Chapter 11

China in Africa: Impacts and prospects for accountable development

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11.1 Introduction: Asian Drivers and effective states

Development cooperation is changing as rising power donors (re)enter the fray. While a growing body of evidence explores some of the economic trends (e.g. UNCTAD 2007), we know little about the impacts of new (and predominantly Asian) drivers of development on state capacity-building and elite commitment to development in poor countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Africa is a key site given existing problems of economic development and governance, but crucially it is emerging as a strategic region in terms of resource access, trade, investment, aid and migration (Alden 2007). Of the rising Asian countries China remains the largest player in Africa, and for this reason is the main focus of this chapter (Brautigam 2009). This chapter reviews the existing evidence on China’s engagement with Africa and maps out a future research agenda in this area.

Over the past decade Africa has gained in international importance and the Chinese are among a number of rapidly industrialising nations that see the continent in strategic terms (Carmody 2011). Moyo (2009, p. 120) argued that the emergence of China is a ‘golden opportunity’ for Africa offering the continent a ‘win-win’ alternative to the scenario of an ‘aid-dependent economy’ by focusing instead on trade and investment and by providing the infrastructure that will enable Africa to ‘move up the development curve’ (Moyo 2009, p. 122). This ideal of ‘help for self help’ is underpinned by an accompanying discourse of development ‘cooperation’ rather than aid and donor-recipient relations (Rampa and Bilal 2011).

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While Moyo (2009) is one of the optimists the pessimists focus on the aid-governance nexus where the Chinese are accused by some of unscrupulous behaviour that undermines good governance (Manning 2006; Phillips 2006; Tull 2006; Naim 2007). Some (Marks 2006; Trofimov 2007) have taken this focus on aid further to argue that China is essentially a neo-colonial power, where African resources are ‘plundered’ by Beijing which cements the long standing uneven division of labour between Africa and the rest of the world. In some ways the ‘China threat’ in Africa reflects a more general concern about China’s challenge to US hegemony (Campbell 2008).

**The political effects of China in Africa**

While we noted that most analysis of China in Africa has focused on the economic ties, and where studies dealt with governance (e.g. Broadman 2007) it is in function of enabling smoother flows of trade and investment. Recently there have been some attempts to analyse the politics of these relationships. Tull (2006) concludes his piece by arguing that ‘China’s massive return to Africa presents a negative political development’ (p. 476) and his thesis usefully examines this in broad political economy terms – something I return to below.

The tendency of China to exacerbate African governance problems is seen by some as an extension of China’s own lack of concern for human rights and accountability at home – the Chinese export the capitalism they know best (Henderson 2008). In terms of putting Chinese aid in the wider context of ‘older’ donors, Dreher *et al.* (2010, p. 18) point out that new donors ‘do not generally exhibit a stronger bias against better governed countries’, the corollary being that older donors, despite their criticisms of China, have also been willing to support corrupt and authoritarian states.
Although there have been useful contributions over the past few years as better data has emerged (e.g. Brautigam 2009), they still tend to attribute the power to China at the expense of Africa. For example, the ‘Asian Drivers’ agenda (Kaplinsky and Messner 2008), which we adapt later, is premised on a conflation of all Asian countries as sharing some essential characteristics and that they do the ‘driving’, which denies African agency. This is echoed in Carmody et al.’s (2011) analysis of Chinese ‘geogovernance’ in Zambia which argues that the Chinese state projects its power into Africa as part of broader goal of shaping globalization, although they are among the few analysts to factor in African political agency (see also Large 2009; Haglund 2009).

Structure and argument

The chapter starts by setting out an analytical framework, which identifies the channels through which China engages with African development. To avoid seeing these channels as dominated by Chinese agendas I use work around the African state to produce an analytical grid that factors in domestic politics. We then look at the actual impacts on governance by applying this framework to three case studies, although other cases are mentioned. The cases are selected as emblematic of the African state types identified in the framework and are not intended to be an exhaustive review of all African cases. We conclude with an outline of emerging trends and future research themes for the short- to medium–term.

The argument is that China impacts on African development in multiple ways that go well beyond the western focus on aid. On one hand we have to be much more aware of the multiple interests and actors on the Chinese side combined with an awareness of African agency on the other. However, a common trait of this engagement is inter-elite brokerage, which has tended to bypass domestic channels of debate and accountability and so tends to
undermine good governance. That said, in most cases it delivers much needed infrastructure which benefits wider society and so could kick start economic growth that in turn might spread benefits. Crucially, as civil society and political processes in Africa have started to contest this elitism and Chinese practices we are seeing slightly more transparent attempts to negotiate the relationship though these are relatively ad hoc and nascent. Moreover China’s entry to Africa is also through independent businesses who lie outside of Chinese state direction and whose impacts on local development could be significant in terms of job creation, although their political involvement will be limited in the short-term.

11.2 Analytical framework

In this section I elaborate an analytical schema for assessing the political impacts of China’s development cooperation. It has two basic elements – the channels through which China impacts on domestic political processes based on an amended version of the framework developed by Kaplinsky and colleagues (e.g. Kaplinsky and Morris 2009; Kaplinsky 2008). As noted above this tends to downplay African political agency and in practice was used to examine economic linkages rather than political aspects. To address this we use the work of Alden (2007) and Tull (2006) who have developed classificatory schema of African regime types to hypothesise the possible impacts of China on African politics.

Asian Drivers

The first element is identifying the channels of interaction and impact. The framework distinguishes different channels of impact transmission, the distinction between complementary and competitive impacts, and between direct and indirect impacts. These channels are contingent and change over time, and vary in significance depending on such things as location, resource endowment, trade links, and geo-strategic significance. Six key
channels stand out in importance: trade links, investment flows (FDI and portfolio investments), aid, governance, flows of migrants, and environmental spillovers. I will elaborate on each of these below. As a heuristic it is also important to stress that these channels are clearly not discrete.

