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Settlement and unsettlement in Aotearoa/New Zealand and Antarctica
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ABSTRACT. This paper is concerned with Aotearoa/New Zealand’s changing relationship to Antarctica, and the Ross Dependency in particular. Through a consideration of post-colonial theory in the Ross Dependency, it is argued that a productive dialogue about the cultural politics of mainland Aotearoa/New Zealand can be opened up. After some reflections on the post-1945 political and cultural trajectory of the country, attention is given to the place of the Maori and their involvement in the polar continent and Southern Ocean. The adoption of Maori place-names on New Zealand maps of the Ross Dependency is considered further because it helps to illuminate the country’s awkward and incomplete post-colonial transformation. Arguably, such an adoption of Maori place-names in Antarctica contributes to a vision of bicultural harmony. However, this is not a view shared by all observers. Developments affecting the crown agency Antarctica New Zealand, alongside recent heritage projects, are scrutinised further in order to consider how Maori–Pakeha relations influence and define contemporary understandings of New Zealand’s presence in Antarctica. Finally, the paper briefly contemplates how a trans-Tasman dialogue with Australian scholars might enable further analysis into how geographically proximate settler colonies engage with Antarctica and their associated territorial claims to the continent and surrounding ocean.

There may, however, be a factor, which might help explain the paucity of Antarctic discussion. Perhaps Antarctica does not need to feature as an object of detailed analysis because, according to Belich and others, New Zealand’s territorial claim is simply ‘preserved’ by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. In other words, Article IV of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty has not only sealed the Ross Dependency claim for the duration of the Treaty, but also enabled it to be isolated from New Zealand’s post-1945 trajectory more generally. This intellectual manoeuvre becomes all the more understandable if one considers Belich’s claim (a widely held one within and beyond the area of Antarctic studies) that the polar continent (as a consequence of the Antarctic Treaty and associated legal instruments) continues to enjoy the palliative presence of science and an environmentally protective regime (Belich 2001: 391–392; see Vidas 2000 for a specialist interpretation).

Simply arguing that Antarctica has been neglected gives the appearance of special pleading, which is unhelpful. We have no desire to reinforce any sense of Antarctica’s unique importance to New Zealand and certainly do not wish to consolidate any further the epigraph ‘a continent for peace and science.’ It also must be acknowledged that the existing polar literature on New Zealand has itself been parochial in its geographical and intellectual horizons. Very few New Zealand-based writers reflecting on the country’s relationship with the Antarctic have been attentive to wider scholarly debates about the country’s colonial/post-colonial politics (see, for example, Quatermain 1961, 1967; Helm and Miller 1964; Auburn 1972; Logan 1979; Prior 1997; and Templeton 2001, 2002). This corpus of scholarly work reflects unwittingly a broader trend — the marginality of Antarctica to contemporary debates on what Derek Gregory has recently labelled ‘the colonial present’ (Gregory 2004).

Introduction

‘In discussing the ‘New Zealand Empire’ in chapter 7, I did not mention its biggest bit: the Ross Dependency in Antarctica. The Ross Dependency is preserved from exploitation by its harsh climate and the Antarctic Treaty of 1959,’ (Belich 2001: 391)

James Belich’s aforementioned observation about the Ross Dependency is typical of contemporary writing on New Zealand’s national identity and allegedly post-colonial condition. Within his best-selling account, Paradise reforged: a history of New Zealanders, the Antarctic receives scant attention. New Zealand’s post-war transformation from a ‘virtual colony’ (Belich’s words) of the UK to a multi-cultural and multi-racial ‘South Pacific’ nation is explained with only the briefest reference to the country’s largest colonial claim, the Ross Dependency. This is surprising, given New Zealand’s status as a polar claimant state and original signatory to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. If Antarctica does feature in more mainstream historical and political analyses of New Zealand, it is usually as an appendage or in relation to the 1979 Air New Zealand Flight 901 crash into the side of Mount Erebus (see Mahon 1984). More than 250 people, many of them New Zealanders, perished.
To account for this lacuna, this paper seeks to explore what difference it would make if New Zealand’s involvement in the Antarctic region were fused with more mainstream accounts of post-1945 political, economic, and cultural transformation. If, as many scholars have claimed, attitudes towards land and occupation have been central to shaping expressions of New Zealand national identity, then it is surprising that this discussion has not embraced the polar landscape and the occupation of the Ross Dependency (see, for example, Bell 1996; Neuman and others 1999; Sinclair 1986; Barrowman 1996; and Byrnes 2001, 2002). Moreover, agencies such as Antarctica New Zealand (ANZ) have recognised that the Ross Dependency will play an increasingly significant role within the changing post-Treaty of Waitangi politics of New Zealand. The use of Maori place-names in the Ross Dependency is perhaps one belated form of recognition that all areas of New Zealand life need to be exposed to bicultural scrutiny. Thus this paper, written by two British-based authors with extensive experience of working in New Zealand (but also informed by estrangement), seeks to stimulate intellectual debate. As a piece of work, it uses interviews and informal conversations to foster further engagement in the absence of other forms of primary material. As a consequence, the paper should be considered as a modest starting point for a discussion, which unsettles (in a constructive sense) our understandings of Antarctica and New Zealand.

Initially, consideration is given to some of the existing themes and debates that have emerged in contemporary discussions of New Zealand’s post-colonial history. Post-colonialism is a contentious subject area and most of the authors quoted here employ the term to convey a historical sense of how New Zealand has undergone a social, cultural, political, and economic transformation since 1945 rather than consider the ‘decolonization’ of theory and practice (for an overview, see Young 2001, 2003). Thereafter, the changing relationship between Pakeha (New Zealanders of European descent) and Maori, and its consequences for New Zealand’s connections to the Ross Dependency, are addressed. As part of that examination, the activities of the New Zealand Geographic Board (NZGB) are investigated in order to reflect upon the practices and underlying politics associated with place-naming in the Antarctic (see Berg and Kearns 1996; Kearns and Berg 2002). The penultimate section considers the role that polar heritage might play in producing, sustaining, and undermining visions of contemporary bicultural New Zealand. Finally, there is an examination of what can be gained by cross-fertilising two disparate academic literatures: the post-colonial histories of New Zealand and polar studies of the Ross Dependency. Across the Tasman Sea, a new generation of Australian scholars readily appreciate that the Australian Antarctic Territory can no longer be treated as a distant appendage of a metropolitan territory (see, for example, Collis 1999; Hains 2002).

