Black advancement, human resources and socio-economic transformation in Zimbabwe after 1980.

Thesis

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ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the policy and practice of black advancement and human resource planning and development in Zimbabwe, in the light of the country's commitment to socialist transformation.

To this end, the thesis undertakes a discussion of the various theoretical paradigms relevant to black advancement and human resource development and planning. It provides a background to the nature of the economy and the state, and education and employment in Zimbabwe before 1980. The thesis then examines the approach of the new government to education and training, it examines the nature of black advancement in the public and private sectors, and broader aspects of human resource development and planning in relation to black advancement and socio-economic transformation.
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Where's black advancement?

Yes, I must congratulate the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation for the timely interview with Mr. John Wood, executive chairman of the Association of Building Societies in Zimbabwe. This coincided with the International Day of Habitat, and also gave the building societies a fair chance to put their case to the nation on a matter of such national importance.

Be that as it may, what was of further particular interest was Mr. Wood's comments on black advancement in his own organisation, CABS. I quote him: "Yes, we have one black who has been overseas for courses and is now the mortgage manager for the whole organisation. You know CABS is for everybody, regardless of colour."

Clearly I cannot believe that a man of Mr. Wood's standing can make such a statement so unashamedly in a television interview. For an organisation the size of CABS to have just one black who is only a mortgage manager cannot be accepted by today's standards.

Their annual report lists seven executives, all white. I also know that one of the assistant general managers is Mr. G. D. Hollick who is directly responsible for mortgages, which makes the job of the mortgage manager a nonsense, with no real authority and decision-making at all.

I was surprised to note that the interviewers did not pursue part of the interview further than just one question, a question which clearly appeared to have unsettled Mr. Wood. Or were the interviewers just like the black members of the central board who do not seem to want to upset the applecart by influencing black advancement in this and other financial organisations?

Unfortunately, the Government also seems quite content with the black advancement directly given to the public sector. Mind you, the war of liberation came about as a direct result of failure to get positive results by way of negotiations.

It would appear to me that time for transferring economic power to the indigenous people of this land by evolution is fast running out. A process of revolution is now needed.

S. M. Moyo.

Chitungwiza.

A CABS spokesman replies as follows: As Mr. John Wood is away on business I feel it would be wrong not to reply to Mr. S. M. Moyo's letter which unfortunately, gives a very biased point of view. I shall therefore endeavour to answer the questions raised.

The seven executives mentioned in the annual report have a total of 909 years' building society experience between them and have all worked their way up the ladder.

What does Mr. Moyo propose a society should do with staff who have proved their ability and loyalty to the organisation? During the course of the next few years certain of these executives will retire, making room for the present middle management to move into these positions.

CABS' organisation, like any other business, has a general manager at the top, with two deputy general managers reporting to him, four assistant general managers reporting to the deputy general managers. The fact that the mortgage manager reports to an assistant general manager is normal management practice.

The administration of the branch is the responsibility of the manager. This applies to all branches; the manager is the person held responsible for the performance of his branch.

Mr. Moyo, who appears to know so much about CABS unfortunately forgot to mention that the society has nine branch managers, six of whom are black (if you want to specify colour) but CABS works on merit alone.

It is unfortunate that Mr. Moyo appears to be so bitter in that he finds it necessary to criticise all
STANDARD Chartered Bank yesterday dismissed as "inaccurate on many counts" a statement by Labour Minister, Dr Frederick Shava, that a settlement had been reached between the bank, its black employees and the ministry to redress alleged discriminatory practices within the bank.

Dr Shava had told a press conference, of which the bank was not informed, that Standard Chartered was guilty of pursuing discriminatory practices; and ordered that the recruitment and promotion of employees be conducted on a non-racial basis.

In a brief statement soon after the bank had been told of the press conference, a spokesman for the bank said that they were "deeply concerned" by Dr Shava's statement which was "inaccurate on many counts — the main one being that no agreement has been reached with the workers through the ministry."

The spokesman further stated that Standard Chartered Bank thought Dr Shava's statement was "prejudicial to both current and future negotiations" between the bank, workers and the ministry.

It was found that blacks had been excluded from key decision-making positions and sensitive posts such as in the advancements department. There was an absence of open recruitment or promotion policy. The bank tended to favour insiders, friends and relatives.

Dr Shava said he was a black executive, Mr Alan Cleary, more support in implementing black advancement.

He said the bank had also suggested that it wanted to examine the possibility of a profit-sharing scheme, adding that the ministry supported this latest development. The minister believes that these discriminatory practices and resultant imbalances found at the bank were a tip of the iceberg, and saw that this could be prevalent throughout the banking industry and other organisations in Zimbabwe.

He said that the ministry had told the bank to restructure the management committee to include three blacks and give the chief executive, Mr Alan Cleary, more support in implementing black advancement.

Blacks would now be appointed to area manager positions from which they were previously excluded; one has since been appointed. Blacks will also be appointed to the security section to redress the imbalances found at the bank. He said that the ministry had told the bank to restructure the management committee to include three blacks and give the chief executive, Mr Alan Cleary, more support in implementing black advancement.

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BLACK ADVANCEMENT, HUMAN RESOURCES AND
SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN ZIMBABWE AFTER 1980.

PART I: INTRODUCTION AND THEORY.

CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE OF STUDY AND METHODOLOGY.

1. PURPOSE OF STUDY


"It will be agreed by all that the human factor, whether alone or together with capital, is a driving force behind almost all forms of development." The Sunday Mail (Zimbabwe), Editorial, 13.9.87.

All African countries that won their independence in the 1950s and 1960s faced the formidable task of 'development' - how to transform the colonial society into an independent self-reliant society that catered for the majority of its people. These countries cited inadequate human resources as one of the fundamental obstacles to development. Consequently, one of the priority tasks of independence was to develop human resources. To this end it was necessary to expand and transform colonial education systems and replace expatriates with local skilled personnel - i.e. to Africanise and localise the labour force.
Zimbabwe, at independence in 1980, followed the same line of thinking. As the two quotations above show, the fundamental assumption was, and is, that the development of human resources is fundamental to development, especially socialist development. The features of the colonial heritage in relation to human resources in Zimbabwe were:

- the dominance of white skills in the colonial economy;
- the lack of skills amongst the African population;
- the possibility of a mass exodus of skilled whites soon after independence. (1)

Zimbabwe set itself the task of "transforming manpower development and utilisation in accordance with it's socialist objectives". It was recognised that to achieve this objective it was necessary to transform social relations.* (2) Central to this process in Zimbabwe was the development of skills amongst the black population*, and the incorporation of black personnel into middle and high level occupational categories previously reserved for whites, ie. the process of black advancement. Immediately after independence, in May 1980, before any manpower surveys or plans appeared, the President issued a Directive that the racial imbalance of personnel in the Public Service be redressed, and encouraging the rest of the public sector and the private sector to do likewise.

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Footnotes:

a. Social Relations in this instance and throughout the thesis is a concept used to refer to class relations in the Marxist framework of analysis - ie. the social relations people enter into with each other and with the means of production.

b. Black population in this instance refers to the racial categories African, Asian and Coloured. Blacks and whites are the terms generally employed in this thesis rather than racial categories European, Coloured, Asian and African. In official statistics Coloured and Asians have been included in the white group and this practice is followed when statistical comparisons are made in the thesis. This approach is also followed because Asians and Coloureds did have some social mobility under the previous regime, unlike Africans. 'Black' in black advancement includes Asians, Coloureds & Africans.
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the policy and practice of black advancement and human resource development in Zimbabwe, in the light of the country's commitment to socialist transformation.

An indication of the problems and contradictions in relation to the policy and practice of black advancement in the first seven years after independence is evident in a recent newspaper comment. In mid-1987 an editorial comment in the Zimbabwe daily newspaper, The Herald, in discussing government regulations that foreign-owned companies have to include local blacks in their disinvestment negotiations noted:

"The debate over the issue almost degenerated into a senseless racial debate... The new rules are aimed at giving the ordinary black a chance finally to own a piece of the business that he has faithfully served for years... We pretend in this country to be blind to the glaring inequalities between whites and blacks. We sometimes pretend that by keeping quiet, workers will be satisfied with the pace of their advancement in industry. They are not. Neither is the Government. Industry and commerce are dangerously misinterpreting Government's quiet diplomacy. One can say with authority that, if anything, there is a reversal of black advancement in industry. We dare anyone to name us one black managing director for every three whites in similar positions... There is a scramble at the moment by industry for senior government employees... for their strong connections with government... In view of all this Government has done well to force managements to include blacks when they buy into disinvested companies. We cannot continue to maintain a system whereby the black will naturally be the shopfloor worker while the whites are in management and the blacks who climb up the ladder get there only at the pleasure of whites... This is Zimbabwe, where 96 years of colonialism have brought about inequality between races. Independence was meant to right that and the government is slowly moving to remedy this situation.." (3)

This editorial comment reflects the variety of contradictory issues evident in the black advancement process. The task of this thesis is to throw light on some of these contradictions and issues by attempting to answer the following questions:
What was the nature of racial inequality at independence?

What has government policy been towards rectifying racial imbalances in the society, and in particular what has it's policy been on black advancement and what progress has there been?

How has the private sector, which is the backbone of the economy, and which historically been dominated by foreign and local white capital, approached the issue of black advancement?

What factors have facilitated and/or hindered the black advancement process in Zimbabwe?

What has government's approach been to human resource development in general, as black advancement is a dependent variable in these broader planning and development processes?

How does government strategy on black advancement and manpower planning fit into their overall policy objective of transforming social relations in the context of the development of a socialist society?

To this end chapters 2 - 7 will discuss the following issues:

Chapter 2 will examine the theoretical paradigms which affect the policy and practice of human resource development, manpower planning and black advancement (or Africanisation). In particular the chapter examines the relationship between ideology and theory on the one hand, and policy and practice on the other. The experiences of other countries will be drawn on.
to illustrate the descriptive, analytical, and prescriptive nature of theory.

Chapter 3 sketches the nature of the economy and the state from the colonial period to the present. The objective of this chapter is to provide the reader with an understanding of the magnitude of the problems which Zimbabwe inherited in 1980.

Chapter 4 focuses on education and employment before 1980. The approach of the settler-colonial regime to education and employment set the scene for the human resource problems Zimbabwe was to face at independence, and shows why black advancement had to be central to development after 1980.

Chapter 5 examines the new government's approach to education and training. Education and training after 1980 became one of the main mechanisms of human resource development, and in particular, black advancement. Wittingly or unwittingly government has taken policy decisions which have led to variety of problems. The basic assumption which still holds in Zimbabwe as it does for other African countries, is that investment in education and training will ensure economic development. The problems with this assumption are discussed in detail in Chapter 2, and in Chapter 5 an attempt is made to illustrate the problematic relationship between education and development with reference to the Zimbabwean experience so far.
Chapter 6 describes and analyses the nature of black advancement in Zimbabwe after 1980. The chapter looks at the political, technical and ideological factors affecting black advancement, government policy, on black advancement and the process of black advancement in the public and private sectors. The focus is on black advancement into skilled occupational categories, as before independence the semi-skilled and unskilled occupational categories were dominantly, if not all, black i.e. African. The nature of black advancement into the middle and higher occupational categories has important political implications for class formation in the independence period.

Chapter 7 looks at the broader aspects of human resource development, and how black advancement has been an integral part of Zimbabwe government manpower policy after 1980. In the past 10 years in Africa it has been accepted that human resource development through education and training alone is not enough. Broader aspects of human resource development, such as incomes...
policy and employment policy are recognised as vital components of human resource development if standards of living are to improve and basic needs of the population are to be met. This chapter will examine how Zimbabwe has tackled these issues in the light of their commitment to socio-economic transformation. Government approach to these issues also has implications for class formation, i.e. the nature of social relations after 1980.

As is evident from the scope that the six chapters cover, a broad spectrum of theoretical and policy issues are tackled in order to examine the nature of black advancement in Zimbabwe after 1980. There has been no published research or writing on this area since 1980, making the task of the thesis original, but also expansive. The thesis attempts to touch on all theoretical, practical and policy-oriented problems of human resource development, and the black advancement process in particular, in the independence period. In attempting to draw together different strands of theory, different aspects of policy, and their practical implications for the transformation of social relations and the development of socialism, and the role of black advancement in this process, it has been necessary to adopt an interdisciplinary approach.

Black advancement and human resources development are interdisciplinary problems. An interdisciplinary approach, while it does not provide close detail on all areas, provides an integrated picture of the problem under investigation. A wide variety of theoretical issues impinge on the
problem, and there is only sufficient time and space to draw the essence rather than exhaust all aspects of every relevant theoretical area. Similarly, from a methodological perspective, the thesis is reliant on data from a variety of sources, and does not concentrate exhaustively on a narrow area. The lack of availability of data and sources also favours a broad approach as there is little published since independence of a specific nature on any area. The thesis has made use of the data which would have been available to the discipline 'specialists' in the different areas. There are obvious limitations on how much an individual researcher can fill the gaps in national socio-economic data in order to cover all aspects of the thesis. It has however been possible to gather qualitative data and sufficient quantitative data to draw conclusions on the nature of black advancement in Zimbabwe after 1980.

2. METHODOLOGY

Fieldwork for the thesis was carried out over two years in Zimbabwe, 1985 - 1987. The study set out with the assumption that black advancement was necessary at all costs, and that resistance to the process was largely based on white racism. In the course of the study it was realised that there are a variety of factors which affect black advancement, further validating the necessity of an inter-disciplinary approach to understanding the problem. From a variety of information
sources, an attempt was made to weave the picture of the nature of black advancement in Zimbabwe after independence.

However, an overall feel for the data came from living in Zimbabwe for three years, and coming to understand the dynamics of the new society. From a methodological point of view it facilitated research design and data collection. Being in Zimbabwe for an extended period enabled the researcher to get to know 'who's who', the important sectors of the economy, the pertinent issues, and most important, to follow these up. From a political point of view it enabled the researcher to distinguish between government rhetoric and practice, and to provide some of the objective and subjective reasons for this discrepancy. Being in the area of research for an extended period also enabled the researcher to see the changing dynamics of the problem under investigation. It allowed for the development of informal contacts and for 'confidences' to be created.

There is data available in Zimbabwe on the subject of research, but there is not a comprehensive collection of time-series data since independence, especially data with a 'racial' breakdown. There are problems of comparability and accuracy of data. Data on the same topic is sometimes contradictory, with different government documents giving different figures, and the relevant ministry not being able to throw any light on these discrepancies. While Zimbabwe is in the process of developing a data base, and is definitely better off than most other African countries, there are still limitations in the data which hinder
the ability of ministries and government to make policy, plans, and implement projects.

The Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare has recognised some of its limitations in terms of collection of data in a paper presented to a conference of the International Labour Office in Copenhagen in 1986. The paper pointed to:

i. A need for more detailed information on critical shortage areas, in order to assist both the control of foreign recruitment, and a more accurate assessment of scholarship needs.

ii. Government to have more detailed information on the training programmes in the private sector in order to assess the rate of African advancement in this sector.

iii. The inadequate information on incomes, and a need for more detail on income levels by occupations, sector, race and sex in order to assess the progress being made in closing the income differentials on a sectoral, racial and sex basis, given the historical inequalities in these areas.

iv. Totally inadequate statistics on employment and unemployment and the need for more statistics on unemployment, its form and the manner in which it relates to the reproduction of labour and capital accumulation on a general level. (4)

A variety of methods and sources were used to acquire the necessary data for this study:

1. A questionnaire to middle level management in the public and private sectors (a sample of 50). (See Appendix 1) The sample
was taken from the University of Zimbabwe part-time students doing the Masters in Business Administration course in the Department of Business Studies. Students on this course are middle level management in the public and private sectors, white and black, and therefore provided a ready made sample. Approximately 30% of students replied representing a cross section of the sample. The data was however not quantifiable, and of a very qualitative nature. The responses from the students through the questionnaire and in a follow-up discussion with the class did however contribute to my overall understanding of the problem of black advancement, and its subjective and objective aspects.

ii. Interviews were conducted with middle level and senior management in the public and private sectors, government officials in relevant ministries especially the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare and the Public Service, and with individuals who could throw light on the subject under research. Approximately 50 different sources were interviewed, some of them on several occasions.

Interviews in the private sector were based on a questionnaire (see Appendix 2). The questionnaire was however completed by the author through personal interview, as this was found to be more effective in yielding data, especially of a qualitative nature. The author conducted interviews by taking notes as there was an insecurity on the part of those being interviewed
about having their voices taped. The experience of the author was that mailed questionnaires were not returned and those that were, were not adequately filled in. Black advancement appears at the end of the questionnaire, and was often only raised at the end of interviews. This was because in the private sector in particular it was perceived as a sensitive issue. In such circumstances the basis of my interview was 'The Provision of Trained Manpower for the Economic Development of Zimbabwe'.

The sample for the private sector was chosen through deciding to interview a cross section of the economy, choosing the most important companies (in terms of their contribution to employment and GDP), and choosing 60% foreign-owned and 40% locally-owned companies representing the distribution of foreign and local capital in the economy. Table 6.10 shows companies interviewed by sector, and sector contribution to employment and GDP. As is evident from this table, most sectors in the economy were covered and the most important companies interviewed.

Individuals were interviewed on the basis of knowledge that they could contribute to the author's understanding of the problem under investigation. Some of these interviews were through introductions from a third party, and others the authors's assessment. Some interviews were so informal that they are not listed in the Bibliography.
The questionnaire and the interviews addressed a series of central issues: the position and background of the respondent; the nature of the company/Ministry/organisation that they work for; the composition of middle and senior management; the total number of employees, racial breakdown of employees, skill shortages at all levels since independence and manpower development programmes; numbers of expatriate personnel; changes (if any) in wages and salaries since independence and the salary structure; the process of black advancement in the organisation, how it had taken place, what official attitude to the issue was, what problems there had been in relation to black advancement; attitude of the company/organisation to government economic and manpower policy. The data acquired from such interviews was more of a qualitative nature than quantitative insofar as statistics acquired were not comparable.

The basis of these questions was to establish the nature of black advancement and human resources development in Zimbabwe since independence, and whether there had been any significant changes in the salary structure and the labour process in accordance with government's socialist objectives..

A number of individuals were interviewed on specific issues such as - changes in government education policy, statistical data - and in such instances the questions focussed on the issue under discussion and not on human resources and black advancement in general.
In government and the private sector individuals were encountered who were reluctant to give information. In some instances they simply did not know enough. This was more frequently the case with newly appointed black personnel in government and the private sector. As well as not having the information, they were worried about their newly-acquired positions. White employees about to retire provided useful information as they had been in a position for a long time and were not worried about their future. Because the author happens to be white, it was also possible to elicit honest opinions from whites who would not have expressed these opinions to black researchers. This was confirmed by the experiences of other black researchers at the University.

iii Another form of data collection was documentary material from various sources: published and unpublished government statistics and documents, Company Reports and Committee papers, unpublished research papers from the University, Government (in particular the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social welfare), and individuals. Unpublished papers were largely the outcome of interviews i.e. being given such a paper at the interview or being told that it exists.

iv. Published primary data from the daily and weekly newspapers and magazines also provided a useful source of information. Some of these sources are pro-government (e.g. The Herald), and others critical of government (e.g. The Financial Gazette which reflects
the opinions of the private sector and is sometimes nick-named The Rhodesian Gazette, and left-wing criticisms reflected in Koto and Social Change. The Herald is a mouthpiece for government to the extent that it is lacking in independent and investigative journalism and largely regurgitates ministerial and government statements. Interestingly enough, reporting on government so verbatim, means that The Herald does inadvertently reflect the contradictions in government, as well as government policy and pronouncements. The Herald is therefore a vital barometer of government opinion and policy.

Comprehensive comparative and time-series data is lacking in this study, although enough data is provided to accomplish the task of the thesis. The reasons for a shortage of comparative, time-series, quantitative data are:

- First, in some instances the data was simply not available.
- Second, in other instances acquiring the necessary data was beyond the scope of the individual researcher.
- Third, there was sometimes a reluctance to give data for reasons of political sensitivity, or the data had been 'lost' or destroyed just prior to independence.
- Fourth, official data there is, is often inaccurate and difficult to use for comparative purposes. Data used in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, but in particular in Chapter 6, had to be re-constituted and re-analysed before it made sense. This is because there is little or no substantive analysis in government
data, and it is sometimes inaccurate. While there are government statistics, in some instances the reasons for their collection and use are not clear. This reflects a more general problem for human resources development and planning. Without statistics and without serious analysis it is difficult to make or implement policy based on reality.

While the study does have a fair amount of quantitative data, qualitative data was more readily available and was used with the quantitative data to make generalised conclusions about the nature of human resources development and black advancement in Zimbabwe since independence.
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL THEMES AND ISSUES

1. INTRODUCTION - THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT OF BLACK ADVANCEMENT

"With the completion of Zimbabwe's first National Manpower Survey, my government now has the data base upon which to plan for the transformation of manpower utilisation and training in accordance with its socialist objectives. However, information on manpower levels and utilisation in the economy does not itself change the conditions of such utilisation. Of fundamental importance is the commitment and organisational capacity to transform the relations of production in which such utilisation takes place. We in Zimbabwe are determined not to be found wanting on either ground." (1)

Since independence in 1980 Zimbabwe has committed itself to a socialist-oriented development strategy and to transforming the relations of production of which human resources development and utilisation are a part. Zimbabwe's commitment to socialism needs to be understood in the context of the current capitalist economy dominated by foreign-owned capital and local capital (almost totally white).

At the time of independence three features characterised the human resources of the inherited capitalist economy:

- the dominance of white skills in all sectors of the colonial economy;
- the lack of skills amongst the African population; and
- the possibility of a mass exodus of skilled whites soon after independence. (2)
In order to deal with these three problematic features, the government needed to accelerate the development of skilled personnel especially amongst the black population. The issue in common, and central to the realisation of government manpower policy after 1980, is therefore black advancement.

In the chapters that follow black advancement and government manpower policy and practice will be analysed in the context of Zimbabwe's socialist objectives. This chapter will examine the theoretical context of black advancement, highlighting aspects of education and human resources policy from the Marxist and non-Marxist perspectives which affect black advancement. An outline of the aspects of Marxist theory which help analyse, describe and understand the nature of black advancement is important in view of Zimbabwe's official commitment to Marxism and socialism. A theoretical discussion of Marxist and non-Marxist approaches is also important as different theoretical perspectives not only analyse and describe problems from a variety of standpoints but also prescribe different solutions, therefore affecting the nature of society accordingly.

While different theoretical viewpoints are discussed, the overall framework of analysis for the thesis is the Marxist approach. It is the opinion of the author that this framework of analysis provides the most useful tools of analysis for the problem under investigation.

Black advancement in Zimbabwe is the concept describing the process which involves:
the development of skills through education and training, and the placement of black personnel in middle and high level positions which were previously reserved for whites. In short therefore, black advancement is the promotion of blacks into occupational categories in the labour market previously held by whites.

In the context of Zimbabwe, black advancement is at once, both a dependant and independant variable of human resource planning, utilisation and development. As a dependant variable it responds to human resource planning - it is a result for example of expansion in education and training, employment and incomes policy, amongst others. Black advancement also operates as an independant variable insofar as there is considerable political pressure behind gaining access to middle and upper level jobs, as well as correcting a visible racial imbalance in government. It is therefore also a driving force with a dynamic of its own, a sensitive political issue influencing education and human resource policy. Thus, as a dependant variable and an independant variable it affects the new society in a variety of ways. Black advancement involves technical issues with regard to human resource planning, development and utilisation. It also involves wider theoretical and political issues which affect and are part of the society.

Black advancement is at once a concept, a goal, strategy and a process. It is not however, itself part of any theoretical framework. The overall affect that black advancement has upon society is dependant upon the human resource strategies and policies pursued by the political
forces in power. These strategies and policies depend upon the ideological persuasion of the leadership and general development orientation of the country. It is therefore necessary in this chapter to examine these broader theoretical issues.

Not being in itself part of a theoretical framework, but dependant upon human resource strategies and the political and ideological context in which it operates, there is no theoretical literature on black advancement as such. Different authors have commented on the issue in passing and in various contexts but there is no body of theoretical literature on black advancement which would be possible to review. In general black advancement or Africanisation in newly independent countries has been treated as a purely technical question, a variable of manpower policy and planning.

It is not perceived as independent variable affected by the wider political and ideological orientations of the society. In fact, even at the technical level there is a common assumption that manpower planning is value-free and not essentially part of any particular theoretical framework which will therefore affect the outcome of such policy.

The rather awkward task of this chapter therefore, is to draw together the different theoretical strands which impinge on black advancement and how it affects or is affected by society. The theoretical debates in areas as diverse as education, human resources, class and the state and development strategies for developing countries are all relevant to the nature of black advancement.
It is not the task of this short chapter to examine each of these debates in great depth. The chapter will however, attempt to highlight those theoretical issues in these areas which impinge directly on human resources and the nature and role of black advancement in a newly independent country. This chapter will therefore:

- briefly outline the problems of human resources in African countries;
- examine the concepts black advancement, Africanisation, localisation, and what factors affect them;
- look at different theoretical approaches to education and human resources;
- and in conclusion, examine the theoretical implications for Africanisation, localisation and black advancement.

2. THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND AFRICANISATION IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES TODAY

Most African countries won their independence in the 1960's. At this time they faced a variety of constraints to development - adequate human resources was one of the most fundamental. An acute shortage of skilled personnel meant that a primary concern of policy makers was "how to expand essentially colonial education systems to meet the demands of independence, and in particular, the urgent need of localising high
level posts predominantly held by expatriates". (3) When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, this was also one of their primary concerns.

Underdeveloped human resources in Africa affected all aspects of development in the post-colonial period. Through to the present the people of Africa are the most under-educated in the underdeveloped world. There are in Africa fewer persons with secondary or higher education in relation to the total population than in Latin America, Asia or the Middle-East. (4) The World Bank observed:

"The scarcity of managerial and technical cadres at the time of independence had strong adverse effects on public administration, industrial development, wage levels and costs. Furthermore, the lack of education among the population reduced the stimuli for progressive change generally experienced where education is more widespread. Finally, the debilitating effects of disease and sickness lowered the productivity of the labour force and the propensity to innovate." (5)

The reasons for the underdeveloped human resources in Africa are fourfold:

a. A lack of educational infrastructure during the colonial period.

b. Manpower policies of the colonial period where immigrants or non-indigenous personnel were sought to meet needs at all skill levels in the public and private sectors.

c. Discriminatory policies of the colonial period which did not allow the local population to be educated and move up the skill ladder.

d. In sum, underdeveloped human resources are the result of colonial education, manpower and economic policies, the primary objective of
which was to secure a cheap (and often migrant) labour force to work the mines, plantations and industries of the colonial economies.

Education in the post colonial period was seen as the answer to the human resource problem they had inherited. Education was regarded as one of the main vehicles for facilitating Africanisation and the development of human resources for social and economic progress. It was accepted that expanding adult literacy and primary education would enhance social equality by increasing the chances for the majority of the population. The expansion of secondary schooling was to produce the graduates needed for the expanding economies in order to perform technical and administrative functions and replace expatriates. University graduates were needed to provide professional and managerial skills for the public and private sectors. (6) Education was also expected to contribute to socialisation, the development of a national culture and national unity. Most important however was that education was considered the prime mover for economic growth and "modernisation." (7) Evidence that this latter view persists is contained in a recent World Bank publication:

"Faster economic growth in Africa requires accelerated development of human resources. This involves more and better formal schooling and intensified training." (8)

Countries such as the United States, Japan, and others in South-East Asia have been given as examples to support the causal link between education and economic growth. By the population in general education
was seen as the only way out of poverty and to a job in government or the modern sector of the economy.

Today in Africa education is however criticised for "not having produced the goods" it promised soon after independence in the 1960's:

a. While education has facilitated the Africanisation process, there are still problems of sufficient appropriately qualified personnel at middle and high levels, and hence a reliance on expatriates to fill some of the gaps. Table 2.1. shows the position towards the end of the 1960's. With the expansion of education at all levels today in most African countries top government posts and a high proportion of the rest of posts in the public sector and increasingly in the private sector are held by nationals. However, there is still a reliance on expatriates for many technical and professional posts in government, and executive, managerial and professional posts in trade and industry, i.e. for more specialised forms of high level personnel. (9)

b. While there is still a reliance on a proportion of expatriates for certain specialised areas unemployment is becoming a fundamental problem in developing countries. With expanding education the educational level of the unemployed has been raised and it is school leavers and graduates who are swelling the ranks of the unemployed in tens of thousands each year. In most African countries unemployment ranges from between 20-50% of the adult population. (10)
Table 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


c. Education has not lead to greater social equality within the population, or between rural and urban populations. On the contrary, access to education has advanced the income, status and power of those who already had some advantage leading to greater disparities in the society as a whole. (11)

d. Social inequality has been exacerbated by the "diploma disease" in which education - "the secondary schools and universities ran as it were the immigration service for the modern sector brideghead". (12) Schools and universities are perceived through the rationing of certificates as having come to act as the selection service for high status and high income jobs in the modern sector. In the ex-colonies the patterns of the modern sector were set by the colonial
administrations. Lifestyle and consequent income levels have tended to persist beyond independence. The basis on which most government jobs were Africanised was university qualifications and secondary school certificates. Education, or rather a certificate, thus became the passport to a job with high income and status. For example a Ugandan graduate entering the civil service in the late 1960's earned an income fifty times the average income per head in Uganda. (13) Despite the fact the glut of jobs available for Africanisation soon after independence no longer exists the ethic that a certificate will provide access to well paid modern sector and government jobs is one of the main motivators behind the continual pressure for educational expansion at all levels, despite the apparent failures of the system. "Qualificationism" has been one of the main vehicles for Africanisation and black advancement in Africa, and in Zimbabwe the situation has been no different.

As well as rationing certificates and therefore high status and income jobs the "diploma disease" also leads to "schooling without education" and personnel without "imagination, initiative, the determination to get to the bottom of things and the desire to do a good job for its own sake.....People are not educated for self initiated, self directed work." (14) This is because of the nature of the education system which is oriented to rote learning and cramming for examinations and certificates rather than child-centred autonomous patterns of learning. (15) It is also because there "is a distinction between schooling which is education and schooling which is only qualification, a mere process of certificating or
In this process "the pupil is concerned not with mastery (of the knowledge itself) but with being certified as having mastered." (16) Newly independent countries are seen as particularly susceptible to this process because of the rapid upward mobility of those with educational qualifications particularly immediately after independence. With more people having access to education the result is "qualification escalation" and "certificate devaluation", which is basically raising the educational level of the unemployed. (17) Employers demand more and more qualifications in order to sift applications and get the "best for the job". (18)

e. Another of the major problems with the education in African countries in the last fifteen to twenty years has been internal inefficiencies. These include - high drop out rates, a lack of buildings, a lack of books and educational materials especially in the sciences, relevance of curriculum, quality of teachers and thus the quality of graduates from all levels of the system. (19)

f. It has become increasingly difficult for governments to sustain the cost of education especially at tertiary level, in the light of general economic difficulties, high population growth rates and world recession. In many countries education took ten to fifteen percent of government expenditure in the early 1960's and twenty to twenty five percent by the end of the decade. (20) Few if any African countries have growth rates which can cope with this type of expenditure in the non-productive sector. This has led to suggestions from quarters such as the World Bank that governments in
developing countries should concentrate their investment in education on primary education, vocational training and non-formal education. This is because, according to this argument the "social rate of return" on primary education is higher, costs are less and providing vocational training "will make people more employable". (See Tables 2.2. and 2.3.) The problem with this strategy is that it takes African governments right back to where they started - with a shortage of middle and high level personnel.

### Table 2.2
THE SOCIAL RETURNS TO EDUCATION IN AFRICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>Rate of Return %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 2.3
COSTS OF A STUDENT-YEAR AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP PER CAPITA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E Africa</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Africa</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>1,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe, N East</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; N Africa</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Last, but not least, educational investment and expansion has not produced economic growth, which in the 1960's was the justification for the enormous expenditure on education. In fact, economic growth in Africa during this period has declined, hence the inability to absorb growing numbers of school leavers. The reasons why education has not produced economic growth will be taken up in more detail in the course of this chapter.

All these problems have faced most African countries in their attempt to overcome their colonial heritage in the last twenty years. Zimbabwe started off a little better insofar as they did have a fair number of Zimbabweans, especially black Zimbabweans, with university degrees and secondary education at the time of independence. Since independence, Zimbabwe has made great gains at all levels. It has managed to make free primary schooling available to most, still a goal set in the 1960's by many African countries but not yet achieved. However, all the problems mentioned above have become evident in Zimbabwe in the past seven years:

There are still some gaps in high level manpower, and school leaver unemployment is one of the most critical problems facing government with over one hundred thousand secondary school leavers coming on to the job market each year. Since independence social inequality has not significantly decreased and educational qualifications have been the main vehicle for black advancement and a passport to a well paid job in the public or private sector. Problems of qualificationism and quality of manpower are evident in the attitude that "having got
a job means an end to work and not the beginning". Serious internal inefficiencies in the education system are becoming evident, and government can no longer afford twenty percent of their budget going to education. Government is therefore attempting to re-adjust policy. Educational investment has not led to economic growth which in the productive sector has been negative since independence.

Why these problems should afflict Zimbabwe in the light of their commitment to socialism will be discussed in this and following chapters. The fact that Africa in general faces all the above problems was confirmed in one document which resulted from the Lagos Conference of the Organisation of African Unity held in 1980. The document summed up the problem of human resources development as follows:

"The principle aspects are the high rate of population growth, the growing level of under and unemployment, the shortage of different types and levels of trained manpower, the high level of adult illiteracy, the deficiency in the educational system and the lack of co-ordinated policies and programmes of manpower training and the funding of training at a national level." (21)

The Conference stressed the fact that Africa's greatest asset was its human resources and that use had not been made of this potential. In the 1980's Africa was still reliant on expatriate personnel for scientific and technical skills. The Conference emphasised the need to develop scientific and technical skills necessary for national development and social progress as well as for "the improvement of life" for the entire population. (22)
The questions which then arise are:

- Why, after twenty years of independence has not this goal not been realised?
- Why, has education "not produced the goods?"
- Why, is Africa still dependent on expatriate personnel?

The World Bank has had to admit that "a decade ago we were far less aware than we are now of the role of politics in educational planning". (23) Human resource and educational planning are shaped by the political and economic institutions and by the general development orientation a country follows. The development orientation of a country will also determine the nature of its links with its colonial power and imperialism in general. Many countries have advocated egalitarian human resource and educational policies, but their objectives have not been realised. Simmons in a World Bank publication reiterated the idea that the reason egalitarian human resource and education policies do not succeed, is largely political. In Simmons' view it is not a lack of knowledge or the technical limitations of planning which is the major reason. He reinforced this view by stating that:

"a recent meeting of educational planners concluded that even when better information was available it was not used, carefully prepared plans were shelved or only partially implemented." (24)

What are the political reasons which have led to the optimism in education in the 1960's becoming disillusionment in the 1980's? The primary factor is the nature of the social relations of the society. In
a newly independent country where educational qualifications have brought a new elite to power or a new middle class, and have given them status and a life style equivalent to that of their colonial administrators, that elite will not threaten their position by advocating the total transformation of the structure of the colonial education system, even though they will allow for its expansion in order to fulfill the pressures of electoral demand. Where there has been a total change in the class structure of the society priority issues in educational policies have been different. The education system does not serve as "the immigration service" to political power, status and a higher income. The Cubans for example gave priority to parental education on child development and made technical training as prestigious as academic training. This would not happen in post colonial capitalism where the managers of companies do not wish to be threatened by articulate educated technicians. Nor do government ministers want to be threatened by outspoken and capable graduates. The nature of the social relations in the ex-colonies are to a certain extent determined by the country's relationship with its ex-colonial power and the international community in general.

This leads to the second factor which has influenced the lack of implementation of the proposals of the 1960's. In some countries, for example, Tanzania and Zambia, egalitarian education and human resource policies have been advocated but not implemented. This is because such policies can only be implemented in the context of more general political and economic transformation when there is a political orientation and a commitment which allows for education and hence
Aficanisation and human resources development to play a progressive role. This is not to say that education and Africanisation cannot in themselves act as vehicles for progress and development. They must definitely can but success can only be guaranteed in the short term if those in political power are acting along the same lines.

The third political or more specifically ideological reason for the lack of success of education and human resource policy is the theoretical framework that ministries and governments wittingly or unwittingly adopt. Theory holds certain assumptions, is descriptive, analytical and prescriptive.

Zimbabwe is the most pertinent example of the gap between policy and practice for the above three reasons. Government has advocated socialism as its official ideology and therefore the need to transform relations of production and consequently human resource development and utilisation. The problem is that government does not then look to the socialist theory on how to achieve this objective. They have rather followed electoral pressure and elements of human capital theory which is based on the assumption that education will produce economic growth and development, therefore invest in education. How much money should be put into what type of education, for whom and to what end was not examined. In addition by 1986 the contraction in the Education Budget plus selection and streaming were being advocated. This needs to be seen in the light of the social relations that have developed after 1980. There is also a lack of commitment in practice to social
transformation. The constraints of the Lancaster House Agreement and therefore Zimbabwe's relationship with its ex-colonial power and imperialism are additional factors which have limited commitment in practice to social transformation. The contradictions between Zimbabwe's commitment to socialism, their policy and practice in the issues of education and human resources, and their implications for black advancement will be examined in the following chapters.

Relevant to this study is the literature on education and development (25), and development strategies for developing countries (26). It is not within the scope of this study to review this literature, although by implication the ideas and debates are assumed and sometimes referred to. This chapter will only examine theoretical issues as they directly affect the discussion on human resources, education and black advancement in Zimbabwe after independence.

3. **AFRICANISATION, LOCALISATION AND BLACK ADVANCEMENT**

As was mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter - black advancement or Africanisation - is the education and placement of blacks in jobs previously held by non-blacks.

The motive for Africanisation as an essentially redressive policy have been the same in all African states after independence (and other previously colonial territories).
At the same time as ex-colonies were addressing the issue, so was the United States of America. While the magnitude of the problem was different and in reverse (i.e. incorporation of a black minority into certain occupational positions rather than the black majority), there are issues which are pertinent and which provide lessons for redressive action in Africa, and more specifically, Zimbabwe. Redressive employment policy in the United States was aimed at:

"redressing racial imbalances in employment and redistributing occupational placement in such a way that racial proportions reflected the population profile." (27)

Motives for the action were prompted by the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960's. This movement exposed the gap between the American dream and the American reality - that there was not freedom of the individual and "equality of opportunity for all." It was a strategy to co-opt at least a section of the black population and give them some of the economic cake - a move supported by private enterprise. It was perceived by business and politicians alike that long term political and

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2 The terms *Africanisation, localisation and black advancement* all mean essentially the same but, are used in different contexts by different countries. They all essentially imply the replacement of expatriates by indigenous (generally black) personnel. Localisation generally will involve replacement of whites by blacks. In a country like Zimbabwe, because of the large white settler population who are Zimbabwean (approx 120 000) it involves the replacement of expatriates by Zimbabweans - black or white. Hence the importance of the concept black advancement in the Zimbabwe context. The term *Africanisation* is the term more generally used in other African countries. However, in Zimbabwe, because of the sensitivity of the issue of the local white population, black advancement is preferred as a term which is less emotive, but means essentially the same - i.e. the advancement of blacks into positions previously held by whites. I will use the terms interchangeably depending on the context of the discussion. The term *Africanisation* is sometimes used not only to refer to manpower but also in discussions on the economy, i.e. *Africanising (or Indigenising) the economy through nationalisation and/or localisation of ownership and/or control of foreign-owned companies*. In this study unless otherwise stated, the term *Africanisation* refers to questions of human resources.
economic interests of the US lay in diffusing the rising tide of protest amongst American blacks.

There were three components or stages in US "affirmative action" policy programme: removal of discrimination through legislation, equalisation policy and preferential treatment: (28)

a. In the 1950's and early 1960's the emphasis was on legislating against discrimination in practice culminating in the 1964 Civil Rights Act. However, it was shown in practice that legislation was not enough. Members of minority groups who had been discriminated against in the past, continued to suffer the effects of the discrimination, and it was not so easy for them to take advantage of "equality of opportunity" which existed in law. (29) Purcell and Cavanagh argued that racial inequality and tensions would persist unless socio-economic institutions were changed (i.e. de-racialisation alone was not enough) - patterns of education, employment and housing which characterise disadvantaged groups need to be changed before they can take advantage of "the rights of individuals". (30) This argument led to the second stage in policy - "equalisation policy".

b. Equalisation policy involved conscious effort on the part of government and the private sector to train and promote blacks. This tactic was designed "to open up competition in the job market". (31) Equalisation policy was however found to be too slow in diffusing the racial crisis in the US in the 1960s. (32)
c. The third aspect of redressive policy to accelerate black advancement was "preferential treatment", which was part of the "affirmative action programme". As part of this programme preference was given to blacks over whites in hiring and promotion, because they were black. Preferential policies were implemented largely through the imposition of quota targets for various categories of employers, "backed up by the sanction of the withdrawal of Federal contracts and funds in the case of non-compliance". (33)

Progress was made in the United States insofar as blacks were incorporated into various levels of the employment structure. As was pointed out above black advancement in the US was not linked so directly to the technical necessity of developing and providing local black skills to run a country. The wider political and ideological issues are however relevant to the problem of black advancement and Africanisation in ex-colonies. In this respect the following points can be made and questions asked:

a. Legislation against discrimination is not enough on its own to overcome the socio-economic effects of discrimination and therefore the position in which the large majority of those who have been discriminated against find themselves.

b. What are the objectives of a black advancement policy - is it really to redress racial differences in the socio-economic structure, or is it a policy on the part of private enterprise and the state to co-
opt a section of the black population in order to ensure the status quo?

c. Hence, does policy in practice benefit only upwardly mobile blacks, leaving the socio-economic status of the large majority of blacks unchanged (despite "equality of opportunity" in law)?

d. Is a policy of preferential treatment discriminatory, or is it necessary in order to redress an unequal situation in order to place all groups on an equal footing?

In the African context three factors have become the critical components of policy formation and practice on Africanisation; viz:

(a) the political factor
(b) the technical or skills factor and
(c) the ideological factor.

a. The Political Factor:

The primary question for all newly independent African governments has been the issue of political power and national sovereignty - i.e. returning political power to the hands of the black majority. In practice this process means "Africanising" all aspects of the new society from culture to the public service as part of the process of consolidating political independence. There is pressure for all aspects
of the society which were previously the preserve of whites or foreigners to be opened up to the black majority. The two areas where newly independent black governments have been under the most pressure to provide immediate results are:

i. To improve economic and social conditions for the black majority, as white political power always meant white social and economic privilege. The assumption was that independence should bring greater equality for everybody. Therefore the need to provide health and education for all.

ii. To show "black" political power through having blacks in all public positions. For example Africanisation of the public service has always been one of the first tasks after independence.

b. The Technical Factor:

All African countries inherited at independence a problem in relation to their human resources. There was an overall shortage of skilled personnel. In particular there was a shortage of high level skills. There was therefore the need immediately after independence to develop - through education, training and being on-the-job - local black skills, at all levels.

In the meantime these middle and high level positions before and immediately after independence were dominated by expatriates and some
local non-Africans e.g. Asians. Black leaders therefore were and still are faced with the problem of how to deal with the question of local non-African and expatriate skills in the context of the political necessity for Africanisation (i.e. to provide jobs for and be seen to be managing with, black skills), coupled with the need to maintain or enhance the administrative and economic efficiency of the country. The dilemma of African governments is that they are dependent on local non-African or expatriate skills to perform the latter. In order to acquire or hold on to these skills it is often necessary to maintain reward structures which appear to perpetuate the inequalities of the colonial system.

Most African governments have thus been faced with the dilemma of needing to Africanise for political reasons, but not being able to if they hoped to keep the economy going i.e. for reasons of shortage of skilled personnel. They are also faced with the dilemma of needing to narrow wage gaps for reasons of ideology and political stability, but being limited in their efforts by the problem of skill retention. (34) There is therefore, often a conflict between technicalities of human resource planning and the political dynamic of Africanisation.

The experience of Zambia is an illustration of the conflict between the reality of shortage of skills amongst the local population (i.e. the technical factor) and the political drive to Africanise (i.e. the political factor). At independence in 1964 the scarcity of educated Africans in Zambia was extreme. In Zambia in 1964 there were in total
just over 1 200 Africans with secondary school certificates - about the same number as in Kenya in 1957, Uganda in 1955, Tanzania in 1960 and Ghana in 1943. The number of Zambian graduates at the time was scarcely 100. (35) The result has been a continued reliance on expatriate, non-African or non-Zambian skills since independence - although progress has been made. 5 years after independence although non-Africans only made up 4% or 27 000 of a total working population of 756 800, they were dominant in professional and administrative jobs. Out of a total of 30 000 employees in the professional and administrative categories there were over 12 000 non-Africans. With the Zambianisation programme, expatriate employment in Government actually increased from approximately 3 000 in 1963 non-Zambians in government employment increased to approximately 6 000 in 1968. This was because of the expansion of the public service, in particular the expansion of the secondary school system which necessitated the recruitment of expatriate teachers. Zambianisation on the mines has been consistently pursued with greater success. Total number of expatriates on the mines declined from 7,621 in 1964 to 5,024 in 1968. (36) This was largely because of a conscious strategy for Zambianisation of certain lower to middle occupational categories on the part of the mining companies.

The problems of Africanisation or Zambianisation on the mines provide interesting lessons for the Africanisation process in general. At the level of Zambianisation of particular occupational categories it was found:
That the first posts to be Zambianised were in the administrative and executive fields, since these areas dealt with policy decisions and required a minimum of formal qualifications. The personnel departments were the first to be totally Zambianised. (37) A similar trend was evident in the black advancement process in Zimbabwe.

Political pressure to Zambianise often led to problems - in particular to "window dressing" - which meant increased earnings and new job titles to the Zambian, while the man who actually pulled the strings behind the scenes and made the decisions was the expatriate. "Window dressing" stemmed not only from political pressure to Zambianise, but also from the combination of resistance such pressure from expatriates and the non-availability of sufficiently qualified Zambians. (38) Again this exact trend occurred in Zimbabwe soon after independence.

Rapid Zambianisation also led to the succession of Zambians often not equipped to do the jobs to which they were assigned. As Burawoy put it:

"The demands of rapid Zambianisation and quality performance are inextricably in conflict with one another". (39)

The same point was made in the Times of Zambia 15 February 1971:

"It is one thing to make valiant calls for speedy Zambianisation, understandable though they may be, but it is quite another to fill the gap between the call and the actuality. The Government has played a decisive role in calling for Zambianisation, but to what extent is it concerned with the quality of the result? Does its role end with a call to action
and the sight of a Zambian face in the personnel office? If so, then it has acquiesced in industrial abortion." (40)

- The reverse side of this problem was expatriate management who created conditions which made it impossible for the new Zambian to perform his task effectively. (41) This was reflected in a lack of confidence and lack of trust in the Zambian. (42) This exact trend was evident in Zimbabwe after independence - although it was mainly local whites who were the obstacle and not expatriates.

Likewise, in Zimbabwe, the issue of quality of human resources in the black advancement process has arisen - a very subtle yet fundamental problem if government and the economy are to continue to run efficiently. The only way of overcoming these problems is careful human resource development and planning - which is often lacking in the years soon after independence. Again this is part of the conflict between the technical factor in the Africanisation process and the political factor.

The Zambian government did come to accept that Zambianisation had to progress within the requirement of maintaining efficiency, and that this conflicted with pressure for accelerated Zambianisation where Zambian personnel would have occupied posts for which they were neither qualified or sufficiently experienced. In Zimbabwe exactly this occurred - black Zimbabwean personnel were given high level posts simply
to comply with black advancement - not meeting requirements in terms of qualifications or experience, with resulting disaster. Having a more educated black population, Zimbabwe's problems of meeting technical requirements have not been as severe as Zambia's.

However, in Zimbabwe the issue is further complicated by the question of local white and expatriate white skills. Whites, who made up only about 3% (150,000 of 7.5 million) of the population, in 1982 dominated professional and skilled categories of the labour force. In addition important policy and decision-making jobs were in the hands of whites. Non-Zimbabweans only accounted for 14% of all employed persons although they were in specialised occupations and industries - rather low compared to other African countries after independence.

While Zimbabwe has had to deal with the question of expatriate skills, it is what to do about local white skills which has been a much more delicate political issue. In general local whites are not as expensive as expatriate personnel in terms of local and foreign currency, they understand better local conditions and have a greater desire to make the system work. On the other hand they often maintain old prejudices and perpetuate social and economic inequalities. In a climate of pressure for Africanisation, the continued presence of local whites gives the impression that there has been no real change since independence. Expatriates on short-term contracts, are less a reminder of the past, and are easily dispensed with at the end of their contracts, but are more expensive especially in terms of foreign exchange.
An additional problem in relation to local whites in Zimbabwe is that while they are not expatriate, they are highly mobile. This is evidenced by the fact that approximately 50% of the white population left the country around the time of independence. The Zimbabwe Government has had to take this fact into account, making a black advancement programme all that more essential.

The unique factor in the Zimbabwean case of black advancement or Africanisation, it is the size of the local white population, and the political, technical and ideological issues that this fact gives rise to. In most other ex-colonial countries, the settler or colonising community packed and left with independence. In Zimbabwe, for at least 50% of the white population, this has not been the case. Therefore there is the need to come to terms with this population in political, technical and ideological terms. Africanisation as a nationalist response to independence and the withdrawal of the colonial community is easier than the dynamics of the problem that Zimbabwe is having to face.

How these dilemmas resolve themselves are dependant upon wider theoretical and technical issues of human resource development, planning and utilisation, which will be discussed in the course of this chapter. They are also dependant on ideological questions or questions of principle - which comprise the third factor affecting policy and practice on Africanisation.
c. The Ideological Factor.

Two issues of ideological principle affect the form that Africanisation takes in policy and practice. These are the issues of race and class. In Zimbabwe these factors are inter-twined such that for historical reasons class and colour coincide. It is the whites who have had the wealth, and control and ownership of the economy. Those whites who were not 'settler-capitalists' were part of a white petty bourgeoisie (clerks, traders, artisans), but because of racial discrimination were able to secure themselves a privileged position in settler-colonial society. The destiny of the Africans was to be labourers on 'white' farms, or labourers in the mines, industries and homes of settler-colonial society. A few educated Africans comprised an aspirant but frustrated petty bourgeoisie (teachers, clerks and nurses). There was not a large enough group of Africans who owned and controlled wealth in order to say that there was an indigenous African capitalist class before 1980. The Coloureds and Asians comprised a petty bourgeoisie, but were also not part of the settler capitalist class. The social relations of the society, and hence the class structure have changed since 1980, and the nature of the black advancement process in Zimbabwe has been central to these changes. The dilemma for the new government has been how to resolve these two ideological issues. The resolution of these issues is fundamental to black advancement and socialist transformation.

It would not be correct to assume that all black leaders become anti-white or are anti-white in their efforts to Africanise. On the contrary
most are committed to a policy of non-racialism. Pressures for Africanisation present them with the dilemma of whether policy should be localisation (consistent with a policy of liberal multi-racialism in the context of a post-settler society) or whether it should be Africanisation, consistent with the beliefs of nationalism in the post-independence period.

Tanzania provides a good example of how this dilemma can be reconciled. In 1962 the government appointed a Commission on Africanisation, the terms of reference of which included:

"...... a detailed and comprehensive investigation into every cadre and grade in the civil service with a view to ensuring that a satisfactory plan for complete Africanisation exists." (46)

Speaking in 1971 on Tanzania's Africanisation policy, President Nyerere said:

"At the same time a deliberate policy of Africanisation of the public services was being pursued in the full recognition that this was itself discriminatory. For before all citizens could be treated equally, it was necessary to rectify the position in which the nation's civil service was dominated by non-Africans, and to make it reflect in some measure the composition of the society ... Once we had demonstrated - to ourselves and others - that being an African did not have to mean being a junior official, the nation was able to accept that in some fields we can, without shame, hire the skilled people who are needed. This had been done by January, 1964, and we were therefore able to revert to a policy of priority to citizens regardless of their racial origin. This is the policy today. Every citizen has the right to be considered on his or her merits, regardless of race, religion or sex." (47)

Thus Tanzania's Africanisation policy had two stages. According to Nyerere policy was discriminatory in the initial stages. However, this policy was seen as only a temporary expedient to be replaced by a policy
of Tanzanianisation in phase 2. In certain other African countries the temporary expedient has evolved into permanent principle. The temporary expedient of Africanisation or black advancement is however consistent with non-racialism, in order to overcome the inequalities of the previous socio-economic order. This was one of the points made earlier when the case of black advancement in the USA was discussed. When the temporary expedient becomes a permanent principle, it is then that it needs to be questioned on ideological grounds.

