

Not that serious? The investigation and trial of the Angry Brigade, 1967-72.

On the night of 12th January 1971, two bombs exploded outside the home of Robert Carr, Secretary of State for Employment. Care was taken to ensure no-one was injured, and responsibility was quickly claimed by a militant group calling themselves 'the Angry Brigade'. The attack marked the first time a British cabinet minister had been attacked by a terrorist group since the Second World War. Up until now, few knew of the Angry Brigade or the string of minor explosions and shootings against property targets, but the aggressive tone of their communiqué (their fourth in fact) to *The Times* suggested a ratcheting up of the intensity and audacity of their campaign: 'Robert Carr got it tonight. We're getting closer.'¹ With no connections to any political party, trade union or official organisation of any sort, the Angry Brigade marked a new kind of British left-wing political protest: one rooted in a libertarian socialism derived from the New Left, the communes, pleasure and horizontalism of the counterculture, and the wildcat strike and combative trade union militancy, new social movements and community activism that would define the energies and victories of the British Left over the decade.

It is remarkable then that, over four decades on, historians of the Left and of the era more broadly refuse to take them seriously, if at all. Marwick gives them one dismissive mention in his vast *The Sixties*, and they have no mention in the major social histories of this time by Beckett, Black, Clarke, Morgan, Porter, or White.² Where discussion occurs, they become transformed into either a romantic or oddball anomaly.³ A throwaway remark by Michael Mansfield, acting as the defence for one of the 'Stoke Newington Eight' later charged with conspiracy for the attacks, is indicative. 'Pythonesque', with its connotations of absurdity and silliness, the comedy of taking themselves too seriously.⁴ Even the tenor of critiques from the Left by Stuart Hall, Lynne Segal and others can be summarised in *The Sun's* glib headline at the end of the trial: 'Downfall of the Bighead Brigade'.⁵ *Bighead* implies the conceit of having ideas above one's station, not knowing one's place; of being overly intellectual, adhering to ideas over practicalities; and isolation, a vanguard disconnected from the public. Right-wing newspapers gleefully published large photos of the sexualised female defendants beside communiqués and dismissive jibes: 'looney plots' (*The Sun*), 'revolutionary claptrap' (*News of the World*), or 'bomb-

happy destructionists' living in a 'Manson-style hippy commune' (*Daily Express*).⁶ Some on the Left have rehashed the same dismissals, pointing to a 'tragic affair' (Stuart Hall) or 'futile' adventurism (Jonathon Green), signalling a 'more macho... desperate politics' (Lynne Segal).⁷ As a result, there is a lastingly inaccurate history of a group with incoherent, bigheaded politics, that brought police harassment into the counterculture and were ultimately sent down.

This problem of memory and disavowal is further complicated in that the five sentenced for their involvement were convicted on weak conspiracy charges with dubious police evidence, of which a further five were acquitted. No-one has ever been prosecuted for causing the actual explosions and shootings with which the Angry Brigade were linked. This reflects a combination of skill and luck on the part of the attackers, but indicates why few would forthrightly claim involvement. Stuart Christie, the police's main suspect though subsequently acquitted of conspiracy, has discussed his knowledge of Angry Brigade members and activities whilst being precise in not asserting any explicit involvement with them.⁸ John Barker, convicted of conspiracy in the attacks, has looked back with unease on that period and any attempts to lionise the Angry Brigade. 'For one thing we were libertarian communists believing in the mass movement, and for another we were NOT THAT SERIOUS... like many young people then and now we smoked a lot of dope and spent a lot of time having a good time'.⁹

Not that serious implies the youthful pleasures of music, drugs and communal living. The Angry Brigade 'had no dreams or desire to 'seize state power' or to kill', Barker clarifies more recently.¹⁰ But there is unease in also looking back with regard to the relative seriousness of the IRA, who had less reservations about killing, be it soldiers (the Official IRA's Aldershot barracks bombing on 22nd February 1972) or civilians (the Provisional IRA's mainland Britain campaign beginning from March 1973 with bombs at the Old Bailey and Great Scotland Yard, spiking over 1974-75 with the 'Balcombe Street Gang').¹¹ Yet such self-effacing remarks do distract from what was serious and seriously meant by the Angry Brigade: a consistency and breadth of libertarian politics, an attention to new protest movements, a hitherto unappreciated ethical dimension of targeting those personally responsible in a personalising way, and a sophistication of organisation that ultimately prevented the police from finding anyone actually responsible for carrying out the attacks.

This paper instead proposes to take the Angry Brigade seriously, and in doing so, extract and assess some significant events and implications from their investigation and trial still missing

from the historical record. It has a historiographical sub-objective, to raise this problem of memory and disavowal, pertinent to Left histories where a given protest movement is perceived not to have succeeded. It also has a political objective. Against the impression of a 'suicidal diversion',¹² there is a consistent and hitherto unappreciated politics within the targets, communiqués, and suspected list of future targets that indicates a perspicacious intuition, if not rationale, about the nascent trends of neoliberal political theory, the intensification of police surveillance and military repression, and the growing political importance of labour struggles over the 1970s. On the one hand, Christie is right to recognise the Angry Brigade as 'a thing of its time',¹³ and after the ascendancy of the IRA, any attempt to carry out lethal explosions against British targets would have been calamitous for radical protest movements. On the other, there is much in its choice of targets, themes and horizontal, diffuse organisation, as well as the crude police crackdown on it, that astutely forecasts the political weather of the far Left in Britain over the 1970s and beyond.

Defining 'the Angry Brigade'

From the outset, we stumble on a considerable methodological problem. Who were the Angry Brigade? What few histories of the Angry Brigade exist tend to take for granted that the five individuals prosecuted for 'conspiracy to cause explosions' across two high-profile trials (Jake Prescott on 1st December 1971; John Barker, Hilary Creek, Jim Greenfield, and Anna Mendleson on 6th December 1972) were actually those who planted explosives or fired weapons at political targets – a charge that no individual was ever found guilty of. Any claim of membership of the Angry Brigade remains tenuous and legally undetermined.

