Friendship, justice and eudaimonia in the Nicomachean ethics

Thesis

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FRIENDSHIP, JUSTICE AND EUDAIMONIA
IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of Arts of the Open University for the Degree of Master of Philosophy in the Discipline of Philosophy

by

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ABSTRACT

It is often claimed that Aristotle's ethical theory is founded upon selfishness and egoism, and that even in his account of friendship, self-interest is paramount. The aim of this dissertation is to examine the validity of these claims.

In chapter 1, Aristotle's theory of friendship is examined in detail. The various kinds of friendship are investigated, principally with a view to establishing whether any genuinely other-regarding features may be found within them. It is concluded that Aristotle makes provision for altruistic well-wishing and well-doing in virtue friendship (that kind of friendship in which the phronimos engages), but that it is impossible to state conclusively whether any measure of genuine goodwill exists in the two lesser friendships.

Chapter 2 aims to show that virtue friendship is centrally related to the cardinal virtue of complete justice, and the active virtuous life. It is shown that the phronimos aims to benefit fellow-citizens as well as close friends, and that he acts towards fellow-citizens in a spirit of friendship, and not of mere rectitude.

By displaying the connection between virtue friendship and complete justice, chapter 2 shows that genuinely other-regarding motivation is central to the active virtuous life, but it remains to be discovered whether this active virtuous life is supremely valuable for man. An examination of the various interpretations of Eudaimonia in chapter 3 reveals that while we may state positively that the theoretical life is supremely valuable for man, no such conclusion is possible in respect of the active virtuous life.

Chapter 4 aims to find a place for virtue friendship in the theoretical life. A distinction is drawn between intention and justification. It is concluded that while Aristotle intends that such friendship should have a place in the theoretical life, he cannot justify that intention satisfactorily.
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INTRODUCTION

Kurt Baier notes that "throughout the history of philosophy, by far the most popular candidate for the position of the moral point of view has been self-interest". In short, self-interest has been assumed to be the key moral principle by many philosophers. The purpose of this dissertation is to discover whether such self-interest is the key principle of Aristotle's ethical theory, whether his ethical theory is built upon nothing more elevating than self-interest and egoism.

It is a common criticism of Aristotle that his "virtuous man is not moral at all, but a calculating egoist whose guiding principle is ... prudence, Bishop Butler's 'cool self love', that he admits only the rationality of prudent self-interest, and not the rationality of moral principle". Numerous examples can be cited. Ferguson notes that "Greek ethics, and Aristotle's own thought, tend to be egocentric"; Allen tells us that Aristotle "takes little or no account of the motive of moral obligation", that "self-interest, more or less enlightened, is assumed to be the motive of all conduct and choice" and that "Aristotle does not even hint that a man, instead of pursuing his own good or happiness, may prefer to choose or act with a view to the happiness of another". Bertrand Russell remarks that "everything that makes men feel a passionate interest in one another is forgotten", and Field, generally a fair and sympathetic critic of Aristotle, comments that whereas morality is "essentially unselfish", Aristotle's idea of the final end or good makes morality "ultimately selfish". Finally, we may quote MacIntyre who asks: "How could there be an ideal society for a man for whom the ideal is as ego-centred as it is for Aristotle?"

This ego-centred-selfishness criticism has even been extended to his theory of friendship. This is very damning indeed, for if concern for others, selflessness, and absence of prudential calculation are to be found anywhere in human experience, they should surely be found in
friendship. But, according to Copleston, "Aristotle tends to give a somewhat self-centred picture of friendship"\textsuperscript{10}, and, according to MacIntyre, "Aristotle's ideal man, (the "ego-centric ideal") deeply injures and deforms his account of friendship"\textsuperscript{11}. Allen writes that, in Aristotle's account of friendship, men do not really "subordinate their interests to that of another", they just "appear" to do so. This is Aristotle's "refreshing realism"\textsuperscript{12}. Very similar remarks are made by Krook and Ferguson: Krook writes that the "breach" (towards concern for others, and away from concern for the self) "is apparent rather than real"\textsuperscript{13}, and Ferguson describes Aristotle's account as "a remarkable attempt to expound altruism in terms of ego-centric psychology"\textsuperscript{14}. There is, in short, "an absolute and irreducible difference", Krook writes, between the Christian conception of friendship (in which there is genuine concern and affection for another) and the theory of friendship put forward by Aristotle\textsuperscript{15}.

Of course, it is not the case that all commentators argue that Aristotle's ethical theory reduces to such selfishness and egoism, but the quotations given above show that the criticism on this point is substantial, and that there is a charge to be investigated. It is the purpose of this dissertation to look in detail at Aristotle's ethical theory as described in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} with a view to discovering whether the allegations are completely true, true in part, or plainly false.
1. BAIER, Kurt  The moral point of view, 1958, p.187.


5. Ibid., p.189.


7. RUSSELL, Bertrand  History of Western philosophy, 1961, p.195.


11. MACINTYRE, Alisdair  op. cit., p.80.


13. KROOK, Dorothea  Three traditions of moral thought, 1959, p.86.

14. FERGUSON, J.  op. cit., p.137.

15. KROOK, Dorothea  op. cit., pp.87-88.
CHAPTER 1
ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF FRIENDSHIP

1.1 Introduction: Friendship and Altruism

It would appear that if genuinely altruistic behaviour is to be found anywhere in human experience, it should be found in that kind of inter-personal relationship that we call friendship. Indeed, according to our beliefs, one of the most striking features of friendships is precisely that friends characteristically seek each other's well-being and that they do so from unselfish motives, from a genuine concern and affection for the friend as an end in himself. If A befriends B because he perceives that B could be useful to him, because he perceives B can be a source of some advantage to him, we would deny that A is a genuine friend of B. Insofar as he did not have concern and affection for B himself, we would deny his claims to friendship. We would say he was insincere about the relationship and regarded B as a means to his own ends and purposes. We could fairly say that A's approach to friendship was not altruistic, but egoistic. Similarly, if A pursued his own interests and well-being in such a way or to such an extent that he showed a manifest obtuseness to the interests and well-being of B, we would also deny that A was a true friend of B. Insofar as he pursued his own interests and well-being at the expense of B's interests and well-being, we could reasonably claim that he was manifesting a hostility (or, at least, an indifference) to B's good, and could not be called a friend. We could fairly say that his approach to friendship was selfish.

According to our modern conception, friendship is characterised by the desire to seek the well-being of the friend, to promote his interests, even where this does not lead to an enhancement of one's own interests and good, and by a desire not to pursue one's own interests and good in such a way that the friend's interests and good is damaged. It is also characterised by an emotional bond, an affection, that is "genuine" in
the sense that it is not kindled or maintained only by the perception of self-advantage. But these characteristics have not been central to all conceptions of friendship. Indeed, they were absent from various Greek conceptions. It is for this reason that Aristotle's account of friendship requires such careful scrutiny. It cannot be assumed that simply because Aristotle devotes two books to the topic of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics that his ethical theory has thereby made provision for genuinely altruistic and unselfish action towards at least a restricted class of individuals. If Aristotle's theory of friendship is like that of some of his predecessors, the allegations of selfish and egocentric behaviour quoted in the introduction may well be true. Indeed, some commentators such as Adkins have argued that the egocentric pre-Aristotelian conception of philia (friendship) survived largely intact in Aristotle's own theory. In the remainder of this section, I shall briefly outline two pre-Aristotelian conceptions of philia, in order to pinpoint the self-regarding and egoistic elements that prevail in these conceptions. When we examine Aristotle's own account, we shall then be in a better position to ascertain whether or not the Aristotelian conception is an advance over that of earlier conceptions or is precisely like it in these respects.

1. Adkins argues that in Homeric society, the effective locus of power, the most cohesive social, political and economic unit was the oikos, a household ruled over by a warrior chief, and consisting of his family, servants and slaves. The members of the household could count upon the rest of the world as being nothing but hostile. The words philos (adjective), philein (verb) and philotes (abstract noun) are used primarily in connection with the warrior chief. Adkins argues that the active side of the philotes relationship is exhibited in beneficence, that is, in concern for the preservation of the object of the chief's attachment. What is vital, according to Adkin's analysis, is that these acts of beneficence are in no way altruistic, but aim always at
the immediate or long-term security of the warrior chief and his oikos.  

Philein is an act which creates or maintains a co-operating relationship; and it need not be accompanied by any friendly feeling at all; it is the action which is all important.

In sum, (1) friendship is not altruistic, but thoroughly self-regarding; (2) there is no characteristic emotional bond, except a "possessive affection" for a dependable instrument and (3) successful action constitutes the relationship; disposition, intention, or attempt are mere addenda.

According to this conception, family, friends (in our sense) and allies (business partners, club members) can all be seen to a greater or lesser extent as reliable or helpful in one's pursuit of success; philia is essentially a relationship of advantage and service.

2. The same lack of altruistic motivation is also a feature of Plato's account of friendship, according to Julia Annas. On Plato's view:

To desire or feel affection for some person is always, at bottom, to have a reason that has a reference to the agent's own welfare. To love or feel affection for some person is, on this view, to see them as a source of something one wants and thinks worth having, and this is impossible except insofar as one thinks of oneself as lacking or needing something, and to that extent in a state which is undesirable.

Julia Annas refers to a distinction Bernard Williams draws between egoistic "I-desires" and altruistic "non-I-desires" in order to show that the Platonic conception of friendship is ultimately egoistic. An "I-desire" has a self-referential propositional content in contrast to a "non-I-desire" which lacks a self-referential propositional content. Plato's account of friendship in the Lysis can be seen to make the claim that all apparently altruistic "non-I-desires" ultimately rest upon, and would not exist without, an egoistic "I-desire" of some kind such as "I desire that I continue to have such a useful, entertaining or worthy friend". According to Plato's account, "non-I-desires" are not the basic motivation in friendship. Julia Annas concludes:

If it is right to take Plato in this way, then the analysis of friendship can not unfairly be called egoistic, giving an I-referring basis to feelings and actions that are apparently altruistic.
In sum, according to this conception of friendship in the *Lysis*,

1. friendship is ultimately egoistic;
2. the emotional bond is conditional on an egoistic aim, that is, affection is felt for the friend only insofar as he is perceived to be a source of a desirable good;
3. the relationship is based solely upon a perceived deficiency. Again, *philia* is essentially a relationship of service and advantage.

We must now discover whether Aristotle, as a creative philosopher, goes beyond this egoistic conception of friendship, or whether, as Adkins suggests, the egoistic conception survives largely intact in Aristotle's own ethical theory.

1.2 The Three Types of Friendship

It is generally accepted that not everything is loved, but only what is lovable, and that is either good, or pleasant or useful. (*NE 1155b18-19*)

For Aristotle, all friendships have an aim or purpose. It is an Aristotelian principle that "for any purposeful thing, whether a natural object, or an organisation, whether a man-devised tool or activity or association, its essential nature is determined by its function, and expressed by the *logos* which states its purpose". Although friendships arise naturally, they are also purposeful. They are goal-directed, and so defined by their goal or purpose. It is because they are goal-directed that Aristotle begins his discussion of friendship by considering the objects of friendship; the good, the pleasant and the useful.

Friendships have a goal (*telos*) or purpose which determines their essential nature. Since there are three kinds of goal that any individual may choose to pursue, so there are three kinds of friendship corresponding to these goals: those directed towards goodness, those directed towards pleasure, and those directed towards utility.

These goals are also called "goods" by Aristotle. He distinguishes between what is "good in itself" or "good without qualification" and what
is relatively good, or good for a particular person. This relative good, the good for a particular person, is good with regard to the special needs of the individual. When a person pursues what is relatively good or good for him as an individual, he is pursuing what is relatively useful or relatively pleasant, for in Aristotle's theory, the relative good may be classified into the relatively useful or relatively pleasant. In contrast, some persons pursue the absolute good or what is "good without qualification". They aim to perform fine and noble deeds and to develop virtuous characters. Such a life is also one that affords pleasure, for that which is absolutely good also gives absolute pleasure. Friendships formed in pursuit of this good are virtue friendships. The two relative friendships of utility and pleasure are, according to Aristotle's theory, the "lesser friendships".

1.2.1 Friendship of Utility

This is the type of friendship found among those who are out to pursue their own advantage. It is the kind of relationship of which the participants ask "what benefit can I derive from this?"

So those who love on the grounds of utility do not love each other for their personal qualities, but only insofar as they derive some benefit from each other (1156a10-12)

In a business relationship, for example, the friends have interests in common (interests in a rather derogatory sense: there is no disinterested love of the "good in itself"). As long as they share these "interests" they will attempt to remain on "friendly terms" with each other. They will like each other in a limited way: to the extent that each can get something out of the other, they wish to continue the relationship.

Neither feels affection for what the other is in himself, but only for what is incidental to his real nature: affection is not felt because the friend is conceived to be a man of good character, but because he is conceived to be a man of wealth and skill. The friends in this association choose, in short, what is accidental and completely ignore what is essential.
Such friends need not find each other useful in every context and in every way. It is only requisite that they find each other useful in some ways. Moreover, they may be useful to each other in dissimilar ways. If A wants to use B, it is usually the case that B has some good, M, which A lacks. In respect of the possession of M, A and B are opposites. However, if the relationship is to be one of friendship and not pure exploitation, the benefits must be reciprocal and mutual. Thus A must have some good, S, of which B wants to take advantage. In respect of S, A and B are again opposites.

Aristotle finds this kind of friendship the most inferior. The friendship is formed in pursuit of an unworthy goal, and the friends like each other for what is accidental and not essential to their natures. Men who form these friendships are pursuing the relative good in preference to the good in itself. When a man's primary goal is to do not what is right, but what is most useful to him, he is acting from a motive which is not the good, but the useful, so correspondingly, to feel affection for another person not because of what he is in himself, but because of the fact that he can be of service to one, is to feel affection from a motive which is not the good, but the useful.

1.2.2 Friendship of Pleasure

This is the type of friendship typically found among the young as they tend to live for immediate pleasure. It is the kind of relationship of which the participants ask "What pleasure can I derive from this?"

Similarly with those who love one another on the grounds of pleasure; because it is not for being of a certain character that witty people are liked but because we find them pleasant. (NE 1156a12-13)

Again in such a friendship it is not requisite that the friends conceive each other to be pleasant in every way or in every context, but only in some ways or in some contexts. "One may well be friends with someone because he is a pleasant drinking companion even while recognising his unsuitability as a companion in other pleasant pursuits." Moreover,
the friends may give each other pleasure in dissimilar ways. A may have an easy manner and B may ride horses well. "Up to a certain point, perhaps, a pleasure friendship is more complete and perfect of its kind, the greater the variety and scope of the pleasures the friends may share; but this is a difference in scope and perfection within a class of friendships which all belong to the same basic type".12

Aristotle argues that friendships based on pleasure are superior to those based on utility for two reasons. First, friends who take pleasure in each other want to spend time together. This is not necessarily true of friendship based on utility for the latter may tolerate each other merely for profit. Secondly, "one finds (in pleasure friendships) a more generous spirit whereas utilitarian friendships belong to the commercially-minded". Thus, inasmuch as friends of pleasure enjoy each other's company, spend time together and have a generous spirit, their relationship resembles more closely the friendship of virtue.

Although pleasure friendships are superior to friendships of utility, they are not the highest form possible for the participants still pursue the relative good (in the form of that which is pleasant to them) in preference to that which is absolutely good.

So when people love each other on the grounds of utility their affection is motivated by their own good, and when they love on the grounds of pleasure it is motivated by their own pleasure. (1156a14-15)

When a man's primary goal is to do not what is right, but what he finds pleasant, he is acting from a motive which is not the good but the pleasant, so correspondingly, to feel affection for another person not because of what he is in himself but because of the pleasure he can give one, is to feel affection from a motive which is not the good but the pleasant.

It might appear that Aristotle's ethical theory is cold and austere for it prizes a life of virtue and regards a life of pleasure as inferior. This view would be incorrect. Aristotle notes that relaxation is a vital part of life and this "includes spending one's time in amusement". Of
the virtues that Aristotle discusses, one is concerned with "entertaining or witty conversation". Thus a man may be virtuous in this respect. The entertaining or witty man is never offensive for he combines his wit with tact, and he always considers the company he is in. (1128a25-26) He is virtuous in that he is entertaining to the right people, in the right circumstances, and from the right motive. He may be contrasted with the joker or buffoon whose wit is excessive and misses the mean in that he pays no regard to the circumstances or the people, but will do anything to raise a laugh. (1128a5) His aim is not the good but the pleasant; his pleasure-seeking motive is so strong that he will attempt to be funny at any cost and indiscriminately. Inasmuch as a man participates in a relationship with the man whose entertainment combines with tact and is in the mean, he is participating in a virtue friendship of the highest kind. To the extent that he participates in a relationship with the buffoon or joker, he is participating in a pleasure friendship. Aristotle does not hold that it is wrong to seek out pleasurable relaxations and relationships. The wrongness lies in separating one's pleasure from the life of virtue - for example, by pursuing it as one's primary goal and forming relationships associated with this primary goal.

1.2.3 Friendship of Virtue or Character

Friendships of utility and friendships of pleasure differ from friendships of virtue or character inasmuch as the former "love for the sake of what is good for themselves". The friend is "loved", he is wished well, because he is conceived to be a source of pleasure or advantage. It is clear that even vicious persons can enjoy such friendships. Virtue is not requisite if friends are such because of their usefulness to one another in business deals. The same is true when pleasure is the object, as when one values a friend because he is a good drinking companion.

Friendships of virtue or character, in contrast, can be found only
among good men. Virtue friends are those who have goodwill for each other, and indeed, love each other, on account of each having good character. In the friendships of utility and pleasure, men value each other for what is accidental to themselves, for it is accidental in Aristotle's theory that a man is wealthy or handsome. His essential self (and, hence, what is of intrinsic worth) is his character. Thus, in virtue friendships, men value each other for themselves, for their essential attributes, and not for their accidental attributes. Cooper expresses Aristotle's point very clearly:

Clearly enough, whether one person is beneficial or pleasant to another is an accidental characteristic of him; his being so results from the purely external and contingent fact that properties or abilities he possesses happen to answer to needs or wants, equally contingent, that characterise the other person. If then the conception of the other person under which one is his friend as beneficial or pleasant to oneself is something that is only incidentally true of him, the same thing must also be said of that property which one acquires as a result of so regarding him: that one is a friend of the other person must be something that holds true only incidentally ... On Aristotle's theory of moral virtue, the virtues are essential properties of human kind: a person realises more or less fully his human nature according as he possesses more or less fully those properties of character which count as moral excellences. And since individual persons are what they essentially are by being human beings, it can be said that a person realises his own essential nature more fully the more completely he possesses the moral excellences. So if one is a friend of another person because of moral qualities he possesses, one will be his friend because he is something that he is essentially, and not accidentally.13

Such friendships are also enduring, for Aristotle argues that a good character, when fully developed, is permanent, or nearly so. Thus, the enduring quality of virtue friendship may be contrasted with the transitory quality of the lesser friendships. Such friendships cease when the friends no longer conceive each other to be useful or pleasant. We may note here a familiar value in Greek thought - permanence. One reason why the friendship of good men is better than any other is that it is lasting, imitating in this the duration of the eternal spheres.

Aristotle concentrates almost exclusively on the friendship of perfectly good men thereby creating the impression that such friendships are possible only among "moral heroes". Cooper suggests that we should
not interpret Aristotle too literally here. He points out that it is "an aspect of the teleological bias of (Aristotle's) thinking which causes him to seek out the best and most fully realised instance when attempting to define a kind of thing", but we should not understand him as implying that only the perfectly virtuous can engage in such friendships. Ideally then, virtue friends will be perfectly good, and thus the same not only in their orientation to living, but also in their attainment of nobility. But even in cases where there is some difference in the kind and degree of their attainment, we should still expect a substantial degree of likeness in their conception of the ideal and in some aspects of their attainment. Furthermore, those who are alike in character will tend to be alike in their tastes and in general in what they find pleasant and useful. For virtue friendship to develop, the parties to the relationship must find in each other by a gradual process the same dedication to the ideal of nobility. Acknowledging this common ideal, virtuous people will tend to group together to attain and further this ideal with and through each other. What in all cases, though to differing degrees, virtue friends will find in each other, is the realisation of the human ideal, an ideal which is the end of their intentional actions.

In summary, we may say that Aristotle distinguishes the various forms of friendship according to the different grounds on which goodwill of affection is forthcoming in each. As there are three such grounds - the good, the pleasant, and the useful - so, correspondingly, there are three forms of friendship: friendship on account of the good, friendship on account of the pleasant, and friendship on account of the useful. Friendship on account of the good is based upon good character, and may, therefore, be called "virtue" or "character-friendship". Friends of this type have goodwill and affection for each other because of the other's good character. Friendship on account of pleasure, in contrast, is based upon the other's providing one with pleasure, and friendship on
account of utility is based upon the other's providing one with advantage. Pleasure and utility friendships are regarded by Aristotle as inferior forms of friendship, while virtue friendship is the paradigm of friendship for Aristotle.

1.3 Other Types of Friendship?

We must now pause to consider whether all philia relationships may be categorised into the good, the pleasant, or the useful, or whether there are some other types which are not discussed by Aristotle, perhaps because they lack the crucial element of choice (prohairesis). The term philia means any kind of affectionate relationship and, thus, philia or friendship is also possible between members of the same family such as between mother and child, father and child, brothers, sisters and cousins. Is Aristotle's classification supposed to apply to these relationships too? It is true that Aristotle makes a limited attempt in Book 8 chapter 12 to align some types of family friendship with the three forms of friendship, but this attempt is incomplete and unsystematic, and it seems that it is not Aristotle's intention to make family friendships a special case of one or more of the three types. Some of Aristotle's examples will serve to show this. In chapter 8, he discusses the case of a mother who loves her absent child. According to the theory of the three motives, the child must be loved on account of the useful, the pleasant, or the good. In this case, utility is clearly ruled out, for, being absent, the child has no way of making itself useful to her. Further, the mother has no way of knowing the real virtuousness of the child, if it is absent, so it cannot be on account of the good that the child is loved. Can it then be on account of pleasure? This may seem to be the most likely motive, and yet it is clear that if pleasure is present, it is not the kind of pleasure that is typical of pleasure friendship. As the child is absent, the mother can derive pleasure only
from the contemplation of the child. Yet, for Aristotle, all friendships require "active realisation"; affection is kindled and maintained through the sharing of activities, rather than through mere feeling and thought alone. Further, an important feature of pleasure friendship is spending time together, and this clearly cannot be met in the case of the absent child. Thus, it is not the typical motive of pleasure that lies behind the love of a mother for her absent child. It seems that none of the three motives apply in this case, and, indeed, Aristotle does not suggest that any one of the three does so. It is more likely that the mother loves her child, not on account of any goal or motive, but merely because the child is her own.

It may be thought that the case of the mother separated from her child is unusual and that all other cases of family relationships fit easily into the three-motive model. Yet this is not the case as Aristotle makes clear. He notes that:

Parents love their children as part of themselves, whereas children love their parents as authors of their being. (1161b18)

He also comments:

Brothers love one another as having sprung from the same origin, because their identity with regard to their parents identifies them with one another. Hence such phrases as "the same blood" and the "same stock" etc. Thus brothers are in a sense the same identity in different bodies. (1161b29-31)

Thus, parents love their children, children their parents and siblings one another, not because as people they are conceived to be good, pleasant, or useful, but merely because they are related to each other. There need be nothing over and above a consciousness of family relationship.

It is true, of course, that members of the same family, for example, brothers, cousins, comrades brought up together could be friends of any one of the three types in that, when of appropriate age, they could use their time and energies in the pursuit of virtue, pleasure or advantage. Yet, even here, it is not clear that Aristotle would accept them as standard cases of the three forms of friendship. Although they may be friends of one of the three types of this sense, through it all they are
family friends. They may pursue a particular goal together but the love and goodwill each has for the other is founded not so much upon the essential or accidental qualities of the other, but upon the kinship existing between them. It is the kinship that constitutes the relation. The ultimate foundation of even these family friendships is thus clearly different. One cannot choose one's kin, hence the foundation is not indicative of character. It is for this reason that Aristotle writes that although all forms of friendship "involve association", family friendships should be "distinguished as a separate species". (1161b12-14)

It is clear that Aristotle believes that family friendships do not fit into the tripartite framework. But does he believe that all philia relationships outside the family fit into the framework? Certainly this framework is not exhaustive of all friendships between persons not related to each other. First, it is possible to have a friendship in which the parties like each other on account of their natures/qualities, but in which no goal is consciously undertaken, and, secondly, it is possible to have a friendship in which even the qualities or natures of the parties are not especially significant. The first, a "no goal" friendship could arise, for example, between two persons who are "naturally virtuous". Aristotle makes a distinction between natural virtue (phasiske arete) and virtue in the full sense (he kuria) (1144b12-17). The pursuit of good deeds, and the cultivation of good character is a conscious undertaking, a primary goal for those who are fully virtuous. They choose to perform good deeds for the intrinsic goodness and rightness of these deeds, and those engaged in such a life form character friendships. In contrast, individuals who are "naturally virtuous" perform the same kind of deeds and display the same kind of character traits as the fully virtuous. But, in their case, the bravery, justice, generosity, or self control that they display stems from an innate tendency (1144b4-9). Two such naturally virtuous individuals could form a friendship, and have affection and goodwill for each other on account of natural, innate,
virtue that each possesses. In such a friendship, the goodwill would be based upon the qualities of the persons concerned, but it would be "goalless" in that the good deeds are not performed on account of any end - advantage, pleasure, or, simply, the intrinsic goodness of the deeds in question.

Although Aristotle recognises the existence of this natural virtue, it does not feature in his account of friendship, and the reason appears to be that friendship based upon such virtue would lack ethical significance in that it is not concerned with choice (prohairesis). Aristotle discusses friendship as one of the virtues, and, in his ethical theory, character and virtue are essentially concerned with choice. "virtue", he writes, "involves choice". If we want to know about an individual's virtuousness (or lack of it), we must look at the choices he makes, in particular, at the ends he selects. In the case of natural virtue friendship, the performance of good deeds arises from inherent tendencies and there is no deliberation and choice of ends. It is probably for the same reason that he omits from discussion what we may call "ungrounded likings" and "unjustifiable attachments" - friendship relations in which there is no goal and in which even the qualities of the friend are not especially significant. It is not that Aristotle believes that goodwill and affection can be bestowed on a purposive or rational basis alone, but that philia relationships in which this purposive or rational basis is absent lack the crucial element of choice and do not, therefore, fall within the domain of ethics.

1.4 The Place of Goodwill in Friendship

Cooper claims that friendship, for Aristotle, is mutual, recognised and active well-wishing and well-doing of good for another for that person's own sake. That is to say, friendship is mutual, recognised, active goodwill. Cooper supports this claim by an explicit definition
of friendship in the *Rhetoric*, and by various passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle seems to suggest a close relationship between friendship and goodwill. We shall quote the important passages in full as they will be a focus for later discussion.

We may begin by defining friendship and *philein*. We may describe *philein* towards anyone as wishing for him what are believed to be good things, not for your own sake, but for his, and being inclined, as far as you can, to bring these things about. A friend is one who has such inclinations, and brings forth these inclinations in return. Those who think they are thus towards each other think themselves friends.

(Rhetoric II,4 1380b34-81a2)

Goodwill is friendship only when it is reciprocated. Perhaps we should add 'and recognised'; because people are often well-disposed towards persons whom they have never seen, but believe to be good or helpful, and one of the latter might feel the same towards the former; then clearly these people are well-disposed towards each other; but how could we call them friends when their feelings for one another are not known? So friends must be well-disposed towards each other, and recognised as wishing each other's good, for one of the three reasons stated above (namely, the good, the pleasant, and the useful).

(NE 8,2 1155-1156a5)

Goodwill seems to be the beginning of friendship ... people cannot be friends unless they first come to feel goodwill, although feeling goodwill does not make them friends, because they only wish for the good of those for whom they feel goodwill; they would not actively help them or take any trouble for their sake. One might then define goodwill as undeveloped friendship which in course of time, when it attains to intimacy becomes friendship.

(NE 9,5,1167a4-12)

These three passages clearly support Cooper's claim that friendship is mutual, recognised, and active goodwill. The requirement of mutuality is the requirement that each friend has goodwill for the other on the grounds of goodness, or pleasure or advantage. Thus, for example, A has goodwill towards B on account of B's good character, and B has goodwill towards A on account of A's good character. The requirement of mutuality is not the requirement that goodwill be forthcoming (in one of the friends) because of the other friend's goodwill towards him. Thus, if A has goodwill towards B on account of B's good character, but B has goodwill towards A on account of A's goodwill towards him, the requirement of mutuality is not met. The requirement of recognition is the requirement that the relationship be conceived by both friends as one of friendship,
and that each friend be conceived by the other as a friend. A relationship does not become one of friendship simply because of the presence of certain sorts of motivation or behaviour. Certain sorts of virtuous acts, for example, could be performed within a relationship of friendship or outside such a relationship. The requirement of "active goodwill" is the requirement that the friends actually have goodwill towards each other, and reasonably frequently do good things for each other. In this way, "active goodwill" is to be distinguished from what we may term "passive goodwill" in which there is merely a disposition to do good to the friend. Aristotle does make it clear that friends need not be constantly active in this way, although the more active they are, the better the friendship. Friends who have already proved their friendship (by active goodwill and good deeds) can remain friends even if they are separated, although lasting separation tends to be the demise of friendship.

