A discourse dynamics investigation of metonymy in talk

Ewa Biernacka

BA (Linguistics; Department of English, University of Wrocław, Poland)
MA (Linguistics; Department of English, University of Wrocław, Poland)

Thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Centre for Research in Education and Educational Technology

The Open University, UK

30th September 2013

DATE OF SUBMISSION: 3 October 2013
DATE OF AWARD: 13 November 2013
PAGINATED BLANK PAGES ARE SCANNED AS FOUND IN ORIGINAL THESIS

NO INFORMATION IS MISSING
Declaration

I confirm that this is my own work and the use of material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged. This thesis has not been submitted to the Open University or to any other institute for a degree, diploma or other qualification.

YOUR ACCEPTANCE

1. Student details
   - Your full name: Ewa Biernacka-Dębska
   - Personal identifier (PI): Y7989287
   - Affiliated Research Centre (ARC) (if applicable): FELS
   - Thesis title: A discourse dynamics investigation of metonymy in talk

2. Authorisation statement
   - I confirm that I am willing for my thesis to be made available to readers by The Open University Library, and that it may be photocopied, subject to the discretion of the Librarian
   - Signed: [Signature]

3. British Library Authorisation (PhD and EdD candidates only)
   - The Open University has agreed that a copy of your thesis can be made available on loan to the British Library Thesis Service on a voluntary basis. The British Library may make the thesis available online. Please indicate your preference below:
     - [ ] I am willing for The Open University to loan the British Library a copy of my thesis
     - OR
     - [ ] I do not wish The Open University to loan the British Library a copy of my thesis

Print name: Ewa Biernacka-Dębska
Date: 31/12/2013 DD/MM/YY
Abstract

In marked contrast to metonymy research based on invented examples and intuitive judgments, this thesis presents a picture of metonymy in discourse derived from empirical analysis of authentic language. Using the discourse dynamics framework (Cameron 2010b), metonymy is investigated in a 17,889 word focus group discussion about the risk of terrorism. To aid and enrich the analysis of metonymic expressions identified in the focus group data, they are tracked in the Oxford English Corpus (OEC) and the Nexis UK database (NexisUK 2008). The research design applied in the thesis enables a multi-faceted appreciation of the phenomenon of metonymy in language.

Responding to an important methodological issue and a gap in the field, the thesis develops and applies a metonymy identification procedure, and offers the first quantitative results to date for metonymy density in language. Findings illuminate the new metonymy category SPECIFIC DATE FOR EVENT HAPPENING ON THAT DATE, instances of interplay of metonymy and metaphor, and cases of what are termed cultural metonymies. The thesis also argues, however, that a vital part of the picture of metonymy is missed if the investigation does not pursue cases which are beyond the procedure. While many metonymies can be identified in discourse by following the procedure, the major advantage of the discourse dynamic framework is it can uncover varying forms of metonymy. Metonymy is found in speakers’ use of pronouns in a process labelled metonymic shifting of pronominal reference (MSPR) and it is involved in metonymic processing of scenarios and metonymic processing of stories stretching over longer fragments of talk. Complexity of metonymic language leads the research to an analytic level which has the potential of revealing more about the core of metonymy and its complex nature.
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Professor Lynne Cameron, Dr Kieran O’Halloran and Dr Daniel Allington for their thoughtful and constructive supervision. I cannot express with words my gratitude to Lynne for the most helpful feedback and support, the inspirational and open-minded attitude to my research work.

This PhD could only be completed because of the funding from the Open University. I am thankful to the institution and will always be proud to represent it.

Furthermore, I would like to thank Professor Gerard Steen, VU University Amsterdam, for his contribution to my academic development, and the RaAM Association for being the intellectual home for me throughout the years.

Finally, I want to thank my husband Maciej for his unfailing support, my daughter Nina for all her smiles, and my Mother and Father for their invaluable help during this project.
# Table of Contents

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1
Rationale for the research .............................................................................................. 1
Focus and aims of the thesis .......................................................................................... 3
Outline of the thesis ...................................................................................................... 6
1. Metonymy in language and thought ......................................................................... 7
   1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 7
   1.2 Metonymy as category ..................................................................................... 8
   1.3 Metonymy in antiquity ..................................................................................... 13
   1.4 Metonymy in contemporary linguistics ............................................................ 16
   1.5 Bringing metonymy to light ............................................................................. 17
   1.6 Cognitive linguistics and the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy ........................................................................................................ 20
      1.6.1 The standard cognitive linguistic notion of conceptual metonymy ............ 22
      1.6.2 Contiguity .................................................................................................... 25
      1.6.3 Metonymy and metaphor ............................................................................ 29
      1.6.4 Synecdoche .................................................................................................. 34
      1.6.5 Domains ...................................................................................................... 35
   1.7 Summary and conclusion ................................................................................. 38
2. Corpus linguistics and metonymy ........................................................................... 43
   2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 43
   2.2 What is a corpus? ............................................................................................. 44
   2.3 What is corpus linguistics? .............................................................................. 45
   2.4 Combining corpus linguistics and the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy for metonymy research .................................................. 47
      2.5 Metonymy and corpus linguistics .................................................................... 48
         2.5.1 Metonymy annotation in a corpus ........................................................... 49
         2.5.2 Corpus explorations of productive domains ........................................... 52
         2.5.3 Corpus explorations of the metonymy-metaphor interplay ..................... 55
   2.6 Summary and conclusion ................................................................................. 59
3. Metonymy in the dynamics of discourse ................................................................ 63
   3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 63
   3.2 Discourse dynamics framework for metonymy and metaphor analysis .............. 65
      3.2.1 The interconnectedness of language and thought in discourse .................. 70
   3.3 Discourse activity and metonymy .................................................................... 73
      3.3.1 Discourse activity and communicative activity .......................................... 73
      3.3.2 Positioning, discourse activity and metonymy .......................................... 74
      3.3.3 Stories, scenarios and metonymy ................................................................. 77
   3.4 Combining discourse dynamic and corpus linguistic approaches with the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy .................................................. 79
   3.5 Summary and conclusion ................................................................................. 81
4. Methodology ............................................................................................................. 83
   4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 83
   4.2 Research questions ............................................................................................ 84
   4.3 Data .................................................................................................................. 85
   4.4 Method .............................................................................................................. 88
   4.5 Use of software ................................................................................................ 90
      4.5.1 Atlas.ti ........................................................................................................ 90
      4.5.2 WordSmith .................................................................................................. 96
   4.6 Use of larger corpora ....................................................................................... 97
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.6.1</td>
<td>The Oxford English Corpus and Nexis UK</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6.2</td>
<td>How the Oxford English Corpus was used</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Summary and conclusion</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Towards a procedure for metonymy identification in discourse</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Developing a procedure for metonymy identification</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Existing metaphor identification procedures</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>An identification procedure for metonymy in discourse</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.1</td>
<td>Application of the proposed procedure – data examples</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.2</td>
<td>The use of dictionaries</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Devising the metonymy identification procedure: summary and reflection</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Application of the metonymy identification procedure to the focus group talk</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>How much metonymy?</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Grammatical analysis of metonymy</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.1</td>
<td>Metonymy: nouns</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.2</td>
<td>Metonymy: verbs</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Distributional analysis of metonymy in discourse: clusters and the ‘super-cluster’</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.1</td>
<td>Visual examination and graphs</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Inside the ‘super-cluster’: the behaviour of metonymy in discourse dynamics</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.1</td>
<td>Who did what? Actions and agents: metonymic use of Blair and government</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.2</td>
<td>Blair, government and parliament in the OEC</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.3</td>
<td>World, the world and metonymy</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Metonymy meets metaphor</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6.1</td>
<td>Interplay of metonymy and metaphor – word and phrase level</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6.2</td>
<td>Interplay of metonymy and metaphor – utterance level</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6.3</td>
<td>Interplay of metonymy and metaphor – discourse event level</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>General summary and conclusion</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Pronouns and metonymy working together in discourse</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Framework for analysis of pronouns</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Pronouns and metonymy in the dynamics of discourse – analysis of findings</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>They</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5.1</td>
<td>They with a metonymic antecedent</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5.2</td>
<td>Metonymic shifting of pronominal reference: Who is they?</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5.3</td>
<td>Final comments on they</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>We</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6.1</td>
<td>The discourse dynamics of we</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6.2</td>
<td>We in the OEC</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6.3</td>
<td>Final comments on we</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>You</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7.1</td>
<td>Who is you?</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7.2</td>
<td>Final comments on you</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>General summary and conclusion</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Metonymy beyond word level</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables

Table 4.1
Specific codes used in Atlas.ti for marking metonymically used words or phrases......91

Table 4.2
Codes used for marking potentially metonymically used they, you, we and he..........93

Table 6.1
Distribution of metonymy in the focus group discussion per main word class.........141

Table 6.2
Nouns and noun phrases: Metonymic uses identified in the focus group.................143

Table 6.3
Verbs and verb phrases: Metonymic uses marked in the focus group talk with application of the metonymy identification procedure.................................................................145

Table 6.4
Frequency of parliament, (Tony) Blair and government in the OEC..........................166

Table 7.1
Quantitative results for pronouns they, you and we in the focus group discussion......200

Table 8.1
Quantitative results for discourse function code co-occurrences with metonymy codes in the focus group discussion..................................................................................257

Appendix

Focus group transcript (lines 1 – 2576) ......................................................................297
List of Figures

Figure 1.1
Domain-based distinction between metonymy and metaphor.................................................. 12

Figure 3.1
Forces shaping language use – Interconnectedness of systems........................................... 67

Figure 4.1
A screen shot of the focus group data coded in Atlas.ti............................................................. 95

Figure 4.2
A screen shot of a WordSmith concordance of all citations of oil in the focus group discussion... 96

Figure 4.3
Concordance of oil in the OEC, across all data types................................................................. 99

Figure 6.1
Distribution of metonymy in the focus group discussion............................................................. 152

Figure 6.2
Frequency graph representing the distribution of metonymy in the ‘super-cluster’ of the focus group talk................................................................. 154

Figure 6.3
OEC citations for the expression (Tony) Blair in collocation with Iraq................................... 168

Figure 6.4
WordSmith concordance extract for world in the focus group data........................................ 177

Figure 6.5
WordSmith concordance for of 9/11 in the focus group data................................................... 183

Figure 6.6
The distribution of 9/11 versus 11th September in the period 11th September 2001 to 11th September 2012 (Nexis UK)................................................................. 184

Figure 6.7
WordSmith concordance for the occurrences of we collocating with go in the focus group data.............................................................................................................. 189

Figure 6.8
WordSmith concordance for the occurrences of we collocating with go (past form) in the focus group data.............................................................................................................. 190

Figure 7.1
Representation of we and its referents (or contextual senses) in: we’ve exploited, we used to exploit in India (top); and we went to Iraq (bottom)................................................................. 217

Figure 7.2
OEC citations for the expression we + go to war .......................................................................... 219

Figure 8.1
Screen shot of discourse function coding with Atlas.ti............................................................... 246

Figure 8.2
Summary of codes set used for the analysis of the focus group discussion................................ 248
Formatting Conventions

The following formatting conventions are used in the thesis:

- *Italics* are used for all words and phrases extracted from the focus group data and corpora; *italics* are also used to introduce new technical terms and book titles.
- **SMALL CAPITALS** are used for conceptual metonymies, i.e. categories, concepts, or conceptual domains involved in metonymic mappings, e.g. *FACE FOR PERSON* where FACE in small capitals refers to the mental representation or domain.
- **Bold** is used for (potentially) metonymically used words and phrases.
- Curly brackets {} are used for contextual senses of lexical units and metonymy vehicles.
- Arrows (~) are used to indicate lines under close examination.
- **Underlining** is used for metaphorically used words and phrases – as originally identified and marked in the Perception and Communication of Terrorism Risk project (Cameron and Maslen 2010: 101); **underlining** is also used for additional emphasis.
- ‘Inverted commas’ are used for important technical terms from the literature and to introduce article titles.

These conventions are followed throughout the work, with the exception of direct quotations from other sources, where the conventions used by the author of the original text are preserved. The thesis distinguishes between metonymy in human thinking and metonymy in language use, and the above formatting reflects the distinction.
Introduction

Rationale for the research

Few studies have analysed the role of metonymic language in discourse; most have focused on conceptual metonymy, based on the tenets of Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy as developed within cognitive linguistics, whose major assumption is that metonymies (as well as metaphors) operate at the level of thinking, hence the terms ‘conceptual metonymy’ and ‘conceptual metaphor’. Metonymy, in comparison with metaphor, has for a remarkable time been relegated to a subordinate category in language and cognition studies. In this thesis, metonymy in discourse is perceived as a phenomenon as salient as metaphor in human cognition and communication. I first became aware of the complexity of metonymy when I was involved in a large metaphor project. One of my main tasks was to mark metaphors in the British National Corpus, and metonymy soon became one of the most frequently intruding phenomena in the analysed linguistic data. It was often very difficult, or impossible, to decide whether something was a metaphor or a metonymy. The analytic difficulty arising from the fact that the two categories seem intertwined became the starting point for my interest in metonymy and prompted me to search for a useful source of data to investigate metonymy in language. It soon became clear to me that, while metonymy could be investigated in a large corpus, using corpus linguistic methods, it was even more fascinating to analyse a transcript of a recorded discussion, treated as a discourse event and a trace of social interaction involving language. The thesis takes an inductive approach to metonymy identification and analysis, based on observation of authentic discourse data and
actual language use. A methodological issue connected with analysing metonymy in talk, the issue of having an explicit procedure for metonymy identification, became another research goal in this thesis. The work on an identification procedure for metaphor, carried out by a group of well-known metaphor scholars (pragglejaz 2007), convinced me that having a procedure was important for applied linguistic research into figurative language.

I soon realised that the interplay of metonymy and metaphor was only one of many intriguing problems connected with metonymy. I became concerned particularly to understand the various ways in which metonymy can work in talk. I noticed that, apart from lexical items conventionally regarded as metonymies, there are lexical items which seem to involve metonymy but have seldom been discussed as such in the metonymy literature. Pronouns are one such class – they present problems in the analysis and so their use and relation to metonymy became particularly fascinating. I also became interested in how metonymy works in longer units of talk, for example when people tell stories or describe situations (termed ‘scenarios’ in this work).

The work on metonymy carried out within the field of cognitive linguistics in general and the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy in particular, has been important for me for its explanations of some features of metonymy in language and thought. However, the theory often uses invented examples which do not reflect actual language use, which affects its validity. In this thesis, the central interest is in metonymy in real world discourse, treated as social interaction, and not in metonymy as a category in isolation. The discourse dynamics framework (Cameron 2010b) is suited to working with discourse as it was developed for the analysis of metaphor in discourse. While the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy downplays the role of language, the discourse dynamics framework is
designed to apply to actual discourse seen as a dynamic system in which there is interaction between language and thinking; in which people's ideas mix, evolve and influence each other; and in which cognition and language use unfold continuously in real time. The framework also stresses the interconnectedness of systems and timescales – cognitive, social, cultural, personal, historical and environmental.

**Focus and aims of the thesis**

The overall aim of the thesis is to investigate metonymy in talk. The thesis sets out to discover how metonymy is used by people when they engage in social interaction involving language, and how it contributes to discourse activity. The thesis seeks to provide a better understanding of metonymy in discourse by analysing how it is used in talk. While metonymy, both on the level of language use and the conceptual level, appears to be a very complex phenomenon, this thesis advocates the view that more illuminating findings can be made when real language is used for the analysis of metonymy, instead of invented examples which constitute the basis for a vast majority of metonymy literature. Inspired by Deignan's observation that data-based findings are possibly more accurate and they better reflect language, the focus of this thesis is on language use, i.e. what people actually say and how they say it, rather than on what they can (hypothetically) say (Deignan 2005b: 224). Below I present an extract from the data used in this thesis. The material was recorded in London in 2006 as part of a large-scale research project, Perception and Communication of Terrorism Risk (PCTR) (Cameron and Maslen 2010: 101)\(^2\). There were eight participants in the focus-group discussion, all women, non-Muslim. The moderator asked them questions concerning the threat of terrorism. The discussion lasted 90 minutes which produced 17,889 words of transcription, divided into lines (1 – 5117),

\(^2\) Details of the project are specified in Chapter Four Methods, Section 4.3.
according to intonation units. In Extract (1) metonymies are presented in bold font and metaphors, as originally identified and marked in the PCTR project, are underlined.

**Extract (1)**

2142 \( \rightarrow \) Abbie for the Muslim world.
2143 Abbie .. because it suddenly,
2144 Abbie brought their profile.
2145 Abbie and their issue,
2146 \( \rightarrow \) Abbie into the homes of the world.
2147 Janet yeah.
2148 Abbie you know,
2149 Abbie we suddenly took up [sic] and noticed,
2150 Abbie simply because,
2151 Abbie the World Trade Centre,
2152 Abbie .. was blown up,
2153 Abbie and all those,
2154 Abbie rich,
2155 Abbie privileged Americans,
2156 Abbie were killed.
2157 Abbie I mean,
2158 Abbie more people are killed,
2159 Abbie in the rest of the world,
2160 Abbie every day,
2161 Abbie than there ever were,
2162 \( \rightarrow \) Abbie in the World Trade Centre,
2163 Abbie .. because they were,
2164 Abbie .. the power base,
2165 Abbie .. you know,
2166 \( \rightarrow \) Abbie the world noticed,

In Extract (1) one of the speakers talks about how she perceives the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (11th September 2001, New York). The thesis identifies metonymically used language and investigates how metonymy contributes to discourse activity, i.e. what the speakers do with their language. For example, there are six uses of the word *world* in Extract (1) (lines: 2142, 2146, 2151, 2159, 2162, 2166). Three of them will be identified as metonymy vehicles (lines: 2142, 2146, 2166) and one of them will be identified as part of one metonymy vehicle (line 2162). Together with other metonymies identified in this extract, the phrases contribute to the discourse activity of positioning in society, expressing emotions and attitudes connected with the issue of terrorism. The thesis will show, for example, how the speaker positions herself in the non-Muslim world, at the same time showing some understanding of the
perspective of the Other, i.e. the *Muslim world*, identified as metonymic in line 2142.

Responding to a gap identified in metonymy scholarship, i.e. the lack of explicit and reliable procedures for metonymy identification in discourse, the thesis undertakes the research goal of designing an explicit identification method. Although provisional, the procedure proposed in this thesis represents an important contribution to the study of metonymy, in that it arises from a sustained engagement with the specific theoretical problems of metonymy identification and as such provides future researchers with a foundation on which to build. Metonymy identification with the designed procedure applied to authentic discourse provides the first to date quantitative results for metonymy density in language at the same time revealing a number of problematic cases. Analysis of the problematic cases finds metonymy involved in dynamic discourse processes, emerging from local interaction and contextual factors.

Aiming to provide a systematic description of metonymy in language, an inductive approach is applied in this thesis. The focus group discussion is analysed with more than one method and with more than one specialised analytic tool. Large language corpora are used for reference, i.e. to compare findings from the focus group talk, to enrich the analysis. The thesis stresses the usefulness of a discourse dynamic approach (Cameron 2010b) which assumes the interconnectedness and reciprocal causality of the micro and macro levels of language use. The conceptual level is not completely discarded – the possibility of conceptual metonymy is not ruled out but it is not presupposed that conceptual metonymies exist independently in people’s minds, constituting a mental store of concepts with attached linguistic expressions. The main focus is how speakers actually use metonymic language to express their
opinions, attitudes and feelings and to create common understanding and meaning, which may possibly reveal something about people’s thinking and conceptualisation processes in talk.

Outline of the thesis

Chapters One to Three outline the theoretical framework within which the research was conducted. In Chapter One, I introduce metonymy as a category of language and thought, and discuss those aspects of both old and new views of metonymy which have implications for metonymy in discourse, which includes a discussion of phenomena related to metonymy, i.e. metaphor and synecdoche. In Chapter Two, I consider the application of corpus linguistic tools for metonymy analysis. In Chapter Three, I present the discourse dynamics framework, which was developed by Cameron for the analysis of metaphor, and which I adopt in this thesis for the investigation of metonymy. Chapter Four engages with the methodology for the analysis of metonymy in talk. Chapter Five offers an identification procedure for metonymy in discourse. I provide a detailed description of how I addressed the research question concerning the creation of such a procedure and show how the goal of designing such a procedure was fulfilled. Chapter Six considers general findings from the analysis of metonymy in the dynamics of the focus group discourse, with quantitative results from applying the proposed identification procedure to the focus group data. A number of problematic cases are signalled, which are then explored in Chapter Seven, which analyses the relation between pronouns and metonymy, and in Chapter Eight which investigates metonymy beyond the level of words. In Chapter Nine I draw conclusions and summarise the main findings of the work, discuss the main contributions of the thesis, identify the strengths and the limitations of the study, and make suggestions for further research.
1. Metonymy in language and thought

1.1 Introduction

The impulse to speak and think with metonymy is a significant part of our everyday experience. Traditionally viewed as just one of many tropes, and clearly subservient in most scholars' minds to the master trope of metaphor, metonymy shapes the way we think and speak of ordinary events and is the basis for many symbolic comparisons in art and literature.

(Gibbs 1999: 61)

Gibbs's chapter in the edited volume Metonymy in language and thought (Panther and Radden 1999) was a significant recognition of the importance of metonymy in thinking and speaking. The book as a whole was an important step in shaping the contemporary view that metonymy should not be relegated to a position subordinate to metaphor in language and cognition studies. Panther and Radden even suggested that metonymy may be more fundamental than metaphor. Since 1980 and the publication of Metaphors we live by (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), which highlighted the role of metaphor as a mechanism that guides human cognition, linguistic research on figurative language has significantly advanced the idea that metonymy is at least equally important (for example Barcelona 2000; Deignan 2005b; Dirven and Pörings 2003; Panther and Thornburg 2003; Panther, Thornburg et al. 2009).

In this chapter some central features of metonymy are discussed. The first section presents the most widely accepted explanation of metonymy as a feature of language and thought, on the basis of both commonly used definitions and real-world, data-
extracted examples (Section 1.2). Next, the oldest accounts of metonymy are reviewed, dating as far back in the history of philosophy and linguistics as the times of ancient Greeks and Romans (Section 1.3). Finally, this chapter discusses metonymy in modern linguistics (Sections 1.4 – 1.6): with main focus on the first breakthrough for metonymy as a field of linguistic research, which began in the 1950s; and cognitive linguistic research into metonymy. This chapter points out some gaps in the metonymy literature, i.e. it attempts to exhibit and highlight areas of research which have not been explored sufficiently or which could be rectified with the addition of alternative research methods and tools. This chapter also introduces and discusses the relevant terminology and constructs; it begins the process of developing an apparatus for the analysis of metonymy in discourse.

1.2 Metonymy as category

Metonymy is ubiquitous in everyday language use. Nevertheless, as a review of traditional and recent literature shows, specifying the nature of metonymy and defining it remains problematic. Metonymy belongs in a group of linguistic and conceptual phenomena which have long been difficult to differentiate and describe. Already in classic ancient rhetoric and philosophy, there existed various typologies of metonymy and related figures of speech and thought (discussed in more detail in Section 1.3). As has been pointed out for example by Barnden (2010: 2), contemporary research does not offer a unified view on metonymy either – there exist a number of theoretical frameworks for metonymy analysis and the terminology in metonymy research also exhibits a wide variety. Gibbs characterises metonymy loosely as a process in which “people take one well-understood or easily perceived aspect of something to represent or stand for the thing as a whole” (1994:
and he discusses empirical evidence that shows that metonymy is not only a figure of speech but, rather it “constitutes one of the primary ways people refer to people, events and situations and thus reflects a particular mode of thought” (1994: 321).

Linguists employ terms such as ‘entity’, ‘concept’, ‘(conceptual) domain’, ‘schema’, ‘mental space’, ‘frame’, ‘Idealised Cognitive Model (ICM)’ to talk about metonymy. To describe the nature of metonymy scholars have used the notions of ‘contiguity’, ‘substitution’, ‘closeness’, ‘association’, ‘elaboration’. In the metonymy identification procedure developed in the present study, the notion of ‘contiguity’ is included, as it provides a basis to demarcate metonymy from metaphor and reflects a more general trend in linguistics, especially in the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy (Barcelona 2000; Croft 2003, 2006; Dirven and Pörings 2003; Nunberg 1995; Panther and Thornburg 2007; Radden and Kövecses 2006; Seto 1999; Steen 2005). ‘Contiguity’ in its basic (concrete and physical) sense expresses a physical relation of contact, closeness, nearness, adjacency, between physical objects. In this thesis, when the term ‘contiguity’ is used to characterise metonymy, it describes relations of abstract adjacency, nearness and closeness, pertaining to the relationship between the basic and contextual senses of a word (or phrase or clause), comprising not only spatial contact but also temporal proximity, causal relations and part-whole relations (Koch 2004: 7). The issues around the notion of ‘contiguity’ are discussed further in this chapter (Section 1.6.2). The debate around definitions and terminology for metonymy description continues to be extremely lively among cognitive linguists and an important issue, that has been recently recognised for example by Stefanowitsch (2006), is that more empirical research, such as corpus linguistic research, is very much needed for insights about the nature of metonymy
as a linguistic category. As far as discourse analysis is concerned, there is still little metonymy-focused research.

The thesis uses a definition of metonymy which reflects the current state of theory about the category:

Metonymy is a semantic link between two senses of a lexical unit that is based on a relationship of contiguity between the referents of the expression in each of those senses.


To illustrate, in light of the quoted definition, how metonymy works, two examples from the OEC (OEC)³ are used. In Example (1), *Pearl Harbour*, the proper name of a location, is used to refer to events that happened in that place at a certain time in history, and in Example (2), *Toyota*, which is a brand name and a name of a company, stands for the people or person who performed the action:

(1) (...) by the '40s, and certainly after *Pearl Harbour*, every Japanese director had no option but to conform (...) 

(2) Owen turned to EKPC when *Toyota* asked for a renewable source for much of the 130,000 kilowatt-hours of power consumed every month by the laboratory on its Erlanger campus.

Some metonymies are more regular in terms of patterns they represent and these are usually more conventional, like Examples (1) and (2); some are less conventional, for example in (3):

³ Unless otherwise specified, all corpus examples are taken from the Oxford English Corpus, a corpus of written and spoken English owned by Oxford University Press. The composition of the Oxford English Corpus, and the techniques used to search it, are described in Chapter Four Methods. Throughout this thesis, citations from the Oxford English Corpus are given in italics. SMALL CAPITALS are used for metonymic (and metaphorical) mappings.
(3) Our waitress offered to ask the kitchen to delay the main courses.

where the kitchen, the name of a place, is used to refer to the people working in the kitchen of a restaurant or bar, such as cooks.

Cognitive linguists usually call the first entity (or concept) in metonymy the ‘Source (Domain)’ and the second – the ‘Target (Domain)’. In accordance with the cognitive linguistic view, the metonymic operation takes place within one (larger) conceptual domain that includes both source and target, sometimes called the ‘matrix domain’ (Croft 2003), or one ‘Idealized Cognitive Model’ (Lakoff 1987), in contrast to metaphor, in which there is a mapping from one conceptual domain (Source Domain) onto another, distinct, conceptual domain (Target Domain). To show the contrast between metaphor and metonymy and to show the domains in the metaphoric and metonymic operations as described by cognitive linguists, two examples and two diagrams are presented (OEC 2013):

(4) In the end, I'm far more interested in seeing the fruit of my work help a human being (…)

(5) Last Friday, Sony announced its decision to fire 928 employees (…)

Figure 1.1 illustrates the difference between metaphor (Example (4)) and metonymy (Example (5)) with respect to the domains (and entities) involved. In Example (4) the word fruit is used to talk about results of work, i.e. a concrete object from the domain of food and natural products is used to talk about something abstract – the results of work. The operation, therefore, takes us from one domain to another, distinct domain and that is why fruit is considered as metaphorical in fruit of my work.
the fruit of my work (Example (4))  Sony announced (Example (5))

**METAPHOR**

S(D) → T(D)

food, product of a plant → results, product of work

**METONYMY**

S(D) → T(D)

a company (institution) → a representative for Sony

---

**Figure 1.1 Domain-based distinction between metonymy and metaphor**

In Example (5) *Sony*, the name of a company, is used to talk about somebody working for Sony and performing the activity of announcing, whether it is a group of people, such as the board, or a single representative. *Sony* can be seen as an attribute of the person or people performing the activity, i.e. the person or people who work for this company. The two entities (or domains) are, thus, connected by the word *Sony* and remain within one larger conceptual domain – **PEOPLE (WORKING FOR SONY)**.

Metonymy is not only often regular and productive, it is also frequent, and even though it had for a long time been studied primarily as a phenomenon in literature and poetry, it has now gained the interest of researchers who study its occurrence and mechanisms in all types of discourse, including natural, everyday speech of
language users (Gibbs 1999: 64; Markert and Nissim 2006: 2). In the two sections that follow, a critical review of approaches to metonymy is presented diachronically. The goal of this brief historic outline is mainly to show that ancient Greeks and Romans not only brought this phenomenon to light, but also discovered ways of explaining it that are not that far from the most recent and up-to-date accounts of metonymy in language and thought.

1.3 Metonymy in antiquity

Mentioning the oldest known accounts and definitions of metonymy is important for two reasons: firstly, we owe the initial insights into the nature of metonymy, among other tropes, to ancient scholars; secondly, modern linguistic approaches to metonymy, both traditional – rhetorical and literary – studies, and psychological and cognitive research, often link to ancient rhetoric in terms of their definitions of metonymy as a language and thought phenomenon.

Linguistic perspectives on metonymy can be traced as far back as the times of ancient Greek and Roman philosophers. In ancient Greek, the term ‘metonymy’ originally means “change of name” (Greek: “metonymia”) and in ancient rhetoric metonymy was often seen as “a transfer of a word to a closely related or neighbouring thing” or “a trope that takes its expression from near and close things by which we can comprehend a word that is not denominated by its proper word” as described by an anonymous author in Rhetorica ad Herennium (after Blank 1999; Koch 1999). Trypho, in the first century BC, defined metonymy as “a part of speech which is imposed on a given thing in a literal sense, but which signifies another given thing according to a type of relationship” (Arata 2005: 57).
Ancient scholars did not agree on a unified explanation and definition of metonymy; neither did they manage to provide fully detailed accounts of how metonymy works or how it should be classified. Some thinkers, including Aristotle, believed metonymy to be a kind of metaphor. Notably, in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, the term metonymy does not appear as such at all. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle defines metaphor as “the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion” (10: 1457b; trans. Whalley) For example, according to Aristotle, the following sentence instantiates a metaphor⁴:

\[(6) \textit{Verily ten thousand noble deeds hath Odysseus wrought.}\]

In Example (6), which is a ‘species to genus’ transference type, *ten thousand* is a species of large number, i.e. *ten thousand* is used to mean “a large number generally”. In the modern sense, the example provided by Aristotle would rather be regarded as metonymy, and not metaphor. Aristotle’s classification, notably, seems to contrast with the definition quoted earlier in this chapter (Section 1.2), in which Gibbs (1994: 320) refers to metonymy as a process that involves using an aspect of something to stand for the thing as a whole, which would suggest the existence of only one ‘transference’ type, to use Aristotle’s vocabulary.

When looking at ancient scholars’ accounts of metonymy, the interesting aspect seems to be not the quality of their explanation or its transparency – what is important is the fact that already in ancient times scholars struggled over metonymy and to talk about it they used terms which are still employed now. Ancient rhetoric was also aware of there being some connection between metonymy and metaphor.

⁴ Translated examples from the original.
This idea was not, however, clearly formulated and cannot be compared with the ongoing debate around this issue in modern rhetoric or linguistics. Although ancient definitions are vague in that the ancient scholars did not provide a clear classification of figures of speech such as metonymy, metaphor and synecdoche (Arata 2005: 65), the examples which often accompany the explanation of metonymy in ancient treatises are also clear instances of what modern scholars would classify as metonymy. Synecdoche is usually defined as a figure of speech and thought in which two entities position themselves in a LARGER-SMALLER, SMALLER-LARGER, PART-FOR-WHOLE or WHOLE-FOR-PART relation to each other. Section 1.6.4 discusses synecdoche in more detail.

Arata (2005: 58) lists metonymies found in various ancient Greek texts, grouped according to categories established by ancient Greek rhetoricians themselves. Among these, we find the type of metonymy, for example, which involves “saying the name of a divinity to mean the name of his attributes and vice versa” and one of the examples of this type of metonymy is Dionysus to signify wine in “they drank pots of Dionysus” (Arata 2005: 58). This is a clear example of what contemporary scholars would classify as metonymy of the type PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT or SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC, as in Pardon me while I grab a Kleenex, a tear just came to my eye (OEC), which can be interpreted as: the producer of a thing standing for the product; or the name of a leading brand standing for the generic product.

Ancient thinkers, thus, must have had a concept of metonymy quite similar to the contemporary one, and they, like contemporary scholars, made attempts at describing it, although it was not a major focus of interest in ancient rhetoric (Arata 2005: 65). Needless to say, the refining and theorising about metonymy continues to
the present day. Notably, in Aristotle's accounts of metaphor (and, implicitly, metonymy), we can find claims that such figures of speech are used by everyone in conversation and not only in the art of oratory, which echoes the emphasis on the ubiquity of metaphor (and metonymy) in language as advocated in the contemporary view.

1.4 Metonymy in contemporary linguistics

Ancient definitions of metonymy are valid and relevant to present-day studies of metonymy in that they point to the ideas of "stand for" relation, as well as substitution, closeness, association, and contiguity. All these terms have been, in modern linguistics, widely considered as crucial and criterial in defining metonymy and making the distinction between metonymy and metaphor. Traditional approaches to metonymy have been adopted, expanded and elaborated by many contemporary scholars – those following the more traditional school of literary studies as well as those following the most recent modes of thinking about metonymy (cognitive linguistic and discourse analytic). The major limitation in the traditional accounts is that they were established mainly for the art of oratory. Nowadays, it is more usual to take the whole cognitive picture into account when explaining metonymy, with broader research into metonymy and a particularly large group of scholars seeking to explain how metonymy works on the level of conceptualisation and examining closely the relation and interaction between the two potent language phenomena – metonymy and metaphor. There also exist a few valuable studies of metonymy in grammar and discourse, which are more usage-oriented and based on real linguistic data.
1.5 Bringing metonymy to light

Metonymy, as well as metaphor, is nowadays a rich and vivid area of research in linguistics and psycholinguistics. In the history of language studies it has not always been in focus – it was rather considered to be merely a rhetorical trope remaining in the domain of rhetoric and literary studies. Metonymy gained much interest around the middle of the twentieth century with the publication of Jakobson’s work on language: ‘Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances’ (1956) and ‘The Metaphoric and the Metonymic Poles’ (Jakobson 2003 reprint of 1956). Jakobson spoke of metonymy and metaphor as two polar modes of thought reflected in human behaviour and language; as two opposing principles according to which words are selected and combined in sentences. He was applying this theory to the analysis of the process of discourse development and interpretation. According to Jakobson, “the development of discourse may take place along two different semantic lines: one topic may lead to another either through their similarity or through their contiguity” and “the metaphorical way would be the most appropriate term for the first case and the metonymic way for the second, since they find their most condensed expression in metaphor and metonymy respectively” (Jakobson 2003 reprint of 1956: 42). Dirven (2003: 41) points out that Jakobson’s metaphoric and metonymic poles do not only underlie metaphor and metonymy in language, but also phenomena in many other language-related fields, such as literature, language impairments, especially aphasia, child language acquisition. Jakobson classified whole literary works by placing them around two opposite poles – metonymic and metaphoric (metonymy in the novel and metaphor in poetry). In a novel “following the path of contiguous relationships, the realist author metonymically digresses from the plot to the atmosphere and from characters to the setting in space and time. He is fond of synecdochic details” (Jakobson 2003 reprint of 1956: 43). For example, in
the scene of Anna Karenina's suicide Tolstoy focuses on the heroine's little red handbag which stands for the character and her distinctive personality as a whole.

The idea that literary works could be classified around the two major poles – metonymic and metaphoric – was later developed by Lodge in his 1977 and 1997 books *The Modes of Modern Writing: Metaphor, Metonymy, and the Typology of Modern Literature* and *The Practice of Writing* (Lodge 1977, 1997). Lodge considered metonymy and metaphor as two modes of writing and an example of writing that is purely metonymic could be, according to Lodge's classification, that of an encyclopaedia entry. Lodge quotes a definition of the proper name "Birmingham":

BIRMINGHAM (bur'ming-um) second largest English city (pop. 1,112,340) Warwickshire; a great industrial centre. Covers 80 sq. mi. Has iron and coal nearby and is noted for metal mfg. (...) Utilities and a bank are city owned. Has noted city orchestra. Site of Anglican and Roman Catholic cathedrals and Univ. of Birmingham. Bombed World War II.

(Lodge 1977: 94)

And Lodge explains:

There is nothing figurative or rhetorical in the mode of selection and combination corresponding to the actual tropes of metonymy and synecdoche. The article is not, of course, a neutral or objective account of Birmingham, just because it *is* selective. But the selection of information, it is safe to assume, is governed by the general conventions and utilitarian purpose of the encyclopaedia rather than by the particular interests and observations of the author, or any design upon the reader's
emotions. As a message it is orientated almost entirely towards context; or, in other words, it is referential.

(Lodge 1977: 95)

Steen and Gibbs (2004) and Semino (2008) point out that Lodge’s work is limited as it does not provide systematic analysis or clear definitions of metonymy and metaphor. However, Lodge’s argument, developed through explication of varying texts, does offer valuable insights and it remains one of the dominant sources for the analysis of metonymy and metaphor in literature. What is noteworthy in Lodge’s classification of the encyclopaedia entry as a “metonymic mode of writing” is that it draws our attention to the fact that metonymy does not only work at word or phrase level, but also at other levels of discourse. It, therefore, links to the idea of multiple interconnected levels in human interaction – one of the key assumptions of the discourse dynamics framework (Cameron 2010b) applied in this thesis (Chapter Three). Lodge’s idea also resonate with a distinction proposed by Gibbs between ‘metonymic processing of language’ and ‘processing metonymic language’ (Gibbs 1999), discussed further (Chapter Three, Section 3.3.3)

Metonymy and metaphor appeared to be figurative expressions which could not be analysed as lexical items that in themselves include all the meaning meant by a speaker in an utterance; expressions whose meaning cannot be encoded and interpreted in a lexeme in a straightforward way. For this reason, the issue of metonymy and metaphor moved from semantics to the pragmatics of language – an important step which foregrounded the role of language user and context. By the year 1980, the pragmatic approach to metonymy and metaphor was the most popular in linguistics as well as poetics thanks to work of such important contributors as Paul Grice, who was one of the first philosophers of language to recognise that most
conversations are based on participants' joint effort and cooperation. He noted that "our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks (...). They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction" (Grice 1975: 45).

The first pragmatic approaches to the study of language and meaning were important for the development of the study of metonymy – from then on, metonymy was seen as a pragmatic phenomenon, which must be analysed in relation to the context, i.e. the situational meaning of an utterance or the presumed intentions of the speaker. Jakobson's theory, despite its deficiencies such as the lack of a clear definition of the two major phenomena he based his theory on (metonymy and metaphor) and his expansion of metonymy and metaphor as tropes to cover all the other tropes, was a turning point for language scholars as it brought the issue of metonymy and metaphor to a central position. Jakobson also, continuing the classical tradition, spoke of metonymy in terms of contiguity and, in a way, he advocated increased study of metonymy in linguistics and other fields. The theories about metonymy and metaphor were, nevertheless, still full of questions and problems regarding meaning, communication and the interpretation of figurative language.

1.6 Cognitive linguistics and the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy

Approaches to language discussed in the previous section, focused on conventions of reading and writing, and highlighted pragmatic interpretation. Cognitive linguistics, which emerged in the 1980s, exhibited the problematic nature of the co-relation between linguistic meaning and knowledge of the world, arguing that language use
and understanding depends on our knowledge of the world and cognition. Present-day cognitive linguistics is a school of linguistic thought and practice concerned with the investigation of the relations between language, the mind and socio-physical experience, strongly influenced by theories and findings from other cognitive sciences such as cognitive psychology (Evans, Bergen et al. 2007). The major contribution of cognitive linguistics to the study of metonymy and metaphor is the development of Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy (Barcelona 2000; Croft 2003; Geeraerts 2002; Gibbs 1994; Kövecses 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Panther and Radden 1999; Panther and Thornburg 2007; Peiersman and Geeraerts 2006), which can be perceived as a breakthrough for metonymy. For language description and linguistic theory, and so for language phenomena like metonymy, the development of cognitive linguistics was a crucial step, with its major foci on issues such as meaning and the mappings between meaning and linguistic form. It emerged as linguists became increasingly aware of the artificial nature of the demarcation between linguistic meaning, cognition and knowledge of the world. It became clear that our understanding of metonymies and metaphors depends largely on our knowledge of the world and context, not only on the meaning of words in isolation or pragmatic rules for interpreting utterances.

Cognitive linguistics cannot be considered to be a specific theory or uniform framework; it is rather a set of approaches and theories built upon shared principles. Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy is one of the theories and areas of intensive research within cognitive linguistics. Cognitive linguistic research into metonymy links to other disciplines, such as linguistic research across languages and cultures, and psycholinguistic research. Designing experimental tests for metonymy understanding, however, remains a difficult and underexplored area due to technical
problems associated with designing and conducting such empirical tests. Gibbs (2007) points out that psycholinguistic research has not been able to show, for example, that people access conceptual metonyms in understanding metonymic utterances. This lack of overt psycholinguistic empirical support for cognitive linguistic theories of metonymy suggests the importance of data-driven approaches such as that taken in this thesis.

1.6.1 The standard cognitive linguistic notion of conceptual metonymy

A widely accepted definition of metonymy in cognitive linguistics is the definition proposed by Radden and Kövecses (1999):

Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same cognitive model.

(Radden and Kövecses 1999: 21)

The “standard cognitive linguistic notion of conceptual metonymy” (Barcelona 2011), has evolved over the years, with major contributions from linguists such as Barcelona, Croft, Geeraerts, Gibbs, Kövecses, Lakoff, Panther, Radden, Thornburg, Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (see for example Barcelona 2000, 2005, 2007; Croft 2003, 2006; Geeraerts 2002, 2006; Gibbs 1994; Kövecses 2002; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Panther and Radden 1999; Panther and Thornburg 2007; Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006; Radden and Kövecses 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Usón 2007). As claimed for example by Barcelona (2011) and Steen (2005), the notion of metonymy as developed by the above-listed linguists is the most widely accepted (with
alternative accounts proposed for example by Fauconnier and Turner (1999, 2002, 2003; 2000)).

In the definition quoted above (Radden and Kövecses 1999: 21), the notion of a cognitive model or Idealised Cognitive Model (Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999) encompasses concepts, forms (especially linguistic), and things and events in the “real world” (Radden and Kövecses 1999: 23). Idealised Cognitive Models (ICMs), according to Lakoff, are complex, structured wholes by means of which we organise our knowledge (Lakoff 1987: 68). In the relations between wholes and parts, two types of metonymy are distinguished: the PART FOR WHOLE (from the Latin PARS PRO TOTO) and WHOLE FOR PART (from the Latin TOTUM PRO PARTE) types of metonymy, reflecting the relation between the ICM as a whole and its elements; and the relation between two constituents within an ICM.

There is debate in cognitive linguistics around the notion of ICMs and related terms, with different terms coming from different authors. Langacker, for example, notes that the construct of ‘abstract domain’ is essentially equivalent to an ‘ICM’, ‘frame’, ‘scene’, ‘schema’, or possibly a ‘script’ (Langacker 1987: 150). Other linguists have arrived at similar conclusions. Cienki (2007) claims that a ‘scene’ as defined by Fillmore (1975: 124) does not differ much from what was in later years called a ‘domain’. Cienki also makes the point that “because each of the terms ‘frame’, ‘ICM’, or ‘domain’ can refer to a kind of knowledge structure which can serve as a background for interpreting the meaning of linguistic forms, there is sometimes overlap in how they are used by different researchers” (2007: 183).

The quoted definition includes the word “vehicle” to refer to conceptual entity. In contrast, this thesis proposes the term metonymy vehicle to refer to a word or phrase as a unit of discourse activity identified as metonymic in the analysed discourse,
based on Cameron’s use of ‘metaphor vehicle’ (Cameron 2003, 2007a, 2008a).

Chapter Five presents the metonymy identification procedure developed in this research and explains in detail the use of terminology used in the analysis (Chapter Five, Sections 5.3. and 5.4).

Within the cognitive linguistic framework for metonymy, there are a number of problematic issues – pertaining to the terminology for example – which are discussed in more detail further in this chapter. There is, however, agreement among cognitive linguists as to the main tenets of the “standard cognitive linguistic notion of conceptual metonymy” (Barcelona 2011; Cuyckens, Berg et al. 2003):

- that metonymy is a fundamentally conceptual – it can be studied through its appearance in language, with the important implication that concepts are not represented as metonymic, but they are metonymic (Barcelona 2000);

- that conceptual metonymy is experientially grounded – conceptual metonymy, like conceptual metaphor, is described as grounded in human bodily experience and interaction with the environment (a property often referred to as ‘embodiment’) (Panther, Thornburg et al. 2009);

- that conceptual metonymy can be the root of cognitive models – conceptual metonymies are treated as stable elements of our system of categories, they can be directly activated in the process of language production and understanding (Barcelona 2000: 6);

- that conceptual metonymy involves experientially and conceptually connected (contiguous) relations – most frequently cited relations include
associative-functional relationships such as for example CAUSE-EFFECT, CONTAINER-CONTAINED, PRODUCER-PRODUCT, PART-WHOLE, SUBSTANCE-OBJECT (Feyaerts 2000: 64).

1.6.2 Contiguity

As has been noted earlier in this chapter (Section 1.2), a central aspect of metonymy that has always accompanied linguistic research into this area is ‘contiguity’. Contiguity is taken to describe a relation of adjacency and closeness, comprising not only spatial contact but also temporal proximity, causal relations and part-whole relations (Koch 2004: 7). In the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy “it is generally held that while metaphor involves mapping across domains and finding or constructing similarity in things that are essentially unlike, metonymy maps within a single domain, along a continuum of meaning” (Deignan 2005b: 55). The claim that metonymy is based on contiguity (and metaphor on similarity) is a firm assumption within cognitive linguistics and it continues to be a more widely used term, for example in a number of corpus linguistic studies of metonymy (Halverson and Engene 2010; Hilpert 2006; Stefanowitsch 2006).

Cognitive linguistic approaches locate contiguity on the conceptual level, which reflects the general cognitivist assumption that that meaning is created by human beings and it does not exist independently of human understanding, knowledge and belief (Feyaerts and Brone 2005). All these human (and cognitive) elements influence what we regard as contiguous and are responsible for where we see the relationship which constitutes the base for metonymy. Contiguity, despite being a commonly used term in the metonymy and metaphor literature, is not a straightforward concept itself. That contiguity is a fuzzy category was noted by Eco
Barnden (2006; 2010: 6) shows that ‘contiguity’ (to describe metonymy) and ‘similarity’ (to describe metaphor) are “slippery” or “fuzzy” notions, which, to some extent, undermines their applicability in making distinctions between metonymy and metaphor. Barnden argues that metaphorical links can be regarded as contiguities, while central types of metonymic contiguity involve similarity. A similar point was made by Eco, who argues that certain expressions can be explained based on both contiguity and similarity (Eco 1979: 79-81). For example, according to Barnden, similarity in metonymy arises when, in PART-FOR-WHOLE metonymy types, the WHOLE and the PART share particular features that are important in the motivation for the metonymy. It is illustrated with the metonymic use of the word hand to refer to sailor. Barnden argues that important (traditional) functions of sailors, such as grasping a rope, are performed partly by their hands and that is why there is a sense in which a sailor and his/her hands are, to some degree, functionally similar. It is, according to Barnden, precisely this partial function sharing and, hence, partial functional similarity, that motivates the metonymy. Taking this idea further, the whole person has the typical function of grasping a rope because of having a part that has that function or an approximation to it. The ‘parthood’ is central to the similarity, and the similarity is central to the significance (in context) of the ‘parthood’ (Barnden 2010: 18-19). A similar observation can also be made for the word hand used metonymically for other kinds of manual workers, e.g. dock hands or farm hands. Manual worker literally means “one who works with hands”, with the workers performing specific functions with the use of their hands, so the hands and the whole person are, as claimed by Barnden, functionally similar to some degree.
Haser (2005) spells out one important quality of the notion of contiguity, which accounts for the difficulties and issues connected with its application in metonymy and metaphor research – namely, that the term ‘contiguity’ is metaphorical in nature when applied to more abstract domains. In the physical sense, contiguity describes a relation of close proximity, with or without actual touching/contact; in the abstract sense of contiguity, there are several different ways of interpreting the relation of non-physical contact or proximity. This, as Haser argues, may be the reason why contiguity does not have a unified definition in the metonymy literature. Haser takes this argument even further and points out that if contiguity can have so many interpretations and some of them are metaphoric ones, then many typical examples of metaphor, such as *He is a pig*, could be considered as metonyms, for there is some abstract contiguity, it could be argued, within our cultural beliefs between pigs and dirt (Haser 2005: 25).

Steen (2007: 58-60) also discusses some issues arising with the application of similarity and contiguity in describing metaphor and metonymy. He points out that similarity and contiguity, commonly regarded as two independent properties, are in fact often involved at the same time, and so it is sometimes possible to see a concept or semantic connection as exhibiting both metonymic and metaphoric features. Examples provided by Steen focus on sense perception verbs – such as *see* in Example (7):

\[ (7) \text{I see what you mean.} \]

Depending on the context in which this utterance is uttered, it can be analysed as either involving metonymy or metaphor. If, Steen explains, two colleagues are discussing a paper they are both working on at the moment of speaking and one of
them says I see what you mean, literal seeing can be involved and it at the same time provides access to understanding, so it is a case of metonymy. On the other hand, if the same utterance is uttered about a paper that the two colleagues have both read but did not bring to the office and are not working on at the moment of speaking, then no literal seeing is involved and seeing is metaphorical.

Steen’s claim resonates with what Cameron also reported in her usage-focused work on educational discourse. Cameron found that some expressions found in her naturally occurring discourse data could be regarded as both metaphors and metonymies, and that the distinction between the two categories is difficult as it rests on the definition of the notion of domains, which is problematic (Cameron 2003: 254). Her examples also include the verb see that can be considered as both metaphorical and metonymic at the same time in utterances produced by a teacher in classroom context such as:

(8) I've been able to see what their problem is.

(9) I don’t want to see any lines drawn.

In Example (8) the verb see means, metaphorically, “to understand/find out” but actual vision can be involved too, which suggests metonymy. In Example (9), the actual vision sense becomes stronger, the teacher may check if pupils drew lines but the sentence also expresses an order, it means that no lines are to be drawn by the pupils, which is metonymic.

While the term contiguity is widely used to describe metonymy, the issue of how contiguity can be defined remains unresolved. For the purposes of the present analysis, contiguity in its basic (concrete and physical) sense, as found in
dictionaries, is taken to express a physical relation of contact, closeness, nearness, adjacency, between physical objects. When the term ‘contiguity’, therefore, is used to describe metonymy, it, as inspired by Koch (2004), describes relations of abstract adjacency, nearness and closeness, pertaining to the relationship between the basic and contextual senses of a word (or phrase or clause), as in the definition of metonymy offered by Panther and Thornburg, cited in Section 1.2 (Panther and Thornburg 2007: 237 after Geeraerts 1994).

1.6.3 Metonymy and metaphor

One of the most intense areas of research within Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy is focused on trying to draw boundaries between the two categories. An explanation of the difference between metonymy and metaphor from a cognitive linguistic perspective that held for a long time in the literature can be found in Gibbs (1994):

Metaphor and metonymy can best be distinguished in making different connections between things (Lakoff and Turner 1989). In metaphor, there are two conceptual domains, and one is understood in terms of another (...). Metonymy involves only one conceptual domain, in that the mapping or connection between two things is within the same domain.

(Gibbs 1994: 321)

However, defining metonymy (and metaphor) in this way, might present problems in light of more recent debate among cognitive linguists over the use of the term ‘domain’ for metonymy definitions, discussed further in this chapter (Section 1.6.5). The mapping in metonymy can sometimes be considered as uncontroversial, such as
in Examples (1) and (2) cited earlier in this chapter (Section 1.2) but sometimes the boundaries between metonymy and metaphor are fuzzy. Radden, for example, proposes that metonymy and metaphor are located along a "literalness-metonymy-metaphor continuum" (Radden 2002: 409). The idea is further taken up by Geeraerts, who proposes that, if such continuum exists, there will also be borderline or in-between cases (Geeraerts 2002: 453-64). Barnden (2010: 4) points out that "metaphoricity and metonymicity are, arguably, language-user-relative in a deep way" and they are influenced by such things as the particular lexicon, encyclopaedic knowledge, and interconceptual relationships held by a particular language user. In light of such principle, an expression should not be said to be metaphorical or metonymic in any absolute sense, but only for a particular user (or users). Barcelona (2004) deals with metonymic processes involved in 'paragon names' such as Shakespeare in expressions such as *There are three real Shakespeare's in my college*. A 'paragon' is an individual category member (or a set of individual members) who represents either an ideal or its opposite (Barcelona 2004: 363) and Barcelona does not treat Shakespeare in such utterances as a metaphorically used word – he shows that such plural use of the proper name *Shakespeare* is a common noun motivated by metonymy. According to Barcelona, in such an utterance, a metonymy creates, on a conceptual level, a stereotype of the individual (Shakespeare) acting as a paragon. Next, the metonymy IDEAL MEMBER OF A CLASS FOR THE CLASS maps the stereotype (and its ideal properties) on to a whole class. The paragon name *Shakespeare*, therefore, stands for the class of writers who have an immense literary talent and, as a result, *Shakespeare* becomes a class name and can be used as a common noun, for example in the plural.
One of the earliest studies of the possible interconnection between metonymy and metaphor from a cognitive linguistic perspective is Goossens (Goossens, Pauwels et al. 1995; Goossens 1995), who categorised various ways in which metonymy and metaphor interact using a database of conventionalised figurative expressions from dictionary entries. Goossens uses a special term, ‘metaphtonymy’, for the metonymy-metaphor overlap. In Goossens’s categorisation, four sub-types of metaphtonymy are distinguished: ‘metaphor from metonymy’, ‘metonymy within metaphor’, ‘metaphor within metonymy’ and ‘demetonymisation in a metaphorical context’, where the first two types are the most frequent. An example of the ‘metonymy within metaphor’, as described by Goossens, is the expression to bite one’s tongue off, in which tongue metonymically stands for speech, and the whole expression is used metaphorically, meaning “deprive oneself of the facility of speech”. ‘Metaphor from metonymy’, on the other hand, can be illustrated by an expression like to be close-lipped, which includes a kind of interpretational chain in the process of production and understanding – it can mean, through metonymy, “to remain silent” (closed lips standing for lack of speech), and, alternatively, it may mean “to talk without actually giving away the information the hearer wants” (Goossens 1995: 172), in which case it is a metaphor. ‘Metaphor from metonymy’, therefore, refers to expressions which are initially metonymic, but which can, by a further step, become metaphoric. It will be shown in Chapter Two (Section 2.5.3) how the classification proposed by Goossens, based in a cognitive linguistic framework, was tested with the use of corpus linguistic techniques (Deignan 2005b). Goossens’s major contribution is the insight that an interaction between metonymy and metaphor can be found in many expressions, which confirms how complex the two categories are both from the perspective of Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy and, by implication, from the perspective of language description and
discourse analysis. Goossens’s work, however, is based on dictionary sources which are not as representative as real-world language data that can be extracted from language corpora. Deignan’s work shows how corpus-based techniques can successfully be combined with the theoretical framework of the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy (Deignan 2005a, 2005b; Deignan and Semino 2010) and it will be shown in the analytic chapters of this thesis that the role of co-text and context (as well as of culture) are all very important for the analysis of metonymy.

