat. I put it away and never looked at it again. I decided I did not deserve it” (Norman 1990, 111). Here is displayed a sense that combat is a superior and more privileged aspect of war and that all other experiences fall short of true war experiences.

This had significant implications for the willingness and ability on the part of women veterans to seek support for the trauma they had experienced in Vietnam. Several of these women reveal that once they had finally decided to go to a veterans center for help they were either made to feel unwelcome by the male Vietnam veterans or came to feel that their experiences were so different from men’s that it was difficult to share them. As one woman veteran stated, “I felt obligated to say that my experience was not such a big deal compared to the guys over there. Now I realize that it was. I felt obligated to push it aside and say, ‘Well, look, I was just a nurse and it wasn’t so bad.’ But it was. It took me many years before I decided that I owed it to myself, that I had the right to say it was stressful” (Norman 1990, 147).

An initial consideration of Iraq female veterans’ narratives suggests that gender issues are remarkably absent from their stories of coming home. In fact many either did not refer to gender relations at all or spoke positively about their relations with male veterans upon their return home. As Stacy explained, “I know our guys [in my unit] defended us too. Tooth and nail. So me being a female over there did affect other people. I know that even to this day one of my guy friends went down to a military school and he said I would love for you guys to meet any girl in my unit. You pick any one of them and you meet them.” Instead of struggling for acceptance from their male comrades, these women veterans emphasized the challenges of reintegration and reestablishing a home routine with their family and friends.

The apparent absence of gender tensions between returning male and female veterans could be related to the fact that military service in the Iraq War has so far not attracted the same stigma from American society as service in Vietnam. This suggests that a record of service in Iraq does not disrupt a man’s identification with militarized masculinity, although such an assessment at this early stage of research (and of the men’s and women’s recent war service) is premature. Yet it does raise questions about what happens to these men and women when they return home.
It also is important to emphasize that the silence that was so profound in the Vietnam veterans’ narratives did not appear to be a factor in the narratives of the Iraq veterans. The women Iraq veterans interviewed for this project reported that their families and friends were openly curious about their experiences in Iraq. Casey remarked that even after she had been home for more than two years, her parents continued to introduce her to friends as their daughter who went to Iraq. In fact, it frustrated her that she had to tell her story over and over again. As she explained,

And another thing is that everybody wanted to know, “How was it? How was it? What did you guys do?” And it was like, “I could talk to you for days and tell you how it was. I could talk to you forever and tell you stories about it, but I don’t really feel like it.” And you don’t want to have to tell the stories over and over. And actually my friend and me used to make a joke that we should just put a big sign on us that said, “Yep, I was deployed, don’t ask me about it.” ... It was annoying to have everybody want to know everything about it. Ask you questions because they don’t understand how it was and they don’t even have a clue as to what the situation was there. And ... it’s hard to explain and then nobody would understand it anyways.

The feeling that civilians at home cannot understand the experiences of the soldier in war is neither unique to the Iraq War, nor is it peculiar to women veterans. Even if these women did not feel silenced by their families and friends, the returning women veterans were aware of a growing disconnection between themselves and civilian society as they adjusted to home life. This is an important point because a smooth reintegration into civilian life is not simply a matter of how receptive the general population is to the war and individuals’ participation in it. Returning home after war is a difficult process of melding the person a soldier was before going to war with the person he or she has become as a result of war service. This makes reintegration challenging in general, even if the war in Iraq is better received than the Vietnam War.  

As Norman’s research on Vietnam veteran nurses indicates, it is difficult for the average citizen to understand the experience of war. Vietnam veterans who stayed in the military for even a few years after returning from the conflict zone felt better able to integrate back to civilian life than those who immediately cut their ties with the military. Norman reports that one nurse regretted that she had severed her ties with the military so soon after her service, even though she had been disillusioned upon her return home. As this woman stated, “It’s not something I would recommend for the future. We were so surrounded by Vietnam and the camaraderie. It was like getting a divorce” (Norman 1990, 126). This point might explain why several of the Iraq War interviewees decided to start working full-time for the National Guard. Most of the women veterans interviewed for this study emphasized that in their first year after returning home they spent little time with their families and socialized only with others who had been deployed to Iraq. They described feeling detached from civilians and impatient with their questions and with what they considered to be banal concerns of daily life.

Combat and the Question of Killing

For the remainder of this paper, I focus closely on the experiences of women Iraq veterans returning home, because their experiences draw out important dialogues with—and responses to—the earlier discussion of combat and the restrictions on women’s involve-
ment in it. Although gender boundaries between men and women recede into the background of these women’s stories as they discuss their reintegration process, several of my interviewees provide insights into some of the foundational issues surrounding the controversies over women in combat, in particular that of killing in the line of duty.

Veronica, an Iraq War veteran and a member of the Air National Guard, expressed ambiguity and struggles between her sense of self as a woman and as an airman. She was the only one of the women interviewed for this project who identified her experiences in Iraq as a factor in her decision to leave the military. She admitted that she intends to retire from the Air National Guard.

Veronica identified herself as “a true female. I like to use that word. I don’t want to spend time trying to prove that I can be a man.” She explained that as an airman she always saw herself as an airman first, and a woman second. “Veronica” felt that because of her age (she was in her late thirties at the time of the interview and had been in the Air National Guard for twenty years) and her views on womanhood, it was time for her to retire. She hinted at struggles experienced during her time in Iraq, even though she remained inside the wire and worked in personnel, widely regarded as a women’s job. “If I were to stay in, it would just keep getting harder and harder,” she said, because she felt her beliefs were being compromised. When asked to explain those beliefs, she said, “[P]robably ... true female[s] would be [ones who] really couldn’t go to war and shoot someone. They don’t have it in them—in me, I should say. I’m not gonna say ‘them’ because there are some [women] who can [be women] and ... actually kill somebody. Of course, if I wanted to save my life, I’d have to do that.” Veronica has very particular views on womanhood and femininity that came into conflict with her military service during her deployment in Iraq. During her previous years of service in the Air National Guard she was able to disconnect her day-to-day duties from the reality of participating in a military institution. The war deployment dissolved the false boundary between her life in the military and the ideological issues that it raised for her.

Veronica is by no means representative of my research sample but she does articulate the ambiguity and challenges that are at the heart of the debates about women in the military and women in combat. It takes us back to the opening of this paper and General Barrow’s comments about women’s inherent ability to nurture and inability to kill. What is striking about Veronica’s comments are her clarifications and hesitations about women as a generalized category and the woman she identifies as herself. She shifts between these as she simultaneously struggles with the moral quandaries of killing in the line of duty. This is something to take seriously in the context of women and men who serve in the armed forces.

Natalie and Amy, two of the other women from my sample, did kill in the course of their duties as soldiers and struggled with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In the interviews both women describe the navigation of their experiences in ways that appear similar to men’s struggles with PTSD but also touch on what these experiences mean to them as women (Grossman 1996).6

Natalie had a particularly difficult experience in Iraq and felt very isolated as a result of her guilt over killing. Her description of the incident and its aftermath echoes aspects of Amy’s narrative: “I don’t like it when people tell me I’m a hero,” Natalie stated. “I’m not a hero. People that died are heroes. The people that I failed to protect are the heroes. [pause] I don’t know. I’m just ashamed.” Although she felt welcomed when she returned home,
Natalie was cautious about what she told friends and family. No one, not even her husband who is also in the military, knew the details of her experiences in Iraq. Amy too was unable to tell her family and friends about having to kill in the line of duty.

Natalie, though, refuses to identify her experience of PTSD as related to her identity as a woman. As she explained, “Maybe women are more emotional, but I think just as many men have PTSD as women. It would almost be strange not to have it in those situations.” Although she concedes that there are gender differences between men and women, she asserts that killing is not outside of women’s capacities but is part of the moral breakdown that happens when a person has taken another life. As a woman who served in the Security Forces, she did not believe being female weakened her abilities. She did however feel the contradictions between her identity as a human being and her identity as a soldier trained to follow orders.

At the same time, Natalie expressed concern about her ability to have a family. She said, “I’m scared I’ll be a bad mom. [pause] I was scared about getting married. [Weber: But that’s going okay?] Yeah [half-heartedly]. Sometimes I feel bad. I feel like this is a whole other side of me that he doesn’t know about. Almost like I’m lying to him. And it’s—[sigh] I feel bad about it, but I think I’d feel even worse if he knew. And [if] I had to look at him every day knowing he knew what I had done. What I was capable of.” Both Natalie and Amy expressed concern about their ability to engage in intimate relationships since their return home from war and both struggle with it as they work through their war experiences.

Amy’s narrative was filled with far more ambiguity in regard to gender and killing, which leads to her discussing her actions in Iraq through a variety of lenses.

You always dream—you always kinda plan for killing people. And then when you do it’s like, wow. It wasn’t quite how I thought it would work. You know.... You don’t call home. I didn’t call home. And I probably struggled. Probably my biggest struggle is that it’s—the struggle between being just kind of a friendly person and crossing over that line, and the whole religion—.... And all the counselors in the world can say, “but were you trying to protect yourself or others?” Well, yeah, I get that part. Totally get that part. It doesn’t make it any easier. Part of that girl thing probably weighs on [me] a little bit more. And it has made me probably more callous than I probably ever would [have been otherwise].

Although Amy expresses her belief that the “girl thing” might have made her more callous about her experiences, she is unable to explain why that might have been the case. Highly aware of her gender position and “crossing over that line,” she navigates between deeply held beliefs about women and her personal experiences, which simultaneously question and undermine the notion that women are unable to kill. Part of her explanation for her callousness might be from her own inability to contend with the guilt and anguish she carries as a result of her war service.

In addition, Amy was uncertain about whether women should be placed in combat roles and speculated about the costs it could have for the women concerned and for American society.

I’m not one that really stands up and says women are equal. I think there’s a lot of difference. Not only just physically. I think some of the traditional combat roles women will get into because they won’t realize—and this might be one of those wars that says, “Women are doin’ pretty good out there. They’re shootin’ people. They’re not cryin’ all the time.” That those roles will open up and us as women will say, “Be careful for what our generations have wished for.” Equal opportunity. Do you really want your daughter
to have the opportunity to carry a sixty-pound pack on her back and be an infantry grunt? ... Do you really want to be that equal, when we could be a cook? [pause] I think there’s—you just got to make sure we look at it both ways. The whole “be careful what you wish for” could backfire for the next generation. And I’m not sayin’ that we shouldn’t carry sixty-pound packs.

Amy raises important concerns about what it would mean for society to erase the differences between the wartime roles of men and women and for women to follow the rules of engagement developed by men. She was articulate in her assertion that being a woman in service has both costs and benefits—as well as compromises. It is important to bear in mind that these statements were made by a woman who has been in the U.S. military for more than fifteen years, who has been exposed to urban combat situations similar to those experienced by infantrymen in Iraq and who feels strongly that women are important to the military institution. Her question is one that seeks greater consideration of the military and societal consequences of experiencing the damaging effects of the realities of war. These are realities that she and Natalie exemplify in their struggle to come to terms with experiencing firsthand the moral breakdown and brutality of war.

Women’s experiences in war, whether they are inside or outside the wire, are as varied and unique as the women themselves. I end this paper on an ambiguous note because it is important to understand that the relationship between war and gender is particularly troubled by a variety of issues. In addition, my small sample indicates that there is a need to explore how women soldiers experience killing and PTSD because they are having these experiences even if they are not regarded as serving in combat roles according to the official definition. Ultimately, questions about the ability of women soldiers to take the lives of the enemy are tangled up in societal beliefs about women and about the differences between men and women. To debate issues surrounding women’s role in war and their ability or inability to participate in combat necessarily requires a more explicit debate about what it means to be a woman. Combat is a highly gendered concept and as women negotiate their roles in the military during war they are working within the perimeters of the military’s rules and regulations that define their place, as well as their beliefs and values about what it means to be a woman in U.S. society. These women’s narratives remind us that as much as we try to believe that war is the domain of men, it is anything but that.

Notes

1. For the purpose of this paper, the Iraq War includes military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan that have taken place since 2003.
2. All data from Veterans Affairs comes from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs projections for 30 September 2007 based on 30 September 2003 data.
3. Based on data from the U.S. Department of Defense and Women in Military Service for America Memorial.
4. In a report prepared by the RAND Corporation for the secretary of defense, collocation was defined as “both unit interdependency and physical proximity” (Harrell et al. 2007, xvii). Scarborough (2004) and Bender (2005) reported that units containing women were being collocated with combat units. The Center for Military Research, among other organizations, claims that the army has broken the combat rule for women through these collocation actions. The growing number of women in greater numbers of units makes collocation tricky for military strategy, because women are not supposed to be collocated with direct combat units. Collocation also helps explain how women in noncombat roles may end up facing combat situations.
5. The point is that important changes take place in individuals who serve in war deployments.
that are separate from societal responses to the war. It is certainly the case that public responses can aid or exacerbate the individual’s reintegration process, but even the most positive and supportive public response to a war and to those who serve in it cannot prevent the realities of wartime service from affecting those individuals.

6. Grossman (1996) provides insight into the complications involved in killing and its impact on the development of PTSD. The work is based largely on men's experiences in these situations.

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Fleeing Feminism or Gendering Citizenship in Great War Britain?*

MARC CALVINI-LEFEBVRE

Abstract: When war broke out in August 1914, the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies suspended its political work on behalf of women’s suffrage and plunged into relief work for women and children. Because it appeared to conform to the reigning ideology of separate spheres, this response has been presented as conclusive evidence of British feminism’s ideological collapse in the face of war. This article argues a contrario that the National Union’s response is further evidence of feminism’s ideological resilience in this period. Relief work, it shows, was one aspect of a broader project aimed at “gendering” the concept and language of citizenship in order to appropriate them for women. The result was an insistence on women’s identity as “citizens,” an identity that in turn had important consequences for the kind of feminism that could be articulated in its name.

Keywords: National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies; feminism; citizenship; gender and war; First World War; Millicent Fawcett; gendering; ideology

Introduction: War In, Feminism Out?

When the Great War broke out in August 1914, women across the United Kingdom turned, like Vera Brittain, to “the only work it seems possible as yet for women to do—the making

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of garments for the soldiers” (quoted in Kent 1993, 14). In those first few months of war, Ray Strachey recalled, “[it] seemed almost as if the old anti-feminist argument was true, and that in a time of national crisis women were superfluous and irrelevant, passive creatures to be fought for, whose only personal function was to sit at home and weep” (Strachey 1928 1978, 338). Perhaps S. Bulan captured the spirit animating the country best in declaring that “[a]t the call of war, the first thought of every man is to fight, of every woman to nurse” (Bulan September 1914, 267). In other words, the eruption of total war had “acted as a clarifying moment” that “revealed the [British system] of gender in flux and thus highlighted [its] workings” (Higonnet et al. 1987, 5). And those workings were clearly along the most traditional of “separate spheres” lines, with men expected to fight and protect the literal and metaphoric home, and women expected to support their protectors unflinchingly and mind the home dutifully in their absence. In short, the outbreak of the Great War gave renewed currency and plausibility to ideas and practices that were strongly identified with the anti-suffrage movement. It was against this background that the constitutionalist National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (NUWSS), the largest organization in the British women’s movement, decided to temporarily suspend its suffrage agitation and turn its considerable organizational abilities instead to relief work targeted specifically at women and children.

As it appeared to accept and even sanction the renewed currency that separate-spheres thinking was enjoying, this abrupt turn to work along so clearly defined traditional gender lines has been presented as conclusive evidence of a broader trend: British feminism’s ideological collapse in the face of war. This case has been made most forcefully by Susan Kent. Describing the NUWSS’s reaction as “unreflective, almost knee-jerk” (Kent 1993, 16), she draws on the work of Denise Riley to argue that its flight from feminism was twofold: “The NUWSS failed to challenge [the dominant] images and representations of women; its valorizing of women’s fundamental identity as mothers and homemakers constituted an embracing of what Riley calls ‘the social.’ In contrast to its prewar stance, however, feminists in the National Union failed to take the next step, to utilize women’s association with ‘the social’ in order to make claims for participation in ‘the political’” (Kent 1993, 22).

Yet if the activities of the National Union certainly drew on the association of women with “the home,” to claim that it did not attempt to use these actions as a stepladder into “the political” is to ignore the countless claims by both its leaders and members that in engaging in relief work they were, in the words of their president Millicent Fawcett, showing themselves “worthy of citizenship, whether our claim to it be recognized or not” (Fawcett 7 August 1914, 376, emphasis added). Entry into “the political,” however tentatively formulated, was certainly part of the agenda.

This may not yet make the agenda feminist, however. Jo Vellacott has indeed suggested that Fawcett’s instinctive adoption of “a traditional view of the appropriate role of women in wartime” was “reinforced by the realization that women’s ‘good behavior’ during the war might further their admittance to the political system—on men’s terms” (Vellacott 1987, 121). So admittance to “the political” may well have been sought but on principles which owed little to prewar feminist ideas, a more subtle form of ideological capitulation perhaps, but an ideological capitulation nonetheless.

Yet behaving in ways that antisuffragist men find palatable is not the same thing as adopting their vision of the world. This has been a central contention of scholars such as Jacqueline de Vries and Nicoletta Gullace, who have sought to recover the distinctively feminist dimension of another alleged symptom of feminism’s wartime ideological collapse: the

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xenophobic jingoism of Christabel and Emmeline Pankhurst, the charismatic leaders of the militant Women’s Social and Political Union (de Vries 1994, Gullace 2002, see also Purvis 2002 and Purvis 2007). By paying close attention to the context, their analyses show that the Pankhursts’ patriotic discourse was not identical to that of the conservative press in either its specific content or intended effects. What they were doing, they reveal, was not capitulating to patriotism but gendering it with a specific goal of obtaining votes for women. Far from demonstrating the ideological collapse of British feminism in the face of war, their prowar stance is suggestive instead of the resilience of feminist thought. As Gullace puts it: “[T]he Great War gave patriotic suffragists ... a more auspicious environment in which to justify claims that had a long and important history within the feminist movement” (Gullace 2002, 6). Such ideological resilience also marked, I will argue in a similarly contextually sensitive reading in this article, the response of Fawcett and her followers in the NUWSS to the outbreak of war.

Drawing on Common Cause and the highbrow monthly that was closely linked to it, the Englishwoman, this article shows that the main object of that response was to appropriate the concept and language of citizenship for women. This was done first by arguing that the gendered nature of citizenship had been confirmed by the war itself. This allowed for a reframing of the language of separate spheres as a non-hierarchical, complementary discourse, while radically redrawing the boundaries between men and women’s respective spheres, to the benefit of the latter. It was done secondly by developing a rhetorical strategy of inclusion that sought to appropriate the language of citizenship for women while simultaneously rejecting all attempts at excluding them from the national community. The result was an insistence on women’s identity as “citizens,” an identity that in turn had important consequences for the kind of feminism that could be articulated in its name.

**Gendering Citizenship and Redefining the “Woman’s Sphere”**

A month into the war, the front page of Common Cause strongly encouraged readers to turn to its correspondence section, where “A Member of the Newcastle Society” had written in to reject the “war argument,” that is, the claim that women could not be citizens because they could not fight (“Opportunity” 28 August 1914, 405). Suffragists had heard this argument before. It had a long ancestry, plunging deep into classical theorizing on citizenship, as a status of freedom that one must be both able and prepared to die for to defend. Yet although the outbreak of war seemed to vindicate this classical conception of citizenship, Common Cause’s correspondent thought that it could be easily rebuffed. One needed simply to repeat in wartime the standard suffragist response given to it in peacetime: “[T]he work of women in the nurture and care of humanity [is] at least as valuable as that of men in armed defence.” This war thus appeared to her as an opportunity to demonstrate the value of women’s contribution to the nation: “No one would suggest that women share in the warfare” but the “lion’s half of the work that is to be done at home” must fall on their shoulders. For suffragists not to engage in this work would be to “shirk the citizenship we have so long asked to be allowed to share.” By taking part in this work at home, the NUWSS demonstrated to British men that “those who claim the privileges of the State are also the first to offer to do its work.”
The sex-specific roles that war imposed on men and women were not, then, a demonstration of the impossibility of women’s citizenship but rather a vindication of feminists’ long-standing claim that there were two faces to citizenship: one male, one female (for a similar point, see Allen 2005, 111). It followed that to accomplish those roles was not so much to take part in the reproduction of one’s ancestral calling as a member of one’s sex but rather to respond to one’s duty as a citizen who happened to be of a particular sex. The sexed citizens were, moreover, strictly equal in their contribution to national survival and complemented one another. Where men must go and fight, women must concentrate on their sphere of expertise and devise solutions for guaranteeing that the impact the war had on it was not detrimental to the nation’s struggle (see Fawcett August 7 1914, 376). As we will now see, in the process of discussing what this entailed, promoters of a gendered citizenship, having already reframed separate spheres as a mutually supportive and nonhierarchical discourse, pushed the boundaries of the “woman’s sphere” beyond the well-defined limits it was usually associated with. Ultimately but importantly, the only boundary they accepted was the role of the soldier.

In its first war issue, the Englishwoman reacted strongly to the “perfect orgy of needlework” and the “sewing-mania” that it felt had gripped the nation’s women (“Echoes of War” September 1914, 303). It reproached the authorities for thinking and saying that women should sew in this crisis, and women for listening to that message: “Are we still in the mid–Victorian age struggling with our Butterick patterns and our needles and threads, to supplement the stupid omissions of a blundering commissariat? Or are we really women of the new era, the era of social science and electric sewing-machines?”

Similarly Common Cause welcomed the coverage by newspapers such as the Evening Standard of the numerous activities women were involving themselves in: “It is distinctly refreshing to find that some newspapers recognise that women’s work in time of war embraces something wider than sewing parties and knitting teas” (“Press Department” 2 October 1914, 465).

This is not to say that sewing parties and knitting teas were not also on the agenda. Indeed, focusing on women’s sphere of expertise meant multiplying articles on how to limit the impact of the war on issues ranging from food supplies to caring for infants, from soldier’s clothing to children’s entertainments. Entire columns were given over to detailing ways in which to conserve food in order to prepare for the long haul and to announcing the creation of maternities, as well as toy and shirt-making shops. It must be noted however that the latter were opened to help women thrown out of work by the war. Thus, focusing on the “woman’s sphere” also meant devising solutions to tackle women’s unemployment caused by war, fighting the corner of soldiers’ dependents against ill-treatment by the authorities, finding homes for stranded Belgian allies, accompanying “alien enemies” back to their homeland, or creating and funding all-female hospital units for the front.

In fact the boundaries of the “woman’s sphere” seemed to be almost endlessly expandable in war. Witness this amused reaction from Common Cause to the surprise raised in some quarters at the National Union’s enthusiastic turn to relief work: “[O]ur members are drawn from that class of women (to be found in all classes) who have held that the world is their home and their charge is to make it home-like” (“The World Our Home” 21 August 1914, 393, emphasis added). It is tempting to dismiss this as merely rhetorical flourish. And yet when Common Cause offered an inventory of the activities women should be engaging in, it did not content itself with quoting the four core areas outlined by Fawcett in a letter to

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the *Manchester Guardian*, “(1) Doctoring and nursing (2) Care of the young womanhood of the nation (3) Care of children (4) Care of child-bearing women,” but also suggested that women should “work as far as we are trained and able, in shop and factory and office and school” (“Our Active Service League” 11 September 1914, 431).

Nor did the argument stop at the expansion of the “woman’s sphere” into nontraditional sectors of activity at home. The *Englishwoman*, for instance, called for some women to be allowed onto the front lines to pick up the wounded even during combat. Drawing on two reported cases of women nursing soldiers in the line of fire, it argued: “[W]e should perhaps reconsider the customary refusal to let women, either nurses or doctors, work at the front. This, perhaps, is another practice which has been put out of date by the military methods of the Germans” (“The Utilisation of Voluntary Aid Detachments” November 1914, 107). The authorities, it concluded, should allow women a “share in the work [and] in the risks” (“The Utilisation of Voluntary Aid Detachments” November 1914, 108).

Thus, far from confining women physically and occupationally to the home, the notion that war imposes sex-specific duties only really meant, from the perspective of this discourse, that women could not fight. For in lieu of two rigidly separate spheres, this discourse suggests the existence of three broad spheres of activity in war: one specific to men (fighting), one specific to women (minding the home, caring for children and pregnant women), and one that consists of activities that men alone do, or overwhelmingly do, but that women could and should do as well (working in shops, factories, offices, schools, and so on). Nor are women confined to working on the home front: those who have the ability and desire should be allowed to risk their lives on the war front. Men, by contrast, do not find their duties expanding into women’s sphere of responsibilities: it is not suggested that they should care for babies, the elderly, or pregnant women and even less that they should take care of the home. However they do retain one monopoly: the role of the soldier. Indeed, even advocates of allowing women into the line of fire limit the possible roles women would take on the front line to “nurses and doctors.” Even here, women remain caregivers.

