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Oliver, Michael J.
(1999).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13619469908581520
Abstract
The recent ICBH Witness Seminar on the 1987 stock market crash was notable for the reluctance of Lord Lawson and Sir Peter Middleton to engage in any discussion on macroeconomic policy at the time of the crash. This article will show that as Chancellor, Lawson had made many ill-judged decisions over monetary policy by October 1987 and continued to do so after the crash. The article will trace the origins of these decisions and examine how the working relationship between the Prime Minister and Chancellor gradually deteriorated after 1985. By placing the stock market crash into a wider context than was offered by Lawson at the Seminar, it is possible to see how the Conservative party lost its reputation for 'sound finance' through the deleterious effects of the 'Lawson boom'.