Histories of psychology after Stonewall: Introduction to the special issue.

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This article introduces the special issue *Fifty Years Since Stonewall: The Science and Politics of Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity*. Here, the commemoration of the 1969 Stonewall uprising frames our discussion of issues of representation that arise in commemorating events in general, and events in the history of psychology in particular. We describe how the articles in the special issue expand the existing narratives about the history of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender psychology that are centered in the United States, focused primarily on sexual orientation and often end, rather than begin, in the time of Stonewall. The international scope of the special issue can suggest new ways to particularize histories of psychology since Stonewall that are centered on the United States. We describe the ideological context that shapes the doing of psychology since Stonewall, the telling of the histories of that psychology, and how “the problem of speaking for others” arises in contexts of power, including the curation of the special issue itself.

**Public Significance Statement**

Psychology has engaged with movements for equality and justice for sexual and gender minorities over the last 50 years, resulting in increasingly affirmative perspectives in many parts of the world. This introduction to the special issue frames the histories of such shifts at local, national, and global levels with particular attention to the politics of commemoration and the problem of speaking for others.

**Keywords:** history, LGBT psychology, commemoration, internationalism, intersectionality

This special issue is intended to stimulate scholarly reflection and debate on how psychology—through both research, and policy influence—has been entangled with changing social and scientific attitudes and theories about sexual orientation and gender diversity around the world over the past 50 years. At the start of this special issue project, the most detailed histories of these relationships were centered on the United States and largely focused on sexual orientation (e.g., Bayer, 1981; Hegarty, 2018; Minton, 2002; Pettit, 2011). We build on and enrich those histories here with in-depth analyses of local developments within the United States (Byers, Vider, & Smith, 2019; Hipp, Gore, Toumayan, Anderson, & Thurston, 2019), and examine the expansion of the field—imagined as “lesbian and gay psychology” for decades—from sexual minorities to gender minorities, particularly in the last 10 years (Riggs et al., 2019).

Accounts of other, more recent national traditions have been much fewer, shorter, and/or available only in specialist publications (see, e.g., Jowett, 2016; Wilkinson, 1999). This is true even when critical histories that highlight activist science exist for these regions. For example, Pillay, Nel, McLachlan, and Victor (2019) noted that critical histories of psychology in South Africa have remained curiously silent about LGBTIQ+ issues. One of our explicit goals, then, was to expand the historiography of this area to encompass other national and regional contexts, acknowledging that psychology itself takes highly varying forms across these
contexts, as does its engagement with social movements (see Rutherford, Capdevila, Undurti, & Palmary, 2011). Thus, this issue also includes historical analyses of psychology in the United Kingdom (Hubbard & Griffiths, 2019), Hungary (Borgos, 2019), and South Africa (Pillay et al., 2019). This international focus is expanded to include Colombia, the Philippines, and Russia by Horne, Maroney, Nel, Chaparro, and Manalastas (2019) who theorized the transnational politics of LGBTI affirmative psychological organizing and its implications in contexts where those psychologies are often coded, in hostile terms, as “Western” impositions. In exploring the varied relationships between psychology, its national associations, LGBTIQ+ activism, and the state in regions around the world, the set of articles included here begins to illuminate the distinctive contours created by histories of colonialism, gender and race relations, the uneven effects of globalization, and the potential power and possibilities of transnational organizing (Horne et al., 2019).

