Mental imagery: pulling the plug on perceptualism

Cavedon-Taylor, Dan (2021). Mental imagery: pulling the plug on perceptualism. Philosophical Studies, 178 pp. 3847–3868.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01628-x

Abstract

What is the relationship between perception and mental imagery? I aim to eliminate an answer that I call perceptualism about mental imagery. Strong perceptualism, defended by Bence Nanay, predictive processing theorists, and several others, claims that imagery is a kind of perceptual state. Weak perceptualism, defended by M. G. F. Martin and Matthew Soteriou, claims that mental imagery is a representation of a perceptual state, a view sometimes called The Dependency Thesis. Strong perceptualism is to be rejected since it misclassifies imagery disorders and abnormalities as perceptual disorders and abnormalities. Weak Perceptualism is to be rejected since it gets wrong the aim and accuracy conditions of a whole class of mental imagery–projected mental imagery–and relies on an impoverished concept of perceptual states, ignoring certain of their structural features. Whatever the relationship between perception and imagery, the perceptualist has it wrong.

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About

• Item ORO ID
• 75983
• Item Type
• Journal Item
• ISSN
• 0031-8116
• Keywords
• Aphantasia; Clinical disorders; Mental imagery; Perceptual experience; The dependency thesis; The visual field
• Academic Unit or School
• Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies > Philosophy
  Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies
  Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
• Copyright Holders
• © 2021 Dan Cavedon-Taylor
• Depositing User
• ORO Import