Social Remittance Acquisition and Gender Ideologies Among Sudanese Migrants in Glasgow

A Thesis Submitted for The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Jamila Elhag Hassan
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ABSTRACT

Though the interlink between migration and development is well-established, migrants’ remittances-acquirement experience, particularly social remittances, is relatively overlooked. This study explores immigrants’ experience in acquiring social remittances. It utilises Sen’s Capability Approach to explore whether and how migration impacts progress towards achieving gender equality among Sudanese in Glasgow. The analysis is based on the idea that migration can improve migrants’ financial and intellectual resources that may alter the power relationship between men and women within the household. This change may lead to more gender-equal relationships. The study explores respondents’ experience in two domains with high potential to provide financial and intellectual resources: the labour-market and social interaction. It also considers respondents’ transnational activities (remittances) and their potential to influence respondents’ gender norms. Then the thesis explores whether the change in resources there are changes in respondents’ gender norms since they arrived in Glasgow by examining changes in sharing three parameters at the household level: authority (head of household and decision-making), labour (provider/ homemaker) and financial resource (control over resources).

The research adopts a qualitative approach to gain an insight into immigrants’ experiences. The findings challenge the literature that asserts migration to more gender-equal settings improves immigrants’ gender norms; and provide a better understanding of the contradicting outcomes of other literature. It demonstrates that the acquisition of social remittances is a complex process involving various structural and individual factors. Interaction of these factors differentiates women’s and men’s access to resources and produced little observable change in respondents’ gender relations, while their gender ideologies strongly resist change. The study shows that respondents’ gender ideology and that at the transnational level have essential impacts on maintaining the respondents’ gender norms. Hence, it views gender ideologies as vital in successful policy and/or development interventions.
إِحْسَانًا 

يُصْدِّقُ هـذا العَمَل المَتَوَاضِح إِلَى أَبِي وْسُيُوْدِي وَأَسْتاذِي، 
الأَسْتاذِ مُحْمَود مُحْمَد طَه 

إِلَى أَحْيَاء مِن نَصْرِ المَرَأَة وَلَا يَزَال، 
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List of Abbreviations
ESOL          English for Speakers of Other Languages
GDI           Gender Development Index
GE            Gender Equality
GII           Gender Inequality Index
GNs           Gender Norms
MDGs          Millennium Development Goals
SCA           Sen’s Capability Approach
SDGs          Sustainable Development Goals
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The nexus between migration and development is a well-established academic field. Initially, the nexus focused on studying the role of financial remittances in developing countries and communities of origin. Increasingly, this widened to explore the impact of social remittances (defined as: “the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities” (Levitt, 1998: 927)) on countries and communities of origin. Hence, migrants have been considered essential development agents. However, within the broad fields of migration studies and development, the experience of migrants in acquiring remittances, particularly social remittances, is often overlooked. To contribute to filling this gap, this study concerns the acquisition of social remittances in transnational spaces.

This chapter introduces the research project. Its second section gives an overview of the study before introducing how cultural change occurs in a transnational context. The third section summarises the study’s contribution to the field of knowledge by highlighting three main contributions. The fourth section introduces the structure of the thesis to show how the project was developed and carried out. The chapter ends with a conclusion and recommends further studies.

1.2 Overview of the Study

The last few decades have seen a growing interest in migration’s potential to induce development in emigration countries. This interest is attributed to the increase in international economic remittances (de Haas, 2012: 9). However, Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2010) argue that economics is not the whole story and culture is entwined with all aspects of migration and development. Increasingly, the notion of social remittances, introduced by Levitt (1998) to capture non-monetary development, has become an academic and policy concern issue. Similarly, although migrants are increasingly viewed as essential development agents who shoulder responsibility for the development of their areas of origin (Raghuram, 2009: 104), and there is a large body of literature on their contribution to development in the emigration countries, the literature on their experience in the immigration countries and the creation of
remittances that aid development in their countries of origin is relatively scant. To contribute to this literature, this study, through a particular focus on gender equality (GE), will explore immigrants’ experience of social-remittance acquisition as an essential prerequisite of their ability to transfer these to their home country. Levitt asserts that the production of social remittances depends on immigrants’ interaction within the host society (Levitt, 1998: 931) and the resources they bring with them (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2010: 2). Immigrants bring cultural and social norms and values that aid or constrain their adjustment to the new setting. Some of their ideas and behaviours are challenged; others are not. Adapting to the new setting may lead them to modify some of these ideas and behaviours, abandon others, and keep those that are unchallenged (ibid: 4).

Hence, migration has the potential to enhance GE through the movement of migrants to settings with better opportunities that may improve immigrants’ financial resources and allow their exposure to different cultures that may alter power relations between women and men. GE (defined as the equal sharing of responsibilities and opportunities between females and males) and women’s empowerment have been on the agenda of international development efforts for decades. They have been increasingly addressed in migration studies to assess whether and how migration has empowered women. Recently, gender has been considered, for the first time, in the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as an essential factor in migration, and the impact of migration on the challenging of social norms that may change the gender norms of immigrants and their communities of origin is being valued (Hennebry et al., 2019: 93). The literature on gender and migration often focuses on women’s experiences. It argues that migration improves women’s autonomy, self-esteem and social standing and provides women and girls with new skills; in turn, these resources can change household power dynamics.

Though Faist (Faist, 2009: 54) calls for empirical accounts to examine men’s experiences, these are often overlooked, and women are seen as the agents of GE transfer (Bastia & Haagsman, 2020: 103-13). This study examines migration and GE (for both women and men) from a development point of view. To contribute to this body of knowledge, it answers the overarching research question: How and to what extent does migration impact progress towards achieving GE among Sudanese women and men in Glasgow?
The study assesses change in gender relations (“the relation of power between women and men…” (Agarwal, 1994: 51)) and gender ideologies (“Self-meaning that signifies a person’s views about the appropriate conduct for women and men” (Kroska, 2001: 20)), two related dimensions of GE that are collectively referred to as gender norms (GNs) in this study. The literature shows that the impact of migration on GE depends on variation in GNs between the sending and the receiving countries. For example, studies show that migration from the South to the North is likely to improve GE (Abdi, 2014; Asima, 2010), while migration within Southern countries may impact GE either negatively (Tuccio & Wahba, 2018) or positively (Dannecker, 2005). In this sense, we might expect Sudanese immigrants in Glasgow to develop more gender-equitable norms than those they held in Sudan. However, some studies show variation in the impact of migration on GNs as a result of individual socioeconomic factors such as education, employment and age (Assis, 2014; Szczepanikova, 2012). Therefore, although this study acknowledges the difference in GNs between Sudan and the UK at the national level, it also argues that this may disguise essential factors, such as differences between ethnic groups, geographic location, and individuals within countries, and that individual socioeconomic factors, whereby GNs vary between individuals even within a household, never mind a country.

Abundant literature focuses on how gender relations are challenged in receiving countries (Amoah, 2019; Carriero & Todesco, 2018; Frank & Hou, 2015). These studies explore the impact of structural, social and individual factors and reveal combinations of change and resistance in gender relations and ideologies. A few studies also show the influence of GNs within the countries of origin and transnational activities (Kabeer, 2002; Tahir, 2019; Abdi, 2014) on immigrants’ gender relations. Although the literature has covered different aspects of change in gender relations, comparatively little research has systematically explored change in gender ideologies. Some studies show a relationship between GNs in home countries and the adoption of gender-equitable norms (Röder & Mührau, 2014) or that gender-equitable attitudes among migrants often do not match their gender behaviours within the family (Carriero & Todesco, 2018). Hence, this study considers gender relations and ideologies, focusing on ideologies as the underlying driver of gender relations.
The study assumes that respondents have moved from Sudan to the UK because of structural factors in both countries. The differences in these structural factors are likely to change respondents’ agencies and GNs. Further, it assumes that respondents arrive in Glasgow with specific characteristics, such as sex, education, employment experience, and GNs. These characteristics mediate respondents’ access to the labour-market and social life to acquire the essential resources that may alter their agency and GNs (such as knowledge of GE and financial resources). Access to the labour-market and the social arena is mediated by other factors, including immigration policy, attitudes towards immigrants, antisocial behaviours, and transnational activities. The study explores whether and how the resources acquired influence gender relations in the household and if there is change, to what extent this is related to these resources and whether it is accompanied by a change in gender ideologies.

Understanding such a complex issue requires the collection of relevant and rich data. Numerous studies have used a quantitative approach to study progress toward GE and empowerment (Charbonneau et al., 2019; Forste & Fox, 2012; Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010). Although these studies have established a relation between GE and some explanatory factors, they have not sufficiently explained these relations. If not impossible, the quantitative measurement of progress towards GE is at the very least challenging. It requires an approach that allows researchers to immerse themselves in the society being studied to capture the process’s complexity and bring a “deeper understanding of the sample it studies” (Hammersley, 2013: 12). Therefore, this study employs a qualitative approach to capture the individual subjectivities and experiences, which are vital in assessing the different ways and levels in/ at which GNs can change. For example, it differentiates between relations and ideologies to gain a more precise idea of if and where change is occurring and how durable any change discovered is likely to be.

The study uses Sen’s Capability Approach (SCA). Besides assessing non-monetary development, this multidimensional approach allows consideration of a wide range of factors that can potentially reshape GNs. The approach enables assessment of the opportunities and constraints in Sudan and Glasgow and the variation in individuals’ abilities to interact with these factors to achieve the wellbeing they value.
1.3 The Specific Contribution of the Study

Several characteristics make this project distinctive. Few studies have considered gender ideologies when examining changes in gender relations due to moving to a culturally different setting (see Asima, 2010; Ali, 2014). Similarly, researchers often study the experience of one sex (usually females), one culture (the host’s dominant culture), or one space (hosting space). This study considers all of these dimensions together to contribute to:

1- Explore the complex process of social-remittance acquisition in terms of GE. Research on migration and development often focuses on the process of sending and receiving social remittances or the outcome of this in countries of birth. However, little has been undertaken on understanding how social remittances have been acquired.

2- The systematic combination of gender relations and ideologies in one study. Change in ideologies is often overlooked in the GE literature, where the focus has been on change in gender relations (see Carlson & Lynch, 2013). This study considers both, but with a particular emphasis on ideologies. The hypothesis is that change in gender relations may be strategic to cope with a specific situation and fail to last beyond this. However, if a change in gender ideology accompanies it, it is more likely to be genuine and endure. To achieve a sustainable change towards GE, a change in gender relations must be accompanied by a change in gender ideology.

3- Enrichment of the literature concerning Sudanese gender and migration. Although there is growing literature on Sudanese migration to the North, it is often focused on the experience of southerners (Abusharaf, 1998; Ayrton, 2019); and the little that does exist on the northerners' experiences are mainly in North America (Abdel-Halim, 2003, 2006; Abusharaf, 2001, 2002). At the same time, it is true that recently more work has taken place on the Sudanese diaspora in Europe, including the UK (Alrasheed, 2015; Assal, 2006; Mingot, 2020, 2021; Mingot & Mazzucato, 2019; Sanders, 2019), the experience of the Sudanese in Scotland has been overlooked. Similarly, there is a dearth of literature on how Sudanese GNs are challenged in the North. This is the first systematic study to use the capability approach and a sample of Sudanese immigrants in the UK (Glasgow) to explore whether and how their GNs are challenged and how they cope with the new setting.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis is organised into nine chapters. Following this introduction, chapter two presents the literature review, which situates the research within the relevant fields of knowledge such as migration, transnationalism, development, and gender; discusses the potential contribution of the study; explains and justifies the theoretical framework used; and poses the research questions. The chapter establishes that the study will critically engage with the migration-development discourse and use SCA as an analytical tool. The literature review frames GE as an international development goal and locates the need to explore progress towards its achievement in transnational spaces. Next, the chapter introduces the migration-development nexus and its key mechanisms of financial and social remittances and emphasises the latter as the main focus of the study. Next, the chapter discusses SCA as the primary analytical tool and its ability to accommodate the various factors that affect the phenomena under concern. It closes by summarising the gaps indicated in the existing literature and puts forward the research questions that guide the study.

Chapter three discusses the methodology and research method chosen to collect the data. It commences with the justification of interpretivism and constructionism as the suitable epistemological and ontological positions for the study. Then, it discusses the research strategy, sampling, process, and data collection techniques. The qualitative methodology is based on in-depth individual and group interviews. The chapter shows how these were carried out and how many individuals participated in the interviews. The chapter then reflects on the researcher’s position and how her personal attributes and migration experience place her in multiple positionalities that vary between insider, outsider and in-betweener, and how this might open or close doors while carrying out social research. Finally, the chapter explains how data were transcribed, coded and analysed using NVivo10 software.

Chapter four introduces structural factors in Sudan and how these have influenced individual decisions and strategies to pursue international migration. The chapter draws a broad outline of the socioeconomic situation in Sudan that triggered mass emigration. Next, it introduces Sudanese migration trends and locates respondents’ experiences within these, differentiating between traditional and contemporary emigration. Finally, it highlights the reasons and motivation for Sudanese emigration that, in turn, will help in understanding the respondents’ gendered local and transnational activities, such as economic activities and remittances.
The chapter then introduces GNs in Sudan as a background to help understand the empirical chapters. It details the historical development of the current dominant GNs. It explores the crucial role of the international and the local political economy in transforming the gender-egalitarian attitudes that prevailed in the medieval era. This transformation introduced Political Islam, enforced a rigid version of Islam that emphasises women’s seclusion and domesticity ideology and enacted Personal Status Laws that jeopardised women’s humanity. The chapter shows that religion is the essential factor in shaping Sudanese gender ideologies and distinguishes between two different schools of Islam: Shari’a, which continues Political Islam and supports gender equity (“fairness of treatment for both women and men, according to their respective needs” (Heide, 2000\(^1\)); and Sunna, which calls for reform of Islam and supports GE. However, the chapter acknowledges the existence of a wide range of religious beliefs between the two schools. The chapter then discusses the shared gender relations that tend to predominate in Sudan and the ideologies behind them. It provides insight into the characteristics that may aid or constrain the respondents’ local and transnational interactions and the GNs within Sudan that may contribute to their resistance to change.

Chapter five concerned the respondents’ attributes when they arrived in Glasgow, mapping the resources they brought as background for the following chapters. The chapter introduces three main themes that might influence the respondents’ interactions in the labour-market and social arena and thus impact their GNs. First, it presents their diverse socioeconomic characteristics—which may differentiate access to the labour-market and any potential change in GNs—and shows how Sudan’s structural factors contributed to altering the gender education gap. It also sketches the respondents’ migration trajectories to draw out the potential impact of these on their everyday life in Glasgow. Second, the chapter discusses emigration motivations and statuses. These factors determine the respondents’ livelihood strategies and entitlements of regarding access to the labour-market and state welfare system, which in turn affects their acquisition of resources with the potential to alter GNs. Third, the chapter discusses the respondents’ GNs as an essential element of their characteristics. It examines the extent to which the process of family formation is gendered, and it’s potential to affect gender relations within the family. Finally, it provides an understanding of the

\(^1\) Cited in (Thompson, 2008: 89)
respondents' gender ideologies before emigration (as well as their natal families), as these will govern their transnational interactions.

Chapters six and seven discuss the labour-market and social networks as sources of financial and intellectual resources with a high potential to influence GNs. Specifically, chapter six explores the potential of Glasgow’s labour-market to provide tangible and intangible resources. It introduces the setting (Glasgow) that will help analyse the empirical data, including immigration and integration policies; the shortage in the labour force that underpins the official welcoming attitude; and immigrants’ labour-market experiences. The chapter then analyses the empirical data to explore how structural factors in both Glasgow and Sudan interact with individual socioeconomic characteristics to determine respondents’ positions in the labour-market. This analysis helps to better understand men’s disadvantaged position in the labour market, women’s limited economic activities, and the clustering of women in low-paid gender-stereotyped jobs. The chapter also considers the social security system as an alternative income source and how access to this may influence GNs. Finally, it concludes with a summary of the factors that mediate access to the labour-market and, specifically, whether the labour-market allows respondents’ access to income and exposure to other cultures that might influence their GNs.

Chapter seven focuses on access to knowledge through social interaction, exploring the respondents’ social interactions in Glasgow and the international arena and how these may affect their GNs. First, it introduces the social context in Glasgow—including its ethnic diversity, which offers exposure to a wide range of cultures—and the official and public attitudes towards immigrants that may promote or inhibit social interaction. Next, the chapter examines respondents’ social interactions in three settings: neighbourhoods, educational institutions, and workplaces, and considers how structural and personal factors influence these interactions. It also explores respondents’ transnational networks and their potential to shape GNs. The chapter concludes by summarising the respondents’ local and transnational networks and their potential impact on GNs.
Chapter eight crowns the project by drawing together the findings of chapters six and seven to offer a comprehensive analysis and then moves on to examine change in three dimensions of GE: power-sharing (head-of-household and decision-making); labour sharing (homemaker/breadwinner); and resource sharing (control over financial resources and remittances). Specifically, it explores whether a change in financial and intellectual resources has improved the respondents’ agency, enabling them to choose the GNs they value. Besides considering the outcomes of chapters six and seven, the analysis considers the education and age variation of the respondents and their spouses as factors that may influence power-sharing. It explores the role of transnational ties in guiding their lives in Glasgow. The chapter ends with a conclusion as to what extent and in how migration has impacted the respondents’ GNs.

Next, chapter nine presents the overall conclusions of this study and answers the main question of how and to what extent migration can support the development of more egalitarian gender relations and ideologies. It addresses each research question in turn and highlights the thesis’ main empirical findings and contributions to the theoretical debates on the migration-development nexus. It summarises the influence of the Glasgow context; the respondents’ transnational activities; and the way in which structural factors in Glasgow and Sudan interact with the respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics to explore whether and to what extent any or all of these have the potential to reinforce or reconfigure their GNs.

The chapter then summarises whether there has been a change in respondents’ gender relations since they arrived in Glasgow and discusses the sustainability of any change found by exploring whether a change in gender ideology has also occurred. Finally, it concludes whether and how migration to Glasgow contributes to respondents’ progress towards/away from GE.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction
GE and women’s empowerment has been on the agenda of international development efforts for decades. They have been increasingly addressed in migration studies to assess whether and how migration has empowered women.

The chapter is composed of seven sections. After the introduction, the chapter introduces and justifies the key terms used in the study. The following section reviews the literature on GE as an international development goal and locates the need to explore progress towards its achievement among women and men in transnational spaces. The literature also shows the change in gender relations in migration settings, despite relative resistance of gender ideologies to change, which needs more investigation. The section establishes that the study will be situated in the migration-development discourse and use SCA. The chapter then introduces the migration-development nexus and its development mechanisms: financial and social remittances. It first highlights the intensification of transnationalism as a form of modern migration that should not be ignored as an essential part of migrants’ everyday life. It also discusses remittances as a development mechanism—with a particular focus on social remittances—and identifies the need for exploring their acquisition, which will be the main focus of this study. The following section is devoted to SCA as the primary analytical tool for analysing how social remittances are acquired. The section introduces the approach's central concepts and its ability to accommodate the personal and structural factors that affect the phenomenon under concern as a justification for its use. The following section summarises the gaps in the literature previously indicated in the chapter. Then, it puts forward the research questions that guide the study. The chapter ends with a conclusion that summarises the chapter.
2.2 Gender Equality and Related Terms

This section defines and justifies the key terms used in this study. It first differentiates between gender equality and equity and justifies the use of the former. Then it introduces the two terms used to assess GE: gender relations and gender ideologies.

2.2.1 Gender Equality or Equity?

Though gender equality and gender equity have distinct definitions, they are sometimes used interchangeably, complementary or distinctively. Gender equity is defined as: “fairness of treatment for both women and men, according to their respective needs” (Heide 2000).² This definition suggests that women and men should be treated ‘fairly’ according to their roles. However, interpretation of this definition varies due to variations in actors’ sense of ‘fairness’. The conservative actors argue for considering the biologically given roles and obligations for women and men in society and interpret gender equity as providing women and men with resources that facilitate the performance of their roles. This understanding may perpetuate unequal gender roles. For example, interventions to improve women’s performance as carers endorse this role as a female’s and prevent men from its sharing. In contrast, those who campaign for women’s autonomy emphasise compensation for women’s historical and social disadvantages that prevent women from sharing equal rights with men to achieve equity. They view equity as means to equality. Given this contradicting understanding of gender equity, the United Nations adopted gender equality when developing the objectives for the Beijing Platform for Action of 1995. Ever since, gender equality has been preferred over gender equity in interventions to address gender inequality between women and men (Payne & Doyal, 2010: 172-3).

GE, according to the United Nations Entity for GE and the Empowerment of Women, is: “the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and girls and boys. […] Gender equality is not a women’s issue but should concern and fully engage men as well as women” (UNEGEAEW, 2001). That is, GE is about the equal sharing of responsibilities and opportunities between females and males. It requires equal enjoyment by women and men of opportunities and resources. It, for example, implies equal sharing of access to and control

² Cited in (Thompson, 2008, 89)
over resources and sharing provider and homemaker roles. Walter highlights a clear
distinction between gender relations in the public sphere (community, public office and
occupations) and the private sphere (partnership roles and parenthood) and the segregation of
roles ascribed to women and men in both spheres. Segregation of women in private and men
in the public sphere is considered inegalitarian (traditional) GNs. In contrast, equal sharing of
the roles in both spheres is deemed an egalitarian norm (Walter, 2018a: 830-1). Progress
towards GE is a process of moving from an inegalitarian gender norm to a more egalitarian
one.

Though some international organisations still use the concept of ‘gender equity’, particularly
in health policy debates, this study uses ‘gender equality’ because it is broader and
uncontested and allows assessing progress towards gender equality for both women and men.
However, the term GE is also contested. An intense debate has been centred on whether
equality requires women to be treated equally to men (and to each other) or to consider the
difference between them. Such debate has been led by the complex dichotomy concepts of
“gender equality” and “gender difference”. Both approaches focus on gender differences,
regardless of whether they are natural, socially constructed or both, which are viewed as
manifestations of sexism. Squires (1999) depicted three chronological stages related to the
equality-differences dichotomy, starting with the focus on commitment to equality, then to
differences and ending with the reconciliation of the contradiction in the paradox.

The proponents of the equality approach assert that equality is achieved through gender
neutrality. They tend to minimise or deny gender differences and consider them obstacles to
socioeconomic equality. They claim that the difference between women and men is not
enough reason to treat them differently. Admission of gender differences and attempt to
provide for such differences will justify the unequal and discriminatory treatment,
perpetuating the inequality. They also consider the special treatment that has been used to
protect women from discrimination against them and keep them out of the public world of
men. They argue that women should have the right to enjoy the privileges men enjoy, from
which they have traditionally been excluded. Their claim is based on the fact that women
have similar capabilities as men in competing for equal access to social, economic, and
intellectual opportunities. Therefore, they strongly emphasise facilitating women’s
participation in paid work on an equal footing with men. Such emphasis sometimes devalues women’s traditional homemaking roles.

In contrast, the second approach to gender equality is grounded on recognising gender differences. Proponents of this approach argue that recognising and valuing how women are different from men and that ignoring these differences will eradicate neither the differences nor the underlying inequalities. Most difference-oriented scholars celebrate women’s traditional roles and activities and challenge society’s values. They criticise the equality approach for judging women by masculine norms and positioning femininity as something to be transcended to achieve equality. They argue that treating women like men punishes women for their difference and reinforces inequality. They conclude that recognition of difference is fundamental for achieving substantive equality.

Thus, these two main approaches to gender equality represent two different understandings of gender difference. Such accounts have run into what Martha Minow describes as the "dilemma of difference" (Scott 1997: 762). According to her, acknowledgement of difference risks recreating occasions for majority discrimination based on that difference, and non-acknowledgement risks recreating circumstances for discrimination based on majority practices and judgments forged without regard for the difference.

The third approach to gender equality, diversity, attempts to resolve the difference dilemma. It deconstructs the equality/difference dichotomy by ‘going beyond’ it (Squires, 1999: 124). It “seeks to show why neither an equality nor a different approach will ever be a satisfactory one given that both work within parameters of debate constructed according to patriarchal norms.” (Ibid: 123). The proponents of this approach criticise other approaches for the risk of recreating and devaluing differences by recognising or ignoring them. The equality approach devalues the difference and risks recreating the underlying inequality by judging women according to the norms of a male-defined world. Similarly, the difference approach risks reinstating the differences it recognises and the underlying structures of inequality that have produced them. The diversity approach also criticises the assumption that equality and difference are mutually exclusive opposites. For example, Lister argues: “a feminist

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3 Cited in (Squires 1999:122)
reinterpretation of citizenship can best be approached by treating each of these oppositions as potentially complementary rather than as mutually exclusive alternatives” (Lister 1997:92).

The two main approaches, in my view, are neither complementary nor mutually exclusive; instead, they are not related. Whether naturally or socially constructed, gender differences should be considered and valued according to neutral values that correct discriminatory social differences and consider natural differences without discriminating against either sex. To illustrate, women’s physiological differences in childbearing and breastfeeding should not put women in a disadvantageous position. This role is essential for the sustainability of humanity and should be given suitable value. For example, whether employed or not, pregnant women should have a more comfortable, easy life; employed women should reduce their working hours without a reduction in their wages. Maternity leave should be for two years (if women want) with full payment and employment rights for employed women and financial support for unemployed ones. On the other hand, social differences that discriminate against women, such as the homemaking role, should be shared with men. Thus, removing socially constructed differences is essential for equality, and ignoring or devaluating natural differences will perpetuate discrimination against women. Accordingly, this study emphasises the provision of “equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men”. The two dimensions of GE used in this study will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

**Gender relations** are defined as “the relation of power between women and men, which are revealed in a range of practices, ideas, and representations, including the division of labour, roles, and resources between women and men, and the ascribing to them of different abilities, attitudes, desires, personality traits, behavioural pattern, and so on” (Agarwal, 1994: 51). This definition focuses on gender role and division of labour in relation to power. However, it omits the tempo-spatial dimension, which is corrected by the UN definition: “specific sub-set of social relations uniting men and women as social groups in a particular community, including how power and access to and control over resources are distributed between the sexes. Gender relations intersect with all other influences on social relations – age, ethnicity, race, and religion – to determine the position and identity of people in a social group. Since Gender relations are a social construct, they can be transformed over time to become

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4 Cited in (Squires 1999: 123)
more equitable” (UN, 2017c). Besides the power-sharing and division of labour, this
definition considers change over time in geographical location indicated by ‘social groups in
a particular community. This definition allows for exploring changes in GN in the migration
context.

The study uses this definition to explore changes in women’s and men’s behaviours and
everyday practices in a new context. Similarly, the study considers that “Gender relations are
a social construct; they can be transformed over time to become more equitable” (UN,
2017c). This statement emphasises the fluidity of gender relations as a “Social construct” that
varies by society. This feature is essential for investigating the impact of moving between
two different contexts.

The second dimension of GE — **Gender ideology** — is defined in two ways: at the individual
level, it is, “Self-meaning that signifies a person’s views about the appropriate conduct for
women and men” (Kroska, 2001: 20) and “how a person identifies herself in terms of marital
and family roles that are traditionally linked to gender” (Greenstein, 1996: 585). It is an
individual’s personal beliefs around women’s and men’s roles and behaviours in the family
and the community. At the community level, though, gender ideology is defined as a set of
attitudes and beliefs about the proper roles of women and men in the family or society, which
can be considered in a continuum ranging from egalitarian (more gender-equitable) to
traditional (less gender-equitable) values (Korabik et al., 2008: 223). Acquisition of social
remittances depends on the context. Therefore, combing the two definitions allows me to
explore the impact of institutional gender ideologies and community norms on the
respondents’ gender ideologies. It enables me to explore whether and how women’s and
men’s GNs have changed due to accessing institutions with different gender ideologies than
what they used to in their home country (e.g., the labour-market and welfare regime).

### 2.3 Gender Equality (GE) and Migration

This section reviews the literature on progress towards GE in migration receiving countries to
identify the gaps that remain to be filled. GE and women’s empowerment has been the focus
of development efforts for several decades. The UN’s first drive to achieve GE was “Women
in Development” in the 1970s, which aimed to improve women’s economic participation. It was replaced by “Gender and Development” in the 1980s, which focused on challenging power relations between women and men (Sweetman, 2013: 2). Both measures had limited success due to:

(1) Failure to consider the gender division of labour. For example, attempts at empowerment often took place through microfinancing projects where women carried out the work, but men controlled the income. These projects added to women’s workload, as they carried out homemaker and breadwinning roles. Furthermore, GE measures introduced new problems for women, such as an increase both in their workload and in domestic violence against them; (2) imposition of a liberal feminist agenda from the North, which was not suitable for the context of the South; (3) failure to include gender analysis for women’s and men’s interests and needs (Sweetman, 2013: 4).

Ferree et al. (1999, p. xix)\(^5\) argue that gender is: “[S]tructure, that is, a latticework of institutionalised social relationships that, by creating and manipulating the categories of gender, organise and signify power at levels above the individual.” If gender is embedded in institutions, gender analysis needs to be about much more than making a statistical breakdown by gender; instead, it needs to be about analysing factors that create variation in women’s and men’s experiences. Failure to consider the structural factors that affect the distribution of resources between women and men will limit the outcome of any interventions.

In 1995, governments worldwide signed the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, endorsed the Plan of Action and committed their countries to achieving GE and women’s empowerment. To achieve this goal, the UN emphasised encouraging men “to participate fully in all actions towards equality” (Beijing Declaration, para. 23) and women to “work together and in partnership with men” (Platform for Action, para. 3) (Wanner & Wadham, 2015: 17). Subsequently, Gender Mainstreaming was identified as the most important mechanism to achieve this goal and defined as:

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\(^5\) Cited in (Mahler & Pessar, 2001: 2)
The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s and men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality (UN, 2002: 1).

This strategy “seeks to ensure that, across the entire policy and issue spectrum: the analysis of issues and the formulation of policy options are informed by a consideration of gender differences and inequalities, and opportunities are sought to narrow gender gaps and support greater equality between women and men” (ibid.: 1-2). It implies using gender-sensitive analysis in policymaking, budgeting and the planning and implementation of projects. However, the validity of gender mainstreaming is questioned (Milward et al., 2015: 75), with various factors cited as reasons for its failure: lack of commitment to the policy; limited resources; improper implementation; the disjuncture between policy and practice; and inability to use “gender” rather than “women” (see(Aasen, 2006; de Jong, 2016; Harcourt, 2016; Milward et al., 2015).

Since then, considerable change has occurred, and GE has become an important international development goal. To “promote gender equality and empower women” was one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UN, 2006) that ended in 2014 without having achieved much success. In 2016, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were launched, including one to “Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls” (UN, 2015: 144-50). However, unlike the MDGs, the SDGs were to be applied globally. Currently, UN organisations use two indices to measure and compare progress in GE at national levels: the Gender Development Index (GDI), which is used to examine gender differences in human development (health, knowledge, and living standards); and the Gender Inequality Index (GII), which is used to assess gender gaps in reproductive health, empowerment, and labour force participation (UNDP, 2019). However, the only index to measure GE among men is the Gender Equitable Men (GEM) scale, which measures men’s equitable and inequitable attitudes toward GNs.

The SDGs recognise gender as an essential factor in migration, acknowledge women migrants as a specific category, and value the impact of migration on challenging social
norms (Holliday et al., 2019: 2555). As well as changing the social and GNs both of migrants and their home communities, migration also improves women’s autonomy, self-esteem and social standing and, in addition, can provide women and girls with new skills. These new resources can change power dynamics within families and households. Migrants may also influence their home communities to adopt more equitable GNs around education, marriage, fertility rates, and gender relations in the household and community (Sijapati, 2015: 5). As stated by Levitt, migration poses challenges to migrants’ gender relations when they settle in a society with different GNs (Levitt, 1998: 230-2).

A growing body of literature on migration and GE has been written. Although some studies consider both women’s and men’s experiences (see Abdi, 2014; Asima, 2010; Lampert, 2009, 2012), the body of literature is criticised for relatively ignoring men’s experiences (Bastia & Haagsman, 2020). Another critique focuses on changes in gender relations (see Carlson & Lynch, 2013), and little work has been done on gender ideologies. Therefore, the following two subsections review the literature on changes in gender relations and ideologies to locate the gaps the study will contribute to filling.

2.2.1 Migration and Change in Gender Relations

The literature on how migration challenges immigrants’ GNs mostly focuses on gender relations. Here, we consider some of the literature’s findings and the factors used to identify the gaps. The most cited dimensions of migration and change in gender relations are the receiving and sending of financial remittances and the acquisition and sending of social remittances.

2.3.1.1 Financial Remittances and Change in Gender Relations

The relationship between financial remittances and change in gender relations is viewed from two angles: change in gender relations due to the migration of men and the sending of remittances to the left-behind women (e.g. Gresham & Smit, 2011: 2; Handapangoda, 2012; King, 2012: 214; Yabiku et al., 2010); and change due to women’s migration and their assumption of the provider role through remitting to their families. The second scenario is based on the premise that migrant women acquire self-esteem and empowerment by earning
money. Remitting to their families allows them to experience increased bargaining power, thereby altering power relations in their families and communities of origin. Additionally, when they remit money, they also send new ideas and images about their newly acquired role (Ramírez et al., 2005: 35). However, although several studies support this scenario, others show the opposite. For example, Lampert’s reflection on the transnational activities of Nigerian women’s organisations in London finds that they reproduce and reinforce the home country’s patriarchal gender relations and have no desire to reconfigure it at home (Lampert, 2012: 159-60). Furthermore, some researchers argue that women’s engagement in sending and receiving financial remittances is not enough to empower them. Other factors, such as restrictive gender ideologies and women’s disadvantaged positions in the labour-market(s) of destination countries, play an essential role (Ghosh, 2009: 37).

2.3.1.2 Challenging Gender Relations in the Host Context

Abundant literature focuses on how gender relations are challenged in host contexts (Amoah, 2019; Carriero & Todesco, 2018; Frank & Hou, 2015) and reveal combinations of change and resistance. For example, a study of Somali immigrant women and men in the US shows that the women achieved economic progress, enhancing their bargaining power and control over resources. This change in the women’s role, from homemaker to breadwinner, challenges the men’s authority. Pre-migration, men were the breadwinners and heads of the household and—from what was framed as an Islamic perspective—they did not share decision-making with the women and could even beat them if they showed disobedience. However, the men’s role was challenged in the migration space, often leading to domestic violence (Abdi, 2014). A similar experience is shared by Bangladeshi women immigrants in Malaysia. They have newly assumed the role of breadwinner and observed differences in the autonomy Malaysian Muslim women enjoy (Dannecker, 2005: 666).

In contrast to the case of the Somali men is that of the Brazilian men who migrated to the same context (US), accompanying their wives as secondary migrants. Once there, they accepted work that would be considered women’s work in their home country, working under the supervision of their wives—i.e., in a subordinate role—in domestic services, doing their share of chores in the house and sharing decision-making (Assis, 2014: 6-7). This case supports Kabeer’s (1999: 689) claim that: “as wives gained access to economic resources
through paid employment, power relations between husbands and wives would become more evenly balanced.” Though the Brazilian men immigrated to the same place as the Somali men, the difference in the outcome of their experience is vast. This variation could be attributed to their pre-migration gender ideologies. For example, the experience of the Nigerian diaspora in London shows that the home country’s patriarchal and GNs tend to be normalised among diaspora organisations. An illustration of this is the number of women relative to men on the organisations’ steering committees; the active participation of women is constrained by their role as mothers and is generally limited to their typical role as food-makers. Furthermore, the women prefer to follow their conventional gender relations in public work and for their husbands to fulfil their roles as providers and pay their organisation fees (Lampert, 2012: 158-9), also see (Röder & Mühlau, 2014; Tahir, 2019). Experiences among the Ghanaian diaspora in London, however, show various outcomes. As Asima (2010: 141-142) found, Ghanaian women have achieved economic empowerment at home, but changes in the gender relations of both women and men vary among other lines, such as age and education.

The rest of the subsection explores the factors that affect gender relations in host contexts. These are grouped into three categories: socioeconomic characteristics, structural, and social factors.

A: Socioeconomic Characteristics and Gender Relations
The literature suggests that change in gender relations varies by individual attributes, such as age, sex, education and employment. It shows that young people, for example, are more flexible and are comfortable adapting to the new setting and adopting the new culture (e.g., (Wang, 2019: 243-4)), yet this is also crosscut by gender. In this sense, research can reveal different outcomes within the same context. For instance, in the Somali study noted above, age and education had no impact on the men’s gender relations, but these were significantly affected by the age of the women (Abdi, 2014). Similarly, a study of Chechen refugee women in three European countries shows that women aged forty and above easily assume the role of breadwinner, leader, and adviser at the community level, while young women hold more conservative attitudes (Szczepanikova, 2012: 479). The case of Ghanaian migrants in London, meanwhile, reveals mixed results. Although age matters in some indicators—such as
the sharing of home-chores and the pooling of economic resources—it has no impact on the number of children. However, the study does conclude that the relationship among the youth is more egalitarian (Asima, 2010: 187). Thus, as the literature reveals variations in how individual characteristics relate to change in gender relations in the host context, this study will examine how personal characteristics (age, education, employment, migration status) of the Sudanese in Glasgow are related to the adoption of new gender relations.

**B: Structural Factors and Gender Relations**

The literature asserts that structural factors in the host context significantly impact the change in gender relations. The frequently cited factors are immigration and inclusion policies, the labour market and other services such as health, education and the social security system.

**Immigration and inclusion policies** determine the entry status of immigrants, which determines their residency, employment rights and eligibility for social welfare. Immigration policy is enacted to favour economic and labour-market needs in the receiving countries. As a result, women’s immigration is relatively restricted due to their low-skills levels; and they have been forced into trafficking channels and illegal work, where they suffer exploitation and abuse and leading to variation between the livelihoods, rights and entitlements of women and men (Piper, 2006, 2008). The migration policies in many receiving countries predominately apply independent migration status to men and dependent to women, and thereby “place women in a ‘family role’ rather than a ‘market role’” (Boyd & Grieco, 2003: 3). Women’s migration, therefore, is often channelled through family reunion, which, by denying them access to the labour-market and social welfare, makes them dependent on their male relatives (Pajnik & Bajt, 2012: 154). This situation affects their access to tangible and intangible resources by restricting their access to the labour-market and social life. However, the recent upsurge in demand for domestic and care work has opened a channel for women’s independent immigration. In 2010, 83% of domestic and care work worldwide was covered by migrant women (Bastia & Piper, 2019: 18-9).

Similarly, to avoid bearing the costs of educating, caring for, and providing a safety net for migrants’ families, immigration policies discourage or prohibit the reunion of migrant families (ibid.: 24). Meeting the requirements for family unification is unattainable for most, and applicants have to work incredibly hard if they are to be successful in bringing their
wives. Furthermore, immigration policies restrict asylum seekers’ access to the labour-market and welfare system. This restriction affects their access to tangible and intangible resources, limiting the potential for change in gender relations.

Under immigration policy, women are often more vulnerable than men. Nevertheless, they are more advantageous concerning other policies and welfare services. For example, in the UK, equal opportunity legislation in all areas of life grants women equal access to all posts and equal pay. Welfare states also influence gender relations by providing welfare for the family, which is awarded to and controlled by women in the most developed countries (Abdi, 2014: 460-7). Receiving welfare benefits can enhance the women's economic status, hence their bargaining power. However, sometimes women having control over financial resources may lead to conflict between spouses; but women use their protection and security rights and violence against women services (Asima, 2010: 179; Abdi, 2014: 460).

The host country's labour market also contributes considerably to changes in gender relations. The literature shows that changes in financial resources may alter power relations between spouses. The labour-market is a central discrimination arena for immigrants and one highly segmented by gender and ethnicity, among other factors (Ghosh, 2009: 25). It restricts immigrants’ employment and segregates them into low-paid jobs with limited contact with people. It also offers different livelihoods, rights and entitlements to immigrant women and men. This situation tends to segregate women into inferior, low-paid ‘female jobs’—mainly unskilled occupations (such as domestic work, manufacturing and agriculture) and welfare and social professions (such as education, health and social work)—while men are offered relatively better-paid, more skilled jobs (Piper, 2008). Such a labour-market mechanism reinforces the gender relations of traditional patriarchal. It depicts a negative image of ‘gender and migration’, and the literature is overwhelmed with female experiences of victimisation, especially when exploring the case of domestic workers. However, as stated by (Kambouri, 2008), this image should not be generalised; some women gain greater autonomy, self-confidence and social status, improve their lives and change oppressive gender relations and roles (see de Oliveira, 2014).
Indeed, the labour-market certainly does not provide well-paid jobs for all men, as Piper (2008) states. Though migrants from developing countries often possess high-level qualifications, the jobs they find are disproportionately in the low-paid and unskilled sectors (Asima, 2010: 59; Curro, 2012: 124; Datta et al., 2009; Ghosh, 2009: 25; Willis & Yeoh, 2000). In addition to prejudice and lack of access to information about job opportunities, their legal rights and entitlements, highly qualified immigrants face ageism and a failure to recognise the qualifications and experience they have gained abroad (Asima 2010, p. 159; Curro, 2012). They are also vulnerable to exploitative work conditions, such as low wages and long hours without overtime pay, and ethnic and racial discrimination (Asima, 2010; Ghosh, 2009: 25). Discrimination still exists in the UK, despite the many acts and legislation—such as the Equal Pay Act, Sex Discrimination Act, and Race Relations Act 2010—against it (Asima, 2010: 59). An illustration of this is that men in non-White ethnic groups, especially those in Black groups, show higher unemployment rates (Asima, 2010: 58); while a recent study shows that employment of Black Minority Ethnic (BME) in average was less than of the ‘White’ by 17%; segregating by sex BME men are less by 10% and women by 22% than ‘White’ counterparts in 2019 (Congreve, 2020). See also (Meer et al., 2020).

However, the disadvantaged position of immigrants is not attributed to labour-market dynamics alone. Factors such as class, family resources, and gender ideology play a considerable role. For example, a study in Britain shows that most women from the Middle East and North Africa do not work when they have young children (Ghosh, 2009: 26), while others restrict their employment to home-based work (ibid.: 33). Gender ideology may also play a part in women’s lack of economic activity, as the literature shows that some negative attitudes towards women’s employment exist (Pessin & Arpino, 2018: 10; Wang, 2019: 243). Other reasons may well be structural, such as a shortage in childcare services; while some men refuse to take jobs, they consider ‘women’s jobs’ or do not consider them suitable for their class position in their home country (Asima, 2010: 161).

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6 I use the census category where BME refers to a combination of the various ‘Black’ categories or non-White categories.
The social interaction of immigrants is the essential mechanism for cultural exchange and the transformation of their gender relations. Considering diversity and super-diversity, Vertovec argues that the interaction of people from all over the world can produce Creole languages and new multi-lingual ethnicities, among others (Vertovec, 2007: 1046). Numerous studies have explored how complex multi-ethnic societies experience, negotiate, accommodate or resist cultural differences (see (Kesten et al., 2011; Neal et al., 2013). However, these studies show that cross-ethnic and cultural interaction is limited.

Social networks, whether national or transnational, also impact gender relations via transmitting values and cultural perceptions (Mernissi, 1987)\(^7\). For example, Kabeer’s analysis of Bengali women’s labour integration in London shows how the “Bangladeshi community’s sense of alienation and low human capital in a Western setting leads to a stricter adherence to tradition and religion, thereby strengthening patriarchal relations and curtailing women’s integration into the host community” (Kabeer, 2000)\(^8\). In comparison, the study of Ghanaians in London shows that interaction with the extended family in Ghana maintains restrictive GNs through decisions on the number of children to have or around remittances and control of women’s income (Asima, 2010: 197, 201). As the GNs of other migrant groups might lead to a change in the GNs of the migrant group under consideration, this study considers interaction with the host community, other immigrants’ groups and international networks.

2.3.2 Migration and Change in Gender Ideology

Researchers increasingly pay attention to the role of gender ideology in shaping gender relations. Although the literature has covered different aspects of change in gender relations in the host context, comparatively little research has systematically explored change in gender ideologies. Röder & Mühlau (2014) examine whether the GNs shape immigrants’ gender values in European countries in their origin countries and whether they adapt their values to the standards of their host countries. The analyses show that immigrants from countries with

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\(^7\) Cited in (Abdi, 2014: 462).

\(^8\) Cited in (ibid:463)
inegalitarian gender relations are less supportive of GE than host society members. However, some immigrants adapt their gender relations to the standards of their residence country. Similarly, Asima (2010) found that Ghanaian women in London experienced a change in their economic power and assumed roles that were previously considered men’s roles, although he also found that neither women nor men were satisfied with this change. In my view, this indicates that such change is strategically coping with a specific (often economic) situation and might not last beyond this situation. This interpretation is confirmed by (McIlwaine, 2010: 295), who studied the change in gender practice and ideology among Latin American women in London. She concludes that there is a change in gender relations that favours women, yet gender ideologies remain much more resistant to change. The literature also shows that the probability of changing the gender ideologies of immigrants from gender-inegalitarian countries depends largely on the traditional GNs and beliefs in those countries. Furthermore, gender relations are never a single individual’s prerogative but are developed, advocated, and reinforced by their families (Tahir, 2019). In contrast, other studies show that migrants may change their gender ideologies if they are exposed to different beliefs for a long time; second-generation immigrants may also change their ideologies (see (Ponce, 2017: 900; Röder & Mühlau, 2014). For example, first-generation immigrants do not change their attitudes towards women’s employment, but change may happen in the second generation (Pessin & Arpino, 2018, 10; Wang, 2019: 244). However, Carriero & Todesco (2018:7) found that egalitarian attitudes among migrants often do not match egalitarian domestic behaviours.

Although the studies mentioned above consider factors that have a high potential to affect gender ideologies, the quantitative methods they used asked close-ended questions regarding specific parameters, such as attitudes towards migrant women’s employment. There is, therefore, a need for studies that improve our understanding of change in ideologies within immigration contexts but that use in-depth methods. By combining gender relations and gender ideologies and considering the impact of individual and structural factors, this study contributes to filling this lacuna. To be precise, it considers personal characteristics (gender, age, education, employment, migration status, period lived in the UK, GNs); structural factors (migration and integration policies, access to the labour-market and other public services such as education and welfare); and social factors (local and transnational social interaction and networks). In addition, the study explores Sudanese women and men’s progress towards achieving GE due to their movement from Sudan to the more gender-egalitarian context of the UK. In 2018, for example, the UK scored 0.119 on the Gender
Development Index and, globally, was ranked 27th on the Gender Inequality Index, while Sudan scored 0.560 and was ranked 139th (UNDP, 2019). In this study, gender relations and gender ideologies will be used as dimensions for GE; together, they will be referred to as GNs.

This study claims that SCA and migration-development nexus are suitable for providing a comprehensive understanding of GE in immigration contexts. De Haas and colleagues understand human mobility—the capability to decide where to live—from a capability development perspective as an integral part of human development. They argue that people move if they have the ability to do so. That movement expands their capabilities (for example, improving their health, education and earning capacity) by expanding the choices open to them (de Haas et al., 2009: 22). This understanding applies to assessing change in GNs as, from a capability perspective, people’s mobility exposes them to other cultures, which may affect their GNs. Therefore, this study applies SCA to explore progress toward GE in migration processes.

2.4 Migration-Development Nexus

2.4.1 Background

Work on change in GNs in the host context is often situated within broader debates on the migration-development nexus. This field provides a wide range of mechanisms and concepts that capture the development process, including social remittances, which contribute to a deeper understanding of migration’s non-monetary developmental impact. The last few decades have shown an upsurge of interest in migration’s potential to induce development in emigration countries. This interest is attributed to the increase in economic remittances ascribed to the rise in international migration, the diversification of geographical sources and destinations of remittances and the surge in remittances volume, and the advancement of transfer technology (de Haas, 2012: 9).

Increasingly, migrants are viewed as essential development agents who contribute to the development of home countries economically, socially and politically (Raghuram, 2009: 104), and bring both wanted and unwanted social ideas (Pellerin & Mullings, 2013: 93-4).
Their development effort is facilitated by the stunning advancement of communication technology whereby gadgets can now be carried in pockets, are easy to use and affordable. This technological advancement has intensified “transnationalism”, where migrants can communicate instantly with their families in remote areas and remit money within two minutes. However, migrants are often challenged by repressive policies in the host countries from one side (de Haas, 2010) and by their obligation to support their kinship and their particularistic affiliations to build the home country from the other (Mohan, 2008). Additionally, some studies show that immigrants are among the most vulnerable in the host countries, regardless of their education levels or careers (Isotalo, 2009: 125-6). Hence, Faist emphasises approaching migration-development from a transnational angle that recognises migrants as development agents (Faist, 2009: 38).

Transnationalism has become a popular concept since the early 1990s. Evidence shows migrants live in a transnational space in which they are “exposed to a set of social expectations, cultural values, and patterns of human interaction that are shaped by more than one social, economic, and political system” (Levitt, 2001: 197). Furthermore, the literature shows that immigrants’ transnational behaviour contributes to maintaining the GNs they brought (Tahir, 2019). This study contributes to this area by considering the impact of respondents’ transnational interactions to understand how these affect their progress towards GE.

Although there is a large body of literature on migrants’ contribution to development in the sending countries, the literature on their experience in the receiving countries and the creation of remittances that aid development in these countries is relatively scant. Therefore, the following subsection introduces the development channels used in the migration-development nexus.

2.4.2 Development Channels in Migration Context

This subsection introduces the development channels used in the migration context and defines the channel used in this study. Faist (Faist, 2008: 21-2) explains migrants’ transnational practices and their link to development via three aspects:
Financial remittances and their potential for poverty reduction and local investment in the global South (though this assumption is contested);

The flow of human capital from the North to the South. Since the 1990s, ‘brain gain’ has been considered a development impact in the South, and migration a win-win situation for migrants and their countries of origin when they return or visit.

Temporary labour migration—because short-term emigrants remit a higher proportion of their income than permanent emigrants—is considered to impact development more than permanent migration. Additionally, short-term emigrants bring knowledge and ideas when they return home (McGregor et al., 2014: 65).

The primary mechanism of all three aspects is the transfer of economic and non-economic resources. That is, the three elements can be summed up in one element: ‘remittances’, which can be divided into two types: financial and social.

Financial remittance is defined as the “portion of a migrant’s earnings sent from the migration destination to the place of origin” (Sørensen, 2004: 4). This type of remittance has been documented since the late nineteenth century, when remittances from the US played a vital role in European countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Yugoslavia (Mellyn, 2003: 1). However, the last few decades have witnessed an upsurge in remittances volume that explained by the increase in international migration and diversification of geographical sources and destinations of remittances, combined with an increase of appreciation of remittances as a development tool in the global south (de Haas, 2012: 9). Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011) claim that most debates about migration and development privilege the economic remittances at the expense of the social one. This study is about social remittances, which will be introduced in the following subsection.

2.4.3- Social Remittances:

Despite financial remittances still standing at the core of the migration-development nexus, the last two decades have shown increasing interest in social remittances. The concept of ‘social remittances’ was coined by Levitt to stand for “the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from [migrants] receiving- to sending-country communities” (Levitt,
Citing various empirical studies, Levitt and Lamba-Nieves argue that economics is not the whole story and that culture is entwined with all aspects of development. For example, migrants send remittances as social insurance; remittances influence norms of marriage and fertility, and educational outcomes, affect politics by affecting cultural orientations and social norms and affect gender and class stratifications (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2010: 2, 3-5). Later, other scholars argue that all remittances become social, whereby financial remittances are invariably inscribed in specific scripts of social relations that make them meaningful for senders and receivers (Carling 2014, Isaakyan & Triandafyllidou 2017).

To avoid confusion about social remittances with global cultural dissemination Levitt (2005: 3) identifies four mechanisms of social remittances transmission:

1. They travel through identifiable pathways with a clear source and destination. In contrast, it is often difficult to distinguish how global culture is disseminated.

2. They are transmitted systematically and intentionally when migrants speak directly to specific recipients or groups about new ideas or behaviours and encourage them to adopt them.

3. They have personalised nature where they are usually transferred between individuals who know one another.

4. Communicating timing. Social remittances are part and parcel of an ongoing process of global cultural diffusion, where the media prepare the recipients to adopt the different kinds of social remittances.

Levitt identifies three types of social remittances (ibid: 934): 1) **Normative structures**, which are ideas, values, and beliefs, including norms for behaviour, notions about family responsibility, principles of neighbourliness and community participation, aspirations for social mobility, as well as an expectation about organisation performance. They also encompass ideas about gender, race, and class identity. 2) **Systems of practice**: These are the actions produced by normative structures. For example, it includes labour, religious practices, and political participation at the household level. In contrast, at the organisation level, it includes strategy, leadership style, recruitment and socialisation mode, and intra-organization contact. 3) **Social capital**: Both the values and norms on which social capital is based and social capital itself also constitute social remittances (Levitt, 1998: 926). Social capital is
about the capacity of individuals to mobilise tangible and intangible resources from their social networks (Bourdieu 1985; Portes 1998). In this study, normative structure is gender ideology in the sense of beliefs and values that govern the power-sharing between males and females; system of practice is about how gender ideologies produce gender relations in terms of sharing labour, authority and resources between spouses; and social capital is local and transnational networks and how they impact respondents’ GN.

Levitt differentiates between *individual* and *collective* social remittances in the same vein as individual and collective economic remittances. By individual social remittances, she means what is transferred between individual migrants and their families and friends in their home countries. In contrast, collective social remittances are sent by groups of migrants such as members of, for example, a Home Town Association, political party or church (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2010: 2). This study is about individual social remittances, as GNs is easier to be transmitted between individuals rather than communities.

Increasingly, social remittances have become an issue of academic concern and scholars from several disciplines have contributed to its development (Boccagni & Decimo, 2013; Drbohlav & Dzúrová, 2020; Grabowska, 2018; Grabowska & Garapich, 2016a; Grabowska et al., 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d; Gresham & Smit, 2011; Guzman et al., 2008; Isaakyan & Triandafyllidou, 2017; Markley, 2011). For example, economists note that migrants do not migrate in the first place to achieve social change but that they acquire and transfer economic, political and social knowledge and behaviour as by-products (Tuccio & Wahba, 2020). In addition, there is evidence that international migration may have encouraged GE, such as increasing women’s parliamentary participation (Lodigiani & Salomone 2015) and reducing the practice of Female Genital Mutilation (Diabate & Mesplé-Somps 2019)*. Later, other scholars argued that all remittances become social, whereas financial remittances are inscribed in specific social relations scripts that make them meaningful for senders and receivers (Carling, 2014; Isaakyan & Triandafyllidou, 2017). Another progress of social remittances literature is the breaking down the process into stages, as shown below.

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* Cited in Tuccio & Wahba, (2020)
2.4.3.1 The Process of Social Remitting

Social remittances are an outcome of a complex interaction process of the migrants in the transnational environment (Levitt 2008, Carling 2014). Because social remittances are often not the intended outcome, it is not easy to observe what and how migrants transfer to the communities of origin. To understand the process of social remitting, Grabowska and colleagues break down the process into three stages: acquisition, transfer and outcomes (Grabowska et al., 2017c). However, the process is not smooth, and resistance can be encountered at every stage (Garapich, 2016).

A. Acquisition Stage:

The process begins with the acquisition phase, when migrants adopt new ideas, attitudes and behaviour in the receiving society. Acquisition occurs though encounters in various social settings, such as workplaces, restaurants, parks, and private houses that allow observing, communicating and doing things with others (Grabowska 2018b).

