Ideology, education and social change in Latin America: a case study of Bolivia 1930-1953

Thesis

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IDEOLOGY, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

IN LATIN AMERICA:

A CASE STUDY OF BOLIVIA 1930 – 1953

This thesis is submitted for the degree

of M Phil in the Faculty of Education

at the Open University in 1989

by Neil Tattersall M Ed (Manchester) B Sc (Dunelm)

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Abstract

The thesis analyses the role of education in affecting the course of social change in Bolivia from 1930 to 1953.

Initially, the thesis discusses the three main research strategies currently employed in historical sociology and argues that the subsequent analysis accords with the strategy favoured by the analytical historical sociologists.

After a brief descriptive account of the geography and political economy of Bolivia, the thesis analyses the relationship between ideology and education, emphasising the fact that the concept of ideology plays a crucial role in clarifying the way in which education functions to reproduce the social relations of production.

The thesis then sets out the apparent consensus view of the role of education in developing countries and shows how this view is justified by reference to the relationship between Latin American states as peripheral zones and their economic/political centres.

Theories of underdevelopment are reviewed with particular reference to contemporary Third World countries, the thesis arguing that cognizance needs to be taken of these theories in order to fully understand the relationship between education and social change in Bolivia.
Agrarian structures, together with the concepts of peasantry and peasant consciousness, are then discussed because recognition needs to be made of the actions of the actual people involved and, at that time, the majority of the Bolivians were peasants.

The thesis then relates how, in the 1920s and 1930s in Bolivia, there existed the conditions which allowed the challenging of the status quo by various discontented factions and which created an environment responsive to the call for an education programme for the peasants. The growth of peasant consciousness is demonstrated and its impact on Bolivia is shown through the development of an indigenal education programme.

The thesis concludes that in Bolivia between 1930 and 1953 there developed an education movement which was the focus of anti-government and subversive activity and which played a considerable part in the promulgation of a land reform law in 1953 which was instrumental in bringing about a major change in the social structure of Bolivian society.
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Publication

Most of Chapters Four and Five have been published together as an Occasional Paper by the University of Manchester Press. The details are as follows:

This thesis will seek to analyse the role of education in affecting the course of social change in Bolivia from 1930 to 1953.

The term 'social change' is very difficult to define. It is concerned with what is by historic or contemporary standards rapid and significant social change. 'Social change' can comprise both changes of the type normally referred to as 'modernisation' or 'industrialisation', and major social revolutions or upheavals. In this thesis it is used in the second sense to refer to major social revolutions in which the dominant hegemony is broken down and replaced by another.

The definition of education is not a narrow formal one which only involves the development of literacy and numeracy, but one which involves the conscientization of the recipient. Freire used 'education' in this sense to mean the learning to perceive social, political and economic contradictions and to take action against such contradictions if they appear oppressive (Freire 1972). Education is fundamentally more wide reaching than literacy and numeracy, and it needs to be located and understood in the context of an analysis of ideology.

Ideological analysis attempts to reveal the 'hidden curriculum' which operates behind all forms of knowledge and to bring to the surface the social structure which is regenerated in its development. Because of this it differs
fundamentally from the philosophical analysis of ideas which leaves out of account the social interests behind them and which maintains, implicitly at least, a belief in value neutrality. The concept of ideology is again difficult to define but it is used here in its widest sense to include all systems of ideas about society which determine social and political action.

The relationship between education and social change was very concisely expressed by Archer in the introduction to her book 'Social Origins of Educational Systems'. In this introduction Archer identifies and answers two fundamental questions about the nature and development of education systems. She writes:-

'..... why does education have the particular inputs, processes and outputs which characterise it at any given time? The basic answer is very simple. Education has the characteristics it does because of the goals pursued by those who control it. The second question asks why these particular inputs, processes and outputs change over time. The basic answer given here is equally simple. Change occurs because new educational goals are pursued by those who have the power to modify previous practices. As we shall see, these answers are deceptively simple. They are insisted upon now, at the beginning because ..... education is fundamentally about what people have wanted of it and have been able to do to it.' (Archer 1979)2.
This definition is very useful because it draws attention to, firstly, the centrality of goals and interests as the bedrock which an analysis of social movements and trends must reveal; secondly, a reminder of the complexity of the interrelationships between education policy, practice and outcomes; and lastly, and most importantly, the necessity to incorporate an analysis of the politics of educational control in any study of specific instances of shifts in educational thinking and provision.

Therefore a key dimension of this thesis is that particular educational innovations in society are directly related to changes in the control mechanisms in the political centre. It is, though, not as simple as that. It is not just that educational developments are seen as consequences of revisions in the politics of educational control. It is the view of the nature of these revisions that counts, and this involves seeing them as not merely superficial changes in how educational control is achieved and defended, but as fundamental changes in what those in control wish to achieve through education, goals which are inevitably related to their overall social vision and ambitions.

Consequently there are a number of very complex interplays between education and social change. When, as defined here, social change is characterised by a breakdown of the dominant hegemony and its replacement by another, rare historical moments are created whereby radical education experimentations can occur because the weight of existing
educational institutions and practices have been lightened. Revolutions require that the residual education systems which reflect the structure, philosophy and continuance of the old orders must be transformed in order to bring them into harmony with the new political philosophy. If this fails to happen it is likely that a revolution will be undermined because it is the education system of a particular country which is responsible for reproducing the social structure of that country. Revolutionary leaders, therefore, look upon educational change as an active and essential component of their struggle.

Precisely how education systems evolve and develop has been the subject of extensive analysis using a variety of difference theoretical perspectives, of which two are particularly important. The first of these, the functionalist theories, and their modernisation derivatives specifically designed for use in developing countries, emphasise the role of consensus in social development. The second of these, the conflict theories, either of a Weberian or neo-Marxist slant, emphasise development through continual conflict between competing groups. Both of these perspectives tend to focus on advanced industrialised societies, or on their dominant effect, whether benevolently, as in modernisation theories, or malevolently, as in dependency theories, on developing societies (after Stoer and Dale)3. Further, both of these major perspectives tend to polarise types of society and they fail to give credence to the fact that, firstly, the
complexity of the societies of developing countries means that within these societies there are elements capable of resisting or transforming the demands of interested developed countries or multi-national corporations and, secondly, that the developed countries themselves are not as autonomous as is commonly perceived, being conditioned by the external demands that are continually made upon them, particularly those demands that are either economic or political or both. Consequently, for both of the major theoretical perspectives, the strength of their analysis of the interaction between different groups in both developed and developing countries is reduced.

It is the intention of this thesis, therefore, in analysing the role education plays in effecting social change in Bolivia earlier this century, to explain the evolution of its education system with reference not only to the economic relationships both within Bolivia, and between Bolivia and other countries, but also with reference to the specific ideological and political conditions that affected Bolivia's internal and external economic relationships, both favourably and adversely.

In this thesis Chapter One looks in broad terms at the three main research strategies currently being employed in the field of historical sociology, and argues that the analysis contained in this thesis accords with the strategy favoured by the analytical historical sociologists.
Chapter Two provides a brief descriptive account of the present physical and human geography and political economy of Bolivia, the intention being to provide a useful framework on which to hang Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine, which specifically relate to the historical development of Bolivian society.

Chapter Three analyses the relationship between ideology and education, emphasising the fact that the concept of ideology plays a crucial role in clarifying the way in which education functions to reproduce the social relations of production. This relationship is located within the specific social structure found in Latin America.

Chapter Four sets out the apparent consensus view of the role of education in developing countries and shows how this view is justified by reference to the relationship between Latin American states as peripheral zones and their economic/political centres. The relationship depends on the maintenance of the status quo within the Latin American countries in order that the centre-oriented local elites in the dependent states can continue to provide surplus capital for the centre rather than the periphery.

Chapter Five reviews theories of underdevelopment with particular reference to contemporary Third World countries, and argues that cognizance needs to be taken of these theories in order to fully understand the relationship between education and social change in Bolivia.
Chapter Six briefly looks at agrarian structures and the concept of peasantry. This is because the majority of the Bolivian people are and were peasants, as here defined. In order to fully understand the relationship between education and social change it is necessary to take full cognizance of all the 'actors' involved in this relationship. In Bolivia during the period under investigation the vast majority of the 'actors' were peasants.

Chapter Seven relates how, in Bolivia in the 1920s and 1930s there existed the conditions which allowed the challenging of the status quo by various discontented factions and which created an environment responsive to the call for an education programme for the peasants.

Chapter Eight describes the philosophy of the indigenal education programme. The growth of peasant consciousness is demonstrated and its impact on Bolivia is shown. In this chapter the growth of Ucureña as a centre of anti-government activity prior to the revolution of 1952 is chartered. This growth is linked to the development of an indigenal education centre and a peasant sindicato (syndicate).

Chapter Nine concludes that in Bolivia between 1930 and 1953 there developed an education movement which was the focus of anti-government and subversive activity and which played a considerable part in the promulgation of a land
reform law in 1953 which was instrumental in bringing about a major change in the social structure of Bolivian society. The indigenal education movement of Bolivia became a force which was an important element in social change in Bolivia rather than being a mechanism by which the status quo might be maintained.

There are a number of important limitations to this thesis. In the first place I have been unable to visit Bolivia and therefore I have not been able to consult primary sources and obtain empirical evidence. Consequently this work is a synthesis with an almost exclusive reliance on secondary sources. Further, these secondary sources have either been written in English, or translated from Spanish to English, and perforce the thesis has had to be based on incomplete information. Secondly, the conditions that lead to social change as defined above, are various, complex and intertwined, with no one condition being easily isolated. There are, for example, tremendous difficulties in trying to tease out the educational strand from the socio-economic equation because developments and changes in education both condition, and are conditioned by, changes that take place in the social, political and economic structures of society. Thirdly, there are currently a number of different research strategies employed in historical sociology. As I argue in Chapter One, this thesis will concentrate on the analytical historical approach, to the virtual exclusion of the others. Lastly, two components of the work have had to be simplified in order that the thesis
achieves a reasonable balance between theoretical and factual analysis. These two are the theories of underdevelopment in Chapter Five, and the concepts of peasantry and peasant consciousness in Chapter Six. An important consideration throughout, therefore, has been a necessity to pay careful consideration to varying histriographical interpretations, and to ask questions about situations that are other than the obvious ones.
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CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH STRATEGIES EMPLOYED IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY
In discussing the role which education might play in social change in developing countries it is necessary, at the outset, to define the specific research strategy being employed and to justify the reasons for its use. The focus of this thesis is on an analysis of the role of education in affecting the course of social change in Bolivia earlier this century. The work, therefore, is historical in nature, and, in common with other historical studies, asks questions about social structures or processes understood to be concretely situated in both time and space; it addresses processes over a period of time; it analyses the interplay between meaningful actions and structural contexts in order to make sense of the unfolding of unintended as well as intended outcomes in social transformations; and it highlights the sequential patterns of social change.

There are three main research strategies used by contemporary historical sociologists in order to explain historical events (after Skocpol 1984)1. The first of these is the application of a single theoretical model to one or more of many possible instances. This research strategy was very common in the 1950s and 1960s when the discipline of sociology was assumed to be capable of formulating a general theory of society which was universally applicable, and history was assumed by sociologists to be concerned with a collection of facts, and was not considered to be problematic. Therefore the application of a general model to one or more historical
instances was the kind of historical sociology most likely to be "empirically rigorous and theoretically relevant in mainstream disciplinary circles" (Skocpol 1984). An example of this type of approach is Erikson's historical analysis of New England entitled 'Wayward Puritans: A study of the sociology of deviance' in 1966. Erikson in this work states that "The data gathered here has not been gathered in order to throw new light on the Puritan Community in New England but to add something to our understanding of deviant behaviour in general, and thus the Puritan experience in America has been treated in these pages as an example of human life everywhere. Whether or not the approach taken here is plausible therefore will eventually depend on the extend to which it helps explain the behaviour of peoples at other moments in time, and not just the particular subjects of this study".

The exponents of this strategy are chiefly interested in demonstrating and elaborating the inner logic of a general theoretical model. Consequently it is very valuable to apply a specific historical case or cases to this model because it provides the theorist with actual examples that can be used to complement and increase the plausibility of abstract concepts and theoretical propositions. On the other hand, the application of a theoretical model to actual specific instances is very arbitrary because the model must, of necessity, be prior to the historical instance. In addition, a myriad of facts about a particular instance are selectively filtered by the author,
and only those that fit the theory are provided.

The second research strategy employed by contemporary historical sociologists is that of using concepts to develop meaningful interpretations of broad historical patterns. The works that fall into this category are an overt self-conscious critical response to those theorists, of whatever political persuasion, to apply putatively against general models to history. Consequently they are a reaction to the very general deterministic tendencies found in both the structural-functionalist and traditional economic Marxist theories.

The 'interpretive' historical sociologists, as they are called, seek to obtain a meaningful interpretation of history. They do this by paying careful attention to "matters of conceptual reorientation and conceptual clarification, and they always use explicit concepts of some generality to define their topical concerns and to guide the selection and presentation of historical patterns from one or two or more cases" (Skocpol 1984). For example, Thompson puts forward (in polemical opposition to economic-determinist views) a concept of class as "an historical phenomenon", "an active process which owes as much as to agency as to condition", and then uses this concept to order selected narratives of events in early nineteenth century Britain (Thompson 1978). Interpretive historical sociologists often compare one study with another, invariably choosing opposites. Bendix, for
example, believed that comparative studies "increased the visibility of one structure by contrasting it with another. Thus European feudalism can be more sharply defined by comparison, say, with Japanese feudalism, (and) the significance of the Church in Western Civilisation can be seen more clearly by contrast with civilisations in which a comparable clerical orientation did not develop" (Bendix 1977)7. Elsewhere, Bendix further elaborates this way of using historical comparisons: "By means of comparative analysis I want to preserve a sense of historical particularity as far as I can, while still comparing different countries. Rather than aim at broader generalisations and lose that sense, I ask the same or at least similar questions of divergent materials and so leave room for divergent answers. I want to make more transparent the divergence among structures of authority and among the ways in which societies have responded to the challenges implicit in the civilisational accomplishments of other countries" (Bendix 1976)8.

The use of comparisons to highlight the particular features of each case study leads interpretive historical sociologists to choose case studies that will offer the greatest contrasts. Thus their aim is to clarify particularities through contrasts, not to prove the worth of a particular theoretical model by using example after example, as with the first group of theorists.

There are many positive aspects of the approach of
interpreive historical sociologists. Their work is easily written, much of it in a narrative form, with the orienting concepts being succinct. There is no need to move from a theoretical, abstract model to specific material that could appear selective or arbitrary. In addition, they give full rein to the actions of people as well as the institutional and cultural contexts in which they operate.

Despite these points, interpretive historical sociological analyses suffer because they are unconcerned about establishing valid explanatory arguments. Both the concepts deployed by interpretive historical sociologists, and the descriptive narratives on which they rely so heavily, assert or imply all sorts of casual connections. Therefore, for those concerned with casual validity, interpretive works which are concerned with specific cases only, can be misleading because they are not concerned to establish explanations that hold across more than single cases.

The third research strategy employed by contemporary historical sociologists is the discovery of casual regularities that account for specifically defined historical processes or outcomes and explain alternative hypotheses to achieve this end. They are collectively known as analytical historical sociologists. Their aim is to develop an adequate explanation for a well-defined outcome in history. Consequently historical facts are not analysed according to any preconceived theoretical model.
There is, therefore, no commitment to any existing theory, but to the discovery of 'concrete casual configurations' (Skocpol 1984) adequate to account for important historical patterns. For example, how important was education in social change in Bolivia?, which is the question this thesis attempts to answer, or why did some commercialising agrarian monarchies end up as democracies and others as fascist or communist dictatorships?, as Barrington Moore asks in 'Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy' (Barrington Moore 1967), or what accounts for the similar causes and outcomes of the French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions, and why did episodes of political crisis and conflict in other modernising agrarian states not proceed in the same way? as Skocpol asks in 'States and Social Revolutions' (Skocpol 1979).

The discovery of casual regularities often involves comparative studies. This is also true of the interpretive historical sociologist's strategy but the emphasis is different. Interpretive historical sociologists tend to ask what happened, and they use comparisons to highlight differences; analytical historical sociologists ask the question why something happened and they look for generalisable explanatory principles. They, therefore, use comparisons to get general causes. Barrington Moore, for example, states that "Comparisons can serve as a rough negative check on accepted historical explanations. And a comparative approach may lead to new historical generalisations", and "too strong a devotion to theory
always carried the danger that one may over-emphasise the facts that fit a theory beyond their importance in the history of individual countries" (Barrington Moore 1967).12

Because wide-ranging comparisons are so often crucial for analytical historical sociologists, the sources they use are often secondary rather than primary. This is in direct contrast to the interpretive historical sociologists who use primary sources in their in-depth studies of particular cases. If a topic is too big for purely primary research, and if excellent studies by specialists are already available in some profusion, secondary sources are appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a given study.

It is necessary though, for comparative historical sociologists who use secondary sources to pay careful attention to varying histriographical interpretations. The questions that a comparative historical sociologist needs to ask about every one of the cases included in his or her study may not correspond to the currently fashionable questions historians are asking about any given case. Thus the comparativist must be very systematic in searching through historical literatures to find evidence for and against the hypotheses being explored. As Lijphart has shown, through his six difference approaches to the study of single cases, many single case studies, as for example this thesis, are in fact extensions of the comparative method.13
Secondary research is usually supplemented by carefully selected primary investigations or reinvestigations. It is also necessary to be familiar with the primary evidence on which the secondary sources have built their conclusions. This can either re-inforce the views of the secondary sources or, alternatively, call into question some of these sources. One potential problem that needs to be avoided is that of being swamped with detail and, consequently, aspects of cases are highlighted according to their 'casual configurations' currently under discussion.

There are, though, two main limitations to the effectiveness of analytical historical sociology. The first of these is credibility. To be credible any analysis needs to be underpinned with theory. Some theoretical ideas always need to be used to set up the terms of an analytical historical investigation, even if an honestly even-handed effort is made to examine the alternative hypotheses in the course of the investigation. Secondly, much of the wording used needs to be taken at face value. For example Barrington Moore's book 'Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy' relies on the taken-for-granted significance of the words 'democracy' and 'dictatorship'. The casual arguments in this book stem from the willingness, on behalf of the reader, to accept the alternative routes of fascism, communism and democracy at face value.

This thesis is an example of analytical historical
sociology because it attempts to effectively combine the concern to address a significant historical problem, namely the relationship between education and social change in Bolivia during the period 1930-1953, with an effort to build better social theories. It, therefore, combines aspects of the research strategies employed by the interpretive historical sociologists and those who have applied general models to history, and, at the same time, avoids the extremes of particularising versus universalising that limit the usefulness and appeal of the other two approaches. This thesis, therefore, in the words of Stinchcombe attempts to build "as a carpenter builds, adjusting the measurements as he (or she) goes along, rather than as an architect builds drawing first and building later".15

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CHAPTER TWO

THE GEOGRAPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BOLIVIA
Land and People

Of all the Latin American countries it is Bolivia that faces the most intractable geographical and economic problems, not only because of its poverty and its excessive dependence on the export of a few primary products, but also because of its position as a land-locked state, and its lack of internal cohesion. Neither the export economy nor metropolitan dominance have succeeded in creating for Bolivia a strongly established nodal region that might serve to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of its peripheral regions.

The historical development of Bolivian society has been significantly influenced by its geographical setting. Bolivia is a large country, with a land area of 1.1 million sq km. The country is situated in the remote interior of the continent and is composed of two distinct parts, a mountainous region (Mountain Bolivia) and a relatively flat region (Lowland Bolivia). Mountain Bolivia comprises the Altiplano, the great central plateau of the Andes, stretching across 8 degrees of latitude, enclosed by fold mountain chains to the west and north east. The Altiplano is actually composed of a large number of high altitude basins, between 3,500 and 4,200 metres above sea level, separated by mountains some 4,000 metres higher. The Altiplano is one of the highest permanently settled regions in the world, and it is Bolivia's heartland with 70 percent of its population. The Altiplano basins are cold and
desolate and little is able to grow in these barren inhospitable surroundings. The majority of the population are Indian who practice subsistence or quasi-subsistence cultivation. The main mining areas of Bolivia are in the Altiplano.

To the west of the Altiplano is the Western Cordillera chain of the Andes which rises above 7,000 metres in places, and is virtually uninhabitable. To the north east is the North Eastern Cordillera which again rises above 7,000 metres. The North Eastern Cordillera is, though, dissected by deep valleys created by tributaries of the Amazon and Paraguay rivers. These valleys are called the Yungas. They have a humid sub-tropical climate, are rich agriculturally, and consequently are quite densely populated. To the east of the North Eastern Cordillera is the Eastern Bolivian Highland. This is a mountainous region, although lower than the Andes, dissected by deep valleys and enclosing numerous basins and plateaus. The basins in particular are well watered and quite densely populated.

Lowland Bolivia (Oriente) comprises the vast region to the east of the Eastern Bolivian Highland. It is a very large plain about 230 metres above sea level, and it is divided into two distinct zones. Towards the north the plain is humid and is covered with alternating patches of grassland, tropical forest and marsh. The area is usually flooded in the rainy season from December to April. To the south is
the Chaco, dry sandy plains with scattered scrub forest extending to the borders of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina. Altogether the lowlands make up 70 per cent of Bolivia’s surface area but contain only 29 per cent of its population and the Chaco itself is virtually uninhabited.

Bolivia, with a total land area about the size of France and Spain combined, had a population of about 1.8 million in 1900, 3 million in 1950, 4.6 million in 1976, and 6.1 million in 1983. The great majority of the population has always lived on the Altiplano and in the Yungas, although in recent years there has been migration to the eastern lowlands. This shift of the centre of gravity of the population, and of its social and economic interests, to the east has meant that the Altiplano, with its long standing pre-occupation with mining and subsistence farming, is becoming depopulated at the expense of the Oriente. In 1950 the Oriente had 20 per cent of Bolivia’s population, and in 1976 this had risen to 29 per cent. The average rate of population growth is 2.7 per cent per annum, which is relatively low for Latin America. This figure disguises the fact that the rate is below 1 per cent on the Altiplano (except in La Paz and Oruro), and over 3 per cent in the Oriente (and 6.9 per cent in Santa Cruz). 33 per cent of the population are classified as urban in Bolivia, that is living in towns of over 5,000 people, and the remaining 67 per cent are rural. It is estimated that 80 per cent of the population live at altitudes above 3,000 metres. The largest towns are La Paz, the seat of
government and the effective capital city, with a population of 1 million, and Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, agricultural centres with populations of 376,000 and 282,000 respectively (1984 figures). The legal capital is Sucre, with a population of 80,000 in 1984.

History

The physical environment is, as indicated, very difficult for human occupation. Many of the settlement nuclei are widely separated by distance and barriers of high relief, deserts or thick forests, and poor surface communications between them inevitably leaves much of the country's periphery within the economic orbit of neighbouring states. Further, centrifugal tendencies are exacerbated because of the long established policy of developing a pattern of communications which linked settlement nuclei outside Bolivia. This pattern was conditioned by the export routes, for example the railway from La Paz to Antofagasta, Bolivia's port in Chile. Consequently the external communication links are much better than the internal ones. There is, for example, still no rail connection between Santa Cruz and Cochabamba. Part of the problem has been the fact that the profits from Bolivia's exports have not been used for the country's internal infrastructure.

Despite this problem, political and cultural unity has been repeatedly imposed over large parts of the region, not least in the pre-Columbian period during the time of the
Incas. The continuing strength and vigour of the Indian population owes a great deal not only to the isolation of scattered communities, but also to the legacy of the high Indian cultures and the sheer weight of their numbers compared with those of their Spanish conquerors. More than anywhere else in Latin America the social and economic problems of integrating the Indian population into national life have proved difficult and intractable. Some have thought to restore the dignity of the Indian by an appeal to the great tradition of the Indian past, and have considered the Incaic tradition as an important element of distinctive nationality. But the dominant theme has usually been the Hispanicization of Indian groups — by the 'formal' process of conquest, conversion to Christianity, and education, or by 'informal' processes such as racial mixture, conscription, migration to the cities, and the penetration of commercialisation into remoter regions.

When the Spanish arrived in Peru in 1532 they found an Inca empire stretching from North Equador south to North West Argentina and Central Chile. The Inca empire had a high degree of unity — it had a very effective road system; it had a system of massive forced labour migration whereby young men aged 17–30 were liable for military and labour service in any part of the empire; it had a system whereby whole populations were resettled or exchanged in order to ensure the subjugation of recently conquered or potentially rebellious territory; and it had one language, Quechua. Further, the Inca empire was quite highly populated, many
of the people being very skilled in either agricultural techniques or in the production and working of precious metals. A large number of the population were urban, socially stratified, and ruled and exploited by an urban elite. It was this urban elite, the religious and administrative structure, that was the main target of the Spanish conquest, with the ultimate replacement of the indigenous urban tradition by the Mediterranean urban culture of the Spanish.

The conquest of Peru (which at that time included present-day Bolivia) led to a number of social and economic changes, two being of particular importance. The first of these were the changes to agricultural practices. Initially the Spanish introduced the system of encomienda, by which they granted themselves the right to labour services in various forms from the Indians of specified areas or villages. Initially a right to labour, the encomienda soon became a right to tribute, and then to a money payment and ultimately to land ownership. The annexation of land to newly founded townships formed the nuclei of some Spanish estates, and the crown also had the right to dispose as it wished of the waste and abandoned lands, formerly belonging to the Indians. Many of these lands were abandoned as a consequence of the operation of the mita, the forced labour system by which a population of Indians were liable to be drafted from their native villages for labour in the mines, and in construction work in towns. The second important change was the creation of
a hierarchy of new towns, many of them mining towns, and a concomitant communications system. These towns and communications had very little in common with the Incan ones.

Bolivia itself came into existence in 1825, carved from the Viceroyalty of La Plata. At its creation it contained approximately 2.3 million sq km, stretching from the Pacific to a rather indefinite northern boundary in the Amazon Basin, and across the Gran Chaco to an equally indefinite boundary to the south-east. Now, with an area of 1.1 million sq km, it covers less than half of its former extent as a result of the loss of territory to all its neighbours. Brazil and Peru appropriated unexplored and sparsely populated rain-forest, swamp and savanna in the north and north-east during the nineteenth century when the search for cinchona and wild rubber gave sudden but temporary economic value to these remote forested areas. To Paraguay, Bolivia lost much of its claim to the scrubland of the Chaco as a result of its humiliating and crushing defeat in the war of the Chaco (1932-35). But the most important loss, to which Bolivia has never been entirely reconciled, was the loss of its access to the Pacific Ocean to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-83). As a consequence of the war, in place of its former territories stretching to the Pacific Ocean, Bolivia had to be content with two railway lines, linking it with the Chilean towns of Arica and Antofagasta on the coast. Bolivia thus became the land-locked state it now is, and
the creation or the maintenance of external links by the building of railways and roads, or by the improvement of river navigation has continued to pre-occupy Bolivian policy ever since. In fact, the pattern of events in Bolivia continually reveals the interplay of political and economic factors against a background dominated by immutable problems of location - a remote mid-continental hinterland of extreme physical difficulty, its core secluded to the point of isolation within the Andean Cordilleras.

There were two very important effects of the land-locked position Bolivia ultimately found itself in. The first of these was that Bolivia failed to share the advantages of direct contact with the new ocean steamship routes in the nineteenth century, and the effective world-wide lessening of distance they initiated. Consequently, very few investors or overseas immigrants settled in Bolivia at this time. The country, therefore, failed to experience any significant modification to its essentially colonial population structure. The 1950 census, for example, showed that out of a population of 3 million, only 35,471 or 1.1 per cent were born outside Bolivia (and 10,269 of these were born in Peru). Today about 70 per cent of the population is Indian, which is the highest percentage in Latin America. This percentage has remained fairly constant - for example, a report by J B Pentland in 1826 estimated the Indian population to be 800,000 or 73 per cent of the total. The second effect of Bolivia's land-
locked position was that the country failed to experience or benefit directly from the increased mobility afforded by the first phase of railway construction in Latin America. It, therefore, remained isolated from two of the most important technical advances bearing on the growth of State organisation and State power during the nineteenth century.

Access to the coast, by direct or indirect means, thus became a priority in the conduct of Bolivia's external affairs, and it was attempted in various ways — by proposed exchanges of territory; by improved access to the navigable portions of international waterways (suggested or confirmed); by demands for a corridor to the Pacific; and by free port and free transit agreements. Bolivia has spent much of its time and energy in trying to solve this problem, but without success. In fact "Bolivia was to bargain intermittently for the cession, exchange or purchase of Arica from Peru or Chile for more than a century" (Fifer 1972).

This particular problem has had two quite different, and yet profound, effects on Bolivia. Firstly, there is little doubt that the attempts to retain a readily accessible outlet on the Pacific seriously retarded the country's development in the nineteenth century, and provoked a situation from which recovery remains slow. In fact, taking a long term view, the failure to incorporate Arica within its own territory at the time of independence must
be regarded as Bolivia’s greatest single impediment to subsequent economic progress. Secondly, and conversely, the denial of independent access to the sea has had a very large emotional effect upon that small be vociferous section of politically conscious Bolivians. In a country beset with internal problems, considerable mental energy has been continuously expended on the obsessive aspiration for a Bolivian Pacific port. It is the one topic with which there is universal agreement. It became one of the most easily projected principles upon which to focus, or attempt to focus, Bolivian nationalism. Negative though such an attitude may be in the search for national identity and political unity, Bolivians derive an element of national and political cohesion from the memory of their misfortunes (after Fifer 1972).2

Ever since independence in 1825, Bolivia’s location resulted in its subsequent external policies being dominated, rightly or wrongly, by the struggle to secure ports and establish practicable outlets to the sea. This created a paradox for Bolivia because the securing of outlets either to the sea or to the continent’s major navigable waterways would, at the same time, involve it in the control and organisation of the most remote and alien parts of its territory. Efforts to establish routes to the sea, and efforts to sustain historical claims to peripheral areas were facets of the same problem. As long as these peripheral areas remained unknown, be they desert, forest or mountain, the inherent weakness of Bolivia’s position
was, to some extent, concealed. Fringe areas could provide frontiers of separation, conveniently insulating rival national interests. Indeed, for the stronger powers, there were obvious advantages to be gained in the avoidance of detailed boundary decisions until more was known of the frontier's economic potential. Where these regions, and the routes they contained, acquired economic and thus political significance, however, former wastelands were reappraised and de jure claims to ownership had to be supported by a degree of internal territorial organisation which Bolivia could never produce. The exploitation of guano, nitrate, rubber and oil were all at some stage to become economic flashpoints on Bolivia's borderlands, and emphasis tended to shift from the ports and routeways vital for Bolivia's trade to the sudden economic revenue the frontiers could yield at that time.

Consequently the conduct of Bolivia's foreign relations has been persistently clouded and largely determined by its international boundary problems. Nevertheless, while Bolivia's five neighbouring states have, in varying degrees, trimmed back approximately one half of the inherited claims, Bolivia's role as a South American buffer state has been simultaneously confirmed. Its central location and the consequential reduction points of direct contact and possible friction it has afforded between the major powers, have helped to ensure its survival.

No less important that the vulnerability of the land-locked
state is the internal lack of cohesion within the existing boundaries. Bolivia is a country of cultural diversity, with few policies commanding widespread loyalty or support. Ratzel’s theme of a 'State - Idea' - a body of traditions and clearly defined purposes to which the majority of the population willingly subscribe, and which help to unify and distinguish a group of people within a politically organised nation-state - is very difficult to achieve in Bolivia. There is a need for the population as a whole to support, and gain fellow-feeling from, a unifying concept and purpose; where serious conflict of spirit, or of ethos exists, the cohesion of the body politic is completely destroyed. "The strongest States", Ratzel concluded, "are those in which the political idea completely fills the body of the State in all its parts. The sections of the State in which the idea does not gain acceptance fall away."