The development of this special issue was, in part, prompted by the anniversary of an event that achieved widespread public visibility both within in the United States and transnationally: the uprisings at the Stonewall Inn in New York, New York, in June of 1969. We thus begin our introduction by exploring the politics of commemoration, emphasizing how the title of this special issue should be read ironically because this special issue is not a commemoration of Stonewall. Rather, it aims to be a historically, politically, and culturally situated contribution to a much longer—and ongoing—project by historians to understand how psychologists and other psy-professionals (e.g., psychiatrists, psychotherapists) have engaged with social movements over time, how those social movements have shaped psychology, and how to analyze the effects of these encounters. In the second section, we situate this contribution within the historiography of psychology more broadly. We show how it complicates and challenges existing histories and expands our understandings of LGBTIQ+ issues and psychology to the non-WEIRD (i.e., Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) world (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) at the same time that it puts the particularities of the U.S. situation into sharper relief. We then discuss some specific issues pertinent to constructing histories of LGBTIQ+ psychology, namely, the dynamics of normativity and how to grapple with the powerful effect of ideological and political context on historical actors without giving them a pass or judging their (often less-than-ideal) actions solely in light of today’s norms. Finally, we engage with the issue of the politics of experience and epistemic location. When considering LGBTIQ+ psychology and its history, who gets to speak for whom, and with what claims to expertise, authenticity, and authority? And importantly, to what effect? We examine what feminist philosopher Linda Alcoff (1991) called “the problem of speaking for others” (p. 5) as it applies to LGBTIQ+ psychology, to its history, and to the curation of the special issue itself.

The Politics of Becoming Commemorable

Commemoration is an intensely political act. It is an attempt to explain where a people come from, to narrate why they form a people, and it projects how they should respond to the open-ended events unfolding in the present (Liu & Hilton, 2005). As noted earlier, when we first made our call for papers for this special issue we intentionally leveraged the 50th anniversary of the events at Stonewall Inn, capitalizing on a much larger ongoing commemoration of Stonewall that happened around the world in 2019. But as historian Susan Stryker (2017) has noted in her book Transgender History: The Roots of Today’s Revolution, “Making history” is an action that we take today, in the present moment, that links our understanding of the past to the future we strive to build” (p. 234). Accordingly, we have kept in mind the question of who commemorates whom and how. Commemoration is often contested, as groups invoke different versions of the past for political ends in the present (Reicher & Haslam, 2016). Our aim here is not to settle the meaning of the past, but to expand and enrich the range of accounts of this past to which psychologists have access.

While this special issue is not a simple commemoration of Stonewall, the events in New York City in 1969 and afterward exemplify how commemorative practices venture constructions of events with lasting implications for the recognition of people as members of social groups. Sociologists Armstrong and Crage (2006) unpacked the processes...
through which an event achieves commemorability in their analysis of the “Stonewall myth” by comparing Stonewall with four other events close to 1969: the police raid of a New Year’s ball in San Francisco, California, in 1965; the Compton’s cafeteria raid in the same city a year later; the Black Cat raid of 1967 in Los Angeles, California; and the large protest in response to the police raid of the Snake Pit Bar in New York City in 1970. These comparisons make clear that Stonewall was certainly not the only time and place that communities fought back against police harassment in this era, nor was it the first event to generate further political organizing. Nonetheless, it was the event that became commemorable. What factors contributed to the construction of Stonewall’s commemorability?

As Armstrong and Crage (2006) noted, the Stonewall story is as much an achievement of gay activism as it is a straightforward account of its origins. During the uprising, activists passed out flyers that influenced the framing of the event and encouraged participation in it. They called up reporters and asked them to come and cover it. Soon after the event, activists used it to launch an annual, national commemoration, promoted it through the homophile media to reach communities in several major U.S. cities. This event, originally called “Christopher Street Liberation Day,” later became known as “Gay Pride.” Gay liberation spread quickly overseas and to other US cities where the commemorative tradition was taken up. On June 24, 2016, Former President Barack Obama conferred National Monument status on the site of the Stonewall Inn, making it the first such monument dedicated to LGBTQ history in the United States and giving its commemorability distinct national importance.

