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Chapter One

Nightlife and outsider areas in an era of spatial and subcultural closure: recasting the politics of popular culture

In June 2000, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced during a lecture to students in Tübingen, Germany, that the government intended to introduce ‘on the spot’ fines to “drunken thugs” who caused mayhem in the streets at night. Activities that had caught his particular attention included “kicking in your gate”, “throwing traffic cones around the street” and “hurling abuse into the night sky” (Evening Standard, 20 June 2000). Clearly unaware of the long-standing tradition of juxtaposing traffic cones with street furniture as a creative gesture when under the influence, the speech heralded an abrupt about turn in attitudes towards developments at night in major city centres. The conventional excesses of the ‘night-time economy’¹ had suddenly become visible to academics and policy-makers and respectable opinion declared itself aghast at the crime, violence, noise and nuisances they had seemingly for the first time witnessed. What had over the past decade become mainstream opinion, that the ‘night-time economy’ held benefits for economic development, regeneration and social order, was reversed. The Licensing Act 2003, which was five years in the making and summarised the drift of opinion towards reframing the nature of control over leisure (Talbot 2006), was declared unhelpful to the irrepressible tendency of the British public towards ‘binge drinking’ and petty street disorder.

¹ This book will alternatively refer to the activities taking place in bars and clubs as nightlife or the ‘night-time economy’, the former to refer to the quasi-commercialised designation of these spaces and the latter to the boosterist representation of these activities as a means to regenerate inner city areas.

Taking into account the traditional problem of 'set' and 'setting', the complex interaction between pharmacology, physiology, psychology and social/cultural context (Homel and Clarke 1994, Alcohol Concern 2004), which entails that the problem of excessive drinking needs to be seen as part of a range of contextual influences (Talbot *unpublished*), the argument that extending licensing hours and increasing supply will in simplistic causal fashion encourage a 'continental drinking culture' was obviously overoptimistic. As various thinkers have suggested (Gofton 1990, Hobbs et al 2003, Measham and Brain 2005), given the massive social, cultural and economic changes that have engendered an individualistic consumer culture, the idea that excess, alienation and personal destructiveness will somehow diminish over time cannot be taken for granted. As writers such as Lyng (2004) have also pointed out, the risk-absent nature of post-industrial society can serve as a challenge towards bodily excess, and this, combined with the intertwined relationship between national identity and drinking culture in the UK, suggested where change was headed. Moreover, government has sought to harness the potential of nightlife as an economic driver, using so-called 'night-time economies' to fuel inner city regeneration. In our neo-liberal and post-modern society, it is felt, rather than problematising transgressive and disorderly behaviour, the national and local government has aligned themselves with the breweries to encourage consumption, leading to the escalation of social problems associated with the night (Hobbs et al. 2003).

These narratives of social change are not the only dynamic to be witnessed in discourses surrounding nightlife or the night-time economy, however, as the current about-turn in law and policy towards enhancing police powers over licensed spaces suggests. Attitudes

towards nightlife have a longer history that needs to be placed in an appropriate context. Particularly since the eighteenth century in the British context, the spaces of 'night culture' have been understood as a social problem, as a site for deviant behaviour. Although the problem of alcohol consumption had an even longer legal history (Webb and Webb 1903) the Disorderly Houses Act 1952, which innovated new forms of regulation within a twenty mile radius of London, marked a key change in governmental discourse. From this point, discussions of the 'problem' of nightlife, of the disorder and even potential revolution resulting from it, was connected to the entertainment of the 'lower orders' (Fielding 1951) and of fears surrounding the night and the dark spaces of the city (Lovatt 1996). In the twentieth century, fear of the 'other' found new objects of concern – the impact of migrants, youthful rebellion, or young women seeking pleasure (Kohn 1992). Nightlife expressed a sense of 'otherness' that had to be 'regulated and contained' (Lovatt 1996:143-144).

As this book will examine in more detail, government has since the nineteenth century held a contradictory attitude towards drinking in particular and popular entertainment in general that has reflected broader political and social conflicts. In the nineteenth century, the proponents of the free-market emphasised the need for individual liberty and personal choice, making behaviour and consumption the responsibility of the individual, while Temperance and other moral entrepreneurs stressed the corrosive effects of drinking (Harrison 1994), resulting in an uneasy balance between permissiveness and containment. Entertainment forms lacking in commercial purpose have been heavily policed and curtailed (Storch 1976), while the language of fear and disorder have had a continued

presence in governmental thinking. Despite recent changes, these contradictions have still not been resolved, with health professionals, academics and policy-makers opposed to the breweries, pub and club chains and the neo-liberal wing of New Labour while the passing of draconian laws to tackle disorder and ‘anti-social behaviour’ continues apace in a new dramatisation of a very old narrative.

The point of the research that is the subject of this book was to analyse the moment of change that occurred in the 1990s when local councils began to concede to the relaxation of closing times and the expansion of supply under pressure from government and local economic conditions. Was it the case that these changes represented a de facto concession to deregulation and permissiveness, or was the outcome more complex than this? What were the broader social, economic and cultural pressures at play? What did these economic and regulatory changes mean for what had been spaces at the forefront of ‘outsider’ (Becker 1963) cultures? To what extent were these changes applied differentially and how did the social and institutional conflicts of particular localities influence the nature of change?

An area was selected as a means of examining these questions, an area given the pseudonym of ‘Southview’². In Southview regeneration strategies had sought to develop the centre of Southview into a night-time economy which many local people viewed suspiciously as a strategy to develop a ‘playground’ for young white professions at the expense of the ‘ownership’ of the area by the local Afro-Caribbean population. Revisiting Southview in 1998, it was not possible at least superficially to argue with this

² The rationale for area anonymity is explored in Chapter Two.

interpretation. Daytime and night-time consumption was a somewhat segregated affair, with the local black population using the day economy to shop and young white people using the night economy to party in ‘down market chic’ bars and clubs, serviced by black bouncers, taxi drivers and dealers at the bottom end of the chain (Ruggiero 1993). This would not be unusual had it not been for the disappearance of a visible black nightlife that had dominated Southview since the 1970s. As this book will convey, this picture was simplistic. It was nevertheless the case that a significant change had occurred, was discussed locally by many residents, and evoked images of a racialised gentrification discussed by Zukin (1991,1996) or Davis (1990, 2005) in the US. New forms of incorporation and regulation were being innovated in Southview but seemed to be taking a specific form. The attempt to understand the dynamics of this process became the main research focus of this book.

More broadly, the aim of this book was to outline the origin of these debates, their consequences in terms of regulatory reform, and finally the impact of new laws and economic strategies on outsider or transgressive subcultures. Particular emphasis is given to how outsider cultures were represented spatially – both in night spaces and specific areas or localities – and how attempts to normalise these spaces and localities through strategies of regeneration or gentrification (Smith 1996) confronted these alternative cultures. This chapter will outline the relationship between licensing law and transgressive cultures historically and its reconfiguration in the context of the critical mass of economic, cultural and social change of the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, it examines the way that ‘outsider’ cultures have been shaped by the dual processes of

moral panic and a legal innovation concerned primarily with containing the night entertainment of women, ethnic minorities, the working class and youth. Central to evaluating the critical importance of a radicalised night culture is the concept of the 'outsider' or the 'other', that can be conceived of as an individual, a group, a space or as an area. In the specific moment of post second world war Britain social perspectives changed markedly in specific areas and cultures, giving rise to spaces of difference or 'outsider' areas that were ultimately stigmatised. The historical residue of stigma in area development and the formulation of strategy are of central importance throughout this book in that it mobilised opinion towards the normalisation of the outsider area and the closure of the physical and mental space of the counterculture. The impact of this closure – the colonisation of the counterculture and the rediscovery of disorder as a descriptor of nightlife – is examined towards the end of this chapter.

