Informality, Infrastructure and the State
in post-apartheid Johannesburg

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ABSTRACT

The central argument of this thesis is that the spatiality of encounter between state and citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa is unequal and discontinuous. Although the developmental post-apartheid state remains a powerful political narrative, the existence of what have been called 'informal' modes of association and organisation suggests that this imagination has not completely permeated post-apartheid society. Based on a case study of 'informal' street traders in inner city Johannesburg, I argue in this thesis that in fact a very particular state geography is emergent in post-apartheid South Africa: using a theoretical literature that includes state theory, governmentality studies and critical post-colonial geography I suggest that mutual imaginations of state and citizenship intersect in particular nodes of encounter. In a context where the institutions of state have neither a coherent nor a singular view of everyday associational life in the city, the Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality has developed a strategy of building formal market places in an attempt to intersect the informal networks that most street traders are implicated into. Markets such as the high-profile Metro Mall in the inner city of Johannesburg therefore serve as nodes of encounter between state and citizens, or what Law (2004) might refer to as Obligatory Points of Passage. Through these markets, the municipality has attempted to encourage traders to imagine themselves as responsible entrepreneurs, and to therefore implicate traders into new networks of association that allow traders to share in an imagination of the post-apartheid developmental state. However, these encounters do not always produce predictable outcomes, and I demonstrate how the Metro Mall serves also as a context for traders to represent to the municipality different expectations of citizenship.
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1. INTRODUCTION – INFORMALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN JOHANNESBURG

“The formal institutions of state are significantly influenced by the persistence of informal social modes of interaction which operate with logics that are often autonomous to those of the State. The totality of social networks can only be harnessed to the developmental effort if the State manages to provide the central co-ordination and leadership that will ensure that externalities of many separate activities become complementary to the development project” (Government of South Africa, Towards a Ten Year Review, 2003: 9 – emphasis added).

1.1 Introduction

In this thesis I am concerned with the intersection of the imagination of the post-apartheid developmental state, and the networks of informal practices and associations into which many South Africans are implicated. At stake in the imagination of the post-apartheid developmental state is a conception of citizenship, in which the everyday lives of South Africans are infiltrated by a shared vision of the state. The national democratic election that took place on 27 April 1994 marked not only the end of racial minority rule in South Africa, but the possibility of a new society populated by post-apartheid democratic citizens. This project was to be realised not only through the extension of democratic rights, but through the appropriation of the apparatuses of state towards the remaking of state-society relations. The post-apartheid developmental state required therefore a hegemonic project of state formation, one that would have as its goal not only: “promoting economic growth or improving the livelihoods of citizens (…). It is also a political process whereby [the state] sets out to manage state-society relations (…) and legitimate their efforts to re-structure politics” (Munro 1996, p.4). On of the first priorities of the new government was to enact the
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), a development programme aimed at the: “democratisation of the state and society” (Government of South Africa 1995). Chipkin (2003) suggests that the RDP was an ambitious developmental programme designed to initiate economic growth according to political as opposed to simply economic criteria. The problem for the post-apartheid developmental state was not simply monopolising the state apparatus in order to redistribute economic surplus, but actively making new forms of citizenship through a developmental agenda. For Chipkin (2003) the RDP imagined the post-apartheid developmental state: “not simply as the delivery of a range of social goods, or about the building of public infrastructure. (...) It presupposed an ethical norm, a moral register, such that development is about the capture of those being ‘developed’ into a certain normative conception of the good citizen” (2003, p.63).

Such a conception – of the good citizens – implies of course the presence of the state in the life of that citizen. Yet the quote above suggests that achieving this aim remains an elusive project. More directly, I suggest that in the sixteen years since the ending of apartheid not only have informal modes and spaces persisted, but new ones have emerged. This project began out of an interest in what seemed to me to be the emergence of forms of order within informality. Through the process I have realised that this speaks directly to the possibility for post-apartheid citizenship. If the project of the post-apartheid developmental state (which I discuss in Chapter Two) is premised on the state being able to actively intervene into people’s lives in order to improve them, then the existence of forms of ordering everyday life which avoid, subvert or are left out of this project then threaten the possibility for realising such a project.

The question that frames this thesis, therefore, is: what are the limits or possibilities of post-apartheid citizenship in a context of informality? It soon became clear, however, that this was also a
question about space: about how the spatiality of the post-apartheid developmental state is imagined as a coherent territory; how informality maps on to the imagined space of the state; and how it re-appropriates spaces or creates new spaces and spatial imaginations, in which new kinds of subject positions are forged. Therefore, in this thesis I will attempt to sketch a geography of the post-apartheid state in South Africa. I argue that spaces of informality challenge the conventional imagination of a territorially coherent and ordered state space. Encounters between state and citizen are occur as moments in space and time, meaning that post-apartheid citizenship must be imagined within this discontinuous and fragmented state geography.

1.2 Informality, Infrastructure and the State

By about four o'clock on a cold April morning, a steady stream of bodies can be seen heading along Heidelberg Road just south of the inner city, the eastern horizon defined by a feint red smudge against the dark winter sky. The bodies, hunched forward against the cold with coats pulled close, make their way along the dusty side-walk, some even walking on the shoulder of the six-lane road, towards the large warehouse complex of the Johannesburg Fresh Produce Market (JFPM). The JFPM is a wholesale distribution point for agricultural produce which has arrived during the night from the neighbouring provinces of Mpumalanga, Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal and the Free State. Some of the bodies making their way to the market are also at the end of a long journey, in some cases travelling over an hour every day to get here at opening time from as far away as Orange Farm, an informal settlement forty kilometres south of the city. Waking at two o'clock in the morning, catching two separate mini-bus 'taxis', and walking the final few miles is a regular routine, just a small part in a much larger network of movement that constitutes the daily routine the city's informal economy. By six o'clock these same bodies will be unpacking boxes of fresh produce for sale on the streets and in the market places of the city — and in particular in the high-density
residential and business district that Johannesburgers refer to as the inner city.

Street trading has existed in Johannesburg since the so-called ‘discovery’ of gold and the founding of the city as a dusty mining camp on the edges of Empire in the late nineteenth century. Although primarily an activity undertaken by poor sectors of society, Nesvag (2000, p.35) suggests that street trading in urban South Africa largely traces a history of black urbanisation. It was within this context that from the late 1930s, and during most of the apartheid regime, street trading was subject to repressive measures aimed at restricting its growth and removing it from the city. By the 1970s black street traders had almost disappeared from the streets of Johannesburg, although some licences were allocated in dedicated market spaces and usually for so-called ‘Asian’ South Africans (Beavon 2004). Then, with the demise of urban apartheid in the late 1980s, what had always existed as an illicit — though fundamental — component of urban livelihood strategies for poor (predominantly black) South Africans emerged as a safety net for an economy with massive unemployment (Beavon 2004). With the ending of ‘influx control’ laws in the 1980s, and the passing of the Business Act of 1991, informal traders moved onto the streets of the inner city.

These informal street traders represent an important component of a complex interaction of actors, nodes and networks that make up the everyday life of the city of Johannesburg. Traders arrive at the JFPM via an informally organised (although now highly regulated) mini-bus 'taxi' industry that accounts for almost eighty per cent of public transport in the city (Dugard 2001). Outside the halls of the JFPM is the unofficial ‘Mandela Market’ where smaller-scale agents and traders are able to arrange small interactions that avoid transaction costs, but still account in total for millions of Rand every month. And then, once business is done, for the five or six kilometre journey from the JFPM to the streets and market-stalls of the inner-city, the produce are transported by an informally-organised network of vans that jostle for business outside the market halls, charging about R100$^1$ for

$^1$Approx. £8 (based on exchange rate of R1 = £0.08 as on 1 Feb 2011)
a full load (often shared between two or three traders). The JFPM is itself an important node in the network of informal trade in the inner city. The JFPM was established as a municipal company in the 1980s as a deliberate strategy to develop and encourage the growth of small white farmers, who struggled to compete with large agro-industrial farms. It was accompanied by the closure of smaller markets in the inner-city, where many Indian- and black South African traders had managed to monopolise the trade of fresh produce in the city (Beavon 2004). The establishment of the JFPM therefore served to consolidate the power of the exclusively-white market agents, and effectively destroyed an emerging market trader class among black South Africans. Today, the same infrastructure that served to destroy the informal economy serves an important role in its survival. It is an important node in sustaining the existence of traders on the streets of the inner city, although whether this represents a revived market trader class is not entirely clear. What is clear is that every day, thousands of Rand's worth of fresh produce are traded on the streets of the inner city, sold by individuals that range between fairly successful small entrepreneurs operating from newly-built market places in the inner city on the one hand, and more 'survivalist' traders who occupy a small stand on a street corner, on the other.

This is not the only network that makes up the complex and dynamic 'informal economy' of inner city Johannesburg. Through complex exchanges and interactions that bring parts of the city and parts of the continent close at hand, cheap Chinese shoes are traded on the streets along-side salted fish from Mozambique, cloth from Ethiopia and second-hand clothes from charities in the Netherlands. All make up nodes within an almost entirely cash economy that remains largely opaque to urban policy-makers and planners (Gotz & Simone 2003). It is this opacity that has proved so frustrating to urban planners and policy-makers, who have to balance the day-to-day management of the urban environment with the broader commitment towards building a post-apartheid city in which a shared vision of citizenship can be realised.
That the life of cities bleeds out of the grids of order imposed upon them has been the subject of numerous engagements with the urban. It was precisely this excess of urban life – the spontaneity and anonymity of the city crowd, or of wandering through the city streets – that so fascinated writers about the nineteenth century modern cities of Europe and America, such as Simmel, Wirth and Benjamin (Robinson 2006). For some of these writers the city was the symbol of great freedom – from the constraints of tradition and culture which were posed as the opposite of urban life (Robinson 2006). The city has always been seen as a place where kinship bonds and cultural continuity are thrown into question. For Benjamin, although this wandering in the city was partly liberating, it also exposed the subterranean, as well as the more explicit, order that operate in the modern metropolis – order that he hoped to inspire revolution against among the inhabitants of the
This failure of hegemonic systems of order and coherence to align with, and recognise, the fluid everyday life of people and spaces – but instead to constrain and subjugate them – appears as a consistent (and mostly-tragic) story of modernity. For example, Scott (1998) describes how the construction of the grand arcades of Paris in the nineteenth century, the very habitat of Benjamin's archetypal though out-of-time flaneur, was part of a social project to destroy and remake the poor quarters of Paris, which had always harboured revolutionary tendencies. The newly remade city brought with it a new regime of urban security, hygiene and public comportment; it became “a more easily managed city and a more ‘readable’ city” (Scott 1998, p.63).

Simone in particular has shown (2006; 2004b; 2001) how order and regularity in the city are often made not through the ‘formal’ infrastructure of the city but through the informal and associational infrastructure of people. In a context of radical uncertainty and change, and where many formal institutions lose their capacity to facilitate a shared public interest, people in the city develop and rely on a peculiar array of tactics for “making do” (2001, p.103). Simone's observations span not only Johannesburg but are also part of a general comment on African cities; for Simone these associational networks, which move between ruthlessness, tenderness, cruelty and indifference (Nuttall & Mbembe 2008, p.7), are what makes cities work - although the term work may not imply a modernist notion of the efficient urban machine. Yet far from celebrating the constant “edginess” of the condition of emergence, Simone (2001) is aware of the ways in which these conditions: “make it difficult for ordinary citizens to get a handle on what is going on, to commit themselves to particular courses of action, or invest in aspirations, livelihoods or projects which require progressive, step-by-step planning and evolution (...) one is increasingly forced to move among various, and usually contradictory, modalities of getting things done” (2001, p.104).
In the network of dynamics that locate the informal traders in relationship to the JFPM, among other things, is the possibility then of imagining an emerging post-apartheid spatial order in Johannesburg. In parts it is inherited from a history of exclusion and segregation – in the long journey from the isolated dormitory townships of Orange Farm to the apartheid-era wholesale market that emerged out of the destruction of the black traders. In parts it is something new and as yet unknown – in the informal networks of transport and trade that have emerged around the JFPM to sustain and drive a vibrant but largely hidden 'informal' economy. In parts it is inculcated and interpellated into an emerging state rationality of space – in the attempts to manage the sector in the inner city in the form of newly-built market places (see Chapter Four).

Moreover, in the context of the post-apartheid moment, the state is the subject of claims for citizenship that are made by many poor South Africans, including traders in the inner city. So while the institutions and agents of the state may not always be able to identify and intervene into the lives of traders, it is nevertheless often invoked and cajoled into an encounter with traders, who make particular demands of them, even as they resist and avoid some of the policies and projects put in place.

1.3 Constructions of Informality

Throughout this text I use the term *informality* to describe the activities and livelihood strategies of street traders in the inner city of Johannesburg. The term is unsatisfactory, but I have used it for two reasons. Firstly, it is the term that has been used in the literature, most notably in respect to the literature on the 'informal sector' or 'informal economy'. This literature itself drew on the work of Kenneth Hart (1973) and others who first developed the concept of informality into a sociological analysis of the urban economy. Hart's (1973) now famous work on urban labour markets in Ghana
suggested that the informal sector was effectively what he termed a “reserve army” of unemployed and underemployed who were not so much outside of formal economic activity and economic growth, but were the product of economic growth that required cheap and flexible labour. Hart argued that the informal sector represented not the last vestiges of pre-capitalist economic activity, but was itself a product of a modern urban economy with capacity for endogenous growth, and that its relationship with the formal economy needed to be understood differently (Hart 1973). Rather than seeing the informal sector as existing outside of and separate from the urban economy, Hart argued that it was an important part of the urban economy in many African cities, where waged labour was frequently supplemented by income from informal means. Hart's work has led to a large literature on informality in cities of the global South, and has been much debated and expanded upon. For example, Moser (1978) made a far more explicit link between the so-called informal and formal sectors of the urban economy, arguing that the informal sector was structurally dependent on the formal sector, which effectively took advantage of the cheap and flexible labour supply that the informal sector made possible. Moreover, informal traders were viewed as effectively unpaid workers selling produce bought from formal sector retailers and producers.

These ideas were influential within the anti-apartheid movement in imagining the spatiality of the post-apartheid city as incorporating a range of urban practices (Dewar 1995; Dewar & Todeschini 2004; Dewar & Watson 1981; Dewar & Watson 1990). These writers were concerned primarily with the inability of apartheid modernist urban planning to accommodate “the actually existing character and everyday spatial practices of informal traders and other actors” (Dierwechter 2006, p.253). These concerns were also part of the broader critique of the apartheid city, and informed the political and academic debates that accompanied the urban-based anti-apartheid protests of the 1980s (see Chapter Three). Many of the professionals who were part of developing the critique of the apartheid city were influenced by the work of Dewar and others, and have subsequently been
actively involved in planning and urban government in the post-apartheid era. The position of many in the city council had been influenced by debates about informality in the apartheid city. Urban informality was engaged by a number of academics and writers attempting to rethink the relationship between labour and the apartheid state in the light of the economic crisis of the early 1980s (Rogerson 2000c; 2000b). Denied and suppressed as it was by the apartheid municipality through controls of street trading in Johannesburg, the informal economy emerged as the site where black South Africans were able to find options for survival in the city (Beavon 2004). The emergence of informal activities in the city were seen as the possible site of a contradiction in the apartheid system: as labour opportunities declined, black urban residents turned to so-called informal activities to augment their incomes.

While the early work of Hart (1972) and Moser (1978) was influential to thinking about the post-apartheid city in the 1980s, the work of De Soto (1990) emerged as highly influential in the 1990s. De Soto also suggested a link between the formal and informal sector, but argued alternatively that the informal sector represented a latent entrepreneurial class hindered by lack of capital and overburdened by bureaucracy. De Soto's work has been much criticised by many on the left because it has been widely embraced by proponents of free-market development (c.f. Gilbert 2002). In a context of huge unemployment, and in recognition of the important political role the informal economy played in sustaining a black urban population during apartheid, the South African Government has been influenced by de Soto's work, in adopting the term the Second Economy. In 2005 the Government launched the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA): “without interventions directly addressed at reducing South Africa’s historical inequalities, growth is unsustainable (...) government has already initiated interventions to address deep-seated inequalities and target the marginalised poor, to bridge the gap with the Second Economy, and ultimately to eliminate the Second Economy” (Government of South Africa 2005,
Although ASGISA was only launched in 2005, it marks the policy culmination of a conflicted engagement within government and think-tanks regarding the nature and appropriate policy response towards informality.

The second reason for using the term *informality* is that it is the term that has been used by the Johannesburg Municipality in engaging traders, for example in the Informal Traders Policy, the by-laws on Informal Trade, and the establishment of an informal Trade sub-unit within the municipality's Department of Economic Development (DED). As already suggested, this is largely as a result of the influence upon policy of the literature on informality. Nevertheless, it is this latter use of the term that opens up an important methodological issue: i.e. the shifting deployment of the term to justifying particular attitudes and interventions. The current policy environment reflects the influence of the Second Economy discourse, with informal traders being cast as entrepreneurs. At the same time, the early engagements with urban planning have strongly influenced attitudes towards the incorporation of informal traders into the urban fabric. There was broad recognition that this constituency had an inevitable right to access the city, but there was little consensus on how to engage the new constituents. The new post-apartheid municipal government was unsure about how to engage the informality and the pace of radical change. It was clear that the city needed to accommodate the new urban users, but it was equally clear that the city was never designed for, nor did it have readily to hand the capacities for, this accommodation.

For example, among the negative perceptions of informal trade identified by the 1995 *Informal Trading Policy for the GJTMC Area (Johannesburg Transitional Municipal Council 1995)* were: "hawkers obstruct the pavement; leave a mess on the pavement; sell from unsightly structures (...) urinate in public; leave goods on the pavement overnight" (1995, p.165.2). More recently, this very visibility of informal trade was largely held responsible for the declining fortunes of the inner city.
as a business and financial centre during the 1990s. In a document tabled at Council on 22 July 1999 proposing the declaration of parts of the inner city as restricted trading areas it was noted that informal trading: “has had a negative impact on investor confidence in the area with a resultant negative impact on the rates base” (Johannesburg Transitional Municipal Council 1999). This sentiment is reiterated in other key documents, and has become a key component of the strategy towards the management of informal traders in the municipality’s Inner City Regeneration Charter (Johannesburg Metro Council 2007b).

In contrast to these constructions of informality as requiring intervention, there have been calls from within the so-called informal sector for intervention when it is not forthcoming. Roy (2005) argues that order and formality have very contingent and quite specific histories. Thus, rather than looking at informality as the lack or loss of order, Roy suggests that we need to consider the contingent (and political) history within which informality has been designated and deployed. The existence of informality, therefore, might be closely connected to constructions of order and rule. In this way, Roy (2005) suggests that informality may be less a claim about the loss of order and more a claim to not be excluded from institutions of state and citizenship. In this thesis I am less concerned with arguing for a specific use of the term than I am with how the term has served to create an object around which different claims are mobilised. Most importantly, I argue in this thesis that informality has been constructed as existing outside of – and therefore requiring to be included into – an imagination of the post-apartheid state. Informal traders can only be made as citizens through being included into encounters with the state. It is the nature of these encounters, and in particular the spaces of these encounters, that I explore in this thesis.
1.4 Engaging Informality

“In sum, if we take on board a post-structuralist critique of the metaphysics of presence then we drive a coach-and-horses through the standard package of common-sense realism. Realities can be made independent, prior, definite and singular, but that is because they are being made that way. It could be otherwise. Actually it is worse than that. If they are being made that way, then it is because the alternative – that they might be dependent, simultaneous, indefinite and/or multiple – is also being systematically Othered” (Law 2007, p.8)

Engaging the context of informal traders in inner city Johannesburg is not straightforward, for two reasons. Firstly, as I have discussed above, and as Law (2007) argues more broadly in terms of social science research, informality is a term that is not clearly defined, and each definition of the term is in fact a construction of the object of intervention (and of research). Secondly, the context is one that is always shifting and changing – traders who I have met and spoken to on one day may very possibly not be traceable on another day, having been implicated into the multiplicity of trajectories and networks that make everyday life in the inner city of Johannesburg so fluid. The project, therefore, of identifying and locating people who would act as informants and resources for my own research traced in some small way the very complexity of the site itself.

As Law (2007) has suggested, all of social science research is about encountering mess in the sense that nothing is ever a predetermined and stable object of analysis. The act of research is therefore, at least traditionally, about ascribing some order to that mess. And yet:

“Realities are not flat. They are not consistent, coherent and definite. Our research
methods necessarily fail. Aporias are ubiquitous. But it is time to move on from the long rearguard action which insists that reality is definite and singular (...) We need new philosophies new disciplines of research. We need to understand that our methods are always more or less unruly assemblages” (Law 2007, p. 11)

There is perhaps no more clear example of the 'messiness' of everyday reality than the informality of inner city Johannesburg. This is not because of some lack of order or rationality. Quite the opposite, in fact. The networks and trajectories that people are implicated into in their everyday lives are extremely ordered and ordering. Yet, the networks of informal street trading in the inner-city of Johannesburg maps the city less as a space ordered by planning and policy-making, and more as an assemblage of connections, nodes and practices – practices that may include subverting and avoiding by-law enforcement, among others. These constitute what Amin and Thrift (2002) have called the “neglected spatialities” of the city. Drawing on Amin and Thrift, Dierwechter (2004) writes:

“we typically overlook the spatialities emerging out of the intersections of culture, economy, biology, planning, governance, micro, macro, and so on. (...) instead, we should do more to map 'the intermesh between flesh and stone, humans and non-humans, fixtures and flows, emotions and practices’” (2004, p.964).

The point, for Dierwechter, is that these spatialities are as much a part of the urban assemblage as apparently more dominant spatialities of order and regularity. They are consistent and patterned, they are everyday routines, and are important networks or meaning and order for many urban inhabitants. Traders have regular clients, they have relationships with specific agents who give them discounts, they share goods transportation with others who trade on the same street or in the same
It is these interactions, these informal transactions and interactions that make up everyday associational life in the city, that Simone (2004) refers to as "people as infrastructure". By this Simone speaks of the:

"(...) economic collaboration among residents seemingly marginalized from and immiserated by urban life (...) These intersections, particularly in the last two decades, have depended on the ability of residents to engage complex combinations of objects, spaces, persons, and practices. These conjunctions become an infrastructure—a platform providing for and reproducing life in the city" (Simone 2004b, p.407)

In other words, what Simone suggests is that in the absence of what might be called 'formal' (or state) institutions and regimes to regulate and structure everyday life, people nevertheless construct regularity and order. The networks and nodes that are the building blocks of this structured and patterned everyday life are individuals and their relationships with other individuals - relationships of trust, expectancy and loyalty, among others.

This notion of "people as infrastructure" is extremely evocative and compelling, for two reasons. Firstly, and not least, because it reminds about that other, more traditional, notion of infrastructure as concrete materiality. Dierwechter (2002) see the city as an assemblage of spatial practices "populated not only by human actors but non-human ones too" (Dierwechter 2004, p.970). Beyond an engagement with police who check licenses and accept bribes, for the most part many traders in the inner city are pretty much outside of the reach of the state. Policies to enumerate and register all traders in the city have never been effectively achieved, in large part this is because the 'informal
sector' is so ever-changing and dynamic. In these everyday routines, traders come into contact with
the state. In large part this is through harassment by the local police, or inspections by the license
officer. It also occurs, importantly, in the form of the built infrastructure of the state, which as I will
attempt to argue, form the context for encounters in which forms of citizenship are imagined and
articulated. And herein is the second reason why the notion of 'infrastructure' as Simone speaks of
it, is so evocative. It acknowledges what I have termed the 'nodal' spatiality of the everyday life of
the city, and in particular of state interventions, that has served as the basis for my own research
methodology.

1.5 Method and Mess

In his now seminal work Seeing Like A State, James Scott (1998) suggests that the state necessarily
simplify complexity and fluidity for the purposes of much larger-scale governance and control, a
process Scott associates with great upheaval and violence on the history of the modern state. This
notion, of the institutions of state struggling to identify and make legible the 'messy' reality of
everyday life, resonates with the context of the inner city of Johannesburg. Yet it misses perhaps the
nuance with which these institutions do encounter the messy everyday life. Recently, a number of
writers have focussed on what is sometimes called the anthropology of the state - the complexity
and messiness within the state itself, and the various often informal routines through which the state
and its subjects encounter one another (Das and Poole, 2004; Lemarcis, 2004; Roy, 2005). This
offers perhaps a more fruitful way of thinking about the complexity of government and social order.

In Johannesburg, the institutions and agents of the municipality have confronted the apparent
illegibility of informality in various ways. Partly convinced that it has a place in a post-apartheid
city, and partly driven by the necessity of relying on problematic but existent urban management
capacities, informality in the post-apartheid city has been engaged through a series of tentative projects and approaches (Gotz & Simone (2003). In this sense, many of the planners and policy makers in the municipality have been very open to talking about their own involvement in what has been (especially during the 1990s) an experimental phase within local government. Accessing people to talk with in strategic positions within the municipality has therefore been a process of following the very lucrative and productive leads that have emerged at each phase of the research. My experience has been that people have been eager to talk, as if talking to researchers (not an uncommon event in the fairly small world of development planning in Johannesburg) provides an opportunity to reflect on what is itself an always shifting process of gradually moving towards an understanding of informality. Many people in such positions in the municipality are also academics, or are part of the academic / conference circuit, and so gaining access to such informants has been relatively straightforward.

What has been less straightforward, and partly mimicking the process of municipality itself, has been attempting to access the dynamics of informality. As I will demonstrate, the municipality has attempted to intervene into the informal dynamics of the inner city but has found that it can only really hope to capture certain flows and trajectories. Thus, the building of infrastructure has been one way in which the municipality has attempted to intervene into a dynamic context that it otherwise has very little access into.

The link between my own research methodology and the interventions of the municipality needs to be spelled out quite clearly. As Law suggests, any act of research both frames and also silences. I have found that as a researcher my access to my own object of research has been largely framed by the way in which that object has been constructed by my research questions. It is these silences, these 'neglected spatialities', that I initially was resolved to explore. Yet, and here has been the
biggest stumbling block, these neglected spatialities cannot always be uncovered. Although I entered the field intending to explore the dynamics of informality in inner city Johannesburg, I soon realised, as did the municipality, that this would be well beyond the scope and scale of my project. It is not just the extent of the informal activities in the inner city, but also the complexity and fluidity of informality, and the very complex and opaque rituals of negotiating entry and access.

In the end, therefore, the methodology can best be described as a case study. There is of course an existing literature on the case study as methodology in social sciences (Baxter and Jack 2008; Flyvbjerg 2006; Stake 1978, 1995; Soy 1997; Yin 2002). Case study as methodology is often seen not as a single tool, but rather as a range of tools directed towards a single case (Johannson 2003). The primary critique of this methodology is therefore that it is not easy to generalise from a single case. What I have found compelling in the methodology is precisely this fact - that through a single pilot project the municipality has attempted to work out a way not to generalise but at least to make legible. Focussing on a single case of a municipal intervention in the inner city of Johannesburg was therefore not about an evaluation of the success or failure of a project, but was about negotiating access into an otherwise illegible context. Thus, my entry point into the field by and large traced and echoed the access into the context that other agents (including the municipality) had negotiated and consolidated. While I managed to make some access through individuals that I met in the market place, or organisations that were variously active in the market or on the streets, my primary point of entry was through the municipal market place itself, and in particular through the institutional mechanism of the Metro Trading Company.

This is not to suggest that the research is a mere 'evaluation' of a municipal project. The trajectories
and tangents that the research process opened up were multiple, although equally speaking many of these were paths that I could not or did not follow. But the crucial point is that my entry point and focus ended up being a case study of one particular attempt to gain entry into - and to make somehow legible and accessible - the informality of the inner city. While my own research has been driven by theoretical questions of order and the structuring of routines and rituals, the intentions of the municipality's interventions have been driven rather by the practical concerns of urban management, and perhaps giving substance to very particular notions of citizenship.

In the research process I have intersected with a multiplicity of trajectories, most of which I have been unable to trace or follow. Perhaps inevitably, my interviewees in the field were – at least initially – confined to those individuals who have come in contact with the state in a more deliberative and sustained manner: members of traders' committees; street committee members; members of NGO's. This has given me some access into the dynamic associational life of the inner city, but I acknowledge that I my own intervention has been partial and contingent. Where possible, I have attempted to build as rich a story as possible about specific moments of encounter between the municipality and traders from my informants. In particular I have been interested in the process that lead to the building of the Metro Mall in that particular place and time. This has led me to recognise the significance also of those areas that surround the Metro Mall, where traders continue to trade. To do this has involved a series of in-depth interviews. While I have dated them in the end notes, many of them in fact occurred over several days and over several visits with individuals.

In addition, I have conducted a series of focus group sessions with traders, making some attempt to distinguish groups of traders by whether they trade inside or outside the market, and whether they are in a committee. With regards the focus group with committee members, this was largely because, soon after beginning to undertake research in the Metro Mall I realised that the traders

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committee were concerned (and rather uncomfortable) about my presence. The first focus group with them was largely about negotiating my presence in the market – which comes with its own obvious ethical issues. I had already been granted permission to undertake research by the market management, although I soon realised that there are various and contested legitimate channels. With regards focus group sessions with traders outside the market, although I had scheduled a follow-up session, the second session was attended by completely new individuals, suggesting that making assumptions about research method and rigour are subject to the 'messy actuality' of the field.

Inevitably, also, there are concerns about safety for the researcher and for the various subjects of the research. The Metro Mall itself is a well-surveiled space, by a private security company, while outside the market precinct the Metro Police are ever present. Ironically, while inside the market the private security company is supposed to provide a safe and secure environment for traders, on the streets outside the market the Metro Police are often seen by traders as the source of insecurity. This difficult and conflictual relationship between traders and the Metro Police was one that I was never able to effectively breach, and while several of my most interesting interviews were with Metro Police officers, I was unable to get any official interview with members of the Johannesburg Metro Police Department. Issues of personal safety restricted my movements outside of the market place to those areas where I could negotiate access via networks I had initially developed through the market place. In such areas I was able to 'hang out', absorbing the everyday life on the streets and in the informal markets of the inner city. I was not able to access those dynamics of interaction that were more hidden - and certainly less likely to invite encounters with the state. I acknowledge that a longer field research process may have enabled this to a greater degree, and my own anxieties and uncertainties prevented me getting at some of these dynamics. There are a number of dedicated researchers, activists and artists who have done very interesting work in some of these contexts, and I am very grateful to those who introduced me to parts of the inner city I otherwise would not have
had access to. If I had a far greater scope for this research project, I would certainly explore these very rich and suggestive avenues.

Finally, I want to reflect upon the link between theory and methodology - which has never been a straightforward relationship throughout this process. I have found myself attempting to hold in one moment the recognition that the context is fluid, and at the same time the need to put down some markers of consistency, however fragile. In this way, much like the municipality itself, I have found points - or nodes - of intervention, at which I and my object have met, and constructed one another.

As I have undertaken the research process, I have realised that this is not simply instrumental or accidental. This, it appears to me, is the fundamental issue that is at stake in the context of informality. That is, how does one (whether state or researcher) access and make somehow legible the messy actuality of everyday life? In this way, then, the unstructured and often improvised methodology mapped out for me a conceptual model - that of 'nodal' government. I elaborate on this concept throughout the thesis, primarily developing an explanation of the concept in chapter three, where I speak about a shift in the spatial imagination of the city from spatial immanence to nodal space. This for me is a question of the spatiality of the state. I suggest in the end that the state does not exist as a territorially defined entity but as a series of nodal points that individuals, objects and processes are incited to move through - similar to what Amin and Thrift have called Obligatory Passage Points. Crucially, what I want to reflect upon here is that this conceptual model of nodal government doubles as, and has emerged out of, a methodological framework for undertaking qualitative field research. As Law has emphasised, the process of research is about building from a given set of resources. It is always incomplete and always unsatisfactory, but it is nevertheless a necessary intervention. It is with this in mind that I have approached the more or less coherent assemblage that is this research report.
1.5 Outline of Thesis

In the Chapter Two I begin with a discussion of the origins of the developmental state more broadly and suggest how it has influenced more specific discussions about the nature and role of the state in post-apartheid South Africa. I then consider a literature on theorising the state, beginning with materialist analyses that have focussed on the relationship between the state and capital. In this chapter I consider the relationship between state, city and subjectivity in post-apartheid South Africa. I begin by outlining the debates about the statuses of these concepts, and the terms of the debate during the apartheid years (Wolpe 1972; Legassick & Wolpe 1976). The apartheid state was more or less effective in defining and governing particular racialised subjectivities through the spatiality of the state, initially through the homeland system, and later through the so-called 'apartheid city'. During apartheid the debates drew on broader materialist arguments about the relationship between state and capital: in particular the work of Poulantzas in the late 1970s and Regulation Theory in the 1980s. Tracing a thread from Poulantzas (1969), to the work of Bob Jessop (1977; 1982) and Michael Mann (1984; 2008), I argue for the materialist debates of the 1970s and 1980s were limited by their materialist view of the state.

While these theorists offer a sophisticated and variegated account of the state as a contingent and contested project within society, A more useful line of thought is to consider the very complex interaction between state and society. The governmentality literature and the ‘anthropology of the state’ literature in particular have been useful for focusing attention on the effects of the state in society, rather than the objective form of the state. I suggest, with reference to a post-colonial literature on state and society, that their focus on the objective reality of the state makes their respective analyses less attuned to the spaces of rupture and incompleteness. Thus, I suggest that a literature influenced by the work of Foucault, and particularly his (2009) lectures on
governmentality, is useful because it focuses on the practices through which the state comes into relief. I make the argument that the post-apartheid state is never more than a fragmented and discontinuous geography, that is held in fragile coherence in particular moments in time and place. In particular, I argue that it is in the post-apartheid city that the state can be seen to coalesce around the infrastructural and development projects. But it is crucially also in the city that the practices and networks of informality serve to subvert and destabilise this coherence.

In Chapter Three I then consider in more detail how the state has come to be imagined through urban policy. I use Mitchell Dean's (1999) development of Foucault's (1984) notion of regimes of practices to show how urban policy is part of a broader imagination of the space of the city. Urban protest had formed a significant part of the anti-apartheid movement, and in this process a vision of a post-apartheid city had been created. This formed a precedent for the development of urban policy in the immediate aftermath of apartheid. I show how this iteration of urban policy was accompanied by a spatial imagination of what I have termed spatial immanence – in other words, it was imagined that urban policy could be used as a tool for the reconstruction of a divided society. However, the messy actuality of space has always undermined and subverted this imagination, and many of the goals of Developmental Local Government have floundered because of the existence of informal practices and modes of association. His was especially exacerbated by the financial crisis that occurred in 1997 within the Johannesburg Municipality. The municipality has responded to the financial crisis through implementing what has been regarded by some as a neoliberal inspired restructuring process. While problematising these accusations of neoliberalism, I argue that a new spatial imagination can be seen to be emerging. Rather than the city seen as a divided topography which can be stitched together through progressive policy, the city is increasingly understood as a far more complex network of potentialities into which urban policy must attempt to intervene.
In a context where the institutions of the state have very little legibility, I argue in *Chapter Four* that urban infrastructure has emerged as one mechanism through which the municipality has been able to intervene into the everyday life of the city. I look at the way in which the building of market places has been an attempt to intervene into the informal networks that operate in the inner city, in particular. I juxtapose this kind of strategic intervention with other attempts to engage informality in the inner city, in particular the attempts made by the local business community to take over some of the urban management function of the municipality in specific sectors of the inner city, through the institution of City Improvement Districts (CIDs). While the CIDs have attempted to engage informality by excluding it from parts of the city, the strategy of building market places for traders has been an attempt to include traders into the city, and to incite an encounter between traders and the state. In this way, I suggest that a new spatiality of citizenship may be detected in the market strategy.

However, I argue in *Chapter Five* that, as with all diagrams of power (Deleuze 2006), the outcomes of the encounter do not always match what the ambitions of the state are. The market places in the inner city were intended to encourage traders to imagine themselves as responsible and autonomous entrepreneurial citizens who would pay rentals for their stalls and in turn invest in growing their businesses into viable enterprises. It was hoped that in this way traders might be encouraged to divorce themselves from the informal networks into which they are implicated and to take up new subject positions in the image of empowered post-apartheid citizens. Rather, I argue that informal traders have appropriated the spaces of the market places into already existing informal networks. Traders move relatively fluidly between the market and the streets outside, either in response to their own changing circumstances, or to take advantage of the unique business opportunities that each space offers. Nevertheless, traders have slowly adapted to the market places as a feature of the everyday life of informal trade in the inner city. I demonstrate how, in order to make the system
function, the agents of the state have had to be themselves implicated into the networks of informality.

Despite the continued existence of networks of informality in the inner city, I argue in *Chapter Six* that the Metro Mall forms the context for a range of new encounters between the state and informal traders, not all of which are anticipated. The chapter begins with a discussion about the ways in which citizenship and foreignness are deployed in the specific context of the market place, showing how foreignness is both claimed and ascribed in various ways in order to secure access to the built infrastructure of the market. In a context where people from many different countries have managed to establish a presence in the city through exclusive and often ethnic trade networks, many South African traders have reiterated particular expressions of citizenship. While this has manifested itself in moments of violent xenophobia, I suggest that a far more common appeal is to the shared history of apartheid. Crucially, this locates post-apartheid citizenship very differently to the governmental ambitions of the municipality, which has attempted to make traders as entrepreneurs. Finally, therefore, I suggest in the *Conclusion* to the thesis that the market place represents a potential new spatiality for citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa.
2. CONSTRUCTIONS OF STATE IN POST-APARHEID SOUTH AFRICA

2.1 Introduction

The national democratic election that took place on 27 April 1994 marked not only the end of racial minority rule in South Africa, but the possibility of a new society populated by post-apartheid democratic citizens. This project was to be realised not only through the extension of democratic rights, but through the appropriation of the apparatuses of state towards the remaking of state-society relations. The post-apartheid developmental state required therefore a hegemonic project of state formation, one that would have as its goal not only: “promoting economic growth or improving the livelihoods of citizens (...). It is also a political process whereby [the state] sets out to manage state-society relations (...) and legitimate their efforts to re-structure politics” (Munro 1996, p.4).

One of the first priorities of the new government was to enact the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), a development programme aimed at the: “democratisation of the state and society” (Government of South Africa 1995). Chipkin (2003) suggests that the RDP was an ambitious developmental programme designed to initiate economic growth according to political as opposed to simply economic criteria. The problem for the post-apartheid developmental state was not simply monopolising the state apparatus in order to redistribute economic surplus, but actively making new forms of citizenship through a developmental agenda. For Chipkin (2003) the RDP imagined the post-apartheid developmental state: “not simply as the delivery of a range of social goods, or about the building of public infrastructure. (...) It presupposed an ethical norm, a moral register, such that development is about the capture of those being ‘developed’ into a certain normative conception of the good citizen” (2003, p.63). Yet the quote above suggests that achieving
these aims remains an elusive project.

I suggest that considering the implication of space into this nexus of state formation and the constitution of subjectivity in post-apartheid South Africa is significant for at least three important reasons. Firstly, it has been shown to have been of fundamental importance in the consolidation, and in the denouement, of the apartheid order. Robinson (1997) has demonstrated how the broader system of apartheid domination operated through particular spatial techniques, and more specifically how the emerging nature and shape of apartheid more broadly was intimately connected to the micro-politics of enforcing apartheid in urban spaces. Here Robinson (1997) also suggests, however, that the apartheid system was never a complete system of order, hanging together as a tenuous apparent coherence through the differentiated and often contingent implementation of racial segregation in urban municipalities. Parnell and Mabin (1995) and Parnell (1997) have further shown how the city was an important site for contesting the apartheid order, and spatial practices such as illegal squatting or moving into areas reserved for white South Africans were perpetually challenging the hegemony of the so-called 'apartheid city' system. More explicitly, as the anti-apartheid movement became more militant, and the repressive apparatus of the state more violent, in the late 1980s, the locally specific organisation of municipal government in urban areas became a specific political target (Swilling 1997). The organisation of urban areas into a patchwork of segregated municipalities meant that poor (mostly black) areas were severely under-serviced and over-crowded, while wealth (white) areas with affluent rate-payers were generously serviced (Beavon 2004).

Despite the political mobilisation towards challenging 'urban apartheid', the effects are still profoundly felt post-apartheid South Africa. Parnell and Pieterse (1998) maintain that the persistence of apartheid-era urban planning creates a specific development challenge in post-
apartheid South Africa. They argue that in engaging the city after apartheid: "we need to admit how continuities with the past shape new approaches in as far as they circumscribe what is considered the ‘norm’ (...) [post-apartheid urban development] must be grounded in a careful and clear assessment of the challenges imposed by the apartheid legacy" (Parnell & Pieterse 1998, p.2). Thus, the significance of the intersection of state, city and forms of subjectivity in post-apartheid South Africa resides, at least partially, in the entanglement of these three vectors of power under an apartheid regime, and its continuing imprint on the (urban) landscape of contemporary South Africa.

The second reason for paying close attention to the entanglements of state, city and subjectivity in post-apartheid South Africa is therefore closely related to the first, but has to do with the approach to engaging the urban after 1994. As Robinson (1997) notes:

"The complex relations between urban spatial arrangements and state power which we can observe in the past should alert us to the possibility that current restructurings of the state and the emergence of a post-apartheid urban form may also be closely related to one another" (1997, p.366)

The post-apartheid period has been characterised by deliberate and concerted attempts to remake the political, institutional and social landscape of South Africa, the central unifying imagination for which has been the idea of the post-apartheid state as a developmental state. Central to the developmental political project in the post-apartheid era has been the implementation of processes that are aimed at re-organising the institutional, fiscal and infrastructural capacities of the state towards empowering Local Government (a term in common use in South Africa to refer, somewhat imprecisely, to the various institutions of state that make up municipal government). Local
Government has been recognised as the most effective and appropriate spatial configuration of post-apartheid state institutions for coordinating and delivering a developmental agenda. This was initially established through the institutional framework of Developmental Local Government (DLG), conceptualised by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as the reorganisation of the local state towards a national development agenda, and enacted into legislation through the White Paper on Developmental Local Government (Government of South Africa 1998). Subsequent to this, a progression of parliamentary acts and government programmes have both established and further enhanced the responsibilities and powers of Local Government. Most significantly, the restructuring of Local Government preceding the Local Government Elections in 2000 established what have become known as Metropolitan Municipalities in six of South Africa's largest urban agglomerations, effectively creating municipalities with capacities and resources to pursue relatively autonomous agendas, although bound by statutory obligations.

The relative effectiveness of the Metro Councils (as they are commonly referred to) in pursuing agendas of growth and development, though contested and by no means entirely successful, is however in marked contrast to the massive financial and capacity constraints faced by many rural and smaller urban municipalities. In 2004, in acknowledgement of their diabolical lack of capacity and failure to deliver effective governance, several municipalities were taken over to be managed by national government through Project Consolidate ( ). This seemingly incoherent dis-equilibrium, between effective urban centres, and poor and marginal rural areas and small towns is recognised, through state documents such as the National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP), as constituting the spatial economy of South Africa, in which: “a relatively small number of localities (...) have the economic potential to restructure and a significantly large number (...) are ultimately likely to decline since they seem to possess limited resources to generate sustainable economic activity” (Government of South Africa 2003, p.10).
Recognising this fragmented spatial economy of the post-apartheid state – between well-functioning Metro Councils, Local (and Provincial) Governments with radically unequal capacities, and a National State with capacity to directly intervene – serves the allocation of resources across a national territory. Pieterse (2009) argues that the NSDP represented an admission by the state that it was failing to effectively coordinate developmental infrastructure investments across what was a very fragmented geography of post-apartheid South Africa. On this admission, the NSDP: “developed a series of principles to guide governmental investment based on the distinction between people and places (...). All people had a right to basic services such as education, health and social security and these need to be provided universally. However, scarce capital for economic investment, especially in connective infrastructures, had to be restricted to places with economic potential, i.e. urban settlements with growth potential” (Pieterse 2009, p.6).

However, as a broad over-view of state strategic priorities it also reveals the limits to such central planning. I therefore suggest a third reason for considering the nexus of space, city and subjectivity in post-apartheid South Africa. That is, despite concerted efforts at pursuing a developmental agenda through Developmental Local Government, the state is unable to infiltrate all of its territory and population equally. On one hand: “there is such extensive disorder (or overlay of different orders) in some sections of urban places, that even the best resourced municipalities cannot realistically expect full control of the governance process” (Parnell & Pieterse 1998, p.12). On the other, a post-apartheid developmental state project is being pursued at precisely the moment that some commentators are recognising the effects of globally circulating forces on state space (Allen & Cochrane 2010; Brenner 2004; Jessop et al. 2008; Jones & Jessop 2010). The post-apartheid state, constitutes therefore a discontinuous geography of power, coalescing at various times and in various spaces, through large-scale infrastructural interventions, or the routine encounters between
individuals and agents of the state.

It is the central argument of this chapter that in order to develop a theory of the post-apartheid developmental state in South Africa that is able to account for the "persistence of informal social modes of interaction" (Government of South Africa 2003), as well as the practices through which the "many separate activities become complementary", we must be willing to think carefully and critically about the intersection of state, space and subjectivity. I suggest that terms such as 'territoriality' and 'scales of state', so central to a well-developed body of literature on state theory, are inadequate for accounting for: (1) the unequal and differentiated ability of the institutions of state to permeate society and realise its agenda, as well as (2) the continuing ability of agents nominally outside of the institutions of the state to permeate and influence the state agenda. Thus, in this chapter I develop a theoretical framework for thinking about the post-apartheid developmental state that gives attention to the symbolic unity, as well as the practices that both coalesce and fragment the developmental state in post-apartheid South Africa (Migdal 2001). In particular, I suggest that the city is an important vector in this nexus of power, both for how the state is able to consolidate a symbolic unity, and for how the state is stretched and fragmented in space.

2.2 The Post-apartheid Developmental State

The early materialist critique of the apartheid state, which owe much to the influence of a broader body of twentieth century work in the Marxist tradition, including the influence of writers such as Gramsci, Althusser and Poulantzas, served as an important critique of the apartheid state. It was essentially concerned to understand why an unprecedented era of growth in South Africa's history served not to dismantle colonial segregationist policies, but to further entrench them. Ideologically sympathetic to the anti-apartheid movement, this materialist critique was influential in the
construction of a political imagination of an interventionist post-apartheid state, and has therefore cast a long shadow in thinking about the state after apartheid. I consider the trajectory of this materialist critique in brief for two reasons. Firstly, in tracing this lineage, we are better able to understand the imagination of the post-apartheid developmental state within the contested accounts of the relationship between capital and the apartheid state, as well as locating the contours of critiques of the post-apartheid state. Secondly, the materialist engagements with the apartheid state covers an important body state theory, one which is both insufficient for theorising the post-apartheid state, while nevertheless offering some very suggestive avenues of exploration — avenues which I suggest have been under-explored in the post-apartheid context.