But the risk of commemorating anything is that it tells what Chimamanda Adichie (2009) called a “single story” about the past (TED, 2009). It promotes some historical actors and events and silences others (Trouillot, 1995). It defines who “the people” are and are not and prescribes what actions in the present are possible or not. The question of who the people are who are recognized by Stonewall commemorations has a history. Moreover, this history has had an impression on the articles that follow. Gay liberation and Stonewall’s memory quickly traveled from New York to London, United Kingdom (Hubbard & Griffiths, 2019), and to Bogota, Colombia (Horne et al., 2019). As Riggs et al. (2019) noted, within the United States, transgender people—and transgender people of color, especially—became written out of the Stonewall narrative in the 1970s when gay organizations organized around sexual orientation as the central basis for political representation. As Hipp et al. (2019) noted, issues of race, class, and gender were decentered in these stories of activism, and the resulting accounts that foreground the removal of homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders fail to address “many of the most critical systemic barriers to equality for LGBTQ+ (especially T) folks of color in the U.S. (e.g., racism, police violence, homelessness)” (p. 884). This has resulted in “the retelling of LGBTQ+ history as one that privileges the needs of and gains made for primarily cisgender white gay men, obscuring the central role that transgender individuals of color played in the foundations of the movement” (p. 884).

Similar critiques followed the telling of the Stonewall story in the Emmerich, Fossat, Frydman, and Lorenz (2015) film Stonewall (e.g., Juzwiak, 2015). A quarter century after Stonewall, designating the 1993 parade in San Francisco with the title “Year of the Queer” prompted intense discussion about what the prototypical aims of that people might be (Gamson, 1995). Pride commemorations have also been resisted in policy and in popular media in many parts of the world (Bricknell, 2000; Ejdos & Božović, 2019). As Horne et al. (2019) noted, in 2012, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Pride parades were banned for the next 100 years in Russia. The politics of commemoration, and conversely, its undoing, are intricately interwoven with questions of power, memory, and (national) identity (Liu & Hilton, 2005).

Commemorability and Psychology’s History

In producing this special issue, we are inevitably engaging in this politics of commemorability. The results suggest that many of the contours of current access to commemorations of Stonewall map onto the contours of recognition of LGBTQI+ people in psychology and its history: neglect of distinct experiences of people of color within the United States (Barnett et al., 2019); neglect of transgender peo-
ple—especially transgender people of color (Hipp et al., 2019; Riggs et al., 2019); and a variably hostile international landscape (Horne et al., 2019).

These factors also suggest how this special issue brings forward new understandings of psychology’s history since Stonewall (even if incompletely). Many histories of psychology’s engagement with sexuality have focused on the events leading up to or centered on the depathologization of homosexuality in the 1970s in American psychiatry and prominently feature Sigmund Freud, Alfred Kinsey, Evelyn Hooker, and Frank Beach (e.g., Bayer, 1981; Minton, 2002; Terry, 1999). Important as these histories are, they do not always resonate with all members of LGBTQI+ communities today, particularly those whose issues were not settled—or even addressed—by the events of the early 1970s. These narratives omit, for example, how bisexuality is selectively affirmed and erased in successive waves of psychological thinking (Barker, 2007), the ongoing erasure and medicalization of transgender lives in psychology (Tosh, 2015), the continued androcentrism of psychological research on sexual minorities in which lesbian and bisexual women are poorly recognized (Lee & Crawford, 2012), the important history of psychologists’ response to HIV/AIDS (see Morin, 1988), and the ways in which the “lesbian and gay affirmative” approach only ever managed to affirm adults such that it has remained “open season on gay kids” in the helping professions for decades (Hegarty, 2018; Sedgwick, 1991; Weinstein, 2018). Many countries are not addressed here (but see also Jowett, 2016). For example, there is no history of China in this issue, the nation with the world’s largest LGBT population, although discrimination against LGBT people in China warrants psychological engagement (Wang et al., 2019). In its focus on research and policy, this special issue does not do justice to the rich history of social constructionist and psychosocial approaches in this field (see Johnson, 2015). The American Psychological Association’s (APA’s) involvement in legal battles for equal marriage legislation is not the focus of this special issue either, but this has received attention previously in this journal (Greene, 2009; Herek, 2006). These omissions are multiple, overlapping, and nontrivial. As the silences in this special issue reveal, there is much more to be done to document and analyze the history of psychology’s engagement with LGBTQI+ issues.

