Citizenship and social psychology: an analysis of constructions of Greek citizenship

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In this chapter we advance a social psychological approach to citizenship. We pay particular attention to the dynamics of constructing citizenship and to the relationship between state policies and lay practices of claims-making. The chapter is structured in four parts. In the first section, we outline a definition of citizenship that is in line with a dynamic social psychological framework. In the second section, we propose a social psychological framework of citizenship that acknowledges the interconnection between citizenship regimes and lay citizens’ perspectives. To illustrate our approach, we discuss a study on Greek citizenship following new legislation that opened up citizenship to the children of migrants for the first time in Greek history. We conclude the chapter with a summary and some ideas about future avenues of research in the social psychology of citizenship.

1. What is citizenship?

The concept of citizenship has been the subject of study by many social science disciplines such as political science, sociology, and political theory, among others. Yet, citizenship resists a simple definition. Indeed, citizenship has been described as an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Condor, 2011). We propose here that it is precisely this contestability that should be the object of the study of citizenship. We also propose that social psychology offers suitable conceptual tools towards this aim.

Most commonly, citizenship has been studied as a state institution, that is, as a type of membership that is managed by the state. Joppke (2010), in a brief outline of key approaches to the study of citizenship in social and political theory, made a distinction between analyses of social, national, post-national and multicultural citizenship. Social citizenship is associated with the work of Marshall (1964) and focuses on the historical development of citizenship rights, from civil to political to social rights. Analyses of national citizenship (for example, Brubaker’s (1992) work) focus on the dynamics between inclusion and exclusion in different citizenship regimes, for instance, in states with ethnic or civic regimes of citizenship. Post-national citizenship, associated with the work of Soysal (1994) among others, refers to new articulations of rights that are unlinked from national citizenship, such as human rights. Finally, work on multicultural citizenship, associated most notably with the work of Kymlicka (1995), is concerned with the accommodation of minority rights within a national society. These analyses approach citizenship as an institution of the state and it is state (or inter-state) policies, structures and practices that they seek to explain, analyse, or challenge.

However illuminating, such state-centric approaches are not sufficient on their own for unpacking the complexity of citizenship, because they leave out of the analysis the perspectives of citizens themselves. While the state is a very powerful political actor, lay citizens are also key actors who need to be taken under consideration in analyses of citizenship. In this regard, we welcome Isin’s (2009; Isin & Nielsen, 2008) work on how citizenship is enacted from the bottom up. Isin (2009) proposes a dynamic, actor-oriented approach to citizenship that focuses on ‘acts’ of citizenship. The starting point of this analysis is that we need a way of conceptualising citizenship that corresponds to contemporary forms of politics: a conceptualisation which is based on agents’ efforts to advance political claims.

From the onset, this framework opens up the study of citizenship to a wide range of actors. Political actors are not just citizens in the formal sense of the term; it is anyone who engages in political action – irrespective of their legal status. Political action and participation are understood here as
acts of claims-making, not simply as a set of behaviours that have traditionally been seen as part of citizenship (e.g. voting). Isin (2009) uses the example of the ‘sans-papiers’ movement in France. The movement, consisting of undocumented or irregular migrants, was mobilised on the basis of claiming the right to stay in France on a regularised status.

This emphasis on enacting citizenship through claims-making processes is aligned with a social and political psychological perspective. Indeed, some work from this field has focused on the ways in which group-level political claims and politicised group identities are key elements in processes of collective action. Notably, the social psychology of protest and collective mobilisation has recently focused on the ways that people, fuelled by a sense of common grievances, act as members of disadvantaged groups and engage in political action in order to challenge power asymmetries in existing intergroup relations (see Klandermans, 2014).