Just as many new African governments were committed to non-racialism, so they were committed to socialism or at least social equality. An essential dilemma faced by policy makers then is that Africanisation of posts held by non-Africans may put black faces in jobs previously held by non-Africans but does not necessarily do anything in terms of social equality for the society as a whole. On the contrary, unless a conscious attempt is made to change the old social structure which allowed for the privileged position of other racial groups during the colonial period, Africanisation only develops a small new black privileged class, leaving the majority of the population with very little real change to their daily lives outside of living under a black government and having some improved social services such as health and education.

An ILO study on Kenya (1972), concluded for example, that since independence there has been no marked reduction in inequality. Racial inequalities of income and wealth distribution had diminished, but the overall distribution of income has not moved to any substantial degree
in an egalitarian direction. Those who benefitted most from economic growth and the Kenyanisation process in the years after independence were the small group of Kenyans who filled the jobs previously held by expatriates, the slightly bigger group who benefitted from the transfer of land from European farmers to African settlers, the small businessmen and a small group of urban employees. The majority of the rural population, the urban working poor and the rural and urban unemployed did not feel the benefits of Kenyanisation. (49)

Thus while Africanisation was interpreted as a success in Kenya, with the independence objectives of growth and Kenyanisation being achieved, in terms of inequality and employment there was no change. In trying to explain why this occurred, the ILO came to the conclusion that in many respects economic growth has largely continued on lines set by the earlier colonial structure. Posts had been Africanised and there had been great expansion, but the structures which led to and have sustained inequality still remain:

"The centre still grows at the expense of the periphery and important parts of the economy are still controlled by expatriate interests..... Kenyanisation has radically changed the racial composition of the group of people in charge at the centre of many of its policies, but has brought about only limited change in the mechanisms which maintain its dominance - the pattern of government income and expenditure, the freedom of foreign firms to establish themselves in Nairobi and the luxury of expenditure by a small high income group superimposed on a base of mass consumption. (50)

Zambia again provides a pertinent example of the relationship and conflict between ideology and the Africanisation process. In
discussing "the technical factor" Burawoy's conclusions on problems of occupational Africanisation were discussed. Burawoy also examined the significance of Zambianisation for the social structure of Zambian society - i.e., the relationship between Zambianisation and the ideological goals of government - to achieve humanism through socialism, to achieve greater social equality. Burawoy came to the following conclusions:

- Zambianisation created a "nouveau riche" class, a new elite or a national or bureaucratic bourgeoisie. This was due to the rapid social mobility allowed through the Zambianisation process.

- This class was likened to Fanon's "get rich quick middle-class (which) shows itself incapable of great ideas or great inventiveness." (51)

Burawoy cited Dumont stating that "too many African elites have interpreted independence as simply meaning that they could move into the jobs and enjoy the privileges of Europeans," along with high salaries, beautiful houses, several servants, expensive cars and expense accounts. (52)

- According to Burawoy a characteristic of the new middle class in Zambia is that they have to display their success of wealth and status in a conscious attempt to show that the rigidity of the colonial social structure which confined Africans to positions of inferiority and poor incomes had been done away with. Wealth and
success were most often displayed through the adoption of European or colonial life styles. (53)

- Rapid advancement immediately after independence leads to a revolution in expectations - with anyone with a qualification thinking they can acquire wealth and status overnight. A few years after there was a rapid decline in opportunities once all posts were filled and "rising frustration" due to the competition for wealth and expectations which had risen out of all proportion with the possibilities of their fulfillment. (54)

- Some of the Zambians promoted to high positions thus have the features of this new middle class - a lack of initiative and dedication to the job, wanting the rewards without paying the costs, and hence play into the hands of the expatriates who were resisting Zambianisation and confirming racial prejudices. Burawoy concludes that the problem with this situation is that the Zambian is blamed for the failures of Zambianisation, the real issues are avoided, responsibility is directed away from the expatriate and "whites and blacks in the ruling class avoid coming to terms with the real problems of Zambianisation". (55)

The discussion on black advancement and Africanisation shows that black advancement is fundamental to social change and social transformation in the post-colonial period. However, black advancement and Africanisation in themselves need not lead to social transformation. It is possible for the colonial socio-economic structure to remain more or less intact
with the exception of Africanisation of personnel in government and certain sectors of the economy. It is also possible for black advancement to be part of nationalist dynamics and part of a social programme to bring about some improvements for the majority of the population in areas such as health and education, but again not to lead to social transformation insofar as there are dramatic changes to the social relations and socio-economic structure of the new society.

It is evident that the policy and practice of Africanisation poses a dilemma for African governments. The process of Africanisation involves not only technical and political issues, but theoretical and therefore ideological questions as well. Africanisation can be a number of varied and sometimes contradictory strategies. Africanisation for some can mean access to high level posts in the private sector. For others it is a policy towards skill development and apprentices. For others it is the expansion of the education system. It is also interpreted as simply replacing non-Africans wherever they may be. For some it is part of a process of socialist transformation. Africanisation can therefore be a strategy, a goal and a policy. The search for strategy and policy is always based on some theoretical assumptions. How the concept of Africanisation is interpreted and implemented depends upon the approach of those in power to wider issues of economic and political power, and to how they approach the broad area of human resource development, planning and utilisation. In the next section I therefore propose to examine the theoretical issues which affect human resource policy and practice.
Most African governments have had two main goals on achieving independence:

a. economic growth as a means to the end of overcoming the inequalities of the colonial period,

b. expansion of the colonial education system in order to meet the demands of independence, and in particular, the urgent need to localise high level posts predominantly held by expatriates. (56)

Two broad, but opposing, theoretical paradigms - the traditional or liberal paradigm and the Marxist paradigm set out the logic of how to achieve each goal. Within each paradigm there is obviously disagreement and debate. I however, propose only to concentrate on the main themes of each paradigm and on the differences between the one paradigm and the other. To this end some over-simplification and generalisation may be necessary, but it is hoped not at the expense of highlighting the main elements of both approaches.

On the question of human resources and development the two paradigms both recognise the fundamental importance of education to the process of economic growth or development and the importance of education in the distribution of wealth and income in society. This is the only common assumption in the two approaches. The assumptions about how these different factors interrelate is where the difference between the two theoretical paradigms comes in. This section will discuss:
A. Human Capital Theory,

B. The Basic Needs Approach, and


A. THE LIBERAL APPROACH AND HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY (HCT).

The Liberal or traditional approach to issues of human resources and education was developed during the 1950's and 1960's with the enormous growth of public expenditure on schools and universities in the post-war period in the US and Western Europe. With independence in the 1950's and 1960's many of these ideas filtered down into the plans of the previously colonial territories. (57)

The liberal approach to issues of human resources and education derives from functionalist theory in social science which was popular in the USA in the 1950's. Technological-functionalism, as it is called, justified educational expansion in theoretical terms by saying that for rapid technological change to occur, there was a need for technicians and professional experts. (58) Policy makers were concerned however, whether expenditure on education was justified in economic terms. This issue was taken up by economists and became known as Human Capital Theory (HCT). This approach did not only have an important influence in the USA and Europe, but also on the development of educational systems in developing countries. Hence the importance of taking a brief look at the origins and importance of this approach.
The main ideas of Human Capital Theory can be found in Theodore Schultz's article - "Investment in Human Capital". (59) The essence of Schultz's theory is as follows:

i. That expenditure on education is **not consumption but investment** in human capital. (60)

ii. This investment has **private and social returns**: 

a. **The private returns** are for the individual - "by investing in themselves people can enlarge the range of choices available to them. It is one way free men can enhance the range of choices available to them. It is one way free men can enhance their welfare." (61) This idea of Schultz's reinforced the pro-capitalist ethic of American society - that all the opportunities are there, it is simply up to the individual to make the most of them. Through investing in himself the worker becomes the holder of capital - human capital. Education is therefore the provider of social equality. According to Schultz:

"labourers have become capitalists not from the diffusion of the ownership of corporate stocks, as folklore would have it, but from the acquisition of knowledge and skills that have economic value." 62)

b. **The social returns** are for the society - investment in education is fundamental to **economic growth**. Schultz attributed
the rapid post-war economic recovery to human capital. Schultz maintained:

"It has been widely observed that increases in national output have been large compared with the increases of land, man-hours and physically reproducible capital. Investment in human capital is probably the major reason for this difference." (63)

The dramatic expansion in education after the war, i.e. investment in human capital was thus seen as one of the vital factors that facilitated economic growth in the post war period in the Western industrialised states.

iii Education facilitates higher productivity, and earnings therefore correspond to different levels of education - i.e. people with more education are worth more economically and are therefore justified in receiving higher earnings. It is education therefore that can facilitate mobility in society. This is a justification for those with PhDs earning a great deal more than a person with a secondary education, or for manual workers earning a great deal less than those who make the decisions.

iv Schultz listed five categories of what constitutes human investments: Health facilities and services, on-the-job training, formal education, adult education, migration to improve job opportunities.
From these above points Schultz drew conclusions for developing countries - while 'poor countries' need capital, most important is investment in human capabilities "which (if) they do not stay abreast of physical capital, become limiting factors in economic growth". (64) Commenting on World Bank loans for capital investment abroad Schultz said: "This one-sided effort is underway despite the fact that the knowledge and skills required to take on and use sufficiently the superior techniques of production, the most valuable resource that we could make available to them, is in very short supply". (65) Schultz's conclusion for aid to developing countries was that there should be a shift from loans for capital investment, to loans for education - i.e. investment in human capital.

The UNESCO conference held in Addis Ababa in 1961 on the 'Development of Education in Africa' - reflected Schultz's ideas verbatim:

"Recent statistical calculations have shown that the accumulation of physical capital explains less than half of the annual increase of production in developed countries. The rest is due to increase in human skills and better organisation of production...There is no disputing that expenditure on some forms of education is an investment which more than pays for itself even in the narrowest economic terms". (66)

Government agencies, private foundations such as the Ford Foundation, and international organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development promote the theory of human capital by
providing funds for economists of education working on the theory of
human capital in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The assumptions of
HCT are reflected clearly by Robert McNamara, a former President of the
World Bank, in the foreward to the 1974 Education Sector Working Paper:

"Ever since the World Bank decided to enter the field of educational
development in 1962, its aim has been basically one to help
developing countries reform and expand their educational systems in
such a way that the latter may contribute more fully to economic
growth". (67)

In 'Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa' (World Bank 1980),
the same idea is expressed:

"Faster growth in Africa requires accelerated development of human
resources. This involves more and better formal schooling and
intensified training." ... "The lack of education among the
population has reduced the stimuli for progressive change generally
experienced where education is more widespread". (p68)

This is exactly what Schultz was saying twenty years earlier.

As Karabel and Halsey point out, the appeal of HCT to capitalist
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank -

"resided substantially in the comforting ideological character of
its message. The nations of the Third World, the theory suggested,
were poor not because of the structure of international economic
relations, but because of internal characteristics - most notably
their lack of human capital. As with the poor within the advanced
countries, nothing in the situation of the Third World countries
called for radical, structural change; development was possible if
only they would improve the quality of their woefully inadequate
human resources. Attention was thus deflected from structural
variables onto individuals". (69)
No doubt there is some truth in the argument that education is important for development, especially scientific and technological development. The socialist countries today see education as essential to their programme of industrialisation and socialist development. It does seem almost common sense that education will be at once reflected and facilitate the level of development of any particular society. In part this is what HCT is saying. Why then has HCT become so discredited?

Application of HCT since the 1960's in developing countries while facilitating quantitative expansion in education, has led to many problems which were not foreseen - a continuing reliance on expatriates, a lack of appropriately qualified technical personnel, massive unemployment for school leavers, inefficiencies in the educational system, a lack of relevance of curriculum, enormous inequalities in the society as a whole.

At this point it is possible to identify the two main criticisms of HCT:
- First, the adherence to the fundamental theoretical tenets of HCT led to these problems because HCT on the basis of mathematical calculations, had shown that investment in education would produce economic growth. This theoretical perspective assumes 'modernisation' through investment in physical and human capital and does not take into account broader aspects of socio-economic development as a whole. The whole theoretical framework therefore rests on an assumption about the relationship between education and the economy, an assumption that because there is a correlation between levels of educational and industrial development and between
productivity and educational levels, there is necessarily a causation which makes education a primary factor in development. In other words the assumption is that education will produce development. And this has not happened. Education in itself cannot produce development. According to Barry Bluestone:

"The anti-poverty policies inspired by the theory of human capital - yielded meagre results because they neglected the structure of the economy and deflected attention towards the characteristics of individuals." (70)

Second, 'the scientific value of the theory of human capital is much disputed'. (71) Calculations about earnings and productivity, and about social and individual rates of return are highly questionable. Jolly and Colclough (1972) in their article "African Manpower Plans: An Evaluation", surveyed thirty eight manpower studies and ten 'rates-of-return studies' - all of which were trying to quantify the economic priorities for educational expansion. Without exception these studies did not meet targets or produce the desired results.

Theoretical responses to the problems of HCT are discussed below. Why however, is there still an adherence to this approach on the part of the World Bank and many developing countries? The answer must lie in the political acceptance of the ideological underpinnings of the assumptions of this theoretical framework. From this perspective current problems of the developing countries (or developed capitalist countries for that matter) do not call for an orientation away from the capitalist system and major changes in the socio-economic structure of the society
concerned. On the contrary capitalism must be encouraged in developing
countries (and developed countries alike) through capital inputs to the
private sector, and the educational system must be improved to give
everyone a chance to help himself as well as developing the skills
necessary for development. These are the assumptions of modernisation
theory and of HCT, and are evident in the policies of international
agencies and western governments towards developing countries. The
ethic is to get a good 'rate-of-return on investment' - be that
investment in the economy or education; not to look at how that
particular 'investment' may affect other aspects of the socio-economic
structure and the quality of life of the population as a whole. The
assumption is that following this approach will provide 'equality of
opportunity' through education. These assumptions can be reflected in
strategies for black advancement, but as was shown in discussion of the
case of the USA, do not in fact overcome inequalities.

HCT is thus the ideological framework of post-colonial education and
often Africanisation strategies, and is an integral part of the
'modernisation' or bourgeois approach to development. The essential
point of HCT is that education can bring about economic development -
without the necessity for structural change in the society at large.
While it can be said that educational expansion in ex-colonies is often
largely a result of electoral demand, this does not remove the
theoretical and ideological underpinnings of such an approach. The
reason it is important to realise these theoretical assumptions, is the
effect they have in practice. As was mentioned earlier, theory not only
describes and analyses, but also affects reality.
B. THE REFORMED LIBERAL APPROACH - A BASIC NEEDS STRATEGY

In response to the wealth of criticism from both liberal and Marxist quarters a reformed liberal approach came into being in the 1970's - reflected in particular in the publications of the International Labour Organisation. After the Second World War the ILO was part of the 'broad international effort of technical assistance' to raise the living standards of the developing countries through rapid economic growth. The ILO acknowledges that the assumptions of HCT were prevalent at this time - i.e. it was assumed that poverty and employment problems would be overcome in developing countries through accelerated economic development, if obstacles to growth were removed. The ILO's contribution was in training workers and managers in order to overcome what was perceived as one of the main obstacles to economic growth - a lack of skills (72).

In the 1960's the ILO began to question the wisdom of modernisation theory and HCT, i.e. that improved standards of living and higher levels of employment would automatically result from skills development and economic growth, irrespective of the pattern of development pursued (73). Economic growth in the two decades after the war had not reduced poverty and inequality or provided sufficient productive employment. On the contrary the numbers of people suffering acute poverty, illiteracy and un-or-under employment had increased. And inequality had increased:
"In most developing countries the richest 10% of the households typically receive about 40% of personal income, whereas the poorest 40% of households receive 15% or less." (76)

The reformed liberal approach therefore became more concerned about issues of equality rather than productivity.

In contrast to the traditional approach, the ILO adopted 'the basic needs approach' in the mid-1970's. In this approach basic needs are defined as "the minimum standard of living which a society should set for the poorest of its people." (75) Basic needs include two elements to be satisfied in order to meet this minimum standard of living:

First, basic needs include minimum requirements for a family for private consumption; adequate food, shelter, clothing, household equipment and furniture.

Second, basic needs include essential services provided by and for the community at large, such as safe drinking water, sanitation, public transport, health and education facilities. (76)

To achieve these basic needs high levels of investment, redistribution of income/wealth and land and high growth rates are required. All these objectives are only perceived as realisable through fuller and more productive employment. (77) Central to the basic needs strategy therefore is employment policy - people must be able and willing to work, have a choice of productive employment which is adequately
remunerated to allow individuals to meet basic consumption needs, and thereby participate in development. (78) If all policy aspects of the basic needs strategy are implemented it is perceived that underemployment, poverty and inequality will be significantly reduced. (79)

The problem the ILO itself has found in the implementation of this strategy is that in order to make an impact on mass poverty and unemployment, difficult political and economic decisions are required. (80) For instance agrarian reform is often required, shifts in investment from consumption for high income groups to production, from urban to rural development, capital-intensive to labour-intensive activities, from the production of non-essential consumer goods to essential ones etc.:

"Experience has shown how great the political obstacles to such shifts usually are and how difficult it often is to secure a firm and lasting government commitment to these measures of an anti-poverty policy." (81)

In sum therefore, the basic needs or reformed liberal approach does recognise the need to examine policy options in order to meet basic needs, and in this context to take into account all aspects of social and economic development - particularly the provision of productive and adequately remunerated employment. The problems with this approach are two-fold:

a. While recognising that the problems of implementation are largely political - i.e. a lack of political will on the part of those in
power, this approach does not provide any political solutions - only policy solutions at the micro-level and sometimes macro-level.

b. While many of the policy-proposals at micro level and even at the broader economic and social level are acceptable, no suggestions are made on adjustments to the overall socio-economic structure. In order to meet these policy objectives it is perceived that the policy proposals are achievable as reforms within the existing political and economic system. In some instances they may well be - but not as a general rule.

The ILO perceives this approach as applicable for any socio-economic system - socialist, capitalist or for developing countries - i.e., the provision of basic needs is a 'one-world problem'.

The basic needs approach therefore, while addressing issues of poverty, inequality and unemployment, does not provide any radical changes for political orientation or socio-economic structure. These issues are taken up in the Marxist approach which examines the problem of human resources and development from a more radical political perspective. According to this approach political decisions are dependent on the nature of the class forces in power, and any significant changes require an alteration of these forces in power and changes in the socio-economic structure. In the next section the Marxist approach to human resources and education will be examined in a critical comparison with Human Capital Theory, or the traditional approach.
C. THE MARXIST APPROACH VS HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY —

A comparison and critique of the liberal view

The Marxist approach to education and human resource development encompasses a range of authors and perspectives, and involves on-going debate. (82) In this brief comparison of the Marxist theoretical approach with that of Human Capital Theory I will only highlight some of the main elements of the Marxist thesis — those that are central to issues of education and human resource policy.

1 Education for What and for Whom?

While Marx did not write much on education, education was a central feature in his philosophy — which is concerned with the development of humankind. Marx's concern was with human development, and the development of human societies from their earliest forms to the present. The objective of Marx's writings was to bring about the form of social organisation which would allow for the fullest development of people. Education is an essential part of this process.

Education in Marxist terms is an active process, it is through a activity — formal and informal that people learn. Education has been defined as "the mode of development of human beings in society". (83) Education is definitely not perceived in narrow economic or even development terms alone. Education is seen as:
* Fundamental to social and economic development and transformation;
* Essential to improving the quality of life for the population as a whole.

HCT perceives education in narrow economic terms - how can as little as possible be spent to get the most in economic terms out of education - i.e. to concentrate and invest in that aspect of education which has the highest rate of return. The reformed liberal approach does recognise that education does have a role to play in development of the individual and wider issues of social development - improves general health levels, reduces population growth, enables people to be self-employed in conditions of widespread unemployment. From the Marxist perspective education is vital to raising the general level of technical and industrial development of a society i.e. for economic development. It is also seen as important in the process of social transformation - not only in narrow development terms. In the 'Theses on Feuerbach', Marx wrote:

"The materialist doctrine that to men are products of circumstances and upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated." (84)

In so far as education is seen necessary for improving the quality of life in the Marxist perspective, a complete education which provides literacy and training for employment is accepted as being a basic right for the population as a whole. The provision of education in Marxist terms is not an economic question, it is a political question - a question of principle. Economic constraints may dictate the pace at
which this goal is achieved - but do not change the principle. The Marxist's argue that decisions on education cannot be made on the basis of investment profitability. In all countries there is a need for education of the population as a whole and for the development of human resources at all levels. Economic questions should only enter when one is examining how best to achieve this goal. This differs fundamentally from the World Bank approach. The latter, following many of the assumptions of the human capital approach, is constantly shifting its policy and juggling with calculations about whether investment in primary and vocational schooling is more or less profitable than investment in tertiary education.

In Africa and in World Bank circles there has been general disillusionment with education in the 1980's because it has not provided what it allegedly promised in the 1960's - economic development, employment, social equality. From the liberal perspective it is the education system that is the problem - what is taught and to whom. It is the education system that has increased unemployment, led to a shortage of skills and generally not facilitated economic development. The solution to the many social problems facing African countries has therefore been to tinker with the education system - to change who and how many people are given a general education, to change what kind of education and how much education different groups are given. From the 1950's there have been attempts at introducing academic and vocational curricula in order to 'reduce unemployment and provide skills for development.'
The attempt by many governments to tinker with the education system is not going to solve their human resources and development problems. Education has 'failed' not because of education - but because it is part of a wider social structure and the nature of the inherited economies.

The disillusionment with education as such is therefore unjustified. It was expected to produce results beyond its capabilities. Furthermore, from the 1950's attempts to vocationalise part of the formal schooling system have not achieved what they intended. And providing less education to fewer people has not solved employment and development problems. P Foster reviewing the experience of countries which has attempted to vocationalise school curricula, concluded that the need was for a more adequate general education at secondary level, with a bias toward general science and English. (85)

"No amount of curriculum juggling is likely to produce the kinds of mass results anticipated by the proponents of technical, vocational and agricultural education." (86)

On social equality and the issue of vocational vs academic education, Foster states:

"Those who criticise the irrational nature of African demand for 'academic' as opposed to 'vocational' education fail to recognise that the strength of academic education has lain precisely in the fact that it is a predominantly vocational education providing access to those occupations with the most prestige, and most important, the highest pay..." (87)
In so far as Marxism accepts education as a right for all, it rejects pluralism of curricula - i.e. the provision of curricula for different groups or classes based on either conceptions of ability, differential needs or a functional basis. Marx understood education as having three components: "mental education, physical education and technological training." This Marx called polytechnical education - i.e. an academic education with a scientific and technical bias (88).

The assumption of the approach which advocates a dual curricula - one vocational and one academic, is that there are those who are not capable of achieving a general academic education. This assumption has implications for policy questions on intelligence testing, streaming, and different curricula for those who are considered more or less able. In a capitalist society it also has implications, and is perceived as a justification for, access to academic education by different social groups and classes - i.e. how the education system reproduces the inequality of the society. In practice, it is the middle and upper classes that have access to the more academic education, and the working class that by a large receives the vocational education - i.e. those who are less able! Educational streaming thus plays a dynamic role in cultural and social reproduction. In reality it is who should receive an academic education, rather than who can. A vocational education may be more useful but in a class society it is definitely not more valuable than an academic education. (89)

From the Marxist perspective all normal children are educable to a general level (+ - 10 years) and should receive a similar education.
"It (Marxism) rejects the idea that children are fatally conditioned by heredity or environment... This does not mean that Marxists hold that all children are equal, that there are no differences in the brain and the structure of the higher nervous system at birth. Of course there are. The Marxist stand is that these anatomical-physiological peculiarities condition but do not determine the child's development. Development is determined rather by the nature and form of the child's activity in the home, at the school and elsewhere." (90)

In sum, from the Marxist standpoint, education is a dynamic process - an essential part of socio-economic development and vital to each individual so as to the change the quality of life for the population as a whole. All children have the right to a full general education (with a scientific bias) in order for education to play a positive role in society and not to reproduce class inequality. Most important, education does not produce economic growth, create unemployment nor solve problems of social inequality - those issues are reflections of the wider social structure and can only be dealt with at that level. Chapter 5 will examine whether Zimbabwe has applied Marxist principles in the expansion of its education system after independence and show how a lack of change in the social structure can hinder the transformation of the education system along socialist lines.

ii. Education and Social Inequality

Carnoy, in describing the essence of the Bowles and Gintis (1976) critique of the approach which perceives education as independent from
politics, the economy and the state – i.e. – the liberal approach, states:

"Thus, the reproduction of economic inequality and the legitimation of that inequality, as well as the legitimation of capitalist relations in production, receive top billing in the role played by education."

In terms of Human Capital Theory (HCT) – education is by implication independent from the economy and the state and is a motive force for providing social equality. Education is there for the taking, ensures social mobility and dictates the price of labour. If the individual does not make the most of this opportunity, there is only the individual to blame. According to HCT – everyone has become a capitalist through investing in this own education, and can become wealthy through education.

Bowles and Gintis explicitly reject non-Marxist explanations of education's economic role in terms of 'the mental skills it supplies students and for which employers pay in the labour market'. (92) For Bowles and Gintis, to understand the role of education in relation to social inequality, one needs to understand the economy in which the education system operates. In their case study of the USA – the economic system was capitalism. From their perspective and the Marxist perspective in general, the essence of capitalism is profit, which is the extraction of surplus value from workers through paying a worker for only a certain proportion of what he produces. The worker owns no capital, and his wages are dictated by the necessity of the capitalist to make profit and the worker to sell his labour-power. Exploitation in
this form is the essence of capitalism and the reason for social inequality.

For HCT, on the contrary, wages reflect that value of the worker to society and the investment he has made in himself. Wages reflect the rate of return for investment in human capital—i.e., education. Wages are not the source of exploitation and inequality as they are in Marxist theory, Bowles and Gintis acknowledge that individuals with more education will be paid more, but that this is compatible with a class-based power structure of the enterprise and the society. In their view therefore:

"rates of return to education reflect the often contradictory requirements of capitalist production and the reproduction of the class structure." (93)

Returning to the role of education—according to HCT:

"Individuals will embark on a course of investment in personal development. The supply of human capital is the simple aggregation of these individual choices... In this view, the history and current state of education is the product of individual choice, constrained of course, by available education and production technologies and the total supply of resources". (94)

From the Marxist perspective in general, and the view of Bowles and Gintis, education does much more than simply produce human capital. According to Bowles and Gintis:

" education segments the work force, forestalls the development of working class consciousness, and legitimates economic inequality by providing an open, objective and ostensibly meritocratic mechanism for assigning individuals to unequal occupational positions." (95)
Education therefore legitimates inequality because it legitimates the unequal distribution of income. Education facilitates inequality because of the type of education provided and to whom it is given - it educates workers to be workers and capitalist to be such. Education rations education certificates and the income which goes with these certificates. The perspective of HCT is quite the opposite:

"A reduction in the inequalities in the distribution of schooling might lead to changes in income in equality."

i.e. more schooling reduces inequality. (96)

In conclusion, from the Marxist perspective education cannot be seen in isolation from the society in which it operates. If it operates in a capitalist society, it will to a certain extent legitimate and facilitate those social relations. The education process is however, not locked into capitalism. It has a dynamic of its own which is a motive force in the process of social and economic development. HCT on the other hand perceives education as an independent force, not an integral part of the existing socio-economic structure, providing social equality and economic development.

iii Education, the State and Class Conflict

In Marxist terms therefore, education needs to be analysed in terms of the political economy of the society. The cog of any society viewed from this perspective is the state. The political power and activity of the state represents the economic and social relations in the society
at large. Those who own and control the economy will effect this power through the political structures of the state. In a capitalist society therefore the state represents the interests of the capitalist class. Amongst Marxists the precise nature of the capitalist state is a topic of much debate. For present purposes it is necessary simply to highlight the Marxist conception of the relationship between education and the state, and the Marxist version of the state compared with the liberal version.

The political economy of education differs from traditional Human Capital Theory in that education in the former is perceived as being shaped by class and political conflict in society as it is manifest in the organisation of the state. Education policy and practice is part of the public sector - the state - and reflects state policies and the interest they represent. In a capitalist society the state represents the interests of the capitalist class and in turn the education system does as well. In Marxist theory, unlike liberal theory, the state is never a neutral entity, operating as an administrative mediating agent above society. The state will ultimately operate in the interests of a single class or group of class interests. Carnoy summed up the two differing perceptions of the state and education as follows:

"This is where political economy most differs from traditional human capital theory: for it is the assumption that the state and education are inseparable from inequitable power relations in the 'private' economy that directly opposes the human capital assumptions of education's neutrality in the context of neutral state." (97)
The concept 'class' is therefore as central to the Marxist analysis of education as that of the 'state'. The Marxist criticism of Human Capital Theory in essence boils down to the absence of the class issue in their analysis. Class and class conflict is central to a Marxist discussion on any aspect of society. Bowles and Gintis isolate the fundamental problem with HCT:

"HCT formally excludes the relevance of class and class conflict.... HCT is the most recent, and perhaps ultimate, step in the elimination of class as a central economic concept...Every worker the human capital theorists are fond of observing, is now a capitalist." (98)

iv. Educational and Human Resource Planning

African manpower plans of the early 1960's were all prepared in the context of a desire for economic growth, and acute shortage of human resources, a heavy reliance on expatriates, the need to expand educational systems to meet needs for human resources and demands by donor agencies to identify priorities for technical assistance and aid. (99) Most African countries on achieving independence did prepare manpower plans. The objectives of the plans were:

1. to provide the necessary human resources for economic growth
2. to localise or Africanise jobs currently held by expatriates
3. to expand the colonial education system in order to meet electoral demand and provide a skilled labour force.

Psacharopolous and Woodhall 1985, made the same point some 20 years later, about the purpose of manpower planning:
"The basic belief underlying attempts at manpower planning is a simple one: skilled manpower is one of the most crucial inputs of a modern economy. Thus to foster economic growth (and to avoid critical shortages or surpluses of manpower), planners have sought to identify future requirements for skilled manpower and to design the education systems so as to produce a labour force with the necessary skills and technical or professional knowledge." (100)

Manpower planning (and it is described as such, not as human resource planning), incorporating educational planning, was and is seen as an essential step in the process of solving the development problems of the post-colonial period. Many politicians would have in fact resisted such a step (because planning was associated with socialism) had the problems facing them not been so serious. The assumption that planning would bring about social and economic development was in part the influence of the developments in the socialist countries. While many African countries at this time made pronouncements about socialism, their planning technique was not in a socialist framework. Planning at this time had also become popular in social democracies such as Britain. The various techniques used for manpower planning in the developed capitalist countries were incorporated into African manpower plans—namely manpower forecasting and cost-benefit analysis. Both these techniques hold certain assumptions common to Human Capital Theory. However in time, as HCT has become increasingly discredited, proponents of either technique have dropped the HCT and modified their technique to encompass general manpower analysis and a variety of micro aspects of manpower planning and adhere now to the liberal, reformed HCT approach. (101) The basic assumptions of HCT are, however, still present. African countries have generally had little or no planning machinery. However, one of the real weaknesses of manpower planning using the traditional
approach is the lack of emphasis on planning machinery. A lack of a planning machinery has not intimidated African countries from elaborating manpower and economic plans, without anticipating the difficulties in realising these plans.

a. **Manpower Forecasting and Cost-Benefit Analysis**

The assumption of manpower planning from a liberal perspective was that "it was possible to ascertain the optimum amount of education for achieving specified growth rates." (102) This idea derives directly from HCT. According to Psacharopolous and Woodhall the idea -

"that education is a form of investment in human capital... is one of the most important developments in economics in recent decades, and has a considerable impact on educational planning in developing countries." (103)

Both manpower forecasting and cost-benefit analysis are techniques of educational planning which derive from this common assumption, and therefore central to manpower planning. From the liberal perspective manpower planning involves providing skilled manpower for economic development. The main vehicle for providing skilled manpower is educational planning - hence the importance of different techniques of educational planning.

Manpower planning from the liberal perspective involving forecasting, cost-benefit analysis or other techniques reflects HCT in that:
The primary assumption is that investment in education i.e. the production of skills (through these techniques of manpower planning) will lead to economic growth, without any changes to the socio-economic structure.

Manpower planning in this perspective is not integrally linked to wider issues of social and economic development as HCT does not link education to wider problems of inequality and socio-economic transformation.

Decisions about planning manpower using techniques such as cost-benefit analysis means planning is judged according to mathematical calculations on the profitability of investment in different levels or types of education. And this is the essence of HCT. Investment in education is worthwhile because it is profitable and investment should be made in those areas of education which are most profitable to society, e.g. primary rather than university education.

In this perspective of manpower planning, the question of its class role, or its role and effect in the class structure of the society is never examined, as the concept class does not exist in HCT.

Cost benefit analysis is concerned with calculating through social and private rates of return the most profitable areas for educational investment. Cost benefit analysis is only concerned with the economic effects of educational provision — it is not concerned with broader
policy questions of allocation and equity, or social and cultural objectives. Its prime purpose is efficiency of economic investment in education. (104) Some of the latest conclusions of the World Bank on the basis of cost-benefit analysis are: cut back on higher and postgraduate education, concentrate investment on primary education, expand part-time education, shift resources out of science and technology and into the arts and social sciences, reduce investment in women's education and cut back on research. (105)

It is clear that from these sorts of recommendations, that cost-benefit analysis in no way concerns itself with broader issues of human resources planning - with education and its importance to the quality of life, equity, the need for a scientific and technological thrust to national development which do not produce good results for cost-benefit analysis in the short term. A case in point is the issue of women's education. Because women have children and therefore are not perceived in cost-benefit terms as putting their education to productive use, a woman's education is not a profitable investment. These problematic World Bank ideas are in the face of the fact that the mathematical calculations of cost-benefit analysis for education have long been questioned. For quite some time it has been accepted that "rates of return or opportunity costs is a very dubious basis for decisions about the allocation of national resources." (107)

Psacharaopolous and Woodhall (1985), two of the main proponents of cost-benefit analysis for educational planning, acknowledge that the effectiveness of the techniques of cost-benefit analysis in evaluating
investment is controversial, but still justify the use of the technique for evaluating educational investment. It is the method still used by the World Bank, in Britain, and elsewhere, not to mention its influence on educational planning in developing countries. Psachoropolous and Woodhall, and the World Bank do recognise some of the shortcomings of the technique which they itemise as:

- that earnings do not perfectly measure productivity
- that education acts as a screening device
- that cost-benefit analysis does not adequately identify externalities
- cost-benefit analysis is essentially a tool of marginal analysis and shows the effect of an incremental increase in investment
- it is unreliable as a guide for fundamental, structural changes in the scale or pattern of investment
- too much trust should not be placed in numerical estimates of rates of return as in some cases they are based on inadequate data or may not take into account wastage, unemployment or the influence of other factors to determine earnings. (107)

A rather formidable list of shortcomings. However, for all these reasons the authors state that it is important that cost-benefit analysis is not used in isolation as an investment appraisal. (108)

In practice however, the Bank does seem to place a lot of weight on the results from this approach - "it provides one essential ingredient in the assessment and choice of investment projects." (109)
Manpower Forecasting is another technique for implementing HCT. Manpower forecasting involves calculating skilled manpower requirements on the basis of a given growth rate, and from there drawing conclusions for educational planning. The focus of manpower forecasting again derived from Human Capital Theory. All manpower plans related projections to economic growth -:

"Methodologically they assumed that manpower was an essential input for production and calculated what level of skilled manpower was required to make possible a projected increase in output." (101)

Jolly and Colclough (1972) surveyed 38 African manpower plans prepared during the 1960's in Africa. The emphasis was on identifying current shortages, forecasting the demand for skilled and educated manpower and providing guidelines for educational expansion. Jolly maintains that the most notable omissions of these manpower plans were employment and unemployment in urban and rural areas, incomes policy - especially trends and incentives in the earnings of skilled and educated persons, and the whole question of the allocation of the labour force, within sectors, occupations and geographical regions. (111) - i.e. the broader aspects of human resources planning.

On ten rate of return studies in Africa which only included data on wages drawn from the urban formal sector and civil service scales - Jolly concluded - "one could give little credence to the calculated rates of return as indicators of the social benefits of education." (112)
Jolly (1975) definitely does not dismiss the positive and necessary role of manpower planning. However, on both manpower forecasting and cost benefit analysis as techniques he says:

"Both techniques require one to swallow some awfully big assumptions if one is even to begin the meal. The trouble is that most practitioners of either art usually develop as strong stomachs for their own type of meal, as they feign to suffer indigestion from that of the others." (113)

Jolly's opinion is that the focus of manpower planning, while still providing long term manpower projections, should shift to micro-studies and deal with issues of - income distribution and equality, and growth of wage earning employment, unemployment and population growth, the rural urban gap, sectoral and occupational studies, the adequacy of training and education for different occupational groups, issues of quantity and quality in formal and informal education, the adequacy of the labour market in allocating jobs - and last but not least what institutions, organisational structures and incentives are necessary to achieve change - i.e. to implement human resources development programmes. This approach is also the approach now favoured by the ILO, i.e. a basic needs approach.

b. A Socialist Approach to Manpower Planning

Being based on the Marxist theoretical perspective discussed above, socialist planning of human resources, and the labour force in particular, has the following features in contrast to the non-Marxist or traditional approach.
i. Socialist planning of human resources is an integral part of the objective of working towards a socialist society, and as such has two main goals:

a) Social - to provide full employment, and give each individual work corresponding to his or her abilities and an income according to accomplishments at work, (i.e. distribution of income is an aspect of labour force planning):

"In this way manpower planning becomes a way to implement a fundamental distribution principle of a socialist society - from each according to ability to each according to work". (115)

b) Economic - "to allocate and use the available labour force efficiently, both qualitatively and quantitatively". (116)

From the Marxist point of view, the labour force is the most important productive force in the society. And it is not infinitely expandable. Production depends on the size of the active labour force and productivity. Time and educational level of the labour force act as constraints. Therefore if there is to be more efficient use of labour, labour needs to be always improving productivity.

Investment in education is seen to lead to increasing productivity. This is a point that the Marxists and Human Capital Theorists have in common. But this is the point of departure for two perspectives. HCT does not encompass the social goals of the socialist approach to human resource
planning. Hence the crucial issues of employment and incomes are generally excluded from traditional manpower plans. This is evident in Zimbabwe where any planning that there has been, has been concerned primarily with 'making skills more national' - i.e. training black Zimbabweans and promoting black advancement.

The issues of employment and incomes are crucial for the achievement of a socialist society as:

1. Income policy can ensure a redistribution of wealth and an end to glaring and escalating inequality which is a feature of African countries today, and Zimbabwe in particular.

2. Full productive employment is perceived as a right for each individual, and standards of living can only be realised and improved for all if all the population is productively utilised in the process of economic development. Unemployment is perceived as a serious waste of resources. In Zimbabwe, unemployment and under-employment is one of the most critical problems facing government seven years after independence, yet employment policy is not an integral part of human resource planning.

ii. Being an integral part of the process of achieving a socialist society, socialist human resource planning is by necessity an integral part of the national economic plan. This point was emphasised by Professor E Stiller:

"Ensuring full employment, training a growing number of highly skilled personnel, and employing them as effectively
as possible are basic issues for socialist economic policy, and therefore an integrated component of economic planning, in particular, manpower planning. It is part of national economic planning and linked in a multiplicity of ways with other sections of the plan, although it displays a series of special aspects". (117)

In traditional manpower planning where techniques such as forecasting, cost-benefit analysis, or even analysis of micro aspects of manpower planning, are used, and where the manpower plan is not an integral part of the expansion and the developments in the economy, the manpower plan becomes an indicative plan or forecast, the goals of which are most often not met because of the independent developments in the economy. For example, there is an overproduction of certain types of skilled personnel, or an underproduction. Most African manpower plans have been of this nature - i.e. indicative forecasts. And most do not meet their objectives. In Zimbabwe there is not really detailed human resource planning to speak of. What there is is concerned with prediction of the requirements of skilled personnel for five years ahead (see First Five Year National Development Plan 1986-1990) and is essentially indicative based on a given economic growth rate. These predictions become useless as the growth rate is already not meeting target, and skill requirements are not integrally linked through manpower plans to the education system. Such indicative forecasts therefore become forecasts on paper which bare little relation to reality.
This brings us to the third feature of socialist human resource planning, the relationship between educational planning and human resource planning. Educational planning is an essential component of human resource planning. In order to achieve full employment, emphasis must be placed on the rapid growth of the productive sectors of the economy. And for this guaranteed trained skilled personnel are necessary. Rational utilisation of the labour force therefore requires that education be planned in relation to demand. Planning for demand may seem to conflict with the provision of education as a right. But in practice does not. It does mean that careful consideration is given to what kind of education depending on needs of the economy, but that there is a variety of options open to individuals to choose from. In terms of the internal logic of the system, it does not seem sensible to let people study for qualifications they will never be able to find employment in.

Most manpower planning techniques in the traditional approach are in fact more concerned with educational than with other aspects of human resource planning - eg. allocation and utilisation of the labour force. Predictions are made on skill requirements, and therefore general indicators are given about education and expansion. There is not however the type of detailed planning which ensures that most of the products of the education system will be absorbed into employment. On the contrary the problem in Africa in general, and Zimbabwe in particular, is that because of the lack of rigorous planning,
most of the products of the education system join the growing pool of unemployed.

While there is careful planning in relation to education in the socialist approach, the socialist principle that a general science based education and training for employment should be available to all is adhered to - as far as economic considerations allow. In other words while economic considerations are important in decisions about educational expansion, they are not the only consideration. The transformation of the education system to provide an education for all which does not reinforce inequality, and which is relevant to later employment, is perceived from the Marxist approach as an integral part of the transformation of the society as a whole. As was discussed above, HCT and the traditional approach tend to treat education and the problems surrounding it in isolation from the rest of the social structure.

iv. As has been shown above by implication, the orientation of socialist planning of human resources is to attempt to overcome social inequality, to be part of the development of new social relations which are not exploitive. In this sense the concept of class is central to understanding the purpose and goals of socialist human resource planning. As was shown earlier, the concept class and its implications are absent in the traditional approach.
The Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, R Mugabe, was quoted as making the same point at the beginning of this chapter. He said that in order to transform manpower utilisation and training in accordance with socialist objectives, it was necessary to transform the relations of production in which such utilisation takes place (118). The question of whether human resource planning in Zimbabwe has been part of the process of transforming social relations since independence, will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. At this point it is suffice to say that human resource planning in Zimbabwe has not been used in order to prevent the development of new exploitative classes in the independence period. The question of class and social inequality has not been part of the process of human resource planning in Zimbabwe in practice.

v. The fifth feature of socialist human resource planning is that it is a rigorous process, not only with goals, but also with mechanisms to ensure implementation. As was pointed out earlier - planning in itself is not socialist, but planning is essential to the achievement of socialism. The first requirement of the planning process is a detailed knowledge of the economy and the labour force. In relation to the labour force, its size and structure, its role in the economy and the nature of the labour process, demand for and the availability of labour - all need to be detailed. On that basis short, medium and long term plans are elaborated with enterprise, regional and national consultation. The traditional approach cannot and prefers not
to elaborate plans of more than five years ahead. In contrast the Marxist approach maintains that only through long term planning is it possible to effect and see changes in the nature of the labour force.

After drawing up the plan the next step in the socialist approach is implementation. Implementation is where the weakness is apparent in African manpower plans. Mechanisms in the socialist approach which attempt to facilitate the implementation of manpower plans are:

- Economic measures: a wage structure that fosters a stable workforce and limits movement between enterprises.
- Social measures: provision of 'monthly days for housework', extra vacation for working women with children, provision of housing in areas with high demand for labour, and others.
- Ideological measures: political awareness of the importance of one's occupation, improvement of discipline on the job through collective discussion and criticism, and others.
- Educational measures: occupational training to ensure replacement of those leaving, continuing education for employed workers, occupational guidance, etc.
- Sociological measures: strengthen work collectives and improve the climate of work, etc.
- Administrative measures: establish limits on admission by disciplines to universities, technical colleges and training
courses for skilled workers in line with future demand in individual professions, etc. (119)

Planning efficient use of the labour force is difficult in itself, and all factors therefore need to be taken into account - mobility, political consciousness, tradition and culture, and the way the labour force has developed historically.

vi. In conclusion, Prof Stiller emphasises the lessons developing countries can learn from the socialist approach to manpower planning:

* The employment problem in developing countries is part of the social or class relations of the society. Its solution therefore lies in socialist transformation and socialist human resource planning.

* Non-binding forecasts as a method of manpower planning, are of minor value. Planning needs to be part of a democratic process that assumes an obligatory nature.

* Detailed knowledge of the nature and role of the labour force is required. A feature lacking in African manpower plans. Zimbabwe's National Manpower Survey 1981, the baseline of data on manpower in Zimbabwe, only covered the formal sector, and even then excluded domestic and agricultural workers. In addition the Survey only provided data on numbers employed in occupations, and did not deal with the structure of the labour force, the nature of the labour process, nor demand for and availability of labour.
Planning of human resources must be an integral part of the national plan, and must have mechanisms which ensure implementation.

The socialist approach to manpower planning therefore is perceived as an integral part of a process of social and economic change. In the traditional approach in contrast all manpower planning is perceived as a technique to facilitate the provision of manpower for economic development (within a capitalist framework). Objectives which are similar in one sense, but radically different in another. Zimbabwe has committed itself on paper to socialism, to transforming the relations of production, and therefore the nature of manpower utilisation and training. As will become evident in later chapters, in practice they have adopted a more traditional approach with black advancement being a central feature and an important dynamic in the nature of the social relations and human resources in Zimbabwe after 1980.

This discussion of the socialist approach to the planning of human resources has not dealt with the problems of the implementation of this approach in different countries. While being aware of the necessity for such a discussion, the task of this section has been to highlight the important theoretical differences between the Marxist and non-Marxist approaches to human resource planning. Even with the Socialist approach, it is necessary to be aware of the objective limitations developing countries face. For example, problems of high un- and under-employment inherited from the colonial period, and vulnerability to fluctuations in the international economy. The socialist approach does
nonetheless provide some alternative strategies which could help developing countries overcome their problems. And it is these strategies which the above discussion has attempted to highlight. In addition Zimbabwe has committed itself to the socialist approach, and later chapters in the thesis will examine Zimbabwe's approach to human resource planning in the light of these main elements of the Marxist approach.

5. CONCLUSION

With all the investment there has been in education and human resource development:-

* economic growth in Africa is slow and in general inequalities have increased in the post colonial period;
* there has been some progress in terms of Africanisation - but independent Africa is far from being self-reliant as far as technical and scientific human resources are concerned.

In concluding how the theoretical discussion so far throws light on this situation, it is necessary to answer three questions:

* How have the different theories influenced or shaped Africa's approach to human resource development and planning?
* How are the different theoretical approaches relevant to the problems of human resources development and planning today?
How do the different theoretical approaches influence the problems of Africanisation, localisation and black advancement?

i. HCT has had direct influence on education and development policy in Africa. It is evident from Africa's experience that investment in education and human resources by governments and aid agencies cannot alone produce economic growth, no matter how much one invests. Education is obviously necessary for economic growth and development, but can only play a sufficiently dynamic role when it is integrated into a wider process of economic and human resource planning. Left to its own dynamic in the context of a post-colonial capitalist economy education can be an obstacle to development (120). Education can use up money that could be invested in the productive sector to create jobs, can promote inequality and thereby impede economic growth and promote political conflict.

While one cannot blame all Africa's development problems on HCT, many countries have wittingly or unwittingly followed the assumptions of this approach. To a certain extent therefore these assumptions have led to some of the human resource problems that exist today. The necessity then exists to look for theoretical approaches which provide alternative policies. The 'Basic Needs Approach' does provide some alternative strategies. The Marxist approach provides an alternative for the purposes of this thesis.

ii. Investment in education and human resource development does not automatically meet a country's needs. Developing manpower plans
and forecasting needs is a common approach to planning. But to
realise manpower plans there is a need for a rigorous process of
planning, organisation, research and implementation. Plans need to
be based on reality and be implemented. A common problem in
independent Africa is that neither of these criteria are met.

iii Ideas of socialism and social equality as objectives of the
independence period have led many African countries to commit
themselves to education for all, and they have then been under
electoral pressure to meet this demand. Achievements in the area
of educational expansion have been commendable. However, education
alone cannot solve the many problems facing these countries, nor
ensure social equality. The demand for increased education has also
been reinforced with increasing unemployment, as the perception is
that those with more education are less likely to be unemployed. In
actual fact however, expanding education in the face of increasing
unemployment does not solve anything.

Educational expansion does however, give newly independent
governments credibility and legitimacy. Expanding education and
social services diverts attention from the necessity of making
structural changes to the economy if there is to be a redistribution
of income and wealth. In addition, in the liberal tradition,
education places the responsibility for 'making the most' of one's
education squarely on the shoulders of the parents and children
themselves, ie. the individual. (121)
While it is a common assumption of HCT that education will facilitate and ensure social equality, in practice this has clearly not been the case. More education has not lead to social equality and a redistribution of incomes. On the contrary, education in developing countries has become the path to power and social privilege. (122) This process has been facilitated by the 'diploma disease', ie. the fact that certification has become the passport to employment with high income and status.

iv. Socialist manpower planning, as seen earlier in this chapter is an integral part of national planning, and has managed to solve problems such as unemployment, income differentials etc. The question is why do many African countries advocate socialism or social equality in plans and then not implement these ideals in practice:

a) For objective reasons - these countries have little financial resources and are locked into a dependent economic relationship with the developed capitalist countries;

b) The rhetoric may be different from the policy and practice because governments in power are unaware of the real nature of socialist planning;

c) The state and political forces in power use socialism to win votes - but do not wish to implement policies which will conflict directly with their interests as an aspirant middle class.
v. As was mentioned in the chapter, Africanisation, localisation and black advancement are part of the political dynamics of the independence period. They are also variables of human resource planning. The theoretical elements of human resource planning therefore have a direct affect on the nature of Africanisation, localisation and black advancement. On the basis of the discussion in this chapter the following conclusions can be made:

a. The form that Africanisation takes depends on the nature of the state and the political forces it represents. Black advancement can be part of a strategy to improve social conditions for the majority. It can be part of a national strategy to consolidate independence. It can simply mean the Africanisation of capitalism, the placement of black personnel in government and certain sectors of the economy. It can mean the expansion of education and training.

b. On the question of Africanisation and economic development - Africanisation can be 'successful' without any change in the socio-economic system (ie. 'black faces in white places'). In other words the process of Africanisation need not necessarily imply any socio-economic change or transformation, although it is a necessary part of this process. On the contrary - the process of Africanisation can reduce the possibilities of socio-economic transformation, and even existing economic efficiency and prospects for development.
c. The expansion of the educational system after independence is the essential vehicle for Africanisation. However, the process of Africanisation can have a variety of effects on the society depending on the role the education system plays in the society as a whole. Africanisation can therefore facilitate inequality insofar as blacks become part of an educational system which is rationing certificates for jobs previously held by whites in a colonial income structure. If however the role of education in the new society is not such that it acts as a sieve for prestigious and high income jobs, then Africanisation will be a vital element in the process of creating a new society.

d. Depending upon one's theoretical approach to human resources development, and labour in particular, Africanisation can help or hinder the development of a new exploitative class in the independence period. Does one see labour as 'Human Capital', or does one see labour as exploited by capital and therefore perceive the need for a restructuring of the class relations of the society in the independence period.

e. Africanisation is part of human resource planning. If human resource planning involves no detailed planning and implementation, and only involves forecasting, then skill shortages will persist, and employment problems will increase despite an Africanisation policy.
f. Africanisation does open doors for Africans or locals to participate in the political process and decide their own future. The bigger problem of the independence period is the socio-economic structure and in whose interests it operates—ie. the objective forces in the society which the new government has to tackle. A change in the colour of government makes little difference at the objective level to the productive forces and social relations of the society at large.