Despite these gaps, the articles in this issue do expose how the reach of LGBT-affirmative psychology along lines of race looms large, particularly in articles that are centered in the United States. As Hegarty (2018) pointed out, early lesbian and gay affirmative voices in the APA emerged from the Board for Social and Ethical Responsibility in Psychology, and many of the signature moves of the new “affirmative” psychology, including the study of prejudice, identity development models, and the psychological concept of minority stress, were formulated first in Black psychology. The two studies of particular U.S. contexts (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Memphis, Tennessee) included in this issue show how outreach by psychologists—both progay and antigay—were grounded in the lived experiences of White people and had more limited uptake beyond White audiences and communities (Byers et al., 2019; Hipp et al., 2019).

The history of the organizational experiences of lesbian and gay ethnic minority psychologists also reveals their struggle to be recognized by a predominantly White field. In a 1983 letter to the steering committee and membership of the Association for Lesbian and Gay Psychologists (ALGP), 1 Latino psychologist Edward Morales berated the organization for institutional racism and marginalization of ethnic minority issues. As he put it, “We are insulted at the severe lack of support by the ALGP membership and steering committee concerning ethnic minority gays and lesbians. This lack of sensitivity and general apathy borders on institutional racism and is completely intolerable!” (Morales, 1983, emphasis in original). At the next APA convention, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, in 1984, the ALGP sponsored a conversation hour on race and participation in association activities, membership, and governance that was led by Hortensia Amaro, Oliva Espin, Louise Rodriguez-Nogués, and Althea Smith. In a report on the session published subsequently in the ALGP newsletter, it was clear that issues of intersectionality were at the core of the discussion years before that term would come into widespread use in academia, and decades before it would be explicitly theorized in psychology (see Barnett et al., 2019; Rutherford & Davidson, in press). It was noted that “Links between fear and oppression due to sexual orientation, and due to race, were acknowledged. . . . The room and the conversation grew hot. Ignorance was not experienced as bliss by anyone present” (Gore, 1984, p. 4). The rise of intersectional histories of psychology—histories that consider the ways in which discourses of race (and racism), gender (and sexism, androcentrism, and cigenderism), class (and classism), and sexuality (heteronormativity), for example, variously combine and interact to structure psychological theory, research, practice, and activism—is also a relatively new enterprise (see Bederman, 1995; Hegarty, 2007; Shields, 1999).

1 ALGP was founded in 1973 and was originally called the Association of Gay Psychologists. After some debate, the name was changed to the Association for Lesbian and Gay Psychologists in 1983. Although representatives worked very closely with (and within) APA, sponsoring programming at the APA convention and meeting regularly with the Board for Social and Ethical Responsibility in Psychology, ALGP was an independent organization. In 1984, when APA lifted the moratorium on new divisions, Division 44, The Society for the Psychological Studies on Lesbian and Gay Issues (now the Society for the Psychology of Sexual Orientation and Gender Diversity), was approved by council. It acquired official status in January of 1985. ALGP continued for several years, however, with much overlap in membership, until disbanding in 1993 after being briefly incorporated as the National Association of Lesbian and Gay Psychologists (see Kimmel & Browning, 1999).
Hipp et al. (2019) suggested that Martin Luther King’s vision catalyzed activism in transgender communities by making available a vision of a better world that could be achieved through organizing. As Barnett et al. (2019) and other content analyses make clear (e.g., Huang et al., 2010), the rise of an intersectional research literature on LGBT people of color in the United States is largely a phenomenon of the last 10 years. Rather, much of “lesbian and gay psychology” in the United States thought about race as an available analogy for sexual minority status rather than an intersection with it for about 40 years after Stonewall (Hegarty, 2018, notwithstanding very important exceptions, e.g., Espin, 1997; Greene, 1997; Zea & Harper, 2004). This reasoning by analogy was engendered by the APA’s advocacy on behalf of lesbian and gay rights, which has been central to APA’s legal advocacy in general (Gilfoyle & Dvoskin, 2017). When this advocacy emerged in the late 1980s, it did so in a context in which racial minorities were recognized as a “suspect class” in U.S. law, while state sodomy laws banning homosexual conduct had been freshly supported by the Bowers v. Hardwick, 1986 ruling of the United States Supreme Court. Progay lawyers appealed to the immutability of sexual orientation to make sexual minorities appear more analogous to racial minorities and other suspect classes in this context (Halley, 1994). The demand for such analogous thinking occluded more intersectional approaches which might have recognized how heteronormativity created differential impacts of psychologically informed policies on diverse ethnic communities in the United States (Cohen, 1997).