Although there have been some attempt in recent years to think about the post-apartheid state through a contemporary literature on the developmental state (Edigheji 2010; Fine 2010; Freund 2007; D. Pillay 2007), with contributors debating the existence of specific characteristics within the South African state, the imagination of an interventionist post-apartheid state traces its origins to debates within the anti-apartheid movement. In particular, it resides in the notion of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s (Chipkin 1997). NDR was the official strategic project for the revolutionary overthrow of the apartheid state adopted by the South African Communist Party (SACP), and has been influential among the major trade union movements, and debated within the broader anti-apartheid movement since that time. The theoretical underpinning of the NDR was based on an interpretation of the apartheid state through the theory of "colonialism of a special kind", which argued that apartheid represented the continuation into a modern state form of an exploitative colonial capitalist model. It was, according to Bond (Bond 2007), an internal version of dependency theory that tried to make sense of the relationship between a segregated state and capital accumulation. According to the theory of 'colonialism of a special kind', the apartheid state did not emerge out of an anti-colonial struggle,
but rather represented a compact between imperial capital and local white economic and political elites. Thus even though nominally an independent nation-state, the South African economy was implicated into broader circulations of capital through empire. In this way, a colonial relationship characterised the relative positions of white and black South Africans, with the latter remaining in the same position as under colonial rule. Implicit within this mode of interpreting the apartheid state was what became known as the 'two-stage' theory of revolution, involving firstly a national liberation from (internal) colonialism, followed by the replacement of the remnants of the capitalist economy by socialism. Various commentators have cautioned that this did not imply the need for two separate political struggles, but that: “the dominant ingredients of later stages must already have begun to mature within the womb of the earlier stage” (Slovo quoted in Bond 2007, p.8). In other words, the 'two-stage' theory of NDR does not imply two separate historical moments, but rather two distinct political moments.

The initial intervention by Harold Wolpe was directed primarily against the liberal theorisation of apartheid which argued that apartheid represented an artificial distortion to a free labour market, and that economic growth would lead to the end of apartheid (Nattrass 1991a). Yet Wolpe also saw similar tendencies within the “colonialism of a special type” argument, and his intervention was as much a response to the left as to the right. Wolpe (1972), among other so-called ‘revisionist’ academics (Posel 1991), were perturbed by the apparent compatibility (if not mutual implication) of apartheid and capitalist economic growth, especially in the 1960s. Wolpe (1972) also saw this tendency of viewing state racism as a backward ideology as inherent in the formulation of the ‘colonialism of a special type’ thesis that was the theoretical cornerstone of the NDR. This theory was unable to explain the relationship between class and race under apartheid, argued Wolpe, thus treating them as isolated categories (Wolpe 1972). The early work of these revisionists represent an attempt to place the control and management of a system of cheap black labour at the centre of the
apartheid state, thus implicating both state and capital in the 'proletarianisation' of the black majority (Natassa 1991). Wolpe (1972) cautioned that in apartheid racism and capital had found a perfect match. For Wolpe, the apartheid state was able to maintain the domination of the black working class not in spite of, but because of the systematic underdevelopment of large parts of the rural landscape. Wolpe used the Gramscian concept of 'articulation' to argue that capital in South Africa was able to parasitically coexist with pre-capitalist modes of production in the 'bantustans'. These imaginary homelands (the territorialisation of the pre-capitalist mode of production) effectively subsidised the capitalist apartheid state by providing cheap labour, while simultaneously absorbing the social costs of reproduction, a role usually taken by the democratic capitalist state in most modern societies (Wolpe 1972). The families and, as wages were forced downwards in the 1970s, also the extended familial networks to which young male labourers were tethered, were expected to absorb the economic and social costs of schooling, caring for the sick and providing for the aged and infirm, while white capital lived off the increased profits (Bond 2007).

For Legassick (1974b; 1974a) the cheap labour system was not a sufficient explanation for apartheid state policy. The paradox that industrial growth required permanent 'detribalised' and proletarianised (black) labour in urban areas, thus creating the conditions for black South Africans to challenge the socio-political structure of cheap labour, was altogether independent of the erosion of the productive capacity of the reserves argued by Wolpe. Moreover, Legassick emphasised that different sectors of the capitalist economy might have differing stakes in black urbanisation: mining and farming functioned well with a migrant labour system, but other sectors, especially manufacturing, would have benefited from an urban workforce. This idea was taken up more directly under the influence of the work of Poulantzas (1969; 1978) in thinking about the fractions of capital within apartheid South Africa (Davies 1979; Davies et al. 1976). Fractions of capital were identified between the sectors of production (i.e. mining, manufacturing and agricultural), their
location within the circulation of capital (i.e. industrial, financial, commercial, landed), or their location within the national politics of white South Africa (i.e. Afrikaans nationalist or English-imperial) (Bond 2007). In South Africa, the Poulantzian concept of fragments of capital has primarily been employed as a critique of the supposed under-theorisation of the internal dynamics of capital in the work of Wolpe on the apartheid state (Clarke 1978). Although he recognised the differentiation of capitalist interests, Wolpe did not analyse this differentiation in any significant way, thus weakening his argument about the specificity of the apartheid state beyond its relation to a history of segregation (Clark 1978). For Davies et al: “the early assumption of hegemony by national capital is the ‘unique’ feature of the South African state” (Davies et al. 1976, p.29). They argue that the state was instrumental in coordinating and adjudicating the interests of the various ‘fractions’ of South African capital through encouraging national monopoly capitalism. This had the effect of exacerbating tensions and struggles between capital and labour, but allowed the state to reduce conflict within the power-bloc, and successful economic growth in the 1960s allowed the state to act decisively in controlling labour. However, for Clark (1978) the focus on fractions of capital conversely took too little account of the conflict between capital and labour in the formation of the apartheid state.

By the late 1970s the apartheid state had reached a point of crisis, with declining output and increased (and increasingly violent) internal resistance. Attempting to theorise this crisis, academics within the materialist tradition drew on the broader work in the name of Regulation Theory, itself partly influenced by Poulantzas’ rethinking of the state (Nattrass 1991). Saul and Gelb (1981) argued that the apartheid policies had been a successful response to an ‘organic crisis’ in the 1940s: “but which by the late 1970s had itself degenerated into crisis, requiring thus the reform of old style apartheid to recreate the conditions for renewed accumulation” (Nattrass 1991b, p.676). The stability of the system that had contributed to growth during the 1950s and 1960s was based upon
both internal and external conditions: internally, cheap labour; and externally, cheap imports based on the strength of the rand linked to the gold standard (Gelb 1987). Thus, cyclical crises in the regime of accumulation (i.e. capitalism based on a segregated labour market, or what Gelb termed racial fordism) were assumed to have built in stabilisers in the form of cheap labour and cheap money (Gelb 1987, p.42). These stabilisers were rendered ineffective in the face of a much more serious structural crisis in the global Fordist system. The break-down of the international fixed exchange-rate system meant that South Africa’s exports and exchange rate became unstable: “the balance of payments and the foreign exchange constraint thus no longer exercised a stabilising long-run effect through their role in cyclical fluctuations, and instead became a destabilising (and unpredictable) factor” (Gelb 1987, p.45).

In the end, the apartheid system did collapse, partly because it became economically unsustainable. The adoption of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as a first priority of the new government therefore suggested to many who were broadly sympathetic with the anti-apartheid movement the possibility of remaking the relationship between the state and its subjects. From the point of view of the trade union movement, the RDP represented the potential completion of the NDR, through the establishment of the enabling conditions for the radical transformation of the social and economic order in South Africa (Chipkin 2003). It is therefore not surprising that a strong critique of the post-apartheid developmental state emerged from within the materialist tradition, especially after the apparent abandonment of the RDP less than two years after it was announced. The closure of the RDP office in 1996 is suggestive to some of the side-lining of a radical developmental agenda by a more conservative economic agenda, encapsulated in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme that served as the guiding strategy for government’s developmental agenda from 1997 (Bond 2007; Freund 2007; Pillay 2007). This apparent shift in emphasis within the state, from the developmental agenda of the RDP based on
redistribution to an interpretation of development premised on growth, has been seen as the resumption of an alliance between the state and capital, prompting accusations that the post-apartheid state may in fact be a neo-apartheid state (Bond 2000). Bond (2007) suggests further that the interpretation of the developmental state in post-apartheid South Africa through GEAR, premised as he interprets it on growth ahead of social intervention, represents the ascendency of the 'bourgeois' African National Congress (ANC) as the predominant organisation of the anti-apartheid movement, and the side-lining of the more socialist South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

Sitas (2007), influenced by the work of Wolpe, argues that the post-apartheid state continues to be characterised by the link between state and capital, albeit in a different state form, through the increasing emphasis within government policy on the informal economy to absorb the unemployed. This is occurring despite the increased capital accumulation by economic elites in the post-apartheid era, increasingly defined by class rather than race. Sitas (2007) regards the post-apartheid developmental state as founded on a compromise between black political elites and white capital, and represents a potential crisis for the post-apartheid state: “a compromise about land between blacks and whites, about the 'customary' (...), the corporate arrangements between labour, state, unions and communities to create a way of moving beyond conflict, as well as the social contract between leaders and followers, whether you call it the RDP or 'delivery’” (Sitas 2007, p.43). While the apartheid state was characterised by the confinement of black South Africans to rural ghettos, Sitas identifies in the post-apartheid developmental state the danger of recreating such ghettos through the confinement of the poor to minimal state remittances and 'life-line' basic services with little structural change in their life opportunities. The state's inability to provide social transformation is the result of the continuing structures of inequality that permeate South African society, and that trace their roots to the implication of capital in the state form.
Hart (G. Hart 2007) locates the apparent compromise not in the defining moment of 1994, but in the very conceptualisation of a post-apartheid state within the anti-apartheid movement. For Hart, the idea of NDR and its implicit assumption of a 'two-stage' revolution, first over the state and then over capital, effectively allowed a middle-class political bourgeoisie in the form of the centrist ANC to take control of the liberation movement – leaving the revolution in effect deferred. For Hart (2007) the class nature of the post-apartheid state has its roots in how the anti-apartheid movement imagined the post-apartheid state. Hart suggests that the two-stage theory of revolution that was the premise of the NDR simply abdicated popular aspirations for political change, and created the perfect vehicle for the bourgeois forces within the anti-apartheid movement to take power (G. Hart 2007). Thus, Hart (2007) argues that it is insufficient to see the abandoning of the RDP in 1996, and the subsequent adoption of GEAR as a shift from: “relatively benign neo-Keynesianism to harsh neoliberalism”, as is often supposed argued (G. Hart 2007, p.56). For Hart, the ascension of GEAR over the RDP did not represent the roll-back of the state in the face of global capital, nor the victory of class over race in a post-apartheid capitalist state, but rather a redefinition of the NDR to serve the legitimation of new political and economic elites, and the construction of new forms of (post-apartheid) subjectivity (G. Hart 2007). This argument resides in an interpretation of the historical propensity of the ANC to articulate South African nationalism within a particular hegemonic project through a powerful ideological monopoly of anti-apartheid resistance (Marais 2001).

This line of argument marks an important recognition of the contested nature of state formation, suggesting that the project of the post-apartheid developmental state has never existed as a coherent vision, but rather exists in the malleable guise of a shared experience of apartheid oppression. Marais (2001) similarly cautions against interpretations of the RDP that read it as some kind of founding social contract, arguing rather that it must be understood as the expression of contestation
about political, economic and social aspirations both during and after apartheid. While it is largely recognised that the RDP was influenced by political personalities in the post-apartheid government who were closely connected to the trade union movement (Freund 2007), Chipkin (2003) has argued that the RDP, and the later White Paper on Local Government, effectively avoided potential sources of contradiction and tension by conceptualising the state as the unproblematic and uncontested site for the articulation of the developmental agenda. Despite the shift away from the RDP, the post-apartheid state has expended huge amounts of social resources on development projects. This is the central paradox of the post-apartheid developmental state: “the single most striking feature of post-1994 South Africa is that despite the general picture (...) of rising levels of state expenditure on social and economic services, coupled to ambitious institutional projects to mobilise resources for development, poverty has nevertheless increased” (Swilling et al. 2004, p.2). Thus, while many people have been positively effected by state expenditure on development, the basic conditions of life for much of the population has remained as it was under apartheid (Freund 2007).

I suggest that the materialist engagement with the post-apartheid state, emerging initially from an engagement with the apartheid state, has provided a critical and insightful analysis of the limits of the post-apartheid developmental state, and alludes to a more complex entanglement between the political and economic rationalities of state formation. However, I suggest that these observations have remained unexplored. What a theory of the post-apartheid state requires, therefore, is a more detailed account of these political rationalities of rule, of the techniques and modes through which the 'apparatus unity' of the state is at least symbolically secured, and more detailed accounts of how the state pursues and achieves (or fails to achieve) its developmental agenda autonomous from the interests of capital. At the same time, it needs to account for the ways in which this agenda is subverted and resisted, whether by capital or by other social agents. The state is always in the
process of attempting to contain and exert influence over an ill-defined territory and population. As Robinson (1997) suggests: “alongside finances, a minimal capacity to act, or an administrative capacity, is essential to all states and often constitutes a powerful autonomous motive for state action. Accumulation of knowledge, surveillance capacities, and the ability to carry out policy choices (the existence and mobilization of an apparatus) provide a substratum of state interests which, in some situations, can be very significant” (Robinson 1997, p.373). This is also the general nature of Mamdani’s (1996) critique of materialist accounts of the apartheid state, although I will consider Mamdani’s work more specifically later in the chapter, when I discuss a broader post-colonial contribution to thinking about the state.

The relative lack of analytical detail within the materialist tradition in South Africa is all the more surprising, given that the materialist literature on state theory more broadly has been productively employed to think about: a) the state as the arena of contestation for a multiplicity of political and social positions; and b) the shifting political, and spatial, rationalities of rule. Ironically, due to its relative dismissal within the South African academy after a brief cameo in the 1980s, the work of Poulantzas provides a potential entry point into thinking about the post-apartheid state. It is to the possibilities of this literature that I now turn my attention.

2.3 The State in Society

Poulantzas’ (1969) presented his theory of the state as an attempt to correct what he regarded as flawed materialist accounts of the state, which emphasised the state as simply an instrument of class rule. Poulantzas was primarily interested in the nature of politics within, and differentiation of, the interests of capital (what Poulantzas termed the ‘fragments’ of capital). For Poulantzas, it is not sufficient to reduce the state to an instrument of class rule. In particular, for Poulantzas there is no
necessary correlation between the interests of capital and the state ruling elite, nor does capital necessarily desire to capture the ruling elite. This was the basis of an ongoing exchange of articles between Poulantzas and another contemporary Marxist writer, Ralph Milliband, in New Left Review in the 1970s. Whereas Milliband (1969) placed a high degree of emphasis on the role of ideology in locating the convergence of interests of the ruling elites and capitalist classes, for Poulantzas the state apparatus is an objective and relatively autonomous structures (Poulantzas 1969). For Poulantzas, to account for the autonomous unity and cohesion of the state, the coincidence of interest between the state and the capitalist classes must be systemic, and not simply a question of the ideological capture of the state bureaucracy by the interest of capital (1969). In other words, for Poulantzas the state remains relatively autonomous from the capitalist classes, even as it functions to maintain the interests of these classes in most the contemporary democratic states.

Against the claims made about the power of ideology, Poulantzas' theory of the state relies rather on the notion of hegemony. States by and large do not rule by oppression (or at least not in the first instance), but through consent and class alliance - secured through democratic institutions and the law (Poulantzas 1969). In this way, the state functions as the regulating factor, or the factor of cohesion, within the broader social formation – in most democratic states the social formation being dominated and delimited by the capitalist mode of production. The capitalist mode of production is, as in most materialist analyses, the primary target of (class) struggle within the social formation. Yet the state, rather than itself the site of that struggle, serves to balance the tendency towards the dissolution of the dominant mode of production (i.e. contradictory class practices that threaten the dominant mode of production) with the tendency towards systemic integrity of the structures of the mode of production (i.e. the institutions of economy, politics and ideology which hold the system together) (Poulantzas 1969). Since the state is relatively autonomous from the economic, political and ideological spheres (i.e. the state does not exist as a function of these spheres, despite their
dependence on the state), it is therefore able to maintain and restore equilibrium to the system. For this reason, although the materiality of the state does not derive from capitalist interests directly, it does provide the conditions for class domination by establishing in particular the economy as a free and separate sphere, crystallised within a national territory, and governed by the rule of law.

For this reason, it is not important first and foremost which class position occupies the institutions of state, but rather a question of the dominant mode of production within the social formation. Within a social formation in which the capitalist mode of production predominates the state apparatus will tend towards maintaining the interests of this system regardless of the class position of those individuals who occupy positions within the state. While the social formation is itself shaped and dominated by a particular capitalist mode of production, Poulantzas' theory also leaves open the possibility that other forces in society operate in and influence the social formation. In this way, Poulantzas (1969) argued that the state is a relationship of the forces that occur within the social formation: “or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among classes and class fractions” (Poulantzas quoted in Painter 2006, p.759). The state is contingent and contested, emerging as the condensation of the interplay of various forces that operate in, and occupy positions within, the broader social formation.

Poulantzas' (1969; 1978) work is therefore an important entry point into thinking about the developmental state in post-apartheid South Africa, because it understands the state within the contested terrain of what Poulantzas terms the social formation, rather than the state as itself the site of class conflict. In this way, the apparent divergence from the developmental agenda sketched out in the RDP towards the growth-oriented and arguably more 'market-friendly' GEAR programme may in fact have less to do with the ideological co-opting of the ANC than with the dominance of capital within the social formation. This echoes a point that Fine (2010) makes regarding the
dominance of what he refers to as the Mineral Energy Complex (MEC) in South Africa. Thus, regardless of the structural reorientation of the state, the persistence of the MEC as the dominant mode of production may anyway place limits on the possibilities for social transformation. Moreover, Poulantzas' insistence that the state is relatively autonomous from the social formation — that the bureaucracy of the state does not necessarily represent, or even support, the interests of capital — allows us to consider far more carefully how the state might articulate and pursue an autonomous agenda. Thus, despite the apparent tendency towards a more 'market-friendly' environment, national state departments such as Education, Health and Housing administer massive budgets and have made considerable developmental interventions into society.

The work of Poulantzas has been influential to theoretical developments in the materialist tradition, notably Regulation Theory, and in particular to the work of one of its proponents Bob Jessop (1990; 1997; 2001). Jessop's work on the state represents one possible avenue for further disentangling the state from its supposed capture by the politics of class conflict, and concentrating on the practices and effects of rule within the state. Focusing on the mundane concerns of 'apparatus unity' (i.e. the strictly administrative problem of securing the unity of state institutions) Jessop (1990) reiterates Poulantzas remarks that the state remains relatively autonomous from class interests even as it serves the interests of a dominant class, because the bureaucracy have no necessary allegiance to any class. However, Jessop further identifies what he regards as a failure in Marxist theories of the state to recognise that the state: “as a set of institutions cannot, qua structural ensemble, exercise power” (1990, p.9). The state has no essential institutional unity that establishes a particular state mode of power. Rather, state institutions are articulated in complex and historically contingent ways with other state and non-state institutions. For Jessop, states are necessarily “emergent, tangential phenomena (...) there could well be continuing struggles to impose contradictory 'apparatus unities' on (potential) state organs” (1990, p.9). There is no single moment when the state emerges in
complete form, within a given territory, nor when all civil servants adopt a particular state project in entirety. The state must therefore be seen less as an institutional form than as the condensation of social contestation.

In Jessop's earlier work the state remained an identifiable apparatus, if a very unspecific one. It is for Jessop (1990): “a distinct ensemble of institutions and organisations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society in the name of their common interest or general will” (Jessop 1990, p.341). In more recent work (2001; 2002) Jessop has extended this theorisation of the state, and developed what he terms a 'strategic-relational' account of the state: “by virtue of its structural selectivity and always specific strategic capacities, [the state's] powers will always be conditional or relational. Their realization depends on the structural ties between the state and its encompassing political system, the strategic links among state managers and other political forces, and the complex web of interdependencies and social networks linking the state and political system to its broader environment” (2001, p.167). Jessop recognises the contingency of state forms and regimes and the variation in state capacities and performance. Thus, he is inclined to suggest that the state is the site of a paradox. The nature of the paradox, for Jessop (2001) is that the state is simultaneously increasingly recognised as just one institutional ensemble among others within a social formation, while at the same time it is called upon to be responsible for maintaining the overall cohesion of that social formation. Thus, for Jessop, the 'strategic-relational' account of the state is most appropriate because it begins to unpack the overall logic of this paradox in a poly-centric social formation.

This account of the state, as: “an emergent, partial, and unstable system that is interdependent with other systems in a complex social order” (2001, p.167), offers a more nuanced and subtle account of the practices of building and sustaining a state project – as something always in progress – than the
work of Poulantzas, although it too is suggestive in this direction. Jessop offers the beginnings of an account of the state as containing far more than the contestation between capital and labour within the 'social formation' – for Jessop a greatly expanded and more complex sphere than envisaged by Poulantzas. Moreover, Jessop's account of the state tends towards a fragmented and discontinuous geography of state capacity and hegemony, conscious that state institutions operate within varying scalar and spatial configurations: cross-cutting and intersecting the nation, the city, and the neighbourhood. It is this discontinuous geography of the state that is most resonant within the post-apartheid context, and for which a theory of the post-apartheid state must be able to account. As suggested above, the post-apartheid state exercises an inconsistent rule across a national territory and through unequally capacitated Local Government, and its presence is not equally felt.

2.4 Infrastructure and Power

When considered through the work of both Poulantzas and Jessop, the materialist tradition offers a compelling and potentially fruitful engagement with the state as a contested and contingent, but nevertheless relatively autonomous, project. This is an important contribution to the materialist literature on the post-apartheid state, which has tended to focus on the ideological contestation within the ANC to explain the apparent abandonment of a developmental agenda. Moreover, the more recent work of Jessop (2002) and Jessop et al (2008) on the emergence of new rationalities of space in the context of global capital provides us with some suggestive avenues towards a greater sensitivity of the discontinuous geography of the state, and the differentiated workings of state power across and through space. As suggested above, a theoretical engagement with the post-apartheid state must be able to account for the ways in which the post-apartheid state emerges and coalesces in particular moments and in particular spaces, and the ways in which it appears divergent and fragmented in other moments and spaces.
The theory of the state offered by Michael Mann (1984; 1993; 2008) is not dissimilar to that of Jessop in many ways. Mann attempts a complex and contingent account of the ‘autonomous power of the nation state’ (i.e. the historically contingent, though hegemonic and productive, power that the state maintains within society) as a product of its ability to coordinate social power within a particular territorial whole (1984 and 1993). For Mann the state is not a necessary object, but the effect of an historically contingent permutation of social forces. Mann is concerned with the origins, mechanisms and results of the autonomous power which the state possesses (2008). For Mann the state can only ever be an arena, and herein resides the source of its power: the state has had the unique ability through history to provide a territorially centralised form of organisation. Like Jessop, Mann (1990) recognised that the state is an always-contingent configuration and permutation of forces within society – primarily the four ‘sources of social power’ which Mann identifies as economic, military, political and ideological. Mann used the term ‘polymorphous crystallization’ to capture how specific configurations of the state apparatus and state power derive from the differential articulation of various elements of the state under these four sources of power.

Mann (2008) identifies primarily two mechanisms through which the state may exert its power: i.e. despotic and infrastructural power. Despotic power implies the ability to repress and attain obedience. Infrastructural power implies the ability to infiltrate into society and gain legitimacy through capturing the social, and refers to the capacity and institutions of modern state government. Mann suggests these as ideal types, with no state exhibiting only the one or the other. Rather, states deploy some combination of these two forms of power. In general, however, states that have deployed and made use of infrastructural power have improved their hold over society, while states that rely primarily on despotic forms of power have generally remained relatively weak politically. Infrastructural power therefore provides one of the autonomous rationalities of political
Infrastructural power is exerted through the extension of state 'infrastructure' into society. Such infrastructure usually has implied: the division and separation of the states main activities into institutions; literacy within the bureaucracy; the extension of standardised coinage and measuring standards; and advancements in communication and transport technologies. Nevertheless, Mann concedes that none of these infrastructures is inherently specific to the state. All of them exist more generally within society, and are part of general social development. Indeed, through history there are many examples of non-state actors either developing or adopting infrastructural capacities, such as the rapid adoption of literacy and standardised measurements for commerce. Nevertheless, Mann maintains that states which have been able to deploy relatively highly developed forms of infrastructure have possessed greater capacity for infrastructural penetration. And in turn, societies in general, and not just their states, have advanced their powers. So none of these infrastructures necessarily changes or effects the relationship between state and society. Thus, Mann concludes that state power cannot derive from any technique or means of power unique to itself.

Neither is it sufficient for a theory of the state to focus on the necessity of the state for the formalisation of social rules; or for the ability of the state to coordinate a multiplicity of functions of rule since these would be the tools of any actor or institution that seeks power. The state possesses no distinct means of power independent of political, ideological, military and economic power that another actor may not possess or that another institution cannot coordinate. The autonomous power of the state lies, therefore, in the fact that the state is inherently territorialised and centralised: "autonomous state power is the product of the usefulness of enhanced territorial centralisation to social life in general" (Mann 2008, p.63). Thus for Mann, where states are strong, societies are relatively territorialised and centralised. Moreover, the state has the ability also to influence this
arena through consolidating its territoriality, primarily through extending its infrastructural power.

Mann’s theory of the state is compelling not least because it suggests that the state is the effect of more than the workings of capital alone. The state as the contingent territorialised coordination of power, contains a range of social conflicts. Certainly in the case of the apartheid state, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s when the oppressive apparatuses of state were simultaneously most brutal and at their most vulnerable, an understanding of the ideological and political capacities of apartheid in relation to those of the anti-apartheid movement is an important corrective to strictly materialist explanations of crisis (Chipkin 2007). Even more significantly, understandings of the South African state after apartheid are inadequate if they account for the fragmented ideological and political terrain of contemporary South Africa in economic terms alone (I take this up in more detail in the following chapter). Nevertheless, Mann’s assumption about the autonomous power of the state emanating from its ability to monopolise and play off other social actors across a territory is subject to a number of criticisms. In the context of broader discussions about the shifting spatial rationalities of global capital (Allen & Cochrane 2010; Brenner 2004; Jessop et al. 2008) for example, Mann’s insistence that the state exists as a territorially integral entity seems hard to sustain. Even if this critique does not contradict his assertion that the state is an historically contingent entity – it’s territorial dissolution may be seen as simply the contingent disintegration of the state – the more nuanced engagements with the shifting spatial rationalities cited above offer arguably more detailed accounts of the shifting geography of the state. Moreover, a post-colonial literature on state-society relations has demonstrated that, in the colonial and post-colonial contexts at least, the state has never been autonomous from society (Patrick Chabal & Daloz 1999; Mbembe 2001; Reno 1997; 1997). I will return to this literature later in the chapter.

What is compelling about Mann’s work, and what I think valuable to retain, is (1) the capillary
account of the state's infiltration of society through the concept of infrastructural power, and (2) the recognition that power is free-floating within society, not emanating from the state alone. The notion of infrastructural power, I suggest, offers a very emergent and contingent account of the way in which the state is inserted into spaces in order to capture society and to legitimate its rule. Recent engagements with the concept of infrastructural power (Schensul 2008; Soifer 2008; Vom Hau 2008) have expressed the productivity of the concept in thinking about the differentiated and discontinuous geography of the state across space. Schensul (2008) in particular, has used the concept to demonstrate how the post-apartheid state has been more or less effective in instantiating itself vis-a-vis other social actors in different urban spaces. The concept of infrastructural power speaks, in my mind, directly to the concern illustrated in the opening quote: "the informal social modes of interaction which operate with logics that are often autonomous to those of the State" (Government of South Africa 2003, p.9). The state has no guarantee that it will capture society, that it will convince individuals and groups to buy into its project and to submit willingly to its rule. The success or failure of the state in this regard is always up for grabs, and more significantly, is never homogeneous but spatially various. Though not well developed in the work of Mann, the concept of infrastructural power is potentially very fruitful for thinking about the discontinuous geography of the post-apartheid state. It also helps to explain where the state is less able to consolidate its infrastructural power, it may revert to some form of despotic power – which may deliver short term acquiescence but may make longer term infrastructural power harder to subsequently achieve.

The three accounts of state theory considered above (the materialist contributions of Poulantzas and Jessop, and the capillary thinking of Mann) share the concept of the 'autonomy' of the state from other spheres of society. Despite the assertion of autonomy for the state, all three authors are writing against the weberian conception of the state as a separate and definable sphere in relationship to other spheres of civil society, with specific capacities and restraints. Within the materialist tradition,
this provided a useful way of demonstrating that the state is not instrumentally related to class conflict but has emerged in modern society to have a rationality of its own beyond the interests of a dominant class. For Poulantzas in particular, not only is the state autonomous from other spheres of society, but in the context of the modern state there is no space from which the state itself is excluded (Painter, 2006). The concept of a separate sphere of civil society, often invoked as a counterweight to the institutions and domination of the state, is nothing more than the: “specific form of the State's presence in socio-economic relations” (Poulantzas 1978, p.70). While both writers are highly suggestive about the contingency (and for Jessop the spatial discontinuity) of the state, they remain imprecise about the relative ability (or inability) of the state to articulate and pursue its own autonomous agenda. This is perhaps partly connected to the persistent preoccupation within the materialist tradition with the social formation, and the state as a product thereof.

Yet it is in this emergent process that the vectors of state, space and subjectivity most clearly converge, and I suggest that it is more developed in the work of Mann, in his concept of Infrastructural power. Mann is also sceptical of the concept of an autonomous sphere of civil society, and is concerned with accounting for the apparent autonomous power of the institutions of the state over other spheres of society, the state's ability to out-maneuver other social agents, and to exert control over a defined territory. The materialist contributions offer a corrective to assumptions that the state is simply an instrument of class rule, suggesting that it possesses autonomous rationalities of rule; the contribution of Mann takes this insightful observation a step further and suggests that the state is able in modern society to monopolize a much wider range of social forces and technologies, not through any power unique to itself other than its own territorial limit. While for all three writers the state is a contingent and emergent source of power that permeates all of society, I suggest that Mann's capillary notion of infrastructural power offers the most compelling account of the differentiated and contested process through which this permeation occurs. This
conception, of power as far more dispersed throughout society, resonates strongly with Foucault's influential thoughts on power, to which I now turn.

2.5 Governmentality and State Formation

"The agenda of the developmental state (...) is ostensibly about a vision-driven, enterprising and empowered performance-oriented government; active citizen participation; reducing inequality; and providing public services. (...) The search for what's really going on is in the messy world of practice where the grand constructions of visionaries and deconstructions of their armchair critics get lost so easily in the detail" (Swilling et al. 2004, p.7).

Despite the suggestiveness of Mann's capillary account of the way through which the state intervenes into society, I suggested two reasons why his account is nevertheless in need of rethinking. Firstly, his account of the autonomous power of the state as residing in its territoriality is open to critique from two directions: the post-colonial critique of civil society, and the neoliberal critique of state space. However, the second reason why Mann's account is lacking, and connected to the assumptions made in the first reason, is that power for Mann emanates outwards, whether from the state or other social agents. Mann's account of infrastructural power begins to challenge these assumptions, it must be admitted, but his insistence on the territoriality of the state means that his conception of power remains one of capacity and deployment.

The work of Foucault is concerned precisely with thinking about the circulation of power within society more generally. Perhaps the most important contribution that Foucault has made into thinking about the state is to recognise that power is productive and relational. Power, for Foucault,
is “the relational environment in which actions take place” (Prado 1995, p.66). Power is not simply an inventory of the instances of coercion, manipulation, and prohibition; these are merely instances of particular outcomes of power relations (Prado 1995). It is therefore the act, and not that individual, that is the bearer of power: “a set of actions upon other actions” and not action upon agents or subjects (Foucault & Rabinow 1984, p.208). Seen in this way, power circulates through the production of knowledge that can be brought to bear. Power does not equate to knowledge, nor knowledge to power; nevertheless Foucault emphasises a close link between power and knowledge; what he refers to as the domains and rituals of truth. For example, the ‘science’ of the criminal justice system produces prison boards, parole boards, criminal pathologists, a police system etc. Throughout the ritual penal procedures the subject is being constituted in relation to these rituals of truth: both as something subject to such rituals of truths, but also as something that identifies and defines itself in relation to these rituals. In this way: “power perpetually creates knowledge (...) there is no exteriority between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power” (Prado 1995, p.71).

Foucault is interested in the ways in which power serves to constitute people as subjects in specific ways, and as his works has focussed on the emergence in society of dominant forms and modes of power. His major works trace the historical emergence of sovereign power, disciplinary power and governmental modes of power in the modern age. In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault (1979) discusses how the body of the modern individual is made both an object and a subject in modern society. In the prison the body is rendered docile; i.e. made an object of control and manipulation. *Discipline and Punish* documents a shift from people as subjects of sovereign power towards people as subjects of disciplinary power; power as coercion to power as surveillance and discipline. Crucial in *Discipline and Punish*, which traces the emergence of disciplinary power in society, is to demonstrate how punitive measures directed at the body became political strategies that pervade
society more generally. Technologies of surveillance are developed in prisons, schools and hospitals; these technologies also emerge more generally in daily life. More specifically, these technologies are supported by the emergence of normative social sciences that provide the 'knowledge' to make bodies docile; to turn the body into an object (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983). In *History of Sexuality* Foucault documents the emergence of government as a mode of power characterised as the "conduct of conduct" (Lemke 2002). Government is a mode of power that: "shapes conduct by working through desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs" (Dean 1999, p.11). For example, sexual health and psychology emerge as spheres of knowledge about sexuality that determine norms about sexual behaviours and conditions. Subjects are able and encouraged to reflect judgementally upon their own behaviour, and so take responsibility for their own comportment; what Foucault calls 'techniques of the self' (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983). As such, governmental power permeates not from a single source, but becomes a more general ordering principle in society, so that individuals become subjects of a broader regime of governmental techniques.

However, Foucault did not present these modes of power as historically separate, suggesting instead a dovetailing of the different modes of power, even as each different mode may have gained a particular pre-eminence at certain historical moments (Legg 2007). Foucault was nevertheless most interested in the emergence of what he has called bio-power, which circulates, constitutes and normalises not from some central sovereign source, but more generally dispersed through society. Foucault traces the emergence of bio-power as the dominant form of power in western societies since the eighteenth century, defined as the ways in which the modern subject is constituted through the emergence of the political technologies of the body and the self on one hand; and technologies of life and population on the other (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983). The most prevalent modes of bio-power in the modern era are discipline and government. While disciplinary techniques of power
operate at the minute and micro-political scale, often between individuals, or individuals and particular spatial forms, government operates at a less intimate scale. The concept of biopower can consist of two components: (1) control of the body; and (2) control of the population (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983). This allowed in the nineteenth century, the emergence of a pre-occupation with sexuality and the consequent disciplines of sexual health and psychology as spheres of knowledge on the one hand, and demographics, public health and economy as spheres of knowledge, defined territorially and emerging concurrent with the emergence of the modern nation state, on the other. Thus Legg (2006) suggests that from the nineteenth century onwards: “governmental rationalities emerged that had political economy as their main form of knowledge, the population as their target for regulation and apparatuses of security as their essential mechanisms” (2006, p.9).

In his now famous 1978 lectures, published as Security, Territory and Population (2009) Foucault was concerned not with the state as the origin of government, but rather with the what he referred to as the governmentalization of the state. In other words, Foucault was concerned with the historically contingent emergence of the state, and how the formal apparatuses of state have become concerned with: “knowing and administering the lives and activities of the persons and things across a territory” (N. S. Rose et al. 2006, p.87). Contrary to Mann’s conception of the capillary capacity of state infrastructural power to permeate and infiltrate society, Foucault has been more concerned with the ways in which rule itself is disbursed across a wide range of social actors. Foucault’s analysis suggests that instead of seeing a single central entity such as a state as responsible for managing the conduct of citizens: “a whole variety of authorities govern in different sites, in relation to different objectives” (Rose et al. 2006, p.85). Foucault was primarily concerned with subjects than with power. He wanted to know how individuals were made into subjects. So that is why he focused on practices, and especially regimes of practices. Foucault is concerned not with defining and identifying power, but with how subjects get made. So in this way he is not concerned
with the state and whether it has power or not. Rather, he is concerned with the practices, and how these coincide with the state form. The state, or more correctly stateness, represents the distribution of resources and capacities across society into a specific permutation i.e. the state form. But this is contingent, and it is the regimes of practices that make subjects, not the state as some objective entity. The institutions that make up stateness, that account for the state-distribution of social resources (as opposed to any other potential distribution, such as the feudal or imperial), are themselves simply culminations of practices that are normalised. This is not to say that the state does not have material effects, of course it does. It is simply to say that “the state” is not an objective source of power, but merely a contingent permutation of social resources that have emerged in parallel with forms of power that operate at the level of body and population.

While the 1978 lecture on governmentality (the third lecture) was primarily devoted to the genealogy of the governmentalisation of the state, what has been of immediate interest for the many writers of what I shall refer to as the governmentality literature (c.f. Dean 1999; Gordon 1991; O'Malley et al. 1997; N. S. Rose 1999) is the ensemble of knowledges, expertise, professionals, practices and policies that identify and attempt to intervene into the population and the political economy. Governmentality can therefore be understood as the techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour at the scale of the population. It is the more or less coordinated set of practices, knowledge and rationalities of the regulation of the conduct of citizens through techniques of government (O'Malley et al. 1997). Against conceptions of the state as the centre from which power emanates, the emergence of rule based on the rationalities and mentalities of government suggests that power is located in the mundane practices through which populations and individuals are surveilled, surveyed, taxed, made healthy, educated etc.

Rose (1999) and Dean (1999) are among a group of people who adapt governmentality to consider
the emergence of free and self-determining individuals as subjects of the modern rational nation-state. Subjects respond to governmental practices through adjusting their comportments and actions, and in turn influence the exercise of government (Rose 1999). This specific formulation of the liberal state is premised on the emergence also of the very idea of a social sphere or civil society, as that space of human interaction separate from but governed by the state (Scott 1995, p.197). This invention of the social in the nineteenth century (Rose 1999, p.112) arose as a resolution to a particular liberal problem of security: the social rendered heterogeneous and autonomous populations generalisable and manageable (Dean 1999; Rose 1999). Society thus emerged as a sphere of government. Poverty, indigence, marriage, fertility, education - all these conditions of the population become social concerns requiring governmental interventions (Rose 1999, p.119).

The governmentality literature has broadly attempted to consider the rise of liberalism in contemporary society through the emergence of free and self-determining individuals as subjects of the modern rational nation-state. Subjects respond to governmental practices through adjusting their comportments and actions, and in turn influence the exercise of government (Rose 1999). This specific formulation of the liberal state is premised on the emergence also of the very idea of a social sphere or civil society, as that space of human interaction separate from but governed by the state (Scott 1995, p.197). This invention of the social in the nineteenth century (Rose 1999, p.112) arose as a resolution to a particular liberal problem of security: the social rendered heterogeneous and autonomous populations generalisable and manageable (Dean 1999; Rose 1999). Society thus emerged as a sphere of government, and of governmental intervention. Poverty, indigence, marriage, fertility, education — all these conditions of the population become social concerns requiring: “government from a social point of view” (Rose 1999, p.119).
Foucault's politics have arguably been oversimplified within the governmentality literature by a focus on the emergence of the mentalities and diagrams of government, rather than the "messy actuality of rule" (Legg 2007, p.19). Yet Foucault was aware that the effects of rationalities of rule may have competing and often contradictory outcomes and effect. There is recognition that the discourses and actions of state do not always produce the intended outcomes. Subjectivities are forged within: "the messy, contingent and haphazard fashion in which localised practices of regulation get hooked up with, modified by, and in turn modify, rationales for projects of government" (Huxley 2007, p.189). It is precisely the disjuncture between intentions and reception which makes Allen (2003) uncomfortable about the ways in which the govermentality literature engages the specific modalities of power; and in particular the difference that space makes to the exercise of power. Moving from power as a micro physical relationship in techniques of discipline, to power as a macro physical relationship of government implies operation across distances. Rose assumes that "government at a distance" (Rose 1999, p.49) is exercised through a loose and flexible translation (i.e. linkages forged between the agencies and institutions that govern). Yet Allen (2003) suggests that different modes of power must be more or less effective given different spatialities. For example, the internalisation of norms requires the ability to recognise authority; claims about appropriate conduct must "strike a chord" in order for free individuals to act upon them. It may then be the case that the authority-recognition mode of power is less effective the more complex the mediation (i.e. the more distant the relationship). Governmentality offers insight into the techniques and practices involved in liberal government; however: "lost within this bundle of practices (...) is not only the distinctive nature and effect of these different modalities of power, but also their inherent spatiality" (Allen 2003, p.147).
2.6 Governmentality and the Colonial Difference

It is in considering what might be called the 'colonial difference' that we are able to see the specific ways in which space affects power. Post-colonial Theory emerged initially as a project of re-writing the marginalised places of Western modernity into a shared history of the modern world, and to de-centre Western narratives of the world. Although the schools of thought are varied, as a general project it has attempted not only to demonstrate how the west has constructed that which is other to it, but also to 'provincialise' such Western narratives as unable to account for all of humanity's experiences (Chakrabarty 2008). Modernity is a shared history of both colonised and coloniser, with both the western centres and the so-called global peripheries implicated in making the modern world. Yet post-colonial theorists have also emphasised that within this shared history there was nevertheless a 'colonial difference' at play in the modes of power which implicated coloniser and colonised subjectivities, whether between European and colonial forms of rule (Stoler 1995), between the differentiated rule of coloniser and colonised within the colonial state (Mamdani 1996; Legg 2007), or whether in the different forms of rule between African and Asian colonial possessions (Mbembe 2001).

Stoler (1995), focusing on The History of Sexuality, argues that empire constructed not only colonised subjects, but colonisers and European populations as well. Stole argues that the construction of self-governing, responsible citizens in Europe cannot be divorced from the constructions of race and racial difference in the colonies. Stoler (1995) argues that it is impossible to understand either colonial or metropolitan society independent of the other. More specifically, the rationalities of rule which produced bio-political power operated across both of these sites and in the process constituted them as sites of power. Yet these rationalities also served to construct colonial categories of difference, race and sexuality that cut across all of nineteenth century imperial
society and operated in the Imperial Capital as well as in the colony. In this way, the close management of settler communities and the simultaneous exclusion of indigenous populations from institutions of civility were part of the same process of rule (1995). Colonial society must be seen as both Europe and colony: modernity must be understood as the interaction between, and mutual constitution of, both coloniser and colonised (though not with equal distributions of power).

Legg (2007) suggest that although in general colonised people were subjected to forms of rule that would have been regarded as authoritarian to people in the imperial capitals, even between colonial possessions forms of rule differed. Thus, while India was largely ruled through co-opting existing elite structures, in Africa rule was based on what Mbembe has called commandment (Mbembe 2001). Both Mbembe (2001) and Bayart (1994) suggest that rule in the African colony (and post-colony) was altogether more arbitrary and less complete than the admittedly belated attempts at civil society formation in India. Bayart (1994) in particular suggests that colonial rule was never intended as a systematic and rational reordering of colonial society, but was imposed arbitrarily and mostly ineffectively by junior officers, resulting in unintended and ‘bastardised’ techniques of obtaining labour from locals while simultaneously maintaining the status quo where possible. It is for this reason, Mbembe (2001) argues, that the predominant form of power in the colony was not governmental power but rather sovereign power (or what Mbembe refers to as commandment): the right to kill and to let live. If techniques of rule directed more at the individuated body were prevalent, then this tended to be in urban areas where the primary bio-political concerns regarded the control of disease and the control of racial contamination (Stoler 1995).

Mamdani argues that in Africa, colonial society was governed through a separation between the formal and 'modern' institutions of state and civil society, primarily in the urban areas and areas of European settlement, and 'traditional' rural areas. The institutions of civil society were restricted to
citizens, comprising primarily white settlers and administrators, other minority groups, and a minority of urban Africans who were organised into trade unions in the severely restricted space of the workplace. The vast majority of the governed population were subjects, confined to the traditional rural areas, deprived of access to the rights of civil society, and ruled in accordance with 'customary law'. It was through the separation between the rural and the urban, and the attendant fragmentation of 'traditional' rural populations into a myriad of ethnic identities, that both the colonial state and the apartheid state were able to exert control over a vast territory and dispersed population without requiring effective or deep penetration. The major exception that Mamdani recognised was the high levels of industrialisation and urbanisation in South Africa, out of which emerged a strong trade union movement including both white and black urban workers. This trade union movement was an important component of the anti-apartheid movement, and it was the cities which formed the stage for the most visible anti-apartheid struggles. Mamdani recognised that the city played an important (and sometimes contradictory) role in the entanglements of apartheid power (Posel 1991; Robinson 1996). While the fragmentation of municipal government served as a tool for pursuing a segregated apartheid state project, empirical studies have suggested the incomplete and contested nature of this 'urban apartheid' (Maylam 1990), and has provided for an urban-based critique of the apartheid system more broadly (Parnell & Mabin 1995).

Mamdani’s argument has been particularly taken up by Munro (1996) who has recognised the subsequent relative marginalisation of rural issues in the policies and programmes of the post-apartheid developmental state. Munro (1996) argued that under apartheid the rural 'bantustans' were designed to maintain the docility of rural populations by defining the structures of allegiance and the meaning of citizenship in terms radically different to those for white urban sectors of the population (Munro 1996). Thus, different populations were expected to experience different structural and ideological relationships with the state, and therefore have different expectations of
citizenship. Yet Munro also recognised that this "bifurcation of the state" was never complete. Thus:

"Migrant workers moved to and fro between these different realms and used the resources generated in one realm to negotiate constraints in the other. Bantustan governments had one foot in the camp of traditional power and the other in the camp of modern political institutions (...). The poverty of resources available to bantustan governments ensured that the central state intervened repeatedly, though inconsistently and unpredictably, in the social lives of rural citizens. (...) Neither form of social authority was reliable, and both tended to undermine local moral economies. (...) The relationship between the public, private and community realms of social life remained indeterminate and uncertain even under the 'decentralised despotism' of tribal authorities. The defining feature of citizenship for rural people was not so much centralised or decentralised despotism but generalised uncertainty" (Munro 1996, p.6).

Mamdani's critique offers not only a sensitivity to the spatial rationalities of rule, but also a cautionary note on the apparent bias towards urban development in post-apartheid South Africa. Mamdani argued that ignoring the persistent division between 'modern' urban areas and 'tribalised' rural areas would mean incomplete democratisation, and the seeds for a possible reversal of democracy.

The distinction Mamdani draws between citizens and subjects echoes a similar distinction that Chatterjee (2004; 2001) draws between civil and political society. Yet while Mamdani's argument is concerned with the spatiality that divides rural and urban, Chatterjee is primarily concerned with the internal politics of cities, and the colonial and post-colonial projects of managing urban populations. Chatterjee shares the concern of Poulantzas and Mann about the limitations of the term civil society,
preferring to limit his use of the term to refer to those institutions and rituals of associational life which are incorporated into and under the control of the modern state. Civil society constitutes a massive sector of the rule of contemporary societies, and includes all aspects of society that conform to the formal rules of society (e.g. equality, autonomy, the rule of law and contract, property rights etc) but which are not conventionally considered part of the institutions of the modern state. These norms and conventions for organising the formal rules of society may differ between societies, although the colonial project brought the formalisation of such norms within a modern state system to most of the world. Yet for Chatterjee, these institutions and norms of the modern (colonial and later post-colonial) state nowhere completely permeated territories and populations. The majority of the population in colonial societies were governed at a distance, largely through their exclusion or selective inclusion into the norms (and normalisation) of what was / is a relatively limited sphere of civil society. What lies outside of civil society – i.e. the institutions and practices that constitute associational life beyond the direct influence of the institutions of state and civil society – Chatterjee refers to as political society (2001).