Instead, the argument I will make here – and one I have developed elsewhere, in an accompanying analysis of the Angry Brigade's political and historical contexts in the counterculture and British New Left – is that the name 'Angry Brigade' referred to a loose, disparate milieu of individuals and groupuscules, aligned to a broadly anti-establishment, revolutionary socialist politics.¹⁴ We should take the *Evening Standard's* claim seriously that 'they are all angry', that the Angry Brigade can only be understood as a more active eruption of new protest movements among welfare claimants, trade unionists, women's liberation, black power, gay liberation, and civil rights in Northern Ireland.¹⁵ The turn to more violent forms of protest reflected a frustration that peaceful protest and university occupations, a common tactic in the UK, France, West Germany, the USA and elsewhere, were no longer effective (if they ever

had been), and may even engender a complacency when dealing with violent state authorities. In the pivotal year of 1968, the *enragés* of Paris over May and June became outmanoeuvred by de Gaulle, whilst the increasingly emboldened and popular democratic movements in Prague and Mexico City were later crushed by August and October respectively in brutal displays of state power.¹⁶ Such events mirrored the assassinations of prominent black civil rights leaders in the US (Malcolm X, 1965; Martin Luther King, 1968; Fred Hampton, 1969), which would lead into the FBI's COINTELPRO suppression of the Black Panthers by 1969-70, with the murder of Hampton and the subsequent arrest of many of its members.¹⁷ The murder by police of Benno Ohnesorg on 2nd June 1967 by police, and the assassination attempt on Rudi Dutschke in Berlin the following April had a similar galvanising effect.¹⁸ When the October 1968 VSC march to Grosvenor Square involved even greater numbers of protestors (and police) than the earlier March 'Battle of Grosvenor Square', but with no obvious outcome, there was a sense of reaching a stalemate, with further VSC marches in London over 1969 and 70 involving significantly dwindling numbers.¹⁹

Despite being in diverse locations and without shared contacts, a small minority of students who had previously been involved in anti-Vietnam protests, led largely by New Left-orientated political groups, were each taking up direct action out of a common frustration with existing forms of peaceful protests and parliamentary politics. By 1969, small groups begin to emerge: in the US, the Weather Underground's attacks begin with the "Days of Rage" in Chicago in October, and amplify following a "Declaration of War" issued by communiqué on 21st May 1970, to avenge the death of Fred Hampton.²⁰ The Tupamaros in West Berlin and Munich had undertaken a small bombing campaign since November 1969, with bank robberies launched by the newly formed Red Army Faction (RAF) from September 1970.²¹ Indicating a common shift in tactics towards more overt violence, the RAF wrote in April 1971 that 'We will not talk about "armed propaganda": we will do it.'²² Making abstract comparisons to the perceived systemic violence of the state (or 'bourgeois violence') against a 'revolutionary violence' or what Marighella had called 'counterviolence' as legitimate opposition in his influential 1969 urban guerrilla manual, the RAF, like the Weather Underground, Angry Brigade and others, frequently saw their protest activist as apiece with Maoist, anti-imperialist and nationalist revolutionary movements across the world.²³

Though a small nucleus of individuals were probably responsible for the majority of publicised attacks and communiqués of the Angry Brigade, particularly those after 1970, it must be noted that this was among a wider surge of violent Left political protest from 1967 to 1972 in Britain, whose use of tactics, politics and targets cannot be so easily extricated from the ‘Angry Brigade’. According to a list made by the Stoke Newington Eight Defence Group (hereafter SN8DG), curated through anecdotes and press clippings, there were around 121 known attacks on property between 3rd February 1968 (an explosive rocket by the First of May group that, like many, fails to explode) and 2nd May 1972 (home-made bomb at an ‘E. London football ground’).²⁴ This figure is likely to be an underestimate, and which in any case indicates the broader problem of political violence and amateur bomb-making across Britain over this period, a phenomena that cannot be easily untangled, given that no-one claimed responsibility for most attacks. This list included explosions at a night-club, a school and a DSS office, as well as Welsh nationalist attacks against the Royal Family. Howard Yallop’s Home Office laboratory had assessed over 1,100 explosions between March 1968 and August 1971, including 123 home-made bombs against property.²⁵ When later pressed by Rock Tansey for the defence at the SN8’s committal, Commander Ernest Bond was unable to give a figure on the exact number of left-wing instances of political violence since 20th August 1967, suggesting the police had been unable to keep count.²⁶

To avoid ambiguity though, I will introduce first the attacks claimed by and attributed to the ‘Angry Brigade’, before those linked by the police investigation. Between the machine-gunning of the Spanish Embassy in London on 4th December 1970 (the first attack claimed shortly after by signed communiqué), and the conclusion of the trial of the ‘Stoke Newington Eight’ on 6th December 1972, there were ten attacks claimed directly by the ‘Angry Brigade’ across up to fifteen stamped communiqués sent to the underground press and national newspapers.²⁷ These include: the aforementioned Spanish Embassy shooting (communiqué 1); the Department of Employment and Productivity (9th December, communiqués 2 and 3); Robert Carr’s home (12th January 1971, communiqué 4); Ford’s Essex office (18th March, communiqué 7); Biba boutique during a shop assistants’ pay dispute (1st May, communiqué 8); Metropolitan Police Computer Room, attacking police surveillance (22nd May, communiqué 9); the home of Ford’s managing director, William Batty, and a transformer at Ford Dagenham during an industrial dispute (22nd July, communiqué 10); home of John Davies, Minister for Trade and Industry (31st July,

communiqué 11); a Territorial Army centre, Holloway, against internment in Northern Ireland (15th August, “Angry Brigade Moonlighter’s Cell”); and the home of Chris Bryant, during a labour dispute (20th October, “The Brigade is Angry”).²⁸

There is a consistent targeting of industrial disputes over 1971, at a time when Heath’s Industrial Relations Act was rendering wildcat strikes illegal, restricting the rights of trade unions and precipitating the conflict with the National Union of Miners that would ultimately cause his government to collapse by 1974. Considering the bill as just one facet of the government’s ‘vicious class war’, in collusion with large employers, the Angry Brigade used bombing as a means to ‘fight back’.²⁹ They imagined themselves as representatives of the ‘revolutionary working class’ – ‘Where two or three revolutionaries use organised violence to attack the class system... there is the Angry Brigade’.³⁰ In bombing their homes, there was an ethical aspiration to make the powerful personally accountable for their decisions in a way that protests and strikes could not. In their frequent cries of ‘Power to the people’ in their later, more prolix communiqués after the Carr attack, the Angry Brigade imagined themselves as agents in a revolutionary socialist movement of allied workers and students that they hoped was about to come to life.