From our perspective, there are two main reasons why social psychology is suitable for the study of citizenship. i) Social psychology is concerned with the politics of everyday knowledge. That is, social psychology is concerned with the processes through which systems of knowledge are constructed, negotiated and transformed in social encounters (Jovchelovitch, 2007). The politics of claims-making within specific political and intergroup contexts are thus central to the discipline. ii) Social psychology has much to offer in connecting the level of everyday politics (as enacted by lay citizens and social groups) and official politics (as performed by official political structures). In fact, the tension between agency and structure is one of the most long-standing considerations in the discipline (Farr, 1996). Points i) and ii) are interconnected. Systems of knowledge are institutionalised and prescriptive but they can also be disrupted, resisted and changed. Indeed, we argue that it is in moments of social disruption that claims-making about citizenship becomes important. In what follows we outline this social psychological perspective in more detail.

2. A social psychological approach to citizenship

In outlining a social psychological framework for the study of citizenship, we draw from two traditions of research that have been particularly concerned with the politics of knowledge construction, social representations and discourse analysis approaches. While there are recognised differences between the two approaches, they share much in common (Gibson, 2015; Voelklein & Howarth, 2005), notably a social constructionist and action-oriented approach towards social phenomena and a concern with the politics involved in processes of knowledge construction.

In the following three sub-sections, we first discuss social psychological work on how meanings of citizenship are negotiated by lay actors. We then move on to discuss the role of state citizenship regimes as nation-building projects. Finally, we explore the links between state and lay perspectives on citizenship.

2.1 The everyday level: perspectives of lay citizens

One of the first social psychological explorations of citizenship was by Shotter (1993) who argued that citizenship is a ‘living ideology’. Shotter (1993) drew attention to the dynamics of citizen identities in the politics of everyday life. He suggested that argumentation and debate over identity and belonging are central when studying citizenship in practice. Taking the lead from Shotter, several social-political psychologists analysed citizenship from a discursive psychology perspective (e.g. Haste, 2004; Barnes et al., 2004). Instead of taking a definition of citizenship as a given, the emphasis has been on how the category of citizenship is constructed and negotiated by social actors and what the ideological and rhetorical functions of these constructions in particular contexts are.
In line with Isin who suggested that we shift “our attention from fixed categories by which we have come to understand or inherit citizenship to the struggles through which these categories themselves have become stakes” (2009, p.383), claims-making has been central in these analyses. In one of the most commonly cited studies in this field, Barnes, Auburn and Lea (2004) studied how local residents mobilised citizen identities to claim entitlement over the management of the local area and to argue against the settling of travellers. Other authors have taken a more explicitly rhetorical approach studying the ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988) played out in constructions of citizenship (e.g. Andreouli & Dashtipour, 2014; Condor & Gibson, 2007; Gibson & Hamilton, 2011). For example, Gibson and Hamilton (2011) in their analysis of young people’s talk about polity membership and immigration, found that participants managed the ideological dilemma of ‘multiculturalism vs. protecting the national culture’ by advancing arguments for having a single, mono-cultural legal system, thus discursively marginalising minority cultures into the realm of private life.

In this body of research, it is evident that constructions of citizenship by lay actors depend on the positioning of these actors within a specific intergroup context. For example, in Greece, which is the empirical focus of this chapter, it has been found that representations of Greek citizenship in public debates vary, to a large extent, according to the ways that actors are positioned within a majority-minority intergroup structure. While native Greek citizens commonly essentialise citizenship as an ethnic category of membership seeking to maintain an established social order of ‘insiders’ (ethnic Greeks) and ‘outsiders’ (non-co-ethnic migrants), migrants challenge this social order by putting forward alternative conceptions of Greek citizenship based on criteria of cultural assimilation and civic participation (Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2015).

What this social psychological perspective highlights is that the ‘ordinary’, ‘lay’ or ‘everyday’ is political. Politics are not the preserve of official political structures. Rather, the politics of representation take place in everyday lives and interactions. Claims-making about citizenship and belonging is about claiming the power to construct and convey particular representations over others (Howarth, Andreouli & Kesi, 2014), in a way that allows social actors to participate in the public sphere on terms that are one’s own (Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011).

