Radicalisation Influence in Social Media

Miriam Fernandez\textsuperscript{1}, Antonio Gonzalez-Pardo\textsuperscript{2} and Harith Alani\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1}Open University, UK
\textsuperscript{2}Universidad Autonoma de Madrid

ABSTRACT

Identifying signs of online extremism is one of the top priorities for counter-extremist agencies. Social media platforms have become prime locations for radicalisation content and behaviour, and therefore much research and practice nowadays are focused on detecting radicalisation material, and accounts that publish such material, on these platforms. However, there is currently a limited understanding of how people on social media platforms are influenced by such content and behaviour, and what are the dynamics of this influence. In this paper, we propose a computational approach for detecting and predicting the radicalisation influence that a user is subjected to. Our approach is grounded on the notion of ‘roots of radicalisation’ from social science theories. We use our approach to analyse and compare the radicalisation influence of 112 pro-ISIS and 112 “general” Twitter users. Our results show the effectiveness of our proposed algorithms in detecting and predicting radicalisation influence, obtaining up to 0.9 F-1 measure for detection and between 0.7 and 0.8 precision for prediction. We have also conducted an in-depth analysis of the social influence received by the 112 pro-ISIS accounts, and reported on the origin, frequency and topical diversity of this influence. While this is an initial attempt towards the effective combination of social and computational perspectives, more work is needed to bridge these disciplines, and to build on their strengths to target the problem of online radicalisation.

Keywords: Online Radicalisation, Radicalisation Influence, Counter-terrorism

ISSN 2332-4031; DOI 10.1561/106.XXXXXXXX © 2014 A. Heezemans

1 Introduction

Radicalisation is a process that historically used to be triggered through social interactions in places of worship, religious schools, prisons, meeting venues, etc. Today, this process often occur on the Internet, where radicalisation content is easily shared, and potential candidates are reached more easily, rapidly, and at an unprecedented scale.

In recent years, some terrorist organisations succeeded in leveraging the power of social media to recruit individuals to their cause and ideology. It is often the case that such recruitment attempts are initiated on open social media platforms (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, YouTube) but then move onto private messages and/or encrypted platforms (e.g., WhatsApp, Telegram). Such encrypted communication channels have also been used by terrorist cells and networks to plan their operations.\textsuperscript{1}

The so-called Islamist State (IS) is arguably one of the first terrorist groups to effectively use social media for spreading their propaganda, for raising funds, and for radicalising and recruiting individuals around the globe. In 2015, the US government published a report claiming that IS succeeded in recruiting more than 25,000 foreign fighters to join their forces, including around 4,500 recruits from Europe and North America.\textsuperscript{2}

To counteract the activities of such organisations, and to halt the spread of radicalisation content, governments, organisations and social media platforms continuously search and block user accounts that are determined to be associated with such terrorist groups and their ideologies. For example, in response to the Paris attacks in November 2015, the hacker community Anonymous published the list of more than 20,000 Twitter accounts that were allegedly linked to IS. However, the methods by which they identified such accounts are too crude. This is evidenced by their inclusion in their list of the social media accounts of the U.S president Barack Obama, the White House, the BBC, the New York Times, and many other anti IS accounts.\textsuperscript{3}

There is a growing need for devising more effective and better grounded computational methods for tracking radicalisation in the online world. However, it remains unclear how radicalisation kickstarts and evolves online, and what signals and patterns are good indicators of such radicalisation behaviour.

Parallel to the development of these computational methods, multiple models have been produced by social science to reflect the factors that influence and drive people to become radicalised Moghaddam, 2005 (e.g., failed integration, poverty, discrimination). These models propose different roots of radicalisation Schmid, 2013; Borum, 2016, such as micro-levels (individual people), meso-levels (groups, communities), and macro-levels (governments, societies). Radicalisation models from psychology and sociology also capture the process of radicalisation, by de-

\textsuperscript{1}\url{https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2016-07-26/myth-lone-wolf-terrorism}
\textsuperscript{3}\url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/34919781/anonymous-anti-islamic-state-list%2Dfeatures-obama-and-bbc-news}
terminating its various stages and common sequences, such as pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination, and Jihadisation Silber et al., 2007.

It is however difficult to understand how the radicalisation process tends to kickstart and evolve online, especially when the amount of traffic generated in social media is so vast. Manual analysis is impractical and thus automatic techniques need to be used. We need to leverage closer the knowledge of theoretical models of radicalisation to design more effective technological solutions to tracking online radicalisation.

To bridge this gap, our work proposes an approach that translates the social science theory of ‘roots of radicalisation’ Schmid, 2013 into a computational model to automatically detect and predict radicalisation influence. Note that our aim is not to determine whether a user is being radicalised or not, but to provide a risk level for each user based on the individual, social and global influences to which she is exposed in social media. By conducting this work we provide the following contributions:

• A summary and analysis of a wide range of theories and models of radicalisation, including the different roots, factors and stages involved in the process.

• The development of a computational approach, grounded on social science theory of roots of radicalisation, that automatically identifies and predicts for each user the individual, social and global radicalisation influences to which she is exposed in social media.

• An comprehensive analysis of the social influence users are exposed to, including the origin, frequency and topical diversity of this influence.

The following sections are structured as follows. Section 2 describes a compendium of different theories and models of radicalisation, as well as the different automatic approaches that have been proposed so far in the literature to detect radicalisation online. Section 3 shows our proposed approach to automatically identify and predict the individual, meso and macro influences on each user. Section 4 discusses our evaluation of this model. A comprehensive investigation of social influence is described in Section 5. An in-depth discussion of our findings is reported in Section 6, while Section 7 concludes.

2 State of the Art

Understanding the mechanisms that govern the process of radicalisation, and online radicalisation in particular, has been the topic of investigation in the domain of social sciences and psychology Moghaddam, 2005, Schmid, 2013, in computing technology Berger and Strathearn, 2013, and in policing Silber et al., 2007.

In this section, we first take a look at theoretical studies to get insights into the different models that have been proposed to describe the radicalisation process, its roots, influencing factors and stages. We then focus on those works that have addressed the problem from a computational perspective. As a result of the analysis of these theories and the observation of how previous computational approaches have targeted the problem, we propose an integrated approach that can be used to capture how the different roots influence the process of online radicalisation and to detect the level of radicalisation influence each user is undergoing.

2.1 Models of Radicalisation

Different models have been proposed in the literature that aim to capture the process of radicalisation King and Taylor, 2011.4

In 2003 Borum, 2003 proposed a four-staged radicalisation model. The first stage, context, begins by identifying some event or condition as being “not right”; poverty, unemployment, government-imposed restrictions, etc. People in the first stage display a propensity of being radicalised. The second stage, comparison, is formed when such event or condition is framed as unjust in comparison to others. In the third stage, attribution, the injustice is blamed on a target policy, person or nation. Second and third stages are understood as the process of indoctrination. Finally, in the fourth stage, reaction, the responsible party is vilified, often demonised, to facilitate justification for aggression. This last stage falls under extremism. When discussing the motives leading to these stages, Borum highlights the importance of the information the user is exposed to; her values and her life experiences. In a most recent publication he stresses the need of investigating the role that the different roots micro (individual) -meso (group) and macro (global) play in understanding the etiology of radicalisation Borum, 2016.

Moghaddam proposed in 2005 the stair-case model of radicalisation Moghaddam, 2005. This model describes a similar progression to the model proposed by Borum, 2003. The initial stage, perceived deprivation, starts with feelings of discontent and perceived adversity, which people seek to alleviate. When those attempts are unsuccessful, they become frustrated, perceived options to unfair treatment, leading to feelings of aggression, displacement of aggression, which are displaced on to some perceived causal agent (who is then regarded as an enemy). With increasing anger directed towards the enemy, some come to sympathise with the violent, extremist ideology of the terrorist groups that act against them; moral engagement. Some of those sympathisers eventually join an extremist group, organisation or movement that advocates for, and perhaps engages in, terrorist violence; legitimacy of the terrorist organisation. At the top or final level among those who have joined are those who overcome any barriers to action and actually commit a terrorist attack; the terrorist act. The validity of this linear stepwise model has been criticised, suggesting that multiple mechanisms/factors could combine in different ways to produce terrorism Lygre et al., 2011.