It should be noted that these three requirements of friendship that Cooper correctly identifies seem to apply primarily to those philia relationships that are freely engaged in. They do not seem to apply readily to all family relationships. The example of the mother and her absent child is a case in point. The mother "feels affection" for her child but "does not seek to receive affection in return". It is "sufficient" for her to see her child "prosper" and to "feel affection" for it even if the child does not render its "mother her due because it does not know her" (1159a17-33). The affection and goodwill is thus unilateral rather than mutual or reciprocal and, of course, it is unrecognised by one of the two parties to the relationship. Also, there can be no "active goodwill" since they are separated from each other; the mother can only have a "passive goodwill", that is, a disposition to do good for her child. Moreover, Aristotle does not suggest that this disposition will weaken if the separation is a long one.
1.5 The Motivation of Well-Wishing

This chapter is concerned above all with the issue of altruism and egoism in Aristotle's theory of friendship. We need to know in particular whether Aristotle makes provision for genuinely disinterested concern in his account of friendship, and if he does so, whether such disinterested concern is a feature of virtue friendship alone, or of the lesser friendships too. Of key importance here is the issue of well-wishing or goodwill, and we must examine in detail the nature and role of this well-wishing or goodwill for the three kinds of friendship.

1.5.1 Well-Wishing and Virtue Friendship

In virtue friendship, well-wishing is genuinely for the other friend's sake. The evidence for this is Aristotle's statement: "Now those who wish well to their friends for their own sake are most truly friends; for they do so by reason of their own nature and not incidentally". Aristotle seems to be saying that among those who enter into relations of friendship, the group that is distinguished from the rest by virtue of the fact that they wish well for the other's sake are most truly friends, and this group is the same group that care for each other because of essential qualities. We have already noted that, according to Aristotle, it is only in virtue friendship that individuals value each other for their essential attributes. In utility and pleasure friendships, individuals value each other for their accidental attributes. Aristotle is, therefore, saying that virtue friends are most truly friends, and that they are most truly friends because the well-wishing of each friend is genuinely for the sake of the other.

We must now consider how it is that the conception of another individual as being of good character can motivate concern for that individual's well-being. What is it, in short, that binds one person's virtuous character and another person's goodwill towards him? Moreover, how can this goodwill be so strong that it is sufficient to spur an individual into action?
It is plausible to suggest that admiration might be present, for admiration is often forthcoming on the perception of various kinds of excellence. But it would also appear that admiration by itself is insufficient to spur one to perform deeds that are intended to benefit the friend. A's admiration of B because of B's good character may well result in A's wishing B well, and in thinking that it would be appropriate, and fitting that B should prosper. But it is far from clear that such admiration by itself would be sufficient to move A to seek actively B's well-being, to do things on his behalf, and it is precisely this feature that is so important in Aristotle's account of virtue friendship. It is far from clear that admiration or respect should issue in anything more than a feeling or, indeed, a firm belief that B is a fine individual, an example to everyone else, and that he deserves to prosper and get what is best. It would seem that Aristotle does hold that something more than mere admiration is required in the kind of goodwill that characterises friendship. In NE 9.5, he suggests that the goodwill that accompanies appreciation of another's excellent qualities can be very weak, and completely lacking in intensity, desire and activity. In such cases, he says, love or affectionate concern (stergein) may be only superficial (1167a1-2). To promote action, greater intimacy and love or affectionate concern is necessary. Cooper spells out this affective element in Aristotle's account very clearly:

(virtue) friendships exist when two persons, having spent enough time together to know one another's character and to trust one another (1156b25-29), come to love one another because of their good human qualities. Aristotle's word for 'love' here is stergein. ... Each loving the other for his good qualities of character, wishes for him whatever is good, for his own sake, precisely in recognition of his goodness of character, and it is mutually known to them that well-wishing of this kind is reciprocated (1156a3-5)16a

Mere admiration is insufficient. Love or affectionate concern is an essential constituent of virtue friendship; it is not merely a superficial feature that decorates or embellishes the friendship. But why should it be the case that for Aristotle good character inspires love or
affectionate concern? Mere admiration may be insufficient to spur one into action; an affective element like love may be needed, but it may still be asked why Aristotle should think that good character should inspire love. Aristotle does not confront this issue explicitly, but I think that the following answer may do justice to his position. That virtuous men seek and love only the good is one of the cornerstones of Aristotle's ethics. Such men look for what is good-in-itself, something that does not point beyond to some further value. Aristotle has no Platonic Form of the Good. But the good man in his active, virtuous life is the personification or embodiment of human good. Since the good man cannot but love the good, affection necessarily accompanies this awareness of the good. It is for this reason that good men love, or have affectionate concern for each other.

Virtue friends will, of course, be useful and pleasant to each other (1156b13), but these features are shared with the lesser friendships. What is distinctive is that virtue friends typically seek to promote each other's good character, its development (1172a11), and exercise. They find in each other a model of human good, and seek to emulate each other (1162b8). Virtue friends come to share a life of virtue.

In having concern for (philoutes) a friend, men have concern for what is good for themselves; for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend (1157b33-34)

Virtue friends observe each other performing good acts of courage, generosity, magnificence, gentleness, truthfulness, temperance, to name some of the virtues that Aristotle explicitly discusses. This observation brings with it a consciousness of oneself and other persons as moral agents, and this consciousness brings with it an admiration and affection for these other people whose aim, like one's own, is to achieve excellence of character. One wishes for the good of these people just because, insofar as one is virtuous and noble, one wishes for the good-in-itself, and these people as they achieve such excellence are themselves the embodiment of the good in itself which is to be found not in the
Platonic heavens, but in the concrete behaviour of virtuous men. Anyone who loves the good, Aristotle writes, will love these good men qua good (men).

We must conclude this section by pinpointing the altruistic kind of well-wishing that typifies virtue friendship. In section 1.1 we referred to Bernard William's classification of desires into supposedly (1) egoistic "I-desires" and (2) altruistic "non-I-desires":

(1) I desire that I prosper
(2) I desire that X prosper

Now it is clear that (2) is more altruistic than (1), but we may still ask whether (2) is altruistic enough, and whether it captures what is typical of Aristotle's virtue friendship. It seems that I could maintain (quite compatibly with (2)) that "X is a fine person, an example to us all, that he deserves what is best, and I hope he gets it", and at the same time not be willing to do anything that will promote his wellbeing.

I could reason as follows:

Persons of excellent character should prosper
This person, A, is of excellent character
Therefore, A should prosper.

This reasoning is clearly altruistic; if I argued in this way, it would be unreasonable for people to call me an egoist. But I would surely be even more altruistic if I desired to be the one who contributes to A's prosperity. Aristotle, as we have just seen, argues that virtue friends seek to promote each other's good character and its development. Each friend can thus be construed as saying something like:

(3) I desire that I help X prosper (where "prosper" is understood to be the attainment of excellent character)

Now (3) is clearly an "I-desire" in Williams's sense of the term, but it is an altruistic "I-desire", not an egoistic "I-desire" because the goal is the good of another individual, for that other individual's own sake. Moreover, it is reasonable to argue that (3) is more altruistic than (2), because real concern for another is manifested in a willingness to do things that benefit that other person and help him prosper. A piously expressed hope or desire that he might prosper is insufficient.
1.5.2 Well-Wishing and the Lesser Friendships

Aristotle's position in respect of the motivation of goodwill in the lesser friendships is not as clear, for he seems to commit himself in various places in the NE to two propositions which are incompatible.

1. Disinterested goodwill (that is, goodwill for the sake of the other) is found within all three types of friendship.

2. Disinterested goodwill is not a characteristic of the lesser friendships, for lesser friends are self-regarding in their concern for each other and they do not care for each other in themselves.\(^{17}\)

Textual support for proposition 1 is found in Book 8 and that for proposition 2 in Book 9. In the EE, Aristotle clearly takes the line that goodwill for the sake of the other person is not a feature of the lesser friendships. The concern of lesser friends is purely self-directed (1241a5-8). Thus, in respect of the motivation of goodwill in the lesser friendships, the EE account is like NE Book 9, and NE Book 8 is incompatible with both.

The main passage in support of proposition 1, the proposition that goodwill for the sake of the other is a characteristic of all three types of friendship (and, hence, a characteristic of the lesser friendships too) is 1156a3-5. It could be argued, though, that in this passage Aristotle is referring to friendship simpliciter; that he is analysing friendship in general, or is attempting to present the reader with a model of friendship. But, as Cooper points out, such an interpretation cannot be correct for Aristotle's words do not support this "model of friendship" view. Aristotle writes:

So friends must be well disposed towards each other, and recognised as wishing each other's good for one of the three reasons stated above.

The implication of the final phrase "for one of the three reasons stated above" is that goodwill in friendship may be forthcoming on any one of the three grounds by which friendship is distinguished into types, namely
the good, the pleasant and the useful. In this passage, then, Aristotle appears to be arguing that goodwill towards the other is a characteristic of all three types of friendship (and, hence, of the lesser friendships too).

If Aristotle assents to proposition 1, it appears that he cannot without inconsistency assent also to proposition 2. But Cooper has recently attempted to show that this is not so. He argues that Aristotle assents to the first proposition, and he then proceeds to argue that, given a particular interpretation of the second proposition, (an interpretation, that is, of what is meant by caring for a person "in himself") the two propositions may be seen to be consistent with one another.

Proposition 2, Cooper argues, has two parts: (a) that the well-wishing that characterises the lesser friendships is grounded upon the advantage or pleasure perceived to accrue to the self, and (b) that lesser friends do not care for each other "for themselves" or for what they are "in themselves". These two parts, Cooper argues, have not always been distinguished by the various commentators, but they are distinct and should, therefore, be kept so. He attempts to show that commentators who argue that Aristotle holds proposition 2(a) are mistaken for Aristotle does hold that there is at least some measure of disinterested well-wishing in the lesser friendships and, therefore, that these forms of friendship are not wholly egoistic and selfish as is sometimes thought. He further attempts to show that Aristotle does indeed hold proposition 2(b), but that 2(b) has been wrongly interpreted by commentators, and has no relation at all to the egoistic-altruistic issue. By this method, Cooper attempts to show that there is no contradiction in what Aristotle says: some measure of disinterested goodwill, that is, goodwill for the sake of the other person, is a feature of all three types of friendship.
We shall begin by discussing 2(b). In describing the three kinds of friendship, Aristotle draws a distinction between (i) caring for others "for themselves" (1156a10), "for what they are" (1156a12), or "on account of themselves" (1157a8) and (ii) caring for others incidentally (1156a17, 1156b11, 1157a4). It is clear that (i) is the kind of concern associated with virtue friendship, while (ii) is that associated with the lesser friendships. It might be thought that because lesser friends do not care for each other "in themselves", they, therefore, do not care for each other "for the other's sake". But Cooper argues that Aristotle is not making this equation; he is simply making the point that in virtue friendship, care and concern arises in virtue of an individual's essential qualities, while in the lesser friendships, such care and concern arises in virtue of an individual's incidental qualities. The particular incidental qualities involved might suggest that the lesser friendships are always selfish and self-seeking, but this does not change Cooper's point that Aristotle is concerned here not to distinguish between egoistic versus altruistic behaviour, but between behaviour motivated by essential versus incidental attributes of the other individual. Cooper is saying, in other words, that it is not necessarily the case that because A does not care for B "in himself" or "for himself" (that is, on account of his essential attributes) that he, therefore, cannot care for B for B's own sake.

According to proposition 2(a), lesser friends are completely selfish and egoistic, for they seek their own benefit or pleasure exclusively. Cooper denies the correctness of this interpretation, arguing that while lesser friends exhibit more self-interested concern than virtue friends, there is still room for some degree of mutual disinterested concern in these friendships. The important passage is 1156a2-5 which we have already quoted, where Aristotle says that friends "wish each other's good" on account of (dia) the good, the pleasant or the useful. Cooper points out in a footnote that although dia can sometimes be used
to "express a purpose", its "normal" usage is in "expressing an antecedent causal condition". If *dia* is understood in a purely purposive sense, it would seem that lesser friends wish each other good in order to produce pleasure or advantage for themselves. *Dia* in this case would express "merely what the well-wisher hopes to achieve or produce by his friend's prosperity". This purposive or prospective account of *dia* would render the well-wishing of the lesser friendships completely egoistic and self-seeking - not because of the purposiveness or prospectivity *in itself*, but simply because of the specific self-regarding purposes involved. Moreover, as this interpretation of *dia* makes the lesser friendships exclusively self-seeking, there is a clear contradiction with proposition 1 according to which there is, at least, some disinterested goodwill (that is, goodwill for the sake of the other person) in the lesser friendships. "If *dia* is taken in this prospective way, as expressing what the well-wisher hopes to produce or achieve by his friend's prosperity, then it is impossible to interpret Aristotle coherently".

Cooper points out that it is very likely that Aristotle intends *dia* to be similarly understood in all three types of friendship, thus, a clue might be provided by investigating the use of *dia* in virtue friendship.

In this case, the 'because' (*dia* ten areten) seems more likely to mean 'in recognition of their friend's having a good character' so that it expresses a consequence or result of the friend's being morally good rather than some purpose that the well-wisher has in wanting him to prosper... Understanding the 'because' in this causal way makes it at least as much retrospective as prospective; the well-wishing and well-doing are responses to what the person is and has done, rather than merely the expression of a hope as to what he will be and may do in the future.

Applying this analysis of *dia* to the lesser friendships, Cooper continues:

... the pleasure friend will now be said to wish well for his friend's own sake in consequence of recognising him as someone who is and has been an enjoyable companion, and the advantage friend wishes his friend well for his friend's own sake, in consequence of recognising him as someone who regularly benefits him, and has done so in the past.
A commentator who held the prospective-purposive interpretation of dia might object that Aristotle's comments about the demise of friendships do not support this interpretation. Aristotle says several times (1156a22-24,33-36) that the lesser friendships cease if the receipt of pleasure or utility ceases. This seems to imply that the friendship ceases because personal benefit or pleasure was the one and only goal, and if the goal is no longer being achieved, the friends will naturally cease wishing each other well, and the friendship will die. Similarly, virtue friendship would cease if the good, in this case, good character, were to disintegrate, although this is not very likely to occur according to Aristotle because good qualities of character are, once fully acquired, permanent or nearly so (1156b12).

Such a challenge lacks much force because Cooper does not hold that friends are completely backward-looking. He says that dia is "at least as much retrospective as prospective,"27. "The antecedent" of their goodwill is not only (the recognition of) regular past pleasure or advantage, or of the other's good character in the past, but also the expectation or belief that such pleasure, advantage or good character will continue in the future. When Cooper is outlining the three types of friendship, he notes that "it is not the actual properties of a person, but those that someone else conceives him as possessing, that are responsible for the existence of a friendship."28. In other words, A's well-wishing for B is built upon A's conception of B. Reasonable grounds for conceiving B as good or pleasant or useful include not only B's past behaviour, but also his present and likely future behaviour and dispositions. A has goodwill towards B because he has a particular conception of B and this conception is grounded in beliefs about B's past, present and future behaviour. Cooper would argue that when Aristotle says that friendship ceases because the benefits cease, he means that the particular conception of the other person that is necessary to cause the goodwill is now absent.
According to Cooper, the lesser friendships involve disinterestedness but in a subtle and limited way, fairly termed "disinterested", but not as fully disinterested as virtue friendships. A lesser friend, A, seeks his own benefit, but within the limits imposed by this aim, he can, caused by his conception of B, still wish well to B for B's own sake. His own benefit is A's overall goal, but it is not his goal in each and every action in the relationship. When A acts he does not always seek to maximise or even advance his own well-being, though it is the case that each and every action will be scanned to see that it is likely to remain within the limits of his overall, long-term personal benefit from the relationship. While A seeks his overall benefit, each act of well-wishing towards B need not be subservient to that end in that it will only be undertaken if it be conceived of as a means to A's overall personal benefit. According to this analysis, the disinterestedness is only limited, but it is an advance on the classical case of Hobbesian self-interest. An example may make this difference clearer.

A and B are "business friends" who run a business to their mutual advantage. One day B falls ill and is taken to hospital. A is considering visiting B in hospital.

(1) It is very inconvenient to me. I should rather go straight home from work, and not stop off at the hospital on the way and get home late for dinner. Still, I shall visit him for otherwise people will talk and say I am neglectful. I might then lose customers to my rivals. Besides B might feel sore if I don't visit him and may end our business partnership which I find very advantageous.

(2) Poor B in hospital! I hope he recovers soon. And with that personality he would hate the boredom of hospital. I must go and visit him and his time won't drag so much. After all we have always been good business friends, and have run the business
successfully, and, hopefully, we might be doing it again soon.

The judgement is the same in both cases in that in each A decides he will visit B, but the reasoning in the two cases is very different. In the first case, A is entirely concerned with his own interests and goals and the possible repercussions that his action might have on his interests and goals. He specifies no interest in the well-being of B and does not wish him well at all. This is a classic statement of self-interest. In the second case, in contrast, A genuinely wishes B well, and is concerned about him as and to the extent that B is conceived to be a beneficial friend. He wishes B well for B's own sake, because he has a particular conception of B as advantageous, and his conception is grounded in beliefs about B's past, present, and likely future behaviour and dispositions.

In this way, the lesser friendships are not relationships of pure self-interest in which there is no place for well-wishing for the sake of the other person. In Cooper's account, lesser friends do wish well for the others' sake, but in ways limited in their basis and degree. Cooper's account does have the advantage that it makes the two propositions compatible and consistent. If Cooper is correct in arguing that Aristotle is committed to proposition 1, then Aristotle can be seen to be consistent in what he says about well-wishing in the lesser friendships. But we may still ask if Cooper's interpretation is correct. Is it true to what Aristotle says and means?

Cooper's argument, as we have noted, depends heavily upon there being a clear-cut distinction between concern for a person for his own sake on the one hand, and concern for a person for his essential/inessential attributes on the other. But Aristotle does not always seem to make such a distinction; indeed, he often equates the two:

Now those who wish well to their friends for their own sake, are most truly friends for they do so by reason of their own nature and not incidentally. (1156b16)
Similarly, the good man wishes himself well:

and does so for his own sake (for he does it for the sake of the intellectual element in him which is thought to be the man himself) (1166a16-17)

Clearly, then, there is some equation of wishing a person well for his own sake and for his essential qualities. But, it can reasonably be argued that this equation is to be expected in the case of the man of good character. Indeed, Cooper does not dispute the equation in the case of the virtuous man. He is not attempting to sever the essential qualities for the other's sake connection with a view to arguing that A may wish B well for his essential qualities but not for B's own sake. The question at issue is not

(a) If A wishes well to B for his essential qualities, must he also wish well to B for B's own sake?

but rather

(b) If A wishes well to B for B's own sake, must he also wish well to B for B's essential qualities?

Cooper answers question (b) in the negative. If A wishes well to B for B's own sake, it is not necessary that he wishes well to B for B's essential qualities. He may instead wish well to B for B's accidental qualities. He thus disputes the equation only in the case of the lesser friendships. Thus, in order to refute Cooper's claim, we need a passage in which Aristotle denies that one can wish another well for his accidental qualities and at the same time wish him well for his own sake. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not provide one.

Textual support for proposition 2 is drawn largely from the NE account of goodwill in Book 9 chapter 5. In this chapter, Aristotle appears to deny explicitly that goodwill exists in the lesser friendships. Thus, this chapter poses a far more significant challenge to Cooper's interpretation. In the relevant passage (1166b30-36) Aristotle first contrasts "mere" goodwill with fully developed friendship, noting that this "mere" goodwill can arise suddenly and spontaneously, but be quite superficial in that those who experience it can be unmoved to take
any trouble for the person for whom they feel it. The example he gives is that of the short-lived goodwill that spectators can have for athletes at the games. Because such goodwill can be so "superficial", it is insufficient to constitute friendship, but it could constitute the "beginnings of friendship" (1167a3-4). Aristotle continues:

One might, then, by a metaphor define goodwill as undeveloped friendship, which in course of time, when it attains to intimacy becomes friendship - but not friendship based on utility or pleasure for these never in fact arouse goodwill (1167a10-14)

In this passage, it might appear that Aristotle is denying that goodwill is a characteristic of the lesser friendships. "For these never in fact arouse goodwill" appears to suggest it. But Cooper argues that Aristotle is making a much more limited or "reduced" claim, viz the claim that "spontaneously" arising goodwill, when it grows into friendship, cannot grow into utility or pleasure friendship, but only into virtue friendship. Spontaneous goodwill is, according to Cooper, that kind of goodwill that arises without past "association" of receipt of benefit or pleasure. Spontaneous goodwill of the kind here under discussion can only be based on admiration for goodness of character; one can feel goodwill towards someone whom one thinks is a good person even though one has no deep personal knowledge of his character and has not personally been affected by any noble action of his, but no one feels goodwill for someone else on the mere ground that he might be a pleasant companion or useful business partner. These sorts of goodwill only arise after the pleasure or the profit has begun to be actualised, and exist always as a response to profit or pleasure one has actually found in association with someone else.30

Thus, according to Cooper's analysis, goodwill may arise in two different ways, (i) Spontaneously (without prior association of self advantage or pleasure) and (ii) Derivatively (through prior association of self advantage or pleasure) which in the lesser friendships would involve receipt of past benefit or pleasure and certain expectation that these will continue in the foreseeable future. Spontaneous goodwill can grow only into virtue friendship because only such friendship can be "actualised" without prior association of self advantage or pleasure. According to Cooper, then, Aristotle is not making the claim that there is no good-
will in the lesser friendships, but only that there is no spontaneous goodwill in such friendships.

So what Aristotle denies here is that eunoia (goodwill) precedes, and possibly turns into a friendship of one of the derivative sorts; he does not deny that once such an relationship has begun, eunoia develops within it. Is Cooper's interpretation correct? Is Aristotle denying the existence of spontaneous goodwill alone or of goodwill per se in the case of the lesser friendships? Perhaps the continuation of the passage will provide the answer.

A man who has received a benefit does indeed return goodwill for what has been done to him, and this is right and proper. But if a person's motive for doing someone a service is the hope of getting, through his help, some substantial advantage, it looks as if the object of his goodwill were not so much the other man as himself - just as a person is not a friend if the attentions he pays have an interested motive.

In this part of the passage, Aristotle is making a distinction between goodwill that is based upon past receipt of benefits (advantage or pleasure) and goodwill that is based upon expectation of benefit (advantage or pleasure) to come. It seems clear that he is denying the existence of disinterested goodwill in the second, purely prospective, case. The goodwill is not disinterested for its object is the self, rather than the other. Does Aristotle allow that the goodwill in the lesser friendships can come into being derivatively in respect of past (but not future) benefits? If he does so, it would appear that Cooper's interpretation is correct - there is not spontaneous goodwill in such friendships, but there is one kind of derivative goodwill, viz goodwill derived from past receipt of benefit. It appears that Aristotle does allow it. The first case under discussion is one in which there is goodwill arising from past receipt of benefit. Moreover, the goodwill is disinterested for it is directed towards the other person.

Such an interpretation, however, is open to challenge. According to the passage, there can be (and, indeed, should be) disinterested goodwill in response to benefits received. But it is plausible to
argue that this goodwill is the goodwill of gratitude rather than of friendship. As Cooper himself makes clear earlier in the article the goodwill of gratitude ("goodwill in return for past pleasure or past service") is not the goodwill of friendship, for the goodwill "as an ingredient of friendship is limited by the other person's continuing to (be thought to) be pleasant or advantageous ... Friendships of whatever sort, require a continuing lively interest of one person in another, and mere gratitude for past pleasure or past service is not enough to provide this". The goodwill Aristotle discusses in this case appears to be that of gratitude — goodwill for past receipt of benefits. But even if this is so, Cooper's argument is not refuted or even weakened by this point alone. It is reasonable to argue that the goodwill of gratitude is insufficient in just the respect that he identifies to constitute the goodwill of friendship; the question is whether it can constitute the beginnings of friendship. After all, in this chapter, Aristotle is concerned above all with the issue of how goodwill (derived from one or more sources) can develop into friendship. "Prospective" goodwill cannot develop into friendship because then the friendship would have an ultimate basis in self-interest, whereas in friendship the concern and goodwill is other-directed. But, the goodwill of gratitude could indeed develop into friendship because it is disinterested goodwill; its ultimate basis is not self-interest. The problem is that Aristotle does not make clear whether or not he believes that the goodwill of gratitude may develop into that of friendship, so it is not possible to be certain what this first case proves. The passage does not confirm Cooper's thesis, but neither does it refute it.

Aristotle notes finally:

In general, goodwill arises on account of some excellence or worth, as when one man seems to another noble, beautiful or brave or something of the sort, as we pointed out in the case of competitors in a contest. (1167a18-20)

In this summary of Book 9 Chapter 5, Aristotle is making the point that it is generally various kinds of human excellence or worth that give rise
to goodwill. He does not say again that past receipt of pleasure or advantage can give rise to goodwill. This omission might tend to suggest that he does not consider that the goodwill of gratitude may be a source for the goodwill of friendship. If this is so, it would seem that neither prospective nor retrospective goodwill can be such a source. But, equally, it can be argued that in this short summary Aristotle is making a rather generalised statement about the origin of goodwill, and he is not concerned to enumerate all its sources. In conclusion, it must be said that it is not possible to be certain whether Cooper's interpretation is correct or incorrect.

1.6 The Five or Six Types of Friendship

Cooper is surely correct to argue that caring for another for his essential/inessential qualities is different from caring for another for his own sake. He may be wrong to conclude that Aristotle makes this distinction—indeed, as we have seen, it is not possible to be certain as to which line Aristotle takes—but it is clear that they are separate, and should, therefore, be kept so. Once this distinction is made, however, many more forms of friendship will be generated.

Disinterested well-wishing (Well-wishing for the sake of the other)  Essential Qualities

Self-interested well-wishing (Well-wishing insofar as it benefits oneself)  Inessential Qualities

1. Friendship based upon disinterested well-wishing and essential qualities (virtue friendship)

2. Friendship based upon disinterested well-wishing and inessential qualities (Cooper's interpretation of lesser friendships)

3. Friendship based upon self-interested well-wishing and essential qualities (to be discussed later)

4. Friendship based upon self-interested well-wishing and inessential qualities (Aristotle's conception of lesser friendship?)
In fact, once this distinction is made, the result is **six** forms of friendship, not **four**, as there are two inessential qualities, viz., pleasure and advantage.

According to Aristotle, there are three major ends or goals in life that any individual may choose to pursue - the good, the pleasant and the useful. It is also the case, for Aristotle, that the forms of friendship mirror these goals of life, that friendship may be viewed as the affectionate and emotional aspect of the pursuit of the respective goal. "There are", he says, "three kinds of friendship corresponding in number to the objects worthy of affection" (1156a6-8). He develops his theory in such a way that pleasure and utility are always relative goods, and virtue the absolute good. A relative good, we noted, is a good for a man as an individual; it meets a special need of his as an individual. Aristotle seems to believe that if it is pleasure or material advantage that a man seeks, it must be for himself that he seeks it. From this assumption he draws the conclusion that any friendship formed in pursuit of this goal must be self-interested. But it is not necessarily the case that the relative goals of material advantage and pleasure must be sought on behalf of oneself. It seems plausible to argue that where pleasure or material advantage are the chief goals or goods, such goals or goods may be pursued selfishly or unselfishly, egoistically or altruistically. Categories 2 and 4 above may be clearly expressed in terms of the altruistic and egoistic "I-desire" model that we employed before.

I desire that I contribute to my friend's material advantage
I desire that I contribute to my friend's pleasure
I desire that I get material advantage from my friend
I desire that I get pleasure from my friend

And, in terms of this "I-desire" model, categories 1 and 3 may be expressed respectively:

I desire that I contribute to my friend's virtuousness
I desire that I get virtue from my friend
According to Aristotle's theory, character virtues are essential properties of human kind; a person realises more or less fully his human nature according as he possesses more or less fully those properties which count as human excellences. For this reason, the individual who chooses to live an excellent life chooses what is objectively worthy of choice; he chooses a goal that is essential to human beings and human lives, and he ignores as irrelevant those other major goals such as material advantage and pleasure which are non-essential to it. Clearly, then, according to Aristotle's theory, the man who makes pleasure or material advantage his primary goal is making a mistake for he chooses what is non-essential to life and ignores what is essential to it. His choices are not in line with what is objectively worthy of choice. It is in this way that he differs from the truly excellent agent, the phronimos. But from the fact that he makes a mistake about which goal is worthy of pursuit, it does not follow that he must pursue his goal selfishly or egoistically. In short, if it is pleasure or material advantage that a man seeks, it need not be for himself alone that he seeks it. Believing such ends as material advantage or pleasure to be good for human beings qua human beings, he may well direct his energies to pursuing them on behalf of his family and friends, as well as on his own behalf. Earlier, we quoted a passage from the Rhetoric in which Aristotle described philein:

We may describe philein towards anyone as wishing for him what are believed to be good things, not for your own sake, but for his, and being inclined as far as you can to bring these things about. (My italics).

