1. Introduction

Over a number of years, Mark Richard has developed an influential account of propositional attitude ascription. The account is motivated primarily by the apparent contextual shiftiness of attitude ascriptions. An attitude ascription is to be deemed true just in case it provides an acceptable translation of an appropriate mental representation – where what counts as an acceptable translation depends on context.

The account itself perhaps receives its most comprehensive treatment in Richard 1990; but it is independently developed, defended and discussed in a number of individual articles. Thirteen such articles have now been collected together, along with an introductory essay that details a number of recent developments of Richard’s views. Roughly speaking, the essays in the collection form two groups. Seven of the essays chart the development and defence of Richard’s account, both before and after Richard 1990. The remaining six essays tackle more general issues relating to attitude ascriptions – such as propositional quantification, semantic pretence, negative existentials, intensional transitives, tensed beliefs and the role of sense in opaque contexts –, albeit with Richard’s account generally playing a prominent role in the discussion. On the whole, the collection provides an excellent example of Richard’s rigorous approach to philosophy. It is recommended for any advanced student or professional working within the philosophies of language or mind.

In what follows, I discuss Richard’s account of belief ascription, as developed in four of the collected essays. (The essays in question are: Richard 1989, 1993, 1995, 2006.) I begin by sketching the account (§2), before focusing on one particular aspect on which Richard says little: how does context determine which translations are acceptable? I shall develop Richard’s suggested answer to this question (§3), raise two concerns about it (§4), and close by offering a speculative alternative (§5).

2. Belief ascription

Belief ascriptions, we are told, appear to be contextually shifty. By way of example, consider Kripke’s (1979) famous case of Pierre, to which Richard adverts a number of times. Pierre grew up in France, without leaving France, and learning to speak only French. He came to

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form a belief, as the result of hearsay, about London. He expresses this belief with the sentence ‘Londres est jolie’. To this day, Pierre has no reservations about sincerely asserting ‘Londres est jolie’. Intuitively, Pierre believes that London is pretty. However, since growing up, Pierre has been kidnapped and brought to an unattractive place. Pierre has since learnt to speak English, and has learnt the name of his new home to be ‘London’. Importantly, Pierre is unaware that he lives in the very place that, in France, he learnt to call ‘Londres’. He has now formed a belief about his unattractive environs, which he expresses using the English sentence ‘London is not pretty’.

Now, suppose that we, who know of Pierre’s predicament, are talking about Pierre. Suppose that we are talking about his ‘French beliefs’. Call this context ‘c1’. Plausibly, in c1, I might well assert:

(1) Pierre believes that London is pretty.

After all, Pierre would sincerely assert the French sentence ‘Londres est jolie’. However, suppose that we are instead talking about Pierre’s ‘English beliefs’. Call this ‘c2’. In c2, we would certainly not assert (1). After all, Pierre would sincerely deny the English sentence ‘London is pretty’. Intuitively, then, there are grounds to say that (1) is true in c1 but false in c2. If that is right, then belief ascription (1) is contextually shifty.

Richard’s account provides us with an attractive explanation of the phenomenon. Simplifying for our present purposes, Richard’s account can be understood as composed of three claims.3

(R1) Beliefs involve sentence-like mental representations that determine (relative to context) Russellian contents.

(R2) A belief ascription is true just in case the content sentence is an acceptable translation of such a mental representation. (Here, in a belief ascription of the form ‘x believes that S’, the ‘content sentence’ is whatever replaces ‘S’.)

(R3) What counts as an acceptable translation is dependent on context.

I shall briefly expand upon (R1)–(R3).

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2 This is Richard’s terminology (1989: 92–3). For our purposes, we need only that beliefs Pierre would express using ‘Londres’ are French beliefs, whereas beliefs he would express using ‘London’ are English beliefs.

Starting with (R1), Richard claims that belief is ‘a relation to a Russellian [content], a relation mediated by relations to sentences or sentence-like [mental representations]’ (1989: 81). For ease, let us follow Richard in making the simplifying assumption that such mental representations take the form of natural language sentences. For the sake of a concrete example, let us suppose that Cédric has a belief that is mediated by a relation to a mental representation of the form ‘la neige est blanche’, which determines (relative to context) the Russellian content:

(being white, snow).