In 2007 the New York Police Department (NYPD) published their own model of radicalisation Silber et al., 2007, focused on Jihadi-Salafi ideology and “the west”. This model is composed of four distinct phases. Pre-radicalisation; most individuals at this stage have lived “ordinary” lives and have little, if any criminal history. In a second stage, self-identification, individuals, influenced by both, internal and external factors, (loosing a job, alienation and discrimination, death in the close family, etc.) begin to explore Salafi Islam. In the third phase, indoctrination,

individuals progressively intensify their beliefs and conclude that circumstances exist where action is required to support the cause. In the final phase, *jihadisation*, individuals accept their individual duty to participate in violent jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors. The model also highlights the influence of the individual, group, and global roots of radicalisation in this process. In particular they highlight “group-think” as one of the most powerful catalysts for leading an individual and/or group to commit a terrorist attack. The model states that all individuals that begin the radicalisation process do not necessarily pass through all the stages and that many do abandon the process at different points. Although the model is sequential, individuals do not always follow a perfectly linear progression, and individuals who do pass through this entire process are likely to be involved in the planning or implementation of a terrorist attack.

McCauley and Moskalenko proposed another model in 2008 McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008. This model also highlights the importance of the different roots of radicalisation. Individuals are radicalised by personal grievances (micro), group grievances (meso) and by global factors like mass-media (macro). Based on these roots the model defines twelve mechanisms of radicalisation. Mechanisms associated with individual factors include personal victimisation and political grievance. Mechanisms associated with group factors include joining a radical group, either via step-by-step self-persuasion -the slippery slope- or via personal connections with people who are already radicalised (friends, loved ones, family members) -the power of love-. They also include extremity shift in like-minded individuals or group polarisation, where like-minded individuals join under discussion groups and feed each other with more and more extreme views; extreme cohesion under isolation and threat, which generally occurs in small combat groups where members can trust only one another; competition for the same base of support, where a subgroup gain status by proposing/conducting more radical actions in support of a cause; competition with state power, where violent government reactions against civil disobedience create sympathy for the victims of state repression; and within group competition, where competition within the group provokes the group to fission in radical subgroups. Macro mechanisms include Jujitsu politics, where displays of patriotism or nationalism create cohesion within the minority/discriminated group, hate, where mass conflicts become more extreme and martyrdom where individuals giving their life for the cause obtain the status of heroes, giving some people a life purpose.

In 2014, Kruglanski and colleagues Kruglanski *et al.*, 2014 presented a new model or radicalisation, and de-radicalisation, based on the notion that the quest for personal significance constitutes a major motivational force that may push individuals towards violent extremism. This model is composed by three key components. The motivational component or the quest for personal significance, represents the goal to which one may be committed. The ideological component identifies the means of violence as appropriate for this goal’s pursuit. The social component, or the process of networking and group dynamics through which the individual comes to share in the violence-justifying ideology. This model highlights the need of defining radicalisation as a process with different degrees.

More recently (2015), Hafez and Mullins, 2015 have focused on Islamic extremism in the West. In their model they highlight four factors that come together to produce violent radicalisation. Grievances include economic marginalisation and cultural alienation, deeply held sense of victimisation, or strong disagreements regarding the foreign policies of states. Networks refer to preexisting friendship ties between ordinary individuals and radicals that lead to the diffusion of extreme beliefs. Ideologies refer to master narratives about the world and one’s place in it. Enabling environments and support structures encompass physical and virtual settings such as the Internet, social media, prisons, or foreign terrorist training camps that provide ideological and material aid for radicalising individuals. While some of these factors are very similar to the ones highlighted in previous models, the authors propose a puzzle metaphor, i.e., a nonlinear, evolutionary approach to radicalisation, rejecting the idea of a sequential process of steps, as proposed by previous models Borum, 2003; Moghaddam, 2005.

As we can see in all these models, radicalisation often starts with individuals who are frustrated with their lives, society or their governments and their policies. These individuals meet other like-minded people, and start being influenced by information, ideas and events that ultimately can result in terrorism. However, the radicalisation process does not unfold in the same way for all people. The mechanism will vary even among those who may be exposed to the same factors and conditions. Radicalisation occurs through a process, typically either through gradual escalation, or as a series of discrete actions or decisions Borum, 2016. What all these models highlight are the different roots that influence the radicalisation process of a user:

- **Micro or Individual roots**: The micro roots of radicalisation relate to factors self-affecting the individual. Perceptions of deprivation, perceived procedural injustice, and symbolic and realistic threat can motivate individuals to seek out extreme organisations Veen, 2016.

- **Meso or group/community roots**: Individuals find support for their ideas and a relationship within a group or community. Some individuals are attracted to a group due to the perceived legitimacy of this group, others via love connections (friends, loved ones or family members who are already part of the group). Groups often use comparison with other groups to show injustice which often creates us-versus-them thinking. Besides the group identity and social interaction, individuals can also be attracted to radicalisation through the use of radical rhetoric by the group.

- **Macro or global roots**: Macro roots include the influence of government and society at home and abroad. Typical examples are the effect of globalisation and modernisation as well as foreign policy of some (western) countries. While globalisation can threaten the group identity it can also expand the radical group by feeding the us-versus-them thinking.

As we can see from our literature analysis, there is a clear association between the three roots of radicalisation (micro, meso and macro) and the various factors and stages identified in the
models or frameworks of radicalisation. While those roots originally developed from off-line interactions (e.g., attending mosques to discuss radical views) they are now rapidly developing online. Edwards and Gribbon, 2013; Von Behr, 2013 investigated internet radicalisation in Europe by speaking with convicted terrorists. Among the salient findings of their work they highlighted that: (i) the internet increases opportunities for self-radicalisation (micro), (ii) the internet allows radicalisation to occur without physical contact by replacing in-person meetings by in-person communication, and by enabling connection with like-minded individuals from across the world 24/7 (meso) and (iii) the internet creates more opportunities to become radicalised by providing access to information and propaganda, as well as by acting as echo-chamber for extremist believes (macro).

2.2 Computational approaches

Researchers from the areas of counter-terrorism and cyber-security have begun to examine the radicalisation phenomenon and to understand the social media presence and actions of extremist organisations. Edaras and Sureka, 2015a. In this section we summarise some of these computational approaches developed towards the analysis, detection and prediction of radicalisation. A summary of these approaches, their goals, the data they used, their key conclusions, and whether they make use of previous knowledge of social science models (see Section 2.1) is reported in Table 1.

Among the works developed towards analysing the online radicalisation phenomenon we can highlight the works of Klausen, 2015; Carter et al., 2014; Chatfield et al., 2015; Vergani and Bliuc, 2015 and Rowe and Saif, 2016. Klausen, 2015 studied the role of social media, and particularly Twitter, in the jihadists’ operational strategy in Syria and Iraq. During 2014, they collected information on 59 Twitter accounts of Western-origin fighters known to be in Syria, and their networks (followers and followees), leading to a total of 29,000 studied accounts. The 59 original accounts were manually identified by the research team. They used known network metrics, like degree-centrality, number of followers or number of tweets, to identify the most influential users. The authors also conducted a manual analysis of the top recent posts of influential individuals to determine the key topics of conversation (religious instruction, reporting battle and interpersonal communication), as well as the content of pictures and videos. The study highlights the direction of the communication flow, from the terrorist accounts, to the fighters based in the insurgent zones, to the followers in the west, and the prominence of female members acting as propagandist.

Carter et al., 2014, collected during 12 months information from 190 social media accounts of Western and European foreign fighters affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusrah and ISIS. These accounts were manually identified and comprise both, Facebook and Twitter accounts. The paper aimed to examine how foreign fighters receive information and who inspires them. The analysis looked at the most popular Facebook pages by “likes”, or the most popular Twitter accounts by “follows”, as well as the numbers of comments and shares of different posts. The paper also looked at the word clouds of different profiles, revealing terms like (islamic, Allah, fight, Mujahideen, ISIS, etc.) The paper reveals the existence of spiritual authorities who foreign fighters go to for inspiration and guidance.

