Evaluating Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs): The Case of Jubilee 2000 Campaign (J2K)

Thesis

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Evaluating Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs): 
The Case of Jubilee 2000 Campaign (J2K)

Thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctorate of Philosophy

Politics and International Studies, 
the Open University

30 September 2014

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Declaration of Authorship

I declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own, original work undertaken in partial fulfillment of my degree and has been generated by me as the result of my own research.

I have made no use of sources, materials or assistance other than those, which have been openly and fully acknowledged in the text. If any part of another person's work has been quoted, this either appears in inverted commas or (if beyond a few lines) is indented. Any direct quotation or source of ideas has been identified in the text by author, date and page number(s) immediately after such an item, and full details are provided in a reference list at the end of the text.

None of this work has been published before submission.

I understand that any breach of the fair practice regulations may result in a mark of zero for this dissertation and that it could also involve other repercussions. I understand also that too great a reliance on the work of others may lead to a low mark.

Signature
Abstract

Evaluating Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs):
The Case of Jubilee 2000 Campaign (J2K)

This thesis deploys the Jubilee 2000 Campaign (J2K) to enhance our knowledge of transnational collective actions (TCAs). It contends that the major collective action theories are inadequate for explaining the emergence of J2K because of their inherent limitations and that the emergence of J2K was underpinned by the principles of 'cutting the diamond' of debt which included robust research, critical analysis and broad framing. This enabled the J2K to deconstruct the perceived arcane nature and complexity of debt and international finance, name debt a crisis, and reframe it as a justice based issue. The thesis argues that it is problematic to cast outcomes in definitive and conclusive terms due to the problem of causal complexity and that evaluating TCAs mainly in the binary of 'success' or 'failure' does not advance our knowledge of TCAs. For this reason, evaluation is better conducted in terms of outcomes before a judgement could be made in terms of success or failure of a collective action vis-à-vis its aims.

The thesis finds that the J2K was successful in its mobilisation and education of the public for debt cancellation. It achieved sensitising impacts because it was able to mobilise and socialise the relevant target actors to accept the debt situation as a crisis and it politicised and mainstreamed the issue in a political context where virtually all the target actors disputed that judgement. Further, the thesis finds evidence that the J2K achieved procedural and substantive impacts as it gained access to its targets and elicited policy changes that resulted in partial debt cancellation. A legacy of the J2K, the thesis contends is that it reinforced aspects of the governance regime of international financial institutions and further exposes the North-South divide.

This thesis concludes that the categorisation of TCAs has intrinsic political meaning and that various groups' agendas and the way TCAs emerge may help explain why TCA outcomes are controversial. It finds that J2K emergence could best be explained by a combination of the core contentions of the major collective action theories, and organisational platform is deemed a major distinguishing factor of TANs.
Acknowledgments

First and foremost I would like to thank the Department of Politics, History and International Relations at Loughborough University for awarding me a fully funded studentship for this research and the additional support for my fieldwork. Although I did not complete my research there, I remain eternally grateful. Many thanks to the Department of Politics and International Studies at the Open University for the fee waiver I was granted when I transferred, following my supervisor, to complete this research.

Thanks to my supervisor Daniel Conway, for your support through the whole process with the ups and downs, to Taku Tamaki, my co-supervisor at Loughborough University, and to my internal examiner at Loughborough University, Dave Berry, for your detailed comments and advice. Further, many thanks to Helen Yanacopulos who joined my supervision team at the OU for demanding and encouraging a critical approach to this study. Very special thanks to the staff at the Special Collections at Newcastle University Library, which holds the Jubilee 2000 archives.

I interviewed a number of individuals who were central to the Jubilee 2000 Campaign in the United Kingdom, North America, Africa and a couple in Latin America. I would like to express my deep gratitude to all of you for your time and openness to revisit the Jubilee 2000 Campaign. It was really inspiring to listen to all of you on this very important issue and I have greatly benefited from your contributions, which have indeed enriched this research.

To my friends – too numerous to mention, who have kept me motivated in difficult times through this research and contributed in different ways to its completion, I offer my very sincere thanks and deep gratitude.

My biggest thanks go to my family for sharing and accommodating my absence, stress and frustration at various stages in this research. To Nicole, thanks a lot for your understanding and encouragement, support and love. Without you, I truly would not have completed this research. To my beloved two daughters Efomo and Esomo, I hope the time spent away from you for this research is one well spent. Thanks a lot.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPP</td>
<td>Black Panther Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Christian Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAFOD</td>
<td>Catholic Agency For Overseas Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDSE</td>
<td>European and North American Catholic NGO Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIIR</td>
<td>Catholic Institute for International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCN</td>
<td>Debt Crisis Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>Debt Sustainability Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>End Conscription Campaign</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDM</td>
<td>Early Day Motion</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAF</td>
<td>Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURODAD</td>
<td>European Network on Debt and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCAP</td>
<td>Global Call to Action Against Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7/8</td>
<td>Group of Seven/Eight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDR</td>
<td>Institute for Development Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFIs</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFS</td>
<td>International Financial System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMI</td>
<td>Jubilee Movement International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDC</td>
<td>Jubilee Debt Campaign</td>
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<tr>
<td>J2K</td>
<td>Jubilee 2000 Campaign</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAI</td>
<td>Multilateral Agreement on Investments</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>Mines Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDRI</td>
<td>Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPH</td>
<td>Make Poverty History</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEF</td>
<td>New Economic Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NSMs</td>
<td>New Social Movements</td>
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<td>NPV</td>
<td>Net Present Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>POS</td>
<td>Political Opportunity Structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPT</td>
<td>Political Process Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAM</td>
<td>Revolutionary Action Movement</td>
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<td>RFE</td>
<td>Radical Flank Effects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMT</td>
<td>Resource Mobilisation Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNA</td>
<td>Republic of New Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIMICs</td>
<td>Severely Indebted Middle-Income Countries</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>TANs</td>
<td>Transnational Advocacy Networks</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCAs</td>
<td>Transnational Collective Actions</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCCB</td>
<td>United States Conference of Catholic Bishops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDM</td>
<td>World Development Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>WLA</td>
<td>Welsh Language Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLS</td>
<td>Welsh Language Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSF</td>
<td>World Social Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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1. Introduction

The Jubilee 2000 Campaign (J2K)\(^1\) was a transnational collective action (TCA) that campaigned for the cancellation of the unpayable debts of impoverished countries. It started in the United Kingdom (UK) in the mid-1990s and lasted till the end of December 2000. The J2K emerged with development non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UK church communities, and labour unions as its core base. The transnational network on debt that it engendered mobilised broad international public support for debt cancellation.

The network had national campaigns in as many as 69 countries, with individual participants from 166 countries and territories across all continents, and had more than 24 million people sign its debt cancellation petition (Grenier, 2003: 86; Barrett, 2000: 29) – a world record at the time. In May 1998, over 70,000 people took part in the “human chain” demonstration organised by the network at the annual meeting of the Group of Eight (G8) - the eight most developed economies – in Birmingham, England. The following year, at the summit of the same group in Cologne, Germany, the network mobilised over 50,000 people to further demand debt cancellation. In the month leading up to the Cologne summit, the Campaign claimed to have mobilised 1 million people, in over 60 countries, to take part in the global chain reaction events, which it had organized to demand debt cancellation.\(^2\)

---

\(^1\) In this thesis, the “J2K” and “the Campaign” shall refer to the transnational network on debt cancellation, which emerged in the UK as “Jubilee 2000”. The “Jubilee 2000 Coalition” will describe the UK component of this network and referred to as the “UK Coalition”. However, because the UK component also had the dual role of an informal international Secretariat in practice and usually spoke on behalf of the Campaign, the Jubilee 2000 Coalition was often conflated with the “J2K”. In chapter five I will expatiate on the dual role of the UK Coalition. In my interview with Joseph Hanlon (15 March 2011) he explained that the “K” in J2K was computer shorthand that stood for ‘a thousand’ and its usage was easily adopted in the Campaign.

Major European governments received thousands of letters, emails, faxes and postcards calling for debt cancellation from sympathisers and participants in the Campaign. With these sustained mass mobilisations and intensive lobbying of decision makers in major creditor countries, at the peak of its advocacy, the network ensured that the issue of debt cancellation and poverty were regular items on the international political agenda. Ultimately, the creditor nations and institutions took on board some of the Campaigns' demands and, at the Cologne summit, agreed to write off about $100 billion of debt. Further, the creditors conceded some policy changes, including unilateral debt cancellations, reducing the required number of years for debt cancellation eligibility, and agreeing to a role for civil society groups in managing the resources that would accrue from debt cancellation.

These creditors' responses to the Campaign's demands have led some campaigners to claim partial goal attainment, and this has in turn led others and some analysts to declare that the J2K was a successful campaign (Long, 2010; Pettifor, 2006; Sachs, 2005; Mayo, 2005a; Collins et al., 2001), although some do qualify that success. The claim that the Campaign was a success is also based on the argument that the issue of sovereign debt of the impoverished countries and international finance, which was long regarded as arcane and untouchable as a campaign issue, was made a mainstream issue and a dominant item on the international political agenda within a few years of the Campaign's emergence.

On the other hand, while it is evident that there were policy change and shifts in the creditors' position and, as a result, some cognisance that the Campaign did indeed achieve some of its aims, it is also a fact that much of the debts which the Campaign set out to cancel as its primary aim are still there. This reality has prompted a
perception of a campaign that did not achieve its set goals, and should hence be considered a failure. Particularly campaigners from the global South, who have often perceived the Campaign to be a failure because it failed to cancel even the poorly and erroneously self-defined ‘unpayable debt’, echo this sentiment. According to them ‘unpayable debt’, as defined by the Campaign, overlooked the structural and systemic causes of the debt, other fundamental and debt-related grievances from the South and, more generally, mirrored and served to reinforce the dominance of the North and the exploitation of the South by the very system that produced the debt (Jubilee South, 1999). Moreover, others argue that the amount purportedly cancelled by the creditors was in fact already classified as ‘bad debt’, as it was obvious to the creditors that they would never be able to collect the debt as the impoverished countries were never in a position to repay (Keet, 2000; Sachs, 2005).

For analysts and practitioners, these divergent and somewhat contradictory claims present an intriguing dilemma because they appear to be at opposing ends. While there may be reasons and valid arguments for the above discrepancies, they present a challenge with regard to the evaluation of the collective action on debt and, more generally, reflect the broader problems and controversies in evaluating the results of the different forms of transnational collective action. These problems cut across both the empirical and theoretical spheres and will be discussed in detail in chapter four; but the divergent perspectives also present an opportunity to examine the way transnational collective actions are evaluated, what the processes may entail, and the implications of the divergent perspectives on evaluation.
1.1 The Research Question

The Jubilee 2000 Campaign is an example of a transnational collective action that encapsulates the intrigues and intricacies, problems and controversies of evaluating transnational collective actions. First, following from the brief sketch above, we could not easily classify the Campaign as a failure, but neither could we definitively declare it a success. Second, different actors shroud the purported results of the Campaign in controversy due to their varied interpretations; and third, if we are able to identify the results associated with the collective action on debt it is not certain that they could all entirely be attributed to the Campaign because of other possible causal factors. Thus the major issue in this research is how a transnational collective action like the J2K can be evaluated in a way that reckons with the divergent perspectives sketched above and the associated issues. Therefore the main question that will be explored in this research is:

*How does evaluating the Jubilee 2000 Campaign aid our understanding of transnational collective actions?*

I will explicate on the relevance of this inquiry below, but to help address this question it would be necessary to examine the following sub questions as well:

- What are the implications of J2K emergence for collective action theories and the categorisation of transnational collective actions?
- How do we evaluate the Jubilee 2000 Campaign?
- What were the outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign?

These questions are important for a number of reasons, which range from the theoretical and practical to their policy implications. First, exploring these questions...
would help us understand why the evaluation of outcomes of transnational collective actions is controversial. In addition to this, it would also allow us to unravel some of the underlying reasons for some of the aforementioned controversies. For example, in the case of J2K, it will be shown that deep-seated, historical issues and ideological differences between certain regional blocks in the debt cancellation network underpinned some of the controversies that trailed its purported outcomes. Therefore, exploring these questions would enable us to better understand that some of the controversies that may surround the evaluation of TCAs are driven by different agendas and factors that are probably beyond the realm and control of any particular transnational collective action.

Second, the J2K was obviously very popular in light of the huge international public support it garnered and the resonance of its message, signified by the number of people who signed its debt cancellation petition (over 24 million, and this was not an on-line petition). It is therefore not surprising that some campaigners view the Campaign as a success, particularly as the creditors officially agreed to some form of debt cancellation (although they resisted using ‘cancellation’ as they insisted on ‘debt relief’). However, in theoretical and practical terms, this perspective is narrow and falls short of a full evaluative account because (even if the claim of partial debt cancellation is substantiated – and that is debatable) it overlooks the fact that majority of the self-defined unpayable debt it aimed to cancel remains. Moreover, what exactly amounts to or constitutes ‘success’ is shrouded in the controversy that is underlined by the differing interpretation of success, and the politics of evaluation, because ‘success’ is neither defined, nor is there any standard of measuring it.
Similarly, to declare the Campaign a failure because some of the unpayable debt remains is equally untenable; that position fails to reckon with other spheres, like public awareness of the issue and agenda-setting levels where the Campaign’s effort may have had an impact. Although the reasons underlying these opposing positions may be understandable, nevertheless, the situation does highlight the relevance of the question of how to evaluate transnational collective actions like the J2K. It shows the necessity of a framework of analysis that would allow us to evaluate the outcomes of the Campaign in a way that broadly captures the different spheres of impacts and allows a more in-depth understanding of its outcomes, if any. A theoretical framework would aid a robust analysis of the different types of impacts and would allow us to overcome the inherent shortcomings of the perspective that sees the Campaign as a ‘failure’ or a ‘success’. The point being made therefore is, evaluating J2K mainly in terms of failure or success largely beclouds a thorough examination of its outcomes because such conclusions are reached without the specific examination of where the Campaign may have succeeded or failed in its aims and how it may have achieved any of the ascribed outcomes.

The relevance of the research question is also demonstrable by its theoretical implications for the emergence of collective actions. The emergence of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign in the mid-1990s saw church communities, development agencies and trade unions as the core support base of the transnational advocacy network on debt. As I will show in this research, some of these groups – religious and secular – were, at the beginning of the Campaign, very hesitant about the ancient biblical concept of Jubilee every fifty years as a campaign theme on sovereign debt and international finance. However, this overtly Judeo-Christian religious concept of Jubilee became, more than any other, the key inspirational factor for its emergence.
and the global appeal and mobilisation of the international public support that the Campaign demonstrated throughout its existence. It was also a major unifying factor, if not the only one in the Campaign, as it elicited agreement from all involved, while tension and conflict raged within the network in virtually all other areas. For theorists who have long grappled with the issue of collective action emergence, the depth of church involvement in the emergence of J2K and the significance of the strong religious jubilee theme offer further insight into contemporary collective action emergence and the opportunity to re-examine existing theories against the socio-political and cultural terrain in which collective actions emerge.

The idea of a Jubilee pattern of debt remission was meticulously developed and expounded on as the basis of addressing the debilitating debt crisis of the impoverished countries. The transnational advocacy on debt was designed around that theme both in terms of aims, frame and strategy. However, when the Campaign diffused to other regions and continents and incorporated similar but already existing campaigns, the seeds of friction were inevitably sown, because there were fundamental differences and huge discrepancies between some of the aims of the existing campaigns and the emergent J2K. Thus, it became an uphill task to define a commonly agreed goal and, as has been aptly noted, reaching a degree of consensus on the goals of the Campaign was the biggest challenge within the network (Collins et al., 2001: 135). The relevance of the research question will be further highlighted if, as this thesis aims to demonstrate, by evaluating the outcomes of J2K we would better understand a) the processes through which some collective action aims are articulated, framed and presented, b) that the strategy which is devised to achieve those aims, and the interpretation of the frames employed by these collective actions, may serve as a mobilising as well as a divisive factor in some of these TCAs.
The friction within the J2K over its aims outlived the Campaign and it is largely due to the depth of that friction that Jubilee South became an offshoot of J2K. In the main, this friction underpins the divergent and polarising evaluative perceptions of some participants in the Campaign. Although the network largely managed to publicly present a united front until the G8 summit in Cologne, at that summit, the friction and disagreement and, in fact, division became public. This was evidenced by two press statements; one from the Jubilee 2000 Coalition, the Jubilee2000USA and Erlassjahr2000 (the national campaign in Germany) along with some celebrities, welcoming the agreement by the G8 leaders as a success, and the other from Jubilee South, declaring the agreement a failure. Neil Watkins and John Dillon for example, who were central to the national campaigns in the United States (US) and Canada, argued that, had the Campaign been devoid of these frictions and remain truly united, it probably could have achieved more of its goals (Interviews with the author, conducted in December 2011). While that may be debatable, there is no doubt that addressing the major question in this study enables us to articulate lessons in the way international campaigns and transnational collective actions are designed, their aims and demands formulated, and how these may eventually affect both the internal cohesion within such collective actions and their likely outcomes.

1.2 Rationale for Research

As a grass roots activist on issues ranging from the students’ movement to the environment, pro-democracy, refugee and human rights in general, I have been involved in various campaigns in one form or another for almost three decades, both in Africa and in Europe. So as I aimed to complete my Masters in International Relations in Germany, I was attracted to the idea of exploring the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). I was fascinated by the emergence of the anti-landmines campaign and network at the behest of a handful of NGOs and the outcomes it would be credited with a few years later. This was particularly impressive to me because, considering the enormous opposition to its declared aims by the most powerful countries in the world, not many would have given some ‘powerless’ NGOs a chance of achieving their aims. As I researched this topic, I became more aware of the intervening factors, which allowed the anti-landmines network to ‘achieve’ its aim of developing an international treaty, which banned the production, sale, stockpiling and use of anti-personnel landmines.

Following from the above, I was interested in finding out the conditions for effective transnational campaigns by looking at a set of ‘failed’ and ‘successful’ campaigns. My preliminary research in this field led me to conclude that for time, logistical and budgetary reasons, the scope of the proposed research was not feasible. However, my initial cursory look at the literature also revealed some gaps, amongst which was the controversy that surrounds the results of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign. This, combined with my interest in the Campaign, which stemmed from my personal involvement in mobilising for the protests at the G8 summit in Cologne, made researching the outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign an attractive proposition.

At the time of the summit in 1999 I lived in Germany, as an asylum seeker from Nigeria, and was involved in refugee self-organisation under a migrant and refugee nationwide network which was called the Caravan-for the rights of refugees and migrants, which used the slogan “we are here because you destroy our countries”. Under this banner, I coordinated a 16-day hunger strike by activists of the Caravan for the immediate period preceding the summit and, together with other local groups,
mobilised supporters and sympathisers to protest at the summit. From our perspective, and with examples of the G8 leaders’ support for dictatorial regimes, arms sales and dubious trade and bilateral agreements, we argued that the policies being pursued by the G8 leaders were having devastating effects on our countries, leading many of us to flee – from political persecution, war and destruction of our natural environment, for example by Western oil companies in the Niger Delta in Nigeria. We further linked this to the harsh asylum and migration politics in the European Union (EU) fore fronted by Germany, which we felt, were very exclusionary and inhumane. Thus, our protest at the G8 Cologne summit in 1999 was, to all intents and purposes, beyond supporting debt cancellation – an issue that was not a priority for many like me who protested at the summit.

As has been documented, over 50,000 people participated in the protests, and the J2K with its German national campaign, the “Erlassjahr”, obviously remained the main umbrella network that coordinated the protests (Jubilee 2000 Coalition, 1999b; Pettifor, 2006: 304). Nevertheless, many other groups, initiatives and networks with various agendas and different grievances against the G8 leaders and their policies were also present. However, all these other groups with their agendas were subsumed under the Jubilee 2000 Campaign and its demands, as hardly any of them, and the issues, which they aimed to address, got any mention in the mainstream media. Overall, the news that the G8 leaders, in negotiations with the J2K representatives, had agreed to a 100 Billion Dollars debt relief for the poorest countries dominated the news waves and the mainstream media.

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3 See also Jubilee 2000 Coalition (2000g).
More than a dozen years on, I am intrigued by what the outcomes of the Campaign, which generated so much public enthusiasm and dominated the international political agenda in the late 1990s, in fact were, as the debt situation of the impoverished countries remains a recurring issue. Moreover, could there have been some lessons from the positions of some Southern campaigners, in view of the debt crises, that have now taken hold in many European countries? For a campaign that mobilised tens of thousands of people from different countries and continents to political events in Europe and millions more around the world to demand debt cancellation, it is clear that it generated enormous public support as shown by the international resonance of its call and the Campaign’s socialisation of the international political leadership. As I seek to provide some answers to the questions outlined above, I will build on previous studies in the field of TCAs to develop a theoretical framework that would aid the identification of the Campaign’s outcomes on different levels.

1.3 Contribution to Knowledge and Collective Action Literature

This research contributes to the study of TCAs in general and transnational advocacy networks in particular on both theoretical and empirical levels by means of both the analysis of J2K as such, and the identification of its outcomes.

First, the study contributes to the theoretical literature with the analytical framework that was developed in order to evaluate the outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign. Specifically, it builds on previous studies, particularly the theoretical framework developed for analysing the outcomes of collective actions of the new social movements (NSMs) cluster. This theoretical framework has been adapted to evaluate the J2K but it could, with further adaptation, be used to evaluate other collective actions pursuing external goals like the J2K.
Second, while it is acknowledged that there are overlaps in the features of movements, networks and coalitions, without adequately specifying these overlaps the conflating and often interchangeable use of these terms in the literature has at times been confusing, and has barely advanced our knowledge of TCAs. Thus, by clarifying these blurry divides, this research makes a further contribution to the literature on TCAs by showing that these terms serve both descriptive and analytical purposes. It shows that they bear inherently political meanings and therefore their use in the literature should command more careful attention and application. Finally, on the theoretical level, this research demonstrates the explanatory gaps in the major collective action theories with regards to the J2K, and shows that it is only a combination of their salient points or core contentions that explains the emergence of J2K, as none could single-handedly account for it. These core points were in part harnessed and combined in the various processes of “cutting the diamond”4 of debt that are explained in chapter six. Further, this thesis confirms transnational collective action (TAN) proponents’ account of their emergence and their transient nature as the J2K ceased to exist in its original form post 2000.

Third, this research makes an empirical contribution to our knowledge of the collective action to abolish the debt of impoverished countries with a detailed analysis of J2K. As outlined in the section on the research question, the issue of whether the Campaign was ‘successful’ or not is mired in debates and controversies. This study brings some needed clarity to these debates and provides answers to some of the pertinent questions by meticulously evaluating the Campaign’s outcomes with a theoretically grounded framework of analysis. By deploying the adapted theoretical

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framework, it was possible to capture the Campaign outcomes in terms of procedural, substantive and sensitising impacts, in addition to others discussed as legacies of the Campaign. Further, it shows why it is problematic to cast these outcomes in definitive and absolute terms. A well-developed framework may have aided a systematic identification of J2K outcomes; but equally significant was the explanation of the causal processes through which those outcomes may have been attained – as this has been noted as a major problem in evaluating TCA outcomes. In this research, the causal processes of the identified outcomes are specified and explained as the public preference mechanism and leverage politics.

Finally, this study contributes to the collective action literature. It clearly articulates the problems, debates and controversies associated with the evaluation of collective actions and outlines possible ways to mitigate some of them. These contributions undoubtedly deepen and broaden our knowledge of the study of TCAs and overall, it contributes to and enhances our understanding of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) as an extension of the new social movements cluster of collective actions. In the next section, I will briefly look at the significance of the Sabbath-Jubilee debt remission and why it served as an inspiration and motivation for the Jubilee 2000 Campaign.

1.4 The Sabbath-Jubilee Debt Remission: A Model for Debt Cancellation

While the Biblical Jubilee principle was the rallying call for debt cancellation in the J2K, that principle is intertwined with the Sabbath principles, a nexus I explore here as the Sabbath-Jubilee principles. These principles are prominent themes in many of the Old and New Testament books. Overall, they cover a number of issues like land ownership, debts, labour relations, loans and usury, debt slavery and other aspects of
life that pertains to equity, societal cohesion and life security in ancient Hebrew societies. According to theologians, these principles address probable and apparent agrarian and other socio-economic problems because it called for concrete actions to rectify serious inequities in the societal order and to overcome the tendency toward wealth accumulation and power for the few and poverty and marginalisation for many (Kinsler and Kinsler, 1999, xvi).

Relevant texts on these principles include Deuteronomy 15, which deals with the specific issue of debts, and Leviticus 25 where the Jubilee principle is broadly outlined. First, the concept of the Sabbath Day was reckoned as the seventh day in the ancient Hebrew Calendar and was regarded as a day of rest. In other biblical passages, the Sabbath Day tradition was extrapolated to the seventh year as the Sabbath Year and the injunctions of the Sabbath Day were broadened to include a year of rest for the land to fallow. Further, it was mandated that there should be remission of debts, and slaves should be freed on the Sabbath Year. It was also mandated that freed slaves were entitled to some portion of what they have worked during their enslavement. These Sabbath Day and Sabbath Year mandates constitute the Sabbath Principles.

Similarly, the Jubilee Principle derives from the mandates of the Jubilee Year. The principle mandates debt remission and freedom from slavery every 7 x 7 years of Sabbath, with the fiftieth year celebrated as the Year of Jubilee. It enjoins a right to recover and repossess land that may have been lost, and liberty to return to properties and families by those who may have been severed from them for various reasons.

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1 All Biblical texts referenced here are from the Revised Standard Version
3 See Deuteronomy 15:1-18, Exodus 23:10-11

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The Jubilee Principle addressed the problem of exploitation, poverty, and marginalisation because they were "(...) meant to provide hope to all the people, even in the worst circumstances, that their lives would be re-established in the Year of Jubilee (...)" (Kinsler and Kinsler, 1999: 16). So while the Sabbath Principles entails the remission of debts, freedom for slaves and rest for the land, the Jubilee Principle confirms these principles and further enjoins a recovery and redistribution of land, and liberty from debt slavery every fifty years. Although there may have been varied interpretations of the Jubilee mandate, it is clear that the Sabbath-Jubilee Principles mandate a cancellation of debts and freedom for slaves.

The issues as to whether the Jubilee mandates were meant to be obligatory or just a pious homily, an earnest exhortation, or simply a utopian dream-hope remain important but are essentially theological, and thus beyond the scope of this research. Suffice to understand the sense in which the biblical doctrine of Jubilee was understood and invoked in the call for debt cancellation for the impoverished countries by the year 2000. For those who mooted the idea of debt cancellation with Jubilee 2000 as its theme, it was their understanding that the year 2000 was marking a biblical cyclical end, culminating with the mandate that unpayable debts be redeemed, slaves be freed from their bondage and given the opportunity for a fresh start (Pettifor and Wood, 1996). It was this understanding and sprit of the biblical Jubilee debt remission that inspired the call and undergirded the Campaign for debt cancellation by the year 2000 for the impoverished countries, so that these countries would be freed from the burden of debt and start anew by the turn of the millennium. Accordingly, the Campaign employed imagery of slavery with symbols of chain as bondage, to represent the situation of the indebted countries.
As I will show in the analytical chapters, the Jubilee theme combined with the year 2000 were not only significant to the Campaign emergence, but crucial to its diffusion and the sometimes tenuous cohesion at different levels of the network. The timing and the theme were clearly motivating factors, which galvanised the mass mobilisation that underpinned and ensured the global status of J2K. Coupled with the frames the Campaign employed, it captured the imagination of the international public, and thus must be considered an important explanatory value in the emergence of J2K as a transnational collective action.

1.5 Campaigns and Outcomes

In this section, I will briefly examine the term ‘campaign’ and the approach to evaluation that will be adopted in this research. One of the issues that arise with the evaluative perspective of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ is that the purported outcomes of TCAs are often cast in definitive and conclusive terms. My critique of that approach means that it is necessary to develop a suitable alternative for this research. As a result, this section will include an outline of the evaluative approach that will be adopted in this study.

Campaigns: What is the meaning of the term ‘campaign’ and how is it to be understood in this research? The term campaign has a broad usage ranging from the military, marketing and media, to the political and a host of others. For example, it could describe a military operation for a particular objective, or the coordinated effort of a politician aspiring for a political office. Yet, it also refers to the organised, coordinated and concerted efforts of collective claimers in a collective action.
Its usage in the context of collective actions, however, can be confusing, as it is often employed within the same context as both a noun and a verb – describing a set of actions, without any proper distinction. As I will discuss in chapter three, Khagram et al. (2002: 7) describes transnational campaigns as the shared strategies or sets of tactics by transnational coalitions. However, I will also point out that what became known as the Jubilee 2000 Campaign started out as Jubilee 2000 initially and because it started to engage in different activities to realise its aims, it was soon referred to as a campaign. Thus, there was a flux in the usage of the term campaign in this context as it was conflated. For the purpose of clarity, the ‘Jubilee 2000 Campaign’ – abbreviated as ‘J2K’ and described in this research as ‘the Campaign’ – will refer to the TCA, which through its organised and coordinated efforts sought to influence decisions on the debt of impoverished countries.

Outcomes: I argued above that the approach, which evaluates the results of collective actions mainly in terms of success or failure, is narrow and ill equipped to adequately capture the impacts of J2K, and is therefore unsuitable for this study. In this research, the perspective that evaluates the results of the collective action on debt in terms of outcomes will be adopted because this would enable us to identify the different types of impacts, which the Campaign had at the different levels. However, as will be shown in chapter four, a major problem in evaluating the outcomes of TCAs is establishing the causal processes through which any identified outcomes may have been achieved. The difficulty this entails is captured by the notion of causal complexity, which holds that it is virtually impossible to identify all the causal factors for any changes that may occur in the arena of contention as these cannot be fully isolated from the wider socio-political, economic and cultural influences.
Consequently, given the web of actors and multiple locations, the complexities and multifaceted dimensions of the debt of impoverished countries and international finance, a conjectural, contextual and temporal approach to outcomes will be adopted in this research. This means that any identified outcomes of J2K would not be cast in absolute, definitive and conclusive terms. While a certain outcome may seem to have derived from a set of collective action activities, there may be other causal factors that the data, which is currently available, may not have uncovered. In other words, the identified outcomes of Jubilee 2000 Campaign in this research would be based on the available data, the context and the time frame of this evaluation. Adopting this approach is to take seriously the context in which the identified outcomes may have been achieved and acknowledge that there may be other possible causal influences. This would help guard against ascribing every perceptible change entirely to the collective action on debt without indisputable proof of the Campaign’s efforts as the sole causal factor of the purported outcome.

In the methodology chapter, I will discuss the research processes and methods employed. This will provide a deeper insight into the reasoning behind the adopted approach. It will also show why it is problematic to cast outcomes in conclusive and definitive terms. However, adopting this approach does not mean that efforts to identify the causal links between the identified outcomes and the collective action activities should be abandoned. This is the case because, while the adopted approach may exclude a categorical, definitive and conclusive declaration, it is still important to identify and explain how certain collective action activities may have led to the identified outcomes. As a result, the causal links between J2K activities and actions and the identified outcomes will, throughout this project, be explored in the form of public preference mechanism and leverage politics (Kolb, 2007; Keck and Sikkink,
1998). In the remainder of this chapter, I will outline the contents of each of the remaining chapters of this thesis.

1.6 Thesis Outline

Chapter two will be divided into two main parts. In the first part, I will examine the background of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign and probe how the debts were incurred. This section will show that the creditors' loan policies – the lack of restriction on capital transfer and loan pushing, and the geo-political interest of the creditors – contributed immensely to the impoverished countries' debt. It will also show that the problem was exacerbated by the debt management schemes, which the creditors deployed as the debt problem developed into a crisis. This section will acquaint us with the basis on which the Campaign would later argue the co-responsibility of the creditors for the debt problem and on which the injustice frame would be deployed.

The second part of the chapter will take a descriptive look at the J2K, the case study for this research. It will examine how the initial ideas for jubilee debt remission became the basis for Jubilee 2000 as a campaign theme, and how it subsequently developed into a transnational network. Starting from 1990, when Martin Dent drew on Christian theology and initiated the idea with his students at Keele University, I will review the Campaign's emergence, development and launch, aims and targets. I will briefly explore the significance of the Jubilee Rome conference and how the Campaign's organisational structure impacted on the dialogic and discursive space in the J2K. Finally, I will examine some of the tensions within the network and the controversy over the closure date. These last sections will highlight the importance of understanding the form of collective action configuration that developed around debt as debt norm entrepreneurs emerged in both the global North and South.
What are transnational advocacy networks and why does it matter whether a TCA is categorized as a network, movement or a coalition? These are some of the questions driving the third chapter. It begins by examining the categorisation of TCAs and shows that the categorisations are based on the level of coordination between the constituent parts of the particular collective action and will include an outline of the dominant modalities of each formation of TCAs. I will argue that the categorisations are not mutually exclusive and should be de-emphasised, as they make no substantial difference to the identification of TCA outcomes. The review will also show the inherent political meanings of these categorisations. Next, I will introduce collective action frames in view of its centrality to the Campaign’s public presentation and mobilisation strategy as a lead to how the Campaign employed the concept. This will be followed by brief reviews of the major theories of collective action. I will highlight their core contentions and their shortcomings to foreground a major argument in this study: concretely I will highlight that there are gaps in the literature on collective actions, as the theories they develop cannot single-handedly account for the emergence of J2K. Hence, this project will argue that a combination of their core contentions is necessary to explain the emergence of J2K.

Transnational advocacy networks are introduced as a burgeoning approach to the study of transnational collective actions. They are defined to include those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a). I will deploy some examples to illustrate the processes, strategies and tactics employed by TANs. Because TANs bear a lot of similarities to, but also extend the features of, the new social movements approach, they are described in this
research as an offshoot or an extension of that approach. However, I will argue that TANs remain distinct both for their intensive use of information politics to gain leverage over more powerful institutions, and the organisational platform from which that information politics is deployed.

The focus of chapter four is the theoretical framework for the evaluation of J2K. This will be preceded by a detailed examination of the problems, debates and controversies associated with the task of evaluating collective actions. The difficulty of linking collective action activities to changes in the arena of contention is noted as a major problem. Following a review of the monitoring and evaluation literature, I will adopt and adapt parts of the theoretical framework, which was developed by Giugni (1995) for the evaluation of new social movements, to evaluate the J2K. This is because the framework, designed for the evaluation of collective actions that pursue external goals, provides for different levels on which the outcomes of a collective action could be evaluated. In this research, these are the procedural, substantive and sensitising levels that would entail the recognition of J2K as legitimate representatives of the collective claimers, impacts of J2K on the target actors’ agenda, policy changes and concessions, and the sensitising of other social actors to the goals of J2K. The next section outlines the public preference mechanism and leverage politics as the causal processes through which the identifiable outcomes of J2K may have been achieved; and the final part concludes the chapter.

In chapter five, I will detail the research methodology that is, the research processes and the methods employed, discuss some of the challenges encountered in these processes, and the reasons underpinning the various decisions I took in conducting this research. A case study approach is used to allow in depth exploration and I
employed multiple methods that include semi-structured qualitative interviews, archival materials, secondary literature and opinion polls. Data from these sources were triangulated to minimise limitations inherent in any of the methods. One of the challenges I faced was defining the boundary for the case due to the breadth of the network and the complex and overlapping role of the UK component in the network. The Jubilee 2000 UK Coalition, while a national campaign, maintained an informal but a functional international Secretariat that was essentially the hub and the public face of the transnational collective action on debt. At the same time, in its activities, it was only responsible to the UK Board, as no such structures existed at the international level. In addition, the fact that the J2K emerged in the UK meant that key sources of information were located in the UK. However, to ensure a balance and a more complete version of events, I used Skype for interviews to source information from other components in different countries and continents. The analytical perspective employed in this research is based on the phenomenological research approach that takes individual and groups’ experiences of shared meanings into account and this was combined with the adapted theoretical framework to identify and analyse the outcomes of J2K.

The sixth chapter, titled “'cutting the diamond’ of debt”, following Pettifor (2006; also interview in March 2011), outlines the major arguments of this research. First, it argues that the major collective action theories are ill equipped to single-handedly explain the emergence of J2K due to their inherent shortcomings and that it is only by combining their salient points or core contentions that J2K’s emergence can be accounted for. Second, it contends that these salient points were harnessed in the processes and dynamics of cutting the diamond of debt, by means of in-depth research, robust and critical analyses, and the broad framing that largely underpinned
the Campaign’s emergence and its identifiable outcomes. It further argues that these processes aided the Campaign’s efforts to demystify and deconstruct the perceived arcane nature of debt and international finance, and identifies the target actors’ co-responsibility for the debt crisis. This in turn allowed for a redefinition of debt as a justice-based issue and enabled the Campaign to deploy the injustice frame, which included a call to redress the debt problem, and served to justify the cancellation of the unpayable debt.

Thirdly, this thesis contends that the Campaign mobilised the international public and socialised the target actors to accept the redefinition of debt as a crisis. It mainstreamed the issue in a political context where virtually all the target actors disputed that judgement. That this hinged on first, the Campaign’s mobilisation strategy, which centred on educating the public about the underlying issues of debt; second, on the opportune timing of the Campaign emergence and the significance of the Jubilee concept coupled with the framing of debt as a justice issue.

I also contend in this chapter that, while the justice theme of the Campaign was appealing enough to attract a broad range of groups in different regions, it was vague and not inclusive enough to accommodate content contributions from the Jubilee South. The friction and division that the varied interpretation of justice spurred was evidenced by the difference in the underlying principles of ‘debt cancellation’ and ‘debt relief’ and it reflects the invocation of different principles of justice by both sides. The chapter will look, in particular, at the controversy surrounding the closing date, the struggle for ownership of the Campaign and the marginalisation of Southern voice in the network.
Chapter seven is driven by the question: ‘Was it worth the efforts?’ At issue is; what were the outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign? The theoretical framework and the analytical approach adopted for this research provided the tools to analyse the data collected, identify and specify the outcomes of J2K. In line with the theoretical framework, the outcomes were specified as procedural, substantive and sensitising impacts supplemented by those discussed as legacies of the Campaign. Access to the target actors by the Campaign and its recognition as legitimate representatives of the collective action on debt meant that the J2K made procedural impacts. The policy changes that saw the introduction of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC1) and its enhanced version (HIPC2), and the unilateral debt cancellation by the creditor countries, constituted substantive impacts, which by extension included the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). Further, the J2K made sensitising impacts by its ability to mobilise and socialise various social actors to its aims, and crucially, this included some of the target actors. As I will detail later, partial debt cancellation resulted from the substantive impacts of the Campaign and this was built on the procedural and the sensitising impacts that the Campaign achieved. While this research refrain from a broad evaluation of J2K as failed or successful campaign given the shortcomings of that approach, it was nevertheless important to examine where the Campaign succeeded or failed in its declared aims and objectives, in light of the identified outcomes.

Finally, the issue of causal mechanisms is explored, and while the causal processes for both the procedural and sensitising impacts are self-evident, those of the substantive impacts derive from the cumulative causal processes of the procedural and sensitising impacts. In other words, this was the access gained to the target actors and the recognition achieved as legitimate representatives.
combined with the processes of the sensitising impacts. This culminated in the public preference mechanism that was deployed to leverage the international financial institutions and the other targets. Throughout this thesis, I argue that outcomes are mediated by a series of factors that could hardly be exhausted; particularly in an intractable and complex issue such as debt, it is therefore problematic to be definitive, absolute and conclusive concerning the outcomes of J2K. Moreover, the difficulty of directly and incontrovertibly linking the Campaign efforts to the identifiable outcomes meant a reasonable justification for the conjectural, contextual and temporal approach to outcomes adopted in this research. In the next chapter, I will examine the background to the Jubilee 2000 Campaign before taking a detail look at the Campaign as the case study for this research.
2. The Background and Emergence of Jubilee 2000 Campaign (J2K)

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will be divided into two main parts. The first part will explore the historical background to the Jubilee 2000 Campaign by tracing the causes of the debt crisis and the management mechanisms that were adopted by the creditors to address the debt problem.

In this section I will seek to argue:

First, that the causes of the debt problem are largely rooted in the creditors’ loan policies, particularly the United States monetary policy changes that enabled unrestricted capital export and the use of foreign aid in the struggle for geo-political influence.

Second, that the management schemes adopted to deal with the debt problem were mainly motivated by the creditors’ desire to stabilise their vulnerable banks and the international banking and finance system, rather than either the debt problem per se or its effects on indebted countries.

The second part of the chapter will detail the emergence of Jubilee 2000 Campaign, and looks at the initial ideas and its origins, from its conception at Keele University in 1990 through its growth into a global campaign. I will review its development, official launch and the formation of the Jubilee 2000 Coalition when Jubilee 2000 merged with the Debt Crisis Network (DCN), before looking at its aims and targets. The Campaign emergence and its leadership provided focus and direction to the anti-debt campaign network at the national and international levels by adopting a number of clearly defined goals and a strategy to achieve those goals.
In any global network that comprised varied and diverse groups from different backgrounds and orientations some problems and tensions are bound to exist, and this applied equally to the J2K. These problems and tensions were sometimes within and between Northern groups but, at other times, they were between Northern and Southern groups. While some of the tensions were due to ideological differences, and played against some historical backgrounds, others stemmed from the usual professional jealousy between groups in the UK Coalition. At times, a clash of different leadership styles and the mode of operation the Campaign adopted compared to some of the aid and development groups also contributed to the tension between groups in the network. I will briefly look at some of these issues, and why some of the simmering tension was partly a reflection of the age-old South-North divides, resulting in the formation of Jubilee South and revealing apparent divisions within the network. The last sections will outline the successor groups to the J2K, and how the organisational structure impacted on the discursive space in the network. The final part is the summary and chapter conclusion. Reviewing the background and history of the Campaign is important because it provides a good contextualisation of the Campaign, which aids our understanding of the Campaign’s definition and frame of the problem. Further, it sheds light on some important issues regarding collective action emergence that will be vital in the analysis of J2K and the conclusions that will be drawn in this research.

2.2 Background of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign: Debt and its Management

As background to the emergence of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign, I will briefly trace the relevant history of the global South countries’ debt, otherwise known as the Third
World8 debt, how it reached crisis levels, and the management mechanisms adopted to address it. This is important because, first, it will enable us to understand the Campaign’s diagnosis and definition of the debt problem, and the reasoning behind its demands. Second, it will explain why the Campaign deployed the ‘injustice’ frame in the debt discourse and, finally, it is vital to the theoretical account of the emergence of J2K that will be discussed later in this research.

Recent studies suggest that the origin and escalation of the debt problem of the global South, which culminated in a crisis, can be partly traced to the surplus capital that was available to many Western banks in the 1970s, and a series of shifts in US monetary policies which took place throughout the 1970s, in the wake of increased inflation, balance of payments and trade deficits (Kindleberger, 1996: 183ff; Darity and Horn, 1988; 1991; Nunnenkamp, 1986). The former precipitated the subsequent ‘Loan pushing’ that the banks engaged in, and the latter facilitated that process. These increased the level of indebtedness of impoverished countries because of the consequent increase in the exchange rate of the dollar with the borrowers’ currency, and the hike in interest rates in international capital markets that increased the debt-service burden (Corbridge, 1993: 24-55; Vallely, 1990: 126-168; Lindert, 1989; Congdon, 1988: 110-135). The reasons for these are diverse, yet interrelated.

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8 Although this is a widely used term in Economics and Development literature, I refrain from using it because it has a number of negative connotations. Instead, I will use countries of the global South or ‘developing countries’ to refer to countries of the same or similar economic status rather than actual geographic demography.

9 Poor planning and domestic policy failures in the borrowing countries also contributed to the problem. But here, I focus on the role of the commercial banks and the lending attitudes of Western creditors, as these were the factors that tipped the problem to a crisis. Another factor was the strategic and geo-political importance of some of these countries to the major powers during the cold war, which meant that corrupt leaders were encouraged and granted loans with the backing of the major powers.
The United States support for Israel in its war with Egypt and Syria\(^\text{10}\) in October 1973 prompted a number of oil-producing Arab States to place oil embargo on the US and some other Western countries, and to cut oil production by as much as 25 per cent. In addition to, but independent of these actions, the organisation for petroleum exporting countries (OPEC) decided to raise the price of crude oil by about 70 per cent, to reflect and stabilise their real incomes from oil (Cohen, 2003; Farr, 1999; Issawi, 1978: 12-16). This followed the failure in negotiations between OPEC and the multinational oil companies over the issue of real price of oil and incomes.\(^\text{11}\) A combination of these actions and events resulted in oil shortages in the international market and a huge increase in oil prices. In 1979, OPEC again took a similar action with the same effect of increased oil prices. Both of these events became known as the ‘oil crises’ (Nunnenkamp, 1986: 52f).

This stabilised high increase in oil prices translated into sudden and enormous wealth for all the oil exporting countries, hence the term “Petro-dollars”. Most of these suddenly rich Arab States decided to deposit their cash in Western commercial banks for profit. As a result, surplus capital was suddenly available to many Western banks, which they then needed to re-invest to enable them to fulfil the contractual promise of profit to their depositors. This was the beginning of the ‘recycling of petro-dollars’, as these banks started ‘loan-pushing’ to many developing countries because there were far too few borrowers in the developed Western countries to match the vast amount of money available (Adams, 1991; Vallely, 1990: 137-148; Darity and Horn, 1988: 8-17; Nunnenkamp, 1986: 92-107).

\(^{10}\) The White House (1973)

\(^{11}\) The Bretton Wood System of fixed exchange rate otherwise known as the ‘gold standard’ was an international monetary regime where the value of the US dollar was tied to Gold and the value of other currencies were tied to the US dollar and it allowed for dollars to be converted to gold. In the early 1970s, the system collapsed because the US unilaterally withdrew support for it in 1971 and this affected the value of the other currencies that were attached to the US Dollar. This, in turn affected the real income that the oil-producing countries were getting from the sale of their oil. Issawi (1978), Vallely (1990).
'Loan-pushing' is defined as lending designed to attract borrowers who would normally be denied access to credit. It occurs whenever lending banks supply more credit to borrowing countries than the borrowing countries would voluntarily take. In practical terms, at the time it meant banks and lending institutions encouraging foreign governments to take loans they do not really need nor qualify for (Hanlon, 2000: 881; Hertz, 2004; Basu, 1991: 24; Darity and Horn, 1988: 17; Darity, 1986: 204). In loan-pushing processes, the rules are very loose, porous and deliberately ignored or relaxed to aid the avoidance of the necessary scrutiny for a loan project to go ahead.

The scenario described above was precisely the case when loans were made to countries of the global South in the 1970s and early 1980s. It was a time when multinational banks “tumbled over one another in trying to uncover new foreign borrowers and practically forced money on the less-developed countries” (Kindleberger, 1996: 19). Andrew Brimmer, a former US Federal Reserve Governor, recalled that it was the time when there was a drastic softening of lending terms and the banks became aggressive credit promoters (cited in Darity and Horn, 1988: 11-15; Hanlon, 2002: 11-12).

The foregoing leads to the second main reason for the debt crisis, which is the series of shifts in US monetary policies. First, the US government in August 1971 unilaterally stopped the possibility of converting the dollar to gold, contrary to the provisions of the Bretton Woods agreement, and with that brought the existing international financial exchange of Bretton Woods to an end. Further shifts in the US monetary policy included the removal of prevailing national restrictions to capital
exports which then allowed banks to loan out money without the necessary scrutiny because the US removed its capital control (Vallely, 1990: 132; Nunnenkamp, 1986: 96-97; Llewellyn, 1979: 25-54). The deregulations also intensified activities at the Eurocurrency market in what has been described as a “competition in fiscal laxity” (Edwards, 1985: 179).

Thus “loan-pushing” and the softening of lending rules and rates, the arbitrary increase in interest rates, and the lack of necessary controls were possible only because of the shifts in US policies that facilitated the process. Although the commercial banks that were recipients of the petrodollars needed to make profits on the money deposited with them, the banks nevertheless gave loans that offered the borrowers to repay less than they actually borrowed in some cases. While this was clearly a novel attitude, it indicated dubious intentions that included entrapping the borrowing countries. The spectre of “loan-pushing” to developing countries in the 1970s appears a typical example of the argument that speculators seek to invest in more profitable ventures often in an atmosphere of fraud and shady dealings (Kindleberger, 1996: 14-23).

The recklessness, with which these banks gave loans, and their overall lending framework, seemed to have been guided by the infamous declaration by Walter Wriston, then Chairman of Citibank, that “countries don’t go bankrupt” (Birdsall and Williamson, 2002: 14). The implication of this was that, whatever happens in the borrowing countries, there would be enough assets to recover the loans. Wriston would be proved right years later, with the dynamics of the ‘debt market’ where third parties could buy impoverished countries debt and forcibly redeem it by seizing any
available assets of the indebted countries, as the recent example of the Democratic Republic of Congo and others show.\(^\text{12}\)

Compounding the problem for the debtor countries, however, was that this period also marked a sharp fall in commodity prices for many of the countries in the global South. This was because of the gluts that occurred at the international market as they were compelled by the lenders to produce more of the same cash crops for export (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2012; Peters, 1999; Hanlon, 2006b: 115f; Adams, 1991: 155; Cardoso and Dornbusch, 1989: 129). So as these countries started to earn less for their commodities, but had to pay more for their loans as a result of the arbitrarily increased interest rates, the inevitable results could only be increased debts as they were compelled to take new loans to meet their repayments. Steadily, the problem from these unfettered loans was deepening as the debts were mounting.

Finally, it has to be added that all these played against the background where aid and loans were used by the major powers (that were also the creditors) as a major weapon in the struggle for geo-political influence and control that marked the cold war era. This process saw the major powers prop up corrupt and brutal dictators in various global South countries. As President Kennedy pointedly noted soon after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis:

\text{Aid is a method by which the United States maintains a position of influence and control around the world and sustains a good many countries which would}

\(^{12}\) In the 1980s the former Yugoslavia gave loans for a power plant to the late dictator Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo). As Congo defaulted on the loan, FG Hemisphere, a Vulture Fund, bought the debt at the debt market for about $3 million and has since tried to claim the original full amount. After failing to confiscate Congolese diplomatic properties in the US, but effectively frozen payments to Congo by international partners through litigation, FG Hemisphere recently got a court in Jersey, in the Channel Islands, to order the Democratic Republic of Congo to pay the sum of over $100 million to it. This happened even after it was revealed that the debt was illegally sold. Liberia and the Republic of Zambia have also undergone similar experiences. There were 17 such cases in 2010 and 2011 and by end 2013, 8 were ongoing (Jubilee USA Network, n.d.).
definitely collapse or pass into the communist bloc...Really, I put it right at
the top of the essential programs in protecting the security of the free world.\textsuperscript{13}

Interestingly, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were accomplices in this process as they were deftly used by the major powers to achieve this aim. A telling example is the case of Mobutu Sese Seko, the former President of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). In 1978, Karin Lissakers\textsuperscript{14} made public an internal IMF memo by Erwin Blumenthal – a key IMF appointee at the central Bank in Zaire. In the memo, Blumenthal warned that creditors have absolutely no chance of getting their money back due to the massive corruption in the country, and the profligate spending of the President. Nevertheless in 1987, the US pushed through a further IMF loan to Zaire, in exchange for providing territory for covert operation in the struggle for influence and against communism in neighbouring Angola (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2012: 11; Shawki, 2010: 223; 2011; Hertz, 2004: 32; Hanlon, 2006b: 123). This was by no means the only case, nor was it peculiar to the US, as it was a staple in the Cold War era.

**The Debt Crisis and its Management:** In most of the global South countries, the cost of debt servicing increasingly led to cuts in funding for health, education and basic necessities like food, clean water and other social services (Sitali, 2008: 3; Zulu, 2002: 5-11; Barrett, 2000: 4, Vallely, 1990: 169-178; Clarke, 1986; Pettifor, 2001: 48; War on Want (WoW), 1986). The creditors response to the debt problem varied as debts were differently classified; as official debts – owed on bilateral or multilateral basis and as private debts – owed mainly to commercial banks. However, Mexico’s announcement on 13 August 1982 that the country was bankrupt, and

\textsuperscript{13} Cited in Hertz, (2004: 29).

\textsuperscript{14} Lissakers was at the time deployed to head the central bank in Zaire but resigned within two years due to the level of corruption by the Zaire leadership and she later became the US Executive Director of the IMF.
could no longer continue to repay its external debts, served to confirm the debt problem as a crisis.

The immediate response of the creditors was a rescue package for Mexico, to ensure continued repayments, and thus began a series of rescheduling efforts (Corbridge, 1993: 44; Adams, 1991: 57; Basu, 1991: 2; Kuczynski, 1988: 83-87). By the end of 1983, 25 countries were in the same position as Mexico. They all received similar packages in order to prevent a potential meltdown of the international finance and banking system and many US banks, as revealed by the testimony of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, to the Senate Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy:

*We face extraordinary pressures in the international financial system.... This is not an abstract, esoteric problem of marginal interest to our (US) economy. Failure to address these problems will jeopardize our jobs, our exports and our financial system. Unless it is dealt with effectively, it could undermine both our recovery and the economies of our trading partners and friends abroad. I am confident that the situation can be managed – but it won’t manage itself (cited in Corbridge, 1993: 41).*

As it turned out, Mexico’s default process could not really play out because the rescue package ensured that while there was a 90-day moratorium on its debt (Basu, 1991: 2), it was able to continue its interest payments.