In conclusion, human resource problems in Africa today may in part be attributed to their colonial heritage, but are also to a fair degree caused by the theoretical assumptions which underlie policy and practice in human resource development, planning and utilisation. Africanisation, localisation and black advancement are part of the political process of independence, and reflect the ideological persuasion of the government of the day. They are also however an integral part of human resource development, planning and utilisation, whatever form it takes. As such they are affected by the theoretical issues which affect human resource development in general.

The task of this thesis is to examine how Zimbabwe has tackled black advancement and the human resource problems it inherited at independence "in accordance with its socialist objectives". I propose in the following chapters therefore to:— examine human resources and the economy in Zimbabwe before and after independence, and to look at the role of black advancement in the post-colonial period.
PART II

BACKGROUND: THE ECONOMY AND THE STATE; EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT BEFORE 1980

Introduction

The necessity for black advancement, the form it was to take and the problems involved were all related to the colonial history of Zimbabwe. In order to understand the nature of human resources in Zimbabwe today, how black advancement has occurred and the relationship between human resources and the economic development of the country it is necessary therefore, to have a conception of the situation before 1980. For this reason, PART II will examine trends before independence:

Chapter 3 The economy and the state;
Chapter 4 Education and employment before 1980.

Chapter 3 will also briefly discuss the economy and the state after 1980. This overview, of the economy and the state, education and employment before 1980, provides the reader with the basis for understanding developments after 1980, and in particular the complexity of issues and problems in relation to human resources and black advancement which the new government inherited.
CHAPTER 3

THE ECONOMY AND THE STATE

1. PRE-COLONIAL ZIMBABWEAN SOCIETY

Pre-colonial Zimbabwe society was composed of two major groupings - the Shona and Ndebele. The Shona had inhabited the area for centuries. The Ndebele settled in the highveld area South-west in the 1850's after the Ndebele - Boer wars. The most important economic activity of the Shona and Ndebele was agriculture. As Beach observed:

"The South Central African polities were basically agricultural communities, in that the most important activity of the greatest number of their people was the production and collection of food. All other activities, including mining, manufacturing, building, trade, politics and religion, were secondary to this, and could not have been carried on without it". (1)

Shifting agriculture was practiced to ensure revitalisation of the soil. In preparation for drought which occurred every few years, drought resistant crops were grown, and a few years supply was always stored.

An important activity of the Shona was also mining. According to Phimister (2) in South Central Africa Africans engaged in the production of and trade in gold for over nine centuries. As demand grew methods of mining and prospecting grew more sophisticated. Gold was bartered with the Portuguese and Muslim merchants for cloth, beads, porcelain and weapons. (3) Copper and iron were other important exports up to the
end of the 19th century. More than 600 mines have been identified as having been utilised during this period. Cattle played an important part in Ndebele societies as the area in which they settled was free from tsetse fly and therefore good for breeding. Both groups engaged in local, regional and long distance trade. Iron working producing hoes and other implements, tobacco and salt industries were important for internal trade. The Shona traded corn for beads, cattle and goats from the Ndebele. The most lucrative export for the Ndebele was ivory. Cattle was also important in Ndebele trade. Both groups produced a surplus of agricultural products and a variety of specialised crafts specifically for the purpose of trading with the Europeans. (4)

For the next ninety years colonial land and labour policies totally undermined these traditional societies and destroyed the indigenous self-sufficient economies.

2. FOUNDATIONS OF A SETTLER-COLONIAL ECONOMY AND STATE

Cecil John Rhodes led the first Pioneer column in 1890 and put up the British flag at what they called Fort Salisbury, which later became Salisbury and after 1980 was renamed Harare. Rhodes represented the British South Africa Company (BSACo) which in its actions had the support of the Imperial Office. The objectives of the BSACo were twofold - to secure west, southern and eastern Africa for Britain, and to discover gold deposits similar to those found in South Africa. The Pioneers from South Africa and Europe were to become the first settlers,
taking mines, land and cattle from the indigenous people. By 1896 the resistance of the Ndebele and Shona people against 'pioneer' and colonial armies had been suppressed, and a period of settler colonial rule, which was to last for the next ninety years, had begun.

From the first few months after the settlers arrived, colonial land and labour policies took on much the same pattern as they had in the South - the reserve system was to become the essential feature of settler colonialism in the region. (5) The essence of the reserve system was that the Africans were to remain in designated areas known as 'native reserves' unless required as labour in the urban or 'white' farming and mining areas. By 1902 reserves totalling 20 million acres had been designated throughout the country. Besides the reserves, there were two other land categories established by the settler-colonial state: a. farms and mines claimed by settlers, absentee landowners or companies; b. unclaimed land which was regarded by the Company as its own until the Privy Council decision of 1918 conferred it as Crown land. (6) By and large it was the best areas for mining and farming that were taken by the settlers. The remaining unwanted areas became part of the reserves.

While land and capital were in abundance in the early stages of settler colonial rule, labour was very scarce. While the indigenous peoples could still feed themselves, there was no reason for them to work under conditions of semi-slavery and for very low wages on white mines and farms. In the early stages Native Commissioners admitted openly that they used forced labour. For example, in 1895 the N/C Hartley observed:
"I am at present forcing the natives of this district to work sorely against their will, using such methods as I think desirable". (7)

In addition the colonial administration recruited labour from surrounding territories and even further afield. (8)

The purpose of the reserve system was twofold: a. to provide a permanent supply of cheap migrant labour for the economy; b. to keep those not employed and the families of those employed in the reserve areas where they allegedly had an economic basis which ensured their needs were met. In reality this rationale allowed for the labourer to be paid an absolute minimum which provided for his needs alone while he was working.

Before the reserves became overpopulated and traditional systems of agriculture therefore undermined, various legal measures were taken to force Africans off the land and into the developing settler economy, but measures were also taken to ensure that they did not stay there. The pass system was introduced towards the end of the 19th century as the cornerstone of the migrant labour system which ensured African workers were transient labourers in the cash economy with their base in the reserve areas. The Vagrancy Act of 1893 stipulated that those Africans who were out of employment in the urban white areas were to be kept out. The Towns Management Ordinance (1894) and the Town Location Regulations 1898 required Africans to have permits to enter and remain in white areas. These rules were praised by Graham Bower, the Imperial Secretary at the Cape, as an important measure in curbing loafing. (9) The pass system thus controlled the flow of Africans into the urban and white
areas. In the early period when the land could still provide basic needs and a surplus, the Colonial Administration instituted a system of taxation in order to force Africans off the land and into wage employment. In the 1890's a hut tax was collected in cash or grain, cattle or even alluvial gold, or two months labour. (10) In 1904 the hut tax of 10s was raised to a poll tax of £1 on each African male, irrespective of whether an individual had a cash income or not. (11) In addition Africans on 'white' land had to pay a variety of rents, dipping and grazing fees. Taxation, rents and fees pushed Africans off 'white' land and into the Reserves.

Taxation still did not ensure enough indigenous labour. For that reason the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau was created to recruit alien African labour. In addition to a shortage of local labour, the reason for recruitment of foreign migrant labour was that it accepted lower wages than local labour and therefore served to keep wage levels down.

The reserve system and local and foreign migrant labour remained an essential part of colonial labour policy up until independence:

"By the time a British Commission sent to Rhodesia in 1914 reported that subsistence and tribal society was incompatible with economic progress, the Reserves were already a permanent feature." (12) This feature of colonial capitalism sets it apart from the pattern the commercialisation of agriculture took in Europe where there was a complete transformation of the traditional forms of agriculture with the development of the capitalist mode of production. (13) This meant that throughout the colonial period blacks were the providers of cheap labour power, but with the exception of some basic goods, the small white
settler community and Europe and South Africa were the market for goods. The home market was an important feature in the development of capitalism which was absent in the settler-colonial economy. Because of what settler-colonialism did to traditional agriculture through land hunger, overpopulation and erosion, because the average African wage was below that required for the subsistence of their family, structural problems developed in the settler-colonial economy which are still evident in the economy today.

Rhodesia never had the extent of gold and mineral deposits found further South. When it became clear to the Company that there was no gold reef to be compared with that of the Rand, the Company decided to diversify, and the obvious direction was agriculture. In 1908 "the white agriculture policy" was launched. The first stage of this policy was:

"to launch a decisive attack on the Reserves in the years 1908 - 1914 with the intention of recovering the best land and making it available for European settlement. This policy was to radically affect the African position on the land". (14)

The reasons for this attack on African access to land were twofold:

a. to ensure that in general Africans were not able to own land (and there provide competition for white agriculture);

b. the switch to an emphasis on farming bought an increased demand for labour, especially seasonal labour. Hence the need to push Africans into being dependent on the wage economy.

Three important departments were created under the "white agriculture policy": As Estates Department, a Department of Agriculture and a Land
Bank. The Estates Department was set up to promote European settlement in 1908 and had information offices in London, Glasgow and South Africa. The Department of Agriculture was set up in 1903 and reorganized in 1908. This Department set up an experimental farm to carry out research and offered advice and a variety of extension services to European farmers throughout the colonial period. (15) The Land Bank was set up in 1912 with a share capital of £250,000 to make credit facilities "available for persons of European descent only". Settler farmers were encouraged through a favourable pricing policy to produce maize and tobacco for export. By 1912 farming had become more important to the Company and the settler economy than mining. White (settler) farmers had become a vital part of the economy and also occupied strategic positions in government and parliament.

Self-rule was given to the settlers in 1923 and Southern Rhodesia became a Dominion. No changes were made to the position Africans had come to occupy in the political, social and economic life of the colony under Company rule. The BSACo governed Rhodesia for 30 years and laid the basis for a settler colonial economy based on mining and more important, agriculture. Foreign capital was always to keep its control over the mining sector, but it was the white settler farming community that was to play the decisive role in Rhodesian political and economic history. The Company set the scene for white political control, racial discrimination in land and agriculture policy and for the migrant labour system.
It is evident from the discussion so far the Rhodesian society from its inception was organised on a basis which served and defended settler interests, as well as the interests of the colonial power. The state has therefore been described as a settler-colonial state. During the colonial period, colonial or metropolitan and settler interests conflicted as well as allied themselves over how best to control labour and achieve maximum economic benefits from the settler-colonial society. As well as looking at economic trends, the following sections will briefly trace how colonial and settler interests were represented through state policy. Such a background is important to understanding the role of the state in relation to those who occupy positions in the state structure in the post-independence period, and therefore the implications of black advancement.

3. CONSOLIDATION OF A SETTLER-COLONIAL STATE AND SOCIETY: 1923-1953

The Company had laid the basis for settler colonial rule, but after being granted 'responsible government' by the Colonial Office, the state took a variety of steps which were to consolidate the economic and political power of the white settler community. These steps ensured that whites had access to the best land, mineral concessions, ownership of industry, freehold rights in urban areas, the advantages of a sound basic education and a right to professional, managerial and skilled jobs. The role of blacks was clearly defined as that of labourers, very often migrant, for a settler economy.
The state took various legal measures which secured the position of the settler community, and with the world recession in the 1930's began to play an important role in the economy in order to develop settler agriculture, initiate industrialisation and a local manufacturing industry as well as provide infrastructure. White political power was secured through the complete exclusion of blacks from the political arena, the alliance between settler farmers and white skilled workers and the representation of their interests, through a variety of channels, in the settler-colonial state.

The key legal instruments which secured white interests were in the areas of land, agricultural marketing, ownership and trading rights in urban areas, labour control and protection of white skilled labour. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 gave legal confirmation to the land alienation that had taken place under Company rule and left the country's 96.4 million acres apportioned as follows: 48.5 million acres, or more than half the country's land area for white occupation, 29 million acres for African use. Individual ownership of land by Africans was only allowed in the Native Purchase Areas which were 8% of the total land area of the country. Africans however found it difficult to get credit, as was mentioned earlier in the policy of the Land Bank. The Purchase Areas were also located further away from railways, markets and roads than the traditional peasantry - making the marketing of produce and acquisition of inputs very difficult. In addition the Land Apportionment Act prohibited African ownership or lease of premises in white areas (which included all towns and cities), and banished African traders from these areas as well.
The Land Apportionment Act therefore effectively did not allow for the development of an African capitalist farming class and an African trading class of any significance. In farming and in trade African competition was eliminated, securing the position of the settler capitalist farmer and the white petty bourgeois traders.

The Maize Control Act of 1931 and the Tobacco Marketing Act of 1936 strengthened the position of settler farmers via-a-vis the African farmers and foreign-owned companies such as the United Tobacco Company. The Maize Control Act helped small white farmers by giving preferential prices for internally marketed maize, and giving the white farmer most of the market. This Act effectively curbed African production and marketing. The Tobacco Marketing Act reduced competition between settler farmers thus strengthening their bargaining power against the foreign-owned tobacco companies.

The Native Registration Act of 1936, The Master and Servant Act and numerous Native Labour enactments tightened the Pass Laws, kept the black labourer firmly in his place, and contributed to the maintenance of a wage structure whereby white farmers paid unskilled labour lower wage rates than did other employers. (21)

The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1933 reserved most supervisory and skilled jobs for whites, guaranteeing them high wages, and consigning most black workers to unskilled lowly paid jobs without the rights to organise themselves in trade unions as they were not included in the definition of "employee". The Act secured skilled jobs and high pay for
whites as it obliged urban employers to pay black and white skilled workers the same. White employers would obviously not employ blacks unless their wages were lower. (22) Geoffrey Huggins of the so-called Reform Party which took office in 1933 and passed the IC Act, justified the legislation of his government as follows:

"The chief measures which protect the European standard against the less developed races are the Industrial Conciliation Act, the Maize Control Act and the Pass Laws ..... The Industrial Conciliation Act only enshrines the principles of the trade unions in England, i.e. that there must be no scabs to break wage agreements". (23)

It is evident from the discussion so far that the legislation adopted by the settler-colonial state consolidated the position and secured the future of the settler (capitalist) farmer, the white petty bourgeoisie and the white skilled worker. In addition it secured a supply of African labour for 'white' farms, mines and for the 'white' urban areas. The co-option of support from the white skilled worker and white petty bourgeoisie was important, as according to one author:

"The class of white wage worker, together with the white petty bourgeoisie, i.e. handicraftsmen, shopkeepers and small employers in agriculture and mining, already in the pre-WW2 period constituted the bulk of the European population in Southern Rhodesia". (24)

The privileged position of the white skilled worker in Rhodesia and the absence of a 'poor white' problem was due to the fact skilled workers were brought to Rhodesia due to a demand for their labour as a consequence of capitalist development through a selective and controlled immigration policy. (25) The demand for skilled white labour was concentrated particularly in mining, transport (railways) and service activities (especially the civil service). Up to independence the white
skilled worker had his interests secured by the state. In agriculture, industry and government the white skilled worker was ensured of a monopoly of skilled jobs and therefore high salaries. The capitalist farmer and those whites that went into industry were assured of no African competition.

In addition to securing settler interests in the ways described above, in the 1930's government and the state began to play an important role in the economy. Up until the 1930's the Rhodesian economy was very much a colonial economy dependent primarily on the export of minerals and agricultural products. Manufacturing industry was not even mentioned in the colonial records of 1932. With the world recession of the 1930's and a decline in demand for exports, the economy stagnated and became isolated from the world capitalist system. It was the state which stepped in and bolstered white agriculture, financed enterprises that private capital would be unwilling or unable to invest in, and created the infrastructure necessary for private capital to operate in.

A variety of support services for white agriculture were developed by government: research and extension services to farmers; massive credit programmes, once for whites to buy land, then to finance improvements and the annual planting; marketing boards which offered fixed pre-planting prices at guaranteed and often subsidised levels. (26) In the industrial field government bought out the mineral rights of the BSACo, which cost them some £2 million; it bought out and nationalised the Cold Storage Commission, the Triangle Sugar Estate and several other
processing industries; it nationalised and developed the iron and steel industry. The Industrial Development Commission was established to identify areas for expansion and then to provide funds to small industries and financial and management advice. (27) In terms of infrastructure great strides were made. Government established the Electricity Supply Commission power stations; invested in road building; partly nationalised Rhodesian Railways; established Central African Airways, the National Housing and Building Board and the Sabi-Limpopo Authority involved in large-scale irrigation works in the low-veld.

By the end of WW2 the basis was laid for an expanding industrial economy. With a pick up in external demand in the post-war period, there was significant industrial expansion in Rhodesia from the mid 1940's to the 1950's. Government followed a policy of industrial protectionism and played an important role in facilitating a process of import substitution and creating an industrial infrastructure with forward, backward and horizontal economic linkages. (28) Imports were restricted, with emphasis being placed on the import of capital goods. Industrialization was not only based on consumer goods import substitution, but also the establishment of a capital goods industry with economic linkages. (29)

Proletarianisation of black workers proceeded rapidly during the 1940's, although urban workers always retained close links with their village, partially to supplement their own sustinence, and increasingly to
supplement the income of their family in the village. Between 1938 and 1946 the number of African workers increased by 69.6% from 217 000 to 368 000. By 1958 they had increased by another 36% to 510 000. During the war African employees made up 12.3% of the indigenous population. By 1952 this had risen to 29.4%. (30)

During this period of industrialisation and increased industrial employment the conditions in the Reserve areas were becoming increasingly inadequate. Factors such as inadequate land, low rainfall, soil overuse, overpopulation, overstocking, limited agricultural knowledge and skills and unavailability of credit facilities were driving peasants onto the job market. Even if Africans had been able to increase productivity, they faced marketing difficulties.

While proletarianisation did increase internal demand creating a market amongst Africans for manufactured goods and agricultural products, the low income policy of the regime meant that the income of African was too low to significantly increase demand for the development of manufacturing industry. It was the influx of Europeans after WW2 which gave a boost to demand for goods and services.

It is evident from the discussion so far that in the 1930's and 1940's settler or domestic capital significantly increased its stake in the economy. In the post-war period foreign capital also gave a boost to the economy partly due to uncertainty about political developments in South Africa. In 1947 foreign investment amounted to £13.5 million. By 1949 this had more than doubled, and by 1951 foreign investment reached
£50.7 million. (31) Primary production was dominated by foreign capital, and about 60% of the manufacturing sector was not domestically controlled by 1980. (32) So while settler or domestic capital had increased its stake in the economy, and consolidated political control, foreign capital was still dominant in the economy as a whole by the 1950's. Foreign capital and the colonial power were in the background, and rarely interfered with the consolidation of white settler rule, so long as their interests were not at risk.

In the period 1923 - 53, the interests of both settlers and colonised were consolidated in Rhodesia. The settlers in particular developed their political base amongst the white farmers and the white petty bourgeoisie, and fostered economic development through industrialisation and the development of infrastructure. Foreign capital still held an important stake in the economy - in primary production, manufacturing and increasingly the financial institutions. It was therefore both settler and colonial interests that the state developed and protected in this period. The African was very definitely relegated to the status of labourer and farmer barely managing to eke out a living in increasingly overcrowded reserves.

4. THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND 1954 - 1963

The fact that the colonial power, while allowing for settler economic and political interests to be consolidated, still had some control is evidence by the creation of the Federation of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland
in 1954. Similar Federations were attempted by Britain with other colonial territories at this time. The reasons for forming the Federation were both political and economic. There was political pressure for an end to colonialism, especially settler rule as it was developing in Southern Rhodesia. Federation was therefore one option in an attempt to move away from overt colonial rule and the racism of Southern Rhodesia, and to make the administration of the territories and moves to self-government easier. The economic benefits of Federation were anticipated as being larger markets and a more diversified federated economy.

Most of the benefits of the Federation period - political and economic - accrued to Southern Rhodesia. The political centre of the Federation was Southern Rhodesia. The economic rationale for the Federation was that all territories would benefit due to increasing scale of economies, expanding investment, employment and therefore income. Nyasaland would supply the labour, Northern Rhodesia foreign exchange from the copper exports, and the manufacturing industry of Southern Rhodesia would serve the other two territories. The diversity provided by Southern Rhodesia's tobacco, Nyasaland's tea and Northern Rhodesia's copper would help reduce fluctuations in export earnings. (33) In practice the only country to benefit economically was Southern Rhodesia - cheap labour from Nyasaland and foreign exchange earnings from Northern Rhodesian copper went to boost the expanding industrial base of the Southern Rhodesian economy. Southern Rhodesia took the major share of the Federal national income. In 1954 Southern Rhodesia's share in the Federal national income was 54% or $340 million. It rose to 55.4% or
$656 million in 1963. (34) The net increase in foreign capital was estimated at $700 million between 1953 and 1963, a 250% increase over the previous ten years. (35)

How the Southern Rhodesian economy benefited from the Federation is evidenced in the development of infrastructure and the diversification of industry during this period. There was investment in railways, roads, housing, bridges, telecommunications, and hydro-electric power (the $R226.4 million Kariba Hydro-electric power station). A significant amount of the expenditure of the Federal government also went to finance Rhodesian parastatals - such as the Grain Marketing Board, Dairy Marketing Board, Electricity Supply Commission. (36) The Kariba project also facilitated the development of a fishing industry and tourism. To cope with the economic expansion there was increased white immigration during this period. Education and technical training of Africans also increased during this period in order to provide the personnel for the expanding industrial sector.

The slogan of the Southern Rhodesian government during the Federal period was 'racial partnership' as opposed to separate development. This strategy was a reflection of the interests of Britain and 'big business' to create - firstly, a secure settler owning class; secondly a stable, skilled African work force; and thirdly, an African 'middle class' as a market for industry and a political buffer to undermine the development of a radical nationalist movement. (37) Some attempts were made to enfranchise an aspirant African middle class, educate an elite, recognise African trade unions, and put some money
into African agriculture. In practice these attempts failed as some were never implemented and what there was was much too little to satisfy the aspirations of the African population. The white electorate, particularly the white workers and agrarian and petty bourgeoisie, felt threatened by these attempts and rallied around the reactionary and overtly racist Rhodesian Front Party which came to power in the 1962 elections. Continuing nationalist opposition, and the impending independence for Zambia (N Rhodesia) and Malawi (Nyasaland) broke the Federation up in 1963. Failing to meet Britain's modest conditions for independence, Southern Rhodesia under Ian Smith made its 'Unilateral Declaration of Independence' (UDI) at the end of 1965.

5. THE ECONOMY AND STATE DURING UDI 1965 - 1980

a. Economic Developments During UDI

There were two distinct phases to Rhodesia's economic development during this period -: first there was a growth phase, from 1965 - 74 and then a phase of decline, 1974 - 1980. During the first phase the economy experienced high growth rates, it expanded and diversified, and employment grew. There was a change in economic strategy from being primarily export oriented, to following a strategy of import substitution industrialisation. Labour needs also changed and increased, leading to some expansion in primary education for Africans and other forms of training. However, this growth took place in the context of the continued exploitation of the African population, and
discrimination in all spheres of life. Any liberalisation of the federal period was reversed in an attempt by the right wing of the settler community to secure white interests, especially those of the farmers, white petty bourgeoisie and white skilled workers. Black political opposition was repressed and the migrant labour system reinforced.

With the escalation of the war in the mid-seventies there was a definite downturn in the economy. Employment declined, and economic and social disruption in the Reserve Areas, or Tribal Trust Lands as they came to be called, increased. With social and economic disruption and decline and the increasing intensity of the guerrilla war, UDI and settler rule came to an end when the liberation movements (ZAPU and ZANU as the Patriotic Front), the Smith regime and the British went to the negotiating table at the Lancaster House Conference in 1980.

At the time of UDI, economic growth had derived from a number of factors: a high demand for primary commodity exports, mainly minerals and tobacco (50% of exports); abundant supplies of cheap labour; increased foreign immigration providing a market for agricultural and manufacturing output; and the resultant business boom which provided incentive for reinvestment of profits. (38) Imports consisted mainly of petroleum products, motor vehicles, consumer goods and capital goods needed for local industries. (39) Britain, Zambia, South Africa and West Germany accounted for 60% of a total exports while 30% of all imports came from Britain. (40) In sum, the Rhodesian economy before
UDI was dependent on world market forces and therefore potentially vulnerable.

In 1964, commercial agriculture contributed 13.8% of GDP, mining 5.9%, and manufacturing 18.5%. These sectors were responsible for 30%, 11% and 14% of gross capital formation respectively. Of the 736 000 people in paid employment in 1964, 299 500 (40%) were in commercial agriculture, 44 400 (6%) in mining and 76 900 (10%) in manufacturing. The other major employment sectors were distribution, hotels and restaurants which employed 61 000 (8%), private domestic service which employed 93 700 (13%, all black) and education which employed 27 800 (4%). Almost exclusively it was the white population which had skilled jobs in these modern sectors of the economy, blacks were employed as semi-skilled or unskilled workers. This white dominance is clearly shown in income statistics. Of the 736 000 people employed in 1964, 12% were white and 88% were black. Yet the average white wage was $209 per month, and the average black wage was $20 per month. A ratio difference of 10:1, white to black. It is clear that it was the white population which was benefiting most from economic growth and employment in industry. (41)

The cheap labour supply, which was a contributory factor to the economic 'success' of Southern Rhodesia, came from neighbouring countries and increasingly the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL's). In 1965, 66% of the country's total population lived in the TTL's, the majority dependent on subsistence agriculture with an average income of $15 a month. By 1965 the TTL's had become overcrowded, the land unproductive and over-grazed.
With a growing rural population more and more peasants were forced to seek work in the towns in the modern sector of the economy to meet their subsistence needs. (42)

In response to sanctions imposed from 1966 to 1980, the regime greatly increased its control over all aspects of economy. In essence Rhodesia oriented its economy away from an export-oriented industrialisation strategy towards an import-substitution strategy dependent on an expanded and diversified local market. In 1965 Development Plan was the basis of the regime's economic strategy. Policy was to increase domestic savings to finance growth, reduce debt obligations, increased employment and real income per capita, but without income distribution, and without restricting the capability of private enterprise to expand. (43)

Immediately after UDI - 1966 - there was a decline in GDP, but after new markets had been found and ways of evading sanctions had been established, a vigorous policy of import substitution promoted, and tighter control over the economy established, particularly in relation to foreign exchange, the result was high growth rates and a rapid increase in employment by the late 1960's. The annual growth rate in real terms during 1964 - 1974 was 7.4% while the per capita rate was 3.8%. (44) In 1965, the year of UDI, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) totalled $733 million and the number of people in paid employment amounted to 748 000. By 1977, GDP had increased almost 200% to $2,161 million, and the number of people in paid employment had risen by 36% to 1,018, 000. (45) Foreign investment did not stop. Between 1964 and
1975 there was a net inflow of capital of some $340 million. In addition, because transnational companies were prevented from repatriating profits, they invested more than they would have otherwise done, and also diversified their operations. Despite sanctions, oil continued to flow into the country using new routes. From 1966 to 1976 oil consumption doubled. (46)

Purely at the economic level, the progress during UDI and sanctions was exceptional. The trends in manufacturing, mining and agriculture illustrate this. Commercial agriculture, which pre-1965 was largely oriented to tobacco, adapted to sanctions through diversification. Tobacco production fell by 40% from 1965 to 1968. (47) Farmers successfully diversified into cotton, maize and wheat production, aided by substantial subsidies and government guarantees to purchase stockpiles of unexportable goods until output was restructured. (48) Whereas, in 1965 the country imported wheat, cereal, some tobacco, sugar, tea, coffee, by the mid-1970's it was self-sufficient in most of these products. (49) The 6 000 white farmers in the country were in fact always the backbone of the Rhodesian Front, and vital to the economy. Agricultural production doubled from 1965 - 1976. The white farmers on average accounted for 75% of all marketed agricultural production during this period. (50) Their average annual sales were valued at $231.2 million over the period. (51) They accounted for 50% of foreign exchange earnings, supplied 48% of raw materials for domestic industry, and a third of national employment. (52) There was a complete neglect of the African agricultural sector during this period.
The mining industry also expanded rapidly from 1965 - 1977. The volume of production increased by over 100%, while the value increased from $64 million to $237 million during this period. (53) Earnings from the mining industry made significant contribution to foreign exchange as a high proportion of minerals were exported. The large-scale mining operations in the country have always been foreign-owned. During sanctions these companies ensured that vital minerals reached their home countries. For example, one important market for minerals from 1972 - 1977 was the United States which ignored UN sanctions for the importation of 'strategic' metals. In 1975 alone chrome exports to the USA were valued at US$32 million. (54)

The greatest development during the UDI period occurred in the manufacturing industry. Between 1964 and 1976 gross output of the manufacturing sector increased by over 270% from $360 million to $1 389 million. In the same period the volume of manufacturing production doubled. In 1970, 3 837 separately identifiable products were being manufactured inside the country, compared with 602 in 1963 and 1 059 in 1966/7. (55) The main sub-sectors contributing to expansion in the manufacturing sector were: plastics, bricks, iron and steel, machinery and metal production, cotton ginning and textile production, canning soft drinks, paper production, industrial chemicals and chocolates. (56) From 1964 to 1975 electricity consumption (which usually is a reflection of industrialisation) rose from 1 981 000 to 6 500 800 megawatt hours. (57)
Government services also expanded during this period in absolute terms from $66.4 million in 1964 to $3 229 million in 1977. (58) Government had set up a variety of bodies to implement economic policy, and facilitate the government's industrialisation strategy. The Industrial Development Corporation was set up to assist industry in loans and managerial supervision. The Agricultural Finance Corporation was formed in 1970 to increase availability of finances to white farmers. Other similar institutions were set up by government to assist industrial investment - The Industrial Promotion Corporation of Central Africa Ltd (IPCORN), a joint financial corporation formed by the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia, local and foreign investors to provide medium term capital and managerial advice; Mindin Loan set up to assist prospective mining entrepeneurs; Universal Exports (UNIVEX) performed the function of finding new markets, extending old ones and the evasion of sanctions. Decisions on protection were taken by the Industrial Tariff Committee; and the Industrial Projects Committee decided on priorities and franchises. (59)

According to one author -:

"Until 1975 the Rhodesian economy was booming in spite of sanctions if not because of them. The decline thereafter (was) due more to guerilla warfare and the restriction of the purchasing power to 3% of the population than to sanctions". (60)

While some of the economic 'success' of the UDI period were due to this new industrialisation strategy, economic growth was also facilitated by the numerous violations of sanctions by some of Rhodesia's main trading partners.
While the economy did diversify and expand during the period 1965 - 74, racial and economic inequalities were reinforced, and as a result the socio-economic position of Africans did not significantly improve. From 1965 - 1974 per capita income increased from $163 to $220. Thereafter per capita income declined. By 1977 it had fallen to $177 at 1965 prices, and by 1978 was approximately $159. There was therefore a decline in real income per head during the UDI period. (61) Even these figures are a distortion of reality as the disparity in income between white and black was so enormous. In real terms the income gap between white and black grew during the UDI period.

While employment grew to 1 041 000 in 1974, (peaking at 1 055 000 in 1975), it declined to 1 018 000 in 1977. The increase from 736 000 was commendable, but not as significant as it seems if the African population increase of approximately 2 million during the same period is taken into account. After 1977 the economy was in no way able to absorb the growing number of Africans coming onto the job market each year. When all these facts are put together with the fact that real income in the rural areas declined throught the whole UDI period, one can only conclude that in real terms the socio-economic position of Africans during the UDI period did not significantly improve, and in the later period certainly declined.

From 1974 until the end of the war (1979/80) the post-UDI economic expansion turned into a general economic decline. GDP fell, industrial production fell, exports and foreign capital inflows fell, and the economy began to go into serious debt. In the period 1974 - 75 to 1977 -
78, State expenditure exceeded revenue by $249 million. By 1978 total debt amounted to $932 million. The new Government of 1980 did not only inherit a serious unemployment problem, but a serious debt problem. In addition it inherited a situation in the rural areas where the peasant economy was near to a complete state of collapse. Escalation of the war has been given as the primary cause of this economic down turn. Expenditure on the war rose from $94 million in 1974 - 75 to some $293 million in 1977 - 78, and by 1978 accounted for nearly 50% of state expenditure. (62) The escalation of the war also came at a time of world recession and inflation rates of 10 - 15%, a decline in commodity prices, plus the oil price rise. In addition, the escalation of the war also made foreign capital nervous of investing.

So in 1980 the new government was to face a series of economic, social and human resource problems as a result of the policies of the UDI regime. The first government of an independent Zimbabwe was going to have to make choices about a variety of issues in order to overcome these problems:

- What kind of economic strategy - socialist or capitalist?
- What was to be the role or foreign capital and local white capital?
- How were they to overcome the socio-economic conditions of the black population and the enormous disparities between white and black?

In order to assess decisions that were made on these issues, it is necessary to understand the nature role of government and the state
after independence. It is therefore necessary to very briefly examine the nature of the state that the new government was to inherit.

b. The State During UDI

Discussion on the settler-colonial state so far has shown how the state organised the society on the basis of ensuring and defending white interests. The state was prepared to defend white interests to the point of involving the country in a 10 year guerilla war. As one author noted:

"The Rhodesian state itself was in no sense a neutral body. It cannot then be likened to a house that can be vacated by its former occupants, that can now be occupied and equally serve the needs of new black residents. Its instruments and structures have been geared to certain tasks, to the protection of certain interests. Its personnel have been schooled to safeguard certain interests, they are steeped in certain values ...". (63)

What interests then did the settler-colonial state really represent towards the end of settler-colonial rule? Did the state represent all white interests, or the interests of certain white groups more than others, the interests of the settlers or local whites more than the interests of the colonial power, what economic interests did the state represent and how easily would the state accommodate a new black government?

At all stages the settler-colonial state did take care of white interests, and did maintain the national oppression of the black population as a whole insofar as the black population never had any
access to political power, their movements were tightly controlled and blacks were by and large labourers for a white society. All white groups - businessmen farmers, traders, civil servants, skilled workers, benefited materially from state social, economic and political policy. However, at different stages the state did represent the political interests of a particular white group more than the other. For example, during Federation foreign capital and sectors of the business community wanted to ease the racial rigidity of the regime. The reaction by the white farmers and the petty bourgeoisie resulted in ten years of UDI, when the most reactionary interests of the white population were reflected in state policy, at the expense of more enlightened settler interests and the interests of the colonial power (Britain) which wanted an end to the overt settler-colonial rule. As one author correctly points out - it is necessary to explore different strategies pursued by those interests labelled 'white' in order to examine those interests which may be promoted after independence, eventhough they may no longer by 'white'. (64)

Another author has argued along the same lines that the settler-colonial state was an "essential community of interests" which brought together "international capital and settler capitalism" for 60 years of colonialism, and that while there was competition over their respective shares,"what brought them together was a common interest in the manner in which the black majority was oppressed and exploited". (65) A vital feature of the settler-colonial state therefore was not only that it represented white interests, but that it represented the interests of settler-colonial capitalism.
During UDI therefore, although it was the most reactionary settler or domestic interests that had the upper hand, there was not a different kind of state:

"There was an essential continuity. The state was still concerned with ensuring the conditions for the reproduction of capital in general, but its apparatuses were modified to allow for the greater incorporation of the interests of the settler farmers and white workers; moreover, in the process of trying to follow their dictates there was a growing contradiction with the role of preserving the conditions for capitalism itself". (66)

The achievement of independence in 1980 undermined the settler interests in the state. But there was no guarantee that independence would end the role and nature of the state as a state serving the interests of capital - local and foreign (white or black). Later chapters will examine the implications of the Africanisation of the state structure for the role the plays in the new society.

The settler-colonial state at all stages of colonial rule since its inception in the 1890's advanced and secured the interests of local white settlers and the colonial power. At various stages one or the other of these forces had the upper hand, but not at the expense of their overall unity on the exploitation of the local people and their resources.

This unity of purpose is evidenced in the "successful" economic policies which were consistently advanced in the interests of the settler-colonial state. Economic policy was successful insofar as it ensured white (settler and colonial) ownership and control of the economy - agriculture and industry. African agriculture was never subsidised to
any significant degree. Africans were forced off white land either through direct eviction or by the imposition of such a battery of financial and other burdens that they elected to go. Once in the reserves Africans could aspire to little more than subsistence cultivators and migrant labourers, prepared to work for the prevailing low wages. Those remained on white land could not compete with their landlords and were forced to work for them for a pittance. At all stages legislation on agriculture, industry and trading and access to the towns curtailed African advancement and hence African competition with settlers or colonial interests. The prosperity of the settler colonial society after WW2 was therefore achieved, as in South Africa, as a direct result of African poverty. While the white society prospered, Africans were barely able to eke a living off the land, and were forced to become migrant labourers with their lives regimented by the pass laws.

With independence settler rule drew to a close. The question to be asked is whether any fundamental changes were then to be made to the colonial-capitalist society, whether the position of the majority of Zimbabweans was to change even though the colour of those in power had changed.
6. THE ECONOMY AND THE STATE AFTER 1980

a. Economic Performance

The period immediately after independence, 1980 - 82, was a boom period, 1983 - 84 a recession. In 1985 the economy picked up again, only to drop again significantly in 1986. (67)

The high growth rates of 1980 - 82 are a result of a variety of unique factors which came into play just after independence. These factors were:

- Exceptionally good rains in the 1980 and 1981 seasons which had a very favourable impact on agricultural production. There was a 30% increase in agricultural exports over this period. (68)

- The removal of sanctions, and an improvement of terms of trade, which together produced a once-off significant increase in exports. Zimbabwe was able to sell stockpiles of key products such as tobacco and ferro-chrome.

- Access to external borrowing, particularly from the IMF.

- As a result of the latter, increased foreign exchange allocations (leading in particular to imports of machinery, raw materials) to industry and an increase in existing capacity utilisation of some 25% - 40% which boosted production.
With independence there was an increase in pent-up demand for goods, and this was boosted by increases in wages, returning refugees, other residents and ex-combatants, as well as an influx of immigrants. (69)

The reconstruction of the country's economic and social infrastructure, involved a high level of economic activity, particularly in the public sector. (70)

Over two-thirds of the rural areas were directly or indirectly affected by the war. In 1980 these areas were opened up to normal economic activity, and production was boosted by a substantial inflow of international reconstruction aid (over Z$70 million) from abroad. (71) Government policy which was more favourable to the marketing of peasant produce, also boosted development in these areas.

As the Government Socio-Economic Review 1980 - 1985 points out:

"The impressive growth in output occurring in 1980 and 1981 was largely met from the utilisation of existing excess capacity arising from large investments which had been made during the pre-1975 period, rather than from an expansion of existing capacity". (72)

The boom was not a result of conscious policy-making and direction given by government, with a view to some kind of restructuring of the economy. The first Transitional National Development Plan in fact only came out when this boom period was over, and on the basis of the performance of the economy so far projected real growth rates of 8% a year to mid-1985.
The growth rate in GDP for 1982 was in fact 0.0%, and for 1983 and 1984, -3.4% and -0.1% respectively. In 1986 the growth rate picked up again to 10.3%, only to drop again in 1986 to -18%. (73)

A variety of factors contributed to the decline after 1981. The most significant factor was persistent drought until mid-1984. This led to a significant decline in agricultural performance, which had a ripple effect throughout the economy. It affected the quantities of agricultural produce which were marketed, which therefore affected agricultural incomes which had an impact on other sectors in the economy and also affected agricultural export earnings, which are a significant proportion of the total, and therefore affected balance of payments performance. There was a significant decline in all productive sectors for the period 1982 - 84, which is reflected in the negative growth rates. Other factors which contributed to the recession of these two years were:

- Declining export earnings in the mining sector due to the fall in metal prices.

- Rising rate of inflation - 12% - 18% in 1982 (74) - accompanied by increased costs of inputs for industry, particularly electricity. Industrial electricity rates rose 200% between 1981 and January 1983. And were increased significantly again in mid 1983. (75) In addition there was a price freeze until May 1982 on a variety of key products, a second minimum wage increase in December 1981, and import restrictions. All these factors had a negative impact on
industrial output. Demand slackened due to the inflation rate and increased taxes which reduced real incomes.

- Reduced export earnings plus unexpectedly low inflows of development finance, led to a current account deficit and therefore increased external borrowing. The result has been an increasing external debt service burden. The debt service ratio in 1984 was estimated to be more than 30% compared to about 15% in 1981.(76)

- In order to improve the balance of payments situation government adopted a variety of policies - restricting imports, devaluation, export promotion, restrictions on external borrowing and exchange control measures. (77) While this did lead to an improvement in the balance of payments, measures such as reducing foreign exchange allocations, according to industry had, and continue to have a negative effect on industrial output and consequently jobs.

The improvement in the economy from late 1984 - 85 was "primarily led by improved demand conditions, both on the external market, and on the domestic market due to improve agricultural performance which had spillover effects on other sectors of the economy". (78)

In 1986 however, growth was down again with a growth rate of only .18%, compared with the previous year of 10.3%. All the main economic sectors with the exception of agriculture showed no significant increase for
1986, and this is before the effects of the 1986-87 drought have been felt. The reasons for this decline, in addition to the drought, are:

* A continuing shortage of foreign exchange and increasing interest rates on debt payments.

* A lack of investment in the productive sectors of the economy since 1980, by the private sector or government. This has serious implications for formal sector employment which has remained more or less static since 1974. Only a handful of the 95,000 school leavers which came onto the job market in 1986 were able to find jobs.

While the peaks of the fluctuations in growth rates look promising, the overall picture is not so good. Since 1980 GDP has increased in constant terms 21% or 3% per year. If one takes into account government figures of a 3% population growth rate, this means that Zimbabwe has recorded zero per capita growth rate since independence. (79) Although growth rates are an indication of economic performance, they do not give any idea about direction and developments in the economy. It is these qualitative issues that need to be examined in order to be able to draw some conclusions about economic progress since 1980.

The discussion so far on the fluctuations in the performance of the Zimbabwe economy since independence show how vulnerable the economy is to external factors such as the weather, key commodity prices, fluctuations in world trade. In addition there were factors such as a
much lower rate of foreign aid and investment than expected, and the threat of South African destabilisation in Matabeleland and Mozambique resulting in higher expenditures on defence. This vulnerability illustrates the need for the government to take policy decisions in a variety of areas which will ensure that the economy is not totally dependent on external forces. This involves difficult issues of how to expand growth and restructure the economy, as well as fulfill the redistributive goals and promises of government.

b. Economic Policy and the State

In terms of policy, government has really "fallen between two stools", and it has become increasingly important to separate policy from practice. As one author pointed out:

"On the one hand government outlines a most convincing economic policy to be based on Marxist-Leninist principles and at the same time expects Western capitalist countries to assist it in that line. Yet it would be obviously against the interest of foreign capital to assist Zimbabwe on its socialist path. Foreign capital could have very easily been received if Zimbabwe had not proclaimed socialist goals." (80)

Another author summed up the criticism from the left and the right as follows:

"Left critics point to the failure of post-independence policies to achieve a significant shift towards the creation of a more egalitarian society and a narrowing of income differentials, a loss of real earnings, negligible employment gains and little structural change in land distribution during the recent period when IMF-associated policies were pursued."
On the other hand, market supportive critics have argued that there has been a failure to provide sufficient incentives to the private sector coupled with an expansion in social service expenditure and subsidies, financed increasingly by borrowing. The need to service this debt has increased foreign exchange shortages and led to dangerously low investment levels which if not tackled will lead to even lower growth rates and hence fewer resources available to promote a more egalitarian society.

(And) there is truth in both these perspectives."(81)

So what has government policy been? The first statement of government economic policy was "Growth with Equity", which was issued in February 1981. Growth, equity and transformation were the key concepts in economic policy immediately after independence. According to the document, government's overriding objective was:

"The attainment in Zimbabwe of a truly socialist, egalitarian and democratic society conditions of sustained growth and equity."(82)

To this end the government committed itself to rapid economic growth, raising incomes and standards of living for the majority, full employment, a more equitable ownership of resources including land, development of the rural economic infrastructure, improvement of social services (including education, health and housing). These objectives were to be realised through long term government objectives to restructure the economy and through the planning process. (83)

These objectives were reflected in the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) 1982/3 - 1984/5, issued in November 1982. The TNDP "did represent the first (and for that reason perhaps the closest to the pre 1980 'party spirit') expression of the reading by ZANU as a party in
government of what the people of Zimbabwe expected from the dismantling of the Rhodesian order." (84) The promises of the liberation struggle were reflected in these first two policy and planning documents. The TNDP promised rapid economic growth, a growth in incomes and standards of living, full employment, access to health, education and housing services and to more and better land. The introduction to the Plan stated:

"My Government, committed as it is to socialism and recognising the urgent need to correct the inherent social and economic imbalances, presents the TNDP as its first endeavour at socialist transformation". (85)

The strategy for achieving these goals was outlined in the TNDP. (86)

The target growth rate for the TNDP was 8% per annum. As has been shown above, this objective was not met. Many of the goals of the TNDP did not begin to be realised. The First Five Year National Development Plan 1986 - 90 (FNDP) attributes the set-backs of the first five years primarily to drought and world economic recession. (87) Expansion in social services (especially health and education) did however exceed the targets of the Plan. In this respect some of the promises of independence were met. On the other hand material production did not grow significantly, employment did not expand, resettlement fell far short of TNDP objectives and there was no real indication of any restructuring of the economy. State control continued to exist in the infrastructural sectors - railway transport, energy, civil aviation, health and education. The strategic sectors of the economy remained dominated by private foreign investment. In addition the economy continued to be reliant on export of raw materials, with agriculture and
mining accounting for two-thirds of total exports. With foreign exchange earned through export of primary commodities, the country still imports industrial raw materials and capital goods needed for the production of goods and services. The country's debt service ratio since independence has become over 30% of GNP, which is contributing the country's balance of payments problems, particularly because of fluctuating interest rates and foreign exchange rates. (88)

The FNDP, still with its fundamental goal being "the establishment and development of a democratic, egalitarian and socialist society", set itself several tasks:

- transformation and control of the economy and economic expansion;
- land reform and efficient utilisation of land;
- raising living standards of the entire population and in particular, the peasant population;
- enlargement of employment opportunities and in particular manpower development;
- development of science and technology; and
- maintenance of a correct balance between the environment and development. (89)
These objectives are to be realised through a growth rate of 5.1% and efficient planning machinery. The thrust of the plan is that investment (foreign and local and government) must be oriented to productive investment and in addition, a greater proportion of the economy must be owned and controlled by Zimbabweans, in particular through government involvement in the productive sectors, either on its own or jointly with local private or foreign partners. In the FNDP Africanisation and localisation of the economy is perceived as one of the main mechanisms of transforming the economy. To this end government has started to purchase major shareholdings in foreign-owned companies. The benefits of such arrangements accrue largely to the foreign-owned companies, as restrictions which normally apply to them are removed. The extent to which buying shares in existing private companies – foreign or local – can transform the economy is questionable. The economy may look more indigenised or Africanised through such joint arrangements, but it is in no way transformed.

In the face of economic difficulties during the TNNDP, the plan was shelved in favour of financial management through the short term objectives of the budget. This meant that equity policies and socio-economic transformation was shelved while government focused on immediate economic difficulties. There are already indicators that the FNDP is falling short of objectives, especially with regard to equity policies, and its investment programme for the productive sector and any meaningful restructuring of ownership and control of the economy.
A major problem in this respect is government's planning machinery, i.e. the ability to effect goals through detailed implementation of the plan. The problem in fact starts one stage earlier with plans not being based on objective reality. In addition, the nature of the post-colonial state affects the ability of the state to implement national plans. According to one author, a clear industrialisation strategy has not yet emerged in Zimbabwe. (92) The primary reason for this is given as the nature of the post-colonial state. Even in the FNDP there is an ambivalence about the role in industrialisation of local private vs state capital, and state capital vs foreign capital. Another problem identified as a cause for an unclear industrialisation strategy is the lack of co-ordinative capacity by the state to define, co-ordinate and implement industrial programmes. (93) Industrialisation, or economic development, is "a complex task that requires co-ordination with the whole economy." (94) How this process resolves itself in Zimbabwe depends on how the class forces of the society reflect their interests through the state apparatus.

The settler-colonial state allied itself closely with the interests of local white capital. Through this alliance the state facilitated the industrialisation process, especially during UDI. The class composition of the post-colonial state, and its objectives are not so clear. Composed largely of the black petty bourgeoisie, the state did not immediately identify with the interests of capital - local (largely white) or foreign. It therefore took a variety of steps which undercut the efficiency of the operations of the capital. Reflecting the ambivalent aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie, the state did not
identify itself clearly with socialism either, in practical terms. As one author noted:

"The view of government towards the private sector has been changing: from being tolerated to nurtured, from being ignored in the decision-making process to being increasingly involved." (95)

Having gone so far, while committed on paper to transformation and socialism, government is limited by various objective constraints: the pattern of government expenditure and overall investment patterns, increasing foreign financial commitments and a rising debt service ratio, the structure if industry and its reliance on imports, drought and world recession. A subjective factor also inhibits the realisation of government policy - namely the ambivalent nature of the state. In the later part of this thesis, after examining some of the developments in the independence period, in particular the nature of black advancement, more conclusions will be made about the nature of the post-colonial state and its role in socialist transformation.
CHAPTER 4

EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT BEFORE INDEPENDENCE

INTRODUCTION

"The fact is that 'selection' operates throughout the whole school career of the African children, with at each stage a threat of rejection - in the lower primary school at Standard 3, and Standard 6, Form 11 and Form IV and finally at Form IV. Children, moreover, are selected by the fortune of misfortune of parental income, religion, family commitments, disease, parental ignorance and intellectual isolation..... All non-African children ...gain admission to secondary school; indeed willy-nilly, they have to go. Thus every non-African child is assured of seven years primary education, followed by at least three years at post- primary school." (1)

The colonial system of education was a dual system - one for whites, Asians and Coloureds, and another for Africans. The education system of Southern Rhodesia conformed to the general colonial and racist policy of separate and unequal development. Curricula, i.e. the content of education ensured this 'separate development'. The objective of the dual education system was to ensure that blacks occupied their prescribed role in the colonial society - a role prescribed by the white minority settler state. The role for blacks in a colonial society was
as labourers, and the education system was to educate them for this and no more, not allowing blacks to develop aspirations to equality at socio-economic and political levels with whites. As the settler-colonial state expanded, there was need for semi-skilled workers, black clerks and administrators, and the education system expanded accordingly to allow a few through the system. But in general the education system provided the foundation for ensuring a privileged position for whites at the economic, social and political levels and limiting black social mobility. Blacks by and large were destined to become semi-skilled or unskilled labourers.

This is a concrete illustration of the point made in Chapter 2 that the education system is an integral part of society serving the interests of the economy and the state. This will become more evident as the colonial education system is discussed in more detail in the course of this chapter.

I propose in this chapter to provide a brief overview of the colonial education system, to describe the situation as it was in the years leading up to independence in 1980. The chapter will show how education affected the employment structure - whites having a near monopoly of technical and managerial jobs, while blacks were in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. The chapter will indicate the structural and quantitative problems the new government was to inherit in 1980 with regard to education and employment. This discussion should give the reader a picture of how whites and blacks form a pattern in the employment structure which necessitated the black advancement programme
of the government after 1980. Exactly how the government dealt with the problem of black advancement will be dealt with in later chapters.

This chapter will therefore examine:
A. Education; and
B. Education and Employment.

A. EDUCATION

1. EDUCATION IN A SETTLER-COLONIAL SOCIETY

From the time of the enactment of The First Education Ordinance in 1899 Cecil John Rhodes proposed a racially segregated system - with the colonial government having responsibility for promoting education for European, Coloured and Asian children, and the white Christian missionaries having responsibility for African education. Missionaries were given some grants for African education in the initial stages on the understanding that it would help them expand their Christian work. The missionaries also provided some of the most exclusive schools for whites. By and large their work was with the Africans, and they were seen by the colonial government as a necessary part of colonial rule in that they broke traditional culture and beliefs winning Africans to a Christian "way of life" and therefore making them more amenable to colonial rule. One author commented:
"Missionary work expanded within the general framework of imperial aims of the early British settlers. Thus the foundations of formal education for Africans were those of Western values which sought to promote the Christian ethic. Therefore, from the cultural, as well as the colonial interest point of view, the missionaries and colonialists found common cause in the aims of British Imperialism and its values." (2)

Despite this 'common cause', the missionaries did provide, and still do, some of the best schools in the country. They also clashed with the colonial government as most white settlers were of the opinion that the mission education:

"made the native unfit for work they were required to perform. They (would) refuse to work preferring to loaf about as learned vagabonds rather than stoop down to what they regarded as below their literary knowledge." (3)

As is evident from Table 4.1, African education was totally neglected by the settler-colonial state. Only in the 1960's did government begin to put any significant amount of money into African education. The small grants that the missionaries were given were on the condition that the mission schools conformed to BSA Company guidelines on education - namely that half the school day was devoted to manual (i.e. non academic) work. (4) Native Commissioners were given powers to withdraw leases from schools which were suspected of promoting "feelings of ill will or hostility against the state". (5) In general it was considered that the mission schools produced Africans which did not conform to the needs of the racist colonial system. An interesting point to note in this respect is that many of the government ministers today were educated at mission schools.
Table 4.1

THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT, MISSION AND OTHER AIDED SCHOOLS 1901 - 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mission-Other</th>
<th>Govt.</th>
<th>Enrolment</th>
<th>Govt. Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,873</td>
<td>2,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43,094</td>
<td>9,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1,216</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>77,000</td>
<td>23,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,422</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>107,122</td>
<td>48,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>111,686</td>
<td>72,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2,232</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>238,040</td>
<td>527,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2,792</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>505,000</td>
<td>3,953,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>3,372</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>663,371</td>
<td>13,200,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,345</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>703,729</td>
<td>17,379,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from M Murphree et al, 1975, p 43.

