Destined to Fail? Why Do UN Integrated Missions Under-Perform?

Thesis

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Version: Version of Record

Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21954/ou.ro.0000f011
DESTINED TO FAIL?

Why Do UN Integrated Missions Under-Perform?

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Development Policy and Practice
The Open University

December 2014

DATE OF SUBMISSION: 9 December 2014
DATE OF AWARD: 14 July 2015
ABSTRACT

DESTINED TO FAIL?
WHY DO UN INTEGRATED MISSIONS UNDER-PERFORM?

UN integrated missions are frequently perceived as under-performing. This causes widespread frustration amongst UN staff, potentially wastes resources of UN member states, and arguably means that the international community is failing in its commitments to safeguard international peace and security. Using an analytical framework adapted from inter-organisational relations theory consisting of power dependency, resource dependency, environmental constraints and organisational learning, this thesis answers the question: why do UN integrated missions under-perform? The research examines two integrated mission case studies in depth, in Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A combination of research methods was used, including literature review, fieldwork, semi-structured interviews, observation, and document analysis. The research finds that there are political and administrative reasons why integrated missions under-perform. It also finds that there is limited organisational learning within the UN system which further prevents the improvement of integrated mission performance. Whilst staff in the integrated missions studied learn operational lessons and are able to make small-scale changes, wider, more fundamental change in how the UN carries out integrated missions does not occur. The obstacles lie in the role of UN member state interests overriding concern for quality of integrated mission performance, as well as in the administrative procedures of UN functioning. The UN is therefore institutionally prevented from implementing the lessons of its integrated mission experience. Integrated missions are not destined to fail but are instead destined only ever to under-perform.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I cannot thank my two supervisors enough for their support and guidance over the past ten years. Helen Yanacopulos and Hazel Johnson from the Open University’s Development, Policy and Practice Department (DPP) were a constant source of ideas, encouragement and chivvying along the way. Studying part-time for a PhD is not easy, and without their continued engagement, I would not have completed this work. They made supervisions fun, focused, and less daunting than they might otherwise have been. Genuinely, thank you.

DPP also supported me financially to undertake my fieldwork in the Congo, a mark of confidence that was both reassuring and helpful. It was hugely appreciated.

I would also like to thank the UK Department for International Development (DFID), my excellent employer throughout this research, and in particular my respective line managers Michael Anderson, Stefan Kossoff, Anna Morgan, and Sue Lane. DFID never stood in my way to work flexibly, and therefore enabled me not to go into the office on Fridays: precious time, providing the much-needed and valued space to think, progress and get this done.
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPE</td>
<td>Complex Political Emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Comité Technique de Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, Returns, Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>UN Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>DMS</td>
<td>UN Department for Mission Support</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>UN Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR-Althea</td>
<td>European Union Force-Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina)</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union and OSCE Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (DRC Armed Forces)</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>HPMEC</td>
<td>Open University Human Participant and Materials Ethics Committee</td>
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<td>ICD</td>
<td>Inter-Congolese Dialogue</td>
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<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<td>ICO</td>
<td>International Civilian Office (in Kosovo)</td>
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<td>ICR</td>
<td>International Civilian Representative</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force (NATO mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IM</td>
<td>Integrated Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>IOR</td>
<td>Inter-Organisational Relations</td>
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<td>IORs</td>
<td>Inter-Organisational Relationships</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Congo (literally, Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Stabilisation Mission in the Congo (literally, Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies de Stabilisation au Congo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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OSCE  Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OT  Organisation Theory
PISG  Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (in Kosovo)
PKO  Peacekeeping Operation
QIP  Quick Impact Project
R2P  The Responsibility to Protect
RBB  Results-Based Budgeting
RC  Resident Coordinator
RCD  Congolese Rally for Democracy (literally, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie)
RDC  République Démocratique du Congo (French language version of DRC)
SCR  Security Council Resolution
SFOR  Stabilisation Force (NATO mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
SPM  Special Political Mission
SRSG  Special Representative of the (UN) Secretary-General
SSR  Security Sector Reform
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
UNAMA  United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNDOF  United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (Syria)
UNHCR  UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOSOM  United Nations Mission in Somalia
UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
UNITAF  Unified Taskforce (Somalia)
UNMIBH  UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK  UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMISS  UN Mission in South Sudan
UNTAET  UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNV  UN Volunteer
US  United States
USAID  US Agency for International Development
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Identifying the Problem and Aims of the Research

This research is concerned with explaining the under-performance of United Nations (UN) civilian peacekeeping missions. It shows that there are both political and organisational reasons why UN integrated missions are prevented from implementing the lessons learned from operational experience. This means that integrated missions are not as effective as they could be; this research seeks to understand why.

The operating constraints facing any peacekeeping mission are inherently challenging, meaning the complete fulfilment of a mission mandate will always be unlikely. Yet political and organisational influences on peacekeeping missions, specific to integrated missions, mean that under-performance is endemic and persistent. The research shows that performance improvement on UN integrated missions is unlikely due to the political nature of the functioning of the UN system. This has implications for the maintenance of global peace and security.

The civilian aspects of a UN peacekeeping operation are commonly made up of various organisations working together as part of a larger whole, commonly termed an integrated mission. The term integrated mission was introduced to UN practice in the late 1990s to reflect the complexity of UN

1 Although there is currently no agreed definition or understanding of what constitutes effectiveness on a UN integrated mission, for the purposes of this thesis, effectiveness is understood in terms of fulfilment of mission mandates
peacekeeping operations and efforts to improve coherence across their civilian and military components. The organisations making up a civilian integrated mission may be various UN agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and/or other international organisations including regional bodies, such as the European Union (EU) or African Union (AU). Typically, a civilian integrated mission will undertake any number of activities, from the provision of basic humanitarian relief, to peacebuilding activities, supporting a country's institutions to be (re-)established following a conflict, promoting economic growth, and/or undertaking core civil administration tasks in the absence of a formal government.

The proposition of this thesis is that integrated missions are not as effective as they could be. They under-perform for both political and organisational reasons. Having established missions on the basis of compromise and agreed areas of political focus, the UN Security Council does not subsequently go on to monitor integrated mission progress in a structured way. Instead, over time, the individual political interests of UN member states override any focus on the operational efficiency of integrated missions: having focused on why a mission should be established and what tasks that mission should be required to fulfil, member states do not subsequently focus on how progress is made against the tasks a mission has been mandated to undertake. Operationally, the UN learns the lessons of its integrated mission experience, but these do not translate into improved practice on the ground. In addition, cumbersome administrative processes in the UN system compound the challenges faced.

This thesis originated in my own empirical experience working on UN integrated missions. Based in Macedonia, Kosovo and subsequently in East Timor as a member of UN staff, I witnessed first-hand some of the administrative challenges faced by staff working on integrated missions. It was particularly striking that many of the same challenges to mission effectiveness experienced in Kosovo
seemed also to be faced on an entirely different mission, in a totally different context, in East Timor. These included high staff vacancy rates, lack of equipment and a sense of not engaging sufficiently with the local population. This experience sparked an interest to learn more about why similar challenges are faced on UN integrated missions regardless of location, timing and context. Having explored some of the literature about integrated missions, I had questions about how the UN, as a system, learns from its experiences and puts them into improved practice. The literature on integrated mission performance was quite sparse. There seemed to be a gap in the literature about organisational form and behaviour and links to political negotiation, i.e. between the structure of an integrated mission and its effectiveness, and their links to UN political negotiation. This thesis begins to address that gap.

Much has been written about the “what” and the “why” of peacekeeping. The aim of this thesis is therefore to look at the “how”. There is a broad, relevant literature that clearly presents the political reasoning behind why each peacekeeping mission is established or withdrawn. Much has also been written on the what – how much is spent, how many staff or military personnel are deployed, how long missions are in place. The literature on how missions perform, however, is relatively weak.

Using two missions as case studies – in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kosovo – the thesis examines how missions are set up, including the institutional and political context in which they are established; how this may have changed over time; how organisations within any one mission interact amongst themselves and with others; and what constraints are faced by staff as they undertake their day-to-day work. Relations between mission staff in the country, and their counterparts based at UN headquarters in New York are also investigated.
The question in the title – destined to fail? – is a genuine one. Chapter 2 sets out the small literature produced to date about integrated mission performance, and shows how any review of practice so far conducted consistently concludes that efforts could have been more effective, and the challenges faced by missions are similar, regardless of context. The literature, nonetheless, stops some way off stating that integrated missions fail outright. Failure can be a subjective concept, and certainly there are observers of peacekeeping that consider this level of under-performance as “failures” (O’Gorman, 2011: 135). That is not the view of this author. Instead, this thesis seeks to explore some of the reasons why integrated missions consistently under-perform. It is written with a view to contributing to knowledge about how integrated mission practice might be improved in the future.

In this introductory chapter, initial background on peacekeeping is provided, by contextualising the challenges faced by any peacekeeping operation and integrated missions within them, and setting out how the concept of integrated missions came about. After outlining the research questions, my interest in the problem is further explained, as well as why case studies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Kosovo were chosen as settings (and missions) in which to conduct fieldwork. Finally, the chapter summarises the structure of the thesis and its findings.

1.2 Integrated Missions as Part of Peacekeeping Operations

The United Nations’ Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has an overall mandate to “plan, prepare, manage and direct UN peacekeeping operations, so that they can effectively fulfil their mandates”.2 DPKO states that peacekeeping operation mandates may well cover the need to:

---

➢ Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spillover of conflict across borders;
➢ Stabilise conflict situations after a cease fire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;
➢ Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements;
➢ Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development.³

The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, and is the foundation document for all United Nations work. The UN was established to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping itself is not mentioned in the Charter and yet has evolved into one of the main tools used by the UN to achieve this purpose (UN, 2008a: 6). The UN has undertaken 68 peacekeeping missions since 1948, 16 of which are ongoing at the time of this research.

The terms “peacekeeping operation”, “peacekeeping mission” and “integrated mission” are often used interchangeably, by both observers and mission staff. In itself, this is evidence of a lack of consolidated understanding within the UN system of what integrated missions are and are trying to be. Since the 1990s, the term integrated mission has changed, so that today it holds different meanings for different people. Formally, the term includes not just those organisations making up a peacekeeping operation – both civilian and military – but also all the other UN agencies present in a country. This research will show that this current definition is not yet fully understood by UN staff, even those working on peacekeeping missions. For the purposes of this thesis, terminology is used in the following way:

*Integrated mission* refers only to the civilian aspects of peacekeeping missions. Note that this does not include other UN agencies working in the same country as a mission, although links between missions and other UN organisations are examined as part of the research.

*Peacekeeping mission* will be used to refer to all elements of an operation in any one country – i.e. the integrated mission and its military contingent counterpart.

*Peacekeeping operation* will refer to all elements of an individual mission: this includes in-country civilian and military operations, related activities at UN headquarters level, in New York, and any other regional or headquarter location, such as logistics bases or out-of-country liaison offices.

These terminological definitions are set out in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: Terminology: The Components of Peacekeeping Operations](image-url)
Peacekeeping missions are products of political discussion and negotiation at the UN Security Council in New York. As such, they are – almost by definition – inherently political organisations. What happens in international politics affects what happens in the Security Council, and what happens in the Security Council is reflected in how integrated missions are set up in any particular country.

Within peacekeeping, integrated missions are a relatively new phenomenon: the first was the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established in 1999. UNMIK brought together all the (civilian) international organisations operating as part of the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, and sat alongside the Kosovo Force, or KFOR - the military component of the mission. UNMIK was the 32nd UN peacekeeping mission to be established.

UNMIK’s integrated structure was set up in response to the widely-recognised coordination failures on previous peacekeeping missions, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a country just next door to Kosovo, and having had its own mission, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNMIBH, since 1995. In addition to UNMIBH, five other peacekeeping missions had been deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina during overlapping time periods: the UN’s Protection Force (UNPROFOR); NATO’s Stabilisation Force and Implementation Force (SFOR and IFOR); the joint European Union (EU) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM); and the EU military mission, codenamed Althea (EUFOR-Althea). None of these missions included any of the activity by international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) also present in the conflict zone (Balas, 2011: 1).

By including all international organisations under one umbrella structure, headed by one overall responsible officer, it was anticipated that coordination challenges within UNMIK would be better
addressed than had previously proven to be the case on other peacekeeping missions, and in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In turn, it was hoped that such a structure would enable greater effectiveness of international operations at ground level.

Integrated missions are led by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) who serves as the senior United Nations representative in a country. SRSGs commonly have at least two deputies (DSRSGs). The heads of each organisation making up the integrated mission are usually DSRSGs, with one DSRSG also acting as “Resident Coordinator” (RC). The Resident Coordinator is the Head of UNDP, charged with coordinating all UN agency activity in a given country. Depending on the particular circumstances of a country, the Head of UNDP will frequently also serve as the UN’s Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), responsible for ensuring coherence across all UN humanitarian activity in a country. This is known as “double-hatting” – i.e. one individual serving as both Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC). In the event that a peacekeeping mission is established in a country, the SRSG assumes overall charge of UN activity, with the RC/HC displaced to become a DSRSG of the civilian peacekeeping mission. This has two implications: first that, in some countries where a peacekeeping mission has been established, there will be one individual “triple-hatted” to work as DSRSG, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator. This involves oversight of what can be up to several thousand staff. Second, the setting up a peacekeeping mission will inherently establish a tension between the staff of those agencies already working in a country and those more newly-arrived to work on the mission. Analysing the relations between these two parts of the UN system reveals the response strategies of each organisation as a result (Chapter 6).

Peacekeeping is therefore difficult, for three principal reasons:
➢ It is undertaken in some of the toughest operating environments in the world, where events are volatile, fluid, and change fast. High levels of violent conflict are the norm rather than exceptions; and physically, the infrastructure is weak or often destroyed.

➢ Against the background of a difficult environment, integrated missions are required to undertake complex tasks, effectively to re-establish the functioning of a state’s political and administrative systems in a sustainable, peaceful way. This is highly political and contentious.

➢ And finally, to do this, integrated missions are established with a multitude of stakeholders – all with differing backgrounds and sometimes even competing strategic objectives. So the internal management of these missions is itself political.

The end of the Cold War saw an upsurge in requests to the UN to undertake peacekeeping missions. Where previously international relations had prevented agreement or decision-making on action from being taken in the Security Council, this changed from 1989 onwards. Of the total 68 missions established to date, just 13 (19%) were set up before 1989. Indeed, between just the five years from 1989 to 2004, a further 20 were established.

At the same time, peacekeeping mission mandates became increasingly complex: where previously UN staff and peacekeepers had been tasked to undertake observation, or small-scale peace support operations, frequently unarmed, and undertaking small-scale confidence-building activities or simply monitoring and reporting on any given situation, during the 1990s, missions were increasingly asked to combine political, security and development tasks, all as part of the same overall operating structure.
The establishment in 1999 of the integrated nature within civilian aspects of peacekeeping missions reflected both these new realities. UNMIK for example, the first integrated mission, was tasked not only with traditional military peacekeeping, but also with the provision of humanitarian assistance; the development of long-term, sustainable political institutions; economic development; and the assumption of all government administration in the province of Kosovo. The UN had never previously been tasked with such a mandate.

Nonetheless, despite the changes in frequency and increased complexity of peacekeeping requirements, it was not until 2000 that the UN undertook its first attempts at peacekeeping reform. Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a Panel on UN Peace Operations, chaired by one of his staff, Lakhdar Brahimi, to review all aspects of peacekeeping until that time. The Panel’s final report, which became known as “the Brahimi Report” (or simply, “Brahimi”) made several recommendations to the UN and its member states for improving the quality of peacekeeping itself, some of which have now been implemented as standard practice in recent missions.

The overall headlines of the report included a call to member states for:

- a renewed commitment to peacekeeping
- increased financial support; and
- significant institutional change within the UN system to improve effectiveness

(UN, 2000a: 54-58)

In particular, the Panel noted that in order to be effective, UN peacekeeping operations must be properly resourced and equipped, and operate under clear, credible and achievable mandates (UN, 2000a: 64, my italics). Since Brahimi, two further reviews have been undertaken. The first, Peace
Operations 2010 was initiated in 2006, just over five years after the publication of Brahimi. This led to the UN's 2008 New Horizon Exercise which again cited deficiencies in peacekeeping operations, and for the first time produced guidelines (the Capstone Doctrine) on best practice for the management of missions. Note that this was eight years after the recommendation for their production had been made and almost sixty years after the establishment of the UN's first peacekeeping mission. Notably, both reviews cite resource constraints as impacting on mission effectiveness. The scale and complexity of peacekeeping are flagged as "straining (the UN's) personnel, administrative and support machinery" (DPKO, 2009: ii).

Most recently, the UN has undertaken a further Civilian Capacity Review (CivCap) specifically to address ongoing concerns about civilian practice on peacekeeping missions. CivCap recognises the need for the international community still to put its "own house in order" to enable improved practice on building and consolidating peace (UN, 2011: 2). Taken together, these reviews constitute the basis for the argument that UN civilian practice on peacekeeping missions has, for some time, been less effective than it could have been. The UN has acknowledged these weaknesses for over twelve years, yet practice remains challenging and unsatisfactory for several UN personnel.

It is the evidence from these reviews, as well as my own empirical experience on peacekeeping missions that led to the research questions for this thesis. In seeking to understand why peacekeeping missions under-perform, there were various potential explanations: could mission under-performance be explained by poor management? Or, given the structure of the UN system that established integrated missions, was there a more political explanation for lack of mission effectiveness? Was there a link between the complex structure of integrated missions, and performance levels? How, if at all, was the UN learning the lessons of its integrated missions? By posing these questions based on
empirical experience and an overview of peacekeeping literature, the central research question was formulated, with three complementary sub-questions also posed in order to respond to the central question.

1.3 Research Questions

This thesis sets out to examine some of the reasons why civilian peacekeeping missions are perceived by UN staff and observers as under-performing. The object of the study is integrated missions; the scope is their management and the political processes that influence their operation.

The central research question is:

- Why do UN integrated missions under-perform?

The sub-questions are:

- How do relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions?
- How do inter-organisational relations impact on UN integrated missions?
- How does the UN learn from its experience of integrated missions?

Further detail on how these questions were arrived at follow the literature review and analytical framework presented in Chapter 2.
1.4 Why Research Missions in Kosovo and the DRC?

In order to answer the research questions, two ongoing integrated missions were selected as case studies for specific examination. These were the UN interim administrative mission in Kosovo (UNMiK) and the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). (MONUC is an acronym from the French language version of the mission’s title – Mission de la Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo [UN Mission in the Congo].) UNMiK was chosen as a case study for this research because of its status as the UN’s first integrated mission. UNMiK was also, at the time of its establishment, the largest peacekeeping operation in history, with 10,000 civilian staff on the integrated mission, and 50,000 military troops making up the rest of the peacekeeping mission (Allied Command Operations, 2012: 1). It was considered that UNMiK’s scale would potentially provide a rich source of data.

In order to respond to the new, integrated focus of operations, UNMiK’s structure was created against four “pillars”. Each pillar represented a separate focus of UNMiK’s mandate, and was led by a different international organisation:

- **Pillar 1** was headed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) who were responsible for coordinating all humanitarian activity in Kosovo at that time;
- **Pillar 2** was headed by UN Civilian Affairs, and charged with public administration;
- **Pillar 3** was headed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and tasked to build up Kosovo’s institutions for the future; and
- **Pillar 4** was headed by the European Union (EU) and mandated with overseeing Kosovo’s economic reconstruction.
All four pillars were headed by a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG), and UNMiK as a whole was overseen by one individual, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Together, this structure formed the integrated mission of UNMiK (see Figure 2).

![Figure 2: UNMiK: the First UN Integrated Mission](image)

Note that, as stated above, this integrated mission structure sat alongside the military component of the peacekeeping mission, KFOR (or Kosovo Force). The term “UNMiK” has consistently been used to refer either to the civilian integrated mission only, or to both the civilian and military components together.

The peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, or Congo), known as MONUC, was chosen as a case study for a number of reasons:

i) DRC is situated in a different geographical place to Kosovo (Africa as opposed to Europe);

ii) MONUC is routinely cited as “the largest peacekeeping mission in the world” due to the financial costs of the operation, despite a far smaller military presence in the country than was
deployed to Kosovo. Like UNMiK, MONUC therefore potentially provided a rich source of data; and

iii) for having a different operating structure to UNMiK given all its civilian staff are drawn from the UN Secretariat or various UN agencies.

MONUC was established in 2000, and in fact ended in 2010, when a subsequent peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO was set up (Mission de la Organisation des Nations Unies de Stabilisation au Congo [or, in English, the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Congo]). Similar to UNMiK, MONUC was also established under an integrated, pillar structure, with an SRSG overseeing all operations. MONUC, however, only had two pillars – for Humanitarian Operations, and Rule of Law activities – and different departments were established under each of these. The Humanitarian pillar was made up of departments for elections; civil affairs; mine action; and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and the Rule of Law pillar was made up of political affairs; security sector reform (SSR); legal; internal oversight; and public information departments (see Figure 3).

Over time, the mission expanded its activities, so that, when formed in 2010, MONUSCO retained a two-pillar structure, but some Rule of Law activities now came under the specific remit of the Office of the SRSO. MONUSCO was therefore a very similar but slightly modified version of MONUC (see Figure 4).
Figure 3: MONUC: The Largest Peacekeeping Operation in the World

Figure 4: MONUSCO: A Modified Version of MONUC
Whilst in some ways quite similar to UNMiK, especially in terms of mission structure, the contrast of one mission in Europe and another in Africa posed a potentially interesting comparative story. In particular, Kosovo is a relatively tiny territory, covering just 10,887 square kilometres. In 1999, the territory was merely a province of Serbia, which itself at that time was one of the two (of previously six) remaining autonomous republics in what was the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Kosovo, compared to most geographic locations of peacekeeping missions, also had a relatively good infrastructure.

In contrast, DRC is vast. It covers 2.3 million square kilometres, an area of land the size of Western Europe, and yet in 2000 – when MONUC was set up – had less than 100 km of paved roads, and was one of the poorest countries in the world. More background detail on the contexts of both Kosovo and DRC and their respective integrated missions will be given in Chapter 4, but for here, it was the contrast between the two contexts that was interesting to me as a researcher. I wanted to examine how international politics played out in these two very different contexts, and what this meant – if anything – in terms of mission performance.

Finally, whilst UNMiK and MONUC were established in 1999 and 2000 respectively, it was useful to me as a researcher to be able to visit missions that were ongoing during the period of my study. UNMiK remains in Kosovo to this day, and although MONUC ended during my research, in 2010, it was replaced immediately with a follow-up mission (MONUSCO – Figure 4) allowing me to visit an ongoing operation on the ground when I was conducting research fieldwork.
1.5 Thesis Argument and Structure

This thesis argues that the effectiveness of UN integrated missions is undermined in two ways: first, by the political relations between UN member states; and second, by the UN's own internal management practices. Missions are set mandates which end up not being fulfilled. UN staff who work on integrated missions know this and report this, but little change is made in mission administration or structure, and over time mission performance deteriorates. Lessons are therefore learned at the operational level but the UN as a system is prevented from improving practice due to the political nature of member state interaction.

Political interaction between UN member states undermines integrated missions as, over time, bilateral interests override the collective interests of member states present when initial mission mandates are set. Over time, mandates therefore become increasingly complicated as more and more tasks and activities are added to them: instead of reaching a compromise position across member states as when negotiating new mission mandates, over time member states simply add in their own specific areas of interests. Mandates become wishlists of the many, rather than the collective, more realistic and focused tasks of the few. This situation is exacerbated by overly-cumbersome administrative UN procedures which impose operational controls on management processes, unsuited to the realities of integrated mission operations.

These two causes of undermining integrated missions are mutually-reinforcing: political relations, interaction and negotiation between UN member states, mean that the UN's administrative practices on integrated missions are left un-scrutinised, and contribute to mission under-performance without being addressed. This undermining of effectiveness is important not just from a practical, value-for-money
perspective – if funds are contributed to missions which perform less effectively than they might, then resources are being wasted – but also from a conceptual perspective – that the international community (in the form of the UN system) is somehow failing those it purports to support. The UN was established to safeguard international peace and security; if it is agreed an integrated mission should be established to ensure this and that mission goes on to under-perform, then the international system is failing in its obligations on international peace and security.

Integrated missions face inherent challenges simply due to their innate complexity, and the fact that they exist solely in difficult, dangerous, and often insecure environments. These contextual factors of integrated missions are unavoidable, meaning that some level of under-performance can always be anticipated. Nonetheless, the political nature of how missions are negotiated means that the UN member states who establish integrated missions usually do not resource them adequately or scrutinise their performance in an informed way. This leads to a heavier loss of focus on high-quality administrative management on the part of senior mission staff than might otherwise be expected or acceptable. It also leads to mission resources being used for different purposes than those anticipated. These tensions are exacerbated by overly-rigid formal administrative procedures in the UN system, notably in human resource management and budgeting processes, which lead mission staff to adopt informal practices of their own. This thesis argues that it is the combination of these political and administrative factors that results in consistent integrated mission under-performance.

The thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter 2 explores the key literature on peacekeeping as part of international politics, as well as organisation and inter-organisational relations theory. It argues that the history of peacekeeping reveals
a gap between the organisational form and politics of the international system, and that this prevents performance improvement on integrated missions being made. During the course of the 1990s, the decade immediately following the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council set increasingly unachievable tasks for its peacekeeping missions, without resourcing integrated missions to fulfil them.

A brief history of peacekeeping is provided, as well some analysis of peacekeeping from various authors who have attempted to explain how peacekeeping as an international activity has come about. The literature sets out the origins of peacekeeping from the start of the United Nations and its development into an expanded set of activities focusing on statebuilding and civilian protection. Further detail about the principal reviews of peacekeeping operations that have been undertaken to date is also provided. In order to link the two broad bodies of literature used in this thesis, on peacekeeping and organisation theory, the chapter goes on to provide a summary of relevant literature on multilateralism.

Next, in order to examine the “how” of integrated missions, i.e. how they function as organisations, how they relate with other organisations and how they perform against mandated objectives, the chapter also presents an overview of organisation theory, inter-organisational relations theory, and theories of organisational learning. It sets out which elements of this theory is used in the analytical framework for the thesis, introducing concepts of power dependency, resource dependency, environmental constraints and single-, double-, and triple-loop organisational learning. The chapter presents the analytical framework used in this thesis to examine integrated missions and their performance. This comprises the three inter-linking elements from inter-organisational relations theory: power dependency, resource dependency and environmental constraints, as conceptualised by Joseph Galaskiewicz (Galaskiewicz, 1985). The chapter sets out that only once fieldwork had been undertaken and data collected was this framework revised to include a perspective of organisational...
learning. The initial analytical framework drawn up for this research required an additional dimension to explain some of the findings from the research data; the analytical framework was therefore refined during the course of the research process. Finally the chapter re-states the research questions, and summarises all the literature presented.

Chapter 3 explains the methodology used to gather and analyse data. A case study approach was adopted to examine integrated missions. To research these cases, semi-structured interview, observation and document analysis methods were used. This chapter presents the research questions in more detail and sets out how the scope of the research was defined. The process of selecting the case studies of integrated missions in Kosovo and DRC is presented. How each research method was used is set out, and some of the challenges, dilemmas and ethical issues faced whilst conducting this research are presented. Finally, the chapter explains the approach used in data analysis for this thesis.

Chapter 4 provides historical contextual background on both DRC and Kosovo. It sets out a political analysis of both countries, including the involvement of the international community over the past 20 to 50 years. The background and evolutions of the integrated mission case studies in each of these countries are also presented, including reflections on mission performance that exist in the literature.

Chapter 5 is the first of two chapters that analyses the data collected as part of this research. The chapter answers the first of the three sub-questions: How do relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions? Data findings on power dependency, resource dependency and environmental constraints are provided. In so doing, the chapter contributes part of the answer to the third research sub-question: How does the UN learn from its experience of integrated missions? It is argued that UN member state relations, particularly those within the UN Security Council, significantly
influence the size, duration and legitimacy of integrated missions. Commonly, this results in inadequate resources being provided to missions to implement their mandated tasks. Over time, UN member state interest in integrated missions declines and bilateral interests strengthen, leading to a loss of focus within mission mandates and consequent lack of direction for UN staff. The loss of member state focus on integrated mission performance prevents systemic learning within the UN meaning that similar weaknesses in performance are found in various integrated missions, regardless of location, size or geo-political significance. Learning takes place at the operational level (single-loop learning) but this is not institutionalised across the UN as a whole (double-loop learning). As such, whilst integrated missions are therefore not destined to fail, the chapter argues they are instead destined only ever to under-perform. The chapter also highlights weaknesses in the framework used to examine inter-organisational relations, principally that environmental constraints are not as significant a factor in examining integrated missions as power and resource dependencies.

Chapter 6 addresses the second research sub-question: How do inter-organisational relations impact on UN integrated missions? In so doing, a further response is provided to the third sub-question: How does the UN learn from its experience of integrated missions? The chapter argues that, despite the political tensions set out in Chapter 5 leading to under-performance on integrated missions, internal administrative processes within the UN system exacerbate an already-messy situation. Mission structures become distorted over time due to the organisational behaviour of the component parts of integrated missions. Yet formally, mission structures remain the same. This suggests that UN member states are either not fully aware of the day-to-day operational practice of integrated missions, or they ignore the challenges being faced. Either way, lack of response from the Security Council enables mission under-performance to continue. The chapter also argues that senior staff lose full control of day-day mission management as staff adopt informal coping mechanisms to address the resource and
administrative constraints they face. As in Chapter 5, it is shown that single-loop learning takes place at the level of the integrated missions, but that this is not translated into broader operationalisation of lessons learned across the UN system. The sheer scale of activity involved in peacekeeping is shown to be the primary environmental constraint faced on integrated missions. It is argued that the lack of systemic lesson learning, caused by the political and administrative constraints borne out in the data, reflects weaknesses in the international community’s safeguarding of global peace and security. The continued under-performance of integrated missions is driven by a lack of adequate scrutiny on the part of the Security Council of how civilian peacekeeping is undertaken. This raises effectiveness and cost effectiveness questions about integrated missions.

Chapter 7 concludes the research, providing an overview of all the data found during production of this thesis, and summarising the background literature and research methodology. The chapter draws on the evidence presented in the preceding empirical Chapters 5 and 6. By summarising the findings of the three sub-questions, the central research question, Why do UN integrated missions under-perform?, is answered. Integrated missions under-perform for political and administrative reasons. Indeed, they are institutionally prevented from improving their performance. Not only do the politics of relations between UN member states affect integrated missions in a way that integrated mission staff find confusing, but the rigid administrative procedures of the UN system, in particular surrounding human resource management and budgeting processes, serve to prevent integrated missions from performing as effectively as both they could, and as their staff largely state they want to. This raises questions about the level of success the UN achieves in its goal of safeguarding international peace and security. The contribution to knowledge is set out, including a critique of Galaskiewicz’s presentation of inter-organisational relations. Finally, the chapter concludes with suggestions for possible further research that could be conducted to confirm and expand the findings of this project.
1.6 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a brief introduction to the thesis. Initial reasoning behind why the research was conducted has been set out, linked both to my own experience in Kosovo, Macedonia and East Timor, as well as to the few reviews on peacekeeping that have so far been conducted. This led to a presentation of the research questions, and overviews of the structures of the two case study integrated missions used in the research. Finally, an outline of the thesis as a whole was presented.

Chapter 2 will now present an overview of peacekeeping literature, setting out the history of peacekeeping and how it has evolved over time. To link peacekeeping to integrated mission performance, and how missions function as organisations, this is followed by background on organisation theory, inter-organisational relations and organisational learning. This literature was examined with a view to understanding the “how” of peacekeeping, i.e. why it is that integrated missions both behave as they do and seem consistently to under-perform.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Chapter 1 gave an overview of this thesis as a whole. This Chapter 2 will present further detail on the background of peacekeeping and how it has evolved since the creation of the United Nations. It argues that there is a gap between the organisational form and politics of the international system, and that this prevents improvements being made in integrated mission performance. With the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping mandates have expanded and the number of peacekeeping operations has greatly increased. Yet, literature on how the civilian elements of peacekeeping missions perform is relatively sparse. This thesis seeks to examine this performance by looking at integrated missions as organisations. As such, this chapter also sets out background on organisation theory, linking the two through a brief presentation of relevant literature on multilateralism. Since integrated missions as organisational entities are themselves frequently made up of multiple organisations, literature on inter-organisational relations theory is also presented. Finally, since early analysis of fieldwork data exposed challenges in UN organisational learning, a brief overview of organisational learning literature is provided with an explanation of how it was integrated into the analytical framework. The chapter ends by providing further details on how the research questions for this work were drawn up.

The previous chapter showed how UN integrated missions are part of broader peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping relates to both security and development aspects of international relations, and as such is
multi-disciplinary. Whilst there is a wealth of literature on peacekeeping, from conceptual theories on best practice, to grey literature about individual missions and specific activities they undertake, there is relatively little academic literature written specifically about integrated missions. This perhaps reflects the shifts in understanding and definition of what precisely constitutes an integrated mission.

Today, the term integrated mission is understood to cover all aspects of a UN’s presence in a country where a peacekeeping mission has been established (UN, 2006: 11). The integrated aspect of the term refers to the attempt to coordinate all UN activities under one umbrella, i.e. of both the peacekeeping mission, civilian and military, and all UN agencies represented in a country. In this way, the security focus of a peacekeeping mission is linked – in theory at least – to the development focus of other UN agencies operating in a country, in particular the UN Development Programme, UNDP. As set out in Chapter 1, UNDP is the UN agency responsible for coordinating all UN agency activity in a country, whether the other UN funds and agencies present form part of a peacekeeping mission or not. The head of UNDP in a country where a peacekeeping mission is established will also serve as the Deputy Head of the Peacekeeping Mission (DSRSG). The term integrated mission therefore reflects the coordination challenges inherent in peacekeeping work, and the UN’s organisational attempts to address them.

This understanding of the term integrated mission was nonetheless only introduced to UN practice in 2006 with the establishment of peacekeeping practice guidelines, or Capstone Doctrine (UN, 2006). Prior to this, an integrated mission (as introduced in Chapter 1) had referred only to attempts at coordination within a peacekeeping mission itself – both across the civilian international organisations making up the mission, as well as between the civilian and military components of a wider peacekeeping mission. How this evolution in terminology has come about mirrors the history of
peacekeeping practice, and reflects a growing understanding in the international community of the importance of linking security and development activity: to ensure security activity is as effective as it might be, it needs to be linked to longer-term development activity (Hettne, 2010: 31; World Bank, 2011: xl). Likewise, to ensure development activity is as effective as it might be, security challenges need to be addressed first. The challenge for the international community, i.e. all member states of the United Nations, is to make these two parts of the UN system work together coherently. To learn about integrated missions, therefore, the history of peacekeeping needs to be set out.

This chapter sets out a brief history of peacekeeping in the following sections. Peacekeeping itself is a core function of international relations, and is frequently undertaken by international organisations. Therefore, to understand how integrated missions came to be established, a review of literature on international relations generally, and international organisations specifically, is required. What those international organisations are tasked to do in a peacekeeping context is then explored by examining literature on humanitarian intervention and statebuilding. The end of the Cold War is highlighted in each section as representing a paradigmatic shift of approach for all relevant spheres of activity and for all relevant stakeholders involved in peacekeeping. The 1990s witnessed not just the beginnings of a merging of security and development practice, but also the expansion of demands on peacekeeping operations, the growth of so-called humanitarian intervention, and a significant increase in the numbers of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in peacekeeping operating environments. A section follows on the early analyses of peacekeeping, as academics sought to explain why peacekeeping had come to look how it does. Finally, an overview of the principal peacekeeping reviews conducted to date is provided. It is shown that whilst much has been written about the “what” and the “why” of peacekeeping, the literature on the “how” – how integrated missions are managed and how well they perform – is relatively light.

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The lack of attention in the literature on how civilian peacekeeping is undertaken suggests both a lack of awareness of what integrated missions are, and consequently of what they may or may not be capable of achieving. This should be borne in mind when reading this chapter as it forms a central tenet of the overall thesis: that there is a gap between the politics of the UN as a system and the management of integrated missions as organisations. Despite over twenty years having passed since the end of the Cold War, the international community still struggles to put into practice its objectives to integrate the two sides of its system, security and development. Essentially, the operational side of the UN is prevented from institutionalising lessons learned from its experiences of integrated missions due to the political relations between UN member states. There is some work within multilateralism literature that sets this out, yet it remains quite sparse.

Consequently, in seeking to examine the performance of integrated missions as organisations, literature on organisation theory is also presented. Next, given that integrated missions are frequently made up of various organisations, inter-organisational relations theory needs to be looked at. This provides the theoretical background both on how organisational relations within integrated missions might affect performance, but also on relations between integrated missions as organisational entities and wider parts of the international system. Finally, given similar lessons seem to be found from the experiences of integrated missions, learning within the UN system does not seem to be being institutionalised. The chapter therefore presents an overview of organisational learning literature. A focus by UN member states on the political aspects of security to the detriment of a focus on achievements in development activity means that integrated missions are not robustly held to account. In turn, this allows for a loss of effectiveness and overall impact of integrated missions. Organisational change for integrated missions, in terms of how they are structured and set up, becomes very difficult for the UN, given the political nature of international negotiation, and consequent lack of attention on administrative
performance. Despite the varied (albeit limited) grey literature on the inadequacies of civilian peacekeeping that repeatedly reflects similar administrative weaknesses in integrated mission performance, the politics of UN negotiation mean that improvements to integrated mission performance are therefore very difficult to bring about. There is a gap between the organisational form of UN operations and the politics of UN member state negotiation. The evidence of this political-administrative divide in UN practice suggests that integrated missions are therefore destined only ever to under-perform.

There are five main sections in this chapter. Following this introduction, Section 2.2 sets out relevant literature on peacekeeping. Section 2.3 makes a link between peacekeeping literature and organisation theory with a brief summary of relevant literature on multilateralism. Section 2.4 presents relevant literature on organisation theory, inter-organisational relations theory and organisational learning. Section 2.5 wraps the preceding sections together to present an analytical framework for the research.

2.2 A Brief History of Peacekeeping: Humanitarian Intervention, the Responsibility to Protect, and Statebuilding

The study of peacekeeping is set within the context of international relations. This section gives a short introduction to the two main schools of international relations thought. It goes on to discuss those areas of international relations most relevant to peacekeeping and how peacekeeping operations have evolved over time. These include humanitarian intervention, the so-called “Responsibility to Protect”, and statebuilding.
Theories of international relations tend be theories of states (Barnett & Finnemore, 2007: 41). International relations today remain framed by the post-World War II international order. In an attempt to prevent the scourge of international war happening again, the prevailing powers of World War II established the United Nations system. The system itself reflects both the political world order of 1945, as well as the approach to and thinking around global security of that time.

The two principal schools of thought in international relations concern liberal economic theory and realism (Jackson & Sorenson, 2007: 3-6). Liberal economic theory in international relations emphasises cooperation, peace, and progress. Liberalists take a positive view of human nature, and are convinced that rational principles can be applied to international affairs (Jackson & Sorenson, 2007: 98). Whilst recognising that individuals are competitive and selfish up to a point, liberalists argue that people ultimately want to cooperate with each other for the greater benefit of all. Conflict and war are therefore not inevitable (Jackson & Sorenson, 2007: 98). A liberal view of the state is that it should enable the individual to thrive. Modern liberalism follows a broad logic along the lines that if states could be established (or built) to resemble those that had prevailed in World War II, then those states – and thereby the world – would be peaceful (Jackson & Sorenson, 2007: 7-8). From the outset of the establishment of the United Nations system, statebuilding – and specifically statebuilding that promoted economically liberal states – was thus inherently linked to peace and international security. Not only this, but the means through which such statebuilding should be brought about – i.e. through hierarchical organisations, with boundaried sets of activities to be undertaken within fixed time limits – also reflected a 1940s liberal economic view of how to get things done (Jackson & Sorenson, 2007: 13-18).
Realism (or political realism) on the other hand is a school of thought that explains international relations in terms of power (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2011: 35). In contrast to liberalism, realism theory is more pessimistic; it argues that international relations are necessarily conflictive, and that conflicts between states are ultimately resolved through war (Jackson & Sorenson, 2007: 60). Realist thinking suggests that individuals strive for power, and that all human actions are attempts both to avoid being dominated by others, and actively to gain control over others (Morgenthau, 1965: 195). Against this line of thinking, the structures put in place for the new international system after World War II were therefore established to enable discussion between these two competing schools of thought (rather than resorting to violence): disputes could be mediated at the international level, and global peace and security could be assured. The balance of power, however, was not equal: there would be five permanent seats on the Security Council – the pinnacle of the new system to negotiate international relations – all with an equal power of veto. Any country without a seat on the Security Council would necessarily have less influence in international affairs.

2.2.1 Humanitarian intervention

The end of the Cold War marked a significant shift in how countries engaged with each other, both between those states represented at the Security Council, and between individual permanent Security Council states and their allies. Resource transfers from wealthier countries to what had previously been their satellite states stopped: “the US no longer needed to shore up its allies in the developing world and so ODA [Official Development Assistance] decreased throughout the 1990s” (Barakat 2010: 22). This led to the gradual erosion of some states’ capacity either to govern, or to protect themselves from political contestation. Where previously political opposition was managed, either through the distribution of funds or forceful repression, the demise of the Cold War meant funds were no longer
available to continue as before. The political space to contest the status quo was opened, manifested as violent conflict (Duffield, 2001: 48).

So-called “new wars” – those contested in a newly-globalised world of inter-connectedness – began to emerge in the early 1990s as power relations in these states began to be contested violently (Duffield, 2001: 13-15; Kaldor, 2006: 1-2). In turn, richer nations, freed from the ideological shackles of unconditional financial support, shifted their responses and engagement with others, and “initiated a series of experiments that sought to identify tools to prevent and resolve armed conflicts and to mitigate their effects” (Macrae, 2001: 2). Peacekeeping operations were the means largely through which these experiments were conducted, with missions being asked to assume a much broader range of tasks than they had previously (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2007: 75). The security and development aspects of international relations began to merge.

Peacekeeping underwent a “triple transformation” (Bellamy, Williams & Griffin, 2007: 75): quantitative, in terms of the number of operations conducted; qualitative, in terms of the complexity of activities operations were required to undertake; and normative, in terms of which activities were understood as now forming part of peacekeeping activity. No longer were (military) peacekeepers required simply to stand between previously-fighting parties. Now, the promotion of liberal democratic practice became part and parcel of peacekeeping requirements, both military and civilian. This still holds true today. Even during interviews conducted for this thesis, similar sentiments were expressed. To take one example from a senior member of MONUSCO management staff in DRC:

“There was a time, in the sort of 60s and 70s, when [peacekeeping missions] were just there to observe, in a buffer zone, not to actually become part of the political process of helping, ushering in a peace process. Now, we are very much part of that, and as a result, there are times when we have a rebellion where we were very much
The end of the Cold War also led to changes within the development aid world. Since the end of World War II, development discourse had been characterised by and understood as a set of long-term activities to achieve sustained economic growth. Development was undertaken in stable environments, and separate from the politics of international relations, played out in the United Nations system (Duffield, 2001: 15; Duffield, 2008: 221; Jackson, 1990: 43). Development assistance, however, was very much the purview of political activity, and used overtly as part of Cold War realpolitik. The Cold War enabled the justification of resource transfers from richer to poorer countries: assistance was used not for development purposes but wider political goals to solidify links with allied (or satellite) states, regardless of the degree to which countries were poor or not (Griffin, 1991: 645).

The onset of the 1990s and the rise of new wars changed this dynamic. Development discourse was "placed firmly within the wider, political framework of international security" (Macrae 2001: 7; Duffield, 2001: 15-16, and 259). Even the UN Security Council recognised the changed dynamic, stating that "non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to international security" (UN, 1992a: 821). Any external actor working in those states affected by violent conflict, who previously had been able to work discretely on specific areas of intervention (development; security; diplomacy) now found themselves having to work together in a new system of international governance (Duffield, 2001: 16). The initial euphoria at the end of decades of bipolar tension led to a "pervasive uncertainty and a much less predictable pattern of international relations" (Barakat, 2005: 21).
At precisely the same time, resources for security and development activity were being significantly reduced: now that political priorities had shifted, funding for those being asked to work together was not forthcoming (Barakat, 2005: 22). This was concisely summed up by Abby Stoddard:

“Despite the five-fold increase in humanitarian needs across the globe in [the 1990s] the percentage of GNP allotted by the US government to foreign humanitarian assistance has stood at or below 0.1 per cent – lower than at any time in the past fifty years.” (Stoddard, 2002: 8)

Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, the number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) filling the vacuum created by a reduction in government intervention increased significantly. Macrae (2001) provides a history of aid for the first ten years after the Cold War, focusing on the proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in particular in conflict zones. She points out that, despite the very different circumstances in which international organisations were now operating, the global architecture used to resource such activity remained the same. Her thesis was therefore that post-conflict intervention could only be inadequate. However, Macrae’s work looked primarily at non-governmental intervention; this was pertinent following a decade when governmental organisations had reduced their activities, the resulting gap being filled by NGOs. Since then, the number of NGOs has continued to rise but governmental organisations have again been tasked also to respond to crises, and now with ever-expanding responsibilities: the number of stakeholders involved in the increasingly complex and overlapping worlds of post-conflict intervention, development and peacekeeping has only proliferated.

Perhaps also unsurprisingly, then, early efforts to coordinate development, security and diplomatic engagement proved unsuccessful – for example, in Somalia in 1993 where a lack of coordination between the principal stakeholders resulted in a failed military operation, and the deaths of eighteen United States soldiers, some being dragged around the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. How
had this come about? Faced with a humanitarian disaster in Somalia, the UN had created the peacekeeping mission, UNOSOM, in April 1992 to “monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies” (UN, 1992b: 58). UNOSOM was the first example of so-called “humanitarian intervention”. However, the duties of UNOSOM could not be fulfilled due to the increasingly negative security situation in the country. The United States offered to reinforce the mission by leading (with 24 other member states) a separate, military, Unified Taskforce (UNITAF) to ensure the fulfillment of UNOSOM and delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Security Council accepted this offer and authorised the use of “all necessary means” to establish a secure environment for the relief effort (UN, 1992c: 3; UN, 1993b: 2). In October 1993, a failed military operation resulted in the eighteen US fatalities, and the US’s announcement it would withdraw from UNITAF (Institute of Policy Studies of Singapore, 1997: 123). Belgium, France and Sweden also withdrew their military support for the force. This failure was witnessed across the world on television screens, and dramatically affected future US engagement in peacekeeping operations.

The events in Somalia outlined above “placed a new generation of operations on hold” (Barakat, 2010: 61) as the international community became more reluctant in its willingness to get involved in new missions and assume new responsibilities. Observers noted that the “myth of quick-fix humanitarian relief backed by military muscle could no longer be sustained” (Bennett, 1996: 136-145). This had dramatic consequences for the people of Rwanda just the following year, in 1994.

Based on its experience in Somalia, the United States decided not to intervene in Rwanda when a genocide, the systematic attempted destruction of the country’s Tutsi population, occurred over the three months of April-June 1994. The US did not want to risk the lives of its military in another, seemingly far-off, political crisis. US President Clinton later stated that:
“The international community, together with nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy as well. We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become safe havens for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide.” (Bill Clinton, Rwanda, 25 March 1998)

Again, improved technology meant that the violence in Rwanda was exposed across the world, and the lack of international response was considered not just inadequate but an outright “disaster” (Whitman & Pocock, 1996: xx).

The events in Rwanda in 1994 were followed fairly swiftly by those in Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 1995. In this case, over seven thousand men and boys took refuge in a so-called UN safe haven and yet were killed when UN peacekeepers failed to intervene. In addition to the killings, over twenty thousand civilians were expelled from the area in a process termed ethnic cleansing. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) later found these events to amount to genocide. The massacre is commonly referred to as the worst mass killing in Europe since World War II (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2013). The atrocities in both Rwanda and Srebrenica were paradigmatic (Ozerdem & Rufini, 2010: 61). They served as testimony to the insufficiency of international responses to political crises. Global outrage and citizen demand for action grew at the same time as “the space for UN-led peacekeeping actions was shrinking” (Ozerdem & Rufini: 62).

2.2.2 The responsibility to protect

Humanitarian intervention is closely linked to the idea of the Responsibility to Protect, or R2P. The responsibility to protect is an approach to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, enshrined in the 2005 UN World Summit outcome document, which encapsulates the
understanding that it is legitimate to undertake military action in states where governments have lost either the will and/or capacity to protect their own citizens from insecurity and human rights abuses (UN, 2005: 30). The doctrine was borne out of a Government of Canada initiative in 2001 that established an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (International Development Research Centre, 2001: viii).

The approach presented a moderately successful – in terms of global acceptance – alternative to the hard tension between armed intervention that violated state sovereignty on the one hand, and systematic abuse and violations of human rights on the other. By speaking in terms not of the right to intervene, but rather the responsibility to protect citizens from atrocity crimes – no matter where they were – the International Commission garnered support from across the range of UN member states. The 2005 World Summit outcome document made it clear that responsibility to govern responsibly was placed firmly back within the sovereignty of individual states, with the role of others to assist them to do so as necessary (International Development Research Centre, 2001: 30). The nub of the approach was that in the event such a responsibility was negated by any individual state, then it became the responsibility of others – a duty, almost – to respond. The responsibility to protect therefore focused not on the act of intervention itself, but rather on the prevention of a demeaning of any (global) citizen's common humanity (Evans, 2006a, b, c and d).