Post-1945 New Zealand: Domestic identity and territorial geopolitics

To understand the changing relationship between Maori and Pakeha New Zealanders, it is useful in this context to reflect on the inception and relevance of the Ross Dependency. Although New Zealand first pressed a claim to the Ross Dependency in 1923, most commentators agree that a lack of political interest accompanied by a dearth of financial resources prevented a more proactive polar policy (Auburn 1972; Logan 1979; Templeton 2001). Indeed it is widely accepted that without the lobbying efforts of the New Zealand Antarctic Society (NZAS) and local newspapers, political apathy would have reigned supreme in the immediate post-1945 period. A revived NZAS, under the leadership of individuals such as R.A. Falla and Arthur Helm, was instrumental in raising concerns about how New Zealand might occupy and investigate its polar dominion (Logan 1979). These worries were also widely echoed by New Zealand’s regional newspapers and academic journals, which frequently lamented the lack of political and popular interest in the Ross Dependency (Fig. 1).

Within a decade of the ending of the Second World War, New Zealanders were preparing in earnest with their Commonwealth colleagues in Britain, Australia, and...
South Africa for a privately organised Trans-Antarctic Expedition (TAE) and planning for the forthcoming 1957–58 International Geophysical Year (Fuchs and Hillary 1958). The charismatic presence of Sir Edmund Hillary, the conqueror of Everest, unquestionably aided this transformation of interest (see Dodds 2002, 2005). The New Zealand government contributed £75,000 towards the TAE, in recognition that a mechanised crossing of Antarctica would help to raise the profile of the Ross Dependency. By 1958, a decision had been taken to establish Scott Base, a permanent scientific station on Ross Island.

Notwithstanding New Zealand’s political and scientific encounters with Antarctica, the idea that the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi had provided a comprehensive ‘road map’ for the ‘peaceful’ evolution of New Zealand was being challenged (Orange 1987; Belich 2001). By the late 1950s and 1960s, the ongoing controversy surrounding the contents of the English and Maori versions of the 1840 Treaty emerged more prominently in New Zealand political life. As Claudia Orange (1987) has demonstrated, according to proponents of the English language version, the Treaty ceded to the British Crown the sovereignty of New Zealand, and in return the original inhabitants (the Maori) were given full rights of ownership over their lands, forests, and fisheries. Only 39 chiefs, however, ever signed the Treaty and disagreements soon emerged over the interpretation of ‘sovereignty’ when settlers began to appropriate lands in the North and South Islands. Maori activists questioned the legitimacy of the Crown’s behaviour and attempts were made via the Waitangi Day Act (1960) to recognise outstanding injustices relating to land ownership and resource allocation (Orange 1987).

Historically speaking, therefore, authors such as Belich, Bell, and Orange have highlighted New Zealand’s awkward and incomplete transition from British colony to post-colonial state. There are two dimensions to this awkward transformation. First, the relationship between the Pakeha and Maori populations within New Zealand became increasingly problematic as Maori activism (alongside feminist struggles) increased in the 1960s. It was contended that the Maori, far from being successfully assimilated in the era following the Treaty of Waitangi, were victims of racism, blatant discrimination, and marginality. As Claudia Bell noted: ‘This Act was subsequently mythologised as the founding of a harmonious, bicultural New Zealand, despite obvious contrary evidence. Internationally, this has given New Zealand the image of good race relations, a peaceful country’ (Bell 1996: 9).

In 1973, the Kirk government attempted to hold onto this public understanding of New Zealand by converting so-called Waitangi Day (6 February) into a public holiday (New Zealand Day) when previously it had been a ‘national day of thanksgiving in commemoration of the signing.’ Two years later, the Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal was created for the purpose of addressing outstanding territorial and resource injustices and then proposing recommendations for the resolution of conflict. According to critics, the Tribunal was given no enforcement powers and thus was perceived to be something of a ‘toothless tiger’ (Orange 1987; Bell 1996).

Second, Britain remained unquestionably New Zealand’s most significant trading partner in the immediate post-1945 era. Successive prime ministers from Sidney Holland to Brian Muldoon often referred to Britain as the ‘mother country’ on the basis of strong emotional, cultural, economic, and military ties cemented in the experiences of the two World Wars. The Crown continues to appoint the Governor General, who has jurisdiction over the Ross Dependency as well as mainland New Zealand. While membership of the 1951 ANZUS pact pointed to the growing importance of US–Australian security relations, James Belich claims that many in New Zealand ‘saw themselves as Britons too’ (Belich 2001: 392). There was, therefore, no simple cultural nor geopolitical transition, as ties with Britain did not simply evaporate from the 1950s onwards (Pawson 1992; Bell 1996). Britain and New Zealand continued to work closely with one another as Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) and in the Commonwealth more generally. Economic and cultural connections with Britain remained at the forefront until at least the 1970s, when Britain’s membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) changed long-standing imperial trading patterns (Johnston 1997; Belich 2001).

Even if many Pakeha New Zealanders were content to remain ‘colonised subjects’ (the Queen is the Head of State), Maori activists were seeking to remove the remaining vestiges of colonial governance following the Treaty of Waitangi. As the domestic politics of New Zealand political life became increasingly divisive in the late 1950s and 1960s, it is instructive to consider how the Ross Dependency was being appropriated and occupied. With the creation of Scott Base, following the successful completion of the TAE and the IGY, New Zealand established a permanent and colonising presence in the Antarctic. The base was an essential element in the country’s effective occupation of the Ross Dependency — a settling presence. New Zealand, as one of the original signatories to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, recognised that the provisions of the Treaty were essential in consolidating the claim to the Ross Dependency. However, Article IV of the Treaty also acknowledged that non-claimant states such as the United States reserved the right to press a claim at a later date. Given the provisions of the Treaty, earlier calls by some political figures to relinquish the claim to the Ross Dependency did not have to be implemented (see Beck 1986). New Zealand Prime Minister Walter Nash is rightly credited with being an important advocate of demilitarisation in Antarctica and the Treaty’s linkage to the United Nations (Templeton 2001, 2002). The declaration of the Antarctic as a nuclear-free zone (Article V) also helped widen its appeal to the wider international community, including India, which had raised the issue of Antarctica in the United Nations in 1956 and 1958 (Sinclair 1976: 320; Chaturvedi 1990, 1996).
The suspension of territorial claims (under Article IV) unquestionably benefited small claimant states such as New Zealand and distant claimant states such as the UK because they were simply unable to match the scientific and logistical activities of larger parties such as the United States and determined gateway claimant states such as Argentina and Australia (Dodds 1997). As part of their wider Cold War strategy, successive New Zealand governments generally sought a close relationship with the United States, and this extended to polar co-operation. New Zealand again benefited from this relationship because the close proximity of the American McMurdo Station to Scott Base meant that access to the latter was aided and abetted by US icebreakers at the start of every summer season. Many New Zealand scientists would also testify that they had been the beneficiaries of American waste management, as scientific equipment placed on the McMurdo rubbish dump was routinely re-cycled by grateful residents of Scott Base.