Yet what remains crucial for Chatterjee is that political society is not simply a sphere of associational life in the absence of the state, but in fact mediates a range of often conflictual relationships between the state and those populations that the state seeks to govern. Political society has, in this sense, four distinctive features: many of the actions that emerge from of political society are illegal (squatting, appropriating public property, refusing payment for services etc.); the actions and demands make claims on the state and use a language of rights; these rights are claimed for the collective rather than the individual; and to the extent that these claims on the state or on other agencies of civil society are engaged, Chatterjee claims that people are treated as deserving (or not) of welfare, rather than as citizens with formal rights (Greenstein 2003). Political society represents a zone of mediation, allowed the colonial and later post-colonial state to reach into and intervene in
populations as targets of 'policy' (Legg 2007). However: “the degree to which they will be so recognized depends entirely on the pressure they are able to exert on those state and non-state agencies through their strategic manoeuvres in political society – by making connections with other marginal groups, with more dominant groups, with political parties and leaders, etc. The effect of these strategic moves within political society is only conjunctural, and may increase or decrease or even vanish entirely if the strategic configuration of (usually) local political forces change” (Chatterjee 2001, p.177).

Mamdani (1996) also emphasised the link between these two spheres: both citizen and subject are governed by the modern colonial state. Both authors recognise the limited utility of the term civil society in thinking about the ways in which the subjects of the modern post-colonial state are governed, and how they organise their engagements with the state. Mamdani (1996) focuses on a spatial separation between the included urban and the excluded rural, while Chatterjee (2001) focuses primarily on the organisation of local politics within urban areas. However, Mamdani is perhaps less optimistic than Chatterjee about the potential for escape, so that the position of subject offers little possibility for autonomous resistance to state power, which anyway is always mediated through the constricting local politics of 'customary law'. While Mamdani does recognise some degree of post-colonial civil society in African states, he maintains that in the main the colonial legacy of ethnic divisions and control by native authorities in the traditional rural areas continues to characterise the experiences of subjectivity by most African populations.

2.7 State, Space and the City

Mamdani had accused the materialist literature on the apartheid state for its ignorance of the actual practices of rule, and proposed instead that apartheid South Africa represented perhaps the
archetype of the colonial mode of rule between citizens and subjects. For Mamdani, the primary division was between the rural and the urban, with the urban as the site of citizenship and the rural as the site at which individuals were subject to so-called traditional rule. While Mamdani's critique of the ignorance of the modes of rule has proved incredibly useful in the South African literature, his distinction between the urban and the rural has turned out far more problematic. In fact, the control and management of South Africa's cities was always an important tool in the apartheid system.

Despite attempts to decentralise industrialisation in the 1960s and 1970s, South Africa's major cities - and Johannesburg in particular - remained central to the apartheid economy (Beall et al. 2002). As such, the management of migration into urban areas and of urban labour supplies was one of the key mandates of the local state during apartheid. Yet the central state maintained a tight handle on most aspects of urban policy so that as much as municipal authorities were responsible for managing migrant labour and black urbanisation they did so in close concert with the central Native Affairs Department (NAD) (Posel 1991).

This dovetailing of apartheid nationally with the management of urban areas as a particular tool in the armour of the racial apartheid state has been well established in the literature (Smith 1992; Mabin 1991; Beall et al. 2002). Indeed, Robinson (1996) suggests that: “the form of cities is closely connected with the nature of the political order and political power” (Robinson 1996, p.293). But if the spatiality of the apartheid state at the national scale ultimately served to locate urban centres in an exploitative relationship with the rural ‘Bantustans’, these urban centres also contained more micro-politics of the apartheid state system internally. This should not be read as a functional relationship between state order and urban form; a simple mapping of power onto urban space. Parnell and Mabin (1995) argue that the origin of residential segregation in South African cities is misleadingly portrayed as the relocation of black urban residents by the application of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act. In the course of day-to-day urban governance: “the enforcement of anti-slum
provisions and public health legislation was at least as powerful in propelling the relocation of Africans (...) thousands of coloureds and Indians were also barred from white suburbs and even poor whites were removed from city slums” (Parnell and Mabin 1995, pages not numbered). This is, for Parnell and Mabin, part of a broader concern with the over-emphasis on a central industrial policy based on cheap labour to explain the evolution of urban governance and residential segregation in South Africa. Parnell and Mabin caution against what they see as the ‘subjugation’ of much wider and more complex urban dynamics to a limited set of political and economic policies on segregation (1995, pages not numbered). While the establishment of ‘locations’ and the clearing of slums within urban areas was broadly considered part of the spatiality of the apartheid political economy (whether as a tool to contain black urbanisation, or to ensured a ready supply of semi-skilled black labour) these practices of urban management also reflect more piecemeal and pragmatic ‘arts’ of urban governance. Thus, claim Parnell and Mabin: “[national] state policies do not always translate neatly into practice” (1995, pages not numbered).

The so-called ‘apartheid city’ was always an in-exact object of analysis referring broadly to a litany of legislation focussed on the urban scale and which attempted to control the movement and settlement of people in urban areas by virtue of race. The legislation included influx control regulations, group areas reservations and the enforcement of the much-hated pass laws among others. Frescura (2001) has suggested that the apartheid city consisted of a broad set of urban planning principles, including the segregation of residential areas, the use of buffer zones (sometimes natural features or industrial zones), and the strategic use of infrastructure and housing projects. It is not clear that the ‘apartheid city’ ever was a coherent set of principles. Maylam (1990) argues rather that the system of urban apartheid was always evolving, although it can nevertheless be identified by four primary and consistent rationalities: “the control over the movement of Africans into urban areas; the regulation and regimentation of the lives of urban Africans through
such mechanisms as segregation, curfews, and controlled housing; the development of a self-financing system whereby Africans came to bear a large share of their own reproduction costs; and the cooptation of members of the urban African petty bourgeoisie through the creation of local institutions, such as advisory boards, community councils, and black local authorities” (1990, p.79). But significantly these four rationalities cannot be seen as a coherent strategy, although they have appeared more or less ‘solid’ at different times (Maylam 1990)

Due to the often individuated and intimate encounters between mainly black South Africans and state authority that such legislation implied (e.g. the enforcement of pass-laws by white police officers; the reservation of amenities and transport for different race groups; the planning and administration of domestic living spaces) this aspect of apartheid was sometimes referred to as ‘petty apartheid’ (Pirie 1992; Robinson 1992; D. M. Smith 1992); the subtle ways through which state power was brought to bear upon urban South Africans in their daily lives. At stake in understanding the ‘apartheid city’ therefore is also a range of “knowledge, professional discourses and the complex linkages which these forge between various aspects of spatiality and power” (Robinson 1992, p.293; see also Beavon 2004 and Dierwechter 2007). The nexus of power that constituted and contained the ‘apartheid city’ was more than the function of the central apartheid state or of racial capital. Just as the state cannot be seen as simply functional of capital, the apartheid city contained a number of competing rationalities. For example, Parnell and Mabin (1995) and Mabin (1990) argue that the day-to-day administration of the apartheid city included genuine engagements with discourses of urban improvement and healthy living environment as much as with influx control. Moreover, Maylam (1995) suggests that at the local scale imperatives of tightened influx control during the apartheid era resided more often with municipalities’ inability to cover the increasing costs of subsidised housing than with concern about cheap labour or broader nationalist policies of separate development.

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The national government did attempt to intervene at certain points. The 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act was a significant attempt by the central state to dictate terms for black urbanisation. The act empowered municipalities to build segregated locations, enforce influx control, and establish advisory boards, paid for through beer-hall sales, rents in black locations and fines levied against black (Maylam 1990, p.66). Yet the Act relied on the decision-making of individual municipalities rather than central coordination, and was largely reluctantly followed because of the costs to municipalities it implied. The 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act strengthened municipalities' powers in terms of influx control, but it crucially gave the Minister of Native Affairs power to compel municipalities to implement the original 1923 Act. Then in 1944 the Housing Amendment Act established a central state body with powers to intervene in local housing policy (Maylam 1990). By the time the National Party came to power in 1948 there already existed a set of regulations and policies that approached what might be called an apparatus for controlling the movement and daily lives of black South Africans in the cities (Maylam 1990, p.68). Nevertheless, the local state retained (and claimed) some degree of autonomy and the tensions between local and central state remained a significant aspect of urban apartheid.

Posel (1991) suggests that the intentions of the apartheid state cannot be read from the various outcomes of municipalities interpreting and enforcing influx-control mechanisms; and that the predominantly Liberal municipalities of the Witwatersrand remained broadly suspicious of the agenda of the Nationalist-dominated central state. Rather than urban segregation being functional to capital, it was more often a source of contradiction and contestation, highlighting in particular the difficult relationship between local and central state: “much of state urban policy over the years has had to be concentrated on managing the contradictions, conflicts and struggles that have developed around urban apartheid. This task of management has been achieved more successfully at certain
times than at other times (...) and the crisis of apartheid [was] in many ways most apparent in the urban arena (Maylam 1990, p.57). Particularly after the economic crisis of the early 1970s, the apartheid state reacted in increasing panic to urban pressures largely beyond its complete control (Beall et al 2002). Thus the 'apartheid city', that archetypal but impossible machine of urban order and discipline, was nowhere complete, continually being developed and refined, and inevitably resisted, whether explicitly or implicitly. In the following chapter (Chapter Three) I will discuss how the imagination of a coherent post-apartheid city has similarly been subverted through the emergence of new forms of urban practices – the so-called informal social modes of interaction which continue to undermine the project of the post-apartheid developmental state.

2.8 Conclusion – The Entanglements of Power in the Post-apartheid State

The above discussion highlights the extent to which thinking about the state as a somehow autonomously derived source of power and authority with territorial reach begins to be disrupted when confronted by the competing rationalities of rule. As Mamdani (1996) and Chabal and Daloz (1999) suggest, the need to respond to imperial demands of colonial extraction meant that the colonial state sought a minimal degree of governance within 'traditional' rural areas, while configuring urban resources towards the interests of a small European administrative elite and the broader demands of extraction. The point is not to lessen the importance of materialist concerns, but to suggest that within this context the relatively mundane concerns of administration, rule, and governance comprise, especially in the colonial era, a sphere of considerable interest and knowledge that took on an independent rationality to that of simply capital. Yet, as the above discussion begins to suggest, this political rationality of rule does not emanate from, nor is it confined to, the state but is a broader rationality that permeates society.
Like the post-colonial state, the post-apartheid state is haunted by the ghost of what came before it. Theoretical attempts to understand the transformative moment in the history of the power in the postcolony may be useful in thinking about post-apartheid forms of power. As we have suggested, although debates about the nature of the apartheid state were contested and vibrant, they were ultimately limited in as far as they were constrained by a materialist framework. In contrast, a body of literature that emerged initially out of urban studies has begun to suggest a far more contested account of the workings of apartheid power, with the city in particular occupying an important space in the translation of state intentions. We suggested also that in building theoretical tools for engaging the post-apartheid state a more careful analysis of power than that offered by the materialist theories of state would be necessary. In this regard, we considered how the state is constantly in a process of announcing itself, of inserting itself into the social domain. The idea of infrastructural power was helpful in this regard, although in its original use it was still connected to a territorially and institutionally defined state apparatus. Infrastructural power has many close resonances with Foucault’s theorisation of power, most particularly in the implication that the state is always in a process of emergence: that is, modes of power that bind state to society are always enacted and cannot be read from the structure of the apparatus. Ultimately, we arrived at a point where power operates in messy and often unintended ways, and we suggested that space plays an important function in this messiness.
3. URBAN GOVERNMENT AND INFORMALITY

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I consider the evolution of urban policy in post-apartheid Johannesburg. I begin by suggesting that modernist ideas of space and of urban order underlay initial imaginations of the post-apartheid city – emerging in particular from a political and intellectual engagement with the so-called apartheid city. Among progressive urban planners, policy-makers and academics there was a belief that the spaces of the city, which reflected in their fragmented landscape the political project of apartheid, could be remade to reflect the ideals of a post-apartheid society. In the previous chapter (Chapter Two) we saw how during apartheid the city was not only the site for, but also the object of, political contestation and anti-apartheid struggle. That is to say, the locus of anti-apartheid protest in the 1980s was not simply located in the poor black townships as opposed to the rural areas, but that the actual system of apartheid municipal government – a system which segregated the urban population based on race, and confined black South Africans to poor and under-serviced neighbourhoods – was itself a target for broader political change. The increasingly untenable conditions within Black Local Authority neighbourhoods generated both deliberate local political resistance that threatened to spill into neighbouring white municipalities, as well as tacit forms of resistance in the form of illegal occupation of state or municipal property (Chipkin 2003). As we will discuss below, these initially very local and spontaneous forms of anti-apartheid resistance precipitated a series of negotiations between township-based civic organisations and white municipalities – in almost all circumstances bypassing the economically and morally bankrupt BLA’s – and served to frame the possibilities for imagining the post-apartheid city. As the political tide turned against the apartheid state, and the ANC began to emerge as the predominant organisation of broad political legitimacy in the country, these locally based negotiations were brought together into nationally-coordinated Local Negotiation Forums. The coordination of these
negotiations served to strengthen the hand of the civic organisations vis-a-vis the white municipalities, which could now no longer offer limited concessions, compelled instead by broader events to negotiate a pathway towards a fundamental transition in municipal government. Yet it also served to consolidate a broad and coordinated urban policy agenda, strengthening the hand of the national scale vis-a-vis the civics and local communities.

Urban policy, perhaps even more explicitly than other forms of governmental practices, is productive of urban space (Dikeç 2007b; 2007a). It does this in the sense that urban policy encapsulates the political decisions and empowers the institutions of state to make actual material interventions into the urban landscape. Housing development schemes, transport infrastructure and basic service delivery are all actively building and changing the urban environment. Yet urban policy also produces space in another sense. Urban policy contains an imagination of urban space which in turn frames the manner in which interventions take place. The urban policy agenda that emerged in the process of resistance to, and defeat of, apartheid was, as we will see, preoccupied with the legacy of the so-called apartheid city.

Progressive elements within the academy and the disciplines of urban planning and policy had also begun to imagine how to dismantle the apartheid city. These academics and professional practitioners were influential on the development of a progressive post-apartheid urban policy regime. Yet the founding documents of post-apartheid urban policy went even further than simply imagining the dismantling of the apartheid city, locating urban policy and urban government not simply as the tool for dismantling the apartheid city but for actively constituting post-apartheid citizenship (Chipkin 2003). That is to say, if the apartheid city was understood as a technology for constituting a racially divided society, and if local resistance to apartheid in the 1980s took the apartheid city as its object of political resistance, then post-apartheid citizenship would, conversely, be constituted through communities and individuals in their transcendence of the apartheid city. For
this reason, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) placed strong emphasis on participation and community development, not just to establish legitimacy for a new state project among residents and communities with potent demands, but to actively produce a particular democratic and participatory post-apartheid citizenship. The developmental post-apartheid state would be realised not only as a result of, but actually through the process of, dismantling the apartheid city.

As we will see, this vision of the post-apartheid city — framed always in response to the apartheid city from which it emerges — contains a very particular spatiality. The resources and institutions of local government were directed towards the city as a largely static and compartmentalised topographical space. Urban space was essentially seen as determinant of society at large, and so the urban environment was approached as a landscape that could be stitched back together through progressive urban policy. That is, a single large rates-base could be used to subsidise development in poor neighbourhoods, progressive housing and human settlement policy could fill in the urban density and investments in transport and infrastructure could improve local economic development.

It is worth noting that this spatial imagination was never clearly resolved, and there were tensions between the need for local participation on the one hand, and cross-municipal subsidisation on the other, suggesting the possible limits of such a vision of post-apartheid urban space even before 1994. More specifically, after 1995 the intense local politics of implementing urban policy served in some instances to exacerbate and enhance the splintered and segregated apartheid city, perversely proving the deep ingrained legacy of apartheid in South African cities. At the same time, progressive policy implementation was increasingly frustrated by dynamics which threatened to fragment the city in new ways, such as privatised security districts and gated communities in wealthy areas, and the growth of informal settlements on the urban periphery. This came to a head in 1997, when the Johannesburg municipality was confronted with a severe financial crisis, caused
largely by massive inefficiencies in the collection of rates and service charges. The response has been a strong assertion of managerialism and financial prudence, gaining much criticism as the supposed 'neoliberalisation' of urban policy (Bond 2000). While I contest what I regard as ideological accusations of neoliberalisation, I suggest that the shift in urban policy has been accompanied by a shift in the spatial imagination of the city. The city is no longer imagined as a static and largely coherent – if segregated – topography, but rather as a dynamic and shifting field of encounters. In this way, new techniques of power have been developed that are directed less at the government of citizens through the disciplining of space, and more at the government of citizens through enticing them into specific encounters with the state.

The ways in which urban space has been imagined and put to use in urban policy has traced the emergence of a regime of urban government in Johannesburg over the past fifteen years. In my analysis of the intersections of attempts to govern the city, and 'informal' modes of ordering everyday life in post-apartheid Johannesburg, I focus on space as both the product of these intersections, and as implicated in the effects of these intersections. My aim in this chapter is to point to the relationship between changing spatial imaginations and shifts in governmental rationalities of rule. In other words, in this chapter I will attempt to show how imaginations of the post-apartheid city have shifted as rationalities of rule have shifted, most especially after 2000. I conclude with a discussion on how this has influenced the significance of the inner city of Johannesburg to the ambitions of post-apartheid urban policy, and introduce very briefly some of the ways in which urban policy intervenes in such spaces – a discussion which I take up in greater detail in the following chapter (Chapter Four).

3.2 Urban Policy, Governmentality and Urban Space

"The target of analysis [is not] 'institutions', 'theories' or 'ideology' but practices – with
the aim of grasping the conditions that make these acceptable at a given moment; the hypothesis being that these types of practices are not just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic circumstances – whatever role these elements may actually play – but, up to a point, possess their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and ‘reason’. It is a question of analysing a ‘regime of practices’ – practices being understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken-for-granted meet and interconnect” (Foucault 2002, p.225).

This section looks to the theoretical underpinnings for the claim about the link between urban policy and urban space. I begin with a discussion of the notion of regimes of practices, as elaborated by Mitchell Dean in his discussion of the concept of governmentality (1999). The concept of regime is a useful way of thinking about urban government, and especially: “the diverse processes and relations by which these elements are assembled into relatively stable forms of organisation and institutional practice” (Dean 1999, p.21). According to Dean, Foucault was concerned that the emergence of such regularised, and what sometimes appear to approach dominant, institutional practices and truths must always raise the question of those practices which precede and sustain them. Regimes of practices involve the convergence of a range of practices, for the production of particular truths and knowledge, and for the regularisation of a range of practical and technical rationality, and are subject to programmes for their own reform (Dean 1999, pp.18-19). This does not mean that regimes of practices do not appear as coherent, organised and more or less institutionalised: “regimes of practices are institutional practices, if the latter term means the routinised and ritualised way we do these things in certain places and at certain times. These regimes also include, moreover, the different ways in which these institutional practices can be thought, made into objects of knowledge, and made subjects of problematisations” (Dean 1999, p.21). Thus, the notion of regime of practices avoids what Dean calls an obsession with the
'sociology of rule', i.e. the description of institutions and their legislated domain of operation, as if these are given a priori. Rather, what an analytics of regimes of practices suggest is that order and regularity emerge through a more complex assemblage of practices. What is important is that these practices operate across multiple sites and institution, and therefore include not only the institutions of the state but a range of other social and political agents.

Foucault was particularly concerned with practices that act on and target the body, and demonstrated the ways in which such practices discipline, manage and effectively constitute embodied subjects – either through the "anatomo-politics of individual bodies", or through the "biopolitics of populations" – what he termed more broadly as "bio-power" (Foucault et al. 2009). Yet, while the regimes of practices of government may appear as broadly coherent, and though they may appear incontestable: "they do not determine forms of subjectivity (...) they illicit, promote, facilitate, foster and attribute various qualities, capacities and statuses to particular agents" (Dean 1999, p.32). These forms of power constitute the regimes of practices through which power in modern states permeate; that is, through encouraging subjects to become self-aware and self-regulating. Foucault is therefore less interested in relations of authority and domination than in the "[seemingly] organised practices through which we are governed and through which we govern ourselves" (Dean 1999, p.18). However, although bio-power refers to the productive power that constitutes and manages human life, regimes of practices also constitute and contain other domains such as the built environment. Regimes of practices also suggest more than simply the discursive field that surrounds urban government. Social (and spatial) order is produced as much through the practices that are enacted upon spaces and individuals, as through the discursive regimes into which they are implicated. Regimes of practices include both the discursive and the material. Thus, one can argue that a regime of urban government practices may consist of the interlinked practices through which the city is the subject of knowledge and statistical research, discursively represented through planning and visioning exercises, administered through policy and enacted upon through
infrastructure programmes (Dean 1999).

An important insight of this line of thinking is to be aware of how regimes of practices constitute their own object. The important element of governmentality, at least as elaborated by Foucault in his lectures on governmentality (Foucault et al. 2009) is the link between government and mentality (Lemke 2002; 2001). It is this aspect of mentality – the policies and discourses that are summoned in the "art of government" – that not only respond to, but actively constitute, the object of intervention. Regimes of governmental practices emerge as assemblages of knowledge, professional disciplines and policy prescriptions brought to bear on specific problem that then requires government intervention. Yet, and this is the key, in the process of the regime emerging the very problem to which the regime is directed is also simultaneously constituted as an object for intervention. A rich body of literature exists that has focussed on the manner in which problems requiring policy intervention are themselves constituted through the development of knowledge and expertise about these problems, both historically and in the contemporary liberal democratic state (Barry et al. 1996; Burchell et al. 1991; Crampton & Elden 2007; Gordon 1991; N. S. Rose et al. 2006). To reiterate, the problems that urban policy addresses, whether spatial or social, are constituted as part of the process of developing policy itself (Dikeç 2007a).

Rose (1999) suggests that implicit in Foucault's use of the concept of governmentality is a latent sense of space, and that rationalities of government imply therefore also the making of governable spaces. This was certainly the case in Foucault's discussions of attempts to create perfectly governable cities (Foucault et al. 2009), and is also the subject of a number of post-colonial invocations of the concepts of governmentality (Legg 2007; Mitchell 1991). Huxley (2006) suggests that governmentality involves: "the fabrication of 'governable spaces' (...) in which questions of boundaries and territorial limits are implicated in determining domains of objects and types of subjects requiring government" (2006, p.772). In this way, rationalities of government
make spaces and environments: “amenable to calculative thought by mobilizing certain ‘truths’ of causal relations in and between spaces, environments, bodies and comportments” (Huxley 2006, p.772).

In my mind, there are two primary concerns that this raises. Firstly, do rationalities of government only makes spaces as amenable and calculative, or are there other ways in which rationalities of government can act upon space? Such notions of legibility and visibility have been central concerns for theorising power and rule in the modern state. Scott’s (1998) now well-cited assertion about what he regards as the primarily negative impacts of the state’s attempts at bringing populations into sight assumes that the state is unable to engage the scale at which people live their everyday lives. Scott’s work is strongly influenced by Foucault’s concept of the bio-political, which is concerned with the progressive organisation of populations and citizens as objects of government and rule (Dean 1999). For Dean (1999) the entity of the modern state is the cumulative effect of these practices of governance - e.g., of ordering spaces and populations in particular ways (Dean 1999). But is it not possible that rationalities of government might attempt to constitute different kinds of spaces to these amenable and calculative spaces? In a context in which the institutions of state appear to have an incomplete sighting and comprehension of urban practices, I suggest in this chapter that it is not (only) amenable and calculative spaces that are produced, but spaces for providing momentary and partial encounters between the state and individuals. In other words, a spatial rationality might be emerging that is less concerned to order space into a legible topography within which subject positions can be made, but rather to capture bodies, and constitute subject positions, in particular moments of space and time.

The second point that is raised, although not unconnected to the first, is how can we think about interventions into urban space which are purposive and deliberate? Both Foucault and Dean have been critiqued for placing very little emphasis on the political contestation inherent in the
coalescence of regimes of practices (Legg 2007). Yet as Dikeç argues, regimes of practices of urban policy suggest that we need to take into account the fact that space is not simply made amenable to other rationalities of government, but that space may be the object of intervention itself. More than simply making spaces amenable, Dikeç (2007b) suggests that urban policy intervenes not upon the city as a space which is already defined, but that the city as an object of government intervention is constituted through the regime of practices through which urban policy is conceived. Urban policy becomes the manner not only through which the problem of urban government is addressed, but the field within which and through which the problem of urban government is articulated and constituted:

“It follows that governmental practices, insofar as they involve both formation and intervention, are not merely ‘confined’ to designated spaces. They constitute those spaces as part of the governing activity. If urban policy has a governmental dimension (...) then its spaces of intervention are not merely the sites of this governmental practice, but, first and foremost, its outcomes” (Dikeç 2007a, p. 280).

These spaces, as the outcome of urban policy interventions, may not of course always match the intended ambitions of urban policy makers. But important to recognise is that urban policy, as a regime of practices, can be purposive and deliberate. Urban spaces are not simply (or not always) the result of a cold and calculative bureaucracy but can be driven by a very purposive politics. Moreover, This is not to suggest that the space upon which urban policy acts is simply a blank slate awaiting ascription. Indeed, the use of the term regime of practices is precisely what is important here, because it is through actual practices in – and not just discourse about – space, that the spatiality of urban policy is produced (Dean 1999). Although Dikeç (2007a) seems to imply the relationship between urban policy and its spatiality is largely one-way, it is precisely what Legg (2007) terms the “messy actuality” of space, and the propensity of the city to exceed the ambitions
of urban policy, that maintain a dynamic and recursive relationship between the regime of practices and its object.

As I will demonstrate in the remainder of the chapter, it is precisely this which is at stake both in the initial development of post-apartheid urban policy, and the later redevelopment of urban policy in response to the "messy actuality" of the post-apartheid city. That is to say, the development of urban policy in the years immediately preceding the first iteration of post-apartheid municipal government contained a particular imagination of urban space, forged through the anti-apartheid movement and the theoretical debates around the apartheid city. This spatial imagination had a particular impact on the way in which the city was intervened into: in particular it conceived a static landscape that could be remade through progressive policy interventions. I have called this spatial imagination *immanent* space, taken from Keith and Pile's (1993) critique of what they call the myth of spatial immanence. In their words: "when we walk the streets (...) we are at once invoking a host of competing spatialities, not a straightforward spatialised reference with a correspondent true meaning (1993, p.8). In their view, the myth of spatial immanence assumes a causal relationship between space and social or economic form – that space is a product or reflection of dominant social and economic forces. This is partly the view of space that underscores Castells' (1985) argument about urban social movements, which had an influence upon the way in which urban-based struggles against apartheid were understood (c.f. Macarthy 1983; Maylam 1995). This materialist imagination of space as superstructure to the economic base was the basis of Lefebvre's critique of Castells, and his more broader elaboration on what he called the production of space. It is therefore not surprising that in their critique, Keith and Pile draw upon Lefebvre to argue instead for a sensitivity to multiple spatialities rather than the illusion of space as a "neutral and passive geometry" (Keith & Pile 1993, p.24). For Lefebvre, such an imagination of space – what Lefebvre calls conceived space – accounts for only one moment of space (Zhang 2006). By conceived space Lefebvre refers to the representations of space through maps, plans and urban policy. In this sense, the rigid model of the
apartheid city would be an archetypal example of conceived space. Yet as we have already demonstrated in the previous chapter (Chapter Two) the apartheid city was never as rigid and as enframing as the apartheid state may have wished. Instead it was cut through and transgressed — albeit against extreme violence and repression — by a range of everyday practices; what Lefebvre might call perceived space, i.e. the practices and routines that traverse the materiality of space. It is this binary opposition — between conceived space and the spatial practices of perceived space — that is perhaps the most easy articulation of the politics of space. In other words, the rigid and constricting space of the state is contested and undermined by the everyday practices of ordinary people. It is partly this which frames De Certeau's distinction between strategy and tactic in the Practice of Everyday Life (2002). Yet these are not dimensions of space, for Lefebvre; at least not in the sense that they are different layers or sediments of an abstract topography. This is precisely why Lefebvre uses the term moments: the perceived and the conceived are held together not as separate dimensions of space but more as different perspectives of the same space (Zhang 2006). And into this dialectic Lefebvre introduces a third moment or perspective — lived space. Lived space is the space of emotions and affect, of symbolism and meaning. It may correspond very closely with both conceived space and perceived space, but is neither one nor the other. Keith and Pile ultimately critique Lefebvre's model of space for a tendency towards teleology and historicism, which detracts from the richness of space that his thoughts induce.

For my sake, the rich and multiple spatialities that Lefebvre and Keith and Pile are important in so far as the spatial imagination that accompanied the initial iteration of the post-apartheid city — that of spatial immanence — is in part undermined by the excess of space. The practices and symbolic associations of space in post-apartheid Johannesburg refused to be contained into the transparent topography of the city of developmental local government and de-segregation. The restructuring of municipal government in the late 1990s was in part a direct response to the failures of this vision of the post-apartheid city. This is not to say that the government of the post-apartheid city is
increasingly responsive to the multiplicity of space. Plans and maps, by-laws and zoning, still
dominate the practice of urban government. Housing schemes, roads and infrastructure projects still
divide the city into a readable and rational topography. Even informal settlements are enumerated
and upgraded, drawn into the city grid. Yet I also argue that a new spatiality is emerging, in which
there is an increasing emphasis not on making space static and readable, but on making the
indeterminacy and excess of space predictable and manageable. This emerges from a recognition of
the multiplicity of space, and the impossibility of containing that multiplicity. This should not,
however, be read as a celebration of informality and excess, but rather as an emerging rationality of
government in a context of indeterminacy and illegibility. These two phases of post-apartheid urban
policy (i.e. pre 1994 and post 1997) have emerged from different political and governmental
rationalities, and directed at rather different political and governmental ambitions. Finally, I want to
add that the distinction between the first and second phases of post-apartheid urban policy as two
separate regimes of urban government practices is one that I have used in order to illustrate
explicitly how different ways of imagining space leads to different ways of intervening into, and
recursively constituting, space. In reality, as I hope to make clear, the evolution of urban policy in
post-apartheid South Africa has been rather more gradual and piecemeal, with different departments
and branches of state pursuing sometimes divergent trajectories.

3.3 Imagining the Post-apartheid City

“In the first decade of democracy, the goal of urban development, of political necessity,
reflected the pre-1994 realities of life under apartheid. Thus, the first flush of urban
policy in the new South Africa emphasised notions of non-racial democracy,
reconstruction and development (...). Progress in the state of human settlement would
be measured against some abstract notion of change relative to the watermarks of
poverty and inequality left by apartheid” (Boraine et al. 2006, p.260)
The development of post-apartheid urban policy, and the emergence of a specific regime of urban government in post-apartheid Johannesburg, has its antecedence in the anti-apartheid movement. In particular, there emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s an academic and professional critique of what became referred to as the *apartheid city* – i.e. the peculiar system of municipal government that emerged in apartheid South Africa and through which racial segregation was administered and maintained. This theoretical critique of apartheid as residing in the mundane and everyday practices of municipal government, in addition to the national project of separate development, was both influenced by and later came to inform the urban-based protests against apartheid (Robinson 1996). That is, under apartheid urban management and modern town planning went hand in hand with urban segregation and the objectives of racial segregation and urban management were complimentary rather than contradictory (Parnell & Pieterse 1998). Urban order, cleanliness, European inspired city aesthetics and extraordinarily high standards of built environment were progressively achieved for white South Africans in the period between the two World Wars by systematically ridding the metropolitan boundaries of people of colour and denying black urbanites full access to urban government.

The idea that urban policy could be directed towards undoing the spatial segregation and inequality of the apartheid city was an important aspiration in the development of urban policy immediately prior to, and in the first few years of, post-apartheid democracy (Pieterse 2004; Todes 2006). This was expressed in both academic engagements with the apartheid city and in popular politics that were not simply located in urban areas but during the last days of apartheid increasingly directed towards the city as a political goal.

The *apartheid city* emerged as a term to describe the specific form of control through segregation of the city. Apartheid Johannesburg was characterised by the segregation of racial groups within the
city, and more specifically the exclusion of black South Africans from access to the city; from living and working in certain parts of the city; from an equitable distribution of resources across the city; and from effective participation in urban life. These exclusions were maintained through a range of techniques and practices of state repression and authority that have been termed the Apartheid City. They included the constant threat of arrest and violence; the subdivision of the city into a myriad of small-scale and racially contained municipal structures; the use of urban planning to structure segregated urban areas; the close cooperation between state and capital to control the supply and reproduction of labour in urban areas, as well as a range of legislative measures such as the Group Areas Act 1950 (Robinson 1996; Swilling 1997). Recognising the centrality urban government to the larger workings of apartheid represented an important contribution to the academic discourse on apartheid. During the 1960s and 1970s the primary conceptualisation of space that animated academic and activist discussion about, and critique of, apartheid was the relationship between cities as areas of production and rural 'bantustans' as areas of reproduction. The changes within the political economy of the apartheid state which occurred in the late 1970s began to expose the inherent fragility of what had appeared a coherent and hegemonic state order (Greenberg 1987). In urban areas the impossibility of the apartheid city was exposed in the inevitable presence of black urban residents in townships, and the dream of an homogeneous city was ultimately abandoned through the repeal of so-called "influx-control laws" in the early 1980s. The focus of both state and anti-apartheid activists shifted towards the apartheid city as the object of politics. The spatial preoccupation shifted towards an increasing interest in the internal dynamics of South African cities in sustaining as well as contesting a political system based on racial segregation (Mabin 1992).

The work of Manuel Castells (1985; 1984) was also influential upon thinking about the apartheid city, particularly his work on urban protest (Harrison 1995; Macarthy 1983; Maylam 1995). In *the City and the Grassroots*, Castells (1985) attempted to situate the city, and particularly urban based protest, within a structuralist account of society. Castells dismissed accounts of urban sociology that
gave precedence to city life as an independent variable in forming culture, regarding instead the
cultural systems of urban life as a product of the capitalist system (Lowe 1986). For Castells the
city represented the spatial logic of the structural demands of late capitalist labour reproduction.

While consumption, and even production to some extent, could be organised at a national and even
trans-national level, Castells argued that labour reproduction (i.e. housing, services and welfare)
was necessarily organised by the state in the form of the city, in the interests of capitalism, as the
most effective spatial solution to capital reproduction. Thus, for Castells urban protest is not simply
a manifestation of broader political struggles, but represents a contradiction within the capitalist
system itself (1985). In making this argument, Castells took issue with what he termed the “myth of
marginality” (1985, p.55) – the idea that the urban poor who inhabit the peripheries of the city are
an inevitable part of cities in less developed parts of the world. The myth of marginality is
sustained, Castells argued, through the artificial conflation of unemployment and economic
marginality on the one hand, and the material conditions of the city’s marginal residents on the
other. Rather, the urban margins are produced as a particular urban form of late industrial
capitalism. More explicitly, the urban margins are the manifestation of a fundamental contradiction
in the late-industrial capitalist system, linked to the role of the state in controlling the sphere of the
reproduction of labour through housing and services (Lowe 1986). That is, the urban margins are a
result of the inability of the market economy, through capitalist state policy, to provide for the needs
of the urban workforce. This includes not only the poor and unemployed but also sometimes the
salaried and middle classes. The emergence of collective action and protest in the urban areas
Castells saw as not first and foremost class-coordinated, yet “there is no doubt that working class
neighbourhoods were the most organised and the most militant on urban issues” (Castells 1985,
p.220). Yet the defining character of these movements was not their class identity, but rather that
they exposed the inability of the capitalist system to provide an adequate means for social and
labour reproduction.
These ideas were clearly resonant with scholars and activists attempting to understand the nature of apartheid urban protest. It became clear for many that the protest action, although framed in a broader anti-apartheid language, was also very much directed at the urban system itself. The theoretical concept of the apartheid city emerged out of, and in turn influenced, the anti-apartheid movement. During the 1980s, the urban-based anti-apartheid protests were largely orchestrated by a collection of local community-based 'civic organisations' that were, at least initially, only loosely tied in to the broader anti-apartheid movement (Swilling 1997). The local nature of these civics, and the nature of their specific struggles for the political and social integration of black and white municipalities, was a defining characteristic of the civic movements. According to Beall et al (2000) the history of the civic movement in places such as Soweto is not only symbolically important in representing the basic community unit of the anti-apartheid movement, but also stands as a necessary counterweight to more centrist histories of the anti-apartheid movement, which have tended to underplay the role of community activism in resisting and challenging everyday experiences of apartheid (Mayekiso 2003). According to Castells (1985), although urban protests expose a fundamental contradiction in the capitalist system, they do not become truly revolutionary until they align with other progressive elements in society. Indeed, in South Africa the urban protests were actively supported by particular elements within the trade union movement, and the first attempt at developing a post-apartheid urban policy framework was also influenced by this tradition. Chipkin (2000) suggests that the involvement of the trade union movement hinged largely on debates within the then Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). The main division was between the 'charterists', who were concerned with a broader definition of the working classes to include the families and dependents of workers effected by the urban crisis, and the 'workerists' who insisted on the specific interests of workers. The latter tended to come from among the migrant workers living in hostels, and whose families were primarily in the rural bantustans. As such, not only were urban issues not directly relevant to this group, but urban based protest and strike action also threatened their incomes. This caused a great deal of tension, and was a large part of the cause.
of violence between township residents and hostel-based migrant labourers in the early 1990s (Tomlinson 1999). Yet the momentum was increasingly in the favour of the charterists, and particularly after the unbanning of the ANC the influence of the workerist tendency began to wane, especially in the context of developing a post-apartheid urban policy.

The Soweto rent boycott of 1986 emerged from the urban based protests in the townships surrounding Johannesburg in the early 1980s, and reflects the specifically local, urban character of these protests (Chipkin 1997; Tomlinson 1999). The rent boycott was directed against the discredited Black Local Authorities, and were as much a direct response to poor services and rent increases in the townships as to the broader segregationist policies of the apartheid regime. The rent boycott eventually included eighty per cent of rent-paying households in Soweto.

These sometimes violent political protests were the catalyst for the articulation of a more theoretical critique of the apartheid city, through a focus on urban fragmentation and dis-integration, and changing urban economies (Todes 2006). The slogan “one city, one tax base” emerged out of the intersection between the popular protest action and this intellectual engagement with the apartheid city. The “one city, one tax base” campaign was not only a call for the end of the racially segregated municipal structures that constituted Johannesburg as a patchwork of unequally resourced urban areas, but assumed that a post-apartheid Johannesburg would be based on the shared wealth and resources of the city (Tomlinson 1999). As Chipkin (2000) notes, the civic organisations were not conceived of, nor did they function as, developmental institutions. They had emerged largely spontaneously, certainly directed against the morally and economically bankrupt Black Local Authorities, but primarily concerned with mobilising township residents. It was only later, when the political tide began to sway against the apartheid regime, that a number of prominent civic movements began to organise the squatting of public land. Nevertheless, the civics did purposefully and deliberately link issues of development to their anti-BLA politics. This was done in that same
breath that broader anti-apartheid slogans, concerning for example the military occupation of townships and the national state of emergency, were articulated. By the end of the 1980s, with the BLAs totally discredited, the defeat of apartheid was linked to what Swilling has termed called ‘transformational’ issues (Swilling quoted in Chipkin 2000). The civics called for the writing-off of arrears, the transfer of houses to residents, the upgrading of services, affordable charges, and the establishment of a single tax base for Soweto and Johannesburg: the “one city, one tax base” claim. From these transformational issues must be seen the first kernel of what would later serve as the basis of legitimacy for post-apartheid urban policy. The theoretical and practical encounters with the concept of the apartheid city therefore served as an important reference point in the process of imagining – and designing – a post-apartheid urban system.

The first attempt at developing an urban policy framework for a post-apartheid society bore, therefore, the strong hallmark of this urban-based anti-apartheid movement as well as the academic critique that accompanied it. Yet it was also significantly influenced by the very messy and uncoordinated process of negotiating inclusive municipal government. In other words, there were at least two dimensions to the final outcome of a post-apartheid urban policy regime – the anti-apartheid struggles and the ways in which the apartheid city was thus conceptualised, and then the give and take of the negotiations, which balanced tensions between local civic movements, white municipalities, and the more centrist tendencies of the ANC, which favoured national coordination of the process as well as favouring larger scale and more bureaucratic municipalities in order to advance a national developmental agenda (Parnell et al. 2002).

The deliberate political agitation in the townships, as well as tacit protest through illegal squatting on public land were key factors in driving white municipalities to local negotiations with residents in neighbouring Black Local Authority areas. These negotiations were initially not coordinated, but were simply local and particular outcomes of engagements between groups with radically different
resources and political expectations (Swilling 1997). In Johannesburg these uncoordinated negotiations were gradually formalised into what became known as the Central Witwatersrand Municipal Chamber (CWMC). The CWMC was established in 1991 as an agreement between what was then the Transvaal Provincial Government and the civic associations in Soweto to negotiate local government transformation from apartheid municipal structures towards a non-racial urban system in Johannesburg (Beall et al 2004; Tomlinson 1999). The CWMC was dominated by the spatial imagination of the apartheid city as the physical manifestation of an unequal society (Todes 2006). There were many disagreements about the specific mechanisms through which urban integration could best be achieved, and how to incorporate the Black Local Authority areas into a broader urban political-economy, but what animated much of these discussions was the understanding that the segregated apartheid city must be the object of future urban policy (Pieterse 2006; U. Pillay & Tomlinson 2006; Todes 2006).

The CWMC was an important early model for initiating a process towards a national negotiating forum on urban integration in all cities in South Africa (Tomlinson et al. 2003). In 1993, aware that the apartheid regime was drawing to a close, the national apartheid government enactment of the Local Government Transition Act (209 of 1993). The stated intention of the Local Government Transition Act was to establish the basis for articulating and enacting non-racial and democratic local government, within a municipal structure that would be able to effectively use the wealth and resources of the city to provide basic services and adequate housing to all urban residents (Tomlinson 1999; Beall et al. 2002). The rationale of Act was to give some legislative regulation and logistical assistance to a process that was already spontaneously under way in some urban areas through local negotiating forums, and to ensure that these negotiations were in the spirit of broad-based integration; in some instances white local authorities, pre-empting change, negotiated with local councils so as to maintain their relative privilege (Swilling 1997). The Act established a fairly restrictive set of guidelines for what had been sometimes spontaneous interactions, and entrenched a
particular spatial order for local government. The Act served to further cement a particular conceptualisation of the post-apartheid city based on a specific interpretation of the apartheid city as a fragmented urban landscape, and envisaged a three-phases process for its achievement:

- the pre-interim phase: this lasted from April 1994 to the local elections of 1995/6
- the interim phase: this lasted from the local elections in 1995 to the next local elections in 2000, although in practice the model of local government that would begin in 2000 was largely in place by about 1997
- the final phase: a fully-transformed municipal system was largely in place by 1997, but was officially achieved through the 2000 local elections (Cameron 2006).

The Act also established the Local Government Negotiating Forums (LGNF), and an interim form of local government with the express function of integrating urban areas and establishing "transitional local coordinating committees" designed to facilitate the provision of urban services to all within a transitional local council – and with the express purpose of stitching together the urban fabric of apartheid. Such a conceptualisation necessarily implied the need for cross-subsidisation from wealthy areas to poorer areas, since the transitional local councils deliberately included both white and black areas together (Cameron 2006). The Local Government Transition Act was the result of the local dialogues that had gone on in each city, and had involved some tough negotiation, particularly over the nature of the local ward system. Yet it was also the result of the centralising tendencies of the ANC, which was concerned to remove the potential for undermining the broader goals of the developmental post-apartheid state – given that white municipalities had managed in some instances to negotiate transitional arrangements that maintained white privilege (Chipkin 2007).

In Johannesburg, three different organisational configurations were proposed (Tomlinson 1999;
The ANC, which had by 1993 emerged as the most powerful grouping in the process, proposed four substructures. This was a compromise that would ensure that former white and black areas were combined into municipalities providing an adequate tax-base for redistributive policy imperatives, but also conceded some degree of more local responsiveness to the civic organisations that had favoured a larger number of local municipal structures – they proposed as many as seven municipal structures (Mayekiso 2003). Beavon (2004) and Cameron (2006) have suggested that the configuration of four municipal substructures would also ensure ANC domination in most of the four proposed structures, although Beall et al. (2002) suggest that the configuration may have reflected a broader concern with de-racialising local government.

Figure 3.1: Proposed transitional municipalities for Johannesburg, 1995

Map a shows the seven original proposed councils, and map b shows the revised proposal recommended by the Guateng provincial government (Source: Tomlinson 1999).
The Act had intentionally granted some concessions to so-called ‘minority’ populations, largely as a concession to conservative white interests which had consistently threatened to scupper the process of transition. This resulted ultimately in an over-representation of formerly white group-areas in the first local elections (Robinson 1997). Conservative white interests had proposed as many as twenty municipal substructures, which reflected a political concern with greater participation and less centralist domination of local government (Tomlinson 1999). Conservative white interests pushed for small-scale municipal structures, driven however by the desire to defend spaces of privilege rather than promoting more direct forms of participation (Tomlinson 1999). In the process this effectively precluded a range of alternative (and potentially progressive) conceptualisations of the future of the post-apartheid city. In particular the community driven civic organisations, which had largely sustained the anti-apartheid struggle during the repressive 1980s while the ANC was under ban, were effectively sidelined in favour of a more centrally-driven process (Mayekiso 2003). However, by late 1994 the slightly revised proposal for seven municipal substructures was presented to and accepted by the Gauteng provincial demarcation board (Tomlinson 1999; Beavon 2004). Given the relatively parlous state of rates and tax revenues that some of the seven substructures would be able to call upon, this system of seven substructures implied a strong upper-tier municipal structure with strong powers of redistribution – the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (GJMC). These often acrimonious negotiations to establish a post-apartheid urban order for Johannesburg were fraught with conflict and compromise (Robinson 1997).

Cameron (2006) suggests that this led to Provincial Governments assuming much of the responsibility for the implementation and coordination of new municipal system before the local election of 1995 (Tomlinson 1999). In the process, what had begun as locally situated and participatory engagements, ended up as bureaucratically imposed resolutions. The Provincial MEC for Housing and Local Government asked the Demarcation Board to consider alternative options for demarcation, strongly suggesting that the ANC’s proposal of four substructures with a relatively
weaker central municipal structure was the proposal most preferred by the province (Tomlinson 1999). As the process threatened to derail, the MEC intervened by over-ruling the process and four municipal substructures were passed into legislation on 10 May 1995 (Beavon 2004). These new councils were regarded as transitional until the municipal elections planned for 2000, and although they were partly centralised under the GJMC they retained some considerable degree of autonomy (Beavon 2004).

