The relationships that bind? Power and alter-globalisation networks

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The relationships that bind? Power and alter-globalisation networks

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ABSTRACT

Many scholars celebrate the emancipatory potential of alter-globalisation networks. This thesis tests this claim, using a case study of the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP), and analysing what the powers which constitute this network reveal about the powers of it. GCAP is one of the largest networks of its type, mobilising nearly 175 million people on a single day in 2009 via national coalitions of civil society organisations in 115 countries. The PhD research focuses on two of these national coalitions in India and Malawi, as well as GCAP’s broad governance structures, and utilises semi-structured and ethnographic interviews, participant observation and documentary analysis. The data was analysed through a methodological frame of governmentality and post-governmentality literatures, to analyse the full range of discourses and agencies which construct GCAP. The thesis interrogates the agency of GCAP through an exploration of three power-related themes, namely: the relationships GCAP enacts with processes of statist and neo-liberal hegemony; how GCAP develops relations of solidarity across distance; and the manner in which GCAP constructs subjects of legitimation. The thesis finds that GCAP embodies a monitored subjectivity vis-à-vis statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power, yet also retains a monitory agency on those powers. It furthermore finds that relations of solidarity developed in GCAP between areas of structural advantage and disadvantage are imbued with both colonial and post-colonial discourses, which simultaneously buttress and contest neoliberal discourses of managerialism, resource-dependency and the fetishisation of ‘the poor’. These different
sets of relations construct GCAP with a contingent, contradictory, yet at times emancipatory and transcendent subjectivity. By creating a snapshot of an alter-globalisation network in diverse social contexts, this thesis reveals the ways in which the power of such networks is uneven and immanent, dependent upon confluences of the various internal and external powers which constitute them.
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ABBREVIATIONS

ANT – Actor Network Theory
CIVICUS – World Alliance for Citizen Participation
CONGOMA – Council of Non-Governmental Organisations in Malawi
ETHINT – Ethnographic Interview
GCAP – The Global Call to Action against Poverty
GCS – Global Civil Society
IDTs – International Development Targets
INGO – International Non-Governmental Organisation
LAG – GCAP Learning and Evaluation Group
MDGs – Millennium Development Goals
NCSTM National Civil Society Taskforce for the MDGs in Malawi
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD-DAC - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee
UN – United Nations
UNMC – United Nations Millennium Campaign
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
WNTA – Wada Na Todo Abhiyan
INTRODUCTION

"Something is happening here, but you don't know what it is, do you, Mr. Jones?"

(Bob Dylan, *Ballad of a Thin Man*, 1965)

In the 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, something has been happening to progressive and public non-state actors. They have expanded and proliferated; they have been suggestive of the unification of diverse peoples across national and regional boundaries in common cause; they have claimed recognition of their campaigns in multilateral reforms and international treaties on everything from the regulation of landmines to the de-regulation of the internet. They have, some argue, prefigured equitable and emancipatory alternatives to neo-liberal and market-driven globalisation. Their power has grown with the explosion of cheaper communications technologies and the availability of 24-hour news in many parts of the world. Globalisation has stretched and intensified the social relations which enable these non-state actors to hold states and international organisations accountable from every corner of the world. However, continuing and growing socio-economic disparities call into question these actors' effectiveness, whilst public disagreements over aims and strategies call into question the degree to which such actors represent coherent positions on the impacts of globalisation and neo-liberalism, as well as the position of marginalised groups in constituting these positions. Many commentators appear to have taken the appearance and proliferation of
these non-state actors as good in and of itself, without interrogating the internal dynamics which constitute them. This thesis addresses this issue, in relation to the following question:

What do the powers in alter-globalisation networks reveal about the powers of them?

That I have called these actors 'alter-globalisation networks' represents the intellectual journey I have taken through this thesis. The research I have carried out concerns the powers which constitute these networks, and what this reveals about their potentials and limitations for prefiguring more equitable social relations in a globalised world. It is relevant to note that simply reaching the point where I could talk about 'alter-globalisation networks' straightforwardly and without caveat represents the culmination of more than three years of being dissatisfied with other popular and scholarly labels for these networks, and the belief that the names we give things are important, for what they allow us to say and think about them. This speaks to a broader theme which this thesis is in part designed to address: that the analytical categories which have dominated the field of research on international, transnational and global activism, protest, and advocacy do in fact quite often close down, to different degrees, critical engagement with these actors, obscuring the realities of the processes and activities that constitute them and underpin their particular forms of normativity and agency.

Something is happening here...conceptual clarity
Several scholars have provided what appear to be analytical frameworks for understanding alter-globalisation networks. I will introduce some of these in greater detail further on in this introductory chapter. For the moment I wish to explain my own choice of term for these actors i.e. alter-globalisation networks. I deploy this term through this thesis in an attempt to provide a framework for these actors which allows us to understand their full range of agencies, and the powers which they are productive of (in terms of discursive and/or material influence) and shaped by. This is something which I will argue that other proposed frameworks do not do particularly effectively. Firstly, I contend that these actors provide or pre-figure alternatives to contemporary and dominant modes of neo-liberal and market-driven globalisation. This is not to argue that such alternatives are necessarily radical, or even progressive, but that they do arise from critiques of the basis and/or impacts of dominant modes of globalisation. Importantly though, I desist from labelling these actors as necessarily ‘global’ (something which other scholars in this field fail to always do; see for example, Kaldor, 1999; 2003; Cohen and Rai, 2000; Bandy and Smith, 2005; Bevington and Dixon 2005; Saunders and Rootes, 2006), as this suggests a semi or actually coherent field of social relations in which these actors interact. I will argue in this thesis that this is a way of conceptualising space, and

1 The term ‘alter’ globalisation’ has been deployed by scholars as an alternative to ‘anti’
globalisation in an attempt to illustrate the acceptance by activists of globalisation in general, but their
rejection of neo-liberal forms of globalisation in particular (see, for example Featherstone, 2003; Broad and
Cavanagh, 2006; Mouffe, 2007; Sassen, 2007b; Reitan, 2008). However, these authors regularly refer to the
alter-globalisation movement. The distinction between this and my deployment of alter-globalisation
networks will become apparent over the coming paragraphs.
‘the global’ as being pre-social, which thus ignores the way that space is socially produced.

Secondly, I contend that the proliferation of such actors over the past 20 years relies on them either being networks, or networked. In other words, they are both produced by networks of social relations, again, not necessarily all progressive and emancipatory, and belong to more ontologically verifiable networks of organisations and actors with whom they interact on a regular basis. Given the uneven nature of these networks I will therefore not be relying on a ‘network of networks’ imaginary, deployed by amongst others Castells (1999a; 2000) and Della Porta (2005). This imaginary arguably flattens social relations (Routledge, 2003: 45) by imagining that these processes uniformly replace a space of different places with spaces of place-dissipating and unfixed grassroots flows (Castells: 1999b). In the context of this study, this imaginary is also slightly tautological; whilst accepting that social reality is networked (unevenly), it does not necessarily reveal very much about the flows of power within networks to talk of a ‘network of networks’. I will instead deploy networks as a set of (uneven and exclusionary) inter-organisational, individual-organisational and inter-personal relationships (Diani, 1992: 109) which constitute alter-globalisation actors, adding to this

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2 The term ‘alter globalisation movement’ is therefore not considered useful in understanding the agency of actors of the type being considered here. This is because ‘movement’ implies a bounded entity which closes off potential sets of constitutive relations seemingly outside that entity. In addition to the scholars in the previous footnote who have talked about the ‘alter-globalisation movement’, there are many others who talk about the ‘global justice movement’, or the ‘movement of movements’ (see, for example, Cohen and Rai, 2000; Buttel and Gould, 2004; Della Porta, 2005; Maiba, 2005; Osterweil, 2005; Saunders and Rootes, 2007). All of these conceptualisations imply a bounded space, and, it will be argued, do not provide a rigorous enough framework for understanding the full agency of these actors.
though the ‘external’ relationships which also constitute the forms of knowledge these actors possess. These latter relationships include those with statist and other powerful hegemonic\(^3\) actors and their discourses. Furthermore, I do not take networks to imply a uniformity of membership-type or affect. Alter-globalisation networks invoke and deploy a number of subjects, sites, tactics, strategies and characteristics. These intersect with each other to create context-specific one-off campaigns, united coalitions and loose sub-networks.

Lastly, I want to frame the manner in which I will refer to the state throughout this thesis. In fact, I will not normally refer to the state, but rather statist formations, hegemony and discourses. I here adopt Hix’s (1998) contention (made in relation to the European Union) that under contemporary conditions of globalisation the state has been re-worked, and that what we might think of as ‘the’ state cannot be thought of as a fixed and stable entity, but a form of rule and norms-governing. Indeed, one might argue that this has always been the case to greater or lesser degrees\(^4\). This also relates to the way I will be referring to neo-liberalism, and in particular neo-liberal hegemony, distinguishing it from statist hegemony. I will be making this distinction in order to stand back, at least momentarily, from the assumption that statist hegemony is always neo-liberal in character. I will therefore distinguish between statist and neo-liberal hegemony in this

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\(^3\) Various interpretations of hegemony and their implications for construing alter-globalisation networks will be discussed in Chapter Two.

\(^4\) Whilst Hix provides what appears to be the most functional overview of these discussions, for more theoretical explorations on the ambiguous and networked form of the state under conditions of post-modernity and globalisation (which collapses the idea of the state as a pre-given) see Badie and Birnbaum, 1979/1983; Mitchell, 1991; Pringle and Watson, 1992; Majone, 1994; Levy, 2006.
thesis because I wish to leave open the possibility that alter-globalisation networks may have relationships with forms of statist hegemonic power other than that of neo-liberalism. So whilst it is true that statist powers may operate against neo-liberal hegemony, such statist powers do still operate under hegemonic logics (even if it is not of the neo-liberal type) which might be contested by oppositional civil society groups and alter-globalisation networks. For example, whilst counter hegemonic regimes in Venezuela or Bolivia may garner support from many alter-globalisation networks, the regimes of North Korea or Iran are unlikely to attract similar levels of support.

Which alter-globalisation network?

This research takes a case study approach, cognisant of the fact that, given the very broad definition of alter-globalisation networks developed above, no case study could ever be representative of alter-globalisation networks per se. Nonetheless, the network considered in this research, the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP), is an actor which by many measures would be considered extremely significant. It maintains a presence in 115 countries; it claims to have mobilised 2% of the world’s population on one day in 20085; and it was the organisational umbrella behind the 2005 UK Make Poverty History campaign. More information about GCAP and the processes which led me to choose it as the case study for this research will be provided in Chapter Four.

Concepts and arguments: Chapters One, Two and Three

The frameworks which have been developed to understand actors like GCAP in the past fifteen years include 'global civil society' (Keane, 2001; Kaldor, 2003), the 'global justice movement' (Cohen and Rai, 2000; Saunders and Rootes, 2006), 'movement of movements' (Della Porta, 2005; Newman, 2007), 'transnational advocacy networks' (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), and the 'anti capitalist movement' (Gilbert, 2008). All of these terms frame alter-globalisation networks in different ways, and provide a rich set of conceptual tools with which to analyse the kinds of activism and protest that have grown around the world in the post-Cold War period in the pursuit of socio-economic justice. Many of these frameworks are also explicitly normative. In Chapters One and Two I will explore this in more detail, and the limitations this involves for some of these frames when understanding the everyday processes and relations which constitute and are produced by alter-globalisation networks. These literatures provide important reference points for the study of power in alter-globalisation networks, and its implications for their potentials and limitations.

In Chapter One I consider one group of scholars who have been particularly influential in the literature and practice of alter-globalisation networks, who I call 'liberal

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Particularly, it should be noted, the practices of important constituent members of GCAP, which emerged and coalesced around the 2005 Make Poverty History Campaign. The campaign was criticised by
cosmopolitans'. Coalescing around a framework of alter-globalisation networks which understands them as constituting a global civil society (even if not explicitly stated as such), I argue in this chapter that liberal cosmopolitanism is over celebratory of the potentials and powers of alter-globalisation networks, positing them as autonomous, deliberative, democratic and pre-figurative of a post-Westphalian, citizen-led democratic order. The framework of analysis which liberal cosmopolitans provide is therefore found to contain a number of significant gaps. It posits a diffusion of power away from the state and statist formations to non-state actors, but fails to provide an analysis of how statist powers have been reworked and now represent a diffuse network of hegemonic power (and the constraints and opportunities this provides for alter-globalisation networks). Linked to this, the liberal cosmopolitan framework is unable to provide a contextualised understanding of the legitimacy and representivity of alter-globalisation networks, and the degree to which they do, rather can be presumed to, provide spaces of deliberation and alternatives to neo-liberal globalisation to be enacted. This is especially the case given the degree to which they may be penetrated by diffuse statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations.

In Chapter Two I explore another important set of scholars who have sought to understand the agency (both actual and potential) of alter-globalisation networks.

'Radical alter-globalisationists' draw on a range of structural and post-structural theories some for embodying the kind of Liberal cosmopolitanism which I will analyse in Chapter One (see Gorringe and Rosie, 2006), for example, by the way in which African performers were sidelined from the main 'Live 8' concerts (a criticism which circulated widely in the media at the time).
to provide a potential framework for understanding alter-globalisation networks, and are more convincing than the liberal cosmopolitans in doing so. It remains the case, though, that the normative commitments of radical alter-globalisationists establish binaries between counter-hegemonic and post-hegemonic\(^7\) renditions of the conditions in which alter-globalisation networks operate, and of the strategies they should operationalise. This again closes down understandings of alter-globalisation networks which might resonate between and/or transcend these positions (for example, the degree to which alter-globalisation networks might work both inside and outside statist formations). I argue that adopting a radical alter-globalisationist approach only allows an imaginary which views one or the other of its binaries as being authentically radical. This is particularly the case with regard to the normative positions adopted by thinkers considered in this chapter for the relationship between alter-globalisation networks and their externalities (i.e. the state and neo-liberal hegemony).

In Chapter Three I draw together what is productive from the first two chapters in addition to further theoretical reflection in order to develop my own epistemological framework for understanding what the powers in alter-globalisation networks might reveal about the powers of them. I attempt to collapse the distinctions between alter-globalisation networks and the market, or the state, which are set up by both liberal cosmopolitans and radical alter-globalisationists, in order to develop a framework which is grounded, non-prescriptive, yet retains a normative commitment to the progressive

\(^7\) I will fully explicate these terms in Chapter Two
ideals claimed by alter-globalisation networks and scholars of them. I argue that in collapsing these distinctions we avoid making overtly normative judgements which obscure the complex agencies of alter-globalisation networks. We also inevitably end up viewing these agencies through a prism of power and space – which power relations construct these networks, and which power relations are alter-globalisation networks productive of? What kind of spaces do these power relations produce? I further develop three core prisms through which these questions of relationality are refracted (and which are thus reflected in the constitution of the data chapters): (i) the relationship between alter-globalisation networks, statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations; (ii) the interaction between cosmopolitan and post-colonial discourses and practices; and (iii) assessing the 'location' of alter-globalisation networks (i.e. to what degree are these networks embedded in the imaginations of the activists and organisations which constitute them?).

Methodology and Research Design

Chapter Four performs several functions. The chapter begins by detailing the rationale and contributions of this research. I note the lack of research conducted into power in alter-globalisation networks, particularly of the discursive kind (this distinction will be explored further in this chapter) with most studies focussing purely on the power of them. This study seeks to address this gap in the literature by first investigating the powers which constitute alter-globalisation networks, but also by linking this directly to the
powers of them. The research also contributes to the so far small set of literature which seeks to investigate alter-globalisation networks in contexts of structural inequality. There are many studies which focus on alter-globalisation mobilisations and protests in Europe or North America, but far fewer in contexts of socio-economic deprivation (Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos, 2004: 850).

I then continue to outline a series of research questions which flow from my core question and which guided my research. These questions are:

Central Research Question

i) What do the powers in alter-globalisation networks reveal about the powers of them?

Sub-research Questions

i) In which ways can alter-globalisation networks be understood as oppositional?

ii) Which processes of exclusion and inclusion constitute alter-globalisation networks?

iii) Where are alter-globalisation networks?
I continue by outlining my epistemological approach to the key concepts of power and space employed in this study, which is relational, drawing on a Foucauldian analysis of power (Foucault, 1969/2002; 1982/1994; 2000; Knights and Willmott, 1982; Wickham, 1986) together with post-governmentality approaches which focus on the agency of practices, and processes of re-subjectification (Clegg, 1989: 204-205; Callon and Latour, 1981; Callon, 1986; Law, 1992; Latour, 2005; Allen, 2004).

Following this, I introduce the focal case study of this research, the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP). I narrate my encounter with GCAP as the result of focussed exploration of alter-globalisation networks together with the odd serendipitous moment, and argue that GCAP represents a significant alter-globalisation network, even if this does not make it necessarily representative. I furthermore introduce the manner in which I approached GCAP as a unit of analysis. Being constituted by coalitions of NGOs, International NGOs (INGOs), trade unions, social movements, faith groups and other civil society actors in 115 countries, each with its own distinctive modus operandi, meant that however I chose to study GCAP carried implications for the results that would be generated. I ultimately decided to conduct case studies within my case study, focussing on two particular coalitions, in Malawi and India. Two coalitions were chosen in order to provide a ‘deep’ rather than ‘broad’ study, whilst these two coalitions in particular were chosen because they provided interesting areas of contrast which shed light on a number of GCAP’s constitutive relationships, because they would ensure that this study was
located in areas of structural disadvantage, and more instrumentally, because they both allowed me to conduct this research in English.

My approach to GCAP as a unit of analysis reveals the distinctively qualitative and 'deep' approach I wanted to take with this research. I justify this approach and the research methods I employed to conduct this study of GCAP as the chapter progresses. These methods included semi-structured and ethnographic interviews, participant observation and an analysis of texts produced by GCAP as a global network as well as by the case study coalitions I included in the study. These methods carry significant limitations, which are acknowledged. I also recount here the manner in which my 'choice' of methods was iterative and shaped by the activity of actually doing research.

**Explorations – Hegemony, Cosmopolitanism and Legitimation**

My explorations of GCAP are presented thematically, across three chapters. In Chapter Five I discuss GCAP's relationship with statist formations and neo-liberal hegemony, what one might crudely call its 'external' relationships. In Chapter Six I discuss the interactions between imperialistic and post-colonial cosmopolitan discursive and interpretative orientations, in the context of the relationships between the various organisations which constitute GCAP. In this case, the focus of the chapter is on what one might crudely call GCAP's 'internal' relationships. In Chapter Seven I seek to 'locate' GCAP through the subjects whom GCAP's core texts construct as being both
authentic, and therefore legitimating of GCAP's claims. This is analysed in an attempt to understand how GCAP is embedded in the imaginations and practices of these subjects, and what this means for an understanding of alter-globalisation networks as global, national or local.

In Chapter Five then I find GCAP's relationship with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations to be complex and contradictory, highly conditioned by the spaces in which GCAP interacts with and converges with these formations. I argue that this relationship is a monitory one (i.e. a form of relation which sees subjects both monitor and be monitored), which creates the conditions for both transformational and co-optive relations with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations. GCAP's close working relationship with the United Nations Millennium Campaign (UNMC) is highlighted as an example of this, and is shown to have uneven affects in the two case study coalitions in India and Malawi. In India this relationship contributes to an oppositional and in part transformative monitory relationship between the coalition there and the Indian government. In Malawi, though, GCAP's relationship with the UNMC is part of a larger story about the discursive and ontological power of the Millennium Development Goals to order and monitor the imaginations and practices of members of that coalition with regard to poverty eradication and social justice.

In Chapter Six I seek to explore the relations of inclusion and exclusion which constitute GCAP. I begin by focussing on the role INGOs play in both the national coalitions and
GCAP more broadly, finding examples of both the emancipation of marginal discourses (particularly in the case of Dalit and Adivasi struggles in India) and domination. I then move on from individual examples of these dynamics to explore the relative success or failure of INGO visions of GCAP. I find that the INGOs narrated GCAP in two main ways, firstly, by measuring GCAP's success quantitatively (how many people GCAP had mobilised), and secondly, by establishing 'authentic' marginalised groups on behalf of whom GCAP worked, but who were nonetheless not expert enough in their own authentically poverty-stricken lives to speak for themselves. I argue that this perspective is drawn from a particularly imperial discourse of cosmopolitanism, which seeks to close down the 'suffering others' who are deemed to be in need of salvation, and is a rendition of GCAP which was particularly successful amongst coalition participants in Malawi. Coalition members in India, though, appeared to draw on their own cosmopolitan discursive resources, which were far more embedded in anti-neo-liberal and post-colonial imaginations. I argue that these different forms of cosmopolitanism interact and fuse with each other in GCAP unevenly, producing non-linear results, and new relations of both inclusion and exclusion.

Chapter Seven represents the drawing together of the previous two data chapters, as they both contribute to the issue of 'locating' GCAP. In this chapter, I illustrate how through its core texts, GCAP constitutes itself as not merely representing, but also being located in, the population groups of the most marginalised, and the national coalitions which are affiliated to it. This affords GCAP the opportunity of claiming itself as authentic and
legitimate, and to claim the successes of national coalitions even where it is hard to find GCAP's involvement in them. Whilst GCAP is credited with opening up spaces for collaboration between types of civil society actors who might not normally have worked together, beyond this, GCAP’s presence in the subjects and network nodes it claims it is constituted through is found to be highly problematic. Amongst coalition members in Malawi GCAP is largely absent from their imaginations of what they are involved in, or at best distant and detached. Coalition members in India on the other hand reveal GCAP to be ill-fitting and irritating to the context in which they work. I therefore argue that GCAP appears to be a discursive network, and in this respect has to do battle with other powerful discourses seeking to shape civil society responses to poverty eradication, and produce the spaces in which these discourses enact themselves. These discourses are both radical (post-colonial, social movement discourses - see Chapter Six) and less so (statist and hegemonic discourses - see Chapter Five).

Implications

In Chapter Eight I summarise the core arguments of the thesis and discuss the implications of the data for alter-globalisation networks more broadly. The argument here follows the logic of the data chapters, i.e., by addressing the implications of the research through the prism of statist, cosmopolitan and discursive-spatial relations.
In the first case, I argue that whilst GCAP exhibited a highly uneven and largely problematic form of monitory oppositionality, it was the very ambiguity and immanence of this type of relation which also revealed its unstable potential. I argue that alter-globalisation networks must always be in relations to that which they are in alterity to, and are thus always monitoring as well as being monitored. The more self-conscious such networks are to these relations therefore, the more they can take advantage of and rework them.

With regard to GCAP’s interacting forms of cosmopolitanism, I argue that alter-globalisation networks are not inclusionary because they are cosmopolitan, but that they may in fact incubate several forms of fusing, resisting and reinforcing cosmopolitanisms, each replete with their own inclusions and exclusions. Cosmopolitanism therefore appears as an other-regarding discursive resource, itself constructed through various interpretative repertoires (Billig et al, 1988; Edley, 2001). It is these interpretations which give cosmopolitanisms their discursive power, always particular and distinctive. Cosmopolitanism therefore becomes more akin to an analytical tool with which to assess the normativity of alter-globalisation networks, rather than a universal prescriptive agenda which all alter-globalisation networks should subscribe to. That GCAP embodies different forms of cosmopolitanism is a case for qualified optimism for the state of alter-globalisation networks more broadly, and suggests that such networks might be learning (slowly, iteratively) the lessons of critiques that were levelled at other similar networked
actors such as Jubilee 2000 (which accused them of being at times largely INGO led and exclusionary - see Mayo, 2005; Yanacopulos, 2009).

In locating alter-globalisation networks, I argue that what we really do is discover the degree to which they are legitimate and representative of those they claim to speak for. On a normative point, I claim that if alter-globalisation networks are going to ensure that they are present in the subjects they argue constitute them, they must recognise and be ever-aware of how these subjects are always co-present with other potentially co-optive actors, i.e. statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, or colonising cosmopolitans. Alter-globalisation networks must therefore recognise that they are engaged in processes of immanence, or ‘always becoming’ (Massumi, 2002; Newman, 2007: 42), which require constant navigation in order to ensure the greatest degree of legitimacy possible for their actions and claims. I argue that this is an inherently inclusive process, which can only expand the potentialities of alter-globalisation networks to enact emancipatory alternatives to neo-liberal globalisation.

In terms of answering the core research question of this thesis then (What do the powers in alter-globalisation networks reveal about the powers of them?) I argue that alter-globalisation networks are constituted by a multiplicity of productive power relationships, which means that it is not possible to talk about the effects of alter-globalisation networks in the singular. Their powers to are entirely dependent on the manner in which the powers which constitute them in different sites converge. The
powers of alter-globalisation networks therefore might be the manner by which they provide opportunities to expose neo-liberal and structural powers to manipulation through convergence. These opportunities are not always taken though, because of the dynamics of these powers in particular sites, yet the opportunities exist nonetheless. I further argue that alter-globalisation networks need therefore to be sensitive to the manner in which what may appear to be a power-exerting relationship in one convergence space may be power-constraining in another context of convergence to which it also contributes. This happens because convergence is inevitably differential, dependent on the relative powers of the different productive relations which combine to constitute the space. Indeed, it is this inevitable differentiability which lends alter-globalisation networks their potential to navigate power (Allen, 2004), to take advantage of certain relations in specific contexts, but to outflank them in others where to engage with them would result in being dominated by them.

This chapter has provided an overview of this thesis. In short, Chapters One and Two provide a critique of existing frameworks for understanding the constitutive powers of

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I will explore the nature of convergence and how it relates to this project in greater detail in Chapter Three. Briefly, convergence is treated as the constituent aspect of any spatial arrangement. It is also treated as contingently productive of new or re-worked and re-subjectivised social relations. Paul Routledge and his colleagues have carried out the most applicable work around convergence in relation to social movements and alter-globalisation networks (see Routledge, 2003a; Cumbers, Routledge and Nativel, 2007; Cumbers and Routledge, 2009), although Kohn perhaps puts it most succinctly when she argues that "The 'global' makes no sense except as the convergence of different localities" (2003: 163). See also Butler (2008: 47), and especially Massey (2005: 191), whose discussion of the coalescing social trajectories which construct London as a cosmopolitan/exploitative financial centre does not deploy the specific term 'convergence', but nonetheless speaks to the themes outlined above.
alter-globalisation networks; Chapter Three develops a more suitable theoretical framework for such an analysis; Chapter Four outlines the methodological implications of this framework and the design of the research; and Chapters Five, Six and Seven analyse the empirical data collected. Why, though, does any of this matter? Changing social realities for the most marginalised is not simply a matter of good will. The impotence many of us feel in the face of natural or human-made disasters, whether near or far, testifies to this simple fact. This research matters because it illustrates the limits of good will, and simultaneously the potential of serious reflection and horizontal, strategic decision making to alter-globalisation networks. Another world is possible (George, 2002), but it’s a treacherous route, requiring a lot of hard work.
CHAPTER ONE

Liberal Cosmopolitans and Global Civil Society

1.1 Introduction

As I have already suggested in the introductory chapter, there are a number of ways in which commentators have attempted to categorise alter-globalisation networks like GCAP, and in doing so have translated these networks into particular visions of how, where and why fundamental socio-economic change should occur. These normative visions are at times far from explicit, and whilst I will argue that they can be productive of certain ways of thinking about alter-globalisation networks, they also serve to close down other ways of understanding them, drawn from alternative theoretical traditions as well as from the empirical study of them.

In this section I propose to clarify the suggestions I have made in this regard by focussing on the most categorical of all the conceptualisations that have been developed to explain alter-globalisation networks, that of global civil society (GCS). There are three important caveats here: firstly, that not all of the arguments engaged with in this chapter refer explicitly to global civil society. Whilst all of the theorists considered and critiqued do provide a framework for understanding alter-globalisation networks as global
phenomena, these frameworks frequently emerge from their epistemologies of national
civil societies per se. The second caveat is that GCS is a category which has broader
reach than alter-globalisation networks. Its theorists claim that it also analytically
incorporates markets and the state (Keane, 2001; Kaldor, 2005). Nonetheless, as will be
shown, alter-globalisation networks do represent a significant actor which the GCS
framework claims to satisfactorily explain in normative terms, representing and
prefiguring new forms of global democracy (Beck, 1997; Falk, 1999; 2005). Lastly, GCS
theorists do not represent a homogeneous theoretical whole. There are many differences
between, for example, the celebratory cosmopolitanism of Ulrich Beck (1997) and the
more measured understandings of the structural constraints placed on people living in

Furthermore, not everyone who I will be calling a GCS theorist would necessarily accept
the label. Other language used to categorise alter-globalisation networks is also
sometimes deployed. In Falk’s case for example, he is much more prone to the term
‘globalization from below’ (1999: 127-137). I will argue though that writers such as Falk
do share common assumptions with other writers who use the term GCS more explicitly.
Namely, they share an implicitly liberal epistemology, and tend to celebrate the
globalisation of progressive social networks as a precursor to some kind of global (often
institutionalised), democratic evolution. In doing so I will argue that they create a narrow
understanding of the agency of alter-globalisation networks, which prevents a fuller
interrogation of their potentials and limitations. This is because liberal cosmopolitans
establish alter-globalisation networks as being a check on statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power, as prefiguring a new democratic order, and of representing the global as an autonomous, bounded site of progressive political change.

An important point needs to be made here; those who have celebrated and heralded the rise of alter-globalisation networks have done so because of the promise they see in ‘grassroots’ activism and collectivity. In this way, writers such as Kaldor, Keane, Falk or Beck might be more correctly labelled as deliberative, rather than liberal, cosmopolitans, distinguishing them from the more top-down liberal institutionalist cosmopolitans (Bray, 2009) such as Held and McGrew (2003) or Archibugi (2008). As Dryzek notes, though, many deliberative democrats have become ‘liberalised’. As a response to this phenomenon, he argues that: “Deliberative democracy should involve a continued quest for democratic authenticity, rather than easy accommodation with the prevailing liberal political economy” (2000: 8). Thus, whether their normative stance regarding alter-globalisation networks is predicated on the belief that they can underpin a deliberative ‘citizenship of the world’ (Nussbaum, 1996), or on the other hand help legitimate a Kantian notion of a democratic world state (Held and Guibernau, 2001; Held and McGrew, 2003), the writers on GCS considered in this chapter can all be referred to as liberal cosmopolitans, as it is their “easy accommodation” (Dryzek, 2000: 8) with liberalism and liberal institutions which lends these thinkers their distinctive approach to GCS. This chapter will focus on the former of the groups just discussed, those with a
more deliberative and 'grassroots' focus, as it is these writers who speak more directly to the powers of alter-globalisation networks.

The core liberal cosmopolitans I will discuss in this chapter broadly share a normative approach to global politics which manifests itself in specifically liberal theories of the drivers of transformative socio-economic change (largely ascribed to GCS – what it represents and its potential) which have certain theoretical and ontological implications. Liberal cosmopolitans make two broad theoretical projections in particular. The first of these outlines the emancipatory nature of the spaces created by alter-globalisation networks and the relationships between these spaces and diffuse, territorially un-fixed statist and neo-liberal hegemonic governing powers. The second broad theoretical projection made by liberal cosmopolitans establishes a binary of and relationship between cosmopolitanism and particularism, where the particular is constructed as 'uncivil', and in need of some form of salvation by a cosmopolitan benefactor. Furthermore, these theorisations lead to claims about the characteristics of the actors which constitute GCS, that they are progressive and emancipatory. This has implications for how GCS as a category leads us to only very specific understandings of the agencies, potentials and limitations of alter-globalisation networks.

I will now therefore discuss the GCS category in relation to each of these areas. I will begin with a brief discussion of the main features of GCS theory and draw links to liberal political and social theory. After this I will explore how, so constructed, GCS proposes
particular and normative understandings of GCS’s relationship to statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power, and the relationship between cosmopolitanism and particularism, based on its liberal imagination. It will be argued throughout that the claims which emerge from such an imagination are ultimately limited in their ability to provide analytical purchase for the study of alter-globalisation networks.

1.2 Global Civil Society – Liberal Roots.

It is important to stress that what I do not intend to do here is claim a kind of liberal essentialism about the concepts which construct the GCS category, nor the theorists that propose them (apart from anything else, such an essentialism would be paradoxical in a discussion of liberalism). Indeed, it is important to be aware that the theorists I will consider here (to greater and lesser degrees to be sure) are no liberal dogmatists. What I do propose then is that several key concepts of the GCS category do share a great deal with both classical and modern forms of liberalism. Indeed, in making this claim I am taking up the assertion of other critics of GCS theorists who have also engaged this critique (Chandhoke, 1995; Heins, 2005), although not in as great detail as I propose to do here. Heins for example argues that “GCS theorists [base their approach] on normative values of the old liberal idea of civil society as a counter-balance to the state” (2005: 186). This then is where I take my point of departure in this section. If GCS is based on liberal values, then it is important to understand which values in particular these are, and how an appreciation of these values helps us to deconstruct the category of GCS
in such a way that we can assess the potentials and limitations of it for understanding and exploring the agencies of alter-globalisation networks.

There is no core definition of GCS which exists in the literature, although some common features can be elucidated. Kaldor argues that GCS represents a new form of politics, which "...is both an outcome of and an agent of global interconnectedness" (2003: 1), whereas Heins (2005) argues that the idea of GCS is one which promotes the primacy of non-state actors as the agents that will perfect the world. What follows is an attempt to distinguish five key concepts which constitute GCS as a framework, and to simultaneously illustrate their grounding in liberal political and social theory, and the limits this places on GCS as a category within which an analysis of alter-globalisation networks can be framed. After outlining these five key features and briefly examining their limitations, I will reflect in more detail on the implications of this liberal epistemology for understanding the usefulness of GCS as an analytical category for the study of alter-globalisation networks.

1.2.1 Post Westphalianism

At first it may seem that the claims of many liberal cosmopolitans that we live in a post-Westphalian era (or at least are witnessing the end of the Westphalian age) (Beck, 2000: 74) may appear distinctly illiberal. After all, this is in part based on the premise that national electoral politics, the bedrock of modern liberal representative democracy
(Axtman, 1996: 10-36), is losing its relevance (Falk, 1999: 131). Gray, a classical liberal, illustrates how this seeming contradiction can be resolved. He asserts that liberalism's core project has always been conceived of as "...the response of modern men to an historical circumstance in which, because the traditional social order has passed away, the powers and limits of governments need redefinition" (1986: 90-91). Indeed, if we view GCS's post-Westphalianism not simply descriptively, but also prescriptively, then one can see the influence of Kant in these ideas, who equally proposed a post-Westphalian world order in response to what he saw as the anarchy and violence of the international order of nation-states (Fine, 2003).

Viewed in this light we can see GCS's post-Westphalian project in distinctly liberal terms. Kaldor seems to make this explicit when she argues that GCS represents a withdrawal from the state towards more global systems of rules and governance, in the face of the decreasing ability of individual states to address many contemporary issues (2005: 107). Similarly, Falk identifies the primary sites of struggle over directions in world policy not at the level of the state but at the institutions of the United Nations (1999: 133). This is what makes the GCS post-Westphalian perspective distinctly liberal; the belief in and the re-siting of the social contract to some form of global system of governance which a global civil society will help legitimate. This then is how GCS

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9 As opposed to other post-Westphalian visions (i.e. Fraser, 2007), which arguably do not derive from this Liberal cosmopolitan perspective. In deriving from other ideological traditions (in Fraser's case, a more radical ideological tradition), they make the case for a more people, rather than institution centred response to political crisis. In doing so, such other forms of post-Westphalianism make the Liberal nature of GCS's post-Westphalianism even clearer.
theorists establish alter-globalisation networks as a check on post-modern neo-liberal and statist hegemonic power, whilst ignoring the potential implication of these networks in those same relations of power. This will be explored further on in this chapter, although for now it is enough to speculate on the degree to which such an imagination of alter-globalisation networks leaves us with a possibly overly-optimistic account of their agencies.

1.2.2 Deliberative, Peaceful and Teleological

Another important constitutive concept of GCS which reasserts its categorical liberalality is that of the teleological development of peace and deliberation which GCS is said to represent. In Kaldor’s terms, GCS represents the contemporary expression of a certain historical development of civil society, situated as a force ‘from below’, which rejects revolutionary violence and does not seek nation-state power, but which instead seeks to link up with other like-minded groups beyond national borders and make claims based on internationally agreed human rights and social norms. Originating in the 1980s in Eastern Europe and Latin America, and facilitated by technological advancements in travels and communication, this conception of civil society formed the basis for the development of today’s GCS (Kaldor, 2005: 106-17). It is this kind of historical idea of GCS which leads Falk to distinguish between the “civil” NGOs and social movements of GCS, and the “uncivil” transnational actors behind the September 11th attacks on the United States (2005: 75), and which leads Keane to claim that “Violence is undoubtedly among the
greatest enemies of global civil society, whose tendency to non-violence stems partly from the fact that its participants more or less share a cosmopolitan outlook” (2001: 38). Rendering GCS with a particular historical and teleological development in this way then asserts a boundary between who is included in civil society (and by extension GCS) and who is not.

Kaldor argues that these practices of non-violence and the public use of reason and deliberation, which have always been inherent to civil society, have now been globalised and thus represent a victory for deliberative democratic movements (2003: 3). It is hard in this sense not to draw parallels with Fukuyama’s teleology of liberal democracy in his book ‘The End of History’ (1993). In more explicitly liberal terms, Macmillan argues that liberalism’s faith in the reconcilability of interests makes it a markedly pacifistic system of thought (1998: 13), whilst Gray claims that civil society is marked by the diverse and sometimes incompatible world visions which can co-exist peacefully within it (1993: 314). Importantly, this co-existence is presumed possible within concurrent institutional and structural coordinates i.e. it does not require the radical reordering of the social order. It is again not hard to see this overriding faith in the ability of social compatibility within the current social and structural order in the work of GCS theorists (this will become clearer in sub-section 1.2.4). Their conception of civil society is based on the ability of potentially conflicting visions of the social good to peacefully co-exist and synthesise.
This is a distinctly liberal vision of civil society, in both Hegelian terms\textsuperscript{10}, and, Lockean also\textsuperscript{11} when viewed as constitutive of a new global order of rules and governance (Kaldor, 2003). Conceptualising alter-globalisation networks in this way assumes an equally accessible deliberative space which actors enter by virtue of their 'civility'. This overlooks the way that alter-globalisation networks may be structured by social relations, which deny access to certain groups, and which also define their 'civility', or inclusivity. This once again leaves a question over the applicability of GCS theorists to understanding the agency of the actors whose agency they claim to explain.

1.2.3 The rational self directed agent

It is a core belief in both classical and modern liberalism that the human individual “has disposition over his talents, abilities and labour” (Gray, 1986: 63). The individual is self directed and rational (Manning, 1976: 16). Keane, however, a key GCS theorist, critiques more radical interpretations of GCS (see Chapter Two) as placing too much emphasis on the autonomous nature of that space, distinguished from state and market. He argues that they underplay the determined nature of GCS (2001: 28). This would appear to contradict

\textsuperscript{10} I am not claiming an intrinsic Liberalism to the work of Hegel here, but rather a way of reading Hegel that can be seen to support a certain incrementalism in imagining political progress, although I am aware there are other more radical ways of reading Hegel in this regard (see Singer, 1983).

\textsuperscript{11} In certain respects this vision of global civil society is similar to Hegel’s conception of the organic community, where the historical conflict between the individual and the collective is synthesised through socialisation into the community and a rationally developed basis for remaining dutiful to the institutions of that community (Singer, 1983: 34-35). In other respects, the conception of global civil society as prefiguring a more institutionally democratic world order is distinctly Lockean. Locke believed that democratic institutions only arose out of a dialectical relationship with an active civil society (Manning, 1976: 22)
my assertion that GCS is informed by a liberal understanding of the individual as rational and self-directed. Keane's critique of more radical perspectives though does not prevent him from asserting that GCS is comprised of many thousands of "...self-directing or non-governmental institutions and ways of life" (ibid: 23).

A reading of the other liberal cosmopolitans considered here reveals similar conceptual approaches to the role of rational agency in constructing GCS as a category. Falk also makes the claim that GCS is comprised of voluntary associations and citizens, and argues that the "inner mobility" of the modern individual is indicative of our constant struggle to "find our place" (1999: 75), whilst Kaldor very unambiguously bases her conception of GCS on "the agency of people who make history" (2005: 111), who, through access to institutions and open debate, will encourage policy-makers to act in the interests of all (Kaldor, 2003: 107). Such a conception of self-directed inter-subjective rational deliberation posits GCS once again as a category of liberal concepts. The liberal theorist Manning, for example, asserts that "the motive force of society and the energy for social reform originate in the spontaneity of the independent mind and the power of the liberated will" (1976: 16) and that "progress [...] will originate in the form of individual contributions to the great debate on man's condition conducted in free and liberal institutions" (ibid: 21). Such statements resonate very strongly with the vision of GCS articulated by liberal cosmopolitans as being constituted by free-thinking, rationally self-directed agents. However, the autonomy associated with GCS renders it as a distinct and transcendent social field divorced from place-based constraints. This ignores the manner
in which alter-globalisation networks may derive their agency from factors and locales beyond their immediate appearance which questions the degree to which they can be thought of as self-directed or rational actors.

1.2.4 Incremental change and claims-making

Manning claims that in liberal thought "progress has been and will continue to be made in the quality of human life, but, from the liberal point of view, all such progress will be piecemeal and gradual." (1976: 21). I have already discussed how Kaldor (2005) especially, although not uniquely, re-sites civil society from national to global governance arrangements. Implicit in this must be a recognition therefore of the claims-making nature of GCS. Furthermore, as also argued above, GCS is conceived by liberal cosmopolitans as a deliberative space of reconcilability. It is likely therefore that any claims-making advanced from this space must be done incrementally.

Indeed, many of the liberal cosmopolitans considered here advance similar ideas about the incremental, claims-making nature of GCS. Falk contends that GCS advances a critical, but non-rejectionist, stance towards economic globalisation, seeking to regulate it to correct social injustices (1999: 136). Echoing this position, Keane argues that GCS should not be seen as the "natural enemy of political institutions" (2001: 36). Furthermore, Falk holds out what might be considered to be a highly liberal hope that one day the forces of global capital may moderate the content of their programme as a
response to the critique of GCS (1999: 152). This once again rules out any analysis of alter-globalisation networks enacting relations of oppositionality or escape from dominant hegemonic powers.

1.2.5 The Peaceful Market

The work of John Keane in particular gives weight to the last of the main constitutive concepts of the GCS category that I will consider here. Keane asserts that civil society grew out of medieval urban centres, themselves formed around the market place. It was in these centres that civil society first found the space to be free from the absolutist state and to hold it to account (2001: 28). Keane therefore argues that capitalism has been, and remains, a key constitutive force of GCS, and that, in response, GCS is a key constitutive force of capitalism. Whereby capitalism has provided the technology and innovation to energise GCS, GCS provides the family ties (for example, transnational migrants), community associations and shared social and linguistic norms without which capitalism could not survive (ibid: 31).

Such an analysis is not necessarily liberal. As will be explored in subsequent discussions, the relationship between alter-globalisation networks and global capitalism is not a straightforward one, and shares some of the features described here by Keane. What marks this rendition out as distinctly liberal is Keane’s assertion that global capitalism carries with it an essentially positive social potential. Whilst noting the poor human rights
record of some for-profit actors, he argues that most global businesses have a shared interest in the spread of peace and democracy — "Their chief executive officers, for instance, do not like working within the deathly shadows of knee-capping, abduction, or murder" (ibid: 33). This reveals a liberal-institutionalist view of the benefits of the free market as a key guarantor of liberty (although clearly the historical preference by Liberals for state-managed capitalism reveals the limits they themselves see in free markets). Gray contends that the market is unique in its ability to ensure peace between potentially conflicting individuals and agents, due to the compulsion to equilibrium which market signals are said to produce. Thus the spread of free market capitalism is argued to be key to guaranteeing peace amongst such conflicting agents (1986: 69).

However, this perspective only recognises the desirability of political rights and freedoms, whilst relegating the social, economic and environmental rights which often appear less well-regarded by transnational corporations (see Broad and Cavanagh, 2008). This pure focus on political rights leads Keane to claim that global capitalism has contributed to the kinds of social capital and cultural diversity which act as one of the guarantors of civility and peace within GCS (2001: 33), something which, as will become clear in the following sections and chapters, is a questionable claim, and which overlooks the manner by which capitalist logics also serve to disempower the potentially radical subjectivities of alter-globalisation networks.

1.2.6 A Concluding note on the Liberalism of GCS theorists
In this short section I have argued that the imagination of GCS provided by the writers considered here draws on a distinctly liberal political and social epistemology (this is what justifies the first half of the term 'liberal cosmopolitan'). In summary, their body of thought can be argued to contain five (not necessarily exclusive) constitutive liberal concepts, namely: post-Westphalianism; deliberative, peaceful teleology; rational agency; incremental claims-based change; and the peaceful nature of the market. It is not my contention here that the thought of Keane, or the other liberal cosmopolitans I have considered, is underpinned by a commitment to free market ideology, just as it has not been my contention that GCS as a category is essentially liberal. Rather, it could be said that the liberal cosmopolitan rendition of GCS represents one iteration (amongst many) of liberal thought as a response to current structural conditions. Understood as such it is possible to contend that the five constitutive concepts of the GCS category discussed above, and their liberal characteristics, illustrate an affinity between GCS as a category and various liberal ideas about the market, individual, state, peace and the global order which I have explored here, even if these are not necessarily considered to be exclusively constitutive of GCS as a category. As I will shortly argue, though, this Liberal affinity does have important implications for the theoretical and ontological claims implied by liberal cosmopolitans about GCS. The following sections will deal with these claims, and will begin to shed light on the extent to which they are useful in helping to analyse the agency of alter-globalisation networks.

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12 An exploration of the second half of this term (cosmopolitan) will follow later on in the chapter.
1.3 The Theoretical and Ontological claims of the Liberal Cosmopolitans

As just discussed, this section will address the theoretical and ontological claims implied by the liberal cosmopolitans for GCS. This is important to understand as it provides a way of judging the merits of GCS as an analytical tool for the study of alter-globalisation networks. These claims broadly concern the various ways in which alter-globalisation networks implicitly and explicitly are constituted by and manage different relations of power. The two broad areas of claims that I will consider here are: the relationships between alter-globalisation networks and statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power as rendered in a GCS framework; and the tensions between the cosmopolitan visions and particularistic demands which alter-globalisation networks are said to transcend by GCS theorists. These two areas invoke both theoretical claims which frame these issues (which build on the liberal cosmopolitics of GCS theorists), as well as ontological claims about the actors and forces which constitute them. Both claims are largely the result of the liberal epistemology which was discussed previously, and the following sections will explore in much greater detail the severe limits this epistemology places on a full understanding of the agencies of alter-globalisation networks.

1.3.1 Statist and Neo-liberal Hegemony

This section will address how liberal cosmopolitans understand the relationship between statist and neo-liberal hegemony, and alter-globalisation networks. Hegemony will be
considered for the moment in both strictly Gramscian and more post-structuralist terms. This is to allow for a full analysis of how liberal cosmopolitans relate to the concept(s) of hegemony. According to liberal cosmopolitans, what is the relationship between GCS and statist and neo-liberal formations, and what light does this shed on how the actors within GCS are conceived to challenge dominant modes of implicit authority? This section will therefore explore how the answers to these questions shed light on how GCS can be used to understand the agencies of alter-globalisation networks, and the relationships these agencies embody between such networks and statist and neo-liberal hegemony.

As might be expected from a perspective which draws on a liberal imagination of the state, statist formations (i.e. both nation-states, or, where it is held that the nation-state is increasingly irrelevant, global governance structures) are held to “play a positive-sum role in protecting, funding, and nurturing non-profit organisations in every part of the earth where there is a lively civil society” (Keane. 2001:35). Furthermore, as explained in

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13 As to the manner by which one group of interests seeks to dominate other interest groups (Gramsci, 1971: 57), through balancing their competing interests (Day, 2005: 8) or liquidating them (Gramsci, 1973: 57). This view of hegemony sees “power concealed in the legitimate status-quo trappings of society's structures, rules, class mechanisms, and cultures, prevent[ing] conflict from arising” (Hardy and O'Sullivan, 1998: 456).

14 As to the manner in which there is no hidden truth which can be revealed to those whose interests are being 'balanced' or 'dominated'. There is, in essence, no 'external' power, which can be overthrown; no delineation between the state on one hand, and society on the other (Mohan, 2002: 9). Hegemony is therefore unpredictable and uneven, simultaneously authorless (Ferguson, 2000) yet omnipresent, but contestable in that omnipresence. This is why hegemony is at once both all-pervasive if embodied fully by the social actors it works through, and because of this, re-workable and subvert-able also. See Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 180; Hardy and O’Sullivan, 1998; Danaher, et al, 2000: 49; Mohan and Stokke, 2007: 558; Gilbert, 2008: 137.

15 Both of these approaches will be brought into more detailed conversation in Chapter Two.
my discussion of GCS and liberalism, GCS is constructed by liberal cosmopolitans with a distinctly post-Westphalian stance. Beck, in particular, has argued that what he calls the “container” theory of the state (1997: 23) has now been shattered by globalisation (ibid: 24) — “Even urban rummagers live in and from the garbage of world society, and remain linked into the symbolic circuits of global culture industries” (ibid: 66). Whilst one could move from this position to conceive of new statist formations in a number of ways, liberal cosmopolitans tend to look towards the sustenance and evolution of existing institutions of global governance as the bedrock of a new global democracy (Beck, 1997: 129-155; Kaldor, 2005: 107; Falk, 1999: 133).

This discussion points towards two issues worth further exploration. Firstly, that governance structures, whether national or global, at least carry the potential to be facilitative of civil society and/or GCS; and secondly, that the nation-state is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the everyday lives of populations around the world. Within the context provided by these two claims, alter-globalisation networks thus represent the key element of GCS which will represent the needs and demands of those populations.

In that liberal cosmopolitans foster a belief that national and global governance structures carry the potential to be facilitative for civil society and/or GCS, such a conceptualisation appears to be productive to a certain point, but leaves us unable to fully capture processes of hegemonic dominance. Kaldor, for example, explains that GCS has its roots in the pro-democracy movements of 1980s Eastern Europe. She argues that these movements gave
voice to ordinary citizens struggling for their rights. The advent of cheap travel and communications technology has now connected such struggles together in the field of GCS (2005: 106). Chandhoke, though, offers an alternative perspective on this history which illuminates gaps in the liberal cosmopolitan conceptualisation of the modes of hegemonic control which civil society actors sometimes operate within. Pointing to the fact that the explosion of civil society activity in Eastern Europe occurred simultaneously with the re-fashioning of the term by the World Bank 16, Chandhoke argues that state and civil society are in a symbiotic relationship, whereby the state sets the limits of political discourse in response to the transgression of previously set limits. Chandhoke argues that an emancipatory civil society is created in these moments of transgression, but it is quite often the case that civil society does not transgress these boundaries, and is in fact defined by them (1995: 9). This means the agency of alter-globalisation networks must be viewed within the webs of hegemonic power in which they operate.

Chandhoke also shows how the space of civil society is one which is often disciplined and abnormalising. Codes of ‘polite’ behaviour and etiquette discipline individuals and social formations (ibid: 186), whilst the space of civil society becomes “a neutralized space, it neutralizes those forms of politics which are outside stipulated limits, or those which question the composition of the sphere.” (ibid: 187). Furthermore, Chatterjee distinguishes between the idealised, or ‘fictive’ notion of civil society, and the everyday

16 Thus questioning the degree to which the pro-democracy movements of Eastern Europe arose autonomously, rather than because it was expedient for them to do so in the eyes of neo-liberal statist powers like the World Bank
governmentality of ‘political society’. According to Chatterjee, civil society describes the relationship between the birth of the nation-state in the West, which required engaged citizens to monitor and participate in the nascent state, and its people, who fulfilled this function. The birth of the nation-state in most of the world, however, occurred in the context of colonial rule, which had already instituted a system of governmentality which segmented people into administrable population groups along lines of ethnicity and tribe. These people were not citizens, but subjects, and were not required to participate in the state. Whilst the early anti-colonial struggles were initially energised by republican ideals of the citizen, the notion of the developmental state, encouraged by international donors and NGOs, re-instituted colonial methods of governmentality, creating population groups along lines of health, wealth and education, ostensibly so they could be ‘cared’ for/administered by the state (2004: 36-38). This does not necessarily result in the reduction of democratic possibilities for people. Chatterjee reveals the opposite in his work around the slums of Calcutta, where such subjects have re-subjectified themselves to take advantage of governmental processes (ibid: 77).

These understandings of the relationships between the state and subjects have ramifications for the ideas and applicability of GCS to the study of alter-globalisation networks. The notion of GCS assumes a participative role for alter-globalisation networks and the actors which constitute them in the various formations of global and regional governance. Whilst I do not necessarily share Chatterjee’s view that civil society is a
fictive and irrelevant notion everywhere in the post-colonial world\(^\text{17}\), his idea of ‘political society’ (ibid: 36-38) does problematise the degree to which understanding alter-globalisation networks through the prism of GCS encourages us to focus too much on the power they exert over their objects of contestation. This carries the potential of overlooking the degree to which aspects of their subjectivity may be defined by these same objects of contestation, and how they form around relations of dependence and ‘care’ to national statist powers, and more recent arrangements of global governance.

We can see how viewing the power of GCS as a one-way process is problematic (whereby GCS is the power-exerting force), when we consider GCS’s relationship to market forces. Where Keane views this set of relationships as largely unproblematic, Lipschutz shares Chandhoke’s view on civil society more broadly, and concludes that this relationship with neo-liberal capitalist logics means that GCS “does little to alter the structure of either national or global political economies” (Lipschutz, 2005: 750). This means that rather than being a space constructed by organisations through whom the voices of individuals can be heard (Kaldor, 2003: 79), and which thus ‘speaks to’ markets, it is as likely that GCS is a space which is constituted by the very injustices which it seeks to address.