Besides the ‘Mexican solution’ that was now the blueprint, there were other proposals to manage the debt problem but it was only the Brady Plan that was implemented. Introduced in 1989 by the US Treasury Secretary, Nicholas Brady, it targeted the severely indebted middle-income countries (SIMICs) in Latin America.

15 While a potential meltdown certainly appeared the most likely scenario under the circumstance, it was by no means the only possible outcome as there were precedence cases in Zaire in 1975, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Poland’s default in 1981 that did not follow the Mexico pattern (Duggar, 2008: 40; Corbridge, 1993: 40-44). However, it should be noted that there was a vast difference in the level of debt and the involvement of commercial banks in these cases.
Quite significantly, it acknowledged that the debts were no longer worth the stated value by the banks, and hence had to be reduced. This tacit debt reduction was done through bonds that were issued by the debtor countries, was guaranteed by the WB and the IMF, and was sold in a secondary market known as “Menu” with various options that included exchange of the private loans (Corbridge, 1993: 71-77; Krugman, 1990, 1989).

The overall effect of the Brady Plan was that it reduced some debts of the SIMICs. More importantly, debt reduction was made an explicit part of the framework, as the banks were compelled to bear some of the loss (Berthélemy and Lensink, 1992: 14). However, as the Brady Plan mainly targeted SIMICs in Latin America with commercial debts, it had no effect in sub-Sahara Africa, as it was only Morocco, Nigeria and Ivory Coast that were grouped with low middle-income countries, and could benefit from it (Herman et al., 2010; Vilanova and Martin, 2001: 4; Corbridge, 1993: 73-74). Finally, there was the Paris Club ‘Terms’ of concessional finance, debt rescheduling and debt “Menu” (Corbridge, 1993: 76-78).16

Generally, the management mechanisms adopted by the creditors to the crisis showed that there was either a lack of in-depth understanding of the crisis or a lack of the necessary political will to address the problem; a critical appraisal would show that the global South debt problem was actually exacerbated by these mechanisms as it relates to sub-Saharan countries. First, although the debt problem pre-dated the Mexico default case, it was not really acknowledged and given proper attention. Second, when the Mexico situation forced attention on the problem, the creditors misdiagnosed it. The issue raised by the indebted countries, beginning with Mexico,

16 For details of the provisions of the various ‘Paris Club Terms’, see Vilanova and Martin (2001: 5).
was understood as liquidity and not as a solvency problem (Momani, 2010; Vilanova and Martin, 2001: 5; Kindleberger, 1996: 19; Corbridge, 1993: 44; Sachs, 1989: 276). As we shall see later, this perception of the problem was a source of public bickering between the WB and the IMF preceding the introduction of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) in 1996. After failing to properly recognise the problem, an inappropriate solution was applied. For example, Mexico got a rescue package, which enabled it to meet its repayments, but it included a further $5 billion dollar loan from the same US banks whose loan it threatened to default on (Corbridge, 1993: 45; Payer, 1989: 13). In other words, the reasons why Mexico could not repay its debts were not really examined; rather, the focus was on Mexico’s continued repayments, which could only be done by securing additional loan with further interests.

The argument here is that the concern of the creditors, particularly the US authorities, was to ensure that debtor countries were in a position to continue to repay due interests on their loans. Congdon (1988: 132f) noted that it was just an elaborate circular process, which meant collecting the loans from one source and giving it further. In some cases, it did not even leave the banks in London or New York. As Huw Evans, a former IMF Executive Director later admitted, the steps taken to manage the debt problem were “(...) aimed at ensuring that existing Fund loans to these countries – arrears on which were beginning to mount – could be refinanced” (1999: 271).

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17 Anayiotis and de Pinies (1990); Sachs (1989). Ffrench-Davis (1990) argues that there may have been variations but it was basically the same prescription for the countries on the verge of default.
18 Huw Evans was UK Executive Director at the IMF and World Bank from 1994-1999 (The Telegraph, 2002).
Thus, the adopted mechanisms were motivated more by the creditors' desire to protect their banks and banking system at the expense of dealing with the debt problems and its consequences for the global South countries. This is supported by analysts who have noted, with regard to the US management of the crisis that "Its objective has been to buttress the US banking system, which is more vulnerable to destabilization by nonperforming foreign loans than at any time in the past" (Eichengreen and Portes, 1989: 212). The former Colombian Finance Minister adds that the response to the 1980s debt crisis "was an excellent way to deal with the US banking crisis, and an awful way to deal with the Latin American debt crisis" (José Antonio Ocampo, cited in Jones, 2012). As I pointed out in the previous section, the loans that were 'pushed' to the debtor countries that underpinned the crisis were facilitated by shifts and changes in the US monetary policies. So there is evidence that the US shares a considerable part of the blame for the debt crisis, particularly when its role in using aid for geo-political influence is factored in.

A further dimension that is often overlooked was that by the late 1960s, the IMF assumed the 'preferred creditors' status and made all debt rescheduling, including aid and other export credit, conditional on agreements with the Fund; even if it was itself not offering any or much of the loans (Evans, 1999: 276; van Drimmelen, 1998: 61; Eichengreen and Portes, 1989: 213ff). This meant that in terms of debt repayments the Fund would be prioritised, and debt rescheduling would include the Fund conditionalities like the structural adjustment programme (SAP), a situation that would complicate attempts at debt cancellation in the course of the Campaign. The result of the foregoing was that it left indebted countries in a very precarious situation, because for a majority of the heavily indebted sub-Saharan countries the situation remained debilitating in spite of the Paris Club Terms.
Further, it saw the emergence of debt norm entrepreneurs$^{19}$ united on the problem as a crisis and it spurred them to amplify the call to redress the problem and, ultimately, gave rise to the transnational collective action on debt, and to that I now turn.

2.3 Emergence of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign

The Jubilee 2000 Campaign was a broad transnational network that was comprised of several local, national and international NGOs, aid and development groups, religious, labour, students’ and civic organisations, which campaigned for the cancellation of impoverished countries’ debt. It started in the UK in the mid-1990s, lasted until the end of 2000, and had national campaigns in as many as 69 countries, with individual participants from 166 countries across all continents (Grenier, 2003: 86; Barrett, 2000: 29). In this section, I will trace the Campaign’s emergence as I look at the initial ideas, its development and growth. I will examine the Campaign’s aims and targets as well as tensions and controversies in the network. The last parts will look at the successor groups, the organisational structure of the Campaign and how that structure impacted on the discursive and dialogue space in the network.

As the case study in this research, tracing its emergence is important for a number of reasons; it allows for the scrutiny of the theoretical claim that collective actions

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$^{19}$ Norms are widely understood as a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity and by norm entrepreneurs is meant, the first groups of people who are engaged and prepared to take actions to rectify identified problems at the domestic or international levels (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891-899; Katzenstein 1996: 5, fn.12). Norm Entrepreneurs are social agents with strong notions about desirable behaviour in their areas of interest and are motivated by values and principled ideas, altruistic, empathetic or ideational commitments. They are usually individuals who champion policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of personal interests or benefits (Mansbridge, 1990a; Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 8f; Oliner and Oliner, 1988; Oliner and Oliner, 1992; Konarzewska, 1992; Keohane, 1990). They attempt to institute alternative modes to practices they consider inappropriate by drawing attention to, problematising issues and contesting what is apparently accepted as normal in any given socio-political and cultural systems or at the international level. For further discussions of the different motivations that could underpin their activities, see Mansbridge (1990b) and Oliner, 1992).
emerge when political opportunity structures lessen constraints and create incentives or opportunities for social actors, who, through repertoires of actions, make and sustain claims concerning their targets. In addition to this, it is also important because it shows the role of ideas and opportune timing in problematising the issue of debt by collective actors against the backdrop of the notion of principled ideas, ethical and non-material values that underpins collective actions in the mode of TANs and the NSMs. As I will show below, the ideas for debt cancellation for impoverished countries existed long before the J2K emerged. The difference was, they never gained the impetus and momentum that was needed to propel them onto the international political agenda where they could be addressed.

Further, looking at the Campaign’s emergence enables us to examine and ascertain how theories of collective action in the literature and the burgeoning approach of TANs, reviewed in the next chapter, fares vis-à-vis the J2K. Does the emergence of J2K in the mid-1990s validate the notion of cognitive liberation propounded by theorists like McAdam (1982: 43-51) and Klandermans (1992: 79)? In other words, did the J2K emerge because participants and potential supporters not only realised that the situation was unjust but felt that it could now be redressed through their own direct efforts? What accounts for J2K’s emergence after a decade and a half-long effort by other groups and networks on debt failed to mobilise public support? By outlining the case study, I will shed light on some of these questions as a prelude to the analysis of J2K later in this research. Finally, it is important because it gives an insight into some of the frictions that transpired in the Campaign and it provides a basis for us to understand some of the controversies surrounding the evaluation of J2K, and the politicised nature of evaluating TCAs.
2.3.1 Initial Ideas and Emergence of the Campaign

This section looks at how the initial ideas for the Jubilee campaign were developed in the interaction between a set of social actors with similar interests in addressing the debt problems of the global South, and how those initial ideas laid the foundation for the TCA on debt that became known as the Jubilee 2000 Campaign.

The origin of the ideas and initiatives that culminated in the J2K can be traced to Martin Dent, Bill Peters, Michael Schluter, and a group of students at Keele University in Britain. Their common interest and socio-political engagement was interrelated. While their common interest was sometimes parallel the interaction between them eventually led Dent and Peters to collaborate with the Debt Crisis Network also in Britain, and together with others, to form the Jubilee 2000 Coalition. Central to their engagement, initiatives, and the collective action that emerged from it was the arcane issue of impoverished countries' debt and international finance, it's devastating consequences, and possible ways to alleviate them (Pettifor, 2006: 299f; Dent, 1999b: 27ff).

Martin Dent had served in the colonial service in Nigeria before joining Keele University in Britain as a Lecturer in Political Science. Throughout his academic career, until he retired in July 1990, he has been engaged with the issue of addressing poverty in the impoverished countries after witnessing the burden of debt on these countries. Drawing on Christian theology and development economics, he developed a proposal, which was based on the biblical paradigm of debt remission. To some extent he had become a recognised figure on the issue of sovereign debt of the global South countries and its consequences. It was this expertise and insight that was brought to bear when he wrote a Paper which included the idea of the Jubilee debt
remission for Frank Judd, then the Director of Oxfam, on ways to help poorer nations. Michael Schluter, who then was Director of Jubilee Centre in Cambridge, obtained a copy of that Paper and noted that the idea of Jubilee was a good basis to challenge the problem of unpayable debt of poor countries and suggested the year 2000AD as "the 'acceptable year' – the year with which to connect the one-off debt remission" (Dent, 1999a: 17) proposed by Dent.

Also in 1990, a group of Keele University students, who were engaged on development issues in poor countries under the title 'Third World First' and 'Oxfam', invited Martin Dent, who was still a Lecturer in the University, to a public event on the same issue. Covering themes of aid, trade and debt in that event, Dent and the students agreed that moving forward, "Jubilee 2000" would be a more suitable title for their continued engagement and envisaged project (Dent, 1999a: 17f). This group of students would form the core support base at the inception of the initial effort at campaigning on debt and in the course of the following three years.

Following their graduation, and in the wake of Dent's retirement from the University in July 1990, Dent worked almost full time on developing the concept of Jubilee 2000 further. He consulted broadly, solicited support from a wide array of people, and wrote letters to Bank Chairmen, civic organisations and religious leaders, and every Member of Parliament. In no time, a group of Parliamentarians from all the major political Parties who supported his ideas was formed. He also wrote to all accredited Ambassadors and High Commissioners to Britain explaining his ideas and

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20 The Jubilee Centre is a Christian social reform organisation and seeks to equip the Church by providing a biblical perspective on issues and trends in the contemporary world. For more see http://www.jubilee-centre.org/engage/jubilee_centre.

21 One of these Chairmen was Sir Jeremy Morse of Lloyds Bank, whose reply Dent considered helpful and which, according to Dent, led him to buy the Bank's ordinary shares to enable him attend their annual shareholder's meeting to further ask questions about unpayable debt and to advance the case for debt cancellation (Dent, 1999b: 30).
soliciting their support for a United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution to declare 2000 the year of Jubilee for unpayable debt (Dent, 1999b: 29ff). He received a number of responses, many of them professing enthusiastic support for his ideas. It was in this process that Dent came in contact with the DCN and started attending their meetings in 1991 (Grenier, 2003: 90).

It was also in the above context that Dent became aware that Bill Peters, a former British High Commissioner in Malawi, had also been working on the debt of global South countries since his retirement in 1983. Although unknown to Dent and his students at the time the idea of Jubilee 2000 was being initiated in Keele, Peters upon his retirement continued to campaign and lobby various government and IFIs in different countries on debt, and argued it in the series of his Valedictory dispatch. As both men got increasingly closer in their engagement on the debt issue, Dent invited Peters in 1993 to Co-Chair Jubilee 2000 with him. Peters accepted the invitation and both of them became regarded as founders of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign (Dent, 1999b: 31). Before I look at how this initial idea developed into a proper campaign in the following years, it is worth noting how Dent envisioned a campaign that would be geared toward poverty eradication. In 1990 Dent wrote:

A movement to be successful and to effect some great and important improvement in human affairs must have three characteristics. It must be bold and inspire the imagination; it must have a single great idea and a simple purpose that can be easily grasped. And finally, it must start from small beginnings and spread to become a great movement, with many branches and advocates with access to publicity and means of influence upon government; it must build up expertise and distinguished leadership as it progresses. Those who start the movement may well not be those who lead it when it grows to larger dimensions. Since the purpose of the movement is to produce

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22 Dent also recounts how he proposed debt remission for low-income countries at the Liberal Democrat Party’s Conference in 1990 where it was adopted as a party policy for the next six years.
23 This referred to the final letters sent home before Ambassadors wrapped up their duties in their assigned posts.
24 Dent acknowledged the advice of David Throup, his Departmental colleague at Keele University for the vision to emphasise a contribution to a campaign to eradicate poverty in the Third World (Dent, 1999b: 27, 38 supra note 1).
beneficial change and not to reflect credit upon its originators, this is altogether fitting and proper.\textsuperscript{25}

A number of Dent’s postulations above would be realised when the Jubilee 2000 became a full-fledged campaign in 1996 and developed into a global campaign thereafter. However, as is usually the case with norm entrepreneurs and in most cases epistemic communities, there is a consensus of expert opinions on a problematised issue and to a large extent, the prognosticated solution. In the case of debt and poverty in the global South countries, it was not different. Since the early 1980s, various aid and development agencies as well as ecumenical bodies from Latin America, Africa, Europe and North America have been drawing attention to the huge effects of debts and poverty in the global South countries. These included calls from the Church and Bishop Councils in England, Norway and Germany, and also by their Methodist and Lutheran equivalents in Africa and Latin America. Others were the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) in 1985 (van Drimmelen, 1998: 69-72). In 1990, the All-African Council of Churches called for debt cancellation for African countries by 2000 while the commonwealth finance ministers discussed the debt situation and debt relief in 1990 and 1992 respectively (Roy, 2005: 86f; Rustomjee, 2004).

The Christian Aid (CA) publication of “Banking on the Poor” in 1988 called for debt forgiveness and argued that poor people in the indebted countries were essentially being charged with the enormous task of debt repayments and bearing the brunt of harsh IMF policies (Christian Aid, 1988). The Catholic aid organisation (CAFOD) launched its Education Campaign ‘Proclaim Jubilee in Africa’ in 1988 with emphasis on the impacts of debt repayments on indebted countries (Teague, 1988). The World

\textsuperscript{25} Cited in Dent (1999b: 28).
Development Movement (WDM) did the same and parodied the *Financial Times* with the production of *Financial Crimes* — a debt newspaper (Greenhill et al., 2003: 27). This was also the reason behind the formation in 1987 of the DCN that was meant to foster coordination and cooperation between groups working on debt. Similar networks developed in countries like the Netherlands with the formation of networks like European Network on Debt and Development (EURODAD) in 1990, which launched “Target 92”, a campaign that focused on the urgent need to resolve the debt crisis caused by official debts (Eurodad, 1994: 24; Donnelly, 1999: 34).

In other words, that debt had become a serious problem for many global South countries was virtually a consensus opinion by 1990, when Dent started to articulate his initial ideas on how to address it. Furthermore, Dent’s proposed solution was not peculiarly novel. As others like Hanlon, Keene, Njoki (interviews with the author in 2011) pointed out, before J2K started there were many campaigns in the global South countries, which were focused on debts. Some of them had more progressive, radical proposals and demands than Dent and the J2K’s. Similarly, as Dent also readily acknowledged, other people and organisations had different ideas about the coming millennium and therefore he did not want ‘Debt-free 2000’ as the name of the proposed campaign (Dent, 1999b: 32). Put differently, the idea of celebrating the impending millennium with some sort of landmark was also not unique to him.

What was unique to Dent, however, was the idea to ingeniously link a concrete proposal for debt remission for indebted countries to the biblical Jubilee concept, complemented by “2000” as suggested by Michael Schluter, hence “Jubilee 2000”, in an opportune timing, in light of the impending millennium. The galvanising effect that the Campaign would derive from this combination, as the last millennium drew
to a close, very much reflected its inspiration and resonance within and beyond the faith-based groups as evident in the Campaign's momentum in the wake of its launch. Thus, although numerous groups, agencies and networks invested a lot of resources and efforts over the decade preceding 1990 into drawing attention to the effects of debt, it failed to become a major item on the international political agenda. Rather, it was the unique combination that Dent articulated and the timing of the emergent Campaign with the link to a momentous event that captured the imagination of people around the world and resulted in the broad public support, which the Campaign ultimately garnered. In the next section, I will look at how these ideas developed into a proper campaign.

2.3.2 Development and Launch of the Campaign

This section reviews how the nucleus of the Jubilee 2000 developed, the launching of the Campaign, and its merger with the DCN to form the Jubilee 2000 Coalition in the UK. Martin Dent had clearly set out his vision of a campaign at the beginning of the 1990s, a few months before he retired from academia. Having initiated the idea, and developed the conceptual framework of the Campaign to some extent, Dent and Peters approached the DCN, who were also preoccupied with the issue of debt of the global South countries, with the proposal to link his idea of debt cancellation to the impending millennium celebration in 2000.

Most of the Network members were sceptical and therefore initially rejected the idea of Jubilee debt remission on the grounds that it was impractical and “too religious” — due to the overt biblical reference, for their constituencies. Nevertheless, some of them still recognised that it was likely to resonate with and hence mobilise large members of faith-based communities in Western creditor countries. One of those
who would later consider the idea 'brilliant' was Ann Pettifor, who at the time was the Co-ordinator of DCN – on behalf of whom she was lobbying the Bank, the Fund, the Paris Club, and the British government for debt relief. She joined with Dent and Isabel Carter, assembled a core group of people who supported the Jubilee concept in March 1995, and by early 1996 they had set up an office in Lower Marsh Street in London with office space provided by Christian Aid (Josselin, 2007: 25; Pettifor, 2006: 299; 1998; Dent, 1999b: 31f; Carter, interview with the author, 26 June 2012).

This core group weighed up various approaches and strategies, continued to develop the concept and structure of a campaign with the theme of Jubilee 2000, which they hoped would grow beyond their immediate base and realm of support. During these brainstorming sessions they critically “...analysed the problem in depth, discussed different, radical approaches to the debt, and began to design and structure a campaign, that we hoped could be internationalized” (Pettifor, 2006: 299). At this formative stage, the Jubilee 2000 ran parallel to the DCN but the core group coveted and envisaged that the fledging Campaign and the DCN’s activities would become integrated, while remaining independent of any of the major aid and development agencies (Pettifor, 2006: 299; Hanlon, interview with the author, March 2011).

The nascent Campaign started out with a group of enthusiastic students who, with Dent, started a petition seeking a UN declaration of the year ‘2000’ as a year of Jubilee (Grenier, 2003: 90; Dent, 1999b: 29). However following their graduation, the Campaign increasingly relied more on supporters from the evangelical Christians who were organised around aid agencies, particularly Tearfund. Many of these supporters viewed the global South debt approach by J2K, which included political analyses of the injustice of global finance, as radical (Pettifor, 2006). This perception
of being radical came across because the analyses were critical of the international economic, banking and finance system, which were depicted by the J2K as partly to blame for the crisis. This was understandable because the diagnosis and analyses of the problems and the presumptive solutions that the J2K was proposing appeared rooted more in the justice, rather than the ‘charity’ approach that most of the aid agencies had been deploying, and which tended to overlook the responsibilities of the creditors in the debt crisis (Pettifor, interview with the author in March 2011).

Nevertheless, there were individuals like Isabel Carter who then was the Community News Editor at Tearfund and who, after meeting with Dent, Peters and Pettifor on different occasions, helped established the Jubilee 2000 Charity Trust and Company in early 1996. She and Bill Peters used their extensive contacts to secure substantial funding and wide publicity for the fledging campaign. The Jubilee 2000 had a Board that was made up of Martin Dent, Bill Peters, Isabel Carter, Will Reid and Tim Green while Ann Pettifor was contracted as Coordinator (Menzies, 2000: 4; Dent, 1999b: 31; Pettifor, 1998; Christian Aid, 1996; Carter, interview with the author, 26 June 2012). The Campaign was launched on 6 April 1996 with the support of Tearfund, Christian Aid, CAFOD and the WDM (Busby, 2010: 71; Gwinn, 2007; Barrett, 2000: 18; Dent, 1999b: 31ff). From then onwards, the Campaign grew rapidly; first within the UK and soon after to other countries, regions and continents as national campaigns emerged in the US, Italy, Germany, Japan, Kenya, Peru and Honduras amongst others (Pettifor, 2006: 300).

As collaboration between Jubilee 2000 and the DCN increased, there was mutual agreement for them to be united, and the groups merged and became the Jubilee 2000 Coalition in July 1997, with Ann Pettifor appointed as Director (Christian Aid, 1996,
On 13 October 1997, the Jubilee 2000 Coalition, with over seventy varied groups and associations on board, was officially launched in the Grand Committee Room of the House of Commons (Pettifor, 2006: 300, Dent, 1999b: 32).

Prior to that, on Sunday 6 April 1997, a neon-lit countdown clock was erected in Piccadilly Circus in London, which proclaimed the Jubilee to launch the 1000-day countdown to the Millennium with 400 supporter and activists (Pettifor, 2011: 13; 2006: 300; Jubilee 2000, 1997; Barrett, 2000: 18; Hanson and Travis, 1999). With the launching, the Campaign presented a very broad and united front nationally on debt and this increased the Campaign's visibility and activities with demands on creditor governments and the IFIs to cancel the debt of the impoverished countries. The Campaign also intensified its call and appeal for public support of its aims. In what follows, I examine the aims and objectives of the Campaign and then look at its targets as it rapidly developed into a transnational collective action.

### 2.3.3 Aims of the Campaign

When the Jubilee 2000 was initiated in 1990, and became a full-fledged campaign in 1996, it aimed to achieve its goals by the end of 2000; but as it developed into a global Campaign, some of its goals expanded. Below, I outline the overall aims of the Campaign. Broadly speaking, the aims of the Campaign can be grouped into three parts. First, the principal aim of the Campaign was to achieve the cancellation of the backlog of unpayable debt of the poorest countries. Second, the Campaign aimed to shift the policy positions of the creditors. These were the IFIs; the Fund, the Bank, the Paris Club and the most developed economies of the Group of Seven/Eight

26 When Pettifor was offered the job to lead Jubilee 2000 Campaign, she was also working part-time for the DCN (Christian Aid, 1996).
The Campaign also advocated for a new arbitration mechanism of debt repayment negotiations. Finally, the Campaign wanted to educate the general and international public about the facts and injustice of international finance and the debt of impoverished countries, and expose the role and co-responsibility of the IFIs and Western creditor nations in the debt crisis.

Specifically, the primary aim of the Campaign was to get the creditor countries and the IFIs to cancel, on a one-off basis, the unpayable debt of the poorest countries by the end of the year 2000 under a fair and transparent process. Unpayable debts, according to the Campaign, are debts, which will never be paid economically or will be paid only by exacting unacceptable costs in diverting resources from health, education and sanitation. In other words, these are debts that cannot be paid without imposing undue human sacrifices and suffering on the masses (Pettifor, 2006: 303).

By the Campaign’s calculation, 52 countries (37 of which were in Africa) belonged to the category of countries with unpayable debt. Together, they owed $376 billion, out of which $300 billion was deemed unpayable (Barrett, 2000: 10).

The Campaign also aimed to cancel debts that in real terms have already been paid and debts, which in all likelihood will never really be paid by the debtor countries because the resources were simply not there for repayment. Finally, the Campaign aimed to cancel “Odious Debts”. These are debts that accrued under repressive and unaccountable governments, by illegitimate parties for illegitimate purposes and for which there was no consent of the people (Hanlon, 2006a and b, 2002, 2000, 1998a;

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27 The G7 countries are Britain, France, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan and United States, and since 1998 in Birmingham, Russia - when it fully participated in all proceedings and the group became G8. See G8 Information Centre (2014).
28 Jubilee 2000 Campaign (n.d.) ‘Who We Are’.
29 See Appendix I for a list of the countries. It should be noted however that the amount the Campaign claimed was owed by these 52 countries fluctuated depending on the type of debt that was included in the calculation although it was always over 300 billion dollars.
Adams, 1991). In other words, debts that were taken out by Dictators, for example loans for building of ‘white elephant’ projects that were of little or no value other than prestige and grandeur that served dubious and corrupt purposes. The Campaign described debt owed by poor countries and it’s servicing as eternal burden, bondage and slavery, and symbolised it by a chain (Lovett, 1998). It called for the chain to be broken, with participants in their events – for example at the launching of the Millennium Countdown clock – regularly chanting, “Break the chains of debt”. The Campaign argued that the cancellation of the debt by the year 2000 would provide a new beginning for the indebted countries from the beginning of the new millennium and thus used the strapline; ‘A debt-free start for a billion people” (Lovett, 1998).

Another goal of the Campaign was to expose the imbalance in the relationship between the creditor and debtor countries, the biased trade and economic conditions that underlined some of the debts, and show how both the creditors and debtors exacerbated the debt crisis, thereby drawing a fair and balanced conclusion of mutual responsibility (Pettifor, 2006: 303; 2001: 48f, Hanlon, interview with author in March 2011). The Campaign also aimed to ensure that future processes of lending and re-negotiation of debt must correspond to a just relationship between borrowers and lenders if the current crisis was to be avoided in the future. The imbalance in power relations, according to the Campaign, is reflected in the deflationary economic conditions that the IFIs are able to enforce on impoverished countries. This, from the Campaign’s perspective, is because the creditors are largely united in their dealings with the debtor countries, while the debtors are compelled to negotiate individually, rendering them divided and powerless, and unable to negotiate with a united voice. The Campaign therefore rejected and called for the abolition of conditionalities and the drastic austerity measures that are usually attached to rescheduled debt.
Moreover, the Campaign argued that the creditors are partly responsible for the crisis, and have therefore lost credibility with regards to solutions for the debt crisis. It argued that since the lenders could not be trusted going forward, they could not be the ones to set the conditions for debt cancellation, hence the call for an independent arbitration panel that could operate under the auspices of the UN with equal representatives of the debtor and creditor countries to negotiate possible repayments. Thus, the campaign argued that,

Debt and financial crises will recur unless the system of international lending and borrowing is subject to the discipline of the law and the market. The reality is that there will never be an orderly workout of poor country debt, as long as creditors remain in the driving seat (...). We in Jubilee 2000 movement propose an independent framework for arbitration when debts become unpayable (Pettifor, 2000a: 140).

Related to the above was the lack of international bankruptcy law akin to the law, as it exists for individual and companies’ debts in the developed Western countries, which the Campaign aimed to also draw some attention to and advocate for.30

Further, the Campaign aimed to ensure that the resources freed up by debt cancellation must be used to alleviate poverty in a transparent and participatory process that allows civil society groups to play significant roles in how the funds are used. This particular aim was not initially part of the Campaign’s plan when it emerged, but Pettifor (2011) claimed that it was included as part of the contribution from Southern groups. Finally, the above listed aims were all underpinned by the Campaign’s objective to expose the role of the IFIs and the creditor countries in the debt crisis by educating the general public in both the creditor and debtor countries of the facts surrounding the sovereign debt of impoverished countries. The point of

this, according to the Campaign, was that by showing the role of the creditors in the crisis, the arcane nature of the debt would be demystified and the argument for mutual responsibility of the creditors and debtors would be validated. This would contrast the dominant narrative in the discourse, which placed the blame solely on the debtors because the facts are concealed and the creditors are not transparent with information on the debt (Pettifor, 2011).

In summary, the J2K focused on the debt problems of the impoverished countries with emphasis on the HIPC list. The Fund and the Bank compiled this list but it was a list that the Campaign contested and sought to expand. A few key points in these aims deserve some further comments and the Campaign’s Charter31 in this summary.

First, the Campaign’s central demand was for a definitive debt cancellation for the countries it identified as bearing unpayable debt – and not merely a reduction to a ‘sustainable’ level or the usual debt service rescheduling that has been the practise by the creditors. Second, the J2K clearly called for cancellation only of the ‘unpayable debts’, and not a cancellation of debt owed by the impoverished countries in general. By taking this tack, the Campaign sought to avoid the counter argument of moral hazard against debt cancellation with regards to countries that were poor but could still afford to repay their debts depending on their export ratio to debt. Third, the cancellation must not be conditional on the austerity measures that are part of the structural adjustment programs, which according to the Campaign, rather than alleviate, actually perpetuate poverty. Fourth, the Campaign argued that there must be recognition that both lenders and borrowers are responsible for the crisis, and precise details of remission must be worked out in a process of collaboration between

31 See Appendix II for The Jubilee 2000 Charter.
each debtor and creditors who should nominate equal representatives to an
independent arbitration panel under the aegis of the UN. Finally, debt cancellation
must benefit ordinary people by ensuring that the money accruing from it is invested
in poverty reduction programmes. This should be on terms that are agreed to in a
transparent and participatory process, which should ensure that civil society groups
take leading roles in the implementation process of the agreement. Having reviewed
the Campaign aims, the question then is: Who are the demands of the Campaign
addressed to, or who are the Campaign’s targets? In what follows, I will outline these
targets and show why the Campaign regarded them as legitimate targets.

2.3.4 Targets of the Campaign

From undertaking a somewhat ‘radical’ analysis of the global South debt crisis since
its inception, coupled with its prognosis of solutions to the crisis, the J2K clearly
identified its targets, that is, creditor countries and financial institutions to whom the
debts were owed and those with the authority to cancel them as advocated. The
Campaign viewed its analysis as ‘radical’ because it pinpointed and highlighted the
creditors’ role in the problem, and thus shifted the blame and focus on to them.
Generally, these targets can be divided into three interrelated groups. The first is
made up of International Financial Institutions and Cartels. This group comprised the
Fund, the Bank and to a lesser extent the Regional Development Banks to whom
multilateral debts were owed, creditor governments organised in the Paris Club,\(^{32}\)
and some Commercial Banks in the developed Western countries.

The second group consisted of the political leaders, finance ministers and Treasuries,
and policy makers in the creditor countries. At the top of this list were the leaders of

\(^{32}\) The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors. For more, see http://www.clubdeparis.org/cn/.
the Group of Eight that I noted above. This group, according to the Campaign, were the main target as they were the most powerful shareholders in the multilateral institutions, which the Campaign regarded as secondary targets (Pettifor, 2000b: 26). The third group, though to a much lesser extent than the first and second groups, were the political leaders and elites of the impoverished countries.

A cursory look at these targets will easily show that the first and second groups are some of the most powerful institutions in the world, which in turn are controlled mainly by the political and financial leaders of the most developed economies in the world represented by the G8. From the Campaign’s perspectives, since a majority of the global South’s debts were either owed to these financial institutions or the G8 countries, both groups constituted legitimate targets as it was thought to be within their reach to cancel the debts. It has to be stressed though that the reasons and motivation for targeting the third group differ significantly from the reasons why the first and second groups were targeted. The first and second groups were understood by the Campaign to be in a position to cancel the debts and the Campaign wanted them to share in the responsibility for the crisis. The reason for targeting the political leaders and elites in impoverished countries was more of the desire to see that they share in the blame and responsibility for the crisis and not necessarily to deliver the desired solutions advocated by the Campaign. Moreover, the Campaign targeted these political leaders so that they could make available, accurate and relevant information about their debt to aid the Campaign’s ability to counter the dominant narrative in the debt discourse – that placed the blame solely on the poor and corrupt leadership of the impoverished countries.
However, as Susan George (1988: 245f) points out, crisis, even debt crisis is not for everyone. She argued that the elites in the impoverished countries might still benefit from the debt crisis when IMF programmes force wages down, and the elites could pick up businesses previously managed by the state when privatisation is imposed. This, in addition to new loans, which could end up swelling their private foreign bank accounts, provided another reason why these elites were also targeted by the Campaign. In other words, there are legitimate reasons for them to be targeted as well although they may not be in a position to cancel the debts. Perhaps more importantly, some of these elites and officials are privy to some of the documents and secret information relating to their countries’ dealings with the foreign creditors. Providing such information to the Campaign would, and did indeed, help the Campaign’s research and reports, which were used to challenge the positions of the creditor countries and the IFIs. In the next section, I will look at the scheduled duration of the Campaign as well as tensions within the network.

2.3.5 Duration of the Campaign and Tension within the Network

As noted earlier, the Campaign closed at the end of 2000, but not all the stakeholders in the network accepted the proposition to end the Campaign by 31 December 2000. As the debate over the issue will show, the timing of the closure was contentious, and it fostered frictions that could not be resolved to the satisfaction of all in the network. Later in this thesis, I shall discuss the implication of this division, both on the network itself and in terms of its impact on how the Campaign is evaluated by some participants in the Campaign.

From the moment the concept of the Jubilee was adopted as a campaign platform to cancel the unpayable debt of the impoverished countries, the year 2000 automatically
became the focal point in terms of its duration and crescendo. At the beginning not much fanfare was made of its projected end by 31 December 2000. Nevertheless it was stated when the Campaign kicked off that it would last till the end of 2000. That much was clear to the initiators and the early core group as the "countdown" to the new millennium began with a neon-lit clock in London. As its Director recounts,

(...) the Jubilee 2000 UK coalition was conceived as a short-lived, time-limited campaign, with a very clear deadline for its goals and a specific date for closure (Pettifor, 2006: 306).

While this may have seemed unusual for a Campaign that set out to achieve such an enormous task, and while it clearly entailed some weaknesses, it did create a certain dynamic in the Campaign as it provoked a sense of urgency with the knowledge that the Campaign was not interminable. As the Deputy Director reflected,

The time limit – that was one of the really useful things. Although it created stress and pressure, it also gave everyone the excuse: we can't worry about structures now, we can't worry about getting the process absolutely right; what we have to do is to build the pressure and get a result because we haven't got very long.33

Part of this dynamism and urgency was reflected in one of the main themes of the Campaign, the 'countdown to the deadline', which was accompanied by similar and other symbolic actions that depicted the urgency and the need to act fast. But as the time drew closer to the anticipated end-date, the issue of closing the Campaign by December 2000 began to generate some friction and division within the network. Some campaigners from the global South and some regions in the UK did not want the Campaign closed because, to them, the task for which the Campaign was set up was not yet done, as the debts were not yet cancelled. Others, however, insisted on the set closing date. As one of the co-founders noted:

33 Adrian Lovett, cited in Grenier, 2003: 92.
We must regard the Jubilee year as ending on January 1st 2001 and seek to achieve our goal of debt remission by that year. The staff in the Jubilee 2000 office have contracts which run until 31st December 2000 (Dent, 1999b: 35).

Nevertheless, such clear-cut assertions did little to ease the tension in the network generated by what has become a controversial termination date for the Campaign. It was particularly problematic with the national campaigns from the global South, some of whom, in the course of the controversy, had come to regard some of their Northern partners as uncommitted to the set goals of cancelling the debt. On the other hand, the initiators and staff at the informal Secretarial insisted that, to maintain credibility, it was better to close as it was stated at the beginning. As I will show in a later section of this research, both sides on this particular issue remained intransigent and it could be argued that they both had cogent and valid arguments to sustain their positions. However, it also has to be understood that the tense and uneasy working relationship between the groups in the UK Coalition on the one hand and the Secretariat on the other also played a major role in the closure. This situation had wider implications for the Campaign because it points to one of the major reasons for the emergence of Jubilee regional blocks in the global South and also clearly impacts on how some participants evaluate the J2K.

Overall, it should be noted that the Campaign ‘formally closed’ given the etymological reference and origin of its name in line with the plans at its conception. However, it broadened, deepened and focused the international anti-debt movement and, in the process, developed a momentum that simply could not be shut down by its formal end-date. In other words, the formal Campaign closed as originally planned, but the broader transcontinental collective action and advocacy built around it did not close as the debts were still there by the end of 2000 and the pledges made by the creditors were as yet unfulfilled (Klu, interview with the author, 20 May 2011;
Papaioannou et al., 2009: 812; Yanacopulos, 2008: 3f). Moreover, most groups that aligned with the Campaign as national campaigns in the global South were in existence long before J2K emerged. For these groups, it was simply inconceivable to close as they continue to witness and experience the devastating effects of debts in their various countries. Thus, it was natural and logical that groups and networks developed from the closure of J2K into Jubilee Plus, Jubilee Movement International (JMI) and Jubilee Debt Campaign (JDC) to continue the efforts at debt cancellation.

Besides the controversial end date, another source of tension within the network was the issue of the level of debt that the Campaign demanded to be cancelled. The Campaign followed Dent’s original proposal for a one-off cancellation of unpayable debt that should be done by end 2000. Accordingly, the Campaign identified 52 countries with a total of $376 billion with $300 billion deemed unpayable. For many of the global South groups, what the Campaign defined as unpayable debts and the Campaign’s ultimate demands were far short of the goals that they had been pursuing before the J2K emerged. For them, the Campaign’s demands did not really address the fundamental issues that led to the debt problem, as they were seen as superficial. It was for the same reason that some groups in the US who had also been working on debt prior to J2K did not initially support or join the Campaign, as it failed to address the systemic problems that creates the debts (Interviews with Keene, 2011; Klu, 2011; Dennis, 2011).

Besides linking the debt to the imbalance in trade and the exploitation of the natural resources in their countries, some Southern campaigners emphasised that they were owed debts by the Western developed countries from colonialism and the need for reparation were ignored by J2K’s demand to cancel only the self-defined unpayable
debt. On African debt for example, the Accra Declaration at the launch of Jubilee 2000 Afrika (sic) Campaign in April 1998 stated inter alia:

That the root-causes of these Debts lie in the History of Slavery and Colonialism, That the Debt Crisis is a function of the unjust system of International Trade and Investment and of Unaccountable Government. That the conditions and the policies that constitute the framework for the repayment of these Debts are unjustifiable instruments of control of the destiny of the Afrikan people.34

While some campaigners in the North accepted such positions as legitimate, and understood the validity of such claims, particularly as such campaigns and demands have been ongoing before Jubilee 2000 emerged, such demands were deemed impractical by most campaigners in the North. This was because these campaigners in the North feared that they would not be able to mobilise the needed public support to influence their targets in the developed Western countries with such positions and demands (Hanlon in an interview with the author on 15 March 2011 and Griesgraber, interview on 9 December 2011). This tension raged throughout the network and the friction it elicited was most evident at the G8 summit in Cologne in 1999. While some campaigners in the North welcomed and celebrated the agreement reached on debt at the summit, it was met with derision and condemnation by some of their Southern partners, who refused to attend the press conference and instead caucused separately (Pettifor, interview with the author, 7 March 2011). Jubilee South stated:

Do not ask us, as we are often asked by debt coalitions and Jubilee Campaigns in the North, to accept the lesser of many evils, to settle for a piece of the loaf and not the whole, to be realistic about HIPCs as the ‘only game in town’. If that is the only game in town, then the problem is not the game in town.35

In the meeting in Cologne immediately following the decision on HIPC2 "people were devouring one another, there was so much venom in the room, it was horrible" (Griesgraber, interview with the author, 9 December 2011).

Part of the above narrated tension and apparent division within the network was earlier highlighted and raised questions of the overall leadership of the Campaign when Congressman Jim Leach in the US Congress proposed a debt relief bill to which conditionalities like SAP were attached. While the Jubilee2000USA supported the proposal,36 the UK Coalition and most of the global South campaigners opposed it due to the conditionalities. At the end, Jubilee2000USA withdrew its support because of the strong opposition from its transnational partners. First, this created the impression of serious factions and division within the network. Second, it raised questions of the leadership within the network, and, perhaps more damaging, it aroused further suspicion by Southern campaigners of some of their Northern partners regarding the set goals of the Campaign.

While this particular tension played out at the transnational level, there were similar instances within the UK Coalition and some of them dated back to the formative years of J2K when Martin Dent introduced the Jubilee-type debt remission to the DCN. For example, while Dent is noted to have initiated the idea of a Jubilee-type debt remission, he was understood to have struggled with attempts to adjust the list of countries he calculated as deserving "forgiveness", and in fact opposed any attempt that suggested or tended to portray the Campaign as totally opposed to third world debt as we know it (Dent, 1997). First, the term "forgiveness" did not sit easily with some in the emerging Campaign, who felt such positions undercut the idea of

36 It should be noted that there were also those who opposed the proposal within the Jubilee2000 USA (Grenier, 2003: 98f; Griesgraber, interview with the author, 9 December 2011).
co-responsibility of debtors and creditors for the crisis, a major argument of the Campaign, as Carter stated in an interview with the author in June 2012. Second, as Ann Pettifor, the UK Coalition Director recalled, “As an African, I have pride in my heritage and the idea that we have to be ‘forgiven’ implied that we sinned and needed to be forgiven by the creditors who were partly responsible for the crisis” (Pettifor, 2011). As both Carter and Pettifor noted, Dent hardly shifted from his position, as he insisted on “forgiveness” and maintained that position till the end of the Campaign.

Further, as the UK Coalition started to gain some footing, some of the aid agencies began to feel quite uneasy with it, as professional jealousy and competition seemed to set in. This stemmed from the perception that the nascent Campaign appeared to be usurping their elite position within the aid and development field, as the UK Coalition was attracting more attention and increasingly becoming more high profile. Also, some of the long-time supporters of these aid agencies continuously upbraided them for not doing enough to support the Campaign. In fact, as result, some started to contribute financially to J2K rather than to the aid agencies because the J2K was proving to be very inspiring (Glennie, 2011; Golding, interview with the author, 27 April 2011).

Moreover, the starkly different leadership and organisational style and structure that the network displayed appeared to be at odds with the traditional and professional approach of the established aid agencies, which tended to be more institutionalised, hierarchical and genteel. Although most of the aid agencies managed to unite under one banner as the Jubilee 2000 Coalition was formed, the professional jealousy, rivalry and competition for profile and funding remained a simmering and ever-present issue in the UK Coalition while it lasted (Randle, 2004: 15-27).
According to Hanlon (interview, 15 March 2011), most groups within the UK Coalition coped with this and several other challenges in the network only because there was a clear terminable date. But as Randle (2004: 15-27) details, others continued with the Coalition for fear of the damage it could cause them, and the possible backlash from their supporters who had all become inspired and motivated by the idea of Jubilee. Not surprisingly, because of the depth of some of these frictions, they outlived the Campaign as it ended on 31 December 2000. In the next section, I will briefly outline some developments towards the end of the Campaign, and the groups that emerged from that closure.

2.3.6 The Successor Campaigns

Although the Campaign had managed to secure some debt cancellation pledges from the creditors, the official end of the Campaign did not mean that it had achieved all its aims. Continuing to campaign for more debt cancellation, and of course insisting that creditors fulfil their pledge, remained major tasks. Thus, as the Millennium deadline got closer, the Campaign announced new initiatives on 2 December 2000. Ann Pettifor was deployed to head Jubilee Plus, a support unit for campaigns on international debt and finance with research and policy analysis that was based at the New Economics Foundation (NEF) which itself was one of the founding groups of the Jubilee 2000 Coalition. It funds the Jubilee Movement International, a network that was established at a conference in Bamako, Mali in April 2001.37 Deputy Director Adrian Lovett was designated to lead the ‘Drop the Debt’ campaign that was charged to target the next G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy in 2001. This project lasted six months and rounded up as planned in July 2001, after which the Jubilee Debt

37 The Jubilee Plus changed to ‘Jubilee Research’ in 2002. For more information see http://www.jubileeplus.org/.
Campaign emerged in the UK as a network of local and regional groups on debt. It co-ordinates and supports local groups, but offers no international leadership like the erstwhile J2K – with its global outreach, goals and deadline. Besides, some national campaigns continue to exist in Africa, Latin America and in the US, all with varying degrees of activities, and some co-operate and caucus as part of the Jubilee South (Josselin, 2007: 25-26; Grenier, 2003: 103; Jubilee South, 1999).

2.3.7 Organisational Structure and the Discursive Space

In the foregoing sections, I have broadly discussed major aspects of the Campaign from its emergence to its closure. In this section, I will look at its organisational structure to expand on the account of the campaign the J2K waged. Specifically, I will look at how the organisational structure accounted for the lack of discursive space between the national campaigns on key issues, leaving a few well-resourced national campaigns to play leading roles. I will briefly compare the lack of discursive space with other forum spaces like in the world social forum, an organisation with considerable internal debate. The overall organisational structure of the J2K is complicated by the dual role of the UK Coalition, an issue I will expatiate on in the methodology chapter. Suffice here to outline the general structure of the Campaign, the national groups, particularly the UK Coalition and the impact of this interface on the discursive space in the network.

National Campaigns: As I noted earlier, the J2K had 69 national campaigns by the end of 2000, with 23 in the global North and 46 in the South (Grenier, 2003: 103). Most of these national campaigns were coalitions of existing and varied groups and organisations with diverse interests that came together following the emergence of

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38 See e.g. for Mali on AllAfrica (2014).
J2K. The UK Coalition like the Jubilee2000USA for example, was noted for the several coalitions and network-of-networks that they were comprised of and in Germany; over 2000 regional groups belonged to the national campaign (Buxton, 2004: 56; Randle, 2004: 6; Pettifor, 2006: 300f). Due to the way the Campaign emerged and the strategy it adopted to pursue its aims, there were no outlined criteria for membership other than the basic requirement for individuals or groups to agree to the major Campaign demands entailed in the petition (Barrett, 2000: 7). As a result of their composition, most of the national campaigns included groups that often competed with each other and their national secretariat for funding and profile (Buxton, 2004: 67). The first international conference of Jubilee national campaigns took place from 15-17 November 1998 in Rome, Italy, which was attended by thirty-eight national groups from the global South and North, and 12 international organisations. At this conference, the Campaign decided not to establish any formal international secretariat.

**Jubilee 2000 Coalition** as the UK national campaign emerged as a result of the merger in July 1997, of the initial Jubilee 2000 and the Debt Crisis Network following proposals for the two groups to deepen their working relationship (Randle, 2004: 5, Christian Aid, 1996). The Coalition was launched in October 1997 and it had a Board that was elected annually by the Assembly – comprised of all the member organisations, which was the ultimate decision-making body. In the Board, some seats were reserved for the election of grassroots activists (regional representatives) and elected places were also reserved for large membership organisations like the aid agencies and Unions (Pettifor, 2006: 301). Randle (2004: 5-6, supra note 10-13) details the merger and how the Board was composed. When

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39 See Appendix IV for the Petition
the Coalition emerged, Michael Taylor, former Director of Christian Aid, was made President and Ed Mayo, the Director of New Economics Foundation, became the Chair while Martin Dent and Bill Peters were both made Vice Presidents and recognized as co-founders. Ann Pettifor was appointed Director and headed the Coalition staff and the Secretariat, and she reported to the Board. While the need to coordinate activities and plans with other national campaigns was recognized, however, the Board assumed responsibility only for and was accountable to the UK Coalition, and therefore absolved itself of any responsibilities for all other groups.

**Implications of the Structure on the Discursive Space in the J2K:** The J2K structure sketched above had far-reaching implications for the Campaign. First, it meant that at the international level, the Campaign was devoid of any formal structure, as it would maintain autonomous units without any clear and systematic arrangement for coordinating the national campaigns. The practical implication of this was that on the one hand, the different national campaigns were free to take decisions, and engage in actions as they chose to advance the Campaign demands. This created a sense of openness, inclusiveness and ownership, which attracted many groups as they joined and took some spontaneous actions without any bureaucratic interference. On the other hand however, the void also meant that some national groups, which were more proactive and well resourced could – wittingly or unwittingly, push issues and dictate agendas at the international level.

Second and following from the above, the structure also points to some weaknesses of internal democracy in the Campaign, as there was no democratically accountable but a yet functional international secretariat. As I stated above, there was no formal international secretariat yet the UK Coalition assumed that role and functioned as
such although it was not accountable to the network in line with the terms of the UK Coalition.\textsuperscript{40} Buxton argues that the structure made it difficult for the Campaign to agree a coordinated international campaign strategy; and this created some avenue for the better-resourced groups to take strategic decisions, which had international relevance and ramifications without proper network-wide consultation. This was true of many Northern campaigns especially the UK Coalition (2004: 68f).

Third, the Campaign structure was informed by its strategy\textsuperscript{41} to pursue its aims. The loose structure and the openness that derived from that strategy reinforced each other but due to the lack of a formal international structure, the task of effectively coordinating the national campaigns was left unattended. This was evident in the lack of consultative and discursive space for formal dialogues and debates by the national campaigns on many important issues in the Campaign. For example, issues relating to tactics like the use of the petition and its wording were discussed in the UK but not by the various national campaigns. The Campaign Charter and Petition were circulated to networks and organisations in different continents by email after the Campaign officially began in April 1996 but there was no forum for discussing them.

The strategy to spread the Campaign message to the broadest possible audience and rely heavily on communication — with the Internet; the use of emails and the Campaign’s websites meant there was no urgency to ensure a discursive space for the national campaigns to engage in regular dialogue or physical meetings. The UK website was initially meant to provide background information on debt and the campaign to cancel it but it soon became the primary means for communication,

\textsuperscript{40} See Grenier (2003: 95f) for why and how the UK Coalition assumed that position
\textsuperscript{41} See section 6.4 for details of the Campaign strategy
setting up meetings, and discussing developments as nearly all the materials produced in the UK were uploaded onto the website (Buxton, 2002: 130ff).

The debate over the Campaign closure is instructive here because, important as that issue was, there was hardly any time and space provided for it to be discussed between the national groups although it was extensively discussed within the UK Coalition. In August 2000, Nic Marks of the New Economics Foundation carried out a consultation by emails and posted letters on behalf of the UK Coalition on a range of issues to national campaigns and every other stakeholder (Randle, 2004: 33f). Although the Campaign closure was dominant in the responses to the questionnaires and remained a major controversial issue, there was neither space nor time for a full discussion of it between the national campaigns.

The Rome conference referenced above was organized by the Swedish and Italian national campaigns and as far as the data show, it was the only instance when a meeting of this sort was organised besides the Campaign meetings at the fringes of other events like the G8 summit in Cologne or the Fund and Bank meetings in Washington. Nevertheless this conference was significant for what it highlighted of the Campaign, the strategic decisions reached, and the fact that it was probably the only meeting where there was an even representation of both Southern and Northern campaigns (Grenier, 2003: 97; Pettifor, 2006: 302). First, the decision not to establish formal international secretariat but to maximize communication was taken by the Campaign at this conference.

Consequently, an email listserv was established of over 300 key campaigners which has become the linchpin of the international movement’s communication and coordination (Buxton, 2004:132).
Second, the conference, which was meant to decide common policy and strategy, produced ‘The Rome Declaration: A Jubilee call for debt cancellation and economic justice’. It defined ‘unpayable debt’ and specified the types of debt that should be cancelled. It blamed the creditor governments; IFIs and commercial banks as chiefly responsible for the debt crisis and therefore, should not set the conditions for debt cancellation.\textsuperscript{42} Among the strategic decisions reached were the specification of the targets and the commitment to build political will in support of the Campaign aims, mobilization and empowerment of civil society through education, access to information and decision-making processes, and the sharing of resources and experiences between national groups within and between the South and the North (Graces, 1999).

Third, the conference highlighted some contentious issues that would later intensify in the following year leading to the division in the network as “Southern campaigns decided to meet separately during part of the conference in a South-South exchange in order to share their experiences (…)” (Collins et al, 2001:143). There were tense discussions over the leadership of the J2K, which was concentrated in the North, the rejection of IFIs conditionalities, and the overall direction of the Campaign.

Another contributory factor to the lack of discursive space was the time limited nature of the Campaign. While the time limit obviously created a sense of urgency, it also gave everyone the excuse – not to worry about the structures or processes as Adrian Lovett, the UK Coalition Deputy Director cited above aptly noted.