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In each of these channels of interaction, there will be a mixture of complementary and competitive impacts. For example, with regard to trade, China may both provide cheap inputs and consumer goods to sub-Saharan Africa and be a market for African exports. On the other hand, imports from China can displace local producers. In relation to FDI, China can be a direct source of inward FDI into sub-Saharan Africa and perhaps crowd-in FDI into Africa from third countries as parts of extended global value chains. These are complementary impacts. But China may also compete with other economies for global FDI.

In terms of thinking through the developmental and political impacts the key aspect of these interactions is the ‘for whom’ component. Countries may be affected differentially – in some cases, for example, the export of fabrics from China to Africa may feed productively into a vibrant clothing and textile value chain; in other cases, it may displace a country’s exports and production for the domestic market. However, these effects are not just felt at the national level, but affect groups within countries differentially. For example, cheap clothing imports from China may displace clothing and textile workers, but cheapen wage goods and hence reduce wage costs for producers in other sectors. These impacts on a complementary-competitive axis may also change over time, and most importantly, they will vary for different classes, regions and groups within economies.
The complementary-competitive axis of impacts is generally quite well recognised and understood. Less widely acknowledged is the distinction between direct and indirect impacts, partly because indirect impacts are difficult to measure. Indirect impacts occur in third country markets and institutions. For example, China’s trade with the US may open or foreclose the opportunities for African economies to export into that market. Similarly, China’s high savings rate has had the effect of lowering global interest rates, indirectly facilitating investment in Africa. As in the case of the complementary/competitive access, the impact of the direct and indirect impacts can be gauged either at the country level, or at intra-national levels. Yet impacts are not just conditioned by the needs of the Chinese actors ‘driving’ this process, but are realised relationally through the ways in which these channels interact with African states and societies.

**Making sense of the African state**

The second element is the nature of the political system with which these channels interact, which is largely but not exclusively a state-centred issue given the bilateral and elite nature of the way China engages with Africa (Taylor 2006, 2007). Carmody and Taylor (2010) use the term ‘flexigemony’ to capture the more dynamic interactions between China and a differentiated landscape of African politics. For them flexigemony denotes how ‘Chinese actors adapt their strategies to suit the particular histories and geographies of the African states with which they engage’ (p. 497). From an African perspective, the ‘emerging’ powers give recipient countries some leverage, what has been termed the ‘revival of triangulation’ (Large 2008). On the face of it China’s interests do not radically alter the role Africa plays in the global division of labour (Tull 2006) but what is interesting to analyse is whether
individual African states are able to harness this hegemonic rivalry for their own ends. How can we conceptualise African state agency?

In order to systematically analyse the relationships between Chinese channels of engagement and African polities we can use the typologies generated by Alden (2007). Alden sets out a broad typology of states - pariah states, illiberal regimes and weak democracies, and democratic countries with diversified economies. Tull (2006) also focuses on three groups of states – democratising, mineral-rich and post-conflict – which cover some of Alden’s concerns. Alden’s schema has an implicit scaling of democratisation and his first two groups are essentially resource rich states. Moreover, post-conflict tells us little about the underlying political-economy and rarely covers whether China has a peace-keeping role.

With pariah partnerships China is seen as a source of stability and provider of FDI and development assistance which is denied by other avenues. Examples are Chad, Sudan and Zimbabwe, with Angola dropping in and out. We will explore the details below, but these cases show that while the Chinese will pursue interests in the face of glaring governance and rights abuses there are times when they draw the line for pragmatic reasons or through international pressure. So, it is wrong to characterise the Chinese as endlessly cynical in such cases.

The illiberal regimes with weak democracy cover much of the rest of SSA, but notably include Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia. The relationships with the Chinese are brokered at elite levels to access strategic resources. But at the same time Chinese investments are more diverse and so bring much needed FDI and development aid, but this can compete with indigenous firms which can cause conflict. There are also strong ties
between political elites and leading local firms so that foreign investments can proceed relatively quickly compared to states with stronger and more accountable institutions. In these states the Chinese are willing to secure leverage via self-aggrandising symbolic infrastructure projects which impact on regime legitimacy.

The *democracies with diversified economies* are few and far between, but South Africa is the notable (and powerful) example. Alden includes Namibia, Botswana and Ghana though these are more debateable cases in terms of the diversification of their economies. In these states the relationship is complex and varies according to the local business interests and policy coherence of the state. There may be competition with local firms but the possibility exists for strategic guidance that could create more local benefits. Here local CSOs are more likely to exist and be able to voice dissent in policy arenas, which could effect the direction and nature of Chinese investment and aid.

As illustrated in Table 11.2 combining the two frameworks produces an analytical grid to track the political effects.

Before analysing specific exemplar case studies we flesh out the six channels in more detail and assess aggregate trends at a continental scale.

*Trade*
Chinese trade with Africa stood at US$817 million in 1977 just before the major reforms that liberalized the Chinese economy, but from 2000 to 2009 bilateral trade rose from US$10.6 billion to US$91.07 billion (CAITEC 2010). In the first half of 2011, China-Africa imports and exports totalled US$79.01 billion, an increase of 29.1% year-on-year (Chinese Custom 2011). African states have benefitted from commodity exports such as oil, minerals, cotton and logs; building of infrastructure, for example, transport and construction of public buildings which are a means of assuring social gains such as education and healthcare in the future; imports of machinery and auto-parts; and welfare gains from consumer imports from China. However, competition with local industries resulted in some closures of local enterprises and job losses, especially around clothing and textiles (Amankwah 2005). This in turn contributed to losses in export to third country markets and further capacity losses in terms of labour and management deskilling (Kaplinsky and Messner 2008).

As a means of stimulating trade and facilitating inward investment the Chinese have recently initiated a series of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) across Africa (Brautigam and Tang 2011). It is expected that these proposed SEZs will focus on value-added industries and provide liberalized investment environments for investors (China Economic Review 2010). According to Davies (2010, p. 26), the zones will create employment opportunities and generate foreign exchange reserves through more diversified sources of income. Although these zones are largely invested in and built by Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs), their main occupants are small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), amounting to 85% of the businesses (Tang and Zhang 2011).