Chatfield et al., 2015 investigated how ISIS members/supporters used Twitter to radicalise and recruit other users. For this purpose they study 3,039 tweets from one account of a known ISIS “information disseminator”. Two annotators categorised those posts manually as: propaganda (information), radicalisation (believes in support of a intergroup conflict and violence), terrorist recruitment (enticing others to join in fighting the jihad war) and other. Examples of these tweets and their content is provided as a result of this exercise. The analysis also studies the frequency and times of posting, indicating him as highly active user, as well as the network of users mentioned in the tweets, which were manually categorised as: international media, regional Arabic media, IS sympathisers and IS fighters.

Vergani and Bliuc, 2015 investigated the evolution of the ISIS’s language by analysing the text contained in the first 11 issues of Dabiq; the official ISIS internet magazine in English. To conduct their analysis they made use of the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) text analysis program. Their analysis highlights: (i) the use of expressions related to achievement, affiliation and power; (ii) a focus on emotional language, which is considered to be effective in mobilising individuals, (ii) frequent mentions of death, female, and religion, which are related to the ISIS ideology and the recruitment of women to the cause and (iv) the use of internet jargon (“btw”, “lol”, etc.), which may be more effective in establishing a communication with the youngest generations of potential recruits.

While Klausen, 2015; Carter et al., 2014; Chatfield et al., 2015 studied the social media behaviour of users once radicalised, Rowe and Saif, 2016 studied the social media actions and interactions of Europe-based Twitter users before, during, and after they exhibited pro-ISIS behaviour. Starting from 512 radicalised Twitter accounts, manually identified in the work of O’Callaghan et al., 2014, they collected their followers, filtered those based in Europe and determined whether those followers were radicalised based on two hypothesis: (i) use of pro-ISIS terminology, a lexicon was generated to test this hypothesis, and (ii) content shared from pro-ISIS accounts. Their filtering process lead to the study of 727 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts and their complete timelines. The study concluded that prior to being activated/radicalised users go through a period of significant increase in adopting innovations (i.e., communicating with new users and adopting new terms). They also highlight that social homophily has a strong bearing on the diffusion process of pro-ISIS terminology through Twitter.

Bermingham et al., 2009 looked at the user profiles and comments of a YouTube video group which purpose was “the conversion of infidels” with the aim of assessing whether users were being radicalised by the group and how this was reflected in comments and interactions. They collected a total of 135,000 comments posted by 700 members and 13,000 group contributors. They performed term frequency to observe the top-terms used in the group as well as sentiment analysis over a subset of comments filtered by a list of keywords of interest (Islam, Israel, Palestine, etc.). They also used centrality measures to identify influencers. They observed that the group was mostly devoted to religious discussion (not radicalisation) and that female users show more extreme and less tolerant views.
Badawy and Ferrara, 2018 explored the use of social media by ISIS to spread its propaganda and to recruit militants. To do so, they analysed a dataset of 1.9 million tweets posted by 25K ISIS and ISIS-sympathizers accounts. They distinguished three different types of messages (violence-driven, theological and sectarian content) and they traced a connection between online rhetoric and events happening on the real world.

Regarding detection we can highlight the works of Berger and Strathearn, 2013; Berger and Morgan, 2015, Agarwal Agarwal and Sureka, 2015b, Ashcroft Ashcroft et al., 2015, Kaati Kaati et al., 2015 and Saif Saif et al., 2017.

Berger and Strathearn, 2013 developed an approach to detect individuals more prone to extremism (in this case white supremacy) among those with interest in violent ideologies. Their approach started by collecting the social networks of twelve known extremists on Twitter (3,542 accounts were collected using this process and a maximum of 200 tweets per account was analysed) and measuring three dimensions for each user: (i) their influence (number of times their content was retweeted), (ii) exposure (number of times they retweeted other’s content) and (iii) interactivity (by looking for keywords in tweets like DM -Direct Message- or email). They concluded that high scores of influence and exposure showed a strong correlation to engagement with the extremist ideology. Manual analysis of the top 200 accounts was used for evaluating the proposed scoring.

Berger and Morgan, 2015 aimed to create a demographic snapshot of ISIS supporters on Twitter and outline a methodology for detecting pro-ISIS accounts. Starting from a set of 454 seed accounts (identified by previous research Berger and Strathearn, 2013 and recursively obtaining followers of those accounts and filtering them based on availability of the account, robot identification, etc., they obtained a final list of 20,000 pro-ISIS accounts to analyse. They estimated that at least 46,000 pro-ISIS accounts were active (as Dec 2014). They created classifiers from a subset of 6,000 accounts that were manually annotated as ISIS supporters or non-supporters. The authors concluded that pro-ISIS supporters could be identified from their profile descriptions: with terms such as succession, linger, Islamic State, Caliphate State or In Iraq all being prominent. When testing this classifier with 1,574 manually annotated accounts they obtained 94% of classification accuracy. However, profile information is only available for around 70% of accounts.

Agarwal and Sureka, 2015b aimed to investigate techniques to automatically identify hate and extremism promoting tweets. Starting from 2 crawls of Twitter data they used a semi-supervised learning approach based on a list of hashtags (#Terrorism, #Islamophobia, #Extremist) to filter those tweets related to hate and extremism. The training dataset has 10,486 tweets. They used random sampling to generate the validation dataset (1M tweets). Tweets were in English and manually annotated by four students. The created and validated two different classifiers (KNN and SVM) based on the generated datasets to classify a tweet as hate promoting or unknown. By creating and validating these classifiers they concluded that the presence of religious, war related terms, offensive words and negative emotions are strong indicators of a tweet to be hate promoting.

Ashcroft et al., 2015 aimed to automatically detect messages released by jihadist groups on Twitter. They collected tweets from 6729 Jihadist sympathisers. Two additional datasets, one of 2,000 randomly selected tweets, and one of tweets from accounts manually annotated as anti-ISIS, were collected for validation. Numbers of tweets for the pro and anti-ISIS datasets are not reported, but based on the provided experiments we estimate they should be around 2,000 each. SVM, Naive Bayes and AdaBoost classifiers were trained with this data using stylometric, time and sentiment features. Authors conclude that Fridays are a key date to spread radical tweets. Automatic detection is viable but can never replace human analysts. It should be seen as a complementary way to detect radical content.

Kaati et al., 2015 developed a classifier, based on data dependent and data independent features, to detect the supporters of Jihadist groups who disseminate propaganda content online. Their experiments were conducted over a dataset of 93 supporters (27K tweets) vs. 742 randomly collected non-supporters (60K tweets) in English and 81 supporters (16K tweets) vs. 256 randomly collected non-supporters (45K tweets) in Arabic. Supporters where identified in the Shumukh al-Islam forum. The developed models showed better performance for English than from Arabic classification. The authors conclude that, while results were promising, experiments on different datasets were needed to understand how well the classification would work on a real use-case scenario.

Saif et al., 2017 proposed a semantic graph-based approach to identify pro vs. anti-ISIS social media accounts. The authors developed multiple classifiers and showed that, their proposed classifier, trained for semantic features, outperformed those trained from lexical, sentiment, topic and network features by 7.8% on average F1-measure. Evaluation was done on a dataset 1,132 Twitter users (with their timelines). 566 pro-ISIS accounts, obtained from Rowe and Saif, 2016 and 566 anti-ISIS users, whose stance was determined by the use of anti-ISIS rhetoric.

Lara-Cabrera et al., 2017 translated a set of indicators found in social science theories of radicalisation (feelings of frustration, introversion, perception of discrimination, etc.) into a set of computational features (mostly sets of keywords) that they could automatically extract from the data. They asses the appearance of these indicators in: (i) a set of 17K tweets from pro-ISIS users provided by Kaggle, a set of 76K tweets from pro-ISIS users provided by Anonymous, and a set of 173K tweets randomly selected by opening the Twitter stream. The authors conclude that, while the proposed metrics show promising results, these metrics are mainly based on keywords. More refined metrics can therefore be proposed to map social science indicators.