(Ratzel quoted in Fifer 1972)3.

In Bolivia the core area could do little to withstand the disintegrative forces on the perimeter. Highland Bolivia forms a complex watershed region, deeply scored by the headwaters of the Amazon and Parana - Paraguay river systems whose middle and lowers courses have always lain outside Bolivian territory. Given the inadequacy of internal communications, the economic effects of these waterways, despite their navigational hazards, tended to become centrifugal rather than centripetal. Physically, the asymmetry of the principal continental divide results in nine-tenths of Bolivia draining towards the Atlantic.
But at the same time, proximity to the Pacific seaboard dictates that Bolivia be classed and regarded as a Pacific state.

Government and Political Structure

Bolivia is a constitutional republic with a two-chamber legislative. It has a history of extreme political instability, having had as many presidents as it had had years of independent existence. (The country witnessed 189 coups in the first 164 years of its independence.) It has been under military rule for most of the last thirty years, although at the time of writing it has a civilian government.

The government's attempts to bring in economic packages to curb Bolivia's inflation have always been thwarted by popular discontent and by strikes. Real wages in 1983 were only 65 per cent of 1978 levels, and consequently living standards had been severely eroded. There are now wage negotiations every six months, or after consumer prices have increased by 40 per cent or more. The COB, Confederación Obrera Boliviana, the Bolivian workers' confederation, is very powerful and the country's miners, comparatively few in number, exert a disproportionate pressure within the COB.
Structure of the Economy

There is an ironical saying in Bolivia that the country is 'a beggar on a throne of gold'; a sparse population lives in poverty amidst rich natural resources. There is a striking discrepancy between the occupational structure of the population and the foreign trade situation; 50 per cent of the workforce is employed in agriculture, mainly subsistence or quasi-subsistence, and 95 per cent of the total exports are from the mining and hydrocarbon industries.

Bolivia relies very largely on loans and grants for development, from the UN and other international funding bodies. Low international commodity prices have negatively affected the export revenues from hydrocarbons and minerals. Its main consumer for natural gas, Argentina, has its own economic problems and its payments are often sporadic and in arrears.

Mining, oil and gas, ore smelting and agriculture are officially Bolivia's main economic activities, but the 'black economy', particularly of cocaine, is estimated to account for around three-quarters of the country's economic product.

The economy suffers from hyper-inflation. The inflation rate was estimated at 8,900 per cent per year in mid 1985 and is fuelled by regular currency devaluations and large
wage demands. Domestic problems are made worse by the foreign debt situation. Large debts were contracted in the boom years from 1974-79, and the total foreign debt is around US $3.6 billion. Debt repayments due in 1984 totalled US $977 million, compared with estimated foreign exchange earning of US $800 million. No payments on the debt have been made since early 1984 and negotiations with the International Monetary Fund continue.

Zuazo’s government attempted to ease the problem with a series of economic programmes. Its economic package in early 1984 was undertaken with the backing of the political opposition. A 75 per cent devaluation was combined with 100 - 500 per cent price increases on food and fuels, and other austerity measures were taken.

The government faces considerable opposition in its programmes for the people. The COB is disinclined to co-operate, blaming the soaring inflation on speculators and middlemen. Labour unrest is itself a cause of poor economic performance, and an additional problem for the government.

Economic devastation reached such a peak in 1984, following a major agricultural disaster and a 10 year low in mining output, that Bolivia was described by western diplomats as ‘a tinderbox ready to explode’. So far the explosion has not happened.
Agriculture

This sector is important to Bolivia’s economy and represents 20 per cent of its GDP. About 45 per cent of the economically active population are engaged in agriculture. Despite this it is an industry beset with problems - yields are low; traditional practices persist; there is a lack of credit; and there is a lack of investment in, for example, irrigation and the improvement of stock breeds.

The main export crops are sugar cane, cotton, coffee and coca leaf. The coca leaf crop in the major growth area with about 75,000 tonnes produced per annum. Some is legally consumed, a little is exported for medical products, and the rest is sold illegally and smuggled out of the country. The government seems powerless to stamp it out, although Bolivia signed the July 1984 Quito Declaration, together with Colombia, Venezuela and Equador, to clamp down on smuggling and to carry out substitution programmes for the growers. These measures were funded by the United States, but they were fiercely resisted and subsequently abandoned. The US provided a drug squad to operate in Bolivia; its members were implicated in the 1984 attempted coup d’etat. The Chapare region is the coca growing centre, an inaccessible area where control is impossible. Some 100,000 peasants are estimated to be involved in growing it, and coca earns over US $200 million per year. Coca leaf acreage increased to 100,000 hectares
Manufacturing

Manufacturing accounts for about 15 per cent of the GDP and employs one-tenth of the labour force. The main manufacturing activities are non-durable consumer goods like food, beverages, textiles and tobacco, which account for 60 per cent of the total manufacture, with the remaining 40 per cent consisting of handicrafts, intermediate goods and oil refining. Production is mainly for the domestic market and it has not expanded significantly in recent years due to the low purchasing power of the majority of the population.

Mining

Mineral ores, particularly tin, have always been Bolivia’s economic mainstay, providing the largest export product, although now natural gas has overtaken tin as the country’s main export earner. The outlook for mining is not encouraging. A combination of poor technology, little exploration and weak international metal market prices serves to curtail expansion.

Tin output is falling. Bolivia was once the world’s largest tin producer, but now it is third to Malaysia and Indonesia. Its tin is mined at high altitudes on the Altiplano. Reserves are becoming exhausted and mining
depths are increasing. Conditions are worsening, leading to labour unrest. The ores have a low metal content and Bolivia is a high-cost producer, therefore margins are thin as tin prices have recently fallen to historically low levels.

The leading tin producer is COMIBOL (Corporación Minera de Bolivia), the state-owned national mining company, which produces two-thirds of the country's output. Prior to nationalisation in 1952, three family empires controlled the tin industry, the Patiño, Hochschild and Aramayo families. The Patiño empire provided 50 per cent of the public finance of the country, and over 80 per cent of Bolivia's foreign currency in 1965 (Klein 1969)4.

Bolivia has other minerals besides tin. It is a potentially world-class lithium producer, with 70 per cent of the world's reserves, and it has 14 per cent of the world's antimony reserves.

The building of smelters is being carried out at an increasing pace. COMIBOL plans to have its total ore output smelted at home by 1990.

Energy

Hydrocarbons are Bolivia's second most important industry. Oil is sufficient to meet national demands. Natural gas is Bolivia's main export, and it is piped to Argentina, or
sent in liquid gas form to Brazil. A pipeline to São Paulo in Brazil is planned for the future.

The hydrocarbon industry has suffered from political uncertainties and the vicissitudes of policy. For example, the oil companies were nationalised in 1937; in 1956 Bolivia was again opened up to foreign companies, but in 1969 the major foreign producer was expropriated, and foreign participation only became possible again after 1972. Of the 15 foreign companies attracted by these new arrangements, only two remained in 1980.

Transport

Bolivia lacks an integrated country-wide road system. Moving goods, particularly farm products, to markets is difficult and many roads are not of an all-weather standard. Air transport is vital because much of Bolivia is inaccessible by other means.

Foreign Trade

Bolivia normally achieves a surplus on its balance of trade, but at the cost of cutting back on imports, and there is always a serious shortage of raw materials and machinery. The current account of the balance of payments is generally in deficit because of the increasing debt service costs.
Balance of trade US $million 1983

Exports - 755 (Minerals 232; Natural gas 378; Sugar 8; Coffee 18)

Imports - 545 (Mainly food and manufactured goods)

Trade balance - 210

Colonisation of the East

The colonisation of the Oriente in recent times has solved a number of Bolivia's problems. It has led to the redistribution of population, particularly by reducing the overcrowded rural population of the northern Altiplano; it has increased domestic food supplies, which has reduced imports and consequently released foreign-exchange reserves for other more important imports of capital goods; and it has strengthened national unity.

Both the Bolivian Development Corporation, which has financed settlements in the Department of Alto Beni in the north east, and the Army, which has developed settlements in the frontier region near the Brazilian and Paraguayan borders, have been instrumental in planned developments in the Oriente. Eleven military projects were underway in 1977 in the Department of Santa Cruz. The barracks are the nuclei around which the army has been responsible for the building of schools, providing a water supply and building roads, churches and markets. Agro-industrial enterprises have followed with massive land concessions, particularly north of Puerto Suárez on the Brazilian frontier.
Obviously this planned colonisation is expensive, and heavy investment is particularly needed in transport developments in order to open up new lands and provide access to the markets. The question of whether or not scarce capital should be invested in the eastern settlements poses a number of fundamental problems. Is there a political necessity to settle the national territory effectively? Where can markets be found for tropical crops once internal domestic markets have been satisfied, and if so what crops? Is the return on capital and effort in the eastern settlements likely to be greater than the return on similar expenditure incurred in programmes of agricultural intensification in older settled regions? Is the existence of available land for peasant settlements in the Oriente an adequate alternative to, and substitute for, a programme of land reform in older settled areas? As yet it is very difficult to answer these questions.

Conclusion

For decades Bolivia’s economic performance has been harmed by governmental economic policies that have swung like a pendulum between the orthodox and the populist, neither of which is capable of generating sustained growth in an economy that has such an unbalanced productive structure. For any improvement in the future there needs to be flexibility on the part of Bolivia’s external lenders, particularly a willingness to extend debt repayment schedules, and to explore ways of lowering its interest
burden.

References

2. Fifer, J V (1972), op cit
3. Fifer, J V (1972), op cit
CHAPTER THREE

IDEOLOGY IN LATIN AMERICA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO EDUCATION
The basic premise of this thesis is that the education system in contemporary capitalist societies is a "historical creation of the bourgeoisie in power, fulfilling specific functions which are realised in the general function of the reproduction of bourgeois society and its modalities of exploitation" (Sharp 1980). The term 'capitalism' is used here to delineate a mode of production. "Capitalism is founded upon a class division between proletariat, or working class, on the one hand, and bourgeoisie, or capitalist class, on the other. These classes are in endemic conflict as regards the distribution of the profits of industrial production. Wages on the one side, and profits on the other are determined by the bitter struggle between capitalist and worker, in which those who own capital are easily dominant" (Giddens 1971).

The specific functions of education are developed in two principal dimensions: the creation and development of 'skills' and talents; and the imposition and diffusion of the dominant ideological forms. In the first of these dimensions the skills and talents which the education system develops do not correspond to an objective need of a certain technical division of labour (i.e. a product of objective requirements for the organisation of production), but rather they respond to a social division of labour (i.e. a product of a society in which private property governs the means of production and, consequently, the exploitation of the labour force) generated by the historical development of the capitalist society. The education
system on producing the skills and talents which the social
division of labour demands, reproduces a social
organisation of production which entails not only differing
skills and expertise (and hence a division between mental
and manual labour), but also hierarchies, privileges and
differences in income and power.

With the 'production' of specific skills and talents the
education system helps in reproducing labour power. This
reproduction can be seen from two aspects. In its most
immediate form this is achieved by giving the labour force
the material means with which it can reproduce itself - the
wage. The wage represents only part of the value produced
by the outlay of labour power which is indispensable for
its reproduction. It is the means for paying for the
house, food etc through which the proletarist reproduces
itself (Althusser 1971)3.

The wage alone, however, does not guarantee the
reproduction of labour power. The labour power must be
'competent' to be able to work in the complex processes of
production which characterise modern industry. The
education system is responsible for the production of
talents and skills which labour power needs. Consequently,
in addition to the techniques and know-how which are needed
for the development and production of these skills, 'norms
of good conduct', attitudes which should be respected by
all in the division of labour in accordance with the work
destined - are learnt.
In other words, the reproduction of labour power not only requires the reproduction of its skills but also - at the same time - the reproduction of its submission to the established order. The agents of exploitation thus reproduce the submission to the dominant ideology by the workers and reproduce the abilities for manipulating the dominant ideology in a concrete way. This leads the discussion on to the second dimension of the education system: the imposition and diffusion of the dominant ideological forms.

All societies need some form of socialisation and it is one of the functions of the education system to provide that socialisation; but it is not possible to speak of a culture of society in a society divided into classes. All societies have a system of domination and a system of social division, through which the culture of the society or the institutions of the society, correspond to the culture and to the institutions imposed by the dominant class. They belong to the society because they have been imposed by the system of domination of the society. Thus the culture which the individuals acquire in their transit through the education system is the dominant culture of society - the culture of the dominant class. Marx, for example, states that "the ideas of the ruling class in every age are the dominant ideas" because "the class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production so that in consequence the ideas of those who
lack the means of mental production are, in general, subject to it" (Marx 1939). In other words, the function of socialisation can be defined as the process of assimilation by individuals of the dominant ideologies of the society.

It is now important to analyse the concept of "ideology" and some of its implications, particularly its reality and its function in society. Towards the middle of last century, Marx and Engels, on analysing capitalist society, showed how the base of social life is constituted by human relations with a view to the production of material goods necessary for existence. Hence we can speak of a social infrastructure: a material support, on top of which and as a dialectical function is established a superstructure, that is to say, a set of conceptions and ideas (political, judicial, philosophical), organisations and institutions (political parties, churches etc) which appear and exist in a determined period. The relationship between the infrastructure and the superstructure is not one of cause and effect. One cannot form a simplistic reduction which would make explicable all the superstructural characteristics by those of the economic infrastructure. To do this would be to analyse the relationship between the two in a very crude and deterministic way because, in order to analyse the relationship between productive activities and superstructure, it is necessary to simplify this complexity by studying it at one point in time. This treats both the infrastructure and the superstructure as
static, and therefore the process from one to the other is lost.

Ideology is conceived of in two senses in this thesis (after Hobsbawm and Sharp). The first is a formulated and generally recognised system of beliefs about society from which programmes of social action can be or are derived, for example liberalism as articulated by Locke, Bentham or J S Mill. These are socio-political theories or theoretical ideologies. Ideology used in this sense requires a consistent shared perception of reality in order to sustain a common cause of social action. The second is something much wider - a similar system of beliefs which are not formulated as much or consciously held, but which nevertheless forms the basis of social and political action of a given group of men. These are the way individuals live their relationship to their real conditions of existence, invoking a sense of ideology as lived experience rather than mere thought (Althusser 1971). These are systems of action or practical ideologies. In this sense members of a society can, and often do, entertain incongruous world views without endangering social interaction or indicating social disintegration. Nash, for example, has shown that pre-conquest myths, the rituals that re-enact them, and modern political ideologies not only can co-exist but can give strength to the self-determination of the indigenous people of the Andes (Nash 1977).
There is a dialectical relationship between these two levels of ideology, with the latter being historically and analytically prior. The insistence upon the analytical priority of practical ideology is supported by the fact that there are no examples in history of completely new systems of thought which develop in isolation from some pre-existing changes in social arrangements (Sharp 1980)\(^1\)\(_0\). The concept of practical ideologies invokes a socially defined way of thinking and acting, a set of conventions and assumptions which make meaning possible. But practical ideologies have a material reality and a material force as well, and they need to be located within an analysis of production relations, not in the sense that the latter mechanistically determine the former, but in the sense of their inseparability. By this it means that "practical ideologies both develop within and are a necessary element of definite social relations of production and they are reproduced and reinforced in the ongoing routines of the labour process" (Sharp 1980)\(^1\)\(_1\).

'Ideology', therefore, includes not only the ideologies commonly recognised and labelled as such, whose significance may be confined to a minority section of society (eg the educated), but all systems of ideas about society which determine social and political action. This is particularly important in Latin America where theoretical ideologies may be unknown or incomprehensible to the majority of people, and where there is for many people a striking divergence between the meaning of such
ideologies within the context of their country of origin and their meaning within the real context of Latin American politics.

In a class society, the practical ideologies within which people live their everyday lives occur within specific relations of domination and subordination which are related to the distribution of power. Thus everyday practical ideologies are structured, and intersected, by the forms and themes of dominant meanings and values. In order to analyse this situation fully it is necessary, following Gramsci (1971)12, to discuss the concept of hegemony. Hegemony refers to a set of assumptions, theories, practical activities, a world view through which the ruling class exerts its dominance. Its function is to reproduce on the ideological plain the conditions for class rule and the continuation of the social relations of production. It provides the fundamental categories of thought and perception of the social word which bind individuals together within one society. To the extent that it is internalised by ordinary people it becomes part of their common sense.

Hegemony, therefore, both supposes something truly total and emphasises the facts of domination. It is, in Williams's words "truly total, not merely secondary or superstructural, ..... but lived at such a depth which saturates society to such an extent, and which even constitutes the limits of common sense for most people,
that it corresponds to the reality of social experience very much more clearly than any notion derived from the formula of base and superstructure" (Williams 1973)13. In this sense, ideology permeates every level and element of society - my thinking, and that of the adversary are both determined by the ideology which permeates my reality. No thinking can be independent of the dominant ideology.

Though hegemony deeply saturates the consciousness of society and permeates to every level and every element, society is not static. The concept of ideological hegemony does not mean that non-dominant classes are ideologically manipulated through and through in some overdetermined way. On the contrary, Gramsci stressed that hegemony has to be fought for against opposing tendencies produced by the structural location of the working class in the labour process; indeed, he emphasised the contradictory nature of common sense (Gramsci 1971)14.

Common sense is, thus, never simply and purely the result of hegemony. As Sharp has suggested, "it contains elements spontaneously generated, residual elements handed down intergenerationally (even though the conditions which produced them by now may have disappeared) and borrowings from inter-class contact, as well as being intersected and moulded by the operation of hegemony into some kind of contradictory unit. Moreover, common sense responds to changes in the socio-historical process" (Sharp 1980)15.
Hegemony then "is not singular, indeed it has its own internal structures which are complex and have continually to be renewed, recreated and defended; and by the same token they can be continually challenged and in certain cases modified" (Williams 1973)16. Hegemonic practice succeeds when it has produced an unquestioned taken-for-granted attitude towards how things are, and when the members of society, operating unconsciously within the limits prescribed by the dominant ideology, maintain and help to reproduce the status quo. But this is the ruling-class ideal. In practice society is dynamic and new ideological initiatives are continually emerging, some oppositional and some counter-hegemonic. All elements or movements in a society which pose some threat to the dominant set of social relations, either new movements (emergent) or old movements (residual) will be incorporated into the dominant value system, since society has qualities of determination to follow a set line of development - it is self directing and self regulating. According to Williams the "selective tradition continually makes and remakes the dominant culture in response to changing initiatives, in a manner which tries to safeguard the fundamental relations of production through a drive to incorporate and thereby transform any initiatives which threaten the capital relation and promise to weaken the bourgeois state" (Williams 1973)17.

But hegemonic practice is not always successful. There is, of course, a tendency for dominant meanings to prevail,
given the control by the hegemonic class over the means whereby practical ideologies are structured and moulded: nevertheless, hegemony can break down particularly in time of acute social crisis. Those elements which do pose some threat to the existing set of relationships will be either modified and incorporated into the central value system, totally opposed and destroyed or, when the crisis of hegemony is omnipresent, will be successful.

This thesis will attempt to analyse the reasons for the breakdown of the prevailing hegemony in Bolivia during the period 1930-53, paying particular attention to the role which education played in this breakdown.

It is now necessary to look more closely at the case of Latin America in general and Bolivia in particular. An analysis needs to be made of theoretical ideologies in the context of Latin America’s capital accumulation process and the class struggle. This is because the differences in the context of theoretical ideologies which influence the nature of educational knowledge, cannot be understood without realising the very different genesis of capitalism in different national contexts, the changing class compromises and alliances which were characteristic of that process, and the variations in the pre-capitalist mode of production with which the developing capitalist mode was articulated. The different historical conditions in different countries is reflected in the differences in the content of the hegemonic ideology in each country.
Traditional interpretations of the roles of ideologies in Latin America, especially operative during the struggles for independence and during the successive phases of 'nation-building' and modernisation, suffered from a strong idealistic bias - they were limited by an exclusive focus on the social consequences of idea-systems. Basically there were two interpretations, the liberal, which stressed the modernising consequences of the adaptation of Western ideas throughout the different stages of Latin American development; and the nationalist, which denounced the adoption of Western ideas believing that they led to further subordination of Latin American societies to European and United States imperialism. The polemic between the two shed little light on the understanding of the actual social structure of ideas in Latin America.

This thesis will concern itself with social structure as a locus of ideas, with the focus being on both the national society and the international context - "the word-historical totality that characterises development and under-development as interacting opposites rather than as polar terms of an abstract continuum" (Corradi 1977)18. This leads to an integrated approach to Latin American development which takes cognizance of the international context, its central focus being the concept of dependence. Since an integrated analysis derived the structural features of Latin American societies from the changing patterns of their dependence vis à vis developed societies, its interpretation of ideologies is two pronged: on the
one hand it investigates how dominant ideologies legitimise the dependence of Latin America on metropolitan powers like the United States (Hamilton 1981)\textsuperscript{19}; on the other, it investigates how they also legitimise the internal rule of classes and elites that occupy strategic positions in the networks of dependence within local societies.

Consequently an examination is necessary of how Latin American development has been related to the principal aspects of world capitalist development in each of its historical stages - colonial, imperialist and neo-imperialist. The phases correspond to the divisions of the epochs of capitalism into commercial-mercantilist, industrial laissez-faire, and monopoly capitalism. An analysis of this kind sheds light on the basic problem of the role of advanced capitalism in maintaining and reinforcing underdevelopment in the Third World. Until the middle of the twentieth century the usual mechanisms of control and economic dependence were mainly loans, financial ties, the penetration of extractive industries by foreign concerns, and also the foreign development and control of infrastructural facilities in most Latin American countries. During the second half of the century, the emergence of United States capitalism as a major world force has inaugurated a new pattern of dependence in the area, under the aegis of multinational corporations.

Therefore instead of focusing attention on capitalist
expansion as an external cause of backwardness, attention needs to be focused on the constitution of dependent social structures. This necessitates an analysis of the social structures of Latin America and their processes in terms of changes that have taken place in the more inclusive system of international stratification. Social structures and idea-structures can then be studied as substructures of this more inclusive system. The function of ideologies and the corresponding behaviour of their bearers need, therefore, to be studied in terms of the position of different groups in the network of dependence. At any given moment, these ideologies reflect a two-fold condition - both national and international.

The patterns of cultural dependence have changed following the different modes of insertion of Latin American societies in the evolving international system of stratification and the structures which this insertion generated. Studies of Latin American dependence often distinguish between different periods of development each one determining different structural peculiarities for these societies. The processes of 'nation-building' correspond to the period of outward growth of Latin American economies, ie the period of expansion of exports and their primary products under the coincident or successive hegemony of England and the United States, externally, and internally under the hegemony of an oligarchy of agrarian and commercial groups. Liberalism prevailed and the ideological climate was by and large
optimistic and oriented towards the reception of European culture since the expansion of European, and above all British, capitalism entailed the corresponding expansion of local exports. And insofar as the internal differentiation of Latin American societies had not yet reached the point in which other groups could challenge the superiority of the oligarchies, the latter were able to maintain their privileged position through the political medium of semi-liberal institutions. The consciousness of dependence was largely non-existent and backwardness was perceived as the internal obstacle to westernisation (Spalding 1977).20

The consolidation and the very success of the pattern of outward growth soon led, however, to the internal differentiation of Latin American societies. Urbanisation, and the emergence of middle sectors and of a rudimentary working class as a result of subsidised industrialisation, determined the appearance of a larger variety of outlooks and ideologies and led to the emergence of new types of intellectuals, and to the organisation of oppositional movements of some consequence. Greaves, for example, has suggested that in Viru, Peru, the transition from patron-client relations to contractual relations generates a proletarian consciousness (Greaves 1972).21 While liberalism crystallised into positivism - thus reflecting the consolidation of the processes of 'nation-building' - both oppositional and reactive ideologies made their appearance; nationalism, socialism, communism etc. The social structure was now perceived as susceptible to
crisis. Converging with these developments, the pole of dominance of the international economy shifted - particularly after World War 1 - to the United States.

Up to that point the dominant elites had managed to establish a political organisation fitted both to the internal needs of oligarchic rule and to the external demands of the world market. The 'liberal-oligarchic' state had served their requirements and a liberal and humanistic culture had sanctioned their rule, as long as there was no political mobilisation of other groups in their societies. Yet the very operation of this system within the established international division of labour had stimulated social change and internal differentiation (Halper and Sterling 1971)\textsuperscript{22}. As will be shown, this was particularly important in Bolivia after the disastrous results of the Chaco War. Here nationalist ideologies became more prevalent - it was no longer the early reactive nationalism of the traditional groups, but the bourgeois 'developmental' nationalism which assumed strong populist features. This new nationalism was the expression of an urban middle class making a bid for social and political hegemony through a complicated system of class alliances, while the oligarchic rule was weakened.

In order, therefore, to fully understand the relationship between ideology, education and social change in Bolivia it is necessary to incorporate into the analysis the concepts of dependency and underdevelopment. In the following two
chapters the relationship between education, dependency, underdevelopment and social change in Latin America will be more fully explored.

References

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CHAPTER FOUR

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA
In discussing the role which education might play in social change in developing countries it is necessary to consider the social and political constraints on the development of formal education. The following chapter will look in more detail than previously at the way in which education in many Latin American states is related to the social, political and economic ties between Latin America and the developed world.

Many studies concerned with the relationship between education and socio-economic development analyse the relationships between the stage of education, measured usually by the percentage of illiterates, education levels of the population, the percentage of the population registered in the different levels and branches of the education system etc, and the level of development of the country concerned, measured by indicators such as per capita income and the percentage of the population classed as urban. In all of these studies several assumptions are held with regard to 'modernisation' and development with which comparisons are made and thus it is thought possible to establish a 'continuum' between 'backward' education systems and 'developed' education systems, where the position of each system can be measured according to such yardsticks as the percentage of illiterates etc.

These studies provide abundant empirical information but, as Sharp suggests, their explanatory capacity is limited by the fact that these comparisons are operated independently
of the actions carried out by specific social groups in a concrete historical setting (Sharp 1980)\(^1\). The education system and the processes involved in it, do not constitute universal facts, in that we can speak of an 'education' for a 'society' independently from specific situations and, as such, valid for any historical period or any society.

As stated in Chapter Three, the basic premise of this thesis is that the education system in contemporary capitalist societies is a "historical creation of the bourgeoisie in power, fulfilling specific functions which are realised in the general function of the reproduction of bourgeois society and its modalities of exploitation" (Sharp 1980)\(^2\).

The basic premise is supported by the following additional premises. The first of these is that the education system is an integral part of the economic, social and political activities of a society. Schooling does not take place in a social vacuum. More specifically the essential nature of the relationship between schooling and other social institutions is caught in Marx's statement that it is not the consciousness of men which determines their social being, but, rather, their social being which determines their consciousness. That is to say that it is men's experiences of living in the world which influence how and what they think about the world. Man's world is formed in his consciousness but the consciousness itself is formed by the conditions of his material existence in the world (Marx
The second additional premise is the fact that the inter-
relationship between the education system and the rest of
society's components is dynamic, such that the education
system is subject to continual transformation resulting
from changing economic, social and political pressures.

Thirdly, control of the education system is very important
to competing groups, since schooling is seen to both
reflect and promote the interests of these groups. The
form, content and distribution of education reflects the
distribution of power in society, and therefore, change in
education always follows on from changes in the
distribution of power.

Fourthly, education is so heavily conditioned by
constraints and compromises of the past that it has to be
seen as reproducing three societies simultaneously, the
past, the present and the future.

Fifthly, the relationship between the education system and
the economy of a country is much more complicated than one
of direct "correspondence". It has been argued by, for
example, Bowles and Gintis (1976)4, that the education
system is characterised by a "correspondence" between the
hidden curriculum of the school and the structure and the
hierarchy of the place of work thereby assuring industrial
concerns of a workforce whose attitudes have been
conditioned to the requirements of industry. This view is too deterministic, because education systems in all states have a degree of autonomy from either their economic requirements or their political demands and, consequently, the relationship between an education system and that country's economy needs to be focused on the relationship of each of them respectively to the state, which is the immediate provider and controller of education.

It is also important to realise that the state's influence on educational practice is, by no means, wholly the result of consciously planned educational policy. This discussion of the relationship between both the education system and the economy to the state in a particular country, leads to the difficult question of defining what is meant by the 'state'. Despite the difficulties of definition this analysis is crucial because it helps to explain how, as well as why, the needs of capitalism are imposed on society.

Sixthly, political ideology plays a significant role in defining the nature of the education system in a society because there is, inherently, in any substantive ideology an education programme that conforms at a theoretical level to the principles of that ideology and, at the same time, seeks to foster and sustain those principles throughout the society.

Therefore in studying the relationship between education
and social change it is important to focus on the class structure of the period to be analysed, and the changing pattern of class alliances. Further, in Bolivia, the education system and the processes carried out within it possess distinctive characteristics in contrast to other (non-Latin American) education systems, given the specific character of its 'dependent' socio-economic formation. This is because no modern state stands in isolation from the rest of the world. All societies are connected with one another historically, economically, culturally and ideologically. Development in different parts of the world is strongly influenced by the dynamics of the total world economy. Consequently, as Wickham has shown in Eire (Wickham 1980)6, an effective understanding of an education system can only be accomplished if the nature of the wider international contexts within which it is embedded is also understood. This is, despite the contributions of Wickham and others, generally a very difficult goal to achieve. Anderson, for example, states that "comparison between complex societies is, so to speak, logically impossible yet scientifically imperative". (Anderson 1959)7.

The concern of this thesis is, therefore, on the one hand with the reality of Bolivian society with its unbalanced distribution of wealth, opportunity and power consequent on its exploitative mode of production, and on the other, with setting the structure of Bolivian society within its global context.
The conditions of underdevelopment and dependence in Bolivia, and her education system, do not belong to different spheres of reality but are part of a single phenomenon whose components are strongly interconnected at internal and external levels. This is because each country has its own, unique, development problems that are dictated by both external and internal conditions. In trying to analyse this fully it is necessary to apply conceptual and analytical tools such as class conflict, in order to unveil the hidden structural roots of the underdevelopment of the country.

Education systems both shape and are shaped by the patterns of development which govern the way in which different societies change through time. The question of how important they are in promoting or hindering development is a very difficult one to answer. It is a question that needs to be analysed against a broad understanding of the interconnections which tie education in with all the different types of social structure. This is because any education system is directly affected by the mechanisms of income and resource distribution, and these mechanisms mould education programmes thereby either inhibiting or promoting development goals. Consequently the understanding of education systems needs a broader set of techniques than the hitherto often used narrow and rather crude techniques of economics. Economics appears to be, as Balogh indicates, too 'mechanistic' to grasp the subtleties of the education - development equation (Balogh 1974).
fact, broad generalisations about education and economic
growth have no credence unless account is taken of the
institutional and other factors in an economy and society
which mould education.

Consequently, what needs to be analysed is, first, the way
in which the social and political structures in Bolivian
society (including the state itself) respond to and mould
patterns of educational investment, and secondly, what are
the results of that investment. According to Williamson
(1979) and others, the argument that Third World societies
require education in order to grow economically founders
when the actual consequences of education investment and
policies are examined. This can be illustrated with
reference to four issues, each of which is connected to
each other.

The first issue concerns the rural-urban imbalance in
educational provision. Smith and others have shown that
the possibilities of upward social mobility through
education clearly discriminate against people from rural
areas. For example, rural areas in general, in Latin
America, have a higher illiteracy rate, shorter duration of
schooling, fewer schools per head of population, fewer,
classrooms per school, and fewer grades offered per school,
than urban areas (Smith 1964).

The geographical concentration of the economy in urban
areas thus has strong correlations with the geographical
concentration of school opportunities. Secondary and university education are almost totally urban phenomena. Pearse, for example, has shown that there is a tendency for the educational institutions already established in urban areas to obtain a disproportionately high percentage of educational resources and consequently deprive rural areas of any real share in the growth of education (Pearse 1974).