**FDI**
China's direct investment in African countries reached $1.44 billion in 2009 (Han 2011), in which non-financial direct investment soared by 55.4% from the previous year (China Daily 2010). In 2008, nearly 1,600 Chinese enterprises had started business in African countries (Wen 2009). Some 180 of these companies were spearheaded by the ‘going out’ policy and have been designated by the Chinese state to benefit from preferential finance, tax concessions and political backing in order to become true multinationals.

In terms of China and Africa one of the important differentiating factors is the scale and type of Chinese enterprise (Gu 2009). While we talk about packages of aid and investment it largely relates to the ties between key Chinese ministries, development banks and large SOEs (Hubbard 2008). These projects are often spatially enclaved with relatively few multipliers in the local economy or ‘deep’ linkages to local society. By contrast we see Chinese private TNCs entering under ‘open’ commercial contracts, where they lack any of the protection afforded by the tying of loans to investment. And finally there are the myriad small Chinese private firms that date back, in some cases, to the colonial period (Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009). Each type of firm has different levels of engagement with local capital, the state and society and we will explore these differences through our case studies.

A recent policy vehicle or enhancing FDI in Africa is the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund) established under the 2006 Africa Policy. The CADFund is the first equity investment fund in China focusing on Africa (Tradeinvest Africa 2009). Other than providing funds for companies, CADFund provides various consultancy services and information sharing for investment in Africa, partner sourcing, finance structuring, and environmental and social issues (CADFund 2010). By the end of 2009, the CADFund had earmarked US$700 million for over 35 projects (CAITEC 2010).
Aid

One of the problems of assessing Chinese aid is that it is not measured in the same way as DAC aid (Glosny 2006; Lancaster 2007; Jacoby 2007; Kragelund 2008) and a lack of domestic transparency compounds the uncertainties, although the publication of an aid White Paper in April 2011 went some way to clarify these issues (Xinhua 2011). China does not separate Official Development Assistance from economic cooperation or investment as long as the intent is to expand local capacity. This is much more about mutual benefit than a discourse of charity or of ‘catching up’ (King 2010).

Many of the features of China’s contemporary aid giving were laid down during the Cold War period. Today, much of the aid is bilateral and delivered through three modes of grant aid, interest free loans, and concessional loans (Davies et al. 2008). Aid is also project based (often turnkey) rather than sectoral or programme aid as encouraged by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Glosny 2006). One of the contentious elements is that much of China’s aid and concessional lending is tied (Kragelund 2008). Hubbard (2008, p. 225) asserts that the Chinese insist that the Chinese contractor appointed by MOFCOM should ‘purchase and import from China as much equipment, technology and services as possible’, which is similar to the earlier Japanese model. This goes against the OECD’s efforts to untie aid, although despite these efforts many DAC donors still have significant proportions of tied aid (Brautigam 2009). A similar issue is raised around export credits which are the preferred currency used by ExIm and potentially allow for more tying (Manning 2006), but Reisen and Ndoye’s (2008) study for the OECD suggests that China’s lending is not ‘imprudent’. As Dreher et al. (2011) conclude ‘we find little reason to blame new donors for using aid as a means to promote commercial self-interest’ (p. 1961).
Governance

As we noted China’s engagement with Africa has often been reduced to a question of exacerbating governance issues. Yet China’s impacts on governance and politics are multi-layered. Given its insistence on ‘non-interference’ and a respect for sovereignty the Chinese would argue that they do not have a direct impact on African politics, yet even if this were true China can impact through multilateral institutions and, importantly, at the ideational level. We discuss these various channels in turn.

First, the reason why China exorcises some commentators and activists is that it seemingly attaches no conditions to its loans and therefore undermines the work of western donors around governance (Naim 2007). Yet Dreher et al. (2011) found relatively little difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ donors in terms of their aid allocating behaviour despite ideological differences alluded to by analysts. While China publicly distances itself from internal political issues, the backlash against its role in Sudan saw a weakening of its ‘non-interference’ line (Large 2008). Holslag (2011) found that China is flexible and pragmatic in its political engagements with Africa. Additionally Glosny (2006) argues that the Chinese are aware they need to understand local institutional cultures to maximise the benefits from their interventions, something analysed in Eisenman’s (2008) study of the Communist Party of China’s International Department (CPC-ID). While this is not the same as direct influence it suggests that the Chinese have a series of ‘quieter’ foreign policy mechanisms (Shambaugh 2007).

Secondly, China’s influence in Africa is also felt through its roles in multilateral organisations. Gu et al. (2008) note that China’s role as an international actor has grown as a
result of its economic rise. This occurs through a range of channels: its imports of energy and resources have shifted prices and ushered in a renewed period of geopolitical anxieties around security of supply; its currency reserves impact on other countries’ financial markets, notably – but not exclusively - the US; it is a significant player in the WTO and other trade and investment forums; and as a polluter it impacts on climate change. In essence these are economic drivers with political effects but China also plays an increasing role in purposive political processes and institutions. While China still engages in bilateral diplomacy it is leading the way towards what some have argued is a multipolar world (Wade 2011) that will reduce the influence of the US-dominated order of the past 70 years (Ikenberry 2008).

A third important political influence of China is at an ideational level. This revolves around, first, a post-colonial solidarity based on shared histories of colonisation and, second, the potentially powerful demonstration effect of the ‘China model’. Six (2009) argues that a key difference that China and India bring to the aid and development agenda is they occupy a ‘dual position’ (p.1110) being both of the developing world but also key drivers of growth in the global economy. This means they do not need to fall back on teleologies of emancipation bound up in western development discourse but are freer to be honest about their interest-based engagements with African countries. Six’ insistence on the transparency of China’s interests is fair although questions of ‘solidarity’ that are the watchwords of China’s discourse of development cooperation also need to be empirically tested rather than taken at face value..