The role of the soldier thus appears as the ultimate outer limit of the expansion of the “woman’s sphere” in war. One could argue that this is the result of feminists’ careful tread ing. After all, the *Englishwoman*’s suggestion is framed largely as a necessary response in the face of Germany’s “military methods,” implying that such a change in “custom” is required as a result of changed conditions and of the nature of the evil-faced, not as a demand of irresponsible feminists hell-bent on equality with men. But far from being a case of uncharacteristic shyness, this non-advocacy of the recruitment of women into the armed forces is best understood as self-imposed. Indeed, for this vision of gendered citizenship to hold, women simply cannot be soldiers. As *Common Cause* put it, “[t]he part of women, even in time of war, is still not to destroy, but to heal; not to strike down, but to raise up and support. About our immediate duty there can be no doubt for any of us; it is to give, to work, to share” (“The Wine Poured Fourth” 9 October 1914, 474–5). If women could be soldiers, they could be killers and would thus not be essentially different from men. Yet if the association of women with “the home” means anything, it means that where men excel in the physical domination of the world, women excel in its “moral” or—in the language of the time—“spiritual” domination. And this in turn justifies both their claim to expertise in certain spheres of life and their claim to citizenship: as they are spiritually or morally better equipped than men, they will bring an important moral dimension to public decision making.
The outbreak of war certainly gave renewed currency to the language and practice of separate spheres. But by the same token it presented these feminists with a unique opportunity to promote their gendered understanding of the concept of citizenship. This in turn allowed them to frame separate spheres as a non-hierarchical, equalitarian discourse and to radically redraw the boundaries between the two gendered spheres without discarding them altogether, thus harnessing the power of the language of separate spheres for their cause.

However, to present bottling fruit, opening a toyshop, and even nursing soldiers on the front line as acts of citizenship is one thing. It is quite another to convince a wider audience that these are just as much acts of citizenship as men’s taking up of arms. To this end, these feminists consistently pursued a rhetorical strategy of inclusion that involved appropriating the discourse of citizenship for women.

**Women as Citizens**

Using the language of citizenship to describe actions to which it was not customarily applied required the use of two discursive techniques: one which might be called “mirroring” and the more familiar operation of gendering.

Mirroring involved the straightforward application of keywords of the discourse of citizenship to women’s actions. Women’s caring roles, for instance, were regularly framed in language more usually associated with military service. *Common Cause* explained its members’ enthusiastic plunge into relief work as a response to a “call for service,” and further described them as “[standing] to their posts” and “[working] for the common weal” (“The World Our Home” 21 August 1914, 393). Similarly, one of the paper’s correspondents proposed that women too should “enlist” (Milner 11 September 1914, 429). But she did not mean by this that they should join the ranks. She meant that women who have “no men of [their] own to encourage and send” should put their names, as men do, on a national list of volunteers prepared to replace a man who enlists in supporting his dependents. “Just as the country calls on the men to fight,” she concluded, “she calls on the women to bring up and care for those whom they leave behind.” More illuminating still are the profound parallels between the manner in which these feminists attempted to mobilize women and the manner in which the authorities mobilized men. Witness Millicent Fawcett’s call to women, emblazoned in bold letters on *Common Cause*—“Women! Your Country Needs You!” which exactly paralleled Kitchener’s famous recruitment poster, the absence of Fawcett’s picture (and pointing index finger) not withstanding (“‘Women! Your Country Needs You!’” 14 August 1914, 385). Similarly, when the NUWSS, following attacks in the press on young women who were behaving frivolously with soldiers, decided to create an Active Service Girls’ Cadet Corps to put their energy and enthusiasm to better use, it entrusted its leadership to Katherine M. Harley, sister of Field Marshal Sir John French. Just as her brother was leading the young men of the nation in their service on the war front, so would she lead the young women of the nation in their service on the home front: “[W]e have mobilised the soldier for the front in France and Belgium: we must mobilise the girl for the front in Great Britain” (A.M.R. December 4 1914, 575). The parallel with the army did not stop at this slogan. Like their male counterparts, these young women were to wear uniforms, be given medals, have a hierarchy of superiors, and follow rigorous training. Only the latter set them
apart from men, however, for they were to be trained not in the art of war, but rather in the arts of homemaking and relief of suffering: “Drilling, marching, first aid to the injured, and musical practice, both in band instruments and in singing, will form a large part of the training of cadets.... The other activities will include: Camp Management, Cooking, Knitting, Sewing, Dancing, Acting, Swimming, Organised Games, &c.”

This mirroring strategy could not always be used, however, because some of the most important features of the discourse of citizenship were so bound up with masculinity that their straightforward application to women’s actions was highly problematic. Applying them to women would thus require their gendering. The concepts of force and honor are two cases in point.

It is by force that the nation is defended, by force that it protects both itself and its allies. Good citizens, therefore, use force in defense of the nation. And women, as Common Cause was keen to demonstrate, were good citizens: “It is the vocation ... of all women, to be foremost in defence of their country—not by arms but by moral force” (“Defenders of the Country” 7 August 1914, 371). The “force” that characterized citizenship in war thus found itself gendered. Men’s “armed force,” used on the war front, was complemented and completed by women’s “moral force,” used on the home front. Where the former sought to defend allies and destroy enemies, the latter sought to maintain morale at home.

In using force, soldiers were said to be defending the nation’s honor, by which was meant its pledged word to defend Belgium in case of invasion. Shortly before the creation of Katherine Harley’s Active Service Girls’ Cadet Corps, another initiative to tackle the issue of young girls’ misbehavior had been launched by suffragists: the League of Honour. Its aim was to bring girls from a privileged background together with their less fortunate sisters who, it was argued, were engaging in morally suspect behavior with recruits as a result of a lack of character and education. The motivation for this initiative, however, went well beyond reforming individuals. Indeed, the third of the League’s four objects was to “[d]eepen, among women and girls of all classes, the sense of their responsibility for the honour of the nation, and to make clear the fact that the manhood of our country is either raised or lowered by the influence of its womanhood” (“The League of Honour” 30 October 1914, 506).

Girls who chose to participate in the League took the following pledge: “I promise, by the help of God, to do all that is in my power to uphold the honour of the nation and its defenders in this time of war, by prayer, purity, and temperance” (“The League of Honour” 30 October 1914, 507). We thus find the concept of the nation’s honor, habitually described as solely falling within the male remit via the honoring of the pledge to Belgium to defend her in case of attack, extended to include women. This is done by claiming that the home front is, above all, a moral front. The threat to the nation’s honor that Germany poses in the realm of international relations is paralleled by the threat that the war poses to the nation’s moral standards at home. Whereas men were the only ones who could defend the nation’s honor abroad, women were the only ones who could defend it at home, because the “morality” of their sexual conduct determined the morality of men’s and as a result determined the moral tone of the nation as a whole. The implication, furthermore, was that an “immoral” nation at home would be more likely to behave “dishonorably” abroad, an implication that gave women’s role even greater importance. Through both of these cases we find reiterated the notion that men and women have separate spheres of specialty which map perfectly to the two “spheres” of the war: the battle front is ideally suited for men’s sex-spe-
specific abilities, the home front for women’s. In both also we find a central feature of the separate-spheres discourse, women’s moral superiority to men, claimed and asserted as characteristic of their different but equal face of citizenship.14

In sum, by appropriating the language and ceremony of citizenship via these two discursive techniques, feminists attempted to redefine women’s sex-specific actions in war as duties of citizenship. Doing one’s duty, however, was only one half of citizenship. The other was proving that one stood united with the rest of the nation. And the suspicion that women were not doing so or simply could not do so had thus to be continually fought.

**Combating the Exclusion of Women from the National Community**

Two months into the war, the *Anti-Suffrage Review* accused the National Union of not respecting the “political truce” that everyone otherwise seemed to agree was called for as a result of war: “The first indication that the Suffragist moral code differed from the one accepted by the rest of the community appeared in the *Common Cause* of August 28th... It was pointed out that the Union had abandoned nothing, and the notice continued: ‘It has announced that it has temporarily “suspended ordinary political work,” but it is doing a good deal of extraordinary political work, and with excellent result.’ The subtle distinction is worthy of the German Press Bureau” (“The Broken Truce” October 1914, 162).

Nor were its opponents alone concerned. One secretary of a society also felt that the National Union was not behaving sufficiently like its male counterparts: “Have not men forgotten that they are Liberals, Unionists, Ulstermen, Nationalists? What we want to prove now is that we are, above all, citizens.... We ask for votes in order that we may the better serve the nation. This is the true basis of any extension of the franchise. If it can be said with any suspicion of truth that we have served the nation so that we might afterwards obtain a vote, then our work will, spiritually, if not materially, have lost its value (“Keeping the Union Alive” 4 September 1914, 417).

At issue in both of these attacks was the central concept of unity and its relationship to citizenship: women must be united with men if they are to lay claim to being citizens; they cannot be seen to be divisive. And to claim that patriotic work was suffrage work was to demonstrate one’s inability to transcend one’s own selfish cause for the greater good. *Common Cause*’s response was to repeat these feminists’ central claim: that the war had demonstrated the truth of their position. “We believe in Women’s Suffrage because we believe the expression of woman’s point of view is necessary for the health of the nation. We believe this even more in time of war than in time of peace, because the tendency of war is to trample on all the half of life which more especially belongs to women” (“Keeping the Union Alive” 4 September 1914, 413).

Thus the war, by treading on women’s “half of life,” had allowed the common agenda (both sexes working together for the common good) to finally catch up with their own. In addition to rejecting claims that their own position was divisive, it was necessary to reject positions articulated by other women that would lead to women as a group being perceived as divisive or separate from men. Two typical instances were the White Feather Movement and feminist pacifism.

Following the birth of the White Feather Movement, in which women would hand a

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white feather to men not in uniform as a symbolic accusation of cowardice, Fawcett wrote to the *Manchester Guardian* to condemn it: “I do not think it is the function of men or women to lecture each other on the special duties of the opposite sex. These duties are sufficiently obvious” (quoted in “Our Active Service League” 11 September 1914, 430). Common Cause concurred: “We are sick to death, we Suffragists, of being told by men what we may do—ought to do—what is ‘womanly!’ In the name of commonsense let us not now copy the folly and set out to tell men what they may do and ought to do—what is ‘manly!’ They know in their hearts what is manly, just as we know what is womanly, if they see us going about our business we may trust them to go about theirs (“Our Active Service League” 11 September 1914, 431).

Emmeline Pankhurst believed, by contrast, that women had a right to tell men to fight by virtue of men’s promise to women to defend them (see, for instance, Pankhurst 23 April, 25–26). But for those pursuing a strategy of inclusion, a group that accuses another of not doing its share of the common load is acting divisively and thus failing to live up to the standards of good citizenship.

Pacifism posed a different kind of problem. Feminist pacifists were often constitutionalists who published in the same organs under review here, and worked closely with proponents of this women-as-citizens discourse. They too argued that women belonged to a different sphere than men. But for them this forced the conclusion that women must, of necessity, act immediately for peace. Because such an argument would set women apart from the united nation and separate them from men who were fighting, it needed to be resisted. But such resistance was made more difficult by the fact that it drew on an identical understanding of women’s special qualities. The response of these feminists to their pacifist colleagues, therefore, was mostly an attempt at containment (“A Sacred Trust” 20 November 1914, 550–1). On the one hand, pacifists were invited, in the name of consistency, to take part in relief work: “The most pacifist of us should ... prove her love of peace to be not a ‘self-regarding pacifism,’ but a self-regardless pity. Those who hate war the most—and what woman is there who does not hate war?—must be the readiest to give their lives to the sacred task of alleviating the horrors of war.”

On the other hand, it was conceded that it was women’s “sacred trust” to “build up public opinion in such wise that if and when our rulers are in a position to consider terms of peace, they will find behind them a great and mighty force making for justice, for self-control, for wisdom.”

To remedy this ignorance women must study war: “We are bound ... to consider what is the cause of war. We cannot be satisfied only to heal its wounds so far as we may, though this healing is a duty from which no woman will dream of holding back.” Following the publication of this view, a reader asked Common Cause to launch an “educational campaign” in its pages to facilitate this greater understanding (Lyon 27 November 1914, 503). There followed a new series of articles entitled “Problems of War and Peace” which attempted to enlighten Common Cause readers on issues ranging from Britain’s treaty obligations to disarmament, from conscientious objection to the Swiss militia system.

In both cases, the aim was clearly to disarm the threat that feminist pacifism represented to women’s inclusion in the national community by either co-opting pacifist women into relief work—the work for which women were being praised—or taking the internationalist and activist sting out of thinking about peace by framing it as yet another duty for women to engage in as “citizens.” When containment failed, however, and pacifists decided...
to take part, with other women from around the world, in the Women’s Peace Congress at The Hague, their attitudes were flatly denounced. Fawcett put it most strongly. For her, as long as German troops had not been repelled, it was “akin to treason to talk of peace” (quoted in Liddington 1989, 96, emphasis original).

The entire women-as-citizens discourse rested on the claim that women were one-half of a united nation: they could neither be seen as undermining that unity by pointing the finger at men for not holding up their end of the bargain, nor could they declare themselves to be somehow outside of this national community, as having different priorities from those of the nation. However, the greatest challenge to this discourse did not come from White Feather movement women or feminist pacifists. Indeed, a testimony to the uphill battle these feminists faced is the fact that women’s discursive exclusion from the language of citizenship was more often than not to be found in banal forms of speech, such as jokes, sayings, and turns of phrase.

Journalists joked that the following advert had appeared in the Times: “Wanted—petticoats for all able-bodied youths in this country who have not yet joined the Navy or Army” (“A Bad Joke” 11 September 1914, 426). To which Common Cause angrily responded: “We express no opinion whatever about the young men who do not volunteer, doubtless they have their reasons—but the innuendo clearly is that they are unmanly—therefore they are to be dressed in women’s clothes. No, thank you! An unmanly man is not fit to wear a woman’s clothes. It is time men learnt that a strong, capable woman is not necessarily ‘virile,’ nor a feeble man woman-like.”

In contesting this limitation of courage to the male gender, Common Cause was performing two interrelated acts. On the one hand, it was challenging the superimposition of positive and negative dichotomies on the male-female dichotomy that was central to the separate-spheres discourse. On the other, it was resisting women’s exclusion from citizenship. Indeed, if women could be successfully associated with non-courageous men, they could ipso facto be excluded, like those men, from “true” citizenship.

Not only jokes, but sayings too could be potent vehicles for excluding women from the community of citizens. Witness the ubiquitous: “For men should work and women should weep.” In its second issue after the war was declared, Common Cause rejected widespread talk of “weeping women” as offensive. Women, it argued, were “keeping the race while those we love are slaughtering each other” (“Woman, the Adaptable: The Queen’s Appeal to Women” 14 August 1914, 388–89). Again the aim was to resist the portrayal of women as feeble and thus incapable of rising up to the challenge, as men were doing, of war—that is, of citizenship.

Turns of phrase also attracted the ire of Common Cause, even when they emanated from such respected an authority as Lord Kitchener himself. In his first speech to the troops, the national hero warned them against the temptations of “women and wine.” The suffragist paper pounced: “Now, when all women are plunged in grief and dread; when so many women have only one thought—how best they can make good the infinite disaster; now, in modern England, we find him warning the men with the foul old tag ‘women and wine.’ It seems to us that the necessary warning might have been conveyed in manlier phrase; that the men might have been appealed to, as they left sorrowing wives, and mothers, and sisters to keep the home together, that they should respect womanhood, and not merely that they should safeguard their own health” (“An Unhappy Phrase” 21 August 1914, 395).

To portray women as a danger to the troops was, once again, to present them as out-
side of the national community. By insisting on the fact that these soldiers had female relatives who were playing a vital role, *Common Cause* was inserting them back in.

That feminists should have spent precious column inches vigorously countering these apparently unimportant utterances is only understandable in light of their strategy of defining women as “citizens.” To let such jokes, sayings, and turns of phrase stand, would have been to let stand the idea that women were not qualified to be citizens. Such exclusion of women from citizenship, however, did not only take place in the discursive arena. Indeed, a number of decisions taken by the authorities either implicitly or explicitly framed women as outside the national community or, worse, a problem for it to solve.

The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Bill was debated throughout 1914 and opposed by women’s suffrage campaigners because it would strip British women who had married foreigners of their citizenship, while British men kept their citizenship regardless of their wives’ nationalities. As a result of the outbreak of war these women now fell under the category of “alien enemies.” The *Englishwoman* was pained: “hundreds of English women must now register themselves as alien enemies, and become liable to removal from their homes if these are in a forbidden area.... This is not a small matter to us, we are accustomed to be denied citizenship; but to be branded as alien enemies is a deeper humiliation ... it is an unforgettable blow to what we hold dearest” (“Echoes of War” September 1914, 308).

Nor did the outbreak of war result in women being treated any more equitably by the authorities. Two cartoons published in *Common Cause* in consecutive weeks in December 1914 highlight this amply. Although the subjects were different—one addresses the War Office’s decision to put soldiers’ and sailors’ wives under police surveillance (Figure 1, page 37), the other the decision to bar women from pubs before 11:30 A.M. (Figure 2, page 37)—the message was the same.

In all three cases—marriage law, surveillance of soldier’s wives, and drinking laws—the same argument was articulated: women were making considerable but unrecognized sacrifices in this war. Worse still, they were either humiliated by the way the law treated them or were being punished for the sacrifices they had made. In every case men failed to value their contributions to the nation and, as suffragists had long been arguing, their unequal treatment resulted from their absence from the bodies that had taken those decisions.

But of much greater concern to the authorities than misbehaving soldiers’ wives or drunken women were prostitutes who were blamed for spreading disease among recruits. Defending these women, however, was more difficult: for what contribution to the nation could they be said to be making? The way in which this problem was dealt with is illustrated by a leader published in *Common Cause* which, four months into the war, reflected on the mixed reactions that were greeting women’s actions. On the one hand, they were being eulogized for their relief work, on the other there were “bitter and repeated complaints of the women who are hindering” (“Women’s Part in War Time” 11 December 1914, 596). Of these there were three types: women who were wasting the money they had received on account of being “dependents” of soldiers or sailors, young girls who were accused of pestering soldiers and engaging in immoral conduct, and professional prostitutes.

The first two cases showed, for *Common Cause*, not that women and girls were somehow individually to blame but rather that their social circumstances were the source of the ill. The dependents of fighting men were often of a poor background and not used to having such amounts of money. To address their poverty was the solution. As for the young girls, they were behaving in this way because, as suffragists had been pointing out for a long
"Women! Your Country Needs You!"

Top: Figure 1: The Crime of Being a Soldier's Wife (Common Cause, 11 December 1914). Bottom: Figure 2: His Patriotic Sacrifice (Common Cause, 18 December 1914).
time, they had been socialized into thinking that convincing a man to marry them was their sole function in life. The solution was to change their education. The prostitute was a different case altogether: “She represents, in an extreme and final form, the woman exploited by society.... It is useless ... to appeal to their patriotism. They have none. A prostitute is without nationality. Her hand is against every man, and every man’s hand against her. Society has exploited her, and she exploits society. What has her country done for her, in heaven’s name, that she should know ‘patriotism’? Nevertheless, she is human, and every proposal that assumes that she is not is bound to fail” (“Woman’s Part in War Time” 11 December 1914, 596).

*Common Cause* concludes that suffragists must help prostitutes as far as possible because their battle from the beginning has also been to obtain recognition of their status as human beings. Yet it is significant that the setting of reference for dealing with prostitutes is not the nation, as it is for soldiers’ wives and for young girls, but humanity. By saying that they have no country, the suffragists are making a clear demarcation between the nation as a whole and prostitutes. Certainly the fault lies not with prostitutes, but with the nation, and yet this conveniently distances “women,” who are contributing to the nation’s struggle, from “prostitutes,” who, although not purposefully, can only undermine it. By saying that prostitutes must be treated as human beings, these feminists are not saying anything they had not said about German women stranded in London at the outbreak of war.9

This exclusion of prostitutes from the nation alerts us to the fact that gendering citizenship in order to define women’s response to war as that of “citizens” had important consequences not only for the concept and language of citizenship, but also for the kind of feminism that one could articulate.

**Defining Women as “Citizens” in the Context of Total War: Consequences for Feminism**

To define women as “citizens” in the context of total war led to the articulation of a feminism marked by five principal features, first an unconditional acceptance of “the nation” as the only possible frame of reference for a feminist politics. Witness *Common Cause*’s justification for its decision not to turn itself into a propaganda machine either for or against the involvement of Britain in the war: “Great Britain has gone to war. This is a British paper. We accept the war as our condition for the time being, and our immediate concern is to bear ourselves as good citizens under these conditions” (“Accepting Facts” 14 August 1914, 386). War is enough to command one’s loyalty to the nation. Thus, whereas *Common Cause* had carried numerous articles throughout the month of July on the International Suffrage Alliance’s meeting in London, in which it celebrated the leaders of sister suffrage societies around the globe who were in attendance (see issues of 10 July, 17 July, 24 July), its first issue discussing the war (31 July) made no mention whatsoever of their continued presence in London and even less of the possibility of international (as distinct from imperial) sisterly action.

The second feature of this feminism is its rejection of xenophobic nationalism. Indeed, this discourse’s ideal citizen is fair-minded, heroic, and honorable, someone who loves her country, defends it because she is bound to, but without hatred for non-nationals. When “German atrocity reports” began to spread in early September 1914, *Common Cause* issued
a characteristic call for Britain not to respond in kind but to continue to behave according to the laws of “civilised warfare” (“The Crime of Vengeance” 18 September 1914, 440). We also saw above that the NUWSS took part in schemes that gave relief to “alien enemies.” These examples, as well as the insistence that one of women’s duties is to prepare public opinion for peace by thinking through the causes of war and how to avoid them, all point to this discourse’s solid rooting in the liberal ideological tradition of reason over passion and right over might. To construct women as “citizens” in war was thus to weld this feminism’s fortunes firmly to those of British liberal nationalism.

A third striking feature of this feminism is the narrowness with which it defines its constituency—that is, those whom it recognizes as “women.” Because non-nationals could not, by definition, be good citizens, they fell out of the picture altogether, as we have just seen. This is not to say, however, that all British females qualified as “women.” The prostitute, for instance, did not come under the category “woman” because she failed both tests of “good citizenship.” Indeed, she did not accomplish any act that could be described as fulfilling a duty to the nation, nor could she be said to stand united with the national community in the common struggle because of the threat she represented to soldiers’ health. The pacifist, similarly, fell outside of feminism’s constituency for failing to stand united in the common cause of national struggle. That constituency, then, was made up of British women who could be described as acting in support of their country, as “good citizens.”

The fourth key feature of this feminism is its rhetorical strategy of inclusion. This provided suffragists with an opportunity to challenge accepted limitations on the “woman’s sphere” by theorizing opportunities that the war opened up for women as proof of the validity of a gendered understanding of citizenship. The “woman’s sphere” thus found itself expanding out of the home into the public domain of men and out of the country, into the front lines. The success of this theorizing, however, was also its limitation, as indeed is the limitation of all strategies of inclusion: even as they attempt to transform from within (and to their advantage) the heavily gendered discourses within which they operate, they tend to highlight and reinscribe their male bias. Thus the campaign to mobilize women could not escape the male-centeredness of the discourse of citizenship, the uneasy, “unnatural” relationship between “women” and “citizenship.”20 When Kitchener pointed his finger at passersby, the poster did not read “Men! Your Country Needs You!” By contrast, Fawcett must preface her call to service with “Women!” thus involuntarily highlighting the fact that it was by no means obvious that women were actually needed. Similarly, Harley does not compare the “girl” that she is mobilizing with the “boy” that the government mobilized, but with the “soldier.”

The final distinctive feature of this feminism is its vision of the male-female relationship as an essentially harmonious one. Because it locked women into a gendered national community that was meant to be harmonious, it could not read men’s symbolic, legal, and literal attacks on women as anything other than irrational bigotry, a lack of understanding borne of prejudice which could and would be overcome by reasoning and argument. To understand it as “sex-war,” as Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst did, would have undermined the basic notion of a united nation. To understand it as a symptom of militarism, as pacifists did, would have undermined the premise of the righteousness of the nation’s cause in this war.
Conclusion: Feminism in War

The aim of this article has been to understand the response of Fawcett and her followers to the outbreak of war by placing it in its linguistic context. This has allowed me to draw two main conclusions.