Throughout, there is a consistent attention to the alienation of the working class by consumerism, conservative sexuality, boring jobs, and a recurring contempt for the organised Left and its stiflingly dull, bureaucratic recuperation of dissent.

‘The Labour Party, the unions and their minions, the CP with its productivity craze, the same bastards who always sell us out... with gestures like one day strikes and one day occupations, petitions... which will achieve bugger all.’³¹

Their politics is consistently anti-hierarchical and suspicious of reforms. The Angry Brigade was repeatedly critical of the organised ‘old-old Left’, in one communiqué equating the Communist Party and International Socialists with Robert Carr – ‘We are against any external structure’!³² This histrionic refusal to ally with others hindered its ability to transmit its political ideas and rationale beyond small parts of the underground press. The necessity of shrinking into a smaller, trusted circle further isolated the group from shop-floor stewards and organised workers who might have been able to tell them that, rather than amplifying protests, the bombings were only inviting unwarranted police attention to striking workers, whose struggles were localised and defensive, and not of the broadly anti-capitalist bent of the Angry Brigade.³³

The communiqués also claimed connection to around sixteen separate attacks which had largely gone unreported, including the BBC broadcast van outside Miss World, London (20th November 1970, communiqué 7); the homes of Metropolitan Police Commissioner Waldron, and Attorney General Rawlinson (30th August and 8th September 1970, originally claimed by ‘Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid’ and the ‘Wild Bunch’ respectively, and later in communiqués 1, 5 and 7); four Barclays’ branches (undated, ‘communiqué 0’); six Conservative associations (13th January, communiqué 7) and a generator in Altrincham (undated, communiqué 7).³⁴ In addition, the police’s conspiracy charge would identify a common ‘acid-delay’ device linking the attacks to those by the First of May group’s ‘Revolutionary Solidarity Movement’, from 1968-1970, most targeted against Franco’s Spain.³⁵ These begin with bombs against the Spanish Embassy, and Columbia Club (popular with American officers) on 3rd March 1968; after a year’s inactivity, unexploded bombs at the Bank of Bilbao and Bank of Spain, 2nd February 1969; a bomb at the Bank of Spain, Liverpool, on 9th February; and at the Bank of Bilbao, London, on 15th March, where two British men are caught red-handed.³⁶ After another year’s lull, a bomb on an Iberian Airways plane at Heathrow, 10th May 1970; an unexploded device at the construction site for the new Paddington Police Station, bearing Greenfield’s fingerprint, 22nd May 1970; an Iberian Airways office, London, 18th August 1970; Heathrow airport, 27th September 1970; and Italian government targets in London, Birmingham and Manchester on 9th October 1970, in solidarity with the Lotta Continua, the latter bearing Mendleson’s fingerprint.³⁷

Given the use of communiqués and small gelignite explosions outside symbolic property targets, one can reasonably agree with the police’s premise that this was the work of a singular network. A central nucleus seems to have been based in North London, with others in Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham. Perhaps having gained the confidence of their First of May suppliers in France with the attacks over 1968-1970, this ‘Angry Brigade’ began their own campaign, initially against British police targets like Waldron in August 1970, expanding into industrial disputes, women’s liberation and Northern Ireland. But with the initial bombs receiving no press coverage, the group changes strategy, and begins using a consistent name, *the Angry Brigade*, and produces its communiqués with the same John Bull printing set and signature stamp, sending these first to the more sympathetic underground press, and then the national papers.

The Carr bombing is the crescendo of this campaign, being their most high profile-target and the one in which most explosive power is used. Thereafter the Angry Brigade secure the media coverage they had sought for their protest attacks, whilst unwittingly inviting into the counterculture a newly formed 'Bomb Squad' that would clumsily harass and raid up to 40 organisations, including Agitprop, the International Socialists and IMG, and the offices of *IT*.³⁸ Whilst the Angry Brigade insisted 'we are too many to know each other ... We are not in a position to say whether any one person is or isn't a member of the Brigade' – a claim to incoherence and non-existence repeated by Christie and the SN8DG – it is more likely that a small, trusted network was behind the key attacks listed above, with the wider phenomena of hundreds of explosions over these years being the work of many Angry Brigades across the UK.³⁹ Given the number of police informants working within the counterculture, the heaviness of police raids over 1971 and the nous required for any illegal conspiracy to succeed, one can surmise that a small number of individuals were involved in the most well-known attacks.

After a largely fruitless Bomb Squad investigation over 1971, a police informant tip-off leads the Bomb Squad to 359 Amhurst Road, a property that had been rented for only six weeks by Barker ('George Buchanan'), Creek, Greenfield and Mendleson ('Nancy Pye'), the latter two sought by police for cheque fraud since June, with wanted photos circulated in the *Police Gazette*.⁴⁰ It is possible that a local police informant spotted the four, though the Angry Brigade's network had at least one recorded police informant in its midst, Gerry Osner.⁴¹ Whilst Carr reports that the address was found through monitoring Mendleson's parents' post, another explanation is a tip-off from within the group.⁴² Erin Pizzey claims she notified police of the planning of the Biba bombing after hearing it being discussed, and 'felt it had gone far too far'; one possibility is that the plan to 'spring' Jake Prescott and Ian Purdie out of prison which Barker was party to, and which would require use of the guns, felt like a step too far into lethality and illegality.⁴³

The police raid the property on 20th August 1971, and in the process find the Angry Brigade's printing set and stamp, as well as a cache of gelignite, detonators and guns. The following morning Stuart Christie and, later, Chris Bott are apprehended by police when they visit the flat; and further arrests result in Angela Weir and Kate McLean making up the final eight.⁴⁴ Whilst the legitimacy of the prosecution evidence would be rigorously undermined in court, it must be noted that after August attacks by the 'Angry Brigade' rapidly diminish, with a

small number of subsequent attacks of a different character claimed, unconvincingly, by people purporting to represent the group, whilst police complained of regularly being contacted by hoaxers.⁴⁵

Whilst Barker would claim in his closing speech that this might reflect a change of strategy on their part, and the 'Geronimo Cell' would insist that the eight were innocent, it may well be that the police had swooped in on what was a safe-house, confiscating their explosives, arresting key individuals and deterring the remainder from risking further incrimination.⁴⁶ Energies were now being turned to the defence of Prescott and Purdie, and later the SN8DG. Less probable, though not implausible, others may have moved into the IRA, following a trajectory like Rose Dugdale, ex-debutante and Tottenham Claimants Union organiser, who had reportedly offered to put up Mendleson's bail, and was later imprisoned for a bungled IRA art heist in 1974.⁴⁷ While many law-abiding Far Left campaigns have done everything permissible to preserve their work for posterity's sake, the same cannot be said for the Angry Brigade, and for obvious reasons.