2.2 The institutional level: the role of the state

Everyday citizenship, as outlined above, is only part of the story. Citizenship is also institutionally demarcated through concrete policies. State practices and policies often echo historical constructions of nationhood in different societies. Favell (2001), for instance, traced Britain’s ‘multicultural’ approach towards integration and citizenship to its tradition of paternalistic tolerance towards the colonised populations. The state can be seen as an ‘entrepreneur of identity’ (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) producing national and citizen identities through the policies it enforces. State citizenship regimes can therefore be understood as nation-building projects (Andreouli & Chryssochou, 2015).

There is some social psychological research that analyses state constructions of citizenship. For example, Andreouli & Howarth (2013) analysed policy documents from Britain’s ‘earned citizenship’ framework and found that they advance a fundamental distinction between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ migrants based on their ability to integrate and contribute to the economy, thus subtly rehearsing a ‘good vs. bad’ immigrant dichotomy and an ‘immigrants as a burden’ narrative. Similarly, Gray and Griffin (2014) analysed how citizenship as an identity is discursively constructed in Britain’s citizenship test. They showed, for instance, that the test constructs citizen identity as something that can be learnt and assessed. This transforms “citizenship from a set of universal rights to a matter of technical expertise”, constituting “some citizens as more ‘qualified’ than others” (p. 311).
Hence, state discourses are equally discursively rich as everyday discourses about citizenship. What however differentiates the two is that state discourses enjoy a higher level of legitimation and can more easily acquire a hegemonic (c.f. Moscovici, 1998) status. Given that the state holds ultimate authority on how citizenship is to be understood and practiced, we conceptualise state discourses and practices as representations that are not easily challenged (Andreouli & Howarth, 2013). We do not suggest that the state necessarily operates as an oppressor, but that institutionalised discourses can convert from prescriptive to descriptive (Castro, 2012) and solidify into ‘the way things are’.

### 2.3 Connecting the two levels

We suggest that a social psychological perspective takes into consideration both levels: (a) how state policies and practices construct citizenship and have an effect on lay citizens’ understandings and enactments of citizenship; (b) how citizens themselves negotiate the meanings of citizenship and may possibly influence state policies. Regarding (a), we presented some research on state citizenship regimes that examines how state policies construct the meanings and boundaries of citizenship. Most commonly, people habitually act out such “already written scripts” (Isin, 2009, p.381) by practicing the rights they have, for example, voting in national elections if they are formally citizens, or going through immigration procedures when they are not. National citizenship is not often reflected upon and this is mostly the case for those who have an established or settled sense of belonging and position in a society (c.f. Stevenson & Muldoon, 2010). Regarding (b), we presented some research that shows how lay citizens may engage in acts of negotiating the meanings and boundaries of citizenship. We advance here a social-psychological approach to citizenship that acknowledges the interconnections between the two levels. This approach pays attention to both how policies construct citizenship and how citizens themselves, as members of minority (e.g. migrants) or majority groups (e.g. indigenous Greeks), negotiate these constructions within specific social and political contexts. The interconnection of the two levels and the processes of meaning construction regarding citizenship become particularly visible when a taken-for-granted state of affairs becomes disrupted (Kadianaki & Gillespie, 2015). Such disruption may occur, for instance, when citizenship regimes are adapted in order to accommodate migrant communities within a nation-state. Thus, we suggest, in times of tension we can study the dynamics of citizenship as an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Condor, 2011) and the connections between state policies and lay constructions. In the next section we report on such an analysis in the Greek context.

