We inhabit a post-colonial world marked by a condition of ‘coloniality, an ‘entangled heterarchy’ of various structural logics (epistemological, ontological etc.) which informed European colonialism and whose ‘legacy effects’ persist in terms of asymmetric power relations between a hegemonic ‘West’ and its subaltern ‘other’ (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992) – an ‘other’ constituted by many ‘others’ including, pre-eminently, the West’s self-designated historically-constitutive antagonistic ‘other’, viz. Islam (Ali 2017). Conceding this point has important consequences for any contemporary endeavour, including those of an explicitly hermeneutic nature. In this connection, and in the context of the endeavour that is this collection of essays, I want to suggest that recognizing and maintaining an awareness of the ontological ‘background’ that is coloniality is crucial when engaging the issue of ‘Heidegger and the Islamicate’ insofar as this post-colonial ‘horizon’ arguably predisposes understanding the conjunction in prepositional terms, i.e. as ‘Heidegger in the Islamicate’, thereby alluding to an asymmetric influence of the former (Heidegger) on the latter (the Islamicate) and concomitant intellectual indebtedness of the latter on the former.

In this chapter, I present two arguments with a view to problematizing such a prepositional understanding and replacing it with consideration of Heidegger and the Islamicate understood non-prepositionally. The first argument, which is transversal in nature, explores an engagement with Heideggerian thinking effected by some Muslim thinkers situated within Europe / ‘the West’, namely members of the Murabitun World Movement, a Sufi order. The second argument, a reversal, considers a possible genealogy for Heidegger’s thought – in particular, his later ‘post-turn’ poetic and ‘mystical’ thinking – inflected by Islamicate thought. My arguments are motivated and informed by a ‘decolonial’ orientation – that is, a commitment to decentering Eurocentrism, the epistemological and ontological ground of which lies in the violent construction of a hierarchical dichotomy between ‘the West and the Rest’ (Hall 1992) – in order to contest Eurocentric accounts of the spatial (that is, geographical) and temporal (that is, historical) sites of Islamicate phenomena and the direction of influence in the encounter between Islamicate and ‘Western’ thought.

1. Transversals

I want to begin by arguing that the possibility of thinking about the Islamicate world in ‘transversal’ terms – and transversality¹ should here be taken to mean across ‘spaces’, ‘locations’ or ‘sites’ (cultural, civilizational, philosophical, political etc.) marked as different /

---
¹For a useful discussion of the concept of transversality in the context of a consideration of the relations between the religious, the ethical and the political, see Schrag (2013). On his view, transversality is associated with the following ideas: convergence without coincidence, unity without identity, commonality without equivalence, assimilation without absorption, and cooperation without uniformity, and it stands as the difference between universality and particularity. It should be noted that according to Schrag, transversality is readily associated with “the goal of dialogue in our efforts toward crosscultural communication [which is] not to achieve universal claims on knowledge and value, but rather to achieve an understanding and appreciation of divergent forms of discourse and action that extend across the boundaries of national identities [emphasis added].” (p.142)
‘other’ according to the Eurocentric logic of the Westphalian inter-state system – requires us to problematize the territorial boundaries historically-associated with the conception of the Islamicate formulated by Marshall Hodgson, a conception that I presume to be operative, at least partly, in the invitation to question concerning “Heidegger in the Islamicate World”. Hodgson (1974) defines ‘the Islamicate’ as that which is associated with the ‘civilizational complex’ grounded in and emerging from Islam, yet not necessarily characterized by fidelity to Islam in any doctrinal or ‘confessional’ sense; on his view, the Islamicate is something that “would refer not directly to the religion, Islam, itself, but to the social and cultural complex historically associated with Islam and the Muslims, both among Muslims themselves and even when found among non-Muslims.” (p.59) Hodgson’s distinction between Islamicate / civilization and Islam / doctrine has recently been contested by Ahmed (2016) on the grounds that it presumes the legitimacy of the post-Christian / secular binary of religion-culture, positioning Islam as a religion – a problematic move insofar as the categories of ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ have a European genealogy, and generalising them for application to non-European traditions points to a certain Eurocentric universalism at work, albeit tacitly and unintended (Asad 1993) (Cavanaugh 2014). While endorsing Ahmad’s critique of Hodgson’s position once the latter has been recast in terms of a religion-culture binary, I take the view that the Islam-Islamicate distinction retains a measure of utility when mapped onto an alternative binary, viz. that of dīn and tamaddun3.

Given the disruption of historical geo-political formations by globalizing multi-directional ‘flows’ (of capital, goods, people, ideas etc.) under conditions of late ‘liquid modernity’, problematization of territorial boundaries becomes necessary in order to be able to cope with a situation in which the signifier ‘Islamicate’ becomes sutured to the idea of the Ummah (lit. ‘nation’ or ‘community’) as a diasporic trans-national network4 – an assemblage of socio-political ‘nodes’ located both outside and inside Europe / the West.

1.1. Diasporas

According to Critical Muslim Studies (CMS)5 theorist Salman Sayyid (2010), “the Muslim Umma refers to the sum total of all adherents of Islam, regardless [of] whether they are located in ‘Muslimstan’ [i.e. territory historically marked as ‘Muslim’] or the elsewhere.” (p.132) On his view, three factors point toward the formation of a globalized Muslim Ummah: (1) the assertion of an explicit Muslim subjectivity; (2) heavy Muslim representation in migrant communities situated within the West; and (3) the phenomenon of urbanisation. (pp.132-133) Sayyid insists that “diaspora [refers to] a condition of being homeless – that is of being displaced and territorially diffused” (p.141), arguing that the Ummah can, and

2 Such problematization entails, at a minimum, a reimagining and redrawing of such boundaries.
3 For a brief yet nuanced discussion of the meaning of the terms dīn and tamaddun, which are only problematically mapped onto those of ‘religion’ and ‘civilization’ respectively, see Al-Attas (1978, Chapter 3).
4 For a conceptualisation of the Muslim Ummah as a trans-national network, see Mandaville (2001).
5 Sayyid (2014) defines CMS as “a series of interventions that aim to clear the ground for sustained reflection on the relationship between Islam, Muslims and the postcolonial context in which they are currently disclosed” (p.11); more precisely, “a field of investigations into matters associated with Muslims which are framed by three related epistemological stances. It is characterised by systematic enquiries that are post-positivist, post-Orientalist and decolonial.” (p.12) For Sayyid (2014), post-positivism follows from the adoption of an anti-essentialist position, while Sayyid et al. (2015) frame post-positivism somewhat less stridently as the ‘suspicion’ of positivism; ‘post-Orientalism’ refers to non-essentialist analyses of the use of the signifier ‘Islam’; and ‘decolonial’ refers to a project of ‘epistemic disobedience’ characterised by contestation of Eurocentric categories and rejection of the violent hierarchy of ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’.
should, be understood as a global diasporic formation⁶ given the ‘homelessness’, in the sense of a lack of autochthony (or ‘rootedness’), resulting from the absence of a non-Westphalian Islamicate ‘Great Power’ – the Caliphate – under contemporary conditions of colonial modernity⁷. Mobilizing the arguments of philosopher Hannah Arendt and cultural theorist Paul Gilroy, Sayyid conceives “diaspora as constituting a marginal (undecidable) position within Western modernity – being in the West but not of the West.” (p.138) Sayyid’s conception of the Ummah as a diaspora is articulated in terms of its contestation of a global West/Rest binary, yet framing the Ummah in such terms is questionable given the existential facticity of indigenous European adoption of Islam since the latter entails the possibility – or rather, actuality – of being both in the West and being of the West while also being in and of the Ummah. Insofar as the Islamicate is historically-sutured to the Ummah, the existence of communities of European – i.e. ‘Western’ – Muslims challenges the binary territorial logic underpinning the distinction Islamicate and ‘Western’.

Having established the basis for a transversal reading of the Islamicate by disrupting the tendency to trans-historically conceive the Islamicate as necessarily situated beyond European – and more broadly, ‘Western’ – borders, I want to unsettle the idea that Islamicate space is coterminous with geography in relation to the specific issue of “Heidegger in the Islamicate World” by pointing to a postmodern / postcolonial Islamicate engagement with the Heideggerian corpus taking place within Europe – specifically, Britain. In this connection, I will explore an ‘indigenous’ European Islamicate encounter with Heidegger, one that has mobilised Heideggerian thought in order to diagnose a perceived malaise within the European civilizational project, yet also pointed to certain alleged limitations of Heideggerian thought and the need to get beyond Heidegger so as to engage with resources within the Islamicate tradition, specifically Sufism (tasawwuf). In order to understand what motivated and continues to motivate these Muslim thinkers’ engagement with Heidegger, it is necessary to provide some biographical context by way of a preamble.

1.2. Ian Dallas and the Murabitun

The Murabitun World Movement was founded by Ian Dallas, also known as Shaykh Abdalqadir as-Sufi / ad-Darqawi / al-Murabit, the author of numerous books on Islam, Sufism (tasawwuf) and political theory⁸. Currently resident in Cape Town, Dallas was born in 1930 in Ayr, Scotland to a Highland family whose history dates back to 1279 CE. Dallas was educated at Ayr Academy, the Royal Academy of Dramatic Art (R.A.D.A) and the University of London, where he was tutored in Elizabethan social history, and he was a playwright and actor⁹ before converting to Islam in 1967 at the hands of the Imam of the Qarawiyyin Mosque in Fes, Morocco. Taking the name Abdalqadir, Dallas joined the Darqawi Sufi order as a student of Muhammad ibn al-Habib, who conferred on him the title as-Sufi. Dallas’ idhn