Radden (2002) alludes to the importance of culture in analysing metonymy and the interaction of metonymy with metaphor. In his paper ‘How metonymic are metaphors?’, he stresses the role of ‘cultural models’ in shaping the conceptualisations of members of a society, i.e. their perception and understanding of the world, and he argues that cultural models can provide metonymic basis for metaphors. ‘Cultural models’ are used by Radden in the sense of Quinn and Holland (1987), who defined them as “presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behaviour in it” (Quinn and Holland 1987: 4). In his discussion of metonymy-based metaphors, Radden does not give a very clear explanation of the idea that cultural models form a metonymic basis for some metaphors. However, Radden’s mention of the importance of culture is an important link between the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy and the discourse dynamics framework applied in this thesis. Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy has traditionally emphasised a separation of thought, language and culture; focusing on the cognitive, downplaying the role of language and disputing the role of culture, claiming, for example, that metaphors are universal across
languages. Contrary to this, evidence has been demonstrated by a number of linguists that both the language speakers speak and the culture they live in play a significant role in their conceptualisations of the world – literal, metonymic and metaphorical. For example Slobin demonstrated, in a series of cross-linguistic studies, that structural aspects of a given language influence how speakers think and conceptualise the same events (Slobin 2003, 2004) and Strauss and Quinn showed how culture shapes our knowledge of a subject (such as marriage) and how it influences the language used to talk about the subject (Strauss and Quinn 1997). Empirical research into metaphor comprehension has also shown that cultural background influences how figurative language is interpreted (Littlemore 2003).

The research presented in this thesis builds on this emerging tradition in metaphor and metonymy studies by treating culture as one of the important forces that shape language and by basing all its conclusions on rigorous empirical analysis of real language use. The cognitive linguistic accounts of the complex cases of the metonymy and metaphor interplay offer some insights into the issue, focusing, however, mainly on conceptual level analysis of the relation between the two categories. The work reviewed in this section appears most relevant to the research presented in this thesis for reasons such as: mentioning culture as an aspect of the analysis of metonymy and metaphor that should be taken into account, revealing how the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy and corpus linguistics can be usefully combined, and presenting particularly complex cases such as that of ‘paragon names’.
1.6.4 Synecdoche

In a study of metonymy, it is necessary to discuss its connection with another related figure, synecdoche. As noted in Section 1.3, synecdoche is usually defined as a figure of speech and thought in which two entities position themselves in a LARGER-SMALLER, SMALLER-LARGER, PART-FOR-WHOLE (PARS PRO TOTO) or WHOLE-FOR-PART (TOTUM PRO PARTE) relation to each other (Bredin (1984), Koch (1999, 2004), Rapp (2002), Steen (2007)). For example, in the sentence below, *face*, a part of a person’s body, stands for the person as a whole:

\[(10) \quad \text{Don't expose your child to too many new faces} \ldots\)

Like metaphor and metonymy, synecdoche is also characterised by indirect meaning based in the presence of two entities; and the two entities are closely related, as is the case with metonymy. Koch (1999) points out that many discussions of synecdoche conflate it with metonymy. He suggests that, on the one hand, there are PART-FOR-WHOLE figures, such as ROOF FOR HOUSE and WHOLE-FOR-PART FIGURES such as AMERICA FOR USA, which should be seen as metonymic according to Koch; and on the other hand there are cases of taxonomic generalisation/extension (e.g. BREAD FOR FOODSTUFF) and of specification/specialisation (e.g. MORTAL FOR MAN), which represent cases of synecdoche (Koch 1999: 154). Seto (1999) defends a specific treatment of synecdoche. Seto first distinguishes two major types of relations – C-relations and E-relations, defined by semantic inclusion. C-relations are relations between categories and subcategories, e.g. SPECIFIC BRAND FOR GENERIC BRAND as in *Could you go down the shops and get me some aspirin please?*, where aspirin stands for painkiller, whereas E-relations are relations between entities and their parts, e.g. PART FOR WHOLE as in *We have been able to beg, borrow and buy enough decorations to really transform the place but we need more hands to get everything*
in place, where HANDS stands for PEOPLE (my examples, OEC). In Seto's account, synecdoche refers to C-relations and metonymy refers to E-relations.

In contemporary linguistics, however, the distinction between metonymy and synecdoche is often blurred, with some linguists claiming that synecdoche should be considered as a type of metonymy, and others arguing that they are two separate categories. As pointed out in Section 1.2, some ancient thinkers (including Aristotle) considered synecdoche and metonymy as kinds of metaphor. Aristotle's definition of metaphor and his examples of metaphors conflate cases of what would be regarded as metonymy (or synecdoche) in the modern sense. The present thesis subsumes synecdoche under metonymy, based on the assumption that the relationships of hierarchy or taxonomy can be understood as metonymic relationships.

1.6.5 Domains

While this thesis does not rely on the notion of 'domain' for the analysis of metonymically used language, 'domains' have been most widely used as a theoretical construct in the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy. A detailed analysis of the concept is known primarily from Langacker's Cognitive Grammar, which originally defined 'domain' as "a coherent area of conceptualization relative to which semantic units may be characterized" (Langacker 1987 cited in Cienki 2007: 182) and in a more recent version offers a broad interpretation of 'domain' as "any kind of conception or realm of experience" (Langacker 2008: 44). Langacker recognises two types of domains: basic and nonbasic. A 'basic domain' is not profiled against a domain that serves as its base, but emerges directly from experience. As Cienki puts it "our sensory capacities are examples of several different basic domains" (Cienki 2007: 182) and "basic domains
may have one or more dimensions” and “basic domains cannot be fully reduced to any other domains, and in this way they can be thought of as primitive dimensions of cognitive representation” (Cienki 2007: 182). For the term ‘nonbasic domain’ Langacker offers a broad explanation: “Any kind of conceptualisation counts as a nonbasic domain capable of being exploited for semantic purposes” (Langacker 2008: 44).

Continuing Langacker’s ideas, Croft (2003) remarks that a ‘domain’ is “a semantic structure that functions as a base for at least one concept profile (typically, many concept profiles)” (2003: 164). A particular semantic structure “can be a concept in a domain (when it is profiled), or a domain itself (when it is functioning as the base to other concept profiles)” (2003: 164). For example, a circle can be a concept in the domain of two-dimensional space (shape), but it can also function as the base for the concepts of an arc, a diameter, a radius, etc. A concept, in turn, is a semantic structure symbolised by a word (Croft 2003: 165 cited in Cienki 2007). As Croft notes, a concept often presupposes several different domains and “the combination of domains simultaneously presupposed by a concept [...] is called a domain matrix” (Croft 2003: 168). Croft relates such definition of domain to developing an approach to metonymy and metaphor, where metonymy involves a mapping within a domain matrix. A common feature of the definitions of ‘domain’ offered by the literature is that they use metaphorical vocabulary (“realm” of experience, “area” of conceptualisation) to describe the abstract notion, which, as a result, provides only an abstract (and metaphorical) explanation of what ‘domains’ are. More recently, Evans and Green (2006) define ‘domain’ within cognitive linguistics as “body of knowledge within our conceptual system that contains and

---

5 Previous Langacker’s work used the term ‘abstract domain’ – the recent Functional Grammar points out the term is infelicitous because many non-basic conceptions pertain to physical circumstances (Langacker 2008: 45).
organises related ideas and experiences”, which is a definition that not only uses metaphorical words (“body” of knowledge and conceptual “systems”) but also conflates individuals and social groups in the use of “our”, manifesting lack of advanced definitions for the terminology which argues for the importance of other approaches to the study of metonymy and metaphor.

Some cognitive linguists have proposed that the notions ‘domain’, ‘subdomain’, ‘single domain’ and ‘separate domains’ are unreliable. Panther (2006), for example, makes an argument against the use of such notions for metonymy (and metaphor) description. Panther uses two examples to illustrate the point (Panther 2006: 155):

(11)  The red shirts won the match.

(12)  My (pet) tiger is a lion.

In Example (11), Panther argues, “one can view red shirts as belonging to the domain of clothing, which is relatable to, but also separate from, the domain of humans” (Panther 2006: 155). However, Example (11) seems to be a similar example to a classic in Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy literature: The ham sandwich is waiting for his check. In this example, for the metonymy ham sandwich, as analysed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Radden and Kovecses (1999, 2006), even though the entities red shirts or ham sandwich come from the domains of clothing and food respectively, which are indeed separate from the domain of people, in the given utterances they become inseparable attributes of the people they refer to, i.e. they are related to them in such a way that if one wanted to make a more explicit statement about those people, one would have to say “The players (people) wearing red shirts won the match” and “The customer (person) who ordered the ham sandwich is waiting for his check”. In contextualised linguistic use,
they remain, thus, within one domain: RED SHIRTS as source and PLAYERS WEARING RED SHIRTS as target, within one conceptual domain. Example (12) *My (pet) tiger is a lion* is provided by Panther to argue that the notion of *separate domains* "should be avoided in a working definition of metaphor" (Panther 2006: 161).

While the notion of 'domain' has been resisted by some cognitive linguists, most of them adhere to the view that domains are useful in describing and defining metonymy within the framework of the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy. As Cienki (2007) observes:

> The notion of domain is at the heart of the encyclopaedic view of linguistic semantics in Cognitive Grammar; if knowledge is encyclopaedic, rather than dictionary-like, domains provide a way of carving out the scope of concepts relevant for characterizing the meanings of linguistic units.

(Cienki 2007: 182)

In a recent volume, *Defining metonymy in cognitive linguistics*, Benczes, Barcelona, and Ruiz de Mendoza (2011) address the issue of the appropriateness of such terminology, comparing the notion of 'domain' to those of 'entity' (for example Radden and Kövecses 1999) and 'cognitive model' (Lakoff 1987). The conclusion is that, even though all these notions are highly abstract, 'domain' appears to be most widely applicable.

### 1.7 Summary and conclusion

In this chapter, metonymy has been explained as a linguistic and conceptual phenomenon. The chapter discussed how metonymy theories developed over time,
beginning from ancient rhetoric and philosophy to contemporary linguistic approaches. Emphasising that metonymy has for a considerable time been relegated to a secondary position to metaphor in linguistic research, the topic and subject of this thesis has been set in the context of the existing research. It has been emphasised that cognitive linguistic approaches locate contiguity on the conceptual level, with the assumption that meaning is created by human beings and it does not exist independently of human understanding, knowledge and belief (Feyaerts and Brone 2005). All these human (and cognitive) elements influence what is regarded as contiguous and are responsible for the relationship which constitutes the base for metonymy. The importance of the co-existence of the above-mentioned combined factors is something that could be seen as common for the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy and the discourse dynamics framework applied for metonymy analysis in this thesis. However, the important difference is that within the former theory, emphasis is on the cognitive, and language does not seem to play an active role in cognition; whereas in the discourse dynamics framework, cognition and language are in relation of reciprocal causality, both unfolding continuously when people engage in verbal interaction.

The terminology discussed in this chapter, especially the vocabulary of cognitive linguistics, is key to metonymy studies – it is part of the research tradition and part of the discourse of talking about metonymy and metaphor, despite the problems around some of the definitions. However, as some limitations of a purely cognitive linguistic approach to metonymy are revealed, the use of a combination of approaches (cognitive, corpus linguistic and discourse analytic) and searching for other theories to explain some aspects of metonymy in discourse becomes justified.
Some connections between cognitive approaches to metonymy and the discourse dynamics framework (discussed in Chapter Three) have been suggested, on the basis of the work of Slobin (2003, 2004) as well as Quinn and Holland (1987), as noted also by Radden (2002). It has also been suggested that corpus linguistic techniques can complement research into metonymy and metaphor within the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy framework. In most work within the framework of the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy, starting from the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), claims for the existence of conceptual metonymies have been based on isolated examples invented or elicited by the researchers, without an explicit method for identifying metonymic expressions in discourse, which raises serious questions about the validity of the presented evidence (Deignan 2005b; Semino, Heywood et al. 2004; Steen 2005). In addition to problems concerning the identification of metonymy in language – i.e. how to decide which words are used metonymically – there is also the additional problem of relating linguistic metonymic expressions to their underlying conceptual metonymies. These shortcomings are being addressed for metaphor by corpus linguists, critical discourse analysts, and other linguists working with authentic discourse (Cameron 2003; Charteris-Black 2004; Deignan 2005b; Musolff 2006). Chapters Two and Three discuss the relevant work and illuminate how the gap can be addressed for metonymy with the use of proposed methods, assuming that they should work for metonymy in a similarly efficient way as for metaphor.

The investigation of metonymy in discourse presented in this thesis reveals the importance of a perspective on metonymy which is not limited to a particular theory (such as the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy) but combines all aspects of metonymy – cognitive as well as linguistic and social. A review of
contemporary literature on metonymy (and metaphor) indicates that: firstly, the
majority of accounts of metonymy in the contemporary literature are cognitive
linguistic studies with only a few approaches to metonymy within corpus linguistics;
secondly, within the cognitive linguistic framework itself, there are many
problematic issues in the “standard cognitive linguistic notion of metonymy” as
developed over the last thirty years (Barcelona 2011: 7).

The following chapter introduces corpus techniques for linguistic research. Corpus
linguistics is, very generally, a study of electronic databases of language. It is a
developing research area in metonymy and metaphor studies, with significantly
fewer corpus explorations of metonymy than metaphor. Chapter Two discusses some
existing corpus linguistic approaches to metonymy and attempts to highlight aspects
of corpus linguistic methodology that can facilitate the analysis of and illuminate
findings about metonymy in language.
2. Corpus linguistics and metonymy

2.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces corpus techniques for linguistic research and discusses corpus linguistic approaches to metonymy, with examples of particularly interesting research work of selected scholars. It has been noted in the Introduction that there exist only few applied linguistic studies of metonymy, with most attention towards metonymy coming from the field of cognitive linguistics. The corpus linguistic approaches to metonymy presented in this chapter are examined for their potential to offer a practical framework and replicable methodologies for analysing metonymy in discourse. Some central features of corpus linguistics are introduced and the application of corpus linguistic methods for the study of metonymy is considered.

The previous chapter discussed how old and new theories of metonymy, especially the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy, attempt to provide terminology and constructs that can become an apparatus for the description of metonymy as category. It was noted that cognitive linguistic research could benefit from working with real language examples, coming, for example, from large language corpora. This chapter stresses the importance of using real examples to address the research aim of understanding metonymy in discourse and discourse activity. It also engages with the particulars of some existing procedures for metonymy identification and annotation in language corpora, which are examined as potentially compatible and useful for the present research.

Section 2.2 explains what a language corpus is. Section 2.3 illustrates what kind of research is usually undertaken within corpus linguistics. Section 2.4 considers how
corpus linguistics and Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy can be successfully combined for the study of metonymy in discourse. Finally, Section 2.5 reviews the existing corpus linguistic research into metonymy and considers how it can aid the analysis undertaken for this thesis and the understanding of metonymy.

2.2 What is a corpus?

One of the most precise characterisations of 'corpus' can be found in Hunston:

A corpus is defined in terms of both its form and its purpose. Linguists have always used the word 'corpus' to describe a collection of naturally occurring examples of language, consisting of anything from a few sentences to a set of written texts or recordings, which have been collected for linguistic study. More recently, the word has been reserved for collections of texts (or parts of text) that are stored and accessed electronically. (...) A corpus is planned, though chance may play a part in the text collection, and it is designed for some linguistic purpose. (...) The corpus is stored in such a way that it can be studied non-linearly, and both quantitatively and qualitatively.

(Hunston 2002: 127)

As observed by Hunston, and also by Deignan (2005b: 5-6), corpora vary in size – from a few thousand to a few billion words, and in terms of content – they may contain texts from one genre, such as language of business meetings; they may encompass Business English in general (for example Cambridge and Nottingham Spoken Business English Corpus, CANBEC); or they may cover a language in
general, for example the British National Corpus, BNC, or the Oxford English Corpus, OEC, which contain all types of written and spoken language.

2.3 What is corpus linguistics?

A corpus by itself is just a store of language – it takes special software and the hands and minds of a human being to sort and re-arrange information stored in a corpus so that various observations can be made.

A corpus does not contain new information about language, but the software offers us a new perspective on the familiar. Most readily available software packages process data from a corpus in three ways: showing frequency, phraseology, and collocation.⁶

(Hunston 2002: 3)

Corpus linguistics is usually regarded as a study of language as it is expressed in the real world – it is about making observations and drawing insights about language and its patterns, investigating how language is used in real situations, for example about contrasts in phraseology between spoken English and the language used by *Times* newspaper, how collocation works or what key phrases appear in academic lectures (Hunston 2002: 6-11). The selection of linguistic items for corpus analysis can have an a priori basis, i.e. the researcher pre-selects items for analysis and uses the corpus to investigate them. This kind of method is a ‘corpus-based’ research method and is deductive, in comparison to inductive ‘corpus-driven’ research

⁶ Stubbs (2002) defines ‘phrase’ as a unit of meaning in connected language use, consisting of at least a few words. Phraseology is the study of such units, which include phrasal verbs, idioms and other types of multi-word lexical units. ‘Collocation’ is defined as “a lexical relation between two or more words which have a tendency to co-occur within a few words of each other ( ... ). For example the word *provide* frequently occurs with words which refer to valuable things that people need, such as *help, assistance, money, food, shelter ( ... )*” (Stubbs 2002: 24).
methods, in which the researcher lets the corpus data show them things, without any preconceived ideas. However, the corpus linguistic method is not only purely quantitative, it also involves analyst's interpretation. In the present research, a large language corpus is used to complement a discourse dynamic analysis of metonymy in talk – it is to compare findings from a focus group discussion. The approach adopted is, thus, 'corpus-based' because it starts with the investigation of words and phrases found in the focus group discussion.

Even though methods and techniques of corpus linguistics vary between researchers, generally results are derived in an automated process, with the use of special tools. Hunston (2002) considers how corpus linguistics contributes and can be useful for developing theories of language and describing languages in general. Deignan (2005b) studies the contribution of corpus linguistics to cognitive linguistics and the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy in particular. Handl (2011a: 126) acknowledges a growing interest in corpus-based studies of figurative language, based on the "justified assumption that an adequate description of the role of metaphor and metonymy in language and thought has to be based on systematic analysis of samples of language use". However, while metaphor has in recent years received considerable attention, metonymy research remains dominated by publications based on intuitive data rather than systematic empirical studies, with the work of Markert and Nissim (Markert and Nissim 2002, 2003, 2006) recognised as a notable exception (Section 2.5.1).
2.4 Combining corpus linguistics and the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy for metonymy research

Some cognitive metaphor and metonymy scholars have been critical of corpus linguistics, arguing that its main disadvantage is the risk of the analysis (of large quantities of data) being "shallow" (for example Panther (2006: 148)). Corpus linguists, on the other hand, often respond that cognitive linguists neglect a bottom-up analysis of metaphors and metonymies and, consequently, disregard many aspects of linguistic realisations of metonymies and metaphors. However, as computational capacity and speed have improved, the use of corpora in language study has gained respectability and it is now recognised as one of the major and fast-developing areas of linguistic enquiry. There have been a few studies investigating the relationship between the two approaches and some scholars claim that they are in the relation of complementarity rather than opposition (Cameron 2007b; Deignan 2005b; Gibbs and Cameron 2008; Stefanowitsch and Gries 2006). We should not deny the role of Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy in putting metonymy and metaphor in the centre of scholarly research, in providing valuable knowledge about conceptual metonymy and metaphor and in initiating a long-standing and rich research tradition. In a sense, the (more recent) field of corpus and discourse analytic research into figurative language could not be taking place if it was not for the earlier development and ideas from the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy. Corpus linguistic approaches are invaluable for the challenge they pose to some theoretical claims of cognitive linguists, for the focus on language as it is actually used by speakers in natural contexts instead of intuitive (or invented) assumptions about language, and, last but not least, for the methods and techniques which appear to be in many ways more objective, showing the researcher facts about language,
with less bias and pre-conception. With corpus linguistic methodology, circularity is more likely to be avoided than with the use of invented examples. A corpus has the potential to show things about metonymy in language which cannot be discovered on the basis of hypothetical invented examples. The obvious limitation of a corpus is that it provides findings which are mainly quantitative and so additional methodology seems important to be used in tandem with a corpus. This gap of a corpus linguistic approach is filled in the present research by using specialised qualitative software for the annotation and analysis of metonymy in discourse. Such empirical analysis has not been, to date, undertaken in relation to metonymy and the use of a combination of methods in a dynamic approach to language (as specified in Chapter Three) is an innovative approach.

2.5 Metonymy and corpus linguistics

Metonymy has been less widely explored than metaphor in linguistics in general and in corpus linguistics in particular. This thesis explores to what extent the techniques applied to metaphor can be applied to metonymy. In this section, the work of three particularly relevant metonymy researchers is presented – chosen for their innovative, corpus linguistic approach to metonymy in real-life language use. The corpus linguistic metonymy research reviewed in this section offers examples of how corpus linguistic tools and techniques can be utilised for and aid the discourse dynamics investigation of metonymy in this thesis.
2.5.1 Metonymy annotation in a corpus

Markert and Nissim (2002, 2003, 2006) produce and describe a general framework for annotating metonymies in text, considering the regularity, productivity and underspecification of metonymic use (2006: 1) and develop a useful annotation scheme for two large groups of metonymies – location names and organisation names. The value of this research is that all their analysis is based on examples taken from a language corpus, the British National Corpus, which guarantees that their examples and all instances of metonymy are real and not based on intuition or invention. For metonymic organisation names, they distinguish five different patterns (their examples):

- **ORGANISATION FOR MEMBERS**, in which an organisation name is used for a person employed or affiliated with the organisation (e.g. *It’s customary to go to work in black or white suits. [...] Woolworths wear them*);

- **ORGANISATION FOR FACILITY**, in which an organisation name is used for a facility, branch, office, location where it is based (e.g. *The opening of a McDonald’s is a major event*);

- **ORGANISATION FOR PRODUCT**, in which an organisation name is used for its product (e.g. *A red light was hung on the Ford’s tail-gate*);

- **ORGANISATION FOR INDEX**, in which an organisation name can be used for an index that indicates its value, for example its stock index (e.g. *Eurotunnel was the most active stock*);

- **ORGANISATION FOR EVENT**, in which an organisation name is used for an event such as a scandal associated with the organisation, similar to some place-for-event metonymies, (e.g. *A remarkable example of back-bench influence on the Prime Minister was seen in the resignation of Leon Brittan from Trade and Industry in the aftermath of Westland*).
For metonymic location names, they distinguish three location-specific patterns: PLACE FOR PEOPLE, PLACE FOR EVENT and PLACE FOR PRODUCT (Markert and Nissim 2006: 6-8). They also distinguish four sub-types within the first pattern PLACE FOR PEOPLE:

- PLACE FOR PEOPLE, in which the name of a place is used for people or organisations associated with it (e.g. The G-24 group expressed readiness to provide Albania with food;
- PLACE FOR EVENT, in which a location name is used for an event that happened in the location (e.g. You think about some of the crises that are going on in the world from Bosnia and so on);
- PLACE FOR PRODUCT, in which the name of a place stands for a product manufactured in that place (e.g. a smooth Bordeaux that was gutsy enough to cope with our food).

Markert and Nissim also list a few class-independent, unconventional metonymic readings. The categories OBJECT FOR NAME and OBJECT FOR REPRESENTATION, they propose, can be applied to most nouns (e.g. This is Malta for the latter, when pointing at the image of the island on a map). They use the category “other” for unconventional metonymies. Some corpus linguists (for example Koester 2006; Seale, Ziebland et al. 2006) nowadays speak more positively of corpus-driven research, as opposed to corpus-based, arguing that corpus-driven analysis does not have any preconceived ideas – the corpus itself shows the researcher what stands out and is interesting. Markert and Nissim’s work is not corpus-driven in that they selected their area of interest themselves (location and organisation name metonymies), so it was not the data ‘showing them things’ from the very beginning. In a sense, therefore, they limited their view to particular types of metonymy. It is at this point that the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy finds its way to
corpus linguistics – the pre-existing idea behind their analysis is based on their theory about metonymy as a conceptual mapping. This fact, nevertheless, does not undermine the legitimacy of their work or the value of their contribution to the study of metonymy in real language use, particularly because they also find ‘new’ metonymic patterns (or mappings), which had not been noted in the literature before. Contrary to most cognitive linguistic research, Markert and Nissim base their analysis and metonymy typology on language corpus data, which is not at all prefabricated or artificial. Their classification of metonymies is, then, corpus-driven rather than corpus-based because it is the result of their corpus search and analysis, not a top-down designed one. An important aspect of their work is also the contribution to the knowledge of metonymy in the form of a corpus of 4,000 annotated occurrences of location and organisation names metonymies in the British National Corpus, which researchers in the field may use at their discretion, and which they used to examine the distribution of metonymies and for experiments in automatic metonymy resolution (Markert and Nissim 2006: 1).

In another corpus linguistic study of metonymy, Halverson and Engene (2010) have recently drawn on the annotation scheme proposed by Markert and Nissim. Halverson and Engene analysed metonymic uses of Schengen and Maastricht location names in two corpora: The Norwegian Newspaper Corpus and Atekst. The focus was on hypothesising about metonymic development, indeterminacy and chaining and they analysed the data having annotated all instances of Schengen and Maastricht in the two corpora – one used for diachronic analysis and one for synchronic analysis.
2.5.2 Corpus explorations of productive domains

Hilpert's (2006) starting point for a corpus-based study is also the selection of a promising source domain, i.e. a domain which is known to play a role in metonymic expressions. Hilpert chooses the lexeme *eye* to explore metonymies that are found in the English language, based on a 10-million-word sample from the British National Corpus (BNC 2005). After extracting numerous examples containing the word *eye*, he explored the frequency of metonymic expressions (as opposed to literal) containing this item and the relation of form and meaning in these expressions (including the patterns they are most likely to appear in and their level of fixedness, collocation and colligation). The strength of his analysis is that he presents an exhaustive qualitative and quantitative analysis of non-literal expressions containing *eye*; he does not limit his search to a particular context but analyses all occurrences of the lexical item. The typology Hilpert adopts for his analysis follows Seto's (1999) distinction between two major types of metonymies – C-metonymies and E-metonymies, defined by semantic inclusion. C-relations are 'kind-of' relations, i.e. relations between categories and subcategories, such as SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC, GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC and SPECIFIC FOR SPECIFIC. E-relations are 'part-of' relations between entities and their parts, e.g. PART FOR WHOLE, WHOLE FOR PART or PART FOR PART. Seto uses the term ‘synecdoche’ to refer to C-metonymies (Seto 1999: 113-15), which Hilpert does not. Example (13) illustrates a C-metonymy with the lexeme *eye*:

(13) *Keep an eye on children when they are playing with animals, and keep animals under control*

In Example (13), *KEEP AN EYE ON* means WATCH or, by a further metonymic link, BE ATTENTIVE, which is a hypernym of WATCH. Visual perception is involved in this
example and the phrase KEEP AN EYE ON maps onto WATCHING via a metonymic mapping— INSTRUMENT FOR ACTIVITY (EYE FOR WATCHING). E-relations on the other hand, in the classifications developed by both Hilpert and Seto, are ‘part-of’ relations between entities and their parts, e.g. PART FOR WHOLE, WHOLE FOR PART or PART FOR PART. Example (14) shows an E-metonymy with the lexeme eye:

(14) **The show as a whole demonstrated his remarkable color sense, often featuring various greens, purples, pinks and oranges along with black and blue, always used with an eye to spatial effects.**

The expression *with an eye to* means with regard to in which the basic E-metonymy is EYE FOR WATCHING. The EYE FOR WATCHING metonymy further feeds the E-metonymy WATCHING FOR CONCERN. Both these metonymies represent ‘part-of’ contiguity relations.

In Hilpert’s study – just as in the studies by Markert and Nissim – corpus linguistic analysis not only allows for a qualitative exploration of real language data, but also produces quantitative results. Among Hilpert’s findings, interestingly, is that 49% of the *eye* examples from his 10 million word BNC sample (BNC 2005) have a figurative meaning: 2.7% of these are metaphorical and the rest are metonymic (Hilpert 2006: 45). As Hilpert observes, this is in line with Lakoff and Johnson (1999) underlining the importance of body concepts in human conceptualisation. The advantage of Hilpert’s observation over Lakoff’s, however, is that it is corpus-driven and not intuitive, therefore providing actual evidence for some theoretical claims of cognitive linguistics.

Another important finding is that 72.9% of the figurative *eye* expressions analysed exhibit 22 fixed or semi-fixed patterns and that the metonymic patterns
differ from literal ones in terms of colligation and grammar. One of the main assumptions of the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy is that “metonymy is a conceptual tool that enables people to understand non-literal language” (Hilpert 2006: 146), which would suggest that the existence of conceptual metonymies in the human conceptual system is a necessary condition for the understanding of metonymic language. The finding implies that people do not actually need to process figurative expressions on the basis of pre-existing conceptual metonymies or metaphors, and as Hilpert argues, “on-line processing of metonymic language seems to be restricted to unconventionised, ad hoc cases of metonymy (...) which are found very rarely in the data” (Hilpert 2006: 146). The analysis suggests that what is frequent in the data is “systematic metonymy” and extensions in the patterns that form metonymic networks. He argues that processing takes place “directly” but on a basis of patterns which function as a kind of “scaffolding” (Hilpert 2006: 146) for people’s interpretation of non-literal language.

The explanation given by Hilpert of this idea, however, is rather brief. The work, nevertheless, shows that corpus linguistics can be applied to the analysis of language in a way which is more data-grounded. It is the kind of research where the data at some stage “shows you things”, which, combined with the richness of the data, leads to new insights about language. The starting point for the analysis in this type of research is the assumption (drawn from the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy) that metonymic expressions with the lexeme eye exist. Corpus data and corpus linguistic methods show the researcher various interesting aspects of these expressions. Cognitive linguistics and corpus linguistics can, therefore, be seen as two approaches which, however distinct, may complement each other, whether it is on the basis of proving or disproving claims or on the basis of challenging the
theory, or providing linguistic evidence and, at the same time, basis for theories of language.

The final point is that the study omits a clear explanation of how Hilpert decided on the metonymicity of his corpus examples. Hilpert notes that “four corpus-based dictionaries have been used for this task”, but does not explain whether he used a particular metonymy identification procedure and what exactly he based his judgments on (Hilpert 2006: 131). In this thesis, it is considered as an important matter and good research practice to detail how one makes such judgments. As remarked also by Stefanowitsch (2006: 11), this matter still calls for researchers’ attention as it has not been widely discussed. The importance of having such procedures is further addressed in Chapter Five.

2.5.3 Corpus explorations of the metonymy-metaphor interplay

Deignan’s 2005 book *Metaphor and corpus linguistics*, which has already been mentioned in Chapter One (Section 1.6.3), is a detailed analysis of the contribution of corpus linguistic approaches to the study of metaphor, a guide through existing methodologies used by researchers in the field and, in a way, a manifesto of the importance of corpus linguistics in researching figurative language. Deignan accomplished a systematic investigation of the main tenets of the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy in relation to real language use. She investigated how data from a large corpus confirm or confront implications of the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy.

The book explains the application of corpus linguistics, as the author indicates, not in opposition to but rather in response to or as complementary to
the framework of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. As the title of the book suggests, it deals mainly with metaphor, not metonymy, but one of its chapters is devoted to metonymy as characterised from the perspective of the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy and tested with the use of corpus linguistics tools. The book, as well as Deignan’s other metonymy-related work (Deignan and Potter 2004; Deignan 2005a), makes a significant contribution to metonymy research. All three studies are discussed in this section, for their relevance to the approach to metonymy in discourse as analysed in this thesis.

As far as metonymy is concerned, the focus is on expressions in which the two figures (metonymy and metaphor) seem to interact. Deignan employs corpus linguistic methods to test and further explore the classification proposed by Goossens, who was one of the first to explore the interconnection between metonymy and metaphor from a cognitive linguistic perspective, as discussed in Chapter One (Section 1.6.3) (Goossens, Pauwels et al. 1995; Goossens 1995, 2002). To investigate metonymy-metaphor interaction, Deignan begins with Goossens’s classification of metonymy/metaphor interactions and tests how it works if applied to real-language data (Goossens’s work is based on examples from a corpus-based dictionary, which means the linguistic evidence is not extracted from a fully natural context). Goossens distinguishes four types of metonymy/metaphor overlap: ‘metaphor from metonymy’, ‘metonymy within metaphor’, ‘metaphor within metonymy’ and ‘demetonymisation in a metaphorical context’. Deignan discards the last two types as she found they hardly ever occur in the real-language database at all, and tracks the first two types in her corpus, a 56 million word cross-section of the Bank of English (BofE) – one of the largest corpora in the world, with over 400 million words of
British English (approx. 70%), North-American English (approx. 20%) and Australian English (approx. 10%).

In the other study, 4,000 concordances including the words nose, mouth, eye and heart were analysed using corpus techniques (Deignan and Potter 2004). As in the case of Hilpert, all these words come from the HUMAN BODY domain – a source domain which is well known for its metonymic potential. The study found that in real language as used by native speakers there are in fact very few examples ‘metonymy within metaphor’ (Chapter One, Section 1.6.3) but, in contrast, that ‘metaphor from metonymy’ is quite frequent. For this reason, it is only the ‘metaphor from metonymy’ type that is adapted for the development of a further corpus-based classification of metonymy-metaphor interactions. Deignan (2005a) discusses patterns of metaphor and metonymy in the corpus, taking into account frequency, context and the issue of ambiguity. The analysis leads her to postulate for one more potential metonymy/metaphor interaction type, ‘metonymy-based metaphor’ (Chapter One, Section 1.6.3). Deignan’s observation is that within the ‘metaphor from metonymy’ type, there is often ambiguity of interpretation, i.e. the utterance/expression may be interpreted either metonymically or metaphorically, for example in (15) below (her example), raised eyebrows can be interpreted either metonymically – the expression to raise one’s eyebrows has metonymic motivation in bodily experience, i.e. it is a natural mechanism in people to raise eyebrows in amazement) – or metaphorically, through a metaphor developed from metonymy, i.e. the speaker is trying to tell us something about the people’s reaction to the situation.

(15) An insider at OK! Says: “This interview has caused quite a few raised eyebrows in the office. We reckon it is the most controversial thing our magazine has ever done”.
Deignan observes that ‘metaphor from metonymy’, as identified in her corpus examples, actually splits into two groups of expressions – those that cause ambiguity and those that do not (2005a: 78-79). Analysing 500 Bank of English citations of the adjectival form of *heated* – checking for collocates to the right of the word to decide on the literalness or figurativeness of the citations, Deignan finds that the lexical items occurring to the right of *heated* (i.e. *heated* + Noun Phrase) always fall clearly into one of two lexical sets – physical entities (e.g. *heated towel rails*) or speech acts (e.g. *heated argument*). When they fall into the physical entity set, the citations are literal; when they fall into the speech activity set, they are metaphorical (with possible metonymic motivation) because in an example like:

(16) *A heated telephone exchange* (…)

the word *heated* may be associated with physical warmth people experience when being angry). In contrast to Goossens’s (Goossens, Pauwels et al. 1995; Goossens 1995, 2002) inclusion of all such cases in the ‘metaphor from metonymy’ category, Deignan observes that Examples (15) and (16) differ in terms of ambiguity. In ‘metaphor from metonymy’, such as Example (15), the borderline between metonymy and metaphor is almost indiscernible, whereas in ‘metonymy-based metaphor’ such as Example (16), there is no ambiguity about the literalness or figurativeness, and metaphoricity and metonymicity within it. A further conclusion is that “rather than attempting to distinguish discrete categories, it is more useful to think of there being a continuum from metaphor and metonymy” (Deignan 2005b: 63). Relations in source and target domains in metonymies are also analysed. Using 1,000 corpus citations with the words *light* and *dark* and other terms from the two domains, e.g. *gloomy* and *bright*, Deignan shows how purely metaphorical mappings differ from ‘metonymy-based metaphor’ or ‘metaphor from metonymy’ in terms of
coherence patterns. For example, the corpus data expressions involving ‘metonymy-based metaphor’ or ‘metaphor from metonymy’, that had one source domain such as LIGHT or DARKNESS, could be mapped onto more than one target domain — the domain of KNOWLEDGE, HAPPINESS or GOODNESS or lack of KNOWLEDGE, EVIL and UNHAPPINESS respectively, and there was no coherence in the semantic relations — most metaphorical meanings of darkness are associated with unhappiness (e.g. Things aren’t as dark as they seem.) while most metaphorical meanings of light are associated with knowledge (e.g. Lyn’s seen the light.) (Deignan 2005b: 183-91).

The work is important from the perspective of both the present research and for corpus linguistics in general, not only for the corpus-based and corpus-driven findings she presents, but also for the connections she makes between corpus linguistics and the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy, and for proving the importance and ubiquity of metonymy as a figure of thought and speech. She combines theory and empirical research, questions and tests some claims of the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy, to show how they can benefit from each other.

2.6 Summary and conclusion

Most corpus linguistic research into figurative language so far has been on metaphor, rather than metonymy. Many of these studies do mention metonymy, but more in the role of the counterpart for metaphor or as a figure which often interacts with it. Corpus linguistic research into such language phenomena as metaphor or metonymy is still in its infancy (as has been observed also by Stefanowitsch (2006: 12) and Deignan (2005b: 224) but it is a fast-developing area of research, which evident in
the number of scholars who deal with corpus linguistics, and the number of scientific centres around the world promoting corpus linguistic research through conferences, workshops and courses. As has been shown, corpus linguistic techniques can be utilised for investigating metonymy in language. With the use of corpus linguistic tools, predictions about language phenomena such as metonymy can be tested in large-scale corpora, producing both quantitative and qualitative results about usage, which by further analysis provides more insights into the categories. The reviewed literature indicates how a corpus, together with specialised software, can facilitate research into linguistic data.

Some existing procedures for metonymy identification and annotation in language corpora have been highlighted, emphasising the benefits of applying clear identification methods for metonymy (and metaphor) research. The work of Markert and Nissim (2002, 2003, 2006) highlights the importance of applying explicit annotation procedures which is still a much-neglected aspect of metonymy research. In Markert and Nissim’s work, ideas from the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy are used as a starting point for a corpus linguistic exploration of metonymies. With the use of such methodology, they provide quantitative empirical findings about widely-known metonymic mappings but they also find ‘new’ metonymic mappings, which had not been discussed in the literature before. The detail of their method is a significant contribution to the development of precise and compatible methodology for metonymy research. Handl (2011a) also recognises the undeniable advantage of systematic considerations of real language data with the use of a large corpus and aided by corpus linguistic tools: “They provide us with a more comprehensive catalogue of existing conceptual mappings and corresponding linguistic expressions and they help us find out which mappings are really deeply
entrenched ways of thinking” (Handl 2011a: 127) and “the best way to obtain a clear and fairly objective picture” of the conventionality and frequency of figurative language is a corpus study. Following this assumption, the thesis attempts to fill the gap identified in the field of metonymy study by employing a large corpus for tracking words and expressions identified as potentially metonymic, so that empirical observations based on authentic language data can be made about metonymic language use. Deignan’s metonymy-related work illuminates some aspects of the relation between corpus linguistics and the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy, showing that the two should be seen as complementary and not opposing frameworks. Some aspects of Deignan’s methodology will be applied in the present research, for example the use of a large reference corpus, and deciding on the number of citations required to extract insights into the use of words and phrases. Chapter Four Methods engages with the technical details of the methodology applied for the analysis of metonymy in talk presented in this thesis.

The chapter stressed the importance of using real language data, such as a corpus, for metonymy research. It showed how metonymy research could benefit from working with a large corpus. It also emphasised the importance of having clearly-formulated identification procedures for metonymy identification in linguistic data such as a corpus in contrast to invented examples, which are often inaccurate if compared with results of searches into authentic language use (Deignan 2005a, 2005b). The discourse dynamics framework (Cameron 2010b) introduced in Chapter Three supports this assumption by focusing on language use in social interaction. The reviewed literature justifies the use of employing a corpus to enrich an investigation of metonymy in language. The research into metonymy carried out for this thesis

61
incorporates a large reference corpus as a second data source alongside the focus group discussion. Metonymy investigated at the level of the focus group data can give insights into the use of metonymy on the micro level of a particular discourse event. Investigating findings from the focus group discussion in a large corpus, will offer macro-level insights into socio-cultural aspects of language use, which is important for a dynamic view of discourse which stresses the interconnectedness and reciprocal causality of the micro and macro levels. The thesis, as will be shown in detail in Chapter Four Methods, proposes analysis of discourse data with the use of several interacting analytic tools.
3. Metonymy in the dynamics of discourse

3.1 Introduction

The research conducted for this thesis incorporates some ideas from cognitive linguistics and is complemented by corpus linguistic techniques. Both approaches were reviewed and evaluated in the previous chapters. This chapter introduces the discourse dynamics framework (Cameron 2010b), recognised as one of the most holistic existing approaches for the analysis of spoken language in interaction (Steen, Dorst et al. 2010), and adapted here for the investigation of metonymy in discourse. It engages with the particulars of the approach, explains why a dynamic framework is appropriate and attempts to show that a dynamic approach to the analysis may fill the gaps in the existing approaches and theories of metonymy in language because it focuses on the dimension of discourse (defined as language use in social interaction (Cameron and Maslen 2010)), in which the level of language use is as important as the cognitive level. As was signalled in Chapter One, there has been no research into metonymy in the dynamics of discourse. When discourse is seen as a dynamic process, in which each sentence uttered by a participant has the potential to influence the other participants, a dynamic approach is needed. Because this thesis investigates metonymy in the dynamics of discourse, metonymy is also perceived as a dynamic language phenomenon.

As Steen et al. also point out, many linguists (with Chafe being a particularly relevant example) have stressed the salient characteristics distinctive for spoken discourse, such as the evanescence of an utterance, the spontaneity, the richness of prosody and the situatedness of speech (Steen, Dorst et al. 2010: 61). A dynamic
approach to discourse and metonymy means that language use is seen as a complex
dynamic system in which there is interaction between language and thinking in the
moment; people’s ideas mix, evolve and influence each other. Cognition and
language use unfold continuously in real time. Words cannot be analysed in isolation
because what is seen in the analysed talk is a process, where speakers share ideas and
ways of talking about their attitudes and feelings, and they negotiate meanings.
Furthermore, if a discourse event is understood as a dynamic system, it is strongly
influenced by factors such as other systems and timescales – cognitive, social,
cultural, personal, historical and environmental. The discourse dynamics framework
stresses the various factors that shape language use, including the use of metonymy.
The discourse context is one of such factors and it must be taken into account. An
important aspect of the view is that it highlights that people can do many things with
the language they use, i.e. a conversation or another discourse event is perceived as
an event in which what people say is also influenced by factors such wanting to
achieve a particular effect, justify an opinion, express attitude or position themselves
in a group or situation. There are many types of discourse activity that can be
investigated in discourse data and, in the dynamic framework, the analysis of
language used by participants – metonymic and metaphorical language in particular
– is combined with the analysis of discourse activity.

In Section 3.2, the discourse dynamics framework for discourse analysis is
described. The discourse dynamics framework was initially developed for the
analysis of metaphor and this chapter explains its application for metonymy analysis
in discourse. Then, in Section 3.3, the focus is on discourse activity and how it can
be described. Section 3.3.2 combines aspects of Positioning Theory as a possible
way of describing what people do in talk and how metonymy works when people
engage with others in spoken interaction. Section 3.3.3 introduces the notions of 'scenarios' and 'stories' and how metonymy works with and within them. Section 3.4 brings together the three-fold framework for this thesis by addressing the question whether the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy, corpus linguistics and the discourse dynamics framework can be successfully combined for the analysis of metonymy in talk.

3.2 Discourse dynamics framework for metonymy and metaphor analysis

In the discourse dynamics approach, a discourse event, defined as 'a specific instance of social interaction involving language' (Cameron and Maslen 2010: 3), is a process in which speakers influence each other's thinking and use of language. Meaning is negotiated on the micro-level of subsequent utterances — through phrasing and re-phrasing of thoughts and ideas, which is often affected by how others immediately react to what one speaker says, i.e. by interrupting, asking a question or asking for clarification. Topics and themes in conversations flow and are part of the dynamics of talk. What we see in the analysed talk is the outcome of a process, where speakers share ideas and ways of talking about their attitudes and feelings, and they negotiate meanings. The use of a particular image or concept expressed either in literal or figurative form is often taken up by the other speakers involved in the discourse.

The discourse dynamics framework was originally developed by Cameron for metaphor analysis in discourse (Cameron 2007a) and it has been shown that, if a given metaphorical expression occurs in discourse, it is extremely likely that the same metaphor will be used again, as if the speakers were building communicative
‘bridges’. Gibbs and Cameron take this idea even further, to the level of the society and the external surroundings of people: the key to their idea of ecology of language and behaviour is “the recognition that metaphor performance is shaped by discourse processes that operate in a continual dynamic interaction between individual cognition and the social and physical environment” (Gibbs and Cameron 2008). A key assumption of the discourse dynamics framework is the multiplicity of dimensions and systems that are interconnected in language use: linguistic, cognitive, affective, physical and cultural. Cameron incorporates ideas from philosophers as well as language and dynamic systems theoreticians, including Bakhtin, Clark and Linell:

Drawing on complexity theory and dynamic systems theory, discourse is seen as a dynamic system that is in continual flux and working on various interconnected dimensions and timescales. (...) The discourse event is understood as the unfolding of the complex dynamic system of the group of people engaged in interaction. The dynamic system of discourse develops, adapts and flows as speakers’ contributions build on each other, and as people develop their own or others’ ideas. We can also understand the discourse activity of each participant as emerging from multiple interacting subsystems within each individual: complex dynamic language systems, complex dynamic cognitive systems, complex dynamic physical systems. Local discourse activity connects outwards into wider networks of environmental, social and cultural systems. So, any system that we focus on, such as a particular discourse event, is massively connected into larger and smaller systems.

(Cameron 2010b: 82)
Figure 3.1 tries to capture the idea of multiple forces shaping language use and the multilayered systems that interconnect and influence one another in social interaction and discourse activity. The translucent circles were used to capture the multiple dimensions of time and space. The arrows pointing in various directions represent the multiple forces which have impact on the system(s) and their reciprocal influence. The black figures represent human beings involved in interaction and communication.

Figure 3.1 Forces shaping language use – Interconnectedness of systems

The discourse dynamic framework is adopted and adapted in the present research to analyse metonymies and metaphors in discourse, taking into account also that when analysing metaphor and metonymy in discourse we face numerous issues such as conventionalisation, grammaticalisation, prosody, context, which all influence the
analysis and have to be accounted for in both the process of identifying metaphorical and metonymic language and analysing it. In light of this, a metonymic expression used by one of the speakers may be understood or not by the others. When it is understood – it is because they have or construct sufficient common background and socio-cultural knowledge of the world; individual reasoning processes and intellect may also be involved. Once an expression has been used by one of the speakers and understood by the others, it is very likely to be reproduced within the same discourse event. On the scale of a particular discourse event or a fragment of such, we see use of more or less conventionalised metaphors and metonymies resulting from shared knowledge of these expressions on the one hand, which is what Gibbs and Cameron refer to as “the macro perspective of socio-cultural and cognitive aspects” (Gibbs and Cameron 2008) and, on the other hand, from ‘conceptual pacts’ (Brennan and Clark 1996) on the micro level of discourse, where speakers gradually come to refer to topics in a particular, sometimes remarkably unified, way. Using a particular word or expression can achieve the effect of calling up a set of events, images and emotions – as has been noted by Ritchie for story (2010: 125).

Why do people use metaphorical and metonymic language? For metaphorical language, Gibbs and Cameron explain:

People may employ certain metaphoric words and phrases because they typically think about particular, usually abstract, domains in metaphoric terms (cognitive), because there is no way to express specific meanings in a language without using metaphor (linguistic), because they wish to impress or persuade another person by the words used (social), and/or because their cultural beliefs and norms are conventionally encoded in
specific metaphorical themes (cultural).

(Gibbs and Cameron 2008: 65)

The thesis proposes reasons for use of metonymic language may be similar – the use of a particular metonymic expression may be due to the pre-existing concept which people know because they have acquired general cognitive knowledge of the world or it can be due to a more ad hoc situation and context (both are culture-specific). The use of a particular image or concept expressed either in literal or figurative form influences the other speakers involved in the discourse. Conventionalisation happens on various scales in language – micro and macro levels. Certain linguistic expressions, including metaphorical and metonymic expressions, may emerge from a small social or cultural group and then become popularized nation- or world-wide. An example of this process is that described by Gibbs and Cameron (2008) reference to the way the words 'movement' and 'struggle' emerged from the discourse within IRA (Irish Republican Army) organization and then, in course of time became identified with the IRA group and are commonly used to refer to IRA issues. They may also be related to metaphorical themes across many domains. The conventionalisation process, however, can also happen conversely – a phrase may be used on the larger scale of, for example, the media, which, consequently, pre-conditions wide reception and popularisation. Therefore, linguistically, the expression originates from the large body of the country (the media being the speaking body of it) and is then adopted in the language of masses of people. This thesis investigates, with the use of corpus linguistic methodology, the conventionalisation of metonymies across the discourse event and over longer timescales.
3.2.1 The interconnectedness of language and thought in discourse

To understand metonymy in discourse requires understanding of both the nature of metonymy and the way it functions in the discourse. To analyse the latter aspect, discourse activity and the contribution of metonymy to discourse activity need to be identified and described. This aspect draws on methodologies of analysing focus group talk in particular, and of thinking in talk more generally (Cameron 2003, 2010b; Slobin 1996, 2003).

The activity of thinking takes on a particular quality when it is employed in the activity of speaking. In the evanescent time frame of constructing utterances in discourse, one fits one’s thoughts into available linguistic forms.

(Slobin 2003: 1)

Slobin (1996, 2003) uses the term “thinking for speaking” to refer to the language and thought processes involved in the activity of talking – in light of which the reason why people say something using particular words is influenced by the particular language they speak. As has been noted earlier in the thesis (Chapter One, Section 1.6.3), Slobin empirically demonstrates that structural aspects of a given language influence how speakers think and conceptualise (2003, 2004), which also resonates with Vygotsky’s (1934 trans. Kozulin) enquiry into language and cognition, perceived as dynamic and inseparable (Section 3.3.2). Strauss and Quinn (1997) show how culture shapes our knowledge of a subject and how it influences the language used to talk about the subject. Billig (1996: 148) claims that “thinking is like a quiet internal argument” which suggests a dialogic nature of thought and language processes. Cameron, inspired by Slobin, uses the term ‘talking-and-
thinking' to refer to the interconnected linguistic, cognitive and affective processes involved in human language interaction (Cameron 2003, 2010b). The most important implications of such a complex and dynamic view of discourse for the analysis of metonymy in talk talking are that the use of any metonymic language must be examined on various levels of discourse, from different angles and taking into account all interconnected dimensions, as well as internal and external factors. The idea lying at the core of complex dynamic systems approach is that context (in the sense of a discourse event that participants engage in) and system (in the sense of interconnected timescales and levels of activity) are inseparable (Cameron 2010b; Gibbs and Cameron 2008; Larsen-Freeman and Cameron 2008). Discourse, in the sense of language interaction in which people engage, co-evolves with context and can be understood as a dynamic system in which people's ideas and ways of expressing these ideas mix, evolve and influence each other.

Social Representations Theory, originally formulated by Moscovici (2001), as described for example by Linell, proposes that ideas which circulate in a society can become more explicit and more coherent in the local situation of a discourse event such as a focus group discussion (Linell 2001: 199). Dynamics of focus group talk reflect the negotiation of ideas in the discourse event but also indicate changing Social Representations. Linell characterises Social Representations as “various kinds of socio-cultural resources such as ideas, systems of ideas, knowledge, beliefs, ideologies, ways of thinking, ways of acting, ways of talking that people in a group/community/culture entertain about particular things in the world” (Linell 2001: 165). For example, in the discourse data analysed in this thesis, the language people use to talk about the risk of terrorism reflects how they conceptualise it; and, at the same time, the local talk also has influence on how they perceive terrorism.
The idea links directly to the 'talking-and-thinking' processes and the reciprocal causality advocated in the discourse dynamics framework. Billig (1993) also advises studying Social Representations in their argumentative context, that is in the conversational practices of people, which is consistent with the dialogic approach of the discourse dynamics framework. A discourse event displays at a micro level how opinions are formed, formulated and re-formulated in a society at large. In this thesis, such approach to analysing discourse is used to study specifically metonymy in the language that people use to talk about things, to express various attitudes and opinions, how language dynamically develops in the argumentative context of people’s conversations. But this thesis also investigates, on the level of conceptualisation, what the language people use — and metonymy in it — reveals about people’s thinking and attitudes. Emphasis can be both on single individuals and on culture, because of the interconnectedness of the various levels. Linell also notes that, in the analysis of Social Representations on the basis of focus group discussions, the emphasis must be on three different but interconnected levels: the interaction between speakers in the situated encounter (which corresponds to discourse event in the discourse dynamics view); the interaction between ideas, thoughts and arguments in the discursive web (which is what the discourse dynamics framework refers to as interconnected systems); and the interaction with socio-cultural traditions (which also corresponds to the discourse dynamics idea of interconnectedness of systems on a more macro scale) (Linell 2001: 170).

Ways of expressing thoughts and ideas are negotiated in a discourse event, or in a number of discourse events, and become established and shared within discourse communities. They develop over shorter or longer periods of time, may be temporary or permanent, may or may not become conventionalised. Cameron’s research on
metaphor has led to the conclusion that metaphorical language "seems likely to play a particularly important role in supplying emergent ways of talking-and-thinking because, when first used, metaphor may be striking and memorable, and thus act as an attractor for future talking-and-thinking" (Cameron and Maslen 2010: 88). The analytic chapters of this thesis will try to help understand how metonymy operates in talk, by investigating some special properties of metonymic language use, for example its contribution to various discourse functions; they will also suggest that metonymic language, like metaphorical language, seems to play a particular role in the processes of talking-and-thinking across various timescales.

3.3 Discourse activity and metonymy

The analysis of language used by participants – metonymic and metaphorical language in particular – is combined with the analysis of discourse activity. The analysis presented in the analytic chapters of this thesis integrates the investigation of metonymy functioning on various levels in the discourse and the contribution of metonymy to discourse activity.

3.3.1 Discourse activity and communicative activity

The notion of 'communicative activity' in the work of Markova et al. (2007) is close to the notion of 'discourse activity' or 'discourse action'. Markova et al. use the term 'communicative activity types' to describe "talk-dominated encounters and other social activities in which communication plays a major role" (Markova, Linell et al. 2007: 70). However, 'communicative activity' as described by Markova et al. is also close to what is, in this analysis, called 'discourse event'. In other words, communicative activity is taken to mean a communicative encounter, whereas
discourse activity or discourse action can apply both to a discourse event as a whole and to micro-scale local activity, e.g. on the utterance level. As Markova et al. observe in the work on dialogue in focus groups, engaging in a discussion is an opportunity for sense-making. In a dialogic and dynamic context, ideas brought by participants are not only expressed but they mix and evolve. Participants of focus group discussions “think together” (Markova, Linell et al. 2007: 132). In fact, Markova et al. report that many focus group participants sometimes initially claim that they do not know what to say about the issues they have come to discuss – and the same participants later develop a rich discussion together. Thinking together of discourse participants in a focus group as well as in almost any other discourse event can be regarded as a type of discourse activity. Focus groups are considered to have characteristics similar to ordinary talk, i.e. spontaneous conversations taking place in people’s everyday lives (Markova, Linell et al. 2007: 103). Myers (1999) also points out that, even though focus groups represent a relatively new discursive activity type, they share many characteristics with a wide range of language interactions, such as chaired meetings, televised discussions, therapeutic groups and dinner table discussions. In focus groups, as is the case in everyday spontaneous talk, people engage in a dialogic circulation of ideas and thinking together. As has been noted earlier, a focus group thinks together – as speakers talk, ideas circulate and evolve in a dialogic and dynamic way (Markova, Linell et al. 2007: 67, 132).