### 3. An empirical analysis of Greek citizenship constructions

#### 3.1 Changes in the Greek citizenship regime: the 2010 law

In 2010 the Greek government passed new citizenship legislation that was regarded as a turning point in Greek immigration policy. Until then, citizenship allocation arrangements were regulative rather than policy-based and they were largely reflective of a “view [of] Greek citizenship as a right to be exclusively reserved for those who ethnically belong to the cherished national community” (Anagnostou, 2011, p.2). This ethnic conception of Greek citizenship is also reflected in the term used in Greek citizenship legislation, the term “ithagenia”. This term is synthesised by the words “ithis” meaning “directly”, and “genos” meaning “descent” or “generation” (Christopoulos, 2013), alluding to an entitlement of those of the same descent or generation. Analyses of lay discourses of citizenship in the Greek context (Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002; Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2015) also reflect this dominance of an ethnic conception of citizenship.

The 2010 law included jus soli criteria that disrupted the domination of jus sanguinis for the first time since the nation-building process of the 19th century (Anagnostou, 2011). According to the law, the children of migrants born in Greece could acquire the Greek citizenship if their parents
completed five years of legal residence in the country. Children of migrants not born in Greece could also acquire Greek citizenship upon successful completion of six years of Greek school provided that their parents completed the required five years of legal residence. In addition, the law provided for the right to elect and be elected to holders of long-term residence permits and foreign citizens of Greek descent.

The new law emerged after years of public discontent with the existing naturalization procedures and criteria, consecutive protests and campaigning developed primarily by migrant communities and organisations who asked for necessary reforms. It was developed by a team of lawyers of the NGO Hellenic League for Human Rights (Christopoulos, 2012) and, though modified in various ways, was passed in parliament in March 2010. The run up to the law also included an online public deliberation, gathering thousands of comments by both migrants and Greek citizens.

The 2010 law, however, evoked intense public debates that revolved around the meaning and the boundaries of citizenship and Greek national identity (Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2015). Parliamentary debates were also heated and reflected a divided political arena concerning the issue (Figou, under review). Political debates centred around symbolic issues, such as “who we are”, rather than around practical matters (Christopoulos, 2012). It can be argued that the heated public and political debates that accompanied the 2010 citizenship law are indicative of a disruption of conventionalised understandings of Greek citizenship.

In February 2011, following an appeal and several counter appeals, the State Council, through judicial decision, declared that the law violated the Greek constitution. According to the decision, the criteria of six years of schooling and the five years of legal residence of parents – for the children born in Greece – could not sufficiently ensure that second generation immigrants had developed strong bonds with the Greek nation. Further, it was argued that the right to vote and be elected should be reserved for Greek citizens but not foreign citizens of Greek descent, on the grounds that the criteria by which their status was granted were dubious and could result in the decomposition of the electoral basis. In other words, the debate rested on the tension between the new (more) civic and the long-standing ethnic definition of citizenship that had dominated both state policy and lay discourses up to that point.

3.2 Lay perspectives on the new citizenship law

In order to explore lay perspectives on the 2010 Greek citizenship law, we present data from a study on the relationship between lay and social scientific discourses on identity, citizenship and migration (see Xenitidou & Greco-Morasso, 2014). For the purposes of the study, the third author conducted one-to-one and group interviews with indigenous and non-indigenous residents in Thessaloniki, the second largest city in Greece. The researcher invited participants to talk about issues at the forefront of public attention around the time of the interview (2013-2014), such as the trajectory of the new citizenship law and the rise of the extreme right. The analysis that follows draws on thirty-two group and individual interviews with twenty-five indigenous Greek citizens and twenty-five non-indigenous migrants living in Thessaloniki. Our analysis here focuses on exploring the claims-making processes that the aforementioned institutional change incited for Greek citizens and for migrants, paying

1 In May 2015, the Greek government submitted a revision to the code of citizenship, which emphasised schooling as a key criterion for citizenship for second generation migrants, thus seeking to ensure that new Greek citizens would have sufficient bonds to the Greek nation. The revision received sufficient support and was passed in parliament, overshadowed by a heated climate about the Greek ‘bail out’ which monopolized public discourse in the summer of 2015.