The lack of discursive space in the J2K contrasts starkly with other forum spaces like the world social forum (WSF), where there is a considerable internal debate and

\textsuperscript{42} Jubilee 2000 Campaign (n.d.) ‘Who We Are’.
consultations among its participants. The WSF, created as a counterpoint to the World Economic Forum (WEF) to articulate a coherent alternative to neo-liberal globalisation and strengthen the reactive capacity of participants (Schoeleitner, 2003), maintains a structure that ensures discursive space for the diverse actors and issues that it attracts and engages. The importance of that space is evident in the Forum’s self-description in its ‘Charter of Principles’ that guides the Forum. It reads inter alia,

The World Social Forum is an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and interlinking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil (...)\(^4\)

Founded in Brazil, the WSF meets annually following its first meeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2001. Given its broad and diverse actors, it is natural that there are tensions in the Forum, however there are structures at the local regional and international levels that creates the discursive and consultative space for the divergent views to be expressed (Whitaker, 2003; Sen, et al. 2003; Abahlali, 2007).

2.4 Summary

The task in this chapter was to probe the background and emergence of J2K. I did this by examining both the causes of the debt and the manner in which the adopted management mechanisms exacerbated the problem, and led to the debt crisis. There is strong evidence that these mechanisms were motivated by the creditors’ selfish interest and desire to ensure the safety of their banks and the international financial system (IFS) at the expense of addressing the debt problem in relation to its effects on the indebted countries. In the later chapters, I will show how the Campaign

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\(^4\) For the complete Charter of principles, see https://fsm2015.org/en/world-social-forum-charter-principles

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further expatiated on this situation to redefine debt as a justice issue by elaborating on the co-responsibility of the creditors for the debt crisis.

I traced the initial ideas of the debt cancellation Campaign, its emergence and development into a full-fledged transnational network. Specifically, I looked at how the idea was initiated and the main Campaign aim – which was a one-off cancellation of the unpayable debt of the impoverished countries under a fair and transparent process. I examined who the targets were and why these actors – mainly the creditor countries and the IFIs were considered legitimate targets as they were understood to be in a position to cancel the debts in question. Further, I examined why some other groups were initially hesitant to embrace the Campaign and some of the noticeable professional jealousy that crept in (in the UK) as the Campaign began to gain traction and heightened profile. However, as I noted, the Campaign was inspirational and motivational enough to enthuse a merger of the major aid, development and campaign bodies to form the Jubilee 2000 Coalition.

As a broad conglomeration of groups from different backgrounds and regions, with sometimes differing aims, amidst a slightly different political setting, it was natural for the Campaign to experience tensions and frictions over goals, styles and other aspects of collective action mobilisation. Unfortunately, some of these were deep seated and resulted in forms of discord that outlived the Campaign. I touched upon the debates that surrounded the scheduled end date, and highlighted some campaign outfits that developed from its closure. Finally, I examined the organisational structure of the Campaign and how the lack of a formal and accountable international secretariat impacted on the discursive and dialogic space in the Campaign. In the next chapter, I will focus on the theoretical aspects of this research.
3. Advocacy Networks in Transnational Collective Actions

3.1 Introduction

The literature on collective action covers various aspects of movements and networks at the national, international and transnational levels. These include their sources and emergence, mobilisation and diffusion, organisation and structure, evaluation and outcomes etc. This chapter will review some of this literature that are relevant to this study, with particular attention to transnational advocacy networks (TANs). This review is important because it will show why TCAs are categorised in certain ways and, in the process, demonstrate that the categorisations are intrinsically political terms, which therefore remain highly contentious. Second, it will allow us to take an in-depth look at the approach of TANs, which, in turn, enables us to adjudge it as the most appropriate descriptive and analytical model to examine the J2K.

In this chapter, I will outline how TCAs are categorised and show that different features could be emphasised to do so. For example, theorists like Khagram et al. (2002) emphasise the level of coordination between the constituent parts of TCAs to determine whether a particular TCA is understood as a transnational social movement, network or a coalition. Others, like Fox (2004) or Bandy and Smith (2005), distinguish forms of TCAs by emphasising differences in their actions, organisational structures and ideological standpoint. I will explore the concept of TANs in greater detail throughout the next section, as it seems to be the most appropriate formation to capture the features of J2K. However, a brief introduction is still necessary here, along with other categories, in order to help establish some conceptual clarity and guide its application throughout this research.
First, the argument that this chapter seeks to make is that the categorisation of TCAs into movements, networks or coalitions is not mutually exclusive, for reasons, which I will discuss below. Second, I will argue that the categorisation makes no substantial difference to evaluating the outcomes of TCAs although they remain useful because first, they aid our understanding of the varied configurations of TCAs and second, it reveals that they bear inherent political meanings. Nevertheless, I will argue that strict delineation of these formations should be de-emphasised. Next, I will briefly review some theories of collective actions – the resource mobilisation theory (RMT) and the political process theory (PPT), to highlight their core points in explaining the emergence of collective actions. The purpose of this is to foreground a major argument in this research – that none of these theories can single-handedly account for the emergence of J2K. As a result, I would argue that a combination of these core points is necessary in order to explain the emergence of J2K. I will also explore the concept of ‘collective action frames’ because, as I introduce and expatiate on the approach of TANs, a good understanding of this concept and its application will be vital to both our grasp of this approach and, in later chapters, for the analysis of J2K.

The next section will examine TANs in depth as a model to understand and analyse certain types of contemporary TCAs like the J2K and the international campaign to ban landmines. Specifically, I will look at their sources, that is, how they emerge, their modes of operation and aims. I will discuss TANs as political spaces; where differently situated actors employ discursive processes and frames to negotiate their common identity and aims, and explore TANs as an extension of the new social movements (NSMs) cluster. The argument I seek to make with these is that TANs share features of this cluster of movements, but that they are distinct for their shared
principled beliefs and values, the intensity of information politics in their processes and for the importance of the organisational platform in deploying information politics. In doing this, I will attempt to justify the perspective, which places the J2K in the theoretical and ideological axis of the new social movements.

3.2 Transnational Collective Actions: Movements, Networks and Coalitions

Generally, studies and analysis of TCAs are conducted within the ambit of transnational social movements, transnational advocacy networks and transnational coalitions. First, what are collective actions? Briefly, collective actions can be described as the articulated collective claims or agitation for certain changes arising from the interaction and engagement of a set of actors through social mobilisation against the backdrop of constraints and opportunities in a socio-political system (Tarrow, 2011: 7f). The aim of a collective action could be to institute or abolish a law, pursue acceptance of some international norms or standards or advocate changes in cultural attitudes. Collective actions are primarily aimed to influence publicly and induce some form of social change and usually; they have defined goals and strategies to achieve them. Their targets are usually more powerful actors like the state, multinational corporations or international institutions like the IMF.

Collective action becomes contentious when used by people who lack access to representative institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities (Tarrow, 2011: 7).

When such challenge and activities are sustained over a period of time and jointly carried out in at least three countries, the particular collective action can be understood as transnational (Khagram et al., 2002: 8); or as Della Porta and Tarrow define it, “Transnational collective action is the coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of activists against international actors, other states, or
international institutions" (2005: 2f). Central to TCAs are domestic and international non-governmental organisations; and how a particular TCA is categorised depends on the characteristic features that are emphasised. It could be the ideological content, forms of actions and organisational structures of the TCA or the level of coordination between the groups as constituent parts of the TCA. In this section, I will briefly look at these configurations to guide our understanding in this research.

3.2.1 Transnational Social Movements

According to Tarrow, these are

Sustained contentious interactions with opponents – national or nonnational – by connected networks of challengers organised across national boundaries. (...) is important that the challengers are rooted in domestic social networks and connected to one another more than episodically through common ways of seeing the world, or through informal or organisational ties, and that their challenges be contentious in deed as well as in word (1998: 184).

Tarrow’s definition, and its implied conditions of duration and the level of integration within domestic structures, suggests that only few real-world phenomena like the Greenpeace and the 1980s Peace movement could be so described (Diani, 2010: 393-95). However, this definition is similar to Khagram et al., who define transnational social movements as, “sets of actors with common purposes and solidarities linked across country boundaries that have the capacity to generate coordinated and sustained social mobilisation in more than one country to publicly influence social change” (2002: 8). More often than not, they maintain an organised social base, higher cohesion than networks and mobilise their constituencies through the use of protest or disruptive action and therefore mirror the features and strategies of domestic social movements (Fox, 2004; Kriesi, 1996; Rucht, 1996).
However, Khagram et al. (2002) argue that to be truly transnational, a social movement would need to demonstrate the capacity to engage in joint and sustained mobilisation in at least three countries over a period of time. This is because, although cross-national diffusion of ideas and strategies may occur between domestic social movements in the same issue areas, such transnational collective action may not necessarily be coordinated. For example, debt cancellation groups existed and had been active in a number of countries of the global South like South Africa, Ecuador and Bolivia amongst others, prior to the emergence of J2K in the 1990s, but there was no evident coordination between them. As a result, although there was a sustained social mobilisation for a common purpose on debt in these countries, that mobilisation fell short of a key condition – the coordination of activities and actions, for a transnational social movement.

3.2.2 Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs)

According to Keck and Sikkink “A transnational advocacy network includes those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services. Such networks are most prevalent in issue areas characterised by high value content and informational uncertainty” (1998a: 2). Although some networks may be formalised, they generally maintain low levels of formal organisational ties, as the contacts between the network members are mainly informal. Networks may not necessarily coordinate their actions and do not usually sustain coordination of tactics, but they do occasionally mobilise large numbers of people, as the J2K protest in Birmingham, UK and Cologne, Germany showed (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2008; Bandy and Smith, 2005: 3; Fox, 2004: 474f; Khagram et al., 2002: 7).
While TANs are primarily made up of domestic and international NGOs, activists and grassroots groups, a host of other social actors – like state institutions and intergovernmental agencies – may be part of their activities, or closely collaborate with them. This was aptly demonstrated in the efforts to ban the continued production, sale and use of antipersonnel landmines (Lawson et al., 1998). In that transnational collective action, international organisations, the Canadian government and a number of other governments and their agencies in Europe worked closely with the antilandmine network to produce the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).

### 3.2.3 Transnational Coalitions

These "are sets of actors linked across borders who publicly and non-violently coordinate to formulate and implement a specific campaign, a shared strategy, or set of tactics" (Khagram, 2004: 12). This configuration can be formed when the strategic interests of different actors converge, even if they are not bound together by deeply shared normative values. A series of campaigns, waged by the same or different transnational coalitions, can lead to the formation or continuation of a transnational network and thus contribute to the development and diffusion of shared norms and dense exchanges of information and services (Khagram, 2004: 13). Conversely, the existence of transnational networks also facilitates the construction of transnational coalitions for the purpose of specific transnational campaigns, and these campaigns become the main features of their strategies or tactics as with networks and are usually the unit of analysis in the study of any particular TCA.

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44 Fox (2004: 477) defines a different type of network – in terms of their actions and not motivations. These networks include broad-based social organisations and constituencies like the ICBL composition, but are motivated not only by shared principled beliefs, ideas and values, but also by material interests.
To recap, there are patterns in the various forms of TCAs with identifiable dominant modalities. For networks, the dominant modality is exchange of information, while campaigns and coordinated tactics form the core of transnational coalitions, and joint mobilisation marks transnational social movements. These categorisations and definitions bear some strength because they are useful in delineating the different forms of TCAs and thus help to avoid the problem of subsuming the various forms of collective action into either protest or social movements which does not advance our understanding (Tarrow, 1998: 2003). Perhaps more importantly, delineating these configurations helps us to understand the intrinsic political nature of these terms and why their usage is sometimes highly contentious. I draw on the J2K to elaborate on this point.

As discussed above, anti-debt groups existed in the global South prior to the emergence of J2K and most of them viewed efforts to cancel the debts of the impoverished countries in the form of a ‘movement’. That is, efforts to generate coordinated and sustained social mobilisation in more than one country to publicly influence policy change on the issue. However, in the wake of J2K emergence in the global North, some anti-debt campaigners in the global North understood their efforts as a ‘campaign’. In fact, in the US, the initial reaction by some groups to the idea of J2K and its demand was one of hesitation because it did not address the underlying fundamental issues of debt and, when they warmed up to it, it was in terms of a short campaign and “we did it as a project” (Dennis, interview with the author 2 December 2011). J2K, understood as such, would be categorised as a specific strategy of a transnational coalition on debt, although the J2K very much tallied with the features of a network rather than a coalition. Nevertheless, to reference J2K as a campaign by those who initiated it, while other anti-debt
campaigners in the global South geared their efforts towards building a movement, meant that the inclusion of both perspectives in the same TCA on debt entailed fundamental differences, with some far reaching implications.

First, campaigners in the North understood their efforts and mobilisation as a series of actions that would be taken and irrespective of the outcomes or the results; a definitive end would take effect. This understanding was clearly reflected in the December 2000 end date that was fixed for the J2K. Secondly, and I will address this in greater details later, it meant that the understanding and position of some global South campaigners on debt were not really compatible with those of their Northern partners and, as a result undermined, as those positions failed to gain any traction with the position of mainstream campaigners in the global North. Put differently, this situation speaks to the marginalisation of the agency of campaigners from the global South (Leroi et al., 2004: 850).

Besides, it is also evident that there are some gaps in the collective action literature in terms of categorisations. For example, Fox (2004: 476) differentiated TCAs into networks, coalitions and movements using six different factors that are not synonymous with the emphasis placed on coordination by Khagram et al. (2002). Of these six factors, only one – exchange of information and experience – was a clear common denominator of the three forms of TCAs and yet, the classification of TCAs was not determined by this factor alone.

Furthermore, as the authors cited above readily admit, the categories are not mutually exclusive and this means that there are overlaps both in the configurations of the TCAs and their dominant modalities. In fact, Fox argues further “(…) exchanges can
produce networks, which can produce coalitions, which can produce movements" (2004: 475). In other words, there is a flux in the emergence and development of a TCA that cannot wholly be captured by its continuous categorisation as a particular type of collective action. This observation is evident in the J2K, because that particular collective action showed that these formations are continuously evolving and therefore not static (Leroi et al., 2004: 850). Put differently, at a certain point in the course of a TCA, the level of coordination will change and this in turn will alter its description and categorisation. Simultaneously, there is the tendency to continue to employ the initial description or categorisation by participants in the collective action or analysts even when there are changes in its dynamics.

Further insights into the J2K are instructive here because prior to the merger between Jubilee 2000 and the DCN in 1997, it was simply referred to as ‘Jubilee 2000’ and it was generally known as a ‘campaign’, although the interaction, exchanges and the level of coordination suggests that a network was emerging. However, when they merged, it became known as the Jubilee 2000 Coalition, a scenario that raises some intriguing questions. First, did the merger really give rise to greater transnational coordination when the merger groups and associations were admittedly within the same country, or was the fact that some of the merging groups had foreign partners and branches enough to nullify such questions? Does the fact that the coordination between the UK groups on debt deepened following the merger and the proclamation of a ‘coalition’ void the evident and manifest features of an emergent J2K network? More importantly, does it really make any substantial difference in evaluating the outcomes of TCAs whether a TCA like the J2K is described as a network or a coalition? These are some of the questions that will be addressed in this research, and which will be part of its contribution to the literature on collective action.
Finally, it is vital to point out particularly in the context of the foregoing discussion that there are no simple answers or one-way solutions to these complexities because of the way some of these formations emerged and developed and the way researchers and practitioners have subsequently categorised them and employed the terms in the literature. However, we can draw some lessons from the J2K detailed in the last chapter. It started as ‘Jubilee 2000’ at its earliest formative stage and was a registered legal entity as a “Trust” and “Charity” with the same name as it developed into a proper campaign in April 1996. Although it officially remained ‘Jubilee 2000’ - but because it had articulated its aims and effectively started a campaign to achieve those aims - it was generally seen or referred to as the Jubilee 2000 Campaign and abbreviated as “J2K”. In less than a year and half after its registration, ‘Jubilee 2000’ merged with the DCN and became known as the Jubilee 2000 Coalition when it was launched in October 1997. Some months later, this coalition mobilised over 70,000 people from different countries and continents to demonstrate at the G8 Summit in Birmingham in May 1998 for debt cancellation. Meanwhile the Campaign diffused rapidly to other countries and continents before and after the Birmingham protests, while it barely maintained any form of transnational coordination.

It is evident that the level of coordination between the various actors in this mobilisation changed from its initial formation, and became more intensive as the mobilisation gathered pace to encompass the transnational sphere. However, this change in the level of coordination needs to be properly specified to aid any efforts to categorise it. This is because, as I noted above, the growth of the collective action and the subsequent coordination appear to have intensified first within the UK and thereafter, at the transnational level, complicating how this particular collective
action is viewed and categorised at each point in time. The registration of Jubilee 2000 as a Charity and a Trust established some formal elements – that suggests a coalition, while contacts between the constituent groups remained informal – exhibiting features of a network with its rapid diffusion. However, the merger in October 1997 resulted in a self-description of a ‘coalition’, although there is no evidence that the required coordination at the transnational level existed at this time or any other time for that matter to justify the label of a transnational coalition. This was more so because the Board of the Jubilee 2000 Coalition was mainly composed of the major aid agencies in the UK, along with some trade unions, and did not include transnational members, as the term coalition would imply. In addition, this Board was only responsible for the actions and activities of the UK Coalition. However, it should be recalled that a few individual staff of the UK Coalition also constituted an informal international Secretariat of the Campaign as they functioned at the transnational level on behalf of the network, leaving the exact status of the UK national campaign in the network conflated.

Thus, to accurately categorise the J2K as a TCA, it is important to note that the manifest dynamics lends itself to varied coordination levels and thus points to the presence of different dominant modalities – information exchange, campaign and coordinated tactics – to suggest forms of a network and a coalition in the J2K at different times. This is because, among other things, the Jubilee 2000 was always described or referred to as a ‘campaign’. However, Khagram et al. (2002: 7) argues that transnational campaigns – which the J2K obviously was - are understood as the shared strategies or sets of tactics by transnational coalitions.
In light of these flux and fluctuations, I would argue that it is problematic to apply strict delineation in categorising forms of TCAs and thus, should be de-emphasised. Except where it is necessary for analytical purposes, as Fox (2004) argued, the distinction does not appear to have any bearing on the sort of evaluation that is the focus of this research. Moreover in practical terms, development practitioners and researchers continue to employ these descriptions interchangeably, and there is no consistency in their application as the case of J2K and the ICBL shows.

Following from the above, I would further argue that while noting that elements of a coalition manifested in the J2K, it would be more appropriate to understand it as a network and less as a coalition – while not overlooking the UK component that branded itself a coalition. This is because although it exhibited features of different forms of mobilisation and coordination at various stages in the course of its emergence and existence, its overall processes, ideological basis, organisation and decision-making structures tallies more with the features of a transnational network than a transnational coalition or movement. At the same time, while it may be useful to understand the J2K in these terms, this understanding also entails some problems. These problems will be discussed as part of the debates and controversies in the evaluation of TCAs in the next chapter. Having previewed these different formations and forms of mobilisation, I will now briefly touch on theories of collective action and the concept of collective action frames that will feature in this research, before a detailed look at TANs as the conceptual framework to describe and analyse the J2K.

3.3 Collective Action Theories and Frames

In this section, I will briefly review a couple of collective action theories and mainly highlight their core contentions in explaining collective action emergence. This is
important because as I will show later, the emergence of J2K could only be explained
by a combination of these core contentions of the different collective action theories,
as none can single-handedly account for the emergence of J2K. I will also look at the
concept of collective action frames because it is vital to the analysis of J2K in this
research. I begin with the Resource Mobilisation Theory and the Political Process
Theory follows this. I will then examine Collective Action Frames before I look at
TANs as an extension of the collective actions of the New Social Movements cluster.

3.3.1 Collective Action Theories

A) Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT): At the core of resource mobilisation
theory is the claim that access to, and control over, resources necessary for collective
actions by the challenging group accounts for the emergence of collective actions.
Basically, the theory holds that collective action originates from the mobilisation of
resources, a rational orientation to action, and it emphasises the importance of
organisation to the challenging population. Resources here include material and non-
material aspects such as money, movement participants, legitimacy, authority,
supporters and sympathisers with time, skills and commitments, and other facilities
that may aid the emergence and sustenance of a collective action (Foweraker, 1995:
61f; Scott, 1990: 24; Tarrow, 1991: 13; McAdam, 1982: 22f, 36; McCarthy and Zald,

The theory also holds that mobilising structures are crucial to the emergence of
collective actions and these are defined as “those collective vehicles, informal as well
as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam
et al., 1996: 3). For example, McAdam’s (1982) analysis of the civil rights
movement showed that local black institutions like churches, colleges and other
informal forums that formed a fertile breeding ground for rights activism and networking among sympathisers played a critical role in the emergence of the civil rights movements in America. In sum, collective actions arise because aggrieved populations are organised enough to mobilise the needed resources to stage actions and events aimed at achieving their goals (Buechler, 2000: 35; Johnston et al, 1994; Jenkins, 1983; McAdam, 1982: 21; Tilly, 1978; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977: 250; McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1216; 1973; Oberschall, 1973). A major critique of this theory relevant to this research is that the theory did not specify how resources and organisation are translated into collective action emergence. Moreover, the RMT makes no provision for the role of principled ideas and values, norms and identity in the emergence of collective actions.

B) Political Process Theory (PPT) / Political Opportunity Structure (POS): The Political Process Theory contends that emergence of collective actions are shaped by broad social processes over a longer period of time, and that they are mediated by the interaction between collective action groups and the larger socio-political environment that they seek to change. Further, it contends that the processes are rather more cumulative than spontaneous, and that political opportunity structure is crucial to the emergence of collective actions (McAdam, 1982: 43-51). The theory holds that collective actions owe their emergence to three essential elements, namely: indigenous organisational strength, cognitive liberation, and the structure of political opportunities. Indigenous organisational strength refers to the internal dynamics between movement members, leaders’ commitment and charisma, groups’ infrastructure and communication amongst others. Cognitive liberation describes a change in the challengers’ consciousness, where potential or actual members see the

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45 For other critiques of the theory, see Dalton et al (1990: 9f); Klandermans and Tarrow (1988); Ferree and Miller (1985).
existing social order not only as unjust or illegitimate, but also as subject to change through their own direct efforts by advocating for the desired change (Klandermans, 1992: 79; McAdam, 1982; Piven and Cloward, 1979: 3-4).

Finally, it holds that movement emergence occurs at an opportune time because it depends on the level of opening in the POS in the arena of contention (Kriesi et al., 1995; Costain, 1992; Kriesi, 1988; Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam, 1986; 1982: 36-59; Morris, 1984; 1981; Tarrow, 1983; Tilly, 1978; 1975; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977). Finally, political opportunity structures are comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents that facilitate or constraint collective action. Political opportunities are thought to improve when power discrepancy between authorities and challengers is reduced and the bargaining position of challengers improves (Kitschelt 1986: 58; McAdam, 1982: 43). This combines with cognitive liberation and indigenous organisational strength to account for the emergence of collective actions according to this theory.\footnote{For the national and international dimensions of POS, see Oberschall (1996); Tarrow (1996: 52f) and for the cultural dimensions see Gamson and Meyer (1996: 279-283); McAdam (1994: 36-45); Brand (1990: 28-39). For a critique, see Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275).}

However, in the context of J2K, it is perhaps advisable to take seriously the argument that views POS as \textit{political context}, because many aspects of the political environment in which collective actions like the J2K emerged are more fluid and of shorter duration than the use of the term \textit{structure} suggests (Kolb, 2007: 53; Rucht, 1994). In this regard, this would include examining the relative openness of the international financial institutions to entertain the demands of the Campaign, and the stability or changes in terms of the positions held by members of the creditor
countries on the issue of debt cancellation. Finally, it would include an evaluation of the presence of notable elites as allies of the Campaign. Again, a critique of this theory that is relevant to this research is that the theory does not reckon with the role of ideas, norms, values and identity in the emergence of collective actions. As I will show in a later section of this chapter, these are central to the cluster of collective actions, which are often termed the new social movements (NSMs).

3.3.2 Collective Action Frames

Collective Action Frames or Frames results from framing; which describes the process through which meaning is constructed and assigned to relevant events and conditions by collective actions with the aim to mobilise potential participants and constituencies, garner support and to demobilise antagonists. Framing provides a purview for the (re) interpretation of notable events, the negotiation and construction of meaning and thus, the creation of reality that enable individuals to locate and perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their arena of contention and the broader world. In the process, it serves to organise individual experiences and guide collective actions (Benford and Snow, 2000: 614; Snow and Benford, 1988: 198, 214: fn. 3; Gamson et al., 1992; Goffman, 1974: 21).

Framing is thus the articulation and production of negotiated, shared meanings and definitions through reflection by individuals and groups on their situation, which they use to motivate, legitimise and guide collective actions. A frame therefore entails the picture of how a collective action problematises its issue, and the image of that issue that is placed in the domain of public discourse by making the collective claims. Collective actors engage in this production, maintenance and transmission of meaning and definitions for constituents, antagonists and observers through frame
alignment; defined as the congruence of individual interests, values and beliefs with collective action interpretative orientations embodied in their activities, goals and ideology (Dobusch and Quack, 2010: 228f; Snow and Benford, 1988: 198; 1992: 136; Gamson, 1992: 111; 1988; Snow et al., 1986: 464).

According to theorists, frame alignment consists of at least four processes\(^{47}\) and framing function to address three main tasks as it relates to collective action mobilisation and participation. The first is *Diagnostic Framing*, which is the identification and diagnosis of events or states of affairs as problematic, and thus requiring a change. This includes pinpointing the cause and the attribution of blame for the problem. The second, *Prognostic Framing*; entails proposed solutions to the diagnosed problems and specifies what needs to be done. The third is *Motivational Framing*; which is basically the call to action in line with the proposed solutions. It also entails the gradual development and adoption of collective action vocabularies that are employed by participants. How richly developed and integrated these processes are, it is argued, plays a significant role in how effective a mobilisation would be (Benford and Snow, 2000: 616-618; Snow and Benford, 1988: 199-213). It should be added that the potency or resonance of a frame is in part mediated by the dynamics of political opportunity structures.

The resonance of a Frame is a function of three factors, namely frame consistency, empirical credibility, and the claim maker’s credibility. Frame Consistency alludes to the possibility of empirically verifying the embedded claims in a frame, and it underscores the lack of contradiction between what a collective action expounds and its practices. The more contradictions between what collective actions avow to and

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\(^{47}\) For details and full discussions of these processes, see Snow and Benford (1988: 214f, fn. 4), Snow et al. (1986: 464-476).
what it practices, the less resonant will be the frame. For example, if a collective action avows to be non-violent and then engages in violent forms of conduct, frames concerning the issues it advocates will hardly resonate because of the apparent contradiction (Benford and Snow, 2000: 619-22; Johnson, 1997). Empirical Credibility refers to whether or not the claims being made in a frame are indicative of the ‘reality’ of the issue at contention. In other words, the more believable a claim is in relation to what is generally observable on the issue, the more likelihood that the frame will engender resonance.

The last of the factors conditioning Frame resonance is the perceived credibility of the claim makers. Essentially, both the status and the expertise knowledge of the claim makers coupled with their track record on the issue accounts for how their credibility is assessed. The more credible the claim makers are, the more persuasive they are likely to be and the broader the appeal of the frame. For example, in the nuclear freeze movement, peace groups enlisted former members of the Defence establishment to speak at rallies and press conferences because of their knowledge of the issues and status in the military.

Similarly, former and current military Generals were recruited by the ICBL to help make the case against the military utility of landmines in the campaign to ban the weapon (Benford and Snow, 2000: 621; Hubert, 2000: 10-16; Rutherford, 2000; Hajnoczi et al., 1998: 292-296; ICRC, 1996: 71-77; Mintz, 1996; Price, 1998: 615-622). This was because, given their expertise, status, and experience in the military, they were understood to be highly knowledgeable and credible on the issue, and were consequently persuasive in declaring that landmines had little, if any military utility. In the J2K, the processes and functions of frames outlined above were well
demonstrated, and the friction over the language of ‘forgiveness’ and ‘cancellation’ suggests the presence of competing frames. Further, as the analysis of J2K will show in later chapters, there was obviously the conscious effort to present the debt issue within the framework of justice and fairness (Papaioannou et al., 2009: 810; Gamson et al., 1992; Snow et al., 1986: 466).

3.4 Transnational Advocacy Networks: A Model of Contemporary TCAs

Earlier, I introduced the different forms of TCA and how they are categorised based on the level of coordination. In this section I will explore the concept of TANs in greater detail, as the formation that appears most suitable for the analysis of J2K. I will look at the motivation, emergence and composition of TANs, and the intensive use of information politics in their modes of operation as a way to understand and analyse the J2K. Finally, I will examine the crucial role of organisational platforms for information politics as a distinguishing factor of TANs.

To expatiate on my introduction of TANs in the previous section, I will draw on three examples in the J2K, the ICBL and the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI). My arguments in these following sections are that, first, TANs are an extension of the new social movements cluster of collective actions because they share and extend the features of those clusters of movements. Secondly, that TANs are distinct for their shared principled beliefs and values, the intensity of information politics in their modes of operation, and the organisational platform for their application of information politics. Thirdly, that the shared features of NSMs and TANs allows, inter alia, that the frameworks used to evaluate the outcomes of the NSMs cluster of collective actions could perceptibly be adapted to evaluate the
outcomes of TANs. Finally, I will attempt to justify the perspective, which places the J2K within the ambit of the theoretical and ideological axis of the NSMs and TANs.

3.4.1 Transnational Advocacy Networks: An Overview

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink first expounded TANs as a separate field of TCA with the seminal publication of "Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics". According to Keck and Sikkink (1998a: 2),

A transnational advocacy network includes those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services. Such networks are most prevalent in issue areas characterised by high value content and informational uncertainty.

Put differently, TANs describe an activist network that transcends national boundaries and consists of members motivated mainly by shared values and principles rather than professional or material interests. Their content largely centres on the agitation for, and the protection of, human dignity vis-a-vis internationally recognised documents and standards of justice, equality, and protection of the natural ecology amongst others, while maximising the use of emergent credible information (Yanacopulos, 2005; Nash, 2000). The shared principled ideas and values are vital in the lifespan of the networks as they shape the networks' perspectives on any particular problem issue, and inform their activities across national borders and cultures. These values and principles usually trump in the relationship between network members as contentious issues and friction between any of them are usually

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48 For details of what follows, see Keck and Sikkink (1998a: 1-38; 1998b) and Bushy (2010: 1-16) for a discussion of collective actions of this mode. For a critique of the motives underpinning them, see Sell and Prakash (2004).

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downplayed in view of the overarching goals of a network. However, there are examples like in the J2K where friction between some regional blocks left enduring schisms and outlived the network, although their shared principled ideas and values remained prominent, contested as they were.

3.4.2 Political Spaces, Employing Discursive Processes and Frames

Ideally, TANs are “political spaces, in which differently situated actors negotiate – formally and informally – the social, cultural, and political meanings of their joint enterprise” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 3). For example, the ICBL was founded by a group of domestic and international NGOs – differently situated in Europe and the United States, that were involved in various aspects of the landmine problem.

However, the anti-landmine campaign developed to include varied groups from different countries, international organisations and agencies like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UN Agencies amongst others. Further, countries like Canada, Belgium, and Norway who played important roles in the final part of the campaign, including the Treaty negotiations, had representatives during the Ottawa Process (Mekata, 2000: 146; Lawson et al. 1998: 160ff; Williams and Goose, 1998: 20-25). Diverse as the ICBL network was in terms of background of membership and those who collaborated with them, in the course of the transnational collective action, the ban norm was collectively developed as ICBL re-defined the production and use of landmines as a humanitarian catastrophe. It was this norm that

49 While this may be the general understanding, some like Hajer (1995: 14) Leroi et al. (2004: 851) have argued that values play a discursive function as a symbolic inclusionary umbrella and are sources of friction within some of these networks given its role in relation to power.

50 The Ottawa Process was the fifteen month-long flurries of diplomatic activities and negotiation process initiated by Canada, which produced the Mine Ban Treaty.
became the central rallying call of the campaign, and it was used to exert pressure on states that were reluctant to sign the MBT.\textsuperscript{51}

As political spaces, and with their characteristic broad composition of actors from diverse backgrounds, there are usually complex interactions within TANs. Network members use these interactions and joint actions to create and develop a common discourse in which they collectively participate as they engage in the intersubjective constructions of frames and meanings. They socially construct these frames as they assign meanings, re-interpret events and occurrences to articulate their positions. TANs draw on experiences and symbols to define or redefine the problem issue within these frames to reflect their perceptions of it as they expose the source of the problem and link it to the responsible authority.

TANs deploy symbols to bring, but also to bind, network members together as the use of chains by J2K to depict ‘slave to debt’ showed while they propose credible and plausible solutions. Thus they intervene in and shape debates and discourses, and help to define both the issue area and the problem itself. By engaging the issues and articulating their position through these processes, they actively partake in the concurrent negotiation and formation of their group identity and interests. While the foregoing is generally the case, a deeper look at some of these networks shows that they do not always fulfil the potential of a discursive and dialogic space that is often associated with them. The case of J2K detailed in chapter two (section 2.3.7) shows that the organisational structure of the Campaign and in particular, the lack of a

\textsuperscript{51} In the landmine discourse, Richard Price contends that, "the problems and solutions were taught to governments, who come to see new practices as appropriate for themselves as members of international society" (1998: 621). He then argues that the role of moral persuasion and international social pressure arising from identity politics and emulation were crucial to securing the Mine Ban Treaty. In other words, some states that originally opposed the ban did not want the identity of themselves as a state that insisted on the continued use of a weapon that was causing huge humanitarian problems.
formal and accountable international secretariat had the effect, among others, of effectively constraining such discursive space in the network.

3.4.3 Emergence, Composition and Lifespan

Usually, TANs emerge from proposals and strategies for social and political actions around apparently intractable problems by norm entrepreneurs or people who, though may be differently situated, are well informed on the issue over a considerable period of time to develop the same or similar world views. This was demonstrated in the anti-landmine campaign as individuals and organisations with similar experiences with the landmine problem in different countries and continents argued that landmines were a humanitarian disaster, which necessitated a ban (Rutherford, 2000; Hubert, 1998; Price, 1998: 615-622). J2K emergence as a transnational network with the aim to abolish the debt of the impoverished countries mirrors the above pattern as anti-debt campaigners in the global North and South highlighted the impacts of debt.

TANs do also tend to emerge from situations where channels between domestic groups and their local authorities are blocked or ineffective in addressing a problem issue as in closed political systems like dictatorial regimes, or where the state is the target or rights violator. In such cases, skilful use of information could elicit the 'boomerang' pattern of influence that comes with international pressure on the domestic authority (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 12f; 1998b: 217). In such models, domestic NGOs or activists disseminate credible information to international NGOs or institutions that in turn persuade other international actors to bring pressure to bear on the domestic authority. However, the near permanent competition between varied domestic collective actions or insurgent groups in different regions for international support means that not all of them can secure the international support they crave.
even with credible information. According to Bob (2005), the prospects of domestic insurgents or domestic collective actions gaining the support of international NGOs or media attention hinges on the strategic marketing of the collective action and the relative power and profile of the international NGOs whose support and aid is being solicited. He argues that while domestic collective actions tailor their image and attempts to fit their goals into the broader aims of the prospective international NGOs to render themselves attractive as potential partners, the international NGOs tend to support groups whose issue profile fits with theirs and with a potential for success, and one that would reflect well on their organisation.

As indicated above, TANs are often composed of a broad range of domestic and international NGOs and may include governmental and intergovernmental agencies, individual office holders in state or multilateral organisations (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 2ff; 1998b: 217ff). Driving the networking dynamics and processes in TANs are the domestic and international NGOs that takes on advocacy tasks with dense, formal and informal information exchange within the network. These dynamics fit with the argument that while individuals and groups who partake in transnational activism may be constrained or supported by domestic networks, their interaction with non-state actors at the international level underlies the prevalent and increased processes of transnational activism; fuelled by but not limited to globalisation and its relation to the changing structure of international politics (Tarrow, 20054f). The absence of rigid leadership hierarchy and the often-loose organisational structure of TANs enable different groups with varied interests to participate in them with variations of actions and activities to suit their involvement. The diversity of groups and NGOs that spanned human rights, environmental and developmental fields,
professional bodies and trade unions, civic and religious groups that participated in the ICBL and the J2K attests to this.

TANs are usually transient and mobile given the role of information, which means that their life cycles are short-lived and impermanent (Keck and Sikkink, 1998b: 236). This impermanence was evident in the campaign for the International Criminal Court (ICC), the ICBL and the MAI. When these networks appear to reach their climax by attaining for example, their main aims or a considerable part of it, they ceased to exist in their original configuration. While a few specific groups, formed for such collective actions may persist, most of them only in skeletal forms, the network ceases to exist and function as it previously did. For example, while some groups of the ICBL continued to exist after the MBT, just like they were before the ICBL emerged, the ICBL per se ceased to exist as a TAN. Similar pattern followed the establishment of the ICC and the demise of the MAI proposals and negotiations.

### 3.4.4 Information Politics, Modes of Operation and Mobilisation

In this section, I will explore TANs’ deployment of information politics, their modes of operation and the type of mobilisation they often engage in. I will show why generating credible information is vital to TANs, how they operate in relation to their varied audience and targets with the information they generate and the importance of organisational platform in a network’s application of information politics.

TANs, as communicative structures and spaces for socio-political exchange, rely on the strategic and effective application of the notion of Information Politics, that is, the ability to generate accurate and credible information and quickly deploy them

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52 According to Keck and Sikkink (1998a: 16-25), this is one of four tactics that TANs use in their efforts at persuasion, socialization and pressurising their targets. Others are symbolic, leverage and accountability politics.
sometimes dramatically, but effectively at appropriate venues to targeted audiences for maximum effects. TANs, because of their dominant modality, are adept at condensing the information they generate into simple, comprehensible forms to persuade and motivate people to act. In employing information politics in their mobilisation processes, TANs often apply a strategy that enables them to focus on multiple audiences at the same time. This means that the information they generate is quickly and effectively circulated to aid them in mobilising their grassroots, the media and the public to put pressure on their targets.

While social and cultural networks are equally important to movement mobilisation (Diani and McAdam, 2003; McAdam et al. 1996) for TANs, the role of information is vital because it is basically the currency on which they run, it is their lifeline, and in fact, central to their identity (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 10, 30) because TANs portray themselves as alternative sources of information. As a result, they necessarily need to generate credible new information or re-interpret previous ones to reiterate a position or offer new perspectives on a problem. They then present the information; to draw attention to the problem and to put pressure on their targets. This explains why these networks painstakingly research their issues, rely on credible eyewitness accounts, expert reports, network-member NGOs on the ground and personal testimonies; that is stories of people affected by the issue at contention like landmine victims in the ICBL (White and Rutherford, 1998). Effective deployment of information politics is crucial to TANs because TANs are mainly engaged in trying to achieve their aims by mediating or changing public discourses and opinion and

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51 Similar argument has been made regarding frame resonance. Benford and Snow (2000: 619-22); Johnson (1997), argue that the more credible the claim makers and their information are, the more persuasive they are likely to be.
through that, leverage the sources information is used to challenge dominant positions on the problem issue as they try to counter and undermine the dominant narratives in a discourse.

Further, they focus on the politicians and policy makers who may be part of their target actors by providing them any new information they may have generated. In doing so, they try to socialise and persuade their target actors as they employ both the insider and outsider models of influence. This means that they simultaneously engage in lobbying their targets and applying public pressure and leverage. This was demonstrated during the protests at the G8 summit in Birmingham, where a meeting between the Campaign leadership and the political leaders of the G8 also took place. This process was repeated in the 1999 Cologne summit (Pettifor, 2006).

Rutherford (2000) and Price (1998) showed how campaigners in the ICBL socialised their targets both on the cognitive agenda setting level by prominently featuring landmine victims and on the norm agenda setting level, a process that involved changing state conception of landmines from one of military-political issue to one of major international humanitarian crisis. By using credible information to challenge and undermine the dominant perspective in the landmine discourse and re-define the landmine problem as a humanitarian crisis, the target actors – including the hesitant states to the ban proposals, were socialised to this 'new' perspective and influenced to alter their conception and understanding of the use of landmines.

54 **Leverage** is an indirect influence where allies of a network bring some pressure to bear on or influence powerful actors like states or international institutions and corporations where a network are unlikely to have a direct influence. Leverage could be material or moral. For more, see (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 23).

55 This argument mirrors that of the role of epistemic communities in international politics via their impact on state and international policies through their influence on national and international policy makers who defer to knowledge-based communities for expert advice and information in moments of crisis or shock to reduce their risks (Adler and Haas, 1992: 381f; Haas, P. M. 1992: 1-16; 1989: 378-381; Haas, E. B., 1990: 2).
Still, in the ICBL, prominent serving and retired military Generals helped to generate credible information, which the campaign used to challenge, discredit and ultimately delegitimise the military utility of landmines. As the military utility of landmines, which was the core argument of mine retention proponents, was discredited, the campaigners simultaneously highlighted the devastating humanitarian cost of the weapon – the key argument of ban proponents (Rutherford, 2000; Hubert, 1998; Price, 1998: 615-622) to advance the case for a ban. Further, the use of expert opinion of surgeons, de-miners and prosthetic specialists who were all engaged with the landmine problems on the ground ensured that the ‘humanitarian cost’ argument was not really challenged as the ban proponents’ claims could easily be verified and validated. By generating such credible information and presenting it in simple and comprehensible manner with testimonies from mine victims, ban proponents were able to assume a dominant position in the landmine discourse. This in turn helped the campaign to influence and secure the support of hitherto reluctant states to ban the weapon and advanced the ban norm.

Quite often, TANs frame complicated issues in simple terms of right or wrong, they identify the blame target and propose possible solutions to simplify the issue to their audience. For example, in the arcane issue of sovereign debt of impoverished countries, campaigners in the J2K argued that it was morally wrong, unfair and unjust for innocent children in impoverished countries to be denied basic necessities due to the debt, for which they were not responsible. Therefore they proposed debt cancellation to redress the problem. Campaigners in the ICBL made similar arguments with regards to the long-lasting effects of the use of landmines, on
innocent people (Cameron et al. 1998). DeMars (2005) argued that these networks and in particular the NGOs that facilitate them do make causal claims that are obscured behind their normative appeals because the causal claims cannot sustain close scrutiny. However, the cause-effect relationship in the continued production and use of anti-personnel landmines could not really be disputed. This was due largely to the irrefutable evidence with expert reports and the personal testimonies of landmines victims gathered on the ground by NGOs.

By presenting the problem, the blame target and possible solutions in a simple and comprehensible manner, TANs usually appeal to a common sense of right or wrong, of justice or norms. This, according to proponents, is part of the reasons why many of their issues gain public resonance as their causes and actions are undergirded by normative logic. This is particularly so in cases “involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is short and clear causal chain (...) assigning responsibility” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 27). While the unpayable debt that the J2K sought to cancel cannot directly be described in these terms, however, it can arguably be included in the moral, justice and normative frame that are referenced above because, although the blame targets for the debt remain contested, there is no doubt about the effects of debt on the poor and vulnerable in the indebted countries.

TANs’ reliance on the sophisticated and strategic use of information also informs the type of mobilisation they are engaged in. These mobilisations, with few exceptions like boycotts or occasional rallies, contrast with the type of mobilisation that social movements are more attuned to that centres on the masses and disruption of the

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accepted order. TANs' mobilisations are rather more of an alternative to mass action because their modus is to use information to motivate, persuade and gain leverage.

Given their modes of operation, events of various kinds do avail campaigners in a network with the strategic choice of receptive and favourable venues that serve as points of reference for TANs because; these events and venues offer opportunities for dramatic and effective application of information politics. For example, in the collective action against the MAI, details of the proposal that were uncovered and released by the network at a crucial point in the negotiations provoked intense international reaction that led to a suspension of the negotiations and ultimately, the demise of the proposal (Smythe, 2000: 81-87; Kobrin, 1998: 97-100; Piccioto, 1998).

Another example was in the MBT negotiations in Oslo. There, the ICBL set up an 'alternative information site' in front of the Hall where the official negotiation was taking place and from there released instant information from the negotiations to the public. This was possible because the network had members with observer status for the negotiations (Hubert, 2000: 13-17; Mekata 2000: 149; Williams and Goose, 1998: 38ff). Information from the negotiation was used to further put public pressure on the delegates from states that were still hesitant to fully support the ban proposals.

TANs are attentive to political opportunities at the domestic level where in concert with other allies, they can employ creative and innovative use of information for sophisticated political strategies against their targets. At the international level, they strive to establish international rules, policies and norms by exerting public pressure to gain leverage over relevant authorities in pursuance of their aims. When rules or norms are instituted at the international level like the mine ban norm was with the MBT, TANs deploy them at the domestic level as international instruments guiding
the proper and acceptable code of state behaviour that domestic authorities should adhere to. This interaction draws on the "two-level game" processes that sees political entrepreneurs exert international influence on domestic politics and actors, and simultaneously domestic politics shapes the international position of domestic actors (Putnam, 1988). In what follows, I will argue that TANs are an extension of the NSMs’ cluster of collective actions because they extend the similar features they share with NSMs.

3.4.5 TANs: An Extension of NSMs with a Novelty

The cluster of collective actions tagged the 'new' social movements emerged from the 1960s onwards and they are understood to organise mainly around more universal concerns, post material values and ethical issues with a drift towards transnationalism in their scope of activities and goals. These forms of collective action emphasise loose organisational and non-hierarchical structures and largely maintain fluid leadership style. Theoretically, two broad paradigms are discernible in these types of collective actions and both are rooted in the underlying common assumption that views these collective actions

(...) as the general expression of the transforming representation of contemporary societies. The transformation of societies from modernism to post-modernism, industrialism to post-industrialism and from materialism to post-materialism (Singh, 2001: 87).

Some theorists who emphasise the personal and political freedom and the cultural and collective identity components of these collective actions have explained their emergence from that perspective (Nash, 2000; Inglehart, 1990; Cohen, 1985; Melucci, 1996; 1995; 1989; Crook et al., 1992: 241ff). Others, who write from post-

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57 For debates and discussions on the 'newness' of these types of collective action, see Waters (2008: 63; Nash (2000: 114), Buechler (1997: 297) and Melucci (1996).
industrial and neo Marxist perspectives (Foweraker, 1997; Neidhardt and Rucht, 1991; Habermas, 1989; Touraine, 1988; 1985; 1971; Offe, 1985), have explained them in terms of processes of large-scale societal differentiation and representation.

Generally, these theorists argue that the inherent contradictions in these societal transformations help to mobilise new political constituencies around either non-material or previously private issues and this results in a clash of values. This clash of values, it is claimed, is epitomised in the NSMs’ mistrust of the marketplace and industrial modernisation and is also reflected in their rejection of society’s traditional consensual model of economic growth and achievement ethic, for non-material goals symbolised by the post material values and ideals they advocate (Buechler, 2000: 47f; McAdam et al, 1996: 7; Kitschelt, 1990: 180; Klandermans and Tarrow, 1988: 7f). For TAN members, the ideological basis of their motivation for action is equally rooted in the same ideological platform as the NSMs because,

advocates pleads the cause of others, defend a cause or proposition where (…) they are organised to promote principled ideas, and norms, and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of their ‘interest’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 8f).

It is against the foregoing ideological background that TANs are to be understood. Their importance and prevalence in such value-laden debates and issues in the areas of human rights, women’s rights, infant health, indigenous peoples and the natural ecology, and more recently, the debt of impoverished countries shows that the ideological basis of the NSMs equally undergirds and accounts for TANs’ motivation. More often than not, in these issues areas, TANs create and give voice to issues and problems, and victims, whose voices may otherwise not gain traction beyond the local level or at the international political level.
Due to the similarities in the features of TANs and the NSMs, they are often conflated in the literature. However, I would argue that it is important to distinguish them and perhaps more appropriate to understand TANs as effectively, an offshoot of the NSMs because, although they share a number of similarities, TANs still retain some distinct features, as I will show below. Understanding TANs, as offshoot of the NSMs is important because it will allow for compatibility in employing for TANs, the analytical tools and framework developed to evaluate the outcomes of the NSMs.

Non-state actors like TANs have become increasingly visible and recognised at the international political stage as major actors due in part to their ability to generate, mobilise and deploy information strategically. Combined with the argument that many issues of TANs attract public resonance because of the normative logic that drives them, it is easy to see why TANs often help to create new issues, give voice to marginalised groups, socialise, persuade, pressure, and sometimes gain leverage over more powerful institutions and governments. According to proponents, it is precisely the motivation of TANs, the centrality and intensity of their strategic deployment of information that marks their distinction and novelty in international politics and TCAs. Keck and Sikkink noted that TANs are

distinctive in the centrality of shared principled ideas and values; their strategies aim to use information and beliefs to motivate people to action and use leverage to gain the support of more powerful institutions (1998a: 30).

They add that while similar formations may have existed on different issues in the past – as with the abolitionist and anti-slavery movements – there is a new dimension to these formations that marks their distinction. They assert that,

What is novel in these networks is the ability of nontraditional international actors to mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and
categories and to persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over much more powerful organisations and governments (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a: 2).

Keck and Sikkink’s distinction of TANs could be augmented because a compelling argument could be advanced with a more incisive look at TANs’ application of information politics. It is generally true that TANs generate and strategically deploys credible information to maximum effects. However, the organisational platform from which that information is disseminated seems a further mark of distinction in the potency of information politics. This, I would argue, is because generating credible information is only one part of the equation; the other part is, who gives the information and from where the information is disseminated. The pertinent question therefore, that the application of information politics raises is, which member organisations or blocks in a network gets attention with the information that is generated and whose position among the diverging views within the network gets traction at the international political level? It is important to address this question even if cursory, because it will show that while credible information is vital to TANs, equally vital is who – which organisation, and where – the region or location, from which the information is disseminated.

Again, I draw on the J2K and the ICBL. First, local groups and NGOs in the global South generated a lot of the information that the J2K provided and with which the network challenged the debt and development data from the IFIs and creditor countries. Notably, it was this gathering and documentation of relevant information on the effects of debt in these countries and the experiences of people living under the conditions precipitated by the debts that gave rise to the anti-debt campaigns in those global South countries long before J2K emerged (Rustomjee, 2004). It is inconceivable that the groups and NGOs that were involved in those collective
actions did not make the information they had available to the public or media. However, their collective claims and agitation did not appear to have gained any traction or resonance beyond their localities. However, this situation changed when the J2K emerged in the global North and incorporated existing debt campaigns.

Secondly, within the J2K network, there existed blocks like the Jubilee South and Afrika Campaign which, for reasons ranging from ideological differences to leadership style and difficult inter-personal relations, had fundamental differences of opinions and positions on issues like the closing date and language used on debt in the network. However, in recognising the network as the legitimate representatives of the collective claimers to consult and negotiate some possible solutions to the debt crisis – the creditor institutions and countries hardly looked to the global South countries. Nor were the Jubilee South position really considered in the agreement that was reached at the Cologne Summit in 1999 as the schism that greeted the agreement showed.

A similar pattern could be observed to some extent in the TCA on landmines. Prior to the emergence of the ICBL, different local groups in different countries were drawing attention to the long-lasting effects of landmines with calls to address the problem. However, they were hardly able to muster any support at the international political level until the ICBL emerged, with a handful of NGOs from Europe and the US at its core to create a strong platform for advocacy. From these examples, a few conjectural points can be made to buttress the case for the crucial role of the organisational platform in TANs’ deployment of information politics.
First, it can be argued that although credible information on debt and its effects on the impoverished countries were always available, the question of which groups were giving out the information and the region from which it was delivered played a role on the efficacy and potency of information politics in the J2K. This, with particular reference to the platform, because not until the emergence of J2K in England, the debt cancellation calls did not receive the enormous international attention that the call by the J2K elicited. Secondly, it can be argued that the J2K was arguably better equipped with resources, particularly media expertise – and the access to international print and broadcast outlets – on account of its major operational bases in the global North, than virtually all the other collective actions in the global South. While this may be a valid point, it however, lends some credence to the argument of the importance of the location from which any credible information is disseminated.

The foregoing is slightly related to the question of which part of a network speaks on behalf of a network at the relevant forums? As a network – with emphasis on diffuse and non-hierarchical structures and leadership – this is an intriguing question because, as I will show later, the question of who speaks for whom and on behalf of the network essentially boiled down to the question of ownership of the Campaign on debt. Put differently, the question speaks to the issue of representation in these networks and by extension, the issue of legitimacy.

Van Rooy (2004: 62-75) and Clark (2001: 26) argue that representation is one of a number of ways through which legitimacy is determined. The former discusses the different aspects of representation ranging from the nature of membership, that takes into account, the size, breadth and depth, to the internal processes of democracy, which reckons with elections, control, accountability and transparency of a group or
network. However, she also specified various other rules including experts’ opinion, the rarity and validity of information a group makes available, and claims by those affected by the issue at contention amongst others. For the latter, representation essentially probes whether an organisation or a network functions according to participatory decision making procedures. Given the bases on which legitimacy could be claimed or determined, it is no surprise that the J2K was thought to have claimed legitimacy on account of its advocacy on debt although it also denied being representative of the poor in the indebted countries. On the other hand, we shall see later that the Jubilee South’s position on these issues form part of the overt and covert friction in the J2K and was partly rooted in Clark’s reflection on the question of who has the right to speak on behalf of third world poor. According to Clark,

Some Northern campaigners have built up communications and debating skills that are the envy of political spin-doctors, yet their arguments may be untrammelled by on-the-ground realities. In drawing raw facts from their Southern partners for use in advocacy strategies that are not based on consultation with those partners, the NGOs can be faulted as insensitive and extractive. Hence there is a growing call from Southern NGOs for Northern groups to surrender power and allow Southern civil society to speak for Southern citizens (2001: 23).