Fernandez and Alani, 2018 and De Smedt et al., 2018 explored the language divergence between pro-ISIS users and non-pro-ISIS users (journalists, researchers, religious users, etc.) that use the same terminology. By understanding the contextual divergence in the use of the same words, these works aimed to provide better user and content detection mechanisms. The work of Fernandez and Alani, 2018 used 17K tweets from pro-ISIS users and 122K tweets from ‘general’ Twitter users who used the same terminology. Both of those datasets are provided by Kaggle. De Smedt et al., 2018 collected 49K tweets from pro-ISIS users in

\[^{11}\text{https://www.kaggle.com/fifthtribe/how-isis-uses-twitter}\]
\[^{12}\text{https://pastebin.com/u/CyberRog}\]
Table 1: Computational approaches towards the analysis (A), detection (D) and prediction (P) of radicalisation. SMM refers to the use of Social Science Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Conclusions</th>
<th>SSM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Klausen, 2015</td>
<td>Study Influence in the jihadihads’ operational strategy in Syria and Iraq</td>
<td>59 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts (manually assessed) and their networks (29,000 accounts)</td>
<td>Communication flow, from the terrorist accounts, to the fighters based in the insurgent zones, to the followers in the west. Prominence of female members acting as propagandists</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Carter et al., 2014</td>
<td>Examine how foreign fighters receive information and who inspires them</td>
<td>190 pro-ISIS Twitter and Facebook accounts (manually assessed)</td>
<td>Existence of spiritual authorities who foreign fighters look to for inspiration and guidance</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Chatthead et al., 2015</td>
<td>Investigate how ISIS members/supporters used Twitter to radicalise and recruit other users</td>
<td>3,039 tweets from one account of a known ISIS “information disseminator” (Twitter)</td>
<td>Posts about propaganda, radicalisation and terrorist recruitment mentioning international media, regional Arabic media, IS sympathisers and IS fighters</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Vergani and Bluc, 2015</td>
<td>Investigated the evolution of the ISIS’s language</td>
<td>first 11 issues of Dabiq, the official ISIS's internet magazine</td>
<td>Use expressions related to achievement, affiliation and power. Emotional language. Mentions of death female and religion and use of internet jargon</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Rowe and Saif, 2016</td>
<td>Study Europe-based Twitter users before, during, and after they exhibited pro-ISIS behaviour to better understand the radicalisation process</td>
<td>977 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts. Categorised as pro-ISIS base on the use of radicalised terminology and sharing from radicalised accounts</td>
<td>Prior to being activated/radicalised users go through a period of significant increase in adopting innovations (i.e. communicating with new users and adopting new terms). Social homophily has a strong bearing on the diffusion process of pro-ISIS terminology.</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Birmingham et al., 2009</td>
<td>Explore the use of sentiment and network analysis to determine if a YouTube group was used as radicalisation channel</td>
<td>135,000 comments and 13,700 user profiles. YouTube group manually assessed</td>
<td>The group was mostly devoted to religious discussion (not radicalisation). Female users show more extreme and less tolerant views</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Badawy and Ferrara, 2018</td>
<td>Explore the use of social media by ISIS to spread its propaganda and recruit militants</td>
<td>1.9 million Twitter posts by 25K IS and ISIS-sympathizers accounts</td>
<td>There are three different types of messages (violence-driven, theological and sectarian content) and a connection between online rhetoric and events happening on the real world</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Berger and Strathearn, 2013</td>
<td>Identify individuals prone to extremism from the followers of extremist accounts</td>
<td>3,542 Twitter accounts (followers of 12 known pro-ISIS accounts)</td>
<td>High scores of influence an exposure showed a strong correlation to engagement with the extremist ideology (manual evaluation)</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Saif et al., 2017</td>
<td>Create classifiers able to automatically identify pro-ISIS users in social media.</td>
<td>1,132 Twitter users (556 pro-ISIS, 556 anti-ISIS). Annotation based on the terminology used and the sharing from known radicalised accounts</td>
<td>Classifiers trained on semantic features outperform those trained from lexical, sentiment, topic and network features</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Berger and Morgan, 2015</td>
<td>Create a demographic snapshot of ISIS supporters on Twitter and outline a methodology for detecting pro-ISIS accounts</td>
<td>20,000 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts (7,574 manually annotated to test classification)</td>
<td>The authors concluded that pro-ISIS supporters could be identified from their profiles descriptions: with terms such as succession, linger, Islamic State, Caliphate State or In Iraq all being prominent</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Agarwal and Sureka, 2015a</td>
<td>Automatic identification of hate and extremism promoting tweets</td>
<td>10,486 hate and terrorism-related Twitter posts (extracted based on hashtags) + 1M random tweets annotated by students for validation</td>
<td>Presence of religious, war related terms, offensive words and negative emotions are strong indicators of a tweet to be hate promoting</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Ashcroft et al., 2015</td>
<td>Automatically detect messages released by jihadist groups on Twitter</td>
<td>2,000 pro-ISIS Twitter posts (containing pro-ISIS terminology and extracted from the accounts 6,729 ISIS sympathisers), 2,000 anti-ISIS tweets(extracted from manually assessed anti-ISIS accounts), 2009 random tweets.</td>
<td>Fridays are a key date to spread radical tweets. Automatic detection is viable but can never replace human analysts. It should be seen as a complementary way to detect radical content.</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Lara-Cabrera et al., 2017</td>
<td>Translate a set of indicators found in social science models into a set of computational features</td>
<td>17K Twitter posts from pro-ISIS users provided by Kaggle, 76K tweets from pro-ISIS users provided by Anonymous, 173K tweets randomly selected</td>
<td>The proposed metrics (mainly based on keywords) show promising results. More refined metrics can be proposed to map social science indicators</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Fernandez and Alani, 2018</td>
<td>Explore the language divergence between pro-ISIS users and non pro-ISIS users (journalists, researchers, etc.) that use the same terminology</td>
<td>17K Twitter posts from pro-ISIS users and 122K tweets from general Twitter users who used the same terminology</td>
<td>The incorporation of language divergence into the detection mechanisms can enhance their precision</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P Ferrara et al., 2016</td>
<td>Proposed a computational framework for detection and prediction of extremism in social media</td>
<td>Over 3M Twitter posts generated over 25 thousand extremist accounts (manually identified, reported, and suspended by Twitter Ferrara, 2017). 29M posts from the followers of these accounts</td>
<td>The ratio of retweets to tweets, the average number of hashtags adopted, the sheer number of tweets and the average number of retweets generated by each user, systematically rank very high in terms of predictive power</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P Magly et al., 2016</td>
<td>Proposed an approach to predict future support or opposition to ISIS</td>
<td>57,000 Twitter users who authored or shared tweets mentioning ISIS. Categorised as pro or anti-ISIS based on the use of the full name of the group vs. an abbreviated form</td>
<td>A major source of support for ISIS stems from frustration.</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the aftermath of 10 terrorist attacks, and 35K tweets by non pro-ISIS users that talk about Islam, Iraq, Syria and Western culture. Both works concluded that studying language divergence between these groups can lead to more accurate user and content detection mechanisms.

Regarding the works on prediction we can highlight the work Magdy et al., 2016 a the more recent work of Ferrara et al., 2016.

Magdy et al., 2016 proposed an approach to identify Arab Twitter accounts explicitly expressing positions supporting or opposing ISIS. They collected 57,000 Twitter users who authored or shared tweets mentioning ISIS and determined their stance based on the use of the full name of the group vs. an abbreviated form. They then created classifiers to predict future support of opposition to ISIS based on the users’ timelines before naming ISIS. The authors conclude that a major source of support for ISIS stems from frustration.

Ferrara et al., 2016 proposed a computational framework for detection and prediction of extremism in social media. For this purpose they use a dataset of over 3M tweets generated by over 25 thousand extremist accounts, who have been manually identified, reported, and suspended by Twitter Ferrara, 2017, and a dataset of 29M posts from the followers of these users. Random forest and logistic regression are used for classification and prediction based on user metadata and activity features, time features, and features based on network statistics. Two types of predictions are made: (i) whether the follower will adopt extremist content (retweet from a known pro-ISIS account) and (ii) whether the follower will interact (reply) with a known pro-ISIS account. The authors conclude that the ratio of retweets to tweets, the average number of hashtags adopted, the sheer number of tweets and the average number of retweets generated by each user, systematically rank very high in terms of predictive power.