The broad geographical reach of the histories collected here provides a useful vantage point illuminating the ways that “racial formations” that are particular to the United States (Omi & Winant, 1994), and attempts to oppose psychology’s complicity with them, created facilitating conditions for the emergence of LGBT-affirmative psychologies in the United States in the 1970s. By contrast, one content analysis of research journals (Jowett, 2018) shows that in the United Kingdom, the shift from the disease model to a stigma model of homosexuality occurred in the 1980s, sometime later than it did in U.S. psychology journals (see Morin, 1977; Watters, 1986). Jowett’s (2018) work was presented at the 20th anniversary conference of the British Psychological Society’s Psychology of Sexualities Section (originally titled the Lesbian and Gay Psychology Section). There is, as of yet, no journal or section of the British Psychological Society that is organized around ethnic minority concerns. Would this shift in the research have been facilitated had such structures and analysis existed in the United Kingdom? Consider also how Pillay et al. (2019) showed there was little recognition of sexual diversity in the critical psychology of the Apartheid era in South Africa. After the post-Apartheid 1994 constitution enshrined rights to freedom from sexual orientation discrimination, this topic began to be researched in the South African context, and the relationship between silence about sexuality and collusion with colonialism began to receive some academic consideration. Read together, these articles can suggest the general hypothesis that the recognition of racial inequalities by psychologists can have determinative effects on the ideals that LGBTIQ+ affirmative psychologists construct in particular national contexts, and their chances of achieving them.

At this point in time, we can only venture such ideas as hypotheses as so much of this history remains unwritten. So far as we know, this special issue is innovative in its focus on the recent history of LGBTIQ+ affirmative psychology, not only within American Psychologist, but within the literature on the history of psychology more generally. In some respects this project is long overdue; sexuality and gender both became objects of wide interdisciplinary interest in the 1990s, partly under the influence of Foucauldian scholars who placed the power/knowledge of psychological disciplines and professions at the center of their analysis. However, there was little historical interest in the history of sexuality in history of psychology journals in the 1990s or before, nor much evidence of interest in sexuality studies, or queer theory in psychology in the 1990s (see Minton, 1997, for a notable exception, and Downing & Gillett, 2011, for discussion). Psychologists’ theories of gender were in this time so far behind transgender theory and activism that they were incommensurate with what was happening on the ground with these movements (Parlee, 1996). It was the success of these movements that led psychologists to appreciate the early insights of scholars such as Kessler and McKenna into the logic of gender attribution (Kessler & McKenna, 1978; McKenna & Kessler, 2000). Only in the past 10–15 years have history of psychology journals begun to include publications on: LGBTIQ+ psychology (e.g., Chiang, 2008; Hammack & Windell, 2011; Hubbard, 2017; Pettit, 2011; Serlin, 2012; Weinstein, 2018).

There are many reasons why the history of psychology since Stonewall has been slow in coming. The challenges of doing recent history may partially explain this. It may seem daunting to those who view the period from the 1970s forward as very much a part of the present (“If I lived through it, it can’t be history!”). Filled with historical actors who are alive and well, and who even talk back, and fraught with ethical and privacy issues, the recent past is contested and contestable terrain (see Potter & Romano, 2012). On the one hand, historians of recent history can also face an avalanche of hyperconnected documentation created by the Internet that defies traditional meaning-making. In this historical context it is possible to feel nostalgia for “decay time” when the past depended on physical resources that tended to rot (Hoskins, 2013). On the other hand, recent
history often requires the historian to create sources by conducting oral history interviews with living participants. While challenging, this is also an incredibly important endeavor, as the first two articles of the special issue demonstrate (Byers et al., 2019; Hipp et al., 2019). Both sets of authors have conducted and assembled valuable oral history interviews that document the experiences of previously unheard actors in LGBTQ+ history, thus making history on multiple levels.