The responsibility to protect narrative has lost some ground since 2005, not least following the international interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The recent stalemate in the UN Security Council over action to take in response to events in Syria is a further example of how hard it can be to implement the recommendations of the responsibility to protect. Nonetheless, proponents of the
doctrine still remain firmly committed to its values, confident that its detractors can be met and arguments against it countered (Evans, 2008).

2.2.3 Statebuilding

This chapter has set out how the end of the Cold War led to both a decrease in the funding for peacekeeping activity and a commensurate rise in the number of NGOs involved in peacekeeping contexts. It has also set out that failures in humanitarian intervention were taking place just as improvements in telecommunications were being made, meaning that these failures were now international in nature. Political demands on security and development actors to do more were increasing at the same time as resources for such activities were decreasing. Combined with a proliferation of stakeholders involved, this resulted in a situational complexity within an international architecture that had shown itself (in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina) to be inadequate for the task: there was a gap between the organisational form and politics of the international system. Set up to address an earlier set of challenges, the international system was now outmoded, frequently failing in its stated intentions: “northern governments and aid agencies have had to adapt to policy failure… they have learnt how to project this reality as success” (Duffield, 2001: 26).

By the time the decision to intervene in Kosovo was undertaken in 1999, the UN was charged not only with an armed response (through NATO, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) and humanitarian provision, as had increasingly become the norm in peacekeeping during the first decade following the end of the Cold War, but also with the assumption of administrative and legislative powers in what some have termed a new form of trusteeship (Caplan, 2002). The international community was now to take over (in the interim) all activities of governance in one area of a sovereign
The UN was specifically required to put a liberal view of achieving international peace and security into practice by literally building a state: instead of merely standing between two warring factions in attempts to keep the peace, peacekeeping had evolved into the assumption of the responsibilities of the state and laying the foundations for longer-term economic development.

Some have commented that such missions are “destined to fail” (O’Gorman 2011: 121). Established with impossible aims, and unrealistic expectations, missions are tasked to achieve statebuilding in limited timeframes with even more limited resources. Duffield looks at the effectiveness of the international community in such “complex political emergencies”, or situations arising from the new politics of the 1990s (Duffield, 2001). The term complex political emergency (or CPE) is credited to Edkins (1996) as denoting a conflict-related humanitarian disaster involving a high degree of social breakdown and dislocation, and requiring a system-wide aid response from the international community. Duffield argues that the complexity of the situations resulted both from, and in, the proliferation of stakeholders involved (Duffield, 2001: 259).

Just as the end of Cold War changed international relations, so too did it change the organisational structure and mandates of multilateral organisations (Duffield, 2001: 71). Specialist organisations were brought together to respond to complex situations, leading to new demands for coordination, streamlining and the avoidance of duplication. At the same time, peacekeeping mission mandates changed, responsibilities grew, and led largely to failures in coordination. For example, UNHCR, the UN’s refugee organisation saw its mandate expand from serving only refugees to also addressing the needs of internally-displaced people (IDPs). UNHCR became the foremost overall humanitarian agency within the UN system, providing not just shelter but food, sanitation and/or educational, and health needs as demanded. UNHCR is also well known to have developed strong operational links
with military bodies (UNHCR, 2006: 4). The military, in turn, have shifted from a purely aggressive stance to a more nuanced humanitarian practice of peacekeeping and saving lives (Duffield, 2001: 71).

Regional organisations, with limited and varying success, also grew in stature due to increased demands on their competence (Duffield, 2001: 73). One example is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) which only began operationalising its diplomatic and advocacy work in the form of missions in the early 1990s. Such missions have gone on to develop considerable oversight responsibility throughout the OSCE’s operating area of South-Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus. The organisation understands security across three dimensions: politico-military, economic and environmental, and human. From a baseline of none, the OSCE now has sixteen field operations, reporting back to the headquarters in Vienna on security incidents and tension for ministerial-level discussion and resolution (OSCE, 2013: 2-4).

Another example is the European Union (EU) which, although not a donor in the traditional sense, but instead a political union of (now 28) member states, started to establish field-based presences with mandates beyond that of traditional embassy-type offices (Caplan, 2002: 8). Following the collapse of Yugoslavia, the EU increasingly sought a leadership position in reconstruction activity, “partly to strengthen its own credibility in foreign policy making” (Caplan, 2002: 8). From the economic and political union of its early days, the EU has evolved to become the largest donor organisation globally, in its own right (EU, 2013: 224).

Against this broad political context, so-called humanitarian intervention emerged as a contested paradigm for international responses to violent conflict (O’Gorman 2011: 142). External intervention in otherwise sovereign states became feasible in the 1990s: such undertakings were not vetoed within
the Security Council as they previously had been. And having failed early on in the 1990s, the international community needed a framework for improved response to violent conflict. However, “the challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies is infinitely more complex than is generally recognised” (Barakat, 2005: 10). Coordination emerges in the literature as a central consideration of statebuilding practice.

2.2.4 Early analyses of how peacekeeping evolved: the centrality of coordination

As early as 1999, five communities were identified as needing “to be coordinated, in order for future responses to complex emergencies to be successful” (Von Hippel, 1999: 151). These were:

- Non-Governmental Organisations;
- Donor governments;
- Multilateral agencies;
- Military establishments; and
- The corporate sector.

As set out in Chapter 1, with the exception of the corporate sector, it is these agencies that came together in the establishment of integrated missions (see Figure 2, UNMIK). By definition, the integrated nature of a mission is an attempt to respond to the need for coordination of activities by all participating stakeholders in any international intervention. At the same time, it is the very prevalence of so many stakeholders that make these missions so complex and unwieldy. Indeed, Caplan sets out that “the international community has apparently learned from the difficulties of Bosnia: (the missions in Kosovo and East Timor) UNMIK and UNTAET have brought together the many different actors in
under a single umbrella. Yet some of these components serve many masters (the OSCE for instance also receives policy and administrative advice from its Permanent Council and Chairperson-in-Office), and UN officials complain that these components still have too much autonomy, and too much time is spent arguing about relative responsibilities” (Caplan, 2002: 25).

In turn, Francis Fukuyama (2004) presents four conditions for statebuilding effectiveness: organisational design; structure of political systems; legitimisation; and culture. He suggests that until the time of his writing, international interventions had focused primarily on political system structures (constitutional reform/establishment) and legitimisation (elections). Culture had begun to be addressed, through the recognition of the importance of using political economy analysis as a foundation for all international intervention – but in practice such activity remained quite small-scale (Fukuyama, 2004: 43). Fukuyama goes on to state that relatively little international attention focused on what he terms organisational design – both within the country of intervention or of those bodies actually intervening. In so doing, he highlighted that the international community had yet to work out what must be done to ensure the development of sustainable, capable states. A major factor in this is a lack of attention on how organisations are set up to support these processes. This is the first example in the literature of recognition of a gap between the international system’s organisational form and politics. Fukuyama did acknowledge that there had been some kind of linear development and improvement from the responses in Somalia (1992), Haiti (1993), Bosnia (1994), Kosovo (1999) and then East Timor (1999), showing that some generalisable lessons could be drawn (and arguably were being learned). But he offered no suggestions as to which practices are fundamental and most useful in statebuilding practice. It was not until 2006, in his next book, Nation Building, that Fukuyama recognised peacekeeping as merely one aspect of a wider “building” process, alongside peace
enforcement; post-conflict reconstruction; and long-term economic and political development (Fukuyama, 2006: 3-7).

Gaps in knowledge and understanding of both state failure and appropriate governance reforms to address such collapses were also recognised by Brinkerhoff in 2005. He argued that such gaps made success less likely in a range of areas: the design of effective intervention strategies; co-ordination amongst donors; necessary resource levels allocated to post-conflict intervention, and ensuring sufficient commitment (political will) on the part of both donors and recipient countries (Brinkerhoff, 2005: 5). Brinkerhoff asserts that post-conflict reconstruction had become "central to today's international relations" and that "practically all bilateral and multilateral international development agencies have established units to address post-conflict transitions" (Brinkerhoff, 2005: 2). He discusses the importance of both legitimacy to tie together the principal elements of post-conflict reconstruction (state building; effectiveness; security) and working at the sub-national level for potentially increased intervention effectiveness (Brinkerhoff, 2005: 11-14).

The political nature of much of this activity and the difficulties of lesson learning is usefully illustrated by the US example. Flournoy shows how many of the lessons of early 1990s intervention were set out for the US in Bill Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive, 56. Building on the mistakes of the past, primarily in Somalia, guidance in the form of six broad tenets was set out (Flournoy, 2006: 88). The tenets were:

- Set a comprehensive strategy;
- Clearly spell out command and control arrangements and the delineation between civil and military authority before the operation begins;
➢ Cultivate strong public support, both domestic and international, and sustain it throughout the operation;

➢ Adapt military forces to the nature and scope of each mission and rapidly deploy a civilian force;

➢ Sustain policy oversight once the operation is underway and continually reassess the mission for consistency with objectives; and finally,

➢ Plan meticulously for and orchestrate a successful transition of power (Flournoy, 2006: 89).

Unfortunately for both the US and Iraq in particular, these were lessons that “seemed to be learned in one administration and then unlearned in the next”, meaning that post-war planning for Iraq in the US, under a Bush presidency, fell to a Pentagon that “had no prior experience with this kind of operation and had limited institutional capacity for setting up the kind of organisation needed” (Fukuyama, 2006: 10). The transfer of responsibility for stabilisation and reconstruction from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department to the Pentagon also served to undermine the US effort. USAID and the State Department had experience from Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan whilst the Pentagon had not worked on reconstruction since the aftermath of World War II (Dobbins, 2006: 226). This meant that “untried individuals were sent to face what for them were unfamiliar problems without the experience, training, bureaucratic backstopping, budgetary authority, or institutional framework needed to successfully fulfil their new responsibilities” (Flournoy, 2006: 89). Still today, the US system has yet to institutionalise its approach to integrated planning and reconstruction operations (Flournoy, 2006: 89).

4 The conflict in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 was not a civil war. The US intervention in this country, however, did shift international thinking on responding to violence and global security, which is why it is mentioned here.
Even before international intervention in Iraq, comparisons between UN and US approaches were made, concluding that despite very different working styles and approaches to intervention, the UN seemed to have achieved greater success (Dobbins et al, 2003: 162). One of the reasons for this was that insufficient coordination within different parts of the US government (development, defense and diplomacy) was recognised as a fundamental flaw in approach.5

In 2005, Guttal tried to show that a model for reconstruction was emerging, pointing out that despite the “fine print” varying in each country, the overall systems and structures that donors seek to establish are the same (Guttal, 2005: 40). Etzioni (2004) on the other hand suggests that complete nation-building is not possible. Rather, donors should concentrate on a specific set of activities, vastly scaling down any attempt to build a state, and be more realistic about what can be achieved by external actors in any given situation. Etzioni distinguishes between a nation and a state, with nation being understood much more broadly than state, as “a community vested in a state” (Etzioni, 2004: 3). A state, therefore, becomes simply a legal entity recognised internationally, whilst a nation has wider connotations of the culture and systems existing within that state. The distinction is important as it is later used as an explanation of why state structures can fail, i.e. without a community-driven understanding and commitment to the common good of the nation, sacrifice on the part of one grouping or compromise in decision-making will not be achieved, possibly leading to systems breakdown and failure (Etzioni, 2004: 5). Etzioni observes that any external intervention in a state is effectively social engineering. He argues that social engineering is inherently unnatural and for this reason will always be difficult to achieve. Success will be even harder if attempts are made by outsiders, and certainly, any assumption that such intervention will be successful in the short-term, and not particularly expensive, is naïve (Etzioni, 2004: 15). He therefore considers it unrealistic for external actors to get involved in nation

5 Several other factors – outside the remit of the thesis or this chapter – are also presented in the Dobbins et al book, including the vastly differing contexts in which intervention was made, and notably the variations in Gross Domestic Product and economic infrastructure of some of the case studies examined.
building. Instead, he advocates a restrained approach, consisting of a much-reduced scope of intervention than current ambitious statements would imply: “Foreign powers would do best if they limited themselves to setting some broad dos and don’ts, but otherwise let nature take its course” (Etzioni, 2004: 16).

The difficulty with this approach is that there may be other incentives for outsiders to take action, be they political, economic, even moral, which this approach does not take into account. Nonetheless, Etzioni provides a further example of the several authors who have commented on peacekeeping and some of its flaws. The next section completes the literature review of peacekeeping to date, presenting the key reviews of peacekeeping practice so far undertaken.

2.2.5 Reviews of UN peacekeeping

It has been set out above that – in contrast to humanitarian intervention or the responsibility to protect – peacekeeping is not a new phenomenon, and has been ongoing almost since the UN was first established. The first peacekeeping mission was undertaken in 1948 (in the Middle East). In the six decades since, peacekeeping “has evolved into one of the main tools used by the international community to manage complex crises that pose a threat to international peace and security” (UN, 2008a: 6). However, as with so much else during the 1990s, including the incipient merging of security and development activity, the proliferation of non-governmental organisations, the rise of globalisation and televised interventions, the functions of peacekeeping, and the relevant structures within it, also changed significantly following the end of the Cold War.
With development now promoted alongside security and political considerations, it was largely through peacekeeping missions that humanitarian intervention was undertaken. Where previously international troops were tasked literally to keep the peace by positioning themselves between former fighting factions, now troops were increasingly mandated to peacekeep in situations where there was no peace to keep. At the same time, civilian missions sat alongside the troops, tasked to undertake an ever-expanding set of activities: civil administration; peacebuilding; humanitarian relief provision; even economic development activity. And whilst resources were of course provided for these civilian missions, total funds in no way matched previous development assistance transfers direct to allied governments (Barakat, 2005: 22). This has led some to argue that the most fundamental challenge to a mission’s operational effectiveness is “the sheer number of functions it must perform, many of them simultaneously, and with great urgency, and the difficulty of identifying the priority tasks as the situation on the ground evolves” (Caplan, 2002: 29). Caplan sets out four factors on which this effectiveness depends: readiness, resources, the nature of the mandate, and, most crucially, the extent of support from international security forces deployed on the territory (Caplan, 2002: 31).

Reflecting this shift, the UN undertook its first review of peacekeeping operations in 2000. Then Secretary-General Kofi Annan established a Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, headed up by Lakhdar Brahimi. The Panel’s report highlighted many of the problems experienced on missions, both as a result of resource constraints and the increasingly high number of tasks missions were being mandated to undertake. These included delays in procurement and personnel recruitment; duplication of effort; lack of effective communications, in particular with host populations; and failures in adapting strategic goals to context (UN, 2000a). The panel went on to make concrete recommendations for operational improvement, the central element of which was the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces for planning and supporting UN peacekeeping operations (UN, 2000a: 34).

Of those reviews listed above, the two more substantial and most relevant to this thesis are those by Caplan and Chesterman. The Chesterman report highlighted the importance of a good understanding of a country’s political economy, and stated that UN efforts at statebuilding until then had reflected only incremental learning. This speaks to the question of what effectiveness in peacekeeping looks like. Like Von Hippel before him, and Fukuyama afterwards, Chesterman recognised that similar methods had been tried in various interim administrations, but that complete success remained elusive. He warned that undertaking actions in the interests of external actors, rather than those of the local population, ran the risk of lowering standards of achievement. And he focused on resources as a key factor in disenabling success, posing three principal contradictions witnessed in transitional administration resourcing: means were inconsistent with ends; inadequate for ends; and sometimes even inappropriate for the mandated ends: “success in state building, in addition to clarity of purpose, requires time and money. A lengthy international presence will not ensure success, but an early departure guarantees failure” (Chesterman, 2003: 246).
Chesterman reflects the earlier work by Duffield and Macrae discussed above, reiterating once again the inadequacy of the international system to address the tasks it (increasingly often) set for itself, pointing out the demands for highest standards of governance, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and service delivery in places self-evidently incapable of delivering (Chesterman, 2003: 107). Crucially for this thesis, Chesterman openly criticises internal UN processes, most notably in human resource management, and in particular the difficulties of not appointing individuals for political reasons or of removing those not performing once in post (Chesterman, 2003: 248). Note that these criticisms chime with the Brahimi report’s recommendations for improved practice: the literature shows that under-performance on integrated missions is similar across a number of cases, not specific to individual missions. Regardless of the varying mandates set by the Security Council, similar challenges on integrated missions persist.

Chesterman demonstrates that, at the operational level at least, UN staff are familiar with some of the organisational constraints they face when attempting to achieve effective peacekeeping. The review also recognises that the UN continued to hold the incorrect organisational assumption that staff possessing relevant skills were able to train others in that same field. There is discussion of the “can do” attitude of many people within the UN system, with the recognition that staff should be aware that such problem-solving approaches may not strictly be appropriate when the “problem” is governing a territory, and process and procedure become more important than what could be construed as a somewhat “cavalier disregard for local sensibilities” in the interests of getting the job done (Chesterman, 2003: 248). The views and perceptions of a local population are underscored as important: it is recognised as contradictory to state a population has control over its territory when a transitional administration is in place. Such claims, if insincere, were viewed as potentially counter-
productive, allowing frustration to build amongst a local population against any external actors (Chesterman, 2003: 152).

Richard Caplan examines the specific cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo and East Timor and highlights several areas of weakness in UN practice. In the case of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), for instance, despite the clarity of the projected outcome, the UN initially encountered “enormous difficulties” in administering the country, largely because it was ill-prepared for the magnitude of the crisis and the rapid deployment it necessitated. This lack of farsightedness had “consequences for operational efficiency... indeed, eleven months after the UN Security Council voted to establish UNTAET, the mission was still not fully staffed” (Caplan, 2002: 18 and 74).

In Kosovo too, problems of “sluggish police deployment meant that, five months into the operation, UNMIK police were totally reliant on the military for law enforcement in three out of five regions” (Caplan, 2002: 31) – roles for which the military were simply not prepared or trained. And in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international presence “suffered severe shortages of transport vehicles, communications equipment and interpreters – shortages that plagued the operation well into its second year” (Caplan, 2002: 33). Overall, this leads to situations whereby “an inadequate number of UN personnel with inadequate means work long hours at fire-fighting and improvising, whilst trying to uphold the name of the UN” (Vieira de Mello, 2002: 49).

Institutional rivalry within the UN is presented as another factor preventing sufficient planning capability. As observed by Caplan: “DPKO and DPA (the UN Departments for Peacekeeping and Political Affairs respectively) remain fiercely protective of their respective territories, and a more
sensible measure would be to merge the two into a single department – but the UN Secretariat has long resisted such a recommendation” (Caplan, 2002: 68).

Finally, planning is flagged as another chronic weakness, occurring at both headquarters and in the field. There are a number of factors for this, but as ever, resources are chief among them (Caplan, 2002: 69). It is not unusual to have one desk officer serving in headquarters as focal point for an entire mission consisting of several thousand personnel or more likely, several missions at a time. Organisational culture plays a part in this: early planning is not encouraged due to the political implications of such an act. Yet, at the same time, such sensitivity means simply that no scenario planning is undertaken at all, leaving UN staff open to criticism and lack of strategy as and when such scenarios do arise.

It is worth acknowledging three relevant studies from grey literature: John Ruggie’s (2003) *The United Nations and Globalisation*; Charles Call’s (2005) review for the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) at the UN Secretariat, *Institutionalising Peace*; and Eide et al’s (2005) review of UN post-conflict peacebuilding practices. Ruggie does not refer specifically to conflict situations, but instead examines the difficulties of institutional reform in the UN system. He flags the institutional recognition that the UN is not responding well enough to some of the challenges it faces today, not least due to its size, but then highlights how the response to these challenges is often the creation of new bodies, in a reactive measure that does not address the specific flaw adequately so as to achieve sweeping and sustained improvement: “The core issues of global governance are barely touched on by the initiatives described here” (Ruggie, 2003: 309).
Ruggie acknowledges that perhaps the UN’s “greatest institutional challenge has been in trying to exploit the system’s multi-functionality and potential synergies within the limits imposed by its deliberately segmented structure” and that a lack of success in the past has not been necessarily due to the people running different agencies, but rather “because of the structure of incentives and accountability under which they operate” (Ruggie, 2003: 312). He too points to human resource capacity within the UN system as a principal area of concern for those looking to improve the quality of UN activity.

Call (2005) and Eide et al (2005) review post-conflict peacebuilding practices by both the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the international community as a whole. Both reviews show that there is already some institutional recognition that improvement could be made in these processes. Both provide concrete and valid recommendations – technical and organisational – showing that there is some recognition that internal adjustments need to be made in order to improve external actor responses to post conflict situations.

The Eide review is the first to flag the terminological difficulties surrounding integrated missions, stating that they found “there is little specified agreement about what comprises an integrated mission in practice” (Eide et al, 2005: 3). This underscores the problem of a lack of formal rules or principles identified in earlier literature. A main result of this is that a variety of practices have emerged, some more successful than others. This review provides welcome recognition that UN staff have a “tendency to blame the limited success rate on lack of resources” whilst “it is equally possible that the main problem is more related to a lack of coherent application of the resources already available” (Eide et al, 2005: 5). The anonymity of their interviewees enables frank discussion of the issues at stake, and makes it clear that UN staff members are aware of the problems faced within their organisation in this
work, albeit with little attempts being made at improvement. One possibility for this is the fact that they simply are not being asked to improve, either within their staff management systems, or by the contributing donor countries from around the world (in the form of evaluations), i.e. there are few systemic mechanisms to ensure valuable lessons are learned from previous activity (Eide et al, 2005: 19). The result is that statebuilding and/or reconstruction activities consistently fail to achieve their potential.

The Call review is helpful to reinforce this point. Every attempt is made in the report both to outline the boundaries set by the terms of reference (i.e. that the report can only be used to serve one individual UN department) and to give a positive hue to all post-conflict peacebuilding activity undertaken by the UN so far. And whilst there are discrete references made to the fact that each of the recommendations could be used more widely within the UN system, Call is evidently at pains not to offend. Clearly, there are sensitivities to take into account when reviewing any organisation’s work, but the tone of such discretion is an indication of the systemic difficulties within the UN of proposing change or offering critique. It is evident that individual sensitivities are allowed to inhibit calls for best practice that might improve international responses overall. Call is surprisingly candid on this, stating: “Institutional turf battles have shaped terminology and fuelled conceptual expansion and confusion” (Call, 2005: 19).

The review is helpful in pointing to some of the difficulties experienced so far in post-conflict peacebuilding; but as a product to enable improved response, its seeming need for self-restraint reduces its impact. The defensive suggestions for improvement are perhaps evidence of the systemic challenges within UN departments (DPA or otherwise) to self-critique. In some ways, the report could be said itself to be a victim of the institutional barriers to post-conflict response.
Familiar themes therefore are seen to emerge from the few reviews of UN peacekeeping, and integrated missions in particular, that there have been to date. Resource constraints and institutional weaknesses, exacerbated by political constraints at the highest levels combine fairly consistently in peacekeeping operations to frustrate the practices on the ground of efficient and effective missions: “It is like being asked to perform Olympic gymnastics and then being placed in a straitjacket” (Vieira de Mello, unpublished, quoted in Caplan, 2002: 74).

The overall result is that operations can only be “ineffective at best” (Weir, 2006: 5). It was this recognition that led the UN to take forward the integrated mission concept first highlighted in the Brahimi report, and first implemented in the field in Kosovo. The process is still ongoing today, with guidelines first introduced in 2008 – note, fully eight years after the recommendation they be produced – and then updated in 2009, 2010, and 2011. A Planning Toolkit was also produced in 2012, which did not so much revise the guidelines but rather seek to clarify some of the ongoing process and terminological confusions amongst UN staff, in order that peacekeeping operations can deliver assistance in a more “efficient and cost-effective way” (UN, 2012: v). The frequency of the updates perhaps reflects the ongoing learning process, and constant evolution, of peacekeeping practice.

The 2008 guidelines were the first reflection of an expansion even of Brahimi’s original recommendation for integration. Whilst coordination within all civilian organisations involved in a specific peacekeeping mission is still assumed, now the guidelines task missions with coordination also with existing UN country teams, i.e. all the other agencies working alongside the mission, usually including but not limited to UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF (if they are not already part of the peacekeeping mission).
The guidelines broadly reflect the lessons of the past, calling for a clear and achievable mandate; a clear vision or end state; engagement with both a host population and regional actors; and, crucially, an adequate provision of resources. They are clear that operations so far have been “guided by a largely unwritten body of principles” meaning that “peacekeeping practitioners in the field are often faced with a confusing and contradictory set of imperatives and pressures” (UN, 2008a: 8-9).

The 2009 update goes further: “simply put, the scale and complexity of peacekeeping today are mismatched with existing capabilities” (UN, 2009: iii). It makes familiar recommendations to the Security Council about allowing earlier planning; clearer and achievable mandates; improved accountability frameworks; and producing guidance and training for peacekeepers.

In sum, despite years of similar messages being presented, albeit in a sparse number of briefings, there has been little change in the structures established on integrated missions, and little improvement in the their performance. The same challenges remain for UN personnel on integrated missions today despite the recommendations made in mission reviews, and the variation in geographic and strategic contexts in which they work. The reviews of UN peacekeeping undertaken to date focus on operational weaknesses, with key themes of human resource management, lack of planning, and lack of mandate clarity all highlighted consistently in each. But they offer little in the way of response to the question why such weaknesses continue to manifest themselves. The corresponding guidelines on integrated mission planning and practice, produced on an almost annual basis by the UN system, also reflect the lack of an agreed operational framework against which progress can be measured. In short, much has been written on the what and the why of peacekeeping, but there is very little on the specifics of the how peacekeeping should be undertaken. As a result, some comment that there is now a “crisis of confidence” in peacekeeping (Jones et al, 2009: 3), whilst others reflect on the continued high demand
which is likely to remain in place for some time (St-Pierre, 2008: 7). The reality for future peacekeeping practice is likely to be a mixture of both – it seems that whilst demand is high, demand for quality is less so. Certainly the complexity of operations and the multi-dimensional tasks mandated to individual missions make performance and achievement of objectives difficult. And it is even more difficult, for now, to see that this will change in the short-term.

2.2.6 Peacekeeping literature – a summary

This section has presented a review of peacekeeping literature, starting with a macro-level overview of the two main schools of thought in international relations theory, liberalism and realism, and moving to focus more specifically on peacekeeping. The evolution of peacekeeping has been presented, from a little-used tool of the international system which simply placed troops between warring factions, to a significantly expanded set of activities, comprising both military and civilian intervention. The shifts in peacekeeping practice reflect the continued merging of security and development activity which began with the end of the Cold War. Since the early 1990s, discussions on peacekeeping have changed from purely military activity to failures of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. These discussions evolved to become a narrative about statebuilding and how best sustainable development can be brought about. There is continued recognition that security will not be achieved without a link to longer-term development activity; and that development cannot be achieved sustainably if security challenges are not addressed. Despite this knowledge, the reviews of peacekeeping practice that have to date been undertaken reflect continuing and consistent challenges to effective performance. Yet, effectiveness remains little understood (or expressly defined), and actual performance of peacekeeping missions as organisations is not studied. Much has been written about the what and the why of peacekeeping but how peacekeeping is undertaken – i.e. the performance of
integrated missions as organisations – remains relatively under-researched. This is a gap in the literature which this thesis seeks to address.

This thesis argues that this persistent under-performance is due to a gap in organisational form within the international system, de-linked from the realities of political negotiation and discussion at the UN Security Council. The two principal reasons for integrated mission under-performance are political and organisational. The political nature of how missions are negotiated means that the UN member states who establish integrated missions usually do not resource them adequately or scrutinise their performance in an informed way. This leads to a loss of focus on management on the part of senior mission staff as instead they struggle to interpret their increasingly-complex mission mandates. It also leads to mission resources being used for different purposes than those anticipated. These tensions are exacerbated by overly-rigid formal management procedures in the UN system, which lead mission staff to adopt informal management practices of their own. This thesis argues that it is the combination of these factors that results in mission under-performance. In order to bridge the two principal bodies of literature used in this research, on peacekeeping and organisation theory, an examination of literature on multilateralism was undertaken. This is set out in the next section.

2.3 Multilateralism: a bridge between peacekeeping literature and organisation theory?

As well as renewed interest in peacekeeping as a means to address the world’s security challenges, the end of the Cold War also initiated a renewed interest in studying multilateralism (Bouchard & Peterson, 2010: 2). Yet authors struggled to conceptualise multilateralism, possibly given that so little of it had been experienced to date (Caporaso, 1992: 600; Naim, 2009: 135). There was (and still is) no single definition of multilateralism (Martin & Simmons, 1998: 733; Bouchard & Peterson, 2010: 6). There
was an “overwhelming emphasis” in international relations literature on power, which tended to obscure a focus and influence on organisational effectiveness (Fosdick, 200: 356). This was perhaps one reason why the impacts of politics and management on international organisations proved “difficult to unravel” (Fosdick, 2000: 358). It was in multilateralism literature that authors began to argue that organisation theory needed to be examined if a true desire to address obstacles to effective international organisation functioning was to be addressed (Fosdick, 2000: 327-328).

Keohane defines multilateralism as “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions” (Keohane, 1990: 731). Multilateralism becomes institutionalised when “arrangements with persistent rules emerge” (Keohane, 1990: 733). And the study of multilateralism equates with “the study of the behaviour of states within international organisations” (Bouchard & Peterson, 2010: 4). Others suggested broader definitions of multilateralism, to include more qualitative dimensions (Ruggie, 1992) or to include more stakeholders than just states (Caporaso, 1992; Thakur, 2002). Regardless of the (still ongoing) definitional discussions of multilateralism, the question of effectiveness in multilateralism began to emerge in the 1990s (Caporaso, 1992; Martin, 1992; Ikenberry, 2003; Naim 2009; Bouchard & Peterson, 2010). This question is the link in this thesis to organisation theory: in the absence of an overarching conceptual framework for multilateralism, measuring the effectiveness of international organisations is difficult. Researchers instead reverted to examining organisation theory and attempting to apply it to multilateral organisations.

The same process happened during the research of this thesis: in order better to understand integrated missions as organisations, their structure and performance, and how they are affected by political
decisions in the UN system, it was necessary to review the literature on organisation theory as well as that of inter-organisational theory. This literature is presented in the following section.

2.4 Organisation Theory and Inter-Organisational Relations Theory

How can some of the performance challenges of UN integrated missions begin to be understood and explained? In the first instance, to address the challenges of human resource management, strategic planning, and communications with a local population, organisation theory needs to be explored. This is somewhat complicated by the reality that there are no right or wrong theories in organisation management (Morgan, 1997: i; Handy, 1999: 20). Organisations are many things at once: “complex, multifaceted, paradoxical” (Morgan, 1997: 347). In the case of integrated missions, as organisations, this is particularly true. As set out in Chapter 1, integrated missions are usually made up of various organisations themselves, so by their very nature they are inherently complex, multifaceted, and paradoxical.

2.4.1 Organisation theory

Despite the first theoretical writings on management appearing even several thousand years ago (Pugh, 2007: xii), organisation theory was only really born as an intellectual field in the 1940s and 1950s (Starbuck, 2005: 170; Hatch, 2006: 26) – coincidentally, this was the same time as peacekeeping started to emerge as an activity for the international community to undertake, i.e. after the Second World War, with the creation of the United Nations. Some also argue that organisation theory only emerged as a field of study shortly after Weber was translated into English in the 1940s (Scott, 2001: 21; Handy, 1999: 20). Indeed, Weber, Durkheim, and Marx were all “writing about bureaucracy and
authority before organisation theory was known by this name" (Hatch, 2006: 7). Yet, Weber’s definition of the state as “a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” (Gerth & Wright Mills, 1948: 78) is still recognised today as the most legitimate in discussions on international relations (Scott, 2001: 13).

Hatch argues that the three best known perspectives on organisation theory are modernist, symbolic-interpretist and post-modernist (Hatch, 2006: 36-56). Looking at organisations from a modernist perspective brings a focus on increasing efficiency and effectiveness by examining the organisation’s structure and control. A symbolic-interpretist approach to organisations instead tries to understand how organisations function from the perspective of their members. A post-modernist perspective takes an altogether different approach, expanding the focus of examination away from the organisation alone to look at how organisations are spoken of and written about (Hatch, 2006: 20). In this approach, an understanding of an organisation is gained not just by understanding its structure, technology, working practice and the like, but also from an appreciation of how that organisation is viewed by others.

In contrast, Handy sets out that there are seven schools of thoughts in organisation theory: scientific management; human relations; bureaucratic; power, conflict and decisions; technology; systems and institutional (Handy, 1999: 20-23). Each school has contributed something useful, and no one school of thought is either entirely right or wrong. On this, Hatch and Handy agree: there is no one ideal theory of organisations. For, Hatch, the three perspectives of organisation theory are not mutually exclusive and have not developed in a linear way. As such it can be difficult to make a case for sorting through them (Hatch, 2006: 7). For Handy, organisation theory “started out simple, but steadily got more complicated” (Handy, 1999: 20) to the point that perhaps organisation theory should not be termed a theory at all.
Looking at organisational “megatrends”, there are three stages of organisational development, and largely Western industrial society still operates in the second of these (Hatch, 2006: 91). From working in factories, an emergent middle-class is now beginning to see the rise of the service sector as a postmodernist response to the way we work. As a result, the abandonment of vertical hierarchies in modern organisations in favour of more horizontally-structured organisations is beginning to be seen. This is likely to inspire a future where organisations show greater flexibility and are more customer-oriented and participative than today (Hatch, 2006: 92). This is pertinent for a study of integrated missions and their performance, organisations that are explicitly hierarchical and designed based on an earlier school of thought than is being used in other organisations currently being established.

Organisational theorists began to conceptualise organisations as open, adaptive systems, rather than the closed systems of previous conception, in the 1970s (Cook, 1977: 62). It was argued that if a system is open, this does not mean simply that it engages with its environment, but that this interchange is an essential factor underlying the system’s viability (Buckley, 1967: 50-56). Thus, environment is not only important as a means to understanding the social context in which organisations exist, but also a primary determinant of organisational structure and process (Blau and Scott, 1962: 108). Thinking evolved later not only to discuss organisational structure, but then to look at structure as a means to determine effectiveness. For organisations to be effective, they themselves will depend on the existence of institutions and rules, which everyone must accept (Brett, 2000: 20).

Applying the point about organisational structure determining effectiveness to the UN, be it specifically concerning post-conflict responses or otherwise, perhaps serves to explain the frustrations of some of the authors reviewed on peacekeeping. The unwieldy nature of the UN system as it currently exists is evidence of an outmoded organisational structure, ill-suited to modern-day demands. The system and
its operations were established as a hierarchical structure, in the 1940s. Organisation theory helps to show that such structures can only ever be unwieldy and therefore less effective than they could be. Organisation theory of modern day organisations suggests that all members of an organisational system are required to be equally qualified for that system to work effectively. In a political system such as the United Nations, made up of member states with varying levels of economic development, as well as organisations and agencies addressing different thematic areas of activity, this is not readily achievable. One dimension of this challenge relates to the fact that multiple organisations and agencies may be involved in any given course of action. This is particularly so in the case of integrated missions, which leads to a consideration of literature on inter-organisational relations.

2.4.2 Inter-organisational relations theory

Unlike organisation theory, this field is not concerned with individuals (unless they are associated with or representing or identifying with different organisations). Conversely, inter-organisational relations are individual: to use the analogy with UNMiK, as represented in Figure 2, inter-organisational relations refers to relations between the EU and OSCE for example, rather than any individuals working for either of these organisations within UNMiK. A relation between organisations is more than just a passing transaction: most inter-organisational relations are collaborative and cooperative, although they may include the possibility of competitive or conflictive elements (Cropper et al, 2008: 5). This section considers the different developments in inter-organisational relations theory and then makes the case for using resource dependency as a starting point in this research. Other kinds of dependency follow from this, also discussed below.
Like organisation theory, the origins of inter-organisational relations are early studies of economics, sociology, and politics, with no real specificity emerging before the 1950s. Von Bertalanffy (1951) introduced systems theory (the study of systems in general to present general principles for application across any system in any field of research), and Boulding (1956) showed its application to the social sciences. This led to Evans's (1965) inter-organisational relations work which referred to focal organisations interacting with the network of organisations in their environments in a variety of potential processes such as cooperation, coordination, competition, conflict or amalgamation. Benson (1975) and Metcalfe (1976) used theories based on politics and looked at the relationship between and among multiple organisations. They introduced concepts of networks and strategies, and linked the formation and fate of networks to their wider political economies. Williamson (1975) explored transaction-cost theory. Cook (1977; discussed below) laid the groundwork for further exploration of exchange and power. And Freeman (2004) reviewed the literature on social network analysis and inter-organisational relations (Cook, 1977: 6-7).

The dominant theoretical perspective that has emerged in discussion of inter-organisational relations is exchange theory introduced by Levine & White in 1961 (Cook, 1977: 64). This was extended by Thompson (1967) and Jacobs (1974) and most recently labelled "resource dependency" by Aldrich (1974). An exchange relation is fundamentally a series of transactions. The term "actor" applies not only to individuals, but also to corporate groups, or organisations as collective actors. The term "resource" refers to any valued activity, service or commodity (Cook, 1977: 64).

Cook also set out that the formation of exchange relations occurs among organisations primarily for two related reasons: specialisation and scarcity (Cook, 1977: 65). Most organisations perform specialised functions and therefore must exchange with other organisations to obtain necessary...
resources and to market their output. Levine & White argue that the scarcity of resources "impels organisations to restrict activity to limited specific functions. The fulfilment of these limited functions in turn requires access to certain kinds of elements which an organisation seeks to obtain by entering into exchanges with other organisations" (Levine & White, 1961: 584). Thus, the limitations on the availability of resources necessitate organisational inter-dependence (or, as Aldrich put it "creates resource dependencies" [Aldrich, 1974: 423]), and foster specialisation.

Like organisation theory, there is no one theory of inter-organisational relations (Galaskiewicz, 1985: 298). Instead, Galaskiewicz argues that there are three theories where such relations take place, all of which overlap and become "analytically messy". These are: resource procurement and allocation; political advocacy; and organisational legitimacy (Galaskiewicz, 1985: 282). Organisations will form relations with other organisations broadly for one of these reasons: they need resources; to form a political coalition of sorts; or they are seeking as individual organisations to make themselves more legitimate by forming relations with other organisations.

UN integrated missions face a tension in legitimacy: they are established by and thus gain their legitimacy from the UN Security Council. Yet at the same time, they are frequently perceived as illegitimate in the eyes of a host population, and/or government. In examining the inter-organisational relations of integrated missions, it is therefore important to distinguish between the types of organisations with which integrated missions interact. Amongst the organisations making up an integrated mission, relations will be characterised by different processes than those between a mission and its host government/population. Since reviews of peacekeeping to date have highlighted challenges of resource and staffing constraints (see above), it is the first of these theories, resource procurement and allocation, that is most relevant to this thesis.
The variety of approaches to the study of inter-organisational relations theory led to a series of reviews on the subject starting in the mid-1970s (Cropper et al, 2008: 8 and 392). One of the most significant of these is that by Joseph Galaskiewicz, 1985 (Cropper et al, 2008: 392). Galaskiewicz summarises the literature on resource procurement and allocation in three broad areas:

- power dependency;
- resource dependency; and
- environmental constraints.

Each of these areas, and how they influenced the analytical framework for this research, is now discussed in turn.

*Power dependency*

The source of any organisation’s power is dependency (Emerson, 1962: 32). Power dependency theory also relates to political advocacy, including coalition formation and efforts at collective action to increase power. It stems from resource dependency theory, given that any organisation’s power (perceived or real) resides implicitly in another organisation’s dependency on it (Aldrich: 1979: 267). It is also possible for organisations to be mutually dependent on each other, and only in these circumstances will coordination of activity be feasible.

Emerson set out that the dependence of an Actor A (be that an individual, group, or organisation) on another Actor B is “directly proportional to A’s motivational investment in goals mediated by B and inversely proportional to the availability of those goals to A outside of the A-B relation” (Emerson,
The dependence of A on B provides the basis of B’s power over A. To the extent that A cannot do without the resources and is unable to obtain them elsewhere, A is dependent on B. The power to control or influence others thus resides in control over things they value.

To put this into a practical example using UNMIK once again, power dependency theory suggests that the OSCE’s dependence on, say, the UN is directly proportional to the OSCE’s buy-in to UN activities and goals. The theory suggests that if the OSCE could achieve its goals without having to recourse to the UN, it is unlikely that they would work together, even if formally they form part of the same overall organisational structure (UNMIK).

The strategy of those organisations which are more dependent on others is to become less dependent, i.e. to reduce the degree of imbalance in an exchange relation (Cook, 1977: 71). Designating ‘Y’ as the resource A is dependent upon B for, there are four possible strategies for organisations to pursue in inter-organisational relations and power dependency:

- **Withdrawal** (Y becomes less valuable to A, making B less powerful, and A thereby less dependent);
- **Network Extension** (if A increases the number of sources available to provide Y, B again is less powerful in the A-B relationship);
- **Status-giving** (A gains control of another resource X, which is valuable to B, meaning that B has less power in the A-B relationship over resource Y); and
- **Coalition Formation** (if A joins with others, B will have less dominance in the A-B relationship)
If any of these strategies is pursued successfully, the power dependency of A on B is reduced, i.e. the power differential between the two organisations is lessened (Cook, 1977: 74).

Another element of power dependency theory is network positioning. There is a strong positive association between power and an organisation’s network centrality: the more other organisations are dependent on a focal organisation for the resources they need, the more likely it is that all (other) stakeholder organisations view the focal organisation as influential (Galaskiewicz, 1985: 282). Central actors are perceived as more powerful, and in turn other powerful actors become aligned with them. In turn, this makes central actors appear even more powerful (Galaskiewicz, 1985: 282; Cook et al, 1983: 277).

Organisations can also develop more power over time, again subject to their position within the inter-organisational network. The more power an organisation has the more influence it has to determine the nature of the inter-organisational exchange, i.e. to determine the form of the interaction and the ratio of exchange. In so doing, it establishes itself as the organisation of authority over others involved in the network (Cook, 1977: 68).

The amount of organisational interaction and the kinds of elements exchanged (resources, labour, referrals) depend upon the function of that organisation (Levine & White 1961: 589), i.e. some organisational functions necessitate more exchanges than others. Other variables, such as organisation prestige, seem to affect the interaction within the limits established by the function variable.

Not all inter-organisational relationships are vertically dependent, i.e. not every organisation in an organisational field is a potential source of resources for every other organisation (Pennings, 1981: 67).
Private sector business practice shows three types of inter-organisational relations: in addition to vertical relations, there are also horizontal and symbiotic relations. Firms horizontally inter-dependent compete with each other in obtaining similar resources and disposing of similar goods and services. Symbiotic organisations relate to each other by providing services to each other but do not control others’ needs. Only vertically inter-dependent firms are viable transactional partners to which organisation partners turn to alleviate resource needs.

**Resource dependency**

Resource dependency theory is frequently recognised as providing the earliest perspective on power in inter-organisational relations (Pfeffer, 1972; Aldrich, 1976, Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, Huxham and Beech, 2008). It includes examination of how resources (including facilities, materials, products, revenues) are procured and allocated. This relates to both power dependency (due to others perhaps controlling available resources) and environmental constraints (as resources may or may not be available in the operating environment). Resource dependency theory focuses on the inter-dependence of one organisation with others, arguing that power can be gained from “external actors”, although conversely those actors can create external constraints on the organisation (Huxham and Beech, 2008: 556).

The overriding reason to establish inter-organisational relations is to ensure organisational survival – and hence the theory of “dependency” (Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967: 892). Generally, organisations strive for autonomy and prefer not to establish inter-organisational relations as they may constrain subsequent action (Zeitz, 1980: 74). So, from the outset, inter-organisational relations theory suggests that establishing relations between two or more organisations is likely to be contentious. Applying this
theory to integrated missions, it suggests that inter-organisational relations between the various components of a mission - regardless of any other external constraining factor - are likely to be strained.

Using the UNMiK example, it could be said either that UNMiK would show reluctance to form working relations with other (non-UNMiK) organisations, or that within UNMiK, the various agencies making up the mission would resist working together so as to be freer to pursue their own goals. The theory suggests that the practice of seeking coordination across agencies or other organisations involved is indeed "destined to fail", as each individual organisation will only remain as part of the umbrella (integrated mission) structure if it is dependent on other organisations to succeed in its own objectives.

Environmental constraints

The literature presents various environmental constraints, all of which relate to an organisation's management of its environmental uncertainty. Pfeffer and Salancik argue that organisations react to power and resource dependency pressures by managing their environments (Huxham and Beech, 2008: 556). This theory links to organisational legitimisation, i.e. those efforts an organisation may undertake to identify with other legitimate community and/or societal symbols so as to reinforce its own place in a given environment. In the case of integrated missions, the theory therefore suggests, counter-intuitively, that environmental factors will play a relatively smaller role in inter-organisational relations than resource or power dependency. As stated above, whilst integrated missions gain legitimacy from their creation and establishment by the UN Security Council, they can frequently be perceived as illegitimate amongst a host population and/or government. The fact of setting up a peacekeeping
mission in any country is evidence of a major failure of a country’s functioning: it is unlikely that there
will be any legitimate community or societal symbols (required by the theory) to bolster the presence of
an integrated mission as an organisation. The only such symbol will be a negative – the absence (or
weak functioning) of other forms of legitimate government.

The literature on environmental constraints has many shortcomings: there is a heavy reliance on the
implicit theory of executive anxiety reduction, making it somewhat reductionist (Galaskiewicz, 1985: 298).
Decision-makers tend to end up being portrayed as insecure bureaucrats who pursue
conservative strategies when their environment becomes too complex to understand completely. Too
much importance is attributed to the personalities and input of executive decision-makers for the
literature to be considered robust. And finally, there are also methodological shortcomings: that is, it is
difficult to measure uncertainty and there is no agreed method of doing so. But this relates to
organisations and their functioning as environmental factors filter into the organisation and this is then
brought to bear on decision-making (Galaskiewicz, 1985: 298).

Environmental uncertainty prompts greater formalisation and control in inter-organisational relations
(Leblebici & Salancik, 1982: 231). In particular, organisational administrators seek out partners whose
executives have similar backgrounds to theirs (Galaskiewicz & Shatin, 1981: 440). In more turbulent
community environments, cooperation is more likely to take place between organisations whose
leaders have similar racial and educational backgrounds, whereas, in more placid environments, the
race and educational background of organisation leaders has no effect on cooperation. This can lead to
inefficiency: decision-makers are willing to forfeit the best deal on resources they need in exchange for
the greater security derived from working with organisation leaders who are like themselves and thus
more trustworthy (Galaskiewicz & Shatin, 1981: 441). Similarly, inter-organisational relations are
more cooperative amongst organisations if the agencies of administrators had similar operating philosophies or values (Hall et al, 1977: 463; Benson et al, 1973; and Galaskiewicz, 1979: 1359).

Inter-organisational relations – a summary

This section has framed discussion around the three principal perspectives on one theory of inter-organisational relations, as summarised by Joseph Galaskiewicz in his 1985 seminal review of inter-organisational relations: power dependency, resource dependency and environmental constraints. Resource dependency theory suggests that organisations enter into relationships with other organisations when they lack the necessary resources to ensure their own survival autonomously. This is likely to establish a relationship of power dependency between the organisations. Resource dependency and power dependency theories are therefore very closely linked. Environmental constraints, despite being relatively under-researched in the literature, are a factor in inter-organisational relations as they may mean resources are available from only one or a limited number of sources (driving a power/resource dependency), or might mean a lack of security for any organisation present in the environment. In situations of environmental uncertainty, organisations may behave inefficiently as (for example, executives may forfeit best practice for colleagues in whom they have more trust [due to educational or racial backgrounds]).

All three elements of inter-organisational relations theory are difficult to analyse independently since organisations will frequently seek to address more than one of them at the same time (Galaskiewicz, 1985: 303). For example, any given individual organisation may well be dependent for resources on another organisation due to environmental constraints, and this will introduce a power relationship (likely hierarchical but not always). The literature on inter-organisational theory is also “highly
fragmented”; and the scholarship is “uneven” (Galaskiewicz, 1985: 281; Cropper et al, 2008: 8). There are a host of tentative findings in a range of fields, without replicated studies to confirm findings either way.

It should be noted that most references in this section on inter-organisational relations, and in particular on resource dependency theory, are now quite dated. Resource dependency theory remained prominent in and of itself, yet has not developed much since initial reviews were conducted in the 1980s. Some state this is due to some of the work having become redundant (Pfeffer, 2007: 439; Huxham & Beech, 2008: 557). Others show that authors on resource and power dependency have instead shifted their focus to other areas of research, notably institutional theory: whilst resource dependency theory narrowed in focus, institutional theory became more expansive (King, 2011). This reflects the shifts in broader organisation theory, as set out above.