The regulation of the 'other': alcohol, popular culture and licensing law

The nature of popular culture and nightlife in the UK have been heavily influenced historically by licensing laws and associated forms of control through surveillance and policing, in particular, the symbolic association made between working-class entertainment (popular culture) and social disorder, decline, rebellion and riot. As Dorn (1983) argued, an understanding of history is important if we are to view current dilemmas with anything beyond simplistic formulations and in particular this book is predicated on the idea that conflict and control throughout history has shaped the nature of space. Moreover, it is not possible to consider the nature and impact of licensing law

without a consideration of its origins given that its current form is largely derived from liquor licensing law from the fifteenth century and entertainment licensing law from the eighteenth.

The earliest law concerning alcohol was passed in 1381 but was aimed merely at the regulation of price to prevent inflation and the cheapening of the coinage (Dorn 1983). However, statutes dating from the fifteenth century established a connection between the consumption of alcohol and labour discipline. As Dorn (1983) and Harrison (1994) argued, alcohol consumption was identified from this point onwards with lax attendance and productivity, political agitation amongst the working-class, riot, disorder and revolution. Drinking and entertainment was seen as a barrier to a longer more regular working week and the intensification of work required by industrialisation. A series of Acts in 1603, 1606, 1635, 1644 and 1647 dictated where and when drinking could take place, ranging from restricting drinking in Inns to residents, banning entertainment on religious days and making drunkenness an offence (Dorn 1983). However, as the Temperance campaigners Sydney and Beatrice Webb (1903) noted, state involvement in the sale and consumption of alcohol was also motivated by two conflicting interests: firstly, the revenue derived from taxes on liquor on the one hand combined with the growing power of the free-trade breweries, and secondly the 'social disease' – the combination of economic deprivation, moral dissolution and indiscipline - that appeared to originate from alcohol on the other. In the case of the latter, concerns about the social effects of alcohol were in particular highlighted by religious and socialist reform

movements who campaigned without success to prohibit the sale of alcohol (Dingle 1980).

Orwell (1940:41) pointed to the hypocrisy embedded in English licensing laws that were ‘designed to interfere with everybody but in practice allowed everything to happen’. At the core of this contradiction lay a conflict of interest within the state itself in so far as it expressed the needs of capitalist reproduction. On the one hand, as indicated above, it was interested in both the taxation revenue gained from the production of liquor and the survival of the industry itself as a core lobby and part of the economy. On the other, it was keen to make provision to prevent drunkenness and entertainment interfering with the working week, as in such practices as ‘Saint Monday’³ (Harrison 1994). Licensing law was never innovated therefore to prohibit the consumption of alcohol so much as regulate the conditions of its use within what were perceived as acceptable outlets for supply (Dorn 1983). The way that licensing law reflected such practices of inclusion and exclusion in the ability to control outlets for alcohol consumption and entertainment often coincided with the interests of the breweries and ensured cooperation and self-regulation.

The ability to mediate permissiveness and control derived from the structure of licensing law and its institutional implementation. As Webb and Webb (1903: 4) noted, licensing law regulated supply in four key ways: firstly, through the payment of taxes and fees for sale and manufacture; secondly, through the registering of individual licensees so they were ‘brought to public notice’; thirdly, through the limitations placed on the number of

³ This was an extension of leisure time into Monday, and illustrated a different pattern of work that involved periods of intense work pasting a few days followed by a similar period of rest and repose. Industrial society required a regular working week, which clashed with these practices.

alehouses in localities and on the qualifications needed to be a keeper; lastly, through the imposition of special rules or conditions of sale. The local operation of the law involved three forms of control exercised by magistrates': the 'power of selection', the 'power of withdrawal' and the 'power of imposing conditions'. The first power came with a 1552 statute (5&6 Edward VI.c.25) in which a license became a privilege, not a right, and magistrates' had the power to select through the exercise of discretion who should be given that privilege. The second power came earlier, with the 1495 (11 Henry VII.c.2) and 1504 (19 Henry VII.c.12) Acts, by which two justices could suspend what were seen as superfluous alehouses (Webb and Webb 1903:6). The third power came from a combination of the first two, and before the 1830 Beer Act judges had total autonomy to impose conditions, such as closing times, the number of licensed venues in areas, where public houses could be situated in the locality and so on (Webb and Webb 1903:9).

These three basic powers have been negotiated and altered in different historical periods depending on prevailing opinion. As already mentioned, in a unique drawing back of statute law, the Beer Act 1830 restricted judicial discretion, specifying that it was limited to making sure the applicant was of good character. The power of withdrawal was placed within the jury system, and parliament argued significantly that the publican should be free to do whatever parliament had not expressly forbidden (Webb and Webb 1903:98). The consequences of this liberalisation was that the number of retailers of liquor grew and as fears spiralled with regard to the growing level of drunkenness, magistrates and bishops agitated for a repeal of the Act. In the winter of 1830 a Parliamentary Committee was formed led by James Silk, Temperance in character, and the following Beerhouse

Acts of 1834 and 1840 enhanced the powers of the justices' with regard to the owners 'qualities'. Despite these shifts and reversals, the basic structure of licensing law and the powers granted to the state to control places of drinking remains similar to the structure of law today and as this book will aim to demonstrate, these specificities of quasi-legal practice embedded in licensing law conferred the ability of magistrates and other empowered authorities to control cultural and social spaces.

Controls over the spaces of popular entertainment were further enhanced by the development of entertainments licensing law in the mid eighteenth century, notably through the Disorderly Houses Act 1752 or as more accurately named 'An Act for the Better Preventing Thefts and Robberies, and for Regulating Places of Public Entertainments, and Punishing Persons Keeping Disorderly Houses', and it was here that the ideological intent of regulatory strategies were most clearly illustrated. It became part of statute as a result of a petition by writer and magistrate' Henry Fielding⁴ to the Lord High Chancellor, which drew attention to the growth in 'criminal' activities in the lower classes and speculated as to their cause. In Fielding's reasoning, the decoupling of the lower orders from feudal bondage had steadily inculcated new customs into this section of society. The growth of wealth resulting from the growing trade had created a demand for labour in return for a wage, the latter of which was squandered in the pursuit of 'luxury' by the lower classes. This was problematic, according to Fielding, because while luxury and pleasure led to vice and ruination amongst the upper classes, it was confined to the family and estate. When the lower orders adopted the same habits, however, it

⁴ Barrister and Justice of the Peace for the County of Middlesex and City of Westminster. The Petition was entitled 'An Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase In Robbers with some proposals for Remedying this Growing Evil'.

shook the foundation of wealth, because it was their labour that underpinned society.