But found amongst Amhurst Road, beside the machine guns and gelignite, old bottles of beer and unwashed clothes, piles of books on the Weathermen and black power, Charles Olson and Raymond Chandler, were notes detailing a project Greenfield would call 'reverse sociology', transforming the powerful into an object of study.⁴⁸ The prosecution would assert that the detailed plans and notes on Osias Freshwater, then the largest private landlord in London, indicated a future Angry Brigade target.⁴⁹ Other individuals named included two cabinet ministers, John Eden (communications) and Lord Carrington (defence); Ray Gunter, chairman of Securicor; and Woodrow Wyatt, Keith Joseph and Nicholas Ridley, all major ideologues and strategists of Thatcher's neoliberal revolution in the following decade. The targets suggest a perspicacious recognition that, against the earlier Left's initial anger and violence against the police and military state alone, that power was more insidious and complex, mediated through wealth, property, and political collusion.

Barker and Creek have looked back on the Angry Brigade as a form of protest, hoping to amplify struggles.⁵⁰ A later remark by the SN8DG neatly summarises the flavour of such protest:

'Its actions are exemplary, designed on the one hand to expose the vulnerability of the ruling class, to enter the homes of the rulers and show they have no clothes, and on the other hand to show the possibility of the revolution arming itself.'⁵¹

It is at once radical, idealistic, even innocent, whilst at the same time out of sync with the defensive and localised struggles of the organised Left. As Barker would say, this was 'not being serious taken to a new level',⁵² and yet far more innocently serious about actualising its protest than many since. When compared to their now more historicised peers, the Angry Brigade lacked the organisation of the Weather Underground's network of contacts, or a popularity among London's young counterculture comparable to the RAF in West Germany. Yet their choice of targets and political messages indicate both greater breadth and depth in their thinking, linking up women's liberation and civil rights in Northern Ireland with state surveillance and trade union disputes. Non-lethal bombing was another channel for political protest. Unlike their international peers, the Angry Brigade's final and most spectacular achievement occurs at the Old Bailey in 1972, in an event that would profoundly challenge the British legal establishment.

The Stoke Newington Eight

The trial of the 'Stoke Newington Eight' began at the Old Bailey on 30th May 1972 and ended on 6th December 1972. Like the Prescott and Purdie trial that preceded it, it would result in half the defendants being acquitted, the other half receiving lengthy jail sentences, with a confused and indecisive jury reaching an uneasy guilty verdict on the conspiracy charge. The case effectively hinged on whether the prosecution could prove beyond reasonable doubt that the guns, gelignite and detonators found at Amhurst Road and later Christie's car belonged to the eight, and had not been planted by police, and that the eight could be sufficiently linked into a conspiracy of 'agreement' behind the twenty-five attacks between 1968-1971. The trial remains one of the most significant of the century, with a remarkable number of precedents and implications. It would become one of the longest criminal trials in English history: the longest since the Tichborne false identity case of 1871, and only recently superseded by the News International phone-hacking trial of 2013-14.⁵³ Over the course of 111 court days, over 200 witnesses, a thousand pages of depositions, three million words in transcripts, 688 exhibits, 3 self-defendants, 39 jurors challenged and 19 excused on grounds of bias, 8 days of judge summing up, 52 hours of jury deliberation, and at an estimated cost of up to £750,000, the trial resulted in one of the most inconsistent verdicts in legal history.⁵⁴

Already by the time the eight were brought before a pre-trial committal on the 25th January, the strength of their case was already weakened by the abysmal defence of Prescott in his separate trial, with Purdie, over November 1971, which resulting in a fifteen year sentence

for Prescott on 1st December. Prescott's involvement in the conspiracy was largely alleged on the weak 'confessions' of fellow cell-mates in HMP Brixton, confessions no doubt motivated by aspirations of parole and the *Daily Mirror's* well-publicised reward of £10,000 for anyone offering information resulting in the prosecution of those behind the Carr bombing.⁵⁵ Though they were debunked in court, his handwriting had been identified to three envelopes containing communiqués sent to the national press, and this alone had been sufficient for the conspiracy charge to stick. Prescott's weak defence also conceded in the charge that the other eight were involved in conspiracy, thereby confirming their guilt in the second trial before it had even begun.⁵⁶ A lesson of the first trial was that even weak proof of conspiratorial agreement could result in a prison sentence. Yet the outcry around the verdict helped galvanise support for the subsequent eight. A large advertorial appeared in the *Guardian* the following month from "People seeking justice for Prescott and Purdie", with signatories including *Time Out*, International Socialists' Executive Committee, Ralph Miliband, Bernadette Devlin MP and John Lennon.⁵⁷ Purdie's unlikely acquittal, secured by not giving any evidence of court, thereby placing the onus on the prosecution to prove conspiratorial involvement, also indicated that with a prudent defence all might not be lost.

The existing defence committee had already organised one protest march to HMP Brixton on 4th September 1971, as well as issuing at least one 'bulletin', presenting the defence's argument within a context of 'class war' and the politicised crackdown on the counterculture.⁵⁸ After Prescott's sentencing, the defence group intensified its activities, calling itself the 'Stoke Newington 8 Defence Group'. It formalised the previous makeshift bulletins it had sent out into a fully-fledged publication, *Conspiracy Notes*, which ran for at least three issues from December 1971 to the late summer of 1972. It also published an explanatory booklet and longer justificatory pamphlet, posters, arranged a benefit gig, made trial transcriptions, and oversaw contact arrangements among the defendants.⁵⁹ It is through *Conspiracy Notes* that one traces the development of what become the trial's most significant features. In the first issue, amongst complaints about the squalid conditions for the women in HMP Holloway, it is clear that the defence is mobilising itself for a politically symbolic case, inspired less by Purdie and more by the landmark 'Mangrove 9' trial of December 1971.⁶⁰ The DPP's case against nine black activists in Notting Hill on conspiracy to incite riot charges collapsed, after the defence was able to convincingly show that the police had equated their activism with criminality, that there was

considerable evidence of racism in the police's relentless surveillance of the black community – a harassment occurring in parallel with that of the counterculture over 1969-70 – and there was no conspiracy case to answer for. Two of the defendants represented themselves, Darcus Howe and Althea Jones Leconte, and others were defended by Ian Macdonald, who would represent Greenfield.⁶¹ Their strategy bore a number of hallmarks seen later, such as a rigorous scrutiny of the jury for bias, and an incisive attack on the credibility of police witnesses.