There are a number of reasons for this concentration of education in urban areas. For example, towns and cities obviously have large population concentrations in relatively small areas. It, therefore, costs less, pro rata, to educate an urban as opposed to a rural child. Further, there are indeed fewer children to educate because urban occupations have less use for child labour than have agricultural occupations.

The advantages of geographical location, which are caused by the economic functions of these locations as production centres, are also reflected in the university system. Even though the Universidad Nacional in Colombia is a public institution with very low fees, more than half of the student population live in cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, while the total population of these cities represents 32% of the total national population, whereas rural areas or towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants, which represent 50% of the national population, provide 11% of the university students. The pre-university origins of
these students show up this disparity even more clearly. 75.3% of the university students originate from towns with over 100,000 inhabitants whereas from towns with less than 10,000 only 1.3% of university students originate (1978 figures). Moreover, admissions examinations represent class discrimination which is orientated to the high and middle class culture.

The second issue concerns the relevance of the curriculum to the majority of the pupils. Tibor Mende, for example, has argued that

"As a matter of fact, much of education now dispensed in poor countries is not only irrelevant to the solution of the problems they face but tends to be positively harmful. It perpetuates contempt for menial tasks, and widens the gulf between the privileged minorities and the under-educated or illiterate masses". (Tibor Mende 1973)

In addition, the World Bank has reported that

"Serious imbalances are observed between the skills generated by education systems and actual needs of most developing countries. In some areas, the number of graduates surpasses the absorptive capacity of labour markets, while in others critical shortages of skills continue to create problems.

These discrepancies between the supply of, and demand for, skills are caused by a complex set of social,
cultural and political conditions and aspirations which condition the development to respond to countries' needs is accentuated by the fact that education institutions have been borrowed from developed countries and have not acquired an indigenous character" (World Bank Report 1974)13.

There is, therefore, a marked contrast between manpower needs and educational output, and this often leads to either the use of imported trained labour, or the sending away of able students to developed countries to train. Many of the latter do not return to their own country to work.

Additional problems are caused by the fact that when formal education is regarded as crucial to the maintenance of social status, the interest of those in power is likely to be in preserving a form of education that guarantees that status. In almost all Latin American countries, for example, secondary education is, in terms of the projected economic needs of the countries, disproportionately centred on traditional academic education strongly emphasising the humanities. This academic education is mainly concentrated in private schools and is the usual preparation for university entrance.

The third issue concerns the inequality within society which is maintained and legitimated through education. The literature relating to this issue is extensive both in
relation to 'developed' and Third World countries. Taking one example to illustrate the point, the World Bank Report in 1974 described the situation thus:

"The regressive character of educational systems and policies is a prevailing feature in most cases, irrespective of the level of development of countries. Educational systems not only fail to ensure mass participation ..... they also practice discrimination in their process of selection, promotion and future determination of careers. They show an elitist bias, favouring urban upper - and middle - income groups at the expense of the rural and urban poor". (World Bank Report 1974)14.

The fourth issue centres around the view expounded by Roberts, that a Third World education system "is itself a social product whose form is determined by the sequence of social changes now occurring in many developing countries" (Roberts 1974)15. Consequently, an education system changes by responding to both the social and economic strategies of people as they themselves undergo social change. For urban living, especially in large cities, makes it less easy for parents to look after a growing child when both of them may work, and when relatives are not likely to be resident close by as they are in rural settlements. Under these conditions the school becomes more significant as an instrument for controlling children as well as for educating them. These social and economic
strategies, therefore, are often in direct or indirect conflict with rational economic planning.

The situation is aptly summed up by Acosta - "Education is institutional inasmuch as it is concentrated in the secondary and higher levels of the system; regional, in the urban sections; and social, in the middle and higher sectors" (Acosta 1974)16. The education system thus discriminates in terms of those people to whom education is offered, but it is also selective within the groups which have some access to educational opportunities.

The people in society who suffer most as a consequence of the issues outlined above are the poor. They are denied educational resources and opportunity, and they are unable to perceive the structures which cause these denials. Paulo Friere has termed this lack of perception the 'culture of silence'. He came to realise that the ignorance and lethargy of the poor was the direct product of the whole system of economic, social and political domination and of paternalism - of which they were victims. Rather than being encouraged and equipped to know and respond to the concrete realities of their world they were kept 'submerged' in a situation in which such critical awareness and response were practically impossible. And it became clear to him that the whole education system was one of the major instruments for the maintenance of this culture of silence (Friere 1972)17.
In attempting to analyse the relationship between education and social change it is important to clarify some of the main factors which shape education systems in Third World countries. The first pair of factors are the interconnecting ones of politics and ideology, and they express themselves collectively most readily in developmental programmes. Developmental programmes, among other things, have a very direct 'influence' in shaping the pattern of growth of education, the distribution of life chances throughout a population, the form and content of schooling and, in particular, the standards of educational selection which operate to decide who shall have access to the different types and levels of education available. The emphasis here is on the world 'influence' - developmental programmes are the main intervening variable between the type of society and the education system of that society. That is not, though, to say that there is a direct penetration of ideas from one to the other. In other words, developmental programmes cannot be viewed as conceptual devices bridging the gap between the microscopic processes of cultural transmission and the macroscopic interrelationships between education and social change. Indeed, the complex linkages between the micro and macro levels in any country need to be analysed with reference to the actual data of that particular country. It is, therefore, the intention of this thesis to focus on actual Bolivian material when attempting to draw together the linkages between the two.
The purpose of the education system in a developmental programme is to produce a social structure that will be required for the future development of that society, so that the future of the society can be guaranteed. This purpose is essential because the developmental programme is that used by a ruling group to manage and to direct economic and social change and, consequently, it embodies the dominant social values of a society. Developmental programmes express the sense of where the dominant groups in a society want to be in the future. They, therefore, express the direction and manner of change in a society.

Developmental programmes are usually defined in ideological terms, and they do not exist in an historical vacuum. In consequence, a country undergoing rapid social change often has one developmental programme superseded by another. This particularly occurs in conditions of political instability where programmes of change derived from a particular development model have not been fully or properly implemented or are, in fact, unsuccessful. It is important, therefore, to be aware of how institutionalised a particular programme is - the greater its degree of institutionalisation and, by extension, the greater its support in society at large, is a reflection, to a very large extent, of the degree to which a dominant political group is in overall control of a country and can effectively mobilise mass support for its programme.

The third set of factors which shape education systems in
Third World countries are the constraints on development which these countries face. Developmental programmes in all societies are constrained by the factors of limited resources and competing priorities. The distribution of educational resources is uneven and limited. The limited level of resources is not a cause but a symptom of the distortions which underdevelopment imposes on social and economic life. The developmental programmes and the constraints are dialectically related, with the constraints preventing particular programmes being realised. The four main constraints are those imposed by the structure of the economy, those which depend upon traditional patterns of economic behaviour, those which relate to the capacity of a political leadership to mobilise support for development and, most importantly, the constant struggle between various social groups for education control which determines the balance of power to define instruction at any given time.

The fourth set of factors are the demands made upon educational resources. What is provided as education in a society is the outcome of difference social groups either pressing on others what they think the others need, or demanding more of what kind of education they feel that they are entitled to. The resulting compromise between provision and demand is always unstable.

The function of education in development is based on its value as a channel for social mobility, and thus as an
efficient mechanism for egalitarianism, at least in terms of opportunity. Its development brings people out of the traditional hierarchy in their country, but it also brings them into a capitalist hierarchy. While this process has elements of liberation, it includes elements of dependency and alienation as well. Most importantly, the schools do not create the conditions in which the student can begin to liberate himself. Rather, the degree of liberation allowed by the school is controlled by the dominant classes. Consequently, most of the traditional mobility channels which have included educational, economic, bureaucratic, military, ecclesiastical and political channels become closed because of the concentrations of capital, income and land. There are some very specific exceptions to the general lack of mobility, such as the flows between the middle and ruling classes, or the appearance of 'new groups' of middle classes (Ratinoff 1977)18. However the appearance of 'new groups' and inter-class upward mobility must be dependent upon the ability of the society to adopt and facilitate these new elites. This situation can become explosive in a context in which populist movements and some leftish groups are organising the masses and provoking agitation. However, if mobility becomes politically necessary as a result of agitation then mobility through education is far less onerous and risky politically speaking, for the government than a programme of generalised mobility by means of the redistribution of capital, land and wealth.
Education is then, in Latin America, a means by which peaceful social change may be brought about, a system by which covert redistribution of capital, land or income may be affected. According to Carnoy, "schooling (in dependent countries) serves as a tool to control social change" (Carnoy 1974)19. However, does this situation ever arise? In a study of education in Colombia the Departamento Nacional de Planeacion in 1970 concluded that 881 per thousand of the total school age population were excluded from social mobility and participation in development. However, in Colombia, many of the illiterates which the planeacion designate as 'resistant to change' are those which ANAPO, a political party, claims as their basic support. The participation in party politics by these marginal groups indicates some desire to participate in social change. Huizer has stated that 'resistance to change' of peasants is mainly a reaction of self-defence against the resistance of change of the traditional elites which fear to lose their domination over the peasants. He has shown that the peasants can be mobilised quite well, if this is done to change the present status quo for a system under which peasants can reasonably expect effective improvements (Huizer 1972)20.

'Resistance to change' is then not a personal problem, but a structural situation created by the economic situation in general and the education system in particular, both of which have excluded large marginal groups from education opportunities - it is the result of both overt and covert
repression. Thus education in this sense is a regressive factor in development - it supports the structures of underdevelopment and it has served as an obstacle to the social mobility of the great majority of the population. Despite this, it is important to realise that 'resistance to change', rather than being an inherent peasant characteristic and an impediment to development and change can be the beginning of an effective peasant action for change. In fact, peasant distrust can be one of the most important promoters of change and development if it is utilised as a force that brings peasants together in a common struggle opposing the traditional vested interest of landlords and other repressive forces (Huizer 1972)21. As Weffert states, "The awakening of critical consciousness leads the way to the expression of social discontents precisely because these discontents are real components of an oppressive situation" (Weffert 1972)22.

The education structure is a mechanism for ensuring the stability of the system, a mechanism for educating the 'right' person or groups or areas, and consequently it is a tool for implementing the needs of foreign interests. However, although the education structure has been an obstacle to the majority of the population by depriving them of opportunities to attend school it has also been an effective mechanism for adaption and change to the needs of dependency. By gearing itself to modernisation, or to the creation of a new technocracy to serve the interests of foreign investors in the industrial and public sectors the
education sector has required large investments and this explains the growth of certain middle class groups and the expansion of the university and urban secondary school systems. In this sense the education structure can be viewed as a mechanism for change and adaption and a causal factor in underdevelopment and a maintenance of the status quo. It is then an internal contradictory structure. Education both maintains and destroys the status quo. It is a mechanism for elite status maintenance and also a mechanism by which new elite - aspirants are created.

However, this situation can be understood by analysing the role which the 'new groups' play in the social structure. The stabilising role which education plays mainly affects the class structure; it does this by offering certain possibilities of mobility to those groups which will enhance the position of the groups in power. Thus education has been instrumental in the formation of a new middle class or technocracy which plays a double role as an ideological supporter of the dominant class and as a functional mainspring in dependency, a phenomenon accepted and fostered by the dominant class. The dominant class is, however, itself dominated by the international pressures controlling the natural economy. The situation of the 'dominated dominant class' represents a contradiction between the needs of national development and foreign interests which maintain this class in power but induces dependency and underdevelopment.
The fact that the education system is at the same time a mechanism of change and of stabilisation can best be understood by an analysis of the contradictions ('contradiction' in the Hegelian sense of the dynamics created by the clash of opposites (Hegel 1964)23.) which link the education system to society. The principal contradictions are, first, the contradiction in the basic nature of the capitalist system, ie class contradiction, and, second, the contradiction in the dependent situation of Latin American society as exemplified by the situation of the 'dominated dominant class'. These two contradictions are highly inter-related and they are fundamental to dependency (Ianni 1970)24. Education is thus a means of inducing the contradictions within society as well as containing its own internal contradictions. The basic contradiction of the education system is that it deprives one class of a chance of attaining a meaningful degree of formal education and grants to another class a high degree of formal education to be used as a form of control and power. The form of this relationship has been changing over time in Latin America. During the Colonial period the contradiction in education was revealed in distinctions made between the aristocracy, white and predominantly Spanish and Portuguese, and the native Indians, negroes and racially mixed peoples. To attend a seminary or a university the applicant had to demonstrate his 'purity' of blood for several generations. Education was the privilege of the Spanish/Portuguese and of their legitimate descendants, that is, the sons born of families
married by the Catholic Church's rites.

After the end of the colonial period blood and racial prerequisites for education were weakened although they did not disappear. However, the education structure still did not allow a large proportion of the population to attend school. The lack of a generalised public primary school system made it impossible for the great majority of the population to enter higher education. With the development of the urbanisation process and 'modernisation' in the twentieth century there came an increase in the number of universities and there developed a conflict between the dominant class and the new groups in the middle class. At the same time divisions developed within the dominant class which was made up of both the old landed aristocracy and the new industrialists. The latter felt the need for an education system geared to the training of rank and file workers in industry and services, particularly in urban areas. At the same time the middle classes were looking for a channel of mobility and the most accessible one was education.

The dominant class appears to hold two different conceptions regarding the function of education in maintaining the system. Some of them believed that it is an efficient way of keeping the 'masses' under control by keeping them in ignorance (Zeitlin 1967)25. Historically, ignorance has been used to stifle the development of anything approaching class consciousness or rich - poor
consciousness. Other believe that the most effective way to ensure the allegiance of the 'masses' is to subdue them in a class controlled process of socialisation leading to an internalisation of the value system of the dominant groups (Lipset and Solari 1967). Carnoy, for example, states that education expansion and reform were implemented in 'independent' Latin American countries when the liberal faction of the local elite perceived that its interests would be furthered by 'modernising' the economy (Carnoy 1974). The first concept is often that which originates from the landed aristocracy, the second that which often originates from the new industrial elites, and the two views exemplify the wide gulf between the vested interests of the dominant class.

In the Bolivian education system these developments were clearly visible. However, in Bolivia one factor has caused a change in the overall development of the education process. It is fairly clear that in many Latin American states the education system has generally been used by the dominant class to fulfil whatever purpose served them best. At a time when a large native technocracy was needed higher education in Latin America expanded. The same development took place in Bolivia. However, what the industrial elites did not realise was that, firstly, once they had offered a degree of upward mobility to the new middle classes in order that they (the new middle classes) would support their (the industrial elites) own status, the new middle classes would not be content until they achieved the status
of the highest echelons of society.

In addition, despite its primary function of selection and socialisation, education does produce individuals who are not only agents of change within the dependent system, but also some who want to break the dependent situation. Thus through increasing schooling the dominant groups in society may unintentionally create forces opposed to dependency and the dominance of the groups who live off the dependent system. Further, Landsberger has suggested that collective responses are generated when people have had their traditional values modified through education through such circumstances as participation in military service and war (Landsberger 1969)28. In Bolivia the creation of the new middle class groups coincided with the very expensive Chaco War (1932-35), and consequently the new middle classes used the loss which Bolivia suffered for their own benefit. The result of this movement and others were crucial to Bolivian society. It meant that not only did the education system allow for some degree of social change but it went considerably further than that. It had in effect acted as one of the tools by which the power of the ruling class could be modified - "it was a strategic class instrument in the struggle to achieve emancipation from oppression and the transformation of society" (Landsberger 1969)29.

The central problem in the revolutionary process is that of bringing about the participation of an oppressed group as divided, unauthentic beings. The mechanism by which this transformation may be brought about is the creation of the
"critical discovery that both they and their oppressors are manifestations of humanisation" (Freire 1972)30. This 'critical discovery' is based on what Lukacs refers to as "explaining to the masses their own actions in order that actions might be understood in terms of the relationship between the action and the factors which prompted it" (Lukacs 1965)31. The 'critical discovery' is based on conscientization, and as such is, Freire notes, the only mechanism by which revolutionary action can be brought about. Conscientization is, as has already been explained, the learning to perceive social, political and economic contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality - thus theoretical 'conscious-raising' activities have meaning only when united with action. Freire points out that:

"the insistence that the oppressed engaged in reflection on their concrete situation is not a call to armchair revolution. On the contrary, reflection - true reflection - leads to action. On the other hand, when the situation calls for action, that action will constitute an authentic praxis, only if its consequences become the object of critical reflection ..... Political action on the side of the oppressed must be pedagogical action in the authentic sense of the word, hence action with the oppressed ..... The correct method lies in dialogue. The conviction of the oppressed that they must fight for their liberation is not a gift bestowed by the revolutionary
leadership but the result of their own conscientization" (Freire 1972)32.

In order that education might become a revolutionary mechanism it is, therefore, necessary that education be considered in terms of raising of consciousness.

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CHAPTER FIVE

THEORIES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT
The aim of this chapter is to review theories of underdevelopment with reference to contemporary Third World countries in general, and Latin America in particular. As a consequence of both the vastness and variety of the literature concerning theories of underdevelopment, this chapter can do no more than provide a brief critical overview of the various theoretical perspectives. It is also hoped that the chapter will show that the sociology of education can profit at a theoretical level from a broadening of its scope into comparative studies, and that the political and economic problems of underdevelopment can be illuminated by studies of education.

A number of difference theories have been proposed in an attempt to explain the reasons for underdevelopment. The earliest recognisable group of theories were based on the notion of social evolution and the implicit assumption that Third World countries would follow the same developmental path as that taken by Western European countries - the path from feudalism to capitalism. These so-called social evolution theories evolved directly from two ideas about social change; firstly, Weber's polar concept of traditional versus modern which was given a Third World dimension in this century by the anthropologist Robert Redfield in his theory of a folk - urban dichotomy; and, secondly, Comte's theory of social evolution in which modern society was the culmination of a series of stages of human development from a traditional society (Klåren and Bossert 1986). Thus evolution was conceived of in the
Spencerian sense as 'a change from a state of relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a state of relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity' (Carneiro 1968)2. This group of theories developed, in particular, after the Second World War. According to Myrdal, major recastings of economic thought have always been responses to changing political conditions (Myrdal 1968)3. The studies of development, therefore, which emerged in the late 1940's did not spring from an autonomous progression of social science theory, but rather from the Western preoccupation with the 'new nations' in the context of an emerging cold war between East and West (Hermassi 1980)4. In this perspective, the Third World countries were seen as potential allies by the two super powers and both the Soviet Union and the United States held up their own experiences as the correct and proper way to develop.

The basic economic tenet of the social evolution theories that developed in the West was the Harrod - Domar model which states that each increase in output provides the basis for further growth because part of the increased output is reinvested. At higher income levels the marginal propensity to save increases, and therefore economic growth, once the process has started, will be self sustaining. Thus the problem of development was how to break loose from the fetters that prevented the underdeveloped countries from marching along the growth path, mathematically symbolised in the Harrod - Domar model (Hettne 1983)5.
There was a dual focus in the social evolution theories - an attempt to discover the general trends in the development of all human societies, and, synonymously, an attempt to analyse the particular "traps" (like high population and poverty) that prevented growth in some societies. The basic idea was that growth was considered to be a unilinear process which would continue eternally once momentum was gained. All societies would eventually, therefore, following the same path to development. Minor deviations from the well-worn path would be righted because the ideology behind these theories of development was supported by the major international funding agencies like the World Bank, the Ford Foundation and the International Monetary Fund. The ideology was based on the view that the worker is a holder of capital, as embodied in his skills and knowledge, and that he has the capacity to invest (in himself). By extension, therefore, the wage-earner, who holds no property and controls neither the process nor the product of his labour, is transformed into a capitalist.

As Comte stated, the unilinear path to development was believed to occur by means of a series of stages of development. The first of these stages corresponds to pre-industrial society where a ceiling exists on the level of attainable output per head as a direct consequence of the low level of technology. The second stage corresponds to a period during which the pre-industrial society starts to become transformed by advances in science and technology (for example, Britain in the late seventeenth century).
The third stage corresponds to a time when there is rapid change from an agricultural to an industrial base in society (for example, the time of the Industrial Revolution in Britain). This is followed in stage four by a long period of sustained, if fluctuating, progress, whereby the regularly growing economy extends technology across all economic activities. It is a time when an economy demonstrates the capacity to move beyond the original industries which caused its rapid change and to broaden its technology. Lastly, in stage five, there is the time when real income per head rises to a point when large numbers gain command over consumption which transcends the basic needs of food, shelter and clothing, and where the service sector of the economy therefore, employs more people than the manufacturing sector (Berger 1976).

Social revolution theories had a very influential effect on Third World countries. There was both the open direct training labour by Western experts, and the more subtle importing of Western institutions like the judiciary and the police, the promotion of modern Western values and, as indicated above with reference to the international funding agencies, the imposition of a Western capitalist ideology.

These theories, although attractive, pose a number of problems. Firstly, they imply a simple sequence of stages through which all societies pass. This rarely happens in practice because contact between the underdeveloped and other countries leads to the reciprocal diffusion of
interests and ideas from one to another, and these, being historically specific, mould the particular and unique development of the country concerned.

Secondly, no satisfactory explanation has been given for the mechanism which 'shifts' the society from one evolutionary stage to another because structural factors, internal or external, were rarely considered - is this mechanism a rational result of specific situations or is it accidental or random? As Eisenstadt has noted, "The first crucial problem concerns the extent to which change from one type of society to another is not accidental or random but, rather, evinces over-all evolutionary or developmental trends" (Eisenstadt 1968)7.

Thirdly, evolutionary theories are too general to explain the range of variation of institutions within a society. Overall, the problem with evolutionary theories is that not all pre-industrial societies are alike and, consequently, their wide range of social structures leads to differing dynamics of social change.

However, despite these obvious problems with evolutionary theory, more sophisticated variants developed, particularly technical - functional or modernisation theories. One particular example of this group of theories is that proposed by W W Rostow in his book 'Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto' (Rostow 1960)8. Rostow's idea is that the transition from traditional to
modern society takes place through five stages. Rostow calls stage one 'The Traditional Society', defining it as one whose structure is developed within limited production functions, based on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world. This is followed by stage two 'The Preconditions for Take-Off', embracing societies in the process of transition; stage three, 'The Take-Off', the interval when the old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally overcome; stage four, 'The Drive to Maturity'; and, lastly, stage five, 'The Age of High Mass Consumption'. This idea is developed from an analysis of the British Industrial Revolution, and is based on the central point that there is a need to increase the rate of capital investment in a society to the point where growth becomes 'automatic'. "Thus, with the correct economic policies, societies which are currently poor can, following a well-known trajectory, pass through the stages of development to become fully modern industrial societies" (Rostow 1960)9.

Another well documented theory is that proposed by Barrington Moore in his book "The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy" (Barrington Moore 1966)10. This book is an excellent example of historically informed theorising, and it attempts a structural explanation of the various paths to modernisation for a society. Moore sees three routes to modernisation: the classical bourgeois revolutions which give rise to democracies; revolution from
above, by a reactionary alliance between a landed aristocracy and a modernising elite, which gives rise to variants of fascism; and revolution from below, in which a peasant revolt becomes the vehicle for a communist-inspired drive towards modernity (Roxborough 1979)11. The central structural variables which Moore identifies, and which determine which path is followed, have to do with the nature of the class structure and, in particular, with the response of the landed upper class to the commercialisation of agriculture. Moore’s theory provides an excellent analysis of the historical and structural explanations for social change, but it is only applicable to the large, and relatively self-contained, societies like China which Moore deals with. The theory is a model of endogenous change, the realisation of the potential that lies dormant in all societies and, as Moore himself notes, it is not capable of dealing with small societies which are subject to external influences.

Technical-functional or modernisation theories, like the two described above, have a number of features in common. Firstly, they are concerned with 'modernisation', which Berger defines as "the institutional and cultural concomitants of economic growth under the conditions of sophisticated technology" (Berger 1976)12, and is, for all practical purposes, equivalent to Westernisation, since the Western countries first reached maturity and, therefore, have served as models for the rest of the world. There is therefore, an identification of growth with the modern idea
of progress. Secondly, the state in the Third World country has a central role to play in that country's development. Thirdly, they are concerned with how education contributes to economic growth — they are concerned with the relationship between economic growth (as measured by per capita GNP) and the level of education (as measured by, for example, literacy levels).

Technical-functional or modernisation theories have a number of distinct problematic areas, both in a general sense and, more specifically, in relation to education. They tend to be theories that exist at a high level of generality, and they, consequently, supply very little empirical evidence to back up their arguments. They also tend to imply that underdevelopment is a natural condition that will eventually disappear. Frank and many others have argued that underdevelopment is not a natural condition but is, in fact, a direct consequence of the specific actions of Western countries (eg Frank 1971)13. In addition, most of the theories are models of endogenous change and their analyses omit the discussion of change in the context of change. Since it is very rarely endogenous, the context of change must somehow be incorporated into the model itself. How a society moves from one stage to another will depend not only on the internal dynamics of the transition, but also on how that society is inserted into the world system at a particular point in the development of that system. An analysis, therefore, of social change within any given society needs an analysis of the way in which that society
is articulated with the world system.

Further, it is implicit in these theories that Third World societies are composed of a modern sector and a traditional sector (a 'dualistic economy' (Hettne 1983))\(^\text{14}\). Frank, in contrast has argued that there exists a whole series of mechanisms whereby the modern sector exploits the traditional sector and thereby generates underdevelopment in the traditional sector. He therefore states that there are not just two distinct sectors, but rather, a continual chain of exploitative relations between the most advanced and the most backward sectors of a society (Frank 1971)\(^\text{15}\). It is probable that the answer lies somewhere between these two extreme views. There are modern and traditional sectors within Third World societies that have some degree of autonomy from each other. Equally clearly, there do exist all sorts of connections between these two sectors.

In addition, modernisation theories had idealist orientations. Drawing considerable inspiration from Weber, modernisationists tended to overemphasise the importance of values and value change in their development models. As a result they paid little attention to the structural constraints of class and to the economic realities that often made holding "unmodern" values quite rational for both peasants - who were caught in the corporatist patron - client relationship - and entrepreneurs - who could earn more through the state bureaucracy or foreign enterprises than they could through their own protestant-ethi
entrepreneurialism.

There are also problems created as a consequence of basing education systems on these theories. For example, education systems of Third World countries do not create a pool of skilled labour necessary for industrial "take-off", but, rather, they create a rise of 'credentialism', or as Dore put it, 'the diploma disease' (Dore 1976)\textsuperscript{16}. In consequence, a large number of people with advanced academic qualifications are unable to get jobs commensurate with these qualifications, and they either emigrate or, often, are the leaders of alternative political movements within their own country (Foster 1965)\textsuperscript{17}. Further to this, there is an assertion within the theories that formal schooling transmits the specific skills and/or general knowledge for more highly skilled jobs. This presupposes a type of schooling which teaches and selects for skills and qualities leading to occupational success in an industrial economy. This is not generally found in Latin America where formal education continues to reflect the values of a traditional, aristocratic society. Schools tend to be academic and they emphasise the preparation for fields which offer high status, but are not directly productive in the economic sense. Indeed, they often foster a disdain for manual labour. It has, in fact, been indicated by economic cost-benefit analyses that in contrast on-the-job training is a much sounder investment (Machlup 1977)\textsuperscript{18}.

In conclusion then, these theories are used to explain the
relationship between education and the economy. Indeed, they do more than explain, they prescribe the optimum nature of that relationship, and, according to Karabel and Halsey, they do not do it very successfully (Karabel and Halsey 1977)19.

Despite the problems associated with modernisation theories, both generally, and with specific reference to education, many writers on Latin America, particularly those from the United States, have applied these theories to explain the region's development problems. Lipset, for example, was strongly influenced by the ideas of Weber and drew directly on the theories of Talcott Parsons in arguing the centrality of differing value systems to explain the disparity between the development of North and South America (Lipset 1967)20. For Lipset, echoing Weber, the lack of an entrepreneurial ethic, which he attributed to Hispanic feudalism, was crucial in explaining Latin American underdevelopment. Underdevelopment could be overcome, however, with the spread of a westernised education system throughout the region. Both Johnson (Johnson 1958)21 and Silvert (Silvert 1967)22 had similar views.

The second major group of theories that attempted to explain the reasons for underdevelopment are collectively termed the 'dependency theories'. The central insight of the dependency theorists was that it was of limited value to study the development of the societies of the Third
World in isolation from the development of more advanced societies. They, therefore, treated the world as if it were a single system. With this as a starting point, the problem was to discover the manner in which the Third World countries were inserted into this single world system, and how this differentiated them from the historical pattern of development of the more advanced nations (Roxborough 1979). This insight was not new - Marx, for example had stressed the importance of the development of a world capitalist economic system as a force linking the fates of the developed and underdeveloped societies to each other. Dependency studies "constitute part of a constantly renewed effort to re-establish a tradition of analysis of economic structures and structures of domination; one that would not suffocate the historical process by removing from it the movement which results from the permanent struggle among groups and classes, therefore instead of accepting the existence of a determined course of history, one looks at an open-ended process" (Cardoso 1972).

Two factors converged to form the 'dependency school'. The first of these were the discussions of underdevelopment in the 1950s that coalesced in the work of the United Nations Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and the second, the revision of orthodox Marxism. The 'dependency school' has never had a uniform doctrine shared by all, but certain ideas are common to it. Firstly, the most important obstacles to development in the Third World countries are not thought to be the lack of either capital
or entrepreneurial skills - on the contrary, they are considered to be external to the country concerned, not internal to it. Economic backwardness is considered to be an historically based phenomenon, the outcome of the poor Third World societies having had their economies and social systems distorted and conditioned by the overseas expansion of capitalist enterprise. Underdevelopment, therefore, is not merely a process which is a concomitant of the expansion of mercantile capitalism and recurs under industrial capitalism, but as one which is actually generated by them (Cardoso 1972).25.

Secondly, because "dependency is based upon an international division of labour which allows industrial development to take place in some countries while restricting it in others and whose growth is conditioned by and subjected to the power centres of the world" (Dos Santos 1973),26 the international division of labour is analysed in terms of the relations between regions, of which two kinds - the centre and the periphery - assume particular importance.27 Due to the fact that the periphery is deprived of its surplus, development in the centre somehow implies underdevelopment in the periphery - the "development of underdevelopment" (Foster-Carter 1976).28 Thus development and underdevelopment are described as two aspects of a single global process. All regions participating in the process are capitalist, but a distinction between central and peripheral capitalism is made (Hettne 1983).29. Thirdly, dependency itself defines
the internal situation of a country and it is structurally linked to it. Therefore isolation from the rest of the world is not considered a solution for a country wanting to break away from the chains of dependency. Such action would cause chaos in a society which is of its essence dependent (Dos Santos 1973)30. The only real alternative open for a country is for it to change its internal structure. This is very difficult to achieve because it would inevitably lead to conflict with the international structure.

Dependency theories, therefore, have in common the view that economic backwardness is not a phenomenon intrinsic to pre-modern societies. Rather it is an historical, externally imposed condition. Further this imposition is reinforced internally by the willing compliance of political and commercial elites (Williamson 1979)31. 'External' domination is, therefore, in its pure sense impracticable. It is practicable only when it finds support among those local groups who profit by it (Dos Santos 1973)32. The major implication of this view is that little fundamental change in Third World countries can take place without major realignments in the international economy. A consequence of poverty is that Third World countries are forced into both debt and aid dependencies (Williamson 1979)33. Both these combine to produce a great pressure for economic modernisation and for the development of a strong sector in the economy. This is the only way that these countries can hope to acquire the funds
necessary for independent industrialisation. But in following such a path these countries reinforce their position within the capitalist world economy. Under these conditions, backed by western aid, the dominant groups within these Third World countries adopt western-orientated dependency models of development because these are the developmental programmes which legitimise the further receipt of aid and forms of trade which, in the long term, are most likely to be disadvantageous to the poorer people within the country concerned.