\(^{17}\) It is rather Chatterjee’s problematisation of the inherent benefits and universal applicability of civil society as a conceptual and normative category which I find useful here. In other words, Chaterjee’s argument assists in understanding that the development of civil society is not always a good thing in and of itself. This theme will be returned to shortly.
This discussion helps to identify a problematic gap in the ontological claims of Liberal cosmopolitans, and the way they invoke the subjects of GCS as autonomous self-directed actors. Kaldor draws heavily on the work of Keck and Sikkink on transnational advocacy networks (1998; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002) to populate her vision of the progressive and representative elements of GCS (Kaldor, 2003: 95). Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) are held to consist of NGOs and social movements which hold specifically international institutions to account over international norms (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002: 3-4). TANs are distinguished from transnational advocacy coalitions (TACs) which are held to be more coherent and contain greater degrees of formal institutionalisation (ibid: 7). For these writers then the subjects of the progressive realm of GCS are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and social movements. Their value is evident to the authors considered in this chapter; Kaldor claims that “they provide an opportunity for voices of grassroots groups to be heard” (2003: 95). Similarly, others argue that such networks and coalitions constitute a global democracy (Falk, 1999: 133) and open up a “...transnational space of the moral and the subpolitical” (Beck, 1997: 26). Keane has further argued that this accessible and democratic space is analogous to a living biosphere – “These ecosystems of Global Civil Society... are interconnected. And they are more or less intricately balanced through continuous flows and recycling of efforts among... populations of individuals of the same species” (2001: 24). This suggests that the actors which constitute alter-globalisation networks interact in spaces of equality, sharing and human values.
These notions can be highly contestable. Massey argues that what we traditionally define as being 'global' is relationally constructed through the daily practices of people and institutions in different localities (themselves relationally constructed). As such Massey contends that

“different places will stand in contrasting relations to the global. They are differentially located within the wider power-geometries. Mali and Chad, most certainly, may be understood as occupying positions of relative powerlessness. But London, or the USA, or the UK? These are the places in and through which globalisation is produced.” (2005: 101).

This challenges Keane’s notion of a ‘finely balanced’ GCS – different spatial arrangements are produced by and incubate different sets of power relations, which means that one cannot create relationships with other places without taking account of one’s own actions in constructing them. So, whilst Keane’s conception of GCS takes a relational perspective, it implicitly flattens or smoothes the processes by which spaces are constructed, thereby ignoring the power crucial to these constructions, and how power circulates differentially, empowering some more than others. This is particularly the case with the NGOs and social movements which populate the progressive elements of GCS, operating in different social and political contexts, with different levels of funding and historically produced epistemologies of social justice (see Nagel, 2005; Yanacopulos, 2009). Translating alter-globalisation networks into a notion of GCS therefore creates the conditions of an uncritical and fixed assessment of them. It ignores how alter-globalisation networks are constructed as subjects via a differentiated and relational process, and problematises any claims to democratic representivity made from within
these spaces (Gabay, 2010). This in turn problematises the equalising effect GCS is supposed to have on power inequalities within it. If GCS itself is imbued by these very inequalities, then how can the alter-globalisation networks which populate it necessarily hold out the promise of a more democratic future? This opens up a range of important questions regarding accessibility, representivity, legitimacy and authenticity when analysing alter-globalisation networks, questions which seem unimportant if viewing such networks through the optimistic lens of Liberal cosmopolitanism and GCS.

In fact both Kaldor (2003: 107) and Keane (2001: 38) explicitly recognise this lack of representativity. Yet they nonetheless argue that this is not necessarily problematic. Whereas Kaldor claims that the message of GCS is more important than its internal democracy (2003: 107), Keane (2009) has argued for the recognition of a new form of 'monitory' democracy which seeks to redefine representation. He argues that since 1945 there has been a proliferation of non-traditional democratic forms, noting over 100 alternative models (for example, participatory budgeting, truth and reconciliation commissions, social forums, etc) whose common function appears to be in their 'monitory' capacity, i.e. their capacity to monitor traditional (the state) and newer (e.g. multi-national corporations) sites of power. Keane argues that democracy has always been based on representation and that these new monitory institutions embody new forms of representation. The multiplication of sites of representativeness to monitor the exercise of power is therefore positive. This is an important step in understanding the extent to which GCS as an analytical category helps us to understand the agency of alter-
globalisation networks. Keane offers a perspective which places the actors which constitute these networks (NGOs, social movements, etc) *outside of* the power of statist formations and neo-liberal hegemony. This is because, for Keane, the act of monitoring presupposes an active externality to these powers.

Many criticisms can be made of Keane in this respect. In a Foucauldian sense one could query whether the multiplication of sites of monitory institutions merely represents a form of advanced governmentality, where the proliferation of these institutions represents the diffusion of statist power over the everyday (Foucault, 1982/1994, Danaher, Schirato and Webb, 2000). This only serves to draw attention to power *between* organisational forms though, rather than within them. As Clegg (1989) argues, organisational forms are fluid, in a constant state of contestation as forces within it fight (sometimes literally) to fix its representativeness. ‘Monitory’ institutions therefore do not simply monitor, but take on a whole range of other, sometimes contradictory roles. Keane (2009) argues that when monitory institutions work well they contest and break down power, but while it may indeed be the case, this is a partial picture, as it ignores entirely the potential creation and re-creation of new elites and oligarchies.

Chandhoke is heavily critical of the liberal cosmopolitan conception of civil society as purely ‘monitory’:
"The problem with the liberal discourse which privileges civil society is that it...is profoundly indifferent to the ability or the inability of the inhabitants of civil society to participate in the sphere of discussion and debate on equal terms...far from being havens of democracy, peace and good will, civil societies have notoriously oppressed their own inhabitants." (1995: 12)

Pederson further argues that an emancipatory political space is not necessarily rooted in civil society, but in the "possibilities for groups of the poor to bring about change through local organizations" (2002: 15). An emancipatory civil society might be the outcome, but the existence of it is no guarantee of social change. This is because of the potential always carried within civil society of colluding in and reproducing domination.

In a discussion of the public role of 'monitory' institutions, then, this means they are always being worked through by other actors (such as statist formations) as well as working on them. This has implications for the kind of potential for public involvement and social change we invest in what are in reality normative concepts deployed by Liberal cosmopolitans in this regard, rather than empirically robust cases. It calls for an exploration of the actual actors which comprise alter-globalisation networks, rejecting the a priori assumption of liberal cosmopolitans that these actors are automatically democratic and autonomous from neo-liberal and statist hegemonic powers.

A number of writers have problematised the kinds of organisations and networks in which liberal cosmopolitans invest so much potential for monitoring power, such as the NGOs and social movements which constitute alter-globalisation networks. Tembo
(2003), Kasfir (1998), and Mohan and Stokke (2007) all question the relevance of international NGOs who bring particularly donor-driven and neo-liberal conceptions of civil society development to countries where such models are inappropriate, or to contexts in which they are harmful to indigenous democratic formations. Mawdsley, Townsend and Porter (2002, 2005) assert that this donor agenda is operationalised through the reporting systems placed on aid-agency grant recipients, be they international or national. This is most damaging, though, in the national context, where Northern reporting cultures may be unfamiliar and inhibiting of more indigenously developed modes of accountability.

Indeed, far from enabling ordinary citizens to have their voices heard (Kaldor, 2003; 2005), Yanacopulos (2009) has noted the manner in which alter-globalisation networks can be split by more and less radical ways of framing issues of justice, with international NGOs often being those less inclined to adopt the radical positions which reflect the desires of the most marginalised. Townsend claims that the moderation of international NGO workers can be explained by the notion that those who populate professionalised NGOs are subsequently drawn into a “transnational community” characterised by a common language of managerialism, reporting and accountability and a desire to legitimise their jobs and organisations (1998: 615). Kamat (2002; 2004) explains this in ideological terms. She argues that NGOs are deeply implicated in the neo-liberal hegemonic project of which the international development agenda is one part. Kamat asserts that NGOs and ‘new social movements’, both of which fit into Keane’s notion of
‘monitory democracy’, do not represent a devolution of power from the state as Keane
would hold, but in fact represent a reproduction of statist and capitalist formations in
public spaces, what Kamat calls the ‘NGO-isation’ of public space i.e. increasing
professionalisation, fiscal responsibility and accountability. Kamat argues that this is a
victory for capitalist “development hegemony” (2002: 615). Lipschutz argues that this
‘NGO-isation’ is in fact a marketisation, and notes the ever increasing discursive affinity
between many NGOs and private corporations (2006: 17). Furthermore, in more prosaic
terms, Heins notes that many NGOs are more interested in establishing their formal rights
with International Governmental Organisations, “since they have reasons to assume that
by relying on quasi-feudal institutional habits and personal privileges of access they get
more out of the political game” (2005: 194). In stating this he explicitly criticises Kaldor
for imagining “that a global civil society based on NGOs can make international
organizations more attuned to the concerns of ordinary citizens as opposed to states” (op
cit).

The literature considered above calls into question the ontological claims made by
Liberal cosmopolitans that the NGOs, social movements, TANs, TACs and monitory
institutions which constitute alter-globalisation networks, and by extension GCS, are
characteristically progressive, or work in an uncomplicated sense for or on behalf of a
global citizenry. That these claims are made in the first place should not be surprising,
given the liberal cosmopolitan bias which infuses the work of such theorists. Nonetheless,
it appears that alter-globalisation networks, constituted as they are by the organisational
and movement forms considered above, are an assemblage of contradictory and complex characteristics, rather than uncomplicated forbearers of a new global democracy. They are not merely the historical and teleological subjects of socio-economic transformation, although I would not disagree with the liberal cosmopolitans that they could be, but also reproduce structural domination and historical imperial projects. This is not to suggest an overly deterministic perspective on alter-globalisation networks and the actors which constitute them: as my empirical chapters will show there are clear examples of emancipatory practices possible within them, but I do mean to suggest the importance of being mindful of all the constitutive relationships which create these networks as subjects to be written about and celebrated or otherwise.

Another important area where Liberal cosmopolitans can be critiqued (in the context of the relationship between GCS and statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power, and how they obscure a fuller understanding of the agencies of alter-globalisation networks) is in their belief that GCS is characteristic of a post-Westphalian age. Ugarteche asserts that the Westphalian state has

"sent a rather strong message that it does not plan to pass away in the near future... There exists no global logic that transcends the national interest of the leading nations, namely of the United States... Power is ‘national’, has a flag, an army and interests." (2007: 65)

He continues to argue that alter-globalisation-type actors have had little to no impact, and gain minimal coverage with mainstream media outlets because global problems largely
require national responses (ibid: 68). Bickerton, Cunliffe and Gourevich follow this theme when they assert that, whilst there is indeed a contemporary challenge to national-sovereignty, this has come predominantly from the imperial projects of other nation states. Alter-globalisation networks offer no meaningful resistance to such attacks, and so “the framework of the sovereign state remains the best means of organizing and sustaining the process of politics, in opposition to all that is offered in its place” (2007: 14).

The traditional binaries posited between the local and the global, the national and the transnational, and the universal and the particular, will be engaged with in greater depth in Chapter Three. For the moment it is important to state that I do not fully agree with the critics just cited above. Depending on the context, the local or the national can be the victim of global ‘structural violence’ (Galtung, 1969; Galtung and Hövik, 1971; Jones, 2005), but such processes come from somewhere, and these places are often identifiable single or multiple locales (Massey, 2005), or circuit nodes (Clegg, 1989), themselves multiply constituted. It is thus not a straightforward process and no one side of the debate can claim with absolute authority the pre-eminence of the national or the global as the site for political struggle.

This debate has, however, revealed that whilst the liberal cosmopolitan rendition of GCS does allow us to understand alter-globalisation networks as constituted by ‘external’ agents such as statist and global governance structures, and the ways in which these
structures may be held to account by alter-globalisation networks, it does not possess the critical conceptual tools with which to capture processes of hegemonic or governmentalised control, nor the continuing, and in some cases, increasing relevance of nation-states. Where Beck accuses those with a fixation on the nation state and national contexts of exhibiting 'methodological nationalism' (i.e. being so fixated on the state as an autonomous unit of analysis that other more fundamental sociological and political processes are ignored), (1997: 87), it is equally possible to accuse liberal cosmopolitans of 'methodological globalism' in their enthusiasm for the 'global' as the unique explainer of contemporary sociological and political phenomena. Indeed, the positing of the global as an autonomous and post-modern social sphere underpins the misplaced liberal cosmopolitan notion that alter-globalisation networks necessarily represent a new and more hopeful form of politics which transcends historical borders and particularisms. It is precisely because the global is not a distinct sphere which can be entered freely, but which is made, produced from particular sites, that alter-globalisation networks do not necessarily prefigure democratic alternatives, but instead reproduce, or at least are forced to work within, hegemonic domination. This is yet another example of how the liberal cosmopolitan epistemology which underpins GCS contains severe limitations for understanding the agencies of alter-globalisation networks.

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18 A fuller exploration of the social production of space and its relevance to understanding the agencies of alter-globalisation networks will take place in Chapter Three.
This section has problematised the liberal cosmopolitan approach to the relationship between alter-globalisation networks and statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power, and the implications of this for understanding the agencies, potentials and limitations of alter-globalisation networks, and for GCS as an analytical category. The next section will consider a further set of theoretical and ontological claims made by liberal cosmopolitan writers – the relationship between cosmopolitanism and particularism – and what this reveals about the potentials of alter-globalisation networks, as rendered by liberal cosmopolitans, for transcending politically damaging particularistic divisiveness.

1.3.2 Cosmopolitanism and Particularism

Thus far in this chapter I have referred to a rendition of GCS which is characterised by the Liberal cosmopolitanism of its main academic proponents. I have spent a great deal of time illustrating how to justify the ‘Liberal’ aspect of this characterisation, but have to a degree neglected the ‘cosmopolitan’ aspect of it. This is in part because the cosmopolitanism of the GCS project is so very explicit, in both ethical and institutional respects. I have already discussed the Liberal cosmopolitan desire to bolster cosmopolitan institutional arrangements of global governance (see section 1.2.4). The ethical imperative of cross-border peace and other regarded-ness characteristic of cosmopolitan political theory since Kant (1795/2006) is similarly embedded in Liberal cosmopolitan thought. Keane, for example, argues that GCS is characterised by “a strong dislike of war, a facility for languages, or a commitment to ordinary courtesy and respect for
It is nonetheless important to consider what a ‘liberal’ cosmopolitanism might look like, and the implications of this for understanding alter-globalisation networks.

In this section, then, I will be exploring how those who celebrate the development of a global civil society imbue the concept with a particular kind of cosmopolitanism which has implications for GCS’s usefulness as an analytical category for alter-globalisation networks. This will be a normative as well as an analytical critique. The two are, of course, intimately linked. If we accept the liberal cosmopolitan analysis that GCS enacts emancipatory and horizontal relationships of solidarity across social, economic and geographical distance, then the normative claim that GCS represents new forms of global democracy becomes substantiated. I will argue, however, that the cosmopolitanism of the main liberal cosmopolitans considered here only allows for a partial analysis of the agencies of alter-globalisation networks. This is because, if accepted on its own terms, we ignore the destructive element of liberal cosmopolitanism and GCS. This element emerges from the very same normative sources which liberal cosmopolitans claim lend GCS its ethical desirability.

If we accept that alter-globalisation networks are constituted by particularistic nodes, then we must expect that these nodes might produce mutual misunderstandings and have major differences between them (Routledge, 2003) – “Very often the moral Esperanto which slowly emerges in spite of this background...is not backed up by everyday
organizational linkages deserving the name of solidarity” (Heins, 2000: 43). These major differences are not necessarily coincidental, but produced by the very same forces which Liberal cosmopolitans claim have produced their progressive GCS. Colas’ (2005) research into Maghrebi social movements, for example, reveals the uneven nature of GCS, and the manner in which it produces different and sometimes inimical empirical realities within the alter-globalisation field. Whilst the factors explaining the emergence of Maghrebi social movements are comparable to that of the ‘civil’ members of GCS (Falk, 2005:75), i.e. the inequities of global capitalism, “…they simultaneously stand and fight against everything liberals – and indeed other progressives - associate to this sphere of world politics” (Colas, 2005: 32). Similarly, Anderson and Rieff make the point that the Roman Catholic Church and many other politically conservative Christian denominations could, but for their politics of course, be considered as global NGOs or social movements (2004: 29), and thus part of the way alter-globalisation networks are conceived of by GCS theorists – in terms of Falk’s ‘globalisation from below’, for instance (1999). This suggests that to understand their agencies, potentials and limitations, alter-globalisation networks have to be studied on their own terms, without making any a priori assumptions about their cosmopolitan nature.

As has already been noted, liberal cosmopolitans celebrate the potential of alter-globalisation networks in creating a new global democratic citizenry. How then, do these theorists conceptualise the tensions (referenced above) between the different nodes which constitute these networks (the tensions between cosmopolitan and particularistic
pretensions), and what ontological claims does this lead them to make about the manner in which these tensions are overcome within alter-globalisation networks? To answer these questions it seems important to understand the kind of cosmopolitanism liberal cosmopolitans propose, both as an explanatory concept and a normative project. This will help to identify the analytical limitations of GCS as imagined by liberal cosmopolitans.

Liberal cosmopolitans have framed the post-Cold War proliferation of global progressive networking and campaigning as the extension and embodiment of what Erskine calls "ethical cosmopolitanism" – that which entails a universal scope of ethical concern (2002: 457). Similarly, Nussbaum has asserted that the emergence of these networks represent that fact that individuals increasingly need "an ability to see themselves as not simply citizens of some local region or group but also, and above all, as human beings bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern: as "citizens of the world"" (2004: 3).

The extension of this ethical perspective in practice requires a questionable sense of universal similarity across large swathes of humanity, often divided by social, economic, cultural, as well as geographic distance. When Keane (2001) claims that violence is inimical to GCS he does so because he believes that its members (including, if we recall, private transnational capital) share a cosmopolitan outlook. Once again it is possible to detect here the liberal belief in the fundamental rational co-existence of the human experience, which can overcome particularistic power inequalities.
This perspective shares much with the (arguably) uncritical cosmopolitanism of Peter Singer. Singer asserts that if individuals can show compassion for their compatriots (who in many countries consist of many races, faiths, etc), then it is rational to expect them to show compassion to anyone, regardless of nationality. If, Singer argues, we accept that individuals are likely to act kindly towards their diverse compatriots, then "impartialism is not beyond our physical powers. It is not even ... beyond our moral powers. Each of us, individually, is capable of acting impartially, even if most of us, most of the time choose not to do so" (2004: 27-28). However, Singer’s assumption that members of the same political community treat each other with respect and compassion is contradicted by the lived experiences of people who suffer from structural and individual violence and abuse on a daily basis from actors within the national spaces they occupy (Gabay, 2008: 201). Despite the problems with this justification, Singer (1999) still recommends that people with relative wealth should immediately donate this wealth to organisations working with people living in poverty, such as Oxfam.

Kuper argues that Singer’s conclusions neglect the relational sense in which we are connected, for “where we do not share our everyday lives with people, we interact with them through a complex and differentiated web of political and economic relations”: (2002: 112). This is also a position shared by Calhoun (2002), who illustrates the degree to which transnational activists and professionals constitute a class differentiated by power and resources from those they purport to work on behalf of i.e. those living in
poverty. Singer's solution to world suffering ignores this relational aspect of structurally caused poverty. A similarly non-relational approach can be found in the work of two significant figures in liberal cosmopolitan thought, Nussbaum (2004), and Appiah (2007), both of whom advocate a cosmopolitanism based on learning about distant others, and in Appiah's case, to reading foreign newspapers and watching non-English language films with subtitles (2007: 2381). This is an approach which is at once both elitist, and appears to relegate the structural conditions which results in the college students of North America (with whose cosmopolitan education Nussbaum (2004) is concerned) being ignorant of the lives of distant others. When Keane suggests that GCS is characterised by respect and courtesy (2001: 38), he relies on a similar elitist and non-relational cosmopolitan logic. It might be very easy for a relatively wealthy and privileged activist to show respect for difference, but this renders as 'uncivil' (Falk, 2005: 75) the anger of those who are victims of the very same structures which privilege the wealthy activist. By the liberal cosmopolitan logic these 'uncivil' actors represent a particularistic, communitarian backwardness which GCS is supposed to overcome. How then can GCS be truly cosmopolitan if those who populate it are unable to conceive of the anger produced by their structural privilege as belonging to the same social space? As established by liberal cosmopolitans, alter-globalisation networks can thus only be understood as highly inimical to the inclusion of the most marginalised and oppressed, externalising their anger and violence as 'uncivil'.
Douzinas argues that these exclusions are historical and expected. He claims that the Liberal-individualistic approach to cosmopolitan ethics represents the secularisation of historical religious eschatology. Whereas the Judeo-Christian notion of the messianic figure was to come from outside humanity and lead it into a utopian age, Kant and Hegel transferred this messianic agency onto humanity. It was now individuals who could lead humanity into utopia. Importantly though, it was also now ‘Man’, and not God, who got to decide what being ‘human’ meant (2007: 151-177). Van de Veer (2002) argues that it is this kind of Liberal individualism which transferred to imperial powers, who forged the originary of contemporary cosmopolitan practice through the colonial encounter. Indeed, others argue that this ancestral individualistic cosmopolitanism is still alive in contemporary cosmopolitan practice—

"the fetishization of liberal individualism has, in the past few years, created a cosmopolitan imaginary signified by the icons of singular personhood. What represents the spirit of world citizenship today? In recent years the answer to this question has not elicited ideas and ideals, but philanthropic individuals—Mother Theresa (for her love of the world’s poor), George Soros (for his economic investment in Central Europe), Ted Turner (for his billion dollar contribution to the United Nations), the late Princess Diana (for her identification with the global issues of AIDS and land mines), and perhaps Bill Gates (for his lordly hold on the universe)" (Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge, 2004: 581)

The argument I am developing here is that to embody and enact a liberal cosmopolitanism, there must be a suffering other which must be excluded and ultimately

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19 Douzinas also recognises the Janus-faced nature of cosmopolitanism, i.e. the possibility of it being non-hierarchical and dominating. I will be addressing the ‘other’ side of cosmopolitanism in Chapter Three (and how it can provide a more optimistic way of understanding the agencies of alter-globalisation networks), the point here being that the form which Douzinas so trenchantly critiques has been the dominant strain in Western history through the modern era, and has been heavily influential on the thought of the Liberal cosmopolitans considered in this chapter.
destroyed in order for the liberal cosmopolitan project to succeed. In other words, if a liberal cosmopolitan project is to succeed, it must 'save' this suffering other, thus reducing and then destroying the identity of it. This is because the aim of the liberal cosmopolitan project is for a socio-economically equitable world, where care for distant others would be unnecessary, or at least, the need might be extremely minimal. However, where constitutive structural inequalities are unacknowledged, the much greater structural, social, technological and economic power which the cosmopolitan benefactor brings to the relationship of care across distance will almost always see the destruction of the distant sufferer, either imaginatively (we 'imagine' that our donations to aid agencies have solved the crisis, which recedes from our television screens and minds, even whilst people continue to suffer and die), or sometimes violently (Iraq was invaded and Iraqis killed so that they might be saved)²⁰.

The liberal cosmopolitan project will therefore be considered unnecessary when all suffering others have been eradicated, not though, through the eradication of the conditions which cause them to suffer, but through the destruction of their very subjectivities, or even their bodies. This is symptomatic of the modern liberal attempt to redress the social inequalities which arise from the unfettered pursuit of individual freedom (Manning, 1976; Greengarten, 1981). It could be argued, though, that treating the symptoms of structural inequality merely maintains the structures of this inequality and silences or oppresses those most disadvantaged by it, in the process expanding, rather

²⁰ These are illustrative and heuristic examples only.
than reducing their number. In reality therefore, the liberal cosmopolitan project can never succeed, because the very structural inequalities which constitute it will always produce new suffering others to ‘save’. The ‘salvation’ this project is predicated on though merely sediments and reproduces the subjectivities of the marginalised. This can most often be seen in the imagery of development and conflict fed to potential donors in areas of structural advantage, which is criticised for fetishising both the people and places of structural disadvantage (Pigg, 1992; Moeller, 1999; Rozario, 2003; Biccum, 2005; Lamers, 2005; Wehbi, 2009). Indeed, this seems to describe the colonial cosmopolitanism of the imperial civilising mission – distant others were fetishised; deemed to be suffering due to a lack of civility. Where such others could not be ‘civilised’ (re-subjectivised) they no longer counted under a definition of what was deemed ‘human’ and were thus violently, culturally and physically destroyed. This problematises the claims of some, like Keane (2001), or Youngs (2009), who claim that cosmopolitanism is an inherently peaceful perspective, explicitly opposed to violence of either the direct or structural kind.

This all suggests we must be mindful of the exclusions alter-globalisation networks might enact, rather than assuming a priori (as the liberal cosmopolitan rendition of GCS suggests) that such networks enact horizontal and democratic relations of solidarity and inclusion. For example, whilst the contemporary cosmopolitans of alter-globalisation networks do not on the whole carry guns, the inclination to destroy the suffering other is not something that has entirely disappeared. Kapur has illustrated the way in which
human rights groups have in their representations destroyed the diverse characteristics of women in rural India who have suffered domestic violence by firstly establishing essential characteristics and behaviours these women share as victims of violence, and then drawing connections between such behaviour and the culture of rural India more broadly. There is no room in this articulation for an empowered subject — "the victim-subject collapses easily into Victorian/colonial assumptions of women as weak, vulnerable, and helpless. It also feeds into conservative, right-wing agendas for women, which are protectionist rather than liberating" (2002: 19).

Korf (2007) furthermore illustrates how NGOs packaged up the diverse and sometimes conflicting communities affected by the 2004 Asian/African Tsunami for the consumption of what one could call 'armchair cosmopolitans' back in the countries where these NGOs were receiving donations from. Whilst smiling fishermen stood holding new fishing rods in television commercials, other communities suffered from government censorship and military oppression (especially in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, and in Aceh, Indonesia). For a liberal cosmopolitan project which ignores the structural inequality of its own composition to record its success, these oppressions must be discursively removed/destroyed, for they otherwise serve as a constant reminder of the very inequalities which constitute this particular cosmopolitan project. Importantly, it is not my argument here that the liberal cosmopolitan theorists considered in this chapter somehow provide a blueprint for the exclusion of certain subjects, but that this exclusivity is implied and sometimes unavoidably executed when this kind of frame is
enacted by some of the NGOs and movements which constitute GCS and alter-
globalisation networks.\textsuperscript{21}

For instance, the assertion that structural inequalities matter is made unnecessary by the
liberal cosmopolitan (non) approach to power \textit{within} the rational, self-directed
organisations it summons as the agents of GCS. Whilst there is an acknowledgement of
power \textit{between} alter-globalisation networks and other agents in GCS (such as private
capital), activist and campaign groups themselves are deemed to be the key to a
cosmopolitan and inclusive world order, and thus escape the analysis of power \textit{within}.
Beck celebrates the power of non-state actors to tie statist formations down in a
Lilliputian metaphor (1997: 72), without investigating how the demands of such groups
are constituted. Kaldor is equally uncritical when she asserts that GCS represents a way
of ordinary people to have their voices heard by those with power (2003: 107).
Nonetheless, Eschle points out that within GCS it is possible that "those in a more
structurally privileged position reinforce their position by promulgating a movement
identity and strategy that fails to challenge and even reproduces hierarchies that shape the
lives of those less privileged than themselves" (2005: 24). This resonates with a liberal

\textsuperscript{21} My treatment of cosmopolitanism in this chapter may appear overly nihilistic. After all, if people
in structurally privileged positions are causing harm by donating money to worthy causes (as illustrated by
Korf (2007) for example), then what else is there that can be done? It is important then to bear in mind that
the critique developed here has been of a particularly liberal, individualistic form of cosmopolitanism,
which, whilst it has been dominant amongst campaigns and activism in structurally privileged contexts,
does not mean that it is the only form of cosmopolitanism embodied and enacted through alter-globalisation
networks. In Chapter Three I will be outlining a more structurally sensitive form of cosmopolitanism which
provides a simultaneous and alternative prism through which to analyse the agencies and powers of alter-
globalisation networks, and which allows us to partially escape the destructive paradox outlined in this
section.
cosmopolitan project which fails to take account of the structural conditions which have created it and which it therefore perpetuates. How, then, are Kaldor's voices articulated, and by whom? And once again, what does this tell us about the emancipatory agencies or otherwise of alter-globalisation networks?

Jones argues that the voices of the most marginalised are rarely heard by the campaigns of GCS. This is because regardless of the causes of suffering, structural violence leaves the experiences of the very poorest "intensely local, personal and individualized" (2005: 68). Jones asks how we can expect people locked into such atomized daily struggles for survival to organise resistance or political activism (op cit). Jones' arguments emerge from her work with people living in extreme poverty in Mozambique, and whilst examples such as the Zapatistas (Collier and Quaratiello, 1999; Marcos, 2001), or the Narmada Dam campaigns (Fisher, 1995; Routledge, 2003b) do point towards the possibility of resistance amongst the very poorest, Jones' claims still have some validity. This is because they call into question the universal sense in which the relationships between the particular individuals or network nodes, and the cosmopolitan organisations which Beck (1997), Kaldor (2005) and Keane (2009) suggest speak for them, can be considered homogenously emancipatory and unproblematic. It furthermore brings into sharp relief the "complex and differentiated web of political and economic relations" (Kuper, 2002: 112) which underpins relationships with individuals differentiated from each other by geographical and socio-economic distance, and calls for a more nuanced solution to wealth discrepancies and cultural (mis) understanding than that provided by
Singer (2004), Nussbaum (2004) and Appiah (2007). Indeed, lacking this aspect, the liberal cosmopolitan approach to the relationships between the cosmopolitan and particular pre/tensions which constitute alter-globalisation networks can be found analytically and normatively limited in the following ways:

i) That in seeking to assert a universal ‘sameness’, liberal cosmopolitanism in fact creates the conditions for authoritarianism, as it removes the possibility for dissent (Mouffe, 2005: 90-94), and requires the discursive, and sometimes physical (although these are not necessarily connected), destruction of its exclusions. This can be seen most clearly in the manner in which Falk dismisses those groups who do not share his progressive project as ‘uncivil’ society (2005: 75).

ii) That it is ahistorical, and indeed that it has to be. If the actors which liberal cosmopolitans summon as the agents of transcendental socio-economic change recognise the construction of their ‘emancipatory’ project as a colonial one (Van de Veer, 2002) replete with the structural inequalities which constitute both itself, as well as its suffering other, then this project immediately shows itself to be part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. This would require a total deconstruction of the role of alter-globalisation networks in contesting and sustaining socio-economic injustice,

22 Of course, there is a logical problem in resolving this issue, which is that the inclusion of exclusions must also be universal for all those excluded to be included. How can this universality then not also be authoritarian? This is a problem which will be addressed further in the next Chapter.
not least by those actors themselves, but also the liberal cosmopolitan theorists of them.

This discussion reveals two issues which will be discussed further in both Chapter Three, and Chapter Six. The first issue is to do with the binary which liberal cosmopolitans establish between cosmopolitanism as a universal ethic of concern and political programme of emancipation, and the particularism of rooted communal or national interests which might mitigate against such ethics and programmes. To an extent I have indulged this binary in this chapter, in order to explore its analytical usefulness for understanding the agencies of alter-globalisation networks. I have found that such an approach is analytically limited in that it fails to identify the potential destructiveness and exclusivity of such networks. It does so because of the assumption of ethical universality made by liberal cosmopolitans. Far from being an abstract universal though, it seems that liberal cosmopolitanism certainly comes from somewhere particular, in both time and space. The implications of this for the analysis of alter-globalisation networks is that it is not necessarily correct to view tensions within them as being between 'universal' (transcendent) and 'particular' (rooted) interests, but rather universally particular ones (i.e. rooted interests with universalising pretensions). This issue will be explored further in subsequent chapters, but for now it is relevant to note that by acknowledging that liberal cosmopolitanism is a particular cosmopolitan discourse, we allow ourselves the opportunity of trying to identify other cosmopolitan discourses embodied in the agencies of alter-globalisation networks.
The second issue which this discussion has revealed is that the liberal cosmopolitan rendition of GCS does not allow for a sustained analysis of power within alter-globalisation networks. Just like liberal cosmopolitans posit a binary relationship between these networks and statist and neo-liberal hegemony, thus concealing the ways in which these networks might be ordered by those powers, a perspective which places alter-globalisation networks in the context of a universally cosmopolitan global civil society conceals the manner in which such networks are produced by different discursive constructions of their aims, members, tactics and strategies. Again, these issues will be further addressed in Chapters Three and Six.

1.4 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter began with the contention that GCS is a category which has been predominantly deployed by a group of writers who can be broadly thought of as liberal cosmopolitans. I further argued that its distinctive applicability is lent to it by a heavy reliance on strands of both classical and modern liberal thought. I have argued that it is possible to detect this reliance in the way that the GCS category draws on five fundamentally liberal concepts which are: the belief in the rational self-directing individual agent; the potential of capitalism to spread peaceful social relations; the deliberative power of alter globalisation networks (and the actors which constitute them) to speak on behalf of ordinary people; the decline of the nation state; and the potential of
incremental claims making to achieve socio-economic change. I have argued that in turn these liberal ideas have conceptually framed the way that liberal cosmopolitans, in their rendition of GCS, approach the content of two theoretical and ontological areas of claims, namely the relationships between alter-globalisation networks, statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power; and the relationships between the cosmopolitan agendas of alter globalisation networks and the particularisms of their network nodes and suffering others (both in the construction and content of this binary).

I have argued that the way that liberal cosmopolitans theorise GCS conceptualises the spaces of alter-globalisation networks self-referentially, thus ignoring the ways in which these spaces can be constituted and disciplined by other social and economic actors. I have also argued that Liberal cosmopolitans theorise the territorial state as being of decreasing relevance to politics, and re-sites politics to a ‘new’ global governance structure which the members of alter-globalisation networks (and the NGOs and social movements which constitute them) hold to account, but that in doing so Liberal cosmopolitans ignore the role of hegemony in constructing this politics, and the continuing and in some cases increasing relevance of some territorialised state actors. I further argued that Liberal cosmopolitans make certain theoretical claims about the relationship between cosmopolitanism and particularism which assumes a shared cosmopolitan agenda between those who populate GCS. This makes the GCS theorised by liberal cosmopolitans a very small and self-referential community, which is unable to account for the wide range of particularistic experiences of the actors who constitute GCS
and more significantly for this study, alter globalisation networks. Additionally, I argued that the liberal cosmopolitan project, in establishing itself as a universal project, ignores the fundamental and particularistic structural inequalities which constitute it, and creates a process of destructive othering which results in the discursive or sometimes physical silencing of other particularities, although the latter is more of a historical feature.

Moving forward, then, it is clear that the liberal cosmopolitanism of GCS only has very limited applicability in explaining with empirical precision the agency and potential of alter-globalisation networks, and in the case of this particular piece of research, GCAP. The preceding discussions, though, do point to some interesting areas of analysis which will be further elucidated in the Research Design and Methodology Chapter (Chapter Four). For now though, these issues include the degree to which alter-globalisation networks monitor and contest hegemonic power, and the degree to which alter-globalisation networks practice modes of cosmopolitanism inimical to and/or pre-figurative of socio-economic transformation.

In the following chapter, I will move on to analyse another set of thinkers who have developed theoretical and ontological claims about alter-globalisation networks, whom I shall refer to as ‘radical alter-globalisationists’. Whilst my own normative position is more closely aligned with these thinkers than has been the case in this chapter, I will nonetheless illustrate limitations in their theorisations of particular issues. Once again,
this will be productive of certain lines of investigation for my empirical case study, GCAP.
2.1 Introduction

Where in Chapter One it was relatively straightforward to distinguish the liberal cosmopolitans and their conceptual development of GCS from other ideological traditions, it is less straightforward when considering the range of formulations that will be considered in this chapter. The muddying of post-GCS terminology is not coincidental. In the previous chapter I argued that liberal cosmopolitans construct false binaries between ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil actors’ which merely serve to obscure the contradictory nature of the actors who would constitute a global civil society. Post-GCS theorists, on the other hand, have sought to address this issue by treating GCS as an analytical field rather than a normative category (Colas, 2005; Reitan, 2007). This has resulted in these theorists trying to analyse and comprehend the actors who populate the field of GCS, and to identify those who represent a transformational/transcendent and thus radical subjectivity. The very term then, ‘global civil society’, becomes quite unhelpful (and mostly unused) in this regard, as it is not the field, but the actors within it, which become the focus of analysis for the theorists considered in this chapter.
This chapter will seek to explore the claims and positions of this group of thinkers in order, once again, to assess the applicability of their claims to the study of alter-globalisation networks. Whilst more nuanced than the liberal cosmopolitans, these theorists are still motivated by particular normative and ideological beliefs. However, it is the case that these beliefs are not quite as straightforward to delineate, and an attempt to do so on my part would undoubtedly misrepresent their work. Whereas the liberal cosmopolitans draw on quite identifiably liberal ideas, the writers which I will consider in this section draw inspiration from a range of structuralist and post-structuralist traditions whose ideas have, over the course of time, cross-pollinated to produce hybrid approaches to alter-globalisation networks. What they have in common is a commitment to imagining alternative ways of living and being, encapsulated in the refrain of the World Social Forum: ‘Another World is Possible!’ (George, 2002). It is for this reason that I will be referring to these thinkers as ‘radical alter-globalisationists’.

23 As will become clear in this chapter, in the context of this thesis I understand these traditions to emanate from Gramscian and Anarchist bodies of thought.

24 I intend this term to reflect the body of thought which has been developed by the thinkers I will consider in this chapter specifically around alter-globalisation networks. It is not, however, intended to represent their wider thought and projects. Furthermore, I want to take this opportunity to distinguish between my term for these thinkers, and the way I have labelled the actors under study in this thesis i.e. alter-globalisation networks. The word ‘radical’ becomes important here, particularly in regard to its historical relationship to the traditions of thought considered in this chapter. Whilst deeply conservative alter-globalisation networks can embody transcendent or revolutionary subjectivities, these do not bear much relation to the form of emancipatory and politically progressive projects associated with the traditions of structuralist and post-structuralist thought considered here (even if, in fruition, not all of these projects have proven to be quite as inclusive and emancipatory as they were promised to be). Thus radical alter-globalisationists are theorising alter-globalisation networks in an explicitly radical, transcendent and emancipatory/progressive context, which does not necessarily apply to all alter-globalisation networks (for example, Al Qaeda undoubtedly envision a transcendent and alternative type of globalisation (and can thus
Whilst this hybridisation of ideological thought has not produced a distinct category similar to the way I argued GCS was constructed, there remain important ideological affiliations and distinctions between groups of radical alter-globalisationists, which are useful to delineate both for understanding this group of thinkers, as well as the distinctions between them and the Liberal cosmopolitans. In this way it will become clear how radical alter-globalisationists offer several approaches to the analysis of alter-globalisation networks, the applicability of which will be measured in this chapter.

Two distinct radical alter-globalisationist groups can be identified as what I will here call hegemonic and post-hegemonic. What I mean by this distinction is that for one set of radical alter-globalisationists (see Bandy and Smith, 2005; Reitan, 2007; Mouffe, 2005; Gilbert, 2008) transcendental radical and progressive change will only come about by interacting with dominant, hegemonic power (be that neo-liberal or more broadly statist), and by creating a counter to such hegemonic power. As I will show, this involves creating relations of solidarity and influence between potentially counter-hegemonic groups. It is for these reasons that I refer to this group of thinkers as hegemonic, because as well as creating a counter-hegemonic bloc, the very act of building links between otherwise disparate groups might in itself be considered hegemonic, in that it involves channelling relations of influence (Gilbert, 2008: 220) and hierarchy (Day, 2005: 215).

be considered as an alter-globalisation network, yet would not be considered emblematic of emancipatory and progressive socio-economic transformation by the radical alter-globalisationists considered here).
This is, in a sense, what hegemonic power looks like (Gilbert, 2008: 220). Post-hegemonic thinkers (see Day, 2005; Pickerill and Chatterton, 2006; Newman, 2007) on the other hand, more influenced by Anarchist traditions of autonomous struggle, reject the desirability or necessity of contestation with statist and neo-liberal powers for a transcendent, radical and progressive political project. They similarly reject creating relationships of solidarity when that involves influencing the strategies of other groups, on the grounds that this would recreate relationships of hierarchy and oppression. Instead they recommend creating spaces of alternative living (alternative to statist and neo-liberal power, conceived not in relation to, but in independence from them) to which others might be attracted, although not forced or persuaded to join.

An example of the hegemonic/post-hegemonic distinction, and how it produces a useful working distinction for this analysis, goes as follows: the work of Hardt and Negri (2001; 2004) has been widely criticised for being a too deterministic (Mouffe, 2005: 108-115; Gilbert, 2008: 163-164) and class-subjectivist (Day 2005: 5-6) account of alter-globalisation networks. One might expect therefore that these critics share some kind of normative and analytical affinity. It becomes clear upon closer analysis, though, that fault lines exist between them. Mouffe (2007), for example, has said that:

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25 It should be noted that if the notion of hegemony can be extended from nation states and international organisations to non-state neo-liberal capitalist actors (Cox, 1992), then we should not dismiss the idea that alternative forms of hegemonic power can be channelled by and through alter-globalisation networks. After all, the role of alter-globalisation networks, according to the hegemonic thinkers considered in this chapter is to provide a counter-hegemony. The methods utilised by these networks to build this counter bloc can be therefore nothing but hegemonic.

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"I have seen a film that was made in Germany, called "Was Tun?". It's about the alter­
globalisation movement and the influence of Hardt and Negri in it. At the end of the film,
the filmmakers ask both of them: "so, what is to be done?" And Negri answers: "wait and
be patient". And Hardt's answer is: "follow your desire". This is their kind of politics and I
seriously do not think that this is enough. 'Just wait, the development of capitalism is going
to bring about the reign of the Multitude'.” (Miessen and Mouffe, 2007)

Mouffe's critique of Hardt and Negri therefore centres on their refusal to engage in
strategy and explicitly confront the formal institutions of neo-liberal hegemony,
embodied in national or global institutions (2005). This echoes Gilbert's (2008) own
critique of Day, who also advocates a politics of refusal with regard to the formal
institutions of the state (Day, 2005: 66-83) and believes that people will follow where
alternatives to neo-liberalism are shown to exist (ibid: 215)26. It is thus clear that this
triumvirate of critics do not share a normative approach. Viewed through a prism of
hegemony/post-hegemony, whilst Gilbert and Mouffe can be considered to be
hegemonists in broad normative agreement, dedicated to designing strategies which
contest neo-liberal hegemony through some form of institutional engagement, Day is
really much closer to Hardt and Negri's post-hegemonism, which seeks to create spaces
of transcendent subjectivity external to statist formations and institutions, even if they do
disagree about the subjects of transformational change.

26 Whilst Day does build an entire book (provocatively entitled Gramsci is Dead - a provocation
which Gilbert is perhaps guilty of falling for) around these arguments, it should be pointed out that
ultimately he does not uniformly dismiss the politics of statist and hegemonic interaction, when he argues
that "I am citing what I see as the historically established limited prospects for these modes, and arguing
that non-hegemonic strategies and tactics need to be explored more fully than has so far been the case"
(2005: 215)
Referring to the thinkers considered in this chapter along the lines of hegemony/post-hegemony then will assist in illustrating why it is that their approaches to alter-globalisation networks remain overtly normative and thus unable to fully capture the full range of agencies, possibilities and enclosures inscribed in the practices of specific alter-globalisation networks. This distinction does though remain slightly heuristic, and as will become evident there is not always a clear delineation between the two sets of thinkers. This is illustrated by the fact that unlike the Liberal cosmopolitans, who, Falk aside (1999; 2005), employed the same GCS language, the theorists I will consider in this section employ a range of interchangeable categorical language to describe alter-globalisation networks, which cannot be simply ascribed to hegemonic or post-hegemonic analytical approaches. Radical alter-globalisationists are only really united in their aversion to the descriptive use of GCS. Thus, in this chapter I will be discussing theorists who talk about ‘Transnational Protest’ (Bandy and Smith, 2005), ‘Global Activism’ (Reitan, 2007), the ‘Global Justice Movement’ (Saunders and Rootes, 2006), the ‘anti-Capitalist Movement’ (Gilbert, 2008), the ‘alter-Globalisation Movement’ (Sassen, 2004), the ‘Movement of Movements’ (Della Porta, 2005), ‘New Social Movements’ (Melucci, 1996), ‘Newest Social Movements’ (Day, 2005) and various other iterations of these terms. As will become evident, all of the authors listed above are inspired by radical and critical political imaginaries. They also use the terms listed above interchangeably. It is therefore clear that it would be impossible for me, in this section, to critique the relevance of a single categorical referent deployed by any group of theorists
inspired by radical political imaginaries in the way that I was able to critique the single categorical referent deployed by theorists inspired by Liberal political imaginaries.

I will therefore distinguish the thinkers considered in this chapter along hegemonic/post hegemonic lines, clarifying when a particular theorist does not fall neatly into this distinction. Delineating these thinkers in this way will be an important exercise in generating an analytical framework in Chapter Three with which to interrogate the agencies, potentials and limitations of alter globalisation networks, and the case study considered in this thesis, GCAP.

The chapter will therefore proceed by bringing hegemonic\textsuperscript{27} and post-hegemonic\textsuperscript{28} radical alter-globalisationists into conversation with each other via a number of concepts inspired by different and overlapping ideological traditions. The conversation will then continue as I proceed to critique the kinds of theoretical and practical binaries set up by these two sets of thinkers. These discussions will centre on approaches to the relationship which radical alter-globalisationists pose between alter-globalisation networks and statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, and then move on to discuss how, in light of what these networks are held to be opposed to, these thinkers conceptualise the need for and content of 'strategy' and the creation of universal transformative subjectivities.

\textsuperscript{27} I.e. those who advocate engagement with hegemonic power and the construction of counter-hegemonic blocs as necessary in achieving radical political change.

\textsuperscript{28} I.e. those who regard engagement with hegemonic power as co-optive, and the construction of counter-hegemonic blocs as oppressive and hierarchical.
2.2 Radical Ideas for Radical Alter-globalisationists

Whilst I am not claiming a teleology of radical thought which underpins the radical alter-globalisationists, any distinction which rests on, or departs from, the notion of hegemony must have clear roots in the thought of Antonio Gramsci (1971). Even post-hegemonists have marked their thought in clear reference to Gramsci (See Day’s *Gramsci is Dead* (2005) for an example of this).

In this section therefore I will consider some of the key features which distinguish radical alter-globalisationist thought, and which serve to underpin the distinction within that field of thought between hegemonists and post-hegemonists. This will highlight contradictions as well as areas of agreement between these two sets of thinkers, which will assist in assessing the applicability of their thought to the study of alter-globalisation networks.

The two key distinguishing features I will consider here then are *oppositionality* and *strategy*. Strategy flows from oppositionality in that one must identify what one is opposed to before one can decide how to overcome it. It is a further (and perhaps obvious) feature of radical alter-globalisationist thought that each of these features consist of a global dimension which distinguishes them from older debates on the
transformative relationship and potential between state and civil society (for example, Chandhoke, 1995)\(^{29}\).

2.2.1 Oppositionality

Oppositionality: a term which insinuates itself differently within radical alter-globalisationist thought, of both hegemonic and post-hegemonic varieties. Related to discussions about strategy, which will be discussed in the next section (strategy is not constructed abstractly, but in relation to a whole field of identified oppositional forces), debates over the place of alter-globalisation networks in radical alter-globalisationist thought (i.e. their agency and potential for creating transcendental, radical and progressive change) clearly invokes other actors. Specifically, as “othering is always implied in making present” (Law, 2003: 7), the very act of naming a global justice, alter-globalisation or anti-capitalist movement inevitably invokes an externality against which that movement operates. Understanding how this externality is conceived of, and how it interacts with alter-globalisation networks, is key to assessing the applicability of radical alter-globalisationist thought to the analysis of such networks.

This section will investigate the ‘what’ question (the section on strategy will be more concerned with questions of ‘how’) i.e. the ways in which radical alter-globalisationist theorists write about the nature of this externality – what it is. What is it that such

\(^{29}\) These debates however will still be drawn upon in this discussion where relevant
networks are in opposition to? To what extent does or can a pure oppositionality exist between alter-globalisation networks and the forces of statist and neo-liberal hegemony?

The liberal cosmopolitan John Keane accuses radical alter-globalisationists of a Gramscian bias which imagines "something like a world proletariat in civvies, the universal object-subject that can snap its chains...draws a thick line between (bad) business backed by government and (good) voluntary associations" (2001: 28). Seemingly proving this characterisation, Chandhoke, whose work on state and civil society draws explicitly from the work of Gramsci, claims that whilst some hold out hope that institutions and practices can be transformed via a radical engagement with them, there are simply some institutions and structures which have persisted historically, and show no signs of being transformed (Chandhoke, 1995: 232). This poses an absolute oppositionality between the forces of emancipation on the one hand (alter-globalisation networks) and the forces of oppression on the other (statist and neo-liberal hegemony).

There are many examples of empirical claims made by contemporary radical alter-globalisationists reinforcing the notion of this pure oppositional characteristic. Retian appears to provide further evidence of Keane's claim when she asserts the purified nature of the ideal 'global activist' (Retain's term) "while others can and do play important facilitative and supportive roles, the onus is shifting to those whose identity as a member of a specific community in a physical place engaged in particular ways of living and working is felt to be under attack" (2007: 56). Similarly, Bandy and Smith posit an
unequal global system on the one hand, and movements and networks mobilised to international solidarity on the other (2005: 232), whilst Cohen and Rai assert that ‘global social movements’ (their term) offer an alternative vision and practice of globalisation in marked contrast to the representatives of global neo-liberalism – transnational corporations, the World Bank and the IMF (2000: 16). They further argue that ‘global social movements’ provide democratic alternatives to the increasingly authoritarian nation-state (ibid: 10).

All of these claims construct alter-globalisation networks and activists as pure, transcendent subjects, un-penetrated by logics of statist or neo-liberal hegemony. In fact, it is held that neo-liberalism itself provides the common symbolic field to contemporary alter-globalisation networks (Crossley, 2002: 676). Gilbert extends this assertion when he argues that any project which does not recognise the centrality of capital to the “reigning political projects of our age” cannot be called properly political (2008: 132). Whilst one may consider these thinkers as hegemonic radical alter-globalisationists (in that they pose the centrality of a neo-liberal hegemonic power which must be engaged with and overcome by alter-globalisation networks), even Day, a post-hegemonist who might be expected to draw out or identify the fragmentation of social contexts, argues that “…the actuality of globalizing capital…mean[s] that all these struggles occur in an increasingly common context, even if they do not explicitly identify this context, or elements of it, as what they are struggling against” (2005: 6). Thus it appears that in studying alter-
globalisation networks we should expect their politics to be explicitly defined by an opposition to neo-liberal capitalist hegemony.

This perspective does seem slightly reductive, and it is ironic that Keane makes this critique of the radical alter-globalisationists, for as we have seen in Chapter One, like other Liberal Cosmopolitans, he can be equally guilty of posing a ‘pure’ NGO-populated element of global civil society, set against the forces of private capital and abusive statist formations. However, this does not make Keane’s argument in this regard any less relevant.

On the one hand, it appears that radical alter-globalisationists are arguing that neo-liberal capitalism is everywhere, thus lending all our actions a symbolic political meaning. On the other hand it appears quite reductionist and in fact contradictory to suggest either that all of our actions are political by dint of this capitalist omnipresence, or that there are certain actions which are not political because they do not operate directly against it. In the study of alter-globalisation networks, this approach would appear to rule out the analysis of actions which are not explicitly reducible to neo-liberal capitalism.

In response to those who have posed this alterity between the forces of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, De Certau argued that the inventiveness of the weak in their engagements with the powerful lends a political and potentially transformative potential to banal everyday practices. These inevitably intertwine the weak and powerful in an ever tighter clinch of
co-constitution and imbrication\(^{30}\) (1984: xvii). In fact, Cumbers, Nativel and Routledge have argued that:

"An overemphasis on resistance can ignore the lives of a variety of people with diverse relationships to globalisation, including unorganised workers, undocumented immigrants, and those not involved in political movements. Thus it is important to attend to a range of social locations and power relations (for example, gender, class, ethnicity, race, and sexuality), that refract globalization processes and the multiple ways that such processes are lived, created, accommodated and acted upon in different historical and geographic settings" (2007: 2590)

Furthermore, Gibson suggests that the capitalist symbolic order identified by the radical alter-globalisationists discussed previously, and which is presumed to give consistency to the identifications of the movements and networks they describe, lacks this assumed rigidity and is itself lacking and inconsistent –

"This does not mean that structures do not exist, or that there is no such thing as neoliberalism, or transnational Capitalism. However, it does mean becoming conscious of the discontinuous and more contingent links between various forms of injustice and that different groups and individuals articulate injustice in means entirely beyond the ideological straitjacket of "one no"\(^{31}\)." (2008: 271)

\(^{30}\) I use this in the Deleuzian (1988) sense of the 'fold' which allows us to understand this weak/powerful engagement in terms which do not lead to the total consumption of one agent/structure by the other. Indeed, it collapses the 'one and other' binary, and allows us to think of this engagement as a fluid one where agents/structures occupy certain positions before moving on to occupy new ones in an unpredictable fashion. Whilst some writers have taken this to imply a smooth space which equalises the weak-powerful disequilibrium (i.e. Castells, 1999b; Hardt and Negri, 2004), others have retained the notion of structured and unequal space without rejecting the notion that weaker actors can enter these spaces and still retain a contesting and transformational element of their own subjectivity (see Laclau, 1996; Gilbert, 2008). This will be explored in greater detail further on in this chapter.

\(^{31}\) This 'one no' likely refers to a popular refrain of the World Social Forum, popularised in the Paul Kingsnorth book, One No, Many Yeses (2003)
How do we understand the agency of alter-globalisation networks in relation to statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations in this highly uneven and contradictory field? Newman answers this by firstly asserting that it is impossible to measure the power of modern statist formations as they flit between modernist (law and order) and post-modernist (discursive, co-optive) strategies in their attempts to order and construct the spaces of our existence. While this may lead one to the nihilism of Baudrillard, who asserts that we have little option but to give in to such overwhelming power (1988), Newman finds hope in the assertion that power is always lacking, and that radical movements may test the limits of statist power by devising a politics which simultaneously engages with and moves beyond these statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations (Newman, 2007: 58). It would appear though that for many alter-globalisationists such an approach to statist formations is ruled out by an over-reified conceptualisation of these formations and the movements who work against them, which sediments them as starkly oppositional forces. This seems to be a significant limitation of radical alter-globalisationist thought in the construction of a research framework for the study of alter-globalisation networks.

Before pursuing this line of argument too much further it should be noted that it would be unfair to extend Keane’s critique (2001: 28) to all radical alter-globalisationists. Chandhoke’s conception of the state-civil society relationship, for example, is an intricately symbiotic one, where only some civil society practices reaffirm the state’s hegemony. For Chandhoke (see also Mohan, 2002: 9; Mohan and Stokke, 2007: 558), civil society is not a ‘good’ in and of itself, as Keane might accuse radical alter-
globalisationists of conceiving it to be, but a place where a radical politics might occur (Chandhoke, 1995: 178). Furthermore, as shall now become clear, not all radical alter-globalisationists share Reitan’s belief in the ‘pure’ global activist (2007), in inherent opposition to the forces of global neo-liberal capitalism.