---

⁶ Sayyid (2010) maintains that “to read the Muslim experience as diasporic requires the reconceptualization of the notion of diaspora from demographic to political … [i.e. to] re-consider the idea of diaspora as a political formation.” (p.137); on his view, “what is of critical importance in the formation of a diaspora is the extent to which power and subjectivity are dispersed [suggesting] that in many ways, diasporas do not require the trinity of displacement, settlement and homeland” (p.138).
⁷ According to Sayyid (2010), “the distinction between the West and the Non-West … underpins all forms of coloniality” (p.141), further articulating this distinction in terms of a “global racial order … constituted by privileging Europeaness (whiteness) over non-Europeaness” (p.142).
⁸ In this connection, it is interesting to note that “Dallas was at one time editor of The International Times, a socialist paper.” (Hermansen 2009, p. 35)
⁹ In 1963, Dallas starred in Federico Fellini’s film 8½ as a magician.
(authorization) for the Darqawi order apparently comes through two shaykhs: Muhammad ibn al-Habib of Morocco, who was his first Shaykh and who he claims made him his muqaddem (representative), and Muhammad al-Fayturi Hamudah. Dallas declared himself to be a shaykh in the Habibiyya Order in 1976, and his movement began to attract followers – mainly young British and American converts to Islam – such that he was eventually able to establish a Sufi community in Norwich, England. According to Hermansen (2009), it is during this period that “his leadership became more and more autocratic [with] less emphasis [being given] to esoteric Sufism as he developed more of a strict and militant [activist political] Islamic position” (p.35), although this view has been contested by Dutton (2014) who argues that “during the 1970s and 1980s, a strong base in Sufism was wedded to a strong commitment to outward fiqh [that is, legal practice].” (p.96)

Dutton (2014) maintains that “[t]he early period … saw the publication of the Shaykh’s highly influential *The Way of Muhammad* (1975), described by the author as a ‘meditation on the five pillars of Islam as viewed by someone who has taken them on and is savouring their meanings’, and, crucially, was also intended ‘to show that it was possible to grasp the meaning of Islam in terms of the European existential tradition’ [emphasis added].” (p.94) In the preface to the second edition of this text, Dallas goes on to state that Islam is “the culmination of it [that is, the fulfilment of the European existentialist tradition whose last phase is inaugurated by Heidegger].” The late 1970s saw the publication of a number of key works by Dallas, including *Jihad: A Groundplan* in 1978, followed by *Resurgent Islam: 1400 Hijra* in 1979, *Kufr: An Islamic Critique* in 1982, and *For the Coming Man* in 1988. A recurring theme in these works, which initially drew inspiration from the organicist thinking of Lewis Mumford and culminated in an engagement with Nietzsche (and Jünger) via

---

10 For a recent study of the background and thinking of Ian Dallas presented from the perspective of an insider, see Dutton (2014). According to Dutton, the ‘key’ teachings of Dallas are as follows: (1) the need to establish Islam (understood not as a religion but rather as a ‘life-transaction’ between the human being and The Real); (2) establishment of amirate (political structure); (3) war against usury; (4) the importance of the `amal (non-textual embodied practice) of the people of Medina; and (5) dhikr (remembrance) of Allah / God / The Real. (p.97) Hermansen (2009) maintains that “although [Dallas] seems to have initially attracted mainly Western converts to Islam as immediate disciples, his aggressively anti-modern and anti-Western ideology gained him support and hearings from Islamist networks in the Muslim world.” (p.35)

12 According to Dutton (2014), Islam must be entered into holistically “[which] means, of course, inwardly and outwardly – in its political and economic aspects as well as its individual and spiritual aspects – although, of course, the two are not separate … It should also be remembered that dhikr [lit. ‘invocation’, ‘remembrance’] only has its meaning alongside an outward practice of the Shari’a [emphasis added].” (pp.97-103) In this connection, Dutton points to Dallas’ (1978) statement concerning the necessity of “combining … the science of inner knowledge and the science of social action [emphasis added].” (p.48)

13 In the first of these early works, Dallas (1978) presents a critique of (Western) modernity – which he refers to as “northern [techno-]culture” (p.13, 20) – pointing to its alleged anti-Islamism which is founded upon Orientalism, Zionism and Masonic / Jacobin bureaucracy, as well as (mytical, magical) Pharaonic (“pyramidal”) left/right statism and structuralism, viz. “the structural principles of mythical scientism” (p.32); elsewhere, he refers to ‘systemic patterning’ (Dallas 1982, p.2), and a ‘systemic method of total control’ (p.7) effected through four basic myths, viz. progress, development, evolution, education (pp.12-29).

14 According to Marx (1990), Mumford should be seen as “a generalist with strong philosophical convictions [and that] his work is best viewed as a sustained vindication of a single view of reality, a comprehensive historical, moral, and metaphysical – one might say cosmological doctrine [deriving from the Counter-Enlightenment ‘Romantic’ reaction] which may be called ‘organicism’.” (pp.6-7) Crucially, Marx goes on to state that “the opposition [or rather, conflict] between the organic and the mechanical, omnipresent in nineteenth-century thought, dominates Mumford’s thinking” and that “the ultimate source of the doctrine was post-Kantian German idealist thinking.” (p.7) Consistent with this view, Casillo (1992) characterizes Mumford’s thought as broadly Hegelian-idealist yet non-determinist, evolutionary yet non-materialist. Although Mumford and Rorty are both indebted to the naturalistic and organicist thinking of Dewey – for example, Marx (1990)
Heidegger as well as with Heidegger himself, is usury. According to Dallas, the being of the contemporary world— that is, Ge-Stell / En-Framing— must be understood in terms of that cybernetic totalism within which information has become the currency of the economic mega-machine that is finance capitalism. Heidegger occupies a particularly important place to engage with beings in a given era. Marx— and Rorty— frames the issue of agency in ontically-antrophic terms; yet what if Mumford is unconsciously gesturing towards the non-anthropic ontological? (Consider, in this regard, Mumford’s distinction in Technics and Civilization (1934) between machines (that is, specific technical objects) and the machine— later “the megamachine”— (that is, the entire technological complex). In this connection, Marx refers to Mumford’s “propensity to treat this technological concept as a virtually autonomous agent of history” (p.17); however, is Mumford's megamachine an agent— that is, a thing / entity and therefore something ontically-causal— or does the ‘technological complex’ in fact constitute a way of being in the sense of the Heideggerian Ge-Stell / En-Framing as an epochal destining / sending forth of being itself?) I would suggest that, among other factors, it is this alleged ‘ontological’ orientation of Mumford’s position that resonates strongly with Dallas given the latter’s appeal to the later Heidegger (and Nietzsche): for example, in The Conduct of Life (1951), Mumford insists that “we must create a new person, who is at one with nature, and a new concept of nature which does full justice to the person”, a view that arguably bears a striking similarity to Dallas’ (1988) Nietzschean-influenced insistence on the need to bring forth ‘a new man’ (p.7). (In this connection, it is interesting to note that Heidegger appeals to a certain conception of the Nietzschean ‘Overman’ in his last period of thinking when referring to an elite group of poets, artists and others who are the heralds of “a God”— that is, a post-En-Framing way of being.) However, it should be noted that according to Casillo (1992), Mumford also follows Ellul in fearing that “any attempt to resolve the social impasse must rely on technological solutions and must therefore re-entrench the technology”. (p.114) This view should be contrasted with that of Heidegger (1977) who follows Jünger’s lead concerning the need to embrace technological Ge-Stell / En-framing in order to overcome it, a view with which Dallas (1990) concurs: “fully in accordance with Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, Jünger insists that the way to freedom lies in plunging into the new reality, embracing it, taking it on, and by a new force, going beyond it.” (p.197).

In this connection, consider, for example, Dallas’ (1988) assertion of “the ur-phenomenon of the global disaster – the crime of usury, the organic disease responsible for the surface eruptions of famine, ecological havoc and nuclear nervous.” (p.6)

In this connection, mention should be made of a brief essay exploring the transformation of language under Ge-Stell / En-Framing by Morrison (2013) who cites Ivan Illich’s Vernacular Values (1980) as drawing attention to “how in 1492 the scholar and grammarian Antonio de Nebrija (1441-1522) petitions Queen Isabella to support his project for the deliberate and systematic displacement of vernacular language by means of the professional formulation and imposition of abstract grammatical rules and the compilation of dictionaries through which gradual process Illich identifies ‘the coming of the market-intensive society in which we now live’ [emphases added].” (pp.10-11) Mention might also be made of Marx’s (1990) pointing to Mumford’s assertion that “abstractions of money, spatial perspective, and mechanical time provided the enclosing frame of modern life [emphases added]” in