However, the challenges of telling recent stories cannot explain all of the delay particularly as it was the context of HIV/AIDS that led social historians to draw out the meanings being produced in the present to an unprecedented degree (Fee & Fox, 1988) and to construct “archives on the run” (Berridge, 2011). Rather, the recognition that history was captured by the politics of HIV/AIDS was a prompt to historicize recent and current events with urgency. There are very many ways in which LGBTQI+ issues are central to the history of recent psychology. Picking up where Hegarty (2018) left off in his short history of this area of psychology, we might ask,

What’s the best example of successful de-pathologization in the twentieth century? Which social groups were most affected when HIV/AIDS transformed what we understand enlightenment knowledge to be? Which issues have defined the relationship between psychology and the law in recent decades? What discovery made us feel that neuroscience might be a politically progressive narrative in the decade of the brain? Which central aspects of ourselves were most transformed by internet-mediated communication? What movement now grounds our understanding of affirmation that we did not have 40 years ago? Given the risks of living in the present, can American psychologists afford an ignorance of the recent history of LGBT psychology? (p. 99)

**Dynamics of “Normativity” and Recognition**

Answering these questions requires some discussion of the ideological contexts within which psychologists take action and historians of psychology write about them. Ideologies such as cultural heterosexism (Herek, 2007) and cisgenderism (Ansara & Hegarty, 2012) have complex relationships with silence. They are embedded in the logic of “othering” which grants a shadowy existence to some groups by some criteria but not by others. They bear a family resemblance to androcentrism (Bem, 1993) and cultural misattribution (Causadias, Vitriol, & Atkin, 2018) in that they deny or neglect the existence of a people, but also locate “difference” in those same people, make a spectacle out of that difference, and construct artificial group boundaries between people. These ideologies have these distorting effects on visibility when they intersect also (Cole, 2009). In countering these ideologies, it has been too easy for psychologists to rally around the assumption that investments in “difference” are easily countered by evidence of same-ness (or vice versa), or that accounts of “nature” are easily opposed by claims about “nurture” (or vice versa). If history tells us nothing else, then it clearly tells us that there are interlocking systems of normativity in place that can readily absorb these kinds of empiricist critiques and which matter for people’s chances of having liveable lives.

Psychology, on its own, is of less use in these contexts than we would like to think or tend to hope. Indeed, historians of sexuality, since Foucault (1978), have been particularly wary of accounts of sexuality and gender produced by well-intentioned liberal voices in psychology and related fields which have eventually become ideological shackles over time (see, e.g., Duggan, 1993). Similarly, some versions of social constructionism would suggest that in some cases, affirmative psychology is nothing more than a better disguised ideology than the medicalization that it has superseded (e.g., Kitzinger, 1987; Rose, 1996). The histories that follow here tell stories of historical actors who “cannot wait for an ideal approach but must instead work iteratively and responsively” as Byers et al. (2019) concluded about the clinician-activists in the Eromin Center in Philadelphia in the 1970s. Actors in these stories are often up against the idealization of heterosexuality or of identification with the gender assigned at birth promoted by “psy-professionals” (Rose, 1996) and backed up by the organization of violence by the state (Horne et al., 2019), their church (Hipp et al., 2019), the army (Pillay et al., 2019), or the media (Borgos, 2019; Hubbard & Griffiths, 2019), and of course, the law. The actions that are taken in these histories are sometimes internally contradictory with each other. As Kitzinger (1997) cogently described, “lesbian and gay psychology” involved dilemmas between using empirical psychology as part of a political strategy of “factualizing” (Pope, 2012), and social constructionist critique of the ideological moves encoded in psychology’s individualism. Psychologists have been both active agents in producing “good science” to counter toxic myths about a minority group (Herek, 1998), and have deconstructed empiricist rhetoric (Clarke, 2000).