3.3.2 Positioning, discourse activity and metonymy

Two central concepts in Markova et al.’s view of discourse as communicative activity type are social roles and activity roles. Social roles are patterns of positioning that people orientate to in social life; activity roles are associated with specific activity types that concern shifting positions in a given dynamic interaction
(speakers take positions for themselves and give them to others). To understand how positions emerge in a discourse event, from a discourse dynamic perspective, both micro and macro level instances of discourse action must be observed. The terms ‘position’ and ‘positioning’ in the analysis are taken to refer mainly to the ways speakers present themselves through the language they use (Markova, Linell et al. 2007: 103). In the context of the discourse dynamics framework and dialogism, positions are dynamic.

It is not overtly explicit how Markova et al.’s definition of ‘position’ and ‘positioning’ relates to ‘positioning’ in the sense of Harré and van Langenhove, but they seem to be used in roughly the same way, with Harré and van Langenhove providing a more tightly formulated description. ‘Positioning’ as originally described in Positioning Theory (Harré and van Langenhove 1999; Harré, Moghaddam et al. 2009) is also dynamic. Similarly to the dynamic approaches of Cameron (2010b) and Markova et al. (2007), Harré and van Langenhove’s theory is much inspired by the work of the Russian theorist, philosopher and psychologist, Lev Vygotsky, whose enquiry into human cognition, language and sociology, pointed to and emphasised the dynamics of human comprehension and the inseparability of thought and language (Vygotsky 1934 trans. Kozulin). Harré and van Langenhove use the notion of ‘positioning triangle’, which pictures a dynamic stability relation between three core elements: position, the social force of what they say and do, and the storylines that are instantiated in the sayings and doings (1999: 18). The three aspects mutually determine one another and positioning thus occurs when a speaker situates him or herself in a discourse event through the language he or she uses and/or against what is said by others. Positioning Theory stresses the importance of the reciprocal

\[\text{Correspondent to and inspired by the pragmatics notion of 'illocutionary force' (Austin 1959).}\]
influence of language, thought and action, as well as the interconnectedness of systems – communal, individual, public and private – and discourse events within them.

In the study of dialogue in focus groups by Markova et al., external and internal ‘framings’ are also distinguished as two communicative activity types (Markova, Linell et al. 2007: 71-73). Framings refer to situation descriptions as constructed by speakers, i.e. descriptions of physical locality and what happens in a situation. For example, the physical locality of the focus group discussion session would be part of its external framing, whereas on-line discourse interaction, with its emergent characteristics, belongs to internal framing. Both external and internal framings are dynamic, corresponding to the multiplicity of interconnected systems in the discourse dynamic view used in this research. An alternative way to consider the speaker’s situation or ‘framing’ is to use the notion ‘stance’ proposed by Myers (2010). In his analysis of public discussions in internet blogs, Myers argues that stance-taking is a prominent phenomenon in his data and that it indicates the priority of individual positioning over collective discussion. Myers defines stance as “a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects, and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimensions of the sociocultural field” (Myers 2010: 264 after DuBois 2007). The term, Myers explains, is broad and covers a range of linguistic features such as modality, evaluation, evidentiality, hedging, politeness and metadiscourse (Myers 2010). The notion of stance, understood as the linguistic expression of one’s position, is close to the notion of ‘position’ and ‘positioning’ used in this thesis.
3.3.3 Stories, scenarios and metonymy

As was mentioned in Chapter One (Section 1.5), a distinction was suggested by Gibbs (1999) between 'metonymic processing of language' and 'processing metonymic language'. With metonymy analysis in discourse, there seems to be an interpretative level which is beyond the level of single words or utterances but which is, at the same time, not the macro level of the whole discourse event. This interpretative level works at the scale of 'stories' and 'scenarios' and Gibbs's idea of 'metonymic processing of language' appears useful for the analysis of metonymy on this level in the discourse event, as will be shown in Chapters Seven and Eight of the thesis. According to Gibbs, processing metonymic language is involved when speakers of a language interpret and understand utterances such as Paris has dropped hemlines this year, which includes metonymically used Paris, i.e. Paris stands for fashion designers based in Paris. Metonymic processing of language, on the other hand, is involved in interpreting and understanding "gaps in narrative by inferring some rich source of information, like a script, from the simple mention of some salient part of that knowledge" (Gibbs 1999: 69). When people interpret a narrative, Gibbs claims, they activate their knowledge and associations connected with the activity described. One type of knowledge involved in the understanding processes is called a 'script' (Gibbs 1999 after Schank and Abelson 1977) and it consists of well-learned scenarios describing structured situations in everyday life (Gibbs 1999: 69).

Metonymic processing, therefore, requires (of participants in a conversation for example) utilising a conventional script for the interpretation of utterances in a story (or narrative to use Gibbs's terms), which may also involve filling in potential gaps in the story. The utterances in the narrative do not need to include any metonymies, but the story as a whole is processed metonymically. Chapter Five
shows how the phenomenon described by Gibbs poses challenges in the process of designing an identification procedure for metonymy while Chapters Seven and Eight explore related findings. Ritchie (2010), defines ‘story’ as “a representation of an event or a series of events.” As Ritchie also points out (following Schank and Abelson 1995) “many individual words and phrases have the capacity to remind us of a story; depending on the context they may activate a detailed experience of the story” (2010: 125). Such words can act as ‘story indexes’, i.e. words or phrases that have the power to suggest and invoke what is not said explicitly, but immediately activated through association. They have the affordance ⁸ to activate, through a metonymic process, various associations, images, feelings and experiences connected to what they directly mean (e.g. a specific date). Such items have much content encoded in a short word or expression, which is important for the analysis of metonymy, as well as the analysis stories and scenarios that metonymy is involved in.

A ‘scenario’, on the other hand, refers to conventional events and people’s actions, which can involve various conventional imaginations, expectations and attitudes. This aspect of the notion of ‘scenario’ is similar to how Cameron and Maslen (2010: 139) and Musolff (2006: 26) define ‘metaphorical scenarios’. The relevant part of Musolff’s definition is where scenario is described as an event with which conventional aspects are associated. However, Musolff’s metaphorical scenarios are conceptual and the scenarios found in this research are in the language used by participants. In the scenarios found in the focus group data, the interest is not in establishing mappings between the various elements/aspects of a “source-situation” and “target concepts” (Musolff 2006: 28). Rather, it is a conventional

---

⁸ The term ‘affordance’ is used in the sense of Linell (2009: 332) to refer to “meaning potential in concrete utterances”.

78
scenario with all its conventional aspects that invokes more than just the situation it describes directly.

3.4 Combining discourse dynamic and corpus linguistic approaches with the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy

Based on a combination of empirical data (discourse event and corpus), Cameron and Deignan (2006) propose that language choices made by speakers on the level of a particular discourse event influence language choices of speakers in future discourse events because discourse systems tend to follow the same principles at different. Cameron (2007b) shows how this discourse analytic and discourse-oriented view complements Conceptual Metaphor Theory:

This type of explanation (...) allows reciprocal causality, both upwards from the individual through emergence and downwards as sociocultural norms influence individuals, replacing the downwards only explanation that language use is motivated by conceptual metaphor. It goes further in rejecting the position that language use is mere expression and repositions it as central to cognition — a move consonant with cognitive linguistics claims.

(Cameron 2007b: 130)

Even though metonymic expressions found in talk may be traced back to some (pre-existing) conceptual metonyms, it is the level of linguistic expression of the speakers involved, that is in focus for the present analysis. In the discourse dynamic approach, analysis of linguistic metonyms and metaphors identified from real-life
discourse data can be seen as complementary in its relationship with ideas from Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy. Handl observes:

The language chosen to talk about something thus also has effects on the addressees’ minds, whose current metaphorical structures are therefore continuously updated by linguistic input. It can be argued that the figurative structures entrenched in a person’s mind arise from, and are sustained by, linguistic as well as non-linguistic sources, which constantly influence each other reciprocally.

(Handl 2011b: 3)

If at the core of cognitive linguistics lies the assumption that “the organisation of our language is intimately related to, and derives directly from, how language is actually used” (Cameron 2007 after Evans and Green 2006: 108), then it seems plausible to expect that researching metonymy in real language can be of benefit for the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy (Cameron 2007b). As has been noted in Chapter Two (Section 2.6), Deignan’s work (2005a, 2005b) indicates that intuitive, invented examples, which often serve as examples within the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy, are often inaccurate if compared with results of corpus searches. Cameron (2007: 108) and Deignan (2005b) argue that the study of metaphor in real language use contributes to the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy just like, vice versa, the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy and cognitive linguistics may motivate empirical studies of metaphor (and metonymy) in language use. The present thesis represents a threefold approach – it does not disregard the cognitive approach because it is interested in how speakers conceive of various topics, but it considers
empirical research based on analysis of authentic language data as more adequate for descriptions of language.

3.5 Summary and conclusion

In this chapter, the most important aspects of the discourse dynamics framework were outlined – focusing on the view of discourse as a dynamic process and the view that people can do many things with words, i.e. there are many types of discourse activity that can be investigated in discourse data. Originally developed for metaphor analysis in discourse, the discourse dynamics framework is applied in this thesis for analysis of metonymy in talk. In light of the dynamic view of discourse, metonymy analysis in discourse, involves investigating various factors and systems that influence speakers' use of language in general and metonymy in particular. While the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy seems to emphasise the cognitive level, thus downplaying the role of language, the discourse dynamics framework focuses on the level of language use and analyses words actually used by speakers. Language use is perceived as a complex dynamic system that is multi-layered and fluid.

In light of the discourse dynamics view, there are several levels on which metonymy performance can be analysed – level of specific utterances, level of the given discourse event connections more broadly. The connection between linguistic metonymy (or metaphor) and conceptual metonymy (or metaphor) is not just a top-down instantiation from thought to language – as it would be within the tenets of the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy. The discourse dynamics view does not rule out the possibility of conceptual metonymy and metaphor altogether but it does not assume that there is a limited set and a mental store of fixed mappings with
attached linguistic expressions. This chapter has explained why the discourse dynamics framework appears to be the most valuable approach for the analysis of metonymy in talk. As a dynamic view of language, it requires a multi-dimensional analysis. Understanding language as a dynamic process, the discourse dynamics approach presupposes that metonymy is also viewed and analysed as a dynamic language and thought phenomenon. The analysis, which focuses on language and cognition which unfold continuously and dynamically in real time, is an innovative approach to metonymy – which has generally rarely been closely investigated in real language data and which has probably never been investigated from the perspective of discourse seen as a dynamic process.
4. Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The first three chapters engaged critically with a set of approaches that will become important for my thesis. It was explained why a dynamic approach is considered as most appropriate for analysis of discourse and providing a coherent picture of metonymy in talk. Focusing on the dimension of real-world discourse from a dynamic perspective and following the assumption that more systematic findings and more valid claims can be made if authentic data is investigated, the thesis aims to fill the gap in metonymy research. The theoretical background for investigating metonymy in discourse included a discussion of some of the most important aspects of old and new theories of metonymy as category, a presentation of existing corpus linguistic research into metonymy, and a presentation of a dynamic approach to analysing discourse. Attempts were made to contextualise the present research in the field of metonymy studies and to provide relevant terminology and constructs to develop an apparatus for the analysis of metonymy in discourse.

The present chapter first presents the research questions that the thesis answers (Section 4.2). Section 4.3 then describes the data sources. Tools and techniques used to analyse the data are described in Sections 4.4 - 4.5. The issue of the identification procedure is signalled in Section 4.5.1. Section 4.6 describes how corpora were used.
4.2 Research questions

Based on the reviewed literature and to accomplish the goals of the research to investigate metonymy in the dynamics of discourse, the following research questions are answered:

**Metonymy in talk**

Research Question 1a: What is the density of metonymy in talk and what types of metonymy occur in the focus group discussion?

Research Question 1b: Which word classes act as metonymies and how do different word classes act as metonymies?

Research Question 1c: On what different levels of discourse (e.g. word, phrase, clause) does metonymy appear?

Research Question 1d: What is the distribution of metonymy in the focus group talk?

Research Question 1e: How does the focus group talk compare to a large language corpus in the use of metonymic language?

**Identification procedure**

Research Question 2a: Is the creation of a metonymy identification procedure possible?

Research Question 2b: What problems arise in setting up a reliable metonymy identification procedure and how can they be resolved?

**Interplay of metonymy and metaphor**

Research Question 3a: Are metonymy and metaphor correlated in talk?

Research Question 3b: What kinds of interplay of metonymy and metaphor occur in the data?

**Metonymy and discourse activity**

Research Question 4a: How is metonymy involved in discourse activity?

Research Question 4b: When does metonymy occur in discourse activity?
To investigate metonymy in talk, focusing on aspects addressed in research questions 1 to 4, data from two different types of sources: a recorded focus group discussion; and two large language datasets – a large corpus of language and an online database of written and spoken texts. Adapting a discourse dynamics perspective observation of the data was undertaken to provide a systematic description and analysis of metonymy in the focus group talk, complemented by comparison of major findings in the large datasets.

4.3 Data

The material used for the investigation of metonymy in talk is a focus group discussion which was recorded in London in 2006 as part of a large-scale social sciences research project, Perception and Communication of Terrorism Risk (PCTR). The project (ESRC RES 228250053) was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council under its New Security Challenges research programme. Within the project, there were altogether 12 different focus group discussions, recorded in London and Leeds. From this dataset, one focus group transcript was selected to serve as data for this metonymy project.

The focus group data offers a sample of group talk which is considered to have the characteristics of authentic language used by people in everyday life (Chapter Three, Section 3.3.1). Even though focus groups represent a relatively new discursive activity type, they share many characteristics with a wide range of language interactions. The 17,889 word discussion is a complete discourse event adequate for being analysed in considerable depth and detail. It contains various types of discourse features, such as individual stories and argumentation. In the focus group discussion, as is the case in everyday spontaneous talk, speakers engage in a dialogic
circulation of ideas and co-construction, or "thinking together" (Markova, Linell et al. 2007: 132). As noted earlier (Chapter Three, Section 3.3.1), focus group participants sometimes initially claim that they do not know what to say about the issues they have come to discuss – and the same participants later develop a rich discussion together. Meaning is negotiated on the micro-level of subsequent utterances – through phrasing and re-phrasing of thoughts and ideas, which is often affected by how others immediately react to what one speaker says, i.e. by interrupting, asking a question or asking for clarification.

The topic of the selected focus group discussion was current at the time the data was collected. The focus group discussions under the Perception and Communication of Terrorism Risk project took place in 2006. On the 11th of September 2001 there was a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks launched by the Islamicist terrorist group al-Qaeda in New York City area and the Pentagon, US, resulting in deaths of 2,996 people, including the 19 hijackers and 2,977 victims. On the 7th of July 2005 four bombs were exploded by terrorists in London public transport, killing 52 people and injuring over 700. The violence of both events shocked people around the world, left long-term grief and consequences of personal, social, political and economic nature. In the UK the event caused serious social disruption not only because of the attacks as such but also because the terrorists were British citizens. The focus group participants are asked questions concerning the threat of terrorism, communication of the risk of terrorism and actions taken by the authorities, the role of the media, the consequences the events had on their lives, the groups in the society. The data offers, therefore, observation of talk about feelings, responses and attitudes as well as events. The flow of topics in the discussion,
though partially led by a moderator, offers the opportunity for investigating the
dynamics of talk and metonymy in it.

There are eight participants, all female, members of the public, non-Muslim,
inhabitants of London. The discussion lasted about 90 minutes, during which the
participants responded to several questions asked by a moderator. The questions
were designed to stimulate talk about the risk of terrorism – about participants’
attitudes and feelings connected with it, and about how the risk of terrorism affects
their everyday lives. The transcript of this focus group discussion consists of 17,889
words (excluding names of speakers provided at the start of each transcript line). The
transcript is divided into lines (1 – 5117), according to intonation units (Cameron
and Maslen 2010; Cameron 2010a after; Chafe 1994; Du Bois, Schuetze-Coburn et
al. 1993). Each line represents one intonation unit. Each intonation unit reflects a
fragment of speech produced under one intonation contour which often corresponds
to a single breath (Cameron and Maslen 2010: 100). All names of participants have
been changed and MOD indicates the moderator.9

The focus group discussion was transcribed by a group of researchers in the
Perception and Communication of Terrorism Risk project, using the following
conventions for representing speech and intonation in the focus group data
transcriptions (Cameron and Maslen 2010: 101):

- A full stop (.) indicates a final closing intonation;
- A comma (,) indicates a slightly falling or level pitch and continuing
  intonation;
- A question mark (?) indicates rising intonation;
- Dashes (--) indicate incomplete intonation units;

9 Transcript (lines 1 – 2576) is included as Appendix.
• Square brackets ([ ]) are used for overlaps across speakers;
• Pauses: double dots (..) mark micro pauses; triple dots (...) mark slightly longer micro pauses; pauses longer than one second are marked with triple dots and the approximate number of seconds in brackets, e.g. (...2.0) marks a two-second-long pause;
• <Q...Q> indicates quasi-reported speech, when a speaker quotes somebody;
• <@> indicates laughing;
• <X...X> indicates indecipherable speech.

Metaphors and metaphor clusters in the discussion were also pre-annotated, based on the Metaphor Identification through Vehicle terms (MIV) procedure for metaphor identification in discourse, formulated by Cameron (2007a). The present analysis retained the metaphor markings – metaphor vehicles are indicated by underlining, which corresponds to Cameron and Maslen’s original annotation.

4.4 Method

As mentioned in Chapter Two (Section 2.6), the research responds to the gaps in empirical research into metonymy by investigating discourse data with the use of more than one analytic tool, i.e. through an innovative combination of automated quantitative tools of corpus linguistics and specialised qualitative analysis software. The focus group discussion was explored to investigate how metonymy is used in the dynamic context of a discussion and how it contributes to discourse activity, and to analyse the interaction between metonymy and metaphor in discourse. The document containing the transcript, with metaphors marked by underlining, was imported into the qualitative analysis software Atlas.ti.
The method for analysing various aspects of metonymy in discourse applied in this research was iterative and hermeneutic. With the assumption that a complex analytic process is necessary in a framework that sees discourse, and metonymy in it, as a dynamic process, the investigation of the focus group discussion involved much movement backwards and forwards between levels of analysis. The discourse data was analysed in various ways, from different angles and perspectives, which entailed taking into account various aspects of the talk, such as lexical choices of the participants, functions of discourse and topics that are developed. A paper version of the transcript and highlighter pens were used as a first step, to get to know the data well. After the initial stage of visual inspections, the following procedure was used:

- working on the micro scale of finding all (potentially) metonymically used lexical units (and marking them with the use of Atlas.ti software);
- working from the macro scale of the whole conversation seen as an interactive on-line process, which included marking:
  - metonymy clusters identified on the basis of distributional analysis of metonymy in this discourse event,
  - scenarios and stories emerging on a higher level,
  - cases of metonymy-metaphor interplay;
- zooming in to analyse fragments of talk highlighted by either the operations listed above or by identifying a recurring or particularly interesting or challenging use of metonymy.

In this kind of analysis, which includes identification and coding of metonymies as well as other aspects such as discourse activity, the metonymy-related phenomena were further analysed on the macro level of the flow of the whole discourse event and discourse activity.
4.5 Use of software

The analysis of the focus group talk combined manual qualitative coding with the use of specialised software Atlas.ti (1993-2013), and an automated corpus linguistic tool, WordSmith (1996-2008). Atlas.ti software was used for the coding of metonymies in the focus group talk and WordSmith software was used for quantitative results such as frequency counts and concordances. Utilising multiple research tools to investigate the transcript, provided insights into various phenomena in discourse, such as, for example, recurrence of metonymic expressions and co-occurrence between linguistic expressions and discourse activity or discourse function (O'Halloran 2011). As has been noted in the previous section, analysis of metonymy in talk in the discourse dynamics framework (Chapter Three, Sections 3.2-3.4) involves adopting various views of the data, i.e. the level of single words or expressions, the level of utterances and the macro-level view of the whole discourse. The use of software has the potential to facilitate some aspects of such multi-faceted analysis (Chapter Two, Section 2.6). This chapter explains how specialised software was used to address the research question and to facilitate the investigation of metonymy in the focus group discussion.

4.5.1 Atlas.ti

Coding all identified metonymies in the transcript with the use of Atlas.ti software facilitated further analysis in several ways. It provided functions for filtering and querying the analysed data. While the coding itself had to be done manually, further functions and searches were available at single mouse-clicks, showing quantitative query results and code families.
When the focus group discussion transcript was imported into Atlas.ti, the first stage involved coding all metonymically and metaphorically used items. Metaphors had been identified by Cameron and Maslen (2010) and they were coded in Atlas.ti accordingly, using the code ‘M’. Coding metonymies involved following the steps of the novel metonymy identification procedure (Chapter Five). In coding the data in Atlas.ti, words or phrases identified as metonymically and metaphorically used were highlighted and a code was attached. The coded text became *quotations* in Atlas.ti.

For metonymy there were 47 specific codes, all structured ‘metonymy / ...’ and they were all included in one main code ‘metonymy’, in a group which is called “code family” in Atlas.ti. Table 4.1 lists all specific codes, belonging to the ‘metonymy’ code family, used for marking metonymically used words and phrases identified with the identification procedure (Chapter Five, Section 5.4).

**Table 4.1**

*Specific codes used in Atlas.ti for marking metonymically used words or phrases*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/7/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/bag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/Blair (inc. anaphoric ‘he’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/bomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/burka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/colour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/dark skin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

91
Table 4.1

*Specific codes used in Atlas.ti for marking metonymically used words or phrases (continued)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/IRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/recorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/Russell Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/Spanish Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/Saddam Hussein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/tube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/turban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/Underground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/the West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/1950s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/20s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy/1984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Developing the identification procedure revealed challenges related to analysis of pronouns *we, you* and *they* in relation to metonymy (Chapters Six and Seven) and so additional codes were invented and applied to mark pronouns *you, we, they* as ‘borderline’ in relation to metonymy. The codes were structured ‘metonymy?/...’, with the question mark to distinguish them from the straightforward cases. Table 4.2 lists all specific codes used for marking the ‘borderline’ cases of pronouns.

**Table 4.2**

*Codes used for marking potentially metonymically used they, you, and we*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific code</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>metonymy?/ you</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy?/ we</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymy?/ they</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Identification of all metonymically used items, as well as items identified as ‘borderline’, provided a macro-scale view of the whole transcript, which allowed for calculations of the overall metonymy density in the focus group discussion and identification of metonymy clusters. Metonymy density was measured based on the number of metonymies per thousand words, which follows the method used by Cameron for metaphor (Cameron 2003; Cameron and Maslen 2010: 105). Number of metonymically used items per every 50 intonation units was entered into an Excel spreadsheet, which then produced a frequency graph and helped identify metonymy clusters. The scale of 50 intonation units was considered as a resolution that offers a clear picture of the curves and slopes corresponding to occurrences of metonymies. The metonymy clusters were then marked with additional codes in Atlas.ti.
(‘metonymy cluster’ code) and metaphor clusters which had been calculated by Cameron and Maslen (2010) were also coded (‘metaphor cluster’ code). The information then supported analysis of when the focus group participants use most metonymies and when metonymy clusters coincide with metaphor clusters. As challenges to the identification procedure were observed, other discourse phenomena were also marked in Atlas.ti to facilitate analysis of metonymy involved in the talk beyond the level of single words or phrases. Details of method and codes used for that part of the analysis are shown in Chapter Eight. Figure 4.1 shows a screen shot of the focus group data coded in Atlas.ti.

In Atlas.ti, a highlighted stretch of talk in the left column/side of the screen is called a *quotation* (such as lines 1812 – 1815 in Figure 4.1), to which various codes have been attached in the right column/side of the screen. Through the coding stage, the software does not decide anything on its own. The codes were invented and applied according to the aims of this research – the more thoroughly this is done, the easier it is later to ask questions of the data with the use of the ‘query’ tool. The software enhances and systematises the interpretive ability of the researcher for example by facilitating multi-level categorisation through creation of groups and families of codes, and making it easier to jump from quotation to quotation by single clicks.

The query tool in Atlas.ti was used to explore the data further, i.e. to find co-occurrences of codes, which was particularly useful for the analysis of the role of metonymy in discourse activity and the interplay of metonymy with metaphor. For example, with the use of the Atlas.ti query tool it was established that out of the ten metaphor clusters identified in the data by the PCTR researchers and annotated in Atlas.ti, eight co-occur with metonymy clusters, which contributed to the analysis of findings related to the interplay of metonymy with metaphor.
Janet: you mean.
Janet: no.
Janet: not really.
Janet: because, there are so many areas.
Janet: erm.
Janet: when people,
Janet: don't have a voice.
Janet: and--
Janet: that's--
Janet: it's the anger.
Janet: that's causing this.
Janet: and a lot of people living in poverty,
Janet: and they see us,
Janet: living in,
Janet: to them,
Janet: that is why they are so angry,
Janet: against America,
Janet: because America,
Janet: is so rich.
Janet: and there is so... many people,
Janet: are so rich.
Janet: the world's out of balance.
Janet: when--
Janet: when things are out of balance.
Janet: yes... you are.
Janet: (2.0) does anyone.
RM: want to add anything.
RM: to that.
4.5.2 WordSmith

Annotation and comparison across the focus group discussion was facilitated, in addition to Atlas.ti software, by WordSmith Tools. The WordSmith concordance function allows fast movement from the micro-level of a selected word, phrase or fragment of discourse to the level of the whole discourse event. The function provided views of all instances of particular metonymic expressions (or another queried item), which made it possible to identify whether speakers use a lot of a given metonymy throughout the transcript or at particular points in the conversation. All citations within the discussion were listed together as a concordance facilitated the comparison of the various co-texts, i.e. if comparison was needed of all instances of a particular expression to check for metonymic and literal use, the process took less time when using WordSmith. Figure 4.2 shows a screen shot of a WordSmith concordance of all citations of the lexical unit *oil* in the focus group discussion.

![Concordance](image)

**Figure 4.2** A screen shot of a WordSmith concordance of all citations of *oil* in the focus group discussion
The concordance function was used for searches of words or phrases (such as *oil* in Figure 4.2) in the focus group data, which had been downloaded in text format into WordSmith. The software then presented a concordance display (Figure 4.2), which gave information about collocates of the search word and its frequency. The individual concordance lines are called *citations*. Figure 4.2 shows citations sorted by order of occurrence in the focus group discussion.

### 4.6 Use of larger corpora

As has been noted by Deignan and Semino (2010: 163), information about word use in a given discourse event can be of interest in itself but it can also be compared with a larger corpus. A large corpus used in this way is usually referred to as a ‘reference corpus’. The method applied in this research for comparing findings from the focus group discussion with a large corpus is informed by the work of other linguists who have studied metaphor and metonymy using corpus linguistic tools (Deignan and Potter 2004; Deignan 2005a, 2005b; Deignan and Semino 2010; Semino 2006, 2008). The use of corpora in language study is now recognised as one of the major and fast-developing areas of linguistic enquiry. Metonymy, however, remains a field that has not been widely explored in corpus linguistics, as has been pointed out for example by Stefanowitsch (2006: 12). Following the assumption that more accurate description of language can be provided when analysis is based on authentic data (Deignan 2005b: 224), the thesis enriches the analysis of metonymy in the focus group talk by employing a large corpus for tracking words and expressions identified as potentially metonymic, so that empirical observations based on authentic language data can be made about metonymic language use.
4.6.1 The Oxford English Corpus and Nexis UK

The Oxford English Corpus (OEC 2013), henceforth OEC, was chosen as a reference corpus because it is one of the biggest collections of language representing all types of English (over two billion words\textsuperscript{10}) – from fiction and specialised journals, through newspapers and magazines, to the language of internet chatrooms and emails. It is a very recent corpus – it encompasses data from the year 2002 to present so it is most relevant to the analysis of the 2006 data. In this study, the OEC was used as a reference corpus in response to findings from the focus group discussion, i.e. to trace linguistic expressions found in a discourse event in a corpus that reflects general contemporary English. In addition to the OEC, I used the Nexis UK\textsuperscript{11} database (Nexis®UK 2008) which contains the full text of most newspapers published in the UK and a selection of newspapers, news services and other business publications from around the world. Nexis UK was used for further reference, i.e. for tracking particularly interesting metonymies found in the analysis of the focus group discussion. The OEC is a fairly recent corpus and it has not received much attention in the literature. Based on data available on the web, it represents a large proportion of today’s real-world language use; It is comprehensive and sampled in a principled way.

While Nexis UK is a database with its own search engine which provides basic results with search options such as searches within specific time-periods or within a selected publication, the OEC requires use of particular specialised software, SketchEngine (Kilgarriff, Rychly et al. 2004; SketchEngine 2008). The software enabled analysis of distributions across registers and domains. It was used to

\textsuperscript{10} Count for summer 2013 as specified by Oxford University Press website; the word count is constantly increasing.

\textsuperscript{11} Formerly Lexis-Nexis Business and News.
generate concordances within the OEC. Figure 4.3 shows a concordance sample of oil in the OEC, across all data types.

Figure 4.3 Concordance of oil in the OEC, across all data types

Observation of particular words or phrases in the OEC and in Nexis UK allowed for observations to be made about how a particular metonymy is represented in datasets of general English, and how it developed across different time-scales. The two sources thus played a role in answering research question 1e that relates to a macro-scale analysis of metonymically used expressions.
4.6.2 How the Oxford English Corpus was used

The literature review identified a gap in research into metonymy in phrases. SketchEngine was found to be useful because it could handle searches for phrases as well as single words, which was valuable to illuminate how metonymy operates in phrases not only single words.

Because the OEC is a very large corpus, often searches retrieve huge numbers of citations. Such numbers cannot be analysed manually but analytic rigour can be maintained by looking at manageable samples (Deignan 2005b: 93). If a search retrieved hundreds or thousands of citations, only a random sample could be used. The number of citations that should constitute a random sample is not identified as a fixed number in the literature – it is usually a number between fifty and a thousand citations, depending on the size of the corpus and research questions that guide the analysis. For the needs of this research, one hundred citations was considered as sufficient for insight and interpretation, and manageable for manual qualitative analysis. For example, the expressions we went to war and go to war were tracked in the OEC to check whether it is a conventionalised expression and to compare it with go to war used with other subjects e.g. he goes to war. The search for go to war produced over 12,000 citations. To check how many citations of go to war occur with the pronoun we as the subject, the collocation list function was used. Having found we in the list, the citations where we is the subject of go to war was analysed in detail, to examine whether the pronoun we was used metonymically. If the number of citations generated was still more than one hundred, a random sample of one hundred citations was used. Once retrieved, a concordance shows the researcher the linguistic contexts in which a lexical item is used, but it does not indicate which citations are metonymic. The information provided by the corpus, therefore, had to
be further processed manually. For the purposes of the present research, it was necessary to decide which citations were regarded as metonymic uses. To decide whether a word or phrase in a particular corpus citation involved metonymy, the metonymy identification procedure proposed in Chapter Five was used.

4.7 Summary and conclusion

Referring to corpus sources in the present study enabled cross-checking the use of a particular expressions in various configurations, including other types of discourse, specific time periods, different genres and registers, which enriched the analysis of metonymy in talk. Corpus data can help provide relatively objective insights about a language, which are difficult or impossible to access otherwise. Metonymy scholars frequently cite invented examples of metonymy, which turn out to be almost non-existent in a large corpus. Corpus linguistic research suggests that “human intuition about language is highly specific, and not at all a good guide to what actually happens when the same people actually use the language” (Sinclair 1991: 4).

A possible limitation of using a corpus is the issue of representativeness. However, relying on web-based data, the OEC presumably represents a large proportion of today’s real-world language use. Other existing corpora of spoken discourse, such as the Cambridge and Nottingham Corpus of Discourse in English (CANCODE)\textsuperscript{12}, the Cambridge and Nottingham Business English Corpus (CANBEC)\textsuperscript{13}, or the British

\textsuperscript{12} The Cambridge and Nottingham Corpus of Discourse in English (CANCODE) was collected in the 1990s as part of a collaborative project between the University of Nottingham and Cambridge University Press.

\textsuperscript{13} The Cambridge and Nottingham Business English Corpus (CANBEC) was collected between 2001 and 2003 and is a one million word extension to the CANCODE corpus, consisting of spoken interaction recorded in a variety of business meeting settings.
National Corpus (BNC)\textsuperscript{14} which includes a spoken component, were considered less relevant for the purposes of this study as they are older than the OEC. For the purposes of this research, i.e. to understand contemporary language use and to search expressions related to fairly recent events, a recent corpus was needed.

This chapter described the methodology used in the investigations of metonymy in talk. It discussed the advantages of applying a combination of automated tools which aided the analytic process in several ways and enriched the analysis. Specific codes used for identification of metonymy beyond word level are described in Chapter Eight. The following Chapter Five engages with the methodological issues related to the creation of an identification procedure for metonymy in discourse; it proposes an attempt at a procedure; it tests the procedure and shows how it was applied in the present research.

\textsuperscript{14}The British National Corpus (BNC) is a 100 million word collection of samples of written and spoken language from a wide range of sources. Work on building the corpus began in 1991, and was completed in 1994.
5. Towards a procedure for metonymy identification in discourse

5.1 Introduction

One of the gaps identified in the literature review chapters was the lack of explicit and reliable procedures for metonymy identification in discourse. Chapter Two discussed an annotation scheme developed for two types of metonymies – location names and organisation names – used for analysing such metonymies in a sample of the British National Corpus (Markert and Nissim 2002, 2003, 2006). It was noted that such explicit annotation procedures have the potential to advance metonymy research in a number of ways, for example by offering large-scale quantitative findings based on real language data and, at the same time, qualitative findings that can merit further work into theory development. Annotation differs from identification, however, in that annotation is about marking items in a corpus or other kind of data – it is not about the process of deciding whether an item is or is not metonymic, although the framework for annotation must be principled and evaluated. Identification is more fundamental than annotation, because annotation relies on employing a reliable identification process by which to decide whether a given item should be annotated as metonymic. A procedure of identification aims to be a tool that helps the analyst decide whether or not an item in the data is metonymic or not, and, as a result, whether it should be marked, annotated or coded in the analysed data set.

The thesis responds to the gap in the field by exploring the possibility of creating a procedure for metonymy identification in discourse. The present chapter first proposes an identification procedure for metonymy, explaining how the
procedure was formulated, developed and tested. It shows how the procedure was inspired by and, to some extent, based on the existing metaphor identification procedures and it discusses a number of specifications in the procedure which are central to the analysis of metonymy in discourse. Secondly, the chapter demonstrates the application of the proposed procedure to the analysed data by showing two examples. Each step of the procedure is then discussed in detail – it is demonstrated how the procedure works and it is shown that the proposed procedure, with all issues related to its development and application – sometimes problematic – formed a basis for the study of metonymy to be reported in the analytic chapters. Finally, this chapter discusses the advantages and limitations of the procedure. It points to a number of problematic cases which were revealed when trying to apply the procedure and which cannot be resolved in a straightforward way. These problematic cases, however, exposed some particularly interesting features of the workings of metonymy in the dynamics of discourse, which become the subject matter of the Chapters Seven and Eight.

5.2 Developing a procedure for metonymy identification

The importance of having explicit identification procedures was illuminated by the work carried out by the pragglejaz group of scholars working on metaphor (pragglejaz 2007). To formulate an identification procedure for discourse phenomena such as metonymy is a difficult task and the procedure presented in this thesis is a first proposal, rather than a finished prescribed method. It is an initial attempt and a starting point in a research area which calls for further scholarly discussion and empirical testing. Concerns with regard to methodological issues connected with
The identification and analysis of metonymy in discourse can begin from the conceptual level, i.e. starting from conceptual metonymies – assumed to be predefined by the literature before the analysis, theoretically well-established mappings in thought – and then searching for expressions in discourse data that manifest those mappings, as was done by Markert and Nissim (2002, 2003, 2006). With such an approach, a set of conceptual metonymies connected with names of places (PLACE FOR PEOPLE, PLACE FOR EVENT, PLACE FOR PRODUCT, as provided for example by Kövecses (2002: 145) could have been used in analysing the focus group talk. If the present research had been carried out within such a “top-down” or deductive conceptual (or cognitive) framework, it would have used lists of
conceptual metonymies (as provided in the literature) and searched for expressions in the focus group data that correspond to the mappings. It would entail that all place names should be first identified and a decision made whether the place name refers to a location literally or not, i.e. whether it is an instantiation of the underlying mapping. For example, one of the first places mentioned in the focus group data is *London* – it is mentioned early on in the talk and it recurs frequently throughout the conversation. *London* is often used literally but for example in lines 860-861 one of the speakers says (...) *that would cause chaos to London*. With a deductive approach, *London* in this instance would be considered as an instantiation of an underlying conceptual metonymy – it could stand for, arguably, the people who live and work in London or the authorities. However, it seems that *London* could also stand for the whole organisational structure of the city, with all its inhabitants and inner-workings. Such a complex conceptual metonymy is not listed in the literature and, therefore, the analysis would need to either be limited to those conceptual mappings which are listed (PLACE FOR PEOPLE) or the analyst would have to establish a new metonymic mapping. Research into figurative language has shown, however, that it is difficult to define conceptual mappings because conceptual phenomena in general have unclear boundaries (as has been noted in Chapter One) and because it is often unavoidably difficult to decide which criteria should be used to determine the exact target in the metonymic mapping (Barcelona 2011: 10)

The search for metonymically used words can be approached from the level of discourse activity, i.e. the level of social interaction involving language, including, importantly, people doing things via the language they use. Such “bottom-up” or inductive analysis does not presume established metonymic mappings and, instead, examines the actual language used for potentially metonymically-used words or
expressions, following an explicit procedure. The second approach has been undertaken for metaphor in the existing metaphor identification procedures (Cameron 2003, 2010b; pragglejaz 2007) but metonymy research is lacking in such approaches and so this thesis proposes to begin developing a procedure for metonymy. To assess how the existing procedures for identifying metaphor in discourse can be adapted for metonymy, we need first to examine them.

5.3 Existing metaphor identification procedures

Two explicit procedures have been proposed for metaphor identification in discourse: the Metaphor Identification Procedure, or MIP (pragglejaz 2007; Steen 2007; Steen, Biernacka et al. 2010), with further modification by a group of researchers at the VU University Amsterdam, known as MIPVU (Steen, Dorst et al. 2010), and Metaphor Identification through Vehicle terms as developed by Cameron (Cameron 2003, 2007a, 2008a). This section engages in a step by step manner with details of the former procedure (MIP). It also presents the most relevant aspects of the latter procedure (Metaphor Identification through Vehicle terms). Both metaphor identification procedures have been particularly inspiring for the development of the proposed metonymy procedure. The Metaphor Identification Procedure, or MIP, as developed by the pragglejaz group is the only procedure that has been formally tested with the purpose of making it a replicable tool for a larger audience of researchers (Steen, Biernacka et al. 2010: 166). This section discusses the content of the procedure and the related issues. It shows how it was utilised for the formulation

---

of the metonymy procedure – checking which steps work the same for metaphor and metonymy and highlighting the differences, i.e. the steps which need to be adapted to be used for metonymy. When applicable, a reference is made to the MIPVU procedure – the identification procedure used in a large-scale metaphor project undertaken by a group of metaphor researchers at the VU University, Amsterdam.

The Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP) consists of the following set of instructions (pragglejaz 2007: 3):

1. Read the entire text/discourse to establish a general understanding of the meaning.

2. Determine the lexical units in the text/discourse.¹⁶

3a. For each lexical unit in the text, establish its meaning in context, i.e. how it applies to an entity, relation or attribute in the situation evoked by the text (contextual meaning). Take into account what comes before and after the lexical unit.

3b. For each lexical unit, determine if it has a more basic contemporary meaning in other contexts than the one in the given context. For our purposes, basic meanings tend to be:

- more concrete; what they evoke is easier to imagine, see, hear, feel, smell, and taste;
- related to bodily action;
- more precise (as opposed to vague);
- historically older.

Basic meanings are not necessarily the most frequent meanings of the lexical unit.

¹⁶ In the case of spoken discourse, 'text' refers to the transcript of the talk.
3c. If the lexical unit has a more basic current/contemporary meaning in other contexts than the given context, decide whether the contextual meaning contrasts with the basic meaning but can be understood in comparison with it.

4. If yes, mark the lexical unit as metaphorical.

In this section, the steps of the MIP procedure are individually discussed, considering the relevance for the metonymy identification procedure and pointing to the necessary adaptations, which are discussed further in this chapter (Section 5.4).

**Step One**

In the first step of the procedure, the whole text needs to be read to establish a general understanding of the meaning. Getting familiar with the whole data is quite unproblematic and uncontroversial. It is a justified first step in the procedure – it reveals the topic(s) of the discourse data and it gives the researcher a general overview of the sequencing and any relevant characteristics of the style or genre. Any additional information, such as the data source or the context in which it was produced may also be helpful for a general overview. The first step, as will be shown in Section 5.4, will be exactly the same for metonymy as for metaphor.

**Step Two**

In the second step, lexical units need to be demarcated. A number of issues have been reported by the pragglejaz group for this step and decisions have been made on how to decide on what counts as a lexical unit. As a general rule in the MIP procedure, a lexical unit is a single word. However, there are a few exceptions in
which a lexical unit is constituted by more than one word. The main criterion established by the pragglejaz group in deciding when a multiword expression should be treated as a whole is the criterion of decomposability, which refers to "whether a lexical unit can be analysed through the meanings of its constituent parts, or whether it can be understood as a whole" (pragglejaz 2007: 26, after Gibbs, Nayak et al. 1989). The first such exception to the general rule are phrasal verbs, which are taken to be single lexical units because they designate one activity and the meaning of a phrasal verb as a whole is not the same as the sum of its parts. For example, the phrasal verb *take off*, in a sentence such as *The plane took off*, constitutes a meaning which cannot be established by combining the senses of the two words *take* and *off*. The other exceptions are multiword expressions such as polywords (such as *let alone* or *of course*) and compounds (such as *stock market*), which, like phrasal verbs, designate a single referent in the text world; these are treated as single lexical units (pragglejaz 2007: 26). Other multiword expressions, such as fixed collocations and idioms are treated as decomposable, i.e. each component of an idiomatic expression or a fixed collocation is analysed as a separate lexical unit. However, such approach of the MIP procedure may appear controversial and problematic because it sometimes seems counterintuitive to analyse individually lexical units which seem to be connected. Cameron, for example, proposes a procedure for metaphor identification which assumes a broader unit of analysis than the lexical unit in MIP (Cameron 2003, 2010b). Cameron approaches metaphor identification from the level of 'vehicle terms', which can be single words as well as phrases consisting of more than one word. 'Vehicle terms' are defined as linguistic expressions that are "incongruous within the on-going discourse context", and they can be "chunks or stretches of talk" (Cameron and Maslen 2010). A method that takes longer stretches of talk as analytic units appears useful for metonymy analysis in discourse because,
as will be demonstrated, the scope of metonymy sometimes extends to a level that is broader than the level of one lexical unit. Compared to Cameron, the MIP procedure is more explicit about what counts as a lexical unit so it may be more transparent for quantitative research. However, often the demarcation of lexical units is counter-intuitive. Cameron's approach may be more suitable with data already well-known to the analyst and for interpretative approaches to analysis. Inspired by Cameron's 'metaphor vehicle', this thesis proposes the term metonymy vehicle for lexical units identified as metonymically used in the dynamics of talk. The issue is further discussed in the following section, which engages with the details of each step of the proposed metonymy identification procedure and establishes what is considered as a metonymy vehicle in identifying metonymy in discourse (Section 5.4). What is common for the MIP procedure and the Metaphor Identification through Vehicle terms procedure is that they both aim to identify units of discourse which are incongruous in the surrounding co-text by identifying basic meanings which are different from contextual meanings. It will also be the core of the proposed metonymy identification procedure to compare meanings of lexical units – contextual and more basic. In the MIP procedure, it is the next step of the identification process.

**Step Three**

Having established the unit of analysis (the lexical unit), the third step of the MIP procedure is determining the meaning of each lexical unit in context (contextual meaning), checking whether it has a more basic meaning and, finally, if it does have a basic meaning, analysing the relation between the two meanings. As the following
section shows, establishing the existence of a more basic sense of words or phrases is also at the core of metonymy identification.

To avoid decisions based on analysts' intuitions, the MIP procedure suggests using dictionaries for establishing contextual and basic meanings (pragglejaz 2007: 16). As Steen points out, it is "convenient to adopt a dictionary as a concrete norm of reference, so that you have an independent reflection of what counts as the meanings of words for a particular group of users of English" (Steen 2007: 97-98). If the contextual sense is a conventionalised sense, it is likely to have an entry in the dictionary. It may also, however, have a novel or specialised meaning, which is less likely to be listed in the dictionary (Steen, Biernacka et al. 2010: 173). The pragglejaz group uses the *Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners* (Rundell 2002) and the choice is justified by the fact that the dictionary is based on a "fairly recent corpus of contemporary English (...) well sampled, containing language data from a wide range of text types" (pragglejaz 2007: 16). It is important for metaphor analysis that the dictionary is based on a corpus of contemporary English (pragglejaz 2007: 16). It is equally important for metonymy analysis because the metonymy identification procedure is concerned with what is metonymic in the particular discourse event, which took place in 2006 and is fairly recent. Section 5.4.2 explains in more detail how the role of dictionaries in establishing contextual and basic senses is different in the proposed metonymy identification procedure from the existing metaphor identification procedure proposed by the pragglejaz group.

When applying the MIP procedure to real world discourse, the analyst may be confronted with a number of problems, such as contextual ambiguity or unfinished broken utterances. Contextual ambiguity can be related to, for example, cases in which two alternative interpretations of an utterance seem plausible: a metaphorical
interpretation or a metonymic interpretation. The pragglejaz group acknowledge the fact that metonymy and metaphor are often confused or intertwined (pragglejaz 2007: 31). However, as they point out, the MIP procedure is supposed to distinguish metaphor from other language phenomena through Step 3c, where the key term is ‘comparison’ (between the contextual and basic senses). Metonymy is a semantic link between two senses of a lexical unit that is based on a relationship of contiguity between the referents of the expression in each of those senses (Section 1.2) that differs from the comparison processes and the relation of similarity involved in metaphor. Such distinction resonates with the distinction used very frequently in the literature (for example Deignan 2005b; Jakobson 2003 reprint of 1956), even though the notions of ‘comparison’ (and ‘similarity’) and ‘contiguity’ raise confusion and on-going scholarly debate (Barnden 2006, 2010; Eco 1979; Steen 2007), as has been discussed in Chapter One (Section 1.6.2).

**Step Four**

The last step of the MIP procedure is to mark the lexical unit as metaphorical if it has a more basic sense which contrasts with the basic sense but can be understood in comparison with it.

It is not spelled out explicitly at this point in the wording of the procedure but it is important to note that identification of metaphors with MIP does not make any claims about the conceptual (cognitive) processing. As Steen, Dorst et al. (2010) point out:
(...) the Pragglejaz Group aim their findings to be maximally compatible with, but emphatically distinct from, research into metaphor as part of people’s psychological processes and their products. There is no claim that any of the metaphorically used words identified by the procedure are also actively realised as metaphorical mappings in the individual mind. The idea is to find expressions in language that are potentially metaphorical in cognition (...)

(Steen, Dorst et al. 2010: 9)

The units identified as metaphorical in the discourse through the application of the procedure are, therefore, ‘potentially’ metaphorical, i.e. an expression identified as metaphorically used may or may not be processed metaphorically on the conceptual level by a language user. Identification of metaphor with MIP is kept transparent through a comparison of dictionary senses of a lexical unit on a linguistic level and it does not attempt to formulate conceptual mappings in the process. For metonymy, as the analytic chapters of this thesis will show, the co-relation of the two levels – the level of lexis and the conceptual level – is of a different nature. The proposed metonymy identification procedure relies on the lexical level (in a similar way to the MIP), but the identification also incorporates the dynamic discourse processes and the discourse activity taking place behind the specific language use.

Initial responses (before publication in 2007) to the Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP) from audiences at metaphor and metonymy conferences were mixed – some scholars expressed their appreciation and found the procedure useful, but others considered aspects of the procedure as wrong. However, only a few years later, at the 7th Researching and Applying Metaphor conference in Caceres, Spain, in 2008, there were several talks which utilised or referred to the MIP procedure (Steen,
Biernacka et al. 2010: 166). Observation of research published in the journal *Metaphor and the Social World* (Cameron and Low 2011) also indicates that the procedure is setting a standard which empirical research at least needs to acknowledge.

The MIP procedure in its present form is quite a straightforward method for metaphor identification in discourse, which was developed with the aim of being useful for a larger group of researchers (Steen, Biernacka et al. 2010). However, it should be acknowledged that the wording of the procedure involved many assumptions and, as is recommended, some decisions should still be resolved by potential users individually. It is, for example, specifically recommended that an analysis protocol should be used for reporting results obtained with the procedure, to make sure information is provided about analysts’ decisions about lexical units, dictionary(ies) used, and other important coding decisions such as decisions about whether or not grammatical words are coded (pragglejaz 2007: 14)

5.4 An identification procedure for metonymy in discourse

Attempts at the formulation of an explicit annotation and identification procedure for metonymy in discourse began from the procedures proposed for metaphor, cited above. Being reliable and replicable, these metaphor identification procedures served as a basis for the formulation of a similar procedure for identifying metonymically used words in discourse. The main difference between the identification procedure for metaphor and the procedure proposed for metonymy lies in the step where the relationship between contextual and basic meanings is analysed. In the case of metaphor it is based on comparison. In metonymy there is a link between two senses
of a lexical unit that is based on a relationship of contiguity between the referents of the expression in each of those senses, with contiguity characterised in Chapter One (1.2) as a relation of adjacency and closeness, comprising not only spatial contact but also temporal proximity, causal relations and part-whole relations (Koch 2004: 7). Another important difference pertains to the use of the term metonymy vehicles and allowing metonymy vehicles to have a broad scope. The following are the steps of the proposed metonymy identification procedure. Examples illustrating how the procedure was used are given below and each step is discussed in more detail in separate sub-sections that follow.
Metonymy identification procedure

1. Read the entire text to get a general understanding of the overall meaning.

2. Determine lexical units.

3. Decide on metonymicity of each lexical unit:
   a. For each lexical unit establish its contextual meaning – taking into account how it applies to an entity in the situation evoked by the text, as well as co-text (i.e. the surrounding text; what is said before and after the examined expression).
   
   b. For each lexical unit determine if it has a more basic contemporary meaning in other contexts than the meaning in the given context.
   
   c. If the lexical unit has a more basic contemporary meaning in other contexts than the given context, and the contextual and basic meanings are different, determine if they are connected by contiguity, defined as relation of adjacency and closeness comprising not only spatial contact but also temporal proximity, causal relations and part-whole relations.

4. If a connection is found in step 3c that is one of contiguity: check backwards and forwards to determine if any other lexical unit(s) belong(s) together semantically, thus determining the extent of the metonymy vehicle; and mark the lexical unit (or lexical units which belong together) as metonymy vehicle.
5.4.1 Application of the proposed procedure – data examples

To illustrate how the procedure works, I use three examples – from the OEC (Example (17)) and from the focus group data (Extracts 5.1 and 5.2).

(17) In Shimizu's defence, it is worth stressing that, by the '40s, and certainly after Pearl Harbour, every Japanese director had no option but to conform at least passively, with those ideals, or stop working (of the major figures, only Yasujirō Ozu followed the latter course).

The expression Pearl Harbour is considered for potential metonymicity. Having read the entire corpus citation (Step I of the procedure), it is established that Pearl Harbour is a lexical unit (Step 2), at step 3a, the contextual meaning of Pearl Harbour is established. In this context, it has the meaning of {sudden attack by Japanese planes on US naval base in Pearl Harbour, Japan, in 1941; which made the US start fighting in World War II; its political and social consequences}. The historical and social motivation for such interpretation is strengthened by the use of the temporal preposition after, which suggests that reference is made not to the place but to events at a point in time. Next, Step 3b established whether it has a more basic sense. The basic meaning of Pearl Harbour found in the dictionary is the geographical and military sense “an important US naval base, at Oahu, Hawaii, US”. (Section 5.4.2 below provides details of how dictionaries were used in this project.)

At step 3c, contextual and basic meanings of the lexical unit were compared, and a decision about whether the meanings are different was made. It seems that in the case of Pearl Harbour the contextual meaning of events and consequences is different from its basic sense but they are connected by contiguity because the basic, geographical sense of Pearl Harbour evokes the events that occurred in that place and their consequences, present in its contextual sense – Pearl Harbour in this
instance refers to events that happened in Pearl Harbour (the geographical location) at a specific time and their political and social consequences. Since a relationship of contiguity was found at step 3c, at step 4 the extent of the metonymy vehicle was determined and the expression *Pearl Harbour* was marked as metonymy vehicle.

In Extract 5.1, the identification procedure is applied to *the West* in an extract from the focus group data.

**Extract 5.1**

925 MOD .. how do you think,
926 MOD the terrorists decide on their actions?
927 Janet they want to hurt us.
928 → Janet .. they want to hurt the West,
929 Janet .. they want to,
930 Janet .. change our lifestyle,
931 Janet they want us,
932 Janet to be more humble17,

Having read the entire data set (step 1 of the procedure) and established lexical units (step 2), at step 3a, the contextual meaning of *the West* is established, as interpreted by the researcher on the basis of the surrounding co-text, i.e. what comes before and after the expression. In this context, it has a political and social meaning, i.e. {developed countries, such as USA, UK, western Europe, located in the West, i.e. in the direction of sunset; and the people that live there} (Longman 2009). Next, at step 3b, it is established whether it has a more basic sense. The basic meaning of *the West* found in the dictionary is the geographical sense “point of orientation; the general direction of sunset” (Longman 2009). At step 3c, contextual and basic meanings of the lexical unit are compared, and a decision about whether they are distinct is made.

It seems that in the case of *the West* the contextual meaning is distinct from its basic sense. However, they appear to be connected by contiguity because the basic

---

17 All names of speakers have been changed; MOD indicates the Moderator; arrows indicate lines under close examination and bold indicates (potential) metonymy; underlining indicates metaphorically used words. Formatting conventions are described in detail in Chapter Four *Methods*.
geographical sense of the West is present in the supposed contextual meaning. At step 4, the extent of the metonymy vehicle is checked backwards and forwards from the West, the decision is made to mark the West only as metonymy vehicle.

In Extract 5.2, the identification procedure is applied to oil in the focus group data.

**Extract 5.2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>speaker</th>
<th>text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2822</td>
<td>Molly</td>
<td>I can't just see any other reason,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2823</td>
<td>Molly</td>
<td>why we would go in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2824</td>
<td>Molly</td>
<td>apart from oil,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2825</td>
<td>Molly</td>
<td>I just can't see.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this extract, the lexical unit oil (line 2824) is analysed as potentially metonymic. As with the first extract, the first step is to read the entire data set (step 1 of the procedure) and establish lexical units (step 2). At step 3a, the contextual meaning of oil is established. In this context, it has a political and economic meaning, i.e. {oil industry, business, politics, power involved in dealing oil, money}. Next, at step 3b, it was established whether it has a more basic sense. The basic meaning of oil found in the dictionary is the “substance” sense. At step 3c, where contextual and basic meanings of oil are compared, a decision must be made whether they are distinct. It seems that in the case of oil the contextual meaning is distinct from its basic sense. It can be seen, however, that they are connected by contiguity because the basic “substance” sense of oil is present in its contextual meaning. That is why next, at step 4, the extent of the metonymy vehicle is checked – both backwards and forwards from oil – and only oil is marked as metonymy vehicle.