maintains that for Mumford, “human beings are organisms, hence their behaviour and their arts are best understood as the outcome of organic processes” (p.7) – Mumford rejects the conventional Darwinian account of evolution based exclusively on competition, favouring an alternative account incorporating cooperation. It should also be noted that according to Casillo (1992), Mumford rejects both statist (p.94) and systemic (p.98) thinking, two lines of critique that Dallas appeals to in his critique of structuralism. Regarding Mumford’s views on technology, Casillo (1992) maintains that for the later Mumford of the 1960s, who has incorporated the insights of Jacques Ellul regarding ‘autonomous technology’, “man is integrated within a technological system which destroys all other alternatives.” (p.114) However, Marx (1990), who considers the thinking of the later Mumford to be increasingly marked by a messianic and apocalyptic tone, criticises Mumford for “imput[ing] historical agency to disembodied abstractions – especially the controlling organic and machine metaphors.” According to Marx, “it is one thing for a historian to emphasize the role of ideas adhered to by significant social groups, but it is quite another to regard history as driven by unmoored ideas aloof, as it were, above the surface occupied by people and events” (p.16), thereby betraying a certain tacit commitment to a materialist – and anthropocentric – conception of the historical. (In this connection it is interesting to note that Mumford’s conception of the megamachine is based on Jung’s notion of the archetype.) Can – should – a similar charge be made against Heidegger as Rorty and other commentators have argued (Thomson 2013) vis-à-vis the latter’s reference to the way of being associated with specific historical epochs and being as determining the possibilities for engaging with beings in a given era? I should like to suggest that Marx’s critique of Mumford – and Rorty’s critique of Heidegger – is tacitly predicated on a secularized or ‘de-godded’ (Wynter 2003) conception of the historical, more specifically an onto-theology / metaphysics which traces the determining locus of history exclusively to human action. In short, Marx – and Rorty – frames the issue of agency in ontically-antropic terms; yet what if Mumford is unconsciously gesturing towards the non-anthropic ontological? (Consider, in this regard, Mumford’s distinction in Technics and Civilization (1934) between machines (that is, specific technical objects) and the machine – later “the megamachine” – (that is, the entire technological complex). In this connection, Marx refers to Mumford’s “propensity to treat this technological concept as a virtually autonomous agent of history” (p.17); however, is Mumford's megamachine an agent – that is, a thing / entity and therefore something ontically-causal – or does the ‘technological complex’ in fact constitute a way of being in the sense of the Heideggerian Ge-Stell / En-Framing as an epochal destining / sending forth of being itself?) I would suggest that, among other factors, it is this alleged ‘ontological’ orientation of Mumford’s position that resonates strongly with Dallas given the latter’s appeal to the later Heidegger (and Nietzsche): for example, in The Conduct of Life (1951), Mumford insists that “we must create a new person, who is at one with nature, and a new concept of nature which does full justice to the person”, a view that arguably bears a striking similarity to Dallas’ (1988) Nietzschean-influenced insistence on the need to bring forth ‘a new man’ (p.7). (In this connection, it is interesting to note that Heidegger appeals to a certain conception of the Nietzschean ‘Overman’ in his last period of thinking when referring to an elite group of poets, artists and others who are the heralds of “a God” – that is, a post-En-Framing way of being.) However, it should be noted that according to Casillo (1992), Mumford also follows Ellul in fearing that “any attempt to resolve the social impasse must rely on technological solutions and must therefore re-entrench the technology”. (p.114) This view should be contrasted with that of Heidegger (1977) who follows Jünger’s lead concerning the need to embrace technological Ge-Stell / En-framing in order to overcome it, a view with which Dallas (1990) concurs: “fully in accordance with Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, Jünger insists that the way to freedom lies in plunging into the new reality, embracing it, taking it on, and by a new force, going beyond it.” (p.197)
in Dallas’ thinking insofar as the latter sees the former as having “reflected profoundly on the crisis of the age, on the nature of time and on death, as well as Being and the Being of beings”, and the importance of authenticity (Dallas 1988, p.79). Such reflections need to be understood in the context of certain ostensibly ‘Islamist’ commitments: for example, in his early writings, Dallas frames the relationship between Islam and ‘the West’ / Europe in a confrontational manner maintaining that “the [Islamic] struggle was not one of ideas, or science versus superstition, advanced versus backward, it was Europe versus the Islamic society [emphasis added]” (Dallas 1978, pp.30-31). However, later works, notable for their explicit engagement with Heideggerian (as well as Nietzschean and Jüngerian) thought, unsettle the terms of this engagement somewhat, and by specific appeal to Heidegger, viz. “the time has come to fight the West itself to save the project of Dasein and by ironic implication save the great Western tradition which has brought us to this urgent moment, or as it must eventually be grasped, Being itself has brought us to this impasse that we might resolve it, given the desire that Being itself possesses for our liberation [emphasis added].” (Dallas 1988, p.86) This ‘shift’ in position, from confrontation with Europe / ‘the West’ to the identification of the latter as the site from which Islam is to re-emerge onto the world stage as successor to the current order, is reiterated in the Preface to the second edition of The Way of Muhammad (1975), viz. “it [is] possible to grasp the meaning of Islam in terms of the European existential tradition. Indeed, it is of course the culmination of it [emphasis added].” (Dallas 2002, p.2) 17

Dallas’ most sustained engagement with Heidegger appears in For the Coming Man (1988) which attempts to argue for the following:

1. A distinction between historical revisionism and historical method grounded in the ontological difference. According to Dallas (1988), “revisionism implies that a distinction has to be made between one official version of history and another version which contains both new material and a new interpretation of events. If it is the historical method that is being questioned then something much deeper and much more serious is at stake. The former implies essentially a cover-up, which of course is reprehensible, while the latter proposes a completely new set of integers, new structural concepts and a

which “man … is reduced to a standardized servo-mechanism [emphasis added]” (p.12), all of which point to an entanglement with themes of usury explored by Dallas and the phenomenon of Ge-Stell / En-Framing as presented by Heidegger in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977). However, it is important to appreciate that Dallas’ understanding of the Heideggerian Ge-Stell / En-Framing as concealing its grounding in shadowy ‘economic’ forces of finance capitalism in due to Jünger, who had a formative influence on Heidegger. According to Dallas, “in 1932, Jünger had recognised that technology did not represent a set of complex tools for man’s use but a new power, technique, which had its own reality and inner logic to which it would in the end make man subservient. Jünger identifies modern man as under the Gestalt of the Worker. Each one of us is defined within the all-embracing system of technique … Jünger makes his case that economics is simply a pernicious industrial process in itself and as such part of the total system that is technique. What is at issue, he insists, is neither economic liberty not economic power, but power in general.” (p.194) For a detailed discussion of Jünger’s seminal influence on Heidegger, see Zimmerman (1990).

17 The similarity between Dallas’ position and the ‘Orientalist’ views of late 18th and 19th century German Romantics – both of which evince a Eurocentric outlook – is readily apparent: for example, Mahdi (1990) maintains that “German Romanticism began with the notion that there was something fundamentally wrong with the excesses of scientism or rationalism or philosophy in the modern West and that it was necessary to supplement it with the poetic, religious, and spiritual dimensions of human life, which can be found in the East. The West was incomplete and needed to complete itself with what it had somehow lost during its recent development. It needed to unify the shattered pieces of human experience; and the way to achieve this unity was to learn about it from the East where it continued to exist and where the missing part — the poetic – had survived [emphasis added].” (p.75)
fundamental change in what the motor forces of events are and the social imperatives on which society is built." (p.8) I suggest that Dallas is here tacitly invoking Heidegger’s ontological difference between beings (phenomena, the ontic, historical revisionism) and being (horizon, the ontological, historical method).

2. Advocacy of a ‘post-structuralist’ and ‘post-positivist’ conception of the relationship between language and being. In this connection, Dallas (1988) maintains that “the adoption of a philosophical method implies the immediate embarkation upon a political activism. It is this that is most feared and has been most brilliantly blocked from the masses by the dominant elite. The main body of those who might approach the philosophical discourse has been effectively trapped in a series of pseudo-sciences which are vacuum-packed to avoid contaminating the social nexus. Linguistics, hermeneutics, phenomenology, a set of boxed games have been proffered to those who stepped outside the acceptable disciplines of positivism and dialectical method.” (p.26)

On his view, “the philosophical discourse, has itself been severed, and in its place a deliberate set of pseudo-sciences which stand in for critical thought, assuring that those who desire to think will not challenge the moral foundations of the society but simply while away their time in meaningless debates about linguistics, literary textual post mortems, and hermeneutics, then we will neither have the means nor the arena to voice a dissident view.” (p.44) Put simply, “if anyone [now] tried to think philosophically it could only be about structures and words.” (p.79)

3. Identification of Ge-Stell / En-Framing as the being of the contemporary era and its implication for the being of the human being following the emergence of the Kantian-Cartesian duality of subject and object. According to Dallas (1990), what “Heidegger had laid bare [in Being and Time] was the deception at the heart of the Kantian description of subjectivity. The impact of this phenomenological unveiling of the observational procedure which set the absolute observer over and against the encompassed object, and which claimed an illusory purity within the event, resonated through all the phenomenologically based sciences, firstly and vitally, history, then psychology, in particular the psycho-analytical methods, anthropology, sociology, and finally, linguistics. This great work had changed for ever the terms of the philosophical discourse. Heidegger’s insight into the nature of technique was the result of his phenomenological exploration of the everyday procedures which resulted from its all-embracing exigencies.” (pp.189-190) In terms of the ‘end-game’ of Cartesian subjectivity, Dallas (1988) maintains that “man manipulates nature to liberate himself in his supreme subjectivity and finds, by the objectification necessary for the control of nature, that he has enslaved himself.” (p.82)

4. Grounding technological being – or ‘technique’ – in the operation of the ostensibly ‘shadowy’ forces of finance capitalism / usury. In this connection, Dallas (1988) asserts that “we find ourselves in a society, a world society, unified as it is by the technological project, which in one of its crucial dimensions is communications, where the technical process, obedient as it is to the mystique of ‘market forces’ reduces the human being to a lost creature without sense of meaning or depths [emphasis added].” (p.81)

5. Critique of the view that technology should be seen as a ‘tool’ echoing Heidegger’s (1977) insistence that “the essence of technology is nothing technological”. According to Dallas (1988), “[f]or Heidegger the idea that technology is a passive tool in our hands is an untenable naïveté and dangerous failure of comprehension regarding its nature. Technology possesses its own inner logic and dynamic that in the end is self-operative and does not, in a very real way, need man. It becomes its own raison d’être. Thus the
mastery of subjectivity that is man becomes enslaved by the apparently passive slave process that is technology. Significantly Heidegger observes that the drive to technologist nature stems from man's sense of being homeless in the world and thus the technological project to tame nature is to provide that home. In the end man makes himself at home everywhere but then nowhere finds he feels at home." (p. 83)

6. Interrogation of the metaphysical tradition with a view to transcending its current grip on human being in the era of Ge-Still / En-Framing. In this connection, Dallas (1988) maintains that “Heidegger goes to the depths of the dynamic of our thinking and questions metaphysics and thinking itself. In his view, it is not enough to negate metaphysics but rather to confront its core and so be free of its overpowering grip on man. To do this Heidegger engaged in a lifelong discourse on the nature of the human being (Dasein) as a project-directed entity and Being itself." (pp.85-86) On his view, Heidegger “felt obliged to rename man, Dasein. For what he had done was nothing less than cast aside the image of man as the enslaved end product of unconfessed functionality and passivity, and replace it with a view of man as a project-oriented being, active and engaged in encountering his meanings and his mortality." (Dallas 1990, p.190)

7. Controversially, that being (Sein) should be viewed in other than impersonal terms – specifically, as capable of desire. According to Dallas (1988), “it would seem if one reads [Heidegger] correctly that the time has come to fight the West itself to save the project of Dasein and by ironic implication save the great Western tradition which has brought us to this urgent moment, or as it must eventually be grasped, Being itself has brought us to this impasse that we might resolve it, given the desire that Being itself possesses for our liberation [emphasis added].” (p.86) I am inclined to the view that attributing a desire for liberation – in fact, desire per se – to being arguably takes us beyond Heidegger. Or is it that liberation is indeed ‘intrinsic’ to being insofar as the essence of Ereignis lies in radical contingency – that is, ‘freedom’?