This research has retained a focus on the resource dependency theory aspects of inter-organisational relations as being more appropriate than more updated theories of organisational networking for application to integrated missions. The UN system was established in the 1940s and many of its structures reflect the hierarchical nature of organisations prevalent at that time. Although the first integrated mission, UNMiK, was established only in 1999, its structure reflected earlier organisational thinking. It is explicitly hierarchical, and not the more flexible, customer-oriented and participative type of post-modernist organisation anticipated by Hatch (Hatch, 2006: 92). In addition, both the literature on integrated missions and (my) empirical experience of having worked on integrated missions suggested that resource scarcity would form a significant element of data findings, so including resource dependency in an over-arching analytical framework was appropriate.
However, both the subsequent fieldwork and a critical reflection on this literature suggested a gap in explaining why integrated missions have not learnt or changed significantly over time, in light of experience. The question arose as to whether the three dimensions of inter-organisational relations theory were sufficient to explain the continued under-performance of integrated missions? It is fair to assume that in an organisation with decades of experience in one particular area – in the UN’s case, of peacekeeping – over time, practices would change and processes improve. Yet, reviews of civilian peacekeeping, sparse as they are, seem to present similar findings over time: integrated missions are facing similar challenges of human and operational resources time and again, regardless of location and size. Despite gradual, incremental change (acknowledged by Fukuyama), weaknesses in civilian peacekeeping persist. In seeking to understand why this happens, it is helpful to consider literature on how organisations learn.

2.5 Organisational Learning Theory

Over time, an organisation’s learning is crucial to its performance: the more an organisation can learn, adapt and improve, the better it will perform as an organisation (Senge, 2007: 486). Yet, conversely, “the primary institutions of our society are oriented toward controlling rather than learning” (Senge, 2007: 486). Formal organisations in today’s world are set up to reward members of staff who perform in a certain, pre-determined way. This stifles creativity and innovation, and “pre-destines organisations to mediocre performance” (Senge, 2007: 486). The days when the head of any organisation could lead from the top and learn individually on behalf of the organisation are increasingly outmoded as today’s world becomes more dynamic, and increasingly inter-dependent.
Organisational learning theory emerged from initial thinking about organisational change, primarily by Kurt Lewin and Max Weber (Hatch, 2006: 313). Lewin set out a theory of organisational change involving three separate stages: unfreezing the status quo, movement in terms of organisational practice, and then refreezing new processes (Lewin, 1947: 229). Change is therefore brought about by disturbing an organisation’s stability, and moving to a new state. Lewin’s work has been criticised as assuming too much stability in an organisation before change is introduced (Hatch, 2006: 311) and ignoring the role of power and politics in organisational behaviour (Pfeffer, 1992: 331), meaning that Weber’s work on the importance of leadership, and the “routinisation of charisma” (Parsons, 1947: 363-386) has been recognised as more important in moving forward thinking on organisational change (Hatch, 2006: 311). Weber argued that organisational change will be brought about through a combination of charisma from a leader, which introduces the idea that change is necessary, and then systemisation and accommodation (or routinisation) of that change (Parsons, 1947: 386).

More recently, organisational change has come to be known as organisational learning (Hatch, 2006: 313). Senge argues that there are two types of organisational learning: generative and adaptive. Generative learning is creative, adapting an organisation’s activities to changed realities. Adaptive learning is about coping, managing changes in an external environment that affect the organisation. The organisation that can learn to generate new ideas and adapt, is one that will survive longer and function more effectively than one that does not (Senge, 2007: 487). Applying this to UN integrated missions would suggest that those organisations that can adapt according to the fluid, changing needs and realities of in-country experiences will be ones that perform effectively and more successfully than others.
March (1991) proposed two types of organisational learning, exploitation and exploration. Exploitation is the use of existing resources to change procedures and so make an organisation more efficient. Exploration is more experimental, and involves using knowledge and resources in new ways to bring about changes in organisational behaviour (March, 1991: 71-87). Organisation learning, nonetheless, is an ambiguous concept and difficult to demonstrate. Nonaka and Takeuchi discuss four types of knowledge transfer in organisations, distinguishing between knowledge which can be articulated (explicit knowledge) and that which cannot (tacit knowledge). These are socialisation (tacit-tacit transfer), codification (tacit-explicit transfer), combination (explicit-explicit transfer) or internalisation (explicit-tacit transfer) (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; see Figure 5).

\[\text{Figure 5: Nonaka and Takeuchi's Process of Organisational Knowledge Conversion}\]

It is through a process of continuous innovation and learning that (Japanese) organisations were shown to learn and thereby be effective and successful. Analysis of the literature on UN integrated missions through this lens suggests that some externalisation has occurred with the drawing up of peacekeeping guidelines, but that most organisational learning within the UN about integrated mission management remains internalised only amongst integrated mission staff, rather than socialised across the UN.
system. Learning takes place tacitly (staff know there is something wrong with the organisational experience they are witnessing and take steps to articulate this) but wider, more systemic change does not happen: the learning is not combined with formal changes in organisational practice.

Schön also argued that modern organisations need to exist in a state of continuous transformation in order to endure (Schön, 1973: 28). Together with Chris Argyris, he theorised that organisations demonstrate three types of learning, single-loop, double-loop and triple-loop (Argyris & Schön, 1978). For them, organisations learn by detecting and then correcting inefficiencies. In single-loop (incremental or following the rules) learning, this is a simple, single process. Deviations and variances from organisational standards are rectified at the lowest operational level to create improved efficiencies and effectiveness, yet standardisation of behaviour across a broader organisation does not occur. By contrast, in double-loop (reframing or changing the rules) learning, organisational behaviour changes in a systemic way, i.e. inefficiencies are detected and corrected as in single-loop learning, but the ways in which organisational processes are undertaken are also re-considered: new behaviours become the norm. Double-loop learning questions practices, norms and policies. It is learning that subsequently leads to institutionalised changes in underlying values and assumptions. Double-loop learning is based on a “theory of action perspective” of how individuals say they behave (espoused theory) and how they actually behave (theory in use) (Argyris & Schön, 1974). Finally, triple-loop learning (or transformational learning, learning how to learn) is the highest form of organisational self-examination that can occur. Triple-loop learning questions the entire rationale of an organisation. It is learning about the learning that has occurred.

Applying this to literature about UN integrated missions would suggest that single-loop learning occurs (staff are aware that existing organisational processes are inadequate for effective performance, and
report this) but that double-loop learning does not (similar challenges and performance weaknesses are witnessed on different integrated missions, regardless of timing or location). Challenges to effective implementation of integrated mission mandates are therefore reported in the literature, but systemic changes in how UN missions work do not occur.

2.6 Bringing It All Together – An Analytical Framework

This research is concerned with the effectiveness of UN civilian peacekeeping missions. An overview of relevant literature reveals that much has been written on the what and the why of peacekeeping, but that relatively little has been written about the how of peacekeeping, i.e. how it is undertaken, how successful this has proven, how integrated missions perform as organisations. A few reviews have been undertaken, by the UN and others, with similar themes on what would improve civilian peacekeeping practice emerging from all of them. Yet little progress has been made to act on the findings of these reviews. To date, there has been no attempt to reconcile these similar findings with an understanding of why they seem to persist, rather than be resolved. This thesis seeks to address that gap. In so doing, this research will contribute to organisation theory by bringing a perspective from the UN system. Given the few reviews that there have been on UN civilian peacekeeping have focused on organisational shortcomings, this research examines UN integrated missions through the lens of organisational theory and, more specifically within that, through a lens of inter-organisational relations, i.e. how integrated missions interact with other organisations and their environments, and what this means in terms of their performance and learning.

Galaskiewicz’s presentation of inter-organisational relations theory as three overlapping and analytically messy theories was therefore considered a useful framework for this thesis. It provided a
simple analytical tool through which the object of the study could be researched. Galaskiewicz’s three-pronged presentation of inter-organisational relations of power dependency, resource dependency and environmental constraints was therefore initially developed into an analytical framework for this research and applied to UN integrated missions (see Figure 6).

![Figure 6: Initially-Proposed Analytical Framework](image)

The framework was used not only to examine the inter-organisational relations within an integrated mission, that is, between those organisations making up the mission, but also to examine the inter-organisational relations between a mission and its counterparts. These counterparts included the UN Security Council, UN colleagues based at headquarters in New York, and other organisations present in the mission setting.

The power dependency of integrated missions and their counterparts, and then of each entity within an integrated mission was examined, and then analysed to learn what that meant in terms of operational performance. Resource dependency in integrated missions was examined both in terms of how international political negotiation affects and influences levels of resourcing to individual missions, and in terms of how these resources are then used at country level on the integrated mission itself. What impact this has on the mission was also explored. Finally, the environmental constraints faced by
integrated missions were also looked at, both in terms of legitimising an integrated mission in its context, but also in terms of the operating environment of integrated missions, and how this affects their daily functioning.

In using this framework to analyse integrated missions, questions surfaced around organisational learning. Note that organisational learning did not form part of the initial analytical framework used to formulate research questions and conduct fieldwork. It was only on analysing the data collected that the importance of ideas about organisational learning became apparent in terms of explaining (continued) integrated mission under-performance. Similar challenges to organisational performance were found in both case studies yet the analytical framework proved insufficient to explain all aspects of why they appeared to persist. This led to the development of a revised analytical framework to include a lens through which organisational learning could be examined. Note that all data were analysed for organisational learning; it became a cross-cutting lens of the analytical framework (see Figure 7).

![Analytical Framework](image_url)

**Figure 7: Analytical Framework**
2.7 Research Questions

The aim of the research was to better examine integrated missions, in terms of how they are conducted and therefore to understand why they under-perform. Are they destined to fail? Or are they simply unconscious victims of a political system and operational structure that is outmoded? By examining the structure, resources and operating environments of integrated missions, this research sought to shed new light on how UN civilian peacekeeping operations are undertaken. Against this background, with the knowledge of relevant organisation theory and peacekeeping literature, the central research question was formulated as:

**Why do UN integrated missions under-perform?**

The analytical framework was to be used to understand integrated missions, and so sub-questions relating to the elements of the framework were developed. In terms of power dependency, it was necessary first to explore how political negotiation at the Security Council in New York affected integrated missions as organisations. This led to the first sub-question:

**How do relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions?**

Next, given the unusual organisational structure of integrated missions, frequently themselves made up of more than one organisation, the relations between the various organisations making up an integrated mission needed to be examined to understand how these relations affect mission performance. This led to the second sub-question:
How do inter-organisational relations impact on integrated missions?

Finally, given the few reviews of UN peacekeeping that had been undertaken prior to this research, as well as the findings from the data produced in this project, each presenting similar evidence of resourcing, staffing and coordination challenges in civilian peacekeeping, this project sought to understand better how the UN learns from its experiences. Why was it that each review was documenting similar findings? Why was under-performance a persistent characteristic of integrated missions rather than gradual improvement over time? Why did the UN not appear to improve its operational practice on integrated missions? These questions led to the formulation of the final sub-question as:

How does the UN learn from its experience of integrated missions?

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has set out how international relations, in particular with regards to peacekeeping, have changed since the end of the Cold War. Resource transfers from wealthier nations to poorer states were withdrawn when the Cold War ended, as guarantees of ideological support in a two-sided conflict were no longer considered to be necessary. As a result, power relations within some states shifted and began to be contested violently. Where previously, violent conflict had largely taken place between states, the 1990s saw a rise in the number of internal civil wars. Yet the forum for international discussion to prevent such conflict, and safeguard international peace and security reflected the politics of the post-World War II environment, and was ill-suited to the different type of violence now manifesting itself in so many Cold War satellites. Those not directly involved in a country’s conflict were institutionally prevented from intervening. Early efforts either failed (Somalia) or received inadequate international
response (Rwanda; Srebrenica). Resources for peacekeeping dwindled; the number of non-governemental organisations proliferated.

Improvements in telecommunications meant that human rights abuses, violence and a rise of insecurity were witnessed around the world with the UN seemingly incapable of responding. This led to public demands for “humanitarian intervention”, i.e. becoming involved in other countries’ wars, regardless of the legality of so doing, and the consequences for state sovereignty. The security and development aspects of international relations began to merge, leading to calls for improved coordination and coherence of activity. The doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect also gained traction, culminating in its provisions being adopted by the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit.

Humanitarian intervention was undertaken through the existing structures of peacekeeping operations. The difference being that with the end of the Cold War, peacekeepers were tasked to deploy to areas where violence was ongoing and there was no peace to keep – often poorly resourced, and mandated to undertake an ever-expanding array of statebuilding activities. “The reality has been that the enormous capacity to wage war was never matched by a similar will and capacity to reconstruct” (Barakat, 2005: 8).

The UN and some others have conducted a few reviews of post-Cold War peacekeeping, each of which highlights resourcing challenges and improved coordination as significant weaknesses. Demands for missions to be “integrated” have persisted from 2000 to the present day, despite the prevalence of significant terminological challenges and misunderstandings amongst peacekeeping practitioners. Operational guidelines on peacekeeping were only introduced in 2008 and have already been updated
three times, almost on an annual basis. Throughout this time, the UN system of governance where
international relations take place has remained the same.

This thesis aims to explore why integrated missions under-perform. It seeks to understand how the UN
learns the lessons of its experience of integrated missions and why these lessons do not seem to lead to
organisational improvement in mission performance. The end of the Cold War led to a renewed
academic interest in multilateralism to address some of the challenges faced by the world, through the
UN system. Research showed that no single, accepted definition of multilateralism existed (still true
today) meaning that studies into the effectiveness of international organisations reverted to using
organisation theory as a conceptual basis. This proved true also of the research process undertaken to
produce this thesis: in order to examine the effectiveness of UN integrated missions, a study of how
specific missions behave as organisations was required.

Literature on organisation theory and inter-organisational relations is fragmented and patchy. Joseph
Galaskiewicz, however, usefully summarised that that there are three overlapping theories that relate to
inter-organisational relations: resource procurement and allocation; political advocacy; and
organisational legitimacy. When considering resource procurement and allocation, the most prominent
constraint to integrated mission effectiveness, three perspectives are relevant. These are power
dependency, resource dependency and environmental constraints. This three-pronged framework was
initially adopted as an analytical framework through which to examine integrated missions, both in
terms of their operational performance, as well as how international politics affects that performance
day-to-day. It was used as the basis from which to draw up the questions used in fieldwork. Yet the
process of analysis of the data produced during fieldwork showed that the framework was unable to
explain all aspects of integrated mission under-performance found in the data produced. An element of
organisational learning needed to be introduced. The analytical framework was therefore adapted to include a lens on organisational learning through which integrated missions could be examined (Figure 7).

The next chapter sets out the methodology behind the research, how fieldwork was undertaken, and how data were collected in order to answer the research questions. It sets out the detail of the approach used to answer the central research question and three related sub-questions, illustrating precisely which relations are explored, both within integrated missions and between integrated missions and their external interlocutors. The research process proved to be an iterative, investigative and non-linear.
3.1 Introduction – the Research Questions

Chapters 1 and 2 have set out that integrated missions are complex and multi-faceted organisations. They are frequently made up of multiple organisations; they are managed specifically in difficult environments, as well as from UN headquarters in New York; and they are influenced by political events and happenings both in the country in which they are located as well as amongst the UN member states that fund them. Integrated missions are also relatively under-explored in academic research. The what and the why of peacekeeping are well documented in the literature, but the how of civilian peacekeeping has received relatively little scrutiny. There have been a few reviews of peacekeeping, and these have revealed various, and persistent, flaws in the process of managing integrated missions, relating not least to challenges of resourcing and stakeholder coordination. Yet the management and day-to-day challenges faced on integrated missions are not usually available to anyone not on their staff, and the missions are frequently located in areas experiencing violent conflict, making them difficult for researchers (or indeed representatives of UN member states) physically to visit. The proposition of this thesis is that, in part as a result of relative under-researching and lack of scrutiny, integrated missions do not perform as effectively as they might. This research seeks to examine why integrated missions under-perform by answering the following questions:
Central research question

- Why do UN integrated missions under-perform?

Sub-questions

- How do relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions?
- How do inter-organisational relations impact on UN integrated missions?
- How does the UN learn from its experience of integrated missions?

The complexity of and relative lack of research into integrated missions meant that various methodological challenges were faced in designing this research. This chapter highlights these methodological challenges, and the methods used to overcome them.

Section 3.2 defines the field of study, and explains the methodology used and why. Section 3.3 describes the process of engagement with integrated mission staff and some of their interlocutors in early 2011, in both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Kosovo. The interview process and research techniques are set out. The ethics and dilemmas faced during this research project are also explained, including confidentiality and my own identity as both a researcher and a member of the UK civil service, as an employee of the Department for International Development (DFID). Section 3.4 sets out how data were analysed, including mention of the challenges of working in more than one language (in this case in French, Serbian and Albanian alongside English), and the effect this had on data collection. Section 3.5 summarises the chapter and presents general conclusions. Overall, data
collection was a dynamic process, with continual reflection on peacekeeping generally, its literature, and the specific dynamics of keeping the peace in both the Congo and Kosovo.

3.2 Research Approach – Getting to Case Studies

Investigation is iterative (Blackmore & Ison, 1998: 41); it requires building a story, the idea of which is consistently conceptualised and reconceptualised according to data uncovered (Thomas, 1998: 14). In this research, the story to be told is about the performance – good, bad or in-between – of UN integrated peacekeeping missions. The crux of the research aimed to explore how relations between UN member states, as well as relations between the various organisations making up an integrated mission impact on missions themselves. As such, there were two levels of investigation – at the micro level in-country (where integrated missions are located) and at the macro level, in New York, where UN member states negotiate and agree to establish integrated missions. An overall methodological approach was needed that would enable the objective, rigorous analysis of both these levels. Given data would be drawn from a number of sources, including literature on integrated missions – insofar as it existed – and empirical evidence from fieldwork, it was likely that a mixed-method approach would be adopted.

The research might have been either quantitative or qualitative in approach – or indeed a mix of the two. Initially, it was anticipated that all members of staff on given integrated missions would be approached through a questionnaire, to generate a significant amount of quantitative data to support findings from other approaches in the research. On examining the logistical feasibility of such an approach, this suggestion was rejected. There was a danger that such an approach would produce an unmanageable quantity of data for one researcher, and data of insufficient depth required for the
explanatory nature of the research question. Finally, a literature review of the use of questionnaires revealed that structured questionnaires are often ineffective when seeking to answer “why” and “how” questions as in the case of this thesis. More detail on the use of surveys and questionnaires is provided below. For now, it simply needs to be noted that the possibility of generating quantitative data for this research was quickly rejected as less appropriate than other forms of methodological approach. It was decided that richer findings could be gained, and more easily, from a qualitative assessment of integrated missions.

Various qualitative methodologies open to researchers were therefore explored. The theoretical drive of any research project is either inductive or deductive in direction (Morse 1991; Morse 2003; Morse & Richards 2006; Morse & Niehaus 2009). This refers to whether the conceptual process of the study is one of discovery or confirmation. In this research, there were no assumptions prior to fieldwork and data analysis about the answer to the “why” question of under-performance by integrated missions, i.e. this was initially an inductive study, one of discovery. Despite both grey literature in the form of peacekeeping reviews and empirical evidence of integrated mission under-performance, it was felt a stronger, more robust, piece of research would be produced if all preconceptions about under-performance were put aside. Hypotheses were therefore not drawn up for testing; this was not deductive research. There was also no attempt to move backwards and forwards between induction or deduction, systematically testing conjectures presented by the data, so this was not an abductive study. Instead, perspectives from inter-organisational relations theory were wrapped together in an analytical framework through which to examine the case studies. Nonetheless, having conducted fieldwork and started to analyse the data collected, it was discovered that some findings did not fall easily into the theoretical categories initially adopted. This suggested that the theory – on its own – had shortcomings; the analytical framework needed to be adjusted. Insights were therefore derived from
the data in a deductive process and combined with the initial inductive approach. The deductive process was followed using a framework of analysis set out in Section 3.5. In this way, the data helped to explain why integrated missions under-perform, with new insights into both peacekeeping practice and inter-organisational relations theory gathered from the case studies examined.

Literature on social science research methods revealed that ethnography is frequently used in qualitative research. Ethnography is a “methodology based on direct observation” (Gobo 2011: 15) which allows for the use of a range of methods and techniques to conduct research, and “offers an unparalleled set of methods for exploring and gaining insight into people’s values, beliefs and behaviours” (Gottlieb 2006: 47-48). Ethnography also “allows the reader to gain a deep understanding of, and empathy for, lives lived and values held in a very different fashion from one’s own” (Gottlieb 2006: 51).

Ethnography is recognised as useful in qualitative research, in particular for its flexibility, enabling a range of methods to be used for research purposes: “what most distinguishes ethnography from other methodologies is a more active role assigned to the cognitive modes of observing, watching, seeing, looking at, gazing at and scrutinising” (Gobo 2011: 15). Yet at the same time, ethnography is not without its detractors as a methodology. Whilst ethnography has “become synonymous with qualitative studies”, for some, it has “become a buzzword and been diluted into a multitude of sometimes contrasting and contradictory meanings” (Gobo, 2011: 15).

There is also controversy in social science research over how far a researcher’s own background and experiences influence data collection and findings. Some argue that ethnography is the “only method based explicitly on the recognition of three fundamental inter-related pre-suppositions:
(a) That data are not just gathered like grapes on a vine, but are also created by human effort
(b) Scholars that produce data are themselves complex and affected by their surroundings; and
(c) The quality and content of the data that a researcher gathers have as much to do with the researcher as they do with the informants of research participants” (Gottlieb, 2006: 48).

Others show how this perspective has been refuted: “experience shows that this idea has scant empirical grounding… because what an ethnography mainly observes are behaviours (rituals, routines, ceremonials) and these are much more stable over time than are attitudes and opinions” (Gobo, 2011: 28).

The literature also made it clear that ethnography involves lengthy periods of time with a specific group – time which it would be neither appropriate nor feasible to access in this research project. A method whereby a researcher can access a specific target group for a specific period of time was therefore required. There are at least three terms that merge with ethnography: case study, fieldwork, and participant observation, defined as follows:

“Case study denotes research on a system bounded in space and time, and embedded in a particular physical and socio-cultural context. Research is conducted using diverse methodologies, methods and data sources, like participant observation, interviews, audio-visual materials, documents and so on.
“Fieldwork stresses the continuous presence of the researcher in the field, as opposed to ‘grab it and run’ methodologies like the survey, in-depth interview or analysis of documents and recordings.

“Participant observation is a distinctive research strategy. Probably participant observation and fieldwork treat observation as a mere technique, while the term ‘ethnography’ stresses the theoretical basis of such work stemming from a particular history and tradition” (Gobo, 2011: 16).

Given the academic disputes in the literature as to what precisely constitutes ethnography, as well as the logistical constraints adopting such an approach would have necessitated, ethnography was rejected as an imperfect research methodology and not appropriate (or feasible) for this research. Nonetheless, when considering an approach to research, thinking about ethnography was drawn on. Using the definitions outlined above, a case study approach was therefore the most realistic and feasible for this project.

3.2.1 What is a case study?

Case studies have almost invariably been associated with qualitative data (Shrank, 2006: 47). Like ethnography, case studies are subject to ongoing debate on definition and scope. They have been defined as both “an intensive examination of a single case of a particular phenomenon” (Orum, 2001: 1509) and “to include both within-case analysis of single cases and comparisons between or among a small number of cases” (Bennett, 2001: 1513). The definitions have three important characteristics in common:
(a) “Case study approach is a research design rather than an approach to the collection or analysis of data, and case studies must involve utilisation in a wide array of different data sources and a number of different analytic strategies
(b) The case study examines units of analysis that are not drawn from a well-demarcated population; and
(c) Case studies are at the centre of a storm of controversy in a number of the social sciences and their authors must therefore be prepared to defend their methods against the slings and arrows of their critics” (Shrank, 2006: 48).

Further examination of relevant literature revealed a twofold technical definition of a case study. A case study is:

1. “An empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and
2. The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin 2009: 18).

In other words, the case study approach is used when an understanding of a real-life phenomenon in depth is desired, but such understanding encompasses important contextual conditions – exactly the
situation faced in this piece of research. In this sense, the use of case studies is not limited to being a data collection tactic alone, but is rather an over-arching research methodology (Stoecker 1991: 101).

Like ethnography, the use of case studies offers a means to conduct qualitative research, using a variety of methods. Given the complexity of peacekeeping and integrated missions within that, an approach was needed that would allow for in-depth examination of particular instances. A case study approach would enable this (Yin 2009: 18). A case study approach also allows for flexibility, i.e. a range of research methods can be used in case studies, within the over-arching methodology – such as observation and/or any other technique. Given the inductive, exploratory nature of the research project, this flexibility was appropriate. In addition, the structural organisation of integrated missions would enable a variety of data sources to be found from within individual case studies. Given this research considers peacekeeping generally, but covering peacekeeping in its entirety (i.e. throughout the past six decades of its operation, and throughout the world of current peacekeeping operations) would not be realistically possible for an individual researcher, case studies were the logical approach to adopt for the purposes of this study.

There is no formula for choosing a research methodology, but the choice depends in large part on the research question to be explored (Yin 2009: 9). The more the questions seek to explain some present circumstance (for example how or why some social phenomenon works) the more case studies will be relevant (Yin 2009: 10). This was pertinent for this research project: Chapters 1 and 2 have set out that much has been written about the what and why of specific peacekeeping missions, but that relatively little has been written about how civilian peacekeeping is undertaken. Both chapters have also set out that whilst there is relatively little literature that reviews peacekeeping, what there is shows that UN integrated missions under-perform. This research sought to answer why. As such, in answering
questions about how peacekeeping is undertaken and why integrated missions under-perform, literature on research methodologies appears to show that a case study approach is ideal.

3.2.2 Defining the scope to be studied

As set out in Chapters 1 and 2, peacekeeping is a potentially vast area of study, and even the scope of integrated missions is not neatly defined. The term integrated mission has shifted in meaning and interpretation even during the period of this research, and still today is not well understood by mission staff. At the outset of the research project, the term integrated mission was understood loosely in the UN system to refer only to the civilian aspects of a peacekeeping operation – i.e. the definition against which it is used in this thesis. Since then, it has come to mean the civilian components of a peacekeeping operation as well as the remaining elements of a UN presence in any respective country.

The scope of this research concerns only the civilian aspects of a peacekeeping operation (i.e. not the military contingents of peacekeeping operations and not the other parts of the UN system that may or may not be represented in the country where a peacekeeping mission has been established). Whilst this may seem a radical cut to any potential scope of a research project, the civilian integrated mission aspects of any peacekeeping operation are in themselves already complex and multi-faceted. In addition, focusing on this element of a peacekeeping operation has not been done before: typically, any reviews of peacekeeping operations focus on military aspects of activity. There are three reasons for this:

- the relative (much higher) proportion of total peacekeeping expenditure on military activity;
The increase in demand for civilian aspects of peacekeeping reflects the general expansion of peacekeeping mandates during the 1990s and the beginnings of a merging between security and development aspects of international relations (Duffield 2001; Fukuyama 2004; Fukuyama 2006; Chesterman 2003; see Chapter 2). It is therefore an area that is less studied than the military aspects of peacekeeping, in operation since the 1940s. The civilian aspects of peacekeeping missions are a relatively recent activity in international affairs.

An integrated mission can be made up solely of UN staff (either recruited direct to a mission or as staff members of any number of UN funds and agencies that may form part of any integrated mission) or it may be made up of staff from a variety of organisations, some UN, some regional. Regardless of the structure of the integrated mission itself, any mission necessarily interacts with various external stakeholders – again, be they other UN organisations or otherwise. Notably, integrated missions have to interact with the populations, including government representatives, of the countries in which they are located; the staff and counterparts in other UN organisations and various non-governmental organisations (NGOs); the representatives of various interested embassies with missions in the country; UN senior management in New York; and representatives of various UN member states also located in New York.
Therefore, whilst the focus of this research is the integrated mission itself, in order to understand the management and performance of that mission, an understanding of the mission's links to its external counterparts is also required.

3.2.3 Using and choosing case studies

Having decided on using a case study approach as the overall research methodology, and limited the scope of the research to the integrated, civilian component of UN peacekeeping missions, how the area of study would be examined now needed to be decided, i.e. which cases would be used to study, and which methods would be used to examine them. Since peacekeeping was first established as an international activity under the auspices of the United Nations in 1948, there have been various peacekeeping missions in operation at any one time. Between initially registering for a PhD in 2004, having some leave of absence, and coming eventually to conduct actual fieldwork in 2011, there were up to eighteen peacekeeping missions a year in operation. It was clear that the resources, both in terms of time and finances, to visit or scrutinise each of these missions (past or ongoing) would not be available for one individual researcher. Even if such a feat were feasible, it was likely that an unmanageable quantity of data would have been produced, unhelpful for the kind of research story anticipated. An element of prioritisation was necessary, or in other words, it was decided to focus in-depth on a small number of integrated missions, rather than lightly on a broad number of missions.

Having decided on a case study approach, and having defined the scope of the research as the civilian components of a peacekeeping mission, a “case” therefore came to mean one specific civilian integrated mission. It now needed to be decided how many and which cases to research. A mixture of the pragmatic (art of the possible) and desirable came into play resulting in the choice of two cases of
the integrated missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Kosovo, known respectively as MONUC (now renamed MONUSCO) and UNMiK.6

3.2.4 Why MONUSCO and UNMiK?

Establishing UNMiK in the UN Security Council was a truly ground-breaking and watershed moment in international politics. For the first time, the international community intervened both militarily in a sovereign state, and tasked the United Nations to assume administrative control of a territory. UNMiK was located in a small province of one European country, yet on creation was the largest peacekeeping mission that had yet been mandated.

By contrast, MONUC was established just a few months after UNMiK in a piecemeal way. A relatively very small number of staff (55 military observers) was tasked to visit DRC, the eleventh largest country in the world. In time, however, MONUC – and its successor MONUSCO – grew to consist of several thousand civilian staff, several thousand military personnel and an overall budget higher than any other peacekeeping mission in history.

In practical terms, therefore, the scale of these missions offered greater opportunities for research than others given their inherently higher levels of accessibility due to larger numbers of potential candidates to contact. Crucially as well, both missions, having been established at similar times (in 1999 and 2000 respectively) were ongoing in 2011 when research was due to be conducted: a good historical perspective could be gained from visiting ongoing missions that had been set up several years

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previously. The sheer scale of both missions also meant that international attention and commentary was more available on MONUC/MONUSCO and UNMiK: there was a larger pot from which to draw data than there was from other missions.

It is important to be clear at this stage that using MONUC/MONUSCO and UNMiK did not constitute a comparative study. Rather, it was anticipated that questions be drawn up against the analytical framework, and then investigated on two case studies during fieldwork. It is possible to draw conclusions using a single case study (Yin, 2009: 6). Yet, given the wide-ranging nature of peacekeeping, an activity that has taken place in most regions of the world, it was felt that more robust conclusions would be drawn from the use of more than one case. For practical reasons to keep the data manageable, two cases were considered sufficient for this research project. Note that it was recognised that research design would have to be robust enough to ensure generalisable findings could be drawn from two case studies. The choice of which integrated missions to use as cases was therefore significant, and impacted on the decision to use MONUC/MONUSCO and UNMiK. Any comparisons along the lines of “MONUSCO worked better or worse than UNMiK” would only ever be incidental to the wider focus of the research.

In the case of UNMiK, various organisations made up the integrated structure. All staff were headed by one single individual, a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, or SRSG. Beneath the SRSG, UNHCR sat alongside the EU, the OSCE and UN Civil Affairs staff to make up the ‘UNMiK’ whole. This enabled research of inter-organisational relations as well as of relational links within the various individual organisations (see Figure 8).

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7 The best-known example of using a single case study can be the basis for significant explanations and generalisations is Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow’s 1971 “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis”, Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc
Conversely, with MONUC/MONUSCO, all staff were UN personnel, either drawn from UN organisations, or recruited directly into the mission to be “mission staff”. Again, this enabled inter-organisational research within the various sections that make up MONUSCO as well as study of the links between MONUSCO and its external counterparts (see Figure 9). Chapter 1 presented figures showing the evolution of MONUC to MONUSCO and these are not replicated here. Note that by the time research was conducted MONUSCO was in place, so Figure 9 below shows the case that was studied during fieldwork (MONUSCO) rather than its earlier structure (MONUC).

Given the different structures of the respective missions; their different geographical location; their ongoing status as live integrated missions; and their sheer size, these case studies were selected to enable a good representation of some of the challenges facing integrated missions generally.
Finally, both MONUSCO and UNMiK were familiar to me as organisations given my previous experience of having worked in both contexts (first as a member of UNMiK staff and later as an observer of MONUC whilst working for the UK Department for International Development [DFID] in DRC). Indeed, it was some of this previous experience that had first sparked my initial interest in the research itself. Nonetheless, despite this useful background and first-hand knowledge of specific integrated missions, UNMiK and MONUSCO were appropriate case studies not because of my familiarity with them, but rather due to their significance in international politics.
Several other case study options were considered and discarded. Other ongoing missions could have been used, for example one case – the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Syria – was discussed as having been established in 1974, potentially providing a comparison between missions of different age and size, as well as being in a third geographical region (and therefore of different geopolitical importance). But UNDOF is primarily a military peacekeeping mission so less relevant for the purposes of this research. Another example considered was the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA. UNAMA is not a peacekeeping mission but instead the first example of a new kind of mission established by the UN in 2002, a Special Political Mission. Using UNAMA as a case study could have enabled a comparison between peacekeeping and other types of mission. Yet, this was not the focus of the research and therefore UNAMA was less relevant than the cases selected. A further case considered was UNTAET, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, which – like both UNMiK and MONUC/MONUSCO – was an integrated peacekeeping mission, and was also established in 1999. Despite being located in a third geographical region (South Asia) and having a continuing presence in East Timor at the time fieldwork was due to be conducted, it was considered that reaching East Timor would likely have made the research somewhat unmanageable logistically, not in and of itself, but in combination with other cases already being visited (as well as proven almost prohibitively expensive): overall, it was concluded that there was no added value to including a third case.

The final agreed case studies were therefore the integrated missions of UNMiK in Kosovo and MONUC/MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. MONUSCO had a very similar structure to MONUC (see Chapter 1) and was considered by many observers, both MONUSCO staff and external counterparts, as merely a replacement of MONUC. The similarities of structure of

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8 This decision was taken several years before the current violence erupted in Syria
MONUSCO and the fact that it was constituted the day following the end of MONUC allowed a certain continuity of sorts for the mission being used as a case in this research project. For research purposes, this meant analysis could continue without due concern or constraint.

3.3 Research Methods

In order to research the case studies chosen, a number of other methods were employed for triangulation purposes, including fieldwork; semi-structured interviews and the use of field notes; observation; and document analysis. This section explains why they were chosen.

Fieldwork is simply the collection of data through physical presence (Eberle & Maeder, 2011: 53). For the purposes of this research project, it was considered beneficial to conduct fieldwork and meet with key individuals for a number of reasons: to enable interlocutors to gain a greater understanding of the research project; and to make it simpler for them to engage by my making the effort to reach them. It was therefore decided that fieldwork was a useful method through which to examine the case studies.

The flexibility of case studies allows for a variety of methods to be used when conducting research (Snow & Trom 2002; Yin 2009). For this research, tools that would provide sufficient perspective to make generalisable findings were required. Experiments, surveys, histories, analysis of archival records, and modelling economic trends are all various types of research method (Yin 2009: 102). Each is a different way of collecting and analysing empirical evidence, and the most important condition for differentiating among them is to classify the type of research question being asked (Yin
2009: 128). Since this research was seeking to answer why and how questions, it was possible in this research to disregard all the methods listed above (experiments, surveys, histories, and modelling economic needs) – with the exception of analysis of archival records or document analysis. As set out above, for how and why questions, case studies are more appropriate (Yin 2009: 10).

Having decided on the cases to be studied, and the use of fieldwork, it now needed to be decided what would be done when doing it: how would I, as a researcher, interact with staff and interlocutors of both UNMiK and MONUSCO? Seeking information from people is always an interactive process, and the investigator stands to find out more from it if it is also a collaborative process (Woodhouse, 1998: 127). There are various approaches that can be followed: two principal ones are sample surveys and key informant interviews (Woodhouse, 1998: 130). The use of questionnaires had already been discarded from the start of the process considering methodological approach, and similar reasoning could be applied to sample surveys as a research method. Also, similar to the reasoning presented above, the literature was clear that in answering why or how questions – as in the case of this research – sample surveys are often ineffective (Woodhouse, 1998: 133). Why and how questions are better addressed using interviews, and specifically semi-structured interviews, i.e. interviews that include open-ended questions, but which are flexible enough to allow the investigator to follow up specific lines of enquiry that emerge during the interview process (Woodhouse, 1998: 133).

There are various other techniques available, including language; long interviews; focus groups; questionnaires; ethnographic charting of social networks; construction of genealogies; oral histories; and field notes. With the exception of field notes, these were all discarded for the following reasons. Social network charting, oral histories and genealogical construction could be immediately discarded as

9 The research questions chosen were: Why do UN integrated missions under-perform? How do relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions? How do inter-organisational relations impact on UN integrated missions? How does the UN learn from its experience of integrated missions?
not being relevant to the research. In the case of language – "the first and most important tool for conducting ethnography" (Gottlieb 2006: 52) – this tool was largely moot given the widespread use and knowledge amongst interlocutors of English. In the event, two interviews in DRC were conducted in French for ease of communication with interviewees, but this was not due to a specific method being used in the research.

Focus groups and questionnaires were two further methods initially considered and subsequently discarded. Whilst recognising that focus groups can offer an "intriguing variation" on the individual interview by gathering a set of individuals to offer an "informative spectrum of ideas about a particular subject" (Gottlieb, 2006: 62), it was felt that more in-depth and sensitive information could be obtained from interviewees if they were approached individually. In the event, one focus group-type interview was conducted, in Kosovo, although this was not initially part of the research design. This came about due to one senior member of UNMiK staff suggesting it would be simpler for me to speak with several members of his team at the same time to gather their views. The group of individuals concerned were happy to participate in the research, so one interview with three respondents was conducted.

Separately, during research design it was initially envisaged that a survey, through the form of a questionnaire, be developed to enable wider data gathering – i.e. from staff based outside mission headquarters, in other parts of DRC or Kosovo, and to enable views from mission staff less senior than those being interviewed. Surveys can "facilitate quantitative analysis that allows for generalisation to an entire population" (Park 2006: 118). By their nature, surveys are "designed to reach a large number of respondents", and their data can complement qualitative work by providing the context for and confirming the findings of qualitative work (Park 2006: 119). But at the same time, surveys "provide only limited information on each unit of observation". They are thus often ill-suited for the study of
nuanced questions related to identity, subjective experience or historical causation (Park, 2006: 118). For this reason, it was decided that a survey was not appropriate for this research. There were, however, further reasons for not pursuing this method. The first is logistical: the literature suggests that conducting a survey in a developing country can be a major undertaking, in terms of both the time and money required. Choosing to conduct a survey is a decision to become “not just a scholar but also a project manager, a fundraiser, a survey methodologist and motivator and supervisor of others” (Park 2006: 121). The second, more important reason, to reconsider was also the caution from the head of MONUSCO, one of my first interviewees, not to over-burden already-busy staff with little time to spare. There was a risk that few responses would be provided through a method that may not have produced significant additional value to the data anyway being gathered. On balance, it was decided that a questionnaire was not necessary for this research.

Long, open-ended interviews, were considered as a tool as they can produce substantively more interesting answers than other techniques, questionnaires in particular (Piore, 2006: 145). Nonetheless, the successful use of long interviews is quite heavily dependent on the ability of the interviewer to produce something material that is interesting and meaningful to the research process; success depends on the ability of the interviewer to “read” or “interpret” the interviews (Piore, 2006: 145), making the use of a long interview as much a matter of intuition and instinct as of systematic methodology. Given my “newness” to the research process and naïveté in interviewing, it was considered that a more structured and planned tool would produce greater benefits and findings to me as a researcher.

In addition, the literature shows that overly-formal, structured interviews can lead those being interviewed to “clam up”, offering short, “tight-lipped” responses to questions aimed at getting their
interviewer out of the room as quickly as feasible (Piore, 2006: 146). Frequently, what works better is simply to allow a participant to tell their own story.

Almost as a compromise between these two forms of interviewing, a third, “middle of the way”, method in interviewing is the semi-structured interview. Semi-structured interviews are often used in qualitative analysis since they are non-standardised, providing a “degree of structure and flexibility at the same time” (Gray 2009: 369). They also allow for a degree of flexibility during the interview, amongst other reasons enabling the interviewer to check for accuracy and understanding. Semi-structured interviews also enable both the interviewee to provide in-depth detail of a matter he or she wishes to provide, as well as the interviewer to change the order, or even number, of questions asked according to how the interview progresses. Planned correctly, an interview process can enable a more comfortable interaction between the investigator and stakeholder than might otherwise be achieved. In meeting individuals face-to-face, more sensitive questions than otherwise can be posed. For example, if anonymous questionnaires had simply been sent to all staff members of the missions to be studied, there would have been no guarantee of response, and elements of qualitative analysis would have been foregone. Finally, semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer potentially to probe new paths within the interview, perhaps not previously considered (Gray 2009: 370). It was therefore decided that semi-structured interviews were the most appropriate and relevant to the research project. Indeed, in the event of the fieldwork, this proved useful as different interviewees had more or less time available and as such were able to go into more or less detail according to their availability/level of experience.
3.3.1 Formulating interview questions

Having decided on semi-structured interviews as a key research method, it needed to be decided which questions would be posed to participants. Each element of the analytical framework was taken in turn, and relevant questions formed to gain relevant data from interview participants. These questions were prepared before travelling on any fieldwork, but in accordance with semi-structured interviewing technique, it was anticipated that not all interviews would follow the same format. For reasons outlined in the previous section, an iterative approach was adopted for all interviews conducted; the questions were merely there as a guide to ensure a good flow of conversation during each interview. If participants wanted to spend more time than others on particular questions, no mention of this was made by me as the interviewer.

It was anticipated that a total of ten questions would be sufficient to guide the interviews, and it was acknowledged that if not all questions could be posed in the time available, this would be acceptable for research purposes. Two lists of questions were drawn up, the first to ask of UN staff, and the second for non-UN staff members who interacted with UN personnel frequently, so were in a good position to provide views and thoughts on UN integrated mission performance in each case study setting.

The first question was the same for both sets of participants, and aimed to relax the interviewee at the start of the interview process. It asked participants simply to describe their role, and how it fitted with the role of the UN mission under discussion. If participants felt comfortable, they could say how long they had been doing their job. This was followed by two further questions about the mission's objectives – how they were understood and how they may have changed over time – in order to
ascertain each participant’s level of knowledge about the mission. These questions were asked to ensure data were being collected both from participants with a range of knowledge and experience of the mission under examination, but also from a majority of people with sufficient levels of mission knowledge to ensure robust data collection.

The next sets of questions specifically addressed the various aspects of the analytical framework. Specific mention of the terms power dependency, resource dependency and environmental constraints was not made, in order to ensure a level of neutrality of response from all participants. Instead, participants were asked generally about any constraints they felt they faced in their daily work, either as UN staff or as interlocutors with UN staff. Participants were also asked about the relations they felt existed both within the various organisations making up the mission and between the mission and interlocutors in New York. Participants were also asked if any of the constraints they felt were experienced on an integrated mission could be overcome, and if so how.

Finally, participants were asked if they felt the mission under discussion had made any or sufficient effort to communicate its objectives and activities with the country’s local population. This was to gauge levels of awareness both on the part of UN staff about how they are perceived by their host nations, as well as to see if levels of effort on communication reflected the strength of antipathy reported by local populations towards UN integrated missions.

In this way, it was anticipated that data would be collected against each element of the analytical framework, and therefore each research question could be answered. The full lists of questions asked of participants are presented as appendices 1 and 2, at the end of this thesis. The following paragraphs set out the processes undertaken to meet with key individuals during fieldwork.
3.3.2 Preparing for fieldwork

In October 2010, I first contacted a former Deputy Head of MONUC, who was visiting DFID offices in London. The interview was set up on email request almost as a means of testing both my initial interview questions, and the process of interviewing itself.

At the same time, the official MONUSCO website was checked both for details of the history of the structure of (what was by then) MONUSCO and for an up-to-date organigram of how MONUSCO is arranged. Neither was found. An email to the generic MONUSCO contact address asking either for details of the Head of MONUSCO or for an organigram received no response. As a result, I contacted the DFID office in the Congo (DFID DRC) for contact details of senior members of MONUSCO, and was given the email of the Head of MONUSCO. In turn, he put me in touch with members of his staff who in turn were able to expand my network of contacts within MONUSCO.

After this, it was simply a matter of confirming my visit dates to Kinshasa, and arranging interviews. Other than two members of staff who would be on holiday (who provided details of individuals acting in their place) no one refused an interview. One interview was conducted by telephone on return from DRC given it did not prove possible to meet up during the visit itself.

DFID DRC also provided email contacts of the major national and international non-governmental organisations present in the capital of DRC, Kinshasa, as well as some contact details of other embassies. Since the focus of the research was on MONUSCO as an organisation, I wanted to concentrate the bulk of the interviews on MONUSCO staff, but at the same time, I wanted to triangulate findings from their data with that of interlocutors with the mission. Four non-governmental
organisation (NGO) and two embassy representatives (UK and US) were selected for consultation, in each case due to being those NGOs/embassies with the largest presence in Kinshasa on the assumption that the larger organisations would have a longer-term knowledge (and therefore more robust/accurate view) of MONUSCO. It was also hoped that their relative size and prominence in the international community would mean there would be a potentially wider range of contacts from which to seek views and comments. Again, positive responses from each organisation contacted were received. I travelled to DRC for two weeks, in the first half of January 2011 and conducted 19 interviews.

Similarly, prior to visiting Kosovo in April 2011, the UNMiK website was checked for details of an organigram and contact details were requested through the generic website contact address, but no response was received. Again, the DFID Kosovo office was approached for contact details of the most senior representatives of UNMiK. Given the process had proven quite simple prior to visiting Congo, my presumption was that it would be a similar process in Kosovo. This proved not to be correct, and receiving contact details of UNMiK staff took longer than anticipated. Few individuals contacted for interview responded to an initial email request, meaning that very few interviews were arranged prior to departure for Kosovo. The bulk of the interviews – ten in total – were therefore arranged having already arrived in Kosovo when it proved simpler to meet the staff of the office of the Head of UNMiK who then gave me advice on who might be best placed to interview. After this, the process of contacting people and arranging interviews passed smoothly, although contacting key non-governmental interlocutors was not achieved; most UNMiK and international staff did not have relevant contacts of this nature: there is evidently less interaction between non-governmental actors in Kosovo and UNMiK/international personnel than in other mission environments – in itself an interesting finding.
As with fieldwork in DRC, contact details for a few embassies that interact with UNMIK were obtained from DFID Kosovo. One member of the UK embassy and one member of the US embassy were selected for interview for the same reasons as previously: both the UK and US have significant influence in Kosovo (as well as being permanent members of the UN Security Council) so it was their view of UN functioning in Kosovo that was sought. Again, no one in Kosovo declined to be interviewed. In both Congo and Kosovo the only interviewees to decline being recorded were the UK and US embassy representatives.

3.3.3 The interview process

Each interview followed a similar format. I would introduce myself and thank the interviewee for their time and for making themselves available. I asked if it was acceptable to record the interview, and presented two similar, hard-copy documents. The first was a letter of introduction from the Open University, stating my credentials as a researcher, and providing contact details of my supervisors in the case of any questions. The second document was a disclaimer stating that the interview would be conducted in confidence, with security of content assured under the UK Data Protection Act 1998, and that a hard copy transcription would be provided as follow up to the interview. I asked each interviewee to sign this disclaimer, and stated that they could withdraw from the process at any time if they chose. Efforts were made to make interviewees feel comfortable; similarly, all interviewees made efforts to welcome me to their place of work.

The interviewees could be divided into two broad groups: members of mission staff and non-mission staff members. All interviewees were asked broadly the same questions, revolving around the core elements of the analytical framework: power dependency, resource dependency, and environmental
constraints. The length of each interview varied, from the shortest of 30 minutes to the longest of an hour and a half (both in DRC). On average, interviews were planned to take place over one hour. Most answers varied in length, but several key themes began to emerge quite quickly during the interview process; these were underlined when similar themes emerged during the second fieldwork visit, to Kosovo. At no time were suggestions given as responses to individual answers; instead, the themes emerged purely as part of the interview process.

Finally, field notes were used as a method within the semi-structured interview process, more than anything as a precaution, to ensure a brief record of what was said was gathered: in the event that the recording of those interviewed was subsequently lost, at least some record would still be available, potentially meaning disturbing the same individual for a second interview could be avoided. In addition, field notes were a useful tool to record observations during the interview: atmospherics, changes in mood, and general thoughts I had during interviews either to link to previous statements in other meetings, or to emphasise points as reminders to myself for use later on, could all be noted for future use and analysis. Clearly, in those interviews where recording was not possible (see Section 3.3.4 below) field notes were a valuable source of reminder once I came to analyse my data several months after having initially conducted the interviews. It was during data analysis that field notes were principally later used, more than anything else as a method of triangulation to ensure my understanding of what was said several months after an interview had been conducted was the same as that I had recorded at the time of the interview itself. This reflects Ottenburg’s view that “the field experience does not stop” on return from fieldwork: thought processes, interpretation and reflection on field notes are “in constant dialogue” (Ottenburg, 1990: 146).
3.3.4 Observation

Observation, better known among anthropologists as "advanced hanging out" (Gottlieb, 2006: 49), is a research method linked to the branch of philosophy known as hermeneutics. It is a technique based on the premise that human life is about interpretation, as well as building rapport with research participants, i.e. understanding life requires observation. As such, it was decided that observation would form a useful method for this research. The method was only used informally: no interview situation was entered into specifically for observation purposes. Rather, observations were made as interviews were anyway being conducted.