Obiorah (2007) argued that China provides a powerful development model, which has a number of possible effects on African development debates. First, he argued, African leaders can use this model to deny political rights to their people. Second, China exports its model
via growth-oriented aid and overlooks the social impacts of its actions under the banner of non-interference. Ultimately so Obiorah feels it is the duty of African civil society to debate and discuss China’s role, because rentier regimes will not engender such debate. While Obiorah is rightfully circumspect about the political (ab)use of the ‘China model’, problems arise in exactly what we mean by the ‘China model’ since arguably there are multiple models in different provinces, something acknowledged by both non-Chinese (e.g. Mittelman 2006) and Chinese analysts alike (Junbo 2011).

**Migration**

While most observers accept that China has sent an increased number of workers to Africa in the past decade, a major problem is that data are speculative (see Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009). To assess the impacts on Africa of this migration requires what Mung terms a ‘triangular’ perspective in which ‘the Chinese diaspora does not only relate to China, but also interacts with the society where it has settled’ (p. 105-6). One upshot of increased trade and migration with Africa has been a rise in political responses to it, largely within civil society (Alden 2007; Davies 2007; Campbell 2008). A number of Africa trade unions and business associations have led the critique of China’s role in national economies (Baah and Jauch 2009; Human Rights Watch 2011).

Moreover, there is some evidence of Chinese migration becoming politicised. Despite the tangible evidence of modernisation that Chinese projects bring there are growing signs of disaffection with the Chinese among Africans (Trofimov 2007) though this has often been whipped up by western media and varies between countries (see Sautman and Hairong 2009; Gadzala and Hanusch 2010). Overall surveys that exist suggest a relatively high approval
rating for the Chinese (e.g. Ngome 2009), but exceptional cases exist where the Chinese presence is used to fire nationalist sentiment.

Environment
As noted much of the use of the Asian Driers framework has been to analyse economic interactions to the relative exclusion of other development channels. A more complete approach to studying China’s development footprint might draw on the insights of ‘political ecology’ (Peet and Watts 2004; Bryant and Bailey 1997). For a study of China and Africa relations natural resources and the environment are key for a number of reasons. First, given the resource focus of much Chinese activity what are the implications for ecosystem sustainability in areas where new exploitation is taking place under conditions of lax regulation (Haglund 2009)? And are the Chinese any better or worse than other multinationals in this regard (Chan-Fishel 2007)? Second, China and other rising powers are moving into agriculture, which has huge implications for access to land, and thereby impacts upon the livelihoods of the poor (Mahmoud 2010). Third, China is a major producer of greenhouse gases which indirectly impact on low income economies through climate change so that export production in China for western markets has impacts on the poor in the developing world (Watts 2010). In turn this creates complex global governance problems where the relatively powerless developing country governments have little say.

11.3 Analysis of existing engagements
The preceding analysis has identified the channels through which China engages with Africa and the nature of the states that in turn mediate these engagements and ultimately determine the developmental impacts. These two dimensions were captured in an analytical framework
and in this section we use that framework to analyse the impacts across the three types of African state.

Table 11.3 provides an overview of the findings and the subsequent section gives detail of each case. Gaps in the table below indicate either a lack of knowledge (Unknown) or a weak relationship (Limited impact).

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**Angola**

As an Illiberal regime with weak democracy, Angola’s post-war economy required huge amounts of social and infrastructural investment and so sought external financing. It was in this context that China in need of energy resources sought to offer Angola a series of oil-backed credit lines with little conditionality (Corkin 2011a). China’s ExIm Bank provided the first funding for infrastructure development in 2002 and a ‘framework agreement’ for new economic cooperation was signed by the Angolan Ministry of Finance and the Chinese Ministry of Trade in 2003 whilst in March 2004 the first US$2-billion financing package for public investment projects was approved.

Two additional ExIm loans of US$500 million and US$2 billion were made in 2007 with the repayment terms increased to 15 years with a revised interest rate of Libor plus 1.25% (Campos and Vines 2008). A further $1 billion loan from the China Development Bank was granted in March 2009 (rising to US$ 1.5 billion in 2010) with a view to supporting the development of Angolan agriculture. In the first official estimate of Chinese credit to Angola,
the Chinese Ambassador said in early 2011 that an estimated US$14.5 billion in credit had been provided since the end of the war from the three Chinese state banks (Power et al. 2012). These credit lines have opened up well over 100 projects in the areas of energy, agriculture, water, health, education, telecommunications, fisheries and public works including key elements in the government’s post-war National Reconstruction Programme. Project proposals identified as priorities by the respective Angolan ministries are put forward to the Grupo de Trabalho Conjunto, a joint committee of the Ministry of Finance and the MOFCOM (China). For each project put to tender, the Chinese government proposes three to four Chinese companies and all projects are inspected by third parties not funded by the credit line while sectoral ministries are in charge of managing these public works and making sure that sufficient staff are trained.

Additionally, oil-backed loans amounting to as much as US$10 billion have also been provided by a private equity firm based in Hong Kong called the China International Fund. Further, some Chinese businesses based in Hong Kong have been a key feature of China’s push into African markets. Levkowitz et al. (2009) have shown many of the Chinese companies currently operating in Angola have the same Hong Kong address at which a handful of individuals control over 30 firms. Key personnel involved in CIF have ties to Chinese state-owned enterprises and state agencies including China International Trust and Investment Corporation, Sinopec and possibly China’s intelligence apparatus. By posing as a private firm, the Group creates numerous companies within a complicated organisational structure to invest globally, thereby enabling the Group to acquire assets ‘unnoticed’. This credit facility has been managed by Angola’s Reconstruction Office, the Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional (GRN), which has been exclusively accountable to the Angolan presidency and originally managed most of the major infrastructure projects. In the major
government reshuffle of March 2010 (in which the President called for a crackdown on corruption) a replacement was sought for the GRN in what was widely seen as a vote of no confidence in the agency and later in the same year the President announced that a company called Sonangol Imobiliária [Sonangol Real Estate] would be taking over responsibility from the GRN for implementing various projects relating to construction and the rehabilitation of infrastructure (Power 2011).