In terms of critique, I want to suggest that Dallas' position is problematic on a number of counts:

1. Dallas’ mobilization of Heidegger – and Heidegger’s thinking in and of itself – is fundamentally Eurocentric, although such Eurocentrism becomes more evident in his later writings. For example, in an early work, Dallas maintains that “the struggle was not one of ideas, or science versus superstition, advanced versus backward, it was Europe versus the Islamic society [emphasis added] and “we are at war” (Dallas 1978, pp.30-31,38). However, a decade later he insists that “in order for us to recover our intellectual balance and our political dynamism it is therefore essential that we reconnect with the most profound and radical stream of the Western tradition, the life-blood of our civilisation. There is no doubt that Western philosophy followed the flow of Western culture. It was Ancient Greek, it became Roman and it ended up German. In the great humanist and idealist tradition of the German thinkers, Western philosophy has always been the lodestone of critical and applicable thought. That discourse reached its traumatic end in Nietzsche and was rescued in turn by Heidegger ... If Heidegger can provide us with the uttermost depths of our knowledge in his discourse on Being itself, he also opens the door on Nietzsche for us so that we can see in a clear light the profound and necessary illumination he brings to us about the problems of the modern age [emphases added].” (Dallas 1988, pp.26-27) Significantly, Dallas refers elsewhere in this
work to the German nation as the “core and heart of Western civilisation” (p.72). I would suggest that it is indigenous Europeans that are being addressed here, although Bewley (1992) has argued that it should be understood to include second-generation diaspora Muslims given historical migration.

2. While Dallas points to Islam as the way of being of ‘the coming man’, his conception of Islam is framed against the backdrop of a rather disparaging outlook vis-à-vis non-European Islam. For example, and controversially, Dallas (1988) has stated the following: “Let no-one think for one minute that we mean by Islam that decadent, Hindu-saturated idolatry that exists in the East today, or that anti-intellectual bigotry of the modern mullahs and ulama who have converted a transformative and heroic way into a sexually guilt-ridden, impotised resentment worse than the rabbis ever dreamed. Nor can we possibly mean that superficial house of balsa facing the whirlwind that is the modernist Islam taught in North Africa, itself the bastard child of the very dualism of the West which we now must remedy.” (p.88)

3. Dallas’ failure to perceive the possibility of a persistence of secularised Christian themes within the Heideggerian oeuvre, both early and late. For example, according to Dallas (1988), Heidegger “Dasein’s facing the reality of Being, that Being which cannot be thought, nor yet escaped, and which does illuminate. His stubborn refusal to situate that experience either socially or personally inside the Christian tradition is not just due to his agreement with Nietzsche on the insidious nature of its false theology and its odd rites of homeopathic anthropophagy and so on, all anathema to the thinking mind, but is because he was convinced that Being itself had a new destiny waiting for the West.” (pp.87-88) While numerous commentators have pointed to Heidegger’s retrieval of pre-Christian Greek ‘paganism’ as a resource for imagining a ‘poetic’ new thinking about being, it is important to consider the extent to which Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein and the ‘apocalyptic’ tone of Heidegger’s history of being as a ‘forgetting’ and ‘falling’ into technological nihilism is inflected by Heidegger’s own Eurocentrism and Christian background; on this point, see Caputo (1993).

4. Conflation of Islamic discourse about God (Allah) with Heideggerian discourse about being (Sein). Examples of such conflation include the following statements: “It is our conviction that the only model which fits the Heideggerian need is Islam and that his own deeply moving and profound reflections on Being itself are nothing other than pure and exact delineations of what may be said about Allah [emphasis added]” (p.88); “properly speaking, there is no theology in Islam. It is not necessary. The declension of Allah’s being, the Being of Beings, is defined by Him in the Qur’an [emphasis added]” (p.92); “Islam in its Qur’anic model offers man a view of Dasein and its intimate nearness to Sein itself, a foundation from which we can create a new society in harmony with a science finally dominated by a non-suicidal species” (p.89); and “the ancient stone is of course the Black Stone of the Ka’aba in Makka, linking an Adamic beginning to an Ibrahimic teaching when it was placed as a corner stone of the Ka’aba, the first House built by mankind for pure Being, Sein, not a religious deity of anthropomorphic character [emphasis added].” (p.90) It is crucial to appreciate that Dallas’ position is informed by way of reference to an extract from ‘Chapter 29: Being as The Void and as Abundance’ appearing in Heidegger’s Nietzsche, Volume IV: Nihilism (Heidegger 1982a) which is quoted in (Dallas 1988). At the end of the quote, Dallas states: “Thus Martin Heidegger. It is this that Islam names Tawhid.” (p.91) Dallas’ quote is reproduced verbatim in works by other members of the Murabitun including those of Abdulhaqq Bewley (1992) who describes it as “a clear and complete “exposition of pure unitary thought” (p.35), and
Uthman Morrison (1997) who refers to it as “[a] remarkable affirmation of the oneness of existence long known to the Muslims as Tawhid” (p.72). However, it should be noted that the extract quoted by Dallas, and subsequently reproduced by Bewley and Morrison, is partial / incomplete, omitting a number of phrases that appear between the phrases cited by Dallas. The complete extract, which forms part of a lecture course delivered by Heidegger at the University of Freiburg in 1940, is usefully compared and contrasted with the much briefer formulation given in Heidegger’s *Basic Concepts* (1993) based on a lecture course from 1941, viz. “Being is the emptiest and at the same time a surplus. Being is the most common and at the same time unique. Being is the most intelligible and at the same time concealment. Being is the most worn-out and at the same time the origin. Being is the most reliable and at the same time the non-ground. Being is the most said and at the same time a keeping silent. Being is the most forgotten and at the same time remembrance. Being is the most constraining and at the same time liberation.” (p.57) It is interesting to note that although Dallas’ identification of being (*Sein*) with God (Allah) has been upheld – in fact, repeated – by some members of the Murabitun such as Bewley and Morrison, it has been contested by others, specifically Kent Palmer (1994) on the grounds that sustained philosophical, system-theoretical and post-Heideggerian phenomenological inquiry demonstrates that being is, in fact, fundamentally fragmented, ‘bottoming-out’ in a void or abyss which marks the limit or end-point of ‘being-thinking’ and points to the need to consider that which is ‘beyond being’.

1.2.1. Umar Vadillo

Born in 1964, Umar Ibrahim Vadillo is a Basque convert to Islam who took over leadership of the Murabitun from Ian Dallas sometime in the 1990s. Although the majority of his research tends to focus on economic and financial matters including a sustained critique of banking as viewed from an Islamic political-activist perspective informed by Dallas’ thinking on the issue, Vadillo has written an interesting essay entitled ‘Heidegger for Muslims’ (2006) in which he points to the following:

1. Western philosophy as a ‘history of the forgetting of being’ in its failure to recognise that truth as correspondence stands in a derivative relationship to truth as unconcealment (*alēthia*). According to Vadillo (2006), “the logic of the [Socratic] Greeks brought a new way of relating to truth that was going to change everything from then on. Truth is through logic a theory of correspondence. It is no longer ‘unconcealment’ (*alēthia*). The new relationship has a new direction: it goes from the ‘I’ (the subject who states) to the truth of the entity (the object which is stated). This is an inversion of the … approach …

---

18 Regarding his understanding of ‘unicity’ (*tawhid*), Bewley (1992) states that it refers “not [to] the distant capricious potentate God of misinterpreted scripture, but Reality itself, that Oneness on which everything is totally and continually dependent for its being, but which is Itself beyond need of anything – a Oneness, not in the mathematical sense of being the first of two or three, but rather that absolute singularity of the physicists which does not permit the existence of anything else alongside it” (p.1).

19 According to information contained inside the dustjacket to his magnum opus, *The Esoteric Deviation in Islam* (2003), “after attending the Augustinian College in Navarre he went on to study agronomy at the University of Madrid. While still at university he embraced Islam. There followed a long period of study applying the commercial parameters defined in Islam’s founding legal document, Imam Malik’s Al-Muwatta, to modern financial practice. This led to his studies on Zakat, which implied the necessary use of the Islamic Gold Dinar and Silver Dirham. He has lectured extensively in various universities, notably in Morocco, Malaysia and Indonesia.”
in which Truth manifests to us.” (p.16) On his view, “the birth of philosophy represented the creation of a way of thinking that transformed the nature of our relation to Truth, and implicitly our understanding of Truth. This transformation replaced knowledge from being understood as unconcealment to a theory of correspondence of logos. This transformation changed the way man himself was going to be understood. The intimate relation that bound the seeker to Truth as a ‘locus of the self-disclosure of Truth’ was transformed into a detached relation that alienated the enquirer from Truth as a ‘logical maker of truth’. This departure was the event of the birth of philosophy. Our criticism of philosophy does not mean that this way of thinking is useless. Our criticism is that this way of thinking is limited. The lack of awareness of this limitation is the danger. Its claim to have absolute validity is the danger.’ (pp.18-19)

2. Sufism as providing a way of engaging with ‘The Real’ beyond the alleged limitations of the later Heidegger’s ‘poetic’ understanding of being based on a retrieval of pre-Socratic thinking. Vadillo (2006) maintains that “access to the Truth has changed its meaning from being ‘unveiling’ (in pre-Socratic or pre-philosophical thinking this is called ‘unconcealment’, αλήθια in Greek) meaning the one that enquires needs unveiling so that the Truth can manifest to him; to another meaning, a theory of correspondence between a statement and what we understand by the entity itself. The first approach, ‘unveiling’, is what we understand as knowledge in Sufism and through Sufism we have a clear indication of what it means.” (p.12) On his view, “for the early [that is, pre-Socratic] Greeks, man stands in an intimate relation with Truth, deriving his own nature from that bond and existing as ‘the locus of the self-disclosure of Truth’. At the same time he seeks to struggle with himself to allow Truth shine through what prevents its disclosure ... We can easily relate (understand) this way of thinking before Socrates, because we have the advantage of Sufism. The Sufis have spoken of man as ‘the locus in which lights manifest’ and that particular locus is not placed in the brain, but in the heart. In the heart of man the lights manifest. Man is engaged in this relationship: he cannot escape from it. Man is created with this feature: this capacity with which man can reach his Creator. The process by which man comes closer to Allah, is in the language of Sufism, ‘unveiling’. Unveiling is the removing of the nafs, of the self. The self has no business in the knowing. In that sense, the self is not the instrument of knowledge, the self cannot think Allah. Allah manifests to him, in the process of his submission to Him: when you submit to Allah, Allah gives you knowledge of Him. Covering the Truth, is clearly expressed by the term Kufr. Uncovering what covers the Truth is in itself knowledge. Naturally, we are not saying the pre-Socratic poets were Sufis. They did not know Islam, they could not be Sufis. Their thinking is not Sufism. What we are saying is that we are better prepared to understand the language which they used. This is important in order to understand what happened during and after the Birth of Philosophy. It will help us to understand the gap that was created and the departure that took place. This is what matters to us. We have no further need to explore the pre-Socratics. They have nothing of use to us. We have enough with Islam [emphasis added].” (pp.14-15)

