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Belief, Experience and the Act of Picture-Making

Cavedon-Taylor, Dan (2014). Belief, Experience and the Act of Picture-Making. Philosophical Explorations, 17(1) pp. 35–48.

DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link: https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2013.814802
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Abstract

Which mental states are involved in representing the world via pictures? According to the Belief-Involving View, belief is necessary. According to the Mere Experience View, belief is dispensable; one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts, so the mere experience of an object is sufficient. I examine Dominic Lopes' defence of, and Berys Gaut's objections to, the Mere Experience View. I argue Gaut's objections are unsuccessful since they (i) require the defender of the Mere Experience View to endorse a theory of action that is optional, at best; (ii) undermine Gaut's own positive claims and (iii) are question-begging. I argue that the real problem with the Mere Experience View is that it is too permissive in circumscribing situations in which one can depict objects. I further argue, contra Lopes, that the fact that one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts supplies no argument for or against either view.

Item Type: Journal Item
Copyright Holders: 2013 Taylor & Francis
ISSN: 1386-9795
Keywords: action; belief; depiction; non-epistemic seeing; pictorial representation
Academic Unit/School: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies > Philosophy
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
Item ID: 66756
Depositing User: Dan Cavedon-Taylor
Date Deposited: 19 Sep 2019 13:32
Last Modified: 19 Sep 2019 13:48
URI: http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/66756
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