Whilst Gilbert does claim that the oppositional force facing contemporary alter-globalisation networks is capitalism (2008: 81), he challenges any inherency to this assertion by framing the oppositionality of alter-globalisation networks as a strategic choice. So for Gilbert, there can only be a political element to alter-globalisation networks when they are capable of connecting a series of places or nodes together in opposition to forces which oppose or oppress them (ibid: 221). This allows for a more subtle reading of both those oppressive forces (which Gilbert summons as ‘capitalism’, but which he treats as a widely differentiated field) and the alter-globalisation networks themselves. In other words, state/hegemony and civil society/alter globalisation nodes do not pre-exist each other as discrete realms but are integrated (Mohan, 2002: 9), and only give the appearance of distinction through the strategic decision to draw lines of opposition.

Colas similarly argues that alter-globalisation networks do not represent a field beyond the relations of statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, but are a result of antagonisms and contradictions affected by these forces. Although thrown up by these contradictions, alter-globalisation networks are still purposive agents seeking
transformational change (2002: 43). From both Gilbert and Colas then it is possible to understand alter-globalisation networks as occupying a field of great differentiation, where in certain circumstances they will be subjectified as agents of arch opposition to statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations (and according to Chandhoke this will most often occur in authoritarian societies where rulers seek to close down civil society – see Chandhoke, 1995: 9), but in most will operate within the subtle contradictions of capitalism, subtleties which will present alter-globalisation networks with strategic and tactical choices.

Laclau, for example, argues that emancipation occurs within broader social processes, not as a distinct precondition or constitutive element of them (1996: 101). Emancipatory practices are thus always formed in the nexus of domination because it is in the universality of that dominating power that the particularity and distinctiveness of an oppressed identity references itself (ibid: 105). In other words, an emancipatory identity arises with direct reference to the domination which has produced it. It would be an entirely different identity without that experience of domination. As such, these radical alter-globalisationist theorists do not posit a strict oppositionality between alter-globalisation networks, and statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, but propose a much more complex and socially rich field of potentialities and constraints which appear more promising for understanding the agencies of alter-globalisation networks.
What is clear from this discussion is that whilst some radical alter-globalisationists posit a pure alterity between the 'good' of voluntary associations and the 'bad' of statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, a closer examination of some of them reveals a far more complex reading of these fields which is productive for an analysis of alter-globalisation networks. Rather than a single field in which the forces of 'good' line up against the forces of 'bad', we here have arrived at a radical alter-globalisationist conception of not one, but a series of overlapping and inter-locking fields which produce different opportunities and constraints for alter-globalisation networks. This discussion has therefore revealed the complex nature of the social fields in which alter-globalisation networks operate, and warns against the judgement of the potentials and limitations of such networks based on a simplistic notion of bounded hegemonic and counter-hegemonic entities. Indeed, given the complex nature of these fields, it is unsurprising that radical alter-globalisationists have proposed different approaches to how alter-globalisation networks should relate to statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations in order to affect transformative socio-economic change. So whilst the hegemonic/post-hegemonic distinction discussed at the beginning of this chapter is not so apparent in what these writers imagine alter-globalisation networks are opposed to, this distinction

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32 It is important at this juncture to distinguish this line of thought from the kind of 'political opportunity theory' (POT) proposed by, amongst others, Tarrow (1996), or MacAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996). Where POT suggests a smooth field which actors approach and take choices based on their rational preferences, the radical alter-globalisationist approach delineated here suggests that actors (and their 'preferences') are shaped by the structural contradictions of statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, which sometimes subjectifies them, and sometimes allows them to take strategic, agentic decisions in the context of this structurally produced background. The main difference between these two approaches is the deployment of 'rationality' by POT theorists. For radical alter-globalisationists, 'rationality' is merely a socially constructed phenomenon.
becomes far more apparent when we consider how they prescribe such networks should relate to that externality (which, as has just been discussed, is not 'external' in any inherent sense). An exploration of these approaches however will reveal further which parts of this debate are useful for the empirical study of alter-globalisation networks.

2.2.2 Strategy

Given the uneven and unfixed nature of neo-liberal and statist hegemony, how should alter-globalisation networks seek to subvert and transcend it? Discussions about strategy within radical alter-globalisationist thought focus on the relevance and necessity of strategy in and of itself. This segues into debates about what any strategic orientation should look like. In this section I will be drawing a distinction between hegemonic and post hegemonic thinkers regarding strategy. For hegemonic thinkers a strategic orientation is key; persuading others to join the counter-hegemonic project is essential to building the critical mass necessary to transcend statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power (see for example Gilbert, 2008: 221). Post-hegemonic thinkers on the other hand can be characterised as being anti-strategic, due to the potential for domination and hierarchy they see in actively building relations between people and groups (see for example, Day, 2005: 219). I will argue that this distinction is revealing for the contributions and limitations it sets on radical alter-globalisationist thought regarding the study of alter-globalisation networks.
The distinction between hegemonic and post-hegemonic thinkers seems clear. Whereas Bandy and Smith would claim that “Any effective challenge to the liberalizing forces of transnational capital must be global, broad based, cross-sectoral, and capable of collective action.” (2005: 231), Day argues that we must “challenge the notion that the only way to achieve meaningful social change is by way of totalising effects across an entire ‘national’ or ‘international society’” (2005: 45). It is these “totalising effects” which Day considers to embody the inherent hierarchicalisation of hegemonic relations and is thus destructive of any truly radical transcendent subjectivity. As the discussion progresses it will become clearer that there is a degree of characterisation implicit within each position’s critique of each other, and that in fact there is some common ground where they both agree. For the moment though this discussion sheds important light on the ways in which alter-globalisation networks should or could be conceived of and measured with regard to their potentials and limitations i.e. by the degree to which they form trans-localities and whether these are implicitly dominating or not.

These debates draw directly back to an affirmation or rejection of Gramsci’s formulation of the ‘war of manoeuvre’ and the ‘war of position’ (1971: 239), with different emphases placed by different theorists on these aspects of Gramsci’s thought. For Gramsci, the ‘war of manoeuvre’ was never more than a temporary position taken by the revolutionary forces, allowing them to maintain spaces of oppositionality with regards to the state, draining the state’s resources, although never decisively, and protecting themselves from the state’s full force. Manoeuvring from one such space to another, this only became a
'war of position' when these spaces lost their value and all that was left were spaces from which to launch decisive attacks against the state’s hegemony, drawing in return the full force of the state (op cit).

Gramsci’s formulation was updated in the 1980’s and 1990’s by a range of theorists whose work further underpins hegemonic/strategic radical alter-globalisationists, and who remain important figures in radical alter-globalisation theory. Writers like Chandhoke (1995), and Laclau and Mouffe (in partnership: 1985; individually: Laclau, 1996; Mouffe, 2005; 2009) have all made the case for the necessity of a strategic orientation to be taken up by opponents to neo-liberal capitalism (Chandhoke, 1995) and latterly neo-liberal globalisation (Mouffe, 2005; 2009). They argue that this is necessary to give what might otherwise be isolated actions a more socially resonant meaning. This appears to echo Gramsci’s formulation of wars of manoeuvre and position – a formulation which always gives otherwise disparate and isolated actions a greater social purpose and resonance.

Chandhoke argues that civil society represents a space from which the hegemonic power of the state (broadly conceived by her as always hegemonic, but which we should consider as relating to statist powers more broadly speaking33), can be challenged and transformed. This is because both state and civil society are constitutive of each other.

33 This is particularly the case if we consider weaker states who themselves might be considered worked through and penetrated by the hegemonic power of donors or transnational capital.
The state must set boundaries around which it defines acceptable and legalistic norms and behaviour, but in doing so provides targets for civil society to discuss, critique and contest such boundaries (1995: 9). It is not enough though to site such struggles in localised settings, for "...the fragmented arena resulting from these particularistic practices is peculiarly vulnerable to being occupied by the state and by the dominant classes" (ibid: 212). It is thus necessary to adopt a more universalistic political strategy with which to contest dominant practices, one which links struggles together. Without such a strategy disparate struggles have no need to come together, and will be dominated by the state (ibid: 223). This suggests we should relate the transformative potentials of alter-globalisation networks directly to the degree to which they manage to expand their demands to include previously non-aligned groups.

Day, a post-hegemonist, and thus an anti-strategist (i.e. someone who does not believe in the necessity of enacting universal strategies), leads us to question the transformative potential we would otherwise assign to alter-globalisation networks which enact universalising strategic practices. He argues that the premise which necessitates universalising strategic orientations is based on a false assumption which he calls the "hegemony of hegemony", and which assumes that "effective social change can only be achieved simultaneously and en masse, across an entire national or supranational space." (2005: 8). In other words, Day criticises those who have been hegemonised by the belief that only a counter-hegemonic bloc can transcend neo-liberal and statist power. According to Day though, universal strategies can only result in the domination of other
less powerful groups, and history shows that re or counter-hegemonising the masses has only ever resulted in oppression (ibid: 214). He concludes: “Change can be achieved for more people by ridding ourselves of one of the final vestiges of the logic of hegemony...the will to save everyone at once...” (ibid: 215). Instead of hegemony/solidarity, Day proposes a logic of affinity wherein “...by providing alternatives for those who can and will join the exodus from the neoliberal order, we open ourselves to sharing what we have built” (op cit). In this way then Day is arguing that the very act of linking struggles together involves creating hierarchical relations prone to various forms of domination. As an alternative he suggests a tactic of ‘leading by example’, of creating alternative ways of living which might attract others to join in.

Laclau provides an alternative approach to the issue of strategy and its desirability in transcending statist and neo-liberal hegemony. He asserts that it is one thing to argue that universalistic strategies are the preserve of dominant groups, and another to claim that the link between the two is innate and natural and therefore incontestable. Indeed, it is in the universal promises of the state that oppressed groups and identities can assert their own particular experiences as being universal, valuable and thus deserving of recognition (1996: 106). Chandhoke provides an elaboration of this process, when she asserts that:

“it allows the marginalized groups to fight for the benefits of the status and privileges of the citizen. Rights therefore become the object of struggles...the enlargement of these spheres [political and civil] permit [...] the marginalized to insert themselves into these realms” (1995: 190 – italics added)
Furthermore, Newman argues that the struggle for recognition by a radicalised and/or excluded subject affects a rupture in the established social order. By asserting a radical/excluded subjectivity *strategically* (i.e. in unison), the social order is forced to enact its promise of universality (i.e. universal rights) (2007: 89-90). When women marched for their right to wear the Islamic headscarf in France, Newman argues that they did so under French flags and the banner of *Egalitée, Liberté, and Fraternité*. As such, the protestors revealed a constitutive contradiction within the state's practices, that whilst “they believe in the Republic...the Republic does not believe in them” (ibid: 90). Thus, Newman argues that “we all belong to the same ‘community’ of those who speak and think, and, yet, ...certain subjects are at the same time excluded from this community and so challenge their exclusion on the basis of the universality of this community” (ibid: 91).

These claims, that universal strategies are not simply the property of the powerful, are given a specific interpretation by Mouffe, who has said that “…without a form of synergy between the alter-globalisation movement and those [established] institutions I don’t think that important advances can be made” (Miessen and Mouffe, 2007). In other words, given the existence of opportunities to insert the experiences and demands of the marginalised into the strategies of the powerful and hegemonic, it is incumbent upon alter-globalisation networks to have a strategy which includes engaging the sites of statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power. This moves the debate on from a discussion regarding the desirability of building universal relations between alter-globalisation nodes, to the necessity of these universalised networks to *engage* with statist and neo-liberal
hegemonic power. Hegemonic/strategic radical alter-globalisationists thus advocate a form of oppositionality with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations which makes explicit claims on those institutions to apply their forms of universal inclusion to all marginalised groups (articulated in unison, strategically), and to recognise these groups’ particularistic demands as part of the state’s universal promise of inclusion. If successful in their claims making, these marginalised groups will transform the socio-economic system, as the very act of extending inclusion and rights to them will explode the fundamental and constitutive inequalities of statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations. As Laclau argues, in this process “universalism as a horizon is expanded at the same time as its necessary attachment to any particular content is broken.” (1996: 106). This means that in addition to the degree to which alter-globalisation networks manage to expand their demands to include previously non-aligned groups, we should, according to hegemonic radical alter-globalisationists, also judge the agencies, potentials and limitations of these networks by the degree to which they force statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power to enact their promises of universal community and equality.

So it is clear that for hegemonic/strategic radical alter-globalisationists, a universal strategy is therefore both necessary for socio-economic transformational change, and also continuously contestable by those who might be being dominated by such a strategic adoption. It seems then that in approaching the questions involved in explaining alter globalisation networks’ agency, potentials and limitations, a universal strategic orientation (universal in representative terms, and in contesting a universal power) open
to internal contestation would be one marker by which to measure these actors. Indeed, Mouffe (2007) claims that this inherent contestation is a constitutive necessity of any radical democratic project and is what ensures the continuing democracy of any universal strategy (Miessen and Mouffe, 2007).

As I have argued previously though, such a position is normative, and is based in large part on Gramsci’s imperative to mount wars of manoeuvre and position (1979: 239). These would be impossible without a universalised strategic, or counter-hegemonic, orientation. Those who espouse post-hegemonic and anti-strategic positions though contest this assertion. As previously illustrated, Day has argued that universal, hegemonising strategies inevitably lead to the domination of subordinate groups (2005: 214). Certainly, given the large swathes of oppressed people in the world today, one would have to question the generalisability of Newman’s assertion that oppressed people can assert their radical subjectivity by simply resorting to the universal strategic promises which are generated by dominant groups of either statist or counter-hegemonic kinds (2007: 91). Indeed, Newman himself elsewhere asserts that it is often necessary to work around, rather than with or in, the institutions of the state and market (2007: 173). Day takes this assertion to its logical critical conclusion, when he argues that a politics of demand assumes that the state can act as a neutral arbiter dispensing rights and privileges like gifts (2005: 80). He compares the pursuit of such rights and privileges to the pursuit

\[34\] Newman occupies a slightly ambiguous position in this hegemonic/post-hegemonic binary, advocating on the one hand a universal transformational subject (and thus cleaving to a narrative of hegemonic strategising), and on the other hand a post-hegemonic politics of escape from the state.
of luxury consumer goods, with which one is never completely satisfied once in possession of (ibid: 83). This creates an endless cycle of demand and partial response and thus new demand in a self-perpetuating cycle of capitalist growth and statist oppression (ibid: 89). Day argues that by engaging in a politics of demand, activists abdicate from the difficult tasks required to truly create transformative change. They are in it for the 'buzz' of recognition, the thrill of getting somewhere close to transformation but never quite achieving it. This then is the basis of Day's criticism of hegemonic radical alter-globalisationists as being "driven by a fantasy of emancipation" (ibid: 84). This would suggest that alter-globalisation networks should be judged by the degree to which they enact a politics of escape from statist and neo-liberal hegemony, rather than engagement with them. Furthermore, the very fact of being networked must be considered, according to this perspective, only legitimate if no attempt at persuasion or influencing has been adopted to attract new nodes and members.

Yet Gilbert dismisses the post-hegemonic position. He argues that "To advocate a wholly post-hegemonic or non-hegemonic conception of politics... is to imply that relations of influence never occur between different elements in a political process (nor that they should)" (2008: 220) and that what he calls the anti-capitalist movement would be nothing more than "a set of isolated and mutually irrelevant struggles deploying wholly localised tactics" if it dispensed with strategic, or hegemonic thinking (ibid: 215).
We appear to have reached a binary in how to judge the agencies of alter-globalisation networks and their effectiveness at enacting a transformational subjectivity. Pickerill and Chatterton reinforce this when they rebut Gilbert's reasoning by arguing that it is misguided in looking for signs of leadership, or a common programme when "the rules of engagement have changed" (2006: 739). For them, it is impossible to gauge the affects of autonomous spaces and movements on broader relations of power and culture. They argue that post-hegemonic activism is not a negative-sum reluctance to take power, but is "a commitment to freedom, non-hierarchy and connection and a desire to eliminate (or reduce) power relations" (op cit). Nonetheless, Gilbert argues that "advocates of such a 'post-hegemonic' or non-hegemonic position can only logically do so on condition that they regard it as a matter of complete indifference whether anyone, anywhere, ever agrees with them or not...This is nonsense" (2008: 220). It would appear then, regarding strategy, that there is little common ground upon which radical alter-globalisationists of the hegemonic and post-hegemonic traditions can agree. They seem inherently opposed to each other with regard to how they conceive of strategy in relation to neo-liberal and statist hegemony. This creates problems for the analysis of alter-globalisation networks. How should their potentials and limitations be judged? Should we dismiss them as apolitical if they do not engage with the institutions of statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations (see Gilbert, 2008: 221), or as reinforcing oppressive statist practices if they do engage with these institutions (see Day, 2005: 89)? Should we automatically regard as oppressive any attempt by alter-globalisation networks to advance universally representative messages? Are these binaries apparent in the empirical practices of alter-
globalisation networks, or are they the result of the normative approaches adopted by the thinkers considered in this chapter?

To an extent, this dilemma is not really a dilemma at all, for, like Mouffe’s contestation-based democracy (2005, 2007), it is within the spaces of such ‘dilemmas’ that the normative practices of alter-globalisation networks themselves may actually unfold, and which prevents any particular normative tradition from monopolising the explicatory ground on which the research of alter-globalisation networks might stand. In other words, it may be that alter-globalisation networks practice acts of both hegemonic contestation and strategising, and post-hegemonic escape and plurality.

To another extent though it is possible to find some common ground between these positions which provides similarly useful insights into the study of alter-globalisation networks. Both camps, probably most represented here by Day’s Gramsci is Dead (2005) and Gilbert’s Anticapitalism and Culture (2008), engage to some degree in some unfair characterising of each other. Day, for example, doesn’t advocate the complete isolation of movements and activists, but proposes a politics of “groundless solidarity” which recognises that all struggles unfold in the same context i.e. neo-liberal capitalism (2005: 202). Whilst he doesn’t elaborate the implications of this for a strategic way of thought, it clearly does have such implications. Similarly, Gilbert, an avowed hegemonist (2008: 215), does not advocate the reinforcement of statist and neo-liberal formations through counter-hegemonic strategising and universalising that Day accuses the neo-Gramscian
hegemonic project of proposing (2005: 213). Instead, Gilbert proposes a vision remarkably similar to the post-hegemonic visions of Day (2005) and Pickerill and Chatterton (2006) when he states that

"It's in the facilitation of connection and the creation of opportunities for common strategising between actors and thinkers...that the possibility of democratic transformation must lie. To be clear then, this is not a matter of unification, homogenisation or centralisation, but of the creation and intensification of relays, the actualisation of potential nodes and points of concentration, the active production of 'commons'" (Gilbert, 2008: 229)

This provides a useful way in which a research approach to alter-globalisation networks can draw on both hegemonic and post-hegemonic thought. Gilbert’s assertion that the very act of strategising involves a fundamental altering of the content of both ‘leader’ and ‘led’ (ibid; 220) is reminiscent of Laclau’s claim that a differential identity cannot be distinguished from the context in which it is produced. The act of distinction therefore also asserts the context at the same time. Similarly, a context cannot be destroyed without also destroying the identity of the destroyer, whose identity is predicated on the existence of the context (1996: 100). For both Laclau and Gilbert then, the point of universalising, or hegemonising strategy, is that it is only through such a process of contestation that transformative subjects can be created, and objects/structures changed. In other words, struggles which isolate themselves, which reject broader strategic partnerships, end up sedimenting their subjectivities and re-asserting dominant relations of power. Day similarly makes the point that the aim of ‘affinity’ politics is to prove attractive to other people and build a critical (and plural) mass of adherents to usher in more equitable
social relations (2005: 202). It thus seems possible that there is some common ground between hegemonic and post-hegemonic radical alter-globalisationists after all, on the issue of the desirability of building a (contingent, always in-the-making) universal strategy at least. It is important though to bear in mind that the issue of engaging with statist and neo-liberal power remains a divisive issue, and one which generates a contradiction in the judgement of alter-globalisation networks i.e. whether such networks should or should not engage with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power.

This section has investigated the cleavages within radical alter-globalisationist thought over the necessity and potential to transform (or not), of universal strategy. I have argued that there is a distinction between Gramscian and neo-Gramscian hegemonists on the one hand, who believe in the fundamental centrality of universal strategy to any project of socio-economic transformation, and more Anarchist-influenced post-hegemonists on the other hand who believe that any such universal subject formation inevitably leads to domination and hierarchy. This debate has ramifications for how alter-globalisation networks are studied, calling for an interrogation into any claims of representation or legitimacy made by such networks and the actors and nodes which constitute them. Additionally, by illustrating the possibility of common ground between hegemonic and post-hegemonic thought, I have attempted to lay the basis for a research approach to alter-globalisation networks which seeks to interrogate both the maintenance/contestation of their own dominated subjectivities, and the way they themselves may dominate other oppressed groups.
2.3 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter I have suggested that there is a diverse group of thinkers who write about and analyse alter-globalisation networks grounded in radical political and social theory. Unlike the Liberal cosmopolitans considered in Chapter One, these writers do not share a unique ideological background, but draw on hybridised radical traditions, including structural, post-structural, Gramscian and Anarchist thought. Thus, what they share as a group is not so much an ideological affinity as a shared sensibility about the prospects and characteristics of contemporary alter-globalisation networks. As such, I have referred to this group of writers as radical alter-globalisationists. I have further argued that there are important points of divergence between these writers, particularly around the axis of hegemony/post-hegemony, which influences the more normative aspects of their thought.

I have identified two key features which run through a great deal of this work, and around which hegemonic/post-hegemonic binaries appear to have concretised. For the first key feature, concerning oppositionality, I have argued that whilst some radical alter-globalisationists posit a pure distinction between alter-globalisation networks and statist and neo-liberal formations, most recognise that both of these fields are complex, uneven and co-constitutive. I argued that it is this recognition that lays the ground for the diversity of opinions which exist regarding how and where statist and neo-liberal power should be contested.
For the second key and related feature, concerning the necessity of a strategic response to that which alter-globalisation networks are opposed to, I have argued that there is a binary between those radical alter-globalisationists who advocate the necessity of a strategic orientation as an essential pathway to the creation of a universal transformational subject, and those who believe that such a subject would be inherently and necessarily exclusionary and dominating. Despite this binary, I have also argued that some common ground exists between the two sets of thinkers, which allows us to approach the study of alter-globalisation networks by looking for both the structural domination of their own subjectivities, and simultaneously the ways in which such networks dominate or exclude other forms of political subjectivity. I also argued though that a much less bridgeable binary existed between hegemonic and post-hegemonic thinkers. This binary exists between those who see the possibility of socio-economic transformation in some form of relationship (albeit a contesting one) with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, and those who reject this position and view any such relationship with these formations as being inherently structured and dominated by them. This binary creates a dilemma for the study of alter-globalisation networks i.e. whether to judge them by the degree to which they engage with/transform statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, or the degree to which they evade/escape these formations, discursively and materially.
In key areas of radical alter-globalisationist thought then there appear to be binaries between hegemonic and post-hegemonic positions, with some aspects of these positions being bridgeable, others not. I have argued that this derives from particular normative positions, and would further argue that such binaries only have limited use for the study of alter-globalisation networks. This is because presented as such, radical alter-globalisationist approaches only allow us to view one or other of its binaries as being authentically radical and transcendental of statist and neo-liberal hegemony. This is particularly the case with regards to the normative positions adopted by thinkers considered in this chapter for the relationship between alter-globalisation networks and their oppositional powers and externalities (i.e. statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations). It means that, for example, we cannot theorise alter-globalisation networks within a radical alter-globalisationist paradigm as operating both within and without statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations.

In the next chapter I will explore some of the issues raised in this and the preceding chapter in more detail, adopting a 'grounded-normative' approach which I intend to allow for a more nuanced account of alter-globalisation networks and which will provide the basis for my methodological framework presented in Chapter Four. In doing so I will draw on some of the same thinkers I have considered in this chapter, but will seek to re-contextualise their approaches in order to arrive at a suitable theoretical framework for the study of alter-globalisation networks.
CHAPTER THREE

Grounded and Normative: An Epistemology of Alter-Globalisation Networks

3.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters have sought to critique a great deal of the theorising about alter-globalisation networks carried out since the end of the Cold War. I have argued that whilst these approaches do generate some useful perspectives for the empirical study of alter-globalisation networks, taken on their own they are too reductive, attempting to identify ideal-types of activist and civil society groups, dismissing at various points those who do not meet these standards as being 'uncivil' (Falk, 2005: 75) or irredeemably unrealistic and utopian (Gilbert, 2008: 220).

Whilst many of the writers considered do nothing more than set out a normative project for organising for socio-economic transformation, in ruling out certain ways of understanding the agency of alter-globalisation networks, to study these networks from any of their perspectives alone would be to privilege certain epistemologies of these networks and relegate the complex agencies which they embody. For example, how do we understand the different perspectives of certain civil society groups towards violent
resistance if we immediately brand any supporters of such resistance as ‘uncivil’? How do we understand the complex relationships that civil society groups have with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations if we immediately brand any relationship with these formations in a pejorative fashion? How do we understand the attempts by some civil society groups to pursue non-hegemonising actions if we simply dismiss them as utopian fancies?

By constructing these enclosures many of the writers considered in the previous two chapters deflect the focus on alter-globalisation networks from their internal constitution to their external relationships. In this chapter then I will argue that such distinctions need to be collapsed if we are to understand the agencies of contemporary alter-globalisation networks. I will seek to develop a theoretical framework which can adequately encompass these complex agencies. Furthermore I will be arguing that in collapsing these distinctions we inevitably end up viewing the agency of alter-globalisation networks through a prism of power and space – which power relations construct these networks, and which power relations are alter-globalisation networks productive of? How do these power relations become embodied, what kind of spaces do they produce (exclusive? inclusive?) and with what effects? Perhaps put more simply, how does the power in alter-globalisation networks, explain the power of them?

At this stage I will not go further in developing these questions and the definitions of power and space which I think will be useful to this study. These questions and
definitions will be developed in the next chapter, 'Methodology and Research Design'. For now, the imperative to study power and relationality within and around alter-globalisation networks does require a brief analysis of the implications of such an approach for how we incorporate a critical yet supportive normativity into the study of them.

3.1.1 Grounded Normativity

Normativity is important to this discussion for the following reason: many of the writers considered in the previous two chapters are, to various degrees, guilty of an uncritical and/or prescriptive normativity in relation to the actors in which they invest their hopes for socio-economic transformative change. This poses a problem. I, like the writers I have discussed, believe in the necessity of a fundamental re-ordering of global socio-economic relations to redistribute resources and wealth away from the ever-shrinking few to the ever-growing majority who suffer from various forms of economic, social, cultural and environmental deprivation and violence. It is not my wish, therefore, to attack the movements and actors which are seeking to make the changes necessary for a more equitable world. Rather, I am motivated by my desire to understand the potentials and limitations of such actors in order to better map out the terrain upon which such struggles need to be fought.
So I seek to strike a middle ground between the uncritical and prescriptive normativity which one finds especially, although not uniquely, amongst the Liberal cosmopolitans on the one hand, and the over-bearing rejection of such movements and campaigns which one finds in the writings of, for example, Chandler, who accuses globally-focussed campaigns of a narcissism born from the failure to “win the argument” at home (2004: 331) or Zizek (2007), who sees in these global campaigns an affirmation of existing socio-economic structures. In this sense, I find the work of Kurasawa useful. Kurasawa encourages the adoption of a ‘critical normativity’ which attempts to constructively engage with alter-globalisation networks in order to “bolster empirical understanding of socio-political situations or structural forces by helping to identify and assess their emancipatory potentialities and perils” (2007: 10). I would argue that this represents an empirically grounded approach to the study of alter-globalisation networks. In asserting this Kurasawa argues that we can move beyond the reification of alter-globalisation networks as an amalgamation of ‘good’ progressive actors (Beck, 1997; Kaldor, 2003), or on the other hand, wasteful nihilists (Chandler, 2004) “and turn our attention to the arduous and contingent forms of struggle that compose [them]” (Kurasawa, 2007: 8). This means that the prescriptive aspect of an analysis of alter-globalisation networks must be cognisant of and grounded in the relations which construct them, and the “potentialities and perils” (ibid: 10) of the structural and spatial contexts in which they emerge.
Of course, it is highly likely that many of the writers I have discussed in Chapters One and Two would consider themselves as being ‘critical’ or at least ‘constructive’ in their approach to alter-globalisation networks, and I certainly do not wish to create a hierarchy of who is more or less ‘critical’ in this regard. Nonetheless, Kurasawa’s enjoinder to focus on the struggles and the tensions which produce alter-globalisation networks seems to me to carry the potential of a more grounded approach which could be especially useful in the analysis of actors invested with such hope by so many.

The rest of this chapter will therefore explore the ways in which a more grounded-normative approach could shed light on the study of alter-globalisation networks, and the kinds of research questions this approach can bring to the fore for the study of these networks. I will break down this approach into three areas of analysis which have arisen from discussions in previous chapters:

i) Statist and Neo-Liberal Hegemonic Power

ii) Cosmopolitanism

iii) Locating Alter-Globalisation Networks

It is not my intention to ‘develop theory’ here, but rather to interrogate what a grounded-normative approach could bring to these thematic areas and how they relate to our understanding of alter-globalisation networks. In the following sections I will address each of these thematic areas in turn through the prism of writers whom I consider to offer
the potential for a grounded-normative approach to understanding these areas in relation to alter-globalisation networks.

3.2 Statist and Neo-Liberal Hegemony Revisited

In Chapter One I discussed the manner in which NGOs have been invested by Liberal cosmopolitans with a monitory agency vis-à-vis statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations (Keane, 2009). I counter-posed the supposed monitory and transformational power of NGOs with the work of, amongst others, Kamat (2002, 2004), who has argued that NGOs represent nothing more than the neo-liberalisation of the public sphere and civil society, and thus perpetuate the dominance of neo-liberal hegemony. This set of claims and counter-claims is a useful representation of the uncritical/rejectionist binary that I identified in the introduction to this chapter, and is one which this section will seek to problematise through utilising the work of writers who provide the framework for what I have defined as a grounded-normative approach to the study of alter-globalisation networks and the actors which constitute them. This section will therefore begin with an expansion of some of the theoretical arguments framing NGOs in Chapter One, using this as a spring-board to take a more grounded-normative, yet simultaneously theoretical approach to these issues.

Heins asserts that the explosion of International NGOs and International Governmental Organisations represents a deep and potentially problematic affinity between civil society
and statist and neo-liberal formations (2005a: 193). He further argues that NGOs and such formations are locked in a relationship where both sides seek to influence the behaviour of the other. For example, whereas agencies like the Red Cross used to accompany their governments into war in order to alleviate the consequences of such actions, Heins argues that they are now more likely to try and change the outlook of governments to war before it has even begun. However, it has also been the case that several NGOs in recent years have proposed armed ‘humanitarian intervention’ as a viable policy option in certain instances (Heins, 2005b; 366). This suggests an ambiguous relationship between statist formations and NGOs, where hegemonic contestation does not necessarily involve being co-opted by a bounded, impenetrable project which takes all before it.

Nonetheless, as Eschle and Stammers point out, many of what they call Transnational Social Movement Organisations (TSMOs) (eliding between this term and NGOs, which perhaps reveals the synonymy they feel these two types of actors have) are entirely unconnected to social movements, and are often technocratic in character, thus sharing more in common with the large bureaucracies they may seek to change than the social movements they claim to represent (2005: 53). This mirrors the argument made by Mawdsley, Townsend and Porter that international and development NGOs represent a diffusion of imperialism and the reproduction of the managerialistic bureaucracy of statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, which can be seen in “an over-bureaucratised ‘report culture’; the priority placed on tracking rather than achieving change; the
exclusions of language and communication technologies (ICTs); and the dominance of a minority of southern NGOs. All these help to promote ‘information loops’—privileged circuits of information and knowledge” (2002: 833). This has helped to produce a mainly English-speaking elite of transnational development workers, disconnected from the communities they are supposed to be working with (ibid: 830). This suggests that we should treat the involvement of NGOs in alter-globalisation networks with suspicion, and that those networks, like my case study in this thesis – the Global Call to Action against Poverty – in whom NGOs play a dominant role, might be severely limited in their abilities to challenge statist and neo-liberal hegemony.

Even those campaigns which seem to challenge the hegemonic logics of neo-liberalism can be questioned. Harrison argues that the United Nations' adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000 (which were the result in part of significant civil society lobbying through a series of international summits in the 1990s (see Hulme, 2007)) does not represent a shift in the logic of growth which underpinned their heavily criticised (especially by civil society) structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s (Harrison, 2004: 11). Indeed, Harrison asserts that the Bank’s post-structural adjustment approach in general simply solidifies the role of the market in alleviating poverty. So whereas in earlier structural adjustment programmes the state was positioned as rent-seeking and parasitical, a block to market expansion, more recent programmes of ‘good governance’ merely reposition the state as the guarantor of similar market expansion (ibid, 18).
Governments dependent on overseas aid are thus subjectified by donors who proactively pursue a project to shape the methods by which government policies are formulated and executed. They fund new techniques of administration, and “aggressively shape the discursive limits of the ‘politics of the possible’, [locking] governance states into a powerful ‘transparency’ by imposing matrices and ‘logframes’ of policy reform” (ibid, 129). A particular form of civil society in these states has emerged, working around issues of ‘anti-corruption’, ‘budget monitoring’, ‘human rights’ and ‘poverty-alleviation’. Such issues mirror the neo-liberal discourse of what the post-conditionality state should be concerned with, and fits neatly with a logic which requires reasonably well-off and content consumers with whom markets can be expanded (ibid, 131). These debates have particular resonance in relation to the issues which the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP) campaigns on i.e. poverty and socio-economic injustice, and problematises the credibility and legitimacy of alter-globalisation networks like GCAP who seek to work with ‘grassroots’ civil society actors in structurally disadvantaged areas. An analysis of such claims requires an investigation of how neo-liberal managerial and social discourses limit the potentials of alter-globalisation networks to exert transcendent and emancipatory modes of power.

One might conclude that the previous discussions mirror the rejectionist tone to civil society of that taken by Kamat (2002, 2004). NGOs, whether of the explicitly ‘development’ kind or not, help to constitute alter-globalisation networks which are
subject to discursive regimes of neo-liberal governmentality from which there is no escape. Statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, and the agencies of neo-liberal market capitalism, constitute what is and what is not possible for the networks and campaigns discussed here.

In a 'grounded-normative' move though, many of these authors also illustrate the various ways in which alter-globalisation networks and the actors which constitute them such as NGOs find various and sometimes unintentional ways of escaping the seemingly dominant hegemonic power. This is the sense in which these actors, as subjects, are productive, not just of the dominant systems and codes from which they are constituted, but of other unpredictable and often unstable modes of becoming. This speaks to the unpredictable and uneven nature of hegemonic power discussed in the previous chapter (see for example Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 180; Mohan and Stokke, 2007: 558; Gilbert, 2008: 137). So, Mawdsley, Townsend and Porter assert that Development NGOs have been "simultaneously approved by the World Bank for their supporting role in strengthening a neoliberal civil society, and endorsed by certain radical activists and revolutionary theorists" (2004: 872). This contradiction, they suggest, speaks to the fact that different NGOs operate under different principles of compliance and resistance, and that these work along a spectrum rather than in any dichotomous either/or sense. NGOs are subjects of rather than subjugated by neo-liberal discourse, and thus their relationship with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations is "a complex mixture of acquiescence,
strategic subversion and resistance to achieve, in part, their goals and desires” (op cit).

This results in an often uneven and contradictory agency, whereby

“not every alternative NGO takes what we would see as the opportunities, while clients and staff of some traditional, patriarchal NGOs make unexpected spaces. It is vital not to exaggerate this use of NGOs ... the use is piecemeal, inchoate, generating few specific social movements able to bring sustained pressure on the state. The alternatives are local, fragmentary, insecure. These are nevertheless courageous, creative endeavours, sometimes successful, which deserve recognition” (ibid: 885)

Similarly, Lipschutz identifies the potential involved in being subjectified to not just reassert but also to challenge the “contradictions inherent in the increasingly dense web of global governmentality” (2005: 767). Alter-globalisation networks therefore may create spaces which might be thought of as “ruptures or discontinuities” (op cit). Due to their unstable and sometimes unintentional and authorless nature (Ferguson, 2000: 401)35 these spaces may or may not overcome neo-liberal governmentality or statist oppression (op cit). For a researcher, such a possibility makes the case for a grounded approach to the relationships between the actors which constitute alter-globalisation networks, statist, and neo-liberal hegemonic formations and agents. This recognises the contradictory and unpredictable outcomes produced by the interplay of these various actors, of essentially structure and agency.

35 Ferguson uses the term ‘authorless’ to describe effects which are unintended, unplanned and unpredicted, but which nonetheless result from the exertion of power. This will be more fully explored in the following chapter.
This discussion speaks more broadly to the debate which was explored in Chapter Two between hegemonic and post-hegemonic approaches to the ‘how’ of oppositionality, i.e. how seemingly oppositional forces should be engaged and dealt with. At the end of that chapter, I concluded that the binary set up by these thinkers in terms of engaging with or not engaging with the institutions and agencies of power left a problem for the research of alter-globalisation networks; namely that following either one of these approaches would result in too easily dismissing the complex and contradictory characteristics of alter-globalisation networks. It would be to ignore the unpredictable and inconsistent manner in which alter-globalisation networks and their nodes might both engage with, and seek to exclude, statist and neo-liberal hegemonic forces in their activities. For in practice, it is unlikely that alter-globalisation networks cleave tightly to one or the other of these positions. It is therefore important not to reify this binary, and investigate theoretically how we might move around or through it in order to fully understand the potentials and limitations of these networks.

Laclau (1996) suggests that in the act of periphery groups making claims on the legalistic framework of statist formations, they simultaneously transform the content, depth and meanings of that legalistic framework, as well as their own identities, which will no longer be constituted by periphery experiences. Clearly, it is possible to see in this Day’s (2005) critique that this would merely reinforce dominant practices as one group moves into the centre whilst others remain on the periphery. However, I would suggest that it is possible to see in this transformation the possibility of not only transforming the content
of statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, but also their form. In doing so, periphery groups might not necessarily move to dominant centre positions, as the very existence of these centre-periphery positions would be transformed and made redundant.

This relates directly to the work of late 19th/early 20th century anarcho-socialist, Gustav Landauer, who would sit squarely within post-hegemonic radical thought. Landauer argued that the state was not an ontological fact, but a series of relationships (1911/1978: 132-138). In this way one might say that the individual self-subjectifies by summoning up the existence of a fixed ontological state where in fact there is nothing but sets of relationships. Landauer therefore advocated first individuals, and then communities, to simply change their relationships and practices in ways that would negate the ‘state’ - “New institutions must be created almost out of nothing, amid chaos; that is alongside rather than inside existing social institutions ... let us destroy ... by the gentle ... and binding reality that we build” (ibid: 135).

Again, it is clear that such a position completely rejects working through statist formations, as it negates the existence of the state as an ontological fact. If we return to Laclau’s transformational claims-making (1995), though, where both the periphery and centre are transformed by virtue of their being brought into relation with each other, we can see how Landauer allows us to imagine the creation of alternatives whose very existence transforms the nature of the identities of those involved, as well as the nature of statist formations – whether these formations are taken to be sets of relations or fixed
entities. Changing the relationship, asserting alternative practices which stretch, move through and around statist formations, allows us to overcome the binary between hegemonic and post-hegemonic radical alter-globalisationists where they advocate an oppositional statist-engagement on the one hand, or reject it on the other. Oppositionality, on this rendering, is not so much about alter-globalisation networks establishing a separation between themselves on one side, and statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations on the other, before then deciding whether to cross the divide and engage, or stay on their own side and escape. Rather, oppositionality here is about affecting a transformational relationality which engages (transforms) statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations by its very existence.

In relating this back to the previous discussion on NGOs and alter-globalisation networks, and their relationship to statist and neo-liberal hegemonic powers, it becomes clear that it is unnecessary to adopt a dichotomous approach to the study of these networks, where their potentials and limitations are judged by either how much or how little they engage with (materially or discursively) what they are ostensibly held to be opposed to. This approach also leads us to be unsurprised when apparently subjectified or dominated actors exhibit practices of re-subjectification or resistance. This is a 'productive' approach to hegemonic power which shares much with the work of the anthropologist of development James Ferguson. In his seminal work on development projects in rural Lesotho, Ferguson took the effects of 'development' as his point of departure, suggesting that whilst the agents of neo-liberal hegemonic power may display
intentionality and construct forms of knowledge, the practices of the subjects they construct represent at least in part the working out/re-working of such complex structures of knowledge (Ferguson, 2000: 400). This means that a point of departure for judging the limitations and potentialities of alter-globalisation networks cannot be with an ontological statist formation, but with the practices and subjectivities of the networks in question.

In this section I have argued that hegemony itself is relational, and thus questioned the utility of a perspective which judges engagements with statist or neo-liberal hegemonic formations in any either/or sense. Rather, the affirmation and embodiment of alternatives in and of themselves challenge and transform hegemonic power. In a way, this is a re-worked version of the liberal cosmopolitan approach to monitory power (Keane, 2009), although in this case relying on an epistemology of alter-globalisation networks and statist/neo-liberal hegemony as co-constitutive. Monitory power then becomes a two way process, with both limiting and emancipatory possibilities for alter-globalisation networks. This is very different to Keane's epistemology of monitory power, which posited alter-globalisation networks as occupying a distinct and autonomous social field from where they could hold statist and neo-liberal hegemony to account. A grounded-normative approach to the relationship between alter-globalisation networks, statist and neo-liberal hegemonic powers can therefore make space for the fully contradictory nature of such networks, and reveal both their limitations and potentials (Where and how do they enact oppositionality? What practices and discourses are involved in this
oppositionality? Which relations constitute this oppositionality?), whilst retaining a broadly constructive and supportive normativity for their aims and agendas.

The next section will utilise the same approach to tackle the ways in which alter-globalisation networks navigate the spatial and moral distances between their various nodes and hubs, as well as the people on whose behalf they often claim to speak. In short, this will be a discussion about the (apparently) universally transcendent pretensions of cosmopolitanism, and the (apparently) rooted myopic interests of particularism which the cosmopolitan project has traditionally sought to overcome (Kant, 1795/2006; Singer, 1999; 2004; Fine, 2003a). This will provide the basis for an exploration of how alter-globalisation networks may be productive of both emancipatory and dominating powers.

3.3 Cosmopolitanism

In Chapter One, I argued that the implication of the Liberal cosmopolitan position for enacting relations of solidarity across geographical, social, economic and cultural distance was a cosmopolitanism almost inevitably bound by its own particular imperial and colonial historical development, and that further, this form of cosmopolitanism was prevalent amongst many of the campaigns of contemporary alter-globalisation networks. I further argued that this historical form of contemporary practice of cosmopolitanism always carries the potential to be a destructive force, as it requires the discursive and/or physical destruction of the suffering other in whose name it mobilises itself.
I then argued that this context gave contemporary cosmopolitanism two distinct features which mitigated against the ability of cosmopolitan campaigns and networks (of which many progressive alter-globalisation networks are undoubtedly examples) to allow the particularistic demands and ways of being of those suffering from structural violence to 'speak back'. To recap, these two features were:

i) A degree of authoritarianism which seeks to 'overcome' difference, but which in reality serves only to silence the weak (Mouffe, 2005).

ii) A degree of ahistoricism, which ignores the history of cosmopolitan ethics as a key aspect of the historical imperial project (Van de Veer, 2002).

In this section, I seek to further problematise notions of cosmopolitanism by 'critiquing the critique'. Most pertinently, do the critiques I just summarised require the rejection of cosmopolitanism, of a transcendental universality between different people, per se? In this section I will be arguing for a more grounded normative approach to cosmopolitanism, which, by investigating alternative forms of cosmopolitan agency seeks to develop other ways of thinking about the meanings of such a project. This is relevant because if the accusation levelled at cosmopolitanism is that it does not recognise the particularistic demands of 'others', then it would be wrong to close off possibilities for such 'others' to speak back with their own cosmopolitanism in researching alter-globalisation networks, networks which clearly operate with some kind of inherent
cosmopolitanism (i.e. an ethic of transcendental care and emancipation across distance\(^{36}\)). For example, the cosmopolitanism of the Liberal cosmopolitans can be rightly critiqued as constructing relations of neo-imperialism and top-down domination. However, does the immanence of this imperial domination, the manner in which it is always being created and is never complete as a project, create the conditions for other forms of cosmopolitanism to challenge its verticality? Does this open up the possibility of identifying emancipatory potentials and powers within alter-globalisation networks, rather than dismissing them uniformly as constructs of Western imperialism? I am therefore seeking here to develop the theoretical basis for articulating not just one, but several forms of cosmopolitanism which may circulate in alter-globalisation networks, some of which may engender more horizontal and emancipatory relations of solidarity.

The kind of cosmopolitanism which Mouffe (2005), for example, criticises is what could be called distinctly ‘Western’ in character, and thus by equating this kind of cosmopolitanism with cosmopolitanism \textit{per se} I would be closing off the possibilities for other forms of cosmopolitanisms to articulate themselves. In talking about a ‘Western’ cosmopolitanism, I do not mean a geographical region, but a project with a particular history and sensibility. This is exactly what Van de Veer is referring to when he claims that cosmopolitan is colonial (2002). However, to reject \textit{all} forms of cosmopolitanism because of this would be as blind to difference as Mouffe accuses the Liberal version of

\footnote{As should be becoming clear, ‘distance’ will be defined in terms beyond the geographical, but also as a social, economic and cultural phenomenon. This will be explored more fully in Chapter Six.}
cosmopolitanism of being. Indeed, I would argue that such a perspective is trapped in what de Sousa Santos (2008) has called ‘Northern Epistemologies’, in this case of an explicitly historically Liberal nature, unable to comprehend that non-Western forms of cosmopolitanism may engender more horizontal and emancipatory relations of solidarity.

It could be argued that identifying the colonial and subject-reinforcing effects of Liberal cosmopolitanism works to reinforce the way that “Third World societies have been colonized by a Western imagination that frames and represents their meaning as part of a project of rule” (Slater, 2004: 9). In other words, the critique of cosmopolitanism as inherently colonial could merely serve to reinforce the notion that the post-colonial world is uniformly subject to relations of neo-imperialism. Heins similarly argues that this critique of Liberal cosmopolitanism in fact reifies the ‘otherness’ which it seeks to make room for. Making his case in the Indian context, he notes how in historical colonial discourse the city was represented as “suspicious and sly”, whereas the countryside was imagined as being populated by “sinless little hill girls” (2000: 42). Such a discourse is now transposed by those who wish to ‘emancipate’ this fetishised other – “Thus, we are confronted with the notion of the ‘feminine’, always ambiguous and nature-loving Orient represented by poor female subsistence farmers as opposed to the ‘masculine’, monocultural and logical West embodied by rich corporate managers”. Indian NGOs who adopt this ‘feminine’ discourse therefore profit from Western cultural codes, “…whereas the neo-modern groups in India have to pay a price for their lack of imagined Otherness. On average, they are attracting less attention and sympathy” (op cit). In a discussion
about the implications of the cosmopolitanism of alter-globalisation networks, this means that we must be wary of treating network nodes in structurally disadvantaged and post-colonial contexts as a romanticised other, seeking to escape from, rather than to be included in, the bonds of a universally transcendent cosmopolitan project. To ignore this possibility would be to ignore forms of alter-globalisation network agency which reveal something about their potentials and limitations.

So we are therefore left with a cosmopolitanism that is colonial, and a critique which feeds off and reinforces this colonialism. What is necessary, then, is an epistemology of cosmopolitanism that allows an identification of colonial and authoritarian tendencies, but that understands that epistemology as one of potentially many unfixed possibilities. Before continuing it is important to reassert the importance of this exploration: the liberal cosmopolitans of Chapter One praised the cosmopolitanism of contemporary alter-globalisation networks, my response to which was particularly critical. As my critique was based on the idea that liberal cosmopolitanism is a particularly Western, historical form, any study concerned with the potentials of alter-globalisation networks which sees cosmopolitanism as only Liberal and Western would be unnecessarily and damagingly reductive. If alter-globalisation networks are articulating alternative cosmopolitanisms\textsuperscript{37}, then a theoretical framework is required which is divorced from the critique of

\textsuperscript{37} It is important to note however that it should not necessarily be assumed that other cosmopolitanisms would be any more horizontal, democratic or inclusive than the Western form critiqued in Chapter One.
cosmopolitanism as colonial and destructive *per se*. The quest for such a framework will be the subject of the rest of this section.

How else then might we understand cosmopolitanism in such ways as to allow different actors to express their different articulations of it? In other words, is it possible to understand cosmopolitanism in terms which do not reinforce the binary between colonial and post colonial, universalistic transcendentalism and particularistic myopia?

Laclau’s attempt to collapse the universal/particular binary, briefly alluded to earlier in this chapter and in the previous chapter, is useful here. Laclau identifies the process by which “…the particular realizes in itself the universal - that is, it eliminates itself as a particular and transforms itself in a transparent medium through which universality operates; or it negates the universal by asserting its particularism” (1995: 95). In the previous chapter I related Newman’s account of French Muslim women asserting their right to wear the headscarf in the context of the apparently universal French belief in Liberté, Égalité, and Fraternité (2007: 89-90). This illustrated both the possibility of the particular to assert itself in the promise of the universal, but also the particular exclusivity of the universal which excludes certain groups (in this case Muslim women). By therefore understanding some of the most aggressive universalisms in modern history (i.e. Western Imperialism) as in fact the universalisation of a powerful particularism (1996: 24), Laclau claims we are faced with problematic paradox, for if we posit that the (marginalised) particular is something that needs to be defended against the (particular)
universalism of Empire (of either the straightforward imperial kind or Hardt and Negri's (2000) post-modern version of non-centred globalised control) then we end up having to defend all kinds of anti-social and reactionary groups (Laclau, 1995: 99), including those who we might previously have understood as representative of a 'universal' neo-liberal project (persecuted City bankers for example).

Laclau overcomes this paradox by collapsing the binary between the universal and the particular that would have us defend one or the other. He argues that by asserting a particularistic identity one is at the same time distinguishing, and thus reaffirming, that from which it is different (the universal). The same is also true of any particularism which seeks to destroy the universalism which oppresses it. That universal context cannot be destroyed without "...destroying at the same time the identity of the particular subject who carries out the destruction" (ibid: 100). This is because if the particular is in part constituted by the universal it seeks to destroy, then destroying the universal will also destroy that of the particular which it constitutes. Thus "a particularism really committed to change can only do so by rejecting both what denies its own identity and this identity itself" (ibid: 102). This therefore means that change which seeks to overcome some form or relation of oppression needs to move beyond both its poles, rejecting a simple politics of the preservation of identity (ibid: 103). This is what Fraser has called the 'transformation-recognition' axis of change, whereby not only is the universal system in question challenged to broaden the meaning it gives to concepts of citizenship, but the very group making the demand is also transformed as it seeks to de or re-subjectivise
itself and de-stabilise group differentiation (2008: 34). Similarly, Massumi has argued that

“having pity for someone who occupies a category that is not socially valorised, or expressing moral outrage on their behalf, is not necessarily helpful in the long run, because it maintains the category and simply inverts its value sign, from negative to positive...It doesn’t challenge identity-based divisions...if any group, disadvantaged or otherwise, identifies itself completely with its self-interests it’s living the fiction that it is a separate autonomy” (2002: www.brianmassumi.com)

From this perspective, a more transcendent cosmopolitanism (and alter-globalisation network) would refrain from fixing any particularistic identity, either that of the oppressed or the oppressor. To illustrate this Laclau distinguishes between two forms of post-colonial struggle. In one, the oppressive colonial power is merely rejected, and ‘othered’. Its constitutive role in the post-colonial movement is unrecognised, and thus the content of power is reversed (with the post-colonial ‘particular’ taking the place of the colonial ‘universal’) but the form of oppression remains. The new, post-colonial universal is therefore only transcendent in that it is the most oppressively powerful particularity. In the second distinction, the inter-constitutivity of the universal and particular is recognised, and their positions as either universal or particular are dissolved. Thus both the contents and forms of oppression are transformed and transcended. In this case it is not just the particular oppressive relation between universal and particular which is inverted, but the particular universal system itself is dismantled and transformed (1996: 31). Applying this discussion to the potentials and limitations of alter-globalisation networks would see us recognise any cosmopolitan ethic which transcends and dissolves
the universal/particular binary of the network in question as a genuinely emancipatory one, and vice versa. In other words, when assessing how the powers of these networks explain the powers of them, the following question could be posed: how do the power relations between their (alter-globalisation networks) always unstable and inter-constitutive poles of universality and particularity inform their ability to enact an emancipatory and socio-economically transcendent political subjectivity? This question will be refined further in the following chapter.

Another useful dimension to consider here is provided by Massey. Where Laclau problematises the universal/particular binary, Massey problematises the local/global one, arguing that traditionally the local has been treated as the victim of the global, and thus distinct from it. Her argument, outlined in Chapter One, that everywhere is ‘local’, but that some localities are more powerful than others and are therefore productive of what appear to be ‘global’ phenomena, problematises fixed distinctions between the local and the global as autonomous geographical fields (something I will return to in the following section). Thus the global may exist may exist in relations of domination with certain locales, as well as constitute the character of certain powerful places, but is always socially produced. In this case the global is itself constituted by the ability or susceptibility of all these locales to either dominate or be dominated. This leads Massey to conclude that just as there is a responsibility on global institutions to ensure particularistic socio-economic equality (i.e. in particular localities which suffer the most
from the structural violence of neo-liberalism), there is also a responsibility of particular local places for the ways they produce what is taken to be 'the global' (2005: 102).