Richard suggests that we take the object of a belief (in a context) to be an interpreted mental representation. He constructs this by pairing each constituent of the mediating mental representation with the content that it determines (in the context). So, in our example, we characterise the object of Cédric’s belief thus:

(2) \( \langle \langle \text{‘est blanche’}, \text{being white} \rangle, \langle \text{‘la neige’}, \text{snow} \rangle \rangle \).

Richard calls such entities ‘Russellian annotated matrices’ (RAMs).

The mental representations in RAMs – e.g., in (2), ‘est blanche’ and ‘la neige’ – are analogous to uninterpreted linguistic items such as words or expressions; they are representational vehicles. As such, they are not to be thought of as Fregean senses, or as encoding ‘ways of thinking’. RAMs, then, are not reflecting any kind of division of mental content into sense and reference. Rather, RAMs are to be understood as pairing representational vehicles with their content (in a context).

Let us move on to (R2). Continuing with our example, consider the belief ascription:

(3) Cédric believes that snow is white.

Now, according to (R2), (3) is true just in case ‘snow is white’ is an acceptable translation of the mental representation involved in one of Cédric’s beliefs. Here, translation is understood as preservation of Russellian content. So ‘snow is white’ translates any sentence-like

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4 Richard maintains that his account ultimately requires a much weaker supposition than this; for example, he (2013: 17) allows that dogs have mental representations that are sentence-like in the requisite sense.

representation that determines the same Russellian content. In particular, ‘snow is white’ translates Cédric’s mental representation ‘la neige est blanche’ (and does not translate his mental representation ‘l’herbe est verte’). On the assumption that Cédric does not possess any other mental representations that determine (being white, snow), (3) shall be true just in case ‘snow is white’ is an acceptable translation of Cédric’s mental representation ‘la neige est blanche’.

As (R3) states, what counts as an acceptable translation is dependent on context. Richard claims that, in any given context, there may be restrictions in play. Suppose that, in context $c_3$, ‘la neige’ is the only mental representation of Cédric’s that may be translated by the word ‘snow’. Richard formalises this by saying that, in $c_3$, the following restriction is in play:

\[
(4) \quad \text{Cédric: ‘snow’ } \rightarrow \text{ ‘la neige’}
\]

If (4) is the only restriction in play in $c_3$, then, in $c_3$: ‘snow is white’ is an acceptable translation of ‘la neige est blanche’ since Russellian content is preserved, and since the only restriction in play is that ‘snow’ translate ‘la neige’. So ‘Cédric believes that snow is white’ is true in $c_3$.

However, suppose that, in $c_4$, other restrictions are in play, such as both:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Cédric: ‘snow’ } & \rightarrow \text{ ‘l’herbe’} \\
\text{Cédric: ‘is white’ } & \rightarrow \text{ ‘est blanche’}.
\end{align*}
\]

(Perhaps, for example, we have stipulated that we are playing a game in which ‘snow’ translates ‘l’herbe’, but in which ‘is white’ still translates ‘est blanche’.) Is (3) true in $c_4$? No. For (3) to be true in $c_4$, two conditions would have to be satisfied. First, ‘snow is white’ would have to translate (i.e. preserve Russellian content of) the mental representation involved in one of Cédric’s beliefs. Second, this mental representation would have to satisfy the restrictions in play: ‘snow’ would have to translate ‘l’herbe’ and ‘is white’ would have to translate ‘est blanche’. So, for (3) to be true in $c_4$, it is necessary that Cédric has a mental representation ‘l’herbe est blanche’ that determines the Russellian content (being white, snow). On the presumption that this is false, it follows that (3) is false in $c_4$.

Recall the case of Pierre. Pierre has beliefs that he would express using the sentences ‘Londres est jolie’ and ‘London is not pretty’. Let these sentences stand proxy for the mental representations involved in the beliefs, and let us say that Pierre has a French belief ‘Londres
est jolie’ and an English belief ‘London is not pretty’. We suggested earlier that, intuitively, sentence (1):

Pierre believes that London is pretty

is true in context c₁, in which we are talking about Pierre’s French beliefs, and false in context c₂, in which we are talking about Pierre’s English beliefs. Let us see how Richard’s account explains these results.