Hence for Fielding the chief evils of the pursuit of pleasure by the lower orders were the loss of money and time, and, of course, an increase in drunkenness. Moreover, Fielding feared the spectacle of riot and sedition.

He therefore argued that the entertainment and consumption habits of the people should be restrained. The problem was how, when, according to Fielding, people took no notice of the law particularly when applied prohibitively, and moreover, would reject any measure that constrained their individual liberty. Further, a system of control had to take account of what Webb and Webb (1903:2) later noted as 'the absence of police'. The answer was found in liquor licensing law, and the Disorderly Houses Act was modelled on its structure.

The Disorderly Houses Act brought together the great themes of early modernity as it related to the inculcation of discipline in the lower classes, in other words, outlining the relationship between idleness, vagrancy and entertainment (Dorn 1983). Firstly, it attacked the practice of advertising a reward for items lost or stolen, thus, it argues, causing temptation to steal⁵. Secondly, that 'the multitude of places of entertainment for the lower sort of people is another great cause of thefts and robberies, as they are thereby tempted to spend their small substance in riotous pleasures, and in consequence are put on unlawful measures of supplying their costs, and renewing their pleasures' (25 George II). It proposed that no place was to be 'kept' for public entertainment within the City of

⁵ Measures to deal with this were in the form of powers given to the justices to examine any 'rogue', 'vagabond', 'idle and disorderly person' as to where he comes from and his means of livelihood.

London and Westminster and 20 miles around this area⁶, without obtaining a license from four or more justices assembled at the Michaelmas Quarter Sessions. Any house without a license was to be deemed a 'disorderly house' and the owner subject to a fine of £140. Constables who were given the power to enter premises and seize individuals keeping the house enforced the system. It relied on informers in a neighbourhood who could write and give evidence to a Constable and the court and on conviction would receive £10. The difficulties of identifying an owner to prosecute, 'by reason of the many subtle and crafty contrivances of persons keeping' these houses was overcome by stating that any person who 'appeared' to be the owner was to be prosecuted. Entertainment venues could not open before 5pm and a limitation of hours of opening was to be 'inserted in, and made conditions of, every such license'. The apparent difficulty of distinguishing between places frequented by the upper classes as opposed to the lower were apparently overcome by inserting a clause which entailed that a premises did not need a license if they were an important theatre (places were listed in the text) or were already licensed by the crown or Lord Chamberlain.

It is obviously the case that both liquor and entertainment licensing law have mutated beyond their original form. It is also the case that the development of police forces in the nineteenth century significantly enhanced the power of the state to enforce law and moreover develop alternative routes to controlling popular entertainment, such as direct repression and surveillance (Storch 1976). However, the licensing of alcohol and entertainment follows basically the same principles outlined by the Webbs, that is, a

⁶ Public Entertainment was not brought under statutory control elsewhere until the Public Health Act 1890, and then only if the local authority chose to adopt it.

system of control aimed at controlling or containing the conditions of supply and of selecting who is a 'fit and proper' person to be licensed. The origin or aim of licensing law - the need to enhance discipline and productivity in the lower orders and a reaction to the end of feudal bondage resulting in class fears surrounding the dangerous 'other' – entailed that the law itself expressed a number of differentiating practices. Firstly, licensing law in form and practice differentiated between different types of entertainment that could roughly be associated with social classes. Secondly, in practice it differentiated between outlets for the commercial sale of alcohol and those entertainment activities over which breweries had little control. Thirdly, since the nineteenth century the state has facilitated a laissez-faire attitude towards supply whilst simultaneously criminalised the consequences of this policy within social groups and individuals, thus differentiating between possible cause and effect (Dorn 1983).

Discourses and outcomes concerning the function of licensing law therefore always expressed themselves in contradictory ways. A consequence of the development and extension of this form of regulation, however, has been the successive colonisation of the state and capital within popular culture and the corresponding marginalisation of cultural forms not susceptible to commodification (Storch 1976, Dorn 1983). On the one hand, therefore, entertainment has been subject to a process of disciplining within commercialised boundaries, and on the other, has been marginalised if too clearly associated with the 'other'. Following on from the utilisation of class as a representation of social fears and the disciplinary impulse, this chapter will now turn to themes of gender, race and youth as symbols of an outsider consciousness in nightlife. In particular,

it will focus on why transgressive cultures were associated with the racial otherness of recent immigrants identified with specific areas – a core theme and question for this book – and why this was seen to be problematic for the authorities.

Transgressive cultures and outsider areas

In the twentieth century fears concerning working-class cultural behaviour in the industrialised cities escalated and mutated into generalised anxieties that had as its object the vast majority of society, that is, women, young people, immigrants alongside elements of class expression (albeit in the post second world war period this was considered more settled and contained with the exception of youth). Again, concerns centred on cultural expression including that of the night. Kohn's (1992) study on the impact of world war one on the regulation of leisure examined fears around the intermingling of races, the proliferation of drugs and the fate of young women, resulting in the delineation of statutory closing times in the Defence of the Realm Act. Erenburg (1981) examined how women who sought night-time leisure opportunities in New York at the turn of the twentieth century were castigated by the authorities for not playing their traditional role of constraining male pleasure. Original government documents demonstrate, for example, in relation to the attempt to pass the Night Clubs Bill in 1925 and the passing of the Private Places of Entertainment (Licensing Act) 1967, that various social movements joined with the police to express anxiety about young men and women mingling with 'aliens' and other 'undesirables' in the clubs and cafes of the West End of London (Talbot, *unpublished article*). While from particularly the eighteenth century the

fear of the 'dangerous classes' centred on working-class districts of the expanding cities, an association of place, fear and class, in the twentieth century it was 'immigrant' areas and places to which those seeking separation from mainstream norms were attracted, and consequently became the object of fear. As Raban (1974) noted in relation to London, there was a strong association between bohemia and the areas in which migrants settled. What follows is an attempt to outline the concept of the outsider and in particular 'outsider areas', why they were associated with immigrant cultures (which tended at least in the first generation to be strongly conservative and religious) and what provoked fears in relation to these social trends.

These moments were strongly bound up with the post-war experience of the counterculture. In the period from 1945, sweeping through the 1960s and 1970s, and even evident in the Manchester Institute of Popular Culture's research agenda in the 1990s, theories of youth culture stressed the separation of youth from mainstream society, the creation of alternative subcultures or countercultures, and the mutual alienation of youth from normative values and vice versa. Becker (1963) for example, and in the British context Stan Cohen (1973) explored how the societal reaction to behaviour or cultural forms sometimes only slightly out of the norm was held to be symbolic of broader societal decline or decay. For these theorists, youth cultural forms were viewed as a prism for broader social anxieties relating to decay, decline, or a loss of 'social order'.

Some theorists, however, went further, stressing that the alienation of youth from traditional norms was often perceived as embodying progressive values, a new society, or

new possible futures. Karl Mannheim, for example, argued the function of the new generation, he argued, was to revitalise society by opening it up to new influences and by living new values that the older generation can only understand theoretically. This analysis was particularly pertinent in the context of the emergence of a new society, that of social democracy, from the old violence of world war and totalitarianism (Mannheim 1943). Indeed, as Lessing portrayed in her literary series subtitled ‘the children of violence’ a new generation is described that is mutated by the violence of the first half of the twentieth century, leading to the rupture of traditional family, work and emotional structures and culminating in neurotic destruction and renewal (Lessing 1969).