In the opinion of the colonial government education must not provide Africans with the knowledge or skills which would have made them dislike manual work, or which would give them aspirations to compete with whites in all spheres of life. The stress for African education was therefore away from academic work. (6) H S Keigwin, who became Director of the Department of Native Development in 1918, further elaborated government policy on African education. He stressed industrial trades such as building, carpentry and farming. He argued that this type of education was more relevant to the lives of the majority of Africans, and also emphasised that part of the reason for advocating this form of education was to ensure that Africans did not receive an education that would bring them into competition with the whites:
"If we do not intend to admit blacks, be it now or by degrees, to encroach on social equality, let us not put false ideas into their heads nor encourage them to foster hopes of equality." (7)

Soon after becoming Director of DND, Keigwin got the government to establish the two industrial institutions of Domboshawa (1921) and Tjolotjo (1922) at which he launched industrial education. (8)

While the missionaries were not opposed to industrial work, they were also anxious to promote formal academic education as that facilitated their work of spreading Christianity. The experience of missionaries was that where schools had withered away, the church too tended to die. (9) The government's intention with education was slightly different, as has already been shown above. Government's intention was to provide Africans with an education which would enable them to survive in their reserves or Tribal Trust Lands. In addition to emphasising that African education should safeguard against bringing Africans into any competition with whites, H G Keigwin emphasised that he had:

"deliberately sought out those industries that lend themselves to primitive hand methods rather than to progressive and highly productive machinery. One (had) to remember that what (was) wanted amongst backward natives (was) something of this old fashioned craftsmanship of 50 to 100 years ago." (10).

Table 4.1 shows government expenditure on African education into the UDI period. Until 1960 government financial input was really very small. In 1901 government provided £133 for 165 students. This amounted to £0.50 per pupil. By 1910 with enrolment up to 9,873, each child got a grant amounting to £0.25 per year. By 1920 with enrolment up to 43,094
each child was only getting £0.22 per year. In the 1930's the government cut aid to the mission schools after many of them were reclassified in the 1920's, and became ineligible for government grants.

The Responsible Government of 1923 took no steps to improve facilities for the education of African children. Education for whites however, in 1930 under the Compulsory Act, became compulsory for all children between the ages of 6 and 15 years. Government also provided scholarships at both primary and secondary level, while all African children were required to pay for their education. Free white education continued up to 1964 when no fees had to be paid except for VI form students, but fees were remitted in case of hardship. Compulsory education for Coloured and Asians was introduced in 1938. The fee position for these groups was the same as that for whites. (11)

Huggins, who became Prime Minister in 1934, set out to ensure white privilege through providing whites with a superior education. In 1934 Huggins maintained:

"If I am allowed to protect my own race and find a niche in this country for every grade of white civilisation, then I will dip into the pockets of the honourable Minister of Finance and see that the native gets more money; but until I know that I am not moving. That is why you find a stand still on the Native Development Vote..." (12)

In 1937 Huggins stated his case more clearly:

"I will go a little further and say that it is only by allowing our race the very best education and bringing out the latent talents there may be that we will enable our race to survive in Africa. I
will go even further and admit that although our youth may be able to play Rugby football and would protect their skin with differential legislation, they will not be able to preserve their white brain and if they are to survive, it will be by nothing but by superior education." (13)

The post-war economic boom and the subsequent economic expansion accompanied by the formation of the Federation in 1953 brought an increased demand for blacks in employment. In 1946 there were 376 000 black employees, by 1958 there were 652 000. This led to some expansion in African education, particularly at Primary level. As is evident from table 4.1 the number of schools, pupils and government expenditure on African education all expanded significantly during this period. The principle of inequality and discrimination however, remained. Between 1955 and 1956, the difference in expenditure on African and non-African education was as in Table 4.2;

Table 4.2

EXPENDITURE ON AFRICAN AND NON-AFRICAN EDUCATION 1955 - 1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Popu/School</th>
<th>Non-African</th>
<th>Popul/School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>School Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Rhodesia</td>
<td>£1 544 211</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>Federalised</td>
<td>50,000 whites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Rhodesia</td>
<td>£1 711 741</td>
<td>Federalised</td>
<td>6,000 Asian &amp;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyasaland</td>
<td>£ 329 965</td>
<td>Federalised</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>£3 585 917</td>
<td>£6 per</td>
<td>£5 252 802</td>
<td>£126 per pupil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Zvogbo, in Ed. I Mandaza, 1985, p 325 & 326.
One of the reasons inequality still remained the essential element in education policy was that it occupied a central role in the Federal franchise system, which was based on education, property and income. Another reason was the high white immigration rate after the war and during the Federal period. Between 1948 and 1960 the European population more than doubled from 101,000 and 218,000. Whites in general provided skilled personnel which therefore contributed to the lack of expansion in education for Africans. In addition with the high immigration rate there was a high rate of white unemployment which led the Huggin’s government to adopt a policy of reserving specialist and professional jobs for whites.

According to Zvogbo:

"The immigrants that came into the country at this time were afraid of African competition. For some, their white skin was the only basis for claiming better jobs." (15)

This led to a tightening of labour legislation and government control of education.

From 1954 – 58 Garfield Todd became Prime Minister, and was one of the most liberal settler Prime Ministers. There was a great improvement in African education during this time, but the racial structure of education remained intact. Places were still limited at all levels, and many Africans received no education at all. The system was also very wasteful with only a very small percentage of those who started in grade one ever reaching Form 4 or Form 6. Table 4.3 illustrates this problem.
Table 4.3

WASTAGE IN AFRICAN EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intake Year</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Sub A 1947</th>
<th>Standard VI 1950</th>
<th>Standard VI 1954</th>
<th>Form IV 1958</th>
<th>Form VI 1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>81.821</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>23,366</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>4,429</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>379</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to Zvogbo this 'low triangle policy' meant that;

"On the whole 80% of children in Southern Rhodesia got schooling up to Standard 2, 36% of 80% went up to Standard 4, and 18% of 36% were able to get full primary education. Of these, only 4% got to Form 4, while only 1% of 2% got to Form 6 (full six years of secondary education)." (16) This was the pattern of colonial education after some 70 years of colonial rule."

2. EDUCATION DURING UDI 1965-1980

a. Primary and Secondary Education

The primary objective of the Rhodesian Front regime was to preserve white minority rule. Education for Africans during this period fitted into this pattern. Control of African education was largely taken away from the missionaries, with Government increasing its control directly and indirectly through African Community Councils. (See table 4.4)
Table 4.4

RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES FOR PRIMARY SCHOOL MANAGEMENT 1970 - 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible authority</th>
<th>Number of schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>2 838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Urban</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Board</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsored</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Council</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Rhodesian Front Government instituted a new fiscal policy relating expenditure for African education (but not white, Asian or Coloured) to the economy of the country. The budget for African education was pegged at 2% of the GNP. (17) The pattern of state expenditure on white (including Asian and Coloured) and African education reflected the inequalities in the system and the priorities of government. (See table 4.5)

The allocation of state finance to primary and secondary schooling also differed significantly between white (including Asian and Coloured) and black. For whites (including Asians and Coloureds) 40% of expenditure was allotted to primary education and 49% to secondary education. For Africans the figures were 59% and 24% respectively. This shows that the priority was to educate Africans to a minimum level of literacy and
numeracy in order to slot them into the lower rungs of the employment structure. The objective was not to have all Africans educated through the secondary system, therefore providing competition for whites for professional and technical jobs.

Table 4.5

STATE EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION 1972 - 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Current expenditure</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount per pupil</td>
<td>Amount per pupil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$ms</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-3</td>
<td>21.76</td>
<td>28.28</td>
<td>20.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-4</td>
<td>23.76</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>21.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-5</td>
<td>30.04</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>25.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-6</td>
<td>33.92</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>28.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-7</td>
<td>38.39</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>30.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-8</td>
<td>39.70</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>31.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: R Riddell, 1980, p 23.
To add to this pattern of inequality all black schoolchildren had to pay school fees. School fees, plus uniforms, stationary, transport - imposed an enormous and often unmanageable burden on the meagre salaries of most African parents.

There was an increase in enrolments during UDI. At primary and secondary level this was to cope with the increasing need for skills in all sectors of the economy. While there was an expansion in secondary education, it was mainly at lower secondary. Primary enrolment increased from 610,268 in 1964, to 671,457 in 1970. For secondary education the expansion was greater, from 8840 in 1964 to 21,040 in 1970. However, only about 300 of these secondary school enrolments were Forms V and VI. The majority of the enrolments, 16,000, were in forms I and II. (18)

However, during UDI Rhodesia's black population was increasing at between 3.2% and 3.6% a year and the expansion of education that there was, did not keep up with this increase. This meant that between 1966 and 1976 the proportion of black children entering grade 1 had fallen from 84% to 72%, and the proportion of primary school leavers entering secondary school had fallen from 25.7% in 1972 to 20.9% in 1976. (19)

Another aspect of the Rhodesian Front's education policy was the New Education Plan which came into operation in 1966. The plan introduced a rigorous selection process for pupil entry into secondary education.
Under the new policy, 12% of all African children completing primary education each year would be allowed to proceed to academic secondary education (F1). 37% were to be admitted to the F2 or vocational secondary education. There was no provision for the remaining 50% of African school children. (20)

The system of F1 and F2 schools never really took off due to the stigma of the F2 schools. The implicit suggestion was made in the elaboration of the policy that the F2 schools were for the less able - i.e. those who were not academically inclined. Teachers, parents and pupils resented it and knew that the job prospects were much better for students who had taken academic courses, as opposed to those who got certificates for non-academic courses such as agriculture, carpentry or building. (21) Vocational secondary education was seen as part of the general policy of the regime to provide Africans with an inferior education in order to protect the political and economic position of the whites.

This highly selective system, coupled with limited places at all levels and the inability of African parents to pay fees meant that in 1975 75% of African children aged 7 began primary school, 54.5% of the grade 1 cohort, or 24% of the population, completed seven years of primary school, 9.9% went onto secondary school, 4% completed Form 4 and 3% passed 6th Form qualifying for University entry. (22) Thus out of every 1000 black schoolchildren in 1975, 250 had never been to school, 337 completed primary school and only 60 went to secondary school, 37 reached Form IV and less than 3 reach the lower Form VI. (23)
Comparing these enrolment figures with white enrolment, 36 times as many black school children as white school children reach school age each year, but six times as many whites as blacks reach Sixth Form. (24)

This system thus meant a very high drop out rate for African children compared with white children. 95% white, Asian and Coloured children who enrolled in Grade 1 went through to Form IV. The drop out rate was due almost entirely to emigration. Approximately 40% went through to Form VI, in 1975. (25) For White, Asian and Coloured children school places were provided for all students up to the age of 16 years. At that stage white, Asian and Coloured children could either go on to Form VI, go onto colleges of further education, or look for work. Whichever choice they made, they could be assured of a place.

Endless statistics are available which provide evidence of the inequalities between white (including Asian and Coloured) and black in primary and secondary education. After the few examples given so far, it is evident that there were gross disparities in the system which assured all white, Asian and Coloured children a school place up to the age of sixteen, whereas most African school children were pushed out of the system even before they wrote their grade 7 exams - leaving them without an adequate level of literacy for the rest of their lives. At independence the government was to inherit an enormous problem of black illiteracy (some 50-60% of the population) as a result of these education policies. It is no wonder that the issue of primary and secondary schooling for all became a vital issue for the new government
in 1980 in its attempts to overcome the racism, discrimination and exploitation of the colonial period.

b. Further Education

There were only a few institutions which provided further education. In general there were adequate opportunities for the white population. For the African population, with the exception of teaching, opportunities were limited. From the training of skilled workers through to apprenticeships, to the training of professional and technical personnel at the University and polytechnics, preference was given to whites.

The further education institutions in the country did not in fact provide enough skilled personnel for the needs of the economy. Employers, including government, relied heavily on immigration for the provision of skilled manpower. In an interview in 1975, Minister of Labour Cronje said that 65% of skilled manpower was provided through immigration and 35% through the apprenticeship training system. (27) Whites also relied quite heavily for further education on South Africa - for example in training for architecture and engineering. In 1977 over 1 900 whites attended further education institutions in South Africa. (28)

The main institutes for further education in Rhodesia in 1976 were the University of Rhodesia, the Salisbury Polytechnic and the Bulawayo
Polytechnic, several smaller technical colleges offering technical training for apprenticeships, courses in agriculture, health, homecraft, and teacher training. In 1976 there were approximately 16,000 students in further education. (29)

In 1976 2,000 blacks with grade 7 and above proceeded to further education and 800 went onto teacher training, giving a total of 2,800. (30) Riddell compares this statistic to the number of blacks that left school in 1975 and failed to proceed to any form of further education in 1976 - 54,240 grade 7 pupils and 14,500 students from various levels of secondary school. This gives a total of 68,740 students. There were places for just over 4% of black school leavers who had completed grade 7 and above. (31) Some of this large number of school leavers would have gone into part-time study or on-the-job training. By and large however, the further education system in the country was wholly inadequate to meet the needs of the population of the country and the skill requirements of industry and commerce.

B. EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

"Rhodesia's education system is part of the present structure and it reinforces the country's present pattern of development. In practice it is elitist, highly selective, economically wasteful, geared to the needs of the small modern sector of the economy which is incapable of providing enough jobs for the country's growing population and is oriented neither to the employment needs of the majority nor the comprehensive eradication of illiteracy.... Change
As was discussed in Chapter 2, education needs to be considered in terms of the role it plays in any given society. It does not exist in a vacuum. According to Riddell:

"planners of the labour force and education need to ask two interrelated questions: does the education system provide the country with the basic skills necessary to maintain and expand the economy? And does the system provide the working population with the skills and productive capacity for employment in society?" (33)

In addition one needs to consider the structure of the economy in order to assess whether - even if the education system does provide the appropriate skills for the individual and the economy - can the economy provide the jobs for the population?

According to Riddell (34) the Rhodesian education system failed on both counts, and the economy was not structured to provide jobs for the growing population. The education system failed to provide the majority of the people with a basic education, and failed to provide an education infrastructure that could ensure the development of skills for an expanding economy, relying instead on white immigrants to provide the skills.

One may argue that the economy during UDI produced 'a small economic miracle', that it diversified, had a growth rate of about 8%, that education and employment grew, and that the country had a small but efficient skilled work force. This is all so. However, it is largely the white population that benefited from these developments. The white
population had the money to buy the increasing range of consumer goods produced locally, they were assured of education and jobs, and had one of the highest standard of living in the world.

However, when one examines the economy and education system of Rhodesia in relation to the benefits for the total population, one can only conclude that there are serious structural problems in the economy and the education system which will need be solved before the majority of the population have access to an education and a job of their choice. For the remainder of this chapter I propose to illustrate some of the contradictions that arose out of the education system and employment structure in Rhodesia before independence: income disparities, unemployment and a shortage of skills in the context of unequal access to education and employment for Africans.

2. POPULATION, INCOMES, EMPLOYMENT AND SKILLS

In 1977 whites made up under 4% of the population of Rhodesia which was close to 7 million. Africans accounted for 95% of the total population. (See Table 4.6)
Table 4.6

POPULATION ESTIMATES BY ETHNIC GROUP - 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>6,440,000</td>
<td>95.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>268,000</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,740,800</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: C Stoneman, 1978, p 5

In 1976 the gross domestic income was $2 000 million. Of this only 58% was paid in wages and salaries (low by international standards according to Stoneman), 34% to whites and 24% to blacks! On the basis of wages and salaries alone this gave whites a per capita income of $2 158 (excluding profits from companies etc., from which whites benefitted greatly) and blacks a per capita income of $95 (including profits of rural households). The ratio of white to black earnings was 1: 10.8 on average, the worst ratio being in agriculture and forestry - 1:24.5.

This distribution of income and wages in relation to population illustrates the fact that it was the whites which occupied the most lucrative jobs, i.e. skilled, professional and technical jobs.
In addition a much higher proportion of the white population was employed. Stoneman (36) showed that in 1976, based on data from the 1969 census only 16% of the total black population was employed — i.e. 920 000 in the formal sector. In addition it was estimated that at the time of the 1969 census there were an additional 51 000 blacks employed: 18 920 self employed outside agriculture; 15 360 employees of black farmers and 16 910 employees of black business men. (37) At the time of the 1969 census the adult black working population was about 3 million. This meant that in 1976 only about 30% of the adult black working population was in employment. (38)

In contrast there were about 115 000 economically active whites, 113 000 in formal employment in 1970 on the basis of the 1969 Census. Given that the total white population was 268 000 in 1977, then approximately 45-50% of the total white population were employed. The unemployment rate amongst the white population was therefore negligible.

Up to 1976/77 the skill distribution of the black and white population was clearly defined. In general whites occupied professional, administrative, managerial and certified skilled posts. In general, blacks occupied semi-skilled and unskilled positions. (See table 4.7) Up to the time of independence there was in fact no comprehensive analysis of the level of black skills in the economy. (39) It was the educational opportunities open to whites that facilitated and consolidated this unequal skill distribution in the economy.
Table 4.7

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY BY RACE 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job categories</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial and</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled and</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi- and</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>5193</td>
<td>5824</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from study done by Murphree et al. 1975, p213.

Even where blacks did have secondary education, they were discriminated against. Murphree et al. (1975) showed that company recruitment and selection policies were discriminatory. Whereas there were no particular requirements for whites for clerical and supervisory positions, upper secondary education with good passes was usually required from Africans for these same positions. It was generally whites, Coloureds and Asians who dominated skilled, professional and managerial positions, and this was because they had the educational qualifications for the job.

In 1977 there were 127,560 white, Asian and Coloured workers in the economy with secondary education. This comprised the total number of
whites, Asians and Coloureds in formal employment. 75% or 95 860 had 4 or more years of secondary education, and a further 68 600 had special training beyond secondary school. (40)

In contrast, in 1969 approximately 50% of Africans in employment had no schooling at all. 50% of Africans in employment comprise domestic and agricultural workers. Generally, these workers had no qualifications at all, and no schooling of consequence. In 1969 most of the remainder of the African workforce had 4 - 7 years primary schooling. (41) This group provided the semi-skilled, clerical and some technical workers.

This position changed marginally during the 1970's with the expansion of secondary education. Murphree et al. (1975) showed that 80% of African employees who had education, only had education below grade 7. Approximately 16% had form I and form II, and 7.8% had form III and form IV. 1.4% had form V, and 1% had form VI. (42)

From 1975 Africans did begin to be absorbed into skilled work, although this was not formally recognised through job categorisation or increases in wages. Incorporation of Africans into skilled work was done largely through job fragmentation. The reasons Africans moved into skilled jobs were the increasing number of white skilled workers emigrating or doing army service, coupled with a real shortage of skilled manpower for the economy. The next section will look in more detail at two of the most glaring contradictions in the Rhodesian economy - high unemployment coupled with a shortage of skilled manpower.
3. THE CONTRADICTIONS - UNEMPLOYMENT AND A SHORTAGE OF SKILLS

The highly discriminatory education and employment structure of Rhodesia, coupled with the structure of the settler-colonial economy, gave rise to two serious problems: a very high rate of unemployment and under-employment amongst the black population on the one hand, and a shortage of skilled manpower on the other. The new government inherited these problems in 1980, and how they tackled them is part of the process of black advancement in Zimbabwe which will be discussed in later chapters.

a. Unemployment

The unemployment crisis that the government inherited in 1980 was a result of policies pursued by the settler-colonial state. The majority of the African population was forced off the most fertile farming lands into Tribal Trust Lands, and the remainder of the African population was forced by various economic measures into the wage economy. Insufficient land, over-grazed and infertile land in what was meant to be a rural-based economy generated mass under- and unemployment. According to D G Clarke, in 1978, 65-70% of all African households in Zimbabwe had either a primary or secondary dependence on wage-labour in order to generate the necessary income required for their subsistence. (43) This is an illustration of how inadequate the rural base of the African population was. In a situation where the working population was expanding faster than employment i.e. unemployment was increasing,
the result was increasing poverty amongst the African population. The solution of the regime to increasing unemployment was a tightening of influx control and reinforcement of the African reserve system in order to keep the unemployed out of the urban areas.

While there was an increase in formal sector employment during the first 10 years of UDI, from 1972 few jobs were created, and by the end of the 1970s there was a decline in formal sector employment, exacerbating the unemployment problem. (For further statistical details on employment during UDI see Chapter 3 and Chapter 7.) From the mid-1970s any surplus there was, was put into the war budget. According to the Census of population in 1969 1.4% of whites were unemployed, 4.1% of Asians and 9.5% of Coloureds. In addition to having a low unemployment rate, whites had a high activity rate for white women - an estimated 30% of white women were in paid employment. (44)

The statistical picture for Africans was very different. There are a variety of figures on African unemployment. They vary depending on which statistics an author uses as his starting point. However, whichever figure one comes up with - the unemployment rate amongst the African population was a very serious and growing problem by the end of the 1970's. Earlier in this chapter Stoneman (1978) was quoted as saying that only 16% of the total black population was in formal employment in 1976 or 30% of the adult black population.
Even though formal sector employment did increase during the first part of UDI, this increase did not keep pace with population growth, the number of school leavers and new entrants to the labour market each year. Zimbabwe has one of the highest population growth rates in Africa, and is about fifth highest in the world with a population growth rate of about 3.5% For the economy to keep pace with this it would require a sustained economic growth of about 10%.(45)

In the 12 year period - 1966 to 1978 - an annual average of 178,545 blacks were out of school. 25% never went to school, 47% left during primary school, 23% left after primary school, and 5% were secondary school leavers. According to Riddell (1980) from 1969 - 1975 an annual average of 33,167 jobs were created, accommodating 19.4% of the blacks out of school. Therefore over 130,000 blacks each year failed to find jobs in wage employment and the numbers leaving school or never going to school increased each year. Between self-employment and employment in the peasant sector Riddell (1980) estimated an additional 20,000 jobs a year during the good years 1969 - 1975.(46) This was still not enough to compensate for the growth in the black working population.

Having secondary education did not significantly increase the chances of a job for a black school leaver. Despite this education was and still is, seen by the majority of Africans as the escape route out of a peasant existence and a life of poverty. This is the reason why the terminal F1-F2 school system never succeeded. Blacks knew that the only chance was through a white collar job as a nurse, a clerk or a teacher,
and one could only reach these jobs after an academic secondary education. As was shown in the previous section by the drop out rate in African education, the aspirations of the majority of African school children and their parents were never met.

B J Dorsey (1975 and 1986) conducted extensive research into the aspirations, academic achievement and career attainment of black secondary school pupils. (47) The study was longitudinal, started in 1971, with follow-up studies on the same group in 1972 and 1985. The black secondary school pupils in the study did extremely well in the Cambridge School Examinations with 96% achieving a full certificate and 37% achieving a first division pass. In general the pass rate for blacks sitting Cambridge 'O' level was 95% - one of the highest in the world. This was partly because only the brightest and most diligent could survive the harsh selection system, and also because teaching was really one of the few job alternatives for educated Africans - 88% of teachers in black schools were qualified, ensuring a high standard of teaching.

72% of boys and girls in the sample of 2 557 had aspirations for going to university. According to Dorsey:

"When employment opportunities for black secondary school graduates were compared with their high aspirations and academic achievements, it was obvious that serious contradictions existed in Rhodesian society which contributed to the frustrations of black youth". (48)

In the first follow up in 1972 only 12% of the students had found jobs, 25% were continuing their studies, while 50% were unemployed. Of the
12% who were employed, 45% had taken menial jobs which did not require a secondary school education. (49) According to Dorsey, the study showed that:

"A secondary school education tended to increase black pupils's self-consciousness, their social awareness and their aspirations. They perceived racial discrimination as the most significant factor frustrating the attainment of their aspirations. They saw this operating in the first instance in the educational sphere with blacks being provided with inferior schools and limited access to further education; but ultimately they saw this discrimination extended to preclude them from many of the best jobs which were reserved for whites". (50)

Dorsey was not the only researcher in the early 1970's who found that the job possibilities for African school leavers were difficult. Mothobi (1978) cites one researcher 'with extensive knowledge of conditions in industry', who examined employment opportunities for Africans, Asians and Coloureds with post-primary education. In a report the researcher stated:

"I was over-sanguine in believing that I would find a specific range of employment opportunities for these people in these fields on any appreciable scale. For it became clear to me, at a very early stage, that the opportunities are at present so limited......". (51)

Another researcher, Swanepoel (1974), conducted a study on behalf of the Rio Tinto Foundation into the job opportunities for school leavers. He concluded that out of approximately 11 000 school leavers in 1974, 1147 would not find job opportunities on par with their schooling. He
maintained that it would be the African school leavers who would fail to find adequate employment. (52)

Before 1980, with or without education, blacks faced severe difficulties in obtaining employment. The reasons for this were mentioned above - the structure of the settler-colonial economy, a discriminatory education system, and discriminatory labour and employment practices.

b. A Shortage of Skills

The high levels of unemployment amongst blacks with and without primary and secondary education needs to be contrasted with the skills shortage in the Rhodesian economy. The 1964 High Level Manpower Study estimated that between 1961 and 1969, between 96,000 and 107,000 skilled people were needed to fill posts in the expanding economy, yet in the period only 46,900 skilled people were added to the work force from the schools. (53) In the period 1970 to 1977 an additional 75,375 skilled people were added to the work force, and according to Riddell (1980) the demand must have been considerably greater than in the previous nine year period. (54)

Despite the unemployment of Africans without schooling, with primary schooling and with secondary schooling - there has always been a shortage of skilled personnel for the Rhodesian economy. Three of the major contributors to this problem have been: the colour bar in the
employment structure and labour legislation; an inadequate and discriminatory education and training infrastructure; and the reliance of the country on immigration to fulfil skilled manpower needs.

With the expansion of the economy after World War 2 and during Federation the need for skilled manpower became acute. However, through immigration, and limited training facilities needs were met. During Federation there were attempts at liberalisation and increasing educational opportunities for Africans eased some of the pressure. However, during the first ten years of UDI when there was the greatest expansion in employment and the economy, the pressures became serious and immigration could no longer adequately fill the gap. Net immigration in the period 1961-1969 was almost zero. The regime in power was an alliance of the most reactionary white political forces, and therefore not willing to make any significant changes in education or employment which would in any way threaten white power and privilege. Force of circumstance - with increasing white emigration and white call-up for the army in the mid-seventies, and economic growth led capital, primarily foreign, but also some large locally owned companies, to informally loosen the restrictions on African employment in skilled work through job analysis, job fragmentation and increased training. For high level personnel - professional and technical, administrative and managerial, capital and government still relied largely on whites, despite shortages.
As there was no breakdown of the skill composition of the African population up to the time of independence, it was very difficult to gauge the extent of the shortage at the semi-skilled and skilled level. While Africans were not certified skilled or even semi-skilled, they did perform the work through job fragmentation or through simply doing the work for the white boss. However, employer organisations and businessmen were claiming an acute shortage of manpower at this level.

For example, in 1970, the President of the Chamber of Mines in an address to the Rhodesian Congress of Mine Officials and Salaried Staff Association said:

"We are not far off the point where this shortage will severely restrict further expansion (of the industry)." (55)

The Manpower and Wage Survey published in January 1971 by the Associated Chamber of Commerce of Rhodesia (ACCOR) reported an 8.2% shortage in the skilled trades, and a 7.9% shortage at the professional level. (56) The 1971 survey by the Central Statistical Office of vacancy rates by industry gave an 8.6% vacancy rate in the skilled trades. (57) On the basis of requirements, 1,520 skilled artisans should have been produced per year during this period. Mothobi (1978), citing the Annual Report of Apprenticeship Training and Skilled Manpower Development Authority 1976, stated:

"The apprenticeship training system produced 309 skilled artisans in 1974, 565 in 1975 and expects to produce 461 in 1976, 591 in 1977, 678 in 1978, 824 in 1979, and 930 in 1980, indicating a total shortfall of 7787 during the period, which must be met from other sources".
Mothobi cites two other sources on the same issue during the mid-seventies:

"Mr G Handover of the Bulawayo Chamber of Industries stated that the shortage of artisans was so acute that most firms had to overwork their staff. The General Manager of Wankie Colliery stated that the shortage had reached crisis proportions and was the Colliery's most serious problem." (59)

A forecast of skilled manpower needs in 1977 by the Apprenticeship Authority predicted a shortage of 12,000 apprentices by the end of the 1970s. (60)

It is evident from these statistics and comments that there was a shortage of skilled and professional manpower in the 1970s. One of the reasons given for this shortage was the training infrastructure for the skilled trades. The sub-section below will look briefly at the inadequacy of the training system for providing skilled labour for the economy, and how the system was utilised to preserve white privilege.

Training for Industry

Prior to 1934 there was no organised apprenticeship training in the country. Training was provided and organised by the employer. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934 placed the training of apprentices under the control of the Industrial Councils for each industry. (61) Industry pressurised for improvements and changes because of the shortage of apprentices in industry. The Apprenticeship Act of 1959
established an Apprenticeship Advisory Board and apprenticeship committees which made recommendations to the Board on training.

The 1964 Select Committee on Apprenticeship and Technical Education identified weaknesses that still existed in the system:

i. The dependence on employers to indenture apprentices "thus making the supply of apprentices dependent on economic conditions and racial considerations instead of the needs of the country". (62) This had led to a serious shortage in apprentices which in 1963 were estimated at - "92% in building, 16% in motor trade, 27% in engineering, 16% in Rhodesia Railways, 18% in mining, 14% in electrical and 50% in aircraft". (63)

ii. The fact that training was still haphazard and unco-ordinated, again because of the dependence on individual employers to provide the training. (64)

As a result of the Report of the Select Committee the 1968 Apprenticeship Act was passed, the key objective of which was:

"To plan, recruit, train, develop and protect Rhodesia's skilled manpower resources". (65)

The Act led to the establishment of the Apprenticeship Training and Skilled Manpower Development Authority under the direction of the Ministry of Labour. The functions of the Authority were to assess
skilled manpower needs in relation to technological and economic development, and to recommend courses for apprenticeship. (66)

Mothobi carried out a study on the training infrastructure for industry which started in 1974 and was published in 1978. His study set out to show that the apprenticeship training system in Rhodesia was:
- inherently incapable of solving the acute shortage of skilled manpower in the country;
- equally incapable of solving the acute shortage of employment opportunities for African school leavers;
- and also incapable of providing a suitable basis for a national system of technical training for industry. (67)

Mothobi found that the reasons for inherent incapacity of the apprenticeship training system were:

a. Inability to provide employment opportunities on a large scale.

b. The lack of will among employers and skilled artisans to train apprentices, especially Africans. This lack of will was due to:
- employers' reliance on immigration for skilled manpower or poaching from other firms;
- the apprenticeship training system's dependence on employers and skilled artisans to train skilled workers and the inability of the Authority to compel them to do so;
resistance of employers and white skilled labour to the indenturing of Africans as apprentices and as journeymen;
- the employers desire for fragmentation as a solution to the problem.

c. Deficiencies in the methods of training and the training infrastructure:

i. At technical colleges by:

- inadequate facilities
- too high minimum entry qualifications
- too much theory, not enough practical work, i.e. a non-industrial training environment
- an unsympathetic approach to the problems of training African apprentices.

ii. On the job by:

- a lack of facilities
- dependence on skilled artisans for training when skilled artisans had no desire to train Africans
- white labour unions protecting white labour from African competition (68)

Apprenticeship training in fact only covered the training of about 4% of the industrial labour force in the 1970's. Mothobi therefore assessed other forms of technical training in industry and the capacity of such
training to provide training and employment for African school leavers and to meet the skill needs of industry.

Making up only about 4% of the skilled labour force meant that apprenticeships could not make any significant impact on the numbers of school leavers looking for jobs, even if all apprenticeships taken each year were taken by Africans. Employers were also increasingly, wanting African apprentices with "O" levels in order to ensure that they would succeed and that white artisans prejudices would not be justified. Thus the apprenticeship system made very little impression on the vast majority of Grade 7 African school leavers, therefore having little impact on unemployment.

The fundamental criticism Mothobi had of the apprenticeship and technical training system was that "it had a deep-rooted involvement in the protection of the vested interests of white labour and white society." (69) With extreme pressure for skilled labour employers did attempt to introduce job fragmentation, but not to fundamentally change the racial structure of the labour force. As the Association of Rhodesian Industries put it:

"The artificial hard-line which is at present drawn between the journeymen and the non-journeymen should be removed. There should be an overall grading of skills and an extension of the various categories of workers within each industry". (70)

White trade union officials held a different view of the job fragmentation. In their view fragmentation meant the development of cheap labour (Africans doing the jobs for much lower wages) which would
eventually eliminate the white skilled worker and so increase the profits for employers! (71) (The very ironical position consistently adopted by white labour in Rhodesia and South Africa in order to protect the economic and political interest of white skilled workers).

As early as the 1930's standardisation of technical and apprenticeship training meant the exclusion of Africans from skilled trades. This was done through the Industrial Conciliation Act and through ensuring that education and training would keep white youth from becoming poor whites. This position was maintained until the end of settler-colonial rule. In 1951 the Chairman on a Select Committee into Technical Education stated:

"One thing we must observe and take very serious consideration of is the large number of natives who are now working in the industrial field, working with an aptitude which seems peculiar to the native mind, and native hands. By technical education we must ensure that even the lower strata of European labour shall not be passed by the intelligent native up the industrial ladder while the European labourer is coming down." (72)

By the 1970's Mothobi found that the situation had not changed much:

"A senior labour official admitted that any white, whatever calibre, could get an apprenticeship....... One Authority officer....told me that a great number of white youths...... who were accepted for apprenticeship training, could not hold their own in open competition with African youths and were only being taken on because some firms have policies to give opportunities of apprenticeship to sons or relatives of workers, or take them on the pleas of their parents." (73)

Up until the late 1970s skilled work was the preserve of white skilled labour and was ensured through controlling who could get apprenticeships and undergo technical training in order to become journeymen.
By the mid-1970’s business was being forced to change its approach, especially the larger companies. The war and increasing emigration of whites with zero immigration led to an increasing proportion of Africans being taken on as apprentices. (See table 4.8) In this period the ratio of immigration to apprenticeship training as a source of skills was reduced from 80%:20% to 65%:35%. (74)

Table 4.8
INTAKE OF APPRENTICES SHOWING NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGE OF AFRICANS 1970-76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>no. of apps.</th>
<th>no. of Africans</th>
<th>% Africans to total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>indentured</td>
<td>indentured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3,06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3,84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5,76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>11,36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>18,08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>16,38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from M Murphree et al., 1975, p 106.

As a result of a reliance on immigration for skills, a discriminatory employment structure preserving white interests, and a lack of infrastructure to cope with the education and technical training of Africans in sufficient numbers, the regime created several problems for itself. It was faced with the problem of a shortage of skilled personnel, (in many senses artificially created), the unemployment of
the vast majority of African school leavers, and the lack of a training infrastructure to meet the growing needs of industry. It is no surprise that the education and technical training of Africans became synonymous with the Africanisation of skilled trades previously dominated by whites and one of the most pressing areas of government manpower policy immediately after independence.

Medium and High Level Skills for the Economy

Above it has been shown that while there was a shortage of skills for the economy at skilled level, to a certain extent this shortage was only on paper i.e. blacks were performing skilled jobs but were not registered and certified. At independence, even with a significant white emigration, the economy would not grind to a halt.

The position for medium and higher level skills was much the same, although for certain professional and technical posts there was more of a real shortage. African graduates found great difficulty in getting employment, with the exception of teaching posts. In a survey of commercial and industrial employers carried out in 1973 by J P Danckwerts (Graduate Manpower Survey 1973) 371 out of 645 employers said they would not find African graduates acceptable. And neither the Ministry of Internal Affairs nor Rhodesia Railways had any "suitable opportunities" for black graduates. (75)
Medium and high level posts in industry and government were the monopoly of whites. While there were vacancies at this level, it was in part an unwillingness to take on blacks. There were blacks qualifying each year from secondary school and university who could not find employment in the Rhodesian economy because of its discriminatory policies. Many of these people left to train or find employment abroad.

Colclough and Murray (1979) examined the supply of blacks with post-primary education and tried to predict shortage areas in the event of mass white emigration. They found that while whites occupied some 63% of the 200,000 skilled jobs in the economy, there was a supply of Africans to fill the gaps that could be created by white emigration, or a black advancement programme by a new government.

Colclough and Murray revealed shortages for jobs requiring 3 – 4 years secondary schooling i.e. 'O' levels. While there were also a considerable number of graduates training abroad, speculation was that they would not cover some of the crucial areas where white high level skills were dominant – engineers, administrators, scientists and accountants. (76) (This speculation was revealed to be correct – see chapter 7.) Earlier it was stated that 68,000 (over 50%) of whites in employment had specific training beyond secondary school. While there were Africans with secondary schooling to provide a pool of potential middle and high level manpower, shortages were predicted for the post-independence period in the event of white emigration due to a lack of
applied training for blacks for specific professional, technical and administrative tasks.

While it is possible to conclude that there was a shortage of skills in Zimbabwe pre-independence, the shortage was not as severe or crippling as in other African countries. There was a pool of Africans with the basic education and a significant number with secondary and university education. In addition there were +/- 8000 black Zimbabweans trained in universities abroad towards the end of the UDI period. (77)

C. CONCLUSION

At independence the new government inherited an extremely difficult task. There was a great disparity in income, wages, education and employment between white and black. In addition there were serious structural problems which the new government would have to face - an educational system which was not providing a basic education for the majority of the population, and which was not providing appropriate and sufficient skills for the economy. The most serious structural problem of all for the government was the inability of the economy to absorb even 25% of the 90 000 or so African school leavers that were coming onto the job market each year.
It is evident from an examination of the problems that government inherited, that a mere de-racialisation of education and expansion of the education system will not solve the complexity of human resource problems in Zimbabwe. The provision of skills, employment and redistribution of income will only be possible through an integrated development programme which encompasses these aims. (78)

Part III will look at how the new government did cope with these issues and what problems they have faced. Black advancement - i.e. the position of blacks in the new socio-economic structure and the mechanisms which facilitated this process will be central to this discussion.
PART III

BLACK ADVANCEMENT IN ZIMBABWE SINCE 1980

INTRODUCTION

Part II, incorporating chapters 3 and 4, discussed the inequities of settler-colonial society. In particular these two chapters focussed on how discrimination in terms of colour affected opportunities for education, and affected the employment and income structure of the society. The settler-colonial economy was structured on the basis of a cheap supply of black unskilled and semi-skilled labour.

It is obvious that a black advancement programme to redress these inequities had to be the priority task of the new government which came to power in 1980. Black advancement was necessary for political reasons, to show that blacks were in control. It was necessary for technical reasons in order to ensure a supply of local and black skilled personnel for the economy. And a black advancement programme was necessary for ideological reasons to redress the inequities of the colonial period.

In order to examine the black advancement process in Zimbabwe after 1980 Part III will be structured as follows:

- **Chapter 5**: Education and Training - the Main Vehicle for Black Advancement.
- **Chapter 6**: Black Advancement in the Public and Private Sectors.
- **Chapter 7**: Human Resource Planning and Black Advancement.

The object of Part III is to examine the process and mechanisms of black advancement in Zimbabwe after 1980 in the context of government policy to transform social relations and develop a socialist society.
CHAPTER 5

EDUCATION AND TRAINING – THE MAIN VEHICLE FOR BLACK ADVANCEMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

Chapter 4 described in detail how education and training was one of the main mechanisms preserving white privilege during settler-colonial rule. Provision of education as a right and as a means of redressing the inequities of the past was an electoral commitment and one of the first areas the new government acted on after coming to power in 1980. Education and training is perceived by the majority of the population as the key to overcoming personal problems of poverty and unemployment.

Education and training became the essential component of the government's human resource development programme. After 1980 'manpower development' involved 'general education and specialised training' (1) to:

- provide skills, especially of a scientific and technological nature, for the economy;
- promote the full development of the country's human resources thus eliminating (white) privilege which was part of the old system;
- contribute to national economic growth and stability. (2)
In order to fulfill these objectives of 'manpower development' government immediately initiated reforms giving priority to the following areas:

a. removal of all racial barriers and expansion of the formal and non-formal education system, especially in the rural areas;
b. the provision of free primary education for all;
c. the expansion of technical and vocational training institutions and the creation of additional facilities;
d. review of the apprenticeship system in order to make it more relevant and effective;
e. identification and upgrading of existing experienced local skills; and
f. utilisation of expatriate expertise where appropriate, and study opportunities abroad as stop-gaps. (3)

In terms of providing a very rapid expansion in education and training facilities at all levels Zimbabwe surpassed all other attempts in Africa. While most other African countries initiated rapid expansion of their educational systems at independence none attempted free primary education with a view to universal primary education, and such rapid expansion at secondary and tertiary levels. Zimbabwe did have some factors in its favour. There was already a fairly large educational infrastructure, and also a more educated black population, particularly with secondary and university education. A significant number of educated blacks were willing to be teachers. Neither of these two
factors existed in many other African countries. Table 5.1 summarises the expansion that took place from 1979 to 1985 in education and technical training.

Table 5.1
ENROLMENTS IN EDUCATION AND TRAINING INSTITUTIONS 1979 - 1985

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<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>primary schools</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1 235</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>1 680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondary schools</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teachers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>002</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training coll. agricultural colleges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agricultural colleges</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>169</td>
<td></td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technical colleges</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apprenticeships</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>University of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1 481</td>
<td>2 240</td>
<td>2 525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This chapter will examine the policy and problems in the expansion of the educational and training infrastructure since 1980. The object of this massive expansion was to overcome the inequities of the past, and to develop the human resources for economic development. In the course of this chapter the theoretical issues discussed in chapter 2 will be referred to in order to draw out the interrelationship between theory, policy and practice, and to highlight some of the problems Zimbabwe is facing.
2. **GOVERNMENT POLICY ON EDUCATION AFTER 1980**

Government's intention to totally transform the education system was evident in the 1980 Election Manifesto of ZANU (PF). Item L of the Manifesto, declared that the intention of the ruling party, ZANU (PF), once in government was to:

a. abolish racial education and utilise the education system to develop in the younger generation a non-racial attitude and a common loyalty to the state;

b. establish a system of compulsory and free education;

c. abolish sex discrimination in the education system;

d. orient the education system to national goals;

e. give every adult who has no or little educational opportunity the right to literacy and adult education;

f. make education play an important role in transforming society;

g. place education in the category of basic human rights and strive to ensure that every child had an educational opportunity to develop his mental, physical and emotional faculties. (4)

Government's intended policy with regard to expanding and transforming the education system was therefore based on the premise that education is a basic human right as well as being essential to economic growth and the development of a socialist society. As will become evident in the course of this chapter, contradictions inevitably arise in attempting to realise both these objectives simultaneously. The electorate while supporting government policy also perceived education in more practical terms - as the key to jobs in the modern sector of the economy, and
therefore as the way out of rural poverty and to a better standard of living.

'Growth with Equity' (1981), was government's first policy statement, and the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) 1982-83 - 1984-85 concretised policy in the form of the Plan. From these two documents government policy on education after 1980 was:

- that education is a human right and a basic human need;
- that education is an instrument affecting access to other basic human needs such as adequate nutrition and health care;
- education is an economic investment in human beings;
- education is an important government instrument for achieving equity, and redressing the gross inequalities resulting from past discriminatory policies and practices. (5)

The TNDP made the important point that education policy had to be part of wider development policy:

"The attainment of our growth and development objectives and the establishment of an egalitarian socialist society critically depend on the effective development and direction of our human resources. The realisation of the full potential of the human being is a central objective of education, which should, however, be integrated with growth and socio-economic development objectives." (6)

In practice the integration of education policy with development policy has been difficult to realise. Education policy and practice has been pursued largely in isolation from general development policy and planning, although government documents do reiterate the necessity for
integration. In pursuit of education policy in itself government introduced free primary education in 1980 with the goal being universal primary education; expanded secondary and university education dramatically; as well as expanding technical and vocational education, and non-formal education and adult literacy. From 1980-81 the education budget has taken the largest vote, comprising 15% - 20% of government expenditure. In 1984-85 education and training was 19.7% of government expenditure, or $522 million. Education in Zimbabwe accounts for about 8% GDP compared with the African average of 3.9%. (8)

The First Five-Year National Development Plan (FNPD) 1986-1990 justified and defended the rationale for educational expenditure and expansion as follows:

"The dominant rationale for spending public funds on education is not only to uphold education as a right for everybody but also to develop the requisite manpower for the development of science and technology, overall industrialisation, management and administration. There is also the aspect of nation building and equalisation of opportunities and incomes. Equally important is the fact that education is a process of socialisation - a process through which children learn norms, culture, values and fundamental ideologies of life." (9)

At the time of publication of the FNPD, however, there were already moves afoot to introduce a new education policy. In 1986 a Task Force was set up by the Ministry of Education to look into the implementation of the 'new structure and content of education'. (10) In 1987 government announced that the new policy would be operational by 1988. (11) The author perceives the reasons for government having to reconsider policy so soon after independence as follows:
Educational expansion was part of the political momentum of independence, a response to electoral demand, a political necessity in order to facilitate black advancement and redress inequalities of the colonial period.

Education policy was therefore not an integral part of national planning, and was more spontaneous than planned. Educational expansion per se was perceived as a good thing. The theoretical and practical problems of massive educational expansion were not anticipated. The Ministry of Finance Economic Planning and Development in their 'Socio-economic Review 1980 - 85' acknowledge the problem as follows:

"Because of the urgency with which government treated the need to redress imbalances in education and therefore the speed with which the policy was implemented, the expansion which took place, particularly the massive school enrolments, tended to be more spontaneous than planned." (12)

Government rationale for the change in education policy is the same as that in other ex-colonies. The main reason given publically is school leaver unemployment and the mismatch between school and 'the world of work'. In government one of the main reasons for change is financial - the inability to sustain massive educational expenditures. The reasons for changing policy, the policy itself and the anticipated outcome of the new policy seem however to have been given as little serious consideration as the early policy of spontaneous expansion.

The rationale for change in policy as given by the Ministry of Education in an internal memorandum and the Minister of Education are as follows:
- We cannot afford to offer all pupils four years of secondary education;
- present 'O' level courses do not meet the needs of pupils, as evidenced by the high failure rate;
- the economy at present can only absorb a fraction of school leavers, ie. most school leavers will not get jobs in the formal sector;
- there is not enough co-ordination between ministeries on education and training and respective institutions;
- students do not leave school with skills recognised in 'the world of work';
- we therefore propose to introduce technical and vocational education in order to cater for the aptitudes of certain pupils and in order to make a sound investment in productive manpower which we need (for economic growth). (13)

Summarising the rationale, the Minister of Education stated:

"Despite the ever-increasing number of pupils passing out of the education system, and despite the ever-increasing education budget, our children are leaving school after 11 years without any skill that is recognised in the world of work. Thus the money spent on education under the present system is not optimally utilised in educating our future manpower needs because of both the structure and the content that have outlived the era for which they were designed to serve." (14)

The change in policy is in essence a change in curriculum aimed at "establishing a polytechnical education system which would marry theory and practice, ideas and action." (15) At primary level therefore technical and vocational subjects would be included. For entry into
secondary level, and the various stages of secondary level, students would be selected for technical or academic streams on the basis of examinations and psychological tests. (16) In the first two years of secondary school, forms I and II, curriculum will include academic and technical and vocational subjects. On the basis of ZJC examinations 40% will go on to complete 'O' levels, 25% will continue with technical and vocational subjects, and the remainder will have to find other options of a technical and vocational nature. Even students who go on to do 'O' levels will be required to do two vocational and technical subjects. The Minister of Education maintains that "through the acquisition of such skills the current shortage of skilled manpower could be overcome... and Education with Production will improve an individual's chances of self-sufficiency in society which purely academic education failed to do." (17)

There are a variety of problems with the new policy proposals:

- they are not integrated into a national employment and economic strategy;
- the new policy can therefore not solve the school leaver unemployment problem - having over 100,000 students a year with a couple of technical subjects each will not make them more employable, especially when there are no jobs being created;
- self-employment and the rural areas is not the solution to the employment problem (this point is discussed in chapter 7 in more detail);
- technical and vocational education will not solve the internal inefficiencies of the system such as the high failure rate and
the declining quality of education, if anything it will exacerbate these problems as qualified teachers and instructors (who are not available) will be needed, so will new syllabi and materials, laboratories and more equipment (none of which are available);

- for the reasons above, technical and vocational education is in fact more expensive and not cheaper, and will therefore not necessarily cut costs;

- technical and vocational streaming in the absence of a change in employment structure and an overall change in the education system leading to a new integrated curriculum leads to first and second grade education, technical and vocational being the second grade education for 'less able' students;

- in this context technical and vocational education reinforces social inequality, and is akin to the British 11 Plus system which was rejected on these grounds.

In sum, the rationale for the change in policy is contradictory, and the desired outcome of the new policy is not clear. There has not been careful consideration of the theoretical assumptions of the policy, the implications of the policy and how it will be effected in practice from a theoretical and practical point of view. The approach proposed is the same as that adopted in other African countries since the 1950s when education as planned at independence did 'not produce the goods'. There has been a proliferation of literature since the 1950s on the problems of 'vocationalising' education. (18) Zimbabwe could reduce
costs, reduce internal inefficiencies, and ensure students have the educational background to meet skill needs without introducing technical and vocational streaming, i.e. through general (even polytechnical) education at secondary level. The problem with the new policy is that it may well be more costly, exacerbate existing problems, and facilitate inequality.

3. EDUCATIONAL EXPANSION AND THE PROBLEMS

a. EXPANSION OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM.

At independence government identified two priorities with regard to educational expansion:

- Rehabilitation of war-damaged facilities, mainly rural primary schools. Community involvement was important in this process. Where schools had been totally destroyed, classes were conducted in the open air. (19) Nearly one third of the primary and secondary schools in the rural areas were seriously damaged, and a considerable number of pupils and teachers were displaced in the years prior to independence. (20)

- Increased enrolment at all levels, especially at secondary school level, in order to redress the imbalance and inequality of the old system. (21) In September 1980 government made primary schooling free, but not compulsory. In practice, no child can be denied a place in primary school. Secondary enrolment was increased dramatically with all students who could get a place having the right to write 'O' levels. There were not
enough facilities to provide secondary education for all primary school graduates. In principle, after independence government committed itself to providing 4 years secondary education for all primary school graduates. In the new policy proposals discussed above, this has been revised with government being committed in principle to providing two years post primary education.