Given the relatively collective nature of the defence, it is difficult to attribute any particular innovation to any one person. A combination of frustration and necessity result in Mendleson and Creek defending themselves, joined by Barker. They hoped that this would also enable them to connect with the jurors 'as real people and not ciphers hiding behind lawyers', convincing them of the integrity of their politics and their case.⁶² It is clear the defence group were also legally astute, and drew on a number of novel legal innovations of the time. From the harsh prison sentences meted out to two 'ringleaders' in the Greek Embassy occupation of April 1967 organised by the Committee of 100, there was a conscious decision by the defence to act collectively, thereby preventing one or two individuals being made an example of.⁶³ The use of 'McKenzie friends' (a person who accompanies the litigant and assists with note-taking, making suggestions, etc.) by the three self-defendants from the outset was legally far-sighted. The recent McKenzie vs. McKenzie case of 1970 actually concerned family law, and had so far been used in a December 1971 trial of three members of the Highbury and Hackney Claimants Unions.⁶⁴

The defence and its supporting committee proved capable, if not courageous. Kevin Winstain for Christie, Macdonald for Greenfield, and Barker representing himself all convincingly demolished most the prosecution case. Ellen's handwriting expertise, used to link McLean to the Waldron and Rawlinson communiqués, and Weir to some of the later Angry Brigade communiqués, was fatally undermined by the defence's use of another handwriting expert, Dr Julius Grant, to evoke reasonable doubt.⁶⁵ Similarly, rigorous vetting of the jury saw the removal of 19 jurors on various grounds of bias, including sympathy or membership of the Conservative Party.⁶⁶ The broadsheet press would complain that it produced a jury biased in favour of the defence, and even endangered the English jury system altogether.⁶⁷ Lord Chief Justice Widgery quickly acted to ensure such jury-vetting did not become legal precedent by January 1973, and would later dismiss the appeal of the four the following June.⁶⁸

Winstain, Barker and Macdonald proved masterly at exposing inconsistencies in the police's account of the raid, with doubts raised about collusion as well as unusual lapses in police memory.⁶⁹ Winstain asked why DS Gilham found only eleven detonators at the house, whilst DC Doyle had earlier discovered thirteen: had the other two been planted in Christie's car?⁷⁰ Winstain additionally made the jury aware of a parallel case of five Saor Eire members in Hackney, whose Old Bailey case was dismissed out of court after an undercover police agent and his handler were proven to have effectively planted machine guns and explosives.⁷¹ Indeed, the Bomb Squad would be subsequently involved in the dubious prosecutions of the 'Guildford Four' and 'Maguire Seven' over 1975-76, now led by Habershon; and both these and the prosecution of the 'Birmingham Six' would be overturned decades later, with evidence of police harassment, false testimonies, inconsistencies in forensic evidence and unbalanced judgements.⁷² Given the inconsistencies revealed by the trial, and the way in which the police have been proven to have acted in an unlawful manner in their subsequent investigations over this period, there are sufficient grounds to dispute the validity of the prosecution against the Eight. The jury effectively determined the police evidence in Christie's case was planted – casting a wider doubt over the credibility of the rest of the weapons – and it may well be that it only the printing set, stamp and duplicator found at Amhurst Road linked the four to the conspiracy. Barker's defence conceded that these were the only incriminating items not planted by police.⁷³

Unfortunately, we cannot be party to the fifty-two hours of private jury deliberation, except to note that after the first day the jury were split 7-5.⁷⁴ By the end of the third day, James effectively forced them to make a verdict that evening by refusing any police-protected accommodation, resulting in the 'uneasy majority' of a 10-2 guilty verdict. There was no common ground between prosecution and defence – at least one side was lying, as James reminded the jury. At the same time, he warned them that to acquit all eight would imply a 'massive dishonesty' on the part of the police, something they were pressured not to accept.⁷⁵ In the end, the same dubious police evidence was taken to acquit Christie yet convict the other four (albeit with reduced jail sentences), in a most unsatisfactory verdict. Though in their *Time Out* press conference after the trial, Bott rightly remarked that the police had come out 'very badly', the jury had effectively acquitted them too in accepting the weapons as evidence of guilt.⁷⁶

Conclusion

The Stoke Newington Eight Defence Group repeatedly complained from the outset about a media 'blackout' on trial coverage, but as Des Wilson convincingly replied, the case was 'so complex and slow-moving' that few newspapers could justify sending correspondents out.⁷⁷ This changed after the trial, with all major newspapers running leading stories on 7th December. The coverage was largely derogatory, but such reports were the first media 'spectacle' since the Carr bombing to secure mainstream coverage, and may well have introduced the ideas of the Angry Brigade to the public. Internal BBC documents of its Review Board reveal consternation over the apparently lax 'error of editorial judgement' which enabled the Angry Brigade to broadcast their opinions on Radio Four's *World at One*, as well as earlier coverage of the Carr bombing.⁷⁸ A silent Creek and eloquent Mendelson were interviewed for ITV's *World in Action* aired shortly after the trial, with Mendelson highlighting that effective protest was being criminalised. 'What is illegal, and what is legal? It is the state's definition of what's legal and what's not legal. It's not our definition'.⁷⁹ Whilst understandably distancing herself, Mendelson situated the Angry Brigade as just one current in a wider swell of working class discontent.