Consider first context c₁. As we are talking about Pierre’s French beliefs, it might be plausible to say that the following restrictions on translation are in play:

(5) Pierre: ‘London’ → ‘Londres’
    Pierre: ‘is pretty’ → ‘est jolie’.

If these restrictions are in play in c₁, it is clear that (1) comes out true in c₁ on Richard’s account. The content sentence of (1) translates Pierre’s French belief ‘Londres est jolie’ (as Russellian content is preserved), and the translation satisfies (5). It follows that, in c₁, the content sentence of (1) is an acceptable translation of the mental representation involved in one of Pierre’s beliefs. It is for this reason that, for Richard, (1) is true in c₁.

Consider context c₂. As we are talking about Pierre’s English belief, it might be plausible to say that different restrictions are in play:

(6) Pierre: ‘London’ → ‘London’
    Pierre: ‘is pretty’ → ‘is pretty’.

If these restrictions are in play in c₂, (1) comes out false in c₂. (I assume here that Pierre does not hold a belief involving the mental representation ‘London is pretty’.) First, although the content sentence of (1) translates Pierre’s French belief ‘Londres est jolie’, the translation does not satisfy (6). Second, the content sentence of (1) does not translate Pierre’s English belief ‘London is not pretty’, as Russellian content is not preserved. In c₂, then, the content sentence of (1) is not an acceptable translation of the mental representation involved in any of Pierre’s beliefs. It is for this reason that, for Richard, (1) is false in c₂.

In what follows, I shall assume for the sake of argument that Richard’s account, as just sketched, is correct.
3. Determination of restrictions in context

I said that, in $c_1$, it might be plausible to say that the restrictions on translation given in (5) are in play. Similarly, I said that, in $c_2$, it might be plausible to say that the restrictions on translation given in (6) are in play. But how does one come to that conclusion? More generally, how does context determine which restrictions on translation are in play? This is a question on which Richard is a little reticent. He says little more than that ‘[a set of restrictions on translation] is a contextual parameter determined (in good part) by the intentions and dispositions of speakers’ (2006: 257). In this section, I shall spell out the view that I think Richard has in mind, before raising two concerns (§4) and offering a speculative alternative (§5).

First, note that it is highly plausible that ordinary speakers are sometimes aware that beliefs involve mental representations. This is evidenced by the ordinary speaker’s implicit sensitivity to variation in these representations, which is displayed in belief ascription. So, for example, in ascribing beliefs to Lois Lane, ordinary speakers will co-ordinate their use of ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ with Lois’ two principal ways of mentally representing Superman/Clark Kent: Lois believes that Superman can fly and Lois believes that Clark Kent cannot fly. And – for a non-homophonic example – ordinary speakers (who know the story) will co-ordinate their use of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ with Hammurabi’s two principal ways of mentally representing Venus: Hammurabi believes that Hesperus can be seen in the evening and Hammurabi believes that Phosphorus cannot be seen in the evening. Plausibly, then, ordinary speakers are sometimes aware that beliefs involve mental representations.

Now, when speakers have such awareness, they can intend to ascribe a belief that involves a particular mental representation. For example, a speaker might say ‘Lois believes that he can fly’, intending to ascribe a belief that Lois would typically express using the sentence ‘Superman can fly’. In such a situation, it might be appropriate to model the speaker’s intentions as a set of restrictions on translation. One might then say that this set of restrictions is thereby the set of restrictions in play in the speaker’s context. This set of restrictions would then be plugged into Richard’s semantics for belief ascription to obtain the truth conditions of the speaker’s utterance. In roughly this way, then, we might allow a speaker’s intentions to fix the restrictions on translation in play upon utterance of a particular belief ascription.