The idea of youth as a symbol of hope for the future and the embodiment of new critical values continued into the 1960s and 1970s in the analysis of countercultures and subcultures. The main way in which countercultural theorists, particularly in the United States, attempted to go beyond the purely literary and symbolic was through the concept of alienation. Youth were utilised as an object and symbol of a social critique and as such, analysis was embedded in the historical, the political and the social. As Keniston argued in *The Uncommitted*, theorists were seeking ‘new ways of thinking, new concepts, new understandings of *how* men and society connect, and above all a new tolerance for complexity of explanation’ (1965: 10). Roszak also argued that despite the positive and negative developments in the counterculture, the consciousness exhibited derives from what he dubs the ‘technocracy’ (1970: 4), a society that exhibits such a high level of organisation and regulation that it swallows every core of the human identity, in which ‘the business of inventing and flourishing treacherous parodies of freedom, joy and

fulfilment becomes an indispensable form of social control under the technocracy.’ (1970: 15). This dystopian vision forms the background to understanding the enthusiasm with which theorists greeted the Dionysian outpourings of particularly American youth. The elevation of truth, feeling, spontaneity and play in some youth cultures (particularly the hippies) for these theorists represented a breathing space in the general social conformity. The synthesis of Marxism and psychoanalysis did much to strengthen these new trends, as theorists sought to analyse the implications of this sick society on the human psyche. As Erich Fromm argued, ‘the real crisis today is one that is unique in human history: it is the *crisis of life itself*.’ (1978: 211)⁷.

The alienation of youth from the destruction of two world wars, the rejection of traditional structures and the impulse towards truth-telling in the post-war period also accounted for their marginalisation by respectable opinion – a defining of the ‘other’, which, as Young (1999) argues, was a core part of the normalising values of social democratic societies. Such trends represented something of a continuing crisis of Western society and the need for closure to prevent change, was deemed necessary by moral entrepreneurs. Various writers highlighted this moment and the attempt, through criminalisation, to stymie alterations in traditional structures. The creation of the

⁷ It should be noted in passing that on the whole the interrelationship between cultural and political expression theorised in the US context did not extend to the UK. Particularly in relation to the research conducted in the Birmingham School of Contemporary Cultural Studies the concept of subculture depicted a rupture between political expression and style (Hall and Jefferson 1976) as subcultures and its stylistics were viewed as an ‘unconscious’ expression of meaning (Hebdige 1979). This arguably led to a discomfort in relation to subcultures, expressed in a two year debate conducted in the pages of *Marxism Today* as to whether youth cultures were politically meaningful, in other words expressed broader class allegiances, which culminated in the final dismissal from Martin Jacques that ‘the cultural and ideological spheres are critical areas of struggle’ but that the consciousness of the counterculture was only ‘partial and ill-developed’ (*Marxism Today* 1975). This writer does not share this reified notion of the political nor disquiet as to the, often temporary, nature of subcultural forms.

marginalised individual or group – the outsider – was viewed as a process of criminalisation, the symbolic representation of a ‘problem’ followed by the internalisation of the outsider identity (Lemert 1951, Becker 1963, Goffman 1963). The reasons explored were varied. Becker (1963), for example, focussed on the moral crusades initiated by the elite or the middle-classes, and how institutions inculcated such campaigns to substantiate their own organisational interests, while Young (1971) analysed the way in which cannabis was criminalised due to its close association with subterranean values of hedonism and play, rather than the formal values of the work ethic. Cohen (1973) saw the mobilisation of social reaction, a moral panic (from politicians, the public and importantly the media) against the Mods and Rockers in Clacton 1964. In an attempt to explain what lay at the core of the social reaction, he argued that it was bound up with the identification of youth with the rejection of the strictures and conformity of class and the rational consumption of work and family in favour of the new classless and ‘affluent’ consumption concerned with leisure. In this analysis, therefore, it is the uncertainty in the face of change that instigates social anxiety and the mobilisation of opinion to create legal and policy initiatives to resolve the ‘problem’.

Sociological discourses particularly since the 1960s have tended to identify the problem of stigmatisation and the formation of an outsider identity in relation to youth subcultures and countercultures, as this chapter has already identified. The problem of stigma was never so localised to the cultural and political rebellion of youth, a moment specific to the post 1945 closure against the vicissitudes of war. The unspoken reality of the formation

of an outsider identity was to be actually found in the re-representation of colonialism and slavery in the internal borders of Western countries (Fanon 1952/1986). Both Becker and Goffman note almost in passing that the stigma or the master status can be that of race, but the ideas, relative to their centrality in the segregation and continual subjugation of Afro-Americans in the ghetto (Wacquant 2001) or the retranslation of colonial domination and callousness in British inner cities, were undeveloped. Rex and Moore's (1967) well-known study of racist institutional practices in housing and more broadly analyses of the criminalisation of Afro-Caribbean populations and cultural forms (Hall et al. 1978, Gilroy 1987, Keith 1993) illuminated a common experience of discrimination in British inner cities but the complexities and impact of identity formation, of misrecognition (Young 2003) remained an open question. To explain this lack requires a return to literature. For example, Ralph Ellison's (1965) fictional biography of the 'invisible man' presented the inevitable falling into of an outsider identity by the central narrator and character, a black man in the US, long predicted and understood by the older generation. The madness precipitated by misrecognition is demonstrated by the presence in the book of a range of characters struggling with alienation through disproportionate reactions, extreme violence and rage being one.

The status and role of the migrant newly arrived in the city, and in a broader sense the impact of the immigrant in the formation of the ghetto has since the Chicago School been a preoccupation of urban sociology. For this group of Chicago sociologists the arrival of migrants created a rupture in the functioning of social mores because of the instability of institutions – such as services, schools, the church – and of populations, for example, the

amount of single people as opposed to families, in areas where they settled, factors Rex and Moore (1967) explain in the UK through institutional discrimination in housing. They referred to this assumed negative phenomena of course as social disorganisation, a decomposition of social values permissive of deviant and criminal conduct. In the UK, Ken Pryce's ethnographic study of the West Indian, mainly Jamaican population of St Paul's (1979) replicated with analysis of social disorganisation. In his analysis, St Paul's, far from being the centre of a 'tight knit, friendly, organic, warm, harmonious community' of what he dubs the 'romantic imagination' (1979:30), the area, alternatively known as the 'village' or 'shanty town' was ridden by social and ethnic divisions resulting in segregation, a lack of community and physical neglect. Indeed, part of the attraction of students and radicals, was the absence of controls on behaviour resulting from the normlessness that abounded. As Pryce notes, a key element of his thesis was the distinct 'life-orientations' between those who work and those who don't - those who 'hustle'. This did not just affect consciousness, however. A point of consideration is what happens to areas where work is not the norm, a central element in the reproduction of conformity (Willis 1978).