Gordon Carr's BBC documentary appeared the following month, presenting to mainstream audiences the politics and development of the Angry Brigade in a critical though informative manner (a book follows two years later).⁸⁰ More than any communiqué, this newspaper coverage and TV documentaries introduced the ideas of the Angry Brigade to the public. Nor did the defence group disintegrate. Three hundred candle-bearing protestors were turned away from HMP Holloway on the night of December 7th.⁸¹ Greenfield, Barker and Mendleson were back in court on cheque fraud charges in February 1973, alongside McLean, Bott, Purdie and seven others, and the separate trial added two and a half years to Greenfield's sentence, and an additional year to Barker's and Mendelson's.⁸² Their appeal was initiated in March 1973, but the defence were again unable to exploit the weakness of the 'imprecise' conspiracy charge, and with the fallout of the IRA Old Bailey bomb overshadowing proceedings, their appeal was easily dismissed in June (though Widgery did adjust the cheque fraud sentence to run concurrently, and reduced Prescott's sentence to ten years).⁸³

The SN8DG had brought together a truly 'disparate set of people', from relatives to politically active friends, as Barker recalls. He adds that it 'imaginatively developed what might be called the better part of AB politics and made more of a mass politics than it had ever done

itself', and it continued its momentum after the trial.⁸⁴ Members of the defence group would become involved in the Up Against the Law collective with several publications over 1972-75, and involvement in other justice campaigns, like the 'Free George Ince' and 'Free George Davis' campaigns (the latter memorably sabotaging The Ashes of 1975 by destroying the turf at Headingley), as well as assisting the work of PROP and the Claimants Unions.⁸⁵ But there was a dispersal by the close of the 1970s, and most of these campaigns and organisations had fizzled out of existence by the time of Thatcher's election. The *Mail* makes a crass scoop by revealing Creek to be suffering from anorexia and in a psychiatric hospital in 1973, whilst the major newspapers belatedly cover the story of Mendleson's parole in 1977 by pondering what message it sent out to the IRA.⁸⁶

It is indeed the legacy of the Provisional IRA that clouds over the not *as* serious Angry Brigade, alongside the sullen mood of 'atomization and dispersal' that student protestors have described feeling after 1968.⁸⁷ But as this paper has argued, the Angry Brigade are best understood as a radical protest group, and one of the better organised networks among a vast tide of amateur bomb attacks and left-wing political violence over 1967-72. They are also more than merely a peculiar end-point of the 1960s: their focus on industrial militancy and Northern Ireland anticipates the major constitutional crises facing British governments over the 1970s and 1980s, whilst their scepticism about the motives and openness of the organised Left, and their politics of women's liberation, intimate the major battlegrounds within the Left over that same period. Above all, there is some ethically commendable about their consistent attempt, and that of others overseas, to 'bring the war home', their fidelity and seriousness in risking their own lives and freedom to actualise their revolutionary socialism, through communes and pleasure, and through experimenting with forms of protest that might force police and government officials to take notice. As Macdonald later reflects, that attention 'cost a lot of people dearly'.⁸⁸ But a similar cost would be exacted from youths in Northern Ireland, in Northern mining towns, or in England's inner cities. Unlike the middle class radicals who have taken pains to distance themselves from this scene on the long march through the institutions, the young and – in the case of the imprisoned five – largely working class intellectuals who dropped out into the counterculture were one of many enemies within. The trial and investigation of the Angry Brigade is an exemplary case of the intensification of police repression of dissent over the 1970s,

who prosecuted and imprisoned these five individuals, and many more subsequently, by any means necessary.

¹ Communiqué 4 in Gordon Carr, *The Angry Brigade: A History of Britain's First Urban Guerrilla Group* (Oakland: PM Press, 2010), p. 239.

² See Arthur Marwick. *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958–c.1974* (New York: OUP, 1998), pp. 751-752; they are inexplicably missing in Jeremy Black, *Britain Since the Seventies* (London: Reaktion, 2004); cf. Andy Beckett, *When the Lights Went Out* (London: Bloomsbury, 2009); Peter Clarke, *Hope and Glory* (London: Penguin, 2004); Kenneth O. Morgan, *Britain Since 1945* (New York: OUP, 2001); Roy Porter, *London: A Social History* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994); Jerry White, *London in the Twentieth Century* (London: Vintage, 2008).

³ Tom Vague, *Anarchy in the UK: The Angry Brigade* (Edinburgh: AK Press, 1997); Jonathon Green, *All Dressed Up: the Sixties and the Counter-culture* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1998), pp. 272-292.

⁴ Michael Mansfield, *Memoirs of a Radical Lawyer* (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), p. 31.

⁵ *The Sun*, 07.12.72, p. 1.

⁶ Steve Chibnall, *Law-and-Order News* (London: Tavistock, 1977), pp. 110-111; "The bomb girls", *Daily Express*, 07.12.72, p. 9.

⁷ Hall et al., *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978), p. 292; Green, "The Urban Guerrillas Britain Forgot", *New Statesman*, 27.08.01; Segal, *What is to be done about the family?* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), p. 49.

⁸ See Stuart Christie, *Edward Heath Made Me Angry. The Christie File, 1967-1975* (Hastings: Christiebooks, 2004), Kindle edition, location 4489.

⁹ Quoted in Carr, *Angry Brigade*, p. 194.

¹⁰ Barker, in private email correspondence with author, December 2015.

¹¹ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 385-6; Steven P. Moysey, *The Road to Balcombe Street. The IRA Reign of Terror in London* (New York: Haworth Press, 2008).

¹² Nigel Fountain, *Underground: The London Alternative Press, 1966-1974* (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 141.

¹³ Christie, *Edward Heath*, loc. 4489.

¹⁴ See J.D. Taylor, "The party's over? The Angry Brigade, the counterculture, and the British New Left, 1967-72", *The Historical Journal*, 58.3 (2015), pp. 877-900.

¹⁵ "The red badge of revolution that is sweeping across Britain", *Evening Standard*, 01.12.71, pp. 22-23.

¹⁶ See Caroline Hoeffler, *British Student Activism in the Long Sixties* (New York; London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 92-6.

¹⁷ The controversy around the publication of COINTELPRO project files in March 1972, found in a raid by the Citizens Commission of an FBI Office at Media, Pennsylvania the previous March, amplified this. On assassinations, see Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin Jr., *Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), pp. 27-8, 115-22, 238-45.

¹⁸ See J. Smith and André Moncourt (eds. and trans.), *The Red Army Faction: A Documentary History, 1: Projectiles for the People* (Oakland; Montreal: PM Press, 2009), pp. 32-6.

¹⁹ See 'Sauce Box', *IT*, vol. 1, no. 28, 5 Apr. 1968, p. 2; Fountain, *Underground*, pp. 56-60; Tariq Ali, *Street Fighting Years: An Autobiography of the Sixties* (London: Verso, 2005), p. 300; and Hoeffler, *British Student Activism*, pp. 110-11.