Below, each step of the proposed procedure is discussed, pointing to differences between a procedure for metonymy and the existing metaphor procedures, and the necessary adaptations.
Step One

Read the entire text to get a general understanding of the overall meaning

Similar to the metaphor procedures (MIP, MIPVU as well as the procedure developed by Cameron), first the text needs to be read through to establish a general understanding of the meaning. Cameron explains that:

Metaphorical uses of words and phrases are most effectively identified against background knowledge of the whole discourse event, since this gives the best chance of recognising anomalies or incongruities between the local discourse topic and the words or phrases being used metaphorically. For this reason, coders read through the transcription or text in order to get a feel for the structure and activity of the discourse, and to understand as far as possible the context in which metaphors were produced.

(Cameron and Maslen 2010: 104)

As pointed out in the section that discusses the use of dictionary for metonymy analysis (Section 5.4.2), context plays a crucial role in metonymy understanding – contextual senses are very frequently established only by referring to the data because they are not found in the dictionary. The analytic chapters (Chapters Six, Seven and Eight) will also stress the importance of background contextual knowledge in analysing the dynamics of metonymy in discourse. Getting familiar with the whole data is a straightforward first step in the metonymy procedure – the researcher gets a general overview of the topic(s), the sequencing and any relevant characteristics of the style or genre. Any additional information, such as the data
source or the context in which it was produced may also be helpful for a general overview.

**Step Two**

*Determine lexical units*

Similar to the MIP, the basic unit of analysis in the identification procedure is the lexical unit. To assume such unit of analysis is in line with the definition of metonymy used in this thesis that characterises metonymy as a link between two senses of a lexical unit (Section 5.3 and Chapter One, Section 1.2). However, at Step 4, as will be shown below, the thesis proposes the term *metonymy vehicle* to refer to lexical unit(s) which have been identified as metonymic and which belong together semantically. While starting the analysis from the level of lexical units allows for rigorous step-by-step identification of metonymy without preconceived judgments, a broader unit appears relevant to refer to metonymically used expressions which consist of more than one lexical unit but are understood as a whole.

**Step Three A**

*For each lexical unit establish its contextual meaning*

Step Three of the metonymy identification procedure establishes the contextual sense of a lexical unit, which is the sense it has in the given context, and surrounded by the given co-text. Contextual senses may be conventional, novel, specialised. For metaphors, if a contextual sense is conventionalised and well-attested, it is very likely to be found in the dictionary; whereas if the contextual sense is non-conventional and novel, it cannot be found in a general dictionary. For metonymy,
this general guideline does not hold – contextual senses are sometimes found in the
dictionary and sometimes not.  

The present project encountered several issues related to establishing the contextual
senses:

• Truncated utterances – when an utterance is not finished, there is not enough
co-text and so there is not enough information necessary to establish precise
meaning or reference of a lexical unit. It happens, for example, when a
speaker is interrupted or when he or she does not finish a sentence, or
stutters. In such cases, the lexical unit is discarded for analysis;

• Indeterminate meaning of lexical units – when it is impossible to determine
the precise meaning of a lexical unit. Scope of reference of some lexical units
can be broad and indeterminate – for example determiners such as that, this,
those, these, deictic expressions such as here and there, and pronouns. Such
items present problems in a systematic application of the identification
procedure, and the problems are twofold:

Firstly, there may be not enough contextual knowledge to determine the exact
contextual meaning of a lexical unit like this or here, it may be impossible to
decide if it is used metonymically or not. In such cases, when the decision is
not straightforward but the lexical unit may, at least potentially, have a
metonymic interpretation, it is marked using a code with a question mark;

Secondly, lexical units such as pronouns can have either determinate or
indeterminate meaning and reference which is treated as an affordance which,
although presenting a problem with the procedure, becomes a peculiar and

---

18 Section 5.4.2 below addresses the issue further by describing the specific role and use of
dictionaries for metonymy identification.
interesting case for metonymy analysis. Chapter Seven presents an in-depth analysis of pronouns and their relation to metonymy;

• Borderline cases of metonymy/metaphor – when the contextual sense of a lexical unit may be interpreted as either metonymic or metaphorical. An example from the focus group data is newspapers love it, where newspapers may be analysed as metonymic (newspapers referring to people, i.e. journalists), in which case love would be literal, but it could also be argued that newspapers love it is a typical case of metaphorical personification, where newspapers is literal and love is metaphorical;

Such examples have been discussed in the literature – for example Low (1999) discusses the expression This essay thinks and similar cases and concludes that the interpretation can, indeed, be twofold. In an experimental study of recognition of personification types in fiction by non-expert readers, Dorst et al. classify such borderline cases as 'personification-with-metonymy', where it is possible to see both a personification and a metonymic relation involved (Dorst, Mulder et al. 2011: 190; 97).

**Step Three B**

*For each lexical unit determine if it has a more basic contemporary meaning*

This step determines if a lexical unit has a more basic contemporary meaning in other contexts than the meaning in the given context. The metaphor identification procedures define basic meanings as more concrete, specific and human-oriented, and it is a similar case for metonymy as well. Basic senses are normally present in the dictionary.
Establishing basic senses appears less complicated for metonymy than for metaphor for a number of reasons. For example, there is no need to make decisions on whether etymology should be considered in determining which sense is more basic – metonymic uses may appear with any entity, disregarding a diachronic relation between senses, because the relation between senses of the lexical unit relies on contiguity understood as closeness and adjacency. Diachronic considerations may only be relevant for metonymy when discussing conventionalisation processes of some metonymy types and what factors influence conventionalisation and popularisation of some metonymic expressions (Chapter Six, Section 6.6.1).

**Step Three C**

*Comparison of contextual and basic meaning*

If the lexical unit has a more basic contemporary meaning in other contexts than the given context, and the contextual and basic meanings are different, Step Three C determines the kind of relation there is between the two senses, and whether they are connected by contiguity. The proposed metonymy identification procedure, like the existing metaphor procedures, aims to identify stretches of discourse which are incongruous in the surrounding co-text by identifying basic meanings which are different from contextual meanings. Comparison of contextual and more basic meanings is at the core of metonymy identification – it reveals whether the relation between them is of metonymic nature. The proposed procedure is supposed to distinguish metonymy from other discourse phenomena through Step Three C, where the key term is ‘contiguity’ (Chapter One, Section 1.6.2). In contrast to metaphor, which involves contrast and comparison, metonymy typically involves a link between two senses that is based on a relationship of contiguity between the
referents of the expression in each of those senses (Section 1.2) that differs from the relation of comparison involved in metaphor.

**Step Four**

*Marking lexical unit(s) as metonymy vehicle*

The last step of the procedure refers back to Step 3c – if a connection is found in Step 3c that is one of contiguity, the lexical unit is considered as *metonymy vehicle*, based on Cameron’s ‘metaphor vehicle’ (2003, 2007a, 2010b). The use of *metonymy vehicle* is considered useful for the analysis of metonymy in the dynamics of talk because vehicles can consist of one lexical unit or they can be phrases consisting of more than one lexical unit. *Metonymy vehicles* in the metonymy procedure refers to linguistic expressions that are understood as a whole, i.e. they designate a single referent or a single activity. The discourse dynamics framework (discussed in Chapter Three), within which metonymy is investigated in this thesis, understands language in terms of use in discourse activity. In using language to express thoughts, ideas and feelings, people “soft assemble’ words and phrases, adjusting them as they go for effective communication of meaning” (Cameron and Maslen 2010: 104). Cameron also points out that, limited to word level, the MIP procedure is not theoretically valid in the discourse dynamics framework (Cameron and Maslen 2010: 104) – language in general as well as phenomena such as metonymy and metaphor do not only work on word level. “By allowing metaphor vehicle terms to be words or phrases, the identification procedure and the theoretical framework fit validly together” (Cameron and Maslen 2010: 104) and, similarly, to propose that metonymy vehicles in the metonymy procedure are allowed to be words or phrases, is valid in the discourse dynamics framework. The scope of metonymy, as will be
shown in the analytic chapters, often extends to a level that is broader than word level, and so a method that allows longer phrases to be identified as metonymy vehicles appears useful for metonymy analysis in discourse. Similarly to metaphor, the metonymy procedure does not make claims about cognitive processing. The idea is to find verbal metonymies, i.e. expressions in the language used by speakers, which potentially work metonymically on the conceptual level.

For metonymy, as Chapters Seven and Eight show, the co-relation of the two levels – the level of lexis and the conceptual level – is of a different nature. The proposed metonymy identification procedure relies on the lexical level (in a similar way to the MIP) and Chapter Six shows findings about metonymy identified in the focus group discussion following the steps of the procedure. Chapter Six will point to, however, a number of problematic cases were identified which led the analysis beyond the steps of the identification procedure, incorporating processes in the dynamics of talk.

5.4.2 The use of dictionaries
The step that actually reveals metonymy is the step in which the contextual sense of a lexical unit is compared with its most basic sense, if a more basic sense exists. Similar to the metaphor identification procedures described above, a dictionary is used to check senses of lexical units in the proposed metonymy identification procedure. The dictionaries used in this study for establishing basic senses of lexical units and, wherever possible, for contextual senses, are the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (Longman 2009) in its online version, and the online edition of Merriam-Webster's Dictionary (Merriam-Webster). The role of dictionary in the
metonymy procedure is different, however, from the existing metaphor identification procedures. In the Metaphor Identification Procedure, or MIP, (pragglejaz 2007), as well as in its modification, the MIPVU (Steen, Dorst et al. 2010), the dictionary is used at all times, and both senses – contextual and basic – are usually found in the dictionary.

For metonymy, unlike metaphor, contextual senses may or may not be found in the dictionary and there does not seem to be a general guideline as to when contextual senses are listed. For example, the contextual sense of the lexical unit *Pearl Harbour* in the corpus citation discussed above (Example (17)) is not found in the dictionary, although the contextual (metonymic) sense seems quite a conventional use of the name – such uses of Pearl Harbour as well as the general metonymy type PLACE FOR ACTIVITY or PLACE FOR EVENT have been discussed in the literature (Kövecses 2002: 144), and they are frequent in the OEC – only the basic geographical and military sense is listed in the dictionary (“an important US naval base, at Oahu, Hawaii, US”). On the other hand, the contextual sense of the vehicle *the West* in the focus group data extract above (Extract 5.2) is found in the dictionary (“developed countries, such as USA, UK, western Europe, located in the West, i.e. in the direction of sunset; and the people that live there” (Longman 2009). Next, at step 3b, we establish whether it has a more basic sense. The basic meaning of *the West* found in the dictionary is the geographical sense “the lands lying to the west of a specified point of orientation”. As has been noted above, the pragglejaz group uses the *Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners* (Rundell 2002) and the choice is justified by the fact that the dictionary is corpus-based, well-sampled and contains versatile language data (pragglejaz 2007: 16). The group of researchers at the VU University Amsterdam, who created a modified version of the MIP
procedure, known as MIPVU (Steen, Dorst et al. 2010), also used the Macmillan dictionary as a primary source of reference. In the initial stages of their long-term metaphor project it was observed, however, that the Macmillan dictionary sometimes conflates sense descriptions (Steen, Biernacka et al. 2010: 179), and so an operational decision was made to use the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (Longman 2009) as a second source. The reason the Longman Dictionary was chosen over the Macmillan was that it was observed that the Longman dictionary seemed to conflate word meanings less frequently. Nevertheless, the choice of dictionary is very much an individual analyst's decision as long as it fulfils the important conditions for the type of linguistics research that is conducted in a given project.

Similar to metaphor, it is important for metonymy identification and analysis that the dictionary describes contemporary English because the metonymy identification procedure is concerned with what is metonymic in the particular discourse event, which is fairly recent. The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (Longman 2009) is fairly recent and based on real, natural English from a corpus (Longman Network Corpus). It features 230,000 words, phrases and meanings, is very well sampled and contains language data from a wide range of texts, distinguishing between written and spoken English. The *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary* is used as a secondary source of information - for example for words or phrases which do not have an entry in the Longman dictionary. It features 476,000 entries and is also very well sampled. The project used online versions of dictionaries to make the checking faster and more efficient. For this reason, dates of access are provided for dictionary quotations of sense descriptions in this thesis instead of page references.
5.5 Reliability

Working in large scale research projects, both the pragglejaz group who developed the MIP and the group of researchers who developed the MIPVU could systematically identify metaphors in discourse applying their explicit procedures and they could monitor the quality, results and general performance through numerous inter-rater reliability tests. As a result, validity, comparability and replicability has been added to metaphor research – the MIPVU researchers have created a component of the BNC-baby corpus (BNC 2005) annotated for metaphors.

As has been noted earlier (Section 5.2), an inductive approach to metonymy analysis, which starts from the level of discourse activity and language use, maintains a distinction between identifying verbal metonymies in the analysed discourse data and formulating metonymic mappings on the conceptual level. Both the MIP and MIPVU stress the role of dictionaries in the process – metaphor identification is operationalised in a relatively straightforward way because dictionaries are used as tools at all times to identify metaphorically used items. Such an operationalised procedure also facilitates reliability testing which is extremely important for the rigour of quantitative results in a project which deals with vast amounts of data. Bearing this in mind, the proposed metonymy identification procedure was also tested in a reliability test, which is reported below.

Three researchers specialising in metaphor studies – they had knowledge about metonymy but it was not the focus of their work – were presented with the identification procedure and they were given three short extracts from the focus group data. Each extract was about 60 words long. Working individually, they were asked to apply the procedure for finding metonymically used words and expressions. The main goal of the test was to check if the procedure would work in the same way
with other researchers, i.e. whether they would know how to apply it and whether
they would succeed in finding metonymically used language following the steps of
the procedure.

In this inter-rater reliability test, results were positive – the three participants
were in most cases in agreement about metonymicity of words and expressions. If
they found some cases difficult to decide, they also agreed on those cases being
borderline, which suggests that the problems were not directly related to the
inadequacy of the method (the procedure) but, rather, they were related to deeper
reasons connected with the complexity of the metonymy category – they had been
detected by the primary analyst and they have become the most challenging aspects
of the analysis of metonymy presented in this thesis. Results of the conducted
reliability test would suggest that the wording of the procedure is quite
comprehensive and straightforward. However, performing one reliability test is not
exhaustive – in future research, the procedure must be further tested empirically to
be able to decide whether it has a potential to be used as a standard method.

The present project which is much smaller in scale assumed that the
researchers’ discussions, the process of developing the procedure and the insights
about metonymy which resulted from it, including the problematic and complex
cases it revealed, were more important than statistics. Statistical results of the
reliability test were, thus, not calculated. In a large-scale project such as the
metaphor project which used the MIPVU procedure, it is possible to present clear
information about statistics, especially given that one of the outputs of their work
was to create an annotated component of the British National Corpus. The focus of
this project with regard to the identification procedure was to address a gap in the
field by attempting to formulate and apply a procedure for metonymy identification
in discourse, as well as to detect and analyse issues and problems which arise. These aspects of the procedure were more important than statistics at this stage. The reliability test performed was designed as a first step in testing the proposed procedure, and it is acknowledged that further testing and further research are needed. The encountered issues suggested potentially interesting areas for further analysis within this project, discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight.

5.6 Devising the metonymy identification procedure: summary and reflection

An inductive approach to metonymy in the focus group data seemed more appropriate for a number of reasons. With such an approach, the analysis starts with the language data and tries to capture instances of 'verbal metonymies', i.e. words and phrases actually used by a speaker, that work, at least potentially, metonymically. A deductive approach, that presumes a set of conceptual mappings, and aims to find its realisations in the language used, would be prone to missing metonymies which are not just top-down instantiations of preconceived conceptual mappings. Notably, as has been shown for metaphor by Cameron (2003: 252), if a conceptual mapping is presumed, the analyst may only be sensitive to the kind of evidence that he or she thinks should be found. The deductive metonymy identification and annotation procedure proposed by Markert and Nissim can be applied for those types of research which are based on corpus data and, in particular, which examine a specific number of metonymic patterns. Researchers do not have to limit themselves to the two major metonymic patterns distinguished and examined by Markert and Nissim (2006), i.e. location-specific and organization-specific, they can first establish other major metonymies and replicate Markert and Nissim's
annotation scheme with respect to other types of metonymies (Chapter Two, Section 2.5.1).

Nonetheless, identifying metonymy in an inductive manner that begins from discourse activity can also involve some inconsistencies. If mere intuition is used to assess metonymicity of lexical items, the reliability of research is questionable because researchers' intuitions can differ, which creates problems for the validity of the identification method and for claims about metonymic language use. Such problems have been noted for metaphor (pragglejaz 2007) and they are very similar for metonymy. Aiming to formulate explicit step-by-step identification procedures seems, therefore, a justified effort and research goal. The identification procedure presented above, despite its limitations, moved the present research away from merely intuitive work and, consequently, increased the consistency of coding. The use of the procedure has been through a course a reliability test but it is acknowledged that further testing and reliability checks are necessary. The procedure, therefore, should be perceived as an offering of an attempt of an identification procedure, rather than a finalised version. It is a procedure one might see as the most direct applicable transformation of the existing metaphor identification procedures, which have received some attention and have been replicated in the last few years. Application of the procedure reveals that for metonymy, like in the case of metaphor, there are exceptions, i.e. special cases which are beyond the procedure but which reveal some particularly interesting workings of metonymy in discourse. These special cases will be discussed in the analytic chapters that follow.

This chapter described how the proposed metonymy identification procedure was developed and formulated. It also demonstrated with examples how it works when
applied to language data. The next chapter shows what happened when the procedure was applied to the whole discourse data. It presents some quantitative findings as well as pointing to problematic (or borderline) cases which were detected when trying to apply the procedure, and which then become the subject of Chapters Seven to Eight.
6. Application of the metonymy identification procedure to the focus group talk

6.1 Introduction

Chapters Four and Five highlighted a number of advantages of an inductive approach to metonymy analysis in discourse data – an approach that focuses on the analysis of real-world language use and discourse activity, and attempts to capture words and phrases actually used by speakers that work metonymically or potentially metonymically. Instances of such words and phrases are called *metonymy vehicles*. Chapter Five also justified the research goal of developing an explicit identification procedure for metonymy in discourse and engaged with the particulars of how the offered procedure was formulated and how it should be applied. Some limitations of the procedure were discussed but it was also observed that trying to apply an explicit procedure in identifying metonymy moves analysis and research away from intuitive work towards rigour and consistency in identification and coding.

The present chapter presents the results of applying the proposed identification procedure to the whole dataset, i.e. the focus group discussion. It also refers to results from the Oxford English Corpus (OEC), which was used for tracking findings from the focus group talk. Although many aspects of metonymy have been explored by scholars over the past thirty years, typically research has not focused on real language data but, rather, invented examples in isolation. Without investigating authentic language use, it is difficult to develop an understanding of how metonymy is used in talk. Progress in the field has also been impeded by the lack of quantitative macro-scale findings based on the application of a systematic identification procedure. Cognitive linguistics has put forward the idea that metonymy shapes the
way we think and speak (Gibbs 1999: 61) and that it is ubiquitous in language (Barcelona 2002; Dirven 1999; Radden and Kövecses 1999; Radden 2005) but no research so far has considered the frequency of metonymy in discourse. Notably, there is research which has counted metaphors in discourse (Cameron 2003: 116; 2010b; Kaal 2012). Cameron reports a metaphor density of around 50 metaphors per 1,000 words in naturally occurring discourse, 60 metaphors per 1,000 words in classroom discourse (Cameron 2003: 55) and around 100 metaphors per 1,000 words in reconciliation talks (Cameron 2010a: 37); and Kaal (2012: 116) reports a frequency of 77 metaphors per 1,000 in conversation based on conversation extracts (of nearly 50,000 words) from a sample of the British National Corpus (BNC-baby).

It is worth stressing that this thesis identifies metonymy vehicles, which are considered as the equivalent of Cameron’s metaphor vehicle terms, whereas Kaal identified and coded metaphorically used lexical units, according to the steps of the MIPVU (the adjusted version of the MIP procedure, as described in Chapter Five, Section 5.3). Coding metaphors or metonymies as lexical units is likely to produce different numbers of metaphors or metonymies because the lexical unit is usually a smaller analytic unit than the proposed metonymy vehicle which encompasses words as well as longer phrases, as was explained in Chapter Five (Section 5.4). In both cases, metaphors were marked following the steps of explicit identification procedures.

The present chapter describes the use of metonymy in the focus group talk in quantitative terms. The chapter first presents descriptive quantitative findings from applying the procedure, synthesising all instances of metonymy identified in the focus group talk by following steps of the proposed procedure. The chapter offers a systematic description of metonymy in the focus group talk to provide a picture of its
use in the flow of discourse, including density and distribution, as well as grammatical type and form of metonymically used language.

Analysis presented in this chapter addresses the research questions:

**Research Question 1a:** What is the density of metonymy in talk and what types of metonymy occur in the focus group discussion?

**Research Question 1b:** Which word classes act as metonymies and how do different word classes act as metonymies?

**Research Question 1c:** On what different levels of discourse (e.g. word, phrase, clause) does metonymy appear?

**Research Question 1d:** What is the distribution of metonymy in the focus group talk?

**Research Question 1e:** How does the focus group talk compare to a large language corpus in the use of metonymic language?

**Research Question 3a:** Are metonymy and metaphor correlated in talk?

**Research Question 3b:** What kinds of interplay of metonymy and metaphor occur in the data?

**Research Question 4a:** How is metonymy involved in discourse activity?

**Research Question 4b:** When does metonymy occur in discourse activity?

In addressing the above questions, the present research complements the existing studies of metonymy which have not usually focused on usage-based empirical data but rather relied on linguists' intuition (as has been pointed out also by Handl 2011a: 137
Work that has tried to fill the gap, namely corpus linguistic work, has produced interesting results (Deignan 2005b; Hilpert 2006; Markert and Nissim 2003, 2006) but it has usually been restricted to a limited number of linguistic items. Quantitative analytic results in data-driven approaches such as the results presented in this thesis, advocate and may indeed stimulate a shift towards more functional considerations. This chapter applies the proposed identification procedure to identify all potentially metonymically used words and expressions in a meaningful relatively large sample of closely analysed authentic discourse (the focus group discussion) and tracks findings in a large language corpus, the OEC. Both the focus group talk and the OEC, offer rich sources of data for the analysis of metonymy, but both also have limitations (Chapter Four). Combining close analysis of the focus group discussion and examination of search results in the large corpus is an attempt to provide a richer picture of metonymy in language.

Section 6.2 presents the overall quantitative results from applying the identification procedure to find metonymy in the focus group data. Section 6.3 provides a grammatical analysis of the identified metonymies – it engages with the details of how different word classes act as metonymies. Section 6.4 shows a distributional analysis of metonymy in the focus group talk. Section 6.5 reviews the findings from the quantitative analysis and explores in more detail the behaviour and features of various metonymies identified with the procedure. The section puts the findings in a discourse dynamic context by interpreting the identified metonymies from a qualitative perspective in selected text extracts. Section 6.6 addresses the interplay of metonymy and metaphor in the focus group. Section 6.7 offers a conclusion of the overall quantitative findings.
6.2 How much metonymy?

In the attempts to count metonymic expressions, a distinction was made between cases which can be counted as metonymy vehicles and longer stretches of talk referred to as ‘scenarios’ and ‘stories’, which do not necessarily include metonymy vehicles, but which work metonymically in other ways. The metonymies of the former group are discussed in this chapter, while the latter become the subject of Chapter Eight, which deals with metonymy beyond word level.

Within the 17,889 words of the focus group talk, 332 metonymy vehicles were identified and annotated using the code ‘metonymy’. Additionally, 283 more ‘borderline’ items were annotated with the code ‘metonymy?’ to mark words or expressions which seem to involve metonymy but cannot be marked as metonymic in a straightforward way according to the steps of the identification procedure. Because of the ‘borderline’ cases, when considering the average frequency of metonymy in the discourse data, two calculations could be performed: including and excluding the ‘borderline’ cases. The number of ‘borderline’ cases is relatively large – it increases the total number of items which can be considered as potentially metonymic by 85%. However, the ‘borderline’ cases all relate to one word class, pronouns, which were captured in the analysis process as a special case. Hence, they are signalled in this chapter and they become the subject of the next analytic chapter, Chapter Seven. The density results for metonymy in discourse (as well as for metaphor in the studies which are cited in Section 6.1) use textual units – information is given on metonymy density per 1,000 words in the transcription of the focus group talk. To calculate metonymy density and present it in readable numbers, the number of metonymies in the transcription was multiplied by 1,000 and divided by the number of words in the transcript (17,889).
Including the 'borderline' cases, there are 615 metonymies in the focus group discussion, a frequency which corresponds to a density of 34 metonymies per 1,000 words. Excluding the 'borderline' cases, the 332 metonymies correspond to a density of 18 metonymies per 1,000 words. The frequency results are the first quantitative data for metonymy density in language – as noted earlier, no research to date has considered how frequent metonymy is in discourse. Handl (2011a, 2011b) proposed an empirical framework for investigating the conventionality and salience of metonymic mappings. However, although Handl's corpus study dealt with large quantities of corpus data, it dealt with only one set of metonymic mappings, i.e. it tested the general relative frequency of metonymic meanings of a given set of expressions, measured against the background of the frequency of the literal meaning of the expression. The present study has found no study to date that measures the frequency/density of metonymy in discourse.

6.3 Grammatical analysis of metonymy

Results of the analysis of the distribution of metonymy in the focus group discussion per main word classes are presented in Table 6.1. The second column shows the raw frequency of each type of metonymy. The third column shows these numbers as percentages of the total number of items marked as metonymically used. The third column shows the numbers as percentages of the total number of items marked as metonymically used and those marked as 'borderline'.

140
Table 6.1

Distribution of metonymy in the focus group discussion per main word class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word class</th>
<th>Number of metonymies</th>
<th>Percentage of total number of metonymies excluding 'borderline' cases ('metonymy' code)</th>
<th>Percentage of total number of metonymies including 'borderline' cases ('metonymy' and 'metonymy?' codes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nouns inc. anaphoric he</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>46,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pronouns they, you, we</td>
<td>283</td>
<td></td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbs</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7,5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 46 verbs marked as metonymic in the data would be, according to this typology, regarded as propositional metonymies—metonymies which result in the change of meanings of propositions. An example of propositional metonymy is provided by Warren (2006: 5):

(18) *It won't happen while I still breathe*

where the verb *breathe* is used with the meaning of 'live'. Warren suggests that the proposition 'Someone breathes' gives rise to the proposition 'Someone lives'. It is worth pointing out that the overall quantitative findings reflect the popular claim among linguists that metonymy is usually referential (while metaphor is predicative). The notion of propositional metonymy also points to one way of interpreting and analysing more complex cases, where, as it is observed, metonymic processes appear
to be involved beyond word level, i.e. where they occur on the level of stretches of talk, as will be shown in Chapter Seven and Eight.

As Section 6.2 noted, the code 'metonymy?' was used 283 times (which is considerably frequent, compared with the 332 uses of the 'metonymy' code) to mark uses of they, we and you which were 'borderline'. All these cases belonged to one word class, pronouns. A separate chapter, Chapter Seven, offers an in-depth analysis of this particular word class and its relation to metonymy.

6.3.1 Metonymy: nouns

This section zooms in on nouns and noun phrases identified as metonymically used. Table 6.2 shows detailed results related to the noun/noun phrase metonymy category. Results were sorted by the number of occurrences of each metonymy. Example line numbers in the transcript are given in the third column. The metonymies in Table 6.2 can be characterised as representing the following patterns:

- They describe basic concepts – i.e. the nouns identified as metonymic do not come from a specialised domain or semantic field; they are, rather, words which constitute a basic vocabulary set (words like head, tube, bag, world, home, names of countries and cities); which are, therefore, close to basic categories or basic objects in the sense of Rosch (1999);
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Noun/Noun phrase</th>
<th>Number of metonymic uses</th>
<th>Example line(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tube</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>131, 134, 135, 171, 1124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blair (inc. anaphoric he)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2532, 2537, 2538, 2539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>588, 980, 2497, 2512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bomb</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>104, 112, 113, 460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>48, 272, 364, 388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>104, 112, 113, 861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bag</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>556, 558, 1148, 1151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>world</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>289, 1041, 1652, 1802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1805, 1806, 1825, 1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underground</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>226, 227, 232, 553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>258, 1928, 1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>life</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>284, 533, 1763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>media</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oil</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1938, 1941, 1942, 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thought</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>234, 663, 935, 1383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>story</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>447, 2003, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1890, 2091, 2103, 2339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2003, 2046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1822, 1826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3840, 3850, 3863, 3870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minutes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>157, 180, 1461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>question</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1679, 1714, 2517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>war</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2316, 2328, 2534, 2537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>company</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>348, 358, 877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>black</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4496, 4891, 4894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>home</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Empire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1972, 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saddam Hussein</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2914, 2916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell Square</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2600, 2678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6.2

**Nouns and noun phrases: Metonymic uses identified in the focus group (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Noun/Noun phrase</th>
<th>Number of metonymic uses</th>
<th>Example line(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hours</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>colours</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>burka</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>turban</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Empire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dark skin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>side</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paper</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recorder</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20s</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- They do not belong to any specific register – the nouns which were identified as metonymically used in the focus group discussion are not words which would normally only link to a particular register of spoken or written language;

- They appear to refer to and be closely linked with the direct and indirect context and topic of the conversation – the speakers use familiar vocabulary, refer to familiar locations; most of the nouns are focused on the specific topic of the conversation – i.e. speakers mention concepts that are associated with the subject of terrorism and war (*bombs*, *government*, *IRA*, names of countries, dates when terrorist events took place).
Sections 6.5 and 6.6 discuss these findings in more detail and how they compare to findings in the OEC.

6.3.2 Metonymy: verbs

In comparison to the noun word class, few verbs were marked as metonymically used in the talk. However, as was pointed out in Section 6.3, results which show that propositional metonymies (which involve verbs) are much less frequent than referential metonymies (which involve nouns) resonate with Warren (2006). Moreover, recent research into cross-linguistic availability of metonymies also indicates that referential metonymies are relatively unconstrained, i.e. they are attested almost universally across languages (Brdar-Szabó and Brdar 2003; Panther and Radden 1999). Table 6.3 shows detailed results related to the verb/verb phrase metonymy category. Results were sorted by the number of occurrences of each metonymy vehicle.

Table 6.3

*Verbs and verb phrases: Metonymic uses identified in the focus group*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Noun/Noun phrase</th>
<th>Number of metonymic uses</th>
<th>Example line(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hear</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>368, 396, 398, 405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see or notice</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1740, 1795, 1853, 1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>go or be out</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>239, 1371, 2434, 4167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>talk</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1881, 2190, 2119, 2120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Warren's analysis of the verb *to breathe* used metonymically with the sense of "to live" was cited in the preceding section (Warren 2006: 5). The examples below illustrate how the proposed identification procedure was applied to mark occurrences of the verbs listed in Table 6.3 as metonymy vehicles in the talk. Extract 6.1 includes the verb *go out* used metonymically, Extract 6.2 – the verb *notice*, and Extract 6.3 – the verb *talk*.

**Extract 6.1**

2428 Chris and as a teenager,
2429 Chris and in my 20s,
2430 Chris the word terrorism wasn't even,
2431 Chris in my .. vocabulary.
2432 Chris it w- --
2433 Chris it just didn't *exist*.
2434 → Chris ...(1.0) you could *go out*,
2435 Chris anywhere,
2436 Chris and be *safe*,
2437 Chris .. all the time.
2438 Chris now,
2439 Chris l--
2440 → Chris .. if my kids *go out*,
2441 Chris I don't *feel* that they're *safe*.
2442 Chris and I worry myself *sick* about them.

The verb phrase *go out* in line 2434 was marked as metonymic. Assuming that the whole data set had been read beforehand (step 1 of the procedure) and lexical units had been established (step 2), at step 3a, the contextual meaning of *go out* is established. In its contextual sense, *going out* refers to {the physical action of going out of the house} but it also refers to {being out and doing things outside the house}. Being able to *go out* in line 2434 links with {being free, feeling secure and safe in the world}, contrasting strongly with the lines that follow, about how the speaker worries about her children going out of the house (line 2440), where *going out* is also used metonymically, meaning {being out and doing things outside the house}, and it is something one does not feel safe about in contemporary times. In this context, it expresses an activity that is associated with being secure and safe. Being
able to go out was something that the speaker could do in the past and she no longer can now. The speaker builds a contrast between what life used to be like in the past, when she was young, and what it is like now, by talking about one specific activity which metonymically represents more than just the basic “exiting the house” activity. At step 3b of the procedure, it was established whether go out has a more basic sense. The basic meaning of go out found in the dictionary is the “physical activity”, “movement” sense. At step 3c, where contextual and basic meanings of the verb phrase are compared, it seemed that in the case of go out the contextual meaning is different from its basic sense and the two senses are related by contiguity because the basic “physical going out” sense is present in its contextual meaning. That is why, at step 4, go out was considered as a metonymy vehicle and the extent of the vehicle was determined to be just the verb.

Four occurrences of the verbs see and notice were identified, at step 2 of the procedure, as metonymy vehicles, based on findings by Cameron (2003) as well as Steen (2007), discussed in Chapter One (Section 1.6.2). In line 2416 of Extract 6.2, the verb notice was marked as potentially metonymic following the steps of the metonymy identification procedure.

Extract 6.2

2405 Janet our life has already changed.
2406 Janet .. we’re consciously,
2407 Janet more con-
2408 Janet concerned about,
2409 Janet who we sit next to on the bus,
2410 Janet .. and,
2411 Janet we’re more aware,
2412 Janet generally,
2413 Janet about s- --
2414 Janet er security.
2415 Janet so,
2416 → Janet we don’t even notice,
2417 Janet the changes,
2418 Janet they’ve .. occurred,
2419 Janet .. gradually,
Assuming that the whole data set had been read beforehand (step 1 of the procedure) and lexical units had been established (step 2), at step 3a, the contextual meaning of *notice* is established. In this extract, *notice* refers not only to actual physical seeing with the eyes but also to {understanding; coming to recognise, and acknowledging}. Next, at step 3b, a more basic sense of *notice* was established. The basic meaning of *notice* found in the dictionary is the “physical activity” of “noticing something with one’s eyes”. At step 3c, where contextual and basic meanings of the verb are compared, the two senses were found to be different but connected by contiguity because the basic “physical noticing” sense may still be involved in the contextual sense of {coming to understand}, i.e. {coming to understand} may occur because somebody observes change in the physical surrounding reality but then they analyse it and take into account the abstract social dimension of change. As the analysis shows, the verb *notice* in this extract refers to the physical as well as abstract reality and that is why, at step 4, the vehicle *notice* was marked as metonymy vehicle.

As Table 6.3 indicates, data analysis with the application of the procedure also found five metonymic uses of the verb *talk* – Extract 6.3 includes one of them.

**Extract 6.3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Character</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2191</td>
<td>Janet</td>
<td>it can only go forwards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2192</td>
<td>Janet</td>
<td>and hopefully,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2193</td>
<td>Janet</td>
<td>.. in the future,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2194</td>
<td>Janet</td>
<td>people will talk more,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2195</td>
<td>Janet</td>
<td>and the world will be spread out,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2196</td>
<td>Janet</td>
<td>a bit more,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2197</td>
<td>Janet</td>
<td>so there isn’t such anger.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having read the entire data set (step 1 of the procedure) and established vehicles (step 2), at step 3a, the contextual meaning of *talk* is established. In this context, it has a meaning which combines the physical activity of {produce words}, {express in speech} and {use language to communicate} with {understand, influence, affect, or
cause by talking and, as a possible result, not engage in violence). Next, at step 3b, it was established whether *talk* has a more basic sense. The basic meaning of *talk* found in the dictionary is the physical sense “produce words” and “express in speech”. At step 3c, contextual and basic meanings of the lexical unit are compared, and a decision is made about whether the senses are different but connected by a contiguity relation. It was assumed that in the case of *talk* the contextual meaning is different from its basic sense, but, since the basic sense is still present in the contextual sense, the two senses are connected by contiguity. For this reason, at step 4, the verb *talk* was marked as metonymy vehicle.

6.4 Distributional analysis of metonymy in discourse: clusters and the ‘super-cluster’

Application of the identification procedure indicates that metonymies, similar to metaphors (Cameron and Stelma 2004), are not distributed evenly in talk. Cameron and Stelma found that metaphors tend to form clusters in discourse data and that metaphor clusters appear to be more frequent in those points of discourse where speakers deal with difficult themes. Therefore, metaphor clusters can point to moments in the discourse event\(^\text{19}\) which are particularly interesting for the analyst. A similar significant pattern was observed for metonymy in the focus group talk – metonymies form several clusters in the analysed discourse event and, moreover, a ‘super-cluster’ seems to emerge in a stretch of the transcribed talk, i.e. a fragment of talk which is particularly significant for the highest number of metonymically used words and phrases coinciding with metaphor clusters. This section explains how the distributional analysis was performed and engages with the details of the findings.

\(^{19}\) Defined as “a specific instance of social interaction involving language” (Cameron and Maslen 2010: 3); see Chapter Three, Section 3.2.
6.4.1 Visual examination and graphs

Potential metonymy clusters in the transcribed discourse data could already be identified at the stage of visual inspection involved in one of the first readings of the transcript. When a paper copy of the transcript was first marked with a highlighter, sections where highlighting was particularly dense could be observed. The highlighted stretches were revisited later, after the identification procedure was formulated and applied. In addition to such straightforward tools as visual observation of manual marking on paper, a graph was plotted using Excel functions to provide a more precise calculation and visual representation of the distribution of metonymies in the talk. A quantitative approach was taken in analysing the distribution of metonymy and the identification of stretches of talk showing significant metonymy density. Cameron and Stelma define metaphor density as the number of metaphor vehicles per 1,000 words of transcript. The 1,000 word measurement was used in this thesis to calculate the average metonymy density from the total number of metonymies marked in the 17,889-word discourse event (Section 6.2). The transcript of the focus group talk has an average metonymy density of 18 metonymies per 1,000 words, excluding the ‘borderline’ cases, and 34 metonymies per 1,000 words including the ‘borderline’ cases. The graphs illustrating the distribution of metonymy in the focus group represent the larger metonymy count – with the purpose of creating a picture of the distribution of all instances of language involving metonymy, including the ‘borderline’ cases, i.e. the particular case of pronouns, discussed in the following chapter. Cameron and Stelma described the use of cumulative frequency graphs for the representation of metaphor density in discourse. This thesis uses a basic frequency graph to illustrate findings related to the distribution of metonymy – Figures 6.1 and 6.2.
In a cumulative frequency graph, clusters would be marked by a steepening of the curve; in a basic frequency graph clusters are marked by the curve going visibly up. In a cumulative frequency graph the total number of metonymies would be represented on the vertical axis as a cumulative total; in the basic frequency graph the total number of metonymies used is not represented but the dynamics of metonymy are represented by the ups and downs of the curve.

The graph in Figure 6.1 was extracted from an Excel spreadsheet. To make the graphical visualisation more detailed, the transcript was divided into blocks of 50 intonation units for which metonymy count was entered. The horizontal axis in the graph shown in Figure 6.1 represents intonation units in the 90 minutes of the conversation. An intonation unit was defined in Chapter Four (Section 4.3) as a fragment of speech “produced under one intonation contour which often corresponds to a single breath” (Cameron and Maslen 2010: 100). In the transcript of the focus group each line is one intonation unit. Dots on the curve represent the number of metonymies in each 50 IUs of the transcript, the point on the vertical axis represents the number of metonymies in that block. The frequency curve shows, in a straightforward way, segments in the talk where speakers used few metonymies as well as fragments where they used many metonymies. The dashed line marks the level above which stretches of talk were considered as metonymy clusters: density of 10 metonymies per 50 intonation units was considered as significant, given the average frequency of metonymy in the focus group discussion was 34 metonymies per 1,000 words of the transcript (including the ‘borderline’ cases), which corresponds to 1.7 metonymies per each 50 intonation units. Identification of metonymy clusters was done by visual inspection of the frequency curve — clusters of metonymies in the talk are shown by steep climbs in the curve in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Distribution of metonymy in the focus group discussion.
The frequency graph in the figure, Figure 6.2, shows a segment of talk (lines 1900 - 3150) in which metonymy density is particularly high, with 481 metonymies in the stretch of 1,250 lines in the transcript. It was found that the analysed fragment coincides with five (out of ten) metaphor clusters identified in the data by the PCTR research team, discussed in Chapter Four (Section 4.3). The graph shown in Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of 481 metonymies (including both the 'metonymy' and 'metonymy?' codes) used in this segment of the talk.

The segment shown in Figure 6.2 was, therefore, called a 'super-cluster' in the talk because it is particularly dense with metonymies and because it encompasses five metaphor clusters. The graph in Figure 6.2 illustrates the distribution of metonymy in the 1250-intonation-unit long stretch of the focus group talk. The super-cluster was investigated for the nature of talk within it. The text relating to the frequent rises of the curve in the metonymy distribution graph (Figure 6.1) reveals an intense episode in which the participants discuss the most controversial and emotional topics - issues of responsibility and agency in society, reasons for going to war, the role of government and media. Metonymies and metaphors in this 'super-cluster' describe how people see themselves in the current situation, their relations with others, their position in society, as well as the issues of agency behind war-related and terrorism-related decisions. To illustrate how speakers use metonymic (and metaphorical) language to talk about these difficult topics, Section 6.5 shows more detailed analysis of the discourse activity in the fragments extracted from the 'super-cluster' identified in the data.

---

20 Perception and Communication of Terrorism Risk (PCTR). The project (ESRC RES 228250053) was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council under its New Security Challenges research programme.
Super-cluster of the focus group talk

Figure 6.2: Frequency graph representing the distribution of metonymy in the

---

154
6.5 Inside the ‘super-cluster’: the behaviour of metonymy in discourse dynamics

As was noted in the previous section, a super-cluster of metonymies and metaphors was identified where speakers discuss particularly intense topics. This section uses two extracts from inside the ‘super-cluster’ showing metonymies used in a rich and heated moment in the discussion. Firstly, analysis based on the proposed identification procedure is demonstrated for each annotated metonymy vehicle (Extract 6.4), except for the pronouns, which are discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 focus on findings relating to the metonymicity of Blair and government, in the focus group and in the OEC. Next, in Section 6.5.3, the analysis picks one of the metonymy vehicles identified in Extract 6.4, the word world (line 2543), and moves to another extract from the focus group data (Extract 6.5), covering lines 2123 – 2166, to show the analysis of the metonymically used world in the discourse dynamics of the ‘super-cluster’, and in the whole discourse event. Bold is used to indicate words and phrases annotated as metonymically used.

In Extract 6.4 four speakers talk about what they think the government’s role is in fighting terrorism and they express their attitudes towards these actions.

Extract 6.4

2511 RM .. what,
2512 RM is the government doing?
2513 Irene we don't know.
2514 Irene @@.
2515 xx not a lot,
2516 xx I don't know.
2517 Janet <X what a big question that is X>.
2518 Irene I don't know.
2519 Fiona you hope,
2520 Fiona you hope it's-
2521 Fiona that they're,
2522 Fiona they're looking out for us.
2523 Fiona .. you hope,
2524 Fiona that they're in negotiations,
2525 Fiona to make it all okay.
2526 Fiona and--
2527 Abbie and --
In Extract 6.4 four speakers talk about what they think is the role of government in fighting terrorism and they express their attitudes towards these actions. Discussion is preceded by a demonstration, how each metonymy vehicle was identified.

government (line 2512)

Step 3a – contextual meaning

The contextual meaning of government is \{group of people who govern the UK\};

Step 3b – basic meaning

The basic sense of government relates to “organization, institution, machinery, or agency”;

Step 3c – contextual meaning and basic meaning related by contiguity?

Yes, the contextual sense is related to the basic sense by a contiguity relation, i.e. the group of people defined in the contextual sense constitute and work for the organisation/institution/agency defined in the basic sense;

Step 4 – metonymy vehicle?

Yes. Upon checking the extent of the metonymy vehicle, the decision is made to include the definite article in the metonymy vehicle.
**question** (line 2517)

*Step 3a – contextual meaning*

The contextual meaning of *question* is {a subject or problem that needs to be discussed or dealt with} or {issue};

*Step 3b – basic meaning*

The basic sense of *question* relates to “a sentence or phrase that is used to ask for information or to test someone's knowledge”;

*Step 3c – contextual meaning and basic meaning related by contiguity?*

Yes, the contextual sense is related to the basic sense by a contiguity relation, i.e. the basic sense of *question* is present in the contextual sense because the moderator has actually asked a question; the contextual sense of “subject” or “problem” is strengthened by the metaphor *big* which suggests the moderator’s question is a broad and complex subject or problem to talk about;

*Step 4 – metonymy vehicle?*

Yes. The extent of the metonymy vehicle is checked backwards and forwards from *question* and the decision is made to mark *question* only as metonymy vehicle.

---

**Tony Blair** (line 2532)

*Step 3a – contextual meaning*

The contextual meaning of *Tony Blair* is {government led by Tony Blair} or {government at the time of Tony Blair being Prime Minister};

*Step 3b – basic meaning*

The basic sense of *Tony Blair* is “the British politician who became leader of the Labour Party in 1994, and Prime Minister in 1997”;

*Step 3c – contextual meaning and basic meaning related by contiguity?*

Yes, the contextual sense is related to the basic sense by a contiguity relation, i.e. the contextual sense involves the basic sense – Tony Blair, the individual defined in the basic sense, represented the British government at the time he was Prime Minister.
The role sense (Prime Minister) and the individual sense are involved in the contextual sense;

\textit{Step 4 – metonymy vehicle?}
Yes.

\textbf{the Iraq war} (line 2534)

\textit{Step 3a – contextual meaning}

The contextual meaning of the phrase \textit{the Iraq war} is not found in the dictionary due to being context-specific and a relatively new item (compared to the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, which is listed in the dictionary); it could be described as \{all aspects connected with the situation of conflict and the state of war with the country of Iraq which began in 2003\}. The fact that the speakers use the word \textit{war} is interesting – because of the nature of the conflict, it can also be considered as debatable whether the situation was actually a war, i.e. it could be called conflict;

\textit{Step 3b – basic meaning}

The basic sense of \textit{the Iraq war} relates to “fighting between two or more countries or between opposing groups within a country, involving large numbers of soldiers and weapons” and the geographical or political sense of Iraq;

\textit{Step 3c – contextual meaning and basic meaning related by contiguity?}
Yes, the contextual sense is related to the basic sense by a contiguity relation, i.e. the basic sense of \textit{the Iraq war} is present in the contextual sense because physical fighting was involved in the war and it took place in the actual geographical location;

\textit{Step 4 – metonymy vehicle?}
Yes.

\textbf{he} (lines: 2537, 2538, 2539)

\textit{Step 3a – contextual meaning}
The pronoun *he* is used anaphorically in this line to *Tony Blair* and its contextual sense corresponds to the contextual sense of *Tony Blair*, i.e. {government led by Tony Blair} or {government at the time of Tony Blair being Prime Minister};

*Step 3b – basic meaning*

The basic sense of the pronoun *he* is “used to refer to a man, boy, or male animal that has already been mentioned or is already known about”; in this line it refers to *Tony Blair*, i.e. “a British politician who became leader of the Labour Party in 1994, and Prime Minister in 1997”;

*Step 3c – contextual meaning and basic meaning related by contiguity?*

Yes, as in the case of *Tony Blair*, the contextual sense is related to the basic sense by a contiguity relation, i.e. the contextual sense involves the basic sense – Tony Blair, the individual defined in the basic sense, represented the British government at the time he was Prime Minister;

*Step 4 – metonymy vehicle?*

Yes.

**world** (line 2543)

*Step 3a – contextual meaning*

The contextual meaning of *world* is {society that people live in, the way people behave, and the kind of life they have};

*Step 3b – basic meaning*

The basic sense of *world* is “the planet we live on, and all the people, cities, and countries on it”;

*Step 3c – contextual meaning and basic meaning related by contiguity?*

Yes, the contextual sense is related to the basic sense by a contiguity relation, i.e. the basic sense is present in the contextual sense, the basic sense found in the dictionary involves the human and organisational aspects (cities, countries). The contextual
sense however, involves all these aspects and, additionally, a more abstract social sense;

*Step 4 – metonymy vehicle?*
Yes.

**the West** (line 2544)

*Step 3a – contextual meaning*
The contextual meaning of *the West* is political and social, i.e. it refers to {society or societies located in the West};

*Step 3b – basic meaning*
The basic sense of *the West* “the lands lying to the west of a specified point of orientation”;

*Step 3c – contextual meaning and basic meaning related by contiguity?*
Yes, the contextual sense is related to the basic sense by a contiguity relation because the basic geographical sense of *the West* is present in the definition of its contextual meaning;

*Step 4 – metonymy vehicle?*
Yes.

The decision to mark the lexical units as metonymy vehicles was outlined (steps 3a, 3b, 3c, and step 4 of the proposed identification procedure). Twenty metonymically used expressions were identified and annotated in this extract – including ten items marked with the ‘metonymy?’ code, applied to metonymy vehicles which are ‘borderline’, all relating to pronouns. These pronouns are considered in the following chapter, Chapter Seven, through an in-depth analysis of the potential metonymicity of the word class of pronouns.
6.5.1 Who did what? Actions and agents: metonymic use of Blair and government

It was observed for Extract 6.4 that speakers use *Tony Blair* and *government* in the analysed fragment to talk about terrorism and the issue of war in Iraq. It was observed for the focus group discussion in general that speakers tend to use one of two agents – *Tony Blair* and *government* – to talk about terrorism and the issue of war in Iraq. Because the choice of one of these expressions has to do with (subconscious) expression of who the speakers believe to be agents of important decisions and events, it is particularly interesting which they use more. Across the whole dataset there are 23 metonymic uses of *(Tony) Blair* (the number includes: 8 uses of *Tony Blair*, 5 uses of *Blair*, and 10 anaphoric uses of the pronoun *he*) and 22 metonymic uses of *government* (8 of which are the Moderator’s). Since *government* is used by the moderator in the questions, the speakers could have picked up on that and also used *government*. However, they also use *(Tony) Blair* and this raises the question of why they do so.

The metonymic uses of *government* and *(Tony) Blair* in the extract as well as in the super-cluster and the rest of the focus group talk, and the metonymic uses of *policy*, *Britain*, *the press* and *newspapers*, all pose questions about speakers’ attitudes relating to specific uses of these words (or phrases) and concepts. The analysis indicated that speakers deliberately or sub-consciously select their language expressions to refer to various entities and agents. *Government, policy, (Tony) Blair, Britain, the press* and *newspapers* are instances of metonymies which are all connected with the topic of society, agency within the society, individual and group responsibility for the country and its society. Metonymic uses of various agents such as *government, policy, (Tony) Blair, Britain* indicate the speakers’ attitudes to the issue of terrorism, the society and the rulers.
Each phrase containing government, (Tony) Blair or policy refers to a slightly different combination of bureaucratic decision-making with constitutionally-established authority. When the government declares or announces something, the actual statement is usually delivered by a representative such as the press secretary. When (Tony) Blair declared something the utterance is performed by him but does not necessarily originate with him – it is often something devised by a whole team of advisors. When it comes to historically significant, important decisions, events, and people use the name of president or prime minister to talk about certain actions, they most frequently do not mean the figure of the individual performing these actions, but a group of people, the government, or the country with its nation. The episode began with the moderator’s question about government’s actions connected with risk of terrorism. It had also been the moderator who had brought up government for the first time in line 544 and the term was used three times by different speakers. Up to this point nobody had used agent words to talk about who was responsible for certain actions. The speakers had been using many pronouns they and we, which will be considered for potential metonymicity in Chapter Seven. However, in many cases, it was impossible to say who the pronoun referred to as there are no explicit antecedents.

In talk, metonymies show themselves usually only through the metonymy vehicle. What the metonymy vehicle stands for (the Target, to use cognitive linguistic terms), or, in other words, the probable referent of a metonymy vehicle, is implicit and left for elaboration and interpretation on the part of the other discourse participants. On the macro scale of the flow of talk, metonymies are shifted and developed between speakers. Extract 6.4 shows how speakers choose to switch from government, proposed by the moderator, to a more specific agent, (Tony) Blair, (and,
in the lines that follow, he) to refer to the government as a whole. It is, arguably, not only (Tony) Blair (the person or politician) that is the referent in lines 2532-2539. Tony Blair did not actually “go into the war”. The uses of Tony Blair are cases of the individual standing for a group, although the group is difficult to define and the standing for relationship is politically motivated in attributing responsibility to the individual.

In the United Kingdom, the government has permission to give the order to begin action and the Prime Minister, acting in the capacity of head of government, has the power to declare war. In the particular case of the events discussed by the focus group, the decision to go to war or to engage in the conflict, involved parliamentary debates and two votes. The decision to join the Iraq war was, therefore, a particularly complex process, with many people and political bodies involved. Nonetheless, speakers in the focus group only use government and (Tony) Blair, used metonymically as shorthands for the complex processes involved in the situation. (Tony) Blair metonymically stands for a whole set of entities such as {government led by Tony Blair}, {government at the time of Tony Blair being Prime Minister}, and {the English army (directed and ordered by government officials)}. It is interesting how Janet in line 2538 immediately picks up Abbie’s use of he (a line before). In what she says, going to war was an “idea” that Tony Blair had. Such a serious and important decision is not likely to be the result of just one person’s idea, but rather a huge group of advisers and connections, as well as voting in this case, but the speaker apparently associates it strongly with the figure of Tony Blair.

The question, then, is why do speakers in Extract 6.4 (and in the ‘super-cluster’ which emerged from the abundance of metonymies and metaphors) sometimes say (Tony) Blair, sometimes government and sometimes Britain. From
the discourse dynamics perspective, there seems to be a micro-level 'lexico-conceptual pact' (Cameron 2007b, 2010b) between speakers in lines 2532-2539, i.e. Janet’s quick ‘borrowing’ from Abbie of the word he to refer to agency and action-taking. The speakers throughout the extract and in the ‘super-cluster’ repeatedly use they, (Tony) Blair and he, which contrasts with who actually was eligible for making the political decisions. When they use government, it stands metonymically for the people working in the British government, the politicians. Speakers, however, very rarely use more precise expressions such as “politicians working in the government”, they choose to use metonymic ‘shortcuts’ such as government or (Tony) Blair. Disregarding the issue of public feeling for and against the war, from the historical point of view, the use of a single name to talk about specific actions or events taking place in the country, seems to work as a useful shortcut. In talk about important events in history, the tendency is to use names of individual figures connected with those events – the names are more unique and prominent than expressions like government – governments change and with a few years’ gap in between, government does not denote the same people, the same ruling party. For example, to talk about the abolition of slavery in the USA, the name “Lincoln” or “Abraham Lincoln” is, as the corpus shows, by far the most frequent, although it was a complex move, with years of conflicts and a war. “Lincoln” is, therefore, a useful and ergonomic shorthand to refer to more complex phenomena, which works as a cultural and historical metonymy, similar to “(Tony) Blair” used to talk about terrorist events and the war against terrorism of our time.

Complexity of the processes involved in the decision-making in politics makes them particularly difficult to understand and are one of the causes of the vagueness of the reference. As noted in Chapters One and Three, Strauss and Quinn
show that culture shapes our knowledge of a subject and that it influences the language used to talk about the subject (Strauss and Quinn 1997). In the Discourse Dynamics framework, culture, history and language are all part of a complex dynamic system (Larsen-Freeman and Cameron 2008). Culture and history are, therefore, forces which influence the language people use and shape the dynamics of discourse. The term cultural metonymy working as a ‘cultural keyword’ (Stubbs 2002: 145) could be applied to instances where metonymy is used as a useful shorthand that captures probable referents which involve complex processes. Cultural metonymies in language emerge from assumed shared experience and cultural background, which make it possible for speakers to use and interpret expressions like (Tony) Blair with full recognition and appreciation of the complexities involved. The term can apply to speakers’ use of both government and (Tony) Blair.

6.5.2 Blair, government and parliament in the OEC

Parliament, (Tony) Blair and government were tracked in the OEC to investigate how they are used across the large language corpus. Overall counts of the number of citations found with the SketchEngine concordance function for the three items are presented in Table 6.4. The OEC showed that (Tony) Blair was used less frequently than government and parliament in the OEC – it had 113,337 citations (36,475 of which were full name and surname Tony Blair) while government resulted in over 1 million (1,272,903) hits and parliament produced 129,350 citations.