Not all analysis of the impact of migration was bounded in sociological discourses of disorganisation, however. Raban (1974) socio-literary account of London, for example, showed the opportunity to reframe and re-imagine identity in the arrival and impact of the 'outsider'. For the newly arrived migrant, whether from another country or from rural domains, the city posits itself as the unknown and the confusing, 'his dazed mental abstraction, his sense of loss, his vain attempts to find forms and precedents for an

experience that seems to go far beyond to respond sensibly to it' (1974: 49), while for the resident the new arrival describes our society from the outside. What is useful in this analysis is that the identity of the immigrant and the resident are not essentialised but rather, in the context of massive change, fluid. The cultural and social hybridity (Nayak 2003) illustrated in this analysis has always been evident in night-time and popular cultures (Hebdige 1987) and might also serve to explain the overlaying of themes of the night, of alternative spaces, of social mobility, that, as examined in this chapter, have haunted moral entrepreneurs and underlined their need to exclude and to externalise that change. In containing the representation of hybridity spatially to the point of arrival in the form of an 'outsider area' – for example, in areas such as Southview – the disruption of norms for mainstream society is minimalised. This can be clearly seen, for example, in the areas around Waterlooplein and the Red Light District in Amsterdam where the pastiche of the subcultural is zoned.

The zone or the ghetto, however, also becomes a form of protection for the migrant or for the perennially excluded (Maurrasse 2006). To return again to Ellison's example, invisibility is a curse but also a protection. Indeed, the central character argues that it is important to also remain invisible, to 'walk softly so as not to awake the sleeping ones' - the sleeping ones being those who insulate themselves from the reality of the other and thus from reality itself, and who are more dangerous when awake and seeking to make the other visible. Pryce (1979) also depicts the 'shanty town' as a place where the disreputable – the hustlers and their younger selves, the teenyboppers – feel at home. As he argues, 'to them St Paul's is their village or their Shanty Town. It is the place where

they live, the territory on which they hustle and the only milieu in which they are really 'in control' (1979: 27). The territory of St Paul's is also overlain with specific places of security in which 'street corner men' (1979:32) can hang about doing deals such as the 'front line' area of Grosvenor Place, or places of entertainment, the 'Club' or the Dive, or blues parties where the respectable elements do not venture. While Price sets up an opposition between respectable and disputable elements of the West Indian Community, however, he notes that all suffer similar experiences of discrimination combined with the legacy of slavery. Moreover, distinct cultural practices, such as family, religion and entertainment, have been embedded in the locality. While respectable elements moved out of St Paul's, this was not the case everywhere (for example, Southview) and as such outsider areas were notable for difference *both* in a heightened rebellion from the work ethic and religious conservatism.

The outsider area is important because its indices and signs not only attract deviance or criminal behaviour, as opponents such as Wilson and Kelling (1982) noted, it also permits social experimentation and creativity albeit one, as Pryce notes, with an edge of destructiveness. Within ghettoised areas and the general ruination of the city after two world wars, deviance and bohemia flourished as lifestyle difference, art, music and nightlife alongside the annoying and disruptive lawlessness and institutional failure and corruption that aspects of this book will attempt to convey. However, as Sennett pointed out in *The uses of disorder* cities enabled an experience beyond the norms offered by mainstream society. In any case, through their very disorganisation they offered a challenge to the ideology of utopian perfectability (Merriford 2000). As illustrated by

what follows, what is interesting about such outsider areas is that only elements of it could be commercialised and colonised through gentrification. Indeed, the process of economic change and physical uplifting tended to result in a fracturing of its impact that could be conceived both through the prism of class and race but also through the normative structures of conformity and rebellion. This chapter will now turn to how the 'night-time economy' as a concept emerged and broad descriptors of the differentials that emerged.

The colonisation of counterculture & the creation of the 'night-time economy'

The traditional narrative or cycle of moral panic followed swiftly by repression was overturned in relation to rave and illustrated something of the context of social change in the late 1980s and 1990s. It was partly that rave was a different cultural form, being spatially located in fields or squats (Redhead 1990, Thornton 1995, Collin 1997, Garratt 1998), was challenging because of its size (often holding 200,000 strong events in fields (Garratt 1998) and furthermore pushed at the boundaries of the 2am closing time for nightclubs. It precipitated for the first time the mass use of illegal intoxicants, but was embodied by cultural entrepreneurs who aspired to be part of the mainstream (Collin 1997, Garratt 1998). Moreover, it actively courted the symbolism of moral approbation yet represented a new response to the management of cultural forms and intoxication, that of harm reduction - the official response to these activities being not at all clear-cut (McRobbie and Thornton 1995). As a culture it was of its times and distinctive for its apparent absence or denial of political consciousness (favouring the spontaneous feeling

of bonding and non-verbal communication that interacted with Ecstasy). The political climate was an important context to this culture in that the commitment to neo-liberalism and in part libertarianism undercut traditional law and order drives and 'moral panics' while promoting the values of entrepreneurialism. As such, rave culture itself expressed and embodied the critical mass of change from what has been dubbed the 'Fordist' society to the post-Fordist, post-industrial and post-modern society (Lovatt 1996).

This of course did not stop, as illustrated previously, a media-led moral panic and violent scenes of confrontation as a result of police raids (Thornton 1995, Garratt 1998). It was merely that the outcome differed from previous drives towards criminalisation. On the one hand, it sparked a health awareness and harm reduction orientated anti-drugs industry, and on the other, served as a platform for new law and order strategies to deal with the unregulated nature of rave events. The tactic of the police and government more generally was to normalise and regulate dance culture. On the 3rd November 1998, Scotland Yard declared war on acid parties (Garratt 1998:146), and the Pay Party Unit (PPU) was formed, led by Ken Tappenden. The PPU's tactics consisted not of drugs raids or fines, but rather set up road blocks (a lesson from the miner's strike of 1984/5), lured party-goers to phantom parties, and used the force of environmental regulation, by-laws and health and safety law against the promoters (Garratt 1998:184). The parties persisted, however, despite the continual disruptions, and the government launched a series of statutory initiatives; the Entertainments (Increased Penalties) Act 1990 raised fines for the contravening of licensing laws from £200 to £20,000 and in addition could entail six months imprisonment; the government further announced that that they would use

powers under the 1988 Criminal Justice Act to confiscate the proceeds of illegal parties; the Association of District Councils urged councils to adopt the Private Places of Entertainment (Licensing) Act 1967 that closed the membership only loophole of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 which contained the statutory provisions for entertainment licensing in the provinces. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 for the first time sought to specify a musical form for the purposes of criminal action⁸.

The way in which this conflict was resolved, however, set the pattern for future policy with regard to clubs, licensing and opening hours, as well as many other regulatory relationships (which will be examined later). The PPU was dissolved amidst lack of funding, but local councils began to give out later licenses which, according to Tappenden, 'wasn't a coincidence, it was a coordinated plan' (Garratt 1998:192). This meant that there was a decision to bring the rave scene within the remit of the licensing structure whilst compromising on the question of hours. It is difficult to assess the accuracy of this statement but it seems clear that around 1990 the government and police nationally began to take a different view of closing times, and consequently issued new instructions to local licensing officers not to oppose extensions of opening hours. From the point of view of the local councils, it coincided with the incorporation of the night sector into regeneration plans, particularly in Metropolitan centres such as Leeds, Manchester and areas of London (Lovatt 1996:150), which was then formally promoted by the Conservative Government in 1993, when it instructed local authorities to take

⁸ Rave was characterised as 'sounds wholly or predominantly characterised by a succession of repetitive beats'.

responsibility for the promotion of the 'evening' economy within sensible planning parameters (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 1993).