Crucially, Vadillo insists that “for the Sufis, what removes the veils (what creates clearing), is not the analytical or scientific look at creation, but rather remembrance/dhikr of Allah (Truth) in every occasion; and what sets man in his track is remembrance of death.” (p.29)

“we do not manufacture ‘fashionable Truth’ (according to our fashion of thinking). There is no such thing. Whoever tries to reach Truth with that way of questioning it only encounters something else: himself. Truth withdraws from essential (philosophical) questioning. If the enquirer is not aware of the limitation, he will think that what comes forward as the answer of his enquiry is the Truth, but it is not. And that enquirer will forever be confused. If that enquirer enquires about God, he will reach a concept of God, but not Allah. This is the world of theology. Theology [like science] does not think.” (p.9)

Put simply, “God is never thought, only the concept of God is thought.” (p.16)

It should be noted that, like his mentor Dallas, Vadillo is committed to a particularly strident ‘Islamist’ position, yet one that goes beyond Dallas vis-à-vis the importance, yet limitations, of Heidegger’s thought for Islam and Muslims. For example, Vadillo (2006) maintains that “you have to know what to expect as a Muslim out of the study of Heidegger. He was not a Muslim, so we are not looking for answers about what is Islam. He cannot give them to us. What Heidegger can help us with is to understand the way of thinking that has become predominant in the West, and by extension all over the world. He called it Metaphysics.” (p.2) In his view, Islam affords the Muslim a unique understanding of the Heideggerian project, specifically that “Heidegger left something unresolved. He finished Philosophy. But he could only vaguely point out the way forward. He resolved this problem with what he calls ‘poetry’, not just any poetry, but the poetry of the one who is no longer himself. The one that lets ‘the things show themselves’ to him. The one who is no longer the observer, but the observed.” Crucially, however, Vadillo maintains that Heidegger “could not go any further. I would not say that what he pointed out was nothing, it was very important. But nobody yet has picked up this unfinished affair. Because the resolution of the End of Philosophy is only one: Islam. After Heidegger’s closing of the shop of philosophy, only Islam can take over. The only possible destiny of the thinking of the West, of the West itself, is Islam. This is why I say that Heidegger spoke to us, because only we, the Muslims, can finish his affair [emphases added].” (pp.3-4)

1.2.2. Kent (‘Abdal-Alim) Palmer

Perhaps the most profound and extensive Murabitun engagement with Heidegger and post-Heideggerian thought, however, is that due to Kent Palmer, an American who converted to Islam at the hands of Dallas while studying in London during the 1980s. Palmer is the author of a number of difficult works including The Fragmentation of Being and The Path beyond The Void (1994) and Primal Ontology and Archaic Existentiality (2000), and various essays exploring the idea of non-duality in Buddhist, Taoist and Sufi thought with a view to surmounting the dualistic nature of Western onto-theology / metaphysics as understood by Heidegger. Palmer’s concern, like that of Dallas as stated in the latter’s The Way of Muhammad (2002), is to expose the ‘nondual kernel’ at the core of the Western worldview by thinking through its structure from the perspective of one situated within this tradition but thinking in terms of a non-dual Sufism20 with the latter itself being informed by thinking drawn

---

20 As Palmer (2014), who mentions being trained in East Asian Studies and specifically Buddhist philosophy, states: “My way was not to study Islam directly or Sufism directly. My way was to go back and to try to understand the Western worldview from the point of view of Islamic Sufism and other nondual perspectives ... [My way was to view] Western Philosophy ... from the perspective of Islamic Sufism within the context of the Western tradition itself; [that is,] within the context of an understanding of the structure of the Western worldview.” (pp.3-5) Palmer’s objective – like Dallas’ – appears to be to ‘complete’ the Western tradition by saving it from itself insofar as it has lost its way in duality. Crucially, anticipating somewhat the arguments of
from other non-dual traditions including Taoism, Buddhism and Advita Vedanta. As an example of such non-dual thinking, consider Palmer’s (2000) Sufi critique of the Divine as wholly transcendent (and non-immanent): “Islam, contrary to popular belief does not appeal to a transcendent God, Allah over and against the mundane world. Islam is completely misunderstood when it is seen as being merely a distortion of Christianity and Judaism. Rather, **Islam is undecidable about the transcendence or immanence of God.** It uses supra-rationality to posit both at the same time and attempts to stave off the ruin that comes from taking the Christian route of accepting paradoxical mixing of the Human and the Divine in the theory of incarnation and the trinity. We sharpen this contrast when we realize that in Islam the positing of God as having either Existence or Being must be an error, because these are duals and the real-truth (*haqq*) must always be the non-dual middle way between all extremes, a position that Islam shares with Buddhism. Thus we settle on the word ‘manifestation’ which means the appearance of the *sifaat*, or attributes, of God as being something we must see through things and their attributes to recognize. The god who is dead is the one who like in Christianity is the Supreme Being, and who like in traditional ‘Asharite theology has necessary existence. The ‘Asharites add an attribute to God that he does not claim for himself in order to fit their theology into an Aristotelian mould that supports the idea of substance. God in that theology is made the ultimate existential substance by being given the attribute of existence which is denied to everything else. Instead, it is better to think that both of these Gods are dead, i.e. the God of Being and the God of Existence. Rather God, as Allah the Unique, manifests beyond this duality in a realm where death is impossible for God. Both the God of the Jews, i.e. the Existent God of the Old Testament, and the God of the Christians that is rooted in Being both miss this essential non-duality of Manifestation between the duals of Existence and Being. This analysis leads us to a different non-theological possibility that has only been attained by the Sufi’s within Islam previously [emphases added].” (p. 117)

1.2.3. Murabitun Discourse – a Decolonial Critique

In terms of transversal arguments relating to the question concerning ‘Heidegger and the Islamicate’, Murabitun discourse is important insofar as it exemplifies Islamicate engagement with Heidegger indigenous to Europe, and thereby outside the Islamicate world as conventionally understood in historical and geographical terms; in addition, it evinces ‘critical’ engagement with the Heideggerian corpus, pointing to the limitations of the Heideggerian project and suggesting ways forward based on ideas drawn from Sufism and Islam. Yet while granting these ‘positive’ aspects of Murabitun discourse about Heidegger, I should like to suggest that one of its principal failings is that, notwithstanding certain differences among Murabitun thinkers including, significantly, whether being (*Sein*) should be identified with God (Allah) or otherwise, it is Eurocentric. While this Eurocentrism is particularly evident in the case of Dallas, it can also be detected in the writings of Bewley21, Morrison, Vadillo and

---

Avens (1982) on the need to engage the imaginal at the limit point of the later Heidegger’s poetic onto-phenoemenology, Palmer states that his oeuvre involves an attempt to ‘invite’ the transformative and purifying prophetic / Muhammadan way “within the imaginal realm to enter the Western worldview” (p.5) which he characterises as ‘poisonous’ and non-dual, yet dark, viz. “nihilism ... flows from the core of the Western worldview.” (p.10)

21 Consider, for example, the following statement by Bewley (1992): “What is needed now is a new growth of Islam completely distinct from any discrete form that Islam has taken in the past. We have to bring out a new growth of Islam from the very texture of our own time, an expression of Islam that will embrace and encompass and absorb and transform the classical tradition of Greece and the European tradition ...” (pp.36-37). In addition,
Palmer, despite engagement with non-European currents of thought including pan-Africanism, Buddhism, Taoism and Sufi philosophy. Palmer’s Eurocentrism is particularly interesting to consider from a decolonial perspective insofar as he contends that “the Western worldview is dominant within the world though colonialization and now globalization and it is ubiquitous across the earth, and thus it needs to be understood as deeply as possible in order to attempt to deal with its excesses which are destroying the planet, not to mention other species and other worlds rooted in the languages of various conquered peoples.” (Palmer 2014, p.6) While this might appear to indicate some form of commitment to overcoming Eurocentrism by decentering it and thinking with an alternative category system, in the context of focus on the Islamic tradition, he goes on to state that “thinking through their own tradition as they should is not the crucial issue confronting the Muslims, and others throughout the third world, but rather understanding the Western tradition is the crucial issue of our times. We are overwhelmed by it. Unless we understand what is overwhelming us we cannot go on to understand our own tradition free from a type of self-orientalisation [emphasis added].” (p.9) In short, the Western tradition is re-centred although Palmer somewhat paradoxically concedes that “we must understand the worldview that we are now part of due to Colonialism and now Globalization … from the point of view of Nondual traditions in general [emphasis added]” (p.9), thereby pointing to the necessity of “work[ing] out from the kernel of the Western worldview in order to transform it from within, because Islam has the capacity to purify even the darkness that is the Western worldview as it is lost in Nihilism. The future is a transformed Western worldview with Sufism at its center purified by Islam [emphases added].” (p.9) Thus, “the way forward is to seize the nondual kernel of the Western worldview itself and by embodying that non-duality from the vantage point of Sufism as the culmination of the whole history of nondual paths, to seek the inner transformation of the Western worldview out of its own inherent non-duality which is best realized based on the Otherness of the heresy of non-duality from within the worldview which is Islamic Sufism [emphases added].” (p.10) I would suggest that Islam – more specifically, Sufism – is here being mobilized in a somewhat ‘instrumentalist’ manner, perhaps as a form of Heideggerian readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), in order to rescue the Western cum global project; in short, a re-inscription of Eurocentrism.