In this section we provided some examples of the types of computational methods that have been developed to analyse, detect and predict radicalisation. An exhaustive list of works and classification is provided in the following article by Correa Correa and Sureka, 2013. Various aspects however can be highlighted from this survey.

- Except the work of Lara-Cabrera Lara-Cabrera et al., 2017 we have found no other computational works grounded on social science theories or models.
- Radicalisation detection is generally considered as a binary problem rather than as a process with different degrees or levels, where classifiers are generated to distinguish pro- vs. anti-ISIS stances.
- Approaches tend to categorise users based on a few pieces of their generated content (few comments, their most recent posts, etc.) but few works consider the complete history of the user (i.e., their timelines) when detecting radicalisation
- While most of the identified approaches focus on the analysis and detection of radicalisation, to the best of our knowledge, only the works of Magdy et al., 2016 and Ferrara Ferrara et al., 2016 focused on predicting radicalisation

We will provide a step forward with respect to previous works by introducing an approach that integrates the knowledge of social science models, in particular the social science theory of ‘roots or radicalisation’ Schmid, 2013, into a computational method to identify the risk of radicalisation for a user. Rather than treating the problem as a binary classification, our approach will provide a score that symbolises the influence of radicalisation to which a user is exposed to, based on the micro, meso and macro roots. As opposed to previous works, our approach uses the timelines of users when measuring this score, considering radicalisation as a long-term process. In addition to the detection of the influence or radicalisation in an individual, our approach also aims to predict the potential future level of radicalisation influence by employing Collaborative Filtering (CF) techniques.

3 Detecting and Predicting Radicalisation Influence

In Section 2, we highlighted how the theoretical models point at different roots of the radicalisation process (micro, meso and macro) Schmid, 2013. Our first task has therefore been to model these roots in terms of social media content. Once acquired an understanding on how these three different roots can be identified and represented, we develop an approach to automatically assess the influence of each of these roots on a user to determine up to which level she is undergoing a radicalisation process.

3.1 Modelling Roots of Radicalisation

When a user participates in a social media platform, she can perform two main actions in terms of posting: (i) creating and posting new content and (ii) sharing content posted by someone within her network.

In this work we are making the assumption that content that is produced by the user reflects the user’s inner thoughts and opinions, and it is therefore a source of data where one can look for the micro or individual radicalisation root. If within her thoughts and opinions we can find traces of radicalisation, this is a reflection that the user is influencing herself. In our work we therefore assume that the micro (individual) root is captured by all the posts that the user has created.

Similarly, shared content reflects opinions and thoughts that the user adopts as her own, but that do not originate from her. Following a similar line of thought, if these data contains traces of radicalisation we consider it as an indication of social influence. We therefore assume that the meso (or social) influence is captured by all the post that the user has shared. We are aware that a user is exposed to more information than the one that she shares. However, when a user is sharing a piece of content, it is a strong indicator that that piece of content has somehow influenced the user who is making it part of her own ideas and believes.

Within the posts that a user creates or shares from her network we can also find links (URLs) to external sites (YouTube videos, news sites, blogs, etc.). These sites capture the macro (global) level of influence over an individual.
Given a user $u$, her complete timeline in a given social media platform $P_u$, her subset of original posts $P_{uo} \subseteq P_u$, her subset of shared posts $P_{ur} \subseteq P_u$, and the set of URLs (links) contained in her posts $L_u$, we define the different roots of influence over a user as:

- $\vec{Micro}_u = (p_1, p_2, ..., p_n), p_i \in P_{uo}$
- $\vec{Meso}_u = (p_1, p_2, ..., p_m), p_j \in P_{ur}$
- $\vec{Macro}_u = (l_1, l_2, ..., l_o), l_k \in L_u$

Vectors of posts representing the micro and meso influences over a user are then broken into smaller units, in this case n-grams. For that purpose we parse the posts to remove all URLs as well as numeric and punctuation symbols. We also remove all those infrequent n-grams that appear only once in the corpus. Giving the set of n-grams obtained after preprocessing all the post, $W_p$, we define the micro and meso vectors of the user $u$ as:

- $V_{\text{micro}} = (w_1, w_2, ..., w_n), w_i \in P_{uo}$ and $w_i \in W_p$
- $V_{\text{meso}} = (w_1, w_2, ..., w_m), w_j \in P_{ur}$ and $w_i \in W_p$

The value of each n-gram in the micro vector of the user $u$ is computed as the frequency of the n-gram in the posts created by the user, normalised by the number of the posts created by the user, $\text{val}(w_i) = \text{freq}(w_i)/|P_{uo}|$.

The value of each n-gram in the meso vector of the user $u$ is computed as the frequency of the n-gram in the posts shared by the user, $P_{ur}$, normalised by the number of the posts shared by the user, $\text{val}(w_j) = \text{freq}(w_j)/|P_{ur}|$.

In the case of the macro influence, we perform automatic data scrapping over the URLs included in $\vec{Macro}_u$ by automatically parsing the HTML and extracting the title and description of the websites. For YouTube videos we also include their titles and descriptions. Giving the set of n-grams obtained after preprocessing all the links $W_l$ we define the macro vector of the user $u$ as:

- $V_{\text{macro}} = (w_1, w_2, ..., w_o), w_k \in L_u$ and $w_k \in W_l$

The value of each word in the macro vector of the user $u$ is computed as the frequency of the n-gram in all the URL entries shared by the user $L_u$, normalised by the number of URLs $\text{val}(w_k) = \text{freq}(w_k)/|L_u|$

Please note that, while we include the macro vector in our model, it has not been possible for us to compute a complete representation of this vector for all users in our experiments (Section 4). 63% of the URLs we collected to generate the macro vectors point to tweets, YouTube videos, and other websites that are now closed. Therefore, while we keep the macro vector in our model for completeness, we have discarded it from our analysis. We will therefore use only the micro and meso vector representations to determine the level of radicalisation influence over the user.

### 3.2 Detecting Radicalisation Influence

To measure the influence of each individual root on the radicalisation process of an individual we based our idea on previous approaches Vergani and Blinc, 2015; Berger and Morgan, 2015; Rowe and Saif, 2016; Lara-Cabrera et al., 2017, who have shown that language is a key descriptor of radicalised behaviour. Our hypothesis is that, if any of the previous extracted vectors contains radicalised terminology, that means that there is a certain influence over a user.

Note that, at no point we aim to claim that the user is radicalised, but we aim to estimate the level of radicalisation influence (individual, social, and global) a user is undergoing.

#### 3.2.1 Compiling Radicalisation Terminology

The use of radicalised terminology has been extensively studied in the state of the art from both, computational and social science approaches. Lexicons have been developed by experts, and have also been created from ISIS generated material, such as the Dabiq14 and Inspire15 magazines. In this work we have collected, integrated and extended existing lexicons with the aim of providing a wider set of terms and expressions representing radicalisation terminology. The integrated lexicons are summarised below:

- **ICT Glossary**: created by experts of the International Institute for Counter Terrorism,16 this glossary contains a total of 100 terms or expressions with their variants in both, English and Arabic. A screenshot with some of these expressions is displayed in Figure 2.

- **Saffron Experts**: created by experts of the Romanian Intelligence Service as part of their participation in the Saffron EU project.17 This lexicon contains 22 terms and expressions with their variants, only in English.

- **Saffron Dabiq Magazines**: this lexicon has been also generated by the Saffron EU project by compiling the list of most common terms from 27 editions of the Dabiq and Inspire Magazines. These magazines are generated by ISIS and constitute a key medium to spread their propaganda. This lexicon is composed by 257 English terms, no variants included.

---

13https://www.ranks.nl/stopwords/
16https://www.ict.org.il
17http://www.saffron-project.eu/
To merge these lexicons we consider as one unique lexical entry the term and their variances. We first incorporate syntactic variances of each term, particularly: (i) lowercase (e.g., Al-'Adu al-bai’d → al-'adu al-baid), (ii) removal of apostrophes (e.g., → Al 'Adu), (iii) removal of hyphens (e.g., → Al 'Adu al bai’d) and (iv) removal of diacritics (e.g., Am¯ ırul-Mu’m¯ in → Amir al-Mu’minin). If two lexicons contain a lexical entry with at least one term in common, we merge these entries in one unique one in the final lexicon. The final lexicon contains 305 entries, including 556 terms, expressions and variances.