The implications for New Zealand’s changing geopolitical relationship with Antarctica were not to be felt until the 1980s when the Labour government of David Lange questioned not only the strategic wisdom of ANZUS (and the right of the US Navy to enter New Zealand ports without confirming whether nuclear weapons were on board), but also challenged the legitimacy of the French to carry out nuclear testing in the South Pacific. As part of that review process, New Zealand was actively re-imagined as a South Pacific nation, with distinct geographical interests, including the management of the Ross Dependency (Dalby 1993; Johnson 1997; Lange 1990). Renewed emphasis was thus given to New Zealand’s local interests, as opposed to the global politics of the Cold War. Between 1982 and 1988, New Zealand chaired (in the form of lawyer Chris Beeby) the controversial debates relating to the Convention for the Regulation of Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), which in 1989 was rejected by Australia and France (Stokke and Vidas 1996). For Lange, commitment to a South Pacific nuclear free zone became the defining symbol of the Labour administration (1984–89), although others have given greater prominence to the repercussions of radical neo-liberal reforms of the New Zealand economy (Lange 1990; Dalby 1993; McKinnon 1993). Later administrations, such as the Bolger government, claimed that New Zealand was also defined by its geographical and cultural relationship to Asia in another display of geopolitical realignment (Johnston 1997).

Despite the growing interest in the international politics of the South Pacific, New Zealand’s support of the Ross Dependency remained financially and logistically modest. Officials closely connected to the Antarctic feared that it would simply disappear from the policy radar screen following the demise of the Lange government (Prior 1997; S. Prior, personal communication, 11 December 2002). A 1989 White Paper and the 1994 Review of New Zealand Strategic Objectives in Antarctica (MFAT 1989, 1994), however, reaffirmed the value of Antarctica to New Zealand. Earlier fears of total disengagement were not realised, as demonstrated by the 1996 decision by the Bolger government to create a crown agency (Antarctica New Zealand) for the purpose of promoting and coordinating New Zealand’s Antarctic interests. Accompanying this development was a renewed claim that New Zealand had to re-imagine itself as a gateway state, with specific responsibilities for environmental stewardship, territorial sovereignty, and resource protection. Christchurch was identified as the major gateway hub on the basis of its importance as a logistical centre for New Zealand Antarctic operations that continue to involve Italy and the United States as polar partners (Prior 1997; S. Prior, personal communication, 11 December 2002).

Public education in combination with ANZ’s sponsored activities such as school visits, VIP visits, and the Artists and Writers Programme (thereafter Artists programme) are used to promote the Ross Dependency and Antarctica more generally within domestic popular culture. According to the poet Bill Manhire, the Artists programme has helped broaden the appeal of Antarctica and purposefully consolidated the presence of the scientific programme, because without scientists and others — such as armed forces personnel — none of this would be possible (B. Manhire, personal communication, 11 December 2002).

The pressures on New Zealand’s presence in the Antarctic were unquestionably strained by the collapse of the CRAMRA negotiations in the late 1980s. The prospect of mineral exploitation in Antarctica had provoked major policy concerns in New Zealand and elsewhere. The subsequent adoption of the Protocol on Environmental Protection (signed in 1991 and entered into force in 1998) banned all forms of mining and placed renewed emphasis on environmental protection. With such a ban, some officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade feared a drop of interest among government ministers and senior civil servants. The creation of ANZ in the midst of the Protocol’s entry into force allayed those fears. However, this important development occurred alongside new fears that illegal fishing was placing renewed pressures on Southern Ocean ecosystems. It raised the spectre of how claimant states such as New Zealand responded to environmental insecurities not only on the continent but also in the surrounding Southern Ocean. In the post-Protocol era, New Zealand has become more assertive with regard to resource and territorial rights following fears, for example, that illegal fishing was occurring in the Ross Sea sector (see Bastmeijer 2002). So, contrary to that opening quote from James Belich, one could argue that the harsh climate is not a sufficient preservative when it comes to the exploitation of fish in the Ross Sea (Belich 2001: 391).

In 1999, the Royal New Zealand Navy used one of its frigates, Te Kaha, to patrol these remote waters in an attempt to deter such acts of illegal fishing. However, the UK and Australia expressed concern regarding the deployment of a warship in the Antarctic Treaty area.
Until then, New Zealand had not been an active fishing nation, despite being an original signatory to the Convention for the Conservation of Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). Since 2001–02, however, six New Zealand-registered fishing vessels have been licensed to fish in CCAMLR 88.1 sub-area alongside mounting military surveillance of other parties’ activities in the Ross Sea. While seeking to monitor and prevent illegal fishing, New Zealand has also sought, via a 2001 environmental report on the Ross Sea, to promote its role as an environmental steward in the Ross Dependency (Antarctica New Zealand 2001). As a gateway state, it is often argued within New Zealand’s Antarctic community that it has a special relationship with the Ross Sea region on the basis of relative proximity (Prior 1997; Templeton 2002). As Stuart Prior, the former head of the Antarctic Policy Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) concluded:

For New Zealand, geography, experience and reputation are valid and compelling parts of the equation. Antarctica constitutes a national asset for a small country with limited sinew and leverage in the world. Our stewardship in the Ross Dependency needs to be of the highest order that reflects our own national values and aspirations. (Prior 1997: 15–16)

As with other Southern Hemisphere countries and so-called gateway states, Antarctica is thus conceptualised as a space in which nations cannot only display their national prowess but also assert ownership. Antarctica is distinct in the sense that New Zealand, as a founding Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party, can operate as a key player on the international scene. The elevated status that Antarctic politics and conservation affords the country also helps to relieve claims to a national identity from its persistent branding as either Australia’s poor cousin or Britain’s dependent. In one briefing paper prepared by MFAT, an extraordinary act of geographical displacement was announced: ‘The Antarctic is our closest neighbour and dominates New Zealand’s geographical position’ (MFAT 2000). Such was the eagerness of officials to qualify New Zealand’s intimate relationship with Antarctica that Australia was mistakenly relegated to being the second closest neighbour. The statement continued with a perspicuous approach:

The Antarctic continent features largely in New Zealand’s history with the early explorers being the first users of the New Zealand Gateway to Antarctica and thousands of New Zealanders since making Antarctica part of their lives.

The Ross Dependency is constitutionally part of New Zealand — anyone born there is a New Zealand citizen and anyone who steals property or assaults another person breaks New Zealand law and is subject to our courts.

These kinds of rhetorical gestures (while occasionally geographically suspect) provide evidence to contemporary policy and visceral investments in Antarctica. Thus it is unwise — as Belich (2001) and Bell (1996) do — to neglect the role of Antarctica in the building of Pakeha settler identity, as it has arguably contributed to a very strong sense of national identity and purpose.