First, far from representing a knee-jerk flight from feminism, their response was a self-conscious continuation of a long-standing feminist argument about the gendered nature of citizenship. By plunging into relief work they were not capitulating to the notion of separate spheres or seeking entry into the political system on men’s terms but gendering the concept and language of citizenship in order to obtain votes for women on resolutely suffragist terms. In a context where men and women’s essential difference was heavily insisted upon and where citizenship was welded to the separate spheres discourse, it was a response that made considerable sense. Indeed, it gave women’s daily relief work a political significance, vindicated the legitimacy of their claim to citizenship, and framed the ubiquitous language of separate spheres as an acceptable, efficient, and empowering political division of labor between women and men. Rather than an exemplar of British feminism’s ideological collapse in the face of war, the case of Fawcett and her followers provides us rather with further evidence of the resilience of feminist thinking in this period.

In addition to strengthening the “resilience thesis,” I have sought in this article to make a first step in moving the debate beyond the collapse-resilience dichotomy by asking not only “did feminism survive the outbreak of war?” but also “what form of feminism emerged as a result of the interaction between a long-standing feminist argument and the context of total war?” Thus, my second conclusion is that to use the long-standing gendered concept of citizenship in a context of total war had a significant impact on the shape of the feminism that Fawcett and her followers promoted. Theirs was a feminism that anchored British women firmly into the British political community, reframed separate-spheres discourse to women’s advantage, and tied feminism firmly to liberal nationalism. This made it a powerful language with which to theorize the wartime expansion of the “woman’s sphere” as evidence of women’s rightful claim to enfranchisement. However, by excluding women both at home and abroad from its constituency and by positing a harmonious national community, this feminist language left its proponents with few conceptual resources to deal with British men’s reluctance to treat them as equals. Indeed, they could only fall back on an appeal to reason, having no possibility of returning to a critique of male domination as either sex interest or as the symptom of militarism.

Notes

1. See Riley 1988, particularly chapters 1 and 3.
2. That attention to the linguistic context of political thought and action allows us to understand more clearly what actors were doing by performing those verbal and nonverbal actions is a central insight of “Cambridge school” historians, particularly Quentin Skinner. His main theoretical articles on this matter and his critics’ responses have been usefully brought together by James Tully in Tully and Skinner 1988.
3. On the resilience of suffragism, see also Smith 2005. It will be clear by now that the debate over the capitulation or resilience of feminist thought in the face of total war has disproportionately focused on the responses to the war of the main suffrage organizations. In seeking to challenge one such interpretation, this article cannot but continue that suffrage-centric trend. Yet this should not be taken to mean that I disagree with those historians who have insisted that the organizations, indi-
viduals, and ideas that constituted the movement for women’s suffrage do not encapsulate the entirety of “British feminism” in this period. For a recent brilliant example, see Delap 2007.

4. The same can be said of course of the well-documented position of Fawcett’s opponents in the NUWSS, the pacifists led by such impressive figures as Catherine Marshall, Helena Swanwick or Maude Royden. See for instance Wiltsher 1985, Liddington 1989, Vellacott 1993, Vellacott 2007. Indeed, the rich diversity of feminist thought in Britain before the war allowed each of these competing factions to plausibly claim the label “feminist” for themselves, despite the radically different positions they expounded. The “ideological collapse” thesis tends to conceal, by denying the label to this or that group, precisely this diversity in prewar feminist thought.

5. These were not the only forums in which this particular discourse was articulated (nor was it the only discourse presented in those forums), but they were certainly among those in which it was presented the most clearly. The value of focusing on periodicals for historians of feminism has recently been highlighted by a marvellous collection edited by Lucy Delap, Maria DiCenzo and Louise Ryan (Delap, et al. 2006).

6. I borrow the expression “strategy of inclusion” from Judith Squires (Squires 2000, 3).

7. Most of the newspaper articles quoted in this article are only a page long. Therefore, in order to avoid the multiplication of in-text references, where multiple citations of the same text are made in one paragraph, the reference is only given once, at the beginning of the paragraph. In addition, the majority of these articles are not signed. They are therefore identified by their title, both in in-text citations and in the list of references.


11. Interestingly, the case for women soldiers was implicitly made in the early days of war in the pages of the Englishwoman. A testament to the strength of the separate-spheres view throughout British society, however, is the fact that it was not made in straightforwardly political pieces. Instead it took the non-threatening form of historical biographies of famous women combatants from the distant past. See the “Martial Heroines” series written by Edith Palliser, beginning with Palliser September 1914, 273–8.

12. For a perceptive discussion of the moral panic over young women’s alleged collective bout of “khaki fever” in the first months of war, which some argued resulted from their non-mobilization, see Woollacott April 1994. For subsequent moral panics involving women’s sexuality, see Grayzel 1999, chapter 4.

13. My concern in this article is with the articulation, not the reception, of these feminists’ attempts to appropriate the language of citizenship for women. It is worth noting in passing, however, that such female organizations styled on the military were largely frowned upon, precisely for their perceived transgression of proper gender roles. Women could claim for themselves the virtues of citizenship, but not don its costume. See for instance Watson 2004, especially chapter 2.

14. The notion that the war had opened a “moral front” at home was not an invention of these feminist commentators. Indeed, their response has much in common with that of the most conservative commentators, who called on women to behave “properly.” See for instance Grayzel 1999, especially chapter 4. Where they part ways, however, is in the feminists’ insistence that to do so was an act of citizenship in addition to being an act of proper womanhood.

15. For an influential study of the White Feather Movement, see Gullace 2002, chapter 4.


17. For a detailed account of the Women’s Peace Congress in The Hague, see Wiltsher 1985.

18. Conscientious objectors were disenfranchised for five years by the Reform Bill of 1918. See Gullace 2002, chapter 8, especially 178–84.

19. See for instance “International Women’s Relief Committee” 2 August 1914, 403. According to this article the NUWSS’s participation in a relief committee’s work to help “alien enemy” women stranded in London stems from “a deeply human sympathy with anyone in trouble.”

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20. This uneasy relationship was acutely felt by contemporaries. In the words of Janet Watson, “Women could only be equal—but-different, and their efforts were always perceived as those of women in particular, not just citizens” (Watson 2004, 7).

21. For a similar, if brief, assessment of the NUWSS’s relief work as “feminist” but from a perspective that is anchored in social and political rather than intellectual history, see Holton 1986, 132. For a longer defense on similar lines, see Vellacott 2007, 15–32.

22. In fairness to Jo Vellacott it must be noted that her most recent work happily accepts the prowar wing of the NUWSS under the label “feminism,” although it remains reluctant to do the same for the jingoism of Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst. See Vellacott 2007, especially chapter 2; for a critique, see Calvini-Lefebvre 2008.

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The Postcolonial Politics of Militarizing Rwandan Women

An Analysis of the Extremist Magazine Kangura and the Gendering of a Genocidal Nation-state

GEORGINA HOLMES

Abstract: Rwanda has been used by many feminist scholars of international relations as a case study to play out understandings of gender-based violence in war and “civil war.” Few feminists have analyzed the mass rape of Rwandan women in the context of a carefully planned and prepared genocide. This article considers the ways in which, in the years leading up to April 1994, the Rwandan nation-state became increasingly militarized and masculinized. It examines the extremist propaganda magazine Kangura’s use of cartoons to militarize Rwandan women—not just as wives, mothers and prostitutes—but as political subjects.

Keywords: feminist international relations theory; genocide; genocidal rape; media; militarization; nation-state; propaganda; Rwanda

Introduction

Between April and July 1994, an estimated 250,000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu women were raped, gang-raped, and mutilated during the Rwandan genocide, when nearly a million men, women and children were killed in one hundred days. Witnesses and survivors have repeatedly testified to the brutality of these rapes by the government army, militia groups, and men and boys from the women’s own communities. Some testimonies report other Rwandan women’s complicity in rape—by telling men where women were hiding, goading men to rape, even disabling victims so that they could not physically escape rape. Most of the work on the conflict in Rwanda by feminist scholars of international relations tends to discuss gender-based violence in the context of “civil war” rather than genocide. On those occasions when the term “genocide” occurs, it is often used interchangeably with war and rarely is space allocated to examine the relationship between the two, let alone to
consider the politics of interpretation that surrounds them. Elsewhere, in sociology and international law, feminist scholars have examined the ways in which Rwandan extremist propaganda was gendered to target Tutsi women with gender-based violence (Baines 2003; Taylor 1999; Chrètien 1995; Kabanda 2007). Much of this research, which hones in on women victims of male violence at the cost of sidelining women perpetrators of genocide, does not adequately examine the complex, gendered power relations that developed in Rwanda and the wider Great Lakes region in the four years leading up to the genocide. This research, like much feminist international relations theory, often presents confused readings of Tutsi women as victims of a blurred civil war or genocide while rendering other Rwandan women invisible.

Feminists have also considered how women’s lives are integral to sustaining militarized societies and upholding military ideals both in times of peace and war (Enloe 2000; 2004), yet few have examined how women are militarized in specific ways in genocide. This is largely because many feminist readings take a global view of women’s militarization that has, for the most part, glossed over the particulars of local politics in Rwanda. By ignoring the information war between the key actors in the Rwandan civil war and genocide both in the Great Lakes region and internationally (via the United Nations, its member states, and international NGOs), gender-sensitive analyses of the Hutu extremist propaganda may actually serve to uphold the extremist interpretation of “war” and “genocide”: it was precisely the threat of civil war that the extremists used to mobilize a nation to commit genocide. This neglect of detail produces prescriptive accounts that time and again in feminist international relations theorizing negate genocide in the overarching story of “women and war.”

In this article I focus on the operation of militaries and militarized cultures in genocide. I argue that simplified accounts of the Rwandan genocide camouflage the unique ways in which gendered depictions of conflict were central to the Hutu extremist propaganda. The paper focuses specifically on images featured in the propaganda magazine Kangura, a mouthpiece for the extremist party Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR), a Hutu extremist political party whose members included some of the most puissant architects of the genocide. The paper is divided into four parts. In the first part I briefly consider the definitions of ethnic war, genocide, gendercide, and genocidal rape before discussing the scholarly issues of interpreting the history of conflict in Rwanda. In the second I adopt Cynthia Enloe’s theory of militarization to look at the development of Rwanda’s genocidal nation-state. In the third I expose some of the inaccuracies of feminist international relations work on Rwanda and consider how these inaccuracies produce partial readings of gendered conflict in Rwanda. I conclude with an examination of Kangura’s militarization of Rwandan women. Here I expand on traditional readings of extremist propaganda to look at the ways in which Kangura also militarized Hutu Rwandan women. This article is based on archival research conducted at the educational Centre Iwacu Kabunsunzu in Kigali, Rwanda. A total of thirty-seven out of the fifty-four editions published between November 1991 and March 1994 were analyzed using discourse analysis. Given time constraints while in Kigali, it was difficult to gain access to a complete collection of Kangura, since many issues were destroyed immediately after the genocide by survivors and repatriated Rwandans. However, the editions I had access to, which spanned from numbers four to fifty-four, give some insight into the militarization of Rwandan women.
Genocide scholars focus on the intent of perpetrators to differentiate between ethnic war and genocide. Ethnic war may include civil war and wars of liberation, and may also incorporate ethnic cleansing—defined as “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by issuing force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area” (Bassiouni Report, 1992 paragraph 55, cited in Allen 1996, 43). The legal definition of genocide, as coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944, was the “intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.” The term “genocide” has in genocide studies been distinguished from “war,” although debates about the relationship between the two continue. Adam Jones, who criticizes the UN’s gender-blind definition of genocide, argues that a gendered lens can help us better understand cultural and societal differences between genocides (2004, vii). For Jones, genocide is “the actualization of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in whole or in substantial part, any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means” (20).

Discussion about rape within feminist theory is diverse. United States–based feminist Beverly Allen, who conducted ethnographic research with Bosnian-Herzegovinian rape and genocide survivors in the mid–1990s, coined the term “genocidal rape” to distinguish between rape in war and rape in genocide. For Allen, genocidal rape is “a military policy of rape for the purpose of genocide” (1996, 1). While “all rape is related in that it derives from a system of dominance and subjugation,” genocidal rape is set apart from other forms of rape by Allen, who writes of the “horrible difference genocidal rape makes” in the “particular suffering it causes” (39). Methods include gang raping and repeat raping with the intent to kill, the insertion of blunt instruments into women with the intent to kill, and forced impregnation as a means to destroy an ethnic group—an act of genocide that Allen herself believes “makes sense only if you are ignorant about genetics” (87).

The definition employed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) states that rape is “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on one person under circumstances which are coercive” (United Nations 1998, 7 paragraphs 2–5). During the Akayesu case, the Trial Chamber concluded that rape and sexual violence in Rwanda in 1994 did constitute genocide because there was evidence of intent to destroy in whole or in part an ethnic group (United Nations 1998, 7 paragraphs 2–5). However, it was the ICTR’s recognition that rape need not include “penetration or physical contact” that moved international legal understandings of rape forward, since the act of perpetrating rape is not specifically male-gendered: women can also be militarized perpetrators of sexual violence, even if they do not physically commit rape. For Allen, however, genocidal rape more adeptly fits definitions of biological warfare than current UN convention definitions. This is a particularly pertinent point in the case of Rwanda, where rape survivors recount that men raped to inflict women with AIDS—the intent to kill by means of a slow death, and signifying the longer-term destruction of the community, including the death of boys and men (Human Rights Watch 1996). While Allen refers to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is important to note that the Serbian genocidal rape policy was remarkably similar to the Hutu extremist policy during the Rwandan genocide, despite occurring simultaneously and on different continents. One significant parallel is the raping of women by men of their own communities. As Allen
states, in Serb-controlled areas where men had fled or had been killed “women were then often raped in their own homes or taken from their homes to another location and raped, often by neighbours or people known to them” (1996, 74).

**Conflicting Rwandan Histories**

A small and densely populated country, Rwanda’s landlocked inhabitants share a common language and comprise three visible ethnicities—the Hutu (the majority), Tutsi and Twa. **Invisible** ethnicities include those who, over time, immigrated to Rwanda from areas that are now Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In precolonial times certain regions of contemporary Rwanda were ruled by the mwami (king) whose centuries-old feudal order operated through a series of administrative networks that radiated out from a core. Other regions remained under the authority of wealthy lineages that could be either Tutsi or Hutu, operating through clan and patron-client systems. It is said that there was little ethnic divisionism between Tutsi and Hutu groups—although anthropologist Christopher Taylor notes that there was in fact more racism toward the Twa than any other ethnicity, in spite of their exclusion from normative histories on Rwandan ethnicity. The advent of German colonial rule in the 1920s, and later Belgian colonial rule in the 1930s, profoundly altered these lineage and patron-client systems. Tutsi chiefs and the royal court’s supremacy over once-powerful lineages and clans were reinforced and justified by Belgian colonial rule that aimed to develop a class-based capitalist society.

As has been well-documented, the European Hamitic hypothesis and “great chain of being” hierarchy, developed from John Hanning Speke’s theories of race evolution, categorized Rwandan “ethnicity” into two groups: the pastoralist Tutsi (who were recorded as being taller and leaner, with high brows and thinner noses and lips, of superior intellect) and the Hutu, shorter and stockier agriculturalists with flatter noses (see Eltringham 2004; Prunier 1997; Newbury 1998; Taylor 1999; Mamdani 2001). The history of Tutsi invasion and conquest was perpetuated during colonial times by Tutsi chiefs to justify their elite position within Rwandan society (Taylor 1999, 88). Yet the stereotypes were strongly based on the visibility of Rwandan men’s and women’s bodies as they were reconfigured and re-represented within the Belgian colonial sphere.

The revolution of 1959 grew out of dissatisfaction with Tutsi monarchist and elite rule but was compounded by increased poverty and loss of control over the means of production on the part of the Hutu. Many Tutsis who also suffered under the regime backed the revolution. In 1957 the Bahutu Manifesto emerged, which introduced “race” into the socio-political context for the first time and was used to fuel ethnic divisionism (Prunier 1997, 45). The 1959 revolution killed an estimated twenty thousand Tutsi and forced thousands into exile (African Rights 1996, 8). Independence in 1963 followed a political uprising of the oppressed Hutu majority that saw thousands of Tutsi massacred. In 1974 President Juvenal Habyarimana, who had taken power in a coup from his predecessor Grégoire Kayibanda in 1973, formed his own political party, Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le développement (MRND). Habyarimana’s regime rested on the ideology that democracy equated to ethnic majority (that is, Hutu) rule but in 1978 article 7 of the Rwandan Constitution claimed that “single-party rule was the basic value of the regime” (African Rights 1996, 8). After the regime’s refusal to permit them to return, refugees in exile organized themselves
in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which staged an attack against Rwanda in October 1990.

The 1990s saw the introduction of democracy following internal opposition and pressure from the international community, including public pressure from France’s President Mitterand. Habyarimana introduced multiparty politics and drew up a new constitution in June 1991. In line with a shift in the priorities of the international community for Rwanda, from development to democracy as development, Habyarimana renamed his party as Mouvement Républicain Nationale pour le Démocratie et le Développement (MRNDD). It is significant that the party retained the same acronym: it preached that all Hutus were automatically members of a “naturally” democratic party. In spite of this ideology, the number of opposition parties burgeoned, including the Hutu-majority party of the South, the Partie Libéral (PL). This reinforced a long-standing regional divide between the Hutus of the North (Habyarimana’s stronghold) and the Hutus of the South (Melvern 2000, 22). In 1993 the new government entered into talks with the RPF, resulting in the signing of the Arusha Accords and the creation of the new post of prime minister—held on an interim basis by Agathe Uwilingiyimana. The early 1990s also saw the growth of NGOs, including women’s organizations, which became increasingly vocal within the new civil society. With protests from women’s activist groups, students, and opposition parties, Habyarimana’s regime was increasingly threatened.

**Interpreting War and Genocide**

Rwanda’s history and the events leading up to the 1994 Rwandan genocide are complex. While I have attempted to provide an overview of the key events that led to the civil war and genocide in Rwanda in April 1994, such an exercise gives rise to a series of contentions around the interpretation of history. Since independence and most notably since the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990, an information war has ensued between the RPF, the Hutu extremists, and their respective international supporters—wherein each “side” has interpreted the history of conflict in Rwanda in ways that justify their own stance. René Lemarchand asserts that different interpretations of the formation of ethnicity and histories of mass violence in the Great Lakes region have produced “basic disagreements” that “are traceable in part to the uncritical use of the term genocide to describe just about any type of ethnic violence” (1998, 3). This issue is made further problematic when we consider the “forgotten” genocide of Burundian Hutu by Burundian Tutsi in 1972 (Lemarchand 1998, 5).

Social anthropologist Johan Pottier contends that Rwanda’s post-genocide government, through the help of Anglophone journalists and “naïve academics” (that is, academics who are “new” to the study of Rwanda), have manipulated the international community with “a simple, easy-to-grasp narrative” and “unproblematic representation” of both the genocide and events since 1994, in particular in relation to the Kibeho incident in 1996, where thousands of refugees—innocents and extremists—were massacred by the Rwandan government army (2002, 46). Yet Pottier’s own observations are not value-free: his analysis of the post-genocide information war makes no reference to the continued extremist propaganda (as evinced in Kangura) generated in Europe—in particular in France, Belgium and Holland—and within the Great Lakes region, as well as Kenya and Nigeria. Circulating lecture halls, scholarly work, novels, plays, films, and pamphlets, the struggle over the interpretation of genocide and war in Rwanda has hit the international arena and features
highly within the Anglophone-Francophone tussle over ideological “ownership” of post-colonial Africa (Chaffer 2002). Propagated by the many exiled extremists and their sympathizers, this material is intended to destabilize post-conflict Rwanda and to keep Hutu power alive. The struggle over interpretation has stepped up in recent years, with the publication of the French-commissioned Bruguiere Report in November 2006 which focused on the unanswered question of “who shot down President Habyriamana’s plane,” an event said to be the “trigger” of the genocide. The Rwandan Mucyo Commission report on the role of the French during the genocide has since followed but, at the time of writing this article, is yet to be published. Such reports seek to pinpoint who exactly is accountable for genocide.

Whatever the outcome of these investigations, it is clear is that there were deep-seated structural and social factors that led to the genocide (Uvin, 2001, 85). Nevertheless mainstream interpretations of Rwandan history tend to be gender blind. With the exception of Malkki’s excellent anthropological work on the construction of nationalist identity in Tanzanian refugee camps, Jefremovas’s survey of Rwandan business women within Rwandan society, and some important observations made by Christopher Taylor on the position of women within Rwandan urban society in the 1980s and 1990s, there is very little historical insight into the militarization of Rwandan women (Malkki 1995; Jefremovas 2002; Taylor 1999).

These multilayered information wars, which give rise to partial stories and accusations of twisted truths, make for a challenging time for any feminist international relations theorist attempting to undertake a gender-aware analysis of genocide and civil war in Rwanda: in the hope of revealing hidden inaccuracies, she or he may be stand accused of supporting a particular “side.” So while within this article I choose to focus specifically on Kangura’s militarized images of Rwandan women, I do not rule out the militarization of women by other actors. Indeed, in the four years prior to the genocide and in the months during the genocide, there were four key military institutions within which both men and women operated: the Hutu extremists supported by the Habyarimana regime; the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF); the UN peacekeeping force led by Romeo Dallaire; and the French troops who were first deployed in Rwanda to fight for Habyrimana’s government forces during the 1990 civil war, and again toward the close of the genocide to support hundreds of thousands of refugees (and retreating extremist government supporters) as they fled into Zaire. These military institutions adopted different ideological representations of women to help ascertain the type of “war” for which they were fighting. The RPF, for example, were dependent on recruiting Rwandan women refugees in Uganda to support the plight of returnees, but its antimonarchist, republican movement which took hold in the early 1990s can in part be attributed to the campaigning efforts of the women who published and disseminated a particular African-socialist literature. The multicultural Ghanaian, Canadian, Belgian, and Bangladeshi UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda—UNAMIR) also adopted specific ideologies that were in part born out of their own cultural readings of woman, albeit pinned together by what Enloe terms the “international” processes of militarization (Enloe 2000, 101). In addition to this, it is important to consider the media environment within which Kangura was produced. Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro, director of the Rwandan Information Office (ORINFOR) in Kigali from 31 July 1993 to 6 April 1994, observes that RTLM (Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines) and Kangura were not the only media to revise history and make truth claims about the events unfolding in Rwanda in the early 1990s. The print publications of the RPF and political
opposition parties “looked very similar in format and presentation....They watched each other closely and tried to emulate or outsmart each other” (Higiro 2007, 79). Such was the political climate at the time that examples of “dehumanization could be found in many of these papers” (Higiro 2007, 79). Yet, as the ICTR media trial confirmed in 2003, evidence showed that there was a clear link between extremist propaganda, such as RTLM and Kangura, and the actions of perpetrators of genocide (Temple-Raston, 2005).

Part Two: Kangura and the Militarization of a Pure Hutu Nation State

International relations theorist Cynthia Enloe defines militarism as an ideology with “distinctively militaristic core beliefs” that serve to justify war (2004, 219). Within a patriarchy, militarism privileges certain types of masculinity. Militarization, like globalization, is a “many-layered [socio-political] process of transformation” (Enloe 2007, 2). In her extremely thought-provoking polemic Manuevers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives, Enloe considers how American patriarchal military policies that inform men’s identities in wartime also inform the identities of women. Whether as wives, girlfriends, mothers, or prostitutes, women are conditioned to support war, privileging masculinity in the process. Women are supporters of war because their sons and husbands fight on the frontline or because, as prostitutes and mistresses, they are economically dependent on the military. For Enloe, the military uses its status to “define national security” and, in turn, social order. This “circular process” relies on “those gender definitions that ... bolster ideological militarism” where “racism and militarism become mutually supportive in such a national security state” (2000, 46). Since, as Enloe concedes, “[p]olicies about men are always made dependent on policies about women” and “[p]olicies about women are always built on policies about men,” (2000, 216), I first turn to look at how militarized masculinities were central to sustaining the pure Hutu nation-state before analyzing the militarization of Rwandan women in Kangura.