The normalisation of dance culture was also facilitated by the ambiguous position of some of its 'cultural entrepreneurs' who were disconnected from the old relationship between club spaces, organised crime and police corruption, and furthermore, were interested largely in making money and, or, facilitating the normalisation of alternative culture within city regeneration strategies in the case of Tony Wilson. The pressure from organised crime or disorganised gangs solidified a relationship between club owners, local government and the police in which particularly the police became central to who were the winners and losers in the new 'night-time economy'. In Manchester, for example, the gang problem made news in Manchester from 1989. This particularly centered around the Hacienda, which was subject to petty demands from gangs to get in for free and threatened doorstaff with guns when they were refused, also demanding the right to sell drugs. The Hacienda was temporarily closed, while Wilson and the club negotiated with the gangs and the police. The club then reopened, only to have six London based security staff stabbed by the Salford gang (Garratt: 1998:234). While the club finally closed on the 4th April 1997, meaning that in the final analysis the club was held culpable for the violence, what was observably new in these events however was that a new generation of club owners from the Hacienda onwards were willing to talk about the problem⁹, and, moreover, cooperate with the police and the council in order to

⁹ When threatened with closure by the police, the club approached the council for help - this led, according to accounts, to the development of a new relationship between the council and club owners whereby council members visited clubs to witness their potential and the clubs promoted themselves as part of a tourism strategy (Garratt 1995)

retain their license through mostly legitimate channels. This was also the case with other 'superclubs' such as the Ministry of Sound in London and Cream in Liverpool. Cream employed Jane Casey as advocate, who had a record of organising public events in the city and had good relations with the police. As Cream opened, Casey joined the local Chamber of Commerce and began negotiations with the police. What was new here was that the police were brought in to accept responsibility for policing illegal activity on or around the venue, and that Cream was referred to as an important local resource (Garrett: 1998). More broadly, what this represented was that the incorporation of nightlife into the economy, making the night-time economy an important aspect of city boosterism, was paralleled by the prising open of its activity to local governance (council and the police) and the turn away from organised crime to legitimate business ownership. This was by no means a easy process of trust and cooperation. The club owners themselves pitched their demand for longer licenses on the basis of expanding the scope of regulation, particularly self-regulation. The Ministry of Sound, for example, gained a twenty-four hour license in 1991 by getting clubbers to testify that the premises they danced in were 'unsafe, unregulated, and illegal' (Garratt: 1998: 286). Cream was raided by the police and twenty people arrested, including four doorstaff, for dealing in 1996. However, this time, the club was not closed. Indeed, the venue was protected by two armed officers for the next six months (Garratt 1998: 302).

Cultural entrepreneurs of the 'Punk' scene or Factory Records and the Hacienda in Manchester had long represented new 'utopian' ambitions for the inner city, which came to fruition with the 'rave scene'. Rave was important because on the one hand, as it

progressed, it held no concrete resistance to being translated into a commodified form (although it also tended to splinter around such debates). On the other it was a mass youth culture that was strongly associated with 'place'. As negotiations were held with the police and councils to halt the use of open space and to locate the culture in inner city spaces (Garratt 1998:192), and because of the limitations of cultural radicalism when essentially participants were looking to make a living out of such cultural activity (Garratt 1998:132), rave or 'dance culture' became the embodiment of the emerging 'night-time economy'. As dance events became mainstream and legitimised by licensing regimes (Lovatt 1996), the culture that inhabited them became a commercial product, as both a brand (Frank 1997, Klein 2000) and as part of a boosterist strategy to utilise subcultural products in inner city regeneration.

This was not however merely a product of the way that rave culture had been contained and mainstreamed, but was part of broader economic and social changes that could be described as post-industrial (Bell 1976). Various writers began in the 1990s to chart the appropriation of cultural goods within the economy and in inner city development strategies (Bianchini and Parkinson 1993, Castells and Hall 1994) and furthermore the impact of this on public culture. Molotch (1996), for example, explored that way in which Los Angeles projected images of 'anything goes' (1996: 223), 'fantasy and exploration' (1996: 241) and 'idiosyncratic localness' that reflects its role as a centre for tourism and the movie industry. Goodwin (1993) referred to this as place marketing – the promotion of 'city myth' (1993: 147) that reflected the new aesthetic consciousness, style as identity and consumption as a mode of self-definition. The role of identity, image and

fantasy has become much more central to economic structures and ‘lifestyles’ in the UK as a result.

More surprising was the utilisation of alternative cultures in this process, including ‘goods’ associated with nightlife. As Zukin argues in her seminal text, *Loft Living* (1989), this was partly a product of the way that alternative culture, in this case Art movements developed in SoHo loft spaces in the 1960s and 1970s, coincided with a social disenchantment with work, family and suburban life. However, just as the manufacturing districts had been turned over to alternative artists they were themselves forced out as rents increased; a contradiction, Zukin argues, between ‘the production of art and other, higher rent uses’ (1989:121). As a consequence of the growing interest, however, the original colonisers were forced out governmental agencies incorporated these perceived¹⁰ shifts of the role of culture as an economic driver in policy strategies. Zukin used the idea of the Artistic Mode of Production to explain the way in which alternative cultures become key to an ‘urban conversion strategy’ (1989:181). What this meant, essentially, was that adding cultural or subcultural value to an area increased land and property values. Moreover, as property became revalorised through alternative culture, it also became sanitised and banal, as can be seen in the inner cities in the UK.

Today, central to regeneration strategies are the ubiquitous ‘cultural quarters’, consisting of art galleries, a cinema, restaurants, bars and clubs, and ironic home furnishing stores

¹⁰ I do not intend here to examine the legitimacy of those claims and perceptions, although in different ways doubts have been cast upon the real extent of cultural contribution, not least because they are not differentially categorised in official statistics (Policy Research Institute 1996). Moreover, there is a question of whether culture is an economic driver or merely a form of social management in a period of decline; concerns that have been raised by Zukin (1989) and Mole (1996).

surrounded by 'loft-style' apartments that are, on the whole, overpriced, small, and cheaply built. Indeed, the idea of a cultural quarter has become the central myth of our time but one that coincides with the needs of advanced capitalism. One of the most striking examples of cultural boosterism that utilises the vernacular of alternative culture can be found in Hoxton and Spitalfields where the search of the 'creative class' for 'abundant high-quality amenities and experiences, an openness to diversity of all kinds, and above all to validate their identities as creative persons' (Florida cited in White 2004:156) provides a value-added veneer, complete with artfully placed graffiti, and mediocre 'loft' housing schemes designed to facilitate City expansion. As White (2004) argues, such schemes are an example of the middling shallowness of contemporary cultural production that appears to have forgotten that culture requires faithfulness to its form, and to the idea of effort and difficulty. Subcultures and countercultures, it should be remembered, were not open to everyone. They were, as the theorists of labelling and moral panic described, either by dint of their own ideology or as a product of their exclusion, accessed by learning the style, politics, values and language of alternative cultural forms, what Klien (2000: 66) referred to as the 'mental space' provided by challenging conventional mores. Today, with or without the aid of the 'baby boomers' responsible, subculture has become dressed up in its most banal form – style – that can be accessed by anyone with a credit card. Lovatt and O'Connor (1995: 133), whilst writing with enthusiasm about the development of nightlife in Manchester in the 1990s, also pointed out that in the context of regeneration, nightlife had the potential to become like the daytime economy, a 'bland consumerist playground of chain stores and fast food outlets' in which new forms of exclusion could take place.

