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Dries, Manuel
(2015).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/nietzstu-2015-0117
Abstract
This article responds to three concerns regarding the viability of Nietzsche’s conception of value creation. Section I examines the claim that philosophy is unlikely to contribute to the creation of value. Section II argues that some puzzles regarding Nietzsche’s allegedly highest value of life-affirmation may require for a solution two different conceptions of life-affirmation: basic life-affirmationb and Life-affirmatione par excellence, which is both qualitatively different and based on a theoretically more demanding conception of life. Section three proposes that Nietzsche’s perspectivist method, which distinguishes between perspectival “knowing” and perspectival “objective” knowledge in GM III 12, may usefully be applied to the knowledge and recognition of differences in value perspectives and help improve our value practices.
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About
- Item ORO ID
- 45560
- Item Type
- Journal Item
- ISSN
- 0342-1422
- Academic Unit or School
-
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies > Philosophy
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) - Depositing User
- Manuel Dries