Militarising Rwandan Men and the Pure Hutu State

It was the pressure to democratize, the rise of multiparty politics and the Arusha Peace Accord (which pushed for power sharing between the MRNDD, RPF, and other political parties) that led Hutu extremists to develop strategies to reunite the Hutus. The obvious solution was to develop the image of ethnic war between civilian Hutus and the “alien” Tutsi. Focusing on the threat of an invasion by the Ugandan-based RPF, the MRNDD sought to provide evidence through extremist propaganda that all Tutsi were enemies of the state, including the Rwandan Tutsi who were portrayed as “the enemy within.” As Gaspard Karamero, the editor of the independent journal Imbago, observed in 1995, “despite the talk of ethnic politics, the point was to eliminate political opposition from whatever quarter it came” (African Rights 1995, 30).

To sustain this public image of ethnic war, these extremists militarized individual Hutus, preparing them for “war,” while at the same time upholding the ideal of a free, democratic subject. MRNDD (Interahamwe) rallies were loud celebrations, with dancing, whistle-blowing, and singing. Hutu citizens were encouraged to learn songs that confused
messages about democracy and freedom with those about war and, more subtly, genocide. At one such demonstration, a large group of MRNDD men and women were filmed chanting: “Nothing scares us, we create terror.... We are not attacked, we attack. Nothing can crush us, we are the ones who crush. Whenever required, we beat all our enemies. On the battlefield, we are the greatest. We are the Interahamwe movement that loves Peace, Unity and Development. We are ready! Our motto: We don’t attack. We liberate” (Kabera 2004).

With the backing of the president, members of the Interahamwe and the extremist party CDR organized militia groups and the government army forces developed training camps to target unemployed Hutu youths (United Nations 1999, 5). As extremist confidence grew, so too did the public exhibitionism of guns and weaponry (Melvern 2006, 81). A key extremist leader, Colonel Théoneste Bagasora, who was instrumental in drawing up and implementing the genocide plan, demonstrated in his public rallies that the action of civilians carrying and using weapons was “ordinary” and even natural. During one oration a Rwandan journalist filmed him displaying his gun as he addressed a crowd of eager listeners. “The gun,” he stated, “no longer belongs only to the soldier. When you see one, do not be afraid. It can not go off by itself. The gun needs to stop only being for the military. Everybody has a right to own one. So that when they come for you, you can shoot back. I always have one with me. Here it is ... here it is” (Bagasora in Kabera 2004). In this major move to transform Hutu consciousness, extremist propaganda infiltrated society at all levels, including community and civil society meetings and the media. One of twenty extremist journals, Kangura was established in 1990 with the support of the threatened dictatorial regime led by President Habyarimana. It took an interactive approach, encouraging Hutus to write to the magazine with comments and suggestions, devising questionnaires for Hutus to complete and return, and writing letters to the president. Rather like Britain’s Private Eye, Kangura was a monthly running commentary on party politics, and cartoons were one satirical device among many to poke fun at opposition politicians. Kangura was published in Kiryarwanda and French and disseminated throughout the Great Lakes region, most notably in Burundi and Kenya. Kangura’s satirical genre was new to Rwandans and appealed to people in rural communities and cities alike. In a country of high illiteracy, particularly among women, cartoons became vital means of communicating political ideas.

**Extremist Media: Simulating “Ethnic War”**

*Kangura* was quick to play on stereotyped images in its attempt to redefine Hutu consciousness. In “The Fear of the Bahutu,” written by Ndekezi Bonaparte-Gisuma and published in December 1990, Hutus are described as “naturally fearful, maladroit, indecisive, naïve, with a characteristic inferiority complex” (*Kangura* 1990 no. 5, 1). In another early article targeting “All the Hutu of the World!” *Kangura* calls for Hutus to “rediscover their ethnicity” in the face of a Tutsi determination to keep them down. The magazine then makes a distinction between the “artificial nation state” and “natural” ethnicity in an attempt to make the broad-based transitional government (BBTG) unpopular (*Kangura* 1990 no. 4, 19). The modern, postcolonial nation-state constructed under the Arusha Accords is first interpreted as a Tutsi plot to keep the Hutus in line (through an artificial democracy), then rendered fragile in opposition to a natural precolonial Hutu ethnicity. Having fragmented the postcolonial nation state, Kangura proceeds to construct in its articles a pure Hutu nation-state. We have briefly considered the masculinized ways in which *Kangura* militarized the Hutu
Part Three: Feminists Theorizing International Relations and Rwanda

Despite Cynthia Enloe’s early call for a feminist investigation of Rwanda, many feminist international relations theorists have failed to distinguish between civil war and genocide in that country (Tickner 2001; Byrne 1995; El Jack 2003; Goldstein 2001; Enloe 2004). This is largely because Rwanda appears as one example among many in the overarching story of women and war in feminist international relations theory. In 1995 Enloe began to unpack the militarizing processes that defined Hutu masculinities before the conflict, stating that “increasing numbers of Hutu women thereby became intensely woven into the state’s ethnicized system as mothers and wives of regular soldiers” (26). Within her framework of understanding Rwanda as “ethnic conflict,” Enloe touches on RPF refugee mothers’ patriotic responsibilities for “keeping alive, among the next generation, thoughts of a far away home” (26). Either way, in both camps, “recruiting young men often requires militia organizers to persuade the mothers of potential recruits” (27). Later, in Maneuvers, Enloe spends some time discussing rape and the militarization of Rwandan women during what she terms the 1994 “civil war” (2000, 137). In an analysis that unintentionally describes the Hutu extremist *image* of a “threat of invasion and ethnic war,” Enloe suggests that as a weapon of war, rape occurs “in the name of national security,” when a “regime is preoccupied with national security,” when “a majority of civilians believe that security is best understood as a military problem,” when “the police and military security apparatuses are male-dominated,” when “the definitions of honour, loyalty, and treason are derived from the institutional cultures of the police and the military,” when “those prevailing institutional cultures are misogynous” and, finally, when “some local women are well enough organized in opposition to regime policies to become publicly visible” (124).

Enloe’s recognition that “systematic rape” is “administered rape” and that “militarized rape” is a public act under the gaze of spectators is extremely important. Yet her discussion of rape in Rwanda is inaccurate because it does not consider the difference of intent between rape as a weapon of war and rape as a weapon to annihilate. There is a distinction between the rape committed by the extremist-led *genocidaires* during the genocide and rape in the civil war which was occurring in the north of Rwanda at the same time. Following the genocide there were some revenge rapes but these were not prolific and the RPF did not endorse the policy—whereas the *genocidaires* did. In reading the Rwandan genocide through the lens of “civil war,” Enloe cannot unpack the very militarizing processes she argues should be unpacked. Enloe dismisses key tactics which the Hutu extremists employed to incite systematic rape—the image of a threat of ethnic war, the image of a threat to national security, the image of the loyal, militarized Hutu civilian, the image of the “alien” Tutsi woman. Rather she confuses these tactics with the factors that actually *enabled* Hutu extremists to incite mass rape: a militarized culture, patriarchy, misogyny, and, finally, the political mobilization of Rwandan women.

Where scholars have undertaken more detailed studies of the gendered impact of conflict in Rwanda, they have often continued this trend of ignoring Rwanda’s genocide, seem-
ingly now entrenched in feminist theorizing of international relations. One example is the
volume edited by Meredith Turshen and Clodilde Twa- 
giriamariya, entitled *What Women Do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa* (1998). While they are right to assert that there
exist in Africa new forms of war that differ from the conventional Clausewitzean model of
interstate war, Turshen and Twagiramariya appear to imply that these “new forms of war”
are simply variations of “civil wars and wars of liberation” (2). Consequently, their read-
ing of Rwanda in the years leading up to 1994 is, to an extent, lacking in nuance: conflict
in Rwanda occurred because of Rwanda’s “weak state” status (that is, its politically weak
and ineffectual governance arrangements). It is perhaps surprising that Turshen and Twa-
giriamariya, despite recognizing that states deliberately become more militarized to retain
power, do not allude to Rwanda’s genocide. In their chapter on rape in Rwanda they depict
a simple history of the country, focusing on the 1959 Revolution, but arguing that the upris-
ing occurred against colonials, not elite Tutsis and monarchists, before confusing the geno-
cide with civil war. They write: “All Rwandans without exception suffered and are still
suffering from the atrocities of the civil war that started in October 1990 when the Rwand-
an Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded from Uganda.... A group of extremists in the country
turned the power struggle between the government, its opposition, and the RPF, which was
on the verge of resolution following the signing of the Arusha Accords in 1993, into a vicious
and bloody ethnic war” (103). That all Rwandan women (particularly those from mixed mar-
rriages) suffer from the different types of mass violence to have occurred in Rwanda since
1990 is at the core of their polemic. Arguing that “Hutus” are not the only perpetrators of
rape, Turshen and Twagiramariya outline the mass rape committed by the RPF since June
1994, suggesting that some Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) soldiers raped Hutu women “in
a never-ending cycle of revenge” (103). In this “civil war” (but not planned extermination
of civilians, including those politically active or extremist-opposing Hutu) “levels of dis-
trust were very high,” they state, and so the “war brought out the worst in people and a
sense of neighbourliness was lost” (9).

Turshen and Twagiramariya’s refusal to acknowledge genocide means that their work
presents only a partial reading of the conflict in Rwanda. First, by writing within the frame-
work of civil and ethnic war, Turshen and Twagiramariya reinforce the Hutu extremist
propaganda of the “threat of ethnic war.” Second, there is no distinction between different
types of rape, including the extremist militarized policy of genocidal rape—a policy sup-
ported and at times perpetrated by women. So while they are right to criticize the simplis-
tic “rendering of ‘evil Hutu’ versus ‘good Tutsi,’” and to emphasize that *all* Rwandan women
have suffered and continue to suffer in one way or another, they suggest that rape is a crime
committed only by men and that, as a male preserve, women’s role in rape is only that of
the “victim.” For Turshen and Twagiramariya this has implications for Hutu women fol-
lowing the genocide, who are today categorized as “guilty” and “made to pay for what Hutu
men have done” (4). It would be fair to say that the majority of Hutu women were not impli-
cated in rape and indeed there are many Hutu women who suffered gender-based violence
in spite of their citizenship rights as Hutu.6 However, in understanding sexual violence
against women in genocide, it is also essential to comprehend the role of women within the
communities that are committing sexual violence, including rape.

Let us consider women’s supporter and spectator roles during genocidal rape. In her
paper “The Political Economy of Rape” published in 2001, Turshen presents a more involved
gender-aware analysis to propose a new thesis: that “systematic rape and sexual abuse are

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among the strategies men use to wrest personal assets from women.” If women “owned property” then militias would claim them as their wives “to legitimate the seizure of land” (Turshen 2001, 63). Here Turshen describes mass violence in April–June 1994 as “genocide”—although no space is afforded to describe what genocide (or gendercide) means. Turshen makes no reference to the role of women in perpetrating and endorsing sexual violence in order to seize property and belongings, despite the countless reports of women robbing dead women or condoning bogus marriage (see Human Rights Watch 1996; African Rights 1995). We have seen how, within feminist theorizing of international relations, genocide and genocidal rape in Rwanda are depicted in the context of civil war. I now look specifically at how Rwandan women were militarized within the pages of Kangura to demonstrate the nuanced ways in which Rwandan women were militarized in genocide—not just as victims but as perpetrators. I argue that greater attention should be paid to the way in which Rwandan women were politically mobilized.

Part Four: Citizen versus Partial- and Non-citizen Rwandan Women in Kangura

In this final part of the paper I examine how Kangura imaged Rwandan women not just according to their ethnicity but by their citizenship status. I define three groups: non-citizen Rwandan women, full-citizen Rwandan women, and partial-citizen Rwandan women, each of which was militarized in specific ways.

Non-Citizen Rwandan Women

Imaged as stereotyped Tutsi women, “non-citizen” Rwandan women were enemies of the state and secret accomplices in ethnic war. In December 1990 Kangura published the Hutu Ten Commandments, four of which concerned Rwandan women. One stated that all Tutsi women worked “only for the interest of [their] Tutsi ethnic group” and all Hutus were ordered to be distrustful not only of Tutsi women but also of Hutu men who had relations with them. Another called for the Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) to be “exclusively Hutu” following the RPF invasion of 1990 (Kangura in Human Rights Watch 1996, 11). Two commandments specifically referred to Hutu women. I suggest that these commandments lead to a direct comparison between Hutu and Tutsi women, first by claiming that Hutu women were more loyal and better wives and mothers; then, through manipulating the colonial obsession with stereotyped physical appearances, by crushing the ego of the supposedly less attractive—that is, less sexually desirable—Hutu woman. Instead Hutu women are called upon to be “vigilant and try to bring [their] husbands, brothers and sons back to reason” in the face of deceitful, seductive Tutsi women (Kangura in Human Rights Watch 1996, 11).

In Kangura these Tutsi women spies and accomplices are presented as sexualized military operators. In issue 35 of the magazine, which appeared in May 1992, an article entitled “The Dresses of Beauties Smell for the Hutus” is accompanied by a cartoon wherein a beautiful woman, who appears to fit the colonial stereotype of the tall, slender Tutsi woman, wears a strapless, floral-print mini-dress, large hoop earrings, and bangles. She is in an erotic pose, her left hand lifting up the corner of her dress to reveal more thigh to the stereo-
typically shorter, thicker-set Hutu man standing beside her. Loyal to the Hutu Ten Commandments and thus loyal to the pure Hutu state, he covers his nose with one hand, keeping the other in his pocket. Kangura’s intimation that this Tutsi woman smells posits her as hypersexual prostitute. Yet thinking out loud, she appears more concerned that her true identity has been uncovered: “They have known our plot. I think the war can stop now for our mission has failed” (Kangura 1992 no. 35, 9). This image operates on many levels. First, it confirms the extremist Hutu theory that Tutsi women “work only in the interest of their ethnic group.” Second, it confirms that Rwanda is threatened by a Tutsi-led ethnic war. Third, it provides a reason for Hutu women to condemn sexually attractive Tutsi women, who may themselves be angered at the artist’s depiction of the colonial stereotype.

At a more intrinsic level the cartoon aims to show how Tutsi women, in using their beauty and taking advantage of Hutu men’s supposed weakness, infiltrate the Rwandan state. Having represented the Tutsi woman’s sexualized body as a weapon of war, Kangura proceeds to depict the enemy’s plot as a preordained failure, thus raising the morale of militarized Hutu men and women. In February 1994, just before the genocide began, the stereotyped Tutsi woman is again portrayed as a hypersexual prostitute in cahoots with both the RPF and United Nations (though this time in a way that makes fun of the UN’s own militarization of women). UN force commander Gen. Roméo Dallaire sits with his arms around two RPF women. Both have their hands on his knee and one is kissing his forehead. Both women are wearing miniskirts, jewelry, and lacy bras. The woman to Dallaire’s right has “I [heart] RPF” tattooed on her arm. A UN peacekeeper stands guard to the left, his gun poised. The caption reads: “Tutsi women: responsible for rallying Whites to the RPF” (Kangura 1994, 15). Representation of the stereotyped Tutsi woman prostitute and a public ridiculing of the UN peace force occurs again in the Hutu extremist journal Power in December 1993. This time a graphic sex scene depicts an orgy between two Tutsi women and three UN peacekeepers. Demilitarizing the UN, positing the international institution solely within a simulated private sphere, the caption simply states: “The Force of Sex and the Belgian Paras” (Power in Chrétien 1995). Here it should be pointed out that the actions of the Belgian paratroopers did not help to dispel rumors about their liaisons with Rwandan women. In January 1994 they had been spotted “running after women and causing fights in local bars and discos” (Dallaire 2003, 163).

Full-Citizen Rwandan Women

The silent majority in most analyses of extremist propaganda, militarized Hutu women loyal to Hutu power, were imaged as full citizens. In the four years leading up to the genocide Kangura was quick to present Hutu women who conformed to the genocide ideology and ideal of the pure Hutu state as equal, democratic citizens. In an early article published in 1992, there is a portrait photograph of a stereotypically beautiful Hutu woman (she personifies the physical image of a “good,” upper-class Hutu woman). Underneath the image reads a statement by Mukarkibibi Zayinabo, allegedly made in June 1989: “In these times we are in, a Rwandan woman should never be denied her rights. Men must know that there is nothing he has that is better than a woman. All of us, we have equal rights in front of the law and democracy belongs to us all” (Kangura 1992, back cover).

It should be noted that Kangura’s representation of both Hutu and Tutsi women depended on their increased visibility within Rwanda’s political sphere. Women represented
a large percentage of the population that had recently been politically mobilized with the opening up to democracy and the growth of the civil society. From the late 1980s to 1994, thirteen women’s groups and NGOs were operating under the umbrella organization PROFEMMES. Members would travel the country educating women and lobbying the government on women’s rights, including land and inheritance rights (which women did not have at this time). But the extremist network operated to quash these movements. In 1993 the MRNDD created its own women’s group with the intent to dispel opposition women’s lobbyist groups (Nyiiramatama 2006). So while women were actively pushing to be visible in their own terms within the public sphere, Kangura rendered their bodies visible only in specific gendered terms that sustained the patriarchal dictatorship. Hutu women, then, were militarized, not just as mothers, wives and daughters, but as political subjects. In Kangura these women often appear next to men in images of political rallying (Kangura 1993 no. 44, 73) or in local, community-based public protest (Kangura 1992, 35 and 1993 no. 44, 17). They are imaged as ordinary, non-militarized citizens confounded by the antics of the opposition parties and advocates of the Arusha Accords peace process (Kangura, 1993 no. 49, 15).

Full-citizen Rwandan women were also depicted as victims of war. In a cartoon published in October 1991, the founder of Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) and key architect of the genocide Ferdinand Nahimana stands tall, holding the radio station above his head. Behind him, crowds of men, women, and children are grouped together but appear half the size of Nahimana himself—indicating the strength and importance of Nahimana, as well as RTLM. The caption states that Nahimana founded a radio station in a community where people had been killed (Kangura 1991 no. 23, 14). Since genocide mobilizes an entire population to annihilate an ethnic group or groups, the war which the extremists tried to depict was not Clausewitzean by convention: there was no front line, no home front, and no interstate battle. Rather the extremists depicted the threat of war with the RPF as the type of conflict which has since been termed new war—based on the RPF movement to “mobilize around ethnic [or] racial identity for the purpose of claiming the state” and a deliberate blurring of the public and private spheres (Kaldor 2001, 76). Perhaps one of the most graphic and shockingly violent images to be published appeared in a parallel journal Kamarampaka on 7 April 1993. Its intent to blur the boundaries between the “home front” and the “front line” is clear. In the cartoon, the RPF (identified by their arm bands) have pillaged a Rwandan village (a hut is on fire in the distance). A member of the MRNDD is stripped to his underwear and tied to a tree. Beside him lies the dismembered trunk of a Hutu man. Two naked women are on the ground to the left of the tree. The woman who belongs to the Hutu Mouvément Démocratique Républicain is tied up, her hands behind her back, a stake wedged through her chest. The second woman is a member of the extremist Hutu party, the CDR. Her hands are being held up by an RPF soldier while his comrade rapes her. Underneath, the caption reads: “Blood and sex: the horrors of war attributed to the RPF” (Kamarampaka in Chrétian 1995, 364).

This simulation of rape, which demonized all Tutsi men, including civilian Tutsi men, is also evident in the extremist-led government army’s military strategies as a means to instill fear of rape among the Hutu community. In November 1993, the United Nations heard that thirty-five people had been massacred in the Rhugenheri region, in five locations concurrently. The UN officer, Maj. Brent Beardsley, who was dispatched to survey one of the massacre sites, noted that children had been murdered and that all the girls had been raped.
Despite inconclusive evidence, the United Nations believed that the massacre had been staged by the Rwandan government forces. As Beardsley recalls in the 2001 Canadian documentary *Rwanda: The Genocide Fax*:

> Very conveniently there was an RPF glove left [lying] on the ground. The RPF—I never saw them wear any gloves and if they did wear gloves, why would they leave it [lying] on the ground? In addition, the government commanders who [were] waiting for us at the bottom of the hill [each wore] a red sash cord, a red rope; [all had these] around their waists, tied, and they [each carried] a very large knife with a big hilt on it. And it appeared to me more when I looked at these children’s necks [that these cords] had been used to strangle them and [that] commandos went through extensive training on how to kill people silently with them [Clarke 2001].

**Women Genocidaires**

While *Kangura* militarized women conversely as civilians and victims of war, in reality many of these politically engaged “free and democratic” women were militarized spectators and supporters of genocide and genocidal rape. In a special report on Rwanda’s women killers, the BBC’s *Newsnight* interviewed a man who witnessed two women in Kigali—Odette and Mama Aline—using a stick to rape a woman on the side of the road, in broad daylight (Hilsum 1995). And there are plenty of other examples of politically corrupt women who took advantage of the personal gains afforded to them as perpetrators of genocide. The only woman to be tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the minister of women and family affairs at the time of the genocide, is one of the most famous examples. Witnesses claim that despite her remit to consider the welfare of all Rwandan women, Nyiramasuhuko played an important role in preparing for genocide in the Butare region of southern Rwanda. Zaina Nyiramatama, founder of the Association for the Defense of Women and Children’s Rights (HAGURUKA), was in Rwanda until January 1994. Nyiramatama suggests that Pauline Nyiramasuhuko did not have “gender politics,” rather a “very patriarchal way of thinking ... she was not fighting to get anything out of the government because she was part of the system” (Nyiramatama 2006).

Nyiramasuhuko stands accused of planning systematic rape and imprisoning women and girls. One witness recounted to African Rights that “the daughters of Buhira, a Tutsi businessman from Butare, were kept at her house for [her son] Chalômoe to rape (African Rights 1995, 92). In the same *Newsnight* special on women killers, British journalist Lindsey Hilsum spoke with Pauline Nyiramasuhuko after she had fled to the refugee camp in Zaire. Despite her high profile role during the genocide, Nyiramasuhuko continued to play on the stereotype of the respectable, caring woman. Here, we also see evidence of Nyiramasuhuko manipulating “international community” perceptions of women in conflict. It is worth citing the interview at some length:

> Hilsum: She was working in the social services section, drawing up plans to look after orphans and abandoned children. She said in April and May last year [1994], she’d organized what she called pacification meetings. Her accusers, she says, are targeting all educated Hutus. The former minister only agreed to be interviewed with her back to the camera, as she put it, “for security reasons.” I asked her to respond to the allegations that she had killed.

> Nyiramasuhuko (translated from Kinyarwanda): I’m ready to talk to the person who said I could have killed. It’s not possible. I couldn’t even kill a chicken.... I don’t know. If there is a person who says a woman, a mother could have killed, I’ll tell you truly then I am ready to confront that person [Hilsum 1995].
Partial-Citizen Rwandan Women

By “partial-citizen” Rwandan women, I am referring to the Hutu women who were citizens by ethnic rights but could not be fully accepted into the pure Hutu state as a result of their own political actions. These women attempted to exercise their true democratic rights by campaigning for equality for women. Many of them opposed Hutu extremism and firmly believed the Arusha Accords would lead to an end to ethnic divisionism. It goes without saying that these politically moderate Hutu (and Tutsi) women posed a major threat to the dictatorship and no one embodied this threat more than the then–prime minister of the interim government, Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana. Since Kangura was primarily a tool to ridicule opposition parties as much as it was a tool to distill genocide propaganda, the magazine’s foremost attack on Uwilingiyimana centered on the fact that she was a woman.

After she was appointed minister for education by Habyarimana in 1992, Uwilingiyimana fought to end the quota system in schools which had sustained a Hutu majority. She was an active member of the women’s civil society movement across Africa and was a founder of Rwanda’s Seruka (“Show Me”) which aimed to include women in the country’s development and played an enormous role in the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE). Described in Kinywanda as an ingare (rebel), Uwilingiyimana used her political influence and determination to “combat ethnic and sexual discrimination” (FAWE 2000, 4). She believed that “true democracy” would include the liberation of women and girls from poverty and forced labor. A Hutu of the South, Uwilingiyimana would frequently speak out against the president’s policies and often came under fire from Hutu extremist politicians and the Interahamwe. Melvern observes that on 8 May 1993 Uwilingiyimana was fiercely attacked in her home by militia, a violent act that resulted in a very public protest by her supporters, including a march led by some 3,000 women (Melvern 2006, 46). On 12 March 1994, Uwilingiyimana was appointed to the post of interim prime minister by President Habyarimana, although she only held this office for thirty-seven days. As Melvern states, it is believed that Habyarimana “thought she could be easily manipulated,” although he discovered very quickly that this was not the case. The second woman to become a prime minister in Africa, Uwilingiyimana remained defiant and on a number of occasions highlighted the dangers of supplying weapons to the population (Melvern 2000, 104). Uwilingiyimana is said to have spoken out against ethnic business and identity cards at one protest march led by women’s organizations in 1993. In an interview with the author of this article, Zaina Nyiramatama recalled Uwilingiyimana saying: “We shouldn’t value ourselves according to our ethnic group, but rather what we are able to do to build our country” (Nyiramatama 2006).

