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Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception

Cavedon-Taylor, Dan (2018). Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Analytic Philosophy, 59(3) pp. 391–412.

DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link: https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12131
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Abstract

Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are either causally influenced, or else are partially constituted, by mental states that are representational, including: mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a background condition for cognitive penetration that renders the phenomenon prima facie intelligible. Naïve realist or purely relational accounts of perception leave cognitive penetration less well-explained, even when formulated with so-called 'standpoints' or 'third relata.'

Item Type: Journal Item
Copyright Holders: 2018 Wiley Periodicals Inc.
ISSN: 2153-9596
Academic Unit/School: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies > Philosophy
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS)
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Item ID: 66750
Depositing User: Dan Cavedon-Taylor
Date Deposited: 19 Sep 2019 11:38
Last Modified: 04 Oct 2019 08:06
URI: http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/66750
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