As a result of the implementation of these two objectives enrolment and facilities at primary and secondary level did increase dramatically. Table 5.2 shows the increase in primary enrolment, schools and teachers. Between 1979 and 1983 the number of children in Grade 1 increased by 117%. This was the result of the introduction of free primary education, and the fact that many children were delayed in starting school because of the war. The number of children entering grade 1 for some years after independence was therefore much larger than the number of children of 5 years old who had reached school going age. (22)

To cope with increased enrolments the number of schools increased significantly (see Table 5.2). While government did contribute to this expansion, most of the expansion has been through private sources - local communities, missions and other religious bodies, private trusts, farmers and companies (see Table 5.3). This is interesting in the light of the pressure within and out of government to do away with private schools which are perceived as symbols of inequality. Financially it is not feasible for government to take over all private schools.
Table 5.2
EXPANSION AT PRIMARY LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary Education</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no. of schools</td>
<td>2,401</td>
<td>3,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enrolment</td>
<td>819,128</td>
<td>2,044,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no. of teachers</td>
<td>18,483</td>
<td>50,937</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.3
NUMBER OF SCHOOLS BY RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY IN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>primary</th>
<th>secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>government</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIMFEP*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>district council</td>
<td>2,947</td>
<td>749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural council</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incl. farm schools)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mission</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mine</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other (incl. provincial auth.)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

schools in urban areas | 326 | 147 |
schools in rural areas | 3,908 | 1,068 |

TOTAL | 4,234 | 1,215 |

* ZIMFEP - Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production

Note: Government and ZIMFEP schools are directly controlled and funded by government. Schools run by councils, missions, mines and other private bodies receive grants from central government in the form of teachers salaries and tuition only. Grants to private schools take up 40% - 50% of the recurrent education budget. (23) Private schools administer the schools themselves, including employment of teachers, but follow the national curriculum.
The large enrolment figures at primary level led to an acute shortage of trained teachers, as table 5.4 reveals. To cope with shortages it was necessary to rely on student teachers from the ZINTEC programme (Zimbabwe Integrated Teacher Education Course), teacher trainees from the conventional colleges and untrained teachers. In 1985 untrained teachers made up over 50% of the total (see Table 5.4). The ZINTEC programme was a four year programme with 16 week residential course at the beginning and end of the programme. In between this time students had an on-the-job training period accompanied by distance education. From 1984 this programme was restructured into a conventional programme with years 1 and 3 being full-time and 2 and 4 being in-service. Table 5.1 showed the increase in intake at teacher training colleges which is still far below the requirements of the education system.

Table 5.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS 1979 - 1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZINTEC trainees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>untrained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentage increase in the enrolment at secondary schools has been much greater than that at primary schools, even though secondary education is not free. As Table 5.5 below shows secondary enrolment increased 700% between 1979 and 1985. This necessitated a significant increase in school buildings from 177 in 1979 to 1,215 in 1985 (see Table 5.5). Similar to the primary schools, the large majority of this expansion has not come directly from government sources (see Table 5.3). Government secondary schools increased from 70 in 1979 to 178 in 1984. Whereas private secondary schools increased from 107 in 1979 to 951 in 1984. (24) Large enrolments have led to double sessioning in the high density suburbs at B schools. (25) The previously white or A schools do not have double sessioning. They therefore provide a higher standard of education with more facilities. Soon after independence bussing was introduced bringing students from high density areas to A schools, thereby making fuller use of these facilities.

Table 5.5

EXPANSION AT SECONDARY LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no. of schools</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>1,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enrolment</td>
<td>66,215</td>
<td>316,438</td>
<td>497,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no. of teachers</td>
<td>3,534</td>
<td>11,191</td>
<td>17,315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The shortage of graduate trained teachers at secondary level to cope with this expansion has been more serious than at primary level. Table 5.5 shows the increase in the number of secondary school teachers from 3534 in 1979 to 17,315 in 1985. Table 5.6 below shows that in 1984 only 13% of the total were graduate trained secondary school teachers. Those with no training accounted for 31% of the total. Pre-independence the majority of teachers were trained, as teaching was one of the few professions open to blacks. A shortage of trained teachers at primary and especially secondary level has serious implications for the quality of education. Government identifies the inappropriateness of the curriculum as one of the primary causes of the high 'O' level failure rate and therefore one of the reasons for the need to 'vocationalise' curriculum. A lack of qualified teachers at 'O' level must be the primary cause of internal inefficiency - ie. a high failure rate. The shortage in secondary school teachers has led to expatriate teachers being recruited to fill the gaps in all subjects, but in particular mathematics and the sciences.

There has also been an expansion in non-formal education through distance education and adult education in the form of evening class study groups. Classes are held mainly in government schools. Student fees go towards the payment of teachers salaries. Students receive no direct assistance from government but benefit indirectly through the free use of government facilities. (26) In particular, there has been an expansion in the number of distance colleges offering 'O' levels, in order to cope with school leavers who have not passed and the shortages of colleges at post-secondary level.
Table 5.6

SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS BY QUALIFICATION 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>type of qualification</th>
<th>no.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>graduate sec. trained</td>
<td>1,909</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>graduate untrained</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-graduate sec. trained</td>
<td>2,872</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary trained</td>
<td>2,821</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary trainees</td>
<td>1,451</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>untrained</td>
<td>4,598</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14,719</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


b. PROBLEMS AND CONSTRAINTS OF EDUCATIONAL EXPANSION.

Zimbabwe's expansion in the schooling system has been commendable. It has however faced a number of problems and constraints some of which are easier solved than others. The major problem areas which will be examined below are: financing education, quality and quantity of education, the mismatch between education and employment, education and inequality, language and curriculum.

i. Financing Education.

As was mentioned above, since 1981-82 education has taken the largest vote allocation in government expenditure. In 1979-80 the budget
allocation for education was $121.6 million or 12.4% of total government votes. In 1984 - 85 the education budget totalled $522 million or 19.7% of government expenditure. About two thirds of the Education Vote goes to salaries and wages as the government is responsible for paying teachers salaries in all registered schools. Employment in the education sector, the largest proportion of which are teachers, increased from 33,800 in 1979 to about 84,400 in 1984. (27)

The rate of expansion of education and the size of the education budget, has begun to raise serious problems for government in the context of increasing unemployment, little productive investment and a generally negative economic growth rate. As the Education budget has gone up, so the growth rate of the Zimbabwean economy has declined. It is evident that government does seriously need to re-locate resources for productive investment in order to generate economic growth and therefore employment. Government faces a dilemma with regard to cutting their educational budget as they are committed to redressing the inequalities in education and to developing human resources. Local pressure, and international pressure in the form of the World Bank, is pushing government to make adjustments to the education system in order to lower educational expenditure.

As early as 1983, the Minister of Finance, when presenting the budget to Parliament, warned that the strain on national resources has reached a limit and increasingly responsibility for educational expansion should devolve on citizens through local authorities and community based organisations. (28) As was pointed out earlier, parents and local
communities have put labour and funds into the establishment and running of schools, particularly in the rural areas. Where there are wealthier communities, this does mean that they provide better facilities for their children, for example the previously white private schools.

This problem has bedevilled all other African countries. Should some of the money spent on education not rather be used to further economic growth and therefore generate employment for the hundreds of thousands of unemployed, including for those products of the educational system who find themselves in the army of the unemployed. The World Bank, in its latest attempt to grapple with this problem recommended that there should be 'more efficient' use of finance for education. They recommended that priority be given to primary schooling, as it has the largest 'social returns' and is therefore the most economical investment. This view has met with a great deal of criticism as developing countries hold that they need to develop their own human resources at all levels and cannot therefore take money from the university and put it into primary schooling.

Government has not openly accepted the World Bank approach, but as was discussed above is in the process of redefining its policy position in the light of financial constraints. In practice government is following World Bank assumptions, which emphasise the provision of primary schooling and also advocate expenditure on vocational and technical training as productive investment because of the 'social returns'. In the new policy post primary education opportunities will depend on a selection procedure based on merit, with only 40% of
secondary school pupils having access to an academic secondary education. 'A' levels are already limited to just under 6 000 of the 15000 children who gain top marks. (31)

Lack of finance has lead to shortages of all kinds - teachers, text books, stationary, buildings and facilities. In this situation again, the children of wealthier parents benefit as they ensure that the needs of their children are met. Shortages affect educational standards. Children cannot do as well without textbooks, with untrained teachers and a high teacher turnover, without laboratory and other facilities. This leads to the next problem facing government - quality vs quantity in educational expansion.

ii. Quality and Quantity in Educational Expansion.

In principle government has wanted to expand the educational system and provide for all that which white children had access to - the chance to write 'O' levels. They wanted all black children to have access to the standard of education which previously only very few blacks managed to attain, but which all white children were assured of. Educational and government officials have therefore always stipulated that while the education system must be expanded to provide for all, standards must be maintained. (32) Policy soon after independence was to provide a common curriculum to 'O' level for all pupils "regardless of ability or location, responding to a social demand which is consistent with the governments socialist ideology."(33) This was seen as a necessary
step in order to do away with the stigma of the old F1 and F2 system discussed in the previous chapter.(34)

The first non-selective intake wrote 'O' levels in 1984 with a national pass rate of 20.6%. (35) Table 5.7 shows the decline from a 66.6% pass rate in 1980 to 20.6% in 1984. The pass rate for 1985 was lower at 19%. Table 5.7 shows that there has been a dramatic rise in the number of students getting their 'O' levels even with a pass rate of 20%, ie: 15 159 in 1984.

Table 5.7
PUPILS ACHIEVING PASSES IN FIVE OR MORE SUBJECTS AT 'O' LEVEL 1980 - 84

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>no. candidates</th>
<th>% 5 or more passes</th>
<th>total no. passed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>6 012</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>4 008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>10 396</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>5 932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>13 733</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>8 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>21 733</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>11 872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>73 724</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>15 159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: B J Dorsey, 1986, Table VII.

Table 5.8 shows that it was the private schools that received the best pass rates, followed by the mission schools and the Group A schools. These schools have more experience in putting students through the 'O' Level examinations, have much better facilities, a supply of textbooks and more qualified staff than the Group B schools and the rural schools. In the private schools for example 99% of secondary school teachers are
trained, in the Group A schools 86%, whereas in the Group B and rural schools only 44% of teachers are trained. (36)

Ncube and Neilson found that even in established and better resourced schools, where enrolments increased rapidly and the number of qualified teachers declined, the result was a declining pass rate in 'O' level examinations. They found that many of the District Council and Rural Government schools had neither the experience nor the resources which the 'O' Level examination required. The pass percentage in these schools ranged from 1% to 27%. Another problem they found was that teacher trainees were being put into these schools where there was already an inexperienced staff, and that they were placed in positions for which they had not received adequate training or experience. The trainee teachers therefore experienced inadequate supervision at the school to which they had been assigned from their teacher training college. (37)

Table 5.8

COMPARISON OF PUPILS WITH FIVE 'O' LEVEL PASSES BY TYPE OF SCHOOL 1982 - 84.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>type of school</th>
<th>1982 no.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1984 no.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>group A (urban)</td>
<td>1 065</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1 783</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>group B (urban)</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2 482</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>district council</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 120</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mission</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1 995</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural govt.</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quality of teaching, school facilities and resources are therefore three of the important reasons for the decline in the pass rate, and hence the internal efficiency of the education system. Another reason is the automatic promotion of secondary school students up the grades. For all these reasons and others, students reach their 'O' level examinations unprepared for the task facing them. To a certain degree a 'decline in standards' must be expected where there is such a dramatic expansion in the schooling system. The issue is whether this decline is permanent or whether with conscious effort to improve on all levels the government can overcome the situation. The changes in policy discussed above will not necessarily solve these problems. They need to be tackled directly through careful planning.

The 20% 'O' level pass rate is one of the main issues forcing government to reconsider their present education policy of an open access to 'O' level secondary schooling. According to the Prime Minister:

"Government's quantitative approach to education has now succeeded in making it possible for all children to have a primary and secondary education. Emphasis now remains to be placed on the quality of education provided and this does not just mean improving the quality of teaching and raising passes. It must also mean that the content of the system must be made to relate to the socio-economic environment of Zimbabwe." (38) (By this the PM means the change to vocational and technical streaming).

The Minister of Education explained what the change in content would mean:

"In addition to providing the necessary productive manpower, vocational and technical training would provide an alternative curriculum for those with an aptitude for such areas of education."(39)
One of the justifications for the proposed change in education policy is therefore that certain pupils have an academic aptitude and others do not. In taking this approach government is blaming the high percentage of 'O' level failures on the students themselves, ie: they are not capable of or do not have the aptitude for O levels.

In Chapter 2 reference was made to the literature on vocational and technical streaming. The conclusions there were that streaming on grounds of academic or non-academic aptitude reinforces existing inequalities in the society and the non-academic streams are generally perceived by parents and pupils as providing a second class education. The socialist view was that for a socialist society the most equitable and practically oriented education was a general science-based education for all, ie: that all children are educable to a certain level. While it would not be fair to prejudge the outcome of the government's efforts to improve the education system there is the danger that a vocational and technical education for some would not solve problems of quality, but only create more and would be perceived as the option for those who are not as bright - which would mean those in the townships and rural areas - those who have not had the chance of being equipped for an 'academic' education primarily because of socio-economic background. While government denies it, the new policy proposals are similar in many respects to the old F1 and F2 schools which were streamed according to vocational and academic orientation.
The mismatch between education and employment is identified as one of the main problems affecting developing countries in the 1980's. The perception of this approach is that education does not prepare children for employment of any kind. The Zimbabwe Government has given this mismatch as one of the main reasons for the need to change the system in Zimbabwe from 'the British to a Zimbabwean system of education'. In fact it would appear that there is a return to the old 11 Plus British system. In the view of the Minister of Education:

"The present system had little bearing on the training and manpower needs of Zimbabwe. The system must change because we cannot continue churning out misfits into our society at so great a cost to the nation. Our curriculum still needs a complete overhaul to give it a thorough going polytechnical bias." (40)

The basis for the concern over mismatch between education and employment is the high rates of unemployment in developing countries - particularly amongst school leavers. In Zimbabwe the problem of unemployment amongst school leavers is not new as was shown in the previous chapter. With the expansion of the education system since independence, the educational level of the unemployed has risen. As the Deputy Minister of Education said:

"What we have is a gradual shifting of the qualifications. Whereas in the past unemployment affected mostly primary school drop-outs; now it is affecting successively the primary school graduate, the secondary school graduate and even university graduates." (41)
Table 5.9

SECONDARY SCHOOL LEAVERS 1983 - 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>School Leavers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>29,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>77,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>98,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>97,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>145,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>156,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>184,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>272,777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Ministry of Manpower Planning, Annual Review of Manpower, 1984, p58.

Table 5.9 shows secondary school leavers from 1983 - 1990. It is estimated that between 1986 and 1990 the number who will leave school each year will increase to over 200,000. In contrast it is estimated that the economy can only create 7,000 formal sector jobs a year and most of these job opportunities are limited to those with job related training and experience. (42) The annual intake of students for tertiary education and training during the period 1983 to 1985 when 100,000 pupils left school annually was 16,835, 15,986 and 17,673 for 1983, 1984 and 1985 respectively. (43) In 1985 therefore under 20% of the total number of school leavers were absorbed by the various educational institutions. The issue of school leaver unemployment has now become of serious concern to government. The new policy proposals to restructure the education system are one of the main solutions being put forward by government to solve this problem. (See also chapter 7 for government approach to unemployment.)
The common misconception in parts of independent Africa and in Zimbabwe is that to make education more 'relevant' will ease the unemployment problem. Making education more 'relevant' means orienting education to rural employment and self-employment in the urban areas. The assumption is that if students are taught agriculture, bricklaying and other vocational skills at primary and post-primary level they will then be in a position to utilise those skills to their own benefit in the rural or urban areas. Insofar as the majority of the population lives in the rural areas, the conception is that there is a need to have a more rural-oriented education, rather than an academic education giving students aspirations for modern sector jobs they will never be able to get.

At independence there was clearly a need to develop the appropriate human resources for development and to restructure the education system so that it met the needs of the majority of the population and the skill needs of the economy. To pre-empt the outcome of new ideas by government on education and training would be presumptuous. However attempts at giving 'appropriate' skills and rural-oriented education in Zimbabwe go back to the days of the colonial government in the 1920's and the F2 schools during UDI. Although government has put its new ideas very carefully to the electorate here is the possibility that the ideas could meet with some resistance. In the view of parents, education should get their children out of poverty, out of a piecemeal existence. Announcing the new policy and attempting to win support for it the Prime Minister stated:

"Our view is that the student who emerges from the secondary school with some level of practical skills is in a far better position to
be servicable to the community and the nation, as well as to himself, than one with purely academic subjects ..... In the majority of cases, where self reliance was called for, the practical student would fare better than the 'academic' one .... In the sphere of community development, youth development programmes and co-operatives, where collective projects and enterprises required technical or vocational skills, products of the new educational system would fit in well."(44)

It is clear from the above statement that a reorientation of the education system at this stage is not geared to a general science oriented education for the population as a whole which is part of a process of rural and urban industrialisation. The new education system would not be providing appropriate skills for new jobs created by an industrialisation strategy. This not being the case, the new policy proposals may result in a second rate technical and vocational education for over 60% of secondary students with the burden of school leaver unemployment being shifted from government to the student.

Previous experience in Africa has shown that industry prefers the 'academic' secondary school student as they have a firmer educational base and are therefore more trainable and more adaptable. (45) Foster found that:

"One of the striking features of post-colonial economies is the domination by government agencies of well-paid and high-status employment opportunities. Such institutions... stress the possession of a formal academic education....." (46)

To do away with aspirations for an education which will get one's child a high status well-paid job it would be necessary to change the structure of occupational opportunities. This has been done in socialist societies, but not in African countries which have introduced
vocational and academic streaming. In Zimbabwe the occupational structure has not changed since independence. The jobs with status and high pay demand an academic education. In those circumstances it is highly likely that the vocational and technical streams will be for the less able and the less advantaged who are not destined to occupy one of the better paid jobs in the society. This system of education is likely therefore to facilitate and reinforce the social inequalities of Zimbabwean society.

Another justification for the system is that school-leavers will be better equipped for the rural areas and for self-employment. (See also chapter 7). The assumption is that if the curriculum is changed, students vocational aspirations will change and they will be happy to eke out a living in the communal lands. Foster found that results were contrary to expectations:

"This has been a favourite theme for well nigh a century... The solution to unrealistic expectations for clerical work and better pay, for the drift to the urban areas and for the disdain for manual work and work in the communal areas, for urban unemployment - is seen in changing the curriculum to provide instruction based upon agriculture and technical subjects, that the aspirations of young people will in consequence, be directed towards agricultural activities; the flight from the land will be checked and the volume of 'frictional' unemployment will correspondingly diminish... This reasoning is largely fallacious. It has already been pointed out by others that the idea that children's vocational aspirations can be altered by massive changes in curriculum is no more than a piece of folklore with little empirical justification."(47)

The most important point in all the discussion of mismatch between employment and education is that changing the education system - in whatever way - will not alleviate unemployment. The Ministry of Education and the Task Force on New Education Policy have not provided evidence as to how in concrete terms 'vocationalising' curriculum will ensure more school leavers employment. They have only speculated that a change in policy might facilitate rural and self-employment, when all evidence points to the contrary.
Rationale for the change in policy states that "the new system will provide the productive manpower we need." (48) No evidence is provided of where the shortages of 'productive manpower' are. On the contrary, at semi-skilled and unskilled levels, which is what secondary school students with a few vocational skills are, there is a surplus running into hundreds of thousands. There are shortages of skilled, technical and professional personnel. Changing the education system will not necessarily create appropriate skills and fill these gaps. Appropriate skills are acquired through careful and detailed planning, especially in developing countries where the needs are so glaring. This planning is especially important at tertiary level - when the school student is moulded for employment. 13 to 16 year olds with a few vocational skills cannot be considered trained personnel for any sector of the economy.

Foster concluded some twenty years ago when writing on Ghana and Nigeria:
"No amount of formal technical, vocational or agricultural instruction alone is going to check the movement from the rural areas, reduce the volume of unemployment or indeed necessarily have any effect on the rate of economic development." (49).

There appears to be no evidence that Zimbabwe has taken cognisance of the experiences of the rest of Africa with vocational and technical training as a strategy to solve the 'mismatch' between education and employment.

iv. Education and Inequality.

Education in the post-independence period is generally perceived by government and people alike as the 'great equaliser' - the means through which the inequalities of the colonial period can be challenged. (50) When the new government is unable to bring about any real changes elsewhere in the socio-economic structure of the new society - expansion of education can provide some legitimacy for the new government and show that it is committed to democratising the new society. In
Zimbabwe the situation has not been different. Education is perceived as a way of redressing the imbalances and inequalities of the previous regime. And to a certain extent it has. All children in Zimbabwe have the right to a primary school education. Racism in education at all levels has been eradicated, insofar as there is no legal mechanism preventing a child having access to education at any level. (In practice through the private school system whites do still have privileged access to education.) This is a very commendable achievement for the government so soon after independence. As was pointed out in Chapter 2 however, education cannot be seen in isolation from the society of which it is an integral part. In a capitalist society, the education system can reinforce the inequalities of the wider society.

In Zimbabwe because of the socio-economic structure that was inherited, there is every possibility for the education system to create and reinforce social inequality. Those who receive a better education, who are not in the township or government rural schools, have a better chance of getting 'O' levels which will give them access to higher academic and technical training. Those with more education are able to get prestigious jobs in the modern sector of the economy. In the absence of an incomes policy which narrows income gaps - more education insures higher incomes for those who reach the 'top'.

So while education has acted for democratisation and self-actualisation of a new generation of Zimbabweans, it is also facilitating the development of new inequalities in the society. This need not always be the case. The quality of education in all schools can improve and
other socio-economic changes could ensure that education does play a
dynamic and positive role in the new society. However, unless
deliberate attempts are made to the contrary, the new policies being
implemented by government could reinforce the inequalities created by
the old education system.

v. Language and Curriculum

Policy on the medium of instruction is that for the first three years of
primary school pupils are taught in their vernacular, and thenceforth
English. At primary level the problem is that teachers resist this
policy starting pupils in English as they arrive at school, with
resultant problems in teaching pupils to read. At secondary school
level, while materials take cogniscance of the fact that second language
students are learning in English as a first language, 'O' level
materials and examinations demand the abilities of a first language
speaker. Mother-tongue is taught formally at primary and secondary
level, and receives as much language learning time as English language
lessons. (51)

Curriculum development has been given a great deal of attention since
independence with 4 objectives in mind:
- to make curriculum relevant to Zimbabwe's development;
- to ensure that curriculum supports the stated socialist
  ideology;
to ensure that curriculum of free of racist and sexist ideology;
- to facilitate the localisation of the examination system. (52)

The Curriculum Development Unit (CDU) set up soon after independence under the Ministry of Education, has three departments: humanities, technical and science, and the new vocational and technical department. In order to meet the 4 objectives mentioned above and to change the ideological thrust of the education system from a racist colonial system to a socialist system in an African context, the CDU set out - to change syllabi at primary and secondary levels, to produce new materials, give in-service training to teachers so that they could cope with the changes, and localise the examination system. It is necessary to examine briefly each of these areas in turn in order to assess the problems of trying to re-orientate the education system.

a. **New syllabi.** In producing new syllabi, the CDU tackled two issues: methodology of teaching and content of syllabi.

- **Methodology.** An attempt has been made to introduce democratic teaching methods and to move away from a rote learning and teacher-oriented approach. Attempts have been made to introduce a child-oriented, problem solving approach for all subjects. The most success has been achieved in the ZIMSCI Programme - an integrated science programme for secondary schools produced by the CDU. One of the main problems with attempting to introduce new teaching methods has been resistance, ignorance and conservatism on the part of teachers. In addition a democratic approach requires more creativity on the part of teachers, self-confidence, and a detailed
knowledge of the subject. With a significant proportion of the teachers being untrained, these qualities are lacking in the teaching staff. So while in principle the objective of the Ministry is to introduce new and better methods of teaching, there are problems in getting this approach to filter down to the teacher in the classroom. (53)

- **Content.** In all subjects the content of syllabi have been changed - in history, social studies, geography, art, science, environmental studies etc.. In line with the objectives mentioned above, the attempt has been to make content more relevant to Zimbabwe, more oriented to agriculture and rural development, and to ensure that the ideological aims of government are reflected in all subjects. From 1988 political economy is being introduced at all levels of secondary school. Once a year specialists working for the CDU have to fill in an appraisal stating how their work in curriculum development is implementing government policy on socialism. It is considered necessary to glorify manual labour, have a positive orientation to the peasantry, promote the two chimurenga wars, patriotism and the nation's heroes. (54)

b. **New materials.** New materials have been produced for all subjects. During 1984 alone CDU produced 91 booklets. The average print run for primary schools is 100,000 and for secondary schools is 35,000. CDU materials are provided free to schools. In addition to books, kits are produced for art, science, and for some of the vocational and technical
subjects. In addition to CDU materials, publishers produce school materials, but these have to be passed by the CDU and to support syllabus content and methodology. There have been 2 main problems with the new materials produced by the CDU. The first is the administration and distribution of materials. Frequently books and kits simply do not get to the schools to which they have been directed. The second main problem with materials, is quality. The writing, presentation, design are not thoroughly researched, boring and dull. Therefore readability and usability of a fair proportion of the materials has not been up to standard. There has been an additional problem of lack of continuity. Book 1 Term 1 is produced, with no follow up of Books 2 and 3 for Terms 2 and 3. The two successful series have been Physical Education and English. Because the CDU materials are free, they have not had to compete with local publishers to sell their books, and teachers consider the materials not good enough and opt for the materials from the publishing houses merely because they are not free and look better.

c. Teacher training. One of the main obstacles to changing the education system is the quality of the teachers. In the teacher training colleges there is conservatism in methodology and content, so when teachers reach the schools they are not able to cope with new approaches and ideas. In addition a high proportion of teachers are not trained in their subject area or in pedagogy. This affects the quality of their teaching.
d. **Localisation of the examination system.** At 'O' level localisation of the examination system is taking place in stages with the assistance of examiners from Britain. Each year local examiners are trained in the marking of a selection of subjects. The objective is that Zimbabwe should set and mark its own examinations, removing dependence on the British system, and providing more flexibility for syllabi. (55)

In conclusion, the CDU has faced objective and subjective constraints in its attempts to develop a curriculum for a new Zimbabwean society. Objective constraints have been the sheer size of increased enrolment, and the necessity to produce low cost materials as most schools have little funds. To a fair degree they managed to overcome the latter. Other objective constraints which are not so easily overcome are the nature of curriculum in practice, and the structure of the education system (discussed in detail in previous sections). It is the constraints on the subjective or qualitative level which have been more difficult to overcome. One of the main problems in this respect is the quality and ideological orientation of teachers. Another is the fact that socialism is attempting to be introduced in schools, albeit in a rather simplistic way, in the context of a society where socialism has not really taken root. It would not be possible to conclude yet that Zimbabwe has a socialist-orientated education system, despite attempts in this direction.
4. VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL TRAINING

While primary and secondary schooling is indirectly a vehicle for black advancement, technical training and the training of middle and high level personnel through the polytechnics and University of Zimbabwe is directly involved developing the middle and high level personnel to occupy positions in the labour market previously dominated by whites. In addition such education and training can play a role in developing skills appropriate for new economic and development needs after independence.

a. POLICY ON VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL TRAINING

The Manpower Planning and Development Act of 1984 gave government control of the expansion of vocational, technical training and research institutions, imposed a levy for employers to assist in the financing of technical training, provided for the research and planning of manpower resources, established the National Manpower Advisory Council (composed of government, employer and employee institutions) and repealed the Vocational and Technical Training Act of 1978. (56)

In essence the Act gave government a much greater degree of control over all aspects of the development of technical and vocational training. This was necessary in order to overcome the skill shortages which were experienced after independence as a result of emigration, the racist
nature of technical training under the previous regime and the fact that technical training was to a fair degree left to employers and therefore depended on the economic climate and the racial prejudices of employers. Government wanted to overcome the racial character of technical training and to ensure that there was sufficient supply of skilled, especially technical personnel for economic development.

Under the new legislation, while vocational and technical training is the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, training is carried out by government, parastatals, private companies and colleges. There has been a significant expansion in training by all of these institutions since independence. With the 1984 Act however, some private companies have tended to hand technical training responsibilities over to government.

b. APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING

Under the new legislation apprenticeship training is the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare. Before independence the route to most technical jobs was through an apprenticeship - and these were generally reserved for whites. The seven designated trades were dominated by whites, as the previous chapter showed. Most apprenticeship recruitment was done by employers, and in this way they controlled the apprenticeship system. In 1986 government centralised recruitment so that the Ministry of Manpower became totally responsible for the recruitment and testing of
apprentices. By this time apprenticeship had been Africanised. In general the private sector has been unhappy with this system. They found that the process takes too long and they do not get the calibre of apprentice that they would like.

Soon after independence the apprenticeship training period was cut from 5 years to 4 in order to speed up the number of journeymen who qualified each year. Government introduced bonding in 1982 as soon after independence Zimbabwe lost many technicians, journeymen and artisans through emigration. This group, i.e. skilled workers, were the most threatened by black advancement and therefore had the highest emigration rate out of all occupational groups (see Chapter 7). Government felt that white apprentices were using Zimbabwe as a training ground, and then leaving the country to practice their skills elsewhere. The bonding system was successful in retaining skills inside the country and helping to correct the racial balance of apprenticeship intake. Even private companies did not want to train whites who were going to leave the country. Following the announcement of the bonding system some white apprentices did resign in protest, (800 between 1982 and 1984). (57) A proportion of them later rejoined and signed contracts with government.

Table 5.10 shows the number of apprentices indentured by race. From 1985 indentured apprentices have not been classified according to race. The total number of apprentices indentured dropped from 2044 in 1981 to 999 in 1984, picking up to 1802 in 1985. (58) The downturn coincided with the downturn in the economy and the introduction of the bonding
system. Table 5.10 also shows that the racial imbalance which existed before independence has changed significantly. In 1981 blacks were 38.2% of those indentured and in 1984 they 81.9% of apprentices indentured.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>industry</th>
<th>1981 white</th>
<th>1981 black</th>
<th>1984 white</th>
<th>1984 black</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aircraft</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>automotive</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>building</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electrical</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mechanical</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>printing</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hairdressing</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL no.</td>
<td>1171</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Blacks includes Coloureds and Asians.

The annual intake of apprentices fluctuates between 1 000 and 2 000. This figure is very small when it is compared to the total of over 1 million employees in the formal sector. In terms of black advancement, a lot of attention was focussed on a very small proportion of the workforce. In 1986 110 000 young people applied for apprenticeships, and only 1 000 were taken on. (59) The processing of such a large number of applications has led to inevitable inefficiencies. Over 50% of the new apprentices were taken on by just
6 government establishments - ZISCO, ZESA, NRZ, Harare, City Council, the Army, and the Registrar of Apprentices itself. (60) The private sector for economic reasons and because they are not happy with government centralised reecruitment are taking on very few new recruits. Neither is the private sector satisfied with the quality of technical training in colleges which has declined due to a shortage of lecturers, space and equipment. Despite the low numbers of apprentices being indentured, government has expanded technical training in order to ensure the development of skilled personnel ( despite high unemployment levels).

c. EXPANSION OF VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL TRAINING

Prior to independence technical training was available at two main colleges - Salisbury Polytechnic and Bulawayo Technical College. Since independence five more technical colleges have been established in Kwekwe, Gweru, Mutare, Kushinga Phikelele and Masvingo. Table 5.1 shows that the intake at technical colleges expanded from 3 663 in 1979 to 14 410 in 1985. In 1985 in line with government policy to increase the training of highly qualified scientific and technical personnel, the Harare Polytechnic started a Bachelor of Technology degree. The largest expansion has however been in business and secretarial studies, which with 8 204 makes up over half the total enrolment at technical colleges. (61) The Ministry of Manpower has observed that this enrolment balance is most likely to result in a shortage of scientific
and technical personnel and an overproduction of personnel in the commercial fields. (62)

The most serious problem for the expansion of technical and vocational training has been a shortage of lecturers. There was an increase of full-time teaching staff at technical colleges of about 28% from 242 in 1981 to 333 in 1985. During this period expatriate lecturers increased from 1.2% of the total in 1981 to 23.7% of the total in 1985. (63) One of the reasons given for this shortage is that Zimbabwean lecturers do not find the employment conditions at technical colleges attractive. It does however also indicate a general shortage of technical instructors. In 1987 government raised salaries of technical instructors in an effort to make the job more appealing. However, the problems of a shortage of lecturers and quality of teaching remain.

Agricultural training is carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture and the University of Zimbabwe. The Ministry has six institutions offering diploma and certificate programmes. The University offers both diploma and degree programmes. The enrolment increased at these institutions from 519 in 1980/81 to 1184 in 1984/5. (64) The enrolment expansion of these institutions has been limited by a shortage of facilities and resources. (65)

Health training is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and the University. As part of its policy to improve preventative, curative and rehabilitative services throughout the country, there has been an expansion in the training of health personnel at all levels. From 1982
health training institutions have produced on average 2001 health personnel each year. 60% - 70% of these personnel are nurses, midwives, medical assistants and village health workers. (66) There is no comprehensive data on health training before 1982, and many of the health training institutions closed during the war. (67) The Ministry of Manpower estimates that the country will soon be self-sufficient in skills related to health services at lower levels. There will continue however to be shortages of highly skilled personnel in the medical professions for some time. Only in 1986 did government start training its own physiotherapists and occupational therapists at the University of Zimbabwe. The country does not yet have any facilities for training dentists and nutritionists. (68)

Parastatal organisations such as the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company - ZISCO, the National Railways of Zimbabwe - NRZ, Air Zimbabwe and the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation - PTC, take on personnel as their employees and then train them to their own skill requirements. NRZ, PTC, CMED and ZISCO have the highest number of trainees. Between 1981 and 1985 overall figures for new recruits for the parastatals have not changed significantly. Approximately 2,800 new recruits have been taken on each year since 1981. (69) The composition of trainees according to race is specified in table 5.11 below. Parastatals are hesitant to give figures on racial breakdown on employees and trainees, hence the number of 'unspecified' according to racial group. The reason for this is that whites and expatriates do still occupy a proportion of skilled technical posts due to skill shortages. In
addition some of the parastatals claim it is against government's policy of non-racialism to keep records according to race. (70) Government soon after independence overestimated the supply of skilled technical personnel in the country and how long it took to produce personnel in this occupational category of the required calibre. (71) The training programmes of the larger parastatals are an attempt to overcome these shortages. It is possible to conclude however, that there has been a decline in the number of white trainees. (72)

Table 5.11

PERCENTAGE TRAINEE ENROLMENTS IN PARASTATALS ACCORDING TO RACE 1981 - 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>race</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whites</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians/Coloureds</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


d. TECHNICAL TRAINING FOR SEMI-SKILLED WORKERS AND FOR YOUTH

In 1982 government initiated Vocational Training Centres (VTC's) in order to upgrade and provide certification for workers who were formally denied access to apprenticeship training but who acquired skills on the job. The two VTC's, Msasa in Harare and Westgate in Bulawayo, fall
under the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare. Since 1982 approximately 2,500 workers a year have been upgraded and passed trade tests in the seven recognised trades. (73) This number is all government can cope with annually. Government reclassified all semi-skilled workers into skilled categories 1-4. Grade 1 is equivalent to an apprentice who has completed a full term of training. Government is administratively unable to cope with the number of requests for trade testing from industry, leading to complaints by the private sector. (74)

Government has taken the initiative for upgrading and trade testing away from private companies and given itself sole responsibility for this procedure. At a VTC the worker can either go through a training programme of up to 4 years, and not simply learn industry-based skills; or the worker can be upgraded and trade tested if the worker already has a fair amount of on-the-job training and experience. Since 1982 therefore, there are increased options provided by government for in-service and pre-employment training at semi-skilled as well as skilled levels. In terms of the total labour force, the numbers receiving access to such training are small.

Youth Training Centres have been established by the Ministry of Youth, Sport and Culture to cope with school leaver unemployment and the shortage of places in educational and training institutions for school leavers. The training at these institutions is vocational:
- to equip youth with skills that would enable them to participate effectively in the development of the country;
- to orientate and encourage youth along socialist lines;
- to improve their skill and efficiency as producers;
- to prepare them for production on their own and in the formal sector;
- to inculcate initiative and reliability. (75)

These Centres are for youth, not workers already in employment. There are 13 such centres with a total of over 2,000 youth. (76) There was a decline in enrolment in 1983/4 due to the drought and apathy with the centres. (77) Enrolment picked up when government started trade testing graduates of these centres in 1985. In the same year the economy also picked up, partly due to good rains. In 1985, 314 graduates were trade tested in building, carpentry and joinery, motor mechanics, fitting and turning and welding. According to the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare most of the graduates of Youth Training Centres are absorbed into the co-operative farming sector and various other self-employment programmes. (78)

Approximately 43 Private Colleges also cater for school leavers providing mostly 'O' and 'A' level courses and commercial studies. In 1985, 5,225 students were enrolled in these colleges. (79)

Expansion of technical and vocational training has been fundamental in facilitating black advancement of personnel at skilled and technical
levels. As is discussed in Chapter 7 however, the nature of the training has not changed fundamentally and there has been no restructuring of the labour process. It is not possible to conclude that there have been changes concomitant with changing the nature of the social relations of the society.

5. THE UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE

In 1981 when the Vice Chancellor of the University, Professor Walter Kamba, assumed office he stated:

"........there is a need for new orientation - a need for a radical orientation on the part of the university. The dramatic achievement of independence must surely have a dramatic impact on the present and future of the university and its role in the development of the country. It must have its feet down on Zimbabwe ground. It must have a new ethos and it must be rooted in the new reality of Zimbabwe....." (80)

Prof. Kamba developed the point further when he said:

- "the University must be foremost a developmental university which is........ concerned, rhetorically and practically, with the search for solutions to the concrete problems of national development..."
- in its teaching and research and in its public service and provision of manpower the university must play a meaningful and effective role in the development of Zimbabwe;
- in playing this role the university "must be guided by a commitment to excellence and relevance ...;"
- "for the university to pursue its goals of excellence and relevance effectively and efficiently it was necessary to open up the formerly clogged channels of communication with government, the private sector and the community at large...;"
It is necessary to examine the changes that have taken place in the University since independence, and how the University has played its role in development.

a. THE EXPANSION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE

In response to government policy to democratised education at all levels, the expansion of secondary schooling and therefore increased demands on tertiary education, and high level skill requirements of the economy - enrolment at the university has almost trebled since independence. Table 5.12 shows that enrolment went up from 2,240 in 1980 to 6,873 in 1987. The table shows that the increase has been spread across all disciplines. Table 5.13 shows that the proportion of black students has increased from 63.7% in 1980 to 93% in 1987, whilst the proportion of white students enrolling at the University has decreased. White students are concentrated in Medicine and Veterinary Science.

Student numbers in 1987 reached close to 7,000 which is the optimum capacity of the University. Only 2,000 out of 7,000 applications were accepted in 1987 - although all qualified for university entry. (82)
Table 5.12

STUDENT NUMBERS BY FACULTY 1980 - 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>402</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>1121</td>
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<td>871</td>
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<td>126</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medicine</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>science</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social studies</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>1248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>veterinary sc.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26*</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2240</td>
<td>2525</td>
<td>3620</td>
<td>4742</td>
<td>6873</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* - veterinary science started in 1982 with 18 students.

Table 5.13

STUDENTS BY RACIAL CLASSIFICATION 1980 and 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>students</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th></th>
<th>1987</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>no.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>1427</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>6397</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians/Col.</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whites</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2240</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6873</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of expansion in enrolment, problems are already arising with the provision of enough teaching assistants, office space and lecture space. Yet the University is proposing to increase total intake to ten thousand students in the next couple of years. (83) Government appears to have done nothing more that establish a Commission of Inquiry into the establishment of a second university - a process which has already been delayed by three to five years. The University is dealing with increasing numbers by 'crisis management' which has serious implications for the quality of teaching. (84)

The academic programmes that have been introduced since independence have been considered in terms of "quality and relevance to the nation". The Report of the Triennial Review Committee for the Triennium 1985 to 87 emphasised the need for relevance of curriculum:

"The University is an integral part of the larger society. The Committee cannot discuss the new approach to style and content of curricula at the University separate from the requirements of the new social, economic and political order in the country which now determines the direction of development. The principle behind the new approach to style and content of curricula is that the development of Zimbabwe as an African country can be carried out to the satisfaction of the nation only by making sure that the content of the curriculum is relevant to the developmental goals of the nation. Further, it is essential to ensure that both taught courses and research activities are closely related to the needs of the nation and reflect the experiences and interests of the nation."

New departments and programmes developed since independence did reflect these principles. They are the Faculty of Veterinary Science and new departments of Rural and Urban Planning, Rehabilitation, Metallurgy, Nursing Science, Mining Engineering and Surveying. It is interesting
to note that Mining Engineering did not exist before 1980 in an economy where mining is so important. New academic programmes are:

Diplomas in: Rural Development Planning, Teaching English to speakers of other languages, International Relations, War and Strategic Studies.


The new departments and programmes are largely in applied and policy oriented areas, thus making some sources in the University feel that courses have become too practical to the detriment of theoretical development. (85) It does however mean that new curricula have been considered in relation to their relevance to developmental needs. There have also been some changes to existing curricula. For example in Medicine more emphasis is now placed on rural medicine and primary health care than on high technology medicine for a small proportion of the population. All new courses are considered in terms of national needs for human resources(86). Before new courses are passed letters are required from potential employers. The University does however complain of a lack of specific information from the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare on skill shortages and training needs. (87)
While a variety of courses have been introduced not all courses available in 1980 have had changes made to the curriculum. It is largely a matter for each department to decide whether such changes are necessary. In a significant number of departments therefore curricula have remained largely the same. To a fair degree the nature of curriculum change, or the lack of it, has depended on the extent of academic staff turnover in a particular department since 1980. Where there were dramatic staff changes the new academic staff brought in new ideas. For example in the departments of Economics and Law where there were dramatic changes in orientation of curriculum as opposed to Sociology where there has been little change.

Expansion and enrolments and academic programmes has also meant the need for an increase in academic staff. Changes in staffing did not however only require an increase in numbers, there was also a need to increase the number of Zimbabweans on the staff, and in particular the number of black Zimbabweans. In 1981 the University made it policy that a non-Zimbabwean would only be appointed when it had been established that no appointable Zimbabweans were available. At independence out of a total of just over 300 members of the academic staff, only 15% were black Zimbabweans. The rest of the staff were either white Zimbabweans or expatriates. The new recruitment policy drastically changed this situation. In 1987 40.3% of the academic staff were black Zimbabweans. Shortages of academic staff have been particularly acute in the Science based disciplines - Agriculture, Engineering, Medicine and Veterinary Science. In 1987 in Engineering, Medicine and
Veterinary Science - 6.9%, 26.8% and 4.2% respectively of the staff were black Zimbabweans. In contrast, in Social Studies 59.6% of the staff were black Zimbabweans. In 1987, across all disciplines the University faced an academic staff shortage of 26.6%. There is also a serious shortage of technical support staff for Science based disciplines.

In order to cope with shortages the University initiated a Staff Development Programme in 1981 to train Zimbabweans locally and abroad. Graduates trained by the University are bonded for a period twice the length of their sponsorship. The objectives of the Programme were itemised as:

- to rectify the racial and male/female imbalances;
- to train and develop staff for itself;
- to be self reliant and self sufficient in skilled personnel;
- to create a pool of qualified assorted personnel from the potential undergraduates.

In 1984 there were 45 trainees abroad. In 1986 there were 66 and in 1987 there were 54.

There are also scholarships available for Zimbabweans to train abroad. Scholarships and external training programmes are evaluated by an Inter-Ministerial Committee on external training. For a training programme to be accepted it has to cover a critical shortage area in the economy. Generally external scholarships are only made available for specialist and post-graduate training. There have been problems where
training abroad is not appropriate to the needs of the student and the economy when the student returns home. For example, differences in technology, equipment, language problems and problems of employers not accepting qualifications. Most Staff Development Fellows have studied in the US or the UK. Ford Foundation and Rockerfeller Foundation have made money available to the University for Staff Development Fellowships. Training Staff Development Fellows in these countries does reinforce ties which existed in the past and mitigates against any dramatic curriculum changes by the University of Zimbabwe. This is evidenced in the nature of courses taught and course content.

Another problem of the SDF programme is that it mitigates against the development of a national intelligentsia. Through expanding links with largely British and American universities, local intellectuals become oriented outwards instead of consolidating national research and scholarship. This is evidenced by the fact that very few PhDs are produced by the local university. While international links are essential, their overall impact on the nature of the local university needs to be carefully assessed. The brain drain of local intellectuals from Zimbabwe to other countries and international organisations has already begun. This process is a reflection of a university which has not consolidated itself sufficiently nationally. While Zimbabwe did have a fair number of local, and in particular black, intellectuals at the time of independence who could take up posts in the University, this was a 'double-edged sword'. By no means all of them were oriented to changing the role and nature of the university.
b. DEMOCRATISATION AND ZIMBABWEANISATION

Outside of expansion and some re-orientation, the other major change to the University has been the Ordinance 23 and 25 which facilitated 'democratisation of Departmental Governance' and has therefore been a vehicle for black advancement at all levels of the University. The University of Zimbabwe Act 1982 ratified this and other changes which aim to democratise and Zimbabweanise the University: channels with government and the private sector and the society at large were opened through changing the composition of the University Council, and changes were made which ensured the Zimbabweanisation of the staff and the 'democratisation of the decision making apparatus of the University'.

(99)

Changes to achieve the latter were based on the existence of the 'absolute power in the hands of the Professor who was also the Head of department under the old system'. The position was virtually for life and the University professors dominated all decision-making levels of the University from department through to the Senate and the Council. Ordinance 23 and 25, instituted in 1981, separated academic from administrative heads - ie. it separated professorial positions from headships of departments. The headship was no longer an appointment for life and was replaced by the appointment of a chairman for a period of three years. This change effectively changed the racial imbalance on the Senate and blacks became the majority with the white professors still being represented. A cynical response to these changes is that this
process has not really democratized the University at the highest levels as the Council is simply a rubber-stamp for the Vice Chancellor. (100)

The other mechanisms for promoting blacks in the University were the ruling on staff appointments mentioned earlier and Staff Development Fellowships. The non-discrimination clause in the University Act means that the University does not in fact appoint on racial grounds. The University is however stringent on the issue of appointing non-Zimbabweans - black or white. Preference will always be given to 'appointable Zimbabweans' even if they do not have the qualifications or experience of a competing expatriate. (101) This has meant that the University has often appointed second best. One senior source in the University stated: "Hopefully soon the University will start appointing on merit". (102)

The following conclusions can be drawn about the changes in the University since independence:

- Increased numbers at the University have had implications for the quality of university service. According to the Registrar quality of teaching had to decline in the light of these changes. Another senior member of the University said:

"By and large the new lecturers appointed who have been mainly black have been junior in terms of experience and publications. Because of increased numbers there is not enough contact with students, there are not enough books and periodicals because of foreign currency shortages, tutorial groups are too big, students become lazy, there are few cases of brilliance and junior staff become demoralised. Quality is dependent on a face to
face relationship and contact with students has become formal and diminished."

(103) It is difficult to measure a decline in quality of teaching - but with all factors taken into account it is inevitable. It is however for the University to overcome these shortfalls in the long term.

- While the University is having some difficulty with coping with its increasing numbers, it has made a University education available to thousands who before 1980 would have had to leave the country to receive a similar education.

- While detailed planning for skills is lacking at Ministry level, the University is providing high-level skills for all sectors of the economy. Without detailed planning however, graduate misplacement and unemployment will become a problem in the not too distant future.

- The University has become more Zimbabwean insofar as black Zimbabweans are represented at all levels, and there is a stringent control on expatriates. Despite early problems with this process such 'falling standards' due to the appointment of inexperienced staff, it must continue if the University is to develop its own pool of experienced personnel and not become dependent on expatriates as has been the case at other African universities. While this is the case, the University is to a fair degree still oriented outwards to consolidating links with primarily British and American universities.
In terms of its role in development the University has become more sensitive to the problems in the society around it. The extent of University participation in development is however dependant on efforts in the society at large to utilise the University as the University is part of the dynamics of the society in which it operates. Attempts are being made to build links between the private sector and the University for this purpose.

6. CONCLUSION

The expansion of the education system in Zimbabwe after 1980 in order to provide education for all and to provide human resources for development is commendable by any standards. The expansion of the education system at all levels has been quite dramatic. Education for all was an election commitment which government could not back down on. Educational inequality was a glaring indicator under the previous regime of differential access on grounds of colour to most opportunities in life - literacy, education, jobs, incomes, life-style, power and status. Education has been one of the few areas where government has been able to provide the population with the material benefits of independence. In addition, the expansion of education at all levels has dramatically improved the provision of human resources for economic and social development.
The Zimbabwe government has not interpreted the role of education in narrow economic terms alone - as do the proponents of Human Capital Theory. There is however in most statements the assumption that education "will contribute to national economic growth and stability". The assumption that education will be an engine for economic growth is frequently made. Mutumbuka, the Minister of Education, was quoted in the course of this chapter as saying exactly this. Yet it is already evident that education expenditure is rising as economic growth rates decline, that education has not equalised incomes or ensured employment. The reasons for education not providing all that was desired of it are blamed on the education system. The solution is therefore to tinker with the education system and not to look to the more dramatic changes that need to be made in the wider socio-economic structure if education is really going to equalise opportunities and incomes.

In the period immediately after independence education opened up opportunities to many and thereby raised incomes for some. At the same time where an education system is part of a wider society where inequality persists, as in Zimbabwe, education will legitimate an unequal distribution of income (often based on educational achievement). Where the schooling system becomes more unequal - for example in the provision of vocational and academic streaming the education system will only facilitate further inequality and social division based on access to education. Access to tertiary education becomes the ultimate goal as it is perceived as a means to ensure wealth and status.
Expansion of education and training at all levels has been the primary vehicle for black advancement since independence. At school level thousands of Zimbabweans are being given a chance that they did not have before 1980, a chance which will affect the quality of their lives and the opportunities they can benefit from. At the level of vocational and technical training black Zimbabweans are being trained in vocational and technical skills which were largely the preserve of whites under the previous regime. At university level black Zimbabweans are being educated to fill the positions of middle and high level personnel in the economy, positions which blacks were excluded from before 1980.

Because Zimbabwe is still in a state of transition, with policy and practice not being clear, it would be unfair to draw definitive conclusions about the role of education in Zimbabwe since independence and for the future. There are however the indicators to show that while Zimbabwe has democratised education dramatically and education has thereby become a vehicle for black advancement, education in itself is insufficient to overcome the many other aspects of social inequality which the new government inherited from the colonial regime.
CHAPTER 6

BLACK ADVANCEMENT IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS

1. INTRODUCTION

"While capable and qualified black professionals have made rapid progress in the public sector since independence, it should be glaringly obvious to most that few have so far made it to the top in the private sector. In fact, one can virtually count the black chief executives of major corporations on one hand". The Herald 4.10.85.

Chapters 3 and 4 showed how blacks had been kept out of the politics, the economy, and of the settler-colonial society in general. Few blacks moved up the occupational scale in the public or the private sector. The education and training system served as an instrument of the settler-colonial society because whites were given priority in access to secondary, university and technical education, it was whites who dominated middle and high level occupational categories in the public and private sectors. At skilled level, whites dominated trade unions and ensured that their members did not receive competition from black labour, keeping black workers in the unskilled and semi-skilled employment categories. Chapter 5 discussed the approach of the new government to education and training policy. Education and training since 1980 have been the main vehicles for black advancement providing the black population with skills for all levels of the economy and society.
This chapter will examine the policy and practice of black advancement in the public and private sectors since independence. It will show what progress there has been in the public and private sectors, and what factors have hindered or helped black advancement in Zimbabwe after 1980. This chapter will also draw on Chapter 2 which discussed the theoretical issues affecting the nature of black advancement. Chapter 2 discussed three factors which affect how the concept black advancement is interpreted and effected in practice, and it is to a brief discussion of these factors that we shall now turn.

2. THE CONCEPT BLACK ADVANCEMENT IN ZIMBABWE

The Africanisation experience in Zimbabwe, while it has some unique features, is not fundamentally different from other African countries. Zimbabwe has a much larger local or resident white population than most other African states, the country did have a stock of black skilled personnel at the time of independence, and the economy is relatively developed with a highly diversified industrial, commercial and agricultural base. A significant amount of this economic activity is dependent on local (white) entrepreneurial skills and capital, not only expats and foreign capital. The country also experienced a far more protracted and bitter war than most other African states in order to put an end to white minority rule. All these features have influenced the specifics of black advancement in Zimbabwe.
They do not, however, affect the political, technical and ideological factors which have influenced interpretation of the concept and the Africanisation process elsewhere in Africa. Zimbabwe was obviously influenced by the rest of Africa about the political importance of the Africanisation process. President Samora Machel of Mozambique however warned Zimbabwe soon after independence in 1980 to carefully guard its skilled personnel and not to make the same mistakes (some unavoidable) that Mozambique had. Machel was warning Zimbabwe to carefully consider how it dealt in political and technical terms with white skilled personnel. After independence in 1974 Mozambique was left with little to no skilled personnel, and this has affected Mozambique's ability to tackle development problems in the post-independence period.

a. The Political Factor

Black advancement is a concept, process and goal which is the natural and necessary outcome of the liberation struggle against white minority rule. Blacks had been held back in all aspects of social, economic and political life on the basis of colour alone. The fulfillment of nationalist aspirations in all walks of life was therefore necessary for the new Government if it was to establish its legitimacy amongst the majority of the population. The Smith - Muzorewa Government (1979-80) had no legitimacy in part because it did not meet these aspirations.