I would argue that the 'responsibility' which Massey argues for implies also an agency on behalf of what we might call the (relational) local. Furthermore, it is illogical to confine such an agency simply to locales which we would define as powerful, and so it must also be extended to locales which appear to be dominated by relationally constructed 'global' processes. Taken together with Laclau's approach to the universal/particular binary, I would argue that this would involve an approach to the study of alter-globalisation networks sensitive not just to the ways that material domination and resistance are produced in and by them, but also epistemological domination and resistance. If diverse cosmopolitan projects and ethics are being enacted by alter-globalisation networks, and if they are constituted by the agency of traditionally defined powerless groups and places (Reitan, 2007), and thus represent non-Western modes of cosmopolitanism, then it is important to ask to what degree they reaffirm or transcend existing subjectifications. Do they, as Heins (2000) asserted, merely reinforce the epistemological colonial imaginary, or represent new transformational configurations of power relations? Furthermore, even if founded on de Sousa Santos' 'epistemologies of the South' (2008), do the agencies of the traditionally weak/oppressed 'particular' (Laclau, 1995) or 'local' (Massey, 2005)

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38 Massey cites the specific example of London, which is celebrated for its availability and diversity of cultural experiences. However, the wealth which makes the consumption of this culture possible is predicated on London existing in relations of domination with other distant locations, from where comes, for example, the cheap migrant labour which provides the armies of low-paid cleaners, cooks, and night-shift security personnel which in part underpins the success of London's financial services, or culinary industries (2005: 101).
simply invert the context of previous colonial and imperial power relations (and thus carry with them the destructive content of Western forms of cosmopolitanism), or transform the whole structure and content of them?

Several writers in post-colonial and broader literatures have sought to provide some answers to these questions. Bhambra warns against being over-zealous in celebrating what may initially appear to be non-Western forms of cosmopolitanism, for in doing so we may simply be reaffirming Europe as the fixed centre of the modern period (2007: 62-64). Mignolo asserts that in doing so we risk being blind to the "darker side of modernity", i.e. colonialism. What is necessary then is a way of re-conceiving cosmopolitanism from the post-colonial perspective in ways which do not re-affirm Western epistemologies, what Mignolo calls "critical cosmopolitanism" (2000: 723). Mignolo suggests we do this by deploying "border thinking" – distinguishing this from a mode of thought which sees the 'marginalised' as separate from the 'centre', "border thinking" involves centring what has been thought of as the periphery, which in doing so is reformative, and potentially transformative of what the 'border' is brought into, or what is brought to it (ibid: 736) (this is reminiscent of Laclau's (1995; 1996) dissolution of the universal-particular relationship discussed previously). Mignolo deploys the use of 'connectors' to explore the inter-discursivity of periphery-centre relations, in order to illustrate the manner in which an analysis of cosmopolitan solidarity can be re-centred without solidifying the West as the originator of modernity and social relations. Connectors are shared terms which encapsulate different definitions brought into contact
with each other in a process of negotiated understanding. Mignolo cites the example of the Zapatistas, who have enacted a particularistic, ‘border’ notion of democracy:

"Democracy for the Zapatistas is not conceptualized in terms of European political philosophy but in terms of Maya social organization based on reciprocity, communal (instead of individual) values, the value of wisdom... The Mexican government doesn't possess the correct interpretation of democracy, under which the Other will be included. But, for that matter, neither do the Zapatistas have the right interpretation. However, the Zapatistas have no choice but to use the word that political hegemony imposed, although using the word doesn't mean bending to its mono-logic interpretation. Once democracy is singled out by the Zapatistas, it becomes a connector through which liberal concepts of democracy and indigenous concepts of reciprocity and community social organization for the common good must come to terms." (2000: 742)

Thus discourse itself becomes the process through which cosmopolitanism is enacted. Mignolo argues for a cosmopolitanism based on “diversality”, whereby instead of connections emanating from a centre to leave those on its periphery re-imagined in a mode of cosmopolitan imperialism, the experiences of the border are brought in to the ‘centre’ and understood as “new forms of projecting and imagining, ethically and politically, from subaltern perspectives” (ibid: 745). This assertion mirrors Pollock, Bhabha and Breckenridge's call to be “archivally cosmopolitan”, when they urge us to “simply look at the world across time and space and see how people have thought and acted beyond the local” (2000: 586).

So for a study of the potentials and limitations of alter-globalisation networks, this means not reducing alternative cosmopolitan visions to being simply non-Western, or as being defined purely by an opposition to ‘Northern epistemologies’ (de Sousa Santos, 2008), as this would be to ignore the fuller potentiality of such alternative cosmopolitanisms. It
would be to fix these visions at the border/periphery, rather than to treat them as alternative and plural centres. Whilst even in these ways cosmopolitan relations could still emerge from a Western epistemology, by keeping in mind Mignolo’s “border thinking” we can begin to develop a focus which simultaneously transcends any notion of the West as being the unique originator of all cosmopolitan relations. This calls for an approach which is attentive to alternative epistemologies of cosmopolitanism and solidarity, and is another example of the potential of more grounded and normative approaches for the understanding of the powers and agencies of alter-globalisation networks.

I want to draw attention here to an underlying theme which seems to underpin this literature on cosmopolitanism from the post-colonial studies canon, and which I believe is helpful in thinking about and analysing the kind of cosmopolitanisms we might encounter in alter-globalisation networks, and that is the distinction Hannah Arendt made between ‘making’ and ‘action’. For Arendt, ‘action’ corresponds to the plurality of humanity, or, as Arendt puts it, that there are “…men, rather than man” (1958/1998: 7). Plurality is the constitutive element of politics, for politics would be unnecessary if all people were the same and reproduced themselves ad infinitum (op cit). In other words, ‘action’ is Arendt’s way of theorising the plurality of individual expression and creativity.

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39 It is important to note here that Arendt was no borderless cosmopolitan, and that my use of her political theory is abstracted to a degree from her broader canon on the role of the state. Arendt’s work has
In political terms, Arendt distinguishes ‘action’ from the mode of politics as ‘making’, which she sees in the majority of historical political practice. ‘Making’ as politics almost always involves the abolition of plurality, of ‘action’. This is a result of people seeking shelter from the unpredictability of plurality/action, and sees a retreat into ‘making’ as politics – i.e. the centralisation of political action in monarch, dictator, party or parliament (ibid: 220). This making/action distinction speaks directly to Mignolo’s ‘diversality’ (2000: 745), and his normative desire to see a cosmopolitanism which emanates not from the centre, in a form of “global design” (ibid: 722), but from the borders, in plurality. I would argue that Arendt’s distinction helps us to understand just quite how risky and uncertain a ‘border’ or post-colonial cosmopolitanism could be. Never existing in isolation, and linked by ‘connectors’ (ibid: 742) to much more powerful hegemonic powers, ‘action’, seems always vulnerable to projects of ‘making’. As such, this provides an important caveat to the research of alter-globalisation networks, and the kinds of cosmopolitanisms which might be encountered within them, namely, that all the forms of cosmopolitan practice and understanding which alter-globalisation networks, may, at various nodal points, incubate, will always be vulnerable to a co-optive project of ‘making’, of de-pluralising. This is a reason then to be cautious about the extent

been appropriated by international relations realists, post-structuralists, feminists, critical theorists and cosmopolitans (Owens, 2009: 31). Arendt however believed that rights and freedoms could only be guaranteed by the territorial state, probably due to her aversion to grand supra-state political and military projects produced by the historical period in which she was writing and living (ibid: 39).
to which we celebrate alternative cosmopolitan visions and practices in alter-globalisation networks.

In this section I have attempted to problematise the central radical critique of cosmopolitan theory which I first introduced in Chapter One. Whilst retaining the belief that this is a relevant critique, I have argued that as a critique it falls into the same trap that it accuses cosmopolitanism of falling into — that of being Euro-centric and blind to post-colonial productivity. In problematising this critique I have further sought to disturb the notion that the only cosmopolitanism possible is one framed in the development of the Western historical colonial project. Post-colonial, or border cosmopolitan projects are inherently risky and uncertain, and thus provide useful insights into the relationships which operate to constitute alter-globalisation networks and their potentials. In the next and final section of this chapter, I will explore literature which helps to explain how we understand the spatial location of alter-globalisation networks, and what implications this has for the legitimacy and authenticity of such networks. This will provide further insights into how a grounded normative approach to such networks could proceed.

3.4 Locating alter-globalisation networks

In the previous section on cosmopolitanism, I drew on the work of Massey (2005) to argue that the local and the global are not distinct from each other, instead co-constituting each other so that both are in fact ‘local’ in the sense that both emerge from particular
places or combinations of places. In this section I will be investigating this claim in more
detail. This is because part of the challenge in researching alter-globalisation networks is
locating the geographical frame in which to study them. This issue is considered here
because in many respects, where one chooses to study alter-globalisation networks
depends on the approach one takes to their relationships with statist and neo-liberal
hegemonic powers (and how one defines those powers), and the degree to which one
deems their cosmopolitanism to be emanating from a single source. In this section, then, I
will attempt to develop a framework by which alter-globalisation networks can be
‘located’ which allows as full an understanding as possible of their multiple agencies and
practices.

3.4.1 'Transnational' vs. 'Global'

Whilst seemingly innocuous, the labels by which alter-globalisation networks are referred
to carry a great deal of significance for the kinds of research questions posed when
studying them. It will be necessary therefore to develop as much clarity as possible in the
terminology I will employ for the study of GCAP, for as I will illustrate, different labels
imply different lines of investigation.

Before plunging into this discussion however, I want to make clear one important caveat:
Any discussion around what is the context in which alter-globalisation networks are
constituted is inherently risky. Any conclusions reached here will be eminently
contestable, not just in the realm of academic debate, but more importantly in the unpredictable process of doing research. Indeed, just because something may appear to be one thing, doesn’t mean that those involved in making that process won’t understand it as something else. This is exactly what Heins argues in relation to global civil society – just because some academics (including me) may not recognise the validity of the claims made by global civil society theorists and Liberal cosmopolitans, does not mean that it is not “...an idea that many people live by” (2005b: 195). Nonetheless, as I have argued, the act of labelling opens up and shuts down different ways of thinking and understanding alter-globalisation networks, and so it seems to me to be an important exercise to engage with these debates in order to make some (or my) kind of sense out of them.

Lipschutz argues that the majority of social movements and networks are transnational, because to ‘go global’ implies being subsumed by homogeneity “…and to lose both distinctiveness and discursive power” (2006: 18). It is because of this threat that many of the actors who constitute such movements and networks remain wedded to some degree of place-specific identity and culture, be that nations, states or ethnic groups (op cit). One immediate issue which arises from Lipschutz’s conceptualisation of these movements and networks as transnational is that the places he assigns the national to are not, in fact, necessarily national. Ethnic groups, even nations, are not necessarily found, and do not necessarily place themselves within the confines of a territorial nation-state. I will return to this shortly.
Sikkink's work on Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs), first with Keck (1998) and later with Khagram and Riker (2002) makes the empirical case for Lipschutz's conceptualisation. According to Keck and these writers, a TAN is based on actors spread across different countries acting to regulate international norms and international governmental organisations such as the Bretton Woods institutions (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002: 7). This is clearly a conceptual language framed by the pre-eminence of the territorial nation-state, and the institutions created by different territorial nation-states agreeing with each other.

Not only does such language place the territorial nation-state as central to how we conceive of alter-globalisation networks (thus being open to criticisms of 'methodological nationalism' (Beck, 1997: 87)), but it is also reminiscent of those who argue for a scalar approach to the way that alter-globalisation networks, and globalisation more broadly, is thought about (Johnston, 2003; Gane, 2004; Sassen, 2007a). Sassen for example, asserts that the territorial nation-state has become "unbundled", and been transcended (thus being 'trans' national\(^{46}\)) by other spatial scales, such as the regional and the global (in Ganes, 2004: 126). It is not that Sassen, and those others who share this approach, seek to reify such scales. Indeed, Johnston is critical of "...the tendency to reduce complex phenomena to a singular level of geographic scale, to see struggles as either [local or global]... [scales are] frequently treated as static ontological entities, obscuring their fluid construction" (2003: 92). However, one has to question whether it is

\(^{46}\) My conclusion, not Sassen's
in deploying the language of scales that such reifications are made more possible (for example, describing an alter-globalisation network as campaigning on a ‘national’ scale41). If, like Sassen, one views functions as shifting from one scale to another, then it is fairly likely that one will seek to find evidence of such functions operating in relatively bounded processes of ‘global’, ‘national’, ‘sub-national’ etc.

This latter point is extremely important. Even though Johnston claims that scales are produced by fluid processes, by invoking the existence of scales he is inevitably invoking something which is fixed, even if it is temporary. According to Pile, privileging particular scales in this manner masks the modalities of domination and resistance which are always ongoing in giving scales the appearance of fixity (1997: 13). In other words, spatial fixity is socially produced, and thus involves some degree of othering and exclusion. So Chandler’s wholesale rejection of activism which locates itself outside of national borders (2004) may have something to do with the fact that he privileges formal local and national political institutions as the sites where transformational socio-economic change should occur (2007). In doing so he rules out the validity of almost any activism not directed at these national institutions, and reifies the pre-eminence of the ‘national’ scale as a fixed and bounded entity. This is not a particularly useful paradigm in which to investigate how alter-globalisation networks operate in space, and where they emerge from. This is because Chandler explicitly relegates the efficacy of any political action with the appearance of non-national features, and assumes that scales exist independently

41 The implications of this kind of labelling in GCAP is discussed in Chapter Seven
of each other, easily transcended by alter-globalisation networks and activists. If that were the case though then we could surely expect to find something called the *Global Call to Action against Poverty* in a place characterised by ‘the global’, retreating, as Chandler would argue, from somewhere else characterised by ‘the national’. I am extremely sceptical as to the degree to which we can characterise space in these fixed and bounded ways. Where exactly, might ‘the global’ be found? Similarly, whilst one might point to a map to locate a national space, how characteristically national are many of these spaces when we consider the reformation and reworking of the state and sovereignty under conditions of globalisation in so many parts of the world? These questions are important with regard to the study of alter-globalisation networks for how particular understandings of space allow us to explore their claims of legitimacy, representation and authenticity. In other words, what do claims of being global allow such networks to say and do, and what does an exploration of where they are actually located, discursively as well as materially, reveal about the authenticity of these claims?

Thus far this discussion has centred on the resonance of the ‘transnational’ and the ‘scalar’ to the study and location of alter-globalisation networks. Of course, GCAP, the case study in this research, is the *Global Call to Action against Poverty*, and I am now going to argue that deploying the ‘global’, rather than the ‘transnational’ has different, and, arguably, more useful connotations in helping to approach the questions posed above. It is important to note that I am going to be developing a particular understanding of the ‘global’ here which divorces it from a scalar or spatially autonomous imaginary.
When the Liberal cosmopolitans talk about 'global' civil society, this global element is deemed to be something qualitatively new in world history (Beck, 1997; Kaldor, 1999; Scholte, 2005). Where Beck in particular accuses those who continue to focus on the territorial nation-state as the preeminent sociological frame of 'methodological nationalism' (2007), I would argue that Beck, and others who claim a distinct global sociological frame, are guilty of a kind of methodological *globalism* which has the same effect. Furthermore, a narrative which presents the global as something new simply solidifies the historical dominance of the modernist territorial nation-state narrative. As Fine argues:

> "the shaky premise of the new cosmopolitanism is that no fundamental change has occurred until recent times. Events as momentous as the political revolutions of the late 18th century and the rise of the modern nation state, the growth of imperialism, colonization and scientific racism in the late 19th century, the collapse of the mainland European empires in the First World War and the formation of a raft of newly independent nation states out of their fragments, the rise of totalitarian regimes with global, anti-national ambitions in the inter-war period, the collapse of overseas empires after the Second World War and the formation of a new raft of post-colonial nation states – all these events are presented as mere punctuation marks in a continuous Westphalian or modernist narrative." (2003b: 457)

Such a perspective therefore separates the national and the global into distinct analytical processes, asserting the territorial nation-state as the autonomous originator of modernity, with the global posited as the post-modern condition. I want to argue however, drawing again on Laclau (1995, 1996) and Massey (2005), that the global (locally originated and universally dominant), is both historical, and relational. Historically, global processes were at the centre of the birth of modernity; for example, the cotton mills of the early
Industrial Revolution were reliant on the cotton and weaving technologies which were imported from India, with the cotton itself picked by slaves (Bhambra, 2007). Relationally, the global can be understood as something which both has producing effects on localised daily lives and institutions, and is constituted by those same lives and institutions. Like Laclau’s discussion on the universal and the particular (1996), the local cannot exist without the global, and vice versa. If there was no global, then how would we distinguish the local from anything else? And if everything was global, how would we distinguish what was local? In this vein, Stammers and Eschle warn against treating globalisation as a homogenising (and thus distinct) force which creates shared experiences. Instead, they argue that globalisation is multi-causal and inter-sectional (2005: 57). This means that there is still room for local, national, ethnic and cultural differences. So we know what the global is not. It is not (as Lipschutz (2006) argues) a homogenising, distinct force. What then, is it?

I would argue that the global is a relational dimension. Scholte (2009) has asserted that there is very little that is not global in some sense. The national may retain relevance in battling the ill effects of neo-liberal globalisation (Halperin, 2003, Ugarteche, 2007), but if the very actions of national governments are responding to global processes, then those actions have been constituted by a relation to those processes which gives those actions a global dimension (even though the global itself will be produced by single, or more often multiple localities). This does not mean that these national actions are entirely global,
merely that they are part-constituted by something which has emerged locally to take on global significance.

For example, the United States is popularly held to be a global superpower. In this way it is productive of certain global relations of domination between itself and other actors. Just as much as the US presence in Iraq is produced by certain national militaristic and imperialistic trends in US foreign policy, thus emanating from a national space, it could also be argued that this very national space is in its turn partly constituted by global processes of migration, oil production and climate change, themselves emerging from particular places to have global effects. In this sense the ‘national’ is not a bounded space or scale, but something relationally constructed and which contains many different dimensions. The same can be said for what we call the ‘global’.

So instead of looking for pre-existing or entirely constituted global, national or local scales or spaces in which alter-globalisation networks might operate, we are left with one space of many dimensional distinctions, productive of diverse experiences and agencies. In political terms this kind of approach underpins Fraser’s ‘all affected’ principle (2007), whereby rights and compensation claims are no longer based on territorial affiliation – to specific places, nations or scales – but are extended to all those who might be affected by the actions of governments or groups in any part of the world. The very fact that they may be affected at great geographical distance from where the action was operationalised speaks to the inter-dimensionality of places and what is experienced in them, and the
manner in which what appears to be singularly global is produced by a range of local and national dimensions.

In the context of alter-globalisation networks, therefore, I find it useful to consider what Routledge has called 'convergence spaces' (2003a: 345-346). Even though Routledge persists with the deployment of a scalar imaginary, I believe that the concept of convergence spaces can be read as something which transcends scale and becomes specific to the actors and relations which constitute such spaces. So, for example, Routledge describes a convergence space as "a heterogeneous affinity - 'a world made of many worlds' (Marcos 2001, 10) - between various social formations" (2003a: 345). Thus, rather than distinct scales being traversed by instrumental social formations such as social movements, a convergence space allows us to think of a site where scales are intermingled (and, I would argue, dissolved), and "where such scales become mutually constitutive...grassroots globalization networks prosecute globalized local actions... and localized global actions" (ibid: 346). Such actions therefore take on various dimensions of the local, national, or global, never being entirely one or the other (and thus never entirely occupying one scale of action, and collapsing the very deployment of this kind of imaginary). Where Kohn argues that "The 'global' makes no sense except as the convergence of different localities" (2003: 163), we might also understand any social site of apparent fixity being the representation of a convergence of particularities or localities (Hetherington, 1997).
Viewing space in this way can also lead us to wonder about which particularities/localities are absent from a specific convergence space, and why. It is the manner in which such convergence(s) may be produced by consensual or conflictual relations that gives this process its productive yet temporary and contingent (upon consensus and/or conflict) feature (Pile, 1997: 13; Butler, 2008: 47). So in the context of alter-globalisation networks, we would need to ask how the spaces they occupy are produced (particularly when claims of horizontality or accessibility are made about these spaces by alter-globalisation networks) and who or what are excluded from these spaces. This would also help to explain how their potential, their power to, and their convergence with other social relations and actors, is immanent in/produced by this process.

In this sub-section I have argued against common conceptions of alter-globalisation networks which see them either as ‘transnational’ thus privileging the territorial nation-state as the main source of contemporary political action, and notions of the global as a distinct and homogeneous space or ‘scale’. Instead I have argued for a conception of the global which views it as a dimension, something which is never whole, and entirely contingent on relations and actors who are to greater and lesser extents dimensionally local or national. These actors in turn are also never whole, and also reliant on productive relations and actors which are to greater or lesser extents dimensionally global. Such a conception of space and the features it takes are thus dependent on the agency of the relations and actors who constitute it. The next sub-section therefore will address this agency in more detail. Following this I will conclude this chapter with a rumination on
what the implications of these discussions are for the study of alter-globalisation networks.

3.4.2 Agency

As I argued in the previous discussion, the global is not new, distinct, homogenising or even singular. It is instead a locally-produced and productive dimension which lends the convergence spaces which might in part be constituted by the global a distinctly heterogeneous character. Given this, it is relevant to include here a discussion of the various and conflicting agencies which might be found in convergence spaces. It is important to take a grounded normative approach to this issue because some writers who address the spaces of alter-globalisation networks (for example: Taylor, 2004; Della Porta, 2005; Saunders and Rootes, 2007) do so in such a way as to uncritically celebrate and fetishise the activists and organisations found therein. One example of this was explored in Chapter One, where Liberal cosmopolitans were found to reify NGOs and social movements as inherently progressive, and somehow bounded off from 'uncivil' society (Falk, 2005: 75). In developing a research framework for the study of alter-globalisation networks and convergence spaces, it is thus important to investigate some of the ways in which global, national and local dimensions combine with the agency of the actors who constitute such spaces to produce dominating and resisting effects. This has clear implications for the normative potential of alter-globalisation networks, and will illustrate the necessity of taking a grounded normative approach to the research of them,
which takes due notice of the conflicting agencies involved in producing the convergence spaces which constitute these networks.

Describing convergence spaces, Routledge asserts that they are comprised of contested social relations, conflicting goals, ideologies and strategies. Whilst this at times can be productive of a transcendental universal agency, more often than not these divisions are ongoing – “problematic issues will continue to arise within convergence spaces concerning unequal discursive and material power relations that result from the differential control of resources” (2003a: 346).

Such an understanding of an always ongoing contestation within groups and movements brings to mind Melucci’s work on collective identity formation (1996), which he argues is always the result of contestation around what that collective identity should look like, and is therefore never fixed or static. Drawing on this Meluccian understanding on social movement formation, Eschle argues that the divergence characteristic of what some people call the global justice or alter-globalisation movement (see Chapter Two for more examples of these terms) is in fact what constitutes it as a movement (2005: 20) – “movements are ongoing processes in which diverse actors construct a common frame of reference...the formation of a collective identity through which participants establish relationships to each other” (p cit). However, such a presupposition assumes a certain degree of equality between the actors involved to have their voices heard and to contribute to the formation or dissolution/reformation of collective identities.
Building on this, Pile argues that one will never really find a singular ‘movement’, with an origin and a destination. Rather, one will encounter a number of at times contesting, at times coherent pathways, which means there is no single reason why people and organisations are mobilised, “no one single aim, no single demand, no one path of struggle” (1997: 29). Pile argues that far from disabling them, this is what makes movements strategic, tactical and resourceful (op cit). This would seem to only be the case when such disparate pathways are able to align themselves, for when they do not, not only would a movement be dysfunctional, but it is unlikely there would be anything resembling a movement to observe. This means that in assessing the potentials and limitations of alter-globalisation networks we must be attentive to how the appearance of coherence and authenticity is maintained.

Cumbers, Nativel and Routledge reveal the constitutive element of exclusivity which produces and maintains coherence in the convergence spaces of alter-globalisation networks. They illustrate the very central role that what they call ‘imagineers’ play in maintaining network or movement coherence in their study of an alter-globalisation network called Peoples’ Global Action South Asia, which has implications for how we understand such coherence as an equally negotiated process or occurrence. Despite the horizontal manner in which PGA South Asia is constituted (2007: 2579), much of the organisational work, including participation in meetings, planning of events, and facilitation of communication flows between network nodes is carried out by what they
call “...free radical activists and key movement contacts” (ibid: 2576). They possess key English-language skills and are computer literate. They therefore are positioned to literally ‘imagine’ the network into being, grounding it in terms of what it is and how it works within the grassroots communities who make up the membership of the other participants in the network (op cit).

Other key nodes in the network who accrue power by virtue of their positionality are the translators who translate the English in which PGA South Asia’s main conferences are held into the languages of the constituent grassroots members (ibid: 2583). Such imagineers compromise PGA South Asia’s “supposed horizontality, generating unequal power relations within the network” (ibid: 2580).

Network imagineers are internationally mobile, perform much of the work that is required to sustain the network and often possess the cultural capital of higher standards of formal education, and the social capital which comes with their travels around the world attending various get-togethers of activists and social movement organisations. They therefore not only route most of the information through their networks, but very often decide the content of it too. Cumbers, Nativel and Routledge point out that such positionality is very often not instrumental, and that “power defaults to them through the characteristics noted above; personal qualities like energy, commitment, and charisma, and the ability to synthesise politically important social moments into identifiable ideas and forms” (ibid: 2584). Furthermore, grassroots members often default to this informal
elite of imagineers to just get on with the organisation of PGA South Asia (op cit), despite having grievances over the direction and content of the network. For example, the authors found that many of the grassroots members of PGA South Asia were distinctly uncomfortable with the network's focus on performative events such as protests and caravans, rather than strategic interventions at the points where the structural violence of neo-liberalism was being felt most forcefully (ibid: 2890). This study by Cumbers, Nativel and Routledge illustrates the manner in which convergence spaces are non-static and non-uniform. Just because they are produced spaces, does not guarantee or even make likely any kind of homogeneity within them. This is because they are immanent, in constant processes of being re-made and re-interpreted.

This sub-section has contributed to the wider discussion on how alter-globalisation networks can be located. I have argued that alter-globalisation networks cannot be judged by their immediate appearances, but that rather any appearance of fixity they have is likely to be unstable and temporary, produced by the agencies of the actors and structures which constitute them, and the often unequal power relations between them. Furthermore, I have argued that these inequalities are linked to the positionality of such actors and structures, both to each other, but also within fields and spaces which are produced by different dimensions of local, national and global processes. It is therefore not necessarily the case that the most powerful actors within a network are 'global', with the weakest being 'local', but rather that the most powerful actors are constituted by different degrees of these dimensions. So for example, an actor which is deeply constituted by its relations
to a powerful national space, such as the USA, may be far more powerful in a network than an actor which travels a great deal and is constituted to a great extent by its global relations, none of which however are particularly productively powerful. This is again important to bear in mind when studying the agencies of alter-globalisation networks, for it prevents us from being automatically celebratory at the appearance of diversity within an alter-globalisation network.

3.5 Chapter Conclusion — A Grounded Normative Framework

I began this chapter by arguing that in order to avoid some of the binaries identified in Chapter Two, and the uncritical celebration of alter-globalisation networks identified in Chapter One, it would be necessary to adopt something which I called a grounded normative approach, which investigates the relations which constitute alter-globalisation networks in order to understand their limitations and potentials. I then adopted this approach to the discussion of three themes which had been present throughout the explorations of Chapters One and Two, namely: Statist and Neo-Liberal Hegemonic Power; Cosmopolitanism; and Locating Alter-Globalisation Networks.

In exploring the relationship between alter-globalisation networks and statist and neoliberal hegemonic powers, I argued that a grounded normative approach allows us to move beyond the hegemonic/post-hegemonic binary which arose out of the radical alter-globalisationist approach discussed in Chapter Two. I proposed that we should
understand neither alter-globalisation networks, nor statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, as fixed entities, but instead as sets of relations which can both affirm, negate and transform the contents of each other. I argued that this approach takes into account the complex ways in which alter-globalisation networks may re-subjectivise themselves and contingently and perhaps temporarily transform the seemingly dominant powers of statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations.

With regards to the ways in which alter-globalisation networks manage the tension between the universalism they attempt to embody and the particularisms which constitute them, I argued that where the Liberal cosmopolitans of Chapter One over-celebrated the cosmopolitan, de-particularising potential of such networks, which often masked Euro-centric and imperial epistemologies and ontologies, the critics of that position have similarly rendered cosmopolitanism as a uniquely western (historical, imperial) concept. I argued however that it was necessary to collapse the universal/particular binary, in order to make it possible to theorise cosmopolitanism from alternative centres of knowledge, using the writings of post-colonial theorists to illustrate this. This discussion pointed again to the importance of paying attention to the relations which constitute alter-globalisation networks in order to assess the degree to which such non-western or alternative cosmopolitanisms are possible, and whether if they are, to what degree they represent more horizontal or equitable modes of encountering distant others.
Finally, I turned my attention to the location of alter-globalisation networks, exploring ways in which a grounded and normative approach can transcend global-national or global-local binaries in the study of alter-globalisation networks, and what this means for understanding their agency. I argued that the various approaches to alter-globalisation networks which cite them as trans-national, global, nationally bound, or multi-scalar, all in their own ways fix these networks at one particular site of existence. Adopting a dimensional approach, I argued that seeing alter-globalisation networks as heterogeneously constituted by and productive of convergent dimensions of global, national and local allowed an understanding to be developed of these networks as existing beyond immediate spatial fixity. This means that the research of alter-globalisation networks needs to take account of the instability of the different spaces they help to produce and how these may often be contradictory and/or exclusive.

If in this chapter I appear to be drawing some methodological conclusions then this is not accidental. What I have attempted to do here is provide the beginnings of a framework in which we can understand the potentials and limitations of alter-globalisation networks without being over-celebratory or over-critical in our analysis of them, and without setting up binaries about what they should be doing based on particular normative positions. In the next chapter I will be setting out my methodology in greater detail, building on the framework developed in this chapter and defining key concepts intrinsic to the study of relationality. I will also be outlining the more instrumental aspects of my
research design, and reflecting on some of the issues and opportunities I encountered when doing this research.
CHAPTER FOUR

Methodology and Research Design

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will be seeking to outline a number of related processes and subjects: the rationale for this research and the research questions which follow from this; a research approach, including defining the key methodological concepts which pertain to it; the case study for this research, the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP) — some background information, and how I chose to study it; the main research methods I chose to use for this research, the justifications for my choice of them, and their limitations, as well as how ‘doing’ the research simultaneously influenced my methods; the ethical implications of the research project; and lastly my approach to the issues of generalisability and truth claims.

4.2 Rationale

In the first three chapters of this thesis, I have attempted to illustrate that whilst various scholars have centred on how alter-globalisation networks supposedly speak to power (see Chapter one) or seek to transcend it (see Chapter Two) many of them (particularly in Chapter One) have failed to focus on how the coalitions, movements and campaigns that
constitute these networks are themselves constituted by power, including the power they wish to speak to/transcend. I have further argued that this has implications for how seriously we can take the socio-economic transformation promised by many of these networks. Lastly, I have argued that a great deal of this work has relied on uncritically normative prescriptions for change, rather than a more grounded approach which would seek to investigate the implications of how and by what/whom these networks are constituted. In Chapter Three I sought to develop a theoretical framework in which such an analysis could take place.

This lack of a more grounded emphasis has been identified by several authors. Diani identifies the lack of attention paid to power generally and leadership specifically in social movements (2003: 105)\(^{42}\). Eschle takes a broader structural approach when she argues that there have been many cases of women’s minority groups being marginalised in the agendas and mobilisations of social movements and civil society. Movements are

\(^{42}\) It is interesting that Diani should make this claim. As perhaps the leading practitioner and exponent of social network analysis (see, Diani, 1992; 1995; 2002; 2003), it is Diani who has done most to illustrate the potential of this method in revealing the dynamics of social movement centralisation and participation (Diani, 2003: 9). As Anheier and Katz point out though, social network analysis has traditionally paid more attention to the existence of ties and relations, rather than their cultural and social meanings and how they are interpreted (2005: 206). Anheier and Katz do however highlight the contributions a social network analysis approach can make to the study of power in alter-globalisation networks (or in their words, ‘global civil society’), including the diffusion of ideas; patterns of inclusion and exclusion; and the relation of structural positions within a network (ibid: 221). However, as Yanacopulos notes, network memberships change over time, and thus render quantitative analyses of them inflexible (Yanacopulos, 2009). This is reinforced by the impression that a social network analysis assumes a relatively static set of social relations existing autonomously from the researcher, and further sets boundaries around what actually constitutes the network (i.e. material organisational forms, rather than, for example, discursive formations). Ultimately, whilst social network analysis does provide useful insights for the study of power in alter-globalisation networks (as well as the Diani’s various contributions, and Anheier and Katz, 2003, see also Saunders and Rootes, 2006), I do not believe it provides the right kind of insights, nor methodological flexibility for the particular epistemology of power I will be developing further on in this chapter.
seen as somehow “outside or below power: as intrinsically counter-hegemonic or emancipatory…” (2005: 23). Together with Stammers, Eschle goes on to argue that the network form so closely associated with both contemporary capitalism (Hardt and Negri, 2000) and the contemporary global civil society and social movements which seek to fight it (Hardt and Negri, 2004), is not necessarily anti-hierarchical and democratic (Stammers and Eschle, 2005: 62-63). They thus argue that “the character and dynamics of network relationships within social movements may be crucial for considering the potential of movements to contribute to a shift towards a more democratic world order” (ibid: 63).

Taking into account both the gaps in the literature on alter-globalisation networks that I identified above, and the framework for analysis which I developed in Chapter Three, this research will seek to address the following questions:

Central Research Question

- What do the powers in alter-globalisation networks reveal about the powers of them?

Sub-research Questions

- In which ways can alter-globalisation networks be understood as oppositional?
• Which processes of exclusion and inclusion constitute alter-globalisation networks?
• Where are alter-globalisation networks?

4.2.1 Contribution to Knowledge

It has been argued that there is a tendency in studies of alter-globalisation networks to focus research on actors in structurally privileged contexts (Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos, 2004), which this project aims to redress. Furthermore, as several authors have attested to (Diani, 2003; Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos, 2004; Amoore and Langley, 2004; Eschle, 2005; Eschle and Stammers, 2005), the study of alter-globalisation networks has often overlooked power within in favour of power to. Nonetheless there are still very few empirical studies of the former. It is the contention here that one cannot understand the potential of such networks to challenge seemingly dominant hegemonic forces without first analysing the degree to which they are themselves constituted by relations to these same powers, and what implications this has for how they can be understood as oppositional, inclusive, and locatable.

4.3 Research Approach

Throughout this thesis so far I have made repeated references to power, and this certainly comes to the fore in the rationale for the research presented at the beginning of this
chapter. Whether it has been to critique the Liberal Cosmopolitans for not considering the exclusions of ‘global civil society’ enough, or to illustrate the tensions inherent to the relationship between the cosmopolitan and the particular, or the state and civil society, power has been writ large thus far.

Up to this point I have been engaging power as a tool of critique, and have avoided explicitly illustrating exactly what kind of power I would deploy in my own analysis. Moving forward though, I intend to deploy ‘power’ analytically. Given this, it is important that I offer a discussion which reflects how I intend to use power as an interrogative concept.

4.3.1 Power and Relationality

In this section I will develop an epistemology of power which will inform my study of GCAP. Steven Lukes’ ‘radical view’ (1974) opened up a discussion on power which sought to look past the observed actions or ‘non-actions’ (Bacharach and Baratz, 1962) of human actors, and to locate power either in structure, as Lukes attempted to do, or, as others have tried to do, in agency, more specifically in shifting and productive relationships. Whereas Lukes claimed that power was hegemonic, dominant and exercised, several writers, first as a response to this claim and then later as an extension of these counter arguments, came to see power in far more diffuse and non-centralised terms.
When Foucault famously argued that “We need to cut off the King’s head” (Foucault, 2000: 122), he was referring to the trend within political theory to view power as centralised, to reify it as sovereign. Power flows down, dominating its subjects as a King does. According to Clegg, “the formal theoretical concern with what was taken to be power had been fixed by Hobbes in a preoccupation with questions of causality, sovereignty and order” (Clegg, 1989: 37). Clegg argued that this concern could still be found in Lukes’ radical view over four hundred years later (op cit).

Clegg, amongst a range of other writers (see for example Knights and Willmott, 1982; Wickham, 1986; Hardy and O’Sullivan, 1998; Sharp, Routledge, Philo and Paddison, 2000; Allen, 2004), proposed more diffuse notions of power, more in line with the late post-structuralism of Foucault. Rejecting the notion that power is something that can be held, exercised, that it has property, Clegg argued that it is the image of it as such - its reification - which is power’s greatest achievement. “When power is regarded as thing like, as something solid, real and material, as something an agent has, then this represents power in its most pervasive and concrete mode. It is securely fixed in its representations.” (1989: 207) These representations are rarely as fixed as they might seem, and it is in recognition of its actually contestable nature that politics becomes possible. Power is thus relational: “it is not a thing nor is it something that people have in a proprietorial sense. They ‘possess’ power only in so far as they are relationally constituted as doing so” (op cit). In other words power is only something that is ‘held’ for as long as the holder of that
power is allowed to do so by the complex sets of relationships with people and institutions which he or she finds themselves in.

It is important to note here that this significantly opens up Foucault's notion of dispersed power. Whereas classical Foucauldian power is for the most part uncontestable, because it is everywhere and thus has no obvious point of contestation, relational power emerges from somewhere, just not where it is often purported to be. This has implications for both those who claim to exert power, and those who are subjectified by it. This is because, understood as such, it is possible to imagine contesting power by altering a single link in the scaffolding of relationships which enables the exertion of power as we experience it. Break a link and the structure might dissolve, or at least be required to reconfigure itself and provide further opportunities for contestation. This is made all the more possible by the fact that often those held to be powerful are not necessarily so in every sense. According to Ferguson,

"planned interventions may produce unintended outcomes that end up, all the same, incorporated into anonymous constellations of control - authorless "strategies", in Foucault's sense - that turn out in the end to have a kind of political intelligibility...the most important political effects of a planned intervention may occur unconsciously, behind the backs or against the wills of "planners" who may seem to be running the show" (2000: 401)

The idea that the effects of power might in fact be unpredictable, and intelligible only in as much as they are internalised by consenting subjects, reveals how powerful the appearance of power can be, but also how malleable it might be. Allen argues that,
because it is relational, power is contestable ‘en route’. By this he means that rather than viewing power as something which effects us from ‘over there’, it is something which controls us ‘over here’ (2004; 30), in place. Like Clegg then, Allen views power as something which is not held by the powerful, but as a relationship. Indeed, for Allen power cannot be held at all, and therefore does not ‘flow’ from one point to another as such, but is merely in constant stages of refraction and flux, never emerging from a centre. This does not mean, though, that power is not experienced and intended, just that as the relationship itself is malleable, power as experienced and intended may rarely be the same thing.\footnote{In a criticism of Allen, Sayer argues that whilst power does travel and is malleable, it is also held, and therefore centres of power can be attacked (2004: 264). Despite this distinction, Sayer does not arrive at particularly different conclusions about how power operationalises. What seems to matter therefore is how power becomes embodied, and therefore brought into being in the ways in which we observe it. To return to Foucault, his argument was not necessarily that power is never centred, but rather that it cannot escape its centre without being refracted through a myriad of social relationships. Therefore power is never exerted or held in an ontological sense, as this can never be observed, because the very act of observing alters the constellation of relations which in turn re-fix power in place (or give power its fixed appearance at a centre) (Foucault, 1982/1994: 225).} This dissonance also means that it is possible to understand resistance as sometimes, and contingently, being able to ‘escape’ dominant power. This is because “power relations are incomplete, fluid, liable to rupture, inconsistent, awkward and ambiguous. Now, spaces of resistance can be seen as not only partially connected to, but also partially dislocated from, spaces of domination” (Pile, 1997: 14). It is in this partial separation that the possibility for resistance exists – the ability to speak back, around or away from power.

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Allen's argument that different forms of power 'travel' differently (i.e. coercion may be very effective at short distances but becomes harder to maintain over larger geographies due to the increasing number of diversions, obstacles and oppositions coercive power would face) (2004: 24) opens up the potential for different strategies at different places in the 'map' of power relations. This is an argument made by Massey (2005), who argues that different power relationships construct spaces and that these subsequent spatial formations construct, constrain, empower and disable different agents. This resonates with the notion of space being the site of convergence discussed in Chapter Three (Hetherington, 1997; Kohn, 2003; Routledge, 2003a). If dominating forms of power cannot dominate a site in its entirety, then that site must be one of converging resisting and consenting relations of power. As I argued in the previous chapter, this also means that it is difficult to talk about bounded sites such as the 'local' or the 'global' – rather, these are relationally constructed sites with few if any specific properties in and of themselves.

This all has implications for how alter-globalisation networks have been viewed with regard to debates around structure and agency, with some concluding that they embody both (Crossley, 2002). Imagining networks as fixed actors with singular agency is to reify the notion of the network. Networks are structures, but this does not mean that they uniformly structure their contents (or 'nodes'). They cannot therefore be assumed to be intrinsically one thing or another, and certainly not intrinsically democratic as some argue (Dryzek, 2000: 134-135). The way they are structured may occur as a result of particular
spatial arrangements of power, but as Clegg (1989) has shown, any organisational form is inherently and continuously contingent, and thus cannot be assumed to simply draw in and conduct the behavior of its members. Rather, it is the relational interplay of structure and agency which provides insight into the appearance of network fixity, and which sheds light on the power relations that construct them, and which are then reproduced through them at given moments (Crossley, 2002).

I am therefore arguing for a particular epistemology of power which creates an approach to alter-globalisation networks which is relational. Whilst this approach takes structure seriously, it seeks to look through structure and adopt a post-governmentality position which allows resistance to have its own partial and contingent agency. This therefore is how I intend to deploy power as an analytical tool in this study. I will now discuss the implications of this for a research approach to alter-globalisation networks.

4.3.2 Researching Relationality

Lukes' 'radical view' suggested that an agent's interests could be deduced from (and thus an analysis of power should rest upon) the degree to which an agent is conscious of those interests and then able to pursue them. In other words, by deducing what an agent would otherwise do, what Lukes called the "counterfactual" (1974: 39-41). Clegg though argues that if we accept that subjects are relationally constituted, then it makes no sense to try to understand what they would do under different conditions, for under those different
conditions they would be different subjects with different agencies, thinking and choosing differently (1989: 96-97).Whilst Lukes’ position is a structuralist one (for it is hegemonic control that produces a false consciousness of ‘non-real’ interests), Clegg in fact accuses his methodology of being too agency-centric, for it implies a certain “moral relativism” i.e. the injection of the researcher’s own values into the definition of what ‘real’ interests are (ibid: 100).

The methodology for this project therefore falls into a tradition which draws on both structuralist and post-structuralist epistemologies of power and space, but which questions some of the key structuralist tenets regarding agency found in Lukes’ work. I attempt to arrive at a post-governmentality framework which rejects notions of a ‘sovereign’ power (Wickham, 1986; Foucault, 2000), instead choosing to view power as having no pre-conceived form. That being so, “...the only problem is to provide oneself with a grid of analysis which makes possible an analytic of relations of power” (Foucault, in Gordon, 1980: 199). This by necessity therefore rejects neither structure nor agency. As I have argued, because power is embodied, and thus malleable and unpredictable (Allen, 2004), opportunities for resistance always exist – whilst structures may form and be productive, they themselves can be subject to productive relations of contestation and change.

Methodologically, this epistemology is brought together in the notion of ‘translation’ put forward by Michel Callon and other figures significant in the development of Actor
Network Theory (ANT) (Callon and Latour 1981; Callon, 1986; Law, 1992; Latour, 2005). The notion of translation seeks to determine how some actors in a network manage to ‘enrol’ and ‘mobilise’ other (human and non-human) actors to a particular vision, a ‘problematisation’ (Callon, 1986) or ‘imagining’ (Cumbers, Nativel and Routledge, 2007) of what that network looks like, what its aims should be, and how actors should behave within it. Such problematisations assemble actors in its vision, enrolling them to particular functions, and mobilising them in certain ways which serve the initial problematisation or vision (Callon, 1986). Whilst ANT’s focus on the agency of material things has been controversial (see Vandenberghe, 2002; Whittle, 2008), this is not a debate which has much relevance to this study. It is rather my intention to take advantage of ANT’s focus on the political and the epistemic (Law, 2007), and how this allows us to understand structure as having an agency of its own to an extent, which, like all agentic processes can be itself structured or mobilised. This calls us to take notice of the ways in which different agents are enrolled and subjectified, and re-translate/re-subjectify themselves within the flexible and porous epistemic boundaries in which they find themselves. For a study of alter-globalisation networks, this means researching them as part of broader epistemic networks constituted by discursive and material relations to statist and neo-liberal hegemonic powers as well as more radical and transformative discourses. It is therefore the degree to which alter globalisation networks are produced by these different discourses/agencies which is of interest here.
In the preceding two sub-sections I have set out my approach to the methodological concepts which I deployed throughout the design of this research project and in the analysis of the data considered in this thesis. The chapter will now continue by introducing in more detail the alter-globalisation network around which this research was conducted, the Global Call to Action against Poverty.

4.4 An alter-globalisation case study – The Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP)

In June 2008 my partner and I took a flight to Lilongwe, capital of Malawi, where we based ourselves for the following month into late July. My plan was to speak to members of organisations that participated in the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP), a large (‘global’) multi-sited network of anti-poverty and social justice NGOs, social movements, trade unions, faith groups and other civil society actors. Many of the organisations I planned to visit in Malawi were based in the capital, although some were in Blantyre to the south, and others were in Mzuzu to the north. At the end of July we flew on to Delhi, where we spent another month whilst I interviewed members of organisations based there that also participated in GCAP. We then spent another month in India moving around as I visited GCAP-participating organisations in Lucknow, Shimla, Kolkata, Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad. In both Malawi and India a lot of time was spent waiting for people to get back to me to confirm interview dates and times.
This rather neat little tale summarises what might be called my ‘field’-work during this study. However, as will become clear, the ‘field’ of this study preceded this trip, and in fact partly constituted and structured my ‘choice’ of GCAP as a case study. This field also extended well beyond Heathrow Terminal 4 upon my ‘return’ from India. In this section therefore, I will detail the processes of decision making and serendipity which resulted in first the choice of GCAP as a case study, my subsequent choice of Malawi and India as sub-case studies, and then the expansion of my ‘field’ beyond my visits to these countries.

There are clearly a great number of alter-globalisation networks, working across a wide number of policy and activist areas which I could have chosen to form the basis of this study. Had it been a straightforward ‘choice’, then it would undoubtedly have taken a lot longer to finally settle on GCAP, although if I had conducted a preliminary and systematic analysis of a range of alter-globalisation networks GCAP would almost certainly have stood out as a principal network. For instance, GCAP is very large. It is constituted by 115 national-level coalitions of International NGOs (where they have a base in a particular country), country-specific NGOs, faith-based organisations, social movements, trade unions and parliamentarians. These national coalitions are supported and coordinated to varying degrees by regional secretariats. The secretariats and coalitions work under broad programmatic agendas agreed to at a bi-annual global assembly, attended by members of national coalitions. In between global assemblies, an
elected Global Council (supported by a global secretariat) takes decisions on issues as they arise.

GCAP’s main aim is to hold national governments and international agencies to account over their commitments under the Millennium Development Goals, as well as a range of agendas including climate and trade justice (GCAP, 2007a). To this end GCAP organises, via its national coalitions, mobilisations around major international summits, as well as the Stand Up against Poverty events which take place on the International Day for the Eradication of World Poverty in October every year. In 2008, GCAP claims that over 116 million people ‘stood up’ against poverty around the world (GCAP, 2008a).

On a more pragmatic level, GCAP is also a very easy network to study and is open to a range of research methods. For instance, GCAP is incredibly transparent, posting a great number of internal discussion and policy documents on its core website (www.whiteband.org). Because GCAP operates in so many spaces and organisational contexts, GCAP also provides many opportunities for a researcher to engage with it.

My decision to research GCAP came at the end of a journey which goes back to my Masters, which I studied for between 2003 and 2005. It was not so much the content of my Masters which shaped my eventual interest in GCAP (although my interest in the study of alter-globalisation activism did begin here too), but the events which bookended that period of time – the 2003 anti-war marches in London and the 2005 Make Poverty
History campaign. Both seemed at the time to be epochal moments of public activism, but neither protest/campaign appeared to succeed in building sustained public constituencies for the kind of change necessary to achieve their aims (and this is to put aside the debates over the success/failure of them in achieving their immediate priorities). So much energy had been expended, and for what? As I turned my thoughts towards studying for a PhD, this was the question which initially motivated me — how do campaigns like we had seen in 2003 and 2005 build the necessary constituencies to achieve the kind of socio-economic transformational change that their aims require?

Of the two campaigns, it was Make Poverty History that appeared more interesting, with its wider aims and potentially broader constituencies. It became clear, however, that when it came to focussing on how I would research this question, two problems posed themselves. One was with the question itself, which I soon realised was a more complicated way of asking ‘How do we change the World?’ The three years I had for my PhD did not seem enough to answer a question of this magnitude (!). The other problem I had was with Make Poverty History itself, which by this time had ceased to function as anything much more than a registered trademark, having been officially disbanded as an active coalition shortly after the 2005 mobilisations. It was also incredibly difficult to pin down what exactly Make Poverty History was, and who and what I would speak to and analyse if I wanted to study it.
It was at this point, about half way through my first year of doctoral study, that I stumbled across GCAP. GCAP is not a name that appears much in the literature produced by the Make Poverty History campaign, but it transpired that GCAP was the network which acted as an umbrella for Make Poverty History, which was, *de jure* if not *de facto*, the UK national coalition of GCAP. Whilst Make Poverty History had been a very autonomous campaign in the UK (because of the richness of resources enjoyed by campaigning organisations in the UK, and the political and popular support it received), and thus required little support from GCAP, in other countries GCAP played a very large role in facilitating the 2005 campaigns. GCAP was big, it was transparent, and at first glance it had a straightforwardly researchable hierarchical structure. I had my alter全球化 network.

4.4.1 Getting into GCAP – a focus on national coalitions

Having 'found' GCAP, my next challenge was to decide how to study it. In taking a relational approach to GCAP, I had to take my own presence in the research seriously. I was under no illusion that I could somehow capture all of GCAP's relationality and agencies, firstly because of my own situatedness as a seemingly and relatively white, economically privileged male⁴⁴, and secondly, because of the unpredictable agency of

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⁴⁴I was mainly reminded of this at times when I became too critical of GCAP. It was very easy for me, as someone who does not need GCAP campaigning for me, to dismiss those aspects of GCAP which served to benefit particular marginalised or oppressed groups. This was especially reinforced to me during
what I was planning to study. I therefore did not plan this research with a view to overcoming Haraway’s ‘god trick’ (1997: 283-295) in mind – quite the opposite, in fact.

This understanding of what was achievable had a significant impact on how, or where, I decided to study GCAP. Rather than make an attempt to ‘capture’ a ‘full’ picture of GCAP’s relationality, which would be necessarily lacking in any case, I decided to follow the advice of Latour (2005), who has argued that it is necessary to follow the actors which constitute a network when deciding who and what to research in it, rather than to define it in the initial stages of the research as the person researching it. In this vein, then, I decided to focus in on the actors which many of GCAP’s documents claim constitute it, and are the base for its action and cooperation; the national coalitions (GCAP, 2005: 3. GCAP, 2006: 5. GCAP, 2007b: 8). I decided that once I was involved in the national coalitions, I would look out from that perspective to where else I should go in seeking an understanding of GCAP’s relationality – a fuller account of that process will take place later in this chapter.

my time in India, speaking with and attending meetings of Dalit and Adivasi campaign organisations, who, as I write about in subsequent chapters of this thesis, have made important gains by being a part of GCAP.

In ‘The Persistence of Vision’ Haraway argues that the ‘god trick’ “…is an illusion that creates the belief in infinite vision and thus a detached observer perspective from which “objective” scientific theory is formulated” (Conroy, 2007: Paragraph 2). In this way, the subjects of all kinds of research have historically been objectified as un-mediated, with theory being seen as the place of the all seeing observer, free from implicit assumptions.
Another reason to start ‘at the bottom’ with the national coalitions was the sheer unfixability of who constituted GCAP in any of its global configurations. Despite GCAP’s hierarchy of national, regional and global bodies, in reality these bodies are not constituted by easily recognisable national, regional or global agents. So for example, most members of the Global Council, GCAP’s main decision making body, in fact also belong to or work for organisations involved in national coalitions. Furthermore, there are a large number of sub-groups with a global remit constituted in the same way, such as the GCAP Feminist Taskforce. So, for example, in the period up to 2007, there were roughly 260 people who participated in the GCAP International Facilitation Team (the precursor to the Global Council) and its various sub bodies and working groups (GCAP, 2007b). Again, judging from their contact details and GCAP’s modus operandi of working from national coalitions up, most of these people were situated in organisations participating in national coalitions, as well as other regional arrangements. The degree, therefore, to which I could address my research to GCAP at a ‘global’ level was questionable. I should point out that this does not mean I advocate a kind of methodological nationalism (as should be clear from Chapter Three). Rather it is the case that by not attempting to research GCAP’s relationality where it might perhaps seem obvious to do so i.e. at the ‘global’, I am retaining here the sense in which neither the ‘global’, nor the ‘regional’ or ‘national’ are autonomous entities. To study GCAP in the places where it is constituted is to precisely not prioritise one distinct ‘scale’ over another, but is simply the result of my intention to allow GCAP its say in where it should be studied.
The focus on the national coalitions again posed questions for this research. There are 115 national coalitions, and either researching all of them, or just a small number of them, would have ramifications for this project. Anything which would involve researching all of the national coalitions would have proved unmanageable and unproductive of the kind of research story I wanted to tell. Clearly I could not visit 115 countries to interview every member of every national coalition. Whilst the Sri Lankan coalition is a one-organisation ‘network’, in India there are 3,000 members. If I tried to do a survey of the coalitions, then apart from issues of language, and the difficulty of getting an adequate response rate, it would also produce exactly the kind of quantitative, representative-‘full picture’ sample that I didn’t believe was plausible and was trying to avoid making a claim of providing through my research.

I therefore decided to focus on only a very small number of national coalitions, and to ‘follow GCAP outwards’ from there. I made this decision in order to provide me with a deeper perspective on what was happening in some parts of GCAP, some of the time. So in other words I went for depth, rather than breadth. Given the kinds of claims made about alter-globalisation networks discussed in Chapters One and Two, I believed (and still do) that such a perspective would speak to these universalising claims in a more meaningful and problematising way perhaps, than a piece of research which itself made universalising claims about GCAP’s agency.
This is then where a mixture of 'grand-theory' and the everyday came into play, resulting in me settling on two national coalitions to study – in India and Malawi. More prosaically, this was dictated by available research budgets, the amount of data I could process in a time-limited research project, my poor non-English language skills, as well as the availability of my partner, who was able to take no more than three months off her full-time job in order to accompany me. More importantly, both India and Malawi provided interesting sub-case studies, as I will now illustrate.