Interviewees were not informed that observation would be used as a research method, but nonetheless direct observation proved an important source of data in two ways. It was helpful to observe interviewees become more relaxed as the format of the interview unfolded: this enabled more probing or sensitive questions to be asked, as foreseen in the semi-structured interview method. Several interviewees acknowledged a need to demonstrate a positive public image of the mission, when in reality they experienced daily frustration and constraints in carrying out their jobs. This was a nuanced revelation that simply would not have been possible through the use of alternative research methods. For example, interviewees were reassured when I could state my research was purely for analytical purposes, with no bearing on either their individual performance or "their" mission. Without observation, some of the more confidential findings of this research would not therefore have been produced.

Observation was also helpful to contextualise some interviewees' answers. For example, particularly in DRC, several interviewees commented on the success of Radio Okapi, an internationally-funded
radio station, managed by MONUC/MONUSCO as a public service broadcaster, disseminating current affairs and topical information to the whole population. The UN also used Radio Okapi to update people about its activities. The station remains the only radio channel in DRC today that is available across the country, to every citizen of DRC. Asking general passers-by in Kinshasa if they knew of Radio Okapi, everyone would answer yes. Radio Okapi was very familiar to the Congolese. But ask them what MONUC or MONUSCO was, or where it was located and they were less certain. Observation helped underline that whilst the mission communications had to some extent succeeded, they had not fully done so, and certainly not to the extent suggested in some interview responses. Again, without having physically travelled to the case study mission locations, this finding would not have been produced.

3.3.5 Document analysis

The final research method selected was document analysis. Grey material – policy-oriented reports prepared for and by governmental and non-governmental agencies\(^\text{10}\) – can be a source of information about a topic being investigated which further research of academic literature cannot provide (O’Laughlin, 1998: 111). Having undertaken a full literature review of both peacekeeping and organisation theory, including inter-organisational relations theory, the research questions had been defined, and a case study approach adopted. In order to ensure I knew as much as possible about the political, social and historical context both of the countries to be visited and the missions to be examined as part of this research, grey material needed to be looked at. It is easier to spot assumptions and incomplete arguments from interviewees if something about the context, region and specific circumstances of those being interviewed is already known (O’Laughlin, 1998: 112). Reading the

\(^{10}\) Definition given in O’Laughlin, 1998: 126
mandates, and any reports on the missions I could find before departing to conduct fieldwork (as well as continuing to do so following completion of fieldwork) provided a richer contextual background for my understanding during the course of this research, as well as a more robust source of data from which to analyse and triangulate findings.

It is important to contextualise grey material itself; such documents must be treated in the same way as other key informants in an investigative process (O'Laughlin, 1998: 118). Political issues can shape the language of a report; the background of the authors can mould a document's findings; the conclusions may be affected by limitations in a product's terms of reference (O'Laughlin, 1998: 121). To address these flaws, a researcher should "re-think" the assumptions and conclusions presented in any grey material, confronting the data for robustness and inconsistencies (if any). Just as any data produced by face-to-face research will be scrutinised and analysed to answer the research questions being posed, so must background documents also be investigated robustly. For the purposes of this project, any document reviewed as background context for the integrated missions of UNMiK and MONUC/MONUSCO was treated objectively, in a self-conscious way, in order to interpret the information presented in a meaningful way to answer the central research question.

3.4 Challenges, Dilemmas and Ethics

Several challenges were faced during the process of this research. Principally, undertaking part-time study whilst working full-time is not easy. Finding the time and space to think about the work at hand, to conduct data analysis, to remain on schedule, and in particular to write up the findings proved very difficult. There were several points during the preparation of this research when delays occurred, schedules were revised and even thinking about stopping altogether became a real possibility.
Certainly, when I moved overseas with my job, it proved impossible to continue to undertake research at the same time. The project was suspended for three years (October 2006 – end September 2009) during the period of registration. When I moved overseas once again with my job in June 2013, finalisation of the thesis was again delayed.

Security concerns were another challenge. Although I had already visited both Kosovo and Congo as part of my work, I was fully aware before conducting fieldwork for this research that neither place is yet fully stable (otherwise the UN would not continue to have an integrated mission presence in each country). As a researcher, I felt quite isolated from the precautions, advice and security provided by being a member of either UN or UK Embassy staff. These were overcome by ensuring I followed public advice from the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and, whilst in DRC and Kosovo, remaining in good contact with the respective UK embassy.

Next, the interview process felt somewhat unknown before it started. It was difficult to know if any of those approached would in fact respond to my request for an interview. Most of those approached are senior members of the UN system, playing busy roles in complex and trying circumstances. There was a good chance that my research could touch on sensitive issues for them personally, given their roles as senior managers in integrated missions. The interview process therefore had to follow a principle of fully informed consent. This posed the only potential ethical concern during the research process. So as not unduly to provoke sensitivities about personal performance, of the success or otherwise of any particular peacekeeping mission, interviewees were not told the title of the research project (why do UN integrated missions under-perform?). Instead, interviewees were informed that the research concerned the performance of peacekeeping missions. It was anticipated that this more neutral description of the research being undertaken would avoid any misinterpretation of the research before
the interview process began. A full ethical review process was undertaken in November 2010 as part of the probation process for continuing with this research project; this dilemma about not mentioning the project title was fully disclosed and agreed to by the Open University Human Participant and Materials Ethics Committee (HPMEC).\(^\text{11}\)

A final dilemma confronted during the research was how far to use evidence gained as part of informal interaction with stakeholders, i.e. people who were not undertaking a formal interview. Whilst for the most part such evidence was discounted, it helped to build a picture of the general perception of peacekeeping missions generally. Whenever anything particularly pertinent was stated, the individual concerned was made aware that the conversation may be used as part of the data analysis process.

### 3.4.1 Challenges – language

DRC has five official languages (Lingala; Swahili; Tshiluba; Kituba; and French) but the only one that is spoken throughout its territory is French. The working language of MONUC and MONUSCO was/is nonetheless English, meaning that the bulk of the interviews conducted in DRC were in English. Nonetheless, given that French is also considered a desired language for all UN staff members, and most Congolese citizens do not speak English, French is, for some interlocutors, an easier, more comfortable language in which to communicate. Given I speak French, it was not a problem if an interviewee requested for an interview to be conducted in French rather than English. This happened on only two occasions. In most other interviews, however, when an expression could not easily be found in English, I suggested it be spoken in French to enable the flow of conversation to continue.

\(^{11}\) HPMEC Approval, number 836, 07 December 2010
Equally, Kosovo has two official languages, Serbian and Albanian, but the official language of UNMIK is English. Most citizens of Kosovo also speak English. I experienced no language difficulties or concerns whilst conducting fieldwork in Kosovo, and all interviews were undertaken in English.

The only challenge to working in various languages arose when it came to transcribing interviews. Transcription is a slow, lengthy process. Having transcribed the first interview myself, time constraints meant that I secured the assistance of a transcriber for all the remaining (recorded) interviews conducted in Congo. The transcriber was not a French speaker meaning that it was only possible for those parts of the interview conducted in English to be transcribed. This challenge did not arise in the case of Kosovo interviews, where I undertook all the transcription myself.

Overall, having some knowledge of any of the languages mentioned above, in addition to English, proved an advantage whilst conducting fieldwork. This was particularly true of knowing French in DRC. In the Congo, all day-to-day conversations and all daily activities are (for non-Congolese at least) conducted in French. Knowledge of this language proved a real asset in terms of gaining more of an insight of people’s general thoughts and perceptions. In terms of building up a story of DRC, knowledge of French – and for that matter any of its other languages – was simply a further means of observation and broader understanding. Likewise, a minor working knowledge of both Albanian and Serbian is useful in Kosovo, both in terms of building rapport with interviewees, as well as understanding more of citizens’ daily lives, all of which play a role in rounding the research project as a whole.
3.4.2 Challenges – identity

Investigation can never fully be separated from questions of values (Thomas 1998: 14). My role as a researcher was compounded by the fact that, by playing the role of researcher, I was in some ways already an insider of sorts. Other than researching part-time on this project, my full-time employment is for the UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID). Being one of the world’s largest donors, DFID is a major actor in international development practice, and certainly in both DRC and Kosovo, is very well known both amongst the local populations and even more so amongst the international community actors in both countries.

Although it was made very clear at the start of each interview that the research in no way related to DFID activity, and was not being conducted on DFID’s behalf in any way, there was always potentially a sense on the part of interviewees that views could in some way be used by DFID in the future. Even the concept of building a story so as to learn about practice for future improvement is a core activity of DFID’s generally, regardless of whether this research on peacekeeping was of concern to DFID or not. Certainly, my work as DFID staff member gave me a perspective on the data collected that others would not have had. This was an inevitable tension continually experienced during the research project.

Using observation, I could confirm during the course of each interview that the interviewee lost any potential difficulty with my role as a DFID employee. By not mentioning DFID or referencing DFID involvement in any activity related to the respective integrated mission, I could establish trust and build up a working relationship of confidentiality (albeit only over the brief period of the interview). The one possible exception to this was the sole interview I conducted for this research with a DFID member.
of staff, the head of DFID DRC. Nonetheless, given the subject matter of the interview, and the perspective this provided on the research, no conflict of sorts was considered to have been present.

At the same time, in the process of securing interviews, being a DFID staff member was useful in a number of ways. DFID contacts were used to obtain UN, embassy and NGO email addresses in the first instance, and I purposefully used a DFID email address to contact UN staff in both Kosovo and Congo. Indeed, I was informed by the Head of DFID DRC that doing so would "help". It is true that securing interviews with senior members of both integrated missions in Kosovo and Congo was not difficult, with responses usually provided by return. The advice from the Head of DFID DRC suggested this would not have been the case had a private, more anonymous, email address been used. Two interviewees (one in DRC and one in Kosovo), despite the caveat of my introduction that I in no way represented DFID for the purposes of the research, even commented that they receive several requests for PhD interviews, but they would have responded more slowly had my email address been more generic, and specifically not from DFID.

Another positive factor in being a researcher at the same time as a DFID staff member is that I was familiar with the process of securing interviews with other nations' embassy staff. Having worked in various British embassies, the formality involved in addressing and contacting ambassadors of other countries, or their representatives, was not a daunting prospect for me as a researcher. When asked not to record my interviews in the US embassies in both Congo and Kosovo, as well as the UK embassy in Kosovo (the only three interviewees to make such requests) this was of no great surprise.

Next, the process of ensuring I had permission to ask UN members of staff for interviews was made simpler by virtue of working for DFID. It was difficult to know who to ask about securing such permission, since there seemed to be no specific information on this subject on UN websites, and
emails to generic contact addresses on the same sites received no responses. Since I work for DFID, I was able to ask Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) colleagues for a specific email contact to ask the question about permission, and shortly received a response to confirm there were no known restrictions to approaching UN staff to discuss their experiences for the purposes of research.

And finally, whilst no such qualms are true today of Kosovo, conducting research in Congo remains an inherently unsafe process to undertake. In January 2011 when I visited, I experienced no security difficulties of any kind. The country at that time was nonetheless one of the world’s most unstable areas, with pockets of violent conflict flaring up regularly. As a DFID member of staff I could secure a visa and travel to the country much more simply than I would have been able to otherwise. I was also able to ensure UK embassy transportation to and from the airport, and remain in close contact with the embassy throughout my stay, in the event my security was threatened. The prospect of undertaking the research with those caveats in place was made much less daunting as a result. In these small ways, then, the process of conducting research was made somewhat simpler due to my position as a DFID member of staff.

3.5 Data Analysis

There are various ways to approach data analysis. In Some Pragmatics of Data Analysis, Tim Rapley helpfully sets out four principal analytic approaches: framework analysis, thematic analysis, interpretative-phenomenological analysis; and constructivist grounded theory (Rapley, 2011: 275). In each approach, the researcher familiarises him- or herself with the data, either as a whole (in framework and thematic analysis) or on a case-by-case basis (in interpretative-phenomenological
analysis and constructivist grounded theory). In the final case, an initial coding of data is worked out before examining data, and then more focused coding is undertaken having looked at some initial data.

My approach was based on how I know I prefer to work, that is, to familiarise myself with a large amount of data, and from this, iteratively begin to draw up themes that appear repeatedly in the evidence. In Rapley’s categorisation, this is a framework analysis. Having done an initial framing of common themes and sub-themes, I was able to apply labels to each instance of whichever theme whenever it occurred in the data against each element of the analytical framework (power dependency; resource dependency; environmental constraints). This was done principally using differently coloured highlighter pens on the transcripts of interviews conducted. Having systematically gone through all the data in this way, I was in a position to begin to chart results, sorting each label by thematic category and beginning to develop descriptive accounts (categorisations) of findings. A simple grid was produced to enable simple categorisation as shown in Figure 10:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question / Analytical Lens</th>
<th>Power Dependency</th>
<th>Resource Dependency</th>
<th>Environmental Constraints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How do relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How do inter-organisational relations impact on integrated missions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How does the UN learn from its experience of integrated missions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10: Categorising Data
Whenever an instance emerged in an interview transcript of a possible response to each of the research questions, it was possible to index it on the grid. In turn, this helped me develop descriptive accounts of patterns (or clusters) in the data, and so produce overall research findings. In this way, the various sections of the categorisation table could simply be presented in narrative form in the empirical chapters of this thesis. For example, budget constraints were frequently highlighted as a key challenge for UN staff. Sometimes this was presented as a political problem if, for example, the UN Security Council had approved a budget of a certain amount for a mission but then funds were not made available. Such data would be considered an example of resource dependency being impacted by relations between UN member state relations. In other instances, budget constraints were considered as being due to inefficient management decisions on an integrated mission itself. Such data would also be considered an example of resource dependency but as impacting on integrated missions in terms of inter-organisational relations within different parts of the same mission.

In instances where data did not fit neatly into one of the categorisation boxes, its relevance was considered for inclusion in the thesis. I.e. if the finding was considered significant enough for inclusion, then it was presented either alongside other findings to which it was closest but not exactly the same (and distinctions clearly made in the narrative to explain this), or additional sections were added to empirical chapters as being of interest to the reader but not precisely generalisable from the research project as a whole. For example, Chapter 5 includes an additional section on overlaps and tensions in the relevant data. In some instances, data were relevant to more than one analytical category. In such examples, data were presented more than once, as being relevant in more than one way for the research project, and relevant links made in the narrative. For example, in Chapter 6 the same data is used to illustrate similar but not the same points relating to resource dependency and
environmental constraints (in this case about the coping mechanisms adopted by UN staff in the face of resource constraints).

The most significant area where this overlap occurred in the data was on organisational learning. Originally, it was anticipated that a specific chapter would be devoted to this research sub-question. But the data analysis process revealed that much of the evidence to answer this question was in fact the same as that for the first two sub-questions. It was at this stage that a revision to the original analytical framework was made. The initial framework (used in fieldwork for data collection) was unable to explain all aspects of under-performance found in the field data: the data were showing that individual staff were in fact learning whilst working on integrated missions; they were aware of the organisational weaknesses they experienced on integrated missions. An element of organisational learning therefore needed to be introduced to the framework. It was decided that only two chapters to present data findings were necessary, but that both needed to include a section on organisational learning. The first (Chapter 5) would answer the first sub-question (How do relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions?) and contribute to part of the answer to the third sub-question (How does the UN learn from its experience of integrated missions?). Similarly, the second chapter presenting empirical data findings (Chapter 6) would answer the second sub-question (How do inter-organisational relations impact on integrated missions?) and also contribute to the answer to the third sub-question.

3.6 Conclusion

The story of producing data for this research has been shown as iterative, investigative and non-linear. Having determined research questions to be explored, a dynamic process was undertaken of choosing a
research approach, defining the scope of the research, and considering which methods to use to examine that scope. A case study approach was adopted, using two integrated mission "cases" from Kosovo and the Congo. In addition to document analysis, it was decided that fieldwork would be used to further explore the cases, using semi-structured interviews, field notes, and observation. Various methods were rejected including the use of a questionnaire, experiments, oral histories and long interviews. The fieldwork process of physically travelling to other countries to conduct research and collect data proved one of the most rewarding elements of this research project.

Some of the challenges – and advantages – of conducting research on integrated missions have been discussed, including security constraints, working in more than one language, and researching on a part-time basis. Some of the ethical dilemmas – and, again, the advantages – of being a DFID member of staff whilst conducting research have been presented, notably being able to build trust with interviewees whilst also at the same time being able to contact interviewees more easily using a DFID email address.

The use of case studies allows for the flexibility and fluidity necessary in qualitative analysis, whilst at the same time enabling a large area of focus to become more manageable: this chapter has shown that it is not possible to cover all aspects of peacekeeping comprehensively in one study, but the use of case studies allows for observations and lessons to be drawn and then expanded into broader, more generalisable, conclusions.

The data analysis process followed the framework analysis approach discussed by Rapley. Having immersed myself in the data as a whole and made myself as familiar with it as possible, key themes were drawn out against the analytical lenses of the three elements of the inter-organisational relations
theory framework (power dependency; resource dependency; environmental constraints). This led to a revision of the initial analytical framework to include an element of organisational learning. In this way, the data on integrated mission under-performance could better be explained than proved possible using the initial framework.

Overall, the methods used – and discarded – and the processes of fieldwork and data analysis, from conceptualisation to re-conceptualisation and then implementation, enabled the research to be conducted. In the following chapters, a brief history of the case study contexts is presented, and then the detail of the data findings from the methodology and methods are set out.
CHAPTER 4

COUNTRY CONTEXT

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides historical background on the macro-level contexts in which the integrated peacekeeping missions of MONUC/MONUSCO and UNMiK were established. Literature on peacekeeping has highlighted that a lack of understanding of a country’s political economy is an important factor in integrated mission under-performance. This chapter provides such background, and also argues that a country’s geo-political importance impacts on the resources provided to any peacekeeping mission as may be established. Section 4.2 provides a brief historical background of the DRC, including the history and evolution of MONUC and MONUSCO, the peacekeeping missions present in the country since 1999 and 2010 respectively. Similarly, Section 4.3 provides a background of Kosovo, including linkages to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The section also provides an overview of the peacekeeping mission, UNMiK, present in Kosovo since 1999. Throughout the chapter, early findings from the data are presented, linking the global geo-political context to the reality of day-to-day practice on a civilian UN integrated peacekeeping mission. The chapter concludes with a summary of information presented, and overview of principal data findings.
4.2 Brief Historical Background – DRC

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC or the Congo) is in central Africa. It is the eleventh largest country in the world, the largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa, and second largest on the continent as a whole (after Algeria). DRC is bordered by nine countries (Tanzania; Uganda; Rwanda; Burundi; Zambia; Angola, the Republic of Congo; the Central Africa Republic; and South Sudan) and has a small, 25-mile, coast to its West, where the mighty River Congo empties into the Atlantic Ocean (see Figure 11).

The Congo’s origins as a state were different from any other African country. It began life not as a colony, but as the personal property of King Léopold II of Belgium (Meredith, 2005: 94). Léopold gained international approval for his personal empire in 1885, calling it the Congo Free State. Nearly a million square miles, and seventy-five times the size of Belgium, Léopold became ‘King-Sovereign’ of one thirteenth of Africa (Meredith, 2005: 95). The brutality of Léopold’s rule has been evocatively and
hauntingly documented in fiction and non-fiction alike. It forms the backdrop for Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*, famously portraying the regret of an inland station manager, Mr Kurtz, shamed by his past misdeeds as he remembers “the horror, the horror” (Conrad, 2000: 123). The abuses under Léopold’s rule caused much public anger in Belgium and elsewhere, eventually meaning he was forced to hand over ‘his’ colony in 1908 to the government of Belgium (Meredith, 2005: 98).

Belgian rule did not fare much more positively. The Belgians deliberately stifled the emergence of any black elite, aiming to ensure their continued dominance and rule over the Congolese for ever. But the winds of change blew through Congo as they did elsewhere on the continent and, unwilling to risk getting mired in a colonial war, Belgium granted independence on 30 June 1960 (Meredith, 2005: 100). The lack of any training of the Congolese during Belgian rule, or any coherent policy for exit, meant that at independence, no Congolese had any experience of government. There were no Congolese doctors, army officers, or secondary school teachers. It was an uncertain period, rife with political divisions and tension, and it was not long before violence flared. Within a fortnight of independence, the new Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, appealed to the UN for assistance (Meredith, 2005: 101-103).

Against an international backdrop of the height of the Cold War, Congo’s domestic political tensions were unsettling, in particular for the United States. Lumumba’s erratic behaviour, including requesting military assistance from the Soviet bloc, meant that he swiftly set the United States – as well as Belgium and the United Nations – against him. America would not risk a loss of influence in Africa and in September 1960 sponsored an initial coup whereby a little-known Congolese general, Mobutu Sese Seko declared he had assumed control of the country. This was true only to a point, meaning that Congo, just six months into independence, and in an echo of what was to follow forty years later, was
divided into four regimes, each with its own army and foreign sponsor (Meredith, 2005: 110). Lumumba was placed under house arrest but fearing his return to power was later executed by firing squad under Belgian supervision – on 07 January 1961 (Meredith, 2005: 112). Only now could Mobutu consolidate his hold on the country. He renamed the country “Zaire” and, following in the colonial tradition established under Belgium, ruled it as his personal fief (Hochschild, 2000; Trefon, 2011; Wrong, 2000). Primed with funds from the United States, Mobutu maintained his hold through patronage, but made no investment in his country at the same time. The extent of his corruption is legendary, and yet sowed the seeds for state collapse and violence, and the anarchy that would eventually erupt. DRC formally came into existence only in 1997, when Mobutu fled the country and Laurent-Désiré Kabila assumed power as part of the “second Congo War”, renaming the country in the process.

The country’s history of most relevance to this research concerns the post-Cold War period, from 1990 to the present day. It is a history of turmoil, violence and institutional collapse. As set out in Chapter 2, Zaire was one of the countries most affected by the loss of financial support when the Cold War came to an end (Hochschild, 2000; Trefon, 2011; Wrong, 2000; Devlin, 2007; Renton et al, 2007). Prior to this, from independence until 1990, Zaire, and Mobutu in particular, had been supported by the United States (as well as France and Belgium) in the battle for political influence in the region. Mobutu had come to power in the second of two coups in 1965 (renaming the country for the first time the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but then changing it to Zaire in 1971) (Renton et al, 2007: 114).

The end of the Cold War meant that “Mobutu outlived his strategic usefulness” (Trefon, 2011: 19) and the previous financial support from the US and others abruptly stopped. The socio-economic situation in the country meant that Mobutu anyway had become an “embarrassment” (Giovannoni et al, 2004:
Within Zaire, this led to swift demands for political reform (Renton et al., 2007: 154). Without the financial backing to silence such calls, Mobutu declared a ‘Third Republic’, revising the constitution and establishing a road map for multiparty elections – the first since those of independence in the 1960s (Trefon, 2011: xv). Initial optimism, however, was replaced by violence when Mobutu “revised his plans” (Renton et al., 2007: 153). This led to protests, especially from students, culminating in a massacre at the University of Lubumbashi in May 1990. It became increasingly clear that Mobutu had little intention of relinquishing power, despite having ruled for so long, and being increasingly frail. A disorganised and unfocused opposition enabled him to hold on (Renton et al., 2007: 154). Finally, in April 1996, following months of toing and froing between the president and opposition, elections were called for May 1997. These were destined never to take place due to events in the East of the country.

Inter-ethnic (Hutu-Tutsi) tensions in neighbouring Rwanda in 1994 led to civil war in that country, and the genocide of between 800,000 and 1 million Tutsis (Autesserre, 2010: 47; Trefon, 2011: 19). Within Rwanda, this led to a 100% displacement of the Rwandan population. Several hundred thousand Rwandans fled their country, spilling over the border into Eastern Zaire (Renton et al., 2007: 176). The Hutu militia that came with them formed alliances with the Congolese army against the Congolese Tutsi population (known as the Banyamulenge), also living in Eastern Congo. At the same time, Tutsi militia from Rwanda also entered Zaire, seeking out some of those responsible for the genocide, and formed alliances of their own with the Banyamulenge, as well as with opponents of Mobutu (Kimber, 1996: 127-146). The build-up of foreign militia, combined with the domestic Zairean army and other armed groups led to the first Congo War of 1996-1997 (Autesserre, 2010: 47-48; Renton et al., 2007: 176-178; Trefon, 2011: 19-20).
Fighting was at first concentrated in the East of the country, due to the presence of resource-rich mines in the area: the causes of conflict shifted from one of ethnic tension to a lethal mix of ethnic violence and economic supremacy, with all groups aiming to establish control of the vast mineral wealth available, in the absence of any Congolese state dominance. As Mamdani points out, “the crisis in Eastern Congo cannot be understood unless we see it as a result of the confluence of the social crisis of post-genocide Rwanda and the citizenship crisis in the entire region” (Mamdani, 2002: 261). This changed in 1997. With little resistance from either the population or the Zairean army, Rwandan-backed forces, under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila expanded their territorial command and swept through the country in a little under three weeks. By this time Mobutu, isolated and dying from cancer, had fled to Togo (and later, Morocco), allowing Kabila to take control of the country (Wrong, 2000: 279). Less than four months later, Mobutu was dead. Kabila proclaimed himself President and Zaire was once again re-named, this time as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Renton et al, 2007: 171).

Kabila miscalculated his next move both by refusing to grant his Banyamulenge supporters indigenous status, and by asking his foreign-backed supporters and advisers (largely from Rwanda) to return home (Autesserre, 2010: 48; Renton et al, 2007: 187). Having witnessed the available resource wealth from DRC’s as yet largely untapped mines, the supporters did not leave, but instead withdrew from the capital Kinshasa back to the East, over half a continent away from the official centre of political power. Backed by the governments of Rwanda, Uganda, and to a lesser extent Burundi, a new rebel movement was formed, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD). In August 1998, the RCD launched an attack on Kabila’s government, leading to the second Congo War of 1998-2003. The mineral wealth at stake led to several other countries becoming involved, including Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad and Sudan (Autesserre, 2010: 48). At the
war’s height, there were nine foreign armies fighting in DRC territory, leading some observers to call it “Africa’s First World War” (Fisher & Onisihi, 2000; McGreal 2008; Nabudere 2004; Shah, 2010).

At independence, Congo was the second most industrialised country in Africa (Putzel et al, 2008); by the end of the 1990s, DRC resembled not so much a country, but rather just the space between the other nations struggling to gain control of its phenomenal mineral wealth. Given the potentially fabulous wealth at stake, the fighting was particularly gruesome, and led to the complete collapse of all state institutions and societal order (such as they had existed in the build-up to violence). Over five million civilian deaths are estimated to have been caused as a result, not so much due to the fighting (or at least not solely) but rather due to the disease, poverty and lack of any redress in the face of physical and human adversity that resulted from the conflict (Coghlan et al, 2008; Shah, 2010; McGreal, 2008). This makes it the world’s most violent conflict since World War II. Certainly today, eastern DRC remains one of the most violent regions on earth.

Despite ongoing violence and fighting, a formal peace agreement – the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement – was signed in July 1999 (Renlon et al, 2007: 201). Various factions agreed to cease hostilities within 24 hours (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, 1999: 15). Although the ceasefire did not fully hold – up to fourteen foreign armies were active in Congo between 1999 and 2003 (Autesserre, 2010: 49) – the violence in the country did reduce dramatically. Essentially, the country was divided up into those areas controlled by the various warring militias: the government controlled the south and west; various other rebel groups controlled the remainder of the territory (Autesserre, 2010: 49). The Lusaka Agreement included provision to establish a peacekeeping force, and enabled the United Nations to support a 90-strong liaison mission to monitor the ceasefire. This liaison mission led to the establishment of MONUC, initially an observer mission, on 24 February 2000. MONUC was symptomatic of the inherent tension within thinking and practice of international peacekeeping, as set
out in Chapter 2: MONUC immediately became an example of a mission mandated for the short-term (an initial duration of six months) tasked with vastly more activities than its provided resources could undertake. It was “widely ridiculed as being hopelessly inadequate” (Renton et al, 2007: 201).

In 2001, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards whilst visiting Zimbabwe. The circumstances remain very unclear, and are unlikely ever to be fully known. The most widely supported rumour is that he was killed due to non-payment of salary (Autesserre, 2010: 50; Trefon, 2011: 20). For several weeks, despite the ongoing conflict, there was a political vacuum in Congo as no one – Congolese or outsider – knew who could possibly take control of such a lawless country. “Dictatorship is the term most often associated with Mobutu. Disintegration best summarises the Laurent-Desire Kabila years” (Trefon, 2010: 20). On his death, the government of Kabila controlled less than half the territory of the country. Kabila’s son, Joseph, was eventually persuaded by the former colonial power Belgium to assume power, and designated president of a transitional government in 2003 (Trefon, 2010: 20).

In some ways, Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s death marked a shift in the ongoing conflict. Joseph Kabila committed himself to the Lusaka agreement, and announced the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), which finally resulted in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement (sometimes called the Sun City Peace Accords) of 2002. Under a two-year interim political arrangement, a new period would begin from July 2003 whereby (Joseph) Kabila remained interim President, and the leaders of the four main warring factions were each given senior positions of state, a system known as the “1+4 model”. In the meantime, the country prepared for democratic elections, initially slated for 2005 (Inter-Congolese Dialogue, 2002). The Agreement made provision for the election preparation deadline to be extended by a maximum of one year, a provision which was taken. The formal installation of DRC’s
Transitional Government on 30 June 2003 “marked the official beginning of the transition from war to peace and democracy” (Autesserre, 2010: 52). DRC’s first elections in over forty years therefore took place on 30 July 2006, with a follow-up second round on 30 October 2006. Joseph Kabila won with 70% of the votes, and remained President at the time of this research.

4.2.1 MONUC: An integrated mission in the Congo

So where did the United Nations come in? Evidently the ongoing fighting after the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999 suggests MONUC was not particularly successful as a peacekeeping mission. What is the context for this? The mission was established following a preceding observation mission. Following the Lusaka Agreement, the Security Council authorised a maximum of 90 military observers to visit DRC and report back (UN, 1999b). Yet, global political will to enable this was sorely lacking: by September 1999, only 39 of these liaison officers had arrived. They reported that further resources would be required to enable them sufficiently to do their work (UN, 1999c). Two months later, in November 1999, the Security Council established MONUC to work on human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, medical support, child protection, political affairs and administrative support. The UN was also requested to make provision to equip up to five hundred UN military observers (UN, 1999d). Only in February 2000 were military personnel mandated to form part of MONUC, and then with a notably cautious maximum of 5,537 troops (which would include the already-provisioned 500 military observers) (UN, 2000b). The mission’s mandate was also expanded to continue monitoring the ceasefire and facilitating humanitarian action, and also to begin mine action, and demobilisation of the warring factions (UN, 2000b). This was in a country the size of Western Europe with a dilapidated infrastructure, ongoing violence, and estimates of up to 40,000 foreign troops still in the country. The low levels of human resources provided in the face of extraordinary need
reflected the political reality of a Security Council very much focused on other matters. It is the first finding in the research of relations between UN member states impacting on UN integrated missions. This is further discussed in Chapter 5.

 Nonetheless, despite its somewhat paltry beginnings, the mission steadily grew. With an initial annual budget of US$55 million in 2000, by 2009-2010 when MONUC ended, and MONUSCO began, annual costs had swollen to over US$1.3 billion, and over 19,000 troops had been authorised for deployment (UN, 2010a). This would include military personnel, military observers and police. Numbers of civilian staff were never stipulated in any of the resolutions on DRC, other than to state an “appropriate civilian component” should be deployed. The growing numbers of military personnel, however, can be used as a proxy indicator of increased contributions to the DRC. In 2004, the Security Council authorised a total of 5,900 troops, including up to 341 police (UN, 2004a). This was increased to 17,030 military personnel in 2007 (UN, 2007b). The largest amount of peacekeepers authorised for deployment to Congo was 19,815 in Security Council Resolution 1856 of 2008 (UN, 2008b) (see Figure 12). On the civilian side, from an initial total of none, by 2010 over 4,300 civilian staff were employed by MONUC: time showed that this mission was not in place simply to “keep the peace” or merely support an electoral process but rather that the Security Council wanted to achieve a legitimate state which could maintain its own security (Autesserre, 2010: 236; UN, 2010a).

 Commensurate to the increased budget and personnel, the mandate also expanded even further over time. From the initial ceasefire monitoring tasks, MONUSCO today now works on elections support, civil affairs, demobilisation and troop reintegration, gender, HIV/AIDS, human rights, mine action, police, political affairs, public information, security sector reform, rule of law, and stabilisation activities – in addition to any military activity its troops may undertake (UN, 2010a) (see Figure 13).
MONUSCO has 15 field offices across the country, as well as its Kinshasa headquarters; there are logistics bases in Kinshasa, Entebbe (Uganda) and Kigoma (Tanzania); and there are four further MONUSCO regional liaison offices in Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda), Pretoria (South Africa) and Bujumbura (Burundi) (DRC interview 13). In addition, MONUSCO works with all ten other UN agencies based in Kinshasa, some of which share office space, but not all of which have field presences across the country. MONUSCO is therefore a significantly large operation, even by UN peacekeeping standards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and Number of Security Council Resolution</th>
<th>Troop Numbers Authorised</th>
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<tr>
<td>SCR 1258 (1999)</td>
<td>90 (military observers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCR 1279 (1999)</td>
<td>500 (military observers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCR 1291 (2000)</td>
<td>5,537</td>
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<td>SCR 1565 (2004)</td>
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<td>SCR 1794 (2007)</td>
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<td>SCR 1856 (2008)</td>
<td>19,815</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCR 1925 (2010)</td>
<td>19,815</td>
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Figure 12: Levels of Troop Numbers Authorised by the Security Council to Deploy to DRC, 1999-2010

Nonetheless, this expansion of MONUC’s presence in the country caused friction with the Congolese population and host government. For the President, acutely conscious of DRC’s standing in the international community, and anxious to improve the country’s reputation, a peacekeeping mission was a constant reminder that fifty years after independence, the country was still not stable enough to manage its own affairs (DRC interview 8). For the population, it was the perceived behaviour of MONUC staff that served to undermine the mission’s popularity. In their eyes, much of the resources made available to the mission were wasted either on incompetent staff, or their administrative support, including large cars, up-market houses, and high salaries (Autesserre, 2010: 90). From 2009, President Kabila made political moves for MONUC to be withdrawn in 2010, i.e. before the celebration of fifty years of independence from Belgium. Although the authorised levels of military personnel remained
the same as in MONUC (UN, 2010b), the creation of a newly-named mission, MONUSCO, and the lack of increase in troop numbers reflected this political tension. Civilian numbers on the mission were also significantly reduced to 2,400 (DRC interview 7).

MONUSCO, despite its small civilian component relative to MONUC is still a large mission. Yet the reality of such a large mission means that the bulk of any financial resources provided are used for administrative and logistical purposes. Especially in a country with such a dilapidated infrastructure, just moving around proves very expensive and difficult. Any journey of distance involves air travel – to the extent that the UN established its own airline (Air MONUC) as part of the mission. During the transition period, 2003-2006, Air MONUC was the largest airline in the whole continent of Africa (DRC interviews 13 and 15). The financial resources remaining, i.e. those that could be used to cover

Figure 13: MONUSCO Structure 2010
the costs of the actual activities requested of the UN in Security Council mandates for the Congo, were consistently therefore shown to be inadequate and “minimal” (Autesserre, 2010: 87-91; DRC interviews 1, 3, 8, 9, 13, 15 and 20). This reveals a kind of “double-edged sword” type of behaviour by the Security Council: occupied by other pressing global affairs, it nonetheless requires UN staff to fulfil demanding mandates whilst not providing sufficient resources for them to do so.

This is borne out in a review of the missions’ recent peacekeeping costs. Total MONUC budget requirements in 2007 were listed as US$ 1,094,247,900. This is broken down into military costs (US$ 465,825,700), civilian personnel costs (US$ 189,916,300), and operational requirements (US$ 423,840,272). Yet, of these operational requirements, only the categories general temporary assistance and quick-impact projects can realistically be used to put the mission mandate into practice. These categories total US$ 3,102,000. Other categories listed under operational requirements include official travel, transportation (ground and air), communications, information technology, medical, and other equipment (UN, 2007a). i.e. out of a total budget of just over a billion dollars, merely US$ 3 million (2.8%) is reserved for non-operating costs. Likewise, in 2010, MONUSCO’s total budget is stated as US$ 1.37 billion, of which US$ 1.5 million is reserved for quick-impact projects. There is no other information in the budget presented about funds reserved for operational activity (UN, 2010b). This is 0.1% of the total. Despite this significantly large operation, then, with its ever-expanding mandate, and the phenomenal needs and sheer size of the country, MONUC’s and later MONUSCO’s resources remain spread pretty thin (DRC interviews 1, 3, 5, 8, 9, 13, 15 and 20). When presented this starkly, it is hardly surprising that the Congolese population reports either lack of awareness about MONUSCO (DRC observation, January 2011) or antipathy towards the mission (Autesserre, 2010: 90).
4.3 Brief Historical Background – Kosovo

Kosovo is in south-eastern Europe, landlocked by Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. It lies in the territory that used to make up Yugoslavia, see Figure 14. From 1918-1991, Yugoslavia comprised six republics (Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia), with Kosovo being part of Serbia. Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in 2008, and is recognised as an independent state by most – but by no means all – members of the United Nations.

There are two principal ethnic groups that make up the population of Kosovo – Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, although Kosovo Albanians today make up by far the majority. There is a deep sense of historical injustice on the part of both ethnic groups which must be understood when examining how Kosovo came to be in its current state of political antagonism. “These rival perceptions of the past, distilled by ideologues and stirred by demagogues, fed on one another to create the intoxicating and explosive nationalism that ravaged Kosovo in the 1990s” (King & Mason, 2006: 25).

Figure 14: Map of Kosovo
"In Kosovo, history is not really about the past, but about the future. In other words, he who holds the past holds the future." (Judah, 2002: 2) In one sentence, Tim Judah neatly sums up the potential political potholes to be dodged when summarising a history of Kosovo. Yet it is all the way back in 1389 where any history of Kosovo must start.

On 28 June, 1389 the Serbs were defeated by the Ottoman Empire at the battle of Kosovo Polje. 1389 has since been mythologised in popular Serbian culture, and is still cited by Serbs today as a principal reason for a claim on the territory (Zirojevic, 2000: 195). Prior to 1389, Kosovo had indeed been a significant part of the Serbian empire, with the seats of the Serbian Orthodox church based in Peja/Péć in north-western Kosovo, and political power based in Prizren, in southern Kosovo (King & Mason, 2006: 26). With the win of Kosovo in 1389, the Ottomans ruled the territory for the next five hundred years. During this time, much of the population converted to Islam due to the “serious disadvantages” of remaining Christian, starting the ethnic identity shift that would have such desperate consequences towards the end of the twentieth century.

The Ottoman Empire’s decline ended in 1912 with the first of the Balkan wars. Serbia once again annexed Kosovo to its own. This was formalised after World War I with the creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 (later renamed Yugoslavia in 1924). Kosovo was confirmed as part of Serbia at the Paris Peace Conference of 1920, with a plea from the Albanians to unite with Albania ignored (Malcolm, 2002: 257, 264 and 273-274; Judah, 2002: 20-22). Throughout the inter-war period, the Albanian population of Yugoslavia was discriminated against by the authorities:

"The most important restriction concerned the Albanian language. Under the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities, which it signed reluctantly in 1919, Yugoslavia promised to supply primary education in the local language in all areas where a

12 Including paying higher taxes, discrimination in legal disputes, and even having to dismount while passing a Muslim (see King & Mason, 2006: 28).
considerable proportion of the population had a language other than the official one (which was Serbo-Croat)... These pledges were openly disregarded... By 1930, there were no Albanian-language schools; nor was there a single Albanian-language publication on sale there, though almost every other minority in Yugoslavia (including Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Turks, and even Russians) had newspapers of its own” (Malcolm, 2002: 267).

Albanian-speakers were simply not regarded as Albanians in any ethnic or national sense: they were merely Albanian-speaking Serbs (Malcolm, 2002: 268). Other forms of pressure put on the Albanians were a systematic policy of colonisation, settling Slav-speakers in Albanian-inhabited areas, and harassment to encourage Albanians to move out of Yugoslavia altogether (Malcolm, 2002: 269). The Albanians had various means with which to respond to these challenges, and chose a combination of political formation, military resistance and self-help (Malcolm, 2002: 269-273). But the lack of political recognition and continued bias against Albanians was again underlined in 1945 following World War II and the establishment of communist Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito. All peoples of Yugoslavia supposedly had the right to secede or unite with other peoples, but this right did not apply to the population of Kosovo: Kosovo remained a part of Serbia, and the Kosovo Albanian population found themselves living once again in a state whose Slav majority regarded them with suspicion and hostility (King & Mason, 2006: 33; Judah, 2002: 30-31). Throughout the Tito period, levels of investment in Kosovo were much lower relative to elsewhere in Yugoslavia. This meant that the population became steadily poorer: the average income in Slovenia in 1946 was three times that of Kosovo; in 1964 it was five times (Malcolm, 2002: 323).

In 1963, the Yugoslav Constitution was changed, and Kosovo was given the status of Autonomous Province of Serbia. It seemed that no demands for Kosovo to secede would ever be heard. But this all changed in 1966. Tito dismissed his Interior Minister, strongman Serb Aleksander Ranković, and information previously withheld about the reality for minorities in Yugoslavia was made available to
him (Malcolm, 2002: 324; Judah, 2002: 36). Various concessions to Albanians followed. Tito visited Kosovo in 1967 (his first visit in seventeen years) and saw for himself the discrimination faced. “One cannot talk about equal rights when Serbs are given preference in factories and Albanians are rejected although they have the same or better qualifications,” he said (Malcolm, 2002: 324). This led to the 1968 revisions to the 1963 Constitution, not least granting Federal status to Yugoslavia’s Autonomous Provinces (including Kosovo). Autonomous Provinces were now legal entities, with the potential for exercising powers equal to those of Yugoslavia’s Republics (Malcolm, 2002: 324). In 1974, with yet another revision to the Constitution, Kosovo became a Republic in all but name; it had its own assembly, police force, and national (sic) bank, even a flag (King & Mason, 2006: 33; Judah, 2002: 38; Malcolm, 2002: 325). Under a system of proportional representation, the Albanians were now, for the first time, represented on Yugoslav state company boards, the civil service, and in government. Kosovo’s administration was progressively “Albanianised”, with Serbs losing their privileged status, and in turn beginning to stir about the discrimination they now felt (Judah, 2002: 44).

Nonetheless, the Yugoslav leadership remained wary of Serb reaction to Kosovo seceding from the Federation and joining Albania. Albanians would only ever be considered a “nationality” in Yugoslavia, not a “nation” (Judah, 2002: 37; King & Mason, 2006: 33). The rationale behind this was two-fold: a state of Albania anyway already existed, but more importantly, if Kosovo were granted Republic status, the population may actually exercise its right to secede from the Federal Yugoslav state (Judah, 2002: 37). Despite the increasing levels of autonomy, the minority Serb population therefore retained overall control of the province. Kosovo Albanians continued with their political demands for more authority (King & Mason, 2006: 35).
Tensions between these two principal communities continued to rise throughout the 1980s and 1990s. With economic decline being experienced throughout Yugoslavia during this time, nationalism and playing on ethnic sensitivities became a powerful rallying cry for the region’s politicians. Slobodan Milošević, recently elected President of the Communist Party in Serbia, dramatically increased his profile and support within Serbia when he visited Kosovo on 28 April 1987 and played on these sensitivities. He declared to the minority Serb population “no one should dare beat you” and returned home to Belgrade to widespread popular approval. This episode is considered a key factor in Milošević’s eventual rise to become head of the government in Serbia (King & Mason: 35-36; Judah, 2002: 53). Whilst in power, Milošević went further and rescinded Kosovo’s autonomous status in 1989.

For Kosovo’s Albanian population, life became harder on every front. Faced with widespread discrimination, and dismissal from state jobs, a period of non-violent resistance began, increasingly segregating ethnic Albanians and Serbs. Led by Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovo’s Albanian population set up a parallel system of governance, including the provision of education and health services, and even an informal election in 1992 (King & Mason, 2006: 39). However, over time, the non-violent resistance met with increasing frustration from others in the community, keen for more impact. Witnessing the violence in others parts of Yugoslavia, fighting spread to Kosovo with the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1998 (Judah, 2002: 115). Sporadic outbursts of violence all targeting the Serbian-led structures of formal government gradually increased in frequency. After 1997, the KLA was much better equipped due to arms flooding into the province from neighbouring Albania following the collapse of financial pyramid schemes in that country: amid the breakdown of law and order, armouries were raided and the entire region was inundated with weapons (King & Mason, 2006: 42).
In Kosovo, political momentum swung away from non-violent protest and enabled more violent demands for independence to manifest (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000: 44). In turn, the Serbs retaliated violently, with Belgrade reinforcing army units in Kosovo, often sanctioning extra-judicial executions and abductions (King & Mason, 2006: 43).

Kosovo was not the only part of Yugoslavia that experienced violent conflict during the 1990s. With Tito's death in 1980, Communist power began to recede (Judah, 2002: 42) and the "frightening complexity of Yugoslavia's ethnic composition, which had been largely forgotten over forty years, began to reveal itself" (Glenny, 1996: 32). Slobodan Milošević actively encouraged the new nationalism, forming a "demo network" which paid the unemployed to travel to his rallies (Glenny, 1996: 34). The populations of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina watched nervously as Milošević's popularity grew in the face of abuses poured on Kosovo. They wondered if they would be next (Glenny, 1996: 57-58). By the time Serbia's leading intellectuals revealed as much by publicly discussing changes to boundaries of the Yugoslav republics, the stage for conflict was set. Most observers considered Kosovo would be the first to erupt in civil war. In fact, it was the political dynamics being stirred up in Kosovo that triggered the other republics to declare independence – first, briefly, in Slovenia (1991), followed by separatist demands from Croatia (1991-1992), and then Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) (Glenny, 1996: 56).

The Bosnian war had claimed up to 250,000 lives and was widely perceived as a failure for the international community, especially following the 1995 massacre at Srebrenica when over 7,000 Bosnian men and boys were killed by Serbian forces in Europe's largest massacre since World War II (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online; Judah, 2002: 120; see also Chapter 2). Violence in Kosovo was therefore in some ways the final straw for the international community. Still reeling from the failures
of Bosnia, there was a perception of a significant danger of the same happening once again in Kosovo. A final diplomatic push in March 1999, at Rambouillet, just outside Paris, ended in failure. NATO launched an aerial bombardment on Serbia on 24 March 1999 in an effort to repel the Yugoslav and Serbian forces out of Kosovo and to prevent further violence against the ethnic Albanian population. It was the first time NATO had acted in such a way (King & Mason, 2006: 45).

The war ended on 10 June 1999 when the Serbian government agreed to hand over control of Kosovo to the United Nations (King & Mason, 2006: 46 and 49). The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, mandating a civilian mission to administer the province. Since this time, Kosovo’s history has been uniquely intertwined with that of the UN’s interim administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMiK). The irony of these events is that in contrast to the years of preparation and billions of dollars in resources made available to the military to conduct the NATO campaign, the civilian component of UNMiK had to be drawn up in a matter of weeks (King & Mason, 2006: 49). This would have lasting consequences of the effectiveness and perceived success of the mission in the years that followed. The arrival of UNMiK did nonetheless bring a modicum of stability to this volatile territory. But it was an imperfect stability. Several thousand Serbs were displaced in the immediate period following UNMiK’s arrival, as Albanians displaced outside Kosovo during the NATO bombing returned to exact a bloody vengeance (King & Mason, 2006: 50; Judah, 2002: 289). Hundreds of Serb homes and monuments were burned and looted. Periodic, if minor, violence continued to flare over the next few years, with an uneasy division of territory into pockets of minority settlements. Most notably, widespread violence flared in Kosovo once again in 2004, leading to further displacement of non-Albanian residents, and further destruction of non-Albanian historical sites. Note this was after five years of UNMiK activity. The violence spurred the international community to consider its position as ultimate authority in Kosovo, and led to a process to bring about a resolution to the legal status of
Kosovo (discussed below). Kosovo declared its own independence on 17 February 2008, and has since been recognised as a sovereign nation by 86 UN member states. Nonetheless the final status of Kosovo as a country remains contested, with little prospect of resolution for the foreseeable future. In 2013, UNMIK therefore remains in place, a shell of its first structure and influence, but nonetheless functioning, and representing the government of Kosovo in international fora.