In many cases, though, speakers do not have (explicit) intentions sufficient to determine the relevant restrictions. For example, suppose that someone utters ‘Hammurabi believes that Hesperus can be seen in the evening’. How likely is she to have the intention: to ascribe a
belief involving the representation that Hammurabi expresses using whatever sentence of his language translates ‘Hesperus can be seen in the evening’? It would certainly be extremely rare for any such intention to be explicit. However, this is perhaps not a problem for Richard. Whether or not a speaker’s explicit intentions on a given occasion suffice to determine the relevant restrictions on translation, it is plausible that the speaker is typically disposed, upon requests for clarification etc., to indicate which of the believer’s mental representations are involved in the ascribed belief. If this is right, then, just as before, it might be appropriate to model the speaker’s dispositions as a set of restrictions on translation – and, as before, this set of restrictions would thereby be the set of restrictions in play in the speaker’s context. Thus, a speaker’s dispositions might be taken to fix the restrictions on translation in play upon utterance of a particular belief ascription.

It is something like this, I think, that Richard has in mind. Let us call it the ‘dispositional account of restriction determination’. I shall now raise two concerns.

4. Two concerns

For independent reasons (concerning the need to avoid contexts in which incompatible restrictions on translation are in play), Richard needs to endorse a broadly Lewisian picture of conversational score. The first concern is that this picture is in tension with the dispositional account of restriction determination. For our purposes, we can understand the picture of conversational score as follows. First, context can be modelled as a list of parameters. Second, contextual parameters are subject to the principle of accommodation. Here, the principle of accommodation is a principle that governs how conversational participants can effect a change of value of a given parameter. Lewis characterises the general form of the principle of accommodation as follows:

If at time t something is said that requires component $s_n$ of conversational score to have a value in the range $r$ if what is said is to be true, or otherwise acceptable; and if $s_n$ does not have a value in the range $r$ just before $t$; and if such-and-such further conditions hold; then at $t$ the score-component $s_n$ takes some value in the range $r$. (Lewis 1979: 347)

6 See Richard 1995: 126ff; 2006: 258f. To be clear, it is the principle of accommodation in particular that Richard requires.
Here is a quick example of how the picture works. Suppose that there is a context parameter for presupposition, and that at the beginning of a conversation it is not presupposed whether there are any kings of Malaysia. Suppose that I assert ‘the King of Malaysia is tall’ – an assertion that, to be acceptable, we may assume, requires the presupposition that there is a unique king of Malaysia. If the other conversational participants do not contest there being a unique king of Malaysia (‘whaddya mean, “King of Malaysia”?!’), then, by the principle of accommodation, the value of the presupposition parameter is shifted so as to include the presupposition that there is a unique king of Malaysia.

Let us extend this picture to include a contextual parameter for restrictions on translation. Call the parameter ‘$s_m$’. At the beginning of a conversation between Sara and Mike, suppose that there are no restrictions on translation in play: at $t_0$, say, $s_m$ is the empty set. Suppose that Sara speaks first (at $t_1$), asserting ‘Lois believes that Superman can fly’; suppose that Mike does not contest. Then, by the principle of accommodation, we expect the value of $s_m$ to shift so as to include some restrictions on translation. Which restrictions? Given the dispositional account of restriction determination, $s_m$ should now include whichever restrictions are determined by Sara’s intentions and dispositions. On a plausible construal of Sara’s intentions and dispositions, at $t_1$:

$$s_m = \{ \text{Lois: ‘Superman’ → ‘Superman’} \}.$$

That, roughly, is how Richard combines Lewis’s picture of conversational score with the dispositional account of restriction determination.

The tension is this. As the story has been told, the value of $s_m$ is shifted to a value that is determined by the intentions and dispositions of the speaker. These intentions and dispositions need not be such that the other conversational participants have epistemic access to them. But, then, it naturally follows that some conversational participants will lack epistemic access to the new value of the parameter. However, this is anathema to the Lewisian account of conversational score. The *raison d’être* of the account is to capture the dynamics of conversation in terms of the contributions made by participants. The reason is, I think, quite clear: in a well-run conversation, each party knows (perhaps implicitly) the state of the conversation at each point. This is reflected by Lewis’s suggestion that ‘[c]onversational score is, by definition, whatever the mental scoreboards say it is’ (1979: 346). It is unclear that there is any room, in a well-run conversation, for variation amongst the ‘mental scoreboards’ of the conversational participants. So, the values of parameters at $t$ had
better be fixed by the course of the conversation up until \( t \) – and not by the intentions of dispositions of the speaker.