Thirdly, as these examples show, effectively deploying information politics goes beyond generating credible information and strategically deploying that information. These cases highlight the vital role and the importance of the organisational platform from which information politics is deployed. Further, it lends credence to the argument advanced by Klandermans and Staggenborg (2002: 261) Stone (2002: 3) that networks can amplify and disseminate ideas far more widely than individual organisations and institutions due to the breadth of their reach. Although this point is often overlooked in the literature, I would argue that this aspect of information
politics adds weight to the overall argument advanced by Keck and Sikkink for information politics as a distinguishing feature of TANs.

To summarise, I have introduced and reviewed in detail the approach of transnational advocacy networks as expounded by proponents and drew on three main examples in the ICBL, the J2K and the MAI to elucidate on their features and processes. These three examples were deployed for illustrative purposes because they exhibit some of the core points of emphasis that were necessary to expatiate on TANs. I noted that TANs are primarily bound together by shared principled ideas and values and they are usually composed of broad and varied groups while their networking processes are driven by domestic and international NGOs. Overall, TANs are understood as political spaces and communicative structures, which combine the potency of, sophisticated and effective information politics with symbolic, leverage and accountability politics to persuade socialise and put pressure on their target actors. I argued that TANs are an extension of the new social movement cluster of collective actions because they share the features of those collective actions but that they are distinct for the centrality of shared principled ideas and values, their intensity and sophistication in deploying information politics. While proponents distinguished TANs on account of their application of information politics, I augmented this argument with the importance of the organisational platform and the location from which information politics is deployed.

3.5 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter I have reviewed the categorisation of TCAs in the literature and noted that the level of coordination between their constituent parts determines whether they are classified as a movement, network or a coalition. I argued that given the non-
linear nature of the emergence and mobilisation of TCAs and the attendant changes and fluctuations in the level of coordination, it is important to de-emphasise the categorisations of networks, movements and coalitions, because the categorisations have no significant bearings on identifying the outcomes of TCAs. I highlighted that these categorisations are highly political terms hence the controversies that trails their usage. I also argued that while J2K exhibited elements of a coalition and a network, it would be more appropriate to view the J2K as a network because of its overall dynamics. I briefly examined theories of collective actions – mainly to highlight their core contentions as background to a major argument in this research that none of these collective action theories could single-handedly explain the emergence of J2K hence; I would argue for a combination of their salient points to account for the emergence of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign. The concept of collective action frames was examined as a prelude to the Campaign’s frame of the debt problem. Following this detailed review of TANs and the categorisation of TCAs, in the next chapter, I will examine the problems and controversies associated with the evaluation of collective actions, review some frameworks for monitoring and evaluation, and outline the theoretical framework to evaluate the J2K.

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will outline the theoretical framework, which will be used for the empirical evaluation of the outcomes of J2K. First, I will review some of the problems and debates in the evaluation of collective actions and this will acquaint us with some of the difficulties associated with the task of evaluation. I will argue that evaluating outcomes of transnational collective actions is problematic for a number of reasons that include the difficulty of establishing the causal links between a network’s efforts and changes in the arena of contention. That part of these problems is the fact that different frames and standards are used to examine the same data thereby producing diverging and even contradictory results. Consequently, outcomes of a collective action are always contested both within and outside the networks. My review of these problems and debates will show that labels such as “success” and “failure” as the main evaluative approach, while tempting and attractive in some cases would be unsuitable for analysing the J2K because they are simplistic and lack the capability to capture the complexities and intricacies in evaluating TCAs, and are relational terms that have no benchmarks for measurement.

Thus, my major argument in this chapter is that because it may be impossible to identify and exhaust the entire causal influences of outcomes, particularly of a TCA on such a complex and intractable issue as debt of impoverished countries, casting outcomes of TCAs in definitive, positivist or absolute terms is problematic. Thus, in this research a contextual, conjectural and temporal approach to outcomes will be adopted. This means that the outcomes that will be identified would not be wholly...
ascribed to the Campaign alone but instead will be viewed in context of available
data and information, and acknowledgement of the possibility that all the causal
influences may not have been exhausted. This will lead to the next section where I
will review a few of the theoretical frameworks in the literature on ‘Monitoring and
Evaluation’ (M&E) as a guide to the theoretical framework that is considered for this
research.

I argued in the last chapter that TANs are an extension of the new social movements’
cluster of collective actions. Building on that, I will adopt Giugni’s (1995) theoretical
framework for the evaluation of NSMs in the next section. I will discuss the reasons
underpinning this approach and I will adapt and outline this framework to suit the
empirical evaluation of the outcomes of J2K. The framework will show that the
outcomes of J2K will be identified and analysed under Procedural, Substantive and
Sensitising Impacts. Following my discussion of the problems associated with the
evaluation of outcomes and particularly the causal complexity, the next section will
outline the causal mechanisms – that are the processes through which the J2K may
have achieved the potential outcomes. The last section will conclude the chapter.

4.2 Problems and Debates in the Evaluation of Transnational Collective
Actions

As discussed in chapter three, there are inconsistencies in the categorisation of forms
of TCAs. The fact that the categories are not mutually exclusive means that there are
sometimes overlaps as some of the configurations may be studied under more than
one category. However, I argued that the categorisation bear no significance in
identifying the outcomes of the various forms of collective actions. Further, in
evaluating these different formations it is evident that they share common problems
and basically the same controversies beset them all. While it has been strongly argued that these collective actions as catalysts for social change provide an indispensable justification for their study (Burstein et al., 1995: 275), this has been rightly augmented with the observation that, “Everyone who has worked on social movements knows how important it is to try to understand their outcomes. Almost everyone admits the extreme difficulty of doing so” (Tarrow, 1999: vii). One reason for this difficulty is that evaluating the outcomes of collective actions is complex and multifaceted and their outcomes and impacts range from the positive to the negative, intended and unintended (Earl, 2000: 7) and could be viewed in both short and long terms. In this section, I examine some of these problems, debates and controversies in evaluating collective actions.

A major problem in evaluating the outcomes, impacts or consequences of a TCA is the difficulty of establishing a causal link between the efforts and activities of the TCA and any change in the social, political and cultural arena of contention. Known as the ‘causal complexity’, it holds that it is virtually impossible to isolate TCAs from the wider factors that may have any causal influence on any change that may occur in the course of a collective action’s challenge (Kolb, 2007: 1). Thus it has been noted that,

we cannot directly determine whether a change is the result of a movement’s action or of reform undertaken by the political authorities. We have to make the link between movement’s action and the observed change indirectly, by specifying the mechanisms through which the former produces the latter (Giugni 1995: 212f).58

Roseneil corroborates this postulation in her analysis and evaluation of the Greenham Common protest of the 1980s. She writes: “Evaluating the influence of Greenham on

58 Meyer (2009: 417) and Tarrow (1998: 161-164) have made the same argument.
global nuclear policy is fraught with difficulty. The impact of Greenham, in this area, is hard to disentangle from that of the wider peace movement” (1997: 67).

Referencing Randle (1987), she continued,

Commenting on non-violent direct action in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the secrecy which surrounds all government decisions, particularly about nuclear weapons, means that it is seldom possible to demonstrate beyond doubt that changes in policy may be attributed to social movements (Roseneil, 1997: 67).

While it is clear that government secrecy may have notched up this difficulty in this particular case, fundamental issue remains establishing the causal links and isolating them from all the possible wider factors.

The above difficulty is accentuated by the fact that some of the impacts or outcomes of these TCAs cannot be easily observed in the short term as such impacts may only manifest over a relatively long period of time. This is usually the case where they seek to change collective attitudes, which takes longer to effect and manifest compared to policy changes that may manifest relatively quicker and are easier to discern. In some cases, the longer it takes for such manifestations, the more difficult it becomes to establish its causality to the TCA. Moreover, the role that movement allies and important elites may play and the influence that such other mediating factors may weigh in any changes that occur in the course of a TCA cannot be entirely credited to the TCA. This reiterates the difficulty of detaching movement efforts from the wider cycles of contention\textsuperscript{59} in which it occurs (Amenta and Caren, 2007: 462-474; Rucht, 2007; 1999: 204; Tarrow, 1998: 163).

\textsuperscript{59} Cycles of contention also known as waves of collective action expounded by Tarrow (1998), describes a phase of heightened conflict across the social system and the cyclical rise and fall of social movement activities. It involves the “early risers” - those people or groups who lay the foundational work and it encompasses the various stages at which an issue becomes an important topic of debate. In other words, it means that the point at which an issue becomes a big collective action topic, there has been preceding events and circumstances, which are part of this cycle that culminates in the emergence of the collective action, which now attracts much attention at a particular time.
Another major problem in evaluating outcomes of TCAs is the fact that some of their outcomes may produce consequences that are not intended and not all such consequences are necessarily positive. Where negative impacts or consequences of a collective action are identified, the collective action may be reluctant to accept them as consequences of their efforts. Nevertheless, opponents of the collective action may point to them as precipitating such effects. The problem that this poses for the evaluation of collective actions is typified by the notion of the 'Radical Flank Effects'\textsuperscript{60} (RFE) as it aptly demonstrates the double-edged nature of this issue.

When groups or factions of the radical persuasion in a collective action threaten to or actually engage in activities that could be tagged ‘extreme’, it may provoke a crackdown by the authorities on the whole collective action and not just the radical wing of it. This may even have wider implications beyond the collective action where such a crackdown may include restricting freedom of speech, association and public meetings or intrusive surveillance. Yet, it could be argued that the authorities would have carried out such a crackdown anyway. Such cases describe a negative radical flank effect (Gupta, 2002; Barkan, 1979; Killian, 1972). This was the case with some groups like the Black Panther Party (BPP), the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) and the Republic of New Africa (RNA) in the civil rights movement in the US. These groups embraced varied versions of Black Ideology and advocated radical positions including separation, secession and overthrow of the United States government by force (Haines, 1988: 46-70).

Conversely, such threats of or actual engagement in ‘radical’ activity may influence the authorities to offer concessions on demands by the collective action. This was the

\textsuperscript{60} For a detail discussion on the Radical Flank Effect, see Haines (1988), Goodwin and Jasper (2009: 411), Gupta, (2002).
case with the enactment of the Welsh Language Act (WLA) of 1967 in the wake of
direct actions and civil disobedience by the Welsh Language Society (WLS) whose
actions were considered radical (Davies, 1989: 46). Further, radical activities may
compel collective action targets to be more receptive to the 'moderate' wing in an
attempt to undermine the radical wing (Gupta, 2002: 6; Haines, 1988; Fones-Wolf,
1986; Bowles et al., 1983; Ramirez, 1978; Ewen, 1976). As McAdam puts it,

(...) the existence of radicals makes moderate groups in the movement more
attractive negotiating partners to the movement opponents. Radicalness
provides strong incentives to the state to get to the bargaining table with the
moderates in order to avoid dealing with the radicals. In addition, financial
support flowing to moderate groups in the movement increases dramatically
in the presence of radicals (1992).61

This was also the logic behind the declaration by Malcolm X, the civil rights leader
who was known for his radical views at the height of the civil rights movement in the
United States, when he said:

I want Dr King to know that I didn't come to Selma to make his job difficult.
I really did come thinking that I could make it easier. If white people realize
what the alternative is, perhaps they'll be more willing to hear Dr King.62

In such cases, there is a positive radical flank effect. Yet, a crackdown could also
undermine those authorities in reputational or ideological terms and thus, could be
counterproductive or unsuccessful and cause protest to spread. On the other hand, the
authorities or the media could use 'radical flanks' to define all those involved in the
collective action and attempt to delegitimise or undermine their protest.

Thus, the outcome of a collective action may produce the unintended consequence of
repression by the authorities just as it may change or strengthen the balance of power
within the collective action where, for example, there is a struggle between

61 Cited in Gupta (2002: 3)
'moderates' or 'reformists' and 'radical' or 'conservative' forces challenging for power or dominance within the collective action. Besides, unintended consequences could be produced in a wide range of areas including creating legal precedents or a movement transforming into a formal pressure group or political party like the Greens in Germany, France and Britain (Scott, 1990: 27; Kitschelt, 1989; Tilly, 1984: 312f.). Evaluating this array of consequences is problematic because not only is their causality difficult to ascertain and link directly to the collective action, but also because such consequences or impacts may not have been part of their aims when they emerged. It is in light of this that Earl (2000: 7) argued that a distinction should be made as to whether a study is about intended or unintended outcomes.

A further problem in the evaluation of TCAs is the difficulty of recognising and assessing their impacts and consequences in the personal and cultural spheres (Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 230ff). People, who participate in collective actions, particularly those like TANs that are motivated and bound together by shared principled values and ideas, embody and attempt to live the values that the collective action expounds. Living these values affects both personal attitudes of participants in the collective action and consequently the culture in ways that may be largely evident, but yet impossible to measure (Conway, 2012: 115f, 164f).

While a number of studies examining the personal impact of movement involvement have been conducted with a particular focus on the 1960s and 1970s movements in the US, methodological shortcomings and the span of the studies have rendered it impossible to generalise from them (Kolb, 2007: 9f).63 Similarly, the students'
movement in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s affected the lifestyle of students from
the way they dressed and ate to the way they talked, worked, and lived their sexual
lives (Keck and Sikkink, 1998a). What consequences these changes in attitude had
on their lives later on are practically impossible to ascertain on a general level. What
is beyond doubt however is that at least in the course of their challenge; the
collective action affected them on personal levels with possibly lifelong
consequences. The situation of the ‘conscription resisters’ in the apartheid era South
Africa who participated in the well-documented case of the End Conscription
Campaign (ECC) is a striking and instructive example (Conway, 2012).

There are also some methodological problems in evaluating the outcomes of TCAs
and I will address them in chapter five. Suffice to say here that it has been argued
(Earl, 2007; Giugni, 2007; Della Porta and Diani, 1999: 235; McAdam, 1999: 117;
Keck and Sikkink, 1998a; Giugni, 1995: 207) that a number of studies in this area
concentrate on ascertaining the impacts of collective action on public policy and
generating new legislation at the expense of other possible areas where their impacts
or consequences could be observed. While impacts of a collective action may be
most visible in the area of legislation or policy changes as response from the
authorities or targets, it is by no means the only area to observe their outcomes or
impacts. Particularly for changes in the cultural spheres, formal changes of policies
may not be required as it may be changes in attitudes and values that are demanded
and impacted (Gamson, 1975: 35). Moreover, such impacts may take long to
manifest owing to slow processes of enlightenment and reorientation. The examples
of foot binding in China and the culture of female genital mutilation (FGM) in many

64 See also Meyer (2009: 421) and for a fuller discussion on the personal consequences of protests, see Sherkat
65 Giugni (2007) and McAdam (1999) are two studies that have taken a summary look at research on this issue.
African and other non-Western countries bear this out (Ibhawoh, 2000; Keck and Sikkink, 1998a). In both cases, the changes advocated for were more of cultural demands and changes in personal attitudes than legislative or public policy changes.

Further, there are some terms with definitional problems - that lack clarity but are nonetheless employed in the evaluation of collective actions. For example, Gamson stated: “Success is an elusive idea” (1975: 28) and others like Kolb (2007), Giugni (1995: 207), have noted that defining and measuring ‘success’ or ‘effectiveness’ remains a thorny issue because they are relational terms and there are no benchmarks to measure them. Yet these notions remain commonly employed in the analysis and evaluation of collective actions in spite of their ambiguity.

Finally is the point I highlighted in the previous chapter, regarding the composition of networks, with the argument that transnational networks more appropriately describes the J2K than a transnational coalition because of its overall dynamics. In the evaluation of TANs like the J2K is the fact that in line with their characteristic features, these formations are basically ‘network of networks’ (Yanacopulos, 2009: 71; 2005: 258). They are made up of different groups and associations, NGOs, inter-governmental and varied religious, professional and civic groups who may be from different backgrounds, but are largely united (with few exceptions) in the declared common aim or goal. Some of these groups are, themselves a network. This was evident in the J2K when its UK component became known as the Jubilee 2000 Coalition when the Debt Crisis Network – a network with its own varied groups and organisations merged with the initial Jubilee 2000.
However, because these various groups are all not usually founded on the basis of the common goal, their expectation and judgement of proceedings may also differ. This in turn affects the way they relate within the network, perceive or evaluate events and results. For example, placing an issue on the national or international political agenda may be the goal of some groups, while actual legislation, policy changes or instituting international rule may be the aim of others. Yet, others may aim for more fundamental structural changes in a particular system and the demands of a collective action may change over time. These dynamics were quite evident in the J2K. Some groups sought fundamental structural changes to the International Financial System while others argued for a more pragmatic approach to cancel the self-defined unpayable debt of the impoverished countries and avoid the crucial issue of fundamental structural changes. It is therefore important to be mindful of these intricacies with regards to the shifting or expanding aims that are articulated by a collective action at different times and the attendant expectations between their varied constituent parts when evaluating TCAs.

Obviously, these problems are varied and may not be experienced in every research in equal measure but combined, they do alert us to the complexities and controversies involved in evaluating TCAs. While the review of these problems is only a fraction of the evaluation processes, it does, however, allow us to draw a few lessons in evaluating the outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign.

First, this review shows why it is difficult to cast the outcomes of a TCA like the J2K in positivist terms that can be proven, documented or reproduced in the same fashion. In other words, we cannot make definitive conclusions or absolutes on outcomes and impacts, as these would always be contested given the causal complexities. One
reason for this is the methodological problem posed by the issue of ‘scaling’ that will be discussed in the methodology chapter. Secondly and related to the above is that in so far as the same data are being examined with different frames and from different perspectives, there will always be divergent if not contradictory results, creating a situation where outcomes are contested and disputed not only by outsiders of the collective action but also within the collective action. This is based on the fact that it is virtually impossible to obtain all the relevant and necessary information regarding a particular collective action and its purported outcomes, as sources of data may include individual biographies and personal recollections and interpretations that may be subject to bias, incompleteness and reinterpretation. Thirdly, acknowledging these problems, paying adequate attention to and clarifying the concepts being employed in evaluating the outcomes of TCAs, and specifically the analytical relevance (if any) of categorising a collective action in any particular form in any research, may mitigate some of these problems.

Finally, like the term ‘success’ and ‘failure’ discussed above, outcomes and impacts are commonly used to evaluate the results of TCAs but unlike ‘success’ and ‘failure’, they reckon with the intricacies and complexities as they allow for a thorough and detailed scrutiny of the TCA. Moreover, they are non-relational terms and therefore do not require any benchmark to operationalise them. Rather, the use of the terms outcomes and impacts is underlined by the necessity to identify the responses of the targets – at different levels and forms, to the demands that the J2K articulated and any other possible effects that may be traceable wholly or partly to the activities and efforts of J2K, unlike ‘success’ and ‘failure’ that tends to be judgemental. In this study, the adapted theoretical framework will aid this identification and the approach to outcomes adopted in this research would mitigate some of these problems.
4.3 Frameworks for Monitoring and Evaluation of Collective Actions

In the preceding section, I reviewed some of the problems and debates in evaluating the outcomes and impacts of TCAs. However, cognisance of the above-enumerated problems does not amount to foregoing the task of trying to identify the outcomes of TCAs. Although these problems may not be encountered in equal measures in every study and while definitive conclusions are hardly advisable with regards to outcomes as argued above, it is still possible to correlate changes in the social, political and cultural arena with the efforts of collection actions (Tarrow, 1998: 162) and attempt to establish some causal links. This means that changes in the arena of contention could be scrutinised and analysed to establish if they were as a result of responses by the target actors to demands and activities of the collective action. Besides, the literature on Monitoring and Evaluation shows different examples and theoretical frameworks for evaluating collective actions and development projects and some do highlight outcomes. In this section, I will briefly review some of these.

This review is important because it avails us with an overview of the different ways that various aspects of TCAs can be evaluated. For example in evaluating the Jubilee 2000 Campaign, Randle (2004) probed the strength and weaknesses of coalition formations as campaigns and examined the inter-personal and inter-agency relations and tension in the J2K. Long (2010) on the other hand, evaluated the J2K from a theological perspective and identified a number of factors that, according to him, were critical to its ‘success’. Similarly, Roseneil (1996; 1997) in evaluating Greenham Common looked at its transformative impact on feminist consciousness and identity and the intersection of the global, local and personal dynamics of the women’s peace movement in the 1980s. Others like Kriesi et al. (1995) focus on and
compare the outcomes of particular collective actions. To continue, a brief note on evaluation and its underpinning principles is warranted.

"Evaluation is the systematic acquisition and assessment of information to provide useful feedback about some object." It is a means by which a judgement can be made about the value or worth of something. Professionals or independent evaluator in a particular field may conduct the evaluation or an internal evaluator may conduct it and there are also self-evaluations (Ritchie, 2007). Yet, there are those done by a host of others like academics, analysts or other disinterested individuals. The purpose of evaluation is, among other things, to review, if specific objectives of a particular project are being met or to determine, whether a project, a campaign or a collective action has produced any effect and how that may have been done or what could be learned from it. To aid any proper evaluation, it is necessary to be equipped with the relevant information on the issue at contention prior to and post the project or collective action being evaluated (Goodyear, 2007: 44). This allows for comparison of the situation at the time of evaluation and aids the identification of changes that may have been precipitated by the collective action or the project under evaluation. In some cases indicator variables, which can be used to measure whether a project is meeting the stated objectives, may be developed for a particular evaluation.

In the context of J2K, evaluation is a method to assess what outcomes resulted from the efforts of the Campaign and to ascertain how it may have achieved those results. In other words, evaluation in this study will guide our quest to find out a) what were the results from the J2K mobilisation and b) what were the processes through which those results may have been achieved?

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As indicated above, there are a number of ways to evaluate TCAs that could form the basis of a theoretical framework to evaluate the outcomes of J2K. Most of the work I will review in this section recognised the problems discussed above but provide some possible pathways to evaluate the outcomes of collective actions nonetheless. Some of the frameworks here were designed to evaluate some specific development projects and there is an emphasis on policy outcomes in some respects, but others were developed based on previous approaches to evaluate collective actions and not necessarily to evaluate the outcomes of a particular collective action or project. I begin with one of the most referenced studies on evaluating collective actions in Gamson's (1975) *The Strategy of Social Protest* as it has been the basis on which others (Giugni, 1995; Cobb and Elder, 1983; Kriesi, 1991; Snow et al., 1986; Tilly, 1978) have developed important frameworks that will be relevant to the evaluation of the outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign.

In this study, Gamson examined 53 different types of collective actions in the US from 1800 to 1945 and their outcomes. Although he broadly employed the notion of success and failure, but in defining what constitutes success he opted to do so in terms of outcomes for according to him, “Success is an elusive idea” (1975: 28). He grouped these outcomes into two main clusters, namely; the outcome on the movement as a challenging group and the outcome that deals with the distribution of new advantages to the groups’ beneficiaries.\(^6\)\(^7\) This led him to develop a typology with four possible outcomes of a collective action: ‘Full Response’, ‘Collapse’, ‘Preemption’, and ‘Co-optation’. These four captions provided the rubric for him to evaluate the outcomes of the collective actions he examined.

\(^6\) For details of this and what follows on his analytical framework, see Gamson (1975: 28-37).
The typology developed by Gamson addresses the two main points, which derived from his main thesis. First is, a movement’s outcome divides between the outcomes on a movement itself and second, the outcomes of a movement are viewed in terms of gaining new advantages for movements’ members. The first point borders on whether a challenging group is accepted as a valid spokesperson for the issue at contention by the antagonist and the second is whether the group’s members gained new advantages. To address the first point, Gamson listed four possible indicators, which show whether a group is accepted or not. These are a) Consultation, which means the openness of the antagonist to dialogue with the challenging group, b) Negotiations; the readiness of the antagonist to enter into continued negotiation with the challenging group as a representative of the challenging constituency, c) Formal recognition; the explicit recognition of the challenging group by the antagonist as the legitimate spokesperson for the contentious constituency and d) Inclusion; which means the inclusion of the challenging groups’ members or leaders in positions of authority in the antagonist’s organisational structures.68

These indicators, although not detailed here and with each carrying some bits of conditions, point to Gamson’s definition of ‘Acceptance’. Briefly, for the second point, Gamson takes the group’s goals as the starting point in assessing members’ benefits, but he rightly cautioned against interpreting achievements as new benefits. While his work and the methodology employed has been rigorously reviewed and critiqued (Frey et al., 1992; Kitschelt, 1986; Mirowsky and Ross, 1981; Goldstone, 1980) and he has since revised some of his initial findings (Gamson, 1989), others

68 With regard to ‘Acceptance’, these were more or less broad indicators. Gamson slightly varied some of them in analysing some of the groups in his sample. Similarly, he made a distinction between antagonists that are designated authorities and those that are not, like the general public (Gamson, 1975: 32f).
have continued to build on it to develop other frameworks for evaluating outcomes of collective actions.

Sasha Rosencil’s (1997)\textsuperscript{69} analysis of the Greenham Common protest also offers some insights into the evaluation of collective actions. She reckoned that it is difficult to evaluate the influence of the Greenham Common protest on global nuclear policy because it is hard to disentangle from those of the wider peace movement. Nevertheless, she highlighted areas where the impacts of the Greenham Common protest were observable and evident. For example, she noted that the Greenham Common protest precipitated similar types of protests and actions in other military bases across Europe. She showed that while the impact of the camp’s contribution to the removal of the weapons was debatable, however, the impact of the protest on public consciousness of the issue was beyond doubt as it provoked public debates on an issue the government would prefer not be discussed in the public sphere. The other strand of this public consciousness was how the locals in Greenham perceived the impact of the military base in their community, and eventually its impact on the status of the base when it was removed later. Finally, she showed how the camp impacted the participants’ identities and consciousness and hinted on some of the long-term impacts that accrued as a result.

A different perspective on evaluation of TCA was provided by Graham Harrison’s (2010)\textsuperscript{70} “The Africanisation of Poverty: A Retrospective on Make Poverty History” (MPH), although the study was not designed to evaluate the MPH in terms of success or impacts. Rather, the study takes an analytical approach to explain how and why the MPH framed and presented Africa as the second ‘other’ – black, poor, famine,

\textsuperscript{69} For details of Rosencil’s analysis of the Greenham Common protest, see Rosencil (1997).

\textsuperscript{70} For details, see Harrison (2010)
lacking and violence etc. in its campaign against poverty – and the first ‘other’ framed as the British government with its policies and practices – the subject of change (2010: 392f). Further, it showed how, due to a multiplicity of factors ranging from historical antecedents, the opportunistic intervention by the British government led by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown71 to the role of the media and celebrities, ‘poverty’ was constructed ‘Africanised’ and represented as such. His analysis touched upon a number of concepts that are important for the evaluation of TCAs in general, two of which are particularly relevant to this research. The first is the concept of political opportunity structure or context and here the G8 Birmingham and Cologne summits presented an opening – where some of the target actors of the TCA on debt were present, and events that served as a reference point for the J2K.

Secondly, the application of the concept of Framing was very much in evidence as the poverty issue, which originally started out with a series of justice claims without specific geographical location, was reconstructed and defined with Africa as its representation. The internal dynamics, interactions and tension within the MPH coalition (and other agencies outside the coalition) that, among other factors, created the discursive space for such reconstruction and representation even with the explicit attempt to avoid that, shows how some consequences that were not intended can become evident as outcomes of a collective action. Finally, Harrison demonstrates that framing was not only used to define the ‘other’ as is the common practice, but was used further to subdivide the ‘other’ into first and the second ‘other’ in the MPH. Thus, framing was not only a process of self-definition – ‘we’ and the ‘other’ but was also deftly and incisively used to construct and define ‘them’ – the target actors and those, on behalf of whom the collective action emerged.

71 Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were at the time the British Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer respectively.
So far, I have looked at a few possible ways to analyse collective actions that include some frameworks for evaluating outcomes of TCAs. However, there are also other frameworks that have been developed by research institutes like the Institute for Development Research (IDR), the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) and New Economic Foundation (NEF) amongst others and some development agencies like Oxfam, Action Aid, Christian Aid and CAFOD for monitoring and evaluating development projects, NGO activities and advocacy in different regions. Some of these frameworks emphasise NGO influence in the policy field and are therefore designed to ascertain their impacts on policies and legislation at the different possible levels. However, some like the CIIR framework also captured other themes like evaluating outcomes of projects and their impacts on civil society empowerment, capacity building and enhanced democratic participation. Further, some of the frameworks provided for likely indicators that can aid the monitoring of how a particular campaign or project may be faring on the various levels where outcomes and impacts could be observed.

Finally is Marco Giugni’s (1995) work on outcomes of NSMs. He built on Gamson’s research as well as on Kriesi (1991) and Kitschelt (1986). Giugni argued that

The outcomes of a social movement imply that its activities produce some changes in at least one of the following arenas: the movement itself, the political system, or the general public (1995: 207).

He distinguished between internal impacts – those more likely to be pursued by sub-cultural and countercultural movements from external impacts – those more likely to be pursued by instrumental movements. Finally, he linked the possibility of these
outcomes to political opportunity structures. His framework encompasses most of the relevant spheres on which the outcomes of the NSMs and TANs can be identified with the types of possible impacts. As a result, I will adopt this theoretical framework to evaluate the outcomes of the J2K, and in the next section I will outline this in detail and discuss how it will be applied in this research.

4.4 Theoretical Framework for the Evaluation of Jubilee 2000 Campaign

As outlined in the last chapter, there are varied configurations of TCAs. In analysing their outcomes and impacts though, not only do they share common problems they also share the lack of a standard theoretical framework. On the one hand, this may be a problem but on the other hand, given the breadth of these TCAs, any single scheme of analysis may become too partial to analyse all of them. Therefore,

(... it is useful to explain with a range of theoretical perspectives. And this especially is the case of phenomena which are not well bounded and about which there is much taxonomic debate and confusion, as is the case with collective behavior (Snow, cited in Gusfield, 2000: 192).73

This observation is particularly apt for TANs as the distinctive line between this type of TCA and other types of transnational configuration remains, until now, largely hazy. As shown in the preceding section, evaluating the outcomes of the different types of TCA is problematic for among other reasons, the difficulty of establishing causal links between changes in the arena of contention and the efforts of those making the collective claims. However, I also showed that in spite of these problems, there are ways to analyse and evaluate different collective actions and varied projects

72 For details of his definitions and framework, see (Giugni, 1995: 207-218). Eisinger (1973) first developed the concept of Political Opportunity Structure (POS) and it was meant to represent the degree of openness of a political system to challenges addressed by social movements. Other theorists have since elaborated the concept and Tarrow (1995), defines it as the signals to social and political actors, which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements. See also Tarrow (1994, 1989, 1983), Della Porta and Rucht (1991), Kitschelt (1986).
73 Gusfield (1994: 75) made similar argument.
with a range of frameworks. I have argued the importance of understanding TANs as an extension of the NSMs because among other reasons, it allows for compatibility in employing the theoretical frameworks developed for evaluating the outcomes of NSMs, to evaluate the outcomes of TANs. Therefore as stated above, I adopt and will adapt Giugni’s theoretical framework to evaluate the outcomes of J2K and below, I outline and discuss this framework.

Giugni’s (1995: 209-218) theoretical framework for evaluating the outcomes of NSMs is comprehensive as he built on and incorporated the contributions of other theorists in the field like Cobb and Elder (1983), Kriesi (1991), Kitschelt (1986), Snow et al. (1986), Tilly (1978), Gamson (1975). However, given the questions driving this research, it is advisable to adapt this framework appropriately to evaluate the J2K. This approach is considered suitable for the reasons discussed below.

First, as Giugni outlined in the explanation of his theoretical framework, subcultural and countercultural movements more often pursue internal goals. This means that when conditions are favourable to them, they are more likely to achieve internal impacts – impacts produced within the movement itself. Internal impacts consist of a movement’s impact on identity; that is, a reinforcement of participants’ identity at the personal or collective levels, and organisational; a change in the organisational structure of the movement (Giugni, 1995: 209). For example, the 1960s civil rights movement in the US would fit into this column because it pursued goals that were meant to have direct impacts on and benefit for the core majority of its members - making the impacts internal. Other examples are the gay movement and the urban

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74 Other theorists describe outcomes slightly differently. For example, Earl (2000) distinguishes outcomes in terms of ‘intra-movement and movement field outcomes’ and ‘extra-movement outcomes.’ The former includes outcomes on the ‘activist’, ‘within movement’ and ‘movement field’ levels, while the latter includes outcomes on the political and cultural levels.
autonomous movement for the countercultural types of collective action (Duyvendak, 1995; Koopmans, 1995).

On the other hand, external impacts are more likely to occur with instrumental movements because these types of movements pursue external goals. This means that the goals that these collective actions pursue are usually not expected to have a direct bearing on them or yield personal benefits to their core members. This is because the impacts they seek are primarily felt by other people or at other spheres. Put differently, the core advocates or mainstream in the collective action have no strong personal material incentives as their dominant motivation (Giugni, 1995: 210, Busby, 2010: 36). Since the goals of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign falls within this latter ambit, it is fitting to approach the evaluation of the outcomes of J2K from this analytical perspective. Consequently, although Giugni’s framework does include internal impacts, that aspect will be omitted from the framework I employ here.

Second, Giugni’s framework relies heavily on the conceptual application of the political opportunity structure in a comparative analysis of movement mobilisation and outcomes in four countries (Giugni, 1995: 211-237). As a result, it had to reckon with the different social, political and institutional structures of the state in these countries. In other words, these states were perfectly placed as the antagonists or the target actors in the movements’ challenge and thus, his framework provided a schema to analyse the outcomes and impacts of these movements in relation to the state and its various institutions.

75 Although the outlined view here is generally true of the J2K (as the Campaign was started by people who were not expecting direct personal benefits for themselves from the Campaign), it should however be noted that some participants in the Campaign particularly in the impoverished countries were in line to benefit from debt cancellation as money from the cancellation was expected to improve their health services and education amongst others. Besides, it is also a fact that some of the Campaign operatives were employed and salaried by parts of the network. Nevertheless, this would not undermine the dominant motivation of those who initiated the idea of the Campaign.
However in this research, much as the concept of POS remains a useful analytical tool in evaluating the outcomes of J2K and much as various states constituted part targets of the J2K (given the prominence of their role in the IFIs and as creditor states), it is out of place to consider any particular state as the main target and hence scrutinise its POS vis-à-vis the outcomes and impacts of J2K. As a result, state-centred impacts like structural impacts, which consist of *institutional structures* and *alliance structures* (Giugni, 1995: 210) that could be observed under normal circumstances in direct relation to the state and its POS, will be excluded from the adapted theoretical framework. Instead, as discussed in chapter two, the various states that were part targets of J2K will, in conjunction with the IFIs constitute the target actors and the impacts of the Campaign – the reaction from these target actors, amongst others, will be assessed from that perspective.

Thirdly, Keck and Sikkink (1998a) argued that the conceptual tools developed for studying social movements are equally important and useful in the study and analysis of TANs. For example, the concepts of Framing, Political Opportunity Structure and Diffusion are all key concepts that have aided our understanding and analysis of social movements both at the domestic and transnational levels and, as I will show in the later chapters, they are equally relevant and useful to the analysis of J2K.

Finally, Keck and Sikkink (1998a: 8, 25, 201) postulated that the influence and impacts of TANs should be evaluated under different categories and sub-headings like procedural, substantive and normative changes or impacts at the international and domestic levels. The specifics of these evaluations, they argued, should verge on how TANs fare by framing debates and getting issues on the agenda, encouraging discursive commitments from states and other policy actors and by influencing
behaviour changes in target actors at the domestic and international levels. As the framework outlined and discussed below will show, these ideas and suggestions are well within the scope of and hence compatible with the adapted framework in this study. Consequently, they will be incorporated into the framework to evaluate the outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign.
Impacts of Transnational Advocacy Networks
(Levels of Analysis)

Fig. Theoretical Framework for the evaluation of Jubilee 2000 Campaign
Adapted from: Types of Impacts of Social Movements (Giugni, 1995: 212)
Drawing on Giugni (1995), this figure displays an overview of the adapted framework for the evaluation of the outcomes of J2K. This adapted framework is in consonance with frameworks for evaluating collective action of the instrumental mode – which more often pursue external goals and thus suitable to evaluate the impacts of J2K which are more likely to be external rather than internal. The outcomes of J2K will be evaluated under three sub-headings, namely procedural, substantive and sensitising impacts and below, I discuss what these would entail.

4.4.1 Procedural Impacts

Procedural Impacts open new channels of participation to network actors and this involves the recognition of those actors as legitimate representatives of the challengers. This recognition could be in the form of establishing consultation procedures, undertaking negotiations and formal recognition or through general inclusion of challengers in the decision-making processes on the advocacy challenge. Procedural impacts are divided into ad hoc and permanent access, both of which are distinguished by the frequency and regularity of the access gained by the challengers. In evaluating the J2K, the outcome or impact to be expected in this realm would include ascertaining if the Campaign or its representatives were recognised by the target actors as legitimate spokespersons on the debt issue and therefore, given due access as well as establishing possibilities of consultation and inputs. In other words, the impact should show whether the target actors recognised the J2K and its leadership as true representative of the collective action on debt. Further, this research would seek to establish the duration of such recognition and the access granted while the Campaign lasted.
4.4.2 Substantive Impacts

Substantive Impacts are understood as changes of policy on the contentious issue in response to a network’s efforts and these are comprised of reactive and proactive versions. According to Giugni (1995: 210), while the former ensures that the challengers avoid worsening the situation regarding their goals, the latter describes the introduction of new advantages, including gaining concessions from the targets. The primary expectation here in evaluating the outcomes of J2K would be to determine if there were any policy changes on the part of the target actors – the creditor nations and the IFIs on the advocacy challenge and the collective claims made by the J2K. For example, I would seek to establish if any (or how many) of the IFIs or creditor nations altered any of their existing policies on the unpayable debt in response to the demands of the J2K and if so, what were the policy changes? Further, a cursory appraisal of the indebted countries’ debt situation should show if their debt condition worsened following the TCA on debt or if they received any new advantages due to the efforts of J2K.

4.4.3 Sensitising Impacts

This type of impacts is defined as the possibility that a network will provoke a sensitising of some social actor in the public or political arena, which goes in the direction of the network’s goals (Giugni, 1995: 211). Sensitising impacts are made up of political agenda and public attitudes. On the components of political agenda, I only focus on Institutional agenda, which refers to a set of concrete and specific items to be treated by the relevant authorities or the target actors. In this segment, the task would be to ascertain if the TCA on debt as represented by the J2K was able to bring its issues and demands to be discussed at the relevant decision-making levels of the creditor nations and the IFIs. Specifically, the impact of the collective action on
debt (if any) should show if the debt cancellation issue was part of the discussion at either the state executive levels, parliamentary sessions or at the appropriate levels of the IFIs and at intergovernmental forums and summits.

The final part of this section is Public Attitudes, which in this case are generally discussed within the ambit of ‘Framing’ that I discussed in the last chapter. In this regard, I would analyse how employing the justice frame by the Campaign for example, helped to mobilise support for its aims. I would look at how that support was reflected in the involvement of local and international celebrities and how the general public responded to protest or public actions staged by the Campaign. Second, it would be expected that debt as an issue, would feature as an item on the national and international political agenda of the target actors in the duration of the Campaign. The figure above displays a link between the procedural and sensitising impacts to the substantive impacts. One of the arguments in this research is that the substantive impacts were predicated on the procedural and sensitising impacts hence the link and this would be become evident as I outline and explain the causal processes of the outcomes of J2K that may be identified. Finally, some identified outcomes of J2K that may exceed the parameters of this framework would be discussed as part of the legacies of J2K to ensure a more complete evaluation.

To summarise, I have discussed the adapted framework to evaluate the outcomes of J2K and with this framework, the level of analysis is divided into procedural, substantive and sensitising impacts; all aimed at identifying the varied impacts that the J2K may have made. I also discussed the reasons informing this approach to evaluate the outcomes of the Campaign and prognosticated on the sorts of impacts that should manifest in the analysis of J2K.
4.5 Causal Mechanisms: Public Preference and Leverage Politics

As discussed in the preceding sections, a major problem in evaluating the outcomes of collective actions is establishing the causal links between the efforts of a collective action and changes in the arena of contention. This problem is heightened in TCAs because of the increased number of actors and their diverse locations. I argued that due to the problem of causal complexity, that is, that it is virtually impossible to identify and isolate all causal factors for any changes that may be identified; this research adopts a contextual and conjectural approach to outcomes. Nevertheless, there are still a number of processes through which outcomes could be linked to and explained by the efforts of a collective action, bearing in mind that it could not be in the sense of mathematical precision hence the adopted approach in this research. Among these are the disruptive and judicial mechanisms, the political access and the international politics mechanism, and the public preference mechanism (Kolb, 2007: 72-94). Of relevance to this research is the public preference mechanism as a causal explanatory process for the potential identifiable outcomes of J2K.

The public preference mechanism holds that if collective actions can mobilise public opinion on their behalf, policy makers or the target actors might respond by shifting their own policy preferences. The mechanism is thought to be effective when the issue at contention can be reduced to a single dimension (Kolb, 2007: 77f). The effectiveness of this mechanism is conditioned on the collective claimers’ ability to deploy both the inside and outside lobbying tactics. Inside lobbying, according to Burstein (1985: 103), is defined as the routine, institutionalised contact between

76 Although the public preference mechanism has mainly been used to explain policy choices of elected officials who weigh their personal preferences and ‘ideal point’ versus electoral and political expediency (Stimson et al., 1995), its dynamics including the role of public opinion combined with the outsider and insider lobbying tactics renders it a suitable causal mechanism for the outcomes of J2K.
political decision makers and representatives of organised groups who want to influence their decisions.

On the other hand, outside lobbying can be defined as efforts by collective claimers and their representatives or leaders to mobilise citizens outside the policy-making community to put pressure on public officials. It is therefore a means through which policy makers experience pressure of popular participation and it could be in the form of mobilising constituents, contact to target actors through letter-writing, phone calls, post cards amongst other means, and public protests to demonstrate popular support for a particular course. Proponents contend that outside lobbying helps to communicate aspects of public opinion to the target actors and at the same time, it demonstrates to the target actors that there is evidently a constituency that attach importance to the issue at contention. Combined, outside lobbying can be a driving impetus for effective inside lobbying (Kollman, 1998: 3-27).

An important factor in the processes of public preference mechanism that can affect its effectiveness is, how the issue is framed to reflect the appropriate definition of the underlying problem, to help shape public preferences. While a difficult process, redefining an issue to assume dominance in the policy issue or discourse can be aided by proponents’ visibility, expertise in the field and access to media. Equally vital to this process is, if the proposition or definition accords with widely and deeply held cultural values and does not threaten a radical redistribution of power or wealth (Stone, 1989: 293-294). As shown in chapter two, these elements were evident in the J2K and I shall return to them in greater details in the analytical chapters.
Added to the public preference mechanism, as a causal explanatory process is *Leverage Politics*, which, according to Keck and Sikkink (1998a: 23), is the ability to gain influence over states or more powerful institutions by weak groups. In other words, it is the exertion of indirect influence on targets actors that is done either through moral or material leverage. In the context of J2K, moral leverage is relevant and this involves a situation where the behaviour of target actors is subjected to public and international scrutiny and as will be shown in the later chapters, the moral argument of the Campaign was one reason for its broad resonance and the influence it was able to exert on its target actors. Thus, in accounting for the link from the efforts and activities of J2K to the identifiable outcomes that will be discussed in the analytical chapters, I will be drawing on the public preference mechanism and leverage politics as the processes through which those outcomes may have been achieved. Again, these will be against the backdrop of the contextual and conjectural approach to outcomes adopted in this study.

### 4.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, I set out to outline the theoretical framework for the evaluation of the outcomes of J2K. In the first section, I reviewed some of the problems and debates in evaluating outcomes of collective actions and noted, amongst others, that a major problem is that of causal complexity, that is the difficulty of identifying and isolating all the possible causal factors in any outcomes associated with collective actions. I argued that evaluating the efforts of TCAs mainly in terms of “success” or “failure” does not advance our knowledge of the field because that perspective fails to capture the intricacies and complexities of the task involved. I further argued that outcomes could not be cast in definitive and conclusive terms for reasons including the
problem of causal complexity; nor could outcomes be framed in positivist terms of things that can be unarguably proven, because we are alerted to the fact that outcomes will remain contested in so far as there are no definitive, conclusive and indisputable proofs. Mindful of this, I argued for and adopted a contextual and conjectural approach to evaluate the outcomes of J2K. Nevertheless, I showed that there are possible pathways to evaluate outcomes of collective actions and projects with a review of some theoretical frameworks.

Following from my introduction of and expatiation on TANs as an extension of the NSM cluster of collective actions in the last chapter, I argued that frameworks developed for evaluating the outcomes of the new social movements could be used to evaluate TANs. This was more so as both are ideologically grounded on the same basis. Thus, I drew on previous research and frameworks of evaluation in the field and adopted Giugni’s (1995) framework for evaluating outcomes of NSMs. I adapted this to suit the empirical evaluation of J2K and the outcomes will be analysed under Procedural, Substantive and Sensitising Impacts. I discussed the reasons for this approach and would augment it by referencing Chapman and Wameyo (2001: 4) who noted, that there is no “correct” framework for the evaluation of a particular project or, as in this case, the J2K as a network of transnational collective actors. Rather, a framework for evaluation is primarily dictated by the main question driving the research and, like other aspects of research, can be shaped by the researcher’s perspective (Yanacopulos, 2007: 37-42). Finally, I discussed the public preference mechanism and leverage politics as causal processes that would establish the link between the efforts and activities of J2K and any potential identifiable outcomes. The next chapter deals with the methodology of this research where I now turn to discuss the research methods employed.
5. Research Design and Methodology

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will discuss the research processes in this study. This will include outlining the multiple methods employed and the reasons underpinning the use of those methods. I will also discuss some of the challenges I faced in the research processes and any limitations and possible implications of those challenges.

This research is designed as a case study and I employed multiple research methods that included semi-structured qualitative interviews, archival research, secondary literature and opinion polls. Those involved – both as activists and employee of J2K - wrote some of the secondary literature and data from these multiple methods were triangulated to minimise limitations inherent in any of these particular methods. There were some challenges in the form of tracking down relevant personnel in J2K and locating all the relevant opinion polls, sorting materials in the J2K archives – which were not properly catalogued and the general state of the archives. Further, because the boundary of the network as a whole is murky, it lacks a clear-cut distinction. This posed the methodological challenge of defining its boundaries as a case in this research, given its breadth coupled with the overlapping functions that some UK Coalition officials performed on behalf of the network. I will discuss the dual roles of these J2K personnel in the UK and why that accentuated the inherent complexity in delineating the boundaries and the overall composition of the network. In Appendix III, I provide a sample of the set of questions that was the basis of the interviews I conducted for this research.
In what follows, I begin by recasting the research question and this is followed by a discussion of the scale of this research and the methods employed. In the next section, I will discuss the analytical approach and this will be followed by some of my reflections on the research and some notes on the ethics, which precedes the chapter conclusion.

5.2 The Research Question and Scale of Research

As explained in the introductory chapter, I have a personal interest in activism and campaign efficacy. My involvement in mobilising for the G8 summit in Cologne in 1999, coupled with the prominence of the debt cancellation issue on the international political agenda, attracted me to research the Jubilee 2000 Campaign as way to better understand transnational collective actions. I have also discussed that at the end of the Cologne summit, the creditor nations announced a hundred billion Dollars debt relief (or cancellation – according to the Campaign), and while this was enough for some campaigners, amongst others to regard the Campaign as a success, others – both within and outside the Campaign, dispute the view that the Campaign was a success. I have argued in this thesis thus far that evaluating collective actions mainly in terms of success and failure does not advance our knowledge of the field for the reason that it fails to capture the rigorous, complex, robust and critical analysis that the evaluation of TCAs demands. Therefore the main question driving this research is: How does evaluating the Jubilee 2000 Campaign aid our understanding of transnational collective actions? To aid my attempt to answer this question, a number of sub research questions will need to be explored. First, if it is problematic to evaluate collective actions in terms of success and failure, how do we evaluate the J2K? What indeed were the outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign? What are the implications of J2K emergence for collective action theories and how collective
actions are categorised in the literature? Addressing these questions will contribute to our understanding of TCAs theoretically and empirically, and thus, would advance our knowledge of the field.

5.3 Scale of Research and the Duality of the UK Component of J2K

As I discussed in the last chapter (section 4.2), researching transnational collective actions is challenging because of the causal complexities and a myriad of other issues and problems and these apply equally to the J2K. My quest to evaluate the J2K immediately raised some questions that also posed some methodological challenges. First, what was involved in terms of the network composition? As is typical of TANs, both the target actors and the various components of the network were several and transnationally situated. Given that the network may have no obvious limits and in light of the fluid, informal and loose structure, how are its boundaries to be determined as a case in this research? Would the evaluation cover the whole transnational sphere with all the components of the network or would it be done in terms of particular national campaigns or regions? In other words, how is the level of analysis to be defined and what is the precise or approximate scale of the network in this research? (Yanacopulos, 2007: 42).

The issue of the scope of research is important because it is the starting point of data collection (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982). However, with participants from 166 countries and 69 national campaigns (Grenier, 2003: 86; Barrett, 2000: 29), - even if we discount the multiplicity of groups and ‘network of networks’ within some of the J2K national campaigns,77 the J2K aptly demonstrates why it is almost impossible to

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77 See Papaioannou et al. (2009) for more on network-of-networks.
include every component in every location in the analytical boundary. The time, logistics and budgetary constraints would simply not permit the extensive empirical fieldwork that such delineation and inclusion would command and the analytical value of it may remain questionable because every stratum could not possibly be of equal value. The fact that I could not realistically include all the components of J2K in equal measures in the analysis compelled me to examine what should be included and where the boundaries should be drawn that would be best suitable to investigate the outcomes of J2K (Yanacopulos, 2007).

There are realist and nominalist approaches to address the issue of setting the boundaries in this type of research. With the former, the researcher “(...) adopts the presumed subjective perceptions of the system actors themselves, defining the boundaries of a social entity as the limits that are consciously experienced by all or most of the actors that are members of the entity” (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982: 22). With the latter, the analyst imposes the boundaries that serve an analytical purpose. Put differently, the analyst may identify a set of criteria defining membership and on that basis selects the network components. While the former is relatively straightforward, the latter require the subjective imposition of the criteria for selecting membership of the network with the risk that those criteria could always be contested – to broaden or streamline the boundaries that may have been set.

However, Diani argues for a general guiding principle in delineating the boundaries of a network. According to him, “The boundaries of a movement network may be defined by actors’ identities, namely by the process through which individual or organisations recognize each other as part of a specific type of community, linked by

78 See also the generic boundary specification strategies outlined by Marsden (2005: 9f) and Laumann et al. (1989).
a specific type of solidarity" (2002: 176). This perspective mirrors the realist approach described above and the advantage of it is that the network is self-defining based on identity. However, there is also a downside to it because this perspective assumes a common identity for all the components of the network - which is usually not the case, as the identity element of these networks is continuously negotiated.

Based on the above and given the question driving this research, I sought 'to follow the actors themselves' (Latour, 2005: 12) who made up the Jubilee 2000 Campaign network and apply a combination of the approaches outlined above to map the boundaries for this research. Thus, my starting point was to recognise and take seriously, how the actors defined or perceived themselves in the network and within that frame of understanding, impose the relevant boundary for my analytical purpose.

Generally, membership of the J2K network was secured by assenting to the central call and demand of the Campaign formulated in the Jubilee 2000 Campaign petition. The petition called for the cancellation of the unpayable debt of the poorest countries by the year 2000, under a fair and transparent process (Pettifor, 2006: 311). 79 However, to follow the actors in the J2K network, it was still necessary to identify and focus on those components that were prominent, visible and central to the extensive exchanges and interactions, particularly between the different components but also in relation to the target actors. This is because as indicated above, the various components of the network did not play significant roles in equal measure.

Thus, I applied the approach outlined above as I identified and traced key personnel who, through their involvement in personal and organisational terms, initiated and

79 The petition is provided in Appendix IV.
contributed to the emergence of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign. As discussed in chapter two, some of these key personnel have written about the history of J2K and their role in establishing it. While this was helpful as it also guided my choice of methods, I nevertheless approached it with caution because I was mindful of the fact that those writing their own histories and roles in such collective actions, have a natural bias that is tied to how they want to be perceived and presented, and the perspective of events they want reflected and get across. Interestingly, this is a bias that some of them readily admit as Pettifor (2006: 298) demonstrated in her account of events in the J2K. It is in light of this inherent downside that it was necessary to triangulate data from these kinds of sources with data from other sources like archival materials and the semi-structured interviews that I conducted.