4.3.1 UNMIK: An integrated mission in Kosovo

UNMIK was established on 10 June 1999 through the end of the Kosovo war and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (UN, 1999a). Security Council Resolution 1244 provides for the administration and protection of Kosovo civilians and legally is still binding. This means that the Head of UNMIK de facto administers Kosovo. UNMIK was therefore the first peacekeeping mission of its kind; no previous mission had allowed for a civilian component also to assume political control and authority of the territory where it operated. Crucially for this thesis, UN staff had no experience of establishing a new political entity from the ground up (King & Mason, 2006: 46). Saddled with phenomenally high expectations on the part of both the Kosovar population and the Security Council, UNMIK faced an uphill task from its very inception.

UNMIK’s creation and arrival was essentially the result of the ethnic tension that built up in Kosovo and its wider region throughout the long history from the fourteenth century onwards. As ethnic divides became deeper and social interaction more and more infrequent, no peaceful compromise solution was found, resulting in an outside body coming in to mediate between Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs.13 There was clear geo-political interest in Kosovo: at its outset, UNMIK was “the most

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13 Other minority communities do exist in Kosovo, including the Gorani, Bosniaks, Ashkali, Egyptian and Roma. The Albanians and Serbs make up 98% of the population, however, and have long been the principal antagonists in this conflict.
intensive intervention ever, receiving more international money, staff and effort per local person than any mission before or since” (Dobbins et al: 125).

As set out in Chapter 1, UNMIK is made up of four pillars (see Figure 15). Originally, pillar I was led by the UNHCR, supervising all humanitarian activity in the province. This was later replaced by a Police and Justice pillar, overseen by UN staff. Pillar II always was and remains today a Civil Administration’ pillar, also led by the UN; Pillar III is led by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the OSCE) and covers Institution Building; and pillar IV covers Economic Development, led by the European Union (EU) (King & Mason, 2006: 76-77). Since 2008, responsibility to implement the work of pillars I and II has been transferred to Kosovo’s own Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) but the UN retains overall authority, and supervises enforcement (Kosovo interviews 2 and 4). UNMIK sits alongside the military component of the peacekeeping mission, the multinational Kosovo Force, or KFOR.

Figure 15: UNMIK Structure 2011
According to Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1244, UNMIK has several functions. It has to:
perform basic civilian administrative functions; promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and
self-government in Kosovo; facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status;
coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies; support the reconstruction of
key infrastructure; maintain civil law and order; promote human rights; and assure the safe and
unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes (UN, 1999a).

In an environment of ongoing violent conflict, widespread infrastructural destruction, and large-scale
mistrust (often outright hostility) amongst the local population, this was no small task. In addition,
interpretation of SCR 1244 was contested from its adoption. From the outset, Russia indicated its
rejection of any resolution that could undermine Serbia’s state sovereignty. The Resolution was
therefore deliberately worded so as to enable different interpretations; otherwise, its adoption would not
have been possible at Security Council level (Kosovo interview 1). The contested nature of this
document is an early finding for this research in itself about how UN members state relations impact on
UN integrated missions.

SCR 1244 stipulates no timeframe for UNMIK to carry out its duties, and little attempt was made to
document performance, successful or otherwise (UN, 1999a). From the outset, resource constraints
prevented true implementation of SCR 1244, and staff concerns and frustrations about progress were
widespread (King & Mason, 2006: 78). Given the significant resources invested, how could this be so?
One explanation could be the dramatic downsizing of the mission as time went by. This was most
usefully set out during one interview with a senior member of UNMIK staff, undertaken as part of the
fieldwork conducted for this research:

"UNMIK is a very different operation than it was at the beginning. At its inception,
or very soon after its inception, UNMIK was the largest UN peacekeeping mission to
date. With over 10,000 staff. And a very large budget. That, I believe, and it's now almost twelve years, has cost the UN some three billion dollars. Of the more than 10,000 employees we had in 2000, 2001, the vast majority were either police officers or local employees. And that structure has changed dramatically over the years. As early as 2002, 2003, the mission was already downsizing. In early December of 2008, the powers that be requested that UNMIK police and justice stand down, take off their weapons and uniforms, and allow EULEX to step into the breach in the North. Which we did. And we rapidly downsized. Or, as we euphemistically put it, 'reconfigured'. We went down in a matter of months from over five thousand, to slightly over five hundred in total. And since then, we've further downsized. Mostly by outsourcing local services, automotive servicing, and security, and things like that.” (Kosovo interview 5)

The UN Security Council focus of international deployments to Kosovo was therefore very strongly linked to the province's security, with provision for large numbers of military and police personnel. There was a much weaker focus on the civilian aspects of the mission, and this resulted in a population not witnessing much progress in terms of social and economic outcomes. It led to dissatisfaction with UNMiK as a whole, with criticism and complaint about UNMiK performance soon drowning out the initial euphoria that met its arrival and inception: public expectations were high, and yet not matched by what UNMiK could achieve. King and Mason set out how the slow deployment of civilian police to Kosovo became a “running scandal” and a “yardstick for measuring the gap between the international community's promises and its actions” (King & Mason, 2006: 55). It was not only the police that were slow to deploy, and often ill-equipped or unprepared for the task. The military and civilian presence also took months to gather momentum: “three months after the conflict, UNMIK still did not have a presence in all of the then 29 municipalities in Kosovo. A year after the conflict, there were still fewer than 300 international UN staff to manage a province of two million people” (King & Mason, 2006: 56).

Eventually, this frustration spilled over into violence. In 2004, widespread looting and displacement signalled the beginning of the end of UNMiK’s popularity with the Kosovo population. The violence led to the initiation of a process of status resolution in Kosovo. No one considered UNMiK in charge
as either equitable or sustainable (King & Mason, 2006: 189 and 215), so a more legitimate, self-determined solution was sought. Nonetheless, coming just five short years after UNMIK’s first arrival, for many observers this seemed quite early. The degradation during the 1980s and 1990s of ethnic Albanian civilian capacity to administer a territory still meant that – even five years into the mission – the likelihood of successful self-government was questionable (King & Mason, 2006: 192-193). Still, it was clear that the population wanted change and was increasingly vocal in its desire for self-rule.

The so-called final status process was led by Martti Ahtisaari, a former President of Finland. Starting from late 2005, he led a process of dialogue and discussion between the main stakeholders involved, based in both Belgrade and Kosovo itself. Throughout 2006, Mr Ahtisaari shuttled to and fro between the respective capitals, keeping the Security Council and UNMIK informed of his ideas, progress and suggestions. Eventually, in March 2007, he published his proposal for Kosovo’s final status, known as the Ahtisaari Plan (Ahtisaari, 2007: 1). This led to some UN member states in May 2007 drafting a Resolution to replace SCR 1244 and end UNMIK. But the draft was never agreed – again, due to Russian objections concerning sovereignty – and in July 2007, its proposal was formally dropped (Kosovo interviews 1 and 2).

Having been widely anticipated to lead to the eventual independence of Kosovo, despite any misgivings about appropriateness of timing or Kosovar capacity for self-rule, the Ahtisaari Plan was effectively shelved because of Russian objections. UNMIK and SCR 1244 were still in place. This is why the declaration of independence came when it did – i.e. six months following the international dialogue about the Plan – and why it was unilateral rather than internationally agreed. It also explains some of the concerns about recognising Kosovo as an independent country: it was not solely Russia that voiced objections to Kosovo’s independence. Recognition of Kosovo as an independent, sovereign
state is still contested by one third of the UN Member States. Only 22 of the European Union’s 28 members have recognised Kosovo as independent (Kosovo interviews 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6).

The Ahtisaari process and (by now moot) Plan had allowed for the European Union (EU) to become more involved in Kosovo, due to the province’s proximity to the rest of the Union: The EU recognised that having an area in the western Balkans that remained outside its membership indefinitely would pose a threat to its security (King & Mason, 2006: 215). Two institutions were proposed, an International Civilian Office (ICO) led by an International Civilian Representative (ICR) and a special policing and Rule of Law mission under the (then) European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), to be known as EULEX. Essentially, they were to be established to assist the Kosovo government in its security and rule of law duties. It was anticipated that the ICO and EULEX would replace any such functions undertaken by UNMiK (European Union, 2008). When independence did not happen in quite the manner anticipated, the institutions were anyway established, and the ICO and EULEX did indeed assume most of UNMiK’s authority and responsibility for policing and the rule of law. Note nonetheless that UNMiK still existed, so that, formally, EULEX existed within the ongoing mandate of SCR 1244. But clarity on roles and responsibility was lacking; concerns about duplication of activity were not addressed. This served to undermine UNMiK even further in the eyes of the Kosovo population. As one respondent interviewed in March 2011 put it:

"UNMiK is one of the most difficult missions in terms of having another political force, meaning that you have the EU. [In] Other areas, when DPKO mission is sent, all the international community is backing what United Nations is doing, and we can be the casting board. But here, we're not." (Kosovo interview 8)

The creation of the ICO and EULEX despite the continued existence of UNMiK reflected a new political reality in Kosovo: UNMiK no longer had the teeth of its early years, and the violence of 2004 had exposed its loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the Kosovo population. Yet political stalemate at the
Security Council meant it could not be disbanded. The EU therefore forged its own path, not fully ignoring UNMIK but certainly going ahead and creating new institutions despite it. In one sense this was the EU acting according to inter-organisational relations theory as set out in Chapter 2: in a situation of power dependency on the UN, the EU withdrew, obtained resources from elsewhere, and created a new organisation (in this case, EULEX). In doing so, the international community undermined UNMIK as a peacekeeping mission. With little involvement of the Kosovo population, the international community had "created a mess" (Kosovo interview 1). Today, despite EULEX's greater legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary citizens of Kosovo, it is UNMIK that remains the ultimate arbiter of authority in Kosovo. This dichotomy causes confusion for both international staff working on the missions (UNMIK and EULEX), and Kosovars. In turn, this confusion has implications for UNMIK's performance, as will be set out in Chapters 5 and 6.

4.4 Conclusion

War is always complex. We have seen from the brief histories of both DRC and Kosovo set out above that its beginnings can be manifold, and long-term (in the case of Kosovo, stemming back several hundred years). And its conclusion is invariably messy, uncertain and difficult. Unquestionably, therefore, any civilian peacekeeping mission, regardless of structure, resources or environment, will face multiple obvious and varied challenges.

This chapter has provided detailed context for the establishment of UN integrated missions in both Congo and Kosovo from 1999. Both missions were established following periods of negotiation at the Security Council in New York. It has been shown how keenly involved all members of the Security Council were in the case of Kosovo, even drafting the text of the Security Council Resolution to
accommodate political sensitivities and enable compromise. Detail was also provided about the lesser engagement of the Security Council when establishing a mission in Congo, despite that country being much larger, and facing a greater set of needs, and higher preceding death toll than Kosovo. The mission in Congo, MONUC (and later MONUSCO), nonetheless grew in size over time, eventually to become the largest peacekeeping mission in the world.

Details about resources provided to each mission have been presented. Despite the hefty financial totals devoted to each mission, close examination of budget reports reveals that the bulk of resources provided to peacekeeping missions are used on logistical and administrative support. Resources to implement the vast array of activities proposed in mission mandates make up a relatively tiny fraction of the overall budget envelope. Political will for peacekeeping, therefore, only goes so far.

Politics are shown to be the driving factor behind the decisions taken when negotiating peacekeeping mandates. The example of recent events in Kosovo is particularly illuminating: in the face of a de-legitimised mission (UNMIK) but legally unable to bring it to an end, various UN member states, in this instance, those which are also members of the European Union, behave according to the organisation theory set out in Chapter 2: they withdraw, finding alternative resources from an alternative source, in this case by creating a new structure in the form of EULEX.

Finally, the continued uncertainty about the future of both these missions has been set out. The political situation in both Congo and Kosovo remains murky. Any observer of Congo will know that the likelihood of the Congolese to assume full control of its own security is a long time in the offing. Yet fourteen years of peacekeeping mission support, through MONUC and now MONUSCO, have axiomatically failed to support the Congolese to bring this about. Likewise, Kosovo’s continued

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14 The note on deaths is not meant to imply that larger peacekeeping operations should be established according to numbers of people killed in fighting, but rather to demonstrate the contrast between international responses to the two conflicts: in both cases, geo-politics were a determining factor in establishing the initial size of the respective peacekeeping missions.
supervision by UNMIK and lack of recognition as a sovereign country by some – if not the majority of – of other states means that UNMIK cannot leave but instead remains in place, rump, with little credibility or real activity to undertake. In both instances, the international community finds itself between a rock and a hard place: this is a sorry indictment on the back of stated ambition as set out in mission mandates, and so many billions invested.

Having set out the broad contexts in which both integrated missions used as case studies are situated, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will now present findings from fieldwork research undertaken in the first quarter of 2011. Each chapter takes a research sub-question in turn, beginning with an examination of the power dependencies found surrounding and within missions: How do relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions?
CHAPTER 5

HOW DO RELATIONS BETWEEN UN MEMBER STATES IMPACT ON INTEGRATED MISSIONS?

"Politicians have created a mess here."
UN staff member, Kosovo, March 2011
(Kosovo interview 1)

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is the first of two to analyse the findings from the research data against the analytical framework presented in Chapter 2. A tri-polar framework of power dependency; resource dependency; and environmental constraints (adapted from Galaskiewicz's presentation of inter-organisational relations; see Chapter 2) is used to examine the two UN integrated missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Kosovo. As set out in Chapter 3, on research methodology, the framework was used to develop questions for semi-structured interviews with both UN and non-UN staff in the case study mission countries. Questions relating to each aspect of the framework were developed in order to answer the research question and three sub-questions. The principal research question of this thesis is: Why do UN integrated missions under-perform? The three research sub-questions are: (1) How do relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions? (2) How do inter-organisational relations impact on UN integrated missions? (3) How does the UN learn from its experience of integrated missions?
The next two chapters examine the political and organisational findings from the fieldwork and then reflect on what these findings mean in terms of UN organisational learning. This Chapter 5 looks at the evidence found to answer sub-question 1, How do relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions?, and in doing so contributes to part of the answer to sub-question 3, How does the UN learn from its experiences of integrated missions? Using data from case study interviews, as well as fieldwork observation, field notes and grey literature, the chapter argues that political negotiation at Security Council level in New York significantly affects how UN integrated missions behave and perform in country. In turn, these relations prevent the UN as an organisation from learning the lessons of its integrated mission experience. There is a hierarchy of influence in UN member state relations, and this leads to a situation of uncertainty for UN integrated mission staff. The various power relations at play between integrated missions and UN member states are set out using the analytical lens of power dependency in Section 5.2. It is argued that these relations affect mission size, length, relevance and legitimacy. In turn, this has an impact on mandate complexity and leads to waste and overall ineffectiveness on integrated missions. In Section 5.3, the chapter moves on to argue that levels of resources made available to integrated missions (financial, human and in terms of equipment) are intricately connected to UN member state relations. A country’s geo-political importance to members of the Security Council affects levels of staff, funding, and equipment provided to an integrated mission. Section 5.4 argues that environmental constraints play little part in member state consideration and do not impact in any significant way on integrated missions. This could mean one of two things: either that the counter-intuitive suggestion in inter-organisational relations theory (as set out in Chapter 2, section 2.4.5) that environmental factors play a relatively smaller role in inter-organisational relations than power or resource dependency is correct, or that environmental constraints were simply less obvious in the two cases examined. Section 5.5 highlights some of the overlaps between power and resource dependency found in the data, whilst also presenting some of the tensions
and contradictions that UN member state relations mean for integrated missions. Principally, there is a
tension between the level of need in the contexts where integrated missions are located and a realistic
level of request and provision to which the international community can respond. Section 5.6 sets out
the evidence found during fieldwork on organisational learning, specifically in terms of how the data
relate to theory. It is argued that UN member state relations prevent the UN from implementing the
learning from its experiences of integrated missions, meaning in turn that integrated missions will only
ever under-perform. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes the chapter with a summary of the key points
produced from the case study data.

5.2 Power Dependency

UN member state relations impact on integrated missions in a variety of ways, and at a number of
levels. This section sets out those relations as found in the case study data. It is essentially a
discussion about political interaction amongst UN member states and how this impacts on integrated
missions. The evidence suggests that political discussions at the global level, i.e. those taking place at
the UN Security Council, and unrelated to the contexts of integrated missions, can have lasting effects
on integrated missions. Over time, member states gradually lose collective focus on individual
missions and instead increase their bilateral interest activity in those countries where missions have
been established. This results in additional tasks being “lumped” into mission mandates without any
sense of strategic direction (DRC interview 11). Missions shift to “autopilot” as mandates become
increasingly frustrating, confusing and more difficult to implement (DRC interview 13). Finally, this
leads to loss of credibility of the mission in the eyes of partner governments and populations. Missions
become wasteful for member states yet reduced levels of political interest in them means they are not
brought to a close.
The relationship between integrated missions and the UN Security Council is not equal. It is only the Security Council that can create and establish integrated peacekeeping missions, meaning that – essentially by definition – integrated missions are power dependent on the Security Council. Immediately, this means that there is a political relationship between an integrated mission and the Security Council. Chapter 2 showed how all members of a modern day organisational system are required to be equally qualified for that system to work effectively. The very nature of the UN as a system, therefore, must affect the effectiveness of missions as understood in organisation theory today: regardless of any advice or suggestion given to the Security Council by integrated mission staff, it is only the Security Council that can decide what a mission should undertake and how long it should do so. As one senior member of UNMIK staff put it:

"Even the SRSG\textsuperscript{15} has said the aim would be really to go. Because that’s the aim, it should be the aim of all UN missions. [But] it’s not up to the UN [staff]."

(Kosovo interview 6)

In this case, the respondent is showing how UNMIK as a mission should really be drawn down and ended, but it is political factors in the Security Council that prevent this happening. UNMIK has arguably been in place for longer than necessary, but political constraints (borne out by power dependencies between the UN Security Council and the integrated mission) have affected the timeframe of the mission.

Cook argues that the strategy of those organisations which are more dependent on others is to become less dependent, i.e. to reduce the degree of imbalance in an exchange relation (Cook, 1977: 73). In Chapter 2, it was shown that organisations have four possible strategies they can pursue to reduce a power differential: withdrawal, network extension, status-giving, or coalition formation. In the case of

\textsuperscript{15}SRSG means Special Representative of the (UN) Secretary-General, the most senior member of staff on any integrated mission. For further detail on the role of an SRSG, and background on peacekeeping generally, see Chapter 2

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integrated missions, however, the power dependency on the Security Council cannot be reduced. Integrated missions gain their legitimacy and very existence from the Security Council, and only the Security Council can designate increased or decreased resources to them. Only the Security Council can bring integrated missions to an end. Integrated missions of themselves cannot withdraw (cease to exist), they cannot expand their networks (join with others) without authorisation from the Security Council, nor can they form coalitions with others or increase their or others' status to ensure their own survival: they are entirely dependent for their form, existence and resource base on the UN Security Council. As such, the data show that, if using this theory of power dependency, integrated missions are unlike most other organisations: they have no potential means to reduce (or really simply to change) their inter-organisational relations with others, i.e. those organisations with which they are in a position of power dependency.

Divergent views amongst UN member states not only affect the length of missions, they also have an impact on how mission activities are undertaken (regardless of what is set out in a mandate). In the case of Kosovo, this has impacted not just on UNMiK as an integrated mission, but also on the very sovereignty of Kosovo as a state. There are simply different perceptions amongst Security Council members in terms of how the context of Kosovo will develop. Two respondents in Kosovo, the first a senior member of UNMiK's management staff and the second the head of a non-UN part of the mission, explained:

"We are at the faultline of a global political disagreement, or powerplay... It is surmountable if you have Russia and the US, Great Britain, France and China agreeing on a way forward with this mission. Or, you know, to end the 1244 mandate.\(^{16}\) They can't agree on changing 1244... that would mean an agreement on the status of Kosovo. Which is not achievable right now. That's a sort of global political landscape! We are in the middle of these forces, opposing each other."

(Kosovo interview 1)

\(^{16}\) The "1244 mandate" mentioned here refers to the Security Council Resolution which established the UN integrated mission in Kosovo (UNMiK) in 1999. It is Security Council Resolution number 1244. For further detail, see Chapter 4.
"We exist in two universes. In the Kosovan universe, we [UNMiK] exist at their invitation... we are here by their consent as a sovereign act. In the universe of Serbia, we are here acting for the United Nations. The proponents of those two universes are constantly trying to drag us into one another. And it's very difficult... In the Serbian-Russian universe if you like, UNMiK still runs the country. It doesn't, of course. I don't think UNMiK is terribly important any more, here. Other than in the Serbian-Russian universe. It's a kind of absurdity."
(Kosovo interview 2)

The diversity of views amongst UN member states – be they at Security Council level, in this case with Russia disagreeing with other members of the Security Council, or amongst other UN member states, in this case representatives from Serbia – has led to political stalemate in Kosovo, with the integrated mission, UNMiK, simply becoming a pawn in the middle of the deliberations. The end result is stalemate: the mission has to remain in place until the divergence in the wider UN member state interests is resolved, which for the time being is indefinitely – "a kind of absurdity". This has effectiveness implications for the mission: it is as if member states are less concerned by mission achievements than they are by the mission simply remaining in existence. UN staff are well aware of this, as seen in the following quote from a senior member of UNMiK management:

"The current Secretary-General says that it's not in his power to change the mandate or to close us down, though nothing would give him greater pleasure."
(Kosovo interview 5)

The activities of the mission become politically irrelevant against the broader backdrop of relations between UN member states. Another UN staff member expressed an element of confusion about working for UNMiK as a result:

"Kosovo is not recognised by the Security Council as such, and the Security Council is giving us a mandate. It's a pretty strange and unique situation."
(Kosovo interview 4)
As well as noting the hierarchical nature of the UN as an organisational system, it is important to note the hierarchy of UN member state relations here: Serbia does not have as much influence at the United Nations as Russia, given Russia's seat on the Security Council. It is at Security Council level where UN member state relations have the stronger impact on integrated missions. One UN staff member quoted the Russian ambassador to Serbia as saying "The Security Council is Russia's playground." (Kosovo interview 5). The respondent went on to say this meant the integrated mission became just one of the toys with which the Security Council can play:

"We've always understood ourselves as a toy, not an instrument. So we are essentially hostage not only of Russia and China -- and China's not passive in this but that's another story -- but above all of Serbia. And eventually, if the constellations are right, and Serbia does decide it wants to be in the EU, it's going to have to give up all of its pretensions to Kosovo. But we're still a ways off from that. The Secretary-General has left it up to the Security Council. And the Security Council, for reasons that have nothing to do with Kosovo, but the national interests of the member states, particularly the permanent member states, simply continue to play this game. So here we are."
(Kosovo interview 5)

Note the reference to the fact that the Security Council is deadlocked about Kosovo "for reasons that have nothing to do with Kosovo". Lower down the UN political hierarchy, another stakeholder, Serbia, may well influence what happens in Kosovo for reasons related to joining the European Union. Again, this has nothing to do with Kosovo, and is certainly not related to the causes of the original conflict when the mission was initially established. Yet it has become a factor in why the timeframe of the mission has been longer than some argue is necessary. Other members of UNMiK interviewed reinforced this finding when citing various Security Council members influencing what happens on the mission. For example, one senior manager in UNMiK said:

"I think it was 2006 when Putin made it very clear that Russia has its own foreign policy. I cannot see immediately that Russia would agree -- nor would China -- to a change in Security Council Resolution 1244... Whenever you talk to [Russian representatives] it's very clear... Russia said it doesn't matter what they do in the UN
General Assembly... we have all our toys in the Security Council, and this is where we play. So that was quite clear. In other words, even if Serbia comes to some kind of arrangement, or an agreement, it doesn’t mean that Russia automatically agrees to a change of 1244.”

(Kosovo interview 1)

At the same time, these data do not go uncontested. Another respondent in Kosovo, this time an UNMiK staff member, disagreed with the notion of Russia ignoring Serbian views:

“I find that very hard to believe. The Russian foreign minister is on record as saying that Russia’s policy is not to be more Serb than the Serbs. So if Serbia decides to recognise Kosovo, Russia’s not going to stop them.”

(Kosovo interview 2)

Whatever the position of Russia on this issue, the discussion serves to illustrate that Russia has an influence, and one that is more significant in UN political negotiations than that of Serbia (or indeed other UN member states). The data show that Russia has a strategic alliance of sorts with Serbia, demonstrating the point relevant to this research that UN member state relations have an impact on integrated missions. In this case, the impact is that the mission cannot be closed down regardless of effectiveness or otherwise: higher-level political considerations and relations between UN member states prevent it.

Political stalemate in the Security Council also means neither the mandate of the integrated mission nor UNMiK’s organisational structure has changed to reflect the much-altered circumstances of Kosovo twelve years after UNMiK was established (albeit only formally; see Chapter 6). Similar to the UN system as a whole still working on an organisational model established in the 1940s (Chapter 2), fieldwork showed UNMiK in 2011 as an organisation still working under an organisational structure from 1999, no longer suited to current contextual factors. Given the presence of the mission, it should be expected that a country or territory’s context will change significantly, i.e. that regardless of impact
– positive or negative – the mission’s very presence will certainly lead to changes. In Kosovo, this was readily recognised by UN and non-UN staff alike:

"The objective of the mission has changed dramatically over time, in particular since 2008."\(^{17}\)
(Kosovo interview 3)

"As I see it, this is all around EU membership. If Serbia ultimately decides that the biggest prize that it must have at all costs is to join the European Union, then inevitably, sooner or later, Serbia will have to bite the bullet and recognise Kosovo, because we will not import another Cyprus to the EU."
(Kosovo interview 2)

In this example, the Kosovo situation is likened to that of Cyprus, a divided island yet already a member of the European Union. This consideration is in no way related to why violence originally flared in Kosovo, or indeed to why the UN Security Council responded in the way it did. Yet the situation in Kosovo has changed so much since UNMiK was first established that new political considerations have entered political debates on Kosovo. Yet the mandate that established UNMiK (UN SCR 1244) remains in place.

Note that these data provide evidence that monitoring performance – and indeed effectiveness of mission performance – is hard. In the case of UNMiK, neither mandate nor (formal) structure has changed despite the shift in political context over time. Even if the Security Council had sought to gauge a measure of effectiveness of UNMiK as an organisational entity, the altered political discourse on Kosovo would make this difficult. Equally, if measurement of the mission’s effectiveness were sought in 2011, the work would be made harder due to an outdated organisational structure remaining in place.

\(^{17}\) In 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia (see Chapter 4). This changed the political dynamic of any discussions about Kosovo for all those involved.
Other examples of member state relations affecting missions were also found. One respondent in Kosovo, a senior member of UNMiK staff, highlighted the significance of the United States in UNMiK’s working:

“It would have been difficult for UNMiK to always administer this territory against the ideas that, for instance, the US office had.”
(Kosovo interview 1)

The respondent is showing how one UN member state (in this example, the USA) uses its office presence in the territory where an integrated mission is established to maintain direct influence on the activities of a mission, in this case UNMiK. Similar data were found in the case of MONUSCO. One observer of the mission, a non-UN staff member, stated of the Congolese government:

“They know that China will not allow a strong UN arm. They know also that the US has never been ready for bold military operations here.”
(DRC interview 19)

The respondent demonstrates not only their own awareness, but also that of the Congolese authorities, of the bilateral interests of UN member states affecting missions. In this instance, both China and the US are singled out as having greater influence on a mission’s operating environment than other member states. China is seen as maintaining a weak mission regardless of the needs of DRC in response to its historical context: its bilateral interests trump that of the collective UN interests. Equally, the US is stated as having little appetite for committing militarily to respond to the violence in Congo. The nub of this example is the relations between DRC, as a UN member state and host country government where MONUSCO has been established, and the integrated mission. The government of DRC is well aware of its relative weakness in the face of US and Chinese interests, as well as of the fact that those relations will mean MONUSCO will not be adequately resourced to address the
challenges presenting themselves in Congo. This affects how MONUSCO and the DRC authorities interact (in this case, negatively).

The data paint a picture of integrated missions being caught in the middle of high-level political discussions between UN member states—particularly those of Russia, China and the United States—even when these discussions do not relate to the activities of integrated missions. This was found to be the case in both integrated missions studied, despite their very different operating contexts: in both cases, the integrated mission was highly power-dependent on the UN Security Council, and this affected mission performance. Even representatives from the countries where missions are located are side-lined in this international hierarchy:

"Kosovo politicians didn't have, of course, the clout that the UN member states [had]. But of course they tried to, you know, throw their weight around. But they didn't have much of that."
(Kosovo interview 1)

For some respondents, this was not unexpected. For them, inequality of influence in the international system was simply a matter of fact. As the UN staff member quoted above stated:

"That's a problem that the UN has in general; of course certain member states have more clout than others. That's a fact of life."
(Kosovo interview 1)

The respondent recognises this situation as a "problem", but is resigned to it as generally inevitable. Where this becomes significant for this research, however, is how these UN member state relations impact on any mission that has been established. In the case of UNMiK, the data show that implementation of a mandate becomes harder. One non-UN staff member observed:
"Donors might have certain priorities, which might not be aligned with the priorities that the mission has. So there's always this conflict of hierarchies, mandates and funding."
(Kosovo interview 7)

This was reinforced by a member of UN staff:

"There were international stakeholders in Kosovo who had their own ideas... It's not always easy to establish the rule of law if you have political interference."
(Kosovo interview 1)

In this case, when asked if such interference ever felt illegitimate, the response was "Oh yes, certainly" (Kosovo interview 1). The impact of UN member state relations therefore makes life more complicated for mission staff, even to the point of a loss of legitimacy of action when undertaking UN-mandated activity. The politics of the UN system and the hierarchies within them therefore affect the operational management and performance of integrated missions. In this case, the mission was at times evidently prevented from carrying out aspects of the rule of law element of the mission mandate as there was a higher level political concern to protect key individuals.

Similar sentiments were found in the DRC case. Just as fieldwork in Kosovo showed that UN member state relations were not equal and impacted on UNMiK, so in Congo were there data to demonstrate the political nature of discussions about MONUSCO. When discussing Security Council interest in DRC, one MONUSCO unit head stated simply that Congo was "not politically well-considered" (DRC interview 3). For members of UN staff and observers alike, member state relations at the Security Council very much affected levels of attention on the situation in the Congo.

Most starkly, this affected even the size of the mission itself. The comment above reflects a resignation to the relative political weakness of DRC in the international system. Likewise, a non-UN staff
member respondent expressed anger at the proportionately small size of MONUC when it was first created:

“You just have to look at the figure of the military, as per the Resolution of September 1999, five thousand, five hundred and thirty-seven – that already said a lot, because no one on earth could believe in the good faith of the signatory parties of the Lusaka Agreement. So if you know that, how can you set such a small number for the first world war in Africa?”
(DRC interview 12)

The sensitivities of political negotiation and discussion were frequently touched on during fieldwork, even showing that the term “peacekeeping” itself remains disputed amongst UN member states. Two senior unit heads of MONUSCO stated:

“Robust peacekeeping is a very sensitive issue for the UN. If you talk to anyone in New York, it is very difficult to get the C34 Committee\(^\text{19}\) to actually sit down and agree a definition of robust peacekeeping, because they look at it from very different angles.”
(DRC interview 11)

“That is where compromise and, you know, a sort of different political agenda come into play. Our very straightforward view does not necessarily always work in the [Security] Council chambers where they have to weave a very complicated path at times.”
(DRC interview 4)

It was also in DRC, when discussing the hierarchy of political negotiation between UN member states, that evidence of member states acting in their own, bilateral, interests, came out very strongly. Member states are shown as mistrustful of each other, and almost cynically uninterested in DRC itself. As a member of MONUSCO’s senior management team put it:

“Quite frankly, they distrust each other. They all have their own agendas, and interests. This is a big country, with a lot of resources. There is quite a bit of jockeying for commercial in-roads by different member states.”
(DRC interview 14)

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\(^{18}\) For more on the contextual background of MONUSCO when it was first established [as MONUC], see Chapter 4.

\(^{19}\) The C34 Committee is the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.
This was reinforced by two non-UN observers of MONUSCO, the second once again specifically highlighting the role of the United States and China:

“I am quite sceptical, and I think the aim is not peace in the Congo, the aim is the resources of Congo.”
(DRC interview 19)

“Negroponte, the then US representative to the UN, when he saw the complexity of the crisis there, and the antagonism, he said ‘war is cheaper’. War is cheaper. And on the other side, you have China. You know, when few people were discussing with them, China was quietly discussing about roads and things like that, and was concocting a contract to its long-term benefit. ... You can do as much effort as you can, it will be difficult to see behind you, Chinese interests.”
(DRC interview 12)

These quotes reflect an appreciation amongst mission staff that UN member states, and particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, are driven primarily by their specific bilateral political and economic interests, with integrated missions having to navigate alongside. In the case of the United States, the data suggest that missions are under-resourced (“War is cheaper”); in the case of China, the data suggest that mission implementation will be made even harder since it may not always be clear what bilateral interests are being pursued.

Whilst this suggests that day-to-day life on a mission becomes harder as a consequence of UN member state interests, the longer-term impact on integrated missions of these bilateral interests is two-fold, in a self-reinforcing way. Firstly, mission mandates, over time, become increasingly complex, as member states add more and more activities according to their own interests. Secondly, missions become drawn out over time. These consequences reinforce each other as the longer the list of requirements in a mandate, the harder the mandate becomes to implement: the mission becomes less effective as the number of tasks it is set proliferates, and it therefore has to remain in place for longer. One senior staff member in MONUSCO stated:
At one stage, I think we had something like forty-eight, forty-nine tasks. And that is purely just lumped on; there is no real messaging out from the Security Council, and [mandates are] not necessarily always designed for ‘right, this can be picked up immediately and used by the people on the ground’.

(DRC interview 11)

There is evidence that changes to mission mandates by the UN Security Council are not made strategically. This is confusing for mission staff. As the requirement within mandates expand over time it is not always clear to mission staff what precisely is required by the Security Council. The Security Council does not set over-arching direction but instead just “lumps on” activities, to the point that the set of tasks presented is not always practical in implementation terms. The same respondent as that quoted above, as well as a further senior MONUSCO representative, went on to add:

“Compatriots over the years have found that quite frustrating at times, you know, ‘what do they really want me to do?’ And that is quite complicated.”

(DRC interview 11)

“It’s not only a multilateral issue, to deal with within the UN. Those countries, they have their own agenda also, on the bilateral level, so we have to try to put all this together. Which becomes very complicated.”

(DRC interview 7)

The inefficiencies of integrated missions begin to be exposed. In these examples, staff are shown at times not to be clear on their own objectives. This means they cannot be performing their roles effectively. This can only represent a cost for those contributing to peacekeeping resources: if staff are being paid to work on missions, but their roles are not well-defined, they will exist as a form of wastage for UN member states. In addition, if those same staff spend their time trying to work out what is meant by peacekeeping mandates, rather than getting on with performing their duties, again, they represent an inefficient investment on the part of member states.

The second consequence of member states increasingly acting on their individual bilateral interests concerns mission duration. Both case study missions had been in place for over a decade at the time
fieldwork was conducted. Reinforcing the point made above about a loss of engagement by member states over time, one member of UNMiK’s senior staff commented:

“We remain here due to the inability of the permanent members of the Security Council to agree amongst themselves on what to do with us. It’s not that any of them really cares all that much about Kosovo.”
(Kosovo interview 5)

The data show that member states reduce their political engagement on individual missions over time, and this represents inefficiencies in peacekeeping costs for contributing countries. One observation from the fieldwork was that there was a commensurate sense of fatigue amongst several UN staff interviewed in this respect, almost as if the loss of political focus from the Security Council in New York has led to capability stagnation on the missions:

“Everyone’s been here too long, myself included.”
(Kosovo interview 5)

“UNMiK actually should have been reduced a long time ago.”
(Kosovo interview 9)

The impact this has on missions is a loss of robustness in performance, a weakening of capability to address the very issues missions were established to address. One observer of MONUSCO stated:

“Ten years of UN presence here has kind of, to say it bluntly, given the UN a teethless face (sic), has given a teethless face to the UN.”
(DRC interview 12)

Another UN staff member, a support unit chief in Congo, expressed his frustration:

“I would say it is a leadership management issue both in New York and in the mission. Ten years into the mission, we are still now considering building accommodation, giving training. Only now. Where was the vision; where was the

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20 For the purposes of the case in DRC, MONUC and its successor mission MONUSCO are considered one and the same.
leadership at the beginning? And that is not only in the mission; that is in New York. The problem is a lot of missions are on autopilot."
(DRC interview 13)

A further frustration expressed by fieldwork respondents concerned the imbalance in power relations between the Security Council and the mission. It means that it is not possible for a mission to address valid concerns about mission capability in a satisfactory way. When asked if missions can influence the bilateral interests of UN member states, the response from a MONUSCO respondent was:

"I don't think so. We don't have any clout here."
(DRC interview 7)

There are even further-reaching impacts of a loss of robustness in strategic direction and commensurate loss of capability on missions. They lead to a loss of credibility of missions in the eyes of the partner governments. One observer of MONUSCO expressed their frustration at the lack of robust interaction between the integrated mission and the Congolese government:

"They [MONUSCO] don't scare anyone in the government anymore. I think that is extremely important. There should be a feeling that an angry SRSG is something to avoid. It may have to do with the personality, but it's not really a question of personality. It is structural, in the sense that I think that this government, just like under Mobutu, this government has much learned about the international community. They know where the teeth are, and where they aren't. And they know that this place is, I think, this is a mission of containment, not of resolution of the crisis. It's a containment, [and] has been so for ten years."
(DRC interview 12)

The loss of robustness in terms of the mission's interactions with a host government reverts back negatively on the integrated mission as, if a mission loses credibility, it will become the focus for criticism, justified or otherwise. Two non-UN respondents in DRC stated:

"Somebody else I spoke to described MONUSCO as a very easy scapegoat, not just for the Security Council, but for the Congolese government itself."
(DRC interview 11)
"The general frustration that NGOs have, and that I think many people within MONUSCO probably have, [are] with the limitations and the tension – limitations they have operationally and the tension imposed on them by a very ambitious mandate and limited resources on the other hand."
(DRC interview 17)

Missions are therefore shown to face multiple political challenges as a result of being power dependent on the Security Council, and of relations between UN member states: timeframes are lengthy; the size of missions is dependent on the level of interest in a country at the Security Council, rather than the peacekeeping needs; missions may face strategic undermining as member states pursue their own bilateral interests; mandates are exponentially expanded even as member state interest wanes over time; this can be confusing for mission staff uncertain how best to prioritise their efforts; effectiveness suffers and missions lose credibility in the eyes of host country governments; this results in high levels of criticism against the missions, both from partner countries and the UN member states themselves.

To some extent, much of this could be expected. There is likely only to be only so much time that UN member states will remain engaged on individual missions. The difficulty with this is that there is no drive to end missions. Staff and missions themselves can only be tasked to come to an end by the Security Council: if that tasking never happens, missions will simply remain in place. Integrated missions become caught in the middle of stagnated political negotiation. One observer of MONUSCO illustrated the point:

"I think there hasn’t been enough effort, on the part of the UN as a body comprised of the Security Council and everything, there hasn’t been enough efforts that were proportionate with the change of attitude on the part of their interlocutors, and their top interlocutor [the President]. The records here of ambassadorial meetings with the President are appalling. So, [there’s been] a kind of side-lining, not only of the UN, because ambassadors are more or less in the same [position]."
(DRC interview 12)
The respondent is showing how a loss of political focus on the part of UN member states has led to a loss of political credibility of the mission amongst the country where the mission is hosted. The wider implication of this is that missions run the risk of simply wasting member state resources. It is quite a self-perpetuating situation at which to arrive: as long as missions lose focus or direction from member states, the longer they stay in place and the less effective they become. The same respondent went on:

"The whole rotten situation that existed twenty years ago is still there. And nothing, nothing, absolutely nothing, can prevent, can spare us the possibility of a totally new MONUSCO at the end of this year. A new one with a lot of handicaps, with a lot of constraints in the sense that the whole lot of lack of credibility, of the decade of lack of progress will be there, on their shoulders."

(DRC interview 12)

In practice, missions generally do reduce in size over time. In DRC, as set out in Chapter 4, the mission halved in size during 2010. UNMiK in 2011 was a snapshot of its former self. But both missions are still present over a decade after being established. Their longevity suggests a difficulty for the Security Council in ending missions, and that reasons for their continuation are politically driven. These bilateral interests trump considerations about mission performance, effectiveness or costs.

To conclude this section, then, missions are established by the UN Security Council, automatically meaning that missions are power dependent on the Council: there is not an equal relationship between the two. UN member states – and in particular those with permanent seats on the Security Council – affect integrated mission through their relations with other states, even if political negotiations are not related to the contexts where missions are located. There is a hierarchy of influence within the international system, meaning that some UN member states have greater influence than others. The host governments of countries where missions are located frequently have less influence than those on the Security Council. This has various impacts on the missions, principally on the size of a mission when it is first established, and that implementation of mission mandates is made more difficult than it
otherwise would be due to political interference from various member states. Over time, member states increase their bilateral attention on countries, and reduce their focus on integrated missions and their mandates. Mandates lose focus and strategic direction which can be frustrating and even confusing for mission staff. In time, as missions run on autopilot, they lose credibility with partner governments. Ultimately, UN member state relations lead to integrated missions becoming wasteful for those same states that created and established them in the first place.

5.3 Resource Dependency

As set out above, integrated missions are created by the UN Security Council, and as such power relations between the two levels of organisation (Security Council and integrated mission) are not equal. This means that requests made by mission staff for resources to implement mission mandates are frequently ignored. As one UN staff member in Congo put it:

“We are very much at the whim of the member states as to what resources we are given in terms of equipment and people.”
(DRC interview 11)

Reflecting on implications of this in terms of organisation theory, similar to the findings in the previous section, it can be said that integrated missions – because they are different to other types of organisation – are not able to behave in the same ways as the theory would suggest. Since they are entirely dependent on member states for their resources, they cannot act to become less dependent on others. The power dependency of integrated missions on the Security Council is such that they are also entirely resource dependent on the Security Council, and the degree of imbalance in this relationship cannot be changed. In order to function and simply exist, integrated missions require human, financial and equipment resources. The sole source of these resources is the UN Security Council. Examining integrated missions through the lens of organisation theory as set out by Cook (1977) integrated
missions cannot withdraw from the power-dependent relationship with the Security Council, as there is no other organisation outside the Security Council that can provide them with human, financial and equipment resources. Integrated missions cannot extend their networks to gain any of these resources from elsewhere. Integrated missions cannot gain status by obtaining other resources: to exist as organisations, integrated missions require only a mandate from the Security Council. Whilst a mandate implies a minimum level of resources will be supplied for the mandate to be implemented, this is not a formal requirement of Security Council mandates. Indeed, the data show that resources supplied are insufficient – at least in the two cases studied. Finally, integrated missions cannot join with others (coalition forming) so as to become stronger in their relations with the Security Council. Given its much more powerful standing in its relations with integrated missions, the Security Council is also in a position to close down missions altogether or simply to ignore any new resources obtained by the mission.

Applying organisation theory to integrated missions through a lens of resource dependency, then, also shows – as did applying the theory through the lens of power dependency – that the Security Council is therefore in a position of ultimate authority over integrated missions: because integrated missions are power dependent, they are also resource dependent on the Security Council. One dependency reinforces the other. This is borne out in the data. If an organisation depends on another for resources, it follows that the second organisation will be in a position of power over the first. The data show that missions are heavily dependent on UN member state relations for resources: indeed, missions would not exist without agreement between UN member states. The principal ways in which this affects missions are in the levels of staff, funding and equipment resources allocated to missions, the length of missions, and ultimately in what integrated missions can achieve. In the face of limited resources,
some aspects of mission mandates will not be undertaken. One UNMiK respondent discussed addressing the politically-stagnant situation in the North of Kosovo:

“It's very difficult to assert Pristina's sovereignty, and the people think that [we] should be helping with the assertion of that sovereignty. But we haven't got the manpower anyway to do that.”

(Kosovo interview 2)

In addition to being power dependent on the Security Council, the data show that missions are therefore also resource dependent.

The question of staffing resources was raised in every interview conducted for this thesis, be it in Kosovo or Congo, the clear implication being that staffing resources on integrated missions are inadequate. The two examples provided below are from senior UN staff members in Kosovo and DRC respectively:

“UNMiK came here in 1999, with a limited budget and with a limited number of personnel.”
(Kosovo interview 1)

“We are seriously under-staffed; we have less than half we are supposed to have.”
(DRC interview 14)

Staffing constraints were cited as being particularly acute in DRC, suggesting that those countries of lower political interest to the Security Council receive fewer resources than those more in the spotlight. This reinforces the finding in Section 5.2 on power dependency about the size of missions when being established being affected (negatively) if Security Council member states have lower levels of interest in the country in conflict. The following quotes were both made by senior UN staff on MONUSCO:

“Some of the [offices] are under-staffed; in some provinces we have only one national staff. We think and we believe that this is not too much.”
(DRC interview 5)
“With roughly eighteen thousand military troops available to us at this point in Congo, almost all of them are deployed to the East, that is nowhere close for us to have the capability to provide full protection to all civilians, even in the Eastern operational area, much less across the country.”
(DRC interview 8)

The point was reinforced by most respondents in DRC making comparisons in available resources with other missions. See the following examples, where comparisons are made with resources available to missions in both Afghanistan and Haiti, countries cited as having higher geo-political importance to the UN Security Council than DRC. Both quotes are from senior UN staff members:

“The area which I am referring to, if you add up the surface area of that region, it is larger than Afghanistan. And eighteen thousand troops only go so far. So.”
(DRC interview 8)

“We have always been very clear internally; we made a study in 2006, we identified the need to have at least 150 or 200 staff [in this unit]. If you compare [us] with Haiti for example, I think there are more than 150 in Haiti. If you compare the size of the countries, we have half. We think we are really under-staffed, if you compare with other missions.”
(DRC interview 3)

The implication is simply that those countries of higher geo-political importance than DRC receive higher levels of resources: UN member state relations pay little relation to the need, scale or complexity of a crisis. The Kosovo case study proved a useful comparison with DRC on this point: Kosovo was cited by various respondents as having greater importance for members of the Security Council than DRC, and commensurately UNMIK had proportionately higher levels of staffing resources than MONUC/MONUSCO. Indeed, in one (albeit exceptional) example, a senior member of UNMIK even highlighted additional staffing resources being made available when they had not been requested. Again, the importance of relations between UN member states (and particularly those of the Security Council) is identified as the reason for this:
“One interesting thing is that this balancing in the Security Council, between recognisers and non-recognisers, has also the effect of giving me cover for, you know, if I need more resources, I will find countries that will be supportive of that. And, in fact, a couple of years ago, they even gave me more money, more personnel than I had asked for. Because they thought ‘oh, you don’t have quite enough – take a bit more!’ I’d never heard of that before! Which I’d never asked for! And you know, I took them!”

(Kosovo interview 4)

Albeit the sole example from either case study of additional resources being provided to a mission to those that had been requested, this quote serves to illustrate the wider point that staff numbers – or indeed mission resources more generally – are not the primary concern for UN member states debating Kosovo in New York, but their political position and viewpoint on the territory is. Administrative concerns – how a mission performs – are simply not the focus of UN member state interactions. As another UNMiK staff member said:

“We’re the only one who stayed ‘big’ if you see what I’m saying. But it’s not necessarily because UNMiK has given us all the resources to do it, in fact that’s not at all the case. What is happening is that we have participating states who said they want to make sure that we stay big because it’s politically important for them.”

(Kosovo interview 9)

The lack of adequate resourcing in relation to the tasks set out in a mission’s mandate is not only felt by UN staff, but also observed by interlocutors with integrated missions. Three non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives in Congo stated:

“I think for really fulfilling a protection mandate as they have, they need more, they need more staff. They will need more coverage, and more outreach.”

(DRC interview 2)

“Hard security, deployment of troops, you know, preventive deployment, or deterrent deployments, are a big part of creating a safe environment, and MONUSCO just doesn’t have the resources to do that.”

(DRC interview 17)

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21 i.e. countries which have recognised Kosovo as a country following their unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, and those which have not.
"If they really would reach their objective, MONUSCO, they will need more people... of course there are not enough. Because they have to choose. Just to face all the constraints they have, whatever it could be, civil or military, they are not enough."

(DRC interview 19)

It could be argued, in attempting to explain a lack of adequate resources for integrated missions, that the sheer scale of the challenges faced by a country are either ignored or not being well-enough understood by the Security Council. The following two examples are indicative of the varying views at different levels of the mission, the first from a very senior member of MONUSCO's management staff, the second from a unit head:

"I think most of the member states that were in the Security Council were to understand that. When it was convenient to forget it, it was forgotten."

(DRC interview 1)

"In six of the Western provinces, we have in each province only one or two staff. In Katanga we have only one. Only two in Mbuji Mayi to cover provinces... which are the size of France... You are chronically under-resourced. Like really, very seriously under-resourced. I think Congo, as a country, it suffers from this total misunderstanding of its size and its complexity."

(DRC interview 3)

This argument is undermined, however, by the evidence that UN staff do provide the Security Council with information about mission resource needs. When asked why MONUSCO staff do not request additional resources, there was a forceful response from a unit head, defending UN representatives:

"They do. They do! And in New York too, the Secretary General tells the Security Council, they need more troops for Congo. But it all comes to the means, OK? It all comes to the money issues."