4.4.2 GCAP in India and Malawi – Contrasts and Comparability

The first point to make here is that despite the title of this subsection this is not a comparative study. Rather, comparisons or contrasts were only drawn in such a way as they shed light on the kinds of relations which constituted GCAP, rather than because they might be of interest as comparisons in their own right, i.e. in order to say that 'Malawian civil society is better at this' or 'Indian civil society is better at that'. Such an analysis would not only be relatively useless for this study, but would also be unfair given the large discrepancies between the histories and agencies of civil societies in India and Malawi. In the interest of providing some insight into why I chose these two countries then, what follows is a brief introduction to GCAP in India and Malawi, and a reflection on some of the literature on civil societies in those countries.
According to a senior GCAP organiser based in the UK, the Indian coalition (named ‘Wada Na Todo Abhiyan’ (WNTA) – Hindi for the ‘Keep Your Promises Campaign’) has achieved remarkable results (Interview 12). It was one of the earliest affiliate coalitions to have been established (actually pre-dating GCAP’s formal induction in 2005) and individual members of it play active roles in GCAP’s governance structures (such as the Global Council). In 2007, during a debate on whether the GCAP Global Secretariat should be moved from its then current location in South Africa, WNTA was the only non-European coalition to have bid to host it.

Historically, India has a very well developed NGO and civil society sector, although this has not led to an unproblematic contemporary civil society terrain. A commitment to Gandhian ‘voluntarism’ has resulted in many NGOs being established by charismatic figureheads with paternalistic ideas about how the victims of socio-economic injustice should be represented and their lives improved (Kamat, 2002; Baviskar, 2005). Furthermore, government licensing of NGOs receiving overseas donations has meant that NGOs who conflict with the government have had to tread a careful line if they do not want their license to receive such funds revoked on a pretext (Baviskar, 2005). Lastly, as the urban centres where most major Indian civil society actors are based have become unrecognisably wealthier in recent years, urban-rural political and cultural boundaries have become more pronounced (Heins, 2000: 42).
The GCAP coalition in Malawi on the other hand (named the National Civil Society Taskforce for the MDGs - NCSTM) operates in a very different context. The civil society sector in Malawi is relatively young, only really growing in the post-dictatorship era of multiparty democracy since 1994. Coinciding at a time of mass donor involvement and attention to civil society, the government views many NGOS as service providers and is unreceptive to criticism and advocacy (Tembo, 2003). Furthermore, because NGO and CSO networks are so young and their members so under-resourced, a situation has arisen where funds for such networks are appropriated by newly formed secretariats who carry out the work of the network but simultaneously create a gulf between themselves and the network membership (James and Malunga, 2006). Despite these dynamics, the NCSTM has organised the largest mobilisations in Africa for the past two Stand Up against Poverty annual mobilisations.

Clearly, then, both national coalitions and contexts were going to provide interesting opportunities for focussing this research in ways which would speak to the kinds of relations which constitute GCAP and of which GCAP is productive. The coalitions provided interesting contrasts in terms of their relationships with GCAP (with far more members of the WNTA being engaged with GCAP processes than in the NCSTM), yet both coalitions were based in contexts on whose behalf GCAP claims to speak, thus suggesting a sense in which GCAP might have been experienced similarly in both coalitions. These then were some of the thoughts I had when I began contacting coalition members in both countries. I shall now move on to the implications of my
methodological framework for the research methods I eventually chose to use in my study of these two GCAP national coalitions, and in anticipation of GCAP more broadly.

4.5 Research Methods

The methodological approach outlined previously allowed me to collect data in such a way that recognised the particularities of the spaces in which they were collected, and the interplay of power between those spaces. It also allowed me to look beyond traditional notions of North-South domination and dependency theory (Kamat, 2004), or resource-mobilisation (Zald and McCarthy, 1979) (although to still identify them where they existed), towards possibly unexpected or non-formulaic examples of emancipation and empowerment. It was also a reflexive approach, which acknowledged my own influence over the construction, for example, of interview situations and transcripts (Taylor, 2003: 27-31)\textsuperscript{46}, as well as the identification of actors within the network (Melucci, 1996: 21).

Latour (2005) claims that it is only when an actor leaves a 'trace' that it can be said to exist within the network. Ultimately such traces will be identified and often constructed by the research participants (including the researcher)\textsuperscript{47}. My methodological and

\textsuperscript{46} The co-producedness of interview situations became evident when I introduced information sheets to the research participants, an issue I cover in more detail further on in this chapter, in section 4.5.5. I was also aware of the fact that in several interviews, research participants were keen to get information about the Open University (OU) from me, and how they could receive grants to take OU courses. I was not sure to what degree my role as a specifically OU researcher had on these overall interview situations, but I cannot discount the possibility that some research participants may have been more compliant or eager to please than they otherwise might have been.

\textsuperscript{47} This was undoubtedly the case with what a very significant output of this research became, and which forms the content of future research I plan to carry out, around the discursive and material effects of
epistemological approach allowed me to adapt questions and methods in a contingent manner, in order to allow such traces to ‘speak back’, recognising therefore the co-
constitutive nature of researcher and researched. This acknowledgment of my own role within the production of the research data required the provision of opportunities for the research participants to 'answer back' in the translation of their inputs into the final thesis (which has the further benefit of retaining the contingency of the data) (Whatmore, 2003: 98). In this way I attempted to overcome the binary between 'the real' and 'the constructed', instead recognising them as “…synonymous aspects of fabrication” (Whatmore, 2003: 95).

As a result of this, I never believed that it would be possible to simply 'capture' a vision of GCAP – that it was simply 'out there' awaiting discovery. I did not therefore seek to assemble this research around a static or graphical representation of GCAP. Instead I had the expectation that GCAP and its terrain would be continuously produced and rearranged by the actors which constituted its network (including me in the moments in which I interacted with it/them). It was therefore not the purpose of this research to 'map'

the Millennium Development Goals on civil society organisations (see Chapters Five and Eight). I had no inclination of the significance of the MDGs to GCAP before I began speaking to GCAP participants in Malawi. In this way ‘traces’ of the MDGs were constructed by/working through the research participants.

It is for this reason that research participants were sent full transcripts of our discussions for comment and analysis. The process of ‘answering back’ also occurred when I confronted research participants with textual data which I had collected in advance about their campaigns. Some responses to these situations challenged my own interpretations of these texts and served to contextualise the way I wrote about them in this thesis.

This is most evident in the degree to which I try to avoid, in my concluding chapter, making truth-claims based on this research. GCAP as presented in this thesis is my interpretation of it. Whilst this interpretation is based on the interactions I had with actors which constitute it and are constituted by it, GCAP is always evolving and mutating, and has already evolved beyond the picture of it I present through this research.
this terrain at any given (and thus highly reductionist) time, but rather to tease out the (at times contradictory) complexities in GCAP's constitution. Whilst a network is relational, these relations make the network form immanent, and are ever shifting and coalescing to construct and reproduce the network differently in different spaces. A static representation of it (for example a social network analysis (see Diani, 2002 – see also footnote 32 on p.148)) - which necessarily involves several degrees of separation from the data as produced - may therefore only have a very limited representational use (Latour 2005).

In using a case study approach I therefore aimed to produce a 'thick' and 'rich' analysis of the processes under study (Snow and Trom, 2002). By this I intended to produce an explicatory understanding of GCAP in particular expressions of its being, which, in shedding light on how we might understand GCAP's agencies, might also provide an illustration of how we go about understanding the agencies of alter-globalisation networks more broadly. Furthermore, a case study approach allowed me the degree of flexibility my methodological understandings called for – it allowed me to consider unexpected factors as they appeared rather then going into the field with a set of static and reified notions.50

In employing a case study approach I am cognisant of its shortcomings, the major one being of poor generalisability (Snow and Trom, 2002), which is always contingent on the

50 The next sub-section will address this in a little more detail
cases being used and the claims being made. This research makes no claim for the universal applicability of its narratives, rather that they may contribute to the as yet small canon of literature analysing the constitutive power relations of alter-globalisation networks.

Based on this methodological perspective, this study utilised a range of research methods. All of them to greater and lesser degrees involved a discourse analytic approach. This was because of the penetrating and intensive focus on patterns and relations of ideas which qualitative discourse analysis offers (Johnston, 2002: 69). As such I will delineate this approach in a bit more detail, before continuing to highlight which methods were deployed in the process of this research, and how they were influenced, and in some cases re-constituted, via my interaction with the other research participants.

4.5.1 Discourse Analysis – a brief summary

Discourse analysis is "the close study of language in use" (Taylor, 2001: 5) and is thus concerned with the way in which meanings are produced. It regards text and talk as social practice rather than a medium through which to discover an absolute truth and assumes that language is not neutral, that it constructs rather than reflects reality (Gill, 1996: 246). Discourse analysis looks at how people use language to construct the(ir) world(s) and how language gives meaning (Tonkiss, 2004: 259). Furthermore, according to Gill
(1996), discourse analysts "produce readings of talks, texts and contexts. We do not claim to 'discover' the 'truth' or even produce a 'definitive' reading..." (147).

Discourses therefore comprise words and language which construct identities, relations and spaces. Discourse analysts are not primarily interested in distinguishing fact from fiction in discourse; rather they are interested in the work that discourses do (Bhasin, 2010). Whilst Marxist or critical discourse analysts maintain a distinction between the material and the cultural, and try to find the material basis of cultural understandings and meaning making (Wetherell, 2001: 384), the approach I adopt in this research is more influenced by Foucauldian and critical psychological understandings of discourse, which collapse this distinction and understand the material as only possible through cultural meaning-making (ibid: 391). Discourses are therefore not understood to be always and necessarily animated by 'secret' or 'hidden' material or cultural drivers, although this is not to dismiss them entirely, but to problematise the tranquility in which they are assumed to pre-exist discourse (Foucault, 1969/2002: 28. Edley, 2001).

Foucault recommends treating discourses on their own terms, but only in order to be able to identify their articulated co-existences, which go beyond the mere intentionality of the speaker or author. Thus "to reveal in all its purity the space in which discursive events are deployed is not to undertake to re-establish it in an isolation that nothing could overcome; it is not to close on upon itself; it is to leave oneself free to describe the interplay of relations within it and outside it" (Foucault, 1969/2002: 32). It is not therefore the
analysis of the language itself that reveals its 'facts', but "the analysis of their coexistence, their succession, their mutual functioning, their reciprocal determination, and their independent or correlative transformation" (op cit). This is clearly then a relational approach to discourse, which shares many features with the approach to power which I laid out earlier, in as much as it allows for an analysis which takes the role of structure in shaping discourse seriously, but only to the extent that it is featured by the discourse, and only to the extent that it too is susceptible to translation and mediation by other actors in relation to it.

This also shares a great deal with another tradition which I wish to deploy in this research, critical discursive psychology (CDP). Whereas Foucauldian analyses have been used to explain the construction of seeming monoliths (the clinic, the prison, etc), the focus of CDP on 'interpretative repertoires' places more emphasis on human agency in the construction of language and allows for the fact that many different repertoires may be expressed by the same person in the course of one piece of talk (Edley, 2001). Interpretative repertoires are thus fragmented, and give rise to 'ideological dilemmas' (Billig et al, 1988). According to Billig et al (ibid), ideological dilemmas in people's talk arise from the contradictions inherent to 'everyday common sense'. Far from being meaningless, this gives people a rich tapestry of discursive resources to draw upon in making sense of their everyday lives. However, identifying these dilemmas and associated interpretative repertoires can still reveal a great deal about their broader ideological context and the subject positions these produce. The key, though, is to
understand that different subjecthoods might be taken on in one piece of talk. In this way therefore “Speakers both exploit and are exploited by existing discursive formations” (Edley, 2001: 223)

In the above manner therefore it is possible to understand discourses and interpretative repertoires as being unstable, contradictory and productive, rather than monolithic constructs conditioned by material practices and macro-ideologies. By collapsing the discursive and the material we also allow for the consideration of discourse as being embodied, and practiced rather than distinctly and purely epistemic – it is in this way that Law (2003) suggests that the work of Foucault and Actor Network Theory are connected, a relationship I intend to deploy in this research by focussing at times on the material implications of discursive constructs. I also intend to draw on this relationship by interpreting what counts as discursive data in a broader sense, to include not simply talk, but also texts and observations.

I want to conclude this section with a caveat. I am not a Critical Discursive Psychologist. Nor am I a Foucauldian Discourse Analyst. This is not an archaeological or historical study. It is simply that I believe both these traditions provide useful tools for the analysis of research data, at given moments in the research process. It is for this reason that I have not deployed these traditions uniformly and universally in the presentation of the research data over the coming chapters. Rather, I have deployed them selectively when it has
seemed most appropriate and interesting to do so. I will now introduce the data which formed the basis of my study, followed by the methods I deployed to analyse it.

4.5.2 Research data

I examined the productive effects of discourses mediated through the following two processes:

i) The talk of GCAP coalition participants in Malawi and India, as well as with members of the GCAP Global Council, GCAP Global Secretariat and GCAP Learning and Accountability Group (of which I was a participant-observer).

ii) The documents of GCAP’s “machinery of representation” (Wetherell, Taylor and Yates, 2001: 4) i.e. the written texts produced by GCAP and the national coalitions via official publications, website articles and news releases and strategy and discussion documents (see separate bibliography for complete list)

Both of these types of discursive mediators lend themselves to the production of researchable texts, which were augmented by observations and informal conversations which will be further detailed in the list of methods I deployed in this research (or were deployed for me in some cases) in the next sub-section. Before that, though, I want to
take a 'reflexive moment'. In analysing both the talk and the documents of GCAP I have been very conscious of my own role in constructing the themes and conclusions which you will find in the data chapters which follow. Even if I was an ‘objective’ researcher (which I am not), then the very act of presenting this research in a written document with a logical progression of thematic chapters inevitably involves the production of a unique research narrative rather than a definitive set of research ‘findings’. Understood in this way, the term ‘research participant’ has to be broadened out from my self, and the members of particular GCAP bodies, but has to also include the Open University’s PhD dissertation guidelines and my Western academic research training, both of which are also mediating actors in the GCAP network under analysis (Latour, 2005). Me, the other human research participants, and these other non-human research participants, all played important roles in mediating the data which I present in the following chapters.

This is something which is particularly important to keep in mind in a study which employs fieldwork. Very often the ‘field’ is thought of as being in another place, separate from where the research is prepared and written up. It is the place where the researcher ‘goes to’ and ‘comes back’ from. However, as Massey explains

"At each stage [of the research]...something is lost (locality, particularity, materiality, multiplicity, continuity) and other things are gained (compatibility, standardisation, text, calculation, circulation, relative universality)...there is both 'reduction' and amplification'...The field, then, begins to seem less like a space which one goes to and subsequently leaves. Rather, it is a much more complex structure which one transforms; it is still present, in transformed form, in your written report...and the processes of transforming it are present too, in every operation 'within' the field...there is not a huge
Whilst I see no need to endlessly repeat my own role in (re) constructing this data narrative, if only because I believe it is fairly obvious and furthermore sheds little light on my core research questions, I nonetheless feel this is an important assertion to make here, as it is something which influenced my choice of methods (i.e. qualitative over quantitative), and my aversion to making truth claims with the data gathered in this research.

4.5.3 Choosing and applying research methods

Having discussed the analytical approach adopted to the data under study in this research, I will now outline in more detail the data analysed, and the four methods deployed in gathering and analysing it – semi-structured interviewing; ethnographic interviewing; participant observation; and documentary analysis. Two of these methods lend themselves to the production of texts for discourse analysis – transcripts in the case of semi-structured interviews, and the collection of written documents in the case of documentary analysis, whilst the other two methods augment these texts by producing observation and conversation-based field notes. This was an important aspect in the selection of these methods (even though some of them were adopted/adapted whilst I was

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51 This is a re-constructive moment because it involves my interpretation of the constructions of the other research participants involved in this project.
in the field') as they provided data which could be analysed using similar analytical tools. I will now introduce each method, why they were deemed appropriate and how I used them to produce data for this research.

_Semi-structured interviewing:_ Semi-structured interviewing was preferred to structured interviewing because it is more useful in answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, and allows for participants to expand their responses (Woodehouse, 1998), thus providing the possibility for ‘rich’ forms of data (Snow and Trom, 2002). I wanted to use interviewing as a method as it would help me to build a picture of how participants in GCAP understand their involvement with it, in reference not just to GCAP but in the other contexts through which they live their lives. Through 31 interviews with members of WNTA, the NCSTM and the GCAP Global Secretariat I sought to elicit details of the inter-relationships between the participants and other actors as they came to light over issues such as strategy, tactics and public mobilisation. This helped to understand key moments of ‘translation’, ‘enrolment’ and ‘mobilisation’ (Callon and Latour 1981; Callon, 1986) through the GCAP network. The interviews were also used to help identify and differentiate between what Latour (2005) calls ‘mediators’ (those who problematise and enrol the network) and ‘intermediaries’ (those who merely reproduce those problematisations).

After transcribing the interviews myself, I shared the transcripts and preliminary analysis I made of the interviews with the research participants in order to re-affirm the 'co-
produced-ness', contingent and sometimes contrariness of the data (Whatmore, 2003). Such data was then used in conjunction with data elicited from my subsequent methods.

The interviews were conducted face-to-face, mostly in the offices of the research participants (although on a few occasions in ‘neutral’ venues such as coffee shops). Lists of national coalition members were available on the websites associated with each coalition and were contacted differently in each country. In Malawi, the NCSTM secretariat provided me with the contact details of all coalition members, who I emailed in advance with details of the proposed research and their involvement in it (see Appendix One). Emails were followed up with phone calls where numbers had been provided. In India however, the WNTA secretariat decided that my request would be more likely responded to if they established contact and set up the interviews on my behalf. Thus, when I arrived in Delhi to conduct the initial interviews, unbeknownst to me, the WNTA secretariat had organised a schedule of interviews for me with Delhi-based coalition members. This had two ramifications, one potential, and one very productive. The first ramification was that this would potentially lead to the interview-based research being controlled and directed by the WNTA secretariat. I was concerned that they would be ‘leaning over my shoulder’ through the research. It transpired that this concern was also one shared by the coalition secretariat, or that at least they were concerned that there would be a perception amongst coalition members that the research

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52 In India www.wadanatodo.net, and in Malawi http://www.sdnp.org.mw/~edsaidi/congoma3/index.htm
was being carried out directly under the auspices of the secretariat, and that this would therefore jeopardise or shape the responses in a certain way. We decided together therefore, that after the first set of interviews which they had already set up for me, I would arrange all subsequent interviews directly. The second ramification of this initial arrangement was far more productive, and created the conditions for the adoption of a second interviewing method which I took the decision to utilise whilst in India.

_Ethnographic Interviewing_: Ethnographic interviewing is a process in which the self/other dichotomy inherently performed in a more formal structured or semi-structured interview setting is collapsed (Thrift, 2003). According to Sherman:

"Ethnographic interviewing ...include[s] those projects in which researchers have established respectful, on-going relationships with their interviewees, including enough rapport for there to be a genuine exchange of views and enough time and openness in the interviews for the interviewees to explore purposefully with the researcher the meanings they place on events in the world...empowering interviewees to shape, according to their world views, the questions being asked and possibly even the focus of the research study" (2007: 370)

Thus ethnographic interviewing is a method which involves questions produced by the evolving context and mood of the interaction. It is interviewing as 'travelling', rather than 'gold-mining' (ibid: 371). During my time in India it quickly became clear to me that the amount of time I was spending in and around the WNTA secretariat, in particular two of its members, was providing me with the opportunity to develop not only more contextualised understandings of the relationships which constructed GCAP in India, and India in GCAP, but also a more contextualised basis for my research project as a whole.
Spending time with, and becoming friends with these individuals left my own position as a researcher far more porous to their opinions and understandings of GCAP and my research more broadly. As such, my representation of the productive effects of the WNTA’s discursive practices became very attuned to the inclusionary and emancipatory possibilities contained within that coalition, as understood by the people involved in it. It is a limitation of this research that I was unable to build similar relationships with some of the research participants in Malawi, and is one possible reason for the more conditioned and dominated context I felt I had encountered there.\footnote{I should stress that this is one reason amongst many, and that both of these impressions were corroborated by more formally conducted interviews and textual analysis. For example, I also believe that there are historical and material reasons for the different situations I encountered which have already been explored earlier on in this chapter, and which will become clearer in the data chapters.}

**Participant Observation:** This is another method which I adopted once I had begun to conduct the research, and occurred in two instances, the second of which further collapses the university/field distinction, as it is a process which is still ongoing and may well continue beyond the end of my time as a PhD student. Firstly, in Malawi I was invited to participate in a NCSTM coalition meeting held at the offices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Malawi. This provided me with a one-off opportunity to witness the action of the coalition as it unfolded in everyday life, an advantage of participant observation (Lichterman, 2002).
The second instance of participant observation I conducted was far more iterative and consuming. As this research became more known within GCAP’s various fora, and as a result of some ‘snowballing’ (Yanacopulos, 2007), I came into contact with one of the co-chairs of GCAP. The co-chairs of GCAP head the GCAP Global Council, and provide public leadership of the network where relevant and asked to do so. The co-chair invited me to participate in a small Learning and Accountability group (LAG) which had been mandated by the Global Council to address GCAP’s organisational structures and operating procedures. This was planned with a view to promoting horizontal leadership of GCAP and the accountability of all parts of the network to all other parts, without sacrificing the non-hierarchical and non-binding nature of its original mandates (GCAP, 2008b). The LAG occupied three main ‘fields’ – conference calls, group email exchanges and one face to face meeting in Utrecht, in April 2009. The LAG also produced its own collection of documentation mainly in the form of discussion reports and strategic analyses and evaluations of GCAP. I was given access, and was expected to contribute to, all of these fields and outputs. I adopted a slightly adapted form of theory-driven participant observation (Lichterman, 2002) in my engagement with the LAG. Rather than taking it as read that I would be “seeing structure happen” (ibid: 118) I was also open to ‘seeing structure created’, or rather, to analysing both the conditioning and productive relationships which would interact within the LAG’s multiple fields.

54 On the whole GCAP tries to ensure that no one is tasked with ‘leading’ the network, and attempts to spread responsibility through the network. However, in reality the co-chairs are often asked by media outlets and other organisations for public comment on various issues.
In both cases, participant observation allowed me to see (albeit particular instances of) GCAP unfold in front of me, with me, at times, doing some of the unfolding. This helped to augment the meanings which individual participants gave to GCAP through the semi structured and ethnographic interviews, by translating some of these meanings into observable interactive practices.

Documentary analysis: In this section I will address the manner in which I encountered and selected the documents which I analysed in this research. The GCAP website (www.whiteband.org) is used by GCAP to communicate not only with the public at large, but also with its constituent network members. As such it is a highly transparent medium where many documents which might normally be considered ‘internal’ or ‘sensitive’ are posted. It should be noted though for all the ease with which I was able to access such documentation it has nonetheless been the case that as such this area of the research has been mediated to a great degree by GCAP and the individuals within GCAP who decide what does and what does not appear on the website. Whilst I have no reason to believe that this is done with any other intention than to be open and transparent, even the simple fact of posting final drafts of documents without their predecessors can create the impression of wide agreement when this may be the outcome of intense negotiation.

In addition to the documents available on the GCAP website, I was also able to analyse texts specific to the two coalitions I was studying in greater depth. The NCTSM had not produced very many public documents, although I was given access to coalition meeting
minutes. I was also in email contact with many of the NCSTM coalition members, and these in themselves constituted interesting research material.

WNTA on the other hand provided me with over 70 non-publicly accessible documents pertaining to their coalition. This included strategy documents, meeting reports, questionnaire responses and internal email exchanges. The email exchanges were particularly interesting, in that they all related to specific instances of controversy and/or disagreement. That these were sent intentionally was of little doubt to me, and made me question the degree to which I was being diverted into certain areas which some members of WNTA wanted me to focus on (for example, the relationships between the International NGOs and the Indian NGOs on the coalition). Whilst accepting this might be happening, the content of the emails were nonetheless of immense interest, and did inform some of my investigations and conversations with the coalition members. The research process in this respect was therefore circular; my initial questioning and contact with the research participants and their ‘machinery of representation’ (Wetherell, Taylor and Yates, 2001: 4) was driven by my original research questions. These were then reconstituted through my encounter with the mediating practices of the research participants and their conditioned and conditioning discourses. This fed back into, but did not entirely displace, my original research questions and approach.

4.5.4 Analysing the data
The data I collected was categorised and analysed using NVIVO 8 software. This software has the advantage of not doing too much to the data as inputted. It is not a programme that can carry out much analysis by itself. Instead, it encourages the user to methodically analyse the data and arrive at his or her conclusions regarding it, leaving a 'paper trail' throughout the entire process for ease of referring back to re-analyse and re-evaluate. To the degree that any piece of software inevitably mediates the data inputted into it, and thus the narratives arising out of it, NVIVO 8 cannot escape this fact. It is though, comparatively, a piece of software that keeps its opinions mainly to itself.

I transcribed the semi-structured interviews over a period of three months, and these, together with the documentary data, provided the main data groups which I uploaded into NVIVO 8. These were supplemented by my field notes from the participant observation and ethnographic interviewing. The data was evaluated and grouped into themes (known in NVIVO 8 as 'nodes') and sub-themes (known as 'tree nodes'). Evaluation took place as an iterative process under many guises; of formulating and revisiting the nodes I had created, submitting various iterations of the research at various stages to peer review (including journal submissions and conference presentations); and lastly in consultation with the participants in the research – formally in emailing the interviewee participants the transcripts of their interviews and asking for comments, and informally in conversation with co-contributors to the events I was a participant-observer in.

4.5.5 Ethics
In many ways this research did not present any ethical dilemmas. For example, the (human) research participants all worked for large and publicly active NGOs, some of them internationally renowned. All of them regularly made public statements in newspapers, online or at public meetings. Whilst the information sheets and consent forms they were asked to sign\textsuperscript{55} (see Appendix Three) offered anonymity, many participants signalled that they were happy for their responses not to be anonymised. Nonetheless, I did not feel that naming the participants would add a great deal to the research, particularly as some participants switched in the course of a conversation from wishing their names to be made public to wishing to be made anonymous. I did therefore anonymise the data, although this was only possible to a certain extent. For example, where comments related to a particular country or other context it was obviously not possible to hide the fact that such comments were being made by actors situated in those countries or contexts. Furthermore, and with respect to the wishes of some of the research participants, I have prepared a full list of human participants (see Annex One) where further relevant details about them and their organisations can be found, where a desire was expressed that this should be the case.

The information and consent sheets provided information about the research project, outlining the theoretical questions I was seeking to address and the practical elements of

\textsuperscript{55} LAG members were emailed this information but were not asked to sign. Consent was given by admitting me to the group as a participant observer.
carrying out the research. The sheets made clear that in the case of face-to-face interviews I would be recording and transcribing the conversations. This was amended slightly for the LAG, as most of my interaction with them was either online, or in a two day group meeting which I did not seek to record.

One issue which arose from this procedure and which in future research projects I intend to think through in greater detail, is the manner in which these ethics and information sheets themselves ‘act’ in the research process. On several occasions during the semi-structured interviews I got the impression that research participants were talking to the themes in the information sheets and using language or concepts that they might not otherwise have done. Whilst this was not necessarily problematic, nor universal, it challenged any remaining notion I had that the answers to my questions would be divorced from those questions, or the themes I brought myself to the interview situations.

4.6 Chapter Conclusion: Generalisable Truth-Claims

In this chapter I have sought to provide the rationale and contribution of this research, the main research questions it will address, discussions around the methodological and analytical concepts that have been deployed in it and the framework and methods that were employed to research the subject matter, GCAP. Whilst a critique of the way power has been understood by scholars of alter-globalisation networks has been an implicit theme throughout the first three chapters of this thesis, in this chapter I have argued for a
particular approach to power as an analytical concept which is relational and post-governmental. This has led to a particular epistemological understanding of data and discourse, and the methods which are best suited to the analysis of data and discourse.

As I have already stated, the methodological approach I adopted for this research was not intended to produce concrete truth claims or universally generalisable results. Rather, it was intended to produce a narrative of GCAP, which, through being brought into existence via a number of co-produced steps, would problematise some of the assumptions made about the inclusionary or exclusionary nature of alter-globalisation networks, and would address gaps in the literature on these networks. More specifically, the narrative of this research is intended to address the manner in which whether or not such networks are thought to speak to or transcend power, they are also constituted by different relations of power, and the implications of this for how we think of their potentials and limitations.

Through analysing these different power relations, the research makes certain contingent claims relating to specific manifestations and locations of power, which serve to relationally constitute alter-globalisation networks. These manifestations and locations were proposed in detail in Chapter Three, and form the thematic ordering of the following data chapters, as they help to understand the agencies of GCAP, and possibly of alter-globalisation networks more broadly. These three main thematic areas (and chapter headings) are:
i) Statist power, neo-liberal hegemony and oppositionality

ii) Competing cosmopolitanisms

iii) Finding GCAP

The chapters that follow will now focus on each one of these thematic areas in turn, before turning to a final discussion and conclusion to this thesis.
CHAPTER FIVE

Statist Power, Neo-Liberal Hegemony and Oppositionality

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will be addressing one of my core research questions, namely:

In which ways can alter-globalisation networks be understood as oppositional?

It will be argued in this chapter that GCAP's oppositionality is differentiated, reciprocal and unstable, problematising notions of GCAP being understood as embodying or enacting a pure oppositionality. It will be argued that this is largely because of the monitory (Keane, 2009) modality of oppositionality which GCAP embodies, although I deploy this term in a different sense to Keane, who as I argued in Chapter One, deploys this term with minimal regard to constitutive and/or governmental power. It will be helpful to interrogate here how being monitory relates to, and is distinguished from oppositionality. Whilst something oppositional might seek escape from the actions of that which it opposes, being monitory implies a relationship between monitory and monitored i.e. that when an agent monitors another agent, it positions that other agent as its point of reference, to the exclusion of broader fields of oppositionality. This is therefore a
relationship of at least partial co-legitimation, as both agents are now open to being affirmed and ordered by the other. The monitoring agent can still oppose, but it is already engaged in a different relationship from that of pure oppositionality which now leaves it open to being co-opted, either as part of a broader hegemonic project, or diffuse and unintentional modes of governmentality. This speaks to the notions of mutual and constitutive hegemonic contestation and transformation, productive of unstable subjectivities, that I discussed in Chapter Three, drawing in particular on Laclau (1995) and Landauer (1911/1978).

In this chapter I will seek to explore the complex interactions between GCAP and various statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations. I will be doing this in an effort to understand the ways in which GCAP can be thought of as an oppositional network, acting either (counter) hegemonically or post-hegemonically. It could be argued that it is slightly misleading to speak of 'interactions', as this assumes two stable and autonomous entities (GCAP and, for example, a territorial state) which act in relation to each other. As I will now illustrate, both GCAP and the entities it positions itself in relation to are in fact uneven and disparate, and constitute each other in different ways, discursively and materially.

The chapter will begin with an account of how GCAP, in certain articulations, constructs its own meaning as one of what I will call 'monitory oppositionality', an ambiguous condition which is at once both opposed to, but also implicitly supportive of statist and
various hegemonic formations. This is because in monitoring these formations it is a form of oppositionality which simultaneously affirms them. I will then illustrate this ambiguity through several steps. Firstly, I will detail GCAP’s relationship with the United Nations, and the internal contestation this has provoked in some parts of GCAP. I will then explore the discursive nature of this relationship with regard to how GCAP frames hegemonic and counter-hegemonic understandings of development more broadly, in part with reference to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.

I will be narrating the forms and contents of monitory oppositionality which emerged during my engagement with and observation of GCAP in the various contexts and fields where this research took place. The point here is that in offering different and at times contradictory accounts of GCAP’s monitory oppositionality, I am suggesting that there is no singular entity called GCAP, but rather a variety of sites where the constituent and at times ambivalently related nodes of the GCAP network embark on everyday engagements with (as subjects or conditioning factors of) various statist and hegemonic configurations.

### 5.2 Monitory Oppositionality

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56 This being said, at times I will refer to GCAP as a singular entity. This reflects the way GCAP presents itself in certain contexts, i.e. on its website, and provides a useful way of interrogating how this projected singularity is successful in mobilising the rest of the GCAP network in a particular vision of it.
On its website, it is claimed that GCAP "is calling for action from the world's leaders to meet their promises to end poverty and inequality" (GCAPa). GCAP is a call against poverty, "demanding solutions" (op cit) from world leaders. Already here we can see a slight ambiguity about how GCAP might be understood. On the one hand it could be argued that GCAP appears to be oppositional. It is against poverty, and demands action on issues where not enough action has taken place. GCAP recognises that such action has not taken place for political reasons and out of the self interest of powerful actors. For example, on trade injustice, the GCAP website has the following to say:

"trade rules and policies, and the imposition of harmful economic policy conditions, have become the vehicle for the indiscriminate liberalization of developing country economies undermining sustainable development, increasing poverty and inequality." (GCAPb)

This suggests an understanding that in making demands on political leaders they are making demands of individual and institutional actors who have been, and in some cases still are, opposed to GCAP's own analysis of political economy. However, engaging in what is an accountability exercise suggests that GCAP is not simply opposed to political leaders and institutions, but also seeks to lobby, advocate and work with such actors, evidenced by current discussions taking place amongst the GCAP Learning and Accountability Group regarding corporate and governmental 'partnerships' (LAG Fieldnotes). This narrows GCAP's field of oppositionality by framing it as a monitory relationship, tied to the actions of particular actors deemed as central to the eradication of poverty. One example of this is GCAP's cooperative relationship with the Club of
Madrid, the organisation of pro-democracy ex-heads of state (www.clubofmadrid.org). In maintaining relationships like these GCAP may not merely monitor and influence but also be monitored and influenced back. The degrees to which these two contradictory yet intrinsically related processes work through GCAP is the subject of this chapter.

Of course, the statements made on the GCAP website are merely one thin layer of GCAP's dynamics in this regard. As I will illustrate, this ambiguity runs through GCAP's constituent nodes, and is the result of historical and ongoing contestation around these issues.

I will therefore begin with an account of the ways in which some of GCAP's constituent nodes envisage themselves as monitoring and conditioning governmental and elite political behaviour. I will also offer an account of how these monitory narratives create practices which serve to condition the behaviour of governments and political elites, redefining and expanding issues such as social inclusion and rights in the process.

In many of the sites where this research took place, GCAP is understood, both in the abstract, and as something which is participated in, as a monitory and at times oppositional entity. Various GCAP statement positions, negotiated at and distributed after every meeting of the GCAP Global Assembly and considered to be guiding documents of the network (LAG Fieldnotes), all make claims to an understanding of GCAP as holding wayward and irresponsible political elites to account. In this way they therefore create
two sets of subjects – political elites and national governments on the one hand, and those to whom they bear a responsibility on the other. A sequence of GCAP statements performs this function:

"Governments too often fail to address the needs of their citizens... Rich countries have yet to act on their repeated pledges to tackle unfair trade rules and practices" (GCAP, 2004a: 3. Italics added)

"The action is meant to put pressure on national leaders and decision-makers to act responsibly and be accountable for their decisions to the people. It is meant to put pressure on government leaders to work in favor of the poor, and to fulfil their promises and commitments to fight against poverty" (GCAP, 2005: 4. Italics added)

"Governments too often fail to meet the needs of the people within their territory... We call on governments to act against poverty immediately and decisively" (GCAP, 2006: 2. Italics added)

"All governments must fulfil their commitments. They must be fully accountable to their peoples" (GCAP, 2007a: 5. Italics added)

Such statements do not position these subjects as unrelated, for to do so would be to create two opposing camps, for example, 'rich' and 'poor', where the 'rich' owed the 'poor' nothing, and the 'poor' had no automatic claim on the 'rich'. This kind of analysis would possibly underpin a more violent or revolutionary oppositional subjectivity. By talking of 'governments' and 'citizens', ‘national leaders’ and ‘the people’, these statements create a relationship of responsibility and accountability which gives GCAP its function of monitory oppositionality – the guardian and overseer of governments’ promises to their peoples. In this way GCAP invokes itself as the enforcer of national and international promises to world citizenry.
This is an invocation shared by many of the national coalition members I spoke to. Research participants summoned several subjects which can be taken to represent the state as a diffuse and elite network responsible for alleviating poverty, as well as subjects which represent those to whom these statist networks should be held to account. Participants across both national coalitions subjectified "government" (Interviews 2, 3, 8, 15, 20, 22) and "parliament" (Interview 3); the "important people" (Interview 6), "bosses" (Interview 3) and "leaders" (Interview 3) as those with the responsibility to alleviate poverty (although in Section 5.4.2 I will illustrate how even this is sometimes ambiguous). The function of the GCAP coalitions in these countries was to hold these state subjects to "account" (Interviews 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10), to "monitor" them (Interviews 5, 8, 22, 30) and to provide "checks and balances" to them (Interviews 15, 18). These functions were performed on behalf of "civil society" (Interviews 3, 4, 15, 20); "the masses" (Interview 3) and "the people" (Interviews 2, 3, 8); "ground" or "grassroots voices" (Interviews 4, 6, 8); and "the marginalised" (Interview 9)

The following interview excerpts represent the context in which the majority of the research participants related these subjects and modalities to each other:

"Its main objective was to make uh, our system accountable to people, because in, especially I can talk about South Asia, for a long time, our governments are not at all accountable." (Interview 2)

"I think governance accountability in the sense of governance accountability to people, democracy...how do you make democracy deeper, relevant to marginalised groups...?" (Interview 9)
"...the new government which had come, promised to the people of the country, so we [WNTA] had to put pressure on the government to at least adhere to the promises they had made” (Interview 8)

"... at times government would like to make things look very rosy, when they are not rosy. So the civil society act more or less as balances, checks and balances in terms of really what is really on the ground.” (Interview 18)

"...the GCAP coalition can play and does try to play that role, to really bring that awareness that these commitments, that our government together with other governments have made to end poverty by making sure that they give attention to these areas. And I think to that purpose, to try and mobilise people to keep on reminding the government, and also like the donor countries who have committed resources to help in the um um...in achieving those uh...goals you know? But I think the thing for me is to monitor ok? To monitor with the purpose of ah...maybe contributing to the achievement of these goals, so to, to track and say, is government doing enough OK?” (Interview 21)

The excerpts reveal the manner in which these research participants networked the subjects and modalities they invoked into relationships with each other. Statist networks and actors need to be held to account, not just to abstractly defined notions of right or justice, but also to the “promises” or “commitments” they have made, in both national and international polices and agreements. The GCAP coalitions were necessary, as one participant in India told me, to “…bridge the gap between the dialogue gap that existed before the Wada Na Todo Abhiyan, [WNTA] between the government and civil society” (Interview 3). Thus it is that the national coalitions employ the modalities of “accountability”, “monitoring”, and of providing “checks and balances”, in order to make governments and other statist actors more responsive and dutiful to their “people”, “masses” or “grassroots”. What is immediately obvious is that these statements negate the possibility of GCAP enacting any kind of post-hegemonic agency (Day, 2005). This kind of monitory relationship with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations makes
any (productive and creative) escape from them impossible. Whether GCAP expands the supposed universality of statist and neo-liberal hegemony by engaging with it transformatively will be explored subsequently.

These statements also reflect an interpretative repertoire which draws on a common understanding of the statist and governmental networks as the arbiters of social change and care. There is though a simultaneous ideological dilemma here; for example, governments do not tell the truth (Interview 21: "...at times government would like to make things look very rosy, when they are not rosy") and they are historically unaccountable (Interview 2: "...for a long time, our governments are not accountable"). This dilemma may represent the everyday contradictions with which social change activists and organisations around the world wrestle. It certainly underpinned the arguments between hegemonic and post-hegemonic radical alter-globalisationists discussed in Chapter Two as to the degree with which progressive movements and activists should engage with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations.

Nonetheless, in my engagements with GCAP participants I did not once encounter statements recommending a disengagement from statist or governmental processes, despite the mistrust with which such institutions and processes might be held. Indeed, the epistemological networks created through GCAP's statements and coalitions have had material ramifications on statist, governmental and political elites and processes. For example, the GCAP-affiliated NCSTM coalition in Malawi lobbied for and contributed to
the drafting of a domestic violence law, which had never existed before in Malawi (Interview 20). They have similarly contributed to government food policy, resulting in a food surplus in the country, some of which is being exported to other African countries. It is not the claim here that these achievements can be solely or directly attributed to a form of monitory oppositionality, and the degree to which this monitory oppositionality is autonomous will be explored in subsequent sections of this chapter. It is the WNTA coalition in India, however, where such a claim has greater veracity, and where indeed, the coalition appears to move beyond pure monitory modalities, and into areas of forging new ground in which they bring statist discourses and practices with them. Minutes from the WNTA central coordinating group make this explicit:

"WNTA should go beyond monitoring promises, to also critique the inadequacy or inaccuracy of policy promises. Therefore, the task of the Abhiyan is also to point out the flawed policies and promises, or areas where there needs to be further policy attention and investment." (WNTA CCG 2006a)

Similarly, at an earlier meeting, "Several members shared the need to 'change realities' rather than merely monitoring realities" (WNTA CCG 2006b). The manner in which the WNTA campaign operationalises this approach is reminiscent of Laclau's (1996) description of rights claims as being an operation which can transform the (hegemonic, particularistic) universal through its inclusion of the excluded particular. Participants invoked the Indian constitution, above and beyond any temporary government policy, as being the core guarantor of universal rights and the document to which the government and statist agencies should be held to account above all else. The rights of marginalised
and excluded groups were therefore asserted in relation to the Indian constitution, not particular and contestable government policies (Interviews 8, 11). This has resulted in lobbying for, and confirmation of, extra resources for scheduled castes, Adivasis, and other minority groups under the latest Indian government Five Year Plan, in direct reference to commitments made in the Indian constitution regarding the distribution of wealth and resources (Interviews 3, 10). In this way the content and form of hegemonic power is transformed, with periphery groups staking their claims within the universalistic promises of hegemonic power, not displacing those who currently occupy powerful positions, but expanding and occupying with them the ground upon which they stand. Again, it is beyond the scope of this research to assert a direct causal link here between the actions of the WNTA and these accomplishments. It should furthermore be noted that the position of historically excluded groups in India is still very precarious. Nonetheless, WNTA members believe this link and their achievements to be real enough, and invoke themselves as mobilising 'mediators' in the network they find themselves in (of statist formations and citizens), rather than discursively or ontologically reproductive intermediaries (Latour, 2005).

So far in this chapter I have narrated a particular set of stories about GCAP. I have utilised statements from GCAP global assemblies and interviews and meeting reports from the Indian and Malawian GCAP coalitions to illuminate a narrative of GCAP that positions it, in certain spaces, as invoking a monitory, or even post-monitory oppositional subjectivity with regards to governments and statist formations. As I have stated
previously though, there is an inherent ambiguity to monitory oppositionality, which I will explore in the next section with reference to GCAP’s relationship with the United Nations.

5.3 Standing Up Against... Who? What?

October 17th every year is the International Day for the Eradication of World Poverty (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/social/intldays/IntlDay/index.html). It is on this day, since 2006, that GCAP has chosen to mobilise for what was first known as Stand Up against Poverty, and since 2008 as Stand Up and Take Action. It may seem fairly straightforward that this date was chosen by GCAP, but this particular interpretation, or ‘translation’ (Callon, 1986; Clegg, 1989) is only very partial, and leaves the relationality which has produced this scenario very opaque. In order to begin explicating this issue I will firstly outline the character of the Stand Up events attributed to them by the authors of various core GCAP documents.

According to a key GCAP strategic report, the annual Stand Up events have attracted greater numbers in each year they have been held – 23.5 million in 2006, 43.7 million in 2007 and 116 million in 2008 (GCAP, 2008c: 6). The same report argued that these mobilisations “...gave ordinary people around the world a simple way to engage in the fight against poverty”, leading it to claim that “GCAP can amplify the voices of those living in poverty and/or suffering injustice, which are presently denied their human
rights” (ibid: 7). Another report claims that 90% of the total participants for the 2007 Stand Up event were based in the ‘Global South’ (Chapman and Mancini, 2009: ii). Taken together, these statements create a narrative which supports the contention that these massive mobilisations are constituted primarily by non-statist actors, the subjects articulated previously as “grassroots voices” and “the people”. This would appear to support the contention that through its Stand Up mobilisations, GCAP provides an oppositional and even counter-hegemonic force. This particular translation of Stand Up creates the context for the authors of the same strategic report to claim that GCAP will “...continue to advocate for positive change through massive and strategic grassroots mobilizations, led by and involving impoverished and marginalized groups” (GCAP, 2008c: 23).

Other accounts of Stand Up provide alternative translations of its meaning and its relationship with governments and other statist formations. The International Day for the Eradication of World Poverty was first established after intense lobbying from various civil society groups at the United Nations and was signed into being by the UN General Assembly in 1992 (Oct17th.org). This is of importance, because it points towards a key relationship which constitutes GCAP, both in its global dimension and also in many of its local contexts – that between GCAP and the United Nations, particularly the United Nations Millennium Campaign (UNMC), but also the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
It is difficult initially to identify exactly where the UNMC comes from. Even though its name suggests it is a United Nations initiative, its website (endpoverty2015.org) and its various proclamations make no mention of this. The UNMC merely “…supports and inspires people from around the world to take action in support of the Millennium Development Goals” (endpoverty2015.orga). It is beyond the scope of this research to provide a genealogy of the UNMC, but a cursory glance at its contacts page confirms that whilst it claims to involve “…a wide network of partners, including civil society organizations, faith-based groups, NGOs, youth, parliamentarians and local governments” (endpoverty2015.orgb), nearly all of its offices are based in UN agency buildings, and its media officer is employed by the UNDP. The UNMC is also listed as a key member of the UN family for achieving the MDGs (un.orgb). The point here is not to suggest anything underhand, but rather and only that the UNMC is squarely an initiative of the United Nations.

This is important because of the relationship which the UNMC maintains with GCAP. The initial brainstorming meeting which heralded the inception of GCAP in 2003 was organised at the behest of the civil society organisation CIVICUS and the UNMC (CIVICUS/UNMC, 2003). The report from the meeting reveals that there were initial concerns amongst the participating civil society actors regarding the relationship. Sessions including topics such as ‘Working with the UN: What Advantages and Possibilities?’ (CIVICUS/UNMC, 2003: 13) may have been designed to allay some of these fears. Furthermore, key UNMC personnel maintained close relationships to some of
the central organisations involved in establishing and funding GCAP (Interviews 1, 12), such as the UNMC Director, Salil Shetty, who before taking up this post was the Executive Director of ActionAid International (Endpoverty.orge). When GCAP was eventually operationalised in 2005, the UNMC was therefore given observer status on what was then called the International Facilitation Team, and what is now known as the Global Council (GCAP’s highest decision making body). As can be seen from the following table, the UNMC is also one of GCAP’s main funders, along with Oxfam GB, Oxfam Novib and ActionAid International.

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<td>Oxfam GB</td>
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(GCAP, 2008d: 13)
In 2009 the UNMC gave GCAP national coalition members 40 grants in at least 20 countries (Endpoverty2015.orgc) at a total of nearly $600,000 (Endpoverty2015.orgd). This money is given primarily for operational and organisational costs associated with the Stand Up mobilisations (GCAP, 2008d: 14). From my own experience in India it was apparent that in some cases these funds do not go to coalition secretariats or co-operative funds, but to individual organisations for particular mobilisations. This is a point I will return to shortly.

It is now perhaps easier to understand why it was that GCAP chose October 17th for its main annual showpiece mobilisation. Already endorsed by the UN, the relationship between the UNMC and GCAP provides a possible explanation for this choice. Explaining the aftermath of the 2005 Make Poverty History campaigns, one member of the GCAP Global Secretariat commented that

"it was agreed it [GCAP] would last until 2007. The end of 2007, so two more years essentially. But then as I said there was this gap [between 2005 and 2007], what do we do in this space? Yeh, we'll continue to focus on the G8, but what else? So the Millennium Campaign came along and suggested Stand Up" (Interview 12)

The numbers suggest that Stand Up has been a great success, but its relationship with the UN system has created problems, mainly because of the opportunities that such a system provides governments, some with very questionable human rights records, to be involved

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57 One issue which this funding data throws up more broadly is the influence of INGOs in GCAP. The relationships between INGOs and other organisations in GCAP is an issue I will explore in further detail in Chapter Six.
with an ostensibly progressive anti-poverty campaign. As one participant said to me, "governments stand up on October 17th too and we need distance from them or our message will be diluted. The UN can't say a word against the government..." (Interview 5). Another claimed that "you know next weekend the Philippine armed forces will stand up against poverty and inequality...it's very difficult for GCAP Philippines, shouting about stand up and take action, to maintain their credibility as a radical grassroots movement" (Interview 12).

This was corroborated during my participant observation at the GCAP Learning and Accountability Group (LAG), where my notes record a discussion amongst the group about the Stand Up events. The group included a member of GCAP Philippines, who reported that 35 million people had ‘stood up’ during the 2008 Stand Up events in that country. However, according to my LAG colleague only 5,000 of these were mobilised by GCAP Philippines. The rest were mobilised by the government, and the day included a televised event where President Gloria Arroyo also ‘stood up’. GCAP Philippines has accused President Arroyo of gross human rights abuses and corruption, and stands on a platform of government reform. The GCAP Philippines member said that to see President Arroyo ‘stand up’ against poverty and inequality dealt a major blow to GCAP Philippines’ credibility.

In India the relationship between GCAP and the UNMC has created similar tensions. WNTA is constituted by over 3,000 individual organisational members, who form into
individual coalitions in each of India's federated states. The WNTA secretariat and Central Steering Group (CSG) coordinate activities and communications through this network, but do not fund it. Individual state partners or coalitions apply for grants from GCAP's core funders – Oxfam UK and Novib, ActionAid International, and the UNMC. One problem is that because the UNMC is a UN agency, it is mandated to work with state-level governments, including those run by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This has created divisions within the WNTA:

"we have lost some of our very important friends in India, because of the Stand Up. During the Stand Up the UNMC directly, not through us, did go and have alliances with State governments, and their logic was these are State governments, which is fair enough, elected governments, but these were all BJP governments, and BJP as you know, at least for me, is Fascist party, and, and working with them in any form is difficult and I've lost friends who are also very strongly anti-BJP. So that's been a huge issue, and then it becomes very difficult to defend our position – they say, ok, you at [your organisation] do good work, but see what's happening to your GCAP work." (Interview 1)

The UNMC's relationship with both GCAP and BJP state governments became so divisive that the WNTA Central Steering Group discussed pulling out of GCAP. Instead, an agreement was reached between WNTA, GCAP and the UNMC whereby WNTA as a national body does not now officially participate in the annual Stand Up events in India, although nor does it bar or dissuade its constitutive state partners from participating (EthInt 2).

It is not necessarily the particularistic contexts of individual GCAP coalitions which are the problem here, but rather Stand Up's conditions of existence, created by GCAP’s
relationship with the UNMC. So for example, in Malawi the government is also involved in the NCSTM’s activities – “the Stand Up campaign, I think most of the activities, whatever, government also does, so talk of Labour Day, there are activities, we join forces with the government on issues” (Interview 13). These situations are not always and necessarily problematic, although they do significantly question the degree to which GCAP can be considered oppositional, or even monitory; of it speaking to power, when it is constituted, at least in part, by that very same power.

Another way in which this can be illustrated is the manner in which Stand Up had been transformed into Stand Up and Take Action. It was explained at the Learning and Accountability Group (LAG) meeting that, as a response to internal criticisms after the 2007 Stand Up mobilisations, the ‘Take Action’ tag was added in order to encourage both mobilisers and mobilised to do more than simply protest against inequality, and to actually do something about it. Once again though, the actions that were discussed at the LAG appeared to be at least in part constituted by the very power GCAP needs to transform if it is to succeed in eradicating poverty and injustice. At the very least these actions appeared piecemeal and symptomatic, rather than structurally radical. Examples of actions included handing out old coats to the homeless in Moscow, and shopping malls agreeing to turn their lights out at night in Indonesia (LAG Fieldnotes). This is not to detract from the utility of such actions, but in as much as they are symptomatic of broader structural conditions, they seem at least in part to merely reaffirm these conditions.
So far I have only really illustrated this by drawing on the ontological assertions of the research participants (people and texts) and the relationships they subject themselves to with statist, and particularly governmental formations. I want to now illustrate GCAP’s ambiguous oppositionality further by exploring the ways in which this idea of speaking to power is challenged by the discursive and epistemological relationship between GCAP and neo-liberal hegemony. I will do this in two stages; firstly, I will explore the different ways in which research participants articulated notions of development and poverty, and how such poverty should be alleviated. In a second, more focused step, I will explore the discursive relationship between GCAP, particularly in Malawi, and the UNMC’s primary campaigning resource and context, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). I intentionally deploy hegemony here because I want to distinguish it from particular statist formations per se, which are not always and necessarily hegemonic, but can also be mobilised counter-hegemonically in certain contexts, spaces and practices (for example, in this research the Indian constitution, or in another example, the South and Central American bloc of territorial states opposed to US influence and foreign policy in international politics). I also intend to illustrate how these discursive relationships have unexpected or unintended outcomes; how hegemony cannot therefore be considered as an all-seeing over-arching monolith, but how this analysis reveals the ambiguous and uneven nature of GCAP’s monitory oppositionality, contextualised as it is by spatially specific sets of relationships.

5.4 Empty Signifiers and Contested Meanings
"the Stand Up initiative is an important agenda for the United Nations Millennium Campaign, and it has a mandate to engage a wide range of social groups towards its objectives. However the CSG [Central Steering Group] felt that we need to be informed and cautious of WNTA’s association with groups who may be involved in Stand Up, but whose operational / ideological agenda is in clear contradiction of the core values and principles of the campaign." (WNTA CSG, 2007a)

The above excerpt from the minutes of a WNTA steering group meeting reveals the ease with which groups with different normative perspectives can interpret and translate GCAP’s main message, that of being ‘anti-poverty’, into their own ideological languages and interpretative schema. This has something of Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) ‘empty signifier’ to it (see also Day, 2005: 74-75). In this section I will explore the different ways that research participants discursively constructed ‘anti-poverty’ and ‘poverty eradication’; the meanings and definitions participants gave to these terms. I will additionally illustrate how some of these meanings explicitly replicate what GCAP core strategic and positional texts identify as neo-liberal and therefore malign understandings of these terms.