3.2.2 Computing Influence

To compute the radicalisation influence of the different roots over the user we compute the cosine similarity between the micro and meso vectors and the generated lexicon \( \vec{L} \). As explained in Section 3.1, we have not been able to compute the macro vectors due to lots of URLs being now closed. We however add here the computation of macro influence for completeness.

- MicroInfluence \( (u) = \text{sim}(V_{\text{micro}}u, \vec{L}) = \frac{V_{\text{micro}}u \cdot \vec{L}}{|V_{\text{micro}}u| \times |\vec{L}|} \)
- MesoInfluence \( (u) = \text{sim}(V_{\text{meso}}u, \vec{L}) = \frac{V_{\text{meso}}u \cdot \vec{L}}{|V_{\text{meso}}u| \times |\vec{L}|} \)
- MacroInfluence \( (u) = \text{sim}(V_{\text{macro}}u, \vec{L}) = \frac{V_{\text{macro}}u \cdot \vec{L}}{|V_{\text{macro}}u| \times |\vec{L}|} \)

3.3 Predicting Radicalisation Influence

Collaborative Filtering (CF) strategies make automatic predictions (filter) about the interests of a user by collecting preference information from many users (collaborating) Shi et al., 2014. This approach usually consists of two steps: 1) look for users that have a similar rating pattern to that of the active user (the user for whom the prediction is done), and 2) use the ratings of users found in step 1 to compute the predictions for the active user. In our model, items are n-grams (terms and expressions used by the users) and ratings are the values of those n-grams (computed based on their frequency) in the posts created and shared by the users. The purpose of using CF strategies is to predict the future micro, meso and macro influences for a user.

4 Evaluation

4.1 Evaluation Set Up

We use two publicly available datasets to study radicalisation, from Kaggle datascience community. The first dataset contains 17,350 tweets from 112 distinct pro-ISIS accounts.\(^{18}\) Based on a three-month period study, users were identified using a set of keywords, such as Dawla, Amaq, Wilayat, etc., and filtered based on their use of images (ISIS flags, images of radical leaders like al-Baghdadi, Anwar Awlaki) and on their network of followers/followers.\(^{19}\) Many of these accounts have now been blocked. To ensure that this dataset contains only users that are not pro-ISIS (they could be anti-ISIS or neutral), we randomly selected 112 of them that are still active today. We have collected the timelines of 112 of these users (197,743 tweets in total). To verify that these accounts are not pro-ISIS, we randomly selected and manually checked 40 of these accounts, using two annotators (authors), who agreed (inter annotator agreement of 1.0 - Cohen’s Kappa) that these accounts do not show signs of support to ISIS.

The second dataset was created as a counterpoise of the previous dataset. It contains 122K tweets from 95,725 distinct users collected on two separate days 7/4/2016 and 7/11/2016. Tweets were collected based on the following keywords (isis, isil, daesh, islamicstate, raqqa, Mosul, ‘islamic state’).\(^{20}\) Many of these accounts have now been blocked. To ensure that this dataset contains only users that are pro-ISIS, we randomly selected and manually checked 40 of these accounts, using two annotators (authors), who agreed (inter annotator agreement of 1.0 - Cohen’s Kappa) that these accounts do not show signs of support to ISIS.

Micro and meso influence vectors have been computed for each of the 224 users based on their tweets and retweets. Regarding the macro influence vector 5,160 URLs were extracted for the first dataset and 176,877 for the second one. When collecting information for those URLs as described in Section 3.1, we discovered that 63% of those URLs are now closed. These URLs point mainly to other tweets. We have therefore discarded the global influence from the rest of our analysis, since this signal is now incomplete for many of the users in our dataset.

---

\(^{18}\)https://www.kaggle.com/fifthtribe/how-isis-uses-twitter

\(^{19}\)http://blog.kaggle.com/2016/06/03/dataset-spotlight-how-isis-uses-twitter/

\(^{20}\)https://www.kaggle.com/activegalaxy/isis-related-tweets
### Results

Figure 3 displays for all users: on the X axis the score of individual influence \((\text{MicroInfluence}(u))\), similarity of the micro vector and the lexicon) and on the Y axis the level of social influence \((\text{MesoInfluence}(u))\), similarity of the meso vector and the lexicon). We can observe two distinct clusters differentiating the group of pro-ISIS vs. general users. As expected, individual and social influences of radicalisation are both higher for pro-ISIS users. Although we do not aim to determine radicalisation stances, we created multiple classifiers to observe how the computed individual (micro) and social (meso) influence could help differentiating users in both datasets when used as features for classification. Results of this classification, using 10-fold cross validation, are reported in Table ?? All classifiers obtained more than 86% precision, with the best classifier obtaining an F1 value of 90.6%. The high accuracy is mainly due to the difference in content posted by the pro-ISIS and by the neutral accounts.

To evaluate our prediction model we split the timelines of each user into two sets, the first 80% of the post are used training and the newest 20% for testing. We use 80% of the data to create the micro and meso vectors for all users (see Figure 1). These matrices are then used to predict preferences (with regard to terms and expressions) for a user by considering the preference information (micro and meso vectors, for many users). The training data is therefore composed of a list of user, item, rating, where the items are the terms and expressions used by the user and the ratings are their values, \(val(u_i)\), computed based on frequencies (Section 3).

To perform our experiments we used the librec library,21 and tested multiple recommender algorithms and configurations for our problem.22 Best results were obtained with the asdvpp recommender Koren, 2008. As we can see in Table 3, precision is higher for the neutral user group, while recall is higher for the pro-ISIS group. Our hypothesis is that the time window of prediction may be a key influencing factor, since data for the non pro-ISIS group spans a longer time period. A key priority is to consider a more fine-grained definition of time in our future work (see Section 6). The Mean Absolute Error (MAE) value is low in all cases. A low value of MAE indicates the effectiveness of the models, since it assesses the mean of the absolute differences between the ratings and the predicted values. While there is ample room for improvement, these results demonstrate the possibility of predicting the radicalisation influence, both individual and social, affecting a user by considering information for many users.

### 5 A Deeper Look into Social Influence

As we saw in our literature review (Section 2), existing models of radicalisation highlight the relevance of social relations during the radicalisation process (i.e., individuals finding a connection with a group or community where they meet like-minded individuals and start being influenced by radical rhetoric, information and ideas). As part of this work, we have taken an in-depth look into the social influence received by the 112 pro-ISIS accounts.

To do so, we built the social graph around these accounts by considering two types of social interactions: retweets (i.e., information shared from others), and mentions (i.e., references to particular accounts). We then used this graph to analyse social influence towards pro-ISIS users, including type of influence, origin, frequency, and topical diversity.

In the following sections we describe how this social graph has been generated (Section 5.1) and the lessons learned from conducting this social influence analysis (Section 5.2).

#### 5.1 Generating the Social Graph

In Twitter, a social graph is generally explicit, and constructed via the follower relationship. However, explicit follower relations are not available as part of the Kaggle dataset (see Section 4.1). It is also not possible to collect this information any longer since the pro-ISIS accounts have been suspended.

We have therefore generated a Social Graph \(G = (V, E)\) based on the different social interactions between the users in the pro-ISIS dataset, where \(V\) is the set of users and \(E\) is the set of edges. In this graph, two users are connected (i.e. \(\exists (u_1, u_2) \in E : u_1 \in V, u_2 \in V, u_1 \neq u_2\)) if, at least, one of the following conditions are satisfied: (i) a user \(u_x\) publishes a tweet mentioning a user, \(u_y\), or (ii) a user \(u_x\) retweets a tweet published by another user, \(u_y\). Note that these edges are directed and weighted to reflect influence (see Figure 4):

- **retweet**: if \(u_x\) retweets, i.e., shares content, from \(u_y\) we assume that \(u_y\) has influenced \(u_x\). We therefore create a direct edge in the graph from \(u_y\) to \(u_x\). As mention in Section 3.1, when a user is sharing a piece of content, it is a strong indicator that that piece of content has somehow influenced the user, who is making it part of her own ideas and believes. Therefore, the weight assigned to this edge is 1, indicating confirmed influence.