Acquiring social remittances depends not only on interaction with the host society (Levitt 1998: 931) but also on the resources immigrants bring with them (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2010). Immigrants bring cultural and social norms and values that aid their adjustment to the new setting. They interact with the new setting and make sense of their experiences using the frame of reference they bring. Some of their ideas and behaviours are challenged; others are not. To adapt to the new setting, they may modify some of these ideas and behaviours, abandon others, and keep the unchallenged ones. As a result, various combinations of ‘old’ and ‘new’ ideas can be produced and transferred to the home country or other immigration countries. Through interaction, immigrants can also modify the ‘interpretative frames’ they have brought (Levitt 1998). Modifying the interpretive frames is a function of immigrants’ interaction with the host community; more contact with the host society leads to more exposure to its different features and potentially encourages migrants to reflect on their own practices and adopt or create new ones. Levitt (2001: 57) identified three categories of migrants defined by their level of acquiring social remittances: 1) ‘recipient observers’, who spend their time mostly with co-ethnics. They change little themselves but passively imitate aspects of the receiving society. 2) ‘Instrumental adopters’ are more integrated and change

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10 Cited in (White & Grabowsk, 2019)
their ways for pragmatic reasons. 3) ‘Purposeful innovators’, who ‘want to learn and benefit from the new world around them and deliberately develop new ideas and practices (Levitt (2001: 57).

Contact with the host society, in turn, depends on one hand on the socio-economic character of the immigrants. Those with a good education or economic resources can have a job opportunity that enables them to have a broader range of social contact (Levitt, 1998: 930). Other factors such as age, gender, cultural background, and individual agency affect contact with the host society. For example, Blum (2015)\(^\text{11}\) argues that migrants’ likelihood of acquiring social remittances depends on their individual capacity for reflexivity. It involves making comparisons between destination and origin locations and recognising variations. The gender of migrants has an essential dimension in the acquisition process. Several studies of Polish migrants conclude that women gained social remittances more easily than men (Grabowska-Lusińska and Jaźwińska-Motylska 2013; Mole, Parutis, Gerry and Burns 2017; Siara 2009)\(^\text{12}\). This study will explore the gender dimension in social remittances acquisition among the Sudanese and its underlying causes.

On the other hand, contact with the host society depends on structural opportunity, which in turn depends on several factors. Ramírez and colleagues argue that “patterns of sending remittances are influenced by a series of political, social and economic factors about the destination country, and crosscut by gender dynamics” (Ramírez et al., 2005: 27). The same could be said for the acquisition of social remittances. For example, opportunities available to women are not similar to that of men. Numerous studies show that women are often employed in the services sector regardless of their skills (see (IOM, 2014)). The services sector allows more social contact across cultures; this may explain why women easily acquire social remittances more than men.

Acquiring social remittances also depends on the social context (cultural factors). Literature shows that migration’s impact on GE depends on the social norms of immigration countries. In other words, migration towards gender-egalitarian countries may improve GE, while

\(^{11}\) Cited in ibid
\(^{12}\) Cited in ibid
migration to countries with traditional gender norms may have the opposite impact. For example, a study in Jordan shows negative externalities, where women in households that experience migration to countries with highly conservative gender norms have more discriminatory gender norms than in non-migrant households (Tuccio & Wahba, 2018). Similarly, Bertoli and Marchetta (2015)\textsuperscript{13} found that returnees in Egypt tend to have a similar number of children to the number prevailing in the destination. On the other hand, returnees from Gulf countries tend to have more children than non-migrants, which indicates deterioration in their GMs. In contrast, studies show that returnees from the UK have improved gender equality at the household level in Poland (White, 2011a: 92-93)\textsuperscript{14} and that in some localities, wives are more suited than husbands to take the role of the essential breadwinner (Ibid: 96-97). Moreover, (Gruntz & Pagès-ElKaroui, 2013: 74) argue that immigrants’ social exclusion due to ethnic and gender parameters in the Gulf and the illegal status of others in France [or social discrimination in Europe] arouse feelings of isolation. This involves comparing host and country of origin, leading to a better appreciation of norms in countries of origin and is often not favourable to acquiring social remittances. However, developing a bifocal perspective can be a social remittance in itself (Garapich 2016)\textsuperscript{15}.

Another contextual feature that should be considered is what Vertovec (2007) calls ‘super-diversity’. Immigration countries are often increasing culturally heterogeneous, with migrants worldwide. The gender norms of other migrant groups may influence the gender norms of the migrant group under consideration. Grabowska notes that immigrants acquire social remittances by encountering natives, co-nationals, and migrants from other countries (Grabowska 2018b)\textsuperscript{16}.

\textsuperscript{13} Cited in (Tuccio & Wahba 2020)
\textsuperscript{14} Cited in (Grabowska & Godfried 2016)
\textsuperscript{15} Cited in (White & Grabowska, 2019)
\textsuperscript{16} Cited in (White & Grabowska, 2019)
B. Transfer Stage:
The transfer stage involves the travel of acquired remittances from the host country to the place of origin. Transfer depends on many factors:

Firstly, transfer depends on the type of social remittances. Not all acquired remittances are transferable. Some ideas or practices are too innovative for the community of origin and impossible to be introduced. Migrants who acquire such ideas and practices may even prefer their home country to remain unchanged. Hence, they deliberately do not remit such innovative social remittances (White & Grabowsk, 2019).

Secondly, transfer depends on the mode of transfer. For example, the transfer occurs when migrants return to live or visit their communities of origin when non-migrants visit migrants in the host country or through the modern interpersonal communication (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2010). However, face-to-face transfer is more influential than mediated contact (Grabowska & Garapich 2016: 2155).

Thirdly, the traits of the remitters. Not every migrant can send social remittances; transfer depends on the remitters' charisma, social positions, and networks. Higher-status individuals are better equipped to transmit social remittances (Levitt 1998: 931). Grabowska (Grabowska, 2018: 85) identifies other traits such as helpfulness and openness. High skills are also considered effective traits (Sturje et al., 2016). Similarly, transfer depends on the gender of the remitters. Though both men and women are change agents, female migration is considerably more significant (Ferrant & Tuccio, 2015). This may be related to the fact that women are more socially interactive than men, as will be discussed later.

C. Outcomes Stage:
The outcomes stage involves the implementation and adaptation of transferred social remittances. Literature shows that not all social remittances are appreciated in the receiving countries (Garapich 2016). Scholars identify varying degrees of acceptability for different remitted ideas and practices within and across countries. For example, ideas and practices about GE remitted from the USA are easily accepted by female non-migrants in Kazakhstan, while volunteering is not (Blum, 2016: 160). In contrast, social remittances transferred to Egypt from Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia were generally not appreciated, and emigrants
and returnees are often seen as interlopers who spread foreign culture (Gruntz & Pagès-ElKaroui, 2013: 74). In Egypt, returnees from Europe are also criticised for their individualistic behaviours and Westernised morals (Baron 2007)\(^\text{17}\). Resistance is also observed in Poland, where the society shows a precautionary attitude towards new ideas and behaviours propagated by migrants (Dzieglewski 2016: 178)\(^\text{18}\).

Most literature on social remittances focuses on the outcomes (Grabowska & Garapich, 2016a, 2016b; Grabowska et al., 2017a; Guzman et al., 2008; Markley, 2011). While the acquisition process has been theorised, there remains limited empirical data on how it unfolds in practice. To contribute to filling this lacuna, the study is about acquiring social remittances in transnational spaces. This study is about whether and how the Sudanese gender ideas and behaviours were challenged and changed in Glasgow. It explores how political, social and economic factors in Glasgow and Sudan intersect with individual characters to affect the creation of social remittances by Sudanese immigrants. The capability approach is flexible enough to capture the impact of the national and cross-national effects on gender norms and that of individual factors.

2.5- Sen’s Capability Approach (SCA)

Samuelson’s Capability Approach (SCA) has been widely used in the development field over the last two to three decades to measure wellbeing, development, and justice. It constitutes the core principles of a development approach that has evolved in the UNDP’s Human Development Reports launched in 1990. Human development is conceptually founded on SCA, particularly Sen’s phrase that “the objective of development is to expand capabilities” (Alkire, 2002: 3; Fukuda-Parr, 2003: 303). Thus, development is no longer considered solely in economic growth but has expanded to cover many positive changes. SCA is suitable for this study for three reasons. 1) It assesses tangible and intangible outcomes, which allows the acquisition of social remittances to be assessed. 2) It acknowledges inter-individual differences; as GNs are inherently contested and are valued differently by different people, SCA helps to provide a sense of this variability. 3) Similarly, it allows the assessment of individual variation to convert opportunities to wellbeing. The focus on location and social context factors allows

\(^{17}\) Cited in (Gruntz & Pagès-ElKaroui, 2013)
\(^{18}\) Cited in (White, 2019)
capturing the impact of Glasgow as a ‘host’ environment and the sending country on the respondent’s ability to acquire social remittances.

SCA’s conceptual core is that a good life is reached when people are free to choose and able to obtain what they have reason to consider essential to do or to be. Sen places a high value on freedom. He argues that greater freedom is both a value and the principal determinant of social effectiveness. Freedom enhances the ability of people not only to help themselves but to influence the world (Sen, 1999: 18). He views freedom as both means and end, arguing that: “In this approach, expansion of freedom is viewed as both (1) the primary end and (2) the principal means of development. They can be called, respectively, the ‘constitutive role’ and the ‘instrumental role’ of freedom in development” (Sen, 1999: 36). To provide a concrete example, the freedom for women and men to have equal obligations and rights is considered a constitutive role/end in the development process. While freedom for them to raise awareness about GE or to introduce policies related to this is an instrumental role/means to achieve GE. Sen also distinguishes between “doing x” and “choosing to do x and doing it” (Sen, 1992: 52). That is to say, for example, that ‘cooking’ is not the same as ‘choosing to cook and doing it’. The first case may not be valued by the actor, but she/he has no opportunity to choose otherwise. Sen sees human beings as the end of development processes, while the increase in economic growth is means (Alkire, 2005: 117). In this sense, Sen (1999) conceptualised development as the process of expanding the substantive freedoms that people enjoy. He used the concept of ‘human capability’ to mean “the real opportunity that we have to accomplish what we value”. Hence, he suggests three dimensions of freedom:

The opportunity dimension of freedom concerns access to combinations of choices that individuals consider valuable for their wellbeing. However, choices are not equally important for everyone, and choices that are not valuable for a specific individual may have adverse impacts. As Sen states, increasing choices does not necessarily lead to an increase in freedom: the additional choices may not be valued, or they might remove the option to live “a peaceful and unbothered life” (Dang, 2014). For example, a couple who emigrated from Sudan to Glasgow may experience GNs differently. While the wife may benefit from increased rights, this value may adversely affect the husband’s wellbeing. Wellbeing freedom is the second dimension. It is related to the objectives that a person values; that is, it concerns the subjective evaluation of wellbeing. One woman might see her participation in
decision-making as essential for her wellbeing, while another sees the reverse. Even if the latter has the opportunity to participate in decision-making, she might not value this, while the former might be striving to achieve this goal but has no access to the opportunities that would enable her to achieve it. Thus, both women have reduced wellbeing in terms of participation in decision-making. As Sen states: “The ‘good life’ is partly a life of genuine choice and not one in which the person is forced into a particular life” (Sen, 1985a).

The third dimension of freedom is the ability of individuals to utilise the real opportunities available to them to achieve the wellbeing they value. Sen refers to this ability as “agency” and defines it as “what a person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important” (Sen, 1985: 203). Agency is process freedom, “that the procedure of free decision by the person himself [...] it is an important requirement of freedom”, regardless of the outcome (Sen, 2002: 585). Agency is intrinsically valued: Acting freely and being able to choose are, in this view, directly conducive to wellbeing (Sen, 1992: 51). Sen also emphasises the individual’s choice concerning wellbeing and their subjective judgement of the outcomes: “someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well” (Sen, 1999:19). To return to the example of the woman who wishes to participate in decision-making, although she can act to achieve what she values, her agency may/may not enable her to utilise the choices available to her to achieve her goal. In Sen’s language, her agency may or may not allow her to convert real opportunities into functionings, which he defines as what a person “manages to do or to be”, and which include achievements such as being well-nourished, healthy, able to participate in social life, and so on (Sen, 1985b: 10; 2005: 5).

Therefore, Sen emphasises the need to consider variation in people’s capacity to convert resources into valuable achievements in response to their personal and locational factors and social context (Sen, 1985a). He uses the term “conversion factors” to capture the relation between a good and the achievement of certain states of being and doing, which is the degree to which a person can transform a resource into a functioning. He identifies three types of conversion factors: personal, related to individual attributes such as physical condition, age, and gender; social, related to social factors within which the individual is located, such as
institutions, cultural and social norms, public policies, gender relations, discriminating practices, and power relations; and environmental, related to natural factors and public facilities such as climate, pollution, education and health facilities (Sen, 1992:19-20, 26-30, 37-38). The three conversion factors are complementary and are essential to achieving wellbeing valued by persons. For instance, a migrant woman is able to utilise the available GNs and social policy (social) and women’s support institutions (environmental) in the host country to share home chores with her husband on an equal basis. SCA is used in this study to explore which ‘wellbeings’ in terms of GNs are valued by the respondents and their capability to achieve their goal. The conversion factors will guide the analysis chapters. Each chapter will be divided into three sections to explore one of the three conversion factors’ impacts on the respondents’ GNs.

2.5.1 Capability Approach, Development and Critiques

SCA is interpreted and applied differently in diverse disciplines and criticised in each, such as development economics, politics, human development and feminist discourses (see (Chandler, 2014; Gasper & Van-Staveren, 2003; Northover, 2012; Prendergast, 2005)).

It is, for example, criticised for being individualistic and not considering the social environment and other structural factors that affect individuals’ capabilities (Ibrahim, 2006: 401; Stewart, 2005: 185), despite covering the three conversion factors. Ibrahim (2006, 401) rightly responded to this critique by saying that Sen considers the political and social affairs and “the importance of social values in affecting the individual’s acts of sympathy and commitment.” Similarly, (Gore, 1997: 241-3) argues that SCA is individualistic only in the sense that it takes the individual rather than the household as the primary unit of analysis since SCA considers conversion factors and social functionings (such as taking part in the life of the community, communicating, being well-integrated in society). This understanding is also appreciated by feminist scholars, who argue that the social and environmental conversion factors enable the analysis of several societal features, such as social norms and discriminatory practices (Robeyns, 2003). Both the conversion factors and individualistic characteristics of the approach are endorsed in this study, which provides empirical support for this argument by using the individual as the primary unit of analysis and showing how the
personal conversion factors interact with the social and environmental conversion factors to determine individuals’ wellbeing.

Scholars have also criticised SCA for being fluid and not having a definite list of capabilities to measure gender inequality. There has been an intense debate regarding this issue. For example, Nussbaum, who, along with Amartya Sen, can be said to have founded the capability approach, has drawn a list of ten items that she considers universally valid as the first step that may be adapted to the context (Nussbaum, 2001: 72-81). However, Sen responds that “The problem is not with listing important capabilities, but with insisting on one predetermined canonical list of capabilities” (Sen, 2004: 77-80). (Robeyns, 2003: 70-2) endorses Sen’s argument and suggests a procedure of five criteria to select capabilities related to gender inequality in the West. She used these criteria and presented a list to assess gender inequality in the West. I also agree with Sen’s argument because SCA is context-dependent that considers both social and environmental contexts. Thus, neither Robeyns nor Nussbaum’s views of having a regional nor universal list of capabilities are logical. If we think of the West (as smaller than the universe), we see that it is not homogenous in terms of political and socioeconomic context; most of its countries have heterogeneous cultures and ethnicities and are parts of transnational spaces for some citizens (who were born abroad). This diversity renders having a national list of gender inequality capabilities misleading rather than regional or universal. Hence, the fluidity of SCA is helpful in this study, allowing me to select the suitable criteria for the respondents and follow the new indicators they stated.

The primary critique of SCA, however, is related to the definition of “development as freedom” and its two categories of instrumental (means) and constitutive (end) freedoms. Scholars in diverse disciplines energetically debate this definition (for review see (Alkire, 2008; Clark, 2005; Navarro, 2000).

“The freedom of businesses to pollute the environment limits the freedom of citizens to enjoy an unpolluted environment…. and so on …. Indeed, we can go further: any particular freedom involves the idea of constraint: for person, P is only free to do action A if other people are constrained from interfering with A” (Nussbaum, 2003: 44).
Freedom of choice is an important issue I will return to it shortly. However, my concern here is about how Sen uses ‘freedom’ and whether there is a distinction between instrumental and constitutive freedoms. It will help me understand the conflict of choices between spouses. My reading of Sen’s work suggests that he does not define the word ‘freedom’ and uses it to mean ‘unrestricting’ in the context of instrumental freedom and ‘functionings’ (achieved wellbeing) concerning constitutive/end freedom. For example, he states that the most critical aspect of freedom is “the extent to which people have the opportunity to achieve outcomes that they value and have reason to value” (Sen, 1999:291). That is, he considers instrumental freedom as the removal of barriers to achieving individuals’ valued functionings. He identifies five categories of \textit{instrumental} freedoms: political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security (Sen, 1999, ch.2). These categories cover social and environmental conversion factors. Therefore, I will use the conversion factors rather than instrumental freedom in this study.

Sen refers to constitutive (end) freedom as a state of being free from poverty, illness, ignorance, discrimination... etc. (Sen 1999). This understanding has been criticised by many scholars and described as a misuse of the term ‘freedom’ (Sen 2003:12) and “…endorsement of freedom/ capability as a goal would be hopelessly vague” (Nussbaum 2003: 47). Sen responds to this critique and calls for distinguishing between “freedom from malaria as such and the other freedoms that result from not having malaria (e.g., being able to move about freely, take on work, etc.)”. He argues that being free from malaria (its elimination by policy intervention) does not add to the freedom due to the reduction of the alternatives (having or not having malaria) to choose from and calls for considering counterfactual choice. He concludes that “seeing freedom in terms of counterfactual choice helps us to understand and interpret these statements and makes them cogent” (2003: 12-14). In my understanding, whether we consider the alternative opportunities or counterfactual choices, constitutive freedom is still a ‘functioning’, and should be understood as a personal attribute to be developed. However, there is a need for a definition to give this meaning. In my view, Taha’s definition of the liberal person, despite not being used in the academic field, is suitable. He defines the liberal person as:

\footnote{Leader of Republicans Movement to which I belong \url{https://www.alfikra.org/index_e.php}}

\footnote{Translated from Arabic}
The person who thinks as he wants, says as he thinks, and acts as he says, then shoulders the responsibility for his actions, according to constitutional laws (Taha, 1967b).

This definition considers ‘constitutive freedom’ as a personal moral attribute every individual should develop to achieve justice.

In other words, it is a moral attribute that prevents people from transgressing others’ freedom. Hence, developing a reasonable level of constitutive freedom is necessary to solve the issue of ‘freedom of choice’. Everybody is free to choose how they think, say and act with the condition not to transgress others’ freedom. The availability of constitutional laws that equally protect the rights of all individuals, regardless of their sexes, is crucial for controlling those who transgress others’ freedom because of their weak constitutive freedom. For example, the laws give women the right to be the only wife of their husbands and protect them from men who have not developed their constitutive freedom and want to have second wives. Those whose moral is not enough to protect others’ rights will be responsible according to these laws. The responsibility part of this definition is essential to resolve the problem of choice—the conflict of interest between spouses about GE.

Sen, however, has other definitions of development than ‘development is freedom’. He defines development at two levels: the first is “positive processes of social, economic and political changes that expand valued capabilities” (Sen, 1990); the second is “the process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen, 1999: 3). That is, development is the process of expanding at least one of the three freedoms discussed above. These definitions show that “development” should be achieved at two complementary levels: structural and individual. Structural means improvement of the context (the opportunities and freedom) to accommodate the wellbeing valued by the individual, while at the individual level means enhancing people’s ability (agency) to choose and achieve what they value, given real opportunities. Change in the agency may lead to valuing better wellbeing, which in turn may lead to intervention to enhance the real opportunities, and so on.
This study employs Sen’s development perception and defines it as a process of valuing a status of higher wellbeing due to a change in opportunities and functioning and again in the agency that enables the individual to pursue her/his goals. In this study, higher wellbeing refers to more egalitarian GNs than those respondents experienced in their home country. Change in opportunities concerns improving access to resources and to a social and environmental context that supports GE; functionings are newly acquired intellectual and/or material resources, and agency gain refers to increased power—due to an increase in valuing GE and/or the existence of structural factors that support GE—to achieve their goals.

This definition will be used to explore women’s and men’s achievements and views on progress towards GE compared to their GNs when they arrived in Glasgow. Men’s progress towards GE will improve their functionings by gaining GE-related knowledge or experience of different gender relations that positively change GE. This change may allow them to acquire sufficient agency to support GE against community norms.

The analysis will also consider two factors that may counteract the progress achieved in the host context. The first is the GNs of the spouse. Variation of GNs between spouses may adversely impact the respondents’ wellbeing. For example, a woman may acquire new resources and theoretically gain in the agency, but the husband’s counteraction may adversely affect her participation in decision-making; hence, the outcome depends on the agency level she gains. The second factor is transnationalism. In the era of transnationalism, as discussed on pages (38-39), we cannot ignore the respondents’ transnational activities as these may reinforce the GNs, they brought with them. For example, requests for remittances may constrain some men as providers to improve their functionings and trap them in menial jobs that do not require language or allow sufficient contact with other cultures for change to occur.

To achieve sustainable change towards GE, the focus should be on changing the GNs of both sexes. However, a change in gender ideology is vital. Otherwise, a change in gender relations may be purely strategic to cope with a particular situation and not last beyond this. Only when accompanied by a gender ideology change will it be a genuine change that lasts. Furthermore, the ideological change should not be conditioned by many factors, such as a change in access to material resources. Instead, it should be due to a change in women’s and men’s perceptions of women’s value as human beings equal to men in their duties and rights.
2.5.2 Sen’s Capability Approach and the Analysis Plan:

Figure (2-1): Analysis Framework

Figure (2-1) illustrates how SCA will be used. It is assumed that respondents have moved from Sudan to the UK due to particular environmental conversion factors in both countries, and the variations in environmental and social conversion factors between the two countries are expected to lead to changes in the agency of the respondents. Respondents are assumed to come to Glasgow with specific functionings/personal conversion factors (sex, education, employment experience, GNs, migration experience), and they may utilise the available environmental conversion factors (education, employment facilities) to improve their functionings. The concern here is improving the knowledge and financial resources that may alter their agencies and GNs. The environmental conversion factors that may provide access to these resources are the labour-market and social networks. Access to the environmental conversion factors is mediated by social conversion factors: the communities’ GNs; the attitudes towards immigrants; antisocial behaviours; transnational activities; and length of time in the immigration setting. Improvement in respondents’ functionings may improve their agency, allowing them to choose from the available sets of GNs the wellbeing they value. Available GNs are not specified because of the situation of superdiversity; however, we expect the most significant influence will be that of the dominant—i.e., Scottish—GNs. The
study, therefore, explores the change in respondents’ GNs rather than comparing their GNs with specific sets. Respondents may value GNs that improve GE or the reverse.

2.6 Research Questions
As mentioned above, this study contributes to filling some gaps in the Migration-Development literature. The central gap it fills is understanding how progress towards GE can be achieved in migration-receiving countries. It contributes to understanding whether and how migration to a more gender-egalitarian setting impacts immigrants’ progress towards attaining GE. From the migration-development perspective, it studies the acquisition of social remittances in transnational contexts. Focusing on gender relations and ideologies (GNs), the study utilises SCA to explore whether and how the respondents’ movement to Glasgow impacts their GNs. An essential contribution will be on change in gender ideology, which has received less attention in the related literature. The study assesses whether the change in respondents’ gender relations (if any) is accompanied by a change in gender ideologies. The study also contributes to enriching the literature on the Sudanese migration experience. The Sudanese community—of both sexes—in Glasgow is large enough to be studied, and there is considerable variation in their socioeconomic characteristics, migration status, ages and time living in Glasgow. The diversity of this community is suitable to answer my research questions.

The overarching research question and the set of sub-questions that guide this work are as follows: Whether and how migration impacts progress towards achieving GE among the Sudanese women and men in Glasgow. The question seeks to understand whether and how respondents’ migration affects two dimensions of GE: gender relations and gender ideologies. Four sub-questions will be addressed:

1. How does Glasgow’s setting contribute to the reinforcement or reconfiguration of Sudanese GNs? This question explores how Glasgow’s context facilitates or constrains respondents’ access to tangible and intangible resources that may affect their GNs.
2. How do the transnational activities of the Sudanese migrants in Glasgow contribute to the reinforcement or reconfiguration of their GNs? This question seeks to understand how Sudan’s socioeconomic situation shapes the respondents’ lives and GNs.

3. How and to what extent do the Sudanese immigrants in Glasgow believe that their gender relations have been reshaped? This question captures respondents’ views on the change in their GNs since they arrived in Glasgow, given their socioeconomic characteristics and length of time in Glasgow. In addition, it assesses change in their gender relations in the private sphere focusing on change in sharing three parameters: power, labour, and resources.

4. How are changes in GE (if any) viewed by the Sudanese women and men in Glasgow? This question assesses changes in gender ideologies. It seeks to understand whether the change in gender relations is accompanied by a change in gender ideologies that will assure its sustainability and likelihood of transmission to the home country.

2.7- Conclusion

This chapter examined the claim that migration to a more gender-egalitarian setting enhances GE based on the literature review. Few studies have examined changes in gender relations or gender ideologies due to moving to a culturally different setting. If they have, they often consider only one parameter (gender relations or ideologies); one sex (usually females), one culture (the host’s dominant culture); or one space (hosting space). This research contributes to filling these gaps by considering these dimensions together. The Sudanese community is both large and diverse enough to answer the research questions. Understanding such complex issues requires a rigorous approach and theoretical framework like that provided by SCA. Similarly, tracing shifts in GE in transnational spaces requires a qualitative approach that enables the researcher to immerse themselves in the community to the extent that they are able to capture the underlying factors that shape such shifts. The research and analysis methods are examined in detail in the following chapter.
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction
The study explores the effect of migration on people's behaviours and perceptions. It explores how migrant women and men experience challenges posed by migration on their GNs and how they view these challenges. Collecting relevant—and rich—data requires a research methodology that enables the researcher to immerse herself in the community and build strong affinity and trust. As migration settings are a core element of the study, the research explores the effect of living in Glasgow on the respondents' GNs; this entails employing a research approach that explores contextual factors.

The chapter describes the discussion around the research question proposed and justifies the methods chosen to research the social remittances acquisition in transnational spaces. It commences with the justification of interpretivism and constructionism as the suitable epistemological and ontological positions for the study before discussing the research strategy, sampling, research process and data collection techniques. Next, it discusses research ethics, reflexivity and the researcher's positionality. Finally, the data analysis process is examined, and a conclusion is drawn.

3.2 Epistemological and Ontological Positions
This section seeks to identify the epistemological and ontological positions that shape the study. Deciding on these positions is essential for planning the rest of the research. Epistemology is about "what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline, [...] and whether the social world can and should be studied according to the same principles, procedures, and ethos as the natural sciences" (Bryman, 2004: 11). Accordingly, epistemology provides a philosophical grounding for assessing what constitutes valid and adequate knowledge. Methodological scholars identify two epistemological positions: positivism and interpretivism. The former advocates using the methods of natural science to study social science, while the latter advocates for not using the methods of natural science; due to the variation in the research nature in natural
(objects) and social (people and institutions) sciences. Furthermore, interpretivism emphasises understanding the social world by examining the interpretation of that world by its participants (Bryman, 2004: 266; Zina, 2013: 6). This study is about the social world, which, following Bryman, I view as dynamic "social constructions built up from the perceptions and actions of social actors" (Bryman, 2004:17); and I believe it should be understood "through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants" (Bryman, 2004: 266). This study requires an epistemological approach that understands GNs as social constructions that respond to people's interactions in their environment. Therefore, interpretivism will be used to explore the impact of migration on the GNs of a diverse group of women and men who move into a multicultural society that has various GNs.

In line with this decision, I next need to choose the ontological position that matches the epistemological approach of interpretivism. Social ontology concerns the nature of social entities and "whether it can be or should be considered as objective entities that have reality external to social actors" (an approach classified as objectivism) or "whether they can and should be considered as social constructions built up from the perceptions and actions of social actors" (an approach classified as constructionism). Objectivists view the social world and its meanings as existing independently of social actors. In contrast, constructionists view the social world as dynamic and in a state of continuous change due to the actors' interactions (Bryman, 2004: 17). This study's research question is formulated to emphasise the dynamic nature of the social entity and the actors' active role in its change. Therefore, I believe a constructionist position is most suitable.

Social constructionism has no single distinctive feature. However, (Burr, 2003: 2-5) cites Gergen (1985) to identify four features, at least one of which is required for an approach to be labelled as constructionist:

1. The rejection of a "taken-for-granted" understanding of the world encourages researchers to reject any claims of objectivity and lack of bias in world observations. For example, objective observation reveals two human genders (women and men), whereas constructionism invites us to investigate whether these categories and their traits are a natural occurrence or social construction.
2. An understanding of the world, its categories and concepts is historically and culturally specific and dependent upon the particular context's socioeconomic arrangements. For example, GNs in the UK today are different from those of two or three decades ago from those in Sudan.

3. The viewing of phenomena as products of a historical process of interaction and negotiation between different groups of people. For example, GNs in Sudan today are a product of interactions between people in the medieval era that changed its matrilineal system to a patriarchal one (see pages 107-109).

4. A belief that "knowledge and social action go together" implies that knowledge about the phenomenon under study sustains or constrains society's behaviour pattern. For example (and as will be discussed in the next chapter), Boddy's claim (2007: 152) that British colonisers enacted a law against the practice of FGM in Sudan because of their knowledge that FGM may cause infertility and they wished to secure a labour force for cotton production.

This research proceeds in a manner that rejects taken-for-granted ways of understanding the world and by which I conduct an in-depth investigation regardless of my prior knowledge about the phenomenon. In addition, the research is based on the premise that the world, its categories and concepts are both spatial-temporal and culturally specific. In this regard, the study considers respondents' GNs pre-and post-migration, the contextual spaces of Glasgow and Sudan, and the respondents' daily local and transnational interactions. It views a phenomenon as a social construct resulting from people's daily interactions.

Constructionist assumptions also have methodological implications because they are based on the premise that: there is no clear distinction between knowledge and reality; the researchers are not distinct from the researched; interactions between the researched and researcher are essential in the research. Burr (2003: 151-159) points out four methodological implications and assumptions for constructionism, which will be considered in this study:

I) The first is that the researcher's objectivity is impossible and that the questions we ask, the hypotheses and theories we use, must arise from assumptions embedded in our perspectives. Simply, this means no human being can step outside their humanity to view the world from
no position at all. This assumption poses significant challenges for researchers. Researchers should acknowledge and work with their intrinsic involvement in the research process and the part this plays in the results. They should also view the research as a co-product between themselves and the respondents. I regarded the research as a co-product between the respondents and me, one in which I followed new points that emerged during the interviews and consulted respondents on some aspects of data collection methods, as I will explain later.

ii) The second is democratising the researcher-researched relationship by giving both parties equal voices. The researcher should not interpret the interviews differently from the respondents’ meaning and must acknowledge the validity of the participants' accounts. My situation as a co-national sharing some migration experiences with the researched enabled me to fulfil this assumption relatively. My language skills and familiarity with the culture helped me follow the respondents narrates and interrupt where necessary to ensure that I captured their words and linguistically understood them correctly. Although it is impossible to understand the respondents' meanings fully, our shared culture and experiences helped me interpret their accounts to ensure they were as close as possible to what they meant.

iii) The third assumption, reflexivity, pertains to acknowledging the researcher's social construction and how this affects the research process and accepting that, like any other theory, constructionism is a social construct. In addition, it acknowledges the researcher's personal and political values and perceptions and how they influence the research. I am aware of my subjectivity and how it shapes the entire study. (Further details are in section 3.6.)

iv) The fourth assumption concerns the reliability and validity of the research. The tools used to evaluate objective research—reliability, validity, and replicability—are not suitable for a constructionism approach. No criterion could be applied universally to judge constructionists' accounts. However, different methods are used to show that the research is carried out systematically. Examples include the provision of in-depth information on how the research was carried out; "member checks"—that is, the researcher asks for feedback from the researched; 'usefulness and fruitfulness', which is about the power of the analysis to generate theory development, novel explanations and to cast further light on previous research findings; and the provision of documentation that enables readers to track the analytical process (Burr, 2003). To validate my study, I provide rich information on the research process (see section 3.4).
The assumptions of the constructionist position necessitate using a research strategy that enables the researcher to go deep into the social entity to explore the change in the social phenomenon and the actors' role in this change. The following section discusses research strategies and which one this study will adopt.

3.3 Research Strategy

Social research approaches are numerous, yet only some can reasonably be considered scientific\(^1\) (Robson, 2011: 13). Quantitative and qualitative research strategies are the most frequently used academic field approaches. Though numerous social scientists (Bryman, 2004: ch. 3 & ch13; Miles et al., 2014: 9; Robson, 2011: 18-; Sarantakos, 1998: 54-5; Silverman, 2010: 118-20) discuss the comparison, antagonism and crossroads between the two strategies, the distinction between them remain ambiguous (Bryman, 2004, 19). An essential feature of quantitative research is that of being guided by a theoretical framework to collect numerical data that are analysed statistically to examine the relationship between a set of predefined variables. In contrast, qualitative research is guided by a theoretical framework to investigate, understand and explain how and why people interpret their social life in a specific way through the collection and analysis of non-numerical data used to test or build a theory.

Most researchers choose one strategy that best suits their research questions, although an approach that combines the two in multi-strategies or mixed methods is steadily increasing (see, for example,(Datta et al., 2009). However, numerous studies (Asaolu et al., 2018; Brako, 2013; Gerling et al., 2019; Gracia & Esping-Andersen, 2015b; Hoherz, 2017; Kyoore & Sulemana, 2019; Qian & Sayer, 2016) have used the quantitative approach to study progress towards GE and empowerment. Although these studies have established relations between GE and some explanatory factors such as educational attainment and employment, they have not sufficiently explained these relations. For example, some studies (Gracia & Esping-Andersen, 2015a; Hoherz, 2017; Qian & Sayer, 2016) show that the spouses of

\(^{21}\) Scientific research has features such as “the use of rigorous systematic procedures; that it is empirical, involving the collection of data or information of some type; that these data are analysed in ways that are adequate to justify whatever conclusion are drawn.” (Robson, 2011, 14)
employed women spend more time on cooking or childcare than the spouses of women who are not employed; but the studies do not explain why they carry out the tasks or who carries them out on the days the women are off work or on leave. Others consider contextual factors (Asaolu et al., 2018; Gerling et al., 2019; Gracia & Esping-Andersen, 2015a), such as modernisation or gender development indices when comparing achievement in two or more settings; however, they do not explain how these settings contribute to the change. Progress towards GE, if not impossible, is at the very least challenging to measure quantitatively as it requires an approach that allows researchers to immerse themselves in the society being studied to capture the complexity of the process and to bring a "deeper understanding of the sample it studies" (Hammersley, 2013: 12).

Therefore, this study will employ a qualitative approach to capture rich data. However, as using quantitative methods permits us to describe phenomena numerically and make sense of the world around us (Stockemer et al., 2019), I will use the quantitative approach as a secondary tool to provide descriptive statistics, such as illustrating the respondents' sociodemographic characteristics. Similarly, I will use the online data sets to describe the respondents' emigration and immigration settings and the Sudanese emigration trends. These data help to understand the respondents' interactions and behaviours that may affect their GNs. However, my primary reliance is on qualitative methods, which I will use to analyse the data I collect to gauge progress towards GE.

Hammersley (2013, 12) understands qualitative research as "a form of social inquiry that tends to adopt a flexible and data-driven research design, to use relatively unstructured data, to emphasise the essential role of subjectivity in the research process, to study a small number of naturally occurring cases in detail, and to use verbal rather than statistical forms of analysis." This description illustrates why the qualitative approach is more suitable for my study, not only because it deals with words rather than numbers or is inductive rather than deductive; more importantly, it is because it emphasises "the ways in which individuals interpret their social world, and also embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of individuals' creation" (see Bryman, 2004, 20). Furthermore, "it seeks to understand social reality in its own terms; […] seeks to understand how social order is created through talk and interactions; exhibits a concern with subjectivity and gaining access to inside experience and is sensitive to the different ways social reality can be constructed"
Increasingly, researchers use the qualitative approach to understand the effect of migration on gender relations and/or ideologies of women and/or men (Abdi, 2014; Asima, 2010; Batnitzky et al., 2009; Curro, 2012; Datta et al., 2009; Sulem, 2013; Szczepanikova, 2012). They use combinations of individual and structural factors to help understand migrant interactions in the setting of their new homes. Researchers who assess women's empowerment use proxies such as education level, employment, improvement in health or time spent on home-chores. Malhotra and colleagues (2002) review literature on women's empowerment, focusing on measurement variables. They criticise indicators such as education and health as "conceptually distant from the dimensions of gender stratification that are hypothesised to affect the outcomes of interest in these studies, and may in some cases be irrelevant or misleading." (Malhotra et al., 2002: 19). I agree with their argument that empowerment is a process and thus cannot be quantified. I would also add that although the variables in question measure the change in 'functionings' that may enhance personal conversion factors, this does not necessarily lead to a change in the agency, and it is the agency that is a suitable indicator for measuring empowerment and progress towards GE. I also agree with Malhotra et al. (2002) in their appreciation of the emergence of research that uses variables such as decision-making, choice, and control. Although researchers use quantitative methods, these variables are more related to agency because they indicate a change in power. I will use these parameters to assess change in three dimensions: power-sharing (head of household and decision-making), labour sharing (employment and home-chores), and financial resource sharing.

Regarding gender ideology, the literature shows it is assessed quantitatively by close-ended questions or scales (for example, The Sex-Role Egalitarianism Scale) that measure attitudes regarding equality between women and men (Brako, 2013; Esina et al., 2018; Pulerwitz & Barker, 2008; Walter, 2018a; Walter, 2018b). These contain items that assess how respondents agree with judgments that either support or challenge traditional gender relations. This study is not about measuring gender ideologies but about assessing change in gender ideologies. Specifically, it is about assessing change in the gender ideologies of each respondent between two points in time to discover the impact of migration. The change (if
any) may be for or against achieving GE. To assess change in gender ideologies, I did not ask all respondents a universal set of questions. Instead, I asked questions about changes in a specific set of gender relations. Then I asked related questions to find whether there were changes. That is, to assess change in gender relations, rather than asking each respondent about, for example, how they shared home-chores when they were in Sudan and compare it with how they share them in Glasgow, I asked them to make this comparison themselves by asking whether sharing of home-chores in Glasgow is different from how they shared it in Sudan. If there is change, I asked whether these changes are combined with changes in gender ideologies as this is an indicator of change sustainability beyond Glasgow, i.e., when the respondents return to the context of Sudan (assuming this context has not changed). Similarly, I ask about unchanged gender relations to identify whether resistance to change occurs due to ideologies or other factors. I also ask open-ended questions in the group interviews to assess change in general attitudes towards change in gender relations in the community. I believe this method is more suitable for assessing change in gender ideologies than asking opinions on hypothetical questions because it assesses actual behaviours.

3.4 Sampling Methods

Sampling is one of the most critical challenges that researchers face. The difficulty lies in how to select the sample and how many people should be interviewed. Some researchers use convenience or opportunistic sampling methods, but purposive sampling is highly recommended in qualitative research. The purposive sampling method is the deliberate choice of participants due to their qualities. It is a strategic technique and entails establishing a good correspondence between research questions and sampling; the researcher purposefully selects the information-rich people who can and are willing to provide the information by virtue of knowledge or experience (Etikan et al., 2016b: 2).

Therefore, my sample covers women and men with various attributes (education, age, and employment) (Appendix One) and migration experiences (status, route, and time in the UK). I selected my sample purposively using snowball and participant observation techniques. Snowball is used "to contact a group of people for whom there is no sampling frame" (Bryman, 2004: 334). It is a sampling technique that involves identifying respondents who then refer the researcher to other potential participants; and was used in the study to help access the targeted group as there was no database to select from (Etikan et al., 2016a: 2-3).
For example, I used participant observation to purposefully select people with various migration statuses, education levels, ages and areas of origin. Furthermore, I asked respondents to help me recruit participants with specific attributes. However, a shortcoming of the snowball technique is that it results in a skewed sample because most people associate with people of like mind (ibid: 3). To correct this, I approached various networks. This combination of sampling methods helped me access the community and recruit the number and quality of the sample I wanted. I conducted five group interviews (21 respondents) and 29.5 individual interviews. One of the individual interviewees withdrew her consent two weeks after being interviewed, and I cancelled one interview halfway through because I had the impression that the respondent was not happy to participate. (I will elaborate on this case in the reflexivity section.) The overall sample size of 49 respondents was sufficient to reflect diversity and variation in opinions.

Theoretically, the ideal sample should consider socioeconomic characteristics and migration status variation. Despite recruitment difficulty posed by the logistics of the targeted group's situation and the topic's sensitivity, I have considered variation in gender, age, education levels, migration types and length of time in the UK. The sample was approximately gender-balanced (28 women and 21 men). The age of respondents at the time of the interviews varies between 23 and 65 years; education level varies between analphabetic and possessing a Master's degree; length of immigration to the UK is between two and 22 years; and migration type varies between refugees (25), family reunion (20) and labour migrants (3). 15 of the 28 individual interviews and three of the five focus groups were with women. I planned to conduct two group interviews for each gender and one gender-mixed one. However, no one agreed to participate in the gender-mixed one. After the first group interview, I asked the participants (five women) whether I could discuss these topics in a gender-mixed group. They agreed that I would not receive genuine opinions even if I found people to participate in the group, arguing that neither men nor women would be able to express themselves freely. In particular, women would not trust men not to divulge their contributions to other men and/or to talk negatively about them and their husbands. Furthermore, men might interpret women's accounts in a way that humiliates their husbands and describes them as powerless and dominated by their wives. They advised me not to conduct a mixed group interview because it might lead to conflict and the possible destruction of families. Committed to research ethics (which I will introduce later), I accepted their opinions and sacrificed what might have
proved an insightful opportunity to assess how women and men represent gender relations in front of one another.

Methodology scholars disagree on the optimal size of group interviews. Though some consider six to ten ideal, others consider an interview with two people to be a group interview (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2014). Three of my group interviews were composed of five participants, and two were composed of three participants. Recruitment for individual interviews proved a significant challenge. Though I spotted potential respondents very early on, I could not build rapport with all of them and, therefore, a few avoided—albeit diplomatically—participation. For example, I could not interview anyone from a group of medical doctors despite having good contact with their wives (one of whom I managed to interview). Women were also controlled by their husbands. Some, for example, withdrew after giving verbal consent and another after two weeks of being interviewed. Recruitment of men proved even more complicated than that of women as the type of jobs they do does not allow them much free time. Most work as taxi drivers or security guards and generally work unsocial hours. Their work routine also constrains their wives' participation as they are accessible only when their husbands are at work, i.e., during unsocial hours. Nonetheless, two of them were happy to be interviewed at night when their husbands were at work, and their children were asleep. Both women were very open and cooperative. We spent long hours awake; we slept around 2 am, and I left their houses around 7 am before their husbands arrived. Though initially, it was challenging to stay overnight with people I was not familiar with, it allowed me to gather valuable data. Furthermore, both the women and their husbands considered it a favour, and it was the start of new friendships. Spending the night with them while their husbands were at work provided them with a feeling of security that replaced fear and loneliness. It also created a strong rapport later expressed by exchanging phone calls and invitations. Recruitment for group interviews proved more difficult than individual interviews, particularly for men. For this reason, and due to the topic's sensitivity, I decided to use groups of friends who were happy to express themselves in front of one another.
3.5 Research Process

The research method used in qualitative research is ethnography, where the researcher immerses herself in a setting to collect in-depth data. However, transnationalism entails modifying this method and a move towards a multi-sited ethnographic approach. The term "multi-sited ethnography" was coined by George E. Marcus to study social phenomena that cannot be thoroughly examined by focusing on a single site (Falzon, 2012; Marcus, 1995). It aims to "follow people, connections, associations, and relationships across space" (Falzon, 2012: 1-2). The approach is strongly criticised by conventional ethnographers, such as Geertz for example, who argues that ethnography requires staying in the site of choice for a relatively long period to understand the social relations of the subjects studied and to gain the suitable "depthness" or "thickness" of understanding (Geertz, 1973: 7). Ethnographers design their research and construct a right research site(s). They select a research model that enables them to answer their research questions as best as possible within the limits of their resources. Marcus identifies six strategies for conducting multi-sited research: following people, things, metaphors, stories, lives, and/or conflict. However, physical mobility is unnecessary for all of them, and researchers can move metaphorically between concepts, ideas, or periods (Marcus, 1995: 105-10). Thus, they can embed in and explore multi-sited contexts even though they physically stay in only one node of the transnational network they are studying. This type of multi-sited ethnography is named "foreshortened multi-sited" to differentiate it from "mono-sited" design in which the respondents are located in one site (ibid.: 110-12).

In this study, I opted for a foreshortened multi-sited approach, not only because of my limited resources (time and financial) but, more importantly, because it enabled me to answer my questions without dilution of the study. My study's primary focus is on the effects of migration (transnationalism) on immigrants' concepts and behaviours rather than on their transnational networks. Furthermore, the study places more emphasis on the impact of immigration space. Focusing on one location has enabled me to engage with a broader sample and range of respondents; allowed longer-term participant observation and long and intensive interviews to achieve greater depth in the study. Similarly, I was also able to collect rich data on the effect of immigrants' transnational social lives on their concepts and behaviours. That is, a foreshortened multi-sited approach has enabled me to collect rich data to answer my research questions.
The fieldwork started in November 2015 and lasted for six months. However, participant observation and building rapport with the community started with my decision to conduct my study in Glasgow. Building rapport with the community is crucial to researching a sensitive topic like GNs. Therefore, after I moved from Norway to Glasgow in June 2013, I cautiously approached the community, conscious that failure to build rapport might fail my study program. Data collection began with two pilot interviews, one with each gender. The aim was to test the planned process, how I should ask the questions, and whether I would get a suitable response. The first interview took place with a woman and lasted for ten hours. The woman had rich experience and, as I did not know the UK's immigration procedure, I frequently probed to understand. This interview helped me acquire sufficient knowledge of the immigration procedure that I was able to save time in future interviews; instead, I could focus on the respondents' own experiences.

The pilot interviews were both constructive. I asked for feedback from each interviewee immediately after the interview. I planned to conduct two rounds of interviews with each respondent, but the pilot interviewees did not recommend that. They argued that it is not easy to access women and men, and most would not be available for two rounds. It was good advice, and I adopted it. Regarding the interview topics, both interviewees expressed concern about the questions around remittances. They recommended removing them as most people work in informal jobs while also receiving benefits, and they might suspect I would report them to the authorities. As remittances are a core focus of the study, I could not follow their advice, but it helped me consider how I should pose questions related to the topic and the importance of emphasising confidentiality and anonymity. Consequently, all respondents were happy to discuss the topic of remittances, although some preferred that I did not audio-record the discussion. In this case, written notes were taken. Another topic I had seen as a potential risk was migration experience, but all participants were happy to answer this question, particularly men who had undertaken a risky journey. The pilot interviews helped me amend the study process, not the topics; therefore, both interviews were considered in the sample.
3.6 Research Methods

As stated above, the research methods used in qualitative research are ethnographic (Bryman, 2004). Although ethnography has its origins in anthropology, it has evolved and is now commonly used to study groups and cultures (Parahoo, 2014). Ethnography, participant observation, and fieldwork are all used interchangeably (Bryman, 2004) to study social interactions, behaviours, and perceptions within groups, teams, organisations, and communities (Parahoo, 2014). Ethnographers use various methods and sources to collect data, including interviews, focus groups, historical and contemporary documents and images, but the primary source is observation (ibid). Some of the characteristics of ethnographic studies include an emphasis on the exploration of social phenomena rather than the testing of hypotheses; the tendency to work with unstructured data; the detailed investigation of a small case; and the analysis of data that entails interpretations of human activities, gathered through verbal narratives. The researcher selects one or a combination of methods suitable for collecting the data she/he wants. Triangulation can add breadth and richness to the study (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005: 5) and enhance confidence in the validity of the findings (Greene et al., 2005). Therefore, to help understand how participants make meaning of their lives in their different gendered domains, this study employed in-depth interviews as the primary data generation method; participant observation for triangulation and to identify potential respondents; and several informal chats.

3.6.1 Participant Observation

Participant observation is claimed to be one of the essential methods in social science. It is defined as a: "method of data collection that employs vision as its main means of data collection" (Sarantakos, 1998: 207). Using this technique, researchers participate in participants' daily interactions and activities over an extended period during which they observe, listen, and ask questions to learn about the participants' life experiences. This method was important in this study. It was used throughout the research period, and notes were written or audio-recorded as soon as possible. My position as a 'native' researcher allowed me to interact with the researched community in their day-to-day activities and events and observe people's interactions in different settings. I immersed myself in the community, listening to them, watching their daily lives and asking questions whenever possible. I started using this method on my arrival in Glasgow. As a potential researcher, I
used participant observation to establish relationships with the community to identify the key figures who might facilitate access to the community and to spot potential respondents. The task was not easy, especially considering that the Sudanese Association was no longer functioning almost from the time of my arrival. However, I volunteered in a charity organisation where I established a project that enabled me to communicate with the Sudanese community. This post allowed me to understand the social context and make essential observations. As an employee in a charity, the Sudanese considered me a trustful source of information and support and involved me in some domestic violence cases. As a result, I noticed how their GNs were challenged in the Glasgow setting. For ethical reasons, I could not use these cases as a data source; however, I noted important observations that would inform my research.

Furthermore, I cautiously approached the community, participated in various events (such as wedding ceremonies, funerals and picnics), and engaged in some women-only gathering groups. As a result, I established good relations with people of different genders, ages, and classes. Participation in such events enabled me to observe their interactions and note gender relations and labour division in areas such as cooking, washing up childcare, and shopping—tasks that are almost always divided along gender lines in Sudan. For example, cooking is always a woman's task in events, while organising and overseeing are men's tasks. Similarly, I had an opportunity to assess the community's gender attitudes from their informal chat. Participant observation enabled me to identify new related research sub-topics and to triangulate women's and men's performance in the community with the data I collected.

3.6.2 In-depth Interviews

In-depth interviews are an essential research technique in this study. In-depth interviews in qualitative research are unstructured or semi-structured interviews used with individuals or groups of respondents (Bryman, 2004: 292). Researchers choose the most suitable research method depending on the form of the research question (i.e., specific research topic or general research area) (ibid.: 321). Because I had specific research topics (appendix two), I utilised a semi-structured format with individual and group interviews. Though I used pre-prepared points to guide the interviews, the flexibility of this format allowed me to amend
these points as required to consider parameters that emerged during the interview, such as, for example, conflict over remittances and the role of the breadwinner. Similarly, the flexibility of semi-structured interviews allowed me to probe for more information and to add carry-on questions based on respondents' replies. This flexibility rendered the interviews closer to the storytelling experience, and they were, therefore, more comfortable for respondents.

3.6.2.1 Individual Interviews
The individual interview allows the researcher to investigate the interviewee's personal experience and opinions (Bryman, 2004: 348). I used individual interviews with 28 respondents to explore their migration venture, demographic data, the resources they brought with them, their living experience in Glasgow, their transnational activities and any change in their GNs. The interviews lasted between four to ten hours and were held at a convenient time and location for the respondents. All except two of the interviews with women were held in their homes, while all except one of the interviews with men were held at Caledonian University. The three exceptions were held in my flat; I was alone in the case of women, while for the man, my husband was in the flat but not in the same room. The man is a family friend who was only available for an interview after 9 pm; therefore, he agreed to attend an interview in my flat. The remaining interviews were held during the day, except the two were conducted at night, as explained in the sampling section. Another exceptional case was the interview with a woman via IMO (an audio and video calls Application) because her husband controls her contact with people. I was involved in her domestic violence case through my work, and I contacted her as a researcher after the case had been settled. Her husband had warned her not to contact anybody, but she insisted on participating once I had reassured her regarding confidentiality and anonymity.

3.6.2.2 Focus Group Interviews
Focus group interviews help to answer questions that would prove more challenging to answer in individual interviews or stimulate people to express themselves explicitly (Punch, 1998: 177). They also allow interviewers to probe one another's reasons for holding a specific opinion. In particular, the group dynamic is a strength of the technique because it facilitates focusing on the most critical topics and indicates where participants agreed or disagreed (Robson, 2011: 294). It "works best for topics people could talk about to each other in their
everyday lives—but don't" (Macnaghten & Myers, 2006: 37). I used the technique to explore participants’ opinions on conflicts over resources and remittances and changes in GNs among the researched community. I was interested in their discussing, arguing, and justifying their opinions and attitudes rather than their personal experiences.

The focus group interviews lasted between 90 to 120 minutes. As a moderator, I first introduced the topics and rules, being careful to create trust and an environment of discretion by emphasising confidentiality and the need to avoid offending others and to respect one another’s opinions. I also explained that my aim was not to reach a consensus but to explore various views and attitudes towards the discussed phenomenon. During the discussion, I facilitated the interchanges and, after the conclusion of one topic, moved the discussion on to the next. I often left participants to address, prompt, and challenge each other; however, in the larger groups, it was necessary to intervene more frequently to call on some participants to speak or to ask others to hold off. In one of the large groups of women, it took longer to stimulate discussion and build rapport, which may have been because, until the day of the interview, I had only met one of the women before the day of the interview. Generally, it was easier to moderate the small groups, but this was at the expense of the loss of group dynamics and diverse opinions. The large groups were more dynamic and generated richer data; however, I would not recommend a group of more than five participants.

3.6.3 Reflections on the Data Collection Process

Both individual and group interviews proceeded in informal atmospheres that did not follow a specific structure—although I had organised guiding points in a particular order. As interviewees jumped between and to different topics, I followed other orders depending on the respondents’ interests. Throughout the interview process, I was careful to acknowledge the interviewees’ viewpoints without imposing mine. The interviews were either fully or partially audio-recorded, except for one: one man refused to record his interview, and three women preferred not to record their answers to specific questions about resource management and remittances. Notes were taken during the interviews, and details were written or audio-recorded immediately after each interview. It was noticeable that people were more relaxed and open when their speech was not audio-recorded. Even those whose
entire interviews were recorded provided more information when we were chatting informally after the interview or during a break. Fortunately, I always received consent to use the additional information. This more relaxed response and increased openness may be explained by respondents’ nervousness and unfamiliarity with the recording process. As Hassan (2009: 37-38) notes, audio-recording is a double-edged sword, and researchers need to be cautious that its use does not result in respondents giving answers the researcher wants to hear.

Although language difficulties may lead to misinterpretation—particularly when the researcher’s first language differs from that of the respondents—because I speak the same first language as the researched (Arabic), I did not face interpretation problems. The interviews were conducted in Arabic, and I translated and transcribed them personally. This process reduced any translation problems that might occur (especially when using a third party) and meant I could ensure that no essential or critical aspects were lost. Thus, while it did not rule out the challenges of shifting from one language to another, it did at least considerably minimise any deficiencies that might result.

During my interaction with the community, informal chat allowed me to build rapport and gather valuable data for the study or information about other potential respondents. More importantly, it helped to identify topics that became central in the study. Most of this chat was around economic resource management, remittances, and related conflicts. Accordingly, the focus of research shifted toward these topics. Furthermore, respondents voluntarily called me to provide pieces of information that they deemed would be of interest. Generally, ethnography has permitted me to address the study's questions, understand the experiences, interpretations, and meanings of women’s and men’s interactions, and draw relevant conclusions.