5.4.1 A Structural Analysis

As with GCAP’s ambiguous monitory oppositionality, at a ‘headline’ level GCAP displays a robustly structural analysis of poverty and what is required to alleviate it. A series of Global Assembly statements and strategy papers argue that the “institutions and processes that perpetuate poverty and inequality” (GCAP, 2008c: 3) need to be “fought”
The decision to extend GCAP through to 2015 is presented as a continuation of "the struggle" (GCAP, 2007a: 1). The talk is of "...the underlying and structural causes that impoverish and exclude large sections of the population" (GCAP, 2008c: 3), whilst hegemonic articulations of development which responsibilise those living in poverty for their own deprivation are explicitly opposed:

"economic growth, profit or well-being for some must inevitably be paid for by others who are then told they are 'not keeping up' (blaming the victims). Poverty is then seen as a 'fact of life', something to accept and learn to live with." (ibid: 6)

This is a highly oppositional translation of what being 'anti-poverty' entails and what 'poverty eradication' means, and is not only articulated in the more rarefied air of GCAP Global Assemblies and working groups. In both the WNTA and NCSTM coalitions, participants articulated a similarly oppositional approach to 'anti-poverty'. Whilst this was more widespread and less surprising in India, where historical anti-colonial and ongoing anti-discrimination struggles lend WNTA a particularly critical edge, a minority of participants in the NCSTM also displayed a less explicitly formulated, yet still structural analysis of the causes of poverty. As subsequent sections and sub-sections of this chapter will show, this represented another 'ideological dilemma' (Billig et al, 1988) between counter-hegemonic and hegemonic constructions of 'anti-poverty' and 'poverty eradication'. Whilst ultimately it will be shown that neo-liberal hegemony provided the dominant interpretative schema through which participants in the NCSTM constructed...
their meanings, this nonetheless reveals the contingent partiality with which discursive networks are constructed and embedded.

Returning to the WNTA, coordination group meeting minutes reveal the extent to which members of the campaign articulate a strongly structural analysis of poverty – "Besides the eradication of poverty, the eradication of extreme wealth should also be the focus of our efforts" (WNTA CCG, 2006c: 8). This articulation of 'poverty eradication', of something which looks beyond and through those living in poverty to broader structures of inequality which require sustained pressure mounted against them, was prevalent amongst WNTA participants, as the following two examples illustrate:

"To just say that we're fighting against poverty does not work in a country like India where anyway 50% of people are living below the $1 mark...my position and many of us believe is that for something like this you need to have a campaign which is not a one day campaign or a month campaign, its obviously for years, and it's a process, its about first building your power at the grassroots" (Interview 1)

"what we are also hoping is given the spread, the reach of GCAP that we can really have a political campaign against poverty... We need a much sharper political campaign where the structural causes of poverty are raised." (Interview 28)

As already noted, amongst members of the NCSTM in Malawi such articulations were less explicitly put, but were nonetheless present. Whilst articulations of poverty and its eradication were predominantly representative of a neo-liberal normalisation of responsibilisation on to those living in poverty (which will be illustrated shortly), some participants illustrated an alternative and structural analysis of the causes of poverty. A
possible implication of this will be discussed shortly, whilst the responsibilisation discourse will be addressed in Section 5.4.2.

If less articulately put, participants in the NCSTM shared some of the views of their counterparts in the WNTA. Looking to build a campaign that is sustained and high pressured rather than just focussed on one-off events, was one similarity expressed by an NCSTM participant – “I see it as a larger, longer...a longer lasting engagement of people for processes in the world which include all the G8, and you know...trade, and things like that, and debt” (Interview 15). Furthermore, two other participants articulated a structural analysis of the causes of poverty.

“so it is also a call to those powerful economies to do something about the general economy of the world...for them to be what they are, and have everything that they have, and continue grabbing and accumulating for themselves, then nothing will change. And as long as those countries which are way below the poverty level, like Malawi, you know, living, the majority living on one dollar - as long as the rich believe it’s ok - per day...” (Interview 17)

“Some have everything in extreme; some have little and nothing in extreme. Nothing. And so that imbalance is what we would be fighting for, so that at least there must be a little something for those who cannot afford...so that we should not say there is poverty when there are some who have extras, who have who are...overly rich if we are talking of poverty... there shouldn’t be other people who go without when others can throw away...can throw to the dogs, when others have completely nothing.” (Interview 19)

It is clear here that both these speakers are drawing on a sense-making schema which understands the world as having enough resources to ensure a basic quality of life for everyone, but which sees these resources as unfairly and unevenly concentrated in the hands of the few. Nonetheless, both of these participants also articulated a responsibilised
poverty alleviation discourse, which sought to place the responsibility of poverty alleviation, at least in part, on those living in poverty. This will be explored further in the following section (5.4.2). For now one could speculate that this illustrates the power of hegemonic neo-liberal development discourses in somewhere like Malawi, where there is such a thriving and dominant donor presence, to order the responses of civil society to issues even when those issues are framed in a critical manner. As already discussed, and will be illustrated further in Section 5.5, the UNMC is one such actor that presents itself rather more radically than the solutions it proposes reveals it to be. For the moment it is important to note that structural critiques of the causes of poverty do proliferate within GCAP's differential sites and nodes. In the following section I will explore in more detail how a responsibilisation discourse to poverty alleviation is articulated, which complicates the manner in which GCAP's structural critique can be unproblematically thought of as a sign that GCAP is a wholly oppositional or counter-hegemonic force, un-penetrated by the power which in some instances, as has just been illustrated, it positions itself against.

5.4.2 'Sensitising' people living in poverty...to their poverty

In the previous section (see p.219) I highlighted a passage from a GCAP strategy document which explicitly critiqued a certain kind of development discourse which promotes the idea that the poverty which people live with is a 'fact of life', which logically must therefore be borne, and ultimately alleviated, by those same poverty-stricken people (GCAP, 2008c: 6). Whilst it is not the aim of this research project to
analyse the ways in which particular donor agencies construct the responsibilised ‘poor’ subject through contemporary development paradigms (see Parfitt, 2009 for a recent example), it is enough to take this claim seriously in the context of how it is able to discursively articulate together with and translate other nodes in GCAP’s network into this problematisation. It is important to stress here that I am not arguing that this claim emanates from a single source, but rather that it has emerged as what Ferguson has called an “authorless strategy” (2000: 401) constituted by a range of structural and hegemonic agencies.

Whilst the previous section revealed the success with which GCAP’s stated structural critique found resonance within the WNTA campaign in India (for a range of spatially-specific historical, and contemporary social reasons), in Malawi, the NCSTM predominantly displayed a rhetoric which took on features of the responsibilised development discourse which the GCAP strategy document critiqued. Furthermore, this discourse co-existed with the radical structural critique of the causes of poverty discussed in the previous section, as well as the alignment of “leaders” and “bosses”, accountable to “citizens” and “the people”, highlighted in Section 5.2. This possibly results from the un-intentionality, and thus incompleteness of neo-liberal hegemony.

Although only a minority of NCSTM members articulated this structural critique, those who did so (cited in the previous section) did not then prescribe a similarly structural course of action to remedy the problem. Instead, they spoke of “sensitising” people to
their poverty (Interview 19), and getting them to take “responsibility towards themselves” (Interview 17). “Sometimes”, I was told, “ignorance [of those living in poverty] is what has always been the problem, ok?” (Interview 19)

The theme of “sensitisation” was one that recurred through several other interviews also. As well as the examples cited above, participants claimed the following:

“when you go into the community you talk about what you’ve gone there for but you also try to sensitise them about poverty reduction” (Interview 23)

“make the masses realise that there is a part they can play towards their own poverty reduction instead of waiting to be given something on a platter” (Interview 24)

“sensitise them about the part they can play in reducing their own poverty” (Interview 30)

This is an interpretative schema which draws on discourses of responsibilisation, which understands poverty alleviation as something which those living in poverty have primary responsibility for enacting. Co-existing with the belief that resources are unfairly distributed around the world was an interpretation of what needed to be done which included people living in poverty “taking responsibility for themselves” (Interview 17).

Of course, the organisations and individuals I spoke to pre-date GCAP, as in all likelihood do the discourses they express. It is not the argument here then that GCAP is somehow responsible for the discourses expressed through its nodes and sites, but that if, as GCAP claims (2008c: 3), this kind of responsibilisation is common to hegemonic
discourses of development and poverty, then such responses make problematic any claim that GCAP is wholly oppositional and not constituted in part by the very powers it claims to oppose.

This individualised discourse of responsibility is one which de-politicises the struggle against poverty. De-politicisation of this nature has created tensions within the GCAP network, particularly between structural and neo-liberal conceptualisations of poverty eradication, and what GCAP needs to do to help enact it. As this section has illustrated, this division is not necessarily geographical across reified lines of ‘North’ and ‘South’, but discursive. This discursive division and its implications will be the subject of the next chapter. For now I want to continue to draw attention to the ways in which parts of the GCAP network are not so much monitory but monitored. In this vein I will now narrate the epistemological and material power of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in monitoring and ordering the NCSTM in Malawi, thus calling into question the claim that GCAP is wholly oppositional, even ambiguously in the critical-monitory sense.

5.5 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

It was when I received the following email that the MDGs really came to the fore in my research. The invitation to participate in this research project which I sent to this participant can be found in Appendix Two. It is recommended that it is read in conjunction with the response below, so that the full sense of how uninvited the MDGs
were can be conveyed. It was because of this that they immediately attracted my attention as a possible mediating actor (Latour, 2005) in the NCSTM network in Malawi:

<xxx@yahoo.com> writes:

Dear Clive,
I hope you are fine. I would like to confirm that i will participate in your research project. Our organisation is called xxx and I am the Executive Director/Founder. Our address is xxx. Cell is xxx
I'm a member of the Taskforce.
I will be ready to participate in July. We are mainly focusing on MDG goal 1, 3 and 6.
Thanks
xxx

(Personal correspondence with research participant, 13th April 2008: Italics added)

The GCAP coalition in Malawi is called the National Civil Society Taskforce for the MDGs, and so in many respects it shouldn't be surprising if participants raise the MDGs in their talk about the coalition. Nonetheless, this response struck me as particularly unusual; so direct and seemingly automatic - 'You haven't asked, but this is what we do and we're good at it'. In Chapter One I discussed a general critique of African civil societies which argues that they are heavily influenced, and in some cases implanted by donors (Kasfir, 1998. Harrison, 2004), but it was interesting nonetheless to speculate about the spatially-specific dynamic which may have led to this in Lilongwe, Malawi's capital city. Many of the NGOs, donors, international financial institutions and government offices all based here, in a newly-built section of the city (known as 'Capital City') divorced by a national park from the older and more poverty-stricken section of the
city (known as 'Old Town'). The implications of Lilongwe's political topography remain speculative in the context of this research, and as I have often stated I am not trying to provide a sense of cause-and-effect here, a concrete truth. Nonetheless, as I began to immerse myself in Lilongwe and the activities and people of the NCSTM, such speculation found partial confirmation in certain occurrences of an everyday-in-practice (or ontological) sense, such as who attended NCSTM steering group meetings. I will return to this theme shortly.

What I would come to understand in Malawi, however, was a very problematic relationship between civil society and the particular 'development hegemony' (Kamat, 2002) of the MDGs, which challenged any claim of GCAP being entirely oppositional, even in a monitory sense. For now I think it will be useful to firstly introduce the MDGs more comprehensively, before contrasting the situation I encountered in the NCSTM with other ways in which that relationship (between GCAP and the MDGs) is understood within GCAP. This will serve to highlight in full relief the very particular understanding of that relationship in Malawi.

5.5.1 What are the MDGs and where do they come from?

"In September 2000, building upon a decade of major United Nations conferences and summits, world leaders came together at United Nations Headquarters in New York to adopt the United Nations Millennium Declaration, committing their nations to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty and setting out a series of time-bound targets - with a deadline of 2015 - that have become known as the Millennium Development Goals."
"The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – which range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015 – form a blueprint agreed to by all the world’s countries and all the world’s leading development institutions." (un.orga)

The MDGs consist of eight targets each with their own subset of targets. These include, by 2015, halving extreme poverty, increasing the numbers of girls in education and halving the spread of HIV/AIDS. A full list of the goals and associated targets can be found in Appendix Five.

The quotes above are taken from the United Nations’ MDGs website, and present a particular history of the MDGs. They were the result of UN summits and were developed and adopted unanimously by the whole host of world nations at the General Assembly. It is important to note therefore that other accounts of the MDGs’ genealogy problematise this translation, and provide the context in which certain parts of the GCAP network are discursively constructed by the MDGs, whilst others position themselves in an ambiguous monitory oppositionality to them, simultaneously critiquing them but also re-affirming them as the only current development agenda in play.

Colin Bradford was the United States representative to the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) during
the 1990s. In an unpublished account of his time at the DAC during this period, he relates the process by which the OECD’s International Development Targets (IDTs) were formed. According to Bradford (and secondary accounts also – see Hulme, 2007), the IDTs were important pre-cursors to the MDGs and formed the basis of those goals and targets (Bradford, 2006: 1). Indeed, a 1996 document produced by the DAC, ‘Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation’, lists these IDTs, and claims to be the first attempt at synthesising targets set at sector-specific summits and meetings from the previous decade (OECD-DAC, 1996: 9). A glance at these targets does indeed reveal their resemblance to the eventual MDGs (I have added the MDG numbers where relevant - see Appendix Five for comparison):

**Economic well-being:**

A reduction by one-half in the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015 (MDG 1)

**Social development:**

Universal primary education in all countries by 2015 (MDG 2)

Demonstrated progress toward gender equality and the empowerment of women by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005 (MDG 3)

A reduction by two-thirds in the mortality rates for infants and children under age 5 and a reduction by three-fourths in maternal mortality, all by 2015 (MDG 4)

Access through the primary health-care system to reproductive health services for all individuals of appropriate ages as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015 (MDG 5)

**Environmental sustainability and regeneration:**
The current implementation of national strategies for sustainable development in all countries by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends in the loss of environmental resources are effectively reversed at both global and national levels by 2015 (MDG 7)

(OECD Development Assistance Committee, 1996: 2)

Bradford (2006) relates that the IDTs were an important stepping stone on the path to the formulation of the MDGs. Bradford reports that he was present at multilateral stakeholder meetings coordinated by the United Nations Development Group. Bradford claims to have argued for the inclusion of the IDTs in the MDGs at one of these stakeholder meetings (ibid: 1). According to Bradford, his intervention at this meeting provided the basis for a further meeting “...that brought people together from the World Bank, IMF, OECD and the UN which became the ‘task force’ that developed the MDGs” (op cit)

Interestingly, Bradford claims that finding an alternative ideological narrative with which to ‘sell’ development to development actors (including developing States) in the aftermath of the Cold War was a major motivation in the drafting of the IDTs (ibid: 2). One can detect issues of contention here for actors who might have different notions of development to that of the DAC. Potentially most problematically, the IDTs, which predated and defined the MDGs, were formulated by a “groupe de réflexion” which consisted of all and only the major bilateral donors at that time (ibid: 3). Furthermore, the IDTs were developed shortly after internal OECD negotiations were being held to
develop the subsequently controversial (and opposed by civil society groups) Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI).

Whether or not we take Bradford at his word, the above account clearly problematises the idea of the MDGs as an automatically benign and apolitical set of goals and targets. Whilst it is not the assertion here that the MDGs are necessarily malign (and indeed, who could argue with eradicating 50% of extreme poverty?), they do appear to represent a hegemonic and therefore exclusionary definition of development. The MDGs do not, for example, mention social exclusion, violence against women, or land rights, all of which have provided sites of civil society advocacy and contestation. They explicitly cite the private sector, and in particular large pharmaceutical companies, as the key to improved development outcomes. Like the heavily criticised ‘Basic Needs’ approach to development of the 1970’s\(^{59}\), this is a view of development which significantly differs both conceptually and instrumentally from contemporary counter-hegemonic definitions of development (See, for example, Bello, 2004. Chang and Grabel, 2004). With GCAP’s close relationship to the UNMC, the MDGs figure largely within the GCAP network. Whilst the contested and ambiguous authorship of the MDGs is of interest, it is not the argument here that this authorship necessarily implies a steady and intentional identity

\(^{59}\) Probably the most-cited critic of the basic needs approach would be Amartya Sen, for whom this critique served to underpin his ‘capabilities’ approach to development in which he accused the basic needs approach of “commodity fetishisation” – see Sen, 1984: 513-5
and impact through time\textsuperscript{59}. Rather, it is the inter-relations with other agencies and the practices this creates which are of interest here as a way of interpreting GCAP's stated monitory oppositionality. It is the different contexts in which I encountered the MDGs 'acting' in this research which reveal the somewhat authorless nature of their agency, and thus the ambiguity of GCAP's oppositionality.

5.5.2 The 'Minimum' Development Goals

In this section I will illustrate the ways in which the MDGs are drawn upon by research participants counter-hegemonically, and the kinds of monitory oppositionality these understandings engender. This will firstly stand on its own as a narrative of GCAP's oppositionality, but also serve to contextualize the ambiguity and inconsistency of this oppositionality within the GCAP network produced by the uneven and co-imbricated relationships between GCAP's nodes, governments, Statist and networked neo-liberal hegemonic formations like the MDGs. This ambiguity and inconsistency will be illustrated in the section following this one, which will focus mainly on the discursive relationship between the MDGs and the NCSTM in Malawi.

Despite GCAP's close relationship with the UNMC, many of GCAP's strategic documents and official statements do hint at an undercurrent of doubt or even cynicism

\textsuperscript{59} For a counter argument to this kind of linear perspective on temporality see Closs-Stephens' interpretation of Walter Benjamin's thought for the study of international relations - 2009: 84
towards the promises of the MDGs. Meeting the MDGs is considered as a "first step" towards eradicating poverty (GCAP, 2004a: 5), which governments are called upon not simply to achieve but to "surpass" (GCAP, 2007a: 7). Whilst this language may not appear particularly dramatic or oppositional, it does match more anecdotal evidence which appears in GCAP evaluation and strategic documents. For example, at the 2003 meeting at which civil society organisations and representatives discussed formally for the first time the formation of something like GCAP, the meeting report suggests that "...there was a great deal of scepticism voiced by the participants about the Millennium Goals and the UN system's seriousness in pursuing the Goals" (CIVICUS/UNMC 2003: 2). Despite this scepticism the meeting participants agreed to work within the framework of the MDGs, although on the understanding that the UNMC would not retreat from addressing what participants understood as the structural causes of poverty (op cit). It remained the case though that an evaluation study conducted in 2008 found that many national coalitions felt that the link between GCAP and the MDGs was "driving the strategic decision making within GCAP rather than issues being thought through independently" (GCAP, 2008d: 20).

An interesting discussion reflecting this tension occurred at the face-to-face GCAP Learning and Accountability Group (LAG) meeting which I was invited to participate in. In response to the complaints of several participants from GCAP coalitions in countries with high levels of poverty, a representative of a large INGO, who was also chairing the meeting, acknowledged that the MDGs were "terribly reductionist" and had previously
alienated some groups, particularly feminist groups, from GCAP. However, she went on to dismiss the discussion as one that kept on repeating itself, saying that the MDGs were not just going to disappear and had to be worked with (LAG Fieldnotes). The power dynamics of discussions between INGOs and other civil society actors who constitute GCAP will be explored in the next chapter. For now it is simply interesting to observe the ongoing tension over the MDGs within one of GCAP’s more central advisory bodies.

This tension appears to be much more keenly felt within some of the national coalitions, particularly those who have the UNMC in-country as a funding partner (roughly 30 coalitions, including the WNTA). When the 2007 Global Assembly took the decision to continue GCAP on to 2015 (thus shadowing the MDGs), a GCAP evaluation report noted one participant who claimed that such a relationship had been ambiguous:

"On the one side the MDGs have more or less determined the activities of GCAP, particularly Stand Up events, while at same time you have GCAP members who go much beyond the MDGs and are in fact critical of the MDGs and see it as a restrictive framework." (GCAP, 2008d: 20)

This was a sentiment explicitly expressed a great deal amongst the members of the WNTA. Some criticised the MDGs for only focussing on macro quantitative targets, which they claimed fail to take into account the huge demographic differentials of poverty in India (Interviews 10, 11). Another summarised the situation thusly:

"many of us, and continue to do so, are sceptical of the MDGs, and...often we call it 'minimum development goals', so there has, various groups have also had issues with
Talking about the campaign strategy in terms which transcended the MDGs also served to illuminate the monitory oppositionality of the WNTA, the way in which it sought to invoke a counter-hegemonic, or hegemonically expansionist/transformative discourse and practice. Focussing on the rights of excluded groups (Interviews 3, 7, 8, 10) in a MDGs context simultaneously affirms the MDGs as a framework but also expands its narrow parameters to groups which carry the possibility of transforming the content of that framework.

This kind of perspective was best articulated by a member of the GCAP Global Secretariat who has spent a great deal of time working with the WNTA campaign:

"with the MDGs to use it as a tool for groups in the North and South to really hold their governments to account on their promises. To push their governments to say, even these promises you're making you're not gonna meet the MDGs, even if you meet the MDGs you're not gonna make much difference in our country because halving poverty, so what? You're gonna increase inequality so on and so forth. Basing it on that, so that the point that civil society is, is credible enough, powerful enough, that we can really dictate the post 2015 agenda, to create an agenda which is radical, which takes into account climate change, inequality, so on and so forth, that's, very personally, that's what I'd like to see GCAP doing" (Interview 12)

This discussion serves to illuminate one example of how discourses of monitory oppositionality are articulated within GCAP's network nodes. As I have previously asserted this is an ambiguous oppositionality, not only because it operates within the framework of a hegemonic discourse of development, but also because it operates
alongside other discourses or schemas which complicate any sense in which one could talk of GCAP embodying a monitory oppositionality per se. I will now illustrate this with continuing reference to the MDGs, and the discursive relationships between them and the NCSTM in Malawi, and the material implications of this.

5.5.3 'Like... being in heaven'

Time and again during my conversations with NCSTM participants in Malawi, the MDGs were deployed without invite. I say 'deployed', rather than 'referenced' or 'mentioned', because the MDGs appeared to be active, not only in shaping the discourses being employed by the research participants, but also in mediating both their activities as a coalition and my own research. In this way they served as an 'actor' (Latour, 2005) in the NCSTM network, albeit on that required summoning in the specific networked context of the NCSTM in Malawi. For example, the following exchange took place during the first interview I undertook in Malawi:

NCSTM Participant: Are you meeting Oxfam?

CG: In Malawi?

NCSTM Participant: Mm.

CG: Well, I was going to ask you about them actually... I'd like to... basically, [NCSTM Secretariat] sent me everyone on the taskforce's contact details...

NCSTM Participant: Ok
CG: And, some of whom I then contacted...some got back to me and some didn’t, but I didn’t notice an Oxfam address – in fact I didn’t notice any international NGOs’ addresses.

NCSTM Participant: But who are you meeting? Your list...

CG: Ok, so I’ve got, [pause, papers taken out of bag] these are the people who have so far agreed to be interviewed...and then...this is the list of email addresses...

NCSTM Participant: Hmm...ok...this is all?

CG: yeh...this is... the email addresses that [NCSTM Secretariat] sent me...and I don’t know if that’s...I didn’t notice any international NGOs on that list...

NCSTM Participant: Yuh...

CG: And I was going to ask you if that’s because they’re not directly involved on the taskforce..?

NCSTM Participant: Yuh, yuh...but I think they are doing some work around it

CG: ok...

NCSTM Participant: This one I think you should meet ['This one' refers to a UNDP programme officer whose business card the NCST participant hands me]

CG: ok

NCSTM Participant: Because she will give you another perspective

CG: yup... what’s her relationship to the taskforce?

NCSTM Participant: UNDP are also...I think they are supporting the taskforce

CG: umhmm

NCSTM Participant: But they are into the Millennium Development Goals, so if you want to hear some stories in terms of what progress government is making in the eyes of the UN system so you can get that perspective.

(Interview 14)
So the participant took my question about International NGOs, and referred me to the UNDP. Later on in the conversation, he said the following:

"for me, there is the GCAP movement, and there is the MDGs... not everyone who is doing the MDG work is in the GCAP... that's why I was mentioning these people so you can meet them, and just get progress on the, on the MDGs for Malawi... yeh" (Interview 14)

It appeared that this participant felt compelled to direct my research to actors who were not obviously part of GCAP. The participant could be said to have been ranking GCAP as subordinate to the MDGs. Here then were the MDGs acting, not simply to shape the NCSTM’s practices, but also my own. This did not necessarily have negative implications for my research, as it resulted in a very productive encounter when I was invited to a meeting of the NCSTM steering group held at the offices of the UNDP in Lilongwe, which I will return to shortly.

For the moment I want to briefly illustrate the manner in which the MDGs discursively orientate the NCSTM’s imaginings of their coalition’s objectives, and poverty eradication in Malawi more broadly. All of the participants in Malawi invoked the MDGs as a defining frame of the coalition. Furthermore, many of them imagined that achieving the MDGs would result in the eradication of poverty. For example, this participant described GCAP as:

"A coalition of different players especially in the civil society, you know, who want to see poverty gone, ok? So, but they want to see poverty gone by using the framework of the 8 MDGs ok?" (Interview 30).
Similarly another participant claimed that

"Meeting the MDGs, they are put in a way that they should actually eradicate poverty and hunger, whatever, so for Malawi, a third world country, I mean, that would cure everything, the economy, that would be, that would be the day we are looking forward to...I think meeting the MDGs in Malawi...I guess...it's...it would be like...being in heaven I guess" (Interview 13)

The MDGs though only promise to reduce extreme poverty by 50% by 2015. Even if the 65.4% of people living below the nationally defined poverty line in Malawi (UNDP, 2008) are all living in extreme poverty, rather than 'regular' poverty, then that still leaves nearly a third of the population living in extreme poverty. Nonetheless, an MDG shadow report produced by the NCSTM claims that “...the MDGs ... look at all people” (NCSTM, 2007: 19). So whilst the members of the NCSTM are trying to enrol the MDGs to their problematisations of poverty alleviation in Malawi, the MDGs are in fact acting in ways which contradict this, and render the NCSTM participants as hegemonically reproducing intermediaries (Latour, 2005) in many important respects. This significantly problematises any claims that GCAP is oppositional in any universal sense, as the discourses of poverty alleviation amongst the NCSTM in Malawi appear to be more of the 'monitored' variety than the monitory. This impression was further reinforced by the practices of the coalition in Malawi.

The 'monitored' discursive constructions of the NCSTM members appear to be intertwined with the material locations and practices of the NCSTM constituent
organisations. Government ministers and appointees are reported to be ubiquitous at NCSTM events (NCSTM, 2008), whilst one of the criticisms levelled at the Blantyre-based NCSTM secretariat (some four hours away from Lilongwe (Malawi’s political centre) by road) is that it does not appear often enough at government consultations in Lilongwe (Interviews 15, 21). Meanwhile, the UNMC (whose nearest office is in Nairobi) and the UNDP (with offices in Capital City/the ‘newer’ Lilongwe) play significant roles in devising the ‘work-programmes’ of the coalition. I was fortunate enough to be able to observe an example of this, the significance of which I will now illustrate.

5.5.4 Please do attend

A few pages ago I presented an excerpt of a conversation I had with one of the research participants in Malawi. In it he recommended that I go and speak to a UNDP employee based in Lilongwe to discuss the government’s performance on the MDG targets. For me, this was already an example of the MDGs acting in a very ontological sense, intruding directly on my research in unexpected ways. As I pursued my list of participants in Malawi, I put the UNDP to the back of my mind for a couple of weeks. I was, initially at least, resistant to the idea of getting distracted by government performance targets and UN measurements. Later, finding myself with a couple of days to kill back in Lilongwe, and feeling uncomfortable about the fact that here was an actor which had been introduced to the NCSTM network which I hadn’t yet chased, I gave the UNDP
employee a call, and made an appointment to see her that afternoon. Slightly later on she
gave me a call back and told me that there was a meeting being held an hour before our
appointment at the UNDP offices which I should come along to. It was going to be
addressed by someone visiting from the UN in Nairobi to talk about the MDGs. I
expressed my concerns to her that I might be a bit of an intruder, but she insisted I come
along. I was soon to find out why.

When I entered the room where the meeting was being held I saw a round table with
people sitting around it, like a committee meeting. The meeting had already got under
way, so I focused first on locating an empty seat and quickly made my way to it, trying to
cause as little fuss as possible. But as I sat down and looked around me I realised that I
knew every single person sitting around the table, apart from about four people, who, it
transpired were UNDP employees and the person from the UN in Nairobi; the UNMC
(Millennium Campaign) in Nairobi, as it turned out. The reason why I knew everyone
else was because I had interviewed them. They were all NCSTM members. This was, it
seemed, a coalition meeting being addressed by the UNMC representative.

The meeting provided an example of the MDGs acting and embodied through their UN
representatives to order the NCSTM in Malawi - its understandings of poverty and its
actions to alleviate it. The UNDP representatives talked of how much they supported the
Stand Up events because of their 'Take Action' approach. This, they said, was important
in avoiding “dependency syndrome” and encouraging “the poor to take ownership”.

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Malawian society, another UNDP representative said, "loves to suffer in silence", and should be more critical of the government (NCSTM Fieldnotes). Setting the context in this way meant that any anti-poverty campaign had to be constructed in a certain manner. For example, this implicitly ruled out a critique of international economic structures, and placed the responsibility for poverty in Malawi equally on government policy, civil society organisations and people living in poverty. We have already seen how this latter discourse permeates throughout the NCSTM network.

The role of the MDGs and UN system in ordering the NCSTM's ontology was not so much a single process of ordering, but consisted of a series of different moments which served to prod the NCSTM members along to certain agreements and outcomes. For example, the coalition secretariat representative was admonished by the UNDP representatives for not attending enough government consultations – "Please do attend!" he was very publicly scolded. The UNMC representative asserted the importance of concentrating on formal government engagement, arguing that this was how policy makers could be bound to decisions and pressure could be brought publicly. This was despite an earlier call by one of the NCSTM members for less reliance on these formal political opportunities, and the success of civil society demonstrations outside the parliament building in Lilongwe to break a deadlock in negotiations over the budget a year earlier (NCSTM Fieldnotes).
Furthermore, as the meeting progressed, it became apparent that the UNDP and UNMC representatives were at first translating discussions into ‘actionable’ points, and then simply taking some decisions themselves, addressing each other in the process rather than the NCSTM members present. Simultaneously, the UNDP and UNMC representatives responsibilised the NCSTM members, particularly the secretariat. The coalition, they were told, were in a position the UN agencies could not occupy, that of being able to critique government, a role they must take on with greater vigour (although as we already know, this could only be done through ‘formal’ channels). Similarly, when the secretariat tried to give the UNDP representative responsibility for a task, she refused, responding “You lead this, the UNDP only supports”.

It is important to bear in mind here that nowhere in the MDGs, nor the UN Millennium Declaration, is it stated that civil society should be instructed, ordered or managed. Indeed, civil society isn’t mentioned much at all – not once in the MDGs, and only in the Millennium Declaration with reference to building a “strong partnership” in pursuit of the MDGs (Article 20) and to provide more opportunities for civil society to contribute to the development of the UN (article 30) (un.orgc). It is the particular spatial context in which the MDGs converge with other temporal factors in the NCTSM and Malawi which produces their ordering effect. In this sense then whist the MDGs represent neo-liberal hegemonic interests, there is no simple cause-effect relationship here. It has taken a combination of factors to produce the NCTSM’s ‘unauthored’ (Ferguson, 2000) monitored agency
In this section on the MDGs, I have attempted to illustrate the complex and contradictory ways in which they are a very active mediating and ordering actor in the GCAP network which represent a particular and hegemonic articulation of ‘development’. Whilst in the WNTA the MDGs have provoked counter-hegemonic articulations of the meaning of development and a form of monitory oppositionality, in the NCSTM they have acted to epistemologically and materially order both understandings and practices of the NCSTM, fixing it as a hegemonically dominated entity. If we were to apply Chatterjee’s model, it could be argued that the NCSTM represents his notion of the ‘fictive’ of civil society (2004: 36-38), subjected only in so much as it can fulfil its role in extending the diffuse control of hegemonic formations. What seems clear is the manner in which the MDGs have not necessarily intended effects in the spaces in which they converge with other productive discursive repertoires and embodying actors, and that the various articulations and practices which are produced in these spaces problematise ideas of GCAP as either universally oppositional or co-opted. They reveal the messy, unintended and multiple agencies of GCAP, and call into question any notion of GCAP’s unity, either of purpose or origin.

5.6 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented a set of at times contradictory narratives about GCAP’s oppositionality regarding governments, statist and other networked and hegemonic elite
formations. I began the chapter by highlighting the way in which GCAP’s participants and texts understood their own agency as a uniformly oppositional one, although ultimately this was understood to be monitory, and thus, in my own interpretation, ambiguous. I continued to illustrate this ambiguity through narrating the history and networked relationality of GCAP’s Stand Up against Poverty/Stand Up and Take Action annual mobilisations. This revealed the problematic relationship between GCAP and the United Nations Millennium Campaign; problematic both for some of the research participants as they described it, but also for the articulations and practices of the NCSTM in Malawi as narrated further on in the chapter.

I continued to explore this monitory and oppositional ambiguity by again highlighting the contradictory discourses and ideological dilemmas prevalent within the parts of GCAP in which I was researching and acting. Whilst GCAP’s Global Assemblies and more historically radicalised nodes, such as the WNTA coalition, articulated a structural critique of the causes and solutions to poverty (resulting in contingently transformative relations with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations), in the NCSTM coalition campaign participants articulated a discourse of poverty alleviation which responsibilised those living in poverty for solving their situations, a discourse which was explicitly critiqued by GCAP’s more radical nodes as being emblematic of neo-liberal hegemonic development discourses. Lastly, and in a further attempt to illustrate the problematic relationship between GCAP and the UNMC, I told the story of the MDGs in Malawi, and the power they are enabled to enact by the distinctive spatial and historical arrangement
that exists in the spaces and sites of Malawi I engaged with. This power is epistemological and ontological, discursively and materially ordering the understandings and practices of the NCSTM in Malawi.

These narratives of GCAP’s agency regarding governments, statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations have been contradictory because GCAP is not one single entity, but is instead composed of many different nodal points, themselves contextualised relationally by social and historical events and modalities. I have attempted to utilise this contradictory set of agencies productively to problematise homogenising claims about the agency of GCAP and by extension alter-globalisation networks, of either the over celebratory or dismissive kind.

In the following chapter I shift the focus of analysis from what might rather simplistically be described at GCAP’s external relationality, to what might equally simplistically be described as GCAP’s internal relationality. These are simplistic descriptions because one of the aims of this research is to collapse such binaries when dealing with alter-globalisation networks, and as I have tried to explain in this chapter, some of these supposed externalities are in fact internally constitutive of GCAP’s agency (or some of its agencies). Such a distinction does however help to understand the context of the following chapter, which will focus on the relationships between the different actors who explicitly constitute GCAP in its day-to-day activities and operations i.e. INGOs, national constituency groups, social movements, trade unions, faith groups and other civil society
actors. In particular I will be analysing the degree to which GCAP incubates various forms of cosmopolitan and post-colonial discourses, and the degree to which they fuse or conflict with each other in producing GCAP’s claimed emancipatory subjectivity.
CHAPTER SIX

Competing Cosmopolitanisms

6.1 Introduction

In the last chapter I explored the ways in which GCAP's relationships with governmental, statist and hegemonic formations helped to explain its oppositionality vis-à-vis those formations and discourses. Whilst I argued that GCAP's own uneven and inconsistent constitution rendered futile a perspective that saw these relationships as being between two distinct and autonomous bodies, one could very crudely say that the last chapter was about GCAP's external relationships, the relationships between its constituent nodes and their externalities (even though those nodes were constituted, in discursive and material terms, by both civil society 'internalities' and governmental/statist/hegemonic 'externalities'). I am stating this here as a way of introducing the subject matter of this chapter, which, whilst not distinct from that which was discussed in the previous chapter, could again rather crudely be understood as an analysis of GCAP's internal relations.

It should be clear by now that I do not view these relations as untainted by their externalities, but, whereas the last chapter concentrated on statist and hegemonic powers, those actors and discourses to which GCAP in certain articulations of itself is opposed, in
In this chapter, I will be analysing the relationships between the actors which very explicitly compose GCAP—international and national NGOs, social movements, trade unions, faith groups, and other civil society actors. I will furthermore be analysing these relationships through the particular prism of inclusion and exclusion, and discursive normalisation and abnormalisation. Rather than asserting the existence of all-powerful universals silencing the voices and actions of weaker, local particularisms, I instead draw on Laclau’s (1995) assertion that anything with the appearance of universality is in fact merely a hegemonic particularism. The question then is to what degree such hegemonic particularisms can be or have been extended and transformed by minority voices in an attempt to include more and more particularisms within its purview. Whilst GCAP is a network of cosmopolitan nodes, in this chapter, I will not be seeking to understand the relationships within GCAP as ones between an actually-existing universalistic cosmopolitanism, silencing particularistic claims against it, but rather as the meeting of several cosmopolitan particularisms, some of which are more successful than others in translating themselves into apparently cosmopolitan universals. The argument developed in this chapter therefore will be that different actors in GCAP draw on different cosmopolitan discursive resources and interpretations of those resources. As expressions of cosmopolitanism are therefore always particularistic, this chapter will address itself to the different cosmopolitan particularities which circulate within GCAP, and their associated inclusions and exclusions.

The core research question this chapter will seek to address therefore is:
Which processes of exclusion and inclusion constitute alter-globalisation networks?

In Chapter One I sketched out, theoretically, the component aspects of a Western liberal imperial cosmopolitanism, characterised by a constitutive destructiveness of the other it attempts to ‘save’ (Douzinas, 2007), whilst in Chapter Three I sketched out a re-centred, post-colonial cosmopolitanism, characterised by the Arendtian notion of “action”, plurality (Arendt, 1958/1998: 7) and the centring of “border thinking” (Mignolo, 2000). As with the previous chapter, the fault lines of these relationships are not simply geographical (i.e. North and South) but more aptly described as discursive. In this way I draw on de Sousa Santos’ concept of the “Epistemologies of the South” (2008) to collapse the geographical distinction between ‘North’ and ‘South’. In other words, this allows us to imagine modes of construction and engagement which may be distinct from fixed geographical places.

The chapter will begin therefore by interrogating the roles played by international NGOs (INGOs) within GCAP (not all of them based in the ‘Global North’ or structurally privileged environments), particularly focussing on their sometimes contradictory roles in supporting, dominating and ordering the GCAP network. The implications of these roles will be to reveal the specific form of cosmopolitanism enacted by the INGOs, and the degree to which this cosmopolitanism can be considered to be inclusionary of GCAP’s
multiple constitutive nodes; the degree to which it is based on 'making' or 'action' in the Arendtian sense (Arendt, 1958/1998: 220)

This will help to set the context for the deployment of the theoretical framework developed in Chapters One and Three, in the exploration of the multiple forms of cosmopolitanism considered in those chapters and which became apparent throughout this research. These will be shown to be particularistic in that they 'come from somewhere', and draw on specific interpretations of cosmopolitan discursive resources. I will draw on examples which illustrate the ways in which these forms of cosmopolitanism interact in moments of tension and co-production, which again carries implications for the ways in which GCAP enacts inclusions and exclusions of its network sites and nodes, both discursively and materially.

6.2 The multiple and contradictory practices of INGOs in GCAP

One immediate question which must be addressed in prefacing this section is why it is that an analysis of the role of INGOs in GCAP is necessary. After all, there are many actors which constitute GCAP, and most of them are not INGOs. Why then should I be taking INGOs as my point of reference? Doesn't this reify the significance of INGOs to the detriment of other actors in GCAP, before I have even sought to ascertain the relative importance of their discourses and actions in constituting GCAP?
Well, possibly, although I will be addressing this imbalance further on in this chapter.

However, there is good reason to begin with the INGOs. Firstly, the dominant role of INGOs has been well documented in other similar networks (see, for example, Yanacopulos, 2009), and secondly, a brief analysis of GCAP reveals the ubiquitous role INGOs play. As illustrated in the previous chapter, ActionAid, Oxfam GB and Oxfam Novib are three of the four core GCAP funders. Secondly, two of the three co-chairs of GCAP work for INGOs. That one of these INGOs is based in the ‘South’ is not necessarily meaningful and challenges the easy geographical distinction between ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ discourses of poverty and cosmopolitanism. Thirdly, INGOs are bestowed with official representation within GCAP’s constitutive national coalitions, which are recommended to include relevant INGOs on their steering groups (GCAP, 2007a). Lastly, INGOs have provided the majority of GCAP’s full-time secretariat staff on secondment. It is clear, then, that INGOs are important in GCAP. How important they are, and what this says about the cosmopolitan pretensions and inclusions of GCAP, will be the subject of this section.

6.2.1 INGOs and the expansion of GCAP’s particularities

It is clear that INGOs do play some supportive roles in GCAP which do enable particularistic discourses to achieve universal-type recognition. Research participants in the WNTA and the NCSTM, working for national and constituency-based civil society actors, identified INGOs as providing “connections” (Interview 17), “links” (Interview 4)
"platforms" (Interview 7) and "facilitation" (Interview 9), bridging national campaigns to the larger GCAP group. In this way, INGOs helped to "maintain a space" (Interview 1) in which many different actors could come together and communicate in ways which had previously proved difficult because of organisational or individual agendas.

In an example of how GCAP has expanded its cosmopolitical agenda to include the demands of marginalised groups, the head of a Dalit organisation in India praised the INGOs, because they had "...provided us platforms where we can voice our concerns, where we can put our demands to the larger group" (Interview 3). Specifically, this individual had been asked to lead a social exclusion taskforce in GCAP, in an effort to mainstream caste and religious minority exclusion within GCAP's narratives around poverty alleviation. Whilst this is something that has emerged from the WNTA, INGOs have played a supportive role in expanding GCAP's particularism to include this previously maligned minority issue.60

60 An issue to be dealt with here concerns why it is we should consider relations like these cosmopolitan. Clearly it is not enough to render any relation of engagement cosmopolitan. I have repeatedly stated that cosmopolitan relations must involve a degree of other regarded-ness. Normally there is an assumption that such relations should unfold over distance. However, this brings us to consider how we define distance. In Chapter Three I argued that we need to consider distance in social, as well as in geographical terms. By doing so cosmopolitan relations can be understood to be practiced across cultural, social and economic as well as spatial, difference and 'distance'. Indeed, one issue which appears to unite an ideological range of the writers considered in Chapters One to Three, despite the serious divisions which otherwise exist between them, is their analysis that neo-liberal capitalist relations have eroded social ties between individuals and communities living in close geographical proximity (Day, 2005; Massey, 2005; Chandler, 2007; Newman, 2007). This is not therefore an issue only of class solidarity, but also of economic (between different classes), cultural and geographical solidarity. When members of GCAP express solidarity with members of marginalised groups, they are establishing cosmopolitan relations across a range of socio-economic divisions. This is why these relations are cosmopolitan, because they involve an engagement with 'others' over social, cultural, spatial and economic distance. What remains to
Even though some of them are country coalition funders, the INGOs do not largely involve themselves in the day-to-day running of the WNTA and NCSTM secretariats. They themselves appear to be aware that this would be seen negatively by their in-country partners on the coalitions. For example, an INGO employee and member of the WNTA steering group claimed:

"Donors give WNTA the space it needs to be a national campaign. Without this space WNTA would have no credibility at a grassroots level, especially with Dalits, Adivasis, groups like that. Many people are suspicious or unmotivated by big global initiatives. The donors understand this" (Interview 8)

And from the NCSTM:

"Now as the national civil society organisations, especially some of the NGOs, collectives, and their secretariats take a stronger hold, then there is a ... phasing out of INGOs to actually pitch in, so we are at the stage now where initially Oxfam and ActionAid have played a very critical role. Now they are very...objective, outside support, we are not part of the day to day secretariat" (Interview 16)

The INGOs therefore appear to provide and/or support inclusionary spaces for smaller, national or constituency-based civil society actors to make their voices heard within GCAP's larger structure, and in turn to inform GCAP's positions vis-à-vis its engagement with various governments, statist formations and publics. Nonetheless, there also appear to be many instances of INGOs asserting their agendas with national be judged of course is the content of these relations, and whether they are emancipatory and horizontal or dominating and hierarchical.
coalitions, creating tensions and divisions within GCAP. Furthermore, INGOs sometimes inadvertently order the GCAP network by virtue of them being best resourced and positioned to do so (this echoes Cumbers, Nativel and Routledge’s ‘imagineers’ (2007)). These issues will be the subject of the next two sub-sections.

6.2.2 Practices of INGO Domination

According to a GCAP evaluation report, some constituent members of GCAP are reported to believe that “...it is organizations with funds that have ended up and been the primary decision makers” (GCAP, 2008c: 24) and that “...the strong presence of donor agencies in the campaign [undermines] the presence of local organizations, creating other movements that keep a distance to GCAP” (ibid: 25). This highlights the way in which INGO domination of the GCAP network acts to exclude less resourced actors and their particularistic concerns. This is a process of exclusion which challenges claims that the cosmopolitanism of alter-globalisation networks is universal, open and inclusive, and that it automatically invokes the ‘border’ voices (Mignolo, 2000). See Chapter One for a discussion of those authors who adopt this universalistic position.

This eventuality was further reinforced by some of the interviewed research participants. According to one, the initial domination of the WNTA campaign by INGOs led to a great deal of scepticism and criticism from Indian NGOs and activists (EthInt 1). It seems this frustration persists:
"How you even plan for campaigns, there's always a disruption that happens... where the INGOs planning the campaigns quickly get onto what will we do? And then for us the question is why do you want to do it? And probably we need, we don't get enough time to really, you know, put both together, because what is also important - there's a great sense of discomfort for many of us when we say you are jumping straight to what you will do, and then what is often dictated by someone sitting in London, who feels that what works in London is a global phenomena... I mean that the GCAP global agenda, I wouldn't say gets dictated, but gets influenced significantly by what is going to look good on BBC. So, so that's where the tension comes in because that's what comes back to India" (Interview 1)

For one participant in the NCSTM, a question about the role of INGOs in the coalition instigated an angry response about INGOs in general:

"there's somebody between those who provide resources and between the ones who implement, like a conduit of some kind, but that conduit has so much influence that sometimes they end up implementing themselves. So that kind of approach to some of us is wrong, because it, it's not like you're building the capacity of the locals, you're saying 'we got the money, we have the money', and you get the master and servant approach" (Interview 18)

Such responses invoke INGOs as mediators (Latour, 2005) in the GCAP network and suggest that their role is controversial, resulting in some instances in the domination of less resourced organisations and activists. This is a process of exclusion which speaks back to some of the more positive roles played by INGOs outlined earlier. However, in both cases the focus has been on individual cases of critique or support. Neither really speaks to the broader processes of discursive inclusion and exclusion which INGOs proliferate throughout GCAP. This is what I will now address, as I seek to understand how the GCAP network is imagined and ordered through the presence of INGOs in it.
6.2.3 The INGO translation of GCAP

This sub-section will explore the following questions: how do INGO representatives imagine and narrate GCAP’s purpose and actions at the level of the national coalitions? How successful and dominant are these (particularistic) translations and orderings? In what ways do these narrations draw on particular types of cosmopolitan discursive resources? And what do they tell us about the kinds of cosmopolitan inclusions and exclusions that GCAP embodies?

In addressing these questions it will become clear that whilst INGO narratives remain largely similar across the WNTA coalition in India and the NCSTM coalition in Malawi, as well as in other areas of the GCAP network, the success with which these narratives order and enrol non-INGO actors is significantly contextualised by the local setting. So in the WNTA this operation has been unsuccessful in many ways, whilst in NCSTM the opposite is largely the case.

But first a note of clarification: I have deliberately avoided the word ‘national’ in relation to the WNTA and NCSTM campaigns as I want to avoid the impression of essentialised bounded features which dictate local responses in India and Malawi. Clearly it is difficult to describe the space in which either country campaign operates in as ‘national’ when members of the respective campaigns regularly travel to other places beyond national boundaries, when members of other country coalitions regularly visit, and when the
discourses drawn on are mediated through different dimensions of geographical boundedness. In this way then the coalitions are presented as operating in localities which serve as the sites of different dimensions of the global, national and local.

I also want to avoid the impression that the individuals involved can be bisected along lines of nationality (or 'inter' nationality in the case of the INGOs). In every case, the members of INGOs that I spoke with in India and Malawi were nationals of those countries. They largely shared their coalition colleagues' respect for (in the NCTSM) or ambivalence towards (in the WNTA) the MDGs. As I will now argue though, they also displayed a common problematisation (in common with INGOs across both countries and those I encountered in other parts of the network) of what GCAP was, and how it should operate, drawing on neo-liberal cosmopolitan discursive resources and donor logics (which I will go on to outline). The discourses of the INGOs therefore did not come fully from 'outside' of India and Malawi, but were part of the fabrics of those localities, vying with other discourses to order and translate the meanings of civil society activity in those localities.

Hence it is the degree to which certain relations of locality and globality, or weaker and more powerful particularisms (Laclau, 1995), intersect which produce the coalitions' contexts. So in Malawi it is the degree to which the 'local', and civil society in particular, has been penetrated by neo-liberal donor logics, combined with the relative isolation of NCSTM members from the more politically radical elements of GCAP's network, which
has made the coalition particularly open and resonant to INGO narratives which mirror this neo-liberal cosmopolitan logic. In India, on the other hand, where civil society has a long history outside of the World Bank-driven civil society agenda of the late 1980s and mid 1990s, and where several non-INGO activists play central roles in not just GCAP, but also many other alter-globalisation networks, non-INGO activists retain a degree of disregard for the logics and narratives of INGOs. In this way therefore they work to speak back to and rework the hegemonic particularisms of the INGO neo-liberal cosmopolitan logics, expanding and transforming them. This section therefore is also in part a story of actant powers (Law, 2003), and how they serve to epistemically dominate, order, re-order and resist in different contexts.

In this section then I will be exploring the narratives of the INGOs themselves, and how and where they successfully enrol other actors to their problematisations of GCAP. In subsequent sections I will explore the tensions these narratives produce, and the alternative problematisations of GCAP which arise from them. This will assist in assessing the degree to which the INGOs engage in relations of inclusion and/or exclusion with other members of GCAP, and the degree to which they produce GCAP as an inclusionary or exclusionary network.

In total I interviewed four INGO representatives in the WNTA and two in the NCTSM. I also had access to the written opinions of three other INGO representatives who were part of the WNTA coalition in India, and participated in the GCAP Learning and
Accountability Group which involved members of three other INGOs. Two broad themes arose from these interviews and observations. The first was the manner in which the INGO participants sought to quantify the campaign’s success, either locally or across GCAP more broadly. Success was repeatedly equated with mobilising large numbers of people (which is what distinguishes this as a narrative of quantification, rather than mobilisation per se), with little reflection on who was being mobilised and what for, although as will become clear further on, this was not a narrative shared unanimously by other non-INGO actors. The following comments from INGO members about the WNTA are illustrative of this quantitative narrative:

"the success of the [campaign] according to me, is the way it mobilised over 3000 groups across the country. Even when they...started the 9 is mine campaign, that was a huge success, because one is the whole idea of 9 is mine, the slogan, such a catchy slogan, and then, involving students across the country, it was a huge success" (Interview 6)

"ever since the secretariat came into being, it's got a much more robust identity...the secretariat has managed to mobilise a lot more players than what they did at the beginning. That’s one. The identity has become more distinct because there have been specific initiatives that have been identified and then those initiatives have been followed through, so for example, the 9 is mine campaign was a very successful campaign, it mobilised school children, a very large number of children" (Interview 10)

Both of these excerpts not only equate success with the mobilisation of people and organisations around WNTA’s ‘9 is Mine’ campaign (a campaign which sought to lobby for 9% of government expenditure to be attributed to health and education), but also further translates campaign success by equating it with “catchy slogans” and the development of “robust identities”. Large numbers, catchy slogans, robust identities; this is the terminology of corporate marketing, rather than radical structural critique. It is
reminiscent of Kamat’s critique of the technical managerial solutions which the neo-liberal logics of NGOs bring to the social issues of power and oppression (2004: 168).

This focus on quantification was also apparent amongst the INGO participants at the Learning and Accountability Group meeting I participated in during April 2009. As already discussed in the previous chapter, the annual Stand Up against Poverty days are often ambiguous for many of the coalitions who participate and mobilise for them. Nonetheless, the INGOs at this meeting stressed the importance of 116 million people standing up in 2008. Furthermore, it was presented as a wholly positive sign of Stand Up’s success that whilst GCAP had official coalitions in 115 countries, reports had come in of mobilisations that had occurred in a further 15 countries on top of that. Nobody was sure who had initiated these mobilisations, or who had participated in them. This appeared to be of secondary importance, despite the concerns which had already been raised regarding Stand Up mobilisations being co-opted by governments with dubious human rights records (see the discussion of this in the previous chapter) (LAG Fieldnotes).

The importance of this is that, where this particular interpretation of success is dominant, it focuses coalitions on quantifiable outcomes rather than content. This was very clear in the NCSTM, where, in addition to the quantifiable agenda of the MDGs addressed in the previous chapter, the NCSTM were responsible for mobilising the largest number of people across the whole of Africa for the Stand Up days in 2007 and 2008. Indeed, during one interview with a NCSTM member, when asked what GCAP was, the participant
reached for her diary and spent a significant amount of time leafing through the pages until she got to October 17th (International Day for the Eradication of Poverty) to tell me that GCAP was Stand Up against Poverty. Furthermore, it became increasingly clear to me that donor funding (especially from the UNMC) to the NCSTM was predominantly given for the purposes of mobilising for Stand Up, resulting in much of the NCSTM's energies being spent on this mobilisation.

This is also important because it de-politicises and technocratizes GCAP, and creates exclusions for groups or individuals who are either unwilling or unable to meet these managerial markers of success. So for example, at the Learning and Accountability Group meeting it was also reported that some coalitions in Central and South America were beginning to withdraw from GCAP at protest against reporting requirements which were being imposed by INGO-donors (LAG Fieldnotes).

This quantification narrative drew on the kind of cosmopolitan discursive resource outlined in Chapter One. The concern with quantity over content is an other-regarding narrative which seeks to flatten and silence the diversity of the other. It is, in Arendtian terms, a politics of "making" (Arendt, 1958/1998), of seeking a false unity of numbers which simultaneously closes down opportunities for dissent through the discursive externalisation of it. Before drawing any further conclusions from this I want to explore briefly the second theme that emerged from the interviews and observations of INGO participants in GCAP, that of the centrality and importance of 'expertise', and the role
such 'expertise' plays in enrolling the imaginations and ordering the activities of the GCAP network nodes.

