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Ahmad, Sardar; Akbar, Saeed; Kodwani, Devendra; Halari, Anwar and Shah, Syed Zubair
(2023).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.2538
Abstract
This paper investigates whether shareholder value is affected by non‐compliance with the prescriptions of a principle‐based ‘comply or explain’ system of corporate governance in the context of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. Using System Generalized Method of Moments estimates to control for different types of endogeneity, the main findings of this paper suggest that non‐compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code adversely affects shareholder value. Furthermore, ex‐post estimates reveal that compliance with certain corporate governance mechanisms is more beneficial than others. With regard to this, compliance with provisions related to board independence is more important than complying with performance‐related pay requirements of the code. These findings have implications for policy makers and financial institutions regarding the usefulness of compliance with a prescribed code of corporate governance, specifically during periods of financial distress.
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About
- Item ORO ID
- 75184
- Item Type
- Journal Item
- ISSN
- 1099-1158
- Keywords
- Financial firms; non-compliance; internal controls; governance mechanism; crisis
- Academic Unit or School
-
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business > Department for Accounting and Finance
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) - Copyright Holders
- © 2021 Sardar Ahmad, © 2021 Saeed Akbar, © 2021 Devendra Kodwani, © 2021 Anwar Halari, © 2021 Syed Zubair Shah
- Depositing User
- Anwar Halari