The underlying argument for the approach to follow the actors is that the most important or prominent and relevant actors are usually situated in strategic locations in the network. Thus, while it is certainly possible that valuable information may also be available in some of the numerous and distant national campaigns, it is safe to imagine that any such information would also be shared with other important components of the network, in particular those in central positions (Diani, 2002: 186; Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 169-174). Further, issues of access to and control of resources (like personnel) and brokerage of information are themes that are relevant to the evaluation of J2K which are also important elements in the prominence and centrality line of argument that informed the approach adopted here.

Based on the above argument, delineating the boundary of this research around the territorial space of the UK with a component that was obviously very important and arguably the most visible well-resourced component of the network seemed the most
appropriate approach to address the questions driving this research. To operationalise this however, it is necessary to make an important clarification regarding a major complexity with this perspective.

First, as discussed in chapter two, the J2K emerged in the UK and so; key figures in that emergence were from the UK. Ditto the major aid agencies and churches on whose back the collective action emerged and developed into a transnational network. The merging of the DCN with the Jubilee 2000 into Jubilee 2000 Coalition in October 1997 saw the creation of a leadership structure, which included an elected Board that was responsible for and accountable to the UK Coalition. The Board assumed no responsibility for and thus remained vague and ambiguous on any role for the transnational aspect of the Campaign (Pettifor, 2006: 300-301; Randle, 2004).

At the same time however, what could be described as the international secretariat of the Campaign, which comprised of a few individuals who, to some extent, provided some leadership to the Campaign, was also in the UK although there was no formal international secretariat (Yanacopulos, 2009: 72). These individuals operated from the UK Coalition and so were not really a distinct body from that Coalition. For example, Ann Pettifor was employed and contracted as a Lobbyist for the DCN on a part-time basis and she also held a part time appointment as Coordinator of Jubilee 2000 at the same time. However, following the merging of DCN and Jubilee 2000, she became the Director of the Jubilee 2000 Coalition with Adrian Lovett as Deputy Director. While their roles obviously transcended the UK Coalition and hence assumed some international outlook in their functions, they, like the Coalition Board, were only accountable to the UK Coalition, although some used their position in the Coalition to take on responsibilities beyond the UK. Moreover, there was no formal
management structure at the international level or a Board to which any of them
could be accountable.

Similarly, there was the Africa Team with its international coordinators Kwesi
Owusu and Kofi Mawuli Klu, which obviously looked at some of the issues from an
African perspective and liaised with national campaigns in Africa. There was also a
liaison officer who, according to Dent (1999b: 32), dealt “with Jubilee committees at
home and abroad” - but they were all integrated with and not separated from the UK
Coalition. Therefore, I would argue that these individuals that essentially made up
the vague international secretariat were all part of the UK Coalition, but some of
their roles and functions inadvertently extended beyond the UK to the international
level of the network. Thus, there was a certain lack of clarity at the time, with regards
to the organisational and leadership structure of J2K particularly at the international
level that this ambiguous duality of the UK Coalition embodied. This was reflected
in the overall outlook of the network.

This obviously murky and complex arrangement and how it functioned, the
interaction it elicited within the UK Coalition and the entire network, combined with
its role in relation to the target actors, guided my decision to loosely demarcate the
boundaries of this research starting from the UK. From there I broadened my
investigation to other areas where the interaction and contacts between the UK
Coalition and other components in different regions led me. It is this transnational
terrain that is defined by the major cross-interactions, agitations and activities from
the UK components of the network vis-à-vis other regions and the target actors, that
form the platform and boundaries on which I evaluate the J2K. However, I should

the UHURU Resurgence’. See also Randle, 2004; Dent, 1999b: 32.
clearly state that in paying relatively closer attention to the UK components of the network; this was not in the form of a case study or a mini case study for that matter. Rather, this was more from the perspective as the main networking component and in light of its role in the Campaign emergence, and the responsibilities it took on behalf of the network. Thus, I sought to have a good overview of the UK Coalition and their interaction with other relevant parts of the network and the target actors, as I traced the emergence of J2K and explored its development into a transnational network.

The other issue that needed to be addressed was the timing of the evaluation and its relation to the time of the collective action, and its possible implications for the research. As discussed in chapter four, outcomes can be assessed in the short or long terms. For short-term impacts, these may already have manifested prior to an evaluation while long-term impacts may only manifest post a particular evaluation. At issue here is the logic, which underlines the argument that because all studies are bounded in time and place, results of these studies are temporary and spatially contingent (Yanacopulos, 2007: 43; Snow and Trom, 2002: 147; Ragin, 1992: 2). This is thus another reason why it is not advisable to draw definitive or absolute conclusions in evaluating the outcomes of transnational collective actions.

In the case under investigation for example, the J2K effectively became a campaign in April 1996 and, as a transnational advocacy network, it ended on 31 December 2000. By the end of the Campaign it could be argued that to a large extent, some of the purported outcomes were yet not identifiable. As I will show in a later chapter, some of the observable outcomes of the Campaign only manifested in the decade following its official end. From all indications, that may not be all, as some of the impacts of J2K could yet manifest in years to come. Thus, the argument that research
into these areas of collective action are more like snapshots that are taken in a particular time and place (Yanacopulos, 2007: 46) seems to aptly reflect this context.

5.4 Research Design, Methods and Data Collection

Having mapped the approximate boundaries, I needed to figure out how best to carry out the investigation to address the question driving this research. In other words, I needed to design or adopt a research strategy and specify the methods deployed to gather and analyse the data. This research is designed as a case study of transnational collective actions and I employed qualitative research with multiple methods because; case studies are most suitable for exploring and analysing contemporary events and in cases where the researcher has no control over actual behavioural events (Yin, 2003: 5).81 Yin argues that the distinctive need for case study arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomenon, as a case study is an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident” (2003: 13).

Among the characteristics of a case study that are relevant to this research is that they are constituted in part by empirical and analytical focus on an instance of a particular theoretical concept or process, or a social event that is interesting in its own right; but at the same time, interest is retained in the general phenomenon (Swanborn, 2010: 8; Snow and Trom, 2002: 147). This is particularly apt here because as I discussed in chapter three, the phenomenon that is transnational advocacy networks as a form of transnational collective actions avails us with the tools to perceive and understand real life events like the J2K. Further, case study, as an intensive examination of a

81 However, the case study approach is also used in historical research for example, Keek and Sikkink (1998) on the abolition of slavery in the US and the campaign against foot binding in China.
single case of a particular phenomenon, seek to generate a richly detailed and ‘thick’ elaboration of the phenomenon under study through the use of triangulation of multiple methods that include but are not limited to qualitative techniques (Schrank, 2006: 21; Orum, 2001: 1509; Snow and Trom, 2002: 147-151).82

I employed multiple methods that include semi-structured interviews, archival research materials and other secondary sources like publications and opinion polls to collect data for this research. To strengthen the potential findings and undermine any shortcomings inherent in any of these methods, data collected from these multiple sources were triangulated. Triangulation entails the use of multiple methods, combination of theories and varied sources of data that are essential to the development of richly and thickly contextualised, holistic analysis. Thus, data from the different sources were crosschecked against each other for verification with the aim to minimise the limitations of any one particular method - that may not fully capture the complexity of a social reality or the phenomenon under investigation (Woodside, 2010: 7-9; Gillham, 2000: 13; Snow and Trom, 2002).

As I settled on researching the J2K, I undertook an extensive literature review of the Campaign. My examination of the available literature gave me a pretty good idea of some of the contentious issues that existed in the J2K network. It also aided my choice of research methods as I developed some of the questions I needed to get answered and the most appropriate way to elicit those answers. Further, from the literature some key potential interviewees were identified and while it was a challenge to locate some of them, however, I did managed and then I proceeded to

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82 Gerring discusses and disagrees with a number of definitions of case studies in the literature but agrees that it may be understood as the intensive study of a single case (2007: 17-36). Similarly, Swanborn (2010: 1-22) elaborates on some of the issues associated with case studies including definitions, generalisation of findings and the confusion arising from the origin of case studies that is rooted in different research traditions.
contact those whom I thought could be readily accessible because of their location in
the UK. The first couple of these were in London, but these were soon followed up
by some other names that were suggested outside London and in other countries in
Africa, Latin and North America.

However, while I was able to secure some interview in some cases, in other cases the
needed follow up interview could not materialise. I should also add that some notable
people in the Campaign and potential interviewees appeared to have moved on from
the J2K or were probably not prepared to revisit some of the issues in the Campaign.
For example, one potential interviewee promised to do an interview with me after I
discussed my research with him, but he never replied to any of my follow-up
requests for a date and this was not the only instance. There may be valid or personal
reasons for these kinds of responses to interview requests but it does show that
potential interviewees are “self-selective” in terms of when and if they agree to
interview or not. Again this demonstrates why caution is needed with regard to data
from interviews and buttresses the need to triangulate any data collected from that
source with data from other sources like the archives, for example. In the following
subsections, I will describe how I deployed the multiple methods used in this
research and some of the challenges they posed in addition to possible implications
for this research. But first some quick notes on the methods and the interviews.

First, in employing the case study approach, I was mindful of the limitations that this
could pose but hoped that the methods employed would mitigate some of those
shortcomings. For example, the well-worn criticism that case study approach would
not permit generalising potential findings\(^8\) was basically not relevant to this study, because this was not the objective in this research; whatever the outcomes that are identified in this study, would essentially be within the purview of a snapshot in time and space that I referenced above. As I have argued in the previous chapters, the perspective of generalising findings would not be in consonance with the conjectural and contextual approach to outcomes adopted in this research. Further, my use of triangulation of data from multiple sources largely undermined the criticism of lack of confirmation of results that is often aimed at this approach.

Second, in conducting the interviews I will describe below, I deployed a method commonly known as the “Snowball Technique” or “chain referral” and through this; I obtained contacts to some potential interviewees (Yanacopulos, 2007; Vogt, 1999: 368). However, I was not able to conduct interviews with all my interview targets for a number of reasons including poor health. Nevertheless, as some of these interview targets have also written about their experiences in the J2K, I was able to access some of their perspectives and as I employed the method of triangulation, it ensured that I was not solely reliant on data from the interviews that could not take place.

On the other hand, as I conducted some of the interviews, it became clear that some of my interviewees retained some information in documentary forms, which they considered personal and was not in any way accessible to the public. Much as I can only speculate on how valuable those documents may be, it would certainly have filled some gaps in and improve the archives, and that would have aided a more complete version of events that transpired in the network. While these challenges and limitations may have some implications on the overall comprehensiveness of the

\(^{8}\) This criticism has been challenged though (see Swanborn, 2010).
potential findings in this research, again, it lends credence to the argument advanced that it is problematic to cast outcomes in absolute and definitive terms, because of possible data limitation and the nature of causal influences.

5.4.1 Semi-structured Interviews

As stated above, I adopted an in-depth and semi-structured method for the interviews I conducted; this method allows for flexibility, digression and in-depth probe in the interview process. Put differently, this method allowed open-ended questions that enabled the interviewee to elaborate on his or her responses, and follow-up questions unlike structured interviews that limit the range of responses to interview questions. As discussed earlier, I was acquainted with some of the contentious issues in the network from my preliminary investigation. Themes like the politicised nature of the Campaign outcomes and friction between the emergent Jubilee 2000 and some aid agencies, began to emerge as issues that would require an in-depth interview method to investigate, in order to understand the dynamics and the divergent positions within the network. The suitability of the semi-structured interview was demonstrated with some interviewees in the global South, as I was able to get a deeper insight into their perception of and involvement with the J2K due to the follow up questions I posed. It also enabled me to uncover the intriguing interpersonal relations that existed in the UK Coalition and the professional jealousy that manifested in the relationship between some aid agencies when the Campaign emerged as a major force in the UK.

Part of the advantages of this type of interviews is that it helps to unravel the motives and perspectives of organisations and individuals who participate in these forms of collective action. In the context of J2K, it served to uncover the depth and the basis of the friction, and helps us to understand the power dynamics and inter-personal and
group relations within the network. Further, data from this source can shed light on
documented materials and biographical memories of events and issues (Blee and
Taylor, 2002: 92). This was confirmed in my interviews with Carter (26 June 2012),
Pettifor (7 March 2011) and Hanlon (15 March 2011) on the friction and difficult
inter-personal relations within the UK Coalition contrary to how it has often been
presented in the literature. I strove to hold face-to-face interviews whenever possible
as I concurred with the argument that the overwhelming strength of the method is the
‘richness’ of the communication that is possible and the collection of high quality
data (Gillham, 2000: 62).

Generally on the interviews, I sought the consent of those I interviewed to record our
discussions and this was always granted. I provided all the interviewees with
basically the same questions (or slightly varied in some cases as I deemed necessary)
prior to the interviews to aid their preparation and I posed those same questions
during the interviews. Most of these questions were developed from my take on the
existing literature and in some cases, from the archival materials that I accessed prior
to some of the interviews and I also posed follow-up questions to some of their
answers. However, while I was able to conduct face-to-face interviews with most of
my interview targets in the UK, the same could not be said of those outside of the
UK. This was because for time, budgetary and logistic reasons, I could not afford to
cover the inter-continental distances involved to conduct face-to-face interviews with
those, resident in Africa, Latin and North America. As a result, these sets of
interviews were conducted online over Skype.  

84 Skype is a propriety voice over Internet Protocol service and software application. It allows users to

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Yanacopulos argued, “there are very few people who could answer specific questions about particular actions taken, as there are not a large number of people involved in the co-ordinating of actions and strategies in these networks” (2007: 47). This argument was particularly valid for the J2K as I ‘followed the actors’ and it guided my decision on and reflected in my scaling of the research around the interactions emanating from and to the main networking hub of the Campaign. Overall, I interviewed fifteen people, transcribed the interviews and on a few occasions, sought clarification on some points from few interviewees.

5.4.2 Archival Materials

My other source of data collection was the archives on the Jubilee 2000 Campaign that are held at Newcastle University in the UK. At the University Library, I was availed with a lot of materials that basically included most of the documents that were in the Campaign office by the end of December 2000. These included internal and external communications - between UK Coalition groups and the Campaign office in London, the DCN and other parts of the network, and exchanges between the Campaign and some of target actors amongst others. There were also publicity materials, some of the minutes of the Board meetings and communications with the media, negotiations and discussions with the local authorities in London, for example over the installation of the Neon Clock that was used for the Millennium Countdown.

However, these materials were not properly catalogued – and therefore not in any systematically arranged order although it was evident that some efforts have been made to put related documents together as shown by the list that I was availed with, which provided a general overview. This problem, which was put down to shortage of staff in the Library, was a challenge to the extent of sorting which materials I
really needed from all the boxes of documents. Further, some documents that should be in some of the labelled boxes like minutes of particular meetings were not there. As Diani (2002: 182) rightly noted, this is not a peculiar problem as network members or collective action participants are often not interested in keeping systematic record of their activities. However, I was able to access most of these available materials and overall, the archives was a useful source of data collection.

On my first visit to the Library, I was informed that it was not possible to personally make photocopies but that I could request the copies I needed, which I gratefully received a few weeks later. In spite of these challenges, using the archives as a data collection source validated the argument that archival research has the advantage of accessibility, cost effectiveness and to a certain degree, more reliability compared to data from other sources like interviews (Diani, 2002). It was particularly helpful in this study because it formed a component of the triangulation method I employed.

5.4.3 Publications, Media Reports and Opinion Polls

Another source of data collection was publications on debt of impoverished countries and media reports on J2K. I was able to access some of the materials from groups like the Jubilee Plus and the Jubilee Debt Campaign that emerged following the closure of the Campaign, which continued to research and campaign on debt.

My final source of data collection was opinion poll results that were conducted between 1998 and 2000. An independent opinion poll company, the 'Ipsos Mori' in the UK, conducted these polls and they looked into public attitudes in the UK regarding debt cancellation in the wake of J2K emergence. As the purpose of the data collected from this source was mainly to give some insights into how the UK public
perceived the Campaign and a glimpse of how well the Campaign’s demands resonated with the public, it was quite a useful data source. Relatedly, I consulted some websites including those of international financial institutions - Bank and Fund, for some information and debt figures. At the end, data collected from these primary and secondary sources were collated and together, formed the basis of my analysis and identification of the outcomes of J2K using the adapted theoretical framework.

5.5 Analytical Approach

The analytical approach I employed in this research was informed by the perspective rooted in the phenomenological research approach that takes into account the individual and group experiences of shared meanings by examining how members of the network perceive their joint enterprise, remember and describe it, judge and make sense of it (Patton, 2002: 104). This perspective requires an in-depth probe of people’s experiences of the phenomenon and hence, the importance of a more complete overview with data from the multiple sources and methods employed in this research. The combination of this analytical approach with the outlined theoretical framework in chapter four, enabled the outcomes of J2K to be identified on different levels, beyond the focus on the policy level that is often the case in the literature on collective actions. Further, it also meant that the multiple methods employed in this research were the most suitable to address the particular questions that revolved around the J2K in this study.

To apply the analytical approach therefore, it was necessary to have a good grasp of participants’ views and perceptions, recollections and experiences and what the collective action on debt generally meant to them. Thus, I gathered relevant and reliable data not only on the outcomes of the Campaign but also on the other themes
and issues that I identified in the research process. This was reflected in the type of information I searched for in the J2K archives and the type of questions I asked my interviewees. For example, I adopted a strategy to start the interviews with the question of how and when the interviewee became involved with the J2K. However, beyond the temporal involvement of the interviewee, the information I sought to obtain with this question was to aid my knowledge of whether such interviewee was involved in some of the frictions within the J2K and possibly their perspective on those frictions as my extensive literature review alerted me to a reasonable time frame of the frictions. The question also revealed in some cases the motivation of some participants, for example when one interviewee also explained why and not only how and when she got involved with the J2K. Her involvement, she explained, was motivated by a personal spiritual experience. These kinds of individual experiences, the interpretation of events and participants' involvement in the J2K were vital to how the Campaign was perceived and evaluated when it closed in 2000 and thus indicates the importance of the analytical approach adopted in this research.

The importance of this analytical approach was also demonstrated in the course of some interviews. In these interviews, I could clearly discern a difference between how some campaigners in the global North regarded the Campaign in contrast to most of those I interviewed in the global South. For example, the perception that a campaign on debt took place was prevalent among many interviewees in the global North and thus, it was done. On the other hand, my impression of most of those I interviewed in the global South reflected a viewpoint that livelihoods of a large part of their population depended and continue to depend on the issue of debt. Therefore for them, the debt issue is much more than just a campaign – that took place hence the continued campaign for debt cancellation, just like before the J2K emerged. The
interview method and the analytical approach deployed in this research helped to unravel these kinds of nuanced differences between different groups (also within the UK Coalition) and some regional blocks in the network. Empirically, the multiple methods and analytical approach also reveals the latent and inherent political meanings that underlie the categorisation of collective actions in the literature, which I outlined in chapter three.

5.6 Reflections on Research

Leroi et al. argued,

In the transnational networks literature the main and often only objects of analysis within the networks are the northern actors, with southern perspectives being marginalised and only being of importance when they affect the legitimacy of northern actors. (...) southern NGOs only appear to be important when they make demands of northern NGOs. As such, northern experiences of participation in transnational networks are privileged over southern ones, which marginalises their agency (2004: 850).

The above critique of the literature on TCAs and the particular reference to both the practices of and the research on transnational networks is, unfortunately, legitimate and valid, and a critique that could not be fully remedied in this research. As I outlined at the outset of this chapter, the scope of this research revolved around what I considered, given the available information on the J2K, the main networking hub and arguably, the most visible and prominent component in the network. Inevitably, any research on the Campaign with the type of questions driving this research will have to pay due, even if lopsided attention to the UK component given its centrality in the network and its role at the international level, on debt cancellation generally.

While it may remain debatable whether the arrangement that saw the UK Coalition in this position was by design or coincidence and whether more could have been done
to mitigate this obvious imbalance, the effect of this is the perceptible subjugation and marginalisation of some southern voices and positions. However, beyond merely exposing this imbalance and shortcoming, what needs to be understood and critiqued in equal measure is the power dynamics within these networks and the role of the Western academic structures in the production and re-production of this imbalance. I will return to this issue in greater detail later in this research but suffice to say that the logistic demands and challenge involved in researching southern involvement equally, in these networks – a problem I faced in this study, suggests that these problems are systemic and so, require some critical self-reflection by researchers and practitioners in further research on TANs.

The above critique in part, informed the research strategy and methods employed in this study. As I detailed in earlier chapters, the idea of Jubilee debt remission and the Campaign that emerged from it were initiated in the UK. That the UK Coalition was the de facto international secretariat of the Campaign and effectively the mouthpiece of the network meant that any research on the Campaign would benefit from the wealth of resources that the UK Coalition has on offer. I had access to a considerable amount of these resources and generated valuable and credible data that aided my analysis in this research. In the process, I conducted interviews with key figures in the Coalition, which set off a snowball effect that led to other vital data sources, in addition to the Campaign archival materials at Newcastle University in the UK.

Given that my primary access was to the UK Coalition and in light of the Coalition’s role and centrality in the Campaign, there was the risk of over reliance on the UK Coalition. To mitigate this and ensure a considerable level of balance, I had to broaden my sources of data collection to other national campaigns in other regions,
by interviewing individuals who were central to national campaigns in Africa, North and Latin America. As discussed above, budgetary and logistic constraints meant I could not physically visit these campaigns but thanks to improved information technology, I was able to conduct these interviews over Skype. This was really an invaluable tool because it enabled me to gather data that otherwise would have been impossible to collect and thus, ensured that there was a good balance in my sources of data collection, which in turn aided the credibility of the triangulated data.

Finally, I deviated from the dominant methodological pattern of research in terms of outcomes in this field, which tends to concentrate on policy outcomes at the expense of other spheres where outcomes of a collection action could be observed. Rather, I have by design – while paying equal attention to the policy sphere – tried to capture a broader sphere where the outcomes of J2K could be identified. This approach has the advantage of being more comprehensive in that it goes beyond identifying and analysing outcomes in the policy spheres and encompasses other areas that are often overlooked in similar studies. In this research, this includes the impacts identified in the procedural and sensitising spheres as well as those impacts discussed as legacies of the Campaign.

5.7 Ethics

In the course of researching the J2K, I conducted interviews with individuals I identified from my preliminary research, the archives and those identified through ‘snowballing’. Informed consent was obtained from the interviewees in accordance with Loughborough University’s research ethics procedures and guidelines. These procedures and guidelines are contained in the Handbook for Postgraduate Research Students (2009).
fieldwork for this research, I was a registered research student at Loughborough University. The interviewees consented to the interviews being recorded and some of them offered clarifications in the future, if needed.

5.8 Chapter Conclusion: Scope of Outcomes

In this chapter, the task was to outline and discuss the research processes and the various methods employed. I drew on the previous chapters to recast the research question and outlined the scale and design of the research. I discussed my choice of and the reasons underlying the case study research design with qualitative research methods that included semi-structured interviews, archival and published materials, and results of opinion polls. The scale of the boundaries was noted to be murky and blurred hence it was roughly delineated around the interactions from and to the UK Coalition given its prominence, centrality and role in the network. I elaborated on the complexity and confusion surrounding the dual and overlapping role of the UK Coalition, which was the national campaign but had staff that functioned and effectively doubled as the de-facto international Secretariat of the J2K.

Some of the challenges in conducting this research were discussed and I reiterated why it is problematic to cast the outcomes of J2K in this study and indeed, any outcomes of other transnational collective actions in absolute and definitive terms. Combined with the adapted theoretical framework, a phenomenological approach was employed in the analysis because it reckons with and takes seriously the experiences and shared meanings of those who participated in the collective action. The final section includes my reflections on this research.
In the concluding chapter of this study, I will outline the general conclusions of this research mindful of any truth-claims and generalisations because of the methods applied, their limitations and the approach to outcomes of collective actions argued and adopted in this study. The outcomes of J2K I will present in this thesis will remain my interpretations of the evidence available and accessible within the scale and time of this research. While this interpretation will be based on the documentary, archival and empirical data gathered from multiple sources, still, it has to be noted that the data is by no means exhausted as discussed in this chapter. This is because different components within the erstwhile J2K network will continue to present perspectives – probably including personal memories (biased as that may be), that is by no means guaranteed to conform with the evidence I analysed in this research, but which will continue to inform our understanding and interpretation of the outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign in the future. Moreover, it is also conceivable that more evidence regarding certain issues and decisions may yet be uncovered and inform a re-interpretation of the data presented and analysed in this research.
6. "Cutting the Diamond"\textsuperscript{86} of Debt

6.1 Introduction

The background and history of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign detailed in chapter two showed that the problem of impoverished countries debt occupied a number of organisations in the UK and other countries in different continents for over a decade before the Campaign emerged. However, debt failed to assume any importance at the international political level. The question then is why did debt become a dominant item on the international political agenda with the emergence of the Campaign in the mid-1990s? Why was it possible that within the space of four years, the Jubilee 2000 initiative for debt remission that barely had any footing became fully transnational and over 24 million people signed its petition for debt cancellation in 166 countries?

In this chapter I will draw on the theoretical and empirical data in the previous chapters to address these questions and explain some of the pertinent issues in this research to substantiate my arguments about the J2K. Put differently, this chapter will examine how the J2K engaged in and emerged from “cutting the diamond” of debt. This will serve to explain some of the theoretical and empirical issues raised so far in this research which are vital to the overall analysis of J2K and, in particular, its outcomes. This is important because first, it will improve our understanding the nature of work and processes that preceded the Campaign emergence. Second, it will show why the Campaign crafted its message within a particular frame – the injustice frame, which was broad and appealing enough to attract the huge international public support it craved. Quite significantly, it will also show that critically examined, the

\textsuperscript{86} Pettifer (2006, 2011).
message and frame of the Campaign were vague and ambiguous to some extent, and not inclusive enough to accommodate the aims of all the groups the J2K attracted.

In her exposé on the fundamentals of successful advocacy, Pettifor (2011, 2006) drew on several collective actions and campaigns and outlined some principles that included ‘survey the landscape’, ‘leadership’, ‘communication’ and ‘opportunity’. Most of these drew on elements of the political process theory’s account of collective action emergence and while they are useful in the analysis of any collective action, of particular interest to this research is the principle of “cutting the diamond”. According to Pettifor, this is the immersive process of deep and rigorous research, critical and robust empirical analyses used for collective action purposes to counter and undercut the dominant narrative in a discourse on an issue of contention and to determine strategy and illuminate the true story (Pettifor, 2006: 307f).

The process of “cutting the diamond” according to her, is usually undertaken by a small, astute, trusted and dedicated group of stakeholders who will examine the issue from all angles, obtain informed advice from relevant experts, scrutinise and cut out their own biases and prejudices while paying due attention to the potential target audiences. The process defines the problem, the goals and the ‘ask’ of the collective action, identifies the blame target and proffer possible solutions while it carefully articulates coherent arguments for them. It entails a good grasp of the issue history, the terrain and associated issues, and quite importantly, it ascertains the power relations on the issue, which helps to determine the potential pressure points. Central to “cutting the diamond” is the frame of the issue and how that serves as a vehicle for the socialisation and mobilisation of the diverse audiences that may be targeted.
Specifically in the context of J2K, Pettifor noted:

Analysis is something that can build a coalition, and the analysis was not accidental. The analysis was worked on for two years. The working out of the analysis is like diamond cutting. You look at a diamond for two years if you’re a diamond cutter. And when you cut it, you cut the problem in such a way as to maximize the reflection of the problem, enabling a lot of people to see themselves in the analysis. When you’ve done that, you then test the way you’ve cut this diamond is actually attracting light, is actually reflecting light, is actually credible.\(^8\)\(^7\)

Thus, “cutting the diamond” enables a holistic and in depth view of the issue. It allows the problem to be defined and presented in a broad and inclusive way to enable the varied targeted audiences to perceive their interest in the issue and partake in the collective action. It is the possibility that the process offers for the articulation, definition or re-definition of the problem issue in a way that reflects individuals and groups’ perspectives of and interest in the problem that underlies the significance of “cutting the diamond”. Pettifor argued that “cutting the diamond” correctly would produce a strategy that is expected to ring true with potential campaigners and galvanise a broad-based collective action, which in turn, would influence decision-makers. Drawing on the empirical materials outlined in this research, my analysis of J2K in this chapter will employ the principles of “cutting the diamond” of debt.

A detail insight into the process of “cutting the diamond” will show that two aspects of the process are fundamentally relevant to the analysis of J2K in this study. First is the in-depth research and critical analysis of the problem issue. Second are the outcomes of the entire process – the frame, which encapsulates the problem, identifies the blame target, and offers plausible solutions. These outcomes also reflect the problem issue as broad and accurately as possible to attract the diverse and desired mobilisation targets. However, as I discussed in chapter three, while frames

are the products of this process, they are continuously mediated and negotiated with new information and experiences, re-interpretation of events and occurrences. This chapter will explore both of these aspects of “cutting the diamond” to explicate the Campaign’s deployment of injustice frame as it redefined the complicated history of the debt and effectively named the problem a crisis. I argued earlier that the major collective action theories lack the capability to single-handedly account for the emergence of J2K rather; J2K emergence is explained by a combination of the salient points or core contentions of these theories. The process through which those core contentions converged entailed the processes of cutting the diamond of debt, as the account of the Campaign emergence shows. The arguments I seek to make in this chapter are as follows:

- That J2K emergence could not be single-handedly accounted for by any of the major collective action theories because of their inherent shortcomings and that it is only a combination of their core contentions that could explain the emergence of J2K.
- That the emergence of J2K was underpinned by the principles of cutting the diamond of debt that entailed robust research and critical analysis, which in turn, enabled the J2K to deconstruct the perceived arcane nature of debt and international finance, named debt a crisis, and redefined and reframed it as a justice-based issue.
- That the J2K mobilised the public and crucially, the relevant target actors to accept the debt situation as a crisis as it politicised and mainstreamed the issue in a political context where virtually all the target actors disputed that judgement.
- That the friction over the appropriate language in the network was a reflection of both the struggle for the ownership of the Campaign and the difference in the underlying principles that guided the divergent position on debt within the network.
- That due to the dynamics of the Campaign emergence, the inclusion of Southern campaigners in the Campaign was not really planned.

The emergence of collective actions remains an intriguing topic in the literature on collective actions. The key question is: why does collective action emerge in some places and times and not in others? In the context of J2K, cutting the diamond of debt is key to answering that question because it entails the processes, which combines
the various factors that are the core contentions of the major collective action theories. Drawing on the discussion of collective action emergence in chapter three, I would argue that there are evident gaps in the literature on this question and that none of the theories can fully and single-handedly account for the emergence of J2K because of their limited explanatory capabilities. To explain the emergence of J2K, it is necessary to combine the salient elements or the core contentions of these collective action theories. This would mean a combination of opportune timing and the notion of cognitive liberation and openings in political opportunity structures — for political process theory. In addition are resources and organisation — for resource mobilisation theory and non-material, universal and ethical values — for the new social movements to explain the emergence of J2K. In doing that, I posit that cutting the diamond of debt enabled the Campaign’s emergence as its processes afforded the initiators the opportunity to be part constitutive of and harness these core elements.

The processes of contesting the dominant narrative on debt were underlined by the extensive research and critical analysis that the Campaign’s initial core group among others, undertook. The result of these processes was embodied in the Campaign’s injustice frame of the problem, which attracted the diverse groups and organisations in different continents to the Campaign. This theme, whose embrace accounts for the transnationalisation of the Campaign, will be explored in the next section. Following that, I will examine the Campaign strategy, which, was designed to mobilise mass public support by education. The Campaign set out to implement this strategy and achieve its aims by educating the public about the underlying injustice of debt and the role and co-responsibility of the creditors in the debt problem. How well the Campaign executed this task, was to a large extent reflected in the fact that debt became a mainstream issue only a few years following the Campaign emergence.
The Campaign's diffusion to different countries and continents marked its full transnational status and evidently, it employed relational and non-relational channels in its diffusion processes. The focus here is on the Campaign's diffusion channels and the role of the media, the use of the emergent Internet technology, the involvement of celebrities, and the music and movie industry in these processes. As the J2K diffused, it attracted groups from varied background and cultures. In incorporating these groups, the Campaign inevitably sowed the seed for some of the friction that would later manifest in the network as strong ideological differences over the depth of its aims surfaced between some regional blocks. In probing these frictions, I will show that some of them were rooted in the divergent principles that guided group participants' perspective on debt within the network.

In a complex and politically contested issue as debt of the impoverished countries, the language used in contesting the narrative on debt was crucial to the collective action on debt. At the international level, this issue was rooted in the question of 'ownership' of the Campaign and the underlying question of representation. The key questions were: who speaks for whom and how appropriate is the language used to portray the problem? Is there room for the voice of those from the global South in the network? Should the initiators of J2K in the global North assume the responsibility of advocating on behalf of the indebted countries? Are the power relations and dynamics in the J2K simply replicating and reflective of the North South divide? These are some of the questions associated with the 'ownership' question that will be discussed in this chapter.
6.2 Explaining the Emergence of J2K through ‘Cutting the Diamond’

The questions driving this chapter are why did the Campaign emerge at the time it did and how did it develop and diffuse its message so widely? It is necessary to address these questions because the emergence and diffusion of the Campaign are central to understanding its identifiable outcomes. As indicated above I will deploy the principles of “cutting the diamond” in my analysis of J2K as this is the main theoretical explanation of the Campaign emergence.

As discussed in chapter three, the major collective action theories emphasise different key elements as sources of collective actions. To briefly recap, the resource mobilisation theory stressed organisation, resources and mobilising structures as the sources of collective action emergence. For political process theory, it is the broader social process over a longer period and emphasis is on indigenous organisational strength, cognitive liberation and opportune time with openings in the political opportunity structures. Ethical, non-material and universal values underpinned the collective actions of the new social movements cluster. However, I also discussed in that chapter that these theories entailed some shortcomings, which render each of them incapable to single-handedly account for the emergence of J2K.

Nevertheless, these core elements were all crucial to the emergence of J2K in varying degrees and at different stages hence it is their combination that theoretically explains J2K’s emergence. The decade and a half work on debt and poverty by aid and development groups failed to advance debt as a major political issue at the national and international levels, fuelling the idea of ‘aid fatigue’ (Bunting, 2000). Part of the consequences of this was the general apathy to the idea of a massive public campaign on debt in the 1990s. For example, in Ann Pettifor’s interview to
lead the Jubilee 2000 Campaign, she proposed an international campaign on debt but it was hardly well received. She recalled the response to her proposal:

That’s not possible. No one has ever executed an effective national and global campaign on sovereign debt and finance before. This is a complex and arcane subject, not easily communicated. We don’t think a public campaign is feasible (Pettifor, 2011: 3).

She argued that a public campaign was possible and that all that was needed was a belief in the millions worldwide who loathe the economic injustice and the backing of an adequately resourced campaign. Whether the doubt that greeted her idea was the reason she was initially overlooked for the post remains unknown, because the post was originally offered to Patrick Costello who turned it down in March 1996 before it was then offered to Pettifor (Carter, interview with the author, 26 June 2012; Jubilee Management Committee, 1995). However, it is clear that the idea of mounting an international campaign on debt remained contentious even after Pettifor assumed office. Isabel Carter, a member of the initial Jubilee 2000 core group corroborated Pettifor’s recollection on the issue. According to her,

Pettifor was frustrated by Dent and Peters because both of them had difficulties getting their heads around the idea of an international campaign and seemed to have no vision of such a campaign (Carter, interview with the author, 26 June 2012).

This statement hints at some difficult inter-personal relations and politicking at this group level from the very beginning. More significantly though, it highlights the depth of scepticism about mounting an international campaign on debt, even amongst those like Dent and Peters who envisioned the mobilisation of mass public support to put pressure on the target actors for debt cancellation. For Pettifor, the reason for scepticism over public campaign on debt was because the issue of international finance and debt were believed to be arcane, complex and fraught with difficulties to
communicate and there was no precedent (Pettifor, 2011: 2006). It is for this reason and the fact that this apathy and scepticism was even more prevalent in the wider development field that the Campaign emergence is remarkable and therefore worth analysing against the backdrop of collective action theories.

As discussed in chapter three, the RMT's emphasis on resources, organisation and mobilising structures as sources of collective action emergence are vital but its weakness remains that it lacks explanation of how the resources are translated into collective actions. Put differently, potential challengers may have resources and organisations but these would not automatically trigger a collective action. However, as the emergence of J2K shows, resources, organisation and connective structures – in the form of churches and the infrastructures of aid and development agencies that served as mobilising structures (McAdam et al., 1996: 3, Tarrow, 1994: 22f) – were all vital features in the emergence of J2K.

A lot of organisational and resource input was required through the different stages of the Campaign emergence. In practical terms, these include the meetings and public events that were organised and the structures that were developed which enabled the emergent Campaign to raise the additional resources needed for its course. Besides the monetary, resources included time – of the initiators and early supporters, contacts – between the initiators and the various segments of society and the press, knowledge and expertise – of the issues and the terrain, and physical structures amongst others. Much of these resources were internally generated. The structures and networks of churches, trade unions and development agencies served as mobilising and connective structures and were akin to and functioned like the
Black churches in the US which provided the platform for the emergence of the civil rights movement in the 1960s (Morris, 1984).

Publication materials like Sauda (see Jubilee 2000, 1996b) – the first public introduction of the Campaign, were widely circulated throughout the network of aid and church agencies at no financial costs to the Campaign. The Campaign maximised existing contacts of these groups and networks as they “ensured that almost every available church hall was used to organise a Jubilee 2000 meeting” (Greenhill et al., 2003: 7). As the J2K started its initial meetings in 1995, it made use of the physical structures of the Christian Aid where a room at the basement of the Christian Aid offices served as the meeting place (Carter, interview with the author, 26 June 2012).

The foundational work by individuals, ecumenical bodies, aid groups and networks in the preceding decade contributed towards building an informed mass with a huge base in the churches that was the core of J2K. These preparatory and informal efforts slowly increased in tempo and climaxed in February 1996 when the DCN organised a nation-wide tour of Britain with eminent African leaders led by ex-President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia to raise the profile of debt cancellation efforts. (Pettifor, 2006: 299; Greenhill et al, 2003: 6). According to Tarrow (1994), these ‘preparatory’ groups that propelled the Campaign constituted the early risers.

As the political process theory (PPT) contends (McAdam, 1982: 43-51), it is this longevity of engagement that provided the cumulative processes for J2K emergence. Moreover, the claim that collective action emergence is mediated and shaped by the interaction between collective action groups and the wider socio-political environment was evidenced by the various interaction between the initiators of
Jubilee 2000 and various segments of the society including some of the target actors. This interaction was evident within the academia at Keele University and between the various groups that made up the DCN, and a host of other social actors that ranged from the religious to diplomatic, cultural and political institutions in the UK. This crossover between these varied social actors among other factors, mediated J2K emergence and its broad mobilisation. Further, the notion of indigenous organisational strength, which describes the internal dynamics and communication between collective action members, leaders' commitment and charisma amongst others, was evident in the emergence of J2K as shown in chapter two and this combined with the notion of cognitive liberation, another key element of the PPT.

Cognitive liberation entails the consciousness of members of a collective action or their potential supporters of the possibility that a problem issue can actually be redressed through their own action (McAdam, 1982). The Jubilee theme that was associated with the impending millennium year 2000 was widely interpreted as the opportunity for a new start by the initiators of Jubilee 2000. This availed them, their early supporters and then the DCN, an opportune timing of the consciousness that the debt problem could actually be resolved through their own engagement. From a PPT perspective, this consciousness and the realisation that the debt problem could actually be redressed by their own actions motivates participants to be involved and in the process translates the resources that may be available into collective action. I showed in chapter two that many in the aid and development agencies were initially hesitant to the Jubilee-type debt remission idea. However, their response changed when they experienced this consciousness and realised that given the Jubilee theme and the time the Campaign would reach its crescendo, it had the potential to mobilise major popular support to put pressure on the target actors to cancel the debt.
Central to PPT is the concept of political opportunity structure, which emphasise the ways in which the overall social-political, cultural and economic setting shapes the emergence of collective action. In the J2K emergence, different aspects of this concept were clearly manifested, most notably in the openness of the institutionalised political system and the presence of elite allies. For example, following the demonstration at the G8 summit in Birmingham, the Campaign received information from the Department for International Development (DFID) that the demonstration strengthened the position of those within the Department who favoured debt cancellation because it showed popular public support for their position (Pettifor, interview in 2011). This was a clear indication that within the Department, political alliances and cleavages were developing between the political elites and in the process creating an opening for the Campaign. It has also been argued that the presence of centre-left governments in some of the major creditor countries like Germany under Gerhard Schroeder and the Social Democratic Party, Tony Blair and the New Labour in the UK and President Clinton and the Democratic Party in the US offered the collective action on debt a more receptive political audience than conservative governments would have (Mayo, 2005b).

It was particularly evident that highly placed individuals within the ruling Labour government supported, in varied degrees, the demands of the Campaign. While Clare Short, the then Secretary of State for International Development seemed to have vacillated between supporting aspects of the Campaign’s demands and disagreeing with other aspects (Short, 1999; Kennedy, 1998), others like Gordon Brown, while Chancellor of the Exchequer, supported the Campaign publicly. This was reflected in the regular audience he granted the Campaign representatives and his presence at the Campaign events and declarations in those events. For example, at a Campaign event
on 7 March 1999 at the Cathedral in London, he stated that debt was “the great moral issue of our day and decade; (...) the greatest single cause of poverty and injustice across the earth, and potentially one of the greatest threats to peace” (Brown, 1999: 1). Nevertheless, much as the different elements of the PPT manifested and were at play in the emergence of J2K, the theory could not account for the motivation of the initiators and thus on its own, unable to fully account for J2K emergence.

Finally, the principles that underpinned the Campaign centred on justice and fairness, universal, ethical, non-material values and shared principled ideas that are the hallmarks of the new social movements. Norm Entrepreneurs are usually motivated by principled ideas and values, altruistic and empathetic commitments as they champion changes that defy a rationalist understanding of personal interest. Martin Dent, the initiator of the Jubilee 2000 idea and his students could be understood in this sense when they initiated the ideas that culminated in the collective action on debt. They were motivated not by interest encapsulated in a rationalist calculation, but interest spurred by justice and fairness and grounded in principled ideas, ethical and non-material values.

As the concept of Jubilee and debt developed into a proper campaign, it attracted and gained the support of like-minded individuals and groups across different regions and continents. Some groups from Southern Africa to countries in Latin America were already engaged on the debt issue and advocated cancellation long before the J2K emerged. The principled ideas and shared values that motivated these groups fostered a sense of common identity and bounded them with the initiators of J2K in the global North. It facilitated their participation in a common discourse, dense exchange of information and availed them with communicative structures – defining features of
transnational advocacy networks. However, while the motivation of those who initiated the J2K could be accounted for by elements of the new social movements’ approach, the NSMs’ approach seems to have taken the core contentions or salient elements of the other theories of collective action discussed above for granted. This is because, the role of resources and organisation, cognitive liberation and opportune timing amongst others, are not explicitly specified in this approach and thus, a weakness that would also discount its ability to single-handedly account for the emergence of J2K.

The argument being made therefore is that various groups and networks that sought debt relief prior to the J2K had resources, organisation and connective structures at their disposal. However, these were not mobilised (at least not to the point) to kick-start a visible public advocacy or collective action on debt nor could they propel debt on to the international political agenda. While the organisation and resources may have been present, the element of cognitive liberation, the necessary catalyst was lacking until it was provided by the Jubilee idea of a one-off debt cancellation by the end of the last millennium. Thus, resources and organisation were translated into collective action by the dynamics of cognitive liberation and opportune timing and these combined with the principled ideas and non-material values that motivated the initiators of Jubilee 2000, explains the emergence of the Campaign. At the top of the chapter, I argued that the Campaign’s emergence hinged on the principles of cutting the diamond as the processes of cutting the diamond of debt enabled the combination and convergence of the core emphasis of the major collective action theories. How these processes were actually carried out is the focus of the following section.
6.3 Contesting the History of Debt and Framing the Campaign

The Jubilee 2000 Campaign emerged amidst a discourse with the dominant narrative that blamed the debt on the incompetence and corruption of the political leadership and elites in the indebted countries. This narrative suggested that the indebted countries must bear the consequences by repaying the debt irrespective of the effects of repayments. The problem with this perspective though was that it reflected only one aspect of the history and neglected other parts. As it emerged, the Campaign’s immediate challenge was to present the other side of the history and challenge the dominant narrative about debt. This entailed first, outlining the underlying issues of the debt problem and the Campaign’s proffered solutions and second, to devise a strategy that would lead to the target actors’ acceptance of the proffered solutions.

To meet these challenges the Campaign employed the two fundamental principles of cutting the diamond discussed earlier in this chapter. The first part of this meant that the initial core group had to carry out in-depth research and critical analysis of the different dimensions of the debt. They researched the workings of international finance and banking system, the creditor’s loan policies as it relates to the indebted countries, the effects of the debt management mechanisms and the impacts of debt on the impoverished countries. Based on these, the Campaign articulated its positions.

First, from the Campaign’s perspectives, the problem indebted countries faced was far more than what was being reported and it was certainly not one of liquidity as the IFIs had presented. The Campaign’s analysis showed that the problem was one of solvency as the indebted countries were essentially bankrupt and only meeting their repayments with new loans. For example, the Campaign cited a UK government press release in 1995, which stated that Britain gave £12.5 million to Zambia for
some of its debt service repayments to IFIs.\textsuperscript{88} Using data from UN agencies and by reinterpreting data from the IFIs, the Campaign’s analysis showed that it was practically impossible for the debts to be repaid without exacting enormous suffering and unbearable human cost; hence it defined the debt as unpayable.\textsuperscript{89} By showing that the debt could not realistically be repaid and with many indebted countries typically spending more money on repayments than on basic necessities, the J2K argued that the management mechanism so far applied had failed to remedy the problem and had in fact, escalated it to a crisis. Consequently, it argued for a new approach – cancellation of the unpayable debt, instead of the ineffective debt rescheduling that was in practice.

Second, the Campaign further contested the history of the debt by exposing the flaws in the nature and processes of most of the debt. The Campaign’s research and analysis showed that the debt was the result of flaws on the creditors’ part. These included the creditors’ loan-pushing and the laxity of their loan policies, unrestricted capital transfer, the ill-fated projects supported by the creditors and for which the loans were secured and crucially, the creditors’ geo-political interest that motivated some of the loans. The Campaign therefore concluded that the indebted countries were not solely to blame for the debt problem given the role of the creditors in it.

The Campaign’s ability to thorough analysis of the debt situation led to two key points that would fundamentally underpin the entire course of the Campaign. First, it enabled the Campaign to reinterpret and demystify the complex debt situation. The arcane and intractable nature of the debt was deconstructed, simplified and made

\textsuperscript{88} Jubilee 2000 Coalition (1997a).
\textsuperscript{89} Jubilee 2000 Coalition (n.d.) ‘The Human Cost of Debt Service’ and ‘Who We Are’; See also Hanlon, 2006: 120
comprehensible to the public. Debt, which was always perceived as complicated and difficult to communicate, effectively became a mainstream issue that could easily be discussed as a result. Second and quite importantly, it enabled the Campaign to show the creditors' part-culpability in the debt crisis. While the first point was integral to the Campaign strategy and its diffusion, the second point was central to its frame as it sought public support for its aims.

_Framing the Campaign: The Injustice Frame:_ Generally, a _frame_ entails the picture of how a collective action problematises its issue and the image of that issue that it wants to project on to the domain of public discourse. Following from the discussion in chapter three, frames are the products of 'framing'. They are the articulation and production of negotiated, shared meanings and definitions through reflection by collective claimers on their situation. Frames allow for the reinterpretation of events, the construction of meaning and reality that enables individuals to locate and perceive, label and identify themselves with occurrences within the arena of contention and the wider world. The Campaign's conviction and argument that the creditors were partly responsible for the debt by the reckless and irresponsible pattern of the loans formed the basis on which it began to redefine debt as justice issue and frame it using the _injustice frame_.

The Injustice frame entails the appraisal that defines the actions of an authority, system or apparent situations as unjust, unfair and thus warrants remedy and, in some cases, legitimates noncompliance (Papaioannou et al, 2009: 810; Gamson et al, 1992; Snow et al, 1986: 466). Guided by this perspective, the Campaign argued that the debt situation of the impoverished countries was unjust going by international law,

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principles and precedents. The Campaign drew on the principle of lender responsibility and argued that since a substantial part of the debt in question was "odious" or illegitimate, it was unjust for debtors to bear its brunt, more so when the creditors were mainly responsible for the situation. Underlying the doctrine of odious debt is the principle that lenders, by lending to dictators and corrupt political leaders who are not accountable to their people, risk having their loans not being repaid. This is because; borrowers may use the loans to strengthen their despotic positions or repress the population that are opposed to them. It is therefore unfair and unjust that their populace are tasked to repay the loans. Loans that were neither accented to by the people nor used for their benefit are deemed odious and should not be repaid (Jayachandran and Kremer, 2006: 216).

The doctrine of odious debt has a long history dating back to 1868 in the US and there are instances of its application in Europe and Africa (Hanlon, 2006a: 213; Jayachandran and Kremer, 2006: 215f; Adams, 1991: 168). In the UK, the British House of Commons International Development Committee acknowledged this doctrine in the case of Rwanda's debt incurred by the genocidal regime in 1994.91 This doctrine was complemented by the emergent concept of illegitimate debt. This type of debts occur when lenders contravene ordinary principles of fair dealing and fail to act in good faith, a concept that finds support at the UK domestic level in the UK Consumer Credit Act of 1974, section 138 (Hanlon, 2006a: 214f, 2002: 7). Illegitimate debt describes loans that were improperly granted for failed development projects or projects that were bound to fail due to inherent flaws. Examples include loans to support the apartheid South Africa, loans for the Bataan nuclear power station in the Philippines that was built on a volcanic earthquake fault, loans to

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91 House of Commons (1998a).

The Campaign was also premised on the notion that it was particularly unfair and unjust for the poor people in these countries who neither approved of nor benefitted from the loans to continue to be denied education, health services, food and clean water as a result of their countries’ expending more money on debt repayments than on providing basic necessities (Lovett, 1998: 5). The Campaign further argued that as the debtors were already paying a heavy price with the effects and cost of debt servicing, it was only fair that the creditors cancel the unpayable debt. It was also considered unjust that the principal amount burrowed by most of the indebted countries had already been repaid many times over and yet these countries remain steeply in debt.\(^9\) Remarkably, the Campaign’s basic arguments with illegitimate and odious debts were backed and echoed by the UN Institute for Training and Research, and given further credence when the British House of Commons International Development Committee recognised it in its 1998 report. It states inter alia;

The unsustainable debt burden of heavily indebted poor countries exists to some extent as a result of irresponsible lending policies pursued by bilateral and multilateral creditors. The Government's memorandum to this inquiry acknowledges this responsibility, referring to "what can, with the benefit of hindsight, be seen as lending policies which did not take full account of the true risks of default.\(^9\)

By contesting the history of debt and demonstrating the part-culpability of the creditors for the debt situation, the Campaign began the process of deconstructing the dominant narrative in the debt discourse. This process was scaled up when the Campaign deployed the injustice frame, which shifted the narrative from one that

solely blamed the indebted countries to one of co-responsibility and redefined debt as injustice that needed to be redressed by a one-off cancellation.

Yanacopulos (2009: 74; 2004) argues that debt, defined as a justice based issue, was an important strategy that helped to attract J2K members and supporters and that it was framed to maximise the number of organisations who could perceive themselves and their interests in the issue as presented. This perspective exemplified a major function of cutting the diamond of debt because it allowed pre-existing anti-debt groups around the world to see their own interest in the emergent J2K. Thus, the frame the Campaign deployed appealed to broad and varied publics hence the impressive numbers of people and organisations that were attracted to the Campaign in the creditor and debtor countries. However, the central theme of justice that the frame portrayed was open to varied interpretations because what exactly constituted ‘justice’ was vague and ambiguous.

In my interviews with Keene, Klu and Lekalakala, leading figures in the Jubilee South, it was clear that many pre-existing anti-debt groups in the global South were attracted to the J2K by its justice theme, the strategic desire to influence its demands, and the potential to use the J2K platform to advance their perspective on debt. For example Lekalakala stated:

We in South Africa saw the emergence of J2K as an opportunity to make the campaign that was already going on in South Africa more international (...) and the major impact for us was that it enlightened a lot of people, and helped put the issue of debt on the national political agenda because, we had struggled to achieve that before the J2K.

However, there was this difference where J2K was very much for debt relief while Jubilee South was pressing for repudiation. That difference undercuts the various backgrounds from which we were operating and positions we took on the issue of debt and what the solutions should be.
The above is an indication that some of the aims of these groups that predated J2K, while not diametrically opposed, did not always tally with the aims outlined by the J2K. Considering that they were now part of J2K, this meant that within the J2K, there were at least two strands with aims that seemed incompatible given the demands of J2K from the onset. The implication of this was that justice; the basis and the common denominator of both of these strands was contested because what constituted justice was open to interpretation. Recent studies suggest that this is a common trend because according to Fraser, "(...) today’s social-justice movements lack a shared understanding of the substance of justice. Unlike their twentieth-century predecessors, who militated mostly for “redistribution,” present-day claimers couch their demands in a variety of idioms, which are oriented to competing goals" (2009: 1f). To better understand this in the context of the J2K, it is important to briefly consider the theoretical underpinnings of how justice was framed in the Campaign because; the divergent interpretation of justice by the different J2K blocks speaks to the evocation of different conceptions of justice.