²⁰ Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley: University of California Press: 2004), p. 120; Dan Berger, *Outlaws of America: The Weather Underground and the Politics of Solidarity* (Oakland: AK Press, 2006), pp. 136-7.

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- ²¹ Reflecting a growing internationalism, Tupamaros were named after Uruguayan Marxist rebels, and all three groups received training in a Palestine Liberation Organization camp in Jordan: see Smith and Moncourt, *Red Army Faction*, pp. 583-85.
- ²² RAF, 'The Urban Guerrilla Concept', in Smith and Moncourt, *Red Army Faction*, p. 100.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p. 86.
- ²⁴ From an untitled, photocopied bundle, produced by the SN8DG, June 1972. Note the defence group wrote 'don't know' next to the attacks on Albany Street army barracks (24.9.71), Bryant (20.10.71), Post Office Tower (30.10.71) and Elverton Street Army Tank HQ (01.11.71), claimed by the 'Angry Brigade'. This organisation had privileged access to the intentions of the Angry Brigade 'members' still at large. In "Papers of Elizabeth Wilson and Angela [Weir] Mason", The Women's Library @LSE, 7EAW/C/13.
- ²⁵ See "Expert makes bomb in court", *The Guardian*, 21.6.72, p. 5.
- ²⁶ A significant date: First of May members shoot the cars of Spanish diplomats, and the US Embassy, in London. This was considered the first 'Angry Brigade' attack in the conspiracy charge of Prescott and Purdie, but dropped for the SN8. Bond's slippage is recorded in Stoke Newington Eight Defence Group, *Conspiracy Notes* [Issue 2, undated – March 1972 speculatively], pp. 6-8.
- ²⁷ Determining the exact number of communiqués is very difficult, as none survive, and several were sent to different newspapers at the same time, often with different wording, which not all newspapers went on to publish. Gordon Carr collects fourteen in total, but one can add a fifteenth: "The Angry Brigade Geronimo Cell", *IT*, no. 144, 14.12.72, p. 8.
- ²⁸ Carr, *Angry Brigade*, pp. 217-226.
- ²⁹ Communiqué 5, in Carr, *Angry Brigade*, p. 239.
- ³⁰ Communiqué 6, *Angry Brigade*, p. 240.
- ³¹ Communiqué 11, p. 245.
- ³² Communiqué 7, pp. 241, 243. Even the SN8DG would later reject this, in *If you want peace, prepare for war* (London: SN8DG, 1972), p. 14.
- ³³ Cf. Peter Carter, on behalf of Birmingham shop stewards, in "Police question strikers on bombs at boss's home", *Daily Mail*, 20.10.71.
- ³⁴ See Carr, *Angry Brigade*, pp. 237-243.
- ³⁵ A common 'acid-delay' links all of the attacks up to Ford, March 1971; thereafter the technique changes to clockwork. Conjectural reasons for this change may reflect the growing intensity of police surveillance on the First of May after the Carr bombing, requiring a change of bomb-production source; the arrest of Purdie on 6 March 1971, dispersing the group; the move of Barker, Creek, Bott and others from Manchester to London in April 1971, followed shortly after by the Biba bombing. Clockwork delay bombs had only been used twice before in London in May 1970, according to police explosives experts, with one such device bearing Greenfield's fingerprint. See National Archives, DPP 2/5017/2.
- ³⁶ A summary of the DPP's case, now in the National Archives (hereafter NA).
- ³⁷ See DPP, "Appeal to the court of appeal", which summarises these, in NA, DPP 2/5014/2, pp. 4-5. Mendleson would later convincingly explain that she had been in Essex during this attack.
- ³⁸ On raids of IS and IMG, see International Marxist Group, *Solidarity with the Stoke Newington Eight* [flyer, 1972], in Mary McIntosh collection, LSE Archives, 3/5/2; and Carr, *Angry Brigade*, pp. 219-225.
- ³⁹ Communiqué 13, *Angry Brigade*, p. 248; Christie, *Edward Heath*, loc. 4489; SN8DG, *A Political Statement* (London: SN8DG, 1972), p. 4.
- ⁴⁰ Carr, *Angry Brigade*, p. 89.
- ⁴¹ Subsequently revealed in an FOI request: see Solomon Hughes, "Inside the Angry Brigade", *Morning Star*, 19.7.2012. Gerry Lawless had already warned the group of police infiltration back in February 1971 in *Red Mole* – see Christie, *Edward Heath*, loc. 5132. Barker is more sceptical, considering it more likely that Osner was 'winding the cops up' – private email correspondence with author, December 2015.
- ⁴² Carr, *Angry Brigade*, p. 102.
- ⁴³ Pizzey speaking in *The Angry Years*, ITV Carlton, 2004; on the planned jailbreak, see Christie, *Edward Heath*, loc. 5360.