3.7 Reflexivity

Reflexivity is an ethnographic research approach whereby the researcher analyses how her/his identity has shaped the process of knowledge construction (Berger, 2015; Mohammad, 2001; Shinozaki, 2012). Increasingly, reflexivity has become a core element of ethnographic
research in which it acts as a quality control strategy (Berger, 2015: 1). It is seen as an ethical approach that makes the “invisible visible or the unconscious conscious of revealing the situatedness, the enframed and staged nature of knowledge” (Mohammad, 2001: 104). Reflexivity is an essential feature of the constructionist approach employed in this study. According to Shinozaki (2012: 1811), it should involve reflection on self, process, and representation, critically examine power relations and politics in the research process and researcher accountability in data collection and interpretation.

Reflection on oneself or self-reflexivity is looking “inward at the researcher and outwards towards the researcher’s relationship with the researched in the field”. Looking inward at the researcher is related to the researcher’s subjectivity. Miles (2014, 11) asserts that researchers can never truly be objective and that “the influence of the researchers’ values, attitudes, and beliefs from and toward fieldwork is not unavoidable.” In line with this, I acknowledge that my interest in this project emerged from my belief in GE, my experience as an immigrant, and my general observations of how Sudanese GNs are challenged in European countries. My gender ideology and migration experience have shaped the study since the research questions were first formulated. I am from a family that follows a religious movement (Republicans Thought)\(^{22}\) that champions women’s empowerment in Sudan and values women first and foremost as human beings. This fact has shaped (indeed, it continues to shape) my entire life, including my migration experience. I first migrated to Norway and then to the UK as an EEU citizen. Besides my personal experience in the two countries, I was involved in mediation between Sudanese spouses in Norway and supported some families in Glasgow. The conflicts I dealt with were often related to the change in GNs of one of the spouses. Together with my personal gender ideology, this experience has informed my research questions, data collection, and interpretation. Moreover, my experience of working as a community development agent in Glasgow improved my knowledge of the Sudanese community there—a fact I sometimes refer to in the analysis. That is, looking inward ensured I remained aware of my positionality in the process of knowledge construction throughout the study. Looking towards the researcher’s relationship with the researched in the field is related to reflection on positionality as ‘insider-outsider’, which I discuss below.

\(^{22}\) https://www.alfikra.org/page_view_e.php?page_id=2
3.7.1 Insider, Outsider or In-Betweener?

Insider-outsider “refers to the boundary marking an inside from an outside, a boundary that is seen to circumscribe identity, social position and belonging and as such marks those who do not belong and hence are excluded” (Mohammad, 2001: 101). Carling et al. (2014), citing their empirical research, argue that countless characteristics can draw boundaries between researchers and the researched. Further, they identify some “in-between” positions where the researcher is neither an insider nor an outsider. In international migration discourse, reflecting on positionality as insider-outsider is commonly based on migration status, where ‘insider’ refers to a migrant researcher who studies phenomena in her ethnonational group. In contrast, ‘outsider’ refers to a native researcher who studies migrant groups (Carling et al., 2014: 42). Shinozaki (2012), for instance, reflecting on her experience, described her positionality while studying her co-migrants as a “native ethnographer”. Accordingly, in the preparation phase for data collection, I considered myself an “insider” who shared a similar national identity, culture and migration experience with the researched. However, when I started the fieldwork, I found myself to be neither an insider nor an outsider. Borrowing the term “in-between” used by Carling et al. (2014), I thus refer to my positionality as “in-betweener”.

On the one hand, my in-betweener positionality is attributable to Sudan's cultural wealth and ethnic diversity that creates variations in Sudanese identities. Assal (2011) states that there is apparent differences between the Sudanese concerning ethnicity, culture, and regional or geographic origin (Assal, 2011b: 1). In Glasgow, for example, there is a difference between two Sudanese groups: Darfuris (people from the Darfur region) and Northerners (other Sudanese). However, although there is sufficient cultural variation between the two groups to make me an outsider for the former and an insider for the latter, this variation is not strong enough to restrict interaction and networking between the two groups. The cultural variation is not large enough to affect my relative understanding and interpretation of their accounts, mainly because I possess prior knowledge of this variation. However, my empirical data show that cultural diversity in GNs exists even within the same region in Sudan. The decisive factor that might make me an outsider for the Darfuris is the civil war in Darfur. Although, in general, there is no apparent hostility between the two groups in Glasgow, some discontent is expressed in the interactions of some Darfuri political activists with the Northerners.
On the other hand, my in-betweener positionality is attributable to my migration experience, which—immigrating to Norway and then to the UK—is similar to that of Sudanese in Glasgow who also emigrated from a developing country to a developed European one. However, although there are similarities between the UK and Norway, their variation is noticeable, particularly regarding immigration and integration policies and their gender attitude. For example, in Norway, child benefit is always received by mothers, while in Glasgow, it is received by either of the parents, often the father. Not all the respondents knew I am Norwegian (I did not see the importance of telling them), and those who did, did not know about the variation between the two countries. Therefore, all the respondents considered me an insider in migration experience and were brief in some of the details they provided of their experiences, assuming my familiarity with the system. However, I could not truly consider myself an insider or an outsider because I did not have sufficient knowledge of the UK’s immigration process before the first pilot interview. Nonetheless, my personal migration experience equipped me with enough knowledge to understand the respondents’ experiences and probe effectively to fill any gaps. For example, my role on the mediation committee in Norway guided me to explore conflict related to managing financial resources among the Sudanese in Glasgow. Similarly, I was not surprised when respondents told me about their experiences with the Job Centre; instead, I was guided by my own experience to dig deeper into theirs.

Besides my in-betweener status, I also assumed clear positionalities as an insider/outsider. Carling et al. (2014: 39), Shinozaki (2012: 1811) and Denzin et al. (2003, p. 9), among others, assert that factors such as education, gender, and class outweigh the cultural identity we associate with insider/outsider status. Considering these factors is essential to studying a heterogeneous community such as the Sudanese and, in particular, considering gender and gender ideology was paramount. As a woman, I was an insider for women and an outsider for men; this meant that I experienced easier access to the women and received more cooperation and openness from them than from the men. For example, I interviewed women at different locations and times—even at midnight—which I could not do with men, thereby losing the opportunity to interview some of them. The women were particularly open as most believed that all women would share similar experiences within the migration context, especially about resource management. They, therefore, expressed confidence that, being a woman myself, I would understand their experiences and that, even if I did not offer them advice, I would be a good listener who would sympathise with them. Although my husband does not
match the husband's image held by most women, my in-laws are more typical, and it was thus easy for me to understand the women’s experiences and feelings and explore this topic confidently.

However, as an outsider to men, I was aware of the risk of being provided with a response they thought would please me rather than that truly represented their reality. To avoid this, I discussed the issue directly, assuring them of the confidentiality of the interviews and the importance of expressing their actual experiences and feelings to build genuine knowledge. Therefore, I firmly believe they gave a correct account of their experiences. Similarly, I expected my personal gender ideology to perhaps lead to their offering strategic responses. As qualitative data concern behaviour as well as actions, some actions involve ‘impression management’, which is defined as “how people want others, including the researcher, to see them” (Miles et al., 2014: 11). Accordingly, I expected both women and men to want me to see them as more gender-egalitarian than they are. However, this expectation proved incorrect. Possible reasons for this include my emphasis, when I introduced the research topics, on the confidentiality and anonymity of the research and on the importance of describing reality rather than trying to please me. A further reason may be that only two women knew my personal gender ideology, both of whom are feminists and therefore had no cause to use impression management.

A further important issue I need to reflect on is the power relation between the researcher and respondents. I was aware that my academic status, professional career, and class status would create power relations that might impact the research. Besides my status as a PhD candidate, I am from a town (Rufaa) where women’s education in Sudan started. Though people from Rufaa have no distinct education level today, they are still seen as highly civilised and preoccupied with schooling. This situation had already affected my social interaction with those who knew I was engaged in education, particularly those with a lower education level. For this reason, I did not reveal this part of my identity unless it was necessary. However, by the time I did tell it, I had already built a strong network with people of various education levels; therefore, I did not face any education-related barriers.

My professional career as a project manager in a charity and my middle-class status (I consider myself middle-class, both in the UK and in Sudan) might create power relations that would impact the research, but I expected that my personal attributes would enable me to
dissolve these. I always differentiate between my work and social life, such as avoiding talking about my work or education in my day-to-day interactions; instead, I behave almost like the group I am interacting with. Despite this, I was confronted by cases that contradicted my expectations. For example, when I recruited one of my work subordinates for an individual interview, despite having what I previously considered a close working relationship, one in which I knew a considerable amount about his personal life, he was not open in the interview, giving short responses even when I probed for details. I received the impression that he had only agreed to participate because I was his line manager, so, to rescue the situation, I politely suggested he instead join in a group interview where the discussion would not concern private experience. He happily agreed and, indeed, recruited two of his friends for the group interview as well. A reverse case was a woman being coercively controlled by her husband. I explained that participation was voluntary and that we should avoid doing anything that might potentially harm her, but she insisted on participating.

A third issue that needs to reflect on is related to social status. During the research period, I found that the Sudanese community in Glasgow is classified into two groups based on migration type: refugees/ asylum seekers and labour migrants/ medical doctors. Some of the families of the medical doctors came to the UK as students and then received resident status as labour migrants. Respondents told me that this group view themselves as belonging to high-class families and refugees as belonging to low-class families who emigrated for economic reasons. As a result, members of the group tend to socialise purely with other labour migrants and with very few refugees with higher education. Although I am from the refugee class, I have good contact with some medical doctors' wives. However, this was not strong enough to facilitate access to the group.

In summary, it is not always straightforward to draw boundaries between insider-outsider, and I found myself switching between the statuses of the insider, outsider and in-betweener. As the last of these is the most flexible, the researcher should use it to tackle the disadvantages of outsider/ insider positionalities. Reflexivity is an important dimension of research ethics; however, other ethical issues remain paramount and should also be considered.
3.8 Research Ethics

In social research, the researcher collects in-depth data, a process that exposes the private life of the respondents to her/him and potentially makes it public. Securing the privacy and safety of the respondents are thus essential ethical principles. Throughout the research, I was cautious to avoid violating any of the four research ethics principles: harm to participants; lack of informed consent; invasion of privacy; and deception (Diener and Crandall, 1978). My research was guided by The Open University’s Code Of Practice for Research and the Ethics Principles for Research Involving Human Participants. The Open University Human Research Ethics Committee approved the research protocol and gave HREC/2015/2082 as a reference number. Accordingly, before starting, I designed an information leaflet that summarised the project. This detailed the objectives and research questions, that participation was voluntary, that respondents could withdraw their accounts within four weeks of completing the interview, and the estimated length and frequency of the interview. I also introduced myself, emphasised confidentiality and anonymity, and prepared a consent form to be signed by those who accepted my request to participate.

During my first contact with prospective participants (either face-to-face or by phone), I introduced myself as a researcher, explained the research to them and requested an appropriate time and place to conduct an interview if they agreed to participate. At face-to-face meetings, I gave the prospective respondent a copy of the information sheet and consent form to read thoroughly before the proposed date of the interview. I would then ask if they wanted any further explanation on the interview day. For those I received their verbal consent by phone, I would go through the information sheet during the call and then give them a copy when I met them. Before starting the interview, I emphasised confidentiality and anonymity and that participation was voluntary before I asked them to sign the consent form. It is noteworthy that they signed immediately; some even wanted to sign before discussing the information sheet. Due to my position as an insider, most people I approached were happy to participate in the research, mainly when they knew that it would help me to achieve an academic degree, which authenticates my belief in the generosity and helpfulness of the Sudanese. As mentioned above, four people refused participation (three Darfuris and one colleague). However, they all did so politely and indirectly, and I accepted their response without any effort to pursue them.

The ‘invasion of privacy’ principle was the most challenging. The research question pertains to the respondents’ private lives, making it difficult to indicate where to draw the line that demarcates privacy. Furthermore, the researcher’s curiosity often drove me to dig deeper into the topic. However, whenever I saw hesitation or discomfort on a respondent’s face, I would hold back and remind her/him that participation was voluntary and that it wasn’t necessary to reply—rather than, for example, encouraging her/him to go ahead by stressing that their answer would be confidential. This happened with three women when I asked about remittances; they agreed to answer the question but requested not to be audio recorded. I respected their request and took written notes instead.

I was also conscious throughout the study to avoid any practices that might cause harm. Immigrants often experience traumatic situations pre-emigration or/and during the emigration process. They also quite often feel homesick. Therefore, I was careful to avoid retrieving memories that might harm their emotions. Similarly, to avoid causing emotional harm, unless individual respondents voluntarily discussed their personal experiences, I restricted questions about conflict over financial resources to group interviews. I also avoided committing any other harmful practice. For example, one interviewee withdrew her account because her husband wanted her to. However, rather than tell me directly, she asked her friend to tell me. I did not call her (I had the impression she felt ashamed) and instead asked her friend to tell her that I had withdrawn her account but that if this had caused her any difficulties, I would intervene. (Fortunately, this was not necessary.) During our initial interview, I had offered to help her access a particular service, and when we met later for me to do this, she was ashamed because she had withdrawn her account. However, she relaxed when I told her I respected her decision and that what happened would not affect our relationship. A similar situation occurred with the two women who withdrew their verbal consent. They told me through a friend and then tried to avoid contact with me. However, I met them at an event where I treated them normally, without mentioning what had happened. It broke the ice, and after this, we continued our relationship without talking about the study.
3.9 Data Analysis

This study is based on a social constructionist approach, focusing on “the process by which meanings are created, negotiated, sustained and modified”, and knowledge and truth are created rather than discovered (Schwandt, 2003)\textsuperscript{24}. Knowledge creation is a cooperative process between the researcher and the researched. This approach suits my thesis because it analyses how social phenomena are modified or sustained in a new context. Berger and Luckmann (1991)\textsuperscript{25} put forward a dual vision for the existence of knowledge: that is, it is both objective and subjective. Subjective vision is explained by the social interaction of people creating the world and knowledge about it, which, due to frequent repetition, becomes internalised in society as a habit that can be reproduced with little effort. Future generations then view this reality and knowledge objectively. However, for my thesis, reversing this logic is a better fit: the objective view of knowledge and reality created and internalised due to previous generations’ interactions can be modified due to those of the current generation. To be precise, the normalised gender relations and ideologies current among the Sudanese community due to previous generations' interactions might be modified due to those of the current generation. Following this logic allows understanding whether the pre-existing GNs have been modified in migration spaces and, if so, how this modification happened.

I adopted a flexible data analysis method from (Sarantakos, 2012: 368-70). It is suitable for the deductive-inductive hybrid analysis approach used in this study. The analysis was a combination of iterative and fixed methods that performed analysis during and after data collection, respectively. The iterative procedure was used to guide the data collection process and identify data needs, during which the collected data were prepared, and a codebook was developed. In this stage, the deductive (theory-driven) process started by creating a simple preliminary codebook guided by the literature and the research questions discussed in chapter two. Four broad code categories were identified and then were further coded into sub-codes (see table 3-2). The codebook was simple and composed of two categories; the name of the code and the description.

\textsuperscript{24} cited in (Andrews, 2012: 40)\textsuperscript{25} Cited in (ibid, 39)
Data preparation (translation and transcription) started with data collection, whereby interviews and notes from individual and group interviews were translated and transcribed as soon as possible. Translation and transcription took place in one step. These tasks are time-consuming, yet they allowed me to reflect on the data and its interpretation. The process took place no longer than two weeks after each interview, except for one focus group interview I transcribed after six weeks. This delay created significant problems; I was only familiar with one of the respondents and could not recognise their voices. However, I received support from one of the group members to overcome this. Before coding, transcriptions were also reviewed to ensure consistency with the recording.

The fixed analysis was conducted manually and electronically aided by the qualitative data analysis software NVivo10, where the data were coded, conceptually organised, interrelated and analysed. Electronically, the data were refined and categorised into two main attributes: interviews and sociodemographic. The former covered individual and group interviews; it was about all questions other than respondents’ personal attributes covered in the latter attributes. The interviews were then encoded into two codes: individual and group discussions. This categorisation helps organise the data and makes the analysis process more accessible.

The interviews were then coded according to a deductive-inductive hybrid approach. The analysis was guided but not confined by the deductive codebook. During the data transformation (translation and transcription) and encoding of transcripts, inductive (data-driven) codes were assigned to segments of data that describe a new theme observed frequently and not captured by the deductive codes (underlined in Table 3-2). When the data revealed a further indicator not in the codebook during the data preparation process or encoding, I added a new code to the codebook. It is noteworthy that the inductive codes were not explicitly anticipated in the research questions; instead, they emerged in the respondents’ answers. For example, the employment code was in the codebook. However, some subcodes related to this higher-level code (remittances, family reunion, childcare, gender ideologies) were added because the data show a considerable explanation for the respondents’ labour-market participation, as discussed in chapter six. Thus, the hybrid analysis process allows researchers to add relevant codes not considered in the research questions that emerged in the
respondents’ answers. Hence, it “empowers researchers to identify how themes are generated from the raw data to uncover meanings central to the phenomenon” (Yukhymenko et al., 2014: 98).

Table (3-1): NVIVO10 Codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Level 3</th>
<th>Level 4</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNS and migration</td>
<td>Gendered emigration experience</td>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td></td>
<td>What motivated them to emigrate.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reaction</td>
<td>Community, family,</td>
<td>How the family and community reacted to the women’s and men’s emigration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gendered emigration experience</td>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Consent, cost, when, discrimination, route, visa-smuggling,</td>
<td>The process of emigration: whether respondents need the permission of a guardian to get an exit visa, how they secured the required cost, and whether they (women) experienced any discrimination. Which route did they follow? Do they enter via pass or smuggling?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendered immigration experience</td>
<td>Asylum application process</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Whether an appeal was needed</td>
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<td>Discrimination during the process</td>
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<td>Length of the period to get status</td>
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<td>Status they got</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Access to services during the process</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNS and the host context</td>
<td>respondents experience access to Services after being granted the status</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Health</td>
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The codes, then, were applied to the data. It is noteworthy that some data have been used for more than one code. For example, some insights about remittances were deductively encoded in the GN and transnationalism code and inductively assigned to the employment code. Answers by every respondent were first assigned to the relevant main code; then excerpts were assigned to the sub-code at the lower level, which was then assigned to the lower sub-code, and so forth. Finally, a query report was generated for every sub-code starting from the lowest level. The content was examined to understand how it related to the variable at the higher level until the main code and how that insight, in turn, related to the main research questions and existing literature.

The codes were further analysed manually by the socioeconomic data. For example, the gender relation/ideology data were analysed by gender, age, education...etc. The query for every code was generated, and the relationship between demographic attributes and the coded variable were manually examined. This is a limitation of the analysis process, where the software could have filtered the data by socioeconomic characteristics.

The respondents’ demographic data and the secondary data used in this study were analysed quantitatively, and the results were illustrated in cross-tabulation and diagrams using the Excel programme. The quantitative part shows the relationship between two parameters, such as variation in age or education between spouses.

Respondents’ (individual and group interviews) demographic data are given in appendix one; pseudonyms replaced the real names. These pseudonyms were used when individual interviews were quoted in the text. For the group interviews, the initial of the respondents' names and the number of the group interview were given with the quotes.
3.10 Conclusion

The chapter described the process of answering the research question concerning the acquisition of social remittances in transnational spaces by discussing the epistemological and ontological positions used. It justified the research strategy, sampling, the use of the foreshortened multi-sited method and data collection techniques, and explained how data were analysed using a deductive-inductive process. I described how I dealt with the ethical issues I confronted in the field and reflected on my positionalities as a researcher. I explored how the researcher assumes multiple positionalities that vary between insider, outsider and in-betweener, and how I used my in-betweener positionality to capitalise on the advantages of insider positionality and to tackle the disadvantages of outsider positionality. The chapter also introduced the importance of quantitative data to describe the emigration setting and the Sudanese emigration experience to understand the respondents’ experiences. This will be explored in more length in the following chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

GENDER AND SUDANESE EMIGRATION

4.1 Introduction

Three of my siblings and I fled Sudan in the early 1990s. We have settled on different continents and hold different nationalities; however, we maintain daily interaction among ourselves and our family, kin, neighbours, and friends in Sudan. Many Sudanese share a similar experience as ours. Understanding complex issues like the Sudanese’s migration, transnationalism, and development requires understanding the socioeconomic and political context that triggered the Sudanese mass migration. This understanding is crucial in interpreting the respondents’ everyday life in immigration countries. Hence, this chapter is related to the environmental conversion factors in Sudan that may affect the respondents’ lives in Glasgow. In particular, it is about the GNs and the political and economic situations in Sudan that triggered the respondents’ emigration and guided their living experience in Glasgow. This information will help to understand the respondents’ gendered local and transnational activities and how they impact their GNs.

The chapter is composed of two main sections. Section two introduces Sudan’s geography and demography as an introduction to the rest of the section. It then presents the Sudanese migration experience and locates the respondents’ experiences within this, differentiating between the traditional, temporary emigration to the Arab oil-rich countries and the contemporary, permanent emigration to the developed countries of the global North. The Sudanese see the latter as more prestigious because of its permanent nature, increased wealth, and cultural change. The section also highlights the reasons and motivations for Sudanese emigration, which pertains to the respondents’ personal conversion factors. These will help understand the respondents’ gendered local and transnational activities, such as economic activities and remittances. Migration trends and migration to the UK as the site of the study are also explored. Finally, the section compares women’s and men’s migration and reveals a significant change in women’s migration, indicating a potential change in Sudanese GNs.
Section three introduces GNs in Sudan as a background to understanding the empirical chapters. It details the historical development of the current dominant GNs and explores the crucial role of international and local political economy in transforming the gender-egalitarian attitudes that prevailed in the medieval era. It shows how the Ottoman Empire introduced Political Islam and enforced a rigid version of Islam that emphasises women’s seclusion and the domesticity ideology and how a local cult then enacted Personal Status Laws that jeopardised women’s humanity. The section shows that religion is the essential factor that shapes Sudanese gender ideologies and goes on to distinguish between two different schools of Islam: one supports gender equity, and the other supports gender equality.

Finally, the section discusses the shared gender relations and ideologies that tend to predominate in Sudan. The section provides an insight into the personal conversion factors of the respondents that may aid or constrain their local and transnational interactions. Similarly, it introduces the GNs in Sudan that may contribute to respondents’ resistance to change. The chapter ends with a conclusion that shows gender variations and emphasises the importance of gender analysis in understanding the migration experience of Sudanese women and men.

4.2 Sudan and Migration Experience

The section introduces the Sudanese migration experience and the reasons for the emergence of a contemporary emigration that seeks permanent residence in developed countries. This information helps to understand respondents’ migration motivation and experience in Glasgow and contributes to understanding the environmental conversion factors that guide their transnational social interactions.

4.2.1 Geography and Demography of Sudan

Unitary Sudan was the largest (2,505,813 square kilometres) and most geographically and culturally diverse country in Africa. According to the 2008 census, the total population was 39.2 million, of whom 30.9 million were in the north and 8.3 million in the south (Bechtold, 2015: 61-72). The country played host to the longest civil war worldwide, ending with its
split into Sudan and South Sudan countries in 2011. After secession, Sudan now ranks third in size in Africa (1,886,068 square kilometres), and its geographical features vary from the vast, harsh deserts of the north to the substantial rain forests of the south. The estimated population in 2020 is 43.43 million, with a growth rate of 2.42% (Population-World-Review, 2020). As Sudanese mass migration is fuelled by an accumulation of factors that existed long before secession, I will use the name ‘Sudan’ to refer to the country both pre- and post-secession. However, dates before 2011 apply to unitary Sudan and those after to current Sudan.

Ethnic and linguistic diversity in Sudan is among the most complex in the world. Its nearly 600 ethnic groups speak more than 400 languages and dialects. Religion is an effective form of social identity and a source of cultural diversity. In the 2000s, 75% of Sudanese were Muslim, 4-10% Christian, and around 20% followed indigenous religions. This diversity diminished after 2011, and almost all the population is now Muslim and Arabic-speaking (Population-World-Review, 2020). Sudan is also rich enough in natural and mineral resources (Elsamani, 2015) to have eliminated poverty throughout the country. However, the covetousness of international and national capitalism has turned this blessing into a scourge, leading to extreme instability (de Waal, 2013) and protracted conflict see: (Anderson, 2000: 2; Berry, 2015: 144; McGowan, 2003: 367; Republicans, 1982). The civil war and the significant decay and destruction of the economy severely constrained Sudan’s ability to realise its full potential and induced poverty, insecurity and mass migration.

4.2.2 Sudanese Migration Experience

In the last four decades, Sudan has experienced unprecedented mass emigration. The situation in Sudan compelled people to invest their limited human and physical resources in migration (Jaspars & Buchanan-Smith, 2018: 23) with the hope of a better and more secure life for themselves and those they left behind. This sub-section introduces the emigration experience of the Sudanese and the emergence of a new type of emigration that may alter their culture. It explores the reasons for the mass migration and considers the trend and gender dimension of migration and migration to the UK. This information is essential for locating the respondents’ experience in the Sudanese migration context. It also helps in understanding how
transnational environmental conversion factors may guide their interactions—both with their new home country and transnationally—as both local and transnational interactions may, in turn, affect their GNs.

4.2.2.1 Traditional and Contemporary Sudanese Emigration

Sudanese migration is an old, highly gendered phenomenon. The Sudanese emigration—whether voluntary or involuntary, started in the late nineteenth century; such as the permanent settlement of pilgrims to Mecca (Abusharaf, 1997: 517) and the slave trade practised by Turko-Egyptian and the British administration during their colonial administration of the country in 1898-1956 (Idris, 2013; Sikainga, 1989). In 1955, this was followed by the southerners’ migration as refugees to Uganda (Republicans, 1982); and, in the late 1950s, by that of elite northerners and Nuba who moved to the UK for education (Fabos, 2012: 54). However, it was only in the 1960s, with the movement of medical doctors to the Gulf countries, the UK and Ireland, that the phenomenon of labour migration began. In the 1970s, this continued to flourish when those with other qualifications were pulled by booming oil production in the oil-rich Arab countries and pushed by the deterioration of the economy in Sudan (Galal-ElDin, 1988; Young, 2006). Another emigration type was for education, mainly to Europe, the USA, the former USSR, or some Arab countries such as Egypt, Iraq, and Libya, for the undergraduate level (Abusharaf, 2001). The typical features of this traditional emigration are that it is temporary; allows for frequent home visits; and is male-dominated (Assal, 2010: 2).

However, the aftermath of the military coup in 1989 marked the turning point in the history of Sudanese mass migration. For example, the number of Sudanese in Arab countries was estimated to be 207,000 before 1989 (Galal-el-Din 1988: 293), which increased to one million after 1989 (Amin & Mahmoud, 1991). In addition, emigration now spanned regional countries and, increasingly, the global North. And, like migrants from other African countries, those from Sudan are as likely to reside in countries with low and medium human development as in those with high or very high human development (UN, 2017a: 12). The reasons for this are that Sudanese migration is mixed; as such, it consists of refugees and asylum-seekers who tend to go to neighbouring countries; temporary labour migrants to the Gulf States, and more permanent migrants to Western countries (IOM, 2011: 68).

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Furthermore, the latter category, which has increased since the early 1990s, is not limited to new emigrants but includes regional emigrants who have also been moving towards the West due to various situations in Sudan and their countries of exile (Abusharaf, 2002: 72-93). Even student emigration has found new destinations, such as Uganda, Kenya, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia, and has become a step in a chain migration to the West (IOM, 2011: 19-20). For example, nine of the 49 respondents came to the UK from Arab countries for education or because of the deterioration of the situation. It is also observable that the Sudanese (mainly families with children) move from non-English speaking European countries to the UK for education or better job opportunities, as in one of the respondents' cases. Another source of this emigration is those born in countries that grant citizenship by birth, such as the UK; as the case of one of the respondents, who came after the deterioration of Sudan's situation.

This new type of emigration is characterised by the search for economic improvement and security and, even more importantly, for a foothold abroad and new citizenship. In contrast to the traditional migrants, contemporary migrants visit Sudan less frequently, particularly before they have been granted new citizenship. Contemporary emigration is also more gender-mixed, and women increasingly emigrate independently. For example, four women in the study migrated independently (although they already possess a UK network). It is also dominated by the highly skilled and youth, as many ousted ex-government employees sought permanent settlement elsewhere, whereas previously, only the wealthy and well-educated could reach places as remote as the UK (Mohamed-Ali, 2011: 6). More recently, this situation has been challenged by an even newer form of emigration. Migrants from Darfur, for example, are a mixture of skilled and unskilled, affluent and disadvantaged (Jaspars & Buchanan-Smith, 2018: 22-3). Indeed, our sample shows a broad spectrum of education levels and skills, as will be seen in the next chapter. The Sudanese themselves differentiate between the two types of emigration by naming the traditional one (labour migration only) “مغتربين” [expatriates]; and the other “مهاجرين” [migrants]. Migrants are seen as more prestigious because of their higher wealth and the cultural change they undergo (this is a phenomenon that merits study), and the following sub-section explains this type of emigration.
4.2.2.2 Sudanese and Mass Migration

To understand the lives and transnational activities of the Sudanese in Glasgow, it is crucial to explore their motivations for emigration as these guides their social interactions and socioeconomic activities in the host context. Therefore, this sub-section highlights some factors that triggered the Sudanese emigration.

4.2.2.2.1 Wars and the Northerners

Sudan was British-colonised between 1899 and 1956. Since independence, Sudan has suffered political instability and protracted civil wars, going through a series of military and counter-military coups and civilian and military regimes. In the period 1958–2011, for example, there were four successful coups and 11 failed coup attempts. As a result, military regimes ruled for more than 50 years, while democratic governments survived for about ten (McGowan, 2003: 367). Sudan was also engaged in multiple civil wars after 1955. The two major battles between the governments and the country's south, 1955-1972 and 1983-2005, held the record for the longest war worldwide and were only ended by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. The agreement granted the southerners autonomy for six years, followed by a referendum on independence; it was held in 2011 and resulted in the secession of southern Sudan. Meanwhile, other wars were also occurring in the Nuba Mountains (1985-2004) and Darfur (2003-2019).

Civil wars in Sudan have played direct and indirect roles in mass emigration. Prolific literature exists on the experience of the southerners (Burr, 2014; Collins, 2007); the Nuba (African Rights, 1995; Hassan, 2009; Totten, 2017); and Darfur (de Waal, 2007; Luban, 2006; Sidahmed et al., 2010; Van Schaack, 2004; Williams & Bellamy, 2005), that reflects the suffering of these during the wars led by successive governments in Khartoum. However, little has been written about the torment that compelled the northerners to join the battlefield (against their wills and ideologies) or sacrifice their education and jobs to flee the country (Mann, 2014: 561-2). To my knowledge, and as a witness to the era, few improvements have been made to the infrastructure since independence, and many communities feel deeply marginalised, neglected and humiliated. Furthermore, the wars cost the lives of many young men who were forced to serve in the army or the Popular Defence Forces (a paramilitary
body allied with the National Islamic Front) after being captured in raids on public transport, private homes and offices, or being officially recruited via their employers. (As we will see in chapter five, the only guaranteed method of avoiding the battlefield was to hide or to flee the country.) The war, then, gave a decisive push towards migration to the generation born in the 1960s and 1970s.

Opponents of the radicalism governments—particularly those who opposed the war and its underlying causes, such as the Republicans—suffered the most, experiencing torture and exile. As the only movement that can challenge radicalism’s ideology, Republicans pose the most dangerous threat to its survival in Sudan. As Howard notes, “The established political and religious elites considered Taha\(^{27}\) a threat to their monopoly on the interpretation of Islam and politics” (cited in (Ali, 2017: 105)). See, too, (De Waal, 2009: 126).

Furthermore, to ensure control of the civil service and other institutions, in his “\(\text{تمكين}\)” ‘\(\text{Tamkeen}\)’ [empowerment] policy (1990-1999), Al-Bashir carried out a purge that ousted any opponents and replaced them with members of the Islamist cadre. The employment procedure was also changed to be controlled by the National Security Office’s authorisation to exclude their opponents. As a result of these and similar measures, most opponents of the regime lost their livelihood means and were compelled to flee the country. \(\text{Tamkeen}\) also involved Islamisation and Arabisation of education, with Islamic ideology taught at all levels and staff in all sectors having to undergo three months of military training and religious education in a closed camp. In 1991, ‘\(\text{حجاب}\)’ [headscarf] became the official dress code for women by presidential decree (Tønnesen & Kjøstvedt, 2010: 8). With the combination of this decree and Article 152\(^{28}\) of the Criminal Law of 1991, women suffered various kinds of punishments, see for example (Anonymous, 2013). As Article 152 was vague, and its implementation depended on individual assessment, most women—other than those ideologically opposed to the hijab, such as the Republicans (Taha, 1967a)—opted to wear it to avoid exploitation. Tactics such as these were a further trigger to mass migration by the skilled labour force and female activists and a motivation for students and parents to seek meaningful qualifications abroad.

\(^{27}\) The leader of the Republican Movement: [https://www.alfikra.org/index_e.php](https://www.alfikra.org/index_e.php)

\(^{28}\) “[W]herever commits in a public place an act or conducts himself in an indecent manner or a manner contrary to public morality or wears an indecent or immoral uniform which causes annoyance to public feelings, shall be punished with whipping not exceeding 40 lashes or with a fine or with both. The act shall be considered contrary to public morality if it is so considered in the religion of the doer or the custom of the country where such act has occurred.” (Tønnesen & Kjøstvedt, 2010: 8).
It is noteworthy that the Sudanese had three successful non-bloody popular uprisings “انتفاضة”, ‘intifadas’; these took place in October 1964, April 1985 (de Waal, 2013: 214-8) and December 2018—the last being against the rule of Al-Bashir. The members of the regime, who had a long history of violence and repression to maintain their wealth and power, responded to the demonstrations aggressively, and people in many towns across Sudan were brutally killed (Sudan-Tribune, 2014). In January 2018, further protests erupted over price hikes of essential commodities following the government's latest lifting of subsidies. This protest continued and escalated in December 2018 to become a revolution that achieved a significant political power shift. It continued with sustained civil disobedience until Al-Bashir was deposed in April 2019 (BBC, 2019). The oppression experienced throughout this period—and the economic situation, as the war and successive governments stripped the country of its resources—offered a further incentive for women and men to emigrate.

4.2.2.2 Employment Structure and Income

The war had a significant impact on both the labour-market structure and the employment rate. Not only because it compelled people to flee their homes and jobs but also because—over and above the Tamkeen policy that introduced selective employment—governments prioritised defence spending over development and job creation (Nour, 2014: 8). Similarly, the transformation of the “وسادة”, ‘wasata’ [personal intermediation] system to favour religious sectarianism, tribal/ethnic solidarity and ideology excluded those who were not affiliated with the ruling party or the Ja’alia tribe of Al-Bashir (Mann, 2014: 562-5).

Consequently, the unemployment rate remained persistently high, particularly during the Al-Bashir regime. Due to the purges, unemployment reached 30% in 1992 (ibid., p. 37) and increased from 16.5% in 1990 to 18.8% in 2011 for those aged 15 years and above (AbuAgla et al., 2013: 4). Unemployment among youth (15-24 years) reached 41.24% in 2004, with a high discrepancy between males (36.64%) and females (43.25%) (Nour, 2014: 28). The unemployment rate was even higher among university graduates. In 2000, for example, 65% of graduates were unemployed, with women particularly affected (71% for women and 57.5% for men); and by 2008, this had reached 75.7% (77.5% for women and 74.2% for men) (ibid.: 32-35).
As you would expect, therefore, Sudan has a high dependency ratio. In 2015 the total youth and elderly dependency ratios were 81.6, 75.4, and 6.3, respectively. Unemployment and austerity policies have impoverished the population, constrained its social development and widened the wealth gap. Sudan’s Human Development Index value had improved from 0.331 in 1990 to 0.490 in 2015; nonetheless, the country remains in the low human development category and has even deteriorated: in 1990, it was ranked 129, but by 2015 this had fallen to 165 (OHPI, 2017: 2). Similarly, the country ranks among the poorest. In 2014, its Multidimensional Poverty Index was 0.287, and the percentage of poor people was 53.4%. However, there is considerable variation in the distribution of poverty between urban (28.7%) and rural areas (64.5%) (OHPI, 2017: 7)—in other words, between the ruling group and their affiliated elites and the rest of the population. As Pantuliano and colleagues note, Sudan’s economic boom has benefited the political, economic, and social elites, with very little accruing most of the urban population. It has also benefited Khartoum and Port Sudan more than other cities (Pantuliano et al., 2011: 5).

4.2.2.2.3 Need for Remittances

Deterioration of the economy and the inefficiency of the social security system in Sudan rendered financial remittances an essential driving force for Sudanese emigration. As a result, remittances play significant roles in the economy and the livelihood of the emigrant’s families and communities. Furthermore, the country has relied heavily on remittances since the start of emigration. Figure (4-1) depicts the World Bank’s series data of Sudanese remittances received in USD millions from 1977 to 2017. It shows a drastic increase in volume in the last two decades (a 4.6-fold increase in inflow in the two first decades), although this has been tempered by a decline since 2011—perhaps explained by secession. However, remittances via unofficial channels are expected to exceed documented ones (IOM, 2011: 20).

Remittances have made a significant contribution at the macro-level, contributing 32% of foreign capital in 1999-2008, for example (Suliman et al., 2014: 73). As Figure (4-2) shows, they contributed 0.5% to GDP in 1977, then reached a peak of 3.8% in 1981 before dropping back to 0.4% in 1991. They then gradually grew again, peaking between 1998 and 2004 (reaching a high point of 6.9% in 2003), before diminishing to 0.2% in 2015 and beyond.
At the community level, remittances contribute to public infrastructures, such as wells, schools, and clinics (Young et al., 2007: 83-107). Similarly, they play an essential role in the livelihoods of the families who receive them. Although there is no official countrywide information, empirical observations suggest that they are used for both basic needs as well as occasional, urgent events such as weddings, burial ceremonies, and migration (IOM, 2011: 67). However, in a recent survey, 90% of respondents used remittances on food (Suliman et al., 2014: 194-7), and case studies, too, confirm that they are used for essential needs such as food, health and education (Young, 2006: 27). Regardless of how remittances are utilised, there is a social obligation among Sudanese to support their kin, as this study shows empirically. Though this study does not directly relate to financial remittances, it does show
that remitting is essential for almost all the respondents and that it was an essential emigration factor for all of them.

4.2.2.3 Sudanese Emigration Trends

Figure (4-3) summarises two sorts of Sudanese emigration from 1990 to 2017. Overall, it reveals that migration is increasing. The exceptional period, between 2005 and 2010, where the line is almost flat, coincided with the period between the Peace Agreement and the secession when people were hoping for positive change. After this, and up to 2015, the line is steeper, indicating a higher emigration rate\(^ {29} \) (and that these hopes were not realised). Although due to the population division between the two countries, the slope might be expected to be negative during this period, it coincides with the collapse of the economy; general strikes; increased oppression; and the scaling up of the war in Darfur.

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\(^ {29} \) Emigration rate is the change in migration stock between two years divided by the number of years.
The traditional migration to the oil-rich Arab countries has grown steadily, as illustrated in Figure (4-4). However, the growth rate was low in the early 1990s and almost zero from 2000 to 2005. Paradoxically, migration to North Africa (Egypt, Libya, and Algeria), as shown in Figure (4-5), generally decreased until 2000 and then fluctuated. Meanwhile, traditional migration to the Gulf countries has been increasing, particularly since 2005.

Figure (4-6) shows the trend of contemporary Sudanese migration to the three main continents that grant citizenship. It shows that migration to Europe was the highest in the early 1990s, which can be explained by the historical relationship between Sudan and the UK.

Note: The analysis has not considered specific factors in the three continents which may have attracted migrants and affected the results.
and traditional migration, while the new migration dominates migration to the other two continents. The steep slope of migration to North America and the less steep slopes to Europe and Australia during the first two decades indicates that the rate and volume of emigration to North America were higher than that to the other two continents, which could be explained by immigration policies (countries in the contents have quota-migration programmes). That the slope is almost flat, even negative, from 2010 to 2015 indicates that there was little increase in migration to America and Europe and a decrease in that to Australia during this time. However, this is because, after 2011, the data differentiate between the Sudanese and the South Sudanese.

4.2.2.4 Sudanese Migration to the UK
Sudan’s relationship with the UK has existed since the colonial era (1899-1956), though it is not a Commonwealth country. As mentioned in section (4.4.1), the UK was the first country to receive traditional Sudanese migration, which started in the 1950s (for education) and the 1960s (for labour). Both types have continued and are sometimes the first step for a new kind of migration. The UK was also among the first countries to host Sudanese protesting against Islamisation and those who originally came for education but later chose to take on professional roles rather than return to Sudan (Ashu, 2012: 14).

![Figure 4-7: Sudanese Migrants in UK by Sex](image)

Source: (UN, 2017b)
From the 1990s, the UK became a refuge for many at-risk people from across the country, including those from the war-affected areas (IOM, 2011: 124) and those who fled to avoid joining the Popular Defence Forces or other forms of oppression. In general, the Sudanese who headed to Europe wanted to settle in the UK due to the historical relationship between the two countries see (Sikainga et al., Undated); the improvement in human rights and educational prospects it offered; and the existence of networks that were already in place (Jaspars & Buchanan-Smith, 2018: xvi). Therefore, between 2005 and 2008, the UK was ranked first in granting permanent residence permits to the Sudanese labour force (Badri & Saeed, 2010: 33).

As shown in Figure (4-7), Sudanese migration to the UK grew at an increasing rate to reach a peak of 17,588 in 2010, then decreased before slowly rising again after 2015 to reach 16,200 in 2017. (As before, the decline in 2010 can be attributed to the separation of the data concerning the Sudanese and South-Sudanese). The steepest curve between 2005 and 2010 indicates a high influx rate due to the escalation of the war in Darfur. The figure also shows an increase in the migration of both women and men, which will be discussed below.

4.2.2.5 Sudanese Emigration and Gender Norms

GNs are an essential determinant of the emigration of women and men. Migration is a challenging, risky venture that is often seen as unsuitable for women due to their vulnerability and concerns around their sexuality and emotional sensitivity. Evidence shows that migrant women experience exploitation and sexual abuse during their migration journey, in refugee camps, and by employers. Even scholars view migration more suitable for men’s nature and their role as breadwinners (Jolly & Reeves, 2005: 10-2). Thus, men’s migration is normalised globally, while the most acceptable form of women’s migration remains that of dependent homemaker. Even in gender-equalitarian societies like Sweden, women migrate, as dependents, to accompany their husbands in their search for better jobs (Brandén, 2014: 952). This has certainly been the case with Sudanese migration, in which, historically, men have dominated as primary breadwinners. Their migration—both as skilled and unskilled labour—has also been well documented, and numerous studies have explored their experience as breadwinners who generate wealth for the wellbeing of their families.
However, women’s role as primary migrants is increasingly recognised among migration scholars. In small numbers, Sudanese women have been engaged in internal and external migration—as both students and breadwinners, although primarily as homemakers—since at least 1960. However, like other women globally, their experience has been omitted because they are perceived as passive dependants, secondary, involuntary, or as making no economic contribution (Assis, 2014: 1; Lutz, 2010: 1648-49). Until recently, statistical records in Sudan were not segregated by gender (Assal, 2011a: 1). Furthermore, the discrepancy between the number of migrant women and men shown in recent data (Figure (4-3)) is explained by a socio-political context that did not favour women’s migration. Independent women’s migration was considered a brazen act that threatened the family and the community’s moral values. Such women were considered “مطلقة”, ’matloqa’ [having no guardian in the family, i.e. without morals] (Abusharaf, 1997: 22-3) and as indicative of a failure of manhood within the family (Assal, 2012: 29). This taboo, however, should not be generalised. Women’s migration was accepted among the upper and middle-upper classes, and some migrated as students, breadwinners and homemakers (Assal, 2010). For example, several female schoolteachers migrated to some Arab countries (e.g., Yemen, Jorden and Libya) (Abusharaf, 1997: 62). However, women generally need to be accompanied by a male guardian or to prove that they had the consent of one to obtain an exit visa. Therefore, women continue to migrate either as dependent or primary migrants with a guardian, while migrant men are always seen as the primary migrant, even when they migrate as guardians to a woman who is the real primary migrant. That is to say, men also migrate as dependants, but this experience is omitted from the data.

However, the prohibition of women’s independent migration is fading, and the number of women who migrate independently is increasing. This might be explained by a change in women’s autonomy or the economic and political situation in Sudan (Assal, 2012: 28); or an intersection between situations at home and abroad (Abusharaf 1997: 62). In 2005, for example, Sudan abolished the condition of women needing proof of a guardian’s consent to be issued with an exit visa (ibid.: 3) and, increasingly, women of different ages and marital statuses are migrating beyond the Gulf countries and for a variety of reasons (Abusharaf, 1997: 63-4). Figure (4-5) shows that total women’s emigration is increasing at an almost similar rate to that of men and that it more than doubled for both in the two decades after Al-Bashir took power. To be precise, women’s migration increased from 250,358 in 1990 to
508,809 in 2010, while men’s increased from 336,705 to 688,416; both peaked in 2017 of 875,745 for women and 1,075,960 for men. Between 2010 and 2017, the migration of women also increased at a slightly higher rate than that of men: 1.7 and 1.6, respectively, which may have been due to more women joining their husbands who had already settled abroad, as was the case in this study’s sample.

Comparing the two main destination continents (North America and Europe) for contemporary migration shows two different patterns. In Europe (Figure (4-8)), the migration of women has seen a steady increase, albeit with considerable variation in rate (6.7 vs 4.7). Considering the focus of the study, Figure (4-7) shows that the UK has a similar pattern to that of Europe, indicating that the bulk of Sudanese European migration took place to the UK. Figure (4-7) also shows that between 1990 and 2010, the increase in women’s rate was 14.6, compared to 10.4 for men; both reached the same rate of 0.9 in 2010, and from then to 2017, it was 13.7 for women and 9.4 for men. However, the distance between the two lines increases throughout this period, indicating significant variation in the number of migrant women and men in Europe and the UK. The curve peaked at 17,588 in 2010, distributed as 10,191 for men and 7,397 for women, and then scaled down to reach 16,200 in total, 9,260 for men and 6,940 for women, in 2017.

Source: (UN, 2017b) Source: (UN, 2017b)
Surprisingly, the migration pattern of women and men varies in North America. Figure (4-9) reveals an interesting phenomenon regarding women’s migration. It shows that the distance between the two lines is very narrow compared to that in the other figures. From 1990, the migration of both genders increases at an almost similar rate until 2000, when women’s migration escalates at a higher rate, crossing the men’s line around 2005 and then continuing above it with a more considerable difference.

The data show that the number of migrants has increased thirteen-fold for women and 8.7-fold for men. This indicates that a considerable number of women have migrated independently. Although Sudan’s internal situation has contributed to this increase—in which women’s emigration to various destinations has grown by a higher rate than men’s, but has only surpassed the men’s rate in North America—it is not by itself enough to explain it. Instead, there must be a reason that attracts Sudanese women to North America. Comparing this study’s sample with Abusharaf’s study provides a logical explanation. Abusharaf found a considerable number of women who migrated to Canada independently. Exploring their situations, she found five categories:

1) relatively young, unmarried, well-educated women who held white-collar jobs in Sudan. They had entered Canada as visitors and then decided to apply for asylum; 2) women who came through the migration lottery program; 3) pregnant women who wanted their children to be born in America; 4) women whose husbands worked in one of the Arab countries and who migrated with their children to find a place of better settlement for the family; 5) women who came as refugees from transit destinations (Abusharaf, 2002: 63).

Comparing this with our sample revealed similar categories apart from the lottery program and that no woman migrated to have a child born in the UK; however, one of the respondents has citizenship by birth. Immigration policies, then, are crucial. Besides citizenship by birth being granted in the US and Canada, both countries also have immigration quota programs (‘lotteries’) that enable women’s secure migration. Education and employment are further factors expected to enhance women’s agency and the propensity for migration. Studies show that most women who migrated by themselves, especially those who were single, possessed high education levels and employment experience (Abusharaf, 1997; Assal, 2012; de Oliveira, 2014; Lutz, 2010) and that they were from the middle class (Assal, 2012; de
Oliveira, 2014). In general, Sudanese migration believes to be limited to the educated and to high- and middle-class people with sufficient resources to reach Europe and other continents. However, recent studies have proved the opposite, showing that some low-skilled women migrated to work as domestic workers in Arab countries (Assal, 2010: 3); and that migrants from Darfur were dominated by young men (18-30 years) with little or no education who often came from disadvantaged families (Jaspars & Buchanan-Smith, 2018: 22-3). The latter category also follows new and more risky migratory routes.

The most common routes of Sudanese migration to the North are via the higher education, immigration quotas—in the case of the US and Canada (Assal, 2010, 3), and trafficking and smuggling (IOM, 2011, 61). In addition, some Sudanese claim asylum in transit stations such as Egypt and Libya (Jaspars & Buchanan-Smith, 2018). Jaspars & Buchanan-Smith illustrate the routes for Darfuris being smuggled to Europe, the exploitation, discrimination, and physical violence they experience throughout their journeys, and the risk to their lives. Most of them worked in Libya first (to earn enough to pay for the Mediterranean crossing, usually in unsafe boats), where they experienced official and unofficial detention and were beaten, tortured, and deprived of necessities. Although the vast majority are men, some Darfuri women also follow this route: 389 women arrived in Italy in 2015 and 2016. This documents another change in traditional Sudanese migration, the explanation for which cannot be limited to the economic or political situation. Rather, it lies in the importance of the changes to women’s education that have empowered women and altered the GNs (ibid: 47).

4.3 Gender Norms in Sudan between the Present and the Past

GNs are the essential focus of this study; therefore, this sub-section introduces the GNs in Sudan and their historical evolvement. This information will help us understand how the respondents’ local (Glasgow) and transnational behaviours are gendered. The literature on gender or women in Sudan is scant. The country was excluded from Arab and African women’s studies until the 1980s, when it came to the attention of foreign and native scholars (Hale, 1997: 45). Most research conducted since then has focused on the role of women in the public sphere (Bernal, 1994, 1997; Hale, 1999, 2000, 2001; House, 1988; Ibnouf, 2011; Tønnessen, 2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2016, 2017, 2019), and the private sphere is almost neglected. Similarly, the focus has been on women’s studies rather than on gender, and even
those who call attention to this suggest study areas that relate to the public sphere and omit the private (see Kamier et al., 1983: 135). Therefore, this study enriches the literature on Sudanese GNs in the private sphere (households and individuals). However, GNs in the private and public spheres are not static or mutually constructive. The following sub-section shows how they have evolved through history.

4.3.1 Gender Politics in Pre-Independence Sudan

Though little is known about GNs before "مهدية", the Mahdiyya (1885-1898) (Hale, 1997: 68), some gender-egalitarian attitudes are documented. Medieval Sudanese history recorded the dominance of a matrilineal system and women’s central positions in the country’s socioeconomic and political spheres. Matrilineal system continued during the Islamic kingdoms in the sixteenth century (Berry, 2015; Metz, 1991) and only started to change with the introduction of political Islam in the early nineteenth century during “تركية”, Turkiyya rule (1821-1898). This period witnessed massive exploitation of the country’s human and natural resources and enforcement of a rigid version of Islam disseminated by “الأزهر”, Al-Azhar (religious-educated university scholars who suppressed the existing Sufi leaders). Turkiyya promoted the seclusion of women and the ideology of domesticity and the harem, and a patriarchal system replaced the local matrilineal one (Hale, 1997, 64-5).

Similarly, the colonisers also altered the socioeconomic structure when they established an export-oriented economy and commercialised and privatised production and land ownership. This change altered the traditional gender division of labour and induced gender economic disparity because women were relegated to the domestic sphere (Hale, 1997: 66). The status of women worsened during Mahdiyya when Personal Status Laws were enacted as a means to control them (Aharon, 2000) further. El-Bakri\(^\text{31}\) describes GNs of that time as:

[The society] was exclusively a man’s world, and the ideal status to which almost every male aspired was to have the means to maintain a polygamous household and to keep his womenfolk shut away behind closed doors …

It is not surprising then that a good woman might be described as one who “leaves her house only twice in her life: once to be married and once to be buried.” Although women gradually revived their cultural life after Mahdiyya (Abdel-Halim, 2010: 13), their status was worsened by the British colonialists (1898-1956), who not only failed to annul the Personal Status Laws (ibid., 4) but codified the patrilineal and patriarchal practices (Hale, 1997: 71). According to Fatima Ibrahim, the British colonisers are most to blame for gender disparity (Abusharaf, 2004: 158). Education restriction is the practice that is most cited for having introduced long-lasting gender gaps, and the British colonisers deliberately constrained women’s education (Abdel-Halim, 2010b: 173) and differentiated between girls’ and boys’ education levels and specialisations (Badri, 1986; Hale, 1996). This disparity consolidated women’s traditional roles, constrained their emancipation, and created a gap between boys and girls and between affluent and disadvantaged women.

Similarly, in the name of ‘civilisation’, the British utilised the sensitive cultural norms to their advantage. This was certainly the case with Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) when, instead of educating people about the harmfulness of the practice, they promulgated a law against it without any consideration of its complexity and sensitivity. They humiliated both the Sudanese and their culture and exposed women’s modesty to vulgarity (Abdel-Halim, 2003; Republicans, 1976: 38). This law has recently come under the attention of scholars, who have discussed the ‘Rufa’a Revolt’ from different viewpoints (Boddy, 2007: 152; El-Bashir, 2017: 12-3). It is noteworthy that though the practice has been fought against for over half a century, in 2014, the prevalence of FGM among women aged 15-49 in Sudan was 86.6%, and in most parts of the country, uncircumcised girls are still considered odd and unmarriageable. From the campaign against FGM with which I am involved in Glasgow, we know that some

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32 A Sudanese byword.
33 A famous Sudanese women’s rights activist and the first president of the Sudanese Women’s Union in 1956.
34 The British administrator who granted Babiker Badri approval to start the first school for women at his home in 1907 stated: “I would myself prefer that the government should not undertake this task [girls’ education] for some time. But […] I cannot see that any possible harm can accrue from starting something [girls’ education] here [in Rufa’a].”
35 The girls studied up to elementary school, where the curriculum focused on homecrafts, needlework and nursing (Badri, 1986; Hale, 1996), while boys could study up to secondary level (Gordon Memorial College) where they could specialise in teaching, administration, accounting, law, science, engineering, or trade.
36 This was argued by Alustadh Mahmoud, who, even though he was against the practice, campaigned against the law. In a pamphlet issued in 1945 he stated: “The government’s stipulation of the law was not showing compassion for the women or for any human and moral reason, otherwise […] why did they not ban the bursting of eyes practiced on children in India, which is also under their control?” (El-Bashir, 2017: 12-3).
37 A revolt led by Alustadh Mahmoud M Taha against the imprisoning of a woman who performed FGM on her daughter in Rufa’a in 1946 (El-Bashir, 2013; El-Bashir, 2017; El-Bashir, 2018).
husbands divorce wives because they have not undergone FGM; other women are compelled to undergo it before marriage or after their first child. These cases did not take place in Glasgow, but they offer strong evidence that FGM is still deep-rooted in the community and that law alone is not enough to eradicate it.