While it might be argued that this line of critique fails to recognise that the Western / Eurocentric project has become a global phenomenon and that Heidegger’s conceptualisation of Ge-Stell / En-Framing as the being of global Eurocentrism provides the most accurate understanding of and pointer to the means by which to overcome it, I would suggest that insofar as the Murabitun see this ‘path beyond’ as unfolding within Europe, their engagement with Heidegger – and Heidegger’s oeuvre itself – constitute, at most, nothing more than an internal or ‘immanentist’ critique, viz. a Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism. Building on the insights of seminal decolonial thinkers such as Frantz Fanon, Sylvia Wynter and Lewis Gordon, and following Maldonado-Torres (2004, 2010), I maintain that the ‘dark underside’ of coloniality remains largely unproblematic and / or concealed in Heidegger’s discourse on modernity as Ge-Stell and its ‘Islamist’ appropriation by the Murabitun. Heidegger’s thinking is fundamentally Eurocentric insofar as it assumes the form of a ‘post-philosophical’ critique of Eurocentric philosophy from within Eurocentric philosophy. According to Maldonado-Torres (2004, 2010), Heidegger’s existential-analytic of Dasein

and restating the position articulated earlier by Dallas (1988), Bewley maintains that “the European tradition has been preparing itself for Islam and … Islam is necessary if Western civilisation is to be turned back from its self-destructive course.” (p.48)
conceals / ignores the colonial underside of modernity\textsuperscript{22}; consider, for example, how Heidegger’s ontological difference between being and beings – and, in the context of human beings, between existentials and existentiells – obscures the ‘colonial difference’ between coloniser and colonised. As Maldonado-Torres points out, to-be-colonised is not a way of being – that is, it is not an existentiell of Dasein; rather, according to Fanon, to-be-colonised is to inhabit a zone of non-being – that is, it is a way of not-being or what might be referred to as an existentiell of the damnés (lit. ‘damned’). In addition, and borrowing a term from Jackson (2005), it might be asked to what extent are Heidegger’s existentials in fact ‘false universals’ that re-inscribe secularised forms of the European / Western Christian way of being?\textsuperscript{23}

2. Reversals

I now want to turn to my second argument concerning the project of investigating ‘Heidegger in the Islamicate World’ and suggest that this framing is tacitly Orientalist and Eurocentric, thereby warranting contestation through decentering. I should like to begin by suggesting that a decolonial commitment to decentering Eurocentrism requires us to consider shifting the terms of engagement from those set by use of the prepositional ‘in’ to those associated with use of the conjunctive ‘and’; in short, engaging with ‘Heidegger and the Islamicate’ rather than ‘Heidegger in the Islamicate’. Effecting such a shift leads to my second argument, a reversal, which considers the possibility of a largely ‘bracketed’ Islamicate ‘contribution’ to the genealogy of Heideggerian thought – in particular, for the later ‘post-turn’ Heidegger’s poetic and ‘mystical’ thinking. Consistent with the understanding that genealogies are fluid, hybrid and cross-civilizational, I do not seek to argue that (later) Heideggerian thought can be reductively traced to and/or grounded in Islamicate thought; rather, merely that the presence of Islamicate thought in Heideggerian thought – which has thus far been noticeable for its near absence – must be acknowledged, and that upon close examination, such ‘bracketed’ Islamicate influences provide resources for thinking beyond Heidegger.

2.1. Heidegger’s (near) ‘Silence’ on the Islamicate

As El-Bizri (2010) has rightly pointed out, Heidegger does refer, albeit fleetingly, to ‘Arabic philosophy’ and the seminal contributions of ibn Sina (Avicenna) to Thomistic thought and Medieval Scholasticism, both of which Heidegger explores in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1982b), viz. the problem of essentia and existentia “can be traced back to Arabic philosophy, above all to Avicenna and his commentary on Aristotle. But Arabic philosophy is influenced essentially by Neoplatonism...” (p.81) Significantly, in the context of a comparison of the understanding of the meaning of metaphysics in Heidegger and Mulla Sadra\textsuperscript{24}, Faruque (2017) maintains that Heidegger shares with the latter “a common

\textsuperscript{22} According to Faruque (2017), for Heidegger “metaphysical inquiry must represent a holistic point of view and should be based on the intrinsic standpoint of the existent / being that questions.” (p.632) Yet, as Maldonado-Torres (2004, 2010) has shown, this ‘existent / being that questions’ – i.e. Dasein – is tacitly raced as European. Insofar as Heidegger’s legacy is rooted in Cartesianism, if only as an attempting at overcoming it, and endorsing decolonial thinker Enrique Dussel’s (2000) argument that the Cartesian ego cogito (or thinking subject) is historically preceded by, and arguably grounded in, an ‘ego conquiro’ (or conquering subject), Heidegger’s concern with “the existential condition of modern humans” must thereby be understood as predicated on the ‘entangled’ emergence of modernity with coloniality.

\textsuperscript{23} On this point, see Caputo (1993).

\textsuperscript{24} Şadr ad-Dīn Muḥammad Shīrāzī (c. 1571/2 – 1640 CE), an eminent thinker of the School of Isfahan.
received history of philosophy, namely the Greco-Islamic tradition stretching from the Presocratics and extending to the great medieval philosophers, such as Avicenna (d. 1037) and Averroës [ibn Rushd] (d. 1198). (In Heidegger’s case, he received the Islamic tradition of philosophy primarily through the Christian scholastics with whom he was so familiar.)" (pp.629-630) Yet Faruque goes on to argue that although Heidegger “was acquainted with Islamic philosophy, as he mentions it in his writings”, such acquaintance deriving from his engagement with the Latin scholastics, “it is clear from his opinions that although he knew Latin well, he did not pay serious attention to the works of Muslim philosophers [emphasis added].” (p.636) What might be the reason for this lack of ‘serious attention’ to Islamic philosophy? While Heidegger’s oeuvre is clearly Eurocentric insofar as it turns on an engagement with metaphysics from within the ‘Western’ philosophical tradition, El-Bizri (2010) insists that “Avicennism belongs to the history of European thought, at least in its Latinate scholasticism, along with the implicit impact it had on foundational figures in modern philosophy, such as Kant and Hegel” (p.12), the latter of whom are formative influences on Heideggerian thought; and, “ibn Sina’s legacy has its own European history, even if it is still considered by some philosophers, historians or theologians (principally in a non-Muslim milieu) as being the tradition of ‘the (oriental-Muslim) other’ that has been veiled within that history.” (p.13)^25 On this basis, it might be argued that at least one strand of Islamicate philosophy must be seen as situated within the European philosophical tradition, thereby unsettling Orientalist tendencies to position Islamicate philosophy as a disjunct ‘other’ to modern (i.e. European) philosophy, both historically-prior and geographically-external.

Yet given Heidegger’s acknowledgement of Avicennism, what might be the reason for his not paying ‘serious attention’ to it? One possible answer to this question suggested by El-Bizri is to simply afford Heidegger the benefit of the doubt, viz. “I do not imply … that Heidegger was not aware of the assimilation of Ibn Sina’s tradition within the European Latin scholarly circles. However, he might not have fully acknowledged the extent of the influence that has been exercised by Avicennism in that intellectual historical-cultural milieu. It might have been the case that Heidegger implicitly assumed that the entailments of ibn Sina’s metaphysics unquestionably belong to classical ontology, or he did not believe that Avicennism was integral to what he grasped as being the history of (Western) metaphysics [emphases added].” (p.14) While good-natured, I want to suggest that El-Bizri’s explanation for Heidegger’s lack of ‘serious attention’ to Islamicate – more specifically, Avicennan – philosophy is phenomenologically and decolonially inadequate in that it fails to consider other possible answers – specifically, and somewhat ironically, those tied to the history of European ‘othering’.

In this connection, another – in the sense of an ‘other’ – possible reason for the near total absence of engagement with Islamicate thinking in Heidegger’s history of the West’s ‘forgetting of being’ that might be advanced turns on the perceived nature of the relationship between Islamicate philosophy and Islam. For example, it might be argued that Heidegger’s overall non-engagement with the Islamicate is a consequence of methodological ‘bracketing’ on the grounds that Islam, as a religion, is merely yet another metaphysical / onto-

^25 On the matter of ‘othering’ and its role in the constitution of ‘self’, and returning to the figure of ibn Sina, Faruque (2017) maintains that “Heidegger does not consider that Avicenna’s philosophy testifies to the emergence of a phenomenological philosophical tradition that takes the question of being to be the most central concern of philosophical investigations. He does not account for what is “the other” within the history of Western metaphysics.” (pp.636-637)
theological phenomenon. While that is certainly possible, I would suggest that Suttor (1983) hints at an alternative explanation when he states that “conceiving the monastic theology Aquinas perfected to be the mystical style proper to Catholic Christians, later Latin and vernacular Western theologians did not study later Arabic (or Persian) theologians deeply, if at all; they generally dealt with Islam polemically” [emphasis added].” (p.87) This dismissive attitude towards Islamicate thought is ironic since Aquinas acknowledged his intellectual indebtedness to Avicenna and Averroes; as Suttor goes on to state, “Aquinas set an example never subsequently followed by Christians, when it came to the close study of and respect for Arabic Muslim theology. We have to say ‘never subsequently followed by Christians’ because, while Aquinas’s frontal debt to Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and methodological debt to Averroës (Ibn Rushd) became textbook commonplaces in the history of European thought, his example was not imitated by his disciples.” (p.87)

Drawing on Suttor’s pointer to Christian polemics, I want to suggest that when Faruque (2017) states that “Heidegger ignores Avicenna’s treatment of the problem of being and the centrality of that question within all the subsequent developments of Avicennan phenomenological ontology up to Sadra [emphasis added]” (p.637)26, such ‘ignorance’ should be understood as an ‘ignoring’ in the sense of a silencing / erasing / ‘bracketing’ of the Islamicate. Developing this line of argument, I want to further suggest that Heidegger’s near silence on the matter of Islamicate thought needs to be understood against the sedimented ‘background’ of a long durée history of European / Western anti-Islamism that commenced with the launch of the Crusades in 1095 CE (Ali 2017), an antagonistic ‘horizon’ which informed the thinking of key figures in the European tradition with which Heidegger engages including Luther27 and Kant28. In short, I want to suggest that Heidegger might be ‘guilty’ of tacitly reproducing the Orientalist ‘bracketing’ / ‘silencing’ / ‘erasure’ of the Islamicate endorsed by such figures29. While Heidegger engages with both Aquinas and

