How does culture shape our moral identity? Moral foundations in Saudi Arabia and Britain

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HOW DOES CULTURE SHAPE OUR MORAL IDENTITY?

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ABSTRACT

North American measures of moral identity (MI) assume that *caring* and *fairness* are the most prototypical features of morality. Moral foundations theory describes such *individualising* foundations of morality as dominant in individualist cultures and *binding* foundations of morality as more particular to collectivist cultures. We weighed the criticism that moral identity scales are guilty of ‘liberal ethnocentrism’ in two studies drawing on participants in the UK and Saudi Arabia. Only individualising traits were prototypical of concepts of moral people in Britain, whilst individualising and binding traits were both prototypical of such concepts in Saudi Arabia (Study 1, N = 160). In Study 2 (N = 539), participants completed the moral identity scale following typical instructions that referred to the prototypical traits of one of five moral foundations. Overall MI scores were lower in Britain than in Saudi Arabia, particularly when instructions described binding traits as characteristics of a moral person. Cross-cultural differences were mediated by the perceived cultural importance attributed to these traits, particularly binding traits. These results justify concerns existing moral identity scales underestimate important cultural variation in conceptualizing moral identity, but justice and caring concerns remain the best single candidates for a universal foundation of human morality.
"Being a self is inseparable from existing in a space of moral issues" (Taylor, 1989, p.112).

In recent years, studies of moral identity have proliferated in psychology. Neither morality nor identity are simple concepts (Hardy & Carlo, 2011), and moral identity has been defined as a reflection of the degree to which being moral is important and central to one's self (Blasi, 1990), and the unity between individual interests and morality (Colby & Damon, 1992). Research on moral identity responds to research that finds weak empirical relationships between moral behaviours and moral reasoning (Walker, 2004). Such findings suggest the possibility that individual differences in moral action are affected more by the desire, than by the cognitive capacity, to act morally (Blasi, 1990).

Moral identities are formed and activated within contexts that are characterised by social relationships, group identities and discourses about what morality might be (Moshman, 2013). However, as Jennings, Mitchell, and Hannah (2015) have recently pointed out, cultural influence has received little attention in the literature on moral identity. This criticism is evidenced by a recent review, which included 112 studies of moral identity conducted in North America and Europe, but just 10 in South and East Asia (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). Similarly, Jia and Krettenauer (2017) argued that the concept of moral
identity is culturally biased, as moral identity research is focused almost exclusively on individual moral domains, such as caring and fairness-related traits. They called for expanding these western moral values to include and consider other overlooked moral concerns in non-Western cultures. These concerns about studies of moral identity echo more general criticism about moral universalism in psychological theory raised by Haidt (2008). Haidt (2008) argued that moral universalism in psychological theory was a historical consequence of liberal progress and change oriented towards justice and individual rights issues in Western societies. He was most concerned that a psychology based on these values would ignore conservative and religious people in Western societies, who might endorse different moral foundations. Accordingly, Haidt concluded that moral psychologists have shown unintended ‘liberal ethnocentrism.’

Our research weighs such criticisms and aims to address the question of whether or not moral identity is subject to a false universalism when the individual values of care and fairness guide the construction of ‘morality’ that moral identity scales measure. This criticism has merit to the extent that conceptions of morality and moral identity are influenced by culture and differ between cultures more than has commonly been presumed in the extant literature. It is worth noting that this research goes beyond previous studies in morality and culture (e.g., Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & Banaszynski, 2001) in three important aspects. First, previous research has focused on moral judgments and rhetoric rather than cultural conceptions of moral identity, for instance, Guerra and Giner-Sorolla, 2010, focus on what is viewed as moral, and Vasquez et al. (2001), focus on what is argued to be moral. Second, they primarily used Schweder’s framework and did not directly test the merits of moral foundation theory in relation to moral identity. Third, neither research examines Saudi Arabian culture or any other Middle Eastern culture.
To introduce this research, we first consider how moral identity scales make assumptions about what morality is, that render these criticisms relevant to our research. Next, we present the moral foundations theory as a framework for our own research on conceptions of moral identity in the UK and Saudi Arabia.

**Concepts and Measures of Moral Identity**

Moral identity has been described as "a self-conception organised around a set of moral traits" (Aquino & Reed, 2002, p.1424), and “the degree to which being a moral person is important to an individual’s identity” (Hardy & Carlo, 2011, p. 212). Moral identity is one of many identities that any individual may have, and it may be salient to varying degrees across contexts (Stets, 2010; Stets & Carter, 2011). When moral identity is activated, moral behaviours, such as donating money (Aquino & Reed, 2002), volunteerism (Nasir & Kirshner, 2003), behaving honestly (Wowra, 2007), behaving pro-socially (Winterich, Aquino, Mittal & Swartz, 2013) and being charitable (Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007) become more likely. Accordingly, an accurate measure of moral identity is important when predicting moral behaviour.

Common measures of moral identity typically present participants with a person who evidences certain moral traits, and by so doing these measures make assumptions about what morality might be. Aquino and Reed’s (2002) scale exemplifies this assumption, as it first asks respondents to visualise a person who evinces traits related to caring and fairness, and how they would think, act, and feel, and next asks participants to complete items that concern identification with such a hypothetical person in mind. We have not focused on this scale for arbitrary reasons. Rather, a recent meta-analysis showed that Aquino and Reed’s (2002) scale was used in 65% of studies assessing the relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). Other commonly used measures of moral identity in
the literature similarly presume that fairness and caring are the prototypical features of a moral person (see e.g., Barriga, Morrison, Liau & Gibbs, 2001; Carter, 2010; Stets & Carter, 2006; Stets, Carter, Harrod, Cerven, & Abrutyn, 2008).