Nonetheless, the colonial period witnessed women’s employment and political participation for the first time. Educated women entered the labour market as teachers, nurses, and clerks and established trade unions (Badri, 1986: 106). Besides this, Omdurman school graduates formed the first women’s association—Educated Girls’ Association—in 1947, which sowed the seed for the Sudanese Women’s Union began in 1952 (Ibrahim, 1996: 4). These associations started women’s collective work, contributing to society’s advancement and working against the British colonists (Badri, 2002; Badri, 1986). Women’s political work is also documented. Two famous women who are a symbol of the women’s struggle for independence are “مهيرة بنت عبود” Mihera Bint Abood, and “العازة عبد الله” Al-Aza Abdulla. The former joined her tribe in fighting the Turko-Egyptian invasion in 1821 (Abdel-Al, 1997: 64), and the latter was the first woman to participate in demonstrations and help with communications among the nationalists of the White Flag League38(Ajuba, 2008: 153).

In sum, women in the pre-independence era suffered from the exploitation by the colonisers who introduced the patriarchal system. However, it is likely that despite its limited nature, access to education facilitated women’s emancipation in the post-independence period.

4.3.2 Gender Politics in Post-Independence Sudan

The national governments inherited low human resources and restrictive Islamic political organisations. At the time of independence, the only women’s organisation that existed was the Sudanese Women’s Union. In 1957, they wrote a memorandum to the Constitutional Committee requesting full election rights for women. All the political parties supported the request except the Umma and Muslim Brothers (El-Amin, 1994: 17). Un-signing the memorandum indicates the gender ideology of these two extremist parties that have dominated the national governments since independence and explains why they did not repeal

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38 The White Brigade Movement was an organized nationalist resistance movement of Sudanese military officers, formed in 1923–24, which made a substantial early attempt toward Sudanese independence.
the Personal Status Laws. Indeed, after independence, no significant change was made to these until Nimeiri took over in 1969, following which, in 1973, the Constitution was amended to grant women some rights such as political participation, equal wages and pensions, and maternity leave (Tønnesen & Kjøstvedt, 2010: 4). However, women’s organisations remained weak. Though they campaigned for changes in the public sphere, they were cautious about discussing Personal Status Laws. For example, they argued against the implementation of the “بيت الطاعة”, ‘bayt etaa’ [obedience house] act by the police, but did not criticise the act itself (Abdel-Halim, 2010a: 5). Moreover, women’s limited freedom had not lasted for more than fourteen years, when Nimeiri turned against his socialist agenda, by bringing the Muslim Brothers back into the government and embarking upon the Islamisation of all laws in September 1983 (ibid.15). These laws are referred to as September Laws because they have no relation to Sharia’s (Abdel-Halim, 2010a).

Nimeiri was overthrown by an uprising in 1985. The new government enacted a transitional constitution, which resembled 1973 one. Though it bestowed GE, no change was made to the September Laws; as Abel-Halim argues: “Despite all the defects that appeared in the Islamic Codes, even by the standards of traditional Islamic schools, and their harsh unconstitutional applications, the democratic government did not bring about any significant change or repeal the codes.” (2010:16). Women’s suffering resumed when the Muslim Brothers came to power again through the Salvation Military Government in 1989 and advocated their version of Islamisation that applied Islamic rules to all aspects of life. Several articles within the Muslim Family Law (1991), the Criminal Law (1991), and the Public Order Act (1996) discriminate against women and girls (Tønnessen, 2010: 6-7). The Interim Constitution of 2005 gave women temporary relief. However, after secession, the government revived the Constitution based on Sharia.

In summary, Sudan has been governed by Sharia almost without a break since Turkiyya; it has been a top-down political tool applied to control people, regardless of their beliefs. One issue that has remained unchanged, even during the democratic government, is that of the Personal Status Laws. However, neither the Islamic faith nor GNs are static, as Bernal notes

39 The act stipulated that a woman who left her husband’s house without his permission should be brought back to it by the police.
(Bernal, 1994). That is, the community's varying social, economic, and political circumstances determine what can be perceived as appropriate GNs.

4.3.3 Gender Norms and the Muslims’ Orthodoxy

Orthodox Islamic ideology lies behind Sudan being one of the six countries that have not signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Tønnessen, 2010). Nonetheless, the MDGs’ Progress Report (2016) shows some progress in gender development indicators. There has been progressing in the education gap, though this varies by education level and geographical location. For example, the percentage of females in tertiary education has increased at a higher rate than males, reaching 54.1% of total students in 2008. Though this indicates a narrowing gap towards parity, it does not necessarily imply a change in attitude towards women’s education. The men serving in the military pre-enrolment (discussed above) and the country’s economic situation have both formed significant barriers to male education. Furthermore, the increase in the number of universities and their distribution across the states facilitates female enrolment, where GNs and financial resources would otherwise constrain some females from studying far from their homes.

Women’s participation in economic activities increased from 18% in 1990 to 30% in 2008, but there are still significant gender gaps in employment. Women comprise 38% of the workforce, and 10% work in the private sector (WHO, 2010). Regarding political participation, women occupied 28% of the seats in the elected parliament in 2010, which was achieved through a quota system, where at least 25% (112) of the seats were reserved for women who competed for it on a separate list. This experience is evidence for the claim that the quota system is used in low democracy countries (Dahlerup, 2008)\(^4\), as the ruling party, National Congress Party, won 109 seats. Furthermore, the women in parliament have not achieved any change in women’s issues, such as abolishing the oppressive Islamic laws that stripped the rights that women once enjoyed (Mathisen et al., 2011). Tønnessen explains this by their fear of confrontation with conservatives (Tønnessen, 2013a: 97). However, I believe that they have not argued against these laws because they do not believe that there is GE in Islam but equity. Because they believe equality within the family is neither necessary nor

\(^4\) Cited in Tønnessen, 2013, p. 95.
desirable, they have fought for women’s rights in public rather than the private sphere (Tønnessen, 2011: 30). Except for two, all the women belong to the National Congress Party and the Umma Party, which both have a similar religious ideology; the former was behind imposing the September Laws, and the latter refused to repeal them when they assumed power. Spiritual faith is essential in constructing GNs in Sudan, as discussed in the following sub-section.

4.3.4 Gender Ideologies

GNs are formed by intersections between various cultural and socioeconomic positions. Nonetheless, scholars often attribute the current gender disparity in Sudan to Islam (see (Badri & Knuth, 2008: 13-4). As a Sudanese, I can confirm that religion (Islam) is vital for the Sudanese and shapes the lives of the majority. For this majority, Islam is “not only a matter of spirituality and rituals but also a major form of social identity” (Bechtold, 2015: 96). However, Islam is not a homogeneous understanding; different people have different views. This sub-section explores the Islamic doctrines in Sudan and how they shape GNs. Sudanese Muslims are adherents of the Sunni (as opposed to the Shi’a) school of Islam. Nonetheless, within this, you can find orthodox Muslims, Muslims who oppose aspects of orthodoxy, adherents of Sufism (ibid.), and Republicans who oppose both orthodoxy and Sufism while calling for reform of Islam (El-Bashir, 2013, 2018; Howard, 1988, 2006, 2016; Taha, 1967b; Tønnessen & Al-Nagar, 2015). Ideologically, these groups can be categorised into two schools: Sharia for the orthodox and followers of Sufism; and Sunna/Second-Message of Islam for Republicans. However, most people fall somewhere between the two doctrines.

Regarding GE, the most challenging issues for its achievement in the Islamic context are the Personal Status Laws and “ﻗﻮامة’ [the guardianship] that assigns women to a subordinate position to men. Both are based on Sharia, which the Republicans call for reform, arguing that it solved the seventh century’s problems but is incapable of solving those of today. Republicans say that guardianship is based on the premises of “инfaq’”

41 Adherents of Sufism seek a closer personal relationship with God through special spiritual disciplines.
[maintenance] and physical protection of women and that it implies that any man is in charge of any woman. For example, because men are obliged to provide for women regarding inheritance, women only receive half of their brothers' heritage. Women are considered a burden on men who are obliged to protect and provide for them. However, today, women are no longer dependent—indeed, they often provide for men—and communities worldwide are governed by laws that protect both women and men. According to the Second Message, there is no longer any need for *Quwama*, and women and men should share equal obligations and rights.

Marriage, in Sharia, is “a contract for having pleasure with a woman.” This deal occurs between men, whereby the husband pays the bride-wealth to the wife’s father or brothers. Women are commodified in this contract: their natal men receive the price, and their husbands receive the services. The husband is also obliged to maintain and protect his new commodity. He only needs to provide the minimum for her to survive as long as she performs her duties (Republicans, 1975). The wife is also compelled to live with her husband regardless of her suffering and has no right to divorce, while her husband has an unrestricted right to it. Furthermore, men have the right to discipline women and flog the ‘disobedient’ ones and the right to marry up to four women, as long as the condition of meeting their material provision is met (ibid.).

In contrast, the Second-Message protects women’s humanity and dignity, giving them equal rights and obligations to men. For example, a woman can choose her husband, be his only wife, and share divorce rights. That is, she can be secure that he will not marry another woman nor divorce her without discussing the issue. Furthermore, she can initiate a divorce herself. All these rights are agreed on in the marriage contract signed by both parties in a small ceremony. The bride-wealth is symbolic (one Sudanese pound) and received by the bride, but the real bride-wealth is that represented by her husband, who commits to the agreed equal rights. Children are considered the secondary fruit of the marriage, and the spouses share the tasks of decision-making, breadwinner, home-chores and discipline of the children.

The Second Message of Islam and Sharia lies at opposite ends of the spectrum of gender ideologies in Sudan, and many combinations exist between them. This diversity is due to changes in the socioeconomic sphere, in education and general awareness—the latter brought
about by globalisation, advances in communication, and, not least, by the awareness-raising efforts of the Republicans. A study conducted in a Sudanese village that shows Islamic doctrine is not static and is influenced by international policy and economics (Bernal, 1994: 40) proved the dynamic of gender ideologies and Islam. The study concludes that: “the pattern of gender relations and the ideologies supporting these does not constitute an autonomous cultural system, reproduced by the community. Instead, the reality and ideals governing gender relations and relations are responsive to economic, political, and ideological conditions in the World System.” (Bernal, 1994: 61). Badri and Knuth (2008), also note that the villagers in Al Gharaza strive to protect their tribe’s norms from the waves of Islamisation. However, Hale argues, “Islamisation was a movement from above, not an autonomous movement; it was a method of consolidating state control by exerting cultural (religious) hegemony. For example, lower- to middle-class women I interviewed claimed to be religious but distanced themselves from what they viewed as fanatical Islam.” (Hale, 1997: 11–12). That is, the majority do not accept the Islamic ideology that has been imposed, and Sudanese women [and men] are not a homogenous group; they are defined by different religious beliefs and socioeconomic positions. This variation will be shown empirically in the following chapters.

4.3.5 Gender relations

Women and men often socialise and behave in line with the stereotypes and beliefs that are acceptable in their community. Those who deviate from this are frowned upon by society. Despite the cultural diversity in Sudan, some basic norms are shared and enforced across the various cultures. The British-Egyptian imperialism has an essential role in women’s prevailing repression and discrimination (Ibrahim, 1996: 3). According to Badri (1990: 3), value systems help define women’s and men’s roles in Sudanese society. Men are expected to be brave and show independent decision-making abilities and protection for others.

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42 There is no doubt that the basic principles of Islam, found in the Mecca verses of the Quran, honour women and give them equal rights with men. The Republicans identified the need for these rights to be enforced and applied them in their communities. They have preached at the grassroots level across Sudan and mobilised women’s organisations to campaign against all forms of discrimination against women since the 1960s. Their work intensified in the International Women’s Year (1975) when the Republican Sisters issued 16 booklets that simplified women’s rights, and both women and men distributed these in streets, clubs and to institutions that dealt with human rights and women’s issues to disseminate the notion throughout the entire community.
In contrast, women are relegated to household activities and are expected to be protected and to accept male decisions. Traditional household activities include providing food and other services necessary to the health and comfort of the household. A good wife is considered a woman who provides comfort and support to a husband and produces children. Therefore, from childhood, women seek to be skilled in housekeeping. Mothers and grandmothers are responsible for children—particularly those under ten—disciplining them and preparing them for their social responsibilities. Girls, for example, start by helping with laundry, sweeping, and cooking. Cooking is an essential task that is carried out almost exclusively by women. Men, boys, and young girls (up to the age of 10), as well as senior women, may take part in household chores outside the house, such as fetching groceries and fodder, caring for the animals, and milking (Badri & Knuth, 2008: 44-8). In addition, fetching water and firewood are often female tasks. Besides this, in farming areas, women participate in family food production and support men in cash-crop production (Hassan, 2009: 123-4; Ibnouf, 2011). It is common for women to support each other with the home-chores, particularly during occasions such as Eid. More importantly, the mother and sisters of new mothers stay with them for two months after the baby's delivery to help with domestic affairs. (It is taboo for women to leave their bed for forty days after labour.)

Meanwhile, the essential role of men is that of the provider. The husband is expected to provide a sufficient family income. Although the literature on this issue is scant, one recent study shows that men sometimes work several days in sequence or all week outside their village to fulfil this responsibility. They are also the primary decision-maker in the household. However, women sometimes assume this role in the absence of their husbands. Some senior women enjoy high esteem in their families and are a source of advice to other family members (Badri & Knuth, 2008: 49).

Except for amongst the Republicans, marriage in Sudan is almost universal and is governed by Sharia and legalised by a marriage contract, "Quaseima". Polygamy is permitted, and divorce is relatively easy for men to obtain. Traditionally, early marriage has been encouraged to fulfil women’s primary reproductive roles. The wedding is costly. Besides the expensive food ceremonies and dance parties, the groom has to pay a sizable bride-wealth, as
well as the cost of the furniture for the couple’s new home and the ‘شيلة’43 (Brown, 2014: 507). However, relatives and friends contribute to the wedding’s overall cost (ibid.; Hassan, 2009, pp. 93-95). Therefore, marriage is often said to be a relationship between two families rather than between two individuals. As is true in most traditional cultures, newly married couples usually face pressure from their natal families to conceive. Indeed, infertility can offer a legitimate excuse for divorce and polygamy. Sons are also preferred over daughters, even by women, as Badri & Knuth (2008, p. 49) illustrates in this quote from a woman: “It’s better to have sons than daughters because the sons bring women into the house.” The burden of tasks women are expected to perform motivates them to support polygamy; in Nuba, for example, the first wife will sometimes promote her husband to have up to four wives to help her (Hassan, 2009: 96-7).

Gender relations, however, are part of an ever-changing process. Badri (1990) notes that Sudan’s changing socioeconomic and political conditions have changed traditional gender relations. She asserts that education is crucial for women’s emancipation and sources of economic power and knowledge. More women are receiving an education that enables them to share non-traditional professional positions with men (Badri, 1990; Bernal, 1994). These changes occur both in the urban and rural settings, with greater recognition of the importance of female education (Badri, 1990). More women enrol in education locally and abroad, more women work, and many males now receive financial contributions from female members (Badri, 1990); however, men continue to maintain complete control over the household income (Tønnessen, 2019: 224). The increasing absence of men—either to carry out their role as breadwinners or to take part in the war—also allows women to become the de facto head of the household. As such, they manage the family’s routine economic and social affairs independently (Badri, 1990; Bernal, 1994: 58).

4.4 Conclusion
The chapter introduced the Sudanese context that helped to shape the attributes of the female and male respondents. It discussed the complex historical, political, and socioeconomic situations in Sudan and how these shaped Sudanese migrations and GNs. The chapter showed

43 This enormous collection of gifts, which includes household goods, new sets of tobes (traditional dress), underwear, dresses and shoes, is often called a shayla (burden) or shanta (suitcase).
that the colonial authorities, radical Muslims and successive national governments are all to blame for the current gender disparity. It emphasised the gap in the knowledge around the Sudanese struggle against repressive regimes and how they were compelled to flee the country, then highlighted the reasons behind Sudanese mass migration and its increasing trend, particularly amongst women.

The chapter then reviewed the literature on Sudanese emigration and differentiated between traditional and contemporary migration. As part of the latter task, it highlighted the lack of consistent data and statistics that consider individual parameters, including sex. However, the chapter also revealed an essential—and increasing—phenomenon: Sudanese women dismantling traditional codes of conduct to emigrate independently to remote destinations. The literature also revealed that Sudanese women are no less likely than men to undertake risky ventures to achieve their goals. Therefore, the chapter emphasised the importance of using gender analysis.

Regarding GNs, the chapter used chronological progress to show how the colonisers and Islamists co-operated in establishing a base of gender disparity and focused on the impact of the Personal Status Laws, which no successive government has dared to annul. It then discussed the gender relations that are common in Sudan and the gender ideologies behind these. It showed that religion is the essential factor in shaping the gender ideologies of the Sudanese and distinguished between two different schools of Islam: one that supports gender equity; and one that supports gender equality—although it acknowledged the existence of a broad spectrum of positions between these. Finally, the chapter drew a comprehensive image of the socioeconomic situation in Sudan that triggered mass migration and the effect of this migration on prevailing GNs. It, therefore, offers a background against which to understand respondents’ specific motivations, migration journey, socioeconomic characteristics, and GNs, which will be discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS AND MIGRATION EXPERIENCES

5.1 Introduction

As discussed in chapter two, Sen asserts the importance of personal factors in converting available opportunities into functionings and well-being that individuals will value. Therefore, this chapter maps the respondents’ personal conversion factors (e.g., sex, age, education, marital status, GNs) and migration experiences. This information will facilitate understanding of the following chapters, helping to explain how personal conversion factors facilitate or constrain access to the labour-market and social life in Glasgow, thereby potentially affecting GNs.

The chapter introduces three themes that influence the respondents’ interactions in their new settings and may affect their GNs. The second section introduces the respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics: age, gender, education, occupations, work experiences and marital status. These parameters offer insights into differential access to the labour-market and potential differential changes to GNs. The third section discusses respondents’ migration experiences, including migration motivation factors, types and length of migration, migration status and migration routes. These factors are related to the environmental conversion factors that will determine the respondents’ livelihood strategies and entitlements in immigration countries and which, in turn, will affect the resource acquirement that can alter GNs. The fourth section explores respondents’ GNs – an essential part of their personal conversion factors that may be challenged in the immigration setting – and highlights three issues that I consider essential indicators of gender ideologies in Sudan. These concern the family's formation, which indicates the gender ideologies governing each couple’s gender relations. Indicators covered are marriage decision and process; bride-wealth; living with the in-laws; and preferred gender of children. Together, these offer an image of the respondents’ gender ideologies before emigration as a baseline for assessing the impact of the immigration setting. In this way, the chapter provides an essential background for the analytical chapters. It shows the considerable influence of environmental conversion factors in Sudan on the respondents’
socioeconomic factors, their decision to emigrate, and how their diverse personal conversion factors impact their lives in Glasgow.

5.2 Migrants’ Socioeconomic Characteristics

This section introduces the respondents’ personal conversion factors at the time of immigration. The parameters considered are education, occupations, work experience and age and marital status at the time of interview. These factors provide insights into variation in accessing the resources that may change respondents’ GNs. However, it should be noted that the sample was selected by the snowball method and is not statistically representative.

5.2.1 The Respondents’ Ages

The respondents' ages are considered because the literature shows that it relates to a change in GNs, although there is no consensus on the direction of this relation. At the time of the interview, respondents’ ages, as shown in Figure (5-1), vary between 23 and 65. Most (78%) females (N=28) are aged between 23 and 40, and most (72%) males (N=21) are between 31 and 50. Though only a few respondents of either gender are in the upper age interval (60-65), they are enough to explore their experiences and opinions. This age spectrum is sufficient to
explore how respondents’ age mediates access to Glasgow’s resources and how it affects their GNs.

5.2.2 Education, Occupations and Work Experiences

Education, occupation and work experience are related to labour-market engagement, an essential arena for improving both tangible and intangible resources that may affect respondents’ GNs. Figure (5-2) shows that at emigration, respondents’ education levels range from no formal education to a Master’s degree; it also indicates the richness of their educational resources: 55% have an education level higher than a secondary school; 23% have a secondary level (up to 11 years); 20% have a basic level (up to 8 years), and 2% have no formal education. Meanwhile, education by sex (Figure (5-3)) shows that females have a higher level of education than males: 93% of the females (compared to 58% of the males) have a secondary level or higher; while at emigration, no female had no formal education, and no male had a Master’s degree. However, this is hardly surprising considering the situation in Sudan, as explored in the previous chapter, whereby war and GNs compelled males to sacrifice their education and emigrate, bypassing their role of protector to fulfil their role of provider. As this has skewed the gender education gap in favour of women, it is to be expected that they will fare better than men in Glasgow’s labour-market and have better access to resources that may alter their GNs.
There is also wide variation in the respondents’ occupation at emigration. 30.6% were employed in white-collar roles (vet, engineer, economist, teacher, journalist, IT professional); although females were represented in all these occupations, not one male was a teacher, engineer, or journalist. We also found that 8% of the respondents were employed in blue-collar roles, but while males were represented in the service sector, only one woman was. Therefore, the sample does not agree with the finding that Sudan's labour market is highly segregated by gender and occupation (Tønnessen, 2019: 231), although this may be explained by migration selectivity and the change in the education gap mentioned above. However, despite their rich educational resources and diversified occupations, only a few respondents’ work experiences match their qualifications. This finding is explained by the labour-market structure as experienced, for example, by Ali:

*Like most Sudanese youth [the 20s-30s], I did menial jobs such as construction and vending.*

This is the case with all the men without higher education who were employed in various menial jobs after they ended their education. Although, in contrast, most graduates set up a trade or small business, these failed to survive the high, unreasonable taxes, as Adil claimed:

*When I failed to get a job, I established a small business, but I couldn’t sustain it because of the unreasonable tax that exceeded tenfold the revenue. All small business owners who don’t belong to the ruling party have suffered the same.*

Sufian further confirmed this:

*Like other Sudanese youth, I graduated and found myself on the street, unemployed and with no hope of finding a job; this was the situation in the early 1990s. I applied for a job at the North Islamic Bank; they rejected me because I am not a ruling party member. I applied to various posts and got the same result. So, what other alternatives did I have? I decided to work in vehicles brokering. I bought old cars, repaired and then sold them. The business grew. I bought a good car—I could not afford it, but my family supported me. The following day the police arrested me and seized the car claiming it was stolen. We proved that we bought it legally. However, the case revealed a group of public sector senior officers from the toll and the traffic police, supported by others from the ruling party, to trading in the public sector’s cars. They released me, but I lost the money I invested in the car, which was my entire*
capital. So, I found myself unemployed again and had no financial resources to resume my job.

It is a common experience for those not affiliated with the ruling party to be unable to find a place in the labour-market. Those with good work experience started their career before the military coup in 1989. For example, Ahmed started working in an insurance company as a student. He continued after graduation until the company closed down due to the country’s economic situation in 1992, at which point he was vice general manager. The rest of the respondents have either little or no work experience. For example, Haytham (a vet) worked as a teaching assistant at a university for two years and in a clinic, while Soliman (a computer scientist) traded between Sudan and Turkey. The frustration of these experiences, combined with Sudan’s economic situation and GNs, will likely motivate men to engage in Glasgow’s labour-market. However, their limited work experience may force them into menial jobs.

Similarly, women are likely to be motivated to generate income, although most emigrated just after graduation and had not previously tried to access the labour-market. However, they were optimistic about the opportunities to find a good job in Glasgow; as Nuha noted:

Our families invested in our education because they wanted us to work and compensate them. Therefore, I expected to get a job in Glasgow.

A few females have experience in trade or business, such as Laila, who engaged in trade between Sudan and Dubai after emigrating with her husband, and Nadia, who was self-employed in the service sector. However, three of the females did have professional work experience: as a bank officer (Zainab), an engineer (Lubna), and a project manager in an international charity (Shadia). Lubna described her career development:

After my graduation, I was employed at a construction company. Then I got a job related to my specialisation in the electric department; I continued working until 2011. During this period, I travelled a lot, inside and outside of Sudan, as part of my work. In 2005, I attended a one-month course in India. We were four, and I was the only female. In 2006, I participated in a course in Egypt and one in Thailand for three months; in 2008-09, I got a Fellowship in Cardiff, the UK, for a Master’s degree. After it, I returned and resumed work; in 2010, I travelled to India for a course.
However, most women have no work experience from Sudan; a few have experience unrelated to their qualifications; and even less have professional jobs that offered opportunities for them to travel abroad—an experience that improved their career, confidence and general knowledge of life. This lack of work experience is likely to reduce the impact in Glasgow's labour-market of their high educational resources and, therefore, the propensity among the women for GNs to change.

5.2.3 Marital Status

Respondents’ marital status is essential to this study. Not only does it indicate female mobility and emancipation—as mentioned on pages (102-103), mobility of single females is traditionally unacceptable in Sudanese culture—but, even more importantly, it allows better investigation of any change in GNs within a household as discussing actual rather than hypothetical experience is more informative. As shown in Figures (5-4) and (5-5), 78% of the respondents are married; 6% (around 7% of the females and 5% of the males) are married but chose not to register their marriage at the relevant department; 12% are single; 2% are widowed, and 2% are divorced. That only around 4% of the females are single, compared to 24% of the males, is explained by the norms as stated by Fatima:

“We cannot travel to Europe before marriage. First, we don’t know how to do it; second, if we know, we are not allowed as single girls to migrate alone. This is our culture.”
Therefore, the experience of the single women would suggest that they are from relatively gender-equalitarian families.

The 6% in an unregistered marriage are separated from those in the married category because they enjoy different official rights, whereby they are treated as either single or, if they have children, as a single parent. Similarly, they are separated from those in the single category because they share the family resources, duties, and obligations with their spouses. This wide variation in marital statuses will help us to understand the variation in their behaviours and opinions. The knowledge generated from the experiences of the 88% of respondents who experienced been married is expected to be richer than that of the 12% who are single.

Comparing spouses' age and education levels indicates gender relations in the household. 23% of respondents have equal education levels with their spouses; 14% of the males have higher education levels than their wives, but most females (63%) have higher education levels than their husbands. To my knowledge, this is a new phenomenon in Sudanese culture (in which husbands usually have a higher education than their wives). As mentioned in section 5.1.2, this change in the educational attainment of both genders results from the protracted war. Although this might be expected to alter power relations favouring women, males probably plan to offset this through age difference. In general, the tendency of men to pair with younger women has existed worldwide throughout history, albeit with the size of the age gap varying across cultures. For example, in African countries, the average age gap may reach ten years, while in Western countries, it is three (Lehmiller & Agnew, 2011: 5). However, the age gap between Sudanese couples in Glasgow is vast, as shown in table (5-1). 81% of the husbands are older than their wives by more than five years-an age variation likely to impact gender relations. If it is assumed that a more significant age gap is associated with higher marital instability (Drefahl, 2010: 313), then the wide age gap in the sample may lead to an imbalance in power that leads to marriage instability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Diff.</th>
<th>0-2</th>
<th>3-5</th>
<th>6-8</th>
<th>9-10</th>
<th>11-14</th>
<th>23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (5-1): Age Difference between Spouses
To conclude, the respondents have diverse personal conversion factors. As the females have better education and work experience than males, they would be expected to fare better regarding access to tangible and intangible resources. However, the age gap between spouses may alter this expectation, as might other factors, such as migration experiences, explored in the next section.

5.3 Migration Experiences

This section relates to the respondents’ environmental conversion factors. It explores four factors related to the migration experience that have a crucial impact on respondents’ local and transnational interactions that, in turn, may impact their GNs. The first factor is emigration motivation. This is expected to determine the respondents’ livelihood strategies, affecting access to resources. Access to resources is also determined by the second factor: migration status. The third factor is migration length, as acculturation literature shows that prolonged exposure to the host culture may alter immigrants’ cultures (Röder & Mühlau, 2014: 919). The fourth factor, migration route, is included because the data show considerable impact on gender relations, notably regarding resource control.

5.3.1 Emigration Motivation

Emigration motivation is an important environmental conversion factor and one expected to guide the living experience of migrants in their new settings. For example, those motivated by education are expected to follow education routes, while those motivated by economic reasons follow employment routes. Either route will affect personal conversion factors and
may also affect GNs. However—as the data show—all the respondents have economic motivations, citing unemployment and the economic situation in Sudan as a reason for their emigration. As Huda said:

*I joined my husband first in Saudi Arabia. He migrated for economic reasons. Though he is a doctor, he couldn’t make money in Sudan. Then he migrated to Glasgow for academic reasons, intending to return to Saudi, improve our economic status, and return to Sudan.*

Huda’s case shows that even the most prestigious occupations were not rewarding in Sudan, which provoked the majority to consider emigration. As Soliman explains, emigration is also a planned family strategy:

*I couldn’t sustain my business because of the high unorganised taxes. My brother and I were responsible for the family after my father passed away. As a family, we agreed that I should migrate to Europe to improve our living conditions and secure family income.*

The economic situation motivates even females whose primary motivation is to accompany their husbands. As Shaza said:

*I migrated to accompany my husband. It is a dream for every girl to get married, travel to Europe, and have a great lifestyle.*

The above illustrates how Sudan's labour-market structure constrained respondents to gain work experience and motivated them to emigrate. Employment simply did not bring sufficient reward to keep people in their posts. As a result, both those with rewarding jobs and the self-employed were compelled to emigrate; as Omer explains:

*I had a cafeteria in a strategic location in Khartoum. I also used it for money transfers to the west of Sudan. The government authority seized the cafeteria, and I was arrested and imprisoned and accused of supporting the west’s rebel movements. This was not true, even the money I transferred was not considerable, but it was an excuse to take my cafeteria because it was in a good location.*
Mahdy, who shared ownership of a restaurant, had a similar experience:

*Though it [the restaurant] generated good income, we couldn’t operate it successfully because of the city council’s unreasonable control. They frequently seized the restaurant’s furniture and equipment without giving a reason. In addition to the high tax, we paid much money to release the furniture and equipment, but they repeated the process often. So, I decided to close it down and emigrate.*

Usurpation of people’s source of income was one of the *Tamkeen* policies that motivated people to emigrate. A similar situation was faced by those employed in the public sector, as Lubna explains:

*I tried to resign many times, but my application was rejected to avoid the financial compensation I was entitled to. In 2010, the staff of the electric department changed, and Osama Abdalla*44 *replaced the general manager. Everything changed. As qualified people who were not loyal to the government, we were considered a threat, side-lined, and replaced by consultants from abroad. In 2011 I got married and left the country.*

Other respondents were motivated by the wars and their consequences. Although six respondents are originally from the Darfur region, only one male, Mohammed, was directly motivated to emigrate by warfare:

*I am here because of the war in our region [Darfur]. My family scattered inside and outside Sudan.*

However, escaping military service and political oppression (discussed in the previous chapter) was mentioned by many respondents, including Sufian:

*At that time [1992], recruitment for the Public Defence Force was at its optimum. I was caught and joined a military training camp, and within a month, the camp relocated to the south. I tried to escape without any success. So, we travelled to Juba and continued the training there. Two days later, we were attacked by the rebels. I was injured. When my family heard about it, they advised me to find any way to come to Khartoum. At the same time, my brother was looking for a way to smuggle me out of the country. Though I was on the battlefield, he managed to issue an exemption from the mandatory military service and then a visa to France for me. The problem was how to return to Khartoum. So, I pretended *

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44 A well-known and corrupt pro-government official
that I was blind; because there were no optical services in the military hospital in Juba, they referred me to the one in Khartoum, where I escaped and travelled to France.

A few respondents cited political oppression as a reason for emigration; for example, Tariq:

I was accused of distributing leaflets against the government. I was arrested and suffered horrible torture during my detention.

Two other males also faced detention and torture as students and emigrated after graduation for security. Laila was motivated by political and gender oppression:

I was politically active until AL- Bashir took power, and freedom of speech was banned. After that, I was involved in secret opposition activities until the application of Sharia laws. The flogging of unveiled females had become quite frequent. I had often been questioned about my dress, and I was told to leave the university [where she was a postgraduate student]. Moreover, I was forced to sign a written pledge containing restrictions concerning behaviour. I felt that this country is no longer mine, and it is high time to emigrate.

Many other factors also motivated respondents to emigrate. A male and a female, for example, emigrated for medical reasons; while another male and female emigrated for education, as Nadia describes:

I travelled abroad for the first time to London in 2007, where I accompanied my husband, who worked in the Sudanese embassy. His mission was for four years. When we returned to Sudan, he faced problems in his workplace. Also, my children had started their education here [in the UK]; we found it challenging to start Sudanese schools and expensive to study in private schools. Fortunately, he had not returned the diplomatic passports when we returned. Therefore, he decided to escape.

Some respondents migrated from other Arab countries due to a combination of factors in that country and Sudan, as experienced by Laila:

In my regular travels to Sudan, I experienced numerous problems and oppression as a female. Consequently, I began to investigate the possibility of settling in another country. Other factors strengthened these thoughts; for instance, the education system in Arab countries offers little to the children, and our residence permit in UAE is temporary. Therefore, I thought of migrating.
Randa experienced the same:

When I was 19 years old, the university age, Sudan was politically unstable, and so were the educational institutions. I am also fed up with the Saudi education system. So, I had to look for other options and came to the UK.

As this subsection shows, most respondents were motivated to emigrate by war and the economic situation in Sudan, although a few did so for other reasons. Consequently, they would likely be driven into menial jobs with limited access to resources.

5.3.2 Migration Status and Length of Migration Experience

Migration status affects people’s entitlement to resources in Glasgow. Though most respondents migrated due to war, different migration statuses are found. More than half of the respondents are refugees (53%) or family unified (41%), while a few are labour migrants (4%) or spouses of labour migrants (2%). It is noteworthy that none of the labour migrants originally migrated from Sudan but either migrated for education and later got jobs (at which point they changed their visas to those of labour migrants) or migrated from other European countries. For example, Randa had not planned to work in the UK:

I was preparing to return to Sudan after graduation, but I had been offered a lucrative job, so I cancelled my ticket and stayed.
Regarding sex, the data show that 95.2% of the males migrated independently and have received refugee status and 4.8% (2) as family unification. In comparison, 71.5% of the women migrated as dependents: 67.9% as family unification and 3.6% as the wife of a labour migrant. Of the remainder, a considerable number migrated as primary migrants; of these, 21.4% (6) have refugee status, and 7.1% have labour migrant status. However, digging deeper into these figures, qualitative analysis reveals that one of the two men who had migrated dependently was underaged, while the second had sent his wife ahead of him to secure a resident permit because she had a higher propensity to obtain refugee status. Similarly, the analysis revealed that only one of the six women with refugee status migrated independently; the rest were either underaged or smuggled with the help of networks, often by the instigation of their husbands. These findings reflect the traditional Sudanese norms in which women migrate as homemakers and men as breadwinners. As stated at the beginning of the section, entitlement remains related to migration status. Those with a refugee status have the same entitlement as citizens, while family unification migrants have access to the labour-market and limited access to the state welfare until they get a permanent resident permit. This variation in their migration status may, therefore, impact the negotiation of their GNs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Migration Length</th>
<th>Length in the UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-29</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Length of migration experience is also likely to relate to changes in immigrants’ GNs positively. As mentioned earlier, migrants may change their gender ideologies if they are exposed to different beliefs for an extended period (Ponce, 2017; Röder & Mühlau, 2014). The length of
respondents’ migration varied between two and 29 years, while the length of their time in the UK varied between two and 22 years (a variation due to chain migration or length of migration route).

Table (5-2) shows the respondents’ migration length in years number (Migration Length) and how many years they have spent in the UK (Length in the UK). It shows that 40% (N=15) of the females have a short emigration period of 2-5 years, while 33% have a long period of 21-29 years. In contrast, 46% (N=13) of the males have an upper-middle length of migration (11-20 years), and 23 have a short period (2-5 yrs.). Length of migration includes the length of respondents’ traditional temporary migration. For example, Laila spent five years in Egypt for education, which she believes was crucial in building her personality and dominant position in her networks. Likewise, it includes traditional male migration, such as Omer (two years) and Mahdy (three years), who returned after they had saved enough money to start their businesses in Sudan. Generally, females have more extended migration periods than males. For example, Huda spent seven years in Saudi and 22 years in Glasgow. Some of the females have spent most of their lives abroad. For instance, Suha-born in Dubai, spent some education years in Sudan and then migrated to Europe—has spent 15 of her 26 years abroad. Similarly, Randa and Lubna have each spent 25 years abroad. Four other respondents started with traditional migration and then decided to move to the UK. However, most males who came directly to the UK took a long time to reach their destination.

In conclusion, respondents who have lived longer in the UK are expected to have observed the difference in GNs between the two cultures and, in response, may have adjusted their own gender relations.

5.3.3 Migration Routes

Migration from the global South to the North does not follow easy or direct routes. As discussed on pages (132-135), the Sudanese often have to follow long, dangerous and expensive routes. Some take years before they reach a destination, which they consider

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45 The plan was to consider a length of three years and more, but a woman (Madeena) included due to her exceptional experience.
suitable for permanent settlement, and our data show that migration routes impact their gender relations and everyday life. Their suffering and expenditure during this journey, for example, motivated them to work hard but also prevented women’s access to financial resources; (A finding that will be discussed in more detail in chapter eight.) The respondents also followed different routes to the UK. The more affluent males followed the easiest and cheapest routes: after paying the official fees (or a little more) for a student or tourist visa to enter a European country, they could start their smuggling venture to the UK for permanent settlement. For example, Lutfi, Adil, Haroon and Haytham entered Greece or France on tourist visas. As settlement in either country was impossible, they had to move on to another country that granted asylum. Those who headed to the Netherlands wasted a long time waiting for their asylum cases to be processed and rejected. When they had to leave, the lucky ones were smuggled to England through the airport using other people’s passports, while the rest tried smuggling themselves through Calais.

However, the less affluent first had to travel to an Arab country to make the money they would need for their journey to Europe. For example, Omer started his journey from Libya, where he suffered humiliating treatment by the natives:

*They treat us like slaves; even those with dark skin say to you “يا عبد ‘abed’ [slave], “go back home” and so forth. Ali experienced the same in Dubai: Dubai doesn’t fulfil my dreams; foreigners have no dignified life. They are just cheap workers, slaves, who should not hop over the red lines, and, when their work permits expire, should return to Sudan.*

Humiliating experience in Arab countries shows variation between the traditional and contemporary migration where Sudanese seek better-dignified life in the North.

Most men arrived via one of two main routes. The most dangerous—via Libya then crossing the Mediterranean by boat to Italy—on which people risk their lives, is called “درب الموت” *Darb-almaut* (the death route); while the route through east Europe is known as “درب التمل” *Darb- alnamil* (the ants’ route) because people are often caught and returned to the previous country before trying again. The two routes often join in Calais. Omer describes one example of Darb-almaut:
I travelled by boat from Tripoli to Italy. It was a perilous journey; we spent five horrible days between the two blues [the sea and the sky]. The boat was overcrowded like a matchbox—you could not stretch your legs without touching others; there was not enough food or water; don’t ask about the toilets. In Italy, we were caught by the police and taken to a camp. The Sudanese there advised me to go to Calais. From Italy, I travelled by train to France. I was caught twice and returned to Italy. I made it on the third attempt, and when I arrived in Paris, I travelled to Calais. I stayed for two weeks; it was brutal and cold. Fortunately, I managed to travel under a truck; I sat for three hours between the tyres until I reached Birmingham in the UK. I couldn’t get off until the truck arrived at its company, then I got off, and people saw me.

Experiences of Darb-almamil are shared by others, with slightly different routes:

Haroon:

I got a visa to Greece. They took my fingerprints, interviewed me, and I stayed for a month; we were smuggled to Albania, where we remained for three days, then smuggled by a truck at midnight to Montenegro, where we walked for six hours until we reached a refugee camp. We were interviewed and got a resident permit for three months. From there, we were smuggled to Serbia. It was also a difficult journey; we walked for about seven hours. I stayed there for months until I got financial support from my brother when I was smuggled to Italy through Sylvania [Bosnia]. From Italy, I travelled by train to Paris, Calais, and by truck to the UK.

Mahdy:

In 2010, a friend helped me to get a visa to Turkey; however, my destination was Europe. Some Sudanese in Turkey helped me with living costs because I didn’t have enough money to continue the journey. First, I was smuggled to Greece by a small balloon boat. I paid $200; there were 50 of us in the boat—its capacity was 20 persons. It was a complicated and dangerous process. We were caught by the police, who took us to a camp with horrible services. Then they took us to a camp in Athens and a prison. After they had taken our fingerprints, they gave us a temporary visa for one month and released us. Then I was smuggled to Italy on a truck and hosted by some Sudanese who advised me to take the train to France. In France, I was also advised by a Sudanese man about how to get to Calais and the smuggling process to the UK. I made two unsuccessful smuggling attempts to get to the UK. The third one was successful—I just hopped in a car inside the train, and the train moved immediately. Finally, I arrived in Dover, where I went to the police and applied for asylum.
However, these are not the longest, most dangerous or most expensive examples. Ali, for example, crossed eleven countries within five years (two of them Dubai and Syria) to reach the UK and, during the three years he spent in Europe, suffered considerable hunger, homelessness, and cold. Those who took the ant route got food and shelter from Sudanese or Arab communities, either working illegally or getting support from their friends or relatives to pay the smuggling fee (a fee paid for each attempt regardless of outcome). The suffering described by many men had its implication for their lives in Glasgow. As discussed in chapter six, all of them were motivated to generate income to compensate for the cost of their journey and support their families in Sudan. However, to do this, they had to take jobs with a low reward and that limited contact with other people, which reduced the propensity for any change in GNS.

In contrast, most women experienced short and safe journeys. The majority, such as Ibtisam, arrived through a family reunion:

My husband sent for me when he got his resident permit, and then I applied to the embassy in Khartoum and got the visa after two months. My husband sent all my travel expenses.

Others came via student, labour or tourist visas direct to the UK, although some, like Shaza were smuggled:

I was smuggled using the passport of another female because my husband had not mentioned me in his case. He had been living here for 16 years. He paid £2000 for the passport. When I arrived at the airport, I applied for asylum. It took only one month to get the resident permit.

One exception to this was the difficulties faced by Zainab, who lived in an Arab country for 11 years and returned to Sudan when her husband passed away, and who wanted to come to Europe with her three children for medical reasons. After the official routes had failed, she and her children entered Europe on tourist visas to France, where she struggled for a year to find a foothold before managing to reach the UK.
In France, we knew my daughter had no free medical treatment. Therefore, we moved to Belgium and applied for asylum there, but we were rejected. We returned to France. We slept in the street and then travelled to Calais, where we applied for asylum and got accommodation. Our fingerprints in Belgium were discovered, and we had to move out. I started to look for a smuggler to help us to get into the UK. A Somali man smuggled my two daughters and me in his car using the passports of other females. Smuggling went peacefully. My son joined us later.

Apart from the labour migrants, Zainab is the only female respondent who migrated independently. However, as a woman over 50 and the mother of three children who migrated to seek medical treatment for one of them, her case would be more acceptable in Sudan than that of a young single female.

In general, women—even those who were smuggled—experienced easier and shorter routes than men, with the costs often paid for by their husbands. Indeed, arranging to bring their wife can often be a headache for Sudanese men (particularly if they were not already married when they sought asylum) as they will need to secure a large amount of money to do so. In a situation with implications for their gender relations, if they cannot fulfil this condition, some, such as the husband of Shaza, will instead arrange for their wives to be smuggled.

In summary, men face more extended, dangerous and expensive routes to the UK than women; they are also expected to pay the cost of bringing their wives. As a result, they often engage in menial jobs that provide a swift income and require a slight adjustment to qualifications. The men’s investment—to reach the UK and pay to bring their wives—casts them in the role of the owners of financial resources and will have implications for their future gender relations.

5.4 Gender Norms
This section explores the GNs—an essential part of the personal and environmental conversion factors that may be challenged in the immigration setting—that the migrants brought with them. It discusses the family’s formation, which will indicate the gender ideologies of both spouses that will govern their gender relations, and offers a background to
the family ideologies that may affect their GNs in Glasgow. Indicators covered are themes that I consider essential indicators of gender ideologies in Sudan: marriage decision and process; bride-wealth; living with the in-laws; and preferred gender of children.

5.4.1 Spouse Selection and Marriage Process

The right to choose a spouse and enter marriage with free and full consent is one of the fundamental rights of women articulated in the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979). Making this choice has an empowering effect on women and is associated with greater marital satisfaction and stability and egalitarian GNs reflected in decision-making authority and freedom of movement (Jejeebhoy et al., 2013). Therefore, respondents who self-select a spouse expect to enjoy an egalitarian relationship. In Sudan, marriage is seen as a relationship between two families rather than between two individuals, and the family's consent is more important than that of the individual who is going to marry. All the respondents covertly or overtly express this. Furthermore, some believe that the family of the groom has the right to select the bride. For example, Lutfi, who is planning to marry within a year, is looking for a suitable bride in Sudan:

I am looking for an educated female from a respectable family. I am looking at the extended family, neighbourhood and then the rest of the networks. My family is helping me in this search. If they spot a female outside the extended family, they ask about the family's reputation; if it is acceptable for them, they go ahead. Family consent is essential; marriage is a relationship between families, not only two persons. Therefore, the consent of both families is necessary for a successful marriage.

Some families prefer marriage within the kinship to ensure the marriage’s success; as Omer stated:

I am married to my cousin. It is not a must to marry my cousin, but as we say in Sudan, you should first غطى فحتاك‬ ‘盖你的‘, ‘cover your dish’.

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[A Sudanese proverb meaning that men who want to marry should prioritise kinship females; although, particularly if they possess an undesirable feature that makes their marriage difficult, they can then search outside the kinship.]

Females also accept marriage to a man approved by their family even though they do not know him. For example, Shaza:

_He is a distant relative. I don’t know him because when he migrated, I was young, but I know his family. His sister asked if I would accept him as a husband; I agreed, and then his family talked to my family and finalised the process. It is enough to know the family, and when my family accepted him, this meant he was a good man._

Even though the family of Haytham’s wife lived in London, he still followed the method used in his natal family. He asked his family in Sudan to investigate her extended family’s reputation before he approached her father:

_A friend suggested her to me, so I asked about her family in Sudan. My uncles know the family because they are distant relatives. I talked with her father when they said the family has a good reputation. I didn’t speak with her first; it is better ‘أدخلو البيوت’ ‘to enter the house through the gate’; when he agreed I asked him to consult her as she should also agree._

Consultation with the girl is essential for some families, as Aziza experienced:

_*He is my cousin; when he decided to marry me, his brother talked to my father, and they sought my consent._*

Sometimes, however, the family has the final word, as was the case for Fatima:

_*He is not a relative but a friend of my brother. He talked first with my brother, and then my brother told me. I refused, but my brother and the family kept pressuring me until I accepted._*
In the old days, females were not consulted at all, as Zainab describes:

_I had never seen him before we married. He was my cousin's brother-in-law, and she nominated me to him. He came to my office and saw me, but I had not known his intention. Then he talked with my mother because my father was dead. So, she consulted my uncles in place of my father, and when they agreed, we got married._

As her father was dead, the responsibility for her marriage lay with Zainab’s kin-males rather than with her mother. That this is a culture she brought with her and practised in Glasgow is made clear in her words concerning her own daughter’s marriage:

_The man first talked with her brother, then they told me, but the decision is in the hands of her brother; he is our man [the head of the family]; he had refused a man before this without our consultation._

Indeed, not consulting women on their future husbands is still practised in some families, for example, Nuha:

_He was my cousin when he decided to marry me, he told his elder brother, who talked with my father, and my father gave his word to them immediately._

As Nuha explained, as her cousin, this is his right, and there is no need for her consent. But, in an extreme case of men’s authority over women, she also told the story of her sister who wanted to marry a man who wasn’t from their family or tribe:

_When the man’s family came to request my sister’s hand, my father requested time to ask about the family, as it is normal in Sudan. However, he called for a consultancy meeting. This meeting is for the kinship men, and their decision is binding. In the meeting, my uncle said he wanted her for his son. So, no word can be said after this._

Involving the family remains essential even for girls who know their choice would be accepted; as Randa describes:

_I will involve my family. I don’t expect them to disapprove of my choice, particularly since my parents met abroad and both families respected their choice. If I decided to marry a foreigner, I would expect them to discuss it with me openly if they were concerned, but I don’t think they would be worried._
As is clear from these examples, decisions around marriage are a family issue and, in the extended family, often lie in male hands even if some families are willing to accept their daughter's choice. Arranged marriage is often practised among migrants as the couples will be satisfied by knowing each other’s family rather than needing to get to know each other. A further type of marriage is what I call ‘quick-pick’ whereby the male sees the female and decides to marry her before they have time to get to know each other, as experienced by Shadia:

*I met him once in Sudan, but our relationship developed after he returned to Glasgow. We got to know each other via Skype. He is good at talking, but the reality is different. We should have met each other and gone out together.*

Or Madeena:

*He is not a relative, but his family are neighbours of ours. He has been living in Europe for a long time. His family and mine pressured me to marry him, and in the end, I accepted him. We finalised the marriage process, and he left immediately. I think it is good to know each other before marriage. I did not have enough time for that.*

Others, such as Haroon, just saw photos:

*I saw her in a wedding video and asked about her. My parents went and requested her hand from her family, as is our traditional method. We got married after eight months.*

Or, as in the case of Dalia, were seen in them:

*He saw my photos at a family event, asked about me, and got my phone number. He talked to me; I was in love with another man, but my friends advised me that he would offer me a better life. We had known each other for about three weeks, and we married in the fourth. All the process was completed within a month. It is a good process, but it would be better to have a longer time to get to know each other.*

All the cases of such marriage experienced severe conflicts; three ended by divorce and one by polygamy. There were also cases of child marriage, such as that of Nadia:

*We had no love story. He told my uncle that he was looking for a wife. My uncle suggested me to him. I was 15 years old and just thinking about having Shabka and*
Sheilla [engagement and wedding gifts] and wearing the wedding dress. I was not mature enough to think about knowing him.

In contrast, we did find love stories in which the spouses chose someone from outside their family and were able—particularly if they were male—to convince their family, as Lutfi described: It is not customary in my family to marry outside the kinship, but my family accepted it, mainly because she is from a good family. It also did not prove difficult for females such as Huda, or Laila whose family—in a reaction that surprised even Laila herself—was not happy with her choice but did not reject it either:

I know I am powerful in the family, make my own decisions, and don’t allow others to interfere in my personal issues, but I had not recognised that I am powerful to the extent that the family wouldn’t interfere in my marriage decision.

However, some females, such as Lubna, did have to fight for their love:

It was a challenge for me! I had to tell my family that I wanted to marry a man who was an infidel asylum seeker; who had a big problem with authority; who couldn’t attend the wedding in person; whom they could not see to judge for themselves; and whom I would then join in Europe. I was sure my mother would object to that, but if I told my father [who was supportive] before her, she would feel bad, so I diplomatically told them. I introduced the issue to them gradually. I told my father the most serious issues and left him to convince my mother. It took time and effort until they accepted him.

To summarise the findings of this section: although there is consensus among respondents that marriage is a relationship between two families and that the consent of these is, therefore, essential, there is some variation in their method of selecting spouses. Although men enjoy more freedom, some still choose to follow gender-traditional ways of starting their families. In general, we found two groups: traditional and gender-egalitarians. The former started their relationship at the family level and, regardless of the level of consultation involved, expected to maintain relatively traditional gender relations. The latter, however, who self-selected their spouse—if necessary, even convincing their families of their choice—were expected to share power more equally.
5.4.2 Bride-wealth and Living with In-Laws

Ethnographic data suggest that despite the profound changes in women’s traditional positions in Africa, bride-wealth is still central in marriage. It is practised in both matrilineal and patrilineal communities and Christian and Muslim populations (Horne et al., 2013: 505). Bride-wealth payment marks the transfer of women’s reproductive and domestic labour rights from her family to her husband’s (Dodoo et al., 2020; Hassan, 2009). In some societies, where men view their wives as property, bride-wealth gives a man all rights whilst the woman is stripped of all freedom (Kambarami, 2006). Bride-wealth payment—whether in whole or instalments—also legitimates domestic violence if a woman does not fulfil her tasks (Alesina et al., 2016). As bride-wealth is associated with traditional GNs, I will explore the respondents’ practices and opinions on bride-wealth and living with their in-laws.

The data show that Shabka, Sheilla and Mahar (bride-wealth) are normalised among the married respondents and paid for/by them. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Mahar is the female’s price, and families are often seen as additional labour force bought to help with the female tasks as Mohammed states:

‘Albint diafa’ [the daughter is a guest] who, when she gets married, disappears from the family and is owned by another one, but sons bring female labour to the family. Nuha also confirms this: It is normal for a female to live with her in-laws to help them after marriage, but I have not done this because I stayed only three months after the wedding.

However, Nuha’s situation is not common to all of Sudan, where four respondents from the same area confirmed that in their tradition, it is the male who lives with his in-laws and provides for his wife. As Aziza describes:

In our traditions, the male lives with his in-laws, contrary to what happens in the rest of Sudan.

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46 Cited in Alberto et al., 2016.
In their region, at least, providing shelter to the husband, rather than female labour for her in-laws, seems to form part of the reciprocity for bride-wealth payment. Thus, Aziza denies being owned by her in-laws, confirming that: *I am only owned by my husband.* Regardless of where the couple lives, the woman feels ‘owned’ by her husband, who paid the bride-wealth.

For others, such as Tariq whose wife is still in Sudan, the wife can live with her parents and help her in-laws:

*My wife is my cousin and neighbour, so she can stay with her family and help my parents.*

On the other hand, although Zainab has a positive attitude towards the custom of living with in-laws to help with female tasks, she would not want her daughter-in-law to live with her because:

*In this country, daughters-in-law do not do the same; I don’t want my son to live with me after marriage.*

That is, she does not want a daughter-in-law to live with her and not serve her. Indeed, living with in-laws seems to be fading out in Sudan, too. Some women agree that unless it is necessary—because of the mother-in-law’s age or health, for example—the couple should not live with either set of in-laws to increase their privacy and avoid conflicts. However, some males, such as Soliman, prefer the opposite:

*It is better than living with her family; this means she has power over you, and so do your in-laws, but when she lives with my family, this means I am responsible and am doing my job as a provider.*

While Ali explains that:

*I prefer to stay with my family to help my mother; also, it will be more economical and make communication easier.*
Although all the respondents considered bride-wealth to be an essential part of the wedding, none of them lived with in-laws as a reciprocal expectation—not only because most had married when one of the spouses was abroad, but also because of variation in customs—women living with their in-laws. However, the most prevalent practice is not a universal custom. As some respondents' opinion reflects, even in Sudan, the custom is fading, and those who reject the norm would be expected to have more egalitarian relations. It seems, therefore, that living with in-laws is not strongly related to bride-wealth payment; instead, bride-wealth in Sudan compensates the female’s family for investing in her upbringing, regardless of the services she provides in her new family. In chapter eight, however, I will examine the relationship between bride-wealth and decision-making on how many children a couple will have.

5.4.3 Preferred Gender of Children

The custom of females living with their in-laws is cited as one reason for preferring to have sons rather than daughters; for example, Mahdy said:

In our culture, we prefer sons because they support their family; the girls get married and move to another family, and we say she is a guest; therefore, I would like to have more sons.

Or, in the words of Lubna:

Because he [a son] is ‘a male’ who will carry on the family’s name and support and provide for his parents, while the girl brings shame, dishonour, and scandal to the family and needs more protection and support, they are tiresome and a burden on the family until they die.