The Angola case points to the ‘China-Africa’ relationship being organised through hybrid and enclaved yet spatially diffuse institutions which are detached from national democratic processes. Agency on the part of selected Chinese and Angolan actors has produced in the CIF-GRN an institutional assemblage that sits within the state apparatus but is only connected to selected and clandestine elements within the state. As Corkin (2011a) argues this might be a response on the part of the Chinese to Angola’s rampant corruption in which direct ties are seen as better than diffuse budget support. The creation of unaccountable enclaves within states echoes the Structural Adjustment era when ‘parallel governments’ (Hutchful 1989) were set up, mainly in finance ministries, by appointed technocrats. However, in contrast to the adjustment era there is no obvious political conditionality, rather a diffuse form of authority based on a small number of powerful actors.

Given that such a small part of the state is actively acting in this relationship is it meaningful to talk about ‘the state’ at all? Social collectivities–like states–that are driven by a small number of actors can have agency if they are given the authority to act by wider society. It is debatable if the Dos Santos regime has such a social contract yet the delivery of much-needed infrastructure not only deepens (or seeks to deepen) the regime’s legitimacy but might benefit wider Angola society. In Dos Santos we see an active and single-minded leader who
exercised his agency to create institutions to channel inward investment in particular directions.

**Ghana**

While I use Ghana as an example of a democratic country with a diversified economy it is noted that the economy is not hugely diverse. The presence and intensity of Chinese involvement is less evident in Ghana compared to Angola, largely due to the lack of strategic minerals although this has changed with the discovery of offshore oilfields in late 2008. Although China has had a long-standing relationship with Ghana since the 1960s, it is only in recent years that the relationship has been taken to a higher level.

Over the years, Chinese aid has been used to build physical infrastructure like roads (for example, the Ofankor-Nsawam section of the Accra-Kumasi road) and buildings (the National Theatre). It was in 2004/2005 when relations improved and Ghana began to receive grants and interest free loans directly from China such as a US$24 million debt relief on interest free loans (Interview with Xi, counsellor, 2008). In the 2006 FOCAC, Ghana and China signed six agreements, including a US$66 million loan for the expansion of Ghana’s telecommunication infrastructure and a US$30 million concessionary loan for the first phase of the National Fibre-optic and E-government project. The project was executed by the Chinese telecom giant Huawei and aimed at linking all the 10 regional capitals and 36 townships on fibre routes (Daily Graphic, 15 August 2007).

In general the process is similar to Angola in which the Chinese sign a framework document for construction and then engage their own contractor from China and procure the materials from the mainland. Upon completion, the Chinese effectively donate the building to the
Ghanaian government (Interview with Xi, counsellor, Ghana). There is a perception amongst ministers and think tanks in Ghana that the Chinese are serving genuine infrastructure needs. As one think-tank told us the ‘Chinese also got it right from the beginning as countries must get infrastructure in place before any development can take place’ (Interview, Private Enterprise Foundation 2008).

Undoubtedly the most significant Chinese engagement with Ghana is the Bui hydroelectric dam. Like many Chinese-funded infrastructure projects the majority of the money comes from ExIm Bank. The Bui Dam will cost US$622m of which US$288m is from buyer credits and US$298 is a commercial loan, the interest on which is repayable after September 2012. It should bring 400 MW of electricity to Ghana’s struggling grid and even allow some to be exported to West African neighbours. This revenue will be paid into an escrow account and funds used to service the debt. In addition there is a special arrangement with the Ghana Cocoa Board to supply cocoa as part payment of the debt.

Chinese corporations in general do not encourage trade unions, and originally did not allow for it at Bui. But a deputation from the Ghana TUC argued that it was enshrined both in Ghanaian law and the contract and so had to (Baah and Jauch 2009). More broadly this highlights an important issue for the developmental impacts of China in Africa. Where local laws are well elaborated and, more importantly, enforced then expropriation is more difficult although the trade-off may be lower levels of absolute investment. An example of weak adherence to the planning process and environmental standards around the Bui Dam reveals both obedience in some areas and noncompliance in others (Hensengerth 2011). This process suggests that where the Ghanaian state is determined to see a project realised then regulatory short cuts can be taken. While not confined to Chinese investments these large, elite brokered
projects are likely to encourage this flouting of due process in favour of the Chinese (Haglund 2009).

Sinohydro and other Chinese firms are looking to deepen their footprint in Ghana and Africa more broadly. Although the Chinese seemed to have got a foothold in Africa through these Chinese government-supported projects they are now competing more openly for tenders and as one European aid official told us ‘winning in straight fights’ (see Corkin 2011b). Furthermore in terms energy oil reserves were discovered in 2008 in Ghana (McCaskie 2008). Estimates of revenue are difficult to determine but the IMF calculates around $20billion over 20 years, peaking between 2011 and 2016. The oil producers soon began arriving. Initially the discovery was through a UK-US consortium–Tullow and Kosmos–but before long a range of applicants was seeking drilling blocks. Importantly the Chinese state-owned enterprise China National Offshore Oil Corporation has sought to purchase Kosmos for a reported $3 billion on the basis of its Ghanaian and Ugandan oil discoveries.

The danger is that with a high budget deficit the government will be tempted to emulate the ‘Angola model’ by collateralising the oil in return for credit. Major multilaterals are urging the Government of Ghana to sort its underlying structural problems first rather than simply use the windfall rents to shore up budget deficits which will re-emerge once the boom ends. Additionally there are worries about a ‘Dutch Disease’ scenario where this resource exportation discourages investment and taxation in non-oil sectors (Oxfam 2009). Agriculture is one of the key sectors likely to suffer under this scenario.

Importantly, with the discovery of oil in Ghana the Chinese announced in 2010 a US$15 billion fund for oil-related infrastructure development which was negotiated at the highest
levels, with Ghana’s President Atta-Mills eschewing a high level meeting in New York about the future of aid to stay on in Beijing for the signing ceremony. This signals the changing power balance in African development relations and the established donors in Ghana have expressed concern about the transparency of these deals (Ghanaweb 2010). However, this situation appears to be changing with greater Parliamentary scrutiny in Ghana over a $3 billion loan from China for an oil and gas corridor (Reuters 2011).

