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Pinder, Mark
(2016).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3726/978-3-653-05840-6
Abstract
In a series of papers, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich critique so-called arguments from reference, arguments that assume a theory of reference in order to establish substantive conclusions. The critique is that, due to cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions giving rise to methodological problems in the theory of reference, all arguments from reference have an unjustified assumption. I examine an important example of an argument from reference, an argument of Churchland’s in support of eliminative materialism. I suggest that extant responses to the critique are unsatisfactory, and provide an alternative response: one might justify the assumption of a theory of reference in an argument from reference by appealing to an appropriate explication of the relevant commonsense concepts
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About
- Item ORO ID
- 56638
- Item Type
- Book Section
- ISBN
- 3-631-66189-4, 978-3-631-66189-5
- Keywords
- intuitions; reference; Churchland; explication; experimental philosophy
- Academic Unit or School
-
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies > Philosophy
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) - Copyright Holders
- © 2016 Peter Lang
- Depositing User
- Mark Pinder