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- ⁴⁴ See DPP, "Statement of Facts", 1972, in National Archives, DPP 2/5015/1. Chris Allen and Pauline Conroy were also charged, but by January 1972 the Attorney General instructs the DPP to drop the case against them for lack of evidence.
- ⁴⁵ On cranks and fakes, see "Consumer 'brigade'", *Guardian*, 09.12.71, p. 6; "Threat to kill the queen", *Observer*, 27.7.71, p. 1; Harold Jackson and Jackie Leishman, "Bombs that go bang in the night", *Guardian*, 02.11.71, p. 11.
- ⁴⁶ Barker, in Carr, *Angry Brigade*, p. 170; "Angry Brigade Geronimo Cell", *IT*, 144, 14.12.72, p. 8.
- ⁴⁷ Fiona MacCarthy, *Last Curtsey: The End of the Debutantes* (London: Faber and Faber, 2006), p. 255; Victoria Brittain, "Yesterday's angries", *Times*, 17.7.75, p. 10.
- ⁴⁸ Greenfield, in Carr, *Angry Brigade*, pp. 161-164; cf. police photographs of Amhurst Road, National Archives, DPP 2/5017/3.
- ⁴⁹ Freshwater stood to gain from the controversial Housing Finance Act (1972). On these and the other targets, see "'Bomb gang had plan of property chief's home'", *Times*, 02.6.72, p. 2; "Man contacted by Angry Brigade had notes on judges", *Guardian*, 18.10.72, p. 6; transcript of John Mathews, opening the prosecution case, 01.6.72, in NA, DPP 2/5018/1, p. 51.
- ⁵⁰ Creek interviewed in Martin Bright, 'Look back in anger', *Observer*, 03.02.02; Duncan Campbell, "The Angry Brigade's John Barker, 40 years on: 'I feel angrier than I ever felt then'", *Guardian*, 03.6.14.
- ⁵¹ SN8DG, *If you want peace*, p. 13.
- ⁵² Barker, in Carr, *Angry Brigade*, p. 184.
- ⁵³ Adam Gearey, Wayne Morrison & Robert Jago, *The Politics of the Common Law: Perspectives, Rights, Processes, Institutions* (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 297.
- ⁵⁴ Figures taken from Christopher Walker, "People to whom protest became a profession", *Times*, 07.12.72, p. 12; "10 years' jail for four in 'Angry Brigade' trial", *Irish Times*, 07.12.72, p. 6; Justinian, "Week in the courts", *Financial Times*, 09.12.72.
- ⁵⁵ *Daily Mirror*, leader comment, 14.1.1971. For detailed analysis of newspaper coverage of the Angry Brigade, see Chibnall, *Law-and-Order News*, pp. 96-7.
- ⁵⁶ See full trial transcript in the Mary McIntosh collection, LSE, 3/5/1.
- ⁵⁷ "Jake Prescott: Have we seen justice done?", *Guardian*, 27.01.72, p. 5.
- ⁵⁸ "The trial of Jake Prescott and Ian Purdie" [November 1971], p. 1, Hackney Archives, M4447. This photocopied bulletin was privately issued to sympathetic groups and underground media outlets.
- ⁵⁹ A fascinating trove of these survive in Mary McIntosh collection, LSE, 3/5/2.
- ⁶⁰ SN8DG, *Conspiracy Notes* [1], pp. 1, 7.
- ⁶¹ On the 'Mangrove 9', see anon. "The Mangrove; just a chapter in a 400 year story", *Time Out*, 24-30.12.71, pp. 6-7.
- ⁶² Barker, private email correspondence with author, December 2015.
- ⁶³ *Conspiracy Notes* [1], pp. 7-9; Christie, *Edward Heath*, loc. 6032.
- ⁶⁴ "McKenzie Men?", *Time Out*, 24-30.12.71, p. 4.
- ⁶⁵ Jackie Leishman, "Handwriting 'up to the jury'", *Guardian*, 30.11.72, p. 5; cf. David Ellen, "Statement of Witness": 15.9.71; 04.10.71; 22.10.71; and 29.10.71, in "Papers of Elizabeth Wilson and Angela [Weir] Mason", The Women's Library @LSE, 7EAW/C/13.
- ⁶⁶ Gary Slapper & David Kelly, *The English Legal System 2013-14* (Abingdon; New York, 2013), pp. 519-526.
- ⁶⁷ For instance "Lawyers' warnings on 'censorship' in choosing jurors", *Times*, 11.12.72, p. 3; Justinian, "The week in the courts: lessons pointed by the Angry Brigade trial", 11.12.72, *Financial Times*.
- ⁶⁸ "Juries: When challenged", *The Economist*, 20.01.73, p. 33. He also oversaw the derisory Widgery Tribunal that acquitted the British Army of all responsibility of the 'Bloody Sunday' massacre in Derry.
- ⁶⁹ See trial transcript produced by SN8DG, in the "Papers of Elizabeth Wilson and Angela [Weir] Mason", The Women's Library @LSE, 7EAW/C/13.
- ⁷⁰ Christie, *Edward Heath*, loc. 6765; Carr, *Angry Brigade*, p. 155.
- ⁷¹ "Police chief to probe row over 'planted arms'", *Mirror*, 17.6.72, p. 5; Christie, *Edward Heath*, loc. 6672.
- ⁷² Coogan, *The IRA*, pp. 389-391, 517-519.

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- ⁷³ SN8DG, trial transcript of Barker and Davies, in "Papers of Elizabeth Wilson...", 7EAW/C/13.
- ⁷⁴ "Victory and defeat", *Time Out*, 15-21.12.72, p. 4.
- ⁷⁵ "Judge in Angry Brigade case on lying", *Times*, 24.11.72, p. 4; Christopher Walker, "Jury in Angry Brigade case guarded in hotel", *Times*, 05.12.72, p. 2;
- ⁷⁶ In "The Press", *Time Out*, 15-21.12.72, p. 9.
- ⁷⁷ Wilson, "No bombs in court", *Observer*, 01.10.72, p. 12.
- ⁷⁸ David Hendy, *Life On Air: a History of Radio Four* (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp. 93-98.
- ⁷⁹ Mendleson, *World in Action*, ITV Granada, December 1972.
- ⁸⁰ Carr, *The Angry Brigade: the spectacular rise and fall of Britain's first urban guerrilla group*, BBC, January 1973.
- ⁸¹ "Bomb squad chief names two people Yard seek", *Times*, 08.12.72, p. 1.
- ⁸² Jackie Leishman, "Money not used for Brigade", *Guardian*, 21.02.73, p. 5; cf. NA, DPP 2/5014/1.
- ⁸³ Christopher Walker, "Four Angry Brigade members lose appeals", *Times*, 20.6.73, p. 4; "Cut in an Angry Brigade sentence", *Guardian*, 21.6.73, p. 8; see also "Appeal to the Court of Appeal" in NA, DPP 2/5014/2, pp. 1-12.
- ⁸⁴ Barker, private email correspondence with author, December 2015.
- ⁸⁵ Christie, *Edward Heath*, loc. 7244, and private correspondence with author; Up Against the Law Collective, "Setting up George Ince", *UPAL* 7 (Dec. 1974).
- ⁸⁶ See "Fury at bomb girl's freedom", *Mail*, 14.9.73, pp. 1-2; and "Minister defends Angry Brigade parole decision", *Financial Times*, 15.02.77, p. 12; "Anna's gone home", *Economist*, 19.02.77, p. 19; "Breaking of Anna the bomber", *Mirror*, 15.02.77, p. 3.
- ⁸⁷ Ali, *Street Fighting Years*, p. 329.
- ⁸⁸ Macdonald speaking in *The Angry Years*, ITV Carlton, 2004.