It seems quite plausible that an individual may hold the wrong beliefs about what kinds of ends are good for human beings, but, believing certain things to be good, such as pleasure and material advantage, may pursue them actively on behalf of others too. He may ask himself the question: "How may I help my friends to prosper materially and do well?" or, "How may I help my friends live a pleasurable life?" Moreover, if he perceives that his friends have similar tastes to himself, that they
hold the same things valuable, and pursue the same ends, he may well
have genuine affection for them of an unrestricted and unlimited kind.
Of course, it is quite possible that an individual who seeks such goals
as pleasure or material advantage may do so in the selfish and egoistic
manner that Aristotle outlines. In this case, the individual would,
indeed, ask of any friendship: "What advantage or pleasure can I derive
from this?" and then, any affection or well-wishing would clearly be
very negligible or entirely absent. The point is that selfishness and
egoism is not a necessary concomitant of the pursuit of material advan-
tage or pleasure, although it may be a contingent fact that those who
pursue such goods often do so on behalf of themselves alone.

The phronimos is the man who does what is objectively worthy of
choice. He understands that character virtues are essential to human
life, and he, therefore, wants to excel in virtuous deeds and to accom-
plish what is finest in his nature. Is it possible that just as it is
the case that he who chooses what is non-essential to life may do so
selfishly or unselfishly, egoistically or altruistically, that he who
chooses what is objectively good and worthy of choice may also do so
selfishly or unselfishly, egoistically or altruistically? In terms of
our "I-desire" model, may the phronimos say equally:

(a) I desire that I contribute to my friend's virtuousness
and
(b) I desire that I get virtue from my friend

or may he-say only the first of these? If Aristotle's account of
virtue friendship is to be seen clearly to be an advance over Plato's
account, (b) must be rejected. In order to ascertain this, we must
look at some relevant passages in the NE, and some possible challenges
that could be levelled at them.

Aristotle argues:

If the function of a friend is to do good rather than to
be treated well; if the performance of good deeds is the
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mark of a good man, and of excellence, and if it is
nobler to do good to a friend than to a stranger, then
a man of high moral standards will need people to whom
he can do good. (1169b10-13)

In this passage, Aristotle writes of the importance of benefiting a
friend. Moreover, it is clear that if an individual practises the
Aristotelian virtues, his friends will always benefit. In particular,
they will benefit from the generosity, bravery etc. of his acts. But,
it could be argued, that, in this passage, Aristotle is making the point
that in the realm of social action, the good man qua good man cannot be
entirely self-sufficient, for many good deeds such as generosity, magni-
icence, and truthfulness can only be done with reference to other people.
The good man's friends thus satisfy a need; they provide him with the
opportunity to perform good deeds and attain human excellence. This
point is made by Ashmore.

The subtle reconciliation of self-love and love for
another reveals itself once again. 'The good man will
need people to do well by.' Consequently, in conferring
benefits upon another, he is satisfying his own needs.33

The implication of Ashmore's statement is that the good man in performing
such deeds for his friend does not make any real sacrifice. He does not
ever act contrary to his own interests; rather he acts in a way which
further his own interests. In this way he is able to reconcile love
for himself with love for another.

In support of this claim, reference could be made to Aristotle's
discussion of self-love. Aristotle distinguishes between the kind of
self-love that is a matter for reproach, and that kind which is a matter
for praise. The lovers of self in the bad sense "assign to themselves
the greater share of wealth, honours and bodily pleasures" (1168b16).
But the lovers of self in the good sense assign to themselves "the things
that are noblest and best" (1168b29), that is, they assign to themselves
virtuous deeds. The individual who is "exceptionally devoted to the
performance of fine actions receives the approval and commendation of
all "for he both benefits himself and helps others". In contrast, the
self-lover in the bad sense, he who attempts to assign to himself "the larger share of money, public honours and bodily pleasures" is reproached, for "he will injure both himself and his neighbours by giving way to base feelings".

But our imaginary critic could point out that this self-love in the good sense could also be a matter for reproach. Suppose that a man makes it his primary goal to do good deeds, and live a virtuous life; further, that he seizes every opportunity he can to practise such virtue. He may, while still wishing his friend well, and having affection for him on account of his virtuous character, still try to seize all opportunity for himself. He may see his friend as a provider of opportunity, as someone on whom he can practise good deeds so that he can attain excellence of character. In short, he may take the lion-share of virtue on each occasion. The possible criticisms to be examined are that the good man always considers his own interests (and does not make sacrifices) and, further, that he attends to his own attainment of excellence, perhaps at the expense of his friend's similar attainment. He can thus be "virtuous" according to Aristotle's theory, when really he is egoistic and selfish.

We have already noted in our discussion of virtue friendship that such friends typically seek to promote each others' good character, its development (1172a11) and exercise. But, it seems, that A cannot help B develop or improve his good character and attain excellence by denying him all opportunity for the practise of virtue, for it is by practise that such excellence is attained. Moreover, virtue friends are said to share in a life of virtue, but it seems unreasonable to suggest that A and B share in a virtuous life, if it is the case that A always monopolises the virtuous activity for himself. Aristotle, in fact, holds this view. He notes that the good man not only gives up to his friend opportunity for material wealth, political honours, and positions (1169a29-31) but he also
Gives up to his friend opportunity for doing fine actions
(1169a33-34)

Secondly, it seems that in Aristotle's account, self-sacrificing
behaviour is a feature of virtue friendship. Thus, it is not the case
that such friends consult only their own interests and never act contrary
to them.

But it is also true to say of the man of good character
that he performs many actions for the sake of his friends
and his country, and if necessary even dies for them
(1169a19)

By such an act, he sacrifices all the goods that he would have attained
and enjoyed had he continued to live. "Five minutes' or an hour's
virtuous action in which he laid down his life could not outweigh the
good of years of virtue which he might still have had if he had not made
the sacrifice in question".35

A more important point concerns the motivation of virtuousness.
This criticism of Aristotle makes the assumption that an individual can
live the best life, be virtuous and engage in virtue friendship, but
do all these things for selfish reasons. But in Aristotle's theory, the
person who is virtuous, the phronimos, acts not for the sake of pleasure
or advantage, but for the sake of what is noble and right. If a person
says "I want Eudaimonia, and I want it for me" he is essentially con­
cerned with his own advantage, rather than with the noble and the good.
The goal of self-development may be a better goal than that of material
advantage, but, in Aristotle's theory, the motivation is of equal
importance to the goal.

Suppose that an individual acts in accordance with some virtue, for
example, makes a donation to a charitable organisation, but maintains
that he has done it in order to develop his benevolence and generosity.
And, in general, let us imagine that this individual does what he con­
siders he ought, but does so in order to,develop his own goodness. We
would surely deny that this individual was acting in a good and virtuous
way at all—his is rather a form of disguised egoism. In performing
these good deeds, he is consulting only his own interests, and he is concerned only for his own well-being. Aristotle would agree. In his theory, the phronimos is the individual who does what is "objectively" and "subjectively" correct. The former category specifies that the phronimos must do what he does at the right time, to the right person, in the right manner etc. The latter category specifies that the proper act must be done with the right motive. The right motive for Aristotle is the noble or the good. The benefactor who makes a donation to a charitable organisation because it is noble or good is virtuous. He who makes the same donation because he enjoys thinking of himself as a benefactor (on account of pleasure) or because he wishes to acquire a virtuous character (on account of advantage) is not virtuous. The motive of the virtuous benefactor is clearly disinterested, while the motives of the other two are respectively the seeking of pleasure and advantage. The same is true for good deeds done to friends. If A does a generous deed for his friend B because he wants B to think of him as generous, or because he wants to develop his own goodness of character, he is not virtuous and he is not a true friend either. A virtue friend would perform a generous act disinterestedly, for the friend's own sake, for the sake of the goodness and rightness of the act, not for the sake of his own advantage or pleasure however these may be construed. As a result of performing such deeds, the good man derives advantage for himself (he develops fineness of character) but this is different from performing good deeds in order to develop one's benevolence or other aspects of one's character. The same is true of pleasure. A virtuous individual may derive pleasure from performing deeds of generosity or other good deeds for the friend's own sake, but, in Aristotle's theory, the individual who performs these deeds in order to derive pleasure is not virtuous at all and is similarly not a true friend.

But, is it still not the case that the virtuous man in Aristotle's theory is acting to satisfy his own needs? Suppose he has a need to
satisfy his own generosity. He sees a blind beggar and gives him some money "to satisfy his generosity". Nowell-Smith points out that such a phrase is misleading:

For if we put it in this way, we are apt to suppose that a man who does something "to satisfy his generosity" is concerned, not with the beggar's welfare, but with his own satisfaction. But this phrase is a misleading way of saying that his motive was generosity, and this entails that he gives the beggar sixpence in order to relieve the beggar's distress. If this too is covert egoism, the accusation altogether loses its sting. It is a tautology that all my desires, inclinations, wantings, likings, and enjoyments are mine; but it is a plain falsehood that what I desire, like, want or enjoy is necessarily my own pleasure or my own anything else.35

A virtuous individual may have a need to be generous, brave or otherwise virtuous, but when he acts virtuously, he does not act in order to satisfy his own interests or needs, but for the sake of the rightness and goodness of the act in question. Similarly, when he does good deeds for a friend, he does them for the friend's own sake, to satisfy the friend's own needs and interests, and not in order to satisfy a need of his own.

Our critic could offer a further criticism. He could point out that in certain passages, Aristotle seems to commit himself to the idea that the good man likes "to assign to himself" the "larger share of what is fine", "the greater good". Thus, far from making any sacrifices, the "good friend" always aims at taking what is best for himself. Any sacrifices he makes are only in order to get something of more fundamental value for himself, thus, they are not really sacrifices at all.

The good man is ready to lose money on condition that his friend shall get more; for the friend gets more, but he himself gains fineness (of character), so he assigns himself the greater good. He behaves in the same way too with regard to political honours and positions; all these he will freely give up to his friend because this is a fine and praiseworthy thing for him to do (1169a27-31) (my italics) and

He may even give up to his friend opportunities for doing fine actions and it may be a finer thing for him to become the cause of his friend's doing them than to have done them himself. Thus, we see that in the whole field of praiseworthy conduct, the good man assigns himself the larger share of what is fine. (1169a33-1169b1) (My italics)
In the first passage, Aristotle is talking about the sacrifices that the good man is prepared to make for his friend. He has just said that "the man of good character performs many actions for the sake of his friends", including dying for them, and, in these two passages, he goes on to enumerate some other sacrifices that the good man will make for his friends, and he mentions, in particular, wealth, status, political position and the opportunity for performing fine actions. Aristotle is enumerating these sacrifices precisely to make the point that the individual gains the noble for himself by being to a high degree self-sacrificing, and not ego-centred and selfish. An individual attains what is noblest and best by being prepared to make sacrifices and in not having selfish motives for friendship.

It is clear that statements such as "the good man assigns himself the larger share of what is fine" and "he assigns himself the greater good" leave open the question of motivation. It is possible that an individual may attempt to assign himself what is best. And of course, the criticism makes the assumption that it is just for such self-interested reasons that the good man acts - he aims to assign himself what is best. But, it is equally possible, and, indeed, more compatible with Aristotle's theory of character virtue that the motivation is unselfish - the man who makes sacrifices of wealth, status etc. for his friend's sake, in order that his friend gets more of these things, gains what is noblest and best, by having unselfish, not selfish motivation. Ultimately, he assigns himself what is best only by being unselfish.

We noted earlier that a character friend performs good deeds disinterestedly, for the friend's own sake, not for the sake of his own advantage or pleasure, however these may be construed. We also noted that, as a result of performing such deeds, the good man derives advantage for himself (he develops fineness of character). It is in this sense that the good man "assigns himself" what is fine and what is best for human beings. The same would be true of pleasure. The good man
enjoys performing good deeds, especially deeds that are intended to enhance the well-being of his friends. Thus, by the performance of such deeds, he also "assigns himself" pleasure.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. "In essentials the concept of philia remains (i.e. for Aristotle) as it was for Homer ... No affection is expressed for one's philoi ... When one finds someone philon, one feels an emotion of an entirely selfish kind, as in Homer, for an external agathon (good): this is the philesis which one may feel for wine". ADKINS, Arthur 'Friendship' and 'self-sufficiency' in Homer and Aristotle, in The Classical Journal, 13, 1963, p.36 and pp.40-41 (my italics).

2. Ibid., p.36.

3. Ibid., p.36. (My italics).


5. Ibid., p.537.

6. Ibid., p.537.


8. Ibid., p.52.


10. Ibid., p.627.

11. Ibid., p.627.

12. Ibid., p.627.

13. Ibid., pp.634-635.


15. Ibid., p.621.

16a. Ibid., pp.629-630.

16b. For an explanation of the word "moral" as used in this thesis, see footnote number 3 to Chapter 3.

18. Ibid., p.625.

Suppose it were the case that the well-wishing of virtue friendship was of a different kind from that which existed in the lesser friendships. Aristotle would not "be guilty of an inconsistency" in that it could be maintained that well-wishing (of some kind) exists in all three forms of friendship, but that well-wishing (of the kind associated with virtue friendship) is not a feature of the lesser friendships. Cooper considers the possibility that Aristotle may use "well-wishing" in a different sense (in a "reduced sense") when talking of the lesser friendships, but rejects it with, I think, successful arguments. COOPER, John M. *op. cit.*, p.632.

19. Ibid., pp.635-636 and 641.

20. Ibid., p.641.


22. Ibid., pp.639 and 636.

23. Ibid., pp.632-633.


25. Ibid., p.633.


27. Ibid., p.633.

28. Ibid., p.626 (my Ital.)

29. Ibid., pp.639-640.

30. Ibid., p.642.

31. Ibid., pp.642-643.

32. Ibid., p.637 footnote.

33. ASHMORE, Robert B. Friendship and the problem of egoism, in *Thomist, 41*(1), 1977, p.126.

34. EWING, A.C. *Ethics*, 1953, p.28.

CHAPTER 2

FRIENDSHIP, JUSTICE AND CHARACTER VIRTUE

2.1 Introduction: The Peripheral Role of Friendship?

In the last chapter, we saw that it is not possible to be certain whether or not Aristotle believes that there is some degree of unselfishness, some active concern and affection for the sake of the friend in the case of the lesser friendships. In contrast, we found no such uncertainty in the case of virtue friendships. We saw that arguments attempting to reduce the motivation of virtue friendship to ultimate egocentricity and selfishness were unfounded. Such friendships are typically motivated by altruism and absence of selfishness.

Virtue friendships, we noted, are formed in pursuit of a virtuous life; they are the kind of relationship in which the phronimos engages. Because such friendships are altruistic and unselfish, it would seem reasonable to argue that, in Aristotle's theory, the truly virtuous man, the phronimos, is not, as some critics have claimed, egocentric and selfish. But such a statement is open to challenge. A critic of Aristotle's theory may allow that, in the virtue of friendship, Aristotle does make room for some degree of unselfish and even altruistic motivation, yet he may argue that this is all besides the point and largely irrelevant. It does nothing to rescue the entire theory from charges of egocentricity and selfishness. After all, Aristotle's "virtuous" individual may be able and willing to act with a view to the well-being of a few, personally chosen, good friends, while not being able and willing to show any such goodwill to individuals outside his close circle. A person may be prepared to make sacrifices for his family and best friends but this hardly proves his general lack of selfishness. It rather proves that he has "limited altruism" or what Hume calls "limited benevolence". Aristotle may be concerned to articulate a vision of the well-lived life, and unselfish friendship may
indeed be an essential constituent of this well-lived life, yet he who is virtuous, he who lives such a life, should extend his unselfishness beyond his own close circle. The issue of friendship is, therefore, merely factitious or ephemeral. Friendship may be a virtue, but it is a minor and insignificant one. To find altruism and unselfishness in this peripheral virtue is quite insufficient to rescue the theory as a whole from allegations of selfishness and egocentricity.

Arguments and assumptions like these concerning the role of friendship in Aristotle's theory have in fact been used. Aristotle's discussion of friendship has even been dismissed as a separate treatise that somehow managed to get itself attached to his great work on ethics:

In Book 8 we are suddenly and with little explanation introduced to the subject of friendship which occupies this and the next book. These books stand in no vital relation to the rest of the work, and one is left with the suspicion that they may have been originally a separate treatise which faulty editing has included in the Ethics. ²

In order to rescue Aristotle's theory from the charge of pure selfishness, we need to show that there is a strong other-regarding tendency in one of his key and significant character virtues. To show that there is such a tendency in some minor and ephemeral virtue would not do very much to rescue the theory. Clearly, if Ross's point quoted above is true, that is, if the virtue of friendship is of no significance and stands in no vital relation to his theory, then this is all that we have succeeded in doing. We would have established that Aristotle allows that in one quite insignificant area in his life, that is, in his personal friendships, the good man will be prepared to act unselfishly by giving due consideration to his friend's interests. It is therefore important to look at the virtue of friendship in context. In this chapter we shall try to establish what role the virtue of friendship plays in Aristotle's ethical theory, whether, in particular, it has any relationship to virtue as such, and to any of the particular virtues such as that of justice. In short, we want to establish whether the virtue of friendship is central or peripheral to Aristotle's theory.
2.2 The Incompatibility of Friendship and Justice?

Aristotle argues that there is a strong relationship between friendship and justice. Certainly it is clear that both are "social virtues". Whereas it is possible to be temperate, brave or resourceful in the absence of other people, one cannot be just or a good friend in the absence of others. Lucas points out that "Robinson Crusoe had no opportunity of practising justice or injustice until Man Friday came on the scene". We could add that Robinson Crusoe had no opportunity for friendship until Man Friday came on the scene. As social virtues both friendship and justice require other people as a sine qua non.

However, the simple condition that two virtues require other people as a sine qua non is not enough to establish a strong link between them. Mercy and compassion also require other people as a sine qua non, but they do not seem to be vitally connected to justice. Indeed, they seem to be very different virtues.

Similarly, we would be inclined to separate justice and friendship very firmly, to put them into separate camps, and to do so on the following kind of grounds. Friendship differs from justice in that if I chose not to befriend you, you would have no cause for complaint, whereas if I were unjust to you, you would. My reasons for engaging in friendship are less coercive than those requiring me to be just. Friendship is based on first-personal reasons. If I choose not to engage in friendships, not to be friendly towards anybody, if considerations of friendship do not move me to action, no further argument is in place; whereas arguments of justice, in contrast, can be put into every person, second and third, as well as first, and urged unremittingly on me, however disinclined I am to heed them. "Justice", as Lucas says, "is what we can insist on". I can insist on being treated justly. But I cannot insist that another befriend me. Unwilling justice is still justice. I can fulfil my obligations of justice in a grudging way. It might be better if I do the same deeds gladly, but justice is
satisfied if I do them at all. In this way justice is a cold virtue and an external one. In contrast, friendship, like fraternity is an inward, warm virtue. Lucas says:

Justice is not fraternity because fraternity is a warm virtue concerned with fellow-feeling, whereas justice is a cold virtue which can be manifested without feeling ...^5

If I fulfil certain obligations of friendship but without the warm spirit or good will of friendship, it is no longer friendship. Unwilling friendship is not friendship, but unwilling justice is still justice.

With these ideas and distinctions in mind, let us turn to Aristotle's account of the relationship between friendship and justice.

In Aristotle's account, friendship and justice do not resemble each other merely because both are social virtues. There is a much more intimate relation between these two virtues. Aristotle argues:

Friendship and justice seem to be exhibited in the same sphere of conduct and between the same persons (1159b25-28)

And

It is natural that the claims of justice should increase with the intensity of friendship, since both involve the same persons and have an equal extension. (1160a7-8)

Why is it the case that justice and friendship should be exhibited between the same people? And why is it the case that the one virtue should be present to the extent that the other one is present so that the more intense the friendship the more intense is the claim of justice?^6

To answer these questions we must look briefly at Aristotle's account of justice. We have seen how he distinguishes between the separate classes of friendship. We must now investigate the different classes of justice with a view to establishing whether any of the classes of friendship cohere with any of the classes of justice.

Aristotle opens his discussion of justice by defining it as "that state of character which disposes (people) to perform just acts and behave in a just manner, and wish for what is just". (1129a7-10) He then distinguishes between two main classes of justice: (1) Complete
(or legal) justice and (2) Particular justice.

2.3 The Two Types of Justice

2.3.1 Complete Justice

Aristotle proceeds to identify complete justice with "legality" and, for this reason, complete or universal justice is also called legal justice. He says that the man who is lawless, grasping and unfair (unequal) is unjust, whereas the just man is law-abiding and fair. He concludes by saying that "just means lawful and fair; and unjust means both unlawful and unfair". (1129a32-34)

This identification of complete justice with law has led some philosophers to believe that complete justice is not an ethical concept at all. Thus Joachim assumes that Aristotle's legal justice was a description of Athenian legal structures and practices, and, in similar vein, Vinogradoff argues in his history of jurisprudence that Aristotle gave complete justice a narrow legalistic interpretation. Are their views correct? Or, is it the case that by "complete justice" and "law" Aristotle means something quite distinct from the modern concept of law with its narrow juridical sense?

We have seen that Aristotle opens his discussion of justice with a definition. Justice is "that state of character that disposes (people) to perform just acts, and behave in a just manner, and wish for what is just". Justice is thus a moral habit or disposition. It is a virtue. Harrison, challenging Joachim's narrow legalistic view, stresses this point. Justice is before all else a moral habit, and not a science or faculty, a crucial distinction that Aristotle makes.

It is also the case that Aristotle's concept of law is something much wider than mere positive law. Law, in this broad sense, is an expression of the ethos of the community and cannot be identified with its later restricted notion of legal enactment. Aristotle says that
the law commands men to practise the virtues of courage, temperance, gentleness and all the other virtues, and to refrain from acts of wickedness (1129b20-23). The law, as Barker points out, prescribes ethical conduct:

> The law enjoins courage, and continence and consideration. It speaks about every virtue and vice, commanding and forbidding. Its rules are laid down in political science, as the standard of what men should do, and what they should forbear to do. As the moral code of a community, law sets forth the end, the Final Good, which that community pursues. The content of the law being thus identified with that of morality, it follows that action in accordance with that content, or justice, is equivalent to action in accordance with the content of morality, or virtue.\(^{10}\)

Thus both law and complete justice are ethical concepts. It is in the concept of the "flourishing of the community" that Aristotle sees the link between the virtue of complete justice and law. The law aims at the good of the community. (1129b14-15) Similarly, "in one of its senses, the term 'just' is applied to anything that produces or preserves the happiness, or the component parts of the happiness, of the political community". (1129b17-19) The sense of justice that Aristotle has in mind, as he makes clear a few lines later, is complete justice. Acts of complete justice aim at the well-being of the community. Both law and complete justice promote the common welfare and advantage and, thereby, promote Eudaimonia in the society (1129b14-15).

After linking the concepts of complete justice and law, Aristotle analyses the relationship between complete justice and the other character virtues. Complete justice, he says, is **complete virtue** (1130a10). It is thus the totality of virtue, and not a part of it. He then adds the crucial qualifying phrase: "but not absolutely, but (only) in relation to others". (1129b26). It is this "relationship to others", this dimension of plurality that distinguishes complete justice from all the other character virtues. Complete justice is not merely a quantitative aggregate of all possible virtues; there is an important qualitative difference involved. Complete justice is complete virtue not with respect to an agent's acts towards himself, but with respect to
those towards others. It has an essentially other-regarding aspect. It is for this reason that Aristotle comments that a man cannot commit injustice against himself in the strict sense. He cannot do so because the significant dimension of relationship to others would be lacking. We may thus say of the virtuous man, that qua doing the right thing, virtue is present, but qua doing the right thing in relation to others, complete justice is present.

It would appear that by arguing that virtue can become complete justice only when it is exercised in relation to others, Aristotle is attributing an important other-regarding or altruistic quality to complete justice. But some critics may challenge this interpretation. They may argue that the condition of "in relation to others" does nothing to prove that Aristotle's ideal man, the completely just man, is not selfish and self-regarding. Aristotle has merely offered a rationally thought-out, sensible way, of garnering the good things of life simply because short-term, unenlightened selfishness is often self-defeating. Because he sees that the "direct" method of gaining increase for oneself does not succeed, he proposes an "indirect" way of profiting the self by first profiting someone else in an other-directed act of justice.

Such an interpretation is not supported by what Aristotle says about complete justice. He writes that the individual who practises the virtue of complete justice is virtuous in the "fullest" sense (1129b31) for he acts with a view to the good of others and not for his own good alone. He notes that "there are plenty of people who can behave virtuously in their own affairs, but who are incapable of doing so in relation to someone else". (1129b32-1130a1) But the "best person is not the one who exercises his virtue towards himself but the one who exercises it towards another, because this is a difficult task". (1130a8-11) It could, of course, be suggested that this individual is "best" because he is selfish in an enlightened way, and that it is "more
difficult" to be self-seeking in this way than to pursue one's own good directly. But this is not what Aristotle is saying. He is making a straightforward distinction between the individual who can satisfy his own interests and needs by practising virtues that aim at his own good, and the individual who can look beyond his own needs to the interests and cares of others, and can exercise virtue for their good. It is easy to be selfish and self-regarding, but it is "difficult" to be selfless and altruistic for there is always a temptation to seek one's own good in preference to the good of others. "Justice", he says, "secures advantage for another person"; it is for "someone else's good". (1130a3-5)

In proposing the virtue of justice as the virtue which is most complete or perfect precisely because it is other-directed, Aristotle is recognising that an individual can increase his own worth only by going outside himself. It is from the outside that qualities of goodness can enter the individual. But, as explained in chapter one, this is not the same as saying that an individual looks outside himself in order to profit himself or attain what is best. The individual who does the latter is still concerned exclusively with his own advantage.

2.3.2 Particular Justice

Justice in this sense is but one part of the multitude of virtues and, as such, is only a part of complete justice. It is that part of it which is especially concerned with "matters of honour, material goods and personal security or safety". It thus has a narrower scope than complete justice. (1130a32-1130b5)

Particular justice may itself be distinguished into types. On the one hand, there is distributive justice which is found in the "distribution of honour, wealth, and other divisible assets of the community which may be allotted among its members" (1130b31-34) while, on the other hand, there is that type of particular justice which "has
a rectifying function in private transactions". (1130b30-1131a1) The essential feature of both these kinds of particular justice is fairness or equality, although what is meant by these terms is different in the two cases.

2.3.2.1 Distributive Justice

In the case of distributive justice, the equality in question is that provided by what Aristotle calls a "geometric proportion". To express the proportional equality of distributive justice at least four terms are needed: two persons for whom it is just and two shares which are just. Proportional equality is a merit-determined relationship between persons and the goods distributed. This is to say that the just distribution of the divisible assets of the community is that in which what is distributed is proportional to the persons involved. The ratio between the shares will be the same as the ratio between the persons. Thus if A and B are equal their shares will be equal, but if either A or B is superior (inferior) to the other, his share will be greater (less) and in the same ratio as the difference between them. (1131a20-29)

Thus, for Aristotle, the equal in the case of distributive justice is not an egalitarian concept but rather a proportional one based upon the differences between the individuals in question.

In order to offer a solution to the problem of merit as the basis of distributive justice, Aristotle gives as an example the distribution of flutes. (1282b32-1283a2) If a number of flute-players are equally skilled in the art, no advantage should be given to those who are better born, better looking or wealthier than the others who lack such advantages. The reason is that these advantages do not make them better flute-players. Thus, he concludes, "it is the superior performers who ought to be given the superior instruments". Distributive justice consists in giving to each man what is fitting or appropriate in the circumstances. Everyone should get what he deserves. (1131a25 and 1281b32)
2.3.2.2 Corrective or Rectifying Justice

Aristotle defines corrective justice as that particular justice which "plays a rectifying part in transactions between man and man". These transactions take place within the private sphere and between citizens. Whereas distributive justice is concerned with the distribution of common goods to individuals, for such justice is a relationship between the community and the individual, corrective justice concerns the transactions between individuals within the community. But the two forms of particular justice do not differ only in this respect. They also differ in what is meant by fairness or equality. As distributive justice is concerned with the individuating features of the individual, and awards him according to his degree of relevant excellence, it is best expressed as a "geometrical, proportional equality or fairness". In the case of corrective justice, on the other hand, the equality or fairness in question is best expressed by an "arithmetic proportion". Again this is not an egalitarian concept (there is no claim that everyone must be given exactly the same thing) but neither is it the same as a geometric proportion. If two people enter into a transaction, their share should be equal both before and after the transaction. Thus, if I steal from you, the amount stolen must be returned so that we have the same amount we started with (perhaps you should also get some additional compensation for the inconvenience you suffered) whereas if I buy some olives from you, I must pay you exactly what they are worth, so that there is neither loss nor gain in our transaction. In the case of corrective justice, the positions of the persons involved relative to each other is not considered. Each man has a right to the amount of goods he started with, and this element alone is taken into account. The point is that corrective justice considers each man as a member of the human species, and from this vantage point every man is arithmetically equal to every other without difference. The character of the agents involved or their particular
skills and capacities do not influence the amount which is to be transferred from one agent to the other.