(DRC interview 7)

Another example of resource dependency between missions and UN member states concerned equipment, and specifically equipment for transportation. In DRC this is particularly acute as, to cover the whole, vast territory of the country, the equipment required just to get around is expensive. Due to
lack of infrastructure, often the best way to get around is by helicopter. Several staff commented on helicopter shortages. The following two quotes are from senior MONUSCO management staff:

"Congo is a country with an exceptionally poor infrastructure in many of the areas where we operate. For us to be able to have the information on risks; for us to be able to respond to that, we require helicopters. Mobility is a challenge. Whenever asked, we say that on our wishlist here would be more helicopters. Now there's great demand for helicopters, globally. Both on peacekeeping missions and other types of international operations going on. So it then becomes a matter of priority." (DRC interview 20)

"The other major concern we have in terms of resources, of the mission as a whole, is helicopters. The Security Council authorised 47. We never had as many because there was a shortage on the market. We had 36 last year. We are right now in the area of 14. Which is a serious issue." (DRC interview 14)

The first of these examples expressly links a lack of helicopters for MONUSCO back to UN member state relations: member states prioritise available resources even to the point that DRC, despite its exceptionally poor infrastructure, receives relatively fewer helicopters than other missions elsewhere. The impact on MONUSCO as a mission once again is negative, specifically in terms of effectiveness: the mandate is not fully implemented. A senior UN staff member commented:

"Overall, we have multiplied the temporary and mobile operating bases. We had 36 in 2008. And we have 91 now. At the same time you have this dramatic decrease in the number of helicopters. That has already got us into serious trouble. About two dozen of them can only be air supplied – you can’t even reach them by road, because there are no roads. So we have competing demands, we have increasingly long supply lines and operational lines, and a declining number of helicopters. That, right now, is the biggest issue in terms of resource constraints. It means in practice that we have to prioritise increasingly, and there are missions that we can’t carry out. There are many other cases where, well, we have to say no when we receive demands." (DRC interview 14)

Resources for DRC, then – both in terms of staffing and equipment – are clearly inadequate for the mission’s mandated tasks, and this is a deliberate move on the part of the Security Council: the power
dependency created between integrated missions and the UN Security Council creates a resource dependency as well. The distribution of available resources both direct to missions and across a range of different missions, is political. Largely, when discussing resources, respondents in both case studies referred to human resources: whether interviewing UN staff or non-UN observers of integrated missions, both UNMiK and MONUSCO were routinely and consistently described as under-staffed. Nonetheless, equipment shortages – particularly in DRC – were also cited as an example by which missions are constrained. Even levels of equipment supplied to missions is shown as political. The examples help to highlight the overlaps between the power and resource dependency aspects of inter-organisational relations theory.

Resource dependency, then, in this case of integrated missions on the Security Council, has two principal impacts on missions. The first concerns resource distribution within missions by mission staff, once a mission has been established. This will be discussed in Chapter 6 as it is an organisational finding rather than a political finding. The second impact, however, concerns how a mission behaves into the longer-term: effectively, a mission stops requesting additional resources as staff are aware it would be politically unrealistic to do so. They know they simply will not receive what is being requested. Both impacts link (negatively) to mission performance as they remain in a permanent state of inadequate resourcing. Of the two cases studied, this was particularly emphasised in DRC, the country of lower political importance to UN member states. Both external observers of MONUSCO and members of MONUSCO staff underscored the point. The following quotes are from an NGO representative who worked closely with MONUSCO, and a senior UN staff member:

“You know, it’s already the biggest [mission] that exists. It costs a lot of money. And I think politically it would be impossible, or really very difficult... I’m not a politician but it would be very difficult to increase now the peacekeeping force.”

(DRC interview 2)
"MONUSCO was, I think since 2004, asked to stay in type of maintenance budget, so it was very difficult to suggest the increase of staffing for the whole mission. Even what we request will not cover the total needs."
(DRC interview 3)

Against this backdrop it is perhaps unsurprising that some staff do not consider mandates to be fully realisable: this would explain why they stop requesting even those resources to cover the tasks set out for them in mission mandates. A senior member of MONUSCO set out his perspective on the resourcing gap between the mission mandate and available resources:

"I think sometimes, from the mission point of view obviously, you would often hear the opinion that the mandate can sometimes be aspirational. Resources [are] not quite sufficient in order to be able to implement all aspects of the mandate that are given to us. It's particularly related to what is aspirational regards [the] mandate given to protect civilians. I think even with 100,000 troops here, there would always be, you know, I mean we cannot guarantee the full protection of civilians. So if you want to look at resource constraints, protection of civilians and the way that can be interpreted, both by the government, by communities, and by our international partners, and then the resource available to achieve that – that's a constraint. That's a gap."
(DRC interview 20)

This also goes some way to explain some of the scepticism observed, interestingly mostly from non-UN staff, about mandates and how they develop over time. There is some suggestion that this is closely linked to troop contingent size, i.e. that as international troop numbers reduce, so too does the political engagement from New York by member states. The following example is from Kosovo where member state interest has reduced over time, but the political divisions highlighted in Section 5.2 have not been resolved. The result is that the mission has to stay in place, despite a reduction in troop numbers in the military component of the mission. A unit head in UNMIK explained:

"Kosovo being the theatre where there was the highest concentration of peacekeeping forces ever, probably. Whatever – per capita, or square kilometre, or however you want to put it. Now they've gone down from whatever they were, 45,000 probably at the peak, they are down to five. And they are talking to move to the 'Gate 3' level as they define it, which would be some 2,000 soldiers. That is in recognition of the fact that there is a certain level of stability here which will allow them to disengage
further. So this allows the international community to disengage more. On the political side this, however, hasn’t happened. And that’s why we need to be still here.”

(Kosovo interview 4)

It is worth making a point here about expectations. This is closely linked to the question of resources devoted to missions, and there are varying viewpoints. As stated above, the overwhelming majority of staff consider their mission to be under-resourced – in both Kosovo and DRC. In Kosovo, as we have seen, there is some evidence (albeit from only one respondent) to suggest that this is not 100% correct, but generally the data suggest that mission resources are insufficient for the tasks set. And yet, staff and observers of integrated missions universally expect to be adequately resourced, i.e. that it is possible to achieve the mandates set. The data show that member state political interests override any real interest in resourcing missions appropriately to enable staff to do so. Two senior member of MONUSCO management compared mission resources with other activities undertaken by member states, and the relative needs in the Congo:

“We were costing about 1.2 billion dollars a year for a peacekeeping mission. The peacekeeping mission on its own – not the development stuff, not the agencies. And that’s sort of a lot of money! Until you stop and think that that’s, you know, the equivalent to a few days that the US was spending in Iraq. I always thought that was a lot of money until AIG managed to get 180 billion as a bail out. So I mean, apples, oranges and so on. But it’s a matter of priorities.”

(DRC interview 1)

“It all comes to the money issues, because already they say this mission is very expensive – 1.3 billion dollars, that’s a lot. But then, when you look at the size of the country, you see the terrain, you see the constraints, the challenges, this is nothing. In the East, where we have ninety-five per cent probably of our troops, it is one soldier for about ten thousand or fifteen thousand people.”

(DRC interview 7)

Using the resource dependency lens of the analytical framework, it has been shown that missions are significantly affected by UN member state relations and political interests at the global level, particularly those of the permanent members of the Security Council. Because integrated missions are
power dependent on the Security Council, they are also resource dependent. This affects levels of staff and equipment provided to missions. Notably, the resources allocated to missions are highly dependent on levels of member state interest in a particular country: in Kosovo, additional resources were allocated without being requested; in DRC the data show a pattern of consistent under-resourcing. In both cases, resources were shown overall to be inadequate. Mission staff do make efforts to set out these constraints to the UN Security Council but political negotiations between member states can mean that these efforts do not translate in improved resourcing on integrated missions, or into organisational learning within the UN system more generally. Over time, this leads to scepticism amongst mission and non-mission staff about the feasibility of fully implementing mission mandates. Ultimately, resource dependency negatively affects levels of mission achievement and means that integrated missions are destined only ever to under-perform.

5.4 Environmental Constraints

Environmental constraints simply were not mentioned during fieldwork as linking to member state relations and their impacts on missions. Only two potential examples could be found, the first linked to the section above on resource dependency. As an observation, there is no question that all UN staff interviewed during fieldwork seemed genuinely tired from their mission experiences. In the words of one senior MONUSCO representative:

"It was the most intensive and demanding job I've ever had."
(DRC interview 1)

Given their responses all highlighted a lack of sufficient resourcing to work on missions, it can be derived that inadequate staffing and equipment resources make the working environment of a mission
harder. In this sense, relations between UN member states impact on the environment of integrated missions through weak resource provision.

The second example of environmental constraints to integrated missions caused by UN member state relations concerns a lack of contextual awareness on the part of personnel supplied by member states to fulfil aspects of the mandate. Although the example given concerned Kosovo, it was given (by coincidence) during an interview with a non-UN staff member in DRC:

"In Kosovo you have police forces from the Fiji islands. They don't know the environment, they don't know the culture, they cannot talk to people. This is a tremendous, tremendous problem these UN contingents have all over the world."

(DRC interview 2)

The respondent is making clear that a lack of understanding for a context to which UN personnel are sent can impact negatively on the success of a mission. A lack of empathy for the situation in which a population finds itself can lead to weak or no response on the part of UN staff in the event a population is under threat – exactly what the mission has been established to prevent. That said, whilst this is a potentially interesting point, this was the only mention of this type of flaw in UN engagement in either of the case studies, and is not therefore considered sufficiently strong data from which to draw conclusions for the purposes of this thesis.

In terms of environmental constraints, then, it cannot be firmly stated that relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions. There are some consequences, including the personal impact on UN staff deployed to work on integrated missions: in the face of inadequate resources, they were observed to work long days, and generally be run-down by their experiences. But relative to levels of data found about power and resource dependency, the evidence was less significant. This suggests that environmental constraints, at least in the two cases studied, are not a significant issue for
integrated missions. Galaskiewicz’s emphasis on environmental constraints against the more robust inter-organisational relations theories of power and resource dependency may therefore have been misplaced, or at least not appropriate when such a framework is adapted to better understand integrated missions and the impact on them of UN member state relations. The data do not show that it is appropriate to give equal weighting in the analytical framework to environmental constraints alongside power and resource dependency. Equal weighting was given to questions drawn up for fieldwork in each case study context, yet analysis of data on return from fieldwork shows much weaker levels of evidence against this element of the analytical framework. When framing inter-organisational relations, therefore, findings from this research suggest that an organisation’s environmental constraints are less influential on that organisation than either power or resource dependency – or indeed than Galaskiewicz suggested. This point will be examined further once the organisational findings from the fieldwork have also been presented, at the end of Chapter 6.

5.5 Overlaps and Tensions

Reviewing the evidence on both power and resource dependency, when discussing how UN member state relations impact on integrated missions, it is clear that the two are mutually-reinforcing. Member state relations impact on the size of an integrated mission right from its very creation: the more geo-politically important a country where a mission is to be established is to members of the UN Security Council, the more resources will be devoted to it. At the same time, the more resources a mission has, the more important it is to the UN Security Council.

This overlap can also be a source of tension within a mission. In the case of DRC, it is hard for anyone to argue that the size of the mission was not substantial, despite all the evidence about insufficient
resourcing ("$1.2 billion; that's sort of a lot of money!" [DRC interview 1]). Yet there is also evidence that member states use the mission size to argue for mission reductions. This impacts on the mission primarily through delays in deploying staff and equipment. One MONUSCO unit head explained:

"Because most of the time they keep saying, 'yeah, this is the biggest mission, this is the most expensive mission. You have 1.3 billion dollars in all of this... It is limited resources that the UN can put here'. The UN doesn't have an army, it has to have troop contributing countries, willing to send their troops here. You know at one time, the issue was to increase the number of troops in the DRC by three thousand. It took over a year to find three thousand people."
(DRC interview 7)

Another example of a similar tension and how this affects a mission was seen in Kosovo. Even eleven years after the end of violent conflict in Kosovo, Serbia still sustains the ethnic Kosovo Serb enclaves, such as they continue to exist in Kosovo, through parallel administrative structures. This allows for the continuation of a lack of recognition of Kosovar independence on the part of those communities, rather than facilitating cohesive multi-ethnic communities throughout the territory, one of UNMIK's principal objectives. Political stalemate in the Security Council enables this situation to continue. The result for the people of Kosovo is economic stagnation and ongoing inter-communal mistrust as conflict resolution remains elusive. The only interest for Serbia or Russia in continuing the impasse is linked to higher-level political negotiation and far removed from the concerns and daily reality of ordinary people in Kosovo. Without sufficient resources to address the impasse, for the mission, the situation has ended in deadlock, stalemate and widespread frustration. A UN staff member observed:

"In some ways the relationship [between the mission and UN member states] has become sort of a non-relationship. Because there are different ideas being pursued by [different UN member states]. I think the recognising stakeholders have realised that they created a bit of a political mess in Kosovo."
(Kosovo interview 1)
A further reflection that needs to be made here is what constitutes adequate resources. One UN staff member in DRC pondered:

“Eighteen thousand - not enough. But is there an enough figure? Particularly in a country, you know, half the size of the United States of America.”
(DRC interview 11)

Others too raised the same question. A senior member of MONUSCO management stated:

“There is sometimes the perception of the world’s largest peacekeeping operation but I think it is also incumbent upon all of us to bear in mind the limitations as well, of what you can and can’t do... it’s not so much a matter of saying ‘oh, we need more’, because I suspect if you did a detailed analysis of what size force you need to provide full civilian protection through that whole area, you’d arrive at astounding numbers that are clearly beyond the realistic expectation for a UN peacekeeping force.”
(DRC interview 8)

The tension between insufficient resources provided to MONUSCO due to DRC not being the UN Security Council’s highest priority and the needs of Congo is stark. As cynical as it may have been perceived by one DRC respondent, it provides the logic for the example of realist thinking in the reported US decision that “war is cheaper” (DRC interview 12). Nonetheless, a tension remains when the aspirational requirements set out in a mission mandate are not reflected in the resources provided to a mission. When pushed about whether levels of expectations on the part of the Security Council were aligned to the reality of insufficient resources for MONUSCO to undertake its mandated tasks, the senior MONUSCO staff member simply replied:

“I don’t know”.
(DRC interview 8)

The lack of certainty reflects the ongoing dilemma for UN integrated mission staff, fully aware both of the requirements of their tasks, of the challenges inherent in peacekeeping, and that complete implementation of unstrategic mission mandates is not possible.
5.6 UN Member State Relations and Organisational Learning

These data reflect the finding from the literature cited in Chapter 2 that, despite the reviews undertaken by the UN at an operational level about civilian peacekeeping practice and what is preventing improved performance, UN member states – and in particular, those on the Security Council – are not factoring those reviews into their political deliberations about countries where missions are established. They suggest that the answer to the third research sub-question, How does the UN learn from its experience of integrated missions?, is that the administrative elements of the UN system do learn lessons about integrated mission performance and effectiveness, but that these lessons are not taken into account in political negotiations between UN member states. More specifically, they suggest that the UN does not learn at the political level. If the majority of political discussions and literature on peacekeeping primarily focus on military components of peacekeeping operations (Chapter 2), and if all reviews from the operational side of the UN focus on performance flaws in terms of resource and equipment deficiencies, and if this evidence does not translate into increased/adequate levels of resourcing for integrated missions, then it follows that the UN as a system is prevented from learning the operational lessons of its integrated mission experience due to the political constraints inherent in relations between UN member states. Applying Nonaka and Takeuchi’s analysis of organisational knowledge transfer to these findings, it can be said that the UN internalises its knowledge (staff on integrated missions are aware of the operational constraints they face) but that this knowledge has not yet been socialised in the wider UN system. This is borne out in the data. It holds therefore that no performance improvement over time, on different missions, will be found.

Similarly, applying the data findings to Senge’s presentation of organisational learning theory, there is significant evidence of coping mechanisms, or adaptive learning, adopted by UN integrated mission
staff (they make the Security Council aware of the political and resourcing challenges faced) yet there is no evidence of generative learning (staff are institutionally prevented from addressing their challenges creatively). The power dependency of integrated missions on the Security Council is such that staff are bound to work within the structures and constraints they are set by the Security Council. This explains why UNMiK’s structure remains in place 10 years after being established, and yet in practice is shown to be a shadow of its former, original, self. The evidence shows that UN member state relations, at least in the cases of UNMiK and MONUC/MONUSCO, constrain fulfilment of integrated mission mandates, and thus their effectiveness. In terms of Argyris and Schön’s classification of organisational learning, these data suggest that single-loop learning (following the rules) is occurring but that double-loop learning (reforming the rules) is not. Staff present their resource concerns to the Security Council but additional provision is not made, despite glaring need.

As a result of UN member state relations, therefore, the result of this research is that integrated missions can only ever under-perform. Certainly, triple-loop learning (learning how to learn) is not happening. The politics of UN member state relations prevent discussion of integrated mission performance against the stated ambition of mission mandates. They also prevent the institutionalisation of lessons learned from integrated mission practice and experience.

5.7 Conclusion

It seems almost trite to state that peacekeeping missions are not established in a political vacuum. It is inevitable that UN member state interests, particularly those of the five permanent members of the Security Council (bilateral or collective), will guide the political discussions and negotiations that create them. Nonetheless, this chapter has argued that the data show that UN member state relations
impact not only on the mandates of integrated missions, but also on their performance and on how the UN as a system learns (or not) from its experiences of integrated missions. The politics surrounding integrated missions mean the UN as a system is prevented from putting learned lessons into practice.

In answering the research sub-question “How do relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions?” then, it can be said there are many impacts. Integrated missions have been shown to be unlike other organisations: they are entirely dependent on the UN Security Council in terms of both power and resource dependency. They therefore cannot behave as other organisations do according to organisation theory: they cannot withdraw, extend their networks or form coalitions with others. Any such actions would first need to be sanctioned by the Security Council. This affects integrated missions in a number of negative ways.

First, the length and size of missions is affected by UN member state levels of interest in a particular country. Mandates become expanded over time, even as collective member state interest declines. Both case studies produced evidence of missions staying in place beyond their useful timeframe, and this is in large part due to a deprioritisation of attention on the missions by the UN Security Council. Over time, UN member states shift their attention away from the collective interest that led to agreement on mission mandates to their own bilateral interests. The result for integrated missions is increasingly unstrategic mandates over time. Missions lose relevance to their country contexts which can be confusing for mission staff and lead to a loss of effectiveness: at the same time as increased requests for clarity are made, engagement reduces from UN member states. Missions begin to perform less effectively and are increasingly criticised by external stakeholders (partner governments or interlocutors) and yet lack the influence on member states needed to provide renewed focus and direction. Missions stay in place longer than arguably necessary, and over time, mission staff stop
making requests for additional resources. This serves only to continue under-performance. Ultimately, the data have therefore shown that it is relations between member states that mean integrated missions reduce in effectiveness over time, and prove wasteful for those same member states.

Next, levels of resources made available to missions are linked to the political interests of UN member states, even to the detriment of the people of the country where missions are established. It has been shown how countries focus their political efforts and attention on countries of higher political priority than others, and resource them accordingly. It was also shown however that in both case studies, resources were overall inadequate for the complicated mission mandates set by the Security Council. This leads to the unnecessary prolonging of mission timeframes.

Finally, in answering the sub-question "How does the UN learn from its experience of integrated missions?" the data suggest that the politics of relations between member states prevent the UN from learning the operational lessons of its integrated mission experience. At the operational level, learning takes place. UN staff – in particular those working on integrated missions – are very aware of the constraints they face and the resulting weaknesses this means for mission performance. There is some evidence that this happens repeatedly; i.e. that this finding is not unique to the two case study missions examined in this research. In addition to the few literature reviews undertaken by the UN as a whole on civilian peacekeeping, staff on integrated missions inform the Security Council about their resourcing requirements and needs. It is at the political end of the UN system – notably the Security Council – that a lack of attention is paid to such evidence. Using the Nanaka and Takeuchi presentation of the process of organisational learning, these data suggest that there is only a tacit transfer of knowledge within the UN system: staff know there is something wrong with their organisational experience of integrated missions, but find it hard to articulate. Some explicit transfer of
knowledge does take place in that reviews of peacekeeping acknowledge those constraints highlighted by staff. Yet these lessons are not institutionalised by the UN as a system. Against Senge's presentation of organisational learning, the data reflect that adaptive learning takes place, but generative learning does not: the power dependency of integrated missions on the Security Council means that operational learning cannot be institutionalised, and results in a loss of mission effectiveness over time. Using Argyris and Schön's presentation of organisational learning theory, the data suggest, at least in the cases of UNMiK and MONUC/MONUSCO, that single loop learning (following the rules) occurs: staff adopt corrective behaviours within the organisational structure and constraints they face. But double-loop learning (reforming the rules) does not occur: the same weaknesses are detected (and in some cases corrected) in very different mission contexts. The overarching norms of integrated mission behaviour (performance) nonetheless remain the same.

If similar challenges are found on integrated missions, reinforced by both the literature and the findings from this research, and if these considerations are not taken into account in Security Council deliberations, given the relationship of power dependency of all integrated missions on the Security Council, it can be said that triple loop learning (learning how to learn) does not happen in the UN system – at least when examining integrated missions. Indeed, this may be the reason why double loop learning does not happen. The political constraints of the relations between UN member states prevent discussion of how integrated missions perform, and indeed what the experience of mission staff is in terms of mission performance. From this, it can be inferred, therefore, that integrated missions will only ever under-perform.

As an overall conclusion then, it can be said that integrated missions are dependent on the UN Security Council to such an extent that, organisationally, they are unlike other organisations. At an operational
level, the UN learns from its experience of integrated missions but weaknesses persist as they are prevented from improving their performance due to the political constraints inherent in relations between UN member states. This sense of staff on missions having to "make do" with the resources made available to them has consequences for how missions behave as organisations, and how each of the organisations that make up an integrated mission behaves. These consequences are examined in Chapter 6 on how inter-organisational relations impact on integrated missions.
CHAPTER 6

HOW DO INTER-ORGANISATIONAL RELATIONS IMPACT ON UN INTEGRATED MISSIONS?

"Some people said it's controlled chaos"
UN senior manager, DRC, January 2011
(DRC interview 13)

6.1 Introduction

In exploring the impact of UN member state relations on integrated missions, the previous chapter presented findings from this research of a primarily political nature. Findings from fieldwork data were analysed against each of the three elements of the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2, revealing that there are various impacts of UN member state relations on integrated missions. One impact was simply on the size of a mission when it is first established, according to the level of political interest in a country for members of the Security Council. Another was found to be that UN member states lose focus on integrated missions over time, as their bilateral interests in countries where missions are hosted increase. Some commented this was linked to levels of troop numbers in the wider peacekeeping operation. Next, mission mandates were found to be expanded in unstrategic ways over time, leading to confusion amongst mission staff on which tasks to prioritise. As mandates become harder to implement, missions attract criticism from interlocutors, including host governments and populations of countries where missions have been established. Missions were found to stay in place longer than necessary, and ultimately to become wasteful for UN member states as the Security Council deprioritises cost effectiveness in favour of more urgent political considerations. The
relationship of total power and resource dependency of integrated missions on the UN Security Council means that integrated missions are unlike other organisations. Ultimately, relations between UN member states mean integrated missions are destined only to under-perform.

Having looked at the macro-level political impacts of UN member state relations on integrated missions, this chapter answers the question How do inter-organisational relations impact on UN integrated missions? In so doing, like Chapter 5, it also contributes to answering the third sub-question, How does the UN learn from its experience of integrated missions? This chapter examines the effects of a more micro level, i.e. the relations between the various organisations that make up integrated missions. If Chapter 5 was about the political findings of integrated missions, this Chapter 6 is about the organisational findings from this research.

Once again using the analytical lenses of power dependency, resource dependency and environmental constraints, this chapter argues that the management systems and processes established in the international system make it difficult for integrated missions to fulfil their tasks. It is shown that even the term “integrated mission” is not fully understood by mission staff. The chapter also argues that UN member states do not focus on this aspect of peacekeeping operations, meaning that they remain unaware of how civilian peacekeeping is conducted. This lack of focus by member states on mission operational practice allows for continued under-performance by integrated missions as mission staff adopt informal coping mechanisms to address the operational challenges they face. These coping mechanisms can prove self-defeating. Senior mission management focuses on clarifying member state priorities, to the detriment of clarifying administrative processes. This negatively affects mission performance. Tensions are exacerbated by the consequences of insufficient resourcing. Section 6.2, on power dependency, sets out the challenges of coordination amongst the various organisations that make
up integrated missions. Over time, power dependency relations between the various organisations that make up integrated missions lose operational usefulness. Mission structures become distorted and less relevant to mandates, and senior staff on integrated missions lose oversight of day-to-day mission management. Section 6.3, on resource dependency, exposes systemic weaknesses in formal UN management procedures. One result of this is that integrated missions adopt informal coping mechanisms in the face of inadequate human resources and complicated budget procedures, some of which are not successful. Section 6.4 on environmental constraints argues that the principal environmental constraint faced by integrated missions is the sheer scale of activity they are attempting to undertake. It links to the two previous sections to show that the way in which integrated missions behave as organisations leads to antipathy from host governments and local populations, making already-challenging situations even harder to operate in. This further exacerbates integrated mission under-performance. The appropriateness of weighting the three elements of the analytical framework equally when examining inter-organisational relations, as suggested by Galaskiewicz is also further examined. Section 6.6 examines the organisational learning elements of the data. It argues that the data show that, rather than institutionalising lessons learned (double-loop learning), in practice the UN instead works in an ad hoc way to address some of the challenges it faces (single-loop learning). This can be self-defeating. The section goes on to argue that one interpretation of these data is that the Security Council, by not sufficiently monitoring integrated mission performance, is failing in its stated responsibility to safeguard international peace and security. The conclusion in Section 6.6 summarises the argument that whilst relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions to make good performance harder (Chapter 5), the cumbersome nature of UN administrative processes and procedures and the integrated mission organisational responses to these challenges, serve to exacerbate them. Inter-organisational relations therefore affect integrated missions in a number of negative ways.
and, once again, it is shown that the UN does not fully learn the lessons of its integrated mission operational experience.

Before presenting results of data analysis against the three elements of the analytical framework, it is important to note at the outset that, when discussing levels of integration on integrated missions, the data showed a lack of clarity amongst UN staff as to what constitutes an integrated mission. This was surprising given the term had first come into usage over ten years prior to the fieldwork being conducted. One UNMiK unit head asked:

"By an integrated mission, do you mean the mission where other UN partner agencies operate?"
(Kosovo interview 3)

The principal confusion reflects how the term integrated mission has evolved since the early 2000s. Originally, the term was used to describe integration amongst only those organisations that made up the mission itself, i.e. the definition used in this research. UNMiK was the first example of such an integrated mission – i.e. a peacekeeping operation made up of military and civilian contingents as usual, with the civilian contingent being formed (initially) of UNHCR, UN staff, the EU and the OSCE – i.e. various organisations from within the international system (see Chapters 1 and 4). Today, the term is used to describe integration between the civilian operations on a peacekeeping mission (as previously) as well as all the agencies that make up a UN country team in country. The quote above shows that this is not fully appreciated across UN personnel working on integrated missions. Given this quote was from a staff member based in Kosovo, it suggests that policy changes at UN headquarters level are not easily translated to country-level peacekeeping operations. The distinction between different understandings of the term integrated mission is important as it affects mission behaviour depending on which understanding is being used.
Elsewhere, the term was known, but not strictly supported. A respondent in DRC hinted at latent antipathy amongst UN staff for working more closely across the international system:

"Then we have that whole debate over 'integrated mission', what does this mean? We saw that as a resignation, as a kind of surrender to the concept of integrated mission with a humanitarian branch under the orders of DPKO and DPA,\textsuperscript{22} and we didn't like it actually."

(DRC interview 12)

The term "integrated mission", then, is not well understood across the UN system and means different things to different staff. This will be discussed in greater detail in section 6.2.2 below.

6.2 Power Dependency

The power dependency aspects of inter-organisational relations on integrated missions concern coordination, both within a mission itself, and with other stakeholders – either within the UN system, or those organisations also present in a country where an integrated mission has been established. This section takes each of these in turn.

6.2.1 Power dependency within integrated missions

The data suggest that there are two principal ways in which power dependency affects inter-organisational relations within integrated missions. The first is that mission structures become distorted over time. This seemed particularly true on those missions made up of various organisations, as in the case of UNMiK. The second is that, in attempting to respond to shifts in mission mandates,

\textsuperscript{22} DPKO is the UN Secretariat’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations; DPA is the UN Secretariat’s Department of Political Affairs
mission senior management lose sight of the day-to-day management of their missions: it is simply not feasible to achieve both.

Some respondents did comment on the potential benefits of inter-organisational relations, notably cost effectiveness, or clarification of roles. The following two quotes are both from Kosovo, the first a senior member of UNMiK, the second from an embassy observer of UNMiK:

"If you think in economic terms, it's always worth the effort."
(Kosovo interview 1)

"It was good for them to sit down and discuss just what they do. For both sides. Because really, UNMiK was doing its own stuff; agencies were doing their own stuff. And sometimes there were really gaps in terms of what is everyone doing."
(Kosovo interview 6)

In Kosovo, there was also the recognition that inter-organisational relations, whilst laborious and process-heavy, were constructive, given that UNMiK's mandate had expanded over time with a commensurate decrease in staffing resources. One member of UNMiK staff explained:

"I think in Kosovo it has to do also with the evolution of UNMiK itself. With reconfiguration of UNMiK, the people working in UNMiK have realised the importance not of integration itself, but of deepening coordination. And you see the benefits of it. Because UNMiK is not able to do many things any more directly. But UNMiK still has the expertise, the connections, the relations at the local level. And it has all this kind of information that by itself cannot do anything in terms of actions, but if you relay to agencies that can do something about it, you are using your information strategically."
(Kosovo interview 10)

Yet these examples were relatively rare. In the majority of cases, and in particular at working level on each of the missions, the tensions of attempting to integrate different parts of the international system result in antipathy and drive frustration amongst some of the individuals concerned. Two members of UNMiK staff commented:
“There are a lot of people who feel that this is now imposed, the integrated mission planning process is being imposed after ten years of work and coordination that went quite well.”
(Kosovo interview 8)

“I have to say that we found some resistance from certain heads of agencies that were not used to it, also from heads of offices here, because they didn’t see the point.”
(Kosovo interview 9)

These quotes suggest that those members of staff who have worked in the UN system for longer than others (in the examples cited, they are at heads of agency level) are those most resistant to the concept of integration. Possibly, these staff have not been involved in decisions taken at headquarters level about the need for integration: without a firm understanding of why directions are being given in New York, staff working on missions are unlikely to adopt new practices. Another (non-UN) UNMIK staff member (from the OSCE) went on to explain that they even at times work against integration and actively aim to separate themselves from the UN:

“It’s been important for all sorts of reasons, including security reasons, to just implement our mandate. But not necessarily flag our, you know, our UNMIK mandate as such. It’s complicated for us to share office space, or it’s complicated for us to be seen too much with them, because that would actually hinder our work. If we would be seen too much as an UNMIK entity, we wouldn’t be able to do be doing what we do. I’m afraid. So we try to separate ourselves from them.”
(Kosovo interview 11)

This statement supports the theory on power dependency presented in Chapter 2. Organisations in situations of power dependency will work in one of four ways: withdraw, extend networks, obtain status or form coalitions (Cook 1977). It was suggested that the OSCE’s dependence on the UN would be directly proportional to the OSCE’s buy-in to UN activities and goals, meaning that if the OSCE could achieve its goals without having to recourse to the UN, it is unlikely that they would work together, even if formally they form part of the same overall organisational structure (UNMIK). The quote above suggests this theory is correct: by stating it is complicated to be seen to be part of UNMIK,
or even to share office space with UN staff, the respondent is demonstrating a loss of buy-in to the overall UNMiK structure, and even mandate. Inter-organisational theory suggests it is unlikely that these two organisations would work together if they did not share a dependency relationship, and that organisational strategy is to become less dependent on others. The evidence shows this has indeed happened: the OSCE has withdrawn from its formal (UNMiK) relationship with the UN as it is no longer dependent on the UN for resources. The power dependency has shifted over time. It should be noted that the formal structure of UNMiK remains in place, meaning that, formally, the OSCE and UN are organisational partners in the same UNMiK endeavor. In practice, the OSCE has separated itself from the UN. Achieving such an imbalance across the outmoded structure that is UNMiK is only possible due to the fact that it is only the Security Council that can change a mission’s structure (see Chapter 5). The fact it has not done so despite the obvious distortion in mission structure confirms a lack of interest on the part of the Security Council in both how peacekeeping is undertaken in practice and the lessons learned by the UN from its operational experience. These data show that UN member states are not aware of the how peacekeeping is being undertaken.

Three UNMiK staff confirmed that UNMiK’s structure had not kept up to speed with latest policy thinking on integrated missions:

“UNMiK is based on an old decision, it’s an old structure, that doesn’t take into account the recent developments within the UN family.”
(Kosovo interview 9)

“The pillar structure, established in ’99 as a result of Resolution 1244, doesn’t really exist anymore. Beyond the fact that OSCE is the sole remaining pillar. One could call us a house, rather than a temple.”
(Kosovo interview 5)

“Virtually nothing [remains in place] any more. The only thing that remains is pillar 3, the institution building and democratising pillar, the OSCE pillar. Which is now, sort of, has taken over a monitoring role. The OSCE, as a mission, is in a similar situation as UNMiK. OSCE stakeholders have problems agreeing on, or had
problems at a certain point in time, agreeing on the fate of the OSCE mission in Kosovo.”
(Kosovo interview 1)

This final quote is a telling statement that the OSCE, despite being part of UNMIK and therefore – at least formally – led overall by an SRSG who reports to the UN Security Council, nonetheless reports to OSCE headquarters in Vienna and specifically not to the UN. The data have shown already that, in 2011, the OSCE no longer truly considered itself part of UNMIK as a cohesive whole for the benefit of the people of Kosovo, but as a separate entity from the UN in strategic terms. This quote suggests that UN staff were also very conscious of this. It is in Vienna that OSCE stakeholders decide on the OSCE mission and its activity, not the UN Security Council in New York, despite them both formally being part of UNMIK. Equally, the presence of OSCE staff as part of UNMIK becomes confusing for other staff on the mission. One non-UN staff member of UNMIK (from the EU) stated firmly that he found the OSCE’s role in UNMIK unclear:

“My view of the OSCE here is that it’s a complete waste of money. It’s about 700 people. I don’t know what they do. Nobody’s ever explained to me what they do.”
(Kosovo interview 2)

The data suggest that full integration across the various organisations that make up UNMIK has not been successful: the OSCE has adopted a withdrawal strategy; the EU is unclear what the OSCE does; UN staff barely consider their OSCE counterparts as part of the same mission structure. The inter-organisational relationships across the organisations that make up UNMIK have essentially broken down. The result of insisting on integration when organisations have no dependency relationship is that UNMIK as an organisational entity becomes somewhat dysfunctional. Time spent on integration processes begins to outweigh time spent actually implementing activity and achieving mission objectives. This impacts both on UNMIK performance, as well as on the perceptions of its performance in the eyes of its interlocutors. A senior member of UNMIK staff commented:
“Although we are trying to implement the concept of an integrated mission, there are limits in factual terms. For instance, virtually every programme has its own administrative structure. It’s very difficult to combine the administrative structures. Partly because the budgets are coming from different sources.”
(Kosovo interview 1)

Similar data were found in DRC. MONUSCO (and its predecessor MONUC) is different to UNMiK in that it is only made up of staff from the UN. There are no other organisations making up the mission. A similar pillar structure is nonetheless in place (see Chapters 1 and 4), and correspondingly similar challenges in inter-organisational relations were found in DRC to those found in Kosovo. One unit head commented:

“Unfortunately, in an integrated mission, not everything is integrated. You have the political side, with the SRSG and his team, the Force Commander and others, that have dreams of what they would like to see happen on the ground. They are given a mandate by the Security Council, a twelve-month mandate, and you can drive a truck through some mandates they’re so big and broad, pages and pages of stuff they want to mission to do. So the SRSG and the programme managers, the ‘substantives’, go ahead and want to implement plans and operations to do this job. Now the other, they are not connected to the other side of the process which is, or very closely, with the budget side of the process.”
(DRC interview 13)

In this example, a tension between the political (or “substantive”) and the administrative parts of the mission structure is highlighted. Both this and the previous example from Kosovo highlight the tensions on integrated missions surrounding budgeting systems, and how these affect mission operations. The DRC quote suggests that, by focusing on mandate implementation, mission senior management lose sight of the administrative resource challenges they face. In the face of resource shortages or challenges, mission leadership is expected to prioritise. There is some evidence from the data from both missions to suggest that this is not done. The following examples refer to MONUSCO, the first from a non-governmental organisation (NGO) observer of the mission, and the second from a middle manager member of mission staff:
"In terms of MONUSCO limitations, I think it’s in part the resources and it’s in part the internal messages maybe. There is no clear indication of what messages are being sent by MONUSCO leadership to staff."
(DRC interview 17)

“He was aware of this situation here, that we don’t have the decision-making body, but the SRSG was not prepared to make a decision on this. That was my understanding.”
(DRC interview 6)

Similarly, an embassy respondent in Kosovo recognised the tension caused by looking for integration and felt that the way to address it was to ensure strong working relations at senior levels of mission management:

“There are different hierarchies, different chains of command, basically the most important thing is that the people who are in charge, like the SRSG and the development coordinator, that there’s a good relationship between them, that they are able to coordinate at the highest level.”
(Kosovo interview 7)

And yet, whilst undoubtedly important, the data suggest that good working relations at senior parts of the mission are not sufficient to enable integration. Chapter 5 showed that relations between UN member states, and particularly those of the Security Council, impact on missions in a variety of ways. The quotes above suggest that UN Security Council members focus their attention very much on mission activities but not on resources required to achieve them. In turn, mission senior managers focus their time on interpreting mandates to the detriment of mandate implementation. It is at the working level within a mission that the administrative challenge of mandate implementation comes into play; the data suggest at that level that integration does not progress either very far or fast - either because they have no strategic direction to do so, or because the UN’s administrative systems prevent it from being possible.
The UN has had integrated mission guidelines since 2008, which sets out the principles of coordination amongst organisations, and its importance for mission effectiveness (UN, 2008a; also see Chapters 1 and 2). Yet no mention of these guidelines was made by any mission staff interviewed during fieldwork. This is an important finding when examining power dependency as it suggests that staff are not being fully prepared or supported when tasked to work on integrated missions. The basis for a mission’s structure, its evolution over time and reasons for working on specific activities should be made clear to mission staff. In a normative sense, in order to ensure staff will perform as effectively as feasible when deployed to work on a mission, the policies behind why missions look as they do, and the reasons for working in a particular location should be familiar to all members of staff. Yet the data suggest this is not the case. This has implications for mission efficiency: if staff do not understand the reasoning behind why they are being tasked to do something, it is unlikely they will succeed in that task. It is also evidence that the UN is not learning the operational lessons of its integrated mission experience: if the guidelines are not being made familiar to staff on missions, then how can they be expected to deliver against them?

Even in 2011, three years after the initial publication of integrated mission guidelines (and a decade after UNMiK was first established as the first integrated mission), both case studies presented evidence of missions still planning to integrate, or working on how best to integrate. Despite both missions having existed for over a decade, formal mechanisms to coordinate and communicate within them are not in place. To take examples from senior members of both MONUSCO and then UNMiK, when asked about progress in integration, staff responded that they were still in the early stages of bringing it about:

“No, not even gone anywhere with this. We are still very much at the embryonic stage here.”
(DRC interview 15)
"When I got here [a year ago], this was barely starting, the process of integration. They were starting to talk about it. They knew about the decision already from the Secretary-General. But actually nothing was moving. It has not reached the stage of implementing things at local level for example. I think it’s still very much into the strategic planning stage.”
(Kosovo interview 5)

The quotes suggest a lack of urgency when considering integration. Not only has thinking on integrating across missions been ongoing for a long time, but progress is slow. To take a further example from Kosovo, efforts to coordinate across the UN system in country have been ongoing for several years:

“We’ve been working since three years ago on the integration strategy with the UN Kosovo team. This is fourteen agencies, and we’re still doing it actually. We have four groups that look into different aspects of the mission. If you want my frank opinion, until that exercise actually, we were not so much aware of the integration per se.”
(Kosovo interview 3)

As an observation, it was hard to escape the sense that there was no real commitment on the part of staff to ensure missions are integrated – either across their component organisations or with other parts of the international system. The result is that missions end up in an almost constant state of planning. In Kosovo in particular, the planning processes seemed more to give staff something to do rather than to have much bearing to the ongoing, if outmoded, mandate. Instead of focusing on implementing specific activity, staff instead spent a lot of effort on simply planning. The most candid of respondents confessed that integration, as a result, simply did not come about. See the following examples from a UN unit head in Kosovo and then a senior member of MONUSCO management:

“Being brutally frank, I think it applies across the board that all the agencies, they tend to do their own thing, and there is a problem in the information sharing.”
(Kosovo interview 3)

“[Coordination] is naturally an ongoing issue. The UN – and particularly here – magnifies that, both in terms of the size of the MONUSCO mission, and the country team more broadly... there are peculiar characteristics, I think, attached to the UN as a structure, both in terms of the agency relationships with their respective
headquarters, the relatively autonomous role that those agencies play, and within MONUSCO itself, in what is a relatively complex organisation. I don't think there is a simple answer to that.”

(DRC interview 8)

This section has shown that there are various impacts on integrated missions as a result of inter-organisational relations within integrated missions. It may be that mission structures become distorted over time, meaning a loss of strategic focus by the mission as a whole. Staff may become confused about what other parts of the mission do. Senior managers may lose focus on the administrative resources available to them as they focus more on the political aspects of their role, and struggle to interpret mission mandates. There is little commitment to integration amongst UN staff, with long delays in initiating processes, and no sense of timeframes for completion. There was evidence from both case studies of missions being in constant modes of planning rather than focusing on implementation of activity. The data show that inter-organisational relations on integrated missions break down over time, and that the UN is not putting the lessons of its experience into practice. Staff are not aware of latest policy thinking at UN headquarters, and administrative systems across UN agencies prevent full integration of mission activity.

6.2.2 Power dependency between integrated missions and other parts of the UN system

Integrated missions are in a relationship of power dependency with various other parts of the UN system, most importantly with the Security Council as well as with administrative support counterparts, based in UN headquarters in New York. It is from these counterparts that missions receive guidance, support and advice. At the individual level, these inter-organisational relations are shown to work well. Relations are particularly strong when a personal link of sorts is made, either from someone in a position of authority, or simply with desk officers working in New York on the geographical location
where a mission is based. The following quotes are from a variety of respondents, the first a middle manager in Congo; the others all from different senior managers in Kosovo:

“Our relations with New York are very good.”
(DRC interview 5)

“The relationship with New York is, I think, as good as it can be right now. We have regular consultations, communications. We’re on the same line.”
(Kosovo interview 1)

“With HQ I have a very good relationship. I have a personal relationship with the Secretary-General. [It] is important to have a personal relationship with the Secretary-General. And with the colleagues, you know, the people who man the desk. Because otherwise you start receiving unhelpful guidance.”
(Kosovo interview 4)

“I can also pick up the phone anytime I feel the need and speak to my New York colleagues. No one has a problem with that.”
(Kosovo interview 5)

Whilst inter-organisational relations are therefore shown largely to be positive at the individual level, this was found not to be true more systemically. This is most stark when examining relations between missions and their administrative counterparts based in New York. There were four types of example found from the case studies, including different contextual interpretations of mission settings; administrative processes; clarity over planning tasks; and requesting resources. These are now each taken in turn.

The first concerns differing understandings of mission contexts between field- and headquarters-based staff. As one respondent in Kosovo stated:

“We have had problems, and do have problems, more in the past though it still exists, of what I would say is a certain degree of subjectivity in New York. They would say that we’re too subjective here, in the other direction. I find some people in New York to be openly pro-Serbia, and they say so. But that’s not really professionally fair. Finding that fine line of neutrality isn’t easy. Because you argue it, and people say ‘oh, he’s totally pro-Kosovo’. We’ve also this problem in dealing with our office in Belgrade in the past. People go native; they would say the same about us.”
(Kosovo interview 5)
An example from DRC concerned a UN global initiative, rather than a specific misunderstanding relating to DRC, and seems harmless enough. The idea was to get citizens across the world to send a text message to their leaders. This was not appropriate to ask of UN staff in Congo given the lack of not just mobile phone technology in DRC, but even simply of mobile phones!

“It was supposed to be worldwide, but it didn’t work for us.”
(DRC interview 7)

The second type of example relating to power dependency between UN staff in the field and headquarters concerns administrative procedures, and exposes the political nature of integrated mission work. In this case, an example was given about the payment of Kosovo citizens who are employed by the UN either in Kosovo or anywhere else in the world. Despite the violence that had erupted in Kosovo over calls for independence, and despite this having eventually led to the largest peacekeeping mission in the world being established (as set out in Chapter 4), UN administrative systems could not be changed to reflect that the territory of Kosovo no longer constituted part of Serbia – regardless of anyone’s political stance in favour of either Serbia or Kosovo Albanians. An UNMiK unit head explained:

“I’ll give you an example that’s completely apolitical in theory, but in fact is extremely political. New York has created a problem with payroll for Kosovo citizens. They put down ‘nationality’ on the form, on contracts and so on, and now they’re saying, ‘No, no, no it has to be Serbia’. Who’s saying it has to be Serbia? What kind of nonsense is this? That’s not status neutral. Someone’s playing a political game. And that’s unacceptable.”
(Kosovo interview 5)

The example introduces and element of conflict in the relationship between different parts of the UN administrative system, and serves as a reminder that as technical and/or administrative an approach as may be taken when examining integrated missions, no area of UN activity is truly apolitical. The evidence backs up the theory set out in Chapter 2 that a relationship between organisations is more than
just a passing transaction: most inter-organisational relations are collaborative, cooperative and usually include the possibility of competitive or conflictive elements (but this is not a requirement) (Cropper et al, 2008: 91). In this case, the impact on the mission is that relationships of trust between different parts of a peacekeeping operation have deteriorated. The two parts of the UN system are not competing, but there is a tension (if not conflict) due to different interpretations of a mission context.

The third example of evidence about inter-organisational relations being strained concerns terminological understandings of the definition of integrated missions. UN staff on the security side of the international system, those working on integrated missions at the country level, have been required since 2008 to undertake an Integrated Mission Planning Process (or IMPP) in conjunction with UN agencies (UN, 2008a; see also Chapters 1 and 2). UN staff working for UN agencies at the country level, on the development side of the international system, are expected to coordinate amongst themselves and produce what is termed an UNDAF (United Nations Development Assistance Framework). As a senior member of MONUSCO sets out, the links between these two processes have not yet been articulated to those working in country, which is confusing for mission staff:

“When it comes to integration, constraints can be identified also at the headquarters level. Even though there's been a lot of work going into integrated mission planning processes, there may still be a number of unclarities (sic) with regard to the various planning tools, and the various programing tools that we are applying. So, for instance, the country team is working with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework as the coordinating framework for what they're doing. We are requested to develop an integrated strategic framework. Whilst the relation between these two documents is not clarified.”

(DRC interview 20)

Again, the inter-organisational relationship is shown to be slightly conflictive, as anticipated in the theory. In this case, staff on missions are not being given the strategic direction they need to work through the administrative processes they are tasked to do. Two different processes have been
requested, but counterparts in New York have not explained to staff in the mission setting how these processes fit together. Staff work well at the individual level (collaboratively and cooperatively) but without clarity from UN headquarters about the links between the IMPP and UNDAF, an element of tension (conflict) is introduced.

Finally, integrated missions are shown to be power-dependent on their counterparts in New York when it comes to requesting resources. Counterparts in New York essentially play a gate-keeping role before resource requests are formally submitted to the General Assembly. This reinforces the finding in Chapter 5 that relations between UN member states lead to missions eventually not even requesting the resources they require to fulfil the tasks they are mandated ("Even what we request will not cover the total needs" DRC interview 3). A middle manager in MONUSCO explained:

"We need to defend the staffing... the whole issue on the logistic support is a major, major difficulty to defend. Because it's millions, it's hundreds [of] millions essentially. We don't have figures yet, but it is between seventy and a hundred million what is proposed, in terms of logistic support for [this unit]. And this is obviously a lot of money. I think the mission has submitted a budget already. And it was an increase of about two hundred million, more than two hundred million, and it has essentially been... New York has essentially said no."
(DRC interview 18)

In this case, staff based in country recognise they still require additional resources, but their requests do not reach the Security Council due to UN headquarters staff rejecting them. The impact on the mission is a continued state of under-resourcing.

This section has presented evidence from the fieldwork about inter-organisational relations between different parts of the UN system. At the individual level, relations work well and are collaborative. At the organisational level, however, an element of conflict is introduced. This has a range of impacts on integrated missions, mostly negative: there may simply be a breakdown in trust between different parts
of a peacekeeping operation, or overall mission performance may suffer due to lack of clarity in planning processes. Finally, a mission may remain under-resourced due to requests for resources not being transmitted to the Security Council. In each case, the data reinforce the theory on inter-organisational relations.

