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Wisniewski, Tomasz Piotr
(2005).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230596368_6
Abstract
Earlier research on insider trading has documented unequivocally that officers, directors and controlling shareholders are in possession of valuable private information and exploit it profitably in security trading.1 It is widely believed that the apparent informational asymmetry arises from the foreknowledge of public disclosures. Consequently, a number of studies have investigated the intensity of insider trading prior to corporate events, such as takeover bids (Seyhun, 1990), dividend and earnings announcements (John and Lang, 1991; Ke, Huddart and Petroni, 2003), stock repurchases (Lee, Mikkelson and Partch, 1992), or bankruptcies (Seyhun and Bradley, 1997).
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About
- Item ORO ID
- 55396
- Item Type
- Book Section
- ISBN
- 1-4039-9153-7, 978-1-4039-9153-9
- Academic Unit or School
-
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business > Department for Accounting and Finance
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) - Copyright Holders
- © 2005 Palgrave Macmillan
- Depositing User
- Tomasz Wisniewski