In Aristotle's account, then, there are two kinds of equality or fairness: geometrical and arithmetical. In arithmetical equality or fairness, not two ratios but two amounts are equal; it is a question of subtraction and addition, and not of division. He says "the equal is a mean by way of arithmetical proportion between the greater and the less". If the two equal persons are A and B, and C is the common amount of gain for A through the loss of the same inflicted on B by A, then equality between A and B is restored by the subtraction of C from A and by its simultaneous addition to B.

Aristotle divides corrective justice into voluntary and involuntary transactions. (1131a1-2) Lee points out that this distinction seems to correspond to that between contract and tort in English law, or to that between obligationes ex contractu and ex delicto in Roman law. Voluntary transactions are those in which the actions of the persons involved are voluntary, for example, selling, lending, leasing, or depositing, whereas, in involuntary transactions, at least one of the persons involved has been the involuntary victim of some kind of behaviour such as theft, poisoning or defamation.

It would appear, as Burnet and Vinogradoff point out, that the arithmetical equality or fairness of corrective justice - that is, seeking adjustment by transferring gain to the side of loss to compensate for material inequalities - could be used only in the case of voluntary transactions, but not in the case of involuntary transactions since, in the latter case, the aggrieved party suffers not only material damage, but also dishonour. It is undeniable that Aristotle's treatment of involuntary transactions as a species of corrective justice which rectifies inequalities on a merely arithmetical basis is rather puzzling. Trude offers an ingenious solution to this problem. He argues that Aristotle not only distinguishes between private and public justice, but
also between civil and penal justice. Corrective justice, he argues, is not only private - in contradistinction to public - but also civil - in contradistinction to penal - justice. Penal justice functions according to the principle of geometric proportion, punishing according to the individual deserts of the criminal, over and above material restitution: it gives retribution according to the measure of guilt. In contrast, corrective justice aims not at the rectification of dishonour, but is concerned only with the rectification of material wrongs, apart from punishment. This material, arithmetical equality or fairness demands that if a bed is stolen, a bed be returned, apart from the dishonour suffered. The aggrieved party is to be compensated for the material loss (where this is possible); further compensation for humiliation endured does not fall within the domain of corrective justice. Corrective justice supplies the civil effects of criminal law, while Aristotle leaves its penal effects to reciprocal justice.

2.3.2.3 Reciprocal Justice

Aristotle's discussion of reciprocal justice, as Hardie points out, has caused a great deal of confusion owing to the "unsuccessful attempts of certain commentators to locate it within one or other of Aristotle's two main divisions of particular justice". Commentators, in other words, are divided into two camps: those who maintain that Aristotle presents three distinct kinds of particular justice, and those who think that he has only two species of it: distributive and corrective, reciprocal justice not being a separate kind. The reason for this divergence of opinion is rooted in the fact that Aristotle is naturally read as saying that particular justice is of two kinds, distributive and corrective (1130b31-1131a1). However, he also states clearly that "reciprocity does not coincide either with distributive or corrective justice - although people want to identify it with the latter when they quote the rule of Rhadamanthus ... for in many cases reciprocity is at variance with corrective justice" (1130b31-1131a1). Aristotle thus
begins his short digression on reciprocal justice with a warning that
ccontradicts his earlier remark, and his subsequent discussion shows that
the earlier remark needs qualification.

It is clear that the various kinds of justice have their own dis-
tinctive kinds of equality or fairness. To each kind of equality or
fairness, there is a corresponding kind of justice. In other words,
there are exactly as many kinds of justice as there are of equality or
fairness. Aristotle lists geometric fairness (proportion) for distribu-
tive justice, arithmetical fairness (proportion) for corrective justice,
and since he presents a third kind of fairness, reciprocal fairness
(proportion), this would, as Jolif and Gauthier, and Ritchie point out,
positively argue for a distinct type of particular justice which, although
unnamed by Aristotle, could be called "reciprocal justice". Ritchie
writes:

We have three distinct mathematical formulae: (1) direct
geometrical proportion (2) arithmetical proportion - or,
more properly, the finding of the arithmetical mean, and
(3) reciprocal proportion; and we may reasonably expect
to find a separate division of justice corresponding to
each.

This reciprocal proportion is symbolised mathematically in the same way
by Jolif and Gauthier, Heath and Ross. Ross writes "'Reciprocal
proportion' involves simply a re-arrangement of the terms of a geometric
proportion. If A:B = C:D, A and B are said to be in a geometric proportion
to C and D, and A, D in reciprocal proportion to B and C". Whereas
arithmetical equality or fairness in justice is the mathematical
expression of the specific numerical equality of all men, precisely as
members of the human species, reciprocal equality or fairness, like
geometric equality or fairness, is based upon the individuating merits
(or demerits) of persons.

It appears, further, that there are two distinct kinds of reciprocal
justice. (Aristotle does not explicitly divide reciprocal justice into
two kinds, but, as he uses reciprocal proportion for establishing justice
in meting out punishment and in exchanging goods, this division is
implied by him). We shall look at penal (retaliatory) justice and commercial justice in turn.

Trude argues, as we have seen, that penal justice is to be conceived of as complementary to corrective justice. While corrective justice seeks to rectify material damage (if any) inflicted by the commission of a crime, penal justice seeks to make good the wrong done to the aggrieved party in the form of punishment over and above the arithmetical equalisation of unjust loss and gain. Thus, the equalisation of material wrongs in involuntary transactions (of corrective justice) is effected through arithmetical equality or fairness, but the dishonour is compensated for by the restoration of equilibrium according to the reciprocal proportion of penal justice. The civil effects of material restitution are supplemented by the penal effects of punishment.

The clearest statement of reciprocal proportion in penal justice is to be found in NE Book 5 chapter 5. Aristotle writes:

For example, if an official strikes someone, it is wrong for him to be struck in return; and if someone strikes an official it is right for him not only to be struck in return but to be punished as well. Again it makes a great difference whether the act was voluntary or involuntary (1132b28-31).

The simple arithmetical fairness or equality of corrective justice is inadequate to restore equilibrium. The principle of reciprocal proportion must be used and, according to its correct application, account must be taken of the positions of the persons involved.

The second kind of reciprocal justice is "commercial justice". Aristotle expressly says that in associations for the exchange of services this sort of justice (reciprocal justice) which holds men together is based upon reciprocal proportion and not upon arithmetical proportion or equality (1132b21-23). There is disagreement among commentators on the basic point of the worth of individuals involved in commercial exchange. The reason for this is that in a commercial exchange of goods, it would appear that there is only a question of maintaining arithmetical
proportion or equality. Thus, it is not immediately clear what sense it makes to say $A:B = C:D$. $A$ and $B$, as the humans involved, do not seem to belong in the equation in the same sense in which they belong in an equation representing either distributive or penal justice. Distributive justice is a function of the merit of the people who are its beneficiaries, and penal justice is a function of the demerits of certain categories of people such as aggressors, but it seems that the reciprocity in commercial exchange has nothing to do with the people, but only with the products they wish to exchange. But Aristotle explicitly says at 1133a33-b1 that "reciprocity will be attained when the terms have been equalised, and when, as a result, the product of the shoemaker is to the product of the farmer as the farmer is to the shoemaker".

The most plausible explanation is that the difference in the economic value of the products $D$ and $C$ is the direct result of the difference in the economic value of the producing artisans, but not vice-versa. The kind of producer determines the kind of product produced, both in quality and quantity. The exchange of goods in commercial justice comes about only because producers are different in terms of different skills. Through these different skills, or economic values of the producers, different products are created, whose market value is a reflection of the economic worth of the producers. This difference in the economic value of producers and their products leads to the commercial exchange of goods and services.

Aristotle notes that people with different skills, not two doctors, but a doctor and a farmer, would be involved in commercial exchange. In economic value or skill, they are not equal and must be equated before the necessary exchange can take place between them (1133a17-18). (If two people with identical skills and products were to engage in trading the same kinds of products among themselves, they presumably would have no difficulty in relying upon arithmetical proportion.) Among different producers and their products, Aristotle lists such pairs as a farmer and
a shoemaker trading shoes for food (1133a33-35, 1133b5-6) and a weaver and a shoemaker exchanging their products. He also gives the case of trading a house for beds, presumably between a builder and a carpenter (1133b23-25).

2.4 Conclusion: The Two Types of Justice

We must complete this brief account of the types of justice by pinpointing the similarities and differences between complete and particular justice. We may begin by quoting Aristotle:

It is manifest that there is another sort of injustice apart from injustice as a whole (complete injustice), the first being a part of the latter. It is called by the same name because its definition falls in the same genus, both sorts of injustice being exhibited in a man's relationship with others; but whereas injustice in the particular sense is concerned with honour or money or safety - or whatever term we may employ to include all these things - its motive being the pleasure that arises from gain, injustice in the general sense (i.e. complete injustice) is concerned with all the things with which the good man is concerned. (1130a34-1130b5)

In order to shed light on the reverse side of this coin, Aristotle adds: "It is clear, then, that there is more than one kind of justice, and that the term 'justice' has another meaning besides virtue as a whole" (1130b5-8). In other words, what is the case in respect of the relationship and nature of injustice, in general (i.e. complete injustice) and in particular, holds also for justice in general and in particular, but in reverse. The distinguishing characteristic of justice, both as general and particular is identified as its "other-relatedness". It is this feature which identifies both as justice, that links them together, and at the same time distinguishes them from the other virtues. But there is a difference in the extent of this other-relatedness which distinguishes the two sorts of justice from each other: complete justice takes a global view of all the things that belong to the good life of the community in general, whereas particular justice deals with particular goods in rendering each individual that which is his due.
In particular justice, the scope of the other-relatedness is limited to certain kinds of goods - "material goods" such as wealth, property, honours and positions. In contrast, in complete justice, the scope of the other-relatedness is not limited to these kinds of goods alone. The individual who plans a military campaign and fights bravely throughout acts in accordance with the virtue of complete justice, but his completely just conduct is aimed not at the material well-being of the community, but at its autonomy and its honour. Of course, as complete justice "is concerned with all the things with which the good man is concerned" it will include material benefits to the community (or part of it) as well. Thus, the individual who makes a donation to a charitable organisation also performs an act of complete justice.

We have seen that Aristotle emphasises the principle of "proportion" or "due" in his discussion of particular justice, but that in his discussion of complete justice he emphasises the principle of "relationship to others". We have already seen what "proportion" or "due" means in the various kinds of particular justice. The key element appears to be that of fair and equitable treatment. But when we attempt to apply "due" or "proportion" to complete justice, we find that it reduces to an almost metaphorical sense. Indeed, it seems odd to talk about "due" or "proportion" at all, for what is "due" to the community at large in the case of complete justice seems to be a whole attitude expressive of readiness on the part of the individual to respond in the most positive and whole-hearted way to the needs of the community. Thus, the principle of "due" or "proportion" has a stronger and more meaningful application in the case of particular justice. When we turn to the principle of the "other", we find the reverse to be true. The sense of "other" is much stronger in the case of complete justice. The individual who acts with a view to the well-being of the community, and who is prepared to undergo great personal loss to achieve this end is considering the "other" in the fullest way possible. Of course, the individual who desires to
treat another fairly and equitably, and, therefore, pays back the money he has borrowed from him or returns to him something of commensurate value for a service or good received does consider the other's good too, but the emphasis is more upon not leaving the other worse off, not doing him down, rather than expressly benefiting him or promoting his well-being. Further, such fair and equitable action is not generally associated with great personal sacrifice.

It is clear that an "attitude expressive of readiness to respond positively and whole-heartedly to the needs of the community" and acting to "benefit the community" are much more altruistic intentions and motivations than giving others "their due", what one "owes" them, or not leaving them "worse off". The former requires a much more positive spirit of goodwill.

2.5 The Relation Between Justice and Friendship

Now that we have investigated briefly the various types of justice in Aristotle's theory, we can return to the main topic which is the relationship between justice and friendship. We noted that Aristotle asserted a very close relationship between the two virtues and claimed that the two virtues were exhibited in the same sphere of conduct and between the same persons, and that it was natural that the claims of justice should increase with the intensity of the friendship.

Friendship and justice seem to be exhibited in the same sphere of conduct and between the same persons; because in every community there is supposed to be some kind of justice and also some friendly feeling ... The proverb "Friends have all things in common" is quite right because friendship is based on community. Brothers and close comrades hold all their possessions in common, and all friends share specified things to a greater or less extent, because friendships too differ in degree. The claims of justice also differ. The duties of parents to children are not the same as those of brothers to one another, nor are the duties the same for comrades as for fellow-citizens. Hence the wrongs committed against these several types of friend differ too; they are aggravated in proportion to the degree of intimacy. For example, it is more serious to defraud a
comrade than a fellow-citizen, and to refuse help to a brother than a stranger, and to strike your father than anybody else. It is natural that the claims of justice should increase with the intensity of the friendship, since both involve the same persons and have an equal extension.

(1159b25-1160a8)

We must first clarify which kind of justice and which kind of friendship Aristotle has in mind. In respect of justice, it is surely clear that Aristotle is not discussing particular justice in any of its forms. Let us take distributive justice first as it seems very clear that he cannot be discussing this form of particular justice.

2.5.1 Particular Justice and Friendship: The Problem of Bias

We saw that distributive justice has as its subject matter the just distribution among the members of the community of those benefits (and burdens) that are assignable and privative (exclusive) in nature. No issue of distributive justice can arise over non-assignable goods like truth, or over non-privative (non-exclusive) ones like happiness, health and knowledge, for if A is healthy, this does not prevent B's being healthy, and if C is happy, he can invite D to share his happiness, so that his own happiness is not diminished thereby, but may actually be enhanced. But neither can an issue of distributive justice arise over those kinds of goods that are so abundant that every man can have all that he could ever desire. No issue of distributive justice, therefore, arises over, for example, the air we breathe. In normal conditions, if A takes more air than usual, he does not leave B and C short, and he does not thereby infringe their rights or damage their interests. The goods that are at issue in distributive justice are typically assignable, transferable, privative, and in short supply, so that if I have more, you or somebody else must have less, and it makes sense to maintain that I should give you some of mine, or vice versa. If such goods are to be assigned justly, they must be assigned according to known and public criteria. Aristotle suggests, as we saw,
a merit-determined relationship between persons and the goods distributed. If A and B are equal, their shares will be equal, but if either A or B is superior (inferior) to the other, his share will be greater (less), and in the same ratio as the difference between them. Aristotle's example is that of the flute-players. Flutes must be distributed according to merit or excellence in flute-playing. In more modern terms, we could say that scholarships in a musical academy should be awarded to those with the highest musical or performing abilities. They should not be awarded on the grounds of irrelevant criteria, for example, because the applicant is wealthy, good-looking or the best friend of the principal of the academy. This is the crucial point. If the absolute basis of distribution is merit or excellence, it cannot also be philia or friendship. If an award is made on the grounds of merit or excellence, it cannot also be true that it is made on the grounds of friendship. It could, of course, be the case that the finest performer is also the principal's best friend, but the basis of the award, if it is a just one, would be merit not friendship. To make an award, not on the grounds of merit, but because the applicant is a best friend or relative is nepotism and a paradigm case of injustice. Aristotle clearly sees this for he says: "it is the superior performers who ought to be given superior instruments". The point is that the claims of distributive justice cannot increase with the intensity of the friendship. A person endowed with the power to distribute the divisible assets of the community whether this be medals, ships, flutes, or anything else, cannot favour his friends and push their claims forward. In sum, the intensity of the friendship is irrelevant on Aristotle's own criteria, and it would contradict merit as the absolute ground of distribution.

I think that a similar argument could be proposed in respect of corrective justice. Again such justice cannot increase with the intensity of the friendship. We saw that, if two people enter into a
transaction, their shares should be equal both before and after the transaction. If I buy some olives from you, I must pay you exactly what they are worth so that there is neither gain nor loss in our transaction. Similarly, if I steal from you, the amount stolen must be returned so that we both have the same amount that we started with. We also saw that the positions of the persons relative to each other is not considered, but each man has a right to the amount of goods he started with, and this element alone is taken into account. The character, and the special abilities of the parties are irrelevant. If this is so, the fact of friendship can make no difference. Similarly, the intensity of the friendship can make no difference. If A and B enter into a sales transaction in which A buys some olives from B, A must pay B what they are worth so that there is neither gain nor loss on either side. A must do this whether B is his best friend or a person scarcely known to him. In sum, the intensity of the friendship is irrelevant in corrective justice.

The same is true of penal justice. The claims of friendship are completely irrelevant to this kind of public and criminal justice. The judge who is called upon to try such cases can no more reduce or waive the penalty because the man who committed the assault is his close friend than he can make the penalty harsher because the man who committed the assault is somebody he personally dislikes. If penalties are to be measured according to reciprocal proportion, they cannot also be measured according to the claims of friendship. The intensity of the friendship is irrelevant on Aristotle's own criteria, and would contradict reciprocal proportion as the absolute ground of this kind of justice. The idea that like penalties should be meted out for like crimes was as familiar to the Greeks as it is to us. "It is just", Isocrates writes, "that those who attempt to commit the same crimes should pay the same penalty".25

It is unlikely that it is particular justice in any of its forms
that Aristotle has in mind when he claims that there is an intimate relationship between justice and friendship. In all the forms of particular justice, the criteria used are impersonal and disinterested. We cannot show favour to our friends and even greater favour to our closest friends. In our friendships we may be partial and choose our own criteria, explaining to nobody else the grounds of our choice. In justice we must be impartial and choose according to impersonal and known criteria - according to geometric proportion in the case of distributive justice, according to arithmetical proportion in the case of corrective justice, and according to reciprocal proportion in the case of penal and commercial justice.

2.5.2 Complete Justice and Friendship: The Problem of Bias Eliminated

If we rule out the various forms of particular justice, we are left with complete justice. There is much evidence to suggest that this is the type of justice that Aristotle had in mind. In discussing the justice and friendship that a King can show his subjects, he says:

That of a King for his subjects consists in outstanding beneficence; because he does good to his subjects (assuming that, being good himself, he is concerned to promote their welfare, like a shepherd caring for his flock - which is why Homer called Agamemnon 'shepherd of the people').

Aristotle is suggesting that a good king can do good to his subjects in a variety of ways. "Outstanding beneficence" and the promotion of well-being is something much greater than distributive and corrective justice (or both of these forms of particular justice combined). A good king would certainly be just in his transactions and distribute honours fairly, but to be outstandingly beneficent and to promote the welfare of his subjects, he would have to do much more than that. He may have to show great bravery, and great generosity as well and perhaps more than that. In short, the good king would have to practise virtue (in its entirety) in relation to others (his subjects) - and
this, of course, is the virtue of complete justice. The kind of justice that the good king practises in relation to his subjects is not merely particular justice; it is complete justice. The kind of justice Aristotle is discussing when he says that friendship and justice are related to each other is complete justice. That this is so may be seen from other comments Aristotle makes. Again, discussing the relationship of the two virtues, he says "It is more serious to refuse help to a comrade than to a fellow-citizen". "Help" seems to be more a component of complete justice than it does a component of particular justice. For to give a person help whether this be to help them financially by an act of generosity, or to help them in another way, for example, by an act of bravery, is something that exceeds what is required by particular justice whose content we have already investigated.

If it is complete justice, and not particular justice, the problem of bias disappears. We saw that it did not make sense to argue that the claims of justice should increase with the intensity of the friendship in the case of particular justice as this would be inconsistent with the geometric proportion that is supposed to hold in the case of distributive justice, with the arithmetic proportion that is supposed to hold in the case of corrective justice, and with the reciprocal proportion that is supposed to hold in the case of reciprocal justice. With complete justice the case is very different. Whereas a man must be just (in the sense of particular justice) to all, his friends and strangers alike, there is no reason why he should not be especially virtuous to those who are his family or his close friends. Why indeed should he not be especially brave in defence of, or especially generous towards, those for whom he has special affection? Every man can insist that he be given that which he is owed - for example, payment for a service agreed upon - but great bravery or great generosity, for example, cannot be insisted upon for they are over and above what one man owes another. They are, therefore, freely given. It is for the agent himself to decide
towards whom such virtuous deeds be directed. It is surely clear that it is right to do more of such deeds for those for whom one has great affection than for those whom one scarcely knows.

This view that it is complete justice and not particular justice that is under discussion may, of course, be questioned for the following reason. Aristotle says:

> For example, it is more serious to defraud a comrade than a fellow citizen, and to refuse help to a brother than to a stranger, and to strike your father than anybody else. (1160a4-8)

Whereas help may fall outside the scope of particular justice, fraud and assault clearly fall within it, fraud being covered by corrective justice, and assault by both reciprocal and corrective justice. It may surely then be argued that it is particular justice that is under discussion, or, possibly, complete justice and particular justice together. We saw that, for Aristotle, complete justice is the practice of complete virtue in relation to one's fellow men. As such, it includes all the particular virtues and, thus, includes particular justice. One thus commits an act of (corrective) injustice whether one defrauds a comrade or fellow citizen, and one commits an act of (reciprocal and corrective) injustice whether one assaults one's father or a stranger. From the point of view of corrective and reciprocal justice, these wrongs must be remedied by the relevant proportions in all cases; it does not depend upon whether the wrong was done to a friend or stranger. However, from the point of view of complete justice, the case is different. Here we are expected to be more virtuous to those for whom we have the most affection, or whom we know best. Defrauding a friend thus remains an act of corrective injustice, and assaulting one's father remains an act of corrective and reciprocal injustice, but because we have special duties to those who are our family and friends, and should have greater affection for them, we are adding other wrongs to the wrong of particular injustice. In addition we are being ungrateful and undutiful (or, completely unjust). Aristotle is not saying that it does not matter
very much if you defraud or strike somebody little known to you, but it matters a lot if the person is well known to you, or that it is permissible to waive the geometric proportion, reciprocal proportion or arithmetical proportion rules when one's family or friends are involved. This would raise the problem of bias that we examined before.

If Aristotle means that we should be more virtuous or completely just towards those for whom we have special affection or goodwill, sense can be made of his statement that "the claims of justice should increase with the intensity of the friendship". The demands of complete justice (but not particular justice) increase and decrease according to the quality (the degree, intensity) of the friendship. We may, therefore, say that there is a qualitative relation between friendship and (complete) justice.

2.5.3 The Complementarity in Society of (Complete) Justice and Virtue Friendship

We have just seen that there is an important qualitative relation between justice and friendship in Aristotle's theory. I think that it is in fact possible to establish another strong link between these two virtues, namely that they always co-exist in a community, and, moreover, increase and decrease to the same extent.

We know that for Aristotle virtue consists in doing what is right for the sake of the good. Complete justice is very similar to it; complete justice consists in doing what is right (in relation to others) for the sake of the good. When a man does what is right, he does the right deed, to the right people, in the right circumstances. When a man acts for the sake of the good, he acts for the sake of the inherent goodness of the action; he does not perform the action because of the pleasure or utility he can derive from it. Of the three goals possible - the useful, the pleasant, and the good - the virtuous man and the completely just man choose only the third. I think that it would be possible to establish that (complete) justice increases with that type
of friendship that Aristotle calls virtue friendship, and that it does so for the following reason.

The greater the incidence of complete justice (virtuous activity in relation to others) that is practised in the society, the greater will be the incidence of good men in that society, (for it is only good men who can be completely just and virtuous). Now good men love the good, but the good that they love is not some Platonic Form of the Good; the good man in his virtuous life is the personification of human good and it is for this reason that good men have affection for each other. Virtue friendship is found among men who feel affection for each other qua good men, as or to the extent that they are good. Thus, the more complete justice there is to be found in the society, the greater will be the incidence of good men, and hence the greater will be the incidence of virtue friendships. The point is that the good man (and the completely just man) chooses what is essential to life and ignores what is incidental to it. Not only does he choose the goal that is essential (the good) and ignores goals that are incidental (the useful and the pleasant), but he also chooses what is essential to a human being (a good character) and ignores what is accidental or irrelevant (wealth, special skills). He chooses both what is essential to life and what is essential to a person. He chooses a goal that is good and essential and he forms friendships that are based on what is good and essential. Thus, where there is a high incidence of complete justice in society, it will be matched by a high incidence of virtue friendships. The two phenomena co-exist, and increase together. Conversely, where there is little complete justice, there will be few virtue friendships.

The situation is, of course, very different in the case of the two "lesser friendships". It is not the case that pleasure and utility friendships increase and decrease in the same proportion as the extent of complete justice in society. It would be fair to say that the
opposite is the case; that the greater the incidence of these forms of friendship in a society, the less the incidence of complete justice in a society, and that this is so for the following reason. We noted before that virtue consists in doing what is right for the sake of the good, and that complete justice consists in doing what is right (in relation to others) for the sake of the good. The motive is of crucial importance. If an action is not done for the sake of the good, neither virtue nor complete justice will be present. There are, for Aristotle, only three possible goals. If we rule out the good, we are left with the useful and the pleasant. Where the useful or the pleasant replace the good as the motive for action, virtue and complete justice will be absent. But where these other goals prevail, so also will the lesser types of friendship which are grounded upon them. Thus, it is fair to say that a high prevalence of "incidental goals" that is, the goals of utility and pleasure, will correlate with a high prevalence of lesser friendships, (simply because "lesser" incidental friendship is based on such incidental goals). To the degree that these incidental goals and friendships are present, complete justice will be absent. Conversely, a high prevalence of people pursuing the essential goal, that is, the goal of the good, will correlate with a high prevalence of virtue friendships, (simply because virtue or essential friendship is grounded on such an essential goal). To the extent that this essential goal and friendship is present in a society, complete justice will also be present.

It is clear why complete justice and friendship have this intimate relation to each other. An act of supreme bravery, or great generosity for a friend's sake is an act of friendship. However, at the same time, that act is also an act of complete justice for it is an act of virtue (doing what is right) with reference to another (the friend) for the sake of the good (the inherent goodness of the act). It is clear how an act of friendship and of (complete) justice can be found among the.
same people, and can exist in the same sphere of conduct. The virtuous act itself can be described as one of complete justice or as one of virtue friendship. It is the same act described from different aspects or viewpoints.

One problem that results from the analysis we have given thus far is that it makes complete justice highly restrictive. It seems to limit the application of acts of complete justice to close friends and family, and yet we should expect that a really virtuous man would do good to more people than just a few close friends and relations. Even allowing for the fact that a Greek City State was smaller and more personal than a modern city, and that the virtuous man would know more people in it, the problem still remains for Aristotle places limits on the number of virtue friendships an individual may have. "Probably this would be the largest number with whom one can be on intimate terms" (1171a1-3). "Indeed it would seem to be impossible to be the devoted friend of many", (1171a10) and "it is not possible to have many friends whom we love for their own sake and for their goodness" (1171a 19-22). Complete justice coheres with virtue friendship, but the virtuous man should surely do good deeds to a wider circle than his closest friends. As we noted at the beginning of the chapter, if a person is prepared to make sacrifices for his family and friends, this does not prove his general lack of selfishness. It merely proves that he has "limited altruism" or "limited benevolence". Is it the case, then, that the truly virtuous man, the phronimos, is prepared to extend his virtuous activity to those outside his close circle?

Aristotle does make it quite clear that a virtuous individual should display his virtue towards those who are outside his close circle. He writes:

The actions that we ought to do or not to do have been divided into two classes as affecting either the whole community or some one of its members. From this point of view, we can act justly or unjustly in either of two ways: towards one definite person or towards the community. (Rhetoric 1373b20-4)
The avoidance of military service is Aristotle's example of an action that is unjust towards the community at large. Conversely, it is clear that, in fighting willingly for the community, an individual is displaying the virtue of justice towards the community. The individual who is willing to fight, knowing that he might be sacrificing his own life if killed, or his well-being if injured, displays an other-regarding attitude and motivation that is an essential characteristic of complete justice.

The virtue of complete justice is, therefore, intimately related to the good of the community too. In Book 8 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle extends the relationship of complete justice and community to include friendship too:

Friendship and justice seem to be exhibited in the same sphere of conduct and between the same persons; because in every community there is supposed to be some kind of justice and also some friendly feeling. (1159b25-27)

This "friendly feeling" Aristotle elsewhere describes as "concord" (1167a21) and he notes that "concord is evidently friendship between the citizens of a state" (1167b2-3). A good community should, therefore, show evidence of both justice and this "friendly feeling" which is "concord" or "civic friendship". Such concord or civic friendship is promoted and fostered by rulers and law-makers for it is the bond that holds the community together (1155a23-25).