21 The term cultural metonymy is sometimes used in the domain of visual arts to refer to visuals that 'carry' metonymy, e.g. the colour red for love, warning or blood; or breast for femininity.
Table 6.4

Frequency of parliament, (Tony) Blair and government in the OEC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phrase</th>
<th>Number of citations</th>
<th>Number of citations in collocation with Iraq</th>
<th>Percentage of total number of citations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blair</td>
<td>113,337</td>
<td>2,044</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which Tony Blair</td>
<td>36,475</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parliament</td>
<td>129,350</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>when modified by: UK/British/English</td>
<td>1,368</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government</td>
<td>1,272,903</td>
<td>5,459</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>when modified by: UK/British/English/Labour</td>
<td>18,696</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The frequency results were not surprising – (Tony) Blair is a proper name which refers to one person specifically, associated with a specific time in history, whereas government and parliament can refer to any government or parliament in the world, at any time. However, when the general results were limited to citations in which government and parliament were modified by English, British or UK, it was found that government had 18,696 citations and parliament 1,368.

To match the topic of the focus group discussion, the citations were further limited to those that collocated with Iraq within 4 words to the left/right, and (at the same time) were modified by UK, British or Labour. A shift in quantitative results was observed when the collocations were tracked: parliament when modified by English, British or UK and collocating with Iraq retrieved only three OEC citations (318); (Tony) Blair – 2,044; and government when modified by English, British, UK...
or Labour retrieved 200 citations. Of the three items, proportionately, (Tony) Blair was the most frequently used in collocation with Iraq; and parliament, when used in collocation with Iraq, was the least frequently used. It should be pointed out, however, that the search for citations for government in the OEC did not capture all instances of the word used to talk about Iraq – the search was limited to co-occurrences of government with Iraq and four modifiers.

The finding that parliament was used least frequently in collocation with Iraq in the general corpus resonates with the findings of the analysis of the focus group talk. The focus group participants do not use the word “parliament” to talk about agents of the events related to terrorism and the Iraq war. The only three occurrences of parliament in the focus group data are the proper name “Houses of Parliament”, used to refer to the location in London. A narrowed sample of one hundred OEC concordances for (Tony) Blair was examined for metonymic versus literal uses. Figure 6.3 shows a SketchEngine concordance for Blair in the OEC. The figure represents 20 concordance lines from a random sample of 100 OEC citations a short extract from the data sample of one hundred citations. For the needs of this research, 100 was considered as manageable for manual qualitative analysis, at the same time providing sufficient insight (Chapter Four, Section 4.6.2).

Analysis of the sample of 100 citations analysed for Blair collocating with Iraq in the OEC found that:

- clearly literal uses of (Tony) Blair were identified in discourse contexts where domestic bureaucracy is the subject (e.g. Tony Blair gets his term in office, Mr Blair used a keynote speech or Blair said);
German outline the ongoing crisis for Tony Blair over Iraq and the need to identify political using much the same language that Bush and Blair used when they attacked Iraq last year used within 45 minutes. Cook says that Blair did not believe Iraq's weapons posed a opposition to the war in Iraq, and Tony Blair gets his third term in office, I would When people today say Iraq could be "Blair's poll tax", they are remembering the then US and UK troops get out. "Blair has said that Iraq is not an issue for streets of Basra, Iraq. Bush and Blair's war has brought instability to the whole taking Britain into Iraq massively damaged Blair's public support and punched gaping holes Washington makes with respect to Iraq. Blair's spokesman added, "Iraq is an issue the country's petroleum reserves. Blair's Iraq dossier: a transparently trumped-up war against Iraq, and denunciations of Blair for being President Bush's poodle, the in preparation for war against Iraq, the Blair government announced Monday, January 20 Besides a possible war against Iraq, Blair said there was also a "mass of intelligence the fate of Iraq will unfold. Here Blair made an extraordinary admission as to how all occupying forces from Iraq, and for Blair and Bush to be held to account for their now deceased Robin Cook, who retired from Blair's cabinet over Iraq. Politics has balloons. Everyone I spoke to believed that Blair's Iraq adventure was a dangerous diversion It is shocking to realise that since Tony Blair authorised air strikes against Iraq at article is misleadingly headlined "Bush, Blair Say Iraq War is Not Cause Of Attacks" attacks are the bitter harvest of Bush and Blair's war in Iraq. But my instinct is that

Figure 6.3 OEC citations for the expression (Tony) Blair in collocation with Iraq

- in 40 of the analysed citations, Blair in collocation with Iraq also collocates with Bush, and the two most frequent lexical patterns are: Bush and Blair and Bush/Blair;
- citations where Blair collocates with Bush all refer directly to their actions (i.e. Bush and Blair invaded Iraq, Bush and Blair attacked Iraq, Bush and Blair's war, Bush and Blair's crimes in Iraq);
- some uses can be considered potentially metonymic (e.g. Tony Blair is sending soldiers to Iraq), similarly to uses in the focus group discussion, because of a contrast between the expression used and the entity that could actually have been involved;
• there are uses which cannot be interpreted as either metonymic or literal, because it is difficult to determine the actual referent in contrast with the agent that can possibly be involved.

In the focus group, 23 uses of Blair were marked as metonymic (which accounts for almost 100% of uses of the expression) because additional information was provided by the context, i.e. uses of Blair could be interpreted taking into account the agent used and the agent that could actually have been involved — if they were in contrast, the item was considered as metonymic. In the OEC, it is more difficult to follow the identification procedure, to establish contextual senses and to check whether the contextual sense differs from the basic sense. Context is limited and it is impossible to know, in many cases, whether Blair is used literally, i.e. whether the individual is the referent, or not which would allow a metonymic interpretation.

The finding that 40 citations in the 100-citation sample show Blair collocation with Bush reflects a tendency in the general corpus to talk about the two agents (used metonymically and literally) together in various contexts. In the focus group discussion, Blair collocates with Bush four times: something to do with Blair and Bush (2932); Blair and Bush thing (2929), which contrasts with Bush and Blair in the OEC in the order of the two names and, consequently, the focus and attention implied; arrogance of Bush and Blair (3128); George Bush didn't need Tony Blair (3161). The frequency of the collocation Bush and Blair in the OEC reflects, similarly to the use of Blair in the focus group talk, how history and culture influence people's knowledge of a subject and the trends in language used to talk about historical events and sociological phenomena. Bush and Blair in phrases such as Bush and Blair's war in Iraq can be considered as what this thesis calls a cultural metonymy working as a shorthand which captures the most memorable referents of
complex processes which involve issues of associated responsibility, shame and blame.

6.5.3 *World, the world* and metonymy

Extract 6.5 is taken from the beginning of the ‘super-cluster’. It is used to show the analysis of the metonymic uses of the word *world* in the focus group. The 9/11 metonymy is discussed further in the present chapter (Section 6.6.1) and the metonymicity of pronouns is the subject of Chapter Seven.

In Extract 6.5 the participants first continue to respond to the moderator’s questions about whether they feel capable of understanding people in other groups in the community and whether the way they feel and think about it ‘now’ (at the time the conversation took place, i.e. 2006) is different from how they would have thought about it a few years earlier (lines 2123 – 2166). In lines 2167 – 2169 the moderator poses another question about change – he asks the participants whether they think that things can ever be the same as they were before. Speakers respond to this in lines 2170 to 2506. Then the moderator, in line with the direction the discussion is proceeding, asks the participants about the role of the government – what the government is doing.

**Extract 6.5**

2123 Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.
2124 Abbie and it's usually violence.
2125 xx [mm].
2126 xx [mm].
2127 Abbie and,
2128 Abbie a- a-
2129 Abbie sustained,
2130 Abbie violent camp-
2131 Abbie campaign,
2132 Abbie .. to get anywhere.
2133 Abbie which is why,
This episode starts when one of the speakers, Abbie, makes a statement about how she perceives the terrorist attacks of 9/11. What is interesting is that she not only tells how she understands the events of 9/11 and their consequences, she also, in some sense, looks at them from the perspective of the Other, the Muslims. By saying "...the 9/11 thing was such a fantastic opportunity for the Muslim world..." she shows some understanding of the other (side). She then positions herself in the non-Muslim world, which, in this fragment, is the metonymic the homes of the metonymic the world – two metonymies of place which highlight emotions connected with the reasoning constructed dynamically in the discourse. The positioning is strengthened by the use of pronouns their (lines 2144 and 2145) and we (2149). These pronouns can be considered as potentially metonymic (see Chapter
Seven) because they refer to the Muslim world and the non-Muslim world expressed as homes of the world in line 2146. The speaker is also positioning herself in yet another way – outside the group of rich, privileged Americans and the power base. In these 30 lines, the speaker achieves the effect of positioning herself in two different ways – in a society divided on religion into Muslim and non-Muslim and in a society divided on nationality (American and non-American). The noun phrase “the world” can be regarded as a potent metonymy because of the abundance of its senses in the lexicon. The Longman Dictionary (Longman 2009) lists the following senses for the entry:

- the globe as a planet in its physical form;
- human society;
- the sphere of one’s life;
- the system of created things or the inhabitants of the earth;
- group of countries (e.g. the Western world, the Arab world).

Analysis based on the proposed identification procedure is demonstrated for each use of the word world in Extract 6.5. There are six uses of the word (lines 2142, 2146, 2151, 2162, 2159, 2166), three of which were identified and annotated as metonymy vehicles based on the identification procedure and are bolded in the extract.

for the Muslim world (line 2142)

Step 3a – contextual meaning

The contextual meaning of the world is {the society, the way people behave, and the kind of life people have};

Step 3b – basic meaning

The basic sense of the world found in the Longman dictionary is more physical: “the planet we live on, and all the people, cities, and countries on it”;
Yes, the contextual sense is related to the basic sense by a contiguity relation, i.e. the basic sense is present in the contextual sense because the basic involves the human and organisational aspects (cities, countries). The basic sense in the dictionary defines "the world" as a whole, while in the speaker's utterance, the basic sense would involve a sub-division into parts of the whole. The contextual sense, however, involves all these aspects and, additionally, the more abstract social senses;

*Step 4 – metonymy vehicle?*

Yes. The preceding lexical unit, *Muslim*, used as modifier, belongs together semantically, i.e. the phrase cannot be separated without retaining the same referent, so the whole phrase *the Muslim world* is marked as one metonymy vehicle.

It brought their issue into **the homes of the world** (line 2146)

*Step 3a – contextual meaning of the world*

The contextual meaning of *the world* is {the society that we live in, the way people behave, and the kind of life we have};

*Step 3b – basic meaning of the world*

The basic sense of *the world* is "the planet we live on, and all the people, cities, and countries on it";

*Step 3c – contextual meaning and basic meaning of the world related by contiguity?*

Yes, the contextual sense is related to the basic sense by a contiguity relation, i.e. the basic sense is present in the contextual sense;

*Step 4 – metonymy vehicle?*

Yes. Checking backwards from *the world*, there is another metonymically used lexical unit, *homes* meaning {the reality people live in; the personal space; the life we have}. The expression *the homes of the world* in line 2146 is a combination of two metonymically used items, which strengthen each other's metonymic interpretation and belong together semantically. The whole phrase, therefore, was marked as one metonymy vehicle.
**the World Trade Centre** (lines 2151 and 2162)

The word *world* in the proper name *the World Trade Centre* is not considered for potential metonymicity as an individual item — it is part of a proper name, and the proper name *World Trade Center* in line 2162 is considered as a whole:

*Step 3a — contextual meaning*

The contextual meaning of *the World Trade Centre* is \{important and powerful companies based in the place World Trade Centre; the people working for those companies\};

*Step 3b — basic meaning*

The basic sense of *the World Trade Centre* is the proper name and place sense "a building in New York";

*Step 3c — contextual meaning and basic meaning related by contiguity?*

Yes, the contextual sense is related to the basic sense by a contiguity relation, i.e. the basic sense is present in the contextual sense. The metonymic interpretation in this instance is strengthened by the following lines, in which the speaker says *they were the power base* which relates *the World Trade Centre* to the people and companies involved;

*Step 4 — metonymy vehicle?*

Yes. Checking backwards and forwards, *the World Trade Centre* is considered as one metonymy vehicle.

... more people are killed in the rest of the *world* (line 2159)

*Step 3a — contextual meaning*

The contextual meaning of *the world* is the location sense \{the planet we live on, and all the people, cities, and countries on it\};

*Step 3b — basic meaning*

The basic sense of *the world* is the location sense "the planet we live on, and all the people, cities, and countries on it";
Step 3c – contextual meaning and basic meaning related by contiguity?
The contextual and basic senses are the same, i.e. there is no contiguity relation between the senses, the word is used literally;

Step 4 – metonymy vehicle?
No.

*the world* noticed (line 2166)

Step 3a – contextual meaning
The contextual meaning of *world* is {people living in the world};

Step 3b – basic meaning
The basic sense of *world* is “the planet we live on, and all the people, cities, and countries on it”;

Step 3c – contextual meaning and basic meaning related by contiguity?
Yes, the contextual sense is related to the basic sense by a contiguity relation, i.e. the basic sense is present in the contextual sense. The metonymic interpretation in this instance is strengthened by the next word in the utterance, the verb *noticed*, which relates to human activity (which can itself be interpreted as metonymic, as Section 6.3.2 demonstrated);

Step 4 – metonymy vehicle?
Yes. Checking backwards and forwards from the lexical unit *world* includes the definite article *the* as part of the vehicle term; *the world*, therefore, is considered as one metonymy vehicle.

When it is used by Abbie in lines 2142 and 2146, *the world* refers to the abstract senses – Abbie is talking about the profile of *the Muslim world* being brought, as a problem or subject, to people’s attention, therefore drawing on the sense of “sphere of one’s life” and “human society”. Nevertheless, the more physical sense of *world*
is still potentially resonant in these more human-related senses – humans are the inhabitants of the world (the planet earth). That is why the relation is metonymic.

Discourse dynamic analysis of metonymies involves examining closely the uses of world throughout the focus group discussion, by various speakers. Metonymic uses of world, tracked across the whole discourse event with the use of WordSmith software concordance tools, confirmed the observation of the data in hard copy version where they were initially marked as an interesting metonymic expression. In Extract 6.5, Abbie used world metonymically three times. Figure 6.4 shows a WordSmith concordance extract with all 18 occurrences of the word world in the focus group discussion (WordSmith 1996-2008). The citations are arranged in such a way that the search term, world, appears down the middle of the screen, with the immediate textual context on either side. They are ordered chronologically according to the line number in the transcript. 4 of 18 citations relate to the proper names World Trade Centre and World War II which were not taken into account when considering the lexical unit world for potential metonymicity.

When world was tracked in the whole dataset using the WordSmith concordance function, it was observed that it is most used with its metonymic senses by Abbie (7 citations). However, there are other speakers who use the world metonymically: Janet (3 uses), Molly (3 uses) and Amy (1 use). Interestingly, it is Molly who first uses the world metonymically in this discussion. In lines 77 – 78 she talks about “terrorism across the world”, and in line 289 she says “it’s everywhere in the world”. The next metonymic use of the world is by Abbie in line 1041 (“once was enough to shake the world”), which suggests she might have sub-consciously “borrowed” this metonymy from Molly and later reused it several times.
In the discourse dynamics, as speakers engage in on-line discussion they affect one another's ideas and forms of expression, i.e. the metonymic expressions they use to talk about certain issues, ideas and attitudes are affected by and affect the speakers who use them and by other speakers (Cameron and Deignan 2006; Cameron 2007a).

Examination of the discourse dynamics of the *world* metonymy in action gives a trace of what ideas and attitudes speakers express when they talk and how they interact with one another. The *world* in its metonymic senses as used by speakers in this discussion is a meaning negotiated between the speakers. As pointed out in Chapter Three (Section 3.2), the use of a particular image or concept expressed in either literal or figurative form is often taken up by the other speakers involved in the discourse. Such a conceptual pact (Brennan and Clark 1996) or a lexico-conceptual pact (Cameron 2007b, 2010b) can be perceived as one of the outcomes of the discourse dynamic process, where speakers negotiate and share...
meanings. Abbie “borrowed” Molly’s metonymic *the world* and used it a number of times. She chose this particular expression from many other expressions potentially available. *The world*, with its metonymic sense, was at that point of on-line thinking and speaking the best way to talk about her feelings and thoughts connected with terrorism. *The world* in 1041 is used in talk about one horrible and powerful event which was enough to “shake the world”, i.e. to shake, metonymically, all possible sub-components of the world, i.e. the countries, the societies, the people. We can, therefore, say that this metonymic use of *the world* not only reflects the way the two (or three) speakers think about terrorism but that it also affects the way they think and talk about it in this particular discourse event.

Analysis of the phrase the *world* draws on the broader issue of a co-relation between metonymy and places which could be analysed as connecting with the ‘poetics of place’ observed by Cameron for metaphor (Cameron 2010a: 174). When speakers engage in the talking-and-thinking (Cameron 2003, 2010b) in discourse dynamics, literal and metonymic uses of various places (including proper location names such as *London, Europe, America, Israel* or *China*, and places like *world* or *the West*), around topics such as places affected or troubled by terrorism, they build common ground and reference – their experience, originating in and associated with concrete physical places, helps establish common understanding and reference. Metonymies of place and space are significant in dynamic construction and co-construction of reasoning (Cameron and Seu 2012). The use of expressions related to various places is connected to discourse activity because places are used to position oneself within the society and a group that shares experience. Places come to stand for events, emotions, and attitudes connected with the events – speakers call for and talk about places which are on the one hand subjective (i.e. people might have
different associations) but on the other, are within shared experience (assumed social knowledge of the conflicts, etc). Uses of places such as *London*, or *World Trade Centre* (used literally and metonymically) as well as *world*, mark a metonymic (and metaphorical) map where terrorism is located, through the interaction between physical places and experiences linked to these places.

### 6.6 Metonymy meets metaphor

Chapter One addressed the issue of the complex relationship between the two language and thought phenomena of metaphor and metonymy. It was pointed out that trying to draw a boundary between metonymy and metaphor has long been of particular interest for linguists but problematic. It was noted that an explanation of the difference that held for a long time in the literature can be found in Gibbs (1994) and it relies on the notion of domains. It was also noted, however, that more recently Barnden (2010) suggested that “metaphoricity and metonymicity are, arguably, language-user-relative in a deep way” and they are influenced by such things as the particular lexicon, encyclopaedic knowledge, and interconceptual relationships held by a particular language user. In light of such principle, an expression should not be said to be metaphorical or metonymic in any absolute sense, but only for particular users (Barnden 2010: 4). Based on the identification undertaken by the PCTR project, there are 1,364 metaphor vehicle terms in this focus group discussion, which corresponds to 77 metaphors per 1,000 words, which happens to coincide with the density figure reported by Kaal (2012) for BNC-baby conversations, bearing in mind, though, that the metaphor density reported in this thesis refers to metaphor vehicle terms (in a similar way that metonymy density reported in this thesis refers to
metonymy vehicle terms) and it could have been larger had the metaphors been coded per lexical unit.

This section discusses some instances of interplay of metonymy and metaphor in the dynamics of discourse. It demonstrates, with examples from the focus group data, how the two phenomena were found to be connected on various levels of discourse: the level of word or phrase, the level of utterance, the level of discourse event. When analysing the focus group data in Atlas.ti, the code ‘interplay’ was used to annotate instances where metonymy and metaphor were involved at the same time on the level of words or phrases and the level of utterances (16 occurrences). Interplay on the level of the whole discourse event relates to stretches of discourse where metonymy and metaphor clusters coincide. No extra code was applied to such instances – occurrences of interplay on this level were analysed qualitatively based on visual observation, aided by the Atlas.ti query tool for finding ‘metonymy cluster code’ and ‘metaphor cluster code’ which coincide, i.e. where these codes overlap or when one of the encompasses the other. Metonymy clusters as well as metaphor clusters vary in length – from three intonation units to nearly one hundred.

6.6.1 Interplay of metonymy and metaphor – word and phrase level

A particularly interesting finding in the focus group data is the use of the expression 9/11 in the plural form. The finding pertains to a case of interplay of metonymy and metaphor which poses questions for theoretical assumptions about metonymy and metaphor, and resonates with considerations in the literature pertaining to the complex issue of boundaries between the two phenomena. This section analyses the
expression *9/11* in detail, showing the evolution of this expression used metonymically in the focus group discussion, tracking the findings in the Nexis UK database, and, finally, showing one particularly complex use of the expression.

*9/11* is used early in the focus group discussion and it is used 17 times in total throughout the talk, by various speakers. Extract 6.6 is used to demonstrate how the expression was found to work metonymically in the data.

**Extract 6.6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2136</td>
<td>Abbie</td>
<td>the <em>9/11 thing</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2137</td>
<td>Abbie</td>
<td>was such a f-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2138</td>
<td>Abbie</td>
<td>fantastic,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2139</td>
<td>Abbie</td>
<td>opportunity,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The expression *the 9/11 thing* used by Abbie in line 2136 is checked following the steps of the identification procedure. At step 3a, the contextual sense of *9/11* is established: {concerning events that took place in New York on the 11th of September 2001, destruction of the World Trade Center, with all the related imagery, the tragedies of the nation and of many individual people; all related atrocities and consequences}. At step 3b, the basic sense of *9/11* is established. The Longman Dictionary lists *9/11* (entered as “nine eleven” as well as “9/11”) with the definition “September 11, 2001, when terrorists used planes to attack New York and Washington”, which can be considered as the basic sense of the expression. It is worth pointing out, however, that it is a fairly new entry in the dictionary, representing the status of the expression for the year 2012. Earlier in the proceedings of this research, i.e. until the year 2011, the expression was not found in the dictionaries and the basic sense was established on the grounds of reference numbers used indexically and symbolically for dates. At the next step, 3c, the relationship between the two is analysed. Because the basic sense (the “date expressed with
numbers’ sense) is still present in the contextual sense, the relationship is considered to be based on contiguity. At step 4, checking backwards and forwards determines the extent of the metonymy vehicle. In Extract 2136, the definite article and thing (metaphorically used) belong together semantically to express {events that took place in New York on the 11th of September 2001, destruction of the World Trade Center, with all the related imagery, the tragedies of the nation and of many individual people; all related atrocities and consequences}, so the phrase the 9/11 thing was annotated as one metonymy vehicle.

9/11 appears early in the focus group discussion, in line 48, and it recurs in the discourse, produced by various speakers. The first use is in a response by one of the speakers (Fiona) to the moderator’s question about what the participants’ associations with terrorism are. Between lines 20 – 64 speakers mention a number of abstract concepts to describe feelings and emotions they immediately associate with terrorism: confusion (line 53 Irene), fear (lines 33, 57 and 60), panic (line 55), chaos (line 64), they also mention concrete images that they picture in their minds when they think of terrorism, such as bombs (line 65), bus attack (line 40), concrete locations Euston (line 43), Russell Square (line 47), London (line 62) and New York (line 49), and, in line 48, 9/11. The identification procedure found all 17 instances of 9/11 in the focus group discussion (WordSmith concordance in Figure 6.5) to be metonymic. By expressing basic human emotions and mentioning these events and dates, referring to shared experience, speakers establish common grounds. The 9/11 metonymy recurs in the text, its instances shifting from one speaker to another.
Figure 6.5 WordSmith concordance for the phrase 9/11 in the focus group data

9/11 used metonymically acts as a hallmark of terrorism, an immediate referent not only to a terrorist event that took place on a specific date but to many associated concepts, events and emotions. In light of this, the discourse function of 9/11 metonymy is important, it is a tool in context where the potentially difficult concept of terrorism is discussed. Speakers, assuming shared background knowledge and understanding, use this metonymy among other abstract and concrete concepts to describe emotions and attitudes and to construct shared, contextualized experience.

A finding connected with a similar expression, 7/7 (which refers to terrorist events which took place in London on the 7th of July 2005 and has three occurrences in the focus group data) should be mentioned at this point. 7/7 as used by speakers in the discussion was identified as metonymy, following the identification procedure. In its metonymic sense, 7/7 follows the same pattern as 9/11, and both these metonyms

---

23 Note: Citation number 1 was removed – software included a line number. One instance was not included by WordSmith and it was identified in manual coding in Atlas.ti (line 434).
represent a category not found in the published literature to date which is labelled SPECIFIC DATE FOR EVENT HAPPENING ON THAT DATE metonymies.

Emergence and evolution of new metonymic meanings is a process which, in this case, can be observed on the level of the discourse event, but also on the macro level of the society, as is indicated by the observation of how meanings of the 9/11 expression evolved over the years following the attacks. Figure 6.6 shows a graph which illustrates the distribution of 9/11 versus 11th September in the period 11th September 2001 to 11th September 2012.

![Graph showing the distribution of 9/11 versus 11th September](image)

**Figure 6.6** The distribution of 9/11 versus 11th September in the period 11th September 2001 to 11th September 2012 (Nexis UK)

The data come from a search of The Times London newspaper in the Nexis UK database, retrieved on 11th September 2012. The search in Nexis UK includes results for both the numerical version (9/11) and the written version (nine eleven) regardless of which search term is entered. The diachronic view suggests only one of the searched expressions (9/11 or nine eleven) has been widely used to refer to the
events of 11th September 2001. The phrase 11th September returns almost zero results. The expression 9/11, therefore, is a cultural metonymy, i.e. a metonymic expression which works as a ‘cultural keyword’ (Stubbs 2002: 145).

The final use of 9/11 in the focus group discussion (citation number 17 in the concordance shown in Figure 6.5) is a particular use of the expression, which was identified as an example of metonymy and metaphor interplay on the lexical level.

**Extract 6.7**

| 2855 | Fiona | they do their, |
| 2856 | Fiona | big pull-out specials, |
| 2857 | Fiona | and their, |
| 2858 | Fiona | ... 10 page, |
| 2859 | Fiona | 9/11s, |
| 2860 | Fiona | and their-- |
| 2861 | Fiona | and all their photo specials, |

In line 2859, one of the speakers uses 9/11s referring to {special newspaper issues about the event called by the specific date} and, possibly, by a further metonymic step {special newspaper issues about other similar events}, which involves a generalisation of 9/11 to refer to {other events similar to 9/11 in importance and scale of violence, that have taken or might take place}. In this use, the presupposed socio-cultural understanding established by the participants throughout the discussion, as discussed above, and knowledge of what the expression 9/11 refers to, is essential.

If 9/11s in line 2859 is interpreted as referring to {terrorist events similar to 9/11 in importance and scale of violence, that have taken or might take place}, it can be considered as a metaphor, on the grounds that other potential terrorist events and concepts associated with them no longer refer to the event that took place on 11th September 2001. The demarcation line between metonymy and metaphor set in
Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy (Gibbs 1994: 321) would indicate that in this instance there are two conceptual domains, i.e. that of the events on 11\textsuperscript{th} September 2001 and that of another terrorist event, and that the mapping between them is a mapping between two domains. On the other hand, it could be argued that 9/11 is a good example of 'chaining of metonymies' (Barcelona 2005). 9/11 as an expression of a particular date (11\textsuperscript{th} September 2001) evolves in the discourse dynamics of the discussion into denoting the events that took place on that date with all their aspects and consequences. But it also further evolves in the discussion to meaning "any events similar to these events" that take, have taken or might potentially take place. Line 2859 shows how 9/11 is used in a grammaticalised form (in the plural), with a sense broader than 9/11 as a date, and even broader than 9/11 as the events that took place on that date in New York. At this point in the conversation it is used to refer to any event that is also a terrorist event or evokes similar atrocities or tragedies. Such interpretation complements the interpretation of 9/11s in line 2859 as {special newspaper issues for an event called by the date}.

Barcelona calls such metonymic uses of certain expressions 'paragons'. A 'paragon' is an individual member or a set of individual members of a category that represents either an ideal or its opposite (Barcelona 2004: 363). The metonymic processes involved in the evolution of 9/11 and its use in line 2859 can be compared to paragon names such as Shakespeare\textsc{es} in expressions such as There are three real Shakespeare\textsc{es} in my college (Barcelona 2004: 363). Shakespeare\textsc{es} in such utterances are not considered as metaphors – Barcelona claims that such plural use of Shakespeare is a common noun motivated by metonymy. Following Barcelona, in an utterance such as line 2859 in the extract, a metonymy creates, on a conceptual level, a stereotype of the individual event (9/11) acting as a paragon. Next, the metonymy
IDEAL MEMBER OF A CLASS FOR THE CLASS maps the stereotype (and its ideal properties) on to a whole class. The paragon date/event 9/11, therefore, stands for the class of events similar to the events on 11th September 2001, and it can be used as a common noun, for example in the plural.

Recurrence of the metonymic (and possibly metaphorical, as could be argued for line 2859) uses of the expression 9/11 in the data reflects the influence of talk on thinking in the discourse dynamics of the conversation. What is said at one point in the conversation constrains how speakers further talk and think. The use of a particular metaphorical or metonymic expression may be due to concepts which the participants all know because they had come to the discussion with shared experience and knowledge of the world or it can be due to a more ad hoc situation and context, both culture-specific – the use of a particular image or concept expressed in a figurative form influences the other speakers involved in the discourse. In the discourse dynamics framework, all these factors are considered to play a role in shaping speakers 'talking-and-thinking'. A metonymic expression used by one of the speakers may be understood or not by the others. When it is understood – it is because they have common background and socio-cultural knowledge of the 'world'. Intellect and individual thinking processes may also be involved. Once it has been used by one of the speakers and understood by the other it is very likely to be reproduced. Particularly, if in this case metonymy works as a lexico-conceptual 'shortcut', i.e. using a simple term, people achieve the effect of alluding to a set of events, images and abstract concepts such as emotions.
6.6.2 Interplay of metonymy and metaphor – utterance level

Interplay of metonymy and metaphor was also identified for units longer than single words or phrases. Interplay at utterance level was identified 15 times in the focus group discussion. Interestingly all these instances involve pronouns such as *we* and *they*, so a connection has to be noted at this point to the in-depth discussion of the relation of pronouns to metonymy in general, which is the subject of Chapter Seven.

This section uses one of the 15 occurrences of the ‘interplay’ code as an example (Extract 6.7) showing how metonymy and metaphor can be closely intertwined in the dynamics of discourse, on the utterance level. Chapter Seven engages in detail with the reasons why the pronoun *we* can be considered as metonymic in the utterance.

**Extract 6.7**

2815 Molly I still feel there must be --
2816 Molly there must be something,
2817 Molly that's has been held back,
2818 Molly the reasons why,
2819 → Molly *we went to .. Iraq,*
2820 Molly that we haven't been--
2821 Molly .. that hasn't been shared with us.

Once *we* in line 2819 has been interpreted as metonymic, the other words in this utterance are analysed. The interpretation of *went, to* and *Iraq* depends on the two possible metonymic interpretations of *we*:

(a) if *we* is used to refer to {*the UK*}, {*country as political entity*}, then

(1) *went* must be considered as metaphorical because the country cannot literally go anywhere, i.e. *went* in this line means {*joined a state of war*};

(2) *Iraq* must be interpreted as metonymic, for its contextual sense is {*all aspects connected with the conflict and the state of war*} with the basic, geographical or political sense of *Iraq* still present;
(b) if \textit{we} refers to \{troops sent Iraq\}, then still, arguably,

(1) \textit{went} may be interpreted as metonymic, meaning \{not only travelling to Iraq but also engaging in military activity\}, whereas

(2) \textit{to} and \textit{Iraq} are probably literal because they refer to a physical location.

In this particular interplay of metonymy and metaphor, the interpretation of metonymically used pronoun \textit{we} conditions the interpretation of the other words in this utterance.

From the perspective of discourse dynamics, the phrase \textit{we went to Iraq} and other phrases used to talk about “going to war” (such as \textit{we went in}) recur in this discussion, shifting from one speaker to another. WordSmith concordances in Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show all occurrences of \textit{we} collocating with \textit{go} in the focus group data.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|l|}
\hline
N & Concordance \\
\hline
1 & Janet although X subtly, 2183 Janet ... we never go back, 2184 Janet to how we \\
2 & Janet to how we were, 2185 Janet like we can't go back, 2186 Janet to the \\
3 & Janet accept now, 2393 Janet when we go to the airport, 2394 Janet it's going \\
4 & Chris so, 2444 Chris ... I don't think we can ever go back, 2445 Chris ... to the \\
5 & see any other reason, 2823 Molly why we would go in, 2824 Molly apart from \\
6 & Janet NATO were saying, 2915 Janet we shouldn't go ... in, 2916 Janet we went \\
7 & to think, 3036 Molly <QS well why can't we just go there, 3037 Molly and sort it \\
8 & 3056 Molly well actually, 3057 Molly we could go over there, 3058 Molly ... but \\
9 & and then nothing happens, 3815 Abbie we all go, 3816 Abbie \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textit{Figure 6.7 WordSmith concordance for the occurrences of \textit{we} collocating with \textit{go} in the focus group data}
Discarding, for the present argument, literal uses of *we + go* and other metaphorical uses of the phrase, in the concordances in Figures 6.7 and 6.8, it can be observed that, through the course of the discussion, speakers share a particular way of talking about going to war with Iraq. In line 3145 of the transcript, found in Figure 6.8, citation 11, Irene says: *we went to Iraq* and the interpretation is exactly the same as Molly’s utterance in 2819. This pattern is also used in line 3036 – when Molly talks about the political situation in China she says “*well why can’t we just go there and sort it out*”? Speakers’ use of this way of talking about political and military decisions and their country’s involvement as a political entity is a pattern that emerges in this discussion. Speakers use an expression where both metaphor and metonymy are at play, describing emotions and attitudes, and constructing shared, contextualised experience.
6.6.3 Interplay of metonymy and metaphor – discourse event level

In this thesis, findings related to metonymy density in the focus group discussion were compared to findings about metaphor in the same data. As noted in Chapter Four (Section 4.3), metaphors in the discussion were identified, as part of the PCTR project (Cameron, Maslen et al. 2009; Cameron and Maslen 2010), based on the Metaphor Identification through Vehicle terms procedure (Cameron 2007a). As was noted in Section 6.2, similar to metaphors (Cameron and Stelma 2004), metonymies are not distributed evenly in talk – similar significant patterns were observed for metonymy and metaphor in the focus group talk – both form several clusters in the analysed discourse event. Metaphor clusters coinciding with metonymy clusters were identified as instances of interplay of metonymy and metaphor on a macro scale of the discourse event.

Clusters co-occurred eight times in the discussion, which means of all ten metaphor clusters identified in the transcript, only two do not coincide with metonymy clusters. Five of the co-occurrences were, as was noted in Section 6.4.5, identified inside the stretch of talk referred to as the ‘super-cluster’, which suggests that clusters of both metonymy and metaphor may occur in discourse at moments where especially complex topics are discussed. Interplay on this level was found through qualitative analysis, based on visual observation, aided by the Atlas.ti query tool for finding codes which coincide (in this case ‘metonymy cluster’ code and ‘metaphor cluster’ code).
6.7 General summary and conclusion

Quantitative analysis presented in this chapter took into account the frequency, distribution and form of metonymic language uses in the focus group conversation. The presented findings illuminated a number of significant features of metonymy in talk – that it is distributed unevenly in the data, that it is intertwined with metaphor, that its behaviour in the discourse is dynamic. By identifying segments in the transcript where metonymy clusters occurred and where metonymy clusters overlapped with metaphor clusters, it was found, for example, that both phenomena were used intensively in significant places in the talk, i.e. where intense and complex issues of individual and state responsibility, agency and attitude are discussed.

This chapter considered quantitative findings about metonymy in the dynamics of the focus group. It was shown that, when identifying nouns and verbs as metonymy vehicles, the procedure, by highlighting the discrepancies in word senses on the level of lexis, was considered to be a reliable tool for identification. The chapter presented findings about metonymy with regard to word classes and studied in more detail nouns and verbs used metonymically in the focus group discussion. As pointed out in Section 6.2, an additional code ‘metonymy?’ was used 283 times in the analysis, to mark words and expressions which were ‘borderline’, and that they all belonged to one word class, pronouns. The following chapter offers an in-depth analysis of this particular word class and its relation to metonymy – it addresses the question whether pronouns can be metonymic. Quantitative findings presented in this chapter indicate that metonymy in the focus group talk is relatively frequent, which is the first empirical insight into how much language is used metonymically and a contribution to the field as there is no other information
available in metonymy research to date about metonymy frequency in other types of data or in different registers.

The chapter presented graphs showing the distribution of metonymy in the focus group talk – the text relating to the many steep points of the curve in the frequency graph involved a segment rich in metonymies and metaphors (including clusters of both). It was shown that in this segment (referred to as the ‘super-cluster’) participants discuss controversial, complex and emotional topics, related to attitudes and opinions towards the government, government policy, political behaviour, and the sense of government and individual agency in the society. This chapter showed how various agents such as government, policy, (Tony) Blair, Britain can be interpreted as metonymies in manifestations of the speakers’ attitudes to the issue of terrorism, the society and the rulers. The chapter proposed that conventionally made expressions such as (Tony) Blair, Bush and Blair and 9/11 work as cultural metonymies. The term cultural metonymy can be applied to instances where a language expression is a useful shorthand, which can be used and understood through assumed shared experience and cultural background.

The chapter referred to results from the OEC, used for tracking findings from the focus group talk to enrich the analysis. The chapter synthesised all instances of metonymy identified in the focus group talk, aiming to provide a picture of its use in the flow of discourse, including density and distribution, as well as grammatical type and form of metonymically used language. The chapter showed how new metonymy categories can emerge and studied cases of metonymy and metaphor interplay on various levels of discourse. The overall aim of the chapter aim was to present a synthesised analysis of all instances of metonymy identified when applying the procedure to the focus group talk. By going through the process of trying to identify
and investigate all instances of metonymy, more has been learned about the nature of the phenomenon. Investigating unproblematic cases identified with the proposed procedure, therefore, is a first step in the attempt to analyse all potentially metonymically used language. However, as the identification procedure is found to be sometimes insufficient in an in-depth analysis of how metonymy works in discourse, other aspects are taken into account in the analytic process. As will be shown in the next two chapters, application of the procedure to the whole discourse event points to a number of cases where metonymy seems to be involved but which require going beyond the procedure. The next two chapters, Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight, point to a number of problematic (or borderline) cases which emerged when trying to apply the procedure.

Findings presented in this chapter provide a baseline for further research which could relate outcomes of the present analysis to other findings, possibly enabling judgments about whether the numbers presented here are high or low; whether they are typical for metonymy in talk in general; and how they compare to other types of registers. Quantitative findings related to metonymy in authentic discourse could offer a way of pinning down the cognitive linguistic claims about the ubiquity of metonymy in language to more specific assertions. The need for further studies in this research area is further addressed in Chapter Nine Conclusions.
7. Pronouns and metonymy working together in discourse

7.1 Introduction

Chapter Six presented the use of metonymy in the focus group talk in quantitative terms by applying the proposed identification procedure to the whole dataset. It offered a systematic description of metonymy and a picture of its flow in discourse. The chapter considered word classes that were found to act as metonymies in the data and engaged in detail with nouns and verbs used metonymically. An additional code ‘metonymy?’ was used to mark cases which were ‘borderline’ and it was found that they all belonged to the class of pronouns.

In the analysis and identification process the personal pronouns they, we and you appeared most intriguing in terms of their relation to metonymy (Sections 7.5 – 7.7)\(^{24}\). The present chapter addresses the question of whether these pronouns can be said to be used metonymically. Using discourse analytic and corpus linguistic tools, this chapter shows how speakers in the focus group discussion use these pronouns, explores their role in discourse activity and raises the question whether they, we and you can be said to be metonymically used. The chapter also discusses pronominal shifts in discourse (narrowing or broadening scope of reference), in a discourse dynamic process labelled *metonymic shifting of pronominal reference (MSPR)*.

Section 7.2 contextualises and justifies the focus of the chapter by showing that, even though there are interesting studies of pronouns in discourse, there is little mention in the literature of the potential metonymicity of pronouns. Sections 7.3 –

\(^{24}\) The 10 occurrences of the pronoun *he* identified as metonymically used were included in Chapter Six (Section 6.3.1), as they were used anaphorically with *Blair*.  

195
7.7 present findings about pronouns in relation to metonymy from the focus group data, illustrate how the metonymy identification procedure works with pronouns in the discourse data, and indicate its limits. The role of *we*, *you* and *they* in discourse activity is discussed and it is considered whether or not some pronouns can be regarded as metonymic. The proposed identification procedure is also further validated. The findings are situated in a discourse dynamic context and the potentially metonymic pronouns are analysed from a qualitative perspective in selected text extracts.

7.2 Framework for analysis of pronouns

Pronouns express reference to nouns which would otherwise be referred to by a noun or noun phrase. In grammar (see for example Halliday 1985; Quirk, Greenbaum et al. 1985: 335), they belong to a closed word class and are believed to express determinate (i.e. specified and fixed) meaning; they are often referred to as indexical and/or deictic words. However, in discourse analysis, the belief that pronouns represent only determinate meaning is not considered to be valid (Bazzanella 2002; Bull and Fetzer 2006). In particular domains of discourse, such as political speeches or political interviews, but also in everyday naturally occurring discourse, the meaning of pronouns such as *we*, *you* or *they* can be either determinate or indeterminate. “Pronouns do not carry their own concept meaning, they get their meaning from the nouns, in whose stead they are used” (Pyykkö 2002 cited in Bull and Fetzer 2006: 5). Being polyvalent by nature, pronouns *we*, *you* and *they* have determinate meaning if their reference can be inferred from the context or if it is made clear by additional information. For example in (19), the reference of *you* used
as form of address is disambiguated by the names that follow, and it is, therefore, determinate:

(19) I'm glad that Saddam Hussein's grip on Iraq appears to have been destroyed. Thank you, Mr Bush, thank you Tony Blair (...)

On the other hand, in a sentence like example (20), the scope of reference of we is broad and indeterminate – it can mean “a colleague and I”, “a group of colleagues and I”, “the executive board of Jennings, the company” or “some or all employees and the executive board of the company”.

(20) Jennings' chairman John Rudgard said: "We believe that, if final terms can be agreed, W&DB would provide a good home for Jennings".

Studies of political and media discourse (Bull and Fetzer 2006; Leudar and Marsland 2004) show that the use of pronouns is one of the most essential language strategies. Because the domain of reference of the pronouns we, they and you, is broad and often not clear-cut, even in context, speakers can use them to good effect to achieve various discourse goals – to position themselves, to shift responsibility and reflect ideology. Also in natural, everyday talk, speakers use pronouns such as we and they to establish or negotiate positions and express identities (Bazzanella 2002; Helmbrecht 2002). The present chapter will demonstrate how, in the focus group discussion, references to Self and Other via the use of pronouns, however conscious or unconscious, indicate speakers’ involvement or distance.

Only a few studies in the metaphor and metonymy literature have addressed pronouns – a search of discussions in literature of the potential metonymicity of pronouns reveals this issue is a highly under-explored one. There are some discussions of the problem of choice of anaphoric pronouns following a metonymic
antecedent (for example Handl 2011a; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Hernandez 2001; Warren 2004). Ruiz de Mendoza claims that by looking at the implicit and explicit in a metonymic expression via (matrix) domains and sub-domains\(^{25}\), the anaphoric pronoun may be predicted, i.e. only the matrix domain is available to be interpreted as antecedent for the anaphoric pronoun. The study, however, only explicitly states that anaphoric pronouns can never be metonymic themselves (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Velasco 2002: 501). The question whether pronouns can be regarded as metonymic is usually suppressed as if it were assumed that pronouns, due to being grammatical words, cannot be used figuratively (Warren 2004).

Nunberg, on the other hand, uses the term “transfers of meaning” to describe linguistic mechanisms that make it possible to refer to different things via the same expression (Nunberg 1995). Two utterances are analysed:

\[(21) \text{ This is parked out back}\]

and

\[(22) \text{ I'm parked out back}\]

(in a situation where a customer hands his or her car key to an attendant at a car park) as involving, respectively, “deferred (indexical) reference” (reference transfer) and “predicate transfer”. Deferred (indexical) reference, illustrated by Example (21), is a process which allows a demonstrative or indexical to refer to an object that corresponds to the contextual element picked out by a demonstration or by the semantic character of the expression, while, in a predicate transfer illustrated by

\(^{25}\) Definition of (matrix) domain as used by Ruiz de Mendoza and other proponents of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory is “a body of knowledge within our conceptual system that contains and organises related ideas and experiences” (Evans and Green 2006: 14).
Example (22), the property that applies to something in one domain can sometimes be used to refer to things in another domain (Nunberg 1995: 111). Despite the lack of clarity of this differentiation (and its application for that matter), what is worth pointing out is that he also suggests that both utterances “involve” metonymy — in sentence (21) it is involved in the interpretation of *this* and in sentence (22) it is the pronoun *I*.

The aim of this chapter is to make a contribution to the neglected research area by aligning aspects of pronouns and metonymies that co-relate the two categories, i.e. complications in the way metonymy works, such as metonymic chains, interaction with ambiguities in the analyst’s interpretation of pronouns in an utterance, and cases where metonymy interacts with metaphor. By attacking especially tricky expressions found in the focus group data, the present chapter demonstrates the complexity and peculiarity of metonymies and pronouns in language use.

7.3 Pronouns and metonymy in the dynamics of discourse – analysis of findings

Of all pronouns used by the speakers, it is *we, you* and *they* (and all pronouns related to them, i.e. their reflexives, possessives, objectives and relatives) that appeared most intriguing in terms of their potential metonymicity. The following sections present analysis of these pronouns, with the aim of explaining why they appeared especially interesting. However, for the sake of validity and to avoid being overruled by preconceived, intuitive judgments about the data, initially all pronouns used by speakers were tested for potential metonymicity using the identification procedure, and those that appeared to be used clearly literally were discarded. The extracts
selected for this chapter illustrate the complications arising from aligning issues connected with how metonymy works in discourse and how pronouns are used by speakers in authentic language. The chapter also discusses instances where metaphor adds a further complicating factor in the analysis (a discourse phenomenon discussed in detail in Chapter Six, Section 6.6), as well as cases where speakers make use of the affordance of pronouns for pronominal shifts in discourse (narrowing or broadening scope of reference, however unconsciously it is done), in a process labelled *metonymic shifting of pronominal reference (MSPR)*.

**7.4 Numbers**

In the focus group discussion (transcript word count: 17,889) there are 436 uses of *you*, 213 uses of *we* and 359 uses of *they* (including their personal, possessive and reflexive form). For *they* – 36 occurrences were identified as potentially metonymic uses; For *we* – 148 occurrences; For *you* – 99 occurrences. Table 7.1 presents quantitative results for pronouns in the focus group discussion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pronoun</th>
<th>Total number of occurrences</th>
<th>Occurrences identified as potentially metonymic</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>they</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>we</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>you</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.5 They

This section discusses the pronoun *they* and the particular questions it poses for the analysis. When the proposed identification procedure was applied to *they*, it seemed plausible to conclude that it is never used metonymically in the data because the basic sense of *they* ("group of people; plural of he, she, it" as found in the Longman dictionary) is broad enough to cover any plural referent. Some of the focus group uses of *they*, however, create a strong feeling of analytical ambiguity and, for this reason, they were regarded as worth discussing. For an overview of the argument, two extracts from the focus group data are presented: Extract 7.1 where *they* is used with a metonymic antecedent and Extract 7.2 where speakers use *they* with referents that appear to be shifting.

7.5.1 *They* with a metonymic antecedent

As has been noted earlier in this chapter (Section 7.2), the question of whether anaphoric pronouns that refer to a metonymic antecedent are metonymic themselves has been neglected in metonymy scholarship. In the focus group discussion, there are several such uses of *they* and examining the data suggested that the issue is peculiar and complex.

Extract 7.1 comes from about the middle of the conversation — the moderator asks the participants a question about the government. *They* and *them* in lines 2575 and 2579 are considered for potential metonymicity.

**Extract 7.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Utterance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2568</td>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>of what <em>measures</em>, you think the <em>government</em>, might be <em>taking</em>, it doesn't <em>come across</em>, loud and clear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2569</td>
<td>MOD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2570</td>
<td>MOD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2571</td>
<td>Chris</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2572</td>
<td>Chris</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this fragment, *them* and *they* are used anaphorically to refer to *the government*.

There are two ways of analysing the use of *them* and *they*:

- **Interpretation One**

  Firstly, *the government* (line 2569) is interpreted, on the basis of the identification procedure, as metonymically used — contextual sense {group of people who govern the UK} different from the basic sense of “organisation” or “institution” but related to it by a contiguity relation because the group of people defined in the contextual sense constitute and work for the organisation/institution/agency defined in the basic sense. Once the expression has been interpreted as metonymic, the referent of *government* being plural, it seems logical not to mark *them* or *they* as metonymic on the grounds that, if a simple substitution test was provided, and *government* was replaced with a phrase (which is its referent in this fragment) like “group of people who govern the UK”, then *they*, as anaphoric to it, would be evidently literal.

- **Interpretation Two**

  *The government* in line 2569 may also be interpreted as singular, meaning {the institution that governs the UK}. In such a case, *the government* in line 2569 is not metonymic, and in the lines that follow, the speakers’ use of *they* might actually indicate a shift in their thinking — speakers are not expressing one idea with two references — they are expressing two ideas, i.e. by choosing to use the pronoun *they*
to talk about government, speakers seem to be emphasising the human element of
government – they see it as an acting group (however indeterminate) of people, not
an abstract institution. The dynamics of language and thinking involved in the
discourse is from {the institution} to {the people who comprise the institution}.
Following the second line of interpretation, them and they in lines 2575 and 2579
seem to be involved in a process that could be described as “retrospective
metonymization”, i.e. the pronouns are not metonymic themselves but they cause a
metonymic step to be taken from a mental reference to “the government”, which was
remembered from the mention of the government in line 2569; they, in such a case,
would directly refer to the people lexico-conceptually reached by the metonymic
step.

Instances like the ones shown in Extract 7.1 show two qualities of pronouns in
relation to metonymy. Firstly, sometimes, in considering the metonymicity of a
pronoun, the argument can work in two different ways. Secondly, the analysis above
shows that a way out of the dilemma is to say that metonymy is involved in the use
of the pronoun they, even though it is not entirely clear whether it lies in the
government or the pronoun they. Metonymy, it could be argued, is found to operate
dynamically in the relation between the noun (mention) and pronoun (anaphor).

7.5.2 Metonymic shifting of pronominal reference: Who is they?
In Extract 7.2, the moderator asks participants how terrorists might decide on their
actions, what their motivations might be. It will be shown in the analysis of this
extract that in fact the referent of they, as it is used by the speakers, is not constant –
rather, it shifts and can be indeterminate, allowing for multiple and dynamic
interpretations, and may involve metonymy. It will also be shown how the
identification procedure works for pronouns and how it is not always sufficient to rely only on the procedure.

_They_ in Extract 7.2 illustrates a particularly challenging aspect of pronouns in relation to metonymy. It has been noted by Steen et al. (2010), who have applied the Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP), that there are cases of metaphor which are questionable or borderline, i.e. where the procedure fails or is insufficient and, in order not to lose important data or special cases, one must go beyond the procedure.

When analysing Extract 7.2 and considering the potential metonymicity of _they_, going beyond the identification procedure was necessary for two reasons: firstly, because something peculiar about the reference of _they_ in this fragment was noticed, and secondly, because of the discourse activity, i.e. what the speaker is doing with her language in this fragment.

**Extract 7.2**

```
917 → Janet they're attacking us.
918   xx   oh yeah.
919 → xx   they are attacking us --
920 → xx   our economy as well.
921 MOD   that's very interesting.
922 MOD   i- it- it er,
923 MOD   it sort of predicts this question in a way,
924 MOD   but how --
925 MOD   .. how do you think,
926 → MOD the terrorists decide on their actions?
927 → Janet they want to hurt us.
928 → Janet .. they want to hurt the West,
929 → Janet .. they want to,
930 → Janet .. change our lifestyle,
931 → Janet they want us,
932 Janet to be more humble,
933 Janet and erm,
934 → Janet .. they want us to live like they do.
935 MOD   ...(2.0) does anyone else have a thought
936 MOD   [on that] ?
937 → Janet [all of us ]would be wearing burkas,
938 → Janet if they had their way.
939 → MOD   ...(3.0) how do they decide,
940 → MOD   on what they do?
```
Working with the identification procedure entails the steps of inferring a contextual sense of each use of *they* in this extract; checking for a more basic sense; and, finally, comparing the two senses. The basic sense of *they* is "group of people" (dictionary entry for *they* is "those ones – used as third person pronoun serving as the plural of he, she, or it or referring to a group of two or more individuals"). The basic sense of *they*, therefore, is broad enough to account for almost any usage in which it refers to a group of individuals, covering people in general, and all kinds of groups of people, however unspecific and unidentified. It could, therefore, also be applicable to any contextual sense (or referent). For this reason, when, in the next step of the procedure, the contextual sense and the basic sense were compared for all instances of *they* in Extract 7.2, it had to be concluded that the two senses are not distinct.

Corpus search results for *they* support this view. It would be difficult to argue that contextual senses of *they* in any of the concordances that were analysed are distinct from the basic sense of the pronoun. The definition of *they* found in dictionaries shows a basic meaning general enough to encompass all referents and it accounts for all citations that were looked at in the corpus. Relying, in the analysis of pronouns in the discourse dynamics, only on the identification procedure, would mean no instances of *they* could be marked as metonymically used. However, the main aim of the present research was to analyse the discourse dynamics of metonymy in talk, which allows for analysing all possible dimensions of metonymy, its workings and mechanisms, and processes involved.

Analysis of *they* in Extract 7.2 provides a number of insights about the other dimension of metonymy in discourse, which is beyond the identification procedure – it reveals metonymy involved in dynamic reference-shifting, which is a kind of
metonymic process in the dynamics of discourse. It could be argued that the analysis presented here points to another kind of metonymy, different from the kind for which steps of the procedure work in a straightforward way. As will be shown at the end of this section, it is the other kind of metonymy that is the most challenging and at the same time core to a proper understanding of this complex phenomenon. The discourse dynamic approach allows for the analysis to go beyond the steps of the procedure and to investigate the other levels and dimensions of metonymy - looking at processes, shifts and movement in the developing discourse.

Already in the first four lines (lines 917 - 920), Janet achieves the effect of a strong opposition between they with the contextual sense or referent {terrorists} and us with the contextual sense or referent {the society; the people in the West} through her use of literal, metonymic and metaphorical vocabulary. In the next lines, she is still expressing her opinions and ideas connected with terrorism and she achieves the effect of a very strong division between, no longer just terrorists and the rest of the society, but also between Western society and non-Western society. The process of positioning herself inside one group of the society and against another is marked by metonymy. Janet creates a division between first them {terrorists} and us {people who are attacked} (line 917); then she specifies us by linking it to the West (lines 927 – 928). Then she mentions burkas which is a metonymic social marker. However, burkas are in fact a distinctive attribute for Muslim women and not terrorists. Wearing a burka, in this fragment, through a process of metonymy, comes to mean {living like a Muslim} and, because of this shift, when Janet says (in line 934) they want us to live like they do, it is no longer clear whether they still means {terrorists} or whether its reference has shifted to another group of people, i.e. {people from the non-Western/Muslim world}, which would also be another
contextual sense. It is an affordance of the pronoun *they* that its reference can shift, it can be vague or implicit. However, with the data analysed in this research, it was not possible to check how speakers in the discussion perceive and process metonymies and, for this reason, judgements about issues such as vagueness were based on analyst’s interpretation of the language used rather than on feedback from participants.