The new institutional arrangements of local government had redrawn the divisions and fragments of the apartheid city to incorporate former white and black local authorities into unified municipal entities with a clear mandate for cross-subsidisation (i.e. that revenues from wealthy areas could be used to subsidise municipal services in poor neighbourhoods). The post-apartheid urban order was to represent: "a political re-conceptualization of the governance process, focused on reorienting state resources and regulatory powers towards the needs of the poor" (Beall et al 2000, p.118).

However, the debates and negotiations over the scale and form of municipalities were not simply about containing political interests. They speak to the very imagination of the post-apartheid city. There was a very real tension, not just between the centrist ANC and the local civics, but even within the ANC as an organisation – and more broadly within progressive urban policy makers – about the appropriate form that developmental local government should take, and what is the best means to achieve it. On the one hand there was the political need to achieve the delivery of services to a population that had expectations of development. On the other hand, there was the acknowledgement that development also implies participation and local democratic empowerment (Chipkin 2003). While this tension was partly acknowledged in later urban policy documents, the commitment to local participation was gradually outweighed by demands to intervene into the huge backlog of service delivery. For this reason, Bond has suggested that urban policy after apartheid emerged increasingly as merely a mechanism for delivering a broader developmental agenda based
on high-level enumerations of demand and supply (Bond 2000). This represents for Bond a process of depoliticising civil society and undermining the legacy of the urban-based anti-apartheid protests.

Against such a prognosis, a number of writers have suggested that the tension between delivery and participation was deeply ingrained in the core of the urban policy content of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (Boraine et al. 2006; Pieterse 2006; Todes 2006). The RDP attempted to embody what has been regarded as an extremely progressive vision of the role of developmental local government and the “democratisation of the state and society” (Government of South Africa 1995). The spectre of the apartheid city looms large in the urban policy components of the RDP; central to its aims was to rectify “apartheid created infrastructure disparities” (Government of South Africa 1995). The RDP articulated a coherent strategy for achieving these goals, taking on board much of the ethos of the civic movements, proposing free lifeline tariffs for basic services, subsidised housing schemes, and the cross-subsidisation from wealthy parts of the city (Government of South Africa 1995). Yet there is also a recognition that the RDP represented a bias towards service delivery. This is perhaps understandable, given that the RDP was put together relatively quickly at the very end of apartheid, and it was only through the process of implementing urban policy over the following years that the actual nuances of the post-apartheid city could be defined (van Donk & Pieterse 2006). The actual formal process of defining and coordinating post-apartheid urban policy into a set of overarching programmes was in the Urban Development Strategy (UDS) which was first drafted in 1996 (Parnell & Pieterse 1998). According to Parnell and Pieterse: “the major focus of the draft UDS was to outline the principle of spatially integrated planning to overcome the segregated legacy of apartheid. This included initial national thinking about the economic and social integration of historically marginalised urban spaces (...) since then the conceptualisation of how South African cities will be reconstructed has become more nuanced” (1998, p.13). The UDS was initially coordinated from within the Office of the RDP, which was in a sense a high-level cross-ministerial body. However, the closure of the Office of the RDP in 1997
meant the loss of this cross-cutting logic for the implementation of urban policy across departments. The UDS was subsequently handed over to the Department of Housing, and emerged in the form of the Urban Development Framework (UDF) in 1998. Whereas the UDS had been able to state a single developmental agenda, the UDF represented an attempt to gather together the disparate implementation projects of a range of departments that had already been delivering services for three years. So the UDF became a review document that drew together the work of already existing programmes, rather than driving a single agenda (Todes 2006)

The overarching framework for urban policy and urban government after the RDP is contained in the Local Government White Paper which was produced in 1998 (Government of South Africa, 1998). The White Paper outlined what became known as Developmental Local Government (DLG). According to the Local Government White Paper (1998), published six months prior to the Act and largely informing the content and spirit of the Act, DLG is: “the dynamic way in which local councils work together with local communities to find sustainable ways to meet their needs and improve their lives” (Government of South Africa 1998, p.6). It has been argued that the content of the DLG legislation in fact relied upon the maintenance of the bureaucratic capacities of the apartheid municipal structures – although reorganising the boundaries to include previously Black Local Authority areas within their remit – as a necessary condition for the effective delivery of services. This preservation of the rationalities of modernist apartheid urban government was ironically seen as crucial to the success of the post-apartheid city due to the need for an institutional framework with which to view the city as object of intervention (Beall et al 2002; Robinson 1997). Furthermore, Bond (2003) has argued that the scope of the DLG framework was limited from its inception because of the demands for cost recovery in service provision, and the unwillingness on the part of urban planners and managers to cross-subsidise: i.e. to take money from the wealthier municipalities to subsidise service delivery in poorer municipalities. Developmental Local Government. Urban policy had been identified as a key element to counter the negative social and
economic effects of the apartheid city, but has had little impact on shifting the key structural areas of intervention, especially land markets, and it also has not developed any mechanisms for acquiring well-located urban land, either by accessing state owned property, through intervening into the commercial property market, or through development incentives (Todes 2006; Pieterse 2006). Moreover, Todes (2006) suggests that much urban policy development over the last fifteen years has been largely consultant-driven. The private sector and the interests of business and industry, recognising that they might be called on to make major investments into any new dispensation, have also been resistant. The needs to maintain the growth potential of the cities effectively deferred more radical attempts at urban integration. Pieterse (2004) suggests that while urban policy in South Africa is directed towards pro-poor initiatives, there has been the gradual integration of language such as ‘urban competitiveness’ and ‘cost-recovery’ into the discourse. Bond (2004) similarly argues that post-apartheid urban policy has tended steadily towards ‘neoliberal imperatives’, and away from the ethos and spirit of DLG.

While Bond (Bond 2000) has critiqued the concept of DLG for its over-reliance on financial viability, van Donk and Pieterse (2006) have argued that it represents a turn away from the first iteration of urban policy after apartheid, which suffered from a spatial determinism – or what I have called an imagination of spatial immanence. While a new emphasis on financial viability was evident, there was also a clear reorientation away from delivery and towards participative planning and development (Parnell & Pieterse 1998). The White Paper was the product of an intensive period of consultation and research, whereas the RDP had been in reality the enactment of a progressive political manifesto compiled by a political and bureaucratic elite – for obvious reasons, as it needed to be done very quickly after the ending of apartheid. The research and consultation that was undertaken by the White Paper Working Committee under four themes: political and institutional systems; developmental local government; municipal finances; and what van Donk and Pieterse have called “reality check” – i.e. what can and cannot be feasibly achieved (2006, p.15). The
Working Committee had envisaged the collation of all their research findings into the final White Paper, but the political demand for a coherent policy framework with adequate time for implementation before the final phase of local government (i.e. 2000) demanded a rationalising of the document: “instead of the research findings culminating in a comprehensive policy framework for local government, the minister and the White Paper Political Committee opted for a more practical approach whereby each section of the Green Paper had to answer a number of specific questions” (van Donk & Pieterse 2006, p.16). Van Donk and Pieterse argue therefore that the final policy framework was a less than perfect attempt at bringing together what had been an extensive body of research into a set of recommendations that could bring together a range of divergent needs and interests. It is also very likely, they argue, that the neoliberal policy debates that were in vogue globally at the time may have played an increasing influence in the ways in which policy was formulated. Yet it remained the case that DLG represents an attempt to come to terms with the realities of urban dynamics:

“Developmental Local Government (...) represents the first sign that the second wave of post-apartheid reconstruction is beginning. The first wave was characterised by various attempts that, with hindsight, represent a rather clumsy understanding of how to institutionalise development policy. Initial urban reconstruction goals and strategies were either too vague, or promised too much. Not least of the problems was that policy objectives, like providing houses for all, had to be radically trimmed to match the emerging fiscal orientation and priorities of the Department of Finance. The second phase of urban reconstruction is significantly more grounded in experience” (Parnell & Pieterse 1998, p.1)

So while urban policy, even within the RDP, was becoming increasingly cut through by demands for financial prudence, Parnell and Pieterse argue that in fact DLG represents not just this one
dimension but in fact a more nuanced engagement with the reality of the city. The first enactment of Developmental Local Government was in 1998, through the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998). The rationale of the act was in recognition that: “municipalities across our country have been involved in a protracted, difficult and challenging transition process in which great strides have been made in democratizing local government,” and a political impetus to “embark on the final phase in the local government transition process to be transformed in line with the vision of democratic and developmental local government” (Act 117 of 1998: preamble; emphasis added). A post-apartheid regime of urban governance was finally made concrete by the Act. Yet, while the dominant spatial imagination of the immediate post-apartheid urban policy was defined by what I have termed spatial immanence (i.e. that space is the container for social action and the product of a political economy), to be acted upon in predictable ways, then the gradual development of urban policy in the years after apartheid have been far more nuanced. This is evident, I argue, in the case of municipal restructuring in Johannesburg after 1997.

3.4 The Elusive Object of Government

The restructuring that took place in the Johannesburg Municipality in 1997 represents in some respects the manifestation of a process that had been under way since the closure of the Office of the RDP in 1996. In late 1997 it emerged that the four municipal substructures and the GJMC were experiencing a negative cash flow of over R130 million per month. Driven by the huge backlog of infrastructure provision in the townships, difficulties in establishing regular payment for rates and services from poor township residents, and the increasing reluctance of wealthy suburban residents to bear the costs of redistributive policies, the GJMC was confronted with a fiscal crisis, the extent of which included:

“"The metropolitan account to ESKOM for bulk electricity supply was three months in
arrears (approximately R300 million). The five councils were heading for an unfunded position of R2 billion by the end of the 1997/1998 financial year, although this position would not have been reached as the councils would have been insolvent by the end of February 1998" (Tomlinson 1999, p.18).

Responding swiftly and decisively to the crisis, the Gauteng Provincial MEC for Development Planning and Local Government appointing an emergency executive committee of ten members from across the five municipal structures, called the Committee of Ten, to crisis-manage the budgeting and financing of the GJMC. The Committee of Ten set about revising the existing 1997/8 operating and capital budgets of the five councils. The mandate was to rationalise as far as possible, so as to provide for a working capital reserve which would cover the anticipated shortfall in payments of rates and services, and to provide for sufficient capital for only those projects that had already been identified by GJMC as strategic (Govender and Aiello, 1999). In the meantime, the Council of Ten was mandated to implement credit control mechanisms across the five council structures and to begin investigating mechanisms for rationalising costs across the five structures in information systems, staff functions, and service delivery mechanisms, including the possibility of outsourcing certain functions.

Anticipating the need for broader institutional changes, the GJMC commissioned a private consultancy firm to report on efficiency savings that the city could undertake. The report, presented in January 1998, suggested that the system of four substructures and an overarching metropolitan council was an inappropriate structure for achieving the strategic objectives of Developmental Local Government in the city, and that this ineffectiveness was compounded by an inefficient duplication of roles and responsibilities between the five structures. Moreover, the consultants highlighted a lack of prioritisation; unclear roles, responsibilities and accountability; a top-heavy structure with a complex and convoluted system of posts and levels of management; and a culture
and work ethic heavily based on administration rather than consultation and service delivery (Govender & Aiello 1999, p.4).

The report was particularly critical on the lack of financial planning in what it termed 'core strategic areas', and suggested that the five municipal structures prioritise their core business areas. The report was used as the basis for instigate a consultancy-led process to re-organise the institutional make-up of the five municipal structures into core and non-core activities, and to explore the various possibilities of municipal service delivery partnerships – or Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) as they have become known (Govender & Aiello 1999). Non-core activities were designated as either asset-based activities; activities which duplicated provincial government functions; and others such as museums and the botanical gardens. In May 1998, with the finances of the five councils still severely restricted, the provincial government expanded the Committee of Ten to become the Committee of Fifteen. The new committee was primarily mandated to implement the guidelines on engaging the private sector in establishing PPPs. By December 1998 a full assessment of all potential PPP-candidate functions of the five structures had been carried out, and feasibility studies for implementing PPP’s were begun.

In January 1999 the GJMC appointed a City Manager, a new executive post that was designed to implement a single financial and budgeting process at an executive level within the five structures. The new appointee was seconded from the national Department of Transport, and had recently overseen the “the most ambitions privatisation project undertaken in South Africa to date – the N4 toll road concession” (Govender & Aiello 1999, p.6). Although the new City Manager was not solely responsible for the document, his office was an important driver of the iGoli 2002 document, which was a three-year strategic framework for institutional reform. The framework was to guide the process of merging the five existing municipal structures into a single Metropolitan municipality. However, it also outlined the institutional structure of the new Metropolitan
municipality, significantly proposing the establishment of public utilities for bulk services such as water and electricity; the privatisation of certain non-core activities with asset-values; and the corporatisation (i.e. the application of private-sector financial management rules) of other non-core activities. The aim of these interventions was to cut wage costs (a huge proportion of which were identified as arising from so-called non-core activities), and to improve the revenue collection from rates and service payments (Reddy 2003). The overall framework was designed: “to restore the city administration (...) into an effective agent for delivery and governance” (Johannesburgnews 2001 accessed January 2011).

The iGoli 2002 framework attracted intense criticism from trade unions, civil society groups and academics. A number of political commentators and journalists at the time even claimed that the fiscal crisis had been exaggerated in order to justify the implementation of local government restructuring that emphasised cost-efficiency over service delivery (Clark & Drimie 2002). Bond (2007) has suggested that even given the level of financial deficit the authorities were extremely uncreative when confronted with crisis. He suggests, for example, that a small increase in service charges, and improved mechanisms for ensuring collection from business and industry would have been sufficient to cover the budget deficit (Bond 2007). The deliberate ignorance of, or institutional inability to consider, such alternatives exemplified for many activists and commentators at the time the broader embrace of neoliberalism in urban policy in South Africa (Beauregard & Tomlinson 2007; Miraftab 2004a; 2004b; Narsiah 2002; Peet 2002; L. Smith 2004; Van Heusden & Pointer 2006; Williams & Taylor 2000). Williams and Taylor (2000) suggested for example, that political elites were persuaded by “a daunting array of material and financial interests both inside and outside South Africa” who were able to portray neoliberalism as “the only game in town, discrediting alternatives before they even reached the negotiating table (...) the result has been a dramatic about-face in the ANC’s economic thinking, whereby redistribution of apartheid’s considerable inequities is no longer the primary goal” (Williams and Taylor 2000, p.37). Similarly,
Miraftab (2004a) has argued that World Bank and IMF consultants played an important role in convincing post-apartheid political elites to adopt neoliberal policies, with the result that: “the language of managerialism and cost recovery has displaced the language of participation and social justice” (Miraftab 2004a, p.877).

The iGoli 2002 framework, popularly portrayed as the privatisation of the provision of urban infrastructure and service delivery (Ballard et al. 2006; Ngwane 2003), in fact was responsible for the privatisation of municipal activities that had historically constituted less than three per cent of total municipal expenditure (Reddy 2003). Rather: “most restructuring involved the creation of internal agencies and utilities, target-setting, and management contracts rather than wholesale privatisation” (Parnell & Robinson 2006, p.345).

Some more nuanced accounts of neoliberalism in post-apartheid urban policy have been attuned to the implication of this. They have been influenced by a very productive and suggestive body of literature which has attempted to theorise the implication of urban political and economic institutions into the global circulation of neoliberal capital (Brenner & Theodore 2002; Jessop 2002; Peck & Tickell 2002; Peck 2001; Swyngedouw et al. 2002). This literature has been concerned to explore how cities: “are not merely localised arenas in which broader global or national projects of neoliberal restructuring unfold [but] have become increasingly central to the reproduction, mutation and continual reconstitution of neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore 2002, p.375). In doing so, it has highlighted the increasingly important role that urban policy and state intervention has played in channelling the circuits of neoliberal capital though particular urban spaces (Peck 2001); the role and often negative social impact of large-scale public-funded urban development projects in city marketing and competitiveness (Swyngedouw et al. 2002); and the “the highly polarized national political economic geographies that have resulted from these realignments (...) emphasising market-driven growth, flexibility and locational competitiveness (...); the intensification of inter-
spatial competition between urban regions (...); and the growing differentiation of national political space among distinctive urban and regional economies, each with their own unique, place-specific economic profiles, infrastructural configurations, institutional arrangements and developmental trajectories” (Brenner 2004, p. 3).

Important to this body of work is an understanding of neoliberalism not as a single set of economic policies that are adopted, but as a political rationality in which the principles of the free market pervade. Ferguson and Gupta (2002) reiterate the sense that neoliberalism is a governmental logic, that is without an overarching hegemonic or global agenda, a set of rationalities of government that operate at the level of the bio-political as much as at the economy:

“The logic of the market has been extended to the operation of state functions, so that even the traditionally core institutions of government, such as post offices, schools, and police are—if not actually privatized—at least run according to an 'enterprise model' (...) but this is not a matter of less government, as the usual ideological formulations would have it. Rather, it indicates a new modality of government, which works by creating mechanisms that work 'all by themselves' to bring about governmental results through the devolution of risk onto the 'enterprise' or the individual (...) and the 'responsibilization' of subjects who are increasingly 'empowered' to discipline themselves” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, p.989).

However, viewing urban policy in post-apartheid Johannesburg through the lens of an emerging neoliberal political rationality also threatens to lose sight of the more contingent – and also contested – nature of the processes that are taking place in Johannesburg. This is line with an emerging conceptualisation of neoliberalism as a contingent process, touching down very different ways in different contexts, being implicated in a range of other rationalities of rule. We need to
consider the “messy actuality” of particular neoliberal projects (Larner 2009; 2005). In other words, when considering the way in which neoliberal rationalities operate in specific contexts such as Johannesburg, we need to be able to think about the complex intersection between neoliberal rationalities and the existence of other rationalities at play. Seen in this light, urban restructuring and the adoption of particular neoliberal strategies are responses to locally derived political rationalities, that may or may not have anything to do with the imperatives of global capital. I suggest that analyses of municipal restructuring and urban policy in post-apartheid South Africa that prioritise neoliberalism risk losing sight of other rationalities that may be at stake. Thus, according to Ong (2007):

“Neoliberalism is conceptualized not as a fixed set of attributes with predetermined outcomes, but as a logic of governing that migrates and is selectively taken up in diverse political contexts. I present an analytics of assemblage over an analytics of structure, and a focus on emerging milieus over the stabilization a new global order (...) if we view neoliberalism not as a system but a migratory set of practices, we would have to take into account how its flows articulate diverse situations and participate in mutating configurations of possibility” (Ong 2007)

Thus, I want to suggest that corporatisation and cost recovery as prominent modes of thinking about urban policy in post-apartheid Johannesburg might have less to do with attracting global capital than with constituting political legitimacy with local political and economic elites. It is about finding ways to appease old capital interests and emergent claims on urban resources by new elites. This should focus enquiry at the broader rationalities of rule.:

“The word neoliberal has become something of a term of abuse in progressive circles in recent years, but I wish to use the term here in a more descriptive and evaluatively
neutral sense. By that, I mean that I wish to be able to think about arguments as neoliberal without automatically and immediately identifying them as 'bad' (...) such an approach builds on neo-Foucauldian analyses of neoliberalism as a form of governmental rationality that operates via the application of market and 'enterprise' mechanisms to the problem of government (...) the term neoliberal in this sense, does not refer to a unified political project (...) which is why it retains a certain political indeterminacy" (Ferguson 2007, p.76).

However, while Ferguson finds such a conception of neoliberalism far more compelling than a more ideologically-driven political project, he nevertheless also questions whether even a single neoliberal rationality can be said to be emerging in the context of post-apartheid South Africa. Ferguson (2007) identifies what he refers to as a neoliberal set of 'moves', like the moves in a chess game, which can be combined with other moves in a variety of different ways, and deployed in pursuit of a wide range of different political ends (Ferguson 2007). In other words, one might conclude, in agreement with Ferguson, that while there are a number of elements within post-apartheid urban policy that appear to be neoliberal in both content and rationality, neoliberalism is an insufficient explanation for what is a far more complex policy environment. While there are indeed many aspects of local government that appear to conform to the logic of the market over the political demands of access (e.g. the privatisation of electricity and water provision in parts of Johannesburg), this in fact exists in a far more complex and contested regime.

I suggest, in fact, that these far more complex rationalities of government can be distinguished at two scales. At the scale of the national government, urban policy is implicated into broad national imperatives of the developmental state agenda. Broad frameworks such as the National Spatial Development Perspective outline the priorities of government that locates the major cities of South Africa into a spatial economy in which these major urban centres account for over eighty per cent of
the production of the country. Far from locating these cities into global neoliberal networks, the rationalities of this kind of rule speak far more closely to Foucault's analysis of government as operating at the scale of population and of economy.

Figure 3.2: Space economy of South Africa
(Source: CSIR)

Indeed, the language of competitiveness and urban growth has been adopted from a neoliberal discourse. One prominent example in the post-apartheid context is the South African Cities Network (SACN), which is a non-statutory forum that brings together civil servants and urban practitioners from South Africa's six largest cities. SACN is a strong advocate of integrative urban policy, and has significant support from government and other civil society groups. SACN has in many respects a very progressive attitude towards cities, but like many advocacy and research agencies is itself locked into a language of efficiency and good governance — apparent hallmarks of neoliberal urban policy. SACN is strongly located in a policy discourse of understanding South African cities.
in terms of more global ideas around sustainability, and as drivers of the economy more broadly defined (Borain et al. 2006).

Borain et al (2006) suggest that SACN has contributed to a broader tendency within urban studies and urban policy in South Africa from understanding the city in terms of a “particularistic expression of the imperative of overcoming apartheid, to a more generalised aspiration for urban innovation led by a developmental state” (Borain et al. 2006, p.261). This is a discourse that is emerging within urban planning as a technical discipline as well, and which is having an impact upon urban policy in South Africa. Todes (2007) identifies a similar tendency in post-apartheid urban policy with the emergence, both within government and non-government circles, of a language of urban competitiveness and cities as drivers of economic growth – rather than as the site for dismantling apartheid segregation, as imagined in the early 1990s. While there remained a commitment to the delivery of urban services, and a large part of municipal budgets is taken up with infrastructure provision, the imperatives for radically rethinking the nature and geography of the post-apartheid city receded in the face of more immediate concerns with the costs and political imperatives of effecting a development agenda. Pieterse (2004) suggests for example, that the new progressive agenda in planning is increasingly one of flexibility and participation:

“It is now recognised that if planning is to be effective it must be accepted (and driven) and legitimated by those it seeks to regulate. Incisive criticisms against the top-down planning have effectively undermined the prospects of large-scale, blueprint planning. Such criticisms highlight the importance of participation and of ‘planning as process’ (...) These two ideas – flexibility and participatory processes – have had a profound influence in the South African debates about the role planning can play in creating integrated cities” (Pieterse 2004, p.3)
The interventions and advocacy work of SACN, among others, feeds into a broader regime of practices of urban government in post-apartheid South Africa in which the spaces of the city are understood less as spaces to be remade through policy and increasingly as more or less of the ingredients for economic growth and dynamism. Yet these speak to the imperatives of a developmental agenda, as much as the imperatives of neoliberalism.

At the local scale, where cities are drawn into the imperatives of this national developmental agenda, the rationalities of urban government relate to the contested local dynamics of urban politics, as well as to the difficulties of enacting the requirements of national and provincial state. The framework of iGoli 2002 was designed in response to the requirements of the Municipal Structures Act (69 of 1999) for setting out the structures of local government institutions within a. The Public Finance Management Act (Act 1 of 1999) and the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003), which relate to public spending and fiscal prudence as key elements of local government, have also shaped the emergence of urban government in Johannesburg in the past decade. These Acts were promulgated in part as a response to the experience of Johannesburg with the two-tier municipal system. The fiscal crisis that emerged in 1997 was seen as potentially undermining the development of unified cities, with strong resources and a single tax base that could be used for redistributive purposes. Moreover, the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) obliges local government to prioritise the basic needs of communities, and ensure access to a minimum level of basic services that are equitable and accessible.

The iGoli 2002 framework is also in line with the statutory requirement of all municipalities to develop long-term development plans. Thus, while iGoli 2002 was intended as the blueprint for restructuring the bureaucracy of municipal government in Johannesburg, it was envisaged that a long-term strategic visioning process would function as the accompanying blueprint for re-
prioritising and implementing Developmental Local Government; this was finally launched in 2002 as Joburg 2030.

In addition, municipalities are required by legislation to undertake regular five-year planning for development projects, called Integrated Development Planning (IDP). The IDP plans are a way of effecting DLG, but there is an emphasis on budgets and on management regimes. Van Donk and Pieterse (2006) agree, suggesting that the first round of IDPs represented a 'shopping list' approach with very little strategic thinking on the part of city managers and planners. There was an over-emphasis on infrastructure delivery and an under-emphasis on social and economic development (Van Donk and Pieterse 2006). However, although tightly controlled in terms of process and procedure, and in terms of budget accounting, they suggest that the IDP documents stand as actual policy commitments to development, and contain the possibility for more progressive thinking about development. That is, the IDP process is imagined within a context that recognises:

"the complex inter-relationship between various aspects of development: political, social, economic, environmental, ethical, infrastructural and spatial. Given their inter-relationship, it is impossible to address one dimension only and expect to make an impact on inequality or poverty. In fact, IDPs recognise that any sustainable and successful strategy must address all of these elements in a co-ordinated way, based on an analysis of the underlying structural factors that sustain economic growth, poverty and inequality. In theory at least, the IDP also makes it essential for a local community to identify development needs and, simultaneously, to execute agreed to anti-poverty and growth strategies that emanate from a common vision that spells out how local needs will be reached (Parnell & Pieterse 1998, p.16).

Initially, there was institutional resistance to implementing the more progressive and innovative
programmes from within a bureaucracy that was still largely made up of apartheid-era civil servants. This was exacerbated by a relatively weak, and still largely fragmented, municipal system. The four transitional municipal substructures that had been enacted for the Greater Johannesburg area were largely independent from one another, combined under an administratively limited Greater Johannesburg Metro Council. This meant that larger scale political aspirations, such as integrating the severe poverty of the Southern suburbs with the economic clusters in the Northern suburbs, were incredibly difficult to orchestrate. In some years, the municipalities were not even spend their budgets, given a lack of capacity within some of the departments (Swilling et al. 2007). Therefore, while the guiding principle that underlay the intentions of much of post-apartheid urban policy – i.e. of dismantling the apartheid city – was continually enunciated, confronted with a lack of capacity in certain areas, political divisiveness within councils, and increasingly restricted resources, policy implementation often relied upon using existing municipal resources and mechanisms.

Pieterse (2004) makes a similar argument, suggesting that “[because] property rights are secured in the Constitution (...) this makes it incredibly difficult for municipalities to intervene in land markets to realise their strategic objectives and planning interventions” (2004, p.7). With the costs of purchasing or making available land in urban areas for low-cost development, and the costs of infrastructure delivery, some of the more radical ideas about urban integration were shelved. The implementation of urban policy quickly became premised on delivery based on quotas and targets, with outcomes determined by such targets rather than by the achievement of a particular developmental agenda. Thus Todes (2003) suggested that: “there is a growing consensus that current development patterns are tending to reinforce older apartheid patterns, or that new forms of spatial divide are emerging” (Todes 2003, p.111). Rather than undoing the apartheid city, the imperatives of service delivery apparently maintained, and later exacerbated, the social inequalities of the apartheid city (Bond 2003; Todes 2007).
Such unwillingness or inability to fully exploit what had, during the anti-apartheid movement, been seen as potential political solutions to undoing the segregated apartheid city, must be seen in the light of an impending political and financial crisis that threatened to undermine the aspirations and imagination of the post-apartheid city. The crisis was partly precipitated by poor financing and inefficient duplication of functions across the five structures, but can be traced to an historical institutional weakness in revenue collection, especially in poor areas given the history of rates and rent boycotts in the townships in the 1980s. This, however, was exacerbated in 1996 and 1997 by a rates boycott from a federation of ratepayers and property-companies in the wealthy northern suburbs, who took the GJMC to court to oppose proposed increases in property rates designed to finance infrastructure provision in poor areas (Tomlinson 1999; Parnell and Robinson 2006). The court case was ultimately dismissed, but the rates boycott by wealthy business and economic elites suggested the limits of consensus to a broadly developmental agenda (Bond 2003). This crisis therefore challenged the assumptions that underlay the imagination of the post-apartheid city: i.e. a unified city with the financial and institutional capacities to effect a radical undoing of the apartheid city.

Faced with massive demands for the state to appear responsive to political aspirations of development, on the one hand, and the reluctance of wealthy constituents to commit to a shared vision, municipal authorities and agencies of the state concerned with urban policy grew increasingly defensive. There was an increasing reliance on the enforcement of urban by-laws – some of which were promulgated in the apartheid era (Du Plessis & Wilson 2004) – to resist land invasions, to control informal trade and to generally maintain the outward appearance of orderly urban management (Todes 2003; Pieterse 2004). The result was a perverse hardening of attitudes towards so-called 'informal' urban practices, which deviated from and challenged the relatively static imagination of the post-apartheid city. Unable to engage in a more responsive manner, the
municipality struggled to maintain a sense of cohesion to its own developmental project. Yet, as I will discuss in the following section, this hardening of attitudes was reserved only for supposed beneficiaries of state development. Local business interests and wealthy constituencies, which were driving an arguably more divisive set of 'informal' urban practices – i.e. suburban sprawl, gated communities, rates boycotts – were far more able to extract concessions from municipal authorities, due in large part to the realisation that the municipality required fiscal prudence.

There is also recognition that the process surrounding *iGoli 2002* has seen intense political hostility between the municipality and local political and community actors. Partly as a result of these sometimes antagonistic and active political effort on the part of civil society and community groups, more recent strategic planning documents have reflected socially oriented and participatory processes (Parnell and Robinson 2006). This should not blind us to the persistence of massive inequality in economic and social capital in post-apartheid cities. At the very least, however, this recognition of the dynamic nature of local politics should alert us to the possibility that the encounter between neoliberalism and post-apartheid urban government is bound to be a contingent and contested one.

3.6 Conclusion — Space as Immanence v. Space as Process

In this chapter I have attempted to argue that the restructuring of municipal government in post-apartheid Johannesburg after 1997, rather than simply the outcome of a neoliberal rationality pervading post-apartheid urban policy, in fact represents a shift in the spatial imagination of the post-apartheid city. Drawing on Dean's (1999) elaborations on Foucault's concept of regimes of practices, I have attempted to show how urban policy does not just act on space, but actively constitutes that space. It does this not only through the programmes and infrastructure projects that make up the built environment, but it also frames the manner in which space is intervened into. This
is, of course, a recursive process. Space is not only produced through urban policy, but exists in a dynamic relationship with it. I suggested also that Regimes of Practices have an attendant spatiality. Whereas the initial process of constituting post-apartheid urban policy was premised on a spatial imagination of spatial immanence – as static and malleable through policy implementation – there is an increasing acknowledgement of the city as dynamic and illegible. I argue that urban policy in post-apartheid South Africa has increasingly constituted the spatiality of the city not as a fixed territorial topography, but rather as a series of nodal interventions that serve to incite response. While large-scale housing and electrification projects are still a fundamental part of Developmental Local Government, there is an increasing emphasis on Local Economic Development projects. As we saw in this chapter, it was precisely the fluidity and illegibility of the city that contributed to the shift in spatial imagination – from one of spatial immanence to one of space as unstable and fluid.

Todes (2006) has argued that the shift in urban policy emphasis from the imperatives of the RDP towards the more pragmatic policies defined by DLG suggests a shift from an emphasis on space to an emphasis on management. I suggest, rather, that there is a shift in the spatiality, rather than a shift away from a spatial concern. There is indeed a concern for the management of dynamic processes, and for targeted interventions. It is as if the emerging post-apartheid spatiality approaches what Allen (2003) terms a topological arrangement – i.e. where space is understood as “a relational effect of social interaction where there are no pre-defined distances or simple proximities to speak of” (2003, p.3). This is not to suggest that the materiality of space is no longer important, and indeed I will show in the following chapter that it is. In the next chapter I will discuss how the local state has gone about making specific interventions into this shifting spatiality precisely through the materiality of built infrastructure.

I want to reiterate that the distinction between the two 'periods' of urban policy that I have discussed is somewhat of an artificial distinction. The two different spatialities – i.e. one of spatial immanence
in which the space of the city can be topographically contained, and one of spatial mobility, in which space is understood as a set of processes and trajectories – do not exist in distinct spatio-temporal terms. Even as one may appear emergent, urban policy in post-apartheid Johannesburg remains a complex and contested terrain.
4. INFORMALITY, GOVERNMENTALITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE

4.1 Introduction

Interventions by the municipality to control and manage informal street trading in Johannesburg date back to the proclamation of the city in 1886, but was particularly established with the designation of land to establish Market Square (now Library Gardens) in the heart of the new settlement in 1893 (Beavon 2004). Initially the market was open to all races, but restrictions on the movements and practices of black South Africans within the city meant that the market was dominated by white traders, with many black traders engaged in more survivalist trade on the peripheries of the market and in the streets of the city. In the decades that followed, the city began to grow very rapidly, and with severe congestion and poor hygiene being associated with the market place, and anxieties around the location of so many black traders in the vicinity, in 1911 a new market was planned for the neighbourhood of Newtown, on the edge of the densely settled Johannesburg city (Beavon 2004). Finally in 1913 the municipal market was relocated into the grand Victorian market halls of the new Johannesburg Market, itself just two city blocks away from the current site of the Metro Mall.

The new market, on the edge of the inner city, provided a much larger area for trade and good transport links into and out of the city. However, there were other ambitions in the location of the new market in Newtown. The Newtown neighbourhood was the site of some existing industrial activity, including a tannery and other small textile industries, but importantly the area also housed a large multi-racial community of working-class and poor families – most of whom were connected to either the tannery or to low-paid service work in the inner city. The new market halls therefore formed part of a municipal "slum clearance" project, and marked the explicit implication of town planning ordinances and routine urban management in achieving a racially motivated agenda. For
example, the newly cleared neighbourhood was designated for industrial and market related activities, although it also housed a men's hostel for black labourers until the late 1960s (Beavon, 2004).

The Native (Black) Urban Areas Act of 1923 which abolition of freehold rights for black South Africans and enforced their non-permanence in urban areas, placed increased limitations on the viability of black market traders. The Act did permit for a limited amount of non-permanent informal trading in the city, for which a permit was required, and this became one way through which unemployed black people could access the city (Beavon 2004). Despite severe restrictions and attempts to limit the licensing of black traders, a small community of black traders who operated legally developed within the new Johannesburg municipal market. The use of town planning and infrastructure to control and manage the movements of specific groups of people in the city was evident again in 1972, when the municipality made the decision to move the Johannesburg Market away from the inner city. The market had become incredibly congested, and was struggling to serve the purpose of an expanding wholesale fresh produce industry (Gaule 2005).

The market was moved away from the Newtown area to a dedicated site several kilometres south of the inner city. A new state-of-the-art market and distribution facility, based partly on consultation with the consultants involved with the relocation of the New Covent Garden market in London, was opened in September 1974. Like other apartheid era infrastructure projects, the new market on the outskirts of the city served also to complement the segregationist rationality. The closure of the old market served as an effective strategy of foreclosing opportunities for independent (i.e. non-contract labour) urban livelihoods for black South Africans, destroying an emerging petty-bourgeoisie among black market traders, and simultaneously solidifying the monopoly of the already powerful (and exclusively white) buying agents, who control prices inside the market (Beavon 2004).

The relocation of the market, while ostensibly a benign municipal function, clearly contained a
political objective – that of controlling the movement of black South Africans into the inner city. With the ending of petty-apartheid and the passing of the Business Act in 1991, the municipality had been faced with the need to engage traders in the inner city. The initial response was to build market spaces for traders, and to enforce anti-trading by-laws to ensure that traders moved into the markets. However, aside from a small section of Hoek Street outside the Anglican Cathedral, which had been planned in 1992 but completed after the ending of apartheid in 1995, the strategy of locating traders into purpose built market facilities was never effectively implemented. This was also a strategy that the business community, through the CJP, had been promoting, although it was not prepared to incur any of the costs of building and maintaining such facilities (CJP 1, 12 March 2009, personal interview). When the CJP realised that the post-apartheid municipality was also equivocal about implementing such a strategy, there was increasing momentum towards the CID model, as discussed above.

In this chapter I aim to explore a link between urban infrastructure interventions in the inner city, and the emergence of such a rationality of rule in Johannesburg. More specifically, I demonstrate how the construction of a municipal market building, i.e. the Metro Mall traders market, represents the material convergence of a number of sometimes contradictory political ambitions that have informality as their object. The Metro Mall serves as the centre-piece of a strategy for managing informal traders in the inner-city of Johannesburg through the construction of markets in areas that are densely traded within the city. Such a strategy emerges from, and relies upon, two quite specific processes, which I will discuss in this chapter. The first is the emergence into political and economic significance of the inner city after 1994, and especially after the financial crisis of 1997. Amidst discourses of decline, and the process of business and commercial retailers vacating the inner city, there was increasing emphasis on the need to impose an urban management regime. The business community was at the forefront of such calls, and developed mechanisms for lobbying the municipality regarding their concerns. Developing partnerships with other inner city constituents
proved a lot more difficult for the municipality, however. Thus, the second process that I refer to in the chapter is the construction of informality as an object of intervention in the inner city. While the business community was largely resistant to the presence of informal street traders on the streets of the inner city, the municipality was confronted with the need to incorporate these new urban users into the everyday life of the city. In the context of illegibility and the lack of effective partnerships, I argue that the municipality has developed the market infrastructure as a tool for intervening into the lives of traders without otherwise being able to know and see them in their entirety. Finally, I illustrate that this has implications for the way in which we think about space. As we have seen in the previous chapter (Chapter Three) there is the emergence in Johannesburg of a spatial imagination of fluidity and potentiality. While the business community has attempted to exclude informality through the control of space, I argue that the municipality has attempted to intervene into space through the strategic incursion into already existing trajectories.

4.2 Infrastructure and Government

The link between infrastructure and forms of state power is present in Michael Mann's concept of infrastructural power. In Mann's work, infrastructural power refers to the ability of the state (or indeed any agent in society) to extend its power over society, through the infiltration into that society of the infrastructures of command and rule. Mann's notion of infrastructural power therefore draws a clear link between the capabilities of the state on the one hand, and the technologies of infrastructure that enable the state to exercise those capabilities, on the other. This does not mean that Mann was first and foremost concerned with the functioning of the materiality of infrastructure within state power. For Mann, infrastructure refers to the: "routinised media through which information and commands are transmitted" (Mann 2008, p.357). Thus, infrastructural power refers rather to the ability to infiltrate and permeate, and was not conceptualised as simply a taxonomy of those technologies and practices that constitute the infrastructure of the state. This is especially
given that the state has no necessary or actual monopoly over any of these infrastructures. Most of
the technologies through which the state exercises infrastructural power exist within society more
generally, but as Mann argues, it is the ability of the modern state in the last two centuries to define
and monopolise territoriality that has allowed it to take unique advantage of these technologies
(Mann 1984).

Nevertheless, Schroeder (2006) argues that Mann tended towards developing historical narrative as
opposed to sociological modelling, and as such was concerned therefore with empirical examples
from history. For Mann the empirical evidence through history of various states' abilities to infiltrate
society resided in the actual capabilities and technological developments within a given social
context (Mann 1984). Thus, for Mann (2008) infrastructural power derives from, and indeed
depends upon: "these same infrastructures – roads, railroads, education systems, computer
networks, etc." (2008, p.357). Infrastructural techniques include many of the capacities of state that
may be considered as the mundane functions of a state bureaucracy, such as statistics and the
standardisation of measurements. Yet they also include the materiality of hard infrastructure, and the
ability of a state to plan, implement and utilise this infrastructure. Mann cites in particular (1984)
the massive growth in the infrastructural capacity of European Nation States as a result of the
Industrial Revolution, and the consequent invention of infrastructural techniques that extended and
facilitated state power, despite the fact that most of these technological innovations resided outside
of the formal institutions of the state.

Of course, what is important for Mann is how such infrastructure might be brought into systematic
networks – or media – through which state power can derive. In other words, while the concept of
infrastructural power retains at its core a sense of the materiality of concrete and steel, it does so
only in so far as this 'hard' infrastructure facilitates and effects the systematic and capillary power of
the state. Infrastructural power, in other words, does not refer to infrastructure as concrete and steel
- this is simply the technology of power. Yet I argue that there are nevertheless strong connections between these two different inflections of the term infrastructure. That is because the capillary nature of infrastructural power – the institutions and organisational capacities of the state – are connected into a network precisely through the points of intersection in the network. This is what is at stake for Simone (2004b) when he speaks of people as infrastructure: i.e. individuals are themselves the nodal points of conversion for a range of trajectories. Interestingly, Simone suggests the significance of people as infrastructure in precisely the context where one might expect state infrastructural power to be relatively absent. Following Mann, one might argue that it is into such a context that the state is attempting to infiltrate, and the materiality of hard infrastructure therefore becomes an important mechanism through which it attempts to do this.

The concept of infrastructural power as developed by Mann provides a useful entry point into thinking about a connection between the materiality of infrastructure and broader rationalities of rule. However, while Mann is concerned with a relationship between infrastructure and state power articulated at the scale of the nation-state – or aggregated down towards regional differences in infrastructural power within the nation state (Soifer & vom Hau 2008) – Mann is less concerned with the actual encounter between the technologies of state infrastructural power and the subjects of that state power. This more intimate politics, of how specific infrastructure encounters and constitutes subjects, is in the work of Mann brushed over in favour of a concern for the ability of the state to utilise and monopolise these technologies. A concern for the micro-politics of encounters between technologies of the state and the production of subjects, and indeed a far more relational account of power that emanates not from the state but operates through encounters between technologies and bodies, is at the heart of Michael Foucault's writing, especially his work on discipline (1979). The body is a central component in, and the major site in the era after modernity of relations of power: what Foucault calls the political technology of the body (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983). Foucault demonstrates how, in the modern age, there has been a move away from repressive
power towards what he terms bio-power: i.e. control over the productive body and over the population. The penal system for example, with the rituals of truth and knowledge that it produces, creates and sustains subjects through inscribing and holding the bodies of the individuals it encounters. Yet infrastructure does not only impact upon subjectivity in terms of making disciplinary spaces within which bodies are captured. As Kooy and Bakker (2008) have argued in the case of colonial and post-colonial water provision in Indonesia, the form in which infrastructural services are provided can also have an impact upon subjective relationships with the state. In their case study, they argue that particular parts of the city have been historically denied access to water infrastructure, in the process excluding those neighbourhoods from 'modern' citizenship:

“Residents whose domestic water practices did not demonstrate a familiarity with scientific rationalities, modern concern for bodily health, or an appropriately economical use of water have been marginalized both materially and discursively (...) access to a ‘modern’ piped water supply has continued to remain contingent upon one’s identity as a ‘modern’ citizen – signified in part by a scientific understanding of water quality, the possession of privatized spaces of water use, and an economically ‘rational’ understanding of water costs/benefits” (Kooy & Bakker 2008, p.385).

In this way, Kooy and Bakker show how infrastructure – like in the case of the municipal market place under apartheid – can be used as a way of excluding from forms of citizenship. Yet, infrastructure can also be used as a way of including. The extension of basic services has been a very important form of extending post-apartheid citizenship. The link between infrastructure and state power is particularly relevant in the context of post-apartheid South Africa, where the state has invested heavily into urban infrastructure. The housing subsidy scheme, the National Skills Fund and the Municipal Infrastructure Grant Fund are three areas where the state has spent heavily and has been relatively effective in attaining certain quotas (Swilling et al. 2004). Yet in general, large-
scale public investments in infrastructure have not managed to effect the radical shifts in the distribution of wealth across society that were intended. The effectiveness of these investments in asserting the authority of the state have been varied, and the institutions of state have been far more effective at delivering the hard infrastructure than in sustaining institutional and participatory mechanisms (Pieterse 2009). Moreover, the state has struggled to encourage private capital to complement public investments, which has meant that the apartheid disparity between wealth areas well serviced by economically productive infrastructure and poor areas with huge demands for basic services continues. Thus: “the biggest failing in urban investment terms is that the private sector has not followed the governments’ wishes in terms of where urban investments are targeted (...). What is clear (...) is that the private investments correlate very closely with where the wealthy live and the public investments correlate with where the urban poor live” (Pieterse 2009, p.2). This suggests that despite relatively large infrastructural capabilities, the state has failed to effectively infiltrate society and achieve its aims. To refer back to Mann, one might argue that despite the capacity for building hard infrastructure, the state’s infrastructural power is limited.

William Reno (1997; 1997; 2000) has argued that so-called “weak” states, which do not exercise effective sovereign control over a defined territory and population, nevertheless are able to rule through monopolising particular points of passage: of commodities, money and individuals. The most obvious of these, according to Reno, are the border crossing and the urban marketplace, both of which serve as symbolic as well as material condensations of the state. Such spaces mark the presence of the state in the everyday lives of many people, as their movement, transactions and interactions are channelled through spaces which situate them into particular encounters with some form of state authority. Through monopolising these nodes of passage – i.e. through engineering rudimentary though effective encounters between itself and its subjects – the state is able to lay claim to a very lucrative source of income, through its ability to extract taxes and levies. Not all of this income reaches the coffers of the national treasury – at least in the instances of which Reno
explores. Much of it contributes to the servicing of patronage networks that bind local state officials into what are complex assemblages of state power. Reno, of course, is concerned with state power in what might be regarded as extreme conditions of the dissolution or fragmentation of state power – contexts in which state territoriality and hegemony is often violently contested, such as in Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Yet his general observation about the role of the marketplace and the border-crossing as nodes through which the state can effectively capture bodies that would otherwise evade its presence, suggests something of the role of such nodes in constituting state power.

Reno’s reference to the writing of Deleuze is also echoed in Eyel Weizman’s (2007) description of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Whereas borders and boundaries were the traditional technology of inclusion and exclusion in the colonial project, Weizman argues that the Israeli tactic of scattering Jewish settlements across the area effectively redraws the geography of political occupation, and makes a political solution increasingly impossible:

“Against the geography of stable, static places, and the balance across linear and fixed sovereign borders, frontiers are deep, shifting, fragmented and elastic territories. Temporary lines of engagement, marked by makeshift boundaries, are not limited to the edges of political space but exist throughout its depth. Distinctions between the 'inside' and the 'outside' cannot be clearly marked. In fact, the straighter, more geometrical and more abstract official colonial borders across the 'New Worlds' tended to be, the more the territories of effective control were fragmented and dynamic and thus unchartable by any conventional mapping technique (...) The frontiers of the Occupied Territories are not rigid and fixed at all; rather they are elastic, and in constant formation. The linear border, a cartographic imaginary inherited from the military and political spatiality of the nation state has splintered into a multitude of temporary, transportable,
deployable and removable border-synonyms (...) that shrink and expand the territory at will " (Weizman 2007, p.4)

Whereas for Reno and Weizman the nodal interventions of the state are about the possibility of control and extraction, Le Marcis (2004) is far more concerned about the how individuals can access, and make claims upon, the state. Le Marcis traces the ways in which the suffering body of the AIDS victim encounters the state. Rather than a coherent regime of health-care that the patient can tap into, he or she encounters the state through a series of interactions on the long journey from sickness to death. The institutions of state are unable to have complete legibility of an individual, and so rely on these haphazard moments of encounter in order to make treatment available, or to bury the body of the victim. It is this, I argue, that is the specific innovative strategy of the building of market places in inner city Johannesburg. The market place is indeed a spatial strategy for intervening into the lives of individuals, and of drawing them into a relationship with the state. Yet the municipality is largely unable to access the dynamics of informality in the inner city, and so has recognised that in order to bring traders into contact with the state, it must be through intersecting with the trajectories of traders at specific points through which traders must pass. The most obvious of these is the Johannesburg Fresh Produce Market (JFPM), which as we saw in Chapter One occupies a point of passage in the everyday trajectories of many traders in the inner city. The JFPM represents a huge revenue-source for the City of Johannesburg municipality which owns the market, with an annual turnover in 2008 of over R2 billion \(^2\), and informal traders represent a significant portion of this trade (JFPM, 31 March 2009, personal interview). Most of the big buyers are from large retail stores in the city and suburbs, and some are from smaller fresh produce store that struggle to compete with the retail giants. What is only recently being understood by JFPM management and officials within the City of Johannesburg municipality, which owns the market, is that in the past ten years the share of that turnover coming from small-scale informal traders, often buying what seem insignificant amounts compared to the large corporate buyers,

\(^2\) Approx. £160 million (based on exchange rate of R1 = £0.08 as on 1 Feb 2011)
accounts for an increasing percentage of turnover:

“The role of the JFPM historically for the city was to control and facilitate trade between the farmers and the buyers (...) more recently it has facilitated the emergence of a strong and vibrant informal economy (...). The reality is that some people thrive in the informal sector. Informal traders buying from the [JFPM] market account for about forty per cent of our turnover” (JFPM, 31 March 2009, personal interview).