**Sudan**

Sudan is key to China’s African oil interests but also a pariah regime. While the Chinese government may be an ‘old friend’ of Sudan based on the idea of non-interference, in practice China has played a deep and critical role in Sudan’s politics. In late 1995 China’s ‘energy cooperation’ with Sudan gathered momentum when President Bashir visited Beijing and secured a reduced rate loan with an agreement between China’s Exim Bank and the Bank of Sudan to finance oil development (Ali 2007).

The turn to China by the National Islamic Front’s (NIF), later re-named the National Congress Party, was borne of necessity. Its renewed war against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) continued, prosecuted as part of a project of Islamist transformation in Sudan. Having poor relations with the IMF and World Bank, Sudan also became the object of sanctions by the UN (1996) and the US (1997) so that turning to China was pragmatic given Beijing’s political dependability and willingness to invest. China viewed Sudan as a friendly state with a more open oil market not, as elsewhere in Africa, dominated by established Western corporations.
From early 1997 CNPC has operated a 40% share in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), the main oil consortium in Sudan. However, oil production in Southern Sudan had been constrained by the lack of a proper infrastructure. So, a CNPC subsidiary was involved in constructing a 1,600-km buried pipeline for GNPOC to connect oil production with the international market. The Khartoum oil refinery was built as a CNPC-Ministry of Energy joint venture with an investment of some $638 million and became operational in February 2000. Following GNPOC, the second major oil consortium in Sudan, Petrodar, was created in 2001. By 2006 China was by far the most important external economic actor in Northern Sudan, whose oil-fuelled economic boom saw real GDP growing by 12% in 2006.

The successful running of Sudan’s oil industry by CNCP and other foreign oil companies amidst the civil wars demonstrated a willingness to side with Khartoum, despite the principle of ‘non-interference’. China’s ‘blind-eye’ support for the NIF has been the wellspring of grievances in many quarters in Sudan. Forced civilian displacement in Southern Sudan has continued, though largely overshadowed by Darfur, and the oil sector was targeted by the SPLA and other groups. Oil rich regions generate considerable revenue, but there have been negligible improvements in service delivery for affected civilian populations. Grievances concerning oil practices, the environmental impact of oil and employment policies of oil companies abound. China has supplied arms to Sudan and helped develop Northern Sudan’s arms manufacturing industry in the late 1990s.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 inaugurated a formal peace between Northern and Southern Sudan but the Chinese retained the ties they had built up over the years. Even before the CPA, the Chinese had identified its post-war reconstruction market as
an area of expansion, especially given that sanctions restricted Western investment. Oil activity has expanded after the CPA and CNPC signed new concessions in 2007. Besides oil, key areas for expansion include construction, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and importantly an assortment of transport infrastructure and energy projects. Most controversially, as we saw earlier, the Merowe dam in Northern Sudan being led by a Chinese consortium has generated conflict and displacement (Bosshard 2009).

China’s diplomacy on Darfur became more publicly engaged from 2006 to the point where its efforts to ‘influence’ the Sudanese government on Darfur blurred the boundaries of non-interference. Beijing underestimated the political risk posed by Darfur to its interests within Sudan, as well as its standing in Africa and on the international stage. More proactive engagement on Darfur was evident before China’s role in Sudan was connected to a ‘genocide Olympics’ campaign by activist groups in the US. The appointment of a new special ambassador, Liu Guijin, in May 2007 was part of China’s efforts to bolster its image and contribute to solutions. For example, more aid has been given to Darfur. Such moves also enabled China to promote its own interests through more vocal diplomacy and participation in multilateral forums and initiatives on Darfur. But China’s more proactive diplomacy was accompanied by continuity in defending the sovereignty of Sudan and arguing against further sanctions, as well as deepening economic links. Thus for this ‘pariah state’ the impact of oil has been to further concentrate wealth rather than achieve broader development, and this seems likely to worsen even if, as a result of diplomacy, it may lose some of its pariah status.

11.4 Discussion

Elites and inclusion
The case studies suggest that regardless of the nature of the African state the dominant mode of engagement between China and Africa is at the elite level. State capacity on the African side clearly exists, even if it is not always in the form that western liberal donors would wish for (see Kelsall 2013). It may even be that this selective and sometimes autocratic state capacity delivers forms of development – it may not be inclusive but it is effective by certain criteria.

China’s preference for bilateralism encourages negotiations between senior officials which often occur outside of domestic accountability structures. In Ghana, for example, earlier Chinese investments such as the IT spine had very little discussion with telecommunications companies or within government and in Angola the GRN was effectively insulated from public scrutiny. In Ghana inputs to the Bui Dam were given to a company owned by a cabinet minister and in Namibia Chinese scholarships went to the children of high-ranking officials suggesting that China’s entry may do little to alter existing forms of patrimonialism. That said, as Davies (2007) notes the Chinese claim that their project focus as opposed to modalities like direct budget support reduces the chances of malfeasance since there is less free-floating cash to be siphoned off. Again, evidence of such arrangements is sparse and arguably part of the Chinese argument is to justify its tying of loans to Chinese SOEs.

**Legitimacy and policy space**

But whether these arrangements are elite-based and relatively unaccountable is somewhat different to whether they build legitimacy and contribute to a longer term view of development. At one level the Angola and Sudan cases show that policy triangulation is possible with African states playing donors and investors off against one another. With resource security a global agenda, Africa’s abundance of strategic minerals has given selected
countries on the continent a degree of space to negotiate. And in this regard it is vitally important not to fixate on China since a raft of new investors are entering these markets (such as India in Sudan and Korea in Ghana, etc.). But as the Busan HLF noted that while these actors and economic relationships may provide enhanced markets for African exports they do not alter the structural position of these economies and do little to kick start broader industrialisation. It is here that purposive policy on the African side is vital if developmental gains are to spread beyond mineral rents. Investment in training, for example, is important if more local employment is to be generated by this new investment.