As the above suggests, the benefits of the urban conversion process, or what has been referred to as gentrification in the UK, has not benefited everyone. Janet Foster's (1999) research conducted in the East End illustrated that the development of the Docklands site led to a splintering of communities into the rich, the white working-class poor, and the minority ethnic poor, while Amin, Massey and Thrift (2000) raised concerns that the new cultural economy of the New Labour/Blair axis was profoundly middle-class in its emphasis, excluding the benefits of diversity. The research conducted in Southview, is also concerned with 'who wins' and the fate of diversity in cultural forms in regeneration strategies. The question of who wins and who loses in the developing night-time economies however, as illustrated earlier, was mediated by the nature of legal regulation and policing strategies. The following section explores the contemporary nature of licensing regulation, specifically the reframing and rediscovery of disorderly spaces, with which this research was concerned.

Differentiation and disorder: the rediscovery of nightlife as a social problem

The first attempt to analyse the changing nature of licensing regulation in response to the new economic structures described above originated from Manchester. Lovatt (1996) argued that licensing regimes echoed post-war 'Fordist bureaucratic control and planning' (Lovatt 1996:144) in which night and day were clearly demarcated through controls over supply and closing times, supporting the key structures of work and family. The changing political economy of the city – de-industrialisation and the growth of the

service and cultural economy, regeneration initiatives and so on - marked a shift towards a more 'flexible' regulatory regime. Manchester was promoted and repackaged as a 'realm of play, of socialisation and of the carnivalesque' (Lovatt 1996:150), and hence legal and policy changes shifted to take account of these developments although still facing hostility from magistrates, planners and the police. Events already described surrounding the Hacienda, however, promoted an administrative change where power was taken out of the hands of council officers by bringing licensing under the remit of the Leaders Office. A change in Chief Constable in Manchester opened up the possibility of new relationships between the council, police and club owners. On the one hand, the night-time economy was emphasised in the city's new imaging and led to a rise in the number of venues. On the other, innovations took place in the mode of regulation, through the creation of the Pub and Club Network, the Safer Dancing Campaign (initiated by Lifeline), the Doorstaff Registration Scheme and frequent liaison between the police, council and club owners. This was described by Lovatt as a 'flatter, more responsive system of urban governance in the city' (Lovatt 1996:161).

In this analysis, while it is the changing nature of the economic and social landscape that unravelled and transformed the nature of regulation, local regulatory arrangements could also 'distort' the impact of global shifts as illustrated by the struggles that ensued within local institutions. For example, Lovatt pointed to an initial 'schism' between three different 'factions' – the leadership of the council, cultural producers and consumers and council officers and the police - in which council officers and the police continued to see the night time economy as a problem (Lovatt 1993). Licensing authorities attempted

to regulate the night-time economy through restricting access to licenses and excluding 'undesirables' from the city centre. However, it was the inability of these bodies to halt the expansion of pleasure-orientated consumption of nightlife that indicated a shift towards deregulation enhanced by modes of responsabilisation through partnership and other compliance strategies. The changes that occurred, however, were not strategic and as such there was always a possibility of a renewed attraction towards Fordist regulatory practices.

The shifting nature of regulatory strategies, and the conflicting interests of cultural regeneration versus social order and fear of the night has continued to haunt debates as to the function and problematics of the night-time economy. Theorists have emphasised the impact of deregulation and governmental retreat in relation to night-time economies, resulting in the unparalleled growth in drinking, disorder and private security (Bromley et al. 2000, Thomas and Bromley 2000, Hobbs et al. 2003). However, as will be seen in chapters six and seven of this book and as noted above, recent changes can be characterised not so much as retreat but a reframing of regulatory strategies. The research conducted in Southview is an attempt to grasp the nature of those strategies, and what they have in common with analysis relating to new forms of social control (Cohen 1985, Young 1999, Garland 2001), which serve as a reminder that social and cultural change prompts new configurations of differentiation, inclusion and exclusion.

The new regulatory framework for managing the night-time economy can be seen most clearly in the Licensing Act 2003 and subsequent legislation. Although the Act to some

degree reflected a rationalisation of existing licensing law (Better Regulation Task Force 1998), it also consolidated over a decade of local practice. It caused consternation amongst policy-makers because it abolished statutory closing times and the presumption that licensing authorities (now local authorities) should allow an application unless there are objections from the police, residents, environmental health, fire authorities and so on. Licensing authorities had also to work within the Secretary of State Guidance, which limited their autonomy to limit supply and closing times. Because of the domination of the night-time economy by large chains, there was a fear that residents and local authorities will have little capacity to object because of the ability of chains to hire effective legal teams (Roberts et al. 2002).

In so far as one is analysing a relationship between the large breweries/chains and residents, a neo-liberal dynamic is certainly observable (although in need of further research), and the attitude of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport towards the liberalisation of gambling would certainly indicate a specific ideological perspective in that respect. However, there is a key dynamic that is often overlooked both in the operation of licensing regimes for over a decade and in the Licensing Act 2003 because the night-time economy is viewed as a homogeneous block. While the measures favour big business, small business, depending on its character, will find the regulatory terrain, more, not less, difficult to negotiate, as this book aims to illustrate. The Licensing Act 2003 is permeated with a bifurcated (Cohen 1985) system of control that, as seen in the White Paper on Licensing Reform, attempts to culturally differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable behaviours and venues. In the White Paper, for example, the violent

and disorderly are juxtaposed to citizens and tourists, disorderly venues to 'family-orientated and café-style' venues, and irresponsible to responsible licensees (Home Office 2000). What is occurring in this legislative thrust is that the night-time economy has been included alongside a range of behaviours labelled anti-social and increasingly subject to spatial and behavioural controls, illustrated by the emphasis on orderly and disorderly cultural and spatial forms in relation to bars and clubs.