In asking participants to call to mind an exemplary moral person, moral identity measures such as Aquino and Reed’s (2002) measure draw on Rosch’s (1975) insight that everyday concepts are organised around central prototypes. By presenting participants with a person who is concerned with care and fairness, Aquino and Reed’s (2002) measure further assumes that respondents conceptualise care and fairness as the values of the most prototypical moral people in their social worlds. However, if these traits are not the most prototypical features of participants’ conceptions of morality across all cultures, as Hadit (2008) argues, then these scales may be vulnerable to charges of bias or liberal ethnocentrism. Indeed, researchers in moral psychology have often called for an empirical study of ordinary people’s prototypes of morality to better understand how morality is lived out in diverse people’s everyday lives (Bloom, 2012; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001). Recently, Krettenauer, Murua and Jia’s (2016) asked participants to define their moral identity by selecting traits from a long list of 80 moral traits, which included many traits other than those related to caring and fairness, allowing participants to construct morality in their own terms to a greater extent. Consistent with such work, the present studies examine the extent that prototypes of exemplary moral people vary across cultures and are consistent with or at odds with western researchers’ definitions and assumptions (see also Kelley, 1992 for a general discussion of this point). Below we describe how moral foundations theory can help to conceptualise moral identity and research this possibility.

**Moral Foundations Theory**
Rather than presume that care and fairness are the central values of a prototypically moral person across cultures, our studies were informed by moral foundations theory, which has challenged moral universalism in a range of psychological theories. Moral universalism is the assumption, that individuals, regardless of their cultures, value the same moral principles (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Shweder, 2012), as in Kohlberg’s (1984) development theory which stated that mature moral reasoning was based on values such as justice and fairness.

Moral foundations theory makes clear predictions about the differences in conceptions of morality, which may orient moral identity in individualist and collectivist cultures. Drawing on anthropological and evolutionary theories of morality, moral foundations theory instead posits five mechanisms, or foundations, believed to be both innate among all humans, and to be shaped by human cultures (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). Thus, these foundations can exist across all cultures to some degree. The foundations of care/harm, includes virtues such as caring, compassion, nurturance and preventing harmful behaviours, and fairness/reciprocity, includes notions such as justice, equality and reciprocal behaviours, both are individualising foundations of morality, where the individual is the centre of moral values (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011). These moral concerns are central to existing claims in psychology about moral universals and are likely to be found in all cultures. Moral foundations theory argues that they are particularly prevalent in western societies, because they align with the importance of individuals’ rights, justice and the importance of caring for individuals’ welfare in those cultures (Vauclair, Wilson & Fischer, 2014).

In contrast, the binding foundations of morality, which restrict individuals’ freedom in order to promote group interests are more prominent in collectivist cultures (Vauclair & Fischer, 2011; Vauclair et al., 2014). Moral foundations theory describes three types of binding foundations: the in-group/loyalty foundation, which includes concerns such as
patriotism, belonging to a group and being loyal to that group; the authority/respect foundation, which involves human concerns about respect, social order and the maintenance of hierarchies; the last foundation is purity/sanctity, which pertains to self-control of desires, purity, religion and spirituality (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011).

Empirical findings support this claim about the distribution of individualizing and binding foundations across individualist and collectivist cultures. Moral foundations are not frequently studied cross-culturally, yet demonstrate cross-cultural differences of moderate magnitude, that are larger than the often-studied individualism-collectivism differences (see Saucier et al., 2015). Participants who completed moral foundations questionnaires in Eastern cultures (e.g., South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia) have reported slightly greater moral concerns with harm, fairness, and authority and much stronger greater moral concerns with in-group loyalty and purity than participants who completed the scales in Western cultures (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Western Europe) (Graham et al., 2011). Accordingly, moral foundations theory may be an under-explored, but useful framework for examining the extent to which empirical measures of moral identity assume fairness and caring to be universally prototypical and are vulnerable to criticisms of bias and ethnocentrism.

Haidt’s (2008) charge of bias or liberal ethnocentrism can be understood at two levels of analysis, a descriptive claim that some culturally particular understandings of morality have been overlooked at the expense of others in research, and a normative claim, that individualist values such as fairness and care are only an arbitrary candidate for universal moral values with equally good alternatives existing in less-researched cultures. Our research directly addresses the basis for the descriptive claim that the field has been ethnocentric, and we return to the normative claim in our discussion. Moral identity scales based on individualizing moral foundations might mis-measure moral identity in collectivist cultures in
one of two ways, by underestimating the moral identities of people in collectivist cultures and by failing to address the prototypical foundations of morality in those cultures.

**The Present Research**

The two studies presented here examined prototypes of moral people in Saudi Arabia and Britain (Study 1) and the effect of foregrounding different prototypes of the moral person on moral identity in the two countries (Study 2). These countries were not chosen arbitrarily, but rather they jointly address a significant gap in the moral psychology literature and allow a ‘hard test’ of claims about moral universalism. Middle East countries are among the least commonly sampled in psychological research in general (Arnett, 2008) and have not been included in large cross-cultural studies of how conceptions of morality vary across cultures (e.g., Graham et al., 2011). Nor can indirect inferences about morality be drawn from sources such as the World Values Survey, as Saudi Arabia does not participate in this study. Middle-Eastern countries differ from more commonly sampled North American cultures (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Contemporary Saudi Arabia does not exemplify the liberal tradition in the West which Haidt (2008) describes as the basis of ‘liberal ethnocentrism’ in psychology. Saudi Arabia scored 38 on as individualism index, and hence like most Arab countries; thus, can be considered a collectivist culture (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). Even among collectivist cultures, Saudi Arabia is understudied, as the most commonly sampled collectivistic countries have Confucian traditions (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). In collectivist societies, group respect and obedience are often prioritised at the expense of individual freedom (Chiu & Hong, 2006) and greater concern is given to group harmony, mutual obligations and interdependence. Islam is the only religion that is allowed to be demonstrated and practiced in Saudi Arabia; state law requires all Saudis to be Muslims (see US Department of State, 2004).
In contrast, Britain scored 89 on the individualism index (Hofstede et al., 2010) and like many European countries, is an individualistic culture in which priority is given to individual aspects of the self, such as the individual's well-being, autonomy, and the right to privacy (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). British society is comparatively secular (Voas & Crockett, 2005), which is not the case in Saudi Arabia or in the frequently studied individualistic culture of the USA. As such the UK represents a better contrast case to Saudi Arabia even than the United States in regard to religion, which is particularly relevant to the moral foundation of purity. Religion in general and Islam in particular have restrictive views of social-moral reality and emphasize self-discipline, scared values and duties (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). As such, these contrasting cultures provided an ideal vantage point from which to weigh claims about the extent, character and possible consequences of a secular, liberal, or western bias in the construction of morality in moral identity scales.