The end result of such developments involving ANZ has been to re-imagine and possibly even re-brand New Zealand’s relationship with the Ross Dependency (Van Ham 2002; Fig. 2). Since the creation of ANZ, there has been a very deliberate strategy (with the assistance of MFAT) to raise public understanding of the Antarctic alongside promoting New Zealand’s importance to the Ross Dependency. The Antarctic Visitor Centre in Christchurch (located next door to Antarctica New Zealand) and Kelly Tarlton’s Antarctic Encounter and Underwater World in Auckland are two such examples where New Zealand’s role in the Ross Dependency is explored alongside more general developments affecting Antarctic science, tourism, and environmental conservation. These attempts to popularise New Zealand’s connections to the Antarctic help in turn to justify the continued existence of ANZ by championing values associated with environmental stewardship, resource protection, and scientific endeavour. Territorial interests are also combined with these aforementioned values and goals. As the Revised New Zealand statement of strategic interest in Antarctica stipulates:

New Zealand is committed to conservation of the intrinsic and wilderness values of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, for the benefit of the world community and for present and future generations of New Zealanders . . . . This will be reflected in active and responsible stewardship . . . . [and] commitment to and credible presence in the Ross Dependency. (MFAT 2002)

These kinds of public pronouncements actually draw upon longer-standing historical mythologies (and associated narratives) relating to New Zealand’s post-Treaty
of Waitangi development. Within post-colonial studies of New Zealand, attention has been drawn to the importance of land in shaping expressions of national identity (for example, Byrnes 2001). In the absence of long-term associations with the country, Pakeha New Zealanders looked in the nineteenth century to their relationship with landscape as evidence for their wise and responsible stewardship. Nature was, in the words of one scholar, transformed into a nation (Bell 1996: 36). It also helped perpetuate an understanding of New Zealand as a benign settler colony, which had successfully assimilated the indigenous Maori population.

Perhaps such claims for environmental stewardship in the Ross Dependency conjure up a New Zealand that never really existed — one where integrated populations co-exist peacefully in a settled landscape. Antarctica, as an alternative location to Pakeha settlement in mainland Aotearoa/New Zealand, however hostile the terrain, appears to provide a stable landscape (or emotional backdrop) to develop Pakeha national identity and a form of ancestral connection with the Antarctic landscape through geographical nomenclature. The whiteness of Antarctica appears, therefore, to be less muddied and troubled compared to metropolitan New Zealand and associated race relations.

**Bicultural New Zealand and Antarctica**

A great deal has been written about New Zealand’s connections to Antarctica, even if much of the literature has concentrated on the evolving scientific, political, and policy-orientated connections with the Ross Dependency. There has been less commentary on the cultural importance of Antarctica and the reasons why Pakeha New Zealanders might consider with some pride these southerly connections. Even less has been written about Maori interest and involvement in New Zealand’s exploration of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean (see Haverkamp 2002), even though landscape relations have been a central question in bicultural debates. Maori involvement in Southern Ocean whaling is a better known dimension (O’Regan 2001; O’Regan, personal communication, 14 December 2002), but few polar commentators in New Zealand or elsewhere would be aware, for example, that Te Atu (who changed his name to John Sacs) travelled to Antarctica in 1840 as part of the United States Exploring Expedition that sailed off the coast of what subsequently became the Australian Antarctic Territory. Or that Dr Louis Potaka accompanied the famous American explorer Richard Byrd to Marie Byrd Land in 1935. And how many could claim to be aware of the presence of Te Tou who was the youngest member of the 1957–58 IGY party stationed at Scott Base and raised the flag at the official opening of the base? At the time of Te Tou, the Trans-Antarctic Expedition exploits of Sir Edmund Hillary, dominated the accounts of New Zealand’s exploration, whereas official reports of New Zealand’s IGY party concentrated on charting and recording scientific achievements, as was the norm in that era, rather than differentiating along lines of ethnicity or gender (Quatermain 1961; Helm and Miller 1964).

One of the reasons why this state of affairs might have existed is that many authors assumed that one could talk of a ‘New Zealand’ contribution to Antarctic exploration and science without specifying that it was, for example, a ‘Maori’ contribution. If differentiation was attempted, it tended to concentrate on either occupational or scientific criteria, such as whether someone was a scientist, explorer, mountaineer, or political figure. This is not in itself surprising because of the widespread involvement of Maori in a range of cultural, economic, and sporting activities. Many observers would have felt that such a differentiation was unnecessary and presumably unwelcome.

As the Treaty of Waitangi negotiations continued to gather momentum in the 1980s and 1990s, however, Maori participation in Antarctic affairs began to be addressed by officials in the Antarctic Policy Unit of the MFAT and ANZ (S. Prior, personal communication, 11 December 2002). According to one former Antarctic official, progress in terms of building partnerships has been slight and perhaps the claim of the well-known author of the Jake Heke trilogy, Alan Duff, characterises the apparent indifference:

To 98% of the Maori Antarctica is a non-event and who can blame them? They live in an emotional, kind of more spiritual world and nor does personal challenge figure greatly in their laid-back lives. As to myself, I’m similar though I would take up the offer to visit ... (A. Duff, personal correspondence, 9 December 2002)

This view, however, would not be shared by all Maori, and one of the challenges facing writers commenting on this topic is not to essentialise a Maori view. Just as there is considerable diversity within the Pakeha community; so Maori interest in and commitment to Antarctica varies among individuals and tribes. One such counter-example is provided by Sir Tipene O’Regan, a member of the South Island tribe Ngai Tahu and a long-standing (23 years by 2002–03) member of the New Zealand Geographical Board (NZGB). In an interview, Sir Tipene made the case that the Ngai Tahu have a concept of the Antarctic as a series of ‘floating white mountains’ (T. O’Regan, personal communication, 14 December 2002). This may reflect the fact that Maori in New Zealand may have seen icebergs floating off the coastline of Southland province and Stewart Island from the nineteenth century onwards. In more recent times, Maori have been stationed at the weather station on Campbell Island and, like many Pakeha in the South Island, they share an affinity and interest in the Southern Ocean including the ecosystem it supports (T. O’Regan, personal communication, 14 December 2002).

As Pawson highlighted (1992, but see also Smith 2004), Pakeha and Maori have different practices and poetics of belonging in the landscape. This indicates that research into Maori connections to the Southern Ocean and Antarctica might be fruitful in suggesting...
imaginings and relationships that are not necessarily founded in the colonial practice of naming and claiming landscape. The suggestion made here is to not repeat the landscape tradition of conjuring noble savages into benign scenes of landscape, nor to make any special claims for indigenousness as a precursor to environmental awareness, but to recognise that a cross-cultural dialogue might offer a productive area of research in which to reframe the cultural relationship between mainland and outpost settlements. Postcolonial forms of thinking in the Antarctic help in turn to question cultural forms and norms of settlement found in mainland Aotearoa/New Zealand. Given the explicit relation between landscape representation (naming) and land use (claiming), it may be pertinent, in the era of the Protocol, for Aotearoa/New Zealand to make real the rationale of ‘stewardship’ through the development of practices within place that do not continue to centre on possession and exploitation after 1840. To address the continuance of the colonial practices of the Crown would not only allow Aotearoa/New Zealand to go forward as a bicultural nation in Antarctica, but would also open up a number of opportunities for further reflection on the nature of environmental stewardship per se. Throughout, some points of departure in thinking in this direction are raised rather than deployed with the intention of providing a definitive answer. Opening a conversation across post-colonial Antarctic and Maori cultures is timely given the evolving role that the Antarctic plays in Pakeha settler identity, and the institutional and academic isolation that has hitherto framed such questions.