In analyzing the images of Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana in Kangura, one can trace her transgression from full citizen to partial citizen and then to noncitizen, and it is significant that the number of published cartoons depicting Uwilingiyimana picked up pace in the final months before the genocide. Kangura took a male chauvinist and sexist approach to Uwilingiyimana to “reveal” that she used her body to further her political career and to expose her inappropriate gendered politics. She first appeared on the front page in May 1992, naked and perched on a pile of books, a sign that Kangura had little respect for Uwilingiyimana in her role as minister of education. Later Kangura focused on her sexuality and made claims that she was having an affair with Faustin Twagiramungu, a fellow moderate Hutu politician, president of the MDR (Mouvement démocratique républicain) and a mem-
ber of the interim government. Frequently depicted in bed with Twagiramungu, her political discussion is reduced to domestic post-intercourse chat, suggesting that the interim government ruled Rwanda from a very private sphere in contrast to Habyarimana’s public, and thus democratic, sphere.

In January 1994, Kangura likened Uwilingiyimana to the stereotyped Tutsi prostitutes—the noncitizens. She appeared on the front page of issue 55 naked in bed, wearing earrings and sporting a short haircut reminiscent of the prostitutes in the previous month’s portrayal of UN peacekeepers’ liaisons with women by Power. Sitting on the edge of the bed looking sexually aroused, Twagiramungu asks Uwilingiyimana, “Baby, why are you crying?” (Kangura 1994 no. 55, 4). In a ploy to destabilize the peace process, Kangura depicts Uwilingiyimana as a self-interested woman who cares little for democracy and the needs of the Rwandan people. Uwilingiyimana responds by reminding Twagiramungu that he must make her “the Prime Minister in the Transition Government.” In a second bedroom scene, published in March 1994, Uwilingiyimana and Twagiramungu discuss the need to send her husband abroad on an assignment so that they can spend more time with each other (Kangura 1994 no. 57, 5). In another move to further derail Uwilingiyimana’s political credibility, Kangura depicts her as pregnant, a claim that the journal portends to be against the will of God. In March 1994 a religious figure separates a crying, naked, and heavily pregnant Uwilingiyimana from a naked Twagiramungu, while shouting “I curse you, sinners!” (Kangura 1994 no. 58, 12).

In May 1993 military strategy and media voyeurism converged when Kangura, in response to the public outcry, published a cartoon depicting the moment when Uwilingiyimana was attacked in her home. Uwilingiyimana is pictured lying half-naked on the floor, staring out toward the reader in yet another provocative pose. Five men (journalists) appear to have just burst in through the doors. Uwilingiyimana says, “Forgive me, I will give you everything that you need.” The cartoon is accompanied by an article in which Kangura addresses Uwilingiyimana directly with a series of questions aimed at discrediting her claim to have been attacked. In depicting her as a “mother” and exposing her supposed “lying about her leg,” Kangura bolsters its own media credibility by imaging itself as loyal to the government: “Because of the respect media journalists have to give politicians, they packed their machines and announced to the country that the Prime Minister was beaten badly by thieves.” Once more the focus is on Uwilingiyimana’s gender. When criticizing Uwilingiyimana for standing up to President Habyarimana’s extremist policies, Kangura argues that she is “known for abusing and disrespecting the President,” claiming that her “stubbornness” is (as expressed in Kinyarwanda) the trait of a woman who is “either crazy or brings a curse.” In this article, she is “shaming” her parents and makes a mockery of her husband, whom Kangura portrays as weak in the face of her strength:

“Where was your husband when you were having this misfortune? Doesn’t a man have a word in his own home, if it’s really his?” (Kangura 1993 no. 15, 4). Criticizing Uwilingiyimana’s silence on the questions they pose, Kangura demands “explanations” or they will have to rebuild the reputation of the (extremist) “national forces” that they accuse Uwilingiyimana of destroying when she “said they refused to come and rescue [her]” (Kangura, 1993 no. 15, 4).

Continually imaged in the very private sphere of the home or bedroom, stripped naked, exposed, and likened to the hypersexual Tutsi women and “prostitutes,” Uwilingiyimana is militarized by Kangura as the accomplice to the enemy within. Yet women enemies and their...
accomplices are presented by the magazine as highly feminized, domestic and lacking in military clout. Just as the body of the Tutsi woman is imaged as a weapon of war, so too is Uwilingiyimana’s, only this time for selfish political gain that contravenes Hutu extremist definitions of democracy and gender equality. In the penultimate issue of Kangura, the extent to which Uwilingiyimana is perceived as a “non-citizen” is clear when she is imaged as a rat that is eating money—a Hutu man is depicted as being on the verge of killing her and Twagiramungu (also imaged as a rat) with a club (Kangura 1994 no. 56, 6). In the same edition, Uwilingiyimana and Twagiramungu are portrayed as dancing chickens (Kangura 1994 no. 56, 3). These depictions are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda about Jews and other ethnic minorities.

Agathe Uwilingiyimana was one of the first politicians to be assassinated on 7 April 1994. She was shot by presidential guards in the early hours of the morning (Melvern 2006, 162–63). At the time, the prime minister’s murder was underreported in the British press, appearing instead as an appendage to the deaths that day of the ten Belgian peacekeepers who had been assigned to protect her. In spite of Kangura’s attempts to slander her, Uwilingiyimana’s strength, courage, and defiance in the face of extremist politicians remains something quite remarkable. In what is possibly the last interview she gave to an international journalist—with Francois Ryckmans in Kigali on 15 March 1994—Uwilingiyimana, in exercising her true democratic rights, observed the “confusion” the extremists were deliberately creating in playing “the ethnic card.” She argued that there was “bad will and irresponsibility on the behalf of some people,” that Habyarimana was “trying to control the political parties,” and that ultimately ordinary Rwandans were suffering: “Almost every day, people are dying, assassinated. The poor peasants, as usual, are not responsible for the political situation. There’s starvation all over the country. People die of hunger everyday, dysentery and malaria. We haven’t got the institutions capable of negotiating with our funders” (Uwilingiyimana 1994).

**Conclusion**

In this article I have argued that feminist international relations theory often presents confused readings of Tutsi women as victims of a blurred civil war and genocide that renders other Rwandan women invisible. I have attempted to reveal the ways in which extremist magazine Kangura militarized Rwandan women as political subjects and in doing so have distinguished the ways in which women were militarized differently as noncitizens, full citizens, and partial citizens. This distinction exposes the disparity between the images of full citizens (who did not speak out or otherwise oppose the Hutu nation state) and partial citizens—Hutu and Tutsi women who, in fighting for women’s equality, were fighting for true democracy. In exposing this political militarization I hope to further our understanding of the militarized roles of women in genocide as well as genocidal rape.

In this article I have also considered the information war that continues to circulate internationally in any recounting of conflict in Rwanda and, in light of this ideological struggle, have suggested that feminists theorizing international relations should be more cautious of the impact of negating the Rwandan genocide—and the complex, gendered power relations that led to genocide—as they embed “Rwanda” in the overarching international story of “women and war.” In producing partial readings of conflict in Rwanda, many
feminist international relations readings obscure some of the complexities that women currently face in post-genocide Rwanda since blanket coverage of “Rwandan women as victims” masks the challenged relationships between women—as well as between men and women—within Rwandan communities today. Indeed, more work needs to be done to examine the militarization of refugees, returnees, and survivors, as well as post-genocide Rwandan society more generally, where security remains tight and where the community-based legal process, Gacaca, may perpetuate masculinized and militarized readings of conflict in Rwanda. I do not in any way wish to render all Hutu people as extremist: there are many cases in which Hutu men and women protected fellow Tutsi and Hutu men and women. Above all this article does not reflect the enormous amount of work that women in Rwanda have done—and are continuing to do—in rebuilding their lives, and their country.

Notes

2. See Martin Shaw (2003) on war and genocide operating on a continuum, and Paul Bartrop (2002) for the argument that genocide does not always occur in the context of war.
3. Newbury (1988) states that there were high levels of migration into Rwanda as people sought to escape famine, disease, and war in other Sub-Saharan regions.
4. For a comprehensive discussion on the politicization of “civilian” and “alien” identities in Rwanda, see Mamdani 2001.
5. For a detailed account of extremist attempts to change Hutu consciousness, see Mamdani 2001.
6. Umutesi (2000) reveals the sexual insecurities that Hutu women fleeing Rwanda endured, particularly if they were mistaken as Tutsi.
8. A photograph taken of Uwilingimana at the time shows that one of her legs had been wounded in the attack (Chrétien, 1995).

References


Nationalism, Gender and (In)Securities in Postcolonial Indian Politics

A Feminist Critical-Constructivist Analysis

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Abstract: This article uses some of the shared premises of feminist readings of gender and nationalism and critical-constructivist analysis of identity and (in)security to render problematic the constructions of gender, nationalism, and nuclear (in)securities in Indian politics. It explores how India’s postcolonial nationalist identity has incorporated gender with continuities and discontinuities to construct divergent forms of statist identities, cartographic anxieties, and nuclear (in)securities. The article demonstrates that the contours of nation-building in postcolonial India have represented a shift from a political to a cultural reconstruction of nationalist identities, thereby also shifting (and producing more complex) representations of gender identities and (in)securities to justify the nation’s security policies.

Keywords: feminism; gender; nationalism; India; constructivism; identity; security; international relations; postcolonial politics

“Nationalist ideologies rely on constructions of masculinity and femininity to naturalize power struggles over who gets to define what the nation stands for. Nations are thus not just systems of cultural [or political] representation[s], but also constitutive of people’s identities through social contests that are frequently violent and always gendered.”—Anne McClintock, “No Longer in a Future Heaven”

Introduction

Religion, nationalism, and politics are intimately intertwined and historical processes of state formation, whether secular or communal, have used women as signifiers to delineate their

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nationalist identities. While feminist analysis has made significant contributions in this area of study, such analysis appears limited, particularly when connecting gender issues with South Asia’s recent resurgence of cultural nationalism and nuclear (in)securities in a critical-constructivist analysis of (in)security. In this context, as Ranchod-Nilsson and Tetreault (2000, 7) claim, “the chameleon quality of nationalism means that it can be couched in multiple and ... competing organizational forms,” requiring theoretically and conceptually newer forms of analysis to review the relation between gender, nationalism, and politics. I find this observation quite compelling when applied in the context of India’s nationalist and communalist identity since it enables me as a feminist scholar of international relations (IR) engaged in security studies to problematize certain contested rearticulations of Indian nationalism, gender identity, and nuclear (in)securities.

In initiating this line of analysis, it is important to note that not all feminist scholars of international relations engage in security studies. Likewise, not all constructivist scholars in IR are feminists. In fact, as Locher and Prugl (2001) have pointed out, there remains a reluctance on the part of both feminists and constructivists, despite their similar intersubjective ontological bases, to engage with one another to provide a more gendered and constructivist reading of everyday reality. While it is not my purpose in this paper to offer a theoretical reformulation of feminism, I consider it of significant merit as a feminist scholar of IR to provide a feminist rereading of nation, gender, and (in)securities by situating this in terms of the critical constructivists’ premise of the cultural construction of identities and (in)securities (Weldes et al. 1999).

In the pages that follow, I highlight the woman question in Indian politics by exploring how the processes of India’s nation-making, whether secular or communal, have relied on gendered discourses and symbolism to remap the nation, its nationalism, and (in)securities. In doing so, I use some of the shared premises of the feminist readings of nationalism and gender(ed) identities and the critical constructivists’ analysis of (in)security to explore how India’s postcolonial nationalist identity (that has been contested between political-territorial and a cultural nationalism) has incorporated gender with continuities and discontinuities to construct divergent forms of statist identities, cartographic anxieties, and nuclear (in)securities. In initiating this line of analysis, I begin with the assumption that the central attribute of nation formation in international politics requires the mapping of a sovereign territorial space, or a geopolitical vision, which accompanies certain cartographic anxieties reflective of a nation’s boundary-making exercises (Krishna 1996). Accordingly, postcolonial nations, including India, have tried to configure their geopolitical visions by consolidating their territories, investing them with national sovereignty, and securing them from others, often by taking recourse to complex gender representations. Thus representations of gender in the task of nation making are nothing new and have even been evidenced and documented by scholars in Indian politics. Starting from this premise, I explore the ways in which the nature of representing the Indian nation, its women, and (in)securities has changed from a geopolitical to a cultural and communal perspective with the rise of the recent Hindu-Right BJP government in India, which is guided by the Hindutva ideology. This represents a shift from a political to a cultural reconstruction of identities and (in)securities necessitating a constructivist reading of the nation, gender, and (in)securities. Although it is rooted in local and cultural contexts, my work also incorporates an interdisciplinary engagement which connects feminist literature on gender and nationalism to constructivist discourses and practices of international relations and security studies.
In this study, I use a critical discourse analysis to explore the constructivist links between Indian nationalism, gender, and (in)securities. The term “critical discourse analysis” refers to the study of the organization of language and its implications (beyond words written or spoken) as may be evidenced through written texts or conversational exchanges (Stubbs 1983). As an interpretive or intersubjective framework of inquiry, critical discourse analysis asks questions about the ways in which specific discourse structures (such as power and ideological hegemony) may produce and legitimize social, political, and cultural dominance, and how such discourse (whether a part of a conversation, news report, public demonstration, or other forms of communication) will help in the production of common-sense knowledge (Van Dijk 1999).

The data for this paper comes from primary sources such as Indian parliamentary debates, election manifestos, journals, newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets produced by the Congress Party and the BJP, as well as speeches by Congress and BJP politicians. These sources were supplemented by semi-structured, open-ended interviews with male and female politicians and activists of the Congress and BJP which I conducted in New Delhi between 1998 and 2004, together with interviews conducted in 2007–2008 pertaining to the post–BJP years. Using a critical discursive approach to the contents and implications of these texts and interviews, I analyze the intersubjective links between these leaders’ ideologies, their articulation of India’s nationalist and gender identities, and (in)securities.

The article begins with a review of traditional and feminist scholarship on nationalism and gender identities. Following this review I suggest that such feminist interpretations of nationalism and gender might offer a more compelling and pragmatic reading of the gender and nationalism scholarship if supplemented with a critical-constructivist framework of (in)security. With this in mind, the second part of the article introduces the conceptual frameworks of representation of dangers; cartographic anxieties; and the constructivists’ premise of cultural construction of (in)securities. I draw together some of the shared premises of the feminists and the critical constructivists to situate my theoretical argument for this paper, that is, a feminist critical-constructivist framework, which I use to explain the discursive and constructivist shifts between nationalism, gender identities, and nuclear (in)securities in Indian politics. The third part of the article undertaken a study of postcolonial India’s nationalist and gender identity under the leadership of the Congress Party, and explores how the symbolic constructions of gender to fix the newly born nation’s territorial boundaries and (in)securities have served a political and nationalist project of the Indian state under the Congress Party. The fourth and final part of the article addresses the resurgence of a cultural nationalism in India under the BJP and explores the ways in which rearticulations of gender, nationalist identity, and (in)securities along cultural lines have justified new trajectories of interstate nuclear policies. I conclude by highlighting how some shared premises of feminism and critical constructivism may offer conceptual and theoretical spaces whereby feminist scholars of IR, constructivists, and others can converse around shared concerns about the cultural construction of gender identities and (in)securities.

Nationalism and Gender(ed) Identities in International Feminist Politics

According to the traditional theories, nationalism is a state-led or a state-seeking form of political identification (Deutsch 1966). Reflective of a secular, modern, and European ide-
ology (Kedourie 1960) or primordial attachments of ethnicity or religion (Geertz 1973), nationalism signifies a process of assimilation of all within a state’s preferred cultural or political form for the purposes of nation formation. The desire for nation formation is rooted in the “nationalist ... myths of affection shared between the citizens and the government,” which enables nationalism to “serve as a vital political discourse ... to mobilize different strata, uniting divergent social interests, and legitimize their political aspirations” (Breuilly 1982, 85; Horowitz 1985; Smith 2000, 1991). Such traditional interpretations of nationalism represent state-centric discourses where the state (or the nation) remains “timeless and immutable, hence fundamentally ahistorical and natural” (Einhorn 2006, 197).

Critics of nationalism have rejected the conceptual merger of nation and nationalism, arguing that nationalism as a cultural phenomenon ensures the homogeneity of the culturally dominant, and hence is a fragmented concept, existing only in the imagination and representing an invented tradition (Chatterjee 1993; Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). For Hobsbawm and Ranger, nationalism as an invented tradition is a process of representation, where the communitarians will create and symbolize the social cohesion of the majoritarian community as constituting the nation. Such invented traditions, a particularly modern phenomenon and evidenced in the newly modernizing societies, represent social engineering of national histories and practices to establish continuity between the past and present. Three modes of inclusion and control perform this task of social engineering: first, the use of institutions such as sports, festivals, and processions; second, the creation of new modes of socialization such as hierarchical education systems; and, finally, the drawing from past traditions, myths, history, and symbols to forge a nation (such as the BJP’s construct of Hindu nation/rashtra). In this context, as Smith claims: “Traditions, history, and symbols must all grow out of the existing memories and beliefs of the people who are to compose nations. Their popular resonance will be greater, the more continuous with the past as they are shown to be.... The task, therefore, for those set out to forge nations is more of reconstructing the customs, traditions, and institutions of the [majoritarian] community, which form the basis of the nation.... This means that manipulation and reconstruction exist and re-enforce the process of nation formation” (1991, 358).

“As insightful and helpful” as Anderson (1991) and others were “in charting new ways to think about the creation of nationalist ideas,” Enloe writes, “they left nationalists ... ungendered” (Enloe 1993, 231). This gender deficiency has been addressed by liberal and postcolonial/critical race feminists, who have engaged in the debates of nationalism and gender identities from such overlapping (yet divergent, interdisciplinary) angles as that of IR feminists, security studies feminists, and/or feminists problematizing the symbolic imbrications of nation, gender, and sexuality in global politics.5

Led by Enloe (1993), the liberal feminists6 have challenged the gendered nature of nations and nationalisms along three lines. First, they have shown how nationalist ideologies based on public-private dichotomies have depicted women’s images and identities as objects, symbols, and victims in bounding the nation. They have, secondly, located gender and nationalisms within the principal focus of international-relations studies. Third, they have addressed women’s involvement in the context of anticolonial and nationalist struggles. Representing the first line of liberal feminist analysis, Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989) and others, such as Pettman (2002, 2007),7 have elaborated how women have symbolically figured in the national project. Women have been presented as biological reproducers of the ethnic collectivity, as reproducers of the boundaries between ethnic and national groups,
and as agents in the ideological reproduction of the groups’ ethical and cultural identity and as symbolic signifiers of group differences. Highlighting this gendered process of nation building, more recent scholarship shows how male-centric nationalisms “construct and functionalize women through discourses of appropriate femininity [and masculinity]” to forge nations and nationalisms (Peterson and Runyan 1998, 8). This body of work demonstrates the ways in which nationalist discourses use “images and practices of sexuality [as] the malleable means of reproducing homogenous and bounded [nations]” (Dwyer 2000, 27) and how nationalist ideologies deploy women’s sexuality in us-versus-them frames—to project “dangerous sexuality ... emanating from either ‘enemies’ within, or ‘Other’ nations’ men” (Einhorn 2006, 202; Mayer 2000). In the context of India, such scholarship has interrogated the ways in which India’s nationalist projects have constructed women primarily in their difference from men. These projects have differentiated between women and idealized women to serve as signifiers to support the male-centric nationalist projects (Sarkar and Butalia 1995; Menon and Bhasin 1996).

The second line of feminist analysis locates gender and nationalisms within the principal focus of international relations and examines how militarized cultures of states imply sexual violence at local, national, regional, and international levels. Enloe (1990, 2000) focuses on the militarized masculinity of states, which, embedded in states’ military policies, legitimize sexual violence in the name of conflict resolution. Chenoy (2002) analyzes militarized and masculinized cultures of South Asian states and their implications for regional gender security. Cohn (1989, 127) extends this analysis to the case of the nuclear arms race and explores the usage by defense intellectuals of gender-loaded terms such as “impregnability, penetration, violation” to justify the military projects of states.

The third group of liberal feminists addresses women’s involvement in the context of anticolonial, nationalist struggles. While this group generally views anticolonial, nationalist struggles as the manifestations of an oppressive, male-dominated agenda which push women to the margins during later periods of state consolidation, some see such struggles opening some space for women’s liberation (Jayawardena and DeAlwis 1996; Yuval-Davis 1997). In the context of India’s anticolonial struggles, feminists have explored the ways in which conflicting forms of nationalisms (an apparently secular Indian and a Hindu nationalism) have relied on considerable manipulation of gender identity to suit their nationalist imaginations (Sangari and Vaid 1989; Sarkar and Butalia 1995; Marik 2001–2002). Such analysis has been evidenced along two lines. The first reveals how early Hindu nationalists, such as Saraswati, Savarkar, and Golwalker, used images of Hindu women to sustain “a politics of [Hindu] community-formation based on the creation of a Muslim Other” (Marik 2001–2002, 121–22). The second line of this analysis demonstrates how the secular Indian nationalists’ women-centric reforms (such as promoting women’s education, encouraging widow remarriage and abolishing suttee), ostensibly undertaken to form “New [Indian] Women” ultimately served nationalist male-centric agendas and discourses (Chatterjee 1993). As Chatterjee explains, the nationalists’ motivation for such reforms was guided by their desire to learn selectively from European ways. This was evidenced in the distinctions that the nationalists maintained between the West and the self, where tradition, home, and women represented the inner or spiritual realm and the colonial world represented the outer or material realm. Sinha (1995) does not accept that Chatterjee’s concept of the inner and outer realm accounts for women’s subjugation. Both Sinha and Chatterjee agree, however, that women’s identities were deployed by both the secular and the Hindu nationalists to...
forge the nation, and that the fate of women’s bodies was not treated as an issue to be addressed in its own right but was used as a pawn by two groups of men in their ideological contestations for nationalist reconstruction.12

The liberal feminists, while progressive in certain contexts, unintentionally narrow the implications of their studies. This is because their analysis of nationalism, which emphasizes the role of violence against women, reduces women to abstract entities and precludes an analysis of the many examples of women’s activism against nationalist projects. In addition, in delineating the masculinized and militarized implications of nationalisms, liberal feminists view masculinities as arbitrary constructs and fail to recognize that the relationship between masculinities, nationalist projects, and women is not a one-way process. Instead this is a complex relationship, whereby women traditionally conceived as passive may be co-opted as militant voices by male-centric nationalist projects, as in the case of militant Hindu nationalist women in India. By contrast, postcolonial/critical-race feminists adopt a critical line of analysis based on Orientalist readings of politics that provides a more historically grounded approach to the study of nation, gender, and nationalism.13

Postcolonial/critical-race feminists examine how historical constructions of race, gender, class, and culture attenuated by western colonialism and imperialism have made use of gendered and hierarchical language of colonization. This is evidenced through everyday colonial exchanges, census reports, media portrayals, and so on, and constructs categories such as the Third World and the West, as well as stereotypical gender identities of the Third World and race (Kabbani 1986; Miller 1990; Mcclintock 1995; Grewal 1995; Prakash 1995; Stoler 2002; Banerjee 2005).14 The premise of postcolonial/critical-race feminists is that identities are results of “material and ideological [power] struggles of historically situated agents” (Agathangelou and Ling 2004, 518). This premise continues to be reflected in postcolonial state formations, where states have taken recourse to a complex bundling of communal, ethnic, and gender identities to rearticulate their desired nation-states (Agathangelou and Ling 2004; McClintock 1995; Ling 2002; Agathangelou 2004). Locating this bundling of identities in the process of nation formation in contemporary South Asia (Jayawardena and DeAlwis 1996; Yuval-Davis 1997) and, more specifically, India, postcolonial feminists have shown how the nationalism of the contemporary Hindu Right in India has reconstructed the nation in three complementary ways. First, the boundaries of Hindu domesticity, community, and nationhood have been realigned using gendered and communal perceptions. Second, Muslims have been depicted as an Other to Hindus. Finally, the bodies and identities of Hindu women have been deployed in militant ways to delineate the political and cultural landscape of post-partition India (Sarkar and Butalia 1995; Basu 1995; Bachetta 2004). The depiction of Muslims as an Other echoes the British construction of communal identities in colonial India,15 albeit with more complex implications for identity formations in the postcolonial Indian context (a point to which I will return later in the text).16 Noting the emergence of such complex identities at the interstices of colonial and postcolonial world orders, which produce some of the ambivalences of postcolonial modernity, Agathangelou and Ling (2004, 518) claim that: “Agents [read: colonized of the Third world]17 and structures [read: colonizers] transform each other constantly ... at the interstices of contending world orders ... producing unanticipated hybridities.... These new meanings and social relations [evidenced within postcolonial nation formations] compel ... a political realization that we are inescapably accountable to others [our colonizers].” Yet, the postcolonial feminists do not initiate a constructivist line of analysis to explore how an
interaction of cultural, religious, historical, and ideological processes may construct the
nation, nationalism, and gender in relation to the nation’s (in)securities. As suggested ear-
erlier, I address this lacunae by supplementing the feminist analysis of nationalism and gen-
der identities with a critical-constructivist framework of identities and (in)securities to offer
a more compelling and pragmatic reading of the nationalism and gender scholarship.