26 In what follows, it is argued that this series of developments includes the various contributions to metaphysical thinking made by ibn `Arabi, an influence on the Medieval Christian mystical thinker Meister Eckhart, whose thinking influenced Heidegger.
27 Crucially, in this connection, Caputo (1993) maintains that the early Heidegger “took his lead not from scholastic theologians like Aquinas, Scotus, and Suarez but from Pascal, Luther, and Kierkegaard, who in turn led him back to Augustine and Paul [emphasis added].” (p.272)
28 Heidegger’s engagement with Kant is significant since the latter refers to Muslims – specifically, Turks – as sensuous and irrational, and he has only negative things to say about Islam vis-à-vis the phenomenon of prophecy, views which are informed by a Lutheran perspective. (In this connection, it should be noted that Kant was notorious for not actually engaging directly with the ‘anthropological phenomena’ he writes about in his works.) Yet Heidegger also engages with Nietzsche, and the latter has a rather different view of Islam and Muslims – at least when compared with its scathing views on Christianity and Christians. For a brief discussion of Heidegger’s indebtedness to Kant and Luther, see Crowe (2006, p.18); for Kant’s views on the Islamicate world, see Almond (2011). On the matter of Nietzsche’s engagement with Islam, see Almond (2003) and Jackson (2007).
29 Mahdi (1990) argues that critical scholarship, exemplified by Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) and other works, readily evinces what might be described as the operation of a historically-sedimented, pre-reflective (or ‘dispositional’) Orientalist ‘background’ or ‘horizon’ informing European thought. On his view, “for reasons not always explicit, conscious, or easy to explain, [Orientalist] scholars seemed to be under some sort of inner compulsion or outer pressure – social, political, cultural, or academic – to pontificate as Orientalists concerning things about which they in fact knew nothing or very little: things that were not the legitimate findings of their own specialized investigations, but derived from commonly-received opinions” and ‘guiding notions’ that were “founded on a mixed bag of religious, cultural, ideological, ethnic (in some cases even racist), and scientific prejudices and practical political interests [emphases added].” (pp.94-96) I concur with Mahdi that this line of argument has rather serious implications for the Western intellectual project since “if true, [it] seems to come down to saying that these studies are guided by irrational motives and by political interests [such that Western] rational thought is ultimately embedded in the irrational [thereby joining] other strands in contemporary
Meister Eckhart\(^{30}\), the latter of whom is himself a Thomist, and while both acknowledge their indebtedness to ibn Sina and ibn Rushd (Averroës), it is significant to note that Suttor (1983) has pointed to the possible – perhaps even \textit{probable} – philosophical debt Aquinas owes to another towering figure within Islamicate thought, viz. ibn ‘Arabi\(^{31}\). In short, while a genealogy from Heidegger to Eckhart to Aquinas to Avicenna (and Averroës) is readily constructed, I would suggest that a similar genealogy from Heidegger to Eckhart to Aquinas to ibn ‘Arabi largely remains unthought – possibly unthinkable, and possibly for the reasons suggested above\(^{32}\). In terms of exploring the possibility – and \textit{probability} – of such a chain of influence, Almond (2010) usefully discusses five possible areas in the thinking of Eckhart and ibn ‘Arabi where ‘striking resemblances’ might lead to the positing of some genuinely similar foundations, viz. (1) the relationship between oneness and multiplicity; (2) God as construct and the God beyond God; (3) Divinity of the self, and the dependency on God; (4) the importance of ‘centrelessness’ and ‘wandering’; and (5) the potential for ‘infinite’ (i.e. open-ended) hermeneutics. Yet it should be noted that Almond makes no attempt to suggest any \textit{genealogical} implications of the similarities (and differences) between the two thinkers\(^{33}\).

More broadly, while there have been a number of attempts at putting Islamicate philosophers into conversation with Heidegger, recent examples including El-Bizri’s (2000) critical Heideggerian engagement with Avicennan metaphysics, and works by Açikgenc (1993), Kamal (2010) and Faruque (2017) among others exploring similarities and differences between Heidegger and Sadra, there is little in the way of a consideration of the possible influence of other Islamicate thought trends such as philosophical Sufism (\textit{tasawwuf}) – specifically, that due to ibn ‘Arabi – on Heidegger in the West, notable exceptions being Henry Corbin, Dobie (2007) and the works of the Murabitun – in particular, those of Palmer\(^{34}\).

Western thought that have abandoned the hope for the pursuit of the truth as a rational, scientific enterprise.” (p.96) In short, “if there is a crisis [of] Orientalism, it cannot be separated from the more general crisis of modern rationalism and the recognition that in many ways it is dogmatic and irrational.” (p.97)

\(^{30}\) In this connection, see Caputo (1978, 1982) and Sikka (1997), none of whom refer to Islamicate figures other than ibn Sina and/or ibn Rushd.

\(^{31}\) According to Suttor (1983), “the early years of Saint Thomas Aquinas, born 1224/5 [CE], and of the University of Naples, which entered history a few months earlier, coincided with Ibn al-‘Arabi’s old age. At that university from 1240 [CE] onwards \textit{it is by no means unlikely that Thomas should have heard of Arabic civilisation’s Doctor Maximus}, for Muslim studies were exceptionally strong there at the time [emphasis added].” (p.87) Crucially, Suttor points out that the \textit{Fusus al-Hikam} was composed and published in Damascus while Aquinas was still a child at home (1229 CE).

\(^{32}\) I maintain this despite the fact that there are a number of works exploring the similarities and differences between the Sufism of ibn ‘Arabi and the mysticism of Eckhart; in this connection, see Sells (1994), Kakaie (2007a, 2007b), and Dobie (2009).

\(^{33}\) While broadly endorsing the existence of such resemblances in terms of shared ‘thematic engagement’ between the two thinkers, I want to suggest that Almond’s emphasis on resemblances tends to undermine the significance of the differences between Eckhartian and Akbarian metaphysics, notwithstanding Almond’s recognition of such differences. On this basis, and somewhat tentatively, I want to suggest that Almond’s way of engaging these thinkers evinces a tacit ‘disposition’ towards assimilating the Akbarian to the Eckhartian, an ironic, perhaps even ‘neo-Orientalist’, move given the fact that ibn ‘Arabi is the chronologically-earlier thinker, and given Almond’s (2007) critique of various postmodern / post-structuralist thinkers on account of a perceived ‘neo-Orientalism’ on their part. For a critique of Almond and the tendency to assimilate Sufism (\textit{tasawwuf}) to ‘Western’ post-structuralism based on viewing the former through conceptual lenses provided by the latter such as Derridean deconstruction, see Shafi (2011).

\(^{34}\) I am interested in exploring the possibility that the ‘philosophical’ Sufism (\textit{tasawwuf}) of Sufis such as ‘Shaykh al-Akbar’ Mohiyuddin ibn ‘Arabi and ‘Maulana’ Jalaluddin Rumi informs the non-dual ‘mysticism’ of Eckhart despite a lack of acknowledgement of such influence. I want to suggest that circumstantial grounds for taking such influence seriously are provided by Kakaie (2007a, 2007b) and Almond (2010), while being more emphatically asserted by Sedgwick (2017, pp.61-62).
referred to earlier. Palmer’s case is particularly interesting in this regard given the critique of the Murabitun presented earlier. For example, and evincing a certain Eurocentric ‘dispositional’ assimilation of ibn ‘Arabi to Eckhart, Palmer (2005) states: “I am a Sufi, and I have read lots of material by Sufis, but when I read Meister Eckhart, I get something that I cannot get from any Sufi, because I feel he is talking to me from within my own tradition, he is saying the same things as the Sufi masters, but when he says them I get it at a deeper level than I do translating across cultures.” (p.2) Elsewhere, Palmer (2014) points to Eckhart as an ‘indigenous’ / European source for thinking through what he refers to as ‘the Homebound journey’ to the non-dual core within the Western worldview. Yet I would suggest that appealing to indigeneity in this context is somewhat problematic given the historical exchanges that have taken place between different traditions – specifically, between Christendom and the Islamicate world.

However, a tacit and possibly unintended assimilation of ibn ‘Arabi to Eckhart is also arguably evinced in an extract from Qur’anic Tawhid (1995), a work by Murabitun founder Ian Dallas. According to Almond (2010), “Eckhart describes the Godhead as a ‘darkness’ (vinsternisse), a ‘nothingness’ (niht), a ‘desert’ (wuste) and an ‘abyss’ (abgrunt), substantives which the Sufi [i.e. ibn ‘Arabi] never really attributes to God. For ibn ‘Arabi, ‘God is sheer light [nūr], while the impossible is sheer darkness [zulma], even though in some places he does describe the names of incompatibility (tanzih) as a collection of ‘darknesses’.” (pp. 280-281)

Crucially, and consistent with this view, Kakaie (2007a) maintains that “Ibn ‘Arabi’s God will become manifest for mankind through the totality of oneness and Eckhart’s God through the oneness of totality. In the oneness of totality, there is no motion, no movement, and no sound. All and all is silence, stillness, and the darkness of Godhead [emphasis added].” (p.458) Eckhart’s conception of the Godhead as a darkness is interesting given the apparent mobilization of Heidegger’s ‘dualistic’ conception of the relation between ‘darkness’ and ‘light’ due to Heraclitus in Dallas’ understanding of tawhid (unicity), viz. “So the light of the [Divine] attributes obliterates the forms until there is a light that is so bright that it puts out everything and makes total blackness. Then there is the culmination of this knowledge which is when that blackness, that obliteration itself reveals the secret of the Oneness of Allah, subhanahu wa ta’ala. This is a light that is a black light. The light of the blackness itself, so that the opposites are joined [emphasis added].” (Dallas 1995, p.24)

2.2. Getting Beyond Heidegger

Beyond identifying the existence of non-Peripatetic trends such as Sufi philosophy in Islamicate thought, I want to suggest that such thinking provides important resources for overcoming certain perceived limitations of Heideggerian thought. While consideration of such matters is beyond the scope of this paper, I should like to point to the following:

1. The tendency of Heideggerian existential ontology to remain trapped within the confines of the ‘linguistic turn’ resulting in a tendency to marginalise the importance of ‘materiality’ and the body conceived in non-dualistic terms. While the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty provides one possible route beyond Heidegger in this regard, I want to suggest