Justice, understood as the parity of participation based on the principle of equal moral worth as full partners in social interaction, requires social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life (Fraser, 2005: 5). Fraser describes justice claims that are thought to be within the ambit of national or state-territorial borders in terms of the Keynesian-Westphalian frame and principles (2005). Under these principles, she argues that the issue of the subjects of justice was settled and that the frame where justice disputes are redressed was equally assumed settled. This was because the national citizenry was assumed to be the subjects of justice while appeals to national public opinion and institutions were seen as the means to redress any injustice, be they claims of redistribution or economic inequalities. The
reasoning was that any injustice claims could be redressed by state institutions and structures, so long as the sources of such injustices were rooted in the state territorial boundaries and hence under the jurisdiction of national institutions and structures. Nevertheless, the review and discussion of a series of proposals and approaches on distributive justice in Simon Caney's (2005) *Justice Beyond Borders* shows that the question of who is included is far from settled and that it is particularly complex at the global level.

However, Fraser also argues that the understanding of the modern territorial states as the appropriate unit for settling justice claims and the citizens as the reference is strongly challenged by the impact and heightened awareness of globalisation. This is because a number of social and economic processes that now shapes individual lives routinely overflow territorial boundaries with a multitude of transnational actors, for example, multilateral institutions like the IFIs, World Trade Organisations (WTO), inter-governmental and non-governmental agencies amongst others. These and similar organisations the argument goes, are neither locatable within the territorial states nor are they answerable to claims of injustice framed in terms of state territorial principles (Fraser, 2009: 19-23). Where these transnational actors are sources of injustice, the problem is made vivid that the territorial states represent an inadequate unit to redress those injustices, which in turn raises the question of the subjects of justice.

At issue in a justice frame therefore is whether due consideration is given to the subjects of justice (and who indeed is a subject of justice?) and if there is adequate and appropriate unit to redress the injustice claim. Central to these questions is the notion of *misrepresentation*, which in its deeper form of *misframing* describes the
demarcation of a polity’s boundaries in ways that wrongly deny some people the chance to participate at all in its authorised contest over justice (Fraser, 2009: 62). For example, where injustice is rooted in transnational sources and yet it is cast as national or state territorial matters, this creates the problem of inappropriate or inadequate unit of redress as the sources of the injustice are beyond the reach of state territorial control. On its own, misframing bears a considerable degree of injustice because; it prevents justice claimers from confronting the offshore sources of their grievance as extra and non-territorial powers are insulated from the reach of justice (Fraser, 2009: 6). More significantly,

(...) it precludes challenge to the background structures that enable foreign predation: above all, the exploitative governance structures of the global economy and the undemocratic design of the interstate system (Fraser, 2009: 63).

It is against the foregoing that the deployment of the injustice frame in the Jubilee 2000 Campaign and the divergent forms and interpretation of justice that was evoked by the different blocks has to be understood. While none of the blocks categorically cast debt in terms of state territorial principles, there was a considerable agreement, given the prognosis of the problem and the proffered solution – divergent as that was, that the sources of the problem and the hence the injustice, lay beyond the state. The underlying questions therefore become one of who was making the justice claim and what form of justice was being evoked? As we shall see later, the friction over the language and the principles, which underpinned the different positions of the Jubilee South and some Northern campaigns, is rooted in misrepresentation and its specific form of misframing. The Jubilee South’s attempt to challenge the background and underlying causes of the impoverished countries’ debt was undercut by the injustices of misframing as Fraser, cited above makes clear.
To summarise, the Campaign’s contestation and reinterpretation of the history and the redefinition of debt — both as a crisis and an issue of justice — meant that it intervened, engaged and confronted the dominant narrative in the debt discourse. Before the Campaign emerged, the dominant narrative solely blamed corruption and poor leadership of the global South elites for the debt crisis. The Campaign’s intervention reversed this by exposing the creditors’ part culpability in the crisis, as it drew on the principles of lender responsibility based on the doctrine of odious debt and the notion of illegitimate debt to substantiate that position. The Campaign proffered cancellation of the unpayable debt as solution for the crisis to ensure some fairness and justice, as that would mean the creditors’ acknowledgement of their responsibility in the crisis and to bear some of the consequences. This was essentially the core message that the injustice frame embodied which derived from cutting the diamond of debt. To understand how the Campaign engaged with this frame, it is vital to get a good grasp of the Campaign strategy and the different levels on which it was applied. This is the focus of the next section.

6.4 Campaign Strategy: Mobilising by Educating

The philosophy underpinning the Jubilee strategy was that in order to shift the policy of government and international institutions you needed on the one hand solid argument backed by research, and on the other hand the pressure of a well informed, mass campaign.

That implied producing literature of two kinds. The first presented the debt issue in clear, digestible form for the general public with no specialist knowledge of international finance and economics. The second was aimed at convincing decisions makers and officials of the validity of the movement’s critique and the practicality of the solution it was proposing (Randle, 2004: 12).

An interesting point for many commentators on the Jubilee 2000 Campaign was how widely it diffused in less than four years following its emergence. In this section, I
will examine the Campaign's mobilisation strategy and how that facilitated its diffusion. This is important because the strategy was central to the goals the Campaign hoped to achieve, which was primarily the cancellation of the backlog of unpayable debt of impoverished countries by the year 2000 under a fair and transparent system. However at its emergence, the Campaign's immediate objective was to run a nationwide campaign in the UK that focused on African debt and to contribute to a worldwide debate and campaign on the global South debt.

As discussed earlier, the Campaign aims were set at its inception in the UK and it originally focused on its target actors in the UK. However, the UK political and financial authorities were at the same time located at the international level; hence the Campaign aims were pursued at the relevant international level. At the national level, the UK was a partner in the bilateral debts and at the international level; the UK was part of the target actors due to its role in the Bank, the Fund and the Paris Club. Consequently, the Campaign strategy was designed to influence decisions at both the national and international levels – where it expected to gain leverage over major IFIs through the pressure of international public opinion. The strategy was for each national campaign to exert pressure on the target actors at the national level and in concert at the relevant international level, on the target actors.

Writing in March 1995 on 'the need to create a coalition for the Jubilee 2000', Dent and Peters stated,

\[\ldots\] there is a need to move from our quiet campaign of persuasion among groups and individuals, to a more general mobilisation of public opinion. \[\ldots\] It requires the participation of many individuals and of organisations far more

94 In the Bank and the Fund, the UK along with other G7 members holds Executive Directorial positions.
96 Martin Dent and Bill Peters are regarded as the co-founders of Jubilee 2000.
influential and well equipped than we. (...) We do, however, require a large and palpable wave of public support to influence decision makers to take the necessary radical decisions, leading to the actions and sacrifices required to achieve the Jubilee (1995: 3).

Thus from the outset, the Campaign was conceived as one that would involve mass mobilisation at the grassroots with broad public support from a large spectrum of the society to put pressure on decision makers akin to the anti-slavery movement of the 19th century (Pettifor, 2006; Dent and Peters, 1999). This idea was refined and consolidated in the process of cutting the diamond of debt when the core group mapped the public advocacy strategy. The strategy was to generate public opinion nationally to put pressure on the UK authorities and combine that with pressure at the international level to influence UK’s partners and fellow targets at the international level. According to Bill Peters in ‘Jubilee 2000’ (n.d.),

Jubilee 2000 has a two-pronged programme of action. It is clear that decision-makers will be helped towards remission (meaning cancellation) if strong popular demand for change has become manifest in developed countries. So, first, we aim to capture and then extend grass roots interest in, and a demand for practical solution of the debt problem. Secondly, we need to change the political and intellectual climate, again particularly in the developed countries, but also worldwide in favour of remission.97

The Campaign strategy therefore proceeded from the conviction that if ordinary people were well informed about the issues and the underlying injustice, they could be mobilised and empowered to act against it and be part of the Campaign. As a result, the strategy was to mobilise huge public support through education by embarking on a broad awareness programme to inform the public at every level of society with the facts and effects of debt on impoverished countries (Pettifor, 2006: 313). As communicative structures for political exchange with emphasis on the strategic and effective application of information politics, it is incumbent on TANs to

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97 In Italic, emphasis mine.
generate credible new information as alternative sites and structures, but also to reinterpret previous ones, simplify and make them readily available to a wide audience. Therefore, at the core of the Campaign strategy was the readiness to research new information on debt and its effect on the indebted countries, simplify and disseminate them. This was a major aspect of cutting the diamond of debt and it underpinned the mass mobilisation strategy the Campaign adopted.

This approach was imperative given the widespread apathy that individuals and groups displayed towards the idea of a public campaign on debt when it was initially floated. The Campaign strategy was designed for the varied audiences that ranged from activists, the general public, politicians and academics to journalists in the print and broadcast media in both creditor and debtor countries. Further, the Campaign liaised with and had a good working relationship with some staff working on debt relief at the Bank and the Fund, and in some Treasuries like in the UK, the US and Germany to obtain as much information as possible (Pettifor, 1996c).

6.4.1 Applying Campaign Strategy: Campaign Diffusion

The Jubilee 2000 Campaign emerged as a proper campaign in April 1996 with the acquisition of a company and charity status in the UK. Before then, it was a small local group like many others and did not have a long list of members. However, there was a difference in that it was envisioned as a national campaign with a set of goals and a definite time to achieve them; but it was designed as and developed into a transnational collective action. The preceding section shows that the Campaign devised a mobilisation strategy that centred on mass public education on debt and international finance; the consequent challenge was to implement that strategy. In other words, how was the Campaign going to spread its message and mobilise its
desired target audience to put pressure on the target actors? This question highlights the practical and empirical relevance of the concept of diffusion in the analysis of collective actions.

The concept of diffusion means the spread of social practices, scientific innovations or other cognitive clusters of perspectives among individuals or groups through certain channels over time. It is the spread of a new message or behaviour with or without variation from one location to another and it is relational or non-relational depending on the communication channel (Givan et al., 2010; Stobaugh and Snow, 2010; Oliver and Myers, 2003: 174). It is relational when the communication is through pre-existing direct ties or interpersonal and organisation contacts while it is non-relational when there are no direct ties between the transmitting and adopting parties where a third party mediates the communication.

In the context of J2K, there was much reliance on the network of the Church, aid and development agencies but the Campaign also aggressively pursued its outreach to other religious, socio-civic and professional associations. It extended invitation to a myriad of organisations including minority and ethnic communities, and migrant and refugee organisations all over the UK (Klu, interview with the author, 20 May 2011; Carter, interview with the author, 26 June 2012). Independent and already existing groups in different spheres began to align with the Campaign, and other interested individuals and student bodies started to form groups that included people of all ages, political parties, professions and religions throughout the country. In other words, the model the Campaign started with and implemented from the very beginning, which meant bringing together different groups and associations of all stripes and uniting them around the single theme of cancelling the unpayable debt, was replicated across
the country. The Campaign's ability to mobilise these varied social actors and diverse publics, and unite them in support of its aims was a key element in its diffusion and ultimately, the broad public support it garnered.

Thus, as the Campaign set the mechanism of diffusion in motion, it practically employed relational and non-relational processes to spread its message. These processes and model of mass mobilisation that started in the UK were replicated at the transnational level as the Campaign used its interpersonal and direct contacts to spread its message and simultaneously established its presence in locations where there were no direct contacts.

The Campaign had a core team of committed and dedicated researchers and it worked and allied with high profile and renowned finance, economics and development experts from different regions. For example, Jeffrey Sachs, the leading Professor of Economics and Sustainable Development at Harvard University, and Professor Adebayo Adedeji, the former UN Under-Secretary-General, became advisers and joined the Campaign's high-profile delegation to meet the Pope John Paul II in September 1999. They continuously researched the debt and its effects on various countries, and prepared high-quality reports and data that were presented in simple and comprehensible manner. These were translated into different languages and disseminated effectively throughout and beyond the network. These research and information materials from the Campaign were handy tools for the highly motivated supporters. In 1990, Dent and his students had started a petition calling for the year 2000 to be declared a Jubilee Year by the UN. This gained considerable support including from the UN Secretary General (Dent and Peters, 1995: 2). However when

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the Campaign began in earnest, a massive petition drive was an integral part of the strategy to get people involved and as the number of signatories indicate, it proved to be a popular strategy in both the debtor and creditor countries.

6.4.2 The Role of the Media, Internet Technology and Celebrities

As argued in chapter three, transnational advocacy networks thrive on information politics and a distinctive feature of this form of collective action is the organisational platform from which that information is disseminated. The results of the continued research and analysis that the Campaign produced were circulated through different media outlets including news and print media, radio and television as well as the Campaign newsletters and publications. The major newspapers and broadcast media were slow to pick up on the Campaign, but this soon turned around as sympathetic journalists were courted and some produced several newspaper articles. Many newspapers including the *Financial Times* and the *Economists* supported the Campaign. The *Guardian* endorsed the Campaign and ran centrefold spread – an eight-page pullout in the weekend of the G8 summit in Birmingham. It encouraged public participation in and donations to the Campaign.99 In February 1999, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Television showed a film, ‘Comic Relief’s Great Big Excellent African Adventure’ with the theme that Africans were engaged in different projects for themselves but that debt was holding them back (Randle, 2004: 13). Thus, the media was used both to educate the public and to put pressure on governments and decision makers at the IFIs.

When the Campaign was launched in 1996, the use of the Internet technology had become relatively widespread particularly in the Western developed countries and

the Campaign used it to great effects. It was useful for rapid communication and circulation of information between the different parts of the network. In January 1997, the Jubilee 2000 UK launched its website and because the UK component was the major hub of the network, a lot of information was made available through that website (Buxton, 2002; Randle, 2004: 34). Also, the J2K was able to gather relevant data on debt and the indebted countries from the websites of the IFIs and UN agencies, which it analysed and reinterpreted. With these and other reports and analysis, it regularly updated its website which it claimed was visited by more people than visited the website of the Fund and Bank in its last years (Pettifor, 2006: 302).

The Campaign wooed the music and entertainment industry and sought out influential public personalities and celebrities to advance its course. Famous and notable stars in the music and movie industry joined the Campaign and major entertainment events like the Annual Brit Awards - watched by a billion people worldwide - and the Notting Hill Carnival backed the Campaign and other music festival like Glastonbury in the UK and Woodstock in the US were used to promote the Campaign to a mass audience and broaden its appeal.\textsuperscript{100} Muhammad Ali, Pope John Paul II, Bob Geldof, David Bowie, Dalai Lama, Desmond Tutu, and Jesse Jackson amongst many other popular figures publicly backed the Campaign. Bono held online chat on debt cancellation with record 12 million viewers and MTV Europe ran a pan-European ad campaign;\textsuperscript{101} all these combined to arouse public interest in and increase the international popularity of the Campaign.

\textsuperscript{100} Jubilee 2000 Coalition (n.d.) 'Drop the Debt'.
\textsuperscript{101} Jubilee 2000 Coalition, 1999c.
6.4.3 The Significance of Jubilee and the Church in the Campaign Diffusion

The introduction of the Jubilee debt remission to the Debt Crisis Network (DCN) was initially met with considerable scepticism on account that it was impractical and the naivety of its initiators. According to Pettifor (who was the Coordinator of DCN at the time),

At the beginning many people were sceptical of the idea and I was sceptical too. But when Dent explained the root of it and its significance to me, I was persuaded and convinced of its brilliance and I went along (Pettifor, interview with the author, 7 March 2011).

While the idea was strange to some in the DCN, the Jubilee theme permeated the Campaign from the onset because Dent’s idea paralleled the biblical Jubilee concept and it was hugely significant in persuading various audiences to support the Campaign. Based on justice, freedom from slavery and the chance for a new start, this religious undertone had a strong impact and shaped some of the major discussions and decisions as J2K emerged. For example, as the initial core group struggled to translate Dent’s idea into a proper and recognisable campaign, one of the early supporters claimed to have received a vision from God while flying over Africa, to help save Africa from the burden of debt and Jubilee 2000 afforded her the opportunity. According to her, this vision led her to help register and establish the Jubilee 2000 as a charity and a limited company (Carter, interview with the author, 26 June 2012). The theological language of the Jubilee and the supplication for a new beginning that was always referenced in the Campaign provoked the effect of a missionary zeal in some individuals. These supporters would be later described as the “ballistically motivated” by some in the Campaign due to their zealousness (Pettifor, interview with the author, 7 March 2011).

\[102\] In my interview with Isabel Carter, she claimed to have kept this information to herself at the time because, it was personal and she did not want it to be a distraction. Pettifor (1998: 3) recounts her first meeting with Carter and confirms Carter’s recollection of how Jubilee 2000 obtained charitable status.
Probably due to the familiarity of the Jubilee theme, this zealousness was also evident among the faith activists at the grassroots level of the church in contrast to the initial lackadaisical attitude of the aid agencies' leadership. In my interview with Golding (26 April 2011), he noted that many at the grass roots level questioned the aid agencies' hesitation to fully support the Campaign. Some, either on their own accord or encouraged by agencies like Tearfund, began to divert their financial contributions instead to the Campaign (Greenhill et al. 2003: 28; Glennie, 2011).

Thus, the Jubilee theme was highly significant because it served as a very persuasive, mobilising and unifying factor in the Campaign emergence, diffusion and cohesion. This is better appreciated when it is understood that linked with the December 2000 end date; it was perhaps the most important factor that held the UK Coalition together as disaffection of and friction between members intensified towards the Campaign's end. According to Hanlon,

It was like a balloon. All the groups were blowing into it knowing that it was going to blow up. But while it was there, everyone was ready to contribute to it knowing that it will not last beyond December 2000 (2011).103

A point that needs to be emphasised is the vital function of the church that is often overlooked in the Campaign diffusion. To understand this it is important to recognise that by its very nature, the Church is transnational and financially well resourced. The transnational aspect of the Church was particularly crucial to the Campaign diffusion because it served as a medium for broadening its reach. For example, CAFOD was instrumental in getting CIDSE – the European and North American Catholic NGO Network, whose 17 member-organisations worked in 120 countries to

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103 Hanlon was the Campaign's Policy Officer. The Campaign's Deputy Director Adrian Lovett expressed similar views. See Grenier (2003: 92).
support the J2K. The same applied to Caritas that had operations in 174 countries worldwide (Cafod, 1998). Similar patterns existed with the Anglicans, Methodists and Baptists cross-continentially. This vast array of church network-of-networks was the solid foundation upon which the mass mobilisation of the international public was built and a major channel of the Campaign’s transnational diffusion.

6.5 The Friction Within: Struggle over Language and Ownership of the Campaign

The previous sections showed how the history of debt was thoroughly contested and deconstructed, simplified and made comprehensible to the public. Debt was redefined a crisis, and a justice issue and the creditors’ complicity was exposed. These, combined with the Jubilee theme, aided the Campaign’s resonance. A key part of how this was mediated was the language the Campaign used to intervene in the debt discourse, challenge the dominant narrative and establish its claims. This section will examine the struggle over the language the Campaign employed, friction over the Campaign ownership and how these impacts on some participants evaluation of the Campaign. The argument I seek to make here is that while the language used was vital to the Campaign’s contestation of the history and redefinition of debt, it was also the source of friction between network members; and it betrays the underlying principles of the varied approaches to the debt problem that is often overlooked in most analysis of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign.

As the J2K emerged, its UK component assumed the role as the main hub of the emergent network, provided leadership to the collective action on debt and was inevitably involved in the frictions. First within the UK Coalition, Martin Dent, who initiated the Jubilee debt remission, argued for debt ‘forgiveness’ as the appropriate
term for the Campaign’s advocacy (Dent, 1990; Pettifor, 2011: 40). Meanwhile, in cutting the diamond of debt, the conclusion that both the creditors and debtors were responsible for the crisis was reached and, in pursuance of fairness and justice, J2K demanded a one-off cancellation. But Dent insisted on ‘forgiveness’ as he felt that the term tallied more with the biblical Jubilee concept – the conceptual basis of his original idea (Pettifor, 2011 and interview with the author, 7 March 2011; Dent, 1999d: 53; Carter, interview with the author, 26 June 2012). As I discussed in chapter two, this was problematic for someone like Ann Pettifor, who felt Dent’s position implied debtors had ‘sinned’ and were seeking forgiveness. Pettifor and Carter also argued that employing ‘forgiveness’ would seriously undermine J2K’s claim of co-responsibility and absolve the creditors of any blame and hence render ineffective, the injustice frame. The UK Coalition continued its use of ‘cancellation’, but with Dent’s insistence on forgiveness (1999d: 53), there was always a simmering tension regarding the language within the Coalition.

Interestingly, this friction within the initial core group in the UK was replicated in different forms – with different arguments at the transnational level. Anti-debt groups and regional blocks like the Jubilee South were more vehemently opposed to the usage of such terms because of the underlying principles. According to Njehu,

“Foriveness was mainly the language of those from the church institutions and this did not fit with the justice perspective. (...) for the Jubilee South it was a question of justice, in the North it was a matter of charity. (Interview with the author, 23 June 2011).

Others in the Jubilee South amplified this perspective as it relates to the use of other terms in the debt discourse and in the process, raised the question of what constitutes justice.
(...) And this was one of the problems with many campaigners in the North who were mainly of the opinion that there should be debt relief. But there is a huge difference between debt relief and debt cancellation. While debt relief suggests that the debt the poor countries owe should be eased and relaxed so that "normality" can continue, debt cancellation meant that one was not recognising the legitimacy of the debt – both in the manner in which the debt occurred and the purpose for which the loans may have been obtained. So we continued to insist that we don't owe and we won't pay.

Unfortunately, many of our Western colleagues could not see it from that perspective and they feared that they would probably not be able to convince those people in their countries who were in a position to influence the decisions on the debt with that argument. At the heart of this one could see that it was from our perspective, a struggle for justice while from the other side, it was more of a charitable engagement (Lekalakala, interview with the author, 19 August 2011).

Thus, a similar controversy to the 'forgiveness' term within the UK Coalition trailed 'debt relief' at the international level – a term widely used by the creditors and some anti-debt groups, including some associated with J2K in the North. Nevertheless, it is important to state that the J2K generally opposed 'debt relief' because it implied limited relief. This according to the Campaign would still leave the overall burden of debt on the poor and thus masked the 'burdensharing' reality that prioritised creditors' interests at the expense of debtors who are compelled to continue repayments (Pettifor, 2011: 22).

It is worth noting however, that given the composition of the network-of-networks that formed different national campaigns, for example in the US, the friction over these various terms could not be classified in terms of North-South divide. From my interview with key participants like Watkins and Brill of the Jubilee 2000USA and Dillon of Jubilee Canada, it is clear that a number of groups in the global North particularly those who had links with groups in Latin America and Africa like the Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns and '50 years is Enough' – core members of
Jubilee 2000USA had much in common with the Jubilee South’s position. Marie Dennis, one of those who launched the Jubilee2000USA puts it thus:

When we first heard the demand of a one-off cancellation we actually did not support that platform because we did not think that the issue, the problem will be solved by a one-off cancellation. We believed that the problem was much more systemic than that and there will be a need to get at the very deepest structures of the global economy in order to be able to solve the problems (Dennis, interview with the author, 2 December 2011).

Although the debate about ‘debt relief’ in the UK Coalition is not entirely clear because it is not fully documented, nevertheless analysis of available data shows that there were also different positions on this. Hanlon augments Pettifor’s argument above for J2K’s rejection of ‘debt relief’:

It was basically a charitable exercise in which the debt of the ‘deserving poor’ is reduced but not totally cancelled (...) and debt relief is seen as a carrot to force the debtor to adopt ‘better’ policies (2006b: 223).

Nevertheless, Dent was not opposed to debt because he was mainly interested in reducing the debt to a ‘manageable level’ for the debtors. In fact, he opposed the proposal, which suggested ‘abolishing third world debt, as we know it altogether’ (Dent, 1996). He calculated that the debtors would need more credit from IFIs after remission while they would have to avoid past mistakes. Therefore, he only wanted the remission of the unpayable debt with “one majestic stroke” as the Parliament, buoyed by mass public opinion, did with slavery (Dent, 1999e: 137) but with the admonition to the debtors to “go your way, and waste no more” (Dent, 1996). He saw the Campaign as a “holy cause” akin to the abolition of slavery, with the task to liberate the indebted countries from the chains of debt (Dent, 2000; 1999c: 39).

It was precisely actions guided by such mind-set as Dent and Carter’s who felt inspired by God to rescue Africa from its burden of debt that some Southern
campaigners considered deeply rooted in charity principles as Lekalakala above pointed out. This led some Southern campaigners to question the motivation of J2K, although it has been presented as justice-based because the ‘charity’ approach failed to reckon with the historical roots and structural causes of the crisis. Moreover, it overlooks the imbalance in power relations between the creditors and the debtors, the role of IFIs — controlled by the creditors; they impose and enforce the creditors economic policies on the indebted countries as Hanlon, above suggests. This perception and line of argument was reflected in different Jubilee South declarations.

For example in 1999, the Jubilee South states:

Debt is essentially an ideological and political instrument for the exploitation and control of our peoples, resources, and countries by those corporations, countries, and institutions that concentrate wealth and power in the global capitalist system. The accumulation of Foreign Debt in countries of the South is a product of the crisis of that very system and it is used to perpetuate the plunder and domination of our nations often with the acquiescence, if not active collaboration, of local elites.104

So while J2K rejected debt relief, some individuals like Dent and some Northern groups based their actions on the principles of charitable engagement that underpins debt relief, in contrast to the principles of justice that undergirds debt cancellation. It is evident that J2K reflected both perspectives and this fuelled doubts about the motivation of some Northern campaigners by some Southern campaigners. It was a measure of this cynicism that the Jubilee South hardly distinguished between those in support of ‘cancellation’ from those in support of ‘debt relief’ in the North because in fairness, there were also groups in the North, which supported the views from these Southern campaigners as discussed above. The difference in the principles cited above underlined the Jubilee South’s rejection of the Brady Bonds, debt buy-back schemes and the HIPC Initiative, because

104 Jubilee South-South (1999). See also Jubilee South (2010).
- They presuppose the legitimacy of the debts of the South to the North.
- They are essentially meant to (sic) to provide Creditor Relief by recycling the uncollectable loans of a limited number of South countries and serve to perpetuate indebtedness by ensuring that indebted countries are able to service their debts through renewed access to international credit.
- They are all tied to structural adjustment programs, poverty reduction criteria and programs and other external conditionalities that impose macroeconomic policies such as liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation, which trap SOUTH countries into a perpetual cycle of debt dependence and underdevelopment.\(^{105}\)

The Jubilee South’s position rejecting these mechanisms shows the depth of the friction and the schism over these principles within the network. While the J2K criticised aspects of HIPC and sought to improve it, generally it was welcomed as a landmark and breakthrough in debt management in contrast to the flat out rejection by the Jubilee South because of the principles driving it and the conditionalities.\(^{106}\)

As discussed above, debt was redefined and framed as a justice issue. However the language used and the interpretation of the principle of justice that Jubilee South articulated and employed in its position appear to be far more reaching than those of the mainstream J2K and its demands. While the mainstream J2K demanded the cancellation of unpayable debt, the Jubilee South demands called for a systemic change as it is in its view, the basis of the injustice – part of which is reflected in the debt crisis. Therefore the difference in the principles of justice and the principles of charity guided the different interpretation of justice between Jubilee South and some sections of the Campaign in the North. At the same time, it should be noted that there were also groups in the Jubilee South that did not prioritise the problems generally articulated by the Jubilee South and were more interested in any mechanism that

\(^{105}\) Jubilee South-South (1999).
\(^{106}\) See Pettifor (1997a).
lessen the burden of debt (Djeutane, interview with the author, 24 November 2011). Thus, while the language the J2K employed was instrumental to its intervention in the debt discourse, redefinition and framing of the debt problem, it also exposed the differences in the principles underlying the Jubilee South position and those of some Northern groups and reveals why certain terms remain acutely contentious.

Another source of friction in the Campaign was the perception of subtle collusion between Northern campaigners and their governments' by some Southern campaigners who argued that it is often difficult to separate their positions. A typical example was the demand by creditor governments, supported by Northern groups for ‘good governance’ by debtor countries as a condition for debt relief. At the same time, Southerners argued, no such demands were placed on the other culprits in the debt crisis, namely the creditors. It has been argued that this undermines the legitimacy of campaigners in the North particularly when the ruling elites in the debtor countries were able to behave the way “they did due to the indifference or conniving Realpolitik of dominant international forces, governmental and entrepreneurial” (Keet, 2000: 468).

Other sources of friction in the network were the controversial end date of the Campaign and the struggle for ownership of the collective action. Following discussions that saw the name ‘Jubilee 2000’ adopted in 1990, the year 2000 automatically became the default date to achieve the one-off cancellation that the Campaign demanded. However, the launch of Jubilee 2000 AfriKa (sic) Campaign in April 1998 in Accra, Ghana was an expression of intention to carry on post 2000, as it was clear that the aims of J2K would not be met by 2000. As the International

Coordinator of the Afrika Campaign, Kofi Mawuli Klu, explained in an interview on the 20 May 2011:

It was clear that those at the centre of activities in the UK were not going to continue beyond 2000 and at the same time, it was clear that the debt would not be cancelled by 2000. So we from the African perspective decided to plan how to continue after 2000 and so we launched the Africa campaign.

By June 2000, Angela Travis, leader of the South team at the Jubilee office, stated in her report to the UK Board Meeting of 12 June 2000:

We are receiving many requests for the campaign to continue beyond 2000, but nowhere are these voices more outspoken and persuasive than in the South. It is simply incomprehensible to Southern campaigners who are both at the receiving end of IMF policies, but also risking so much in the fight against them, that we should contemplate stopping when so much more needs to be achieved.108

Similar desire to continue was also strongly expressed by most of the UK regional groups but other stakeholders in the Coalition had differing views on this while the major aid agencies insisted on closure. For the agencies, a major factor was that they did not want to continue a coalition with a secretariat they could not really control, as it had proved near impossible to do that. For some in the Secretariat, this lack of control was the reason the Campaign ‘succeeded’ and it is also the reason why a campaign like the J2K will never again happen with the aid agencies (Hanlon, interview with the author, 15 March 2011). The agencies inability to control the Secretariat may have been an issue and it may well have aided the purported success of the Campaign but it did not prevent the emergence of a similar collective action (with the same agencies and similar set of actors) in the form of Make Poverty History a few years later. At issue therefore is the extent to which a Secretariat (particularly one with an overlapping international function like in the J2K) is necessary for these networks and the degree of control that needs to be exercised by

108 Cited in Randle (2004:35)
the relevant stakeholders. While J2K and MPH did not formally maintain an
international Secretariat, both operated one in practise (Yanacopulos, 2009: 72) and
yet were greeted with mixed reviews.

However, the fact that groups in the UK Coalition had reached their limits of
working together was fuelled by the intense competition and rivalry between the
major aid agencies. The bigger and high profile aid agencies like the Christian Aid
felt their status was being usurped with likely financial implications while lesser ones
like Tearfund was believed to be gaining in profile and benefitting disproportionately
from the Campaign (Randle, 2004:17). In fact, some of the aid agencies only stayed
in the Coalition till the end to avoid any potential backlash from their own members
and the damage an exit would inflict on their image (Randle, 2004: 26f). Similarly,
Roger Williamson’s response to the proposal to second Jamie Drummond of
Christian Aid to Jubilee 2000 part time also reflected the professional jealousy and
tense working relationship between Christian Aid and Jubilee 2000 in the UK
Coalition. In a memorandum marked ‘strictly confidential’ he writes,

At the last Board meeting (22.10), Ann Pettifor was inveighing against a
Christian Aid staff member writing letters on Jubilee 2000 notepaper, now
Jamie is back in favour. For how long? (...) On previous showings, it seems
clear to me that Jubilee 2000 will want the media coverage and the money
accruing from high-level, high publicity work. Are we content with Jamie
working in this way?109

These discussions are instructive because they reveal the issues and difficulties
within the UK Coalition that are often overlooked in studies in this field. Personal
differences and leadership style of those at the Secretariat that did not appear to fit
the traditional aid agencies’ modes of operation only added to the desire of the

agencies to discontinue. According to Pettifor, they “wanted to break up the Coalition, and also to get rid of me. So they were very happy to do this. There is no question in my mind that this is what they wanted to do". Thus, while the Southern groups overwhelmingly supported continuation of the Campaign, the hierarchy and decision making process skewed in favour of the aid agencies in the Board, pushed through their wish for closure even though the Board was also divided on this. The pre-set end date offered a convenient cover because it was argued that for credibility purposes, it was necessary to stick to the initial end date.

The idea that debt has been taken ‘thus far’ was also prevalent among some Coalition members who argued that it was time to move on to other issues like trade that was becoming a major item on the international political agenda. While trade may have been an important issue, to close the Campaign under the circumstances only served to confirm the fears of Southern campaigners who had come to view many Northern campaigners’ engagement on debt as uncommitted and on ad hoc basis, because they would move on to the next issue even if the problem that was set out to be confronted by the campaign had not yielded its desired results. (...) As you can see today, as we feared, our northern colleagues have largely moved on from the debt issue on to other issues but the suffering and effects of debt on the poor countries have essentially been the same (Lekalakala, interview with the author, 19 August 2011).

In the foregoing paragraphs, I hinted at the leadership style in the J2K but I will briefly expatiate on this as a source of friction in the network. When the Jubilee2000USA supported the Leach Bill for debt relief, the UK Coalition mobilised internationally to oppose it because of the conditionalities and this led the

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111 Barbara Crowther and Michael Taylor both of Cafod and Christian Aid respectively, cited in Randle (2004: 32).
US group to withdraw its support. This followed the agreement to reject any conditionality in an international conference in Rome in November 1998 that was attended by 38 Northern and Southern campaigns.\textsuperscript{112} The Southern groups were enraged at the US group’s support for the Bill because it ignored the Rome agreement and it failed to take into account Southern campaigners’ opposition to the conditionalities. Similarly, HIPC2 had structural adjustment conditionality. But while the J2K criticised those conditionalities, it did not oppose but welcomed HIPC2 agreement. All these raised questions of inconsistency of the Campaign leadership and served to heighten the suspicion among Southern campaigners that was part of the friction within the network.

Although to a lesser extent, the involvement of celebrities in the Campaign was another contentious issue. While celebrities were generally welcomed because they advanced the Campaign’s profile and broadened its reach, Southern campaigners and some in the North were outraged that they became spokespersons for the Campaign because they provided a fodder for the target actors. Lekalakala sums this up in my interview with her (19 August 2011),

> With the involvement of the celebrities in that form, the forum was created for people, the decision makers who were not interested in meeting us and really taking our positions seriously to meet these Stars and make it look like they were representing the campaign.

> This was one of the things and disagreement you saw in Cologne because, we from the South were saying no to what was being offered by the G8 in Cologne because of the conditionalities that were attached to what they were pledging, the Stars were there praising them for offering that and much to our amazement, some of our northern colleagues were in agreement with them.

\textit{North-South Partnership or Marginalised Southern Voice?} Taking stock of the different dimensions of friction in the network helps us to understand the form of

\textsuperscript{112} Jubilee 2000 Coalition (n.d.) ‘Who We Are’.
partnership that existed in the network. For example, in setting the Campaign’s primary goal, the voice of Southern campaigners who were engaged on debt long before J2K emerged was not considered. The Campaign claimed that it did not want to ‘organise’ in the South because; it wanted to foster a spirit of self-determination that would see the Southerners self-organise. This is ironic because there were already many self-organised groups on debt in the South long before the idea of J2K was conceived. Yet, when Southerners were eventually seen as ‘organised’ and brought into the fold, their voice was practically marginalised because the way the aims were set foreclosed any real possibility for content contribution from the South.

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), a requirement for accessing HIPC2, is claimed to be the result of pressure from campaigners in debtor nations (Pettifor, 2011: 40). However, analysis of and evidence from the policy formulation processes that resulted in the PRSP fails to confirm this because,

Despite the fact that the Addis Ababa meeting was the main mechanism during the consultation process for input from the ‘South’, especially Southern governments, still only around half of the participants were from Southern institutions. It is also worth noting that all the presentations at the meeting were made by Northern organisations, apart from the presentation on the Uganda experience (...). In the compendium of comments (...) containing around 20 submissions, there are only three substantive comments from Southern institutions.\textsuperscript{113}

Therefore, one would be hard pressed to attribute the introduction of PRSP to Southern campaigners particularly considering the years of prior internal institutional politicking and manoeuvring at the Bank and the Fund on PRSP (Momani, 2010). Moreover, the IFIs must approve any such proposals before implementation. The implication of this is that the indebted countries have no overall control of the PRSP,

\textsuperscript{113} Christiansen and Hovland: (2003: 38f)
as the much-touted notion of ‘country ownership’ would suggest, because it is the IFIs that have the final say on it and thus, another form of external control.

For Southern campaigners, the decision to close the Campaign validated their initial scepticism about the motivation of J2K because from all indications, the inclusion of Southern groups in the Campaign was simply an after-thought. As a result, there was no plan for Southern groups to substantially contribute in terms of decisions in the Campaign hence their strong appeal to continue with the Campaign post-2000 had no effect. Hanlon rightly noted,

Jubilee 2000 started off basically as a Northern campaign. It was a Northern campaign talking to Northern governments and Northern based institutions. I actually agree with that. The North controls the international financial institutions, it has the creditor countries and it has to cancel the debt.

However, it very quickly became clear that there was a resonance in the South to this campaign. It resonated with campaigns that were already starting there. There was a debt campaign in Mozambique (….) there was one in South Africa and one in Argentina and in a number of other countries. So soon Jubilee 2000 took on a Southern focus which Ann and other people had not thought about.114

With regards to North South divide and network relations, the problem is that the J2K emergence and its goals presented a dilemma by its very existence. On the one hand, as Southern activists readily admit, it helped to put the issue of debt on their national political agenda. On the other hand, it represented an unsolicited but yet forceful intervention in the collective action consciousness of Southern campaigners that could not be ignored. While Southern campaigners had sought to present their collective action as a ‘movement’, J2K emerged in the North with the label of a ‘campaign’ and crucially with a pre-set end date. The implication of this was that with a ‘campaign’, particularly one that was scheduled to end in 2000 irrespective of its outcomes, the issue would be considered ‘done’, unlike a ‘movement’ would

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imply. In other words, the fear on the part of Southern campaigners was that with the way J2K was set up and positioned to achieve its aims, those who initiated and ultimately closed the Campaign would have ‘done debt’ and move on to other ‘exciting’ issues even without achieving the set goal. As leading members of the UK Coalition confirmed, this was exactly what happened (Randle, 2004).

There are two vital points worth making in the context of the above. One is theoretical and the other is empirical. First, as I discussed in chapter three, the foregoing demonstrates the inherent political nature of categorising collective actions either as movements, networks or coalitions. While debt continued to remain important for many campaigners in the North who have been previously engaged on it prior to J2K emergence, the Campaign on debt was essentially done because that is the ‘nature’ of campaigns anyway – there is time to campaign on an issue and after that, other issues are next. In other words, the Campaign was simply ‘a campaign’ – a chosen tactic for the collective action on debt at that particular time. This, however, does not overlook the continued efforts of some groups on debt, except that the state of advocacy on debt is more like a reversal to the pre-J2K emergence than a semblance of the public and transnational advocacy that was the J2K. For Southern campaigners though, it is an entirely different story because,

For many of us who had been involved in the campaign before J2K even came on, the issue of debt is really a matter of life and death – the same can be seen in Argentina, Ecuador and many Latin American countries. And unfortunately, the same remains today even after some claim that the campaign was successful at the end of 2000 (Lekalakala, interview with the author, 19 August, 2011).

The second point is fundamental in that it encompasses basically all the varied aspects of the frictions discussed above and it boils down to ownership of the collective action and representation. Put differently, where does the power to make
decision reside in the network and who represents whom? Which part of the network gets attention and above all whose voice is marginalised? Given the dynamics of J2K emergence and diffusion, it can be argued that it was probably inevitable that there would be a struggle for the ownership of the Campaign and this manifested on different levels. As indicated above, the competition for funding, membership and the struggle between various agencies in the UK Coalition, the Board and Secretariat was mainly over ownership. According to the Campaign Deputy Director,

The Jubilee secretariat had a very focused, perhaps tunnel-vision, approach and were quite clear about what we were trying to do. We weren’t going to let anything get in the way of doing that, and sometimes we bulldozed people aside in the process. And in the context of a short-life campaign with a clear, morally-founded, goal, we tended to justify that, and were probably right to do so (Adrian Lovett, cited in Randle, 2004: 22).

This struggle for ownership was not confined to the UK because it could be discerned that some Southern campaigners, who sought to input their views and perspectives on debt into the J2K, could not really be accommodated by the vision and aim of the Campaign. This was because, Northern campaigners feared that they would not be able to mobilise the needed public support to influence their targets with such positions (Hanlon, interview with the author, 15 March 2011; Lekalakala, interview with the author, 19 August, 2011, Dearden, interview with the author, London, 19 April 2011; Njehu, interview with the author, 23 June 2011).

A major criticism of the networks mode of collective actions is that while it is often portrayed as transnational – which they often are – the Southern partners in these networks are only important to the extent that they enhance the legitimacy of their major partners in the North. In other words, there is no equal relationship between the Southern and Northern partners in these networks and this is evident on different levels. For example, Randle (2004) highlighted the abject state of the African and
Latin American Desks at the Secretariat compared to others that were focused on the
developed countries and it is acknowledged and documented that the Campaign only
paid “lip service’ to Southern leadership (Grenier, 2003: 98). The experiences of
many in the South who participated in the J2K would seem to confirm the validity of
such criticism. It was against this background that Jubilee South (1999) argued,

That mobilisation and strategy development around debt and other unjust
features of neoliberal globalization must be essentially defined by the
oppressed peoples themselves and in terms they set forth. Nothing about us
without us. We hope and trust that jubilee partners in the North can and will
be supportive of these assertions, as opposed to simply “featurI NG US” as
potential beneficiaries of Northern-defined advocacy and momentary debt
“relief”.

It is clear some Southern members did not feel any ownership of the collective action
on an issue that centred on them, and the struggle over the language used in the
Campaign attest to their attempt to wrest that ownership which rested squarely with
the major hub of the Campaign in the North. Although the Campaign was often
presented as a grass roots campaign, in-depth analysis of its internal workings would
suggest otherwise. While it may not have been openly stated at the time, it has since
been acknowledged that, “There was a sense that Jubilee was created in the North by
middle-class white people, which was then offered to the South” (Tim Moulds, cited
in Grenier, 2003: 98).

A careful scrutiny of the personalities involved in initiating and coordinating the
early and later stages of the Campaign would attest to Moulds’ assertion. This would
be given more credence when it is understood that as part of the original strategy for
Jubilee 2000, the South was only meant to be integrated within the British campaign
and Southerners were to be provided platforms to make the case for debt
cancellation. Martin Dent, who initiated the idea, was a former colonial officer in Nigeria, Bill Peters was a former Diplomat and Ann Pettifor, who was Coordinator and later Director, was a Lobbyist of the World Bank, the IMF and the British Treasury along with others like Accountants, Bankers and highly placed individuals in the development field with profiles that seems at odd with grass roots organising. Although it cannot be denied that the Campaign mobilised broadly at the grass roots with the church as its base, it is hardly compatible that a grass roots campaign would be launched in the British Parliament and invite a conservative Prime Minister to be a its patron.

Finally, we can now return to the question of North South partnership or whether the voice of Southerners was marginalised in the network. From the foregoing, it is clear that the form of partnership that existed between Northern and Southern campaigners in the network was neither planned nor intended. This was because, the initiators perceived the emergent J2K as a Northern collective action that was meant to address Northern governments and their institutions who were in a position to address an identified problem – the backlog of unpayable debt of poor countries. As a result, there was really no provision from its inception for Southern voices because at best, campaigners from the South were to be offered a platform to make their case for debt cancellation. Consequently, although all groups and individuals from all regions were welcomed to join the Campaign, it was almost predictable that ‘radical’ and critical voices like the Jubilee South would be incompatible with the position of the J2K initiators. This does not discount the fact that a number of national campaigns from the South were engaged in the J2K but in terms of decisions taken, their voices

or positions seems to have been marginalised. As discussed above, this was most evident in the decision to close the Campaign.

6.6 Chapter Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to analyse the Jubilee 2000 Campaign by probing why, in spite of the widespread apathy towards a public campaign on debt, a collective action on the issue emerged and became truly transnational in less than four years. I sought to account for the emergence of J2K and explain the process of its outcomes by deploying the principles of cutting the diamond of debt. This entails a robust, rigorous empirical research and critical analysis that allows the problem to be framed in a way that maximises its reflection, which in turn enables a lot of people to see themselves in the analysis and conceptualise their involvement. Based on this, I drew on the theoretical and empirical materials in the previous chapters and argued that due to gaps in the major collective action theories, none could single-handedly explain the emergence of J2K and that it is only by combining the core contentions of these theories that J2K’s emergence could be accounted for.

I argued that the Campaign used the principles of cutting the diamond to intervene in the debt discourse and contest the dominant narrative that solely blamed the debtors for the debt problem. By challenging the history of debt, the Campaign reinterpreted the problem, effectively named debt a crisis and redefined debt as a justice based issue as it employed the concept of odious and illegitimate debts to show the lenders’ part-culpability in the debt crisis.
I also argued that the J2K used the church and similar transnational organisations to broaden, diffuse and internationalise the Campaign and that the timing of the Campaign and the impending millennium provided it some momentum. This combined with the Jubilee theme that underpinned the Campaign and the application of the injustice frame aided the Campaign’s resonance with the international public, given the international goodwill that surrounded the impending millennium.

The arguments the Campaign used to justify the application of the injustice frame were examined and why it arrived at the cancellation of the unpayable debt as the solution to the debt crisis. In articulating its arguments, the Campaign contested the dominant narrative in the debt discourse that solely blamed the indebted countries and drew the conclusion of co-responsibility of the creditors and debtors as, according to the Campaign; they were complicit in the crisis. In every discourse, the language used is always important and this was apparent in the debt discourse as the controversy surrounding the use of debt ‘forgiveness’ and ‘relief’ shows. A further aspect of this was the term ‘campaign’, an inherently politicised term that was implicitly used as a tactic with the implication that justified a time-limited collective action on debt much to the chagrin of some groups in the South. Overall, the frictions and much of the controversies derived from the question of ownership of the collective action on debt and the issue of representation. The analysis in this chapter showed that the ownership rested squarely with the main hub of the Campaign in the North as Southern partners mainly fulfilled the oft-critiqued role of legitimising actions of Northern partners in such networks.

In the next chapter, I will identify the outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign using the theoretical framework developed in chapter four. To briefly preview these, a
contextual and conjectural approach will be taken in identifying these outcomes as opposed to definitive and absolute conclusions.
7. Was it Worth the Efforts? Identifiable Outcomes of J2K

7.1 Introduction

In articulating how the results of collective actions could be evaluated, Jennifer Earl (2000) argued that success could be understood as a special case of extra-movement outcomes where the outcomes are clearly advocated for and intended by leading collective action organisations or network components in TANs. Earl’s notion of success would seem a fitting evaluative term to describe and analyse the outcomes of a network like the International Campaign to Ban Landmines that advocated for a binding international treaty on landmines – a treaty that was signed a few years after the mine ban campaign was launched. However, in line with the arguments in this research, the ‘success’ approach would amount to a sweeping generalisation that betrays simplistic and superficial appraisal of the network’s efforts and the lack of appreciation of other factors, rather than the necessary, critical and in-depth investigation and analysis that the evaluation of collective actions warrants. As discussed earlier ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are relational terms that require a defined benchmark to operationalise if they are applied as the main approach in evaluating TCAs particularly as there is still a lack of an overall theory of ‘success’, hence it is most appropriate to evaluate the results of collective actions in terms of outcomes (Kolb, 2007: 23; Burstein et al., 1995: 135). Nevertheless, this does not preclude the use of success or failure as sub-evaluative terms in assessing the identified outcomes of any particular TCAs against the backdrop of its outlined aims and objectives. Used in this sense, one overcomes the problem of a sweeping generalisation that fails to reckon with the intricacies and complexities, in-depth and critical analysis that the evaluation of transnational collective action demands and the need for a benchmark.
This perspective is adopted here to complement the approach to outcomes in this research.

Outcomes could be described as the general effects of collective actions including, but not limited to, results of interactions among network components or movement organisations and the actors whose behaviour they are trying to change and relevant actors in the broader environment (Earl, 2000; Burstein et al., 1995). Obviously, this is a broad definition that is meant to ensure that evaluation is not limited to or concentrated on policy impacts alone (as is often the case) at the expense of other spheres of collective action impacts. Earl's extra-movement outcomes, following Giugni (1995) in this research, are described as external impacts, the realm in which the evaluation of J2K outcomes is categorised and will be analysed.

In this chapter, I will argue that based on a conjectural, temporal and contextual approach and the theoretical framework for this research; the results of the collective action on debt can be identified. Using the adapted theoretical framework, I will specify the outcomes of J2K under procedural impacts, substantive impacts and sensitising impacts. Those outcomes that do not fit neatly into this framework will be discussed under the subheading of Legacies. As I discussed in chapter four, part of the complexity in the evaluation of TCA outcomes is the timing of conducting any particular evaluation in relation to the collective action because, while some outcomes may be identifiable in the short term, others may only manifest in the long term. For the J2K, the timing of evaluating its outcomes is of particular importance as the collective action had an effective end date of 31 December 2000 that was implemented and, as I will show in this chapter, some of its currently identifiable outcomes only began to manifest after its closure. Furthermore, it is also reasonable to expect future manifestations of other outcomes of J2K, further lending credence to
the conjectural, contextual and temporal approach argued in this research. This is because given the nature of causal complexity, particularly in an extremely complex and multifaceted issue as impoverished countries debt, it is problematic to be absolute and definitive about conclusions on outcomes even when there may be grounds to question if certain claimed impacts would have occurred without the collective action on debt. I begin with the identifiable procedural impacts.

7.2 Procedural Impacts

...legitimacy must be established first, before claims of representativeness can be made. Jubilee 2000 was so constituted that our Board of Director were elected by member organisations – and accountable to the membership annually. Furthermore, we did not claim to be representative even while we had mobilised millions of people (Pettifor, 2000b: 28).

As displayed in fig. 1 procedural impacts is one of the strands under external impacts and as I discussed earlier, collective actions generally make procedural impacts if the target actors recognise the challengers as legitimate representatives of the aggrieved or collective claimers. Recognition can be demonstrated in different forms that may include establishing consultation procedures and engaging in negotiations with the challengers or through formal recognition and inclusion of the challengers in decision-making processes. Recognition of the challengers may result in ad hoc or permanent access and these are distinguished by the frequency and longevity of the accorded recognition. As it relates to the J2K, procedural impacts would be established if there is evidence to show that the J2K was recognised as legitimate representatives of the collective action on debt by the target actors – that is, the IFIs¹¹⁷ and the creditor nations. Thus, to ascertain whether the J2K made procedural impacts, I will analyse the data collected for this research and, in particular, the

¹¹⁷ International Financial Institutions mainly describe the International Monetary Fund (IMF) referenced here as 'the Fund' and the World Bank referenced as 'the Bank'.

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interaction and communication between the Campaign and the target actors, to ascertain if any recognition was accorded the Campaign as legitimate representatives by the target actors and the longevity of any such recognition.

The discussions and analysis in the last chapter showed that J2K emerged in the North and its aims were set within the parameters of what the initiators and the early core group thought were realistic given their socio-political environment and targets. As a result, the Campaign could not really accommodate much content contribution from some Southern blocks that were critical of the aims and approach adopted by the Campaign. It also showed that while the Campaign may have had many national campaigns in the South, this was not by design, as the Campaign never planned to organise in the South. This, the Campaign claimed, was because the founding organisations believed that the right of the people in the impoverished countries to self-organisation was fundamental to the equal relationship that the Campaign wanted to foster between its component parts. Further, the Campaign resolved not to speak “on behalf of” the South or the poor and did not claim to be representative of the impoverished countries in the course of the transnational collective action on debt (Pettifor, 2000b: 27-28).

The foregoing paragraph and the quotation cited above points to some of the issues and dilemmas that the Campaign experienced. As discussed in the last chapter, the friction over the language used in the Campaign and the subtle struggle for ownership of the collective action on debt meant that the claim to representativeness would always be contested and controversial in so far as there was no clear and open debate about these issues in the whole network. However, as shown in the preceding chapter, the urgency and the momentum generated by the Campaign’s end date and
the “tunnel-vision” approach adopted by the Secretariat meant that there was a lack of will and openness to any debate on the issue, which effectively foreclosed any possibility of properly discussing, let alone resolving it.

Pettifor, above, also suggests that establishing legitimacy precedes representativeness but according to Van Rooy (2004), representation is only one of several sources of legitimacy. From the rarity and validity of information, the size and breadth to the experiential evidence and expert opinions the Campaign featured in its analysis of the debt crisis amongst others, there were reasonable grounds for the Campaign to claim legitimacy and indeed representation as its public posturing suggests. However, if as Pettifor asserts that the Campaign did not claim representation, this begs a couple of questions: on whose behalf was the Campaign speaking and advocating if not on behalf of the poor people in the indebted countries? Did the Campaign simply assume or appropriated legitimacy indirectly because there were national campaigns in some indebted countries thereby validating the discrepancy in power relations between their Northern and Southern components? These questions are important for two reasons.