We noted earlier that friendship has certain logical features: reciprocity, awareness, and goodwill. Friendship is consciously reciprocated goodwill. It does seem reasonable to argue that civic friendship (or concord) will be present to the same extent as complete justice. The more virtuous activity in relation to other persons that is practised in the community, the more consciously reciprocated goodwill there should be. Acts of courage or generosity done by citizens to each other would generate goodwill and concord in a society. The more virtue that is practised on fellow-citizens, the more mutual goodwill there will be among those citizens. If a private citizen, a man who
is very brave, jumps into a fast-flowing river to rescue a fellow-citizen's child, such goodwill will be generated. Equally, if a wealthy man gives generously to a charitable organisation which helps the dependants of those killed in battle, such an act will also arouse goodwill in the community. The more virtuous activity that is practised on fellow-citizens, the more mutual goodwill there will be among those citizens. Aristotle notes: "A man who has received a benefit does indeed return goodwill for what has been done to him, and this is right and proper", (1167a14) and "in general, goodwill is roused by some merit and goodness" (1167a18-19).

Conversely, the less complete justice that is practised on fellow-citizens, the less reason there is for mutual goodwill. If the citizens of a state never do good to each other, goodwill would have no place. Equally, if the citizens of a state practise good deeds on one another but do so on account of the pleasant or useful, goodwill is again out of place. Thus, if a man makes a large donation to a charitable organisation with a view to enhancing his reputation and thereby gaining political office, no goodwill is deserved. Similarly, if he makes this large donation because he derives pleasure from being thought of as a great benefactor, again no goodwill is deserved. The deed is done for the sake of pleasure, and not for the sake of the good. Complete justice is absent and so also is goodwill and civic friendship.

We saw earlier that complete justice could be present to the extent that virtue friendship was present, but that it was strange to limit the application of complete justice to a few close friends. We can now see that complete justice also increases to the same extent as civic friendship, and thus has a wider field of application. Whereas Aristotle argues that one can have only a few good friends, he argues that this is not so in the case of civic friends.

It is possible indeed to be friendly with many in the civic sense ... in fact to be a man of really admirable
character; but it is not possible to have many friends whom we love for their own sake and for their goodness. (1171a17-20)

Virtuous deeds can be practised by private citizens on each other, but also by rulers towards their subjects. Rulers clearly have great opportunity to practise complete justice on their subjects. In a good constitution such as in a good monarchy this is what happens.

On the other hand, in the perverted constitutions friendship, like justice, is little found, and least in the worst. (1161a30-31)

In a tyranny (the perversion of monarchy) the two decrease together. The reason for this is not difficult to find. The tyrant fails to do good to his subjects, to be beneficent like the good king. He thus fails to practise the virtue of complete justice. Justice is absent. He bears them no goodwill; in fact, "their relation is like that of the craftsman to his tool" (1161a35). In short, he treats them like inanimate objects. In return they bear him no goodwill. It is the man who has "received a benefit who returns goodwill for what has been done to him". In this case, only burdens and no benefits are meted out so goodwill has no place. Both justice and friendship are absent.

The case is different where there is a good and beneficent king or where there is a timocracy in which "all the citizens are equal and good" (1161a27). Justice and friendship both flourish.

We can see that friendship in the widest sense (virtue and civic friendship) is no small or insignificant virtue in Aristotle's ethical theory. It has an important role; it is related in such a way to virtue and complete justice (the cardinal virtue) that they are always present together, and increase and decrease to the same extent. In sum, friendship is central and not peripheral to Aristotle's ethical theory. Friendship and the "friendly feeling" are of crucial importance to the virtuous life.
Footnotes - Chapter 2


4. Ibid., p.3.

5. Ibid., p.4.

6. Superficially, at least, this looks like a paradigm case of injustice rather than of justice for justice is understood to be impartial and, therefore, quite independent of claims of friendship. I discuss this issue of partiality and bias in respect of Aristotle's two types of justice in sections 2.5.1 to 2.5.3 of this chapter.


Other commentators on Aristotle's account of justice have also rejected the narrow, legalistic interpretation. For example, D.G. Ritchie explains that Aristotle's complete justice is "Righteousness or rightness of conduct; it is the fulfilling of the whole law, written and unwritten", in Aristotle's subdivisions of 'particular justice', in Classical Review, vol.8, 1894, p.185.

Paul Shorey (commenting specifically on Vinogradoff's juridical interpretation) remarks that "Aristotle's universal (i.e. complete) justice seems to me an ethical, rather than a legal conception, and what legal reference there may be is brought in only in subordination to, and in illustration of, the ethical idea", in Universal justice in Aristotle's ethics, in Classical Philology, vol.19, 1924, pp.279-280.


11. For an argument along these lines, see WEIL, E. L'anthropologie d'Aristote, in Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, vol.51, 1946, p.11.

12. Cf. Euripides. He divides men into two classes: those who are just and are concerned for the good of their neighbour, and those who are concerned solely with their own gain and advancement, always seeking only what is best for themselves, without regard for others. Heracleidae, 1-5.


15. The basis of comparison in the case of corrective justice is not what kind of human being someone is - as in distributive justice - but that one is a human being as such. Therefore, corrective justice is, in this sense, prior to, and more fundamental than distributive justice: one has to be a human being first, before one can develop merit-deserving, individualising qualities or excellences.

16. LEE, H.D.P. op. cit., p.130.

17. BURNET, John The ethics of Aristotle, 1900 The notes to NE 1132a4, 1132a9, 1132a32, and VINOGRA DOFF, Paul Aristotle on legal redress, 1928, pp.8-9.


19. HARDIE, W.F.R. Aristotle's ethical theory, 1968, p.188.


22. Complete justice as complete virtue includes all the particular virtues. Thus, it it includes particular justice too. The individual who is completely just, therefore, practises the virtue of particular justice. But the completely just man - he who is habitually disposed to be completely just - goes beyond this other-regarding virtue by practising all (or, at least, most) of the other virtues too in relation to others. Complete justice has a wider field of application, and, consequently, a wider field of other-regarding activity than particular justice. Of course, the individual who practises the virtue of particular justice (to the right persons, from the right motive etc.) by so doing, makes a contribution to complete justice. But, if his other-regarding activities stretch only as far as particular justice, it does not seem reasonable on Aristotle's account to call him a completely just individual.


23b. No issue of distributive justice can arise over non-pritive goods like happiness, health and knowledge. This does not, of course, imply that the means that may be necessary for attaining these goods cannot be an issue of distributive justice. Goods like drugs, hospitals, education, are often the means for the attainment of goods such as happiness, health and knowledge, and they do give rise to issues of distribution or allocation, for the means are essentially privative (exclusive). If A consumes more of a particular good or service, it is usually the case that there is less left for B and C. Cf. Aristotle and the distribution of flutes. Not everyone can have exclusive use of the best flutes. Nor can everyone have private tuition with the best teachers at a musical academy.

24. This constellation of conditions often referred to as the "circumstances" of distributive justice are clearly set out in Hume's
Treatise of human nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 2 and in his An
enquiry concerning the principles of morals, 3. Of justice. They form the basis of most modern accounts too, including John

25. Isocrates, Against Lochites, 5–6 (396) Isocrates in three volumes,
1945, Vol.3.
3.1 Introduction: Eudaimonia - The Problem Stated

In the last chapter, we examined the relationship between the virtue of friendship and the cardinal virtue of justice. This was necessary for the following reason. It is only in the virtue of friendship, Cooper points out, that Aristotle expresses himself directly on the subject of taking an interest in others merely as such and for their own sakes. Now to find genuinely other-regarding tendencies in some minor, insignificant virtue that stands apart from the main part of Aristotle's ethical theory would hardly suffice to exonerate that theory from criticisms of selfishness and self-seeking. On the other hand, to find such genuinely other-regarding tendencies in some major and significant virtue that is fundamentally related to all the other moral virtues is quite a different story. Thus it was necessary to show our critic that friendship is not some isolated, insignificant virtue that found its way into Aristotle's NE by "faulty editing" but that it is essentially and fundamentally related to the other moral virtues.1a

Suppose that our critic concedes the point that the virtue of friendship does stand in a vital relation to the other moral virtues, but argues that this goes no way to prove that friendship has any connection with Eudaimonia, with the life that is best for man, for a life devoted to the exercise of these moral virtues is not after all the life that makes a man truly Eudaimon. Clearly, if Eudaimonia were such that it excluded precisely those moral virtues like justice to which the virtue of friendship is connected, there could still be a problem for Aristotle. If Eudaimonia consisted not in the life of morally virtuous activity, but, for example, in the life of theoretical (philosophical) contemplation, then the argument so far would have done nothing to show that friendship had any relation to Eudaimonia. It would still be
necessary to show that the virtue of friendship stood in some relation to this life of theoretical (philosophical) activity.

It is to this problem that we must now turn. We must first establish whether Eudaimonia includes moral activity, the life of good deeds with which this dissertation has so far been concerned. If it does so, there is no problem, for we have already seen that friendship is fundamentally linked to this form of life. If, however, we find that there is some doubt as to whether Eudaimonia does include morally virtuous activity, or, if we find that Eudaimonia definitely excluded such activity, our work would not, of course, be complete. We would have to establish independently that friendship stood in some vital relation to the activity(ies) of Eudaimonia - whichever this (these) turned out to be. The task of this chapter will be to examine the content or nature of Eudaimonia, to find out what kind of activities would make a man truly Eudaimon. In the next chapter, we shall attempt to establish whether friendship, and, in particular, virtue friendship, stands in any vital relation to these activities, and whether friendship is really necessary to the life that is truly Eudaimon.

3.2 Eudaimonia: The Three Interpretations

What kind of activities constitute Eudaimonia? Unfortunately, the Nicomachean Ethics exhibits a certain lack of clarity on this topic. Not surprisingly, therefore, commentators have differed greatly in the interpretations they have offered. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between the Intellectualist and Comprehensive interpretations. According to the Intellectualist interpretation, "Eudaimonia is realised in the activity of the most divine part of man, functioning in accordance with its proper excellence. This is the activity of theoretical contemplation." Eudaimonia consists in the activity of theorising. This activity is considered paramount, everything else being pursued merely and solely as
a means to the attainment and furtherance of this end. According to the Comprehensive account, Eudaimonia "essentially involves not just the activity of the theoretical intellect, but the full range of human life and action, in accordance with the broader excellences of moral virtue and practical wisdom". The Comprehensive interpretation denies that there is only one activity, the activity of theoretical contemplation, that constitutes Eudaimonia. It holds that Eudaimonia consists in a plurality of activities, good in themselves, and desired (at least in part) for their own sakes. Nagel points out that "this view connects Eudaimonia with the conception of human nature as composite, i.e. as involving the interaction of reason, emotion, perception and action in an ensouled body". Whereas the Intellectualist interpretation connects Eudaimonia with the conception of man as nous, that is, as pure intellect or mind with no material counterpart, the Comprehensive interpretation connects Eudaimonia with the conception of man as suntheton, that is, as strictly human, as matter (appetites, desires, sensations, emotions etc.) organised by reason.

A third interpretation has recently been proposed by John Cooper. His view is that there are two Eudaimonias, one corresponding to the intellectual life, and the other to the comprehensive life. The former life, that which Aristotle considers better and more worthy, consists in intellectual activity alone, while the latter "secondary" Eudaimonia, though primarily concerned with morally good activity, also allows for intellectual activity. In respect of content, Cooper's interpretation has much in common with the other two interpretations just outlined. His primary Eudaimonia which consists in nothing but theoretical activity is precisely the Eudaimonia that the supporter of the Intellectual interpretation espouses, while his secondary Eudaimonia which consists in both moral activity and theoretical activity is precisely the Eudaimonia that the supporter of the Comprehensive interpretation espouses. Cooper, in fact, calls his primary intellectualist Eudaimonia "unmixed" Eudaimonia,
and his secondary Comprehensive Eudaimonia "mixed" Eudaimonia, but, for the sake of clarity, I shall use Nagel's terminology of Intellectualist and Comprehensive Eudaimonia throughout the chapter.

3.2.1 The Intellectualist Interpretation

Proponents of the Intellectualist interpretation of Eudaimonia draw their main source of support from the following passage:

The good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue, and if there are several virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete. (1098a16-17)

In this passage, Aristotle clearly claims that Eudaimonia consists exclusively of activity in accordance with the best virtue, and he denies as constitutive of Eudaimonia any activity that is considered intrinsically worthwhile but is not in conformity with the best virtue. If it is the case that Eudaimonia consists in an activity of the soul in accordance with the best virtue, then, adherents of this interpretation will argue, we shall know the nature of Eudaimonia as soon as we find that virtue. Which, then, is the best virtue?

We have already seen that Aristotle says that Eudaimonia will be attained when a man fulfils his "function", when he realises his nature or his distinctively human powers. This does not mean fulfilling his "function" qua athlete, or realising his nature qua flute-player, but fulfilling his function and realising his nature qua man. It is in the attainment of excellence in the exercise of the distinctively human powers that a man will become a good man, and his life a good life.

Aristotle holds that it is the ability to think that distinguishes men from other animals, and that the good life is one in which this capacity is exercised well. Man's end or Eudaimonia lies in the activity, not the mere possession of his rational element, that sets him apart from other animals. It is by exercising his soul in conformity to reason, or to the rational element that man fulfils his function and attains Eudaimonia.
However, the rational capacity is clearly at work in both theoretical activity and in practical (moral) activity. For Aristotle, the choice is thus between the virtue of theoretical wisdom and that of practical wisdom. He chooses the former (for reasons to be explained shortly). His choice has appeared strange to many commentators. Hardie, for example, writes:

It is no doubt true that man is the only theoretical animal. But the capacity of some men for theory is small. And theory is not the only activity in respect of which man is rational and no other animal is rational ... What is common and peculiar to men is rationality in a general sense, not theoretical insight which is a specialised way of being rational. A man differs from other animals not primarily in being a natural metaphysician, but rather in being able to plan his life consciously for the attainment of an inclusive end.®

Nagel attempts to explain why, for Aristotle, "the use of reason to earn a living or procure food does not form part of the central function of man", why the "proper exercise of the rational faculty does have a point beyond the uses of cleverness, prudence, and courage, beyond the rational calculation of the most sensible way to spend one's time and money, or to organise society"7.

Humans, like animals, can "employ reason in the service of nutrition and reproduction. Reason is also employed in the control of perception, locomotion and desire". But:

Human possibilities reveal that reason has a use beyond the ordering of practical life. The circle of mutual support between reason, activity and nutrition is not completely closed. In fact all of it, including the practical employment of reason, serves to support the individual for an activity that completely transcends these worldly concerns. The model of feedback does not work for the ergon of humans because the best and purest employment of reason has nothing to do with daily life. Aristotle believes, in short, that human life is not important enough for humans to spend their lives on. A person should seek to transcend not only his individual practical concerns, but also those of society or humanity as a whole.®

Aristotle writes:

For it would be strange to regard politics or practical wisdom as the highest kind of knowledge, when in fact man is not the best thing in the universe ... There are other things whose nature is much more divine than man's: (for example) ... the constituent parts of the universe.

(1141a20-22 and a34-b2)
and

Our discussion has shown that theoretical wisdom comprises both scientific knowledge and (apprehension by the) intelligence of things which by their nature are valued most highly. (1141b2-3)

Aristotle's point is that theoretical wisdom is superior because it deals with higher and more noble truths. It is the best virtue because it deals with things that are best and are valued most highly. Aristotle implies that activity of the more elevated sort is by its nature more desirable and worthwhile than activity that is mundane and not concerned with eternal truths and objects. Thus, theoretical wisdom, being the virtue that promotes and makes possible this kind of superior activity is the best virtue.

The second reason Aristotle gives for regarding theoretical wisdom as superior to practical wisdom is that practical wisdom is a means to the attainment of theoretical wisdom. It is thus subservient to theoretical wisdom.

Still, practical wisdom has not authority over theoretical wisdom or the better part of our soul any more than the art of medicine has authority over health. (Just as medicine does not use health, but makes the provisions to secure it, so) practical wisdom does not use theoretical wisdom but makes the provisions to secure it. It issues commands to attain it, but it does not issue them to wisdom itself. (1145a6-10)

Aristotle does not make clear how practical wisdom can be a means to the attainment of theoretical wisdom, nor how it can make provision to secure it. Nevertheless, he certainly holds that practical wisdom can in no way be considered superior to theoretical wisdom, any more than medicine could be considered superior to health. Theoretical wisdom is the ultimate virtue, and part of the value of practical wisdom is that it can assist in obtaining this virtue. Theoretical wisdom is never subservient to practical wisdom, and, thus, there is no way in which theoretical wisdom can be considered the lesser of the two virtues.

To these two reasons for regarding theoretical wisdom as superior to practical wisdom, we could add a third one. Hardie points out that:
Aristotle does not fail to see and mention the fact that an object may be desired both independently for itself and independently for its effects (EN 1.6, 1097a30-34). He was aware also that theoretical activity is not the only kind of activity which is independently desired. But he evidently thought that an activity which was never desired except for itself would be intrinsically desirable in a higher degree than an activity which, in addition, to being desired for itself, was also useful. It is, so to say, beneath the dignity of the most godlike activities that they should be useful. Aristotle is led in this way, and by other routes, to give a narrow and exclusive account of the final good, to conceive of the supreme end as dominant and not inclusive.

The "narrow, exclusive" or "dominant end" is Hardie's terminology for the Intellectualist interpretation of Eudaimonia; an "inclusive end" is his terminology for the Comprehensive interpretation.

The reasoning behind the Intellectualist interpretation is thus clear. Aristotle says that Eudaimonia is an activity of the soul in conformity with virtue, or with the best one if there are several. We have found that Aristotle argues that there are two virtues, but that theoretical wisdom is the better. Adherents of the Intellectualist view, therefore, conclude that, for Aristotle, Eudaimonia is a life dedicated to attaining theoretical knowledge.

Hardie says, as we have just noted, that Aristotle "gives a narrow and exclusive account of the final good", and "conceives of the end as dominant and not inclusive". Nagel argues that Aristotle "pares away everything except the intellect, till the only thing which intrinsically bears on Eudaimonia is the quality of contemplative (theoretical) activity".

He summarises what he understands to be Aristotle's position (and adds that he believes it is a very "compelling position")

This divine element which gives us the capacity to think about things higher than ourselves, is the highest aspect of our souls, and we are not justified in foregoing its activities to concentrate on lowlier matters, viz. our own lives, unless the demands in the latter area threaten to make contemplation impossible. As he says at 1177b33, we should not listen to those who urge that a human should think human thoughts, and a mortal mortal ones. Rather we should cultivate that portion of our nature that promises to transcend the rest. If anyone insists that the rest...
belongs to a complete account of human life, then the view might be put, somewhat paradoxically, by saying that comprehensive human good is not everything, and should not be the main human goal. We must identify with the highest part of ourselves, rather than with the whole. The other functions including the practical employment of reason itself, provide support for the highest form of activity, but do not enter into our proper excellence as primary component factors. This is because men are not simply the most complex species of animals, but possess as their essential nature a capacity to transcend themselves and become like gods. It is in virtue of this capacity that they are capable of Eudaimonia, whereas animals are incapable of it, children have not achieved it, and certain adults e.g. slaves, are prevented from reaching it.\textsuperscript{13}

It should be noted that the Intellectualist interpretation poses no problem if man is viewed as nous, as his divine element, as pure intellect with no material counterpart. In theoretical activity, the "best" part, the theoretical element of the rational soul is emphasised. But there is a problem if man is viewed as suntheton, as both matter (body, desires, appetites, emotions etc.) and reason. And it is true to say that in the NE, man is viewed in just this way too. The problem is that man as suntheton would have little or no share in Eudaimonia, if theoretical activity alone constituted Eudaimonia; little share if one allows that impure forms of theoretical activity could constitute Eudaimonia, and no share at all if one allows only pure theoretical activity (since such activity is beyond man's nature as suntheton) (1177b24-30). But if man as suntheton can have no share in Eudaimonia, Aristotle's position becomes inconsistent because he states clearly that "the good we are now seeking must be obtainable" (1096b35). Thus, the purely Intellectualist interpretation makes Aristotle's position incomprehensible and inconsistent.

If one attributes a certain theory or viewpoint to a particular philosopher, it is insufficient to look at just one passage in a work, and it is even more insufficient to look at just a few sentences in a single passage and then attempt to reach firm conclusions as to what that philosopher really means. Thus, in the case of Aristotle, it is not sufficient to look at one short passage, (1177a12-13) and then
reach the conclusion that he identifies Eudaimonia with the life of theoretical activity. I think that if one looks at other passages in NE, and even at the wider context of the passage from which we earlier quoted (1177a12-13), there is good reason to cast doubt on the validity of the Intellectualist interpretation of Aristotle. This is not to say that a search of other passages proves conclusively that Aristotle does not hold the Intellectualist position, but merely that these passages seem to cast a certain doubt upon it.

We may begin by examining the wider context of the passage from which we quoted earlier (1177a12-13). When we study the paragraph in its entirety, we find evidence to suggest that the first sentence may be misleading.

Now, if happiness is activity in conformity with virtue, it is to be expected that it should conform with the highest virtue, and that is the virtue of the best part of us. Whether this is intelligence or something else which, it is thought, by its very nature rules and guides us, and which gives us our notions of what is noble and divine; whether it is itself divine, or the most divine thing in us; it is the activity of this part (when operating), in conformity with the excellence or virtue proper to it that will be perfect happiness. That it is activity concerned with theoretical knowledge or contemplation has already been stated. (1177a12-18)

The Intellectualist proponent can point out that the "highest virtue", "the virtue of the best part of us" is theoretical, not practical wisdom, and that this passage supports his position. The proponent is certainly correct that the "highest virtue", or "the virtue of the best part of us" is theoretical wisdom. However, the words of the passage must be clearly noted. Aristotle begins by talking about Eudaimonia, and ends by talking about complete or perfect Eudaimonia. He clearly identifies perfect Eudaimonia with theoretical knowledge and activity. Perfect Eudaimonia is, therefore, intellectualist in nature. Is Eudaimonia simpliciter also just a life of theoretical activity? Aristotle is unclear on this point. While he certainly does not deny that Eudaimonia simpliciter is intellectualist in nature, he obviously
wants to emphasise the intellectualist character of teleia Eudaimonia.

He does so again at 1177b24-26:

The activity of our intelligence constitutes the perfect happiness of man, provided it encompasses a complete span of life ...

If both Eudaimonia simpliciter, and teleia Eudaimonia were both purely intellectualist, they would not be distinguishable. Aristotle is clearly attempting to make a distinction. It, therefore, seems reasonable to conclude that Aristotle thinks teleia Eudaimonia, and not Eudaimonia simpliciter is purely intellectualist.

We may now consider other important passages that help to elucidate the nature of Eudaimonia. Book 10 chapter 8 opens with the following comment:

A life guided by the other kind of virtue (the practical) is happy in a secondary sense since its active exercise is confined to man. (1178a9-10)

If Aristotle believes that Eudaimonia consists only in theoretical activity, it is odd that he should call a life devoted to some other kind of activity happy (Eudaimon). If Eudaimonia is identical or co-extensive with theoretical activity, then a life guided by practical activity cannot also be happy. In this passage, Aristotle clearly argues that some non-theoretical activity is a constituent part of Eudaimonia, of man's good. Admittedly, the moral life results in Eudaimonia of a "secondary kind", not a primary kind. But this is different from denying that such a life has a part in Eudaimonia at all. We can say that, for Aristotle, intrinsically pursued moral activity is a constituent part of "secondary Eudaimonia". The distinction between Eudaimonia and secondary Eudaimonia, like that between complete/perfect Eudaimonia and Eudaimonia simpliciter certainly casts doubts upon the purely Intellectualist interpretation.

Again, at 1178a19-22, Aristotle writes:

The fact that these (moral) virtues are also bound up with the emotions indicates that they belong to our composite nature, and the virtues of our composite nature
are human virtues; consequently, a life guided by these virtues and the happiness (that goes with it are likewise human). The happiness of the intelligence, however, is quite separate from that kind of happiness.

This passage is important for the following reason. If Aristotle means to identify Eudaimonia with theoretical activity alone, it is not clear why he should talk about two kinds of Eudaimonia, one associated with nous ("intelligence") and the other associated with "human virtue". The life associated with "human virtue" should not be called Eudaimon at all. Again we find Aristotle attempting to make a distinction between two kinds of Eudaimonia. We have, on the one hand, teleia (complete/perfect) Eudaimonia, or the activity of the intelligence (nous); on the other hand, we have Eudaimonia simpliciter, "secondary Eudaimonia", or "moral virtue" Eudaimonia.

From the passages we have examined, I think it is reasonable to conclude that we cannot say beyond doubt that Aristotle identifies Eudaimonia with the life of theoretical activity alone.

3.2.2 The Comprehensive Interpretation

We have already seen that it is implausible to argue that intrinsically pursued moral activity is not a constituent part of Eudaimonia. We saw, first, that if Eudaimonia is identified with theoretical activity alone, Aristotle's position becomes incoherent and inconsistent. We saw, secondly, that many passages in the NE show clearly that Aristotle believes that moral activity is, in some way, a constituent part of Eudaimonia.

The question to be addressed now is in what sense Aristotle conceives such moral activity to be a constituent part of Eudaimonia. In this section, we shall examine the Comprehensive interpretations advanced by philosophers such as Ross and Joachim. In the next section, we shall examine the two-Eudaimonias interpretation advocated by Cooper.

According to the Comprehensive interpretation, there is one
Eudaimonia which "essentially involves not just the activity of the theoretical intellect, but the full range of human life and action in accordance with the broader excellences of moral virtue and practical wisdom. This view connects Eudaimonia with the conception of human nature as composite i.e. as involving the interaction of reason, emotion, perception, and action in an ensouled body".

The important point about the Comprehensive interpretation is that, according to it, there is one Eudaimonia that consists in theoretical and moral activity. However, it is not an essential part of this interpretation that these two constituent parts be placed on one level, and share an equal status. The Comprehensive interpretation allows that the activities of Eudaimonia may be graded, that theoretical activity may be regarded as intrinsically more valuable and more worthwhile than moral activity. Joachim summarises this interpretation of Eudaimonia:

Aristotle does not, and could not, leave the two lives side by side, as each the best life. Two best lives - two supreme and all embracing tele would be absurd, a contradiction in terms. As we shall see, in Book 10, he decides that the life of the thinker is the supremely valuable life for man, is indeed super-human, a god's life which man enjoys in virtue of the divinity in him. But he recognises a genuine, though secondary and subordinate, value in the life of the statesman and citizen. That is to say, he measures the value of the two lives. The ideal is manifested in both these forms, and both, therefore, have genuine value, but the one is more valuable than the other ... i.e. (it) more fully or more perfectly manifests the ideal.

According to Joachim, then, Aristotle places great importance on both kinds of activity, but finishes by making theoretical activity the more valued, the more prized of the two activities. Both these activities are part of one Eudaimonia for these two lives are related to each other. The two-Eudaimonias interpretation is dismissed by Joachim as "absurd" and "a contradiction in terms". In the next section we shall attempt to establish whether this view is as "absurd" and "contradictory" as Joachim believes.
Proponents of the Comprehensive interpretation can point to the language that Aristotle uses in Book 10 chapters 7 to 9. In his discussion of Eudaimonia, Aristotle several times uses comparative and superlative versions of the word, thereby implying that Eudaimonia may be graded, and possibly even attained to differing extents. At 1178a4-8, Aristotle says that the life guided by reason (nous) is "happiest"; at 1178a9-10, he says that the life guided by moral virtue is happy in a "secondary" sense; and at 1179a22-31, he tells us that the man who "exercises and cultivates" his intelligence and engages in theoretical activity, will be most dear to the gods, and "happiest" too.

It should be noted that the use of comparatives and superlatives is not conclusive or even strong evidence in favour of the Comprehensive interpretation. It is, after all, quite possible for there to be two quite separate Eudaimonias, the activity of one of which makes a man "happy", while the activity of the other makes a man "more happy" or "most happy". The language is, therefore, compatible with both the Comprehensive interpretation and with Cooper's interpretation. It is, of course, not compatible with the Intellectualist interpretation.

The best support for the Comprehensive, but graded interpretation comes from Aristotle's passages concerning *teleia* Eudaimonia. To show that this is so we must summarise Aristotle's general ideas briefly, and then see just how the *teleia* Eudaimonia passages fit into the account.

We have seen that, according to Aristotle, Eudaimonia is to be identified with the active exercise of man's rational capacities since man alone is capable of rational activity. "The proper function of man", Aristotle writes, "consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with the rational principle" (1098a7-8). Eudaimonia results from man's fulfilling his function or end as a rational being. How then can man best fulfil his function as a rational being? Aristotle writes:
First of all, then, we should insist that both theoretical and practical wisdom are necessarily desirable in themselves, even if neither of them produces anything. For each of them is the virtue of a different part of the soul.

Secondly, they do in fact produce something: theoretical wisdom produces happiness, not as medicine produces health, but as health itself makes a person healthy. For since theoretical wisdom is one part of virtue in its entirety, possessing and actualising it makes a man happy (for happiness as we have seen (1.7) consists in the activity of virtue).

In the third place, a man fulfils his proper function only by way of practical wisdom and moral excellence or virtue: (moral) virtue makes us aim at the right target, and practical wisdom makes us use the right means. (1144a1-9)

In this long passage, Aristotle makes it clear that it is not only theoretical activity (the outcome of the exercise of nous) that promotes and produces Eudaimonia. Practical wisdom and moral virtue also promote and produce Eudaimonia because these virtues too make it possible for man to fulfil his end as a rational agent. In order to fulfil his end or function as a rational being, a man must possess and exercise nous (so that he can engage in theoría which is the best and most prized rational activity), but so he must also possess and exercise moral virtue and practical wisdom (so that he can engage in moral deliberation and choice).

