Intersubjective Belief

Brown, Vivienne (2019). Intersubjective Belief. Episteme, 16(2) pp. 139–156.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2017.29

URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/a...

Abstract

This paper proposes a new model of shared belief amongst individual subjects based on a new approach to theorising individual subjects in social context. In this approach, which I term the intersubjective approach, individual subjects are modelled in terms of the standpoint of each of us, thereby incorporating the phenomenological standpoint of an individual subject's inclusion of herself within the plurality, ‘us’ (a class in the distributive sense). This provides resources for a new model of shared belief, including common belief, in terms of intersubjective belief, which is an individual subject's belief that ‘each of us has the same belief that p’. The paper argues that the intersubjective model of shared belief provides a non-reductive alternative to the standard interactive model of mutual belief and common belief, and so provides a non-individualistic framework for analysing shared belief in social contexts. As an illustration, the intersubjective model of common belief is applied to the Hi-Lo game; the solution is (High, High).

Viewing alternatives

Metrics

Item Actions

Export

You can export this page using these formats Digital Object Identifier - DOI