The dynamic shift is from one pronoun to another pronoun or, in other words, from one referent of *they* to another in a discourse dynamic process which I labelled *metonymic shifting of pronominal reference* (MSPR). The contextual senses (or referents) of the pronoun *they* are dynamic, shifting, and context-dependent to such extent that their interpretation may actually vary from speaker to speaker and from hearer to hearer, depending on factors coming from multiple dynamic interconnected systems (Cameron 2010b; Gibbs and Cameron 2008; Larsen-Freeman and Cameron 2008). Metonymic shifting of pronominal reference involving shifting or chaining of referents within one pronoun is a discourse dynamic metonymic process – arguably, however, *they* acts metonymically not just because its reference is shifting – it is because the shifts consist of contiguity links, which change dynamically in the discourse, i.e. from *they* linked to {terrorists} in line 926, through *they* linked to {people wearing burkas associated with terrorists or fundamentalists}, to *they* linked to {the Muslim world}. These affordances allow the reasoning to proceed – expanding from terrorists, to people wearing burkas (associated with terrorists and/or fundamentalists) or the Muslim world, and contributing to the strong sense of *us* and *them* opposition that is quite strong in this fragment and that emerges as a theme at a higher level across the data. The indeterminacy or vagueness of *they*, the way its reference often seems to be shifting in this discussion and the metonymic process
involved in the shifting and movement across the chain of pronouns, are the reasons to regard uses of *they* such as in lines 927 – 938 as metonymic, despite the fact that such analytic decision means going beyond the identification procedure and engaging with analysis of discourse dynamics of items such as pronouns beyond the level of lexis, which involves analysing dynamic processes, such as shifting referents.

### 7.5.3 Final comments on *they*

The identification procedure, which was itself an important research goal (Chapter Five), proved to be a useful tool, working in a straightforward way for a vast majority of words and phrases, which were identified as metonymies following the steps of the procedure. Such cases could be regarded as one type of metonymy, i.e. the relatively straightforward and unambiguous type. Analysis of *they* in Extract 7.1 and 7.2 suggested, however, another type of metonymy – a type which is involved in processes of language and reasoning rather than in the lexis; a type which is itself a process in the dynamics of discourse seen as a system within other interconnected systems, such as the dynamic shifting of referents (from noun to pronoun or, in the process labelled *metonymic shifting of pronominal reference* (MSPR), from pronoun to pronoun), changing contextual senses and chaining of referents.

Analysing metonymy as a process leads, arguably, to better understanding of the phenomenon. Another dimension of metonymy is revealed when an attempt is made at investigating more than one-to-one relations (between entities, concepts, referents or basic vs. contextual meanings), i.e. when tracking the dynamic shifting of referents and other dynamic processes in the discourse. It was shown that the use of *they* by the focus group speakers is complex, and reasons for marking some uses
of *they* as metonymy were explained. If such instances of *they* were discarded, an important part of the analysis of how metonymy works in discourse would, arguably, be missed.

As Section 7.5 has shown, sole use of the identification procedure would have missed instances of metonymy vitally important for advancing the study of metonymy in discourse. Analysis of pronouns and of the complex dynamic discourse processes involved points to what lies at the heart of metonymy. *Metonymic shifting of pronominal reference*, as was shown for the pronoun *they* in Section 7.5, is an example of the kind of movement and dynamics that is an intrinsic feature of the discourse dynamics framework and the perspective of complex dynamic systems (Cameron 2010b; Gibbs and Cameron 2008; Larsen-Freeman and Cameron 2008).

Uses of *they* in Extract 7.2 serve specific discourse functions and the types of discourse activity in which the speaker uses the pronoun are interesting. When considering the potential metonymicity of pronouns — given their indexical and referential nature, there seems to be a contrast between the lexical and grammatical level, on which the identification procedure relies, and the conceptual level, on which the possible thinking processes behind the specific language use and the discourse activity taking place can be analysed. On the level of lexis, which is picked by the identification procedure, *they* operates as a pronoun, but its reference; as this section has shown, can extend, shift or be multi-layered.

When examining the whole transcript, a tendency among the speakers to create very strong divisions between *us* and *them* was observed. The referents of pronouns involved in creating the sense of division shift: sometimes *us* refers to people in the West or non-Muslim people and *them* — to terrorists and the Muslim people; and sometimes *us* means {people in the society} and *them* refers to
Both they and we serve a specific discourse function and are found in different kinds of discourse activity. Through the use of they and we (sometimes literal and sometimes metonymic), speakers achieve the effect of positioning themselves in the society, among and against other groups of people, and in relation to authoritative bodies such as the government.

It seems plausible to say that, as observed in Extract 7.2, the choice of pronouns by the speakers serves specific discourse functions in the discourse activity they are used in – through a combination of metonymic reasoning processes evident in the language used, including the pronouns, the language becomes extremely affective. The words used in this fragment do not have a particularly affective force in isolation but when they are interpreted in context, both the metonymically used vocabulary in this fragment and the instances of non-metonymic they, emerge as important for conveying the effect of a strong contrast between groups of people and for the discourse activity they are used in, i.e. expression of attitude in general and participants contextualising themselves in the society and in a world where terrorism has become a universal and omnipresent issue.

7.6 We

The scope of reference of the pronoun we is significantly large and it is often difficult to establish. Linguists recognise up to eight types of uses of we. Based on Quirk, they are the following (Quirk, Greenbaum et al. 1985: 350, cited in Inigo-Mora 2004: 33-34):

- Generic: it is an "enlarged" inclusive "we" which may include the whole human race;
• Inclusive authorial: it is used in serious writing and seeks to involve the reader in a joint enterprise;

• Editorial: it is used by a single individual in scientific writing in order to avoid an egoistic “I”;

• Rhetorical: it is used in the collective sense of “the nation”, “the party”; It may be viewed as a special type of generic “we”;

• To refer to the hearer (= you): it is normally used by doctors when talking to a patient and by teachers when giving instructions to students; It is an inclusive “we” used to sound condescending in the case of doctors and non-authoritative in the case of teachers;

• To refer to a third person (= s/he): For example one secretary might say to another with reference to their boss: “We’re in a bad mood today”

• Royal: it is virtually obsolete and is used by a monarch;

• Nonstandard: plural “us” used for the singular “me”: “lend us a fiver”;

• The pronoun we provides the affordance to show loose or vague reference, as well as, rhetorically, to conceal or shift responsibility.

In the domain of political discourse, we is often used strategically to display involvement or the lack of it\(^\text{26}\), to equivocate, i.e. intentionally imprecise language.

In natural social interaction, we plays a key role in establishing group membership, i.e. its use by speakers expresses distance or solidarity with others – as noted in Section 7.5, references to Self as we and Other as they, whether determinate or indeterminate, create a sense of opposition. Nunberg recognised that in utterances

\(^{26}\) Selective use of pronouns, i.e. choosing to use ‘we’ over ‘I’ is called ‘footing’ (Bull and Fetzer 2006: 9).
like "We are parked out back" (used by a couple handing car keys to an attendant at a car park; his example), there is a metonymic operation involved (Nunberg 1995: 110). This resonates with the findings of the thesis which point to the process-like nature of metonymy involved in the dynamics of talk and in particular in metonymic shifting of pronominal reference (MSPR). Nunberg does not explain precisely how metonymy is involved, but the interpretation could be that we, in this utterance, means "the car we own, our car" and so there is a difference between the basic sense of we and its contextual sense, and their relationship is based on contiguity. Bull and Fetzer (2006: 15) claim that in everyday interactions, understanding of we is usually unambiguous because context and contextual cues let speakers arrive at a shared understanding of the pronoun and its referents.

7.6.1 The discourse dynamics of we

The present section shows that in the discourse event of the focus group discussion the referents of we (as well as they) are sometimes ambiguous, sometimes metonymic, and sometimes they shift, as ideas and reasoning develop. Even though speakers gradually build common language resources to talk about particular events or actions, the expressions they use often allow for multiple interpretations. In the discourse dynamic framework, a conversation like the focus group discussion is perceived as a dynamic discourse event, influenced by various forces, such as the speakers' need to justify opinions and attitudes, and their need, often unconscious, to position themselves among other members of the society.

In the focus group data, we can often be interpreted as metonymic and the analysis of we also involves multiple steps, including the investigation of the interplay of metonymy with metaphor in utterances which contain we. To discuss the use of we
by speakers in the focus group discussion and its (potential) metonymicity, two extracts from the transcript are used, with focus on such uses of we in the data which were classified as potentially metonymic and which raised questions due to their complexity from a discourse analytic perspective, just as was found for they in Section 7.5.

Extract 7.3 is taken from the middle of the discussion. The participants are now responding to the moderator's question about the role of the government – what the government is doing, what measures it is taking and whether the focus group feel the government wants ordinary people to be doing anything differently (from a few years earlier).

Extract 7.3

2808→ Molly we should still be sceptical,
2809 Molly a bit,
2810 Molly but,
2811 Molly I don't know,
2812 Molly how I feel about,
2813 Molly .. the war in Iraq,
2814 Molly what the motivations were.
2815 Molly I still feel there must be --
2816 Molly there must be something,
2817 Molly that's has been held back,
2818 Molly the reasons why,
2819→ Molly we went to .. Iraq,
2820→ Molly that we haven't been--
2821→ Molly .. that hasn't been shared with us.
2822 Molly I can't just see any other reason,
2823→ Molly why we would go in.
2824 Molly apart from oil,
2825 Molly I just can't see.

In Extract 7.4 the same topic continues – the role of the government and other agents responsible for making decisions about security of the the country. The moderator has asked the speakers another question – whether they think there are ways in which the threat is exaggerated or played down by the government or by the media.

213
In the following discussion of *we*, the sense of belonging to Western society, which was identified in Section 7.5, is retained, and focus here is on showing how speakers in the focus group discussion use the pronoun *we* to situate themselves within society and in relation to other entities, such as political bodies.
The Longman Dictionary (Longman 2009) lists the following senses for we:

- I and the rest of a group that includes me;
- you and I;
- you and I and another or others;
- I and another or others not including you.

All senses in Longman are included as one entry, which means they must be regarded as variants of the same sense, and they are all equally basic. In Extract 7.3, we is used 5 times by Molly, and in Extract 7.4 it is used 12 times by 3 speakers (Liz, Molly and Janet). This section shows what happens when the metonymy identification procedure is applied to these instances of we.

In line 2808 Molly says we should be sceptical. The contextual meaning of this utterance may be at least twofold – we may mean {I and the other people in the focus group} or {I and other (groups of) people in the society}. However, despite the ambiguity (from the analyst’s perspective), both potential contextual senses of we are covered by the dictionary definition quoted above, and that is why in this line we is non-metonymic. In line 2819, however, when Molly says we went to Iraq she could not possibly have been included as an actor or agent in the action she is talking about. As pointed out in Chapter Six, Section 6.6.2, when Molly says we in line 2819, she actually refers to the decision-making bodies in her country who decided on sending troops to Iraq and possibly the troops themselves. This sense can by no means include Molly so it is different from the basic sense of we. It resonates with one of the uses of the pronouns we distinguished by Quirk (1985: 350, cited in Inigo-Mora 2004: 33-34).

In metonymy, the relationship between the contextual sense and the basic sense must be based on contiguity. It seems that in this case, metonymicity of we is
conditioned by the interpretation of the whole utterance as used by the speaker, i.e. the fact that the speaker says *we went to Iraq* reflects her strong feeling of connection between the decision making bodies of the country and its people. Even though it was the country as political entity that entered the state of war and was sending troops to Iraq, it affected the whole society so much that some of its members (like Molly) talk about it as if they were themselves included in the decisions and actions, i.e. they express a democratic representation of the country and themselves as members of its society. Section 6.6.2 (Chapter Six), which focused on the interplay of metonymy and metaphor, showed how the metonymic uses of *we* recur in the focus group discussion and how such uses are usually affective – metonymic uses of *we* play an important role in establishing attitude and identity, especially the feeling of belonging to a particular social group. For example, one of the speakers, Liz, in line 1962, says: *we’ve exploited, we used to exploit in India* – Liz uses *we* to talk about what the British Empire used to do in the past – she could not have been included as actor/agent in those actions and the British Empire no longer exists, so the contextual sense of *we* is distinct from its basic sense in these uses, and the relation between them is based on contiguity as the two senses involve the referent “society”. The language used by speaker in this utterance reflects how metonymies develop naturally in the course of discourse activity as part of how speakers reason with them. It could also, arguably, be assumed a conventional way of speaking about the country, with the generic use of *we* recognised by Quirk (1985: 350, cited in Inigo-Mora 2004: 33-34). Figure 7.1 shows diagrams illustrating the referents (or contextual senses) of *we* in *we’ve exploited, we used to exploit in India* and in *we went to Iraq*. 

216
Figure 7.1 Representation of we and its referents (or contextual senses) in: we've exploited, we used to exploit in India (top); and we went to Iraq (bottom)

The bottom diagram in Figure 7.1 shows the relations between the possible referents of we in we went to Iraq (line 2819): there is no direct link between the basic sense of we ("you and I") and the contextual sense/referent {the troops sent to Iraq}. The two senses, however, are circled inside another possible referent of we {the country as political entity}, which provides contiguity links and, as a result, shared background for {you and I} and {the troops sent to Iraq} to be connected. The top diagram in Figure 7.1 shows the relations between the possible referents and the contiguity relations between the senses of we in we've exploited, we used to exploit (line 1962): the link between the basic sense of we (you and I) and the contextual sense or referent {the British Empire} is provided by the shared background sense of we {the society}.

217
7.6.2 We in the OEC

To investigate *go to Iraq* further, it was tracked in the OEC. The search retrieved 1500 citations, which is a much smaller number than 12000 citations for *go to war*. However, given the timescales to which these two expressions could potentially refer, it is clear that *go to war* can be used to describe events that stretch much further into the past than *go to Iraq*, which is used to refer to relatively recent events.

The search was then limited to those citations which included the pronoun *we*, to see how *we* is used with *go to Iraq*. The search retrieved 88 citations. Due to the great size of the OEC, the result was regarded as grounds to assume that the expression *we + go to Iraq* is not yet a conventionalised expression. In most of the 88 corpus citations, however, *we* was found to be used in a similar way to how speakers of the focus group discussion, i.e. involving metonymy.

When tracked in the OEC, the pronoun *we* in collocation with *go to war*, has over one thousand citations which suggests it is a conventionalised way of talking about military action in English. A random sample of one hundred citations was used to check whether *we* in the phrase is used metonymically or not. Given the basic sense of the pronoun *we*, it is only in the case of military sources (based on the text classification used in the OEC, see left-hand column of the OEC concordance in Figure 7.2) that the pronoun can actually be used literally with *go to war*. Figure 7.2 shows an OEC concordance extract of a sample of one hundred citations of *we + go to war* from the OEC which were analysed. In most of the citations, *we* is used in the same way as it is used by speakers in the focus group discussion, i.e. with metonymy involved.
Figure 7.2 OEC citations for the expression \textit{we + go to war}

Figure 7.2 shows a screenshot of twenty citations from a sample of one hundred citations of \textit{we + go to war}. In most of the citations, as analysis reveals, \textit{we} involves metonymy. For example, the first two citations:

(23) \begin{quote} 
\textit{I was kind of worried because we were actually mixing it* the day we went to war}. (*it refers to a music album)
\end{quote}

and

(24) \begin{quote} 
\textit{We are often told we must go to war because some swarthy foreign head of state is not a big fan of the U.S. president.}
\end{quote}

In both examples, there are contiguity relations between the possible contextual senses of \textit{we} \{the country as political entity\} and/or \{the society\}, and the basic sense of \textit{we} \{you and I\}. 

219
7.6.3 Final comments on we

A context such as a focus group, in which speakers are members of the general public, is more spontaneous than a political debate or speech and it is interesting to see how speakers who had not known each other before the discourse event (the focus group discussion) come to use common language as a tool in context where the difficult issues of terrorism and war are discussed. As was shown in Chapter Six (for example Section 6.5.3), speakers engaged in talking-and-thinking (Cameron 2003, 2010b) affect each other's ideas and language, which includes the metonymic expressions used to express attitudes and experience As the conversation proceeds, slow building of common ground and common resources can be observed – speakers start referring to the same events using the same vocabulary, the same lexicocentric pacts (Cameron 2007b, 2010b).

Section 7.6 showed how the pronoun we (as was the case for they in Section 7.5), is used by speakers to position themselves in relation to the government. It was shown that we, like they, allows for multiple interpretation. Examples involved cases of metonymy and metaphor interplay in discourse, in which metaphor added a further dimension and another possibility of interpretation of an utterance. In discourse dynamics, expressions which involve such interplay may become lexicocentric pacts established by participants. The discourse levels on which metonymic processes involved in speakers' use of the pronoun we seem to operate, presented a challenge for the analysis in the present research. As in the case of they in Section 7.5, analysis of we also revealed metonymy which is not captured by the identification procedure. It was shown how metonymy is involved in processes of language and reasoning rather than in the lexis.
Section 7.6 has also shown, similarly to Section 7.5, that a key part of analysis would have been missed if the issue of pronouns had not been pursued. Pronouns seem to require a more specific approach than following steps of the (or an!) identification procedure – they require going beyond the procedure and inferring possible correlating contextual meanings and tracking the metonymic shifts between them. Alternatively, the identification procedure could be re-formulated for pronouns in a way which allows the contiguity relationship between the basic meaning and the contextual meaning to rely not on the basic dictionary sense as it stands but rather on an entity or entities in the context which are directly referred to. Arguably, however, the finding about the complexity of metonymy observed in the analysis of pronouns may be more important than trying to develop the identification procedure. A discourse dynamic analysis of we in the complex relations between its senses (or referents) and the dynamic processes involved reveals findings which may contribute to the understanding of what lies at the heart of metonymy and which may advance the study of metonymy in discourse. In the case of we in we went to Iraq discussed above, the contiguity relation is not really directly based on the basic sense as such – it can surely first be worked out who, i.e. what referent or entity, the “I” and perhaps “you” (in the dictionary entry) are in the specific context, which then allows for the further metonymic steps based on those specific entities.

7.7 You

Self- and Other-references as well as address forms are firmly anchored to the pronominal system (Bull and Fetzer 2006: 1, 4-12). You is the pronoun used to express reference to second-person singular and plural. As has been mentioned earlier (Section 7.2), pronouns, including you, are considered to be context-
dependent indexical expressions, i.e. their interpretation is tightly linked to the context they are used in. On the other hand, pronominal reference with *you* may express meaning that is either determinate or indeterminate due to its affordance as a generic pronoun which can denote a large scope of reference in general. In fact, it is frequently difficult or impossible to distinguish between the personal and generic *you*, and context does not provide enough information or feedback about what the pronoun refers to. The affordance of the pronoun *you* to be used determinately and indeterminately, and to shift reference in the dynamics of discourse, appears to be of great importance, especially where speakers engage in the discourse activity of negotiating positions and identities.

### 7.7.1 Who is *you*?

In the focus group discussion, the referents of *you* are sometimes vague in the sense that they allow for multiple interpretations. This does not seem, however, to cause confusion among the participants, which is evidence that meanings are established dynamically by participants. The departure point for the analysis of *you* in the present research, as was the case with the other pronouns analysed in this section, was the identification procedure and the question of whether *you* can be considered metonymic.

A definition of *you* found in the Longman Dictionary (Longman 2009) includes the following senses:

- used to refer to a person or group of people when speaking or writing to them;
- people in general.
It would be very difficult to claim that the first sense is more basic than the second – when *you* is used as a generic pronoun, to refer to people in general, it often also includes the first sense, i.e. the person who is addressed or involved in the discourse event.

This section first shows two extracts (7.5 and 7.6) from the focus group data. The extracts illustrate cases where the pronoun *you* serves the function of establishing a speaker’s position and making a connection with the rest of the speakers. The presented analysis considers whether *you* can be said to be used metonymically in such instances and explains why it is difficult to make a definitive decision. It is observed, however, that there are a few passages in the focus group discussion, where *you* seems to be playing a specific role in the speakers’ thinking, which, arguably, involves metonymic reasoning. This is illustrated in Extract 7.7.

**Extract 7.5**

| 309 | Amy | we've just come back from Thailand, |
| 310 | Amy | with my boyfriend, |
| 311 | Amy | and, |
| 312 | Amy | .. as you're going in, |
| 313 | Amy | you had to put everything, |
| 314 | Amy | like you couldn't take any tweezers, |
| 315 | Amy | no lighters, |
| 316 | Amy | no batteries, |

**Extract 7.6**

| 1181 | Fiona | I went to New York, |
| 1182 | Fiona | a-- |
| 1183 | Fiona | a month ago, |
| 1184 | Fiona | and I had to take my shoes and belt off. |
| 1185 | Janet | they make take your belt off, |
| 1186 | Janet | and your coat, |
| 1187 | Janet | [as well], |
| 1188 | Liz | [yes your coat], |
| 1189 | Janet | coats, |
| 1190 | Janet | all your jewellery, |
Extract 7.5 comes from early on in the conversation. The focus group participants are responding to a question from the moderator about situations in which the subject of terrorism comes up in their everyday life – who they talk to about terrorism and what prompts the subject. Extract 7.6 comes from a bit later and here speakers are talking about what effect the threat of terrorism has had on people. In both extracts, speakers first use other pronouns and then switch to you.

In extract 7.5, Amy uses we in line 309, and in line 310 she makes it clear who the pronoun refers to (“with my boyfriend”). Amy introduces, therefore, a specific situation, with specific agents. However, in the next lines, she switches immediately to you. The pronoun you as used in lines 312-314 shifts even further – in line 312 it is used with the present tense and in 313-314 with the past tense. Even though Amy is still describing exactly the same event, there is a shift in her choice of pronouns and, possibly, their reference. The agents in the situation Amy is describing could still only actually involve people who where there, at the airport, at the specific time. By choosing to use the generic you (“anybody” or “people in general”) and the present tense, Amy expands reference of the phrase, i.e. the situation she describes changes to a more common scenario. But in 313-314, Amy switches back to the past tense to describe what happened to her, so the pronoun you
is used to talk about the *we* in line 309. Amy's experience cannot include the people she is talking to, which is, potentially, a reason to assume that such uses of *you* involve metonymy. As is the case of *we* in utterances such as *we used to exploit* and *we went to Iraq*, in lines 313-314 there is a step from *you* in its generic sense to a sense in which *you* is used to talk about personal experience (referring to the same subject as *we* in 309 in describing an event in the past). Therefore, it could be argued that, within the generic sense of *you*, there is a difference between its basic and contextual senses but there is still some relationship between them, i.e. they are still in the domain of people and their potential common experience/known scenarios.

The effect Amy achieves via this *metonymic shifting of pronominal reference (MSPR)*, combined with the shifting of tense, is that of generalising her own experience. She tells a story about a specific situation which took place in the place and, presumably, included specific agents (as well as actions and setting), but, because of the specific language used to tell the story, the story functions as a *typifying scenario*[^27] (Myers 1999, 2007, 2008), which is a description of a generalised situation, events and experience. The tenses used by the speaker and the pronouns acting potentially metonymically allow for the generalisation by suggesting typical recognisable events and actions.

In extract 7.6, three speakers are engaging in similar discourse activity – their use of the pronoun *you* plays a key role in building shared experience – speakers add their own experience, building on each other’s experience, and establishing their position within the focus group. In line 1181 Fiona is talking about what happened to her in the past, and she uses the personal pronoun *I* to talk about the situation. However, Janet in lines 1185-1186 immediately adds her own knowledge about the

[^27]: Myers's notion of typification, and *typifying scenarios* are explored in more detail in Chapter Eight.
scenario Fiona described, and she uses you. She immediately expresses a bond, therefore, with Fiona or also shifts reference. The agent shifts from an individual, Fiona, to people in general, in the typical scenario they are talking about (that of being searched at airports as a result of terrorism). The third speaker, Liz, adds to this, now shared, experience, by using your in line 1186. In line 1192 she uses we to tell specifically about what happened to her and her family, but then again uses you in 1202 and 1207.

When considering the potential metonymicity of you, as analysis of extracts 7.5 shows, a metonymic interpretation may in some cases be claimed viable, but it is usually only one of all possible interpretations. What seems evident, however, is that the pronoun you shows an affordance to allow for shifts in reference (metonymic shifting of pronominal reference) as well as shifts in ideas. Dynamic forces present in any social interaction, such as the need to bond and build solidarity with others in a group, prompt speakers to use the affordance of pronouns. Through the use of the discourse marker you know and the use of the pronoun you in its generic sense, the speakers in this extract achieve a strong feeling of belonging to the same social group. This use of you is a pattern in the focus group discussion, i.e. there are many passages in which speakers use the pronoun you in a similar, typifying, way. Extract 7.7, however, illustrates yet another way in which you is used.

**Extract 7.7**

1733 Janet the Palestinians actually,
1734 Janet have a .. good cause to be angry.
1735 Janet and,
1736 Janet erm,
1737 Janet they've been persecuted,
1738 Janet for a long long time,
1739 Janet .. and,
1740 → Janet nobody took any notice,
1741 Janet .. of their .. cry.
1742 Janet and,
.. what happens, when you put somebody in a corner, they start to fight.
and they're fighting dirty, an-
not all the, the er bombers are, erm, ...(1.0) from Palestine, but I think a lot of grief,
... and a lot of anger's, stemmed from that area.
and,
[SIREN OUTSIDE] [probably a lot of recruitment, has come, from,
young Palestinians, because they have no hope],
and when you take away somebody's hope,
then you take away their life.

The participants are now responding to the moderator’s question about whether they can imagine how the situation has changed for other groups. Notably, then, it may be expected that a strong opposition between Self and Other, in the sense of us and them, will be emerging. Janet, however, seems to be empathising with the Other. She explains why some groups (Palestinians) might have reasons to be angry (i.e. engage in terrorism) and, in her reasoning, she uses the pronoun you in lines 1744, 1762, 1763. Through the use of you to describe the scenario of “putting somebody in the corner” and “taking away somebody’s hope”, Janet achieves the effect of a typifying scenario, through which she appeals to and evokes recognised feelings and experiences, and brings the listeners closer to understanding the Others (Palestinians). Such scenarios and the metonymies and metonymic processes involved play a significant role in construction and co-construction of reasoning in discourse dynamics (Cameron and Seu 2012). By being willing to try to understand and explain reasons for terrorism, she makes a gesture of empathy towards the Other (Cameron 2010a). It is not clear whether you in the generic sense (people in general) refers to as much as the entire humanity or the Western world (line 1740 nobody
took notice of their cry) or the major enemy of Palestine, i.e. Israel – it is not possible to say for certain who puts the Palestinians “in the corner” (as Janet says in line 1744) or who “takes away their hope” (line 1762). The affordance of you in this extract to refer to different agents allows movement in the discourse activity by letting the speaker develop the ideas she expresses. In line 1744 as well as 1740, 1762 and 1763, the speaker uses highly metaphorical language to express her thoughts and attitudes. The metaphors add to a scenario in which somebody actively involved in violence is described as a victim who is put in a corner and deprived of hope, so that their reasons for violence or being angry appear to be, at least to some extent, justified. Through the use of you in these sentences (and not, for example, they) and formulating her ideas by employing common metaphorical scenarios, the problem of the Palestinians is aligned with the rest of the society and a form of empathy is expressed by the speaker. The language used by the speaker in this utterance reflects how ambiguous, and possibly metonymic, senses of pronouns develop naturally in the course of the discourse event and how speakers reason with these multiple pronominal references.

7.7.2 Final comments on you

This section engaged with how speakers achieve a level of familiarity and shared experience as the focus group conversation proceeds, so that there seems to be no confusion among the group about the understanding of the pronoun you, however indeterminately it is used. This section showed instances of speakers’ use of the pronoun you, where it was chosen over another, nominal or pronominal, expression, i.e. where a speaker shifts from using I to you, or where two or three speakers negotiate the choice of pronoun.
A number of studies analyse how pronouns can be used strategically by speakers – in the domain of political discourse and in the language of the Parliamentary community in general (Bull and Fetzer 2006; Inigo-Mora 2004; Leudar and Marsland 2004). In authentic discourse, as this section showed, pronouns such as you, also often serve similar functions, even though it seems plausible to assume that it is more likely to be done subconsciously by speakers engaging in a discourse event. The affordance of the pronoun you to shift reference, in the process of metonymic shifting of pronominal reference, which was analysed in this section, corresponds to the analysis of they and we in earlier sections. All these pronouns play a role in the discourse activity of negotiating positions and establishing identity. It was shown that the pronoun you plays a crucial role in describing scenarios and telling stories. It was shown how, in the discourse dynamics, a scenario or a story, told with the use of the pronoun you, can become a typifying scenario (Myers 1999, 2007, 2008) through processes which involve metonymy. It was shown that the pronoun you is also involved in discourse actions such as making gestures of empathy, as it plays a role in aligning groups of people (e.g. Palestinians aligned with any other people in extract 7.7).

Similarly to they and we the discourse levels on which the pronoun you needs to be analysed, presented a challenge for the analysis. The shifting of pronouns and tenses, as well as the metonymic shifts of pronominal reference, described in Section 7.7, similarly to sections 7.5 and 7.6, point to the state of flux, intrinsic to dynamic systems. The observed typifying scenarios seem to exhibit workings of metonymy which are complex and difficult to capture. The typifying scenarios seem, however, also to reveal aspects of metonymy which may help understand the core of it.
Typifying scenarios and their relation to metonymy are analysed in detail in Chapter Eight.

7.8 General summary and conclusion

This chapter considered findings about pronouns and metonymy in the discourse dynamics of the focus group discussion. The main purpose of this chapter was to describe the use of pronouns they, we and you by the focus group and to address the question whether such pronouns can be metonymic. In the analysis and identification process these pronouns appeared most intriguing in terms of their potential metonymicity – they, we and you were found to show the affordance to be used either determinately or indeterminately, to shift between referents, thus contributing to the discourse activity and local discourse action by allowing speakers to make strategic use (either conscious or not) of their language. Extracts presented in this chapter were used to discuss the role of we, you and they in discourse activity and to consider whether or not some pronouns can be regarded as metonymic. The findings, situated in a discourse dynamic context and the potentially metonymic pronouns were analysed from a qualitative perspective in selected text extracts.

Metonymy was found to operate dynamically in the mention-anaphor relations between nouns and pronouns, as was the case for they with a metonymic antecedent. Metonymy was also found to operate in the dynamic shifting from one pronoun to another pronoun (i.e. between the shifting referents of the same pronoun), in a processes labelled metonymic shifting of pronominal reference (MSPR). The shifting of referents is an intrinsic feature of dynamic systems and the processes of metonymy involved in the shifting are an important part of the complex dynamic processes in the discourse. The complex processes, such as those involving pronouns
(analysed in this chapter) and scenarios (analysed in detail in the following chapter),
can be considered as core to metonymy seen as a process in discourse, significant in
the dialogic and dynamic construction (and co-construction) of reasoning, further
explored in Chapter Eight.

Trying to apply the proposed identification procedure to the analysis of
pronouns was only a starting point for the analysis presented in this chapter. The
focal finding of the chapter was that a vital part of the analysis would have been
missed, if it had not been stretched beyond the procedure. This chapter pointed to
metonymy involved in dynamic discourse processes which cannot be captured by the
procedure, showing what lies at the heart of metonymy, i.e. its complex, dynamic,
context- and process-dependent nature. It was explained that for some instances of
metonymy it was necessary to go beyond the identification procedure because of a
contrast between different levels of analysis that must be taken into account: the
lexical and grammatical levels, on which the identification procedure relies; the
conceptual level, which incorporates the thinking processes behind the specific
language use; and, finally, the level of the discourse activity taking place. The
contrast has implications for future research pertaining to the adequacy of an
identification procedure for metonymy in the particular case of pronouns. It was
suggested that in future research the procedure could possibly be amended for
pronouns. It was explained, however, that the category requires a different approach,
such as that applied in this thesis, in which the identification procedure needs to be
over-ruled and its role is primarily that of revealing the particularity of some
categories (such as pronouns).

The chapter explored the complexities and particularities of pronouns in
relation to metonymy and analysed the important strategic functions of pronouns in
language and discourse activity. It was shown that the affordance of pronouns *they*, *we* and *you*, to be used determinately and indeterminately, and to shift reference in the dynamics of discourse, is of great importance, especially where speakers engage in the discourse activity of negotiating positions and identities, and of empathising. The language used by speakers in the cited extracts showed how ambiguous, and possibly metonymic, senses of pronouns develop in the course of the discourse event, thus revealing how speakers may be, arguably, thinking and developing their argument through metonymy.

Throughout the analysis, the discourse dynamics framework was used to analyse how speakers influence each other in on-line discussion – what one speaker says at some point of the discourse event may influence other participants’ language and ideas. Phrases such as *we went to Iraq* which involve a special affordance of pronouns and a form of metonymy and metaphor interplay, emerge on the micro level of the discourse event, over the course of minutes, but they are also anchored in larger systems in the society, i.e. there are other dimensions and timescales of discourse which affect the language people in the focus group discussion use, for example the language of the media popularises some expressions over others and people might be, unconsciously, influenced by particular forms of expressions they hear on the radio. Examination of language used by speakers involved in interaction in a given discourse event, however, shows that people also build common vocabulary and come to share words and phrases to talk about events, attitudes and ideas. Lexico-conceptual pacts (Cameron 2007b, 2010b) are formed between some or all of the participants as they engage in talking-and-thinking (Cameron and Maslen 2010) in a discourse event, and pronouns, used metonymically and literally,
play a role both in building and negotiating such pacts and in the discourse activity that the speakers are engaged in.

The analysis of *they, we* and *you* has shown that the phenomena of metonymy requires an approach which underpins its multi-layered and process-like dynamic nature. The analysis of pronouns and their relation to metonymy, therefore, contributes to advancing a view of metonymy which takes into account processes of talking and thinking in the dynamics of discourse. The talking-and-thinking (Cameron 2003, 2010a) is, as Chapter Three explained, a dynamic and multi-layered process – sometimes what the speakers say reflects the thinking while sometimes the language comes first; sometimes the thinking changes the language while sometimes the language influences the thinking. In the cognitive linguistic framework, it would be assumed that language use is motivated by conceptual metonymy and that language reflects presupposed metonymic mappings – the discourse dynamic framework, in contrast, assumes a two-way reciprocal causality and influence and it allows multiple levels of analysis.
8. Metonymy beyond word level

8.1 Introduction

Chapter Seven offered an in-depth analysis of the particular word class of pronouns and its relation to metonymy. The analysis presented a problem and challenge as it required an approach that is beyond the procedure, which relies on the lexical level, because metonymy can be found on other levels of analysis, such as the conceptual level, which incorporates the thinking processes behind the specific language use, and the discourse activity level, which incorporates the local micro and/or macro discourse functions, i.e. what speakers do with words. However, it was shown that a vital part of the analysis of metonymy in the focus group talk would have been missed if it had not stretched beyond the steps of the procedure. It was suggested that the findings that followed from assuming such an approach provide more insight into the nature and complexity of metonymy in discourse. The chapter pointed to metonymy involved in dynamic discourse processes, showing what lies at the heart of metonymy, i.e. its complex, dynamic, context- and process-dependent nature.

Following one of the key assumptions of the discourse dynamic framework (Chapter Three), the present chapter also focuses on the analysis of metonymy in discourse as a dynamic and complex process. It discusses aspects of metonymy which are difficult and intriguing by analysing metonymy-related discourse phenomena which did not work according to the proposed identification procedure. The chapter introduces another type of process-like metonymy – it focuses on the role of metonymy embedded in stories and scenarios in discourse dynamic processes labelled metonymic processing of scenarios and metonymic processing of stories. Studies by the pragglejaz group, discussed earlier in the thesis (for example Chapter
Five) did not analyse patterns of discourse; Cameron’s research included work on patterns of metaphor in talk (2007a). The present thesis, therefore, expands the area of research which investigates discourse patterns in the macro perspective view, i.e. by analysing metonymy in talk beyond word level and attempting to pin down discourse processes and a discourse pattern, another dimension is added to the analysis of metonymy in talk.

Firstly, Section 8.2 presents the framework for the analysis of the discourse phenomena that is the focus of the chapter. Section 8.3 then sets out the analytic tools which were designed for the new analysis. Sections 8.4 – 8.5 engage with the details of the findings – they offer discussion of what the data analysis showed and interpretation of findings elicited from the discourse data.

8.2 Framework for the analysis of metonymy in discourse beyond word level

Analysis presented in this chapter, of metonymy involved in the discourse beyond the word level, addresses the following research questions:

- **Research Question 1c**: On what different levels of discourse (e.g. word, phrase, clause) does metonymy appear?
- **Research Question 4a**: How is metonymy involved in discourse activity?
- **Research Question 4b**: When does metonymy occur in discourse activity?
To answer the research questions, the analysis focuses on features of language used by the focus group participants, and metonymy in it, identified on levels of discourse which are beyond single words or phrases and beyond utterances – it focuses on longer stretches of speech, combining analysis of micro- and macro-level discourse action and metonymy in it.

When data analysis was carried out in the present research, following the steps of the identification procedure, and using the codes designed for metonymies, it was observed, as has already been claimed for the case of pronouns, that metonymic processes could be found in the data on levels higher than the level of word, i.e. over longer talk episodes. It was assumed that an important part of analysis of metonymy in talk would be missed, if the observations were not pursued. The processes related to pronouns were labelled *metonymic shifting of pronominal reference* (MSPR) (Chapter Seven, Section 7.5.2) and the processes related to particular kind of scenarios (and stories), which are the focus of this chapter, were labelled *metonymic processing of scenarios* and *metonymic processing of stories*. The discourse dynamics framework allows multiple analytic dimensions to be employed to encompass discourse processes and their dynamics. This part of the analysis built on relevant ideas and frameworks about patterns and processes in language and thought from Ritchie (2010), Billig (1985, 1996), Cameron and Seu (2012), and Hoey (1991), McCarthy (2004), Myers (1999), which, together with close examination of the focus group discussion transcript, were important for designing Atlas.ti codes used in the analysis presented in this chapter.
8.2.1 Stories in talk

Cameron and Seu (2012) found stories to be one of two particularly prevalent types of narratives in focus groups, and described a story (or a personal story, to use Cameron and Seu's precise term), usually told in the past tense, to usually recount a series of linked events with an outcome, and to be often signalled by a discourse marker like "once" (Cameron and Seu 2012: 287). Cameron et al. (2013) found that the power of stories is exploited in talk, "to establish perceptual – cognitive coherence at individual level and to construct broader shared understanding at group and sociocultural level".

Ritchie (2010: 125) defines story as "a representation of an event or a series of events" and notes (following Schank and Abelson 1995) that "many individual words and phrases have the capacity to remind us of a story; depending on the context they may activate a detailed experience of the story". Ritchie labels such words and phrases 'story indexes'. Such affordances of words and phrases are particularly important for metonymy – expressions such as the metonymic 9/11 in the focus group talk (Chapter Six, Section 6.6.1) – can also serve as story indexes, which may activate, depending on the context, a broad range of details connected with different aspects of various stories related to the event and associated images, emotions and experiences. For example, as was shown in Chapter Six, the expression 9/11 was found to refer not only to the particular date (11th September 2001) but also to many concepts, representations such as TV images, events and emotions associated with the particular event, and with similar events of the kind. Such expressions have the affordance to activate, through a metonymic process, various associations, images and experiences connected to events that happened on that
particular date, sometimes also linking to the general-to-specific and specific-to-
general shifts in the discourse.

8.2.2 Scenarios in talk

The other narrative type characteristic of group interaction, distinguished by
Cameron and Seu (2012), as well as Cameron at al. (2013) is typifying scenario.
Based on Myers’s idea of typification (1999), a typifying scenario presents a state of
affairs that other discourse participants seem to be expected to recognise as
representing how things are. A typifying scenario is less specific than a story, it
usually focuses less on the events and outcome, and more on settings and characters.
A typifying scenario often uses you pronouns and present tenses (Cameron and Seu
2012). The pronoun you involved in metonymic discourse processes was discussed
in Chapter Seven (Section 7.7), which included an extract (Extract 7.5) that showed
how, through metonymic shifting of pronominal reference (MSPR), a speaker may
expand reference of a situation, i.e. because of shifting from using we to using you,
the situation described changes to a more common scenario, with the effect of
generalising the speaker’s own experience and potentially aligning it with others’
experience.

A scenario refers to conventional events and people’s actions, which can
involve various conventional imaginations, expectations and attitudes. This aspect of
the notion of scenario is similar to how Cameron and Maslen (2010: 139) and
Musolff (2006: 26) define ‘metaphorical scenarios’. The relevant part of Musolff’s
definition is where scenario is described as an event with which conventional aspects
are associated. However, Musolff’s metaphorical scenarios are conceptual and the
scenarios found in this research are in the discourse. In the scenarios found in the
focus group data, the interest is not in establishing mappings between the various elements/aspects of a "source-situation" and "target concepts" (Musolff 2006: 28) but rather on the scenario which appeals sufficiently to shared experience and relates to shared understanding by conventional aspects that invoke more than just the situation the scenario describes directly (it can be mapped onto a larger target domain). Since "systematicity of metaphor and metonymy also manifests itself in narrative of various kinds" (Cameron and Seu 2012: 287, after Cameron et al. 2010 and Ritchie 2010), the present chapter investigates how metonymy manifests itself in typifying scenarios, employing the corresponding ideas and frameworks offered by the cited literature.

8.2.3 Typification

Typifying scenarios (Cameron and Seu 2012) link to a pattern of focus group discourse observed by Myers (1999, 2007, 2008). Myers describes typification as a pattern of discourse and a process in which an example is given in such a way that it comes across as something general. In his study of the discourse of focus groups discussions, Myers shows how speakers use reported speech to present a particular event (from a speaker's individual experience) as a typical pattern of behaviour. "Typification could be common in many settings. In focus groups it has a particular function, because the situation calls on participants to speak, by implication, from their specific experience but for a group to generalize their own experience and check whether others share it" (Myers 1999: 386). Myers's notion of typification links to Markova et al.'s ideas on focus group dialogism, "thinking together" of focus group participants, and positioning. For reported speech, the quoted words "are not themselves offered as significant, but through typified reported speech they can
be taken as emblematic of broader attitudes. The sense of detachment from the current speaker and situation is what allows for typification” (Myers 1999: 386).

Positioning and signalling solidarity achieved through typification in Myers’s sense, as well as through the use of scenarios in the general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts in the focus group discourse, relates to Clark and Gerrig’s (1990) study of quotations which found that “when speakers demonstrate only a snippet of an event, they tacitly assume that their addressees share the right background to interpret it in the same way they do” (1990: 793). In focus groups speakers tend to quickly pick up on the invitations to share and display their interpretation – Myers argues that “with reported speech, an imaginary scene is created which is a generic one, so will be recognized and shared by others” (Myers 1999: 389). Some of the general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts in the focus group talk work in a similar way and metonymy has a significant role in the process. The kind of situation Myers refers to as scene is referred to, in the present analysis, as a scenario (which is not necessarily imaginary). Myers’s analysis of reported speech in focus group discourse and his notion of typification resonates with the phenomena observed in the present research and the vocabulary used to describe it – reflecting the dynamics of the processes observed in the data.

8.2.4 *General-to-specific* and *specific-to-general* shifts in discourse

The *general-to-specific* and *specific-to-general* shifts observed as a pattern in the focus group data, is a pattern included in McCarthy’s discussion of several major patterns of text organisation in written discourse (2004: 157). McCarthy observes that the general to specific pattern appears to be one of the larger patterns of
discourse organisation and a purposeful discourse strategy. McCarthy also observes that “finding patterns in texts is a matter of interpretation by the reader (...) and it will often be possible to analyse a given text in more than one way” (McCarthy 2004: 161). Hoey (1991, 2001) also identified the general-specific pattern as one of the main patterns of text organisation, where a generalisation is followed by specific statements, which often include supportive or clarifying examples. The general-specific pattern is typical for example in reference texts such as encyclopaedias and in texts of estate agent listings, where a general description of a property is followed by specific details and concluded by a general statement about the property again (McCarthy 2004: 157). What is important in McCarthy’s and Hoey’s descriptions of the general-specific pattern is that the pattern has no fixed size and that the pattern can be found in various forms, for example:

\[
\text{General } \rightarrow \text{ Specific } \rightarrow \text{ Specific } \rightarrow \text{ General}
\]

or:

\[
\text{General } \rightarrow \text{ Specific } \rightarrow \text{ Even more specific } \rightarrow \text{ General}
\]

McCarthy, notably, recognised that a view of text which is concerned with the relationships between \textit{sequences} or \textit{segments} of text is a dynamic view (McCarthy 2004: 29).

In the analysis of the focus group data, general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts were found to be present in spoken discourse as well, varying in form and size in the dynamics of talk. Section 8.5 discusses findings related to the ‘general’ and the ‘specific’ in the focus group data and observes that the shifts, with metonymic processes involved, are involved in one of the most frequent functions of language – in the expression of attitude and making a point. In the present analysis, the terms general-to-specific and specific-to-general \textit{shifts} was chosen over general-specific
pattern - to highlight the dynamic nature of this discourse phenomenon, and to emphasise that it is a process rather than a static relation between elements of discourse.

8.2.5 Generalisation and particularisation

Resonating with Myers's *typification* are Billig's (1996) notions of 'categorisation' and 'particularisation' and their interdependence. Categorisation, using Billig's terms, is a process which places particular information into general categories (which, as Billig's argument follows, leads to stereotypes); while particularisation is a process which distinguishes particular stimuli from other stimuli (which leads to tolerance). Categorisation "at its simplest level, involves the placing of a particular object, or entity, within a general category" (Billig 1996: 151) and we do this all the time, when we use language to talk about entities, make statements, express opinions. For example, when we say "stealing is wrong" we are making a categorisation, i.e. we are placing stealing in the category of wrongful actions (Billig 1996: 151). We are, at the same time, making a general statement, i.e. conveying the message that all stealing is without doubt wrong, where "wrong" can only be defined as the binary opposite of "right" and so refers to a very general category too. Particularisation would be made if, for example, certain circumstances of stealing were explained as justified and, consequently, appeared not (or less) wrong.

In talk such as the focus group discussion, the tendency to generalise and particularise appears to be, in line with Billig (1996: 165), "a normal mode of language and thought processing". Billig's notions of *categorisation* and *particularisation* processes are relevant to the phenomena coded in the present research as 'general' and 'specific' - used to refer to expressing general ideas,
statements, beliefs and giving specific examples. Levels of categorisation vary between cultures and individuals and they are not static (Billig 1985: 92). For Billig, categorisation and particularisation are cognitive processes which are so deeply interrelated that the ability to categorise presupposes the ability to particularise (Billig 1996: 163). Out of many possible categories, one is selected. To categorise something by putting it in the appropriate category, we must have particularised that category. In discourse, processes of categorisation and particularisation are also interrelated — "in order to use categories, we must be able to particularise and vice versa" (Billig 1996: 164). Language can express differences of opinion, enables speakers to select appropriate categories and particularities to express thoughts to others in a given context and to argue their point (Billig 1985: 91). A language provides us with a variety of ways of talking about the world. We not only have different categories that can be applied to things; we can also argue the merits of categorizing one way and not another. One category can be used in opposition to other potential categories (Billig 1996: 165). Billig's ideas of categorisation and particularisation correspond to the claim that the shifts in discourse, from general to specific and from specific to general, seem to be a natural tendency in language and thinking: just as categorisation and particularisation are intrinsically connected, so are the general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts connected and co-occurring in discourse.

8.3 Atlas.ti annotation of metonymy beyond word level
To determine the analysis of metonymy beyond word level, the data had to be analysed at a more macro-level scale – the analysis investigated stretches or episodes of talk for discourse dynamics, macro-level discourse patterns and metonymy. This
section demonstrates how additional codes were used in Atlas.ti to facilitate empirical analysis of the focus group discourse. Marking the data with discourse functions codes specified below, facilitated observation and analysis of the data from the perspective of looking for levels of discourse on which metonymy can be involved, looking for potential patterns of conceptualisation, and investigating how metonymy links to discourse activity (research questions 1c, 1d, 4a, 4b).

In a study of argumentation in reading groups, with the use of Atlas.ti software, O'Halloran (2011) used a set of discourse function codes such as argumentation, co-construction, claim, counter-claim, challenge. Inspired by the method, to analyse metonymy in discourse activity and discourse processes beyond the level of single words or phrases, the present analysis used four codes ('general', 'specific', 'story', 'scenario') classified as discourse function codes and used to mark specific discourse phenomena. Additionally, the code 'co-construction' was used for marking dynamic discourse processes of "thinking together" in the sense of Markova et al. (2007: 132) and in the discourse dynamics sense of mixing and evolving of ideas brought by participants to the discussion. 'Co-construction', therefore, was applied where utterances from different speakers build on each other, for example where two or three participants respond to the moderator's question taking short turns which together form a coherent utterance which could just as well belong to just one speaker. The analytic decision to apply the 'co-construction' code was based on observation of the discourse dynamics from the perspective of the flow of speakers' utterances pertaining to a single problem or idea. Text identified as including the above was highlighted in Atlas.ti and the corresponding code or codes were attached – as shown in Figure 8.1. The highlighted text ('quotation' in Atlas.ti)
is a stretch of discourse to which the code ‘general’ is attached. The fragment includes other co-occurring codes.

Figure 8.1 Screen shot of discourse function coding with Atlas.ti

It was assumed that observing the processes of metonymy involved in stories and scenarios, as well as in the general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts in the focus group discourse, might reveal particular discourse tendencies of speakers in the focus group discussion, such as using particular, potentially metonymic, vocabulary which allows for typification, generalisation or co-construction. The discourse function codes (‘general’, ‘specific’, ‘story’, ‘scenario’, and, additionally, ‘co-construction’) further co-occur with other codes used in Atlas.ti annotation.

In Extract 8.1, which comes from the end of the focus group discussion, the participants are responding to the moderator’s question about messages they would
hypothetically like to send to the government and other authorities — about the influence of the current situation on their lives, and what the authorities would like to do about it. Extract 8.1 is an example of the Atlas.ti coding process and method for scenarios, stories and the general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts. Extract 8.1 shows a stretch of discourse which was coded as 'general' (lines 4923 – 4929: we’ll land up; or something like that), ‘specific’ (lines 4924 – 4928: country like George Orwell; like in 1984) and ‘scenario’ (lines 4923 – 4929). Extract 8.1, at the same time, embeds items coded as metonymies (line 4923: we; line 4924: country; line 4927: we; line 4928: 1984).

Extract 8.1

4923 Abbie but we'll land up.
4924 Abbie .. becoming a country like,
4925 Abbie George Orwell,
4926 Abbie ...(2.0) decreed,
4927 Abbie we were going to be like,
4928 Abbie .. in 1984,
4929 Abbie or something.

Extract 8.1 is an example of how metonymy interacts with scenarios and the general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts. In line 4923 Abbie starts expressing her opinion about the influence the current situation has on people’s lives. The opinion is expressed in a ‘prophecy’ kind of general statement and the metaphorical verb land up, which has a very broad abstract sense of {being in a place, situation or position after a lot of things have happened}. The statement also opens a scenario which is continued up to line 4929. In line 4925, a specific association is added — that of a specific writer (George Orwell) — followed by another specific idea in line 4928 — that of the writer’s book (1984). The episode ends in another general point (or something). The scenario consists of people (potentially metonymic we, metonymic country, and George Orwell), activity (we’ll land up; we were going to be like) and
setting (*like in 1984*). The contribution of metonymy in this episode is vital – its interaction with the other discourse phenomena, coded as ‘specific’, ‘general’ and ‘scenario’. The hypothetical scenario (or “prophecy”) sketched by the speaker is also an example of story index (Section 8.2.1), i.e. it includes reference to literature and culture, which offers a rich source of associations at the same time assuming shared cultural capital. The potentially metonymic *we* strengthens the speaker’s sense of belonging to the group and the society (expressed metonymically as *country*).

Figure 8.2 shows a summary of codes used for the analysis of the focus group discussion – all classified as discourse function codes (adapted from O’Halloran (2011) and modified).

![Figure 8.2 Summary of codes set used for the analysis of the focus group discussion](image)

Codes used in the present analysis reflect what was considered as relevant for the discussion of metonymy beyond word level – i.e. it was regarded as key that
speakers in the focus group show a tendency to almost always either talk about
general things, give specific examples, describe settings and situations (labelled
scenarios in the present analysis) or tell stories (disregarding whether they are, at the
same time, making a claim or counter-claim). The codes emerged from very close
data observation, sensitised to salient features of the discourse.

Codes applied in Atlas.ti correspond to the constituents of the discourse phenomena
under scrutiny, i.e. stories and scenarios, as well as the general-to-specific and
specific-to-general shifts. The codes applied, therefore, were the following:

- ‘story’ – attached to the transcript where an account is given of
  someone’s experience; usually told in the past tense; usually recounting a
  series of linked events with an outcome;

- ‘scenario’ – attached to the transcript where a less specific account is
  given of a situation or a scene; usually focusing less on the events and
  outcome, and more on settings and characters; refers to conventional
  events and people’s actions, which can involve various conventional
  imaginings, expectations and attitudes;

- ‘general’ – used when a generalisation is made by a speaker or speakers

- ‘specific’ – used when a specific example is given by a speaker to
  illustrate a point; a specific story about individual experience is told, or a
  specific scenario is described.

The code ‘story’ was attached to discourse episodes when it was noted that a speaker
gives an account of some personal experience – either of her own or of somebody
they know. A speaker’s turn could consist of more than one story. The code was
attached to the transcript where it is one speaker’s turn. However, if the turn included
short interruptions like “yes”, “yeah” or “oh dear” by another speaker or speakers,
the code would still encompass the whole fragment and be considered as one instance of story.

The code ‘scenario’ was used when it was noted that a description is given of a situation or scene that corresponds to the definition of scenario given above. Similar to story, a speaker’s turn could consist of more than one scenario. If a speaker turn included a scenario which was interrupted by another speaker or speakers, the code ‘scenario’ would still encompass the whole fragment and be considered as one instance of scenario.

The code ‘general’ was attached to stretches of talk where a speaker makes a generalisation. The code was usually used with utterances whereby the generalisation is signalled by a word or phrase like “generally”, “in general”, “never”, “always”, “all”, “anything”, etc. One turn of a speaker could consist of more than one statement marked as general.

The code ‘specific’ was attached to the discourse data where a speaker makes a specific point, such as giving a specific example, referring to a specific location or person, telling a specific story. Words signalling stretches of discourse to be marked as ‘specific’ include “for example”, “in particular”, “especially”.

As pointed out earlier (Section 8.3), the analysis also used an additional code, ‘co-construction’, which was attached to the data where utterances from different speakers build on each other. The code was attached to longer stretches of discourse, by definition encompassing multiple speakers turns.

The coding process behind the analytic decision and the justification for use of each of the codes was based mainly on close data observation. The inter-rater reliability check performed for metonymy identification (reported in detail in
Chapter Five, Section 5.5) played a role in detecting the importance of metonymy analysis beyond word level. The issues and problems discussed in the inter-rater tests pointed to a consistency among testers — at the stage of developing and testing the identification procedure the testers agreed that some cases were borderline and required a different approach. These borderline cases became points of interest for further research, and they are the focus of this chapter, as well as the previous chapter. It is acknowledged that further testing of identifying metonymy involved in discourse dynamic processes, such as scenarios, stories as well as general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts, are ideas for future research as they have not been performed in the present study.

Codes applied in this part of the research were attached to longer stretches of talk — from an utterance of one intonation unit (one line in the transcript) to several intonation units (i.e. several lines in the transcript). When a stretch of several lines was considered as a coherent whole in terms of the message or idea conveyed, the code was attached once, to the whole episode. For example, in Extract 8.1 the code 'general' encompasses lines 4923 through to 4929, and the code 'specific' is embedded inside the 'general'. Attaching codes with a different method, or following another researcher's judgments, could potentially impact the quantitative results presented in Section 8.4. However, this study assumed it was more crucial to exhibit the complex features of metonymy in discourse dynamic processes than to engage with statistical results for this part of the study.
8.4 Overall findings: stories and scenarios, general and specific

Quantitative results in Atlas.ti demonstrate that in the focus group discussion, there were:

- 117 instances of 'scenarios';
- 112 instances of 'stories';
- 123 instances of 'general';
- 92 instances of 'specific'.