- **mention**: if \(u_x\) mentions \(u_y\) in a post created by her, i.e., explicitly names user \(u_y\) in her post, we assume that \(u_x\) is trying to influence \(u_y\). We therefore create a directed edge from \(u_x\) to \(u_y\) in the graph. We however do not know whether this interaction has indeed resulted in \(u_y\) being influenced. The weight of the edge is then set to

---

21 [https://www.librec.net](https://www.librec.net)
22 [https://www.librec.net/dokuwiki/doku.php?id=AlgorithmList](https://www.librec.net/dokuwiki/doku.php?id=AlgorithmList)
From the original 112 pro-ISIS accounts and their content (17,350 tweets), see Section 4.1, we extracted 3,157 new user accounts, either because they are mentioned in these tweets, or tweets are retweeted from these accounts. For example, in Figure 4, u1 is part of the original pro-ISIS dataset, but u2 and u3 are user accounts emerging from the data processing. To provide a more completed version of the social graph (particularly in terms of interactions among these users) we:

- used the Twitter Search API\footnote{https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/search/api-reference/get-search-tweets.html} to collect the entire timeliness (all posted tweets) for these accounts. Note that not all of these accounts are currently available. Non available accounts are either suspended, closed, or private.
- selected from these timeliness the tweets that were posted on the same time-period when data was collected for the original 112 pro-ISIS accounts (i.e., September 2015 until January 2016). A total of 73,241 tweets were obtained after filtering
- used the collected tweets to enrich the graph with further nodes and relations

The resulting Social Graph $G = (V, E)$ contains 3,269 nodes (112 from the original pro-ISIS datasets and 3,157 new ones). From these nodes, 1,835 are currently not accessible any longer. If an account is suspended, we consider it as an indicator that the account may have belonged to a radical user. On the other hand, if the account is currently still alive we consider it as an indicator that the account may belong to a non-radical user. Hence, we will split users in two subgroups for the rest of our analysis.

### 5.2 Social Influence Analysis

Table 4 summarises the influence received by the pro-ISIS group from within the group (proISISInf) and from outside the group. Here we distinguish influence from: (i) those accounts that are still alive (AliveInf, i.e., alive influencers), (ii) those accounts that are not accessible via the Twitter API any longer (ClosedInf, i.e., closed influencers). We also distinguish between influence via retweets (RTs) and influence via mentions (MEs), since, as explained before, these interactions do not reflect the same type of influence.

As we can see in Table 4, the highest level of influence received by the pro-ISIS group is via retweets. Since mentions constitute less than 10% of the total influence, and also reflect an intent to influence, rather than a confirmed influence, we have decided to focus on retweets for the rest of our analysis.

#### 5.2.1 Origin

One may hypothesise that the majority of influence received by the pro-ISIS group should come from radical accounts. However, as we can see in Table 4, while a high level of influence originates from either known radical accounts (i.e., within the pro-ISIS group - 1,345 retweets), of from potential radical accounts (i.e., Twitter accounts that are now closed, ClosedInf - 2,362 retweets), a high level of influence also comes from accounts that are still alive (i.e., are not likely to belong to radical individuals, AliveInf - 2,116 retweets). This is reflected not only on the intensity of the influence (number of retweets) but also on the diversity of the influence (number of unique accounts from which tweets are retweeted). 730 alive accounts and 707 closed accounts are influencing the pro-ISIS group. Within the pro-ISIS group, 58 out 112 accounts (52%) are influencing others via retweets. It is important to point out here that, while the original 112 accounts were not collected based on explicit follower/followee Twitter relations (see Section 4.1), there is a high interconnection among these accounts, in terms of how they mention or retweet one another.

Since a similar level of influence, in terms of frequency and diversity, originates in the AliveInf and the ClosedInf groups, a key question is whether this influence is topically different (i.e., whether the themes that emerge from these subgroups are different)

### 5.2.2 Topical Divergence

To observe topical divergence we extracted the tag clouds from the posts that originated in the AliveInf and ClosedInf groups and were retweeted by the 112 pro-ISIS accounts. The weight of each term is based on $tf*idf$\footnote{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tf%E2%80%93idf} where term frequency ($tf$) is computed as the frequency of the term within each group and to compute inverse document frequency ($idf$) we consider how distinctive the term is across the three groups (AliveInf, ClosedInf and proISISInf). This gives us a better insight into how discriminative the terms are. Additionally, we manually analysed a
random sample of 1,000 tweets for each subgroup.

Figures 5 and 6 show the tag clouds for the AliveInf and ClosedInf groups respectively. We can observe that, while many terms and themes are common (ISIS, Syria, Aleppo), words commonly used to report terrorist attacks and war-related events (‘killed’, ‘destroyed’, ‘militias’, ‘victory’, ‘soldiers’, ‘fighters’, ‘civilians’), as well as words commonly associated to religion (allah, Sheikh, Muslims) are more prominent in the AliveInf group. The conducted manual analysis reflects that pro-ISIS users are retweeting news/information about war events from this group. Among the influence originating at the ClosedInf group we found more words related to locations and victories, such as ‘Syria’, ‘aleppo’, ‘libya’, ‘Palmyra’, ‘Egypt’, and references to ISIS enemies, such as Russia or the US. The manual analysis of the tweets from the ClosedInf group reveals that, while reporting about the same events, tweets originating from this group present a more propagandistic tone, promoting the victories of ISIS over its enemies.

5.2.3 Frequency

An analysis across subgroups reveals long tail patterns in terms of frequency (number of retweets) and diversity (number of users) of influence. For the AliveInf group we can see that 40% of pro-ISIS accounts retweet from less than 10 users, but a few of them (2.6%) are influenced by more than 100 different accounts (see Figure 7). Among these users we can find suspended accounts. A similar pattern can be found in Figure 8 with most pro-ISIS users retweeting 10 tweets or less from the AliveInf group, and few of them (4.5%) retweeting more than 100 tweets. These users include the previous three accounts plus another two suspended accounts. This overlap indicates that users that are exposed to
Detection of online radicalisation is faced by multiple challenges. From an accuracy perspective, the majority of the “ground truth” datasets used in previous work are either not available or lack solid verification Parekh et al., 2018. Many such datasets (e.g., Agarwal and Sureka, 2015b; Ashcroft et al., 2015; Rowe and Saif, 2016) were collected using sets of keywords, where users whose tweets contain those words would be regarded as in the “radicalised” set. However, we continue to observe that many who use radicalisation terminology in their tweets are simply reporting current events (e.g., “Islamic State hacks Swedish radio station”, or sharing harmless religious rhetoric (e.g., “If you want to talk to Allah, pray. If you want Allah to talk to you, read the Qur’an”, or even countering extremism (“armed jihad is for defence of muslim nation. Not for establishment of khilafah.”)).

There remains a great need for a gold standard dataset of accounts to be used for studying radicalisation. Such a dataset should be manually verified by experts, to ensure that cases such as the above would not be regarded as in the positive set. Currently, we are working with law enforcement agencies and experts to be able to obtain such gold standards. One source of manually identified radical accounts is Ctrl-sec, which uses volunteers to report the existence of ISIS propaganda in social media. Their initiative claims to be the one responsible of closing more than 200,000 Twitter accounts in three years. While these are key mechanisms to fight online radicalisation, the fact that accounts are rapidly closed once identified as radical means that data cannot be further collected and analysed.

Additionally, recent studies Conway et al., 2019 have shown that Twitter may not be any longer a conductive space for pro-ISIS accounts and communities to flourish, with other social networking platforms, such as Telegram, gaining momentum. The difficulties of collecting data from these more private social spaces, as well as the difficulties of sharing data across research teams (note that radicalisation data is highly sensitive and therefore controlled by privacy regulations), makes this research susceptible of falling under the street light effect. Findings are focused on the particular dataset under study and may not be generalisable. However, the proposed approach to identify and predict radicalisation influence is indeed generic and applicable to textual data from other social networks. One limitation to highlight is that, as Cohen pointed out in the domain of politics Cohen and Ruths, 2013, our approach won’t be able to identify or predict the radicalisation influence for a user unless the user does contribute to social media, either by posting or by sharing content.