Other respondents, such as Shadia support this reasoning:

The boy sustains the family’s name, but the girl, the name of the family, will not continue beyond her; and Lutfi: They say this is the son of X throughout the son’s life; but the girl as soon as she gets married, they will say the wife of ‘Y’. However, Nuha argues more logically that: There is no guarantee that the son will have children and behave ideally in a way that honours the family; and if he sustains the family’s name, the girl [through her tasks as homemaker] sustains the family itself.
Another reason was given for why sons are preferred to sustain wealth, as Zainab explains:

The son sustains the family and wealth; the son inherits more than the girl because girls only inherit half of a son’s share. In some tribes, such as “شايقية”, ‘Shaigia’, the girls inherit nothing; all the wealth goes to the sons. They don’t want their wealth to go outside the family and be circulated in another family.

Furthermore, sons are considered a proof of masculinity, as Suha notes:

It is a symbol of masculinity that males produce males rather than females;

Ali supports:

It is a matter of pride in their genes and masculinity. When you have many sons, you would be proud that you could make a large family that will bring more children and support.

Some respondents, too, such as Soliman, believe that:

Daughters need more support than sons and take time until they become independent, mainly through marriage; while sons soon become independent because they work in whatever job they find, there is no shame for them in doing that, while girls should not work or should only follow a specific career such as teaching; thus, girls are more expensive than boys.

Indeed, males sometimes fear having girls because of related problems, such as those around their marriage. As Ali explains:

When they have girls, they [the males] should behave respectfully so that their daughters can get married. When people request the girl’s hand, they accept immediately, as if they want to get rid of them. Moreover, they make everything easy if he is from the family; if he is cousin or kin, she has to marry him without consultation.

All but two of the women expressed no preference, hoping to have both sexes. Nadia, for example, states:

I have no preference; both are the same at this time, but having girls and boys is good, just to experience both growing up.
Lubna, meanwhile, would prefer girls because she is an alone daughter, while another, Suha, would prefer boys because:

I am not strong enough to have girls. Boys depend on themselves soon, but the girl is a burden on her mother until she gets married.

In contrast, we found a diversification of male responses. Some prefer girls because their families have none or because they are ‘cute and kind’; others do not mind because they believe children’s performance depends on discipline. For example, Omer:

I don’t differentiate; both are the same for me; nowadays [in Sudan], they are similar, and sometimes the girl supports the family more than the boy.

Or Ahmed:

It depends on the discipline; if you discipline your children to be independent and have a feeling of belonging to the family, they will provide for their parents’ emotional needs. However, others prefer having boys; Ali represents an extreme case: I want ten boys; if she has girls, they do not count. So, no, I don’t want any girls.

Most females argue that their husbands prefer having sons and want to please them. Here’s Aziza, for example:

I have a daughter; it is not easy to conceive; now, I want this [pregnancy] to be a boy. He [her husband] threatened to return me [to Sudan] if it is a girl.

Or Suha:

According to the culture of his tribe, which is called “بطنحين”, ‘Bataheen’ and his family prefer boys. So, he was happy to have two boys; now I am pregnant, and I wished this to be a girl, but he doesn’t; he wants only boys. He was worried about having a girl, but when we found it would be a boy, he relaxed and became very happy.

Such responses are certainly not unique; women such as Nadia, who were from other regions, also told stories about males’ unhappiness at having baby girls:
Yes, they like boys very much. For example, my sister has five girls; the sixth one, after scanning, was expected to be a boy. So, her husband was thrilled and bought a bull to be slaughtered for a celebration party. Nevertheless, it happened to be a girl. He went into a coma and had high blood pressure, and he was admitted to the hospital for days.

GNs, however, do not remain static; people can move to a more egalitarian level (or, indeed, in the opposite direction), as Nuha described her father:

*Throughout his life, my father hated females, even his sisters; he used to beat and control them. They should not go out and should not go to school. He wouldn’t have daughters. His firstborn was a girl (now she is a doctor); he was furious and wouldn’t see people who came to congratulate him. After the daughter, he got four sons successfully. He was thrilled and gave a big party for the coming of each of them; he slaughtered many sheep and invited many people. After the boys, he got a girl, but he did nothing. Then I was born, and two other girls after me. Similarly, he did nothing. My mother is not from my father’s tribe [Bataheen], so she insisted on our education up to a university degree. My brothers married and moved to live far from him, whether in Saudia or Khartoum. My sister, who is in Saudia Arabia, and I call him regularly and ask about his health and needs, but my brothers never do that; my father calls them once a month, and they never call him. So, he said that he would have all his children to be girls if he could return in time. He was happy with the boys; he invested in their education and discipline, but in the end, he didn’t receive even a phone call from them.*

Most respondents assert that the preference for having sons over daughters has been changing in Sudan, with the commonly cited reason being the female assumption of the role of provider:

*They believe boys help their parents financially more than girls. It is not always true; many females support their families; for example, I have a sister in Dubai; who supports my family. She is not married; however, good males allow their wives to help their parents. But males like my husband believe that wives are owned by husbands and should not help their families. (Aziza)*

*Everything has changed. Previously boys worked in menial jobs, but girls did not. Now both girls and boys have the same education level, are employed in the same jobs, and earn the same income, so they are equal. (Lutfi)*
Nowadays, girls [in Sudan] are more productive and responsible for the family than sons; I know many females who provide for their families. (Soliman)

I think this [a preference for sons] was an old understanding when the girl had no financial responsibility. Currently, the girls have similar responsibilities to the boys. Kindness and responsibility towards the family are not related to sex but also to culture and upbringing. The importance of having girls and boys is only for diversity; it is good to have both sexes. (Shadia)

During the last few decades, the economic situation in Sudan has been terrible; most families have female providers, and in some, the primary breadwinner is female. (Lubna)

The situation has changed. In Khartoum, most families have financial, productive females. Previously, boys were more productive than girls, they provided for their families, while the girls cared for it, but this has changed. For example, when I was working in Sudan, many of my female colleagues were the main breadwinners for their parents and siblings. One of them refused to marry a good youth because she couldn’t travel with him inside or outside Sudan and leave her natal family without financial support. (Dalia)

To conclude, the preference for having boys over girls is a dominant culture in Sudan. The reasons cited are: carrying on the family name, reputation, wealth, and bringing a female labour force to the family. In contrast, girls are seen as ‘guests’ and burdens on the family—although some respondents suggest that these norms are starting to change in Sudan due to the deterioration of the economic situation that enhanced females’ education and their economic contribution to the family. However, although some women and a few men do not mind, and some women would prefer to have boys purely to please their husbands (they are indifferent), most respondents would still prefer to have boys, and those that do would be expected to be more gender traditional.

It is also noteworthy that although the data did not cover variation between ethnic groups (tribes) systematically, some variations emerged. These include wealth inheritance in Shaigia; living with in-laws in Mahas; and the highly traditional GNs among Bataheen.
(Although the six respondents from the Bataheen tribe grew up in Khartoum, their extremely traditional GNs were astonishing to the researcher.)

5.5 Conclusion

The chapter mapped the resources immigrants brought with them to provide a background for the following chapters. It introduced three main themes that might be expected to influence the respondents’ interactions in their new setting and impact their GNs. It introduced the respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics and showed how Sudan’s environmental conversion factors altered the gender education gap. Respondents brought diverse socioeconomic characteristics that may differentiate their access to the labour-market and a potential change in their GNs. The chapter also discussed the respondents’ emigration motivation, routes and status. These are related to the environmental conversion factors that determine the respondents’ livelihood strategies and entitlements in terms of access to the labour-market and the state welfare system, which in turn affect the acquisition of resources with the potential to alter GNs.

The chapter also discussed the respondents’ GNs as essential to their personal conversion factors. It discussed how gendered the family formation process is and the potential to affect gender relations in the family. These factors provide an image of the respondents’ gender ideologies before emigration (and those of their natal families) that will govern their transnational interactions. The next chapter examines how these factors differentiate respondents’ access to the labour-market and Glasgow's welfare system.
CHAPTER SIX

THE LABOUR-MARKET AND CHANGE IN GENDER NORMS

6.1 Introduction

Regardless of their emigration motivations, Immigrants seek to improve their economic situation. This study is not concerned primarily with economic improvement; instead, it is about achieving GE. It employs SCA to explore change in respondents’ GNs due to variation in opportunities, that is, due to their access to tangible (income) and intangible (knowledge) resources. The labour-market is an essential environmental conversion factor allowing access to tangible and intangible resources. The central argument is that change in women’s and/or men’s resources may alter household’s power relationship and/or relative agencies. This change may lead to more gender-equal relationships or the reverse.

Therefore, this chapter explores the respondents’ participation in the labour-market and their potential to alter their GNs. It explores the environmental conversion factors that provide opportunities or barriers; and how respondents use their personal conversion factors to overcome these barriers and convert the opportunities into valuable wellbeing. Introducing the setting in which the respondents locate themselves, the immigration and integration policies, and the labour-market mechanism is essential to understanding how Glasgow’s context facilitates or constrains the respondents’ economic activities and the potential impact on their GNs. The first section introduces Glasgow and the UK’s immigration history and policy. It indicates the need for immigrants to fill the labour force gap, their entitlement during the immigration process, and how this may affect their economic activities. It then introduces the labour-market and the integration policies at national and regional levels. Finally, it shows women’s and men’s economic participation and the employment disparity between them and that of the BME —including Africans, which is the category within which the respondents fall—and their disadvantaged position.

The third section analyses the empirical data on the respondents’ economic activities. It explores how respondents have used their personal conversion factors to utilise opportunities or overcome barriers in the labour-market. It starts by exploring their labour-market strategies...
and how the decision to access the labour-market was made within the family. It shows the importance of GNs in making this decision. It then illustrates the respondents’ economic activities before proceeding to an in-depth analysis of the data. It also explores the respondents’ employment journey to reveal whether they utilised their personal conversion factors in the labour-market. The chapter next examines the experiences of each gender separately. It explores the job types each gender assumes and whether this allows exposure to other cultures and generates income that may affect their agency and GNs. The chapter also explores the kinds of state benefits received by the respondents and their implications for GNs. Before the conclusion, the chapter examines the underlying causes of respondents’ outcomes. It argues that skills and structural factors are not enough to understand immigrants’ employment routes but that other factors, such as GNs and transnational activities, play an essential role. The chapter concludes with a summary of the factors that mediate respondents’ access to the labour-market and, specifically, whether the interaction between personal, social and environmental factors in the labour-market in Glasgow allows respondents access to income and exposure to other cultures that might influence their GNs.

6.2 Glasgow, Immigration and Employment

This section concerns the environmental conversion factors that provide respondents with opportunities and/or barriers. It introduces the setting within which the respondents locate themselves. This setting is not merely geographic. It is also an open space within which multiple identities can be constructed through political, economic and social interactions; and a gendered space that affects how gender is constructed and understood in societies (Massey, 1994). Hence, the section gives an essential overview, introducing immigration and integration policies and the labour-market. Such information is crucial in understanding how the setting influences the respondents’ economic activities and the possibility of impacting their GNs.

6.2.1 Setting the Scene: Glasgow City

Glasgow is the largest city in Scotland and the fourth largest in the UK. It was one of the world’s most important chemical, textile and engineering centres. However, many job opportunities were lost due to a shakeout in heavy industry and manufacturing in the 1980s.
Today, around one-tenth of the city’s jobs are in manufacturing and construction, and the largest employment sectors are health services, business administration and retail (GCMB, 2016). Glasgow has always been among the most deprived cities in Scotland. It contains the largest share of deprived areas of any town or city in Scotland. In 2016, 48% of the city’s neighbourhoods were among the 20% most deprived in Scotland, and 65% fell within the 40% most deprived areas (Gov.Scot, 2016). Regarding poverty, in 2016, 38% of Glasgow’s population were income deprived, and 37% were health deprived (ibid:13). However, poverty in Scotland has been lower than in other UK nations for more than ten years. It has shown a declining trend for over 20 years, falling from 23% in 1994 to 18% in 2011, then remaining stable until it increased slightly to 19% in 2016 (Barnard, 2017: 2-3).

The city has suffered several decades of population decline due to an ageing population, low fertility rates, high emigration levels, and low immigration levels. To avoid a demographic crisis, the Scottish Government enacted a pro-immigration strategy to maintain population growth and fill labour-market shortages (Hepburn & Rosie, 2014). This strategy has resulted in considerable population growth (6.7%) in Glasgow over the last two decades.

6.2.2 Migration and Immigration Policies

Migration is the driver of Scotland’s population growth. Between 1998 and 2018, Scotland’s population increased by 7.1% and Glasgow City by 6.7%. Immigration to Scotland was estimated to be 19,000 people per annum between 2003 and 2010, rising to 27,000 in 2011 (Sim, 2014: 1). Though immigration to Glasgow has decreased in the last few years, it is still high. In mid-2018, 10,000 people had immigrated to the city within the previous twelve months (NRS, 2019a). In addition to the influx of Eastern Europeans, the city attracted skilled migrants from developing countries through the Fresh Talent Initiative. The initiative allowed international students who had pursued studies at Scottish universities to work in Scotland for two years after graduation without a work permit (Scottish-Executive, 2004). More importantly, since 2000, refugees and asylum seekers have substantially contributed to Glasgow’s and Scotland’s population size. Following the introduction of the UK government’s dispersal policy (Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999), Glasgow has consistently housed more asylum seekers than any other UK authority. The city agreed with

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47 This local share is calculated by dividing the number of deprived data zones in the area by all data zones in this area.
the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) to provide 2500 units of accommodation every year between 2000 and 2006 (Sim, 2014: 1-5) and provided an additional 5800 units in the period between 2006 and 2011 (Freeke, 2012). Most asylum seekers and refugees in Scotland (20,000) are BME—Sudan is among their ten leading countries of origin—and 6070 of these are hosted in Glasgow (Sim, 2014: 5). BMEs in Scotland has increased from 7.2% of the total population in 2001 to 15.5% in 2011 (Office-for-National-Statistic, 2019). The welcoming immigration policy facilitated this demographic and cultural change.

Immigration Policy

Immigration policy is an essential environmental conversion factor for immigrants because it determines their entitlement and access to the labour-market. In the UK, immigration policy is decided at the national level and administrated by the Home Office. Most refugees receive their refugee status after claiming asylum in the country. They are granted five years’ Limited Leave to Remain, after which they can be granted Indefinite Leave to Remain—and consequently, British citizenship—after reassessing the situation in their countries of origin. Those whose asylum applications are refused may have the right to appeal the decision (Bales, 2013: 433). During the asylum-seeking period, applicants have no work permit and are not entitled to public funds. However, most of them receive accommodation and financial support from NASS. Those whose asylum applications are rejected are not entitled to any support, and their housing and financial aid are removed.

Those granted refugee status continue to receive support for four weeks, after which they either get jobs or access the mainstream welfare system on the same basis as citizens (ibid.). However, scholars recognise that the four-week transition period from asylum seeker to refugee is not long enough to support refugees into paid employment (Strang et al., 2018: 202), and many of them, therefore, fall into the trap of social benefit. The UK social welfare system provides different benefits for people with no or low income and those with children or disabilities. Until their income is high enough to support their families, refugees are entitled to Housing Benefits, Jobseeker’s Allowance or Income Support; all families with children are entitled to Child Benefits and Tax Credits. Families claim these benefits as a

48 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office
household, but they are received by one of the partners. In addition, people with disability are entitled to Disability Living Allowance, and those who care for them are entitled to Carer’s Allowance (COSLA, Undated).

Refugees can apply to get their close family members (spouse and children) to the UK under refugee family reunion rules. Since July 2012, residents who apply to bring non-EEA family members have been required to meet a minimum financial income threshold. The required amount to get a spouse is £18,600 per year before tax. A higher amount is required when children accompany them, rising by £3,800 for the first child and £2,400 for each additional child. In the case of refugees, the requirement can only be met through income generated in the UK by the UK-resident applicant’s employment. The financial requirement must be met each time the migrant applies for temporary leave to remain as a family member (usually twice), and again when they become eligible to apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain (Gower & McGuinness, 2017: 5-7). Practically, this policy poses a challenge to refugees. Most of them do not earn the requested minimum income. As noted by the Migration Observatory, 43% of employed British nationals do not earn enough to sponsor a non-EEA spouse, 53% do not earn enough to sponsor a spouse and a child, and 58% do not earn enough to sponsor a spouse and two children. The rule also hits women harder than men. 57% of employed women in the UK fail to reach the threshold for sponsoring a non-EEA spouse compared to 28% of the men, and the percentages rise to 72% and 67%, respectively, when two children are involved. The impact also varies by ethnicity: 43% of ‘White’ employees do not earn enough to sponsor a non-EEA spouse compared with 51% of ‘Non-White’ employees. In Scotland, 43% of employed non-EEA people cannot sponsor a spouse, 53% cannot sponsor a spouse and a child, and 60% cannot sponsor a spouse and two children. Although those whose cases involve immediate family members will usually be granted recourse to public funds, this is not always the case for those whose applications involve non-immediate family members or who married after they fled from their country of origin (McNeil, 2014).

That is, immigration policy negatively affects migrants’ access to the labour-market and welfare system during the asylum-seeking period. Similarly, the family reunion requirement is unattainable for the majority. Thus, it was challenging for most refugee respondents, particularly those who waited a long time to get a response.
6.2.3 Labour-market Overview

The labour-market can likely influence immigrants’ GNs through access to financial resources and cultural exposure. Besides securing economic independence, employment enhances confidence and self-esteem and enables interaction with other societies and acquiring cultural competencies (e.g. language) (Phillimore & Goodson, 2006: 1719). That is, it has social and financial integrative functions (Mulvey, 2015: 12). Though Sen emphasises measuring the change in functionings and capabilities to assess change in GE, he does not ignore the role of financial resources. However, access to income is mediated by personal and structural factors that affect people’s capacity to convert resources into wellbeing. Before exploring the Sudanese experiences, the following paragraphs introduce Scotland's labour market and the government’s effort to facilitate immigrants’ employment to help understand the respondents’ employment journey.

The labour-market in Scotland is segmented by different attributes, including gender and ethnicity. Generally, the employment rate of people aged 16-64 slightly increased from 73.6% in 2008 to 74.1% in 2017. This increase is broken down into a rise in the rate of women’s employment from 68.4% to 70.3%, and for men, from 77.8% to 78%. However, there is considerable variation in employment rates across Scotland’s local authorities, and Glasgow is often among those with the lowest employment rates. For example, it had the lowest employment rate in Scotland in 2017 (64.3%), with 59.3% and 69.5% for women and men, respectively.

Despite the government policy of GE, “No one should be denied rights or opportunities because of their gender.”(Gov.Scot, Undated), women and men face different experiences in the labour-market. Occupational segregation is deeply entrenched in economic structures. Women are underrepresented at senior levels in all industries and sectors and overrepresented in low-paid, stereotypical female jobs, like cleaning, caring, catering, clerical, and retail work. Additionally, the proportion of working part-time is higher than that of men. In 2017, 42.3% of employed women worked part-time, compared to 12.2% of employed men.
Despite the efforts of women’s organisations such as Engender\(^49\) that campaign for GE and close the gender pay gap, women are still more likely to have primary responsibility for childcare and care for sick or older people. Lack of childcare and the relative dearth of flexible working opportunities are significant barriers to women’s access to the labour market. Childcare services are limited and expensive in the city. Some parents give up their work or reduce their working hours to reduce childcare costs (Kidner et al., 2014: 3). Lone mothers and older women (grandmothers) are disadvantaged in lost earning potential and increased risk of pension poverty due to childcare responsibility (ibid.). Women also receive less payment than men. In 2016/17, the median hourly earnings for men were £12.39 compared to £10.49 for women, representing a pay gap of 15.3%. The pay gap between Muslims and non-Muslims is even higher: median hourly earnings were £9.19 for Muslims, and £11.39 for those with no religion/Christians, a pay gap of 19.3% (Netto et al., 2011: 40). Generally, relative poverty (60% contemporary median income after housing costs) in the BME communities is twice that of ‘White’ communities (39.6% compared with 17.6%) (Farrer & Co, 2018: 37).

**6.2.4- Labour-market Integration: Policy and Practice**

The labour-market is the essential environmental conversion factor considered in this study. Labour-market integration is a shared interest of immigrants and the governments in receiving countries. The latter develop policies to integrate the former into the labour-market. However, immigrants’ low employment rate is often seen as a problem of qualifications rather than structure, and integration policies focus on qualification-building and ignore structural factors (Mulvey, 2015: 14). This subsection is about labour-market integration policies and how they benefit immigrants in Scotland and Glasgow. Political actors rarely discuss facilitators of and barriers to immigrants’ labour-market integration (SIRIUS, 2019: 570). However, some integration strategies have been introduced at different governmental levels (Mulvey, 2015).

\(^49\) https://www.engender.org.uk/
The Government’s first integration strategy at the UK level—Full and Equal Citizen—was established in 2000 to facilitate refugees’ access to jobs and other services (e.g., benefits, housing, and ESOL). The programme has been criticised for lacking a nationally coordinated strategy and providing only limited resources to small local projects (Mulvey, 2015). In 2003, the Department for Work and Pensions set out the Working to Rebuild Lives strategy, mainly focused on labour-market integration. In 2005, Integration Matters was introduced, a strategy that, for the first time, included funded refugee integration programmes. An example of this was the National Refugee Integration Services (SUNRISE) which provided four-week individual support to newly recognised refugees to guide them in accessing mainstream services and bringing up their families (Cheung & Phillimore, 2017; Mulvey, 2015). In 2008, SUNRISE was replaced by the Refugee Integration and Employment Service (RIES), which extended the period of services from four weeks to one year but limited them to providing support in employment and education. In 2010, RIES was closed in an austerity measure. In 2012, migrant integration was devolved to local authorities (Cheung & Phillimore, 2017: 9).

Spencer points out that the level of support provided in each of these programmes were never enough to address the disproportionate disadvantages refugees faced (Spencer, 2011: 216). This is borne out by the findings of a longitudinal Survey of New Refugees (SNR) established to measure the integration outcomes of RIES. The survey showed a slight increase (15%) in the employment rate among service users between eight and 21 months from the start of the project; however, half of the employed people assumed jobs beneath the level of their qualifications (Daniel & Zurawan, 2010: 2).

At the regional level, the Scottish Government facilitates migrants’ integration from the asylum-seeking stage (Mulvey, 2015: 3). Scotland has a long history of welcoming refugees and asylum seekers. Since 2002, with other stakeholders, the Scottish Government has been engaged in developing strategies to aid the integration of refugees and asylum seekers (GILMER, 2010). For example, the Bridges programme was established in 2002 to provide employability support to migrants and asylum seekers; and the Refugees into Teaching programme was implemented between 2004 and 2011 (ibid.). In 2014, the Scottish Government introduced the first New Scots Strategy, which ran until 2017, when it was replaced by the second, which will run until 2022. The strategy takes a person-centred approach and recognises that personal characteristics and circumstances can significantly impact refugees’ integration experiences (SRC, 2017). The Scottish Government also funds a range of interventions to improve employment skills for vulnerable people and reduce the
unemployment rate. For example, it funded Skills Development Scotland\(^{50}\) to deliver a wide range of guidance and employment support to people of all ages entering the workforce\(^{51}\).

Nonetheless, evidence shows that BMEs, particularly Africans, are disadvantaged in Scotland’s labour-market (Netto et al., 2011). Despite legislation and training and equality policies, ethnic minorities are discriminated against in the labour-market throughout the employment process (EOC, 2016: 10). For example, many ethnic minorities people applied for public sector jobs and were interviewed but failed to get the role. Moreover, only 17.7% of ‘Non-White’ people interviewed for local authority jobs were appointed, compared to 31.9% of ‘White’ interviewees (ibid.). The conditions of the labour-market, however, are not based solely on qualifications. Evidence shows that social networks play considerable roles in the employment process, with much recruitment through word-of-mouth rather than open recruitment. As ethnic minority people are often excluded from informal networks due to cultural differences such as their accent, they are more likely to be excluded from the labour-market (Hughes, 2015: 4). In addition, they may be filtered out by the ethnicity of their names during the employment process (Netto et al., 2011: 19). These are some of the reasons why the employment rate for BMEs, particularly ‘Black’ people, remains low in Scotland. For example, in 2017/18, the employment rate for BME men was 69.6% compared to 78.8% for ‘White’ men; and that of BME women was 46.9% compared to 72% for ‘White’ women (Close the Gap, 2019a: 17).

In 2014, the percentage of BME employed by the public sector was 0.8%, though they represented 4% of the population. The proportion had increased to 1.6% in 2017. In Glasgow, the workforce from BME backgrounds is less than 2%, although the BME population is 12%. They are also overrepresented in low-paying occupations and are underrepresented in non-low-paying ones (Aspinall & Watters, 2010; Brynin & Longhi, 2015). One solution suggested to tackle these barriers is the Modern Apprenticeships scheme. However, ethnic minorities are poorly represented in this (1.4%) (Macpherson, 2015). This is explained by a lack of understanding of the potential value of Modern Apprenticeships, reluctance to work in specific industries, or a preference to continue their education. Furthermore, BME people who participated in Modern Apprenticeships were less likely to complete their programme.

\(^{50}\) https://www.skillsdevelopmentscotland.co.uk/

\(^{51}\) https://www.apprenticeships.scot/about/
and less likely to be kept on by employers if they did (EOC, 2016). The Modern Apprenticeships programme is also criticised for reinforcing the stereotype of the female framework. Women who join the program are concentrated in health and social care and hairdressing work. Close the Gap expressed concern that this could contribute to the high level of occupational segregation and underemployment experienced by female ethnic minority employees, in which they are clustered into lower-grade jobs and denied access to training opportunities and promotion (ibid.). This situation is explained by a set of personal and structural barriers such as the need to undertake caring responsibilities, a lack of affordable childcare, a lack of flexible working opportunities, and a tendency in most societies for women to be clustered in low-paid, insecure jobs (EOC, 2013).

As an environmental conversion factor, the labour-market is expected to differentiate between the respondents (as BMEs) and the ‘White’ and between female and male respondents. Similarly, the shortage of childcare services and flexible jobs restricts women’s employment. As a result, the tangible and intangible resources that the labour-market provides are likely to be limited. The following section explores this in more detail through the respondents’ experiences.

### 6.3 Sudanese and the Labour-market in Glasgow

This section explores whether and how respondents have used their personal conversion factors to utilise opportunities or overcome barriers in the labour-market. It establishes an understanding of whether the respondents have accessed the labour-market and undertaken jobs that enable them to generate reasonable incomes and interact with other cultures. It argues that skills and structural factors are not enough to understand the employment route of immigrants. Other factors such as GNs and transnational activities guide respondents’ employment journeys. The section explores respondents’ labour-market strategies and how they utilise the available opportunities to facilitate their employment. It explores their employment status, the factors that facilitated or constrained their employment, their job types, and whether it allows contact with other cultures. The section also explores how those who failed to access the labour-market or received a little financial reward utilise other opportunities such as State Welfare as a source of income and how this might influence GNs.
6.3.1 Labour-market Strategies

People believe that the domestic role requires feminine qualities, and the employment role requires masculine attributes—which are behind the assigning of domestic work to women and paid employment to men (Eagly & Steffen, 1984: 740-1). Similarly, a recent study shows that culture, in terms of attitude toward women’s employment and high fertility, is behind the low economic participation of first-generation immigrant women in the US (Oreffice, 2014: 163). This section challenges this literature and explores how the decision to access the labour-market is made within the respondents’ families, considering the three conversion factors.

The data show that respondents’ GNs are more influential than qualifications in employment strategies. Indeed, their employment strategies mirror the variation in their GNs. Generally, men’s employment was not contested or discussed among any respondents. It is a well-established custom, and men’s role as breadwinners was taken for granted. In contrast, there was variation in women’s employment strategies. Some families accepted the employment of both spouses, while in others, the husband prevented the wife from seeking employment—regardless of how her qualifications compared to his.

In some families, female employment is normal and needs no discussion, particularly in those with work experience before emigration and labour migrants. For example, Randa, who came to the UK as an undergraduate student—a rare situation in Sudan—utilised the Fresh Talent Initiative and got a job after graduation. Similarly, Lubna accompanied her husband to a European country, but she searched for a job abroad and found one in Glasgow when she failed to get one. Both women are from families with a history of the independent migration of young women: Lubna has British citizenship by birth, and Randa’s parents got to know each other when they were studying in the UK in the early 1960s. In other words, they are from families with relatively egalitarian gender values.

However, although most highly educated women had graduated shortly before emigration, they found themselves constrained by individual, social and environmental conversion factors to think about employment once in Glasgow. As Suha explained:
If I have someone to take care of my children, he might allow me to work;

Or, in the words of Adil (highly educated, but less so than his wife, who has a Master’s degree):

When her child has enrolled in the nursery, she can work;

Or Haytham, who, like his wife, is highly educated:

I have not discussed it with her; this is the normal situation. If she wanted to work, she would not have time for her children. She can’t work before the children are at school, and if she has more than three children, I don’t think she would have time for work.

Adil’s and Haytham’s wives received their education in the UK and have better employment prospects than their husbands. However, GNs are more influential than qualifications. Both women and men see children as belonging to, and the responsibility of, mothers; it is noteworthy that none of the respondents above referred to them as our children. This is typical in Sudan, where childcare is women’s responsibility, and even in Scotland, women provide 70% of unpaid care (Close the Gap, 2019a).

The experiences described above are normalised and, as such, seldom negotiated. Tellingly, the word allow is often used, indicating that the wives have no bargaining power and that their employment decisions lie solely in their husband’s hands. Fatima clearly states this:

If they [husbands] allowed us, we would work.

In response to further probing, she revealed that her husband does not allow her to go out alone and does not dare discuss employment with him. She believes that if she stayed in Sudan rather than marrying him, she would be employed. This indicates that the deterioration she has experienced in her gender relations may be explained by her husband’s GNs and coercive control. The experience of Suha is similar:

When I decided to work, my family agreed with me. So, I worked as a babysitter for an Arab family. But when I got engaged to my husband, I quit. He was unhappy with that job but never asked me to leave it. Instead, he made me feel like I was working as a maid. So, I stopped the work.
Even though Suha has better education and has lived in Glasgow for longer than her husband, she reinforces traditional norms by relinquishing the right to work that she experienced in her natal family to please him, thus showing that her GNs match those of her husband.\footnote{52 In fact, most women experienced some form of coercive control, whether subtle or overt; but, as this is not common in Sudan, it is not clear whether it is due to the husbands’ gender norms having changed in Glasgow.}

In contrast, women with egalitarian GNs described a different experience. Laila offers one example of a powerful woman able to influence her husband’s opinion, in her case, through the threat of divorce. As she narrated:

> He preferred to stay in a Gulf country and visit us three times a year. When I began my Master’s, I needed his help with the children and domestic work, but he refused to come. We argued long on the issue before he acquiesced to my opinion and joined us.

Laila’s husband wanted to remain in his decent job in the Gulf, while Laila wished to improve her skills and get a decent job in Glasgow. However, unlike in the abovementioned situations, their bargaining power was equal.

This sub-section dealt with the respondents’ employment strategies. It shows that GNs as a personal and social conversion factor are essential in women’s and men’s employment strategies. Employment for both men and women is guided by their GNs—and that of their spouses—rather than qualifications. Most men and women also believe that women’s employment contradicts their role as mothers. While men’s employment was normalised among all the respondents, opinion varied on that of women. Some women would like to work, but the decision lies with their husbands without bargaining power. Further, they are constrained by environmental conversion factors such as childcare facilities and the shortage of time-flexible jobs. Overall, individual, social and environmental factors restrict the likelihood of women's improvement of their income and cultural exposure compared to men. The following sub-section explores the employment routes of those who decide to take the journey.
6.3.2 Labour-market Participation

As mentioned in section 6.2.4, immigrants are vulnerable in the labour-market. This subsection explores the respondents’ experiences in Glasgow. Table (6-1) summarises their labour-market participation at the time of the interviews. Labour-market / economic participation covers preparation for employment (e.g., education), job seeking and employment activities. These activities are not mutually exclusive; some respondents combine two activities, such as working and studying. For simplicity, only the main activity is considered. Studying the host language is considered a labour-market activity, even though some women are not yet considering employment. Some women learn the language to help them communicate with their children’s schools, health visitors, and doctors. However, they may consider employment in the future.

Table (6-1): Labour-market Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>85.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobseeker</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that 95.2% of the men were economically active, compared to 39.3% of the women. Though access to the labour-market is not easy for either skilled or unskilled immigrants of either gender, the data show that 85.7% of Sudanese men and 14.3% of women earn wages. 7.1% of the women were jobseekers compared to 4.8% of the men; 17.9% of the women and 4.8% of the men were preparing themselves for the labour-market by enrolling in training or education. However, most women (57.1%) were economically inactive, compared to 4.8% of the men. The literature on BME economic activity, particularly women, in Scotland is scant. However, the annual population survey data in 2017-18 show that women within their ethnic groups are more likely to be economically inactive than men in the same group and that BME women are less active than ‘White’ women (Close the Gap, 2019a: 18-9).
6.3.3 Preparation for the Labour-market

The first step immigrants need to access the labour-market is to evaluate their qualifications and skills against the needs of the labour-market. They should acquire reasonable language skills, knowledge about the labour-market culture, and recognition of their qualifications and work experience.

The essential qualification to be evaluated is the host country’s language, which is crucial for employment and their everyday lives. It equips them with the communication skills necessary for their social integration and improves their ability to adjust to the qualifications they will need in their new setting. Since 2007, the Scottish Government has developed an English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) learning strategy linked to welfare provision (Gov.Scot, 2015: 10). Most men have enrolled in this programme. However, some did not need it because they had already improved their English before emigration, either for educational reasons (Haytham) or employment (Ahmed, Haroon). In contrast, most women had not enrolled in the programme because of the shortage of childcare services, while a few women—students and labour migrants—were not entitled, and one (Shadia) already had a BSc. in English and experience in its teaching.

Refugees have the opportunity to start the ESOL programme from the asylum-seeking stage. However, most men had not followed it beyond a basic level that would enable them to obtain a menial job. The focus groups confirmed this, agreeing that men do not fulfil the programme because of pressure to remit families back home. As stated by ‘K’ (female, Group1):

They are not patient enough to follow the ESOL programme, particularly those who get a job. Families in Sudan do not know the situation here and do not accept not being at work. People came here when they were quite grown up, and it is not easy for them to learn the language; some have been living here for more than fifteen years and cannot communicate in English.

Men’s individual, social and transnational environmental conversion factors—their age, their GNs as a provider, and the socioeconomic situation in Sudan—constrained their ability to
utilise the local environmental conversion factors to improve their skills and gain better job opportunities. However, a few continued with the ESOL to get higher education and better jobs. Of these, all except one already had a first degree from Sudan. The exception, Mohammed, had no formal education, as he explained:

_I had not been to school in Sudan, and I can’t read or write in Arabic, but now I can communicate very good in English; I am pleased about that. Now I am at the intermediate level. I will continue to a higher level; then, I will enrol in a construction course at the college to get a decent job._

Those with higher education were motivated to use their qualification regardless of age. Similarly, Mohammed was motivated to compensate for his previously lost education opportunity, but he was relatively young and did not face learning difficulties. Personal conversion factors such as age and education thus impacted the respondents’ access to the environmental conversion factors that would help improve these personal conversation factors and their access to suitable jobs.

However, this was not the case for most women. Although most have higher education and are relatively young, their mothering role constrained their ability to access the ESOL programme. Most have one or two children under three years old and plan to have at least four. Therefore, the majority were waiting to obtain access to childcare. One exceptional case was Nuha, who had been able to enrol because her husband cares for their children. Similarly, the ability of Laila, a single mother, to improve her English skills was not constrained by her age or her mothering role. While her children were at school, she attended the community’s English classes at a local church and continued to the college’s highest level.

In the same way that the three conversion factors guide the respondents’ employment strategies, they also guide their implementation. For example, some of the men were constrained by their personal and social conversion factors (their provider role), and a few were enabled by their personal conversion factor (Education) to access the environmental conversion factors (ESOL) to adjust their qualifications to the needs of the labour-market. In contrast, most women were unable to use their personal conversion factors to utilise the
environmental conversion factors to improve their employability skills due to their personal, social (GNs) and environmental (shortage of childcare) conversion factors. However, personal conversion factors enabled those with some education attainment or motivation to utilise the available opportunities to improve their qualifications.

The next step towards employment is recognition of the education they acquired abroad. Only two respondents sought recognition of their education. Both are vets. One (Laila) has a Master’s degree, and the other (Haytham) has a Bachelor’s degree, although neither was able to utilise it, as we will see. Laila’s education was recognised as equivalent to a BSc. and Haytham’s as a Higher National Diploma (HND). The rest of the respondents who had completed higher education had not sought recognition, either because they did not know they needed to adjust their education to the UK level and/or because they had not brought their certificate from Sudan.

A few men built on the qualifications they had from Sudan to utilise the available education/training opportunities. They attended Master’s (Ahmed) or Bachelor’s (Haytham, Adil, Sufian) degrees or vocational training (Ali, Haroon, Soliman, Khalid). Notably, those who followed a Bachelor’s degree already had a degree from Sudan. For one (Haytham), the UK’s educational opportunities motivated him to emigrate. However, although he originally planned to follow a Master’s, he could not do so when—as mentioned above—his BSc was only recognised as a high national diploma. Despite trying to build this up, no university would admit him, so he changed his career to studying biomedicine. In contrast, Adil’s and Sufian’s second BSc was aligned with their education in Sudan. Those who attended vocational training (for example, security guard, warehouse work, cooking and food hygiene) had a combination of education levels. Some of those who attended higher education in Glasgow undertook vocational training to get a menial job while studying. This could be explained by the labour-market mechanism and their remitting obligations. Those who attended education, for example, did not have a responsibility to remit at that time. However, more men than women enrolled in education. Two women attended education in Glasgow, though both had completed higher education before emigration. Laila (mentioned above) could not follow her career as a vet, so she attended a course on food hygiene; then, when she could still get a job, she undertook a Master’s in community development. The other, Huda,
had qualified as an engineer in Sudan but decided to undertake additional education in childcare after first gaining some relevant experience.

To sum up, none of the refugee respondents has utilised the essential individual conversion factors (education and work experience) that they brought with them, and all of them needed to adjust their qualifications to the labour-market. However, other conversion factors compelled some respondents to adjust their qualifications. While their provider role constrained some men, some women were constrained by their mothering role. That is, their GNs and remittance obligations significantly impacted their ability to utilise the available opportunities. For example, while the provider role had motivated some men to improve their language skills before emigration to be ready for the European labour-market, it constrained others to utilise the available ESOL and education opportunities in Glasgow. As a result, they drop out of the ESOL programme once they get a menial job and start remitting to their natal families.

In contrast, personal conversion factors enabled highly educated men and those with educational motivation to utilise the available opportunities to improve their qualifications. A few undertook various education and vocational training levels to improve their qualifications. In contrast, most women have not utilised these opportunities as their ability to follow the ESOL programme was constrained by their mothering role and the shortage of childcare facilities. It is noteworthy that female labour migrants did not need to adjust their qualifications and secured their jobs before arriving in Glasgow. The following two sub-sections explore whether and how the respondents utilised their skills to obtain relevant jobs.

### 6.3.4 Women and the Labour-market

This sub-section deals with the women’s experience in Glasgow’s labour-market and the likelihood of this affecting their GNs. The central argument is that change in women’s material and intellectual resources, and contact with more gender-egalitarian cultures, allow them to acquire resources that may enhance their agencies and resist their subordination to men. The study shows that the GNs of women, their husbands, and their migration statuses are essential in understanding women’s employment. Women possess diverse qualifications
and experiences in the labour-market in Glasgow. Though the majority were highly educated, only a few (four) were employed. Of these, two are labour migrants, one is the wife of a labour migrant, and one is a refugee. Although they followed different employment routes, all of them had professional jobs. Before arriving in Glasgow, the two labour migrants secured their jobs. Lubna is an electrical engineer who applied for her job when living in another European country; Randa migrated to study a BSc. in economics at Liverpool. After graduation, she worked for two years before returning to Sudan; she came again as a labour migrant, her education and work experience in the UK was fundamental in getting this post. Meanwhile, Huda, the wife of a labour migrant who first came with a student visa, qualified as an engineer but did not gain any work experience. After graduation, she married and accompanied her husband first to Saudi Arabia and then to Glasgow as a family with two children. They were not entitled to welfare benefits, and she had to work to support the family. She was offered an engineering post, but she preferred a flexible job with short shifts that would allow her to simultaneously assume the provider and homemaker roles. Therefore, she worked in a nursery and undertook education to qualify as a social worker. That is, her gender role constrained her not following her career as an engineer.

The experience of Laila, the refugee, was affected by environmental and personal conversion factors. When she arrived in Glasgow, her Master’s in Veterinary Medicine was recognised as the equivalent of a BSc. So, after she had improved her English, she undertook a work placement in a veterinary clinic, hoping this would enable her to continue her career. However, to practice as a vet in the UK requires registration with the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, which has high academic and financial requirements. As Laila explains:

*I found it demanding, with a low likelihood of success for a mother of three children. So, I changed my career*

Her mothering role, financial resources, and qualification requirements constrained Laila’s ability to continue her career. As a result, she opted to adjust her qualifications to her new situation and follow a less prestigious job that would accommodate her gender relation and financial situation. Even so, for a year, she applied for many relevant posts without being shortlisted, which she explained to her lack of competence in writing applications and CVs; this is common among migrants. The labour-market culture differs from Sudan’s, and migrants must acquire proper knowledge and skills to integrate successfully. Although there
are services to support newcomers in this area, most respondents are unaware of them. However, after receiving support from a friend, Laila was eventually shortlisted for four posts before being offered her current role as a project officer in a charity. She believes she failed to get one of the jobs she was shortlisted for, despite performing well in the interview due to ethnic discrimination. Most staff at that institution were Pakistani and therefore employed a Pakistani woman because they preferred to have a colleague from the same cultural background. Laila considers her current role as below her qualifications and ambitions.

A lack of understanding of the labour-market culture is also apparent in the job-seeking process, as the experience of Ibtisam illustrates:

The condition of only paying social benefits to those searching for a job is not easy for those who don’t speak English. The job centre helped me with CV-writing and asked me to distribute it weekly to ten potential employers. So, I distributed it to many places. They took it and said they would call when they had a vacant post, but I have never been called. I don’t like this process; it’s like being a beggar, but I have to do it; otherwise, I would not get my benefits.

As she could not express herself well in English, Ibtisam did not expect to get a job by distributing her CV and felt humiliated by having to ‘beg’ for a job to receive her financial entitlement. Effectively, she is excluded from the labour-market because of her poor language skills and inability to develop an effective job-seeking technique. Another jobseeker, Shadia, is highly qualified with a Master’s degree in English and good relevant work experience, but her situation as a lone mother and the shortage of childcare services prevents her from engaging in the labour-market. She complained about the pressure from the jobcentre to find work and the lack of flexible jobs that would accommodate her situation, one in which her mothering role and the labour-market structure limit her ability to get a job. Ghosh (2009) notes that migrant women with young children often do not work. This is in accordance with this study’s finding that all women with young children do not work. Two reasons explain this: cultural factors, whereby children are seen as the essential fruit of marriage and women are seen as their carers; and structural factors, where a shortage of childcare services and flexible jobs constrains mothers’ access to education and the labour-market.
However, the employment experiences of the two labour migrant women contradict Piper’s (2008) claim that the labour-market segregates women into inferior, low-paid jobs traditionally undertaken by females, as both assumed professional jobs that matched their qualifications. In contrast, the case of Laila, the refugee woman, supports Piper’s claim, as even after changing her career, she failed to find a job that matched her qualifications. Huda’s, meanwhile, neither supports nor contradicts Piper’s claim. The labour-market offered her a suitable job, but she rejected it because of her gender role as a mother and homemaker.

Huda’s case also shows the importance of GNs in the labour-market integration of women. While Huda opted to take a low-paid gender-stereotyped job to fulfil her role as a homemaker, Lubna opted to continue her career. Moreover, Lubna migrated to Glasgow specifically to fulfil her role as a provider for her natal family in Sudan. Their contrasting experiences show that environmental conversion factors are not enough to explain the immigrants’ participation in the labour-market and point to the importance of considering both individual and social conversion factors.

To conclude, women’s labour-market integration is mediated by their personal conversion factors (skills, migration status and GNs), social conversion factors (the GNs of their spouses) and environmental conversion factors (childcare facilities and labour-market mechanism). Some women have lost potential employment opportunities due to the GNs of their husbands. However, they are relatively new to Glasgow\(^{53}\), and their agency may improve when it has been exposed to other cultures for longer. The impact of education level on women’s employment is also limited: 61% had a level higher than the mandatory in Glasgow (see Figure (5-2)), but only 14% of the highly educated were employed.

### 6.3.5 Men and the Labour-market

The labour-market works differently for men than women concerning the achievement of GE. Reduction in men’s income to a level below that of their wives may alter the power relationship favouring the women and induce more gender-egalitarian norms—or it may do

\(^{53}\) Have spent less than five years there
the reverse, where control over women increases. Similarly, men’s exposure to more gender-
egalitarian cultures may alter their GNs in either direction. They may accept the egalitarian
norms or reject them and become more conservative. As all the men were motivated to
emigrate by the desire for economic improvement, their integration in the labour-market
would be expected to be high. The data show that all except one of the men were active in the
labour-market, doing either formal or informal jobs or combining the two. In accord with the
finding of Brynin & Longhi (2015) and Aspinall & Watters (2010), almost all of them were
in low-paid menial jobs regardless of their qualifications. Most were clustered into security
guard jobs and catering (cooking/ dishwasher/ delivery) roles, while a few were employed in
cleaning, shop-keeping, barbering and warehouses. The only one in a professional role is a
self-employed IT technician who spent some time in menial jobs to earn the money he
needed to start his business after failing to obtain a relevant job. Some men undertake menial
jobs while attending education or ESOL programmes, seeking other jobs or volunteering to
gain experience.

Most respondents are employed as security guards. Students, in particular, like this job
because—as they can carry it out during the evening and at weekends—it allows them to
study. The others prefer it because it does not require high language skills or involve contact
with people who might discriminate against them; as noted by Sufian, who had previously
worked as a dishwasher but resigned due to his boss’s discrimination and humiliating attitude
towards him.

Security work is also preferred due to its relatively good pay. Despite being paid less than
the minimum wage per hour, security work is better paid than catering. Most respondents can
compensate for the low wage by working more hours; the majority work from 6 pm to 6 am
during the week and extra hours at weekends. Low payment, exploitation and humiliation are
oft-cited experiences in catering services. At the time of the interviews, three men and three
women’ husbands worked in catering. Two already had some cookery experience in Sudan,
and a third, Ali, started in Glasgow because he had no alternative. As he said:

I had never been in a kitchen in my life..., but I had no choice. I wanted to survive,
and because I received no benefit after my case was rejected, I had to find a source of
income.
Similarly, Aziza said of her husband:

*He has no qualifications [education], so he had to take whatever job he found.*

It is noteworthy that all except one of those involved in catering work have low qualifications; if their positions were formal, we might say that the labour-market had provided them with a job that matched their qualification.

Respondents also complained about the scarcity of informal work due to competition with white Eastern Europeans and those from the Caribbean, for example, who have good English skills. They also face increased control by immigration officials. Informal employment is a criminal offence for both employers and employees. Sanctions were strengthened in 2008 and 2016, and employers who hire informal workers can be sentenced to up to 51 weeks in prison and an unlimited fine, while the informal worker can face deportation (SIRIUS, 2018: 480-1).

Catering is where respondents experience the most exploitation, humiliation and discrimination. They all earn less than the minimum wage and are not paid regularly. Cooks often have to do other tasks besides cooking, such as dishwashing and cleaning, and undertake extra tasks without payment. For example, although Mahdy is employed and paid for one shift, he must prepare food for the second shift. Those working in informal jobs are vulnerable and unable to report exploitation or refuse to carry out exploitative tasks because they would be fired. It is not easy to find another job, as Mahdy said:

*Getting another job takes time, and once found, it may be worse than this. Also, the family back home can’t wait.*

Family demands, then, are a significant factor in their accepting exploitative jobs. However, when I asked the cooks, particularly those with previous experience in Sudan, why they had not established their own business, they cited language as the primary constraint. As, for example, Mahdy considers himself too old to sit at a school desk. This indicates his GNs, as he sees himself at a productive age, he would be ashamed to attend school.
The situation of those in menial jobs other than catering is not better. No one is employed formally, and all face similar discrimination and exploitation. Haroon’s experience is just one of many:

*I used to work black [informal] jobs because no one would give me a white job. The last one was in an Asian grocery. The employer understood my situation [a health problem] and was flexible. However, once, he asked me to clean the butchery after eight o’clock at night. I was exhausted after a long day. I asked for additional payment, but he refused. He dismissed me when I insisted that I would not do it without payment.*

Like many respondents, Haroon was forced to accept an informal job because nobody would offer him a formal one.

The employment statuses of Sudanese men are determined by a combination of personal, social and environmental conversion factors. Most have not utilised the available opportunities to improve their employability skills instead of doing informal jobs requiring no formal qualifications. The most commonly cited reasons are the situation in Sudan and the obligation to provide remittances. However, even those who invested in adjusting their qualifications to the labour-market failed to use their new qualifications and were clustered into low-skill jobs. Below, the reasons for their employment status are explored.

6.4 Labour-market and Access to Resources

This chapter aims to assess changes in resources due to labour-market integration. All the men have accessed the labour-market in Glasgow, while only four out of 28 women (two of whom are labour migrants) have been employed. However, women’s jobs allowed for a good income and cultural exposure. Although we are not interested in the amount of income itself, the variation in pay rates between Sudan and Scotland is enough to improve their tangible resources and may alter their GNs. The other two women have accessed income for the first time: one as a new graduate and the other ten years after graduation. This improvement in their tangible resources would be expected to alter their GNs. The four women’s professional jobs allow daily contact with colleagues and, to some extent, with other service users, which, as we will discuss in chapter seven, may expand their social network.
In contrast, except for one, all men do menial jobs that do not allow contact with other people. Those who work as security guards work at night in isolated locations; those who work in catering work in stressful atmospheres that do not allow space for networking. Similarly—because of the type of work, its informal nature and discrimination—their jobs do not generate reasonable incomes. The state social security system is thus an essential source of income for disadvantaged people.

6.5 State Welfare as Income Source

State welfare is an essential income source for those who cannot generate sufficient income. Evidence suggests that minority ethnic groups experience limited entitlement to benefits and are less likely to claim the benefits they are entitled to (Netto et al., 2011, 59). However, this study shows the opposite. Only five respondents were in households that did not receive social benefits at the interview time. Three were labour migrants who were not entitled to them, and two were single refugee men who earned enough money to survive. All the rest, except one, received at least three main benefits: Jobseeker’s Allowance, Child Benefit, and Housing Benefit; and were exempt from Council Tax. The exceptional case was Lalia, who received Child Benefits and Child Tax Credit, but her unemployed husband was not entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance because she generates enough income to support the family. Some respondents also received other benefits such as Disability Living Allowance (DLA) or Carer’s Allowance. For example, Zainab received DLA, her daughter received a Carer’s Allowance, while Nadia and Suha received DLA for their disabled children and Carer’s Allowances and Child Tax Credit.

In two-parent households, parents must nominate one of them to receive household benefits. Apart from three cases of unregistered marriage and one widow, men were invariably nominated. Surprisingly, some women do not know which benefits they receive.

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54 The welfare system was reformed in 2013, and a Universal Credit (UC) was introduced graduating, but none of the respondent was on UC at time of the interviews.
The social security system is expected to contribute to GE by providing an income source for women. In Scotland, women are twice as dependent on social security as men: 20% of women compared to 10% of men in 2010. Furthermore, it provides essential support for lone parents, as 95% (92% of whom are women) depend on Income Support. In addition, 74% of those claiming Carer’s Allowance are women (Wood, 2013). However, the pattern among the Sudanese is different. As this study shows, more men receive benefits than women. This is because men, as providers, receive the family benefits that are jointly paid. That is, the benefit improves men’s financial resources more than women.

In summary, Glasgow’s labour-market and the social security system do not provide most women with either a reasonable income or knowledge, while men receive a reasonable income but not knowledge. Both the labour-market and the social security system thus reinforce respondents’ GNs regarding access to tangible resources and fail to allow most of them sufficient contact with other cultures.

6.6 Labour-market and Conversion Factors

The oft-cited barriers to refugees’ employment in the UK are poor English skills; low qualifications (or a lack of recognition of qualifications); lack of familiarity with the UK system; lack of information; and employer discrimination (Aspinall & Watters, 2010: 49-50). This sub-section investigates how the three conversion factors—personal, environmental and social—interact to determine the respondents’ employment outcomes.

6.6.1 Personal Conversion Factors

Personal factors have various impacts on respondents’ employment. While Education has not facilitated employment, the majority’s poor English skills and labour-market knowledge strengthened the status quo. Further, their ages played an important role as most migrated in the production age found it difficult to invest in their skills when they should provide for their families.
Migration status defines the right to work. Figure (5-8) shows that our sample is dominated by those with refugee and family reunion statuses who have the same employment rights. Only one was denied access to the labour-market on the ground of migration status, as he believes. Haytham received a work placement through the Bridges Programme\textsuperscript{55} as a laboratory assistant at the Veterinary School at the University of Glasgow as he narrates:

\begin{quote}
They were very cooperative. It was an excellent opportunity, though they did not even pay transport expenses. I did my best to prove my qualifications practically. After two months, they offered me a job and requested my documents. But once they knew I was a refugee, they withdrew the offer.
\end{quote}

Though he had not received an explanation, he considered it anti-migrant behaviour. However, GNs are essential in shaping the respondents’ labour-market integration. The homemaker role constrained most women from starting the ESOL, while the provider role constrained most men from completing it.

\subsection*{6.6.2 Environmental Conversion Factors}

The labour-market mechanism pushed men to its margin, regardless of their qualifications, and restricted mothers' employment. As mentioned above, there was a shortage of flexible jobs that accommodate the situation of mothers. The labour-market also pushed men into menial and informal jobs. As Ahmed explained:

\begin{quote}
I failed to get a job commensurate with my qualifications. For moral reasons, I don’t want to do a ‘black’ [informal] job. I sought jobs that were lower than my qualifications, but nobody wanted to employ me formally, so I had to accept doing a black job to cover the increasing demands of my family in Sudan.
\end{quote}

It is noticeable that women do not risk-taking informal jobs. This may be explained by their GNs and belief that men should provide for them.

\textbf{Qualification-Recognition and the Education System:} Only two respondents sought recognition of their qualifications. Both had their qualification evaluated at a lower level, but

\footnote{\textsuperscript{55} The Bridges Programmes- Founded in 2002, is a specialist agency founded in 2002 to support the social, educational and economic integration of refugees and asylum seekers, as well as other migrants, who live in Glasgow. \url{https://www.bridgesprogrammes.org.uk/}}
neither managed to use them or build on them to reach the required level. The education system is also blamed for failing to support qualified people and limiting those who missed educational opportunities to realise their potential. The respondents explained this as due to racism or Islamophobia.

**Migration policies** have positively and negatively impacted the respondents’ employment experiences. The asylum-seeking stage’s right to access education and the labour-market have saved a few respondents’ time; some started to learn English. On the other hand, the family reunion requirement has contributed to men’s concentration in menial jobs with limited access to resources. In addition, **integration policies** are not well implemented; for example, only one respondent utilised the employment support programmes.

The steady deterioration of **Sudan’s economy** is responsible for pushing the respondents to the margin of the labour-market. The pressing demand for remittances is a crucial driver in accepting whatever job is available. For example, Mohammed:

*My ambition is to compensate for my lost education opportunity. I study hard to learn English, but sometimes I have to stop education to work hard to cover my family’s needs.*

In general, men are restricted by Sudanese socioeconomic status from accessing decent jobs or improving their qualifications.