**Study 1: Prototypes of the Moral Person**

In Study 1, we follow Kelley’s (1992) advice to bridge the gap between common sense psychology and popular psychology by examining the structure of key concepts. Cultural psychologists have emphasized that differences in the prototypes or exemplars that people call to mind may be “public carriers of culture as well as vehicles of intergenerational transmission of cultural values” (Fu & Chiu, 2007, p. 659) or “collective wisdom” (Horowitz & Turan, 2008, p. 1059). Moral psychologists have observed both cross-cultural similarities and differences in prototypes of exemplary moral people. Vauclair et al. (2014) found that individualising moral traits were central to laypeople’s conceptions of moral character in both individualistic and collectivistic cultures. In contrast, binding moral traits were found to be salient only in the collectivist cultures studied. Along with moral foundations theory, such findings related to moral character lead us to hypothesise that individualising traits would be
prototypical of morally exemplary people across cultures, whilst binding foundations would be prototypical of morally exemplary people only in collectivist cultures like Saudi Arabia.

Evidence for this hypothesis about prototypes of moral people in these two cultures would inform our claims about the liberal ethnocentrism that existing moral identity measures risk. As previously mentioned, existing moral identity scales assume that caring and fairness are the most prototypical moral traits and assess moral identity via ratings about a person who has those traits (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Study 1 examined whether these traits were the prototypical traits that characterise a moral person in Saudi and British cultures. Drawing on the moral foundations theory, the individualism-collectivism theory, and the cross-cultural research on prototypes of moral character (Vauclair et al., 2014), we predicted that individualising moral foundation traits, would be prototypical in both samples. However, following from previous research, we predicted that binding traits would be prototypical in Saudi Arabia but not in a British sample (Graham et al., 2009; Hofstede, 1980).

Method

Participants. The data was collected from the University of Surrey in the UK and from King Saud University in the Saudi capital, Riyadh. The participants were 80 undergraduate British students from the University of Surrey in the UK and 80 undergraduate Saudi students from King Saud University in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi participants were mostly women (64%) and reported their ages as 18–21 years old (54%), 22–25 years old (38%), 26–29 years old (6%) and 30–33 years old (2%). All Saudi participants were ethnic Arabs and followers of Islam. The British students were mostly women (81%), mostly White (69%) and reported their ages as 18–21 years old (68%), 22–25 years old (26%) or 26–29 years old (6%), and their religions as Christian (43%), none (38%), Muslim (10%), other (5%), Buddhist (3%) and Hindu (1%).

Materials and Procedure. Participants completed a paper demographic questionnaire
prior to the principal open-ended prompt:

Which qualities or traits do you think a moral person should have? You can list more than three points.

Participants were given a maximum of 20 minutes to generate responses to the prompt. For the Saudi sample, all materials were translated and back-translated into Arabic, both here and in Study 2. Both studies also received ethical approval from the university where this research was conducted.

Results

Coding. British participants produced on average more responses to the prompt than Saudi students did (M = 4.39, 3.76 traits respectively), t (158) = 2.47, p = .01. The traits generated by the Saudi sample were translated by the first author, who is fluent in Arabic and English, and reviewed by two other bilingual colleagues who were blind to the study’s hypothesis. The two lists of moral traits generated by the Saudi and British participants were then categorised by the first author and another coder in English using standard judgment rules (Fesher, 1988; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; Walker & Pitts, 1998). For example, compound phrases were divided into separate traits (e.g. “being kind and passionate” was split into “kind” and “passionate”), converted nouns were turned into adjectives when possible (e.g. “helping” became “helpful”) and all modifiers were dropped (e.g. “very religious” became “religious”). Subtle differences between traits were maintained where possible (e.g., 'fair” and “just”). No traits were excluded on the grounds of relevance. Traits listed related to religion in the Saudi sample were grouped together and named “religiousness”. Inter-rater reliability between the two coders was achieved for both samples (Krippendorff’s α .81, .85 for Saudi and British sample respectively).

Prototypical Traits of Moral People. In total, nineteen traits were generated by at least eight participants in one country (i.e., 10% of that country’s sample) and were deemed
sufficiently prototypical to merit analysis (see Table 1). Individualising moral traits, honesty and caring, were the most frequently mentioned traits in both samples, consistent with the assumption that such traits are universally valued (Aquino & Reed, 2002). However, by and large, the countries differed in their prototypes. Among these 19 traits, 11 were mentioned exclusively only by participants in only one culture, and of the remaining eight traits, Chi-squared tests revealed significant differences in the frequency of with which six of them were mentioned across the two cultures. Only two of nineteen prototypical traits, appreciative, and honesty, were mentioned with equivalent frequency in both cultures. Following Vauclair et al. (2014), scree plots display the graded structure of the category in each culture (see Figure 1). In the British sample, the most prototypical moral traits tend to reference individualising foundations (e.g., honesty, caring, kindness, helpfulness, fairness, consideration and open-mindedness). In the Saudi sample, prototypical traits reference both individualizing foundations (e.g., honesty, truthfulness and caring) and binding foundations (e.g., respect and religiousness).