Dierwechter (2004) has a similar sense of the role of market place infrastructure in post-apartheid Cape Town. He borrows a term from Amin and Thrift (2002): Obligatory Passage Points (OPP). By this he intends to express that: “the diagram of urban power, then, is not a thing; it is a process. It is about getting people to show up; to pass through these OPPs; to use and pay for certain spaces and not others; to cross the street when the light is green; to become certain kinds of subjects” (Dierwechter 2004, p.966). In other words, it is not through the uniform control of the space of a territory that the municipality is able to intersect and capture the bodies of the traders; rather it is through the control of those spaces through which they must inevitably pass in their everyday lives. It is in the market place that the state is able to set up a health clinic with free HIV testing, for example, and it is through the market place that the state is able to capture the traders, if for a brief moment, as they move through the inner city within networks which the state otherwise has little possibility of penetrating.

4.3 The Changing Significance of Johannesburg Inner City

Arguably the most persistent narrative of Johannesburg in the last twenty years has been the change in fortune of the inner city – the area that has historically (though not exclusively, particularly in the last decade) functioned as the high-density business and commercial district of Johannesburg (see
Due to the segregated planning of the apartheid city, the inner city sits at the geographical, as well as symbolic, meeting point between the wealthy (mostly white) northern suburbs, and the poor (mostly black) townships to the south: "the appropriate image might well be one of two vastly unequal wheels turning, and the point where they grind is in the [inner] city" (Tomlinson 1999, p.1659). The inner city served as the convergence point for transport networks: the railways that connected the distant townships of the South and East, and the free-ways that connect the sprawling suburbs in the North. The inner city has been a powerful political symbol, both as the epicentre of the apartheid economy, as well as the centre of the political aspiration of a desegregated post-apartheid city. More recently, as the apartheid economy began to falter in the 1980s, the inner city has been connected to aspirations of work and opportunity in a context of increasing rural and township poverty (Reid 2005). This is despite the fact that much of the industrial and service sector employment of the city is concentrated in the northern industrial corridor between Johannesburg and Pretoria.
1980s, the inner city has been connected to aspirations of work and opportunity in a context of increasing rural and township poverty (Reid 2005). This is despite that fact that many formal work opportunities are in the northern industrial corridor between Johannesburg and Pretoria. Although this intense geography of segregation was never as hegemonic as the apartheid authorities might have imagined – being constantly contested and undermined by the everyday practices of urban government (Robinson 1997) – the inner city remained nevertheless a powerful political aspiration within the anti-apartheid movement.

Figure 4.1: Johannesburg Inner City.

Metro Mall and Park Station are indicated. Field research was conducted inside Metro Mall, in the square in front of Park Station (intersection de Villiers and Hoek), along Pritchard Street, Hoek Street, De Villiers Street and Wanderers Street.
Discourses of decline associated with the inner city have their antecedents in a much longer history, and the inner city had been steadily losing high-profile tenants since at least the 1970s. The gradual gravitation of business and retail away from the inner city has its antecedents in processes not primarily connected to the undermining of petty-apartheid, but rather to changes in the political economy of the city in the 1970s (Beall et al. 2002). In the early 1970s two independent municipalities were proclaimed in the rapidly growing northern suburbs of Johannesburg. This was partly a deliberate strategy of the apartheid state to maintain fragmented municipal entities in urban areas, and by the 1980s the area that is now the Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality consisted of a patchwork of nine white municipalities, and three nearby Black Local Authority neighbourhoods (Beall et al. 2002; see fig. x). Even at the height of the apartheid economic boom in the 1960s traditional business centre of the the inner city was often regarded as congested and chaotic, and the two new municipalities of Randburg (proclaimed in 1969) and Sandton (proclaimed in 1971) began to compete directly with the inner city for office and retail tenants (Beavon 2004). Especially after the new M1 freeway was completed in the mid 1970s, linking inner city Johannesburg with the northern suburbs and Pretoria, the political economy of the city began to shift towards an industrial and services sector corridor, and away from the more traditional mining and banking capital, which has large property holdings in the inner city.

At the same time that the locus of business was shifting towards the office parks and transport links to the north of the inner city, people long denied access to the city and its resources were beginning to establish a foothold in the inner city. As white residents began to leave the high-rise apartments of the inner city for the economically expanding suburbs during the 1980s, black urban residents were simultaneously at the sharp end of a decade of under-subsidisation of housing in the black townships. As poor black South Africans were defying the apartheid by-laws and moving into informal settlements on the edges of formal townships and suburbs, socio-economically more mobile black South Africans began to take advantage of the gradually declining rentals in inner city
neighbourhoods, as well as the relaxation of by-laws prohibiting their place of abode in the city (Beall et al. 2002). In 1986, under immense pressure due to a failing economy and massive political resistance, the apartheid Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, signed the Abolition of Influx Control Act (Act 68 of 1986). Although this was technically limited to black South Africans who already had the right to enter white urban areas, it signalled the beginning of the gradual demise of what was known as petty-apartheid – the urban by-laws that prevented black people from accessing certain parts of the city and from accessing certain urban resources. The Business Act of 1991 effectively deregulated informal street trading, legitimising what was already an established – if hidden and illicit – urban practice in the inner city.

At the same time, the apartheid City of Johannesburg municipality was left largely immobilised. The City of Johannesburg municipality had traditionally been dominated by an English-speaking liberal business elite, who were antagonistic with the predominantly Afrikaans Nationalist Party who were ideologically most invested in apartheid. With the apartheid system approaching its death, the municipality appeared unable and unwilling to effectively manage the transition from a segregated city to an inclusive city. The Johannesburg Municipality wanted to project an image of Johannesburg as South Africa's most multi-racial and integrated city (Bremner 2000), but was still caught up in a liberal modernist vision of urban government (Reid 2005). However, it was also confronted by a new constituency of urban users who made demands of inclusion into the city, yet who nevertheless regarded the white municipality as illegitimate. Increasingly aware that the apartheid era was winding to a close, the municipality proved incapable of developing systems of management that did not rely on the exclusionary laws of apartheid, but which could rather respond to the rationality of inclusion (Reid 2005). In effect, the municipality avoided making any long-term decisions, and retreated from the administration of by-laws which it felt may be perceived as un-progressive.
The result was a relative lack of municipal governance, with little political will available to drive specific urban projects. The new urban uses who were entering the city were largely left to establish their own rules of managing and ordering parts of the inner city, often in conflict with existing urban users, although there were no mechanisms in place to manage such conflicts. The city made little provision for new forms of urban practice such as sharing accommodation between two and even three families, encouraging and managing street trading as a means of accessing livelihood, and providing facilities for informal modes of transport that emerged in the place of what had been the systematic disinvestment in public transport under apartheid (Beall et al, 2002).

This gradual trend – the euphemistically termed “greying” of the city (Gaule 2005) – prefigured a radical demographic change in the inner city especially: in 1986 black South Africans accounted for about twenty per cent of the residents of Hillbrow, the highest-density inner city suburb. By 1993 that figure was closer to eighty per cent, and by 1996 it was almost ninety five per cent (Bremner 2000, p.186). The other important demographic shift that occurred, and which has made the informal dynamics of the inner city so difficult to engage, is the immigration of people from many other African countries. By the middle of the decade there were substantial populations of Zimbabweans, Nigerians, Ethiopians, Mozambicans and Malawians in parts of the inner city. I shall return to the significance of this in Chapter Six.

Despite the huge demographic shifts that were occurring, the changing character of the area was not necessarily associated with a decline in the socio-economic aspirations of the new residents. Beall et al (2002) suggest that black South Africans moving into the high-density inner city neighbourhoods were primarily more educated and more economically mobile than poor black South Africans who lived in the townships or peripheral informal settlements. They argue that the slum conditions that were to become so associated with discourses of decline in the inner city were produced at least as much through the unwillingness of the municipality to enforce urban by-laws
and to prosecute landlords for disingenuous landlord practices in a context of racial anxiety, as through socio-economic fluidity and the movement of poor people into the inner city (Beall et al. 2002; Bremner 2000). Thus, Beall et al (2002) argue further that the deployment of discourses of decline cannot be disassociated from race, and anxieties among white residents and business elite around the rapid changes that were occurring in the 1990s.

A number of writers have suggested that discourses of decline among white residents and business elites towards the inner city were largely connected to colonial and apartheid-era modernist fantasies of urban order, which have always veiled an anxiety about race (Nesvag 2000; Popke & Ballard 2004). Drawing on the writing of Zygmunt Bauman (1991) and a broader post-colonial literature on colonial norms of urban order (P. Chabal 1996; Mudimbe 1994), Popke (2001) and Popke and Ballard (2004) have argued that the problem of order was at the heart of apartheid urban policy. While this mirrors experiences in other post-colonial cities, such anxieties of order were exacerbated in the South African context by already-fraught anxieties about racial identity (Beall et al. 2003; Nesvag 2000). Popke (2001) suggests that apartheid was simultaneously a project of modernist utopianism directed towards ordering subjects and spaces, even as it was a racist and segregationist project. This modernist ideal of order has remained, for Popke (2001) a dominant fantasy among white South Africans in post-apartheid South Africa. In this sense, the existence of informal activities during the apartheid era provoked anxieties not only around the location of black South Africans in the city, but of the modernist apartheid order more generally under threat. In a similar manner, Dirisuweit (2006) and Popke and Ballard (2004) suggest the persistence of fantasies of modernity, and anxieties of disorder associated with the inner city, is an articulation of a sense of loss of privilege and prominence among former elite groups in a context of seeming illegibility and fluidity. As a result, many buildings were simply abandoned by owners: “a consequence of this mass exodus to the north [suburbs] led to the ‘mothballing’ of many of the buildings in the city centre (…) unable to let them, and faced with the costs of maintaining and guarding them against
crime, property owners simply bricked up the doors and windows at the lower levels to prevent vagrants from entering inside" (Gaule 2005, p.2347).

The Newtown precinct was largely considered as symbolic of the informality that was so characteristic of the inner city by the 1990s. Derelict since the mid-1960s, the existence of an underdevelopment precinct at the heart of the inner city has its roots in a particular apartheid history, and the racial segregation of the city. The inner city in particular had undergone a succession of processes of re-conceptualisation in an effort to make concrete both the political aim of racial segregation and the economic aim of locating the city in the regional economy. In the early years of the municipality of Johannesburg, in the early twentieth century, the Newtown area was an industrial area and urban slum. It was home to a community of working class black and white residents who worked in the abattoir and mill that dominated the area (Beavon 2004). The area was forcibly removed and raised in the 1920s, and reclaimed as the neighbourhood of Newtown. The apartheid municipality located a massive power-station on the site in the 1950s, but by the late 1960s it was insufficient for the power needs of the fast-growing city, and was de-commissioned. Coincidentally, the area was also home to the municipal market, where mostly Indian South Africans traded fresh produce. This was also closed in the 1950s, and the relocated further south of the inner city in a move which effectively destroyed the small traders and empowered the large white wholesalers and buying agents. The clearing of this area in the heart of the inner city had opened up a piece of real-estate at the doorstep of the inner city. A number of attempts were made over the years to re-invent and occupy the space, and the area had a brief moment of revival in the 1980s when the Johannesburg Stock Exchange relocated nearby, as did First National Bank and the South African Reserve Bank (see fig. 4).

However, changes in the political economy of the city, already well entrenched by the 1980s, meant that many of these plans were never implemented. A portion of the site was allocated as a municipal
parking-lot, a stop-gap solution to the poor traffic-planning of the 1960s and 1970s, which had restricted parking allocations to a third of the available office space in an effort to reduce congestion. Ironically, poor transport planning had been one of the very early drivers of business and retail relocating to the northern suburbs in the 1970s. For the rest, the precinct remained an unresolved part of the city from the point of view of the municipality. There was an effort to market the area as an emerging cultural precinct, especially after the establishment of the Market Theatre and Museum Africa in the old abandoned municipal market building, in the early 1990s. A number of night-clubs located in the area, and for several years there was a biennial art exhibition hosted in one of the warehouse buildings in the early 1990s.

Consisting of large unused warehouse buildings and areas of vacant city lots at the very heart of the inner city, in the early 1990s the Newtown area quickly became occupied by people looking to gain a foothold into the city as apartheid began to collapse. The empty turbine buildings were occupied as informal accommodation, without adequate services (Gaule 2005). In the early 1990s, as office workers began to commute to the emerging office-park developments in the northern suburbs and along the N1 free-way corridor between Johannesburg and Pretoria, the vacant municipal car-park was occupied as an informal taxi-rank for the burgeoning informal taxi industry that operated between the inner city and the over-populated townships to the south. Accompanying these important, but as yet unsubsidised or unregulated, transport nodes was an industry of small-scale and often survivalist traders selling sweets, vegetables, cooked food and cheap or used clothes to commuters and taxi-drivers. In the mid-1990s the Stock Exchange relocated to Sandton, and the Newtown precinct therefore stood as the symbol of the decline of the inner city.

4.4 Informality and Exclusionary Spaces in the Inner City

The emergence of a post-apartheid municipal system in Johannesburg in 1995 coincided with a
perception among business and political elites that the inner city had become unmanageable and ungovernable, and the new municipal government was confronted with the unenviable task of attempting to regulate and organise the management of the inner city. Already in 1991, in response to declining property values and business prospects, a number of prominent local business interests with large property portfolios in the inner city formed the Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP): “a trilateral meeting-place, with people from council, business and the community coming together to discuss issues in the inner city (...) obviously business was a major player, since they have a lot of assets in the inner city, but the community was represented (...) The Partnership was established in an attempt to precisely answer the question: how does the city consult in the context of informality?” (CJP 1, 12 March 2009, personal interview).

The two primary issues of concern for the CJP were the negative impact of informal traders on the urban environment; and the continued existence of abandoned and dilapidated residential buildings in the inner city that conspired to depress the value of nearby commercial properties. However, while representatives of local residents were invited to participate, from the very beginning there was no representation from street traders, who were not recognised as legitimate members of the local community: “unfortunately, traders are often not regarded as part of the community, since they come from outside the city, and don’t necessarily live nearby (...) even if they were businessmen, they were sidelined because they were informal” (CJP 1, 12 March 2009, personal interview).

The CJP had supported the apartheid municipality's plans, tabled initially in 1992, for building formal market structures to house informal traders in the inner city. Although the CJP were willing to invest in such initiatives in the inner city, it remained essentially committed to re-establishing effective urban management, at least in certain parts of the inner city, primarily to defend property values (Beall et al. 2002). In 1992 the municipality had drawn up plans for housing traders in purpose-built market buildings as a way of dealing with the growth of informal traders in the inner
city. Yet, as we have discussed above, the council was largely immobilised due to the impending demise of apartheid, with the result that very little was realised in that time. In 1995 the new municipality completed the conversion of a small pedestrianised section of Hoek Street into a covered market space (see fig. 1), but beyond this it made little other serious interventions. The business lobby, through the CJP, consistently lobbied the municipality to adopt the original proposal (Beall et al. 2002). In this way it was felt that traders could be moved off the streets and into facilities that would be designed and built for that use. The other hand of this proposal, of course, was the enforcement of by-laws and restrictions in order to force traders off the streets and into the markets. In the apparent absence of any broad commitments to impose a regime of by-law enforcement across the inner city, the CJP was instrumental in lobbying for legislation on the designation of Business Improvement Districts (BID), an urban management practice made popular by experiences in British and American cities in the 1980s. If the municipality was not committed to building markets for traders, the business lobby at least expected that the municipality would allow businesses to enforce by-laws in particular precincts.

The CJP, representing a well-resourced constituency, posed a significant interest group in the inner city, and an important partner for the municipality – if not always of the same mindset. An initial attempt, in early 1995, at establishing a consultative forum between the municipality and inner city constituents (called the Inner City Ivukile), did not include the local business community, and largely for this reason it was never very effective at establishing working partnerships for implementing urban development projects (Beall et al. 2002; Bremner 2000).
Already in 1993 the CJP had established the first BID in the inner city, although legislation for such an initiative had not yet been established, so the BID operated on a voluntary basis, with individual businesses making contributions. The BID was also not legally able to enforce any by-laws in the area of its remit, but it did provide a private security presence on the streets. The CJP continued to lobby for legislation on BID initiatives based on the perceived success of the pilot project, and has provided input into the drafting of the initial municipal by-laws on informal trade (Johannesburg Metro Council 2004). In 1997 the Gauteng Provincial Legislature adopted their recommendations, albeit within the less business-oriented language of City Improvement District (CID) (Gauteng Province Act No. 12 of 1997). Although nominally included in the legislation are requirements for community participation and engagement, the legislation effectively provides the framework for
local property owners and businesses to take on some of the functions of municipal management—although by-law enforcement remains the unique jurisdiction of the Johannesburg Metro Police Department (JMPD) (Peyroux 2007, p.8).

Four CIDs were established in the inner city in 1997, again financed through a voluntary levy on local businesses and property owners, although with specific powers to enforce certain by-laws. The CIDs effectively supplemented municipal services by providing private security and basic street-level maintenance in the designated area. In return for taking on the costs of increasing security, as well as a number of other traditionally municipal services such as cleaning and maintaining the street infrastructure, the CJP have expected the council to reciprocate by restricting informal trade and supporting projects to combating the decline of property value. According to a representative, “the CJP prefer a blanket ban on trading in CID areas because there is already very little management by the city, and so relying on the city to police such a system would be more difficult than simply restricting trade completely” (CJP 1, 12 March 2009, personal interview).

This kind of intervention into the space of the city, effectively bounding and colonising space, has a strong precedent, both in colonial urban rule and in the history of apartheid urban management (Legg 2007; Popke 2001). It represents what Legg refers to as a: “tight and intense archipelago of institutions to protect the elite, while the rest of the population was left to the more distanced normalisation of colonial government” (2007, p.23). It represents a specific spatial strategy connected, as I have argued in the previous chapter, to the modern conception of space as amenable to ordering and division. Yet this archipelago is also an embattled and defensive response, a defence of a threatened territory. In response to perceived decline in the inner city, and to the apparent inability of the municipality to effectively respond, it is to this manning of the barricades that the business community have largely retreated.
4.5 Incorporating Informality into the Inner City

Certainly, those involved in the negotiations to establish the new municipal system were acutely aware of the significance of the inner city for the city as a whole. The initial proposal for seven local municipalities had included the inner city as a single municipality – despite its small geographic area and residential population. However, within the proposal for four municipal structures in Johannesburg that was ultimately ratified by the Gauteng Provincial Demarcation Board, the inner city was incorporated into what became known as the Southern Metropolitan Municipal Substructure (Southern MMS), an indication perhaps of the change in political stakes that occurred in the short time between imagining the managing the post-apartheid city. Whereas the inner city was imagined as the symbolic centre of a unified city, with small-enough substructures to make participation meaningful, the priorities of managing the post-apartheid city meant levering resources to implement delivery in deprived areas (see Chapter Three).

The Southern MMC, by far the most populous of the four substructures incorporating all of Soweto and the Southern suburbs, also contained some of the most under-serviced neighbourhoods and the smallest per-capita rates base in the entire metropolitan region. Rates collected from businesses in the inner city accounted for eighty per cent of the entire income for the Southern MMS in 1997; the corresponding figures for business rates collection in the other three municipal substructures were thirty per cent, fifty per cent and sixty per cent respectively. Without the rates income from the inner city the Southern MMS comprised the lowest per capita rates base across the four substructures, less than half of that in the Northern and Eastern substructures, and included the poorest neighbourhoods in the entire metropolitan region (Tomlinson 1999). Interventions into the inner city, regarded as an already well-serviced formerly white group area, were neither politically defensible nor necessarily especially desirable for the new municipal government, which understood its own mandate as dismantling apartheid-inherited inequalities in accessing urban
services. The strongest lobby calling for intervention in the inner city was coming from the mostly white business community. Against these calls were competing areas of political importance that demanded attention from the municipality. Concerned primarily with the politics of local service delivery in what were some of the most deprived neighbourhoods in Johannesburg, the Southern MMS did not develop a specific programme directed at the inner city. This is not to suggest that the authorities were not aware of, and concerned about, the importance of the inner city. In 1995 Johannesburg had been decreed as the capital city of Gauteng Province, and the Provincial Legislature has subsequently become a major property owner in the inner city. The point is simply to express the role that the inner city played in the spatiality of the city as a whole. The inner city served an administrative, and to a certain degree an economic function, to a much larger municipal territory, and it was to the organisation and ordering of this municipal territory that the administrative centre was primarily directed.

However, especially after the restructuring of municipal government after 1997, the role of the inner city as a driver of local economic development was reasserted. A number of high-profile urban upgrade projects around the same time had begun with much optimism but had stalled largely because community partnerships proved incredibly difficult for the municipality to establish. The informal politics of many inner city communities involved long and protracted engagements with municipal officers, and often people who had been active for some time suddenly ceased to be involved, or disappeared (Beall et al. 2002). The inner City Forum (ICF), established in 1996 was far more broadly embraced, including representatives from as broad a range of inner city constituents as appeared possible at the time, including representatives from the municipality; the business sector; and civil society groups – in the form of the Inner City Community Forum. This was the first effort to actively engage all sectors in the inner city, and it initially had the commitment of both community and business. The Inner City Forum was established to initiate a visioning process for the inner city, and to define an effective and consultative urban management
strategy for achieving this vision (Reid 2005, p.158). The business community, through the Johannesburg Inner City Business Coalition, agreed to fund much of the costs for this process, and emerged as an important ally for the municipality (Fraser 2008). The result of the Inner City Forum was the vision of Johannesburg as “the Golden Heartbeat of Africa”, and was intended to underscore the policies and programmes for the regeneration of the inner city (Bremner 2000). This vision was launched in June 1997 by the deputy president of South Africa, suggesting once again something of the emerging importance of the inner city to a broader political project. Perhaps more significantly, however, it suggested the importance of the partnership between the municipality and the local business lobby in the inner city. In a context where the municipality had struggled to identify, let alone forge working partnerships with, community representatives, the business lobby made it very clear what conditions it placed on supporting municipal interventions in the inner city.

Despite the effective partnership that the municipality has established with the business community in the inner city, the municipality has attempted to also construct partnerships with other communities that inhabit the inner city. In contrast to the establishment of CIDs in the inner city, Lipietz (2004) and Beall et al. (2002) have illustrated how the process of establishing effective urban management regimes in residential parts of the inner city have involved often protracted and difficult partnership-building with local communities. Beall et al. (2002), for example, show how the redevelopment of the inner city neighbourhood of Yeoville involved an ultimately failed process of trying to identify community leaders and committed community members in a context of continual demographic shifts, xenophobic suspicions and closed networks of informal association. In this context, while the CIDs may be seen as somewhat disagreeable institutional partnerships between the municipality and the business lobby, with an often negative impact on the livelihoods of informal traders in the inner city, the rationality that underlies such partnerships has a lot to do with the legibility of the potential partners. The inner city business lobby remains an important, and most significantly an easily identifiable, constituency. The business rates of the inner city are
immensely valuable and provide the possibility for development projects in other parts of the city. Thus, the municipality has been responsive to initiatives of the business community to maintain and clean-up parts of the inner city, and in exchange are willing to designate an area out of bounds for traders. For the business community the inner city in the late 1990s was appearing a less and less conducive environment for business, and property portfolios were being undermined by falling property values as a result of perceptions of "crime and grime". For the Office of the Mayor, especially in the light of the 1997 fiscal crisis, the inner city business community represented an increasingly important constituency, with business rates from the inner city representing over twenty per cent of the entire rates base of the four municipal substructures in 1999 (Tomlinson 1999). Yet there remain significant contradiction between the ambitions of the municipality and the interests of the business lobby regarding the inner city. Although the business community and the municipality were largely cooperative over such interventions and initiatives in the inner city, it is important to recognise that their goals were nevertheless divergent. Thus, while the municipality will: "usually jump at a proposal by the business sector to clean up an area, and in exchange will designate an area out of bounds for traders, because they have little capacity, [there is nevertheless] some significant contradictions between the schemes of the business sector and the ideals of the municipality regarding the inner city" (CJP 1, 12 March 2009, personal interview).

Informal traders remain a major, if under-represented, constituency within the inner city. Within national government circles, the informal economy was increasingly seen as a vital space for state intervention to coordinate local economic development (Rogerson 2000a; 1999). The historical significance of the informal economy in sustaining black urban residents in the context of declining formal sector employment in the 1980s, and during the resistance, as well as sustaining black urbanisation more broadly, thus entrenching a base for urban protest, intersected with an emerging state commitment to support and integrate what is termed the 'second economy' both as a result of ideological commitments to a transformative developmental state and to the reality of the inability
of the state to effectively realise the vision of the developmental state. It also has its precedents in
the early response to informality in the inner city by white authorities in Johannesburg. The Native
(Black) Urban Areas Act of 1923, which abolished freehold rights for black South Africans and
enforced their non-permanence in urban areas, placed increasing limitations on black market
traders, who in the preceding years had begun to define a presence in the city that was not
dependent upon waged labour. The Act permitted for a limited amount of non-permanent informal
trading in the city, for which a permit was required, and this became one method through which
unemployed black people could access the city (Beavon 2004). However, in the 1940s the
municipality declared a restricted area of 23 city blocks in the inner city, within which only a very
limited number of municipally-controlled trading stands were leased to black traders. This restricted
area was expanded in 1947, and again in 1953, to effectively make the entire inner city area a
restricted trading area – except for some very limited permits to trade before seven o’clock in the
morning and after six o’clock in the evening (Beavon 2004). Moreover, even outside of this
restricted area, black traders were required to move their stands every twenty minutes. Such
restrictions served to effectively sanitise the apartheid city of people who’s presence in the city
signified anxieties of both race and order (Popke 2001). These ideas were influential within the anti-
apartheid movement in imagining the spatiality of the post-apartheid city as incorporating a range of
urban practices (Dewar 1995; Dewar & Todeschini 2004; Dewar & Watson 1981; Dewar & Watson
1990). These writers were concerned primarily with the inability of apartheid modernist urban
planning to accommodate “the actually existing character and everyday spatial practices of informal
traders and other actors” (Dierwechter 2006, p.253). These concerns were also part of the broader
critique of the apartheid city, and informed the political and academic debates that accompanied the
urban-based anti-apartheid protests of the 1980s (see Chapter Three). Many of the professionals
who were part of developing the critique of the apartheid city were influenced by the work of
Dewar and others, and have subsequently been actively involved in planning and urban government
in the post-apartheid era.
Therefore, while there has arguably been a tendency amongst the business community to withdraw from the city in the face of informality, the municipal authorities have had a rather more complex attitude towards the presence of informal practices and modes of association in the inner city. Although there is no doubt that the municipality has been broadly supportive of the business community's attempts at managing certain function in the inner city that the municipality itself is unable or unwilling to prioritise, the municipality nevertheless has a different political and social agenda to the business community. The municipality was well aware of a broader political commitment to an urban practice that not only contained the livelihoods of many people unable to access employment, but represented an historical claim by black South Africans to a right to the city. The emerging significance of the inner city as a post-apartheid space was part of a broad perception that the city should be able to cater for and accommodate all its inhabitants:

“The state has an obligation to become involved. Some traders spend two hours setting up their stalls in the morning and two hours again in the evening taking it down. Traders are not able to leverage collective buying, or to coordinate waste management and security on their own. It is a notoriously fragmented industry, with intense trade emerging around commuter points and little management of the way in which people have access to this trade (...) so the state has a role to play in this industry, and in making sure that people have an opportunity to improve their lives” (JDA 2, 16 May 2009, personal interview).

Contrary to the perception of some within the business lobby and conservative white interests, that the municipality has been unwilling to confront informality, at least since the mid 1990s the Office of the Mayor has been deeply concerned with informality and its own responsibilities in this regard, especially the link between informal trade and poverty more broadly:
"The informal economy is an economy of poverty. It traps people and they struggle to get beyond it. For this reason the state needs to intervene" (JDA 3, 25 March 2009, personal interview).

"[The informal sector] is a dysfunctional industry. There is no proper entry and exit, no labour laws, no protection. It is also filled with a whole host of survivalist traders, and it shows the failures of the welfare system. The apartheid attitude towards the informal sector was simply to abandon the poor. But who says that simply deregulating informal trade is a way to deal with the poor in this city? (JDA 1, 16 April 2009, personal interview).

The last of these quotes clearly suggests, however, that the municipality was unclear exactly of its own mandate regarding the informal sector. There is a clear understanding that informal traders are part and parcel of a post-apartheid public sphere, but this is also articulated as a failure not only of the formal economy to provide employment, but also of the welfare state to prevent people becoming mere survivalists. It was therefore within such a context that the municipality has developed, during the 1990s, a number of policy documents directed at the development and management of informal trade in the inner city: the Informal Trade Policy for the GJTMC Area (1995); the Management of Informal Trade policy document (1998); the Urban Solutions Strategy (1999); and the Urban Market Development Strategy (1999), which outlined the initial strategy for developing markets in the inner city.

In 1997, as a result of the restructuring process that the emanated from the fiscal crisis, the Office of the Mayor established the Inner City Office (ICO). The Inner City Office was from its inception an experiment within the municipal bureaucracy. It was effectively an autonomous project design and facilitation unit, falling outside of any municipal hierarchy, directly linked to the Office of the
Mayor. The ICO was mandated to initiate and coordinate a range of urban environmental upgrade and social and economic development projects, and it was motivated by the assumption that these could most effectively and sustainably be achieved in partnership with business and community partners. This was partly a strategic decision, but it was also a result of the increasing emphasis within municipal and national government on governance through partnerships, and also on the need to find external funding for any projects it initiated.

The ICO adopted what Gotz and Simone (2003) have termed a “project approach” to establishing the conditions for effective governance in the inner city. This approach was in stark contrast to the CID strategy of establishing order through by-law enforcement and visible policing. While other municipal agencies have been responsible (and variously effective) for the enforcement of urban by-laws, the ICO identified a number of strategic projects that they believed would have multiplier effects in the surrounding urban landscape. The reason for opting for this project approach were three-fold. Firstly, it was believed to be more realistic to attract funding from other government and private-sector sources for one-off prestige projects, rather than for ongoing urban-management expenses. Secondly, in a context where workable partnerships appeared hard to identify and sustain, especially among very vulnerable and fragile communities, strategic interventions were seen as the best hope of galvanising a very diffuse and fragmented urban population (Gotz & Simone 2003). As Gotz and Simone state the problem: “against a 10 000 strong street trading population with no other means of livelihood, and with limited manpower and resources, a governmentality based on the principles of isolate, designate, assign, and individually permit or prohibit is simply not viable, or appropriate. Another solution to the problems as interpreted was needed” (2003). Thirdly, while this was partly an intentional strategy, it also came about through the lack of institutional commitment and long-term budgeting within the municipality:

“Building facilities such as Metro Mall is very expensive. Nevertheless, capital budget is
easier to get hold of than operating budgets. This forces a project management kind of approach, and makes it difficult to sustain projects (...). The state is willing to put resources into a single intervention and then wants to step back” (JDA 2, 16 May 2009, personal interview).

This project approach faced criticism from community activists and NGOs working amongst inner city communities on the one hand, and from the business lobby on the other hand. It was argued that such strategic nodal interventions would not get to the real concerns and problems faced by many inner city communities, and would simply become high-profile and expensive experiments. On the other hand, it was argued that this approach would not take account of the need to reintroduce order into the city by reinforcing the enforcement of by-laws. Nevertheless, the ICO was established upon the assumption that radical indeterminacy and illegibility required less conventional approaches to urban intervention. It was hoped that through the process of strategic nodal interventions, something of the dynamics of inner city communities might be learned, and that such projects would generate opportunities for individuals and groups to become involved. In short, the ICO was working on the assumption that rather than proscribing and disciplining the actions of individuals, they could be invited or enticed into contact with the state through these interventions, and could therefore be induced to enact new forms of citizenship (Gotz & Simone 2003).

Within a prevailing discourse of urban decline in the inner city, of which informal street trading was the primary symbol, the ICO attempted to re-imagine the role and function of informal traders in the inner city. The ICO was acutely aware of the broader dynamics of informality, and its relationship to poverty not only in Johannesburg but within the broader region:

“...It is a very difficult environment to operate in. In the mid-1990s the fear inside municipality was that increasing poverty in the Eastern Cape would rapidly increase the
amount of people on the streets of Johannesburg. We would have to be able to plane for that. Then in the late 1990s the economy of Zimbabwe collapsed and those fears came true, although the influx was from foreigners rather than people from the Eastern Cape, which heightened xenophobic tensions. This is not easy to manage. Poverty inevitably increases the amount of people on the streets trying to make a livelihood (...). But this does not mean that allowing people to cram into the empty spaces on the streets is a way of engaging poverty. In my mind, most people who are on the streets would rather have a job than be trading. They don't all see themselves as self-employed business-people (...). The apartheid government systematically smashed the black merchant and entrepreneurial classes. Now poor South Africans are out-traded on the streets of Johannesburg, and this leads to tensions and xenophobia" (JDA 2, 16 May 2009, personal interview).

As the quote above suggests, the ICO had therefore to try and get traders to re-imagine themselves as entrepreneurs rather than as survivalists. The impulse was not to produce a class of business people, but rather to imagine a space for informal traders within the economy of the city that would be productive and could provide a space for people to transcend their current position (Gotz & Simone 2003):

"We knew in the process that many traders might lose their livelihoods, but we needed people to diversify, to move beyond just selling fruits and vegetables. We needed the informal economy to be viable for people (...) We have to help some traders to grow beyond the survivalist mode, and we also have to help formal business grow and prosper (...) Of course, some traders will always be survivalist, and maybe they need to be contained elsewhere in the social infrastructure " (JDA 1, 16 April 2009, personal interview)
4.6 Market Place as Governmental Technology

In 1999 the ICO commissioned the building of the Metro Mall traders market in the Newtown precinct of the inner city. It was not the first market that the ICO had commissioned, having completed in early 1999 a market facility in Yeoville, which is a residential area on the edge of the inner city. Yet the Metro Mall market was by far the most ambitious project yet undertaken by the ICO, and represented the ultimate act of confidence in what was still regarded as a radical method for engaging informality. The opening of the Yeoville market had not been a complete successful, with traders boycotting the new market. The boycott was ostensibly to do with the cost of renting the stalls, despite the fact that an intense process of negotiation with traders and traders’ organisations in the months leading up to the opening had determined rentals based on traders’ incomes. However, Gotz and Simone (2003) suggest that it had as much to do with the ICO’s inability to fully comprehend the dynamic of informality in the area. The project team had identified two informal trader organisations during the research phase, each claiming to represent traders in that neighbourhood. While the Yeoville Traders Association (YTA) were recognised as a genuine local traders association with a demonstrable membership base and a leadership that appeared committed to participation and communication, the Gauteng Hawkers Association (GHA) presented themselves to the project team as a disruptive and divisive element within the local dynamics of informal traders. The GHA was characterised by some members of the project team as little more than a group of charlatans and protection-racketeers, and the advice was to disengage with this group and attempt to engage traders directly (Gotz and Simone, 2003, p. 139). This judgement had proved almost fatal for the prospects of the Yeoville Market, because it failed to take into account the very contested nature of the micro-politics of accessing and maintaining scare resources in the inner city. While the ICO had secured cooperation from the YTA, working with the leadership over the course of several months, the GHA, possibly driven by the fear of a threat to their own
monopoly on coordinating traders, continually accused the ICO of wanting to exploit poor traders and to make money off their hard work. Even though the YTA had agreed to particular terms for traders to occupy the new market, their leadership were unable to appear as puppets to the ICO, and their hand was forced by the GHA into boycotting the market at the eleventh hour – citing the exploitation of traders by the ICO. In order to encourage traders into the market a moratorium on rents was imposed, initially for six months, and then indefinitely (ICO 1, 6 March 2009, personal interview). A great deal of trust was lost between the local community and the ICO in the process, and as such the new market was never fully embraced as a local initiative (Yeoville Community Activist, 20 February 2009, personal interview). This was further compounded by the apparent elitism of the process:

"The market, which is supposed to be a community resource, was launched as a VIP event for the city to announce itself (...) So the market has struggled to make itself loved; it has never really been embraced or celebrated by the community. Within a few days of the opening people had already moved back onto the streets, because the passing trade there is better. So the city has to police the streets to keep traders inside a market they don't want" (Yeoville Community Activist, 20 February 2009, personal interview).

The ICO were determined that the Metro Mall development would be able to learn from the mistakes of Yeoville. One of these lessons was the idea that taxis and informal traders could, and should, be accommodated together:

"[Yeoville] market has struggled because it was built pretty much as a destination market and not a street market. This meant that traders lost out on the passing trade, which was what the survivalist traders relied on. One solution to this presented itself in the form of the taxis. Linking the taxis and the traders was a partial solution, because what we had
observed was that the traders tended to congregate around transport nodes. This is where most of their customers come from, either the taxi drivers themselves or the customers coming into and leaving the city. This is where the model came from; from trial and error but also from watching how the traders organised themselves” (project architect, 15 April 2009, personal interview).

“The lack of space in the Metro Mall site, and especially the clashes that we had with the taxi industry, meant that we considered solving the two problems together. Yeoville had showed the importance of these two industries for each other, and so the plan was to build a taxi rank and market space together. The rationale behind the linking of the taxis and the traders was based on research coming out of Yeoville and other experiences. There appeared to be a clear link between the two industries, and analysis showed a clustering of the two industries even in informal contexts. Since both are informal industries it seemed logical to link them together in terms of management” (JDA 1, 16 April 2009, personal interview).

Moreover, it was not only traders whose behaviour and attitudes the Metro Mall development was intended to change. The “project approach” was also intended to pull various public and private sector partners into the project. This is partly the reason that there was such an emphasis on the financial viability of the project, and the reason that the rental issue in Yeoville had been so difficult. The ICO had established the Metro Trading Company (MTC) as the market management company that would act as the primary client for the Metro Mall. It was intended that the MTC would be able to break even based on the rental of stalls to traders, and this was so as to convince both public funders (primarily the provincial government) as well as potential private partners that the informal economy could be provided for within a functioning and productive urban economy.
Finally, the Metro Mall traders market was only a component of a much bigger provincial-funded plan for the Newtown area. In the process of planning and building the Metro Mall, the project team effectively planned a whole new city block into the urban grid, which would later be used for an inner city housing development project. The site itself consisted of a large piece of undeveloped property owned by Intersite, the property-division of the state-owned railway company. When the ICO, as chief client of the development project, began the process to acquire the land for the Metro Mall development, the area was being used as an informal transport depot for mini-buses coming primarily from Soweto. Before this, during the apartheid era, the land had been used as a municipal parking lot. The site had been designated for development since the 1960s, but these plans had been shelved as the economic changes in the late 1970s meant that the office and retail occupancy in the inner city was declining. A development of the site was again proposed in early 1994, the Park City development, to include a hotel, convention centre and the new provincial legislature (Beavon 2004, p.267). However, the continued uncertainty about the inner city as a conducive business environment led to these plans also being shelved. Thus, even symbolically this was an opportunity to literally build a new post-apartheid urban public space (project architect, 15 April 2009, personal interview). Moreover, the new Metro Mall market place was in close proximity to the old Johannesburg municipal market, effectively reclaiming an area that had a history of multi-racial urban culture (Beavon 2004).
The entire site included the large-scale infrastructure projects of Mandela Bridge and the M1 freeway off-ramp (see fig. 3), which were designed to improve access into the Newtown area. It was to be the cultural precinct of the city, with the location of the Market Theatre, Museum Africa and the expected relocation of jazz clubs and cafes. The Metro Mall project represented a significant public investment into this area of the inner city, and was intended to serve as a lead project for the development of the precinct, and a model for the management and accommodation of informal traders in the city. Yet inherent within these infrastructural interventions were a range of political and symbolic intentions. The Metro Mall was not simply an opportunity to consolidate the footprint of the city, but also an opportunity to achieve two apparently contradictory political aims: to
intervene in the operation of two informal sectors; and to make a bold statement about the role of
the inner city in creating the vision of a post-apartheid city:

"The brief was to make a sense of place in the inner city for what was seen as a vibrant
activity, and to give a sense of permanence to the structure as a way of locating informal
traders in the city. For this reason we chose deliberately to use robust and heavy
materials, because the building was designed to take a heavy impact in its daily use. In
some ways we were designing the train-station of the nineteenth century, in the sense
that this is the entry point into the city for many commuters, and it is also a new kind of
public building. There was a conscious effort to create a civic space, to make an
extroverted civic structure for the use of urban citizens" (project architect, 15 April
2009, personal interview).

Both the Yeoville Market and the new high-profile Metro Mall development, although confronting a
number of problems not least being the initial resistance on the part of traders to use the markets,
were undertaken in a spirit of optimism about the potential for intervening into the informality of
the inner city. There was a sense within the ICO that such projects could really incite traders to
imagine themselves differently, and to change their behaviour so that they could actually have
expectations of one day being off the streets. While there are clearly valid criticisms about the
expectations of traders to be entrepreneurs, and the fact that many traders would be forced off the
streets entirely, the point has to be recognised that the ICO were willing to shift their own
expectations of informality in order to attempt to intervene into the lives of traders. There had been
a willingness to learn and adapt. In the next chapter (Chapter Five) I argue that what began as an
experimental process was effectively made into a static system as a result of the perceived success
of the Metro Mall model.
4.7 Conclusion

On a Monday morning in late November 2002, in a small ceremony attended by several local politicians and members of the local press, the Mayor of Johannesburg officially opened the newly-built Metro Mall traders’ market and transport facility on the north-western edge of the inner-city. Construction on the project had begun in late 1999 under the auspices of the Inner City Office (ICO) of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council. The Metro Mall project was a significant undertaking, representing the investment of R200 million\(^3\) of public funding into the inner-city, most of which was leveraged through Blue IQ, a Gauteng Provincial Government fund for strategic investments in public infrastructure in the province. Part of the money was also accessed through the National Government. At the opening ceremony Metro Mall was hailed as the most sophisticated market facility to be built in Johannesburg to date, and marked the return of market trading to the everyday life of the inner-city. The 2003 Digest of South African Architecture featured the Metro Mall as an example of what they called ‘new innovations’ in public infrastructure. Metro Mall was also featured on the *Fast Forward Johannesburg* architecture exhibition in Berlin in 2005, the South African pavilion of the 2005 Sao Paulo Architecture Biennial, and has been promoted as a signature example of South Africa’s emerging “freedom architecture” (Davie 2005). This was largely the intention of the Metro Mall – to act as a high-profile prestige project to announce and provide space for the activities of informal traders.

The Metro Mall was built in an attempt to make a statement about the state. It was an attempt to make concrete the state, even when we know that spaces of the city are a combination of flexibility and consistency, always in a state of becoming. Order coalesces in certain moments. The Metro Mall is the coalescing of a particular moment of spatial order – an assemblage that emerged from the concurrent desires to create a new kind of urban space, to clean up the inner city for business, and the desire to engage in the lives of the poor in a proactive manner. We decided that the Metro

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\(^3\) Approx. £16 million (based on exchange rate of R1 = £0.06 as on 1 Feb 2011)
Mall, at least initially, was partially successful as a governmental technology. It managed to articulate a new post-apartheid urban space in the city, to locate traders into a single space, and to show a sound financial model for this kind of infrastructure project. This last point is important, because it speak to the issue of not just making the inner city viable for investment, but also for social delivery projects. That is to say, in a context where resources are relatively scarce and partnerships hard to come by, solid commitments to build infrastructure in the city appear as a signal of confidence in the presence of the state. The city has opted for market-oriented solutions, which is problematic, but the context for these decisions has been conditioned by circumstances that have led the state to seek visible partnerships. Moreover, there has been no long-term commitment to funding institutions, since budgets are only for capital expenditure.

Infrastructure has been an important tool through which the city has been able to engage and manage informal traders, and I also considered the power of infrastructure in marking the presence of the state. However, I show that the effects of the processes of building infrastructure in the city has not always been as was anticipated: partly as a result of the confluence of a range of rationalities in the city, including goals of redevelopment and a vision of a post apartheid city, the effects has been to create an archipelago of infrastructure that marks the states presence. Rather than containing and disciplining all traders into market spaces, the effect has been, I argued, one of symbolising the vision of the state, and of a series of markers that invite a particular form of citizenship - especially in the light of the city's project and precinct approach to urban renewal. Thus, although the specific goal of locating all traders into formal markets has not been achieved, I argue that a form of governmentality has evolved where the infrastructure projects have served as reference points for making claims about informality in the city.

Importantly, in searching for anchor-points for the spatial imaginary of post-apartheid city, the state has attempted to identify workable partnerships in the context of what I have termed the elusive ob-
ject of government. The networks and spatial practices which the state does not penetrate are neither necessarily resilient nor productive. In many instances, the people who occupy these spaces in fact make claims of the state to be included and implicated into the spaces of the state - into welfare housing, state-provided facilities, even the post-apartheid city itself. This vision of the post-a­partheid city, though it struggles to settle itself down in the spaces of the city, is nevertheless a powerful and seductive vision. In a sense, then, the conception of space as fluid is a recognition that the local state lacks the capacity to fully meet all these competing demands, and so people must 'help themselves' through the opportunities that are created to do so. In a context where there is little expectation that the municipality will be able to exert complete control over all spaces of the city, the inner city has emerged as an important node through which the municipality can engage with people. It is an important gateway and interchange – between the Southern and Northern suburbs, between the rural poor and the developmental state – and has become a symbol of a vision of a post-apartheid citizenship, one that people are invited and incited to partake in.

