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Kind Properties and the Metaphysics of Perception: Towards Impure Relationalism

Cavedon-Taylor, Dan (2015). Kind Properties and the Metaphysics of Perception: Towards Impure Relationalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96(4) pp. 487–509.

DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12112
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Abstract

A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception is between those who hold that perception is a detection relation of sensory awareness (naïve realists) and those who hold that it is representational state akin to belief (representationalists). Another key debate is between those who claim that we can perceive natural or artifactual kind properties, e.g. ‘being a tomato’, ‘being a doorknob’, etc. and those who hold we cannot. The current consensus is that these debates are entirely unrelated. I argue that this consensus is wrong: the perception of natural or artifactal kinds favours representationalism. Naïve realists who wish to accommodate such perception should embrace a disunified metaphysics of perception, one that combines relational and representational events; call such a view ‘impure relationalism.’

Item Type: Journal Item
Copyright Holders: 2015 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Lt
ISSN: 0279-0750
Academic Unit/School: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies > Philosophy
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
Item ID: 66753
Depositing User: Dan Cavedon-Taylor
Date Deposited: 19 Sep 2019 13:07
Last Modified: 23 Sep 2019 14:30
URI: http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/66753
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