I digress briefly to introduce the terms representations of danger, cartographic anx-
ieties, and cultural construction of (in)securities in order to resituate the feminist readings
of nation, gender, and (in)securities from a constructivist perspective.

Representing Danger: Cartographic Anxieties
and Construction of (In)Securities

A geopolitical vision includes “any idea concerning the relation between one’s own and
other places, involving feelings of (in)security and/or invoking ideas about a collective mis-
sion or foreign policy” (Dijkink 1996, 11). In this sense, a geopolitical vision also reflects a
nation’s boundary-making practices, or what Krishna (1996) calls cartographic anxieties.
Such anxieties center around questions concerning one’s nationalist identity and survival,
and require a distinction between them and us, as well as an emotional or political attach-
ment to one’s place and close feelings of nationalism and national identity with one’s own
territory. However, as Krishna explains, cartographic anxieties go far beyond mere techni-
cal and scientific mapping of a country’s boundaries. They also include representational
practices that in various ways have attempted to inscribe a nation with a content, history,
meaning, and trajectory. This is because the central attribute of nation formation and nation-
alist identity in international politics requires the production of a particular configura-
tion of territorial space—“that is territorially disjointed, mutually exclusive, and [yet] function-
ally similar like other sovereign states” (Ruggie 1993, 144). Accordingly, nations (including
India) have tried to configure their territorial boundaries and invest them with national polit-
cal sovereignty. Reconfiguring territorial boundaries, however, also means that territories
need to be constantly guarded, remade and resecured, and that this nation-making process
is maintained by the production of an Other.

Security is thus closely linked to nationalist identity politics. How we define ourselves
depends on how we represent Others, and this becomes integrally linked to how we secure
ourselves against Others. In this representation of danger, threats do not merely exist. Rather,
they emerge from certain “context-bound” judgments made by policy makers where a “his-
torical mode of representation,” which self-consciously adopts an imagination of the self
and the Other, is adopted to define danger (Campbell 1992, 8). In this dynamic of project-
ing the self and Other, identity becomes an inescapable dimension of being. It is not fixed
by nature but constituted in relation to difference. As Campbell (8) argues, “Whether we
are talking of the body or the state ... the identity of each is performatively constituted.”
The constitution of a state’s identity is achieved through the construction of boundaries
which serve to “demarcate an insider from an outsider, the self from the other, and the
domestic from the alien” (Campbell 1992, 8). In this sense, a state as a sovereign entity in
world politics has no ontological status, but is tenuously constituted by a discourse involv-
ing “repetition of acts ... through a regulated process of repetition.” Thus, “states are never
finished entities” because the performative nature of their identities and the practices that
constitute it can never be complete (Campbell 1992, 9, 11).
In this context, one may raise the following questions: If there are no primary or stable identities then how can international relations speak about state, war, security, danger, sovereignty? Is not security determined by the presence of a sovereign state and war conducted in its name before anarchy? Problematizing this conventional assumption that international relations is in a state of anarchy, critical constructivists view (in)security as what Campbell (1992, 2) calls “representations of danger.” For critical constructivists, “(in)securities [are] cultural in the sense that they are produced in and out of the contexts within which people give meanings to their actions, experiences, and make sense of their lives” (Weldes et al. 1999, 2). Operating within frameworks of meanings, assumptions, and distinctive social identities—the representation of the Other and what constitutes (in)securities are left open to the dynamics of interpretation, whereby relations of identity and Otherness may be produced, enforced, and reified in a conflictual manner. Thus an Other is considered threatening not only by its actions but also by its very constitution through certain “codes of intelligibility,” thereby making (in)securities a cultural production of danger (Weldes et al. 1999, 2). Moreover, constructing identities of an Other in interstate relations may not simply be confined to rigid interstate dynamics, but mediated by a complex realignment of political structures, ideological perceptions, and cultural and religious traditions involving state elites, which may themselves play crucial roles in reproducing statist identities and (in)securities (Weldes et al., 1999).

These constructivist perspectives allow us to understand states as paradoxical entities that do not possess preexisting stable identities. As a consequence, every state is marked by a tension to adjust to the many axes of its nationalist identity in order to represent an imagined community. Central to this process of constituting a state’s identity is the state’s security and foreign policy and its construction of danger which serve to consolidate the state’s identity. This is because if a state faces no dangers then it would implicate an absence of movement via stasis and would wither away. Accordingly, a state’s security and foreign policy, by inscribing certain “codes of dangers,” helps to contain and reproduce the state’s boundaries, and Ironically guarantees for the state an impelling identity (Campbell 1992, 11).

A Feminist Critical-constructivist Framework

In this paper I use some of the shared premises of feminist readings of nationalism and gender identities and the critical-constructivist reading of (in)security to render problematic the constructions of gender, nationalism, and nuclear (in)securities in Indian politics. These premises are, first, that the world is intersubjectively created (Agathangelou and Ling 2004; Campbell 1992; Weldes et al. 1999); second, that identities are constitutive of historically situated ideological power struggles (Agathangelou and Ling 2004; Weldes et al. 1999); and third, that “a commitment to an ontology of becoming,” that is, exploring how identities are constructed, can serve as the basis for a better theoretical and empirical understanding of world politics (Locher and Prugl 2001, 111; Campbell 1992; Weldes et al. 1999). Yet there are differences between the feminists’ and the critical constructivists’ readings of identity politics. First, most constructivists, like Campbell (1992), Weldes et al. (1999) and others, have “ignored feminist literature and gender analysis,” which lead them to “miss an important part of the empirical reality in power politics” (Locher and Prugl 2001, 113). Likewise feminists in IR (Peterson 1996; Pettman 2007) agree that gender is a social construct and in
Nationalism, State Identity, and Discursive Otherness in Postcolonial India

The concept of India’s geopolitical vision has an implicit connection with the project of modernity. On the one hand, national movements in India were reacting to the subjugation inherent in colonization and thus indicative of counter-hegemonic projects. Yet, the reigning models of nation building in postcolonial India were derivative of the western experiences of modernity. In this section I will use this premise to analyze the emergence of India as a modern postcolonial state that set in motion two contradictory processes of nation building based on imaginative nationalism and a reflexive Otherness. The first process produced India as a cartographically defined geographical whole based on cultural synthesis and territorial fixity, while the second represented a reflexive Otherness (that is, a process by which alignments between the state’s identity and its territories constituted gendered practices of subordination and hierarchy). I argue that both trends are gendered byproducts of postcolonial modernity and, like the ambivalences of modernity as alluded to by the postcolonial feminists, have contributed to internal contradictions within the Indian polity facilitating the rise of the BJP.

Territorial/Political Nationalism and State Identity

Reflecting the claim by Smith (1991) that imagery has always played a crucial role in politics and nowhere more so than our understanding of nationalism, the western-educated political elites in India, deeply influenced by the imageries of the eighteenth-century liberal state in Europe, attempted to conjure into existence a modern India in terms of a political and geographical integrity. Given India’s colonial history, its leaders recognized that a strong, unified, and sovereign state was essential in order to establish India’s sovereign presence in the world, to preserve its unity against foreign powers as well as its internal cohesion. Fixity as a nation, defined in terms of its territorial integrity expressed as political and territorial nationalism rather than cultural and religious nationalism, was the first step toward this concept of nation formation. It signified the emergence of an approach by the state that emphasized an “impersonal, statistical collective identity of the people as a complex malleable unit, representative of the individuating logic of modernity” (Kaviraj 1997, 325). An accompanying aspect in this process of nation formation was the plasticity of its social and
political world, where the population as an imagined Indian community could be molded by certain intentional actions of its state leaders, such as India’s national security policies (which I describe below), to secure the boundaries of the modern Indian territory.

An important aspect of a modern state in producing nationalism is that the rulers and the ruled share a common nationality, and the concept of a territorial and political nationalism along with the secular ideology of Sarvadharma Swamabhava (all religions are equal) provided India’s foundations as a modern state. In articulating a secular nationalism, Nehru was aware that “bringing religion into politics meant the ruin of both” and claimed that “it was for the Hindus to make the larger number of Muslims ... feel at home in India” (Parthasarathy 1989, 9). However the secular nationalism of Nehru did not preclude some majoritarian nationalists, such as Sardar Patel, from making their presence felt during the debates over constitution making (Balachandran 1996). In fact, one can argue that such Hindu sentiments, although subdued from dominating India’s formal politics, did exist underground and enjoyed a resurgence on a national scale in 1998.

For purposes of brevity I will not develop this analysis further but proceed to build on the feminist critical-constructivist premise to show how representational and discursive strategies used by the immediate post-independent secular Congress leaders have drawn on women’s images and identities to construct India’s geopolitical visions, identities, and (in)securities.

**Geopolitical (In)Securities and Gender in India**

As elaborated above, the logic of international politics requires that in mapping a nation’s identity, states, as sovereign and self-contained entities, must guard and secure their boundaries. Thus India’s boundary-making exercise, the very condition of its nationalist identity, has defined India’s postcolonial (in)security. In this context, as Muppidi (1999, 126) points out, the boundaries are reached when particular representations of the Other seem “unintelligible, irrational, or ungraspable” in and through the lenses of the articulators of this (in)security. The conception of a sovereign Indian state to be formed after independence from its colonizer had legitimized the (in)security imaginary of colonial India. In the post-colonial era this imaginary was rearticulated by the Congress Party vis-à-vis an Other [Pakistan] that was carved out of the violent partition of the country. Thus the postcolonial Indian state’s efforts in producing external dangers has not only emerged from its drive to secure its identity but also from an (in)security pegged to India’s partition history. Accordingly, cartographic anxieties, understood as physical preservation of India’s borders to be metonymous with the state of the Union, justified postcolonial Indian political actors’ discourses of (in)security (Muppidi 1999). Gender became integral to the Indian state’s nationalist discourses to construct its boundaries, anxieties, and (in)securities.

As Nehru himself once argued, “nothing adds to popular passions more than stories of abduction of women, and as long as these ... women are not rescued, trouble will simmer and might blaze out” (Jenkins 1974, 52). The connection implied in this statement between Indian women’s abducted bodies (violated by abduction, enforced conversion, and impermissible cohabitation) and securing India’s nationalist boundaries vis-à-vis this abductor (Pakistan) has consumed the major debates surrounding India’s (in)security. For example, in the aftermath of partition the government of India was swamped with complaints by relatives of abducted women seeking to recover them, either through government, mil-
itary, or voluntary efforts. In this act of recovery, carried out by the government through the Central Recovery Operation (1947–1952), the “material, symbolic, and political” significance of the abducted women was not lost either on the women themselves or on the leaders of the state (Menon and Bhasin 1996, 5). Leaders of the Indian state guided by certain masculinist notions—which I term as a traditional and Indian masculinity—repeatedly used instances of the rape and abduction of their innocent Indian mothers and sisters to articulate India’s nationalist identity as a territorial space vis-à-vis Pakistan. They expressed their concern and anger at the moral depravity of Pakistan that characterized the shameful chapter in the history of both countries (Constituent Assembly of India 1947). That “our [India’s] innocent sisters” had been dishonored was an issue that could not be looked upon with equanimity. (Constituent Assembly of India 1947, 122) The All India Congress Committee passed a resolution (November 1947) which stated that: “The Congress views with pain, horror, and anxiety the tragedies of Calcutta, East Bengal, Bihar.... These new developments in communal strife ... have involved ... mass conversion, abduction, and violation of women and forcible marriages.... Women who have been abducted and forcibly married must be restored to their homes” (Constituent Assembly of India 1947, 122).

In addition, members of the Indian government also drew upon cultural and religious icons to underscore their protectionist stance vis-à-vis Indian women. As one member of the Indian Parliament said: “If there is any sore point or distressful fact to which we cannot be reconcile under any circumstances, it is the question of abduction and non-restoration of Hindu women. We all know our history ... of what happened in the name of Shri Ram when Sita was abducted. Here, where thousands of girls are concerned, we cannot forget this. As descendants of Ram we have to bring back every Sita that is alive” (Constituent Assembly of India 1949, 137).

The issue of abduction was also analyzed by the Indian leaders in terms of India and Pakistan’s civilized and uncivilized identity. This is because, as Anderson (1991) observes, passionate human loyalty reaches unprecedented heights when the nation imagined as a monolithic community faces an Other, differentiated community. This sentiment was reflected in a resolution passed by the All India Congress Committee in November 1949, which also drew upon Indian women to configure the Indian self and Pakistani Other: “During these disorders, large numbers of women have been abducted ... and there have been forcible conversions on a large scale. No civilized people can recognize such conversions and there is nothing more heinous than the abduction of women. Every effort must be made to restore women to their original home” (Constituent Assembly of India 1949, 138). Interestingly, as Menon and Bhasin (1996) note, nowhere was the government of India’s condemnation of rape accompanied by eagerness to take action against the abduction of Muslim women by Hindu men (instances of which were many) because here no offenses had been committed against the Hindu community or religion.

Furthermore, at the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Session held in December 1951 considerable dissatisfaction was expressed at the slow pace of recovery of Indian women from Pakistan. There was extreme disquiet at the mention of two thousand Indian women being held by government servants in Pakistan and at the agreement by the Indian government of a cease-fire with Pakistan over Kashmir without first negotiating the return of abducted Hindu women to India. Some members of the Indian Parliament even went out so far to call for “an open war to recover our sisters and daughters lying helpless in Pakistan” (Constituent Assembly of India 1951, 138).
It is not my intention to suggest that the predicament of these abducted women taken to the Pakistani side was not traumatic or that the government of India’s repatriation program was not humanitarian in seeking to return these abducted women to their rightful places. Yet I also share Menon and Bhasin’s (1996) view that one cannot argue that the lots of all these abducted women were uniformly grim and that all their abductors on the Pakistani side were bestial. Menon and Bhasin, as well as a Hindi movie from India, Pinjar (meaning “Skeleton” in the Punjabi language), provide examples of Indian women who were abducted by Muslim men and taken to Pakistan but who were unwilling to return to India during the repatriation and resettlement programs. These women had settled with their new husbands and families in Pakistan and felt accepted and respected there. Such examples that contradict the negative image of Pakistan were undocumented or ignored in India’s statist accounts that sought to secure the nation and its women. In this context, following the feminist-constructivist premise, one may argue that the Indian government’s recovery program not only enabled the government to draw upon the identification needs of the Indian state as caring, secular, and modern (which the Other, Pakistan, was not), but also enabled the state to construct itself benevolently vis-à-vis Pakistan, to articulate a statist vision of what constituted the legitimate place of Indian women in their families, communities, and the nation, and also use victimized images of women (while denying autonomy to their lived experiences) to define a threatening Other (Pakistan). Moreover, the Other was identified at the most crucial site of patriarchal control, that is, over the issue of Indian women’s sexuality that by implication belonged to the paternal realm of the Indian state.

While some may argue that for India the urgency of securing both its borders and women’s bodies is understandable, an urgency rooted in the making of a postcolonial nation, I argue that this had a political and symbolic implication for women: abducted women became symbolic of demarcating territories, crossing borders and articulating (in)securities associated with violating or consolidating the social, cultural, and political boundaries of the Indian and Pakistani states.

Indeed, India’s nationalist discourse sheds light on the fact that India’s political nationalism was not homogeneous and, despite its modernist identity, was no less silent in drawing on women’s images and identities to articulate (in)security imaginaries vis-à-vis an Other. To this extent the Indian state’s masculinity has been reflective of the colonial masculinity’s savior and patriarchal agenda vis-à-vis Indian women, and has also drawn from Hindu religious and cultural metaphors to justify India’s boundaries vis-à-vis the other nation. I also accept that the nationalism of Congress was implicitly Hindu-centric (there is further evidence of this in the contradictions that emerged in the theory and practice of secularism of post–Nehru Indian prime ministers), and has even created space for the emergence of the BJP’s Hindu nationalism on a national scale. From the standpoint of real politics, one must also be cognizant that soon after their independence, India and Pakistan fought a war in 1948 (over Kashmir), and in this geostrategic sense Pakistan did constitute a security threat to India. Yet my point in the above section, albeit drawing on some of the familiar feminist discourses of Indian women’s abduction and repatriation, was to show how the discursive interpellation of Indian nationalism with women’s bodies and identities to construct the nation’s identity, the location of its Other, and frame its national (in)security discourses has constituted a symbolically significant political and not a communal activity for the Indian state under the Congress Party. Seen from a feminist, critical-constructivist lens, the symbolic construction of gender has served a political and nationalist project for
the Indian state, which, reflective of the newly born nation’s cartographic anxieties, has “construct[ed] and functionalize[d] women through discourses of appropriate femininity [and masculinity]” to inscribe “codes of dangers ... that help[ed] containing and reproducing the state's boundaries” (Peterson and Runyan 1998, 8; Campbell 1992, 8). Ironically, it has also “guarantee[d] for the state an impelling identity” (Campbell 1992, 8).

Yet, as constructivists argue, every state is marked by an inherent tension to adjust to the many axes of its nationalist identity to represent an imagined community, and inscribing “codes of dangers” keeps the process going. (Campbell 1992, 11) Following this premise, I describe below how the boundary-making exercise of India and its discursive articulation of a Pakistani, Islamic danger assume a qualitatively different turn under the BJP. Gender, nationalism, and (in)securities get reconstructed culturally to support the BJP’s ideological construct of India as a Hindu nation.

The BJP and the Making of a Hindu India

Several factors explain the resurgence of the BJP’s nationalism/communalism and masculinity in contemporary India. For example, this can be seen as a legacy of the colonial construction of racial and religious identities, which over the years have fanned the early and later Hindu nationalists’ militancy to counter colonial projections of Hindu virility. Or it could be regarded as among the dilemmas of the secular Indian nation that, having become too modern, secular, and global, has lost its indigenous cultural space, thus necessitating its revival. It could also be argued that the pro–Hindu practices adopted by Congress leaders for electoral purposes created the space for the resurgence of Hindu nationalism. Without entering into these debates, I proceed in the remainder of my paper to explore how the BJP, guided by the Hindutva ideology, has linked the nation’s internal and external anti–Muslim anxieties to reconstruct the nation (rashtra), gender, and its (in)securities from cultural and religious perspectives.

Cultural/Religious Nationalism, the Rashtra, Gender and (In)Securities

Like its master organization the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS), the BJP has sought to make Hindutva its ideological mascot, which, rooted in the “one nation, one people, one culture” concept, redefines India as a Hindu rashtra (BJP Election Manifesto 1998, 6). Pitrabhoomi (fatherland), jati (bloodline) and sanskriti (culture) were identified by the BJP as the three principles of Hindutva. According to the BJP, the first principle, pitrabhoomi, implies that to be a Hindu one should be born within the territorial boundaries of India. Jati (bloodline) claims that to be a Hindu one should establish lineage from natural as opposed to converted Hindu parents. Sanskriti (culture) implies that only those whose sacred land (sacred to their religion) lay within their fatherland (India) actually have the moral basis for claiming citizenship of India, thereby privileging a cultural and religious rather than a territorial concept of citizenship in India (Deshpande 1995). The BJP also finds a linkage between Hindutva, the Hindu rashtra, and a cultural nationalism in India. A suggested linkage of this communal cause in building a nationalist India becomes particularly visible in the BJP’s Election Manifesto (1998). In the introduction, which spelled out the vision, faith, and com-
mitment of the BJP, the manifesto declared that “[t]he present millennium began with the subjugation of our ancient land. Let a reinvigorated, proud, and prosperous India herald the next millennium” (6). It ended with an appeal to “all patriotic Indians” to assist the BJP in the task of reconstructing a nationalist India representative of a composite culture (80). However, the definition of this composite culture echoes a rather communal fervor. In the words of the then BJP president: “despite the composite nature of Indian culture, Hinduism remains by far the most powerful and pervasive element in that culture. Those who lay great stress on the composite nature of Indian culture, frequently minimize this basic fact” (Bharatiya Janata Party 2000, 160).

A seemingly harmless concept deemed essential for the development of the nation, the “one nation, one people, one culture” concept of the BJP makes Hinduism the common denominator of India’s national identity—one inextricably woven with the humanism of the land. It forces one to use the terms “Hindutva,” “Hinduism,” and “the Hindu nation” synonymously (Chowdhry, 2000).

The BJP’s commitment to Hindutva, underpinned by the assumption that the land of the Christians and Muslims lay outside India, has enabled the party to utilize this aspect of Hindutva to depict the Hindu nation’s enemies through religious lenses. Thus a part of the BJP’s nationalist and communalist agenda has been to construct the Indian Muslims as a locus of internal threat to the nation and use Indian women (redefined by the BJP as Hindu women) to justify this threat. The party’s nationalist discourse defines “patriots” and “traitors” in terms of their religious affiliations and gender remains integral in establishing this image. For example, a woman BJP member, Sadhvi Rithambhara, supported the Hindus in the Ramjanmbhoomi (1992) riots as a “fight for the preservation of a civilization, for Indianness, for national consciousness” (Kakar 1996, 157). BJP spokeswoman Sushma Swaraj suspected treachery on the part of the Muslims against India because “the former rooted for Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war” (Chowdhry 2000, 117). Another representative of the BJP, projecting rape as a communal discourse, claimed that “the rape of Hindu women by Muslims becomes a strategy for the community to express their jehadi mentality, by inflicting such harms on a Hindu women’s right to bodily honor and integrity” (Gouri, personal communication with the author, 16 August 2004).

Indeed, some might argue that if the nationalist discourse of the BJP, like that of the Congress, also draws upon Hindu women’s right to bodily honor and integrity, then what makes the BJP’s nationalist discourse distinctive? I argue that the masculinist assumptions underpinning the BJP’s nationalist and communalist discourse, which Banerjee (2005) defines as an “armed masculinity,” assumes a much more militant, aggressive, and communal tone. This tone enables the party to construct the images of Hindu women in newer ways to rearticulate the Hindu nation’s cartographic anxieties and (in)securities in order to justify a nuclear policy. I explain below the concept of “armed masculinity” and then relate it to the cultural reconstruction of gender and nuclear (in)securities of the BJP.

**Cultural (In)securities, Gender, and Nuclearization of the Hindu Rashtra**

Invoking a postcolonial feminist line of analysis, Banerjee (2005) contends that a particular interpretation of Hindu manhood, armed and communal, informs the BJP’s nationalist and communalist agenda. In this model, the Hindu male, which is an ideological
construct, is both a “Hindu soldier and warrior monk.” The Hindu male as a “Hindu soldier” incorporates ideals of Hindu spiritual strength and moral fortitude and, as a “warrior monk,” represents certain virtues that enable him to oppose an enemy who is evil and communal (14). The Hindu male, representing a “Hindu soldier and warrior monk,” is “decisive, aggressive, muscular, willing to engage in battle against an enemy, and is also opposed to the notions of femininity ... the latter characterized by weakness, non-violence, compassion, and willingness to compromise” (14). When these two attributes of Hindu masculinity intersect, nationalist discourses of the Hindu Right rearticulate the nation’s enemy, the location of Hindu women, and (in)securities vis-à-vis this enemy through communal lenses. I suggest that Islamic phobias perceived by the Hindu leaders vis-à-vis Indian Muslims (internally), as illustrated above, get discursively transposed to phobias that the nation perceives vis-à-vis Pakistan (externally). An illustration of this process can be seen in the following comments from a BJP leader: “In the history of all violence against our women either the Indian Muslims or their extended hand Pakistan has been the abductor community country that has revealed a lustful behavior of its males towards our women. If there is any reprehensible past which we cannot forget and forgive, it is the abduction and torture of Hindu women by Pakistan during partition” (Ramji, personal communication with the author, 17 July 2002).