There are two evolving areas of Antarctic endeavour where Maori may well contribute further to New Zealand’s evolving relationship with Antarctica and the Southern Ocean — place-naming in the Ross Dependency and resource management (which is considered in less detail in this paper). With regards to the first issue, the New Zealand Geographic Board (NZGB) looms large in any consideration of Ross Dependency place-naming. Recognised as a key factor in the contestation of power, naming is integral to the relationship between place and the politics of identity (Massey 1994; Massey and Jess 1995; Ashcroft and others 1995; Jacobs 1996). One of the challenges that needs to be confronted is the rather different approach to place-naming between Pakeha and Maori. Recent scholarship in New Zealand has traced these differences and sought to explore their cultural and political implications (see, for example, Berg and Kearns 1996; Byrnes 2001, 2002; Kearns and Berg 2002; Smith 2004).

While the incorporation of Maori place-names into the Antarctic landscape initially appears like an inclusive cultural act, the prevailing creation of place through naming, can, as Berg and Kearns (1996) argued, nonetheless, reinforce Pakeha dominance, by defining meaning in non-indigenous terms:

Place-names are part of the social construction of space and the symbolic construction of meanings about place. Accordingly, we argue that the names applied to places in Aotearoa assist in the construction of the symbolic and material orders that legitimate the dominance of a hegemonic Pakeha masculinity. (Berg and Kearns 1996: 99)

Berg and Kearns argued that ‘naming becomes a form of norming’ (Berg and Kearns 1996: 99), that helps to reproduce rather than amend or replace the dominance of Pakeha inscriptions on the landscape of mainland New Zealand. More broadly, Yi-Fuan Tuan asserted that this cultural superiority should not surprise, because, ‘it is recognised that place naming is largely the preserve of dominant social actors’ (Tuan 1974: 7). Thus, the Pakeha authority to incorporate Maori names into the Antarctic and Southern Ocean risks a parallel reproduction of Pakeha dominance in naming practices in the mainland. To address this power dynamic, therefore, naming must not simply be seen as a symbolic act isolated from other cultural practices involving Maori–Pakeha relations. In order to function beyond a token gesture, place-naming needs to be embedded in a corresponding recognition and promotion of other ways of seeing and being in place, defined in indigenous terms.

The adoption of criteria by the NZGB for Maori names in the Antarctic is arguably problematic. The Board’s stated criteria stipulate that Maori words for species, mammals, birds, geographic features, and place-names will take preference over Maori ancestral names because of a lack of ancestral connection with Antarctica. As Sir Tipene has stated, Maori place-names ‘carry a cargo of meaning and memory, they signpost the fact that place has a human dimension’ (O’Regan 1990: xiii). More importantly and distinctly: ‘Most Pakeha names mark individual places and individual memories of parcels of history. They generally have no particular connection to each other, each standing in its own right. The meaning of many Maori names though, can only be understood through their connection to other names and other places’ (O’Regan 1990: xiii). While Maori names may signify an autochthonous connection to place, it would seem (contrary to O’Regan) unreasonable to assume that Pakeha names have no narrative connection with place (Dods 2005). The use of place-names such as Scott Base and Hillary Coast contribute to an ancestral linkage between Antarctica and New Zealand (and the former imperial power, Britain). Likewise, it would be unwise to assume that Maori do not have a non-exploitative view of place compared to Pakeha.

Maori names, however, frequently belong to a tribal group and often commemorate journeys of exploration by ancestors (as arguably do Pakeha place-names in Antarctica) or chart the relationship between tribes and landscapes (Smith 2004). As Sir Tipene contended, the Maori voyagers: ‘Rolled up legends, whakapapa and our place-names and carried them with us to be unrolled in a new place and fitted to a new landscape’ (O’Regan 2001: 2).

For a culture that remains predominantly oral-based, Maori place-names provide invaluable resources for
story-telling. They have been described as ‘survey pegs of memory,’ which help release parcels of history to a tribal narrator and his/her audience (and often derive from the sound of the landscape). When a tribe moved, so did its place-names. They remained a mobile resource and thus could be replanted on a landscape. Stories can, therefore, be repeated in fresh spatial settings even though former locations remain bound together within a web of memory. Place-names, especially those commemorating ancestors, cannot be simply transplanted onto places and regions where the Maori have no physical connection. So it would be quite unthinkable that the Maori name for Mount Cook (Aoraki) could be simply transplanted to one of Antarctica’s peaks. Aoraki is the most sacred of all the ancestors for the Ngai Tahu tribe and provides a powerful source of tribal identity. To use Aoraki in the context of Antarctica would, therefore, reduce such a name to a quasi-cultural artefact.

As a consequence of this significant connection between place, tribal identity, and memory, the use of Maori names, especially those that relate to ancestors, would not be appropriate given there is no evidence that the double-hulled canoes used by voyagers reached the Antarctic continent. Where the NZGB has incorporated Maori names onto the official maps of the Ross Dependency, they have tended to be generic, such as mountain bird names: Kea, Kaka, Ruru, and Kakapo (which is odd given that these animals have no connections to Antarctica). Others have reflected on Maori words for the elements: Mānau (boisterous wind), Parawera (south wind), Pa Tio Tio (frozen over), and Tarakaka (southwest wind). This would appear to be less surprising because one could argue that they have some relevance to the conditions found in Antarctica. One of the most recent place-naming decisions revolved around the crash of Air New Zealand flight 901, which collided with Mount Erebus in November 1979. The crash zone has been named Te Puna Roimata Peak (Spring of Tears) and commemorates the loss of 257 people including many New Zealanders of all ethnic and religious dominations.

Significantly, the NZGB does not engage in public consultation with regards to the Ross Sea region, and thus is quite different from mainland New Zealand naming practices. In the case of the Antarctic, a technical committee considers proposals and makes recommendations to the Board. All proposals for new names in the Ross Dependency are then shared with the other major party active in the region — the United States. Remarkably, there is an agreement that New Zealand and the United States share place-naming so that in any one given year each country will have a 50% approval rate (T. O’Regan, personal communication, 14 December 2002). The approved names are then sent to the Scientific Committee of Antarctic Research (SCAR) Working Group on Geodesy and Geographical Information for final approval and incorporation. Most of the existing New Zealand place-names commemorate either geographical features (such as Dark Tower) and/or names involving Pakeha activities and/or individuals (such as Hillary Coast and Quatermain Glacier).