To invoke the thinking of anthropologist and cultural theorist Mary Douglas, these ideologies treat folk who are not recognized by available culturally particular narratives as dirt because they are matter that is somehow “out of place.” Cultural responses to such people that are common among humans are to kill them, avoid them, adjust them so that they better fit the available categories, or venerate them for transcending those categories (Douglas, 1966). These ideologies and the practices that they justify are ongoing. Douglas’s (1966) range of cultural approaches to “matter out of place” describes well the range of contemporary cultural responses to people born with intersex traits, for example (Cornwall, 2013). Humans rarely categorize each other for arbitrary reasons, but often do so to warrant treating others differently, as in diagnostic systems for example (Bowker & Star, 1999). More than simple empiri-
cism, these cultural logics require a kind of “double consciousness” among those for whom they create double binds more than others, that goes beyond the liberal notion of “prejudice” (Gaines & Reed, 1995).

Double consciousness is also experienced by historians in this field. The erasure of LGBTQI+ history can present historians of psychology with the dilemma between allowing the erasure to continue versus calling time on it by projecting essent ialist notions from the present backward (Hubbard, 2017). Nonetheless, a long view of history over several decades tells stories of shifting recognition of the possibility of diverse lives that is often brought about by small groups of actors, such as those shifting “transnormativity” (Riggs et al., this volume), or the British “liberal humanist” recognition of lesbian and gay individuals (Hubbard & Griffiths, 2019).

Telling histories about such shifts in what was won or lost and by whom, when and where is not simple storytelling; our understanding has implications for how to oppose rather than collude with ideologies such as cultural heterosexism and cisgenderism. For example, even the most limited successes can be met with the ideology of modern prejudice, which suggests that any effort to inch closer to equality is pushing things too far or appealing for “special rights” unfairly (Morrison & Morrison, 2002, see also Bartoş, Bałs, & Berger, 2014). We hope this special issue provides an intellectual resource that describes in diverse ways how progress, when it has occurred, has unfolded under nonideal conditions and has had partial effects. Psychologists have long been presented with political choices about whether to write accounts of personhood that go with or against culturally enforced ideologies. When such critiques guide our understanding of what the past actions of LGBTQI+ psychologists might have meant, it is easy to look back with a singular “hindsight bias” (Fischhoff, 1975) that underestimates the risks that were taken in bringing about the less-than-ideal present, and the availability of our current concerns, hopes and critiques upon those very partial achievements in the past.

**Speaking for Others/Speaking From “Experience”**

A further challenge facing historians of psychology since Stonewall—and an ongoing issue for psychologists working with marginalized groups—is that of speaking for others. By the late 1980s, feminist and anticolonial scholars, among others, had called attention to the danger—and even violence—of speaking for others when “others” include those whose experiences of oppression, marginalization, and colonization are not shared by their more privileged, often academic, interlocutors (see also Teo, 2010). As feminist philosopher Linda Alcoff (1991) summarized, recognition of the problem of speaking for others was based on the growing acknowledgment that the social location of the speaker has epistemic significance, that “where one speaks from affects the meaning and truth of what one says” (p. 6). Both the content of the message and the credibility afforded to it are indelibly colored by the location of the speaker. Feminist historian and social psychologist Jill Morawski (1990) put it this way: “Feminist scholarship has repeatedly demonstrated that how and what we come to know depends on who we are” (p. 175). This stance is obviously in tension with the empiricist idea that the social location of observers does not matter a lot, creating fruitful dilemmas among feminist psychologists at this time (Crawford & Marecek, 1989; Riger, 1992). As Pettit (2011) has described, by the early 1980s, there were competing claims to represent lesbian and gay interests within the APA that did or did not grant credence to the importance of speaking from within the group. Questions about the relationship between the body politic of psychological cultures and the politics of the psychological body of knowledge produced in those cultures loomed large by the late 1980s in “lesbian and gay psychology” also, not least because of HIV/AIDS. The most fulsome and cogent critique of the “affirmative” lesbian and gay psychology called attention both to the seductive empiricist rhetoric of psychology and the trope of speaking for whole communities by self-appointed in-group representatives (Kitzinger, 1987). As Hegarty (2018) has described, the question of whether transgender people can legitimately speak for themselves remained a tension in APA’s (2009) Task Force report on gender identity and gender variance by virtue of its consultation with psychiatric bodies.