When analysed in detail, dependency theories fall into two distinct categories. The first of these is the approach to view dependency as some form of boundary interchange, the dependence of one system on another; and the second is the approach to view dependency as a conditioning factor which alters the internal functioning and articulation of the elements of the dependent social formation. The first approach views dependency as a relationship between different parties, and the second views dependency as a set of structures. The crucial distinctions between the two is that in the second approach the internal dynamics of the dependent social formation are fundamentally different from the internal dynamics of the social formations of advanced capitalism.

One example of the first approach was that proposed by Frank in his analysis of the relationship between the United States and Latin America (Frank 1971).
process of dependency was, he considered, responsible for
the underdevelopment of Latin America. The United States,
Frank claimed, actively underdeveloped Latin America.
Gerassi extended this argument and he explained that the
United States actively underdeveloped of Latin America in
three specific, recognisable and analysable stages - first,
by controlling the sources of raw materials for the benefit
of the United States. Secondly, by controlling the markets
in the Latin American countries for the benefit of the
United States producers; and thirdly, by controlling the
Latin American countries internal developments and economic
structures so as to guarantee continued expansion of the
first two stages (Gerassi 1972)36. This latter point is
particularly important bearing in mind the fact that Marx
had once warned that the first revolutionary wave in an
imperialised country will come about as the result of the
frustration by the national bourgeoisie, which will have
reached a development stage where it will have accumulated
enough capital to want to become competitive to the
industrialising corporations. The United States is not
allowing this to happen in Latin America.

Frank’s analysis, while containing much that is useful in
further our understanding of the dependency relationship,
contains a number of problematic areas. Firstly, his
analysis of colonialism purports to rest on the class
relationships of capitalist exploitation, but in fact he
treats these relationships as residual (Roxborough 1979)37.
That is to say, the conceptualisation of class relations,
which is present in the theory, is almost totally ignored in his analysis of the relations of domination and subordination. Consequently, he does not analyse the relationships of exploitation in terms of social classes, and he, therefore, does not explain different levels of development and underdevelopment - or, more appropriately, levels of exploitation between nations (Leys 1977)38. Secondly, according to Laclau (1971)39, Frank's definition of capitalism differs radically from the Marxist one, since it emphasises exchange and commercial relationships rather than the actual processes of production. In particular, he confuses participation in the world capitalist economic system with the dominance of the capitalist mode of production in Latin America (Roxborough 1979)40. It is implicit in this notion that dependent social formations were, to a certain extent, "passive victims" of their place in the world capitalist economy which was the single main determinant of the internal economic and class structure. This failure to recognise the significance of autonomous Third World histories, especially the process of class formation, or to highlight the resistance to colonialism, shows Frank's failure to understand the two-way nature of the relationships between social formations (Brenner 1977)41. Thirdly, although Frank uses sound evidence to demonstrate that the economies of Latin America produce primarily for the world market and have, in fact, being closely tied to this world market since the sixteenth century some of his conclusions are questionable. For example, Frank concludes from this that Latin America has
been capitalist from the time of the Iberian conquest. The implication therefore is that if the Iberians implanted a capitalist society into Latin America in the early sixteenth century, then Spain and Portugal must themselves have been capitalist at that time. It is very debatable as Marx rightly said, to consider that capitalism developed in the Iberian Peninsula before it developed in England. Frank tries to overcome this problem by saying that it was the mercantile capitalist sector of Iberian society that was responsible for the implementation of capitalism in Latin America. This simply pushes the same problem back one stage further.

Overall, therefore, Frank simplified the debate, disdained the specificity of the situation, and failed to attempt any sort of theoretical scheme of a dialectical type that might draw together the general and the particular in a specific whole (Cardoso 1972)42.

In conclusion if, as Frank and others have argued, dependency is viewed merely as a relationship between two countries then, as Quijano says

"the concept would have no other function than to replace, for certain purposes, the concept of 'imperialism', without providing the necessary understanding of how the articulation of elements produced by imperialist domination, giving rise to a determinate socio-economic formation subordinated to
it, is carried out" (Quijano 1974).43.

This problem has been recognised by a number of dependency theorists who belong to the second category outlined above—those that view dependency as a set of structures. One example of an exponent of this approach is Dos Santos. He defines dependency as

"a situation in which a certain group of countries have their economies conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected" (Dos Santos 1970).44,

and "dependency conditions a certain internal structure which redefines it as a function of the structural possibilities of the distinct national economies" (Dos Santos 1970).45.

Dos Santos' definitions contain two parts. The first part, which asserts that dependency is a relationship between two groups of economies (those that condition others, and those that are conditioned by them), does not constitute an advance on previous formulations of the problem, for example, the work of Frank. After all, all economies are interdependent and they condition each other in a reciprocal manner, therefore there is a need to specify the nature of the dependency. The second part attempts to do just this by stating that dependency is a certain internal structure different from that of the advanced nations.
Problems, though, subsequently arise when attempts are made to conceptualise these structural differences. There have been two specific lines of approach to this problem. The first asserts that there is a mode of production in dependent countries which is different from that of advanced countries (the 'peripheral' and 'central' capitalisms mentioned above). The second asserts that while the dependent countries have a capitalist mode of production, the articulation of this capitalist mode of production with the other modes of production in that country's social formation and with the economies of the advanced industrial countries, results in a different manner of functioning of that mode of production.

Turning specifically to Latin America, an adequate conceptualisation of its history must take into account the diversity of historical experiences of the various republics. Only one example within the dependency perspective adequately meets this criterion. This is the work initially formulated by Cardoso and subsequently refined with the help of Faletto (Cardoso and Faletto 1979).46

The main theme of Cardoso and Faletto's work is the relationship that exists between political struggles of groups/classes, on the one hand, and the history of economic - political structures of domination, both internal and external, on the other. Thus, they argue, it is of less interest to us to catalogue events than to seek
in them the meaning of basic structural relationships and the stages of their development in their double determination: on the level of local systems of domination and on the level of their relationship with the international order. Political and economic processes appear in the latter as if they were the expression of a struggle between nation states, but they also involve conflicts between social groups/classes (after Roxborough 1984).47

In order, therefore, to explain the historical process from the theoretical perspective of dependence, it is necessary to make explicit how international conflicts between states are linked with international political struggles as well as with the basic ways whereby, both domestically and internationally, the social organisation of economic production takes place. In other words, the key question is one of political power - how class alliances are formed and political decisions taken in each country in a given historical circumstance.

Specifically, Cardoso and Faletto indicate the key variables which enable the researcher to make sense of the multiplicity of development paths followed by Latin American countries. Their starting point is a differentiation of types of export economies in the nineteenth century into two basic types. These are enclave economies, for example, plantation and mining economies, where the ownership of the wealth of the country is
foreign; and economies where there is a national control of the productive system. Cardoso and Faletto argue that this difference in the structure of the export sectors led to different trajectories for these two groups of countries. The key question facing Latin American states in the early part of this century was how the middle classes would be incorporated politically. In the enclave economies the state was under the exclusive domination of the oligarchy. As a consequence, the incorporation of the middle classes could proceed either by a breakdown of the oligarchic order, as occurred in Bolivia in 1952, or as a result of conflicts among the dominant classes, enabling a middle class challenge to succeed, as in Chile. In this path, the role of the state was a key to the success or otherwise of the project.

In the societies where there was national control of the productive system, the state reflected a co-existence of the oligarchy and the bourgeoisie. Here also there were two possible routes to the incorporation of the middle classes. Where there was a substantial degree of unity among dominant classes, the incorporation of the middle classes would occur under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie as, for example, in Argentina. In countries where dominant classes were fragmented, for example, Brazil, there was only a partial incorporation of the middle classes. In both enclave and nationally owned export sector situations, middle class challenges to the system of oligarchic domination might fail, due to the resistance of the
oligarchy and/or the weakness of the middle classes, for example, Colombia (after Roxborough 1984)48.

This, in brief, is the basic idea of Cardoso and Faletto. Variations in the structure of the dominant class are used to explain differing political outcomes in terms of the varying modes of incorporation of the middle classes.

Cardoso and Faletto's work advances previous dependency theory because a number of different political paths can be traced because it looks at two dichotomous variables (national versus foreign ownership of the export sectors, and the degree of dominant class unity). Despite this, the theory is in part defective. For example, the terms 'middle class', 'bourgeoisie' and 'oligarchy' are not defined. This provides difficulties in analysing socio-economic conflict because the key issues in the theory revolve around the degree of unity or otherwise of the dominant classes, and the relationships between them and the state. If the basic terms used are not adequately defined, conflicts tend to be inferred rather than demonstrated empirically.

Further, Cardoso and Faletto's theory concentrates exclusively on the dominant class. Social change is better analysed in terms of conflicts and tensions between and within dominant and subordinate classes (Henfrey 1981)49. Also, while the methodology of the work is excellent, their empirical analysis suffers from a number of serious
problems. For example, they refer to class unity in Argentina. Others, for example Smith, disagree. Smith argues that, particularly amongst the 'cattle people', there are a number of different classes (Smith 1969)\(^50\). Cardoso and Faletto also argue that in Brazil the division within the ranks of the dominant class was sectoral, between the coffee oligarchy and industrialists. Others have argued that the divisions in Brazil were along regional lines. This had its origins in the changing pattern of Brazil’s exports, the historical development of which meant that regions, and within them, regional oligarchies, rose and fell as their exports prospered and declined in the world market (Dean 1969)\(^51\).

Overall, the key variables of the Cardoso - Faletto model had to do with the structure of the dominant classes. This derived from the nature of the productive system, in particular, from the organisation of the export sectors and their linkages with the world market. This is an advance on previous writing on dependency because it enables the researcher to incorporate into a single theoretical framework both a concern for situations of external dependency and a focus on the productive structures of the particular Latin American country.

In conclusion, therefore, dependency can be regarded as a social formation defined by the complex articulation, both internal and external, of several modes of production. Continued backwardness is the result of the way in which
these modes are articulated, and the specific articulations are the result, not of chance but of an historical process of imperialist domination. The overall result is that these different modes of production are articulated in such a way as to either discourage growth, or to transfer the benefits of growth abroad.

There are a number of general criticisms that can be levelled at all the dependency theories. For example, in the real world no country is either self-reliant, or develops merely as a reflection of another country. All countries are dependent on each other, and on the system of which they form a part. This dependency, though, varies from country to country in both kind and degree. This has led to most theoretical analyses that have developed in the wake of dependency theory to assume the existence of one strongly integrated world. Further, dependency theories fail to propose alternative paths to growth that do not depend on trade and foreign investment; they overemphasise the importance of the United States in Latin America, and are unable to distinguish between national security interests and United States economic interests; and, social classes are not defined with sufficient clarity - generally, the theorists have failed to devote enough effort to the history and dynamics of the class formation, to the various forms of appropriating surplus within peripheral social formations, and to the class struggles which have characterised and continue to characterise these places (Forbes 1986)52.
Turning specifically to the position of education within Third World countries, dependency theories, unlike the modernisation theories outlined above, contain very few prescriptions, implicit or explicit, for education because they concentrate mainly on purely economic factors. They therefore have a somewhat economic reductionist stance by taking education, and other 'superstructural' phenomena, to be largely determined by the economic base of a country (Dale et al 1981)53. It is fallacy to suppose that all other factors in society are determined by economic ones, as Williams has so cogently shown (Williams 1973)54.

Education in Third World countries is also affected to a large degree by both internal political constraints and cultural traditions.

When education is mentioned by the dependency theorists it is viewed as contributing, not to development, but to increased dependency. According to Carnoy it is usually seen as a form of 'cultural imperialism' (Carnoy 1974)55. The main argument of cultural imperialism is that the power and influence of some states over others is not confined to strictly economic spheres, but to cultural spheres as well. This sees the education system of weaker countries as being shaped in the image of more powerful countries, either as part of their colonial legacy, or because it seems an important step in their development. It also involves the cultural penetration of their education systems by curricula and textbooks originally produced with the schools of the dominant society in mind. This
influence and penetration is from two sources - the advanced industrial countries like the United States, and international organisations like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Carnoy 1974). The main problem with 'cultural imperialism' is that it tends to homogenise both sides of the dependent - dominant country relationship, to blur the many subtle (and not so subtle) differences between modes of domination through education, and the ways in which it is received and consumed (Dale 1981).

Many dependency theorists analyse the dominant - dominated situation in Third World countries (for example, Ianni 1970). Their theories tend to break down when they try to come to terms with the interconnection between the 'internal' and 'external' factors. One radical way of dealing with the internal - external problem has been suggested by Wallerstein with his 'world-system perspective' (Wallerstein 1974). He abolishes the distinction altogether by making the world system his unit of analysis. He says that he

"abandoned the idea altogether of taking either the sovereign state or that vaguer concept, the national society, as the unit of analysis. I decided that neither one was a social system and that one could only speak of social change in social systems. The only social system in this scheme was the world system" (Wallerstein 1974).
Wallerstein believes that the modern world comprises a single capitalist world economy, which has emerged historically since the sixteenth century, and which still exists today. Internal class contradictions and political struggles of a particular state must be understood by initially siting them in the world economy. The ways in which various political and cultural thrusts may be efforts to alter or preserve a position within this world economy, which is to the advantage or disadvantage of particular groups located within a particular state, can then be understood. Therefore, Wallerstein's theory holds that the constraints are entirely economic, that the ability of developing societies to control their own destiny is entirely a function of their place in the capitalist world economy.

This is, in fact, similar to the position put forward by Frank. However, the notion of a world system forms the focus of Wallerstein's work in a way that it does not in the work of the dependent theorists, where it serves the primary function of defining a set of external influences which explain the under-development of the Third World.

The main argument against Wallerstein's theory is that the relationship between developed and underdeveloped is not as dependent as he would have us believe (Skocpol and Trimberger 1978, George 1980, Skocpol 1982). The single world capitalist economy in which all countries are structurally located has political as well as economic
dimensions. Consequently, a Third World country has a degree of independence in its ability to play-off one powerful nation against another (Dale 1981).

To conclude, whatever version of dependency analysis is accepted, it must be recognised that much-needed reforms are impossible without a restructuring of the mode of articulation of the economy of a country with the world economy. Most dependency theorists argue that this restructuring will be opposed by the ruling class in the dependent country and by imperialism, and that this resistance will only be overcome by a revolution. Therefore dependency theorists argue that the only realistic alternatives are either revolution or continued dependence.

In recent years the dependency school has tended to decrease in importance and its demise has left an awkward theoretical vacuum. Its critics have generally been less successful in pointing out new theoretical directions than in criticising the old. A number of alternatives to dependency theory have, though, been developed. One example of these alternatives is the status - conflict theory, a theory derived from the work of Weber, and developed by a number of sociologists, in particular Collins with his work on the United States (1971). According to this theory, society is regarded as being characterised by cultural groups struggling continuously with each other for wealth, power and prestige. Membership
of these groups gives individuals a sense of identity — there is a general acceptance by group members of one another as status equals. The theory further maintains that the status groups use the schools to preserve and even strengthen their positions in society. The schools are able to do this because their main function is to teach and select for particular groups by imparting the values and culture associated with the group in control of the education system. Thus, as La Belle and Verhine state, "educational requirements for employment, rather than flowing from functional economic demands, enable the particular status group controlling schools to control the work place as well. By basing occupational attainment on educational attainment, the elite status group assures the selection of higher level employees from its own membership and lower level workers who at least have been indoctrinated to respect its cultural superiority" (La Belle and Verhine 1975). The status — conflict theory suggests that, because the number of qualified people in society increases over time, the educational requirements for particular jobs also rises. This is because other status groups, in particular the middle classes, demand the education that will enable them to compete with the elite. Consequently, employers raise their educational requirements to maintain the relative prestige of their own occupational position.

Therefore, the basic argument of the status — conflict theory is that "what explains the increase in educational
provision is not the increasing need of the economy for skills, but rather conflict between various status groups within society for educational qualifications which provide access to desirable occupational and social positions". (Dale 1981)65. The theory highlights the fact that there are a multiplicity of causes for any education system, and these stem from a wide range of possible struggles between economic, religious and cultural groups for all kinds of domination, economic success and prestige (Dale 1981)66.

Thus the status - conflict theorists see a far wider range of interests than purely economic ones playing important parts in shaping the patterns of educational provision. Education is therefore recognised as being involved with cultural organisation as well as with the material economy, and that the relationship between the two is not one way. This argument is counter to the economic reductionism of both cultural imperialism and international organisations like the World Bank.

A refinement of the status - conflict theory has been proposed by Pomfret (1979)67 who combined Collins's theory of cultural markets with Wallerstein's 'world-system perspective'. This combination was proposed because, while Collins's theory contained much of value, the cultural markets in the theory were 'given', there being no attempt at an explanation of the composition and workings of the markets themselves and how and why they change historically. Pomfret's theory is an advance on status-
conflict theory, particularly with regard to the analysis of the central role played by education in society, but by incorporating the views of Wallerstein, much of the theory is again reducible to the economic.

Another alternative to the dependency theories is the revival of orthodox Marxism, particularly the idea that Third World imperialism is the pioneer of capitalism. One of its main exponents is Warren (1980)68. This perspective not only contradicts the whole dependency and underdevelopment tradition, but also much of what Lenin wrote about imperialism. Warren, in straight Marxian terms, restates the conventional wisdom of the 1950s and 1960s, namely the industrialisation of the West initiated and accelerated modern development in the rest of the world. Thus the least industrialised countries of today can see in the so-called newly industrialised countries an image of their own future. It is arguable, though, whether this ever happens (Scheffer 1981)69. Even countries that have developed industrially along Western lines, countries like South Korea and Taiwan, have not taken the same path. In addition, both of these countries have been favoured by strategic considerations as 'free world' bastions in a highly sensitive area, and in South Korea in particular, the control of the situation is, in part, related to its political system - a repressive military regime. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly apparent that it is necessary to look at the development of a country in the context of the changing world economy.
Further alternatives are those theories within which the dependency perspective has been incorporated. There is, for example, the neo-structural approach of Sunkel and Fuenzalida (1979)\textsuperscript{70}, based on the ideas of Furtado\textsuperscript{71}, which concentrates on the 'transnational capitalist system'. This approach can be regarded as dualism at the global level since the most striking feature of the system is the polarised development of transnationalization, on the one hand, and national disintegration on the other. Starting with the first aspect, the capitalist system is in the process of change from an international to a transnational structure with "the transnational corporations as the most significant actors" (Hettne 1983)\textsuperscript{72}. Looking at the other side of this dual global structure, the national societies, as a consequence of the transnational process, undergo a process of disintegration, implying a disruption of indigenous economic societies and a concentration of property and income. Indeed Cardoso argued that multinational corporations caused the 'internationalization of the internal market' (Cardoso 1972)\textsuperscript{73}.

A number of recent neo-Marxist approaches to the problem have been formulated. They concentrate on the articulation of modes of production, and, following the failure of, particularly, the dependency theories to tackle the Marxist analysis of production relations or provide a focus for the micro-analysis of production relations, they have come to occupy a more central position in the debate on underdevelopment. Briefly, these approaches are based upon
a theory of imperialism which sees the security of cheap labour supplies as the dominant impulse in the expansion of capitalism outwards from the centre. In the main though, they focus on the articulation of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production in peripheral social formations, demonstrating the dominant role of capitalism within articulation and the way in which this dominance is used to 'conserv[e]' and 'dissolv[e]' the pre-capitalist modes of production74.

The most comprehensive recent attempt to develop a theory of the articulation of modes of production is by Taylor (Taylor 1979)75. He rejects the concept of underdevelopment and substitutes the notion of a transitional social formation "which is dominated by an articulation of (at least) two modes of production - a capitalist and a non-capitalist mode - in which the former is, or is becoming, increasingly dominant over the other" (Taylor 1979)76. The result is that peripheral social formations are characterised by a series of dislocations between levels of the social formation. Thus Taylor substitutes a notion of restricted and uneven development for underdevelopment.

The 'articulation of modes of production' theories have been able to overcome the problems of scale implicit in, particularly, the dependency and world systems approaches. Nevertheless, these studies give pre-eminence in explanations of the underdevelopment of petty production to
exchange mechanisms and the transfer of value which these bring about. As Brenner has argued, dependence on the flow of surplus across space puts stress on a quantitative process producing underdevelopment and masks the qualitative processes behind it (Brenner 1977). Just as accumulation begs the question of why the accumulated surplus should be used for productive investment, so the loss of economic surplus cannot provide the only explanation for the poverty and low productivity of the petty producers - what also needs to be considered are the role of the state (and, incidentally, the influence of external forces upon it), the influence of the world economic policy, and the ideology of development (Kahn 1974). Further, the concept of mode of production used fails to embrace the totality of a system of reproduction - it is a concept which adopts a reductionist approach. It transforms a complex and all-embracing phenomenon to a simplistic abstraction of an empirical observation, based on the delineation of the form of exploitation or the labour process. This reductionist error is responsible for the tendency to treat "articulation as a form of dualism, in which non-capitalist modes are defined as a specific kind of subjugation of labour deprived of their own laws of motion. Therefore there is a need to incorporate the laws of motion into a conceptualisation of a mode of production" (Banaj 1977). A third criticism is that articulation theory is often reduced to crude economic determinism (Mouzelis 1980). Fourthly, articulation theory, by concentrating on the economic, fails to adequately tackle
class formation, the importance of class domination, class struggle and the role of the State.

There is another group of theories which have developed recently, specifically with reference to Latin America. These are the corporatist theories. Corporatism is a very old concept of community and the state, and is based on the ideas of Comte and Durkheim. The classic example of a corporatist institution is the Roman Catholic church, which is organically and hierarchically organised with some residual autonomy at the level of the individual priest. According to modern corporatist theories (for example Wiarda 1974) Latin American underdevelopment is a product of this unique and enduring corporatist tradition, which not only stood apart from, but rejected, the revolutionary spirit that animated the West in the age of capitalism and modernity after 1500. Both anti-capitalist and anti-Marxist, corporatists reject what they see as the imposition of foreign, alien development models on Latin America. Development, if it is to come to the region, must be filtered through and adapted to what they see as a uniquely Latin American structure and tradition. For many the core of this distinctiveness is to be found in the authority of the state and the central role it has played in shaping the society and the economy. Some corporatists have thus envisioned a third, non-capitalist, non-Marxist path to development. This move is directed by a powerful, activated and interventionist state, but one that is within the essentially Catholic cultural and philosophical
framework of Latin American tradition.

Corporatist theorists have been criticised on a number of fronts. For example, it is viewed by some, like Valenzeula and Valenzuela (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978) as an apology for fascism, designed to repress conflicts, tensions and the general sociopolitical crisis unleashed by modernisation; and by others (particularly Marxists) who reject the corporatist's rigid denial of class conflict. By overemphasising the corporatist structures they downplay or ignore the class antagonisms that occur within or across such structures.

Outlined above are some example of the many diverse approaches that have been formulated to attempt to explain the reasons for underdevelopment. They range from the modernisation theories, through the dependency theories and their recent more sophisticated variants, to the neo-Marxist and other approaches. The analysis of these various approaches has determined the specific points around which studies of the relationship between education and social change need to focus.

The first of these is that development in different parts of the world is strongly influenced by the dynamics of the total world economy. This has subsequently led to a fairly widespread understanding of the fact that each country has its own, unique development problems that are dictated by both external and internal conditions.
The second point is that in understanding the relationship between education and development in any country it is necessary to establish what the external constraints are on that country. There has been a tendency to suggest, particularly by the dependency theorists, Wallerstein, and the modes of production theorists that these constraints are entirely economic. In reality, the problem is more complicated because the constraints are economic, political, social and cultural. Further, they emanate from two sources, neither of which is mutually exclusive. On the one hand are the developed countries and on the other organisations like the World Bank, and they together, by their dependent nature, set the structure of a Third World society within its global context. These external constraints obviously influence internal factors. As states are drawn into international military and economic competition, substantial changes are engendered in a variety of aspects of domestic organisation - for example, states faced with increasing military competition often seek greater centralised control of resources.

The third point is that an explanation is needed of the differences that occur between countries that have operated under similar external constraints. This explanation, therefore, necessitates a detailed analysis and subsequent understanding of a country’s internal structure, in particular the role and position of the state. This is because countries with similar external constraints have undertaken difference approaches to their problems - each
individual country has its own internal political constraints and cultural traditions (Skocpol 1979). Turning specifically to education, the major cause of educational change in a country is the changing nature of the state. It is therefore necessary to examine how the state first became involved in the education process (Archer 1979); what the changing demands on the state in carrying out its basic functions are; and how these affect the structure and process of the education system. The role of the state in Third World countries is ambiguous since it co-operates with transnational corporations while at the same time trying to maintain a certain autonomy. Despite this ambiguity it is necessary to focus on the state because previous attempts to explain why the education system is as it is, either from an interactionist perspective or from a neo-Marxist perspective, separately or jointly, have failed.

The fourth point is that there needs to be an historical analysis of both the formation of the different social classes and the changing patterns of class alliances in the country concerned. In this way, the specificity of the historical development of the various social formations can be highlighted. The class structure of Third World countries differs from that of the developed nations in two main ways: it is more complex, and the classes themselves are usually much weaker. In addition the class structure is incomplete in the sense that a fraction of the dominant class, that which is externally oriented, is international
rather than national. The 'foreign' section of the dominant class does not directly form part of the legitimate structures of the nation-state. This kind of class structure, which transcends the boundaries of nation-states is a very good argument for not focusing on the nation-state as a unit of analysis, but of talking instead of a single world class structure.

The complexity of the class structure means that a great variety of forms of class alliance are possible. This complexity has been brought about to some degree by the emergence of new social classes this century, in particular an urban middle class and a nascent proletariat. The complexity reveals itself most significantly in relation to the peasant social structure. Each agricultural system specifies a distinct set of rural social classes. How important the peasants are in social change needs careful analysis, bearing in mind the difficulty of viewing the peasants as a homogeneous group. Marx, for example, viewed the peasants as a conservative force in politics, and Banfield supported this in his work in Southern Italy (Banfield 1958). On the other hand, Caldwell, working in China, argued that there the peasants displaced the urban proletariat as the revolutionary vanguard (Caldwell 1969). This point will be analysed in more detail in Chapter Six.

Once the class analysis has reached a certain level, it is necessary to complete it with an institutional analysis of
the relationship between politics and social classes. This is because the politics of any social class are the function, not only of the structural characteristics of the class itself, but also of the structure of the field of action into which that class is inserted. There are determinate relationships between the development of social classes and the functioning of political institutions, and these relationships are not always direct and unproblematic.

The fifth point is that, in addition to an analysis of external constraints and internal social structure, it is necessary to look at the local level. Here there is often a distinct form of economy, as for example, tin mining in the Bolivian Andes, and these often give rise to a specific set of social classes and local political institutions. Both at the political level and the economic level there is some form of institutional link between the local and the national society.

The sixth point is that it is necessary to look at the interconnections between education and the rest of society, and therefore the way in which the social and political structures in society (including the state itself) respond to and mould patterns of educational investment. Further to this, the results of this investment need to be analysed. In studying these interconnections it is important to remind ourselves that there are a multiplicity of causes for any educational system; these stem from a
wide range of possible struggles between economic, religious and cultural groups for all kinds of domination, economic success and prestige; and the interrelationship between the education system and the rest of society is a dynamic one.

Lastly, it is important to realise that many theorists of underdevelopment overgeneralise. They believe that they can construct a model of an underdeveloped country and its problems, as if there was a unique situation of underdevelopment, and all specific countries were merely variants of the model. There are two basic objections to this approach. The first is that the range of variation among contemporary underdeveloped countries is very great indeed. The second is that when a model of an underdeveloped country is taken and social processes within it are analysed, the approach is ahistorical.

It is ahistorical in that it de-emphasises two things. On the one hand, such a model plays down the importance of the changing international context in which development takes place. This changing international context has a very important bearing on change within individual Third World countries. On the other hand, most models de-emphasise the extend to which the changing economic structure produces structural changes in the class structure and gives rise to changing patterns of class alliances. These changing patterns have important repercussions at the level of politics and the state (Roxborough 1979)88.
Therefore, the analysis of Bolivia which follows is historically specific both in terms of the development of the world capitalist system, and in terms of the way in which the articulation of Bolivia with that system has generated, over time, a specific class structure and set of social institutions with their own history.

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85. Class analysis, in the context of underdevelopment in general, has meant quite different things to different people. Amin, for instance, is representative of the attempt to reconcile class analysis and his own distinctive version of dependency/world systems theory (Amin, S (1976), Unequal Development, Sussex : The Harvester Press). Rey, on the other hand has attempted to reconcile class analysis and articulation (Rey, P P (1979), 'Class contradiction in lineage societies', Critique of Anthropology 4). While both Rey and Amin attempted to locate class analysis within prevailing structuralist analyses, other authors have tried to dispense with much of this support and focus primarily on class itself - by so doing they give the domestic bourgeoisie much greater prominence in their class analyses - for example, Petras, J and Trachte, K (1979), 'Liberal, structural and radical approaches to political economy: an assessment and an alternative, Contemporary Crises, 3.


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CHAPTER SIX

PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOLIVIA: AGRARIAN STRUCTURES AND THE PEASANTRY
In order to fully analyse the role which education plays in creating social change in any country, it is necessary at the outset to understand both the different social groups and classes of people in that country, and the relationships between them. When a country is essentially a rural one as Bolivia is, the majority of its people work on the land and are generically terms 'peasants'. This chapter will briefly look at the agrarian structures prevailing in Bolivia prior to the revolution and, by extension, the concepts of peasantry and peasant consciousness.

An agrarian structure can be defined as a set of institutions, norms (both written and unwritten), and social, political and economic relationships governing the access to, and use of, land as a productive resource (Stavenhagen 1970). Agrarian structures, especially the land tenure system, condition the social and economic relationships between landlord and tenant. Around the basic pivots of man - land and man - man relationships have arisen legal norms, stratification hierarchies, patterns of social behaviour and political power systems (all of which, taken as a whole, are subsumed under the term 'agrarian structures'). From the peasant's point of view the agrarian structure has two aspects. It consists on the one hand of those productive units through which he pursues his livelihood and the institutional conditions of - and conflicts generated by - the several roles which he may be obliged to perform (like landowner, labourer, tenant or
debtor); on the other hand, it consists of the landgroup, deeply moulded by the economic relationships required by the productive process, yet sustaining other roles involving values of motivational autonomy (Pearse 1975).2

The pre-revolutionary agrarian structure of Bolivia owes much to three factors; its high altitude, the landlocked isolation of the country, and the economic importance of mining. The high altitude severely limited the agricultural potentialities and restricted the attractiveness of estate development, the landlocked isolation meant that agricultural production was of local interest only, and the importance of mining meant that there was a continual movement of labour from the land to the mines, and an increasing demand for agricultural supplies necessary for mining, like leather, meat, tallow and pack animals.

The 1950 agricultural census gives a rough idea of the landholding structure in pre-revolutionary Bolivia. There were about 7,000 holdings of over 500 hectares, 600 of these being over 10,000 hectares, and though this represented only 8 per cent of all production units these holdings controlled 95 per cent of the arable land in Bolivia, of which only 0.8 per cent was actually under cultivation. At the other extreme 69 per cent of the production units covered less than 10 hectares apiece and occupied only 0.41 per cent of arable land, of which one half was under cultivation. Between the two extremes were
22.5 per cent of the production units, covering between 10
and 500 hectares; they accounted for 4.5 per cent of arable
land, of which 23.5 per cent was under cultivation (figures
quoted in Cusicanqui 1987)3.