As a way of a post-script to the conclusion I want to reiterate my initial claim about the nature of space and technologies of government in the inner city. In this chapter I have outlined two spatial responses to the incursion of informality into the 'modernist imagination' of order that was once the symbol of the apartheid city. In the first instance, we saw how the business community, increasingly anxious about the loss of order in the city, and concerned with declining property values, retreated to a strategy of delimiting and defending spaces in the form of the CIDs. In contrast, we saw how the ICO attempted to engage informality through a more inclusive strategy. There is an important link between the emergence of this nodal rationality as a rationality of government, and the fact that it is also latent within the informal sector itself. That is to say, in a world where traders themselves also have incomplete access to what is going on in the inner city, they also operate through networked relationships based often on ethnicity and place of origin for example. I will discuss this in Chapter Six. Nevertheless, as Lipietz (2004) and Beall et al. (2002) have separately suggested,
such interventions have much to do with the intractability of forging partnerships among communities in the inner city. Whereas the business community represents a well resourced and very visible constituency in the inner city, many inner city neighbourhoods have very fragile community coherence. Traders, in particular, are a part of a fluid and often illegible network of association.

Also want to reiterate that there is no one dominant form of spatial rationality in Johannesburg, as Foucault himself might argue in respect of different rationalities of government (2009). Rather there is articulation between different forms. So while I have attempted to illustrate how the Metro Mall forms part of a broader spatial rationality of nodes and points, there continues to exist other forms of spatial control in the inner city, for example what I have called, referring to Legg (2007) an “archipelago” of controlled access space in the inner city. This is enforced through the privatisation of police functions, the imposing of licences, and the marking of spaces as inclusive or exclusive. Moreover, as I will argue in the following chapter (Chapter Five) the nodal rationality of space may in fact allow for the gradual capture of space within this archipelago.
5. DISCIPLINE AND INFORMALITY IN THE INNER CITY

5.1 Introduction

In early 1999, some months after the opening of the Yeoville market, a group of traders who were operating from inside the market submitted a memorandum of demands to the Municipal Council. The memorandum effectively requested that the traders be allowed to manage the facility themselves, based on a democratically elected traders committee. In addition, the traders committee would facilitate the formation of a number of cooperative groups from among the traders which would be commissioned to undertake the services such as security and cleaning of the market. The traders regarded the Metro Trading Company (MTC), which was established by the municipality in order to manage market facilities in the city, as unresponsive to the real needs of traders, signalled by the fact that the MTC had outsourced the cleaning and security contracts for the newly-built market to private companies. Instead, the traders argued, the municipality should acknowledge the existing capacities and knowledge that exists within the trader community and allow for the self-regulation of the market place. This was a powerful statement, and given the apparent lack of trader cohesion in the lead-up to the opening of the market (see Chapter Four) suggests that at the very least the Yeoville market had achieved one of its intended outcomes – the market place as a material space had created the context for traders to develop a different imagination of themselves. Here was a group of traders who clearly felt newly empowered to represent themselves as the new occupants of the Yeoville market. Moreover, this was a group of traders that included both foreign and South African traders who were based in the new market, suggesting that the new market has the potential to create new subjectivities not based in the ethnic bubbles that seemed to predominate among informal traders in the inner city. The Yeoville market had apparently produced an organised and legible population of empowered traders who were able to speak in a shared voice, using official channels, to make claims about managing their own market.
Why then, given this obvious success, did the Executive Committee of the municipal council deny the memorandum of demands on 15 June 1999? If the building of market places was intended to create a point of encounter between the state and traders in the absence of more viable community partnerships, then it may seem counter-productive for the council to reject an autonomous attempt to achieve just that. Perhaps understandably, the municipality was reluctant to relinquish control of such an expensive new infrastructural asset, especially in a context where an apparently coherent trader organisation had only recently proved to be far more complex. Yet Gotz and Simone (2003) have suggested that around the same time as the opening of the Metro Mall a similar project in the inner city for the location of an informal mini-bus rank into a formal built facility had done just that: i.e. it had successfully handed over the management of the new facility to the mini-bus operators association. This in an industry which is well known to not only operate within a complex informal and self-regulated network, but which has the propensity for violent conflict between rival operators (Dugard 2001). It gives some indication, therefore, that what had begun as an experiment in intervening into the informality of the inner city was emerging increasingly as a viable and effective tool for managing the distribution and activities of informal traders. Thus, despite the commitment on the part of the ICO to create the conditions for traders to imagine themselves differently, the self-imagination of the traders who submitted the memorandum clearly did not match the image that the municipality had of them.

Whereas the original intervention into the informality of the inner city had hoped to induce traders to imagine themselves as entrepreneurs, I argue in this chapter that what had begun as an open-ended possibility became increasingly narrowly defined within municipal policy. More broadly, what I attempt to demonstrate in this chapter is that the technology of the market place became increasingly contained within a broader diagram of power within the inner city in which nodal interventions were used to drive urban management agendas. This was especially the case after the
municipal restructuring process that culminated in the 2000 local government election, following which the ICO was disbanded and reconfigured as the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA). The mandate of the JDA is not restricted to the inner city, but rather functions as a strategic project development entity. I argue that the in moving from an experimental pilot project to a 'roll-out' diagram, something of the local specificity of each context was lost.

However, like all diagrams of power I demonstrate that there are a range of inconsistencies and subversions that occur which serve not only to undermine the neat functioning of the system but also potentially create spaces for innovative responses to informality. This chapter then is also about the misfit between the diagram of power and the excess of space. The diagram of the market place as a model for the government of informal trade in Johannesburg is consistently undermined through, firstly, the inability or unwillingness of traders to pay for the stalls inside the market. In this way, despite the promulgation of by-laws which restrict trading in certain areas, the municipality has been unable to effectively maintain traders off the streets of the inner city. Secondly, and related to the above, the diagram of power is undermined by the subsequent impossibility of the Metro Trading Company (MTC) to survive as a self-sustaining institution – at least along the lines as it was envisaged. As a result, I argue finally that the market place, as a material space of encounter rather than as an archetype of a diagram, does in fact configure a particular form of order in the inner city. Traders have adopted to the presence of new infrastructural interventions in the inner city, and have developed very innovative ways in which to imagine themselves as more than survivalist traders, even as this order is not always in line with what the municipality would envisage.

5.2 From Heterotopia to Spatial Diagram

Foucault (1986) recognised that in every society there exist actual spaces that act as counter-sites:
“a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested and inverted” (Foucault 1986, p.24). Foucault referred to these spaces as heterotopia, and regarded them as spaces for innovation and the emergence of new forms of practice, not necessarily by intention but through the fact that these spaces incubated an alternative order to the more dominant order of the city (Hetherington 1997). These heterotopia were actual spaces – Hetherington (1997) suggests the Palais Royal, the masons lodge and the industrial factory as three such places which have provided a context for both representing and challenging the ideal spaces of modern nineteenth century European society. Significantly, these heterotopia represent for Foucault the emergence of forms of practice and behaviour that might both contradict but also enhance governmental aspirations of order and control. The effects of such heterotopia in society are usually far more contingent and partial than in their pure form, and they are rarely completely realised.

Yet these heterotopia contained also the ideals of how spaces in society might function and the kinds of results they might engender. Such abstract ideals Foucault called diagrams. For Foucault these archetypical models of ordering spaces and practices were models that did not necessarily represent the most common outcome within the space but which nevertheless contained the essence of a broader circulating rationality (Huxley 2006; 2007):

“If I had wanted to describe ‘real life’ in the prisons, I wouldn’t indeed have gone to Bentham. But the fact that this real life isn’t the same thing as the theoreticians’ schema doesn’t entail that these schemas are therefore utopian, imaginary, etc. (...) It is absolutely correct that the actual functioning of the prisons (...) was a witches’ brew compared to the beautiful Benthamite machine” (Foucault & Rabinow 1984, p.81)

As Huxley these diagrams of power are important as models against which programmes of
government are defined, evaluated and adjusted. They are seldom realised in their entirety, but they contain ideal aspirations about the organisation and distribution of material objects in space, and examples of such ‘diagrams’ underlie projects of urban and social reform within the history of modernity (Huxley, 2007). Huxley argues that such programmes and projects cannot be dismissed as failed idealism, but must be understood to play an important role in shaping the emergent practices of urban government. Such diagrams of power contains the: “immanent rules of formation – the regularities and distributions – that allow things to be said and understood about urban existence” (Osborne & N. S. Rose 1999, p.738). Yet, following Deleuze (2006), Osborne and Rose also suggesting that these diagrams are not simply a matter of discourse. Diagrams produce effects in that they render things “seeable, sayable, and doable” (1999, p.738). Such regularities and distributions are, therefore, associated with the very materiality of the subject and of space. The diagram is accompanied by a range of not only discursive but also material technical devices: the infrastructure of sewers, electricity, telegraphs – and market places (Osborne & Rose 1999). It is through these technical devices that the diagram might be seen as immanent – ordering, composing and laying out across space the materiality of the subject's everyday life (Osborne & Rose 1999).

Deleuze (2006) interprets Foucault’s notion of the diagram as insisting that: “there is no diagram that does not also include, besides the points which it connects up, certain relatively free or unbound points, points of creativity, change and resistance” (2006, p. 44). This is a point that both O'Malley et al. (1997) and Legg (2007) stress in their respective critiques of the governmentality literature. While O'Malley et al. (1997) are primarily concerned with the potential for the insights of Foucault’s concept to contribute to a political project in which contestation and agency are reasserted, Legg (2007) is primarily concerned, along with others within a post-colonial perspective (Corbridge 2005; Das & Poole 2004), with the empirical evidence that diagrams of power are never neatly mapped onto space. Theirs is a concern not so much with a political project of resistance but with the implications of incompleteness and incoherence to the political rationalities of rule. It is
this that I am also concerned with in the case of the Metro Mall in the inner city of Johanneburg.

5.3 Metro Mall as Diagram of Power

Between 1999 when the Metro Mall was first commissioned and 2002 when it was opened for business the institutional structure of the municipality underwent a fundamental change. The restructuring of Municipal government in Johannesburg, as in all South African municipalities, was part of an ongoing process of establishing Developmental Local Government, and the stages of the restructuring had been outlined in the Local Government Transition Act (209 of 1993) (see Chapter Three). However, within the confines of particular policies that outlined the expectations of municipal government, municipalities were able to make decisions about what best suited them. In Johannesburg after 1997, as we have seen in Chapter Three, the municipality made very rapid progress in restructuring, accused by some of adopting a neoliberal approach to urban government. I have already contested the validity of such statements, and the point is not to reproduce the debate here. It is simply to note that one of the significant changes that occurred in the process was the dissolution of the Inner City Office, to be absorbed into a new institutional mechanism called the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA). The scale of operations of the JDA was significantly different to that of the ICO. Whereas the ICO had been established to lead projects for inner city regeneration, the JDA has a municipal-wide mandate. What I suggest, therefore, is that what had begun as a relatively experimental process to attempt to engage with and develop working partnerships with informal traders in the inner city gradually became much broader technology for managing informal trade in the city.

This shift in emphasis can be seen in the comparison between informal trade policy in the mid-1990s and the policy that emerged in 2002. In 1995 a policy for the management of informal trade was promulgated for the Johannesburg municipality, and it contained the general interpretation of
the role and function of informality within the broader post-apartheid city. It was also the policy document that underlay the interventions of the ICO in the inner city – i.e. the need to acknowledge and plan for the incorporation of informal traders into the city:

"Having taken into account the characteristics of informal traders in the metropolitan area, and knowing that the informal sector plays a vital role in the future, the greatest challenge to Local Government is to promote and effectively manage informal trading. In order for informal trading to be promoted, and included in the city in a holistic manner, necessary control (legislation) and management (policy) needs to be developed, and initiated and implemented by the council" (Johannesburg Transitional Municipal Council 1995, introduction).

The tone and intent is markedly different in the council document on informal trade in the city from 2002:

"There are two key elements to the [informal trade] policy. First, the policy seeks to remove traders from the streets and place them into markets, which have appropriate infrastructure and services to remove the negative consequences of street trading, mentioned above. The second policy element is to develop informal trading into a more dynamic and commercially viable activity for those who earn their livings from such activities. The first element of the policy supports the second. The policy should be viewed as a developmental policy and not merely as a set of regulations - i.e., a policy to develop street trading and informal traders into a new mercantile class who operate in a semi-formal retail environment even though this semi-formal retail environment differs in character from traditional white suburban retail formal trading environments" (Johannesburg Metro Council 2002, 8.5)
The comparison is not intended as a normative one. Indeed, both documents envisage a prominent role for the municipality in intervening into the sector, and in both documents there is a commitment to the development of informal traders into entrepreneurs. The difference lies in the emphasis on the position of traders in the urban economy. In the earlier document from 1995, and implicit in the way in which the ICO approached informal traders, their inclusion was accepted but not yet known. In the 2002 document there is a clear and systematic understanding of the place of informal traders in the city, suggesting that the question of informality had been somehow resolved – awaiting only implementation.

From the very outset, even within the 1995 Informal Trading Policy, was the assumption that the best way to intervene into the lives of informal traders was to construct them as entrepreneurs. However, for the ICO the construction of traders as entrepreneurs was about attempting to intervene into the lives of traders, and to encourage them off the streets and into market places. The ends, in other words, were connected to much more local issues of urban management. As Gotz and Simone suggest:

“If a sufficient number of markets could be built, and if they could be organized in a way which provided street traders incentives to keep stalls within them, the prohibition on un-organized street trading proper could be enforced with more vigour in the knowledge that a satisfactory alternative had been arranged” (Gotz and Simone 2003).

The Informal Trading Policy for the City of Johannesburg (July 2007) outlines a completely different imperative for intervening into the sector:

“the City hereby aims to create an environment within which the informal trading sector
and its participants can become commercially viable and dynamic, so much so that as a whole the sector contributes to the City's vision for total growth" (Johannesburg Metro Council 2007a).

This is not to say that the ICO did not have longer term ambitions for informal traders within the urban economy, and there has always been the assumption that informal traders need to be assisted in order to make a contribution to an economy that has massive unemployment figures. In the light of this emerging policy regime, it is unsurprising that the Executive Council of the municipality refused the memorandum presented by traders to manage their own market place – the role that the JDA and other strategic units within the municipality imagine for the informal economy is to become very specific kinds of small businesses, that are subject to a policy regime and easily identified and controlled.

In this light, the municipality has attempted to establish initiatives such as the Open for Business centres, that were intended to operate through the auspices of Metro Trading Company (MTC) as a network of “world-class African entrepreneurship development centres”. The centres were intended as a one-stop shop for communities and small businesses to get help in starting and growing their business potential:

“So as to make positive contributions and constructive change to the economic sphere (...) the object is to take informal street traders and give them an understanding of the basics of business practices. From there they will move onto the more formal SMME development programme (...) it is hoped that in time the Open for Business centres will stand as guarantor for loans provided to potential entrepreneurs by the Department of Trade and Industry and local banks”

In addition to the Open for Business centres, the MTC has collaborated with the Department of Economic Development (DED) to establish training programmes for traders, and initiatives that provide some possibility of access to formal capital in the form of bank loans:

“We also have quite a few initiatives that go beyond our initial mandate, such as Grow Your Business, which is run in collaboration with Wits University. To be honest, this is mostly coordinated by the Department of Economic Development, but we are on board as a partner in this project. But more than this we assist with business advice and the formation of cooperatives among traders. The Emtonjeni Centre, inside the Metro Mall (...) provides support for basic health issues and concerns, like HIV screening, and also provides informal-sector advice and business facilities like telephone and fax machine (...) MTC has also initiated a plan with First National Bank to provide business planning and possibly loan-application advice for traders. We are also exploring the possibility of franchising as an avenue for traders who want to graduate beyond informal trade. Franchising is a good opportunity as it provides a single distribution point. More than this we have been looking at the possibility of setting up some schemes where traders could acquire a stake in the distribution company of a franchise. We don’t want people to be informal for thirty years” (MTC 2, 13 February 2009, personal interview).

Moreover, whereas the municipality had written such ambitions premised on the management of informality in the city through the development of traders into entrepreneurs into previous policy document, these policy documents had focussed on skills development and training of individual traders. The new policy direction was focussed not on the personal improvement of individual traders to improve their own capacity for business, but rather on streamlining the informal economy more broadly in line with the focus on economic growth in the urban economy more broadly:
“In past policies these development programmes have always concentrated on increasing the skills of individual traders. In this new approach two types of development programmes are proposed. The first is the customary entrepreneur development programme; the second is the new dimension that involves a broader sectoral development programme - i.e. programmes that support the growth and sophistication of the sector itself and how supply chains in the sector operate” (Johannesburg Metro Council 2002, 8.4)

This policy reiterated a policy commitment regarding informal trade in the inner city made some years earlier:

“For the (...) system to deliver on the final policy objectives there is an implicit assumption that the size of the existing trader community be administered and limited. In other words some barriers to entry into informal trading need to be created if the policy is to work. The only viable barrier available is an administration system which issues licenses and permits to all grades of market traders (...). All existing traders can be accommodated. New entrants after the closing licensing date however may not be able to be accommodated” (Johannesburg Metro Council 2002, 8.9).

In 2006 the Office of the Mayor established the Central Strategy Unit (CSU) within the municipality, which partly replaced the Office of the City Manager, which had been established during the fiscal crisis of 1997. The mandate of the new CSU within the structure of the Johannesburg municipality is: “to help set up a uniform strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation system for the City of Johannesburg. In short, it supports the executive mayor and the city manager in their oversight of the entire organisation of the City of Johannesburg, thereby
promoting the stated organisational goal of good governance (...) It periodically formulates high-
level policy for the City”. The CSU has produced a number of important policy documents that
define the strategic priorities of the Mayor. One such document is the Inner City Regeneration
Charter (Johannesburg Metro Council 2007b). The Inner City Charter, as it is commonly referred to
within urban planning and policy circles, is the document that defines the municipality's programme
for the regeneration of the inner city, which includes the management of informal traders. The
desired outcome of this strategy regarding informal traders in the inner city are defined as: “through
a developmental, not simply regulatory approach, the City of Johannesburg will work with all
necessary stakeholders to ensure that there is no more unmanaged trading on the streets of the Inner
City beyond June 2009” (Johannesburg Metro Council 2007b, emphasis added). Unmanaged
trading does not necessarily equate to no traders on the streets, but it does include: “trading without
the necessary permits, in an area that is not designated as one or other type of formalised trading
space, and / or in a manner that is in contravention of appropriate by-laws” (ibid). The Charter goes
on to outline a strategy for the re-organisation of informal trading in the inner city, through the
provision of “well-located, appropriate and affordable” trading spaces. However, the Charter
stipulates that a limit will be set on the number of traders that may trade in the inner city: “and this
limit will be strictly enforced” (ibid).

The new policy direction for the establishment of formal markets throughout the city and ranked
according to a graded system, was outlined in the Regeneration Charter, and reiterated in the
Informal Trading Policy. A-grade markets are: “permanent, enclosed and fully serviced centres built
for the purpose of informal trading” (Johannesburg Metro Council 2007a). These formal structures
are supposedly established where there is heavy pedestrian traffic, and often linked with transport
facilities. An example in this category includes the Metro Mall and the Yeoville Market. D-grade
markets consist of: “individual informal traders in an area designated for informal trading with
D-grade markets are effectively the demarcation on pavements of already-traded streets, little more than an attempt at regulating traders in-situ. According to the 2007 Charter, the original intention was to phase out C- and D-grade markets entirely by 2009, and house all traders into (mostly as yet un-built) A- and B-grade formal market places. This, however, was an optimistic revision of the original 2003 policy commitment to graduate all traders into A- and B-grade markets within fifteen years (i.e. 2018).

More recently the municipality has been experimenting with an electronic data-base connected to a smart-card system that traders are issued with when they apply for a traders license from the MTC. The smart card system was one of the new innovations that the municipality anticipated might make the sector more knowable and legible. It was envisaged that the system would be rolled out by the end of that year (i.e. 2007): "initially this will provide for basic statistical data by which the City can better understand trends shaping the informal economy. Over time this will be expanded and upgraded to provide a record of each trader and his or her trading activities on a centralised database (...) The database and smart card system will also provide a record of the training and support that the trader has been able to access, how long the trader has been trading for, location of trading space (...) the system may become the basis for facilitating the graduation of traders into alternative economic opportunities since it will enable easy identification of micro-retailers who are most equipped to take up alternative space off the street" (Johannesburg Metro Council 2007b, emphasis added). The smart-card system was seen as a key technological innovation for the management of traders, and part of a process of making the traders more visible to the institutions of the state:

"We have attempted to improve the regulation of the industry through the implementation of smart cards. There are all sorts of issues that play out on the streets: illegal trading; subletting of stalls; 'selling' stalls to foreigners who may not qualify for a traders license.
How the process works is that we identify a street that requires regulation and management, and we then implement a process of demarcating the street with stalls. This can take some time because there are always different claims about who has a right to be there, and the street is often over-traded to begin with. The smart cards that we issue are then connected to the specific demarcated and registered site. This way we can track where a trader trades from, and the history of payment. We are also speaking with the Johannesburg Fresh Produce Market so that instead of buying-cards, traders can use their smart-card to buy produce at the wholesale market. Once the technology is there, it has many potential uses, such as discounts at other stores for example” (MTC 1, 17 December 2009, personal interview).

The smart-card system was also an integral component of the 2007 Informal Trading Policy for the City of Johannesburg, which outlined the broad strategic orientation of the city with regards informal trade, as outlined and established in the Inner City Regeneration Charter. The policy recognised informal trade as an important and necessary part of the city, but was also part of a process of making the industry more legible:

7.1 All informal traders trading in the jurisdictional area of the the municipality are to be registered and allocated trading space for which they shall pay rentals, the amount of which shall be determined from time to time. The MTC shall become the one-stop shop for this purpose.

7.2 All informal traders trading in the jurisdictional area of the COJ are required to apply for a trading permit with the MTC (…)

7.4 Once their application for a trading permit has been successful, the applicant trader will be issued with a smart-card with such details on it as their biographical information, trading space to which they had been allocated, rent-paying status, as well as the goods and
services in which they have permission to trade.

7.4.1 The MTC-issued smart-card will constitute a tool for the administration and management of informal trading (Johannesburg Metro Council 2007a)

Yet the issuing of smart-cards has been intermittent at best: according to a report by local NGO the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), by June 2009 there were only about six hundred traders registered with smart cards, and the date for full implementation has been pushed back indefinitely. The vast majority of traders operating in the inner city remain both outside of the formal market places, and effectively unregistered by the authorities. Rather than the market places encouraging traders off the streets, in order to reassert the strategy of maintaining traders off the street and accessible to the state, the municipality has implemented a regime of enforcement. Yet the strict enforcement of legislation to keep traders off the streets, or at the very least confined to identifiable stalls, is a politically and practically difficult activity:

"By-law enforcement in the city is a big problem, and its partly a product of competing interests in the city. In some areas certainly there is not enough enforcement, and these areas are over-traded. In some instances there is too much enforcement, and traders have no security or stability. We have to make spaces available for traders in the city, but we also need to strike a balance between the needs of the poor in terms of accessing opportunities and the realities of the city in terms of needing investment and capital. The city needs to govern" (MTC 2, 13 February 2009, personal interview).

In part this represents the lack of institutional cohesion within the municipality, and the divergent ambitions and expectations of each agency within the municipality. While the JDA and the CSU are responsible for strategic thinking, and have been able to conceptualise broader models for the management of informal traders in the city, the MTC and the Department of Economic
Development (DED) (within which the informal trading sub-unit is located) are responsible for engaging with traders on a day-to-day level. The MTC in particular is underfunded and has no clear mandate of its own role. This lack of institutional cohesion was evident in the issues surrounding the promulgation of an informal trade by-laws in the inner city.

In 2004 the municipality promulgated the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality Street Trading By-Laws (21 May 2004),\(^5\) passed under the national government's Municipal Systems Act. They replaced the by-laws that had been drawn up under the previous Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metro Council (GJTMC),\(^6\) and promulgated in 1995. The 2004 by-law defines street trading as "a single act of selling or offering of services in a public road or public space."\(^7\) The 2004 by-laws contained a number of restrictions and prohibitions regarding the activities and areas where traders are allowed to operate in the inner city. Yet while it engages a context that is necessarily fluid, and which provides a livelihood for many of the poorest people accessing the city, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), a socio-economic rights organisation based at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, claim that implicit in the by-laws is: "a focus on the protection of businesses, public buildings and monuments, pedestrians and traffic flow, as well as the maintaining of cleanliness, hygiene, safety, public order and open space within the city" (Tissington 2009, p.12) rather than on the protection of livelihoods. Partly because it was in response to the policy environment rather than to the actual context of traders, the by-laws were largely regarded as being heavy-handed. The by-laws were focussed on rather inflexible sets of rules and regulations that effectively constituted a list of prohibitions regarding trade. It was criticised by many commentators and traders organisations as an attempt to criminalise and prohibit trade in the city. Tissington argued that the effective and equitable implementation of any by-laws in the city would require a far greater degree of engagement between the state and the traders, as well as engagement

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\(^5\) City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality Street Trading By-laws (Published in Provincial Gazette Extraordinary No 179 dated 21 May 2004 under Notice Number 833)

\(^6\) GJTMC was effectively made up of four transitional councils, representing the the Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western parts of Johannesburg. It was in existence between 1995 and 2000.

\(^7\) Ibid, page 3

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among traders on the by-law legislation, citing her own findings as well as the findings of a number of research studies in the sector as evidence (Tissington 2009). In particular constitutional requirement for consultation between the state and affected parties on matters of local government should form the basis for a greater legal contestation of the by-laws, although Tissington acknowledged that the biggest hindrance remains the lack of "strong, effective and representative street trader organisations" (Tissington 2009, p.16). In essence, those elements of the by-laws that the traders have objected to reflect the broad sentiment of the Draft Informal Trading Policy for the City of Johannesburg (2007), as well as the Regeneration Charter. These high-level documents have been devised primarily within the JDA and the CSU, although the MTC was involved in drafting the 2007 Policy. Resistance to the by-laws has come from traders as well as other civil society organisations such as CALS, although these responses have been relatively muted. This would seem unusual in a political environment where civil-society protest around socio-economic rights in other parts of the city have been a characteristic of local political contestation over the past decade (Ballard et al. 2006; Bénit-Gbaffou & Lama-Rewal 2008). Nevertheless, a process to redraft the by-laws was begun shortly after the 2004 by-laws were promulgated. The revised set of by-laws was eventually proposed and drafted by the municipality in 2007, for promulgation in early 2009. The primary changes between the 2004 by-laws and the proposed 2009 by-laws include a reclassification of the nomenclature to reflect 'informal' rather than 'street' traders; reduced spot-fines for unlicensed trading and reduced prison terms for non-payment of fines; and attempts at greater transparency around the issuing of fines. Nevertheless, the proposed new by-laws also reiterated the powers of MTC in terms of allocating spaces and licensing traders, and the prohibition of trade in certain areas. The new by-laws were signed by the Mayor in 2009, yet as of March 2010 are pending provincial gazetting. The municipality has been accused of attempting to pass the by-laws without a proper consultation and feedback process, despite the numerous attempts to organise public participatory meetings over the two-year period that the 2004 by-laws were under review. At public meetings in September 2009 and November 2009 the by-laws were presented for public
discussion, and concerns were again raised by traders about some of the implications – primarily they were concerned with the police being allowed to confiscate their belongings if they were trading without a license.

While the broad policy direction towards informal trade, as contained within the 2007 *Draft Informal Trading Policy for the City of Johannesburg*, and the 2007 Regeneration Charter emerges from executive decisions taken within the CSU and the JDA, the by-laws are a function of the DED. The failure to pass the by-laws speaks to the kinds of relationship that the DED has with traders. They are confronted by traders and are the face of the municipality for traders, and so are confronted with the difficult task of going through a consultative process with traders about what are in effect very minor issues around demarcation of stalls, encroachment onto pavements and health and safety codes around the handling of certain kinds of foods like meat. The real decision making that is driving the broader policy on the location of markets, and the eventual removal of traders from the streets altogether, is taken at a much higher level of authority. This is clearly evident in the ambiguous position of the Metro Trading Company within the municipality. For example, in contrast to the commitment of municipal policy towards the growth of the industry, the MTC is sometimes less obtuse about its own role in the management of traders:

“Managing the street traders is a massive challenge (...) This is an important component of the functionality of the city as an urban system (...) you can see that unregulated street trading can lead to decay. Our function assists to normalise the urban environment and make it orderly. It is a necessary evil, and the removal of some traders is an unintended consequence of the management of the urban environment (...) but it is a difficult function, and we cannot easily tell traders what to do” (MTC 1, 17 December 2009, personal interview).
It is ultimately this disjuncture – between the policy process and the day-to-day administration of traders – that serves to subvert the diagram.

5.4 The Dissolution of Institutional Cohesion

An institutional mechanism, in the form of the Metro Trading Company (MTC), was established to take over the management of the Yeoville Market upon its completion, and the MTC was technically the principal client for the Metro Mall project. The Metro Mall scheme was an altogether more ambitious project than the Yeoville Market project, comprising space for four hundred traders and a major transport hub. As such, it has been described as: “Johannesburg's most sophisticated trade and transport facility” (Thale 2003). However, the MTC had very little involvement with the planning and project management, apart from in the final stages of building, when offices for the MTC were added to the design in space that had been planned for public facilities for taxi drivers (MTC 2, 13 February 2009, personal interview).

Even before the Metro Mall was completed, it appeared as though the intentions of the planners were being subverted by the everyday realities of this managerial approach. The market was intended to be a space that would announce and celebrate these informal sectors in the city:

“The initial plans were very ambitious, partly as a lesson from Yeoville but also as part of the idea of access and permanence (...) MTC began to assume control of the market places and informal trade in the city and they were established as the main client near the completion of the Metro mall project. There were offices and facilities for MTC added into the design brief (...) The market is now run by MTC, and they have their own agenda. For example, there was a crèche that was initially planned but this was subsequently taken out. I am not sure why” (project architect, 15 April 2009, personal interview)
The MTC, established as the public agency to manage the new markets, is subsidised by about seventy per cent by the municipality, and is constrained by severe lack of resources. Yet the municipality has invested a lot of resources and trust into the success of the model, and has high expectations of its success. The problem, it seems, was that:

"There was never a business case made for the entire project itself. It was always seen as an infrastructure capital expenditure. We were thus concerned with the capital costs, and less concerned with the running costs of the completed market. Since there was no budget set aside for the running costs, this would either have to be found or else the market would have to be self-sustaining. Thus, rentals have become so contentious. MTC inherited the market without a budget of its own, so they had to make the budget for themselves. Initially the biggest source was identified as the taxis, but they are hard to control. Many taxi associations are refusing to pay anything, and they are well organised and have a lot of muscle. The MTC is one hundred per cent owned by the city, and it is subsidised by Metro, but there is pressure towards making the company self-sufficient" (ICO 1, 6 March 2009, personal interview).

The resolution to the lack of funding for long-term budgeting and for the development of institutional mechanisms was the MTC. The MTC was set up by the city as a facilities management company to manage all the new facilities. Thus, even though there may exist a genuine desire within the municipality to see a proper management of and engagement with traders, the institutional framework has been granted the expertise or management structure that might make this a reality. The existence of the MTC is connected to the pragmatic logic of the corporatising local state, and the need to manage traders efficiently, than to the desire to positively influence the
lives and the ways of life of the traders. In a sense, the MTC is a poor compromise between the need for an agency to manage and engage traders and the desire to show that the management of traders in markets could be self-sustaining. The critical inconsistency within the municipality was the awkward organisational arrangement that left the MTC without adequate budget to effectively manage the conditions of informality in the inner city:

“The specific mandate of the MTC is a public transport and trading facilities management role. In all the facilities that we manage these two functions are linked: i.e. transport and trading. Although the entity is supposed to be self-funding, about seventy two per cent of the funding for MTC comes from subsidies from the city. The rest comes from user fees. Payment is a challenge (...) The recovery rate among traders is about 51 per cent (...) it is a difficult political issue. We are supposed to be able to deny access for non-payment, and to evict traders if they continually do not pay. But there is a lot of politics about these issues. This makes it difficult, because we as the MTC cannot continue to incur the costs” (MTC 2, 13 February 2009, personal interview).

This lack of resources has meant that the MTC has been unable to effectively perform the function that it is supposedly mandated to perform:

“The money doesn't come. So we are not willing to take over some facilities - for example the Fordsburg market. The city is now stuck with assets with no-one to operate them. It is a problem with the way the city plans. You cant allocate cap-ex without thinking about the operating costs. The city expects MTC to be self-financing but that is impossible at the moment. There are forty one transport facilities in the city. The MTC operates and manages twelve. The other twenty nine are simply unsubsidised. They are used but not operated by anyone. So they become vandalised and downgraded.
Obviously MTC needs to take these facilities over, since this is our core function and area of expertise. But the important thing for us to consider is our ability to generate revenue from these facilities” (personal interview, MTC 2, 13 February 2009)

Moreover, the MTC does not even appear to have the adequate mandate to manage informal traders in the inner city. The MTC remains the main face of interaction between the municipality and traders, yet despite a policy environment that locates traders firmly within the sphere of municipal by-laws and controls, the central agent for administering these policies has little ability to keep track of traders outside of the new market facilities:

“It is JMPD [Johannesburg Metro Police Department] that is supposed to be responsible for the policing of street traders, and the enforcement of the by-laws. MTC is responsible for the management of street trading but we have no capacity to police it (...) also, we do not manage all the streets where some form of trade occurs. We are a facilities management company, and we do not make policy decisions. We are mandated to manage particular facilities, which also include some streets where trading is demarcated and allowed through the by-laws. But these by-laws are made elsewhere” (personal interview, MTC 2, 13 February 2009).

Here we see the contradictory roles and functions of different municipal departments. The intention behind the market buildings is subverted not just through the resistant actions of its intended users (i.e. taxis and traders) who re-appropriate the streets outside the market in order to re-establish networks that they relied upon. The intention behind the market buildings is also subverted through the different attitude towards, and understanding of, its role within urban management:

“Even today it is difficult to work across departments in the municipality. For example,
the Economic Development unit, whose function is to facilitate trade and industry in the city, erected a whole lot of steel stalls in parts of inner city Johannesburg outside formal business premises. This was a response to demands from formal businesses to control street-traders, but it completely scuppers the attempts at a more strategic and holistic response to trading in the inner city" (JDA 2, 16 May 2009, personal interview)

“One of the big problems is that the city runs in silos, so it is so difficult to coordinate things between different departments. We have had this problem at JDA; we were set up to try and cut across these silos but its very difficult. Department A does x, department C has to implement it or run it, but there is no relationship or proper communication between the two. The most classic example is the new iconic Mandela Bridge. The bridge was an iconic project, with money from the mayor and JDA. But it is a road, so it falls under Johannesburg Roads Agency. They have no extra budget to maintain the bridge any more than they might maintain other bridges, so the lights no longer work, the bridge has been vandalised and there is no longer a dedicated security presence on the bridge” (JDA 1, 16 April 2009, personal interview).

“Budgets go year to year so projects need to as well. But social dynamics have different rhythms (...) an agency like MTC has an annual budget, and for projects they tender and get things done within that budget year. The question that is more difficult to deal with is how to have more strategic planning in which all departments are present. For example, the MTC have been pushing ahead with the plans for the Fordsburg market. We have had plenty of clashes with them. It is a vibrant market, and it operates well as a public space. It does not need a formal structure (...) This is such a typical bricks-and-mortar response to a situation that does not need it” (SPU, 18 December 2009, personal interview).
Faced with limited budget, MTC have considered looking further afield for new revenue streams:

"At the moment how things function is that MTC takes over a facility, collects a subsidy from the city to operate the facility, and then augments that subsidy with the rentals collected. But even if we had one hundred per cent collection rate that would still account for less than the entire operating budget. The city needs to realise that it has to subsidise these facilities. So the main concern for MTC is to maximise the operating revenue through increasing rental opportunities. We need to have solid anchor tenants in our facilities (...) and space for advertising. In this way the market will become a destination market, increasing the traffic of people through the market. Of course we don't have to ask anchor tenants to make huge investments. The idea would be to get traders together and they can apply for a franchise. We do not need to empower the already established companies, but to use them to help empower the small traders" (MTC 2, 13 February 2009, personal interview).

The recent investment by the city in a new public transport system, and the subsequent establishment of transport as a stand-alone department within the municipality, has offered one such opportunity for MTC to contract itself out for the management of the new facilities:

"The Strategic Public Transport Network (SPTN) has become a priority for the city (...) in this context, there is a possibility that the taxi industry will begin to decline slowly, so the MTC needs to redefine its mandate in this case. The MTC has been mandated with managing the new BRT stations, and the operating budget for this comes directly from the powerful new Department of Transport. At the moment there is a restriction on how close to the BRT station traders are allowed to trade. But traders will begin to
gravitate around the stations, especially if these are the new areas of foot traffic. Traders won’t stay in the markets if there is no traffic there. So we will need to manage this in the future, and think about how this will work (MTC 1, 17 December 2009, personal interview).

However, the problem with these more recent attempts to rethink the revenue streams of the MTC is that they progressively serve to alienate those traders who are seen as the original constituency of the MTC. The practices of the MTC, partly as a result of institutional failures, serves to undermine the potential for more sustained engagement between the municipality and the traders. Those traders who occupy stalls inside the market building are often popularly dismissed by many informal traders in the surrounding areas as foreigners (various interviews with traders in Yeoville). This perception is something that is recognised as a potential problem for the legitimacy of the MTC as an institution, and I will address this in Chapter Six.

5.4 Moving Between Market and Street

In the early morning of Monday, 4 August 2003, less than a year since the official opening ceremony of the Metro Mall by the Mayor of Johannesburg, twenty-three traders arrived at the Metro Mall to discover that they had been locked out of their stalls by the Metro Trading Company (MTC). The traders had been locked out for not paying rentals on their stalls. Although at the time over sixty per cent of traders were in arrears for between one and six months of rent, a spokesperson for MTC confirmed that the lock-outs were confined only to traders: “who have not paid rent for six months or more (…). Collectively, they owe R100 060\(^8\) in unpaid rent” (Thale 2003). Concerned with the potential for protest among traders inside the market, as well as the political ramifications at council of evicting hawkers back onto the streets, the MTC made a statement to the effect that that traders were not in danger of actual eviction. Rather, the MTC attempted to renegotiate the

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8 Approx. £8000 (based on exchange rate of R1 = £0.08 as on 1 Feb 2011)
terms of repayment: “some [traders] are definitely making an effort to pay, although they still owe some money. We’ve locked out those who have simply not bothered to make payment (...) we will propose that those who can’t afford the rent move to cheaper, open stalls. (...) we have asked them to pay twenty-five per cent of their arrears and make arrangements with us to settle the rest” (Thale 2003). Almost all of the twenty-three traders were subsequently allowed access to their stalls after making some commitment to covering the arrears, although several of them did not return (Focus group session 1, Metro Mall, 22 April 2009, Metro Mall traders committee). Although never clearly established in the focus group session, most participants seemed to agree that those several traders who did not return were now trading outside the market on the streets of the inner city.

The municipality consistently, and perhaps legitimately, claims to be concerned to nurture informal traders as a valid and legitimate part of the life and economy of the city sector: “law enforcement is secondary. Traders must first feel that they are not outcasts. Our primary focus is to develop the sector” (municipal spokesperson quoted in Thale 2003). Yet such initiatives do not always meet their own intended target. Despite the rhetoric of nurturing business acumen, and the partnerships established such as Grow Your Business, traders (whether inside or outside the market place) remain marginal from the formal institutions of the economy. Moreover, in the implementation of municipal strategy, there is an acknowledgement that there will be a reduction on the number of people who can access the city and make a living from trade:

“The informal sector can only realistically accommodate a certain amount of traders before it reduces everyone in the industry to mere survivalist trade. Traders need to be trained and capacititated. Some may need to move out of the sector and allow others to grow successfully” (MTC 2, 13 February 2009, personal interview)

Yet is in unclear that traders “move out” when they are unable to make money in the market place.
Rather, they move back onto the streets of the inner city, thus serving to undermine the very model of the market. The MTC admit that they have very little data regarding the movement of traders in the city (MTC 1, 17 December 2009, personal interview). This was supposed to be the function of the smart-card system, but in the context of several thousand informal traders who operate in the inner city, many of whom are immigrants or mere survivalist traders, such a system seems hopelessly inadequate. The movement of traders between the market place and the streets of the inner city seems a fluid and elastic process. Yet what I argue is that, while this largely undocumented movement serves to subvert the ambitions of the municipality – and dissipate the diagram of power within which the market place is located – the market nevertheless does serve as an important node in the livelihoods of traders. In fact, it is the ability to move so fluidly between the inside and outside that serves as such a resource. This happens in at least three ways.

Firstly, there are traders who have managed to access stalls inside the market, but have subsequently decided to move away from the market and rent the stall onwards. This is the common accusation made about the ways in which foreign traders access stalls inside the market, but it is not only foreigners who access stalls in this way:

"This stall belongs to my wife's brother (...) he is in the Eastern Cape now, he went back some months back because his wife was sick I think. I do not know when he will be back, but he may get another stall when he comes back (...) I can also sell at Prichard Street, where my wife has a stall, so we will see (...) at the moment I pay him for the stall here, he only charges me for the rent cost" (BP, 11 March 2009, trader in Metro Mall, personal interview)
As BP has suggested, his brother-in-law moves between the market place and many other parts of the country, and so there are times when he is not able to manage his stall. In this case, it makes sense for him to hand it over to BP to use. This same logic seems to work in the case of MN:

“This is a stall that belongs to another lady (...). When there is trouble at home, then you have to go. And if you are not using the stall then the MTC will take it away, So you have to pass it on to someone else (...) but MTC do not like it when you do that, and they will take your stall from you (...) so I have to pretend to be that other lady” (MN, 12 March 2009, trader in Metro Mall, personal interview).
These informal arrangements between traders suggest that, whereas the market place is designed to cater for regular and legible entrepreneurial traders, in fact many traders do not fit into this category. Moreover, as we saw in the case of BP, the connection between the inside and the outside remains both close and in itself an important resource. That is, BP's wife has another stall out on the streets, so the temporary access to the stall inside the market provides an extra source of income.

The second way in which the inside and the outside bleed into one another is encapsulated in those traders who have either been forced, or made a decision, to leave the market place and return to the streets. This decision perhaps seems a sensible one to make for many traders, given that trading on the streets is rent-free, and given that the street offers lucrative foot-traffic all day and not only at
peak commuter times. This access to the lucrative trade of the streets has caused some degree of resentment from traders inside the market place, and there is some degree of resentment from those who do trade inside the market place and pay rents:

**MM:** We are paying so much to the MTC, and they out there are paying nothing for what they are doing, which is wrong because they do not even have a license.

**BN:** It is good business out there, but we have to wait in here and no-one comes to buy from us (...) MTC keep promising to chase them outside (...)

**MM:** But why should they case them, anyway? Why should anybody have to pay to trade here [in the inner city]? (focus group session 3, 12 May 2009, Metro Mall traders)

NG expressed similar sentiments about the difference between his business when he was trading outside the market and now that he is inside the market:

“Before they built this market I used to have ten guys working for me, selling fruit and vegetables. Now you can see that I have only these three guys. I built a house for my family in Nelspruit, with twelve rooms. But there are many problems with the house now and I do not have enough money to fix it all (...) it was far better when we were outside, but what can we do? They have built this new market where we used to trade, so now we have nowhere else to go but to stay here” (NG, trader in Metro Mall, personal interview)

Given the sense of resentment, it might seem logical for traders from inside the market to choose to leave, and to rather trade from outside the market place. Yet there are reasons why traders would choose to remain inside the market and trade from there. Perhaps the main reason is that there is the legal protection that is afforded from being a rent-paying trader inside the market. Despite their
access to lucrative trade, the traders inside the market who I interviewed, and who were part of my focus groups, suggested that they knew many occasions of friends or relatives being harassed by the police for trading outside in the streets:

"At least Metro Police can't chase us here (...) not like outside. They keep taking the stock of traders in the streets, and then you have to pay too much to get it back (...) its too bad outside (they used to chase me, and then once I lost my whole stock. So I decided to come inside here" (PO, trader in Metro Mall personal interview)

More than legal protection, there is also security of stock. The market place provides lock-up facilities for traders to store their goods overnight, although there were stories circulating during the time of my research that the security guards were stealing from the stock (Focus group session 1, Metro Mall, 22 April 2009 1, Metro Mall traders committee). Trading from inside the market also provides access to facilities that are not readily accessible outside on the streets, most especially a functioning kitchen:

"This is my place here, this kitchen (...) I used to sell from a caravan before they built this market. The caravan was fine, but it was always a question of running short of gas. And when it rained, then my customers would get wet. So to have this kitchen inside the market is obviously better (...) but it is far away from where most of my customers are" (BN, 17 March 2009, trader in Metro Mall, personal interview).
All of this suggests therefore, that the policy regime of the municipality is having the desired effect – traders are seeing the benefits of moving off the streets and making the decision to pay for a legal and permanent stall. Yet as my interview with BN continued, I realised that the access to the market place only served as a resource in the context of mobility between the inside and the outside:

"I sell to the drivers of the mini-buses. Some of them come here, but they prefer to stay together out there [the empty plot of land opposite the Metro Mall which is used for a range of informal activities connected to the taxi industry, such as car-washing, mechanics, wheel-polishing etc.] (...) So I have my kitchen here, but I have two girls who work for me. They walk around and sell to the drivers. (...) They are very good at selling (...) the drivers prefer to buy from girls" (BN, 17 March 2009, trader in Metro
What this suggests, then, is that despite the loss of passing trade some traders at least have adopted innovative strategies for exploiting both the inside and the outside of the market.

This is the case with the final example of how the inside and the outside are far more fluid than anticipated. Z is a young man from Malawi, who sells shoes. He has no license to trade in the inner city, being an immigrant without proper papers. He also fixes shoes, and he does this from a street-side stall in Hillbrow:

"I share the stand with six other guys. So I have two morning in the week to use the
stall. Other times I walk through the city. Its a better way because I can always go
where there is business (...) of course the police have stopped me many times, but I
keep everything in my bag so they cannot say that I am selling illegally” (Z, 18 March
2009, mobile trader, personal interview).

Z trades all over the inner city, and he knows the best times for being in certain places. One of his
most profitable times is at peak commuter time in the market:

“I am here in the afternoon, by four o'clock. I have to keep in the busy areas, because if
the security catch me they will throw me out (...) its a good time to catch customers,
especially at the end of the week when they have money. People are going home fo rthe
weekend, and they want to buy some nice shoes” (Z, 18 March 2009, mobile trader,
personal interview)

Z moves between the street and the market place, between inside and outside, undetected but illicit.
For him, the ability to access both these spaces is what provides him with his livelihood. This is
much the same for BN, although in a slightly different way. In this way, the distinction between
inside and outside, while very real and definable, is nevertheless permeable. And it is this
permeability that serves as a resource. I suggest, therefore, that in this process of undermining the
coherence of the market place, the very logic of the market place is reiterated. In other words, in so
far as the market place was designed to serve as a node through which traders could be incited to re-
imagine themselves as entrepreneurs, then it serves precisely that function. The traders who move
seamlessly between the market place and the street are able to take advantage of what the market
place offers them, as well as access the passing trade of the street. In this way, the formalised space
of the market place has become infiltrated by the informal networks of the streets, and appropriated
into these informal networks. However, it is not only the spaces of the market that are infiltrated by
these informal networks. In the last section I demonstrate how the institutions of the state itself become implicated into these networks.