**6.6.3 Social Conversion Factors**

**Gender Norms** at the community level in Sudan considerably impact immigrants’ employment. Remittance obligations are related to gender relations because data shows that the provider role has extended overseas. Providing for the natal family offers a fundamental explanation for the male respondents’ labour-market outcomes. The husbands’ GNs also have a considerable impact on the employment of their wives. Similarly, GN at the host community level has an adverse impact on respondents’ GE. Gender equality in terms of access to state welfare intersects with individual GNs to adversely impact women. The rule of receiving welfare benefits by either spouse mentioned above jeopardised women’s access to the benefits always received by men and supported the traditional provider role.
Discrimination: Respondents experience various sorts of discrimination in accessing the labour-market. Above, we mentioned racism and Islamophobia; respondents are also concerned about ageism. Though ageism is banned in Scotland by the Equality Act 2010 (Gov.UK, 2010), it is well recognised among the respondents. Two men learnt from the experiences of other migrants and took them into account in their employment strategies. For example, Lutfi only planned to follow a short education programme after finishing his ESOL:

*I don’t want to take long education because of my age; many people who took education here then couldn’t get a job because of their age.*

Ageism is recognised among migrant men because most migrated as adults and then had to wait a considerable time to achieve refugee status before adjusting their skills to the labour-market.

In conclusion, the respondents’ employment statuses are determined by various combinations of the three conversion factors. The majority have not utilised the available opportunities to improve their employability skills and do informal jobs incommensurate with their qualifications. The most cited reasons for this are the situation in Sudan and remittance obligations. However, even those who invested time adjusting their qualification to the labour-market then failed to use this due to discrimination. Concerning women and men, the women who work are employed in professional jobs, while all the men, except one, carry out menial jobs. The logical explanation is migration status: all men in the sample are refugees, while all the employed women, except one, are labour migrants. Though all of them have equal employment rights, the labour migrants secured their jobs before arriving in Glasgow.

6.7 Conclusion

The chapter explored Glasgow’s labour-market as an environmental conversion factor and its potential to provide tangible and intangible resources that may influence the respondents’ GNs. The central idea for analysis was that the labour-market might influence immigrants’ GNs through cultural exposure and access to financial resources. It explored how Sen’s three conversion factors interacted to determine the respondents’ positions in the labour-market.
The findings showed that despite its potential, the impact of the labour-market on respondents’ GNs is small. Women had limited access to the labour-market. The majority were constrained by the shortage of childcare facilities and flexible jobs, their GNs, and husbands’ GNs from being economically active. The few employed women had professional jobs that generated good incomes and allowed reasonable contact with other cultures. Although most of these were already part of relatively gender-egalitarian households, their position in the labour-market offered the potential to impact GNs further, if required.

In contrast, almost all the men were economically active. However, the interaction of the three conversion factors forced them into low-paid informal jobs with limited cultural exposure. Even highly qualified men were prevented by the labour-market structure, the education system and discrimination from utilising their qualifications. The recognition procedure of qualifications also constrained some educated women and men from following their careers. Even those who undertook education in the UK were later unable to use it due to the labour-market mechanism. The education system was also blamed for failing to support qualified people and preventing those who had missed educational opportunities from realising their potential. However, the analysis revealed that the labour-market is not entirely to blame for this situation. Other factors, such as remittance obligations and GNs, contribute substantially. Respondents access the state social security system to compensate for low wages in the labour market. The data show that all the refugee respondents received three or more benefits and that the men were the primary receivers.

Generally, Glasgow’s labour-market and the social security system do not provide women with a reasonable income or knowledge, while men receive a reasonable income but not knowledge. Thus, both the labour-market and the social security system can potentially reinforce respondents' GNs concerning access to tangible resources and fail to allow most of them sufficient contact with other cultures. However, contact with different cultures in areas outside work may offset this, as we explore in chapter seven.
CHAPTER SEVEN

SOCIAL NETWORKS: ACCESSIBILITY AND QUALITY

7.1 Introduction

The chapter is about the accessibility and quality of social networks as one of the environmental conversion factors considered in this study. It is about how and with whom the respondents built their social networks and the potential impact of these networks on their GNs. The analysis is based on the idea that GNs modification depends on interaction with the host’s diverse cultures. It is noteworthy that the host social environment is multicultural. Migration has posed challenges of “difference” (race, ethnicity, religion, culture and nationality) in receiving countries (Modood, 2013: 392-3). Policymakers and scholars have explored various approaches to managing cultural differences and the negative consequences (including prejudice, discrimination, culture-crisis and the threat to social cohesiveness). These approaches have gradually evolved from a belief in the importance of assimilating or melting immigrants’ cultures into the mainstream one—to form a single homogeneous culture and shared identity—into various versions of the integration approach (Hepburn, 2015). The multiculturalism model recognises and respects cultural differences (Modood, 2011: 26-9), and allows both minorities and the majority the freedom “to mix with, borrow and learn from all” (ibid.: 4-7).

The recognition of migrant groups of various socioeconomic statuses, languages, ethnicities and religions resulted in the superdiversity paradigm (Vertovec, 2007: 1024). Geography scholars have tried to develop an “unpanicked” approach to multiculturalism and diversity (Neal et al., 2013). Hence, the contemporary multicultural approach to conviviality and everyday life has emerged. Multiculturalism is a “dynamic, lived field of action within which social actors construct and deconstruct ideas of cultural difference, national belonging and place-making” (Harris, 2009: 188). Because of this definition’s dynamic character and its mix across ethnic groups, the study considers the interaction of the Sudanese with a combination of ethnic groups and cultures rather than merely the native culture during everyday interactions.
The everyday approach focuses on ethnic segregation, multi-ethnic cohabitation and conviviality. Conviviality attempts to understand the routine social interaction between ethnic groups in contexts of difference. It concerns how people manage difference and how cultural difference evolves and develops dynamically (Amin, 2002). In exploring people’s experiences in superdiverse settings, geographers have focused on encounters in cities that they describe as places of “throwntogetherness” (Massey, 2005). Numerous studies have been conducted in the micro-social world to explore how complex multi-ethnic societies experience, negotiate, accommodate or resist cultural differences. Some of these studies are concerned with how multi-ethnic people experience micro-geographies such as small cities (Kesten et al., 2011; Neal et al., 2013) or the suburbs of metropolitan cities (Hall, 2012; Wessendorf, 2013, 2014). Others are concerned with how multi-ethnic societies share access to micro-local public or semi-public spaces such as leisure centres (Jones et al., 2015), education institutions (Bennett et al., 2017), library and integration networks (Peterson, 2021), green parks (Neal et al., 2015), or buses (Koefoed et al., 2017); or how such places are used by a diverse population (Jones et al., 2015). Others again are concerned with how people build relationships across ethnic diversity while sharing micro-local settings (Neal & Vincent, 2013).

Geographers also note that the UK’s increasing diversification exceeds the parameters (e.g. migration and socioeconomic statuses) indicated by (Vertovec, 2010), thus proving its superdiversity. They suggest that: “People differ from each other not only because of these standard variables but because they carry with them different values, norms, ideas and identities, which intersect in plural ways between and within groups and categories that are normally acknowledged in the public discourse” (Tasan-Kok et al., 2014: 18-9). Considering the variation in people’s “values, norms, ideas and identities” in encounter-settings adds an important dimension that contributes to an in-depth understanding of the interaction’s outcomes.

Despite celebrating multiculturalism, evidence shows a lack of positive mixing and interaction between groups, which indicates a failure in integration and cohesion. As a result, some ethnic groups are becoming too inward-looking (Cantle, 2001; Favell, 2019; Nayak, 2012; Schinkel, 2018). Schinkel (2018: 6) also indicates the crucial role politicians and integration research play in othering immigrants and their children and the view of integration as a one-way process. Furthermore, “they [politicians and researchers] become
accomplices in a neo-colonial system of oppression” (Hadj Abdou, 2019: 1). Schinkel and his supporters thus blame the politicians and researchers for discrimination against immigrants. However, as this study will show, immigrants are not innocent victims; some respondents deliberately avoid contacting autochthonous Scots.

The chapter is composed of four sections. As background to what will follow, the second section introduces the social atmosphere in Glasgow. It presents the ethnic diversity of the city that allows the exposure of respondents to a wide range of cultures. It also explores official and public attitudes towards immigrant ethnic minorities that may promote or inhibit the respondents’ social interaction. The third section examines the respondents’ social experiences. Specifically, it explores networking in three settings: neighbourhoods, educational institutions, and workplaces, and the conversion factors that influence respondents’ social interaction. It also explores the respondents’ transnational networks and the potential of these to shape their GNs. Finally, the chapter summarises the respondents’ local and transnational networks and their potential impact on GNs.

7.2 The Social Context of Glasgow

7.2.1 Cultural and Ethnic Diversity

Glasgow is one of the UK's most culturally and ethnically diverse cities. This subsection shows that immigration adds to cultural and ethnic diversity. The ethnic minority population in Scotland, particularly in Glasgow, has increased considerably over the last two decades: the size of ‘Non-White’ ethnic groups increased four-fold in both the country and the city between 1991 and 2011 censuses. In the same period, the number of ‘White’ Scots declined by 13,000 (Walsh, 2017: 8-12).

Figure (7-1) shows the size of ethnic minority groups (expressed in thousands) according to the 2011 census (NRS, 2019c). The population is categorised into 16 ethnic groups, and three new groups (Arab, Polish and Gypsy) have been added since the previous census to reflect diversity better. The hybrid identity of the Sudanese potentially places them in two categories: African and Arab. However, they are categorised as African. The African group account for 30,000, representing an increase of 25,000 from the previous census.
Similarly, the ethnic geography of the country has drastically changed over the last decade. The data from the Annual Population Survey for 2018 show that immigrants living in Scotland account for 9% of the population (4% in the 2011 census) (NRS, 2019). This data set covers people from 27 African countries, yet some data, including Sudan, are unavailable due to disclosure control. However, these groups are not distributed evenly across the country. Immigrants are more likely than those born in the UK to live in cities (55% compared to 25%) and concentrated in the three main cities. They form 21% of Edinburgh’s population, 19% of Aberdeen’s, and 16% of Glasgow’s (NRS, 2019).

The immigrant ethnic minorities in Glasgow more than doubled between the 2001 and 2011 censuses, increasing from 7.2% of the population to 15.4%. The most significant increase was in Africans, who reached 316% (Freeke, 2013: 2). Glasgow has always been more diverse than the country. For instance, in 2011, ‘non-White’ ethnic minorities counted 12% of the city’s population compared to 4% of the country’s (Walsh, 2017, 10). Exploring the city’s ethnic composition, the 2011 census shows that the ‘White’ Scottish group accounted for 79% of the population. South Asians comprised the largest (8%) ethnic minority group, followed by ‘White’ Other British (4%), ‘White’ Other (4%), African (2%) and Chinese (2%) groups.
As a result of the increase in immigrant ethnic groups, more parts of Glasgow have become ethnically diverse. In 2001, five of the city’s 56 planning neighbourhoods had an ethnic minority population of 12%; by 2011, this had increased to 11 and, in nine of these, the ethnic minority population was between 25% and 50% (Freeke, 2013, 4-5). That is, ethnic groups are not evenly distributed across the city but are clustered by ethnicity. For example, the ‘White’ Other British are mostly clustered in the centre and the west of the city, and the South Asian are predominantly in the south. The Africans, however, are geographically less concentrated, forming about 11% of the population of Springburn, in the northwest of the city, but more evenly spread across other areas of Glasgow (ibid.). Springburn had the highest number (322) of Africans in Scotland in 2001, followed by two wards in Edinburgh. By 2011 Springburn’s African population had increased to 2,360, followed by other wards in Glasgow and Aberdeen.

Glasgow’s religious diversity is also relatively high compared to other cities in Scotland. In 2001, 29% of the city’s inhabitants were Catholic, 23% had no faith, and 3% were Muslim. Drilling down within each group, Glasgow is a vital population centre for non-European religions. In 2001, it hosted 42% of Muslims in Scotland, 36% of Sikhs and 22% of Hindus. Muslims are clustered in the south, particularly in the inner-city areas of the Gorbals, Pollokshields and Govanhill (Pacione, 2005: 143; 2009). This clustering may impact social interaction, with members of each group primarily interacting among themselves.

7.2.2 Integration Policy and Attitudes towards Immigration

Integration policy and public attitudes towards immigration are essential social conversion factors that mediate access to networks. Immigration is a central issue in the UK and Scottish politics and public debates. For example, it was a driver of the Scottish referendum on independence from the UK in 2014 and the UK’s membership of the European Union in 2016 (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017). Hence, it is often top of all parties’ election agendas. The UK-level political arena is characterised by an overwhelmingly hostile debate over immigration. For instance, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government and the mainstream political parties in Westminster pledged to reduce net migration to less than 100,000 per annum by 2015 (McCollum et al., 2014: 80). The Scottish arena, in contrast, is characterised
by a political consensus across parties in favour of immigration (Hepburn & Rosie, 2014); this is made apparent in Scotland’s welcoming immigration policy and integration strategies.

7.2.2.1 Integration Policy

Regardless of how it is defined, the integration process is influenced by the receiving society’s institutional environment and the settling population’s personal capacities (Valtonen, 2004). Building on a literature review by (Hepburn, 2015), this section highlights the legislation and integration strategies that help understand Glasgow’s social context.

Although immigration has become a principal concern for UK politics and the public, it has a less explicit focus in UK policy frames. For example, the UK is famous for its multiculturalism due to settlement by people from former colonies and Commonwealth countries. However, despite this, there is no clear policy on integration that addresses the needs and inclusion of migrants as a community. Instead, the UK has a strong ‘race-relations’ model of multicultural policies that foster tolerance and respect for different cultures. Indeed, it has some of the most advanced anti-discrimination legislation in Europe, which promotes racial equality and prohibits discrimination, focusing on the BME (Hepburn, 2015). The multicultural approach, however, has been blamed for the creation of “parallel lives”, the segregation of ethnic minority groups from British society and increased hostility towards immigrants (see (McGhee, 2005; Spencer, 2011). In 2001, the Cantle Report, produced by the Community Cohesion Review Team (CCRT), argued that tensions between diverse cultural communities could be overcome by emphasising common citizenship and core values (Cantle, 2001: 9). Moreover, it suggested a “community cohesion” approach, which emphasised the need to foster a sense of belonging and shared values (ibid.). However, this approach failed to make a sufficient contribution to reconciliation between different cultural groups, who continued to follow parallel lives characterised by hostility (see (BBC, 2005).

56 Cited in (Stewart, 2009).
57 It examined hostile incidences in London
Like the rest of the UK, the Scottish government has developed its race-relations model to cover immigrants’ issues, although it differs from England. The most striking variations are that it offers a two-way approach that allows interaction between immigrants and non-immigrants; includes both refugees and asylum seekers; celebrates refugees’ diverse cultures; gives refugees a sense of identity and belonging when they are named “New Scots” (Hepburn & Rosie, 2014: xx). In 2002, Scotland launched the One Scotland, Many Cultures campaigns (Lewis & Craig, 2014) to combat racism. Scotland also recognised multiculturalism, whereby everyone in Scotland needed to work together to ensure the best possible future for all (ibid: 107).

In 2008, the Scottish Government produced a Race Equality Statement showing their intention to build: “A Scotland which embraces diversity whilst also fostering a sense of common purpose and goals […] A Scotland where all of our communities are recognised as threads which make up the tartan of our nation’s life” (Scottish Government, 2008, 1). In 2013, the first New Scots: Integrating Refugees in Scotland’s Communities strategy was developed to provide a framework for those working towards refugee integration. Its implementation (2014-2017) included six action plans around the needs of asylum seekers and refugees: employability and welfare; housing; education; health; and communities and social connections (Gov.Scot, 2017). A second strategy is under implementation under this title (2018-2022) (Gov.Scot, 2018). However, theoretically, these strategies have not considered the essential needs of refugees or their cultures well. For example, education is the fourth SDG and is vital for upward socioeconomic mobility, but refugees who missed this opportunity are not considered, whereas other countries, such as Norway, offer adult education to this category (Bjerkaker, 2016; Werber, 2015). Despite this, Hepburn, Rosie, and other authors perceive Scotland as having a relatively welcoming attitude towards migrants and a broad political consensus and awareness that immigration is necessary for demographic stability and economic growth (McCollum et al., 2014).

59 Cited in Hepburn, 2015
7.2.2.2 Attitudes towards Immigration

This subsection examines public attitudes towards immigrants as an essential determinant of social interaction. Academic studies confirm that Scotland’s media portray a more positive image of immigrants than England’s (Devine & McCarthy, 2019). However, as Bond argues, the official attitude towards immigration “does not necessarily match the perspectives of those in the wider population” (Bond, 2006: 623). For example, a significant share of the Scottish public believes that ethnic minorities threaten Scotland’s identity (McCollum et al., 2014) and culture (Hepburn & Rosie, 2014: 1).

Academic studies have demonstrated mixed attitudes among the population towards immigration. Some studies reveal a higher tolerance level for asylum seekers (Lewis, 2006) and less Islamophobia (Hussain & Miller, 2006) in Scotland than in England. In contrast, others argue that immigration is perceived negatively by the general public in Scotland and that the positive attitude was “simply because they have been less exposed to it” (McCollum et al., 2014: 89). Bond (2006, 623), for example, shows the public’s reluctance in Scotland to embrace the “Scottishness” of some ethnic minority groups. At the beginning of this decade, studies show growing evidence of intolerance towards immigration among the general public in Scotland and the UK. This intolerance is attributed to the overall rise in immigration (particularly in asylum applications) combined with the nature of political and policy debate and how migration and asylum issues are represented in the media (Crawley et al., 2013; McCollum et al., 2014). In 2014, the Migration Observatory showed that in Scotland, a majority (58%) of those asked supported a reduction in immigration, although more people thought immigration was good for Scotland (41%) than bad (31%) (Observatory, 2014).

However, understanding public attitudes towards immigration is not straightforward. It is a complex issue affected by structural (e.g. social, economic) and individual (e.g. employment, qualification, socio-demographic) factors (Crawley, 2005: 9). Accordingly, the research on attitudes towards immigration has become more insightful with more attributes of the research subjects and the researched considered. Immigrants’ essential characteristics are the type of immigration; skills; and country of origin (an umbrella term that covers various attributes such as language, religion, and cultural distance). This newer research shows that British people generally prefer the immigration of highly skilled people closer to them.
An online survey conducted in 2017, for example, shows that the British have “ethnic hierarchy” preference patterns in which immigrants who are most preferred are those who are White, English-speaking, European, and from Christian countries, while the least preferred are non-White, non-Europeans from Muslim countries. In line with this, Australians are more welcome than Romanians, Pakistanis and Nigerians (Ford, 2011).

Academic writing about minority groups in Scotland is relatively scarce. Primarily, it focuses on the most prominent groups from South Asia (McCollum et al., 2014), with only a few studies on Africans (Hill, 2017). This study adds to this literature by exploring an African/Arab community’s experience.

7.3 Social Interaction of the Sudanese in Glasgow

This section explores the respondents’ social interactions that may affect their GNs. It pertains to the respondents’ social networks: how they are formed, with whom, encountering frequency, depth of relationship, and factors that facilitate/constrain the networking process. The focus is on their interactions with Sudanese and other cultures, neighbourhoods, education and workplaces.

7.3.1 Respondents’ Social Interaction with Sudanese

The Sudanese community in Glasgow identified two distinct categories: doctors, often labour migrants, and asylum seekers and refugees. However, networking across these categories is rare, as Laila stated:

The doctors and their families always network among themselves. They avoid contact with refugees because they consider them as low class. Nevertheless, I have contact with some of them, though I am a refugee. It may be because I have a professional job.

Huda, too, who falls within the doctor group, confirmed that although she networks with different ethnic groups, she mostly networks with Sudanese doctors’ families. However, the
data show that some respondents do not belong to either category: Lubna and Randa (both labour migrants) have minimal contact with the other Sudanese.

Generally, most Sudanese feel they have weak contact with other Sudanese compared to what they had in Sudan. Further, their contact is limited to kinship or those from their area of origin. However, families exchange occasional visits, particularly around events such as illness, childbirth, grief and Eid, and socialising more rarely.

The research also shows that Sudanese women and men socialise separately. Most women socialise in their homes. Some exchange visits as individuals, but most gather regularly in organised networks of between 10 and 15 women. Generally, these networks are homogenous regarding education, employment and interest. They often run a ‘Sandoq’, [a rotating saving fund] where the women gather at the woman's home whose turn it is to receive it. Nuha, a moderator of one group, describes it thus:

*I have good contact with Sudanese women. So, I organised them into a Sandoq-group to come out from the home routine and have fun. We gather at home once a month; we don’t discuss specific topics but have fun together.*

In the summer, the groups also gather in parks. Another encountering place mentioned, for example, by Nadia, was the shopping centre:

*I have good contact with Sudanese women in the neighbourhood. We exchange visits, and sometimes we meet in the shopping centre.*

Similarly, Sudanese men often socialise at home. They form small groups of friends who gather in single men’s flats (rarely in families’) to play cards. Some gather daily in Sudanese Cafe in the city centre, owned by a Sudanese man and provide Sudanese food. The men play cards and billiards and exchange community news. Another social interaction site is the mosque; most men mentioned meeting people at the Central Mosque after Friday prayers for a short chat to exchange personal information. Some of the younger men also go to places such as pubs. It is noticeable that men socialise more frequently than women and in a wider variety of places. Their socialisation is often at the expense of women: if men gather outside
the home, women have to spend more time alone with their children, and if they gather at home, women have to spend more time catering.

The above shows that the Sudanese maintain relatively strong social interaction among themselves, even if they are weaker than those they had in Sudan. However, the fact that they socialise with relatives and like-minded friends from across the city allows limited opportunities for cultural exchange.

7.3.2 Respondents’ Social Interaction with Other Cultures

This subsection examines the respondents’ social interaction with other cultures within neighbourhoods, educational institutions and workplaces.

7.3.2.1 Respondents’ Social Interaction within Neighbourhoods

Residential patterns and their relation to integration have been a focus for academics and policymakers. The policymakers agree that ethnic residential segregation obstructs the social interaction and integration of minority ethnic groups (Harrison et al., 2005)\(^{60}\). In the UK, residential segregation has been seen as a threat to social cohesion since the Cantle Report, when the reporting team was struck by “the depth of polarisation of our towns and cities […] many communities operate based on parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote meaningful exchanges” (Cantle, 2001: 9).

In the academic field, however, there are two contradicting views on residential segregation. The favourable scenario sees it as a sign of community strength and substantial social capital. In contrast, the adverse scenario views it as a sign of social exclusion or ‘self-segregation’, that is, the reluctance of ethnic minorities to integrate (see Phillips, 2006). Hence, increasing support for residential mixing and related policies are implemented to improve social interaction across ethnic groups and social cohesion (Bolt et al., 2010b). However, the outcomes have not proved positive results because of the limited interaction between groups,

\(^{60}\) Cited in (Bolt et al., 2010a).
even in mixed neighbourhoods. Schinkel (2018: 6) also rightly criticises such research for focusing on immigrants’ behaviour and ignoring that of the autochthonous people; for example, there is no research into the number of friends the autochthonous have from other ethnic groups. Moreover, there is a lack of in-depth research that explains the reasons for self-segregation. This section explores the respondents’ residential distribution and their social interactions.

Immigrants’ segregation is often related to the asylum-seekers dispersal system and the refugees’ housing plan. Asylum seekers in Glasgow are housed in the void housing stock (often scheduled for demolition) in most deprived areas. Such areas have above-average unemployment rates, low-income households, and limited community facilities (Sim & Bowes, 2007: 732). The areas are also characterised by high resentment towards asylum seekers. All the respondents, except the two labour migrants, were accommodated in high-rise buildings in such areas. They were moved out for the renovation reason to unsecured areas, as Laila notes:

_After removing Red Road flats [Springburn], we were given accommodation in a high-rise building in Kingsway Court [Victoria Park]. Refugees have usually been accommodated in high-rise buildings because the Scots do not like these buildings due to the damp and foul conditions._

The rest of the respondents described similar experiences, with the majority living in areas dominated by drug abusers and racism. Women had to get home before sunset to avoid suffering harassment and hostility, as Suha describes:

_Our residential area [Springburn] was evil; people threw stones and glass at us. They insulted us and spoke abusively when we went out. However, we always went out together and were never out late._

Most respondents were unsatisfied with their housing experience during their asylum-seeking period. Though some were satisfied with the conditions of their temporary flats, none were pleased with their residential area. Generally, all the respondents had lived in two or more areas in Glasgow before moving to the area they resided in at the interview time. Almost all of them still live in deprived, insecure areas, as shown in Figure (7-2).
Considering social interaction in the residential areas, the data show that the few respondents who live in Dennistoun, Nitshill and East Kilbride are the families of labour migrants and their experiences differ. Randa has no contact in her proximity but has not experienced antisocial behaviour\(^{61}\). Huda experienced antisocial behaviour in her first area, but not her current, Pakistani-dominated one, where she has good communication with her neighbours and exchanges visits and food with them much as she would if she were living in Sudan. Lubna’s neighbourhood is dominated by Scots, and she has had a positive experience:

*My relationship with the neighbours is good; they are very friendly. I am the only 'Black'. Most people in my building are seniors; we chat when we see each other and exchange seasonal cards.*

Exchanging visits and food is a shared culture in Muslim communities such as Sudan and Pakistan. However, exchanging seasonal cards is an acquired behaviour that is not practised in Sudan.

Although these three areas are relatively secure, the Sudanese who reside there have no firm social contact with neighbours. Nonetheless, their networks seem better than those of

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\(^{61}\)“behaviour by a person which causes, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to persons not of the same household as the person” (Antisocial Behaviour Act 2003 and Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011).
Springburn & Canal and Parkhead residents. Both areas are inhabited by diverse ethnic groups but are the most deprived and famously insecure. Although most respondents live in these areas, none has contact with other ethnic groups; as Fatima, a resident in Parkhead, narrates:

*Our residential area is inhabited by drug- and alcohol-addicted people; it is famous for crimes. We can't go out alone in the evening, many addicted people are in the street, and we hear many immoral and antisocial words. Also, sometimes they knock on the door; one of them lives in our building. We are terrified. Two months ago, a man was killed in our street, not far from my flat. Police interrogated all the people who lived in the street.*

The police recommend they go out in groups, as Adil (Govan) describes:

*The police came to the YMCA*\(^{62}\) *and advised us to go out in groups because we were at risk and targeted by the natives. I know six people who experienced harassment by the natives to the extent that they needed medical treatment.*

However, even following this advice is not always enough; as Haytham (Springburn) narrates:

*One day, two friends and I were returning from the centre around 9 pm. We found ourselves surrounded by about ten White youths when we reached our area. They said to us, “Go home; this is not your country. What are you doing here?” Then they thrashed us hard; we couldn’t defend ourselves because they were many.*

Those who live in Victoria Park, Pollokshields, Govan and Govanhill have a more secure life, though Govan, too, is famous for antisocial behaviour as described by Adil:

*My second flat was good, but it was in a bad area. It is famous for racism and antisocial behaviour. We heard many negative words from people between the ages of 20 to 30 years, such as “What are you doing here?”, “Return to your country” and so forth. Also, they asked for money; if you didn’t give it to them, they smacked you.*

Nonetheless, residents of these areas have relatively better social interactions. For example, some have limited contact with other Arabic speakers (Iraqis, Syrians and Eritreans) in

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\(^{62}\) Asylum seekers’ residence
colleges, mosques, community centres, parks or children’s playgrounds. However, relations often do not extend beyond these areas. In contrast, some, such as Suha (Victoria Park), managed to build good relations:

*When we went to the park with the children, we developed a network through children. Sometimes I got to know people from Arab countries and continued relations with them. We exchanged visits.*

Children often act as an effective interaction means, as Nuha (Govanhill) confirms:

*I have a good network: of Italian, Pakistani, Ethiopian, Kurdish, Iraqi, and Moroccan friends. Some I know from the college and others from the playground in our neighbourhood; we go there once a week. Our children become friends; we invite each other for children’s birthdays. We also arrange children’s summer programmes together.*

Through activities related to their children, they also built good relationships that extended to their homes, which is rare among other respondents. Another exceptional case is Nadia (Govan), who has relatively good contact with her Scottish neighbour:

*I have a good relationship with my neighbour; she is an old Scottish woman. She has visited me twice, but I have never visited her. I also give her some food as we do in Sudan.*

In contrast, men have infrequent contact with ‘White’ people. Although Haytham (Canal), for example, claims to have good contact with all his neighbours:

*I have good communication with my neighbours, both natives and immigrants. I have never had any problem with them;*

To my understanding, and based on the respondents’ discussions, having ‘good contact’ means ‘never had any problem with’ or is limited to simple greetings such as those Tariq describes:

*We greet each other when we meet on the stairs or outside, but no more.*
Some respondents were satisfied with living with other migrants—such as Arabs and Pakistanis—with whom they share some culture. They consider it more secure for their families, even if they have little contact beyond greetings. However, the cultural similarity (of language or religion) reduces the likelihood of GNs’ change.

The data show that Sudanese have weak social contact in their residential areas and that antisocial behaviour significantly impacts contact building. In general, women are in a better position than men, utilising children and food as facilitating agents to build networks, although this is mostly with people with cultural similarities and does not usually extend beyond exchanging greetings and a few words. Two women have limited contact with senior Scottish women, but because of the type and frequency of this contact, it is not expected to have a considerable impact on their GNs.

b) Respondents’ Social Contact within Sites of Education and Work

Education and employment have contradictory effects on social interaction. On the one hand, the opportunities for students and the employed to share contact with colleagues and service users are excellent. On the other, employment and education take place at the expense of leisure time. Though a reasonable number of males and women are engaged in education and employment in Glasgow, only a few mentioned gaining networks through them.

As mentioned on pages (169-172), all the employed men work long hours in jobs that only allow limited contact with others. In catering, for example, meal breaks are generally only 30 minutes and must be taken alone so that the work as a whole doesn’t stop. Nonetheless, Mahdy and Ali, both cooks, have good work relationships; as Mahdy relates:

> I have a good relationship with my colleagues. I have been working there for four years; most of them are Indian and Pakistani.

However, from what respondents said, I understood that by ‘colleague’, they meant ‘employer’ and that this contact was the normal relationship between employer and employee. It did not extend beyond the workplace, other than when Ali invited his employer’s family and colleagues to his wedding.
Some women's experience—having little opportunity to interact during work—is similar. Lubna, for example, an engineer who works with men, describes her relationship with colleagues in these words:

*Our contact is semi-formal. We talk about the job; we know little about each other’s private life. We have never thought about going out together, even at Christmas time.*

In contrast, other employed women, such as Huda, who works in a nursery, have better networks:

*I have friends from different ethnic groups, but most are my work colleagues and neighbours. For example, with the Scots, we socialise at restaurants, and they have visited me, but I have never visited them.*

Laila has established good contact with African and Scottish women through her work and volunteering. She describes this network as:

*Limited, but we go out for tea and coffee and exchange visits with Africans. I have never felt like an outsider with the Africans; sometimes, we discuss cultural issues, including gender.*

Laila’s and Huda’s experiences show that they have adopted a new socialising method of going out with the Scots while maintaining their Sudanese culture of inviting people home. However, as both expressed, these relations are not frequent or deep enough to alter their GNs. In contrast, Randa feels more integrated. Her social networks are:

*Composed of education or employment colleagues. I have good integration in Glasgow. I often go to the cinema or theatre; I also go for a walk with some friends. Though I know many Scots, most of my friends are from other ethnic groups (Russian and Indian).*

Randa’s social interaction with other cultures seems deeper than with Sudanese. Surprisingly, although some respondents had attended higher education in Glasgow, they had not developed networks beyond the university, unlike Randa.
Timewise, both employment and education have negative impacts on Sudanese social interaction. As Mahdy, who works long shifts (from 2 pm to 5 am) as a cook, comments:

   *I had some Sudanese I got to know here [in Glasgow], and we became like brothers. We exchanged visits. I don’t do this anymore; I am busy.*

Education has the same impact as Adil explains:

   *I don’t have a good network because I was a student and busy all the time for the last three years.*

That is, neither respondents who attend education in Glasgow nor those employed have time for social interaction.

Generally, the Sudanese in Glasgow have weak social relations with those outside their group, and the majority feel isolated compared to their social lives in Sudan. Although they have contact with relatives, co-villagers or like-minded people, their connection with other people (mostly with members of other BME groups) is weak and is not expected to impact GNs. The following sub-section examines the reasons for the limited social interaction of the Sudanese.

### 7.4 Sudanese Social Interaction and Conversion Factors

This section discusses the factors that facilitate or constrain the respondents’ social communication. It is divided into three sub-sections, each covering one of the three conversion factors.

#### 7.4.1 Environmental Conversion Factors

**Integration Policy and Residential Patterns**

Integration policies are not supportive of the respondents. As discussed above, they failed to support the education of those who missed out on the opportunity at home, while residential distribution limited social interaction across ethnic groups, restricting it to those with cultural similarities.
Besides, the available integration services are rarely accessed. Although most areas have a community centre, within many of which integration networks and charities provide refugee services, only one female respondent mentioned having contact with one. Despite the high potential they offer for social interaction across ethnic groups and cultures. Some Sudanese do not access them because of their ‘bad’ reputation for empowering women. Some women choose not to attend the centres; others are prevented from doing so by their husbands.

Another issue, though not directly related to access to financial and intellectual resources, is that limited access to gynaecology services has been shown to impact maintaining and even reinforcing Sudanese GNs considerably. For example, three respondents mentioned that they had been unable to access gynaecology services before either receiving treatment for infertility from their GP for three years or suffering a third miscarriage. Although this is a nationally applied rule, Sudanese GNs make it particularly unfair for Sudanese women, as ‘failure’ to produce children is viewed as an acceptable reason for polygamy or divorce: see, for example, the case of Dalia page (209).

**Public places** are arenas to encounter other ethnic groups, and, as such, they may provide an opportunity to build social networks and observe different cultures. Numerous studies (Kesten et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2015; Neal et al., 2015) have been conducted in public places to explore immigrants’ everyday interactions. Though there are plenty—and various—public places in Glasgow, only a few were mentioned in this study: restaurants; the Sudanese café; parks; cinemas; theatres; discos; mosques; and integration networks centres. All of these are highly gendered for Sudanese. For example, the cinema, theatre, disco, Sudanese café and mosque are generally for men, although the sample did provide some exceptions for women accessing the cinema and the theatre. Indeed, men are free to access all public places, although most named the Sudanese café and the mosque as the primary places they socialise. However, as people only remain at the mosque for a short time after prayers to exchange news, it can hardly be considered a site where GNs are exchanged or negotiated.
In contrast, the Sudanese café is such a site, although it is mainly used by Sudanese, so the opportunity for GNs to be negotiated remains limited. None of the men mentioned that they discussed issues there, but the females mentioned it as a place where peer pressure could be experienced, and the exchange of gossip and mockery of men their wives dominated could occur. As discussed above, although a few women mentioned socialisation at parks and shopping centres, most go to these in homogenous groups and do not interact with others; the only exceptions are those who go with their children. Only one young man mentioned going to the disco/pub with Scottish friends. As this networking was with people with a high cultural distance and was deep enough for them to go out frequently, it is a type that may alter GNs.

7.4.2 Personal Conversion Factors

**Gender:** The data show that women are more socially engaged than men and have relatively better contact with other cultures. This outcome can be crosscut with other factors such as age, which also affects social interaction. For example, Ahmed (aged 61), who has some university friends, considers himself too old to go out and have fun. While Khalid (aged 24) said:

*I have a good network with the Scots. I developed it in the hostel [for asylum seekers] and still keep it. Most of them are girls.*

However, it is impossible to discern a clear pattern based purely on age. For example, Laila and Huda (both in their 50s) are the most socially engaged (with colleagues) women in the sample, while some younger women and men have limited networks. It may, then, be explained by personal styles.

Similarly, education and employment have no apparent impact pattern on respondents’ networking. Most highly educated and employed women had good contact with colleagues, but only one has a relationship beyond this, whereby she regularly socialises with some BME women. However, they had little contact with other ethnic groups in their neighbourhoods, although a few unemployed women with lower education and a small number of educated women utilised different tools to build a connection with other ethnic groups. Similarly,
almost all men have no contact with their neighbours beyond exchanging greetings, while their job types and routines have limited their interaction at work and in neighbourhoods.

The language was cited as an essential barrier to respondents’ social interactions with non-Arabic speakers, as most respondents have poor English skills. Language, however, is not a barrier for everyone. For example, some people use other means (children and food). Similarly, language is not a facilitating communication factor for everyone. For example, some respondents, such as Huda, Lubna, Laila and Randa, have good language skills and a good network with non-Arabic speakers; others with similar skills, such as Ahmed, Haytham, and Sufian, do not.

Gender Norms, however, have a clear impact on respondents' networking. Most male respondents, as providers, devoted their time to education or work. Their work routines also restrict women’s social interaction. As homemakers, women do not go out before they do domestic work or while their husband is at home. For example, Fatima’s husband works as a security guard from 6 pm to 6 am, and his commute takes an hour. Fatima must have prepared breakfast by the time he arrived home around 7 am. After this, he sleeps until 3 pm. During this time, she and their one-year-old daughter must be quiet. Fatima has changed her and her daughter’s daily routine to match that of her husband; they sleep during the day and are awake at night. After he gets up, they have a meal together before he leaves around 5 pm. Then she can exchange visits with her Sudanese neighbour, who has the same routine. Like other Sudanese men, Fatima’s husband often takes his day off on Fridays to go to the mosque, meet his friends, and spend the rest of the day playing cards with them.

That is, GNs constrain the ability of both Sudanese women and men to form social networks.

Length of stay in the UK/ Glasgow is expected to increase respondents’ exposure to various cultures. However, the data show that it does not impact their access to resources. Men have low social interaction across ethnic groups, regardless of how long they have lived in Glasgow. Moreover, their social interaction with Sudanese is reduced when they enrol in education or employment. Their length of time in Glasgow can negatively impact their social interactions. However, women’s experience shows no discernible pattern. For example,
Zainab (11 years) has limited contact with Sudanese; Laila (11 years) and Huda (22 years) have limited contact both with Sudanese and with other ethnic groups; while Ibtisam, Nadia and Nuha, who have all been living in Glasgow for five years, have good social engagement; but those who have been living there for three years have almost no contact with other ethnic groups. As before, results may be related to personalities and lifestyles.

The data show that personal styles greatly influence the respondents’ social interactions. Some, such as Ibtisam, are naturally open:

\[
I \text{ was used to social life, so I couldn’t just stay home. I always have visitors or visit others.}
\]

Others, such as Haroon, prefer limiting their network to relatives; or staying home. Tariq opted to stay home because he had not been able to find his preferred milieu:

\[
I \text{ have no good social connection. There is a Sudanese café, but I don’t like it; Sudanese just play cards. I don’t like these things. I spend my time watching TV or browsing the internet.}
\]

Hence, personal styles and preferences may explain limited social interaction.

### 7.4.3 Social Conversion Factors

#### Gender Norms within Families

The data show that spouses or parents control the social interactions of some women and girls. Suha, for example, describes how she and her sister were controlled by their mother and brother when they were teenagers:

\[
We \text{ participated in some Sudanese events, but we always had to be accompanied by my brother. Sometimes she [her mother] allowed us to go out with our college colleagues if she knew them. We went to the city centre but had to be home before sunset. We have never been to the cinema or the disco. It is one of the reasons I decided to get married early. After my marriage, I expanded my network.}
\]
Despite her marriage, Suha’s experience as a teenager continues to affect her networking. She still has limited contact with Sudanese, and though she goes out often, at least twice a week, it is mainly to restaurants or parks with her children and sometimes with other BMEs.

Some men control their wives for fear that they will learn the culture of the host country, particularly its dress code and financial rights, as is the case of Madeena:

*He [her husband] doesn’t allow me to contact some people such as X because she doesn’t wear a scarf or Z because she goes to charities events. I had good contact with a few Sudanese but only visited them with him. He always asked me what we had discussed if I was alone with the women. So, I have to stay home unless it is indispensable. Also, I did not allow visitors when he was out or to call anyone. He checks my phone, and if he finds a call, he asks me what we have discussed.*

However, despite this (and as discussed in group interviews), some women were able to educate others about their financial rights and encourage them to control their benefits.

**Racism and Antisocial Behaviour**

Antisocial behaviour is a crucial influence on Sudanese social interaction. Most Sudanese who came to Glasgow in the early 2000s have experienced or observed antisocial behaviour, as mentioned on pages (190-195). It has restricted their interaction both with other cultural groups and among themselves. The types of antisocial behaviours experienced are racism and Islamophobia, as Dalia describes:

*I experienced racism often, particularly on the buses and in the neighbourhood [Springburn]. The young people call us “monkey” or “chocolate”. Also, on the buses, we heard insults and swearwords for Muslims;*

Mahdy confirms:

*The area [Govan] was not good because the teenagers bothered my wife because she wears the hijab.*
The most cited places for these experiences to occur were on public transport, in schools and in neighbourhoods; particularly, many cases of conflict with neighbours due to the noise made by children.

However, some respondents deny the existence of racism. Ali, for example, says:

*I live in an area where all residents are Scots but have never experienced racism.*
*Those who experience racism are because they went out with the Scots; went to the bars with them, or went out with the drug users; therefore, they hear the racist words.*

Ali has not experienced antisocial behaviour and explains its existence by socialisation with drug users. In his view, those who experience antisocial behaviours are to blame for going to places where they do not belong. This would tend to indicate that antisocial behaviours are practised by a specific category within the community. Regardless of where it exists, antisocial behaviour plays a significant role in the social interaction of the Sudanese with the Scottish. Those who do believe it exists have good reason to avoid contact; those who believe it exists in specific places avoid interaction to prevent it from happening. Either way, the result is little to no social interaction. The respondents’ experience, however, supports the finding of Lewis (2006) that antisocial behaviour is practised by young, low-educated people and by those with alcohol and drug dependencies.

Hence, the experiences of most respondents in this area may explain their limited interaction with Scots and other ethnic groups. Although other factors, too, may play a considerable role.

**Transnational Activities**

Migrants’ transnational activities are their social interaction with “family, loved ones, kin, community, ethnic groups or fellow nationals wherever they may be” (Mohan, 2002:132). These activities may play crucial roles in maintaining or changing migrants’ GNs. Therefore, networks in the home country are expected to maintain GNs, while the effect of those in other states will depend on social context. However, as only a few respondents mention contact
networks in countries other than Sudan, we limit our focus to transnational activities with networks in Sudan.

All respondents mentioned having frequent contact with their networks back home. Besides following the news on social media, they use different software applications to communicate with individuals or groups about local and private issues. Their most regular and frequent contact is with family members, which is integral to their daily lives. As well as exchanging news and remittances, they involve them in their everyday lives in Glasgow and decisions on personal issues. It is illustrated by the examples that follow.

(i) Routine Communication

During the interview, all the respondents mentioned using WhatsApp daily to interact with their networks in Sudan. For example, Huda:

This communication was not accessible in our first years. Telephone calls were expensive. We used Yahoo messenger, but the internet service in Sudan was terrible. Now we call my in-laws every Friday, and I call my sister daily.

Nuha admits that:

The first and last thing I do in my day is to check WhatsApp. Sometimes I get news before the others in the same house.

Women whose husbands work at night chat with family and friends back home. As Fatima commented:

I don’t know how I would survive those long nights without WhatsApp! I spend all my nights chatting with my sisters and friends.

Communication technology, however, is not accessible to everyone, and internet coverage remains limited in Sudan, particularly in rural areas and small towns, as Lutfi describes:

The internet is not accessible in my town. I was able to exchange messages but not chat. They read them at midnight and reply. Sometimes I call my parents to hear their voices, as both have traditional mobile phones.

Hence, the frequency of communication may limit respondents’ local networking and act to maintain their GNs; Assuming, that is, GNs do not change in Sudan.
(ii) Remittances

Remittances are an essential factor in maintaining and strengthening transnational bonds. They play a crucial role in regular communication. Except for two women, all the respondents remit at least once a month to their families. As a minimum, this involves discussion to let the family know they have been sent and for the family to acknowledge receipt. However, there is more communication when circumstances (illness, loan, events) require it. Suha sees remittances as an essential part of communication with her in-laws:

They always ask for money; whenever you call, they complain and ask for money;

Sometimes remittances become a source of negative communication, particularly between women and their in-laws, as in Shadia’s case:

They always ask for more; his father even talked with me when my husband was unemployed and could only remit a small amount from the benefits. He thought I prevented my husband from remitting.

Indeed, remittances often cause dispute and discussion; as Aziza notes:

We are always in conflict because of the remittances. The conflict extended to our families. He doesn’t only remit for the family’s necessities but also for his sisters’ families and luxurious items. He never tells me how much he sends, but my mother and sisters tell me—he is my cousin.

Remittances generate considerable transnational communication, which involves more than purely financial discussion. It maintains cultural issues such as who should remit and for what expenses. For example, two women do not remit to their families because a woman should not support her natal family with her husband’s money, as Dalia notes:

Sometimes I send them gifts, but they tell me, “You are dependent, so you don’t need to send them to us.”

Thus, remittance-sending maintains GNs by which men are considered breadwinners and women homemakers.
(iii) Family Affairs

Here, family affairs are marriage and divorce. In Sudan, families are involved in making decisions about them, and the Sudanese in Glasgow sustain this norm across the borders. Families in Sudan are directly involved in selecting their sons’ wives. They choose the woman and then discuss their choice with him; as Soliman relates:

> I plan to get married within a year. My family is helping me in the search for a suitable woman. When they find her, they will tell me about her and her family and send a photo; if I accept, they will proceed.

Another example is Dalia, whose husband saw her in a wedding party video and told his family that he would like to marry her. His family agreed and communicated with her to gain their approval; once this was granted, Dalia chatted with her future husband (via WhatsApp) until they were married. Shadia, too, got to know her now ex-husband via social media and joined him in Glasgow after they married.

The strength of this norm is illustrated by Suha, who met her husband in Glasgow, where she lives with her natal family. Even so, her uncles in Sudan investigated her husband’s family and reputation there and exchanged visits to get to know them before they gave their consent. It was only then that the Glasgow wedding process was finalised. Another case in which transnational interaction played an essential role was the marriage of Dalia’s husband to his second wife, as she narrates:

> We have a perfect relationship; he respects me and discusses everything with me. His cousin lives near us. He thinks the woman should traditionally respect her husband and [that my husband should] not consult me. Because I couldn’t conceive in the first year of marriage, he told my father-in-law that I dominated my husband, that he provided whatever I wanted, and that I misused his money. He roused him against me and suggested my husband marry another woman who could sustain the family name. He also encouraged my husband to get married to have children.

His family chose a woman for him and arranged the marriage; I knew nothing. On the wedding day, my mother got to know about it by chance and called me to blame me that I didn’t tell her. It was a shock for me, and my father [who was in a third country] was angry and insisted on a divorce. My husband also felt sad at my sadness and wanted to divorce his new wife, but his family insisted on continuing and said to him,
“We started the process, so don’t fail us in the community.” So, he couldn’t divorce her.

In this case, considerable transnational communication took place between Dalia’s husband, his cousin and their families in Sudan, while it also involved cross-border (across three countries) communication between Dalia and her parents. Shadia’s divorce, too, took considerable transnational communication after her ex-husband disappeared without notice and her family located him in Sudan. Although he refused to divorce her, she involved her family and was eventually able to convince them of her decision. She then travelled to Sudan to initiate a court case against him to receive a divorce. As these examples show, families are often involved in cases of conflict across borders.

Traditionally, in Sudan, couples seek their families’ mediation to resolve disputes they cannot settle, and Sudanese in Glasgow continue this norm. As Shadia said:

> When I involved my family, I told them I had given him [her husband] all I could, but he didn’t respect me; I had nothing more for him. His mother also became involved and told him to agree to divorce, but he refused. My family tried to mediate between us, but I insisted on my opinion. So, they told him to divorce since she insisted.

Thus, the divorce process took place across borders. Similarly, Madeena’s situation led to conflict between the families of her and her husband in Sudan:

> The conflict extended to our families in Sudan. My mother was worried about me because I didn’t call her for a long time, and when they called me, they couldn’t get through because my phone was locked. So, they started to argue with his family about what their son had done to me. One day I called my sister in the Gulf and learned about this problem, and then I called my mother. I told her about the domestic violence I had experienced and what I had done [initiated a policy case], but she disagreed with what I had done. I didn’t tell her how I had been suffering; therefore, she didn’t support me. My husband told his family everything in addition to many lies. Thus, his family believed him because they wanted his remittances and to please him, so he continued remitting. Consequently, I decided to withdraw my case. I don’t want to cause a problem for my family. His family can talk negatively about me, harming my entire family.
This case also involved discussion across the borders of three countries, and a problem in Glasgow extended to include both families in Sudan. Furthermore, to avoid escalating the conflict between the families, Madeena retracted her statement and remained with her abusive husband to protect her family’s reputation in Sudan. Thus, the dispute was resolved in line with Sudanese values, reinforcing the respondents’ GNs but jeopardising women’s rights in Glasgow.

**Number of Children:** In Sudan, having children is a family issue and parents often—although this now happens less—motivate their children to have more. In some cases, this continues to occur across borders; as Huda notes:

> My in-laws are civilised and never interfered in our family affairs, but my mother and sisters wanted me to have more children.

Similarly, although Laila’s in-laws did not discuss how many children she should have with her, her sister convinced her to have more than the two she had planned to increase her security when she was older. Lubna, too, who couldn’t conceive in the first year of marriage, said that:

> My mother and her sisters constantly nag me about pregnancy. They suspect that I do not want to have children. Though I told them the truth [a health problem] and asked them not to ask me again, they continued nagging until I became pregnant.

Infertility or a delay in having children is a big concern for both families, particularly the wives, because it may lead to divorce or polygamy. For example, Soliman, whose wife is infertile, described the pressure he faces:

> My family want to have children to expand the family; I am the oldest son, and they press me to get married again, but I don’t want to.

The experience of Dalia—a victim of both traditions in Sudan and the health services in Glasgow—was similar. When she had not become pregnant within the first six months of marriage, her family and in-laws started to nag her and advised her to see a doctor. She saw her GP, but protocols prevent referral to a gynaecologist before the third year of marriage.
When she eventually saw a gynaecologist, the issue was not severe, and after a course of tablets, she became pregnant. However, her husband had already married a second wife following pressure from his family in Sudan.

Generally, all the respondents had discussed the issue of having children—and how many to have—with family or friends in Sudan. This indicates that it is an issue for the extended family rather than the couples alone. Furthermore, it sustains the norm of having a large number of children.

Social Images: Most respondents, particularly the males, are keen to maintain a positive social image in Sudan. For example, group interviews often mentioned that some men tried to prove their solid financial status to their networks in Sudan (page 265). Similarly, Ali and Mohammed both hide the fact that they work as a cook because it is not acceptable in their families’ culture; while Nadia’s husband spends his time improving his qualifications at the expense of his family, as she explains:

*My husband had experienced humiliation in his workplace in Sudan. Therefore, he struggles to improve his qualifications to compensate for this negative experience and prove that he is in a better situation. Unfortunately, all this is at my expense; I have to stay home and not develop myself throughout the five years we have been in Glasgow.*

Hence, maintaining a positive social image can have a negative impact on GNs. The desire to maintain a solid financial appearance increased demand for remittances and men’s control over resources, which led to cases such as that of Nadia, who could not access the resources that may have helped her improve her GNs.

To sum up, transnational interactions are essential to the respondents' everyday lives, who discuss major and minor issues with their families and often implement their suggestions. The relationship may thus play an essential role in maintaining GNs.
7.6 Conclusion

The chapter examined the Sudanese social interactions in Glasgow and the international arena and how these may affect their GNs. It showed that the Sudanese have relatively strong social relations among themselves, although weaker than those they had in Sudan. They spend their time at home, work or in public places that allow little contact with other cultures. In general, women have better social contact with different cultures than men, who have minimal contact with other ethnic groups beyond exchanging greetings. A few women utilise children and food as facilitating tools to establish contact with other ethnic groups, although mostly with people with some cultural similarity (Muslim and Arabic speakers). Even fewer have limited contact with senior Scottish women or other non-Arabic speakers. Generally, the type and frequency of respondents’ networking have a low propensity to impact GNs.

Exploring these outcomes further revealed they are due to a combination of intersections of the three conversion factors. However, GNs as individual and social conversion factors, together with transnational activities (remittances and networking) and antisocial behaviours, have a high potential to restrict respondents’ social interaction and sustain their GNs. The following chapter will reveal how the respondents’ local and transnational experiences impact their GNs at the household level.
CHAPTER EIGHT

NEGOTIATION OF GENDER NORMS IN THE DOMESTIC SPHERE

8.1 Introduction

This project assesses progress towards GE in a migration context. This chapter crowns the project by exploring migration’s impact on progress toward GE. Specifically, it examines whether the respondents’ agency has improved and enabled them to choose the GNs they value. The best place to test this is the private sphere, as the home is the primary location for organising gender relations and the site where gender hierarchies and differences are reproduced and maintained (Glenn, 1999).

Progress towards GE is assessed through consideration of three dimensions: power-sharing (head-of-household and decision-making), labour sharing (homemaker/breadwinner), and resource sharing (control over financial resources and remittances). These cover most parameters in the literature related to GE and women’s empowerment (Donald et al., 2017, 2020; Jennings et al., 2014; Kabeer, 1999). Hence, the chapter comprises three main sections, each discussing one of the three dimensions.

8.2 Migration and Authority Sharing

One approach to estimating dominance in gender relations is investigating authority sharing between women and men to determine who has more power. Looking at the head-of-household and strategic decision-making, this section examines the power relationship that underpins the respondents' GNs and identifies the impact of migration. Besides considering interaction in the Glasgow context, it considers the education and age variation of the respondents and their spouses as the literature shows the importance of authority distribution within the household (Bertocchi et al., 2012).
8.2.1 Head-of-household

This sub-section examines whether men’s authority as head-of-household in Sudan has changed. The findings indicate that being head-of-the-household is a male responsibility. Fatima summarises this responsibility:

*He provides for us, and we seek his consent for everything we do or do not do.*

While Suha adds:

*He is the symbol of the family and represents it in the community. He attends the parents’ meetings and community meetings and is contacted for any official or communal work.*

There is a consensus that head-of-household responsibilities comprise four main duties: provider, decision-maker, primary contact, and family symbol. Furthermore, all respondents use masculine articles (he/ his) to describe the head-of-household, indicating that this is the typical sex of the person who assumes the role. Zainab, for example, believes her lone son—but the youngest child—is the head-of-household:

*Since God created the world, men have been the head-of-household. Hence, I brought him up to be the head-of-household. Now he has the final word as if we were in Sudan. It is his natural position.*

Haytham, too, agrees:

*None of the Sudanese men would accept to be led by their wife, whether here or in Sudan. It is our tradition and natural role; we should hold it.*

However, while none of the respondents argues that women should be head-of-household, a few, such as Ahmed, argue that the role should be shared:

*I disagree with the concept that the head-of-household should be the husband or the wife; instead, it should be shared. For example, my wife perfectly performs the head-of-household role in the Sudanese perception. However, she is not the head of the household, and we share the responsibility. The employed one takes the financial responsibility without jeopardising the right of the other in decision-making.*
A few women, such as Laila, also consider the role should be equally shared. However, Lubna, who considers herself the head of her natal family, shares the responsibility with her husband in her household, though he is unemployed. It seems, then, that women accept having power over their brothers, but not over their husbands.

