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Chappell, Sophie Grace
(2023).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192843562.003.0002
Abstract
This chapter considers the notions of role-compliance and role-recalcitrance by starting from a simple argument-schema for role-reasons: (1) that role-recalcitrance is a human universal; (2) that at least some role-recalcitrance is ethically interesting; (3) that at least some ethically interesting role-recalcitrance is a very good thing. The argument for (1) and (2) examines some well-known claims that Alasdair MacIntyre offers about “heroic societies” in After Virtue: in particular, his connected claims (a) that people in those societies cannot “step back” from their roles, and (b) that there are arguments across the Is–Ought Gap that are based on “functional concepts”. A re-examination of the Iliad’s central figure of Achilles refutes (a), and suggests an a fortiori argument for (1). Analysis of (b) leads to a distinction—which refutes (b)—between logical and psychological/sociological cogency; to some reflections on analyticity in general; and to the conclusion, which is a rephrasing of (3), that at least sometimes the ability to be role-recalcitrant is precisely “what makes us truly human”.