The NZGB is reportedly eager to encourage Maori names for volcanic features and to incorporate Maori and Polynesian mythical names. While this policy of active encouragement may be seen as an attempt to co-opt (however widely supported by Maori) a more culturally diverse range of place-naming, it has not been welcomed by all interested parties. The attendant danger accompanying this policy is that it perpetuates the mythology of bicultural harmony and yet fails to acknowledge the colonial practices (naming, surveying, and claiming land) of Pakeha both in New Zealand and the Ross Dependency (Smith 2004). The Board’s American counterparts are allegedly uneasy about the proliferation of Maori place-names in the Ross Dependency. According to Sir Tipene, the role of indigenous place-names raises troubling issues not only relating to pronunciation by native English speakers but also perhaps to the manner in which native Americans and their land claims within the United States have been addressed (T. O’Regan, personal communication, 14 December 2002). With regard to the former, geographers such as Kearns and Berg (2002) have already demonstrated that unease over the usage and pronunciation of Maori names is not unique to American audiences. The Board specifies that Maori landscape names must be euphonious to an international audience. Within New Zealand, a significant number of Pakeha have expressed misgivings about the suitability of Maori place-names, particularly with regard to ‘Health and Safety’ issues (T. O’Regan, personal communication, 14 December 2002). It has been suggested (privately to Sir Tipene) that lives could be placed at risk because of an inability of rescue crews to correctly pronounce Maori-inspired place-names, for example. Presumably, the widespread use of GPS helps ameliorate these kinds of oral-based obstacles.

The fraught assimilation and often appropriation of Maori place-names only addresses symbolic mappings of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean, without a corresponding consideration of the rights of possession that such naming has historically claimed. Given the diversity and strength of Maori relationships with the Southern Ocean it is not unreasonable to expect that this geographical region had importance in Maori economic as well as cultural understandings. There are currently two outstanding Maori claims before the Waitangi Tribunal on the sub-Antarctic Auckland Islands. The Ngai Tahu, the principal tribe of the South Island is able to recount voyages to this region before European settlement. A party of Maori-Moriori from the Chatham Islands colonised Port Ross in the Auckland Islands in the mid-nineteenth century for a brief period, departing in 1856 (King 2004). Moreover, as the controversy regarding the management of Mount Ruapehu on North Island has recently demonstrated, Maori and Pakeha communities can fundamentally disagree over how to address generational responsibilities and environmental stewardship (New Zealand Herald...
22 December 2003). As Ailsa Smith has noted: ‘A Maori sense of place, if it exists, would make explicit this link with places that have grown familiar, not simply during the lifetime of an individual but, more importantly, during the extended lifespan of countless past generations’ (Smith 2004: 17).

Commercially speaking, and thus with reference to the second major issue involving bicultural New Zealand and Antarctica, Maori and especially the Ngai Tahu have a profound interest in the Southern Ocean ecosystems. Since the creation of the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary (established by the International Whaling Commission in 1994), Maori have been involved in whale-watching activities, and in the future may have an interest in the commercial development of the Ross Sea fishery. The possibility for further involvement exists against a backdrop of growing resource activism within the Ross Dependency. Maori fishing rights are a significant source of economic and cultural anxiety that have yet to fully impact on Antarctic New Zealand’s Antarctic policy. However, a successful claim to the Auckland Islands would for example bring with it considerable exclusive rights to fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around the Islands. As such, this might imperil a vision of Maori simply being incorporated into the dominant strategies and visions of Pakeha with regard to Antarctica and the Ross Dependency. The ongoing controversies surrounding the ownership of the foreshore and seabed surrounding mainland New Zealand suggest that these kinds of territorial disputes are likely to be a feature of the political landscape for some time to come (BBC 2004; New Zealand Herald 4 November 2004).

In developing this argument, it needs to be acknowledged that the narrative structure employed here does not represent an attempt to bolt on some kind of Maori dimension. Instead, with reference to a range of literatures and intellectual terrains, it should be possible to challenge underlying assumptions about the nature of Antarctica, the role of New Zealand, and the belief that ideologies and practices such as colonialism have no relevance to the polar continent and surrounding Southern Ocean. It is also axiomatic that the analysis developed here is intended to facilitate further engagement, which should not be solely confined to New Zealand and New Zealanders.

**Going forward with a bicultural vision of the Antarctic**

New Zealand’s territories in Antarctica present a particular type of problem to a self-avowed bicultural nation. Namely, how does a supposedly post-colonial nation (that is nonetheless constitutionally bound to the Crown) reconcile itself to a form of colonialism that acknowledges the injustices of a colonial past while simultaneously reproducing its practices in the present, with regard to the Antarctic? Polar histories have tended to view Antarctica as ‘empty space’ without indigenous peoples and thus a place devoid of the contested politics of colonialism. The fact of *tabula rasa*, rather than the fiction of it, has meant that Antarctica remains an attractive space for a colonial outpost in the form of the Antarctic New Zealand programme and the colonial settlement of Scott Base. And while Antarctica’s colonial geographies are not overlain with the struggles of indigenous exchange, the displacement (or lack of disruption) of colonial narratives in Antarctic colonies implicates those spatialities in a discussion of the postcolonial.

As postcolonial literature has investigated at length, the project of colonialism was not simply about possession of indigenous land, but involved a whole set of dominant practices and performances in defining space in relation to a metropolitan centre (Carter 1987, 1992; Driver 2001; Jacobs 1996; Pratt 1992; Samuel 1994; Thomas 1994; Thomas and Loshe 1999; Ryan 1996; Gregory 2004). Antarctica’s lack of indigenous population does not, therefore, mean that colonialism and associated practices such as surveying and permanent occupation cannot be cross-examined with a reference to the former British colony, New Zealand. In other words, the authors reject Belich’s claim that the 1959 Antarctic Treaty simply preserves the territorial status quo. It also performs another vital function, namely assisting signatories such as New Zealand to evade their colonising relationship with Antarctica in favour of a more benign commitment to scientific activity and environmental protection.

If science provides one mechanism for avoiding consideration of how colonial relationships were established within Antarctica, then the creation and reproduction of polar heritage offers another cultural safety valve. As other scholars have noted, heritage (with associated exhibitions and museums) has contributed greatly to the formation of national identities and histories (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Cannadine 2001; Huggan 2001). Heritage helps tell stories and constructs nationalist visions and narratives of a country and its population. The increased investment in the Artists programme by ANZ, and subsequent production of a national ‘landscape aesthetic’ for Antarctica is one such way. Public exhibits of artwork play their part in preserving a record not only of the past but also in contributing to a contemporary political agenda regarding New Zealand’s scientific, political, and environmental profile in Antarctica.