Nearly a decade of New Labour in office has been marked by a preoccupation with societal violence and disaggregation, fuelling the incorporation in law of such concepts of 'anti-social behaviour' and 'disorder' in which certain behaviours have been held responsible for a collapse in civility, which in turn is thought to have a causal relationship to supposedly rising crime rates (Wilson and Kelling 1982, Kelling 2001). Beginning with the Crime and Disorder Act 1988 there has been permeation of civil and criminal law, and a 'criminalisation' of social policy and democratic governance (Hughes et al. 2002). The incorporation of concepts of disorder and incivility has broader consequences for due process and civil liberties. Brown (2004), for example, points to the evidential problems in a system of punishment largely defined by subjective interests. As evident even in government reports, perceptions of what anti-social behaviour is are defined by localised concerns (Home Office 2003), thus further undermining national or universal ideas of what crime is and increasing tendencies towards an escalation of criminalising behaviours. Within the night-time economy, the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, the Licensing Act itself, the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, the Clean Neighbourhood and Environment Act 2005, changes to planning regulations over use classes, the Violent

Crime Reduction Bill and crime prevention measures (Police Standards Unit and Crime Directorate 2005) have brought in a range of sanctions and controls that belie the assumed tendency towards deregulation. Closure Orders, 'On the Spot' fines, License Reviews, new sanctions and responsibilities for licensees and their staff, Exclusion Orders, Alcohol Disorder Zones, and planning controls have strengthened the powers of the police and councils to reproblematised nightlife. In particular, it enhances the tendency to differentiate between the orderly and disorderly, the causes and consequences of which are illustrated in this book.

A preoccupation with incivility and disorder is not, however, simply a construction of policy. As Garland (2001) has illustrated, fear, risk consciousness and a demand for the punitive curtailment of problematic behaviours, the 'culture of control', is embedded in the social and spatial landscape. While Garland locates this phenomena in the failures of traditional systems of justice to cope with rising crime rates, Rose (2000) argues that we are locked into circuits of inclusion and exclusion based around an ability to conform to behaviours that will allow access to mainstream consumption. Those who are unable to translate into the circuits of inclusion are pushed into the 'underclass' that has specific cultures and modes of reproduction. One might interpret this as poverty or welfare dependency that has become culturally entrenched and, as Young (1999) argues, that the main fault lines of society are no longer wholly concerned with 'diversity' but with 'difficulty'; late modern society has redefined those traditionally excluded on the basis of race, sexuality or alternatively as a saleable commodity but has an intolerance of the behaviours associated with the marginalised – the underside of the consumer society.

Just as we have created a society that culturally celebrates ownership and things whilst rapidly dismantling the equal ability to access this culture, we have similarly expanded consumption at night whilst criminalising its effects.

It is a return to the concept of gentrification that summarises the effects of the consumer society within public space in general, for example in escalating house prices as the inner city is revalorised after an extended period of decline. Not only do the processes involved in gentrification serve to 'reclaim' the inner city for the middle-classes through a suggestion that their economic and 'social capital' is the only possibility for regeneration thereby, as Smith (1996: 32) argues, suggesting that 'affected neighbourhoods were somehow devitalised or culturally moribund prior to gentrification' (1996:32), gentrification also excludes. Smith, for example, argues that the language of inner city development has become more defensive in the wake of economic decline. The desire to reclaim the inner city is harnessed onto strategies designed to curb the presumed 'crime and violence, drugs and unemployment, immigration and depravity' (1996:211) associated in popular discourse with immigrants, the poor, minorities, the unemployed, and any other new categories of exclusion. In other words a strong desire to 'sanitise' the city, referred to by Smith as 'revanchism'. Zukin refers to the idea of 'disneyfication' to describe the search for an 'ideal' urban space, free from the risks of the inner city, and a consciousness not just recreated in Disneyland itself, but in the inner city gentrified districts (Zukin 1991, 1995). Techniques of control emerge whereby the 'other' is objectified in spatial localities by the adoption of strategies of containment through the closure, privatisation and sanitisation of public space. As a consequence, the discourse of

security and protection became a common currency of public discourse, alongside strategies that contain risk and the fear of risk, such as private security, gated communities and Zero Tolerance (Young 1999). Davis's (1990) description of the dystopia that is the 'pure capitalism' of Los Angeles, is illustrative of the way in which populations are divided along class lines in a 'fortress' style form of social control as a consequence of the escalation of market-led 'reaction'. As he argues, in 'cities like Los Angeles, on the bad end of postmodernity, one observes an unprecedented tendency to merge urban design, architecture and the police apparatus into a single, comprehensive security effort' (Davis 1990:224). This process in the US is a racialised one, as witnessed in what Davis analysed as the callous disposal of disadvantaged black communities in a flooded New Orleans (Davis 2005). Although the brutality, segregation and powerlessness described here is seen to be not necessarily illustrative of the British context (O'Connor and Wynne 1996), similar processes enacted through regeneration initiatives have been found in the night-time economy in Newcastle (Chatterton and Hollands 2002, 2003), in Manchester (Böse 2005) and in the research that is the subject of this book.

Yet it is also the case that the consumer society holds the potential to incorporate both diverse and difficult behaviours into the valorisation process, and, as noted by O'Connor and Wynne (1996), or Hobbs et al. (2003) liminality and transgression are built in to the promotion of night-time products. The circuits of inclusion and exclusion are unstable because of the underlying capacity of any cultural form of social behaviour to be commodified. The violence of gang culture and the poverty of the 'streets' can be

repackaged and celebrated in film and music whilst any kind of prohibited behaviour can be made into an 'ironic statement' aptly satirised by Charlie Brooker's take on the emotional and moral vacuity of young middle-class professionals in Hoxton (Nathan Barley www.thegestalt.org/simon/cunt/). In a society dependent on facilitating consumption, including mainstream cultural and what was been traditionally viewed as subcultural products, urban redevelopment appears reliant on the mobilisation of fantasy and its ability to renegotiate the terms of social reality. Coexisting therefore with traditional forms of exclusion is an increasingly bizarre dystopian universe of behaviours freed from traditional repression and social or moral constraint. This book is an attempt to grasp how this dualism manifests itself in local regeneration and regulatory strategies in the development of night-time economies.

Mediated at local level, the dualism of the reality of exclusion and the fantasy of assimilation becomes retranslated as the theft of subcultural product and its retranslation into a sanitised version of itself (White 2004) alongside the practical exclusion from the actual gains of revalorisation. Subcultures and the counterculture were innovative and experimental, but also dangerous and destructive. Discourse and policy that is concerned with intoxication in the night-time economy is currently searching for a risk-free nightlife, yet traditionally cultural experimentation was by its nature risky, involving as it did the dynamics of social mobility, the innovation of political and cultural ideologies mediated through the marrying of intellectuals and working-class anger (exemplified in Punk) and personal or moral experimentation often resulting in freefall. The essential disorganisation and potential destructiveness of such trends are all evident in the locality

of Southview. However, as Klein argues, the commodification and branding of alternative culture involves a loss of not just physical but mental space, that is, the possibility of imagining alternatives.

This book aims to explore themes of subcultural appropriation and exclusion as enacted through the development of a 'night-time economy' in Southview, London. It is particularly focussed on regulatory strategies and how individuals within key networks were bound or constrained by both the objective direction of change and their adopted subjectivity, the outcome being an urban conversion process (Zukin 1989) orientated towards harnessing the cultural capital incoming young white professionals. The following chapter will outline how this research was conducted, and in particular how the historical legacy of the management of social relations in Southview defined the direction and management of the research. Chapters three to seven will then explore the legacy of criminalisation for economic and cultural development, gentrification and the reconfiguration of regulatory strategies in relation to nightlife and the night-time economy.