- Table 1 -

- Figure 1 -

Discussion

Study 1 gives support both to moral universalism and its critics. On the one hand, individualising traits were prototypical of moral people in both Saudi and British samples. On the other, binding traits were also highly prototypical of the category of moral people, but only in the collectivist culture; Saudi Arabia. These findings support our hypotheses informed by Vauclair et al.’s (2014) research on moral character.
These findings also justify concerns that commonly used moral identity measures using targets who exemplify individualising traits (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002) might not be as good a fit in Saudi culture as in British culture. Such measures would seem to match the most available bases of morality in Britain but not in Saudi Arabia, justifying concern about some ‘liberal ethnocentrism’ in moral identity measurement (c.f., Haidt, 2008), caused to a larger difference between researchers’ and participants’ prototypes of morality in Saudi Arabia than in the UK (c.f., Kelley, 1992). There are sometimes two stages in prototype research, in which traits are first generated by participants, as in Study 1, and next, rated for, e.g., importance or prototypicality in a second study (Horowitz & Turan, 2008). Here we instead used a different approach to cultural context. We examined how moral identity among the British and Saudi people might be activated differently by prompts to consider people who possess different sets of moral traits that range across the five foundations of morality. This aligns with the conceptualization of moral identity as something that can be activated in different contexts (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Stets, 2010; Stets & Carter, 2011), in this context focusing on the activation of different types of traits.

**Study 2: Diverse Foundations of Moral Identity**

In Study 2, Saudi and British participants completed moral identity measures in one of six conditions. Participants were presented either with a person characterised by the exact moral traits listed in Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale, or with a person characterised by moral traits that represent one of the five moral foundations. Consequently, participants were presented with a person exemplifying individualising traits in three conditions, and binding traits in three conditions. We had three predictions about how moral identity might vary under these conditions. We derived our hypothesis both from Study 1 and moral foundations theory, in particular the large study by Graham et al (2011) that shows that
Eastern participants (from South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia, n=2,258) reported slightly higher scores in terms of harm, fairness and authority in comparison to participants from Western countries. The Eastern participants also demonstrated stronger ingroup and purity moral concerns compared with Western participants (from Western countries, n=104,893). Thus, we predicted that moral identity scores would be higher in Saudi than in British sample overall. Second, we also tested the hypothesis that British participants in the individualising conditions would achieve higher moral identity scores than those in the binding conditions, derived both from moral foundations theory and the results of Study 1. Third, we also explored whether Saudi participants in the binding conditions would score higher or equivalently than those in the individualising conditions, as both patterns have been shown in the moral foundations literature.

Moreover, we explored the extent to which differences in the perceived cultural importance of these traits mediated any cross-cultural differences that we observed. Perceived cultural importance or shared knowledge generally guides people’s behaviours and influences their thoughts about themselves and other members of their society, although individuals do also vary somewhat in their perception or reading of these consensual views (Wan, 2012; Wan, Chiu, Peng, & Tam, 2007). Accordingly, self-concepts, values and behaviours are shaped by looking outward at their social contexts (Zou et al., 2009). People’s perceptions of their cultural knowledge have been studied as intersubjective representation (Wan, 2012), intersubjective culture (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010) and perceived cultural importance (Zou et al., 2009). We follow such research here as “people’s perceptions of consensual views are considered to be an important explanatory variable in carrying cultural patterns” (Zou et al., 2009. p.580).

In Study 2, we examined relationships between the set of moral traits that activate participants' moral identities and their perceptions of the cultural importance of those same
traits. All participants completed measures of the perceived cultural importance of the traits that were presented on the moral identity measure that they completed. Correlations between personal views and the perceived social consensus on different topics, vary in their strength (Fischer, 2006; Wan et al., 2007), but can mediate cultural differences in cognition (Zou et al., 2009). We examined the strength of these associations and mediation between moral identity scores and the perceived cultural importance of the traits presented on the moral identity measures. The perceived cultural importance literature leads us to predict that cultural importance ratings would mirror the pattern of difference across the moral identity scores, and the two sets of scores would be correlated in all conditions in both cultures. Such correlations could evidence more than one cultural process, as cultural importance and self-concepts ‘make each other up’ in reciprocal ways (Markus & Kitayama, 2010). To develop a causal understanding of such everyday understandings of morality, we aimed to avoid the problem of testing only one causal model and not its alternatives (Fiedler et al., 2018).

Specifically, we measured the strength of effects by which both the perceived importance of the traits mediating country differences in moral identity, moral identity mediated country differences in the perceived cultural importance of traits.

**Method**

*Participants.* Given that the aim was to evaluate the differences in sample means, with the probability of alpha errors at 0.05 and powers of 0.80 to detect a medium effect size (.25), the sample size was calculated by using G*Power programme 3.1.7 (see Cunningham & Gardner, 2007). The minimum number of participants in each group had to be 36. The study was administered using online survey software, namely Qualtrics Surveys. This study was advertised on notice boards across the University of Surrey, UK and King Saud University, Saudi Arabia. The link was also posted on SONA (a participant recruitment system) and
various social networks such as Facebook and Twitter. One hundred and eighty-seven women and 105 men formed the Saudi sample, and 137 women and 110 men formed the British sample. Most of the British sample identified as white British (200 or 81%). Median age was higher among Saudi participants (Mdn = 34 years, range = 18-65 years) than among British participants (Mdn = 26 years, Range = 18-86 years), $U = 37.66$, $Z = -4.889$, $p = .001$. Significantly more of the Saudi than British participants were women, $\chi^2 (N = 539, 1) = 4.10$, $p = .04$. All participants were entered into a prize draw for one of twenty £10 gift cards.