The additional code 'co-construction' was applied 49 times in the whole transcript. Extract 8.2 is used to illustrate examples of discourse fragments identified as including all of the above discourse phenomena and the corresponding codes. The extract comes from the beginning of the conversation. The moderator has asked the participants a question about the prompts that bring up the subject of terrorism and about who, in everyday life, they talk to about terrorism.

Extract 8.2

126 Irene and my son,
127 Irene I h- heard it on,
128 Irene the car radio,
129 Irene and he was w-
130 Irene walking X towards Old Street,
131 Irene .. g- to get on the tube,
132 Irene .. so I phoned him up,
133 Irene I said,
134 Irene <QS don't go on the tube,
135 Irene don't go on the tube QS>,
136 Irene you know,
137 Irene and er,
138 Irene and all he said was,
139 Irene er,
140 Irene well first of all,
he thought it was just .. an accident,
.. and then--
and then he said,
<Q well
it can't be an accident Q>,
X so many police around,
there's so many ambulances around,
i- it's got to be much more than that.
.. so-
it's--
i- it's--
...(1.0) it's just
the fear that is,
any-
anywhere,
.. you never know,
your next minutes,
.. you know-
I think,
that's the --
that's a great problem.
.. that's a big worry.
you never know when it is going to strike,
do you.
mm.
you can speak to friends,
and you will always speak,
to somebody who's had a-
somebody who knows somebody,
who was nearly .. there,
or who was nearly on the tube,

Lines 126 – 148 of Extract 8.2 were coded as ‘story’, as they give an account of particular events and individual experience, told in the past tense (my son, I heard, I phoned him, he was walking, he said) with a direct quotation of words used at the time the event was taking place (don't go on the tube, don't go on the tube; well it can't be an accident, so many police around, there's so many ambulances around, it's got to be much more than that). The code ‘specific’ was also applied to the same stretch of the transcript as Irene gives account of specific individual experience, using simple and continuous past tenses and direct quotations (lines 126 – 135). The code ‘specific’ was also applied because the story told by the speaker serves as a specific example of the kind of situation discussed in the focus group conversation, in response to the moderator’s question.
Further down in Extract 8.2, lines 152 – 162 were marked with the code 'general'. The speaker, Irene, now makes a general statement about fear (it's just the fear that is anywhere; you never know your next minutes; that's the great problem; that's a big worry). In her one turn, therefore, Irene switches from talking about particular individual events in the past (co-occurring codes 'specific' and 'story' in Atlas.ti) to expressing her general feeling about the omnipresence of fear and the unpredictability of danger. Additionally, by switching from the pronouns I and he used in lines 126 – 148 to tell the story, to the pronoun you/your in lines 156 – 157, the speaker achieves the effect of generalising her experience and her feelings. The pronominal shift, therefore, combined with the shifting of tense, contributes to the typifying 'scenario' identified for lines 152 – 157, with, arguably, a generalised situation, events and experience.

The general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts emerged from the coding process as a salient discourse phenomenon. Resonating with McCarthy's (2004) and Hoey's (1991, 2001) accounts of the general-specific/specific-general pattern in written discourse types, in the focus group talk the pattern or shift also has no fixed size and is found in various forms, i.e. it is 'general' shifting to 'specific', or 'specific' shifting to 'general'; there are also further shifts, i.e. from 'specific' to more 'specific' and, next, again to 'general'. Additionally, stories and scenarios were found to be co-related to discourse episodes identified as 'specific' and/or 'general'. The correlations were observed in Atlas.ti both in manual qualitative analysis and with the Atlas.ti query tool, which shows co-occurrences of the codes. The correlations exhibit proximity relations such as one code embedded in or by another code, code overlaps, and adjacent codes.
Speakers in Extract 8.2 directly contribute to the typifying scenario created by the first speaker, Irene, in lines 152 – 157. Liz (lines 163 – 164) adds another general idea (you, never) to what the preceding speaker had said. Amy (lines 166 – 171) also utters general ideas (using general words such as always, somebody) and she also uses the pronoun you. The scenario typified by Irene, therefore, continues to be typified by the following speakers. Discourse episodes where speakers were found to engage in the activity of explicitly building on each other’s words were regarded as particular instances of “thinking together” in the sense of Markova et al. (2007). As was noted in Section 8.2.3, the notion of typification, from Myers (1999), links the notion of “thinking together” of focus groups from Markova et al. (2007: 132) and what was marked as “co-construction” in O’Halloran’s (2011) study of focus groups.

The three speakers in lines 152 – 171 are engaging in similar discourse activity, adding their own experience and building on each other’s words. Irene starts her turn by telling a specific story, then switching to more general statements about fear and terrorism. Liz immediately adds her own feeling, relating directly to Irene’s words. The third speaker, Amy, adds to this, now shared, experience – by using you, the present tense, and referring directly, but in more general terms, to the event described by the first speaker in the specific story told at the beginning (you will always speak to somebody who’s had somebody who knows somebody who was nearly there on the tube). The typifying scenario in Extract 8.2 is used as a way of sharing experience and constructing shared understanding. The discourse dynamics of the individual turns as well as group co-construction reveal ways in which the three speakers use particular language to formulate ideas in such a way as to make them optimal and accessible for others. In the process of typification, using Myers’s
terms (1999, 2007, 2008), scenarios and examples are often formulated and offered in such a way that they come across as something general.

8.5 Findings: metonymy, scenarios and stories

Through the processes of typification and scenarios, as well as through the processes involved in the general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts in the focus group discourse, speakers in the focus group discussion exhibit a tendency to share and display their interpretation. The tenses used by the speaker and the pronouns acting, potentially, metonymically allow for the generalisation by suggesting typical recognisable events and actions.

The discourse phenomena identified in Extracts 8.2 (Section 8.4), further co-occur with metonymy and metaphor in the discourse event. Table 8.1 summarises the number of such code co-occurrences in the whole transcript and shows the quantitative results of the analysis. The quantitative results presented in Table 8.1 correspond to cases where a metonymically used word or phrase was found in a stretch of talk which had been identified embedded in one of the discourse function codes annotated in Atlas.ti. The table summarises the number of such code co-occurrences in the whole transcript indicating that an item marked with ‘metonymy’ code was found embedded in: 45% of stories; 56% of scenarios; 36% general; and 72% ‘specific’. Two extracts are presented to show examples of metonymy involved in scenarios and stories.
Table 8.1

Quantitative results for discourse function code co-occurrences with metonymy codes in the focus group discussion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse function code</th>
<th>Number of occurrences</th>
<th>Number of co-occurrences with metonymy codes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'general'</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'specific'</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'story'</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'scenario'</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extract 8.3 presents metonymy interacting with a typifying scenario. It is a stretch of discourse to which the code ‘general’ was attached, which at the same time embeds items coded as metonymies (line 1811: world; 1814: you). Notably, the extract is also an example of a typifying scenario (lines 1813 – 1815: when things are out of balance you get trauma), with a setting established in line 1811 (world), people (generic you), and an abstract action or state (things are out of balance). The co-occurrence of the three codes demonstrates how metonymy works in the discourse phenomena under observation. In Extract 8.3, the speaker, Janet, is the first one to respond to a question asked by the moderator about whether the group have a sense of understanding other groups (national, ethnical, religious) and whether the participants' views and feelings about it have changed in recent years.
Extract 8.3

1811 Janet ... the world's out of balance.
1812 Janet and when --
1813 Janet when things are out of balance.
1814 Janet you-you get.
1815 Janet ... trauma.

Firstly, line 1811, provides a general setting (metonymic world, in the sense of {social world} as well as {everywhere}). Next, the setting, expressed metonymically, is used for developing a scenario, i.e. a brief sketch of a situation that expresses the speaker's opinion in the form of a general truth (use of zero conditional type of sentence in lines 1813 – 1815) and assumes a shared attitude. Use of potentially metonymic you in line 1814 points to a further correlation of metonymy with the 'general' as well as with the 'scenario' - the pronoun you plays its role in constructing shared understanding, i.e. the situation described changes to a scenario expected to be recognised as a general truth, so the speaker's own point of view is generalised and aligned with others' experience.

In Extract 8.4 metonymy interacts with the discourse phenomena termed 'specific' and 'story'. In this episode, which comes from the beginning of the focus group discussion, one of the speakers responds to the moderator's question about where the participants get their ideas about terrorism from and who they talk to about terrorism.

Extract 8.4

95 RM who do you talk to,
96 RM ... about terrorism,
97 RM ...(1.0) if and when you do,
98 RM who's- who's it with?
99 xx [X],
100 Chris [X my family],
101 Chris yes my family,
102 Chris ... particularly.
103 Chris I remember the day when they were,
104 Chris ... bombing London,
105 Chris ...(1.0) my son was,
106 Chris upstairs,
107 Chris and he'd,
had a night out, the night before, so he was still asleep, as I just ran upstairs and said, <QS God they're bombing London> they're bombing London QS>, .. and he jumped out of bed, and ran downstairs, and we just sat there, watching television, for hours on end.

The speaker in Extract 8.4 tells a specific story (lines 100 – 118), with people (I, my son, they), setting (upstairs and downstairs, indicating being at home) and actions (was asleep, ran, bombing, jumped, sat, watching TV). The metonymies bombing London (where bombing London refers to {four bombs detonated in four locations in public transport in the city of London}) used by Chris in telling the story (line 104) and in the direct quotation in the story (lines 112 and 113) contribute to the affective quality of the story. The speaker’s formulation of the reported action, with a strongly dysphemistic effect of the metonymic expression bombing London and the hyperbole hours (in line 118), reflects a highly emotional attitude and stresses the great impact of the events of 7th of July 2005 when four bombs were detonated in London public transport.

Following Cameron and Seu (2012: 287), the scenario constructed in lines 1811 – 1815 of Extract 8.3 was considered as a typifying scenario with metonymies (and metaphors) inside it and the story in Extract 8.4 was identified as a story with metonymies and metaphors. The next section of this chapter will argue that there is yet another discourse phenomenon related to metonymy and scenarios – a distinction will be made between the processing and interpretation of scenarios and stories which include metonymies (occurring when speakers produce and process stretches of talk with words and/or phrases identified as metonymic); and metonymic processing of scenarios and metonymic processing of stories, occurring when
speakers produce and process stretches of talk which involve dynamic metonymic operations but which do not necessarily include words or phrases marked individually as metonymically used. The distinction between such discourse dynamic phenomena is discussed in detail in the following section (Section 8.5.1 - 8.5.3).

8.5.1 Analysis and discussion

The distinction introduced above chimes with Gibbs's distinction between 'metonymic processing of language' and 'processing metonymic language' (Gibbs 1999), discussed earlier in this thesis (Chapter One Section 1.5 and Chapter Three, Section 3.3.3). The interpretative level which is beyond word level seems to apply to 'scenarios' and 'stories' and the process labelled as metonymic processing of scenarios and metonymic processing of stories, proposed in this thesis, corresponds to Gibbs's idea of 'metonymic processing of language', which occurs in interpreting and understanding "gaps in narrative by inferring some rich source of information, like a script, from the simple mention of some salient part of that knowledge" (Gibbs 1999: 69). In metonymic processing of scenarios, when people interpret utterances which include recognisable scenarios of everyday life situations, they activate their knowledge and associations connected with the situation and can infer more information from it described.

The approach suggested that metonymy analysis in discourse involves an interpretative level which is beyond the level of single words or utterances but which is, at the same time, not the macro level of the whole discourse event. The approach also resonates with Lodge's classification of encyclopaedia entries as "metonymic mode of writing" (Lodge 1977, discussed in Chapter One p.), which links to Gibbs's
distinction between two types of metonymy-involving language processing and which draws attention to the fact that metonymy does not just work at word or phrase level but at other levels.

8.5.2 Processing scenarios and stories which include metonymies

When speakers in the focus group produce and interpret utterances such as Extract 8.5 below, the production and interpretation of the utterance involves processing a scenario which includes items identified as metonymies.

Extract 8.5

1058 Chris what happens is,  
1059 Chris if you have something like 9/11,  
1060 Chris or what we had in London,  
1061 Chris .. and then,  
1062 Chris ... (1.0) there will be nothing,  
1063 Chris for .. a year,  
1064 Chris two years,  
1065 Chris and everybody will start to get,  
1066 Chris a little bit lax about security,

The whole extract, stretching from line 1058 to line 1066, was identified as a scenario because it describes an unspecific account of a hypothetical situation typified through the use of present tenses (as well as will used to describe the present in a conditional), the pronoun you (line 1059) and the word everybody. The stretch of talk is considered as a scenario (Cameron and Seu 2012: 287) and it includes metonymically used you and 9/11 in line 1059 (i.e. the date expressed in numerical form stands for the event that took place on 9th September 2001 in New York). The discourse process of producing and interpreting the utterances in Extract 8.5 is considered as an instance of processing a scenario (which includes metonymies).
8.5.3 Metonymic processing of scenarios and metonymic processing of stories

Metonymic processing of scenarios is involved when speakers in the focus group produce and interpret scenarios by inferring, to use Gibbs's terms, "some rich source of information, like a script, from the simple mention of some salient part of that knowledge" (Gibbs 1999: 69). When people interpret utterances such as Extract 8.6 below, they activate their knowledge and associations connected with the activity described. Such well-learned scenarios describing structured situations in everyday life make it possible to not only to understand the activity actually talked about (such as seeing a bag) but also to infer the associations and the feelings which add more meaning to the words uttered. Metonymic processing of scenarios, therefore, involves (of participants in a conversation for example) referring to a well-known scenario and using it for the expression and interpretation of a more complex metonymic meaning. The utterances in the scenario do not need to include any metonymically used words or phrases, but the scenario as a whole is processed metonymically.

In Extract 8.6, the speaker, Janet, is responding to the moderator's question regarding the influence the risk of terrorism has on people's lives. Lines 2406 – 2409 in Extract 8.6 include metonymic processing of a scenario.

Extract 8.6

2405  Janet our life has already changed.
2406  Janet .. we're consciously,
2407  Janet more con-
2408  Janet concerned about,
2409  Janet who we sit next to on the bus,
2410  Janet .. and,
2411  Janet we're more aware,
2412  Janet generally,
2413  Janet about s--
2414  Janet er security.
We're consciously more concerned about who we sit next to on a bus (lines 2406 – 2409) describes a scene which is a specific one. The activity described is that of being on a bus. However, through a metonymic operation, another sense can be inferred from this activity, i.e. the sense of being out, using public transport, meeting incidental people. Being more concerned about who we sit next to on a bus is an expression of how people’s reactions and attitudes to other people have changed because of the risk of terrorism. It reflects the new awareness that a fellow passenger might be a dangerous terrorist, as was the case on the trains and buses in the London bombings in 2005. The meaning and its interpretation are possible through metonymic processing of scenarios, proposed in this chapter. In a context where the speaker talks about how life has changed generally due to the risk of terrorism, the specific scene which includes the specific activity of sitting on a bus, operates as a typified, generic scene. The shift from a specific scene to a typified (or generic) one is possible through metonymy that is, by definition, the kind of operation that makes the transfer possible on linguistic and conceptual levels. The specific-to-general shift in this fragment is also observed in the words used explicitly by the speaker (we're more aware generally about security). The fragment, it can be argued, involves a discourse dynamic process labelled metonymic processing of scenario.

As shown above, a metonymically-processed scenario identified in the present research does not necessarily include metonyms identified on the level of single words or phrases – it may do so, but it may also consist of literally used words, which, as a whole, in the discourse dynamics, involve metonymy. Investigation of the focus group discussion found 17 instances of metonymic processing of scenarios, where literal words used by the speaker(s) construct a scenario which is metonymic; and 12 instances of metonymic processing of stories,
where literal accounts given by the speaker involve a metonymic operation. Extract 8.7 is used to discuss a story which involves an instance of *metonymic processing of stories*.

**Extract 8.7**

1281 Fiona I remember,
1282 Fiona it was about two days,
1283 Fiona after that bus attack,
1284 Fiona ... and I was sat ne- --
1285 Fiona I was sat next to this,
1286 Fiona really old Muslim guy,
1287 Fiona all in his,
1288 Fiona whole outfit,
1289 Fiona and he had the biggest of bags,
1290 xx @ @,
1291 Fiona like this,
1292 Fiona .. on the bus,
1293 Fiona and I'm sat next to him,
1294 Fiona I'm thinking,
1295 Fiona <QS what's in your bag SQ> [TONE OF COMEDIC SUSPICION]

In Extract 8.7 the participants are talking, in response to the moderator's question, about the effects of the threat of terrorism – what impact it has had on their life. The speaker, Fiona, tells a story by giving an account of her individual experience which includes reference to being on the bus and bags. These two elements are emblematic of situations where there is some threat, with evidence in other fragments in the data, that the other participants immediately recognise what is meant. Other speakers also speak of bags in describing situations and experience related to terrorism (e.g. lines 558, 616, 1157, 2383, 5063). The reason that reference to bags is made 15 times in the focus group discussion is partially in the local discourse dynamics of the particular discourse event (speakers sharing vocabulary), as well as in the broader socio-cultural dynamics, with the role of the media in reporting stories which activate and strengthen particular images associated with terrorism, such as bags and rucksacks. Situations where everyday actions such as going out or sitting on a bus,
are likely to easily activate stories and scenarios related to the risk of terrorism and involving items which symbolise them.

Analysis of stories (and scenarios) in the ‘specific’ and ‘general’ episodes identified in the discourse data, shows that on word level, using a particular word or expression can achieve the effect of calling up a set of events, images and emotions – as has been noted by Ritchie (2010: 125) “many individual words and phrases have the capacity to remind us of a story; depending on the context they may activate a detailed experience of the story”. On the level of lexis, Extract 8.7 does not include items marked as metonymic. On the level which is beyond single words and phrases, i.e. the whole story involving bags, told as a specific account of individual experience, contributes to the emergence of a typifying scenario which is metonymic – the scenario of situations involving bags, found elsewhere in the discourse.

As Extract 8.8 below shows, the speaker, Fiona, together with another speaker, Janet, had already spoken about bags, in a fragment which was also identified as involving a metonymic scenario, and which includes group dynamics of thinking together (marked with ‘co-construction’ code).

**Extract 8.8**

```
1145 Fiona I think,  
1146 Fiona I'm a lot,  
1147 Fiona more suspicious,  
1148→ Fiona if I see a bag,  
1149 Fiona I'll be like,  
1150 Fiona <QS hello,  
1151→ Fiona whose bag's this? QS>,  
1152 Janet yes,  
1153 Fiona yes,  
1154 Janet I've done that in airports,  
1155 Janet I did that in America,  
1156 Janet <and I couldn't believe in @>,  
1157→ Janet these bags hanging around.
```
In the case of scenarios, a typifying scenario found in the talk at one level, can be extended, through metonymy, to suit other levels. For example, in an utterance such as the example quoted above, bags on word level in the described stories and scenarios are linked to the literal physical action of watching out and being careful when one sees a bag in a public location, because of the immediate association between bags and risk. Through a metonymic process involved, the metonymic scenarios involving bags extend to the level of a more general feeling of being at risk, of being potentially exposed to danger (symbolised here by bags).

8.6 General summary and conclusion

This chapter engaged with analysis of metonymy beyond the level of words, showing findings from investigation of the focus group discussion. The main purpose of this chapter was to describe the phenomena labelled metonymic processing of scenarios and metonymic processing of stories, which was identified in the analysis of the discourse dynamics of the focus group talk. As in the other chapters, the findings were situated in a discourse dynamic context and the chapter engaged with both quantitative results and qualitative analysis of findings. Extracts presented in this chapter were used to illustrate and discuss the workings of metonymy beyond the scope of metonymic words and phrases identified with the application of the identification procedure. It was shown how metonymy is often involved in processing of stories and scenarios, correlated to the dynamic general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts in the discourse. The chapter also considered communicative activity related to the identified metonymy-involving dynamic processes.
Analysis of metonymy involved in dynamic processes beyond the word level, addressed research questions 1c, 1d, 4a and 4b pertaining to the levels of discourse on which metonymy appears and metonymy involved in discourse activity. The findings presented and discussed in this chapter showed features of language used by the focus group participants, and metonymy in it, identified on levels of discourse which are beyond single words or utterances – the analysis focused on longer stretches of speech, combined micro- and macro-level discourse action and metonymy involved in it. Metonymy was found to be involved in scenarios and stories, which are correlated to the general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts. *Metonymic processing of scenarios and metonymic processing of stories* frequently overlap in the focus group discourse with the general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts. Specific stories and specific scenarios which are typified often serve the general, i.e. what is specific becomes general through metonymic expressions and metonymic processing of typified scenarios.

The attempt to apply the proposed metonymy identification procedure, as anticipated in the research, was only a starting point for the analysis presented in this chapter. As in the case of pronouns and the process of *metonymic shifting of pronominal reference*, the focal finding of the chapter was that a vital part of the analysis would have been missed, if it had not been stretched beyond the procedure. This chapter pointed to metonymy involved in another dynamic discourse process which cannot be captured by the procedure, which, importantly, helps understand what is perhaps key about metonymy, i.e. its complex context- and process-dependent nature. In this chapter metonymy was found to operate dynamically in *metonymic processing of scenarios*, as well as in *metonymic processing of stories*, with scenarios and stories recognised as socio-linguistically and cognitively
important in establishing shared understanding between speakers. The language used by speakers in the cited extracts showed how instances of metonymic processing of typified scenarios develop dynamically in the discourse, thus suggesting how speakers may be, arguably, thinking and developing their reasoning through metonymy.

The phenomenon labelled *metonymic processing of scenarios*, identified in this research, has implications for future research into metonymy – it shows that analysis of metonymy as a phenomenon of language and thought must be approached as multi-layered, dynamic and process-like. The analysis of *metonymic processing of scenarios*, as well as the investigation of pronouns and their relation to metonymy, therefore, advance a view of metonymy which takes into account processes of talking and thinking in the dynamics of discourse and advances, therefore, the study of metonymy in general. Metonymy analysis on the level of *metonymic processing of scenarios* may have implications for metonymy on word level – the relation between the high-level metonymy (in *metonymic processing of scenarios*) vs. word level metonymy may be perceived as similar to the relation of allegory vs. metaphor; the high-level metonymy is about the human input in the discourse processes of talking and thinking, the dynamic shifting and the dynamic typification, which may be seen as one process or three variations of one process or three processes for investigation. The analysis of the high-level metonymy should, therefore, be combined in any attempt to formulate a bigger view of metonymy.

This chapter linked to the preceding chapter (Chapter Seven) by the claim that pursuing metonymy involved in the complex discourse processes can contribute to advancing the study of the category. This chapter further argued that analysing metonymy beyond the level of words, e.g. in stories and scenarios, as well as the
general-to-specific and specific-to-general shifts, can be considered as core for our understanding of metonymy in talk. The following chapter, Chapter Nine, summarises the innovative aspects of the thesis together and makes recommendations about further research activity over metonymy. It also concludes on how the offered approaches to metonymy contribute to advancing the knowledge of its nature.
9. Conclusion, evaluation and implications

9.1 Introduction

In the study presented in this thesis, I have accomplished the twofold research aim of developing a procedure for metonymy identification in discourse and investigating how metonymy works in talk. In Chapters One, Two and Three, I offered key theoretical and analytic frameworks for the study of metonymy in talk carried out for this thesis. In Chapter One, I discussed the terminology and ideas of the contemporary metonymy and metaphor theory which relate to the research. I presented and critically assessed the various approaches to metonymy research to date and highlighted a number of challenging issues concerning the category. In Chapter Two, I discussed corpus linguistic approaches to metonymy, with emphasis on research techniques which were regarded as relevant and useful for the present study. Chapter Three engaged with the details of the Discourse Dynamics framework, showing why the approach was considered as most suitable for the analysis of metonymy in talk and how it fills the gaps in the existing approaches and theories. Chapter Four presented my general methodology for the analysis — I described the main data and the software that facilitated the research as well as the larger corpora used for reference. To accomplish the research goal of designing an identification procedure for metonymy in discourse, in Chapter Five I described how such a procedure was developed and formulated. I also showed examples to demonstrate how the procedure works. Chapter Six considered general findings about metonymy in the dynamics of the focus group discourse, with quantitative results from applying the proposed identification procedure to the focus group data. I observed that development and application of the procedure played an additional role
in the research – it highlighted borderline cases and pointed to a number of issues in metonymy analysis, which I then explored in Chapter Seven (metonymy and pronouns), and Chapter Eight (metonymy beyond word level: scenarios and stories). In this chapter, I first discuss the findings of the analysis in light of the research questions listed in Chapter Four. I then offer an evaluation of the thesis and suggestions for further research.

9.2 Overview of findings

Undertaking systematic analysis of metonymy in the talk of the focus group, with more than one method and with more than one analytic tool, including specialised software, provided a rigorous description of metonymy in the dynamics of discourse. Large language corpora used for reference enriched the analysis by enabling comparison of the focus group findings with a large database of the English language. Close qualitative analysis of micro-level language use was accompanied by macro-level quantitative results, which allowed for many aspects of metonymy to be identified and analysed.

While the approach presupposed for the thesis was an inductive one, with metonymy identification based on observation of the discourse data and actual language use, the thesis also undertook and accomplished the research goal of designing an explicit procedure for metonymy identification in discourse. Application of the designed procedure then allowed for rigorous metonymy identification in the focus group data, which provided the first to date quantitative results for metonymy density in discourse. Metonymy analysis following the steps of the identification procedure also revealed, however, a number of problematic cases which involved metonymy
but required going beyond the proposed procedure. Analysis of the problematic cases has found metonymy emerging from local interaction and contextual factors, working in discourse dynamic processes labelled *metonymic shifting of pronominal reference* and *metonymic processing of scenarios* and *metonymic processing of stories*. Pursuing the analysis of metonymy on levels higher than the level of single words or phrases has shown that a vital part of the investigation of metonymy in discourse would be missed if the proposed identification procedure had not revealed the problematic cases and if it had not been overruled. The thesis has found the identification procedure to be important as an explicit method, but it has also made it clear that the more complex cases of metonymy are even more crucial and analysis of metonymy as a discourse dynamic process contributes to our understanding of metonymy in discourse.

### 9.3 Metonymy identification procedure

Set Two of the research questions (RQs 2a – 2b, Chapter Four, Section 4.3) concerned the creation of a metonymy identification procedure.

The thesis responded to a gap identified in metonymy scholarship, i.e. the lack of explicit and reliable procedures for metonymy identification in discourse. The problem has been acknowledged for metaphor (pragglejaz 2007) and it should be acknowledged for metonymy. In accomplishing the goal of creating and offering such a procedure, the research found a viable resolution to the problem of inconsistency which occurs if mere intuition is used to decide on metonymicity of language. While the work of the pragglejaz group (2007), Steen et al. (2010), and Cameron (2003, 2007a, 2008a, 2008b) demonstrated that explicit identification
procedures are an important component for the analysis of metaphor in discourse, this thesis demonstrated it is equally important for the analysis of metonymy. The thesis, notably, developed, formulated, tested and applied a procedure, and found it to be a valid and replicable metonymy identification method, useful for making claims about metonymy in discourse. Application of the devised procedure, despite its limitations, found it was possible to move the analysis away from intuition-based judgments and towards increased consistency and transparency of identification and coding. The thesis, thus, also confirmed that the effort connected with aiming to devise and refine identification procedures is justified.

9.4 Metonymy in discourse

The following sub-sections summarise findings related to three sets of research questions (1a – 1e, 3a – 3b, and 4a – 4b; Chapter Four, Section 4.2), concerned with metonymy in discourse: density of use, types of metonymy and levels of discourse on which metonymy occurs, discourse activity and the interplay of metonymy with metaphor.

9.4.1 Density and distribution of metonymy

While the proposed identification procedure was regarded as a research goal in itself rather than a finished prescribed method, application of the procedure allowed for rigorous and systematic metonymy identification and annotation, which provided a transparent macro-level picture of metonymy distribution in the focus group talk and offered insights into the frequency of metonymy in discourse.

274
Findings resulting from systematic metonymy identification and annotation in the focus group discourse showed two alternative counts for metonymy density in the 17,889-word discussion: including cases considered as ‘borderline’, the analysis found 615 metonymies, which corresponds to a density of 34 metonymies per 1,000 words; excluding the ‘borderline’ cases the analysis found 332 metonymies, which corresponds to 18 metonymies per 1,000 words. Findings further showed that 86% of the 332 items marked as metonymically used were nouns and 14% were verbs. Analysis also considered 283 ‘borderline’ uses of the pronouns they, you, we, which were then explored in detail as close qualitative analysis of pronouns suggested there were other, higher-level discourse dynamic processes in which metonymy was involved, which required going beyond the procedure. A preliminary conclusion from the quantitative findings of the research is that metonymy is relatively frequent in the focus group talk – the conclusion offering the first empirical indication of how much language is used metonymically.

Analysis also indicated that metonymies, similar to metaphors (Cameron and Stelma 2004), are not distributed evenly in talk – metonymies in the focus group discussion form clusters and, additionally, a ‘super-cluster’ was observed in the transcribed talk, i.e. a fragment of talk which is particularly significant for the highest number of metonymically used words and metaphors. To provide a visual representation of metonymy distribution in the focus group talk, I offered graphs showing the distribution of metonymy in the focus group talk – with segments rich in metonymies and metaphors clearly marked by steep points of curves in the frequency graphs.
9.4.2 Interplay of metonymy with metaphor

Close qualitative analysis provided findings which illuminated how metonymy is intertwined with metaphor on three different levels in the dynamics of discourse. Interplay of the two phenomena was found on the micro-level of one word or phrase (9/11); on the level of one utterance (we went to Iraq); and on the macro-level of the whole discourse event, as metonymy clusters were found to overlap with metaphor clusters. In most occurrences the phrase 9/11 was found to be metonymic. However, the analysis also identified usage for which interplay of metonymy and metaphor was observed (9/11s). The proposed interpretation of such usage of the phrase resonated with Barcelona’s explication of ‘paragons’ (Barcelona 2004: 363) but the finding poses questions for the theory of metonymy and metaphor, indicating the need for further research to address the issue.

9.4.3 New metonymy category

The phrases 9/11 and 7/7 were identified as metonymies and they were found to represent a new category of metonymy – not found in the literature to date and identified for the first time in this research. The new metonymy category was labelled SPECIFIC DATE FOR EVENT. Analysis methods employing specialised software served as useful tools for the observation of the phrase 9/11 in the focus group talk, and for tracking its evolution over time in a larger database. The dynamics of the metonymic expression 9/11 in the analysed data showed the emergence and evolution of a new meaning as a process which can be observed on the level of the discourse event, while tracking the expression in the Nexis UK database showed the process on a more macro level of the society. The findings showed, thus, how new metonymy categories develop – observing how language used by the participants
both shaped, and was shaped by, the interaction ('lexico-conceptual pacts') and how language evolves socio-culturally over time. The development of the phrase 9/11 and the emergence of a new metonymy category reflects and supports one of the assumptions of the discourse dynamics view – which highlights change and interconnectedness of multiple dynamic systems and which would see such metonymy category as a “temporary stability emerging from the activity of interconnecting systems of socially-situated language use and cognitive activity” (Cameron, Maslen et al. 2009: 64), rather than a fixed mapping.

9.4.4 Metonymy and discourse activity, cultural metonymy

Systematic analysis and annotation of metonymy in talk found that metonymies, similar to metaphors (Cameron and Stelma 2004), were not distributed evenly in talk. Clusters of metonymies were identified in the focus group discussion and most of them also overlapped with metaphor clusters. It was further observed that both phenomena were used intensively in significant places in the talk, i.e. where intense and complex issues of individual and state responsibility, agency and attitude are discussed. It was also suggested that various agents such as government, Tony Blair, Britain can be interpreted as metonymies in manifestations of the speakers’ attitudes to the issue of terrorism, the society and the rulers. The thesis offered insights into how conventionally made expressions such as Bush and Blair and 9/11 work as cultural metonymies. While the phenomenon of cultural metonymy addresses a broader research purpose for further study, it was argued that the term cultural metonymy working as a ‘cultural keyword’ (Stubbs 2002: 145) could be applied to instances where a metonymic expression is used as a shorthand that captures probable referents involved in complex processes. Cultural metonymies emerge in language based on assumed shared experience and cultural background, which make
it possible for speakers to use and interpret expressions like (Tony) Blair or 9/11 with an understanding of the complexities involved.

Pronouns were found to contribute to discourse activity and local discourse action by allowing speakers to make strategic use (either conscious or not) of their language. Complexities of pronouns in relation to metonymy were explored and their important strategic functions in language and discourse activity were analysed. The thesis found that the affordance of pronouns they, we and you, to be used in a process labelled metonymic shifting of pronominal reference (MSPR), was of great importance for engaging in the discourse activity of negotiating positions and identities, and of empathising. The discourse dynamics approach was adequate for analysing metonymy in contextualised discourse activity also in the complex case of scenarios and stories. Resonating with Cameron (Cameron 2010b; Gibbs and Cameron 2008; Larsen-Freeman and Cameron 2008) as well as Markova et al. (2007), it was found that what is said by the focus group participants reflects ideas brought to the discussion but it was also observed that, in the dialogic and dynamic context, the ideas mix and evolve as participants of focus group discussion “think together” (Markova, Linell et al. 2007: 132), with metonymy involved.

9.4.5 Metonymy as a dynamic discourse process

Close qualitative analysis of the focus group data revealed that for some instances of metonymy it was necessary to go beyond the identification procedure because of a contrast between different levels of analysis that must be taken into account: the lexical and grammatical levels, on which the identification procedure relies; the conceptual level, which incorporates the thinking processes behind the specific language use; and, finally, the level of the discourse activity taking place. Pronouns
appeared intriguing in terms of their potential metonymicity and the thesis considered whether, beyond the proposed identification procedure, the pronouns they, we and you can involve metonymy. It was also shown that the pronoun you plays a crucial role in scenarios and stories – a scenario or a story, in which the pronoun you is used, becomes a typifying scenario (Myers 1999, 2007, 2008) through processes which involve metonymy.

The thesis also showed how metonymy was found to be involved in producing and interpreting scenarios and stories – labelling the phenomena metonymic processing of scenarios and metonymic processing of stories. Findings pertaining to the dynamic discourse processes of metonymic shifting of pronominal reference, metonymic processing of scenarios and metonymic processing of stories constituted a vital part of the investigation of metonymy in talk. The findings pointed to metonymy involved in language in ways which cannot be captured by the procedure, and which demonstrate what is perhaps key about metonymy – its dynamic process-like and context-dependent nature. Applying a complex dynamic systems perspective allowed for metonymic language to be viewed as fluid, evolving and multilayered.

9.5 Evaluation

9.5.1 Strengths of the work
Firstly, the study presented in this thesis has applied an empirical approach to a research area which has so far involved mainly theoretical assumptions based on intuition and invented examples. The study used authentic discourse data which was considered as more adequate for a description of metonymy in language than the
data used in many previous studies because it made claims about metonymy more grounded.

Secondly, the thesis developed, tested and applied an explicit procedure for metonymy identification in discourse. To my knowledge, only my research has undertaken such challenge with regard to metonymy. The proposed procedure is functional in use and it adds to transparency of judgments; It was found to be reliable for instances of metonymy identified on the level of lexis and it played an important role in exposing the more problematic cases. The proposed procedure, arising from engagement with theoretical problems and methodological issues related to metonymy, is a foundation on which future research may build. In undertaking the task of developing a procedure for metonymy, I assumed that a procedure for metonymy should be similar to the existing metaphor procedures and I found that it is more difficult to formulate. The fact, however, that working with the procedure revealed also the complex cases, was treated not as an obstacle, but rather as a challenge and direction for further analysis, beyond the level of word covered by the identification procedure.

Moreover, the thesis exploited more than one tool for the analysis of data and it is hoped to have extended the scope of metonymy research. For metonymy analysis in the focus group data I have utilised specialised software for qualitative analysis and concordance software. I have enriched the analysis by employing large language databases – while the potential of using large computerised corpora has now been recognised in the field, I was innovative in my particular choice of the OEC used with specialised analytic software, SketchEngine.

---

28 The pragglejaz group did begin the task around 2008 – but it was not continued.
Further, cognitive linguists make claims that metonymy shapes the way people speak and think (Gibbs 1999: 61) and that it is ubiquitous in language (Barcelona 2002; Dirven 1999; Radden and Kövecses 1999; Radden 2005), without, however, investigating the frequency of metonymy in authentic discourse data. The thesis considered this gap and contributed to the field by offering the first empirical indication of how much language is used metonymically.

Another strength of the work is the application of a new approach to metonymy analysis. The Discourse Dynamics framework, which assumes a two-way reciprocal causality between language and thinking, allows for multiple levels of analysis of phenomena such as metonymy. It also allows for interpreting language use as a dynamic and multi-layered process, in which context and discourse activity play a key role.

Because of the above strengths of my research, I hope to have contributed to the study of metonymy and the understanding of metonymy in language.

9.5.2 Limitations

Although large language databases were employed for reference and tracking findings from the focus group discussion, the findings were predominantly based on one type of interaction. I have also used quantitative findings in the analysis but I have not attempted detailed statistical analysis. The large-scale metaphor projects discussed in the thesis subjected data to in-depth statistical analysis. The present metonymy project, much smaller in scale, assumed that the process of developing the procedure and the insights about metonymy which resulted from it, in particular the problematic and complex cases it revealed, were more important at this stage than statistics. The identification procedure was also found to be sometimes insufficient in
an in-depth analysis of how metonymy works in discourse and other aspects were taken into account in the analytic process. Application of the procedure to the whole discourse event pointed to a number of cases where metonymy seems to be involved and which required going beyond the procedure. The thesis has not tackled the issue by attempting to reformulate the procedure – it was assumed at the stage of applying the procedure that, while applying a procedure is important, pursuing the investigation of metonymy beyond the level of single words or phrases, and so beyond the steps of the procedure, is more important for showing what lies at the core of metonymy.

Furthermore, it was not possible to check how speakers in the discussion perceive and process metonymies and, for this reason, the judgements about metonymy in discourse processes and discourse activity was based on analyst's interpretation of the language used rather than on feedback from participants. Also analysis of language use in a dynamic context would be even richer if there was access to the audio or video material, which would allow for analysis of accompanying gesture, tone of voice, facial expression.

Finally, the issue of representation may be seen as a possible limitation of using any large corpus. However, the OEC was selected (over other exiting corpora) because it is comprehensive, well-sampled and very recent – and, because this research adopted a dynamic view of language, a most recent corpus was required to understand contemporary language use and to search expressions related to recent events. It was also assumed that, based on data available on the web, it represents a large proportion of today's real-world language use.
9.5.3 Implications for further research

Quantitative findings about metonymy density presented in this thesis provide a baseline for further research in which outcomes of the present analysis could be related to other findings to enable judgments about whether the numbers presented here are high or low and whether they are typical for metonymy in talk in general. Such findings could allow for more grounded assertions about the ubiquity of metonymy in language and offer a way of pinning down the theoretical cognitive linguistic claims (Barcelona 2002; Dirven 1999; Radden and Kövecses 1999; Radden 2005).

Further studies could also investigate how the findings from the analysis of the focus group discourse, both quantitative and qualitative, compare to other types of registers and genres. It would be valuable to conduct empirical examinations of metonymy in versatile data to establish whether certain genres, registers or contexts, contain a larger proportion of metonymically used language and whether the phenomena found in this thesis is similar in other discourse types and other genres. Such cross-genre investigations have been conducted for metaphor (Dorst 2011; Kaal 2012; Krennmayr 2011; Steen, Dorst et al. 2010), and they would also contribute to our understanding of metonymy.

The thesis stressed the need for an explicit method for metonymy identification and showed how such a method can lead to new insights about metonymy in talk. The proposed identification procedure can be applied for identifying metonymically used words and phrases, it is acknowledged that further research is required to refine the procedure so it can become a more prescribed metonymy identification method. A consistency check on samples of the data has been conducted for the procedure before it was taken on all the data but further reliability tests would surely be of
benefit for further metonymy investigations. The offered attempt of an identification procedure was inspired by the existing metaphor identification procedure which required years of testing and application by a group of scholars (pragglejaz 2007; Steen, Dorst et al. 2010; Steen, Biernacka et al. 2010). Further research could undertake the same effort for metonymy. Engaging with the analysis of metonymy involved in dynamic discourse processes has elucidated more of what lies at the heart of metonymy and further research could attempt to formulate a combined procedure which would identify both metonymy working at word level and the process-like metonymy.

9.6 Concluding thoughts

My aim in this PhD thesis was to provide a picture of metonymy in discourse that is unique in a number of ways: it applies a newly developed framework, it is based on an explicit metonymy identification method, and it at the same time utilises corpus linguistic methods and tools. While the research showed that the research aim of developing an identification procedure was justified and it did show that metonymy can be identified in discourse by following steps of the procedure, it was important to realise at one point in the research, that a vital part of the picture of metonymy in discourse would be missed, if the investigation did not pursue cases which were revealed as problematic and exceptions to the procedure. The procedure, therefore, is important but the dynamic analytic view of metonymy in discourse, which unifies discourse processes, human communication and discourse action is also very important. When I imagine the multi-layered process-like metonymy working in
discourse dynamics on different levels, I cannot draw it myself, but I could talk about it and have it drawn for this final page of my thesis.  

29 Graphic by Maciej Dębski
Bibliography


Bull, Peter and Fetzer, Anita (2006), 'Who are we and who are you? The strategic use of forms of address in political interviews', Text & Talk, 26 (1), 3–37.

Cameron, Lynne (2003), Metaphor in educational discourse (London/New York Continuum).

Cameron, Lynne (2007a), 'Patterns of metaphor use in reconciliation talk', Discourse & Society, 18 (2), 197-222.


Cameron, Lynne and Maslen, Robert (eds.) (2010), Metaphor analysis: Research practice in applied linguistics, social sciences and the humanities (London: Equinox Publishing Ltd).


Cameron, Lynne and Seu, Irene Bruna (2012), 'Landscapes of empathy: Spatial scenarios, metaphors and metonymies in responses to distant suffering', Text & Talk, 32 (3), 281-305.


288


Eco, Umberto (1979), *The role of the reader: Explorations in the semiotics of texts* (Indiana University Press).


Fauconnier, Gilles and Turner, Mark (1999), 'Metonymy and conceptual integration', in Klaus-Uwe Panther and Günter Radden (eds.), *Metonymy in language and thought* (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins), 77-90.


Fauconnier, Gilles and Turner, Mark (2003), 'Metaphor, metonymy and binding', in René Dirven and Ralf Pörings (eds.), *Metaphor and metonymy in comparison and contrast* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter).


Feyaerts, Kurt and Brone, Geert (2005), 'Expressivity and metonymic inferencing: Stylistic variation in nonliterary language use', *Style*, 39, 12-36.


Gibbs, Raymond W. Jr (1999), 'Speaking and thinking with metonymy', in Klaus-Uwe Panther and Günter Radden (eds.), *Metonymy in language and thought* (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins), 61-76.


Grice, Paul (1975), 'Logic and conversation', in Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (eds.), *Syntax and semantics* (New York: Academis), 41-58.


Hilpert, Martin (2006), 'Keeping an eye on the data: Metonymies and their patterns', in Anatol Stefanowitsch and Stefan Th. Gries (eds.), *Corpus-based approaches to metaphor and metonymy* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter), 123-52.


Koch, Peter (1999), 'Frame and contiguity: On the cognitive bases of metonymy and certain types of word formation', in Klaus-Uwe Panther and Günter Radden (eds.), *Metonymy in language and thought* (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins), 139-68.


Larsen-Freeman, Diane and Cameron, Lynne (2008), *Complex systems and applied linguistics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).


Low, Graham (1999), 'This paper thinks... Investigating the acceptability of the metaphor AN ESSAY IS A PERSON', in Graham Low and Lynne Cameron (eds.), *Researching and applying metaphor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 221-48.


Myers, Greg (2010), 'Stance-taking and public discussion in blogs', *Critical Discourse Studies*, 7 (4), 263-75.

Nexis®UK (2008), (London: Reed Elsevier (UK) Ltd ).


Panther, Klaus-Uwe (2006), 'Metonymy as usage event', in Gitte Kristiansen, Michel Achard, René Dirven, and Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (eds.), *Cognitive linguistics: Current applications and future perspectives* (Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter), 147-87.

Panther, Klaus-Uwe and Radden, Günter (eds.) (1999), *Metonymy in language and thought* (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins).


Peirsman, Yves and Geeraerts, Dirk (2006), 'Metonymy as a prototypical category', *Cognitive Linguistics* 17 (3), 269-316.


Pyykö, Riitta (2002), 'Who is ‘us’ in Russian political discourse', in Anna Duszak (ed.), *Us and Others* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins).

Quinn, Naomi and Holland, Dorothy (eds.) (1987), *Cultural models in language and thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).


Radden, Günter (2005), 'The ubiquity of metonymy', in Jose Luis Otal Campo (ed.), *Cognitive and discourse approaches to metaphor and metonymy* (Universitat Jaume I).


Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, Francisco José and Usón, Ricardo Mairal (2007), 'High-level metaphor and metonymy in meaning construction', in Günter Radden, Klaus-Michael Köpcke, Thomas Berg and Peter Siemund (ed.), Aspects of meaning construction (Amsterdam: John Benjamins), 33-49.

Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, Francisco José and Velasco, Olga Diez (2002), 'Patterns of conceptual interaction', in René Dirven and Ralf Pörings (eds.), Metaphor and metonymy in comparison and contrast (Berlin/New York: Muyton de Gruyter).


Semino, Elena (2008), Metaphor in discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).


Seto, Ken-ichi (1999), 'Distinguishing metonymy from synecdoche', in Klaus-Uwe Panther and Günter Radden (eds.), Metonymy in language and thought (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins), 91-120.


SketchEngine (2008), (LEXCOM Lexical Computing).

Slobin, Dan (1996), 'From "thought and language" to "thinking for speaking"', in John J. Gumperz and Stephen C. Levinson (eds.), Rethinking linguistic relativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 70-96.


Steen, Gerard, Biernacka, Ewa, Dorst, Alotta, Kaal, Anna, López-Rodríguez; Irene, and Pasma, Tryntje (2010), 'Pragglejaz in practice: finding metaphorically
used words in natural discourse', in Graham Low, Lynne Cameron, Alice Deignan, and Zazie Todd (eds.), *Metaphor in the real world* (Amsterdam: Benjamins), 165-85.


Stefanowitsch, Anatol (2006), 'Corpus-based approaches to metaphor and metonymy', in Anatol Stefanowitsch and Stefan Th. Gries (eds.), *Corpus-based approaches to metaphor and metonymy*, 1-16.


Appendix

This appendix is one half of the focus group transcript (lines 1 – 2576). The identified metonymies are presented in bold font. Underlining represents metaphorically used words and phrases – as originally identified and marked in the Perception and Communication of Terrorism Risk project (Cameron and Maslen 2010 (ESRC RES 228250053)).

1 RM ok,
2 RM thank you very much,
3 RM and I'm Rob,
4 RM and I live in,
5 RM .. Bradford
6 RM so,
7 RM .. nowhere near you.
8 ALL <@>
9 RM and this is Rachele and,
10 RM she .. also lives in London,
11 RM though she is from Italy,
12 RM ... (1.0) ok,
13 RM if I say the word terrorism,
14 RM .. what's the first .. thing,
15 RM that comes into your head?
16 RM can I get [a response from everyone again
17 RM X please],
18 Chris [fear],
19 xx [fear],
20 xx fear,
21 xx fear,
22 Abbie ... (2.0) well,
23 Abbie ... (3.0) I'm Northern Irish
24 Abbie so,
25 Abbie to me,
26 Abbie the word terrorism,
27 Abbie is .. received with,
28 Abbie scepticism.
29 Abbie .. initially.
30 RM okay.
31 Amy ... (1.0) panic,
32 Liz ... (1.0) yeah,
33 Liz I'd say fear,
34 Fiona ... (1.0) I --
35 Fiona I think of--
36 Fiona the two images --
37 Fiona two images,
38 Fiona come into my head,
39 Fiona either the--
40 Fiona the bus .. attack,
Fiona in--
Fiona in er,
Fiona Euston,
Fiona the bus--
Fiona you know,
Fiona near,
Fiona Russell Square,
Fiona .. and .. and 9/11,
Fiona New York,
Fiona X,
Irene I think of,
Irene erm,
Irene ... the total c- confusion,
Irene erm-
Irene ...(1.0) panic,
Irene and confusion,
Irene ...(1.0) fear,
Irene you know,
Irene usual things.
Janet fear,
Janet fear of my sons being harmed,
Janet .. they're working in London.
Molly yes X,
Molly chaos,
Molly .. bombs,
Molly .. especially like,
Molly you know,
Molly .. images,
Molly that we've .. seen recently,
Molly .. in the news,
Molly .. flash up,
Molly immediately.
Molly ... erm--
Molly probably quite London-centric,
Molly .. then moving around--
Molly later I think about,
Molly obviously terrorism,
Molly .. across the world,
Molly .. in Israel,
Molly XX,
Molly ...(1.0) something like that,
RM ok.
RM .. thank you.
RM we're--
RM we're very interested,
RM in getting at,
RM .. where people get their ideas,
RM about .. terrorism from,
RM so,
RM .. can I ask you,
RM now,
RM .. this is for everybody,
RM or whoever wants to talk,
RM .. erm--
RM who do you talk to,
RM .. about terrorism,
RM ...(1.0) if and when you do,
RM who's- who's it with?
xx [X].
Chris [X my family],
Chris yes my family,
Chris particularly.
Chris I remember the day when they were, bombing London,
(1.0) my son was, upstairs, and he'd,
... had a night .. out, the night before,
so he was still asleep, as I just ran upstairs and said,
<QS God they're bombing London
they're bombing London QS>.
Chris .. and he jumped out of bed, and ran downstairs,
Chris and we just sat there, watching television,
Chris for hours on end.
Chris .. that was, erm,
Chris the Russell Square bombing.
Chris ...(1.0) [and that],
Irene [and my-]--
Chris and that was my family,
Chris my closest to me.
Irene and my son,
Irene I h- heard it on, the car radio,
Irene and he was w-
Irene walking X towards Old Street,
Irene .. g- to get on the tube,
Irene .. so I phoned him up,
Irene I said,
Irene <QS don't go on the tube,
don't go on the tube QS>,
Irene you know,
Irene and er,
Irene and all he said was,
Irene er,
Irene well first of all,
Irene he thought it was just .. an accident,
Irene .. and then--
Irene and then he said,
Irene <Q well
it can't be an accident Q>,
Irene X so many police around,
Irene there's so many ambulances around,
Irene i- it's got to be much more than that.
Irene .. so-
Irene it's--
Irene it's--
Irene ...(1.0) it's just
Irene the fear that is,
Irene any-
Irene anywhere,
Irene .. you never know,
Irene your next minutes,
Irene .. you know-
Irene I think,
Irene that's the --
Irene that's a great problem.
Irene .. that's a big worry.
you never know when it is going to strike.

Liz do you.

RM mm.

Amy you can speak to friends,

Amy and you will always speak,

Amy to somebody who's had a-

Amy somebody who knows somebody,

Amy who was nearly .. there,

Amy or who was nearly on the tube,

xx mm.

Amy it seems,

Amy <X they've seen X> XX,

Amy which is when so many people died,

Amy XX,

Amy <X as she X> said,

Amy something completely different,

Amy and it's,

Amy .. every minute you are just getting,

Amy ...(1.0) another perspective on it,

Amy and XX,

Fiona I think I block it out.

Fiona I don't think I speak to anybody about it.

Fiona I er,

Fiona I--

Fiona I don't .. try and-

Fiona I try not to think about it.

Fiona ... erm-

Fiona so,

Fiona erm,

Fiona to answer your question,

Fiona who do I talk to about it,

Fiona I talk to nobody about it.

RM okay.

Janet I am the same.

Janet I do that as well.

Janet ...(1.0) I don't want to think about it.

Janet ... it is so out of my control.

Janet .. so there is no point dwelling on it.

Janet X

RM does anyone who --

RM who does .. talk about the subject,

RM find themselves,

RM doing it,

RM with anyone other than,

RM members of their family?

RM ...(1.0) you touched on friends there,

Liz in the supermarket,

Liz people talk about it.

Liz .. in the supermarket queue,

Liz quite often.

Fiona @

Liz no,

Liz really.

Liz .. all the -

Liz if you're in a long queue,

Liz .. and something like that,

Liz has just occurred,

Liz ... people were just,

Liz sort of--

Liz mesmerised.

Liz and shocked,
and,
.. talking about it,
... I have a fear of going on Underground,
I don't like Underground anyway,
.. and now,
if--
I have to think twice,
if I have got to go anywhere,
.. and use the Underground,
... because I'm claustrophobic,
the thought of going down underground anyway,
...(1.0) doesn't,
...(1.0) excite me,
.. or if somebody is walking behind me,
I'm--
I'm out shopping,
and X if you hear footsteps,
you are sort of wary,
...(2.0) more so now than ever.
does anyone else find themselves,
talking to anyone other than ..family?
yeah,
I talk to my friends.
erm,
.. just to,
not so much attached to one --
er an individual event,
but rather than,
the era that we find ourselves in now,
.. like the political climate,
.. we might discuss how that's,
erm --
...(1.0) impacting upon how we see other people,
on our relations with,
.. other countries,
politics in general.
and it's,
.. a very unique position that we're in now.
I think you're --
also if you're out .. to dinner,
with a group of .. friends,
who don't necessarily know each other,
you're the--
you're .. the mutual friends' host,
.. you end--
you X .. inevitably,
end up talking about,
.. politics.
9/11 particularly,
does come up,
in .. quite a lot of conversations,
you know,
because that's,
was just so devastating,
for everybody involved.
and what is it that--
that prompts it?
what .. brings the subject .. up?
...(3.0) some-
normally on such a wide scale isn't it?
lives lost,
people --

you know,

families being ripped apart,

because it's a real threat,

it's everywhere in the world.

yes it is.

xx [XX]

I think when people,

plan a holiday,

when they plan,

a summer holiday,

an Easter holiday,

I think it then comes up,

in conversations,

about going to certain places,

or just travelling in general.

I think then it comes up.

yeah, that's true.

when you are just about to go to the airport,

someone will say,

about the searching,

or 'cos there's more security now--

we've just come back from Thailand,

with my boyfriend,

and,

.. as you're going in,

you had to put everything,

like you couldn't take any tweezers,

no lighters,

no batteries,

anything.

and there's a huge,

plastic box,

you had to put everything in.