With reference to the Ross Dependency, contestation is not simply about challenging the imaginative spatial inscriptions of place, but, more importantly, about how New Zealanders imagine themselves in Antarctica (the site of the nation’s southernmost outpost rather than southermost frontier). At this point, the confidence of a bicultural society with integrated cultural forms breaks down, to exhibit a seemingly exclusively Pakeha culture and heritage. While not wanting to over-estimate the coherence of the histories and preoccupations of the heritage business, two important questions deserve further consideration: who represents heritage? And what do these representations of heritage do? In answering these questions one might look to the national and heritage bodies in order to question how they represent (if at
Arguably, there is a consistent reproduction of the biography of the white male subject as a shaping entity in the Antarctic landscape (reproduced in Ross Dependency place-names such as Quartermain Glacier, Hillary Coast). This subject, in turn, is made to stand for the history of the Antarctic, a historical ordering that disregards any other relationship to place, and potentially narrows the field for the development of future relations to the Ross Dependency. There is a need to read this legacy as constitutive of the construction of the cultural landscape of Antarctica within the New Zealand geographic imaginary (both Pakeha and Maori). Predominantly it is a social and symbolic production that occurs both in the naming of places and the heritages that are paid attention to in museums, such as Edmund Hillary’s tractor, which is on display in the Canterbury Museum (Fig. 3). The strength of this production of Pakeha masculinities in the history of the settlement of the Ross Dependency is evidenced in the lack of any photographs of Te Tou raising the flag at Scott Base in either the archive or the contemporaneous newspapers of the Canterbury Museum Document Centre (B. Norris, personal communication, 8 December 2003).

Emphasising the histories of the Crown and their continuance in the present, by default creates a view of Antarctica as a singular, bounded space of colonial history. The continuance of reading Antarctic histories through the activities of dominant actors can be witnessed at the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa recent exhibition ‘Antarctic heroes’ (May–October 2004). As a national museum that has received much attention from postcolonial scholars, New Zealand policy-makers, and Maori activists, the exhibition is a potent reminder of the lack of bicultural consideration that is perceived to be required in approaching polar histories. Given that the museum declares itself as the site of ‘stories of the New Zealand land and its peoples’ this remiss of cultural consideration is marked (not least because the display originally derives from the ‘South: race to the Pole’ exhibition staged at the National Maritime Museum in London). Through the focus of the exhibition, the concentration on the colonial past of racing to the Pole makes a seamless transition into the colonial present. This in turn affects a ‘whitening’ of the Antarctic space in the New Zealand imaginary, as a history of conquering landscape is exchanged for a history of its conquerors or, in the case of Scott, those that were conquered by it. But any potential decolonising of the geographic imagination is always likely to be fraught. For example, as Baden Norris of Canterbury Museum has pointed out, the reason Te Tou raised the flag at the opening of Scott Base in the 1950s was because he was the youngest member of the expedition, not because he was Maori.

One might ask, at this stage, what are the implications of these ‘white imaginings’ in terms of bicultural New Zealand identity? Antarctica, framed as an exclusively white space, is an extreme realisation of Pakeha desire for a belonging, exhibiting an uncontested pride in settling one of the most extreme environments in the world. Given Pakeha history, the empathy with settler societies is apparent and understandable (Lamb 1999; Neumann and others 1999). However this empathy has its complications; by locating Antarctica as a parallel of settlement without the disturbances of indigenous peoples, the implications of that colonial history are disavowed. The production of a continuous history elides the changes in Pakeha–Maori relations that Paul Spoonley argues from the 1980s mark
a change in Pakeha identity: ‘They moved from seeing themselves as “colonised” (in relation to the British) to a perception of themselves as “colonisers” in relation to the Maori’ (Spoonley 1995: 24; more generally, see Blunt and Rose 1994). Located within the safety of a comfortable spatial margin, narratives of belonging that emphasise an a priori whiteness, reinforce pride in the colonial continuation of the Crown.

If Pakeha pride is located in settlement of New Zealand’s territory of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, it nonetheless continues to unsettle relations at home by displacing colonial fantasies from mainland to outpost, and thus calls into question the vision of a successful bicultural nation. While postcolonial literature has stressed the operational power of representation in the establishment of hegemonic meanings of place, it is also pertinent to think about how Antarctic cultural industries could offer a space within which to contest exclusive white histories. Christchurch, as a self-appointed gateway city and celebrated as the most English of cities, is a key site in the production of meanings about the Antarctic to ever-increasing visitor and indigenous audiences, which are predominantly tourist, professional, scientific, and academic. In the Antarctic Gallery in Canterbury Museum, for example, amongst the display of almost exclusively ‘Heroic Era’ — 1890s–1910s — material, there is one photocopied reference to Maori connections to the Antarctic. In Maori folklore the aurora was called ‘Tahu Nui A Rangi’ (the great burning in the sky), and thought to be smoke and light from the fires reflecting off the ice lit by kinsmen lost in the cold seas of the south. Surprisingly, the museum currently has no policy to consider the production and negotiation of bicultural heritages.

Similar to Canterbury Museum, and like many of the smaller Antarctic cultural institutions in New Zealand, the New Zealand Antarctic Heritage Trust (NZAHT) is exclusively concerned with the restoration and dissemination of artefacts from the Heroic Era of exploration, and thus emphasises the continuing histories of the Crown. The Trust has emerged out of the larger and better-funded United Kingdom Antarctic Heritage Trust (UKAHT) and continues to share in its commemoration of artefacts of ‘national importance.’ For example, the NZAHT and UKAHT both appealed for funds from the public to purchase objects at the 2001 Christie’s polar sale under the slogan ‘Your country needs you.’ Disagreements between the two trusts have tended to be focused around differing ideas over what are the most appropriate conservational practices rather than any question over why the heritage of Scott and Shackleton should continue to be of importance to Aotearoa/New Zealand. In other words, journalists, political organisations, and heritage bodies alike assumed that these connections were worthwhile rather than considering the matter explicitly.

Considerable cultural and financial investment has gone into the preservation of the history of the Crown, such as the large-scale press coverage of the conservation activities of the NZAHT, return visits by veteran ‘Antarcticans’ such as the New Zealand members of the TAE, the visit of Princess Anne to the historic huts, the holding of the keys to Scott’s Discovery Hut at Scott Base, the logistic support of Antarctica New Zealand, and contributions from New Zealanders in the form of donations. Perhaps even more surprising, and in stark contrast to the aforementioned investments in the artefacts of the ‘Heroic Era,’ much debate has ensued over whether New Zealand’s objects of polar history, in the form of the TAE Hut, can be considered heritage at all. The popularity and financial investment in these objects of the Heroic Era form dramatic representations of the emotional investment that the journeys of imperial Britain’s explorer heroes such as Captain Scott stimulate in contemporary Pakeha audiences. Antarctica, as a consequence of these kinds of performances, is culturally frozen as a proverbial heritage site.

The pragmatic reasoning for the maintenance of such singular histories (and associated heritage) can perhaps be found in the Heritage Trust’s close financial association with the tourist industry and its maintenance of a view of the Antarctic as a space of heroic endeavour, or adventure tourism. However, within this model of heritage, place becomes one-dimensional and the rights of an uncontested inheritance claimed by default. As remembering occurs in the present it is pertinent to think about how contemporary practices in dealing with histories affect the building of either inclusive or exclusive national identities.