5.5 Informal Encounters on the Streets of the Inner City

In part the municipality has engaged the seeming invisibility of informal traders on the streets of the inner city with blanket restrictions on trading in particular areas, and by designing legislation that encourages traders to move into formal market spaces. But the continual movement of informal traders between the formal market spaces and back onto the streets obviously represents a failure of the Metro Mall as a model in some ways - both in the sense that the traders are not convinced by the model, and in that sense that traders are ending up back on the streets, thus subverting the intentions of the process. A member of the JDA was quoted in the local press claiming: “The markets can only accommodate about 5000 traders. Then we have seasonal hawkers (...) it is difficult to plan properly for all these interests” (Thale 2002). In the same article, a municipal councillor admitted: “informal trading can never be completely eliminated from the streets” (Thale 2002). These subtle admissions, that informal traders will always continue to be a part of the urban landscape in the inner city of Johannesburg are echoed by responses to the promulgation of the 2004 by-laws. A member of the Gauteng Hawkers Association (GHA) claimed in the local press: “informal traders are here to stay. We will oppose any moves to get rid of informal traders. Even subsistence traders have a right to do business” (Thale 2002).

In part, however, the response has been more pragmatic. Although the idea of a multi-tiered grading system for market facilities has underlain the municipal strategy towards informal trade in the inner city since at least the development of the Inner City Charter and the Informal Trade Policy in 2007, and the principle of upgrading and managing street-level stalls was part of the original 1995 Informal Trading Policy, most resources have been channelled into prestige projects such as Metro
Mall and Yeoville Market. However, there is increasing attention to the possibilities offered by what are called linear markets - that is, the upgrading and formalisation of street-level trading stalls into a formal market structure:

"The new informal trading policy provides for the provision of linear markets, a new kind of facility built along pedestrianised streets (...) The linear markets are market facilities in a linear fashion along the middle of a street. The first of these is the Hoek Street linear market that opened a few weeks ago, and there will also be one opening in Fordsburg very soon, with others planned for the inner city" (MTC 2, 13 February 2009, personal interview).

A section of Hoek Street, further to the south of the current project, had been pedestrianised and fitted with trading stalls in late 1993, as a response by the white Johannesburg Municipality to the increase in informal trade in the inner city at the time. In early 1995 a proposal was tabled at Council to extend this development northwards, connecting the original street market with the southwestern entrance to Park Station. The proposal was for the construction of ninety-two individual trading structures in two parallel rows along the street. The proposal was accepted but never enacted, giving way to the more ambitious strategy of formal market structures, which was especially strongly pushed after 1999. However, the solution of linear markets to the persistence of apparently unregulated trade in specific quarters of the inner city was revived in the 2007 policy document, and has been more actively pursued in response to the perceived high costs of managing formal structures - as exemplified by the failure of MTC to turn a profit in its first ten years of operation.
The first of these new generation of linear markets was constructed in Hoek Street, and was due to open in June 2008. The Hoek Street linear market was supposed to be open for trade in June 2008. In May 2009 I was called early on a Saturday morning by one of the traders with whom I had developed a particular relationship whom I had interviewed a number of times during my field research. The reason for the call was because of an impromptu meeting to be held that morning at the Hoek Street linear market, which had been standing completed but empty and hoarded for several months. The reason that the structure was standing empty hinged on the difficult politics of who should have the right to occupy the new structure. The new market was designed to house forty-five traders, but more than seventy traders were active on the street. Since the assumption was
that those traders not allocated space in the new market would no longer be allowed to trade on the street outside the market, the stakes were obviously high. The allocation process was supposed to proceed from a list that had been compiled by the municipality during the planning and construction phase of the Hoek Street market. Priority would be given to those who had traded the street the longest, and then by age and gender. Young men were lowest down the list. The problem was that three separate lists had been compiled: one by the Metro Trading Company (MTC), one by the Department of Economic Development (DED) and a third by the South African National Traders Alliance (SANTRA), a small organisation claiming to represent traders in that part of the inner city. None of the three lists corresponded with each other.

The list compiled by the DED appeared to hold the most weight, because it had been the first list compiled, and because it was done based on discussions with the -recognised trader's block-committee. The MTC list had also been compiled in consultation with the block-committee, but was more recent and therefore may not have recognised the claims of people who had been trading when construction began but may have moved away in the interim. SANTRA claimed that their list was most accurate, given that the block-committee was never recognised by all traders in the street, and merely represented a small group of traders who were willing to cooperate with the municipality from time to time. Others claimed that SANTRA was taking advantage of the newly built market to advance its own members, even if they had no legitimate claim to be located in the new market. The meeting had been called on short notice by the DED largely as a response to separate demands from SANTRA and other more locally based interests that the issue be resolved.

On that Sunday morning, surrounded by the noise and rhythms of what is one of the most densely-traded parts of the inner city, a civil servant from the municipal DED stood in the midst of twenty or thirty angry traders clutching three lists, and seemed to hold sway. The civil servant listened to each angry voice in turn, spoke about the difficulty that confronted him as a representative of the
municipality, and proceeded to carefully construct a tentative and workable resolution. The major compromise achieved was that many small-scale traders would agree to share the new stalls. A number of others were promised first access to a future proposed market, and in the meantime could be accommodated on the street just outside the new market building. The civil servant had an evident gift at negotiating the cut-and-thrust of a space such as this – his resolution to the anger and resentment was tenuous and only partially legitimate. Certainly it contradicted the sentiment of municipal policy to move traders off the streets and into new market facilities, so that traders could envisage themselves as independent and self-sufficient entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, it appeared to appease those traders present, and within a month the new market was open for tentative business.

The actual messy dynamics of the context of Hoek Street and surrounds provides a very useful microcosm for exploring the encounters between the municipality and traders in the inner city. Here I witnessed an actual encounter between traders and state, a space where both became visible to each other, even if momentarily. It is only a very partial view that each has of the other. But here the state is seen not only in the symbolism of the built infrastructure, but in the actual body of a civil servant from the city council. There are often bodies that take on the form of the state, in the form of the police-men or the market managers. But this was a real man who has connections to actual power, it appeared. In this space, he too must be rough and tumble. He must by-pass some of the rules of legibility and discipline in order to effect some form of compromise in the inner city streets.
As the agency that has the closest engagement with informal traders in the inner city, the MTC was originally conceived as the implementing agent for the planning and building of linear markets. The MTC acted as client for the building of the Hoek Street market, with the capital budget coming from the JDA. However, in 2009 the new board of directors of the MTC reiterated the core function of the agency, which it regarded as facilities management, thus reoriented the agency away from project management and construction. This effectively means that the linear market scheme, which represented an interesting experimentation with engaging informality in the inner city, will not be realised:

“We have drawn up a business plan for the implementation of linear markets throughout
the whole inner city. It would cost about R200 million for the whole city, *but at this stage we have no capital budget, and there is also a slim chance next year. So it is little more than a pilot scheme at this stage*” (personal interview, MTC 2, 13 February 2009, *emphasis added*).

Whereas the Metro Mall model, which also began as an experiment, was extended to become, for a time, a much broader diagram of power and order in the inner city, the linear market, which represents potentially a more locally contingent engagement with the dynamics of informality in the inner city, appears to be no more than a one-off experiment. At the moment it seems that the JDA is also reluctant to take on the role of finding funding for the roll-out of linear markets, focussing rather on the large-scale projects within the Inner City Charter.

### 5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has been about the spaces of encounter. It is about the moments at which the orders of the state serve to structure and provide the context for how the spaces of informality actually happen, and how the spaces of informality simultaneously intersect and infiltrate the way that the state ends up operating. Formalised market spaces such as Metro Mall have served as the site for specific encounters between the municipality and informal traders. In these spaces the municipality and traders come into visibility - but only partially. Specifically, informal traders are visible in so far as they fit into the prescribed role of small-scale entrepreneur. Of course, in the messy spaces that occupy both inside and outside of the formal market structures both traders and the municipality are less clearly visible. It is on the streets of the inner city that the municipality and traders are forced into messy encounters. But I think that these encounters are themselves never clear and transparent. The possibility of occupying a space between visible and invisible means that the encounter is always provisional.
As both Cross (1998) and Simone (2006) suggest in separate ways, the ability to remain invisible and illegible, whether to the state or to organisations that would represent their supposed interests, is a resource that many in the informal sector rely upon. This is clearly a source of constant frustration for many well-intentioned state officials and their attempts at making the sector more visible through smart cards and electronic databases of traders. The inadequacy of these responses to the sector has arguably been recognised in the more recent strategy of building linear markets in already-traded streets, but the discussion about the allocation process for the market suggests that such interventions are attempts at making the municipality visible as much as making traders visible.
6. STATE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS IN THE MARKET PLACE

6.1 Introduction

One of the peculiar, yet somehow mundane, accounts that dominated one of my focus group sessions was an event that had occurred in the market a few days before my first arrival. This particular focus group session was held with members of the Metro Mall Traders Committee, a committee elected from among the traders inside the market place that meets with representatives of the MTC on a weekly basis. The Traders Committee is an officially-sanctioned body, and exists as part of the constitution of the MTC. The conversation in the focus group session revolved around one of the small stalls on the upper level of the Metro Mall, which had suffered a small fire as a result of an electrical short. The cause of the electric short was caused by a faulty two-plate stove; clearly the stall-holder was using the stall to prepare food, although according to her trading permit she had rented the space for a hair. The MTC management had investigated the incident and taken no action – and at the time of the focus group session the kitchen was still operational. According to the participants of the focus group session, this was because the woman was the wife of a prominent Nigerian trader, the chairman of the Nigerian traders association that includes most Nigerians who trade inside the Metro Mall.

That this fairly mundane story was of concern to the members of the committee present at the focus discussion is, on one hand, testament to the relatively unremarkable daily life of the market place, punctuated in the main by the routines of buying stock and opening and closing the stall, and the rhythms of busy and quiet trading times. In this context, almost any event out of the ordinary very quickly circulates in the small talk between friends and acquaintances. Yet it also contains a number of more important observations. The reconstruction of this simple account of everyday life within
the market place speaks of the spectre of xenophobic tension that permeates a space such as the Metro Mall. Indeed, ethnicity and nationality form important markers of inclusion and exclusion in the largely opaque dynamics of informal trading in the inner city of Johannesburg. The Traders Committee is composed exclusively of South African traders, and they expressed anger and resentment towards the MTC for its apparent favouritism displayed towards foreign traders. In this manner, citizenship is mobilised as something by which to either include or exclude someone from access and belonging – here, the South African traders could be said to be making a claim about belonging based on the exclusion of foreign traders. From another perspective, the story of the fire in the hair salon speaks of the messy and opaque entanglements of formal and informal. In other words, even within the confined and ordered space of the Metro Mall – where stalls are neatly demarcated and particular activities confined to particular parts of the building – the less than transparent dynamics of informal associational life penetrate. The cluster of hair salons on the upper level of Metro Mall form an important social space for many Nigerian traders, and therefore also the context for shared meals of home cooking. At the same time, while the MTC management officially do not recognise the Nigerian traders association as a legitimate consultative forum – pointing to the Traders Committee as the official point of communication between traders and market management – nevertheless they chose to resolve the issue through the 'informal' channel of the Nigerian traders association. This, of course, has angered members of the Traders Committee, who have called the MTC on this inconsistency. What this suggests, therefore, is that in making a demand to be approached as the recognised channel through which to resolve the issue the Traders Committee were calling upon the MTC to be more legible and transparent. The anger that the Traders Committee expressed at their exclusion from the process, I argue, was not a demonstration of xenophobia – although in early 2009 when I was in Johannesburg there was still a palpable tension upon the streets less than a year after vicious xenophobic violence claimed several lives⁹. Their disappointment was not directed at the Nigerian traders, but rather at the MTC.

In this chapter, I discuss how the Metro Mall forms the context for a range of new encounters between the state and informal traders, not all of which are anticipated. The chapter will begin with a discussion about the ways in which citizenship and foreignness are deployed in the specific context of the Metro Mall, showing how foreignness is both claimed and ascribed in various ways in order to secure access to the built infrastructure of the market. In a context where people from many different countries have managed to establish a presence in the city through exclusive and often ethnic trade networks, many South African traders have reiterated particular expressions of citizenship. While this has manifested itself in moments of violent xenophobia, I suggest that a far more common appeal is to the shared history of apartheid. Crucially, this locates post-apartheid citizenship very differently to the governmental ambitions of JDA and MTC, which have attempted to make traders as petty entrepreneurs. While these claims of nationality are discussed in terms of their relevance for the micro-politics of the Metro Mall, they also extend into other parts of the inner city. In a context of often-frustrated and impotent claims for access based on citizenship, I then consider how other forms of associational life have emerged in the inner city.

As I argued in the previous chapter, the Metro Mall exists within a diagram of power that implicates traders into a particular entrepreneurial subjectivity, although I also suggested that the governmental ambitions of this diagram are always being subverted. Yet far from the MTC — as the local embodiment of the state — being eschewed and avoided, I suggest in this vignette that the it too is called into being by traders, although not necessarily as entrepreneurial subjects. In this chapter I will argue that the Metro Mall serves as the enabling spatial node for encounters between a multiplicity of associational networks. Yet while these networks may have divergent trajectories, I suggest that the Metro Mall forms the context for the mutual imagination of both state and citizen. Despite their respective fragmentations and dissipations, the state and citizens are nevertheless
captured in these spaces, held in each others vision and made imperfectly visible. I argue in particular that the materiality of the market place constitutes the possibility for such encounters and sightings. Traders are not only drawn into, but actively construct, encounters with the state. That is to say, while traders may reject particular forms of entrepreneurial citizenship that are offered through the MTC and the market places in the inner city, nevertheless a fantasy of the state and of a post-apartheid citizenship continue to animate everyday life in the inner city. While the various institutions of the state struggle to adequately comprehend how to engage with traders, traders themselves are actively imagining – and calling upon – the state to intervene into their lives. Thus, while the state may exist merely as an imagination – as a fantasy of coherence – this fantasy is nevertheless a powerful node around which notions of citizenship can cohere.

As we have suggested in the previous two chapters, this fragmented and discontinuous state assemblage constitutes a very specific spatiality – one in which individuals are captured and momentarily arrested along divergent trajectories. In these moments of encounter forms of subjectivity – forms of inclusion and exclusion – are articulated and enacted. I suggested already that in the case of the municipal market spaces such subjectivities do not always match the governmental ambitions of the state, but rather serve to subvert and further fragment the state. In this chapter I argue, however, that such encounters nevertheless constitute new forms of subjectivity, and possible alternative visions of state and citizenship are articulated.

6.2 Informality and Subjectivity

As we have discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter Five) the post-apartheid state is little more than what Secor has termed a “loosely knit ensemble (...) a field of interrelation between sites, agents, techniques and capacities” which exists only as an imagination of coherence (Anna J Secor
2007, p.34). For Secor (2007) the fundamental paradox of the state is therefore the seeming contradiction between the apparent coherent unity of the state and: “the contingency, lack of coordination, unevenness, and extralegal shadows of the lived state” (2007, p.34). Secor is here concerned to reiterate that, while the state is seldom experienced as an ontologically coherent entity, there remains some imagination of the state as a unified and coherent entity. For Taussig (1997) this magical quality of the state, as an elusive but pervasive symbol, lays a heavy burden upon society. Taussig the everywhere presence of the state does not suggest the complete enframing of space in the way that Mitchell (1991) has spoken of colonial Egypt. Rather, the presence of the state is a spectral presence, itself co-opted and contained within the occult, the disorderly and the informal. This does not mean that there are not some spaces where the state appears more ordered and orderly. In these spaces, the state achieves its most coherent form. Yet the magic of the state is equally present in those spaces that appear beyond the reach of these modernist orderly spaces. Zizeck makes a similar argument about the state as a “fantasy” — something that is absent in any substantial form and yet which has important discursive and material effects in society (Navaro-Yashin 2002). For both Taussig and Zizek, the spectral state is somehow a burden, a weight that hides the underlying structure of an unequal society. This is why, referring to Gramsci’s ruminations on ideology, for Taussig the state is a façade. Zizeck prefers a lacanian language, referring to the state as a ‘symptom’ — that is, the state is obviously a figment but we as subjects of the state chose willingly to pretend that we do not see the fallacy of it. In this way Zizeck argues that we engage the state with cynicism — i.e. we recoil from that which we know is a fallacy and yet which we imbue with power over our own lives.

For Secor (2007), influenced rather by a recent post-colonial engagement with the anthropology of the state (Aretxaga 2003; Das & Poole 2004; Gupta 1995; Thomas Blom Hansen & Stepputat 2001), the important question does not relate to that which the spectre of the state hides. More
important is the effect of this imagination. As Secor suggests: “there is no ‘encounter’ between a
sovereign state and a sovereign subject but only a mutual imagination that takes shape through
particular space-time techniques of power” (2007, p.49). We have already suggested in the previous
chapter that the state is encountered by people in the form of the local government official. I have
also suggested that the materiality of infrastructure also constitutes an encounter with the state,
drawing on the work of Mitchell (1991) who speaks about how the state space enframes what can
be thought and done. Thus the concern is not so much with the state as some kind of veil of
ignorance, but rather the effects that the shared imagination of the state has. One effect of course is
the way in which conceptions of citizenship can be framed. As Chipkin (2003) has argued, and as I
have shown in Chapter Two, the imagination of the post-apartheid developmental state was
accompanied by, and justified in the name of, the imagination of the post-apartheid citizen.

The state exists as a shared vision, and so the imagination of the state permeates deep into society.
However, that shared vision of the state has much to do with the way in which subjectivity is
considered. Just as the practices of the state attempt to make legible the objects of governance,
bringing populations into visibility, so the state becomes visible and legible to individuals through
some of these same practices (Corbridge et al. 2005). Rather than an external object, the state is
embedded in and produced through such practices, languages and the particular spaces that are
constituted through practice (Das and Poole 2004, p.3). In this way, the attempts by the state to
intervene into, and make legible, the population are as important as the effects of these interventions
in the social field (Corbridge et al. 2005). The interventions by the state necessarily produce
contexts for encounters between the state and those whom the state attempts to rule. It is through
these encounters that the state itself becomes legible (Corbridge et al. 2005). As Gupta claims:

“There is obviously no Archimedean point from which to visualize ‘the state’, only
numerous situated knowledges (...) Bureaucrats, for example, imagine it through statistics (...), official reports, and tours, whereas citizens do so through newspaper stories, dealings with particular government agencies, the pronouncements of politicians, and so forth. Constructions of the state clearly vary according to the manner in which different actors are positioned. It is therefore important to situate a certain symbolic construction of the state with respect to the particular context in which it is realized” (Gupta 1995, p.392).

In this way, imaginations of state and citizenship, at least for ordinary people in their everyday lives, are informed by where they stand – and importantly, their experience of the agents of state that they encounter. As we already saw in the previous chapter (Chapter Five), the most common encounter that traders have with the state is in the form of the MTC or the DED. Traders have an ambiguous relationship with the MTC in particular, and have resisted the attempts by the MTC to cast them as entrepreneurial citizens. As we have also seen, the MTC itself has an ambiguous relationship to this form of citizenship, charged with implementing a policy that it feels neither capable nor inclined to do. In this chapter I will demonstrate how traders simultaneously eschew this form of citizenship while making claims upon the state to give them citizenship in other forms. This often requires circumventing or avoiding the MTC, even as the MTC attempts to respond to the needs of traders.

Aretxaga (2003) suggests that in the imagination of ordinary people the state might be split, existing in the same moment as both good and bad state: “triggering an imaginary of the state in which desire and fear are entangled in a relation of misrecognition from which one cannot be extricated” (2003, p.407). Secor similarly argues that these two imaginations of the state are always present, making the relationship of the citizen with the state always caught between what she calls longing
and despair - between the good state that provides justice and belonging and the bad state that is uncar ing and inflicts arbitrary punishment. The experience of the everyday state, for Secor, is best described as one of recoiling desire. In the everyday desire for justice, care and belonging, ordinary people imagine and call upon the good state. And yet, in the face of corruption and indifference people recoil in the moment of subjection: "recognizing ourselves as subjects of an abstract guilt that is compounded through protests of innocence" (Secor 2007, p.48). Hansen (2001) makes a similar distinction, when talking about the state in post-colonial India, between what he calls the sublime and the profane, which both exist within the imagination of the state. That is, the state contains both the expectations of a better life, as well as the real experience of corruption, patronage and illegibility.

However, while this way of attempting to unpack what is undoubtedly a complex imagination within which the state exists, I suggest that Aretxaga (2003), Hansen (2001) and Secor (2007) all miss something of the way in which the mutual constructions of state and citizen are recursive. In other words, just as the state is being imagined into being, so citizens are also imagined into being. This space of imagination, I argue, contains far more than a sense of the sublime expectations and the profane fears of the state. Rather, imaginations of the state and citizenship occur within a far more complex assemblage of subjective positions. In particular, I suggest that these imaginations are produced in encounters, which are material and embodied. A number of geographers have been variously interested in embodied practices as part of the formation of subjectivities (Cloke et al. 2008; Gregson & G. Rose 2000; McNay 1999; B. Morris 2004; A. J Secor 2003). McNay suggests that: "embodiment expresses a moment of indeterminacy whereby the embodied subject is constituted through dominant norms but not reducible to them" (McNay 1999, p.99). Gregson and Rose (2000) make a similar point when they reflect on Butler's notion of performativity to think about the constructedness of identity and subjectivity: "performance and performativity are
important conceptual tools for a critical geography concerned to denaturalise taken-for-granted social practices”; they argue instead for: “the creativity of everyday life” (Gregson & Rose 2000, p.434). Cloke et al. (2008) engage Butler’s interest in performance as: “the ways in which identity formation is inscribed both by the routinised iterative performances of sedimented forms of social practice and by the regulatory power of the discourses which are thus sedimented” (Cloke et al. 2008, p.246). For them the concept of performance is useful because it suggests unplanned effects of encounters that are only ever known through the act of doing: “these manifestations of everyday life suggest an immanent rupture in space and subjectivity which at any moment allows change to happen (...) performativity is thus a becoming practice” (Cloke et al 2008, p.246). However, McNay finds Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus and of practice more compelling than Butler’s performativity because it opens up the potential for thinking temporally; that is, while Butler performativity implies the enactment of a given ‘script’, habitus, at least as McNay understands it, suggests that subjects ‘make their own scripts’ (if not completely in their own terms) (McNay 1999).

Bourdieu, like Foucault, is interested in processes of making subjectivity. While Foucault is primarily concerned to trace the origin and emergence of the modern subject, Bourdieu wants to understand how this subject is placed, and acts, within a social world. McNay suggests that for Foucault the acquisition of inscription by the docile body through inculcation and normalisation renders the subject as an ‘effect’ of power. While McNay sees in his later work on practices of the self as beginning to rectify this concern, she nevertheless sees in Foucault’s model a lack of consideration for the subject: “failure to consider fully the recalcitrance of embodied existence to self-fashioning” (McNay 1999, p.97). Bourdieu thinks through the various permutations in which subjects come to be distributed into social fields, the resources they have at their disposal, and the options therefore available to them as they navigate their own realities. What Bourdieu attempts to do is uncover the mostly buried structures which constitute the social worlds, and the mechanisms
that reproduce and transform them (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). Bourdieu is primarily concerned with *practice* as the actions and rituals which constitute the subjects relationship to the world. This resonates with the literature on governmentality and government of the self, yet for Bourdieu these practices of the self are far more explicitly embodied. Bourdieu wants to maintain that individuals have a practical knowledge of the world which they invest in their daily activities (Jenkins 2003); that is, systems of social domination and relations of power accrue incrementally, adjust to and are shaped through the *practices* of individuals. So for example class is not an overarching determiner of ones existence in the world: “but is a matter of embodied social practice, unfolding and varying culturally” (Haylett 2003, p.62).

Bourdieu’s social world consists of an unlimited (and always evolving) accumulation of *fields*; the political, the economic, the aesthetic etc. Each field has its own regulative principles, its own limits and its own values; a field is not simply the cumulative actions of those within the field, but is structured and rule-bound. Depending on their relative position within a field, it is precisely these rules and limits that agents struggle over; the field is a “space of conflict and competition” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p.17). Maintaining or altering the rules and limits of a social field implies access to the distribution of capital within the field; in this sense the field is dynamic, always in play. No social agent exists solely in one field of play. Moreover, no field is ever completely closed: fields are influenced by other fields, and by the movement of social agents between fields. Although external structures do not automatically constrain social action, the social world remains relatively regular; the distribution of social and cultural capital remains generally consistent, and the choices of social actors is often predictable. To explain this Bourdieu develops his notion of the *habitus*: a structuring mechanism that is embodied within social agents, a systems of dispositions that allows them to make sense of, and respond to, the changeability of the social world (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). The *habitus* can be seen as the “internalisation of external
structures” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992); the embodiment of the social world. The social actor therefore inhabits the social world, takes on certain roles, and is disposed (but not trained) to respond in certain ways. Habitus is a creative force, but only with the limits of the embodiment of the social structures that produce it. Finally, social practices are always spatial practices. They happen within space, and they happen about space. For this reason, Bourdieu's is an analysis that acknowledges temporality: “practice unfolds in time and it has all the correlative properties (...) that synchronization destroys” (Bourdieu 1990, p.81).

While Bourdieu is concerned primarily with everyday practices and the construction of identities and meaning through these practices, De Certeau (2002) is directly concerned with the spatiality of these everyday practices. For De Certeau human and social practices are always practices in space. More than that, practices are always spatial in that they define and shape spatial symbols. For De Certeau these symbols are unpacked through spatio-symbolic metaphors like walking, pathways and the city. Through the process of moving and acting in space emerges: “the possibility of converting one spatial signifier into another” (Thrift 1996, p.16). De Certeau is concerned with the ways in which space and people’s everyday practices are recursively constituted; everyday practices are what constitute space, and space is likewise constructed out of the practices of everyday life (Thrift 1996). De Certeau (2002) uses two concepts to explain how agents operate within, and thereby create space: strategy and tactic. Strategies are the broader organising principles of space, such as administrative and political power; not dissimilar to what Soja suggests Lefebvre means by 'perceived space' (Soja 1996). These are the dominant rhythms of the city, which most powerfully orders the way that we think about any represent space. Tactics on the other hand are the spontaneous and uncoordinated interventions that agents make in their engagements with the world. Tactics are the often minute and silent rhythms of the city, and it is these tactics that De Certeau regards as the most important site of analysis of the city.
Inspired by the work of De Certeau, a number of urban geographers have considered the city as a space in which bodies necessarily transgress the 'cartographic impulse' of the city (A. J Secor 2003; Stratford 2002). For de Certeau (2002) the function of cities is to control everyday life; but functions do not coincide with effects in the city (Amin & Thrift 2002; Frow 1991). Frow agrees that by looking at practices de Certeau is able to usefully move away from text as prescription, to refuse the idea that textual effects are inherent. To practice is not simply to use things as they are given but: “to evade prescriptions embedded in official textuality” (Frow 1991, p.58). Yet Frow suggests that there is too simple an equation of power in de Certeau's model between resistance and oppression; the walker and the map. Morris (2004) similarly agrees that it is not enough to make so rigid a distinction between strategy and tactic; between the official and the everyday. We cannot just suggest that walking is always a resistant act opposed to compliance: “there is no such thing as an intrinsically oppressive practice or a resistant act: it is the nature of these acts' articulations to social formation and sites that finally determines their social effect” (Morris 2004, p.682). Morris suggests rather that what is needed is a: “fuller, richer cartography of the spaces between total compliance and resistance (...) more vigorous and multi-dimensional account of the complex manner in which bodies, power, mobility and urban form intersect within the contemporary city” (Morris 2004, p.681). The relationship between the embodied walker and the ordering city is always in both directions: the city is made by the walker just as the walker is constituted in the spaces of the city (Morris 2004; Cloke et al 2008). Models of urban life which divide the city up into rationalities of regulation and resistance; strategies of order and tactics of resistance; may miss something of the city as: “the multitude of spatial performances and practices (...) a space where a multitude of rationalities and non rationalities are played out” (Cloke et al 2008, p.241).

It is precisely in this multitude of rationalities that subjectivity emerges. I have already suggested in
the previous chapter (Chapter Five) that traders are implicated into a range of networks that make up what we have termed the spaces of informality in this thesis. Within this messy - but nevertheless ordered and navigable context - encounters with the state are just fragments in a multiplicity of possible connections. Of course, through the infrastructure of the market place we have seen that the municipality has attempted to incite encounters between the state and informal traders as citizens. Yet these same individuals are implicated into other networks and encounters, through which different subject positions might emerge - subject positions that possibly contradict those of entrepreneurial citizens. Yet I will show how the market place, as such a significant intervention into the inner city, has indeed managed to monopolise many of these encounters and in so doing has actually pushed traders into various encounters with the state. In these encounters, both state and citizen are mutually constituted, but what I shall demonstrate is that these mutual imaginations do not match the expectation of the other. In this way, even as the state imagines traders to be entrepreneurs, traders themselves are making claims on the state which have very different articulations of citizenship.

6.3 National Identity and the Territorialisation of Inner City Johannesburg

"In South Africa there is a lot of racism in business. Racism is business here. Groups of people tend to stick together. As a Nigerian, I was always connected to other Nigerians. In de Villiers street you will see that it is all Nigerians. I was lucky, because the guy who I bought this business from was from Burkina [Faso], even though he was supposed to sell it to someone from his country (...) The Ethiopians, for example, are very closed business people. You can talk with the Ethiopians, do business with them, but they will never introduce you to the real business - to the suppliers and the producers. They will only do this for fellow Ethiopians" (NJ, Nigerian trader on Wanderers Street, selling second hand
Despite his use of the term 'racism' in the above quote, I am concerned in this section rather with the ways in which race (or more specifically nationality) is used as a way of structuring difference in the everyday life of the inner city of Johannesburg. In particular I am interested in the ways in which foreignness and local-ness are used as different claims about belonging in the city. For example, Vidal (2010) has argued in his discussion about Mozambican migrants in Johannesburg that the evocation of national identity among Mozambicans is connected to containing access to resources rather than to some subjective experience of being Mozambican:

"Mozambican migrants tend to develop a specific ethnic conscience once in Johannesburg (...) it does not lead them to collective action and practices, except the discursive drawing of an ethnic boundary separating Mozambicans and South African blacks. For this reason, it would be exaggerated to say that the city generates nationalism among them. Rather, they use nationality as a resource to strengthen their individual rather than collective identities" (Vidal 2010, p.60)

In the context of the aftermath of xenophobic violence that erupted in parts of the city in May 2008, and then again in early 2009, it is easy to assume that the invocation of foreignness and local-ness implies suspicion and intolerance. Although this is sometimes the case, the construction of difference along lines of nationality is seldom consistent. Secondly, even in contexts where difference is relatively starkly delineated this does not necessarily imply suspicion. I am interested in how the delineations of difference along lines of nationality are connected to different networks of agency, and how these networks are productive of new spatial practices in the inner city.
The inner city of Johannesburg has been a place of opportunity for people from all parts of the continent and the world. This has arguably been the case since the city emerged from the gold-mines in the late nineteenth century (c.f. Beavon 2004). During the twentieth century the city became a mythical symbol of opportunity for among migrant African communities (c.f. Ferguson 1990; Harries 1994). While the collapse of the apartheid city opened up the possibility for black South Africans to move into parts of the city that had previously been denied them, it also saw the much more rapid expansion of immigrant communities from further afield, who have made the inner city their home. One of the earliest groups to establish a strong permanent presence in the inner city are immigrants from Nigeria: Nigerians in Johannesburg have been very effective at mobilising exclusive networks of association to insert themselves within the formal and informal economy of the city. In the process they have emerged as the subject of many negative stereo-types among South Africans:

"South Africans all have this perception of Nigerians as criminals and drug-dealers. But this is a stereo-type; the drug trade is constructed by the media and the police to discredit Nigerian businessmen (...) we are here to do business, and you can see that many Nigerians own property and businesses in Johannesburg (...) it is the Zimbabweans who are criminals" (NK, Nigerian traders' association, Metro Mall, 12 May 2009, personal interview: *emphasis added*)

It is not just perceptions in the media that define foreignness. There are very material consequences, which include the fact of being harassed by police: Landau (2006) suggests that while most South African traders in the inner city are only irregularly the victims of police harassment, almost seventy per cent of foreign nationals report regular or occasional harassment by the police involving the exchange of a bribe, the confiscation of goods, or the confiscation of permit papers. Moreover,
while foreignness may be deployed as a single over-arching distinction in some circumstances, there are many actual and material distinctions between, for example, being constructed as either Nigerian or Ethiopian, as implied by the quote from NJ earlier in the chapter.

It is not just in business that the construction of Nigerian identity is associated with racist stereotypes, but in the broader South African society. In the same moment as the speaker rejects the negative associations (and projecting them onto another immigrant identity) he affirms more positive associations of Nigerians as "businessmen". In this way the differentiation between foreigner and South African is turned into something that does not negatively excludes those who are defined as foreign, but rather become a register of exclusivity and superiority. What is valued is the ability to do business, and the inability of South Africans to do business is a source of derision. At the same time, this mark of exclusivity is affirmed through reiterating a physical and emotional distance:

"South Africa is not a good place to do business. There are too many criminals here. It is not a safe place (...) as a foreigner you have to keep to your own because there is a lot of xenophobia" (NS, Nigerian traders' association, Metro Mall, 30 April 2009, personal interview)

A few moments later, the conversation circulated back to the association of Nigerians as good businessmen. The speaker claimed:

"South African's are not very business minded. For one thing, they all sell the same things, so they do not make so much money. That is why we sell different things, and often you will see Nigerians going to Hong Kong or India to buy stock (...) there is a lot
of money to be made here in South Africa if you are a good businessman” (NS, Nigerian traders' association, Metro Mall, 30 April 2009, personal interview)

In this way, the speaker appears to make a claim that excludes South African citizens on the basis of being poor businessmen, unable to take advantage of opportunities in which there is clearly “a lot of money to be made”. This appears to contradict the earlier statement, in which the speaker claimed that South Africa is not good for business. This contradiction therefore contains an ambivalence about Johannesburg, one that I would suggest speaks to a broader resignation of the speaker to the qualified agency that mobility and foreignness have made available. Whether Johannesburg is a good place for business or not is dependent to some degree on what the context is. NS's own narrative of agency includes awaiting papers for an application to join his brother who is living in the UK, a possibility which appears to have stalled. This means that he is caught between aspirations of leaving Johannesburg, and the immediate need to assert his own place in the city. In this way, I suggest that NS's ambivalence about the business potential in Johannesburg is less a statement about business potential than about distancing himself from what it means to be South African, while still claiming agency in that space. Claiming foreignness is simultaneously about making a claim to be exceptional at business, to have expectations and skills better than South Africans have on the one hand, and to maintain the possibility of mobility on the other. In a very material sense these claims of exclusivity and exception also serve to underpin the maintenance of lucrative trade networks that span beyond the Johannesburg and the borders of South Africa.

It is this identity, of Nigerians as businessmen, that the members of the Nigerian traders' association, which operates from inside the Metro Mall, are keen to share with me. The association has no official name or status, existing more as a loose affiliation, primarily an alliance of traders that serves as a network for sharing opportunities and difficulties both in terms of trade and in terms of
social and cultural support. Through the association, NK claims that traders have been able to send money and gifts home with people who may be travelling back to Nigeria. The association was also very efficient at distributing information and support during the outbreak of xenophobic violence in May 2008. NK claims that for the most part Nigerians were not targeted by the violence, and while this may have something to do with the fact that Nigerians are less integrated in South Africa than immigrants from Southern Africa (especially Mozambique and Zimbabwe: c.f. Landau 2009) the heightened anxiety around nationality at the time appears to have generated subtle public affirmations of Nigerian identity during the weeks of unrest:

“We had to defend our businesses, because that's how we survive. Unlike the South Africans, we do not get anything from the government here (...) God will only help those who work hard. We were not scared because we Nigerians, we are good businessmen (...) [At that time] all the Nigerian traders come together and you could see that we are many Nigerians on the streets” (NK, Nigerian traders' association, Metro Mall 12 May 2009, personal interview)

Such displays and affirmations of being Nigerian are an important resource, and the ability to claim this identity has become a means of accessing resources in the inner city of Johannesburg. Yet the appeal to a Nigerian identity also cuts across other important markers of identity that have historically been significant, notably that between the Ibo and other West African ethnic identities (Guyer, 2005). The slippage between Nigerian and Ibo was not always easy to follow for an outsider like myself, and sometimes within a single conversation about nationality the terms would be used almost interchangeably. For example, when talking about the Nigerian traders' association, Nigerians were defined in opposition to South Africans, but at times the identification of being “good businessmen” was ascribed to Ibo identity:
"We Ibo are business people. That is why you will see us in every country. Even in Nigeria, the Ibo are the ones that travel (...) When the country was rich with oil the Ibo established networks across the world. Then, when the oil was taken over by the ruling elite, we had to make use of other networks. That is why you will see us in every country. If there is money to be made, you will find the Ibo people will be there" (NK, Nigerian traders' association, Metro Mall, 12 May 2009, personal interview).

The distinction between Ibo and other Nigerian ethnic groups is arguably more than a subtle distinction, since these ethnic identities are useful (or exclusionary) for accessing specific resources within West African trading networks (Guyer 2004). Nevertheless, inside the Metro Mall the Nigerian traders' association has emerged more explicitly as an alliance of traders that would appear to be more broadly inclusive of Nigerian nationality. I was not able to adequately establish whether internal differentiations played a significant role in the micro-politics of the Nigerian traders' association, although NK suggested that non-Ibo Nigerians were also part of the association (NK, Nigerian traders' association, Metro Mall, 12 May 2009, personal interview). At least initially, therefore, this identification as Nigerian more broadly conceived, rather than as Ibo for example, is an identity constructed in the context of the specific micro-politics of inner city Johannesburg, and of the Metro Mall in particular. Indeed, while the Nigerian traders inside the Metro Mall have networks of association way beyond the relatively limited confines of the market, networks that may be ultimately more significant and lucrative and that may appeal to ethnicity more so than nationality, inside the Metro Mall at least the Nigerian traders have attempted to carefully construct a Nigerian identity based on exclusivity and business acumen. It is an identity that has had some degree of resonance, and that I suggest has proved relatively successful in securing access to certain resources, as I will attempt to illustrated in reference to the vignette with which I began this chapter.
As I suggested above in the discussion about Nigerian traders inside Metro Mall, the physical space of the market can operate as the site for specific inclusions and exclusions. In the case of the Nigerian traders, the micro-politics of the management of the market provide the context for affirming an inclusive Nigerian identity that can be defined in an exclusive relationship to other traders inside the market. This is a narrative that is more broadly repeated about the inner city – that it is divided between areas of Nigerians, Ethiopians, Mozambicans etc. It is a relatively common claim among South African traders that there are few spaces left for them – and this is partly why the new market facilities are seen as one possible resources that South Africans can have relatively privileged access to (focus group session 3, 12 May 2009, Metro Mall, traders).

Figure 6.1: Nigerian NJ having his hair cut by a South African barber, de Villiers Street

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But expectations of fitting into a specific national identity can also prove a burden in some instances, and is not automatically a useful resource. In the streets outside the Metro Mall this identification occupies a more ambiguous place, as illustrated by the example of NJ, from whose interview the quote about business and race was taken. The sentiment that NJ expressed, of being lucky to access his business through someone who was not Nigerian, is suggestive of the fact that these networks of association based on specific constructions of being Nigerian (or Ethiopian, and even of foreignness more broadly), can also serve to limit the options open to people. This is not only through the negative associations and stereo-types to which people become tied in certain circumstances, although both NJ and the members of the Nigerian traders’ association attempted to distance themselves from these stereo-types. For NJ, there were also very material reasons to avoid the networks that locate people in inner city Johannesburg as Nigerian, which had less to do with external perceptions than with internal expectations. While he would have had access to some lucrative trade networks, NJ claims that he has been able to develop his own business because he has not had to be part of shared buying co-operatives and monopolistic suppliers that other Nigerians sometimes find themselves part of. This does not only include illegal and criminal activity, but NJ feels sufficiently aware of this as a threat to want to distance himself:

“I do not want to sell what they want me to sell only. Here I can make my own business (...) if things went bad then I could easily go and sell drugs, but I do not want to do that. I want to be a preacher so that I can preach the word. That is my gift” (NJ, Nigerian trader outside Park Station, 15 May 2009, personal interview)

Trading where he does trade, in an area not dominated by Nigerian traders, NJ has able to get access to networks that would have been beyond his reach. He has become a significant and long-standing figure in the street where he trades, although he prefers not to be seen as a senior member for the
community, and he has never stood to be elected to the street committee. However, in making these decisions, NJ has also had to make certain commitments and sacrifices. NJ is married to a South African woman. He lives in an apartment in a lower middle class area of the city, far away from the inner city apartment living that characterises most Nigerian immigrants in the city. NJ' future is largely located in Johannesburg, marked by his willingness to make the city his home. But the city that he chooses to inhabit is not the same one inhabited by some other Nigerian traders, or at least it is marked by very specific codes of differentiation.

Of course, the fact that NJ himself does have a stall sold him by an Ethiopian speaks also to the constant undermining of the apparent rigidity of national and ethnic identity in the inner city. That NJ was able to access other networks, although this may speak of his own innovative resource in the city, also suggests that these networks are at some level able to be transcended. Perhaps, in the end, it is the ability to tell the story of this transcendence — the ability to maintain the narrative of rigid division while simultaneously claiming ones own ability to transcend the division — that also serves as a resource in the inner city. Certainly, in this way NJ has been able to protect what is a lucrative network from others who might otherwise also sell the same products as he does. In this way, narratives of national identity, and the territorialisation of the city, circulate as a currency just as readily as inclusion into or exclusion from these networks operate as currency.

6.4 Inclusion and Exclusion as Citizenship Claims

"CoJ want to chase us away — they don't want us here. But we did not struggle [against apartheid] for nothing. We are here because we know our rights. They want the city to be clean — for the cleanliness of the city we must go home and starve. (...) my place is not dirty. It is the people doing hair extensions, and selling vegetables, that are very
careless. Most especially these Maputo people – they don’t care about our place (...) There are six traders on this block who are South African, out of twelve or thirteen. If you count it collectively it is more than seventy per cent from outside. All the South Africans are staying at home, they have too much pride. To be honest the people who started this [street trading] are from outside. There were many jobs here before, but there have been so many retrenchments so now we trade” (ML, 20 March 2009, South African trader selling hats and bags in Pritchard Street, personal interview).

As I suggested above in the discussion about Nigerian traders inside Metro Mall, the physical space of the market can operate as the site for specific inclusions and exclusions. In the case of the Nigerian traders, the micro-politics of the management of the market provide the context for affirming an inclusive Nigerian identity that can be defined in an exclusive relationship to other traders inside the market. Although I did not explore it in much detail, I nevertheless suggested that such identification does not necessarily hold outside the confines of the Metro Mall. The competition for resources in parts of the city where state infrastructure is more scarce may imply other networks of association and identification. While I will return to discuss the blurred distinction between inside and outside that can be overstated in talking about the Metro Mall and the streets of the inner city as distinct spaces, I discuss here the way in which particular conceptions of South African citizenship are constructed in relation to the provision of market infrastructure. This is often done in reaction to the constructions of foreignness discussed above, although this does not inevitably translate into xenophobic attitudes. Rather, I am interested in how citizenship is constructed in relation to expectations of the developmental post-apartheid state that appear to contradict the forms of citizenship imagined in the governmental ambitions of the MTC and JDA.
Johannesburg is located in a larger narrative about the post-apartheid South Africa, in which expectations of the developmental post-apartheid state have given way to more modest engagements with the present. For ML, the context of trading on the streets of inner city Johannesburg is the result of a vision of a post-apartheid South Africa that has not yet been achieved, or more accurately appears to have slipped from grasp — of the decline of the industrial economy and the unfulfilled expectations of service delivery and development. Although ML’s claims about South African citizenship are located in relation to the relative success of foreign traders in establishing livelihoods in inner city Johannesburg, her attitude towards foreigners appears ambiguous: in one breath she accuses foreign nationals of not caring about “our” place, and in the other she seems to praise them for being innovative and entrepreneurial. For the speaker, the real distinction between foreigners and South Africans has to do with a level of expectation. Foreigners trade on the streets because they are business people, and they are in a land where they cannot expect benefits associated with citizenship. South Africans, by contrast, have had to resort to trading because the expectations of employment and the welfare state have proved a failed dream.

The construction South African identity connected to sense of entitlement based on a nationally articulated form of citizenship, is also closely intertwined with notions of work and employment. The quote from ML at the beginning of this section ended with the statement: “all the South Africans are staying at home, they have too much pride (...) there were many jobs here before, but there have been so many retrenchments so now we trade”. Trading on the streets is understood, in this statement, as a second best option; an option forced upon people in the absence of proper work. This does not mean that traders are not highly defensive of their right to be trading on the streets. But it does tie into constructions of hope and aspiration far more located in expectations of the developmental state — even where these aspirations are described as interrupted or arrested. Again in focus group discussions, traders indicated desires of work and employment, either for themselves or
for their children:

**M:** (middle-aged man who sells vegetables with his wife in Wanderers Street): I used to have a job as security. But there is no work now. That is why we are here on the streets.

**L1** (elderly woman who sells hats in Prichard street): The government was supposed to give us jobs. There are no jobs here anyway (...) we look after ourselves. We are working for ourselves (...)

**M:** Our daughter is at Wits [University] doing medicine. She is the youngest. We have sent three children to the university, all from our small stall. So when the police want to chase us from here, then we have to struggle for our daughter, for her future, so that she does not have to be on the streets like us. Then she can look after her parents [when she is working].

The focus group discussion went back and forward between bemoaning the lack of proper employment, or the loss of employment on the one hand, and attempts to assert the validity of being located a a trader on the streets of the inner city. I often got the sense that the people I spoke with would rather be employed in a formal job, or expressing the hope that through them trading on the streets their children would have access to better opportunities. In some instances, the claims of labour and employment are directed at the developmental state, with the articulation of South African-ness therefore connected to narratives of the promises of the welfare state. The fact that the DED representative whom we met in the last chapter used to be a trader and is now in government is regarded sometimes with resentment, but is nevertheless regarded with envy. It remains to be seen how well the narrative of the entrepreneurial subject manages to capture the imagination of people.

This ambiguous sentiment has been expressed in focus group discussions by traders who are based
inside the Metro Mall (and are therefore the beneficiaries of state infrastructure, albeit reluctantly) as well as traders who operate outside of the formal market place, and who expressed a sense of neglect. In a focus group discussion with members of the elected Metro Mall committee, when participants had recently expressed resentment about the apparent preferential treatment that foreign traders receive from MTC, there was by no means a unanimous resentment towards foreign traders, although there was also little sympathy expressed. Rather, it was MTC which was regarded as the source of stolen expectations:

M (woman selling sweets and vegetables inside Metro Mall): Our problem is not with the foreigners. They are like us, they are here to make a living (...) our problem is with the MTC. They charge us too much rent, when this space was supposed to be ours. They were supposed to give the contract for cleaning and security to traders, but they do not consult. They do not listen (...) 