In the previous chapter I explored how research participants, regardless of their organisational affiliation, positioned GCAP as speaking on behalf of the "marginalised" (Interview 9), and the "grassroots voices" (Interviews 4, 6, and 8). This suggests a plurality-based (Arendt, 1958/1998; Mouffe, 2005) cosmopolitanism which unfolds across social, cultural, economic and geographical distance, and is inclusive and centring of these 'border' (Mignolo, 2000) voices in formulating solutions to agreed problems. However, many of the INGO participants seemed to hierarchicalise this relationship. In other words, whilst GCAP and its nodes were to speak on behalf of these groups, it could not rely on these same groups to articulate their core messages. The following two excerpts from the same interview with an INGO participant in the WNTA campaign reflect this ideological dilemma (Billig, 1998):

"If you have a national or international agenda but you don't give a damn to the local, localised district and state level agendas, then I think your campaign will not be successful. Somebody sitting...in a district will not be related to the national campaign because he doesn't see any relevance, so that's where he needs to see the linkages...and so the national groups need to adopt local agendas..."

"I think when you talk to government one thing is very challenging that you need to, whatever you say, you need to have evidence for that, because they will come with their own evidence and say 'this is what we think is wrong', so you need to meet that with your own evidence, because they will say 'what you say is not right'. That is one challenge, a more scientific way of looking at issues... they may be very good at protesting, but when it comes to sitting across the table from government, and sitting with government officials who are very senior people, who have you know, they have machines and systems to support them then how do you substantiate your argument, and that is what is important for Wada Na Todo now, because I think now it has reached a stage where you get into..."
dialogues with Minister of Health, with Planning Commission chairperson, so I think there you really need to stand your ground. And, that is also a challenge to bring in experts within the campaign, not maybe in a formal, formal place in the campaign, but definitely as people who support us technically, with expertise…” (Interview 8)

Ultimately this dilemma is resolved. Note how in the first passage the participant repeats the assertion that GCAP, and specifically the WNTA coalition, must place “local agendas” at the heart of their campaigns, in order to build “linkages” with those local activists. This participant interprets GCAP’s effectiveness as being contingent on the articulation of the authentic local, which is therefore positioned as central to the success of the broader campaign. In the second passage, though, “experts” are called upon to be brought “within the campaign” which assumes that they, and their expertise, are currently outside of the campaign. The authentic local is here positioned as “very good at protesting”, but not sufficiently expert about their own social problems to “substantiate [their] argument” and sit down and match government officials with their “machines and systems”. This is a reproduction of the colonial imagining of the authentic local (Heins, 2000; Kapur, 2002) as both important for the legitimacy of the ruling elite, but distant also in terms of shaping the decisions and policies which affect their lives.

In the WNTA campaign, this discourse was not shared by all participants, with many of the non-INGO participants measuring the success and challenge of the WNTA campaign by their ability to engage with a wide range of marginalised groups, and bringing their
voices into conversation with government officials. In the NCSTM though, this discourse was articulated by many participants regardless of organisational affiliation, and possibly for the particularistic spatial dimension pertinent to Malawi’s localities discussed in the last chapter and previously in this chapter.

This discourse and reliance on external ‘expertise’ amongst the non-INGO NCSTM participants was drawn upon fairly regularly in response to questions regarding the role of INGOs in the coalition. The responses displayed a reliance upon the INGOs, although one which was seen as unproblematic:

"they are well resourced, they are able to pool all these bits and pieces like people to put them on the table and say these are the issues. So they have resources for example to do research. Or to even bring in and share issues of for example the economy, yeh, to put that on the table" (Interview 17)

"we need some expertise from a research institution, so that is why we have all these things in the taskforce." (Interview 20)

"I remembered last year we had uh.... I think two people from UK, can’t remember her name um....first, uh....she came after we had already done....it was like she was coming to review the things we had done. But we always have that international support, it is always there" (Interview 30)

The final response above provides further interest as it draws a link between the uses of external expertise as a monitoring device on their own activities, and then brackets this as a form of “support”. Of further interest is the manner in which this unreflective attitude to

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61 It is not my intention here to reify the authenticity of these groups or their representatives. The point here is merely to distinguish this more qualitative, group-based approach to the quantitative, ‘expertise’ approach of the INGOs.
INGOs amongst non-INGO participants in the NCSTM was actually viewed as a problem by one of the INGO participants in Malawi:

"So we should come in with our agendas, and share the agenda and copy the agenda, whatever... but in Malawi we do not have as many organisations that are able to do that and it ends up being international organisations, and in my view it's because of resources, finances, that there are a few organisations that have money that they can use for like... for networking, or advocacy work. Other local organisations are starving, so for them to leave what their donor had agreed to and come to these platforms and put in resources, that doesn't happen. So the challenge is, ok do we continue having this as international influenced, or ok if we leave out these international influences it's really a dilemma that we do get" (Interview 16)

This last comment does little to challenge the notion that many of the non-INGO participants in Malawi have internalised the necessity of external 'expertise' to the sustenance of the NCSTM campaign. Nonetheless it does problematise any straightforward relationship between the presence of INGOs per se and the neo-liberal discourses of managerialism and technical expertise which were prevalent in the NCSTM coalition, and point perhaps to broader influences in localities dominated by donor agendas in what Harrison (2004) has called 'governance states'.

Nonetheless, for the purposes of this thesis, it remains the case that the last example was the only one where an INGO participant reflected critically on the role of INGOs within the different national coalitions. It appears then that whilst INGOs can play a supportive role within the national coalitions and GCAP more broadly, this can and does slip very easily into an ordering of the GCAP network in ways which problematise this relationship as a purely enabling one. By quantifying success and asserting the necessity
of external expertise, the INGOs in this research have served to perpetuate a discourse which professionalises the network and marginalises the value and the expertise of those voices who one could argue have the most to gain from poverty eradication; those living in poverty themselves.

This answers the first part of the question with which I opened this section: how do INGO representatives imagine and narrate GCAP’s purpose and actions at the level of the national coalitions? It also suggests that the INGOs in GCAP perpetuate the form of exclusionary neo-liberal (managerialistic) and colonial (construction of the authentic local) cosmopolitanism critiqued in Chapter One, which in the NCSTM at least has proven quite dominant (see Chapter Five). A point to be addressed here is the degree to which it is valid to label these INGO discourses as cosmopolitan. I do not intend to use the term as a ‘catch-all’ for GCAP’s relationality. Rather, I draw on the critique of western, colonial and neo-liberal cosmopolitanism which I offered in Chapter One. If cosmopolitanism can be described as an open orientation to the world (Youngs, 2009), or an ‘ethic of universal concern’ (Erskine, 2002), then the narratives of the INGOs certainly do embody this. They are concerned with the ‘grassroots’ and the ‘marginalised’, in other words, those who are removed by social, economic, cultural or geographic distance. However, as I have argued previously, it is to the content of these relations that we must pay attention, in order to understand what form of cosmopolitanism is being expressed and practised. For it seems the case that, conversely, in opening out to the world, the discourses of the INGOs have the effect of closing it
down. As I argued in Chapter One this is because it is a form of cosmopolitanism which destroys the subject of its concern (the 'grassroots', the 'marginalised') by silencing it. It is a form of cosmopolitanism as 'making' (Arendt, 1958/1998), one which discursively centralises power in the hands of 'experts', whilst simultaneously reifying the voicelessness of the 'authentic local'.

With respect to the second and fourth questions which opened this section (how successful and dominant are these (particularistic) translations? What do they tell us about the kinds of cosmopolitan inclusions and exclusions that GCAP embodies?), these discourses are only partly successful in enrolling other coalition members and GCAP network nodes. It is in this partiality, in the spaces where counter-discourses are forged and expanded, where GCAP incubates a different form of cosmopolitanism to challenge what might be called the neo-liberal and colonial cosmopolitanism described above. This counter-hegemonic cosmopolitanism draws on the post-colonial experience, inserting itself into the broader cosmopolitan discourses of GCAP. As will be shown, this is not an uncomplicated and straightforward process, and is not necessarily horizontal and emancipatory because it is post-colonial. In other words, such a form of cosmopolitanism does not necessarily transcend the relations of domination (Laclau, 1995) which characterises the neo-liberal/colonial cosmopolitanism of the INGOs. It nonetheless signifies the potential of GCAP to incubate both neo-liberal and more radical cosmopolitan discourses and critiques. It is not the case that these discourses would not have existed without GCAP, but rather, that GCAP opens spaces where these different
discourses can challenge each other and in some cases articulate with each other. This will be the subject of the following section and sub-sections.

6.3 Re-working power

In the previous section I argued that the kind of narratives with which INGO representatives imagined the GCAP network represented a form of neo-liberal, managerialistic and colonial cosmopolitanism which excluded by definition certain voices and practices which are unable to articulate themselves in these terms. I argued that in the sites occupied by the NCSTM, a ‘weaker’ locality more readily dominated by agents from ‘stronger’ localities (Massey, 2005), such narratives have contributed to the self-understanding of the broader NCSTM network participants as viewing success in de-politicised and quantifiable terms (How many MDGs can be met? How many people can be encouraged to ‘stand up’?) and viewing themselves as being in need of external expertise, thus devaluing their own experiences, and those of people living in poverty.

In this section I wish to explore further the nexus of this managerialistic neo-liberal and colonial cosmopolitanism and the resistance it met (and arguably part-produced) within the WNTA coalition. Where in the NCSTM the resistance this power produced was negligible, in India, a much ‘stronger’ civil society locality, this power circulated and produced resistance to it. However, I also wish to illustrate the way that the power of this neo-liberal cosmopolitan discourse has been subverted into something which transcends
pure resistance and is in fact, albeit contingently and delicately, productive itself of a
different form of cosmopolitanism, one based on the co-imbrication of colonial and post-
colonial spaces in India. This echoes Allen’s (2004) argument that power travels, and thus
cannot be analysed predictably or in a linear manner, but is in fact twisted and re-formed
as and where it ‘.touches down’.

I am going to illustrate this in two steps; firstly, through a brief analysis of the
cosmopolitan discourses of the WNTA non-INGO steering group participants. This will
set the stage for the second step, which will involve narrating an incident which occurred
in mid-2007 where the WNTA campaign discussed bidding to host the GCAP Global
Secretariat, which was due to move from its then base in South Africa. This incident will
illustrate the manner in which the neo-liberal and colonial cosmopolitan power of the
INGOs produced and was re-worked and transcended by the differently constituted
cosmopolitan ethic of the non-INGO WNTA participants, drawing on and re-centring
post-colonial cosmopolitan discursive resources. The section, and chapter, will end by
contextualising this post-colonial cosmopolitanism in subsequent debates which ensued
across the GCAP network regarding GCAP’s legal status and formalisation. This will
illustrate the continuously tense environment in which GCAP’s cosmopolitanisms co-
exist and produce each other, neither succeeding wholly in translating GCAP as they
would envisage it.

6.3.1 A post—colonial cosmopolitanism?
Non-INGO WNTA steering group participants very explicitly understood their role in GCAP as one of leadership. Indeed, this was represented in official WNTA documentation, which could suggest that all participants, INGO and non-INGO alike, shared this narrative. As I will illustrate in the next sub-section though, this was not always the case. Nonetheless, a WNTA funding bid for 2007-2008 makes the following assertion (note the instrumental reference to the MDGs – this bid was compiled for WNTA’s INGO and UN funders):

“This initiative [WNTA] also emerged in response to the fact that India has a crucial role to play in enabling the global achievement of the MDGs — and not only because one-fourth of the world’s poor reside in South Asia and the achievement of critical targets such as in relation to Infant and Maternal Mortality are dependent on a rise in its national average. We believe that in its role as the world’s largest democracy, and host to among the most diverse and historically significant civil society initiatives in the world, this country can set important precedents for the world in relation to the policy actions and civil society efforts that need to be initiated to achieve the Millennium Declaration.” (WNTA, 2007b: 1)

This passage reveals the way in which the WNTA campaign seeks to frame itself as transcending the silent subjecthood of the victimised other which in Chapter One I argued was both sustained and destroyed by a western, colonial and neo-liberal cosmopolitan normativity. The passage seeks to construct a more assertive and proactive subjectivity which is based on the specifically anti and post-colonial experiences of Indian civil society. It is simultaneously a subjecthood which seeks to reach out beyond the Indian experience to lead efforts to achieve the MDGs. In that this therefore draws on post-colonial discursive resources to articulate an other-regarding normativity, we might call
this a post-colonial cosmopolitanism, although it is unclear at this stage as to whether by simply representing an alternative form of cosmopolitanism it is qualitatively different from the Western cosmopolitanism which I have thus far critiqued.

Nonetheless, many non-NGO participants of the campaign sought to articulate this subjecthood, either asserting the current actuality of Indian leadership in GCAP or identifying the need for there to be more of it:

"we believe we are ahead of GCAP, because our campaign, our national level campaign, is more important, but we are also equally contributing to the global agenda" (Interview 2)

"there needs to be a partnership which utilises India's power. Some international partners still see India as a country that just needs more aid and that's a perspective that needs to change." (Interview 31)

"the global in a country like India, which is so big, with so many issues, so many problems, the global is very real, and the need is very urgent, but still is far away, and I wish it wasn't, but its still, you know, it does impact, but to be able to, uh, so, just to see coalitions as implementers, I don't know how effective it will be" (Interview 9)

As I argued above, it is unclear to what extent this post-colonial cosmopolitanism reflects a cosmopolitanism which is qualitatively more horizontal, or other-regarding. Certainly in the above excerpts it appears that WNTA participants draw on an interpretative schema which frames India's engagement with the world in self-referential terms. In this way one might argue that this post-colonial cosmopolitanism does not, as Laclau (1995) and Fraser (2008) recommend, transcend the relations of oppression created through traditional forms of western, neo-liberal and colonial cosmopolitanism and instead
merely inverts them. The degree to which this is the case will become clearer further on in this chapter. What does seem apparent is that by virtue of being post-colonial, this is a cosmopolitanism which both contextualises the exclusionary cosmopolitanism of the INGOs and inserts into GCAP meanings and narratives which would otherwise be absent throughout the network.

An example I wish to highlight to illustrate how different forms of cosmopolitanism in GCAP articulate with each other draws on Mignolo's (2000) concept of the cosmopolitan 'connector' referenced in Chapter Three. In his conceptualisation, Mignolo illustrates how words or concepts like 'democracy' are invested with different interpretations in colonial and post-colonial contexts and are then 'connected' at particular sites where these discourses are simultaneously in conflict, but also open to each other, infecting each other with their respective meanings and creating new co-produced meanings. In this way language and meaning itself is invested with cosmopolitan potential. What therefore begins as an encounter between seemingly reified colonial and post-colonial discourses is simultaneously infused with cosmopolitanisms, as the encounter itself involves an other-oriented openness.

In GCAP, one example of this kind of post-colonial cosmopolitan (redefining) connectivity can be illustrated by different understandings of 'accountability' within the

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62 Mignolo uses the example of different and clashing interpretations of democracy between the post-colonial Zapatistas and the colonial Mexican State (2000: 742).
GCAP network. In 2007, the International Facilitation Team (the precursor to the GCAP Global Council) established a Future Structures Taskforce, following the decision of the GCAP Global Assembly that year to continue GCAP until 2015. The ensuing Future Structures proposal document, which was circulated throughout GCAP's national coalitions, noted the following:

"We view the current GCAP structure as having weaknesses in its accountability system at various levels... [GCAP needs to] strengthen transparent and accountable system[s] where who is responsible for what is clear and the responsible parties are held to account for the outcomes of activities... Repeatedly, we are reminded that the national coalitions are the base for GCAP. When we consider the long-term development of GCAP, we feel that some system will need to be in place to ensure that the national coalitions are broad-based, inclusive, democratically-run and outcome-driven." (GCAP, 2007c: 3-4)

It is clear here that it is the national coalitions which are to be held to account. It is not entirely clear by who or what, but what is clear is that accountability here is understood as a top down process. In response to this document, WNTA framed accountability differently, arguing that:

"The entire question of accountability... the issues of political or functional accountability to the countries and constituencies whom GCAP ultimately represents, the General Assembly (which represents the interests of these constituencies), the Regional Governance or even the 'building-block national coalitions' appears to have been insufficiently explored or represented" (WNTA, 2007c: 3)

In ways I was able to observe, this term "accountability" served as a form of cosmopolitan connector between two different cosmopolitan perspectives, replete with their own normativities and historical specificities. In the former, expressed in the GCAP strategy document, cosmopolitanism is rendered as a prescriptive demand for other-
regarded-ness ("broad-based...inclusive...democratically run..."). Cosmopolitan openness is therefore situated as core to GCAP’s agenda, but only on the part of those constituent nodes on whom lays GCAP’s claims to legitimacy – the national coalitions. In the latter case, WNTA expresses a post colonial cosmopolitanism which is rendered via the articulation of accountability as being a process which empowers those whom GCAP is supposed to be other-regarded to, “…the countries and coalitions whom GCAP ultimately represents”.

Much of the discussion at the Learning and Accountability Group (LAG) meeting I attended in April 2009 centred on GCAP’s continuing quest to build structures of accountability that would satisfy the top-down understandings of accountability expressed in the proposal document cited on the previous page. However, the chair of the LAG, who is also one of GCAP’s co-chairs and a representative of an INGO, expressed the following sentiment (recorded in my field notes) through which much of the resultant accountability discussion was subsequently refracted – “When we talk about accountability, I think it’s important to talk not about donors, but about accountability to people living in poverty” (LAG Fieldnotes). This suggests that the interpretation of that concept expressed by the WNTA campaign, and possibly by other constituent GCAP campaigns in similar post-colonial contexts, acted to fuse with more classically colonial interpretations of accountability to result in a co-produced, ‘balancing-act’ materialisation of the concept. This ‘balancing act’ was evident throughout the LAG meeting, where, resonating with De Sousa Santos’s “epistemologies of the South” (2008), representatives from campaigns...
working in post-colonial contexts constantly reasserted 'bottom-up' accountability to balance out the 'top-down' accountability of the INGOs and structurally privileged campaigns, which occasionally, as shown in the remark above from the LAG chair, cross-fertilised. This suggests a degree of cosmopolitanism to the language of accountability itself as expressed in this context.

This constantly unstable connectivity is an example of the kinds of conflicting and co-productive cosmopolitanisms which GCAP incubates and expresses. It illustrates that these cosmopolitanisms, of either the neo-liberal, western and colonial or post-colonial varieties, are particularistic, and thus can not be entirely all-encompassing but are more likely to clash, fuse and re-work each other in unpredictable, inclusionary and exclusionary ways, depending on the sites where such cosmopolitanisms materialise. Cosmopolitanism here then, is not something which is universal, horizontal and benign, set against the particular, or against the verticalities and structural violence of 'the Global North' (See Youngs, 2009 for this kind of binary). Rather, cosmopolitanism here is understood as a discursive resource, spatially unbounded, and as an always particularistic outward-looking perspective which can take on a range of different, benign and malign features.

In the following sub-section I intend to illustrate the inclusionary and exclusionary results of these fusing and clashing cosmopolitanisms, with continuing reference to the WNTA campaign.
6.3.2 Power-resistance-power: ongoing tensions between competing cosmopolitanisms

The declaration produced following the first meeting of the Global Assembly in Johannesburg, 2004, began an oft-repeated process of asserting the national coalitions as the "building blocks" of GCAP (LAG Fieldnotes). The Johannesburg declaration asserted that GCAP must be "CSO-led and focus on sustainable and long-term national processes" (GCAP, 2004a: 14). Similarly, the Beirut declaration from the Global Assembly of 2006 positioned the national coalitions as explicitly national actors (GCAP, 2006: 5), whilst the Montevideo declaration in 2007 claimed that "National coalitions are the base for our action and cooperation and should play a key role in developing policy messages that reflect local contexts" (GCAP, 2007a: 8). These declarations were assembled following days of debate and discussion between global assembly participants (EthInt 1), many of whom were from coalitions based in structurally disadvantaged localities.63

One marker of the constitution of the Global Assemblies is the degree to which the language of the assembly declarations is distinctly more radical than the literature which is produced by the professionalised GCAP Global Secretariat to support mobilisations such as Stand Up. The point of this is that it appears that the Global Assembly declarations are not purely or even mostly the result of INGO agendas dominating the discussions. Nonetheless, what I do want to argue is that the result of this mandatory

63 Grants were made available by GCAP's funders for resource-poor organisations to attend.
focus of the national on the national, is that whilst this was intended and has allowed national coalitions a degree of autonomy from INGOs and other international agendas within their campaigns (although not everywhere, as illustrated in the previous chapter), this positioning has also made it much harder for national coalitions to transcend their subjectivity as solely national actors, in order to take on more network-wide leadership roles.

The void this creates is therefore filled either by INGOs and their employees, or those non-INGO civil society actors with the resources to send their employees flying around the world to meetings of the Global Council, or the Learning and Accountability Group. In the WNTA, for example, whilst some individuals on the steering group who work for non-INGO civil society organisations, have been active in GCAP’s various policy and leadership bodies, the coalition as a coalition has found it much harder to take advantage of particular leadership opportunities as they have arisen. The arguments deployed (by INGOs active in the WNTA campaign) against their involvement in this way have been precisely those contained within the Global Assembly declarations - national coalitions should focus on ‘the national’.

In this section I will explore the particular example of this tension which I encountered between the INGO and non-INGO members of the WNTA steering group, by investigating the positions which evolved around a debate about whether WNTA should bid to host the GCAP Global Secretariat, which in 2007 was soon to leave its then current
host in South Africa. It should be noted here that whilst I will claim that two distinct narratives developed amongst INGO participants on the one hand, and non-INGO participants on the other hand, this does not speak to a simplistic North-South geographical distinction. All of the participants on the WNTA steering group are Indian nationals, and so, as I have argued previously, if there is a distinction it is absolutely discursive. It was beyond the scope of my research to investigate how such discourses act within different organisational actors, although this discursive distinction does appear to support those who have argued that international NGO workers or activists have formed into a distinct class of their own (see for example, Calhoun, 2008).

According to members of the WNTA steering group who have also been active at the Global Assemblies, when news filtered around the GCAP network that the GCAP Secretariat would require new hosts, India was approached by a number of other country coalitions to bid for it (EthInt1. Ethint2). This framed the responses of the non INGO participants in the campaign, who talked about the issue as one of leadership. The following remarks are all from individual contributions to an email discussion which took place between all of the steering group members regarding the possibility of WNTA bidding to host the secretariat.

"I feel this is really a recognition of the way WNTA has been able to build and consolidated its work on the ground, and thereby, in a unique position to expand its global role."

"the proposal has clearly to do with the identification of this political leadership that the India/ Asia process may have to offer in terms of offering a more political, policy & constituency oriented future to GCAP"
"it is also an opportunity for all of us to see that the issues of the most vulnerable gets prominence in this new scenario. Asia house largest number of poor of the world and hence GCAP secretariat provide an opportunity to centre its strategy, actions, policy advocacy and lobbying with the international agencies and the governments to echo the voices of these"

"If we get an opportunity to play a more proactive role in shaping up some of the civil society discourse of poverty, should we not take it up (if not then, why should we worry about domination of northern led campaigning styles)?"

(WNTA CSG, 2007d)

It is clear from these contributions that these steering group members understood the issue of hosting the secretariat as one of leadership. This was not just a leadership of particular organisations or of self-promotion (although undoubtedly this also played a role, as is clear from the first response in particular), but a leadership which invoked the voices of the "most vulnerable" and drew explicitly from a post-colonial contextualisation of this issue. This is evident from the final response and the way it externalises "northern-led campaigning styles" from the way in which the contributor imagines WNTA would operationalise its own campaigning style across the GCAP network given the opportunity. In a cosmopolitan sense, these statements also illustrate the manner in which the non-INGO members of the WNTA steering group sought to transcend their subjectivity as national actors, and furthermore as structurally silenced others. It is this very structural inequality experienced in India which these participants claim gives WNTA a louder, more political and more radical voice. The degree to which such an empowered particularism would transcend both 'poles of oppression' (Laclau, 1995) in prefiguring a post-colonial cosmopolitan horizontality is still unclear, though, largely because it has thus far not been operationalised. However, one might argue that in seeking to take on a
leadership role in GCAP, the WNTA would indeed simply invert, rather than transcend, the modes of hierarchy and exclusion which currently constitute some of GCAP's internodal relationships.

Putting this conjecture aside for the moment, I need here to underline the degree to which this email discussion completely divided the contributors into two opposing camps, one which understood this issue as one of leadership, entirely composed of non-INGO participants, and the other which understood the issue as one of resources, entirely composed of INGOs. It is to this second camp that I will now turn.

The following excerpts from the same email discussion cited above were contributed solely by members of the WNTA steering group who work for INGOs and are based in India. They are drawn from longer passages, but constitute the total number of INGO representatives who contributed to this debate. The responses share very similar features, and constitute an interpretative schema which frames the issue of hosting the GCAP Global Secretariat as one of resources.

"WNTA should focus on its original mandate and further strengthen its work by effectively influencing public policies and constantly playing a role to bridge the gap between grassroots level CBOs [community based organisations] and the national level advocacy efforts" 

"WNTA needs to advance its own mandate (far from being achieved) and hosting and managing a GCAP secretariat is an entirely different cup of tea. There are issues of registration, financial resources (though one or the other donor may decide to support for an year or so), leadership, and national and international dynamics"
"it is perhaps premature to explore the possibility of WNTA hosting the GCAP secretariat. While WNTA has covered considerable ground, much more needs to be done and the network (or platform?) needs strengthening. It is still very young, faced with a large number of unresolved issues, and the length of its life is unclear as of now. Given all this, it really makes sense to focus on strengthening WNTA nationally."

(WNTA CSG, 2007d)

As well as asserting the resource burden of hosting the Global Secretariat, the tone of some of the contributions is often paternalistic and admonishing – WNTA, for example, is “...still very young”. Furthermore, the contributions draw back to the positioning of the ‘national’ on the ‘national’ as first deployed in the GCAP Global Assembly statements. The INGO contributors assert that WNTA needs to “advance its own mandate” which involves “strengthening WNTA nationally”. Whether this was the kind of national focussing the chair of WNTA (from a non-INGO civil society organisation) had in mind when he was asked to negotiate the autonomy of national campaigns on behalf of the Asian and Latin America/Caribbean regions at the Beirut and Montevideo Global Assemblies (EthInt2) is doubtful. What is clear is that this sentiment can be and has been refracted through different interpretative schema, which in this case resulted in (the possibly unintentional but nonetheless real) stifling of WNTA’s leadership aspirations, and the potentially resultant post-colonial cosmopolitanisation of the GCAP network.

Nevertheless, a steering group meeting that followed this discussion resulted in a translation of the debate into a seemingly consensual position statement, invoking Melucci’s (1996) assertion that collective identity formation and processes of positioning tend to mask contentious disagreements and debates which in part constitute those
resulting identities and positions. The meeting minutes show that the participants agreed that the resource burden of hosting the secretariat could be great, but concluded that:

"this is possibly the most opportune time for the Abhiyan [WNTA] to play an influencing role in the global process - which should not be seen only as a role but also a responsibility that cannot be escaped also in the context of the global factors that influence the issues that we are trying to deal with locally." (WNTA CSG, 2007c)

The language deployed here suggests that it was the non-INGO participants who managed to win this particular debate, for whilst the local/national focus of the campaign is reiterated, it is done with the recognition of the co-production of local and global processes and spaces – “the global factors that influence the issues that we are trying to deal with locally” – and thus the unavoidability of engaging with these processes. Whilst the INGOs understood WNTA as having a responsibility to an India posited as a bounded national space, the passage above appears to assert a co-imbricated and networked imagining of space which leaves WNTA with the “responsibility” of influencing the “global process”.

Despite the seeming finality of the above statement, similar sentiments were still being expressed by research participants when I was in India in August and September 2008, a year later. The INGO participants still drew back to the ‘national’ mandate of WNTA, and voiced a concern over resources. Non-INGO participants still drew heavily on a more post-colonial understanding of what this opportunity to host the secretariat meant. For example:
“there’s always this problem where if you’re from the Global South you can be a voice but you can’t, you can’t be a visionary, you know, the decision maker. I think that, I find it problematic and I think if there is, you know, another world is possible, and if we’re talking about alternatives, then how is it different from any other, what we call structures of imperial globalisation? So I think that as a principle...if it’s a southern process it also has to have southern leadership” (Interview 9)

Nonetheless, by this point the internal debate amongst the WNTA secretariat had become slightly outdated. In another move which demonstrates the tensions between the different types of cosmopolitanism which GCAP incubates, the idea of a GCAP secretariat being hosted anywhere had been rejected. Instead, and against the wishes of a majority of participants at the GCAP Global Assembly in 2007 at Montevideo (GCAP, 2007c), the GCAP Global Council had taken the decision to explore and then enact the institutionalisation of GCAP as a legal body. The secretariat could then be part of this legal body, thus negating the need for any particular national coalition to host it. This therefore replicates a form of outward-regard which simultaneously silences the other. It is a form of ‘making’ (Arendt, 1958/1998) which works against the ‘diversality’ with which Mignolo (2000) recommends we conduct cosmopolitan projects.

The following passage reveals the manner in which the Global Council-appointed Future Structures Taskforce moved the discussion on from what had been agreed to at Montevideo, explicitly overriding what the report itself admits is GCAP’s perceived strength, its plurality:
At the Montevideo [2007 Global Assembly] meeting, the majority of participants expressed by the straw poll results and general discussion their preference for the non-formal, non-legal global structure for GCAP. Our understanding is that it is primarily based on their general assessment that GCAP’s strength lies in its diversity, spontaneity, political strength and leadership, dynamism and flexibility and that legal registration would work against maintaining and furthering this very strength.

... At the same time, we have come to recognize that the current structure needs to gradually evolve so as to make GCAP on the whole stronger, more democratic and more sustainable as an effective and impact-oriented anti-poverty global campaign led by civil society. Now that GCAP has decided to continue at least till 2015 and possibly longer, it is apt for us to consider this structural question with a long-term view... it [is] unavoidable and adequate to create an independent legal organization for the global secretariat" (GCAP, 2007c: 3 [italics added])

At the Learning and Accountability Group (LAG) meeting I attended in April 2009, one of the participants from a Southern GCAP coalition said something to me which was at once both hopeful and sceptical. My notes record that the participant told me that GCAP could be a “new” kind of movement; not a social movement, but not just a group of NGOs either. Instead, it could be something which bridged the latent power, analysis and resistance of the first group to the resources of the latter. “If we get this right”, I was told, “it could be fantastic” (LAG Fieldnotes). “Getting it right” was the LAG’s agenda, although this was proving to be a contested process. By the time I was invited into the LAG in early 2009, the legal registration of GCAP was already a fait accompli. Nonetheless, participants of the group from structurally disadvantaged contexts continued to express discomfort with the direction of events, particularly given the implications of legal registration which were being presented in the group discussions i.e. uni-directional accountability procedures, including the introduction of memoranda of understanding which national coalitions were going to be expected to sign (LAG Fieldnotes). This built upon a recommendation by the Global Council-appointed Future Structures Taskforce,
which appeared to transform the nature of GCAP’s Global Assemblies. In previous years they were open to any organisation that was a member of a national coalition and wished to attend, discuss and vote on issues. However, the taskforce recommended that only those organisations which had signed up to the MoU should in future have voting rights (GCAP, 2007c: 10).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, those members of the LAG most comfortable and insistent on the need for MoUs were those from the INGOs. This was an issue that had already come to my attention through the analysis of GCAP’s core documents and some of the documents that the WNTA campaign had sent me. It appeared that the WNTA campaign had prepared a highly critical and detailed response to the Future Structures Taskforce’s proposals, accusing GCAP of amongst other things departing from the “strong verdict of the Global Assembly” (WNTA, 2007c: 3), whilst constructing the new centrally directed Global Secretariat as “…the ‘driver’ of GCAP, while the national coalitions and other constituents of the Global Assembly are reduced to subsidiaries” (op cit). My experience at the LAG had confirmed that these concerns were not limited to the WNTA campaign. Nonetheless they were, according to a GCAP evaluation document, “minority” concerns (GCAP, 2008c: 24). Furthermore, the same report asserted that, of 50 countries who had returned comments on the Future Structures Proposal, the majority had been supportive of the registration of GCAP as a legally centralised agency (ibid: 4).
It should be noted at this point that the proposals for the legal registration of GCAP made an explicit distinction between the legal and the political. The legal registration was recommended so that GCAP could be more accountable to donors and thus raise new funds (GCAP, 2007c: 4). Politically, GCAP would still be 'owned' by its national constituent nodes. This seemed a very murky distinction, which was evidenced by the discussion regarding the introduction of MoUs at the LAG.

I wish to deal here with a broader issue which addresses the exclusionary nature of the cosmopolitanism expressed in the GCAP Future Structures (GCAP, 2007c) and evaluation (GCAP, 2008c) documents discussed above. Specifically, I wish to explore the connotations of describing opposition to the legal registration of GCAP as "minority" (ibid: 24). It is not my contention that a greater deal of opposition to the legal registration of GCAP exists than the evaluation report admits. This was beyond the scope of my research, as it would have involved a much wider study, thus sacrificing the depth I wished to pursue. Rather, I wish to discuss what asserting these concerns as 'minority' connotes, particularly for a cosmopolitan network like GCAP, which seeks to champion the voices of the 'silent majority' of those living in poverty around the world.

Firstly, it seems important to think through the degree to which country-coalitions submit responses to calls from the Global Secretariat or other core bodies. For example, the reason I was asked to be on the Learning and Accountability Group was because not a single country coalition had responded to the call for members – eventually, individuals
were just asked. Is it therefore reasonable to base network-wide support for an initiative on the responses of 50 country coalitions, and relegate opposition to it as being in the ‘minority’, especially when that opposition was articulated so broadly at the Montevideo Global Assembly meeting in 2007? More importantly, though, how can these concerns be relegated as ‘minority’ when they are articulated by a country coalition (WNTA in India) which, at least as far as the participants in the GCAP network are concerned, speaks for 455 million people living on less than $1.25 a day (Ravallion and Chen, 2006: 5)? According to World Bank estimates, this constitutes around a third of the total world population living on less than $1.25 a day (op cit). It appears questionable, then, that the concerns expressed by the taken-for representatives of these people can be considered a ‘minority’ position.

My argument is that the positions of the authors of these documents reflect a cosmopolitan discursive resource which resonates with the exclusionary Liberal cosmopolitanism which I critiqued in Chapter One of this thesis. It is premised on an idea of autonomous equality between actors, which are in fact differentiated by a vast array of structural inequalities. It is a type of cosmopolitanism which fails to take Fraser’s (2007) “all-affected” principle into account and instead propagates the idea that no matter the issue of concern, every member of the GCAP network has opinions of equal value. Given the inequality of resources between these actors, it seems that this kind of liberal cosmopolitan equality has in fact excluded the very voices supposed to be represented by GCAP.
6.4 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter I have sought to address which processes of exclusion and inclusion constitute GCAP, and the implications of this for how we understand alter-globalisation networks. I began by establishing the prism through which much of the chapter proceeded; that of cosmopolitanism. I then analysed the processes of exclusion and inclusion incubated by GCAP which challenged or buttressed the kinds of cosmopolitanism GCAP represents. I focussed on the role played in GCAP by INGOs, who have taken on leading roles in funding and mobilising the network at many of its nodal points, including in the two case study coalitions researched for this thesis. Individual research participants were shown to highlight instances of both support and domination by INGOs. In the former case, INGOs have enabled the discursive and practical expansion of rhetoric around poverty eradication to include the social exclusion of minority groups, particularly drawing on the Indian Dalit and Adivasi experience, and projecting this experience into forums, of both civil society and statist formations, which have previously excluded it. On the other hand, research participants also accused INGOs of monopolising GCAP's agenda, at both a network-wide and coalition-specific level. This illustrated the contradictory agency of INGOs within GCAP, but revealed little about how these contradictory agencies served to include or exclude forms of knowledge and practice beyond the individual testimonies of the research participants.
I therefore attempted to analyse how the INGOs involved in the WNTA and NCSTM coalitions and across the network more broadly, narrated and imagined GCAP’s purpose and agency. I then explored how discursively successful and dominant these particularistic problematisations have become amongst the non-INGO participants in this research, in order to ascertain the alternative knowledges and practices which are either silenced or produced through interacting with these INGO problematisations.

Two main INGO problematisations of GCAP became evident to me, both of which were characterised as being other-regarding, but which drew on neo-liberal and managerialistic cosmopolitan discursive resources. Firstly, GCAP’s success was taken to be measured quantitatively. The aim was to measure how many people had participated in the Stand Up Against Poverty mobilisations, not who or why. Secondly, INGO participants expressed an ideological dilemma between the ‘authentic’ local voices which were needed to legitimate GCAP but which were simultaneously not authentic enough to speak with authority about the poverty they lived in. Thus external expertise was needed to make the campaign more effective. This is indicative of a particularly neo-liberal, colonial cosmopolitanism discursive resource which was critiqued in Chapter One. It excludes the voices of those who are supposed to be represented by GCAP. Leaving aside how seriously we take the claims of representativeness of civil society organisations (see Chandler, 2004, for a critique), it is clear that GCAP is constituted on the basis that at least some of these organisations are representative of people living in poverty, yet even these organisations are excluded by the INGO insistence on external expertise.
These two particularistic and Western, neo-liberal and colonial cosmopolitan problematisations were especially dominant amongst non-INGO members of the NCSTM coalition, many of whom reaffirmed the need for external expertise in the coalition, and even equated GCAP solely with the Stand Up mobilisations. More materially, it was clear that the NCSTM’s main energies were expended on the Stand Up mobilisations, for which it mobilised the largest number of people in Africa during the 2006 and 2007 events. The success and dominance of these discursive problematisations in the NCSTM can be linked back to the spatial and social dynamics of the donor presence in Malawi discussed in the previous chapter, and explored by critics of the application of the civil society model in African countries such as Harrison (2004) or Kasfir (1998). Nonetheless, the NCSTM is part of a broader network, and it is perhaps surprising that some of GCAP’s more radically oriented nodes and actors have not more influenced the NCSTM in some way. This will be explored more fully in the following chapter.

As much as the INGO (particularistic-cosmopolitan) problematisation of GCAP’s success and purpose was dominant in some respects and sites, the WNTA coalition illustrated how it also produced resistant discourses and practices, although in mobilising historical discursive resources distinct from the neo-liberal and managerial discourses of the INGOs, I argued that this resistance represented a post-colonial cosmopolitan discursive resource. Non-INGO WNTA participants adopted a subjecthood which sought to transcend the status of silenced and victimised ‘other’ and project a cosmopolitan other-
regardingness which drew on particularistic historical discursive resources to re-translate core GCAP initiatives and framing concepts, such as ‘accountability’. In this way WNTA’s re-translations, informed by a particularistic colonial and post-colonial experience, fused with more colonially informed discourses to produce new meanings and understandings. Importantly, in turning to the core question of this chapter (Which processes of exclusion and inclusion constitute alter-globalisation networks?), it was apparent through the account of the GCAP Secretariat and GCAP’s legal registration, that this post-colonial cosmopolitanism was itself unstable and unfixed, especially in fusion with other forms of Western, Liberal and colonial cosmopolitanism.

In this way, then, the processes of exclusion and inclusion which constitute GCAP can all be understood to be cosmopolitan. This is because all of these processes, and the discourses discussed in this chapter which constitute them, are deployed to speak and act for a greater global community. As this is the case, understanding GCAP, or alter-globalisation networks more broadly, as cosmopolitan is not analytically useful for understanding the inclusions and exclusion of such networks. Cosmopolitanism as understood here is not a transcendental universal posed against particularistic fundamentalisms or hegemonic structural violence, but itself comes from somewhere, and can take on several contradictory features, as illustrated here. It is not necessarily the case that the WNTA campaign’s post-colonial cosmopolitanism is flatter, more anti-hierarchical or emancipatory than the Liberal colonial cosmopolitanism of the INGOs, nor that it prefigures a situation where poles of oppression/emancipation will be
transcended (in Laclau’s sense – see 1995). However, simply by being deployed, WNTA’s cosmopolitanism illuminates the particularity and multiplicity of cosmopolitanism(s) enacted in GCAP. Once understood as such it becomes clear that alter-globalisation networks are not inclusionary because they are cosmopolitan, but that they may in fact incubate several forms of fusing, resisting and reinforcing cosmopolitanisms, each replete with their own inclusions and exclusions. In GCAP’s case, there are certainly many exclusions which constitute it, but it has also opened up space for different cosmopolitanisms to interact with each other, producing (partial yet inclusionary) discursive articulations which would not have been deployed and diffused otherwise.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Finding GCAP

7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I recalled a story about a research participant who, when asked what GCAP was, spent several minutes flicking through her diary in order to tell me that it was 17th October, Stand Up Against Poverty. This was interesting for what it meant that GCAP was not for this participant. It was not "the world’s largest civil society alliance fighting against poverty and inequality" (GCAPa). It was not a campaign, a network, a coalition or a social movement. It was merely a one-day mobilisation written in a diary.

This incident focussed my mind on something that had been bothering me throughout the conversations I had been having with some of the NCSTM participants in Malawi. In several cases, I couldn’t be sure whether they had actually heard of GCAP. It wasn’t that they didn’t talk about GCAP, but rather that when they did they seemed to talk about it in very broad and general terms. I was wondering what influence my ethics-committee necessitated information sheet was having on the participants; whether by referring to GCAP (see Appendix Three), it was acting as some kind of ‘mediator’ (Latour, 2005) and rendering some of the GCAP Malawi participants as intermediaries through which its
knowledge flowed. In other words, if they had not seen the information sheet, would they have mentioned GCAP at all?

I will be exploring this issue in greater detail further on in this chapter, but I introduce it here to contextualise the broader theme tackled in this chapter, where I will seek to address the following question:

*Where are alter-globalisation networks located?*

I wish to unpick this question slightly in the context of GCAP. Clearly, GCAP is somewhere. It has a secretariat, recently moved to the Netherlands, where GCAP as an entity is now formally registered. However, this chapter will seek to address the ways in which these facts are relevant for those whom GCAP claims to speak on behalf of and involve. In a dimensional sense, where ‘the global’ converges and dissolves with other scales, and is thus only partly constitutive of everyday ontologies and discursive repertoires, can GCAP be said to be located beyond the imaginations and constructions of a few seconded (and relatively well-paid) INGO employees who work for or participate in GCAP’s global bodies and who author its reports? Indeed, can the ‘convergence spaces’ (Routledge, 2003a) of different temporalities and trajectories I encountered in the places where this research was conducted be understood as being imbued with the global dimension which GCAP might normally be taken to represent?
These questions relate back to issues discussed in the last two chapters, which is why this discussion has been left to last. Can GCAP be located, for example, in Malawi, where poverty eradication discourses contradict GCAP’s stated analysis? Or in India, can GCAP be said to be anything other than an external irritant, given the WNTA’s struggles to open its own space with regards to Stand Up against Poverty and bidding to host the GCAP secretariat?

This chapter will seek to locate GCAP from several perspectives. It will begin by exploring the manner in which GCAP is constructed, through its core evaluation and strategic documents and declarations, as a grassroots network, implying that GCAP can be located in specific ‘local’ sites. This will be shown to be imagined and therefore always partial and incomplete, in the sense that, as shown in the previous chapter, GCAP seeks to site itself in its constituent national coalitions, and is imagined as doing so unobtrusively, even though the evidence suggests that this is an uneven and contested process.

The chapter will then continue to explore the manner in which GCAP constructs a reciprocal relationship with its constitutive coalitions and sites by summoning them into a picture of what GCAP is. GCAP therefore is sited in its nodes, and in return these nodes are constructed as being part of GCAP. GCAP is therefore constructed in such a way that it enrols its nodal localities regardless of their willingness to be enrolled in this way. In
this construction, therefore, GCAP is located in the local, and in turn the local is located in the global, i.e. the local is constructed to provide GCAP its global legitimacy.

Finally, the chapter will assess the degree to which these constructions are affirmed or contested by the actors and ontologies these constructions of GCAP seek to enrol. It will explore the way that GCAP does indeed act and add a degree of global dimensionality to the convergence spaces where this research was conducted, but also how GCAP is simultaneously silent or even absent from some of these sites, thus questioning its legitimacy and representivity. It will be argued that these silences and absences are a result of the other agencies with which GCAP co-exists in its convergence spaces. It means that GCAP is an immanent and never finalised network.

7.2 Constructing GCAP at the grassroots

In Chapter Five I illustrated the ways in which GCAP's main policy statements and strategic documents created distinctions between the diffuse statist networks on the one hand, and 'the poor', 'the people' or 'citizens' on the other hand. GCAP's role in this regard was to speak to and monitor the former on the behalf of the latter. This suggests that GCAP is based on a representative model. In this section though, I will explore how, through these same texts GCAP is constructed as a network which is not simply representative, and not therefore located separately from that which it represents. Instead, I will argue that subjects are created in these documents in which GCAP is explicitly
located. These subjects are ordinary, everyday, marginalised and non-marginalised people. They are ‘the poor’, ‘the people’ and ‘citizens’ referenced above, and their particular subjectification allows GCAP to claim a degree of authenticity and legitimacy in not just speaking for them, but speaking with them.

The processes of constructing GCAP as representative of and implicated in a world citizenry are not mutually exclusive, and develop concurrently in GCAP’s core documents. As related in Chapter Five, there are several instances where GCAP has posited itself as a representative network. In the declaration made following the 2007 Global Assembly, for example, it is stated that GCAP is “committed to democratizing the values, mechanisms and processes of negotiation and decision making in the interest of the poorest and marginalized people” (GCAP, 2007a: 2). Additionally, in the same declaration, and in the one preceding it, the following statement is made:

“National coalitions ensure that our activities are designed around the priorities and demands that are closest to the people [and] encourage and provide space for other civil society sectors, grassroots organizations and local groups – particularly women, children and youth and marginalized groups - to play larger roles in the campaign.” (GCAP, 2006: 5; GCAP, 2007a: 8-9)

GCAP is thus not only constructed and located as being autonomously representative, working “in the interest of the poorest…” (GCAP, 2007a: 2 - italics added), but it is also located in the subjects it seeks to work on behalf of – women, children, youth, marginalised groups – in order to articulate their priorities and demands. This lends
GCAP’s proclamations a degree of legitimacy they could not claim if GCAP was simply constructed as a network working in the *autonomously defined* interests of these groups.

Other documents perform this construction and location of GCAP in a similar manner. A strategic report claims that, “The Global Call to Action against Poverty embraces a growing number of civil society actors and people in both the South and North” (GCAP, 2008c: 6). A report from meetings of the International Facilitation Group (pre-cursor to the Global Council) constructs GCAP as “...reaching mass peoples” with ownership of the campaign being “...devolved to the grassroots movements” (GCAP, 2005: 7). The report also claims that, “There are over 150 million people supporting GCAP currently and a known distribution of 50 million white bands around the world” (ibid: 6). The report does not offer a way of verifying this level of support, but the claim once again locates GCAP as a known and participated-in entity in particular sites and spaces of convergence across the world.

In Chapter Five I illustrated the way in which GCAP mobilisations are in some instances co-opted, and how there is uncertainty amongst core GCAP activists as to the degree that mobilisation participants are aware of what they are ‘standing up’ for; the same might be said of the white wristband. Does the distribution of 50 million white wristbands mean that GCAP can be located quite literally in the minds and on the wrists of 50 million people? This research has not been designed to explicitly address such a question, although this chapter will seek to problematise such an assumption, and the role this kind
of assumption plays in constructing GCAP as a network sited in a multiplicity of authentic and legitimising localities.

In Chapter Six I explored the manner in which GCAP positioned its constituent national coalitions as exclusively national entities, thus empowering them in matters of national concern, beyond the prescriptions of any globally agreed policy position, but simultaneously disempowering them when it came to national coalitions being able to direct global processes. In appearing to empower the national coalitions though, GCAP’s core documents construct them with the same function of authenticity and legitimacy as ‘the people’ and ‘the masses’. So for example, a strategic report claims that “National activities...are home grown, but by sharing experiences these activities ‘travel’” (GCAP, 2008c: 7). Whilst this may well be the case, it again constructs GCAP as a network constituted by specific sites, therefore locating GCAP in those sites.

Because GCAP locates itself in the national coalitions and the general populace, it can lay claim to the achievements of these actors. For example, amongst many other things, GCAP is claimed to have contributed to increased levels of spending on health and education in India (GCAP, 2008c: 6). This presumably refers to the ‘9 is Mine’ campaign, which was mentioned in Chapter Six. The ‘9 is Mine’ campaign sought to lobby the government of India to allocate 9% of the national budget to health and education (they eventually committed to 8% - EthInt2). Many WNTA participants referred to this as a great success of their campaign, but none of them ever mentioned
GCAP in reference to it. Such was the evident ‘WNTA-ness’ of the campaign that it never struck me to explore GCAP’s involvement with it, for to do so would have been to introduce GCAP as an actor where it simply was not acting. Of course to describe any of WNTA’s activities as purely WNTA-ish, or even Indian, would be to subscribe to a notion of space which is bounded and impenetrable. Nonetheless, GCAP’s enrolment of ‘9 is Mine’ appeared problematic when compared to the manner in which WNTA participants talked about the campaign. I will explore the significance of the way WNTA participants talked about GCAP in section 7.3.3, but for now it is important to note how GCAP being constructed as a network located in its nodal sites allows it to claim the successes of those sites and subjectify them as being part of GCAP.

In this section I have explored the ways in which GCAP is constructed in such a way as to implicate it in and enrol groups of the general population at large as well as national coalitions and their activities. This allows GCAP to situate itself in what it can claim is an authentically constituted form of representation and legitimation. It also constructs GCAP in such a way as to claim credit for successes achieved by national coalitions. In the following section I will consider the manner in which GCAP acts in the network it is constructed through, in an attempt to illustrate the degree to which GCAP can be considered to be located beyond the imaginations of the contributors to GCAP’s core documents and texts.

7.3 GCAP Acting...
It is not my intention in this chapter to claim that GCAP cannot be found in the network which is constructed through its core documents and texts. After all, it was only after a preliminary analysis of these texts that I was able to identify what I have been referring to as GCAP's constituent national coalitions, in particular those in India and Malawi. The significance of this beyond what it says about the imaginations of GCAP's core authors and narrators remains nonetheless debatable. Assessing the degree to which GCAP is a known entity with, and can thus be said to be located amongst, the most marginalised groups or the general population at large was beyond the purview of this research. Therefore, the following sub-sections will explore the ways in which GCAP is talked about and registered by the supposed nodes of the GCAP network (i.e. the national coalitions). This will be taken to be indicative of where GCAP can be located, and the degree to which GCAP contributes to the construction of the spaces in which these nodes operate.

7.3.1 GCAP Acting ... (Evidently)

In this sub-section then I will be addressing the degree to which it is evident that GCAP does in fact act in the network that has been constructed by it\(^64\). A GCAP evaluation document makes several claims which suggest that GCAP can be located within its

\(^{64}\) It is worth noting at this point that the coalition data for this section is drawn almost entirely from the WNTA. The reasons for this will become clear in the section to follow this one.
constituent national coalitions, and which are confirmed by the comments of WNTA participants I spoke to. So for instance, the GCAP evaluation suggests that GCAP has connected “...constituencies across the globe to address issues of poverty and inequality” (GCAP, 2008c: i). As I illustrated in Chapter Six, this has certainly been the case with Dalit groups in India who have connected their cause to other network nodes focusing on the broader relationship between poverty and social exclusion. As one participant told me:

“So I guess our voice has been taken ... across the globe ... now we are able to influence a larger number of the organisations, Indian organisations, INGOS, and we can really have a dialogue with them ... so I guess our voice has amplified ... Otherwise we had been talking to the Dalit organisations” (Interview 3)

This response points to the possibility that GCAP has contributed to the construction of spaces where the dissolution of scalar boundaries has taken place, in this case dissolving the boundaries between localised Dalit struggles (“...Otherwise we had been talking to ourselves”) and broader, supra-sited social struggles. This is related to a further claim made in the GCAP evaluation report, which goes on to say that:

“One of the key achievements of GCAP has been to get organisations, constituencies and people working together who hadn’t done so before. GCAP has managed to forge an alliance that brings together a broad range of organisations and constituencies who would not normally engage with each other in advocating against poverty and injustice” (GCAP, 2008c: ii)

Again, this claim is supported by the comments of a WNTA participant, who told me that:
"...the kind of spread that we have of the coalition, it is because of GCAP. It is extremely difficult in this country to see Oxfam, ActionAid, Christian Aid, all sitting together, also the UN sitting together, so it's a huge benefit we have, and then they bring their partners with us, all these coming together, you have the trade unions. Now we are able to talk to the informal trade unions because of our links globally, so the coalition space that GCAP has created globally is something we are using, and that's of huge benefit, a huge, huge benefit I think...So the possibility of building alliances is enormous because of GCAP, and which unfortunately, is extremely difficult if you try and do that linking up locally.” (Interview 1)

This comment is reminiscent of the “localised global actions” which Routledge argues takes place in convergence spaces (2003a: 346). WNTA is able to engage with informal trade unions because the global is brought into Indian localities through the links both WNTA and the trade unions have to other supra-site struggles and campaigns. Whilst GCAP was not expressly referenced, this sentiment (of GCAP opening up previously closed spaces of convergence) was also expressed by an NCSTM participant:

"...you know when you have an isolated voice, for example if gender is talking on its own, you discover that gender becomes a cross cutting issue. If you have no support from the education sector, you have no support from the agriculture sector; at times you tend to be narrow minded. But if you are in a taskforce...because if we are just talking as isolated voices it will not be easy to advocate and ensure these targets are achieved.” (Interview 18)

Finally, the GCAP evaluation claims that:

"GCAP's work has genuinely contributed to broadening the debate and actions around poverty in the localities where GCAP has worked. Thus ensuring that issues of poverty and injustice remain visible and on the agenda of decision makers and amongst a broad range of publics across the globe.” (GCAP, 2008c: 5)

65 The possible reasons for this will be explored in the next sub-section
This is a bold claim, asserting as it does a concrete presence in the spaces in which the national coalitions operate. As I argued in Chapter Five, this is somewhat problematised by the ordering presence of the MDGs in the NCSTM. Just as this claim is difficult to completely verify, it is similarly difficult to completely dismiss. For example, it is apparent that the WNTA coalition shares the belief that GCAP has contributed to opening up debates on poverty in India, if not in the sense that GCAP exists beyond their enrolment of it, then at least in certain instrumental respects:

"...the GCAP activities around the UN Climate Change Conference could serve as an opportunity for us to orient ourselves and our partners on how we want to build our position on Climate Change in relation to Poverty & Social Exclusion" (WNTA CSG, 2007a)

It seems evident therefore that GCAP does act in certain important respects. It connects otherwise isolated voices; it brings actors together who otherwise would find it hard to work together; and it enables national coalitions to enrol transcendental discourses in an attempt to force policy changes from their governments. GCAP therefore can be found within the subjects that are constructed for it in its core strategic and policy documents, and can be said to contribute to the construction of the convergence spaces which are created at GCAP’s nodal points. As I will now illustrate, this is a deeply uneven and contradictory process. Even in the WNTA coalition, where the data for this sub-section has mostly been drawn, GCAP is more of an irritant-actor than constructive-actor, and rather than enrolling the WNTA, is enrolled itself but only selectively and instrumentally. Alternatively, in the NCTSM coalition, GCAP is barely detectable, the space being constructed by other powerful actors such as the MDGs. This will be explored in the next
sub-section. Before I move on though, I want to consider something that a member of the GCAP global secretariat told me, which perhaps goes some way to explaining this unevenness:

"...the name was kind of intentionally shit; it's not supposed to be a name that everyone knows about, because what we didn't want was a global campaign...that was going to take away power from the national coalitions. So where you've already got the Wada Na Todo Abbiyan they shouldn't change their name to GCAP India, or Make Poverty History India, it's the Wada Na Todo Abhiyan, part of the Global Call to Action against Poverty." (Interview 12)

This statement is interesting in that is constructs GCAP as being simultaneously present and absent. In being present, GCAP is an actor which enrols national coalitions into its construction of what it is and what it has achieved, but in being absent, as we are about to see, GCAP is made silent by other more powerful actors and discourses, such as those explored in the previous two chapters.