After independence in 1980, black advancement has been part of the process of meeting these nationalist aspirations through -
Africanisation of the civil service, improving social welfare, particularly access to education and health services, generally removing racial discrimination in the society and thereby opening up all occupational categories to blacks. To a lessor or greater degree, the political factor has influenced the black advancement process, thereby making black advancement an independent variable in human resources development and planning after 1980.

The political necessity for black advancement is evidenced in the fact that it was one of the first issues government acted on after independence. On 2nd May 1980, the Prime Minister issued the Presidential Directive on black advancement. The constitutional basis of the Directive was a clause in the Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe which was a result of the Lancaster House Agreement. Chapter VII (75) (2) states:

"The president may give general directions of policy to the Public Service Commission with the object of achieving a suitable representation of the various elements of the population in the Public Service and the Prison Service". (1)

The Presidential Directive applied specifically to the Public Service Commission which is responsible for recruitment, appointment and promotions in the Public Service. It directed the Public Service Commission to:

* Recruit staff to all grades of the Public Service in such a manner as to bring about a balanced representation of the elements which make up Zimbabwe's population.

* To maintain efficiency and satisfy career ambitions.
To make annual reports on progress. (2)

The policy statement concluded by emphasising that the:

"objective is the early creation of a balanced service fully representative of all elements of the population and with the skills appropriate to the country's needs. For this a greater training effort will be required." (3)

The Presidential Directive is the main piece of legislation there has been directly on black advancement, and it was only legally binding on the Public Service. It was also directed at the parastatals and the private sector, but involved no legal mechanisms for implementation in these areas. The Presidential Directive did nonetheless facilitate black advancement in the society as a whole through its political message on the necessity to redress the racial imbalance in all areas and sectors of the society. (4)

b. The Technical Factor

The technical factor is the issue of providing local skills in the independence period. All newly independent countries have faced this problem, and the necessity to overcome dependence on expatriate skills. In Zimbabwe the technical factor is an important factor in the black advancement process, but the focus has been on local black vs white skills, more than expatriate vs local black skills. From 1980 there was a definite commitment to restrict expatriates and develop local skills, but the proportion of expatriates in 1980 was not that great and has
declined since. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, local whites, because of their mobility, can however be viewed as potential expatriates.

The drive has therefore been to develop and promote local black skills, hence the term black advancement, in the context of the existence of a pool of local white skilled personnel. About 50% of the white population of 1/4 million emigrated around 1980 and this meant the departure of over 50% of skilled personnel. Whites in the total workforce declined from about 90 000 in 1980 to 29 000 in 1985. This gap in skilled personnel opened the way for black advancement at all levels. However, the idea that it is necessary still within this context to consciously develop and promote blacks, began in 1980, and has continued since. At the technical level this view is valid insofar as if there is not a conscious effort to plan for development and promotion of black personnel, local whites and expatriates could continue to dominate skilled occupational levels in the economy at the expense of the development of black skills.

Chapter 2 discussed the dilemma between the political and technical factors in the black advancement process. In the early phases of the black advancement process in Zimbabwe, the political factor did, by necessity, dominate in both the public and private sectors. In the civil service qualifications were taken into account, but there was a conscious effort to promote blacks as such. After 1985, when it was generally accepted that the Presidential Directive had been achieved in the public service, the emphasis shifted to recruitment and promotion on merit. (5)
In the parastatals, at management level, the initial criteria was definitely the political factor in preference to the technical issue of suitably qualified and experienced personnel. Following a Commission of Inquiry into the Parastatals, in 1986/87, this approach was revealed to be extremely problematic, especially where technical and professional qualifications are concerned, and the emphasis shifted to the technical factor to the point of appointing white (Rhodesian) management who had the necessary skills, (for example on the National Railways of Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Corporation).

While there is a real basis to the criticisms made by the Commission of Inquiry into the Parastatals (and these will be taken up later in the Chapter), this shift from the primacy of politics to the primacy of technicism raises some questions. The assumption is that the technocrat is a neutral being and above politics. The problem is who is defining the expertise, who controls management, and to what ends? In Zimbabwe at present the technicist argument is in part the whites fighting back with elements of muted racism and with the political objective of influencing the nature of the public sector. The argument of the white technocrats is that Government must loosen its grip on the parastatals and that the parastatals should be allowed to run as private companies. Such an approach has important political and economic implications for government in the light of government commitment to socialism and socio-economic transformation. It is the state that has been party to this shift, and this reflects the economic problems which government is experiencing which make them weak, as well as the changing nature of
the state in the independence period, and in particular the nature of black advancement in the state structure. (6)

In the private sector, immediately after independence primacy of the political factor led to 'window dressing' appointments. The Minister of Manpower pointed out that such appointments only reinforced racist attitudes as people were not equipped for the job. (7) Elements in the private sector have realised that such appointments are not the solution to black advancement.

The dilemma between the technical and political factors does not mean that the necessity did not exist to consciously redress the racial imbalance in all sectors. It rather points to the necessity to do so with political consideration plus careful human resource development and planning, rather than simply the political motive to put black faces in white places, or the technical motive to ignore political considerations.

c. The Ideological Factor

There are two ideological issues which are relevant when analysing the role of black advancement in Zimbabwean society:

i - the racial or colour issue; and

ii- the class issue.
Zimbabwe in its Constitution is committed to a non-racial society. Despite being implemented in the Public Service, the Presidential Directive has not been withdrawn. Black advancement is still an issue in the parastatals and the private sector. However, the Minister of Manpower consistently does call for recruitment and promotion on merit (for all Zimbabweans white or black). (8)

Following the Directive there is not another official statement or document which addresses the issue of recruitment and promotion of personnel on the basis of colour and/or merit. In practice there can be no doubt that the colour factor is still important. In the absence of a planned and time-specified policy, there is the real possibility of the perpetuation of policy based on colour, instead of non-racialism:

"The principle justification for the discriminatory nature of Africanisation is that it is a temporary suspension of the principle of non-racialism to achieve the ultimate entrenchment of that principle. Continual vigilance is therefore required to ensure that the means does not distort the goal and that the expedient does not become the principle. The policy should therefore be designed within specific time frameworks, and implementation subject to continuous review". (9)

Zimbabwe in various government policy documents and statements by the Prime Minister is also committed to socialism. There is however, no legal mechanism for the implementation of socialism in the Constitution, and no evidence that serious political or economic decisions have been taken to implement socialism in practice. As the examples of Kenya and Zambia showed in Chapter 2, black advancement or Africanisation in the
context of social inequality, while giving a bit to the black majority also led to the development of a new black elite.

The dilemma in Zimbabwe is that pressure on government by blacks to accelerate black advancement in the private sector, is accelerating the development of a black middle class which is fast becoming part of the post-colonial capitalist economy. (10) In addition, senior government officials, while they may not all perceive of themselves as aspirant capitalists, earn 30-40 times that of the average Zimbabwean and are thereby also becoming part of the new elite.

The black advancement strategy in Zimbabwe has essentially revolved around the implementation of the Presidential Directive. It has addressed the issue of colour through positive discrimination, but is not clear on where the practice of non-racialism should begin and end. There is no doubt that black advancement in itself was a necessary start to the building of a non-racial society. The question is what is its future role in a non-racial society? The future role of black advancement in Zimbabwe from the perspective of positive and negative colour discrimination has not been spelt out by government.

At no point has black advancement in Zimbabwe been tackled or interpreted from a class perspective, ie. government has never addressed the effects that the black advancement process will have (is having) on the developing class structure of the society. Government has only interpreted black advancement from a colour perspective, ie. the training of blacks and the placement of blacks in occupational
categories previously dominated by whites. The question is which *blacks* now have social mobility, and what does this process mean for the majority of the black population?

There is obviously a general political consensus amongst the black population that black advancement is part of the process of political independence. While it has been an important political issue in the independence period, it has never become a party-political issue. At the level of trade unions and local party politics the issue of black advancement has been taken for granted and never raised specifically. For the minority of the working class who are skilled, Africanisation took place rapidly and as a matter of course as whites left the country and white trade unions dissolved. For the rest of the working class it is 'bread and butter' issues that have dominated their demands since 1980.

It is amongst the petty bourgeoisie and aspirant black middle class that black advancement has been, and still is, an issue. It is these groups who have had access to social mobility and its benefits since independence, and who have been most concerned about the pace of black advancement in the public, and particularly, private sectors. In Zimbabwe black advancement has essentially been the training and placement of the black petty bourgeoisie and aspirant middle class into occupational categories previously dominated by whites. It is obviously this group therefore, that becomes frustrated when the pace of black advancement is not fast enough. In 1987 this frustration was again becoming evident as the days of "window dressing" and stalling through
"lack of qualified personnel" become numbered, with the new black elite beginning to assert itself.

The interesting feature of the nature of the new black elite is that, so far, because of the presence of a white capitalist class who owns and controls the economy in co-operation with foreign capital, the development of a black national bourgeoisie has been held back. Instead there is the development of a state bourgeoisie (who has access to wealth on the basis of state power) and aspirant middle class and petty bourgeoisie which has become less nationalist, i.e. less nationally oriented, as its position depends on its incorporation and co-option by white capital and foreign capital. The same goes for the state bourgeoisie, but it has more muscle with which to bargain. Nonetheless, since independence, it has become less nationalist and more open to co-operation with the private sector and international capital. Maybe it is fairer to argue that the state was constrained by international capital, by the Lancaster House Agreement, by local white capital (the private sector), and that these forces have therefore influenced the nature of the petty bourgeoisie and the developing state bourgeoisie in the independence period.

The nature of black advancement in Zimbabwe therefore leads one to conclude that the colour question has not been entirely resolved in practice. While in principle Zimbabwe is a non-racial society, and it is accepted that black advancement is a vital element in building this non-racial society, how is black advancement going to be used to this end in the long term? On the other hand, nor has the class nature of
black advancement been resolved in accordance with its socialist principles. Black advancement has been an issue for those blacks who are socially mobile, or potentially socially mobile, not for the majority of black Zimbabweans.

The outcome of this argument, is not to conclude that black advancement should not have taken place, and blacks should not have moved into all the jobs vacated by whites. It is merely to show the form that black advancement has taken, which does not conform to government's original objective of transforming social relations in accordance with its objective of building a socialist society. The rest of this Chapter will outline the process of black advancement in Zimbabwe from just prior to independence. The object of this section was to provide the tools of analysis for examining this process.

3. BLACK ADVANCEMENT BEFORE INDEPENDENCE

As late as the early 1970's the concept of Africanisation or black advancement was not really evident yet in Zimbabwe. A study carried out by the Centre for Inter-Racial Studies at the University found that:

"...employment policy and practice in respect to the allocation of jobs and rewards for work are generally not merit-based, and... are constrained by the mechanisms of racial discrimination." (11)

By the mid-1970's a combination of factors led to a change in attitude by some employers and the realisation of the necessity of at least some
black advancement. These factors were the changing political climate, a shortage of white skills through emigration and the escalation of the war, and 'enlightened self-interest' on the part of larger employers (for example Anglo-American, Rio Tinto).

The 1977 Annual Report of The Empress Nickel Mining Company, (part of Rio Tinto), reported:

"In 1977 we removed all reference to race in the classification of our employees and divided them into two groups based on the importance to the company of the work that they do, Group 1 being unskilled, and Group 2 skilled employees." (12)

According to Rio Tinto:

"Our policy was directed to the desire to survive as a multinational Company". (13)

Similarly Anglo-American Corporation moved on the black advancement issue in about 1977 because:

"We experienced Zambianisation and nationalisation in Zambia of the mining companies. In 1977 a lot of our top people came from Zambia to draw up a black advancement programme for black advancement in Zimbabwe. We knew from our experience on the mines in Zambia, that when there was a new government here they were going to push for Zimbabweanisation." (14)

The approach of Anglo American and some of the other MNCs became central to Zimbabwe's black advancement process in the private sector after independence. The MNCs claim to be able to bring about 'successful' and 'genuine' black advancement - ie. black advancement where blacks can actually perform the jobs - through careful human resources development
and planning. Because government has not come up with any alternative approaches after 1980, the MNCs do boast they have the answer and attempt to influence the rest of the private sector likewise.

Murphree (15) likened this early black advancement phase in Zimbabwe to the 'equalisation practice' in the USA in the late 1950's and early 1960's. He cites Dr Broby, of the University of Rhodesia, who in 1978 found management committed to 'equal opportunity' programmes:

"Training programmes for Africans at supervisory and management levels have already been implemented and the introduction of equal job opportunities is being generally explored. Concepts such as localisation, indigenisation, and Africanisation have become part of senior management's repartee. The term 'localisation' appears to have taken preference over the others, as it is devoid of any racial connotation. 'Localisation' is already widely practised both here and elsewhere by many of the multinational corporations trading in this country. Indeed, a policy of localisation has been put forward as one of the arguments in favour of the presence of multinationals in developing countries. Such a personnel policy provides expanded job opportunities for the indigenous population, and is contributory to the creation of a pool of well trained manpower.

The neutrality of the 'equal opportunity employer' approach reflects the rational goal of the enterprise in combining labour, capital resources and managerial expertise in the best possible way. This policy, espoused by the Institute of Personnel Management (Southern Africa) rejects 'Africanisation' since it is claimed that this would lead to discrimination in reverse, and such a state of affairs would not be in the interest of the individual or the enterprise. Equal opportunity, they say, opens the way for a truly multiracial environment, at least as far as the work context is concerned." (16)

The ethic in the private sector which prefers 'localisation' or 'Zimbabweanisation' to 'Africanisation' or black advancement is still the general trend after independence. In the private sector the motivation of the attitude is sometimes genuine, but also sometimes
opportunist and racist, and a justification for being slow about black advancement.

An 'equalisation approach' would not have met the political demands of independence, therefore the necessity of the Presidential Directive and the pressure for black advancement by Government after 1980. It was also necessary because the public sector lagged behind the private sector in the late seventies - there was not even a conception of an 'equalisation policy' in government. The 1960 Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland states that:

"There are at present no Non-Europeans serving in the Southern Rhodesia Civil Service, though the Southern Rhodesia Government have announced their intention of taking early action to admit them." (17)

In fact there were no significant changes in this regard during UDI.

The settler colonial regime did not permit an African civil servant to rise above the middle rank of senior administrative officer. One of the reasons for this was given in 1979 by a Minister for the Public Service in the UDI Government:

"The mere possession of an academic qualification is not in itself a criterion for appointment to any job.... We have to consider suitability of the candidates bearing in mind certain factors. Perhaps the most important single factor so far as the Public Service is concerned is loyalty to the State.....Secondly, national security". (18)

Soon after the establishment of the Smith/ Muzorewa Government in March 1979, Secretary of the Public Services, Mr Clive Newman announced that after the March Agreement there had been a 50% rise in the number of
Africans employed in the Public Service in administrative, executive, professional, health and other related fields.

"We do not have an Africanisation policy", he said. "We are integrating the Service. We hire on merit. Not because somebody has a black or white face."

The recruiting officer, Miss Jane Mackenzie, said:

"We found that blacks who were reluctant to work for the white government are now willing to work for the present government. We are being approached by young Africans who find it difficult to get a job in commerce and with degrees from universities abroad."

Still the changes were not that significant, although there was some progress in terms of numbers. At the time of independence, of the 10 570 established officers in the public service, only 3368 (31.9%) were black with senior administrative officer (which is the 5th level in the administrative hierarchy) being the highest rank held by an African.

After 1980 it was in government and the civil service where black advancement and Africanisation did occur, the private sector and the parastatals (to a lessor degree) have lagged behind.
4. **THE STATISTICS: POPULATION, COLOUR, NATIONALITY AND OCCUPATION**

   **AFTER 1980**

a. **POPULATION**

Table 6.1 shows that according to the 1982 census the white population was 147,000 or 2% of the total population of Zimbabwe. According to the previous census of 1969, the white population was 4.5% of the total or 230,000. According to projections of the Central Statistical Office (Salisbury, October 1976) in 1975 the white population was 277,000. From the mid 1970's white emigration rose steeply, with some 95,000 people (largely white) emigrating between 1976 and 1985. (See table 6.2). A proportion of whites left as tourists, but did not return, thus lowering the white population statistic further.

Table 6.1

**POPULATION BY ETHNIC GROUP 1969 and 1982**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1982</th>
<th></th>
<th>1969</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no. '000</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>no. '000</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>7,291</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>4,880</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colours</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2

**INMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION 1975-1986**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Emigrants</th>
<th>Net migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975...</td>
<td>12 552</td>
<td>9 242</td>
<td>3 310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976...</td>
<td>7 941</td>
<td>13 013</td>
<td>- 5 072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977...</td>
<td>5 914</td>
<td>14 556</td>
<td>- 8 642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978...</td>
<td>4 650</td>
<td>16 467</td>
<td>-11 817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979...</td>
<td>3 647</td>
<td>12 951</td>
<td>-9 304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980...</td>
<td>6 407</td>
<td>17 240</td>
<td>-10 833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981...</td>
<td>7 794</td>
<td>20 534</td>
<td>-12 740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982...</td>
<td>7 715</td>
<td>17 942</td>
<td>-10 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983...</td>
<td>6 944</td>
<td>19 067</td>
<td>-12 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984...</td>
<td>5 567</td>
<td>16 979</td>
<td>-11 412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985...</td>
<td>5 471</td>
<td>6 918</td>
<td>-1 447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986...</td>
<td>4 452</td>
<td>3 787</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


b. **COLOUR AND OCCUPATION IN THE ECONOMY**

Table 6.3 shows that while whites were 2% of the population in 1982, they made up 3% of the labour force, or 69,810 persons.

Table 6.3

**TOTAL LABOUR FORCE BY COLOUR 1982**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>1 098 060</td>
<td>67 200</td>
<td>12 310</td>
<td>1 177 570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>264 460</td>
<td>2 280</td>
<td>1 360</td>
<td>268 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Farmers</td>
<td>1 037 920</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1 038 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL LABOUR FORCE</td>
<td>2 400 440</td>
<td>69 810</td>
<td>13 820</td>
<td>2 484 070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compiled from Statistical Yearbook, 1985, CSO, P47.*
The National Manpower Survey of 1981 found that although whites made up only 2.7% of the population, and 3% of the total labour force, they dominated professional and skilled categories, while Africans dominated semi-skilled and unskilled categories.

Table 6.4 illustrates this point, showing that in the professional category whites were in the majority in 1981 - 20,934 as compared with 15,964 blacks. Whites thus made up 22% of the skilled labour force, while they were only 3% of the labour force as a whole.

Table 6.4
SKILL AND COLOUR, 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>% Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Labour Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>15,964</td>
<td>20,934</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>57,222</td>
<td>30,287</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi Skilled</td>
<td>158,981</td>
<td>15,003</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>298,391</td>
<td>66,224</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 'Black' includes Coloureds and Asians.
Table 6.5 shows that the proportion of whites in the skilled labour force declined from 22% in 1981 to 15% in 1985. This is due to white emigration and black advancement (including recategorisation and upgrading of skilled and semi-skilled labour).

Table 6.5

COLOUR DISTRIBUTION OF SKILLED LABOUR FORCE, 1981 AND 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>232 167</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>66 224</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>298 391</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes:

i) 'Skilled Labour Force' includes professional, skilled and semi-skilled employees.

ii) 'Blacks' includes Africans, Coloureds and Asians.

iii) 1981 statistics based on National Manpower Survey; whereas 1985 statistics based on Annual Occupational Survey of employees of private establishments and parastatals. Hence difference in total skilled labour force.

iv) 1985 statistics included unskilled labour and staff in training. These were subtracted from total in order to make figures comparable. Government statistics do not subtract these categories and therefore incorrectly claim that the proportion of whites has dropped from 22% to 7%,(See ARM, 1985 P43).

Table 6.6/A gives a different breakdown in that it shows white and black percentages for specific occupational categories. The National Manpower Survey showed that whites were dominant in administrative and managerial occupations. 74% of administrative and managerial posts were occupied by
whites. The other occupational category in which whites were dominant was the professional and technical group, making up 44% of the total. The National Manpower Survey observed that in general important policy and decision-making jobs were in the hands of whites. In addition whites enjoyed the highest incomes at all skill levels and in all occupations. According to the NMS 50% of the national payroll went to the skilled and professional categories which were dominated by whites and made up only 20% of employed persons for all establishments. \(21\)

Table 6.6/B shows how in 1985 there was a decline in the total number and the proportion of whites in the professional and technical, and the administrative and managerial occupational categories. Where whites were 74% (or 8172) of the total administrative and managerial/posts in 1981, they were 50% (or 3023) in 1985. Whites in the professional and technical category have declined from 44% (or 11 785) to 11% (or 7226). In contrast, blacks in this category have increased from 56% (or 15 246) to 89% (or 54 554) of the total. While the number of whites in this category has declined, the increase in the total number of blacks is very high - over 15 000 to over 54 000. This is due to black advancement ie. upgrading and recognition of technical skills previously not certified; increased technical training, due to skills shortages on the part of the parastatals and the private sector; advancement of black professionals. \(22\). In addition there was some error on the part of employees who included unskilled persons in this group (8% of the total). There is also a noticeable drop in the number of whites in the production and related category, which largely means a drop in the number of white artisans. \(23\)
group accounted for 14% of employees covered in the 1985 survey. Whites in this group dominated occupations such as architecture, engineering, physical science and related, medicine, veterinary science, accounting and machine and electrical fitting. (24)

It is interesting to note how small the proportion of administrative and managerial posts are in relation to the total skilled labour force - i.e. 2% in 1981 and 1% in 1985. It is this occupational group, as well as the professional and technical group, where a great deal of the pressure has been for black advancement.

The table 6.6/A & B are misleading in terms of total numbers of blacks in the administrative and managerial category. The 1981 figures are based on statistics for all sectors, whereas the 1985 figures are based on a survey of the private sector and parastatals - (ie. excluding Public Administration). It is not therefore correct to conclude from the Tables that the total number of black managers has declined. Blacks in the administrative and managerial group for public administration were also reflected in this category in 1981 and totalled 766. (25). If one subtracts this figure from the total given for 1981, and compares it with the 1985 figure, it is possible to conclude that there has been an increase in the total number of blacks in the administrative and managerial category for the private sector and parastatals. In other words there has been black advancement into the administrative and managerial category for the parastatals and the private sector. This is one of the areas where the controversy about the pace of black advancement still exists. (Tables 6.6/A & B)
Table 6.6

A. RACIAL DISTRIBUTION BY OCCUPATION, 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATIONAL GROUP</th>
<th>BLACK number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>WHITE number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, Technical and related</td>
<td>15 246</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11 785</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin. and Managerial</td>
<td>2 912</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8 172</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and related</td>
<td>104 335</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>13 388</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. RACIAL DISTRIBUTION BY OCCUPATION, 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATIONAL GROUP</th>
<th>BLACK number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>WHITE number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional Technical and related</td>
<td>54 554</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>7 226</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin. and Managerial</td>
<td>2 683</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3 023</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and related</td>
<td>114 745</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>5 028</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTES:
1) 'Blacks' includes African, Coloureds and Asians.
2) 1981 statistics based on National Manpower Survey; 1985 statistics based on Annual Occupational Survey of Employees which covers private establishments and parastatals.
c. COLOUR AND OCCUPATION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

The Presidential Directive on black advancement was directed to the Public Service the month after independence. The Public Service is therefore where the change in the ratio of black to white in employment has been most noticeable. As Table 6.7 shows the proportion of whites in the Public Service workforce as a whole declined from 14% in 1981 to 6% in 1984. By 1985 the figure was at 3%, and according to the Minister of State for the Public Service, the Directive had therefore been achieved. The proportion of whites in the Public Service by 1985 was representative of the proportion of whites in the population and the labour force as a whole i.e. 3%.

The changes in the overall proportion of whites in the Public Service are not as significant as the changes at officer level. It is at officer level that whites were concentrated. (See Table 6.7) As is evident from the table, in 1981 with the exception of health and teaching, whites were about 50% of each employment category. By 1984 the total numbers and the ratio of whites in the professional, technical and administrative categories of the Public Service had declined significantly. (See Table 6.7). The decline in proportion of whites is slightly greater than it is in real terms as the number of blacks in the Public Service had nearly doubled in the same period. In total the number of whites had declined just under 50% from 8 094 to 4 889.

(Table 6.7 /...
Table 6.7

DISTRIBUTION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE WORKFORCE BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP AND COLOUR, 1981 and 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration open</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>1 146</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration closed</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>1 048</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>1 193</td>
<td>1 057</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>1 030</td>
<td>1 181</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>1 007</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>1 986</td>
<td>2 926</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>1 103</td>
<td>3 344</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>4 442</td>
<td>7 771</td>
<td>6 213</td>
<td>11 228</td>
<td>1 479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Executive</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>1 004</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group I</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>8 187</td>
<td>2 879</td>
<td>11 066</td>
<td>9 449</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group II</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>8 755</td>
<td>4 8 759</td>
<td>11 413</td>
<td>2 11 413</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group III</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>22 695</td>
<td>4 22 699</td>
<td>32 618</td>
<td>2 32 620</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 281</td>
<td>1 376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>46 348</td>
<td>8 094</td>
<td>56 442</td>
<td>77 575</td>
<td>4 886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Compiled from ARM, 1984 p35.
d. **NATIONALITY AND OCCUPATION**

Incomparable and inaccurate government statistics become even more of a problem when one tries to establish trends in nationality and occupation. Within these limitations, some indicators can be given. According to the National Manpower Survey, 1981, 14% of the labour force (semi-skilled and above) was non-Zimbabwean, 2% were dual citizenship holders, and 84% were Zimbabweans. (See Table 6.8) At the skilled and professional level the non-Zimbabweans were white expatriates. According to the National Manpower Survey, they were found in accounting, architecture, all forms of engineering, finance, real estate, banking, mining and health. While the occupations dominated by non-nationals were quantitatively insignificant, they constituted decision-making levels. At semi-skilled and unskilled level non-Zimbabweans comprised black migrant workers for mining and agriculture.

**Table 6.8**

**SKILL AND NATIONALITY BY OCCUPATION AS PERCENTAGE OF LABOUR FORCE, 1981.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>ZIMBABWEAN</th>
<th>DUAL</th>
<th>NON-ZIMBABWEAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Skilled</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL %   | 84 | 2  | 14 |
| Number    | 251 404 | 6 266 | 40 721 |

*Source: Compiled from NMS, Vol 3, P187.*

*Notes:* 1) Labour Force includes semi-skilled, skilled and professional employees.
Table 6.9 A shows occupational category and nationality. The high proportion of non-Zimbabweans in the administrative and managerial category is evidence of the role of non-Zimbabweans in decision-making positions. In Table 6.9 B which shows the statistics for 1985, there has been a drop in the number of non-Zimbabweans in the professional and technical group (4945 to 1470) and in the administrative and managerial group, (3093 to 460). This is evidence of stringent government control over expatriate employment. Changes in citizenship regulations will have meant that some of the non-Zimbabweans will have become Zimbabweans, and the decline in the figure of non-Zimbabweans does therefore not necessarily mean that all these persons left the country. There is however no data available which indicates precise numbers.

According to Government statistics the total number of non-Zimbabweans in employment in 1985 was 7% (32 206), the total number of Zimbabweans therefore having risen to 93%. This figure of 7% is not exactly comparable with the 1981 figure of 14% as it is based on the workforce in 1985 as surveyed by the Annual Occupational Survey of Employees - ie 436 364 persons.(27). Nonetheless, it is possible to conclude that the number of non-Zimbabweans in the labour force has declined due to tight government control of immigration and expatriate recruitment. A more realistic statistic is a decline from 14% in 1981 to 10% in 1985. This decline has occurred largely in the professional and technical, and administrative and managerial occupational categories.

(Table 6.9/A & B /..)
### Table 6.9 A and B

#### A. NATIONALITY & OCCUPATION 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>ZIMBABWEAN number</th>
<th>ZIMBABWEAN %</th>
<th>NON-ZIMBABWEAN(+ DUAL) number</th>
<th>NON-ZIMBABWEAN(+ DUAL) %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>20 972</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4 945(+1 114)</td>
<td>18(+4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and related</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>7 199</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3 093(+ 792)</td>
<td>28(+7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and managerial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural, forestry and related</td>
<td>35 202</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>7 449(+ 520)</td>
<td>17(+1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and related</td>
<td>104 294</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>12 469</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from NMS, Vol 3, P187.

Note: Non-Zimbabweans are added to dual citizenship holders in for purposes of comparison as in Table 6.9B there are no dual citizenship holders.

#### B. NATIONALITY AND OCCUPATION 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>ZIMBABWEAN number</th>
<th>ZIMBABWEAN %</th>
<th>NON-ZIMBABWEAN number</th>
<th>NON-ZIMBABWEAN %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>60 410</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1 470</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and related</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>5 565</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Managerial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural, Forestry and related</td>
<td>102 021</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>14 023</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and related</td>
<td>109 607</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>10 165</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from ARM unpublished, 1985, P47.
In conclusion, since the mid-1970's the total white population has halved. Whites as a proportion of the total labour force in the same period have been reduced over 50% dropping from 69,810 in 1981, to 29,889 in 1985. Similarly the number of whites in the public service has reduced 50% from 8,094 in 1981 to 4,889 in 1984. Whites as a proportion of the skilled labour force have dropped from 22% in 1981 to 15% in 1985. In the Public Service whites have dropped from 14% of the total in 1981 to 3% in 1985. While there has been a significant drop in the number of whites in the labour force, they are still concentrated in professional and technical, and administrative and managerial occupations. In the Public Service on the other hand by 1984 blacks comprised over 85% of persons in these categories.

The number of non-Zimbabweans in the labour force has declined from 14% in 1981 to about 10% in 1985. In particular there has been a decline in the number of employees (largely white expatriates) in the professional and technical and administrative and managerial occupational categories. The decline in the number of whites and non-Zimbabweans in the skilled labour force has been due to white emigration and black advancement. We will now turn to look in more detail at policy and pressure for black advancement and how this process of black advancement has taken place in the private and public sectors.
5. **Policy and Pressure for Black Advancement**

There are two general items in government policy which address the issue of black advancement - the clause on non-racialism in the Constitution, and the Presidential Directive on black advancement in the Public Sector. The clause in the Constitution addresses the issue by implication rather than directly, and is against discrimination - positive or otherwise. The Presidential Directive was only legally binding on the Public Service, and only provided guidelines for implementation for the Public Service with respect to training, appointments and promotions.

Aspects of government human resource policy have directly addressed the issue of black advancement. These cover three areas which are dealt with in more detail in the previous chapter and in the next chapter: human resource development through expanding access to education and training; legislation relating to Africanisation of skilled workers (apprenticeship centralisation, bonding of apprentices, upgrading and training of semi-skilled workers); control of foreign recruitment to protect the advancement of blacks into professional, technical and administrative occupations. There is not however, policy or legislation which directly addresses black advancement in the economy. There is no programme of action which suggests the objectives of black advancement in the economy and how to achieve them. On the contrary, the Labour Relations Act of 1985, through it's clause on racial discrimination technically makes positive discrimination in favour of blacks illegal.
This is not to say that government does not perceive the issue of black advancement and the development of local skilled personnel as important. They most definitely do. Government has actually not known what action to take on black advancement in the private sector and to a lesser degree the parastatals, because of the sensitivity of relations between government and the private sector. The First Five Year Plan 1986-90 is evidence of how government views the problem. They have not however, provided any back-up to implement their ideas:

"The plan objective of transforming and controlling the economy requires an increased supply of domestic skilled manpower, which will make possible transfer of leading managerial positions to nationals".(28)

Government therefore perceives localisation (and by implication Africanisation) of personnel as part of the process of transforming the economy and increasing ownership and control by government. Africanisation and localisation of personnel can give the economy a greater 'national orientation', but do not necessarily or in themselves facilitate ownership, control and transformation. There are 2 mechanisms government has introduced to facilitate local and black participation in the economy:

a. Controls on reliability of funds following disinvestment by foreign-owned companies. The Reserve Bank insists that equity involved may be remitted only if at least 50% (preferably more) of the local equity is in the hands of one of the three approved categories of owners: black Zimbabweans, black Zimbabwe co-operatives, or the Zimbabwe Government itself.(29). The private sector contested this ruling as being against the Constitution.
b. Sponsorship of 'small' black businessmen through the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and the Small Enterprise Development Corporation (SEDCO).

While there is no specific policy on black advancement for the private sector and the economy as a whole, there has been continuous pressure for black advancement by government, and by aspirant blacks. Statements by consecutive Ministers reflect this pressure:

"Commerce and industry must increase the rate of advancement of qualified blacks into senior positions. It is necessary however to maintain high standards of efficiency and satisfy career aspirations of existing staff." (30) - Kangai, Minister of Labour, 1980.

"Employers cannot be allowed to continue resisting black advancement and recruitment in industry. Employers insist on recruiting expatriates. Once the Government moves on advancement in the private sector a lot of pressure will be put on employers." (31) - Kangai, Minister of Labour 1981.

"Highly qualified black Zimbabweans are leaving the country because of blocking tactics by employers. Veterinary surgeons, engineers, people with motor maintenance certificates have been refused jobs. The person who says they have had no experience - where and how did he get his experience - if it was not through initial employment ?" (32) Shava, Minister of Manpower 1981.

By 1984 this issue was raised within the Congress of Zimbabwe Industries, through their Annual Congress. One Minister stated at the 1984 Congress:

"There is an unwillingness on the part of the bigger boys in the CZI to democratise their boardrooms". (33)
By 1985 CZI's own black president was calling on industry to undertake "manpower planning programmes" and to establish targets and plans for black advancement.

"While it is expensive to train and sometimes duplicate position to facilitate the black advancement process, it was a necessary cost." (34).

In 1986 the Minister of Manpower, Shava, called for genuine black advancement saying yet again that black advancement was becoming increasingly cosmetic and meaningless. (35) Due to what is perceived as the slow pace of black advancement a strong lobby of senior black businessmen has consistently tried to pressurise Government to legislate for the private sector on black advancement.

In mid 1987 Government agreed in principle to examine the possibility of introducing legislation by the end of the year. (36) This thesis was submitted before any evidence of such legislation materialised.

Government approach to legislation on black advancement for the private sector has been ambivalent for three reasons:

a) There is a sensitivity about alienating the private sector, which is the backbone of the economy.

b) There is a realisation that there are objective difficulties about black advancement - for example adequate qualifications and experience.

c) Legislation on black advancement for private sector is in apparent contradiction with government's socialist objectives. (37).
The objective of government pressure on the private sector so far has been:

a) "To make the private sector more sensitive to government policy, and to give the private sector a greater national orientation".

b) "To assist in the mobility of non-whites into all occupational levels."

c) "Perceived as part of an overall national manpower development strategy". (38)

In sum, the "approach of Government (to black advancement in the private sector) is a nationalist approach, it is not challenging international capital in any way". (39) In practice, however, government has been in a dilemma about what to do in relation to policy and legislation.

Whether for the public or private sector, Government's conception of black advancement has therefore been:

a) To get blacks into middle and high level positions in administration, industry and commerce;

b) To ensure Africanisation of skilled workers.

Promotion and placement of blacks into these two groups is essentially promotion of blacks into the skilled and professional employment categories. Since 1980 these two categories have accounted for approximately 6% and 25% of the working population respectively. A further 25% of the workforce comprises semi-skilled workers, and the remaining 50% unskilled workers. Before and after independence both these categories have been largely black. The issue of black advancement therefore indirectly affects only some 30% of the labour force.
Those workers in the semi-skilled and unskilled categories are affected by legislation on upgrading and trade-testing, but even such measures have only affected a very small percentage of the total unskilled and semi-skilled workforce - some 10-12 000 out of 1.4 million workers. In practice different sectors in industry have approached the issue of recategorisation differently. Different approaches to recategorisation in a workforce where fragmentation of skill has been commonplace -

"underlines the fact that reclassification cannot be separated from existing relations of production. Government focus on Africanisation of apprenticeship and skilled labour has meant a continuation of the tendency towards the use of fragmented labour." (41)

An analysis of the labour process and any changes there have been in relation to skill, training, technology, pay, career and nature of work, plus all round benefits, is fundamental to understanding the nature of social relations after 1980, and how much things have or have not changed. Such analysis however, requires research beyond the scope of this thesis, which is primarily concerned with black advancement.

The focus of black advancement has been skilled and professional workers. Even before legislation on Africanisation of apprenticeship had appeared, the number of whites in this category was dramatically reduced, and large numbers of blacks had been promoted to the skilled category from which they were previously excluded. There were no political or technical obstacles in the way of black advancement into skilled level, and the process therefore proceeded quite rapidly and without the need for much pressure from government. Many of the larger
employers had wanted to advance blacks into skilled categories before independence.

The issue of black advancement has therefore affected professional employees and a proportion of skilled workers (clerks in banks, first line management for example). It is primarily for the middle and high level employees, a rather small percentage of the workforce, that government is being pressurised to introduce legislation. The following editorial comment is an indication of this pressure:

"We cannot continue to maintain a system whereby the black will naturally be the shop floor worker while the whites are in management, and the blacks who climb the ladder get there only at the pleasure of the whites". (42)

The next section will look at exactly what progress there has been in black advancement at all skill levels for the public and private sector. It will then become more evident where the pace of black advancement has been slow, and where it has proceeded more rapidly.
6. THE PROCESS OF BLACK ADVANCEMENT IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS:

General trends and problems.

This section will look at how the process of black advancement has taken place in the private and public sectors. The section will cover:

a. Black Advancement in the Private Sector,
b. Black Advancement in the Public Service,
c. Black Advancement in the Parastatals.

a. BLACK ADVANCEMENT IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Certain general trends have emerged in the private sector with respect to black advancement since independence. These trends were derived from a variety of surveys, interviews and primary sources (government documents, company documents, newspapers and others).

A study carried out by the author involved 35 interviews of ten companies - 4 locally-owned and 6 foreign-owned. (See Chapter 1 on Methodology for details of interview schedules.) The companies interviewed and their role in the economy are shown in table 6.10. Findings of the study were largely qualitative, and are reflected in the discussion below on general trends in the private sector.

In the course of interviews, most sub-sectors within the manufacturing sector were covered: foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco, textiles, wood and furniture, printing, paper and publishing, non-metallic minerals, metals and metal products, transport equipment. Those sub-sectors not
covered were: chemicals, and clothing and footwear. An attempt was made to cover all important sectors of the economy, and to cover foreign and locally owned companies in the proportions they are represented in the economy (i.e. 60% : 40%).

Table 6.10

COMPANIES INTERVIEWED BY SECTOR, AND SECTOR CONTRIBUTION TO GDP AND EMPLOYMENT, 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland H.(l)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T A Holdings(l)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art Printers(l)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morewear(l)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rio Tinto Z(f)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Anglo Am.(f)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Mutual(f)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta Corp.(f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astra Corp.(f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonrho Z(f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Employees '000s  265.5  55.2  166.5  50.0  15.7  81.5
% GDP            13.7  5.8  27.5  6.7  6.5  13.1

Fieldwork by author.
Notes:  
1. Services (education, health and administration) are excluded.  
2. Companies in electricity and water, and construction sectors were not covered.  
3. (f) = foreign-owned, (l) = locally-owned company.
Below are the trends which emerged from these interviews and other sources of data on black advancement in the private sector:

1. The number of whites at skilled level and professional level has declined since independence. Black advancement at skilled level or D and C band on the Patterson grading system was rapid. Most companies reported more or less complete Africanisation at C Band and lower. The process of black advancement into junior and middle management was slower and few blacks have made it to senior management level in the private sector.

Table 6.11 shows black advancement for C+ band employees at Rio Tinto Zimbabwe Ltd. (Mining Division). As is evident from the table the process began in the mid 1970's.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL EMPLOYEES</th>
<th>TOTAL C+ EMPLOYEES</th>
<th>TOTAL C+ WHITE EMPLOYEES</th>
<th>% WHITE OF TOTAL C+ EMPLOYEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1974</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1976</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1978</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1980</td>
<td>4 241</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1982</td>
<td>2 912</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1984</td>
<td>2 292</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1986</td>
<td>2 541</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*C+ = Skilled/Managerial employees

Table 6.12 shows the results of CZI Survey into black advancement into junior, middle and senior management levels.

**Table 6.12**

**SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF CZI SURVEY ON BLACK ADVANCEMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NUMBER WHITES</th>
<th>NUMBER BLACKS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>% BLACK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Administration</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Administration</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing/Sales</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Notes:**

i. In Finance no blacks held the position of financial director and few held the position of financial manager.

ii. Similarly in Production the figures were weighted by the larger numbers lower down the hierarchy. No directors of production were black and 50% of production managers were black. An interesting point to note is that 72% of supervisors and 91% of superintendents were black. Before independence these positions would have been held by whites.

iii. Again, with Marketing and Sales, directors and managers are largely white. At sales manager level there are more blacks involved.

The Survey revealed that blacks had been appointed to management, but not senior management. At senior levels of finance, general administration, production and purchasing there was not a single black in a sample of 38 companies.
Another Survey carried out by the CZI in 1987 revealed that out of more than 200 chairmen and managing directors in the country's top 100 companies, there were only 12 Africans. (43)

ii. In professional occupations there was also slow black advancement.

The areas where black advancement is slow largely reflected the areas where shortages are consistently reported in official government documents and by the private sector: architecture, legal, personnel, all areas of engineering, banking and finance, management which requires scientific, technical and financial skills at a high level.

A Senior Executive of the Standard Bank was quoted in a survey on black advancement in banking and finance as saying:

"Very senior and experienced black managers are scarce in this country. If you wanted a senior black manager, where would you find him? You would probably steal from somebody else, but there is a gentlemen's agreement between banks that they should not steal from each other".

In the same survey a senior executive in a building society admitted there were:

"No blacks at senior management level because of a lack of experienced people on the market." (44)

iii. It is possible to identify three phases in the process of black advancement to management and professional positions:

- First, in 1980-81 there was panic from white management who were very insecure about their position in relation to government. Many companies
felt impelled to appoint blacks even though they did not want or could not find the appropriate personnel. At this stage a fair proportion of black managerial appointments were 'window dressing' appointments. Positions were created with responsibility and perks removed. Black directors were appointed with no executive powers. Most of the appointments were for newly created posts of personnel manager and industrial relations officer. These posts were seen as necessary in the new political climate, and the personnel appointed to them were to keep labour happy, and to be the channel to government. In the first few years after independence many of those appointed to these positions had in fact worked for government, and were seen by private sector management as therefore providing them with credibility and access to government.

- Second, by 1984-85 government and black management began to complain about 'window dressing' appointments and a lack of real black managerial advancement. White management also began to realise that 'window dressing' appointments were not productive, had no credibility with government, and in fact were a 'weight around the neck' of the company as they were so evidently unable to cope with the job. It was at this stage that the issue was raised in the CZI, and companies with more foresight began to plan for black managerial advancement.

- Third, in 1986-87 government claimed the private sector were stalling on black advancement because they have come to feel secure about their position in the economy. Government had not yet taken any binding policy decisions on black advancement which affect the private sector. Hence
there were new calls for legislation on black advancement in the private sector by the end of 1987.

iv. The larger companies, and those which are foreign-owned were the first to respond to the necessity of black advancement. Smaller local companies, especially family enterprises are the ones which have been slower, and in some instances not Africanised at middle and senior management levels at all. Black advancement is easier for the MNC's as they have experience with the problem, and real decision making powers ultimately lie with the parent company. As was mentioned earlier in the Chapter, one of their main motives has been the necessity to survive in the new political environment. Anglo American, the largest employer in Zimbabwe after the Public Service, began a detailed black advancement programme of graduate training and development in 1976. The Anglo American strategy was based on their experience of Zambianisation and nationalisation of the Zambian copper mines. They claim that government and others in the private sector should look closely at their approach. (45)

v. Reasons given by black and white management for the slow pace of black advancement in the private sector are:

- A lack of experienced personnel and the necessity of maintaining efficiency in technical areas. It is not possible to appoint personnel
who cannot guarantee productivity, profits and efficient management. As one source reported:

"We cannot afford to put someone in a job if they cannot do it properly. Industry has been slower than government in Africanising, and that is because we have to stay efficient." (46)

- A lack of industrial expansion and job creation. The private sector maintain that the Public Service was able to quickly absorb blacks into senior positions because of the incentives offered for early retirement. For more rapid black advancement, the private sector maintain that industrial expansion is needed.

- The private sector report a 'crisis of expectations' amongst aspirant black managers. Companies report receiving job applications for the position of general manager. Where blacks are appointed to middle management, they very soon expect promotion and perks. In the view of the private sector, senior management requires years of experience. The crisis of expectations comes from the political dynamic of Africanisation and independence, and the fact that immediately after independence there were rapid 'window dressing' promotions.

- Racial prejudice was a reason given by black management for a lack of black advancement at managerial level. Where white management was given a choice, they would take a white rather than a black.

- As well as not having the experience, black aspirant management, in general does not have the capital to buy themselves into the private
sector. Black management is asking for control, yet it does not own capital. As one black manager stated:

"I would not give my inheritance away to a stranger. They will fight to keep what they have."

There is an insecurity on the part of senior white management about appointing blacks. Whites are often older, have few academic qualifications, feel they do not 'know' blacks, and that they will be pushed out and not have control. Some companies therefore prefer to just not appoint blacks.

In sum, it is a combination of technical, racial and class factors which have held back the pace of black managerial advancement.

vi. Training at skilled and management level have been important mechanisms of black advancement. Around independence many companies began education programmes for semi-skilled and skilled workers, including up-grading and other job-related programmes. With increasing government control and centralisation of in-service training since independence, many companies have begun to cut back on their education programmes for skilled and semi-skilled workers. The private sector has however benefited from Africanisation of skilled work, and various aspects of labour legislation. Fragmentation of skilled work in particular has worked in their favour, and there no is longer resistance to it as the white unions have dissolved. Black unions are weak, and negotiations take place largely through Industrial Councils. It is
unfortunately not possible in this thesis to deal at length with the labour process.

Management training has flourished since independence. Management training is one of the ways in which the private sector have maintained their influence in the economy. There have been a proliferation of private institutions offering management training, and government have set up their own Management Training Bureau to train managers for the private sector. By and large the private sector have not been happy with the government initiative, which has essentially failed. One of the problems of management training is that it has falsely raised the expectations of senior white management and aspirant black management alike. Both expect capable management to be produced from management training courses. The larger companies, however, which have consciously undertaken to ensure 'genuine' black advancement (ie. not 'window dressing'), (such as Delta Corporation, Anglo American, Lonrho (Mining) Zimbabwe) do maintain that effective human resource development and training through management training and career development is the only way to ensure effective black advancement.

vii. **Management in the private sector is largely (white) Zimbabwean and not expatriate.** Government legislation on foreign recruitment, coupled with the existence of local white management, has meant that 'expatriatism' has not become a problem in Zimbabwe. Foreign-owned companies such as Rio Tinto claim to have no expatriates. Anglo American claims to have 12 in a workforce of 23 000. Locally-owned companies such
as Art Printers and TA Holdings claim in principle to have done without expatriates. Statistics on expatriates are given earlier in this Chapter and in Chapter 7. Government have stated that restricting the appointment of expatriate management is a mechanism for facilitating black advancement and for ensuring the localisation of human resources, white or black. (47 - The person being interviewed is in this instance reflecting government policy.)

viii. **Black and white management alike were of the opinion that government legislation on black advancement would be counter-productive.** White management held the opinion that promotion should be on merit. Black management held a similar opinion and it was felt that legislation would simply promote 'window dressing'. Black management however, did maintain that a conscious programme of black advancement was necessary in order to overcome racial imbalance, and that mechanisms such as multi-directorships and evidence of black advancement programmes in financial reports should be encouraged.

ix. **In the companies where 'genuine' black advancement had occurred at management level, two factors were given as important:**
   - A genuine commitment by top management to black advancement;
   - Constant planning, recruitment and development of trainees at all levels, and not simply the placement of blacks, allowing them to 'sink or swim', and then blaming them when they did not perform well.
x. **In conclusion.** black advancement at skilled level since 1980 has proceeded fairly rapidly and without much pressure from government. Government legislation on apprenticeship training, upgrading and trade testing did facilitate the process. The emigration of white skilled workers was a key factor in rapid black advancement at this level.

Black advancement into middle and senior management in the private sector has been much slower. There are technical, racial and class factors which have hindered this process. Where companies have undertaken effective black advancement programmes, it has required a commitment from senior management and consistent planning and development of personnel. Much of the black advancement at managerial level soon after 1980 was 'window dressing'. With pressure from black management and government, and a realisation on the part of the private sector that such appointments were not productive, the trend slowed down. By the end of 1987 there was still pressure on the private sector to increase the pace of black managerial advancement.

b. **BLACK ADVANCEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE**

Like other African countries, in Zimbabwe the Africanisation of the public sector, and in particular the civil service, was one of the first issues to be tackled after independence. As one author commented on Africa in general:
"The Africanisation of the civil service, no matter what the costs in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, became the only viable political alternative." (48)

As has already been said above, in accordance with the Lancaster House Agreement (1979) the President issued a Directive in May 1980 which is in essence aimed to correct the racial imbalance in the Public Service. As the Sunday Mail said:" It was to break the white domination of the civil service." (49) The Directive appointed the Public Service Commission which was to be reponsible for recruitment, appointments and promotion for the Public Service, thereby implementing the Presidential Directive on black advancement. The Public Service Commission was to report annually on progress in relation to black advancement. According to the Prime Minister the proposals for the Presidential Directive were in essence as recommended by a team of Whitehall Civil Servants sent by the British Government to advise on the "restructuring and Africanisation of the Public Service". (50)

At independence, from Assistant Secretary level upwards there was only a handful of blacks. By 1987 only 3% of the whole civil service was white, representing the proportion of whites in the population as a whole. A handful of these whites were still in top administrative posts. In 1987 "the factual position is that the Presidential Directive has been implemented, although it remains in existence". (51) Earlier in this chapter the statistics of black advancement in the public service were given.
This section will look briefly at the factors facilitating black advancement in the Public Service and the problems encountered in this process.

Factors Facilitating Black Advancement in the Public Service

1) White Exodus

Over 5 000 experienced white officers left the civil service soon after 1980. (52) The majority left the service for political or racial reasons, although not all left the country. A significant proportion went to the private sector. According to the Minister of State for the Public Service whites left because they did not like the idea of being subservient to blacks, they were fearful of their promotion prospects, they did not think blacks could run the country, they were fearful of the future of their children, and most important were encouraged by the incentive scheme. (53)

11) White Retirement and the Incentive Scheme

The Retirement Incentive Scheme has been a mechanism in many British colonies to induce white civil servants to stay on for some five years after independence. This secures the continuity of British interests after independence. Such a scheme was introduced in Zimbabwe in 1979
under the Smith - Muzorewa regime, and later became part of the Lancaster House Agreement.

The conditions of that scheme were that:

- If a white officer was replaced by a black officer they could retire with full benefits;
- The pension benefits increased for five years after independence;
- The scheme guaranteed remitability of the benefits to any person ordinarily resident outside of the country.
- A lump sum which was a proportion of pension benefits, could be commuted tax free on retirement. (54)

The Scheme in fact became an inducement for whites to leave the country or at least to leave the civil service with pension benefits and take another job in the private sector.

An analysis of 696 retirements in 1983 revealed that 567 people retired under the scheme. 506 of these were below 60 years of age - ie. the minimum pensionable age. (See Table 6.13.)