The agrarian structure itself therefore had a number of
components all interconnected like links in a chain. About
one third of the peasantry lived in "communities". There
were 3,779 communities (3.5 per cent of the agricultural
units) with 26 per cent of the cultivated area in Bolivia
according to the 1950 census. A community was a legally
recognised landgroup in which formal possession of the land
was vested in the collectivity, though in fact actual
possession, with rights of inheritance, was held by
individual families. The communities were not production
units but rather supra-domestic units of social
reproduction, within which there existed domestic
production units. They evolved out of the ayllu, or
kingroup, encountered by the Spanish conquerors and given
legal standing under the Spanish colonial regime (after
Pearse 1975)4. The ayllu was a community which occupied a
specific territory and whose members were related to one
another. It was the basic organisational and socio-
economic unit of Andean culture (Cusicanqui 1987)5. The
ayllu was very similar to medieval European systems and
consequently the Spanish perpetuated them, albeit in a
modified form, because they were familiar with them.

The estates in pre-revolutionary Bolivia can be
collectively classed as manorial estates, and they were called latifundios or haciendas. There was no single type, with wide variations existing, particularly from region to region (Barnes 1970)6. The unproductive latifundios that relied on tenant farmers were the usual type, and they accounted for 44.3 per cent of the cultivated area of Bolivia, but only 9.4 per cent of all production units according to the 1950 census. Despite the variety of latifundios, there were certain things in common, the main one being that the labour force was based on a service-tenure arrangement and a serf-like relation to the landlord. Service comprised, firstly, labour on the manorial farm in return for a plot of land; secondly, labour duties or impositions not connected at all with the productive process (usually domestic service); and thirdly, aljiri, the collection and portage of agricultural provisions from the latifundio to the market.

As a social structure the latifundio was made up of a stratified population of three groups of labourers. These were the sharecroppers or colonos who worked a system called colonato whereby they had from one to four hectare parcels of land at the margin of the latifundio called minifundios; the day labourers or peons; and the free peons or hutahuahuas who helped to sharecrop the colonos' parcels of land. The latifundio had a 'two-storey' economy, with commercialisation at the top, supplying food for the urban/mining centres, and traditional subsistence at the bottom. Consequently there was an exclusive relationship
of the latifundios with the market economy by means of trading their farm products; political and cultural isolation of the peasants; and a patriarchal and centralised authority of the landowner (García 1964).

The agricultural marketing system was poor prior to the revolution. Most products served a regional market only—an agricultural system typical of pre-capitalist markets where regions that produced surpluses of certain products were not able to meet the demand in areas where there were shortages. This situation was aggravated because the economy was based on a single mineral export (silver initially, and then tin). This single mineral export conditioned the transport system of Bolivia, which mainly comprised railways. The railway lines radiated out from La Paz to neighbouring countries like spokes of a wheel and there were no real communication lines developed transversely from 'spoke' to 'spoke'. This led to the country being dependent upon imported rather than home grown food.

The historical development of the latifundios in the Altiplano, and in other regions with high densities of Indian populations, was such that the estate owner had little control over the production process and was consequently hamstrung by the pace and techniques of traditional communal or family production, which continued to prevail on the latifundios. Legal ownership of the land, the colonial-type relationship of domination and the
symbolic presence of the latifundio owner in the ritual calendar by which the production cycle was organised pointed to the duality of the typical Altiplano estate. It was possible to call upon surplus labour because of the despotic - paternalistic ascendancy of the latifundio owner over the organising bodies of the community "cloistered" within the latifundio (Cusicanqui 1987)8.

As described above, the latifundio owner could obtain extra labour from the tenant farmer thanks to certain complementary devices which attested to the Indians' lack of independence when it came to making decisions concerning production (Rojas 1978)9.

Further, given the latifundio owner's position in the community's political and ideological structure, it was possible to maintain tributary relationships (like shifts of unpaid domestic services, various forms of tithes and other obligations). Here the latifundio owner played the role not merely of landowner, but also representative of the State, and heir to colonial privileges. It is for this reason that the term "feudal", which is often used to describe the traditional latifundios in the Andean area, is not suitable, since their specific nature involves precisely this connection of income - labour relations with tributary relations and forms of subordination and discipline of the labour force which are clearly colonial in origin. According to Cusicanqui a much better term would be servile - colonial production relations.
The economic options open to the owner on his latifundio were extremely limited. He could require his tenant farmers to perform additional unpaid tasks to increase the volume of production and to meet the fluctuations in demand for foodstuffs for the urban and mining areas, but whenever he tried to do this he was met with resistance. The Altiplano latifundio owners tried to compensate for these limitations in two different ways. Firstly, they imposed trade monopolies on the surpluses produced by individual tenant farmers; and secondly, they mortgaged their land in order to obtain capital for investments outside agriculture. Neither of these two courses of action was very effective, and in time the landed elite in the Altiplano became increasingly marginalised.

The historical development of the latifundios in regions other than the Altiplano, and in other regions with a high density of Indian populations, was quite different. For example, in the Cochabamba Valley region, there was a distinction between the high and the low valleys. In the high valleys there was a tenant farming system like the Altiplano, but it was less rigid and there were no tributary relations. In the low valleys, the dominant system was one of sharecropping. It was here that the agricultural production was linked to the domestic market which expanded at times, particularly during the mining booms. The booms produced a large group of small,
independent commercial producers called piqueros who competed with the estate owners in supplying the urban and mining centres, and competed very successfully (Dandler 1969)\textsuperscript{11}. The latifundios in this area tended to either stagnate or indeed collapse.

Even so, the crisis the latifundios were going through did not necessarily convince people of the need for a solution like the redistributive agrarian reform or the method this would imply. The method of selective modernisation based on income differential, that was already evident in the Cochabamba Valley, was certainly a possibility and, indeed, was the usual way of breaking up traditional estates in other Latin American countries. The fact that the large latifundios had to be destroyed in order to make way for capitalist development in agriculture showed that the collective will of the Indian peasant masses was already present in history and that many future events would depend on their actions, as will be shown in the following two chapters.

Historically, changes have taken place which have had profound effects on the agrarian structure of Bolivia. In the nineteenth century the Indian peasant, the poorest element of society, was disproportionately taxed in the heaviest manner possible. In fact, until well into the last quarter of the nineteenth century Indian taxation was the largest source of the government's revenue (Klein 1969 quoted in Havet 1985)\textsuperscript{12}. During most of the nineteenth
century, Bolivian politics was dominated by its landed elite, a direct result of the heavy peasant taxation. The central and local governments could not have collected the taxes on the peasants without the co-operation, or at least neutrality, of the landed elite. This was true even for the head tax on members of the free Indian communities. More specifically, the landed elite siphoned off the surpluses from the peasants that it directly controlled, while the central and local governments taxed the free Indian communities and marginally the rest of the peasantry.

In the nineteenth century, alliances of landowners controlled Bolivian politics through both the manipulation of the law and, above all, the application of force. Indeed the landed elite destroyed the free Indian communities. Prior to 1874 the number of peasants in communities was much larger than the third of the total population of Bolivia indicated by the 1950 census. This percentage declined for two main reasons; firstly, in 1874 the laws of Ex-Vinculation were passed by the government, the aim being to turn the community peasants (communards) into peons on the latifundios; and, secondly, the development of latifundios during the decade 1890 - 1900, as a consequence of an increased world demand for silver, the development of a rail network to export the silver, and urban developments, both at the mines and along the railway routes, led to an increased demand for foodstuffs. This in consequence led to the expansion of commercial
agriculture, and therefore as a response to the increased demand for foodstuffs in the national market, the latifundios expanded both the amount of their land and their labour in order to augment the quantities of their products. This confirms the fourth hypothesis of Frank, as stated in his article 'The Development of Underdevelopment' viz:

"the latifundium ..... was typically born as a commercial enterprise which created for itself the institutions which permitted it to respond to increased demand in the world or national market by expanding the amount of land, capital and labour to increase the supply of its products" (Frank 1972)13.

It is estimated that between 1846 and 1900 the percentage of Indians who were members of free landowning communities declined from 53 to 27, and this decline reflected essentially a major growth in latifundios (Klein 1969)14.

To summarise, therefore, two elements explain the encroachments of the landed elite on the free Indian landowning communities. The expanding market and transport for foodstuffs constituted the main cause, and the political power of the landed elites provided the means.

Overall, during the period up to the revolution, particularly from the end of the nineteenth century, the peasants of Bolivia were marginalised socially,
economically and politically due to their segregation with respect to the market, to the means of national communications, and to their lack of political and civil rights. This was exacerbated because they were also culturally marginalised as a consequence of their inability to speak Spanish, and the fact that the majority could neither read or write. According to Klein, the Bolivian Indians were almost totally unaware of the nation’s existence and they formed a separate society with their own languages and cultures. Their relationships with the non-Indian society were confined to the economic sphere, and even here, they were almost exclusively rural, and largely subsistence farmers, leaving the urban centres overwhelmingly to the white and mixed Indian-white, or cholo, populations. These two societies were hierarchically arranged, and the non-Indian minority, the only part of the nation truly aware of the national existence, totally exploited the Indian majority both through the discriminatory tax system, and even more importantly in its growing control over the land (Klein 1969)15. In fact the peasants became increasingly irrelevant economically, and so almost inevitably did the landed elite. At the end of the nineteenth century the struggle for political control of central government developed between the tin entrepreneurs and the landed elite and the latter lost. However, given its tradition of social control, the landed elite resisted remarkably well politically, even at the national level.
Consequently, prior to the revolution the peasants were subjected to separation in discrete landgroups (both communities and latifundios) and the management of their relationships with the rest of society was carried out by a class of person highly conscious of the necessity of maintaining them in subjugation and isolation.

Throughout the first part of this chapter the word 'peasant' has been used frequently. It is now necessary to look at the concept of peasantry, and in particular at the Bolivian peasant. The actual definition of the term 'peasant' has created endless controversy, and particularly depends on which dimension or dimensions of the relationship between peasantry and national society have to be emphasised and to what degree of exclusivity (Foster 1967)\textsuperscript{16}.

According to Shanin, four major conceptual traditions have influenced contemporary scholarship concerning peasants (Shanin 1971)\textsuperscript{17}. The first of these is the Marxist class theory. Here the peasants are perceived to be the suppressed and exploited producers of pre-capitalist society. Contemporary peasantry therefore appears as a leftover of an earlier social formation, its characteristics reinforced by remaining at the bottom of the social power structure. The second major tradition is termed the 'specific economy' typology and it has viewed peasant social structure as being determined by a specific type of economy, the crux of which lies in the way a family
farm operates. This second tradition has many similarities with the first. The third major tradition, the ethnographic cultural tradition, stems from traditional western anthropology. Here peasants are representatives of an earlier national tradition, preserved as a 'cultural lag' by the intertia typical of peasant societies. This approach considers that the true nature of the relationship between peasant and national society is economic and/or political. Some authors like Wolf stress above all the economic dimension, and consider that 'peasant' refers mainly to an occupational status (Wolf 1966)18. Other authors, such as Witfogel, stress more the political dimension of the relationship: here 'peasant' refers mainly to a political status (Witfogel 1963)19. The fourth, and last, major tradition is rather complex. It is a traditional - functionalist tradition based on the work of Durkheim. The basic dualism accepted by Durkheim divides society into 'traditional' and modern or 'organic', based on a division of labour. Kroeber later placed peasant societies in an intermediate position as 'part societies with part cultures' (Kroeber 1948)20. This was turned by Redfield into the cornerstone of a conceptualisation accepted by the majority of American anthropologists (Redfield 1956)21.

Sociological definitions and models resemble two-dimensional sketches of a multi-dimensional reality. Each carries partial truth, each reflects necessarily only part of the characterised phenomenon. The reality is richer
than any generalisation and that holds particularly true for peasant societies, highly complex social structures with little formal organisation.

In defining the term 'peasant' it is useful to distinguish between tribal cultivators, peasants and modern farmers (Stavenhagen 1975)22. Tribal cultivators live in relatively closed, self-contained societies, and while they may engage in trade or barter with other groups, they are not economically integrated into wider social units, that is to say, they have not undergone the structural transformations which result from contact with a capitalist economy - they are the 'primitives' in ethnological literature.

In contrast to tribal or primitive peoples, peasant societies do form part of wider economic, social and political units, with which they engage in special kinds of relationships. Peasant economies tend towards self-sufficiency and the household is the main unit for production and consumption, based on the intensive use of family labour.

It is mainly in regard to this latter element that 'traditional' peasants are distinguished from 'modern' commercial farmers, who operate as entrepreneurs, buying and selling in a products and capital market (Wolf 1966)23. Peasants would thus occupy somehow an intermediate position between tribal segments on the one hand, and commercial
agriculturalists on the other. For some theorists, peasantry are merely holdovers from precapitalist times, which tend to disappear as capitalism develops. While this may have been the case in Western Europe, the situation in Latin America is quite different. Here there are still many millions of peasants (whatever the specific definition employed) who are well integrated into the underdeveloped capitalist system.

Shanin argued that one determining factor was insufficient to describe a 'peasant', and consequently he proposed four main characteristics (Shanin 1971)24, which were agreed by Stavenhagen (Stavenhagen 1975)25. These were, firstly, the peasant family farm being the basic unit of a multidimensional social organisation. The self-perpetuating family farm operates as a major unit of peasant property, socialization, sociability and welfare with the individual tending to submit to a formalised family-role behaviour. Secondly, land husbandry being the main means of livelihood directly providing the major part of the consumption needs; thirdly, specific traditional culture being related to the way of life of small communities; and, lastly, the 'underdog position' - the domination of the peasantry by outsiders.

Within these general characteristics it is possible to recognise several specific groups. For example, in Latin America Wolf distinguishes between the peasant properly speaking and the subsistence cultivator, the share cropper,
the landless agricultural labourer, the capitalistic agricultural entrepreneur etc (Wolf 1955)26. Such distinctions tend to be rather academic because there is considerable overlap between the categories, and because in Latin America the term campesino (peasant) is a generic concept whereby the mass of the rural population identifies itself27.

Landsberger and Hewitt define a peasant as 'any rural cultivator who is low in economic and political status. Low economic status denotes little access to economic inputs (such as capital, land and knowledge); little control over the management of these inputs (where to cultivate and when to work); and little control over output and its distribution between the factors of production. Low political status likewise denotes little access to political inputs (such as votes); little control over the management of political affairs (over elected or appointed officials); and little control over the output of the political system (ie content of political decisions)' (Landsberger and Hewitt 1970)28.

Defining a peasant in this way makes the concept relative - it becomes a set of quantitatively variable dimensions. It also makes the concept a broad, inclusive one. It includes not only those who own the very little land they cultivate (the minifundistas), but also those who rent, sharecrop or give labour services in return for land, and those who work the land for wages. The adoption of a narrower definition
like those proposed by Shanin and Stavenhagen is inadvisable since numerous ‘peasant organisations’ throughout Latin America did, and still do, in practice, contain members of all the disparate rural groups described above, one such example being found in Bolivia prior to the revolution.

The definition of a peasant that this thesis adopts combines the above definition of Landsberger and Hewitt’s with an understanding that peasants are a class in their own right, and that this implies, firstly, a consideration of their socio-economic context; secondly an evaluation of their subjective views as a product of their historical experience and embodied in a plan of action; and, thirdly, forms of organisation, concrete expressions of class consciousness and identification of allies and enemies (after Dandler 1977)29. To a large extent in pre-revolutionary Bolivia, because the majority of the Indian population lived in the countryside, the terms ‘Indian’ and ‘peasant’ were synonymous.

Once peasants are defined it is necessary to understand how they organised and expressed themselves concretely as a class in a specific historical context. Therefore, throughout this analysis of Bolivia up to and including the 1952 Revolution, the role of the peasants as an active force within a broad populist movement; the organisation of the peasants and how they expressed their common objectives; and the relationship of the peasant to social
change, following concrete political strategies, will be kept firmly in mind. Analysis, therefore, needs to be focused on the organisation, leadership and ideology of the Bolivian people, in particular, the majority who are peasants as defined above. Further, with respect to these three aspects (organisation, leadership and ideology), it is necessary to determine those elements contributing to the peasantry’s cohesion as a class as well as those which restrain such a process (Alavi 1973)30.

To further our knowledge of the Bolivian peasant prior to the revolution it is also important to understand the ethnic and linguistic reasons for their marginalisation. The 1950 census established the composition of the population by using the language usually spoken. At that time 38 per cent of the Indians spoke only Aymara and 54 per cent spoke only Quechua. Both Quechua and, to a lesser extent, the Aymaran language, are divided among numerous dialects which limited the Indians ability to communicate effectively with other Indians outside their immediate localities. And while Quechua and Aymara have many points of similarity in vocabulary and syntax, they are separate languages mutually unintelligible. A few other independent languages such as Uru and Guarani were spoken by a few individuals, most of whom also spoke Quechua and Aymara. Only about 6 per cent of the Indians spoke Spanish as a second language and they were found in and around the major towns and cities. The 1950 census also revealed that 65 per cent of the population were classified as indigenous,
with the remaining 35 per cent classified as non-indigenous. Unfortunately it is difficult to compare the 1950 census with the one of 1900 in order to determine the evolution of the population's ethnic composition, since the two censuses use different, and in many respects, unclear categories.

These figures give only a vague idea of the complex web of social relationships that bound the different sectors of Bolivian society together. Well into the twentieth century it was a society marked by class-consciousness and colour-consciousness (Demelas 1980), in spite of the advent of capitalism and the attendant transformation of the production process.

During the last twenty years, a number of studies have advanced our knowledge and understanding of peasant movements, and in general about the role of the peasants in the revolutionary struggles of the Third World. In an outstanding work on this subject, Wolf demonstrates that the most important revolutions of the twentieth century to date (Mexico, Russia, China, Viet Nam, Algeria, Cuba) were the outcome of the peasantry's active participation within the alliance of revolutionary forces, but adds, significantly, that the results of these revolutions were in the long run different from the expectations of the peasants who made them possible, although they achieved one of their fundamental aims, the recovery of land (Wolf 1969). This thesis will now turn its attention
specifically to the situation in Bolivia earlier this century, particularly to the role education played in social change bearing in mind that the majority of the 'actors' in the Bolivian situation were peasants.

References

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10. Cusicanqui, R (1987), op cit


15. Klein, H (1969), op cit


19. Witfogel (1963), Oriental Despotism


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23. Wolf, E R (1966), op cit
24. Shanin, T (1971), op cit
25. Stavenhagen, R (1975), op cit
27. The term 'campeсino' only came into existence in Bolivia after the 1952 Revolution. Prior to that the peasants were referred, derogatorily, as 'indios'.
This chapter will look at the historical development of Bolivian society up to the end of the Chaco War in 1936. The main aim is to outline the preconditions of the Bolivian Revolution which developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This is because "the Bolivian Revolution was directed not only against a previous government, but against the institutions that had made that government possible and even inevitable" (Patch 1960)1.

Following the Spanish Conquest of the Indian populations of the New World, the area of Potosí, in what was Alto Peru was exploited for silver which was extracted and shipped to Spain. Alto Peru, which subsequently became the Republic of Bolivia in 1825, was organised to service Spain mercantilistic needs. But the conquistadores who had by force subjugated the Indians were, in the main, ill-suited to the peaceful process of imperial business. In the eyes of Spain they posed a potential threat to the orderly flow of precious goods between Alto Peru and Spain. For this reason, Spain sought to domesticate them with generous land grants. Thus was developed the landed component of Bolivia’s ruling oligarchy.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century Bolivia’s silver-exporting economy was consolidated and this put an end to a protracted recession that had blighted the early days of the Republic. For the first time since independence, the reinforced position of the oligarchy’s
export sector and new opportunities for expanded trade enabled the dominant Creole sectors of Bolivian society to launch an offensive against the Indian communities. Until then the Indians' contribution to the central government's modest budget had represented a considerable percentage of the total amount. But with the influx of revenue from trade and mineral exports, the relative importance of their tribute diminished.

The first real attack on the Indian communities was in 1866 when the dictator Melgarejo tried to auction off their lands under the Decree of 20 March. The attack failed as a consequence of a fierce Indian backlash. Subsequent attacks were less blatant and more effective. In 1874 the Laws of Ex-Vinculation were passed, as mentioned in Chapter Six. These laws declared the Indian community to be legally dissolved and stipulated that communal lands were to be subdivided. This made it possible for the latifundios to rapidly extend their holdings during the next forty years, particularly in the Altiplano. One important consequence of this was the rise of the colonato system, worked by the colonos or share-croppers. Their numbers increased significantly, and they became a distinct group among the peasants. The colonos' relations with the others in the Indian communities was complex and at times conflictual.

The national government of Bolivia was initially controlled by the Conservatives, but was taken over by the Liberals.
after the Federal Revolution of 1899. One consequence of this was the shifting of the centre of power from silver-rich Potosí in the south to La Paz where it has remained ever since. The Liberal Army owned its victory in large measure to the support of the Indian army led by an Aymaran called Willka. The Indian army troops sided with the Liberals during the first phase of the civil war, but they soon developed their own objectives, even though they were not always explicitly stated or clearly formulated. Their demands were four-fold; firstly, the redistribution of usurped communal land; secondly, resistance to the onslaughts of the landowners of Spanish descent; thirdly, a refusal to recognise the authority of either the Conservatives or the Liberals over the Indian troops; and, lastly, the establishment of an autonomous Indian Government under the authority of its principal leader. The rebels, therefore, clearly perceived their interests as being radically different from those of the other belligerents and they early on understood the intercaste nature of the Liberal-Conservative dispute.

The Indian forces were defeated and decimated. Nevertheless they had acted like a nation within a nation, and in their clash with the dominant Creole minority, they behaved as if it were an anti-colonial struggle. Indeed the crisis unleashed by the rebellion made the Creoles collectively conscious once again of the "Indian" as a colonial type.
The Willka rebellion was to mark the end of an era. The breadth and coherence of the movement, together with the Indians refusal to accept any form of mediating mechanism which could translate their demands into terms that would be intelligible to, and be considered legitimate by, other sectors of society, were not to be found in subsequent confrontations during the next half century.

The Liberals that came to power in 1899 were the newer social elements brought into existence by the ancillary activities associated with silver. Liberalists embarked upon a policy of centralisation, standardisation, the continued building of an economic infrastructure, and the extinction of the 'indigenous race' (Cusicanqui 1987)2. The ideology which sustained and justified this course of action could be described as an imported, basically classical European liberalism or Social-Darwinism, heavily flavoured with French positivism, the former influence establishing a laissez-faire market principle, and the latter the notion of environmental control as the basic principle of administration (Malloy 1970)3. This ideology found an acceptable way to perpetuate the Liberals' entrenched racism (Demelas 1980)4. Quoting Antelo, Moreno commented: "The Inca Indians and mestizos have absolutely no place in the gradual evolution of modern society. Sooner or later, in the struggle for existence, they are doomed to extinction under the reign of pure or purified whites" (Moreno 1960)5.
The chief governmental concept of the Liberals was the idea that the state should supply the limited essential means within which private economic domains, based on the motive of individual profit, could flourish. During the period of the Liberal Government from 1900 - 1920 communal lands were expropriated at an increasingly rapid rate. Politicians, merchants and mining entrepreneurs acquired lands as a way to obtain capital, either through speculation or mortgages, to invest from time to time in short-lived non-agricultural business ventures. None of the state objectives of the Ex-Vinculation Acts, which affirmed the need to turn members of the Indian community into small landowners and let land become a freely negotiable commodity, were actually fulfilled. As has already been noted, the forced expropriation of communal land gave the estate owners increased power and promoted the spread of servile relationships in agricultural production.

Concomitant with the consolidation of the Liberal’s power, Bolivia experienced the impact of a most important economic pattern: the last and definitive decline in silver and a boom in tin. The industrial breakthrough in Europe and the United States, spurred on by the coming war, set off a tremendous demand for tin and Bolivia responded to this demand. The Liberals tied the nation’s fortunes to this new source of wealth — tin paid for everything, and there was no real attempt at any internal industrial development. This led to a very skewed pattern of development because the exchange earned by tin was not touched except in
minimal taxes, and therefore Bolivia had to rely on the investment decisions of the mineowners to experience the expected growth effects. But the tin magnates were internationalists and they took their money out of the country. Therefore, there was both minimal investment of capital surplus within the country, and a drainage of the national gold to pay for imports and to service the national debt. According to Malloy, "Under the Liberals, Bolivia was denied secondary growth impulses and, at the same time, its monetary stability was progressively undermined" (Malloy 1970).

In summary, then, during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century, Bolivia underwent two fundamentally important processes. First, there was a process of political change which saw the creation of a modern centralised state oriented towards economic development and also the first outline of political conflict in which important structuring roles were played by class, party and interest groups. Secondly, through the silver and tin booms, the country sustained a strong burst of economic development and modernisation which saw the progressive rationalisation of economic organisation, the country's entrance into the international market, the appearance and influence of new theories and values, and the emergence of new groups and interests.

However, the process of development and modernisation during this time became increasingly reliant on the
fortunes of the tin industry. As a result of this, the country experienced a very skewed pattern of development. The expansion of the tin industry eventually detracted from and curbed the development of other productive sectors. Finally, it began to dominate all aspects of the country’s development, not only as a focal point of economic organisation and integration, but also as a primary cause of negative economic effects which led to stagnation in all other spheres of local activity. Malloy, for example, states that "During the forty year period from 1880 - 1920, Bolivia experienced a skewed and truncated pattern of development and modernisation with future growth based on the potential of one major industry - tin" (Malloy 1970).

This phenomenon of skewed development eventually resulted in a bifurcation of the country into two increasingly differentiated socio-economic systems. On the one hand, a system emerged based on the extraction and shipment of tin abroad (the 'national system'), while, on the other, there was an agricultural system based either on subsistence farming or on very low-level, regionalised, commercial activities (the 'local system'). There were, in effect, 'Two Bolivias', but, despite the fact that a "citizen of La Paz or Santa Cruz is apt to speak of himself and think of himself as a Paceño or a Cruceño rather than a Boliviano" (Edelmann 1967), these 'Two Bolivias' were not separated into distinct unities. There was not a 'dual society' but an internally differentiated unit in which the parts (or subsystems) were locked into a relationship of 'internal...
colonialism' (Stavenhagen 1968). The 'national system' not only differentiated itself from the 'local system', but did so at the expense of it; the backwardness of the latter was due in large part to the manner in which the former developed. Thus the development pattern experienced by the country as a whole was skewed. From the political point of view, a key link between the two was a national elite stratum which dominated the apparatus of government and which had personal interests in both the urban and the rural systems. This elite stratum became, in effect, the only nationwide grouping in the country, and, therefore, one of the most important elements holding the two Bolivias together.

The national constitution stated that Bolivia was a unitary republic with sovereignty "vested essentially in the nation" (Cleven 1940). All persons born in the territory of Bolivia were Bolivians. But to be a Bolivian was not necessarily to be a Bolivian citizen. To be a citizen one hand to, among other things, "be able to read and write, to own estate, or to have an income of 200 bolivianos, provided that this amount does not represent wages received for work as a domestic" (Cleven 1940). If one was not a citizen as defined, one could not exercise public powers, vote, be a candidate, or hold public office.

By constitutional fiat, over 75 per cent of the population were not citizens of the republic of Bolivia. The entire agricultural Indian population was excluded, as were urban
'floaters' and a large number of workers. Citizenship was primarily a middle and upper income group privilege. As these groups lived primarily in the cities, effective citizenship was mainly a character of the 'national system' thereby further reinforcing the fragmentation of the country.

A core characteristic of the pre-revolutionary political system was non-participation by legal process. One element of the history of the advancing European nation state - the Bolivian elite's direct model - was the increasing political awareness of the populations and their direct linkage to states through the advancement of the concept of citizenship. One of the main reasons for Bolivia's stunted growth was its open rejection of this form of incorporation into a national state community. At first, the ruling elite did not want a true national base; after the development pattern described above began to gel, it positively demanded non-involvement. Increasing the scope of citizen involvement would have meant an increase in demands on social resources. As the economic base began to take shape, however, the country had enough trouble accommodating the demands of already established groups, let alone incorporating any excluded groups. One of the pre-requisites of system stability therefore, was the passivity and non-involvement of the majority non-citizen population.

The pattern of social stratification was quite complex in
pre-revolutionary Bolivia. The country could not be conceptualised in the classic tripartite class terms of upper, middle and lower, since there was no single class system (Patch 1960)12. Bolivia lacked a single social space in which groups could be structured systematically. The majority of the population were Indian peasants tied to a rigid stratification, one so rigid as to approximate a system of closed castes. The religious structure likewise placed a high value on the acceptance of the traditional patterns and emphasised the rewards of a future rather than a present life. This social immobilisation was further intensified by the absence of educational facilities for the peasants living on the latifundios. While the traditional social stratification operated to restrict their social mobility, their economic and geographical mobility was also severely hampered by lack of education, widespread illiteracy, a general inability to speak Spanish, and their ignorance of other opportunities and other regions.

The rest of the population was divided between the national bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie. The petit bourgeoisie were urban, but they were not a middle class group as such. They were not national in scope and they did not bridge the gap between the national and local systems. This group encompassed those who rose in economic status during the years 1880 - 1920, but did not make it to the top. If filled out the occupational and status roles between the national bourgeoisie and the 'lower' groupings.
Economically, the petit bourgeoisie was a vulnerable group relying on the smooth functioning of the national system to secure its position. But by grace of its role as the effective electoral body of the state, the petit bourgeoisie was the real source of continuing legitimacy for the relations of authority and political dominance operative in the country. The petit bourgeoisie was the bedrock support group of the pre-revolutionary socio-political order. This relatively small and ill-defined grouping, encapsulated in the cities and only tenuously connected with the rest of the country, was the human foundation upon which the Bolivian 'nation state' stood.

As a product of recent mobility the petit bourgeoisie was a group with aspirations. These aspirations included entrance into the national bourgeoisie which it aped in all aspects of its life style. This urban middle sector was not a focal point of change-oriented activity in the sense of modernisation and development, at least in the pre-1935 era. Ideologically and aspirationally, it identified with the national bourgeoisie, an identification reinforced by its economic dependency. A factor of growing importance to the petit bourgeoisie’s life situation was the closing of mobility channels which occurred with the levelling off of economic growth in the late 1920s.

By the late 1920s, after experiencing a period of considerable economic expansion due to the development of the tin industry, the tin industry itself declined, and in
consequence Bolivia became increasingly immobilised economically, socially and politically. What existed was a society which was neither wholly modern nor wholly traditional, but neither was it transitional – in effect, the entire Bolivian economy ground to a halt. The economic immobilisation which came to grip Bolivia reduced the society’s surplus and created a series of financial crises which developed after 1925 and culminated in the general bankruptcy in 1930. This severely arrested growth and development and resulted in a number of structural strains which, in turn, began to create serious problems for significant groups in Bolivian society.

The first of these problems centred around peasant struggles. After 1910 rebellions began to break out once again in several of the Altiplano provinces. For example, there was a rebellion at a regional level in Pacajes in 1914; there was a small scale revolt of Indians and tenant farmers at Caquiaviri in 1918; and there were intermittent skirmishes around Achacachi between 1920 and 1931. These rebellions had two factors common to them. The first of these was the fact that they all took place along the edge of Indian community lands, which were constantly being threatened by the expansion of the larger estates, and the second was that the leadership of the rebellions was invariably Indian. The rebellions themselves were manifestations on the part of the Indian peasantry to break with the colonial/class order which had been reinforced by the State via political reforms introduced in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, and maintained by the Liberals throughout the first 20 years of the twentieth century.

The peasant movements for reform during the period 1910 - 1930 had a number of demands common to them. They were aiming for the restitution of the communal lands usurped by the latifundios; for the abolition of compulsory military service; for the suppression of the various surviving forms of colonial tribute; for the presence of Indian representatives in both the Congress and at the local government level; for the establishment of community schools; and for free access to the agricultural markets. Many of these demands, although not explicitly formulated, were taken up again after the Chaco War as will be demonstrated in Chapter Eight.