First, they highlight some of the contradictions in the network and second, they indicate some sort of revisionism because the perspective that denies the Campaign’s representation of the poor in the South conveniently overlooks the content of the Campaign’s intervention in the debt discourse and the Campaign’s public presentation. The images and pictures that were used in the Campaign’s publications, the numbers and statistics that were continuously churned out, and the overall message, all reflect a campaign that assumed the role of a spokesperson for the poor in the indebted countries. In fact, going back to Dent’s idea of the Jubilee and debt
remission, his concern was for the poorest countries' debt to be reduced to the point
where it will again be manageable so that they could further access the international
credit market that they would need. He meticulously calculated which countries
'.deserved' remission, which 'deserved' special treatment and those that should not
get any remission because they were under dictatorial governments even though they
were poor enough by the criteria, which he personally set out (Dent, 2000; 1999c:
47-48). While Dent may not have had the final say in these matters, it is important to
recall that the Campaign built its list of the highly indebted poor countries on Dent's
initial calculations, and as Carter (interview with the author, 26 June 2012) recalled,
Dent had difficulties compromising on these issues. Dent may have been sincerely
motivated to 'help' the poor in the indebted countries by organising to put pressure
on the lenders to reduce the debt to a manageable level. However, to cast this in
terms of 'forgiveness', which implies that the debtors 'sinned' - evidenced in his
writings throughout the Campaign – betrays a paternalistic approach and a lack of
understanding of the justice dimension in the discourse on debt.

While the Campaign *de jure* may not have claimed representativeness, *de facto* this
was the case. There is the argument that has been advanced by some campaigners in
the North that the creditors are Northern governments as well as the financial
institutions they control and that the Campaign was simply trying to get these
institutions and creditors to be accountable and transparent in their dealings (Hanlon,
interview with the author, 15 March 2011a, Randle, 2004: 30). At best, this was a
potential and an unintended side effect and in reality a clear attempt at revisionism.
This is because in the Campaign's analysis and intervention in the debt discourse,
this issue, important as it may have been, did not assume any priority at any time in
the course of the Campaign. Further, when HIPC2 was agreed, it became the high
point of the Campaign with the constant reminder that the creditors caved in to the pressure of public opinion and mass mobilisation of J2K for debt cancellation – not for transparency and accountability of the creditors because there was nothing to suggest that this was the aim nor could the said achievement be cast in that form. This was just as the scheme’s benefit to the poor people in the indebted countries following its implementation has been touted as impacts of the Campaign. In none of these are any mention made of the progress (or lack of) of the Campaign’s efforts for transparency and accountability of the creditor countries and the IFIs. These are good reasons to contest the validity of this claim.

Nevertheless, I would also argue that there is discernible evidence from the available data to show that while the Campaign may not have formally declared to represent the indebted countries, it was nonetheless recognised as legitimate spokesperson for the collective claimers that demanded debt cancellation for the indebted countries. Among this body of evidence are the interactions between the Campaign and the target actors, which support the argument that the Campaign and its operatives were accorded recognition as legitimate representatives. This perceptible recognition could be discerned on different levels in line with the theoretical framework and with different components of the network – which, as is typical of TANs (see chapter three), are transnationally situated. In this section, I will discuss the procedural impacts of J2K by highlighting events and occurrences, which shows the recognition that was accorded the Campaign through the access gained by two of its most prominent components – the Jubilee2000USA and Jubilee 2000 Coalition, the national campaign in the UK. Both of these components are the focus here because of the centrality of their location in the network in relation to some of the major target actors and what their roles show in the procedural outcomes of J2K.
The J2K made some procedural impacts basically through its early stages to the end of December 2000 when the Campaign closed and these were mainly in the spheres of consultation procedures and negotiations. Evidence of this can be gleaned from its activities in its formative years when the Campaign began to provide the platform for consultations with the relevant stakeholders, which included leaders and opinion formers from the impoverished countries and representatives of relevant IFIs in the debt problem. Beginning with the African Leaders Tour of Britain in February 1996, Jubilee 2000 in collaboration with the DCN invited the then Managing Director of the IMF, Mr Michael Camdessus, and Huw Evans, the UK Director at the Fund, to a meeting on Third World Debt in London to personally engage the Campaign and its grievances. In the meeting, Camdessus was confronted with public outrage about IMF policies and the situation of the indebted countries (Momani, 2010; Pettifor, 2006). Feedback from this event fed into the discussions of the Fund’s Board meeting where Evans stated that the London “seminar participants had concluded that there was a need for further action by both the Fund and the Bank, beyond present instruments”. By April that year, plans for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative were revealed at the spring meeting of the Fund and the Bank and by September 1996, the HIPC Initiative was officially launched. This was a major plan that attempted to address the debt crisis and one that marked a shift in the architecture of debt management by the IFIs as calls for a new approach intensified.

While some in the Campaign claimed that the meeting with Camdessus led directly to IMF’s unprecedented step of writing off debts by participating in the HIPC

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118 Cited in Momani (2010: 41).
119 International Monetary Fund (1999a: 3). This initiative will be referred to as HIPC1 while the later version that came into effect in 1999 will be known as HIPC2. I will discuss details of these initiatives in a later section in this chapter.
Initiative (Pettifor, 2006: 299) may be debatable, the meeting was, however, a forum which afforded J2K representatives and some leaders of the impoverished countries to make the case for debt cancellation before representatives of major target actors. It should be noted that this was a period that was marked by public disagreements between the Bank that concluded the debts were unsustainable and the Fund, which still thought the debts were sustainable as long as the indebted countries were meeting their repayments, even if they were only doing so by getting further loans (Momani, 2010).

It is possible, as Ann Pettifor’s report on the 1996 Spring Meeting of the Bank/Fund suggests (Pettifor, 1996a), based on information from the Bank’s staff, that Camdessus’ participation in the London meeting helped swayed his position to accept that the debts were unsustainable. Prior to the London meeting, the IMF had steadfastly refused to countenance the idea of writing off any debt arguing that cancellation was incompatible with its mandate and ideology and that it would undermine the Fund’s credibility (Hertz, 2004: 114; Holman, 1995: 6). As has been detailed by Momani (2010); Callaghy (2002); Graham and Flanders (1995), there has been intense and long standing resistance by the Fund to alter its policy and accept the argument that the indebted countries were essentially bankrupt and how that led to a top-down political pressure from some of the shareholders in light of the increasingly glaring consequences of debt overhang in the indebted countries. Thus, while the London meeting may have helped to persuade the Fund’s leadership to basically accept the crisis situation of the debtor countries; this was preceded by many years of internal politicking and wrangling between different segments of the Fund – from the staff and management to the Board and prominent shareholders in the Fund over whether to adopt the multilateral debt relief norm. Again because of
these kinds of backdrop to the introduction of the HIPC Initiative, it is not advisable to be definitive and absolute on collective action outcomes even with due cognisance and possibly, apparent causal processes through which any collective action may have brought about any such changes.

Still on the consultation processes with the IFIs as target actors, Pettifor in her combined role for the DCN and Jubilee 2000 held face-to-face meetings with 15 Executive Directors of the Bank and Fund at their October 1996 Annual Meetings, in addition to individuals like Geoff Katz and Enriquez Rueda-Sabateur of the International Development Association (IDA) and Raymond Brooks and Nawal Kamel, who designed and were charged with implementing HIPC1 (Pettifor, 1996c). Further, Horst Koehler, who succeeded Camdessus as the Managing Director of IMF, also met with debt cancellation Campaigners on 8 September 2000 in a meeting hosted by Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Clare Short, the International Development Minister in London, where the Campaign demanded a new deal on debt. Other consultation processes included the World Faith and Development Conferences, which were co-hosted by, then head of the World Bank, James Wolfesohn and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. George Carey, in February 1998 in London and in November 1999 in Washington, and the Lambeth Conference of Anglican Bishops in July 1998 in the UK. These were fora which provided the J2K access to some of the target actors and which it exploited to further advance the case for debt cancellation.

Responses and reactions from some of these target actors in these meetings to the perspectives of the Campaign were indicative of the influence the Campaign was ¹²⁰ These meetings were conveyed to help to bridge the gap between faith communities and the WB in order to enable them to work together more effectively.

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having on them. For example, at the Washington Conference, the IMF Managing Director “urged the religions to build on the momentum gained by the Jubilee 2000 Campaign for the reduction of the debt burden of the poorest countries to start a broader world-wide movement for poverty reduction”.\(^{121}\) At the Lambeth Conference, Christian Aid, a prominent member of the UK Coalition showed a video about the impact of structural adjustments, which, though the IMF Managing Director was very angry about (Christiansen and Hovland, 2003: 30), highlighted the effects of the structural adjustment programmes imposed by the IFIs. By engaging in such public discussions and consultation processes with the Campaign, these representatives of major target actors were demonstrating their acknowledgement and recognition of J2K as legitimate representatives of the debt cancellation collective claimers. A further demonstration of this recognition by these sets of target actors was evident when the Bank and Fund invited J2K to address a seminar on debt at their September meeting in 1998 (Christiansen and Hovland, 2003: 63).\(^{122}\)

As discussed in chapter six, the Campaign strategy was to engage the target actors at both the national and the relevant international levels. In the UK, the Campaign used various events and occasions to gain access to the local target actors, the British government and, in particular, the Treasury. The two-decade long work on debt and poverty by aid and development agencies ensured that some high level contact existed between operatives of these agencies (most of whom were now UK Coalition members) and officials at the relevant Departments like the Treasury, DfID and with some cabinet ministers. For example, individuals like Paul Spray, who was first the

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\(^{121}\) The World Bank Group and Lambeth Palace (1999).

\(^{122}\) See also Kenneth Clarke’s letter to Ann Pettifor in which he expressed gratitude to the DCN (which Pettifor led and which merged with Jubilee 2000) for getting the HIPC “Initiative off the drawing board to the point of implementation” (Clarke 1996).
Head of Aid and later Policy and Campaigns Director at Christian Aid, joined the DfID.123

Generally, the election of Tony Blair as Prime Minister and the New Labour government in 1997 created an opening in the political opportunity structure, which aided the access that the emergent J2K had to some target actors. Gallagher (2011) and Porteous (2005) argue that with increases in aid and debt relief to Africa, the Blair Commission for Africa and military intervention in Sierra Leone, Africa represented a key focus of Britain’s foreign policy under Blair. Further, Blair’s fulfilment of his election promise to create a new Department for international development and Clare Shorts’ insistence on a complete independence of the DfID from the Foreign Office as a condition for her to lead the new Department (Kampfner, 2004: 64), buttresses the argument of the emphasis by the New Labour government on this policy focus. While Clare Short was not an advocate of debt cancellation, she was, however, keen on poverty reduction (Short, 1998, 1999) and her realisation that both issues could not be separated coupled with Gordon Brown, the Chancellor, who publicly supported debt cancellation, meant that there were individuals in key positions in the New labour government whose presence and support substantially increased access for the Campaign to these target actors.

Interactions and consultations between the Campaign, the Treasury and DfID officials intensified while the Chancellor featured prominently in a number of events with the Campaign. For example, on 17 December 1997, in a meeting with the J2K Director along with key aid agencies and the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Campaign urged the Chancellor to take a lead on debt cancellation particularly as

Britain was to assume the presidency of the European Union in January 1998. The Chancellor responded and committed the UK to broader and deeper debt relief than was promised at the Mauritius Mandate and he shared the Campaign’s perspective that debt cancellation was the most appropriate way to celebrate the millennium.\textsuperscript{124}

Further, on 7 March 1999, in a public event organised by the Campaign at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London, Gordon Brown gave a speech along with the J2K Director and national representatives from Kenya and Mozambique. In that event, the Chancellor described debt as “the great moral issue of our day and this decade; the greatest single cause of poverty and injustice across the earth and potentially one of the greatest threats to peace”.\textsuperscript{125} He then called for debt to be dropped immediately and announced a British proposal for the cancellation of $50 billion further to the previously announced £20 billion cancellation in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) while he also supported proposals to halve the qualifying period for debt cancellation under HIPC1 from six to three years proposed by Germany.\textsuperscript{126}

In May 1998, at the venue of the G7 Summit in Birmingham, England 70, 000 people turned out in response to the call by the J2K and formed a human chain to demand the cancellation of the unpayable debt of the impoverished countries. The summit host, Prime Minister Tony Blair, who initially attempted to avoid the protests along with the other G7 leaders by shifting the venue of the meeting to a different location, apparently reversed his decision and returned with Gordon Brown and a couple of other cabinet ministers to meet with the Campaign deputation and agreed to explore possibilities for further debt relief (Greenhill et al., 2003: 9). It was also at

\textsuperscript{124} Jubilee 2000 Coalition, 1997c.
\textsuperscript{125} Brown, 1999.
\textsuperscript{126} BBC News (1999). See also Short (1999).
a rally organised by the Campaign that the Chancellor and the International Development Secretary announced that payments to the UK from all 41 HIPC countries would be stopped, starting from 1 December 2000.\textsuperscript{127}

Meanwhile in the United States, data suggests that the Jubilee2000USA also gained some recognition from the target actors as legitimate representatives of the collective claimers since its inception in July 1997 at the Denver G7 summit. This was evident from the series of high profile consultations that this national campaign conducted with some of the target actors particularly in the last two years of the Campaign. Campaign representatives were consulted and they participated in negotiations that resulted in the enhanced HIPC in 1999 as evidenced by their meetings with Treasury officials who asked for their input to the proposals being scheduled for the House and the Senate.\textsuperscript{128} The access that was granted to the Campaign representatives as they intensively lobbied the Congress for approval of funds requested by the Clinton administration to fulfil its pledge to cancel debts owed the US further showed the Campaign’s recognition. In the previous chapter, I discussed the disagreement in the network over the way some celebrities were involved in the Campaign, as they were seen as the Campaign’s spokespersons. In the US, however, their role was central to the inroad the Campaign made in lobbying the Congress and top-level administration officials. Noreena Hertz (2005) details Bono’s involvement with Jubilee2000USA in the intensive and extensive lobbying of administration officials and political operatives, Congressmen and Senators to support debt cancellation and approve the needed funds. While Bono was not formally an official of the Campaign, he was however, a very prominent representative or ambassador of the J2K in lobbying the various relevant actors at the different levels in the US. He recounts how and why he

\textsuperscript{127} HM Treasury, 2000.
\textsuperscript{128} Sec email from John Garrett, 1999.
invited some of the most conservative politicians who opposed debt cancellation to a concert he organised, in an attempt to gain their support for debt cancellation. \footnote{Why Poverty (2012).}

The recognition that the Campaign gained from the target actors as legitimate representatives of the collective claimers on debt ensured that the Campaign was granted access to the target actors at different levels. This access, in turn, enabled the Campaign to participate in consultation processes that allowed it to contribute to discussions and proposals, prior to major decisions on debt by the target actors. As outlined in the theoretical framework for this research, it is still necessary, however, to examine the duration of the access gained by the Campaign. As indicated at the top of this section, the Campaign gained almost instant recognition from the target actors, due partly to the foundational work by aid and development agencies in the UK in the two decades that preceded the Campaign emergence. Thus, through its early stages in 1996 until it folded in December 2000, the Campaign was able to maintain a certain degree of access to the target actors as evidenced, for example, by the presence of the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, at the Campaign rally in London, in December 2000. There, he and Clare Short announced Britain’s renunciation of any further payments from the 41 countries of the HIPC Initiative. This, amongst others, demonstrates the continued recognition the Campaign had from some of the target actors and showed some elements of permanence while the collective action lasted.

To summarise, procedural impacts open new channels of participation to network actors and this involves the recognition of those actors as legitimate representatives of the collective claimers, which could be in the form of establishing consultation procedures, undertaking negotiations or formal recognition. In this section, I have
discussed the issue of representativeness and shown how the Campaign had sought to deny any claim to representing the poor people and the indebted countries. However, from the available data, the Campaign declarations and actions, and its overall intervention in the debt discourse, it is evident that it fully assumed that role of representation - de facto. Moreover, the Campaign was recognised as legitimate representatives by different target actors and this was mainly in the form of establishing consultation procedures at different levels and, as a focus in this section, with the UK Coalition and Jubilee2000USA components of the network. On their own, these procedural impacts do not signify any major socio-political changes but they do importantly, form the basis on which further impacts could potentially be made by the collective claimers. As the next section will show, the access gained to the target actors and the recognition the Campaign achieved from them in return, fed into the substantive impacts of the Campaign.

7.3 Substantive Impacts: Reactive and Proactive

As discussed in chapter four, substantive impacts, unlike procedural impacts, revolve around policies. These types of impacts are understood as policy changes by the target actors on the problem issue in response to collective actions and they could either be reactive and proactive. Giugni (1995: 210) argues that while reactive impacts ensure that the challengers avoid worsening the situation regarding their goals, proactive impacts describe the introduction of new advantages, including gaining concessions from the targets actors. Thus, to evaluate the outcomes of J2K in this realm, it is necessary to determine whether there were any policy changes on the part of the creditor nations and the IFIs on debt, more precisely, the unpayable debt, in response to the Campaign's demands. Further, outcomes in this sphere would
show whether the situation of the indebted countries worsened or not and whether these countries received any new advantages following the demands by the J2K.

As I discussed in chapter two, the major aim of the J2K was to cancel the backlog of unpayable debt of the impoverished countries, which the Campaign defined as debts that cannot be paid without imposing undue human sacrifices and suffering on the masses (Pettifor, 2006: 303).\textsuperscript{130} Attendant to this was the aim to change the policies of the IMF, the Bank, the Paris Club and those of the most developed economies of the G8 in addition to advocating for a new arbitration mechanism of debt repayment negotiations. In this section, I will analyse the data and discuss relevant policy changes that may have been effected by the above target actors in response to the Campaign demands and attempt to distinguish which, if any of these policy changes, resulted in improved or worsened situation for the impoverished countries.

The claim that the Campaign may have made some substantive impacts by eliciting some policy changes from the target actors can be argued by examining the target actors’ reaction to demands for policy change by the Campaign. As I discussed in chapter two, a major criticism of the existing policies of the IFIs and creditor nations was the spiral of debt rescheduling. The Campaign\textsuperscript{131} and others (Birdsall and Williamson, 2002: 5; Vilanova and Martin, 2001: 1) claimed that debt rescheduling rather than ameliorate, was actually worsening the debt situation of the impoverished countries. Therefore the Campaign argued that existing policies have failed to redress what has become an obvious crisis hence the need for changes to the creditors’ policies on debt and repayments.

\textsuperscript{130} Jubilee 2000 Campaign (n.d.) 'Who We Are'.
\textsuperscript{131} See Ann Pettifor (1996b) and Pettifor (1999).
From the mid-nineties, when the Campaign emerged till December 2000, when it closed, data analysis shows evidence of two major interrelated policy changes on debt by the IFIs. Data also suggest that there were some policy changes by some creditor nations, in particular the group of the most developed economies, the G8. These changes by the G8 were linked in some ways to the policy changes by the IFIs, particularly the Paris Club Terms\textsuperscript{132} that were already being implemented with some of the heavily indebted poor countries. Due to the interrelatedness of the two main policy changes by the IFIs, I will highlight the first major policy change and outline the further changes that were made to it, which constitute the second policy change.

7.3.1 The First Policy Change

The first major change to the policies of the IFIs was when the Bank and the Fund launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative at their Annual Meetings in October 1996. This was in response to the continued demand for debt cancellation and the creditors’ acknowledgement that debt relief based on the traditional relief mechanisms has failed to address the debt burden of impoverished countries (Trotsenburg and MacArthur, 1999: 2f).

The HIPC Initiative entails coordinated action by the international financial community, including multilateral institutions, to reduce to sustainable levels the external debt burden of heavily indebted poor countries that pursue IMF and World Bank-supported adjustment and reform programs, but for whom traditional debt relief mechanisms are insufficient (IMF, 1999b).

This Initiative was significant because it was a scheme for a comprehensive debt relief in that it included debts owed to the multilateral institutions and all other

\textsuperscript{132} For a summary of the Terms, see Villanova and Martin (2001: 5). The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries. As debtor countries undertake reforms to stabilize and restore their macroeconomic and financial situation, Paris Club creditors provide an appropriate debt treatment. Paris Club creditors provide debt treatments to debtor countries in the form of rescheduling, which is debt relief by postponement or, in the case of concessional rescheduling, reduction in debt service obligations during a defined period (flow treatment) or as of a set date (stock treatment). For more, see http://www.clubdepars.org/en/
relevant creditors. It outlined a set of conditions for debt cancellation for some indebted countries and was notable because, in theory, debt repayment would depend on the debtor's ability to pay as opposed to debt rescheduling where indebted countries were meant to simply meet the creditors' demands. Thus the Initiative contrasts with, and therefore a marked departure from the recurrent rescheduling approaches by the creditors in the Paris Club. Perhaps more significantly, it was the first official acknowledgement of the failure of previous mechanisms by the IFIs and that the debts were unsustainable, in other words, unpayable.

Under the Initiative, debt relief would be offered through the HIPC Trust Fund that would be set up and funded by creditors and this would be administered by the International Development Association (IDA) while the Fund would give debt relief through its grants and special Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) loans. Prior to HIPC, writing off debt was "taboo" for the Fund and the Bank hence debt cancellation was not really an option they considered because these institutions enforced their 'preferred creditors' status (Trotsenburg and MacArthur, 1999: 1; Pettifor, 1997a: 4). This status meant that debt repayments to these institutions were prioritised over and above other creditors even if these other creditors (including creditor countries) offered any debt relief to the indebted countries. However, with the introduction of HIPC, the principle of the preferred creditors status was undermined as the debt relief offered was across the board.

133 This is the arm of the World Bank that offers concessionary that is long-term interest free loans.
134 ESAF was the Fund's programme for concessionary loans; which are interest free or very low interest loans to poor countries. It was replaced in November 1999 by Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).
7.3.2 The Second Policy Change

Some noteworthy conditions in the HIPC Initiative needs to be briefly highlighted here because, the Campaign’s continued advocacy for changes to these conditions and the subsequent reaction by the creditors that resulted in further changes to the Initiative are indicative of further substantive impacts of the Campaign. First, eligibility for debt relief under the Initiative was limited to IDA-only countries\textsuperscript{135} that must demonstrate a good track record in social reforms and IMF/WB structural adjustment programmes for three years leading to the decision point. The decision point is followed by a debt sustainability analysis (DSA) - conducted and approved by the Fund and the Bank staff. Thereafter, creditors would commit to provide sufficient debt relief to reduce the debt burden to a sustainable level at completion point. The completion point is reached after a further three-year period of continued reforms that is assessed on performance criteria before debts would actually be written off (Trotsenburg and MacArthur, 1999: 2; Hanlon, 1998b: 11).\textsuperscript{136}

Second, indebted countries must be eligible for debt relief under the traditional debt relief mechanisms, like the Naples Terms and thirdly, the debt level, after accessing the traditional debt relief mechanism, must still be deemed unsustainable. A sustainable level of debt is reached only when a country “is able to meet its current and future external debt-service obligations in full, without recourse to debt relief, rescheduling, or the accumulation of arrears” (Trotsenburg and MacArthur, 1999: 2). Or, as the Bank defines it, “is the ability to manage debts so they do not grow and impede economic stability and growth”.\textsuperscript{137} In practical terms, the Fund and the Bank

\textsuperscript{135} These are countries eligible to borrow from the International Development Association.

\textsuperscript{136} See IMF, 1998 and see also: Pettifor, (1997b).

\textsuperscript{137} World Bank (2013a).
defined sustainability “as the net present value (NPV)\textsuperscript{138} of public and publicly guaranteed external debt in per cent of exports within the range of 200 - 250 per cent, the ratio of external debt service to exports within the range of 20 - 25” (Trozensburg and MacArthur, 1999). At the inception of the Initiative, data suggested about 20 countries might be eligible but 41 countries eventually made the HIPC list.\textsuperscript{139} However, by mid-1999, when the Initiative was being reviewed, only 29 countries were expected to qualify for debt relief and in the enhanced version, 36 countries were estimated to be potentially eligible for debt relief.\textsuperscript{140}

While campaigners welcomed the underlying principles of a comprehensive exit from debt overhang towards sustainability with this policy change, they, however, had major criticisms of various aspects of the Initiative.\textsuperscript{141} These ranged from the eligibility criteria, including the definition of sustainability, the threshold of which J2K argued was set too high that it excluded many poor countries and the use of exports as basis for calculation rather than the fiscal situation, to the meagre relief offered at the end and the time needed to actually secure the relief. Overall, the depth and breadth of HIPC\textsubscript{1} were seriously criticised with deep scepticism over whether it would have any impact on the debt burden, poverty and human development in the impoverished countries.

Consequently, the J2K continued to advocate for changes to the HIPC Initiative and the slow pace of its implementation, which by the end of 1998 had barely delivered

\textsuperscript{138} The net present value (NPV) of debt is a measure that takes into account the degree of concessionality, this is debts accruing from loans at lower than prevailing market interest rates. The net present value is therefore defined as the sum of all future debt-service obligations (interest and principal) on existing debt, discounted at the market interest rate (Trozensburg and MacArthur, 1999: 2).

\textsuperscript{139} See Appendix 1 for details of the list.

\textsuperscript{140} However, at the last assessment for eligibility at the end of 2010, three countries; Kyrgyz Republic, Bhutan and Lao Peoples Democratic Republic failed to meet the indebtedness criterion and were subsequently excluded in 2011, see IMF, 2013: 6.

\textsuperscript{141} See Pettifor (1996c); Eurodad, (1996) and Hanlon (1998b).
any substantial debt relief to the indebted countries, aided the Campaign's call for further changes.\textsuperscript{142} This combination of factors led the Bank and the Fund in February 1999 to instigate a two-phase consultative process with civil society in different regions, on ways to improve the Initiative. Each phase targeted some specific questions, which included basically all the criticisms that campaigners had, and a call for suggestions on various aspects of the Initiative (IMF, 1999a).

Inputs to the first phase ended by mid-March 1999 while contributions for the second phase lasted till mid-June 1999. The reports on these consultative processes were the basis of the comprehensive review of the Initiative in 1999. The result of the review, the recommended modifications and their endorsement by the Bank and Fund's Interim and Development Committees, and the subsequent agreement by the G8 leaders that was ratified by the Boards of the Bank and Fund in the fall of 1999, are known as the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC\textsubscript{2}) Initiative. This version improved on some of the provisions of HIPC\textsubscript{1} and thus constitutes the second major policy change by the target actors on impoverished countries debt.

The criticisms that met the first two years of HIPC\textsubscript{1} and its implementation which became the focus of the continued advocacy for further policy change by the Campaign ensured that the call for faster, deeper and broader debt cancellation became the mantra in the course of the review, leading up to the G8 summit in 1999. In response, proposals from the review that the G8 Finance Ministers presented and endorsed by their political leaders included a number of changes that seemed designed to address some of the issues raised by the Campaign. For example, questions were raised concerning the impacts of HIPC\textsubscript{1} on poverty reduction and

\textsuperscript{142} International Monetary Fund (1999a); University of Toronto/G8 Research Group (1999).
human development in the indebted countries. So while HIPC1 primarily focused on reducing the debt of the poorest countries to a sustainable level so that they may exit from debt rescheduling processes, poverty reduction became central to HIPC2, as the provision of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was now made a prerequisite for debt relief eligibility. According to IMF, the PRSP was introduced as a participatory, country-led mechanism to more sharply focus countries' poverty reduction efforts. It was intended that the PRSP approach would bring about substantive changes in the way countries' economic plans were formulated. These changes would include policies that are more clearly focused on growth and poverty reduction, a full integration between the poverty reduction and macroeconomic elements of the program, and greater degrees of participation by civil society and national ownership, which in turn would lead to more consistent policy implementation (IMF, 2004).

The PRSP emphasised country ownership, transparency, and broad participation involving civil society with the aim to develop programmes and social policies geared towards and focused on poverty reduction. This point was relatively mute in HIPC1 as it got no attention.

Other changes to the Initiative ranged from the revised down sustainability threshold, which broadened the potential number of countries that could be eligible and the amount that could be written off, to the time of delivering the actual debt relief (see IMF, 1999c). For example, floating completion points, interim relief by IFIs and front-loaded debt relief from completion point were introduced as measures to free up resources for poverty-reduction spending even before the actual completion point, in contrast to HIPC1. Eligibility qualification time was reduced from 6 to 3 years and there was also a change to how the calculation of assistance would now be done. While it was based on projections in HIPC1, under HIPC2 it would be based on actual data at completion point. The issue of sustainability that was one of the most
contentious under HIPC1 was also addressed to some extent with some changes to the threshold. The net present value was reduced to 150 per cent from 200 – 250 per cent while the export to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio was reduced from 40 to 30 per cent and revenue to GDP from 20-15 per cent. There were changes to the effect of cancelling eligible Paris Club debts of up to 90 per cent or more - where needed - and the sale of ten million ounces of gold was agreed in principle to finance the Initiative and ESAF.

However, the continued imposition of IFIs macroeconomic policies on indebted countries and the power to monitor and exercise bureaucratic control by the IFIs over these countries was also extended.\textsuperscript{143} The changes made by the target actors to HIPC1 clearly reflect the demands of J2K following the Campaign’s criticisms of the provisions and implementation of HIPC1, and it was an acknowledgement of the Campaign’s influence on those changes that the target actors adopted the Campaign’s language in stating that the goal of the Initiative was now,

\begin{quote}
To ensure deep, broad and fast debt relief and thereby contribute toward growth, poverty reduction, and debt sustainability in the poorest, most heavily indebted countries.\textsuperscript{144}
\end{quote}

\textbf{7.3.3 Further Policy Changes by Other Target Actors}

As discussed in chapter two, the Campaign’s target actors included individual creditor countries – all the G8 countries except Russia and members of the Paris Club amongst others. Each of these creditor countries was owed some of the unpayable debts. Thus, as the Campaign advocated for policy change and debt cancellation at the IFIs, this was simultaneously accompanied by advocacy for the individual creditor countries to cancel the unpayable debts.

\textsuperscript{143} Jubilee 2000 Coalition (1999b).
\textsuperscript{144} World Bank, 2013b.
Besides the policy changes that saw to the participation of the IFIs in the HIPC Initiative and the commitments of the G8 leaders in the Cologne 1999 summit, some of the individual creditor countries also made changes to their policies on unpayable debt. Part of the reasons for this was that prior to and particularly after the G7 Birmingham summit in May 1998 and the mounting criticism of HIPC1, there was increased public pressure following heightened advocacy and intense political lobbying for debt cancellation. This was particularly so in countries like the UK and the US where the Campaign had some of its strongest national campaigns in the global North. So while HIPC2 seemed to have reckoned with some of the criticism of HIPC1, there was still the understanding among some creditor nations that HIPC2 did not go far enough. This was evident in Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister’s statement to the House of Commons soon after the Cologne summit that, “I would like to see us go further still on debt; it is an issue whose time has come. I will personally do whatever I can to make that happen”.\textsuperscript{145}

The prospects raised by Blair’s statement were underlined and brought into effect by some creditors’ unilateral decision to cancel more debt beyond the cancellation entailed in HIPC2. Norway was the first to announce 100 per cent bilateral debt cancellation to HIPC countries when they reach the completion point of the HIPC processes. Canada led the G8 countries in pledging 100 per cent cancellation while President Clinton announced the US 100 per cent cancellation on 29 September 1999. On 21 December 1999, Gordon Brown and Clare Short met with the Jubilee 2000 Coalition and announced that Britain would cancel 100 per cent of debts owed by some of the poorest countries and Japan’s announcement – the last of the G8, but

\textsuperscript{145} Cited in Hanlon and Garrett (1999).
which included more contribution to HIPC Trust Fund – came on 10 April 2000. The Campaign welcomed the Japanese decision and further called on the Bank, the Fund and the regional development banks to follow suit, as they remained the only major creditors yet to cancel 100 per cent debt of any sort.

Thus, by spring 2000, all the G7 countries had pledged to cancel 100 per cent of debts owed by all 41 HIPCs. Canada went further and announced debt moratorium in December 2000 on selected HIPC countries and in Britain, Gordon Brown took a similar step and announced that Britain would stop taking debt repayments from the 41 HIPC countries in December 2000. This pledge according to the Campaign goes beyond those of other G7 governments on poor countries debt. By end 2012, all Paris Club members have cancelled bilateral debt beyond the HIPC Initiative.

Evidently, most of the major target actors changed some of their existing policies on debt and, in the case of the first major policy change, were compelled to make further changes in the wake of intensified advocacy by the J2K for further policy changes. For example the Bank and particularly the Fund that had consistently argued that debt relief was not part of their organisational mandate changed their policies and participated in the HIPC Initiative. According to Axel van Trotsenburg, the Manager of the HIPC Unit at the World Bank and Alan MacArthur, Deputy Division Chief, Policy Development and Review Department of the IMF, “Before this Initiative, multilateral debt relief was a taboo” (Trotsenburg and MacArthur, 1999: 2).

148 International Monetary Fund (2013: 41).
The general effects of these policy changes are diverse but, put together, they specifically increased both the amount of debt cancellation that the creditors were willing to offer the indebted countries and the number of countries that could potentially benefit from that offer. Overall, HIPC2 offered 45 billion Dollars debt cancellation and this, in addition to the 55 billion Dollars already offered in HIPC1, took the initial total amount of debt cancellation under the HIPC Initiative to the tune of one hundred billion Dollars.149

To better understand the impact of these policy changes and examine whether they constitute reactive or proactive impacts, it is important to look at the broader picture beyond the immediate amount offered in the HIPC Initiative. This is because, data revision and discount rate used in calculating the amount certain countries get during HIPC implementation coupled with further developments in 2005 with the G8, the Bank, the Fund and the African Development Bank (AfDB) on debt, has meant an increase in the sum total of debt cancelled so far. Although these later developments cannot be grouped with or credited entirely to the J2K, but as I will show below, they were connected with the collective claims of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign.

In what could be described as a continuum in the efforts to cancel more of the J2K-defined unpayable debts post-2000, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) was established by the G8 at the Gleneagles summit in 2005 following a very intensive campaign by the Make Poverty History (MPH) and the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP).150 The MDRI, which was set up to help low-income countries advance towards the United Nations’ Millennium Development

149 Jubilee 2000 Coalition, 1999b.
150 For more information on GCAP and Make Poverty History see http://whiteband.org/en/about/history; http://www.makcpovertyhistory.ca/about; http://www.makcpovertyhistory.org/achievements/.
Goals (MDGs)\textsuperscript{151} is only open to countries that have gone through HIPC processes and meets other conditions like macroeconomics policies, implementation of a poverty reduction strategy and public expenditure management. At HIPC completion point, eligible countries get 100 per cent debt cancellation on eligible debt from three multilateral institutions; the Bank, Fund and the African Development Fund (AfDF).\textsuperscript{152}

It is the summary of the implementation of both the HIPC Initiative and the MDRI that gives a more complete picture of the policy changes by the target actors and the amount of debt cancelled by the creditors. Data from the Fund and the Bank show that 35 countries have reached HIPC completion point. There are 3 countries currently at pre-decision points and 1 country is at decision point while 3 others from the initial list of 41 were deemed ineligible in 2011.\textsuperscript{153} Further, the data shows that 74.3 and 39.7 billion Dollars have been cancelled under the HIPC and MDRI respectively, bringing the total to 114.0 billion Dollars at end-2012 present value terms.\textsuperscript{154} However, by end 2013, the Jubilee Debt Campaign reckoned that following the last batch of cancellation, the total amount so far cancelled now stands at 130 billion Dollars (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2013). Finally, the Bank and Fund’s data reveals that debt indicators of HIPCs have declined since 1999 and that both schemes have contributed to increased poverty-reduction expenditure after decision point.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{152} International Monetary Fund (2014). In 2007, the Inter-American Development Bank also decided to provide similar debt relief to five HIPCs in the Western Hemisphere; see also Cox (2011: 14-16).
\textsuperscript{153} International Monetary Fund (2013: 7).
\textsuperscript{154} International Monetary Fund (2013: 31).
\textsuperscript{155} World Bank, 2013b.
Data analysis of the HIPC Initiative and the MDRI show that the target actors made some concessions on the collective demands of J2K in the form of policy changes on debt. Some of these concessions culminated in some new advantages for some of the impoverished countries as indicated in the above references. Further, there have been reports in a number of the impoverished countries where money freed due to debt cancellation has made a difference to their ability to provide basic social amenities, healthcare and improve primary education. For example, primary school fees were abolished in countries like Ghana, Malawi and in Benin after some of their debts were cancelled while Tanzania was able to recruit 62,000 teachers in the first three years after cancellation. Others like Zambia have abolished user fees at rural healthcare clinics while Bolivia is reported to have spent more money on hospitals and housing (Williams, 2008: 25; Thomas, 2008: 258; Greenhill, 2002; Elliot, 2000). It could therefore be argued that due to these new advantages, the collective action on debt seemed to have made some proactive impacts.

On the other hand, however, while some of the HIPC Initiative countries have reached completion point and thus secured some debt cancellation, a number of them are still at high risk of debt distress as the implementation report of November 2011 shows.\textsuperscript{156} Part of the reasons for this is that in some cases, data used to calculate revenues, export and currency exchange rates are revised negatively by the creditors and this leaves short, the amount a particular indebted country may be due. Further, a number of litigations against some of these countries may ultimately undermine any of the new advantages that the indebted countries may have gained with the policy changes discussed above. In these cases, firms or debts holders who bought debt at devalued costs in the debt market, attempt to recoup the full value through litigation

\textsuperscript{156} International Development Association and International Monetary Fund (2011: 23).
in courts in the developed Western countries. By end 2013, 8 such cases were on-going while 17 others were known in 2010 and 2011 respectively.\(^\text{157}\)

Finally, some countries may have financially benefitted as a result of funds freed from HIPC and MDRI schemes but the further imposition of strict macroeconomic policies with structural adjustment programmes by the IFIs means more control by external institutions at the expense of democracy and national institutions in these countries. As discussed in the previous sections, this further control is also evident in the production of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, a key eligibility requirement in HIPC2. Although the PRSP is always presented as “country owned” - suggesting the particular countries are in control of the programmes entailed in it, still, it must be approved by the IFIs who are also responsible for monitoring its implementation. As the Jubilee South argued and echoed by the Campaign, the conditions attached to these programmes and the power of oversight granted the IFIs appear to be a control mechanism employed by the creditors over the impoverished countries.\(^\text{158}\)

Were that really the case, it would be an argument that lends credence to any claim that the collective action on debt cancellation may have made some reactive impacts. However, there is no conclusive evidence on this issue, as it remains unclear - even if the above is proven factually correct, whether it worsened the case of the impoverished countries or simply maintains the existing pre-J2K order.

To summarise, this section examined substantive impacts, which are policy changes by the target actors in response to collective action demands. In general, the target actors – the IFIs and major creditor countries – made some policy changes on debt of

\(^{157}\) International Development Association and International Monetary Fund (2011: 16) and International Monetary Fund (2013: 46).

\(^{158}\) Jubilee South-South (1999); Jubilee 2000 Coalition (1999b).
the impoverished countries. First, the IFIs accepted that the debts were unsustainable and hence adopted the principle of debt relief that led to their participation in the HIPC Initiative. Second, following continued criticism of HIPC1 and increased international public advocacy by the J2K, the IFIs were pressured to make further changes to the Initiative culminating in HIPC2, which clearly included inputs from the J2K. Further, the major creditor countries led by the G8 also changed some of their debt policies in response to the Campaign demands as they announced more debt cancellation beyond the HIPC Initiative provisions. Finally, interrelated policy changes saw the introduction of the MDRI that further increased the amount of debt cancelled by the IFIs. In the next section I will examine sensitising impacts, a different type of outcome that is identified with the Campaign.

7.4 Sensitising Impacts: Political Agenda and Public Attitudes

Following my discussion of the different types of collective action impacts in chapter four, if a collective action provokes a sensitising of some social actor in the public or political arena that goes in the direction of its aims, it is said to have made a sensitising impact. Sensitising impact is comprised of political agenda and public attitudes. Of particular relevance to this study is institutional agenda, a component of Political agenda, which refers to a set of concrete and specific items to be treated by the target actors. To establish the impact of J2K in this segment, debt cancellation would have been an item for discussion by the target actors at the relevant levels and there must be evidence showing any general public or specific sector mobilisation by the Campaign.

The movement to cancel the sovereign external debt of poor nations neither began nor ended circa 2000. Rather, the Jubilee 2000 movement was one important passage in a longer score (Roodman, 2010).
Roodman’s observation that efforts to cancel the debt of poor nations preceded the J2K is factually correct and so is the implied suggestion that such efforts would also continue post-J2K, as it is ‘a longer score’. As demonstrated in the preceding section, that continuity has very much been on course with the inception of the MDRI in 2005. Of more interest to this research, however, is the notion and acknowledgement that the J2K was one important part of this ‘longer score’ because it raises the question of why and how the J2K assumed that status. To address these, I would argue that the ability of the Campaign to animate and excite very broad and diverse constituencies nationally in the UK and internationally, is fundamental and crucial to understanding why the Campaign assumed that importance and a pointer to the sensitising impacts of the Campaign. In the last chapter, we saw that the core of the Campaign strategy was ‘mobilising by educating’. The chapter also showed how that strategy was applied as the Campaign relied heavily on the network-of-networks and cross overs that spanned the church, aid agencies, labour unions and the entertainment industry. All these were central to the mass mobilisation, which the Campaign engineered while it existed, and key to the Campaign’s ability to sensitise a broad swathe of the public to its goals.

For the past four years the terms of the debate have been set by the debt campaigners, who little by little have forced the plight of the world’s forgotten people onto the political agenda (Elliot, 2000).

The above citation indicates that the Campaign had steadily engendered public consciousness of the issue, as debt became an important item on the international political agenda. As I discussed in the last chapter, not many believed in a public campaign on debt because of its complicated and arcane nature. However with the emergence of J2K and its relatively rapid diffusion, debt was transformed from its obscurity into a mainstream issue that could easily be discussed and understood by
the general public as it was framed as justice, rather than a charity issue. The Campaign’s ability to simplify what was indeed a complex and multidimensional issue into a simple, comprehensible and easily communicated issue aided its public mobilisation and the broad support it garnered.

This public support was demonstrated in many mass mobilisations that the Campaign carried out in different countries and continents and these ensured political pressure on the relevant target actors at the national levels and simultaneously built public pressure at the international level on the target actors. At the same time, with the Campaign combining outsider and insider tactics (Burstein, 1985: 103; Kollman, 1998: 3-27) it simultaneously employed intensive lobbying of various target actors in different locations to propel debt to become a dominant item on the international political agenda, most prominently at the 1998 and 1999 G8 summits. In the lead up to the Cologne summit for example, virtually all the G8 members presented debt cancellation proposals with each country trying to out-do the other in terms of how deep the relief should go (Kaiser, 1999). This flurry of competing proposals for debt cancellation by various G8 leaders was clearly a reaction to the international public pressure that was generated in concert with the national campaigns. For example, with popular support from international public personalities that ranged from the Pope to celebrities and major football clubs in Italy, the Italian Parliament passed a law for debt cancellation that stipulated a number of more favourable conditions and went beyond the provisions of HIPC2. That the G8 Final Communiqué easily adopted the “deeper, broader and faster” mantra of J2K is a measure of the Campaign’s impact on the HIPC2 agreement. However, it also showed how easily the target actors could co-opt the language of the Campaign while

the necessary substantial policy changes to justify that language was still questionable lacking even with HIPC2.\textsuperscript{161} According to the spokesperson for the Bank, Anthony Gaeta, the Jubilee 2000

has managed to put a relatively arcane issue – that of international finance and development – on the negotiating table throughout the world. The pledges Clinton and Brown have made would not have happened without Jubilee 2000. It’s one of the most effective global lobbying campaigns I have ever seen (Cited in Garrett, 1999).

The mass mobilisations and the attendant public pressure quickly propelled debt cancellation on to national political agendas in different countries too. In the UK, there were Early Day Motions (EDM) No. 1122 and 112A1 in 1998 on Jubilee 2000, which over 100 Parliamentarians signed.\textsuperscript{162} Further, members of Parliament formed the All-Party Jubilee 2000 Coalition group, which had over 100 members and by July 1998, they introduced a bill in the Parliament to write off the unpayable debt. They went further and launched a Global Parliamentary Debt Initiative in support of J2K and debt cancellation was often discussed in the Parliament.\textsuperscript{163} In the US where the conservative Republican Party partly controlled Congress, a Congressional caucus formed around debt cancellation and they were instrumental to the efforts at securing the broad support that was needed for congressional approval of funds for debt cancellation. Larry Summers, the economic adviser to the President, had several meetings with the US national campaign and stated that debt cancellation was a priority for the Clinton administration. This was acted on when Congress voted on various occasions to fund the US commitments in the HIPC Initiative including permission for the IMF to sell the requested gold reserves to finance it.\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{161} G8 Information Centre (1999).
\textsuperscript{163} Jubilee 2000 Coalition (1998a); House of Commons (1999); House of Commons (2011).
Besides the big rallies that demonstrated enormous public support for the aims of the Campaign, there were also the signatures collected for the petition to cancel the debt. In June 2000, at the presentation of the signatures to the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, the Campaign claimed a world record 21.5 million have been collected rising to 24,319,181 million at the final count. It went into the Guinness Book of World Records in 1997 as the most international petition ever with signatures from over 166 countries (Cox, 2011; Williams, 2008: 12-13).  

A further reflection of the public attitude in the UK could be gleaned from the results of the independent polls conducted by Ipsos-MORI in 1998, barely two years after the Campaign was launched. Data showed that 69 per cent of the populace preferred to see the government cancel Third World debt as a way to celebrate the millennium as opposed to 17 per cent who would like to build the Dome – the touted option at the time. By June 2000, data from a second poll showed that the Campaign maintains its popularity with the public as more than two out of three who had a view on the issue supported the campaign.  

Finally, it is safe to say that the Campaign sensitised some of its target actors at the IFIs to its goals as the statement of the World Bank spokesperson referenced above attests. On 8 September 2000, Horst Koehler, the IMF Managing Director in a meeting with the Campaign and the UK government stated: “I’m personally thinking we could – we should – go a step further in debt relief, an even bolder step”. The Campaign’s sensitising efforts were not limited to targets at the IFIs because as shown above, different G8 governments announced, independent of each other, debt

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166 Ipsos MORI (2000).
cancellation packages that went beyond the international and concerted efforts at
debt cancellation that the HIPC Initiative represented. As notable political voices,
there were declarations from Gordon Brown, Tony Blair to Kofi Annan and Gerhard
Schroeder's open letter in the Financial Times/Wall Street Journal that indicated they
have been sensitised by the J2K to its aims. President Clinton best captured this in
his announcement of the 100 per cent cancellation of debts owed to the US. He said,

For many developing countries, however, there is a greater obstacle in the
path to progress. For many of them, excessive and completely unsustainable
debt can halt progress, drag down growth, drain resources that are needed to
meet the most basic human conditions, like clean water, shelter, health care
and education. Debt and debt relief are normally subjects for economists. But
there is nothing academic about them. Simply put, unsustainable debt is
helping to keep too many poor countries and poor people in poverty. That is
clearly why the Pope and so many other world leaders from all walks of life
have asked us all to do more to reduce the debt of the poorest nations as a gift
to the new millennium – not just to them, but to all the rest of us, as well
(Clinton, 1999).

To summarise, we can see that the Campaign sensitised the target actors to its aims
as statements from a considerable number of the target actors at the national and
international levels attests. Besides, these target actors also undertook concrete
actions, some of which reflected in the policy changes that were in the direction of
the Campaign goals of cancelling the unpayable debt discussed under substantive
impacts in the preceding section. That debt was a dominant issue on the agenda at the
G8 summits in Birmingham and Cologne, in addition to its regular presence at the
different but relevant national levels for example in Italy, the US and the UK shows
that the Campaign made some sensitising impacts by propelling the issue of debt on
to the national political agendas in these countries and others, and at the international
level. The sensitising of the public was demonstrated in different forms that included
the tens of thousands at the Campaign’s protest events and the record signatories of
its petition for debt cancellation.
7.5 Causal Mechanisms: Public Preference and Leverage Politics

As discussed in chapter four, a major problem in evaluating the outcomes of collective actions is the difficulty of establishing the causal links between the efforts and activities of a collective action and the identified changes in the arena of contention. This difficulty, known as the 'causal complexity', holds that it is virtually impossible to isolate collective actions and their efforts from the wider factors that may have any causal influence on changes that may occur in the course of a collective action challenge (Kolb, 2007: 1). Nevertheless, it is still vital to explain the processes through which a certain outcome is thought to have derived from a particular or a combination of collective action activities. Kiser and Hechter (1998: 790) aptly noted that these processes, known as causal mechanisms, cannot be directly determined due to the possible influence of other factors, hence it has to be done indirectly (Meyer, 2009: 417; Tarrow, 1998: 161-164; Giugni, 1995: 212f).

Specifying the causal mechanism of the identified outcomes in the collective action on debt is further complicated by the nature and complexity of the issue and the multidimensionality of the locations and actors involved. However, I argued in chapter four that there are plausible ways that could be explored to account for the processes through which a collective action may have caused a certain type of effects. I also explained that in the context of J2K, it is most appropriate to probe the public preference mechanism and leverage politics as the processes through which it may have achieved the above identified outcomes given its adopted strategy, the Campaign's transnational character and the multiple location of its target actors.

To briefly recap, the public preference mechanism is essentially centred on the ability of collective claimers to mobilise public opinion on their behalf and deploy
that to leverage the target actors and their policy preferences in favour of the collective aims. It involves employing both insider and outsider lobbying strategies and reframing the issue – where necessary. It could also entail redefining an issue to expose the underlying problem, which may help in the efficacy of these processes. In the context of the collective action on debt, these causal mechanisms or processes are vital to explain how J2K achieved the outcomes identified above. For the procedural and sensitising impacts, the processes through which they were achieved are relatively self-evident. First, the consultation and negotiation processes, which were, amongst other things, the access the J2K gained to the target actors were largely created by the Campaign as it provided different forums to engage the target actors. This in turn, had the effect that the target actors recognised the J2K as legitimate representatives of the collective action on debt. Thus, the causal mechanism for the procedural impacts was demonstrated and evidenced by the continuous engagement, interaction and communication between the target actors and the J2K.

Second, the sensitising of public and social actors to the Campaign aims constitutes the sensitising impacts as explained in the preceding section. On this, the causal mechanism is also self-evident in that the J2K employed relational and non-relational channels as it used the various network-of-networks of the church and trade unions, the media and students amongst others, to diffuse its normative and justice-framed message. The erudite but simplified deconstruction of the debt problem, the various activities and public actions, the numerous publications, the involvement of celebrities and popular international personalities that was part of the strategy which was designed to mobilise by educating, ensured that various segments of the society were well attuned to and informed about debt, its underlying issues and were thus, sensitised to the Campaign aims.
Further, the output of the intensive research and critical analysis combined with the Campaign frame in ‘cutting the diamond’ of debt was credible enough to effectively counter the creditors’ portrayal of the problem, as the Campaign redefined it a crisis, a redefinition that gained widespread resonance even with the target actors. For example, the IFIs demonstrated acceptance of this redefinition by partaking in the unprecedented scheme of comprehensive debt management that saw them write off some of the unpayable debt. This resonance was built on credibility, which was based on verifiable data and facts on the situation of the indebted countries as espoused by the Campaign. These, aided by the Campaign’s ability to mobilise and convince high profile celebrities and personalities to amplify its message, combined with the mass public protests, form the causal processes through which the J2K mobilised and sensitised the public and other social actors to its aims.

To recap, for the substantive impacts, these were policy changes that resulted in the HIPC Initiative and its enhanced version, the individual policy changes of the creditor countries with the 100 per cent cancellation of eligible debt and by extension, the MDRI that was introduced in 2005. For these sets of impacts, the causal mechanism basically included those mechanisms of the sensitising impacts in the preceding paragraph. However, it is important to emphasis the focus and the dynamics of redefining debt as crisis and framing it as justice-themed issue with the Campaign’s mass mobilisation of the public. While these processes served to inform and mobilise the various social sectors to support the Campaign under sensitising impact, under substantive impacts they functioned to generate and put pressure on the target actors at the relevant national and international levels and fora. At the UK national level, this included letter-writing, post cards, emails to the Treasury,
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the International Development Secretary and the Prime Minister amongst others. This was the same in countries like Germany, US, Italy, France and Japan – all with strong Jubilee national campaigns.

Two of the most visible mass mobilisations and protests were the G8 summits in Birmingham and Cologne that drew over 70,000 and 50,000 protesters respectively to demand debt cancellation. These events served as opportunities, which the J2K used to put pressure on its targets and leverage important stakeholders in the IFIs as the G8 political leaders met. Clare Short echoed the sentiments of President Clinton and the IMF spokesperson on the importance of J2K mobilisation when she acknowledged that the protest had a real beneficial effect on debt negotiations.\textsuperscript{168} It was a testament to and a confirmation of the efficacy of the pressure generated by these kinds of mass mobilisation on political leaders that key individuals like Gordon Brown urged the J2K “to keep up the pressure in order to strengthen their hands in negotiations with other governments and also with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund” (Dent, 2000).