The Antarctic Gallery in Canterbury Museum is scheduled to be redesigned in the next few years, and thus would present an opportune moment for the consideration of the role of its history in considering other visions of the Antarctic and the Southern Ocean. Amongst the archives at Canterbury Museum, it is perhaps not surprising to find that Captain Scott and the Discovery crew attended a dinner at the Savage Club in Christchurch before departing for Antarctica. The main entertainment for the evening was a performance by ‘The Sagacious Savage’ about the maintenance of the proper boundaries of civilisation by the exclusion of Maori from the club (Canterbury Museum Document MS212:36, No 156). The play concluded with the white settlers being boiled alive by Maori in a big cooking pot after their inadvisable admittance of Maori to the Savage Club (for a general account of racial performances, see Pearson 2004). This particular cultural act is highlighted only to clarify the importance of cultural power in producing, circulating, and legitimating racial hierarchies and boundaries between civilisation and barbarism. Such a distinction was perhaps one of the most important observations concerning colonial practices made by post-colonial scholars such as the late Edward Said (1978, 1993).

There are many other stories of cultural interaction that remain dormant in the archives. For example, Edward Wilson noted and drew images in his diary of visits made to the Maori Pa at Kaiapo, Maori graves, and dance performances before Discovery set sail from Lyttelton.
(Fig. 4). The return visits from Maori to Discovery were recorded in photographs in the Royal Geographical Society photographic archives. Wilson recorded:

The old chief then addressed us in Maori and an interpreter told us all about it . . . then they sang to us in Maori, then tea and cakes, then a visit to a very English church, and then after many photos were taken, we went off to an old Maori battlefield where we had an excellent picnic lunch, and a wander round the battle ground, where a monument has been erected. (Wilson 1901: 39)

Within the cultural encounter (Pratt 1992) between Antarctic explorer and indigenous settler, a blind spot in Antarctic cultural history dramatically pronounced itself. As picnic lunches on Maori battlefields and anthropological reflections by the crew suggested a settled history of colonialism, the performances of the savage club pointed to the alleviation of its unsettling affects through theatre.

For a seemingly more positive contemporary view of an integrated bicultural Ross Dependency, one might point to the 2003/04 New Year celebrations at Scott Base, where the New Zealand cargo crew entertained the Americans at McMurdo Station with a performance of the Maori haka. However, the appropriation of the indigenous through sporting practice (Jackson and Hokowitlu 2002; Maclean 2003), in keeping with the naming of All Black Peak in the Ross Dependency, can be viewed as another symbolic act of Pakeha dominance that sidelines a more substantial or challenging Maori involvement. The haka is for many Maori not only a vigorous dance but also an act of cultural assertion (Calder 1998).

Some Maori activists object to the use of the haka by the All Black rugby team precisely because of the assumed representation of Maori as ‘the tamed savage’ successfully settled into a Pakeha-dominated society. Keith Sinclair once claimed that sport, alongside other activities such as war and farming, helped to cement claims to a distinct bicultural New Zealand identity. As he noted, ‘Rugby stimulated national pride and national feeling. It brought the nation together, providing a focus of feeling of unity. It brought Maori and Pakeha together’ (Sinclair 1976: 152). The value of sport as a binding agent (and the continued performance of the haka in rugby games) has been challenged in recent years. Arguably such expressions of Pakeha pride at the myth of Aotearoa/New Zealand as a harmonious space of race relations (‘We are all New Zealanders’) neglect the difficult but productive exercise
of confronting the legacy of the Crown and its idealised narratives, which continue to find their expression in the Ross Dependency.

Conclusions

As New Zealand engages with a highly visible process of nation-building, which attempts to embrace indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, it is often easier to locate this change within the formation of cultural symbols (such as place-naming and the adopting of indigenous practices like the haka) rather than to employ substantial changes in institutional practices (such as actively supporting Maori involvement in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean or critically examining the production and consumption of heritage industries). Arguably, targeting the latter would involve a far more wide-ranging examination of particular constellations of power, knowledge, and geography (Gregory 2004) in the production of cultural representations of the Ross Dependency.

Ironically, to indigenise settler nationalism in non-indigenous ways (such as inappropriate forms of place-naming or appropriation of cultural motifs) only succeeds in confirming Pakeha dominance and the male mythologizing that is so embedded in New Zealand Antarctic cultures. Unsurprisingly, some Maori have deep concerns over the cultural misappropriation and branding of Aotearoa/New Zealand through Maori imagery (A. Duff, personal correspondence, 9 December 2002). Perhaps, the real opportunity for a double-vision of the Antarctica and the Southern Ocean lies adjacent to the necessity to readress symbolic practices in Aotearoa/New Zealand and the Ross Dependency, and would entail challenging the exculpatory stories of Antarctica, especially with regard to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the role of science in shaping Pakeha activities.

Decolonising New Zealand’s relationship to Antarctica should not be seen in isolation. Across the Tasman Sea lies Australia, which in turn makes claim to more than 40% of Antarctica. Both settler colonies have laid claim to extraordinarily large territories in a manner that bears many similarities with their colonial forbearers. Territories have been mapped, resources evaluated, bases established, and flags thrust into the ice. One challenge for trans-Tasman post-colonial dialogue is to explore further how Antarctic territories have not only been and continue to be appropriated, but also the manner in which they inform (often discretely) contemporary cultural and political policy within the metropolitan territory (see Collis 1999; Hains 2002). Critically, however, it has to be acknowledged that the modern states of Australia and New Zealand are created in fundamentally different manners — Australia through the claim of terra nullis and New Zealand via treaty. While Antarctica continues to be significant in emboldening claims to a more benevolent national identity and national character in New Zealand, Australia has never proposed that Aboriginal place-names should be incorporated into the maps of the Australian Antarctic Territory.

The challenge for all those interested in the relationship between settler colonies such as Aotearoa/New Zealand and Australia (and elsewhere including Argentina and South Africa) and the Antarctic is to open up a different kind of cultural dialogue and geographical engagement. A post-colonial approach to Antarctica would be invaluable because, as Derek Gregory has wisely noted:

Post-colonialism revisits the colonial past in order to recover the dead weight of colonialism: to revive its shapes, like the chalk outlines of a crime scene, and to recall the living bodies they so imperfectly summon to presence. But it is also an act of opposition. Post-colonialism reveals the continuing impositions and exactions of colonialism in order to subvert them: to examine them, disavow them and dispel them. (Gregory 2004: 9)

This paper has attempted to develop a sense of what might be called the post-colonial present in Antarctic and New Zealand studies. The challenge remains for Antarctic scholars, policy-makers, and those involved in the heritage industry to take up the dead weight of those colonial questions in order to interrogate and subvert their allegedly post-colonial present.

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