It is not straightforward to avoid the tension. In particular, it would not suffice as a response to simply alter the account of conversational score – perhaps by rejecting Lewis’s comment about mental scoreboards, or by similar means. The problem is this. In a well-run conversation, the hearer grasps the truth conditions of the speaker’s utterances – and it seems to be incumbent upon an account of conversation to explain this fact. It is not clear, however, how such an explanation can be given – at least with regard to belief ascriptions – if we endorse the dispositional account of restriction determination. There is thus a *prima facie* tension between any account of conversation that Richard might give, and the dispositional account of restriction determination. If the latter is to be endorsed, such tensions would have to be resolved.

The second concern is that there are putative counterexamples: there are cases in which restrictions on translation are brought into play, even though the speaker plausibly lacks corresponding intentions and dispositions. Let me give two examples.

Here is the first. Suppose that Mike is confused. He believes that ‘Clark Kent’ is the name of the superhero, and that the counter ego is (somewhat ironically) named ‘Superman’. Moreover, suppose that Mike (mistakenly) thinks that Lois Lane believes that the superhero in question cannot fly. Finally, suppose that, during a conversation about *Superman*, Mike asserts

\[
(7) \quad \text{Lois believes that Clark Kent cannot fly}
\]

while intending to pick out a belief that involves the ‘superhero mental representation’. Intuitively, I think, the assertion is true: I agree with Mike that Lois does believe that Clark Kent cannot fly. But Mike’s intentions determine the following restriction

\[
\text{Lois: } \text{‘Clark Kent’} \rightarrow \text{‘Superman’},
\]

given which, according to the dispositional account of restriction determination, Mike’s assertion is false. To capture our intuitions, it is more natural to say that the following restriction is in play:

\[
\text{Lois: } \text{‘Clark Kent’} \rightarrow \text{‘Clark Kent’}.
\]
This contradicts the prediction given by the dispositional account of restriction determination.

Here is the second example. Suppose that Mike knows nothing about Pierre, but earlier overheard someone comment that Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. Later, Mike meets Pierre’s friend Sara. Mike asserts:

(8) Pierre does not believe that London is pretty.

I am not so sure about this case, but I am inclined to say that Mike’s utterance is true – or, at least, not false. In one way or another, it seems that Mike manages to pick up on the restrictions that were in play in the overheard conversation, something like:


However, it is not clear that Mike’s intentions and dispositions must suffice to establish any such restriction. First, since he knows nothing of Pierre’s predicament, Mike might lack a determinate disposition to clarify the intended restriction in one way or the other. Second, Mike might lack the disposition to defer to the previous conversation on this matter. (Perhaps, if pushed, Mike would simply say: ‘well, I overheard someone say it, that’s all I’m saying’.)

If one accepts that there can be a situation in which Mike lacks both such dispositions, then the dispositional account of restriction determination cannot deliver the required restriction for Mike’s utterance of (8) to come out true (or, at least, not false).

Examples such as these put pressure on the dispositional account of restriction determination. They show that there is a prima facie gap between the restrictions that are in play in contexts, and the intentions and dispositions of the relevant speaker.

I suspect that Richard might be tempted to respond as follows. The two examples trade on the fact that Mike lacks complete information about Lois Lane, Superman and Pierre. But, plausibly, if we were to endow Mike with a fuller knowledge of the situations, then he would possess the requisite dispositions. Richard might be tempted to capture this with a refinement of the stimulus conditions: the restrictions on translation might then be determined by the speaker’s disposition, upon requests for clarification and endowment of full knowledge of the relevant situation, to indicate which of the believer’s mental representations are involved in the ascribed belief.
Let me register two misgivings I have about this strategy. First, it remains unclear to me that speakers have the requisite dispositions. Is there really a matter of fact about how Mike would clarify his assertions given full knowledge of the relevant situations? Might it not make a difference how Mike is endowed with the information, which aspects of the information are emphasised, etc.? The answers to such questions are far from clear. Second, I am a little suspicious of the methodological strategy: it involves the attribution to speakers of substantive dispositions in order to capture some of our semantic intuitions. But in what way are our semantic intuitions sufficient to attribute to Mike dispositions to act in certain ways when endowed with full knowledge etc.? I am not sure that it is methodologically sound simply to attribute dispositions to Mike in order to ensure that Richard’s account captures our intuitions. We would need independent grounds to justify the attribution of dispositions.