7.6 Legacies of the Campaign

As I discussed in chapter four, part of the problems in evaluating the outcomes of TCAs is that some of the outcomes are unintended and particularly when they are not positive, the collective actions may be loath to accept them as consequences of their efforts. In the foregoing sections, I have identified and discussed a number of outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign using the adapted theoretical framework. However, there are other outcomes of the Campaign that are not fully captured by

\textsuperscript{168} Cited in Dent (1999b: 36).
and do not neatly fit into the framework deployed so far and so in this section, I will briefly discuss some of these under the realm of “Legacies of the Campaign” for a more complete account of the analysis of J2K.

First, one of the major criticisms of the various debt relief mechanisms by the IFIs prior to the emergence of J2K and while the Campaign lasted was the spiral of debt rescheduling and the attendant structural adjustment programs that the indebted countries were compelled to implement. Although the J2K generally upheld that criticism, its efforts were mainly geared towards achieving its primary demand, which was the cancellation of the self-defined unpayable debt. In other words, the Campaign did not pay much attention to the structures that gave rise to the debt and by extension the governance regime that derives from it. However, the emergence of Jubilee South infused a different tone into the debt discourse and saw more radical demands as they adopted a rejectionist position on the governance regime of the IFIs and in fact, a rejection of the entire international financial system and debt mechanisms. As I explained earlier, for pragmatic reasons, this position failed to resonate among most of the J2K Campaigners in the global North who largely welcomed the Cologne agreement for HIPC2. J2K’s acceptance and celebration of HIPC2 as the major achievement of the Campaign had far reaching implications as one of the legacies of the Campaign because; it served to stabilize and reinforce the governance regime of the IFIs. This is particularly so when it is taken into account that the IFIs not only retained the power to continue to impose macroeconomic measures like SAP and thus monitor and control the economies of the indebted countries, but also extended and strengthened those powers with their oversight of the PRSP in HIPC2. In other words, it is a legacy of the Campaign that the IFIs and creditor nations maintained and tightened their control of the impoverished countries.
Relatedly, as indicated in the previous sections, a number of the countries that were eligible for debt cancellation under HIPC and MDRI have been recorded as suffering debt distress. However, there is a widespread perception as the Jubilee South feared, and cautioned in the course of the Campaign that the issue of impoverished countries debt would be seen as ‘done’ by closing the Campaign in December 2000. It is therefore a legacy of the Campaign that this discrepancy exists on the reality of debt of the impoverished countries.

Second, it is a legacy of the Campaign that the narrative that views debt cancellation in terms of charity no longer dominates the debt discourse. Rather, debt is now mainly viewed in terms of justice and what is morally right; a view that has completely overturned the “moral hazard” argument of debt cancellation opponents. Further, the unprecedented pressure on creditor nations and institutions on debt led to serious questions in public discourse about neo-liberal economic policies and compelled the major powers to consult with civil society groups on economic policy. In the process of these consultations, the creditor countries and institutions rapidly adopted the civil society language in the debt discourse so much so that there is hardly any difference now between the debt campaigners’ language and those of the creditors.

Third, it is also a legacy of the Campaign that the purported mandate of the Bank and the Fund that allegedly barred them from cancelling debt of any form were revised to allow their participation in the HIPC Initiative. By participating in debt cancellation schemes, the IFIs fully acknowledged failure of the existing mechanisms like the various Paris Club terms. This acknowledgement by extension is also a legacy of the Campaign. A related point is that the privileged ‘preferred creditors’ status that the
IFIs have enjoyed in all debt negotiations and rescheduling was undermined and eroded as a result of the HIPC Initiative.

Finally, while there was always some form of cooperation between some civil society groups in the global South and groups in the global North, it is a legacy of the Campaign that it offered the opportunity to intensify such networking. This in turn emboldened the political leaders of the indebted countries to be more assertive on the injustices of the debt and the need for cancellation. On the other hand, it is also a legacy of the Campaign that the gulf and the unequal partnership in the North-South divide was further entrenched as the feeling of mistrust by some Southern campaigners of their Northern counterparts, over long term commitment and the lack of unity of purpose was exacerbated and made more visible in the Campaign.

7.7 Chapter Conclusion: Partial Debt Cancellation and Public Awareness

This chapter was driven by the question: “Was it worth the efforts?” In other words, what were the results of the enormous efforts that went into the collective action to cancel the unpayable debt? Thus, the purpose of this chapter was to analyse the data on J2K, identify its outcomes and based on that, assess where the Campaign may have succeeded or failed. Given the problem of causal complexity discussed in previous chapters, I argued that conducted within a conjectural, contextual and temporal approach and based on the theoretical framework adopted for this research, it is possible to identify some of the results of J2K efforts. Consequently, I analysed the data on J2K and specified its outcomes under procedural, substantive and sensitising impacts, and complemented this with the legacies of the Campaign.
First, data analysis showed that the J2K made procedural impacts because it had access to the various target actors nationally – in the UK and in the US, and internationally – with the IFIs – the Bank and the Fund, and these target actors recognised the J2K as legitimate representatives of the collective action on debt. This recognition, which was in the form of consultation processes, was evidenced by the series of meetings and communications between the Campaign and the various target actors. The access granted the J2K enabled its operatives to meet with top-level representatives of the IFIs, key administration staff of creditor nations and members of parliaments, cabinet ministers and heads of government. With these impacts and through these fora, the Campaign was able to make contributions to key decisions on debt that would later culminate in the substantive impacts of the Campaign. Obviously, the longevity of the access granted by the various target actors differ but overall, it arguably lasted the course of the collective action, for example in the UK, while it may have been different in other locations due to the varied dynamics of the differently situated actors. For example, although the US group was also recognised as legitimate representatives and granted access, it was difficult for them to advance their aim in the Congress at a crucial point until Bono was recruited by the Campaign to help persuade relevant but recalcitrant members of Congress and even some in the Clinton administration.

Second, data showed that there were some major policy changes in the direction of the Campaign aims. The first was the HIPC Initiative in 1996 and this was followed three years later by the enhanced version. Although there is evidence to suggest (given its preceding procedural impacts) that the J2K partly influenced the eventual change of policy on the part of the Fund and the Bank, one would be hard pressed to ascribe more concrete causal influence to the J2K for this particular policy change.
However, the enhanced version of the HIPC Initiative more strongly reflect the impact of the Campaign given its inputs in the policy process and the changes effected by the target actors. Nevertheless, it is also a fact that the squabbles between the Bank and the Fund over some of the issues the Campaign was raising (some of which eventually fed into HIPC2) had been on-going for some years. So while the Campaign may take credit for such changes, due acknowledgement must also be made of other factors that may have causally influenced that policy change. Again, as I have argued in this research, this validates the conjectural approach adopted in this research because against this background, to cast this particular outcome in conclusive and definitive terms would be problematic. As this instance demonstrates, while it may appear obvious that a particular set of action led to a certain effect, there may be some underlying or background factors that may not be readily uncovered but yet had a significant causal influence on the identified outcome.

Other substantive impacts include the further policy changes by most of the creditor countries that resulted in the pledge to cancel 100 per cent bilateral ODA debts and later, the introduction of the MDRI. Particularly with the MDRI, it shows that the Campaign continued to influence policy changes on debt even after it officially closed; a point that further lends credence to the contextual and temporal approach to outcomes in this research. Finally in this section is the issue of whether these impacts were reactive or proactive. Given the policy changes, the available data on implementation and the reported effects of the debts cancelled for the eligible countries, it is safe to say that the indebted countries have obtained some new advantages as a result of the collective action on debt. However, that the IMF programmes remain imposed alerts us to the possibility of reactive impacts because
the implementation of IFIs macroeconomic policies imply that those multilateral institutions maintain significant controls over those economies, infringing on local institutions and democracy.

The Campaign demonstrated its ability to sensitise varied constituencies by the vigorous implementation of its mobilisation strategy. This meant that it continued to educate a broad spectrum of the international public about international finance and debt, the impact of debt in the impoverished countries, the role of the creditors in the problem and the underlying injustice. It kept its members, supporters, volunteers and sympathisers motivated by the constant reminder of the moral principles of the Jubilee and ensured that millions were swayed to attend their events, sign petitions and send emails and post cards to the varied target actors to support its aims. That debt cancellation became a mainstream issue and a dominant item on the international political agenda in less than 4 years following the Campaign’s launch, attests to the mobilising and sensitising prowess of the Campaign. This was more so because most people – even among the converted, regarded the debt problem as a complex and arcane issue that the public would never understand and by no less a figure than Clare Short (Glennie, 2011).

The issue of causal mechanism was addressed in this chapter and I have sought to account for the causal processes of these impacts by deploying the public preference mechanism and leverage politics. These entailed the mobilisation of public opinion and support for the Campaign aims to put pressure on and leverage the relevant targets. Finally, I briefly discussed some other outcomes of the Campaign that were not fully captured by the theoretical framework that was deployed in this research.
It is perhaps appropriate to conclude this chapter with a few comments on the identified outcomes that are presented in the foregoing sections under procedural, substantive and sensitising impacts. First, it is noteworthy that recognition by and access to the target actors as impacts of collective actions do not constitute any significant change on their own in the overall scheme of things. However, they do form a basis and provide the platform upon which collective claimers could make inputs and contributions that, potentially, could enhance their impacts in other spheres. As has been shown in this chapter, the Campaign used its access to the target actors to contribute to the identifiable substantive impacts of the Campaign.

Second, as I have argued throughout this study, outcomes of TCAs are approached from a contextual, conjectural and temporal perspective, which means that it differs from presenting outcomes in definitive and absolute terms and conclusions. It is worth reiterating this approach because while it has been possible to outline most of the identifiable outcomes of the Campaign, at least with the adapted theoretical framework, to determine all the causal influences and factors remain a task that I could not be completely certain to accomplish. This is because particularly for impoverished countries debt with its multiple actors and locations, complexities and dimensions, it is virtually impossible to isolate and pinpoint all the causal influences of the identified outcomes. Nevertheless, it is still possible to demonstrate, as I have done here with the public preference mechanism and leverage politics, to render a certain plausible explanation, within the parameters of this study and available data, of how the identified outcomes are linked to the Campaign’s efforts and activities.
8. Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

This research has investigated the evaluation of transnational collective actions and deployed the Jubilee 2000 Campaign as a case study. The research was primarily driven by the question: How does evaluating the Jubilee 2000 Campaign aid our understanding of transnational collective actions? I argued that it was necessary to evaluate and ascertain the outcomes of the Campaign because of its theoretical, practical and policy implications and that it was such a high profile collective action that mobilised broad international public support for the aim to cancel the unpayable debt of the impoverished countries. I further argued that it was vital for analysts and practitioners to know the outcomes so that we could draw some lessons from the way the Campaign was waged and to understand the controversy that surrounds its outcomes. My background and personal interest in campaign efficacy and my role in mobilising for the protest at the G8 summit in 1999 was an added motivation to research the J2K as a way to better understand TCAs in their various formations. To address the main research question though it was necessary to explore the following set of sub questions:

- What are the implications of J2K emergence for collective action theories and the categorisation of transnational collective actions?
- How do we evaluate the Jubilee 2000 Campaign?
- What were the outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign?

In this chapter, I will briefly recap the narrative of this thesis before addressing the above questions. To begin, it was necessary to outline the case study for this research
because it acquainted us with the descriptive overview of the Campaign emergence from its earliest stage and this enlightened us to the various social processes and background, which later in the thesis enabled us to examine its emergence vis-a-vis collective action theories. Furthermore, as background to the Campaign emergence, the sources of the debts, the debt management schemes deployed by the creditors and how these escalated the debt problem and culminated in a crisis were explored. These details, previewed in chapter two, formed the basis of the background information with which the Campaign identified the creditors’ part-culpability in the debt problem, redefined debt as a justice issue and foregrounded the Campaign’s deployment of the injustice frame. This part of the research also alerted us to some of the friction in the network, which was further explored in the analytical chapters.

This thesis noted that TCAs are categorised as coalitions, movements or networks based on the level of coordination between their constituent parts and their dominant modalities while it also noted some overlaps between the different formations. TANs were introduced in detail and the major collective action theories were briefly reviewed to highlight their core contentions and emphasis, and their shortcomings. I briefly introduced collective action frames. It was recognised that collective action configurations were not mutually exclusive because of the way they emerge and develop, and TANs were described as an extension of the new social movements’ cluster of collective actions. This is because; TANs share and extend the features of those collective actions. J2K was explored as a TAN because of its overall dynamics – with information exchange, the dominant modality of this form of configuration. Discerning the outcomes of collective actions entails some inherent difficulties irrespective of the type of formation and so; these problems and controversies were reviewed. The advantage of this meant that I was conscious of these problems in the
research processes and this guided how this research was designed; it informed the methods I employed and the data collected. Quite significantly, it informed my approach to outcomes in this research.

Finally, Giugni's (1995) theoretical framework – for evaluating the outcomes of collective actions of the new social movements cluster offered a suitably adaptable option to capture the different spheres where the Campaign may have made some impacts. Multiple research methods that included semi structured interviews, archival materials and secondary literature were employed and data from these varied sources were triangulated to minimise shortcomings inherent to any of the methods. The data was analysed with a phenomenological research approach – which takes individual and groups’ experiences of shared meanings into account. This, combined with the adapted theoretical framework, aided the identification of the Campaign outcomes, which were specified as procedural, substantive and sensitising impacts. However, there were still some outcomes of the Campaign that could not be fully captured by the adapted framework and these were discussed as legacies of the Campaign.

In this research, I argued that given the problem of causal complexity which holds that it is virtually impossible to isolate the entire causal influences of identified outcomes, it is problematic to cast outcomes in absolute and conclusive terms. In the context of J2K, this problem was accentuated by the intractable nature of impoverished countries debt and international finance and the multiplicity of actors involved and their diverse locations. Therefore in this research, a conjectural, contextual and temporal approach to outcomes was adopted, which meant that the identified outcomes of J2K could not be cast in absolute terms. In other words, the identified outcomes and the conclusions reached on them are viewed as a snapshot in
time that is based on the available data and my interpretation of that data. Still, it was vital to account for the processes through which the identified outcomes may have been achieved. In this research, the public preference mechanism and leverage politics were identified and explained as the causal processes through which the identified outcomes of J2K were achieved as pressure was brought to bear on the target actors with the international public support the Campaign mobilised.

Against the foregoing, I will now explore the questions outlined above and provide some answers based on the preceding chapters. In the next section, I will first address the main research question with the major points of how evaluating the J2K aids our understanding of TCAs and I will elaborate on those points with answers to the sub questions in the following sections.

8.2 Understanding Transnational Collective Actions

This research was mainly driven by the question:

*How does evaluating the Jubilee 2000 Campaign aid our understanding of transnational collective actions?*

In this research, I evaluated the J2K in the quest to better understand TCAs. In the last two chapters; I identified the outcomes of the Campaign; discussed some of the friction in the network and the underlying reasons for some of those frictions, and participants’ view of the outcomes. I also discussed the common approach that mainly evaluates TCAs in terms of success and failure and the shortcomings of that approach, and how to overcome those weaknesses in applying ‘success’ or ‘failure’.
Evaluating J2K in this research has immensely aided our understanding of TCAs in theoretical and empirical terms. First, by analysing the emergence of J2K vis-à-vis theories of collective actions, the analysis of J2K in this research showed some of the gaps in the literature on collective actions as it exposed the inherent shortcomings in these theories with regards to sources of collective action emergence. The evaluation showed that while the emphasis of the major collective action theories remain vital to understanding the sources of collective action emergence; the gaps in these theories undercut their capability to singularly and fully account for the emergence of a collective action like the J2K. Further, evaluating J2K helps us to understand that to account for the emergence of collective actions like the J2K, it is necessary to complement and combine the core contentions and points of emphasis of these theories which I will discuss below.

Second, evaluating J2K in this research enhances our understanding of how TCAs are categorised and the implication of those categorisations because, it shows that although TCAs are categorised as movements, coalitions and networks, yet these formations are not mutually exclusive because of the evolving and changing structures and modalities in their emergence and development. Further, the evaluation of J2K alerts us to the intrinsic political nature of the terms used in these categorisations. For example, as discussed in the previous chapters, the J2K emerged in the global North as a campaign and was essentially understood as such although it developed into a network. In theoretical terms, this understanding implies that it was a specific strategy of a coalition even though there were no manifest structures or features of a coalition at the time. On the other hand, Southern anti-debt campaigners understood their efforts (which predated J2K) as geared towards building a movement – which meant efforts to generate coordinated and sustained social
mobilisation in more than one country to publicly influence policy change on debt. Obviously, this understanding discounts any pre-fixed closure dates such as end 2000 that was set for J2K. It was therefore logical that the closure date of the Campaign became a very contentious issue in the network because the inherent political nature of these terms and their underlying meaning bore practical implications for different components in the network hence the controversy it precipitated.

Third, evaluating the J2K helps us to understand how we can evaluate the outcomes of TCAs in ways that broadly captures their impacts other than the binary of success or failure. This in turn, helps us to avoid the associated problem of the lack of measurement yardstick that is required to operationalise it if deployed as the main evaluative approach. By adapting the framework developed for evaluating the outcomes of new social movements, it was possible to identify the outcomes of J2K in the procedural and sensitising spheres. This was in addition to the policy sphere (substantive impacts) that is often the focus of most studies on collective action outcomes. Besides, other outcomes that do not fit neatly into the framework deployed were identified and discussed as legacies of the Campaign. Further, evaluating J2K in this research aids our understanding of why it is problematic to cast outcomes of TCAs in definitive and conclusive terms particularly given the problem of causal complexity and the other difficulties and controversies associated with evaluating TCAs.

The final point is one that is related to the foregoing. The evaluation of J2K in this research enlightened us to the fact that broad international public support and resonance of a collective action frame may generate pressure on the target actors of a collective action. However, these may be severely limited in any attempt to address
some of the fundamental issues that may undergird the particular problem. This research shows that cancelling the unpayable debt of the impoverished countries was the main aim of the J2K and the Campaign strategy was geared towards mobilising public pressure to leverage the creditors to cancel the debt. It was no surprise therefore that the Campaign claimed some measure of success when the creditors agreed to write off about 100 Billion Dollars through the HIPC Initiative.

However, the focus on this objective coupled with the time-limited span of the Campaign meant that the systemic and structural causes of the debt were left wholly unscathed. The Jubilee South did draw attention to what it perceived as the fundamental causes of debt, but this appeared to be a broader agenda that was not seriously considered as part of the J2K aims when it was initiated. So, while many groups that constituted Jubilee South were part of the J2K, it is evident that some of them were driven more by this broader agenda than the goals the J2K initiators set out as they increasingly became more vocal about this agenda as the Campaign end date drew nearer. This highlights one of the ways the evaluation of J2K in this research enhances our understanding of TCAs because, it alerts us to the various interpretations and the politics involved in the evaluation of TCAs.

The import of this is that these different agendas then served as the platform from which the different participants assessed the Campaign and its outcomes. For example at the G8 Cologne summit, the press statement issued by the Jubilee 2000 Coalition and Jubilee2000USA showed that the J2K embraced and broadly viewed HIPC2 as a ‘success’ and in fact, was portrayed as the highlight of the Campaign. On the other hand, the Jubilee South flatly rejected HIPC2 at the same summit because of the continued conditionality in the Initiative, which it claimed, increased and
consolidated the creditors' power to control the economies of the indebted countries. This showed that the Jubilee South assessed the Campaign policy impacts based on its agenda, which sought structural and systemic changes to the global economic and financial systems that it viewed as the causes of the debt but which, HIPC2 did not address.

Thus, the Campaign strategy and the resonance of its frame may have generated enormous international public pressure on the target actors to offer the concessions entailed in HIPC2, however, that strategy was ill-equipped to address the systemic and structural causes of the debt. This alerts us to the limitation of the strategy of a broad public support in addressing such fundamental issues. However, it has to be noted that the Campaign did not set out explicitly to address the fundamental causes of debt, although it did aim for a situation where there would not be a reoccurrence of such debilitating debt. This invariably implied addressing the causes of debt, which the cancellation of the unpayable debt (even if that were fully achieved) would not have solved.

8.3 Jubilee 2000 Campaign Emergence: Theoretical Implications

For over a decade and half leading to the mid-1990s, several organisations and networks across all continents raised concerns about the level and effects of debt of the impoverished countries. However, debt did not become a major item on the international political agenda and not until the Jubilee 2000 Campaign; a collective action did not emerge on the issue. The relevant sub question to be addressed in relation to this is:
What are the implications of J2K emergence for collective action theories and the categorisation of transnational collective actions?

In chapter two, I outlined the emergence of J2K and in chapter three, I reviewed collective action theories, the categorisation of collective actions and introduced TANs in detail. Juxtaposed, the emergence of J2K bears some implications both for collective action theories and the categorisation of collective actions in the literature.

First, the emergence of J2K demonstrates some of the shortcomings in the major collective action theories because as discussed in chapter three, there are gaps in these theories with their core emphasis, which render each, on their own, unable to fully account for the emergence of J2K. For example, the resource mobilisation theory emphasised resources and organisation as the sources of collective action emergence but it is clear that these core points alone could not account for the emergence of collective actions because the theory fails to specify how the resources and organisation translates into collective action. In the context of J2K, vital as the resources and organisation that were initially available to the J2K initiators were, these alone could not account for the emergence of J2K.

This gap in the literature was arguably filled by the political process theory’s (PPT) core points of cognitive liberation – which is the realisation that a problem issue could actually be redressed by participants’ involvement and actions. This along with opportune timing and openings in the political opportunity structures are the PPT’s emphasis as sources of collective action. It is this consciousness according to the theory that is the catalyst that motivates participants and sympathisers to be involved, and in the process translates resources and organisation into collective action. In the
emergence of J2K it was the Jubilee theme with its meaning and aspirations that were articulated within the justice frame, coupled with the opportune timing that was the year 2000 which provided the consciousness that the debt crisis could actually be resolved. This was the catalyst for participants' involvement and thus a validation of the notion of cognitive liberation in collective action emergence.

Clearly, the above core points of the PPT complement the resources and organisation that are the core contentions of the RMT. Still, together, they do not account for the role of principled ideas, ethical and non-material values, which motivated the debt norm entrepreneurs to initiate the collective action on debt and which, are the core elements of the new social movements' approach. Therefore, to fully account for the emergence of J2K, it is necessary to further augment the core contentions and emphasis of the RMT and PPT explained above with those of the NSMs approach. On the other hand, the new social movements approach seems muted on the core emphasis of both the RMT and the PPT, as it does not explicitly acknowledge them as sources of collective action emergence. The implication of this is, the gaps in the major collective action theories means that singularly, the theories could not fully account for J2K emergence but combined, it is their core contentions that explains J2K emergence because they complement each other and provides a holistic account of its emergence.

I argued in chapter six that the initiators of J2K demonstrated, harnessed and combined the various core points of the major collective action theories in the processes of cutting the diamond of debt. The initiators, as part of the internal resources, generated the additional resources and the requisite organisation from the period of the initial ideas for the Campaign onwards. The in-depth research, robust
and critical analysis that is fundamental to ‘cutting the diamond’ constituted part of the resources and organisation that was vital to the Campaign emergence. This was connected to the other fundamental part of cutting the diamond – the framing of the problem in a broad way to maximise its reflection and enable a broad swathe of individuals, groups and organisations to see themselves and their interests in the analysis of debt. Redefining debt and demonstrating the part-culpability of the creditors in the crisis based on the in-depth research and critical analysis of the history of debt, the Campaign framed the debt problem as justice-based issue. This in turn, attracted the broad participation of different segments of the national and international public and varied social sectors that then realised that their involvement in the emergent collective action, offered a realistic opportunity to redress the debt problem given the opportune time of the millennium end and the Jubilee theme.

Second, the emergence of J2K and its processes analysed in this research has further implications for the collective action literature particularly in relation to TANs because, it confirms a few propositions by TAN proponents as discussed in chapter three. For example, proponents contend that TANs emerge from proposals and strategies for social and political actions around apparently intractable problems by norm entrepreneurs or people who, though may be differently situated, are well informed on the issue over a considerable period of time to develop the same or similar world views. The emergence of debt norm entrepreneurs in the debtor and creditor countries who, having been engaged on the issue of debt for over a decade and half before J2K emerged meant that there were similar views between these differently situated social actors on the purportedly arcane and intractable issue of impoverished countries debt and international finance. It was this similarity in their views that informed their perspectives in their prognosis of and solution to the debt
crisis. As I discussed in chapter six, anti-debt groups in many indebted countries advocated debt cancellation prior to J2K emergence and the J2K initiators mirrored this view, as they demanded cancellation of the unpayable debt.

Third, I noted in my elaboration on TANs in chapter three that TANs were transient in nature, which means that their life cycles are short-lived and impermanent. In other words, when these networks reach their climax by attaining for example, their main aims or a considerable part of it, they cease to exist in their particular original configuration. The effective closure of J2K at the end of 2000 (although the closure date was unusual and appear unique to the J2K) meant that the J2K perfectly mirrored the observable transient nature of networks like the MAI and the ICBL. While some form of debt cancellation advocacy continue to exist after the closure of the Campaign, just like some components of networks like the ICBL after they reached their crescendo, they all ceased to exist in their original formation.

Fourth, TANs, understood as political spaces and communicative structures employ discursive processes and frames to negotiate their common identity. They combine the potency of effective information and leverage politics to persuade, socialise and put pressure on their target actors to produce changes in their issue areas. Fully deploying information politics with new and re-interpreted information on debt – based on in-depth research and critical analysis, the J2K provided the political space to broaden the debt discourse beyond the usual frame of aid and charity to one of justice and fairness. That several target actors were socialised to the Campaign’s perspective – that the debt problem was indeed a crisis, and were persuaded to respond by changing the existing debt management schemes, attests to this point. However, this research also showed that the dialogic and discursive space in the
Campaign was constrained by its organisational structure that lacked a formal and accountable but yet functional international secretariat.

Further, the networking processes of J2K discussed in this research confirm the contention that the networking dynamics between the different components of TANs are driven by domestic and international NGOs. The various aid, development and anti-poverty NGOs for example that were core members of the UK Coalition, aided by the informal secretariat that was part of the UK component facilitated the formal and informal exchange of information that made the UK component the main networking hub of the Campaign.

Finally, a point worth noting is the implication of J2K emergence for how TCAs are categorised in the literature. I showed in chapter two that the TCA on debt began as ‘Jubilee 2000’ and because it started to campaign for debt cancellation, it was simultaneously referred to as ‘Jubilee 2000’ and ‘Jubilee 2000 campaign’. When it merged with the DCN, it became known as Jubilee 2000 Coalition. All through these processes, the structure and the dynamics as well as the dominant mode were not static as they continually evolved.

The implication of the above for the categorisation of TCAs is that these networks do not always fit neatly into any of the categories in the literature because of the way they emerge and develop, and the internal or structural changes they may undergo in such processes. This explains the conflation and sometimes confusing application of the terms used to categorise TCAs because their dominant features do overlap within a certain span of time in the course of their duration. Fox succinctly captured this when he concludes, “(...) exchanges can produce networks, which can produce
coalitions, which can produce movements” (2004: 475). While the J2K was ultimately examined in this research as a TAN for analytical purposes and because of its overall dominant dynamics, it is clear that its categorisation in the literature was sometimes confusing due in part to the above explanation hence I argued for de-emphasising strict categorisation of transnational collective actions.

8.4 Evaluating the Jubilee 2000 Campaign

This research has sought to better understand TCAs by investigating the J2K. The relevant sub question in this section is:

*How do we evaluate the J2K?*

It is inevitable that different groups, initiatives and organisations would be involved in the emergence of any TCA. How the aims and demands of a TCA are defined, articulated and presented and how the strategy to achieve those aims are crafted and pursued will influence how participants evaluate the outcomes of that particular TCA. When groups are motivated by different agendas in the emergence of a collective action, those agendas feed into the reasons why the outcomes of any collective action becomes controversial and it underlines the politics of evaluation. To some extent therefore, controversies surrounding the outcomes of any TCA may be rooted in the emergence of that particular collective action and this is part of the problems in evaluating TCAs.

In this research I discussed how different actors have laid different and often contradictory claims in evaluating the results of J2K. Part of the problem I showed in chapter four was the tendency to evaluate the results of collective actions in the
binary of ‘success’ or ‘failure’. I showed that this perspective could not adequately capture the results of the J2K because broadly applied, it fails to reckon with the in-depth, robust and critical analysis of identifying the Campaign results and the causal processes through which they may have been achieved. Moreover, I argued that success and failure are relative terms that require measurement yardstick to operationalise and since that approach lacks a measurement yardstick, it would amount to unfounded sweeping declaration to mainly evaluate the J2K in terms of success or failure.

As a result I argued that the Campaign results be assessed or evaluated in terms of ‘outcomes’ in line with the adopted theoretical framework in this research. In chapter three I argued that TANs are an extension of the collective actions of the NSMs cluster because of their similar features. These similarities, coupled with the common ideological basis of both the NSMs and TANs, allowed for the framework devised for evaluating the NSMs to be deployed to evaluate TANs hence it was adapted to suit the evaluation of J2K outcomes in this research. This implied that the collective action on debt would produce some changes in the collective action itself, the political system or the general public. Accordingly, the J2K was evaluated with the adapted theoretical framework and its outcomes identified as procedural, substantive and sensitising impacts. To supplement this, other outcomes that exceeded the parameters of the theoretical framework were discussed as legacies of the Campaign. Finally, given the issue of causal complexity particularly in an intractable problem of debt and international finance, a conjectural and contextual approach was adopted to avoid casting the outcomes in definitive and conclusive terms.
8.5 Specifying the Outcomes of Jubilee 2000 Campaign

The question of how to evaluate the J2K has been addressed and a theoretical framework for that purpose has been outlined. I will now explore the question:

*What were the outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign?*

The outcomes of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign could be specified as follows: First, the J2K made procedural impacts by the access it gained to the target actors, which was mainly in the form of consultations and negotiations. It provided platform for consultations with the relevant stakeholders that included representatives of the IFIs and major creditor nations. The target actors in turn, recognised the J2K as legitimate representatives of the collective action on debt as they granted audience to the Campaign at different levels. At the national level in the UK and the US, the political leadership engaged the Campaign and had several high level meetings with its representatives. For example, Treasury officials met with the Jubilee2000USA on different occasions and discussed amongst other things, how the value of the debt owed to the US could be downgraded, to facilitate a cross-party support in the Congress, for debt cancellation. Further, the procedural impact of the Campaign was demonstrated by the access it had to Senators and other members of the Congress as it lobbied for approval of the requested funds for debt cancellation by the Clinton Administration. In the UK, these consultations and negotiations took place between the UK Coalition and the Prime Minister, Cabinet members and the Treasury and DfID officials amongst others. These processes were used by the Campaign to outline and advance its position on debt and showed the target actors' recognition of the Campaign as legitimate representatives of the collective action on debt.
Second, the Campaign outcomes included the substantive impacts it made on debt cancellation. Specifically, this entailed the creditors’ policy changes that HIPC2 represented and the policy changes that the individual creditor countries made on the debt of impoverished countries. HIPC2 as a major policy change was agreed at the G8 summit in Cologne in 1999 and it provided for some policy changes that were geared to address the Campaign’s criticisms of HIPC1. For example, the amount of debt that the creditors agreed to cancel rose to 100 billion Dollars from the initial 45 billion in HIPC1 and the number of years required to qualify for debt cancellation was halved from 6 to 3. Further, major creditor countries made individual policy changes to the effect of 100 per cent cancellation of certain categories of debt for the impoverished countries. Finally, an extension of these policy changes was reflected in the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative in 2005. This Initiative also provided for 100 per cent cancellation of certain categories of debt owed to the multilateral financial institutions, which in turn, increased the overall amount of debt agreed to be cancelled by the creditors. While this could not be entirely attributed to the J2K, it is evident that the MDRI built on the previous policy changes outlined above and the indebted countries could only be eligible for debt cancellation offered by this Initiative after going through the processes of HIPC2.

Third, a major outcome of the Campaign was evident in the sensitising impact it had. To better appreciate this, it is important to recall that when the idea of Jubilee and debt cancellation was initiated, it was scorned at and dismissed by many, including those in the aid and development field. This was because; impoverished countries debt was seen as arcane and intractable, complicated and difficult to communicate and therefore not an issue suitable for international campaign. In less than four years following the emergence of J2K, Jubilee debt cancellation became an international
mainstream issue due to the Campaign's sensitising ability. The complexity around
debt and international finance was deconstructed and simplified so that debt and its
underlying issues, including the role of creditors in the problem became easy to
communicate. As a result, various social sectors and actors from the public and
private, music and movie industry to the political arena were sensitised to the issue of
impoverished countries debt and the need for cancellation that the Campaign
demanded. That over 24 million people worldwide signed the Campaign's petition
for debt cancellation is a pointer to the sensitising impacts of J2K. A further
demonstration of the sensitising impacts is reflected by the fact that debt cancellation
became a dominant item in the institutional and political agenda of the target actors
following the emergence of J2K. At the national level in Italy, the UK and the US for
example, debt cancellation was a major feature in the Parliaments and Congress, and
at the Executive levels. At the international level, debt cancellation (or relief as the
creditors preferred) was a dominant item in the political agenda as reflected at the G8
Cologne summit in 1999 and in Birmingham, UK in 1998.

The above outcomes were identified with the theoretical framework adopted for this
research but there were other outcomes that did not neatly fit into this framework and
these were discussed as legacies of the Campaign. First, one such outcome was that
the Campaign reinforced the governance regime of the IFIs as their control
mechanisms over the indebted countries' economies were strengthened by the
continued imposition of macroeconomic measures, and their oversight of the Poverty
Reduction Strategies. Second, that debt is now widely considered as 'done' by most
Northern campaigners is a legacy of the Campaign. Third, that debt cancellation is
now viewed as a justice and moral issue rather than a charity and philanthropic act is
a credit to and a legacy of the Campaign. The policy change within the IFIs that
enabled their participation in the HIPC Initiative, and eroded their ‘preferred creditors’ status, is also a legacy of the Campaign. Finally, the Campaign further exposed the gulf and unequal partnership between civil society groups in the global North and South, and in particular, the mistrust that some Southern campaigners have of their Northern partners with regards to long term commitment to debt cancellation.

8.6 Findings of the Research and Contribution to Knowledge

This research has contribution to knowledge theoretically and empirically with the investigation of J2K because it helps us to better understand TCAs and particularly in the case of J2K, its emergence and outcomes. First, the study revealed that while the core emphasis of the major collective action theories may be vital to explaining the emergence of various collective actions, the case of J2K demonstrates the theoretical gaps in the literature because, as discussed above singularly, each of these theories are under equipped to explain the emergence of J2K. The Resource Mobilisation Theory could not account for how resources and organisation are translated into collective action emergence and although the political process theory offers an explanation of this process with the notion of cognitive liberation, neither of these theories could account for the role of principled ideas, ethical and non-material values in the emergence of J2K. However, this research also showed the necessity to combine the core emphasis of these theories to complement each other and render a more complete explanation of J2K emergence, a process that saw the application of the principles of cutting the diamond of debt.

To explain the emergence of J2K therefore, the initiators generated and mobilised various forms of resources and organisation and utilised the faith communities that
served as the mobilising structures in the Campaign emergence. To activate and translate these into the emergence of J2K, the highly significant notion of cognitive liberation and the importance of opportune timing were brought into play with the impending year 2000 and the Jubilee theme, which was the catalyst that cognitive liberation represents. It was this consciousness and apparent realisation that the debt problem could actually be redressed by the engagement of the initiators and their early supporters that formed part of the cumulative processes of J2K emergence. These core contentions of RMT and the PPT were all bounded by the ethical, non-material, principled and universal values that are the core points of the new social movements approach.

Cutting the diamond of debt allowed the redefinition of debt as justice issue and allowed debt to be framed in broad terms to maximise its reflection and hence attraction to a wide range of audience that perceived themselves and their interests in the debt problem. Although it is rare that a religious theme plays such a highly significant role in contemporary collective actions, the significance of the Jubilee theme could not be overestimated. It provided the opportune timing with the millennium ending and had a strong motivating, mobilising and galvanising effect in the Campaign emergence and diffusion.

Second, this research contributes to knowledge in that it fills a major gap in the literature on TCAs. This research was driven primarily by the question of how evaluating the J2K aids our understanding of transnational collective actions; how we evaluate the results and what indeed the outcomes of the collective action on debt were? That the Campaign gained huge international popularity with the resonance of its message and the Jubilee theme was no doubt. However, the outcomes of the
efforts that were put into the Campaign remained under explored in part because, most studies do not specifically focus on analysing its outcomes in a systematic way with a theoretical framework.

This research has contributed to knowledge by filling these gaps first, by critiquing the categorisation of TCAs and situating J2K within the network model of collective actions and the ideological axis of the new social movements’ approach. Second, by employing a theoretical framework that aided the identification of J2K outcomes at the different levels, this research avoided the shortcomings of the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ approach to evaluation in the context of J2K. Relatedly, by analysing the available data with the adapted theoretical framework, this research specified the Campaign outcomes on the different levels. These were the procedural, sensitising and substantive impacts, and those outcomes that I discussed as legacies of the Campaign, and thus, clarify what the results of the collective action on debt were.

My third contribution to knowledge is that the detailed examination of J2K in this research shows the difficulties that plague these networks in accommodating the aims of all the groups involved in them because of the varied agendas that may motivate a group to participate. The friction over the appropriate language in the network not only attest to the struggle for the ownership of the Campaign, but also exposed a deeper and fundamental difference in the principles guiding the different positions within the network. These different positions for example between the Jubilee South and the Jubilee 2000 Coalition were driven by the different agendas. As discussed in chapter six, the depth of these differences resulted in the schism that became public at the G8 summit in Cologne.
Again, this research contributes to knowledge by alerting us to these complexities. Concretely, it shows that because the J2K was initiated in the North, where the aims and the strategy to achieve those aims were crafted and where the initiators meant to influence the creditors and their institutions, there was no provision for Southern campaigners to make any meaningful content contribution that did not fully fit into the already defined plan. In other words, the incorporation and involvement of Southern campaigners and their agendas into the J2K was either an afterthought or a development that was simply beyond the control of the initiators. The later admission by key Campaign hierarchy in the UK that the J2K was formed by white middle class in the UK and presented to the South and that they (referring to the UK Secretariat) had a ‘tunnel vision’ approach which they were determined to see through without any distraction, is a confirmation that Southern partners and their voices were not equally taken into consideration in the Campaign emergence. The friction over HIPC2, the language of ‘forgiveness’ and the closure date are some of the issues and problems that could be traced to the Campaign emergence and which were driven by the varied agendas of different groups and blocks in the J2K.

Fourth, TAN proponents have long argued information politics as a major distinguishing feature of TANs. This research has augmented this distinction by highlighting the importance of the organisational platform from which TANs deploy information politics. While new or reinterpreted information may be vital to TANs, it is the platform from which that information is deployed that is crucial to the effectiveness of information politics. A lot of the information the J2K generated and deployed in the course of its existence was based on the true situation in the indebted countries including those countries where there had been anti debt groups. However, these groups lacked the organisational platform like the J2K through which such
information could be potently deployed until the J2K emerged. As discussed in the previous sections, the J2K was recognised as legitimate representatives of the collection action on debt and it could be argued that this was possible because of the organisational platform the J2K provided for advocacy on debt of the impoverished countries and from which it deployed the information it sourced.

Further, most studies on J2K have either taken the problem of causal complexity for granted or completely ignored it by failing to specify the causal processes through which the achievements that are ascribed to the J2K were achieved. In this research, a conjectural, contextual and temporal approach to outcomes was adopted due to the consciousness of other possible intervening causal influences on the identified J2K outcomes. The public preference mechanism and leverage politics were identified and explained as the causal processes of the Campaign outcomes.

Finally, I have argued in this research that the approach of evaluating TCAs mainly in terms of success and failure is not advisable for reasons I discussed earlier, hence the evaluation of J2K in this research has been conducted in terms of outcomes. While not evaluating J2K generally in terms of success and failure and given that the outcomes are now identified, I will now attempt to look at some of these outcomes vis-à-vis the Campaign aims to assess how the Campaign fared in its aims. Evidently, some of the outcomes discussed above reflect positively on the Campaign and thus, a reasonable ground for the assessment that the Campaign was a success in some of its aims. However, that success will remain qualified relative to the Campaign’s overall aims and in light of the conjectural, temporal and contextual approach to outcomes in this research given the extensive discussions of the problems and controversies associated with evaluating the outcomes of TCAs. I will briefly look at two examples
where success (or a degree of it) could be argued and a couple more examples for the assessment that the Campaign failed.

First, I detailed in chapter two that the J2K calculated that $300 of the $376 billion owed by the identified 52 indebted countries was unpayable. Given that the debt management schemes of HIPC and MDRI have so far resulted in $130 billion debt cancellations, it is safe to say that the J2K was partially successful in its aim to cancel the unpayable debt (although it is noted that the MDRI did not directly result from J2K efforts). At the same time, this partial success also implies that there was a partial failure as a considerable part of the self-defined unpayable remained. Second, besides the targets that were socialised, the Campaign mobilised the international public to its aims and this was reflected in the number of people who signed the debt cancellation petition. Debt, the arcane, intractable and complex issue was deconstructed and simplified that it became easily communicated and hence a mainstream issue in less than 4 years. Perhaps more than any other type of outcomes, the Campaign’s aim for international mass mobilisation and education about the facts on debt, and to expose the role of the creditors in the crisis could be judged a success.

On the other hand, it could equally be argued that the Campaign failed to achieve a number of other aims that it set out to achieve. For example, the Campaign hardly made any progress on its aim to establish an independent arbitration panel with equal representatives of debtor and creditor countries under the aegis of the UN, and the establishment of an international bankruptcy law for countries in desperate situations. Similarly, the Campaign’s aim to prevent a reoccurrence of the debt problem implied that the causes of the current problem would be addressed. However, the fact that the Campaign left the dubious international financial system unscathed while the IFIs
remained undemocratic, and the creditors firmly in control of decision-making on debt meant that the aim to prevent a reoccurrence was nothing more than fanciful. The recent examples of Western European countries like Italy, Spain and the ongoing debt problem in Greece shows that not only is there a reoccurrence but also an expansion of the debt problem to new territories, a point that validates the criticism from the Jubilee South. Finally, it is the creditors, contrary to the aims of the Campaign who still set the conditionalities for debt cancellation. Instructively, the creditors' power to impose these harsh conditionalities including privatisation of public services and other structural adjustment programmes that the Campaign railed against was strengthened by the HIPC2 agreement. On this point, there is credible justification that the Campaign failed to achieve its aim. However, a note of caution is advisable here. As indicated above, the assessment of success or failure that I have made here is not a general evaluation of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign as that would be contrary to the overall argument and approach of this research. Rather, this has been an attempt to scrutinise some of the aims of the Campaign given the outcomes that were identified in the least several sections and chapters of this research.

8.7 Areas of Further Research

The J2K was examined in this research as a way to better understand transnational collective actions. In the process, I have also explored a number of other questions and issues in relation to TCAs however; there are still some areas that could be worth further investigation. One potential area to further explore concerns the transient nature of TANs. As we have seen in this research, the J2K like other TANs ceased to exist in its original configuration by the end of 2000 although the debt problem was still there. This was in the wake of the policy change by the target actors in 1999 that was obviously a major highlight of the Campaign. The question then is what is
responsible for the transient nature of TANs when as in the case of J2K the original problem persists?

Second, the issue of (un)equal partnership between Northern and Southern campaigners in these networks has been criticised in the literature on advocacy networks. The argument that Southerners are only important to the extent that they are sources of legitimacy for their Northern partners is reflected in my discussion of the question of ownership of the Campaign. At issue therefore is: How should the legitimacy of Northern campaigners be conceptualised and understood on issues like impoverished countries debt besides legitimacy being largely appropriated by ‘incorporating’ Southern partners?

8.8 Final Comments

I was motivated to conduct this research for its theoretical and empirical importance, my personal interest in campaign efficacy and the quest to ascertain the results of J2K. Throughout the processes of exploring the archival materials, conducting interviews and engaging the secondary literature, I have found researching this topic quite exhilarating.

A common remark on the Jubilee 2000 Campaign is: That was a really big campaign but there are still a lot of poor and indebted countries. This is often followed by the question: what happened to the debt? These kinds of questions and remarks reiterate the importance of a deeper understanding of TCAs particularly in terms of how we evaluate their results. While analysts and theorists may theoretically explore various aspects of a TCA, a deeper understanding of these formations is equally important to practitioners and more generally, the public. This is because; some may view the
results of a particular collective action in terms of whether the primary aim for which it emerged was achieved or not. As shown in this research, a deeper understanding of TCAs enables us to identify the various spheres where a TCA may have made an impact and how those impacts may have been achieved. These may be areas other than that relating to the main aim that may have been set by the particular TCA. Finally, a deeper understanding of TCAs is necessary to alert us to their limitations in terms of the strategies they employ and their potential for change.
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10. Appendices

10.1 Appendix I: Combined Actual HIPCs List and J2K-Identified List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eligible for HIPC</th>
<th>Ineligible for HIPC</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Eritrea***</td>
<td>Unclear Eligibility</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Myanmar+</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe+</td>
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<td>Guinea+</td>
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<td>Guinea-Bissau*</td>
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<td>Guyana*</td>
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<td>Haiti**</td>
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<td>Honduras*</td>
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<td>Kenya+</td>
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<td>Liberia+</td>
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<td>Madagascar*</td>
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<td>Malawi+</td>
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<td>Mauritania*</td>
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<td>Rwanda*</td>
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<td>São Tomé &amp; Príncipe*</td>
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<td>Senegal*</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone*</td>
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<td>Uganda*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen, Republic of</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia*</td>
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</table>

Some J2K-identified countries did not meet HIPC conditions while some countries made the HIPC list after HIPC2 although J2K did not originally identify them as needing cancellation.

+Countries originally identified by J2K as in need of debt cancellation
**Completion Point Countries (As of end-September 2013)
***Decision Point Countries (As of end-September 2013)
****Pre-Decision Point Countries (As of end-September 2013)
10.2 Appendix II: The Jubilee 2000 Charter

The Jubilee 2000 Charter

The Jubilee 2000 Charter suggests a solution to the problem of Third World debt which is attractive to both debtors and creditors. It proposes the remission – by 31 December 2000 – of the unpayable debts owed by highly indebted poor countries to commercial banks, creditor governments and multilateral bodies (such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and Regional Development Banks.)

The Jubilee 2000 Charter proposes that:

- There is an overwhelming need to remission of the backlog of unpayable debts owed by highly indebted poor countries. Debt remission should relate to commercial, government and IMF/World Bank debts, and debt reduction should comprehensively include all three forms of debt.
- Creditors as well as debtors must accept responsibility for these high levels of indebtedness.
- The remission should be a one-off, unrepeatable act, tied to the celebration of the new millennium. It would set no precedents for future loans.
- The precise details of remission should be worked out in consultation with both creditors and debtors for each debtor country.
- These details should be agreed by arbitrators nominated in equal numbers by both creditor and debtor, under the aegis of the UN.
- Their deliberations should be transparent and well publicised, taking into account for each debtor country, that country’s probity, economic management, social policies and human rights record.
- Funds available after the remission of debt should be channelled into policies which benefit the poor, in line with UNICEF’s recommendations for investment in social development.
- Low income countries – with an annual income per person of less than US $700 – should receive full remission of all unpayable debt.
Higher income countries – with an annual income per person between US $700 and US $2,000 – should receive partial remission.

Source: Taken from Hanson (1996: 25)

10.3 Appendix III: Sample of Interview Questions

1. How did you begin with the campaign and can you elaborate on the merging with the DCN and what that meant?

2. What were the main or primary aims of the campaign?
   + Do you think these were realised?

3. From the perspective of the campaigners, the J2K was a successful campaign. Why do you think this is a correct assessment?
   + What reasons would you adduce for these results you just enumerated? Why was the campaign able to achieve this?
   + Do you think the faction of Jubilee South also share this assessment?

4. What would you consider as the general impact and consequences of the campaign both on the short and long terms?

5. The campaign developed a strategy that enabled the inclusion of a broad spectrum of the society as reflected in the declaration: “We, the undersigned call on all world leaders to cancel the unpayable (sic) debts of the poorest countries by the year 2000, under a fair and transparent process”. (Pettifor, 2006:316).
   **Question:** Were there other strategies that were specifically discussed and adopted or discarded?

6. The British and the German J2K campaigns led the North’s campaign in Cologne 1999 where the rift between the North and the South was widened. You acknowledged that mistakes were made and the Jubilee South was critical of your final statement or declaration (welcoming the G8 progress on debts) at the end.
   **Question:** What were these mistakes?

7. What was the tension between the policy experts on international finance and those without knowledge on these issues about?

8. What was the antagonism that was sometimes there from the Christian evangelicals to other Christian organisations that you mentioned in your article of April 2004? Who were these evangelicals?

9. What were the tensions within the broad British coalition?

10. Which campaigns/organisations carried on after 2000 onwards and what changed in the organisation, constituency and targets?

11. Possibly useful documents? Contacts to Dent and Bill Peters? Others you’ll recommend I talk to?

12. When was the Rome meeting where tension between the North and the South initially surfaced?
Jubilee 2000 Petition

We, the people of Britain, believe that at the start of the new millennium, the birth day of a new world is at hand.

To make a fresh start, we believe it essential to cancel the backlog of unpayable debts of the poorest nations by the year 2000;

and call upon the leaders of the richest creditor nations to achieve such a comprehensive remission of the debts of the poorest countries - in time for celebrations of the new millennium.

SIGNED:

NAME          ADDRESS          ORGANISATION


Source: Robinson Library Special Collections, Temporary Box List for the Jubilee 2000 Papers, Box 2, University Library, Newcastle.
10.5 Appendix V: Notes on Interviewees

Notes on Interviewees

Marie Brill became the Executive Director of the Jubilee USA Network in 2001. Prior to that she was engaged with an organisation that was partly based in the US and Nicaragua, where she worked with groups that later formed the Jubilee Nicaragua in 1998.

Isabel Carter, the former Community News Editor at Tearfund, registered the Jubilee 2000 Charity Trust and Company in April 1996 and was a member of the initial Jubilee 2000 Board.

Nick Dearden was until recently Director of the Jubilee Debt Campaign, one of the groups that developed from the closure of the Jubilee 2000 Campaign in December 2000. The Jubilee Debt Campaign continues to campaign for debt cancellation and coordinates anti debt groups in the UK. Nick Dearden is since September 2013 Director of the World Development Movement.

Marie Dennis was until recently Director of the Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns in the US where she worked from 1989 to 2012. She was a member of the Coordinating Committee of the Jubilee2000USA Network.

John Dillon is a key member of Kairos Canada, the Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives. The Initiative played a leading role in Jubilee Canada.

Georgine Kengne Djeutane is a Senior Policy Officer at the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) and was one of the founders of Jubilee 2000 Cameroon in 1999.

David Golding got involved with Jubilee 2000 in 1996 through Tearfund and was a founding board member and co-chair of the Jubilee Debt Campaign. He was one of the regional leaders in the UK Coalition who seriously opposed the closing of the Campaign in 2000.

Jo Marie Griesgraber chaired the Executive Committee of Jubilee 2000/USA and was a Senior Associate at the Center of Concern, a Jesuit social justice research and advocacy center, from 1989-2000.

Joseph Hanlon was the Policy Officer for the Jubilee 2000 Campaign and has written extensively on international debt, particularly of the highly indebted poor countries. He helped develop the notion of "illegitimate debt".

Beverly Keene is the International Coordinator of Jubilee South/Americas and is the Coordinator Jubilee South-Dialogue 2000 in Argentina. She was involved with the Jubilee 2000 Campaign in Latin America in collaboration with other national Jubilee 2000 campaigns in the region.
Kofi Mawuli Klu was the Chair of African Liberation and Solidarity Campaign which was a member of the Jubilee 2000 Coalition/UK and was the International Coordinator of Jubilee 2000 AFRIKA CAMPAIGN from 1998-2000.

Makoma Lekalakala was the national campaign Coordinator for the Jubilee 2000 Campaign in South Africa and remains a leading figure in the Jubilee South. She was actively involved in the anti-debt campaign in South Africa prior to the emergence of Jubilee 2000 Campaign.

Delfa Mantilla was a leading member of Jubilee Ecuador and Ecuador National Debt Group.

Njoki Njeroge Njehu is the founder and Executive Director of ‘Daughters of Mumbi Global Resource Center’ in Kenya and was in the Executive Committee of the Jubilee 2000 USA. In 1998 she was the Coordinator of the Washington based ‘50 Years is Enough’, a network of over 200 groups that worked to transform the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. She is a leading Africa Jubilee South activist.

Ann Pettifor was the Coordinator of Jubilee 2000 and later Director of the Jubilee 2000 Coalition in the UK from 1997-2000. She was the Coordinator of the Debt Crisis Network when she joined the Jubilee 2000 in 1995 and was contracted part-time to both organisations.

Neil Watkins was the former Coordinator and later Executive Director of the Jubilee2000USA.