2 The data were collected as part of the 294227 MC-GIG project LSSDMIC – LAY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE DISCOURSES ON IDENTITY, MIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP awarded to the third author.
particular attention to the ways in which participants negotiated the meanings and boundaries of citizenship. In what follows, we present our findings in terms of three key themes that participants, both Greek citizens and migrants, drew upon to construct citizenship in this context: ethnicity (extracts 1-2), feelings of national belonging (extracts 3-4) and civic participation (extracts 5-6).

As anticipated, ethnicity was central in our data. This reflects the history of Greek citizenship and Greek identity in general, which have been predominantly defined in ethnic terms. Indigenous Greeks in the sample drew on ethnic understandings of Greekness to argue against citizenship for migrants, thus seeking to maintain an ‘us Greeks’/‘them foreigners’ system of social relations that privileges ethnic Greeks. Migrants too oriented towards such prevalent majoritarian discourses by distinguishing between ethnic belonging and citizenship. This allowed them to both argue for more rights and avoid disrupting these hegemonic representations of Greekness. The following two extracts illustrate these points.

Extract 1
Lakis: Now, it doesn’t have to do who, it doesn’t have to do with where you’ve been born and the rest, you are Albanian, you are Albanian that’s that. And I don’t say it at all in a racist way, right? All of these happened in order also for them to become acclimatised the best possible to the Greek country, isn’t that right? For this [reason] they want to give citizenship to some of other nationality. I focus on that you will take Greek citizenship with whatever way and with whatever law will come out, you personally as a person should never renounce your country. (Group interview, indigenous Greek)

Lakis, in the extract above is drawing on an ethnic representation of citizenship to make a claim against the new legislation that gives citizenship rights to migrants. While Lakis negotiates the criteria for citizenship acquisition with reference to origin, his point that origin is fixed and irreversible, is treated as amenable to the stigma of racism, which he disclaims, a common rhetorical strategy in discussions of citizenship and immigration (e.g. Augoustinos & Every, 2007). The grounds for this disclaimer seem to be that while integration is important, it should not be sought at all costs nor should it be sought instrumentally or opportunistically. Citizenship acquisition by migrants is therefore treated as selling out and betraying their country of origin, and on these grounds, Lakis ‘advises’ migrants not to be ‘trapped’ into doing it. In this extract, citizenship is equated to nationality – Greekness – and, as such, reserved for ethnic Greeks, corroborating thus a socially prevalent ethnic representation of citizenship based on descent.

In the following extract, Debora, a second-generation migrant from Southern Albania, orients to such prevalent ethnic understandings of Greekness by making a distinction between feelings of national belonging and citizenship rights.

Extract 2
Debora: If it was up to me, if it were in my hand I want to stay in the future, to live the rest of my life here and it would be easier for me in essence to have the Greek citizenship. Not just to show off and you know that I live in Greece and I have the Greek identity card or anything like this, but more for what it offers. Because it offers things and services and various [other things] that it offers only to the Greeks whereas to the others not. Mainly for this reason I want the Greek citizenship and not for some other reason. For the services basically. For the rights, for these.
Soula: That is, you don’t feel it?
Debora: OK I don’t believe that a paper let’s say can tell you that “ok because you have Greek citizenship you are Greek”. In essence, in practice, I wanted just and only just for the things it offers you, that is rights, for the services but theoretically, I don’t need the paper to tell me
Debora, orients to citizenship acquisition as a practical matter related to state bureaucracy and access to rights, a seemingly civic representation of citizenship. Citizenship acquisition is constructed as a formal recognition of rights and is to be used as a functional tool to deal with bureaucratic aspects of everyday life. This construction makes the distinction between rights and feelings relevant in the negotiation of citizenship. Feelings are dissociated from citizenship on the grounds that the bureaucratic granting of the latter is not a proof of feeling. By disassociating ‘belonging-proper’ from citizenship, Debora is able to make a claim to Greek citizenship whilst simultaneously avoiding claiming a Greek identity. While feeling Greek is not denied, claiming a Greek identity based on feeling would potentially open this kind of talk to criticism as it would question ethnic representations of Greekness. In other words, Debora is able to claim citizenship on the basis of functionality while leaving Greekness intact.