**Design.** Study 2 had a 2 (culture) x 6 (moral traits) between-subjects design. Participants in each culture were randomly assigned to one of six conditions. We refer to the Aquino and Reed’s moral traits (2002), care/harm, and fairness/reciprocity conditions as *individualising* conditions and the in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity conditions as *binding* conditions below.

**Materials.** Participants were first presented with one of six groups of moral traits that varied by condition. In the Aquino & Reed (2002) condition, traits were *Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest, Kind*. In the five moral foundations conditions these traits were *Caring, Compassionate, Sympathetic, Peaceful, Protective* (care/harm condition); *Fair, Honest, Just, Tolerant, Fair-Minded* (fairness/reciprocity condition), *Group Loyal, Devoted, Patriot, Communal, Familial* (in-group/loyalty condition); *Obedient, Respectful to Authority, Dutiful, Lawful, Committed to the Traditions of Society* (authority/respect condition), and *Pure, Chaste, Pious, Humble, Abstinent* (purity condition).

The set of moral traits were taken from the moral foundations dictionary (Graham, et al., 2009), these were selected with some considerations. For instance, only positive moral traits were selected; for example, in “fairness/reciprocity condition”, *bigot* was not included. This decision was made following the results of the first study, which showed that
participants used positive traits to portray a moral person rather than negative traits. (For further details about this tendency regarding judging moral behaviours, see Wiltermuth, Monin, & Chow, 2010). In addition, Aquino and Reed’s (2002) scale was designed to tap a moral rather than immoral aspect of self and listed only positive traits, rendering the inclusion of negative traits inappropriate here. Similarly, words with a negative prefix were avoided; for example, tolerant was selected over unprejudiced. Further, an effort was made to select moral traits with which participants in both samples were familiar. In this regard, bourgeois, which is a trait falling under the authority/respect moral foundation, was not selected as it is hard to find an adjective with the same meaning in Arabic.

All participants next read the following description drawn verbatim from Aquino and Reed’s scale (2002, p. 1427):

The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else.

For a moment, visualise in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how the person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following question.

Next, participants completed the ten 5-point Likert items from Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale. Sample items include It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics, and The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these characteristics. Responses range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and high scores indicated greater activation of moral identity.

Next, four 5-point Likert items assessed the perceived cultural importance of the moral traits. High scores indicate greater cultural importance:

These characteristics are important in [Saudi/British] society.

It is important that people in my society have these characteristics.

These characteristics are important to a typical [Saudi/British] person.
These characteristics represent what [Saudi/British] people think a moral person is like.

Demographic information was reported last.

Procedure: Data collection was conducted online using Qualtrics software. Participants were recruited via a snowball sampling method drawing on social media networks including Facebook and Twitter.

Results

Data Screening. The reliability of the moral identity scales and perceived cultural importance scales are reported in Table 2. Although some scales had lower reliability than traditional cut-offs allow, aggregate scores were calculated to allow tests of the hypotheses and these low reliabilities are discussed further below. Skewness values and kurtosis values showed that neither moral identity nor perceived cultural importance scales were normally distributed in either culture, and transformations failed to normalise these data. Accordingly, nonparametric tests were used to test the main hypotheses. Finally, as the age and gender distribution varied between countries, we checked that age was not correlated with moral identity or perceived cultural importance in any condition in either country. Spearman’s correlations ranged from 0.01 to 0.32 (all \( p > 0.05 \)), revealing that age was not significantly correlated with moral identity or perceived cultural importance. A Mann-Whitney U test was conducted, to see if there were any differences between males and females in each condition, in each country. The analyses showed there were non-significant differences in moral identity or perceived cultural importance (p values ranged from 0.16 to 0.98). Accordingly, there was no need to control for age or gender in subsequent analyse or treat them as additional independent variables.

Moral Identity. We had first hypothesized that moral identity would be lower in the British sample than in the Saudi sample overall (Graham et al., 2009). Mann-Whitney U tests
showed that Saudi participants scored higher than their British counterparts in all conditions, and the differences were significant in all but the Care/Harm condition (see Table 2). To examine the variation in moral identity within cultures, Kruskal-Wallis tests compared moral identity scores across conditions in each country. In Britain, moral identity scores varied significantly between conditions, \( \chi^2 (5) = 58.25, p = .001 \), but in the Saudi sample, we found no significant difference between conditions, \( \chi^2 (5) = 8.31, p = .14 \). To interpret differences between conditions in British sample, and to limit Type I errors, statistical significance was set for pairwise comparisons at \( .0033 (.05/15) \) using Dunn’s procedure with the Bonferroni correction (Demšar, 2006). Moral identity scores were significantly higher in each of the three individualising conditions that in each of the three moral binding conditions with only one exception; scores in the care/harm condition were non-significantly higher than scores in the authority/respect condition (see Table 2). Mirroring the prototypes observed in Study 1, British participants scored higher in moral identity when presented with individualising traits, but Saudi participants scored high in moral identity irrespective of whether individualizing or binding traits were presented.

**Perceived Cultural Importance.** We next examined perceived cultural importance. As predicted, the Saudi participants accorded more significance to all the moral traits than did their British counterparts (See Table 2). We also examined differences between conditions within countries. In Britain, differences between the conditions were statistically significant, \( \chi^2 (5) = 64.22, p = .001 \), and post hoc tests showed that all the individualising moral traits were accorded statistically greater cultural significance than all of the moral binding traits with only two exceptions; the care/harm traits were only accorded non-significantly greater importance than the in-group/loyalty and authority/respect traits. In the Saudi sample, the omnibus test for differences between conditions was significant \( \chi^2 (5) =12.56, p = .03 \), but post hoc tests revealed no statistically significant pairwise comparisons. As predicted, the
perceived cultural importance scores mirrored the pattern of differences in moral identity scores.

