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Skovoroda, Rodion; Bruce, Alistair; Buck, Trevor and Gregory-Smith, Ian
(2019).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.06.002
Abstract
We analyze the incentive effects of the Performance-Vesting Equity (PVE) component of executive pay that is characterized by zero exercise price and performance-contingent vesting. We demonstrate how PVE with upward-sloping convex/concave vesting curves can be a more efficient risk-sharing and incentive alignment device than strictly convex stock options.
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About
- Item ORO ID
- 69548
- Item Type
- Journal Item
- ISSN
- 0165-1765
- Keywords
- Executive compensation; Incentive pay; Performance-Vesting Equity
- Academic Unit or School
-
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business > Department for Accounting and Finance
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) > Business
Faculty of Business and Law (FBL) - Copyright Holders
- © 2019 Elsevier B.V.
- Related URLs
- Depositing User
- Rodion Skovoroda