Indeed, no respondent considered a female to be head-of-household unless there was no male in the family. Even the widowed Zainab, mentioned above, educated her youngest son to fulfil the role, while Lubna and Laila, who assumed the primary provider’s role and shared decision-making with their husbands, did not consider themselves head-of-household and considered it a shared responsibility. These findings indicate that the ideology that lies behind the role is deep-rooted. Furthermore, the duties that pertain to being head-of-household assemble all the power in the hands of the men; that a provider is a man implies that the homemaker is a woman, while the decision-maker employs control over resources.

Although fulfilling all four features describes the ideal head-of-household, in reality, fulfilling one is enough for a man to assume the role, as Adil’s statement makes clear:

Though we share decision-making, I am still the head-of-household and the provider.

Similarly, Nadia, who had experienced conflict with her husband over financial resources control; accordingly, the benefits being transferred to her account instead of his, said:

He does not contribute to the family income, but he is still the head-of-household because he does the external communications.

For Adil, being the provider is more important than being the sole decision-maker. In contrast, failing to provide has not excluded Nadia’s husband from being head-of-household since, for example, he attends the parents’ meetings.

Findings also show that variation in age and education between spouses has no impact on the role of the head-of-household. For example, Nadia has a lower education and is 12 years
younger than her husband, while Adil has a lower education and is one year older than his wife. These examples reflect the general situation in the sample, considering that 86% of the females have education levels equal to or higher than their husbands, and 81% are younger than their husbands by six years or more.

8.2.2 Sharing of Decision-Making Power

Participation in decision-making is used to gauge power-sharing in the household as an indicator of GE. Concerning theory, scholars offer a review of the literature that has modelled the decision-making process within families from the unitary model to cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models. The unitary model assumes that household members pool resources and that preferences are either treated as homogeneous or the husband’s preferences determine resource allocation. Non-cooperative models assume independent actions by both spouses, while the cooperative model posits direct negotiation between spouses, whereby outcomes depend on the relative bargaining power. However, empirical studies suggest that most households do not fully pool income, and spousal preferences are often not homogeneous. Hence, resources are allocated according to the husbands’ and wives’ relative intra-household decision-making authority (Browning et al., 2014; Himmelweit et al., 2013). Decision-making authority is determined by personal and social (family and community) conversion factors. As Bertocchi and colleagues argue, the probability of the wife being in charge is affected by household characteristics and, more importantly, by differences between her and her husband’s attributes in terms of age, education, and income (Bertocchi et al., 2012).

This sub-section examines migration's impact on gendered participation in household decision-making to gain a sense of change in gender power relations. The research found heterogeneity in the sharing of decision-making that was not explained by the individual factors under consideration. For example, though most respondents mention sharing decision-making with their spouses, further digging reveals variation. Although a few women and men state they make decisions by discussing the positive and negative sides of the subject first, the final word often belongs to the husband. For example, Laila, who states she shares the head-of-household role, explains the decision-making process thus:
All decisions are discussed as a family [including the children]. I am more flexible than him. For example, we discuss the issue, and I defend my opinion, but if I can’t convince him, I will not insist. I don’t like minor issues to be a reason for conflicts. He always insists on his opinion. He tries to discuss things with us and pretends that he will consider our views, but in the end, he does what he thinks is right without consideration of our opinions. I always say to him, “You have spurious democracy.”

In this, Laila’s husband is not unique; most men believe the Sudanese saying: “المرأة لو فأس ما ينكسر رأس” , ‘If the woman were an axe, she could not destroy the head’ [as the head contains the brain, it is a symbol of the belief in women’s low decision-making ability]. The examples of Haroon:

We discuss everything, whether small or large. Often, we agree; otherwise, I decided I am the head-of-the-household;

And Omer:

If we disagree, she respects me and accepts my opinion even if she is not happy,

show that either there is no bargaining or, if there is, that women’s bargaining power is low.

Furthermore, lack of negotiation is seen as a sign of respect for husbands, as Zainab’s words show:

My husband never consulted me, and I accepted whatever he did—a good wife always says “Yes” to her husband.

This attitude is essential to the social image of both women and men. Indeed, most women’s attitudes are similar to that of Zainab; even those who attempt to negotiate said ‘yes’ in the end. For example, Fatima:

We don’t discuss everything. We discuss only the large and serious issues such as buying a house [...]. If we disagree, we—the women—always capitulate, but the men never do. They consider they know everything. All the Sudanese men are like that.
The women are not satisfied with the decision-making mechanism, but they have no power to change it. Therefore, they avoid arguing because it leads to conflict, as Laila (above) experienced and Shadia, too:

*He has never consulted me. He always does what he wants without even telling me; I just come to learn everything in the end, and I don’t dare to give my opinion; otherwise, it would lead to a big conflict.*

Some women, however, are able to manipulate their husbands or to use diplomacy to achieve their goals, as ‘M’ (she, group1) argued; and a few, such as Lubna, do share decision-making equally:

*We continue our discussion logically; one must convince the other. It doesn’t create problems because the disagreement is not on fundamental issues and doesn’t harm others. We respect each other’s opinions, and the decision should be for the benefit of both of us as a unit.*

There is no evidence of men’s decision-making process changing due to migration. As Ali explained:

*We, as Easterners, could never change at once; I still do things without consulting her.*

In contrast, some women felt disempowered and that they had lost the decision-making participation they enjoyed in their natal families; as Shadia describes:

*I grew up in a gender-egalitarian family. My mother is the eldest, and still, my uncles consult her on the shared issues. Similarly, she consults us on matters related to us. But my husband has a different attitude […] He treats me like a piece of furniture.*

This disempowerment may be explained by a lack of control over financial resources, as discussed in the following section, but first, we will explore women’s involvement in deciding how many children to have.
Preferred Number and Gender of Children

The decision on the number of children a couple wishes to have been essential in assessing power relations in household decision-making. A broad body of research demonstrates the association between women’s empowerment and reproductive outcomes, including contraceptive use, birth intervals and fertility (Boivin et al., 2018; Duvander et al., 2020; Mosha et al., 2013; Phan, 2015). Furthermore, there is a broad consensus that men strongly influence family size decisions. This sub-section deals with the decision around the number of children and gender preferences and how these are impacted by migration. Historically, it was normal for Sudanese families to have ten or more children, mainly sons, who represented an essential labour force and security for the family. However, this culture is changing, particularly in urban areas, where the average family size is estimated to be 5.9 (Esri, 2019), although this is still large compared to an average size of 2.15 in Scotland in the same year (NRS, 2019b).

Most respondents had not discussed the number of children and simply wanted to have as many as the wife could conceive. This failure to discuss the issue implies that it is taken for granted or that the decision lies in the hands of one person—generally, those of the husband. Soliman, for example, wants to have ten children and stated that although he could accept his wife’s opinion if she wanted more, he couldn’t if she wanted less. Most women also want to have many children, as Shaza’s words illustrate:

“I want as many children as possible, and so does my husband; we have not discussed it, but this is our culture.”

Culture is cited as the main reason for having a high number of children, particularly by those who are lone children or who have few siblings themselves; as Tariq:

“I want ten children. I haven’t asked her [his wife], but she would agree because she knows I’m an only child.”

However, there is no evidence as to whether the women would agree to this number of children or—if they disagree—of their feelings about polygamy, although Randa, who only wants one child, stated that if her husband disagreed:

“It is not up to him; it is my own body.”
A few other women also wished to have fewer children (3-5), although this figure remains high compared to the average size of families in Glasgow.

The attitude of the Sudanese men towards having children is diverse. If the wife has a fertility issue, some, such as Mahdy and Omer, who have been married for over ten years without having children, accept their situation. In contrast, for others, having children is essential to the security of the marriage. Dalia’s husband, for example, married a second wife when Dalia had not conceived after one year of marriage. Many respondents mention that children are essential for their parents’ security, although this is starting to change. As Sufian, who has been married for more than 15 years without having children, says:

*When my mother nags me about having children to help me when I get old, I challenge her because I haven’t supported her.*

The decision on the number of children is also complicated by gender preferences. As Suha explains:

*My husband wanted six boys when we were newly married; girls are not counted. So, I have to continue giving birth until the boys become six, regardless of how many girls I have in between them.*

Indeed, as discussed in chapter 5, most respondents would prefer to have boys. (See 5.4.3 above). Following the move to Glasgow, gender preference changed in two cases. That of Suha:

*I wanted girls, but now I am not strong enough to have girls. Girls need mothers’ support even after getting married, but boys soon become independent. Therefore, I would like to have four boys.*

And Harron:

*Before we had our daughter, I wanted a son, but the situation is different here. I see no difference between girls and boys.*

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63 Although, as in the case of Sufian whose mother lives in a European country, this change may be limited to those who live in welfare-providing countries.
Just as Harron recognises the cultural variation between Glasgow and his community in Sudan, Adil, too, shows some adaptability to the Glasgow setting and flexibility in considering his wife’s opinion:

I have not discussed it with her [his wife], but I think she wants two. Women generally don’t want to have many children, but we are not European; two are very few in the Sudanese culture. So, I think having a number between the two cultures is suitable.

Although the sustainability of these changes was not assessed, the variable nature suggests a high likelihood of sustainability; and the continuation of those respondents to appreciate a smaller number of children than what they wish to have before emigration.

To conclude, there is a slight variation in the respondents’ beliefs regarding head-of-household. These beliefs have not been affected by migration experiences regardless of the respondents’ gender, age, education and length of stay in Glasgow. The head-of-household’s duties assemble all the power in the hands of the men, regardless of their relative education or age or their position in the family (husband/ son/ brother). A slight change was observed among a few respondents around decision-making sharing and the desired number and sex of children, which is a sign of the impact of migration. Although a contrasting change, in which some women felt disempowered in Glasgow due to the loss of the shared decision-making they had enjoyed in their natal families, is not fully explained by migration; instead, variation in the couple’s gender ideologies plays a considerable role. That is, the data fail to reveal a specific trend of impact related to the variables under consideration or variations in age and education level between spouses indicates the strength of the respondents’ gender ideologies.

8.3 Migration and Labour Sharing

Gender, as a social construction, comes with a set of expectations for women and men. For instance, as mothers, women are expected to be nurturers, and, as fathers, men are expected to be providers (Townsend, 2002). As women worldwide started to dismantle this legacy by assuming paid jobs, their increasing access to these jobs, particularly in the North, has generated heated debate in the academic community about the effects of this societal restructuring on GNs. The focus has been on the division of paid and unpaid work between
couples from equality and/or equity angles; whether the advancement women have achieved in the public sphere is paralleled in the domestic sphere; and in what ways, and to what extent, the stability of marriage is affected (Chesters, 2012; Iturrate & Dominguez-Folgueras, 2018; Ridgeway, 2011). Throughout my observations in homes and informal interactions in the Sudanese community in Glasgow, it was notable that, other than in a small number of cases, the homemaker role was women’s and that of provider was men’s. This section explores the respondents’ experience in the division of labour. It comprises two sub-sections; the first is devoted to provisioning choice, and the second is home-chore sharing.

8.3.1 Breadwinner Choice

In chapter six, we found that almost all the men were active in the labour-market, while the reverse was true for most women. This section explores the labour-market engagement choice and provision status within the household. The human capital theory states that individuals consider what is best for overall household utility, and couples divide household labour based on who is best at which job, including paid employment (Dalmia & Sicilian, 2008). However, comparing the respondents’ education levels and employment statuses reveals that almost all the women are either equal to or better qualified than their spouses; nonetheless, most are not economically active.

The three employed women possess similar education levels to their spouses, two of whom (those of Laila and Lubna) were not employed, and the third (Huda’s) was recently retired. However, this situation is due to the labour-market mechanism rather than choice. Both Laila and Lubna view themselves as the household’s breadwinner and that it is normal for them to assume this role. Furthermore, since her graduation Lubna has considered herself the primary provider for her natal family in Sudan—a responsibility she believes is normal as her family’s eldest child (regardless of sex). In contrast, Laila assumed the provider position for the first time in Glasgow and feels it is normal to provide pocket money for her husband:

*I think this is a normal situation. One day he was the provider, and I took my pocket money from him. Now, the situation has reversed, and I want to do as he did.*
Although Laila possessed a gender-egalitarian attitude before emigration, her provider attitude is unusual in Sudan—as was confirmed by the focus groups of both sexes, in which there was consensus that in Sudan. However, women’s income may be additional support for the family; men are the primary breadwinners. Huda, who was employed for the first time in Glasgow and provided for the family while her husband was a student, confirmed this. Even when he was a student, she did not consider herself the breadwinner and gave her salary to him—because he was the provider—to add to the savings he brought with him. However, once her husband got a job, she regained control over her salary:

As the head-of-household and provider, my husband pays all the expenses from the mortgage to the bread; I pay nothing.

Huda’s view—of breadwinning as a male task and homemaking as a female one—was shared among all the respondents, regardless of employment status.

Traditionally, Sudanese women do not marry men who are equally or less qualified than they are. However, this norm has been dismantled by the war and its consequences, including youth death and emigration (as our sample, in which 63% of the females have higher qualifications than their husbands), makes clear (see page 120). Indeed, most unemployed women possess university degrees while their husbands have secondary school certificates or less. That most respondents choose for the husband to be employed, albeit in the informal sector, is thus not only due to the labour-market mechanism discussed in chapter six but to the belief that men are—and should be—the breadwinner. Although a few women, for example, Ibtisam, are happy to share the responsibility with their husbands:

Now he provides for us; similarly, if I work, we will pool the incomes and use them together because we are one unit.

The majority, such as Fatima’s view it as a male task:

The man is responsible for providing for the family, and the woman is responsible for her house. We give them the shopping list; if they provide it, they will find home a paradise.
Aziza’s words, which reveal she views women’s income as supplementary, further confirm this:

If I had income, I would not use it on necessary home expenses like food; I wouldn’t help him unless it was an emergency; this is his responsibility.

A similar attitude is found among women whose marriage is not registered and receives social benefits as single mothers. For example, Suha, a single mother of two who receives social benefits, said:

My husband pays for the food and the children’s needs and entertainment; this is his responsibility;

Similarly, does Shaza:

I receive mine and child benefits and completely control them […] My husband pays for everything except the rent because I receive housing benefits and council tax. So, I fulfil my responsibility as a wife and mother; he should do his duty as the provider and head-of-the-family.

Neither woman, then, considers social benefit as part of household income. Generally, income is understood as wages only, and benefits are viewed as a gift from the government; husbands are still expected to fulfil the provider role.

Most men either have similar or lower qualifications than their wives but, regardless of this, see themselves as the breadwinners; employment was hence their choice, and almost all of them were economically active. For instance, although Adil’s wife gained a Master’s in Glasgow, their respective employment was not open to negotiation:

I am still the head-of-household and the provider; let her fulfil her natural role and enlarge the family.

Similarly, Haytham’s wife, who possesses a similar education level to him but who, as a computer professional who grew up and gained a degree in the UK, has better employment opportunities, has never been economically active. Haytham explains this through a gendered division of labour which understands breadwinning as a male role:
She has to fulfil her primary role first; when her child gets a place in the nursery, she will be pregnant with the second and so forth. In this way, she wouldn’t have time for employment.

Regardless of the reasoning, there is thus consensus among the men, even the single ones, that breadwinning is a male role and that, if a woman does have an income, it should not be used to provide the daily essentials. As Soliman states:

*I am responsible for providing for the family; I will pay for everything. [If my wife were to have an income], it is hers; she could use it on whatever she wants. Of course, it is up to her if she wants to buy anything for the house I can’t afford, but I would not ask her to do that.*

Many men agree that they would only accept their wives spending their own income to “buy things for her home”, as Omer describes:

*I am the provider, it is my responsibility, and I don’t accept the support of my wife as I didn’t accept the support of my sisters. If she wants to buy something for her home, it is up to her, but I will not ask her to purchase anything.*

Indeed, the use of female income seemed to have a negative impact on some respondents’ sense of manhood. Ahmed, for example, had been dependent on his wife for an extended period but had just found an informal job:

*This job has improved my spiritual health and self-esteem and motivated me to live. I feel I am doing something useful; it helps me to fulfill my role as provider and head-of-the-household. I used to take my petty cash from my wife; sometimes, I couldn’t buy everything I needed. Anyhow, I have now relieved my wife of the financial burden.*

Thus, even a marginal, informal job is viewed as more dignified than dependence on his wife. However, this feeling is not shared by those, such as Lutfi, who depend on benefits received by their (single) wives:

*I received a bursary from the college for one person because I am registered as single. My wife receives all the benefits for her and the children. Usually, we use my money first, then hers. I feel normal taking from her money because it is social benefits for the family and not her wage.*
This attitude is confirmed by Adil:

My wife receives all the benefits, but I have her bank card. I use the benefit first. It is usually enough for our living; we save my income. Yes, in Sudan, men don’t use their wives’ money, but this is not her money; it is a benefit from the government.

In contrast to the women (for example, the cases of Suha and Shaza on the previous page), the men consider benefits to be part of income and, therefore, that they can be used for essential items. As a result, questions in the focus groups around benefits and their relation to the provider role often took an exciting direction that the researcher had not intended, with discussion focusing on whether men provide for their family (thereby indicating that “provider” is viewed as a male role). Women agreed that in Glasgow, men do not provide for their families as they would in Sudan. As ‘N’ (female, group 1) explained:

Men do not work and provide for the family as in Sudan. They work part-time in informal jobs and send their income to Sudan while using benefits to provide for their families. Though it is in their accounts, it is not their money; each household member has a share. They did nothing more than withdraw it from the bank machine.

Indeed, in the later focus group meeting, ‘N’ would respond to ‘K’, who viewed benefits as men’s right as the primary migrants, while the women had just been brought by them:

The Queen provides child benefits, so the Queen is the provider, not the husband.

The rest of the group liked the statement and expressed strong agreement. Meanwhile, in the male focus groups, it was noticeable that men would avoid talking about wage-earning and focus instead on how some men provided little to their families due to, for example, addiction to alcohol or gambling. However, probing revealed that most consider the benefits part of their income. For example, ‘K’ (group 2) argued:

It is not easy to find work. Therefore, unemployed people are entitled to the benefits. Because men are the breadwinners, it is part of their income.

The difference in women’s and men’s perceptions of benefits, and the conflict that ensues, will be discussed more fully in the financial management section.
Except for a small number of women, the data show that the breadwinner is a male role in both Sudan and Glasgow; the contribution employed females make either for secondary items or for items that facilitate the performing of their role as homemaker. Although a small number of women have assumed the breadwinner position due to Glasgow's labour market, this has not changed their perception of the provider role. The most challenging issue concerns what constitutes income and how it should be allocated, with social benefits being a particular source of confusion. In general, men receive benefits, which they consider as their income that can be allocated for essential household items; however, if the wife gets the benefits, the husband still expects to control and allocate them on the grounds that it is not their wife’s wage. In contrast, the women view benefits as government support for the family and believe that husbands should continue providing for the family and household necessities from their wages.

8.3.2 Migration and Domestic Labour Sharing

Intense academic attention has been paid to the sharing of domestic work by employed couples and its impact on the health of the marriage relationship (Iturrate & Domínguez-Folgueras, 2018), on the gender segregation of domestic work (Blair & Lichter, 1991), and fertility choice (Kan et al., 2019). The literature shows that although men have started to share house-chores, women still assume the lion’s share (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016; Forste & Fox, 2012; Sayer, 2005). However, this consensus has been broken by a recent study from Norway that shows women with better market productivity out-earn their husbands and carries out fewer home-chores (Onozaka & Hafzi, 2018). Calasanti and Bailey summarise the explanation of a couple’s domestic work-sharing into three non-mutually exclusive scenarios: (1) time constraint, in which the division of household labour is explained as a result of competition from women’s and men’s other time commitments; (2) relative resources approach, which views the spouse with the most resources as doing the least housework; (3) gender ideology approach, which considers that men and women with egalitarian attitudes will have a more equal division of labour than those with traditional values (Calasanti & Bailey, 1991: 35-6).
As discussed in chapter 5, home-chores are women’s tasks in Sudan. This sub-section explores whether the context of Glasgow has affected the respondents’ sharing of such tasks. Although the issue was addressed through open-ended questions, all the respondents focused on cooking, cleaning, and washing-up rather than shopping, washing, and ironing.

### 8.3.3 Migration and Change in the Sharing of Home-Chores

In the UK, although women still carry out the lion’s share of home-chores, the time they spend on cooking has declined, while that of men has risen. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that men cook regularly. Like other developed countries, the UK has experienced a rapid change in eating habits. Over the last few decades, people have increasingly chosen to eat outside the home or to buy ready-prepared or pre-cooked food (Wolfson et al., 2016: 150-1). However, this habit has not been adopted by the Sudanese, who continue to cook and eat their traditional food. It should also be noted that the preparation of Sudanese food requires skill and is time-consuming, particularly when carried out in conjunction with all the other home-chores. This section explores whether and how the respondents share these tasks.

#### 8.3.3.1 Women and the Sharing of Home-Chores

None of the women, except for Laila and Randa, had any experience sharing home-chores with males in Sudan. Randa grew up in a gender-egalitarian family and, since childhood, had learnt to share home-chores with her brothers\(^64\), which suggests attitudes are perhaps changing in the new generations. However, this transition also exists amongst older generations, such as Laila, who grew up in a traditional family but started to share home-chores with her husband when she got married:

> We have shared home-chores since we get married. My husband used to do all types of home-chores in his natal family. Therefore, we shared the chores almost 50-50. He can do any task, but he likes cooking more than cleaning. He doesn’t define the job as a women’s task; he just does the tasks he enjoys.

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\(^64\) Gender egalitarianism in this sample does not coincide with class. For example, Laila’s husband, along with the other men who shared home-chores before marriage, are from a lower class; Huda, who makes a clear demarcation between the roles of provider and homemaker, is from a higher class; and Randa, Lubna and Laila, who all share more gender-egalitarian attitudes, are from the middle class.
As the case above indicates, the spouse’s gender ideology considerably impacts home-chores sharing. Although Laila’s husband is exceptional, he is certainly not unique; other men in the study describe experiences of helping their mothers. (A point we will return to.)

In Glasgow, most women continue to perform home-chores almost as they would have in Sudan, in addition to other tasks such as shopping and accompanying the children to and from nursery/school, the GP, sport/leisure activities and health visitors. They also miss the support they received in Sudan from the women in their kinship or neighbourhood. However, in Glasgow, some receive occasional help from their husband with hoovering, cleaning the toilet, ironing or washing up and—very rarely—cooking.

For women, neither employment nor the existence of good social networks has influenced the sharing of home-chores, as the case of Huda (employed and with good networks with different ethnic groups) illustrates:

*When I come home, I have to do all the home-chores and the shopping; it is my primary duty. Now that my children [two boys] are grown up and employed, I still fulfil my responsibility as a woman. I have a home assistant who comes once a week to clean the house and iron.*

Although Huda lives with three men (her husband and two sons), rather than getting support from them, she hires another woman—who, as further emphasis that home-chores are her responsibility, she pays from her own salary—to assist her. Other women, such as Lubna, are reluctant to receive help from their husband, even if he is unemployed:

*My husband is supportive and wants to help, but he can’t because he doesn’t know how. I don’t allow him to assist in the kitchen because I have been used to doing everything since I was in Sudan, and he has no experience as a typical Sudanese man.*

Despite both women having attended higher education in the UK and employment, neither has witnessed a change in sharing home-chores. Neither their access to resources (education and a wage) nor their contact with other cultures has had any impact. Moreover, neither the time constraint scenario nor that of relative resources can explain this, particularly in the case
of Lubna, whose husband is unemployed. There remains gender ideology, a suggestion that is borne out by Huda’s use of terms such as “primary duty” and “responsibility as a woman”. Similarly, Lubna describes how she is used to doing the home-chores alone, which indicates the GNs among which she grew up. That their spouses—who have made no effort to change or to insist on participating—share this ideology is clear. Indeed, it has even been passed on to Huda’s children who grew up in Glasgow, indicating how deep-rooted the gendered division of labour is in their family.

The experiences of unemployed women with weak social contact are diverse. Although they all carry out the lion’s share of home-chores, some receive occasional support from their husbands; others struggle to get any at all; and some view the home as their kingdom, to be defended from male interference. For example, ‘F’ (group 1) argues that:

*My house is my kingdom. I want to work alone; I wouldn’t feel happy if he [her husband] shared it with me;*

Ibtisam, whose husband is a cook, expresses the same logic:

*I do all the home-chores, but he helps when we have visitors. I don’t accept that [he cooks at home], this is my work, and his work is at the restaurant. [If I were employed], I would do my home-chores before I went to work; I should do both.*

Furthermore, respondents such as Zainab have transferred this ideology to their children:

*I cook, and my daughter cleans and does the rest of the work. He [the son] does nothing at home, even his clothes. He throws them on the floor and later finds them washed and ironed.*

Regardless of variations in age, education level and migration length, the women continue to follow the common practice in Sudan, as ‘A’ (group 1) describes:

*The norms in Sudan are very unfair. Moreover, women are unreasonable with themselves and just want to do the same as their grandmothers. Even those who came here and knew that women have rights insist on holding on to their traditional culture. We are saying the same as our grandmothers said: “Men working in the kitchen is shameful or shows disrespect”, and so forth.*
Despite this, most women complain about the workload and lack of support. One extreme case (although certainly not rare within the Sudanese community) is provided by Nadia, whose husband is a postgraduate student and one of whose children, due to disability, needs assistance with most tasks:

The home-chores are not divided; I do everything. It is much work; we are a big family. I clean twice a day and wash up uncountable times. I have to cook different kinds of food every day because my children do not eat the same food my husband and I eat. My daughter, who is ill, eats exceptional food that I have to cook daily. One son sometimes eats out, and the other doesn’t eat the same food as his sisters, so I have to cook at least three things a day. I do the washing, but my elder son irons his clothes and cleans his room; he sometimes warms up his food. Sometimes my second daughter helps me with looking after her sister. My husband does nothing. He says it is not his duty, so he goes out at 7 am and returns at 6 pm to find his food ready; then, he lazes about in the house watching TV.

Another extreme case is that described by Madeena:

He has never helped with the home-chores; even after giving birth, he only supported me for the first two days. After that, I did everything alone until I became ill. He often has visitors, and they come at any time. So, I have to cook at any time. Sometimes, I carried my child on my back, so I could use my hands to chop onion, and the child cried, but he never helped. He believes that women have to do their job in whatever situation.

Although both women had low social contact, however, they received support from some insinuations that would change their lives; as Nadia narrates:

One day we met with those who helped us with her [their disabled daughter]. I told them I couldn’t wash her because she was fragile. They asked if I had someone to help me. My husband replied that he had helped me. It was not true, but I kept silent. When I came home and asked him to help me, he refused. So, immediately, I called the health visitor and arranged an appointment. I told her my husband didn’t help me and I did all the work alone. She called us for a meeting and said to him that he should be trained to take care of his daughter. They taught him, and now he helps me. I have rights, and I should claim them, as all women should; now I can leave her with him and go out and socialise. I am happy we are here; if we were in Sudan, he would never help me.

65 In line with the Sudanese taboo, after childbirth women should remain in bed for 40 days.
At the interview time, Madeena, too, was receiving support from The Red Cross and was in the process of divorcing her husband. However, most women do not have sufficient agency to access such support.

Some women do receive occasional support from their husbands, in the case, for example, of illness or visitors; others receive help but only as a tactic that allows the men to control the financial resources, as Shadia describes:

_He sometimes cooks—not to help me, but to control the expenditure._

Madeena, too, stated that her husband did the shopping not to help her but to control what she spent. In Sudan, shopping is mostly done by men or by children. In Glasgow, most men do the shopping from the _halal_ shops in the city centre, but women buy the daily consumables from local grocery shops. However, women like Nadia prefer to do all the shopping because their husbands do not buy all the items they list.

In summary, the women’s experiences do not reveal any impact from their social contact within and across ethnic groups. Some women, however, receive considerable support from state institutions that lead to a change in their gender relations. The following sub-section explores the experience of the men.

**8.3.3.2 Men and the Sharing of Home-Chores**

Almost none of the men had experienced sharing home-chores in Sudan. The few who had been as a result of unusual situations. For example, Ahmed explained that he learnt how to do the home-chores when he was young as his sisters got married and moved out of the house, and there was nobody else to help his mother. Although two other men describe similar experiences, it is not common in Sudan. Most families who do not have daughters get support from their kinship or neighbours. For example, Tariq, an only child, never helped with the home-chores because his cousin helped his mother instead. Other male participants
mentioned they had experienced doing home-chores, but by probing further, we found that they had rarely even fried eggs or made a cup of tea for themselves.

However, despite this, all the men had to do home-chores at some stage during their emigration period, before the arrival of their wives. Those who had had some experience before emigration, such as Lutfi, found it easy:

> I used to help my mother because I have no sisters. I helped a lot with cooking and cleaning. So, when I emigrated and had to make my food, I didn’t have a problem like the others. Also, I trained other Sudanese.

However, it was more of a challenge for those without any experience; as Tariq describes:

> I had never cooked in Sudan. I learnt cooking here; a friend of mine trained me. It is a challenging task; even cleaning and washing up are difficult. I realised this when I started to do it. Chopping the onion is the most challenging task; I don’t know how women do it daily.

Tariq went on to express regret for not helping his mother:

> She [his mother] did everything for my dad and me. So, I regret not helping her.

However, men ceased cooking as soon as their wives arrived, as Haroon narrates:

> When my wife comes, she does her job;

Haytham, who does not help with home-chores at all, agrees:

> In Sudan, the man never cooks or goes in the kitchen; we will continue doing the same here.

Those who are unmarried, such as Mohammed, also plan to maintain this culture:

> I will marry a woman from Sudan and not allow her to learn this country’s culture. She will have to do all the home-chores; I may help her with cleaning when she is pregnant, but not more.
Other men, however, help their wives. Lutfi, for example:

Since my wife arrived, she has done all the home-chores. However, I helped a lot. I am used to being in the kitchen, so I am always with her in the kitchen. I also do the cleaning, mainly difficult things like the bathroom.

Or Mahdy:

My wife does all the home-chores; I help her when we have visitors. However, she doesn’t like chopping chicken and fish; I always do it. Otherwise, she does all the work.

Although Lutfi helped his mother a lot in Sudan and enjoyed cooking before his wife arrived, he now helps her but does not share the home-chores equally. Similarly, Mahdy, who is employed as a cook, helps with other home-chores but never cooks at home. In contrast, Ahmed, whose wife is employed, does the lion’s share of the home-chores:

My wife works full-time, and she is tired when she returns. So, I do all the home-chores. Cooking takes a long time; therefore, I do it.

The data thus show some variation in the practice of home-chores. Most women and men consider it a female role, and although all the men performed home-chores at some stage during their migration, they ceased to do so after their wives arrived. Women complain about their workload in Glasgow, and about the loss of the help, they would have received from other women in Sudan. However, some males provide—and some women accept—support, which might represent a step towards sharing home-chores. A very few women are able to utilise the available services to compel their husbands to take part in home-chores. The next sub-section explores the sustainability of the changes that have taken place as a proxy for changes in perception around sharing home-chores.

8.3.3.3 Change in Attitudes Towards the Sharing of Home-Chores

The sharing of home-chores was energetically discussed in the focus groups. Some women argued that their husbands should support them; others disagreed. One illustrative case is that of ‘A’, who took part in group 1:
My husband doesn’t speak good English, so I do all the outside tasks. However, all tasks need English skills, and he can’t do it, so he should do the home-chores the days I am doing one of these tasks.

She then went on to reply to those who disagreed with her:

I can’t work both inside and outside; he has to do something. It is not my problem he can’t speak English, he came here before me, but he wants to work informally rather than learn English. If he can’t cook, he will have to order food. I think the man has to contribute to the household by working outside or inside. I disagree with you, “M”, that we must hold on to our traditions and that the man should not work in the kitchen. The situation here is different, and we do a lot of work that we didn’t do in Sudan, so they should also do things that they didn’t do in Sudan.

‘A’ is from a very conservative family. Although she was born and grew up in Khartoum, she could not go out, even to attend her study at the university, without a guardian. Although she was not happy with the situation, she was unable to change it, and it is this experience, I believe, that has made her more open to adapting to the setting of Glasgow. ‘A’ values egalitarian gender norms before emigration, and through building valuable social contact that has allowed her to acquire the necessary information, she has improved her agency and fought for her rights. Her example proves that considering Sen’s personal conversion factors is vital for understanding variation in change in GNs between individuals in the same setting.

Like the women, the members of the male focus groups did not all share the same opinion either. For example, some, such as ‘K’ (group 2), considered women’s workload in Glasgow to be higher than in Sudan, and that the men should help them:

Here, the situation is different; women have more tasks outside the home. It is shameful [for men] to do home-chores in our culture, but human beings can change with time and setting. It is not disgraceful to change. It is normal to cook here, and we cook when we are alone, so why should we see it as shameful to help when we get married?

66 She should not use the public transport, and a guardian accompanied her to and from the university
However, although most men agreed that it is acceptable to help with—but not share—the home-chores, some continued to insist that they are part of women’s natural role and that women should be capable of doing them whatever their situation: ‘E’, for example (group 5):

Women in Sudan have tough roles in their houses. They do more than most men. But here, women have a very sophisticated life; everything is done with electric equipment. By nature, women have strong bodies to carry out this work; whether pregnant, breastfeeding, caring for six children or whatever her situation, she can do the home-chores. So, when the man arrives at his home, he should find it as comfortable as heaven.

As the discussions within the focus groups made clear, home-chores’ perception as a female task is a deep-rooted cultural issue. Although most men agreed that occasional help was acceptable, they were clear that this was limited to the Glasgow setting and would cease if they returned to Sudan. As Soliman explained, this is due to the country's culture and availability of female labour.

Another excuse offered was that the women do not allow them to help, as Khalid argues:

I can cook, it would not be a problem for me, but the women in the family would not allow me to.

Although he is happy to help, he does not possess sufficient agency—or perhaps desire—to lead a change in his family, which indicates that little has changed in his ideology. However, he is not alone in this; many of the women, even having lived in the gender-egalitarian setting of Glasgow, agree that they would not allow their husbands to help them in Sudan, as ‘H’ (group 4) describes:

No, he would not do it; men help here because nobody sees them. If he did it in Sudan, people would consider him to be dominated by his wife, and no one would respect him.

Others, however, do not only refuse to help to save face in front of the community; simply being in Sudan is enough to return them to the practices of its culture, as ‘J’ (group 3) narrates:
My husband here makes his morning coffee and sometimes cooks, but he never comes near the kitchen in Sudan, even if we are alone. When we go to Sudan on holidays, we rent a flat and live alone; however, he waits for me to make him coffee when he gets up before me. When I told him that he used to make it in Glasgow, he replied, “I do it there but not here.” I can understand that he doesn’t want his family to see him in the kitchen, but we were alone!

Although most men confirmed that they would not help their wives with home-chores if they returned to Sudan, there were some exceptions, such as Tariq, who started to value women’s roles after he experienced doing home-chores for himself, and who stated that he would continue to do so if he returned to Sudan. Furthermore, he would not mind if his friends saw him cooking:

I don’t mind. I travelled a lot, suffered a lot, and learned from that, so they should learn from me.

Ali, too, when he stayed with his natal family in Sudan on holiday, cooked a pizza to prove to his brother that he could. However, he was happy that his father had not seen him:

If my father had seen me, it would have been a catastrophe. Fortunately, he never comes into the women’s area.

A catastrophe did occur, however, when his mother and sister saw him changing his baby’s nappy:

It became a big problem for my wife and me. They saw me doing something shameful; since then, they have disrespected my wife and me.

Indeed, the problem escalated to the extent that it ended with a breakdown in the relationship between his wife and his natal family. Hence, his example reveals the extent to which sustainability of change in GNs is conditioned by the norms of the family in Sudan.
In summary, nearly all the respondents confirm that home-chores are a female task, although there is some variation in practice. Few respondents had experienced sharing home-chores before emigration, but all the men had to do them at some point in Glasgow. However, this was due to circumstances rather than a change in gender ideology, and most did not continue to do so after the arrival of their wives. Despite variation in employment status, social network, education level, age and gender, most respondents follow the same practice concerning home-chores that they had in Sudan. The fact that some males provide support and some women accept it might represent a step towards more egalitarian GNs, although discussion in the focus groups would suggest that social image in Sudan is a barrier to lasting change. The few respondents who have made changes that they believe would last beyond the Glasgow setting and continue in Sudan have low education and no social contact; indeed, it seems to be their experience of how difficult cooking is, rather than either of these two factors, that lies behind the change.

8.4 Migration and Resources Sharing

Edwards (1981)\textsuperscript{67} distinguishes between financial control and financial management. The person who controls the budget can make spending decisions, while management is limited to implementing these decisions. Hence, control of the household budget bestows a more dominant position than its management. This section looks at the relative position of women and men in controlling and managing financial resources. The focus will be on remittances as an essential motivation for respondents’ emigration.

8.4.1 Control and Management of Financial Resources

This sub-section explores how the respondents share financial resources control and management and whether this is affected by their migration experience. Data from individual and group interviews show slight variation, with control and management almost always a male responsibility. The data also show that women have limited access to financial resources. Generally, women who receive the income—whether wage or benefit—have better control over it. For example, Laila receives and controls her salary and the household benefits

\textsuperscript{67} Cited in (Waseem, 2004)
but allows her husband access, transferring an amount to his personal account for the shopping and his expenses. In contrast, before he got a job, Huda gave her husband her salary to add to his controlled and managed savings. Once he found one, although she regained control over her salary, she still had no influence on the family’s resources. Lubna, whose husband receives benefits from other European countries, shares control and management of her wage without touching his benefits, as she said:

*His benefit is small; he uses it for his own needs and sends the rest to his family. I give him my bank card to do the shopping or anything we want to pay for.*

Although these examples show variation in female practice, none of the women, except Laila, has complete control of the family’s financial resources.

In contrast, all except two of the men have complete control. One of the exceptions is Ahmed, who received pocket money from his wife before he found a small informal job; and Ali, whose marriage is not registered and whose wife, therefore, gets the benefits, does not receive separate pocket money, but his wife issues the household’s petty cash to his management. The remaining men control the family income regardless of source, although some share its management with their wives—giving them petty cash or a credit card to buy the household needs.

Most unemployed women report almost identical experiences. None, except Nuha, receive their benefits or control or manage them. And although Nuha is unique in managing the household benefits, this doesn’t extend to her husband’s wage, as she explains:

*He receives the benefit and gives it to me. I take the daily expenses and save the rest. I don’t know about his wage, but sometimes he covers the shortage when we remit to the family.*

However, some of the women do have access to some financial resources. Ibtisam, for example, receives sufficient pocket money:

*My husband is not entitled to the social benefits, but he receives mine and has control over all the money. Yet, he gives me what I want.*
A few, like Fatima, receive weekly petty cash for household expenses but are allowed to save the balance. In contrast, others have to return this after they have done the shopping; as Madeena narrates:

My husband receives all the benefits and gives me nothing. Sometimes I do the shopping for small items, but I have to bring the receipt and the balance back.

Madeena is illustrative of those women who experience injustice both from their husbands and from public institutions, as she relates:

My husband received all the benefits, but after the conflict, the lawyer advised me to have my own account to receive my and the child's benefits. When we went to the job centre, they said the benefits of both should be received by one of us, so I just received the child benefit. He also controls this because he doesn’t allow me to use it without his consent.

Her case shows how vulnerable women are in the social welfare system and how little power women have to protect their families or implement the advice. The joined claim for benefits restricted respondents’ access to financial resources. Despite the support of some institutions, Madeena could not exert control over her financial resources, which indicates that support alone is insufficient to induce change. Moreover, other women not only have no role in controlling or managing resources, but they also are not even aware of the benefits received by the household, as Nadia’s experience clarifies:

When I asked him about the benefit, I didn’t get a response. I know he spends the most money on his natal family. One day I got a bank statement and found that he had received a lot of money. With the help of an organisation, I found that he receives disability and carer allowances. I had never heard about them, and he had never helped with my daughter.

Not only does Nadia not know about the household benefits, but she also provides care for their disabled child while her husband receives the payment.
Discussion in the focus groups confirmed that few women know about their household's benefits, whereas few women understand that the household's income is the husband's wage. As ‘M’ (group 1) noted:

Most women don’t know how much the benefit is, and 90% of family conflicts and divorces are related to child benefits.

Most women who took part in the focus groups confirm her words. For example, ‘H’ (group 4):

I am sure that in 99% of the Sudanese families here, the man receives the child benefit and sends it to Sudan.

In such a situation, conflict is to be expected, and the data show a consensus that financial resources are the main reason for domestic violence and family breakdown among the Sudanese. The men explain this as a result of women’s interference in the management of financial resources, as ‘E’ (group 5) summarises:

In Sudan, financial resources management is the man’s duty. When people come here, some continue the same, and others do it differently. The women start to interfere and claim rights over it, which lead to conflicts.

‘A’ (group 2) explains the underlying cause of this conflict:

The situation that a woman has rights here gives her power. She is not afraid of being divorced; she would receive more benefits. This situation encourages her to insist on having financial resources management. She feels she has no need for the man and opts for divorce.

Their examples show their reluctance to change and prefer to blame the institutions that give women equal rights. Most men feel that sharing the management of financial resources reduces their sources of income, threatens their manhood, and annuls their authority as head-of-the-household.
In contrast, most women agree that men misuse the family’s benefit payments, as ‘D’ (group 4) relates:

They provide low-quality lives for their families to meet their natal families’ requests.

Women argue that benefits should be in the mother’s hands as the person best-placed to know her children’s needs and keen to provide for them. Although a few women, such as ‘K’ (group 3), disagree:

It is better [for the benefit] to be in the men’s hands because this is their responsibility. You come here to accompany your husband, not for money. It is better to be in his hands because he brought you. It is up to him to send it to his family. You can request politely to send some to your family from time to time.

In other words, she believes that women should maintain the culture they had in Sudan.

The women’s “interference” in managing financial resources and sending remittances is a major cause of conflict and leads to much male anger. ‘Y’ (group 5), for example, argued furiously:

I think this is not her concern! Before she came here, she knew nothing about this benefit. When she came here and had a social benefit, she wanted to control all the resources and the man not to send to his family! It is wrong, I think. She should not interfere with this. When she was in Sudan, I provided for her, and she didn’t ask me for anything, so why does she ask now? If we returned and she had no benefit, would she prevent me from helping my family? She has no right since I provide for her.

Many men shared this opinion, with some comparing the situation of the Sudanese in the Arab countries where there are no benefits and no conflicts. Indeed, remittances seem to be essential in men’s insistence on keeping financial resources under their control.
8.4.2 Remittances and Decision-Making

Remittance sending is strongly related to the role of the provider, which is perceived as male’s role among the Sudanese in Glasgow. As one of the essential motivations for emigration, almost all men regularly remit to their natal families, regardless of their employment status or income level. In contrast, except for those who control their income, none of the women regularly remit theirs. While the data show that a few respondents from affluent families do not remit regularly, most remit a fixed amount of money monthly and extra amounts occasionally, such as at Ramadan or Eid, or for special events such as weddings, and illnesses or funerals.

Decisions on remittances are taken individually and are not discussed with spouses. According to Lubna:

*It is a matter of duty. I have to remit a certain amount to my family and more when there is more need. Similarly, he remits to his family, and sometimes I support him if he does not have enough money. I tell him how much I remit, but I do not discuss it with him. It is a red line; no one can prevent others from doing it.*

This attitude is shared by all the men and by the husbands of the women. However, remittances are discussed directly or indirectly with natal families, as Khalid notes:

*Most income goes to Sudan. Whenever I call, my mother asks for money; sometimes, I remit twice a month. She doesn’t decide the amount directly but says: “We have this loan amount” or “We have such a problem”. So, I estimate the amount and send.*

Women, such as Madeena, complain that they are not consulted and only find out about remittances when their husbands call their parents:

*He has never consulted me! Instead, he provides for us what he wants and remits what his parents want. I know he has remitted either when he tells his father on the phone or when his father stops nagging.*

Decisions on remittances are related to financial power; those without access to financial resources have almost no say. The research shows that remittance sending is a priority, and
respondents follow various tactics to secure the necessary money, such as reducing the quantity and quality of their food, or working extra hours, even at the expense of their education.

There is also consensus that men often remit even at the expense of their own family, who may be deprived of essential needs to pay for the luxuries of the man’s family. For example, this is the experience of ‘S’ (she, group 1):

*Their families in Sudan build houses and have luxury furniture and cars, while their family here does not have a good life.*

That is to say, men prioritise providing for their natal families over their own families and do not dare to tell their parents that they have no money or are unemployed. The standard explanation is that their families here have a luxurious life compared to their natal families. Others argue that in the “closed” setting of Glasgow, the families’ lives are more private, whereas, in the more open communities of Sudan, everyone is looking for an improvement in the natal families’ living standards. This view helps to explain the unlimited demands made by families in Sudan. As ‘B’ (she, group-5) comments:

*Families in Sudan consider emigrants like banks with unlimited money, so they always ask for more.*

(Lindley, 2007) notes that this situation is common among people who have experienced protracted civil wars, although some respondents excuse the unlimited demands, arguing that they result from the emigrants’ boasting. For example, ‘S’ (she, group 1):

*Men do not tell their families they are unemployed; they feel it is shameful. They also take photos of themselves near luxurious houses and cars and send them to their families, pretending they are theirs, to show how they live. Most of them remit to their families just to show off; they want to show that they have a good life here, while in reality, they depend on benefits. Therefore, their families ask for every single need.*
Although most respondents remit from state benefits, even though these are just enough for them to survive, they are not unique in this—it has also been noted among Somalis (Lindley, 2009: 19). These examples indicate that the role of the provider extends across borders and that the social image of the remitter and his natal family in Sudan is an essential reason behind the decision to remit.

The data show that the few females who have control over their income and regularly remit to their families also remit or support remitting to their in-laws, which implies that they, too, are keen to protect their husbands’ social image. In contrast, most men regularly remit to their natal families but only remit a small amount occasionally to their in-laws. The overt or covert explanation is that women are not obliged to provide for their families. As Omer states:

I remit monthly to my family and sometimes to hers [his wife’s]. I remit more to my family because I am their primary provider.

Haroon, who refuses to remit to his in-laws, confirms this, arguing:

She [his wife] has no income, and as a woman, she has no responsibility for her family.

Women complained about men’s remitting behaviour, as Fatima stated:

It is a priority to remit to his family. I can’t talk; otherwise, it would be a catastrophe. I want him to secure our future, we need to have our own house, but I can’t say that.

Decisions around remittances often trigger conflict between couples and their natal families, particularly if the families of both spouses live in the same neighbourhood. As Aziza comments:

My in-laws always ask for more. He doesn’t only remit for the necessities. He sends more than we use. We are always in conflict because of the remittances. The conflict extends to our mothers [who are sisters].
As discussed within the focus groups concerned the community in general, it often revealed more information about remittances to in-laws. For example, all the men agreed that women are not obliged to remit to their parents. As ‘K’ (group 2) explains:

In our culture, the man is responsible for his parents and siblings, but the woman has no responsibility for her natal family. Therefore, if a woman remits to her family, she should say it is from her husband’s income because she doesn’t work.

‘J’ (group 2) confirms this:

People in Sudan do not know about benefits; money is only from work, and their daughter doesn’t work, so when she remits, she should say it is from her husband.

The focus groups clarified that the men are keen to maintain a good social image in Sudan and do not want to acknowledge the loss of the provider role, even when remittances are made from their benefits or those of their wife or child. Further, respondents such as ‘K’ (group 2) argue that they have earned the right to these:

This benefit is mine—who suffered until I arrived here and brought her when I settled. She didn’t suffer like me. Has she been in Calais and slept in the forest? Has she suffered smuggling? Has she been followed by the police? Has she been imprisoned? She came by plane directly here, and I paid for the ticket.

His logic about benefits prevails among the men, as Madeena confirms:

Men believe that men own women and their assets and should not help their wives' families.

On the other hand, most women argue that because they suffer pregnancy, labour, breastfeeding, and the rearing and bringing up of children, the child benefits are theirs, and they should send it to their parents who invested in their childhood and education. They also disclosed that women could save a small amount from the household’s petty cash, which they can then remit behind their husbands' back. ‘R’ (he, group 2), who works in informal money transfer, confirms this:
There are many problems around remitting. I think the problem is men. Often the man remits three million Sudanese pounds to his family and a half million to his in-laws. When the wife finds out about this—normally from her family—she sends it to her family behind his back. Sometimes the same amount as he sent to his family.

In general, the many domestic violence and divorce cases among the Sudanese in Glasgow and the UK are related to remittances. Our data show four cases that ended in divorce; one was not directly related to financial resources. Although the respondent acknowledged the part this played, she attributes her insistence on divorce mainly to variation in their gender ideologies. One case that did resolve peacefully is that of Nadia:

One day I saw the bank statement and learned that the disability allowance is massive. The painful thing is that all this money goes to Sudan, and my child’s needs are not provided for. So, I immediately called the health visitor, and she changed it to being paid into my account. My husband was furious and argued a lot. I have not spoken much with him; I just told him it was because he sent it to Sudan, and my children need it. I told him it is the government money, and my daughter is sick, so she has to enjoy this money, and you can send it to Sudan from your benefits. In the end, he gave me all the children’s benefits. All this happened without us having a big problem because I was diplomatic and did not argue back a lot about it. More importantly, because many organisations follow my daughter’s case, I tell them if I have any problems.

Nadia was thus able to utilise the available support and transfer the benefit to her account without significant conflict.

In summary, financial resources are an essential power source within the household. Those with an income source have complete control over it, and the data show insignificant variation in control and management of the financial resources, which are almost always a male responsibility. Remittances are an essential item in the household budget and a priority for the remitters.
8.5 Limitations of the Study

Many limitations associated with the study need to be acknowledged and carefully considered in future research.

The first one is related to the sampling strategy. The snowball, purposeful sampling strategy used in this study is associated with sample bias. The sample is composed of those who wanted to help the researcher and their networks. Although the researcher addressed this by diversifying the networks and attempting to cover individuals with a wide range of attributes, the data showed a close similarity in their experiences. This similarity may be due to a similarity in GNs that was not considered in the sampling strategy. So, better diversification of the network and consideration of the primary individual attributes considered in the study may produce different results.

The second shortcoming is the topic’s sensitivity and the targeted group’s situation logistics. These facts posed recruitment difficulties. To address the issue, I recruited friends who were happy to express themselves in front of one another for group interviews. The experience showed that these groups’ members were almost like-minded and did not challenge each other. Having opinion variation within the group may be an insightful opportunity to produce richer data.

The third limitation is the interview length and availability of the respondents, which limited the checking of their accounts. Accordingly, none of the respondents offered to be contacted twice so that we could check their accounts. However, after the interviews, I reviewed with them the topics that had been discussed.

The fourth shortcoming is the complexity of the topics (labour-market, social networking, transnationalism and the three conversion factors) addressed and the PhD space. Each topic is enough to produce a PhD dissertation about social remittances acquisition in terms of GE. However, the program’s limit does not allow enough space for thorough analysis. Similarly, it does not allow considering other factors that may substantially impact respondents’ GN,
such as the media. Though the data showed little change in respondents’ GN, other factors may considerably contribute to more complex analysis.

The last limitation mentioned here is related to the SCA, which is a complex, broad and fragmented approach. Though it is used reasonably as an analysis tool, the space did not allow discussion of its different themes, particularly the freedom concept.

### 8.6 Conclusion

The chapter concerned the impact of migration on Sudanese’s GNs. It examined change in the sharing of three dimensions of GE: power, labour and resources. The study shows that respondents had diverse GNs when they arrived in Glasgow, including a few with more egalitarian GNs than the rest. However, in the context of Glasgow, very few showed any consequent change in any of the three dimensions’ parameters. In general, all the respondents agree on the four main duties of the head of the household, and these duties place all three dimensions firmly in men’s hands. As it is culturally inherited, men hold on to the role of head-of-the-household firmly, and sharing it with women is viewed as a matter of shame. Furthermore, some women feel disempowered due to their husbands’ GNs. In general, most respondents believe they should maintain the same power relations in Sudan and that changing the status quo is not a priority.

This status quo, and the duties that pertain to the role of head-of-the-household, posit a clear demarcation of labour sharing that enhances men’s position: men assume the role of provider and women that of homemaker—even though most women possess equal or better qualifications than their spouse. Due to the labour-market mechanism, or their access to social benefits, a few women have assumed the provider role for the first time in Glasgow. However, because of the family’s gender ideology, this has not affected the power-sharing.

The data show variation in the practice of home-chores. Although most retain their practice from Sudan, some changes are noticed. For example, some males provide occasional support, and some women accept it, which may represent a change concerning GE. However, except
for one man, none of the respondents would continue to do so if they returned to Sudan, indicating that no change has occurred in ideologies.

The data also show some variation in control and management of financial resources, although these are almost always male responsibilities. To protect their husband’s self-esteem, some employed women share the role, while—to free themselves from a burden—some men delegate benefits management to their wife. As a result, women who receive social benefits feel empowered by having control over them. In contrast, a few women felt disempowered by the loss of the management of household expenditure they had enjoyed in Sudan. Regarding the remittances, almost all the men—particularly those who had accessed a paid job for the first time—felt empowered by the improvement in their position in their natal families. However, remittances are also a major cause of conflict and family breakdown.

Migration has thus had diverse impacts on the respondents. While a few have experienced change towards/away from GE—or have started to negotiate their GNs, most are keen to preserve their essential GNs. Furthermore, all except one of those who did show change admit this would not continue if they returned to Sudan, which indicates the resilience of these GNs. Although the intersection of all three conversion factors determines these outcomes, personal ideologies play a fundamental role. Hence, the study suggests that efforts to improve GE should target gender ideologies at individual and household levels.
CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Introduction

This chapter concludes the study and highlights its main empirical findings and contributions to the theoretical debates on the migration-development nexus, mainly how social remittances are acquired before being transferred to countries of origin. The study drew upon original qualitative data and examined whether and how respondents’ migration impacts two dimensions of gender equality: gender relations and gender ideologies (collectively referred to as gender norms). The impact of migration on gender equality has been the main contribution of this study. The analysis was based on the idea that modification of respondents’ gender norms depends on the change in respondents’ economic resources and knowledge, which may, in turn, alter the power relationship and/or relative agencies within the household.

To tackle the complexities of this thesis, the study used Sen’s Capability Approach, which allows consideration of personal, social and environmental conversion factors with the potential to reshape gender norms. The study also employed Sen’s perception of development, which is a process of valuing higher wellbeing due to changes in opportunities, functioning and agency that enable an individual to pursue her goals. It found that the experiences of the Sudanese in Glasgow challenge the claim that immigration to different cultural settings alters GNs (Levitt 1998, Sijapati 2015). Specifically, the study showed that social and environmental factors in the UK (Glasgow) and Sudan interacted with the respondents’ individual conversion factors, resulting in a limited change in GNs for only a few respondents.

The chapter is organised into six sections and addresses each research question. Following this introduction, the second section reviews the study’s findings on the influence of migrating to Glasgow on the respondents’ GNs. The section concludes that key domains of the Glasgow context (labour-market, the social security system, and the social arena)
reinforced respondents’ GNs concerning access to financial resources and failed to allow most of them sufficient contact with other cultures. The third section focuses on the respondents’ transnational activities. It asserts that transnational activities (remittances and social networking), are essential for the respondents’ everyday lives and vital in reinforcing GNs. The fourth section considers whether there has been a change in respondents’ gender relations since they arrived in Glasgow. Through its focus on sharing three essential power-source parameters (authority, labour and financial resources) at the household level, the study reveals a slight change in the gender relations of a few respondents. The fifth section discusses the sustainability of this change and examines the resistance of respondents’ gender ideologies to change. The chapter ends with a conclusion summarising the study’s contribution to the body of knowledge.