The second of these problems was a generalised economic squeeze on the petit bourgeoisie. The hardening of stratification lines made it more and more difficult for these groups to move vertically. Their location in the service sector of economy and their general dependence on salaries and fees rendered them particularly susceptible to fluctuations in the financial system. Thus, when the society began to experience chronic financial crises, these groups found it increasingly difficult to maintain the life style commensurate with their status and self-identity. For them, insecurity and debilitating effort merely to remain in their present social positions became the daily
The third of these problems, and of more immediate significance in the late 1920s, was the situation experienced by the oncoming generation of elite and sub-elite youth. By birthright, this generation expected high status, and through education they were prepared for entrance into appropriate roles in the liberal professions, politics and bureaucracy. Due to its overall declining economic capacity, Bolivia as a society was unable to maintain a sufficient number of high status roles at the requisite level to absorb this and succeeding new generations. The result was a gap between legitimate role expectations and the ability to realise them. This problem of status incongruence was reinforced by two other factors: the non-too-edifying comparison of Bolivia's overall position vis-à-vis that of other more developed nations; and, more importantly, the contradiction between the 'official' notions of equality, citizenship and advancement by achievement and the actual reality confronting the country. The convergence of these factors fostered a generational split in Bolivia's elite and sub-elite strata.

The fourth dimension of cleavage and strain arose out of the disturbance of more traditional social groupings and the problem of incorporating new groups. Economic development in Bolivia's 'liberal' framework resulted in downward pressure on many of the traditional artisan groups and, at the same time, created newer worker groups.
former responded with demands for alleviations of economic pressure, while the latter experienced the phenomenon of 'rising expectations' and pressed demands for higher wages, better working conditions, the right to organise, and political representation. The traditional artisan groups were pushed down, but not completely superseded, and newer labour groups were created, though the foundations for a broad national working class failed to materialise. Hence the lower stratum of society was a compound of traditional and modern elements. Nonetheless, the lower stratum was becoming the source of increasingly strident demands for change, particularly after 1922 when firstly, it was learnt by experience that striking could achieve favourable government attention, and secondly, it was permeated by leftist (particularly Marxist) literature and ideas brought to the workers by the young intellectual elite drawn from the universities. This kind of combined movement and pressure from below is a characteristic feature of development and modernisation, and it needs an elite prepared to adapt to it - this did not occur in Bolivia.

Thus by the late 1920s the results of these structural strains and internal contradictions were apparent. Strikes, demonstrations and political violence were common. Even more important was the development of a combined artisan and labour movement which became progressively more radical and disruptive. Finally, there appeared a generalised movement among students and young professionals who began to raise serious questions about the legitimacy
of the existing 'liberal' order.

Immobilism was the source of other severe strains, not the least of which was the growing tendency towards factionalisation within the ruling elite. As Kling has noted, in a static society in which the control of the basic sources of wealth (in Bolivia, mines and land) becomes relatively fixed, there tends to develop a problem of the circulation of wealth among the elite (Kling 1965)15. Public office becomes an important means of horizontal circulation, and there is a tendency for politics to become an intra-elite struggle to control offices. This struggle became increasingly important in Bolivian politics during the 1920s. By natural processes, the ruling elite, in effect, was outgrowing the economic basis of its own eliteness. The result was a growing factionalisation of the dominant parties and a growing tendency for elite factions to employ violence against one another. At the very time that some adaptive and/or effective repressive action was required to effect wide social control, the ruling elite was exhausting its energies in mutually destructive struggles, one example being economic conflicts among the three large tin barons over their respective shares of the internationally imposed quotas.

In the face of demands for change and reform, the ruling elite became increasingly intransigent. The Saavedra Government (1921 - 1925) flirted with mild reforms, for
example, passing the country’s first labour laws which included provision for an 8 hour day and compensation for industrial accidents. Saavedra also tolerated and legalised strikes and broadened the patronage systems of the small "democratic" oligarchy, giving a populist touch to Bolivian politics. However, when faced with growing political and economic demands, and being unable to satisfy them, he ordered the massacre of the followers of Jesús de Machaca in 1921, and then the miners of Unicia in 1923.

Hernando Siles (1926 - 1930), in the throes of the financial crisis, raised a nationalist banner but sought to quash a university reform movement.

Both the governments of Saavedra and Siles attempted to broaden the elitist, exclusive social base of oligarchic political power, but without impinging on its social power. When Saavedra made timid attempts to raise taxes on the mining industry, the tin barons countered by internationalising the capital of the companies they controlled. During this time, the penetration of international finance, especially North American capital, into the Bolivian economy, was stepped up and diversified. The unfavourable contracts that the Saavedra Government accepted in order to extend the railway network in fact led to the denationalization of the State’s main source of revenue.

Thus, for all these reasons, the government’s social measures accomplished little except set the stage for the
mobilisation of the people, whose demands were being thwarted.

Even if sectors of the governing elite had wanted to adapt to the pressures for change, economic immobilism prevented the means. Ultimately, the elite’s own precarious economic position and its tendency to factionalisation called into question its long-range ability to control, by any method, the political pressures building up around and within it. Thus the ruling elite were both increasingly unwilling and incapable of undertaking adaptive action.

Thus, by the late 1920s basic structural imbalances and overall immobilism in Bolivia were generating a series of important cleavage lines which, in turn, were generating demands for significant sectors of the society for some form of remedial action. These cleavage lines, on the one hand, were creating potentially strong movements of counter-system strength, while simultaneously weakening the ability of the ruling elites to innovate or resist. And yet, Bolivia, though, like many other states, especially in Latin America, could have carried on indefinitely like this - but two extra factors pushed Bolivia towards revolution.

In 1929 the world wide depression hit Bolivia particularly severely. Then, after scarcely enough time to assess the full damage of the depression, the repressive Salamanca regime (1931 - 1934) led the country to the debacle of the Chaco War. On top of its other problems then, Bolivia
experienced, within a period of less than 5 years, a disastrous depression and a humiliating military disaster. "These two severely disjointing experiences functioned as accelerators, propelling Bolivia into a revolutionary situation" (Malloy 1970)17.

During the depression of 1929 - 1930 the financial structure of Bolivia collapsed and she became bankrupt. In the 1929 budget 37 per cent of expenditure was earmarked to service the foreign debt and 20 per cent was allocated for military needs. The effects of the depression spread quickly through the active sector of the economy. Unemployment became widespread and chronic, forcing the national and local government to institute work projects (Klein 1969)18. Widespread lay-offs were followed by rising prices and acute shortages of food and other primary goods in the cities. With the country's reserves exhausted, imports were restricted, but the local agricultural sector was not organised to fill the gap. Thus the depression did not create problems so much as expose existing imbalances and contradictions.

The worsening economic crisis reflected itself in the political sphere. Strikes, demonstrations and civil disorders became daily occurrences. The artisan-labour movement expanded and became more radical despite governmental opposition. Student activities went in the same direction. Most significantly, there were demonstrations and marches by petit bourgeoisie groups
reacting to rising prices and shortages.

In 1930 a military junta came to power under the conservative and dogmatic leadership of Daniel Salamanca. He whipped up fear of an alien communist threat among the people and, at the same time, began to appeal to Bolivian chauvinism with talk of war. The preparation for war with Paraguay - something which had been simmering for many years - became an umbrella under which repression of internal opposition was justified. By these means, Salamanca attempted to divert the growing internal pressures demanding change.

Through the use of force, the strike movement was broken, the labour organisation demoralised and radical opposition disintegrated and went underground.

There is a limit, though, to how long a government can survive by repression, particularly when it is in the throes of an economic crisis and this crisis is affecting the well-being of groups like the petit bourgeoisie who are ordinarily the bedrock of its support. The Bolivian crisis was hitting just those groups, as was revealed by mounting protest activity among the government employees.

Whatever his reasons, it was in this context that Salamanca chose to lead his country into a major foreign war. The war "was a desperate attempt on the part of the oligarchy to live up to its self-image and dispel the nightmare of a
country that was bankrupt and besieged by the "rabble"
(Cusicanqui 1987)19. The issue of the was the disputed
territory between Bolivia and Paraguay, known as the Chaco.

This piece of arid wasteland, days from La Paz, was to be
the arena in which an army consisting of Indians and
mestizos from the high Andes would test the Bolivian
national honour, and by extension, the reality of any such
thing as a Bolivian nation. The Indians themselves were
hijacked rather than drafted into the army and, although
the war was fought on the basis of 'nationalism', the
Indians did not think of themselves as Bolivians.

The war begun in July 1932 and ended in victory for
Paraguay in June 1936, with the loss of 65,000 Bolivians.
From the beginning the Paraguayans out-thought and out-
fought the Bolivians, most of whom were fighting in an
environment completely alien to them, and who were backed
by a weak government and an incompetent military leader
(Patch 1960)20. The war strained Bolivia's economy even
further, and led to further governmental borrowing and
consequent inflation.

The effect of the war on the different strata of Bolivian
society was very dramatic, particularly with regard to the
Indians. It was a strange experience for them to see
unfamiliar areas of their country, to conceive of Bolivia
as a nation, and to become the object of propaganda
designed to persuade them that they were citizens of a
single nation. According to Huitzer, "The participation of many Indians (in the Chaco War) ... caused a new consciousness among the indigenous people about their relationship to the whites who often depended on them in critical situations" (Huitzer 1972)21. The long-maintained equilibrium, which had depended on preserving the role of the Indians as serfs in a feudalistic society, had been disturbed.

A deep sense of frustration arose in the peasant soldiers as a result of their experiences during and after the war. The army enforced caste-like relationships, and with demobilisation they were confronted once more with the social stratification system of the latifundio. Consequently many of the Indians did not go back to their lands but remained in the cities where they joined the swelling ranks of the unemployed and underemployed. Many periodically returned to their homes where they told of the new life they were leading. In the Cochabamba Valley, for example, the Indians formed a peasant union immediately after the war, the full implications of which will be discussed in a future section.

The Chaco War was obviously very costly for the country, but the peasants as a class were almost unaffected because they occupied a very secondary position in the creation of wealth at the national level (Havet 1985, quoting Wolf 1966)22.
Overall, Bolivia was defeated in 1936 but it was neither the loss of lives nor the war itself which finally upset the country’s social and economic equilibrium. It was rather the rise of a liberal image of the prospective role of the Indian within the nation and a new sense of participation, realised or otherwise, by the Indian population in the national life (Dandler 1971)23. Thus the war nationalised the "conscience" of Bolivia’s population. The fact that the Indians and recruits of mestizo-Creole origin fought side by side served to heighten awareness of the country’s unresolved problems and helped to develop a social conscience and a pro-Indian sentiment on the part of the Creole urban middle class. Concurrently, among the intellectuals there also arose a liberal image of the prospective national roles of the peasants, the miners and the urban poor (Patch 1960)24.

The war also had effects on some other social groups in Bolivia. Many of the elite and sub-elite youths who returned from the Chaco vehemently renewed their demands for change. Thus a generation of young officers, expressing the frustrations and demands of the war victims, entered the political arena. They were joined by others, as a consequence of the Salamanca Government’s policy of conscripting people with known leftist views as privates in the army. These people utilised this experience to proselytise among their fellow soldiers. The consequence was that more people with left wing views returned from the war than had originally entered (Malloy 1970)25.
The question of the war's impact on other worker groups is more difficult. Proscribed organisations emerged much more powerful and more radical than ever before. Strikes and demonstrations broke out in all major cities and had a hitherto unparalleled political impact. A general strike precipitated the overthrow of one president and made uncomfortable the tenure of others. The psychological impact of the war no doubt contributed to the climate of popular agitation, but it should not be over emphasised. Account must also be taken of the economic crisis which followed the war, and that the overthrow of Salamanca by the field army in 1935 provided the opportunity for pent-up demands to be expressed.

In general the ending of the Chaco War led to pressures for change from below. After 1935 such movements came steadily under the leadership of more specifically worker groups, and after 1936 it became virtually impossible to turn the tide. The war, therefore, served as a catalytic agent in a period of new thinking which accompanied the introduction of Socialist and Marxist doctrines into Bolivia. A new stream of thought worked through the universities in the late 1920s and early 1930s establishing a philosophical basis of an ardent nationalism which found its expression in the disastrous Chaco War. Whatever the logic of the position, the effect of the sudden equality of combatants from all classes and the new knowledge of opportunities operated to break or weaken those barriers upon which the former system had rested. Klein went so far as to write
that "this event (the Chaco War) is the primary catalyst for the 1952 revolution" (Klein 1969)27.

In retrospect, it can be said that the political stability of the pre-revolutionary order depended on three basic factors; a healthy and growing tin industry; a committed petit bourgeoisie; and minimal movement in those sectors consciously defined as outside the system (approximately 75 per cent of the population). By 1936 the tin industry was in decline and showed no signs of recovery. The petit bourgeoisie, trapped in a static social and economic climate and then threatened with the possibility of decline, was becoming progressively more alienated. Almost an entire generation of youth, ordinarily destined to enter the national elite, had lost faith in the authority of the existing order. Movement in the lower strata of society was reaching a level of organisational maturity which was to establish it as a permanent feature of the national political scene. Finally, the first faint stirrings of potential movement among the Indian peasants was rippling across the surface of the agricultural system.

Thus in 1936 the preconditions for a revolutionary situation were established in Bolivia. The existence of these preconditions did not guarantee that a revolution would take place, and in fact the revolution did not occur for another 16 years. One major reason for this time lag was the fact that the various discontented strata in Bolivian society in 1936 acted as divided, unauthentic
groups. One essential ingredient was still missing: a way to spread their ideas or, in other words, the establishment of a common language which would make it possible for the community leaders to formulate and disseminate their set of demands, and which would infuse the rebellious actions with a sense of justice and legitimacy recognised as such in other spheres of society. As Friere has noted, the only mechanism by which such revolutionary action can be brought about is through the conscientization of the oppressed groups (Friere 1972)28. In Bolivia from 1936 onwards there was an attempt to raise the consciousness of the discontented strata of Bolivian society by means of an indigenal education programme, and in the following chapter this programme and its effects will be analysed.

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13. These groups were the urban middle sectors and included teachers, petty traders and low-level government and private bureaucrats.
14. The newer worker groups included the occupations that resulted as a consequence of the development of the tin industry like engineers.
16. In 1927 the excess of world production of tin had begun to provoke a slow but steady decline in world prices. The depression aggravated the situation and greatly accelerated this decline. In terms of United States currency, tin dropped from 917 dollars a ton in 1927 to 794 dollars a ton in 1929, and eventually

17. Malloy, J M (1970), op cit
19. Cusicanqui, S R (1987), op cit
20. Patch, R W (1960), op cit


24. Patch, R W (1960), op cit
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26. For a list of presidents of Bolivia, see Appendix 1.
27. Klein, H (1969), op cit
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECT OF THE INDIGENAL EDUCATION PROGRAMME IN BOLIVIA
This chapter will look in detail at the indigenal education programme and its effect on the growth of consciousness among the Bolivian peasants. The chapter will also attempt to locate the indigenal education programme within the wider context of the political, social and economic development of Bolivia during the period from the end of the Chaco War in 1936 until the immediate aftermath of the 1952 revolution.

There have been a number of different definitions of the term "revolution", some succinct as, for example, Malloy's who defined a revolution as not being "an event, but a process of varying duration and outcome", which is completed when there is "movement from one authoritative political order, through a period when political order is in question, to a new authoritative political order" (Malloy 1970)1; and some more elaborate as, for example, Shanin who believed a revolution to be fundamentally an interaction characterised not solely by the acts of one class but by the dynamic interplay of the following facets: a major structural crisis of the society; a major crisis in the ruling elite and its legitimacy to govern; a "crystallisation" of classes expressed in an at least temporary increase in class self identification and a tendency to militancy across class lines; and an operation of revolutionary elites capable of providing leadership in a revolutionary struggle (Shanin 1972)2.

The definition adopted for use in this thesis attempts at a
compromise between the general definition of Malloy and the more specific and deterministic definition of Shanin. Consequently a revolution, as defined here, is a dramatic social upheaval which results in the general rearrangement of the social, economic and political relationships within a society - it is, in effect, a period when the dominant hegemony is broken down and replaced by another. Revolutionary situations develop when significant segments of society become aware that the existing societal framework does not fulfil their desires or their needs, and they start demands for change. A revolutionary potential is reached when those discontented persons conclude that the existing political framework is the major obstacle to desired changes and that they, as an organised group, must act as the agents of change.

There have been many theories of revolution, particularly these based on cognitive psychology (for example, Gurr 1970), structural - functional sociology (for example, Johnson 1966), or pluralist political science (for example, Stinchcombe 1965), which have tended to view the development of revolutionary situations as basically a two-step process. First, a pattern of events arises that somehow marks a break or change from previous patterns. This change then affects some critical variable as, for example, the cognitive state of the minds of the masses. If the effect on the critical variable is of sufficient magnitude, a potentially revolutionary situation occurs. Once this potentially revolutionary situation does occur, a
variety of incidental events that a society could ordinarily absorb without collapsing, such as a war, may precipitate a revolution.

These theories suffer on a number of accounts. Firstly, the 'critical variable' is extremely difficult to observe in practice. This is because one cannot readily measure, for example, the cognitive state of mind of large masses of individuals, and thus it is very difficult to obtain a correlation between broadly defined "social change" and changes in the level of the critical variables. Secondly, if the critical variable is difficult to measure, then it is virtually impossible to specify the level that portends a potentially revolutionary situation. Thirdly, these theories fail to account effectively for the variations in outcomes of different revolutions.

Consequently, the framework proposed here rejects any deterministic cause and effect analysis, favouring the view that analyses must proceed in terms of interacting factors developing in a potentially sequential fashion over time. In addition, the framework proposed will incorporate within it the following points which the above-mentioned theories tend to ignore. Many of these points are specific to Latin America where revolutionary actions are 'populist', populism being defined as a political movement for reform which enjoys the support of the working class or the peasants, but does not result from the autonomous organisational power of either the working class or the
peasants (Di Tella 1965)6.

Firstly, because the state is not merely an arena for conflict or a means of coercion, but an autonomous entity, and that there exists among states a diversity of goals as well as of structures, which affect the possibilities for revolutionary change, the state’s role needs to be analysed. Secondly, the intrusion of international political and economic pressures needs to be included, because they may introduce incentives, or needs, that bring the state and its landlords into opposition with basic aspects of the agrarian, economic and political organisation of their society, thus creating an impetus to revolutionary change (Skocpol and Trimberger 1976)7. Thirdly, the raising of the levels of aspiration of the Bolivian peasants, occasioned by the indigenal education programme (the 'revolution of rising expectations') and the engendering of a subsequent status incongruence leading to a mass mobilisation needs to be studied (Di Tella 1965)8.

Fourthly, Bolivia, in common with many other Latin American countries, had an elite placed at the middle or upper-middle levels of stratification, impregnated with an anti-status quo motivation. Many Third World countries typically lack middle sectors and are dominated by a small upper class. These provide the most fertile ground for various types of populism. The usually stagnant economic and social conditions, added to political repression by a conservative government, tend to drive many sectors of the
middle class and the bourgeoisie into opposition. Even sectors of the army and the clergy are affected in this way. What is likely to happen depends on the exact identity of the groups driven into the reformist camp. They may either include numerous elements from the upper middle classes, the military and the clergy, or else they may only attract lower middle class individuals, including intellectuals. Another criterion which should be applied is whether groups attracted to the camp of reform are fairly widely accepted or, conversely, socially rejected, by the dominant social circles of the class from which they come. These two criteria are, according to Di Tella, important because they permit an assessment of the degree of radicalism of the anti-status quo populist movement. Di Tella suggests that when the second alternative of either criterion prevails the populism is more radical, and this view needs to be tested in the Bolivian context (Di Tella 1965)9. Fifthly, it is necessary for an ideology or a widespread emotional state to develop in order to help communications between leaders and followers, and to create collective enthusiasm; and an understanding of the development of this ideology, either through the efforts of the indigenal education programme, or by other means, needs to be included. In conclusion, therefore, the analysis which follows will concentrate on both the various combinations of developing structural patterns internal to Bolivia, and, on its concomitant international pressures.

Therefore revolutionary movements in Third World countries
are usually based on, firstly, some elements drawn from the urban working class, which is neither numerous nor well organised in such countries; secondly, support from the peasantry; and,thirdly, an elite of professional revolutionaries, mainly drawn from the lower middle class and intelligentsia, strongly at odds with their own class of origin, which tends to develop 'tough-minded' attitudes as a result. The reason for these attitudes can be either their own status incongruence, or the chasm between their aspirations - produced by their education - and job opportunities, or due to some strong ideology. Whatever the reason, this group is essential to the strength and fighting power of the movement. If the social conditions in the country do not produce such a group in significant numbers, no amount of training in leadership can replace it (after Di Tella 1965).10.

On the basis of these last three characteristics, the revolutionary movements of the Third World countries find themselves in a different category from Marx's traditional model of a revolutionary working-class party. It is not only that in place of the urban workers there are now peasants. Far more important is the prominent role played by the professional revolutionaries alienated in varying degrees from their class of origin.

Most anthropologists and historians are agreed that before the Chaco War the traditional equilibrium of Bolivian society was undisturbed (for example, Patch 196011, Dandler
196912, and Klein 1969)13, and that Bolivia entered a revolutionary situation towards the end of the war, a situation that lasted for 17 years (1935 - 1952). This extended period, though an important factor in escalating both the level of violence and the degree of change that the society was to eventually experience, was due in large measure to the fact that the discontented strata in Bolivian society were not acting as a unified whole. This was mainly because of the distrust and resistance to change of the majority of them. But, as Huizer suggests, distrust is not an inherent peasant characteristic but the result of several ages of repression and can be one of the most important promoters of change and development when it is utilised as a force bringing together peasants in a common struggle (Huizer 1972)14.

Turning specifically to the indigenal education programme, this programme grew up in Bolivia in the 1930s to meet the needs of the rural Indian population. Until 1931 rural schools in Bolivia were established solely in non-Indian centres, and they took only white and mestizo children. The teaching in these schools was formal and academic: it was completely rigid in its standards, and there was a predominance of memorising and passive listening, and a pre-occupation with abstract definitions.

In 1931 the first school for Indians was founded, along entirely original lines, by a team of pro-Indian teachers led by Professor Elizardo Pérez in Ucureña in the
Cochabamba Valley. Other schools slowly followed, usually in neighbouring places, and the whole group of schools in a given district was named a Rural School Nucleus (Nucleo Escolar Campesino). This slow growth of schools continued until the ending of the Chaco War in 1936. From that date onwards the number of schools increase quite quickly as part of the rural sindicato (syndicate) development in the Cochabamba Valley.

There were three types of schools included in the indigenal education programme. These were, firstly, the 'complete schools' (the Central Schools of the Nuclei) in which each of the six years of the primary course was supervised by a separate teacher; secondly, the 'incomplete schools', where there were only three or four grades supervised by only two or three teachers; and, thirdly, the single teacher or sectional schools, where a sole teacher supervised the work of children in two or three different grades.

In order that as many Indian children as possible went to school many schools, particularly the single teacher schools, had a 'Double Day' system whereby some groups of children went to school in the morning and others in the afternoon. Consequently the rural families, whose economy often depended on having the children to help in the house or fields, could benefit from this 'Double Day' because the children were at home for half the daylight hours.

The training of the rural teachers was carried out in seven
Rural Normal Schools spread throughout the country, of which the most radical was at Warisata, close to Achacachi. The course of instruction lasted 5 years, the first 2 being given to a widening of general education, the next 2 to pedagogic studies, and the fifth to continuous and systematic teaching practice, both in the schools and in the rural communities which were within the areas of operation of the schools. Consequently, the would-be teachers had the opportunity of practising teaching with both children and adults. The curriculum taught in the Rural Normal Schools included Education in Hygiene and Sanitation, Home Education, Fundamental Education, Rural Economy (Co-operatives and Agrarian Reform), Rural Industries and Rural Sociology.

There were five very important characteristics of the Rural School Nucleus. Firstly, the Central School identified with its wider community and acted as 'head and heart' making the problems of the small communities where the sectional schools were, its own problems; thus there was a coherent group attitude towards all problems. The sectional schools, in turn, felt themselves to be an integral part of a greater whole, and they had a sense of responsibility to the Nuclear group. This mutual strengthening extended also to the pedagogic and technical aspects of the work done. Secondly, the same spirit which animated the Central School pervaded each affiliated school. Thirdly, the continuing concern of the Director of the Nucleus, in his capacity as administrator and
supervisor, was for integration, and consequently there was a close bond between the dependent and main schools through the efforts of the teachers and the communal agencies. Fourthly, a group of specialist teachers - of farming, hygiene and rural industries - worked with the Director of the Nucleus outside the field of the class teachers and they taught solely the Indian parents. The authority of this group embraced the Central School, from which it originated, and the whole cluster of dependent schools. Consequently, one very important aspect of the indigenal education programme was the teaching and consequential awareness - raising of both the Indian children and their parents. Fifthly, the community participated actively through organisations such as the School Aid Boards, the 'Amauta' Council (in the pre-Hispanic era the 'Amauta' was the Inca's wise counsellor) and the Local Authorities, on which it was represented. The School Aid Boards were legally constituted bodies whose members were elected directly by the residents to watch over the continuing progress of the school service. The 'Amauta' Councils were institutions founded in conjunction with the Nuclear School system; they were advisory bodies concerned with school and community activities in each locality.

All the schools were initially resourced on a self-help basis, with the local communities building the schools and the teachers' houses. The Government paid the teachers' salaries.
A well equipped rural school had as its working area the classroom(s), the vegetable garden, a 'hygiene corner', a place for the preparation of food, a stream or fountain, and a hen coop or pigsty. The school curriculum itself was very broad and practical. It was centred initially on the community's needs, and farming and tool subjects were given first priority. Other aspects of the curriculum were health education (hygiene and sanitation), reading, writing and arithmetic and, in the higher grades in the Central Schools, the social and political aspects of agrarian reform. These latter two aspects of the curriculum heightened the awareness of both the Indian children and, particularly, their parents, and correspond closely to Friere's notion of 'conscientization'.

Consequently, the main aim of the indigenal education programme was to bring the discontented strata, particularly the peasants, together by awakening them and raising their consciousness to such a level that they became an organised group receptive to the anti-government feeling which developed in post-Chaco Bolivian society. There had always been the existence of envy, jealousy and difficult interpersonal relations existing in peasant villages, and the indigenal education programme aimed at reducing these jealousies and internal conflicts by showing the peasants that they could face, in a united way, the forces which had kept them in a submissive and backward state. The belief of the programme was that the best way to utilise peasant distrust as a positive force was to
engage the peasants in struggles through organised action for their most basic demand: land.

The implementation of a liberating education policy requires political power and the oppressed in society have none. Consequently, following the ideas of Friere, a distinction needs to be made between systematic education, which can only be changed by political power, and education projects, which should be carried out with the oppressed in the process of organising them, based on the practice, not of the act of transferring knowledge, but of knowing (Friere 1972)15.

The indigenal education programme effectively made this distinction by promoting the function of education as a raising of consciousness, particularly among the adults. Indeed it went further than this because, through it, the Indian peasants were able to perceive their personal and social reality as well as the contradictions within it; and they also became conscious of their own perception of that reality and were able to deal critically with it. Linked with this was the belief that theoretical 'conscious-raising' activities had meaning only when united with action directed at the structures to be transformed. Those thus educated came to a new awareness of selfhood and they began to look critically at the social situation in which they found themselves. Consequently, the newly educated groups became a potent force in pre-revolutionary Bolivian society, and their support was actively sought by the
organised political parties of the Left.

In 1936 the first post-Chaco War government, headed by Colonel Toro (1936 - 1937), came into office amidst great hopes for a moral regeneration of the country. Toro proclaimed the "lofty and noble ideal of restoring Bolivia's economic sovereignty, putting a stop to misery and poverty, and giving the manual and intellectual workers back their human dignity" (quoted in Klein 1968).16 A decree was issued by the Ministry of Labour concerning compulsory union membership during Toro's time. The decree was corporatist in intent and it helped to speed up the organisation of workers throughout the country. The first unions/sindicatos of tenant farmers on the large estates were formed in the Cochabamba Valley, the objective of these unions being to lease church-owned and municipal lands, which until then had been administered under the colonato system. In fact the 1936 decree obliged 'municipal and religious entities' wishing to sell their properties to give preference, in equal condition, to service-tenants in occupation of the lands who were able to organise themselves in an agricultural union. It was significant that the first unions were in the Cochabamba Valley. This was mainly because of the eagerness on the part of its rural population for contacts with new "cultural representatives - intermediaries" - teachers, war veterans, miners and urban workers (Dandler 196917, 197118). Thus, the Union of Tenant Farmers of the Cliza Valley, which was set up on the estate of the monastery of
Santa Clara and was run by veterans of peasant origin, had close ties with the rural school of Ana Rancho, which provided the tenant farmers with management advice. Also on the Vacas settlement nearby, which belonged to the municipality of Cochabamba, the teachers negotiated direct administration of the estate by the tenant farmers, and they established an education centre, based on the one at Ucureña (Dandler 1969). The Ucureña school, meanwhile, the one created in 1931 by Professor Elizardo Pérez’s team, obtained government recognition and support during the Toro and Busch (1937 - 1939) administrations. The school itself was a Central School and it served a network of sectional schools which were organised in the neighbouring localities and estates.

However, the new arrangements worked for a few years only. For example, in 1939 a small group of landowners got together to destroy the nascent Cliza Valley sindicato and remove the threat to the customary pattern of landlord rule. With help from the government they prevailed upon the Santa Clara monastery to sell the land to them so that they could abandon the legal arrangement made by the sindicato and its helpers. They cleared the land and destroyed the houses of the peasants under the pretext of rationalising the cultivation. Those peasants who did not want to work again for the estate were driven from the land, and 12 peasant leaders were confined to an isolated area of the country. According to Patch, "This attack on the syndicate members did more than any other act to unify
the Indian population and awaken it to political life"
(Patch 1960)20.

After this first defeat the Cliza Valley sindicato turned from the direct attempt to secure the land for the peasants to a programme of school building and other improvements designed to organise and prepare the peasants for what they now saw as an inevitable struggle with the landowners.

In this difficult period during and after 1940, the Cliza Valley sindicato became increasingly dependent on the leadership of the local school director Guerra (who became a member of the Stalinist PIR party). With assistance from various intellectuals from the town of Cochabamba, Guerra helped the peasants purchase some parts of the estate, although for a price higher than the landowners would have paid. About 2,000 peasants thus became the owners of one hectare plots and gained their independence. Guerra also helped peasants of surrounding estates to channel their complaints to the authorities about abuses by the landlords. The sindicato spread its influence and, in turn, helped in the founding of various smaller schools related to the Central School in Ucureña. By 1946, there were 41 such schools with 62 teachers and 2,100 pupils in the area. Such was the power of the school-union combination that in 1946 their pressure secured the appointment of an Indian peasant as "corregidor"21. Further, towards the end of 1946, Ucureña was chosen as one of the rural education centres to be assisted by the
Service Cooperativo Interamericano de Educación (SCIDE, a joint American-Bolivian fundamental education agency).

The objectives of these sindicatos, as well as the activities of the schools and the pro-Indian teachers, were of course modest. The leasing and self-management of land that did not belong to the land-owning elite did not call the system of land ownership directly into question. However, because everything was so closely interrelated, even limited reforms were a threat to the landed gentry. The local structures of the oligarchy's power were as yet intact, and they were not prepared to given an inch to the Indian peasantry. Just as they had formerly extended the boundaries of the large estates and surrounded the communities, the local power structure now attempted to narrow the ideological gap generated by the Indian's protest movements. It was clear that in such a situation any measure taken by the State could cut two ways.