Several authors here highlight further that what both pathologizing and affirmative psychologies have presented as valid knowledge about LGBTQI lives has historically been generated by White cisgender men. Aware of these risks, the founders of APA Division 44 embedded principles of gender and ethnic representation in their committee structure and suite of awards from the outset in 1985 (Kimmel & Browning, 1999). We have cause to reflect critically on whether such well-meaning moves toward representation were sufficient to recognize and do justice to the intersectional nature of psychological issues in this domain. Reflection on that issue in this context should highlight how the histories of norms that are set by psychological bodies may have a loose or distant relationship to the research that is produced in those national contexts.

Awareness of the distortion and oppression that has often occurred when (even well-meaning) privileged people have spoken on behalf of others had, by the early 1990s, led many critical scholars to retreat from or abandon the practice itself. But according to Alcoff (1991), wholesale retreat is an unsatisfactory response to the problem. We agree. Choosing to abandon others to continued silence also has consequences. To minimize the possibility of distortion and harm, she argued, “speaking for others” must always be accompanied by an analysis—not only of the content of the
claims and of the social location of the speaker—but of the effects the claims exert:

One cannot simply look at the location of the speaker or her credentials to speak, nor can one look merely at the propositional content of the speech; one must look at where the speech goes and what it does there. (p. 26, italics added)

Alcoff’s perspective on speech as a form of action was, of course, shared by the key texts that would make up sexuality studies at this point in time (e.g., Butler, 1990; Foucault, 1978; Sedgwick, 1990) and by the turn to discourse in social psychology in many countries other than the United States (e.g., Parker, 1989; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). We are aware that there are multiple levels of speaking for others that are in the frame in this special issue. Of course, the analyses offered by several of the articles cast the history of LGBTQI + psychology as a history of the struggle to recognize, allow, and affirm subjectivities that have been kept unknowable by those who do not share them. The question of which selfhood, subjectionhood, or identity psychologists have been able to recognize, affirm and enable is a historical one that has unfolded with particular speed or inexplicable slowness in the recent histories examined here. As several articles here show, psychologists have often had to take pains to refute the psychological theories that they inherited and to hold back the disciplinary urge to see all difference through the lens of the normal/abnormal distinction to create the conditions of such recognition. (Hubbard & Griffiths, 2019; Riggs et al., 2019).

In addition, we also need to keep in mind that in talking about psychologists as historical actors, we are almost always talking about an advantaged group no matter what the context. When psychologists encounter LGBTQI + people as clients, patients, research participants or indirect targets of evidence-based policies, they enjoy an epistemological advantage to the extent the psychologists’ accounts of what happened are taken to be the objective, scientific ones. Historians are often left to work with records in which psychologists’ accounts of what happened have been encoded as authoritative, and those who have been made subjects of psychological knowledge have been described, but not in terms of their own choosing.

In reflecting on our own speaking positions here, we are keen to position this work not as any kind of definitive or final account of the history of psychology since Stonewall, but as opening up the stories to a wider range of storytellers. From the 60 abstracts that we received in response to our call in 2018, it became clear to us that there were two competing and incompatible narratives that people wanted to tell about the intertwining histories of psychology and LGBTQI + movements. One was a celebratory romance, in which psychological science pushes out superstition and prejudice in an ongoing struggle to end inequality. The other narrative was a tragedy, in which a will to power animates psychological science and liberalism (or neo-liberalism) is its most effective driving ideology. We are quite convinced that the historical “truth” is more interesting and dangerous than either of these “simple stories” (TED, 2009), and that historical truths may be found in the ironic relationships between these narratives and the events of the past (Harrow, 1997; White, 1973). We hope that the articles that follow will not be read as defining what the “proper objects” of the history of psychology after Stonewall should be (Butler, 1994), but instead prompt others to continue to tell less simple stories, well-grounded in historical evidence, that inform us what psychologists did, where, when, why and how, and—importantly—with what effects.

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