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Price, Carolyn
(2020).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onz032
Abstract
Daniel Jacobson (2013) has argued that regret is a single sentiment, defined by a particular intentional content and a particular set of motivational effects. Its function, he claims, is to motivate remedial action if possible, but at any rate, to prompt policy change; he concludes that regret is concerned specifically with mistakes. In this discussion, I present an alternative account. Extending a suggestion made by Daniel Kahneman (1995, 1998), I argue that regret is not a single sentiment, but comes in a range of emotional flavours, distinguished by their phenomenology and by their cognitive and motivational effects. As a result, different flavours of regret have different fittingness conditions and contribute to our lives in different ways.
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About
- Item ORO ID
- 66180
- Item Type
- Journal Item
- ISSN
- 0026-9662
- Keywords
- Jacobson; Williams; regret; emotion; motivation; action; mistake; luck
- Academic Unit or School
-
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies > Philosophy
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) > Social Sciences and Global Studies
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS) - Research Group
- Global Challenges and Social Justice
- Copyright Holders
- © 2020 Oxford University Press
- Related URLs
- Depositing User
- Carolyn Price