From the beginning of the century onwards, education had been one of the oligarchy's favourite themes when they talked about civilising the Indians. Usurped land and the ambitious plans for importing European settlers blended perfectly with another device for "eliminating the Indian", namely schooling. (In 1925 J Mollins stated: "The Indian is traditionally conservative and is a prolific genitor; this means that if he is left to his own instincts, he will sooner or later become a social and political danger. The Indian must be eliminated through education" (quoted in 206
During the cycle of uprisings in the 1910s and 1920s, the Indian peasantry saw the ambivalent issue of schooling as a way to reformulate its "reciprocity agreement" with the State (Platt 1982). By learning the language of their oppressors, the Indians hoped to combat the power of the local landowners and townspeople. These trends were amplified during the post war era and the Indian's network of urban contacts, their ideological points of reference, and organisational schemes became diversified.

Furthermore, the tolerant policy of the governments of Toro and Busch, which ignored the ideology on which the oligarchy was founded, helped to point up the emptiness and ambiguity of its proposals for civilising the Indian. It left more scope for popular demands. One can say that for the very first time, the "people" became part and parcel of political life following the Chaco War. Pro-Indian sentiment was becoming more explicit among middle class intellectuals. Meanwhile the sindicato movement of the tenant farmers of Cochabamba was broadening its appeal, and winning support from workers' federations, the student movement and the teachers.

It is important to realise, though, that the new current of ideas had more impact in some areas than others, and this was in part because of the indigenal education programme. For example, in the Cochabamba Valley the Quechua language in this region was already a product of several centuries...
of cross-breeding, and bilingualism in the towns was the norm (Quechua and Spanish).

The great geographical and social mobility of these Indians increased when the war veterans went back to the countryside. Further, a more open market structure, dating back to the domestic colonial market of the Potosí mining industry (Larson 1978)24, had been a considerable help in erasing inter-ethnic frictions and broadening the spectrum of relationships and alliances between the peasantry and other sectors of society. In the Altiplano, and the Puna de Norte in the south, on the contrary, the caste structure remained and this was much less vulnerable to the influx of these new currents; there was no indigenal education programme here and therefore the sindicato movement developed much later. In fact, in the province of Belisario Boeto in the south there was no protest activity at all prior to the 1952 revolution (Havet 1985)25.

The post-war era also marked the end of the traditional party system and the rise of new popular and left-wing parties in Bolivia. Indeed, according to Klein, under the regimes of Toro and Busch, Bolivia’s traditional political party system was destroyed and the way was prepared for a new revolutionary ideology and the eventual success of the 1952 revolution (Klein 1965)26. From the late 1930s to mid 1940s numerous political discussion groups sprang up with diverse ideological leanings, and they later joined together to form new parties. The most important were the
Trotskyist POR, a Workers Revolutionary Party; the Stalinist PIR, a party very popular with the peasants and school teachers in the Ucureña area; and the MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario), a party formed by a group of intellectuals headed by Paz Estenssoro, comprising a mixture of liberal intellectuals and young army officers who were dissatisfied with the mishandling of the Chaco War. (The MNR party was the cornerstone of the 'populist' movement as defined by Di Tella (Di Tella 1965)27, which developed in Bolivia at this time because its power rested on mass mobilisation, an alliance of classes, and a diffuse ideology of reforms and social change.) Traditional Liberals and Republicans (and even Conservatives) buried the hatchet and joined together to draw up a pact called 'la Concordancia'. It was a sort of defensive withdrawal which turned them into mere agents of the mining-landowning circle. The extent of the oligarchy's political isolation can be seen in its gradual loss of control over the instruments which had served so effectively to uphold its supremacy since the turn of the century. Both the army and the electoral system ultimately turned against the oligarchy.

Meanwhile, the new political parties vied with each other for the allegiance of the Indians. (The Indians for the first time were perceived not as a threat but as a potential political asset.) The most obvious result of these efforts was the spread of a new form of peasant opposition that was clearly inspired by the sindicatos,
namely, sit-down strikes by tenant farmers on large estates. Throughout this time the word was spread by individuals who acted as agitators, many of whom had been taught to read, write and think by teachers employed on the indigenal education programme.

As a proof of their organisational ability, the First Congress of Quechua-speaking Indians was held at Sucre in August 1942, under the auspices of the Trade Union Confederation of Bolivia and the Worker and Student Federations of Sucre and Oruro. At this Congress, according to newspaper accounts, "peasants and workers, in a fraternal embrace, have joined in a common cause to make their aspirations and proposals for emancipation come true". The main resolutions included the abolition of compulsory personal service (the pongaje), restitution of usurped communal lands, and relief from taxes. The Peñaranda Government (1940 - 1943), which was part of the cycle of military restoration initiated after the war, responded with a set of measures designed to control the movement, which the oligarchical press denounced as the result of "communist agitation in the countryside". In the February 1943 Supreme Decree the government ordered the following: "Article 1. All articles and paragraphs in the statutes of workers' and labour organisations that contain matters relating to agricultural work or peasant activities are declared null and void" (quoted in Antezana 1973)28.

Peñaranda also set up a Legal Office for the Free Defence
of Indians, in an attempt to limit the influence of the legal advisers of the anti-oligarchy political and labour organisations, and he enacted a State security decree, laying down penalties for "agitators who, by infiltrating the large estates and Indian communities, disrupt agricultural work and incite others to take part in work stoppages or in passive resistance".

Meanwhile, Aymara war veterans undertook the task of organising and arming the tenant farmers of the Chijjcha estate and encouraging work to rule strikes in Ayopaya in the Cochabamba Valley, as well as in several provinces in the department of Oruro. This was the prevailing climate when the second Congress of Quechua-speaking Indians was held, once again in Sucre, in August 1943. The objectives of the Congress were to organise sit-down strikes and to seek agreements with the workers in the towns and cities.

With the Villarroel coup d'état in December 1943, and the formation of the RADEPA-MNR coalition government, the strikers were able to exert more pressure. Under Villarroel's government the "peoples" movement reached its highest point, with an increased awareness and a highly organised peasantry. For example, in August 1944 Paz Estenssoro and Guevara presented to the National Convention a proposal for a moderate agrarian programme. Opposition from the majority of the Convention controlled by the powerful organisation of large landholders, the Sociedad Rural Boliviana, was strong enough to block acceptance of
the proposal. But the MNR, led by Paz Estenssoro and Guevara, which defended the proposal, awakened the peasantry to the fact that they had allies. As a consequence, spontaneous uprisings were replaced by more effective methods for achieving land reform. Consequently, the MNR, which had won the support of the mine workers unions by denouncing the Catavi Massacre of 1942, and by taking the Ministers of 'la Concordancia' to task, set about organising unions of workers and peasants. This led to the First Indian Congress held in La Paz in May 1945 fronted by Villarroel, Ramos and Mamani. The ideological impact of this Indian conclave, held at the seat of the Bolivian government, and in the presence of its highest authorities, was perhaps more important than any of the measures it adopted.

The Congress had approximately 1,000 delegates from all 98 provinces. The main points of the agenda were abolition of unpaid personal services which the peasants had to render to their landlords; regulation of agricultural labour conditions and agrarian policy; and education. No radical measures were proposed by the peasant delegates, but the demands made were directed against the most abusive forms of servitude and lack of educational facilities. As a result of the First Indian Congress of 1945 government decrees were issued. In themselves these decrees (abolition of the free labour services on the large estates (the pongaje), regulations concerning masters' and tenant farmers' obligations and rights, and the obligation of the
landlords to establish schools on the large estates) did not pose a serious threat to the ownership system or to the economic power of the landowners. Land reform as such was not dealt with. They were an affront only because they represented unacceptable state interference in the internal affairs of the large estates, and because they legitimated to a certain extent the Indian's questioning of the barriers of caste on which the tenant farmer-master relationship was based. This questioning destroyed the ideological foundations for disciplining the tenant farmers.

Even more outrageous was the fact that the President of the Republic, Villarroel, attended a meeting of the Indian "masses", because it was a foretaste of a new State programme in which the Indian peasants would play a major role. It is interesting to compare this situation with the Revolution of 1899. Now the oligarchy was faced with an increasingly overwhelming and intelligible entity (much of it a product of the indigenal education programme), whose demands could even be considered reasonable and worthy of attention, whereas in 1899 the stigma attached to the Indians and the idea that they were barbarians had been justification enough to resolve any conflict in the countryside with armed repression.

As on other occasions, the Indians brought to the State's attention their own framework of interpretation and the concepts they had personally developed concerning society
and the State. The abolition of compulsory personal service, occasioned by the 1945 Congress, was seen as the end of slavery and submission, and as a guarantee on the part of the State that usurped land would be returned to its rightful owners. In the face of this basic act of injustice by the State, the position of the landowners looked like an act of disobedience, like individual intransigence against the common good.

The Villarroel-MNR government tried in vain to control the Indian agitators who were spreading the good news around the country and encouraging fellow Indians to set up sindicatos and seize land. The actions of the rural agitation went beyond the limits of party or union affiliation. Ramos, for example, in the Irupana region of the Yungas even called himself the "President of the Peasants".

On 21 July 1946 Villarroel was lynched by a city mob in La Paz. The inhabitants of the capital rejoiced at his downfall. They believed that this action, the killing of the "father" of the Indians, would save the oligarchy's power. The lynching of Villarroel triggered off a period of repression of the Indian agitators, and a new colonial subjection of the Indians and their territory. Riots occurred throughout the country. The Indians blamed the MNR - they believed that, like the Liberals in 1899, the party had resorted to the hateful expedient of taking advantage of the "ignorance" of the Indians (Antezana 214.
Rebellions occurred in late 1946 and early 1947. They originated in the Cochabamba Valley area. According to President Hertzog (1947 - 1949) it was "the most serious Indian uprising in our history". It was not an organised rebellion under a single command, and it did not occur in a simultaneous or co-ordinated way. In many cases rebellion was the result of relatively minor actions like, for example, the holding of a meeting to found a sindicato, or the setting up of a school, getting out of hand and becoming violent. Nevertheless many of the estate owners became fearful and fled their properties.

The loaded ideological terms which contemporary historians used to record these events, as well as their use of stereotypes like, for example "Indian uprising", prevents us from perceiving the real diversity of the situations that generated conflict and the specific forms of alliances that the Indian peasantry forged with other sectors of society. In general terms there were two types of conflict. The first of these was in the regions with less inter-ethnic friction, and a more open market structure, which had received the benefits of the indigenal education programme, regions like the Cochabamba Valley. Here direct conflict between tenant farmers and landowners took the form of work to rule strikes. The sindicato leadership, the presence of urban activists and the legal advice given to the sindicatos, made it possible to set up bodies for
negotiating with the landlords. The struggle took the form of refusing to pay land rent or modify the conditions of payment. In many cases, the Indians succeeded in obtaining the subdivision and sale of portions of the estates to tenant farmers.

The second type of conflict occurred in the Altiplano and in some valleys with large Indian populations. Here the situation was more complex. In these regions, the tension along the border between the large estates and the Indian communities, and the inter-ethnic friction between the mestizo-Creole towns and the rural areas populated by the Indians played a major role. Here, a new type of leader emerged; he came from somewhere outside the large estates, and combined the community tradition of self-defence with a broad range of labour union and urban contacts and experiences. In these regions, the principal form of struggle was the siege. The siege came from outside the boundaries of the large estates (by means of the symbolic destruction of boundary stones and signposts, bonfires etc), and it made the landowners flee. Later the siege took place inside the estates; the tenant farmers appropriated or destroyed the landlords' harvests. Violent clashes occurred when landowners attempted to break the siege by calling in the local authorities. This second type of conflict was the more violent of the two; for example, in Ayopaya in 1947 (in the high mountain chain above the Cochabamba Valley), 10,000 Indian peasants took arms, forcing several landlords to flee, and killing at least two
of them. This movement was headed by Indian rebel leaders who had contacts with leaders from other regions, and with miners from the Oruro district.

This uprising was one of many which occurred in 1947. The uprisings were supported by the Local Workers Federation (FOL), and its rural wing the Departmental Agrarian Federation (FAD). The FOL was probably the only union organisation which understood the Indian cause. The leaders of its FAD wing were, in the main, teachers, and they travelled throughout the country encouraging the organisation of unions, sit-down strikes and the founding of schools, and thus they made it possible to reach the most dispersed and most heavily controlled tenant farmers. Indian leadership and ideology continued to dominate the movement, as can be seen by the fact that the main demands of the movement in 1947 were more or less the same as those in pre-Chaco War times, namely the abolition of compulsory military service; abolition of the road service and other taxes; the restitution of community lands seized by the estate owners, and the setting up of schools in the communities and on large estates. Added to these demands were others, formulated as a consequence of their more recent history, namely legal recognition of the agrarian sindicatos, which came out of the Indian Congress of 1945; and the pioneering experiences of the agrarian sindicatos of the Cochabamba Valley.

Although the objectives and methods of the various rebel
centres of the 1947 uprisings were not alike, the official response was the same everywhere: indiscriminate violence, the organisation of the army and the police against the rebels, (a special rural police corps was created) and the arresting of hundreds of Indian agitators and their exile to the tropical north of the country.

During the period 1946 - 1952 there was a restoration of oligarchical governmental rule in Bolivia. This coincided with the post-war economic effects on the country, particularly a decline in the demand for tin. This led to large numbers of miners being laid off. Many returned to their birthplaces, further increasing the pressure on the land, and they helped to disseminate the organisational and political knowledge of the sindicatos, which could thus be grafted onto the existing communal organisations.

The repression ended up by unifying the opposition. As a result of the MNR's defeat, and that of the labour movement in the 1949 civil war, Indian rebels from all over Bolivia rubbed shoulders with Movimientist political and labour leaders in prison cells and in exile. This gave rise to the first "peasant cells" of the MNR, whose members were recruited from among the independent community leaders who had participated in the 1947 rebellions. Movimientist influence increased in the countryside throughout the "Six Year Period", as it was called, between 1946 and 1952.

At least two more Indian Congresses were held
clandestinely, in Potosí and La Paz, and the MNR, through its leaders, was already making its presence felt here. There was also one public Indian Congress in Pacajes Province in January 1952.

The relationship between the MNR and the Indian peasant movement prior to 1952 was basically ambiguous. There were no longer any references to restitution of communal lands in the Resolutions adopted at the Pacajes Congress; instead, there was an MNR package of proposals for modernisation, such as the creation of wholesale markets, the improvement of rural education, the re-establishment of the Free Defence Courts for Indians, and a request to the government to carry out a study on land reform (Antezana 1973)30.

This ambivalence may go to explain the lack of connection between the two most significant events involving mass action during the "Six Year Period": the general rebellion of 1947, and the civil war of 1949. The civil war, led by the MNR and by dissident factions in the army, with the participation of miners, factory workers, railway workers and low income townspeople, received marginal support from the peasants, whether Indian or mestizo. On the contrary, the 1947 uprisings remained isolated from the most active nuclei of the organised labour movement, and especially from the miners, despite the extensive urban contacts of its leaders. This surprising lack of co-ordination points up the fragility of the "workers-peasant-middle class
alliance" on which the MNR was attempting to build a populist platform.

The MNR's lack of receptivity to the demands of the Indians of the Altiplano and its resentful and paternalistic attitude towards a modest programme of State reforms instituted by the Pacajes Congress in 1952 also shown the extent to which the MNR and the old dominant caste were basically in agreement about the Indian peasantry. The Indians demands did not fit into the MNR's plan to create a culturally unified nation by means of inter-marriage, Hispanicization and the domestic market. The very idea of a racial melting pot proposed by the MNR, and unquestioned by the Left, then as now, presupposes a one-sided attachment to Western values, language and the thought processes of the Creole class; it precludes any form of multiculturalism or multilingualism. The Indian programme, in so far as it implied a strengthening of the Andean's ethnic sense of identity, therefore stood in the way of the idea of a "decent" mestizo-Creole nation cherished by the leaders of the party which was to head the 1952 insurrection (Cusicanqui 1987)31.

Following the 1947 rebellion, the MNR tried to turn the Indian movement into a "peasant movement"; they set up structures for co-optation and union control to convert the rural masses. They were to be passive receivers of the new civilising proposals. Hundreds of Indian agitators were incorporated into this enveloping movement, which gradually
caused them to change even their own perception of themselves. They slowly abandoned their ethnic attachment and assimilated the illusion of equality among citizens.

In the elections which were scheduled by the cabinet of Urriolagoitia (President 1949 - 1951) for May 1951, the government was expected to control the outcome by legal means, since the franchise was restricted to literate males, largely urban dwellers who, it was thought, would split their votes among several competing candidates. Under the constitution, if no candidate received an absolute majority, the Congress could choose the president from among the three candidates receiving the most votes. Since the Congress was dominated by the government it was assumed it would proceed to choose the government’s candidate Gosalvez.

The government party was more surprised than anyone when the votes gave Paz Estenssoro, the MNR candidate, 45 per cent of the 120,000 ballots cast, and the MNR also elected six out of nine senators, and 10 out of 55 deputies. However, in spite of the MNR’s impressive showing in a restricted electorate which was not generally regarded as favourable to it, Paz Estenssoro had not received an absolute majority. Although he had a 5 to 3 plurality over Gosalvez, there was no assurance that the Congress would not choose the government’s own candidate as president.
The suddenly, on 16 May 1951, Urriolagoitia resigned, handed over the reins of government to a military junta and fled to Chile. The reason given by the junta for the coup was the necessity of keeping the MNR from power. The MNR, they proclaimed, was an alliance of Nazi, Fascist and Communist elements which would establish a dictatorial type of government, nationalise the mines and industry, and institute a campaign of terror. The junta lacked both positive leadership and positive support. It accomplished little, and its unity steadily deteriorated until in April 1952 it fell when the leader of the national military police went over to the MNR. This precipitated the revolution of 9 - 12 April, with street fighting between the army on one side and the miners, workers, a rebellious police and other forces on the other, the latter being victorious.

About two weeks later, Paz Estenssoro returned from exile in Argentina and became president. Changes occurred in Bolivia relatively soon after the new government had taken power. A young generation of military and civilian leaders emerged to search for alternatives to transform Bolivian society. This ideological and revolutionary ferment was also evident among miners and other workers, whose struggles during the decade before the revolution were marked by such historical incidents as the Catavi Massacre in 1942, the founding of the Bolivian Federation of Mineworkers in 1946, and the launching of their famous Tesis de Pulacaua during the same year. Further, the
peasants did not remain bystanders to these political currents. As described earlier in this and the previous chapter, they had a rich history of organisational groundwork, rebellions and other attempts to seek their liberation during the 1930s and 1940s. The new government gave amnesty to the peasant leaders who were in gaols, and although the peasants did not participate in the immediate events of April 1952, as soon as the MNR assumed power the word spread that a new era was to begin for them. The revolutionary situation opened a growing opportunity structure for a variety of political agitators and organisers to make contact with peasants, mobilise and arm them, and search for leaders among them to proselytise about the revolution and the rights of the peasants. Certain rural areas soon became critical foci of agitation and mobilisation which influenced the scope and impact of the agrarian reform.

After the revolution there were two difference attitudes to the peasants taken by the MNR. One group, on the moderate right of the party, agreed that the peasants should be incorporated through suffrage, education and, above all, agrarian reform which was to be carefully studied and implemented in an orderly manner. Within this wing, some argued to limit the latifundio in size and eliminate free service obligations. In this moderate view, the sindicato was conceived as a labour union to act as a bargaining agent and only secondarily as a political instrument. The motto of this group was "order and work". The other group,
on the left of the party, were inclined to model peasant sindicatos after labour and mining unions, primarily as political instruments which were armed and organised to support and radicalise the revolution. Their motto was the "land for the one who works". Consequently, the countryside became a vast arena of political mobilisation. The most dynamic organisers and agitators tended to associate with the various leftist groups (Dandler 1977)32.

In order to fully understand the effects of the revolution on the peasants, a fairly detailed analysis of the situation in the Cochabamba Valley, particularly the district of Ucureña, will be attempted. The district of Ucureña had been an important centre for rural union activities ever since the 1930s, in part due to the raising of the consciousness of the peasants by the indigenal education programme, as has been shown previously in this chapter. In late 1952, the unionists had "taken it upon themselves to being a process of land redistribution whose influence spread rapidly" (Dandler 1969)33. Ucureña became a high priority area for the government, not only because of the urgent need to control any possible excesses during land distribution, but also because the smallholders there best personified the ideal of a plebeian-mestizo nation on which the MNR's philosophy for a unified culture was founded. Moreover, the union network that existed in the region was adequate for setting up patronage mediation structures which could quickly channel peasant support to the new government.
Thus, one of the earliest networks of MNR political middlemen came into being in the Cochabamba valley. It produced the first leaders of national importance who would set up the State-sponsored union apparatus needed by the government. These leaders came from a significant potential leadership pool among the peasants, many of whom, prior to 1952, had demonstrated leadership, developed political connections with the MNR and other political parties, or participated in the mining labour union movement. These leaders obtained their strength and credibility from either some form of legitimacy conferred from higher authority, or through mass mobilisation. Two peasant leaders soon eclipsed the rest. They were Rivas, the Assistant Mayor of Sipe Sipe, the sub-capital of Quillocollo, who was an MNR activist and former mine union leader, and was fluent in both Quechua and Spanish; and Rojas, who came from Ucureña, had fought in the Chaco War, worked with the school director Guerra in the 1940s, headed the sindicato of Ucureña in 1946, had ties with the POR, and who was the undisputed leader of the Ucureña trade union in the high valley (Dandler 1977)34.

With the support of the newly established Ministry of Rural Affairs, Rivas established a Peasant Federation in the low valley, while Rojas consolidated his power among the sindicatos in the high valley, basing his leadership on personal charisma, a core of subordinates, advice from the left wing, historical experience of Ucureña as the country’s first rural sindicato, and the fact that he was
of peasant stock and was, therefore, a "real peasant" (Dandler 1971)35. Rojas, because of his previous political associations, did not count with the support of the provincial MNR leaders during his attempts to reorganise the sindicato in 1952. But he shrewdly promoted himself as the leader closer to the masses by identifying himself with the local colonos or landless. (The landless peasants who held usufruct plots on the latifundios became the most mobilisable forces in rural Bolivia during the agrarian reform process, confirming a significant distinction made by the Marx about class consciousness among landless peasants, in contrast to those who had land, namely that if you have nothing you have nothing to lose.) Rojas also drew upon the symbols and rhetoric of the revolution, reworked them with other culturally relevant symbols and effectively exploited the historical experience and notoriety of Ucureña, with the result that he presented a plan for action and all the while promoted himself as the leader closest to the peasants. In other words, an ideological programme was generated which expressed a sentiment of class consciousness.

The two leaders responded differently, with Rojas advocating direct action to appropriate the land and expel the estate owners, whereas Rivas, more bureaucratically, tried to achieve his aims formally by government approval. In a situation that was critical for the consolidation of the new government, and in the midst of acrimonious internal quarrels over the course that land reform should
take, the direct appropriation of land, coupled with the organisation of sindicatos, and the beginning of armed peasant militia, threatened to be beyond the government’s control. In January 1953 Rojas, supported by the POR, took control of the regional Peasant Federation, thereby sparking off a crisis which compelled the government to abandon for the time being its plans for a bureaucratic subordination of the movement in the valleys. On 30 April 1953, four months before the national agrarian reform decree (2 August 1953), the MNR under pressure ratified the appropriations in Ucureña and elsewhere in the Cochabamba Valley, thus consolidating Rojas’s leadership and choice of methods.

The government then decided to win over Rojas. Thanks to an irresistible amount of personal favours, he was ultimately turned into a complaisant official of the MNR sponsored union movement. In 1953, the authorities recognised him as a regional leader; then he became departmental leader in 1954, a member of parliament from 1956 to 1958 and Minister for Rural Affairs in 1959. The result of this governmental policy was the rise of two rival political and territorial powers in the Cochabamba Valley whose leaders sought continuously to interfere in one another’s sphere of influence.

It is worth noting that the roots of Ucureña’s militant stance was not so much based on a sudden ideological conversion of a few men or Rojas in particular; Ucureños
had a deep historical awareness of their struggle for land ownership and freedom from landowners, occasioned to a large extent by the indigenal education programme. They were convinced that they could settle for nothing less than a total re-distribution of the latifundios. When the new regime called for peasant support, Ucureños were too impatient to accept further promises, studies and legalities. In short, they were ready to organise themselves and to act. They needed a leader and Rojas, in particular, fitted the bill.

Thus Ucureña, and its surroundings, provided what has been described as a 'revolutionary hearth' or 'focus' with experienced leadership and a network of organisations which could mobilise the peasants, not only by landgroups, but en masse, and a peasantry with revolutionary thoughts (in terms of the existing social situation) and clear short-term revolutionary objectives, namely the taking of the land by those who worked it. It comes about therefore that although Ucureña did not participate directly in the revolution on 9 April 1952, its success was the signal for insurgency directed at the Cochabamba estates and beyond, organised by the peasant leadership under Rojas, and carried out by both the peasants politically mobilised in the area, and the students.

The early meetings of the Ucureña sindicato organised task forces of peasants and young pro-MNR students from the Cochabamba Valley region, dispatching them to the farthest
reaches of Bolivia. These task forces were supported by other marginalised Bolivians who had been mobilised by political movements within and on the edges of the new forces of power. They included, in particular, persons of peasant stock who had been detached from the land, and who lived in towns and cities but had not been absorbed into the citizens sector; left-wing students; and peasants who had been able to go through a partial personal emancipation through organised participation in political and union work, or through studying at radical education centres like the one in Warisata. Often these task forces or teams of organisers were the first to bring the news of the revolution to the remote Indian villages. Consequently events in each latifundio were precipitated by the news of the revolution, the changes in the local political set up occasioned by the revolution, and the arrival of the organisers at the latifundio itself.

Concomitant with this informal spreading of information about the revolution, the MNR itself created the Ministry of Peasant Affairs immediately after it came into power in April 1952. The Ministry was not a revolutionary peasant focus, but the Minister himself assembled his team with the help of members of the miners' union. Curiously, neither the formation of peasant sindicatos nor agrarian reform were officially included among the objectives of this Ministry. However, these concerns became its main preoccupation, particularly after the considerable peasant pressure that was generated in the Cochabamba Valley had
occurred in favour of radical reform. Consequently, in order to gain the support of the peasantry as a whole, the Minister of Peasant Affairs started a campaign to organise the peasants all over the country into sindicatos. Many of the mine workers who had worked in unionisation (most of whom were former peasants and spoke the indigenous languages) travelled all over the country, in this case in an official capacity, to help to create the peasant sindicatos. These sindicatos were then institutionalised by a commission of the Ministry of Peasant Affairs. The whole campaign culminated in the ceremony of the promulgation of the Land Reform Decree on 2 August 1953 in (appropriately) Ucureña, when between 100,000 and 200,000 peasants from most of the regions of Bolivia, armed and organised into sindicatos, came to witness this important event. Thus the peasants from all over the country could see with their own eyes how their colleagues in the Ucureña area (and beyond) had already effective control over the lands which they had seized from the latifundio owners (Alexander 1958). This ceremony was very important because the peasantry in most of the country, despite the visits of the task forces and the miners, remained initially distrustful after the change of government because of their experiences with former "revolutions", and particularly with the severe repression which they had suffered since the fall of the Villarroel government in 1946.

The Cochabamba Valley area, particularly the district of
Ucureña, was the most advanced region in Bolivia in terms of rural sindicato development, but it was not the only one. In the Yungas, for example, a tradition of peasant organisation already existed prior to the revolution. A peasant leader called Callisaya had participated in the Villarroel Peasant Congress of 1945 and had suffered police persecution, threats of death and imprisonment since then, but he had continued to go from latifundio to latifundio initiating school developments, and organising the peasants into 'loose' unions (Pearse 1975)37. Also, after the revolution the POR, the Trotskyist Workers Revolutionary Party, organised sindicatos on many of the Yungas latifundios, and only ceased its activity when the MNR announced its intention of carrying out land reform (Delgado 1968)38.

The Land Reform Decree of August 1953 gave de jure recognition to the de facto changes which had taken place in some areas of the country, particularly in the Cochabamba Valley region. Effective land redistribution spread all over the country with the help of the sindicatos. Almost all the latifundios were distributed to about 300,000 peasants in less than a year. Only large properties which were run as efficient commercial farms rather than feudal estates were respected by the peasants in accordance with the land reform decree. In those enterprises, wages were paid and there was no obligation to render feudal services. In detail, the post 1952 agrarian transformation "consisted of 5,000 - 6,000 discrete
episodic sequences involving, firstly, the subtraction of
the patron as individual and as role; secondly, the
reconstitution of an internal administrative structure;
and, thirdly, the building of a new nexus between landgroup
and society, including market relationships and
administrative and political links" (Pearse 1975)39.

The question of the motivation behind the MNR government’s
promulgation of the 1953 Land Reform Decree, and the extent
of its commitment to it, is debatable. Some authors, for
example, Patch, consider that the MNR government’s part in
agrarian reform was limited. It was the unexpected
organisation of the peasants, and their de facto
expropriation of land in several parts of the country that
forced the government to move swiftly (Patch 1960)40.
Other authors, for example, Alexander and Carballo,
consider that the government was turned to land reform
before the peasant pressure had grown on a large scale. In
other words, it was the government’s initiative that
created much of the subsequent pressure (Alexander 195841;
Carballo 1963)42.

The effects of the 1952 revolution on the Bolivian
peasantry was both extensive and profound, at least
initially. Nevertheless it had a greater impact in some
areas than in others. For example, the revolution affected
the peasants of the Cochabamba Valley region very much
indeed. The peasants there, who were very well organised,
established relationships with the urban-Creole society as
a whole, forcing it to accept somewhat more democratic forms of social management than it wished. The peasants were thus able to establish the terms of their incorporation into the new political structure that had emerged in 1952. This phase, which lasted roughly from 1952 to 1958, culminated in the consolidation of a new structure for mediation between the peasant movement and the State. It was seen most clearly in the government-sponsored union machinery which, through the MNR, linked the more remote rural areas with the reorganised, consolidated governmental nucleus after the revolution. Further, unionisation and peasant mobilisation helped to restructure the 'mercantile space' which had been the subject of keen competition between peasant production and latifundio production.

Thus the peasants played a very active role in the Cochabamba Valley region, particularly immediately after the revolution, largely as a consequence of the raising of their consciousness by the indigenal education programme. They began to act as a class-for-itself because, firstly, they synthesised their own ideology, permitting relatively independent and previously unchartered actions; secondly, they developed their own forms of organisation and struggle, acting not only politically, but also, at times, as armed militia: the sindicatos became an instrument of local government, asserted political control in the provinces and became the principal link between the peasantry and the national government; and, thirdly, on the
basis of their ideology and political organisation, peasants made demands and asserted their influence in ways which constituted a power capability to be reckoned with (Dandler 1977)43.

Nevertheless, closer analysis reveals that this mobilisation gradually lost momentum over time, as political partners were sought within a context of shifting alliances, internecine strife within the MNR, and the vague overall ideology guiding the entire evolutionary process. The leaders were concerned at times with their own image, and securing legitimacy from above. Moreover, matters other than agrarian reform were considered only fleetingly.

Therefore the peasants of the Cochabamba Valley region were not passive bystanders to the revolutionary movement. But their role was limited by the populist movement itself and the very nature of the revolution. Indeed, a paradox of peasant movements in the Third World is that the peasants begin to act as a class-for-itself in the marxist sense only when they find forms of organisation and ideology adequate to satisfy their demands and when they mobilise within a revolutionary struggle; however, this struggle can be sustained and revolutionary goals reached only when the peasants are allied to a national revolutionary movement.