While some migrants in the sample treated citizenship as a ‘practical’ matter of acquiring more rights and access to services, for other migrants as well as for some Greeks in the sample, citizenship was constructed in terms of feelings of national belonging from which rights emanate (see also, Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2015). As we show, this way of bringing closer together Greek identification and Greek citizenship worked in similar ways for Greeks and migrants in our data: for the former, it helped construct another layer of assessing migrants’ entitlement to citizenship and for the latter, it provided a way of claiming citizenship through declarations of national commitment. In both cases, however, the dominant essentialised understanding of Greekness, as an internal state that cannot easily be altered, was maintained.

Extract 3

Virginia: I don’t disagree with this law. That is, I believe that it should give a right to these people, whoever feels Greek and has certain preconditions, and these, it goes without saying that these preconditions someone has to define right? We can’t say who feels Greek in a general way. Those preconditions that were prescribed I think, that the second generation of immigrants if they wish to they can acquire the citizenship, does not find me in opposition. That is, I believe that they have to, since they are integrated into Greek society, for what reason would they deny these people? Since they meet the legal preconditions the right to acquire the citizenship has to be given to them, if they wish to, I repeat. (Individual interview, indigenious Greek)

Virginia positions herself favourably towards the law through the use of negations – ‘I don’t disagree with the law’, ‘does not find me in opposition’ – a response which assumes that a negative take on the law could have been expected as normal. While Virginia sees the new law in a positive light in principle, she considers the difficulty of pinning down the requirements that would make someone a Greek citizen in practice. The problem arises due to the difficulty of assessing feelings of being Greek. The problem of measuring feelings – that would make someone Greek ‘truly’ and without question (see Verkuyten & de Wolf, 2002) – is managed by Virginia with reference to second generation migrants by putting forward the criteria of legality, integration, and choice. Whoever meets the stream of these criteria is entitled to Greek citizenship ‘in principle’, while feeling Greek is retained as a key criterion. References to feelings and cultural assimilation were prevalent in Greek participants’ discourse and were also part of the state discourse. As we noted (3.1), the State Council discussed amendments to the 2010 law on the basis of securing migrants’ bonds with the Greek nation. The 2015 revision of the law responded to this by constituting education – schooling – as the means through which this may achieved (measured and proven). Thus, while indigenous Greeks’
feelings of national belonging are taken as a given, migrants are under the obligation to prove their commitment. This is also shown in the extract below by Kostas, a second-generation migrant from Albania.

Extract 4
Kostas: I don’t know now how they are thinking about it, the others, but in my mind let’s say I feel Greek citizen because from the first years we came here I took part [in] the celebrations, we learned Greek dances, at the parade, the excursions, the games, in the sad moments, the troubles, in all of these that is. That is, I felt, I felt from the beginning that I was part of this place. That is, I never had that, let’s say I never had this, let’s say that others had felt. Simply now when I have reached adulthood, it is not that I don’t feel it, but I feel that I am outside, I don’t know, from things because let’s say after the age of eighteen you vote. Yes, let’s say I don’t vote due to citizenship, due to a lot of things. I think the most important thing is in the future. That is, whatever political move happens in Greece it doesn’t interest me in essence, because I know that I am not part of this process nor am I going to be. Unless something changes, let’s say with ithageneia, citizenship and the likes. I think this is the basic thing. (Individual interview 9, second generation immigrant from Albania)