Likewise another BJP leader says: “Recall our history: Hindu women from the Indian side had been kidnapped to the other side of the border to the Northwest Frontiers and Rawalpindi, and were stripped and paraded in Kabul; they were sold at the bazaars (market places). If India should remember this history of its sisters, then it should retaliate against Pakistan ... and retaliate on the grounds of its sisters whom our country has a tradition of protecting” (Madanbhai, personal communication with the author, 4 August 2003).

In perceiving their role as the protectors of Hindu women, the BJP leaders also situate their notions of (a Hindu) India “as a Ram Rajya [land of the Hindu deity Ram], where the Sitas need to be protected against Pakistan” (Rakhalbabu, personal communication with the author, 13 July 2004). While the same analogy of Indian women as Sitas was used by the Congress leaders, in the case of the BJP the discourse of the protection of women before an enemy is rearticulated in a communal context unlike the discourse of Congress, which was rooted in a geopolitical context. This communal tone is evidenced from the rest of Rakhalbabu’s statement, that “some of our misguided brothers [meaning Hindu men] also have committed similar crimes [of abduction] to a certain extent, but greater fault lies with the Pakistani community and its men.” I argue that this aspect of the BJP’s cultural/Hindu masculinity appears disturbing from two aspects: first, in highlighting a link between Hinduism and the Indian state; and second, in using bodies of Hindu women in overtly communal ways in reconstructing India as a Hindu nation. In such communal discourses, the collectivity of Indian women is substituted by the term “Hindu women.” Additionally, preparedness against this enemy, even if through a nuclear weapons policy, becomes imperative. A BJP representative states: “India should do something commensurate to retaliate with the gravity of the situation.... One should understand that with the Islamic bomb in their [Pakistan’s] hand, India needs to be prepared.... Not only because it is the right thing to protect our bharatmata [motherland] and our sisters but also because it is our tradition” (Madanbhai, personal communication with the author, 21 August 2003). Likewise, another BJP member claims: “Here, when our entire nation is concerned, we thousands of Hindu women, we must be fully prepared to avenge ourselves on those [Pakistani] responsible for
the past humiliation of our nation and our sisters ... more so, considering the imminent nuclear danger that we are facing from them. Every Sita and Draupadi must be protected” (Sureshji, personal communication with the author, 15 March 2004).

The above sentiments reveal the extent to which the BJP’s discourses on Hindu women as bounded collectivities vis-à-vis Pakistan infuse the party’s nuclear weapons policies. While much of this glorification of traditional representations of Hindu women is seen by the party as a necessary corrective so that a Hindu Golden Age can be brought back to contemporary India, a deeper analysis of such sentiments reveals that the depiction of Hindu women in their traditionally threatened capacities vis-à-vis Pakistan and Islam constitutes an effort by the party to justify a nuclear trajectory in Indo-Pakistan relations. In other words, what I argue here is that the BJP’s concern for Hindu women (reflective of the Sitas and Draupadis of the Hindu rashtra) is ultimately tempered by the production of a communal, patriarchal visual self, where the vulnerable nature of Hindu women thus portrayed and the specific protective norms envisaged for their protection justify an anti–Pakistani (in)security imaginary for the nation.

Further complicating the feminist analysis of nationalism from a constructivist perspective, it is also interesting to note that the image of Hindu women envisaged as passive and traditional does not always remain so for the Hindu leaders. In a sharp disjuncture from the traditional Indian masculinity of the Congress (which mainly drew upon women’s identities as passive entities), the BJP’s masculinity—armed and aggressive—also calls women to rise above their traditional roles and images. In this militant form, women become visible in the women’s faction of the BJP (known as the Mohila Morcha) and become powerful orators of the party’s armed and communal masculinity. The Sadhvis (women ideologues of the BJP) have erased visible markers of their womanhood—jewelry, make-up and feminine dress—and have become aggressive, powerful, and masculinist to enter the realm of this discourse. Expressed in their chilling tones is a jingoistic fervor by which they articulate a Pakistani nuclear danger that faces the Hindu nation and its women—which even justifies a Hindu bomb. Evidenced is a tone of militancy from a woman BJP ideologue, who interweaves religious overtones with militant images of Hindu goddesses such as Durga and Kali to legitimize India’s Islamic adversary and the (Hindu) bomb: “Look at the Hindu goddesses. They all bear weapons in their hands. Kali had a Brahmastra [a weapon of great power]; Durga had a chakra [a weapon in the shape of a disc]. We need our astra [nuclear weapon] too, to fight the rakshas [demon] threatening our nation” (Kamaladi, personal communication with the author, 6 April 2002).

According to Menon (2003), the presence of a few virulently anti–Muslim women in the BJP does not imply that most of the Hindu women attracted to the party are also anti–Islamic or militant. While this point is well taken, one must also accept that the discursive reconstruction of Hindu women in their militant forms to support the party’s nationalist, communalist, and (in)security agenda represents the rise of a new sexism in postcolonial Indian politics—one not so overtly manipulated under the Congress Party. While the militancy of these female ideologues is projected by the BJP as empowering women (by enabling them as sovereign embodiments of the state to speak before a strategic Islamic threat), I argue that the apparent spatial mobility allowed to these women become contested, since their token of liberalization is ultimately rooted in the party’s communalist, patriarchal image. In this sense, the BJP’s rearticulation of Indian-Pakistani identities based on unfathomable Hindu-Muslim differences is not only reflective of the resurgence of colo-
nial legacies at this particular juncture of postcolonial Indian politics. From a feminist, critical-constructivist study of identities and (in)securities this development appears more disturbing given that the party uses its Hindutva-dominated masculinity to reconstruct Indian Hindu women, to link the nation’s internal and external cultural (in)securities, and to justify a new trajectory of interstate nuclear politics.

Conclusion: A Feminist Critical-Constructivist Analysis—Implications for Nation, Gender and (In)Securities

As Samaddara (2001, 31) argues, “We live in partitioned times ... it is within our post-colonial being, in our agony, pessimism and strivings.” In this sense, the history of partition is an incomplete one. It is simultaneously an event of the past and a sign of the present. As the postcolonial Indian state continues to grapple with its task of nation building, forms of cartographic anxieties have subsumed the state’s identity (as a self) and have enabled the state’s leaders to construct various configurations of sexist ideologies to manipulate women as markers of hostile interstate identities, Islamic (in)securities, and nuclear trajectories. In making this linkage between nationalist identity, (in)security, and gender, I am cognizant that nationalist, fundamentalist regimes all over the world have essentialized gender to serve their nation-building projects. Postcolonial India was no exception to this, and both the Congress Party’s traditional/Indian and the BJP’s Hindu masculinity have drawn on gendered representational strategies to define India’s nationalist imaginations and cartographic anxieties vis-à-vis the Pakistani state. Despite this commonality between the masculinity of the Congress and that of the BJP (whereby each masculinity has represented a gendered nationalism of the Indian state), the feminist critical-constructivist line of analysis followed in this article has enabled a revisiting of the issues of nation, nationalism, and gender by linking the consolidation and continuation of these issues to postcolonial India’s nuclear (in)security politics.

Read through some of the shared ontological premises of feminist critical-constructivism, namely that identities are intersubjectively created and constitutive of historically situated ideological power struggles, I have explored in this paper how certain contested notions of Hindu-Muslim communal identities that were (mis)articulated in the British colonial context have reemerged in postcolonial Indian politics with more complex variations on nationalism, gender identities, and (in)securities. To this extent, I have argued that whether it was the postcolonial nationalism of the Indian state (grounded in the western modernity and the Enlightenment) or the Hindu nationalism of the BJP (with promises of the return to a Hindu Golden Age), both nationalist discourses have selectively appropriated gendered representations to define the nation’s (in)securities. Based on a realist, neoliberal reading of international relations or on traditional state-centric discourses of nationalism, such nationalist endeavors of the Indian state represent a politics of statecraft to configure their territorial spaces, which must be “territorially disjointed, mutually exclusive, and [yet] functionally similar like other sovereign states” (Ruggie 1993, 144). A feminist critical-constructivist reading of this phenomenon, however, unravels more critical but understudied terrains of nation, nationalism, and gender studies. Such a theoretical framework, albeit at the margins of mainstream IR and security studies, enables one to explore how certain culturally guided codes of intelligibility, representing a complex alignment of
political structures, ideological perceptions, and cultural and religious traditions, may construct gendered identities and communal (in)securities in intra- and interstate relations and politics. Indeed, the BJP’s Hindu masculinity representing the ideological construct of a “Hindu soldier and warrior monk” is an example of just such a complex alignment that has interwoven religion, culture, and gender to construct the Hindu rashtra and its Islamic (in)securities.

Although a Congress-led alliance, the UPA (United Progressive Alliance), has governed India since 2004, Hindutva, as articulated by the BJP, remains an important component of India’s political culture (which contains possibilities of the BJP’s return to power as the national government in India). To this end, recent field trips and interviews conducted with BJP ideologues in India, especially with those at the Mohila Morcha (the BJP women’s wing), reveal that they continue to articulate anti–Islamic, anti–Pakistani sentiments. Conflating Indian nationalism with a Hindu cultural identity, a BJP activist recently claimed, “No matter what you say, secularism has not given us [Hindus] any homogenous identity; we have remained one among many in our own land.... We are Hindus, tied by our unique cultural virtues ... and will not hesitate to hold on to this identity and that of our cherished Hindustan” (Sharmaji, personal communication with the author, 12 May 2008). Furthermore, embracing the model of militant womanhood against a cultural enemy, a women ideologue from the party said, “In the name of Shri Ram, I will sacrifice my son, even if I have to send him to the borders [the India-Pakistan line of control where most India-Pakistan wars are fought] to defend my country against them” (Manju, personal communication with the author, 2 May 2008). Yet these statist discourses should not preclude the existence of agency in Indian politics by men and women challenging these discourses of identity and (in)security—a point well-heeded by both the feminist (namely postcolonial) and critical-constructivist analysts of identity and (in)security.

To this extent, the contribution of this article lies in the application of some of the shared contours of feminism and critical constructivism to study an empirical phenomenon of nationalism, gender, and (in)security at a localized and culturally specific context of postcolonial Indian politics. This article also offers some conceptual and analytical spaces (which I term here as a feminist critical-constructivist framework of analysis), whereby international relations scholars—feminists, constructivists and others—can engage in conversations around shared concerns about the cultural construction of gender identities and (in)securities. To this end, as Tickner (1997, 630) says: “Seeking greater understanding across theoretical divides, and the scientific and political cultures that sustain them, might be the best model if feminist international theory [and analysis] is to have a future in the discipline [of international politics].”

Notes

1. I will elaborate on these observations later in the article.
2. For a detailed analysis of this argument and a discussion of similarities and differences between feminists and constructivists, see Locher and Prugl (2001). For a similar line of reasoning suggesting a dialogue between constructivism and postcolonial IR/feminist theory, see Ling (2002).
3. I undertake this analysis with reference to the Congress Party and the BJP’s (in)securities vis-à-vis Pakistan because these governmental phases represent two very different visions of India’s nationalist identities and (in)securities. The formative years of modern India’s nation building and perceptions of Pakistani (in)securities under the leadership of Congress (evidenced through their gendered efforts in fixing the state’s boundaries) become particularly interesting when contrasted with the state’s communalist identity and (in)securities that were articulated under a BJP government.
4. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is a Hindu Right party that headed the governing national coalition of India from May 1998 through April 2004. It maintains ties with its master organization the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS) and upholds the ideology of Hindutva. Hindutva is rooted in the concept of "one nation, one people, and one culture" and depicts India as a Hindu nation.

5. For illustrations of such overlapping scholarship in the field of gender and nationalism studies, see Pettman (2002, 2007).

6. I categorize this group of feminist approaches to nationalism as liberal because this group, despite making progressive contributions to the field, has failed to initiate a more critical and historically grounded analysis of the subject, which is done by the postcolonial critical-race feminists.

7. Pettman’s scholarship (2002, 2007) represents simultaneous efforts at unraveling the gendered nature of nations and nationalisms as well as locating issues of women’s security vis-à-vis gendered states in IR theory. Thus her work on gender and nationalisms spans feminist IR studies, security studies, and symbolic studies of gender and nationalism in global politics.

8. Some recent feminist historians, anthropologists, and literary studies scholars have also identified the ways in which images of Indian women have been projected in Indian commercial cinemas, documentaries, calendar arts, novels, and maps to suit India’s nationalist projects (Ramawamy 2003).

9. The rise of a Hindu nationalism coincided with the rise of a Hindu patriarchy in early twentieth-century India. This rise was a consequence of a prevalent view among upper-class and high-caste Hindus that there was a staged deterioration of the Hindu civilization before the proliferating Muslims. Notably, this phobia of a Muslim threat was a consequence of the colonial construction of antagonistic Hindu-Muslim communal differences—an aspect that remains an important theme of this essay—which I argue has been replayed by the BJP.

10. Some of these secular Indian nationalists, such Ambedkar, were implicitly Hindu-centric.

11. She suggests that the colonial construction of the self versus the Indians initiated practices of disempowerment of Indian males in the public sphere, which compelled Indian males to further restrict women’s mobility at home to establish their superior selves.

12. However, women’s agency did exist in early India, evidenced through English-educated protofeminists such as Pandita Ramabai.

13. Given these limitations, I define the collective genre of the liberal feminist analysis of nationalism as engendering the literature on nationalism but not paying sufficient attention to the “how-possible” questions in the constructions of gender and nationalisms.

14. Grewal (1995), Prakash (1995) and Banerjee (2005) have highlighted the gendered nature of British colonialism vis-à-vis Indian women. Banerjee (13–14) particularly notes how the colonial masculinity “rooted in an Anglo-Protestant interpretation of manhood” and “defined by martial prowess” constructed Indian males as barbaric (thus justifying the colonizers’ savior efforts to liberate India women by abolishing suttee); projected Indian men as cowardly (by showing preference for the martial Muslim races over the non-martial Bengalis/Hindus); and also, unrealistically, depicted the Hindu-Muslim communities in colonial India as representing unfathomable differences.

15. For a detailed analysis of the colonial construction of communalism in colonial India, see Chandra (1984) and Pandey (1992).

16. Yet Third World women are not simply victims vis-à-vis their power structures (in this case the communalist, chauvinist Indian state); rather they engage in survival strategies in relation to the latter, illustrations of which are ample in India and elsewhere in South Asia (Jeffery and Basu 1998; Jayawardena and De Alwis 1996).

17. According to postcolonial theory, the colonized are not simply victims of the power structure (the colonizer) but reveal agency that leads to a mutual transformation of both the colonizer and the colonized.

18. For more detailed explanations of the terms “imaginative nationalism” and “reflexive Otherness” with regard to India’s state formation, see Kaviraj (1997) and Chaturvedi (2001).

19. In the Indian epic Ramayana, Sita (the princess-queen of Ayodhya) was abducted by the demon-king Ravana while in exile with her husband Lord Ram. Following this abduction, a war was fought between Ram and Ravana, and Sita was rescued. Hindu nationalists focus on and glorify the chastity of Sita and the trial by fire (representing the Hindu god of purity) that she had to endure to prove that she had remained faithful to her husband even while imprisoned by another man.

20. The Ram Janmbhoomi-Babri mosque riots occurred in December 1992 in the Indian town of Ayodhya. The riots were the result of a religious dispute centering around the Hindu fundamen-
talist claim that the Babri mosque, built in 1528 for the Mughal King Babur, was constructed on the site of a Hindu temple. Following communal instigation by the Hindu Right, thousands of Hindu fundamentalist agitators destroyed the mosque.

21. Draupadi is the queen in the Indian epic Mahabharat and the shared wife of the five Pandava brothers. Although revered in the Hindu texts, she too had to face the challenges of patriarchy, for Draupadi was lost by her husbands in a game of dice and narrowly escaped having to disrobe as a result.

22. Exploring such links between Hindu women’s militant agency and (a Hindu) patriarchy, Sen (2007), in a recent study conducted in the slums of Bombay, explores the actions of women belonging to the Shiv Sena, a Hindu nationalist party that has been very active in Indian national politics since the 1990s. Sen studies the women’s efforts to foment communal violence against their neighboring Muslim communities and concludes that this course of action represents a rational survival strategy on the part of these women to protect themselves from the male violence that they encounter within their own families and communities.

23. For such accounts of agency, especially in Indian politics, see Das (2007).

24. For a critical constructivist’s optimistic view of agency that denaturalizes the dominant discourses of security, see Weldes et al. (1999, 16–21). For a feminist analysis of agency as a common ground on which both feminists and critical constructivists can converse, see Locher and Prugl (2001).

References


The Letters of Mollie Weinstein
Experiences of a WAC in Wartime Europe

CYNDEE SCHAFFER

Abstract: This research note presents and discusses extracts from the letters of Mollie Weinstein, a member of the U.S. Women’s Army Corps who served in Europe during the Second World War. The passages reproduced here focus on Weinstein’s experiences in London in 1944 and in France during 1944–45. Weinstein’s letters to her family give a flavor of the everyday experiences and the concerns of U.S. service women as well as the hardships faced by civilians in both countries during the war.

Keywords: Second World War; Women’s Army Corps; London; France; bombing; women’s military history

Mollie Weinstein (now Schaffer) (born 1916) was a shy, retiring, young Jewish woman from Detroit who enlisted in the Women’s Army Corps (WACs) just months after it was established in 1943. Before she enlisted, Weinstein already had some experience of the U.S. military as a result of her job as a medical transcriber for the Veterans Administration in Dearborn, Michigan, but her decision to volunteer to serve her country in uniform was influenced primarily by the examples of family and close friends who had already joined the armed forces. Her favorite first cousin, Jack Winkour, was killed in a flying accident in 1942 while serving in the U.S military in the South Pacific. Two of her closest friends, Ella Marcus and Helen Freidberg, had already enlisted in the WACs. Weinstein decided that soon there wouldn’t be anyone her age left at home so she might as well join. Rather than seek employment with any of the industries that supplied the U.S. war effort or indeed another of the women’s services, she decided to join the WACs because she knew that they were being assigned overseas and she wanted to serve in Europe. Weinstein found that joining the services was not as easy as she had anticipated, however. Initially she was rejected because she did not meet the minimum weight requirement of 105 pounds set by the U.S. Army for its recruits.2 She went home to “fatten” herself up for about a month and was finally accepted in October 1943.

Mollie Weinstein’s letters to her sister Beck (Rebecca Winston, 1912–1999), brother

Cyndee Schaffer is the daughter of Mollie Weinstein Schaffer (now living in Vernon Hills, Illinois) and is currently editing her mother’s letters for publication. She has been married to her husband, Douglas Schwartz, for thirty-three years. They live in Northbrook, Illinois, and together they have three children. She has a master’s degree in curriculum development and has worked as a high school mathematics teacher and a corporate trainer and documentation writer.
Jack (Jack Weinstein, born 1922) and best friend Sarah (Sarah Weinstein, now Kaminsky) provide a chronology of her service as a WAC, from its beginnings with her train trip to Daytona Beach, Florida, for basic training in October 1943, through her first assignments in California and Georgia, her service overseas in England, France, and Germany, and her return to the United States on the Queen Mary in November 1945.

Weinstein worked for the Medical Intelligence squad in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO) as a stenographer for Lt. Col. William A. Howard. Much of her work, which was highly praised by her commanding officers, related to soldiers who had been injured and were sent to military hospitals in the area, and involved drafting reports and taking dictation, although the restrictions of wartime military censorship meant that she was not able to refer to her job in any detail in her letters to family and friends.

In London with the Doodlebugs

In April 1944 Mollie Weinstein left Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, for England. She was stationed in London during the city’s bombardment by “Doodlebugs.” Doodlebugs or “buzz bombs” were missiles that would explode on impact. Germany began to use them to attack the southeast of England shortly after the D-Day invasion began on 6 June 1944 (Blumenson 1978, 26). When military censorship permitted her to write about conditions in London, Weinstein described the continuous bombings and their effects on WACs stationed in London as well as on the city’s civilian population. Although initially everyone sought protection from the bombs, as the bombardment continued over many weeks the situation came to be regarded as “normal” by Weinstein and the other WACs, who just went about their daily business amid the noise and danger (Holm 1992, 83).

Weinstein shared this information with her sister in the letter reproduced below but she did not want her parents to know about the dangers she was facing and so titled this letter, “My Special Letter to You.”

26 July 1944
London, England

Dear Beck:

Restrictions on the Doodlebug situation as far as our mail is concerned have been lifted somewhat since Churchill’s speech. In fact, I could have written a few weeks ago about it but held off. But now I have gotten to a point where I feel a lot of those people back home, who sit back complacently, ought to know that there is a real war going on, and Beck, I see it every day. The air raid sirens are a frequent sound to us during the day as well as the night. And, it means the real thing over here—those damn buzz bombs come a floating round. They have been our unwelcome visitors both day and night since approximately one week after D-Day.

I am sure that many of the people I write to think because I write only of the pleasant things that there is nothing else that enters into our little lives. I don’t believe that the people back home can grasp any part of the situation over here. For some unknown reason, I know it just doesn’t penetrate.

However, the wonderful thing about it all is this one fact that will certainly defeat the other side and soon, too—we continue with our work. Work goes on as usual, which, of course, is something that the Axis are totally unprepared for....

I, of course, have many incidents to relate, which will have to wait until I see you, however, this one, through the courtesy of the censor, I know, you will find interesting.

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One night after a particularly busy day at the office, I was sleeping most soundly at our billets. It happened to be during the early days of those confounded “things.” Well, anyway, their roar was terrific and yet I slept. I noticed a heavy feeling on my head and awoke drowsily to feel my bunk mate holding on to my hand and sitting on my bed; she had placed my helmet on my head and we both listened for the damn motor to shut off and fortunately it didn’t land where we expected it to. You can bet your boots we both felt to see if we were wearing our dog tags.

Another time when I was getting a permanent in a particularly popular section for those Doodlebugs to land, the imminent danger signal went off for that particular vicinity. (The imminent danger signal is usually a whistle that goes off in your particular vicinity and that means it is just about overhead. That is different from an air raid siren.) Well, those darn old whistles started going off right in the middle of his hair cutting and I looked just like a portrait of the old “Madame Zulu” herself. Naturally the hair cutting stopped immediately. He took me to a particularly sheltered spot on the stairway of his shop and away from any windows of any type. Of course, we did feel a jar when the damn thing hit not too far away. Then Mr.______ took me back to the beauty chair and continued with the handiwork. When he put me under the machine for the permanent, he told me if there was another imminent danger signal, that he would disentangle me from the contraption. But I was most rash—I said I would take a chance and go through—regardless. (I really don’t think my hair is worth such a rash statement but I trusted to luck and the imminent danger signal did not go off while I was in the beauty shop)....

Taking it all in all, it really is a great experience and certainly makes one appreciate the good old USA more than you can realize. I know you are anxious about me—but don’t be because for some reason I am most calm about it. Even if I had the opportunity to go home right now, I don’t believe I would take it—no—not until this war is really over.... Another sight always gives me a peculiar feeling and really penetrates—when I see the bus loads of children being evacuated from London to safer places, having separated from their family and friends. However, during the early days of the buzz bombing, I happened to see and hear many bus loads of these children being evacuated. They were singing and hooting and waved to us as they passed us on the streets.

In her letters Weinstein talked about the “Doodlebugs” as a matter of fact and almost in passing, as in a letter to her sister dated 1 August 1944, when she remarks, “Yes, we are still dodging ‘Doodlebugs.'” However, her family back home in Detroit did not take this situation lightly and she discovered in the letter from her sister reproduced below that her descriptions of life in wartime London had been read not only by her parents but also by the editorial staff of the Detroit Jewish News.

Detroit, Michigan
August 4, 1944

Dear Mollie:

Ma and Pa know about your letter of the 26th. I felt it would be better that they should as they keep inquiring. Also I had shown your letter to Dena, the girl at the Jewish News and she asked permission to show it to Mr. Slomovitz, the editor. He begged me to allow him to use some of it. He said it was so interesting and after all you can’t be an ostrich about such things....

You know, Mollie, even though your letters previous to the July 26th were merely of social activities, I felt all along that you were in or very near London, because of the frequent times you spoke of having been there on pass. The papers at this time, of course, are filled with the numerous and constant robot bombings and the fact that they seem to be more frequent than less. We naturally are concerned and would appreciate hearing from you as often as possible.
Although Weinstein provided lengthy accounts of the Doodlebug bombardment for her sister, she continued to urge Beck not to share every detail with their parents in order to spare them additional anxiety about her safety.