I mean I got taken--

I had some <dry shampoo>

I XX,

I got like four bottles,

taken off me,

.. like everything just gets--

.. and then you obviously talk to people,

in the queue,

<X about X>,

why they're doing this,

or,

.. some people,

<X and that X>,

think that it is really good,

that they're doing this,

RM yeah.

oh yes,

you check in,

.. quite a few hours --

especially,

.. on long haul,

it's about four hours,

so,

we went to New York last year,

and that was--
.. but that was good,
because I've been to America before,
and on American Airlines,
... they were very lax.
...(1.0) very very lax.
we went,
on an internal flight,
and,
.. it was just like getting on a bus,
there's no security.
there was no security,
whatssoever,
and that was American Airlines.
the pilot actually,
walked on and said,
<Q I won't be a moment Q>,
as if he was getting,
his bus ready.
.. but that was before 9/11.
right.
what--
what other sources of information are there?
.. where else might you hear,
about the subject from?
movies.
... films.
because there are so many films with,
...(3.0) stories,
linked to terror threats.
you know even,
...(3.0) silly silly movies,
like The Poseidon Adventure,
or something like that,
you know,
erm,
... and and-
I can't think.
... Catch-22,
or,
you know,
movies like that.
Jeffrey Archer's new book is all about,
9/11.
and the twin towers coming down,
<X so much X>,
.. the Americans actually received it really well,
... the way he has done that.
that's --
he was on Richard and Judy,
.. and that's X - 
I hadn't heard anything for a while,
this was only last week,
and that was the only thing I'd heard,
for a long time,
about it,
and it just brings it all back.
and then,
they start talking about the London terror attacks,
and then,
...(1.0) you just hear it,
all the time,
Fiona songs,
Fiona as well,
Fiona erm--
Fiona .. Melissa Etheridge,
Fiona erm,
Fiona who is an American,
Fiona erm sort of-
Fiona .. rock folk singer,
Fiona erm,
Fiona she's got a song,
Fiona about the 9/11 attack.
Fiona .. Bruce Springsteen,
Fiona wrote a whole --
Fiona his --
Fiona .. I think,
Fiona either his last album,
Fiona or the album before,
Fiona was all about,
Fiona .. 9/11 as well.
Fiona so--
Fiona .. a lot of songs.
Amy there is a lot of things,
Amy in magazines now,
Amy as well.
Amy and a lot of,
Amy good stories,
Amy like,
Amy <Q 9/11 .. two years on Q>,
Amy or something or--
Amy and there was one,
Amy last year I remember,
Amy it was 9/11 .. mothers,
Amy and it was women who were pregnant,
Amy at the time,
Amy and who'd lost partners,
Amy who worked in the World Trade Centre.
Amy .. and them with their babies a year on,
Amy and what they were doing,
Amy and --
Amy sort of,
Amy <swapped > stories,
Amy and things like that,
Amy some of them have got X new partners,
Amy or,
Amy .. some of them had,
Amy .. had twins,
Amy when they were not expecting that,
Amy X,
Amy X,
Liz there is also,
Liz erm,
Liz about the --
Liz that girl,
Liz in .. in the London bombing,
Liz who had both her legs blown off,
xx [yes],
xx [X],
Liz and then she married,
Liz didn't she,
Liz and they followed--
Liz I did watch--
Liz: I don't watch a lot of television, but I did follow that one.

Chris: she walked down the aisle,

Liz: [didn't she]

Chris: [how brave],

Liz: you know,

Liz: ... it was--

Liz: ...amazing,

Liz: .. you know,

Liz: I think,

Liz: .. sometimes these things,

Liz: only happen to,

Liz: really brave people.

Liz: .. the- the strength that she had,

Liz: and the determination,

Irene: and when--

Irene: and,

Irene: .. hostages,

Irene: when they ge- go--

Irene: go into these countries,

Irene: like like--

Irene: like er --

Irene: th- this week,

Irene: .. you know --

Irene: and --

Irene: and the different reaction,

Irene: between the --

Irene: the Canadian guy,

Irene: and the British guy,

Irene: .. th-

Irene: the Canadian guy,

Irene: was so thankful,

Irene: so grateful,

Irene: .. and --

Irene: our guy just said,

Irene: <Q okay.

Irene: you know,

Irene: thanks,

Irene: thanks mate Q>,

Irene: you know,

Irene: and walked off.

Irene: and e-

Irene: they don't think <X anything X> about it,

Irene: and and--

Irene: people want to go to these countries,

Irene: .. for,

Irene: religious,

Irene: erm,

Irene: .. Christianity,

Irene: wha-

Irene: what's --

Irene: what is it?

Irene: what- what are they going for,

Irene: you know?

Irene: and the-

Irene: and they say,

Irene: <Q well,

Irene: d- don't --

Irene: ... don't save me,

Irene: if- .. if I become a hostage Q>,
Irene but,
Irene .. but we do.
xx .. we erm,
xx lose lives,
xx on trying to save people,
xx .. and er --
xx .. and people put themselves into,
xx .. difficult environments.
RM is anyone -
RM is anyone,
RM aware of any other source of information?
Abbie newspapers,
Abbie .. television,
Fiona the internet.
RM ...(1.0) has anyone came across any government leaflets on--
RM on the subject?
Amy X,
Janet yes,
Janet yes,
Liz we did have one,
Liz didn't we,
Liz put through--
Amy it's awful.
Amy every time you're in the Underground,
Amy every two seconds,
Amy it's,
Amy <Q watch your bag,
Amy watch your X,
Amy watch your bag Q >,
Amy a lot more than it was,
Amy .. before,
Amy .. watching .. who's around you,
Amy if you see anything suspicious.
Amy <X you never see anything suspicious X>.
RM I'll come back to that,
RM [yeah],
Liz [we had]-
Liz we had leaflets,
Liz put through the door.
Janet yes,
Fiona did you?
Liz yes,
Liz yes,
Fiona what to do,
Fiona .. in a terrorist attack,
Fiona [what to]-
Liz [what to do]
Liz yeah.
Liz what to do,
Liz [in a terrorist]--
Irene [[where do you live again]]?
Liz leaflets,
Liz it was like--
Irene and where do you live?
Liz [LOC],
Irene oh,
Irene [LOC],
Liz .. yes we did,
Fiona it was a government-produced leaflet
Fiona wasn't it.
Fiona yeah.

Fiona .. [I saved mine].

Janet [I can't even remember what was in it.]

Janet do you remember what was in it?

Fiona it was--

Fiona it was,

Fiona kind of laid out like,

Fiona erm,

Fiona .. <Q what to do,

Fiona when your plane crashes Q>.

xx oh my God.

Fiona it was like,

Fiona you know--,

xx <@@>

Fiona <@@> you know those drawings,

Fiona X,

xx XXX

Janet I was pretty unimpressed.

xx XX

Fiona there was--

Fiona there was lots of--

Fiona .. there was lots of graphics in it,

Fiona of .. you know,

Fiona what--

Fiona you know,

Fiona what to do if you see a--

Fiona a bag,

Fiona and there would be a,

Fiona you know,

Fiona a drawing of a bag,

Fiona and--

Fiona and so forth.

Abbie ...(2.0) it didn't have much impact XX

Fiona no,

Fiona 'cos I thought,

Fiona .. I thought,

Fiona .. that's an unusual leaflet.

Fiona I think I should keep that,

Fiona for .. posterity.

ALL @@

RM ...(1.0) ok,

RM erm-

RM what you think the risks are,

RM actually,

RM from terrorism?

RM what- what--

RM might happen?

Janet ...(1.0) I think probably,

Janet the risks are quite small.

Janet but,

Janet we could have a major attack here,

Janet any time.

Janet .. and,

Janet my biggest fear is--

Janet that it's,

Janet the unseen .. thing,

Janet that's going to .. spread,

Janet and cause,

Janet - a lot of,

Janet deaths.
you mean like,
that,
they talked about that,
chemical,
they were going to release und--,
in the underground,
or
[yeah]
[yeah]
my fr-- --
that would be horrendous,
absolutely horrendous.
the thought of that,
my fr-
.. my friend at work is,
absolutely terrified of that.
.. and she talks about that,
.. quite a bit.
I think-
I used to get the Piccadilly line,
every day,
and that's all completely underground,
and there would be no escape,
from anything,
like that.
.. and I mean,
I've --
I mean,
l er,
honestly think it is quite a small risk,
and you hear these things.
<Q they've foiled this plot in,
...(2.0) Israel,
or wherever,
that was planning to,
...(1.0) create mass hysteria,
and kill thousands of people Q>.
oh yeah,
you hear of plots like,
in London,
that they follow,
[don't you],
yeah,
and I mean],
I worked at [LONDON DEPARTMENT STORE],
and in my .. introduction last --
it was just after the,
...(1.0) seventh of July,
things,
XX starting to be XX,
.. and they were talking about,
erm,
.. [LONDON DEPARTMENT STORE],
is the most bombed building in Europe.
it has been bombed 13 times,
in like],
[really],
in the past 20 years or something.
.. and there's --
there's actually like memorial stones outside,
Amy quite a scary thing.

Amy I mean,

Amy they have,

Amy .. bomb curtains in the canteen,

Amy and,

Amy .. they tell you how to use everything,

Amy and,

Amy tape <X your calls X> if,

Amy there's going to be a bomb,

Amy and- and they find things,

Amy a lot of the time.

Amy .. you hear stuff,

Amy like it's been <Q Mr and Mrs so and so Q>,

Amy report to so and so Q>,

Liz probably because,

Liz Mr [OWNER OF STORE] is,

Liz XX

Amy yeah,

Amy but I mean,

Amy you find them in,

Amy ... like,

Amy .. in video cassette tapes,

Amy or cigarette packets,

Amy .. hidden usually,

Amy in the furniture part,

Amy and they put them down the back of --

Amy .. sort of like underneath,

RM mm.

Janet where do you find?

Irene Harrods,

Amy they can put bombs in videotapes,

Janet oh right,

Amy or in like cigarette packets,

Amy it just looks like a piece of rubbish.

Amy and they can put them in the bins,

Amy X

Liz they have got-

Liz they have got no--

Liz you know,

Liz these terrorists,

Liz have got no,

Liz .. erm,

Liz scruples,

Liz have they.

Liz no feeling,

Liz they're just,

Liz .. (2.0) just wi--

Liz wicked.

Janet well,

Janet they think we're wicked,

Janet don't they,

Janet [it is scary],

RM [does it ],

RM does it occur to you,

RM I'll --

RM I'll kind of,

RM take you in that direction,

RM in just a moment,

RM but,

RM just one final point on this,
does it occur to you that anything else
might happen?
we have,
erm,
like a range of possibilities X,
[or is that XX],
[i always] imagine that one day,
the the --
that the houses of Parliament will be blown up.
that something then will [[happen]],
[[XX]]
the houses of Parliament.
and,
I just think,
<X your X> Canary Wharf's,
a large building,
[X]
[yes,
the city],
the city.
[[X be hit X]],
[[XX]]
[[when a lot's going on]],
even X,
at the Albert Hall,
you .. sometimes think,
when it's absolutely full.
mm.
<X you see X>,
you could --
you can't tell,
it could be a very high-profile,
area,
or target,
or,
it could not.
I mean,
.. Shepherds Bush,
foiled attempt recently,
.. was not high-profile,
it would have caused,
a hell of a lot of .. deaths,
had it -
.. had it happened.
you know,
so,
it's -
.. you don't know,
that's the whole thing,
I think.
it's --
we can't tell,
<X wherefore [PARTICIPANT FROM NI] X> fear's .. widespread.
because .. no one knows when,
or how,
or if,
it will happen.
[I remember]--
it's very eth --
it's very ethnic.
it's very ethnically mixed around here,
Molly as well,
Molly so you--
Molly .. you presume,
Molly they don't target somewhere,
Molly where it's quite,
Molly .. erm heterogeneous,
Molly and there's only one kind of person,
Molly the sort of person that they're <X after X>,
Molly to get.
Liz I don't think they care,
Irene [I don't think they care],
Janet [they don't care about their own],
Irene I don't think they care.
Irene .. they don't care who you are.
Irene whether you're .. children,
Irene adults,
Irene [I don't think they care],
xx [no X],
Janet [it doesn't make any difference to them,
Janet there is not proper XX at all].
Irene no.
Irene .. they don't care who you are.
Irene whether you're .. children,
Irene adults,
Irene [I don't think they care],
Fiona I remember erm,
Fiona a taxi driver,
Fiona once saying to me,
Fiona <Q all they've got to do,
Fiona is just .. blow the bridges up Q>.
Fiona .. that would cause .. chaos,
Fiona to London.
Fiona <@>
Liz yeah.
Liz my husband,
Liz [X],
Janet [I actually think],
Janet they're more,
Janet .. intelligent than that.
Janet and I think that the .. moves,
Janet they are likely to make now,
Janet are going to be much more subtle.
Janet .. and,
Janet er,
Janet I was suspicious,
Janet of .. the strikes,
Janet that er,
Janet brought the airlines to a close.
Janet .. I thought that could've been terrorist-based.
Janet ...(2.0) do you remember?
RM mm.
Janet recently.
xx yeah.
Janet because,
Janet .. there's an awful lot of Muslims,
Janet that were in the catering .. business,
Janet .. and--
Janet er,
Janet the fact that they were able to,
Janet .. stop,
Janet air traffic,
Janet .. and I--
Janet actually travelling in that time,
Janet no food on an aeroplane
Janet on long haul.
Janet which was quite unusual.
Janet ... and,
Janet .. I was very suspicious,
Janet that it could have been,
Janet .. a terrorist plot.
Janet I know it sounds a bit dramatic,
Janet but I thought it would have,
Janet .. actually been,
Janet a very successful,
Janet .. terrorist plot,
Janet .. with nobody actually being caught,
Janet .. although some people lost their jobs.
Janet .. but that caused,
Janet millions and millions,
Janet of pounds worth of --
Janet to the economy,
Janet it stopped lots of people,
Janet having business appointments,
Janet .. and I think terrorism could take,
Janet this sort of form,
Janet .. as opposed to .. bombs.
Janet .. so there is more than one way,
Janet they're attacking us.
xx oh yeah.
xx they are attacking us --
xx .. our economy as well.
RM that's very interesting.
RM i- it- er,
RM it sort of predicts this question in a way.
RM but how --
RM .. how do you think,
RM the terrorists decide on their actions?
Janet they want to hurt us.
Janet .. they want to hurt the West,
Janet .. they want to,
Janet .. change our lifestyle,
Janet they want us,
Janet to be more humble,
Janet and erm,
Janet .. they want us to live like they do.
RM ...(2.0) does anyone else have a thought
RM [on that] ?
Janet [all of us] would be wearing burkas,
Janet if they had their way.
RM ...(3.0) how do they decide,
RM on what they do?
Amy I think they take a long time to decide.
Amy they plan everything.
Liz down to --
Liz its intricate,
Liz isn't it.
Amy yeah,
Amy very very well,
Amy they've got a lot,
Janet [there is no rush,
Janet is there].
Amy [they have a lot of],
Amy people learning.
Amy .. they had the guy,
Amy from .. Leeds university,
Amy who was--
956 Amy ... a biochemist,
957 Amy ... or something like that.
958 Liz yeah,
959 Liz ...(1.0) they brainwash these youngsters,
960 Liz though,
961 Liz don't they.
962 Liz [<X all these young people X>].
963 Abbie [I think it can be very sophisticated].
964 Abbie it can also be remarkably simple,
965 Abbie as well.
966 Abbie ... some of the,
967 Abbie maj-
968 Abbie major impact things.
969 Abbie can be --
970 Abbie ...(1.0) can be created,
971 Abbie from a very small cell.
972 Janet yeah,
973 Liz you know that from Northern Ireland.
974 Abbie yeah,
975 Abbie I mean,
976 Abbie ... you know,
977 Abbie in Northern Ireland,
978 Abbie people,
979 Abbie ...(1.0) they might be clever terrorists,
980 Abbie but they weren't high-profile government,
981 Abbie you know,
982 Abbie they were ordinary people,
983 Abbie on the ground.
984 Abbie ... very ordinary people,
985 Abbie who had,
986 Abbie ...(1.0) a fight to fight as they saw it,
987 Abbie and went about that in various ways.
988 Abbie do you know what I mean?
989 Abbie ... so you don't have to be --
990 Abbie it doesn't have to be terribly sophisticated,
991 Abbie to cause a lot of--
992 Irene I think --
993 Abbie damage,
994 Irene I think they are sophisticated,
995 Irene I think they're clever,
996 Irene they are shrewd,
997 Irene and they are fearless,
998 Amy but things like 9/11,
999 Amy they got on board with--
1000 Amy [penknives and stuff],
1001 Abbie [but that was],
1002 Amy that was a really simple thing to do,
1003 Amy they could,
1004 Amy ... get these things X--
1005 Liz but they used,
1006 Liz the- the young to do that,
1007 Liz didn't they.
1008 Abbie but the 9/11 was a masterstroke.
1009 Abbie I mean,
1010 Abbie ... as everyone knows,
1011 Abbie ... you know,
1012 Abbie you could never--
1013 Abbie you know--
1014 Abbie sometimes,
1015 Abbie ...(1.0) truth is stranger than fiction,
1016 Abbie it was on 9/11.
... it was so classic,
that it left the world, 
[A]
.. and just seeing],
[that no one could believe],
and that was s- --
that was planned,
as we know,
from documentaries since,
.. that was highly organised,
.. highly clever,
and that was cooking for a long-time,
.. and it had the impact,
.. but then since that,
because that--
because of the major clampdown --
.. clampdown on security,
.. you're only able to do that once.
.. you know.
.. but once was enough,
to shake the world.
.. [and since that,
.. it has been sporadic attacks],
.. they wanted to.
.. but then since that,
because that--
.. clampdown on security,
.. you're only able to do that once.
.. you know.
.. but once was enough,
to shake the world.
.. [and since that,
.. it has been sporadic attacks],
.. they wanted to.
.. but then since that,
because that--
because of the major clampdown --
.. clampdown on security,
.. you're only able to do that once.
.. you know.
.. but once was enough,
to shake the world.
.. [and since that,
.. it has been sporadic attacks],
.. they wanted to.
.. but then since that,
because that--
because of the major clampdown --
.. clampdown on security,
.. you're only able to do that once.
.. you know.
.. but once was enough,
to shake the world.
.. [and since that,
.. it has been sporadic attacks],
.. they wanted to.
.. but then since that,
because that--
because of the major clampdown --
.. clampdown on security,
.. you're only able to do that once.
.. you know.
.. but once was enough,
to shake the world.
.. [and since that,
.. it has been sporadic attacks],
.. they wanted to.
.. but then since that,
because that--
because of the major clampdown --
.. clampdown on security,
.. you're only able to do that once.
.. you know.
.. but once was enough,
to shake the world.
.. [and since that,
.. it has been sporadic attacks],
.. they wanted to.
.. but then since that,
because that--
because of the major clampdown --
.. clampdown on security,
.. you're only able to do that once.
.. you know.
.. but once was enough,
to shake the world.
Fiona a job in [LONDON DEPARTMENT STORE],
xx <@@>
Irene it's easy,
Liz no but they do,
Liz they worm their way in,
Irene it is just so easy.
Irene it is.
Irene it's really easy.
Janet they have --
Janet they have [no conscience] either,
Irene [no],
Janet and they are not afraid to die,
Janet for their beliefs.
Janet and this is something new.
Janet .. that,
Janet .. fro--
Janet as--
Janet a--
Janet in the past,
Janet .. terrorists wanted to live,
Janet .. but these people don't care about this,
Chris well they --
Chris they're assuming that they are--
Chris ...(1.0) in the light,
Chris of the eyes of God,
Liz [and that's],
xxx XXX
Liz that's the scary thing,
Irene but I --
Irene I think the worst bit,
Irene is they are,
Irene very intelligent people.
Irene .. very intelligent.
Irene .. it's not stupid people who do it.
Irene it's very .. technically minded people.
RM ...(1.0) what do you think,
RM the effect has been on people,
RM of this threat,
RM of terrorism?
Amy a lot of people,
Amy X don't get,
Amy public transport any more.
Amy .. a lot of people,
Amy are very afraid,
Amy and very --
Amy .. you see people,
Amy X I get the tube every day,
Amy at rush hour,
Amy X,
Amy you see people like,
Amy eyeing people up,
Amy or,
Amy you know,
Amy moving .. away,
Amy from <X other X> carriages,
Amy and,
Amy .. hardly anybody gets in the first two carriages,
Amy everyone crams in,
Amy the back end of the carriages,
Amy -- because that's where,
Amy ...(1.0) bombs would probably be,
Amy X stop,
Amy they'll take out the first few carriages,
Amy to stop the train.
Amy ...(1.0) you see people,
Amy a lot of people,
Amy going to the back of the carriages,
Fiona I think,
Fiona I'm a lot,
Fiona more suspicious,
Fiona if I see a bag,
Fiona I'll be like,
Fiona <QS hello,
Fiona whose bag's this? QS>,
Janet yes,
Fiona yes,
Janet I've done that in airports,
Janet I did that in America,
Janet <and I couldn't believe in @>,
Janet these bags hanging around,
Janet @,
Janet I went up,
Janet <QS excuse me,
Janet there is bags,
Janet over there QS>,
Janet <Q oh really?! Q>,
Janet they weren't the slightest bit fazed,
Janet actually but,
Fiona no I've done it a couple of times,
Fiona in pubs,
Fiona in .. central London,
Liz I actually,
Liz made --
Liz the --
Liz .. erm --
Liz when we went --
Liz .. we went to Cuba,
Liz just over a year ago,
Liz and all the men had to take their shoes off,
Liz their belts,
Liz ... and I have never seen that,
Liz before,
Fiona I went to New York,
Fiona a--
Fiona a month ago,
Fiona and I had to take my shoes and belt off.
Janet they make take your belt off,
Janet and your coat,
Janet [as well],
Liz [yes your coat],
Janet coats,
Janet all your jewellery,
Janet and shoes,
Liz we went to New York,
Liz just over a year ago,
Liz X,
Liz ... and I fly to France,
Liz an awful lot.
Liz .. my son lives in France,
Liz and,
Liz ... they've even got,
Liz: you know, in the small airport, which you go to, we fly down to Carcassonne, and they've become very very conscious of looking for X, checking you, and shoes come off there, as well.

Liz: people are a lot more suspicious.

Fiona: I think people are a lot more suspicious.

Fiona: you know, er, more wary of, other people, and their .. luggage, and their bags, and .. <Q who are they Q>, and stuff, if you are on a bus, or on a tube, or -- in a pub in Central London.

Liz: you do have to, be at the airports, a lot lot earlier, even for the shorter flights. but it was four hours, before for New York, and that is a long long time.

Irene: was once working for, a large company, large building, and we did have, red alert days. when we -- when we d--- everyone .. had to .. evacuate the building.

Irene: certainly, and it quite often happened, during the- .. the Gulf War, after 9/11.

Irene: yeah.

Molly: I think also -- you erm, are aware, that you are looking at people.

Molly: erm, Muslim-looking people, and you,
.. start wondering.
.. and you think,
<QS oh,
why am I doing this QS >.
and,
before that point.
you never --
you know,
you never did.
it was --
now <X they're just like X>,
XXX
.. Metropolitan Police,
.. and erm,
.. you feel terribly guilty,
for doing so,
.. but there is always that nagging thought,
you know,
[X],
[so true],
I remember,
it was about two days,
after that bus attack,
.. and I was sat ne--
I was sat next to this,
really old Muslim guy,
all in his,
whole outfit,
and he had the biggest of bags,
@ @,
like this,
.. on the bus,
and I'm sat next to him,
I'm thinking,
<QS what's in your bag SQ> [TONE OF COMEDIC SUSPICION]
ALL @ @,
and it was like,
sort of <X half an hour trip X>,
it was terrible.
and I kept thinking to myself,
<QS no.
don't be so silly QS>,
you know,
you're being,
[X]
[you can't],
you can't,
you know,
look at them all,
@,
and think --
but we went-
we took the children to the museum,
.. in half term,
and,
.. God it's a nightmare.
getting into the museum,
because the queues,
you don't --
you're- you're checked --
...(1.0) everything is checked.
Liz: ...I mean,
Liz: ...I can remember,
Liz: we never did that.
Liz: nobody--
Liz: you're checked wherever you go now.
XX: yeah.
Liz: if you go to a --
Liz: erm,
Liz: .. theatres --
Irene: yes,
Liz: and--
Amy XXX,
Amy: they had actual metal detectors,
Amy: X,
Liz: open air,
Liz: you know,
Liz: festivals or--
Liz: [ X musicals?],
Irene: [I'm quite used],
Irene: to it now though.,
Irene: .. I am quite used to being checked.
Irene: I'm quite happy that I'm checked.
XX: yes.
XX: yes.
Janet: [it's quite reassuring in a way],
Chris: yes [I am happy],
Chris: that there are some checks],
Fiona: saying that though,
Fiona: a friend of mine --
Fiona: .. a very good friend of mine,
Fiona: lives in Israel,
Fiona: and she said,
Fiona: that she's checked,
Fiona: to go into the local shop,
Fiona: to buy --
Fiona: to buy a loaf of bread.
Irene: I can believe it.
Irene: I can believe it.
Fiona: and your ch- --
Fiona: sh- --
Fiona: she says you are checked,
Fiona: to go into s--
Fiona: into the mall,
Fiona: the shopping mall,
Fiona: .. and then you are checked,
Fiona: to go into the shops,
Fiona: inside the mall,
Fiona: .. and I think that,
Fiona: that would just drive me insane.
Fiona: .. especially when you just pop out,
Fiona: to get a loaf of bread.
Irene: no,
Irene: I think,
Irene: in Israel,
Irene: X
Irene: I would be,
Irene: quite happy to be checked.
XX: @@,
ALL: @@,
Liz: yeah,
Liz: I think I would too.
Molly
my thoughts,
.. recently,
.. especially soon after,
.. erm,
.. 7/7,
XX
and erm,
.. was --
<X you see X> I'm Jewish,
and was --
my thoughts were,
<QS well,
maybe people will realise,
what it's like,
in Israel,
.. and will sympathise with,
.. the situation over there SQ>.
and sometimes I feel,
the news,
.. is very one-sided.
erm,
.. and .. maybe,
if people appreciate,
s-
why,
.. there is a war,
you know,
it's better to save lives.
.. and the thing is --
<X like that X> like that,
.. and you think,
..<QS maybe it will open your eyes,
<QS certain things,
which are happening,
in other parts of the world SQ>.
.. I don't think there has though,
hugely.
.. I haven't seen a huge difference in --
in reporting or perception.
okay.
.. we'll talk about the media,
.. a bit later.
erm,
have --
have any of your --
your own --
and you've touched on that a bit.
but have any of your decisions,
activities,
changed,
in the light of --
of this situation?
Liz
X
...(2.0) I don't go on the tube.
xx
no.
xx
me neither.
...(1.0) full stop.
..(4.0) sometimes,
I tend to get off the tube,
as I am changing to the Piccadilly line,
Amy from the District.

Amy I will get off at South Kensington,

Amy and get the bus to [LAGE DEPARTMENT STORE],

Amy because sometimes,

Amy I just,

Amy I don't know,

Amy like it's really busy,

Amy or something.

Amy I just don't like --

Amy cos it's so cram-

Amy like cramped,

Amy on this tube,

Amy X everywhere,

Amy underground's pitch black,

Amy .. and I just think,

Amy <QS I'd rather just get the bus,

Amy where .. it will take me,

Amy five minutes to get there SQ>,

Amy and,

Amy so I go to the bus,

Amy and,

Amy I don't know,

Amy X

Fiona ...(1.0) I don't think --

Fiona I don't think I've changed.

Fiona I think that,

Fiona .. I've tried not to change.

Fiona I've become --

Fiona I'm suspicious,

Fiona .. but --

Fiona .. but I --

Fiona I still go on the bus.

Fiona I still go on the tube,

RM is that,

RM like,

RM a conscious decision?

Fiona yeah,

Fiona I think so,

Fiona yeah.

RM to do the same?

Fiona yeah.

Irene I probably changed in the first,

Irene 2 or 3 weeks,

Irene after th-

Irene the event,

Irene .. but after that,

Irene probably not,

Irene you know,

Irene <X you've got to X> get back to normality,

Irene after X

Janet I've always,

Janet hated the tube anyway.

Janet .. I think it's-

Janet .. it's frightening.

Janet .. for me it's frightening,

Janet to be in that space.

Janet so .. I would always try and avoid the tube.

Janet I am --

Janet I haven't really altered my life,

Janet but I am more,

Janet aware,
Janet ... (1.0) more conscious.
RM ... (2.0) all right then,
RM let's,
RM that's quite pers-
RM about personal,
RM consequences,
RM if we,
RM make it,
RM a bit broader,
RM do you think that the situation,
RM could be said to have affected some groups,
RM more than others?
xx [groups?],
Irene [what sorry?],
RM groups.
RM some groups more than others.
Irene oh groups.
Fiona yeah,
Fiona I'm sure,
Fiona that all the Muslim guys,
Fiona feel like they're being eyed up.
xx @@@
Fiona [but they have got the]--
Janet [I should think it's made it],
Janet very uncomfortable.
Janet for a lot of very,
Janet .. good Muslim people,
Janet living in this country,
Janet [[which is a shame]],
xx [[yes]],
Molly and there was a backlash,
Molly wasn't there,
Molly soon after 9/11 where,
Molly .. people,
Molly erm,
Molly were victim-
Molly erm,
Molly punished,
Molly for what they didn't do,
Molly at all.
Molly I think there was --
Fiona yeah.
Fiona that's true.
Fiona up North,
Fiona wasn't it,
Fiona I think there was,
Fiona .. some erm --
Molly yeah,
Liz XX
Liz lived up North.
Fiona a lot of restaurants,
Fiona were X.
Fiona .. in New York @,
Liz my husband's a London taxi driver and --
Liz people --
Liz they weren't busy.
Liz .. people weren't travelling.
Liz XXX
Fiona and people weren't coming into X
Liz tour- tourists weren't coming into.
Liz you know,
Liz .. people weren’t coming into London.
Abbie and has that changed?
Abbie have they come --
Abbie have they come back?
Liz yes,
Liz it’s all come --
Liz it’s back now.
Chris I think we probably,
Chris stayed out of,
Chris .. s--
Chris Central London,
Chris for quite long time,
Chris afterwards,
Chris actually.
Chris .. feel a bit nervous,
Chris going to the theatre,
Chris and places like that.
RM ..(1.0) I would like to get,
RM a bit further into this idea of-
RM of whether that some groups,
RM are more or,
RM less affected.
RM do you think,
RM it would be fair to say,
RM that some groups are more at risk,
RM of community reactions,
RM as a result,
RM of what’s happened?
Amy I could imagine in,
Amy .. like Leeds and Bradford,
Amy where those .. guys were from,
Amy .. who were responsible for that,
Amy I can imagine,
Amy there was a lot of ..(1.0) trouble.
Amy .. and then there’s --
Amy .. you can imagine,
Amy half of them retaliating.
Liz ..(2.0) they can XXX.
Molly yeah,
xx XX
Janet a Pakistani,
Janet erm,
Janet .. young man was- [26, 0,5]
Janet .. murdered,
Janet round the corner,
Janet from where I live,
Janet in [LOC],
Janet .. er,
Janet last week.
Janet .. and I don’t know,
Janet if it was racially motivated..
Janet but,
Janet .. everyone assumes,
Janet if you’re,
Janet .. erm,
Janet .. (1.0) dark skin and Indian,
Janet .. you’re Muslim.
Janet which is untrue,
Janet of course.
Janet but erm,
Janet I- I do believe,
1627 Janet that,
1628 Janet erm,
1629 Janet the Muslim,
1630 Janet the Muslim community,
1631 Janet has probably suffered a lot,
1632 Janet as erm,
1633 Janet .. a consequence of terrorism.
1634 RM ...(2.0) do you think,
1635 RM some groups,
1636 RM might be,
1637 RM less at risk,
1638 RM than others?
1639 Abbie X Muslims.
1640 Abbie ... I think it's basically,
1641 Abbie the Muslim,
1642 Abbie ...(1.0) population,
1643 Abbie which would be the main -
1644 Abbie ...(1.0) the only group,
1645 Abbie who would be X --
1646 Abbie wh- whose --
1647 Abbie .. who would be affected,
1648 Abbie .. by it,
1649 Abbie because it's all,
1650 Abbie come from.
1651 Abbie .. the Muslim,
1652 Abbie ...(1.0) world.
1653 Irene I think Asians,
1654 Irene [regardless of their religion],
1655 Janet [Asians are probably] slightly worse,
1656 Janet although,
1657 Janet Muslims are many colours,
1658 Janet and .. creeds,
1659 Janet aren't they?
1660 xx [X].
1661 xx [X].
1662 Irene well,
1663 Irene and Asians are many .. religions,
1664 Irene you know.
1665 Irene so I'd say Asians,
1666 Irene X
1667 Abbie don't you think,
1668 Abbie it just all boils [down].
1669 Abbie down to religion?
1670 Irene pardon?
1671 Abbie all the wars,
1672 Abbie and everything,
1673 Abbie are all down --
1674 Abbie basically,
1675 Abbie down to religion.
1676 Liz and greed.
1677 Abbie and greed,
1678 Liz hate and greed.
1679 RM ...(2.0) they're big questions,
1680 RM aren't they.
1681 RM I don't know if we can get,
1682 RM to the answers of those,
1683 RM today.
1684 RM .. but--
1685 RM do you think,
1686 RM erm,
1687 RM do you feel .. able,
1688 RM to understand,
1689 RM what it's like for,
1690 RM people in other groups,
1691 RM in the community?
1692 Janet definitely.
1693 Janet I do.
1694 RM ...(1.0) and--
1695 RM is that something that's changed,
1696 RM with this situation?
1697 Amy I've got no first hand experience of it.
1698 Amy I don't know anybody who's .. Muslim,
1699 Amy or anything.
1700 Amy but I can sympathize,
1701 Amy with what they must .. be feeling,
1702 Amy just from my own suspicion,
1703 Amy X
1704 Amy 'cos they must think --
1705 Amy X how they must feel.
1706 Amy ..but that's as far as I can go,
1707 Amy .. 'cos I don't,
1708 Amy X Muslims.
1709 Amy X get their point of view,
1710 Amy .. just from reading newspapers on,
1711 Amy X
1712 Janet X,
1713 Janet I don't know anybody.
1714 Amy it's quite a hard question to say,
1715 Amy which groups have been more affected,
1716 Amy because,
1717 Amy X,
1718 Amy X,
1719 RM mm.
1720 RM does anyone else have--
1721 RM have a sense,
1722 RM of being able to,
1723 RM understand,
1724 RM what it's like,
1725 RM for other groups?
1726 Liz I think it must be X,
1727 Janet well I think X,
1728 Janet X it's a bit touchy.
1729 Janet erm,
1730 Molly <that's @ok>,
1731 Janet @,
1732 Janet I think,
1733 Janet the Palestinians actually,
1734 Janet have a .. good cause to be angry.
1735 Janet and,
1736 Janet erm,
1737 Janet they've been persecuted,
1738 Janet for a long long time,
1739 Janet .. and,
1740 Janet nobody took any notice,
1741 Janet .. of their .. cry.
1742 Janet and,
1743 Janet .. what happens,
1744 Janet when you put somebody in a corner.
1745 Janet they start to fight.
1746 Janet and they're fighting dirty.
1747 Janet an-
1748 Janet not all the,
Janet the bombers are,
Janet erm,
Janet ...(1.0) from Palestine,
Janet but I think a lot of grief,
Janet .. and a lot of anger's,
Janet stemmed from that area.
Janet and,
Janet [SIREN OUTSIDE]
Janet [probably a lot of recruitment,
Janet has come,
Janet from,
Janet young Palestinians,
Janet because they have no hope,
Janet and when you take away somebody's hope,
Janet then you take away their life.
RM ...(3.0) do you think,
RM that your--
RM what you think about that,
RM has changed,
RM ... since we've,
RM .. been in this situation here?
Janet ...(3.0) I am sorry,
Janet I don't understand,
Janet what you mean.
RM I mean,
RM is that --
RM do you think,
RM you think differently about it now,
RM from how you would have done,
RM a few years ago?
Janet what,
Janet after us being,
Janet .. terrorized,
Janet you mean?
Janet .. no,
Janet not really,
Janet because,
Janet .. there are so many areas,
Janet erm,
Janet where people,
Janet don't have a voice.
Janet .. and--
Janet that's--
Janet .. it's the anger,
Janet that's causing this.
Janet .. and a lot of people living in poverty,
Janet and they see us,
Janet living in.
Janet to them,
Janet and I mean,
Janet for us it is ordinary life,
Janet but they see us as being very affluent,
Janet .. and there's a lot of,
Janet poverty in the world,
Janet and they are very--
Janet that is why they are so angry,
Janet against America.
Janet .. because America,
Janet is so rich.
Janet and there's so .. many people,
Janet are so rich,
Janet: and--
Janet: ... the world's out of balance.
Janet: and when--
Janet: when things are out of balance,
Janet: you- you get.
Janet: ... trauma.
RM: ...(2.0) does anyone,
RM: want to add anything,
RM: to that,
RM: or does anyone think differently,
RM: about that?
Irene: well I just think that,
Irene: ... the whole of Europe,
Irene: is- is rich.
Irene: .. you know,
Irene: it's not just America.
Irene: .. Europe is rich.
Irene: [XXX]
Janet: [I know,
Janet: but America is particularly] --
Janet: .. it's very flashy X,
Janet: isn't it.
Liz: yeah.
Janet: it's sort of--
Janet: I mean,
Janet: you --
Janet: .. billionaires are ten a penny in America.
Janet: .. millionaires,
Janet: forget it.
Janet: they're --
Janet: you know,
Janet: like--
Irene: everyday,
Irene: everyday @ @,
Liz: [X],
Janet: [there are lot of millionaires in the London],
Janet: lets face it,
Janet: millionaires ar-
Janet: are nothing special these days at all.
Janet: erm,
Janet: in fact,
Janet: billionaires aren't,
Janet: but,
Janet: .. if you look at the poverty in Africa,
Janet: and--
Janet: at the Palestinians,
Janet: erm,
Janet: ...(1.0) and even in--
Irene: Africans aren't .. terrorists,
Irene: are they?
Janet: yes.
Janet: .. yes,
Janet: there are Muslim .. Africans,
Janet: that are terrorists.
Janet: ...(1.0) there's a lot of Muslims in Africa,
Janet: but,
Janet: I'm sure,
Janet: I've been [X],
Irene: [North Africa.
Irene: yeah North Africa],
Janet: I might be wrong.
I'm no expert,
by any means,
but I'm sure that there are--
yes North Africa,
all round the North.
yes.
you see,
I think you have to be very careful,
with the term terrorist,
anyway.
because the people that we're talking about,
as terrorists,
don't see themselves as terrorists.
... they see themselves,
as,
fighting for a cause,
a political cause.
yes,
yes,
like the IRA were.
yeah,
exactly,
not individuals.
you can't say,
people haven't got a conscience,
or people are evil,
or anything,
... because they're not.
inerently,
they are ordinary people,
who have been forced.
or...
into carry out.
what they wouldn't do,
unless,
they were in a situation.
that they found.
intolerable.
and it's only when situations are intolerable,
that you get flare ups.
X,
and it's also,
you know,
driven.
... by politics,
and it's--
you know,
when I- I --
any terrorist act,
I don't immediately --
say,
<QS oh evil horrible people QS>,
because I think,
look at the cause behind it.
... and look at George Bush,
what he is doing.
look at what this country has done,
in the past.
big.
rich,
Abbie powerful,
Abbie countries,
Abbie always have,
Abbie and always will,
Abbie exploit.. their power.
Abbie all the rest of the world,
Janet and this last war was all about oil.
Janet I am totally confident of that.
Janet it was nothing to do with Saddam Hussein.
Janet [it was all oil],
Janet [that was oil],
Janet [and even the Bush family],
Abbie George Bush senior,
Abbie has been,
Abbie you know--
Abbie there's video footage of him meeting,
Abbie what do you call him,
Abbie Bin Laden,
Abbie who are very rich,
Abbie I mean,
Abbie extremely royal [sic] family,
Abbie .. you now,
Abbie and- and negotiating on oil.
Abbie you know,
Abbie so,
Abbie you know,
Janet yes it's corrupt,
Chris there is a lot we don't know.
Chris there is an awful lot we don't know.
Liz and we've exploited,
Liz we used to exploit,
Liz in
Liz ye-
Liz years and years ago,
Liz my X --
Liz I can remember,
Liz .. when my father was alive,
Liz he'd say,
Liz you know,
Liz <Q the British Empire, we're the worst Q>.
Janet we were.
Liz yeah.
Liz we have exploited,
Liz and used--
Janet we were,
Molly [the British Empire the Spanish Empire],
xx sorry,
RM X,
Molly didn't --
Molly didn't he,
Molly erm,
Molly ...(1.0) have relations,
Molly with Saddam Hussein,
Molly years ago?
Janet yes.
Janet America employed him.
Liz yeah.
Molly there was a really,
Molly interesting,
1993 Molly film,
1994 Molly actually,
1995 Molly it was called <Q Munich Q>,
1996 xx [X],
1997 xx [X],
1998 Molly erm,
1999 Molly and,
2000 Molly what it did was,
2001 Molly is that,
2002 Molly it showed both sides,
2003 Molly of the story in Israel,
2004 Molly from Jerusalem,
2005 Molly from a person inside,
2006 Molly and you really do feel compassion,
2007 Molly and--
2008 Molly for both,
2009 Molly because you hear the individ -
2010 Molly the each story,
2011 Molly and you,
2012 Molly erm,
2013 Molly completely understand,
2014 Molly .. where both sides are coming from.
2015 Molly erm,
2016 Molly .. I thought,
2017 Molly right-
2018 Molly I am probably particularly one-sided,
2019 Molly X,
2020 Molly I am biased,
2021 Molly I am,
2022 Molly it's true.
2023 Molly but,
2024 Molly .. I can --
2025 Molly I can sympathise with both parties,
2026 Molly .. and what they're going through.
2027 Molly and I can see,
2028 Molly why a terrorist,
2029 Molly .. would become a terrorist,
2030 Molly and why they wouldn't think they are,
2031 Molly but they're a freedom fighter.
2032 Molly erm,
2033 Molly and why in their eyes,
2034 Molly what they are doing is so noble,
2035 Molly I can understand that.
2036 Molly .. I don't--
2037 Molly and as a result,
2038 Molly I don't think,
2039 Molly we can ever do anything about it.
2040 Molly I don't think,
2041 Molly that,
2042 Molly .. we can ever turn back the clock.
2043 Janet I don't agree with you there,
2044 Janet [I think we can do things].
2045 Irene [I think you can make it right].
2046 Irene [I think Israel can be made right],
2047 Janet [I think you can make a change],
2048 Janet yes,
2049 Liz it is going to take a long time.
2050 Irene no,
2051 Irene [no],
2052 Janet [when --]
2053 Janet when the politicians,
take the time,
yes,
it will take time,
but it- it can be changed.
I hope so.
there is no reason,
why it can't be changed.
there is no solution.
[X],
[X],
X,
and I--
recently,
my mother was saying,
<Q you know,
the Jewish people,
aren't any better,
than the,
.. you know,
it's six of one,
and half a dozen of the other,
and you can't side for one,
and not the other Q>,
because it--
and I've got relatives,
that live in Israel.
.. but they seem to take --
every day,
that .. a bomb goes off.
or there is an explosion,
it is a way of life.
they don't--
what --
.. what a way to live.
dreadful.
[X],
[listen,
we had] the IRA,
fighting,
and,
dropping bombs here,
.. blowing us up,
etc,
and--
they had their grievances,
.. and genuine grievances,
otherwise it would never have started,
but it ended up,
with a lot of thugs,
running the IRA.
but,
we have managed,
to,
.. get that sorted out,
but somebody has to,
.. start talking.
it can take X,
@,
[it took a long time for that],
[it took a long time to do that],
can you do it one at the time,
Abbie the unfortunate reality is that, it usually takes violence, because talking doesn't go anywhere. and it's usually violence. Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.

Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere. Abbie Abbie because talking doesn't go anywhere.
Irene X,
nothing ever stays still.
Irene catastrophic.
Janet so things always evolve.
Janet into something new.
Janet although X subtly.
Janet ... we never go back.
Janet to how we were,
Janet like we can't go back.
Janet to the 1950s.
Janet so --
Janet nothing will remain stagnant.
Janet or --
Janet or go backwards.
Janet it can only go forwards.
Janet and hopefully,
Janet .. in the future,
Janet people will talk more,
Janet and the world will be spread out.
Janet a bit more,
Janet so there isn't such anger.
Janet and --
Janet we never go back,
Janet to how we were,
Janet like we can't go back,
Janet to the 1950s.
Janet so --
Janet nothing will remain stagnant.
Janet or --
Janet or go backwards.
Janet it can only go forwards.
Janet and hopefully,
Janet .. in the future,
Janet people will talk more,
Janet and the world will be spread out.
Janet a bit more,
Janet so there isn't such anger.
Janet and --
Janet we never go back,
Janet to how we were,
Janet like we can't go back,
Janet to the 1950s.
Janet so --
Janet nothing will remain stagnant.
Janet or --
Janet or go backwards.
Janet it can only go forwards.
Janet and hopefully,
Janet .. in the future,
Janet people will talk more,
Janet and the world will be spread out.
Janet a bit more,
Janet so there isn't such anger.
Janet and --
Janet we never go back,
Janet to how we were,
Janet like we can't go back,
Janet to the 1950s.
Janet so --
Janet nothing will remain stagnant.
Janet or --
Janet or go backwards.
Janet it can only go forwards.
Janet and hopefully,
Janet .. in the future,
Janet people will talk more,
Janet and the world will be spread out.
Janet a bit more,
Janet so there isn't such anger.
Janet and --
Janet we never go back,
Janet to how we were,
Janet like we can't go back,
Janet to the 1950s.
Janet so --
Janet nothing will remain stagnant.
Janet or --
Janet or go backwards.
Janet it can only go forwards.
Janet and hopefully,
Janet .. in the future,
Janet people will talk more,
Janet and the world will be spread out.
Janet a bit more,
Janet so there isn't such anger.
Janet and --
Janet we never go back,
Janet to how we were,
Janet like we can't go back,
Janet to the 1950s.
Janet so --
Janet nothing will remain stagnant.
Janet or --
Janet or go backwards.
Janet it can only go forwards.
Janet and hopefully,
Janet .. in the future,
Janet people will talk more,
Janet and the world will be spread out.
Janet a bit more,
Janet so there isn't such anger.
Janet and --
Janet we never go back,
Janet to how we were,
Janet like we can't go back,
Janet to the 1950s.
Janet so --
Janet nothing will remain stagnant.
Janet or --
Janet or go backwards.
Janet it can only go forwards.
Janet and hopefully,
Janet .. in the future,
Janet people will talk more,
Janet and the world will be spread out.
Janet a bit more,
Janet so there isn't such anger.
Janet and --
Janet we never go back,
Janet to how we were,
Janet like we can't go back,
Janet to the 1950s.
Janet so --
Janet nothing will remain stagnant.
Janet or --
Janet or go backwards.
Janet it can only go forwards.
Janet and hopefully,
Janet .. in the future,
Janet people will talk more,
Janet and the world will be spread out.
Janet a bit more,
Janet so there isn't such anger.
Janet and --
Janet we never go back,
Janet to how we were,
Janet like we can't go back,
Janet to the 1950s.
Janet so --
Janet nothing will remain stagnant.
Janet or --
Janet or go backwards.
Janet it can only go forwards.
Janet and hopefully,
Janet .. in the future,
Janet people will talk more,
Janet and the world will be spread out.
Janet a bit more,
Janet so there isn't such anger.
Janet and --
Janet we never go back,
Janet to how we were,
Janet like we can't go back,
Janet to the 1950s.
Janet so --
Janet nothing will remain stagnant.
Janet or --
Janet or go backwards.
Janet it can only go forwards.
Janet and hopefully,
Janet .. in the future,
Janet people will talk more,
Janet and the world will be spread out.
Janet a bit more,
Janet so there isn't such anger.
Janet and --
Janet we never go back,
Janet to how we were,
Janet like we can't go back,
Janet to the 1950s.
Janet so --
Janet nothing will remain stagnant.
Janet or --
Janet or go backwards.
Janet it can only go forwards.
Janet and hopefully,
Janet .. in the future,
Janet people will talk more,
Janet and the world will be spread out.
Janet a bit more,
Janet so there isn't such anger.
Janet and --
Janet we never go back,
Janet to how we were,
Fiona I'm sure probably,
Fiona everybody for .. thirty years,
Fiona went <Q ooh,
Fiona do you think we should go on a boat?
Fiona oh I don't know about that Q>,
Fiona .. and then probably when--
Fiona .. World --
Fiona World War II happened,
Fiona or something,
Fiona you know,
Fiona X
Fiona yeah,
Fiona but it was the rich,
Fiona privileged people,
Fiona who went down with the Titanic.

Fiona .. erm,
Fiona .. when you say,
Fiona <Q...will things be the same Q>,
Fiona ar--
Fiona .. are they not the same now?
Fiona [but what you mean] by the same?
Fiona like--
Fiona .. like--
Fiona for me,
Fiona I don-
Fiona .. er,
Fiona okay--
Fiona I've .. seen,
Fiona the Trade Centre go down,
Fiona and I've seen bombs in London,
Fiona I've seen the Harrods bomb,
Fiona I've seen the Oxford Street bombs,
Fiona I have seen the--
Fiona .. bombs on the buses,
Fiona I've seen,
Fiona .. bombs on the tube,
Fiona ... but I don't --
Fiona and-
Fiona .. but maybe I'm .. lucky enough,
Fiona that it hasn't affected me.
Fiona that - I-
Fiona that --I-
Fiona I'm lucky that,
Fiona I've never been in one of those, (terrorist attacks)
Fiona .. terrorist attacks,
Fiona .. that nobody very close to me,
Fiona has been one of those terrorist attacks,
Fiona so I think,
Fiona maybe,
Fiona ...(1.0) [things are still the same for me].

Abbie [I think --
Abbie I think the] --
Abbie .. I think the difference is,
Abbie now,
Abbie with--
Abbie the --
Abbie .. the precise difference,
Abbie is that you,
Abbie could be targeted,
Abbie .. any of your family,
Abbie could be targeted,
Abbie you just don’t know.
Abbie I mean in the first --
Abbie X the old-fashioned wars,
Abbie .. you knew who was potentially going to get killed,
Abbie it was your son,
Abbie you know,
Abbie your--
Abbie your husband,
Abbie or whatever,
Abbie because they went out onto the battlefield.
Abbie now,
Abbie the war,
Abbie .. is global.
Fiona okay.
Fiona XX
Abbie <X it could happen in any way X>,
Janet <X and anywhere X>,
Abbie and it's not armies,
Abbie it- it's taken in; --
Abbie in the civilian population.
Fiona I--
Abbie and that’s why you can never be the same again.
Fiona I --
Fiona I get that with the war stuff.
Fiona that yeah okay,
Fiona you know that,
Fiona suddenly the siren goes off ,
Fiona so something’s going to happen.
Fiona .. whereas we don’t get no siren,
Fiona it just happens.
Fiona ..erm,
Fiona .. but--
Fiona .. but,
Fiona you know,
Fiona there was the IRA,
Fiona so,
Fiona there was bombs all the time,
Fiona when I was growing up.
Fiona in London,
Fiona so I was--
Fiona .. my mum would always go,
Fiona <Q you be careful of bags Q>,
Fiona .. you know;
Fiona when I was a kid.
Amy yeah,
Amy X my mum,
Amy <X tended to X> say exactly the same.
Amy I think it's a generational thing.
Fiona erm--
Fiona so .. I don't know,
Fiona ...(1.0) I think,
Fiona I think my life is still the same.
Fiona .. even though,
Fiona now,
Fiona instead of the IRA bombing me,

Fiona it's some guy,

Fiona with a turban.

Liz do you agree?

Amy yeah,

Amy because I think that's X X,

Amy I mean,

Amy I was trying to say,

Amy I think it has been exactly the same,

Amy .. my life --

Amy I don't think anything has changed.

Amy apart from me being,

Amy .. slightly more suspicious,

Amy but I think,

Amy that just happens,

Amy around the time,

Amy <X or X> something.

Amy X I remember first,

Amy moving to London.

Amy .. 'cos I'm from [TOWN IN NE ENGLAND],

Amy my dad lives here,

Amy .. being,

Amy 11 or 12,

Amy and,

Amy being told to watch bags and stuff.

Amy it's always been the way.

Amy so it's --

Amy doesn't affect,

Amy anything I do.

Amy X,

Janet I think the changes,

Janet are more subtle than that.

Janet we we--

Janet accept now,

Janet when we go to the airport,

Janet it's going to take us,

Janet .. three .. four hours,

Janet before we can--

Janet .. you know,

Janet with our journey,

Janet etc,

Janet .. from London.

Janet .. instead of two hours.

Janet erm,

Janet so,

Janet .. from that point of view,

Janet our life has already changed.

Janet .. we're consciously,

Janet more con-

Janet concerned about,

Janet who we sit next to on the bus,

Janet .. and,

Janet we're more aware,

Janet generally,

Janet about s--

Janet er security.

Janet so,

Janet we don't even notice,

Janet the changes,

Janet they've .. occurred,
Janet and subtly.

Chris I don't know,

Chris I - I do think there is --

Chris I think there is a --

Chris there's a safety thing here.

Chris I mean,

Chris I-

Chris I was born and brought up in Scotland.

Chris and as a teenager,

Chris and in my 20s,

Chris the word terrorism wasn't even,

Chris in my .. vocabulary.

Chris it w --

Chris it just didn't exist.

Chris ...(1.0) you could go out,

Chris anywhere,

Chris and be safe,

Chris .. all the time.

Chris now,

Chris I--

Chris .. if my kids go out,

Chris I don't feel that they're safe.

Chris and I worry myself sick about them.

Chris so,

Chris .. I don't think we can ever go back.

Chris .. to the way things were.

Janet yes,

Janet but that's a bit of an illusion.

Janet .. because,

Janet you .. probably had--

Janet okay we have rape --

Janet erm,

Janet .. date rape now,

Janet I think because of drugs,

Janet .. but,

Janet as a young woman,

Janet you were probably,

Janet .. mildly at risk,

Janet as young --

Janet you know,

Janet young girls are still,

Janet mildly at risk from attack,

Janet from,

Janet .. erm,

Janet men or whatever.

Janet that ha--

Janet it did happen,

Janet when we were,

Janet .. young girls.

Chris, yeah,

Chris but not a bombing,

Chris or anything.

Janet no,

Janet but you were still at risk,

Janet but you didn't have it,

Janet .. spread all over the newspapers,

Janet for weeks on end,

Janet terrifying everybody.

Janet .. and the press has got a lot to answer for.

Janet and I think,

Janet some of the things.
Janet the press print, 
Janet .. about terrorism, 
Janet and scaremongering, 
Janet is -- 
Janet bad. 
RM okay, 
RM well I'll -- 
RM .. I'll take us, 
RM .. over there, 
RM now, 
RM then. 
Janet @ 
Abbie yeah, 
Abbie <X but you X> really want to know, 
Abbie who's feeding it. 
Abbie whether it's -- 
Abbie it's a government, 
Abbie ... policy. 
RM alright, 
RM well let -- 
Abbie how much <X on X> alert do they want us to be, 
Abbie you know, 
Abbie the red alert, 
Abbie green alert, 
Abbie orange alert, 
Abbie what does it all mean? 
RM ok, 
RM give me the space of, 
RM .. one more question, 
RM and then you can answer that one. 
RM .. what, 
RM is the government doing? 
RM we don't know. 
RM @@, 
xx not a lot, 
xx I don't know. 
Janet <X what a big question that is X>. 
Irene I don't know. 
Fiona you hope, 
Fiona you hope it's- 
Fiona that they're, 
Fiona they're looking out for us. 
Fiona .. you hope, 
Fiona that they're in negotiations, 
Fiona to make it all okay. 
Fiona and-- 
Abbie and -- 
Abbie yeah. 
Abbie they're keeping us, 
Abbie on high alert, 
Abbie because erm, 
Abbie Tony Blair's trying to make us all, 
Abbie .. think that, 
Abbie the Iraq war, 
Abbie was a good idea. 
Abbie you know, 
Abbie [he went into the war for Britain X], 
Janet [that was the worst idea he's ever had], 
Janet and he has had a few since then. 
Abbie keep on X 
Abbie <Q we are protecting you. 

338
Abbie: we have to protect you,
Abbie: 'cos it's a very dangerous world,
Abbie: outside of the West Q.

Irene: @
Irene: I think that,
Irene: a lot of terrorists,
Irene: have come through the Channel Tunnel.
Irene: you know,
Irene: they don't fly into Heathrow,
Irene: or Gatwick.
Irene: you know,
Irene: I think they can come that way,
Irene: that they come --
Chris: [you still get searched though],
Irene: [North of England],
Chris: you still get searched through --
Chris: going through the tunnel.
Irene: hardly,
Irene: hardly,
Irene: X tunnel X.
Irene: you know,
Irene: ...(1.0) you drive in.
Irene: ...hardly.
RM: I'm trying to get at your --
RM: your awareness,
RM: of --
RM: of what measures,
RM: you think the government,
RM: might be taking.
Chris: it doesn't come across.
Chris: loud and clear.
Chris: let's put it like that.
Janet: well,
Janet: to be fair to them,