I doubt that the concerns raised here are fatal to the dispositional account of restriction determination. But, if Richard intends to endorse it, more needs to be said.

5. A speculative suggestion
Let me close with a speculative alternative to the dispositional account. Suppose that we endorse the Lewisian picture of conversational score, i.e. we think that well-run conversations have shared scoreboards. Suppose also that there is a contextual parameter for restrictions on translation. Our question is: what determines the value of this parameter?

I am disinclined to think that we can cite a single factor in answer to this question. Instead, I think that there may be a number of factors. Here is a non-exhaustive list of three potential factors.

First, there may be conventionally-triggered restrictions. For example, I suspect that engaging in the Superman fiction conventionally triggers the restrictions:

\[(9) \quad \text{Lois: } \text{‘Clark Kent’} \rightarrow \text{‘Clark Kent’}\]
\[
\quad \text{Lois: } \text{‘Superman’} \rightarrow \text{‘Superman’}.
\]

And, likewise, I suspect that talking about Hammurabi, Hesperus and Phosphorus conventionally triggers the restrictions:

\[
\text{Hammurabi: } \text{‘Hesperus’} \rightarrow H\
\quad \text{Hammurabi: } \text{‘Phosphorus’} \rightarrow P
\]
where ‘H’ and ‘P’ respectively denote the representations that Hammurabi expresses using whichever expressions of his language conventionally translate ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’. To have a well-run conversation on such a subject matter, all participants must be party to the restrictions. Most of the time, this will simply be presupposed – but, sometimes, conversational participants may be explicitly initiated into the conventions. This naturally captures the intuition about Mike’s assertion of (7): the discussion about Superman conventionally triggers the restrictions given in (9), and thus Mike’s assertion is true; but the conversation is not well-run, as Mike is not party to the restrictions in play.

A second potential factor is homophony. When a belief ascription is asserted (and uncontested), and the content sentence belongs to the believer’s language, the value of the restriction parameter may shift to favour homophonic translation. Something like this might be happening in Mike’s assertion of (8). The homophony factor, however, is certainly not straightforward. In particular, if it is common knowledge between the speaker and hearer that that the believer lacks some relevant knowledge, then homophony does not appear to play a role. For example, suppose that Clark Kent’s mother, Martha Kent, overhears Lois compliment Superman’s cape. She might then utter to Clark’s father, Jonathan Kent: ‘Lois believes that Clark looks good in a cape’. Intuitively, the utterance is true – even if Lois would deny ‘Clark looks good in a cape’. If homophony were to be taken as a factor, then such defeating conditions would have to be spelt out.

A third potential factor is relevance. For example, if we are talking Pierre’s English beliefs – or if we are discussing Pierre’s thoughts about his local environs –, then an (uncontested) assertion of ‘Pierre believes that London is big’ may shift the value of the context parameter to include the restriction:


After all, that is the restriction required to make the contribution relevant to the conversation. However, if we are talking about Pierre’s French beliefs – or if we are discussing the reputation of London amongst the French –, then an (uncontested) assertion of ‘Pierre believes that London is big’ may shift the value of the context parameter to include the restriction:

Again, it seems that the restriction is required in order to make the assertion relevant: Pierre’s English beliefs just are not relevant to the case in hand.

Overall, Richard has provided us with a highly plausible account of belief ascription that is available to the fan of Russellian content. The collection offers both accessible entry points to his account, as well as more technical and detailed developments thereof. It comes highly recommended. I hope that, in this short piece, I have provided a few thoughts about how future discussion of Richard’s insightful account might be directed.

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References