While our approach to identify radicalisation influence is applicable to data from different social networking sites, and it is based on lexicons, which has the associated advantage that training data is not needed Cohen and Ruths, 2013, it is important to highlight that the used lexicon is focused on Jihadist radicalisation. To apply this approach to other types of radicalisation, such as Alt-right, the used lexicon would need to be changed or adapted.

From a policing perspective, radicalisation is not a crime. Radicals from all religions and ideologies can freely express their beliefs and practice their freedom-of-speech. However, adopting or preaching for violent-radicalisation is a criminal offence. Nevertheless, none of the related works we encountered made this distinction. In future work we will add violence detection to our methods (e.g., Basave et al., 2013).

Figure 10: Influence received by ClosedInf via RTs (posts)

In summary, our analysis of social influence shows that pro-ISIS accounts do not only receive their influence from other pro-ISIS accounts only, but also from ‘general’, non pro-ISIS accounts. This influence is rich in quantity and diversity, although following long tail patterns. I.e., most of the studied users retweeted less than 10 times from less than 10 accounts, while a few of them retweeted hundreds of times from more than a hundred different accounts. Our social analysis also concludes that, while the influencing messages from pro-ISIS and general accounts do not show a high topical divergence (i.e., themes are similar), the tone in which those messages are written presents a higher degree of subjectivity and self-promotion when originating in the ClosedInf group.

6 Discussion

Detection of online radicalisation is faced by multiple challenges. From an accuracy perspective, the majority of the “ground truth” datasets used in previous work are either not available or lack solid verification Parekh et al., 2018. Many such datasets (e.g., Agarwal and Sureka, 2015b; Ashcroft et al., 2015; Rowe and Saif, 2016) were collected using sets of keywords, where users whose tweets contain those words would be regarded as in the “radicalised” set. However, we continue to observe that many who use radicalisation terminology in their tweets are simply reporting current events (e.g., “Islamic State hacks Swedish radio station”, or sharing harmless religious rhetoric (e.g., “If you want to talk to Allah, pray. If you want Allah to talk to you, read the Qur’an”, or even countering extremism (“armed jihad is for defence of muslim nation. Not for establishment of khilafah.”)).

There remains a great need for a gold standard dataset of accounts to be used for studying radicalisation. Such a dataset should be manually verified by experts, to ensure that cases such as the above would not be regarded as in the positive set. Currently, we are working with law enforcement agencies and experts to be able to obtain such gold standards. One source of manually identified radical accounts is Ctrl-sec, which uses volunteers to report the existence of ISIS propaganda in social media. Their initiative claims to be the one responsible of closing more than 200,000 Twitter accounts in three years. While these are key mechanisms to fight online radicalisation, the fact that accounts are rapidly closed once identified as radical means that data cannot be further collected and analysed.

Additionally, recent studies Conway et al., 2019 have shown that Twitter may not be any longer a conductive space for pro-ISIS accounts and communities to flourish, with other social networking platforms, such as Telegram, gaining momentum. The difficulties of collecting data from these more private social spaces, as well as the difficulties of sharing data across research teams (note that radicalisation data is highly sensitive and therefore controlled by privacy regulations), makes this research susceptible of falling under the street light effect. Findings are focused on the particular dataset under study and may not be generalisable. However, the proposed approach to identify and predict radicalisation influence is indeed generic and applicable to textual data from other social networks. One limitation to highlight is that, as Cohen pointed out in the domain of politics Cohen and Ruths, 2013, our approach won’t be able to identify or predict the radicalisation influence for a user unless the user does contribute to social media, either by posting or by sharing content.

While our approach to identify radicalisation influence is applicable to data from different social networking sites, and it is based on lexicons, which has the associated advantage that training data is not needed Cohen and Ruths, 2013, it is important to highlight that the used lexicon is focused on Jihadist radicalisation. To apply this approach to other types of radicalisation, such as Alt-right, the used lexicon would need to be changed or adapted.

From a policing perspective, radicalisation is not a crime. Radicals from all religions and ideologies can freely express their beliefs and practice their freedom-of-speech. However, adopting or preaching for violent-radicalisation is a criminal offence. Nevertheless, none of the related works we encountered made this distinction. In future work we will add violence detection to our methods (e.g., Basave et al., 2013).
We have proposed an approach to measure and predict radicalisation influence using a keyword-based representations of the roots of radicalisation and on a combined lexicon of radical terminology. However, as in the case of generating reliable gold standards, the use of a bag of words approach can be enhanced to consider other factors (such as the semantics of the language, or social network structures) for a more complete representation. For example, when computing the meso vector (or social influence) we are not currently considering further interactions, such as ‘likes’, ‘replies’ or even ‘direct messages’. Hence, the social influence could actually be higher than the one reported in our work. While we took these aspects into consideration when designing the approach, this information is not always available for all social networks, and mostly not available in the existing datasets, hence we have discarded these elements for this first version of our model Fernandez et al., 2018. Similarly, the fact that many of the URLs shared in those posts are no longer available has made us take the decision of discarding the macro influence out of our analysis.

We have however tried to provide an in-depth analysis of the existing elements of social influence by building a social graph based on users’ interactions and analysing this graph. It is relevant to observe that: (i) social influence does originate from both, pro-ISIS as well as ‘general’ accounts and, (ii) there is not a high topical/term divergence between the influence that originates in these two subgroups. There is however a divergence on how these terms are used to portray the message Fernandez and Alani, 2018. Our future work aims to introduce a deeper level of NLP analysis to study how messages are being conveyed and if different influencing techniques are being used in those messages (e.g., gaining trust, promoting fear, etc.).

To perform our predictions we have split the user timeliness into 80-20. However, radicalisation is indeed a process, and the social influence could actually be higher than the one reported in our work. While we took these aspects into consideration when designing the approach, this information is not always available for all social networks, and mostly not available in the existing datasets, hence we have discarded these elements for this first version of our model Fernandez et al., 2018. Similarly, the fact that many of the URLs shared in those posts are no longer available has made us take the decision of discarding the macro influence out of our analysis.

We have however tried to provide an in-depth analysis of the existing elements of social influence by building a social graph based on users’ interactions and analysing this graph. It is relevant to observe that: (i) social influence does originate from both, pro-ISIS as well as ‘general’ accounts and, (ii) there is not a high topical/term divergence between the influence that originates in these two subgroups. There is however a divergence on how these terms are used to portray the message Fernandez and Alani, 2018. Our future work aims to introduce a deeper level of NLP analysis to study how messages are being conveyed and if different influencing techniques are being used in those messages (e.g., gaining trust, promoting fear, etc.).

To perform our predictions we have split the user timeliness into 80-20. However, radicalisation is indeed a process, and the social influence could actually be higher than the one reported in our work. While we took these aspects into consideration when designing the approach, this information is not always available for all social networks, and mostly not available in the existing datasets, hence we have discarded these elements for this first version of our model Fernandez et al., 2018. Similarly, the fact that many of the URLs shared in those posts are no longer available has made us take the decision of discarding the macro influence out of our analysis.

7 Conclusions

Creating intelligent technologies to automatically identify online radicalisation is a key priority of counter-extremist agencies. However, little effort has been devoted to integrate the knowledge of existing theories of radicalisation in the development of these technologies. In this paper we propose a computational approach for detecting and predicting the radicalisation influence a user is exposed to, grounded on the concept of ‘roots of radicalisation’, identified in social science models. While our approach constitutes a first step to bridge these disciples, a stronger collaboration is needed to effectively target the problem online radicalisation.

Acknowledgments

This work has been supported by Trivalent, H2020, grant agreement 740934.

References


Bermingham, A., M. Conway, L. McInerney, N. O’Hare, and A. F. Smeaton (2009). “Combining social network analysis and sentiment analysis to explore the potential for online radicalisation”. In: Int. Conf. Advances in Social Network Analysis and Mining (ASONAM’09).


Veen, J. van der (2016). “Predicting susceptibility to radicalization: An empirical exploration of psychological needs and perceptions of deprivation, injustice, and group threat”.