Both ML’s comments, which I suggest make a claim about citizenship based on the right not to be removed (“we know our rights”), and the focus group discussion around preferential access to state infrastructure, locate expectations of privilege and preferential access in relation to a relatively homogeneous construction of ‘foreignness’. This is arguably more strongly felt among traders who operate outside of the market building, and who feel excluded from the privilege owed to South Africans. In a focus group discussion there was a sense that the infrastructure of the local state was for sale to the highest bidder, not only in the form of the formal markets like metro Mall but also the upgraded street-side stalls that have been built in parts of the city in a more piecemeal manner10:

S (Young man selling cigarettes and sweets in Wanderers street): We need to look at how

10 I already suggested in Chapter Four that the duplication of the upgrading of street stalls was the result of competing interests between departments within the municipality
the foreigners get their stands because often it happens through bribery. You will find that very often the foreigners, for whatever reason, have the money to pay bribes, even at mid-month, so that their things don't get taken away. We have been promised new stalls, but we are still waiting, while the foreigners are buying them even before they are built.

L2 (middle-aged woman selling vegetables in Wanderers Street): Take for example De Villiers [Street]. It was sold to the foreigners for R100 000. They can do whatever they like there now. They allocate the stalls, and they collect the rentals there. It is here in our area that the police come and chase us.

S: These new stalls [in Hoek Street linear market] should be for the South Africans, but still you will find that MTC sell them to the foreigners.

The citing of a specific amount of money that De Villiers Street was “sold” to foreigners for (a transaction that is almost certainly fictitious) contributes to a larger mythology about forgotten rights and restricted access. Participant S contributes to this mythology by claiming that the MTC have sold stalls inside Hoek Street linear market to the foreigners as well. In the previous chapter I showed that the allocation of stalls inside the Hoek Street linear market was made to South African traders, amid appeals by the representative of the City of Johannesburg's Department of Economic Development (DED) for greater representation and participation among traders (although I did also suggested that this process was not transparent). The point that I wish to highlight is that while these frustrations are often expressed in relation to foreign traders who do appear to have access, this construction of right does not automatically equate to xenophobic attitudes towards foreign traders. What it does do is deploy a language of citizenship that is connected to an understanding of the post-apartheid South African state that resides in infrastructure delivery but not in the institutional structure of the MTC.
The discussion continued about how the MTC were favouring foreigners because they had money to buy privilege. It was interspersed with resentment towards foreigners, and ific concerns about the interests of the MTC and the police. All participants agreed that there was an association between money and access to the allocation of resources in the inner city. The quoting of an exact amount lends some credibility to a claim that is almost certainly false. Nevertheless, there is an association between foreigners and access to money that South Africans do not have. I was also interested to note that this was not necessarily associated with a resentment towards foreigners. In fact, some of the participants expressed a sympathetic attitude towards foreigners, and almost all agreed to having done business with Nigerian and Ethiopian traders. Constructions of a singular South African identity had far more to do with defining particular delineations of inclusion that would offer privileged access to resources from the state than with a latent xenophobia towards foreign immigrants.

Of particular importance is the fact that there are other precedents of post-apartheid citizenship that exist, and into which many traders are implicated. In other words, it is not just in the market place in the inner city that traders have encountered the state. Many are recipients of housing subsidies through the national Department of Housing, and most of these traders also have experience of getting access to basic services in their homes. For example, PD recounts having accessed housing and basic services through the state:

"I in Soweto, in an RDP house (...) I was one of the first to get the houses from the government (...) and I have built on an extra room, paid for by my small stall here. Of course it is better now that we have these things (...) water and electricity (...) but there is no work so you have to do it for yourself" (PD, woman selling bags and hats in Wanderers Street, personal interview)
In this quote from PD, she articulates the ambiguous attitude towards the role of the state in her life, on one hand recognising that her life has been improved, but also acknowledging that she has to do things for herself. It is almost as if the access to housing and services are not markers of the state but expectations of what it means to be a post-apartheid citizen. So there is a seeming distance between the attitude towards the state and expectations of citizenship. However, the prejudices based on nationality, and in particular the construction of South African-ness in relation to foreignness, works both ways. The idea of South Africans as being dependent on specific expectations of the state is part of the construction of exclusivity from many foreign traders:

“The guys who work for me are Malawian. South Africans don't want to work for me, especially as I am a foreigner. They all want government jobs (...) they are not good to employ. When they work for you they make trouble. They get jealous and they call the police all the time” (NJ, Nigerian trader outside Park Station, 15 May 2009, personal interview).

On the other hand, many South African traders are concerned that foreigners get preferential treatment because they have access to greater resources through dubious methods:

“Often South Africans accuse foreigners of bribing the police or the officials from MTC in order to get stalls inside the markets or in the stalls that have been erected. But we as foreigners have few options and no legal status when we get to this country. If you buy a stall from a South African because she is tired and prefers not to be a business person, then as a foreigner you have to give the police something when they come to ask you questions” (NJ, Nigerian trader outside Park Station, 15 May 2009, personal interview).
In various interviews, staff of the MTC have admitted that they do rent to foreigners because foreigners are more successful businessmen and they are more reliable tenants, able to pay the rent. One member of the MTC staff even suggested that more than fifty per cent of traders in the Yeoville Market are foreigners:

"We are under pressure from the city and other traders to limit access to foreign traders. In Yeoville it is the case that about seventy per cent of the traders are foreign nationals. But it is difficult for us, because in most cases the foreigners have a better reputation in terms of payment. It is an often-quoted cliché, but the foreigners tend to be more diligent when it comes to payment of user-fees and to matters of business. They are businessmen, and that is why they succeed as traders. It is true that foreigners often get their stalls by buying them off South African traders, and they are the casualty when we enforce the proper systems. It is not a strategy to give preference to foreign traders, as some locals think. But we cannot always keep track of the informal transactions through which foreigners get access to stalls. And if they are reliable in terms of payment that is better for the city" (MTC 1, 17 December 2009, personal interview).

The percentage is far less inside Metro Mall, although foreign traders do make a significant minority of those in the market. More than this, members of the MTC staff also acknowledge that many foreigners get stalls in ways that are not legitimate, but they also claim it is not always easy to monitor this:

"There are many foreign traders in our facilities. Some of these traders are legal and have licences to trade: they may be married to a South African, for example, or if they
are from SADC they are entitled to be in the country for a designated period. Asylum seekers are in the country for three months, and often do some form of trading to make money while they are here. At other times the foreigners have been sold a stall by the person who used to trade there - sometimes for as much as R15 000. Of course, our stalls are not for sale. The facilities belong to MTC and we only rent them to traders. But it happens and we need to be able to manage these situations" (MTC 1, 17 December 2009, personal interview).

Crucially, the claim is often not that foreigners should be kept out of the country, or that they should not be allowed to trade. Rather, it has to do with the claiming of advantage and privilege in the competitive context of inner city Johannesburg. Being South African is claimed as the basis for preferential treatment, and preferential access to the infrastructure of the state. This is in marked contrast to the ascribing of specific entrepreneurial subjectivities discussed in the previous chapter. Here, being South African is a very different claim to citizenship than that offered through the construction of entrepreneurial subjects in the Metro Mall.

The point that is made in the suggestion that foreigners need to “give the police something when they come to ask you questions”, and in the informal manner in which the Nigerian traders' association have access to the MTC management, is that foreigners do not operate outside of the sphere of the state. Rather than operating in a shadow economy that exists beyond the influence of the state, foreigners often rely on the informal workings of the state in order to exploit opportunities that South African traders may not have access to. This does not assume that their transactions are illegal, or that they are criminal, simply that they have to engage with the state in less formal ways in order to access resources. The point that this above section has attempted to argue, therefore, is that in the construction of new forms of subjectivity in the inner city of Johannesburg, the state is
never far even if it seems to be invisible. The point however is that the state is engaged and constructed in different formations. Nigerian traders engage the state through largely informal means, gaining access to resources by affirming particular representations of Nigerian identity (i.e. that they are good businessmen) and eschewing others. So the MTC have unofficially agreed that foreigners are better businessmen, they pay the rent. At the same time, foreigners have to engage the state through the litany of paperwork and potential harassment that comes with being on the streets. In this sense, the ability of Nigerian trades to have gained access to spaces inside official city markets has lent them a legitimacy that other foreigners do not have, who are left in a vulnerable state on the streets.

As I discussed in the previous chapter, inside the Metro mall the market management, all employees of the Metro Trading Company (MTC) of the City of Johannesburg, has attempted to organise traders into a recognised committee with elected block representatives. Although Nigerian traders represent a significant minority of traders inside the market, the officially recognised committee is dominated by South African trades, some of whom claim more politicised identities beyond the market place. The market management officially recognise only the committee of elected block representatives, and it has been expressed in two interviews with members of the market management that it undesirable to have a fragmentation of trader representation inside the market (MTC 1, 17 December 2009, personal interview; MTC 2, 13 February 2009, personal interview). It is nevertheless acknowledged that Nigerian traders do have an association, although the market management claim to have no official engagement with the association. In focus group discussions with members of the recognised committee, the incident of the fire was used as a catalyst for a broader discussion about the perceived effectiveness of the market management. In these discussions it was made blatantly clear that committee members believed that management were informally giving preferential treatment to Nigerian traders.
The perception that the Nigerian traders' association has been able to gain some unofficial preferential access to the MTC management is not an example of the effectiveness of the Nigerian traders' association. In fact, this perception has threatened to create suspicion among traders, both those inside Metro Mall and those outside the market and who regard themselves as marginalised from the benefits of state infrastructure. In a context of suspicion and antagonism, the Nigerian traders' association has provided an important source of solidarity for Nigerian traders inside Metro Mall. However, while the association clearly makes use of informal channels of communication with market management, it has also been able to encourage avenues of cooperation between South African traders and Nigerian traders. For example, the association have contributed money for members of the elected committee to attend meetings with committees from other markets in Johannesburg. While from the point of view of the Nigerian traders' association this may be a pragmatic move to gain favour within the local politics of the Metro Mall, it has gone some way to establishing an effective co-existence between South African and foreign traders inside the market.

6.5 Alternative Articulations of Citizenship

In the past decade there has been no shortage of organisations claiming to represent traders. The following organisations are only a few that have emerged at various moments and in particular parts of the inner city claiming different mandates: African Council of Hawkers and Informal Businesses (ACHIB), Faith, Gauteng Hawkers Association (GHA), South African National Traders Alliance (SANTRA), Johannesburg Well of Development and Training (JOWEDET). Only the Nigerian traders' association (which has no actual name or acronym) has maintained a perpetual membership, and this only since the opening of the Metro Mall in 2002, based on the fact that it represents a specific constituency, and has managed to be an effective body for achieving particular aims for
members. Yet its membership is limited to several dozen traders inside Metro Mall, and members are not registered in any formal way. Beyond such local networks of association and cooperation, it is not clear that the organisations that claim to represent traders have either a specific constituency, or are effective in achieving the aims of their claimed mandate. In a review of survey data on informal traders in South African cities at the end of the 1990s, Motala (2002) confirmed a general pattern among informal traders in South African cities:

"[A study] found that only 11 per cent of street traders in Grahamstown were in an organization, although a majority of respondents acknowledged it was important to belong to one (...) a study in Durban (1998) found that 2 per cent of men and 6 per cent of women in the sample were members of trader organizations. Research undertaken by CASE in Johannesburg (1998) confirmed that 15 per cent of traders belonged to associations" (Motala 2002, p.16).

In 2009 when I was undertaking my research, an interviewee from JDA expressed a similar experience in the processes of building the Yoeville Market and the Metro Mall:

"The membership of those organisations that claim to represent traders swells at different times, most often when some problem arises. If any organisation claims to represent traders you have to ask: when and where? Certainly it seems that representing informal traders in the 1990s was a quick way to make money. Generally the groups are splintered (JDA 1, 16 April 2009, personal interview)

The most visible organisation in the area of the inner city where I was undertaking research was an organisation called SANTRA. Out of the twenty traders operating in Wanderers Street whom I
interviewed (out of perhaps two hundred traders who operate in that street), only seven claimed to have heard of SANTRA. Conversely, of the nearly twenty traders inside the Metro Mall whom I interviewed, most knew about SANTRA. Those who knew the organisation were either ambivalent or generally supportive, although I met none who claimed to be a member of the organisation. One trader in particular, who has been involved in organising trader representation over the past ten years, questioned SANTRA’s role in the local dynamics of informal traders. She suggested that the organisation exists less as a traders organisation or union, and more as a vehicle to protect particular interests among informal traders:

“SANTRA is owned by individuals, not by any members. SANTRA looks for business, always negotiating deals for the few traders who are the oldest members. Livingston can talk, that is why he always gets things done, and why he has so many plans and schemes. But the organisation doesn’t consult with members (...) it is there for the benefit of a few people” (ML, 20 March 2009, South African trader selling hats and bags in Pritchard Street, personal interview)

This representation of SANTRA may understate the extent to which at least some of its core leadership appear genuinely committed to organising greater representation among traders. Between March and June 2009, in addition to numerous in-depth interviews with members of SANTRA’s leadership, I attended three public meetings that SANTRA held in a run-down hotel in the inner city. The meetings were called the recent eviction of traders from around Ellis Park to make way for the FIFA 2010 stadium renewal project, and the proposed amendments to the 2004 informal trade by-laws. While SANTRA pointed to its continued, and sometimes solitary, engagement with the municipality over these issues, it was clear that the organisation survives largely on the energy of its leadership rather than the groundswell of its membership. Most people at the each of the meetings I
attended were attending simply because they had heard that they may get some assistance. For this reason, each meeting seemed to take the same format – traders would take turns to voice their specific grievance, and the committee would make claims about meeting with members of the government in the past and in the future.

One of the committee members of SANTRA explained to me the impetus behind the formation of SANTRA:

“There is no representation among traders. In the Johannesburg Fresh Produce Market there is a retailers forum, but the informal traders are not represented, even though we [informal traders] are the biggest client. At Metro Mall there is no proper committee as such, and the market has never been based on engagement and participation” (SL, 27 February 2009, SANTRA committee member, personal interview).

The organisation struggles to secure consistent support among traders, and the chairperson admitted that membership figures are uncertain. One member of the SANTRA committee mentioned a couple of hundred members, but even if this optimistic figure represents those who have paid membership dues, the quotes above suggest that even this does not count as effective membership.

SL remains one of the most consistent personalities involved in the local politics of informal traders in Johannesburg over the past ten years, and is an outspoken member of SANTRA. He is know or recognised by many of the traders and civil servants with whom I spoke. SL has operated in a number of different guises, and in the institutional form of many different organisations. A traders who has been trading in the inner city for over ten years and knows SL well, describes him as follows:
"That guy [laughing]! In 1994 he had an organisation called Faith. He told all of us to join with him so that he would prevent us being evicted from the station [where we were trading]. We paid that R10 subscription but he did nothing. He just ran away. Then in the late 1990s he had another organisation. I can't remember what that one was called but it was the same story – he ran away. Then it was ACHIB, now it is SANTRA (...) He is a good guy, he stands for the rights of people. But there is no consistency" (PP, 19 March 2009, selling hats and snacks outside Park Station, personal interview).
This description of his personality within the context of informal traders in Johannesburg is echoed in his own description of his involvement with traders:

“In 1986 we formed ACHIB. One guy basically hijacked the organisation, so I left and went to organise other groups (...) then in 2005 we launched SANTRA. It was launched by the Minister of the Department of Trade and Industry” (SL, 27 February 2009, SANTRA committee member, personal interview).

Figure 6.3: an old sign for a defunct organisation outside Park Station

He also served as a member of the board of the Randburg Chamber of Commerce in the early 1990s when informal traders were making their first appearance on the streets, and were seen by the
mainly white business community and municipality as the cause of urban decline in that suburban. Given these description, it is hard to dispel the perhaps unfair assumption that for SL the informal traders are his resource and space of belonging, rather than the other way around. However, SL's continued reincarnation is also counter-intuitively SANTRA's biggest asset. He was instrumental in resolving the allocation of stalls at the delayed Hoek Street linear market as we discussed in the previous chapter, and he has been a consistent figure in delaying the passing of the proposed new informal trade by-laws, which many traders regard as being written so as to further regulate and control their activities. His personal influence has therefore been important, although the ongoing delay of passing the by-laws, and the lobbying against their implementation, has arguably been mostly the work of more activist-oriented organisations such as Streetnet and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), neither of whom are membership-organisations but would more appropriately be described as NGOs. While SANTRA has a broad commitment to supporting and empowering informal traders, the organisation is not easily cast simply as a traders' organisation. Rather, it functions as something of a small business development NGO, concerned with making the informal sector a platform for building viable businesses. However, this focus on informal traders as the potential site for capital accumulation is in tension with the governmental ambitions of the MTC and JDA:

"The plan for the markets and the MTC was an attempt to shrink the informal traders. It was implemented by people who are against the advancement of poor black people. All these markets have never produced one successful businessman" (SL, 27 February 2009, SANTRA committee member, personal interview).

While the MTC and the JDA have attempted to construct informal traders as entrepreneurs, SL regards their strategic response to informal traders as overly-reliant on by-laws and restrictions,
while ignoring the need for capital. In this way SL has positioned SANTRA as a vehicle through which to invest in informal traders – something that he berates formal banks and government loan organisations for failing to do. In this regard, SL has personally attempted to develop networks with a number of local small-scale lawyers, funding and loan institutions within the state and within the local and international NGO sector – a list that includes some less reputable institutions and personalities. Not all of these networks have proved profitable, but through exploiting these networks at various times and in various ways SANTRA has managed to just about sustain its activities over the past five years.

What I have attempted to shown in the discussion of SANTRA thus far is that the organisation manifests a very specific narrative about state and citizenship – one in which the state in its sublime constellation is the vanguard of advancing the interests of poor black South Africans. This was perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the Minister of the (national) Department of Trade and Industry was invited to launch the organisation in 2005. This is contrasted to the profane face of the state in the form of the MTC and the JDA, who have apparently conspired to work against the advancement of the poor. Both SANTRA and the MTC and JDA have appealed to an imagination of traders as businessmen and entrepreneurs, although the terms are clearly quite different.

Yet the appeal to a notion of citizenship that excludes and de-legitimises the MTC and JDA has for the most part not proved a lucrative association. This emerged in particular in a series of encounters that led to my introduction to another organisation of informal traders in the inner city. In fact, JOWEDET is less of a traders’ organisation and more accurately described as a kind of savings scheme or cooperative, incorporating a small group of predominantly elderly women traders who have known each other for several years. The name stands for Johannesburg Well of Development and Training. The members of JOWEDET are mostly drawn from a particular part of the city, and
while some trade inside the new Metro Mall, they know each other from before the Metro Mall was built.

Although I had interviewed a number of its members, I would not have encountered the organisation but for a fortunate series of events that occurred one day while I was in the Metro Mall. I was interviewing BN, one of the older traders inside the Metro Mall, one of the committee members, and someone who had been an invaluable resource for my research in terms of making contact with other interviewees. During the interview, an old friend of BN came past to have a quick lunch at his friends stall. The friend was not a trader, but worked for the local newspaper, and the visit was more of a courtesy to an old friend than a regular lunchtime routine. The two had been friends since before the Metro Mall was built, and the man having lunch had in fact helped BN to buy the small caravan from which he used to sell his cooked food in the early 1990s. Later that afternoon, when the interview appeared to have drifted into idle banter, ML stopped by to chat with BN. ML trades outside the Metro mall, in Pritchard Street, not more than ten minutes walk from the market but far away enough for me to be surprised by the chance visit. I had not known that ML and BN knew each other, and they explained to me that they were old friends since the days before the Metro Mall was built. That was when JOWEDET began, and the friend who had helped BN to purchase the caravan was also involved in the founding of the organisation.

As the discussion proceeded, ML mentioned to me three plots of land on the outskirts of the city that JOWEDET had recently been given access to by an unknown benefactor. As in the case of the caravan, the connection was not a trader; in this case he was somehow connected to this group of traders through the Johannesburg Fresh Produce Market:

“We have just been given access to three plots in Zuidbekom, near Soweto. The owner
is working for City Deep [i.e. JFPM] so he is offering these three plots to JOWEDET to plough. MTC doesn’t know about this. We want them to be amazed when we show them what we can do” (ML, 20 March 2009, South African trader selling hats and bags in Pritchard Street, personal interview)

Like SANTRA, JOWEDET is not an organisation that claims to represent the interest of traders in a context of political agitation. It has a limited membership, less by intent than in the way that the organisation operate. JOWEDET represents a vehicle for securing and managing particular scarce resources that can offer its members an advantage – in this case, access to apparently lucrative benefactors in the form of either a caravan or a piece of land. Unlike SANTRA, JOWEDET is perhaps less immersed in a mythology of citizenship located in the expectations of the developmental state. Rather, members of JOWEDET tended to express a sense of the failure of these expectations: I already showed how ML, who is a prominent member of JOWEDET, stated in an earlier quote that traders are on the streets as a result of this failure. It is also perhaps interesting to reflect in this regard that all members of JOWEDET with whom I spoke claimed to be supporting COPE for the national elections that took place while I was undertaking field research11.

JOWEDET can be partly understood as a response to the failure of securing resources elsewhere. Underlining the narratives of inclusion and exclusion that define JOWEDET is a sense of failure from elsewhere, a sense of resignation that things will have to be done without outside assistance:

“Everybody is tired of DED and the MTC. If they have a meeting they can have it on their own (...) JOWEDET organised a big flea-market with all big companies who supply traders, but MTC and etcetera passed the buck. They stole the idea. (...) when

11 The Congress of the People (COPE) is a party that contested the national elections of April 2009 in opposition to the ANC, and emerged as a breakaway faction of the ruling party.
we wanted to launch JOWEDET, we booked a big hall. MTC were supposed to pay, but again the passed the buck. These people are all bad" (ML, 20 March 2009, South African trader selling hats and bags in Pritchard Street, personal interview)

Despite this sense of disenchantment, ML’s earlier statement - “we want them to be amazed” - still suggests that there is some desire for recognition from the MTC. Perhaps, unlike SANTRA, this is suggestive of a willingness to accept that the MTC remain an important ally in certain respects.

The example of both SANTRA and JOWEDET, though in very different ways, suggests that informal traders are neither the neglected and destitute poor in need of being made into entrepreneurs, nor the site of chaos and disorder. Though it remains an incredibly difficult context within which to make a living, and while many informal traders are little more than survivalists, the inner city is a space of dynamism and innovation. Individuals make very clear judgements about their own welfare and interest. However, what it does suggest is that traders operate in an environment that is very insecure and tenuous. Rather than making traders more robust and versatile, the interventions by the local state appear to be working against traders feelings of belonging.

6.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to argue that the market place has provided a material context for a range of encounters that contain what Simone (2003) refers to as multiplicity of subject positions. Encounters between the state and citizens also occur in this space, the manifestation of mutual imaginations of each other. Yet rather than encountering one another as pre-determined entities, these mutual imaginations are, I suggest, mediated through among other things these multiple
subject positions. While Secor (2007) and Hansen (2001) have attempted to speak of the encounter between state and citizen as containing both the profane and the sublime faces of the state – between "despair and desire" – I have argued that imaginations of the state and citizenship contain a far more complex assemblage of expectations. On the streets of Johannesburg, and infiltrating into the market place, individuals are implicated into networks which draw them away from or into encounters with the 'imagined' state. It is, unfortunately, one of the limitations of the scale and methodological approach of this research thesis, that a fuller and richer account of these other trajectories has not been pursued. There are, of course, significant methodological and theoretical implications of this limitation. I can here only be suggestive of some of the rich and rigorous research undertaken by others that has begun to delve into this context. In Doornfontein, at the eastern edge of the inner city, Ethiopian traders occupy entire ten-storey buildings, often rented from Chinese businessmen, with the former office-space refitted as shops, restaurants and textile workshops. In Jeppestown, south east of the inner city, Mozambican traders sell fresh and dried fish that is transported by friends or relatives in a suitcase via coach or train. And in various pockets across the city, Nigerian traders monopolise a trade in cell-phones and cell-phone accessories that are bought in Hong Kong and transported in hand-luggage back to Johannesburg. These coordinated and hugely sophisticated networks of trade that stretch way beyond the borders of South Africa constitute very powerful spheres of interpellation and implication.

Yet these other networks, as invisible and hidden as they may be, are not simply other spaces, which draw individuals into alternative encounters away from the state. These other networks also intersect, reinforce and redefine the state-citizen nexus. Often, they intersect in the actual space of the Metro Mall itself, as with the strong presence of Nigerian traders in the market place. Yet even where they do not, occupying spaces and resources that avoid encounter with the state as far as possible, these other networks constitute the increasingly fluid and complex terrain of informality.
into which the state attempts to intervene.

This reasserts, of course, a claim that we developed in theoretical terms in Chapter Two - i.e. that the construction of state (and citizenship) is a project that does not correspond to an already-given entity called 'the state'. It is only through these encounters that the state is brought into being. As I have further attempted to demonstrate in the example of informal traders in the inner city, the imagination of the state — the vision of what state and citizenship will look like — is open to contestation and remaking in the moment of encounter. Rather than thinking about state and citizenship in terms of how the institutions of the state delineate these entities, therefore, it may be more useful to think about how such conceptual containers resonate with, and are potentially inhabited by, individuals. As we have seen, traders find many benefits from the state's attempts to incorporate them into its orbit. At the same time, the movements of resistance by traders to being incorporated also shift the parameters and forms of this incorporation. The argument of this thesis has been to demonstrate the discontinuous and uneven geography of the post-apartheid state — in particular to suggest that state power in a context of informality functions through a discontinuous geography of nodal interventions. In this chapter I have suggested that these nodes form the context for encounters between state and citizen, such that individuals can move somewhat autonomously into and out of these encounters — and in the process incite new imaginations of state and citizenship.
7. CONCLUSION: THE DISCONTINUOUS GEOGRAPHY OF THE STATE

7.1 Introduction

“Things are changing in the way that the city approaches these issues (...) with the building of Metro Mall there was an attempt to engage more pro-actively the informal sector of the city. But now the JDA has focussed on the big projects such as Gautrain, BRT [the new rapid bus transit system] and the FIFA stadium. You won't get such a project for taxis and traders again. Those days seem to be over” (ICO 2, 16 December 2009, personal interview).

The building of the Metro Mall market signals perhaps a high water mark in the municipality's engagement with informality in the inner city of Johannesburg. As we suggested in Chapter Five, what had begun as an experimentation has ended up as part of a much broader policy 'diagram' for the management of informality. Yet it nevertheless remains an important node for informal traders in the city. As we showed in Chapter Six, the Metro Mall serves not only as a space of encounter between traders and the municipality, but it incites a range of other encounters as well. As the quote above suggests, the municipality is concerned more recently with larger infrastructure projects. Yet rather than view the Metro Mall as only partially successful in its attempt to produce new forms of subjectivity among traders, I am inclined to see in the changing strategic focus of the municipality the markers of its success. I began this thesis with the suggestion that spaces of informality posed a particularly acute crisis for the imagination of a post-apartheid developmental state in South Africa. I used a literature on the post-colonial state and governmentality studies to argue that the geography of the state in post-apartheid South Africa is discontinuous and uneven. What I have argued throughout this thesis, is that a different way of looking at the geography of state power might be
appropriate. In particular, I have suggested that state power operates through a nodal, rather than a topographical, spatiality. Through an infrastructure of such nodes, the state has attempted to intervene into peoples lives, and intercept the trajectories and networks of what has been cast as the informal. The quote above suggests that the municipality is moving away from a concern with informal traders. This may or may not be the case – indeed, there appears to be a less experimental phase under way within the halls of power and decision making. But what is clear is that the strategic infrastructure projects remain important nodes through which state power functions. Big projects such as the BRT and the Gautrain are designed to precisely lever in partnerships within the business community and civil society. In the process, there will be many modes of association and organisation that become marginalised. But these also create many more opportunities to invite individuals into an encounter with the state. While the signs are not always positive, and appear to be increasingly repressive and marginalising, We need to hang on theoretically to the potential for the production of any number of possible outcomes.

In this concluding chapter I want to briefly recapitulate the argument that I have made about the discontinuous and uneven geography of the state, and the emergence of a new geography of state power. Thereafter, I want to speculate what this new geography of state power might mean for the emergence of new forms of citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa.

7.2 The fragmentary geography of the state

We saw in the beginning of Chapter Two that “the persistence of informal social modes of interaction which operate with logics that are often autonomous to those of the State” pose a serious challenge to the notion of a post-apartheid developmental state (Government of South Africa, Towards a Ten Year Review, 2003, p.9). While the persistence of these modes of interaction has not
necessarily caused the institutions of local and national government to doubt the hegemony of the state in society, at least theoretically it must suggest that the logic of the state does not pervade evenly and consistently throughout society. Drawing on a much wider post-colonial literature (Bayart 1994; Corbridge 2005; Das & Poole 2004; Ferguson 2007; Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Gupta 1995; Mamdani 1996), I have attempted to argue that the geography of 'stateness' is indeed fragmented and dispersed. The post-apartheid state, I suggested, is an imagination of coherence, it is a political project which holds within it a notion of citizenship residing in a process of development (Chipkin 2007).

Infrastructure forms a powerful symbolic function in this imagination of the post-apartheid developmental state. It is largely the unequal access of urban populations to infrastructure that has driven the content of post-apartheid urban policy, and it is the delivery of urban infrastructure that constitutes the bulk of urban development projects. This is partly because of a bias within the structure of local government towards infrastructure projects with fixed-term budgets than to institution-building projects that have less material outcome and indefinite budget time-frames. Moreover, this bias is partly a result of the persistence of a modernist planning discourse and also of apartheid-era capacities and institutional mechanisms (Robinson 1997). This is perhaps understandable, because post-apartheid urban government had to immediately begin to deliver on political expectations after 1994. There was therefore a long process of urban restructuring, culminating in 2000 with the second local government elections, which officially ushered in the final stage of local government restructuring. This process of restructuring produced the basket of policies that collectively make up what has become known as Developmental Local Government (DLG), and it is this set of mechanisms that the developmental state is to be finally realised.

The crisis that these spaces of informality pose to this imagination is not that the state might be seen
to have fissures and ruptures; rather such spaces of informality threaten the state with dissolution. The fundamental question for those defenders of the imagination of the post-apartheid developmental state, therefore, should not be how to control and eliminate such spaces of informality – such informal modes of social interaction – but rather how to infiltrate and insert the imagination of the state into such spaces. This is precisely what was at stake for the Inner City Office (ICO), I believe. Faced with the political need to create inclusive urban spaces on the one hand, and the opacity of modes of social interaction on the streets of the inner city on the other, the ICO struggled to find ways of building partnerships with local communities. In a context of rapid demographic change, insecurity and vulnerability finding reliable and committed individuals and communities with which to work on resolving some of the social and economic issues on the inner city proved elusive and disheartening. It is here, I have attempted to argue, that the connection between the question of citizenship and the centrality of infrastructure for the imagination of the developmental state converge. The ICO has been, for various reasons, unable to build lasting partnerships with local communities in the inner city. But through the materiality of infrastructure interventions, notably the Metro Mall market, the ICO has attempted to constitute nodes through which traders might be incited to move. Instead of working against and attempting to contain the informal practices, the ICO attempted to channel these practices through specific spaces thus capturing the bodies of traders – even if for a moment – and thus inciting an imagination of the post-apartheid state. This has implied and necessitated a willingness to let go of assumptions and expectations of the spatial integrity of the state on the part of the ICO.

As we have seen, the ambitious expectations – that the Metro Mall might serve to implicate traders into being more responsible and entrepreneurial, into selling a range of different products, of making use of the business courses that are offered at the market, and of making regular payments of rents – has been only partially successful. Traders have continued to trade on the streets of the
inner city, moving between the regulated spaces of the market and the more informal spaces of the streets in ways that serve to undermine the aims of the market place. In response the municipality has attempted to enforce health and zoning by-laws in an attempt to force traders into the market.

Yet, while traders have rejected the entrepreneurial citizenship that the market place was intended to make available to them, I suggested in the final chapter that the Metro Mall nevertheless forms the context, both in its materiality and in its symbolism, for a shared imagination of what the post-apartheid state and post-apartheid citizenship might be. This is because the Metro Mall has, ironically perhaps, served exactly what it was intended to do – it has provided a space for a range of very material encounters in which both the state and citizenship are held in imagination. These mutual imaginings of state and citizenship may not correspond to a given ambition. Certainly, traders have tended to reject attempts at making them as entrepreneurs. And yet the Metro Mall has also provided the context for traders to make specific appeals of the state, and in so doing to bring the state into being. Traders do not want to pay rents, but they do want the state to provide facilities that improve their daily lives. Traders do not want to be harassed by the police for trading without a license, but they do want the state to invest in their cooperative schemes. In these moments, the developmental state becomes a very real and powerful imagination, and traders – who otherwise operate in modes of practice that are at odds with the developmental state project – constitute themselves as citizens in relationship to that imagination.

7.3 Informality and Encounter

The most important argument that this thesis makes is that the geography of state power in post-apartheid South Africa is discontinuous and uneven. Rather than suggesting a dysfunctional state, however, I suggest that this is the condition of state power more generally and not only in South
Africa. The state is a more or less coherent assemblage that coalesces and is concentrated in particular moments, in particular spaces – and through particular technologies, such as the Metro Mall. While an imagination of a coherent post-apartheid developmental state remains very pervasive as a political narrative in South Africa, a new geography of state power has emerged which is characterised by a nodal, rather than a topographical, spatiality. I want finally to offer a slightly more speculative conclusion about what this might mean for emerging forms of subjectivity in post-apartheid South Africa. As we have suggested, the state has attempted to intervene into society through building an infrastructure of nodes through which individuals are channelled. Yet, as we discussed in Chapter Six, individuals nevertheless encounter the state as one of a multiplicity of networks and trajectories. What propensity is there for individuals to be incited to enact and take on certain forms of citizenship in relation to the state? And how might this new geography of state power help us to think about citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa?

In his discussion on the possibility of imagining citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa, Chipkin (2007) suggests that a search for the basis of citizenship in a bounded and internally coherent understanding of the national and the true national subject is both empirically and theoretically limited. For Chipkin, what he regards as a preoccupation within post-apartheid South Africa, for identifying the pure national subject in whose name the anti-apartheid movement was victorious and in whose liberation and making as citizen the developmental state is justified, is as socially divisive as it is elusive. This is because the national subject is always a limited and narrow definition of what constitutes the South African public sphere:

"[The Nation] is composed of subjects who are marked by a surplus vis-a-vis belief. They are indifferent to empirical vicissitudes, because their attitude to other persons and things is always already built into their identity as authentic national subjects."
Interpolation does not so much instil within individuals a dominant ideology, in the sense of ideas and beliefs, as organise a way of thinking and acting (...) [interpolation] organises ideas and concepts in a paradoxical structure such that the relation among terms is always already given in advance” (Chipkin 2007, p.217).

Against this conception of the national subject/citizen as one who is essentialised and interpolated to act and behave in certain ways vis-a-vis the state and that which is not a national citizen, Chipkin proposes the concept of the democratic citizen:

“The national citizen is a figure whose very soul has been captured by the state (he lives in a certain way, works in certain way, practices sex in a certain way, loves in a certain way etc). The accomplice of this is ‘nation-building’ – the production of a South African people. In contrast, the democratic citizen is a figure without any particular features (no particular culture, gender, sexual orientation and so on). All that is expected of her is that she behaves democratically in the public domain” (Chipkin 2003 p.82).

In Chipkin’s terms, therefore, the democratic citizen is not defined by any quality that he or she might posses (e.g. culture, gender, sexual orientation etc) but rather by his or her participation in a democratic public domain. This cosmopolitan interpretation of the democratic citizen may indeed be critiqued for its blindness to difference that may make an individual more or less able to participate in this democratic public domain. What is does achieve, however, is to point out not only the political dangers (in terms of xenophobia, or even in terms of the dissolution of the public into fragmented claims about belonging); it also points out the theoretical limits of thinking about citizenship as national citizenship. Chipkin is driven to ask whether South African’s can exist at all – the answer, for him, lies in the possibility for a democratic citizenship: i.e. in a citizenship that is
not based on exclusion but rather on participation. Such exclusionary notions of citizenship continue to find political use, of course, and may have both negative or positive implications in different contexts. Yet Gotz and Simone (2003) argue that in fact, in the case of the inner city of Johannesburg at least, far from this form of relationship with the state being readily available to traders if only they would disinvest from other forms of association that alienate them from the state, there are rather a lack of spaces for constituting inside and outside - what they call belonging. Equally, those networks of informality that implicate people into various relationships that may or may not intersect with the ambitions of the developmental state project, do not necessarily provide alternative spaces of bounded community cohesion:

“A deficit of belonging, wherein agents start to lose hold of traditional places in which they feel secure and known, is calling forth its logical inverse, more frantic attempts to claim rights to places, physical or social, that embody connectedness, completeness, and coherence. Simultaneously however, urban actors are seeking pure spaces of mobility, in which ties to established territories of self-knowledge and collective recognition are neither compromised by a multiplication of the arenas of action and identification, nor in themselves limit the room for manoeuvre across multiple sites of opportunity” (Gotz and Simone 2003, pages not numbered).

These multiple sites of opportunity Gotz and Simone call spaces of becoming. Both Chipkin (2007) and Gotz and Simone (2003) therefore have suggested the limits of thinking about citizenship in terms of bounded and exclusive categories. Chipkin has attempted to define a cosmopolitan alternative, while Gotz and Simone have argued – in a slightly different direction – that spaces of becoming, which do not tie people to places and relationships, offer the possibility for productive encounters between the state and individuals in the inner city. If people are to make anew spaces for
themselves in the city, they may need to: “delink themselves from the familiar social contexts in which they have been embedded” (Simone 2006, p.359).

Gotz and Simone's concept of becoming is closely linked, in my mind, to Ferguson's (1999) use of the idea expectation. In his study of the experience of modernist development on the Zambian copper-belt in the 1950s and 1960s, he shows how a sense of the self constructed as modern was bound up not only in access to work and the city, but was a far more complex inhabitation of a world view into which the subject could insert him or herself. In a similar way, rather than seen as being contained by a national identity, I am inclined to locate certain constructions of citizenship as a far more complex set of expectations that individuals have come to inhabit – and which cannot be met simply through the developmental state. I suggest that all three of these offer a productive starting point for thinking about post-apartheid citizenship. In particular each is suggestive of – although leaves unexplored – the radical shift in how we think about the spatiality of citizenship. To draw this out I turn first to a brief discussion on the way in which difference and alterity can be thought, and then suggest how this might be relevant to our discussion on the Metro Mall.

7.4 Difference and Orientation

In Colonising Egypt, Timothy Mitchell (1991) discusses at length Bourdieu's methodical unpacking of the difference between the traditional Kabyl house and the house that the European colonial authorities attempted to impose upon people in Algeria:

"The house is organised (...) according to a set of homologous oppositions: between fire and water, cooked and raw, high and low, light and shade, day and night, male and female, nif and hurma, fertilising and able to be fertilised. But to say 'the house is organised' in this way is misleading for two kinds of reason. First, the house is not in
that sense a neutral space in which items or persons are arranged. The space itself is
polarised, according to the oppositions Bourdieu describes, and the polar oppositions
invest every activity of the house, including even the way in which the house is built.
Considered, moreover, in relation to the rest of the village, the house becomes just one
polarity, the 'female', in a larger world. The same oppositions are established between
the house as a whole and the rest of the universe, that is, the male world, the place of
assembly, the fields, and the market (...) These oppositions are not fixed categories into
which items and spaces can be organised; they are an effect not of spatial coordinates
but of polar forces. (...) such polar forces occur themselves not as a structure of
oppositions but as an unstable play of differences” (Mitchell 1991, p.51; emphasis
added).

There are two important observations to make from this quote. The first is that the objects of the
house are not defined into categories by an internal coherence of an object, by some intrinsic quality
of the object itself. Rather, they are defined into categories based on their location within a system
of the "unstable play of difference". Objects are not ordered by a unique quality that they have and
other objects do not have. Grain is not located in the house in a place designed for the storage of
grain. Rather, grain is oriented in the house such that it occupies a place in an oppositional
relationship to that which is male, or wet for example. It is this last part of the quote, however, that I
think is of most importance for our discussion on citizenship. The oppositions that serve to structure
the house are not a product of the dividing up of space, but of polar forces that are a structure of the
"unstable play of differences".

It is this concept of differences that Mitchell finds close associations with in the work of Derrida. As
Mitchell says: “difference (...) is not a pattern of distinctions or intervals between things, but an
always unstable deferring or differing within" (Mitchell 1991, p.52). Such a notion of difference, at least as Mitchell has described it, is ascribed not from the comparison of a range of characteristics, but rather based upon (constantly unstable and shifting) relations of proximity and distance. That is, A is different to B because it is closer to C. But A is closer to B than to D perhaps. So in this way, what is different and what is alike is constantly being determined by the (always shifting) positions that A, B and C take vis-a-vis each other:

"The male, the light or the dry is each nothing more than the process of excluding or deferring the female, the dark or the wet. In a sense, therefore, the male includes the female, the light includes the dark, the dry includes the wet, and vice versa, for each term occurs only as the uncertain disappearance or postponement of what it differs from (...). What this amounted to, then, was a way of building and living that refused to resolve itself into the appearance of a frame and what is enframed (...) a town was not built as a series of structures located in space. The spacing was the building, and such spacing, in the city as much as in the village, was always polarised" (Mitchell 1991, p.51).

In other words, for Mitchell the traditional Algerian town does not conform to the modernist ordering of space based on the absolute categorisation of objects and functions. The town is a set of relationships, a set of objects and spaces imbued with meaning against which people are positioned. With the insight of Bourdieu's (1992) concept of the Habitus, we might even suggest that rather than being positioned, people take up a position. It is this concept of taking up a position – of locating oneself not in some defined space but into a relation of difference – that offers a way of thinking about the spatiality of citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa. More than this, I suggest that the Metro Mall – as node – does exactly this because it invites traders to take up a position, to orient
themselves in relation to the market and to other networks. While on one hand the Metro Mall can be read as the imposition of modernist town-planning and zoning onto the inner city to somehow resist the growth of informality, I suggest that it can also be read as a pole in the sense that Mitchell means, against which traders are incited to take a position.

Mitchell's discussion of difference as a constant realignment is echoed in Isin's (2002) attempt at thinking about citizenship outside of notions of space as somehow bounded:

"The logic of exclusion assumes that the categories of strangers and outsiders (...) preexisted citizenship and that, once defined, it excluded them. The logic of exclusion presupposes that the excluding and the excluded are conceived as irreconcilable; that the excluded is perceived in purely negative terms, having no property of its own, but merely expressing the absence of the properties of the other; that these properties are essential; that the properties of the excluded are experienced as stranger, hidden, frightful, or menacing; that the properties of the excluding are a mere negation of the properties of the other; and the exclusion itself (or confinement or annihilation) is actuated socially (...) by contrast the focus on otherness as a condition of citizenship assumes that in fact citizenship and its alterity always emerged simultaneously in a dialogical manner and constituted each other (...) the alterity of citizenship, therefore, does not preexist, but is constituted by it" (Isin 2002, p.4)

Isin uses the term alterity to think about the different ways in which individuals might take a position vis-a-vis one another or some iteration of the state, for example. For Isin, therefore, the question of citizenship is not simply about the designation of inside and outside, but rather a broader issue of how people form groups, and the relationships that people have towards these
groups. More specifically, Isin suggest that people can have solidaristic, agonistic or alienating relationships with groups and group formation:

"The formations of groups [is] a fundamental but dynamic processes through which beings orient toward and take positions. Through orientations, strategies and technologies as forms of being political, beings develop solidaristic, agonistic and alienating relationships (...) these forms and modes constitute ontological ways of being political in the sense that being implicated in them is not necessarily intentional but purposive (...). It is through these forms and modes that beings are constituted as citizens, strangers, outsiders and aliens, as possible ways of being (positions) rather than as identities or differences. It is therefore impossible to investigate 'citizenship' as that name that citizens (as distinguished from strangers, outsiders and aliens) have given themselves, without investigating the specific figuration of orientations, strategies and technologies that are available for deployment in producing solidaristic, agonistic and alienating multiplicities" (Isin 2005, p.375).

In other words, subjectivities that people hold vis-a-vis a group need not be in terms only of being inside or outside. Indeed, as Isin argues, there is perhaps no example of any single group identity that would match in an unproblematic manner onto any individual. Thinking about citizenship in this way suggests a rethinking of the spatiality of citizenship. If the state itself is a fragmented and discontinuous geography, then citizenship too can only be constituted within such a fragmented geography. Yet, as we see in Isin's discussion about group formation, and Mitchell's discussion about difference, it is this very spatiality that allows for a more multiple understanding of citizenship. That is, if we eschew some notion of citizenship based on an identifiable quality of inclusion into a group, and think rather of citizenship as an incitement to take up a position of
participation into a group, then the image of the Metro Mall as a node into which traders are invited to partake seems apt. In this way, I argue, the Metro Mall may inadvertently serve the function that it was always intended for, although as we saw in Chapter Six this may happen in ways that are not always expected. If, as Isin argues, the city is a 'difference machine' (2005) – or put differently by Amin and Thrift (2002), if the city is a machine for engineering encounters – then I suggest that the Metro Mall may be an important node in that machine. It may be possible, therefore, to see in the Metro Mall the possibility for enacting a post-apartheid citizenship.
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY


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SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS

BN, 17 March 2009, trader in Metro Mall
BP, 11 March 2009, trader in Metro Mall
CJP 1, 12 March 2009, member of the CJP administration
DED 1, 18 April 2009, member of Dept. of Economic Development, Johannesburg Municipality
DED 2, 25 May 2009, member of Dept. of Economic Development, Johannesburg Municipality
ICO 1, 6 March 2009, former member of the ICO and currently consultant to the municipality
ICO 2, 16 December 2009, former member of the ICO and currently employed by the municipality
JDA 1, 16 April 2009, member of the JDA strategy team
JDA 2, 20 February 2009, member of the JDA administration
JDA 3, 25 March 2009, member of the JDA administration
JFPM, 31 March 2009, member of the JFPM administration
ML, 20 March 2009, trader selling hats and bags in Pritchard Street
MN, 12 March 2009, trader in Metro Mall and member of the traders committee
MTC 1, 17 December 2009, member of the MTC administration
MTC 2, 13 February 2009, member of the MTC administration
NG, 13 March 2009, trader in Metro Mall
NJ, 15 May 2009, Nigerian trader outside Park Station
NK, 12 May 2009, trader in Metro mall and member of the Nigerian traders association
NS, 30 April 2009, trader in Metro Mall and member of the Nigerian traders association
PO, 16 March 2009, trader in Metro Mall
PP, 19 March 2009, outside Park Station
Project architect, 15 April 2009, member of the architectural team that worked on the Metro Mall
SL, 27 February 2009, member of the SANTRA committee
SPU, 18 December 2009, member of the Strategy and Policy Unit in the Johannesburg Municipality

Yeoville Activist, 20 February 2009, local activist working with street traders in Yeoville

Z, 18 March 2009, mobile trader

Focus group session 1, Metro Mall, 22 April 2009 – members of the Metro Mall traders committee

Focus group session 2, Wits University, 24 April 2009 – traders from Park Station and Wanderers Street

Focus group session 3, Metro Mall, 12 May 2009 – traders from Metro Mall

Focus group session 4, Wits University, 13 May 2009 – follow up with traders from Park Station and Wanderers Street