It is clear that in this passage Aristotle is not subscribing to the view that Eudaimonia may only result from the one best virtue, but he is saying that it stems from the activity of rational virtue in its entirety. Is there, then, a contradiction between this passage and 1098a16-17 where Aristotle says:

Eudaimonia is an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue, and if there are several virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete.

Earlier we examined one of the passages in which Aristotle draws a distinction between Eudaimonia simpliciter and teleia Eudaimonia. Aristotle begins Book 10 chapter 7 by saying:

Now if happiness is activity in conformity with virtue, it is to be expected that it should conform with the highest virtue, and that is the virtue of the best part of us (1177a12-13)
(This passage is consistent with 1098a16-17 where Aristotle argues that Eudaimonia results from activity in conformity with the best and most complete virtue]. But we also saw that Aristotle concludes the passage as follows:

It is the activity of this part (when operating) in conformity with the excellence or virtue proper to it that will be complete/perfect happiness. (1177a16-17)

It would be reasonable to argue that Aristotle holds the view that the highest virtue, theoretical wisdom, is identical with teleia Eudaimonia, not Eudaimonia simpliciter. Teleia Eudaimonia clearly allows Aristotle to give theoretical activity a special status while at the same time not denying that moral activity is also a constituent part of Eudaimonia. Both practical activity and theoretical activity result from the exercise of man's rational element.

This interpretation of the passage quoted gains support from another at 1177b24-27. Here Aristotle writes:

The activity of our intelligence (i.e. theoretical activity) constitutes the perfect/complete happiness of man, provided it encompasses a complete span of life ...

Theoretical activity is again identified with perfect/complete Eudaimonia rather than with Eudaimonia simpliciter. It is quite plausible to argue that Aristotle's view is that it is teleia Eudaimonia, not Eudaimonia simpliciter that excludes moral activity. While activity in conformity with theoretical wisdom constitutes the fullest flourishing of our natures as rational beings, activity in conformity with practical virtue also results in the realisation of our natures as rational beings, but— at a less high level.

The Comprehensive interpretation holds that there is only one Eudaimonia whose component parts are accorded different levels of priority. The supreme and highly prized life is that of theoretical activity; the lower, but nevertheless important, life is that of moral (practical) activity. It seems to be necessary to the Comprehensive interpretation that these two "lives" or components of Eudaimonia be substantively
related, for if they are not so, it would surely be reasonable to argue that there are two distinct Eudaimonias, not one. This is a view that we shall investigate in the next section of this chapter, and also, more indirectly, in chapter 4 when we examine Aristotle's conception of the soul. In the remainder of this section, we shall briefly mention how three of Aristotle's commentators have viewed the relationship between the two components of Eudaimonia, and offer a few comments about these views.

Ross has the idea that moral activity is a providing condition for theoretical activity. This idea probably stems from Aristotle's claim that theoria is perfect Eudaimonia, and from the fact that he has made theoria the only activity that is sought for its own sake, and never for the sake of any further end. Ross writes:

And it (moral activity) helps to bring into being the higher kind (theoretical activity). Aristotle says very little about how it does this. The practical wisdom of the statesman provides by legislation for the pursuit of scientific and philosophical studies. And we must suppose that in the individual life also, Aristotle thought of moral action as providing for the existence of intellectual activity by keeping in subjection the passions. But though his formal theory thus makes the moral life subsidiary to the intellectual, this relationship is not worked out in detail.

According to Ross, then, moral action is a providing condition for theoretical activity. It acts as a providing condition in the sense that it keeps the emotions in subjection, thereby creating the kind of psychological state that is requisite for successful theoretical activity. Ross does not claim that there is a causal connection between the two kinds of activity; he only claims that the control of the emotions that is vital to moral action provides the psychological state that is also conducive to theoretical activity.

It is clear, however, that Ross's explanation provides only the weakest of links between the two forms of activity. If these two forms of activity are supposed to be related as aspects or components of one Eudaimonia, we would expect a much tighter or more intimate link between
the two aspects or components. If none can be provided, there is
little strength to the argument that there is one Eudaimonia. It would
seem reasonable to suggest that there are two Eudaimonias, the lesser
form of which acts as a providing condition for the superior form.

According to the interpretation given by Burnet, and Stewart, the
theoretical life is the goal or final cause for men's moral activity.

Burnet writes:

Now we see what is the true "standard of the means" (horos
ton mesoteton) ... it is the theoretic life which the
phronimos keeps in view when he determines the mean; for
he knows that his own practical wisdom is only ancillary to
the theoretical wisdom of the philosopher. 19

Their idea is that Aristotle attempts to relate the two forms of virtue
by making the theoretical life the target or goal (skopos) and standard
(horos) to which the man of moral virtue refers when he determines the
mean. They both argue that the rational principle (logos) to which the
man of practical wisdom attends when he determines the mean has a close
connection with theoria. The mean which is so essential to morally
correct action would be defined in terms of logos (a rational principle)
which in turn would be defined by reference to theoria as a standard and
goal.

If it were the case that theoria were the standard and goal for
all men's good actions, it would seem that Aristotle has provided a
single and final end for men's actions. However, this interpretation
can be criticised for it seems unlikely that Aristotle intends the
phronimos to "keep in view", to look to the life of theoria as a standard
or goal, in short, to use this life as a yardstick for his own activities.
Jaeger makes this point clearly. He says that according to Aristotle,
the man of practical wisdom has his own standard; he judges according
to his own type of wisdom and experience and does not look to any other
form of life for guidance.

The NE does not make moral insight dependent on knowledge
of the transcendental; it looks for a "natural" foundation
of it in practical human consciousness, and in moral character. 20
And the good man judges each class of things rightly, and in each the truth appears to him ... and perhaps the good man differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of things ...  

Aristotle, he tells us, "rejects universal norms", and "recognises no measure but the autonomous conscience of the ethically educated person". Jaeger, thus, denies that theoria is the yardstick that the phronimos uses to determine morally good action. He also denies that the phronimos "keeps theoria in view" as a goal or end. The theoretical life is neither a standard nor a goal for the phronimos. Each form of life has its own standard and goal.

3.2.3 The Two-Eudaimonias Interpretation of J.M. Cooper

In Reason and human good in Aristotle, Cooper proposes and defends a two-Eudaimonias interpretation. His view is that there are two separate and distinct Eudaimonias, one which corresponds to the theoretical life alone, and the other which corresponds to the moral life. The first, the better and more prized Eudaimonia, consists of theoretical activity alone, while the second, or lesser, Eudaimonia consists largely of moral activity, but admits of some theoretical activity in addition. In respect of content, there is, of course, much in common between Cooper's interpretation and the other two interpretations. Primary Eudaimonia which consists in nothing but theoretical activity is intellectualist in nature, while secondary Eudaimonia which consists in moral activity and some theoretical activity is comprehensive in nature.

The most significant difference between Cooper's interpretation and the other interpretations is not then in respect of content. The difference lies in his claim that there are two Eudaimonia, not one. Cooper defends his view by reference to the meaning of the word "bios", and from a detailed reading of 1177b26-1178a22. In this passage, Aristotle writes of an intellectual (theoretic) life, and a moral life. Cooper argues that these are not two aspects of a single life, but
rather two completely separate and distinct forms of life. His justification is that the Greek word bios always means "(mode of) life", and that "in any one period of time, one can have only one mode of life". The bios of an individual, then, is not a single aspect of a person's life; rather, it refers to the total organisation of that individual's life. In English, however, it is clear that we often speak of aspects of a person's life. Thus, we can speak of a person's moral life, social life, and political life. There is a Greek equivalent of this English "aspect of life". This, Cooper says, is zoe. It is not bios. It is incorrect in Greek to speak of a person's social bios, moral bios and political bios as being all different aspects of an individual's bios, for bios means a person's manner of being, the total organisation of his life. At any one period of time, one can have only one mode of life, and, further, Cooper argues, bioi do not combine. Thus, he concludes, if there are two separate and distinct lives which cannot combine, so there must be two separate and distinct Eudaimonias corresponding to these separate and distinct lives.

Cooper justifies his claim that there are two Eudaimonias by reference to the two distinct bioi that men may lead - the theoretical life and the moral life. Suppose, however, that there are more than two bioi that men can lead. Are there then more than two Eudaimonias? At 1096b14-1097a11, Aristotle writes of the life (bios) of pleasure. Is there then a Eudaimonia corresponding to this bios? Perhaps, if there is a bios of advantage, we should have to admit a Eudaimonia corresponding to this bios too? This, of course, would be a total misrepresentation of Aristotle's position. A man is only Eudaimon when he fulfils his function as a rational being. There are only two kinds of excellent rational activity - activity in accordance with theoretical wisdom and activity in accordance with practical wisdom. It is not the bios itself which is significant; it is the kind of activity that constitutes a bios that is important. A bios or mode of life organised around
pleasure or advantage is not a candidate for Eudaimonia. But a life
that is organised around theoretical or moral activity is clearly
Eudaimon. If one admits that Aristotle predicates "Eudaimon" of only
two different bioi, and if one further admits that bioi can never
combine, then one must accept that there are only two Eudaimonias.

Proponents of the Comprehensive interpretation might attempt to
salvage their case by the following kind of argument. They could
challenge Cooper's assumption that Aristotle is speaking literally when
he refers to a "moral life" and an "intellectual life". Cooper assumes
that Aristotle really intends to say that there are two separate lives
a man can lead, and that if he is to be Eudaimon, he might choose one
or the other, but not both. A Comprehensivist might argue that
Aristotle uses the expressions "moral life" and "intellectual life" only
in a figurative and not in a literal sense in order to clarify and show
in their pure forms the two different rational activities that can con­
stitute Eudaimonia. Such an argument is really an extension of Stewart's
point that the "wise man" (who corresponds to ho kata ton noun bios)
and the "practical man" (who corresponds to ho kata ten alien areten
bios) are not intended by Aristotle as real men, but are abstractions
used for the purpose of illustration and clarification. Thus, in
Book 10: 7 and 8, Aristotle is not speaking literally about Eudaimonia,
but is giving a general outline of it by arguing that it is attained when
we realise the divine and purely human aspects of our rational nature
by engaging in theoretical and moral activities respectively. In this
way, the Comprehensivist could argue, there are not two distinct
Eudaimonias, but only one — one that incorporates two parts of men's
rational soul, but each of which can be attained to a greater or lesser
extent by real men.

The plausibility of this Comprehensivist attack depends upon whether
there is a good case for arguing that man as nous and man as complex
being are in fact two separate and distinct entities or whether they are
two parts of a single complex unit. If the former were true, it would seem that Cooper is correct to argue that there are two Eudaimonias, one corresponding to nous and the theoretic life, and the other to man as complex being and the moral life. If the latter were true instead, it would surely be the case that the Comprehensivist interpretation is more sound than Cooper's two-Eudaimonia interpretation. I shall argue, that Cooper has a good case for claiming that the two natures in the NE do in some sense constitute two separate "men" and two separate souls.

Cooper points out that nous in Book 10: 7 refers to the theoretic intellect alone; it does not refer to the practical intellect or to a "mixed" intellect. He supports his case by reference to 1177b28-9, and 1178a6-22, two passages in which Aristotle is explicit about the nature of nous. In the first passage, Aristotle sharply distinguishes man qua nous from man qua suntheton, and argues that man qua nous is divine, but man qua suntheton is strictly human. Man qua nous is regarded as superior to man qua suntheton, just as the activity of man qua nous is superior to the activity of man qua suntheton. In the second passage, he makes it clear that the moral virtues (the virtues of practical wisdom) are not excellences of the nous. Cooper adds that Book 10 is especially important as it is the only place in the NE where Aristotle speaks of man as pure intellect.

Cooper also uses Aristotle's De Anima in support of his theory. In this work, Aristotle makes a clear distinction between man's highest powers and his biological and psychological functions. The latter are intrinsically linked with the body. This is not the case, however, with the former, with man's highest intellectual powers. This is because Aristotle does not view the mind as being inextricably linked with the body and its activities. Cooper quotes Aristotle:

"It (nous) seems to be a distinct kind of soul and it alone admits of separation, as the immortal from the perishable (413b26-7)"

Clearly, it is difficult to envisage how the mind constitutes a different kind of soul. But it seems that in De Anima, Aristotle dichotomises Man
into two separate and distinct souls, one associated with the activity of a body, and the other something quite distinct from the body and its activities.

Cooper argues that the theory of the souls in De Anima coincides with Aristotle's discussion in Book 10: 7-9 of man qua nous and man qua suntheton, where the former is regarded as purely theoretical and divine, and the latter as a combined body and soul. Cooper writes:

It is then the late and technical psychological theory of the De Anima to which Aristotle appeals in arguing the identification of a human being with his (theoretical) nous. According to the theory of the De Anima a human being cannot correctly be thought of as a single complex creature, possessing physical, emotional and intellectual characteristics of various kinds, and bound together and unified as parts or aspects of the soul, which being his form, make him the creature he is. Instead, the highest intellectual powers are split off from the others and make, in some obscure way, to constitute a soul all on their own.^^

It should also be noted that Aristotle's introduction of teleia Eudaimonia in Book 10, to which we referred earlier, gives support to Cooper's interpretation. If, in this final book of NE, Aristotle does adopt the psychology of De Anima and, therefore, assumes that in a strict sense there are two souls and two "men", it is not surprising that he should introduce terminology that would enable him to refer to the final ends or Eudaimonias of both souls or "men". The final end of man qua nous is a life devoted to theoretical activity, a life that, according to Aristotle, is teleios Eudaimon; and the final end of man qua complex being (qua suntheton) is a life that is predominantly practical, a life that, according to Aristotle, is "secondarily" Eudaimon.

Cooper's two Eudaimonias interpretation thus receives support from (a) the meaning of the word bios, and (b) from Aristotle's psychological theory. It seems that Cooper has good grounds for arguing that Aristotle has two Eudaimonias, one that corresponds to man qua nous and the theoretical life, and a second corresponding to man qua suntheton, and the moral life.

We have just stated that, according to Cooper's interpretation, the
final end of man qua nous is a life devoted to theoretical activity, 
a life that is teleios Eudaimon; and the final end of man qua suntheton 
is a life that consists predominantly of moral activity, but includes 
some theoretical activity in addition, a life that is secondarily 
Eudaimon.

What evidence does Cooper offer to support his view that the superior 
teleia Eudaimonia is to be identified with the life of theoretical 
activity alone?

In many passages in Book 10: 7-9, Aristotle implies directly and 
indirectly that life in accordance with nous includes only theoretical 
activity as intrinsically worthwhile. At 1177b24-31, for example, he 
says:

... It follows that the activity of our intelligence constitutes the complete/perfect happiness of man, provided that it encompasses a complete span of life; for nothing connected with happiness must be incomplete.

However, such a life (bios) would be more than human. A man who would live it would do so not insofar as he is human, but because there is a divine element within him. This divine element is as far above our composite nature as its activity is above the active exercise of the other (i.e. practical) kind of virtue. So if it is true that intelligence (ho nous) is divine, in comparison with man, then a life guided by intelligence is divine in comparison with human life.

Aristotle is clear in this passage that it is the activity of our in-
telligence that constitutes teleia Eudaimonia. It should be noted that 
no such claim is made about moral activity. Aristotle is also clear 
that the activity of nous is as superior to the activity of practical 
virtue as the nature of man as nous is superior to the nature of man qua 
suntheton. This suggests that the activity of nous (theoretical activity) 
is attributed to man as nous, while the activity of practical virtue is 
attributed to man as suntheton, and also that these two activities are 
as separate as man qua nous and man qua suntheton. This passage seems 
to suggest that the life (bios) in accordance with nous is completely 
intellectualist.

Cooper's view gains further support from 1178b8-24 where Aristotle
writes that the gods whose lives are divine engage only in theoretical activity. If life in accord with nous is divine (godlike), and the gods lead lives that are exclusively intellectualist, it is reasonable to conclude that life in accord with nous (ho kata ton noun bios) is strictly intellectualist.

Given that (1) man qua nous is man (1178a6-7), (2) that Eudaimonia is attained when an individual fulfils his end qua man and (3) that man qua nous fulfils his end by engaging in theoretical activity, it follows that only theoretical activity is worthy of pursuit as an end. Other forms of activity (for example, intrinsically pursued moral activity) would not enable an individual to fulfil his end qua nous. Cooper concludes:

The identification of oneself, and thus one's true interests, with one's intellect and its interests, means that one regards everything else as alien, and having no independent claims on one's energies. (But) such an attitude is obviously incompatible with moral virtue as Aristotle understands it. If one possesses a virtue, one performs the relevant acts for their own sakes, regarding them as good in themselves; but this one could assuredly not do if one thought that any value they might encompass was not of any direct interest to oneself.28

According to Cooper's interpretation, intrinsically pursued moral activity is not a constituent part of teleia Eudaimonia, of the life associated with man as nous. But at 1178b3-7, Aristotle states that the individual who engages in theoretical activity requires external goods so that he can perform actions in conformity with moral virtue. Cooper calls this a "moral slip" on Aristotle's part, and he points out that a man who performs morally virtuous actions is not ipso facto a virtuous man.29 He points out that, for Aristotle, a man is only morally virtuous when he performs morally virtuous acts from a firm and unchangeable character (1105b5-9; 1105a28-33). Thus, for example, a man who performs just acts is a just man only if he acts knowingly, does the acts for their own sakes, and acts from a firm and unchangeable character. But, Cooper argues, the theoriser who performs virtuous actions is not a
virtuous man since "Aristotle conspicuously avoids saying that the theoriser will be a virtuous person". He is merely acting virtuously because it best suits his interests.

He (the theoriser) may, as Aristotle maintains, have reason to act justly from time to time, or liberally or courageously, and so on; but he will regard such actions as forced upon him by the involvement with others that he inescapably finds himself entangled in. He does in fact live among other men, and must therefore keep up appropriate relations with them if he is to devote himself as fully as possible to his intellectual work.

Clearly, of great importance to Cooper's analysis is the distinction between moral activity that is intrinsically pursued (pursued for its own sake), and moral activity that is extrinsically pursued (pursued for the sake of some further end). According to Cooper's interpretation, the theoriser performs moral actions because it suits him, because it serves his other (theorising) interests. The moral activity he engages in is thus extrinsically pursued. He engages in moral activity because "he does in fact live among other men, and must, therefore, keep up appropriate relations with them, if he is to devote himself as fully as possible to his theoretical work". In short the theoriser needs society if he is to devote himself fully to his intellectual work. He needs it for the external goods and general support it can give him. Society, however, would not support individuals who openly disregard its established moral standards and practices. So, if the theoriser wants to remain part of society, if he is to have the external goods he requires for study such as libraries and other necessities, he must perform moral actions and act according to established moral practices so that he will be fully accepted by that society.

Cooper's view, I believe, can be challenged by looking at other passages in the NE which cast serious doubts upon the interpretation. An alternative view is that the theoriser acts as virtue demands because he is a human, and chooses to live as a human being. At 1178b3-7, Aristotle writes:
But insofar as he (the theoriser) is human, he chooses to act as virtue demands ...

Aristotle implies that although the theoriser is in some sense his nous, he must still live in the light of the fact that he is also, in some sense, a human being. It is significant that Aristotle uses the word "chooses". That the theoriser chooses to act as virtue demands, suggests that he engages in such activities because he wants to do them and opts to do them voluntarily for "choice" Aristotle tells us, is a "deliberate desire for things that are within our power" (1113a11). In Cooper's analysis, in contrast, the theoriser does not freely opt to perform these activities at all; he finds that he must comply because of his other needs and interests.

We know from 1178a9-23 that morally virtuous acts are what Aristotle has in mind when he says that the theoriser is human and lives as a human. So we can argue that when Aristotle writes that the theoriser chooses to live as a human being because he is human, he is implying that the theoriser in some way wishes to develop and exercise his moral capacities.

Such a view is very different from Cooper's, and it is not clear which is to be preferred. If an individual is to be identified with his nous alone, then indeed he would have no real use for intrinsically pursued moral activity. But neither NE nor De Anima give a precise and detailed account of the sense in which an individual is his nous, or even of the sense in which man qua nous is separate and distinct from man qua suntheton.

It should also be noted that, if Cooper's view is correct, the results would be thoroughly unpalatable. If a person acts morally for calculated reasons alone, there is no reason why he who is teleios Eudaimon should not violate moral principles whenever it would serve his best interests, whenever it would maximise his opportunities for theoretical activity. There is nothing to prevent us from viewing as teleios Eudaimon a man who engages in theoretical activity but who would some-
times be unjust to others, disrespectful of their worth, and inattentive to their personal needs. Such a view would of course have important implications for our topic of friendship. But it does seem to be a logical consequence of the view that theoretical activity alone constitutes teleia Eudaimonia, and that man is to be identified strictly with his nous.

We must finally consider briefly the nature of the life that is secondarily Eudaimon, the life that Aristotle calls ho kata ten allen areten (bios). Such a life clearly consists in intrinsically pursued practical and moral activity (1178a9-23). The interesting question is whether it includes intrinsically pursued theoretical activity in addition, Cooper's view is that it does so; the life that is secondarily Eudaimon is what he calls a "mixed life". It includes both intrinsically pursued moral activity, and intrinsically pursued theoretical activity, but the balance is weighted in favour of the former.

I think that it is possible to argue that Aristotle does not intend the life that is secondarily Eudaimon to include intrinsically pursued theoretical activity.

The first point is that Aristotle does not suggest anywhere in NE that such activity will be a constituent part of ho kata ten allen areten (bios). If he does intend this life to include theoretical activity, in some sense, it is strange that he makes no mention of it.

A second, more important, point that tends to suggest that this secondary life does not include intrinsically pursued theoretical activity is made by Devereux. He points out that in Book 10: 7-9, Aristotle always associates ho kata ten allen areten bios, not with nous, but with suntheton. These two facts suggest that the man who is secondarily Eudaimon has no concern for theoretical activity and pursuits. We may also recall that in Book 10: 7-9, Aristotle refers to man qua nous as divine, and to man qua suntheton as human. If theoretical activity is a manifestation of the divine, but man qua suntheton is human (not
divine), it is reasonable to argue that the life that is secondarily
Eudaimon, the life that is associated with man as suntheton, does not
include intrinsically pursued theoretical activity. Devereux writes:

In Chapter 8 of Book 10, he (Aristotle) describes the
second best form of Eudaimonia as a "life in accordance
with the virtues of our composite (suntheton) nature",
and he specifies these as moral virtues plus practical
wisdom; philosophical (theoretical) wisdom is not a
virtue of our "Composite nature". This way of character­
ising the second best form of Eudaimonia at least suggests
that the exercise of philosophical wisdom is not an
essential constituent of the active life.33

3.3 Conclusion: The Content of Eudaimonia

The goal of this chapter was to discover the nature or content of
Aristotle's Eudaimonia. We have found that there is good reason to
argue that there are two Eudaimonias, not one, but the results in respect
of the content or nature of Eudaimonia are not at all definitive. We
have failed to establish conclusively whether or not theoretical activity
is a constituent part of secondary Eudaimonia. We have also failed to
establish conclusively whether or not intrinsically pursued moral
activity is a constituent part of teleia Eudaimonia. Our failure to
establish conclusively the latter is, for our purposes, more serious
than our failure to establish conclusively the former. This is so for
the following reason. "It is only in friendship", Cooper points out,
"that Aristotle expresses himself directly on the importance to a
flourishing human life of taking an interest in other persons, merely as
such and for their own sake".34 It is thus in friendship alone
(especially virtue friendship) that we find genuinely other-regarding
tendencies. In chapter 2, we found that there is an intimate link between
friendship and the morally virtuous life. We saw, in particular, that
Aristotle holds that morally virtuous actions may be directed towards
personal friends and fellow-citizens. The good man performs good deeds
that benefit his personally-chosen friends, but he is, nevertheless,
disposed to act well by, and, indeed, benefit, those with whom he is not personally connected. In other words, the good man conducts himself towards his fellow-citizens in a spirit of friendship rather than of more rectitude. There are thus genuinely other-regarding tendencies associated with the morally virtuous life. Our next step was to establish conclusively that intrinsically pursued moral activity is part of the best life for man, that it is, in short, part of teleia Eudaimonia. If we had been successful in proving this, we would then have shown that there are genuinely other-regarding tendencies in Aristotle's teleia Eudaimonia, and that critics who argue that Aristotle's ethical theory is "ultimately selfish" are really unjustified in so doing. As it is, however, we have not been able to make this final step. We have failed to prove conclusively that intrinsically pursued moral activity is a constituent part of man's final good.

It might appear that it is Cooper's two-Eudaimonias interpretation which does most harm to the case we have been attempting to construct in that the damage for Aristotle is created by pushing intrinsically pursued moral activity into a secondary, lesser, Eudaimonia. This, however, is not really the case. Comprehensivists argue that there is one Eudaimonia, not two, and that this one Eudaimonia consists in intrinsically pursued moral activity and theoretical activity, but most concede that Aristotle does not place the two activities on a level. It is, of course, the theoretical life which is placed on a pedestal. Joachim, as we saw, noted the absurdity involved in according the two alternative ideals equal status. There is no doubt in his mind as to which is superior. Thus, even if there were only one Eudaimonia, the case we have been attempting to construct would not have been saved. We would still want to know whether the genuinely other-regarding qualities of virtue and civic friendship that we have associated with intrinsically pursued moral activity can also be associated with what Joachim calls "the supremely valuable life for man". We would still need to know that
the intimate relationship that holds between friendship and the morally virtuous life also holds between friendship and "the supremely valuable life for man" (that is, a life devoted to theoretical activity).

We can conclude that the case we have been attempting to construct to show the other-regardingness of Aristotle's ethical theory would be proved only if, in the case of the two Eudaimonias interpretation, intrinsically pursued moral activity were a constituent part of primary or teleia Eudaimonia or, if in the case of the comprehensive interpretation, such activity were a constituent of the superior level of it. We have, of course, seen that neither of these cases can be conclusively proved. Whether we believe, like Cooper, that there are two Eudaimonias, or, like Joachim, that there is one comprising two levels, there is one fact of which we can be certain. This is that Aristotle believes that theoretical activity is the more prized activity, that it is, in short, "supremely valuable for man". As this fact is certain, it is from this fact that we must begin our investigations in the next chapter.
Aristotle has no word corresponding to "moral". But various commentators on Aristotle's ethical theory such as Nagel and Cooper use the word "moral", and phrases like "the moral life" and "moral activity" with a specialised meaning. "Moral activity" and "the moral life" in this specialised sense is that kind of activity or life pursued by the phronimos, the virtue or character friend, the completely just man, as established in chapters 1 and 2. By moral activity, they mean "practically virtuous activity", that kind of activity that arises from the application of practical wisdom. In this chapter and the next, I frequently use such phrases as the "moral life" and "moral activity", and I, similarly, use them with this specialised meaning. I think such phrases are neater and less cumbersome than "practically virtuous activity" and the "practically virtuous life".

4. Ibid., p.252.

5. COOPER, John M. Reason and human good in Aristotle, 1975, chapter 3, especially pp.147-164.


7. NAGEL, Thomas op. cit., p.257.

8a. Ibid., p.257.

8b. The idea that the exercise of practical wisdom in some way "makes provision to secure" theoretical wisdom (i.e. that the life of character virtue enables one to live a good theoretical life) may appear to clash with Aristotle's view that the life of character virtue is always pursued for its own sake, and not for some ulterior reason. But this is not so, because Aristotle is not at this point talking about the motivation of individuals in pursuing the two kinds of lives. Thus, he is not saying that an individual, A, exercises practical wisdom in order to improve his capacity for theoretical wisdom, because he sees that the exercise of practical wisdom "secures" him the best life. Aristotle is looking at things from the outside only. His claim is that as a result of exercising practical wisdom well, a person is (in some way) better able to attain theoretical wisdom. Cf. pp.41-5, chapter 1. As a result of living the life of a phronimos, an individual attains what is best for himself. But he does not live this life in order to attain what is best for himself, for to do this is to live such a life for self-interested reasons.


10. Ibid., p.283.

11. NAGEL, Thomas op. cit., p.254.

12. Ibid., p.259.
13. Ibid., pp.258-259.
14. Ostwald's translation of teleia is "complete" but Ackrill's is "perfect" (ACKRILL, J.L. Aristotle's ethics, 1973).
15. NAGEL, Thomas op. cit., p.252.
17. For a discussion of the relationship of the two lives as advanced by comprehensivists see pp.96-98. See also chapter 4.
18. ROSS, W.D. Aristotle, 1949, p.233, and see also my note 8b above.
21. Ibid., p.88.
22. Ibid., p.88.
23. COOPER, John M. op. cit., chapter 3, especially pp.147-164.
24. Ibid., pp.159-165.
25. Ibid., p.160.
27. COOPER, John M. op. cit., p.176.
28. Ibid., p.163.
29. Ibid., pp.163-164.
30. Ibid., p.164.
31. Ibid., pp.164-165.
33. Ibid., p.838.
4.1 Introduction: Intention and Justification

We have seen how inexplicit Aristotle is in his discussion of the nature and content of Eudaimonia. It is for this reason that our results in the last chapter were so inconclusive. Despite this, we found that there was just one fact of which we could be certain, namely that, in Aristotle's theory, the theoretical life is supremely valuable for man. In this chapter, we shall attempt to establish whether there is an intimate relationship between true (virtue) friendship and the theoretical life. We shall attempt to establish whether Aristotle intends that friendship should play a role in this "supremely valuable" life, and we shall also attempt to establish whether he can justify that intention. These two issues are separate. It might be the case that Aristotle intends that true friendship should play a role in the theoretical life, but that given certain assumptions he makes, for example, assumptions regarding the nature of the soul, he cannot justify his intentions.

