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Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions

Price, Carolyn (2006). Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2(1) pp. 49–68.

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Abstract

Should moods be regarded as intentional states, and, if so, what kind of intentional content do they have? I focus on irritability (understood as an angry mood) and apprehension (understood as a fearful mood), which I examine from the perspective of a teleosemantic theory of content. Eric Lormand has argued that moods are non-intentional states, distinct from emotions; Robert Solomon and Peter Goldie argue that moods are generalised emotions and that they have intentional content of a correspondingly general kind. I present a third model, on which moods are regarded, not as generalised emotions, but as states of vigilance; and I argue that, on this model, moods should be regarded as intentional states of a kind quite distinct from emotions. An advantage of this account is that it allows us to distinguish between a mood of apprehension and an episode of objectless fear.

Item Type: Journal Article
ISSN: 1845-8475
Keywords: Mind; philosophy; mood; emotion; intentionality
Academic Unit/Department: Arts > Philosophy
Item ID: 8824
Depositing User: Carolyn Price
Date Deposited: 02 Aug 2007
Last Modified: 02 Dec 2010 20:03
URI: http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/8824
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