In contrast, the effects of the 1952 revolution on the peasants in the Altiplano, for example, while still significant were much less extensive. This was mainly
because inter-ethnic frictions continued to prevent the relationships between the sindicatos and the political parties from functioning democratically. Peasant union power was quickly supplanted by the paternalistic manipulation of the MNR bosses. Furthermore, the organisation of social life in the Altiplano was still strongly linked to the continuation of the Andean community (the aymará). Nevertheless the post-reform era saw increased commercialisation of the production of the community members and former tenant farmers. It is worth noting that one of the most important demonstrations in the region had been organised in defence of the country fair which gave the peasants free access to the market, and which consequently threatened the landowners' all-embracing trade monopoly. With the presence of both unions and armed militia, it was no longer possible to destroy the country markets as the latifundio owners of the Altiplano had done in the past. An impressive number of new villages and fairs sprung up around the countryside reflecting the phenomenon of active commercialisation of the family production of community members, former tenant farmers and smallholders.

Therefore the accession to power of the MNR party in 1952 did not represent, as had many of Bolivia's previous revolutions, "A mere changing of the palace guard, and the transfer of political incumbency from one clique to another" (Heath, Erasmus and Buechler 1969)44. The revolution of 1952 was the basis of a profound social
revolution. It destroyed to a large extent the economic and political systems that constituted the support of the traditional ruling class, and it almost completely destroyed the power of the former elite and resulted in immediate and significant modifications of political life and government policy which have subsequently been codified in constitutional changes (Dunkerley 1984).45

After the 1952 revolution greater freedom for the peasantry resulted. Expressions of this freedom included the absence of overt landlord domination, the destruction of the system of free labour, and the extension of the right to vote to illiterate people. (The voting population rose from 126,125 in the last election of 1951 to 931,888 in the first election after the electoral law was passed (Wells et al 1966)).46

There were, though, failures in other areas. One of the basic problems created by the 1952 revolution was the fact that its plan for cultural unification failed. A country of Indians ruled by large landowners was supposed to disappear with the revolution. The latter were to be turned into democratic progressive-minded members of the middle class, while the Indians were to become Hispanicised citizens capable of participating in a growing domestic market. The term "Indian" was to disappear thanks to inter-marriage, schooling, migration to the cities, and the dismantling of the traditional Indian communities, to be replaced by the word "campesino". These dreams were short-
lived. After the triumph of the 1952 revolution, the democracy instituted thanks to the popular militia, and both the government-sponsored and the other unions in the countryside, gave way over time to patronage and vertical control by the government party, and the notion of Indian civil rights tended to disappear as subtler forms of the old oligarchical-colonial discrimination and domination came to the fore.

There were also adverse effects on other areas of Bolivia's economy besides agriculture during the post-revolutionary period, particularly in mining on which sector the country depended heavily. Although the major tin mines were nationalised after 1952, the dependence on foreign controlled markets remained the same or worsened. The tin industry was a high cost, low quality industry, with decaying capital investment, producing above world tin prices. Inflation, which was serious before the revolution, became astronomical afterwards (From 1952 - 1956 Bolivia's inflation rate was the highest in the world), and this effectively wiped out much of the government's resources, and a large proportion of the middle class (Zondag 1966)47.

These factors meant that, while the destruction of the old regime was relatively simple, creating a new and functioning society was very difficult. The net result of this economic crisis was that the MNR leadership decided to turn to North America for aid on a massive scale in order

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to support themselves in power while reconstructing the economy.

While the mine workers continued to struggle for more radical and fundamental changes in Bolivian society, the peasant sindicatos, after they had benefited from land reform, were on some occasions utilised to appease or even combat the miners. They were used increasingly as shock troops against the labour movement, and they were plunged into factional strife that was encouraged by the various splinter groups of the increasingly divided MNR. This was particularly the case after 1964.

Before the revolution Bolivia’s peasants suffered oppression and exploitation at the hands of the few large landowners who controlled almost all the arable land in Bolivia. After the revolution, though, the power that was once concentrated in the hands of the large landowners became diffused among various rural elite groups who continued, by largely illicit means, to extort wealth and deference from the peasants they controlled.

The new peasant union power therefore had to face the resurgence of class and colonial forms of domination in the new bourgeois State. The structure of the union apparatus itself reflected the tensions in this process. In one sense, unionism was the main means of exercising the new citizen status acquired by the Indian peasantry after the revolution. However, in another sense, and particularly in
regions like the south and the Altiplano, it was merely the
continuation of the age-old efforts to civilise the
colonised Indian masses by the dominant Creole caste.
These regional ambiguities and disparities in regard to the
meaning of peasant unionism became more obvious over time.
The reconstitution of the oligarchy after 1952 led to a
general deterioration of the union apparatus as an
instrument for the political representation of the Indian
peasants. Corruption, pseudo-leaders imposed from the top,
and union manipulation deprived these new citizens, who
officially were "free and equal", of their place in society
and in the power structure. The democracy of the armed
militia during the initial phase thus gave way to forms of
peasant power that were increasingly symbolic. Any
attempts to show ideological independence were
systematically marginalised, and potentially dangerous
sectors were subordinated. This process undermined and
finally blurred the original democratic character of the
peasants participation in the revolutionary movement. The
fact that patronage was used to subvert the unions also
reflected a form of contempt for the Indian by the Creoles,
who still viewed him as a second-class citizen.

Therefore the Bolivian Land Reform Decree had been a
powerful tool of social order, an apparatus aimed at
diffusing and neutralising potential unrest. The Land
Reform Decree was the socialising arm of the new political
order in the rural areas. In particular, it directed the
peasants away from seeking control of the local, and
eventually, the national, power structure. It directed the peasants towards control of land, which was the main power base of the traditional manorial landowner. This giving of the land to the peasants diffused the largest part of any potential feelings of frustration among the peasants (after Havet 1985)48.

Once the land problem had been dealt with and the government-sponsored union structure had been consolidated, the second phase of the revolution revealed the basic inconsistencies of the new State's proposals, reflected in the growing political polarisation of the peasant union movement. Most of the peasant leaders decided that they would side with the right wing factions that dominated the MNR and with the leaders of the civilian and military bureaucracies that succeeded one another in power, though a minority was constantly tempted by the organised labour movement. The tension between these two possible alliances split the union movement.

In summary, it can be said that in Bolivia the peasant organisation initially grew and became strong as a direct consequence of the raising of the peasants consciousness by the indigenal education programme, uncontrolled by the government. Only later, was it institutionalised as part of the national political system after this system had undergone considerable and drastic change. The peasant organisation had a certain influence on the creation of a new political structure which arose after the revolutionary
changes. The peasants initially won significant benefits, mainly connected with the redistribution of land. As a result, the majority were so indebted to the new system that they supported it in spite of the fact that the flow of further benefits was very small. They continued to live at the margin of society although somewhat better off than previously.

The peasants and their organisations were helpful in bringing about a change in the traditional social structure, opening up possibilities for a more dynamic development of the country as a whole. However, after the transfer of most or part of the political power from the traditional elite into the hands of more dynamic groups (generally the middle sector), the peasantry was neutralised as a political force. Rather, emphasis was placed on consolidation and institutionalisation of the peasantry's role as political supporters of the new elites. Consequently, the initial phase, particularly from 1952 - 1958, can be described as a process of active subordination of the Indian peasants to the State, under the auspices of the Cochabamba agrarian movement which formed the backbone of the union apparatus set up after 1952. The peasantry took on the role of historical actor and was able, initially, to dictate the terms and conditions of its participation in the new power structure, but, over a period of time, it lost this initiative.

In conclusion, the peasants of Bolivia were awakened by the
indigenal education programme, in particular by the efforts of the teachers, many of whom were trained at the radical Warisata school. Many of these teachers went on to become peasant union leaders at the provincial, departmental and national levels, and they were instrumental in building up relationships between the peasantry and the revolutionary Left, and creating links between the rural and urban dwellers.

Prior to the indigenal education programme the social immobility typical of the Bolivian class structure was intensified by the absence of education facilities for the peasants living on the latifundios. While the traditional social stratification operated to restrict their social mobility, their economic and geographical mobility was also severely hampered by lack of education, widespread illiteracy, and their ignorance of other opportunities and other areas.

The indigenal education movement itself combined a critique of the existing, and very limited, educational provision with a radical political and socio-economic perspective. Education was thus regarded as a process for and on behalf of the peasants which emphasised collective rather than competitive individual effort and common rather than private goals. Thus it achieved a sense of class consciousness and a peasant counter-hegemony that posed a great threat to public order during the period 1936 - 1952.
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CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSIONS
The process of educational development during periods of upheaval, when the dominant hegemony is losing its grip, raises with particular sharpness the general problem of the relationship between ideology, education and social change. For these periods of upheaval are among the rare historical moments when the weight of existing institutions and practices lightens to permit radical educational development. In Bolivia the period of upheaval at the end of the Chaco War permitted the development of the indigenal education programme.

Bolivia entered a revolutionary situation in 1935, and perhaps the most important confirmation of this new situation was the reappearance, in a more aggravated form, of the generational split first apparent in the 1920s. The humiliation of the war was a profoundly disassociating experience for Bolivia's elite and sub-elite youth, and after 1936 most of this generation were implacably alienated from the prevailing political order. One of the main symptoms of a revolutionary situation in a society is the phenomenon of the 'desertion of the intellectuals'. Intellectuals play an important social role in developing and maintaining political values and concepts. The transference of the allegiance of the intellectuals, therefore, weakens the value structure of the existing system and opens a period in which new definitions of political structure and purpose vie for allegiance. (Gramsci, in particular, argued that the intellectuals are very important especially at an early stage. He had a
belief in the political role of the intellectuals and in their potential to provide an ideological counter-attack to the social hegemony and state domination of the existing hierarchy (Gramsci 1971). The generational split that reappeared after the war confirmed the desertion of Bolivia's intellectuals.

The immediate post war period was one of "ideological effervescence" (Malloy 1970), and the nation's young intellectuals, in looking for explanations for Bolivia's problems, attempted to formulate new ideological images. Through these images, the youths began to attack the prevailing pattern of political thought and to bid for the allegiance of various publics. Through their control of the urban educational apparatus, counter-groups were able to influence younger students in the secondary and primary schools and to convert the universities into bastions of anti-government activity.

It was this reinforcement and broadening of the generational split that was the most critical result of the Chaco War. The phenomenon cut through the centre of the existing control structure and aggravated the revolutionary situation. It strengthened the pressures building for change by providing an ideological focus and a pool of leadership. Also, it weakened the already debilitated ruling elite stratum by denying it the energies of its own younger generation. Of critical importance in this latter dimension was the destruction of the unity and discipline
of the army, which severely reduced its effectiveness as a mechanism of defence for the prevailing order.

In Bolivia, then, the major source of counter-elites was not the marginal or suppressed sectors of the society, but the pre-existing elite and sub-elite sectors. The rupture of the elite and sub-elite sectors is a common occurrence, particularly in underdeveloped or partially developed societies; and, as has been explained previously in Chapter Eight, such splits are important in generating the 'populist'-type movements which are the most common form of counter-sentiment in these societies (Di Tella 1965). The Bolivian situation indicates further that these splits arise from a combination of "status incongruence and the demonstration effect, and can be severely aggravated by an experience such as defeat in war" (Malloy 1970).

However, a society like Bolivia's which has become immobilised in a transitional state is less vulnerable to class-based counter movements than to the formation of cross-sectoral alliances. This is because the most important structural weakness of such a society is its inability to maintain cohesion at the upper and intermediate layers of stratification. Pressure here, especially along generational lines, creates fissures in the very core of the society's control structure, leading to a further weakening of the society's ability to maintain coherence, and to the anomaly that counter-elites and counter-publics are produced from within the existing elite
and sub-elite strata. If these counter-groups are unable to achieve reform they will then tend to reach across stratification lines and form cross-class blocks.

This is what happened in Bolivia. The elite and sub-elite counter groups, realising that they were unlikely to achieve their desired radical reforms on their own, developed a cross-sectoral alliance aimed at removing the blockages to change. It was a 'national popular movement' based on the belief that the various discontented strata in Bolivia needed to act as a unified whole. It was therefore realised that it was only possible to achieve radical social change by incorporating into this movement the workers and the peasants; and in fact "this bloc (the workers and peasants) played the largest role in radicalising the revolution in its early days" (Malloy 1970).

There was, therefore a necessity for the development of a peasant movement in Bolivia after the Chaco War, a movement that was, in part at least, in sympathy with the aspirations for radical social changes of the dissatisfied elite and sub-elite groups. In summarising the development of this movement it is useful to consider whether peasants are revolutionary or not. One tradition regards the peasants as the proletarian vanguard capable of producing a revolution. This view is primarily derived from an analysis of the class struggles and contradictions in European capitalist societies. The other tradition takes
into account the peasantry as an essential factor in the revolutionary struggle. According to this view, conditions for a socialist revolution are ripe in Third World countries and, although in these cases peasants do not necessarily replace the proletariat, they form a major sector in the alliance of revolutionary forces. Barrington Moore, for example, adopts this latter view arguing that although peasant involvement in a more generally revolutionary context will no doubt accelerate the tempo and broaden the changes a society will go through, it is doubtful that a peasantry can either initiate or accomplish a broad revolutionary process by itself. Whether it is stimulated by a guerrilla movement that leads to an insurrection, or by an outburst following an insurrection, the revolutionary potential of the peasantry is dependent upon contact with other social sectors and a weakening of the existing control structure by counter-groups in the urban sphere (Barrington Moore)7. In Bolivia during the period in question, it can be argued that the peasantry, particularly those in the Cochabamba Valley region, played an active role within the revolutionary process as part of a coalition of forces, where the organisations of the mining proletariat nevertheless were the vanguard forces. Consequently in Bolivia the peasantry was not the passive element of rural France in 1789, as described by Marx (Marx 1973)8, but neither was it the active force of the Chinese Revolution of 1949 or of the Indochina War of the 1960s. The peasants in Bolivia played a dynamic role in the revolution, but only as part of a populist alliance of
Peasants are a group or class within society that are quite different from any other group or class. Shanin recognised this and, in exploring the important relationship between class consciousness and organisation, he used the term 'low classness' to contrast the peasant class consciousness and its political organisation with respect to the rest of the proletariat. According to Shanin this was in part due to the more immediate nature of peasant demands as well as the peasantry's socio-political weakness:

"peasants in their struggles tend to fight for land rather than for broader political aims and have an eye on the local day-to-day concerns rather than to care for general long-term concepts and ideologies .... The vertical segmentation of peasants into local communities, class and groups and the differentiation of interest within these communities themselves has made for difficulties in crystallizing nationwide aims and symbols and developing national leadership and organisation ....." (Shanin 1971)9

Similarly Hobsbawm argues that the proletariat tends to assume a more solidary, persistent and militant stance in the long run than do the peasants; at the most, he continues, a peasant movement has a regional scope or may have a national impact when the movement develops in one or
two strategic regions or produces highly mobile armed groups (Hobsbawm 1973)10. According to this view peasants generally depend on outside leadership and direction in order to exercise influence at the national level11.

There are, according to Huizer, a number of factors which are necessary for a peasant movement to develop (Huizer 1972)12. These factors are in addition to the overall organisability of the peasants implied in their resistance to the culture of repression. Modernising influences are one of the initial pre-requisites and in Bolivia the most important of these was the Chaco War, a war which brought frustration rather than improvements to the majority of the peasants.

In the actual process, a very important first step is the creation of awareness among the peasants of their basic interests and grievances, and of the possibility that united action can be undertaken to defend those interests. According to Illich, "It can be a genuinely new and emotionally charges experience for a Latin American peasant to learn that his own identity as a peasant is socially determined and that he as an individual has the capacity to play an active role in shaping the society that defines him" (Illich 1972)13.

A practical difficulty in creating this awareness is the fact that, although peasants may see or feel the need for overall change (in particular the abolition of land tenure
conditions), they do not clearly visualise the ways and means through which this can be realised. It is at this crucial point that urban leaders (such as Guerra, the school teacher in Ucureña) become important. They can channel the vague awareness of a need for change into a more concrete awareness of ways and means to change through organised effort. The method of promotion of these aims is through education campaigns, and this was one of the main functions of the indigenal education programme. Existing general grievances or needs of the peasants, without being particularly acute at a certain moment can become so through abusive acts of the landlords and through teaching or explaining. The growth or creation among the peasants of awareness of their basic needs and of the possibilities of demanding and struggling for the fulfilment of these needs is the process of conscientization. Conscientization is based on the view that those who, in learning to read and write, come to a new awareness of selfhood and begin to look critically at the social situation in which they find themselves and they often take the initiative in acting to transform the society that has denied them this opportunity of participation. Education is therefore regarded as a subversive force (Freire 1972)14. The most important aspect of this process of creating awareness in Bolivia referred to the need to break through the impact of the traditional land tenure and power system, and the means by which this break may be accomplished.

One of the obstacles to the awareness of the need for
radical change in cases where there are no blatant abuses, is the fact that the traditional system has some more or less continuously applied defence mechanisms which prevent the peasants from seeing their situation clearly. Since the culture of repression has prevailed for ages, certain elements have come up under this system which try to soften its impact - this is the role of patronage. Landlords, as long as they are solidly in control, try to maintain the image of being good fathers. Such apparently benevolent patronage can be created easily since the latifundio system generally is the only frame of reference for the peasants who grew up on it. Belonging to it was not a question of voluntary choice but simply one of ascription. One is born into it and one has practically no way of escaping from its impact.

It is clear that an important condition for the formation of a representative organisation of peasants is to break through the closedness, dependence and coercion of the traditional patronage system. This can generally only be done by the active stimulation of dissent and conflict and the creation of new loyalties outside and conflicting with the traditional ones.

The creation of dissent to overcome the traditional influence of the landlord implies the promotion of awareness of the peasants' rational interests as contrary to the traditional bonds existing in the latifundio system. In Ucureña, the fear and intransigence of the landed elite
was a help in this respect. In fact the lawlessness and at times violent opposition from the landlords which the peasants encountered when they tried to form a representative organisation within the traditional social climate, practically forced them to greater internal cohesiveness out of the need for self-defence or resistance.

In the sociology of conflict it is easier, according to Coser, to form a group when there is an opposing force than to form a group when there is no opposition (Coser 1956)15. Thus, the fact that the formation of representative peasant organisations is strongly opposed and creates a conflict situation can be interpreted positively as a fact which may help to strengthen the cohesion of the new group.

As a result of the acute need for the defence of common interests, interpersonal conflicts which always exist in peasant communities tend to diminish. However, some basic consensus within the peasant group before a conflict becomes open is an important condition for achieving cohesion in the face of an outside threat. This, again, shows the importance of conscientization. If this basic consensus does not exist, an outside threat may cause general apathy rather than internal cohesion.

It is important to note that, while in some respects peasant organisations in their formative stages can draw lessons from the syndical struggle of urban workers, there
is considerable difference between a peasant movement and an urban labour organisation involved in conflict. This further shows the immense importance of the conscientization programme because while most industrial labour conflicts are solved in Latin America within the prevailing system, leaving the social structure of enterprises as such intact, solutions to the basic problems in rural areas can only come about through changes in the social structure. In labour conflicts, there is often a basic consensus between employers and workers, which can be maintained in spite of a conflict over details such as the size of wages. Between the majority of the landlords and the peasantry, however, such consensus generally exists only if maintained by coercion.

The second of the factors which plays a role in the dynamics of the growth of the peasant movement is the availability of a charismatic leadership with some previous organising experiences able to rally the peasants around the need to abolish the land tenure conditions. The role of leadership is very important, because the following of peasant leaders has to grow in competition or even conflict with the already existing ties of the latifundio system. According to Blasier, "social revolution breaks out only in the presence of a revolutionary leadership" (Blasier 1967). Usually this leadership group is made up of men who in one way or another belonged to the social strata of the elite (Freire 1972). In Bolivia, though, the dominant leader who emerged in the Cochabamba Valley region
after the 1952 revolution was Rojas, who while having some previous organisational experience, both in Ucureña and in Argentina, was from the peasantry, and indeed he made political capital out of this aspect of his background.

Further, the leader who has built a network of relationships outside his immediate locality can channel resources and favours to his followers in return for political support and loyalty. At the same time, this political intermediary maintains close relationships as a ‘client’ with individuals in high positions. Consequently, peasant leaders gain power when they begin to act as brokers between the rank and file of the peasantry and the bureaucratic institutions surrounding them (Wolf 1969)\textsuperscript{18}.

Seeing that a radical agrarian reform was the only solution for the existing rural inequalities, but that the majority of the peasants had not yet realised it, the leaders tried to create awareness of this need. (According to Freire, the leaders must get unity among the oppressed and unity of leaders with the oppressed. Since the unity of the oppressed involves solidarity among them regardless of their exact status, this unity unquestionably requires class consciousness (Freire 1972\textsuperscript{19}.)) This was done not only through conscientization, teaching and explaining the social implications of rural underdevelopment, but also through the struggle itself. By showing time after time that the landlords would not grant moderate, legally guaranteed demands and civil rights, it was easily
demonstrated to the peasants that only radical changes in the rural power structure could lead to fulfilment of their demands and redress of their grievances.

This escalation of awareness through the struggle for civil rights and other basic needs had considerable success. It had the added advantage that the peasants learned gradually to overcome their traditional fear of opposing the rural elite; they started facing their opposition on issues where justice and common sense were so overwhelmingly on their side that they felt they could take the risk. These were also the issues where the attitude of the landlords was most flagrantly in conflict with law and order, and the landlord's refusal to give in to legitimate demands diminished their traditional prestige in the eyes of their workers and public opinion.

In many areas, peasants had never contemplated the possibility of using means more radical than a petition or an appeal to justice. Radical means had not been tried consistently and their uselessness was almost accepted as a fact of life. Once it was demonstrated that following through on a case with dedicated legal help made the landlords uneasy and intransigent, the use of more radical means, like strikes and the peaceful occupation of land, appeared to be more feasible.

One of the first things peasants organisations, opposing the traditional latifundio system, try to organise for
their members is the kind of services like schools that landlords sometimes provide for their peasants to tie them to the latifundio and oblige them to conform to a basically disadvantageous and exploitative system. Once such services are taken care of through means outside the monopoly of the landlord, the true characteristics of the patron-worker relationship on the latifundos and the need and possibility to break with it becomes more obvious. Therefore peasant leaders process an explicit sense of exploitation shared by peasants as a class into an awareness of their political capacity to act as a unified force.

The third of the elements which plays a role in the dynamics of the growth of the peasant movement is the alliance with urban supporters who link the organisation with forces at regional or national level. This is important because isolated peasant movements do not work unless they have contact with urban sympathisers who are willing to be allies in the struggle against the traditional and vested rural interests. The linkage of local peasant organisations with a wider framework of mutual or outside support, or a combination of both, is a crucial factor in the success of new groups. For example, the message of the Ucúreña sindicatos was supported and spread by the school teachers and the miners, and later, the growing movement was related to political parties working at the national level such as the MNR. In fact, it is very difficult to isolate peasant organisations or their
leadership from the broader societal context. Their ideology includes symbols and important elements of urban and mineworkers' class consciousness, and of political parties as well as of the diffuse populist ideology and MNR rhetoric. (NB According to Van den Berghe, in most underdeveloped countries teachers play a more important role and enjoy more power and privileges relative to the mass of their countrymen than they do in developed countries (Van den Berghe 1978)20.

An important advantage of the federation of local unions or other community or peasant organisations is that it is a defensive step in the break up of the traditional social system dominated by the latifundio. The peasants become aware that in other communities in neighbouring areas people have the same problems. This psychological factor may help to overcome an initial fear of resisting or breaking with the local system.

An additional psychological effect of the broadening of the peasant organisations beyond the community level is the feeling of power which people get when belonging to a large-scale regional movement. An example to illustrate this is the First Indian Congress in La Paz in 1945. Here the peasants for the first time in their lives got a feeling of power and importance when they had a regional meeting and marched in their hundreds through the streets of an important city to represent their interests and show themselves as a unified body. Mass meetings and parades of
this type have an important function during the formation process of a peasant organisation; to strengthen the self-esteem of the peasantry and to impress public opinion.

As the peasant movement grows, a process of consolidation, and of gaining strength, generally will follow, usually through the holding of regular meetings. The question of leadership becomes very important at this stage. Initially a charismatic and altruistic leader is needed, but once the movement becomes larger, organisational discipline is needed because strategic moves to gain certain benefits become equally or more important for the members than to follow a charismatic leader. A type of leader is then needed who inspires active and sustained participation rather than a "following". Thus the peasant movement needs to be institutionalised - in Bolivia, the process of structuring the movement took place after the peasant federation in the area where it originated, Cochabamba, had shown its power. National political leaders, particularly Paz Estenssoro, used the MNR party and its activities to spread the peasant movement into the whole country and to institutionalise it into a national framework related to MNR interests.

The political role of the peasant organisations in their struggle for land can sometimes be violent. Only after agrarian reform was well under way in Bolivia was peasant participation channelled through newly created institutions, such as trade unions. This was a direct
result of the lawlessness and culture of repression prevailing in the rural areas and the severe obstacles created by the opposition of traditional vested interests to orderly and institutional, yet dynamic, reform of the land tenure structure. And it conforms to the philosophy of the indigenal education movement that theoretical 'conscious-raising' activities have meaning only when united with action directed at the structures to be transformed. According to Carroll, "... a certain amount of violence, unrest and disorder are unavoidable and even necessary for successful reform measures" (Carroll 1964)21.

The whole issue of escalation of peasant demands as a reaction to landlord intransigence clearly demonstrates that peasants are not revolutionaries by birth, but neither are they the passive victims of traditional or modern forms of patronage. According to Freire, all peasants have the ability to achieve the consciousness of being oppressed individuals and from this individual consciousness can develop, given the right guidance, a class consciousness (Freire 1972)22. It was this aim which was central to the philosophy of the indigenal education programme in Bolivia.

It seems that clear-cut, radical demands for land distribution or restitution, and leadership which in a rather uncompromising way leads the peasant in the struggle for these demands, ensures a strong cohesion in the organisation and active participation of the peasants.
There is no guarantee, however, that effective political peasant participation will continue after this main demand has been fulfilled. Often peasant organisations develop strongly during the height of the struggle for land reform, but soon after are partly or wholly neutralised. The effect of the Bolivian peasant movement was, for example, rather limited after 1953. The force of the peasants was neutralised more or less successfully by the middle-sector elites making the peasant organisations dependent on the distribution of benefits through a political patronage system that had been created essentially to serve classes other than the peasantry. The peasant organisational structure could possibly have been used to mobilise the peasantry behind a national development effort. Particularly after the radical land distribution, there was great enthusiasm among the peasants for new undertakings at all levels. But efforts were deliberately undertaken by the middle-sector elite to calm and control this fervour rather than to channel it in effective ways.

One very important, and ironic, neutralising factor was probably the extension of basic formal education in Bolivia after 1953. There was an attempt at a complete re-organisation of the Bolivian education system, "designed both to extend opportunity and to make education more relevant to the needs of the different sectors of the population and the changing needs of the country" (Alexander 1958:23). Out of this effort came a specific rural education programme administered by the Ministry of
Peasant Affairs. This education programme, unlike the earlier indigenal education programme, functioned as an instrument which was used by the new middle-sector elite to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic of the peasant system and bring about conformity to it. (NB The fact that the peasant mobilisation was neutralised after 1953 lends credence to the view that conscientization is a "permanent critical approach to reality in order to discover it and discover the myths that deceive us and help to maintain the oppressing dehumanising structures" (Freire 1972)24. According to Freire, revolution must be permanent and it must be cultural revolution - a continuous cultural self-criticism of men in society and the world. In this way Bolivia can be contrasted with Communist China where there was both a conscious attempt to take culture as always problematic and to question it; and an ideological commitment to a radical reform programme and a mobilisation of the peasantry rather than a neutralisation of them).

Therefore education and the raising of peasant consciousness, particularly at the all important preliminary level, played a major role in stimulating the peasant mobilisations. For the peasantry to be a vanguard of revolutionary action, for it to develop a 'class-struggle' of which Huizer (1972)25 believes it capable, the raising of peasant consciousness is essential. In fact without it, other motivating forces in peasant mobilisations are of little value and no lasting influence.
Blanco notes that

"We consider each success a step forward mainly because the way it has been achieved educates the peasants.....

We always show that the authorities are the class enemies of the peasants, and that if they have made some concessions, it is not because of their 'sense of justice' but because of their fear of the wrath of the masses.....

The best thing we gain from each victory, aside from the victory itself, is the lesson for the masses. Each triumph serves to give them more confidence in themselves, in the power of their limited action. Each triumph serves to show them that we are in a way of exploited versus exploiters. With this criterion even defeats can be educational" (Blanco 1972)26.

Formal education in developing nations seeks to "indoctrinate the oncoming generation with the basic outlooks and values of the political order" (Key 1963)27 and as such is a mechanism which seeks to maintain the status quo. If education is to be used as a means of social change in developing societies then it must act as an agent which actively alters the status quo rather than maintains it. In Bolivia between 1930 and 1953 there developed a movement, the indigenal education movement which, because of the social and political circumstances which were prevalent immediately after the Chaco War, does
appear to have constituted a mechanism for social change. The education movement was effective in raising the consciousness of those it sought to educate to such a level that they became receptive to the anti-government feeling which developed in post-Chaco Bolivian society. This group became a potent force in the pre-revolutionary society and their support was actively sought by the organised political parties of the Left. The education movement, through the conscientization of the peasants, was also responsible for the raising of the political, social and economic aspirations of this group of people to such a level that they actively sought to participate in Bolivian society on a more equal level. These factors led them to become a potent force in the immediate post-revolutionary rural activities of 1952 and 1953 to such an extent that they become largely responsible for forcing the revolutionary government to formulate a land reform programme which was instrumental in bringing about a major change in the social structure of Bolivian society. In this way it can be seen that in certain circumstances education movements in developing societies need not "indoctrinate the oncoming generation with the basic outlooks and values of the political order" but can, rather, seek to radically alter these outlooks and values and create a new political order. In Bolivia these circumstances existed and the indigenal education movement developed into an active agent of social change with revolutionary potential.
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5. In part after Di Tella, T (1965), op cit
11. From a more theoretical point of view, Lukacs (1971), contrasts the proletariat with all other classes for its special position in society and history. The proletariat's struggle for its class interests is to be identified with the historical progress of all the society. All other classes, in contrast, seek goals which do not go beyond their own limited interests.
17. Freire, P (1972), op cit
19. Freire, P (1972), op cit
22. Freire, P (1972), op cit
24. Freire, P (1972), op cit
25. Huizer, G (1972), op cit


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APPENDIX ONE

PRESIDENTS OF BOLIVIA 1921 - 1952
Presidents of Bolivia 1921 - 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bautista Saavedra</td>
<td>1921-25</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felipe Guzmán (provisional)</td>
<td>1925-26</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hernando Siles</td>
<td>1926-30</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junta Militar de Gobierno</td>
<td>1930-31</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Salamanca</td>
<td>1931-34</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Luis Tejada Sorzano</td>
<td>1934-36</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David R Toro</td>
<td>1936-38</td>
<td>Military Socialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germán Busch</td>
<td>1938-39</td>
<td>Military Socialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Quintanilla</td>
<td>1939-40</td>
<td>Coalition-Conser-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>vative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrique Peñaranda</td>
<td>1940-43</td>
<td>Coalition-Conser-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>vative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gualberto Villarroel</td>
<td>1943-46</td>
<td>RADEPA-MNR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomás Monje Gutiérrez</td>
<td>1946-47</td>
<td>PURS-PIR coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrique Hertzoz</td>
<td>1947-49</td>
<td>PURS-PIR coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamerto Urriolagoitia</td>
<td>1949-51</td>
<td>PURS-PIR coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junta Militar de Gobierno</td>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parties

MNR : Movimiento Nacioanlista Revolucionario : National Revolutionary Party

PIR : Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria : Left Revolutionary Party

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POR : Partido Obrero Revolucionario : Workers Revolutionary Party

PURS : Partido de la Unión Republicana Socialista : United Republican Socialist Party

RADEPA : Razón de Patria : Reason of the Fatherland
(secret organisation of young military officers which spearheaded the coup of 1943)