6.2.3 Power dependency between integrated missions and other organisations

The unstable and contested nature of the working environments where integrated missions are based means that, despite the size and complexity of MONUSCO or UNMiK as individual organisations, they interact with a large array of other organisations, many of which focus on similar or even overlapping areas of work as that covered in mission mandates. As such, they enter into inter-organisational relationships. They become power dependent on each other since they each exist according to the nature of the activity of what the others are or are not undertaking. A UN respondent in Congo set out the various focuses of different UN agencies on conflict prevention:

"If you're looking at integration, with what the country team is doing in reducing tension for instance. The work that UNHCR is doing for the return of refugees; the work that HABITAT is doing to resolve land ownership issues; the work that UNICEF is doing to support return of refugees, or return of internally displaced [people] (IDPs), and defuse tension. And that of other UN agencies and their partners too."
(DRC interview 20)

In this example, the integrated mission is mandated to work on refugee return to Congo, and has to interact with other UN agencies all of whom are also working on refugee return, but with their own specific angle on the matter: UNHCR focuses on refugees; HABITAT focuses on who owns which land on return from being a refugee; UNICEF supports them both and also focuses on internally
displaced people. These organisations are all power-dependent on each other in the sense that they could not continue to exist if any other organisation assumed any of their responsibilities.

The data reinforce the theory that inter-organisation relations only exist when necessary (i.e. when a power dependency is involved) and that organisational strategy is to reduce that dependency. For example, there was evidence from the case studies about relations not being built when not necessary. Two NGO representatives in Congo stated:

"We try all the time to stay quite far away from MONUSCO. We consider MONUSCO part of the conflict and so they are not neutral."
(DRC interview 19)

"I think we share strategic objectives in a loose sense, in terms of you know, a lot of our programmes are building an effective and accountable Congolese state, particularly around the areas of service delivery, in health and education and community development. But in practice there is not really much overlap; we don’t have much contact with MONUSCO in any real sense in those sectors."
(DRC interview 17)

In both examples, whilst the work of each organisation may be similar to that of MONUSCO, there is no sense of dependency on the part of either, so no inter-organisational relationship needs to be established. Elsewhere, there is a need to establish relations between organisations, and – on the surface at least – such inter-organisational relations are shown to be strong. They are constructive and based on collaboration and constructive. One respondent, an interlocutor with MONUSCO in Congo, reported:

"We are in a steady dialogue with MONUSCO... I think this is a dialogue which is rather friendly, constructive."
(DRC interview 2)

Some evidence was found that these inter-organisational relations are mutually-supportive. Two NGO workers in Congo spoke about information sharing for the purposes of triangulation of reporting, and
supporting MONUSCO to improve its practices. In turn, other organisations are dependent on MONUSCO for logistical support or other assistance:

“We pretend to be completely out of this MONUSCO set up, but it could happen that we need them in fact. As they have knowledge of the environment where we are working, we try also to get information from them, and they try to get information from us. We try to cross-check with them the information we have. And I think they do the same.”
(DRC interview 19)

“We are also helping, I think, MONUSCO to have a stronger partnership, to improve certain approaches.”
(DRC interview 2)

Yet, unquestionably, inter-organisational relations are strained when examining integrated missions, reflecting the power-dependent nature of the relationships. Organisations working on similar activities are almost in competition with each other. One non-UN UNMIK staff member discussed the potential for competition amongst the various organisations in Kosovo:

“There are so many international organisations here, in a very small place, they’re all jostling for space in some way.”
(Kosovo interview 2)

Just as internal inefficiencies have proven dissatisfying for UN staff, frustrations amongst external partners are also clear, despite their recognising the constraints under which UN staff operate. As seen in the last chapter, one DRC NGO respondent stated:

“The general frustration that NGOs have, and that I think many people within MONUSCO probably have, [are] with the limitations and the tension – limitations they have operationally and the tension imposed on them by a very ambitious mandate and limited resources on the other hand.”
(DRC interview 17)

Some respondents admitted to a “love-hate relationship to some extent” with MONUSCO (DRC interview 17). Regardless of who was interviewed, all respondents who have to interact with missions
expressed frustrations with mission performance. Take the three following examples, the first from an embassy respondent in Kosovo; the second from an NGO worker in Congo; and the third from a UN mission staff member in Kosovo:

“Coordination with other international organisations, I think that would be the main constraint actually.”
(Kosovo interview 6)

“The interlocutors I’ve had are very constructive, mostly intelligent, people. Who are rather committed to their tasks. MONUSCO, though, does not have very clear organisational lines. I mean the fact that there are many cooks to make the decision [sic], the process of decision-taking [is] very long. And very intransparent [sic]. And there are also, there is also a bit of, you know, there are also these UN agencies who are, let’s say, under the MONUSCO umbrella as well. But then they’re also independent. And I think it’s a complicated, complicated structure.”
(DRC interview 2)

“UNMIK is one of the most difficult missions in terms of having another political force, meaning that you have the EU. Other areas, when DPKO mission is sent, all the international community is backing what United Nations is doing, and we can be the casting board. But here, we’re not.”
(Kosovo interview 8)

Another NGO respondent in Congo stated:

“Coordination at the Kinshasa level is very weak in general. Coordination around development activities is not strong here in any sense, and MONUSCO does not play a leading role – at least on the NGO side. Given the state of the Congolese government, I would expect MONUSCO to be behind the scenes pushing that it happens, or one of the other UN agencies. But that doesn’t really happen, so.”
(DRC interview 17)

The challenges reported in inter-organisational relations were thus not personal: relations between individuals were regularly reported as strong. Relations became strained due to the constraints faced organisationally by integrated missions: frustrations about mission performance in terms of how they coordinate with others were expressed by respondents in both Kosovo and DRC. This is evidence of network positioning, discussed in the power dependency theory presented in Chapter 2. There is a strong positive association between power and an organisation’s network centrality: the more other
organisations are dependent on a focal organisation for the resources they need, the more likely it is that all (other) stakeholder organisations view the focal organisation as influential. In this case, MONUSCO and UNMiK are focal organisations, and others are dependent on them for various resources, be it leadership in coordination, provision of security, information about latest contextual development, or access to government representatives. The theory suggests that central actors are perceived as more powerful, and in turn other powerful actors become aligned with them. In turn, this makes central actors appear even more powerful (Galaskiewicz, 1985: 282). In this case, NGOs, embassy counterparts and other international organisations have aligned themselves with MONUSCO and UNMiK and, despite their frustration about how the respective missions fulfil their central role, they have not withdrawn from the inter-organisational relationship.

This section has set out some of the frustrations felt by external interlocutors with integrated missions. Non-UN respondents expressed sympathy for UN staff, acknowledging the resource constraints and political challenges faced by integrated missions. Some inter-organisational relations are shown to be mutually-supportive, with external counterparts of UNMiK and MONUSCO working constructively with the missions to improve performance. Elsewhere, organisations reported steering clear of MONUSCO if an inter-organisational relationship was not necessary. Finally, non-UN respondents, whilst sympathetic to the resource challenges faced on integrated missions, also expressed some frustrations about working with them, in particular about unclear reporting lines, slow decision-making processes, and lack of coordination and leadership. Integrated missions are shown as more powerful than other organisations when inter-organisational relations are formed, i.e. external organisations may be dependent on missions for information, direction or even security provision. Yet mission under-performance tends to mean that such relations are therefore strained.
6.2.4 Power dependency – a summary

To conclude the power dependency part of this chapter, then, inter-organisational relations are shown to be constructive at the personal level, but more dysfunctional organisationally. Integration is not yet a concept fully understood by UN staff, and this leads to a lack of buy-in for processes seeking to reinforce the integrative nature of UN activity in a country. It means mission staff spend a disproportionate amount of their time on planning rather than implementing activity. Senior mission staff are shown to focus their attention on the political shifts taking place in mission mandates, and as a result do not have sufficient scope also to oversee the day-to-day management of their missions. This allows a loss of buy-in for integration on the part of some UN staff, and leads to lengthy and slow planning processes, as well as lack of organisational clarity, particularly in decision-making. For external organisations needing to form relations with the integrated mission, this proves frustrating. As suggested by the theory, inter-organisational relations are shown to exist only in those instances where one organisational entity has some form of power-dependency over another, for example either between the integrated mission and counterparts in New York or between integrated missions and other organisations in a country where the mission is established. In both case studies, the integrated missions under examination were seen to be dependent on their technical counterparts in New York, but more powerful than other organisations present in the mission setting.

6.3 Resource Dependency

If the preceding section presented data findings about inter-organisational relations and their impact on integrated missions in terms of power, this section does so in terms of resources. It has been shown already that the two concepts are closely linked: organisations in a position of resource dependency
will also be in a position of power dependency. Resource dependency theory suggests that, generally, organisations strive for autonomy and prefer not to establish inter-organisational relations as they may constrain subsequent action. This means, from the outset, establishing relations between two or more organisations is likely to be contentious (Zeitz, 1980: 74). Applying this to integrated missions suggests that inter-organisational relations between the various components of a mission – regardless of any other external constraining factor – are likely to be strained. This is borne out in the data.

Ostensibly, inter-organisational relations concerning resources on integrated missions work well at some levels, but the data also show that the impact on integrated missions is that personal incentives can contribute to a loss of mission efficiency. UN budget and human resource management processes are shown to be cumbersome, taking up disproportionate amounts of scarce staff time. The procedures are shown to be mutually-reinforcing, with weaknesses in budget processes exacerbating tensions in human resource processes. A result of these procedures being unduly time-intensive is that organisations and units within integrated missions are shown to act opportunistically, and adopt coping mechanisms in the face of constrained resources. These coping mechanisms are shown not always to work, and even in some cases to work against the effective fulfilment of a mission mandate. These mechanisms become institutionalised in mission practice but not within the UN system as a while.

Similar to data on power dependency, when analysing resource dependency, the data suggest that inter-organisational relations work well, on the surface at least: units understand their roles and their position in the mission structure. For example, see the following two quotes from two members of MONUSCO middle management staff when asked what their role is:

"The division is, you can call it a service division, because we support all the rest of the mission."
(DRC interview 7)
"We are complementing the effort of the other sections."
(DRC interview 5)

It is also possible to find examples of collaboration across units leading to positive outcomes for the mission:

"I think it worked so well because it was a joint effort, from the beginning. When the idea was put on the table, people sat together to discuss how to do it, to divide the task – who will do what? – and I think that's why it worked so well."
(DRC interview 7)

In this example, various units from across MONUSCO worked together to produce a positive result. The activity was a direct response to tasks set out in MONUSCO's mandate, a factor considered important for the inter-organisational relations to work well. If an activity is mentioned in a mission mandate, in the words of the same respondent, it "immediately becomes important. I think that's why it was so successful" (DRC interview 7). Mission mandates, therefore, are shown to drive priorities and focus of mission staff. The previous section showed how this was true for senior managers on missions; here it is shown that mandates infiltrate throughout the working structure of a mission.

Nonetheless, scratching the surface a little begins to expose some of the difficulties faced. One senior member of MONUSCO staff discussed the practicalities of resolving differences of understanding about who will be in charge of different activities. There does not seem to be a hard and fast rule for resolving any such tensions, more that units within the mission have to resolve it themselves:

"The only thing is, you know, sometimes, some of the sections may think that they are the one who has to lead this particular activity, the other time another section, they think that they have to lead this particular activity – but at the end of the day they come up and you know try to figure out who has to do what and – it has to work. Because we are here for a mandate. So we need to work together at least to make sure that we talk the same language and we are following the same rules and regulations."
(DRC interview 5)
Again, it is shown that mission mandates drive staff incentives, with staff almost competing to work on activities stated in them. Where do these different interpretations of who is in charge come from? Quite often, respondents highlighted concerns relating to the incentives of UN staff to showcase their work. Rather than focusing on mandate implementation, individuals sometimes become overly-focused on their own standing within a mission, regardless or not of whether they are best-placed to undertake activities or not. This seems particularly acute when mandates are changed. Unlike the strong inter-organisational relations at the personal level shown in the preceding section, when it comes to such relations over resources, behaviour at the individual level is important, and shown to be unreliable in terms of fulfilling a mission mandate. The following two quotes are from the same respondent in Congo, a middle manager on MONUSCO:

“They had one meeting, which was quite good. But then the second meeting, nobody showed up. Because that was some personal relations there, between the head of this office and other offices... And you cannot rely on the personal relations between the different heads of offices – [sometimes] nothing is happening between those two units because they don't speak together. I am very surprised about all this personal agendas: it's quite [important] to get your moment of fame here, so you can climb a little bit...

“... And I understood also in the older mandate, that [this work] was much higher on the agenda. It's not much in the existing mandate. And that tells there something to me that maybe this is not that important any more. And I had a discussion with the Chief of Staff about this and he agreed the organisation is not reflecting the new mandate.”
(DRC interview 6)

In both quotes, the respondent expresses his surprise both at the level of personal incentives driven by mission mandates, and by the lack of organisational structure change despite shifts in mission priorities as set out in revised mandates. This echoes the findings from UNMiK about a mission structure staying in place despite so many changes to the context and mandate that the mission has become a ghost of its former self (previous section). The data suggest that integrated missions, as organisations,
are shown to be inflexible and unresponsive to change, with commensurate implications for performance.

Part of the reason for this was explained time and again in fieldwork interviews as being due to the bureaucratic nature of some basic management practices used in integrated missions. Two principal areas were highlighted as particularly flawed, and impacting negatively on integrated missions: human resource management, and budget processes. A MONUSCO unit head explained:

"Three areas where I think the UN needs help, and I think these are generally acknowledged by everybody. One is HR [human resources]. We are not getting the people that we want, quickly enough or with the right skillsets. It is taking way too long, in some cases over a year to get someone in. The rules are constantly changing; even our HR staff don't know all the rules... The second is the procurement system. It takes way too long to get the kind of materials you want, and of the quality you want. It takes us anywhere from four to six months and more to get equipment in here. It takes too long. The third thing is the budget itself, the budget cycle, the budget process."
(DRC interview 13)

The point on procurement practice was not borne out in the data: there was simply no other mention of procurement (weak or otherwise) in case study interviews in either Kosovo or DRC. The other two areas of management practice – human resource management and the budget process – were flagged either singly or together in almost every interview conducted as exacerbating the challenges already anyway faced by integrated missions, due to the confusion created by UN member state relations. Given their significance in the findings, the data on both these areas will now be examined in turn.

6.3.1 The budget process

Formal budget processes concerning UN integrated missions are negotiated by different parts of the UN system, and are very burdensome for mission staff. Both these factors lead to strained inter-
organisational relations. One MONUSCO senior staff member explained the variance in approach from operational specialists aiming to fulfil mission mandates, and finance specialists defending proposed budgets:

“What I find very strange in DPKO is that the budget issues are negotiated by DMS. So we, all the substantive section, in coordination with our DSRSGs, we work on budgets – but after[wards], the budgets are defended in New York by Administration. We develop our expected accomplishments of the year which is translated into a budget. But the DMS, they don’t have any ideas of what we are going to achieve. I think it is normal they should be present to defend the budget because they know all the subtleties of the financial process. But they should not be the one who defends the operational issues. How can they defend the need to have more human rights officers? They don’t have any idea about this. They don’t have the technical expertise.”

(DRC interview 3)

The quote shows how, as a staff member, this respondent understands the logic of including finance specialists in budget negotiations, but also that there is confusion as to why only finance specialists are involved. The argument is that the two sides of the process could be better aligned. Operationally, this has an impact on the mission as senior members of mission staff are left ignorant of the reality of available resources. Another MONUSCO respondent reinforced this point:

“The SRSG and the programme managers, the ‘substantives’, go ahead and want to implement plans and operations to do the job. Now they are not connected (or at least very closely) to the other side of the process, which is the budget side. We then get a budget of $1.365 billion and we do not have enough money to support all the desires, wishes and projects of the SRSG and the substantives. This is where the challenge comes in, to reduce their expectations on what they need.”

(DRC interview 13)

Chapter 5 set out how mission mandates become increasingly unwieldy over time, as bilateral UN member state interests outweigh more realistic proposals about what can feasibly be achieved. In attempting to respond to these mandates, senior mission managers are perceived by their administrative

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23 DPKO is the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; DMS is the Department for Mission Support; a DSRSG is a Deputy SRSG
colleagues to have unrealistic expectations of which activities the mission can undertake. Inter-
organisational relations between different parts of an integrated mission become strained as a result of
how UN budget systems have been established. The tension is fairly constant as the nature of working
in a mission environment frequently requires the two sides of the process to negotiate. The same
respondent went on:

“In this mission, we still have a huge problem. I can have meetings with substantives,
and with the Force Commander, and come to an agreement that we must cut back, we
must reduce, and a week later he establishes a new operating base... That is a
challenge that administration, the support, and the SRSG and his team, that is
something we have to reconcile, and sort out. That is a big deal, a big deal.”
(DRC interview 13)

Senior management focus on the political requirements of mandates is shown to have a detrimental
impact on mission performance in administrative terms. In addition, the budget process itself is
burdensome. A MONUSCO middle manager set out the nature of working on three reporting cycles
simultaneously:

“We have a planning framework which is called Results-Based Budgeting, an ‘RBB’
framework. Basically we’re working on three reporting cycles at the same time.
We’re working in the one that completed last financial year, looking at what was
achieved, with the resources that we were given; we’re working with the current [year],
and we’re working in the coming financial year. So I think we have a lot of
opportunity to say, ‘within our resources, this is what is achievable, and this is what
we’re doing’. Obviously if you ask us, we would want additional resources, to do
more of what we think is priority. But the available resource is what it is.”
(DRC interview 20)

It becomes clear that despite planning processes and strong staff commitment to implement their
mandates (to succeed on the mission), the parallel processes of planning and budgeting impact
negatively on mission implementation. A MONUSCO middle manager set out his frustration at the
inflexibility of the processes, whereby plans need to be submitted months in advance of proposed
implementation:
"The budget process is crazy as such, because it starts in September of the year before. So you have to design something for nine months later. It's ridiculous. And then you can't change, even if you redo things in February, it doesn't change, you can't change anything! It's a very inflexible process, it starts in September and it is supposed to be 01st July to the 30th June budget. And whenever you have submitted in final, you cannot change. In nine months, anything can happen. It is ridiculous. Maybe sometimes you can run through an additional budget, but it takes also a long time. If you cannot change things after five months, if you submit in September and then in February, if you cannot change from the mission side, I find it bizarre. Nobody can really explain that to me!"

(DRC interview 18)

When asked if this could possibly be changed, or if an improvement could be foreseen, the same respondent went on to suggest that this would not be feasible:

"I think it is a good thing to have an early planning process, that is very important. But you should not impose — or you need to have a certain flexibility... I think that's the will of the administration in New York to change something or not to change something."

(DRC interview 18)

The level of frustration expressed by UN staff over budget processes is strong evidence of how these procedures impact negatively on integrated missions. The strength of the evidence on this point goes some way to explain the frustrations of external interlocutors with missions (see previous section on power dependency). It is not overly-surprising that coordination with others is weak given the disproportionate amount of time spend on internal administrative procedures such as the budget process.

6.3.2 Human resource management

The next area of management practice that leads to intra-organisational tension within integrated missions is human resource management. Budget processes and human resource management practice on integrated missions are linked: the first delays the second. In an effort to ensure complete fairness
in recruitment, the UN has made formal recruitment very slow. A MONUSCO respondent explained how it was possible for a colleague to apply to his unit and then take over a year and half to arrive:

"The reason it has all these checks and balances is, we have, over the years, had about 2% of the people spoil it for the 98%. They cut corners, they used, they recruited friends, family, who knows what they did? But they did things inappropriately, and in a non-transparent way. So, as a result, the United Nations has been forced to come up with various checks and balances, in HR, in procurement, and in other areas, simply to make sure that things are done in a transparent, fair and equal way."
(DRC interview 13)

It is difficult to argue with processes considered fair, transparent and equal. Yet the sting in the tail of the centrally-driven human resource management processes is that they have become so cumbersome as to become part of the problem, affecting mission performance. Not only do the processes take a long time to play out, but they require the inputs of the already-over-stretched mission staff:

"The system is not bad intrinsically, but it does not work! One of the problems of this system is that you ask under-staffed sections to participate to these panels – so we do not have enough staff, we are very stretched. And, at the same time, we are asked to participate to the administrative process – which is not bad; they want to associate us, which is not bad. But it does not work, because this system does not have dedicated staff enough at the mission level and at the New York level to manage the recruitment process."
(DRC interview 3)

These delays in formal recruitment severely impact on mission performance: without the correct number of appropriately skilled staff in place, activity slows down. Just as staff are overly-burdened by the budget process, so too are they constrained from conducting their mandated activities due to the administrative burden that is human resource management. As an example, in a separate office of MONUSCO, a staff member highlighted an initiative just getting underway as the interview took place. He anticipated visiting the West of the country to enable the peacekeeping mission to draw down its presence and hand over to the longer-term UN country team presence. This sort of initiative would
allow for reduced costs for UN member states contributing to peacekeeping missions. When asked why this had not happened before, it was clear plans had been pending for over two years. In the interim, progress had simply stopped:

“Well I just got here! About three months, almost four months [ago]. Before me, my predecessor had left almost two years ago. So there was no one doing this function.”
(DRC interview 15)

Evidently, vacancies in some mission posts are carried for up to several years at a time. A result of this insufficient resourcing is that activities that could save resources for contributing countries are delayed. Another MONUSCO staff member spoke of his relief when his boss finally arrived in post:

“I was three times in charge, and in average it took between seven, and one year and half to find a replacement. One time it was seven months, the second time it was ten months, and now, the third time, it was the longer one, it was eighteen months I think. Which means I occupy two functions. So it is a relief of course for me, and for MONUSCO, to have a Director and also a deputy at the same time because you can do much more.”
(DRC interview 3)

Data were also found to show that these challenges are not unique to the case study missions, but rather are systemic across UN missions. Many of the staff interviewed during fieldwork had prior experience of working on other UN missions, and readily gave examples from Liberia, or Haiti, or even Kosovo whilst currently working in DRC. They expressed little surprise at the situation they found themselves in, be it as part of UNMiK or MONUSCO. A MONUSCO senior staff member explained:

“You are never at full staffing in peacekeeping because you cannot actually start recruiting for a person before somebody has officially notified his or her departure. There is a one month resignation period in the UN, and it always takes a couple of months to recruit somebody. Inevitably, the fact that you have people coming and going inevitably creates a gap. But if we get eighty, eighty-five per cent, we can do our job.”
(DRC interview 14)
This is a telling example for a number of reasons: the systemic flaws in human resource management have come to be institutionalised, to the point that staff do not expect to work at full staffing strength. It is arguably fair enough that missions to carry vacancies for, say, a “couple of months” as presented in the example. But the evidence suggests that such vacancy lengths are not common, and frequently extend much further. Another reason this is useful is that there is a clear expectation that staff should work over and above their anticipated role: if a mission is staffed up to 85%, there is a gap between objectives and the resources available to fulfil them. Perhaps a 15% gap is acceptable, but it could be argued that this reflects an unnecessary expectation on anyone recruited to work on missions, and also that missions are not planning properly to enable them work as effectively as possible.

Another result of weakly-performing human resource management processes is additional work for those staff in post: in the absence of anyone being there, staff fill in for the vacancies. One member of MONUSCO staff explained how he was formally filling three roles at the time of interview:

“Since I came here four months ago, I have been doing these two. And now that Paul is not here, I am doing one, two, three!”
(DRC interview 15)

It is not possible to fulfil two or more roles effectively, so the example highlights an effectiveness impact on the overall mission. Another respondent pointed out that this is quite typical of MONUSCO working practice:

“You have to wait six months to have candidates to fill the vacancies. So now we are obliged to develop temporary vacancy systems, to find temporary candidates, who will maybe apply to the roster and may be selected – we hope! – for them to be confirmed in six months or one year. This is the issue. It sounds a bit crazy.”
(DRC interview 3)
When asked if this was common practice on the mission, the response was “for sure”. Staff take on inexperienced or under-qualified replacements just to fill a gap. Elsewhere, others show a lack of willingness to recruit unqualified staff, preferring to wait until suitable candidates can be found. A senior member of MONUSCO management discussed how a roster existed for candidates to come to his unit, but he refused all of those suggested for not being of high enough quality. When it was suggested some people might react by recruiting anyone just to have the vacancy filled, he replied simply “I don't want to do that.” (DRC interview 3)

A further example is simply having no choice in the matter. As a result of unit depletion, staff are sometimes recruited and immediately have to fill additional posts at a higher level whilst those posts also remain vacant. One (now senior) MONUSCO respondent explained:

“I was recruited as Deputy, but since the Director and Deputy Director had already left before my arrival, I was immediately put in charge of the Division, and have continued in the capacity [for two and a half years] when I was temporarily transferred for one year. In the meantime, I was confirmed as Director, which is my role right now.”

(DRC interview 14)

In this example, the post of Director was clearly vacant for a total of three years, and eventually simply transferred to the staff member originally recruited to act as Deputy. The process is somewhat cyclical: either vacancies are filled with unqualified staff, or they remain vacant. Either way, both strategies are opportunistic – staff are shown to adopt coping mechanisms to address the human resource constraints they face. This contributes to the stress of those staff involved; and the strategies combine to mean a loss of mission effectiveness.

Another coping mechanism adopted by staff is simply to act on initiative. Even senior mission managers admit to working quite flexibly with management procedures:
“When it comes to protection, it’s not just a question of putting a soldier at the corner of every village that is at risk. It’s also a question of working with our Human Rights division, or with our Civil Affairs section, and with other parts of the mission, to try to use available resources to us as innovatively as possible in responding to the protection challenges.”
(DRC interview 20)

In the event that the correct resources are not available, staff use their initiative, or “use resources innovatively” to make do. Staff are transferred into roles for which they are not necessarily qualified, more to make up numbers than to ensure effectiveness. There were plenty of examples of this in both case studies. The quotes below are from unit heads on UNMiK and then MONUSCO. Both show how staff are used flexibly in attempts to address the work to be done:

“The UNVs [UN Volunteers] perform the same function, they may be called political officers, reporting officers, but they also go to the field.”
(Kosovo interview 3)

“Flexibility. In this office, everybody can do everything. During these festive holidays, for example, I was a reporting officer. I was a reporting officer, I was a logistics officer. I am asking that from everybody here. There is a kind of flexibility of functions. We have less staff than the range of activities we have to manage. So you have to be flexible, you have to be ‘performant’ in conflict management, in protection, or in logistics at the same time.”
(DRC interview 3)

As an observation, it was hard to escape the sense that some UN staff perform heroically in the face of substantial pressure. With little to no support for them as individuals, they manage as best they can with their available resources, and yet the end result remains that mission mandates are not implemented as demanded. It is worth noting the personal pressure this brings to bear on staff as individuals. Several respondents reported feelings of stress and frustration about the situations they found themselves in. The following examples are all from senior managers within MONUSCO:

“It was the most intensive and demanding job I’ve ever had.”
(DRC interview 1)

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“You have to develop, it’s experience. This is part of my job. I am spending a lot of time for the motivation of my staff. I am trying to answer to all the reports, to comment, to guide, to have discussion with the people, if possible go on missions on the ground (which is not very possible for me, for the moment, because I am waiting for this Director...) but you know, to be aware, to be present, to be always there. You have to show the example. I was staying here during the holidays. You know.”
(DRC interview 3)

“This is the kind of stress you get in missions, where people sometimes have to do more than their fair share.”
(DRC interview 15)

6.3.3 Acting opportunistically in the face of resource constraints

There is no question that staffing an integrated mission is a tough challenge. Frequently at short notice, the UN is tasked to find qualified, experienced personnel willing to live in some of the most difficult environments of the world, and to undertake a vast array of tasks, sometimes assuming the government of an entire territory. As one member of senior UNMiK staff explained:

“It’s not always easy to find the right people for the right task. You need to have, and you need to be able to supervise, specialists in all areas of the economy, in all areas of civil administration, in all areas of, you know, whatever there is.”
(Kosovo interview 1)

It is therefore hardly surprising that completing these tasks proves difficult. Combined with insufficient levels of resources, as set out in Chapter 5, integrated mission staff face an uphill struggle to ensure they can adequately fulfil their mandates. In the absence of adequate resources to undertake mandated tasks, organisations or units within them adopt informal coping mechanisms, and work opportunistically to gain additional resources. One MONUSCO respondent stated:

“We have tried and managed to find internal solution, to find complementary staff.”
(DRC interview 3)
In both Kosovo and DRC the data show that staff are regularly – to the point perhaps of routinely – poached across mission departments according to the seniority of unit heads, or the priorities of mission leadership. The coping mechanisms may include simple senior management direction; staff swaps; re-skilling; or management prioritisation. In the case of MONUSCO, various staff commented on how units respond. Either staff are reallocated by senior management:

“So the Chief of Staff, and then the SRSG said, [this unit] gets vacant posts from other sections, and you are not allowed to refuse.”
(DRC interview 18)

“It’s a question of trying to identify areas, hotspots, where the protection challenges are greatest, and then assign resources to those areas. But those are resources we have to take from other areas.”
(DRC interview 20)

Or they are simply poached from other units:

“You see, in my office, for example, right now, I don’t have anybody. I just have a driver and that’s it. All the posts that were allocated to my office, budgeted for my office, were taken elsewhere, because people need the posts. OK? So this office is completely depleted.”
(DRC interview 15)

And in response, some are simply poached back:

“What I am trying to do right now for instance, I had a post for an Admin officer. That post has gone. I found an [alternative] post. So I’ll take that from another section... You know: I need it. You have more than one person doing this function, I need someone, I need one of them!”
(DRC interview 15)

In some cases, budget lines are fiddled with to enable more staff to work on certain tasks:

“They were, in fact they are, budgeted on an administrative budget line – but we use them, we manage them for activities.”
(DRC interview 3)
In Kosovo, similar practices were found. Staff are reallocated jobs not according to skillsets or appropriateness for the job, but instead simply because they are available. One departmental head explained:

"Before they used to be language assistants. Now, because we are very thin on the ground, the local staff started performing the functions of the field officers."

(Kosovo interview 3)

The quote makes clear that without some posts being filled, other parts of the unit are affected. If some posts are vacant for prolonged periods of time, in some cases, this may lead to the entire unit wasting away, or "depleting". This has two principal consequences for the mission as a whole: first, clearly the unit is not supporting implementation of a mission mandate, so effectiveness of performance is affected; and second, it means that on arrival to a post where such depletion has taken place, a new member of staff cannot immediately start by getting on with the job at hand, the work of the unit into which he or she has been placed, but instead has to look around to find support and other human resources to start work. Again, mission performance is weakened. Mandated tasks are not being addressed. A third, indirect, consequence is that anxiety levels for those staff having to cope with these constraints are raised, in some cases almost permanently.

Staff in both Kosovo and DRC were aware that these practices have performance implications for the missions. As one MONUSCO middle manager said:

"It makes it difficult to deliver in a most effective manner. Because we don't really have the right people for the kind of work we are trying to do."

(DRC interview 15)

Some of these coping mechanisms prove unsuccessful. In the case of Kosovo, attempts to reconfigure job descriptions did not work. A senior member of UNMiK management discussed the inability of repositioned staff to adapt to their "new" jobs in the political affairs department:
"To expect Civil Affairs officers or Returns officers to be able to think and write politically, let alone analyse, is a tall order. And that's being diplomatic. There was a change of heart within six months. And without firing anyone, they simply created the 'Office of Community Support and Facilitation'. I called it the 'Office of Reconfigured Brothers and Sisters'.”

(Kosovo interview 5)

In the Kosovo case, however, there is an added complication that resources cannot be transferred across the various organisations that make up the mission. In the DRC, mission units are all made up of UN staff, and several interview responses set out that transferring resources between them – regardless of the efficiency and effectiveness implications this may have for the mission generally – is a regular feature of mission life. In Kosovo, this practice is less simple as the organisational boundaries between the mission's various pillars hold firm. Whilst staff are transferred within the UN, or within the OSCE just as in the DRC example, staff are not transferred across from the UN to the OSCE or vice versa. As shown in the previous section on power dependency, over time this results in imbalances of staffing within the mission, distorting the structure of the integrated mission as a whole. In 2011, the UN pillars of UNMiK totalled 400 staff, whereas the OSCE, with its 700 staff, outweighed this by a factor of nearly two to one.

This reinforces the point made above that senior mission managers, distracted by increasingly complicated mandates, lose sight of what is happening administratively within missions: the distorted numbers within the OSCE were cited as an example of loss of mission effectiveness. If the resources are there, they will be used, but there are questions about how effectively they are being deployed:

"That raises a question how essential is OSCE? OSCE I think is probably less essential to UNMiK than it used to be. It's good that we have them there. It's good that we can call on them if we need something. They do that kind of technical monitoring very well. And it's something we don't have the staff to do. They also do it on a municipal level which we don't at all. Whether they need to have that many people is another question."

(Kosovo interview 5)
The finding that the OSCE’s power dependency on the UNMiK structure (see Section 6.2.1) has reduced to the point that it has followed inter-organisational relations theory and withdrawn from its relationship with the UN is confirmed here. A member of UN staff is expressing the same finding from the opposite perspective: the UN is less dependent on the OSCE. Yet the mission structure remains in place. The lack of political interest from UN member states in how peacekeeping operations are conducted is once again confirmed. And this lack of interest is shown to have a detrimental impact on mission performance.

There is also some evidence of a loss of management accountability in missions concerning such practices. There is certainly a case to be made that if the work of one part of a mission is no longer needed, either through task completion or simply due to other activities taking greater priority, that unit can be closed down. Instead, staff continue to work in their units, but act opportunistically in terms of activities undertaken. When a mandate revision meant the work of one MONUSCO unit effectively came to an end, the unit itself was not closed down, but simply side-lined. When asked what this meant for the staff of that unit, the unit head responded:

“That means they haven’t been doing much within this area since. [The unit] still exists. But it’s not working too much. They always try to find new angles to get into this proposals [sic].”

(DRC interview 6)

The responses suggest that senior mission management do not have a firm grasp on the resources available to them, and certainly that the UN Security Council is not aware of such practices. If coping mechanisms are adopted to shift staff about according to (admittedly confusing) mandate priorities, but at the same time other parts of the mission have staff resources available who are not overly-occupied by their (now de-prioritised) activities, it is shown that mission resources are not being used as effectively as they could be. Units within organisations that make up integrated missions can therefore
be resource dependent on each other, but intra-organisational relations are such that resources, and staffing resources in particular, are moved around in an un-strategic way.

There is evidently a significant quantity of data that human resource management practice is flawed on integrated missions. The data have shown that organisations within integrated missions behave opportunistically in the face of staffing constraints. Either staff are re-directed to work in new units; or tasks are undertaken by organisations with greater resources. Staff can be poached between organisational units; or posts remain vacant for up to several years at a time. Job descriptions are changed; budget lines are fudged. Some staff cling to a need for quality and refuse to recruit unqualified staff meaning significant gaps in filling vacancies; others are less discerning and take what can be found, reducing the quality of mission performance in the process. The irony of adopting these informal coping mechanisms is that it leads to the continued rigidity in formal, centralised procedures. This was evidenced in the quote from a middle manager from MONUSCO:

"2% of the people spoil it for the 98%. They cut corners... So as a result, the United Nations has been forced to come up with various checks and balances...simply to make sure that things are done in a transparent, fair and equal way."
(DRC interview 13)

It is a vicious circle of tension between integrated missions and administrative counterparts in New York headquarters which ultimately works against successful mission mandate implementation. The combination of these factors serve to increase the pressures on staff as individuals as they cope and make do as best they can.
6.3.4 Resource dependency – a summary

Chapter 5 showed how relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions and create resource dependencies. This chapter has shown that such dependencies have further impacts within the missions themselves. Staff incentives are driven by priorities set out in mission mandates, and in turn this leads to opportunist responses to human resource challenges which do not always succeed, and can have negative impacts on mission performance. Budget procedures are also shown to be cumbersome, further weakening mission performance. The parallel processes of operational planning and budgeting mean that resources provided to missions do not equate to the anticipated achievements of staff wanting to implement their mandates. This has an impact on formal human resource practice within missions, meaning that either vacancies are carried for months, even years, at a time, or that staff adopt their own informal coping mechanisms. These might include assuming roles themselves, adding to their own personal pressure in already-difficult environments, or leaving vacancies open for several years in which case mission mandates are not fulfilled, or recruiting under-qualified staff, unsuitable for the work to be done, risking low quality implementation of mandated tasks. The practice of using initiative to get around formal procedures has been institutionalised on missions, and has become part of day-to-day mission life.

Yet these mechanisms have not been institutionalised across the UN system. The coping mechanisms adopted are also ultimately self-defeating as they lead to a tension between missions and UN headquarters in New York which responds by making formal procedures increasingly rigid. They also contribute to increased pressure and frustration for mission staff. Ultimately, integrated mission staff are left, managing as best they can, in the face of substantially difficult challenges. On both human resource management and budgeting processes, burdensome administrative procedures draw mission
staff away from their mandated activity and prevent completion of tasks. In combination, all these factors serve to weaken integrated mission performance: resources are not used as best they could be, and mandated activities are either not done or done poorly. UN member states remain unaware of the challenges facing mission staff as they do not focus on how peacekeeping practices are undertaken (and note the findings from Chapter 5 which showed that integrated mission staff eventually stop making resource requests to the Security Council as they know such requests will not prove fruitful). One interpretation of these data is that UN member states are therefore not robustly or sufficiently holding integrated missions to account for their performance. Ultimately, the UN as a system, and the Security Council in particular, then, is not upholding its stated mission of safeguarding international peace and security. By consistently focusing on political negotiations and broader relations between UN member states (the what and the why of peacekeeping), rather than examining integrated mission performance and responding to repeated demands for additional resources (the how), the Security Council enables inefficient practices and overall under-performance to continue on integrated missions. This reflects a lower prioritisation of cost effectiveness from integrated missions against other political discussions in the Security Council.

6.4 Environmental Constraints

Similar to the data about environmental constraints affecting UN member state relations presented in Chapter 5, the data on inter-organisational relations being affected by environmental constraints, and what impact this has on UN integrated missions, were also, relatively weak relative to the strength of data found on power dependency and resource dependency. Nonetheless, four principal inter-organisational environmental constraints were highlighted during fieldwork as impacting on integrated missions, concerning security, coordination, communications about mission activities, and the sheer scale of tasks set for missions in mandates.
Security is perhaps the most obvious of these, given that no mission staff can achieve much in the face of environmental insecurity, i.e. if they are under attack. This point was only really raised for the military, and much more frequently in DRC than Kosovo. But it highlights a challenge to effective mandate implementation. An NGO observer of MONUSCO in DRC commented:

"Every initiative has its disadvantages as well. There have been two, three nasty attacks of MONUSCO bases in the last months, where some Congolese wanted access to a base, and when they were let in they started to massacre some MONUSCO soldiers. I think those contingents become then much more cautious if something like this has happened."
(DRC interview 2)

Next, the inter-organisational relations evidence presented above showed a negative impact on both case study missions to the extent that they contributed to the missions' environment. Weaknesses in coordination between integrated missions and other stakeholders, combined with the very real constraints faced on the mission due to weaknesses in human resource management and budgeting practices serve to present a sense of inefficiency in mission performance. In turn, this reduces the legitimacy of integrated missions in the eyes of interlocutors. Criticism of both missions studied had become widespread by the time fieldwork was undertaken, to the point that it in turn affected the effectiveness of both cases examined. Two observers of UNMiK reported:

"Anything that UNMiK does is a little bit of a sensitive issue."
(Kosovo interview 7)

"The honeymoon with the Kosovan people is well and truly over."
(Kosovo interview 2)

Likewise, a non-governmental organisation observer of MONUSCO stated:

"The relationship between MONUSCO and with government is a difficult one."
(DRC interview 2)
In both environments, the sheer number of interlocutors with which integrated missions have to engage means that they face an almost impossible task to succeed in terms of coordination. And, as stated in the previous sections, if staff time is taken up by burdensome budget and/or human resource management procedures, it stands to reason that a focus on coordination with external counterparts will be reduced. In particular, relations between missions and partner governments were cited as difficult in almost every interview conducted. UN missions are only possible with the express support of a host country, meaning that missions rely on partner government support for their very existence. Staff on both missions were clear that working with partner governments was not easy. Senior members of UNMiK and MONUSCO explained:

“Our relations with the Kosovo authorities, in the beginning after the proclamation of independence, were not very good.”
(Kosovo interview 3)

“I don’t think it’s a secret that at times our relationship is a bumpy one. I think it’s more politics-driven than practitioners-driven, but I sense they do not have a liking for multinational type of business, doing business in a multinational way. And MONUSCO at times gets in the middle of that.”
(DRC interview 11)

Third, in both case studies, a similar pattern emerged about relations between the mission and partner government, principally that at the central government level, relations were extremely weak, but at sub-national level, there were strong data to suggest that inter-organisational relations worked well. Senior members of MONUSCO and UNMiK staff explained:

“Working with the government of DRC is very difficult at the national level. At the provincial level, at the very local level, I think we have very good relations with them. With the arrival of our new Director, we will develop more this political link at the national level. It is linked to the fact that there is no regular coordination systems (sic) between MONUSCO and the government, at the national level. At the provincial level, you have CTC – Comité Technique de Coordination – which meets every month. We don’t have that at the national level. What we have to develop by ourselves is, let’s say, a direct, bilateral ministry and section type of relations. Which is important, we need this type of more or less informal contact, but we need a
more formal mechanism of coordination with them, which is not there... I think because of the relations of the senior management with the government.”
(DRC interview 3)

“Really, we have a very good welcome from the municipal authorities on the ground. Which we cannot say about the central level government. Because politically their position is that UNMIK’s time in Kosovo is over. It’s very difficult to talk to the central government.”
(Kosovo interview 3)

In the first example, the resource constraints due to staffing vacancies have impacted on central-level relations between the mission and the partner government. In this example, the Director post has been vacant for eighteen months, during which time the mission has not had the capacity to address the political difficulties faced by this unit. In the second quote, it is shown how even meeting with government representatives has become problematic. The same respondent goes on to explain that meetings between UNMIK senior management and the Kosovar Prime Minister are few and far between:

“There was one meeting with the Prime Minister, between prime minister and SRSG, which hadn’t happened for more than a year.”
(Kosovo interview 3)

Observers of UNMIK agreed. One non-UN respondent stated that UNMIK’s continued presence in Kosovo had become a source of resentment for the population. As a result, working closely with government became harder:

“The UN mission in Kosovo is not popular with the people. For the bulk of the people, the Kosovo Albanian majority, there’s a resentment of the UN because they see them as still hanging on, and constraining the full exercise of independence. The UN finds it relatively difficult to get in to see the Kosovo authorities.”
(Kosovo interview 2)

Both case studies produced data to show that the visibility of integrated missions very much reduces over time. As an observation, in both Kosovo and DRC where missions had been present for over ten
years at the time fieldwork was conducted, when travelling to meet up with mission staff for
interviews, the local population found it difficult to locate mission headquarters precisely. In Kosovo,
such lack of visibility was cited as deliberate:

"You know, that's one of the reasons why we moved out of the centre of the city. We
wanted to be out of the way. Because we're in a position where we can't recognise
what the local government is doing. And this doesn't make it exactly easy for the
population to, sort of, like us and agree with us. So what you do then is you get out of
the way. And this is to some extent reflected in our relationship with the press."
(Kosovo interview 1)

Another UNMiK respondent agreed. As UNMiK's reputation for weak performance grew over time,
they lost legitimacy in the eyes of Kosovars:

"It's a problem, though, that UNMiK has - how do I say this? - they don't have a
great reputation. They certainly didn't have a great reputation in the beginning... I
mean when they were big and strong. Now, they become - I hate to use the word, but
- they become less relevant."
(Kosovo interview 11)

In both Kosovo and DRC, almost every respondent emphasised that the domestic population was
unaware of the role, achievements and activity of the UN mission's presence in their country. The
popular perception of the UN mission in both case studies was overwhelmingly perceived to be
negative. Surprisingly, most also reflected that levels of efforts on communications are more than
sufficient (particularly in DRC with Radio Okapi). There was a small amount of evidence in Kosovo
that this perception may not be correct, i.e. that Kosovo citizens state negative sentiments towards
UNMiK but in reality do not feel overly-negative towards it. This was not, however, borne out in
observation: when speaking with passers-by about the research in Kosovo (and DRC) interlocutors
would simply frown, shake their heads, and respond negatively. And yet, nonetheless, on neither
mission were efforts in place to resolve this tension. The evidence suggests that getting
communications right is either unachievable or certainly very difficult. And it also suggests that learning the lessons to improve mission communications is not happening.

The impact, then, of a loss of credibility of the mission on the part of the host country is that inter-organisational relations are lost. These data back up environment constraints theory as presented in Chapter 2. As stated there, the theory links to organisational legitimisation, or efforts an organisation may undertake so as to reinforce its own place in a given environment. In the case of integrated missions, the data suggest very little effort is undertaken to explain what an integrated mission is to a local population, and that the inefficient performance of missions serves to undermine any legitimacy a mission may originally have had.

Finally, a major finding in the data relating to environmental constraints impacting on integrated missions was the sheer scale of activity missions are expected to undertake. Chapter 5 set out some of the reasons why mission mandates proliferate to the point of becoming more aspirational than realistic, due to the increased focus over time of UN member states on their own bilateral interests. This leads to an expansion of remit for various parts of integrated missions. By way of example, three senior mission managers, the first two from MONUSCO and the third from UNMiK explained the activity and resources they oversee:

"I have a staff, a national and international staff of over two thousand two hundred and fifty, throughout the mission, and they are divided into eight sections. The mission is spread out in over one hundred and ten operating bases, so we have people all over the countryside, and the coordination to keep the bases open, to keep them fuelled up, to provide MedEvac [Medical Evacuation] support, seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day, is a big issue. And this, some people when I first came here, they said it's controlled chaos."
(DRC interview 13)

"The section has four main pillars. The first is protection of civilians. The second one is the restoration and extension of state authority. The third one is conflict"
prevention and management. And the fourth is support civil society organisations. After that, we have some tools. We have the outreach funds. We also have the QIPs − Quick Impact Projects. And we have also the logistics. We are facilitating all logistic support on MONUSCO flights to UN agencies, NGOs, civil society organisations. It represents more than eleven thousand requests per year. We are based in seventeen bases, in eleven provinces.”

(DRC interview 3)

“It starts with aviation, goes over water quality, goes over health sector, goes over the civil service. Basically the entire range of issues that a government has to deal with.”

(Kosovo interview 1)

Despite all the frustration and confusion expressed in every interview about the lack of resources available to fulfil mandates, UN staff are nonetheless anyway undertaking phenomenally complex sets of activity. Supervising thousands of staff, covering wide ranges of activity, working with any number of a variety of interlocutors, it becomes less surprising that integrated missions under-perform against such phenomenal requests. The sheer scale of these requests presents the greatest environmental constraint to implementation of mission mandates.

Nonetheless, the scale of data found from each case study about integrated mission power and resource dependency, relative to those on environmental constraints suggests that, at least when examining integrated missions, there is a flaw in equating all three elements of Galaskiewicz’s presentation of one element of inter-organisational relations theory. Certainly, there are data to be found about environmental constraints facing integrated missions, as this section and section 5.4 have shown. A question remains, however, around equating the strength these findings with those on power and resource dependency – at least when using these three elements of inter-organisational relations theory to examine integrated missions. It was suggested in Chapter 5, when analysing the data about how UN member state relations impact on integrated missions, that Galaskiewicz’s call for greater focus on environmental constraints when analysing inter-organisational relations may have been misplaced: the
data did not show that environmental constraints are a significant issue for integrated missions when examined from the perspective of relations between UN member states. This has been borne out when examining integrated missions from a perspective of inter-organisational relations (between the organisations that make up a mission; between missions and other parts of the UN; and between missions and their external interlocutors): once again, environmental constraints are not a significant issue. It can be inferred, therefore that it is not appropriate to weigh environmental constraints equally alongside power and resource dependency when analysing inter-organisational relations, at least when examining integrated missions.

6.5 Inter-Organisational Relations and Organisational Learning

The research shows that the lessons from integrated mission experience – at least in Kosovo and DRC – are not being learned by UN member states, and particularly the Security Council. UN staff are only too well aware of the human and equipment resource constraints they face, and indeed in some cases adopt coping mechanisms to address them. Nonetheless, the cumbersome administrative procedures of the UN, in particular in human resource management and budgeting, serve to exacerbate underperformance on integrated missions. It is therefore not the operational side of UN functioning that prevents lesson learning but instead the political aspects of UN working, the relations between UN member states, which prevent the institutionalisation of improvement. Indeed, it is as if the opportunistic behaviour of the various organisations within integrated missions becomes institutionalised, a standard way of working. Yet this does not translate into wider learning across the UN system, and indeed can contribute to further under-performance on individual missions.
Applying these findings to organisational learning theory, the data again show (as in Chapter 5) that adaptive learning is happening: staff cope with a lack of adequate human resources by routinely poaching others from different units making up MONUSCO. This could also be said to be the exploration learning presented by March: staff are experimenting with existing resources in attempts to meet the objectives set out in mission mandates. Whilst this reflects an element of learning, it is not an example of exploitation, i.e. use of resources to make organisations more efficient. Rather, the data show that such adaptive (or coping) mechanisms serve in the end to be self-defeating and to reduce integrated mission effectiveness. Against the Nonaka and Takeuchi framework of learning, the data again demonstrate that there is both tacit and explicit knowledge about weaknesses in integrated mission performance, but that this learning has only been internalised, i.e. it is known only on the mission itself.