Commenting on the Incentive Scheme the 1983 Annual Review of Manpower said that the Scheme:

"had contributed to the drainage of skilled manpower from the public sector to the private sector. These people get full retirement benefits from the Government at the same time as getting full salaries from the private sector. Maybe the Incentive Scheme has not been as useful as it was meant to be." (55)

The Scheme has also had a negative affect on foreign currency reserves, due to the emigration of most of those who retired. One of the early
retirees, who went to the private sector said - "it seemed crazy not to leave". (56) A significant proportion of the whites who have remained after 1985 are too old to start new careers and are there waiting for full pension benefits for retiring at retirement age. (57)

Table 6.13

RETIREMENT AT NON-PENSIONABLE AND PENSIONABLE AGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>AGE BELOW 60</th>
<th></th>
<th>AGE 60+</th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>number</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>number</td>
<td>percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Staff</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Personnel</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Staff</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Staff</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental Staff</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


iii) Supercession and Shifting Sideways

A proportion of whites do claim to have left because of being superceded by newcomers or junior officials who in their eyes were not adequately qualified for the job. The whites were therefore put in a position where they felt that they had to tolerate inefficiency and inexperience. Other whites claim to have been squeezed out, to have realised that their
promotion prospects were zero, and to have had their working situation made intolerable for them. (58) The Minister of State for the Public Service claims that such cases were the minority, although they did exist. (59) In addition he maintains that only three civil servants actually lost their jobs - ie. were fired. (60)

iv) The Presidential Directive and Promotion on Merit

The objective of the Directive was "to redress the racial imbalance, ie. preference had to be given to blacks in recruitment, appointment and promotion." (61) Colour was not however the sole criteria for appointment. Appointment and promotion was still on merit, and it was the role of the Public Service Commission to ensure this. (62) It was necessary that people had adequate qualifications for the job, and then preference was given to blacks. (63) Now that the balance is redressed, except for a couple of controversial areas, appointment and promotion is on merit. (64) The exception is constitutional posts (such as permanant secretaries, the Attorney General and Ambassadors) where political factors are considered and the Prime Minister and President are consulted. (65) For all non-constitutional posts ideology or political persuasion are not a necessary consideration. A new appointee does not have to be a socialist to be appointed to Public Commissioner or any other senior administrative post. In fact most of those appointed to senior administrative positions after 1980 were trained in the UK and USA and their ideological orientation favoured the status quo, with modifications in terms of colour. (66)
v) Training and Manpower Development

After 1980 Government policy was to give training to all levels of the civil service. This policy was reinforced by further legislation in 1986 which stipulated that all ministries be involved in training and career development for all levels of the service. (67)

Upper levels of the civil service receive training at the Zimbabwe Institute of Public Administration and Management established in 1984. Middle and lower level personnel are trained in management and administration at 2 centres in Highlands, Harare and in Bulawayo. Training is also undertaken at provincial level and concentrates particularly on development in the rural areas. (68) Individual ministries undertake specialised training. All training for the civil service is managed by the Training Management Bureau of the Ministry of the Public Service.

Problems for the New Civil Service

According to the Minister of State for the Public Service, the problems for the new civil service have been much the same as those experienced by other newly independent countries. They are:

1) Inefficiency,  ii) Corruption, iii) Nepotism
Taking into consideration the expansion of the civil service and the change over in personnel, a decline in efficiency was inevitable. "There was definitely a lowering in the 'quality of service' after 1980, to say standards declined is too political." (69) According to the Minister of State, the Civil Service went into a trough, which it is now out of, "not in all areas, but in general". (70) A decline 'in quality of service' is also inevitable since no blacks were trained or given experience in state administration before independence. "It does then seem ironical that the whites complain." (71) Inefficiency has been countered through:

- selective recruitment, appointment and promotions;
- training;
- use of expatriates where necessary. (72)

The problem of 'inefficiency', is that all governments are accused at some point of being inefficient, and such an opinion can reflect other prejudices, especially muted racism in the case of Africa. The new government did inherit a state apparatus ill-equipped to deal with the needs of the majority of Zimbabweans, and in the change-over a decline in efficiency in various departments of the state apparatus was inevitable, as the Minister of State himself points out. Crucial areas such as the Army and State Security have maintained some 'white skills' and received outside help, in particular from Britain. In other departments inefficiency is a reflection of the quality of personnel. Inefficiency is sometimes discussed openly, but not often enough. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, quality of personnel is not only a technical issue, it is also a political
issue. This is especially so in relation to personnel working in the state structure. A commitment to one's job must reflect a political commitment. And this is not always there. While one can see inefficiencies, one would definitely not be able to conclude anything near to a collapse in the state structure. Some inefficiencies are in themselves also political in that they require political decisions to correct them, and these decisions are not always taken, for political reasons, as well as reasons of inefficiency.

ii. Corruption

A certain level of corruption was inevitable, due to a variety of factors:

- Temptation was placed in front of people who were disadvantaged and felt justified in taking state funds. In the early stages there was not an awareness of the possibilities of dismissal, arrest and jail.

- Others deliberately took advantage of the poor quality of personnel who administered accounting and financial systems. It was therefore easy to fiddle the books and detection was not likely.

- There was no hierarchy of discipline. People allowed 'their comrades' to get away with corruption by remaining silent.

- Greed, a desire to 'have a bit of the cake'. 
- All these factors relate to bad appointments due to the rapid expansion of the service and the inability to process each appointment carefully. (73)

Smaller and larger instances of corruption have been evident in the civil service since 1980. The more serious offences are documented by the Auditor General in the Reports of the Public Accounts Committee. In response, Government has adopted a variety of measures:

- introduced an Anti-Corruption Bill in 1986;
- improved and strengthened financial systems;
- introduced an anti-corruption ethic through government statements and public speeches, especially those of the Prime Minister;
- exposed corruption at whatever level making clear that no-one is above the law (for example the Commissioner of Police was brought to trial for corruption);
- altered disciplinary regulations so that they are tough and easy to administer;
- and more measures are proposed. (74)

Corruption has therefore been evident in the state structure since independence at all levels, but Government has taken stringent measures to overcome the problem.

iii. Nepotism

Nepotism is even more of a diffuse problem to discuss than that of inefficiency. It is a part of daily reality, yet to document it is ver
difficult. Nepotism has been a problem in appointment and promotions to Government posts. Where measures are not taken to prevent it, it is inevitable in a society where tribal and family affiliations are still an important feature of the social structure. It is also inevitable in a country like Zimbabwe where the state has become the main vehicle for black advancement, i.e. advancement of the petty bourgeoisie. The role of the Public Service Commission was to attempt to prevent such practices, and to a certain extent it did.

The Civil Service and A New Zimbabwean Society

How has the role of the civil service changed in relation to government socialist objectives? Has the change simply been cosmetic, i.e. putting black faces in white places with the role of the service remaining much the same?

There have been changes in the role of the state and its structure since independence. Black advancement in itself has democratised the state structure, made it more 'national', and more responsive to the implementation of government policy. To meet the demands of independence a significant proportion of Government expenditure has been in the non-productive areas of the state sector. Since 1980 the state has therefore increased its role as a provider of social welfare for the majority of the population. To cope with this role the state structure expanded to provide education, health and improved facilities in the rural areas. The new state
structure has therefore adjusted its structure and size to cope with its welfare role after independence, to redress imbalance and meet the promises of the liberation struggle. (75) While the state had become more 'national', and in that sense is representing the majority of Zimbabweans, the class orientation of the state has not changed in practice. The interests of capital, white or black, foreign or local, are still served through the state structures and through legislation. There has been no fundamental transformation in the role of the state since independence. The Lancaster House Agreement was the basis for ensuring that no such transformation would take place.

c. BLACK ADVANCEMENT IN THE PARASTATAALS

At independence government inherited 35 parastatals. They were strong institutions, with salaries 80% of private sector salaries, and mainly white management. Most of the management had been in the job long and was therefore experienced. (76)

A study done for the National Manpower Survey in 1981 on a sample of parastatal organisations examined the composition of the skilled personnel category in these organisations (NRZ, ESC, ZISCO, PTC, Air ZIM, Zimbank and Reserve Bank). The underlying motivation of the study was that:
"the main objective of the government is to create an economy that is self-reliant, self generating. Thus it is very important that Government organs be managed by highly trained and patriotically motivated professionals and technicians". (77)

The study showed that of the 838 professional employees - 89% were white and 11% black; and 21% of the whites were of British nationality. The blacks had the educational qualifications and the whites the experience. 28% of blacks held university degrees against 17% of whites. Yet 88% of white employees have more than 10 year work experience, as opposed to 10% of blacks. The working experience of whites placed whites in the highest income bracket. Of the skilled category of employees - 56% were white, and 44% black. Of all the whites, half of them are of British nationality. The nationality variable is a bit confusing. Probably a lot of those of British Nationality are dual citizenship holders, and after the new citizenship law, may have renounced their British nationality. However, the numbers in themselves are significant and interesting. They are a further illustration of the point made in Chapter 4 that the majority of skilled personnel, and professional technical personnel were acquired through immigration and not through training and promoting local (particularly black) personnel.

A last observation of interest is that most of the whites employed by parastatals were about to retire - and the majority of these whites were British nationals. (No doubt many of them have since benefited from the Retirement Scheme). The Ministry of Manpower viewed this situation as serious, ie. that in parastatals British nationals held a majority of the posts at professional and skilled levels. It was very possible that at any moment these personnel could leave the country.
Progress on black advancement in the parastatals since independence is difficult to gauge. Bits of information, such as the quotation below are obtainable, but there a lack of comparative detail due to limited government data. (78)

"The Cotton Marketing Board, CMB, as was indeed the case with many public sector organisations, found itself with mass resignations from experienced employees - virtually all of them whites, in the period following the attainment of independence..... In 1980 there were 867 people employed in the CMB, 128 of them were salaried staff and of these 32 were blacks and 96 whites. There was only one black depot manager and not a single black ginner. But now the Board's employment figures had risen to 1 193, with 243 salaried staff and 227 of these are blacks and 16 whites. Six out of the eight depot managers were blacks and all the ginning personnel from chief ginner to the mixers are blacks..." (79)

Table 6.14

RACIAL CLASSIFICATION IN THE PARASTATALS - SELECT OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES AND TOTAL EMPLOYMENT, 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>BLACK</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, No.</td>
<td>3 234</td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and related</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and Managerial No.</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and related</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>7 959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL No. 41 149 2 932

% 93 7


Note: 'Black' includes Coloureds and Asians.
The only data available comparative since the above NMS study is the Annual Occupational Survey of Employees of 1985 (see Table 6.14) As is evident from the Table, 19% of professional and technical posts, and 36% of administrative and managerial posts were held by whites in 1985. Although the data is not directly comparable, it is an improvement on the data revealed by the NMS in 1981.

From interviews and other primary data on the parastatals it is possible to draw conclusions about the progress on human resource development and black advancement since independence. In general black advancement at middle and higher levels in the parastatals was slower than the Public Service. (80) As with the private sector, black advancement at lower levels - ie. skilled worker and below proceeded quite rapidly.

For middle and high level personnel, progress of black advancement in the parastatals was slower for several reasons:
- The Presidential Directive although directed to the parastatals as part of the public sector, was not legally binding for them.
- No equivalent to the Public Service Commission was set up for the parastatals to ensure the implementation of the Directive.
- Senior management in the parastatals is of a more professional technical nature, and therefore more difficult to replace in a short period of time. (81)
- There was obstruction from white management to the advancement of blacks into management positions. This was evidenced in the National Railways, Air Zimbabwe, the Cold Storage Commission, to name a few. (82)
This resistance was partly technical (for reasons of safety and efficiency), and partly racist.

Because of the slow advancement in the parastatals, government began to intervene directly through relevant ministries, in personnel appointments for the parastatals. By 1984 the balance was largely redressed, and by 1987 there were only a very small proportion of whites left. Those left were a handful either waiting for retirement, and some government appointees. (83)

The mechanisms which facilitated black advancement in the parastatals have therefore been:

i. White Exodus

At Independence 90% of whites in the civil service left, 70% of those in the parastatals and 35 - 40% of those in the private sector. The reason for the white exodus are much the same as those mentioned above, racism, political fear and the Incentive Retirement Scheme. (84)

ii. Salaries

Soon after independence government froze salaries for senior government personnel. This meant that the living standards of senior personnel in the parastatals has declined about 30% since independence. Many of those with the skills, therefore left the public sector for the private sector. In addition whites were
recruited by the private sector to fill the gaps of those who had left. (85)

iii. Training and human resource development

Changes in government legislation regarding training and grading of apprentices skilled and semi-skilled workers facilitated Africanisation of skilled occupational categories in the parastatals.

iv. The Presidential Directive

Implementation of the Directive became the responsibility of the relevant Ministry, and in practice became the responsibility of the Minister or Deputy Minister. Because of the lack of any structure, for personnel appointments, the system was open to abuse. The result was tribalism and nepotism, ill-advised appointments, appointments where the personnel concerned were clearly not technically and professionally qualified for the job. (For example of the General Managers of ZISCO, the National Railways and Air Zimbabwe). (86)

As a result of this whites left "as they did not want to work under inefficient people". The whites recognised the need to redress the racial imbalance, but left on mass when it became clear that the black personnel they were working for were not qualified for the job. (87)
Ad hoc and individualised implementation of the Presidential Directive for the parastatals has had serious economic repercussions. Serious financial loss and mismeasurement led to the necessity for Government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry into the Parastatals in 1986. The Inquiry was chaired by Justice Smith, a Zimbabwean. Justice Smith's chairmanship raised problems amongst Ministers who came under criticism during the Inquiry. The Inquiry pointed to the fact that the importance of technical considerations when appointing senior management for economic and financial institutions was totally underestimated. Senior management were appointed because they were black and also for nepotistic reasons. Because of such ill-advised appointments, problems such as inefficiency, corruption and nepotism have been evident in the parastatals to a greater degree than the civil service.

In order to rectify the situation the Commission of Inquiry appointed in 1986, in 1987 recommended legislation which would establish a permanent Parastatals Commission to appoint the boards of parastatals, help appoint senior staff and have powers of control and supervision over parastatals and state controlled companies. The Bill was gazetted in September 1987. It was anticipated that this Bill would overcome some of the serious problems which have to a fair degree been a result of the black advancement process in the parastatals.
Two case studies will be briefly examined in order to illustrate the general points made above about the process of black advancement in the parastatals:

1. Air Zimbabwe Corporation (AZ)

The Minister of Transport, Dr H Ushewokunze, issued a Directive to the General Manager of Air Zimbabwe dated September 30, 1985, which read as follows:

"Further to your enquiry, including a request for consideration to be given to the employment of a further complement of pilots, I direct as follows:
From now onwards and in order to redress the racial imbalance in this sector of your Corporation, you are requested and required to employ black pilots, whether they be Zimbabwean or non-Zimbabwean.
This Directive stands and is non-negotiable." (90)

Commenting on Justice Smith's Chairmanship of the Inquiry, the Minister of Transport, Dr H Ushewokunze questioned the existence of the Committee claiming that white Zimbabweans:

"have been fighting a serious economic war against the policy of Zimbabweanisation... We have misplaced our trust... It appears to me we are throwing away our initiative of government to these people because we shall govern on their say-so." (91)

"Hopes that the efficiency and administration of Air Zimbabwe would greatly improve after the Smith Commission's Report on the unsatisfactory running of the airline... are vanishing among key members of the staff. At least five of 15 aircraft engineers resigned their posts due to dissatisfaction with their conditions... 15 senior air crew members, including pilots, have
left AZ or intend shortly to resign... Other senior management staff of all races are contemplating resigning because certain senior promotional posts since 1985 are still filled by less qualified people on a non-advertised basis... Another deep and long-continued cause of dissatisfaction among senior staff is known to be AZ's failure to implement the long-promised 15% critical allowance applicable to flight engineers and senior experienced categories, including pilots." (92)

Air Zimbabwe employs a relatively small workforce of about 1 650. Over 50% of the workforce are in the skilled and professional occupational categories, because of the specialised and highly skilled nature of the Corporation. Table 6.15 shows skill breakdown according to colour for the years 1980 and 1986. As is evident from the Table, in 1980 whites comprised all but a few of the skilled and professional personnel which made up 56.5% of the workforce. In 1986 whites were only 14% of the total workforce in these categories comprising 55% of the total workforce. There is however a stable number of whites in the professional category - 10.5% of the workforce in 1980 and 9% of the workforce in 1986. The reason for this is that whites dominate the highly skilled (and well paid) professions of pilots and flight engineers. Hence the above quotation by the Minister of Transport who wanted to take rather drastic measures to Africanise these posts. As Table 6.16 shows, professionals take 34% of the salary bill whereas they only comprise 15% of the total workforce. Semi-skilled and unskilled workers on the other hand, who comprise 45% of the workforce, receive 22% of the wage bill. In 1986 pilots earned in the region of $35 000 a
year, whereas the lowest grade unskilled worker earned in the region of $3,500 a year. (93)

Table 6.15

CLASSIFICATION BY COLOUR AND SKILL FOR AIR ZIMBABWE CORPORATION 1980 and 1986 IN NUMBERS AND AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL WORKFORCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>white</td>
<td>black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional no.</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skilled no.</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s-skilled no.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>un-skilled no.</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL no.</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.16

AIR ZIMBABWE - SALARIES AND WAGES EXPENDITURE BY SKILL FOR 1986 in $000's and %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1986 $000</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>professional</td>
<td>7280</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skilled</td>
<td>9540</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s-skilled</td>
<td>3270</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>un-skilled</td>
<td>1620</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soon after independence there was pressure for black advancement at all levels of the Corporation. (95) In response a black general manager was appointed, and blacks were brought into skilled, managerial and professional occupational categories. In addition in-house and on-the-job training was started. A Quarterly Review was produced in the first couple of years after independence on the Correction of the Racial Imbalance. (94) Up until 1980 almost all managerial, supervisory and skilled posts were white, i.e. 60% of the workforce. In 1986 whites comprised only 15% of the workforce (see Table 6.15), although they still comprised 90% of pilots. According to one source in Air Zimbabwe, black advancement proceeded at a pace that "was faster than was economically sound." (96) The June 1981 Quarterly Review on the Correction of the Racial Imbalance reported that problems holding back the pace of black advancement were a lack of available personnel with airline experience, a lack of adequate training facilities, and the long duration for training pilots. (97)

The Commission of Inquiry into Parastatals indentified several problems affecting the efficient running of the airline. Amongst them were a lack of competence on the part of the general manager, and interference from the Minister of Transport. This interference had taken the form of directives on black advancement, dismissals, appointments and promotions; use of airtickets for immediate family and relatives; and interference in detailed affairs of the airline such as uniforms (the Minister rejected uniforms made for $50 000 saying his design costing $90 000 must be used instead). As was mentioned above nepotism is
difficult to itemise, but in appointments and promotions, and in use of Corporation funds it was evident in this instance.

In conclusion, black advancement has clearly taken place in the airline at all skill levels since independence. Problems of personalities (Minister vs the general manager) and technical and professional incompetence led to the need for the Commission of Inquiry. No doubt the new Parastatal Commission which will be responsible for appointments and promotions will alleviate some of these problems.

ii. The National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ).

"Once prescribed promotion procedures are ignored or dispensed with, and promotions are made by way of 'secretive, unchallengeable Ministerial directive', allegations of nepotism and tribalism are bound to occur. Whether or not these views are justified, they are sincerely held by many black employees in the Railways." (98)

"Because instances of racism and allegations thereof are so damaging to harmonious staff relations and have such a harmful effect on the efficiency of the Railways, we consider that steps should be taken to deal with the problem. Those areas in the Railways where black advancement has not been fully achieved should be identified and comprehensive plans drawn up to redress the position as soon as possible. The issue should be brought out in the open and discussed at all levels of management so that the plan is properly implemented and the policy of black advancement is not abused in order to favour friends or relatives or to cover inefficiency or incompetence." (99)

After the Public Service and Anglo American, the National Railways of Zimbabwe are the largest employer in the country, employing 19 000
people. Historically racism was endemic on the Railways with no blacks occupying skilled and professional job categories, and with blacks never being allowed to supervise whites. In response to the Presidential Directive, the General manager of the Railways in 1982, Mr Lea-Cox, in co-operation with the then Minister of Transport, Mr Masango, issued Special Notice 1276 in which management had drawn up plans and targets for black advancement which were to be kept under review. (100)

As a result of Special Notice 1276 blacks were appointed to senior posts on the NRZ. Table 6.17 shows the number of blacks in senior management in January 1987 (ie grades 1 - 5: grade 1 - 3 are professional and technical staff, and grades 4 -5 are supervisory staff). In 1984 as a result of progress on black advancement, the Minister of Transport issued a Directive that Notice 1276 be altered such that appointments be made on merit. He later however changed his mind with no explanation. (101)

The present Minister of Transport, Dr H Ushewokunze, as the newly appointed Minister in 1984, appointed a black manager to the Railways, the ex-Minister of Transport, Mr Masango. This was the new Minister's first Directive. In appointing Mr Masango the Minister stated that:

"the appointment was a political one and therefore no experience or qualifications were called for, and Mr Masango was being imposed on the Railways." (102)
Table 6.17

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY ON THE RAILWAYS BY COLOUR 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational category by grade</th>
<th>black</th>
<th>white</th>
<th>total</th>
<th>% white</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 3 (proff and tech.)</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 5 (supervisory)</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>artisan</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10 (skilled &amp; s-skilled)</td>
<td>7336</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>7934</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 12 (un-skilled &amp; manual)</td>
<td>8240</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16664</td>
<td>1377</td>
<td>18021</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Blacks includes Africans and Coloureds.

Two of the fundamental issues in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Parastatals on The National Railways of Zimbabwe, were the issue of ministerial interference and the Minister's allegations of racism and a lack of black advancement on the Railways. The Smith Commission ruled that the Minister had intervened beyond the limits of the law and that promotions of blacks had taken place in such a manner that weakened management to the detriment of the Railways. (103) One of
the important areas of Ministerial intervention was in appointments and promotion of personnel:

"The feeling was that promotion was not on the basis of merit, but on whom one knew". (104)

The Committee maintained that whites and blacks alike had been affected by the actions of the Minister. It was alleged that blacks known to the Minister had succeeded better qualified blacks already due for promotion. It was reported that in 1985 the Minister directed 65 appointments to the Railways, and 1986 43 such appointments. Some of which were totally unsuitable. In a significant number of cases the people were not technically qualified and were skipping promotion procedures. (105)

The Smith Committee made three recommendations on black advancement on the Railways in addition to reduced Ministerial interference:

"a. All promotions and appointments should be made in accordance with the laid down procedures.

b. In those Branches where adequate black advancement has taken place, promotions and appointments should be made on the basis of merit; but in those Branches where this has not occurred, special emphasis should be given through training and the recruitment of suitable persons, to achieve adequate black advancement as soon as possible.

c. The performance of those appointed or promoted by way of Ministerial directive should be monitored over the next six months and if they do not measure up to the job they should be transferred." (106)

The Minister of Transport denounced the Report of the Commission of Inquiry as "a piece of political pornography", at the same time as reporting to Parliament that all white employees on the Railways had opted for early retirement. (107) The Minister did not respond to specific allegations of the Commission. The thrust of his criticism of the Report was that management of parastatals is not only a technical
matter, but also a political matter, hence the right of Ministerial interference. (108) While the Minister has a point, (this argument was discussed earlier in this Chapter) a problem arises when the political authority is abused, as has been the case in a number of instances in Zimbabwe.

Both these case studies illustrate points made in the general discussion so far. Black advancement has taken place in the parastatals, albeit slower than in the Public Service. The reasons for the slower pace of advancement have been technical and ideological (i.e. racism). In the absence of a Commission responsible for appointments and promotions in the parastatals, abuse of Ministerial power and managerial positions led to unsuitable promotions and appointments which negatively affected the efficient running of a number of the parastatal organisations. The Commission of Inquiry established in 1986 was to rectify these irregularities and suggest mechanisms for ensuring the efficient management of the parastatals. While the Commission made important suggestions on a technical level on how to improve management, in particular through appointing adequately qualified and experienced personnel, it was lacking on the political level, i.e. the role of the parastatals in the economy and in the context of socialist transformation.
Black advancement to skilled and managerial positions in the private sector has occurred, but much more rapidly in the former than the latter. In the early stages after independence a fair number of black managerial appointments were merely 'window dressing' - to make the company 'look' better and to try and develop a negotiating link with government. By 1984/5, due to protest from black management and government, the private sector began to realise the problems with window dressing appointments, to accept the inevitability of black advancement to managerial level in the private sector and in some instances to plan for the development and training of black management. The consensus in the private sector is that by 1987 there was still a shortage of senior black management.

The technical factor, has therefore been the primary factor determining the pace of black advancement in the private sector. The necessity of maintaining efficiency and profits is more important to the private sector than the post-independence political dynamics of nationalism and black advancement. The white politics of racism and prejudice has however been the other important factor in determining the pace of black advancement in the private sector. There is an ideological dynamic behind the technicist call for 'experienced' personnel.

In the Public Service the primacy of the political factor, of black majority rule, led to the rapid Africanisation of the civil service. Having a pool of educated black personnel, Zimbabwe, unlike some other
African countries, did not however reduce qualification requirements for entering the civil service. If anything, the educational level of new recruits has been raised since independence. The technical factor was also important in considering appointments and promotions, although in the early stages, (and even in 1987), if the choice is between white and black with equal qualifications and experience, or even a better qualified white, the black would get the job.

Due to resistance from white management to respond to government calls for black advancement in the parastatals, government intervened, and gave the responsibility of appointments to individual ministries. As in the Public Service, the political factor became the primary consideration for appointment and promotion, and the technical factor (ie technical and professional expertise) was secondary. The result was mismanagement, corruption, nepotism and serious economic problems for parastatals which took this road. (For example ZISCO, Air Zimbabwe, The National Railways of Zimbabwe). For those parastatals where careful human resource planning and development was an integral part of the implementation of a black advancement policy, such serious problems did not arise, (for example the Agricultural Marketing Authority, the Dairy Marketing Board, The Cold Storage Commission).

In general, it is possible to conclude that in the private sector, it is the whites who still dominate the highly-paid and decision-making jobs. In the public sector it is the blacks who dominate these positions. Conscious policy on the part of government to restrict the recruitment and use of expatriates, has meant that expatriate expertise has not
become a barrier to the development of local personnel, or a financial burden, to the extent it has in other African countries.

The problem with Zimbabwe's approach to black advancement is that there has not been a time specific directive, applicable to the society as a whole, with mechanisms for securing implementation. The result is that outside of the Public Service, the implementation and interpretation of black advancement depends on the individual employer or ministry. This lays black advancement policy open to abuse - to racism (from both sides), to tribalism and nepotism. There is no surity that the balance will be redressed in all sectors, and that non-racialism will become the modis operandi. The assumption on the part of government has been that once the Directive was issued, this meant that it was implemented, and no mechanisms for implementation were necessary.

This is not to advocate that there should not have been rapid black advancement to all sectors. It is rather to show that for effective black advancement to be realised, careful human resource planning and development is necessary, in the context of overall political considerations. In Zimbabwe, while issuing the Presidential Directive and encouraging black advancement, government has hedged about the issue of black advancement because of the sensitivity of the local white population, and in particular the necessity not to alienate local (white) capital. This could be interpreted as a pragmatic approach, necessary to maintain skills and keep the economy going. And there is no doubt that such an approach was necessary. However it needs to be part
of a conscious overall strategy, which in the Zimbabwe case it has not been.

One reason that black advancement has taken this form in Zimbabwe, is that the ideological factor is a dilemma for Zimbabwe which has not been resolved. The issues of race and class, of non-racialism and class interest provide a dilemma which government has not yet completely come to terms with. There is no indication of when Africanisation should become Zimbabweanisation, leading to insecurity on the part of whites, and in perpetuation of nationalism and tribalism by some blacks. Preferring caution to collision in relation to the private sector, government has left black advancement and personnel considerations for the private sector to the private sector.

Black advancement in the private sector is the incorporation of blacks into post-colonial capitalism and is therefore contrary to a strategy of socio-economic transformation. This reflects a fundamental contradiction in Zimbabwe's approach to black advancement. As one newly appointed black chairman of a large group of companies said:

"I fought to get myself a good job, and I have it, I did not fight for socialism." (109)

Another senior black manager pointed out:

"Black advancement is vital if business is to have a long term stay in this country. Black advancement is about the need to advance
blacks and to make them part and parcel of the free enterprise system". (110)

Black advancement, whether it takes five years or twenty five years is inevitable in Zimbabwe. The form black advancement will take in the long term in Zimbabwe society is dependent on how the political, technical and ideological issues resolve themselves.
CHAPTER 7

BLACK ADVANCEMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES PLANNING IN ZIMBABWE

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine Zimbabwe's approach to human resource planning in the light of its commitment to black advancement and socialism. In the First Five Year National Development Plan 1986-1980 government committed itself to:

- raising living standards of the entire population, and in particular the peasant population;
- the enlargement of employment opportunities and 'manpower development'.

In chapter 2 it was shown that government soon after independence committed itself to the transformation of human resources planning and development through transforming the social relations of the society. Also in Chapter 2 we discussed at the general theoretical level the objectives of a socialist approach to human resource development and planning.

The human resource problems that Zimbabwe inherited, plus post-colonial capitalism have stood in the way of Zimbabwe's fulfilling these objectives, and meeting the necessary requirements of a socialist
approach to human resource development and planning. In addition, Zimbabwe has taken policy decisions, and failed to take decisions, in relation to black advancement and human resources planning which would have facilitated a socialist approach to human resource development and planning.

In Chapter 2 it was pointed out that black advancement is at once a dependent and an independent variable of human resource development and planning. It is an independent variable insofar as it has its own political momentum. But it is a dependent variable in that it is a part of human resource planning, and is therefore dependent on the nature of human resource planning. This chapter will examine black advancement as a dependent variable in examining Zimbabwe's approach to human resource planning. The Chapter will show the way in which the technical factor (i.e. human resource planning) affects the nature of black advancement in practice. It will also examine how far Zimbabwe has succeeded in transforming human resource planning in accordance with its socialist principles and objectives. In other words, the approach a country has to human resource development and planning, affects the nature of black advancement, and it is Zimbabwe's approach to human resource planning and the way it has affected the black advancement process that is being examined in this chapter.
2. HUMAN RESOURCES PLANNING AS A VEHICLE FOR BLACK ADVANCEMENT AND
SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION

The Department of Research and Planning of the Ministry of Labour,
Manpower Planning and Social Welfare was established at independence.
The Department was set up to:

"determine a framework for national decision making on manpower and
to suggest alternative projects and programmes for eliminating
manpower gaps... to begin to plan and correct the distorted manpower
situation inherited from the colonial past... to provide immediate
measures regarding manpower development and utilisation... (and to)
draft medium and long term plans on manpower." (1)

The Department defines Manpower Planning as "concerned with the
management of human resources, their preparation and deployment into
productive processes." It is the assessment and analysis of the
quantities and qualities of the personnel available and to be made
available for duties in various occupational categories with a view to
making recommendations and designing programmes to alleviate manpower
imbalances. (2) On the basis of this definition the Department sets
itself the objectives of:

"a. assessing the future needs of Zimbabwe for trained manpower in the
    light of economic, technological and other developments;
b. ensuring planned development and proper utilisation of human
    resources." (3)

Three interrelated questions arise:
a. How close are these definitions and objectives to a socialist
    approach to human resource planning and to achieving "the
transformation of manpower training and utilisation in accordance with its (Zimbabwe's) socialist objectives". (4)

b. What progress has the Ministry made with respect to human resource planning, within its own objectives?
c. How does the black advancement variable feature in Zimbabwe's approach to human resource planning?

To examine question one it is necessary to go back to the definition of human resource planning from a socialist perspective (See Chapter 2). Human resource planning from this perspective encompassed the provision of employment for all, an adequate income according to accomplishments at work and allocation of the labour force efficiently both quantitatively and qualitatively in order to ensure optimum use of labour for economic development. Most important is that human resource planning is an integral part of national economic planning.

From its objectives and its practice it is evident that the Department of Research and Planning of the Ministry of Manpower in Zimbabwe concentrates on the development and utilisation of human resources to fill gaps and imbalances "in the light of economic developments". The broader social aspects of human resource planning - incomes and employment - are not part of the objectives of the Department. They are issues of concern to the Ministry but do not form an integral part of the immediate objectives of human resource planning. The definition of human resource planning and the tasks the Department of Research and Planning sets itself, therefore fall short of the socialist definition
insofar as they do not fulfill the social objectives which are a vital component of human resource planning in a socialist society. This has limited the ability of the Ministry concerned and government to:

"transform manpower training and utilisation...and the relations of production in which such utilisation takes place in accordance with its socialist objectives." (6)

Another limitation of the conception of human resource planning in Zimbabwe in relation to socialist transformation is the lack of integration of human resource planning into national economic planning. The Department of Research and Planning of the Ministry of Manpower does function in "conjunction with the Ministries of Finance, Economic Planning and Development and Education." (7) However, there are not detailed mechanisms for plans relating to human resource utilisation and development outside of manpower forecasts in relation to economic growth. (8) Chapter 2 discussed the limitations of this approach to human resource planning.

In relation to the second question - what progress has the Ministry made in relation to human resource planning, development and utilisation in its own terms - there have been successes and failures. At independence there were serious gaps in the data available to allow for comprehensive human resource planning, utilisation and development. The first task that the Ministry set itself therefore was the National Manpower Survey in order to provide:

"the data base upon which to plan for the transformation of manpower utilisation and training in accordance with ... socialist objectives." (9)
The objectives of the NMS were fourfold:
- to assess the size and characteristics of the work force at professional, skilled and semi-skilled levels;
- to assess the potential of Zimbabweans working or studying abroad;
- to assess existing shortages with regard to professional, skilled and semi-skilled personnel;
- to formulate short, medium and long term policies for education and training to meet the country's development requirements. (10)

The NMS did make a significant contribution to the data gap, although it excluded from its survey domestic workers, the armed forces, subsistence agriculture and the informal sector. (11) It did to some extent assess shortages, although only in relation to present demand, and did not provide any analysis of human resource requirements for a changing Zimbabwe. More is said on the NMS and its assessment of skill shortages later in this Chapter.

On the basis of the NMS certain immediate policy issues were tackled - "primarily those aspects resulting from colonial prejudices and inadequacies." (12) The Ministry of Manpower initiated a National Manpower Strategy to rectify racial imbalances and provide "a stable and reliable force making skills truly national". (13) As part of the Strategy "there has been an element of planning - bonding of apprentices, centralised recruitment of apprentices, scholarships, programmes for shortage areas, expansion of the polytechnics, foreign recruitment controls". (14) In addition the Ministry of Education has facilitated the massive expansion in access to education at all levels.
These measures have helped to do away with the racial distribution in employment and ensure the development of an educated and skilled population of Zimbabweans at all levels.

Attention was drawn in the NMS to the salary structure in Zimbabwe which "has one of the world's highest differentials" (15) and to the school leaver problem, but no concrete policy suggestions were made.

The focus of the human resource planning strategy after independence has therefore not been a socialist strategy insofar as there has not been an integrated planned approach to the problems of incomes, employment, quality and quality of personnel for socialist economic development. According to the Director of Research and Planning, Ministry of Manpower: "There is a lack of planning in government. Much of the planning there is is indicative planning and not central planning". (16) The 1984 Annual Review of Manpower pointed out that:

"One of the major lessons of the past five years has been the lack of an effective planning machinery in government". (17)

This makes human resource planning particularly difficult - especially in the context of a capitalist economy. As the 1983 Annual Review of Manpower states:

"The logic of capitalist economies, dominated by transnational companies, imposes serious problems, especially in the utilisation and deployment of labour". (18)

The Director of Research and Planning, Ministry of Manpower explained:

"We have not been able to project manpower requirements. We do not know how the private sector is going to expand. Predictions then depend on foreign exchange allocations and exports. We project in an indicative way. What the private sector is going to do is a matter of guesswork. We are planning for the private sector and
training for them - we cannot however, link this planning to expansion". (19)

The Ministry of Manpower therefore maintains that it is limited in how far it is possible to plan human resource utilisation in the context of a capitalist economy. Wider issues of human resource planning such as employment and incomes have not been dealt with in terms of socialist objectives. There is no integrated plan incorporating education and training, employment, incomes, and efficiency of labour.

The third question at the beginning of this section was the role of black advancement as a dependent variable of human resource planning? It is evident from the discussion so far that the main thrust of Zimbabwe's approach to human resources has been black advancement i.e. "to make skills more national". 'Manpower policy' in Zimbabwe has concentrated on creating black skills to the exclusion of other important aspects of human resource policy.

While black advancement has been the essential ingredient of human resource policy, as human resource planning is weak in general, so is it weak in relation to black advancement. Outside of the Presidential Directive there are no policy document on black advancement, despite its importance to human resources, politics and the economy in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe never went as far as elaborating manpower plans with goals for localisation and Africanisation as many other African countries did. (See the examples in Chapter 2 citing Jolly and Colcough 1972)
Nonetheless the human resource policy there is, has been directed to overcoming the racial imbalances in the employment structure inherited from the colonial regime.

In conclusion, human resource planning in Zimbabwe since independence has been oriented towards overcoming racial imbalances and skills shortages in a general sense, but not through detailed planning mechanisms. Human resource planning has not however involved restructuring human resources with a view to "transforming the relations of production in which manpower utilisation takes place", i.e. with a view to socialist transformation. (20) Human resource planning has therefore been a vehicle for black advancement, but not for socialist transformation.

The following section will look at the important problems for human resource policy in Zimbabwe, problems which stand in the way of the transformation of the relations of production.
3. **MAJOR PROBLEMS FOR HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY AND BLACK ADVANCEMENT**

Three areas in particular pose problems for manpower policy and planning in Zimbabwe:

a. Employment and unemployment

b. Skills shortages and expatriates

c. Incomes and wages

---

### a. EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT

#### i. Supply of labour

The 1982 census provides the most recent systematic and comprehensive data on the population of Zimbabwe and the labour force within it. There are problems with the data, particularly in relation to definitions and categories of unemployed and underemployed persons. There is no indication of underemployment amongst communal farmers or the informal sector. The census does however, provide an indication of the nature of the labour market in Zimbabwe (see Table 7.1.).
Table 7.1

POPULATION AND THE LABOUR FORCE 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popn. 7.5m</td>
<td>7.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children under 15yrs</td>
<td>3.6m 48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economically inactive</td>
<td>1.4m 37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>students</td>
<td>.4m 24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homemakers</td>
<td>.8m 57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income recipients</td>
<td>.2m 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labour force</td>
<td>2.5m 63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communal farmers</td>
<td>1.0m 42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployed</td>
<td>.3m 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>informal sector</td>
<td>.1m 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formal sector</td>
<td>1.0m 72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1985, CSO, p43.

Employment in the formal sector has fluctuated between .985 and 1.050m since 1974 (see Table 7.2.). There has in other words been a negligible growth in formal employment during this period. With a growth in population during the same period, since 1974 the ratio of population employed has declined. Table 7.2. shows that the ratio of population employed has declined from 18.4% in 1974 to 12.4% in 1985. The table also shows that the GDP has declined during the same period.
Table 7.2:
INCOME, OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE ZIMBABWE ECONOMY 1965 - 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>GDP PER CAPITA CONSTANT PRICES Z$</th>
<th>INFLATION</th>
<th>EMPLOYMENT</th>
<th>EMPLOYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>748 000</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>1040 000</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>985 000</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>1010 000</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1038 000</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1046 000</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>1033 000</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>1000 000</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>990 000</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Assumed population growth rate = 3.5%)


According to the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) (1982/3 - 1984/5) GDP was expected to be 8% per annum, and formal employment was to increase 3% per annum, i.e. 108 200 jobs per annum. (21) These targets were derived from the impressive performance of the economy in 1980/81. The Plan anticipated that future economic growth and employment would follow a similar trend as the period immediately after independence. The reasons for the boom at independence cannot have been carefully examined. Table 7.3. shows planned and actual employment trends during the Plan period.
Table 7.3. A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1982/3</th>
<th></th>
<th>1983/4</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plan</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Plan</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material production</td>
<td>+3.20</td>
<td>-4.40</td>
<td>+3.39</td>
<td>-2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-material production</td>
<td>+3.20</td>
<td>-4.85</td>
<td>+3.11</td>
<td>+3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>+3.16</td>
<td>-1.55</td>
<td>+3.30</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3. B.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1982/3</th>
<th></th>
<th>1983</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plan</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Plan</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material production</td>
<td>+23.4</td>
<td>-32.2</td>
<td>+25.6</td>
<td>-19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-material production</td>
<td>+9.9</td>
<td>+15.9</td>
<td>+10.5</td>
<td>+10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>+33.3</td>
<td>-16.5</td>
<td>+36.1</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table shows that employment growth rates for 1982/3 and 1983/4 were -1.55 and 1.76 respectively, instead of 3.16 and 3.30 respectively. Instead of over 30,000 jobs being created each year as planned, there was a decline in employment in real terms. The economy was only able to create about 7,000 jobs a year (22).
Table 7.4. shows percentage growth rates for the economy and employment (productive and non-productive sectors) for 1974 to 1985. The Table shows that with the exception of 1980, since independence there has been a negative rate of growth in employment in the productive sector. Employment in the non-productive sector has grown. This performance is contrary to the TNDP and as we will see, the First Five Year National Development Plan. Both place emphasis on the need for growth in employment in the productive sector.

Table 7.4.:  
GROWTH RATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EMPLOYMENT 1974-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP% (1980=100)</th>
<th>Employment Growth Rates %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Material Production Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>15,5</td>
<td>4,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>-0,2</td>
<td>0,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>0,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>11,0</td>
<td>2,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>15,0</td>
<td>-0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0,0</td>
<td>-1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>-3,5</td>
<td>-3,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>-0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6,0</td>
<td>-0,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most significant decline in employment has been in agriculture. In 1983 agriculture employed 263,000, or 25% of all employees. In 1975 agriculture employed 35% of all employees. The reasons for this decline are many - drought and recession, the war, migration of white farmers, the rising minimum wage and the agro industrial wage which has to a certain extent forced increasing mechanisation in agriculture. Between 1975 and 1983 employment in agriculture fell by 100,000 persons (23). Manufacturing, which is the second largest sector of the Zimbabwe economy with 17% of all employees (1983), lost 17,000 employees between 1982 and 1985 (24). All other sectors in material production have fallen below envisaged targets of the TNDF. As a result the share of employment in the productive sector has declined from 71% in 1980 to around 65% in 1984.

At the same time the share of employment in the non-productive sector has increased, particularly in the public sector which comprised 9% of all employees in 1975 and 17% in 1983, representing an increase of 80,000 persons (25). This increase has been in the public administration, health and education sectors. This expansion of the non-productive sectors reflects the type of economic expansion that has taken place since independence. It will not be possible to sustain this type of economic expansion without some expansion of the productive sector. While these intentions are stated on paper and in plans, there is no indication in practice of expansion in the productive sector which would lead to job creation and finance for the non-productive sector.
Despite this performance, the First Five Year National Development Plan 1986 - 1990, sets itself the task of creating 144 000 jobs over the Plan period, or an average of over 36 000 jobs a year. This means an annual employment growth rate of 2.7% annually. The Plan projects an annual growth of 3.9% in the labour force (26). By 1990 the potential labour force (persons aged between 15 and 64 years of age) will have increased to 5.1 million from 3.9 million in 1984, implying an annual net addition to the labour pool of some 200 000 people annually (27). Given the age structure of the population, the number of job-seekers coming onto the job market each year will be even higher (28).

The situation is even more dramatic if one takes into account the number of school leavers who will be joining the labour market each year and thus further aggravating the unemployment situation already prevalent in the economy. Table 5.9 (Chapter 5) shows the number of school leavers joining the labour market annually, which is increasing rapidly due to the expansion of secondary education. The Table shows that the number of school leavers with 4 and 6 years secondary education will increase from 29 600 in 1983 to 330 800 in 1991. These figures do not include those who drop out of the education system.

In reality the economy only creates 7 000 jobs a year. The Five Year Plan targets are much greater than this, and the number of new job seekers entering the labour market are greater still. In addition there is the increasing number of school leavers, and the existing pool of underemployed and unemployed. Since the launching of the Plan in 1986 there has been no significant investment in the productive sector which
would facilitate the job creation in this sector. If anything, this sector is still contracting.

ii. **Unemployment**

Within certain confines, statistics on unemployment in Zimbabwe are guesswork. To date there have been no comprehensive studies on unemployment and underemployment in the economy. The official figure according to the 1982 census (see Table 7.1.) is 0.3m or 19% of the labour force (excluding communal farmers). In fact the informal sector and communal farmers can be included in the unemployed/underemployed category. This puts over 50% of the African workforce in this category. In contrast 96% of the white population and 89% of other population groups are in formal employment (see Table 7.5. and Table 6.3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.5: TOTAL LABOUR FORCE BY RACE, 1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Labour Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the initial stage after independence government did not face up to the unemployment problem, although it was a social problem inherited from the settler-colonial regime. As late as 1982, the Minister of Manpower Planning and Development, Dr Shava, "ruled out any possibility of unemployment for people undergoing training". He said all "those undergoing training would be absorbed in employment and would replace expatriates in government, industry and commerce". The Minister correlated the growth in skilled personnel with the rate of economic growth - an assumption of HCT, which was in fact not correct according to statistics on Table 7.4. (29). Similarly the statistics on unemployment are contradictory, and were played down until in 1984 when there was a dramatic expansion in the number of secondary school leavers joining the labour market, and the problem could no longer be ignored (30). The Minister of Manpower, Dr Shava, announced that 7% of the workforce was unemployed. This figure does not correlate in any way with the 1982 census. In September 1984 the Ministry of Manpower released its Annual Review of Manpower for 1983 giving an unemployment figure of over 21% (31).

By 1985/6 government began to recognise that it did have a serious problem in relation to unemployment. The First Five Year National Development Plan identifies unemployment as:

"a major national issue ..... (which) looms as one of the most socially destabilising problems throughout the plan period" (32).

The Plan identified the primary causes in the growth of unemployment as:

"the decline in the economy's labour-absorbative capacity which resulted from the economic difficulties of three successive years of drought and recession and the tendency among enterprises to shift from labour-intensive to capital-intensive techniques of production on account of wage increases. Rapid population growth also
aggravated the problem". And "the backlog of unemployment that resulted from the three year recession and the drought was too large to be absorbed into the work force in a single good year. The other cause of the persistent and growing unemployment problem is the large number of school leavers who now enter the labour market each year" (33).

None of these reasons identify the root cause of the unemployment problem in Zimbabwe. They rather identify the symptoms as being the cause. The problem is that if the wrong reasons are given, wrong solutions will be provided. Zimbabwe’s unemployment problem did not begin with the three year recession. If that was really one of the main causes of the problem it would not be that difficult to solve. School leavers do not cause unemployment – they are a symptom of the problem. Returning refugees and ex-combatants at independence also added to the unemployed inherited at independence, but they again were a symptom of the inability of the economy to provide productive employment which contributes to incomes and economic growth.

The reasons given in Chapter 4 for the unemployment problem that Zimbabwe inherited were the structure of the economy and discriminatory labour and employment practices. Since independence at many levels in the labour market discrimination has been removed. Soon after independence there were many jobs made available to blacks which previously had not been – from skilled level upwards. In addition the massive expansion of public sector jobs gave many blacks access to a job. After taking up the initial slack, the labour market has again become stagnant. The fundamental cause for this now has to be the same
as the cause of the unemployment crisis before independence: the structure of the economy, including its links with foreign capital. This has not changed significantly, and likewise the structure of the labour market had not changed either. Riddell was cited in Chapter 4 as saying that to create full productive employment in order to provide jobs for school leavers from a new de-racialised education system, fundamental economic changes would have to be part of overall development goals. There have been no such fundamental changes since independence which are addressing the economic structure and therefore the provision of employment within it.

The fact the wrong reasons lead to wrong solutions is evidenced in Government's present approach to the unemployment crisis. In 1985 Government set up an Inter-Ministerial Cabinet Committee to deal with the unemployment crisis. The Ministry of Manpower sits on this committee. One source within the Ministry describes government solutions to the problem as essentially "evasive":

"expansion of training for youth, national youth service after school, vague statements on co-ops, early retirement in the public sector, expansion of jobs in parastatals through shorter working hours, growth points in the rural areas" (34). In addition there is the strategy to change the education system - to vocationalise it - in order to make students more employable (35).

In the Five Year Plan Government did make reference to the need to channel investment "into areas that have the potential for generating employment opportunities". "In this connection, Government will divert about 47.0% of total investment into the productive sectors of the
While Government repeatedly states in the Plan its intention to "distribute its investment in favour of material production sectors ....... either on its own or jointly with local private or foreign partners" (37), the productive sectors (agriculture, mining and manufacturing) which are to account for 47.0% of total investment - have contracted. There is not the investment being made in these sectors, despite government's intention to do so. Government's other strategy in the Five Year Plan with regard to employment is to:

"encourage self-employment by formalising the informal sector and promoting the development of co-operatives in all sectors of the economy. For the formalised informal sector to contribute towards solving the problem of unemployment its members should be trained in relevant skills so that they can run their small enterprises efficiently" (38). Another Government strategy to create employment has been "the resettlement of a large number of families, ....... and an accelerated rural development programme, which would promote the development of small and medium-scale industries" (39).

In practice what has Government's approach to the unemployment crisis been? Since 1982 investment in both the public and private sectors has been declining. As a result of low investment, there have been "continued depressed employment trends although marginal increase was recorded for 1984" (40). There has therefore not been any changes in the formal sector of the economy which have facilitated the creation of employment opportunities. The Government Socio-economic Review 1980-85 concludes:

"the fact the employment performance has tended to fall far below economic growth performance is reflective of the inability of the economy, given its existing structure and present levels and patterns of investment to absorb adequate numbers of the labour force". "This points to the need for structural changes which involve investment into areas which facilitate the creation labour force each year" (41).
While this point is repeatedly made in some government quarters, although not others, there is very little done about it in practice. Government has left the problem of employment creation to ad hoc co-operative and resettlement schemes, the growth of the informal sector, some youth training projects, and have committed themselves to a national service scheme, although this has not yet been realised. In addition there are new education policies being proposed which aim to make school students more employable, especially in the rural areas and the informal sector, fitting into the existing government strategy in practice on unemployment (see Chapter 5 where the feasibility of this strategy was analysed). The remainder of the section will examine how effective and how feasible government proposals to alleviate the unemployment situation are. The following issues will be examined in relation to their ability to alleviate unemployment: the co-ops, the informal sector, resettlement and the communal areas, and an additional point on 'vocationalisation' of education.

1. 571 employment generating co-operatives were formed between 1981 and 1984. By 1984 employment had been created for 21,371 people or 2% of total formal employment. The co-operatives have faced a variety of problems including lack of capital, lack of skills, lack of land, lack of government support, lack of infrastructure. While they have provided employment for an average of some 5,343 persons a year, co-operatives are not growing nearly fast enough to have any significant impact on the unemployment problem (42).
Table 7.1. shows that the informal sector makes up 9% of the labour force excluding communal farmers, or 5% of communal farmers are included in the labour force, i.e. about 132,000 people. Growth of the informal sector has been facilitated by the inability of the formal sector to absorb new labour, and substantial rural-urban migration. Individuals in this sector use their own skills to generate some employment and income from such activities as food vendors, carpenters, builders, handicrafts, metal workers, tin smiths etc. ... The activities of those people in the informal sector are neither registered nor licenced. 90% of the people in the informal sector are women. (43) Government in its original Growth with Equity statement stressed the role of this sector for employment creation. In this context government undertook a joint survey with the ILO - an Informal Sector Study in 1983. Conclusions from the study showed that the growth of the informal sector related to the inability of the formal to provide jobs and adequate earnings. In addition the Study showed that:

"both with regard to incomes earned (which are too low) and hours worked (which are too long) the informal sector represents disguised unemployment or under-employment of labour indicating gross misallocation of resources" (44).

There has been little government input into this sector. In terms of its role in the economy so far, it is evident that the informal sector exists because of unemployment, it exists in order to provide people with only a very bare existence, does not contribute to productivity as a whole. While the existence of this sector does play a certain minimal role in the economy, it is evident that it is not the solution to the very serious unemployment problem facing government. Neither does it
contribute to productivity, therefore not assisting very much in the increase and redistribution of earnings.

iii. The majority of the Zimbabwe population still live and work in the rural areas. Only 26% of the population is urban, i.e. living in towns that have populations of more than 2 500 (45). Over 60% of the labour force is engaged in agricultural or related activities. 42% of these are communal farmers. Chapter 2 described how the communal areas were by and large the poorest land, had become overpopulated and overused. Riddell was cited as saying that 60-70% of those in the communal areas were dependent on a wage income in the formal sector. The National Household Capability Survey (1985) (46) showed that over 40% of communal households received remittances. Those families which do not receive them tend to have a lower nutritional status. The introduction of non-discriminatory pricing, marketing and credit policies and state support services have helped the peasantry to become more productive and increased their contribution to staple food production. The more successful peasant producers are however concentrated in natural regions II and III (47). Where peasant production has increased significantly, it has been on prime land, where infrastructure is also much better. At the most, 20% of the peasants have gained from the reforms in the independence period. This illustrates the problems with the strategy which envisages the rural, especially communal areas as providing the solution to unemployment outside of any radical changes to the structure of agricultural production (for example land reform, industrialisation.) In addition, recurrent drought leads to fluctuations in peasant
production, thus making the peasantry still reliant, where it has the chance, on alternative sources of income from the formal or informal sector.