9.2 How Does Glasgow’s Setting Impact Sudanese Gender Norms?

The literature shows that change in material and/or intellectual resources alters the power relationship between males and females in the household and contributes to change, either towards or away from GE (Abdi, 2014; Dannecker, 2005; Kabeer, 1999, 2008). This study considered respondents’ interactions in two domains (the labour-market and social networking) as environmental conversion factors with a high potential for reshaping GNs. The study also considered the state welfare system as an alternative income source.

Theoretically, acquiring material and intellectual resources works differently for men and women to achieve gender equality. The central argument is that the improvement of women’s material and intellectual resources, and contact with more gender-egalitarian cultures, allows women to acquire resources that may enhance their agency and resist their subordination to men. However, while a reduction in men’s income to a level below that of their wives may alter the power relationship in favour of the women and induce more gender-egalitarian norms, it can also do the reverse by, for example, increasing men’s control over women’s resources (see (Kabeer et al., 2011). Similarly, men’s exposure to more gender-egalitarian cultures may lead to their appreciating—and adopting—new GNs, or to their seeing these as a risk for their masculinity and adopting even more traditional GNs, such as controlling women’s mobility and social interaction. Moreover, men who adopt more egalitarian-GNs
must first improve their agency to choose what they value, even if this goes against the norms of their society, including those of their wives. The findings showed that respondents’ interactions in Glasgow could potentially reinforce GNs. In the following two subsections, we will discuss respondents’ experiences in the labour-market and social life.

9.2.1 The Labour-market and GNs:

The labour-market is expected to influence immigrants’ GNs through access to financial resources and cultural exposure. The findings showed that respondents’ experiences accord with most literature (Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2018) that BME immigrants are disadvantaged in the labour-market. The women in my study had limited access to the labour-market. Most were constrained by insufficient childcare facilities and flexible jobs from being economically active. In contrast, almost all the men were economically active. However, they do low-paid informal jobs with limited exposure to more diverse cultures. Their experiences are in accord with the literature that women within their ethnic groups are more likely to be economically inactive than men in the same ethnic group (Close the Gap, 2019: 18-9). The capability approach and breaking down the employment process into stages (strategy, preparation and employment) allowed multidimensional explanations for these outcomes. The study showed that individual, environmental, and social conversion factors have considerably influenced Sudanese employment in Glasgow since the employment strategy phase.

Examining the respondents’ employment strategies uncovered essential explanations for the women’ low economic participation and the reverse for the males. First, it showed that GNs, as a personal and social conversion factor, are essential for women’s and men’s employment strategies. Employment for both is guided by their GNs—and that of their spouses—rather than by their skills or qualifications. The traditional breadwinner–homemaker division of labour is normalised among respondents, despite the women’s higher qualifications versus men’s and their higher potential of getting better jobs. Generally, men’s employment was not contested or even discussed. It was a well-established custom, and men’s role as breadwinners was taken for granted.
In contrast, there was variation in women’s employment strategies, where a few and their spouses accepted their employment. Further, few women wanted to work, but they had no bargaining power to discuss it with their husbands. This situation reflects Ghosh’s (2009: 26) statement that women from the Middle East and North Africa do not work when they have young children. Though children often are seen as the reason for women’s low economic activity, this study showed that the essential factor is the GNs. A reasonable explanation is provided by the women and their husbands' personal and social conversion factors (in terms of GNs). Almost all respondents view men as the provider and women are the homemakers. Furthermore, women wanted men to provide for their families from wages instead of benefits. Consequently, most respondents had not considered women’s employment, even in cases where the women were better qualified and had better prospects than their husbands.

Furthermore, a few women had lost potential opportunities due to the GNs of their husbands, who prevented them from considering employment. Similarly, the provider role is not contested by respondents as something men are expected to undertake. The study uncovered that having young children is insufficient to explain this situation. Other factors, such as personal and social (their GNs and husbands’ GNs) conversion factors, have substantial roles. Hence, as I discuss now, only a few women proceeded to the preparation stage besides men.

The preparation stage explored the transfer of qualifications acquired abroad and adjusting qualifications to the labour-market needs in Glasgow. Only two respondents sought transfer of their qualifications. Both were evaluated less than their degree, and none managed to use these qualifications or build on them to follow their careers. The reason for the case of the female in this study was personal and centred on environmental conversion factors, as she could not take the needed exams to pursue her career because it is expensive and difficult for a lone mother to obtain the required grade. The reason for the male respondent was environmental where no relevant universities admitted him to continue his education.

The consequences for both were taking jobs below their qualifications and becoming trapped in low-skilled, and low-paid work; a similar finding was also reported by (Close the Gap, 2019b: 6). Though the recognition and education system are the most frequently blamed for this outcome, personal conversion factors also affect. For example, in a situation of a lone mother of three children, her age and financial status constrained her from taking needed
courses to follow her career. The rest of the respondents did not consider transferring their qualifications. Some men (particularly those with higher education from Sudan) attended higher education or vocational training to improve employability. Women did not consider employment or seek recognition except for one and the labour migrants. The only refugee woman who considered employment attended education after failing to continue her career. Qualifications transfer is not only because of the recognition services; personal factors also have considerable roles.

The essential qualification needed is the host language. Though the Government has provided language learning opportunities since the asylum-seeking stage, only a few have utilised it. Personal and social conversion factors (Education, age and remittances) had considerable impacts on its utilisation. Personal and social conversion factors enabled few respondents to access the ESOL, as those with higher education improved their English to study and then get decent jobs. Young people who lost education opportunities in Sudan were motivated to compensate for the lost opportunity and attend formal education in Glasgow. In contrast, most of those in the production age have remittances obligations and feel they are too old to spend time learning English, and they dropped out of the ESOL program when they got menial jobs. Most men were guided by the provider role for their natal families to skip the ESOL program. In contrast, most women could not use their personal conversion factors to utilise the environmental conversion factors to improve their employability skills. For example, most women could not use their education to access ESOL programs and attend suitable education programs.

That is, respondents’ GNs and remittances obligations significantly impacted their ability to utilise the available opportunities. The education system was also blamed for failing to support qualified people and preventing those who had missed educational opportunities from realising their potential.

The data also showed that most respondents had not utilised the opportunities for employability support, which may partly be explained by some low levels of education and others’ lack of knowledge about the service. However, there is also strong evidence that men
preferred the swift generation of income to invest in their employability and improve their employment status in the future. An important reason for this is their provider role, migration during their most economically active years, the situation in Sudan and their remittance obligations.

The last stage is job seeking and actual employment experiences. The bulk of the literature on immigrants’ employment is on this stage and tends to show the disadvantaged positions of immigrants, particularly BMEs / refugees. Following the finding of, for example, Brynin & Longhi (2015) and Aspinall & Watters (2010), almost all respondents were in low-paid menial jobs regardless of their qualifications. Highly qualified men could not utilise their qualifications. Even those who invested time in adjusting their qualifications to the needs of the labour-market failed to use them.

The oft-cited barriers to refugees’ employment in the UK are poor English skills, low qualifications (or a lack of recognition of qualifications), lack of familiarity with the UK labour-market, lack of information about available jobs, and discrimination (Aspinall & Watters, 2010: 49-50). The data confirmed the existence of these factors, showed other factors and provided more explanation, as explained below:

The poor English skills are confirmed in the study as the preparation stage showed that respondents were constrained by their GNs, and environmental conversions factors in Glasgow (childcare) and Sudan (remittances obligation) to utilise the ESOL opportunity.

Contrary to the literature, only a few respondents have low qualifications. Nonetheless, the labour-market did not facilitate the utilisation of essential individual conversion factors (education and work experience) whether these had been acquired abroad or in Glasgow. The labour-market is often blamed for deskilling qualified immigrants (Asima, 2010: 59; Curro, 2012: 124; Datta et al., 2009). However, the data showed that it is not the only causal factor. The respondents’ GNs and environmental factors (economic and political situations) in Sudan are more influential than the labour-market. Only two respondents sought recognition or tried
to use their qualifications as mentioned above. Similarly, only two men sought to access the labour-market formally. They did menial jobs due to discrimination (ageism and anti-migration), whereas the rest accepted whatever position they got regardless of their qualifications. Most of them did not invest in their qualifications and did not seek formal jobs. All ended up doing low-paid informal jobs with limited cultural exposure. However, not all of them were deskill. Except for one, those involved in catering work have low qualifications. If their positions were formal, we might say that the labour-market had provided them with a job matching their qualifications.

The rest were deskill not because of the labour-market but because other factors played an essential role. The data showed strong evidence that men preferred the swift income generation to improve their future employment status. An important reason for this is their provider role, having migrated during their most economically active years, the situation in Sudan and their remittance obligations. The data also showed that the immigration policy has a substantial role in immigrants’ economic participation. The family-unification requirements pushed men to the margin of the labour-market to work hard and save the money necessary to bring their families to the UK.

Considering women’s experiences, most findings are consistence with the literature that women are less economically active than men, though most have higher qualifications. For example, only a few women were economically active regardless of qualifications. One logical explanation for this is the labour-market mechanism in Glasgow, whereby there is a lack of flexible job opportunities that accommodate the situations of mothers with young children on the one hand and a shortage of childcare facilities on the other. However, as explained above, most women have not considered employment due to their GNs and husbands’.

GNs also explain the clustering of the few women employed in low-paid gender-stereotyped jobs, a finding often explained by the labour-market mechanism (Piper, 2008). The research showed that the labour-market intersected with other factors, principally GNs, migration status and shortage of childcare facilities and that it also worked differently for women.
Following Piper’s view, the labour-market mechanism intersects with migration status to divert refugee women to low-paid ‘female’ jobs. However, two women labour migrants were offered jobs that matched their qualifications. Apart from the labour migrants, only one refugee woman sought access to the labour-market. She invested in her qualifications, experienced discrimination and accepted a professional job lower than her qualifications. Her case supports Piper’s claim, as she failed to find a job that matched her qualifications even after changing her career.

Another woman who sought a job in Glasgow was a labour migrant’s wife. Though she was offered a job that matches her qualification (engineer), she rejected the offer, instead opting for a more flexible and stereotypically female role of the social worker, which, in line with her gender ideology, allowed her to carry out her main task of homemaker and mother to small children. In contrast, a labour migrant with similar qualifications migrated to Glasgow to assume a similar post, which in her case was in line with her gender ideology and view of herself as a provider for her natal family. However, one case rejects Piper’s claim as the labour-market provided her with a prestigious job. The other neither supports nor contradicts Piper’s claim. The labour-market offered her a suitable job, but she rejected it because of her gender role as a homemaker. Thus, her GNs guided her to accept an inferior position, not the labour-market. GNs, as a personal conversion factor, vary considerably but are still essential in the respondents’ economic activities. The contrast provided by the decisions of these two women is evidence that environmental conversion factors such as the labour-market mechanism and shortage of childcare are insufficient to explain the nature and extent of migrants’ participation in the labour-market. Indeed, it underlines the importance of considering individual and social conversion factors.

Respondents experienced employer discrimination at different stages. Three respondents experienced it during the employment process, but most experienced it during work. However, their GNs and remittances obligations compelled them to accept the situation. Nevertheless, it is not easy to get another job or not fulfil their remittances responsibility. Further, they could not report discrimination due to the informal nature of their careers.
The analysis also showed that the state welfare system intersects with respondents’ GNs to reduce women’s potential to improve their financial resources. To compensate for low pay in the labour-market, respondents accessed the social security system. Most respondents received three or more benefits. All respondents' social benefits, except those whose marriage is not officially registered or who is a widow, are received and controlled by men. The gender equality at the institutional level (either of the couples should receive household’s benefits) intersects with respondents’ GNs to put the state benefits in men’s hands. As providers in Sudanese culture, men receive the family’s benefits, thereby improving their financial resources more than women. In a situation with a high likelihood of reinforcing traditional GNs, neither the labour-market nor the social security system provided women with reasonable income or knowledge. At the same time, men received reasonable income but not knowledge.

Regarding exposure to other cultures in the workplaces or education institutions, the finding showed that men do jobs that do not allow contact with others, except managers. For those who engaged in education, their relations with colleagues never go beyond the education institution fences. In contrast, except for one, the four employed women had good contact with colleagues, which may result in changes in GNs if needed.

To conclude, despite its potential, the impact of the labour-market on respondents’ GNs is limited. Respondents’ experience in the labour-market is generally similar to general BME immigrants in the West; however, using Sen’s conversion factors and breaking down the employment process revealed more of their disadvantaged positions. It showed that skills and structural elements are not enough to understand the employment route of immigrants. Other factors such as GNs and transnational activities (e.g., remittances) are essential in guiding respondents’ employment journeys. Generally, Glasgow’s labour-market and the social security system did not provide women with a reasonable income or knowledge, while men received a reasonable income but not knowledge. Thus, both the labour-market and the social security system can potentially reinforce the GNs of respondents concerning access to tangible resources and fails to allow most of them sufficient contact with other cultures. However, contact with other cultures in areas outside work may offset this, as we explored in chapter seven.
The analysis revealed that the labour-market is not entirely to blame for immigrants’ disadvantaged positions. Other factors, such as GNs, remittance obligations and immigration policy, make a substantial contribution.

9.2.2 Social Networks and GNs:

The study explored the accessibility and quality of respondents’ social networks as one of the environmental conversion factors considered. It dealt with how and with whom the respondents built their social networks and the potential impact of these networks on their GNs. The study explored respondents’ encounters in three settings: neighbourhoods, workplaces and educational institutions, and the conversion factors influencing respondents’ social interaction. The analysis was based on the idea that the modification of GNs depends on interaction with the host’s diverse cultures. Ethnic diversity in Glasgow posits that “People differ [...] carry with them different values, norms, ideas and identities” (Tasan-Kok et al., 2014: 18-9). However, the integration policies and public attitudes toward immigrants significantly impact building such networks.

The findings showed that the respondents had limited access to knowledge in the social arena, living, as they do, in niches with little contact with other ethnic groups. They only mix within networks of relatives and like-minded friends and spend their time either at home, at work, or in public places (such as the Sudanese Café, in the case of the men) that do not allow contact with other cultures which might expose them to different, potentially more egalitarian GNs. Women have more social contact across ethnic groups than men. A few utilise children and food as facilitating tools, albeit predominantly with people with some cultural similarity (i.e., Muslim and Arabic speakers) and a high likelihood of holding similar GNs. Even fewer women had contact with (generally elderly) Scottish women and other non-Arabic speakers. However, this mostly did not go beyond greetings or exchanging a few words related to their children (a type of contact with a low propensity to impact GNs, since it concerns their experiences of childcare rather than any critique of their shouldering this role). Indeed, among the respondents and their networks, this gendered shouldering appears normalised, and they have not gained enough knowledge or experience that would allow them to criticise this.
However, living in niches is not always intentional. The capability approach shows that the three conversion factors influence respondents’ behaviour and social interactions. For example, as environmental factors, the asylum-seekers dispersal system and the refugees’ housing plan were responsible for segregating respondents by placing them in the void housing stock in the most deprived areas. Almost all the respondents have either lived or continue to live in the city's most deprived, insecure areas, dominated by BME or ‘White’ residents, the latter group perceived to be dominated by drug abusers and addicts. The study showed that this residential distribution considerably impacts Sudanese social interaction. However, even those who lived in better-off areas dominated by so-called ‘White’ Scots or with more security had no better contact with other cultures in their proximities. This finding supports Bolt et al. (2010) in that there is limited interaction between groups, even in mixed neighbourhoods across European countries. The social conversion factors explained this situation with the study showing that experience or observation of antisocial behaviour significantly impacts building networks across groups and among Sudanese.

Most respondents have experienced or observed antisocial behaviour. The types of antisocial behaviours experienced are racism and Islamophobia. Though it was experienced in places like public transport and schools, it was often experienced in neighbourhoods, where most men experienced physical harassment and women verbal harassment. Such behaviours restricted women’s mobility, particularly after sunset, and created some families’ hostility with their neighbours. Generally, there was consensus among respondents on antisocial behaviours in social arenas (some denied its existence in official institutions), and even a few confirmed its existence to the extent that their friends moved to England because they believed they would experience less racism there. This situation supports Bond (2006: 623) finding of racism against BMEs in Scotland and McCollum et al. (2014: 89) argument that anti-immigration has not surfaced in public in Scotland due to the Scots’ little experience of immigration. However, the data support the finding of Lewis (2006) that antisocial behaviour is practised by young, low-educated people and by those with alcohol and drug dependencies.
Regardless of where it exists or by whom it is practised, antisocial behaviour played a significant role in the social interaction of the Sudanese with other ethnic groups, mainly the Scottish. Those who believe it exists have good reason to avoid contact with Scots; those who think it exists in specific places avoid interaction to prevent it from happening. Either way, there is little to no social interaction between the Sudanese and the Scottish in the social arena. However, there was some variation in women’s and men’s experiences.

In general, women have better social contact with other cultures than men, who have minimal contact with other ethnic groups beyond exchanging greetings. A few women utilised children and food as facilitating tools to contact other ethnic groups, although mostly with people with some cultural similarity (Muslim and Arabic speakers). Even fewer have contact with senior Scottish women or other ethnic groups such as Indians or Italians. Again, this rarely extends beyond greetings or exchanging a few words—beyond a type and frequency of contact with a low propensity to impact on GNs.

Though both community and governmental strategies to facilitate social integration exist, the study showed they had limited benefits for the respondents. Although female refugee respondents did possess information about the existence of these integration networks and the charities that provide related services, women who had arrived through the family-unification process did not possess such knowledge, increasing their dependence on their husbands as a source of information. In fact, despite the existence of a community centre in almost every residential area, together with city-wide integration networks and charities that provide refugee services, only one woman mentioned having any contact with them. Although such places have a high potential for social interaction across ethnic groups and cultures (see Peterson, 2021), most Sudanese women did not access them because of their ‘bad’ reputation for empowering women. Some women avoided doing so deliberately; others were coercively controlled by their husbands to prevent them from doing so. Furthermore, some charities are partly to blame due to their limited accessibility in terms of using English only in their communication with immigrants or cultural competency. For example, it is understandable that a delivery approach in which only information about women’s rights is delivered to women is likely to be perceived as existing to rouse women against men.
The data also showed that integration policies had not addressed essential needs such as education and health: the former reduced respondents’ propensity to have a better job and cultural exposure. The latter jeopardised women’s rights, as the limited access to gynaecological services considerably impacted Sudanese GNs. Some women experienced denial of access to gynaecology services before either receiving treatment for infertility from their GP for three years or suffering a third miscarriage. Although this is a nationally applied rule, Sudanese GNs make it unfair for Sudanese women; failure to conceive is an acceptable reason for polygamy or divorce, as a respondent experienced the latter. Furthermore, multiculturalism is not considered in the health sector, where conceiving is essential for most respondents’ marriage sustainability. Having access to gynaecology services earlier, for example, after the first year of marriage, would rescue some families.

An essential environmental conversion factor for encountering other ethnic groups is public places. Though there are plenty—and various—public places in Glasgow, the findings showed that only a few respondents accessed public places other than the mosques and the Sudanese café. Both sites were with a limited opportunity for cultural exchange and GNs negotiation

Though the study did not set out to compare GNs in sending and receiving societies, it acknowledged that the UK (Glasgow) is more gender-egalitarian than Sudan at the national level while also arguing that—as GNs vary by individual—not everyone in the UK is more egalitarian than everyone in Sudan. However, the dominant GNs in Glasgow are crucial social conversion factors that mediate respondents’ access to resources, including employment, social benefits and social interactions. For example, although Glasgow’s relative gender equality means that the official system attempts to treat people equally and asks partners to choose one of them to receive collective benefits, the respondents’ GN restrict women’s access to benefits, and the husband (as provider) had always been ‘chosen’ to receive the household’s benefits.
The data showed that GNs at the household level considerably impacted access to resources. The normalisation of the dichotomy of breadwinner-homemaker guided spouses’ access to financial resources through employment and social benefits. However, it also controlled access to knowledge through social interaction. In line with Hondagneu-Sotelo’s (1994) argument that men insist on preserving traditional GNs, as well as their authority and social position, the research shows that some men controlled their wives’ access to charities and their interaction with women whom they considered to be sources of knowledge that might alter their wives’ perceptions. Others, meanwhile, were indirectly controlled by their husbands; for example, men who work at night wanted their wives to be at home during the day to serve them. Similarly, mothers and brothers controlled a few women’s social interactions when they were younger.

The data also showed that immigrants were not innocent victims. As mentioned above, some respondents deliberately avoided contacting autochthonous Scots and those they deemed well integrated into the host context. Besides, other personal conversion factors have a substantial influence on social contact. For example, GNs were vital in limiting men’s social interaction, as most devote their time to education or work, as discussed above, and spared minimal leisure time. Other factors are a lack of English-language skills, which many women consider a significant constraint. Lifestyle also showed a reasonable impact on respondents’ networking. Some women are very social, and some men restrict their contact with their relatives or deliberately avoid contact with others. Other attributes—education, employment, and length of stay in the UK—did not reveal a pattern.

In conclusion, Glasgow settings can potentially reinforce the respondents’ GNs. Exploring these outcomes further revealed they are due to a combination of intersections of the three conversion factors. However, the GNs of respondents and their spouses were the most influential in these outcomes. GNs in Sudan also considerably impact immigrants’ access to resources. Remitting obligations are related to the accepted gender relations in which the role of the provider has been deemed the men’s responsibility, which is held overseas. Indeed, providing for their natal family was a fundamental explanation for the male respondents’ labour-market and networking outcomes.
9.3 How Do the Sudanese’s Transnational Activities Impact Their Gender Norms?

The literature shows that GNs in the country of origin play a considerable role in immigrants’ adoption of the GNs of the host counties (Röder & Mühlau, 2014) and that immigrants’ transnational activities contribute to maintaining their GNs (Tahir, 2019). The study’s findings support this literature and provide an in-depth analysis of the process. They show that Sudanese respondents live in transnational spaces and that their transnational activities are integral to their everyday life in Glasgow. The fact that respondents maintain solid transnational social relations and communicate with their networks in Sudan daily limits their local networking and considerably impacts the maintenance of their GNs. Moreover, the study shows that with very few exceptions, both women and men value these GNs and want to sustain them.

The data showed that Sudanese migrants sustain the norms of family affairs across borders. For example, families in Sudan were still directly involved in choosing their son’s bride or approving their daughter’s groom after investigating the prospective family’s reputation. Indeed, this continued to be practised even when the natal families were in the UK. Families in Sudan also contributed to polygamy in Glasgow—convincing, for example, sons to marry a second wife if their first should delay in conceiving—and became involved in divorce cases. In Sudan, where women often are blamed for divorce, families try to avoid daughters getting divorced because of the damage to their daughters and reputations. This norm extends to Glasgow, where women reported that it was hard to convince their families to accept—never mind support—their decision to divorce. Indeed, families continue to mediate across borders in cases of marital conflict, and in the main, these are resolved according to Sudanese values, which jeopardises women’s rights in Glasgow and increases the potential of sustaining GNs. Although some women improved their knowledge in Glasgow about their rights, most opted to continue with abusive husbands to protect their family’s reputation in Sudan.

Furthermore, transnational activities were shown to guide the respondents’ economic activities. Remittances were essential in maintaining and strengthening transnational bonds, and most respondents remitted to their families at least once a month. However, as well as maintaining bonds between remitter and receiver, remitting was also a source of hostility between spouses in Glasgow. The most conflict between spouses concerned the management
of financial resources and the fact that husbands remit to their natal families rather than to their in-laws. Indeed, these conflicts sometimes extended to the families in Sudan. Hence, remittance sending generates considerable transnational communication, and its effects extend far beyond purely financial considerations. For examples, it maintains cultural issues such as who should remit and for what expenses; it empowers some women in the transnational field but also maintains GNs (i.e., that men should act as breadwinners and women as homemakers); and it drives men to take badly paid jobs that allow little social interaction or leisure time, rather than spending time on adjusting their qualifications to the needs of the labour-market.

Most respondents, particularly the males, are keen to maintain a positive reputation and social status in Sudan; for example, by not telling their families that they work in restaurants because it is a shameful issue. Some men try to prove to their networks in Sudan that they have high financial status or remit whatever their family requests to prove their manhood. Others spent their time improving their qualification at their family's expense. Moreover, this drive to maintain status and reputation has a negative impact on gender relations, leading, as it does, to increased demands for remittances and male control over resources while improving qualifications at the expense of the family has reduced their wives’ access to resources, such as education that may help them improve their GNs. Indeed, it also acts as a barrier to the sustainability of any change.

9.4 Does Migration Contribute to Gender Equality?

The study explored the impact of migration on progress towards GE. Specifically, it explored whether the respondents’ agency has improved and enabled them to choose the GNs they value. Progress towards GE was assessed through examining change in the sharing of three dimensions of gender equality that cover most parameters used in the literature related to GE and women’s empowerment: power-sharing (head-of-household and decision-making), labour sharing (homemaker/ breadwinner); and resource sharing (control over financial resources and remittances). The study showed that respondents had diverse GNs when they arrived in Glasgow, including a few whose norms were more egalitarian than the rest. However, within the context of Glasgow, very few respondents showed any consequent change in the parameters of any of the three dimensions.
9.4.1 Power-sharing:

As argued in chapter eight power-sharing is about the head of the household and the decision-making powers.

9.4.1.1 Head of Household

In general, all respondents agreed on the four primary duties of the head of the household—provider, decision-maker, primary contact and family symbol—which places all three dimensions of power-sharing (authority, labour and resources) squarely in men’s hands regardless of their relative education or age or their position in the family (husband/son/brother). As a culturally inherited role, most men were determined to hold on to their position as head-of-the-household, and none of the women challenged this, although some assumed the provider role, which is one of its essential duties. Further, a widow considered her lone son the head of the household, though he is younger than his two sisters.

However, there was a slight variation in the respondents’ beliefs regarding head-of-household. A woman considered herself the head of the household, and a man disagreed with the concept arguing that this responsibility should be equally shared. These beliefs have not been affected by migration experiences regardless of the respondents’ gender, age, education and length of stay in Glasgow. Revealingly, the study showed that women would accept becoming head of their natal family, indicating the influential position held by husbands (compared to fathers and brothers) in Sudanese culture.

9.4.1.2 Decision-making

Decision-making sharing was examined to assess change in gendered power relations in households due to migration. The analysis was based on the argument that decision-making is affected by household characteristics and, more importantly, variation between spouses’ ages, education and income (Bertocchi et al., 2012). Similarly, it looked for the decision-making models (unitary, cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models) (Browning et al., 2014; Himmelweit et al., 2013), to identify changes due to migration. The findings showed heterogeneity in the sharing of decision-making that was not explained by the individual factors mentioned by (Bertocchi et al., 2012). The data showed that, except for a few who
have a cooperative decision-making model, all respondents had a unitary model (see (Browning et al., 2014), and the husbands had the final word. However, considering the head of the household’s attributes suggests that gender ideologies are highly influential. Though a slight change was observed among a few respondents around the sharing of decision-making, it is not merely attributed to migration. Although a contrasting change, in which some women felt disempowered in Glasgow due to the loss of the shared decision-making they had enjoyed in their natal families, is not fully explained by migration; instead, variation in the couple’s gender ideologies plays a considerable role. However, most women believed they should maintain the same power relations in Sudan and that changing the status quo was not a priority. The data fail to reveal a specific trend of impact related to the variables under consideration (age, education, employment, period lived in the UK) or variations in age and education level between spouses, which indicates the strength of the respondents’ gender ideologies.

9.4.2 Labour Sharing

Labour sharing is about change in how couples divide their labour between providing and homemaking. Gender, as a social construction, generally assigns homemaking to women and breadwinning to men (Townsend, 2002). However, women’s economic participation has restructured these norms, mainly in the Global North. The study explored the respondents’ experience in the division of labour by focusing on provisioning choice and home-chore sharing.

9.4.2.1 Breadwinner Choice

The study explored the labour-market engagement choice and provision status within the household. Theoretically, individuals consider what is best for overall household utility, and couples divide household labour based on who is best at which job, including paid employment (Dalmia & Sicilian, 2008). However, the experience of the Sudanese in Glasgow showed the reverse. The data showed that almost all the women are equal to or better qualified than their spouses; nonetheless, most are not economically active. Except for a few women, the data showed that the role of breadwinner is a male one in both Sudan and Glasgow; the contribution employed females make is either for secondary items or for items
that facilitate the performing of their role as homemakers. Although a few women assumed the breadwinner position in Glasgow, this has not changed how the provider role is perceived; indicating no or little change in women’s and men’s perceptions or agency to allow them to accept women to be providers. This situation may be explained by the family’s gender ideology, where the provider is a male role, and sharing it with women is viewed as a matter of shame.

The most challenging issue concerns what constitutes income and how it should be allocated, with social benefits being a particular source of confusion. In general, men receive state benefits, which they consider their income that can be allocated for essential household items; if the wife gets the benefits, the husband still expects to control and allocate them because it is not their wife’s wage. In contrast, the women view benefits as government support for the family and believe that husbands should continue providing for the family from their salaries.

9.4.2.2 Migration and Domestic Labour Sharing

The literature shows that although men have started to share house-chores, women still assume the lion’s share in the UK (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016; Forste & Fox, 2012; Sayer, 2005)). Three scenarios explain this: time constraints, relative resources, and gender ideology, which considers that men and women with egalitarian attitudes will have a more equal division of labour than those with traditional values (Calasanti & Bailey, 1991: 35-6). However, the study established that home chores are women’s tasks exclusively in Sudan.

The study explored whether the context of Glasgow has affected the respondents’ sharing of such tasks, focusing on cooking, cleaning, and washing-up rather than shopping, washing, and ironing. Though people in the UK have increasingly chosen to eat outside the home or buy ready-prepared or pre-cooked food (Wolfson et al., 2016: 150-1), the respondents opted to continue cooking and eating their traditional food, though it is time-consuming and requires skills.

The data showed that except for a female and a male respondent, none had experienced sharing home-chores in Sudan. The few men who did were as a result of unusual situations. Almost all respondents considered home-chores to be a female role and continued to divide it
as they experienced in Sudan, though all men had cooked for themselves in Glasgow before the arrival of their wives. All women continued to carry out home-chores almost as they would have in Sudan and—a common source of complaint—additional tasks such as shopping and accompanying the children to and from nursery/school, the GP, sport/leisure activities and health visitors. They also missed the support they received in Sudan from the women in their kinship network or neighbourhood. However, some received occasional (when women are sick or having visitors) help from their husbands with tasks such as hoovering, cleaning the toilet, ironing or washing up and—very rarely—cooking. However, not all women accept the status quo passively. Exceptionally, one woman convinced her husband to do the home-chores while she was at college or do other tasks that required good English commands since he had not learnt the language and was not employed. Another woman utilised the services of health visitors and compelled her husband to participate in home-chores, after five years of a demanding job serving him and their five children, including one with special needs. In contrast, a full-time employed woman refused to share the tasks with her unemployed husband when he offered to help with home-chores. Similarly, another with a similar situation had not considered sharing the duties with her husband or two adult sons; instead, she hired a maid and paid her by her wage because she helped her do her tasks.

The literature does not explain the status quo on social remittances acquisition through resource changes. Though women accessed resources through attending higher education in the UK, having relatively good wages and contact with other cultures, none experienced a change in the sharing of home-chores. Moreover, neither the time constraint scenario nor relative resources can explain this. However, it may be explained by gender ideology. A suggestion is borne out by the consensus that home-chores are a female role, and in the words of women is that it is my “primary duty” and “my responsibility as a woman”. This ideology has even been passed on to children who grew up in Glasgow, indicating how deep-rooted the gendered division of labour is in their family. However, the two cases of women who managed to share home-chores with their husbands indicate a change in their agency due to experiences rather than resources. One was empowered by the environmental conversion factors (health visitors service) that support women. Her spatial situation improved her knowledge about the existence of such services, and she used them when she failed to get support from her husband. The other may be explained by the resource variation scenario, as her English is better than her husband's.
Considering the men, except for one who used to do home-chore in Sudan, none shared the tasks or was happy with the occasional support he provided. Their situation may be explained by the literature on social remittances acquisition, as almost all men had improved their financial resources but not knowledge. Similarly, it may partially be explained by time constraints and relative resources scenarios, as almost all men devoted their time to their job or education and improved their financial resources relative to women. Similarly, it may be explained by gender ideology. As most believe, home-chores are women's tasks and ceased doing them when their wives arrived in Glasgow. Moreover, some argue that men should not provide help because women are naturally strong to carry home chores even in ‘weakened’ situations such as pregnancy. However, many did not support this argument, as most men considered help necessary in some situations. In contrast, some women argued that their husbands should help with home-chores because it is more than they did in Sudan, and no one could help them. Therefore, though they valued sharing home-chores, their agency failed to achieve change.

To conclude, the data showed that the traditional division of labour (provider/homemaker) is normalised among most respondents, regardless of their relative qualifications. Nonetheless, there was a slight variation in the practice of home-chores, and most retained their practice from Sudan, despite variation in employment status, social network, education level, age and gender. However, some males provided—and some women accepted—support, which might represent a step towards sharing home-chores. In addition, a slight change in a few women’s agency helped them involve their husbands in the home-chores. Both changes in resources approach and two of Calasanti & Bailey’s (1991) scenarios failed to explain women’s experiences, while supported men’s experiences. Gender ideology is found to be the fundamental reason for respondents’ resistance to gender relations change.

9.4.3 Resources Sharing

The study explored the change in sharing control over and managing financial resources due to immigration to Glasgow. Control of the household budget bestows a more dominant position than the management. Data from individual and group interviews showed slight variation, with control and management almost always a male responsibility. Generally, women had limited access to financial resources; the three employed women had different
experiences controlling and managing their income. One had complete control and managed
the household income (her wage and benefits), though it was the first time assuming the
provider role. She was happy to give her husband pocket money as he did when their
situation was the reverse. In contrast, of the other two women, to protect their unemployed
husband’s self-esteem, one gave him her salary to add to the savings he controlled and
managed, and the other shared control and management of her wage with him without
touching his benefits. A change in resources may explain the case of the first woman; as she
improved her financial resources in Glasgow, she already held gender-egalitarian perceptions.
Again, this is explained by variations in gender ideologies more than changes in resources, as
the other two women had not valued sharing responsibility with husbands.

Single women or those whose marriages were not officially registered enjoyed full control
and management of their incomes. One of them gave her husband pocket money, while the
other saved her income and insisted the husband pay for their living expenses. It is hard to
explain their situation as there is no registered marriage in such cases. However, change in
their financial resources seems to have empowered them. In contrast, a few women felt
disempowered by the loss of the management of the household’s petty cash they had enjoyed
in Sudan, where they could buy household necessities and save the balance.

In contrast, all men controlled and managed the families’ income, except for one. To free
himself from a burdensome task, he delegated benefits management to his wife. All men were
empowered by improving financial resources, but none valued sharing them with their wives,
indicating no change in knowledge and gender ideologies.

About the remittances sending, almost all the men—particularly those who had accessed a
paid job for the first time—felt empowered and improved their position in their natal
families. However, remittances were also a significant cause of conflict and family
breakdown. The study established that remittances were an essential item in the household
budget and a main priority for the remitters, regardless of their employment status or income
level. The data suggest remittances extended the provider role across borders, and an
essential motive for them is the remitter’s social image with his natal family in Sudan. Except
for a few from affluent families, men remitted specific amounts to their natal family regularly and other amounts occasionally. In contrast, except for those who control their income, none of the women regularly remit theirs.

At the same time, remittances were the main cause of conflict and family breakdown in Glasgow as men remit to their families but not to their in-laws. Remitting from the benefits enlarged the conflict, sometimes extending to natal families. In addition, decisions on remittances are taken individually and are not discussed with spouses. As a result, women were often unaware of how much their husbands remit and complained that they remit at the expense of their children's needs.

All men, then, had accessed financial resources in Glasgow but not knowledge related to GNs. Consequently, none—other than a few who helped with domestic work occasionally—had changed their behaviour or attitudes toward sharing resources or labour division. Moreover, regardless of their resources in relation to those of their wife, most men worked to preserve their power, using coercive control to curb the propensity of the few women who did show interest in altering their GNs. Indeed, some went further, restricting behaviours such as the shared decision-making their wives enjoyed in their more egalitarian natal families. As a result, most women lacked the necessary freedom to access the resources to build agency to resist men’s control and choose the wellbeing they valued.

Kabeer et al. (2011) assert the importance of men’s support for empowering women through, for example, microfinance projects. They conclude that “women who are valued and supported by other family members, including male members, find it easier to translate the resources at their disposal into enhanced voice and agency, including their public mobility and participation in politics” (Kabeer et al., 2011: 39). The findings of this study resonate strongly with this statement and show the importance of men’s GNs (particularly husbands) in altering the GNs women had before marriage. For example, the few women who used the services available to change their gender relations—through access to social benefits and the sharing of household chores—did not undergo a concomitant change in ideology. Indeed, in a finding that contradicts much of the mainstream literature, those who had improved their
resources in Glasgow (irrespective of whether they were relatively more or less gender-egalitarian before emigration) had not changed their GNs. The fact that they remain satisfied with their situation and have not considered adopting more egalitarian attitudes is perhaps explained by their not yet having accessed the necessary knowledge. Hence, change in financial resources, if unaccompanied by any parallel cognitive changeable to influence gender ideology, does not improve women’s agency or contribute to their empowerment.

In the same way, the study reveals that access to financial resources is not enough to empower women (and that most women—whether they improved their functionings or not—have not enhanced their agency at home). Similarly, almost no male respondent had changed their functionings, such as education or English skills, or acquired the agency that might enable them to accept sharing power with females. This agency is essential if men are to gain confidence; they need to stand up against community norms and resist peer pressure, and/or insist on doing the tasks in the cases in which some wives, for example, do not allow their husbands to share domestic work.

In conclusion, although a slight change was observed among a few respondents regarding the sharing of domestic work because of migration, there is strong resistance to any change in the essential roles that concentrate power in men’s hands because the head of household and control over its resources remains. Moreover, the data fails to reveal a specific trend of impact related to the variables under consideration or variations in age and education level between spouses, which indicates the strength of the respondents’ gender ideologies.

9.5 Why Are Sudanese Gender Ideologies Resistant to Change?

The literature shows that egalitarian attitudes among migrants often do not match egalitarian domestic behaviours (see, for example, Carriero & Todesco, 2018). This study has established that ideology is the driving force behind Sudanese gender relations. Though ideology is not static, it is likely to be long-lasting, particularly when related to religious beliefs. Consequently, this study examined changes in attitudes towards gender equality in the domestic sphere to gauge sustainable behaviour change. The study suggests that to achieve sustainable change towards gender equality, change in gender relations must be
accompanied by a change in gender ideology; otherwise, a change in gender relations may be purely strategic to cope with a particular situation and not last beyond this.

Although a slight ideological change was revealed among a few respondents concerning the sharing of domestic work, the resistance of other parameters to change was observed. Most men, for example, did not continue to carry out any domestic work after the arrival of their wives, which—together with the women’s acceptance of occasional help rather than the genuine sharing of domestic work—indicates that the division of labour is grounded in deep-rooted ideologies. The sole exception provided by the man who regretted having never helped his mother after he experienced doing domestic work for himself and would continue doing it in Sudan indicates a genuine shift in ideology, which should be considered development. Despite having no access to gender-related intellectual resources, his personal experience was sufficient to achieve a change in the agency that enabled him to challenge the norms in Sudan. (A change, it should be noted that did not happen even among the women who complained about their increased workload in Glasgow.) However, the data do not explain whether this change was in support of his mother only or would include other females, such as a wife.

The resistance of women in particular to change is explained by the conclusion of a study in Bangladesh that “in order to bring about sustainable and transformative change in women’s lives a combination of factors is needed: changes in women’s consciousness and understanding, in their material security and wellbeing and in their capacity to renegotiate existing and to participate in new relationships.” (Kabeer et al., 2011: 38). This study shows that lack of “women’s consciousness and understanding” is fundamental in the resistance of the Sudanese women (and, indeed, the men) to change.

Men are keen to preserve a good social image in Sudan as providers, and remittances are crucial in their insistence on keeping financial resources under their control. However, even when remittances come from social benefits, men tell their families they are from their wages; and in the few cases where a wife does remit to her family, they say it is from the husband’s wage, which indicates the essential role the ideology in Sudan plays in the
resistance of the respondents’ ideology to change. Indeed, control over financial resources is the root cause of domestic conflict in cases where the wife does claim access to social benefits. Scholars suggest that increasing women’s control of economic resources challenges the familial power structure and undermine men’s extra-familial status (see, for example, Pessar, 1984; Kibria, 1990). In line with this, the Sudanese men feel that sharing the management of financial resources would threaten their manhood and annul their role as head of the household. Similarly, although some women had utilised some institutions (such as health visitors) to access the family’s financial resources, thereby improving their power in the household, the majority had not, and gender ideologies were the main reason for this unwillingness. In other words, they had not gained knowledge that improved their valuation of gender-equalitarian behaviour and perceptions.

Almost all respondents valued the ‘wellbeings’ in terms of GNs that they were used to in Sudan. However, very few of the small number of women who did value a more egalitarian division of labour (including employment) and control over resources had any real opportunity to achieve change. This is because, despite Glasgow's better environmental and social conversion factors that should have improved their opportunities, GNs at the household level meant they lacked freedom of choice. Considering Levitt's (2001: 57) categories of social remittances acquiring levels, the data showed that the respondents fall into two categories; most were ‘recipient observers’, as they spent time with like-minded people and achieved little change. A few were ‘Instrumental adopters’ as they achieved slight change for pragmatic reasons, such as giving and receiving help with home-chores, that would not last beyond the specific situations.

In conclusion, the study shows the resistance of Sudanese women’s and men’s ideologies to change. In particular, it shows that gender ideology at the individual and household level, as well as at the community level in Sudan, has an essential impact on the maintenance of GNs and that in terms of gender equality, the respondents have not acquired social remittances that can be transferred to Sudan.

68 Cited in (Röder & Mühlau, 2014)
9.6 Conclusion

Focusing on Sudanese women and men in Glasgow and gender equality, the study employed a qualitative approach and answered the main research question concerning how migration to a more gender-egalitarian setting impacts immigrants’ progress towards achieving gender equality. The focus lay on understanding the process of the acquisition of social remittances. The study has contributed to the literature pertaining to migration and development in several ways.

Firstly, it contributes to understanding the dynamics around how and to what extent social remittances are acquired before they are transferred to countries of origin. Using the capability approach as an analytical tool facilitated understanding of this complex process. This approach showed that environmental and social conversion factors in sending- and receiving contexts interact with migrants’ individual conversion factors to determine the outcome of the social remittance acquisition process. The experiences of the Sudanese women and men in Glasgow who were engaged in this study challenge the mainstream literature that moving to a more egalitarian gender setting improves gender equality. While it is true that a few respondents achieved small moves either towards or away from gender equality, most failed to show any change. Thus, most of them are ‘recipient observers’ who almost acquire nothing, while a few are ‘instrumental adopters’ who change for pragmatic reasons. The data found no clear impact (in terms of change in gender relations and ideology) from respondents’ contact with Glasgow’s host society, including that of other immigrant groups and ethnic minorities. The limited inter-ethnic contacts respondents established were weak and had no impact on GNs. Thus, little in the way of new ideas or practices that could constitute social remittances has been acquired.

The thesis also contributes to understanding how gender ideologies facilitate or constrain social remittance acquisition; in other words, the movement towards gender equality. The study considers gender relations and ideologies as parameters of gender equality and argues that a change in gender ideologies must accompany any change in gender relations if it is to be sustainable and thus be considered development. However, the study reveals the strong resistance of the Sudanese women’s and men’s ideologies to change, regardless of access to financial resources and knowledge. Furthermore, it shows the influence of men’s (particularly husbands’) GNs on women’s progress towards gender equality. Therefore, the study suggests
that change in GNs should not be related to any factor such as access to material resources. Instead, it should be due to a change in women’s and men’s perceptions (ideologies) of women's value as human beings equal to men in duties and rights.

The thesis's final contribution lies in enriching the literature on the Sudanese migration experience. It provides rich data about their emigration experiences and journeys, differentiates between temporary and permanent migration to the North, and highlights the increasing participation of women in the latter. More importantly, it provides data on Sudanese GNs within the private sphere and explores how some of these have been challenged but ultimately not changed in the context of migration. The study also provides evidence for the impact of immigrants’ transnational activities on acquiring social remittances and documents a case of reverse remittances. It shows that the Sudanese maintain strong bonds with their networks in Sudan and that this considerably impacts their life in Glasgow. These transnational relations guide their access to tangible and intangible resources and maintain their GNs.

In addition, the study offers an example of using Sen’s Capability Approach as an analytical tool, the inclusive features of which provide a valuable analytical lens for exploring the complexity of achieving gender equality in the immigration context. In particular, the three conversion factors enabled consideration of the local and transnational factors that affect the respondents’ GNs in Glasgow. In contrast, consideration of transnational environmental and social conversion factors increased understanding of the resistance of the Sudanese GNs to change.

9.7 Implications of the Study:
This study has wide-range implications in the field of migration and development studies. It provides evidence for implications of gendered processes and structures in the experiences of immigrants. Hence, the study has academic, political and practical implications.

From an academic viewpoint, the study used Sen’s Capability Approach as an analysis tool and combined individual and structural factors to explore women's and men's experiences in acquiring social remittances in terms of GE. Using SCA to explore change in gender relations
and ideologies simultaneously adds insights for further analytical inquiry using a similar methodology. This methodology enhanced our understanding of the migration-development nexus regarding gender equality. The findings revealed that:

- Progress towards GE due to migration to more gender-egalitarian countries is influenced by immigrants’ gender ideologies more than the host country context. It shows that immigrant interactions in the arenas (labour-market and social networks) that provide access to resources presumably influence GE are mediated by individual and household gender ideologies. Hence, Gender Ideology is an essential explanatory factor for migrants’ experiences that are often explained by structural factors. On the one hand, immigrants’ gender ideologies are crucial in explaining their disadvantaged position in the labour-market and clustering of employed women in low-paid gender-stereotyped jobs, which are often explained by the labour-market mechanism. Nonetheless, gender ideologies are not the sole ones to blame for the limited participation of immigrant women with young children in the economy; other structural factors (labour-market mechanism and childcare services) play considerable roles.

- Other factors in the host country, such as immigration and integration policies, played considerable roles in respondents’ access to resources. For example, the family reunion policy has pushed most men to informal low-paid jobs at the expense of improving their employability. Similarly, respondents’ culture was not considered in the health sector, and the limited access to gynaecology services has extended polygamy to Glasgow.

- Immigrants limited social interaction, which is explained by residential segregation and antisocial behaviours, is also influenced by immigrants’ gender norms and related activities. The study shows that male immigrants’ job routines restricted their social interaction and that of their wives (considering their homemaker role).

- Transnationalism influences immigrants' everyday lives, including maintenance of social and economic participation and gender norms. For example, political and economic situations in Sudan and the remittances obligation have pushed men to the margin of the labour-market and restricted improving their and women’s resources. Likewise, natal families’ involvement in respondents’ family affairs has sustained their traditional GNs. Not least, routine communication has restricted their local networking.
• Gender norms in the host context reinforced traditional gender norms. Equal rights restricted women’s access to the welfare system and improved men’s financial resources and power.

From policy viewpoints:

• Policy interventions must consider multiculturism regarding variations in gender ideologies at the individual level. For example, because GNs are more influential than qualifications in employment strategies, employment efforts should be for families instead of individuals focusing on the individual with the best outcome for the family regardless of gender.

• Improvement of the integration policy mainly deals with education and employment. For example, ESOL should be mandatory and intensive; the curriculum should cover education, work, and cultural themes.

• Improvement of the social welfare system to enable women access to financial resources.

• Improvement of the integration policy mainly deals with education and employment. For example, ESOL should be mandatory and intensive; the curriculum should cover education, work, and cultural themes.

• Improvement of the social welfare system to enable women access to financial resources.

• Removal of the family reunion requirements for the non-EEA refugees to enable men to improve their capacity to lead dignified life;

• Multiculturism should consider GNs' variation in the provision of health services and improvement of access to gynaecological services;

From a practical viewpoint:

• Improvement of integration policy implementation and considering cultural diversity among staff. For example, awareness-raising about gender and Violence against Women and Girls should be delivered for both genders and in an approach that builds happy families rather than hostility.

• Tightening control over employers who refuse to employ people legally will reduce BMEs' vulnerability and enhance their access to resources.

• On the ground of the research, the candidate has established a charity (Together for Better Life) to support the researched and similar communities to lead dignified lives in the UK based on this study. Similarly, BME’s organisations should be empowered to support their communities.
• Improvement of training and volunteering opportunities; and making it mandatory for jobseekers. For example, the training and volunteering should be relevant to qualifications.
• Improvement of domestic violence services and establishment of conflict mediation bodies.
## APPENDIX ONE-A: INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

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## APPENDIX ONE-B: GROUP INTERVIEWS PARTICIPANTS

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APPENDIX TWO: INTERVIEWS GUIDE POINTS

Individual interview:

Socioeconomic data:
Name, age, education level, occupation, experience, living area, the town of origin, marital status, and the number of children. the same demographic characters of the husband

Emigration Experience:
Motivation, Process (decision, visa, family’s and community’s opinion), When, Route

Immigration Experience (Activities in the UK):

Gender Ideologies: (to assess ideology before emigration and whether it changed)
Discuss the marriage process and how the marriage decision was taken
Opinion on (and whether there is change): Head of the household? Provider? Living with in-laws? No. of children's decision? Sex preference of children?

Gender and the host context:
Access to services (education, health, housing, employability services)

Labour-market:
Preparation phase:
Employability improvement (to assess change in qualification in Glasgow)
Recognition of education gained abroad

Employment
How employment decision was made
Access (search, how you get a job)
Type of job they do, Relevance to education, payment
Relations at work
Discrimination experience

Neighbourhood:
What do respondents think about the areas they lived and live in and the social interaction?
Networking:
How is the network selected? With whom do they network? Where? Frequency? What do they do or discuss

Transnational space: How often do they communicate with Sudan? with whom? About what?

Change in Gender Roles:
Contribution to: household expenditure? Decision-making process? home-chores?
Economic resources: Source, Control/ management, Remittances (who, to whom, frequency)

Change in gender ideology: if respondents return to Sudan, will they continue doing the new GNs they acquired in Glasgow?

Group Interviews guide Points

1. What do you think about the women who want their husband to share the home-chores/ the husband who shares them?
2. What do you think about those who share decision making with their spouses?
3. Do you think the Sudanese men provide for their families?
4. Who should remit and to whom?
5. Why there are conflicts between spouses in Glasgow?
6. Do you think those who changed their GNs in Glasgow will continue in Sudan?
About Jamila Hassan:

Jamila Hassan is a research candidate in Development Studies, at the Development Policy and Practice Group at The Open University, UK. She has B.Sc. in Agricultural economics, University of Khartoum, and a Masters in Development Studies from The Norwegian University of Life Sciences. Jamila’s research interests are primarily in the fields of development, gender and migration. She is particularly interested in the relationship between migration and development, especially in exploring the developmental experiences of immigrants in their immigration setting.

Contact Jamila Hassan:

+44 (0) 7551779014
jamila.hassan@open.ac.uk

Our responsibilities to you:

- **We guard your privacy**: your participation will be treated in strict confidence in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act. Your contribution will be used for research purposes only. Nobody will be individually identified in any reports and publications produced from this study, unless you request otherwise.

- **We respect your wishes**: participation in the study is entirely voluntary and you are not obliged to answer any questions you do not wish to.

- **We answer your questions**: we will be happy to answer any questions you may have about the research. Should you wish to be kept informed of the progress and outcomes of the project, Jamila will send you a summary of the project findings.

Gender Relations and Migration: the Sudanese diaspora in Glasgow

Funded by: The researcher

Jamila Hassan is conducting this research, exploring your experience of migration and living in Glasgow.

This leaflet provides you with further information about the study.
What is the aim of this research?

We are asking for your help with a study about gender relations and migration of the Sudanese diaspora in Glasgow.

This project aims to better understand the relationship between gender relations and migration experiences of the Sudanese in Glasgow, particularly in terms of how socioeconomic policies affect experience of women and men.

What is involved?

We are interested in finding out about the experiences of Sudanese living in Glasgow. To do this, we would like to conduct some interviews with Sudanese women and men living in Glasgow. Your views will help us to better understand how gender relations of the Sudanese affect and have been affected by their migration experience and the Glaswegian context.

Interviews will involve Jamila talking with you for about four hours, divided into two sessions, and the second might be in a group. With your permission, the interview can be recorded using an audio-recorder or hand-written notes so that we can be sure that we correctly remember everything that you tell us. If you would prefer that the interview is not recorded, that is also fine. We will work around you to arrange a venue and time convenient to

What will I be asked?

We will ask you to talk about the following broad topics:

- Your individual migration experiences
- Your individual living experiences in Glasgow
- Your individual experience of gender relations
- Your views on the experiences of the Sudanese in Glasgow.
- Your views on the experiences of gender relations of the Sudanese in Glasgow

Do I have to take part?

No. We are relying on your voluntary cooperation. No one is taking part in this study who does not want to. Even if you say yes to begin with, you are free to withdraw at any time and any information you provide can be withdrawn up to 4 weeks after the last interview.

Why I have been contacted?

Because you are Sudanese, aged 18 years or older, and have been living in Glasgow for more than three years.

Is it confidential?

Yes. Everything that you tell Jamila Hassan will be in confidence. No personal information will be passed to anyone. No individual will be identifiable from the published results of the research, unless they request otherwise.

What happens now?

Jamila will ask for your consent to take part in the research and will arrange an appointment to come and see you.

What if I have other questions?

If you have any other questions, Jamila would be happy to answer them. Please contact her using the details on the back of this leaflet.
APPENDIX FOUR: CONSENT FORM

Development Policy and Practice Group, The Open University, UK
Consent form for persons participating in a research project
Gender Relations and Migration: The Sudanese Diaspora in Glasgow

Name of participant:

Name of principal investigator(s): Jamila Elhag Hassan

1. I consent to participate in this project, the details of which have been explained to me, and I have been provided with a written statement in plain language to keep.

2. I understand that my participation will involve an interview and I agree that the researcher may use the results as described in the plain language statement.

3. I acknowledge that:
   (a) The possible effects of participating in this research have been explained to my satisfaction;
   (b) I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without explanation or prejudice and to withdraw any data I have provided within four weeks from the second round of the interviews;
   (c) The project is for the purpose of research;
   (d) I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide will be safeguarded subject to any legal requirements;
   (e) I have been informed that with my consent the data generated will be stored securely and will be destroyed after five years;
   (f) If necessary, any data from me will be referred to by a pseudonym in any publications arising from the research, unless I request that my real name is used;
   (g) I have been informed that a summary of the research findings will be forwarded to me, should I request this.

   I consent to this interview being audio-recorded □ yes □ no (please tick)

   I consent to this interview being recorded in hand-written note form □ yes □ no (please tick)

   I wish to receive the summary project report □ yes □ no (please tick)

Participant signature: Date:

Contact: Jamila Elhag Hassan, Development Policy and Practice Group, The Open University, Tel: +44 (0) 7551779014. Email: jamila.hassan@open.ac.uk
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