- Table 2 -

*Correlation and Mediation Analysis.* Thus far, several of our initial hypotheses have been confirmed. First, moral identity scores were higher in the Saudi sample than in the British sample, and moral identity scores varied across individualising and binding conditions in the British sample but not the Saudi sample. Second, this pattern was mirrored by the perceived cultural importance scores. Accordingly, we conducted two mediational analysis to examine processes by which culture and self might ‘make each other up’ (Markus & Kitayama, 2010). We first examined if perceived cultural importance mediated cultural differences in moral identity. This mediation has been tested by the researchers who utilised the intersubjective culture approach in their research to show that the cultural differences found in a different form of tested concepts, were mediated by participants’ perceptions of the degree to which these forms are important and shared in their culture (e.g., see Zou et al., 2009). We also examined if cultural differences in moral identity affected perceived cultural importance. This reverse mediation “the second mediation” tested whether perceived cultural importance was mediated by moral identity. This alternative mediation was considered for two reasons. First, as the self and culture constitute each other, culture influences how individuals perceive themselves, suggesting that individuals’ moral identities are affected by the ideas and practices in their sociocultural surroundings (for a review on the mutual constitution of self and culture, see Markus & Kitayama, 2010). The second reason was the false consensus bias, where people tend to think that their ideas are widely spread and shared in their society (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977).
The two mediation analyses were conducted in all five conditions by computing the regression coefficient between the predictor and mediator, as well as the regression coefficient between the mediator and outcome. For each condition, 10,000 bootstrapping samples were drawn independently and then used to estimate the indirect effect of (the predictor) on (the outcome) through (the mediator). This nonparametric approach was recommended by Field (2013) and Preachers and Hayes (2004). Given that the distribution of the mediator and outcomes is not normal, this method is preferable as it makes no assumptions about the shape of distribution of data, such as normal distribution (Preachers & Hayes, 2004).

First, we conducted tests of mediation to investigate the extent to which the effect of the predictor, country (Saudi vs. Britain) on the dependent variable, moral identity was mediated by perceived cultural importance. Mediation requires a significant correlation between the dependent variable (i.e., moral identity) and the mediator (i.e., perceived cultural importance) and observed group differences in both measures (Preachers & Hayes, 2004). These conditions were met in five of the six conditions. In the fairness/reciprocity condition, moral identity and perceived cultural importance scales were not significantly correlated in either country (see Table 2).

In all five remaining conditions, significant evidence of mediation was observed (see Figure 2). In all cases, the regression coefficient \( a \) shows that country predicted significant variance in perceived cultural importance, and the regression coefficient \( b \) shows that perceived cultural importance predicted significant variance in moral identity. The strength of mediation is represented by \( ab \). In the two individualising conditions examined, perceived cultural importance mediated a significant indirect effect of country on moral identity, \( ab = 1.47, 95\% \text{ CI} [0.46, 3.19] \) in the Aquino and Reed’s moral traits condition, and \( ab = 2.48, 95\% \text{ CI} [1.22, 4.46] \) in the care/harm condition. These mediation effects are both medium-to-
large, $\kappa^2 = 0.15$, 95% CI [0.05, 0.28], $\kappa^2 = 0.22$, 95% CI [.12, .36] in the Aquino and Reed’s moral traits and care/harm conditions respectively (Field, 2013). Perceived cultural importance mediated a significant indirect effect of country on moral identity in the three binding conditions also, $ab = 5.78$, 95% CI [3.70, 8.28], $ab = 4.18$ (95% CI [2.04, 6.44], and $ab = 5.20$ (95% CI [2.68, 8.41] in the in-group/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity conditions respectively. In all three conditions, this mediation effect was large, $\kappa^2 = 0.37$ (95% CI [.026, 0.49], $\kappa^2 = 0.25$ (95% CI [0.13, 0.36], and $\kappa^2 = 0.28$ (95% CI [0.14, 0.42] in the in-group/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity conditions respectively. These findings are consistent with the conclusion that the differences in Saudi and British moral identity scores were mediated by cultural differences in perceived importance, particularly in the binding moral foundation conditions.

Second, we conducted tests of mediation to investigate the extent to which the effect of the predictor, country (Saudi vs. Britain) on the dependent variable, perceived cultural importance was mediated by moral identity. In the Aquino and Reed’s moral traits condition, the indirect effect of the country on perceived cultural importance was mediated by moral identity ($ab = .61$, 95% CI [0.14, 1.57] and this effect was medium-to-large ($\kappa^2 = 0.10$, 95% CI [0.03, 0.23]. In the care/harm condition, moral identity did not mediate the effect of country on perceived cultural importance ($ab = .21$, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.83]. In all three of the binding moral traits conditions, moral identity mediated the significant effect of country on perceived cultural importance, $ab = 1.36$, 95% CI [0.58, 2.37], $ab = 1.71$ (95% CI [0.91, 2.71], and $ab = 2.39$ (95% CI [1.00, 4.31] in the in-group/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity conditions respectively. These mediation effects were medium-to-large in the in-group/loyalty and authority/respect conditions, $\kappa^2 = 0.18$ (95% CI [.09, 0.31], $\kappa^2 = 0.24$ (95% CI [0.13, 0.36] respectively. The mediation effect was large in the purity/sanctity condition, $\kappa^2 = 0.25$ (95% CI [0.11, 0.45].
Discussion

As predicted, British participants scored lower in moral identity in the binding conditions than in the individualising conditions, whilst Saudi participants scored equivalently across all conditions. These results are in line with both the results of Study 1 and moral foundations theory predictions about cultural differences (e.g., Haidt et al., 1993). These country differences in moral identity are mirrored by differences in the perceived cultural importance of the relevant moral traits. Differences in moral identity are mediated by differences in perceived cultural importance in five of the six conditions, and this mediation is particularly strong in the binding conditions. Significant, but somewhat weaker evidence was also found that differences in moral identity also mediate differences in perceived cultural importance, in four of five conditions. Differences in moral identity and perceived cultural importance appear to ‘make each other up,’ particularly with regard to the binding foundations of morality. We discuss the implications of both studies below.