Kostas makes reference to his subjective feelings of being Greek which serves to suggest that he is ‘truly’ Greek – as private feelings cannot be easily disputed (Kadianaki & Andreouli, 2015; Verkuyten & de Wolf, 2002). Kostas also makes reference to participation in mundane, everyday life (e.g. playing) and ritualized Greek culture (e.g. celebrations) as the ways through which he came to feel Greek. In other words, cultural assimilation is constructed as the basis for belonging and feeling like a Greek citizen. Indeed, Kostas notes that he never felt out of place like other migrants in Greece. However, this ‘banal’ (c.f. Billig, 1995) sense of belonging was disrupted when he turned eighteen, the age when young people acquire full citizenship rights in Greece. What we see here is a rupture between ‘feeling like’ and ‘being’ a Greek citizen – the former being subjective, the latter being formally recognized by the state. Having built up this rupture as paradoxical, Kostas associates formal recognition to feelings of belonging, on the basis of which he makes a claim for Greek citizenship. Appeals to feelings as the basis of being ‘truly’ Greek was common across the data set, as was the appeal to cultural assimilation. By putting forward a cultural and feelings-based conception of citizenship, migrants were able to make a claim for belonging on the basis of assimilation, therefore retaining some elements of the prevalent ethno-cultural representation of Greekness.

Civic understandings of citizenship were also present in the data, albeit much less compared to ethnic and feelings-based understandings. In the following extract, Milli, a second-generation migrant from Albania, talks about citizenship in terms of a social contract between citizens and state.

Extract 5
Milli: I think, that whoever person is considered citizen of Greece, and I imagine that citizen is considered also an alien who is legal in the country, should have the right to participate in the social life of the place where he/she lives. I want, I have the need to vote, since I switch on my television and watch the parliament, since the laws concern me, the taxation that is voted concerns me. It concerns me how much you will pay tax because in this country I pay, it concerns me how much, how many hours children have lessons in the schools, because my children may be here, I am giving you an example now. The laws concern me. I if I steal something I will steal it here. According to the Greek court I will be evaluated in any case. So yes, I think that it is necessary that people vote. Anyone who lives legally in Greece I think that it is necessary to vote. (Individual interview, second generation immigrant from Albania)
Milli treats voting as an individual right directly impinging upon people’s everyday lives, on which grounds she makes claims for access to this right. In her argument above, the condition for the right to vote is being a Greek citizen, which is constructed in terms of legal residence, active participation and contribution to society. This is presented as a social contract with civic rather than ethnic or cultural criteria. On these grounds, Milli claims that all legally residing ‘aliens’ should be entitled to acquire Greek citizenship. Such inclusive civic understandings of citizenship also featured in some of the interviews with native Greeks. However, even in its inclusionary civic sense, citizenship was at times only allowed within limits by Greeks in the sample, manifesting a dilemma between extension of citizenship as a matter of principle versus preserving or minimising the impact to the dominant culture ‘in practice’, as the following extract shows.

Extract 6
Melli: Look sure, sure it concerns the, the resident of x y municipality who is either, as we said, an alien or Greek. It concerns him because he lives there. It is just, maybe it is something deeper, the political issue that affects all our lives and its culture, our history? That is to say it has to do with all these and many foreigners, and I have experienced this first hand, don’t know Greek history. Maybe, how should I put this? Their view on the issue of election would affect negatively the Greeks who live here, who live more with these people, they know what it is about, they have a clearer view. (Individual interview, indigenous Greek)

Melli’s account above seems torn between voting in local elections as a right of all local residents ‘in principle’, and the interests of Greeks, ‘in practice’. The importance of the issue of voting is heightened with extreme case formulations from the local level to ‘all our lives’ and ‘all the rest of Greeks’. She argues against an extension of the voting right in national elections to non-Greeks on the grounds that they lack knowledge of Greek history and politics. In this way, granting voting rights to non-Greeks is constructed as problematic, not on the grounds of ethnicity per se, but on the grounds that they lack the historical knowledge which is assumed to grant them with appropriate political views. This is a condition which could be seen as accompanying their status of being foreign, but which Melli supports through reference to her personal experience, thus managing the consequences of essentialising it as a trait. In this account, Greeks and foreigners are constructed as two distinct groups and voting is treated as a privilege of the political connoisseurs, namely the native Greeks due to their longer-term residence in the country.

