A Revenge Problem Without the Concept of Truth

Pinder, Mark (2015). A Revenge Problem Without the Concept of Truth. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 4(3) pp. 151–161.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.168

Abstract

The vast majority of putative solutions to the liar paradox face the infamous revenge problem. In recent work, however, Kevin Scharp has extensively developed an exciting and highly novel “inconsistency approach” to the paradox that, he claims, does not face revenge. If Scharp is right, then this represents a significant step forward in our attempts to solve the liar paradox. However, in this paper, I raise a revenge problem that faces Scharp's inconsistency approach.

Viewing alternatives

Metrics

Item Actions

Export

You can export this page using these formats Digital Object Identifier - DOI

About

• Item ORO ID
• 56634
• Item Type
• Journal Item
• ISSN
• 2161-2234
• Keywords
• liar paradox; revenge; truth; Scharp; inconsistency approach; replacement
• Academic Unit or School
• Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies > Philosophy
  Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies
  Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
• Copyright Holders
• © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy
• Depositing User
• Mark Pinder