In terms of regime legitimacy, Tull (2006) and Holslag (2011) note that Chinese investments have enhanced the legitimacy of recipient regimes. This is more than the aid-based vanity projects, such as ministries and stadia, but much-needed transport and energy infrastructure (Foster et al 2008). While it is too early to say definitively this infrastructural development might not only enhance the legitimacy of incumbent regimes but will have multiple, indirect benefits to citizens through such things as enhanced mobility and information flows. Moreover, effective transportation and communications can only increase the ability of the central state to reach and administer its territory, although how this plays out depends on the intentions of the regime that controls the system. In Sudan, for example, Chinese owned infrastructure was used by the Sudanese army to mount attacks in the South so we need to be attuned to the progressive and regressive uses of technology and infrastructure that the Chinese bring.

**Labour and environment**

The evidence around investment and labour suggests that labour importation varies according to the nature of the project, the Chinese firm involved, and the labour market conditions in
Africa (Chen and Orr 2009). In Ghana, for example, Chinese labour was limited and firms had relatively little trouble finding semi-skilled labour, although the conditions and pay of this work are not high. That said, research by the author in Nigeria revealed that while local employees acknowledged the lower wages they were also grateful for the resilience of Chinese firms. Where a number of major Nigerian employers had gone bust the Chinese firms were still operating. By contrast the post-war labour market of Angola was poor so that labour importation is higher despite local content clauses (Corkin 2011b).

Moreover the extension of the ‘China Inc.’ assumptions into Africa tends to suggest that ethnic economies are internally coherent and enclavic – the Chinese only look after their own. But this is clearly misplaced as our evidence showed hard capitalist logics determining business behaviour as opposed to favouring of co-ethnics. That is not to say that these business relationships are random, but that ethnicity and nationality are over-determined in the literature on Chinese migrant businesses, which in turn diverts attention from the potential benefits to African economies. For example, recent research in Zambia (Fessehaie 2011) and Angola (Corkin 2011b) suggests that the Chinese are not as enclaved as earlier reports suggested and local firms have secured a growing number of contracts.

In all cases the environmental impacts are poorly understood and the focus has been on high profile cases, such as the Merowe Dam in Sudan. Again, there are issues around the contracts underpinning these investments, which go beyond a simple China-Africa logic. In the case of the Merowe Dam it is the German consulting firm that is being prosecuted which suggests that mitigating negative social and environmental impacts is a matter of complex arrangements between multiple actors, although as the Ghana and Angola cases show local
laws are poorly enforced around these major projects though there is no evidence that this situation is worse regarding Chinese projects.

11.5 Emerging issues and research gaps

The foregoing analysis suggests that China and other Asian powers are changing the political landscape of African states though not as drastically as western sceptics would believe. As a recent report noted “There is a clear opportunity for Africa to grab now, since both traditional and ‘new’ players are in an important phase of reforming (e.g. Europe) and designing (e.g. China, India and Brazil) their development policy towards Africa” (Rampa and Bilal 2011, p. VIII). To capitalise on this opportunity requires a series of coordinated responses across African, BRIC and multilateral political spaces.

Changing China

China’s domestic development has been the driver of its overseas engagements so as it changes there are likely to be implications for Africa. Kaplinsky and Farooki (2011) show that China’s and India’s high levels of commodity demand are likely to continue for at least 25 years which means that Africa will remain a strategic commercial interest. Despite the global recession and a slight drop in China’s growth rate, China honoured its aid commitments to Africa. Yet the Chinese model is clearly imperfect with large and growing domestic inequality and environmental damage (Shirk 2007; Watts 2010). As international scrutiny and the influence of policy norms deepens it is likely that Chinese SOEs and policy makers will adopt more sustainable approaches and we are already seeing CSR agendas amongst some policy banks and SOEs. But as Chinese firms proliferate, diversify and internationalise it becomes ever harder for the Chinese state to monitor and regulate them (Reilly and Na 2007) while the large numbers of smaller private firms never even enter these
regulatory mechanisms. Hence, we are likely to see some high profile firms voluntarily adopting better practices but for the majority it will be business as usual unless and until African states have the capacity and willingness to regulate.

We are also seeing an evolution of Chinese firms, especially SOEs. Most come in under tied arrangements linked to state-backed concessional loans, which reduces the risk to these firms, even if the absolute levels of profit are thin. However, there is emerging evidence (Corkin 2011b) that once established in an African market these firms operate like any other TNC and tender for open contracts which they are increasingly winning.

The cases reviewed in Section 3 showed that despite China branding itself as ‘non-interfering’ this has always been a flexible discourse. The Sudan case showed a growing involvement in domestic politics and the Libyan evacuation of 2011 suggested that a priority for China is ensuring the safety of its nationals, which is linked to stability of the political operating environment. Hence, we are likely to see growing direct involvement in African governance. This is likely to be below the radar rather than through public governance programmes.

Despite the long-standing discourse around ‘South-South’ cooperation and the distancing of China from mainstream donors, there is growing self-awareness of China as an international development actor. The White Paper on aid in May 2011 was relatively light on details (Provost 2011) but was significant for using the term aid and acknowledging, despite its fragmentation, that China has an evolving aid ‘system’. Other institutional reorganisation identified in the White paper and the establishment of the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development (Davies 2007) suggests that a reflexive
analytical move within China’s aid system is under way and noises are being made about closer convergence around international development norms.

**African states**

Many of the issues that China in Africa raises are not unique to this specific relationship. As Broadman (2007) notes many of the issues around Africa’s engagement with China concern long-standing problems of policy coherence, political stability and border controls which pre-date China’s entry. As such this raises a much wider series of questions about the African state and political economy, which are beyond the scope of this chapter.