4. Conclusions

In this chapter we advanced a social psychological approach to citizenship that takes under consideration the institutional level of formal policy and practice and the bottom-up level of lay citizens’ perspectives. We argued, in particular, that if social psychologists are interested in studying the politics of representation in debates about citizenship, then exploring both citizenship regimes and how people and social groups negotiate these regimes of citizenship provides a fruitful way forward. To illustrate our approach, we first presented an overview of the citizenship regime in the Greek context, followed by a more extended analysis of lay debates in the context of a recent immigration law in Greece which opened up citizenship to second-generation migrants, thus disrupting ethnic representations of Greek citizenship.

Our data show that for many native Greek citizens, the new law introduced a discrepancy between the established ethnic view of Greekness and the more civic criteria put forward by the law. Greek participants responded by negotiating the meanings and boundaries of citizenship in different ways: by restricting the scope of citizenship to ethnic Greeks, by differentiating between ethnic and civic membership, by putting forward an argument for ‘true’ Greekness on the basis of feelings and cultural assimilation, and by putting forward a more inclusive civic conception of Greek citizenship.
on the basis of a give-and-take social contract, although often with caveats which privileged ethnic Greeks. On the other hand, for migrants, the new law represented an opportunity to re-negotiate the boundaries of citizenship in line with their own stakes after many years of being excluded from citizenship debates. Our data show that migrants responded to the new law by making claims for rights-based citizenship as different from ‘belonging-proper’, by claiming that they are Greeks ‘truly’ because they are culturally assimilated or because they ‘feel’ Greek, and by claiming citizenship on the basis that they are already active members of the society. Their arguments, being centred on cultural and civic criteria contrasted with the dominant ethnic conception of citizenship that was disrupted through the introduction of the new law.

Despite their different stakes, there are clearly overlaps in how Greek and migrant participants negotiate the meanings of citizenship in light of the new law. A key common theme is the distinction between ‘belonging-proper’ and civic membership of a polity. The distinction between the two points precisely to the disjuncture between, on the one hand, prevalent ethnic lay representations of Greekness and, on the other hand, institutional arrangements that introduce civic elements to the definition of the nation. On the part of Greek citizens, this distinction serves to maintain an ethnic representation of Greekness and construct a hierarchy of belonging that constraints’ migrants’ ability to make claims that they are they are ‘truly’ Greek. On the part of migrants, this distinction serves to allow them to make claims for citizenship either because they can argue that they fulfil the conditions of ‘true’ Greekness or by disclaiming ‘true’ Greekness and seeking civic inclusion instead.

In light of these findings, we suggest that social psychological analyses of citizenship should unravel the different and competing constructions of citizenship within the lay realm and examine the different ways they connect with a variety of institutional discourses, particularly at times of social change. As suggested above, citizenship may not be reflected upon but it may simply be practiced as a well-established habitus (Isin, 2009). Ethnic representations of Greek citizenship are such habitual ways of understanding citizenship in the Greek context. On the other hand, social change, such as new citizenship laws that become heavily debated in the public sphere, can disrupt such prevalent constructions. While such disruption may provide the ground for a renegotiation of the meanings and boundaries of citizenship in a way that is more inclusive, it may also elicit strong resistance in order to maintain existing representations of citizenship.

To conclude, we suggest that the social psychology of citizenship studies such points of disruption and the processes of representational change and resistance from the perspectives of both ‘lay’ and ‘official’ political actors. Examination of the connections between policy-making and everyday life is an important social-psychological endeavour with socio-political implications. It permits us to respond to questions such as: What are the lived realities that citizenship policies create for citizens? How do policies demarcate inclusion or exclusion of different social groups and how is this inclusion/exclusion negotiated at the level of everyday experience? What power relations does the institutional discourse create and how are these legitimised or contested in the social arena? These are questions that we feel a social psychology of citizenship can explore in future research.

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