35 Kakaie (2007a) insists that “there is a great distance between ibn ‘Arabi’s God and that of philosophy, even neo-Platonism [for] Muslim philosophers and theologians made God so transcendent that they even regarded him as an unconceivable essence of whom no knowledge can be obtained and with whom no relationship may be established.” (p.459) Nonetheless, Kakaie (2007b) maintains that “ibn ‘Arabi and Eckhart, in explaining their theoretical mysticism, more or less employ Peripatetic philosophy.” (p.180)
that the bazarkhian or ‘interstitial’ Sufism (tasawwuf) of ibn ‘Arabi provides an Islamicate ‘other’ path worth exploring insofar as Akbarian ‘anthropo-cosmology’ takes its point of departure from a paradoxical ‘liminal space’ between inner and outer, subject and object, Dasein and world. According to Bashier (2004), the purpose of the barzakh is to provide unity to a given duality, a function described by ibn ‘Arabi in the Fūtūḥāt Makkīyya (or ‘Makkan Openings’) as follows: “The truth about the barzakh is that there can be no barzakh in it. The barzakh is what meets the two [sides which it separates] with its [undivided] essence. If it were to meet the one side with a face that is other than the face with which it meets the other side, there would have to be between the two faces a barzakh to separate them so that they do not meet. In that case it [that which meets one of the things with a face which is other than the face with which it meets the other] is not a barzakh. The true barzakh is that which meets one of the things between which it separates with the very face with which it meets the other. It is in its essence identical to everything that it meets”. (Cited in Bashier (2004), pp.86-87.) 2. The possibility that Heideggerian phenomenology ‘falls short’ in advocating a return to a historically ‘original’ source of thought, and the need to engage Islamicate sources – pre-eminently, The Qur’an – and the imaginal / mythical / archetypal thinking of Sufi philosophy beyond the confines of the Judeo-Christian tradition as means by which to transcend the merely poetic. According to Avens (1984), “Heidegger’s later thought is not only compatible in many respects with Sufi gnosis, but that it positively demands a leap into a circle which is more subtle than the famous ‘hermeneutical circle’ and more truly phenomenological than the phenomenology of quotidian and ordinary modes of human existence (Edmund Husserl)”. (p.5) Crucially, he maintains that “what [the later] Heidegger calls ‘Being’ is probably best illustrated by the Heraclitean ‘river’ or the Buddhist ‘flame’ or, in Sufi terms, by ‘renewing of creation at each instant.’ The ‘being’ of a phenomenon – of any phenomenon – is eristic in that it reveals itself in the polar tension between opposites (not to the either/or style of ratiocination). The truth (alēthia) of being is primordial strife (Heraclitean polemos, ‘war’) between light and darkness, revelation and concealment. But, contrary to the common sense view of formal logic, this

36 In this connection, it is interesting to note that Sutto (1983) refers to ibn ‘Arabi as “correct[ing] the tendency of ibn Sina and al-Ghazali to speak of the soul as a substance complete in itself, not needing a body [since] the senses and the imagination and the faculty of movement reside in the soul-body compound, not the soul.” (p.92) 37 Against the later Heidegger, Caputo (1988) maintains that “‘awakening’ from the ‘oblivion’ [that is, ‘forgetting’] of Being … is not a matter of returning to a primordial beginning in order to find there the secret to a New Dawn. It is rather a raised awareness of the oblivion and its inextinguishability which keeps its distance from historical hierarchies of any sort … It is thus a profoundly emancipatory thought which puts us all on the alert for the powers that be, or presume to be, which give themselves airs of ahistorical necessity and immutable presence [emphases added].” (p.520) In this connection, it should be noted that Falaturi (1979), Brown (1983) and Manzoor (2003) have attempted to argue the case for engaging The Qur’an as non-linear, ahistorically-archetypal and mythopoetic against the linearity of any phenomenon – of any phenomenon – is eristic in that it reveals itself in the polar tension between opposites (not to the either/or style of ratiocination). The truth (alēthia) of being is primordial strife (Heraclitean polemos, ‘war’) between light and darkness, revelation and concealment. But, contrary to the common sense view of formal logic, this

36 In this connection, it is interesting to note that Sutto (1983) refers to ibn ‘Arabi as “correct[ing] the tendency of ibn Sina and al-Ghazali to speak of the soul as a substance complete in itself, not needing a body [since] the senses and the imagination and the faculty of movement reside in the soul-body compound, not the soul.” (p.92) 37 Against the later Heidegger, Caputo (1988) maintains that “‘awakening’ from the ‘oblivion’ [that is, ‘forgetting’] of Being … is not a matter of returning to a primordial beginning in order to find there the secret to a New Dawn. It is rather a raised awareness of the oblivion and its inextinguishability which keeps its distance from historical hierarchies of any sort … It is thus a profoundly emancipatory thought which puts us all on the alert for the powers that be, or presume to be, which give themselves airs of ahistorical necessity and immutable presence [emphases added].” (p.520) In this connection, it should be noted that Falaturi (1979), Brown (1983) and Manzoor (2003) have attempted to argue the case for engaging The Qur’an as non-linear, ahistorically-archetypal and mythopoetic against the linearity of any phenomenon – of any phenomenon – is eristic in that it reveals itself in the polar tension between opposites (not to the either/or style of ratiocination). The truth (alēthia) of being is primordial strife (Heraclitean polemos, ‘war’) between light and darkness, revelation and concealment. But, contrary to the common sense view of formal logic, this
conflict, though ‘negativizing,’ does not lead to the extinction of one or the other of the opposites. Opposites in nature ... are not contradictory but polar; instead of destroying each other, they live by virtue of each other and at each other’s expense. The same is true of the so-called opposite of life and death; they too feed on each other.” (p.14) While it might be argued, from an Akbarian perspective, that Heidegger’s being (Sein) bears some similarity to the interplay of Divine names as they manifest in the things of the world, it is crucial to appreciate that Heidegger sees nothing beyond Heraclitean being’s historical self-disclosure as Ereignis / En-Owning / Appropriation. Yet ibn ‘Arabi would presumably point to the non-dual source of such revealing/concealing ‘movement’, viz. Allah. Another important distinction lies in the difference between conceiving of being as a ‘gift’ rather than as a ‘debt’, the latter pointing more clearly to a situation involving accountability (on the part of the human debtor) and thereby to an ethical orientation. Finally, there is a need to consider the limits of phenomenology: according to Avens (1984), the problem with the traditional phenomenological standpoint is that it ‘stops short’ in its examination of the phenomenology of consciousness, failing to locate its essence in imaginal archetypes / mythical patterns. In this connection, the relation between Heidegger and archetypal psychology is explored by Avens in an earlier work where it is claimed that Heidegger sees language “as primordial poetry in that it springs from the mythopoetic basis of our mind.” (Avens 1982, p.188) However, I want to suggest that a post-Heideggerian Islamicate return to ‘beginnings’ in light of the destruction of metaphysics should lead us to engage with The Qur’an on an imaginal / mythopoetic basis. Following Avens, I want to further suggest that Heidegger’s shortcomings vis-à-vis his ‘inceptual’ thinking lies in a phenomenological fixation on ‘outward’ history concomitant with a bracketing of the ‘inward’ archetypal. In this connection, it is interesting – and telling – to note that The Qur’an refers to different people living in different times and places (histories, geographies) who receive the same ‘archetypal’ message – that is, Islam as din (crudely, ‘religion’) remains Islam as din, trans-historically / archetypally and only varies / differs (historically, geographically) as shar.

3. The exploration of a ‘neo-Akbarian’ alternative to the Western post-Christian phenomenological tendency to bracket ‘causality’ from association with the Divine. Caputo (1993) maintains that for the later ‘non-voluntarist’ Heidegger, “the upshot of ‘thinking’ for theology is to cease to think of God as causa sui, as the causal energy that creates and sustains the cosmos, and to turn instead to the God before whom one can dance or bend one’s knee. This he calls the truly ‘divine God’ ... and it reminds us of Pascal’s injunction to lay aside the God of the philosophers in favor of the God of Abraham and Isaac.” (p.285) I would suggest that Heidegger’s position is informed by a rather extreme shift away from the transcendent towards immanence – arguably a move in a direction opposite to that of Eckhart from whom the later drew inspiration. Yet from an Akbarian position embracing bazahrkhan, liminal or ‘interstitial’ thinking, it is not a question of moving from one pole to another, but rather of embracing both simultaneously, viz. tanzih (‘transcendence’) and tashbih (‘immanence’), thereby allowing

39 In the current context, ‘neo-Akbarian’ should be understood as referring to a contemporary philosophical orientation informed by aspects of the Akbarian worldview that are considered useful, perhaps even necessary, for rethinking causality in transversal terms such that Divine action is neither ‘bracketed’ from worldly causation, nor considered a ‘dimension of meaning’ additional to such causation as proposed by Rahman (1994, pp.3,10).

40 On the matter of Eckhart’s shift in focus from immanence to transcendence, see Kakaie (2007a, 2007b).
for both metaphysical / causal / impersonal and imaging / symbolic / personal engagements with the Divine.

In this chapter, I began by arguing for the need to problematize the siting of the Islamicate and the implications of this for the articulation of Heideggerian thought by diasporic Muslims situated in Europe. I then went on to argue for the need to reconsider the genealogy of Heidegger’s thinking – in particular, its later post-Kehre poetic / ‘mystical’ expression – in relation to Heidegger’s silence on, and possible erasure of, the Islamicate as a source for such thinking. Both arguments were motivated and informed by a decolonial commitment to decentering Eurocentrism, a commitment which I want to reaffirm and which prompts the elaboration of both arguments in terms of exploring other ‘Western’ Muslim – and Islamicate – engagements with the Heideggerian corpus, along with further – and deeper – investigation of the possible influence of Islamicate discourses on figures readily identified as genealogical precursors to and sources of inspiration for Heidegger himself.

REFERENCES


---

41 Specifically, discourses engaging with wujūd (existence, lit. ‘that which is found’), kawn (being), izoph (manifestation) etc.; in this connection, see Shehadi (1982). For a brief yet illuminating discussion of the difference between the Avicennan and Akbarian views on the issue of existence, see Kakaie (2007b).