The highest quality land in Zimbabwe is still concentrated in private hands, i.e. largely white farmers and agro-industries, and has been protected by the Lancaster House Agreement. Most resettlement since independence has taken place to middle or low quality land, and the amount of land transferred for settlement has not been substantial. These resettlement areas were part of a government programme after independence to resettle people displaced by the war and those in grossly overpopulated areas onto areas of commercial land that was unutilised or under-utilised. It was also, as was mentioned above a part of government's employment strategy to create productive employment in the rural areas and deal with urban unemployed. The resettlement programme was also an attempt to redress the inequitable division and occupation of land on a racial basis.

Government planned to resettle a total number of 162 000 peasant families over the three year period of the Transitional Development Plan at a total cost of $260 million at constant 1981 prices (48). The major feature of the resettlement programme is that most of the land redistributed is qualitatively the poorest. In addition financial constraints have led to incomplete government support and a rather slow pace of settlement. Foreign aid pledges for resettlement (especially from the British and Americans) have been largely unforthcoming. By
1985 approximately 2.5 million hectares of land at a total cost of just over 50 million had been redistributed. 36,000 families comprising over 250,000 people were resettled onto this land. This is way under the initial target for resettlement. Slightly over 60% of those resettled were from the communal lands, the rest being refugees, the landless and unemployed persons (50). On the whole the resettlement programme has resettled individual families, rather than establish producer co-operatives. By 1984 there were about 41 producer co-operatives established on approximately 35,000 hectares of land from whole farms bought from large scale commercial farmers.

The Five Year Development Plan has actually reduced the objectives and targets for land distribution. In contrast to the TNDP, it planned to resettle 15,000 families annually amounting to a total of 75,000 families - 50,000 families below the original target. Government policy to create small and medium scale industry in the rural areas has by and large not taken off - to the extent that it has created a solution to unemployment and under-employment in the rural areas. It may however be too early to conclude that such policy in the long term could not provide a partial solution to the unemployment problem.

Agricultural employment, rather than increasing since independence, has declined from 365,000 in 1974, to 327,000 in 1980. 263,500 in 1983, 277,800 in 1985. From government's progress so far on the resettlement question, the decline in employment in the agricultural sector, the low level of formal sectors jobs created in the rural areas through rural industrialisation, as well as the continued reliance of rural households
on remittances from urban incomes, it is evident that "there has not been adequate investment in the rural areas to change the pattern of employment in the desired direction" (51). So while government is shifting the unemployment crisis to rural areas, orienting education to the rural areas, there has not been the restructuring of production in the rural areas to facilitate any increase in employment. On the contrary employment is on the decline.

iv. Chapter 5 discussed the problems with the government approach which perceives the solution to unemployment as being in vocational-oriented education which gears students to the communal areas and the informal sector. Research has shown that students with some education have different aspirations. 1982 Census data showed that, excluding the communal sector, unemployment was lowest (10.5%) amongst those with secondary an higher education, but highest (21%) amongst those with primary education. The unemployment rate for those with no education at 19.6%, was slightly lower than for those with primary schooling only. This suggests that those with primary education prefer to seek work in the urban areas and the formal sector, not the communal areas and informal sector. However, their qualifications are inadequate to secure employment in the formal sector. For the few jobs available, they are competing with people who are better educated than themselves (52).

Another study showed that 72% of those with secondary education were employed in the formal economy compared with 43% for primary education and 42% for those with no schooling. At the same time, only 20% of
those with secondary education were working as communal farmers as against 45% in the case of primary school leavers, and 47.6% of those with no formal education. This is another indicator of the problems in the approach which perceives of the communal areas and the informal sector being able to contribute significantly to the absorption of the fast-growing number of secondary school leavers (53).

V. In conclusion, government policy is therefore in reality doing very little to tackle the enormous and growing unemployment problem in Zimbabwe. Putting the emphasis on the need for the problem to be solved by vocationalising education, orienting employment to the communal areas and agriculture, recognising the informal sector, is having little or no impact on the problem and not tackling the fundamental cause either. While on paper government has committed itself to expanding the productive sector, this has not happened and there is no indication that there is a change in government investment strategy in order to implement this policy.

A survey was carried out in 1986 by the Department of Business Studies of the University of Zimbabwe in order to establish "Formal Sector Employment Demand Conditions in Zimbabwe". The survey found that factors which deterred increased employment in Zimbabwe were: insufficient demand for output, the inability of employers to dismiss workers, wage and salary costs, and the availability of foreign exchange. Foreign exchange was a primary factor affecting manufacturing employment, and wages and salary costs deterred employment in the non-
manufacturing sector (54). By and large these factors are aspects of new government policy which the private sector is not happy with. The study argues that there is the need for the economy to function more efficiently. The study makes the case for new macro-economic policy on the part of government which would include a growth rate of 5% and the expansion of labour-intensive employment (55). Even with these and other changes, the study admits that "unemployment is still likely to increase substantially in the next decade" (56). Recognising that even with more free-market oriented policies the formal sector will not be able to generate sufficient jobs, the study falls back on the government strategy which advocates agriculture, the co-operatives, the informal sector and small-scale enterprises as having to absorb a significant number of job-seekers. In short, while identifying aspects of present government policy which facilitate the unemployment problem, the study does not identify the structural causes of the unemployment problem nor does it provide real solutions.

The fundamental cause of unemployment in Zimbabwe after independence is the structure of the economy inherited from the colonial period. In human resource policy and economic policy government has not yet come up with any practical solutions with address the enormity of the unemployment problem.
Chapter 4 showed that up to 1976/7 in general whites occupied professional, administrative and managerial, and technical and certified skilled posts. Blacks in general occupied semi-skilled and unskilled positions. 75% of non-Africans in employment had 4 or more years secondary schooling, and just over half had special training beyond secondary school. Over 50% of the African workforce had no schooling at all, and the majority of the remainder had some primary schooling. Even those Africans who did manage to get a secondary schooling and further training were not guaranteed of a job because they were black. Unemployment amongst Africans with primary schooling and less was very high.

In this context there was a relatively severe skills shortage at all levels. The main historical reasons for the skills shortage were:

- the colour bar in the employment structure and labour legislation;
- an inadequate and discriminatory education and training infrastructure for the black population;
- a reliance on (white) immigration to fulfill needs for skilled personnel.

Despite shortages, unlike most other African countries, at independence Zimbabwe did have a pool of Africans who were qualified at various levels from skilled upwards. From skilled to professional level there
were Africans who could not get jobs or certification because of their colour. This meant that at independence, while there was a shortage of personnel in specific areas, the situation was not absolutely critical. The situation was however accelerated by the emigration of whites at and soon after independence.

According to the new Prime Minister three factors which had been of concern to the national liberation movement with regard to the task of "human resources planning and development in a future independent Zimbabwe" were:
- "the dominance of white skills in all sectors of the colonial economy;
- the dearth of skills among the African population; and
- the possibility of a mass exodus of skilled whites at independence"

Evidence for this viewpoint had come from the variety of studies done before independence, especially towards the end of the 1970's when the studies were evaluating skill shortages with a view to needs at and immediately after independence (58). About half of these studies were based on secondary sources, and they were done by researchers outside the country. This applies in particular to the studies done by agencies just prior to independence - The Zimbabwe Manpower Survey, The Immediate Manpower and Training Needs for an Independent Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Towards a New Order. This limited the accuracy of these studies, but they all provided a general indication of where shortages would be after independence.
The National Manpower Survey (NMS), the first of its kind carried out by the new government in 1981 did provide new empirical data and gave an indication of skill shortage areas. Information on skill shortages was not detailed, nor were specific plans or strategies proposed on how to overcome these shortage areas. General strategies were proposed, especially opening up opportunities for education and training at all levels, but not a strategy which detailed how to overcome specific shortage areas.

The primary thrust of the National Manpower Survey was political. It's objective was to deny a shortage of black skills and a reliance on white technical and professional manpower - i.e. "white indispensibility in the economy" (59).

According to the NMS, colonialism did generate:

"formally and informally- a whole corpus of skills among the African people. The scope and extent of these skills however remained largely concealed behind white settler ideological rhetoric and their official statistics all of which were designed to emphasise the assumed indispensibility of white skills .......... (and) that there was a dearth of skills among the African people in Zimbabwe" (60).

The mechanisms for ensuring this were - job reservation, undercategorization of skills (i.e. Africans being categorised as semi-skilled whereas they could perform the tasks of the white artisan), and under-utilisation and unemployment of African skilled and professional personnel (61).

The NMS made a claim to being better than other studies which were "purely technical and empiricist". According to the NMS it was:
"ideologically oriented towards a belief in, and the desirability for, social and economic transformation" (62). The NMS therefore perceived its role as "a contribution towards to exposure of white settler ideology, revealing the true nature and impact of white settler colonialism and describing the scope and extent of skills development. All this should indicate that if there was a manpower shortage at independence in 1980, it was less with regard to the nature of the economy (and number of jobs therein) that we inherited than in relation to the future needs and objectives of politically independent and development oriented Zimbabwe" (63).

In actual fact the NMS did not make any significant contribution to policy and planning for "a strategy for socialist transformation", which it promised to do (64). No detail was given of the kind of skills needed for a 'development oriented Zimbabwe'. In its objective to prove that white skills were not indispensible the NMS credited the colonial education system with more than it deserved and overlooked important detail in order to ensure that there was in fact the scientific and technical personnel necessary for an independent Zimbabwe. The NMS maintained that:

"the economy was only 5% below employment capacity in 1981", and that "there can be no doubt therefore that 'manpower shortage' as such cannot be the main constraint to economic development in post-colonial Zimbabwe" (65).

The NMS itself in other chapters, and other government and independent studies have provided data to the contrary on skills shortages. The NMS claimed that there were major shortage areas in: "administration and management, agriculture, engineering and medicine" (66). An ongoing survey by the Department of Business Studies of the University of Zimbabwe showed that 32% of companies surveyed said that production was
seriously inhibited by a shortage of skilled personnel (67). In 1981 the public sector alone had vacancies constituting 41.6% of total posts in the highly technical fields, i.e. 482 of 1159 technical posts were vacant (68). The First Five Year National Development Plan 1986 - 1990 stated that all sectors of the economy were seriously short of:

"personnel with scientific and technical know-how, particularly those who can man research and development establishments as well as those who can teach science subjects at secondary and university level" (69).

The Annual Reviews of Manpower 1983 and 1984 published by the Ministry of Manpower reiterate the existence of shortages of personnel in administrative, managerial, and professional and technical occupational categories, but provide no detailed plans for overcoming these problems nor qualitative analysis on the kind of personnel required.

Three factors which have exacerbated the skills shortage after independence are: misallocation of skills, the 'manpower drift' from the public to the private sector and emigration.

- Misallocation of skills

With the flight of administrative skills soon after independence, and the income and status attached to administrative posts, many of the scientific and technical personnel available went into administrative positions in the public and private sector (70).
- 'Manpower drift'

The manpower drift from the public to the private sector has been caused primarily by the salary differential. A graduate leaving university will start in the private sector on double what he would get in government (71). And this differential increases as one moves up the scale and with experience. Government did attempt to counter-act this problem with a 15% critical areas allowance for senior administrative and technical personnel, but cannot compete with private sector salaries. The 'manpower drift' has also been facilitated by black advancement in the private sector. The private sector employed officials who have worked for government for essentially political reasons, for example as labour relations and personnel officers. The manpower drift has led to diminished efficiency in the public sector and a high turnover of civil servants (72).

- Emigration

From the mid-1970's emigration began to exacerbate skill shortages in all occupations. The most severely affected were professional and technical, administrative and managerial, and production and related workers (see Table 7.6.A and B.). By 1985 the situation had stabilised with net migration being approximately 400. Many immigrants after independence come to the country as expatriates to fill shortage areas created by emigrants. Most of these immigrants are teachers,
architects, engineers and related technicians, medical and managerial personnel (73).

Table 7.6 A:

**Numbers of Economically Active Immigrants by Occupational Category 1965-85**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>During UDI</th>
<th>Post Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical and related workers</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>1,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin and managerial workers</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and related workers</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>1,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric. and related workers</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and related workers</td>
<td>1,216</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>2,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequately described</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,747</td>
<td>5,595</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-361-
### Table 7.6. B.

**Numbers of Economically Active Emigrants by Occupational Category 1965-85**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>During UDI</th>
<th>Post Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical and relations workers</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>1,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin and managerial workers</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and related workers</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>1,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric. and related workers</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and related workers</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequately described</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2,791</td>
<td>4,870</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Statistical Office, Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics, various years.
The return of black Zimbabweans from exile and study abroad as well as promotion of Africans into positions held previously by whites has filled a fair proportion of the gaps created by white emigrants. However, remaining whites and blacks who had been advanced into occupational categories previously reserved for whites, could not meet skill requirements after independence. Government's response was to adopt the National Manpower Strategy mentioned earlier in the Chapter in order to ensure a stable and reliable workforce of skilled Zimbabweans. As a part of this strategy, government approach to expatriates has been an important factor in overcoming skill shortages.

ii. Control of Foreign Recruitment and Expatriates

Unlike many other African countries, Zimbabwe took a very firm stand on foreign recruitment and expatriates from the start. Even before independence the liberation movements reflected their fear of the effect of an open foreign recruitment policy in the Patriotic Front's Zimbabwe Manpower Survey:

"Expatriates drain the meagre foreign exchange reserves of the country; delay the training of nationals; do not alleviate the problem of unemployment which is one of the critical problems facing developing countries; and lastly, when a country employing foreign experts decides to introduce economic measures in the interests of its people, against the countries exporting foreign expertise, the foreign experts are usually used by their governments to sabotage such measures" (74).

The government policy document 'Growth with Equity', 1981, stated that:

"Government is fundamentally opposed to any system of external recruitment based on expatriate conditions." (75)
To ensure that foreign recruitment did not become an obstacle to the development of indigenous skills, an Inter-Ministerial Manpower Planning Committee on Foreign Recruitment (MPCFR) was set up in the Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development "to advise the Immigration Department on all skill-based applications for permits to work in Zimbabwe" (76). The Ministry of Manpower distinguish between foreign recruits who are foreigners employed on local terms and who do not repatriate funds, and expatriates who are people on contract who repatriate funds. Both categories of people are still processed by the MPCFR and Immigration. Expatriates are not given the perks they are in other African countries - they receive no gratuity or pension. Those employed by the private sector are however employed at very high salaries - $36 000 to $150 000 a year (77).

Permission to recruit foreign personnel must be sought from the Committee. For the Public Sector this is done through the Public Service Committee on Foreign Recruitment. The MPCFR established strict criteria for recruiting foreign personnel:

- that there are no unemployed and suitably qualified persons in the country;
- that the employer had genuinely explored the possibilities of filling the vacancy from within the establishment;
- that the foreign recruit has experience and is capable of training a Zimbabwean to fill his place (78).

In order to ensure that employer and foreign recruit abide by the regulations a Foreign Recruitment Monitoring Team was set up in the Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development. The Monitoring Team was
to control the inflow of foreigners and to check that where there were foreigners there was some transfer of skills taking place or a training programme organised by the employer. This team has itself faced problems because of a lack of technically qualified staff. It is therefore not always in a position to make judgements. It has suffered from a shortage of personnel, and found it difficult to get the truth from companies who often prefer a qualified and experienced white expatriate to a qualified inexperienced black Zimbabwean (79).

According to the Administrator on Foreign Recruitment the black Zimbabweans who returned after independence by and large had degrees in the Arts and Social Sciences. "The highest group was historians - look at the degrees of all the executive directors and ministers. There were few scientists, engineers, architects." (80) Shortages still exist, according to the Administrator on Foreign Recruitment, for the ministries in the following areas: technical instructors, doctors, nurses and related specialists, road and traffic civil engineers, agriculture, construction (architects and quantity surveyors), education - a critical shortage of teachers - 8 000 in January 1986 despite foreign recruitment (- reason is expansion, poor conditions of service and lack of mobility); mining engineers, metallurgists and geologists.

For the private sector there is a shortage of all types of engineers - civil, mechanical, electrical, mining, metallurgy, architects, aircraft and computers; in finance chartered accountants, actualists in insurance, statisticians and managers (problem with management is that people want to recruit managers with experience).
According to the 1985 (unpublished) Annual Review of Manpower:

"the demand for critical skills has continued to outstrip supply hence the continued reliance on expatriates" (81).

Table 7.7. shows the number of expatriates approved since independence and that the 1985 figure is the highest - 22.9% more than the 1984 figure. The increase is in the technical, professional and related workers - up about 200 or 15.5%. The production and related group was up 29.8%. According to the ARM 1985 (unpublished) the latter is a critical shortage area. So far upgrading and increased training has not overcome the shortages in this area, despite claims of the NMS that these measures would do so.

Table 7.7:
APPROVED EXPATRIATE PERSONNEL BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUPS 1982-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation Group</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical and related</td>
<td></td>
<td>914</td>
<td>1226</td>
<td>1132</td>
<td>1307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and Managerial</td>
<td></td>
<td>129</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and Related Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td>338</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>1494</td>
<td>1820</td>
<td>1494</td>
<td>1836</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though there was this slight increase in 1985, in general government does have a fairly tight control over foreign recruitment. The problem is that there is not a similar control over the allocation of local skills within the education system and economy - and without this skills shortages will persist. According to one source, where one finds expatriates it illustrates inefficiency in the handling of human resource development - "expatriates are the benchmark on the success or otherwise of how manpower has been handled" (82). He was referring in particular to human resource development in the parastatals, particularly management.

The attitude of government to expatriates has however been political more than technical, except in cases of dire shortage such as teaching. The principle has been to keep expatriates out as much as possible, in order to provide jobs for Zimbabweans and ensure the development of indigenous personnel. Carefully planned use of expatriates with Zimbabwean understudies may have been prudent for skill development in certain areas. For example, Chapter 5 showed that the university operates at 26% under capacity, has a stringent control on expatriates, and could benefit from experienced personnel. The problem is that efficient use of expatriates requires detailed and careful planning, which is lacking in the Zimbabwean context.
Chapter 4 discussed the large disparity between black and white incomes before independence. Whites had a per capita income of $2,158 per annum, whereas blacks had a per capita income of $95 per annum. The average ratio of white: black earnings was 1:10.8. The agricultural sector was much worse with an average ratio for white: black of 1:24.5. This disparity was reflected in the National Manpower Survey (1981). The Survey showed there were income inequalities on the basis of race and sex in all sectors. In all sectors whites enjoyed the highest incomes at all skill levels and in all occupations. Whites, who were 9% of employed persons, received 37% of total wages in 1981 (83). Black's wages in general were particularly low because of the inferior position blacks occupied in the employment structure and the society as a whole.

In its first policy statement - 'Growth with Equity' (1981), government committed itself to raising living standards and incomes and improving the highly equitable distribution of wealth and income inherited at independence. Both these objectives are essential elements of a socialist or 'basic needs' human resource strategy. They are also essential to a post-independence strategy which is attempting to overcome the enormous racial disparities and imbalances in income and living standards inherited from the colonial period.
It is difficult to make any detailed analysis about changes of the racial and overall distribution of incomes and wealth since independence, as the data is not available. There is no comprehensive data on incomes and wages since independence. In particular there is a dearth of data on incomes in the rural areas. The data there is, which is primarily on the formal sector, has not been kept according to colour (race). There are however some indicators of trends since independence.

Soon after independence government introduced a selection of measures to improve the position of the lower income earners, who make up the large majority of the population. These measures were taken on the basis of a political decision to provide the majority of blacks with some benefits from independence, rather than as a part of an overall incomes policy. While government does still adhere to a policy of raising incomes for all the population and reducing income disparities, there has not been an integrated incomes policy which serves to implement these objectives.

The first measures government took included minimum wage legislation, subsidies for basic food items, free primary schooling and free health care for those earning less than $150 per month. These measures led to important gains for lower income groups in the first years after independence. When the economy began to run into difficulties, the first of government policies to be shelved were those which favoured low income groups. In 1982 subsidies were reduced and there was a wage freeze. From 1983 government announced annual wage increases each year until 1987 when there was another wage freeze. In a confidential
memorandum to the World Bank government said that it would not let wages rise by more than half the cost of living (84).

Tables 7.8. and 7.9. show what has happened since 1980 to minimum wages and average earnings in relation to inflation and poverty datum line. Table 7.8. shows that domestic workers have had a marginal increase in wages at constant prices. Industrial workers on the other hand have actually had a decrease in real minimum wages since independence. Table 7.9. shows that both industrial and domestic wages are still well below the poverty datum line.

From 7.10. and 7.11. it is evident that at current prices average earnings have gone up since independence. For the industrial sector and agricultural sector a proportion of each income group has shifted one notch upwards. Table 7.9. shows however than in real terms in relation to the poverty datum line average earnings declined. From the data in Tables 7.10. and 7.11. and similar data from the CSO for earlier years, it has been calculated that real minimum wages rose from $1 607 pa in 1979, to $1 863 in 1980, to 2 040 in 1981, peaking at $2 227 in 1982 (at 1980 constant prices). Subsequently they fell to $1 990 in 1983, $1 813 in 1984 and $1 577 in 1985. The 1985 figure is below the national average for 1975 (85). According to these figures real average earnings grew at 4 and 5.4% respectively for 1981 and 1982. For 1983, 1984 and 1985 average earnings in real terms declined at -12.6%, -8.7% and -4.7% respectively (86). During this same period, from 1981 - 1985 inflation grew at 12.3%, 10.2%, 20.8%, 18.4% and 8.1% respectively. Earlier in this chapter it was shown that during this same period there was little
or no growth in employment. In the productive sector employment in fact declined.

In addition to a decline in average earnings in real terms, there has not been any significant re-distribution of income. This is evident from Tables 7.10 and 7.11. If anything, the disparity has become greater. In 1977 the top 20% of wage earners earned 41.7% of total earnings. In 1984 the top 20% of wage earners earned 55.8% of total earnings. In contrast the 20% lowest paid wage earners took 7.6% of total earnings in 1977, and 5.9% of total earnings in 1984 (87).

The number of whites in formal sector employment has declined from approximately 70,000 or 22% of the labour force in 1981, approximately 30,000 or 7% of the labour force in 1985. Africans in the professional occupational category have increased from 34% in 1981 to 66% in 1985; and in the administrative and managerial category from 19% to 45% (88). During this period there has been no change in the salary structure of the public or private sector, although the disparity in salaries between the public and private sector increased. What has happened in the employment structure in Zimbabwe is exactly what the National Manpower Survey set out to avoid - blacks have moved into places vacated by whites with no changes in the employment or income structure. While the overall gap between white and black wage earners has declined insofar as there is now a proportion of the black workforce earning salaries previously earned by whites. For the large majority of the black workforce in the semi-skilled and unskilled occupations the position they occupy in the employment and income structure has not changed.
In conclusion, since independence government has not adopted an incomes policy which increases standards of living for the majority and alters the inequalities in the society in terms of income and wealth. A proportion of blacks have moved rapidly up the income structure into professional and managerial occupations vacated by whites. While the glaring division between white and black incomes therefore no longer exists, standards of living for the majority have not significantly improved and overall inequality in income and wealth in the society has increased.

(Tables 7.8, 7.9, 7.10, 7.11 /...)
Table 7.8: Minimum Wages in Nominal and Real Terms for Domestic & Industrial Workers ($ per month)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>C.P.I.</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Constant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1980</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1980</td>
<td>102.9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1982</td>
<td>117.1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1983</td>
<td>169.5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1984</td>
<td>189.2</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1985</td>
<td>196.9</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1986</td>
<td>230.0</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Industrial Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>C.P.I. 1980=100</th>
<th>Current Price</th>
<th>Constant Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1980</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1980</td>
<td>102.4</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1982</td>
<td>117.1</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1983</td>
<td>169.5</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1984</td>
<td>184.2</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1985</td>
<td>196.9</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1986</td>
<td>230.9</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.9

Minimum Wages, Earnings and the Poverty Datum Line

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Industrial</th>
<th>Average Earnings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.588 1,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.644 1,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>0.724 1,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.653 1,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.595 1,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.624 1,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>0.577 ---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from R Davies (Unpublished paper) 1987, p 17.
### Table 7.10:

**Wage Distribution of Employment (excluding Agriculture and Domestic Workers) 1982 - 1985.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>under $50</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50 - under $75</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75 - under $100</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100 - under $150</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$150 - under $250</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$250 - under $500</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$500 - under $750</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$750 - under $1000</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1000 - under $1500</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1500 - above</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Employment '000 | 670.2 | 670.1 | 667.2 | 681.1 |

**Source:** Central Statistical Office, unpublished data, 1987
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $50</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50 - under $75</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75 - under $100</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100 - under $150</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$150 - under $250</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$250 - under $500</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$500 - under $750</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$750 - under $1000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1000 - under $1500</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1500 - above</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Employment '000</strong></td>
<td>274.3</td>
<td>263.5</td>
<td>271.2</td>
<td>277.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Central Statistical Office, unpublished data, 1987
'Manpower planning' in Zimbabwe has addressed the issue of skills. The 'National Manpower Strategy' was oriented to making skills more 'national' - i.e. black and localised. In this sense 'manpower planning' has been a vehicle for black advancement. It is black advancement through education, training, occupational mobility and control of expatriates which has facilitated the development of a pool of skilled personnel more representative of the Zimbabwean population. Black advancement, as a variable of 'manpower planning', has therefore been a successful part of government strategy to:

- overcome the dominance of white skills in all sectors of the economy,
- rectify the dearth of skills amongst the African population,
- cater for the exodus of white skills soon after independence.

Human resource planning in Zimbabwe has fallen short of either a 'basic needs' strategy or a socialist strategy. Provision of productive employment, raising standards of living and redistributing income are essential to both strategies. As the discussion above on government policy (or the lack of it) on employment and incomes has shown, neither of these two serious problems have been adequately tackled since 1980. Government's manpower strategy has been a national strategy (i.e. fulfilled nationalist aspirations) to provide Zimbabwean skills for the Zimbabwean economy. Black advancement has been central to this process, although in 1987 all sectors of the economy has not yet been
Africanised. The 'manpower planning' by government to effect this strategy has been indicative stopping largely at objectives in government documents. Human Resource planning has not been an integral part of national economic planning, nor have mechanisms for implementation existed in order to secure the objectives government sets itself. The latter two are again essential requirements of a socialist approach to human resource planning.

Black advancement in the context has meant the advancement of the black petty bourgeoisie and black aspirant national/state bourgeoisie into the social structure of post-colonial capitalism. There has not been a transformation of the relations of production through human resource planning, utilisation and development in the context of socialist transformation - the objective government set itself in 1981 (90).
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis set itself the task of examining the policy and practice of black advancement and human resources development in Zimbabwe, in the context of the country's commitment to socialist transformation. At the start of the study the assumption was that black advancement was necessary at all costs, and any hindrance to the process was largely based on white racism. In the course of the study it was realised that the process is more complicated than simply the replacement of white with black faces, and that political as well as technical and ideological issues are involved in the nature of the black advancement process. On the basis of research done and demonstrated in this study, the following conclusions can be made:

1. The main government policy there has been since 1980 on black advancement is the Presidential Directive to the Public Service, issued by the President in May 1980. The primary objective of this Directive was political, i.e. to meet the demands of the liberation struggle for a black majority government. The immediate aim of the Presidential Directive was to rectify racial imbalances in the appointment and promotion of personnel in the civil service. By 1987 the Presidential Directive had been achieved in the Public Service with only 3% of the Service being white. These few whites
are however still in important decision-making positions in the Public Service.

The Presidential Directive was not binding on other sectors of the society. In the Public Service there were mechanisms to ensure it's implementation, but these did not apply to the parastatals (also part of the public sector) nor the private sector. At no time has black advancement been integrated into human resource plans in terms quotas as was the case elsewhere in Africa.

As a result of lack of clarity on the mechanisms for implementation of a black advancement policy to the public sector as a whole, shortages of personnel and white prejudice black advancement in the parastatals was slower, and exhibited a variety of problems. In response to the slow pace of advancement, individual Ministers were given responsibility for implementation of the Presidential Directive in their Ministry. The political factor, ie. being Zimbabwean and black, became the primary factor in black advancement to managerial level in the parastatals. In some important instances the powers of the Minister were abused and resulted in nepotism, inefficiency and corruption. Following a Comission of Inquiry into the Parastatals in 1986/7 legislation was passed to establish a permanent Parastatals Commission, one of the prime responsibilities of which is to be the appointment and promotion of personnel. The balance between technicism and politics has been a fundamental issue in the case of black advancement in the parastatals.
2. There has been no government policy directly on the issue of black advancement to middle and high level positions in the private sector. There was policy which affected black advancement to skilled level. This legislation affected the recruitment, training and certification of apprentices and skilled workers. Even before the legislation was completely through, apprenticeships and skilled work had become Africanised. No changes were made however to the nature and structure of skilled work in the production process.

Controversy regarding black advancement has been for the advancement of blacks into middle and senior level management and to professional and technical posts in the private sector. Aspirant black management and government have been pressurising for black advancement in the private sector since soon after independence. The objective of government pressure on the private sector has been to facilitate the promotion of blacks into middle and senior management, and to give the private sector a more national (i.e. black) orientation. Government pressure for black advancement in the private sector has not in any way been linked to the realisation of socialism, and in practice would seem to conflict with this goal through the creation of an aspirant black middle class.

Progress regarding black advancement into managerial positions of a professional, technical and administrative nature in the private sector, has been slower than in the public sector. In addition a fair amount of the black advancement has been 'window dressing'. New posts have been created with responsibilities and perks removed.
The private sector justify this slow pace of advancement primarily in terms of a lack of qualified and in particular, experienced personnel. In general, outside of 'window dressing' appointments, the technical factor has been the main consideration in appointments for middle and high level personnel. The primary concern of the private sector is to maintain efficiency and profits, despite the political dynamics of independence. There is an element of racism and prejudice which has affected the pace of black advancement in the private sector. It is the larger and foreign-owned companies which have been more likely to appoint blacks. Those companies where there has been 'successful' black advancement emphasise the need for careful human resource development and planning programmes, so that blacks are not thrust into posts for which they are not prepared, thereby reinforcing racist attitudes.

In general, whites dominate the highly-paid and decision-making jobs in the private sector, and in the public sector it is blacks who dominate these positions.

3. A variety of factors have helped and hindered the black advancement process. As was mentioned above, the manpower factor and racism have been two important factors hindering it. Another important factor is the lack of detailed policy and plans on the part of government. While the issue is important at the political level, and constantly referred to, there has not been a black advancement strategy for the economy as a whole. An important factor facilitating black
advancement in the public sector, and to a lesser extent the private
sector, was the exodus of whites around the time of independence.
The white population was approximately halved by the mid-1980s.

The main factor facilitating black advancement at all levels of the
society and for all occupational categories, has been the rapid
expansion in education and training. The expansion of primary and
secondary schooling, vocational and technical training, and the
University of Zimbabwe, has provided human resources for all levels
of the society and given hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans an
opportunity that they did not have before independence.

The expansion of Zimbabwe's education system was more spontaneous
than planned. It was a response to post-independence electoral
demand and the desire to provide some concrete benefits of
independence for the majority of the population. In addition there
was, and is, the assumption that educational expansion will ensure
economic growth. Zimbabwe therefore followed essentially the
traditional approach to educational planning, although they do claim
to have socialist objectives.

Economic problems and school leaver unemployment have led Zimbabwe
to re-orient the education system limiting the numbers who will
complete an academic secondary education and 'vocationalising'
primary and secondary education. In the context of a society where
large disparities and inequalities still exist, such policy is
likely to lead to an exacerbation of problems such as the 'diploma
disease' and to reinforce the role education can play in facilitating social inequality. Education will nonetheless facilitate black advancement. But in the context of social inequality, it will also facilitate class formation with those who can get an education also being able to 'make it' in terms of jobs and income.

Another important factor facilitating the development and promotion of local black personnel has been a stringent control on expatriate recruitment by government for the public and private sectors. In 1985 non-Zimbabweans were 2% of the professional and technical occupational category, and 8% of the administrative and managerial occupational category. While Zimbabwe does have shortages in these occupational categories, and does recruit expatriates on a very selective basis, it does not have the problem of 'expatriatism' evident in the post-independence period in other African countries.

4. The primary issue for Zimbabwe in terms of human resources has been black advancement more than the localisation of personnel, although both are evident in the post-independence National Manpower Strategy. The primary concern of Zimbabwe's National Manpower Strategy has been to develop and promote local, particularly black, skills. This strategy has involved issues mentioned already - centralisation of recruitment and training of skilled workers, in particular apprentices; massive expansion in education and training; and control of foreign recruitment and expatriates. While Zimbabwe
has had what is called a 'National Manpower Strategy' the main elements of which have been directed to black advancement, it has been a 'strategy' and not a plan. There have been measures to promote black advancement, but these have not been part of an integrated approach to human resource development and planning, and economic planning. A planning machinery for human resources and for the economy as a whole in notably lacking Zimbabwe, despite government commitment to the contrary.

Zimbabwe's National Manpower Strategy, in addressing the issue of skills, and making human resources more 'national', i.e. black and localised, has succeeded to a significant degree in overcoming some of the important human resource problems Zimbabwe inherited at independence, namely:

- the dominance of white skills in all sectors of the economy,
- the dearth of skills amongst the African population,
- the ability to cope with a mass exodus of skilled whites.

5. In terms of being part of a strategy to transform social relations and develop socialism, Zimbabwe's approach to human resource planning has fallen short. In line with its socialist objectives, Zimbabwe set itself the task of raising living standards of the entire population, overcoming disparities of income and wealth, and enlarging employment opportunities. While the disparity between white and black incomes has narrowed since independence, largely because of black advancement, incomes have not improved much in real
terms, and there is a growing disparity between highest and lowest income earners. Unemployment is one of the most serious problems facing Zimbabwe in the independence period, and a definite hinderance to black advancement at all levels. Government has taken no practical measures which will have any serious impact on the growing unemployment problem. While Zimbabwe did inherit a colonial-capitalist economy with gross disparities, it has not taken the policy and practical steps necessary for socialist approach to human resource planning and for socio-economic transformation as a whole.

6. Chapter 2 pointed out that there is no theory which in itself explains the black advancement process. There are rather a variety of theoretical strands which facilitate our understanding of this process. In discussing the implications of these different strands of theory for the process of black advancement, an attempt was made in Chapter 2 to explain the forms that black advancement can take and why. On the basis of this discussion, a few more conclusions of a theoretical nature can be made about the black advancement process in Zimbabwe:

- Black advancement has taken the form it has in Zimbabwe because of the nature of the post-colonial state. The state in Zimbabwe reflects the ambivalence of the petty bourgeoisie in power, and policy serves their interests.
The process of Africanisation or black advancement in Zimbabwe has not necessarily led to economic development or socio-economic transformation. On the contrary, the productive sector has contracted since independence, Zimbabwe is facing serious debt-financing problems, and employment in real terms has declined. In some instances in the public sector, black advancement in itself has resulted in inefficiency and serious economic problems for certain parastatals.

While education and training facilitates black advancement, it is also facilitating class formation. It is possible to conclude that black advancement in an unequal society itself facilitates class formation.

Despite a commitment to socialism, government approach to labour, and the relations between capital and labour have not changed since independence.

Black advancement has opened the doors so that Zimbabweans, and in particular black Zimbabweans, can participate in the political process and decide their own future. The bigger problem, that of economic independence, government has had difficulty in tackling. The change in the colour of government, and the colour of a proportion of the private sector, has made little difference at the objective level to the productive forces and social relations of the society at large.
7. It is still possible to ask why black advancement took the form it did, and why the socialist objectives of government are not being realised? There are three reasons for this:

a. The social relations of the new society. There are forces in the new Zimbabwean society, an important section of the whites that have remained and the developing black middle class and petty bourgeoisie, who do not want socialism and who say as much. While these groups are proponents of black advancement, their conception is black advancement to ensure that blacks are part of post-colonial capitalism, and not black advancement which accompanies socio-economic transformation. There are of course white reactionaries who are resisting even this form of black advancement, but they are in the minority, and consistent pressure for black advancement is isolating them.

Central to the nature of the social relations of the new society is the nature of the post-colonial state. Comprised primarily of the black petty bourgeoisie and elements of a black aspirant middle class, plus a quota of whites from the old regime, while advocating socialism, the state has been ambivalent in practice. The state did not in the early stages act seriously on implementing socialism, and it frustrated white local and foreign capital. It did meet the narrow demands of the national liberation struggle, i.e. political independence for the majority of Zimbabweans. It has been constantly aware of the need not to completely alienate local white capital and foreign capital, as this is where the economic power lies. In time, with economic
difficulties at home and world recession co-operation between government and capital has improved. The state definitely does represent national interests, i.e. it is not simply a tool of international capital, but these national interests are serving the development of post-colonial capitalism, and not transformation towards a socialist society.

b. The theory government followed. At no point has there been a theoretical elaboration of government's conception of black advancement. Whilst they had socialist objectives, they did not follow socialist theory for implementing such objectives. Rather in many instances, wittingly or unwittingly, government has adopted a traditional approach to education and human resource planning, to politics and economic development. At times there almost seems to be an ad hoc and sometimes contradictory approach in government policy, with a lack of theoretical and ideological clarity of a pragmatic nature. There is no doubt that in certain instances socialist proclamations are simply rhetoric and for the benefit of the electorate. But it would be much too cynical to reject all government objectives and policy as simply taking this form. It is therefore the opinion of the author that there is an underestimation of the importance of theory and its implementation in practice. It is not possible to advocate socialism, and use elements of traditional theory to implement it, hoping socialism will happen. There is a scientific basis to the effect of theory in practice, and this depends on the nature of the theory in the first place. Because
of a lack of theoretical clarity government has fallen rapidly into the same problems other countries in Africa are facing. There are attempts in government to do things differently, but these views do not yet have the upper hand.

c. The technical factor, i.e. the human resources with the knowledge and expertise for implementing socialism were not available. Most of those who went into the new state structure were trained in British and American universities, and the local university and did not have the theoretical or practical experience which would enable them to seriously alter the nature of the state structure they had become a part of. The liberation movement was oriented, up until the Lancaster House Agreement, to a bush guerilla war and not the complexities and technicalities of post-colonial development. The Lancaster House Agreement which became the Zimbabwe Constitution tied the hands of government on a number of important issues, and one was the possibility of taking any drastic steps which would facilitate socialist development. It does seem that if a new government does not come to power without a clear conception of what they want and, most important, how to get there, events and political forces rapidly overtake them, and before they know it they are on a certain course of development.

Given these conclusions on the nature of black advancement in Zimbabwe what are the implications for the future and for policy? This is a
complex question the answer to which could provide the scope for another thesis. In conclusion to this thesis however, it is necessary to provide some indicators of the way forward if government objectives are to be realised. Description and analysis alone is insufficient and can lead to the shortcomings of empiricism and traditional social science. Cliched as it may be, Marx's point that there is the need not only to interpret the world, but also to change it, remains valid. The question of how to change it is informed by theory. But most important, again from Marx, is that that theory is informed by practice, by objective reality, and not by whim and fancy or ideal models in textbooks.

In 1980 the Zimbabwe government inherited a very difficult situation. Whatever the wishes and desires of government, to build socialism in absence of a revolutionary transfer of state power, in the context of South Africa's destabilisation policies, and the need to keep the economy going when it was owned and controlled by white local and foreign capital, was a very difficult task. A task for which national liberation movement politically and technically was not prepared. Nonetheless, government made important gains in attempting to realise the national aspirations of Zimbabweans. The question is how to deepen these gains, and realise the government objective of building a more egalitarian society.

To this end there are three areas where changes would be necessary:

a. At the ideological level. As was discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, how the ideological issues of class and colour are resolved, affects
the nature of black advancement. In these chapters it was pointed out that Zimbabwe had not resolved the issues colour or class in policy and practice. Being black and Zimbabwean is still of primary importance, and this approach fuels the development of black petty bourgeois and aspirant middle class aspirations. While government proclaims the interests of the workers and the peasantry, this is not realised in practice. This leads to the next point.

b. At the political level, there is the need to deepen the gains of national democracy. Since independence the aspirations of the working class and the peasantry have not really been reflected through their own organisations such as the trade unions, and neither at the general political level, outside of going to the polling booth to vote for the ruling party.

c. At the policy or technical level. The nature of the black advancement process has implications for various areas of policy, and these areas of policy similarly affect the nature of the black advancement process. This thesis has attempted to touch on these areas - the economy, education, employment, incomes and human resource planning and development in general. In terms of the economy it is necessary for government to concentrate on developing the productive sector - in the urban and the rural areas. An essential part of such policy would be the industrialisation and restructuring of agriculture and the rural areas. Changes in economic policy would have a positive effect on raising incomes and creating employment. In addition attention needs to be given to the growing disparity in incomes, and school leaver unemployment. In terms of education, government needs to move away from the
traditional approach of streaming and vocationalisation that it is following at present, and within economic confines, concentrate on the provision of relevant science-based education for all. If the working class is to play a more active role in production, the content and orientation of technical and vocational training will also need consideration. Human resource planning needs to be integrated into economic plans, and more research is needed on the type of skills and human resources required for a development and socialist oriented Zimbabwe. And last, but not least, a theoretical conception of black advancement is needed with an awareness of the policy implications, and the overall effect of the black advancement process on the future of Zimbabwean society.

These implications are drawn on the assumption of government socialist, or at least egalitarian, objectives. The fundamental question is, with black advancement taking the course it has, does the political will to implement socialism or build a more egalitarian society still exist?
APPENDICES
THE PROVISION OF TRAINED MANPOWER FOR THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF ZIMBABWE - Africanisation of the public and private sectors

Questionnaire: For MBA, Dept. Business Studies, University of Zimbabwe.

Researcher: Brigid Strachan, Open University, London.
Dept. Economics, University of Zimbabwe.

Questionnaire number: 29

Please return Questionnaire to: Brigid Strachan,
c/o Mr Peter McBurney or Secretary, Business Studies. 
or R229 New Social Studies Bldg.

Please note: This questionnaire and its findings are confidential.
Your name and organisation will not be quoted.

Instructions:
The object of the questionnaire is to get as much information as
possible on your experiences of Africanisation, and how your
employer(s) has/have approached the issue. You may find that you
are unable or choose not to answer certain questions. In this
instance please put a line through the particular question, and
continue with the questionnaire. If the space provided for your
answer is not enough, please add additional pages.

Thank you for your co-operation.

1. Personal Details
a. Name: ...........................................

b. Present employer: ..............................

c. Previous employment (last 10 years):  ...........................................
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........................................................................................................
Questionnaire number .........................

1. d. Educational qualifications: .................................................................
   .................................................................................................

   e. Present Salary: .................................................................
   .................................................................................................

2. Africanisation
   a. What is your attitude to the question of Africanisation?

   b. What is the attitude/policy of your present (and if possible previous) employer to the problem of Africanisation?

   c. What practical steps has your present (and if possible previous) employer taken on Africanisation?
2. Which posts have had Blacks appointed to them which were previously held by Whites only?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Job Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>Professional/Technical</td>
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<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>Administrative/Managerial</td>
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<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>Clerical</td>
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<tr>
<td>iv.</td>
<td>Skilled</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(e.g. foremen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v.</td>
<td>Other</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2.e. How has Africanisation taken place? (e.g. were new positions created, were Blacks retrained, were skilled jobs fragmented, were new titles given to old jobs, was responsibility taken away from positions to which Blacks were promoted etc...)
2.9. What have your personal experiences been on the issue of Africanisation since Independence?
Questionnaire number: 21

3. Expatriates
   a. Are any expatriates/foreign experts employed by your Ministry/Company? .................................................................
   
   b. How many expatriates are employed and what positions do they hold?

4. Salary
   a. Could you provide the salary structure of your company/Ministry?

   b. Could you provide any information on how salary scales have changed since Independence?

5. Shortages of skilled manpower
   Does your company/Ministry experience shortages of skilled manpower? If possible, please give details.
6. Training / Manpower Development
   a. Does your firm/ Ministry have a policy of manpower development?
      If so, please detail policy. If not, give possible reasons.

   b. As a result of this policy, (if there is one) what training
      facilities are made available to employees?

7. The MBA course
   a. What motivated you to take the MBA course?

   b. How do you think you will benefit from taking the course?

   c. If you could choose, where would you prefer to be employed on
      completion of this course?

   d. Do you have any suggestions to make on the course content and
      its relevance to your job?
Questionnaire:

1. Provision of trained manpower for the economic development
   Zimbabwe - the private sector

Researcher: Brigid Strachan - Open University, London;
           Dept. Economics, Univ. of Zimbabwe.

Please return questionnaire to: Brigid Strachan, P.O. Box H.G. 190,
Harare.

Questionnaire Number: ........................

Date of interview: ...........................

1. Name and position of respondent: ...............................

   ..............................................................

1.b. Background of respondent: .................................

   ..............................................................

2. Company

   a. Name and address of company: ............................

   ..............................................................

   b. Ownership of company: .................................

   ..............................................................

   c. Subsidiaries/ Operating units/ Divisions
      & principal business/ products:

   ..............................................................
Section: Subsidiaries and products cont.:

Sector and subsector(s):

Turnover:

Market: (local or export)

Board of Directors:

Management:
3. **Number of employees**

How many employees, by skill level for the periods pre-Independence, 1981, 1985? What percentage of these employees are Black, and what percentage are locals? (Please fill in these details on the statistics page at the end of the questionnaire).

4. **Turnover of employees**

a. **Employees who left at Independence:** Did more employees than usual leave the company at Independence? Is it possible to say from what skill level the employees who left were, and whether they were white or black? (Please fill in these details on the statistics page at the end of the questionnaire).

b. **Skills gap:** Did the departure of these employees have any effect on the production of the firm? ii. Was it easy to replace personnel who left at Independence?
Researcher: B Strachan, P.O. Box H.G. 190, Harare.

Questionnaire number: ..................................

4. b. ii. cont. .................................................................
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   iii. What kind of shortages in manpower did your firm face for the year 1985? (Please detail by skill level). What would be the reasons for these shortages and how would your firm pose to remedy the situation? .................................................................
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5. Expatriate Personnel
   a. How many non-Zimbabweans were employed in the firm for the period pre-Independence, 1981 and 1985? Detail by skill level if possible (Please fill in these details on the statistics page at the end of the questionnaire).
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   b. Do the foreign recruitment controls pose any problems to your firm? (eg. manpower, skills, production) .................................................................
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5. c. Does your firm make use of consultancies/management contracts? If so, please give details. .................................................................
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6. Manpower Training
   a. What kind of training does the firm provide for the various skill levels of employees in your firm? (apprenticeships, in-service, management courses, degree courses etc.)
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   b. What problems does your company face in providing further training for employees? .................................................................
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(If necessary additional information can be provided on statistics page).
7. **Future Manpower Requirements**

What manpower needs do you anticipate for the company in the next five years? How does the company pose to deal with these needs?

8. **Wages and Salaries**

a. What are the salaries of employees by skill level for the periods Pre-Independence, 1981, 1985? (Please fill in these details on the statistics page at the end of the questionnaire).

b. What changes, if any, have been made in the wage/salary structure of the firm in the post-Independence period?

(If necessary, additional information can be detailed on stats page.)
9. Company management and job structure
What changes, if any, have there been in the post-Independence period to the management and job structure, or to job descriptions.
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10. Problems with employees
What problems has your company faced with employees at the various skill levels in the Post-Independence period?
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11. Africanisation

a. There has been pressure from Government to 'Africanise' jobs held previously mainly by Whites. How has this company approached this problem?

b. What are the skill levels, job descriptions and salaries of posts which have been 'Africanised'?

(These details may be filled in on the Statistics page).

c. What problems has the company/had with 'Africanisation' at any level of the firm?

or you personally
12. **Government Policy**

What changes or improvements in Government policy would assist the expansion of this company and the manpower development to this end? .................................................................
Researcher: B Strachan, P.O. Box H.G. 190, Harare.

Questionnaire number: ................................

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**STATISTICS**

3. Number of employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill level</th>
<th>Pre- Ind.</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total % Black % Local</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Professional/ Technical</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Admin/ Managerial</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Clerical</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Skilled</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Semi-skilled</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Unskilled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Employees who left at Independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colour</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
5.a. Expatriate personnel/ non-Zimbabwean employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill level</th>
<th>Pre-Ind.</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

6.a. Training Programmes (please specify intake pre-Ind., 1981, 1985)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intake</th>
<th>eg.i. Apprenticeship</th>
<th>Pre-Ind</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Category</td>
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</table>

eg.ii. In-service Training Schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intake</th>
<th>Skill level/ job detail</th>
<th>Pre-Ind.</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Researcher: B. Strachan, P.O. Box hg 190, Harare.

Questionnaire number: ........................

STATISTICS
6.a. eg.iii. Management Training

eg.iv. Other
**Researcher:** B Strachan, P.O. Box H.G. 190, Harare.

**Questionnaire number:** ..........................

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**STATISTICS**

8.a. **Wages and Salaries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill level</th>
<th>Pre-1981</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
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<td>6.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

b. **Changes in wage/salary structure**

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11.b. **Posts 'Africanised'**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill level</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Salary change</th>
<th>Job description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOOTNOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 1:

2. ibid.
3. The Herald 11.5.87.

CHAPTER 2:

2. ibid p 3.
4. ibid p 209
7. Modernisation, conceptual part of modernisation theory, assumes development to be a linear progression from traditional to more modern society. The model 'modern society' is western capitalist society. The assumption is that given time and the crucial inputs (physical and human capital) developing countries will move along this trajectory. Rostow's 'Stages of Economic Growth' - An Anti-Communist Manifesto (1960), is characteristic of the approach.
10. See ILO, 1976, p 16-20;
    ILO, 1973, esp. article by H Singer and R Jolly;
    M Blaug, ILO, 1973,
    R Dore, 1976.
12. R Dore, 1976, op cit. p 2
13. ibid p 3
14. ibid p 7 - 12
16. ibid p 8.
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28. ibid. p 117.
31. M W Murphree 1979, ibid, p 118.
32. ibid.
33. Some of the more important relevant legislation is to be found in:
   a. President Kennedy's Executive Order No. 10925 of 1961,
   b. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
   c. Executive Order No. 11246, and
34. M W Murphree 1979, ibid, p 120.
37. ibid, p 5.
38. ibid.
39. ibid.
41. ibid p 52.
42. ibid, p 54.
44. NMS, Vol 1 1981, op cit, p 49.
48. M W Murphree 1979, ibid, p 120.
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54. ibid.
55. ibid, p 69.
58. ibid p 9.
61. ibid p 314.
62. ibid.
63. ibid p 313.
64. ibid. p 317.
65. ibid p 322.
67. World Bank 1974, p 1, cited in Open University, E 353 Block 2 Units 5 - 7, p 17.
72. ILO, 1976, p 1, 2.
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74. ibid.
75. ibid p 7.
76. Ibid p 7.
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78. Ibid p 8.
79. Ibid.
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82. See: Footnote 25.
86. Ibid, p 161.
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94. Ibid p 77.
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5. Republic of Zimbabwe, Growth with Equity, p11; TNDP p87.
6. TNDP, p90.
10. Ms Robertson, Member of Task Force on New Education Policy, interview, 27.10.87.
11. Sunday Mail 27.9.87, and Sunday Mail 18.10.87.
14. The Herald 4.12.86
15. Sunday Mail, 18.10.87.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
19. TNDP, p90.
21. TNDP, p90.
24. Ibid. p170.
25. A schools are government schools in urban areas which were reserved for whites only before 1980. B schools are government schools in the township areas.
29. World Bank, 1986. See also Chapter 2.
31. AED, 1985, op. cit. p 34.
33. ibid.
34. F1 schools were for academic students and F2 schools for vocationally oriented students. Some of the white schools did have vocational and academic streams.
38. The Herald 3.1.87.
41. The Herald, 13.5.87.
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44. The Herald, 3.1.87.
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51. Ms M Robertson, CDU and member of Task Force on New Education Policy, interview 27.10.87.
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