Given that there are these two issues of intention and justification, they can be combined in such a way as to yield the following four possibilities:

(1) That Aristotle intends that friendship should play no role in the theoretical life, and he provides no justification for the existence of such a role.

(2) That Aristotle intends that friendship should play a role in the theoretical life, and he provides a justification for the existence of such a role.

(3) That Aristotle intends that friendship should play no role in the theoretical life, but (his theory is such that) a justification could, nonetheless, be given for the existence of such a role.

(4) That Aristotle intends that friendship should play a role in the
theoretical life, but (his theory is such that) he cannot justify the role.

We shall attempt to establish which one of the four possibilities is true of the NE. Given the truth of Cooper's claim that it is only in virtue friendship that Aristotle expresses himself directly on the value of "taking an interest in other people merely as such and for their own sakes"\(^1\), it seems that if (1) is true, Aristotle's ethical theory is "ultimately selfish" as some critics have argued\(^2\). However, if (2) is true, the criticism would be completely unjustified. What can we say about (3) and (4)? Intentions, I believe, are very important. If Aristotle does not intend that friendship, (and hence other-regardingness) should play a vital role in the life that is "supremely valuable for man", we could scarcely be justified in exonerating his theory from the charge of selfishness, even though his theory is such that it can accidentally accommodate true friendship within it. It is simply "unintentionally unselfish". If (4) were true, a charge of selfishness does not seem justified. It would seem that it is merely unfortunate that a sound justification cannot be provided given that Aristotle desires a role for true friendship. If (4) were true, it would seem that the "selfish" criticism would have to be modified to read "selfish - but unintentionally so". This, of course, takes much of the sting out of the criticism.

4.2 Aristotle's Intentions

4.2.1 The Issue of Autarkeia

In the two books of the NE dealing with friendship, there is no separate section which deals specifically with the friendship of men engaged in the theoretical life. Nevertheless, I think it is possible to reach some conclusions as to whether or not Aristotle intends that friendship should play a vital role in this form of Eudaimonia. Of central
importance in Aristotle's discussion is the notion of autarkēia (self-sufficiency) and we shall, therefore, examine it in some detail.

Aristotle claims that the perfect good must be self-sufficient (autarkēia). He informs us at 1097b9-11 that by self-sufficient he does not mean a man who lives his life in isolation, but a man who also lives with parents, children, a wife, and friends and fellow citizens generally, since man is by nature a social and political being.

What he does understand by self-sufficient is "that which taken by itself makes something desirable and deficient in nothing". He concludes: "It is happiness in our opinion which fits this description".

The chief good, according to Aristotle, must be final. This means that it must be desired for its own sake, and not for the sake of something else. Although we may choose honour, pleasure, reason, and virtue for themselves, we could also choose them for the sake of happiness. But happiness we could never desire for the sake of something else.

What men choose for its own sake must be completely or perfectly desirable and choiceworthy, and deficient in nothing. This is the way in which the final good is self-sufficient.

An important point must be made. Happiness (Eudaimonia), as we have seen, consists in various activities. According to Cooper's interpretation, teleia Eudaimonia consists in theoretical activity alone, while Eudaimonia simpliciter consists in moral activity and some theoretical activity too. But, in saying that Eudaimonia consists in certain activities (not in others), Aristotle is not making any claims about the type of external goods (if any) that might be vital constituents of it. In saying that Eudaimonia consists in the activity of theoria, and not, for example, in the activities of gambling and drinking, Aristotle is neither asserting nor denying that certain external goods may be necessary and vital constituents of Eudaimonia. The question is quite open. Teleia Eudaimonia could be inclusive in that it includes certain external
goods, or it could be exclusive in that it excludes such goods. The passage quoted above suggests that Aristotle wants to include human relationships in Eudaimonia; he mentions specifically "parents, children, a wife, friends and fellow citizens".

That Aristotle wants to include certain external goods in Eudaimonia becomes clearer in the continuation of that passage. Aristotle writes:

It is happiness in our opinion which fits this description. Moreover happiness is of all things the most desirable, and it is not counted as one good thing among many others. But if it were counted as one among many others, it is obvious that the addition of even the least of these goods would make it more desirable; for the addition would produce an extra amount of good, and the greater amount of good is always more desirable than the lesser. We see then that happiness is something final and self-sufficient and the end of our actions. (1097b15-21)

If Eudaimonia were an exclusive end (in Hardie's sense), that is, if it consisted in theoretical activity alone, and omitted all external goods such as human relationships, then it is surely to be "counted as one good among many" since the addition of friends, family, and general harmonious social interaction would produce a greater amount of good. It appears then that if Eudaimonia is to be self-sufficient (deficient in nothing) it must be an inclusive end, that is, it must include such external goods, for otherwise the addition of such goods would make it more desirable. And if Eudaimonia is not that which is most desirable and choiceworthy, it is deficient in certain respects, and thus is not self-sufficient (sufficient unto itself, lacking in nothing). It appears then that Eudaimonia (and of course teleia Eudaimonia) which cannot be deficient in any way, must be inclusive ends. They must be particular lifestyles, forms of life, characterised by certain activities, and certain "external" goods such as human relationships.

It seems clear then that Aristotle's notion of Eudaimonia and self-sufficiency cannot be such that it excludes goods such as friends and social interaction within the city state. Such goods must be included in Eudaimonia for the simple reason that the individual who has them will
have a life that is more desirable and choiceworthy than he who is
without them. There are in fact passages in the NE where Aristotle
explicitly says that Eudaimonia includes such goods. At 1099a31-6,
for example, he says:

And there are some external goods the absence of which
spoils supreme happiness, e.g. good birth, good children,
and beauty: for a man who is very ugly in appearance or
ill-born or who lives all by himself and has no children
cannot be classified as altogether happy; even less
happy perhaps is a man whose children and friends are
worthless, or one who has lost good children and friends
through death.

To be self-sufficient, then, it is not necessary to live a "solitary
life". The definition of self-sufficient at 1097b8-15 is thus quite
consistent with Aristotle's claim at the beginning of Book 8 that "nobody
would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other good
things"(1155a6-7), and with other claims he makes at 1157b-1158a. In
these sections he says that even those who are supremely happy wish to
"spend time" with others; in fact, "solitude suits these people least
of all" (1157b21). It would surely be strange to make the happy man
solitary, Aristotle writes elsewhere, and we should not imagine the
supremely happy person enduring the pain of a solitary life (1169b16-17).
"Nobody", he comments, "can endure what is painful continually, not even
the good itself, were it painful to him" (1158a24-25).

Man's capacity for self-sufficiency is not realised by isolating
himself, but by living a life that is truly Eudaimon. "The individual
when isolated", Aristotle says in the Politics "is not self-sufficient
... He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he
is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god" (1253a26-9).
A man does not become self-sufficient by denying his social nature. In
this formulation of autarkeia (self-sufficient), Burnet points out,
Aristotle takes the "auto" in autarkeia as what suffices by itself, and not
as what suffices for a man by himself.

There is, however, another definition of "self-sufficient" offered by
Aristotle which appears to compete with, and contradict, the one just given by ruling out the possibility of friendship and harmonious social relations. We know that it is in the activity of *theoria* that a human being most closely approximates the divine. It is by the activity of *theoria* that humans come closest to living the divine life and come closest to attaining complete happiness, and it is as a philosopher that a man is best loved by the gods, since it is reasonable that the gods should delight in that which is best and most akin to them (1179a25-6). But a god, as we have just seen in the quotation above from the *Politics* has no need of friends for a god is sufficient for himself alone.

This kind of divine self-sufficiency appears to compete with the appeals of friendship and harmonious social interaction. Aristotle makes clear that this kind of self-sufficiency is a measure of a thing’s goodness. Among the ways of comparing good things in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle mentions self-sufficiency since "of two things, that which stands less in need of the other, or of other things ... is the greater good, since it is more self-sufficing" (1364a8).

Among Aristotle’s recommendations for the theoretical life is its self-sufficiency. He suggests that if a man chooses this life, he can, in the activity of *theoria*, be most self-sufficient, independent and self-reliant.

And the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most to the "theoretic" activity. For while a philosopher as well as a just man, or one possessing any other virtue, needs the necessaries of life, when they are sufficiently equipped with things of that sort, the just man needs people towards whom and with whom he will act justly, and the temperate man, the brave man, and each of the others is in the same case, but the wise man, even when by himself, can engage in thought, and the better the wiser he is; no doubt he can do so better if he has fellow workers but he is nonetheless most self-sufficient. (1177a27-b1)

In this passage, Aristotle claims that the philosopher (he who is engaged in the theoretical life), like the morally virtuous man, requires the necessities of life, but unlike him, he can engage in his chosen activity by himself, without other human beings. Friends, fellow
citizens, and fellow workers are not vital to him. Aristotle certainly does not suggest that human relationships are a "constituent good" in his Eudaimonia, that his Eudaimonia would in some way be incomplete without harmonious human relationships, without friends, parents, a wife, and children. This passage seems to contradict 1097b19-21, and 1099a31-b6 where we saw that Aristotle explicitly and implicitly holds that without such human relationships, Eudaimonia would be deficient (in desirability and choiceworthiness) and hence not self-sufficient.

Thus, the passages at 1097b9-21 and 1099a31-36 seem to support what Hardie calls the inclusive interpretation, the interpretation that Eudaimonia includes certain goods such as friends and harmonious social relations in addition to theoretical activity, while the passage at 1177a27-b1 seems to support the exclusive interpretation, the interpretation that Eudaimonia is simply the life of theoretical activity and excludes such goods as friends and harmonious social relations.

There is clearly a tension in Aristotle's account between the probable isolation of the philosopher arising both from his desire for self-sufficiency (the desire to be godlike) and also from the nature of his activity, and the inherent human need and desire for friendship and social interaction. This tension mirrors the tension in the NE between man as nous (and, therefore, divine) and man as composite or suntheton (and, therefore, human) that we examined before. Hardie's "inclusive" Eudaimonia is more appropriate to man's nature as suntheton, as a social being; his "exclusive" Eudaimonia is more appropriate to man as nous, as a divine being.

Aristotle clearly praises the self-sufficiency, independence and self reliance of the theoriser; the fact that this man alone "can think even when by himself". Despite this, I believe that it is the conception of self-sufficiency attained through community and friendship, rather than through total isolation, that Aristotle ultimately prefers. My argument will refer to some passages in the NE to which we have
already referred in the context of moral virtue. The argument is, in fact, the parallel of that already given in that context.

Aristotle informs us that although the "activity of our intelligence (nous) constitutes teleia Eudaimonia, such a life would be more than human. A man who would live it would do so not insofar as he is human, but because there is a divine element within him." The activity of nous is as far above the activity of practical virtue as the nature of man qua nous is above the nature of man qua suntheton.

Aristotle also informs us that of all people it is the philosopher or theoriser who needs the fewest external goods for his activity for he can think without political power, without great wealth and without other people. But this philosopher is also a human being and insofar as he is human, and lives in the society of his fellow men, he chooses to live the morally virtuous life. Thus, like the morally virtuous man, he will choose and desire appropriate external goods and this will include choosing and desiring friends, family, good children etc. (1178b3-7). Even though the theoriser is in some sense his nous, Aristotle still insists that he must live in the light of the fact that he is, in some sense, human. Neither NE nor De Anima give a precise account of the sense in which man is his nous, or of the sense in which man qua nous is separate and distinct from man qua suntheton, or complex being. But, Aristotle certainly believes that the theoriser must live and choose like a human being. He thus acts as a moral agent, lives among his fellow men, and shows them concern and respect. The theoriser chooses to live as a human being because he is human. He chooses the society of his fellow men (1178b3-7).

This interpretation allows us to make sense of Aristotle's assertions about the importance of friendship and harmonious social interaction. It allows us to make sense of his comment in the Politics that "the individual when isolated is not self-sufficing", and of his comment in NE that "by self-sufficiency we do not mean a man who lives
his life in isolation, but a man who also lives with parents, children, a wife, and friends and fellow citizens generally". It allows us to make sense of his comment that "we should not imagine the supremely happy person enduring the pain of a solitary life" (1169b16-17), of the comment in Magna Moralia that "the self-sufficient man will need, in addition, friendship", and finally, of his comment in NE that justice may be found among men "who share their life with an eye to being self-sufficient". It is the notion of self-sufficiency attained through friendship and community that, I believe, Aristotle ultimately prefers.

There is another important point concerning the human dimension of the theoriser. This point arises out of what was said earlier against the purely intellectualist interpretation of Eudaimonia.

The activity of the gods and their perfect happiness is to be found in theoretical activity, the life of the mind. The greatest happiness for mortals is attained in the same activity, so far as is possible for man, as this activity is best and most pleasant. The intellectual faculty, that power which makes man think is "our natural ruler and guide" (1177a14), and "even if it be small in bulk, in power and worth it surpasses everything" (1178a2-3). It is thus in the activity of theoria that humans come closest to living the lives of the gods, and come closest to complete happiness. When they engage in theoretical activity they are employing their "best part" (the theoretical element of the rational part of the soul) in conformity with theoretical wisdom, and the purer and more continuous the activity becomes, the more they approach the realisation of their natures qua nous, qua divine. However, as we said before, only the gods can engage in pure theoretical activity. Men's efforts are more limited, first, because their intellectual powers are more limited, and secondly, because, unlike a god, they also have a material being; they have a body, desires, sensations, and appetites which make pure and continuous theoria impossible for them. Because men have these limitations, it was argued
that pure and continuous theoretical activity is an impossible ideal.

It was argued that the purely intellectualist interpretation of Eudaimonia must be wrong for it is an ideal that no man can realise, and yet Aristotle claims that "the good which we are now seeking must be obtainable". We then suggested that Eudaimonia must include at some level an attainable ideal such as intrinsically pursued moral activity. The inclusion of such activity certainly takes care of the problem of man's material mode (his desires, appetites, sensations), but what about the problem concerning his limited or imperfect intellectual powers? With imperfect intellectual powers, men may find that a life devoted to theoria is too high an ideal, too daunting, and thus not fully pleasurable. I think that it is here that friendship and the sharing of intellectual activities play an important role.

In Book 10 of NE, Aristotle says of the philosopher that "he can engage in theoria better with fellow workers" (1177b1). This idea that "two heads are better than one" finds support from a passage in the Metaphysics. Aristotle writes:

The investigation of truth is in one sense difficult, in another easy. An indication of this is that while no one is able to attain it properly, neither do they all miss the goal, but each one says something about the nature of things. Thus, although individually they make little or no contribution to the truth, the sum of all their efforts is a result of some magnitude. (993a30-b4)

Philosopher friends share in the activity of thought. Aristotle claims that the greatest mark of friendship is living together, and "sharing together in discussion and thought" is what living together means in the case of men, and not, as for cattle "feeding in the same place".

Aristotle enumerates many activities that can be shared; among them is the study or common pursuit of philosophy (1172a1-7). We can, therefore, say that, as friends, men of intellectual excellence live or share their lives together as co-workers in theoretical activity.

According to Aristotle, a shared life is compatible with self-sufficiency. In the NE, he remarks that justice may be found among men
"who share their life with an eye to self-sufficiency" (1134a26-7). It is this idea of self-sufficiency attained through community, friendship and the sharing of activities which, I think, Aristotle ultimately prefers, and which lies behind his belief that even those engaged in theoría realise their activity more completely with other philosophers.

Joachim's interpretation is similar. He writes:

Friendship ... i.e. intellectual communion and fellowship of noble action - so far from arguing a want of self-sufficiency in the Eudaimon, is a necessary condition of life. For without it, he would be actually endeès i.e. deficient in something intrinsically aireton (choice-worthy) to him, something therefore which he ought to have.

4.2.2 Which Type of Friendship?

Before we finally leave the subject of Aristotle's intentions regarding friendship and the theoretical life, we must address one final question. In chapter 2, we saw that Aristotle analyses three distinct classes of friendship - utility friendships, pleasure friendships, and virtue friendships. He has no fourth class called "theoretical friendships". This, indeed, is not surprising since, as we noted, there is no separate section in the NE dealing specifically with the friendship of men engaged in the theoretical life. Despite this, we have seen that it is reasonable to suggest that Aristotle intends that the philosopher or theoriser, like all other men, should engage in friendships. But in what kind of friendship? The question is very important. Virtue friendships are clearly the most other-regarding of the three classes. The two lesser forms are, of course, much less so. If Aristotle's ethical theory is to be exonerated from the charge of selfishness, we need at least to show that he intends that those who are truly Eudaimon engage only in the highest form of friendship.

We have seen that Aristotle argues that man fulfils his function, attains Eudaimonia, by exercising his soul in conformity with reason. We have also seen that the "rational part of the soul has two sub-
divisions (1103a1-3), a theoretical subdivision and a practical subdivision, and that the former is the higher and better of the two. In theoretical activity, the individual employs the better and divine element of the rational part of the soul. In engaging in such activity, he attains teleia Eudaimonia. In contrast, in practical (moral) activity, the individual employs the lesser or human element of the rational part of his soul. In engaging in such activity, he attains "secondary" Eudaimonia.

If the highest form of friendship is appropriate to the individual who is secondarily Eudaimon, it seems reasonable to assume that it is also appropriate to he who is teleios Eudaimon. It is implausible to suggest that he who is teleios Eudaimon should be fulfilled and content with inferior friendships. It is more reasonable to suggest that Aristotle intends that he who is teleios Eudaimon, like he who is secondarily Eudaimon, should engage only in the highest form of friendship, in virtue friendship. Theoretical wisdom, like practical wisdom, is a virtue. It is, in fact, the "highest virtue". It seems plausible to argue that Aristotle should intend that he who lives in conformity with the "highest virtue" should choose the highest (virtue) friendship. I think that it is quite possible to construct an account of the friendship of intellectually virtuous men which parallels Aristotle's account of morally virtuous men. There seems to be no evidence to show that the same principles do not hold.

In our discussion of morally virtuous friendship, several points emerged:

1. That morally virtuous men love and choose the good in itself.
2. That this good in itself is to be found, not in the metaphysical Platonic heaven, but in the concrete behaviour of virtuous men.
3. That morally virtuous activity or behaviour is good in itself; it is chosen as an end in itself, and he who chooses it will be Eudaimon.
4. That since morally virtuous men cannot but love the good, affection necessarily accompanies this awareness of the good, and it is for this reason that morally virtuous men have affection for each other.

Morally virtuous men observe each other performing morally virtuous acts. This observation brings with it a consciousness of oneself and others as moral agents, and this consciousness brings with it an admiration and affection for others who share the goal of attaining what is morally best. One wishes for the good of these people just because, and insofar as one is noble and virtuous, one wishes for the good in itself, and these people, in living such a life, are the personification of this good in itself. Anyone who loves the good will love these men, Aristotle says, "qua good men". 7

5. That morally virtuous friends value each other for what is essential to themselves, and not for what is accidental. It is accidental in Aristotle's account that a man is handsome or wealthy. His intrinsic value lies in his mind and in his character as ruled and guided by that mind. The morally virtuous friend opts for the intrinsic rather than for the instrumental, for the essential rather than for the accidental.

6. That the friendship of morally virtuous men is permanent, not transient, for good character, when fully developed, is enduring.

I think that a parallel account can be constructed for intellectually virtuous friendship upon the same principles.

1. It is clear that all virtuous men love the good in itself. This is the keystone in Aristotle's ethical theory. He who is intellectually virtuous, no less than he who is morally virtuous loves and chooses the good in itself.
2. That this good in itself is to be found, not in the metaphysical Platonic heaven, but in the activities of intellectually virtuous men.

3. That intellectually virtuous activity is good in itself; it is chosen as an end in itself and he who chooses it will be teleios Eudaimon.

4. All virtuous men love what is inherently good, what is good in itself. Morally virtuous men love what is morally good. Theoretically virtuous men love and choose what is intellectually good. We have argued that, in the case of morally virtuous men, affection necessarily accompanies the awareness of the moral good, and it is for this reason that morally virtuous men have affection for each other. It could similarly be argued that, in the case of the intellectual good, affection necessarily accompanies awareness of the intellectual good, and it is for this reason that fellow theorisers have affection for each other.

Intellectually virtuous men can observe each other's attempts at attaining theoretical wisdom. This observation can bring with it a consciousness of oneself and others as rational intellectual agents, and this consciousness can bring with it an admiration and affection for others who share the goal of attaining intellectual excellence. One can wish for the good of these people just because, and insofar as one is good, one wishes for the good in itself, and these people, in living such a life, are the personification of this good in itself, this intellectual excellence. Just as the inherent goodness of moral actions necessarily gives rise to mutual affection among fellow promoters of social harmony and welfare, so, it could be argued, the inherent goodness and rationality of acts of wisdom would necessarily give rise to mutual affection among fellow theorisers.

5. To value and have affection for a man on account of his theoretical...
Wisdom is to value and have affection for him on account of what he is essentially and not accidentally. Man's essential and intrinsic value lies in his mind, in his rationality. We have seen that there is good reason to believe that Aristotle regards theoretical wisdom as the higher and better aspect of that rationality, the aspect that more truly defines him. Thus, it is certainly true to argue that the intellectually virtuous friend opts for the intrinsic rather than for the instrumental, for the essential rather than for the accidental.

6. That the friendship of intellectually virtuous men is permanent, imitating in this the duration of the eternal spheres which such friends may help each other to contemplate.

We can summarise this section as follows: Aristotle clearly intends that the man engaged in theoretical activity, like the man who is engaged in moral activity, should have friends. He should not lead a solitary life. Aristotle does not specify which of the three classes of friendship would be most appropriate to him. I have tried to show why, according to Aristotle's principles, according to what he says generally about friendship, virtue and the theoretical life, it is reasonable to suppose that it is the class of virtue friendship which is appropriate to the man who is teleios Eudaimon.

In chapter 2 we argued that virtue friendships have distinct other-regarding features. In particular, we noted that the well-wishing and affection in virtue friendship is genuine and unconditional; it is felt on account of what the friend is in himself, and not on account of any pleasures and advantages he can offer. The affection and well-wishing is thus not hedged about with self-regarding conditions and qualifications. There is no evidence in NE to show that the same principles do not hold in the case of intellectually virtuous friendships, that the unconditional and genuine well-wishing and affection that obtains in the case of morally virtuous friendship cannot also hold in the case of intellec-
tually virtuous friendships. We have also seen in this section that there is some reason to believe that Aristotle intends that the man who is theoretically virtuous and, therefore, *teleios* Eudaimon, is also a good moral agent. He acts morally, not as Cooper suggests, because it suits his interests, but because he is a human being and he chooses to live as one. He thus desires and chooses the company of others, and he desires and chooses to live a moral life. For these reasons, we can say that Aristotle does not intend the theoretical life to be a selfish one, and those engaged in it to be selfish.

At the beginning of this chapter, a distinction was drawn between "intention" and "justification". It was suggested that although Aristotle might intend that his theoriser also be a good friend and a morally virtuous man, he may not be able to justify that intention because of certain assumptions he makes. It is to this topic of justification that I shall now turn. It will require a detailed examination of the nature of man's soul. If Aristotle is to justify the claim that the theoriser chooses a moral life and chooses to be a good friend, he must show that there is some connection between the emotional and affective elements of the soul, and the intellectual element of the soul, for, if there is no such connection, the appropriate feelings and emotions that characterise friendship and which are also necessary for moral action could not be generated.

### Aristotle's Justification

#### 4.3.1 The Nature of the Soul

In NE Book 1, 13, Aristotle begins his discussion of the virtues with a brief analysis of the nature of the soul. He informs us that it consists of two elements, one rational and one non-rational. These elements in turn each consist of two parts.

In respect of the parts of the non-rational element, Aristotle comments:
Thus we see that the irrational element of the soul has two parts: one is vegetative and has no share in reason at all, the other is the seat of the appetites and of desire in general and partakes of reason insofar as it complies with and accepts its leadership; it possesses reason in the sense that we say it is "reasonable" to accept the advice of a father and of friends, not in the sense that we have a rational understanding of mathematical propositions.

(1102b28-33)

In respect of the parts of the rational element he says:

If it is correct to say that the appetitive (part) too has reason, it follows that the rational element of the soul has two subdivisions: the one possesses reason in the strict sense, contained within itself, and the other possesses reason in the sense that it listens to reason as one would listen to a father.

(1103a1-4)

When Aristotle says that the one subdivision "possesses reason in the strict sense, contained within itself", he is referring to the calculative and theoretical parts. The subdivision that "possesses reason in the sense that it listens to a father" is the appetitive part that listens to practical wisdom.

Man's soul thus consists in three parts. First, there is the vegetative, completely non-rational part. This is responsible for growth and nutrition but it plays no part in man's fulfilment as a rational being. Secondly, there is an appetitive part (or capacity) which is part rational and part non-rational. It is the centre of appetite and desire and it can listen to reason and conform to it. This part plays a role in the fulfilment of man as a rational being since it is in some sense rational. Thirdly, there are the parts (or capacities) that "possess reason in the strict sense, contained within itself" and have no association with desire and appetite. These purely rational parts (or capacities), the calculative and theoretical, play the most important role in the fulfilment of man as a rational being.

The appetitive, calculative and theoretical parts (or capacities) may be described as the rational parts (or capacities) of the soul. These rational parts (or capacities) may be realised or used in rational activities. We know that, for Aristotle, a man attains Eudaimonia when he fulfils his function as a rational being. Thus, we can say
that when a man engages in activities that use these three rational capacities, he is fulfilling his function as a rational being, and he thereby attains Eudaimonia. He who uses these capacities fully, engages in excellent (virtuous) activity and is, accordingly, an excellent (virtuous) man.

The three rational parts (or capacities) of the soul all have separate virtues. Moral virtue (morally virtuous activity) is the virtue of the appetitive part; practical wisdom (practical activity) is the virtue of the calculative part; and theoretical wisdom (theoretical activity) is the virtue of the theoretical part.

In respect of moral virtue, Aristotle says:

Virtue or excellence is a characteristic involving choice, and it consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it.

It is clear that Aristotle sees a relation between moral virtue, (the virtue of the appetitive part) and practical wisdom, (the virtue of the calculative part). We shall examine the relation shortly. But we should note now that practical wisdom is essential to moral virtue. The mean is determined by the individual who has practical wisdom. The importance of practical wisdom for the practice of moral virtue is also stated by Aristotle at 1106b10:

For it is moral virtue that is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is in emotions and actions that excess, deficiency, and the median are found. Thus we can experience fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and generally any kind of pain either too much or too little, and in either case not properly. But to experience all this at the right time, toward the right object, toward the right people, for the right reason, and in the right manner ... this is the median and the best course, the course that is a mark of virtue.

In respect of practical wisdom, the virtue of the calculative part, Aristotle says:

It (practical wisdom) is a truth attaining characteristic of acting rationally in matters good and bad for man ... That is why we think that Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom. They have the capacity of seeing what
is good for themselves and for mankind, and these are, we believe, the qualities of men capable of managing households and states. (1140b4-11)

He who has practical wisdom calculates and deliberates well. But as "no one deliberates about objects that cannot be other than as they are" (1139al2-13), practical wisdom must deal with "objects" that admit of being otherwise, with things that are contingent. For Aristotle, there are two kinds of contingent things: (1) things that are made, that is, artifacts and (2) things that are done, that is, actions performed in the city state. For our purposes (2) is especially important. The ability to do the right thing, to the right people, in the right circumstances, and in the right manner is directly dependent on the application of the virtue (or excellence) of practical wisdom.

Aristotle notes:

Practical wisdom, on the other hand, is concerned with human affairs and with matters about which deliberation is possible. As we have said, the most characteristic function of a man of practical wisdom is to deliberate well: no one deliberates about things that cannot be other than they are, nor about things that are not directed to some end, an end that is good and attainable by action. In an unqualified sense, that man is good at deliberating who, by reasoning, can aim at and hit the best thing attainable to man by action. (1141b8-14)

Practical wisdom enables a man to deliberate well about actions he can perform. Aristotle denies that the actions upon which the man of practical wisdom deliberates are simply those that enhance his own well-being. Practical wisdom is concerned with the welfare of the individual who possesses it, but it cannot be confined to the welfare of that individual alone since the individual is first and foremost a member of the society.