LONDON, ENGLAND
11 August 1944

Dear Beck:

Just a few lines to let you know I am okay and feeling fine.... This paragraph you can leave out for Mom and Pop. Anyhoo, this morning while slapping on my make-up, we had a couple or three of those Doodlebugs glide over our billets or close enough to feel a vibration, which I can assure you was most uncomfortable—but did I stop my make-up—no! Anyway, we did hear two of them land. In other words, if the people back in the States think this war is already over, I do think they are a bit mistaken.

Soon Weinstein’s letters home were being shared not only with family members and the Detroit Jewish News, but also with her sister’s employer, prominent Detroit attorney John McNeil Burns.

Detroit, Michigan
(20 August 1944)

To PFC Mollie Weinstein, a Grand Girl Overseas

Dear Mollie:

You see, Mollie, I get your sister to read to me at least parts of almost every letter you write. So I know a lot about your experiences, your reactions to what you are doing and what you think, more than you would imagine....

I do hope, Mollie, that you can keep some sort of a diary. When you think of the things that have happened to you in the past year that never happened before and never will again, it is really quite thrilling. Can you tell us any more about your work? The Nazis seem to be getting hell right now and we are all hoping as hard as we can that the Doodlebug factories are blown sky high and the fiends that operate them go along with them....

Sincerely yours,
John McNeil Burns

A few months later, Weinstein remarked in her correspondence that she had recently realized that she never told her sister very much about her closest friends in the army with whom she lived and who were her constant companions in air raid drills and Doodlebug attacks.

PARIS, FRANCE
29 Dec 44

Dear Beck:

That is odd my not telling you about the girls I pal around with and with whom I live. Completely slipped my mind I do believe. I think by now you have received pictures of all the gals: “Johnnie,” “Smitty,” “Loddo” and “Bats.”

Johnnie is the one I know best of all, that is, because we were together in the Forward Echelon and “sweated-out” the London doodlebugs together....

Johnnie was with me the night we moved from one billet to another in London.... At 5 am we have a practice air alert and we certainly found out later no one needs any practice on that. And, to top it all off at 7 am as I get locked in the latrine when the door knob falls off, who comes to the rescue—well, Johnnie, of course! She calls the janitor and “our little Nell is saved!” Never will I forget that night.

I don’t have to detail our experiences with the doodlebugs in London but I do laugh

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at Johnnie when she says I am the only one who got her to wear her “dog tags.” But that is an army regulation—as if she didn’t know.

Weinstein and her fellow WACs were determined that the enemy would not prevent them from fulfilling their professional responsibilities or indeed from enjoying themselves in their off-duty hours, and this determination comes through very clearly in the selection of letters reproduced above. Sympathy for the hardships and dangers endured by British civilians, especially the children, is also evident in this correspondence, along with a deep appreciation for the peace and security of ordinary life in the United States and a quiet confidence in the eventual success of Allied forces.

In France after D-Day

In the summer of 1944 Mollie Weinstein was transferred to France in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) Forward Echelon, following Allied troops into Normandy after the D-Day invasion. First she was stationed in Normandy (August 1944), living in the woods in tents pitched in the mud. Then she moved to Paris (September 1944) and finally to Versailles (July 1945).

As a recurring theme throughout these excerpts from her letters, Weinstein found her high school French to be a significant asset, as she was frequently asked to act as an interpreter both in the course of her official duties and at social gatherings.

SOMEWHERE IN FRANCE
25 August 1944

Dear Beck:

I had this letter kicking around my pocket and decided to add a little more. Last night Smitty (my gal friend, the draftsman) and I went out with a couple of Sgts. We stopped at a very nice farmhouse and the man who lived there gave us cider and wouldn’t let the boys pay for anything. He gave us fresh figs and kept giving us more, not giving any to the boys—of course we gave them out to the boys, too. The old Frenchman kept saying: “Les filles Americaine sont tres jolies.” (The American girls are very pretty.) Smitty and I kept laughing. We translated it to the boys. Then the Frenchman said: (to make the boys feel good) “Les soldats sont jolis.” (The soldiers are pretty.) That really made us laugh. I learned a lot from that Frenchman—They hadn’t had soap in 2 years; no sugar for months, and many other things.

By the middle of September 1944, Weinstein was able to tell her family that she was in Paris and enjoying the sights and sounds of the city. Her letters include her comments on fashion, her accommodation, the nightlife that was available, and the shows which she and her friends saw. She continued to find herself called upon to act as an interpreter in many situations, even when she was just out walking down the street.

PARIS—FRANCE
16 Sept. 1944

Dear Beck:

I know that you wonder how I am getting along with the French language. Am doing wonderfully well. In fact, yesterday I acted as an interpreter. Last night a number of us went to the Arc de Triomphe. We wanted to go up into it and see the view of Paris but the gendarme there said that we could not at that time as it was closed for the public—
Mollie Weinstein in Paris, Winter 1944–45. (Photograph reproduced by permission of Mollie Weinstein Schaffer.)
perhaps later he said. All that in French and he could not speak one word of English.
Then we walked away. We didn’t get very far when I heard a shuffling of feet and turned
around—there was the gendarme making a “bee-line” for me with an Air Corps Captain
in his tow. The Captain asked me if I could speak French and I said a little. He asked me
to ask the gendarme several questions and I translated the answers. It was great fun and
I understood everything. They were trying to determine whether our pilots had flown
any planes under the Arc, which was against regulations. Anyway, the answer was no.

As the letters reproduced below demonstrate, Weinstein continued to enjoy using her
skills as a French interpreter and often received praise for her abilities from French people
who spoke no English.

PARIS, FRANCE
25 Sept 44

Dear Beck:
Saturday night Smitty, another WAC and myself met some very nice French boys at a
G. I. show. They understood my French very well—anyway they are coming over to our
Recreation Room at our Hotel and they want to learn English and will teach us French.
One of the fellows insisted he would have to bring a hammer with him to teach one of
the girls (Loddo—another one of my pals, who can’t seem to twist her tongue for those
French words) and really pound that into her. They didn’t think I would need such
drastic lessons. They didn’t speak a word of English and I was the only link. What a spot
to be in—I had to translate everything my friends wanted to say. Many a time I would
be actually stuck for a word—without a dictionary at hand. Anyway they seemed to
understand me without difficulty.

PARIS
29 September 1944

Dear Jackie:
Today, we finally tracked down a French tailor. I had to get a size 14 uniform cut
down a bit to fit me.... He didn’t speak a word of English. For a moment I thought he
was going to give me a fit—something like we see in the movies. You know, where they
hold the front of your suit up while you look at the back and vice versa. However, I do
think it will come out well....
My French is coming along very well, and I enjoy it no end. In fact, today I happened
to pick up a French paper and was amazed at how much I could actually understand. It
just dawned upon me that I am adding new words to my vocabulary every day. How-
ever, I still can’t understand a word when two excited Frenchmen get into an argument.

Paris, den 10 October 1944

Dear Beck:
Almost forgot to tell you about the French chemist I met. He was so amazed to hear
me speak French. He said something that would make my old French teachers so proud.
He said I was one of the few Americans that spoke French without an English accent.
He said he had spoken to an American officer (Colonel) who perhaps had a greater
vocabulary in French—but spoke it with a distinct English accent which made it difficult
to understand. By the way, this chemist spoke only French!

Mollie continued to use her French and even to improve on it whenever the opportu-
nity arose.
Dear Beck:

By the way, I still see my French friends once a week and learn French. However, didn’t see them last week on account of my cold. You would have laughed your head off if you had heard me talking with my French friend on the phone, explaining my cold in a darn nasal voice—but maybe it helps French pronunciation—you know that language!

Weinstein brought a friend along to search for the sister of one of her Detroit friends who had been living in Paris with her young son. When she found the sister, she learned of the horrors that they, as foreign-born Jews, had experienced during the war. Once again Weinstein’s ability to speak French proved useful as they found that the woman spoke no English.

Dear Beck:

After lunch Coleman met me at my hotel and we went searching for Mrs. Sally Fish. Weinstein brought a friend along to search for the sister of one of her Detroit friends who had been living in Paris with her young son. When she found the sister, she learned of the horrors that they, as foreign-born Jews, had experienced during the war. 11 Once again Weinstein’s ability to speak French proved useful as they found that the woman spoke no English.

After lunch Coleman met me at my hotel and we went searching for Mrs. Sally Fish. We had absolutely no trouble finding the place. Coleman has a wonderful sense of direction. He doesn’t speak French but can find any place in Paris. (You guessed it. He used to be a Boy Scout!) As we stood in front of her address, we weren’t quite sure that was the place. There were stores on the ground floor and then a doorway leading into a courtyard. It was a very old and dreary looking place. An old Frenchwoman saw us looking around and asked us who we were looking for. I said “Mrs. Sally Fish—does she live here?” She said “Yes—second floor.” We crossed the courtyard and walked into the old building. They were uneven stone steps and the hallway gave me an eerie feeling. I turned around to Coleman and said I was sure glad that he was with me. You see it’s not too good an idea going traipsing around Paris to places you don’t know. Anyway, we got to the second floor and there were three doors. Coleman said “Try this one.” I knocked on the door and a short woman with blond hair answered. I said “Are you Mrs. Fish?” She said she was. I said—“You have a sister in America, Mrs. Weissenburg, who gave me your address—which was sent to me from America by my sister.” Mrs. Fish asked us to come in and was so happy to see us. She asked us to sit down. Her apartment was most bare. She has absolutely nothing. Only one blanket for covering on her bed. Victor, her little son, who is just darling was scooting around the room with his scooter and he had a few broken toys strewn around the room. He is four years old—reminds me a lot of Georgie in England. I immediately gave him a couple of Nestle’s candy bars that I had saved from my rations and also some little candy Charms that I had received in a small package from Gloria Cooper, one of the girls at the V.A.F. Victor was so cute—he said: “C’est tres gentile de vous.” (It was very nice of you.) And I said: “Il n’y a pas de quoi.” (You’re welcome.) You know candy is a rarity for the French people. As he sucked one of the Charms, he kept telling his mother—“Il y a du sucre.” (There is sugar.) He was so happy. I guess they hardly ever get anything with sugar in it.

Anyway, Mrs. Fish asked us what language did we want to speak. She did not speak any English at all. So I spoke French and Coleman spoke German and we got along just fine. She spoke French, German and Yiddish. With the three languages working at all times, this is the story I got from her.

She has just returned to Paris. Has been here only two weeks. Eight months ago her husband was taken away by the Germans. They had been hiding successfully until then—but he happened to go out on the street one day and they picked him up. She has tried to contact him through the Red Cross but they know nothing. She has had to buy herself free (herself and child) twice. Once she had to pay a ransom of 10,000 francs. These stories are unbelievable, sad, but true. She, of course, has no way of knowing
what has happened to her husband. She also does not know how the rest of the family is—I believe two sisters (or maybe three, can’t recall) fled to Poland. Has no word about them.

Weinstein’s friends used her expertise in speaking and understanding French to help them in work-related situations. Weinstein found that even if she did not know the French equivalents of particular English words, she still was able to communicate and to resolve a situation satisfactorily.

Paris, France
17 Nov. 44

Dear Beck:

By the way, you would have laughed at me today and would have gotten a big kick out of my situation. Loddo, my bunk mate, who works on the floor above me, rushed down this morning for me to come into her office to act as an interpreter. It seems that the First Lt. in her office was having a little difficulty explaining to two Frenchmen what he wanted done with two telephones. It seems he wanted one phone to be left in its place and the new one to be installed. The Frenchmen wanted to pull out the old phone and install the new one in another place. I couldn’t think of the word “remove”—but the Lt. was pretty cute—he said “removeee” (trying to help me out) so I looked at the Frenchmen and in the course of my conversation threw in the word “remove” with a questioning look on my “pan” (face)—I said it very French-like but it didn’t work. I guess there is no such word in the French dictionnaire. Anyhow, I finally got them to understand the problem. It’s very silly but I often “fake” words and it’s surprising how many times it does work.

In social situations, Weinstein was also never at a loss in conversing in French.

PARIS, FRANCE
10 Feb 1945, 8:30

Dear Beck:

Anyway, the payoff is that he finally made a special, special effort (I mean the Sarge[3]) and invited me out to some civilian friend’s house…. The women were all dressed beautifully, two were synthetic blondes. I felt sort of out of place with my dark hair. They all spoke French. They understood English very well but just a few spoke it so that you could actually understand what they meant. By the way, I knew the Sarge was trying to show me off…. There was a French Colonel that sat next to me (by the way, he was unattached)—although he didn’t speak English very well, I could understand him. (I think he understood my French.) He said to me in French: “Si vous voulez apprendre la langue Francais, il faut que vous couchez vec—” (If you wish to learn the French language, you must sleep with—) Right then and there I chimed in (I’m not even at a loss for retorts in the French language) and said: “Oui, une dictionnaire vivante!” (Yes, a living dictionary!)—Don’t know if my French is spelled correctly but you do get the idea, don’t you? If not, let me know. (Ha.)

Even among her friends and during her off-duty hours, Weinstein found no respite when it came to translating and being the interpreter.

PARIS, France
1 March 1945

Dear Beck:

After a hectic Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday until 1 p.m. (in the afternoon) when I went back to work—I decided Wednesday evening, which was last night, to take it really easy and go to bed after supper. Anyway, I told Loddo to wake me at 6:30 pm
when everyone else finished with their baths and ironing. I would do my little chores after I rested—that would be from 6:30 pm till 8:30 pm. I fully intended to sleep while everyone piddled around and finished their work. But, Beck, it always happens to me. There I was in bed practically asleep; Johnnie had just finished her bath and was lying in bed; Loddo was ironing; Helen (new girl) as Bats is no longer with us, was lying on her bed resting—SO WHAT HAPPENS—A civilian French gal that Loddo looked up for someone in America—One of those correspondents I believe from French class or something—comes over. I was so d---- tired and so was everyone else—but we had to entertain. I really think she thought we were quite nuts. Lying in bed and entertaining. I guess you couldn’t do that in civilian life—but there we were. Loddo was at a complete loss—she had had only six months of French in school years and years ago and didn’t know what to say or do. So—I had to come to the rescue. I—was the interpreter. So did I get to bed early—NO! The gal’s name is Renee and she is in her last year of college—going in for teaching school.

By the way, her visit to us was one of the most amusing I have encountered. You know I never use a dictionary (French English)—not that I am so good, but just that I don’t have one. Anyhoo, I got stuck for a word and I used our telephone and asked our operator, who is French.—Well after beaucoup discussion and she had difficulty too—and everyone in our room went into hysterics—she finally came forth with the wrong word. Anyway, I struggled through and finally did get the correct word. What a life!

Weinstein also acted as an interpreter when she showed American soldiers around Paris and her friends enjoyed hearing her speak French.

6 March 1945

Dear Beck:

The afternoon we went sightseeing. It wasn’t too nice a day and don’t think we took many snaps. Anyway, with my sense of direction, it turned out so that Charles was taking us on the tour. He would orient himself with the map—and then I would act as the interpreter and ask the French people how to get there. Dick and Charles got the biggest kick out of my French speaking so that they kept asking me to ask the French people questions. Anyway, we saw: the Louvre Palace, Palace des Invalides, Tomb of Emperor Napoleon, Arc de Triomphe, Place de la Concorde (where the guillotine stood during the French Revolution), the Opera.

PARIS, FRANCE

16 March 1945

Dear Sarah,

Anyway, he wanted to do something entirely different the last evening—not be with a lot of G.I.’s—wanted to go to one of those real Frenchie cabarets. He left the planning up to me. (I am getting to be a real “operator”).... At 7:30 pm we were all ready and started out on our big evening. We were going to the famous Montmartre district, which, I understand is similar to New York’s Greenwich Village. We went by Metro and got off at Pigalle. Then we set out to find the famous Bel Tabarin. We really didn’t have much difficulty in finding it. I talked with one of the waiter—in French—and the place didn’t open until 9 pm and the “spectacle” was on at 11 pm—which, of course, would be too late for a couple of Cinderellas like Loddo and me because we had to take the last Metro at 11:15 in order to make our darn old bedcheck. However, we were not too disappointed as there were many other famous cabarets for us to track down and besides they wanted to hear me speak French. The next place we went to was Chantilly—which was a similar set-up. We ambled by the Paradise but decided to forego the information quiz there as it was a bit dark and eerie. All of a sudden it dawned on me—what about MOULIN ROUGE. (You must have heard of that place, Sarah. I believe it used to be
only a theater.) Well, that’s where we ended up. The place opened at 9 pm and the various acts began at 10 pm. That set-up was much more to our liking.

Weinstein’s knowledge of French continued to be very helpful in solving the problems of everyday life, for example in dealing with French merchants who had no knowledge of English.

PARIS, FRANCE
12 May 1945

Dear Beck:

Yesterday, I had to ask the Colonel to let me off for a while in the morning to act as an interpreter between Loddo and the man at the optical shop. He doesn’t speak a word of English. Then later in the day, we stopped at the tailor shop and there was a WAC Lt. who was in quite a mess trying to grab off her two shirts and jump into her jeep—she was in a hurry and couldn’t make herself understood. She looked at me helplessly and asked if I could speak it. It seems the time before she was given two shirts that didn’t belong to her and the tailoress wanted her to return them and wouldn’t give her anything else. There were three skirts involved in the deal somehow and she wanted at least one of them for the big parade Monday. So—you can see what a mess that was. Well—I got it all straightened out and everyone was happy. It was really very simple.

All in all Weinstein’s ability to speak and understand French aided her, her friends, and her acquaintances in all aspects of everyday life in France. She facilitated situations that were complicated and at times unmanageable for others who did not possess her knowledge of the French language, thus making otherwise difficult circumstances tolerable and more pleasant for those who sought her assistance.

Notes

1. First and foremost, I want to thank my mother for her service to her country during the Second World War, without which this article and the forthcoming book would not be possible. I would like to thank my aunt, Rebecca Winston, for saving my mother’s letters from her wartime service. I would like thank Teri Embrey and Amanda Catanio of the Pritzker Military Library, Chicago, Illinois, for their research assistance. I am grateful to my sister Roberta Schaffer, my brother Joel Schaffer, my daughter Ariel Schwartz, and my son Jordan Schwartz for their help in reviewing this submission, and to my uncle Jack Weinstein who has taken the time to review the entire collection of letters. Most of all, I want to thank my husband, Douglas Schwartz, for his everlasting support for this submission as well as for the completion of the book.

2. The army also required recruits to be at least five feet tall and to have at least twelve teeth (Armchair Reader World War II 2007, 88).

3. During the Second World War, the U.S. Army’s surgeon general established the Medical Intelligence Division to support wartime planning by providing comprehensive information about the conditions in locations where American military forces were likely to be deployed. As soon as plans were made for moving troops into specific regions, the Division researched local diseases, disease-spreading insects, sanitation, sewage disposal, water supply, and buildings that could serve as hospitals (Ratcliff 1943, 119–120).

4. The term “Doodlebug” was used to refer to two different types of jet- and rocket-propelled bombs: V-1s and V-2s. The V-1s were noisy and relatively slow which made it easier for the British to shoot them down, but the V-2s were silent and traveled at higher speeds and therefore caused more damage. London and other populated areas continued to be bombarded until the Allies captured most of the launching sites in the closing months of the war (Blumenson 1978, 26).

5. The secretary at the Detroit Jewish News.

6. Before joining the WACS, “Johnnie” (full name unknown) was a secretary for an investment counselor in Louisville, Kentucky.
7. Before joining the WACS, “Smitty” (Faye Lyne) was a drafter from Georgia.
8. Before joining the WACS, “Loddo” (Mary Grace Kirby) was a stenographer from Pennsylvania. Weinstein and Kirby continued their correspondence after the war until Kirby’s death in 2007.
9. Before joining the WACS, “Bats” (whose last name was Batastello) was a statistician from Boston, Massachusetts.
10. The first WACS to land in Normandy started arriving by boat on 14 July 1944 and were assigned to Forward Echelon, Communications Zone. They camped out in an apple orchard and slept on army cots in shelters or tents, living in the mud and cold (Treadwell 1954, 387–88).
11. Foreign-born Jews in Paris were subject to brutal treatment by the Nazis and many were deported to concentration camps, never to be heard from again. (Blumenson 1978, 13–14)
12. Coleman Bricker was one of Weinstein’s constant companions from the time they met in Paris in October 1944 until she was transferred to Frankfurt, Germany, in August 1945, after which they corresponded through letters until they each returned to their respective homes in the United States, Weinstein to Detroit and Coleman to Los Angeles. Although they lost touch in the intervening years, contact was reestablished in 1999.
13. Alex Korody, who lived in New York after his wartime military service and died in the late 1970s.
14. Charles Knotts and Weinstein met when they were both stationed in Wilmington, California. They kept in touch when they were each transferred to the ETO and were stationed in the same general vicinity. Weinstein wrote to Knotts’s colonel, telling him that she was Knotts’s fiancée and asking for permission for Knotts to visit her in Paris. In fact they were not engaged but Weinstein wanted him to have some time off from the dangers and hardships of combat duty.
15. Sergeant George Greenberg, another soldier who looked Weinstein up while in Paris.
17. This refers to the parade on 14 May 1945 to mark the third anniversary of the formation of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps, the forerunner of the WAC.

References
Minerva Journal of Women and War is a peer-reviewed, multidisciplinary journal which welcomes submissions pertaining to the relationship of women to war and the role of gender in the armed services around the world. Articles examining these issues from different disciplinary perspectives such as anthropology, conflict and peace studies, cultural studies, history, international relations, politics, public policy, sociology, and women’s studies are welcome.

Submission Details. Articles should include a 100-word abstract, six to 12 keywords, and be approximately 8,000 to 10,000 words including endnotes and references. Shorter pieces of approximately 2,000 to 4,000 words which report on work in progress or excerpts from diaries or other archival sources will be considered for publication under the heading “research note.” The submission of short stories and poetry that involve women’s experience of war are also invited.

Manuscripts should follow the Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition, with the exception of European styles for dates (e.g., 23 January 1995). Wherever possible, parenthetical text citations in author-date style should be used, as in the following example:

As a result of her war experiences, she decided to read history instead of English. “It’s my job, now, to find out all about it,” she wrote, “and try to prevent it, in so far as one person can, from happening to other people in the days to come.” (Brittain 1933, 471)

Headline-style capitalization for the reference list should be used, as in the following example:


Refer to section 16.10 in the Chicago Manual of Style for further examples. If a more substantial explanation is needed, the author may elect to create an endnote:

"It’s my job, now, to find out all about it,” she wrote, “and try to prevent it, in so far as one person can, from happening to other people in the days to come.”

Note
1. See Brittain 1933, 471. Testament of Youth was Brittain’s attempt “to tell history in terms of personal life” (1933, 11).

References

Tables should be prepared using tabs, not the tabling function in Word, and saved in separate files. Figures should be provided in separate files, in black and white, and in .tif or .jpeg format of a minimum resolution of 300 dpi at 100 percent. Please confirm that manuscripts have been submitted for publication solely to Minerva Journal of Women and War.

Manuscripts should be submitted as an email attachment to Dr. Jennifer G. Mathers, Senior Executive Editor at minerva@mcfarlandpub.com or by post: Dr. Jennifer G. Mathers, Minerva Journal of Women and War, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth SY23 3FE United Kingdom.
Guidelines for Reviewers

Minerva Journal of Women and War seeks to provide informative and timely reviews of books and films which focus on any aspect of women’s relationships with wars, conflicts and militaries, from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. In addition to reviews of single items (or reviews of up to three items), longer review articles are also welcome.

The normal length for reviews is 750–1000 words for one item. A review of two items should be approximately 1500–1800 words and a review of three items up to 2500 words. Review articles can be up to 4000 words long.

The review should begin with the bibliographic information about the book(s) or film(s) including the ISBN if relevant. The review should end with the full name and institutional affiliation of the reviewer. The first names of all persons mentioned in the review should be provided. Where direct quotations are used, a page reference should follow: “For the most part, we accept some rough and ready division between male life takers and women life givers, a cleavage enshrined through such symbolic vehicles as Beautiful Soul and Just Warrior.” (p. 165)

A review should contain a balance between description and critical evaluation. In addition to providing an indication of the principal arguments and contents of the book or film, a review should, where possible, comment on the significance of the contribution which this work makes.

All reviews should be double spaced and sent as Word documents attached to an email message to the Reviews Editor at bookreviews.minerva@mcfarlandpub.com. Acceptance for publication is conditional on approval. All reviews and review articles are subject to editing.

Those interested in reviewing books or films for the journal or who would like to suggest such items to be reviewed are invited to contact the Reviews Editor.