General Discussion

The moral identity literature from Blasi (1984) onward evidences a persistent assumption that fairness and caring comprise the most prototypical contents of moral identity. This assumption is most strongly encoded in moral identity measures such as the much-used Aquino and Reed (2002) scale which measures moral identity by asking participants to identify with a target person who evidences individualising moral traits. Across two studies we found convergent evidence that moral identity is grounded in different prototypes in Saudi Arabia and Britain. Saudi participants generated both individualising and
binding features as prototypical of moral people (Study 1) and identified highly with moral people who were characterized as possessing either individualising or binding features (Study 2). Although they generated more responses and more unique responses overall, British participants tended to list only individualising features as prototypical of moral people (Study 1). British people also identified only with moral people who evidenced individualising features but not binding features (Study 2). From a Saudi point of view, British moral identity might seem detailed, but limited in its scope to only a few of several possible foundations of human morality.

Mediation analysis pointed to a reciprocal process by which identification with people who evince such traits and the perceived cultural importance of those traits make each other up (Study 2). Cultural differences in moral identity, perceived cultural importance and mediation effects were larger with regard to the binding foundations of morality than the individualising foundations of morality (Study 2). We discuss the implications of these findings for cultural psychology, studies of moral identity, and the validity of Haidt’s criticism of ‘liberal ethnocentrism’ and our own future research below.

First, as morality has been disproportionately studied in WEIRD cultures in psychology (Henrich et al., 2010) we followed Graham et al.’s (2011, p. 368) call to study non-individualist moral traits in collectivist cultures ‘at least descriptively, even if those societies are structured in ways that many researchers believe to be normatively immoral, e.g., patriarchies and theocracies’. Cultural constructions of morality certainly vary in meaningful ways that affect individuals’ thinking, feeling, and identification with moral foundations in Saudi Arabia and Britain. Specifically, Saudi participants conceptualized binding foundations as central to morality (Study 1), considered those foundations culturally important and identified with people who evidenced them (Study 2). These studies integrate the value of prototype studies (Kelley, 1998) and the perceived cultural importance approach
(Zou et al., 2009), extending both to the study of moral identity in in a collectivist and Middle Eastern (Saudi culture) for the first time. These distinct ways of thinking about and internalising morality and defining one’s moral identity would have been missed by examining morality only in an individualist culture.

Second, the present studies also describe how drawing on moral foundation theory can systematically uncover variations in the contents of moral identity across cultural contexts. Particularly, whilst individualising traits are central to both cultures, binding foundations were central in Saudi Arabia but not in Britain. The reciprocal process by which perceived cultural importance and moral identification influenced each other was also consistently stronger for binding than individualising traits (Study 2). Individualising foundations are not foreign or obscure to Saudi participants, whilst the binding foundations are at most peripheral to Britain constructions of morality, are perceived as lacking cultural importance, and are not a basis for strong moral identification.

Third, these results inform Haidt’s (2008) claim that the psychological study of morality suffers from ‘liberal ethnocentrism’. Reviews of moral identity emphasize the positive role of moral identity in leading people to engage in prosocial and ethical behaviours, and in restraining them from antisocial and unethical behaviours (e.g., Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; Jennings et al., 2015). Accordingly, ethnocentrism of an evaluative sort could creep into psychological science if moral identity measures systematically underestimated moral identity scores in collectivist cultures. Such ethnocentrism was not observed here. Rather, Saudi and British participants’ moral identity scores were both highest in the fairness/reciprocity condition, and Saudi participants moral identity scores were, overall, similar across all conditions in Study 2. Our results do not support a claim of liberal ethnocentrism on the grounds that existing measures underestimate moral identity in Saudi Arabia.
Liberal ethnocentrism could also be charged if researchers failed to assess the cultural constructions of morality that members of a culture consider most important. Here, our results present a mixed body of evidence. On the one hand, Saudi conceptions of morality and not solely based on individualising foundations (Study 1). In addition, moral identity measures were less reliable in the individualising than the binding conditions in Saudi Arabia (Study 2). These results suggest that very commonly used moral identity scales such as Aquino and Reed’s (2002) would not address the prototypical or most reliable construction of morality in the Saudi context. On the other hand, Saudi and British participants both considered the individualist foundations to be culturally important, and Saudi participants rated those foundations somewhat more culturally important than the binding foundations (see Table 2). Taken together, all of these results suggest that any liberal ethnocentrism resulting from existing moral identity scales consists of blunting the accurate measurement of moral identity rather than underestimating moral identity in Saudi culture.

This synthesis of our diverse findings generatively suggests one reason why moral identity has been found to be more predictive of moral behaviour in individualist cultures than in collectivist cultures. Hertz and Krettenauer (2016) observed this difference between cultures and suggested that the low effect size of the relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour in collectivist cultures was likely due to that ‘the moral identity construct in its present form is culturally limited and needs to be expanded in order to accommodate to cultures different from the West’ (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016, p.8). The presented research is a response to Hertz and Krettenauer’s (2016) call for expanding and reconceptualising the existing constructs and measures of moral identity, and one of very few that have investigated moral identity in a Middle East's collectivist cultures culture in depth.