A man who knows and concerns himself with his own interests is regarded as a man of practical wisdom ... For people seek their own good and think that this is what they should do ... And yet surely one's own good cannot exist without household management nor without a political system. (1142a1-10)

At 1141b24-27, Aristotle tells us that practical wisdom includes the science of politics and legislation. Thus we can say that the capacity
of practical wisdom has a wide field of application, extending to all
social, political and moral affairs. Problems in these areas could
not be adequately solved by individuals who lacked the capacity to
deliberate well.

In respect of theoretical wisdom which is the virtue or excellence
that stems from the theoretical part of the rational element of the soul,
Aristotle says:

It is, therefore, clear, that wisdom must be the most precise
and perfect form of knowledge. Consequently, a wise man
must not only know what follows from fundamental principles,
but he must also have true knowledge of the fundamental
principles themselves. Accordingly, theoretical wisdom
must comprise both intelligence and scientific knowledge.

Theoretical wisdom, unlike practical wisdom, deals with fundamental
principles and realities that do not admit of being otherwise. It does
not deal with contingent matters, nor does it have any affiliation with
desire, choice and human action. Its only goal is the attainment of
truth and the avoidance of falsity in the realm of eternal and necessary
truths. It thus deals with knowledge of the highest and purest kind.
Aristotle makes the contrast between practical wisdom and theoretical
wisdom very clear. Practical wisdom is the foundation of all deliber-
ation and choice and is the virtue responsible for decision and action
in the field of man's moral, social and political well-being. Theo-
retical wisdom, in contrast, is the capacity that enables a man to
discover fundamental principles and to make correct deductions from them.
It is the virtue or excellence responsible for attaining truth in the
sphere of eternal and unchanging reality.

We must now examine the relationships that exist between the three
virtues. In particular, we shall need to discover if there are any
substantive relationships between theoretical wisdom and practical
wisdom, and between theoretical wisdom and moral virtue. This will
enable us to establish whether the individual who is teleios Eudaimon,
or most proficient in theoretical activity is necessarily most
proficient at performing actions that have the good of his fellow men at heart (whether, in short, he is also most proficient in practical wisdom), and it will also help us to establish whether he who is teleios Eudaimon also has the capacity to experience the other-regarding emotions that are central to personal and civic friendship.

There is much evidence to suggest a substantive relationship between moral virtue and practical wisdom. It seems that Aristotle is attempting to show that these two virtues are mutually dependent upon each other in the sense that neither virtue can be complete without the other.

Aristotle suggests that moral virtue is a sine qua non condition for practical wisdom in that, without moral virtue, the means-end deliberative ability that characterises practical wisdom is indistinguishable from cleverness. An individual who has the ability to work out appropriate means to a desired end, but who lacks moral virtue may be said to possess the capacity of cleverness, but not the capacity of practical wisdom. He is not, in short, a phronimos. For Aristotle, moral action must always have an end, and this end is what is intrinsically right and good. Deliberative excellence, excellence in means-end reasoning cannot provide this end.

A man fulfils his proper function only by way of practical wisdom and moral excellence or virtue: virtue makes us aim at the right target, and practical wisdom makes us use the right means.

"No choice", Aristotle informs us, "will be right without practical wisdom and (moral) virtue. For virtue determines the end, and practical wisdom makes us do what is conducive to that end". A morally good action results from the operation of moral virtue (which supplies the intrinsically right end) and of practical wisdom (which supplies the appropriate means). We know that, for Aristotle, a man is not good because he performs a good action. To be morally good, he must perform that action for its inherent goodness and rightness. The donation of a sum of money to a charitable organisation, for example, may be made either because it is (a) useful - the donor may be standing for office
and feel that a reputation for charity would be helpful; (b) pleasant - the donor may enjoy thinking of himself as a benefactor; or (c) good - the benefactor may make his donation for the sake of what is proper, correct, the right thing to do, and this, for Aristotle, equals what is morally good. Aristotle tells us many times that this motive, based upon a perception of what it is necessary to do, is the only one which gives moral value to an act. The objective constituents of correct action will always vary, because situations always vary, but the subjective constituents will always be the same - a choice of the good for the sake of the good. In the case of (a) and (b) above, the agent is not acting morally. He is merely employing cleverness in finding means appropriate to an end he desires. But the end is not a moral end. Moral virtue "aims at the right target" and makes our choice right for it is moral virtue that causes us to perform good and right acts just because they are intrinsically good and right, just because they have intrinsic worth. Thus we can say that moral virtue is a sine qua non condition for practical wisdom; it is necessary for a man to have moral virtue if he is to have practical wisdom in the true sense, and not mere cleverness.

It is clear that just as practical wisdom requires moral virtue for its completion, so moral virtue requires practical wisdom for its completion. Aristotle argues for the dependence of moral virtue upon practical wisdom by distinguishing between full moral virtue and natural virtue, just as he argues for the dependence of practical wisdom upon moral virtue by distinguishing practical wisdom from cleverness.

Just as there exist two kinds of quality, cleverness and practical wisdom, in that part of us which forms opinions (i.e. in the calculative element) so also there are two kinds of quality in the moral part of us, natural virtue, and virtue in the full sense. Now virtue in the full sense cannot be attained without practical wisdom.

"Natural virtue" is a trait or capacity that can be found in "children and beasts" (1144b4-9):
But it is evident that without intelligence, (natural virtue) is harmful ... (if a man acts blindly i.e. using his natural virtue alone, he will fail;) but once he acquires intelligence it makes a great difference to his action. At that point, the natural characteristic will become that virtue in the full sense which it previously resembled.

An individual may "be just and capable of self-control" because he has natural virtue. But his justice and self-control is only "good in the full sense" if it is guided by and, indeed, united with practical wisdom. Moral virtue or excellence, he tells us, "is not only a characteristic which is guided by right reason, but also a characteristic which is united with right reason; and right reason in moral matters is practical wisdom" (1144b21-5). Thus, we can say that it is necessary for a man to have practical wisdom if he is to have moral virtue, (moral virtue in the full sense and not mere natural virtue).

Aristotle states clearly the mutual dependence of the two virtues upon each other:

Our discussion, then, has made it clear that it is impossible to be good in the full sense of the word without practical wisdom or to be a man of practical wisdom without moral excellence or virtue. (1144b30-32)

We must now try to establish whether there is a relationship of mutual dependence between moral virtue and theoretical reason similar to that which we have just found to exist between moral virtue and practical reason. It seems clear that the answer must be negative. Moral virtue, Aristotle informs us, involves choosing what is right. Theoretical wisdom, in contrast, deals with attaining pure truth, not truth displayed in action.

What affirmation and negation are in the realm of thought, pursuit and avoidance are in the realm of desire. Therefore, since moral virtue is a characteristic involving choice, and since choice is a deliberative desire, it follows that if the choice is to be good, the reasoning must be true, and the desire correct; that is, reasoning must affirm what desire pursues. This then is the kind of thought and the kind of truth that is practical and concerned with action. On the other hand, in the kind of thought involved in theoretical knowledge, and not in action or production, the good and the bad states are, respectively, truth and falsehood. (1139a21-8)
Aristotle's point is that moral virtue is inextricably tied to desire, choice and action, whereas theoretical wisdom which has no such link is concerned with knowledge, truth and falsity of a non-practical kind. He is separating pure theoretical reasoning from the desire or choice-linked practical reasoning which is central to moral activity. The precise nature of the separation is not made clear, but it seems sufficient to rule out the possibility of a substantive relationship between moral virtue and theoretical wisdom.

We have found that there is a relationship of mutual dependence obtaining between moral virtue and practical wisdom. We have also found that no comparable relationship obtains between moral virtue and theoretical wisdom. To complete the task, we must attempt to establish whether there is an integral relationship between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom. We need to know, in particular, whether it is possible for an individual to have practical wisdom and not theoretical wisdom, or theoretical wisdom and not practical wisdom. The latter is, of course, more important for the topic of friendship, as we need to know whether he who engages most fully in the theoretical life is necessarily morally virtuous and a good friend. I shall try to show that the two virtues are, in fact, sharply contrasted in that they have different fields of application and also different ends or functions.

We have already seen that the two virtues have different fields of application, so only a few words are necessary by way of a reminder. Practical wisdom deals with contingent matters that are capable of being otherwise, whereas theoretical wisdom deals with things that are eternal and unchanging. The contingent matters with which practical wisdom deals are matters that are in our power and can be altered by human actions. Practical wisdom, unlike theoretical wisdom can, therefore, never be concerned with immutable truths, and with objects whose nature is divine. This already suggests a certain lack of common ground between the two virtues, but the distinction becomes sharper when we
investigate the end or function of both virtues.

Both virtues have truth as their goal or end (1139b12-13). But the end of practical wisdom is truth concerning actions which are particular and that can be otherwise, while the end of theoretical wisdom is truth concerning things that are universal and necessary. The end of practical wisdom is truth in harmony with correct desire (1139b29) but the end of theoretical wisdom is attainment of truth and avoidance of falsity.

The case for the independence of the two virtues is strengthened by the fact that Aristotle never claims that theoretical wisdom will depend upon practical wisdom for its proper functioning. We have seen that theoretical wisdom enables a man to have true knowledge of fundamental principles and, in addition, to know what follows from such principles. In fact, it is intelligence (nous) that provides knowledge of the former, it is scientific knowledge (episteme) that provides knowledge of the latter (1139b31-2)\(^\text{10}\). But neither nous nor episteme require practical wisdom for their proper functioning.

In view of the fact that theoretical wisdom has a different field of application from practical wisdom, aims at a different end or goal from practical wisdom and, finally, does not require it for its proper functioning, it is clear that the two virtues are not substantively related to each other. There would appear to be no reason why a man who excels in one of these two virtues should necessarily excel in the other. Aristotle, in fact, admits as much.

Our discussion has shown that theoretical knowledge comprises both scientific knowledge and (apprehension by the) intelligence of things which by their nature are valued most highly. That is why it is said that men like Anaxagoras and Thales have theoretical wisdom but not practical wisdom; when we see that they do not know what is advantageous to them, we admit that they know extraordinary, wonderful, difficult and superhuman things, but call their knowledge useless because the good they are seeking is not human. (1141b2-9)

This passage is especially significant and revealing for in it Aristotle allows that an individual may have theoretical wisdom and lack practical
wisdom, and that practical wisdom, therefore, is not a necessary condition for possessing and using theoretical wisdom. Anaxagoras and Thales are his examples of men who "have theoretical wisdom but not practical wisdom". If it is possible to have theoretical wisdom without practical wisdom, it is not reasonable to argue that the two virtues are integrally related and are mutually dependent upon each other.

An individual may clearly have theoretical wisdom and not practical wisdom. Is the reverse also true? For our purposes, this half of the relation is much less important, so only two brief comments will be made.

In the first place, it should be noted again that the chief characteristic of the man of practical wisdom is that he deliberates well. There is no reason to suppose that a man who deliberates well, who makes correct choices in the field of human action should necessarily excel in acquiring knowledge of fundamental principles (and what follows from them), any more than he who excels in the latter should also excel in the former.

Secondly, Aristotle never suggests that he who has the virtue of practical wisdom will necessarily also have the virtue of theoretical wisdom. The only other virtue that the phronimos has in addition to practical wisdom is, as we have seen, moral virtue.

We can now see that theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom are not integrally related to each other; there is no relation of mutual dependence between these two virtues.

We have seen that it is possible for an individual to have theoretical wisdom and not practical wisdom. We have also seen that it is possible for an individual to have theoretical wisdom and not moral virtue. We must now spell out the implications of this situation for the theory of friendship.
4.3.2 Good Deeds and Friendship

In chapters 2 and 3, we established that there is a very close relationship between the performance of good deeds and the highest form of friendship. We saw that the relationship between virtue-friendship, complete justice and virtue could be stated in the following way: in doing the right thing, virtue is present; in doing the right thing in relation to others, complete justice is present; in being conscious of oneself doing the right thing, affection for oneself or self-love is present; in being conscious of another doing the right thing, friendship or affection for that other is present. Because good men love the good, affection always accompanies this awareness of the good.

It is important to note that good deeds are of prime significance in the life of the virtuous man, the completely just man, and the virtuous friend. The importance of good deeds in true friendship is clearly stated by Aristotle:

We define a friend as one who wishes and does what is good. (1166a2-3) (My ital.)

Similarly, when he contrasts friendship with goodwill, he again emphasises good deeds. Good deeds, particularly those that aim to benefit, are a feature of friendship, but not of goodwill.

Affection implies intimacy, whereas goodwill can spring up quite suddenly as happens in the case of competitors at athletic festivals; for the spectators feel goodwill towards them, and share their hopes, but they would not do anything to help them, because their goodwill is a sudden development, and their kindly feeling is superficial. (1166b34-1167a2) (my ital.)

Good deeds are thus important in virtue friendship. Virtue friends not only share each other's goals and aspirations, they also choose to help each other.

When the virtue friend performs good deeds, he does so for the sake of the good and noble, for the sake of what is proper and correct. Aristotle tells us many times that this motive, based upon a perception of what it is necessary to do, is the only one which gives moral value to an act. He also tells us many times that it is the combination of
the powers of moral virtue and practical wisdom that enables a man to choose and perform good deeds. In performing good deeds, a man employs practical wisdom and moral virtue, but not theoretical wisdom.

We have seen that it is possible to have theoretical wisdom and to lack practical wisdom and moral virtue. It is, therefore, possible to excel in theoretical activity and to be thoroughly deficient or incompetent in moral, social and political activities. The words: "it is possible" are important. There is no relationship of mutual dependence between theoretical activity and moral virtue, or between theoretical activity and practical wisdom so that the presence of theoretical wisdom does not guarantee the presence of either moral virtue or practical wisdom.

But, at the same time, there is no evidence to suggest that theoretical wisdom in any way precludes or excludes moral virtue or practical wisdom, so that he who excels in theoretical activity must necessarily fail in practical activity. It seems, therefore, that a man may embody both kinds of wisdom, or he may not. It seems clear, then, that the morally good man and the theoriser can coincide, but that the coincidence is a matter of contingent fact rather than of necessity. The contrast between virtue friendship and moral excellence on the one hand, and virtue friendship and theoretical excellence on the other, can be stated in the following way: The morally virtuous man, the completely just man and the true friend are all different descriptions of one and the same individual - the individual who is a phronimos. But we cannot extend the identity to include theoretical wisdom too. The philosopher or theoriser is not necessarily the morally virtuous man, the completely just man and the true friend. It may be that the theoriser and the good friend often coincide, but it is not necessary that he does so. We must, therefore, conclude that we may describe as teleios Eudaimon the man who lacks the capacities for moral, and hence, other-regarding activities.

The point that the theoriser can lack moral virtue and practical
wisdom might be conceded, but an objector might argue along the following lines: an individual who lacks moral virtue and practical wisdom can, nonetheless, perform good deeds and other-regarding acts of the kind that are usually associated with virtue friendship. Aristotle speaks of natural virtue, and he speaks of an individual's acting justly through natural virtue. Although he does not specify which kind of justice he means, it is quite plausible to suggest that he means complete justice, for why should a man not be naturally generous, naturally brave, and naturally thoughtful? It would then be possible to say that an individual who lacks practical wisdom and moral virtue could, nevertheless, perform good deeds, aim to benefit others, and act in a generally other-regarding manner.

Such an argument would, I think, have two weaknesses. The first is that there is no relation of mutual dependence between theoretical wisdom and natural virtue. The individual who has theoretical wisdom need not necessarily have natural virtue. Natural virtue, like other natural characteristics, varies between individuals. It is thus quite possible for a man to excel in theoretical activity and possess little natural virtue.

The second weakness of the argument is as follows: Aristotle says, as we have seen, that the theoriser "chooses to act as virtue demands" and this suggests that engaging in such activities is something he wants to do and freely opts to do. This is because, for Aristotle, "choice" is "a deliberate desire for things that are within our power" (1113a11). But natural virtue, in contrast, is spontaneous and unchosen. It is for this reason that Aristotle argues that animals and children who lack the power to choose, can, nonetheless, possess natural virtue. The only moral virtue for Aristotle is choice of the good for the sake of the good. Thus, deeds that benefit others, but which are performed from natural virtue cannot be counted as moral in the full sense and cannot give Aristotle what he needs to justify his claim that the theoriser
"chooses to act as virtue demands". We must, therefore, conclude that it is not the case that the theoriser is necessarily a man who has genuine moral virtue in the sense that he chooses to perform acts that benefit others and, hence, engages in other-regarding activities.

Our objector might concede this point, but press his case in a different direction. He may argue that it is a mistake to give the performance of good deeds so central a place for it is not by performing good deeds alone that a man may be a good friend and be genuinely other-regarding. Our objector might argue that the friendship of fellow theorists must be sharply distinguished from the friendship of fellow promoters of social harmony and welfare. In the case of the former, there need not occur "acts of friendship" as such, but only a common consciousness of acts of wisdom whose inherent goodness and rationality would necessarily give rise to mutual affection. The affection and well-wishing felt for the friend in the case of theoretical virtue friendship is just as unconditional as it is in the case of morally virtuous friendship. In both cases, it is based upon what is intrinsic and essential rather than upon what is extrinsic and accidental. In both cases, it is based upon what the friend is in himself (his rational soul) rather than upon the advantages or pleasures the friend can give, so the affection and well-wishing is genuinely other-regarding and totally unselfish. In the case of the morally excellent man, we may say that his intrinsic value lies in his mind, and in his character as ruled and guided by that mind, and that affection and well-wishing is based upon that intrinsic self. In the case of the theoretically excellent man, we may say that his intrinsic value lies in his mind, in particular, in his nous or that part of him which is most divine and godlike, and that the affection and well-wishing is based on that intrinsic self. To wish for the friend's preservation for the sake of what best defines him, namely his power of theoretical thought (nous), our objector could argue, is most laudable and certainly unselfish.
The latter point is surely correct. To wish someone well, to have affection for him on account of what he is in himself, rather than on account of what is to be gained from him for oneself is, as we have argued before, an important feature of unselfishness. Nevertheless, I think that the argument as developed in the last paragraph may be faulted on two accounts. First, I believe that it is implausible to argue that good deeds are completely irrelevant. Secondly, I think it is possible to show that someone who lacks moral virtue (as the man of outstanding theoretical ability may do) may not, on that account, experience the requisite affection and other emotions that are central to friendship. I shall deal with the first point in the remainder of this section and with the second point in the next section.

My case for the importance of good deeds in theoretical virtue friendships will be brief and will centre around two related examples that stem from comments that Aristotle makes.

Even less happy perhaps is a man whose children and friends are worthless or who has lost good children and friends through death. (1099b4-6)

Suppose that there are two philosophers, A and B. A is very wealthy, and B is quite poor. B's young son becomes ill, is taken to the doctor who diagnoses that he has a certain condition which must be treated quickly otherwise he will die. B, however, is most distressed because the treatment is very expensive and he knows that he cannot, by himself, raise sufficient money now or perhaps at any time. A gets to know of B's predicament. It seems clear that A should practise the virtue of generosity, that it is implausible to argue that moral virtue and good deeds are irrelevant to those engaged in the theoretical life. If A does not make the money available to B on terms B can manage, then he is surely not a good friend. To be a good friend, A must have affection for B and wish him well, but one cannot plausibly argue that such affection and well-wishing is displayed in being totally neglectful and unresponsive to B's personal needs, and the personal needs of those
he loves. Aristotle, of course, sees this clearly; he notes the importance of helping friends (1167a9) and he argues that "insofar as (the philosopher) is human and lives in the society of his fellow men, he chooses to act as virtue demands" (1178b3-7).

In the related example, we can suppose that it is B himself who is ill, his philosophy begins to suffer but, as above, he cannot afford the treatment because; unlike A, he is quite poor. Even as a philosopher he has the needs of a human being:

But being a man (the philosopher) will need external prosperity; for our nature is not sufficient for the purpose of contemplation, but our body must also be healthy, and must have food and other attention. (1178b33-5)

As a man, the theoriser has certain needs which must be fulfilled. That is, even though the theoriser in some sense is his nous (and neither NE nor De Anima give a precise account of the sense in which he is his nous), Aristotle still insists that he has human needs and must, therefore, live in the light of the fact that he is, in some sense, a human being. If A wishes for his friend's preservation for the sake of what best defines him, namely his power of thought (nous), and he sees his friend's philosophy suffering through ill-health, then he must surely see the appropriateness of an act of generosity. Friendship without good deeds would be no friendship at all.

4.3.3 Affection, Moral Emotion and Friendship

We have already seen that theoretical wisdom is concerned with knowledge, truth and falsity in their non-practical applications, and that such wisdom has no connection with desire, choice and action. We have also seen that practical wisdom and moral virtue, in contrast, are inextricably bound to desire, choice, and action, and that in order to act correctly and well, an individual must employ his powers of practical wisdom and moral virtue. Virtuous action, in short, depends upon the correct application of practical wisdom and moral virtue. In this final section, I shall attempt to extend the analysis by showing how, in
Aristotle's account, appropriate emotional experience and response (this term will be explained shortly) also depend upon the correct application of practical wisdom and moral virtue. This dependence of emotional experience upon practical wisdom and moral virtue is very significant for our purposes for the following reason. We know that a man may possess theoretical wisdom and yet lack practical wisdom and moral virtue. If appropriate emotional experience depends upon practical wisdom and moral virtue, then it follows that it is possible for an individual who lacks these capacities to lack also these appropriate emotional experiences and responses. It is, of course, possible for a man to possess both theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom and moral virtue; the possession of theoretical wisdom does not exclude the possession of the other two excellences, but equally it does not guarantee their presence.

Aristotle informs us that by emotions:

I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure and pain. (1105b21-23)

He adds that it is not the presence of these emotions alone that make us virtuous; we do not praise a man merely because he feels a particular emotion such as pity but we do praise a man who "feels it in a certain way" (1105b28-33).

I shall now attempt to show that in order to feel these emotions in a certain way, in order to be praised, a man must employ moral virtue.

For it is moral virtue that is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is in emotions and actions that excess, deficiency and the median are found. Thus we can experience fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity and generally any kind of pleasure and pain either too much or too little, and in either case not properly. But to experience all this at the right time, toward the right objects, toward the right people, for the right reason, and in the right manner - that is the median and the best course, the course that is a mark of virtue. (1106b16-23)

It is thus possible to feel too little of a particular emotion, or too
much, or to feel it in the wrong manner, for the wrong person, or for
the wrong reason. It is possible, for example, to feel too little
pity or sympathy for a friend who is in a particular predicament, or to
feel it in the wrong manner or even for the wrong reason. It is moral
virtue that enables us to attain the median or mean in respect of our
emotions, to experience appropriate emotions.

There is clearly a mean in respect of our emotions just as there
is a mean in respect of our actions. Aristotle makes this clear in
the passage quoted above. He also says:

A mean can also be found in our emotional experiences,
and in our emotions. (1108a30)

We have already seen that in order to attain the mean in our emotions,
in order to be virtuous, we need moral virtue. However, we also need
practical wisdom:

(Moral) virtue or excellence is a characteristic involving
choice, and it consists in observing the mean relative to
us, a mean that is defined by a rational principle such as
a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it.
(1106b36-1107a2)

At 1178a9-23, Aristotle tells us that it is necessary to control our
emotions by possessing and employing practical wisdom, and that the
emotions are closely related to virtues of character.

Enough has been said concerning the dependence of correct or
appropriate emotion (emotion that attains the mean) upon moral virtue
and practical wisdom to show that there is a problem for the individual
who has theoretical wisdom but not these other two virtues. It would
be quite possible for a man to be excellent in theoretical activity, but,
for example, to miss the mean of pity or sympathy towards a friend who
is in a particular predicament. The theoriser may feel too little pity
and sympathy or he may feel none at all, his sympathy may be directed
towards the wrong person, or he may feel it for the wrong reason.

The same problem could arise in respect of affection too, and
affection, as we know, is central to friendship. The theoriser may
feel too little affection for a friend, or he may feel it in the wrong
manner or for the wrong reason. The idea that a man of great theoretical ability could, nonetheless, feel affection for his friend and wish him well for the wrong reason is very significant. In Aristotle’s theory, there is only one virtuous motive - the choice of the good for the sake of the good, and it is this motive that is associated with virtue friendship. The virtuous man chooses correctly; he chooses what is essential and intrinsic, what is good in itself, and this is the rational soul. In the case of theoretical virtue friendship, I suggested that the affection and well-wishing would be based, not upon the rational soul in its entirety, but upon one part of it, upon nous or that part that is most authoritative and most godlike. To feel affection and wish a man well on this account is to feel affection for him for the right reason in Aristotle’s account. If the theoriser feels affection for the friend for any other reason, we must conclude that it is not virtue friendship. We can now see that it is possible for a man to have outstanding theoretical ability and yet to lack the moral emotions and moral affection that is requisite for virtue friendship. The type of affection associated with virtue friendship is the only one that is truly other-regarding, and there seems to be no guarantee that the theoriser should experience it.

As the possession of theoretical wisdom does not rule out the possibility of the possession of practical wisdom and moral virtue, it is quite possible that the man who excels in theoretical wisdom could also attain the mean in emotional experience, character and deeds. Equally, however, we must conclude that as there is no mutual dependence of theoretical wisdom upon moral virtue and practical wisdom, as it is possible to have theoretical wisdom and to lack the other two virtues, we cannot be sure that the theoriser will attain the mean in these three respects. We have seen that the morally good man (he who attains the mean in these ways) and the true friend are one and the same person under different descriptions; we can now see that we cannot
similarly identify the theoretically excellent man with the true friend. It may be that they coincide as a matter of contingent fact; on the other hand, they may not do so.

There seems to be good evidence to suggest that Aristotle intends that the theoriser choose and live a morally excellent life, and engage in the best form of friendship, a form of friendship that is genuinely other-regarding. Despite this, we must conclude that he leaves that intention unjustified. He cannot justify a role for true friendship and morally excellent activity in the life that is teleios Eudaimon.


4. This is the line of reasoning that Hardie seems to be presenting on pages 22-23 of Aristotle's ethical theory.

5. BURNET, John The ethics of Aristotle, 1900, pp. 32-33.


7. Aristotle's argument about the desirability of having a friend, another self, on the grounds that we can observe his actions more easily than we can our own, has met with objections. Hardie writes:

   If it is obvious that there is a sense in which we can be aware of the activities, including the thoughts, of others more easily than we can be aware of our own, it is no less obvious that there is a sense in which our own activities and thoughts are the only activities and thoughts of which we can be aware at all ... Aristotle ignores the difference between a man's awareness of his own thoughts, and his awareness of the thoughts of his friend ... Unless there were a difference, the thoughts of his friend would have to be literally his own thoughts. HARDIE, W.F.R. op. cit., 1968, p. 331.

   Cooper in "friendship and the good" (p. 294) grants Hardie's point, but says that it makes no difference to Aristotle's argument. However, perhaps Hardie's point should not be granted anyway, for it is not at all clear that "awareness" in the argument at 1170b8-12 should be interpreted as introspection, as an immediate awareness of the contents of consciousness (of the other person).

8. It should be noted that the terminology used in Books 1 and 6 of the NE is different from that used in Book 10 chapters 6-9. In Books 1 and 6, Aristotle speaks of the parts and elements of the soul, whereas in Book 10, 6-9, he speaks of nous and suntheton. It might be thought that this change of terminology indicates a change in Aristotle's views, that his views on the nature of the soul and man's fulfilment of his function as a rational being have undergone major revision so that his ideas about the soul's parts and virtues in Books 1 and 6 should not be taken as his real view of the subject. L.H.G. Greenwood offers four reasons for "supposing that VI and X, vi-viii are in the main thoroughly consistent with one another". (Aristotle: Nicomachean ethics, book six, 1909, p. 78).

   First, X, vi-viii, regards theoretical wisdom as the best virtue (as VI does), and makes Eudaimonia result from the employment of this virtue. Secondly, theoria kata sophian in VI may be regarded as equivalent to theoretiike in X, vi-viii since both expressions are used to refer to speculative, as opposed to practical, activity. Thirdly, there is no need to be concerned by the fact that in VI to epistemonikon but not nous is called the best part of the soul, since:
Nous in X vii is probably used (in much the same sense as in VI ii) to mean the intellect in general, and is distinguished from the inferior part of the soul, whose 
energeia (activity) is praktike (practical), in the same way as, in VI ii, dianoia aute (understanding itself) is distinguished from dianoia conjoined with orexis (desire). (Ibid. p.77)

Finally, there are a number of details in X, vi-viii which "show agreement with, or dependence upon, the doctrine of VI and the form in which it is there expressed" (Ibid., p.78). Two of the more important details that Greenwood mentions are (i) the relationship between practical wisdom and moral virtue, and (ii) the relationship between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom.

9. It should be pointed out that there is no agreement among commentators in respect of the terminology that should be employed to refer to the divisions and subdivisions of man's soul. Ross uses "faculty", "element" and "part"; Rackham uses "faculty" and "part", and Ostwald "element" and "part". Moreover, where one commentator uses the term "part" to describe a particular division of aspect of the soul, another commentator may use the term "element" instead to describe precisely the same division or aspect of the soul. Thus, to avoid confusion, I have used one translation (Ostwald's) throughout this section.

10. See also NE 1141a3-8. Ostwald refers the reader to Posterior Analytics 71b9-72b4, 73a21-74a3.
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