Argyris and Schön’s presentation of organisational learning would use the data to argue, as in Chapter 5, that single-loop learning has taken place but that double-loop learning has not. Whilst staff adapt to their resource constraints on the mission itself, and adopt a number of inter-organisational relations to do so, broader learning across the UN system does not occur: a combination of the knowledge and adopted coping mechanisms at integrated mission level has not led to the institutionalisation of learning throughout the system more generally. Combined with the finding that guidelines on integrated mission practice are not explained to new members of mission staff (Section 6.2.1) this serves to explain why similar challenges and reasons for under-performance are found in both case studies (and arguably elsewhere, on other integrated missions).
6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has proven the more challenging of the empirical chapters in this thesis. There were significant quantities of data to analyse coherently against the theoretical framework. Applying the framework to integrated missions is a sorry tale of inefficiency, ineffectiveness and general under-performance. This is shown to be frustrating for mission personnel and their counterparts alike. Having presented data about power dependencies across three elements of an integrated mission (across the organisations that make up missions; between integrated missions and other parts of the UN system; and between integrated missions and external interlocutors) this chapter has argued, as in Chapter 5, that political interests mean that UN member states do not enable the lessons of the UN’s operational experience of integrated missions to be learnt. Because the Security Council in particular does not show interest in how integrated missions operate in practice (the ‘how’ of peacekeeping), under-performance on integrated missions is not addressed institutionally by the UN. Whilst adaptive learning take place at the level of an integrated mission, double-loop learning does not occur across the UN system.

There even remains confusion about the definition of integrated missions amongst UN staff, over a decade after the term was initially coined, as the system struggles to put policy into practice. Effectiveness of integrated mission activity, not to mention cost effectiveness, is therefore (again) shown to be a lower priority for the Security Council than other political negotiations between UN member states. The result is that integrated missions, whilst under-performing, are not truly held to account by those same member states that establish them. It is argued that by not learning the lessons of integrated mission experience, and thereby enabling the continued under-performance of integrated
missions, the Security Council is not fully succeeding in its ultimate duty of safeguarding international peace and security.

Power dependencies have been shown to be created between various organisations that make up integrated missions, as well as between integrated missions and other parts of the UN, and between integrated missions and other stakeholders present in a mission setting. Integrated missions have been shown to be more powerful than other interlocutors in a mission setting, but less so than counterparts in the UN system. Within integrated missions, as power dependencies decrease over time, organisations follow theory and withdraw from each other. This passes unnoticed by the UN Security Council meaning that formal mission structures remain in place. This drives resentment and confusion amongst mission staff, notably across different organisations making up missions, and contributes to underperformance by the missions as organisations.

Resource dependencies within integrated mission have been shown to be complex and multi-faceted, with particular tensions in budgeting processes and human resource management. Staff adopt coping mechanisms to address some of the challenges they face, and some of these become institutionalised in day-to-day mission practice. Budget processes have been shown to be tackled by different parts of the UN system, revealing a disconnect between different staff members on missions: those in operational roles attempt fulfilment of entire mandates, whereas support staff are guided more by the harder reality of available financial resources. At the same time, there is evidence that not all resources available to integrated missions are used as effectively as they could be. Some coping mechanisms, in particular concerning human resource management are shown to be self-defeating and serve to exacerbate underperformance by the mission as a whole. Under-qualified staff are sometimes put in place to fulfil roles for which they are ill-suited. Or posts remain vacant for prolonged periods of time, sometimes for up
to several years, meaning that missions perform inefficiently and foster resentment amongst interlocutors. These weaknesses in mission operations have also been shown to pass unnoticed by UN member states. The UN Security Council in particular is shown to be unaware of how peacekeeping operations are conducted in practice, focusing instead on political negotiations. By not focusing on the operational aspects of peacekeeping, integrated missions under-perform even further as a result of inter-organisational relations over and above the existing effects of relations between UN member states. In such a way, the UN is shown not to learn politically from the lessons of its operational experience, and ultimately reveals weaknesses in the safeguarding of international peace and security.

Environmental constraints from the perspective of inter-organisational relations were shown to affect integrated missions in four different ways. These were security-related, with staff unwilling to form inter-organisational relations in the face of threats to their own personal security. Other concerns related to coordination, with several interlocutors of integrated missions expressing frustration at mission under-performance. Missions were also shown as weak in terms of communicating their objectives and accomplishments. In turn, this had led over time to tensions between integrated missions and their partner governments, particularly at central levels of government, and a commensurate loss of legitimacy for the mission overall. Nonetheless, the data findings relating to environmental constraints and their impact on integrated missions were found to be significantly weaker than those concerning both power and resource dependency. As in Chapter 5, this suggests that Galaskiewicz’s call for equality of weighting across these three areas of inter-organisational relations theory may be misplaced, or at least when examining integrated missions.

Reflecting back on the organisational learning taking place when viewed through an inter-organisational relations lens, the data show, as in Chapter 5, that integrated mission staff demonstrate
adaptive learning, experimenting with new coping mechanisms when faced with human resource and budgeting weaknesses. However, this only happens at integrated mission level, rather than being learned across the UN system. Whilst staff on both missions showed they had internalised the learning of their operational experiences, and sought to address them, this learning has not yet spread beyond the unit of each integrated mission. This helps to explain why similar challenges in organisational performance are found on different integrated missions, despite their very different contexts and operating environments. As such, the chapter argued that single-loop learning occurs, but double-loop learning does not.

Chapter 5 showed how relations between UN member states make fulfilling integrated mission mandates difficult. This Chapter 6 has shown how UN practices and procedures — notably in budgeting and human resource management — exacerbate an already-difficult situation and further weaken mission performance. Given the wealth of information gained from two short pieces of fieldwork to obtain these conclusions, as well as the evidence in the reviews of peacekeeping undertaken to date by the UN, it is surprising that systemic weaknesses in UN integrated mission management persist. The data suggest that lack of consideration on the part of UN Security Council members about the practice of integrated missions — the how of civilian peacekeeping — is a factor in explaining continued mission under-performance.

Chapter 7 will now seek to conclude all the findings from this thesis. It will summarise all activities undertaken and all data provided in this research. In so doing, the chapter will answer the central research question Why do UN integrated missions under-perform? It will set out the implications of this research for inter-organisational relations theory. The chapter will also provide recommendations for further research in this field.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

WHY DO UN INTEGRATED MISSIONS UNDER-PERFORM?

"We have done good, but not 1.3 billion dollars' worth of good."
Political officer, MONUSCO, January 2011
(DRC interview 14)

7.1 Introduction

This thesis has argued that UN integrated missions under-perform for both political and organisational reasons. The political interests of UN member states, and in particular those of the Security Council, prevent the translation of operational lessons learned on integrated missions from being put into practice. There is thus a gap between the organisational form and the politics of the international system. At the same time, cumbersome administrative processes within the UN, notably on budgeting and human resource management exacerbate the political problem, meaning that similar performance challenges are witnessed in different operational settings, regardless of the context where an integrated mission may have been established. Using the language of Argyris and Schöen, single-loop learning (following the rules) occurs but double-loop learning (changing the rules) does not. This may be because triple-loop learning (learning how to learn) does not occur in the UN system. Indeed, the data suggest that the political nature of UN member state relations means that triple-loop learning is not possible in the UN. One interpretation of enabling the continued under-performance of integrated missions is that the UN Security Council is not fully achieving its stated goal of safeguarding
international peace and security. Certainly, it is not doing so as effectively and cost effectively as organisation theory suggests is possible.

This chapter summarises the thesis and reflects on the analytical framework as a tool adopted to examine UN integrated missions. Each research sub-question is examined in turn. The contribution to knowledge is set out and areas for further research are suggested.

The data presented in this thesis reinforce the argument that there is a case for improved performance by UN integrated missions. Although reviews of operational practice are scarce, similar findings are set out in each that exists. This research has produced new data by examining two integrated missions in depth, using an analytical framework adapted from inter-organisational relations theory. In examining the organisational management of integrated missions, this research has sought to look in more depth at how peacekeeping operations are conducted rather than simply the political reasons for why they are established, or what resources are made available to them. Given the findings that relations between UN member states impact in a variety of significant ways on integrated missions, it should be expected that integrated mission performance – regardless of location – remains weak in the future. Mandates and ambition will continue not to be fully achieved; the international system will continue to perform weakly against its obligations on peace and security.

Chapter 1 introduced the thesis and framed the scope of the research. The concept of an integrated mission was explained; missions were situated within the wider contexts of peacekeeping operations. It was explained that this thesis only examines the civilian side of peacekeeping operations, and within them, looks only at peacekeeping mission activity, rather than any work by other UN funds or agencies that may be present in a peacekeeping context. The first integrated mission, UNMiK, was established
in Kosovo in 1999, following coordination failures within the international community prior to this, and notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Peacekeeping was described as inherently difficult for a number of reasons, not least that it takes place in some of the hardest operating environments in the world. The chapter also introduced some of the reviews that have been conducted on peacekeeping which highlight mission under-performance. Taken together, it was argued that these reviews constitute a basis for the argument that integrated missions could perform to a higher standard. The reviews each point to management challenges and inefficiency as some of the reasons for integrated mission under-performance. The chapter then set out the research questions, linking weaknesses in performance on peacekeeping missions to organisation theory and inter-organisational relations theory. The over-arching problem to be addressed was characterized in the central research question: Why do UN integrated missions under-perform? Finally, the chapter introduced the two case study missions in Kosovo and the DRC, and set out the reasons why they were selected.

Chapter 2 set out the work already done on the topics of examination, i.e. both peacekeeping itself and the theories to be used to examine its performance: organisation theory, inter-organisational relations theory and organisational learning theory. It was argued that whilst much has been written about the why and the what of peacekeeping, relatively little has been written about the how. When examining how integrated missions perform, a gap is revealed between the organisational form and politics of the international system. It is this gap that this thesis has sought to address and understand. The chapter presented a history of how peacekeeping has evolved since the creation of the United Nations after World War II, and went on to link this to the various reviews of peacekeeping that have been undertaken.
Initially, peacekeeping consisted of troops alone, requested to stand in the middle of two opposing sides in a conflict. High levels of funding were not used for their stated purposes, but rather instead for the pursuit of bilateral political interests of UN member states, notably those of the US and Russia. This changed significantly following the end of the Cold War. No longer were funds provided to satellite states of Security Council members. Political contestation in those satellites turned violent. New wars began to emerge and led to increased public calls for more peaceful countries to intervene. At first focusing on humanitarian intervention, the UN during the 1990s became increasingly tasked with higher numbers of activities. By the end of the decade, the UN was asked to intervene in Kosovo, not only with troops but also with an entire civilian staff to assume administrative roles across all areas of government activity. The era of statebuilding had come of age.

The chapter went on to set out detail on the few reviews of civilian peacekeeping that have been conducted to date. It was argued that they reveal persistent challenges in mission organisation. The most comprehensive review of peacekeeping conducted by the UN was the Brahimi review of 2000. This was followed by the smaller-scale Peace Operations 2010 work of 2006 and the UN’s New Horizon initiative in 2008. Most recently the Civilian Capacity review of 2011 looked at the necessary capabilities the UN requires when conducting civilian peacekeeping operations. Various other reviews of peacekeeping have been conducted, all providing recommendations for improved practice and reflecting similar themes of weaknesses in peacekeeping generally. The chapter went on to set out a brief summary of relevant multilateralism literature, serving as a bridge between the two principal bodies of literature used in this research, on peacekeeping and organisation theory. Multilateralism is a distinct area of international relations theory, lacking still today both a single definition and a conceptual framework. Most multilateralism research focuses on behavior by states (rather than behavior of states within international organisations) and therefore focuses on power rather than
organisation. This makes assessments of international organisation performance difficult. Researchers tend therefore to use organisation theory to examine international organisation performance.

Given the focus of the peacekeeping review recommendations on organisational concerns, the chapter went on to discuss organisation theory. Given integrated missions are frequently made up of one or more organisations, literature on inter-organisational relations theory was also examined. Finally, given the peacekeeping literature and the data produced through this research project both highlighted questions about lesson learning of integrated mission experience, the chapter also presented an overview of organisational learning theory. Detail on three elements of inter-organisational theory was set out, on power dependency, resource dependency and environmental constraints. It was explained that resource dependency theory, whilst still prominent in discussions on inter-organisational relations, has diminished in significance in the modern day. This reflects wider organisational development generally. Yet, resource dependency is used in this thesis as being more appropriate for examining structures created under UN auspices, i.e. with an earlier organisational design, than more modern interpretations of what organisations should look like. These three elements of inter-organisational relations were then presented as the initial analytical framework proposed to examine integrated missions.

It was explained that during the research process, the initial analytical framework proved insufficient to explain all aspects of why integrated missions under-perform. An element of organisational learning needed to be introduced. A revised analytical framework was therefore presented, including elements of power dependency, resource dependency, environmental constraints, and organisational learning. Finally, further detail on the selection of research questions was provided.
Chapter 3 set out the methodology used in this research. It was explained why a case study approach was adopted as the principal methodology against other options. Further detail was presented on why UN integrated missions in Kosovo and DRC were chosen for examination, and the various research methods used were set out. Fieldwork was chosen as the best way to engage with stakeholders for this type of research. Other methods selected included semi-structured interviews, field notes, observation and document analysis. The chapter also set out why various methods were discarded during the research process, including the use of a questionnaire or other possible case studies. The process of formulating questions for semi-structured interviews was provided, alongside detail about how interviews and other parts of the fieldwork were set up. Twenty interviews were conducted as part of fieldwork in the DRC, and twelve were conducted in Kosovo. The chapter went on to describe the interview process, as well as to set out how observation and document analysis were used. The chapter included a section about ethical challenges and dilemmas encountered during the research, including working in more than one language, my identity as a former integrated mission staff member and now employee of the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), and conducting research on a part-time basis. Finally, the chapter presented the approach to data analysis used, once fieldwork had been conducted. This highlighted the challenge faced during the data analysis process that the initial analytical framework proved insufficient to explain all aspects of integrated mission under-performance. The necessitated a revision to the analytical framework, as well as to the presentation of data findings. Rather than drawing up a separate chapter to answer all three sub-questions, it was decided during the data analysis process that only two data chapters were necessary. The first would answer the first research sub-question as well as contribute to the answer to the third sub-question. The second chapter discussing data findings would answer the second research sub-question and also contribute to the third sub-question.
Chapter 4 set out the background contexts for missions being established in both DRC and Kosovo. Congo is presented as a state with different origins than any other African country. After systematic abuses under the reign of Belgian King Léopold II, the country was handed over to the Belgian state. Even then, the Belgians stifled the emergence of any black elite, meaning that by the time independence was granted in 1960, the citizens of Congo were in no way prepared for administering a country. A subsequent coup led to the dominance of the state by Mobutu Sese Seko for over four decades, sustained by funding primarily from the United States. With the end of the Cold War, Congo became one of the countries discussed in Chapter 2 that no longer received such funding, and political space opened up to question the rule of Mobutu and demand change. Linked to the spillover from genocidal Rwanda, Mobutu was deposed in 1997. His dictatorship was replaced by further disintegration of the state under Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and then his son Joseph. The chapter showed how the UN hesitated to intervene in DRC and that, even when a mission was established, resources were paltry for the task at hand. Nonetheless, from meagre beginnings, the mission eventually became the largest in the world. Other than a change of name from MONUC to MONUSCO in 2010 and a reduction of half the civilian staff numbers, the size of the mission today remains static in a country which retains some of the highest levels of violence anywhere in the world.

Kosovo, on the other hand, started with a large mission, UNMiK, established in 1999, which today is a shell of its former self. Situated in south-eastern Europe, a region of higher importance to members on the UN Security Council than DRC, Kosovo’s past has been dogged by rival perceptions of history amongst its primarily ethnic Albanian and Serb populations. The chapter records the path to violence in the late 1990s through a historical perspective stemming back to 1389. Widespread discrimination throughout the period culminated in 1987 when former Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milošević visited the province and re-inflamed inter-ethnic tension in the region. Following the wars in Slovenia,
Croatia and particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina as Yugoslavia broke up, fighting in Kosovo was in some ways the final straw for the international community. NATO launched airstrikes against Serbia in 1999, and the UNMiK was established. The chapter provided an overview of UNMiK to the present day, and argued that the mission will have to remain in place for the foreseeable future due not to need but rather to the continued indecision by members of the UN Security Council on the sovereign status of Kosovo as a territory. With this chapter, all background material in the thesis was completed.

Chapter 5 was the first of two empirical data chapters in this research, looking at the politics and power dependencies that affect integrated missions. It responded to the first research sub-question, How do relations between UN member states impact on integrated missions? and contributed to the third sub-question, How does the UN learn the lessons of its experience of integrated missions? Drawing on findings from the research data, it was argued that the bilateral political interests of UN member states mean that the Security Council does not focus on the organisational management and performance of integrated missions. This prevents lessons learned by the operational side of the UN system from being put into practice: staff on integrated missions internalise the lessons they learn from their operational knowledge but this learning has not yet been socialised it into the wider system beyond integrated missions themselves. Single-loop learning occurs but double-loop learning does not. The norms of behaviour on integrated missions therefore do not change. As such, it can be anticipated that similar challenges will be found in future integrated missions regardless of their location or geo-political significance. This reinforces previous findings in the existing literature on integrated missions. The data also show that relations between UN member states form a political block to UN performance improvement on integrated missions. Finally, the chapter argued that the total power dependency of integrated missions on the UN Security Council means that missions are incapable of adopting any of
the usual power dependency organisational strategies suggested by inter-organisational relations theory. In this way, integrated missions were found to be unlike other organisations.

Likewise, Chapter 6 argued that in addition to the political reasons for integrated mission under-performance, there are also internal UN administrative reasons that exacerbate the problem. The chapter addressed the inter-organisational relations within and between integrated missions, as well as those relations between missions and UN member states. In so doing, the chapter answered the second research sub-question How do inter-organisational relations impact on integrated missions? as well as completed the findings for the third sub-question, How does the UN learn from its experiences of integrated missions? The data presented evidence that integrated missions are not only chronically under-resourced for their mandated purposes, but also that those resources that are made available are not used as efficiently and effectively as they could be. UN human resource management and budgeting processes in particular are hamstrung at mission level by overly-constraining procedures established at headquarters in New York. One interpretation of these findings is that, by enabling the continued under-performance of integrated missions both due to the effects of relations between UN member states and inter-organisational relations between the various organisations making up an integrated mission, the UN Security Council is not fully achieving its stated objective of safeguarding international peace and security.

Having given an overview of the thesis in this introduction, this Chapter 7 now addresses each of the sub-questions in turn. In so doing, the chapter will address the central research question Why do UN integrated missions under-perform? The chapter re-visits Galaskiewicz’s suggestion that environmental constraints need to be considered equally alongside power and resource dependency when examining inter-organisational relations, and summarises the findings relating to organisational
learning within the UN system when examining integrated missions. This leads to the contributions of the research and implications for further study, both concerning peacekeeping practice as well as relating to inter-organisational relations theory. The chapter concludes by addressing the question in the thesis title, whether integrated missions are destined to fail.

7.2 How Do Relations Between UN Member States Impact on Integrated Missions?

This research has demonstrated that there is a hierarchy of influence between UN member states. Some members of the UN Security Council have greater influence on international affairs than others. This affects the size, mandate, length and efficiency of the integrated missions established in each location examined in the research. Over time, these challenges affect mission effectiveness. To take the question of size first, it has been shown how Kosovo is located in an area of higher geo-political importance to members of the Security Council than DRC. DRC was “not politically well-considered” (DRC interview 12), meaning that far fewer troops than the contextual situation suggested were required were deployed to the country when the peacekeeping mission was first established, despite it being the scene of what several observers have termed “Africa’s First World War” (see Chapter 4). Relations between UN member states also affect the length of integrated missions. Respondents in Kosovo stated how “the aim would really be to go” (Kosovo interview 6) and yet reflected on the fact that different interpretations of the status of Kosovo as a sovereign state mean that the mission cannot yet be disbanded, and is unlikely to be for some time to come.

Relations between UN member states also affect mission mandates, and essentially make them more complicated. Respondents in both Kosovo and DRC provided evidence that mandates can be confusing for mission staff: “What do they really want me to do?” (DRC interview 11). Bilateral
interests on the part of member states in the countries where missions are established increase over time, and override interests relating to the integrated missions: "They all have their own agendas, and interests" (DRC interview 14). In both case studies, this was shown to lead to a loss of member state focus on the operational activity of integrated missions and their performance. Missions are left somewhat stuck in the middle of relations between member states, under-resourced for their tasks and having to make do. Over time, this means mission mandates become increasingly cumbersome and complicated: "I think we had something like forty-eight, forty-nine tasks, purely just lumped on" (DRC interview 11). This has the effect on missions of ensuring they remain in place longer than necessary. It also leads to confusion amongst UN staff about what they are precisely being required to do. Implementation of mandates becomes harder over time. In turn this leads to reduced mission efficiency: staff are not implementing mandated activity whilst they attempt to understand their tasks. Confusing situations also place additional burdens on staff, who become tired by the challenges they face: "Everyone’s been here too long, myself included" (Kosovo interview 5); "It was the most intensive and demanding job I’ve ever had" (DRC interview 1).

If missions are in place for long periods of time, they lose robustness of operation: “ten years of UN presence here has given a toothless (sic) face to the UN” (DRC interview 12). The indirect consequence of relations between UN member states therefore means that “a lot of missions are on autopilot” (DRC interview 13). They begin to become the focus of criticism from a host country population, as their objectives become increasingly obscure to citizens.

UN member state relations also affect the distribution of available resources amongst integrated missions. Missions are very much “at the whim of member states in terms of resources” (DRC interview 11). Some suggest this is linked to troop numbers, i.e. wherever there are greater numbers of
military troops in a country, the higher the member state interest and therefore the higher the level of resources, including for civilian aspects of peacekeeping.

This is particularly resonant in terms of staffing and equipment resources, as well as – again – mission duration. Whereas shortages of human resources were found in both cases, and were particularly acute in DRC, in Kosovo there was one example of additional resources being provided to those initially requested (Kosovo interview 4). This ignoring of resource needs on the part of the Security Council was shown to be entirely deliberate: “when it was convenient to forget (the level of need in Congo), it was forgotten” (DRC interview 1). In terms of equipment, helicopters were found to be a particular cause of concern in DRC; low numbers had “got us into serious trouble” (DRC interview 14). These resourcing challenges have the effect on missions that staff eventually end up stopping making any requests for the resources they need: they know such requests will not receive a positive response so simply end their demands. Destined to remain under-resourced for the remainder of the duration of a mission, the mission loses effectiveness and performs weakly. The data therefore show that the relations between UN member states are a key factor in explaining why integrated missions under-perform.

7.3 How Do Inter-Organisational Relations Impact on Integrated Missions?

The data collected during this research show that inter-organisational relations between the various organisations that make up integrated missions break down over time. Senior managers are shown to focus increasingly on interpreting mandates, to the detriment of managing their organisations effectively. They provide little direction to integrate, either across the mission or with other UN bodies
present in a mission context. In addition, the administrative procedures within the UN system make such integration harder.

At the individual level, relations work well: there was good evidence that staff make sufficient attempts to collaborate with counterparts in other organisations, with UN colleagues in New York, as well as with staff in other UN funds and agencies in the mission setting. Yet, examining inter-organisational relations at the level of organisations, elements of tension (if not conflict) are introduced. Within a mission, this manifested itself in three ways. First, there was some evidence that staff interpret mission contexts differently according to whether they are located in the country of the mission or externally. Next, there remains a lack of clarity in the UN system about operational differences between the Integrated Mission Planning Process, and the UN Development Assistance Framework. Finally, similar to the evidence presented in the previous section, the evidence that staff on integrated missions eventually stop transmitting requests to headquarters for the resources they need suggests an element of weakened inter-organisational relations.

Relations with other organisations, external to the mission, were found in each case to be conflictive: UN agencies already present in a mission setting resented the arrival of integrated missions and the assumption of overall UN leadership in a country; partner governments were shown to resent the presence of integrated missions in their countries, and over time to scapegoat integrated missions as they lose legitimacy. Non-governmental organisations in both case study settings were shown to be frustrated at the integrated missions' perceived lack of leadership in coordination. Other organisations in a mission setting only formed relations with integrated missions if necessary. Some respondents admitted to a “love-hate relationship” with MONUSCO (DRC interview 17). In Kosovo, there was evidence of a “jostling for space” amongst all the organisations present (Kosovo interview 2).
respondents commented on the challenges of coordination. There was considerable frustration amongst non-UN staff about their experiences of working with the UN. Either this was a frustration about lack of internal mission coordination (Kosovo interview 6), or frustration about lack of communication with other international organisations and non-governmental organisation (DRC interview 17). Administrative processes in particular were seen as taking too long, especially on decision-making (DRC interview 2). Yet at the same time, other organisations – be they UN agencies, partner governments or non-governmental organisations – were shown to be power dependent on integrated missions for information, security and logistical resources. This has a legitimising effect on integrated missions. In each instance, those organisations in the position of lower power adopted strategies to diffuse the power relationship: they each tended to withdraw from the dependency, for example if they could each obtain information and logistics resources from elsewhere. However, none could obtain security provision from elsewhere so withdrawal from the dependency was not fully realised. Hence the frustration with the integrated missions: they did not want to be dependent on them but had to be to survive themselves as organisational entities in the integrated mission context.

The impacts on missions of these inter-organisational relations are varied. Individual organisations within a mission respond to their situation according to organisation theory, distorting mission structures. The case of UNMiK case showed how both the OSCE and EU reduced their power dependency on the UN. Effectively, the OSCE adopted a withdrawal strategy from its dependency on the UN-led parts of UNMiK. The OSCE had a readily-available supply of human, financial and equipment resources from its own headquarters in Vienna and did not need to depend on the UN’s Security Council in New York to obtain them. OSCE staff reported being cautious about associating themselves too much with UNMiK (Kosovo interview 11), despite the fact that the OSCE formally constituted one of the initial UNMiK pillars. By the time fieldwork was conducted, over a decade
since UNMiK had first been established, this withdrawal strategy had led to a situation where even colleagues in other organisations that form UNMiK had lost sight of what their counterparts were doing. One colleague on UNMiK, when discussing the OSCE, expressed frustration at their lack of knowledge about what their counterpart was there to achieve: “I don’t know what they do. Nobody’s ever explained to me what they do” (Kosovo interview 2).

Likewise, the literature presented in Chapter 4 demonstrates that the EU has adopted a status-giving strategy in its approach to UNMiK: it acted outside the auspices of the UN Security Council, and created EULEX. UNMiK as a four-pillar structure was shown to have become a shadow of its former self, undermined in both legitimacy and capability. The actions of both organisations, the OSCE and EU, have therefore served to undermine UNMiK. The data suggest that individual organisations that make up integrated missions can – and do – adopt survival strategies according to power dependency theory, to the detriment of integrated missions as a whole.

All the strategic organisational responses to a power differential are simply unavailable to integrated missions as individual organisations themselves. Similar to examining the impacts on missions of UN member state relations, when looking at integrated mission inter-organisational relations, integrated missions are therefore shown to be unlike other organisations. Missions are shown to be unresponsive to change, for political reasons: the OSCE and EU have withdrawn from their roles in UNMiK, yet the UNMiK structure remains in place; the mandate for MONUSCO has shifted over time, but the organisational structure of the mission reveals no commensurate change. In both cases, there is evidence that keeping a mission structure in place when a political context has shifted leads to mission inefficiency. A respondent in Kosovo valued the OSCE presence but questioned its continued size: “Whether they need to have that many people is another question” (Kosovo interview 5). Likewise in
Congo, when a mandate changed to deprioritise the work of one unit, but the unit remained in place, one respondent observed: “they haven’t been doing much within this area since. [The unit] still exists. But it’s not working too much.” (DRC interview 6)

In resource dependency terms, the data showed that mandates drive mission activity. There was evidence that staff will work constructively across mission organisational entities if their activity of focus is in a mandate (DRC interview 7). Confusion sets in when there is a lack of clarity on which organisation in the mission has the lead role. In such cases, staff are shown to compete for visibility and to showcase their contribution to particular areas of work (DRC interviews 5 and 6).

UN procedures were also revealed as cumbersome, and having negative impacts on integrated missions. The budget process in particular was highlighted for criticism: only finance specialists are involved in defending budget preparations to the UN General Assembly, with no technical inputs possible (DRC interviews 3 and 18). Rigid processes mean that plans need to be submitted months before requirements, but cannot then be changed if circumstances have changed to make this necessary. From this perspective, given so much staff time is taken up with preparing budgets, it is unsurprising that missions find it hard to engage, not least coordinate or even integrate, with other organisations in the mission context.

UN human resource management procedures were also shown to have a significant impact on the case study missions. They take up so much time that, similar to budget practices, staff are prevented from doing their mandated tasks. The procedures reinforce the lack of administrative clarity for UN staff. In the face of such constraints, staff are shown to adopt coping mechanisms, which frequently do not work. Staff are moved around in ways that lack strategic direction, and overall mission resources end
up not being used as effectively as possible. In the case of UNMIK, an integrated mission made up of various organisations, this has led to a distortion of staffing proportions over time: the OSCE retained 700 staff in Kosovo at the time fieldwork was conducted, whilst the remainder of UNMIK had just 400 staff in total. On MONUSCO, an integrated mission made up solely of UN personnel, different units were shown either to be depleted or prioritised according to senior management preference. The data suggest that these systemic flaws have become institutionalised at the mission level, explaining why similar frustrations amongst UN staff can be found across a range of integrated missions, despite very different operating environments.

Such practices have led to central UN procedures becoming increasingly burdensome, resulting in an unvirtuous circle whereby the coping mechanisms adopted by UN staff to address the resourcing constraints faced become self-defeating for integrated mission purposes: “2% of the people spoil[ed] it for the 98%.” (DRC interview 13)

Data from the DRC case showed that the mission operated at 85% of formal human resource levels (DRC interview 14), meaning either that staff must work over and above their formal roles, or that mission planning procedures are weak. Either way, the impact on the mission as a whole is a loss of effectiveness. Staff were shown frequently to assume more than one role on a mission, or to recruit staff unqualified for the task at hand. They are routinely expected to work “flexibly” and fill in for vacant roles, despite at the same time not being in any way supported to do so (DRC interview 14).

To conclude this section, it can be said that inter-organisational relations therefore affect integrated missions in terms of coordination with external partners, human resource management, budget preparation and consequent loss of effectiveness.
7.4 How Does the UN Learn From Its Experience of Integrated Missions?

Similar findings about integrated missions were found in both MONUSCO and UNMiK, two very different missions in very different contexts. There was widespread frustration amongst both UN staff and their interlocutors about inefficient administrative processes, and significant levels of under-resourcing in both staff and equipment. These findings chime with those of the reviews of UN peacekeeping conducted previously, both by the UN itself as well as other observers. Combined, these data suggest that the UN does not learn from its experience of integrated missions. This research has argued that in fact the administrative side of the UN does indeed acknowledge its flaws and systemic weaknesses, does report its resource challenges both through regular reporting on specific missions, and through the few reviews of civilian peacekeeping that have to date been undertaken, and does show evidence of individuals adopting their own coping mechanisms to address the challenges with which they are confronted: this research has shown that in the cases of UNMiK and MONUC/MONUSCO, single-loop organisational learning occurs. It is the political side of the UN system that prevents these lessons from being implemented in a more systemic way, and which therefore prevents overall integrated mission performance improvement: this research has shown that at the level of the UN as a political and administrative system, double-loop learning does not occur.

A number of interview respondents had experience on a large number of missions, and were vocal in their continued criticism of weaknesses in UN administrative systems regardless of mission location. This suggests that the relations between UN member states are a key factor in explaining why lesson learning is not institutionalised in the UN system. In itself, this is evidence of a lack of (UN) organisational learning: staff face repeated experiences on different missions as they progress with their careers, rather than any institutionalised improvement across the board of integrated mission practice.
Using Nanaka and Takeuchi’s presentation of the processes of organisational knowledge conversion, the data show that there is tacit knowledge amongst UN staff about the organisational weaknesses they face on integrated missions: they report it direct, and they adopt adaptive learning processes to cope with the administrative and resourcing challenges faced. The reviews of UN peacekeeping undertaken to date also reveal similar findings, i.e. that some of this knowledge is explicit: it is written in reporting to the UN Security Council. According to Argyris and Schöns’s interpretation of organisational learning, this indicates that single-loop learning occurs on integrated missions. Nonetheless, the continued lack of institutionalisation of this learning or knowledge transfer, suggests that double-loop learning does not occur within the UN system about integrated missions.

Even the term “integrated mission” was not well-understood by mission staff. The term means different things to different people. The data showed that the UN finds it hard to put policy into practice: there was no mention of the guidelines produced at UN headquarters on the Integrated Mission Planning Process in any of the interviews conducted during fieldwork. Despite having been in place for over a decade, both case study missions were found still to be working on integration. The data showed how there was little commitment to integration amongst UN staff; instead, they remain in a constant state of planning, reducing the effectiveness of their work, rather than learning a lesson and moving on.

The sheer level of complaint from UN staff interviewed during fieldwork, compounded by the level of criticism and observation about lack of resources on integrated missions from non-mission counterparts, suggests that those closely involved with the activity of integrated missions know full well that resources, and human resources in particular, are a key constraint for integrated missions. They have learned this lesson. It is the total power dependency missions have on the Security Council
for levels of resources that prevents these lessons from being socialised more broadly in operational practice. It is not the administrative side of the UN system that does not learn operational lessons, but rather the political side of the system that prevents lessons from being implemented. Despite repeated requests from UN operational personnel for more staff, military personnel and equipment, the resources are not forthcoming. Note the exasperation of one UN staff member in DRC when asked why the Secretary-General’s Special Representative did not request additional resources: “They do. They do! And in New York too, the Secretary General tells the Security Council, they need more troops for Congo!” (DRC interview 7).

Integrated mission staff are aware that these constraints and even responses impact negatively on mission performance. They recognise that shifting staff to roles for which they have no experience “makes it difficult to deliver in a more effective manner” (DRC interview 15). Rather, it is the member states that remain either unaware of or insensitive to such practices (the ‘how’ of peacekeeping), and the consequent loss of mission performance.

Mission staff and their counterparts have also learned that strategies to request additional resources from those with which they are in a power-dependent relationship do not work. The only recourse left available to missions is therefore not to implement the lessons of previous integrated mission experience, but instead to be forced to spend disproportionate amounts of time addressing the same constraints. This explains why similar coping mechanisms, such as shifting staff across units and “reconfiguring” roles, were found in both UNMiK and MONUSCO despite their very different contexts, scale and strategic operations. It also explains why similar findings and recommendations are found on different missions, regardless of geography or geo-political significance, and presented over time in the various reviews of peacekeeping undertaken.
The challenge of integrated mission performance is therefore not one of lesson learning, but rather of implementing lessons already learned: the UN needs to institutionalise good practice (double-loop learning) and could perhaps do so through a process of triple-loop learning. Until this happens, underperformance on integrated missions will persist. This has both effectiveness and cost effectiveness implications for the international community.

Despite various references made by UN staff on both UNMiK and MONUSCO to similar constraints faced on other missions – usually previous missions on which staff had worked – no link was made in any of the interviews between discussions at Security Council level about one mission against others. This suggests that political and technical discussions at UN headquarters take place in isolation. UN operational staff are not in a position to refer cross-mission experience to the Security Council. Again, it is shown that it is at the political level, and in particular within the Security Council that the UN is not learning the lessons of integrated mission experience. And again, this explains why repeated reviews of UN peacekeeping present similar findings and recommendations over time, without being addressed: the block is political, not operational. This thesis argues that until such institutionalisation of good practice occurs, good practice in the safeguarding of international peace and security cannot fully be attained.

This thesis has argued that there are both political and operational reasons why UN integrated missions under-perform. Politically, integrated missions are in a position of total power and resource dependency on the UN Security Council. This makes them unlike other organisations, and means they cannot behave as other organisations do in the face of such constraints. Primarily, it is lack of resources – both human and equipment – that hinders integrated mission performance. The Security Council does not respond to requests for resources once its interests in a mission have waned.
Organisationally, integrated missions are further hindered in their performance by overly-bureaucratic operational procedures that are often unclear to UN staff. This means that despite the very real resource constraints faced, resources are not used as effectively as they could be. Lack of effective scrutiny on the part of the Security Council therefore impacts on the quality of mission performance: missions are left to themselves to manage the day-to-day operations of their activity. Yet senior mission managers become distracted by increasing mandate tasks and themselves lose sight of inefficient internal practices.

7.5 Revisiting Galaskiewicz

The analytical framework for this research was adapted from Joseph Galaskiewicz’s 1985 literature review of inter-organisational relations. By summarising the literature written up to that point on inter-organisational relations, Galaskiewicz framed his article around three arenas: resource procurement and allocation; political advocacy; and organisational legitimisation. The analytical framework was adapted from the first of these, given the emphasis on resource challenges in reviews of civilian peacekeeping operations at the start of this project. Galaskiewicz presented the literature on resource procurement and allocation against the mutually inter-linked headings of power and resource dependency. In his critique he states that researchers have “not paid enough attention to the environmental constraints” that affect organisations (Galaskiewicz, 1985: 286). It was for this reason that an analytical framework to examine integrated missions was initially drawn up using not only the power and resource dependency of inter-organisational relations, but also the area environmental constraints highlighted as a weakness in other inter-organisational relations research.
Yet, the research process for this study highlighted two shortcomings in the initial framework. First, when looking at both how relations between UN member states and how inter-organisational relations affected integrated missions through a lens of environmental constraints, the data were found to be weak. There are some such constraints, including the personal impact on UN staff deployed to work on integrated missions: in the face of inadequate resources, they were observed to work long days, and generally to be run-down by their experiences. Equally, four constraints were found relating to inter-organisational relations, concerning security, coordination, communications about mission activities, and the sheer scale of tasks set for missions. But relative to levels of data found about power and resource dependency, these environmental constraints findings were considered less significant for the purposes of this thesis. When examining both the political impacts of UN member state relations on integrated missions and the organisational impacts of inter-organisational relations between missions and their various counterparts, the data showed that an equal weighting in the analytical framework to environmental constraints alongside power and resource dependency was not appropriate, at least when examining UN integrated missions.

Next, the implications of any findings about why integrated missions under-performed were not easily extracted from a framework that did not include an element on organisational learning. Despite the strength of data about under-performance, the research was not fully answering the central question about why it was happening. An element of organisational learning needed to be introduced to the research study. It was for this reason that the analytical framework initially chosen for this research was adapted to include a perspective of organisational learning through which integrated missions could be examined. This suggests that Galaskiewicz’s framing of inter-organisational relations literature around three arenas – whilst acknowledging that any examination of the theory would always be analytically messy – is insufficient. When examining organisational performance through such a
lens, an element of organisational learning may be necessary. Certainly, it proved useful in the case of this research on UN integrated missions.

7.6 Contributions of the Research

There are three levels of contribution from this research: contribution to theory; contribution to knowledge; and contribution to policy and practice. First, the contribution to theory is that an analytical framework developed from inter-organisational relations theory can be strengthened if a perspective of organisational learning is introduced. Reviews and summaries of inter-organisational relations theory are dominated by perspectives of power dependency and resource dependency. When discussing resource procurement and allocation, Galaskiewicz introduced a further perspective of environmental constraints, stating that this was a relatively under-researched perspective when examining inter-organisational relations (Galaskiewicz, 1985). Yet, this study of integrated missions found such a framework insufficient to explain why under-performance persisted. An element of organisational learning needed to be introduced in order better to understand why similar data were consistently found in reviews of civilian peacekeeping.

A further contribution to inter-organisational relations theory is that environmental constraints do not impact on inter-organisational relations to the same extent as power and resource dependency – or at least, not when examining integrated missions. This study has shown that an equal weighting across such a framework was inappropriate. Testing how far such emphasis should be given in this type of research would be a valuable further contribution to knowledge. Equally, Galaskiewicz stated that research studies on inter-organisational relations are frequently not replicated (Galaskiewicz, 1985: 281). Similar examination of integrated missions using an analytical framework of power dependency,
resource dependency and environmental constraints – either once again in Kosovo and DRC or in other/more peacekeeping settings – would expand knowledge in this field.

Next, the contribution to knowledge about civilian peacekeeping from this research is significant. There have been very few studies of integrated mission performance, and none as systematic and analytical as this one. By examining in depth the experiences of civilian UN staff in Kosovo and DRC, this research has begun to bridge a gap in current knowledge about peacekeeping. Rather than simply present further data on the challenges faced by integrated missions, this thesis sets out why these data persist. The political and administrative parts of the UN system are not currently sufficiently aligned to enable the most effective (and cost effective) response possible to challenges to international peace and security. Indeed, without changes to the current UN system, and higher-level learning on the part of the UN, it is unlikely that integrated missions will ever fully achieve their mandated tasks. This research has therefore argued that they are destined only ever to under-perform.

The contribution of this research to peacekeeping policy and practice is that there are political and organisational reasons why integrated missions under-perform. In order for the UN system truly to shift the norms and behaviours found on integrated mission (and thereby improve performance) – double-loop learning – more attention needs to be paid to the organisational structure and performance of integrated missions than is currently, in particular by the Security Council. Research that examined how the (negative) effects of member state political interests on integrated mission performance could be mitigated would be a valid contribution to knowledge.

In addition, there is currently no agreed method to calculate the efficiency, effectiveness and cost effectiveness of integrated missions. This research found no evidence of routine assessments being
conducted of mission performance. Despite existing accountability measures, whereby the head of a mission reports back to the Security Council on progress and resourcing needs, little focus was found on monitoring performance impact. This research therefore suggests a need for robust, independent monitoring of integrated missions, both in terms of structure, size and organisational robustness, as well as of effectiveness and delivery for the citizens of the country where a mission is established. There is a corresponding case for quantitative studies to be conducted to build an evidence base of the implications of mission under-performance – perhaps beginning to monetise some of the consequences of under-resourcing and mission inefficiency. This study found that missions frequently operate with high vacancy rates, and spend a disproportionate amount of time on planning and budgetary processes. One respondent stated that it was common for the DRC mission to work at 85% of its human resource requirements (DRC interview 14). Research that proposed an accepted method to monitor mission efficiency and effectiveness may encourage a greater Security Council focus on integrated mission impact than is currently the case.

A further finding of this research was a lack of understanding on the part of a local population of what integrated missions exist to achieve, primarily due to the high power dependency of integrated missions on the UN Security Council. This led in part to increasingly negative relations with partner governments over time, particularly at central levels. It was found that assessing the correct levels of communication with a local population was challenging. Yet it was also found that existing levels had not proven sufficient.

Finally, then, the implications for future research from this study are fourfold: (i) future research of inter-organisational relations could usefully examine if organisational learning would appropriately be included as a perspective through which to better understand other types of organisation; (ii) studies
could be replicated similar to this one to see if similar findings are produced and so strengthen the evidence base about inter-organisational relations, organisational learning and about UN integrated missions generally; (iii) research into methods to understand the efficiency and effectiveness of integrated missions could enable simpler cross-comparison and time-based learning of integrated mission performance and the costs to UN member states of mission inefficiencies; and finally (iv) research into how best to communicate the role and achievements of integrated missions could helpfully improve relations between them and a local population. Such research could also further contribute to the organisational learning of integrated missions in terms of their performance and impact.

7.7 Final Conclusion

Based on literature, two case studies, a range of qualitative methods and research findings, this thesis has shown that there are multiple reasons for integrated mission under-performance, political and organisational. This is not to say that missions are destined to fail. It is perhaps more accurate to state that missions are destined to disappoint. If the international community is truly committed to the safeguarding of global peace and security, then it has a duty to ensure that all resources provided to achieve this laudable aim are used as effectively as possible. This thesis has shown that political interests of UN member states and cumbersome administrative processes in the UN operational system mean this does not currently happen. The UN system is both politically and administratively prevented from implementing the lessons learned from its integrated mission experience. As such, international peace and security is not being safeguarded in as effective or cost effective a manner as potentially possible.
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**APPENDIX 1: List of Interviewees**

| DRC Interview 1 | DSRSG, MONUC |
| DRC Interview 2 | Chef de Delegation, ICRC |
| DRC Interview 3 | Head, Civilian Affairs, MONUSCO |
| DRC Interview 4 | Head Human Rights, MONUSCO |
| DRC Interview 5 | Deputy Head, RoL, MONUSCO |
| DRC Interview 6 | Deputy Head, SSR, MONUSCO |
| DRC Interview 7 | Deputy Head, Public Information, MONUSCO |
| DRC Interview 8 | SRSG, MONUSCO |
| DRC Interview 9 | Deputy SRSG, MONUSCO |
| DRC Interview 10 | Head DFID DRC |
| DRC Interview 11 | Deputy Force Commander, MONUSCO |
| DRC Interview 12 | Team Leader, Country Initiative for Cohesive Leadership in DRC |
| DRC Interview 13 | Chief Integrated Support Services, MONUSCO |
| DRC Interview 14 | Head of Political Affairs, MONUSCO |
| DRC Interview 15 | Deputy Director, DMS, MONUSCO |
| DRC Interview 16 | Deputy US Ambassador |
| DRC Interview 17 | Regional Director, IRC DRC |
| DRC Interview 18 | OIC MONUSCO Elections |
| DRC Interview 19 | Deputy Head, MSF Belgium |
| DRC Interview 20 | MONUSCO Chief of Staff |
| Kosovo Interview 1 | Head of UNMiK Legal Affairs |
| Kosovo Interview 2 | Deputy Head, EULEX |
| Kosovo Interview 3 | Head of UNMiK Community Support and Facilitation Division |
| Kosovo Interview 4 | SRSRG, UNMiK |
| Kosovo Interview 5 | Head of UNMiK Political Affairs |
| Kosovo Interview 6 | Deputy Head of Mission, UK Embassy |
| Kosovo Interview 7 | 1st Secretary, Political, US Embassy |
| Kosovo Interview 8 | Chief of Staff's Office, UNMiK |
| Kosovo Interview 9 | Chief of Staff’s Office, UNMiK |
| Kosovo Interview 10 | Chief of Staff’s Office, UNMiK |
| Kosovo Interview 11 | Senior Coordinator, OMiK |
| Kosovo Interview 12 | SRSRG Office, UNMiK |
APPENDIX 2: Semi-Structured Interview Questions for UN Staff

Thanks
PhD Background (my work Kosovo, Congo etc)
OK to record?
Interview Consent Form

1) Please can you describe your role? (Relative to role of SRSG) (How long have you been in post?)

2) What do you understand the mission’s objectives to be? (Is this the official understanding?)

3) Have the mission’s objectives stayed the same throughout your time here? How have they changed? Do you know why they changed?)

4) What is your specific role in implementing those objectives? What do you do? And how?

5) How much does your work interact with other organisations within MONUSCO / UNMiK? How easy is that? What is the relationship btw MONUSCO / UNMiK and X?

6) What constraints to achieving the mission’s objectives do you face?

7) What about political constraints – relationship with NY / UN member states?

8) How do these differ from challenges of working with the Congolese / Kosovars? How did you address them (in each case)?

9) (How) Can they be overcome?

10) What efforts have been made (by you or the mission – or anyone else) to communicate the vision / mandate of MONUSCO / UNMiK? (Internally; to Congolese / Kosovar people; to international reps) How effective do you think these have been? What about impact – has there been any? (How do you know?)
APPENDIX 3: Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Non-UN Staff

Thanks
PhD Background (my work Kosovo, Congo etc)
OK to record?
Interview Consent Form

1) Please can you describe your role? (How long have you been in post?) How does your role interact with MONUSCO / UNMiK?

2) What do you understand the mission’s objectives to be?

3) Have the mission’s objectives stayed the same throughout your time here? (How have they changed? Do you know why they changed?)

4) Do you or your organisation play any kind of role in implementing MONUSCO / UNMiK objectives? How?

5) How do you work with the mission? Can you give me an example (of good and/or bad experience / practice)?

6) What constraints do you consider MONUSCO / UNMiK faces?

7) What about political constraints – relationship with NY / UN member states? How did these differ from challenges of working with the Congolese / Kosovars? (Do you face the same constraints?)

8) What’s your role in this? Do you report back to your HQ / mission in New York? What’s the link to UN monitoring of MONUSCO / UNMiK and member state feedback?

9) [(How) Can these constraints be overcome?] How effectively do you think MONUSCO / UNMiK manages to overcome these constraints?

10) How effectively do you think the various agencies within MONUSCO / UNMiK work together? Why / Why not?

11) Have you seen efforts by the mission to communicate its vision? (Internally; to Congolese / Kosovar people; to you; to international reps) How effective do you think these were? Were they sufficient? What impact did they have? (How do you know?)