As our results are theoretically informative and conceptually generative, some limitations of these studies should be acknowledged. For example, while we opted to recruit
participants online in Study 2 to reach out to a general population in both cultures, this
method of recruitment may be considered highly selective because participants who lack
computer and internet skills were unable to participate. Additionally, due to the small
sample sizes in each condition in Study 2, we did not run any tests to evaluate the scales
equivalence for the British and Saudi samples. Likewise, the acquiescent response bias,
where people tend to agree rather than disagree, might play a role in observed cultural
differences, particularly in the results of Study 2 where the Saudi sample scored higher than
British sample in all scales. Acquiescence bias influences the ways participants answer
scales (Smith, 2004), and tends to be higher in cultures that score high in collectivism and
power distance, which are both characteristics of Saudi culture (Hofstede, 1980). Thus, this
type of bias might have played a role in increasing the cultural differences measured in
Study 2 but is unlikely to have caused mediation effects of different sizes across the
individualizing and binding conditions. Another limitation that must be considered is that
we constructed the perceived cultural importance scale for the purpose of this research
because no standardized measures of the intersubjective culture approach or perceived
cultural importance exist (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010).

Furthermore, as this paper’s main aim is to test specific hypotheses concerning cross-
cultural variation in moral identity in two cultures, Saudi Arabia and Britain, it does not
provide an exhaustive or universal study of moral identity. As the two cultures differ in
multiple dimensions, some may argue that studies of two cultures are susceptible to the
interpretation paradox (Van de Vijver & Leung, 2000). Our research attempted to guard
against this problem by using clear and competing theoretical bases for our hypotheses and
by using different methodological approaches to investigate them in an understudied culture.
As such, we hope that the current results elicit further research into cultural variability in
moral identity, including a broader range of different cultures than those studied hitherto.
The current results prompt our closing comments on the *normative* charge of liberal ethnocentrism and considerations for future cross-cultural research on moral identity. Of course, any charge of ethnocentrism, even *liberal* ethnocentrism, appeals to an individualist foundation of morality; the foundation of fairness. At its most basic, ethnocentrism offends our morality because it treats an outgroup *unfairly*. Indeed, any effective criticism that others are guilty of ethnocentrism grants more priority to the individualist foundation of fairness than to the binding foundation of in-group loyalty. A positive reception of the ‘liberal ethnocentrism’ criticism among these groups whom it is said to exclude - political conservatives in individualist cultures and people in collectivist cultures, for example – might constitute evidence that such groups also, to a surprising degree, consider fairness more important than in-group loyalty, at least in some situations.

Because of these conceptual difficulties, studies such as this one that tease apart different possible meanings of “liberal ethnocentrism” have particular conceptual value. Only in one condition did we observe *statistical independence* of moral identity scores and perceived cultural importance scores in both countries; the fairness/harm condition. If we had to advise psychologists to pick one and only one of the five moral foundations as a basis for moral universalism, our results would still lead us to choose harm/fairness as the best candidate for the job, consistent with other evidence that non-human species, such as chimpanzees, show a sense of fairness that points to its evolutionary adaptive function (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; de Waal, 1996).

Both our use of moral foundations theory and our conclusions about the construct validity of moral identity measures suggest new reasons for examining moral identity in cross-cultural studies. As noted in the introduction, moral identity measures are important to psychological science principally because individuals’ moral identity can predict their engagement in moral behaviour. Hitherto the predictive validity of moral identity measures
has been more successful in individualist than collectivist cultures. However, our research and reconceptualization of moral identity with respect to a broader set of moral foundations suggests the possibility of better, more predictive moral identity measures in collectivist cultures that draw on a different conceptualization of what morality is. We are investigating the predictive validity of new measures based on the conceptual framework developed here in both Saudi Arabia and in Britain. Consistent with the value of fairness in Britain, in Saudi Arabia, and among theorists concerned with liberal ethnocentrism, we are focusing on predicting the treatment of minority groups. We also hope to address the question of whether there is a dark side of moral identity that is neglected specifically when we as researchers recognise and include binding moral concerns in the conceptualization and measurements of moral identity (AlSheddi, 2018).
REFERENCE


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HOW DOES CULTURE SHAPE OUR MORAL IDENTITY?


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### TABLES

Table 1. *Moral traits free-listed by at least 10% of the British sample (N = 80) and the Saudi sample (N=80).* (Study 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral traits</th>
<th>Frequencies of moral traits</th>
<th>χ²</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British sample</td>
<td>Saudi sample</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral traits mentioned by both samples</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respectful</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caring</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kind</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helpful</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.43*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considerate/Considering</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appreciative</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathetic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral traits mentioned by British Sample only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open-minded</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfless</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Trait</td>
<td>Frequency了自己的样本 only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowing what is right</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbiased</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathetic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not judgmental</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustworthy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiousness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truthful</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiving</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: *Median (and Reliability of) Moral Identity and Perceived Cultural Importance Measures, and Correlations between Variables by Culture and Condition (Study 2)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Moral Identity (MI)</th>
<th>Importance (I)</th>
<th>Correlation (MI x I)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mdn (α)</td>
<td>Mdn (α)</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquino &amp; Reed traits (I)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3.85 (.59)</td>
<td>3.70 (.78)</td>
<td>919*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care/Harm (I)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3.80 (.61)</td>
<td>3.65 (.73)</td>
<td>794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair/Reciprocity (I)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4.05 (.65)</td>
<td>3.70 (.77)</td>
<td>701*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Group/Loyalty (B)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3.85 (.85)</td>
<td>3.30 (.85)</td>
<td>515**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority/Respect (B)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3.70 (.85)</td>
<td>3.10 (.93)</td>
<td>649***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purity/Sanctity (B)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>3.80 (.77)</td>
<td>2.70 (.88)</td>
<td>242***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: I = Individualizing Moral Foundations Condition, B = Binding Moral Foundations Condition, U = Mann-Whitney U test. *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.00*