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This chapter offers arguments to support the following conjectures: (1) despite claims by Rawls and some commentators, Rawls is not and cannot be a deliberative democrat; the evidence for this can be gleaned by focussing on various interpretations of the structure of Rawls’ arguments in A Theory of Justice (1972) and Political Liberalism (1993) respectively; and (2) if we ask more directly how the ideal dialogue of the original position might be approximated in real-world conditions, we can reach suggestive conclusions about institutions and deliberative democracy radically different from those reached by Rawls himself.
|Item Type:||Book Chapter|
|Keywords:||John Rawls; deliberative democracy; political theory|
|Academic Unit/Department:||Social Sciences > Politics and International Studies
|Interdisciplinary Research Centre:||Centre for Citizenship, Identities and Governance (CCIG)|
|Depositing User:||Michael Saward|
|Date Deposited:||19 Jan 2007|
|Last Modified:||23 Feb 2016 17:31|
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