One of the key issues at the interface of accumulation and inclusion is around the use of African labour. We noted that use of African labour varies according to labour market conditions and nature of the project, but that it is generally quite high. However, much of this African labour is relatively unskilled and so skills transfer is low and few African governments are investing in vocational training (Okonjo-Iweala 2010) which creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of the Chinese requiring the importation of skilled labour. However, we have seen companies like Huawei setting up training centres in Africa (Chang et al. 2009) as it is aware that local workers have certain advantages over Chinese staff. A similar issue is around linkages to local firms. We have seen in the cases of Angola and DRC that local content clauses were part of the agreements around loan packages but that adherence is uneven. There is emerging evidence that Chinese investment is creating local linkages to African firms though the jobs created in these firms tend to be relatively low skilled (Teka 2011) and in the case of Angola contracts are skewed towards firms owned by the ruling party (Soares de Oliveira 2007). These studies also show that local policy can make a difference and so while, for example, Angola has set up joint venture clauses that encouraged
foreign firms to partner with local firms much of the rest of the policy needed to kick start industrialisation was poorly elaborated.

**Multilateral forums**

The previous sub-section argued that it is long-standing structural issues within recipient states that need to be addressed rather than simply reforming the mode of entry of the new donors. While the Chinese White Paper on aid echoed some of the concepts and makes some concessions to international norms, it is unlikely that the Chinese state will wholeheartedly throw itself into these institutional processes. Their own development models are too powerful and different for them to, for example, suddenly start championing civil society, but as we noted there is space for consensus around business-led growth (Chaponniere 2009). So, there is likely to be some convergence with Western donors around issues which do not threaten China’s own growth or domestic political agendas, such as greener technologies and investments in technical capacity building and social infrastructure. However, if the ‘China model’ is used ideologically by recipient states in Africa to oppose liberal reforms then this could become a site of conflict between Chinese, western and African actors.

The need for ongoing dialogue and learning (European Commission 2008; Davies 2010) between new donors, old donors and recipients is still high on the agenda, as evidenced by debates at the 2011 Busan HLF on Aid Effectiveness. In comparison to the Paris and Accra meetings the new donors were much more prominent although the debates were salutary. While they recognised the benefits that South-South cooperation could bring to LDCs they noted that terms of trade are generally not altered by these relationships and Africa still largely imports manufactured goods while exporting raw materials. In the case of China they noted that the 2009 FOCAC meeting did pledge technical training and this might be one area
where African states can use the commodities boom to upgrade skills levels, but this requires concerted and coordinated policy.

11.6 Research Gaps

We conclude with a series of research gaps in terms of the impacts of Chinese and Asian involvement on elite commitment to development and state effectiveness in Africa.

Development discourses

A recurring theme within the major Chinese projects is that the Chinese get things done and that what they provide is important, notably infrastructure. In terms of questioning notions of ‘effectiveness’ the issue for international development actors is more around development effectiveness than aid effectiveness per se (Rampa and Bilal 2011; Chaponniere 2009). The Paris Declaration usefully focuses on aid effectiveness but for recipient states the entry of China has refocused the debate around what is needed for development since the causal link between more/better aid and development is inconclusive. Sachs (2007) argues that China has forced the ‘nuts and bolts’ of development back on the agenda after a period in which liberal institutionalism fixated some policy makers. The China model, such that it exists, is one in which legitimacy is built on sustained growth and while its social and ecological effects are problematic it has recalibrated the wider debates around what development means.

Emerging issue: What is development effectiveness and how does China effect a change in this understanding? How do other actors respond to this changing discourse?

Elites and inclusive development
The analysis above suggests that recipient states and regimes can play a determining role in how relations with new donors play out, how far broader development priorities are negotiated with their respective polities, and who ultimately benefits from this new phase of development cooperation. Under all three regime types discussed in sections 2 and 3 we see elite compacts evolving in unaccountable ways. However, domestic and international scrutiny is growing as is China’s own sense of ‘social responsibility’ for its development and investment projects. Despite this lack of accountability to domestic societies, these engagements with Africa do not necessarily make them anti-development if the effectiveness of these arrangements is directed at social and economic infrastructure which might benefit broader society. Moreover if these investments stimulate economic growth and produce socially useful tax revenue then the developmental gains could spread further.

**Emerging issue:** Does China’s preference for elite brokering undermine moves to democratic and open government? If new investments stimulate growth will these gains be channelled to broader developmental goals?

**Governance interventions**

While the Chinese, for example, stress ‘non-interference’ we have seen that this was always something of a myth and is now breaking down. If this proves to be the case then this has major implications for politics in these countries, as well as for relations between the rising powers and ‘established’ powers that have long held trusteeship over these states (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009). At the same time as China’s power within multilateral organisations grows we are likely to see influence brought to bear in more indirect ways that will affect pan-African and national policy processes.
**Emerging issue:** What forms of more direct and multilateral political intervention in Africa are the Chinese engaging in? To what extent does this conflict with established powers on the continent?

**New actors**

Despite the importance of China in Africa there is a lack of analysis on countries operating in Africa besides China. Hence, we need much better data on who the new actors are, where they operate, how they operate and with what impacts on development and politics in those countries. While we can hypothesise, that new donors share certain characteristics and are different is some regards to DAC donors there is nothing substantive on how these play out on the ground in Africa.

**Emerging issue:** To what extent are new actors stepping up their African engagements? How is this organised and with what impacts?

**Environmental impacts**

Another emergent issue noted in the analysis of section 3 is that we know very little about the environmental impacts and questions of land rights in Africa. In the past these have proven to be important political issues but have hardly been touched upon in the existing work on China and the Rising Powers in Africa. However, there is no primary or comparative work on these issues, with some rather sloppy causal analysis implying that the Chinese export the capitalism they know best and so overlook environmental consequences. Certainly, China’s domestic environmental record is not good though neither have been other countries that have industrialised in the past. And the Chinese have made a concerted and rapid shift to greener growth so it is not possible to simply project bad practices onto Chinese overseas operations.
Rather we need systematic and comparative studies which assess whether Chinese firms are in fact worse than other nations’ firms, which require a sample of different types of sizes of firms.

**Emerging issue:** What are the environmental impacts of Chinese activity in Africa and to what extent is this different to non-Chinese actors? What are the African responses to this?