7.3.2 GCAP Acting ... (Absently)

I want to return now to the NCSTM participant I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter; the one who when asked what GCAP was, responded by spending several minutes (I even switched off my Dictaphone at this point) flicking through her diary until she remembered to go to October 17th so she could tell me that GCAP was Stand Up against Poverty.
As I said in my introduction to this chapter, this encounter was a prime example of what I had been feeling throughout my conversations with NCSTM participants up to that point but could not quite put my finger on. At first, I turned my attention to the participants themselves: why were they not more aware of GCAP? They were, after all, involved in a GCAP network. Were they simply ignorant of what they were involved in?

But then I realised that it was GCAP that was trying to act in this network, and that if NCSTM participants were not articulating themselves with GCAP’s translation of the network, then this was maybe something more to do with GCAP, rather than the NCSTM participants. I therefore shifted focus, and asked in what ways was GCAP not acting in the NCSTM, and why?

There were several examples of GCAP not acting in the NCSTM during my time in Malawi. These shifted between a complete absence, to a presence, although one that was completely external, distant even. The following interview excerpts illustrate how GCAP was almost entirely absent from NCSTM participants’ imaginations of what they were involved in:

CG: What is GCAP?
NCSTM Participant: GCAP? (CG: yeh) GCAP is...what is GCAP?
CG: Ha ha ha! That’s a great answer.

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66 I have retained the pauses in these excerpts as I believe they are illustrative of the uncertainty and absence I am illustrating here
NCSTM Participant: Mmmm......of course I know what is GCAP, but I cannot say...um....as a workers organisation we are fully involved in the GCAP, maybe ah....ah....I cannot tell you much about this GCAP

CG: I guess it's more like if someone said, someone came into your office and they said I've heard about this thing, I went to the Stand up Against Poverty, I've heard about this thing called GCAP, what does it do? What is it? Does it do anything in Malawi?

NCSTM Participant: Yeh of course they are doing a lot, of course they are doing a lot, and the, sure they are doing a tremendous job, they are doing it right, they are doing it with the....um....the community, at the village level....they are doing a lot at the village level at the community level, trying to empower the women, also trying to help the government in how they can combat the poverty levels and how you can reduce the poverty levels with the community and they do it at the, with the chief, mostly they do it in the villages.

CG: And sorry, who is it you are talking about? Who is 'they'? Who's doing that?

NCSTM Participant: At the community level? (CO yeh) They do it with the chiefs

CG: But who's doing that?

NCSTM Participant: The CONGOMA. (CG ah ok.) CONGOMA, yeh CONGOMA, it's CONGOMA who does it, CONGOMA who champions it, CONGOMA.

(Interview 25)

The Council for Non-Governmental Organisations in Malawi (CONGOMA) is the organisation which hosts the NCSTM secretariat. It was established by the government of Malawi to register all NGOs in the country. By equating GCAP with CONGOMA this participant revealed two important points. Firstly, that GCAP, for her, has no presence in the NCSTM beyond the actions of NCSTM coalition members. In this way then GCAP is absent in form. Secondly, even though GCAP is thought to be synonymous with the actions of other NCSTM coalition members, it seems clear that this is the result not of strategic positioning on the behalf of GCAP, but of GCAP’s absence from the NCSTM. In other words GCAP for this participant became a signifier through which she could talk about the actions of the NCSTM broadly and CONGOMA specifically, actions which in
no way represent how GCAP constructs its own agency. GCAP does not claim to work in villages and with community chiefs. GCAP claims to organise mass mobilisations and lobby the international institutions of global governance. By this participant’s rendition then, GCAP is absent from the NCSTM and the spaces in which it operates in both form and content.

This next excerpt from a different interview possibly illustrates the degree to which my information sheet introduced GCAP into the imagination of this NCSTM participant, once again supporting the contention that GCAP was entirely absent from the NCSTM:

CG: If I said what is GCAP, then what would you say?
NCSTM Participant: Ha ha ha!
CG: And a few people have done that, a few people have laughed!
NCSTM Participant: Ha ha! I think... a Global... 
CG: A Global Call to Action against Poverty?
NCSTM Participant: Yuh, against, against er... [looks down at information sheet]
CG: Yeh

(Interview 22)

Both of these responses illustrate the degree to which GCAP has failed to permeate into the NCSTM network. It means that if one were to look for GCAP in the NCSTM, one

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67 In its core documents GCAP articulates its aims as being to stage “...massive and strategic grassroots mobilizations” (GCAP, 2008c: 23).
would rarely find it. Even those participants who had participated in some of GCAP's other nodal points beyond the NCSTM, such as INGO participants, did not construct GCAP as an actor in the NCSTM. Rather than being completely absent from their descriptions however, in these cases GCAP was external, acting somewhere else, somewhere distant, but not in the NCSTM. One such participant commented:

"But in terms of knowing where actually is the GCAP secretariat, and how it is raising money, and eh, how it is implementing its programme, I don't have bigger details of that (CG hmm) but the one big event is the Stand Up event which is coordinated whether from the UK, or the US... I think mainly from the UK, so that's the little that I know" (Interview 14)

In this construction GCAP is not above but beyond. In other words, the NCSTM and GCAP are not in some kind of hierarchical relationship; GCAP is simply somewhere else, somewhere distant. It touches down in the NCSTM once a year through the Stand Up against Poverty mobilisation, but nothing more. This chimes with another NCSTM participant who told me that all she knew of GCAP was when some people came to Malawi for the Stand Up against Poverty mobilisation. She could not tell me who they were, or where they were from, simply that they had something to do with GCAP. Of course this lack of hierarchy and diffuse and uncertain attribution is not simply a failure of GCAP to enrol the NCSTM into its problematisation of the network, but says something about GCAP itself. As the member of the GCAP global secretariat quoted on page 306 said, the intention has not been to impose GCAP on national coalitions. Furthermore, GCAP's taskforces and evaluation groups are mostly composed of
volunteers from constituent network organisations, or even from beyond the formal membership of the network (such as in my case and my membership of the Learning and Accountability Group). If people 'from GCAP' visited Malawi, it may well be the case that they were actually not from GCAP at all in a formal sense, and thus any confusion or uncertainty about who they were and their role is perhaps understandable.

It nonetheless seems the case that GCAP is at most a distant externality to the NCSTM, and even entirely absent for some NCSTM participants. This means that one can not automatically locate GCAP in the spaces which it claims constitute it. With regards to the discussion around global dimensionality in Chapter Three, this means that the way the NCSTM is experienced by its participants is lacking the global dimension which GCAP affects to bring, and which it was shown to enact for some participants of the WNTA coalition. This is not to say that global dimensionality does not circulate and act in the NCSTM network. As I illustrated in the previous two chapters, the MDGs, and neoliberal managerialistic discourses, are both significant actors in the NCSTM. It appears that in the convergence space which the NCSTM occupies then, GCAP is simply not strong enough to compete with these other discursive actors and thus is not able to establish itself as a place-specific actor.

A participant in the WNTA reinforced this point, when she told me the following:

"So, how does Global Call against Poverty impact on the partner in Orissa, unless that
linkage is very tangibly established...how do you get a partner working in Orissa, who’s main concern is hunger, and how do you get them to be a stakeholder, so...it’s not very evident. I don’t know.” (Interview 9)

This participant was very aware of and active in GCAP; for example, she was a member of the Learning and Accountability Group of which I was also a member. However, her comment about the partner in Orissa (a state with one of India’s highest poverty levels) highlighted the degree to which GCAP has to battle not just those actors we might traditionally think of as ‘actors’ in the sense of defining poverty eradication (i.e. the institutions of global governance), but also everyday experiences of hunger or homelessness. GCAP claims to be constituted in part through the most marginalised, but this participant’s comment brought to mind Jones’ (2005) assertion that for those living in the most poverty, in the most desperation, ideas and concepts like global networks and campaigns are utterly meaningless. Hunger, disease, and homelessness are far more powerful actors ordering the networked realities of these peoples’ lives, in patterning their constructions of and engagements with the world. This reveals the manner in which convergence spaces, however constituted, are always in the process of being made, as are the actors and discourses which constitute them. In other words, it is not the case that GCAP cannot penetrate the NCSTM, merely that thus far it largely has not.

In this sub-section I have illustrated the difficulty I encountered in ‘finding GCAP’ in the NCSTM. Rather than seeking explanations in the actions or knowledge of the NCSTM participants, I realised that I was encountering this difficulty simply because GCAP was
not there. It was quite literally, nowhere to be found. Where GCAP was acknowledged it was as far away, distant, and un-locatable. This challenged the construction of GCAP in its core policy and strategic documents as being constituted through the national coalitions, and further comments from WNTA participants challenged the assertion that GCAP was also constituted through the actions and consciousness of the most marginalised. In the next section I will explore further the ways in which WNTA participants constructed their understandings of GCAP. I will argue that just as GCAP is largely absent from the NCSTM, in the WNTA, GCAP is present, but still distant, and in many ways unwelcome.

7.3.3 GCAP Acting ... (Uninvited)

As I have recounted in previous chapters, many WNTA participants are involved in GCAP governance and evaluation processes and bodies. The WNTA convenor is a member of the GCAP Global Council, and two other WNTA participants are members of the Learning and Accountability Group of which I am also a member. Another WNTA participant convenes the GCAP social exclusion taskforce, and the secretariat coordinator has recently left this role to become the new GCAP Global Secretariat campaigns coordinator. Clearly then, the WNTA is very present in GCAP. One might expect therefore, to find GCAP very present in the WNTA.
Rather, and perhaps symptomatic of the tensions recorded between WNTA and GCAP in the previous chapter, several WNTA participants, including those involved in GCAP’s governing and evaluation bodies, expressed a mixture of uncertainty and mild disdain towards GCAP’s role in the WNTA. This was laid out in quite official terms in the minutes of a WNTA steering group meeting:

"x reminded the group that we need to be clear about the independence of the WNTA, which is not seen as an India G-CAP campaign" (WNTA CCG, 2006)

It is clear that such a position may also be strategic, and does not necessarily contradict the construction of GCAP as being located in and articulated through its national coalitions. For example, one member of the Global Secretariat told me that:

"[GCAP] should be diverse, it should be really diverse, every coalition should have representatives, or represent, trade unions, faith groups, um, traditional civil society activists, ah, student groups, women’s groups, its really important, and, it should be a body which doesn’t dictate what national coalitions do" (Interview 12)

In this way then GCAP’s relationship with the national coalitions might be imagined as being one-way. In other words, national coalitions may not identify with GCAP, but GCAP will identify with the national coalitions. At the Learning and Accountability Group (LAG) which I participated in though, it seemed that this kind of enrolment was not sufficient to maintain GCAP as a cohesive alter-globalisation network. Indeed, one of the core reasons for the formation of the LAG was to develop systems which would draw all of GCAP’s constituent parts together in processes of mutual accountability.
It became apparent though that for those working in some of the national coalitions, GCAP seemed not just absent, but irrelevant. This was clear from a discussion at the LAG during which it was revealed that members of national coalitions attending the World Social Forum did not feel comfortable or willing to speak on behalf of GCAP. Rather, they were speaking on behalf of their own organisations and constituencies. The GCAP co-chair present at the LAG expressed great surprise and shock at this. The way the discussion then developed signified the distinction between GCAP being absent in the NCSTM, and irrelevant in the WNTA. The GCAP co-chair imagined that the issue at stake here was one of ownership. My notes record her asking: "How do we get some of that bottom-up ownership?" (LAG Fieldnotes). And indeed, with the NCSTM, more involvement in GCAP’s processes might well engender greater degrees of knowledge and ownership of GCAP. However, many of those unwilling to express what GCAP was at the WSF, and many of those unwilling to articulate GCAP as part of their own activities in the WNTA, are already involved in GCAP’s governance and evaluation processes and bodies. This suggests then that the issue here is not one of ownership, of GCAP and its national coalitions being absent from each other, in need of more connectivity, but is instead an issue of relevance. It is an issue of mattering. In short, GCAP, in many important respects, just doesn’t seem to matter.

This seemed especially evident in the WNTA, and shed further light on the distinction made by the campaign between being seen as ‘GCAP India’ and WNTA. One passage
from the email discussion amongst the WNTA steering group members regarding hosting the GCAP Secretariat (discussed in the previous chapter) was particularly revealing in this regard. The passage is written by the WNTA coalition convener, and relates to the degree to which initial discussions about hosting the secretariat tailed off (they picked up again shortly after this email):

"I was surprised that the discussion died so quickly. An abrupt end to discussions on such a major issue made me ask several questions. For instance, is our linkage with GCAP organic or artificial, how does the GCAP benefit the campaign, why do we put in so many energies in GCAP (I am a member of GCAP International Facilitation Team, x is the Convener of South Asia GCAP, x gives time to Asia Facilitation Team, x, without any formal role has been giving a lot of time to supporting the South Asian and Asian secretariat, particularly around mobilization and work on maternal mortality, etc.), what is our learning from the larger campaign, are we being able to influence the larger (at least civil society) discourse on poverty from the southern perspective?" (WNTA, 2007d)

This passage raises the issue of GCAP's relevance quite explicitly. Despite the involvement of several WNTA participants in GCAP's governance and other processes, the passage queries the relevance of GCAP to WNTA's activities. The passage questions both directions of the relationship, that between GCAP and WNTA ("...what is our learning from the larger campaign?") and the relationship between WNTA and GCAP ("...are we able to influence the larger (at least civil society) discourse on poverty...?"). The words "at least civil society" suggests the composer of this passage is talking explicitly about GCAP, or GCAP's other constituent nodes, rather than the discourses which circulate through statist and hegemonic networks more broadly. If the former statement questions the relevance of GCAP to WNTA, then this latter statement
questions the degree to which GCAP is located in, and thus articulatory of, its' supposedly constituent nodes.

The degree to which GCAP is articulated as largely irrelevant by members of the WNTA steering group, including those involved in GCAP’s governance structures, is quite widespread. A LAG colleague, who is also a WNTA steering group member, told me that:

“GCAP is not Wada Na Todo. GCAP, of course at one level we can say this is Indian coalition of GCAP, but we really look at it as a local approach, and Wada Na Todo has a lot of functions in its work, at the national level, and India’s just very big, and the issues here are just so much so, sometimes, so it really doesn’t, it’s not in the day-to-day that we are actually concerned...its not something that crosses the mind, the day to day functioning of Wada Na Todo” (Interview 9)

Other WNTA participants reported that:

“coalitions here, organisations here are not here because of GCAP. Organisations that have built Wad Na Todo are older and will be here longer than GCAP, or may not stay for different reasons, so our existence is not because of GCAP” (Interview 2)

“I’m more interested in national, and state and district level. So from that perspective, I would say...you know, the role of GCAP, and the relevance of GCAP needs to be viewed from that perspective.” (Interview 10)

These articulations of GCAP construct it as something which is present, but which is largely irrelevant to the spaces which WNTA occupies and in which it converges with other actors and scalar dimensions. GCAP in these renditions even seems intrusive. The degree to which we can ‘find’ GCAP in the WNTA therefore is highly constrained by the ways in which WNTA participants discursively de-construct GCAP as a globally
networked initiative. As is clear from these statements, WNTA participants clearly conceive of the WNTA as an Indian initiative. This is not to say that WNTA participants view India, or the Indian experience, as pure, essentialised and national. This should be apparent from Chapter Six, where WNTA sought unsuccessfully to host the GCAP Secretariat in the belief that their experiences were part of a broader struggle which articulates itself and is responded to in India, but is also part of broader networked issues of inequality and discrimination which require responses beyond any particular nation-state. This is why WNTA participants involve themselves in GCAP's processes and structures beyond India, and underpinned several participants' belief (discussed in Chapter Six) that GCAP required 'Southern' leadership. Nevertheless, WNTA participants clearly question the value and relevance of what they construct as an external actor seeking to enrol them into actions (such as the Stand Up mobilisations, discussed in Chapter Five) which are not particularly relevant in the (globalised) Indian context. Unlike in the NCSTM then, where GCAP was not present, in the WNTA GCAP is present, just slightly unwelcome.

7.4 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter began by highlighting the manner in which GCAP discursively constructs itself as a network constituted by its national coalitions, and population groups of the most marginalised. It has illustrated the ways in which GCAP claims authenticity and legitimacy from such a construction, and how this enables it to claim a convergence with
the successes of distinctly national coalition-based initiatives and achievements. In these ways then, GCAP was shown to locate itself in its constituent nodes and the convergence spaces/converging actors that exist there, including constituencies of the marginalised.

Indeed, it was shown how in some instances, particularly with regards to the kinds of spaces and connections GCAP helps to construct, GCAP is present in, and enables the construction of these nodes. Without GCAP, some participants claimed, the broad coalitions that constitute the WNTA and NCSTM may not have come into being.

The chapter continued to greatly problematise the degree to which it could be said that GCAP is present in its nodes beyond the momentum it has given them to construct themselves. This was in turn shown to disrupt GCAP’s construction of itself as being constituted by its nodes. In the NCSTM, GCAP was shown to be largely absent from participants’ imaginations of the network they were involved in. For a number of reasons, including the discursive power of the MDGs which were discussed in Chapter Five, GCAP was simply not strong enough to assert its presence in the NCSTM. Alternatively, in the WNTA, GCAP was acknowledged and present, but mostly constructed as ill-fitting, and even unwelcome, despite the activism of several WNTA participants in GCAP’s processes of governance and evaluation. Linked to the reticence of national coalition members in other countries to voice representation of GCAP at the World Social Forum, it seemed that in many cases for WNTA participants, GCAP just did not
matter with regards to issues and processes in India, despite the recognition of the global
dimensionality which part-constitutes those issues and processes.

So to return to the question which began this chapter, where are alter-globalisation
networks - in this case GCAP - located? As has been the case throughout this thesis, the
answer is not straightforward, and is highly differential. GCAP has a presence beyond the
imaginations of its core activists and authors of its core texts. At the same time GCAP is
a discursive network as much as anything else, and in this respect has to do battle with,
and is penetrated by, other powerful discourses seeking to shape civil society responses to
poverty eradication, both more radical than it is (post-colonial, social movement
discourses – see Chapter Six) and less so (statist and hegemonic discourses – see Chapter
Five). In this sense then alter-globalisation networks, and any global dimensionality they
claim to bring to the convergence spaces in which they and their nodes act, can only be
located where they are embodied and enacted. Locating GCAP therefore is highly
dependent on where one is looking, constrained and defined by spatial arrangements of
discursive orientations and social relations. In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I will
discuss this, and the conclusions and implications from my other data chapters, in the
context of alter-globalisation networks more broadly.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Implications and Conclusions

8.1 Introduction

This thesis has explored the agencies and powers of a large alter-globalisation network, the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP), in an attempt to evaluate the potential of such networks to effect socio-economic transformational change. This thesis has also explored power. It has explored power directly, in a methodological and epistemological sense, but it has also explored issues of power pluralities and potentialities, of power in and of. Power has been viewed productively, through networks of unpredictable, contradictory and malleable relationships. It has been a partial study; not because I tried to capture GCAP and couldn’t, but because GCAP is not a single unit of analysis simply waiting to be discovered and studied. It is as much a product of the imaginations of those who participate in it as it is located in the 115 countries which form its nodal points.

This concluding chapter will at first recap and summarise the narrative of the thesis, before taking this as a departure point to discuss some of the implications and broader claims that have arisen from the research. Whilst it has never been my intention to generate universalisable truth claims, I am also aware of the danger of simply stating ‘this
is what happened’. It is therefore the case that this chapter will address important methodological and normative issues that have been produced during the research process. Finally, I will illustrate a future research programme which arises out of both the general and specific findings of the thesis.

8.2 Framing the research

So many labels could be applied to GCAP: Part of global (Kaldor, 2003), or transnational (Bandy and Smith, 2005) or international (Colas, 2005), civil society; a global justice movement (Saunders and Rootes, 2006); a transnational advocacy network or coalition (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). This proliferation of labels left me feeling reticent to commit to any one or the other. Key conceptual problems exist with all of them, and were discussed in the first three chapters of this thesis. Nonetheless, I had to be able to refer to GCAP as something. I therefore sought to develop, in the introduction to this thesis, some appropriate language with which to talk about GCAP, and actors like it. I settled on the term ‘alter-globalisation network’. This was to be distinguished from the alter-globalisation movement (Gilbert, 2008), which involves similarly problematical assumptions about the actors invoked as some of the other labels mentioned above. The term alter-globalisation network was deployed to invoke the widest possible spread of possibly contradictory agencies which constitute actors like GCAP. It drew attention to the networked and relational construction of such actors, and recognised that being alter-globalisation was not the same as being anti or even necessarily radically alternative.
Being alter-globalisation allowed for different degrees of normativity and political strategy to coexist, and thus the virtue of being alternative did not necessarily frame that alterity in radical terms.

Having settled on some adequate language to refer to GCAP by, the thesis proceeded to explore the manner in which alter-globalisation networks had been framed by two key schools of thought in the literature on such networks: the liberal cosmopolitans (Chapter One) and the radical alter-globalisationists (Chapter Two). In referring to them as schools of thought I was being slightly heuristic, although I argued that there were significant theoretical and conceptual linkages which made considering these writers in this way productive in framing this study.

8.2.1 Liberal Cosmopolitans

In Chapter One I argued that there are a group of scholars who have been significant in analysing alter-globalisation networks and who uncritically celebrate such networks as being a part of what they term as 'global civil society'. I argued that global civil society (GCS) is celebrated as representing the pluralisation of power away from the territorial state, involving a set of autonomous actors which, whilst perhaps at times contradictory, nonetheless incubate an inclination to non-violence, deliberation and progressive ideals of social justice. These claims, whilst sometimes presented as analytical, and thus potentially appropriate for trying to understand the agency and potentials of alter-
globalisation networks, were found to be unduly normative and thus unable to comprehend and conceptualise contradictions to their prescriptive content.

In particular I argued that global civil society theorists displayed two key normative problems. The first involved the ideological basis to their claims, which was shown to derive from classical and modern liberal ideas, which theorised alter-globalisation networks as being rational, autonomous, deliberative, and representative. In this vein, the territorial state was held to be of decreasing relevance to politics, which was re-sited to a 'new' global governance structure which the members of alter-globalisation networks held to account. I argued that this ignored the role of statist hegemony in constructing this politics, and the continuing and in some cases increasing relevance of some territorialised state actors.

This is therefore what made the theorists I discussed in this chapter liberal. The second key normative problem these theorists displayed is what makes them cosmopolitans. I argued that these theorists imply claims about the normative visions of alter-globalisation networks which assumes a shared cosmopolitan agenda between those who populate GCS. This either makes GCS a very small and self-referential community, excluding those who may not share this outlook, or means that GCS as an analytical category is simply unable to conceive of the wide range of particularistic experiences of the actors who constitute alter-globalisation networks. Additionally, I argued that the liberal cosmopolitan project, in establishing itself as a universal project, ignored the
fundamental and particularistic structural inequalities which constitute it, and created a process of destructive othering which results in the discursive or sometimes physical silencing of particular and/or marginalised groups. In understanding alter-globalisation networks within a liberal cosmopolitan frame however, such destructive processes are rendered invisible. I therefore concluded that GCS represented a normative liberal cosmopolitan project which was poorly equipped (in the specificity of its normativity) to analyse and describe the relationality, agency and potentials of alter-globalisation networks.

8.2.2 The Radical Alter-Globalisationists

In Chapter Two I focussed on a second normative school of thought which I termed 'Radical Alter-Globalisationist'. Unlike the liberal cosmopolitans considered in Chapter One, these writers did not share a unique ideological background, but drew on hybridised radical structural and post-structural traditions. Thus, what they shared as a group was not so much an ideological affinity as a shared sensibility about the prospects and characteristics of contemporary alter-globalisation networks. I further argued that despite a lack of 'pure' ideological distinctiveness, there were still points of convergence between these theorists, particularly around the axis of hegemony/post-hegemony, which I argued influenced the more normative aspects of their thought.
In exploring the thought of radical alter-globalisationists I argued that they created two sets of binaries which carry both opportunities but also constraints for the degree to which radical alter-globalisationist thought could be used analytically in the study of alter-globalisation networks. With the first of these binaries, concerning oppositionality, I argued that a hegemonic/post-hegemonic binary existed between those who saw the possibility of socio-economic transformation in some form of relationship (often a contesting one) with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, and those who rejected this position and viewed any such relationship as being inherently structured and dominated by these formations. This created a dilemma for the study of alter-globalisation networks i.e. whether to judge them by the degree to which they engage with/transform statist and neo-liberal formations, or the degree to which they evade/escape these formations, discursively and materially.

With the second binary, concerning strategy, I argued that there was a distinction between those radical alter-globalisationists who advocated the necessity of a strategic orientation as an essential pathway to the creation of a universal transformational subject, and those who believed that such a subject would be inherently and necessarily exclusionary and dominating. Despite this binary, I also argued that some common ground existed between the two sets of thinkers, which allowed for an approach to the study of alter-globalisation networks which sought to address both the structural domination of their own subjectivities (and the way they rework this domination), and
simultaneously the ways in which such networks dominate or exclude other forms of political subjectivity.

I therefore argued that these binaries only had limited use for the study of alter-globalisation networks. This is because, presented as such, radical alter-globalisation approaches only allowed us to view one or other of its binaries as being authentically radical. This was particularly the case with regard to the normative positions adopted vis-à-vis the relationship between alter-globalisation networks and their externalities (i.e. statist formations and neo-liberal hegemony). It meant that, for example, it was not possible to theorise alter-globalisation networks within a radical alter-globalisationist paradigm as operating both within and without statist formations, unless one adopted a degree of epistemological flexibility; it was to the development of such a theoretical framework that the next chapter addressed itself.

8.2.3 Grounded and Normative – an Epistemology of Alter-Globalisation Networks

This chapter was essentially concerned with developing a theoretical framework for the study of alter globalisation networks. It took an empirically directed, yet normative approach in the sense that I was simultaneously concerned with getting underneath the normativity which had plagued the approaches considered in Chapters One and Two, but also wished to retain a sense of concern for transformational social change which many of these writers also exhibited.
In setting up this framework I established the theoretical groundwork for investigating three areas of relevance and importance which had arisen from my consideration of the literature in Chapters One and Two, namely:

i) Statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power;

ii) Cosmopolitanism;

iii) Locating alter-globalisation networks.

I then proceeded to elaborate theoretical and epistemological approaches to each of these themes which would underpin my study of GCAP. With regards to the first theme, I proposed that we should understand neither alter-globalisation networks, nor statist formations, as fixed entities, but instead as sets of relations which can both affirm, negate and transform the contents of each other. I argued that this approach takes into account the complex ways in which alter-globalisation networks may re-subjectivise themselves and contingently and perhaps temporarily transform the seemingly dominant powers of statist and hegemonic neo-liberalism. Such an approach would move beyond the automatic celebrationism of the Liberal cosmopolitans in their rendition of alter-globalisation networks as being autonomous and self-directed actors. It would also transcend the binary of the radical alter-globalisationists with regard to their exclusionary definitions of what it means to be oppositional.
With regards to developing a theoretical approach to understanding the cosmopolitanism of alter-globalisation networks, I argued that whilst the cosmopolitanism of the Liberal cosmopolitans could be rightly critiqued as constructing relations of neo-imperialism, it was in the immanence of this process that we might discover other forms of cosmopolitanism which challenged the verticality of historically western operationalisations of the concept. I argued that it was therefore necessary to collapse the universal/particular binary often used to critique cosmopolitanism with, in order to make it possible to theorise cosmopolitanism from the periphery, using the writings of post-colonial theorists to illustrate this. This discussion pointed again to the importance of paying attention to the relations which constitute alter-globalisation networks to assess the degree to which such non-western cosmopolitanisms are possible, and if they are, to what degree they represent more horizontal or equitable modes of enacting solidarity with distant others.

Lastly, I sought to develop an epistemological and theoretical framework for understanding how alter-globalisation networks spatialised, or in other words, 'where' they were. I sought to transcend global-national or global-local binaries in the study of alter-globalisation networks, and what this means for their agency. I argued that the various approaches to alter-globalisation networks which cite them as trans-national, global, nationally bound, or multi-scalar, all in their own ways fix alter-globalisation networks at one particular site of existence. In adopting a dimensional approach, I argued that seeing alter-globalisation networks as heterogeneously constituted by and productive
of converging dimensions of global, national and local allowed an understanding to be developed of these networks as existing beyond immediate spatial fixity. This would have implications for how we understand the powers of such networks to transform statist and neo-liberal hegemony.

8.3 Implications of the research

Having established an epistemological framework in Chapter Three, I went on to elucidate my methodology and research design in Chapter Four, establishing the grounds for a relational, post-governmentality approach to the study of a set of research questions generated through my analysis of the literature in Chapters One, Two and Three. These questions were:

Core Research Question:

i) What do the powers in alter-globalisation networks reveal about the power of them?

Sub-research Questions:

ii) In which ways can alter-globalisation networks be understood as oppositional?
iii) Which processes of exclusion and inclusion constitute alter-globalisation networks?

iv) Where are alter-globalisation networks?

The remainder of this concluding chapter will involve explorations of these questions, and what light my case study of GCAP can shed on them. This will involve addressing the implications of my study of GCAP for both the theory and the practice of alter-globalisation networks. In seeking to make these linkages therefore I will address the questions above in reverse order, beginning with the sub-research questions and finishing by addressing my core research question. This is because of the manner in which my sub-research questions build into my core research question.

8.3.1 In which ways can alter-globalisation networks be understood as oppositional?

In Chapter Five, where I addressed this question in relation to GCAP, I argued that GCAP was in part constituted through its relationships with various statist agencies and neo-liberal hegemonic discourses. This had certain enclosing effects, particularly in the National Civil Society Taskforce on the Millennium Development Goals (NCSTM) coalition in Malawi, which was highly discursively and ontologically ordered through its relationship with various UN agencies and their embodiment of the MDGs.
However, this relationship was also productive, in that it created the conditions for some parts of the GCAP network to creatively transform and expand meanings of social justice and poverty eradication. It was through these contradictions that GCAP embodied a form of monitory oppositionality quite distinct from that developed by the Liberal cosmopolitans (and most widely expounded by Keane, 2009). As developed in Chapter Five, GCAP’s monitory oppositionality was always and inherently ambiguous, dependent as it was on the ‘monitory’ as a distinct form of relation between its contextualised nodes and other statist or neo-liberal hegemonic actors and formations. This monitory relationality is distinct in that it is a form of relationship which can only ever be other-regarding, and thus imbued with that same otherness. In this way GCAP challenged the wholly celebratory tone of the Liberal cosmopolitan literature, as well as the inside/outside binary displayed in the radical alter-globalisationist literature.

Turning this towards alter-globalisation networks more broadly, what further claims could be made? Just because GCAP exhibited monitory oppositionality does not mean that such a relationship would or should only ever display the same characteristics which were displayed through the GCAP network. Indeed, whilst in the parts of GCAP I studied such relationships were often found to be problematic, this was because GCAP’s monitory oppositionality was produced specifically by the particular constellations of the convergence spaces in which GCAP’s nodes operated. It is precisely because it is an ambiguous form of oppositionality that a greater attention to its ambiguity (on the part of alter-globalisation activists and actors) could also make it more consciously malleable.
No alter-globalisation network can exist in isolation from the forms of globalisation to which it proposes alternatives. All such networks are therefore in temporally and spatially produced monitory relations with the agencies of the dominant and hegemonic forms of globalisation they are in alterity to (wherever such agencies may ‘touch down’ and deploy – ‘locally’, ‘nationally’, ‘globally’, etc.). The point therefore is not whether alter-globalisation networks should adopt ‘outsider’ or ‘insider’ strategies in creating their alternatives (the binary established in the radical alter-globalisationist literature in Chapter Two); this creates a smokescreen which conceals the inherent and simultaneous inside/outside nature of these relationships. The more pertinent issue is the degree to which such networks are able to become aware of how monitory relationships can produce them as subjects, so that they may then be able to release their multiple subjectivities. By this I mean that GCAP illustrated the manner in which relations of monitory oppositionality can produce both uniform consenting subjects (as in the NCSTM) and diverse resisting and even transcendent subjects (as in the Wada Na Todo Abhiyan (WNTA) in India). The spaces of the NCSTM and the WNTA were historically produced, yet this did not make these spaces absolute. In the NCSTM there were examples of a more structural critique, and in the WNTA examples of highly ordered consent. Whilst these were minority positions in each case, they point to the potential for agency to interact with the structural conditions of time and space in the construction and operationalisation of relations of monitory oppositionality.
Alter-globalisation networks can be understood therefore to be oppositional in a highly ambiguous and power-implicated sense. It is in the contradictions which these features create, however, that the potential transformative agency of alter-globalisation networks might be found, and self-consciously and strategically deployed.

8.3.2 Which processes of exclusion and inclusion constitute alter-globalisation networks?

In Chapter Six I explored the manner in which GCAP was constituted by a range of inclusions and exclusions which could all be framed as cosmopolitan. In this way I disputed the notion that cosmopolitanism is inherently universal, underpinning sets of ever-increasing relations of inclusion. By asserting the particularity of cosmopolitanism, that it always has to come from somewhere and is therefore unavoidably limited, I created space for other forms of particularistic cosmopolitanism to be analysed on the same terms. This was significant as it transcended the universal/particular, domination/resistance binary which can often be deployed in analyses of this kind.

I argued that cosmopolitanism is not just a Western, liberal and imperial construct. This allowed for the inclusion of other potential and immanent forms of cosmopolitanism in my analysis. Another innovation I adopted in my approach to this chapter was to analyse cosmopolitanism as a discursive resource deployed by the research participants for understanding the role of GCAP’s agency. As such it was possible to map the degree to which certain forms of cosmopolitanism were successful in discursively enrolling actors.
to its problematisations. It was thus the case that different cosmopolitan discourses intertwined and fused with each other in productive modes of inclusion and exclusion in GCAP’s convergence spaces. This was most evident in the WNTA, where research participants interpreted GCAP’s potentials and limitations through a prism of radical post-coloniality, yet found GCAP to be an uneven field of opportunities for such radical discourses to articulate themselves. In the NCSTM though, very few expressed similarly radical forms of cosmopolitan interpretation and were instead subjectified by more exclusionary forms of imperial cosmopolitanism, which enclosed research participants in managerialistic and neo-liberal interpretative repertoires.

For alter-globalisation networks more generally this has several implications. It means that they are not inclusionary because they are cosmopolitan, but that they may in fact incubate several forms of fusing, resisting and reinforcing cosmopolitanisms, each replete with their own inclusions and exclusions. Cosmopolitanism therefore appears as an other-regarding discursive resource, itself constructed through various interpretative repertoires of solidarity over economic, social, cultural and geographical distance. It is these interpretations which give cosmopolitanisms their discursive power, always particular and distinctive. Cosmopolitanism therefore becomes more akin to an analytical tool with which to assess the normativity of alter-globalisation networks, rather than a universal prescriptive agenda which all alter-globalisation networks should subscribe to.
Chapter Six also pointed to the power of a particular and post-colonial form of cosmopolitanism. This served to challenge understandings of cosmopolitanism as always and inherently destructive, regardless of where it is ‘from’. Whilst it was not possible to ascertain whether this post-colonial cosmopolitanism was flatter, more horizontal or more equitable than its imperial other, its very articulation did reveal a potential shift in the discursive and practical orientations of alter-globalisation networks of the kind that GCAP represents.

For instance, GCAP, with a genealogy which stretches back to Make Poverty History and Jubilee 2000 before that, emerged from a critique of those networks and campaigns as being dominated by international NGOs and structurally privileged interpretations of justice (See Gorringe and Rose, 2006; Yanacopulos, 2009). It has therefore become simple to dismiss such mass-scale public-mobilising networks as at best ineffectual and at worst dominating and exclusionary. Nonetheless, despite the imperfection with which GCAP embodies post-colonial forms of cosmopolitanism, and however much imperial forms of cosmopolitanism still dominate, that GCAP actively embodies and is produced by these different cosmopolitan discourses suggests that alter-globalisation networks of this kind may be learning some of the lessons from previous iterations of them. This is no more than a contingent and uncertain assertion, based as it is on immanent processes, but it is a case for qualified optimism nonetheless.

8.3.3 Where are alter-globalisation networks?
In Chapter Seven I argued that GCAP constructed itself as being embodied through the authenticity of marginalised and poverty-stricken groups, and their representatives. Despite the fact that GCAP appeared to have created opportunities for actors to cooperate with each other who might not normally have done so, this became a problematic construction when compared to the everyday articulations of GCAP which were expressed by research participants in the NCSTM (where GCAP was largely either absent or distant) and the WNTA (where GCAP was largely present but irritating).

Rejecting the global, national and local as distinct spheres or scales, and considering any space as co-constituted by all of these dimensions in collapsed interaction, it meant that GCAP was therefore often simply unlocatable beyond the imaginations of a few relatively well-paid and structurally advantaged seconded INGO employees. It was certainly often not locatable in the very spaces from which it claimed to be constituted.

This was largely because GCAP could not compete with the discursively more powerful relations which co-constituted the spaces in which GCAP claimed to be legitimised and enacted. This illustrates the continuing weaknesses exhibited by alter-globalisation networks in the face of statist, or neo-liberal hegemonic formations and agendas, as well as the dangers faced by alter-globalisation networks if they are perceived by some of their nodes as not being radical enough. This challenges overly-celebratory renditions of alter-globalisation networks' power. By addressing the issues which have been discussed in
Chapters Five and Six i.e. how self-conscious they are of their monitory oppositionality and the processes of inclusion and exclusion which constitute them, alter-globalisation networks can make themselves more present in a constructive and emancipatory manner. The degree to which alter-globalisation networks will always be co-present with other contradictory and oppositional actors means that they must engage in processes of immanence or ‘always-becoming’, of re-asserting and re-defining their legitimacy (a necessarily inclusive process) in the light of ever-changing conditions. This is one possible interpretation of why GCAP’s centralised formalisation was unpopular for many constitutive members, because it was seen as closing down the possibilities for an always-updating process of inclusive legitimation.

To summarise, then, I have thus far argued that from this research have emerged a number of theoretical insights into the agency, potentials and limitations (the powers) of alter-globalisation networks. Firstly, these networks exhibit relations of monitory oppositionality, which represent an ambiguous and malleable power. Secondly, alter-globalisation networks incubate different forms of particularistic cosmopolitanisms, which should be understood analytically as discursive resources for understanding and operationalising engagements with the world. It is in the interaction of these different forms that optimism lies for the potentials of alter-globalisation networks. Lastly, alter-globalisation networks must engage in constant processes of becoming, in order to navigate and elude the co-optive powers of those actors which are co-present in the
spaces in which they operate. This is a necessary move in providing meaningful and inclusive legitimacy for alter-globalisation networks.

8.3.4 What do the powers in alter-globalisation networks reveal about the power of them?

I can now return to my initial and core research question, which in itself presupposed a certain approach to power ("powers") which understood it as multiple and therefore potentially contradictory. This presupposition seemed valid throughout the conduct of this research. GCAP was an uneven and contradictory field of messy social relations, and there is no reason to suspect that GCAP would be unique as an alter-globalisation network in this regard.

That alter-globalisation networks are therefore constituted by a multiplicity of powers in the form of productive relations, means that it is not possible to talk about the effects of alter-globalisation networks in the singular either. Their power is entirely dependent on the manner in which the powers which constitute them in different sites converge. Powers which include highly constraining and monitoring statist ones, as well as relations of potentially emancipatory cosmopolitanism.

Alter-globalisation networks therefore might be understood as sites where alternative visions of the future, and discourses of the past converge. In doing so, these visions and
discourses produce each other and new versions of themselves in unpredictable and co-
constituting ways. The power of alter-globalisation networks therefore might be the
manner by which they provide opportunities to expose neo-liberal and structural powers
to manipulation through convergence with them. This is not necessarily an evolutionary
or piecemeal approach to social change, but rather is predicated on the degree to which
the convergent engagement in question is self-conscious and strategic. These
opportunities are not always taken, again because of the dynamics of these powers in
particular sites, yet the opportunities exist nonetheless.

Strategically speaking, alter-globalisation networks need therefore to be sensitive to the
manner in which what may appear to be a power-exerting relationship in one
convergence space may be power-constraining in another context of convergence to
which it also contributes (the obvious example with GCAP being its relationship with the
UNMC and the MDGs). This happens because convergence is inevitably differential,
dependent on the relative powers of the different productive relations which constitute the
space in question. It is this inevitable differentiability which lends alter-globalisation
networks their potential to navigate power, to take advantage of certain relations in
specific contexts, but to outflank them in others. So, for example, undoubtedly GCAP’s
relationship with the UNMC and the MDGs has brought resources and prestige, but in
other contexts it has brought domination. This suggests that the powers in alter-
globalisation networks are productive of the power of them, but not in a straightforwardly
teleological sense; that these powers act in contradictory ways, but more importantly, are malleable and navigable.

8.4 Key contributions and recommendations for further research

This research has contributed in a number of key areas:

i) GCAP is very large, possibly the largest alter-globalisation network of its kind. Despite the problematic manner in which it mobilises and is sometimes mobilised, it is still a network which can reach over 170 million people for a one-day mobilisation. This makes GCAP a very significant actor, yet, for all this, little research exists which makes GCAP its central unit of analysis. This research therefore represents a significant contribution to understanding a network which has close operational relationships with the United Nations, appears to be expanding year-by-year, and whose co-chair can secure meetings with everyone from Ban-Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary General, to Bono (LAG Fieldnotes, 2009).

ii) This research has re-centred research on alter-globalisation networks, and particularly International NGOs, away from Europe and North America.

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68 Every year, more country coalitions form to participate in the Stand Up mobilisations, and numbers of mobilised people increase. An extra 57 million people ‘stood up’ in 2009, compared to the 116 million who ‘stood up’ in 2008 – see http://www.whiteband.org/media/press-info/world-record-shattered-by-citizens-across-globe-demanding-that-their-leaders-end-poverty/
Research on civil societies in what is taken to be the 'Global South' can sometimes be 'methodologically nationalist' (Beck 1997). This research has attempted to illustrate the manners in which civil societies in structurally disadvantaged societies are just as 'global' as the powers normally understood as dominating them. This therefore contributes to the small but growing canon of literature in this regard.

iii) This research has also contributed to an important understanding of the ways in which cosmopolitanism and post-colonialism are not distinct and competitive, universal against particular, but that cosmopolitanism itself is merely an other-regarding discursive resource which can be filled with distinctive discursive and ideological orientations and interpretations.

iv) The manner in which this research showed the MDGs to be interacting with civil society in a highly ordering manner represents an innovation in research on the politics of international development agendas, and particularly on the MDGs, which has thus far been largely carried out within the paradigm of that particular agenda. In other words, research into the MDGs normally asks, 'how do we achieve the MDGs?' (see Black and White, 2004), or 'how can civil society contribute to their achievement?' (see Foster, 2003). This latter question is particularly lacking a counter and critical approach in the academic literature (i.e. what are the MDGs doing to civil society?), and so this research represents an important contribution in that regard.
These contributions are of course accompanied by a number of constraints on what I have been able to achieve with this research. I have been necessarily constrained by time, personnel, finances and expertise. There are therefore a number of areas where this research could be supplemented, as well as new avenues of research which have emerged whilst conducting it.

It would certainly be relevant to investigate the constitution of other GCAP national coalitions. This study was narrow in that regard, and largely overlooked 113 of the 115 national coalitions affiliated in some way to GCAP. Studies of similar depth to this, or indeed wider studies deploying quantitative methods would undoubtedly add to what little is currently known about GCAP, which is, after all, an incredibly large alter-globalisation network, contributing to the mobilisation of millions of people, through its Stand Up and other mobilisations.

In this regard it might be useful to study other alter-globalisation networks utilising a similar epistemological and methodological framework to which this study has been carried out. GCAP is but one of several similarly constituted alter-globalisation networks – the Global Campaign for Education (http://www.campaignforeducation.org/) being the most obvious comparative network.

Another area in which this research was constrained was in its inability to generalise too much about the actant power of the MDGs, both in a civil society context, but also with
regard to statist and multilateral governance strategies. Further research is required on the productive effects of the MDGs on national governments and civil society actors in structurally disadvantaged societies. One area of research which I therefore believe is particularly valuable and intend to pursue is the particular historical production and genealogy of the MDGs. This will create the analytical framework in which to understand their effects on national governments and civil societies.

Furthermore, and as was clear through this research, GCAP is immanent, always in-the-making. This means that many of my conclusions are speculative, or open-ended. That this can only ever be the case for research of this kind is a reason to keep on researching GCAP, not to stop. In particular, how GCAP continues to operationalise its interacting forms of cosmopolitanism will reveal a great deal about the potentials of alter-globalisation networks to transcend or re-make structural discursive power. Likewise, as GCAP moves into a more centrally-formalised era, further research will be needed to reveal the degree to which these kinds of processes serve to narrow alter-globalisation networks' bases, or provide opportunities for previously marginalised discourses to be mainstreamed.

8.5 Final comments

"The people who make social movements, often at great costs and under conditions of threat and danger, do so in the perverse belief that their efforts can make the world better, more just, and indeed, that those actions are necessary to make substantial change. It is professionally irresponsible to expend efforts on projects that elucidate theories or advance
analyses that don’t harken back to critical questions about the quality of our lives and of others. Social Science could be a powerful tool for social justice, a Promethean notion too readily abandoned” (Meyer, 2002: 6-7)

“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please” (Marx, 1852/1991: 93)

I often found myself feeling inspired during my interactions with GCAP. Whether this has always been apparent in this thesis I am not certain, but it is the main reason why I am still involved with the Learning and Accountability Group. For all its imperfections, contradictions and sometimes the damage it colludes in, GCAP remains a set of spaces in which some people, some of the time, are able to imagine and try to affect an alternative and more equitable present and future. It is very easy sometimes to dismiss the sum of these efforts, and indeed scepticism is sometimes deserved. However, the commitment, belief and sense of injustice illustrated by many of the people who participated in this research I could not doubt, and it is to them and others engaged in alter-globalisation networks, attempting to re-make the structural conditions in which they find themselves, which I hope this research is useful for.
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WNTA CSG (2007d) Email discussion

WNTA CSG (2007e) ‘Minutes of Central Steering Group Meeting, 8th July’ (New Delhi)
## APPENDIX ONE
Interviews

The descriptions vary in specificity according to the degree of anonymity requested by each participant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Location and Date</th>
<th>Description or Affiliation</th>
<th>Involvement in GCAP</th>
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<td>WNTA Convenor; National Centre for Advocacy Studies, India</td>
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APPENDIX TWO

Email to research participants requesting participation for interviews

Clive Gabay <C.B.A.Gabay@open.ac.uk> wrote:

Dear xxx,

I am emailing you following xxx’s email below introducing me and my project. I am a PhD student at the Open University in the UK, and I am studying the way in which the Global Call to Action against Poverty (G-CAP) facilitates the engagement of NGOs at the national level. I am therefore interested in the relationships between you/your organisation and the other members of the National Civil Society Taskforce on MDGs in Malawi, as well as between you/your organisation and the global G-CAP structure. Fuller details of my research project can be emailed to you on request.

I am keen to interview you for the purposes of this project, and will be visiting Malawi/India for xxx weeks in July/August/September. This should take no more than 60-90 minutes, and will be recorded on a dictaphone to ensure I do not misrepresent your comments. Please be assured that if you wish to withdraw any of your comments at any time then all you need to do is contact me. Also, I will not share the recording of your interview with any other person, which will be kept in a secure and safe place.

I would be tremendously grateful if you would agree to take part in this project, and you would be helping me a great deal if you could let me have the following information:

1) Confirmation that you are willing to be interviewed and that you are available to do this in July/August/September - If you are willing and available then I will contact you shortly to arrange a date and time convenient for you.
2) The name of your organisation and your position within it.
3) The address and location of your organisation.
4) Your position within the National Civil Society Taskforce on MDGs in Malawi/Wada Na Todo Abhiyan

Many thanks for your time and effort,

Best wishes,

Clive
APPENDIX THREE

Consent form and information sheet shown to research participants at interview

Power within ‘Global Networks’: A case study of the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP)

This research project is led by Clive Gabay (see http://dpp.open.ac.uk/people/gabay.htm / +44 7734 902 708), a PhD student from the Development Policy and Practice Group of the Open University in the United Kingdom. His supervisors are Dr. Giles Mohan (g.mohan@open.ac.uk / +44 1908 653 654) and Dr. Helen Yanacopulos (h.yanacopulos@open.ac.uk / +44 1908 654 893) and can be contacted should you require further details about this project.

This project examines the relationships between individuals and organisations within the Global Call to Action against Poverty. Given the tendency to privilege Northern voices in research on global campaigns, social movements and networks, it is hoped that this project will provide some opportunities for Southern voices to be prioritised within debates over the role of such campaigns, movements and networks, and the role of local, national and international NGOs within them. Identifying where certain actors are empowered and others are disempowered within GCAP’s various structures and processes will also assist GCAP in its own ongoing review of its operations now that it has decided to continue through to 2015. These issues will be examined through sub-case studies of the Indian and Malawian GCAP coalitions, Wada Na Todo Abhiyan and the National Civil Society Taskforce on MDGs in Malawi respectively. In particular the project will focus on relationships within the coalitions, and between the coalitions and GCAP’s regional and global structures.

The research is based on semi-structured interviews with NGO representatives on the Indian and Malawian coalition steering groups, as well as with central UK-based NGOs; a survey of members of the wider Indian and Malawian coalitions; and web and document analysis. The findings will be of strategic importance to the national coalitions concerned and to GCAP more widely at this time of fundamental review for the organisation, and the project will undertake targeted dissemination amongst the national coalitions and GCAP.
Before agreeing to take part in the research Clive will fully explain the research and answer all your questions about it. Once agreed Clive will:

(a) Tape and write up the interview
(b) Send you a printed copy of the interview, together with some initial comments for your thoughts and amendment
(c) Ensure your anonymity if you so wished, and use pseudonyms where necessary
(d) Ensure the security of the interview content under the United Kingdom Data Protection Act (1998)
(e) Ensure that you may withdraw from the study at any time simply by saying so and, if you wish, have any or all of the interview data that you have contributed destroyed

By signing this form I agree to take part in this research.

Name (please print): .................................................................
Date: ..................................................

Signature: .................................................................
APPENDIX FOUR
Interview themes and questions

Interview themes – key informants:

1) When and how was the coalition established?
2) How many members are there in the coalition?
3) Is coalition membership open to any organisation?
4) How were the steering group members selected and are they rotated?
5) Is there a sectoral configuration to the steering group?
6) Who represents the coalition within GCAP globally and regionally?
7) What do INGOs contribute to the coalition?
8) How is the coalition funded?
9) Are there any other key people you think I should speak to?

Interview themes – ALL coalition members:

1) Tell me about your organisation and how it came to be involved in the taskforce/abhiyan?
2) What is the purpose of the Abhiyan/Taskforce? (main issues, why they are important, etc)
3) What would success and failure look like?
4) How has your organisation/members benefited from being part of the campaign-coalition?

The themes and questions presented here were formulated prior to my visits to the NSCTM and WNTA coalitions. They were subsequently adapted iteratively in response to the actually developing research process.
5) If I asked you – 'What is GCAP?' - What would you say?

6) What role does GCAP play in the national campaign-coalition?

7) What is the role of the steering group?
   a. What specific methods does it use to interact with the wider campaign-coalition membership?
   b. What expectations do you have of the wider campaign-coalition membership?

8) What is your view on the mix of organisations on the steering group (INGOS, National Advocacy NGOs, Constituency NGOs) – How would you describe the collaboration?

**WNTA-specific questions:**

1) Are there any contradictions in having the campaign’s major funders (Oxfam, NOVIB, UMC) also playing central roles on the CCG and CSG?

2) What are your views on India hosting the GCAP secretariat?

3) What do you feel the CSG learnt from the Bihar process?

4) Tell me about the decision to increasingly focus the campaign on Advocacy activities.

**NCSTM-specific questions**

1) Where does the campaign’s funding come from?

2) Are INGOs involved in the taskforce, and if not why not?
   1. If they aren't involved, will that change in light of GCAP's future strategy and the explicit sectoral breakdown that has been proposed for coalition steering groups (thirds)?
APPENDIX FIVE
The Millennium Development Goals

1. End Extreme Poverty:
   Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day
   Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people
   Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

2. Achieve Universal Primary Education:
   Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

3. Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women
   Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015

4. Reduce Child Mortality
   Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate

5. Improve Maternal Health
   Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio
   Achieve universal access to reproductive health

6. Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and other Diseases
   Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

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Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it

Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability

Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources

Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss

Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation

By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

8. Develop a Global Partnership for Development

Address the special needs of least developed countries, landlocked countries and small island developing states

Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system

Deal comprehensively with developing countries’ debt

In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries

In cooperation with the private sector, make available benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications