Governing domestic violence: 'doing' government, police realities and feminisms in policy activities

Thesis

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GOVERNING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
‘DOING’ GOVERNMENT, POLICE REALITIES AND FEMINISMS
IN POLICY ACTIVITIES

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

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Abstract

This thesis uses a discursive approach to examine how 'government', Chief Officer 'police realities' and 'feminisms' are accomplished as 'doings' in domestic violence policy activities across the decade 1990-2000. The main reasons for undertaking this research were absences in the governmentality literature around domestic violence, gender, analyses of power and changes in political government; unease about 'police culture' having slipped from currency in academic debate about the policing of domestic violence; and concern about what happens to feminisms in the government policy-making context.

Drawing on domestic violence policy documents, produced in the period 1990-2000, my main arguments are that 'doing' government is largely demonstrable in the activities of problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding 'working together'; and that much government truth-telling is founded on the claim of 'the already responsible government'. Chief Officers of police also self-present as already fulfilling their responsibilities; constituting their versions of reality through identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource. In contrast, 'doing' feminism seems less robust. It appears in organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence which are not permissive of women blaming and formulating subjects of representation. But none of these activities are named as or bounded to 'feminism' per se.

Changes in political government appear to impact differently on these various 'doings'. New Labour attempts to extend more control than the Conservatives over policy community members, gender(ed) understandings of domestic violence and local 'crime' matters. Chief Officers attune to shifts in government guidance but appear to use these truths in the service of their own transactional business. By comparison, shifts in the positions from which feminists speak appear to effect changes in their warranting strategies and exercisings of power. Thus there is a sense that 'feminisms' are perhaps the more malleable versions of reality in this context.
Acknowledgements

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This thesis is dedicated to my best partner and my best friend: Doug and Lin, thank you.
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Introduction

On the face of it the year 2000 seems to have been the culmination of a decade of domestic violence being taken seriously by the government and the police. Through the first part of the 1990s the Conservatives generated the first policies for the policing of, and inter-agency working around, domestic violence (Home Office, 1990, 1995). The Home Office published domestic violence research (Grace, 1995; Lloyd et al, 1994; Morley & Mullender, 1994). The Home Affairs Select Committee of 1992/3 focused on the issue (HASC, 1993a, 1993b) and there were parliamentary debates (Hansard, 1993, 1995). Legislation generated by this administration was carried forward by New Labour. The Family Law Act, Part IV, rationalised the means by which protective injunctions could be secured (Harwin & Barron, 2000) and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 has potentially beneficial applications in regard to domestic violence (Kelly, 2001; Kelly & Humphreys, 2000b).

New Labour undertook an integrated programme to end violence against women (The Women’s Unit, 1999); published research on domestic violence (Hanmer et al, 1999; Kelly et al, 1999; Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 1998); produced guidance to local crime reduction initiatives (e.g. Mullender, 2000; Walby & Myhill, 2000); rendered multi-agency working between the police, local authorities and local groups mandatory through the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (sections 5-7); and revised the policies on the policing of, and multi-agency working around, domestic violence (Home Office, 2000a, 2000b).

The police too made public declarations of taking domestic violence seriously (Stevens, 2000; Blair, 2000). In particular, the Metropolitan Police held an international conference for government personnel, service providers and academics (MPS, 2000b). And from this event they distributed copies of their 2000 domestic violence policy (MPS, 2000a). Further, working in specialist units addressing domestic violence, long a source of police assertions that domestic violence was not ‘real’ police work (e.g. Sheptycki, 1993; Waddington, 1993), has apparently become a “good career move” (Aitkenhead, 2003).

Feminists have been working tirelessly to provide services to, and raise awareness about, women experiencing domestic violence since the 1970s (e.g. Binney et al, 1981; Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Kelly, 1988; Pizzey, 1974; Southall Black Sisters, 1989; Stanko, 1989).
And they continue to do so (e.g. Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Harwin, 1999; Kelly, 2001; Patel, 1999, 2000; Stanko, 2000, 2001a, 2001b). In 1992, some were invited to give evidence at the Home Affairs Select Committee on domestic violence (HASC, 1993b). During the decade, feminists produced Home Office research (Hanmer et al, 1999; Kelly et al, 1999; Morley & Mullender, 1994); including authoring much of the government guidance to local crime initiatives in 2000 (e.g. Hague, 2000; Levison & Harwin, 2000). Further, Women’s Aid was consulted regarding the Family Law Act (Harwin & Barron, 2000) and named as a lead agency in New Labour government documents (Home Office, 2000a; The Women’s Unit, 1999). Feminists still work with the police at the local level, in many cases building on informal working arrangements which they themselves initiated (Abrar et al, 2000; Kelly et al, 1999). Consequently, it would seem that years of feminist campaigning and activism has played a key role in domestic violence’s emergence as a government and police policy concern.

However, as a subscriber to Foucauldian accounts of power and governmentality (e.g. Foucault, 1976, 1991), I am concerned about government’s policy interest in domestic violence at this point in history and the impact that might have on resistances traditionally posed by the police and feminists. As a post-structuralist, I am troubled that critiques of the policing of domestic violence grounded in understandings of police culture appear to have slipped from academic currency (e.g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; Southall Black Sisters, 1989); and that debates about what constitutes ‘doing’ feminism are most often associated with the research context (e.g. Haraway, 1990; Harding, 1991; Kelly, 1996; Williamson, 2000). As a feminist, I am drawn by debates which question feminist participation in government policy-making activities (Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Patel, 1999; Scott, 1993); claims that feminism is ‘in abeyance’ (Bagguley, 2002); fears that feminist knowledges have been appropriated for aims potentially antithetical to feminism (Radford, 2003); and arguments that New Labour see feminism as “yesterday’s politics” (Coote, 2000, p.3). Finally, as a discourse analyst, I understand that the various ‘doings’ of government, police officers and feminists in the policy arena will be demonstrable in their domestic violence policy talk and text.

distance' is framed as the means by which government steers others to do its bidding "by way of persuasion inherent in its truths" (Rose, 1999a, p.10). This marks a shift in the type of power exercised from sovereign power, an absolutist form of power that demands a specific response, to a form of pastoral power that offers the rewards of health, wealth and happiness to those who take responsibility for self-actualising (Foucault, 1982). Thus it can be seen as a more economical form of governing. Political discourse of this kind normally produces an account of those to be governed (Rose & Miller, 1992). This includes formulations of 'good citizens', those who have self-responsibilised, and 'bad citizens', those who have, as yet, failed to do so (Rose, 2000). Part of the correcting process of governance is to mobilise 'bad citizens' to self-actualise, usually with the help of 'appropriate' experts. But political discourse also presents a version of the government itself (Dean, 1999). And these dual constitutions of 'reflexive government' and 'responsibilised others' are necessary for constituting a government that understands and acts upon notions of 'good government' (Rose & Miller, 1992).

A key way of communicating governmental persuasion, and a site where much governance is 'done', is policy (Shore & Wright, 1997). Policy is constitutive of policy community members, including the government, target populations to be acted upon and 'appropriate' experts. Expert status may well be afforded to statutory bodies but voluntary agencies may be so positioned if they are understood to have local "indigenous knowledges" which might be beneficial for mobilising 'problem populations' (Shore & Wright, 1997, p.15). Consequently, government policy documents are likely to be rich sources of exercisings of governmental power including truth-claims and responsibilisations.

However, herein lies a paradox. Despite drawing on Foucauldian understandings of power, governmentality is not a theory of power (Barry et al, 1993). Instead it tends to focus on the reflexive, problematising and persuasive aspects of 'doing' government. How these activities are received or responded to is not normally explored (Kemshall & Maguire, 2001; Miller, 2001; Stenson, 2000). Thus 'doing' government is seemingly accomplished in the absence of competing accounts of reality (O'Malley, 2001) even to the extent that a top-down, possibly sovereign power relation, is implied (Garland, 1996, 2001). For Foucault (1976), there is no bi-polar formulation of rulers and the ruled. Rather power can be exercised from many positions within power relationships. Wherever there is power,
there is also resistance (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). Resistance may allow power to extend its reach but equally it may disrupt power.

In regard to domestic violence policy, potential resistances to governmental persuasions are likely to come from the police and feminists. This is because, at the practitioner level, they both produce the kinds of 'indigenous knowledges' about domestic violence populations of 'bad citizens' which might be deemed useful for governing at a distance. But both are positioned in different power relationships with government. As statutory agencies, it is appropriate for government to direct the police in a way not commensurate with feminists working in the women's voluntary sector or academia. Consequently, focusing on exercisings of governmental power without considering the different resistances that may facilitate or impede its progress is problematic (McLaughlin, 2002b).

As well as analyses of power, there are other absences in the governmentalist literature which have implications for this thesis. Firstly, domestic violence tends to be overlooked in favour of generic categories of 'crime' or 'risk' (as noted by Hughes, 1998; O'Malley, 1992). And yet, in the decade 1990-2000, domestic violence has emerged and evolved as a distinct 'governable matter' in its own right (see Chapter One). Secondly, in regard to domestic violence, gender understandings may well be important. For example, government has a history of attempting to mobilise women, as women, to manage their own risk through crime prevention literature (Gardner, 1990; Marcus, 1992; Stanko, 1995, 1996, 1997). Therefore, it is hard to see why government would give up such a potentially powerful tradition of responsibilising women 'victims' in their domestic violence discourse. But governmentalists do not seem unduly concerned by gender (as noted by Stanko, 1995, 1996; Walklate, 1997, 2002).

Thirdly, the decade 1990-2000 marks a shift in political government from Conservative to New Labour. For governmentalists (e.g. Rose, 1999b), New Labour are not seen as particularly inventive in their politics. Thus continuities and disjunctures through changes in political government tend not to feature large in governmentalist accounts (as noted by McLaughlin & Murji, 2001; Newman, 2001). I believe that this oversight on the part of governmentalists could be hasty, particularly when New Labour's re-imaginings of crime and the community are considered (Matthews & Pitts, 2001; Newman, 2001). For example, the re-positioning of feminists in government domestic violence policy-making processes...
from Select Committee witnesses in 1992 (HASC, 1993b) to authors of government
guidance in 2000 (see footnote 5) appears too significant to be dismissed as un-inventive.
Rather, it suggests that, at the very least, New Labour have exercised different persuasions
on how policy-making participants should work together.

Consequently, a governmentalist approach offers a way to analyse the policy 'doings' of
government and opportunities, not yet realised, to explore: resistances from the police and feminist;
the governmental activity of problem formulation in domestic violence policy
and policy-making processes; government's management and mobilisation of (female)
gender, particularly in constituting 'victims'; and the impact, if any, from changes in
political government, especially in persuasions to the police and feminists around how they
should work together. But it does not provide the means for understanding how the police
and feminists 'do' what it is that they do in the policy context.

'Police culture' has long been cited as influential to how the police understand their world
(e.g. Chatterton, 1983; Manning, 1977; Reiner, 1992; Westmarland, 2001). But as a
grounding for feminist critique about the policing of domestic violence (e.g. Dobash &
Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; Southall Black Sisters, 1989) it has apparently slipped from
academic currency. That is, arguments about whether the sexism and racism enacted in the
police canteen is largely indicative of how the law is enforced around domestic violence
now tend to be discussed in a backwater of police studies (e.g. Waddington, 1999) rather
than in feminist and/or governance research.

The debate as formulated in the 1970s and 1980s was problematic for me for two reasons.
Firstly, police culture was reified as an organisationally bound set of values, shared by
those of similar ranks, and language is simply a medium of conveyance. For post-
structuralist understandings, language is the site where meanings and subjectivities are
constituted and reproduced (Ramazanoglu, 1993; Weedon, 1997). Therefore, culture can be
seen as a 'verb' (Street, 1993); a 'doing' which is constitutive of the organisation and its
boundaries (Foucault, 1982; Wright, 1994). Discursive studies of the police focus on how
non-police knowledges are reformulated at notional boundary edges (Tracey & Anderson,
1999; Whalen & Zimmerman, 1990); how identity-work is used to undermine competing
versions (Fletcher, 1991); and how gender politics are accomplished (Auburn et al, 1995;
Wowk, 1984).

...
Secondly, police versions of reality are implied to be the preserve of junior officers only. And yet, there is no reason why Chief Officers of police should not be engaging in 'police culture' activity (Chan, 1996; Savage et al, 2001). Indeed, Chief Officers play a lead role in police policy-making processes, can access particular sources of power from the positions they occupy and have much to gain from engaging with government guidance (see Chapter 2, part one). Consequently, Chief Officer accomplishments in 'doing' police culture, or perhaps more accurately 'police realities' as identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender, could have important implications in the policy context which, to date, have not been explored.

From the feminist literature, it is clear that there is growing concern about what feminist participation in policy-making might mean (Abrar et al, 2000; Foley, 1996; Gagné, 1996; Jenness, 1999; Kelly, 1999; Lennie, 1999; Scott, 1993). One debate revolves around whether feminists should attempt, with care, to convert any opportunity that arises (Kelly & Humphreys, 2000b) or to exercise power by not working with governments which have abused feminists' previous co-operation (Patel, 1999, 2000). It is not the aim of this thesis to come down on one or other side of this argument. Rather, in keeping with my focus on 'doings', I share concern about the possible power relations which such government contexts encompass (Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Itzin, 2000; Smart, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1995); and I see feminisms as 'truth' producing discourse (Bell, 1995, 2001, 2002). Therefore, I am interested in accounting for what happens when feminists do take part in government policy-making around domestic violence.

However, this raises questions about how 'feminism' might be accomplished. To date, much feminist debate on the 'doing' of feminism has been located in the research domain (e.g. Harding, 1991; Kelly, 1996; Williamson, 2000). An exploration of what makes feminist research 'feminist' (Chapter 2, part two) seems to indicate the importance of the 'politics of production' to feminist-generated knowledges. A problem arises when some feminists obscure the relevance of their political concerns to the knowledges which they produce (Gill, 1998). Thus there is an implicit assumption that The Truth arising from such research will continue to be 'true' regardless of the context into which the discourse passes (Smart, 1995). But this assumption may be ill-founded. Within policy-making processes, in particular, truths are likely to be assimilated and reformulated in line with policy aims
(Shore & Wright, 1997); and certain ways of doing, knowing and telling truth are likely to be rendered ‘inappropriate’ (Patel, 1999, 2000).

Consequently, the question of how feminisms might be accomplished in policy-making becomes one of how feminist politics can be made relevant in the policy arena where feminists also have a tendency to play down their political concerns (Abrar et al, 2000; Kelly, 1999). Following Kelly (1999), there appear to be three activities which may be pertinent in this regard. Firstly, Kelly (1999) suggests that organisational naming, that is names that invoke political meanings such as ‘Southall Black Sisters’ and saying those names, is an important way within the policy-making context that feminism can continue to be made relevant to the knowledges that it has produced. Secondly, Kelly (1999) argues that forwarding ‘causes’ in the policy context, in ways that render the ‘doer of the deed’ visible and are not permissive of women blaming, could go some way to framing domestic violence as a problem for women rather than a problem of women.

Finally, there is the subject of representation. There is concern that feminisms could contribute to their own marginalisation if their politics become exclusionary by not paying sufficient attention to how their subjects of representation are formulated (Coote, 2000; Kelly, 1996; Mouffe, 1992). In particular, eliding differences in ‘race’, class and (dis)ability, and founding claims in the ‘worth’ of motherhood are problematic (Butler, 1990, 1992). But different feminisms may produce incompatible subjects of representation. And in this case, contra Kelly (1999), I argue that airing these differences in private rather than in the policy arena could facilitate government’s assimilation of feminist-generated knowledges as a single, united ‘truth’. Overall, I see organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence and producing subjects of representation as providing the basis for interrogating the ‘doing’ of feminisms in the government domestic violence policy-making arena.

It is one thing to identify that ‘doing’ government, police realities and feminisms may be important for explaining what is accomplished within policy activities. But it is quite another to account for what these various ‘doings’ might look like. They need to be demonstrable and theoretically sound. Therefore, methodologically, I have fashioned a synthetic discursive approach which draws on different analytical modes in order to address the questions raised by this thesis.
Unsurprisingly, Foucauldian Analysis (e.g. Carabine, 2001)\(^1\) attunes to Foucauldian understandings of discourse, knowledge/truth and power (discussed in detail in Chapter One). Thus it is compatible with post-structuralist notions of language and governmentality approaches. It is concerned with themes, ‘dialogues’ with counter themes and exercisings of power (Carabine, 2001). And it considers the wider rationalities and strategies of governance such as problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working together (Chapter One). Therefore, at the macro level of discursive analysis, it is a suitable analytical tool. However, its focus on breadth incurs the penalty of lack of depth. And the micro interactions of contestation and resistance, which are important to this thesis, can be overlooked in such an analysis (Kitzinger, 2000).

By contrast, Conversation Analysis (e.g. Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 1990; Sacks, 1972; Schegloff, 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Silverman, 1998; Wooffitt, 2001) is concerned with micro-political accomplishment. What is produced in interactive talk is all that is necessary for understanding the consequential nature of meaning-making. Although that approach is not adopted in my methodology, the tenet of ‘participants’ relevance’ is taken seriously. For example, ‘doing’ police realities cannot be demonstrated in the a priori assertion that the speaker ‘is’ a police officer. Rather, the emphasis is on whether and how the utterances make ‘being’ a police officer relevant to the truth-claims therein. A post-structuralist investigation of police cultures (Chapter 2, part one) indicates that the ‘doing of being’ a police officer is important to founding reality claims (Fletcher, 1991; Shearing & Ericson, 1991). Thus a Conversation Analytical inspired form of Discourse Analysis (Widdicombe, 1993, 1998) is used to illustrate how identity-work around ‘police officer’ is key to accomplishments of boundary-work, and to a lesser extent, gender formulations. And this forms the basis for interrogating the ‘doing’ of police realities.

‘Discourse Analysis’ is a term used for a range of approaches, including Foucauldian and Conversation Analysis, although it often indicates one of a myriad of positions somewhere between those macro and micro extremes (e.g. Edley & Wetherell, 2001; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Speer & Potter, 2000; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). From this body of work, feminism has been rendered apposite in two ways: how ‘the feminist’ is constituted in talk (Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 2001); and how feminist reflexivity is important as an ongoing consideration throughout the research process (Gill,

\(^{1}\) It is not that Carabine (2001) is the only person to be using Foucauldian Analysis. Rather, she is a rare case of a
One of the problems generated for this study by my data is that ‘feminist’ does not appear as an ‘appropriate’ category for warranting accounts within the government policy-making context. Certainly that makes for an interesting absence in itself, but it neither facilitates understandings of how feminism is ‘done’ nor necessarily indicates that ‘doing’ feminism is absent from policy activities. Further where feminists are included at the national level (discussed in Chapter 6) it is as ‘non-statutory service providers’ or ‘academic researchers’. Therefore, not all those who participated were feminist.

Initially, I struggled with who was and who was not feminist and how feminism, if at all, was being accomplished. As a feminist, I felt torn by the competing accounts and found myself engaging in gut-reaction judgements of who was doing what ‘better’. I realised I was ‘doing’ identity-work, boundary-work and mobilising gender as an occasional resource. There were times when it seemed ‘too difficult’ and I wondered whether, if I collapsed the thesis down to just the police and government, life would be easier and no-one would notice. But the tenets of feminist reflexivity, as having concern for women’s lives and a desire to elucidate the truths that are produced and attended to about those lives, were ultimately too important.

Consequently, what is often an intuitive and iterative analytical process required additional, at times mechanical, self-policing on my part. I therefore treated all the accounts produced by voluntary sector service providers and academic researchers as having the potential to be ‘doing’ feminism in terms of organisational naming, forwarding the causes of domestic violence and producing subjects of representation. By letting go of the notion that only feminists ‘do’ feminism I also reaped certain benefits, namely, identifying the ways that different participants managed the ‘rules of engagement’; showing that feminist discourse is hard to accomplish consistently during policy-making; and demonstrating that government, particularly New Labour, attempts to reformulate feminist-generated truth by ‘doing’ a version of feminism itself.

In order to satisfy the methodological synthesis, my data needed to be, at least notionally, in ‘dialogue’ with each other. To satisfy my theoretical concerns, they had to represent a change in political government and be viable for investigating the ‘doings’ of government,
Chief Officer police realities and feminisms. Transcriptions from the Home Affairs Select Committee on domestic violence (HASC, 1993b) provided interactive policy-making talk from police officers (including Chief Officers) and non-statutory service providers. But it was also positioned as a government dialogue with these groups between the production of a policy on the policing of domestic violence\(^2\) and one on inter-agency working and domestic violence\(^3\).

In 2000, New Labour published revisions of both these polices\(^4\) which means these documents can be understood as dialogic with both their predecessors and their respective audiences. There was no domestic violence Home Affairs Select Committee policy-making process under New Labour’s first term. However, participating feminists were now repositioned under the rubric of ‘academic researchers’ producing government guidance for local crime reduction initiatives\(^5\). Thus opportunities to conduct different dialogues from 1992/3 and to attempt to govern domestic violence at a distance were afforded. By contrast, the police had become more obscured in government policy-making arenas. Consequently, the Chief Officer data from this period comprise a Metropolitan Police domestic violence policy document which was made highly visible and dialogic by its distribution at an international conference for government personnel, service providers and academic researchers (MPS, 2000a).

My aim in this thesis is to employ the synthetic discursive methodology outlined above to analyse domestic violence policy and policy-making talk and text produced during John Major’s Conservative administrations and New Labour’s first term. The governmentality literature provides an account of ‘doing’ government and policy as a technology of governance. But as I noted previously, it tends to overlook domestic violence, gender, shifts in political government and how non-government ‘doings’ in terms of resistances facilitate and/or impede governance’s progress. Much literature on police culture is realist and not concerned with Chief Officers and the implications arising from that for policy activities. Also, the relevance of police culture to the policing of domestic violence seems to have slipped from academic currency. Further, although the ‘doing’ of feminism in the

\(^2\) Home Office Circular No. 60 of 1990.

\(^3\) Home Office Circular 1995. This document does not appear to have an issue number, therefore as the only Home Office Circular from this year quoted in this research, it is consistently named ‘HOC 1995’.

\(^4\) Home Office Circular No.19 of 2000 and Multi-agency guidance on domestic violence (Home Office 2000a).

\(^5\) The full list of these memos is: Crisp & Stanko, 2000; Davidson et al, 2000; Edwards 2000a, 2000b; Hague, 2000; Hamer & Griffiths, 2000; Kelly & Humphreys, 2000a; Levison & Harwin, 2000; Mullender, 2000; Mullender & Burton, 2000; Mullender & Hague, 2000; Walby & Myhill, 2000.
policy arena has become an important feminist focus, it has yet to be explored at the discursive level. This research attempts to contribute to these gaps left by the academic literature and to forward discursive understandings of ‘doing’ government, police realities and feminisms. My specific aims are:-

- To investigate the exercisings of power and resistance in the production of truths about domestic violence. Focusing on the local interactions of talk and the wider ‘dialogues’ with mainstream discourses of texts allows for a fuller account of what is accomplished during policy-making activities; particularly how government, Chief Officer police realities and feminisms are ‘done’.

- To explore the shifts between Conservative and New Labour attempts to govern domestic violence. Concentrating on the continuities and disjunctures between government accounts will enable me to consider how real or imagined counter-versions are managed through strategies of problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working together.

- To analyse the ‘doing’ of Chief Officer police realities around domestic violence. Forging a methodology to interrogate identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource, can overcome the problems of understanding police culture as a reified entity that police organisations ‘have’; and render ‘police culture’ a currently viable way of interrogating the policing of domestic violence.

- To present an account of ‘doing’ feminism. By exploring organisational naming, constitutions of causes and formulations of subjects of representation in domestic violence policy-making talk and text, the focus becomes how ‘feminism’ is, or is not, made relevant to participation, truth-claims and responsibilisations. It may also be useful for understanding how successive governments attempt (or not) to manage feminisms by ‘doing’ a version of feminism themselves.

My main objective is to present a discursive analysis of the interactions of truths about domestic violence between competing government, Chief Officer and feminist versions within the policy-making arena.
This thesis is set out as follows:-

In Chapter One I explore Foucauldian understandings of discourse, knowledge and power and how this has been influential in the governmentality work of Rose and others. I point to how such an approach falls short in regard to overlooking shifts between political governments, domestic violence as a discrete topic, the salience of gender and possible resistances to governmental exercisings of power. In considering these absences for the period 1990 to 2000, I identify problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working together as key government strategies in problematising and correcting domestic violence.

In Chapter 2 I focus on the possible resistances to government truths about domestic violence posed by Chief Officers of police and feminists. In Part One, I examine realist accounts of police culture and how a post-structuralist position on language affords opportunities to ask different questions. In particular, identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource can be seen to be instrumental in how ‘police realities’ are ‘done’. I also explore what an investigation of Chief Officer police realities, a key absence from the literature, might add to an analysis of police policy-making talk and text. In Part Two, I concentrate on feminisms. I interrogate what makes feminist-generated knowledges feminist. And I argue that a focus on organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence and producing subjects of representation provides a viable means for exploring the ‘doing’ of feminism.

In Chapter 3 I outline my discursive methodology. Providing examples of Foucauldian Analysis and Conversation Analysis, I explore issues of analytical depth and identity-work, indicating what each has contributed to my synthetic approach. Further, inspired by Discourse Analysis, I present a reflexive account of how this thesis came to be and how theoretical, methodological and data selection decisions were interrelated.

Chapter 4 marks the beginning of the main analytical findings. Here, two successive government policies on the policing of domestic violence are compared; Home Office Circular No. 60 of 1990 and Home Office Circular No. 19 of 2000. The emphasis is on the governmental activities of problem formulation and constituting victims with a particular concern for how power is mobilised to persuade the police audience of the veracity of these accounts.
The Chapter 5 data are Chief Officer domestic violence policy talk and text from 1992 and 2000. This apparently dissonant pairing of Chief Officer talk at the Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC, 1993b) and a Metropolitan Police policy text (MPS, 2000a) reflects shifts in the overt positioning of Chief Officers in government policy-making contexts across the decade. I compare and contrast 'resistances' in the 'doing' of Chief Officer police realities in terms of identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource. And I draw attention to methodological considerations between analysing talk and text.

In Chapter 6 the focus of investigation is the 'doing' of feminism in policy-making talk at the Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC, 1993b) and in the 2000 What Works? memos as government policy-making text. The producers of this discourse are not exclusively feminist. Unlike the police, whose participation is founded in their police status, feminists take part in 1992 as 'non-statutory service providers' and in 2000 as 'academic researchers'. Within the contexts of their different positionings, their exercisings of power and resistance around the activities of organisational naming, formulating causes of domestic violence and producing subjects of representation are interrogated. In addition, I compare the similarities and differences between analysing talk and text.

Chapter 7 brings the focus of analysis back to government discourse. This time the contrast is between Home Office Circular 1995, produced by the Conservatives as the first government policy on inter-agency working and domestic violence and its New Labour successor (Home Office, 2000a). The purpose is to interrogate shifts in the governmental strategy of forwarding working together. Discourse about general formulations of statutory agency obligations and persuasions is explored. But more specifically, the ways in which 'Women's Aid' is mobilised to found truth-claims, including responsibilisations, is also a key concern.

In the conclusion, I summarise and draw together the main findings of the thesis. And I present these in conjunction with feminist comment and suggestions for future research directions.

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6 See footnote 5.
Chapter One:
‘Doing’ Government: origins, developments and absences

Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to set out my theoretical framework and to explore from the academic literature what is known about the ‘doing’ of government around domestic violence policy. The purpose of this is to delineate the focus of this thesis as a whole and to raise specific questions that I will take to my government discourse data.

I examine the origins of my post-structuralist perspective, namely Foucauldian understandings of discourse, knowledge, power and governmentality (Foucault, 1976, 1980, 1982, 1988, 1991). Foucauldian theory puts competing notions of ‘truth’ into question. It also renders policy, its power networks and participants, a viable research topic. Further, I illustrate how governmentalists, particularly Rose (1993, 1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2000) have developed Foucault’s work to produce an account of how the ‘doing’ of government as a ‘problematising activity’ might be accomplished and analysed. From this perspective, two aspects of governance are likely to be demonstrable in government discourse: working on itself (‘reflexive government’) and working on others (‘responsibilised others’). The latter is exemplified through the notions of ‘community’ as a means of governance (Rose, 1999b, 2000), policy as ‘a technology of governance’ (Shore & Wright, 1997) and ‘managerialism’ (de Lint, 1998).

I go on to critique the macro level focus of these governmentalist studies, especially how they tend to overlook certain issues. Three absences which are central to this study and its comparison of the Conservative governments of the early 1990s and New Labour’s first term are elucidated. Firstly, domestic violence as a current ‘governable matter’ in its own right is explored; its ‘emergence’ as a distinct government crime-policy domain in 1990 and how ‘domestic violence as crime’ might be useful, but in different ways, under New Labour. Secondly, gender understandings, which are likely to be made relevant by at least some participants in domestic violence policy-making, are interrogated. The focus is on how domestic violence and those who commit, experience and deliver service provision for it might be rendered governable through gender discourse with a specific emphasis on New Labour’s formulation of the policy category ‘violence against women’.
Thirdly, analyses of power are examined. A debate between Rose (2000) and Garland (1996, 2000) highlights that an emphasis on how governmentality works in principle misses much of what happens in practice. Indeed, the focus on an ‘ethos of analysis’ rather than a theory of power (e.g. Barry et al, 1993) renders analyses of power superfluous (Newman, 2001). And yet, even a brief foray into what is known about the evolution of crime partnerships indicates that New Labour have maximised the potential of discourses of working together as means of governance, especially over feminist organisations. Collectively, my concern with changes of political government across domestic violence, gender understandings and analyses of power identifies three common governmental activities that seem important in how domestic violence was governed in the period 1990-2000: ‘problem formulation’, ‘constituting victims’ and forwarding ‘working together’.

Within the chapter conclusion, I reiterate my theoretical position and how it and the gaps in the academic literature have shaped the scope of this thesis, in order to outline what will be taken forward to future chapters.

1. Origins

In Foucauldian understandings, discourses are “historically variable ways of specifying knowledge and truth” and they delineate “what it is possible to speak of at a given moment.” (Ramazanoglu, 1993, p.19). Language has no inherent meaning of its own. Rather it is discourses within a historical/geographical time and space which give language its meaning. What is ‘true’ does not matter in and of itself (Foucault, 1980). What is important is how ‘truth’ is accomplished in discourse and privileged over competing versions. Further, human beings are not seen as producers of truth but as subjects constituted through discourse (Foucault, 1982). Thus I am concerned with how discourses are formulated and reproduced in ‘truths’ about domestic violence; be they government (e.g. Carabine, 2001), police (e.g. Adlam, 2002) or feminist (e.g. Bell, 1995, 2001, 2002) generated. For example, recent government policy has framed domestic violence primarily as ‘crime’ (Home Office, 1995, 2000a). Therefore, those experiencing domestic violence are likely to be constituted as ‘victims of crime’. Other available subject positions such as ‘women’ or ‘survivors’ may be undermined by or attempt to undermine ‘truths’ about ‘victims’.
Knowledges, as ways of knowing and accomplishing ‘truth’, are important to Foucauldian theory. Discourses of ‘crime’ and ‘victims’ may mean different things at different times. But they may also be the site of struggle in one specific historical and geographical locale. For example, consultation between agencies about crime at the local level has become a common occurrence in recent years (Hughes, 1998; Matthews & Pitts, 2001). In regard to such domestic violence co-operations, the participants most often present are the police and women’s advocates from local refuges (Malos, 2000). The police and women’s advocates may well produce competing ‘truths’ about domestic violence. For the police, organisational culture as a way of knowing will probably influence the ‘truths’ forwarded and the meanings accomplished (see Chapter 2). Women’s advocates, whether feminist or not, are likely to negotiate ‘truths’ around other interests (see Chapter 2). Therefore the meanings of ‘crime’ and ‘victims’ may be very different for them.

How these competing versions of the ‘truth’ fare will be influenced by the power/knowledge networks operating in that particular time and place. Certainly the government ‘truth’ of ‘domestic violence as crime’ may be a source of power for police accounts. But any ‘expertise’ afforded to women’s advocate knowledges about ‘victims’ might also be important.

Foucault is most clear about his position on power in The History of Sexuality, Volume One (Foucault, 1976, p.92-96). Here he counters much traditional and radical thought about power. Power is productive not repressive. It is integral to and constitutive of a range of relations as diverse as economic processes and sexual relationships. It is everywhere because it comes from everywhere. There is no bi-polar formulation of the powerful and the powerless. Rather, power can be visualised as capillary, spreading out in a multitude of directions and networks. Power is not owned or given and it cannot be acquired. But it can be exercised from a variety of positions within power relationships. Wherever there is power, there is also resistance. Indeed, power relations need to be contested in order to keep them in currency:-

“[P]ower needs resistance as one of its fundamental conditions of operation. It is through the articulation of points of resistance that power spreads through the social field. But, it is also, of course, through resistance that power is disrupted. Resistance is both an element of the functioning of power and a source of its perpetual disorder.” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p.147)
For this thesis, a good example of how Foucauldian notions of power may be useful concerns ‘policy’ itself. Evaluations of policies for the policing of domestic violence tend to critique how and in what ways those charged with specific responsibilities have not met them (e.g. Grace, 1995, 1999; Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 1998). Critique of practice and policy content often leads to assertions that more or better policy is required (Miller & Rose, 1990). But focusing on post-policy outcomes misses the point of what policy itself is doing (Crinson, 1998); particularly in regard to exercisings of power such as the constitutions of subjects and truths. Further, the relationship between those who write policy and those whose actions are to be directed by it is posited as a top-down power relation, to be regulated by rewards and sanctions. Therefore, policy is seen as a “rational, action-orientated instrument that decision makers use to solve problems and affect change” (Shore & Wright, 1997, p.5 (sic)). However, policy is unlikely to ever make a smooth transition from drawing board to practice (Miller & Rose, 1990). This is because of the vast range of networks of power and knowledges invoked in consultative policy-making processes and the diverse interests of participants before practice is ever embarked upon. Consequently, policy and the processes that give rise to it are potentially fruitful sites of study in their own right.

In his later work, Foucault (1982, 1988, 1991) began to consider ‘governmentality’ as a way of understanding how modern systems of power work. Power itself was not Foucault’s main concern but the ways in which “human beings are made subjects” (1982, p.208). This is important for understanding how governmentality is seen to function. From the middle of the eighteenth century there was a major shift in the rationality of government whereby changes occurred to both concepts of spaces to be governed and the way in which governance was to be achieved (1991). The change of focus from sovereign control of territory to ‘the population’ made the question of modern government “how to introduce economy - that is to say, the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth ... into the management of the state” (1991, p.99). This stands in stark contrast to accounts of the state “as a kind of political power which ignores individuals looking only at the interests of the totality” (1982, p.213).

Foucault sees the state’s exercising of power as “both ... individualizing and totalizing” (1982, p.213) due to the way in which the state has harnessed a form of pastoral power. Pastoral power in its format in Christianity promises salvation in the next world contingent
on self-sacrifice and looking after each individual in this world. In order to work as a form of power it requires an integral way of knowing oneself and acting accordingly. The modern form of pastoral power promises 'salvation' in this world in the form of health, wealth and security. It also extends its scope through a range of officials such as the police and institutions such as the family. Most importantly it too constitutes a way of knowing and experiencing oneself both as an individual and as part of a population (Foucault, 1982).

A significant element of steering self-knowing populations concerns generating and employing knowledges about them. The rise of statistics, 'psy' professions and research are indicative of not only how 'truths' about certain populations can be formulated but also 'scientifically' justified ways of knowing the 'truth' (1976, 1991).

By way of example, it is useful to reprise the government discourse of 'domestic violence as crime' and the diverse interests and knowledges of probable policy-makers. If domestic violence is primarily seen as a problem of crime by government, the presence of the police at policy-making does not seem illogical. But by contrast, the presence of those representing women's refuges (Home Affairs Select Committee, 1993a, 1993b) and academics with a specialism in domestic violence (Home Office What Works? Memos, 2000: e.g. Liz Kelly and Audrey Mullender) seems potentially dissonant. From a governmentality perspective their participation is legitimised through the knowledges they have about populations to be governed. If women who experience domestic violence are to be promised 'health, wealth and security' and rendered capable of aspiring to and pursuing them, they need to be mobilised as a population. Therefore, the participation in policy-making of those 'experts' who could facilitate this desirable outcome is not only logical but necessary. And this necessity may afford women's advocates more opportunities to exercise power than might be immediately apparent (see Chapter 2).

In this section I have set out the Foucauldian origins of my theoretical perspective. Notions of discourse, knowledge, power and governmentality are important not only to how I approach my work but also in framing what is to be studied. I am therefore interested in government policy and processes surrounding domestic violence with a particular emphasis on discourse, knowledge and exercisings of power by the key participants of government, the police and women's advocates. In the next section I focus on how governmentalists have developed Foucault's work and how that further influences the direction of this thesis.
2. Developments

Governmentalists, notably Rose (1993, 1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2000), have developed Foucault's notions of the economy of governing 'at a distance' through the constitution of 'governable subjects' and 'governable matters'. And this provides an account of the 'doing' of government. From this perspective, 'government' is seen as a "problematising activity", a 'doing', which "poses the obligations of rulers in terms of the problems they seek to address" (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.181, my emphasis; Rose, 1993). Therefore political discourse becomes the site in which a particular 'reality' is constituted and analysed and strategies formulated to correct it. These strategies, or perhaps more accurately political rationalities, always embody "some account of the persons over whom government is to be exercised" (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.179).

'Neo-liberalism' (or 'advanced liberalism') is understood as a distinct rationality that emerged in western societies in the mid-seventies countering the welfarism of the post-war period (Rose & Miller, 1992; Rose, 1993, 1999a & 2000). The liberalism that preceded welfarism was characterised by two principles: there was a limit on what could be governed and subjects' rights were important. Therefore, the conundrum for liberal government was how to work on civil society for the benefit of all. The solution was to valorise freedom whilst at the same time working on shaping that freedom in a way that encouraged subjects to self-govern in line with government's ideal of a good society (Rose, 1993). Integral to this approach was a 'reflexivity', a self-questioning by government about its legitimacy to rule and what constituted 'good government'. Therefore those who are to be governed include government itself.

The re-emergence of liberal ideals in the mid-seventies led to the denigration of post-war welfarism that provided for subjects in order to shape society, as a 'nanny state' that stifled individuality, was expensive and did not work (Rose, 2000). Welfarist government was deemed too large and trying to do too much and was critiqued as both malign and arrogant (Rose & Miller, 1992). 'Good' government was once again conceptualised in terms of 'less is more' (Rose, 1996). Hence, neo-liberal government has led to "a widespread recasting of the ideal role of the state ... (as) ... a partner, animator and facilitator for a variety of independent agents and powers" (Rose, 2000, p.323). The shift in political rationality is to "steering and regulating rather than rowing and providing" (Rose, 2000, p.324). This relocation of 'doing' government within political discourse in terms of reconstituting its
legitimacy to govern and the way it should govern is sometimes termed as ‘reflexive government’ in governance studies (e.g. Dean, 1999).

However, ‘reflexive government’ is not the only component of ‘governing at a distance’. This has another arm that concerns how those to be governed and their relationships to government are formulated. The neo-liberal ideal for the ‘appropriate’ citizen to be governed by this ‘appropriate’ form of government is characterised as self-regulating, self-responsible and investing in and capitalising on their own capabilities (Rose, 1999a). Thus the aim of this aspect of ‘doing’ government is to ‘responsibilise’ others. But ensuring citizens play their part appropriately cannot be enforced as that would demand more ‘hands-on’ government which is antithetical to neo-liberalism. Rather, governmentality is the art of exercising modern power “by seeking to invest the individual with subjectivity” (Miller, 1986, p.29, my emphasis). Indeed it:

“achieves its effects not through the threat of violence or constraint, but by way of persuasion inherent in its truths, the anxieties stimulated by its norms, and the attraction exercised by the images of life and self it offers” (Rose, 1999a, p.10).

An example of this ‘self-governing’ ideal which is pertinent to my thesis concerns the notion of ‘community’. The decentralisation of the ‘steering and regulating’ state has led to a fragmentation of the territory to be governed. Consequently, ‘society’ is weakened as a means of rallying individuals to a common good (Rose, 1996). By contrast, ‘community’ is very flexible. It can be argued on the basis of ‘self-evident’ features (e.g. ‘Asian community’) or locale (e.g. ‘community college’). It can be used to broaden a category (‘the wider community’) and to section off specific populations as having shared self-interests (e.g. ‘gay community’) (Rose, 1996). Constituting a ‘community’ brings into being both a population and ‘truths’ about its common purpose and collective nature (Hughes, 1998; McLaughlin, 2002a, 2002b). It has the added benefit of being seemingly benign and even logical. The ‘community’ is all of us, it is in us and effectively ‘just us’ (Rose, 1999b). And the sense is that ‘community’ is reliable, we can and should rely on ourselves and ‘people like us’.

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1 ‘Community’ has been notoriously under-theorised within criminology (McLaughlin, 1994; Lewis et al, 2001). Perhaps a key example concerns Braithwaite (2000) who as a proponent of restorative justice recommends ‘community solutions’ underpinned by understandings of ‘community’ from Maori culture. In Australia, these modes of correction have been imposed disproportionately on Aboriginal peoples whose notions of ‘community’ bear no relation to those in Maori culture (Hughes, 1998).
Community’ also functions in the way in which individuals are included or excluded as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ citizens within a specific community. The counterparts of responsible, autonomous citizens are “non-citizens, failed citizens, anti-citizens ... those who are unable or unwilling to enterprise their lives or manage their own risk” (Rose, 2000, p.331). Consequently, criminals, drug-users and those groups associated as risky or dangerous to civil society are not formulated as distinct communities. Nor does their failure place ‘bad citizens’ outside of a community. As with any counterpart, one of their functions is to constitute the included by definition (Rose, 2000). In this way, ‘bad citizens’ are often presented as localised problems for and of particular communities.

The steering and regulating ‘reflexive government’ does not abandon ‘bad citizens’ nor the ‘communities’ that house them. Rather, it concerns itself with helping them to help themselves2. This may take the form of ensuring that local service providers such as the police consult ‘community’ groups (e.g. Crime and Disorder Act, 1998). Thus as government reduces its direct exercisings of power and consequent obligations, ‘communities’ are caught in a “double movement of autonomization and responsibilization” (Rose, 1999b, p.476); the problem of the community is theirs and they are enabled to be free to contribute to its management as they choose. Therefore, “Community ... is itself a means of government” (Rose, 2000, p.329, emphasis in the original).

‘Community’ as a means of governance can be mobilised in a multitude of ways; and one that has resonance for this thesis is ‘policy’. There is a huge growth in policy and the way it impinges on all areas of our lives. Policy achieves its greatest impact “when, through metaphors of the individual and society, it influences the way people construct themselves, their conduct and their social relations as free individuals” (Shore & Wright, 1997, p.5). The language of policy is often cast in neutral terms that disguise both the authorship and its political rationality (Apthorpe, 1997). Such terms as ‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ appeal to an abstract notion of economy thereby masking for whom a particular action is beneficial (Shore & Wright, 1997). Most importantly, policies constitute ‘policy communities’ comprising three key elements: target populations of people to be self-actualised and self-responsibilised (bad or failing citizens); an ideal of what ‘good citizens’ might look like;

2 There is a limit to the ‘reasonableness’ of assistance that will be offered to failed citizens (Rose, 2000). ‘Hopeless cases’, those who cannot or will not self-actualise and who are deemed as a drain on and/or a danger to others, will ultimately incur heavy penalties (Hindess, 2001).
and an account of those ‘experts’ charged with policing (in its generic sense) those to be self-actualised (Hyatt, 1997).

For example, government policies for steering domestic violence interventions are likely, where domestic violence is formulated as crime, to create subject positions for ‘victims’ and ‘offenders’ as ‘bad citizens’, those unable to manage their own risk and those presenting risk to others. But actually reading or coming into direct contact with the policy is not a common occurrence. Therefore, the need for victims and offenders to self-regulate in line with the policy’s bidding (to stop becoming the victims of crime or to stop committing crime) will probably be framed as the responsibility of other policy community members; those who can be seen as ‘appropriate’ helpers or ‘experts’ in the self-responsibilisation process (Shore & Wright, 1997). Within the UK, those most commonly afforded ‘expert’ status around domestic violence are the police and women’s advocates. How they can be persuaded to embrace the responsibilities suggested by policy can be understood as mobilising appeals to ‘community’.

The police have long been encouraged to consider the ‘community’ as an under-used police resource (Goldstein, 1990). Thus the potential appeal of ‘community’ to the police is that it positions them where they can influence understandings of ‘community leaders’, ‘local experts’ and ‘responsible citizens’; perhaps even constituting the ‘community’ that is to be governed (Stenson, 1993). Indeed:

“engaging the community holds the potential for involving informal controls that are more permanent and more effective than any measures the police themselves are in a position to implement” (Goldstein, 1990, p.45, my emphasis).

In terms of domestic violence policy community membership, the notion of domestic violence as crime continues this encouragement. It positions the police as the most appropriate ‘professionals’ working on it. Dealing with criminals and gate-keeping the criminal justice system is within their professional remit. Thus despite how poorly they may have policed domestic violence in the past (e.g. Faragher, 1985; Ferraro & Pope, 1993; and see Chapter 2, part one) arresting those who commit it has always, theoretically, fallen within their jurisdiction. Their newer concern surrounds victims and how they might be persuaded to become ‘good citizens’ by managing their own risks through the criminal
justice system. And this, within a governmentalist account of policy, is where feminist 'expertise' becomes important as a potential police resource.

Within the UK, refuges for those experiencing domestic violence are almost exclusively run by women for women; and in the main they are managed under a feminist ethos. Although only 15% of those experiencing domestic violence use refuges (Home Office, 2003b) and they tend not to be representative of (Levison & Harwin, 2000), or conducive to (Haaken & Yragui, 2003), ethnic diversity, they do have a thirty year history of mobilising women to seek service provision for domestic violence. As such they produce "indigenous knowledges" (Shore & Wright, 1997, p.15) about a significant section of the target population which domestic violence policy seeks to govern; truths that have been successful in encouraging 'victims' to manage their own risk. Whilst this may seem to indicate that such feminist-generated knowledges are invaluable to policy, their future as such is not assured. Indigenous knowledges have a shelf-life for policy. That is, whilst they are useful and relevant to those charged with new responsibilities, they will be afforded 'expert' status. But if more useful or more relevant knowledges emerge the older versions may well be allowed to slip from currency (Shore & Wright, 1997).

Thus what government domestic violence policy may do is to found 'community' appeals to encourage feminist participation. It might position feminists as quasi-community leaders of women experiencing domestic violence; 'good citizens' who are attempting to help their community. And as policy community members, it may afford them (albeit temporary) 'expert' status to help the police (and others) with their new responsibilities. Accordingly, feminists are likely to be constituted as active citizens, located within the community, rather than 'professionals', acting upon the community. As such, within domestic violence policy feminists are likely to be cast in a power relationship of 'professionalised police and responsibilised public' (O'Malley, 1997). And that is a far cry from the feminist-generated informal working relationships with the police, often to feminist aims, which pre-dated formal policy provision (Abrar et al, 2000; Kelly et al, 1999). Consequently, policy and the ways in which it mobilises 'community' to work on the 'status' and inter-relationships between policy community members can be understood as a 'technology of governance' (Shore & Wright, 1997).
However, ‘community’ may not be the only discourse that policy mobilises as a means of governance over the police and feminists. Another key resource, and one that works on notions of professionalism, is ‘managerialism’ (Crawford, 2001; Hughes, 1998; McLaughlin & Murji, 2001). The managerialist ethos is underpinned by the assumption that better management leads to better policing (Hughes, 1998). It can be detected in the reduction of the public police’s domain, for example, in increases in private security (Loader, 2000) and civilianisation3 (Loveday, 1993). And it manifests in how senior officers have been made accountable in new ways (O’Malley, 1997): their use of resources (Leigh et al, 1999; Stockdale et al, 1999); how they attempt to prevent crime (Liddle & Gelsthorpe, 1993, 1994a, 1994b); and how they deliver what the public want (Bland, 1997; Chatterton et al, 1997; Elliott & Nicholls, 1996).

In regard to domestic violence, managerialism can be seen to have influenced changes in the activities and structures of police organisations. Thus domestic violence is now recorded as a ‘repeat crime’ rather than a series of isolated incidents (Farrell et al, 2000). And from the 1980s, specialist domestic violence units began to emerge (Sheptycki, 1993). Some commentators argue that these structural changes, as aspects of good management, will lead to changes in the ways that patrol officers understand and carry out policing (e.g. Goldstein, 1990). But governmentalists (notably, de Lint, 1998) contest this. Central to managerialism is the notion that good managers persuade staff to be self-motivating and self-regulating. However, the nature of patrol work is such that many officers are already responsibilised in this way. They carry out much of their work not directly supervised and rely heavily on their own discretion. Consequently, moves to be ‘better managers’, in the form of heightened activity to persuade patrol officers to self-responsibilise, is more likely to produce “refuge from accountability” for senior managers than to have much impact on the street (de Lint, 1998, p.280). In short, self-presentation as ‘good managers’ could be the main end product of the managerialist influence.

The notion of ‘professionalised police and responsibilised public’ suggests that feminists engaged in government policy-making processes may not be subject to managerialist discourse. But an example from the 1980s indicates that there is precedence for government to mobilise ‘professionalism’ in the attempted governance of feminist organisations (Foley, 1996). Rape Crisis (RC) is a grass-roots feminist organisation

3 Civilianisation is a rationale that leads to the assessment of all police posts in order to consider whether or not the job
established in the UK in 1976. As such it comprised a 'by women for women' service which endeavoured to develop theory from practice and use that to campaign for social change. It was this campaigning aspect that apparently led to problems when, in the mid-eighties, the police and hospitals began to join up in order to offer services to rape victims. In some cases these Sexual Assault Centres were set up without consultation with the local RC centre which was already providing similar services and had built up a certain expertise. In this way, feminist support services were undermined and potentially marginalised.

Although Sexual Assault Centres did not take off in any great numbers, their appearance marked significant changes and challenges for RC (Foley, 1996). Government funding was now accompanied by quasi-legal agreements which exerted considerable pressure to 'professionalise' and run RC centres along business lines. This led to some centres moving from collective working practices to hierarchical structures, recruiting staff on the basis of formal qualifications and providing services for men (Foley, 1996; Gillespie, 1996). Competition for funding (and clients) with non-feminist service providers lead to many RC centres focusing out of necessity on service provision alone, detached from the major feminist concerns of campaigning and consciousness raising (Foley, 1996). This 'choice' of being marginalised in order to retain their full political ethos or accepting funding and the consequent de-politicisation is also apparent in the history of rape crisis centres in the USA (Scott, 1993); suggesting that feminist participation in government processes may lead to a reduction in the activities which traditionally define 'feminism' (Bagguley, 2002).

Thus managerialism, or at least 'professionalism' discourse, could be mobilised by government in the constitution of subject positions for the police and feminists as domestic violence policy community members. However, it may lead to problems: senior officers might simply be empowered to talk up their professionalism as 'good managers'; and notions of 'professionalised feminists' could disrupt the 'professionalised police/ responsibilised public' dynamic that seems important to policy aims.

In this section I have explored aspects of governmentalists' work which develop Foucault's governmentality thesis. In particular, I have placed emphasis on their view of how the 'doing' of government can be seen to be done: in terms of constituting problems and
solutions and through the simultaneous activities of 'reflexive government' and 'responsibilising others'. From this perspective, 'community' can be viewed as a means of governance; a flexible discourse that both appeals to common-sense notions of belonging and 'good citizenry' and can be used to justify intervention upon 'bad citizens'. Further, policy can be understood as a 'technology of governance': something that puts physical distance between government and 'bad citizens' but extends governmental control over target populations by working on the power inter-relationships of policy community members, such as 'professionalised police and responsibilised public'. 'Managerialism' may also be mobilised by policy as a means of governance over police and feminist organisations. But its usage could empower policy community members to disrupt policy's aims.

In the next section I focus on what I see as key omissions from the governmentalist thesis in considering how domestic violence might be governed.

3. Absences

Although I broadly subscribe to the governmentalist approach outlined in section 2, in regard to domestic violence and policy-making it has potential limitations too. Integral to this thesis is a contrast in attempts to govern domestic violence from 1990 to 2000, a period that marks the emergence of domestic violence as a government policy interest under the Conservatives and its reformulation under New Labour's first term. As such, a governmentalist focus could miss the potential to explore continuities and disjunctures between changes in political government (Newman, 2001; McLaughlin & Murji, 2001). And the notion of neo-liberalism may become an a priori understanding rather than interrogating shifts (if any) in how 'government' is accomplished. Further, an interest in the macro level has been criticised for overlooking domestic violence as a specific 'governable matter' (Hughes, 1998; O'Malley, 1992), gender (Stanko, 1995, 1996; Walklate, 1997, 2002) and analyses of power (Miller, 2001; Newman, 2001; Stenson, 2000). Therefore, in this section I explore these absences from the governmentalist literature.
Governmentality studies tend to focus on the macro level, either in terms of the globalisation of ‘crime’ (e.g. Shearing & Stenning, 1985; and see Braithwaite, 2000) or notions of ‘risk’ and ‘crime’ based on Ulrich Beck’s work on insurance risk (e.g. O’Malley, 1992; and see Dean, 1999; O’Malley, 2001). Both of these approaches ignore what happens at the more micro levels (Kemshall & Maguire, 2001; Miller, 2001). Further, an emphasis on ‘crime’ loses sight of how a government’s problem formulation of domestic violence as ‘crime’ renders inappropriate other ways of speaking about the matter. In short ‘crime’ is reified as a starting point of research in a way that overlooks any benefits or disadvantages to government of steering domestic violence into a ‘crime’ classification (Hughes, 1998; O’Malley, 1992).

For governmentalists concerned with ‘governable matters’, the constitution of domestic violence as a specific policy domain seems to be a significant omission. In 1975 there was a Parliamentary Select Committee on Violence in Marriage (see MPS, 1975). Although this resulted in some encouragement to the police to keep statistics, review policy and treat domestic violence seriously (Holder, 1999; Hoyle, 1998; Morley, 2000) it is most famous for providing police quotations about the sanctity of marriage overriding the relevance of police intervention. Government tentatively pressed on with Home Office Circular No. 69 of 1986. But this document was mainly concerned with sexual offences and domestic violence seemed to be tacked on in areas surrounding the more sensitive treatment of victims (Hoyle, 1998). Indeed, there is some evidence that ‘sexual offences’ was constituted as the ‘governable matter’ of the 1980s (see Foley, 1996).

By contrast, domestic violence seems to be a prime ‘governable matter’ in government policy and policy-making in the period 1990 to 2000. The first indication of this came in 1989 with the publication of a Home Office literature review on domestic violence (Smith, 1989). In 1990, a specific policy for the policing of domestic violence came into being: Home Office Circular 60/90 (Home Office, 1990). In 1992/3 the Home Affairs Select

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4 Braithwaite (2000) is an exponent of restorative justice. The notion of re-integrative shaming within this approach has been explored by New Labour in regard to youth crime (Home Office, 2003). And there are those who argue that it might be a useful intervention in domestic violence (e.g. Hudson, 2002). But I share the pro-feminist view that apology already forms a large part of violent men’s cycles of violence against their women partners (Lewis et al, 2001).

5 A notable exception is Merry (2001), see section 3.2.

6 Home Office Circulars (HOC) are a particular manifestation of government policy in the UK. Regardless of topic, they are numbered sequentially within a calendar year. Therefore, HOC 69/1986 is the sixty-ninth HOC issued in 1986.
Committee held session on domestic violence (HASC, 1993a, 1993b). The Government Response to this Select Committee (Home Office, 1993) led to, amongst other things, the appointment of an official Interdepartmental Working Party and a Ministerial Group, a domestic violence awareness campaign (Don’t Stand For It, 1994) and another policy. This time Home Office Circular 1995 focused on inter-agency working. This document can be seen as encouragement to all those who provide services to those experiencing domestic violence to work together to a common end under the banner of ‘crime’ (Patel, 1999).

There was much optimism that New Labour coming to power in 1997 would treat domestic violence more seriously (Malos, 2000) even though no specific manifesto promises were made (The Labour Party, 1997). However, a campaign was forthcoming (Home Office, 1999a), as was a general policy on domestic violence (Home Office, 1999b), a cross-departmental strategy on violence against women (Women’s Unit, 1999), the establishment of The Women’s Unit and the appointment of two Ministers for Women. In addition, a distinct Interdepartmental Group on violence against women and domestic violence was set up. By 2000, New Labour had published a series of What Works? literature reviews and formulated these as the basis of informing and securing funding for local crime prevention initiatives (Home Office, 2000d-g). Further, the ‘policing domestic violence’ and ‘inter-agency working’ Home Office Circulars set up by the Conservatives were re-drafted and reissued (Home Office, 2000a & 2000b).

Although this list of government activity indicates that domestic violence has emerged and developed as a government policy interest in the period 1990-2000, it leaves two key questions unanswered: why the problem of domestic violence was formulated as one of ‘crime’ by government when it was; and why might New Labour keep the problem formulation ‘domestic violence as crime’ in currency.

The links between domestic violence and crime may well have been influenced by feminist critiques of the policing of domestic violence (e.g. Edwards, 1986, 1989; Hatty, 1989;
Southall Black Sisters, 1989; Stanko, 1989, 1994a); and feminist activisms for raising consciousness about and government interest in domestic violence (e.g. Pizzey, 1974; Binney et al, 1981; Mooney, 1993). But not all feminisms forward crime interventions (see Snider, 1998) and ‘crime’ is often only one of many issues such as housing, benefits, refuge provision, support networks and immigration restrictions which are raised by feminists (e.g. Harwin & Barron, 2000; Malos & Hague, 1997; Mama, 2000; Wilcox, 2000). Also, it is problematic to consider feminist ‘gains’ as linear and resulting from sustained campaigning (Smart, 1989). Thus rather than seeing government’s formulation of ‘domestic violence is crime’ as a product of feminist pressures, it is important to consider why, at this point in history, government might selectively ‘hear’ and act upon knowledges that had been circulating for nearly fifteen years.

From this perspective, ‘domestic violence as crime’ can be seen as potentially useful to Conservative governments up to and including those of the early 1990s. For a political party whose primary claim was to be the party of law and order, the ‘fact of life’ of high crime rates posed a serious problem (Garland, 1996, 2001). Indeed it was also a problem for, predominantly Home Office, criminologists who since the 1970s had found themselves in a bit of a no-man’s land (Hughes, 1998; O’Malley, 1997). Up until that time Home Office criminology had been predominantly concerned with the causes of crime and how the criminal, a person predisposed to criminal acts, could be rehabilitated (Hughes, 1998). However, much of this research had concluded that ‘nothing works’ (Hughes, 1998; O’Malley, 1992; Savage & Nash, 2001; Tilley, 2002) and this rendered crime potentially ungovernable. The knowledges produced about crime could offer government no ways of exercising power over crime rates. Therefore, this precipitated both government and Home Office criminological approaches to change from ‘crime’ to ‘crime prevention’ (see Forrester et al, 1988; Sampson et al, 1988).

Crime prevention and particularly understandings of ‘repeat victimisation’ and ‘situational crime prevention’ stem from the work of Ron Clarke; formerly the head of the Home Office Planning Unit and involved in the creation of the British Crime Surveys. Early British Crime Surveys indicated that half of those victimised by crime were repeat victims and that they suffered 81% of all reported crime. Further, four percent of victims were chronically victimised and their experiences accounted for 44% of repeat crime. Therefore, it seemed logical that working on the victims could be more efficacious than working on
criminals (Farrell & Pease, 1993; Pease, 1998; Tilley, 1995). ‘Situational crime prevention’ is forwarded as “the scientific arm of routine precautions” (Clarke, 1997, p.3). That is, simple activities such as locking doors and keeping possessions safe could reduce the opportunities for crime in a way that was potentially measurable. If the appropriate population were to be advised of how to keep their property and themselves safe, the fewer opportunities for crime would lead to a reduction in crime. In short, ‘target hardening’ is seen to reduce crime.

Consequently, it is not hard to see why domestic violence, generating some 1300 calls a day to the UK police (Stanko, 2000, 2001a, 2001b) and its associated patterns of abuse (e.g. Smith, 1989), came to be seen as “the quintessential repeat crime” (Farrell et al, 2000, p.15; Hanmer et al, 1999); and one that might be preventable through positioning those experiencing domestic violence as the targets to be hardened (e.g. Lloyd et al, 1994; Farrell & Buckley, 1999).

In addition, there were The Minneapolis Experiments of the 1980s (Sherman & Berk, 1984; Berk & Newton, 1985). This research concluded that the police arrest of domestic violence offenders did, at least in some circumstances, deter future violence. Despite the well documented flaws with these studies, the notion that ‘arrest is a deterrent’ was adopted with an alacrity not previously seen (Gelles, 1993) and which shocked even the researchers who produced it (Sheptycki, 1993). It is, though, not so surprising that governments would seize an opportunity to promote a ‘truth’ that said domestic violence was governable as a crime. After the worrying notion that ‘nothing works’ to reduce crime here was ‘truth’ that confirmed what governments wanted to hear. Domestic violence produced a substantial amount of crime. Despite arrest’s deterrence potential being highly contested (e.g. Hoyle & Sanders, 2000; Manning, 1993) ‘something worked’ and was measurable in terms of crime prevention. Domestic violence (and therefore crime) was reducible if those experiencing it could be encouraged to call the police and the police

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11 Despite doubts about whether such an approach is cost effective (Welsh & Farrington, 1999) and the problem that some crime will always be displaced elsewhere (Anderson & Pease, 1997), the logic of situational crime prevention has remained popular in Home Office research.

12 Most criticisms highlight methodological flaws such as research design and the participation of voluntary officers who systematically undermined the random nature of the experiment (Smith, 1989). It would also appear that the vast majority of the data was collected by one officer who was highly enthusiastic about the whole project (see Sherman & Berk, 1984). Also, the design assumed the process by which deterrence works (Manning, 1993). Other critiques problematised phone calls to the police as an effective measure for something as complex as domestic violence (Snider, 1998); there was no exploration of the possibility that women might be better off not calling the police at all (Edwards, 1989), and; mandatory arrest policies would reduce police discretion which might impinge on police attempts to address
could be persuaded to use arrest accordingly. Consequently, the parts of feminist-generated knowledges which criticised the police for not facilitating women’s use of the criminal justice system (e.g. Edwards, 1989; Southall Black Sisters, 1989) were useful to and therefore ‘heard’ by government (see Hoyle & Sanders, 2000).

However, it would be a mistake to assume that New Labour simply continued in the same vein. Certainly, domestic violence was still framed primarily as crime (e.g. Home Office, 2000b). Also, feminist-generated knowledges and the notion of ‘what works’ were still apparent in government documents (Hope, 2002; What Works? memoranda, see footnote 9). But New Labour had different concerns, not least of which was to self-present as a viable alternative to the Conservatives particularly in regard to wresting their mantle as ‘the party of law and order’ (McLaughlin & Murji, 2001; Savage & Nash, 2001). Central to this strategy, and commensurate with its ‘Third Way’ rhetoric, was to re-imagine the roles and responsibilities of civil society in a way that would reshape understandings of the social democracy relationship between government and the citizenry (Newman, 2001). In short, in regard to ‘crime’, New Labour’s main problem appeared to be how to constitute and mobilise ‘responsible citizens’. The solution appeared to be notions of ‘community’.

The first part of New Labour’s strategy can be understood as making ‘crime’ into ‘the public’s problem’ in three distinct ways. Firstly, the notion of ‘crime’ was reformulated as one of ‘crime and disorder’ (Matthews & Pitts, 2001). That is, commensurate with New Labour’s view of social democracy, the category was expanded in a way that incorporated the “prime concerns of ordinary citizens” (Giddens, 2000, p.4; McLaughlin, 2002a). Thus a range of anti-social behaviours and sub-criminal nuisances such as ‘loutish-ness’, noisy neighbours and littering all came under the rubric of crime and disorder (see Home Office, 2003a). In this way, the need for crime prevention was re-framed into a “civilising mission” and one which apparently reflected the voiced concerns of the citizenry (McLaughlin, 2002b, p.55).

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13 Although Third Way discourse, promoting a ‘reasonable’ course between notions of social democracy and neo-liberal concerns with market forces, is a feature of New Labour’s approach to social democracy (Crawford, 2001; Giddens, 1998), it is not a specific concern in this thesis. This is because the bulk of the work accomplished by ‘The Third Way’ concerns legitimising New Labour’s chosen path as the only viable political alternative rather than a distinct strategy per se (Newman, 2001; Rose, 1999b). At the level at which I analyse government policies (Chapters 4 and 7), I am more concerned with how responsibilisations of citizens and organisations are accomplished in that discourse.
Secondly, the term ‘crime prevention’ was replaced with the concept of ‘community safety’. ‘Community Safety’ had been recommended to the Conservatives in 1991 by the Morgan Report but not taken up (Matthews & Pitts, 2001; McLaughlin, 2002a; Newburn, 2002; Tilley, 2002). The benefit of this ethos to government was explicitly formulated as encouraging the public to embrace crime as a local issue; one that they could and should accept some responsibility for rather than seeing it just as a police matter (Hughes, 1998). Consequently, ‘community safety’ founded attempts to mobilise citizens to share the ‘ownership’ of crime and disorder in their area.

Thirdly, New Labour’s imagining of ‘community’ was heavily influence by the work of Etzioni in the USA (Crawford, 2001; Hancock & Matthews, 2001; Hughes, 1998; McLaughlin, 2002b; Rose, 1999b). In regard to the argument I am making here, Etzioni’s most important contribution concerns how a lack of community can be implicated in high rates of crime and disorder (Crawford, 2001). Thus combined with the understandings that the problem of crime and disorder should be influenced by the public and that citizens are stakeholders in their community safety, the community is additionally implicated in the state of disorder in which it finds itself. In short, New Labour have constituted a potent mix of public rights, citizen responsibilities and community blame which serve to reformulate ‘crime’ as the problem of the citizenry.

However, reformulating a problem and responsibilising people to do something about it is only part of what New Labour have apparently accomplished. Therefore, the second part of New Labour’s strategy can be seen as the government enabling communities to fulfil their responsibilities. The ‘empowerment’ of citizens is crucial both in assisting them to play their part in governance and well as re-drawing their relationships with government and others (Newman, 2001). In regard to crime, the local partnerships made statutory under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 essentially de-centre the responsibility for crime from the police (Matthews & Pitts, 2001). The police, local authorities, health authorities and probation services are now obliged to work in partnership with each other (see section 3.3), joining up their responses to social problems and considering the implications to community safety of their combined and individual agency activities (Savage & Nash, 2001). And consultation with the local community has been rendered a necessity. Thus communities are empowered to be ‘heard’ by local services and participate in how local issues are addressed.
But my primary point in exploring New Labour's approach to matters of crime was to consider why 'domestic violence as crime' might be a useful concept. And one answer seems to be 'refuges'. In New Labour's understanding, volunteering is central to community life (McLaughlin, 2002b). Therefore, as voluntary organisations, refuges stand as a ready-made example of 'good citizens', defining 'the problem', accepting responsibility for 'the problem' and engaged in community safety activity. Although this way of working preceded New Labour discourse it nonetheless is likely to be claimed by them as part of their 'success story' (Newman, 2001). Also, as I argued in section 2, refuge workers have a history of working together with the police. Thus the feminist ethos of collaborating with local service providers is broadly contingent with New Labour notions of active citizenship. Consequently, 'domestic violence as crime' might well be a useful concept to New Labour in that it validates certain refuge activities as government successes whilst facilitating their assimilation and/or selective reformulation under governance (see also section 3.3).

However, refuges also generate a possible contradiction for New Labour. As well as 'community', 'family' is an important discourse for them in re-generating notions of moral order (Newman, 2001). Refuges can be seen to bring women together as a 'community' of women, often but not exclusively, from the local area. Whether refuges actually form part of the wider community in which they are located is debatable due to the often secret nature of their locations (Haaken & Yragui, 2003). But interestingly, 'community' is absent from government policy around domestic violence (Walklate, 2002). And I wonder if the idea of women living in a community of women who have, in the main, left 'family' relationships with men, renders refuges, their client group and those who run them 'troublesome' for New Labour despite the advantages of their self-responsibilised citizenry. This idea is developed further in the following section.

In this section I argued that domestic violence as a distinct governable matter, warrants more attention than it has been afforded by government officials. From 1990-2000 domestic violence emerged and developed as a government crime policy interest. But to assume that the potential usefulness to government of 'domestic violence as crime' remained constant through the Conservative administrations of the early 1990s and New Labour's first term would be problematic.
For the Conservatives, the problem formulation of domestic violence as crime was seemingly beneficial for lowering crime rates through criminal justice interventions and encouraging individual citizens to take responsibility for their safety. Thus their policies might be expected to place a heavy emphasis on the 'proper' policing of domestic violence and how victims might be persuaded to use the criminal justice system. For New Labour, the apparent benefits of 'domestic violence as crime' can be found in how pre-existent forms of working such as refuges and feminist-led police collaborations exemplified the responsible citizenry of New Labour's imagination in a number of ways: they exercised the right to define problems; they claimed some 'ownership' of the problem; they exercised responsibility for managing 'community safety'; and they worked with local service providers. Consequently, their domestic violence policies might be expected to frame a less central role for the police and an increased emphasis on the voluntary sector.

The governmental activity of problem formulation about domestic violence around 'crime' and 'responsibilised others' can be seen to have been useful to both the Conservatives and New Labour; although in different ways. But how they constitute domestic violence in actual policy discourse is absent from governmentalist and other governance studies. And this gap is addressed within this thesis.

In the next section I pick up a concern that I expressed here in regard to the contradiction that communities of women may raise for New Labour around the joint notions of 'responsibilised citizens' and 'the family'. Thus I turn my attention to understandings of gender and domestic violence.

3.2 The salience of gender

In the same way that governmentalists overlook domestic violence (as noted by Hughes, 1998; O'Malley, 1992) they also do not generally concern themselves with gender (Stanko, 1995, 1996; Walklate, 1997, 2002) or diversity more generally (Newman, 2001). Further, an emphasis on 'crime' tends to lead to an exploration of 'offenders' as 'bad citizens' with limited attention paid to how 'victims' may be constituted as 'bad citizens' (e.g. Rose, 2000). And yet, it is hard to render gender irrelevant to domestic violence. Statistics (Mirrlees-Black & Byron, 1999; Mooney, 1993), accounts by violent men (Anderson &

14 Foucault's notorious disinterest in gender (see Sumner, 1990) is one reason why his work is often seen as incompatible with feminisms; others include notions that we are dupes, doomed regardless of our efforts and a
Umberson, 2001; Lewis et al, 2001) and even non-feminist research (Bourlet, 1990; Hoyle, 1998) contradict conceptions of crime as gender free. And this is particularly pertinent for domestic violence policy-making where the presence of women's advocates in 1993 (Home Affairs Select Committee) and in 2000 (What Works? literature reviews)\(^\text{15}\) suggests that 'women experiencing domestic violence' are the key population earmarked for governance (see also sections one and 2).

The case is slightly different in the USA where women 'victims' are subject to a gendered intervention of 'separation' whilst at the same time men are made subject to programmes of retraining in masculinity (Merry, 2001). This 'balance' is not found in the UK, where programmes for men are still in their pilot stages despite over ten years of research (Bowen et al, 2002; Burton et al, 1998; Eadie & Knight, 2002; Home Office, 2003b). One reason for this may concern feminist resistance to them. This has been on the grounds that 'programmes for violent men' can cover a multitude of interventions from simple anger management to pro-feminist ones that engage with gender relations (Lewis et al, 2001; Orme et al, 2001). Feminist preferred formats often follow the Duluth model which emphasises men's use of power and control over women (see Pence & McMahon, 1999; Pence & McDonnell, 2000). Another problem for feminists is that, traditionally, government sponsored interventions on men have been at the expense of services for women (Burton et al, 1998). A further objection stems from schemes that are linked to criminal justice processes (such as CHANGE in Scotland in the early 1990s). These can be problematic because offenders may be held accountable to the criminal justice system rather than to the women they have committed violence upon (Orme et al, 2001).

The lack of programmes for violent men in the UK suggests that 'men who commit domestic violence' may not currently be framed as a specific population to be governed\(^\text{16}\). Rather, they are likely to fall into a generic, ungendered category of 'offenders'. Consequently, the gender relevance of domestic violence for the purposes of intervention might emphasise female gender for 'the done-tos' and no specific gender for 'the doers'.

\(^{15}\) See footnote 9.

\(^{16}\) Scourfield and Drakeford (2002) indicate that New Labour's main masculinity formulations in policy concern fathering and the education of boys.
Such a precedence is supported by feminist critiques of crime prevention literature specifically addressed to women (Gardner, 1990; Marcus, 1992; Stanko, 1995, 1996, 1997; Walklate, 2002). In particular, these documents constitute a disturbing formulation of ‘the responsible woman’ (Stanko, 1995, my emphasis). This ‘responsible woman’ polices herself and her actions in such a way as to avoid crime, especially that which lurks down allies and in dark places. If she becomes a victim of crime she has become an imprudent woman (Stanko, 1995, 1997). The subject positions constituted for women in this discourse render them “vulnerable and victimizable” (Smart, 1992, p.222; Marcus, 1992). And they have the potential to widen women’s fears, encourage self-blame and increase their self-policing (Stanko, 1996). Thus ‘being women’ not simply being victims of crime is problematised; and that could be useful in the ‘management’ of ‘women’ (Ramazanoglu & Holland, 1993).

However, this highlights a potential contradiction between feminist critique and feminist policy-making. Often the ‘woman’ of feminist discourse is formulated as a ‘survivor’ in need of support, services and interventions to empower her to take control of her life and safety (see Chapter 2, section 2.2). In some ways, the ‘responsible woman’ of crime prevention discourse, as self-actualising and managing her own risk like a responsible ‘good citizen’, can be seen as similar to feminist-generated subjects of representation. And:

“Feminists have ... sometimes been unaware of the way in which ... subjects are constituted as having inbuilt or essential attributes and defects which require certain kinds of intervention and surveillance. The social practices which are aimed at these subjects stem directly from the discourses which created them in the first place.”

(Watson, 2000, p.74)

Consequently, feminist policy-makers may have inadvertently contributed to a wider understanding of ‘being women’ as problematic but governable around issues of domestic violence (see Chapter 2, part two).

In government policies from 1990 to 2000, ‘women who experience domestic violence’ have been steered towards criminal justice solutions (Harwin & Barron, 2000). However, there are three distinct differences in the ways that successive political governments can be seen to have re-imagined (gendered) victimhood. Firstly, New Labour are credited with having wedded discourses of rights and obligations more effectively than their predecessors (Lund, 1999; Rose, 1999b). Consequently, “No rights without
responsibilities” (Giddens, 1998, p.65) leaves less room for formulations of (women) victims who may be exempted from the need to self-responsibilise (Lund, 1999). This may lead to an increase in mobilising/enabling discourse around the constitution of victims within crime policy.

Secondly, New Labour have formulated a new policy category of ‘violence against women’ (Women’s Unit, 1999); as a governable matter separate from, but related to, domestic violence. In the previous section, I argued that domestic violence communities of women could be problematic for a government concerned with ‘the family’. ‘Violence against women’ constitutes a policy community of ‘just women’; it neither genders offenders nor renders domestic violence commensurate with gendered victimhood. Thus whilst this could be read as a viable government response to feminist claims for a constituency of women, it could equally be read as a means by which notions of female gender and heterosexual family violence are managed out of domestic violence formulations.

Thirdly, and following on from my second point, it is worth considering the other ‘community’ voices that have came to the fore in regard to domestic violence; namely, lesbian and gay representations (e.g. Haymes, 2000; Kibblewhite, 2000) and those of ethnic minority women (Alibhai-Brown, 2000; hooks, 2000; Huda, 2000; Mama, 2000). I am not arguing that domestic violence should be framed as gendered violence; nor that these competing versions of reality should not be heard. Rather, I am questioning the usefulness of these voices at this time to government should it wish to undermine notions of domestic violence as gender(ed) ‘family’ violence. Potentially, both could be used to disrupt gender understandings: ‘race’ and ethnicity despite intersecting with gender are often treated as a separate issue (e.g. Home Office, 2003b); and gay and lesbian identity politics often elide gender difference (Cooper, 1992/3). Further, although discourses of homosexuality could be understood as detrimental to ‘the family’, they might also be useful to a government concerned with managing the contradiction of ‘the family’ and communities of women around domestic violence.

In this section I have argued that gender, or at the least female gender, is likely to be made relevant by some participants in policy-making for domestic violence. Specifically in the governmental activity of constituting victims, female gender and responsibility ascription
around 'being women' are likely to present in both Conservative and New Labour policies; but it is also probable that gender/victim formulations will be a source of difference too. It would seem that New Labour have created the potential to constitute very different subject positions for domestic violence victims from those in Conservative discourse. In particular, it appears that notions of female gender, male against female gendered violence and family violence are being managed. And this could be related to the contradiction for New Labour's notions of 'the family' arising from the prevalence of communities of women who attempt to take responsibility for their own safety by leaving violent men. Thus the absences from governmentalist studies of gender and 'bad citizen' victimhood raise unanswered questions about gender(ed) understandings of domestic violence in government policies. How (if at all) will they be managed? In what ways (if any) are they mobilised in constituting victims of domestic violence as governable? This too is a gap in research knowledge that this thesis aims to address.

In the final section of this chapter I consider another key absence from governmentalist accounts which is important to this study; namely, analyses of power.

3.3 Analyses of power

Perhaps the main problem arising for me from governmentalist studies is how governing at a distance is deemed to work in principle rather than in practice. A key example would be 'resistances'. Much is claimed for resistance but little is demonstrated (Miller, 2001; Stenson, 2000). And this tends to frame the 'doing' of government as an undisturbed linear progression, not something that might evolve in regard to obstacles (O'Malley, 2001). I see this as symptomatic of governmentalist accounts being forwarded as an 'ethos of analysis' rather than a theory of power (e.g. Barry et al, 1993); in a way that renders analyses of power superfluous (Newman, 2001). Therefore, in this section, I explore through the example of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA 1998) and 'partnership' discourse what such a governmentalist approach might miss that is relevant to my thesis.

The CDA 1998 is seen as important because it enshrines in law the notion of statutory local crime partnerships between the police and local authorities (e.g. Matthews & Pitts, 2001; Savage & Nash, 2001). From a governmentalist perspective, the appearance of CDA 1998 does not disrupt the governmentality thesis. Although responsibilisation is the more normal
means by which governmental power is exercised, the mobilisation of the law can be seen as a continuance of this rationality. Certainly it may involve using the resource of sovereign power as entailed by 'the law'. But Foucault (1980) never claimed that sovereign power was dead and gone, simply that as a means of day-to-day governance it was no longer efficacious. Therefore, potentially, invocations of the law may well indicate that governmental power has temporarily harnessed sovereign power for its aims (Rose & Valverde, 1998). In this account, responsibilisation is still the key rationality and 'partnership', like 'community' and 'managerialism', is rendered a potential means of governance.

However, a competing account is provided by Garland (1996, 2000). He accepts that governments engage in responsibilisation but he sees this as a strategy rather than a rationality. That is, he argues that when government mobilises the law it is not in the service of a new form of power. Rather, it indicates that sovereign power has been working all along. Thus invocation of the law is commensurate with government flexing its muscles, reminding the police and others who holds all the power and forcing them to do what they would not do when simply responsibilised through other means. From this perspective, 'partnership' is simply one of many responsibilisation strategies (Garland, 2000, p.124).

My point in presenting these two accounts is that both are theoretically possible, internally consistent and potentially compelling. But neither demonstrate their positions in practice. Certainly, for me as a discourse analyst, how New Labour constitute CDA 1998 in actual policy discourse is important (See Chapter 7). But even without that depth, much can be gleaned from a consideration of the existent academic literature about CDA 1998 and how that indicates shifts from the Conservatives to New Labour; how 'partnership' and other discourses of working together have been mobilised; and the political implications for non-statutory participants. All of these are important considerations for my thesis and all are absent from governmentalist versions.


\footnote{In Chapter 2, I interrogate how the 'doings' of the police and feminists, key non-government domestic violence policy-makers, might be identified and analysed as potential resistances.}
Service providers who share client groups should consult each other, ensuring that clients get the best service available and do not end up moving from organisation to organisation seeking what they need. The principle of this logic is supported by even the most radical thinkers (e.g. Patel, 2000). And for years feminists developed working relationships with the police for just such a purpose (Abrar et al., 2000; Kelly et al., 1999). But within governmental understandings, 'partnership' is useful for masking power differentials between 'partners' (Newman, 2001; O'Malley, 1997), eliding political differences (Newman, 2001) and working on government's responsibilities for, and relationships to, what happens at the local level (Matthews & Pitts, 2001; Newman, 2001).

To illustrate the differences between the Conservatives and New Labour around 'partnership', it is worth briefly considering how crime partnerships, in particular, have evolved. Early crime partnerships under the Conservatives comprised the Five Towns Scheme in 1986, Safer Cities from 1988 onwards and Crime Concern from 1990 (Houghton, 2000). But these were never central to the government's thrust on crime policy (Tilley, 2002) and were largely concerned with encouraging private investment (Houghton, 2000).

In regard to domestic violence, the notion of crime partnerships was introduced in Home Office Circular 60/90 in the form of inter-agency working (Home Office, 1990; see Chapter 7). Here, following the recommendations of the Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC, 1993a, 1993b) the police were encouraged to work together in partnership with other statutory and voluntary agencies under the auspices of 'crime' (Patel, 1999). No additional funding was made available and these working arrangements were advisory rather than compulsory (Patel, 1999). The Conservative emphasis on single agency effectiveness (Newman, 2001) is perhaps reflected in the discourse 'inter-agency'. But this document, within its advisory persuasions, did begin to disrupt the notion that domestic violence as crime could be effectively dealt with by any one single agency (see Home Office, 1995 and Chapter 7).

For feminists electing to work in inter-agency partnerships, there are potentially mixed blessings. Certainly their knowledges are likely to be valued and HOC 1995 can be seen as

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18 In some ways it is hard to call this a debate per se. This is because Garland (2000) never cites Rose and Rose (2000)
a response to the HASC where feminist service providers were called as witnesses (see Chapter 6). However, government processes are likely to have ‘rules of engagement’ that position and work upon participants in particular ways (Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Patel, 1999; Smart, 1989). These may include delimiting the relevance of knowledges to those parts that are useful for crime aims (Crawford, 1994); appropriating feminist-generated ways of working together for individual agency benefit (Radford, 2003); and effectively, managing feminist organisations by inviting them in where the potentially troublesome elements of their knowledges and practices can be rendered inappropriate (Patel, 1999). Indeed, the increased participation of feminists in government realms has led to a decline in activities traditionally associated with feminist resistances (Bagguley, 2002; and see Chapter 2). But the voluntary nature of crime partnerships for the police and other statutory agencies, possibly meant that the impetus to work together could still be feminist-led; and historically, this has resulted in partnerships run on feminist lines (Abrar et al, 2000; Kelly, 1999).

By contrast, New Labour capitalised on the potential of ‘partnership’ as a means of governance (Crawford, 2001; Newman, 2001). The CDA 1998 enshrined in law the notion that the accomplishment of community safety lay beyond the capability of a single agency (Crawford, 2001)19. Consequently, this problem focus necessitated a ‘joined-up’ response both at the local level of statutory/voluntary service providers and in terms of the relationship between central and local government (Newman, 2001). And the shift in working together discourse from ‘inter-agency’ to ‘multi-agency’ appears to reflect this move to a social problem emphasis.

Those implicated in local crime partnerships now had a duty to community safety. But this devolution of responsibility was not commensurate with a devolution of power (Crawford, 2001). For statutory partners, CDA 1998 “prescribes the goals they should pursue, the targets they should achieve and the timescales in which they should operate, but not the means for their achievement” (Matthews & Pitts, 2001, p.7). And this is accompanied by a complex system of additional funding linked to community safety achievements (Home Office, 2000d-g). Thus New Labour ascribes responsibility and allows limited autonomy whilst simultaneously holding on to managerialist performance indicators, problem

in a foray into crime studies quotes Garland as in agreement with his position.
19 Although domestic violence was not initially rendered a statutory subject of crime partnership in CDA 1998, this has been mooted in New Labour’s latest government White Paper on domestic violence (Home Office, 2003b).
formulation and funding (see Tilley & Laycock, 2000); thereby reducing the amount of government that needs ‘doing’ but extending the reach of governance (Crawford, 2001).

For feminists engaged in this type of partnership work, the additional implications are manifold. Firstly, New Labour’s imagining of working together assumes consensus between partners and therefore does not engage with the complexities of political differences (Newman, 2001); feminism in particular is seen as “yesterday’s politics” (Coote, 2000, p.3). Secondly, the joined-up approach houses a contradiction whereby single agencies still have individual responsibilities that are likely to impact upon their partnership activities (Crawford, 2001). Thirdly, the mobilisation of the law in regard to partnership impacts on the power positionings of those police and feminists already working together voluntarily. The shift for the police from voluntary to compulsory participants is not accompanied by a similar shift for feminists. As non-statutory participants, government policy cannot directly direct them; thus they remain ‘public volunteers’ in a way that formalises the ‘professionalised police/responsibilised public’ divide (O’Malley, 1997) and frames their ‘appropriate’ participation as ‘good citizenry’.

Consequently, the Rose/Garland ‘debate’ around what type of power is mobilised in governance seems to miss the opportunity to explore how crime partnerships have evolved through discourses of working together (including ‘inter-agency’ and multi-agency’); how New Labour has seemingly maximised the resource of ‘partnership’ as a means of governance; and how forwarding working together around domestic violence has been potentially useful for governing feminist organisations.

In this section I critiqued governmentalist accounts which demonstrate governance in principle rather than in practice. The absence of potential resistances is a key concern that I address in Chapter 2. Here I argued that a competing account of government’s mobilisation of the law in the form of CDA 1998 was equally compelling but similarly lacking. A comparison of the Conservatives and New Labour approaches to crime partnerships indicated that the governmental activity of forwarding ‘working together’ has been important to both; although New Labour seems to have extended the reach of its governance especially where feminist organisations are concerned. The gaps in the governmentalist literature raise questions for this thesis. How do New Labour constitute ‘the law’ in the activity of forwarding working together? What shifts between the
Conservatives and New Labour are identifiable in formulations of feminist agencies? How do Conservative/New Labour accounts of single agency responsibilities differ in policy which forwards working together?

In the chapter conclusion, which follows, I reprise my theoretical position, summarise my thesis focus and indicate what is to be taken forward to Chapter 2.

**Conclusion**

This thesis is underpinned by Foucauldian understandings of discourse, knowledge, subjectivity, power/resistance and governmentality. Thus I am interested in ‘truth’; who constitutes it, who occupies positions as truth-tellers and how truth is accomplished. I see policy as a technology of governance and I am therefore interested in the various exercisings of power (and resistance) within policy documents and policy-making processes. The key concern of this thesis is domestic violence as a governable matter; that is, how truths told about it, including those that mobilise gender understandings, subject it to governance in the period 1990-2000.

I also subscribe to a governmentalist account of the ‘doing’ of government as a problematising activity. My primary analytical concern for government policy discourse will focus on how the ‘doings’ of ‘reflexive government/responsibilised others’ and ‘professionalised police/responsibilised public’ are accomplished through the governmental activities of problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working together. In addition, I will look out for ways in which government policy mobilises discourses, such as ‘community’, ‘managerialism’ and ‘partnership’, as means of governance.

Chapters 4 and 7 of this research house my analysis of government policy discourse. Of major concern are the continuities and disjunctures between documents produced by the Conservatives in the early 1990s and New Labour’s first term.

In Chapter 4 the two policies for comparison are: Home Office Circular 60/90, the first ever policy published in the UK, in 1990, for the specific matter of policing domestic violence; and Home Office Circular 19/2000, New Labour’s revision of 60/90 in 2000. Between these two I will explore shifts in the governmental activities of problem
formulation and constituting victims; how truth is accomplished, including responsibility claims and ascription. Problem formulation is likely to revolve around understandings of domestic violence, crime and gender. The literature suggests that the Conservatives may place a heavy emphasis on the ‘proper’ policing of domestic violence and frame links between domestic violence and female gender. By contrast, New Labour might be expected to present a less central role for the police in dealing with domestic violence and to undermine gender(ed) formulations. Victim constitution is likely to mobilise gender and responsibility discourse. The academic literature seems to imply that the Conservatives will generate women victims and possibly some room for them to be exempted from responsibility. In comparison, New Labour’s victims may well be diverse in terms of ethnicity and sexuality. It is anticipated that female gender will be ‘managed’ and that no victims will be exempted from responsibilisation.

In Chapter 7 I contrast two government policy documents which promote working together in regard to domestic violence: the Conservatives’ Home Office Circular 1995, the first inter-agency policy of its kind in this country; and New Labour’s Multi-Agency Guidance (Home Office, 2000a), its revision. The key emphases for similarities and differences concern how understandings of domestic violence as a local crime problem are used to found appeals to work together and how the feminist organisation Women’s Aid is constituted in regard to single and joint agency responsibilities. Between the Conservatives and New Labour, the literature suggests continuities around the ‘logic’ of working together, notions of ‘professionalised police/responsibilised public’ and attempts to assimilate but de-politicise feminist-generated knowledges and working practices; and New Labour disjunctures around the mobilisation of ‘the law’ (CDA 1998) and the extent and means of governance exercised over Women’s Aid, including diversity issues and the notion of a ‘good citizenry’ success story.

In this chapter I have set out my theoretical perspective, the thesis focus, my understandings of the ‘doing’ of government and how that will be taken forward to the relevant analysis chapters. However, I have not examined potential resistances to governmental activities; an ‘analysis of power’ omission for which I criticised governmentalist approaches. Therefore, in Chapter 2 I explore how the domestic violence policy ‘doings’ of the police and feminists might be analysable in ways commensurate with my post-structuralist position.
Chapter 2: Possible Resistances: ‘Doing’ Police Realities, ‘Doing’ Feminisms

Introduction

In Chapter One I set out my theoretical perspective as subscribing to Foucauldian understandings of discourse, subjectivity, ‘truth’ and power; and incorporating a governmentalist account of ‘doing’ government. Thus I see ‘policy’ as a technology of governance and ‘government’ as a problematising activity which includes accounts of those to be governed. These attempts to govern ‘at a distance’ should be demonstrable in the governmental activities of problem formulation, victim constitution and the forwarding of ‘working together’. And it is likely that power inter-relationships between policy community members such as ‘reflexive government/responsibilised others’ and ‘professionalised police/responsibilised public’ will be generated in the ‘doing’ of government. I was also critical of the traditional macro level focus of governmentalists which tends to overlook domestic violence as a distinct ‘governable matter’, the salience of gender, analyses of power and changes in political government. Therefore, this thesis attempts to explore these absences by examining the ‘doing’ of government in regard to domestic violence policy-making in the period 1990-2000.

A key concern I was unable to explore in Chapter One arises from the governmentalist tendency not to engage in analyses of power; namely, potential resistances (Kemshall & Maguire, 2001; Miller, 2001; Stenson, 2000). Specifically, ‘government’ is often presented as an uninterrupted accomplishment rather than an on-going and evolving rationality which deals (or not) with the challenges posed to it (O’Malley, 2001). Therefore, in this chapter I interrogate the ‘doings’ of two other domestic violence policy community members for this point in history; that is, the police and feminists.

In part one I focus on the police. I critique accounts which reify the police culture of junior officers. Then through post-structuralist theory reprised from Chapter One, I go on to re-conceptualise ‘police realities’ as ways of ‘doing’ truth; particularly through identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource. And I place emphasis on Chief Officer ‘doings’ of police realities, domestic violence policy-making as an opportunity to ‘do’ police culture and potential shifts in these accomplishments between 1990 and 2000. In part two I explore feminisms. I begin by interrogating what might render
feminist activities 'feminist'. And after Kelly (1999), I examine how feminism might be made relevant to policy-making participation around domestic violence. Specifically, I identify organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence and producing subjects of representation as ways feminism might be accomplished.

In the chapter conclusion I summarise how I intend to analyse 'doing' police realities and 'doing' feminisms. And I delineate what is to be taken forward to future chapters.

1. 'Doing' Police Realities

In the 1970s and 1980s, it was common for feminists to critique 'police culture' as relevant to the poor policing of domestic violence (e.g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; Southall Black Sisters, 1989). Two aspects of this position are problematic for me. Firstly, it presents a realist account of junior officer 'culture' which leads to a theoretical impasse in the face of pro-police realist challenges (e.g. Waddington, 1993, 1999). Secondly, in recent years, police culture seems to have slipped from currency in feminist accounts of policing domestic violence. The emphasis now seems to be on influencing the structures within which police culture might operate (e.g. Ganapathy, 2002; Stanko, 1994b). Thus feminists seem more interested in senior police officers but less concerned with police culture per se.

The aim of this chapter part is to examine what is known about police culture and policy-making from the academic literature. The purpose is to delineate Chief Officer police realities as a viable and current site of enquiry for this thesis. Therefore, in section 1.1 I make a conceptual move from 'police culture' to 'police realities' by arguing that post-structuralist theory offers understandings of police realities as accomplishments; particularly around identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource. In section 1.2 I bring policy-making as police-work into focus and argue that Chief Officers are also likely to 'do' police realities. And I suggest that interrogating Chief Officer 'doings' of cultures in domestic violence policy-making activities from 1990-2000 is an, as yet, unexplored but potentially fruitful site for research.
1.1 From police culture to police realities

In common parlance the term ‘canteen culture’ has become synonymous with what the police are like (Fielding, 1994; Sheptycki, 1993). At least at the level of the rank and file, there is a rowdy and regular set of sexist (Fielding, 1994), racist (Smith & Gray, 1983) and homophobic (Burke, 1993) exchanges. Excessive drinking, womanising and sexual boasting are common (Skolnick, 1966; Westmarland, 2001). And homosexuality is hated and reviled (Frewin & Tuffin, 1998; McKenzie, 1993; Niederhoffer, 1969). Consequently, police culture is widely viewed as distinctly ‘macho’ (Brown & Heidensohn, 2000; Herbert, 1998; Prokos & Padavic, 2002; Reiner, 1992; Young, 1991).

This extends to police talk about the work that they do. Although police officers often ‘talk up’ the dangerous and ‘manly’ aspects of police-work, this sits in sharp contrast to the mundane nature of much of what they actually do (Banton, 1964; Bittner, 1967; Cain, 1973; Cumming et al, 1965; Ericson, 1982; Herbert, 1998; Manning, 1977; Punch, 1979; Reiner, 1991a, 1994; Walker, 1996). Policewomen are seen as a feminising threat to traditional police-work (Fielding & Fielding, 1992; Waddington, 1999; Walklate, 1993) and even a danger to the policemen who may feel obliged to protect them (Jones, 1986). And yet, policewomen too apparently embrace police culture (Brewer, 1991; Brown & Campbell, 1991; Holdaway & Parker, 1998; Sheptycki, 1993). Further, there is a set of terms within police talk that categorise duties as worthwhile or ‘rubbish’ and members of the public as good or bad (Manning, 1977; Reiner, 1992; Waddington, 1993); although, it should be noted that there are no neutral formulations for women as there are for men.

In regard to the policing of domestic violence, it is commonly asserted that the police make decisions based on their understandings of what domestic violence is (e.g. Bell & Bell, 1991; Felson & Ackerman, 2001; Ferraro, 1989; Ferraro & Pope, 1993; Fyfe et al, 1997; LSPU, 1986). Factors considered in deciding whether or not a crime has been committed include the perceived worthiness of the victim (Chatterton, 1983; Faragher, 1985; Loseke, 1989; Westmarland, 2001); and how ‘serious’ the violence is deemed to be (Felson et al, 2002; Sheptycki, 1993; Waddington, 1993). A ‘troublesome’ woman may be arrested.

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1 Television’s obsession with realism and the police has provided most of us with ideas about how the police see the world (Hurd, 1979; Loseke, 1989; Tulloch & Tulloch, 1992).
2 ‘Rank and file’ is a shorthand within police studies for those police officers who normally conduct patrol duties. They are normally of the rank of constable or sergeant.
3 The most common ‘positive’ representation of women is ‘policemen’s wives’. They are invariably invoked as paragons of virtue (Estridge, 1994), in need of protection from the terrible truth of policing (Fletcher, 1991) and somehow important to the doing of being a policeman (as illustrated in Banton, 1964).
rather than the man (Banton, 1964)\textsuperscript{3} or threatened with a counter-arrest (Ferraro, 1996; Westmarland, 2001). Further, there is a suggestion that the police are particularly negative when incidents of domestic violence occur within same sex partnerships (Haymes, 2000) and where the people involved are black, Asian or from other minoritised ethnic groups (e.g. Patel, 2000; Stanko, 1989)\textsuperscript{6}.

However, despite these fairly coherent knowledges about ‘canteen culture’ and the ‘policing of domestic violence’, how they may be consequent upon one another is contested. Those who understand these two activities to be related tend to be (pro)feminist (e.g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; Southall Black Sisters 1989). Those who contend any inter-relatedness tend to be pro-police (e.g. Holdaway, 1995; Skolnick, 1966; Waddington, 1999). Between these two positions there is agreement that ‘canteen culture’ exists and that the ‘policing of domestic violence’ leaves something to be desired. The disagreement concerns whether the two are part of the same phenomenon (e.g. Southall Black Sisters, 1989) or ‘bifurcated’ (Waddington, 1999).

The feminist perspective from the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; Southall Black Sisters 1989) asserts the relationship between ‘police culture’ and the ‘policing of domestic violence’ as largely self-evident. The sexist talk in the canteen is a manifestation of the same values that underpin the way domestic violence is policed. This is deemed particularly evident in terms of how the police subject women experiencing domestic violence to the same exercisings of patriarchal power that their abusers subject them to (Southall Black Sisters, 1989). That is, the macho police service and violent men both abuse the privilege of maleness to the detriment of women. Thus police sexism is an important consideration.

By contrast, the pro-police account\textsuperscript{7} claims that ‘canteen culture’ and ‘policing domestic violence’ are ‘bifurcated’ (Waddington, 1999). What happens in the canteen is merely a concentration of sexist talk (Holdaway, 1995) or a natural response to the pressures and

\textsuperscript{4} Within this bracket, Chatterton (1983) is the only one not critical of the way the police deal with domestic violence.

\textsuperscript{5} Like Chatterton (1983), Banton’s (1964) account is pro-police. In a domestic violence incident he witnessed where a drunken woman was arrested he appears to agree that she is the cause of the ‘trouble’.

\textsuperscript{6} In the case of Asian populations, the police often cite their own lack of cultural understandings as a reason not to interfere in ‘family’/‘cultural’ matters (Patel, 2000). By contrast, black populations tend to be over-policed and this, through fear of how they may be treated, can result in the police not being called at all (Edwards, 1989; Ferraro, 1996; Mama, 2000; Snider, 1998; Stanko, 1989).

\textsuperscript{7} It is noteworthy how many of the ex-police officers working in police studies adopt this position (e.g. Bourlet, 1990; Holdaway, 1983, 1995; McKenzie, 1993; Niederhoffer, 1969; Waddington, 1993, 1999).
constraints of police work (Reiner, 1992; Skolnick, 1966). It gives “purpose and meaning to (an) inherently problematic occupational experience” (Waddington, 1999, p.287). Within the police canteen, officers boast because it helps them feel better about themselves and remain untainted by the “dirty work” with which they deal (Waddington, 1999, p.299). Domestic violence generates criticism for the police because the public do not understand that the police categorisation for assessing such cases is “domestics” (Waddington, 1993, p.161). This category comprises a range of incidents from squabbling neighbours to lost children. The police are interested in crimes and it is difficult to sift crime from what could just be spiteful motives (Waddington, 1993). Sexist talk is ubiquitous (Waddington, 1999) and police officers’ attitudes are not that different from the public’s (Scripture, 1997). Therefore, police sexism is not that important.

To some extent these two approaches have reached a theoretical impasse. They see the same ‘canteen culture’ and poor policing of domestic violence but they contest what that means. For the feminist account presented here, the meaning lies chiefly in the effects of these activities and for Waddington, the meaning is to be found in what the police themselves understand to be happening. I think both effects and police understandings are important. And I see the impasse as a result of both approaches reifying ‘canteen culture’. That is, they assume that culture is ‘real’ and language is simply a medium through which thoughts, feelings and accounts are conveyed; in short, they are realist accounts. From a post-structuralist perspective police culture, or ‘police realities’, is ‘a verb’. As a means of ‘doing’, including ‘knowing’ and ‘being’, police cultures can be understood to be constituting police versions of social reality as true. Therefore, theoretically, this shifts the focus of enquiry from what reified police cultures mean. And it generates opportunities to ask different questions such as how police cultures may be accomplished and to what effect.

In post-structuralist theory, as I argued in Chapter One, language is the site where meanings are produced, subjects constituted and social realities formulated (Weedon, 1997). Discourse is contradictory (Gill, 1993; Meyers, 1994; Stalans, 1996; Wetherell et al, 1987) and provides “competing ways of giving meaning to the world” and knowing truth (Weedon, 1997, p.23). Subjectivity too is “a site of disunity and conflict” (Weedon, 1997, p.21) and individuals “the site and subjects of discursive struggle” (Weedon, 1997, p.93). Consequently, subject positions are not something one has or is but they are “ways of
being an individual” (Weedon, 1997, p.3, my emphasis). Also discourse is historically and geographically specific (Ramazanoglu, 1993). And there will consequently be limitations in any time or place to what can be spoken and how an individual can ‘be’. Further, because of the contested nature of truth, all social realities are fragile and require production and reproduction in order to keep them in currency (Weedon, 1997). Therefore, a member of a police organisation has certain opportunities to make meanings and occupy subject positions. These will shape ‘the doing of being’ a police officer which in itself needs to be repetitious in order to be kept current.

For example, ethnomethodological accounts of policing (Sacks, 1972; Shearing & Ericson, 1991) illustrate ways of ‘doing the being’ of a police officer. In regard to patrol officers, this comprises seeing the social world differently:–

“For the police, objects and places having routine uses are conceived in terms of favorite misuses. Garbage cans are places in which dead babies are thrown, schoolyards are places where molesters hang out, stores are places where shoplifters go, etc” (Sacks, 1972, p.292).

This version of police social reality is communicated to new police recruits through the use of story-telling. Providing anecdotal accounts is also used to convey ‘rules’ about how to read an incident and how to react ‘appropriately’ (Shearing & Ericson, 1991). In this way, patrol officers, over time, build up a ‘tool-kit’ of situations and responses that imbue their subjectivities with a police ‘sensibility’ (Shearing & Ericson, 1991). And this comprises a world view that “as a way of seeing, implies a way of being that invites a doing” (Shearing & Ericson, 1991, p.499).

Therefore, organisational culture is not, as suggested by realist accounts, something that people within an organisation have (Wright, 1994). Nor is it something that just ‘is’ within the boundaries of the institution (Wright, 1994) or a specific organisational locale such as the police canteen. Rather culture is a ‘verb’ (Street, 1993). It is a ‘doing’ that is actively and repeatedly produced, reproduced and kept current within a range of processes. As such it comprises exercisings of power whereby knowledges are formulated and forwarded as truth.

8 Considering the distinction between ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998, p.1) this paper of Sacks’ is more in the vein of ethnomethodology. This is because he seems to be musing about how the
From this perspective, it is possible to explore what ‘doing’ police realities might comprise. McNulty (1994) suggests that public encounters generate opportunities to reproduce police versions of reality. And this seems to be borne out by discursive studies of emergency calls to the police (Tracey & Anderson, 1999; Whalen & Zimmerman, 1990). These illustrate how public claims of truth are interrogated and reformulated when they are presented to a police organisation. In short, public meanings are changed in order to generate a police response or justify no response. This is a common feature of institutional discourse (Agar, 1985) whereby accounts passing from the outside into an organisation are effectively ‘recontextualised’ (Linell, 1998). No talk is produced outside of a context. A person calling the police is making meanings of their own which are contextually bound to what they think they are asking for or what their expectations of the police might be. Therefore, when the incoming truth is reformulated to make sense within police versions of social reality it is recontextualised. Further, this exercising of power over competing knowledges constitutes an organisational boundary (Foucault, 1982). Thus ‘doing’ culture in terms of boundary-work is constitutive of the organisation itself (Wright, 1994).

Another example of how police realities are kept current by privileging the truths they produce and constituting boundaries comes from a study about the use of anecdotes in police discourse (Fletcher, 1991). Anecdotes are a very common feature of police talk (Shearing & Ericson, 1991). However, they are not used in conversations with police wives and criminals (Fletcher, 1991). The arguments that police officers use for why this is the case concern the dangers of unnecessarily upsetting their spouses and potentially giving away important information to wrong-doers (Fletcher, 1991). This suggests that anecdotes are understood to convey something that only those with police officer identities know. This argument is further supported when the use of police anecdotes with other police officers and community members are explored. In conversations with officers in similar ranks, anecdotes invoke the notion of shared experience. But in talk with non-police, the subject position constituted for the audience is used as a device to show just how divorced their experience is from (police) reality (Fletcher, 1991). In short, the version forwarded and founded in police identity-work is presented as reality; not a police reality, but the reality which can only be seen in its totality from the vantage point of the police.
A further discursive example about how police realities may function is provided by interrogation studies and concerns notions of gender (Auburn et al, 1995; Wowk, 1984). This research is interesting because it demonstrates the mobilisation of gender as a resource in the same transactional business of securing a confession.

Wowk (1984) explores a police interrogation of a man accused of murdering a woman after a party. She shows how a police officer draws on common-sense understandings of women's sexual manipulation of men and uses this to blame the woman and exculpate the man's action. In the common-sense understandings of wider society, negative representations of women are frequent (Smart, 1992). Claims for the inferiority of women and their difference from men are often grounded in truths about their propensity for sexual manipulation (Gough, 1998). Thus Wowk's (1984) research illustrates that non-police-generated truths, or 'outsider knowledges', may be reproduced in police discourse without much recontextualisation, if they are useful to the transactional business in hand.

Auburn et al (1995) analysed a range of police interrogations, some of them domestic violence, where men were accused of using violence against other people. This study indicates that even within the same discursive work with the same man, female gender comes and goes in its usefulness to the particular matter in hand. For example, the notion that it is unmanly/un-gentlemanly to hit a woman is used in attempts to secure a confession. But once a confession is secured and the police emphasis shifts to building a 'crime' case of assault, gender is no longer warranted. Consequently, it would seem that gender proves a valuable occasional resource at least in the activity of interrogation.

Collectively, this notion of gender as non-police-generated discourse available to police realities as an occasional resource is commensurate with West and Zimmerman's (1987, p.129) account of gender as a "product of social doings". They argue that gender can be understood as an omnirelevant resource which can be accomplished and made relevant in any activity. Consequently, both the presence and absence of gender discourse may be pertinent to gender 'doings'. Whether gender is mobilised as an occasional resource in other police discourse has not been documented within the academic literature. But interrogation studies provide a potential means of moving beyond arguments that police

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9 These same underpinnings are apparent in the discourse of rapists (Godenzi, 1994; Scully & Morolla, 1984, 1985) and men who beat their women partners (Adams et al, 1995; Cavanagh et al, 2001; Heam, 1996a, 1996b) when justifying their actions in terms of men's rights to have sex with women and women's culpability in bringing that about.
sexism is necessarily related and therefore worthy of investigation (e.g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; Southall Black Sisters, 1989) or bifurcated and therefore dismissable (e.g. Waddington, 1999).

Indeed, in keeping with my focus on discursive work on how talk is occasioned rather than timeless, I would argue that what is important is to consider what sexism is doing in a particular time and place not that all sexism is automatically related (Gelsthorpe, 1986). And that would involve both demonstrating the relevance of gender discourse to those who produce it (e.g. Williams 2002; and see Chapter 3) and exploring the effects of police exercisings of power which invoke gender (Gelsthorpe, 1986).

In this section I have examined the traditional literature which identifies similar accounts of ‘canteen culture’ and the policing of domestic violence but contests how these activities are related. They tend to reify police culture and implicate either effects or police understandings as crucial to accounting for meaning. I have argued that police cultures are best understood as ‘a verb’. They are ways of knowing truth and ‘doing the being’ of a police officer. Their frailty as social realities requires them to risk the disruptive potential of challenges in order for them to be reproduced and kept in currency. As exercisings of power, through identity-work and boundary-work, they are mobilised to undermine competing accounts, privilege police versions of reality and recontextualise competing knowledges. But they are not water-tight. Common-sense discourses can pass into police realities particularly if they serve the transactional aims of a situation. Gender can be shown to have been mobilised in this way as an occasional resource. From this perspective, both effects and police understandings are important. However, I, like traditional studies of police culture, have focused primarily on the rank and file. Therefore, in the next section I consider the implications of Chief Officer police realities and how these might provide a useful site for exploring police policy-making activities.

1.2 Chief Officer police realities and domestic violence policy activities 1990-2000
Studies of the police do posit a variety of different police cultures for the rank and file. These concern differences between an urban/rural divide (Cain, 1973); community policing/patrol officers (Fielding, 1995); detectives/non-detectives (Hobbs, 1991); and rivalry between police stations (Young, 1991). Some also point to differences between managers and non-managers (Chan, 1996; Punch, 1983; Niederhoffer, 1969; Reuss-Ianni
& Ianni, 1983; Skolnick, 1966). Although these accounts of police managers suggest different concerns arising from different positions that they hold within police organisations, the main focus for most tends to be about how the rank and file attempt to undermine senior managers. It is uncommon for Chief Officers to come under the spotlight in their own right (for exceptions see Reiner, 1991b; Savage et al, 2001) or to consider how and in what ways their constitution and reproduction of cultures contributes to their dealings with the public. And yet, a post-structuralist account of police realities would seem to suggest that there is no reason why Chief Officers should not be ‘doing’ cultures too; and policy-making can be understood as a policing activity (Patel, 1999). Therefore, in this section I explore some possible similarities and differences in the ‘doing’ of Chief Officer police realities around domestic violence policy work in the period 1990-2000.

In Chapter One I argued that ‘community’, ‘managerialism’ and ‘partnership’ might all be discourses which government could mobilise as means of governing the police through policy as a technology of governance. Appeals to community were likely to encourage the police to see communities as under-used police resources (e.g. Goldstein, 1990). ‘Managerialism’, although seeking to produce better police managers, might actually generate the sole product of Chief Officers self-presenting as good, professional managers (de Lint, 1998; Hughes, 1998). Notions of crime ‘partnership’ normally result in an empowerment of the police through the constitution of a ‘professionalised police/responsibilised public’ power dynamic (O’Malley, 1997). Therefore, it would seem, commensurate with my account of police realities in section 1.1, that governmental attempts to steer and guide the police might actually be useful to Chief Officers in constituting and reproducing their versions of reality; particularly in identity-work.

Also in Chapter One I identified some shifts in the concerns of the Conservatives and New Labour which might influence attempts to govern the police. And these too may impact on Chief Officer ‘doings’ around domestic violence policy activities. Firstly, between the early 1990s and 2000, there is likely to be a governmental disjuncture in understandings of domestic violence as gender(ed) violence. Although it seems probable that Chief Officer police realities will mobilise gender as an occasional resource when useful to the transactional business in hand, there may be historical differences in how this is accomplished. Secondly, the police have always had a mandate to serve the public. But New Labour have re-imagined notions of crime and community, thereby decentralising the
role of the police (Crawford, 2001; Matthews & Pitts, 2001; Newman, 2001). Therefore, there could be changes in the ways Chief Officers manage ‘the community’ in their boundary-work.

Moreover, there is another factor which may impact on both how and where the ‘doing’ of Chief Officer police realities is enacted in regard to domestic violence. In England and Wales\textsuperscript{10}, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) is an organisation which represents the interests of all officers above the rank of Chief Superintendent regardless of individual service boundaries. As a professional police body, it is a means of collective and politicised engagement in public debate (Hatty, 1991; McLaughlin & Murji, 1997; Reiner, 1992) and often consulted by government in changes to policing and legal processes\textsuperscript{11}. Therefore, ‘ACPO’ is a potential resource for Chief Officers in warranting their versions of reality.

In regard to domestic violence, representatives of ACPO were invited to submit written and oral evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee on domestic violence in 1992/3 (HASC 1992/3). And from my thesis perspective, the discourse produced by Chief Officers during this ‘event’ has potential for exploring their police realities as resistances to governmental exercisings of power around domestic violence during the Conservative administrations of the early 1990s.

However, in 1997, the formal status of ACPO changed (Savage et al, 2001). It became a company registered as a ‘professional organisation’ ostensibly because this provided ACPO with a more appropriate legal position in terms of the amounts of money it was handling (Savage et al, 2001). But it had an additional effect in that it rendered ACPO very visible as a body accountable to no-one but its members and this has led in recent years to ACPO lowering its profile in ‘public matters’ (Savage et al, 2001). Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that when New Labour was revising domestic violence policy in 2000 (Home Office 2000a, 2000b) ACPO were consulted but their policy-making activities were not conducted in the public domain.

\textsuperscript{10} There are also Scottish and Northern Irish versions of ACPO which are not pertinent to this thesis.

\textsuperscript{11} One such example would be the change to allowing juries to bring in a guilty verdict by majority rather than unanimous decision in 1966 (Reiner, 1983).
By contrast, their 'silence' on this issue, at this time, was filled by the Metropolitan Police (MPS/the Met). There has long been dissonance between the MPS and ACPO due to the sheer number of ACPO-ranked officers in the MPS and the Met's concern with being seen as internationally renowned proponents of policing (Savage et al., 2001). Therefore, it is interesting that in 2000 the MPS held a domestic violence 'Enough is Enough' conference (MPS, 2000b). Delegates included national government representatives, the mayor of London, academics, service providers, feminists and other police. Their participation supported the positioning of the Met as nationally and internationally important in regard to domestic violence expertise. Consequently, it was noteworthy that the Met used this opportunity to disseminate their current policing domestic violence policy (MPS, 2000a) by the boxful. It suggests that Met Chief Officers, at a particular historical point when ACPO were keeping a low-profile, were able to formulate a platform for the promotion of their versions of reality.

The implication for my thesis is that Chief Officer discourse about domestic violence in the public domain in 2000 was produced by the Met rather than ACPO. Although MPS Chief Officers will still have access to 'ACPO' as a warrant for truth-telling, there may be concerns particular to the Met which impact on their 'doing' of police realities. And this is discussed further in Chapter 3.

In this section I have argued that my post-structuralist account of 'doing' police realities could prove useful in an interrogation of Chief Officer accomplishments around domestic violence policy activities from 1990-2000. In the chapter part summary, which follows, I consider the implications of this.

**Summary**

In seeking a means to address the absence in governmentalist studies of a viable account of 'doing' police resistance or exercisings of power, I became troubled by a particular feminist debate of the 1970s and 1980s. This perspective, like many others of its time, gave a realist account of police culture in the rank and file. But in recent years it had lost favour and a new emphasis on senior police officers seemed to have been accompanied by a fall in interest about police culture more generally. I was keen to rekindle interest in police culture as a way of interrogating the policing of domestic violence; but with a focus on culture as a
series of ‘doings’, Chief Officers as ‘doers’ of culture and domestic violence policy-making as a policing activity.

Therefore, in this chapter part I began by making a conceptual move from ‘police culture’ to ‘police realities’. From a post-structuralist position on language, I was able to fashion a means for interrogating the ‘doing’ of police realities in the activities of identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource. And it seems possible to extrapolate this account to Chief Officer ‘doings’ and policy-making as a way of policing domestic violence. I went on to identify ‘community’, ‘managerialism’, ‘partnership’ and ‘ACPO’ as possible Chief Officer truth-telling resources. In the period 1990-2000, there are probable shifts in how and where Chief Officers will constitute their versions of reality around domestic violence. These include New Labour’s re-imaginings of what domestic violence, crime and community ‘are’ and the Met’s high-profile activity at a time when ACPO was keeping a low-profile. Finally, ACPO representatives’ discourse at HASC 1992/3 and the Met’s 2000 domestic violence policy appear to provide viable sites of enquiry for tracing some of these shifts.

In this chapter part I have focused on police realities. In part two I turn my attention to the other main possible source of resistances to governmental exercisings of power around domestic violence, namely feminisms.

2. ‘Doing’ Feminisms 1990-2000

Interrogating feminist participation is a form of activism in its own right (Kelly & Humphreys, 2000b). It demands critical feminist engagement (Lennie, 1999; Patel, 1999) and is increasingly seen as important in the UK (e.g. Abrar et al, 2000; Coote, 2000; Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Kelly, 1999; Patel, 2000; Smart, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1995) and the USA (e.g. Gagné, 1996; Jenness, 1999; Schneider, 2000; Scott, 1993). And yet, analyses of what feminists actually ‘do’ in policy-making and their work with other agencies seem few and far between (for exceptions see Kelly, 1999; Mann, 2000). Indeed, the most common site for investigations of the ‘doing’ of feminism is ‘feminist research’ (e.g. Haraway, 1990; Harding, 1991; Hekman, 1999). But feminisms, like police realities and governmental ‘doings’, can be understood as discursive accomplishments. And exploring them as such is a viable research area (Bell, 1995, 2001, 2002).
However, my post-structuralist approach leaves me with two problems. Firstly, the two sets of data I have selected in regard to ‘doing’ feminism in government policy-making comprise: an oral evidence session at HASC 1992/3 where feminists were present; and the twelve What Works? memoranda published by the Home Office under New Labour, largely authored by feminists. On each occasion ‘feminist’ was not a government requirement for participation; the shift was from ‘(women) service providers to domestic violence victims’ to ‘academic researchers with a domestic violence specialism’. And the word ‘feminist’ does not appear in any of these data. Therefore, unlike critique of explicitly feminist research (e.g. Hoyle & Sanders, 2000), I do not have a specifically ‘feminist’ starting point. To say a priori that some are feminist and some are not negates certain possibilities, such as, feminists may not always ‘do’ feminism; non-feminists may accomplish feminist ‘doings’; and even men might ‘do’ feminism. And this leads to my second problem, simply, what might ‘doing’ feminism in the government policy-making context look like?

Therefore, the aim of this chapter half is to examine, through my theoretical framework, what can be ascertained about ‘doing’ feminisms from the academic literature. The purpose is to delineate a viable means of analysing and demonstrating feminist ‘doings’ in the government policy arena. In section 2.1 I question what is ‘feminist’ about feminist research and reprise from Chapter One some of the ways that successive governments from 1990-2000 might attempt to govern feminisms. In section 2.2, following Kelly (1999), I look at three activities which might be useful in identifying the ‘doing’ of feminisms in policy-making, namely; organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence and producing subjects of representation.

2.1 What makes feminist research ‘feminist’?

If establishing ‘truth’ was simply a case of presenting women’s accounts as ‘speaking for themselves’, then effectively anyone could do it. For example, the police have access to first hand accounts from women in domestic violence situations. But they also have a history of countering women’s versions of what happens to them (Brown, 1998; Gregory & Lees, 1999; Heidensohn, 1992; Martin, 1996; Young, 1991). Thus a woman may describe

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13 These are actually all studies which include accounts of how police women’s accounts of sexual harassment are diluted, countered and explained away at all levels of the police service.
the same events to a feminist researcher, a non-feminist researcher and a police officer, all of whom may claim very different truths to be grounded in that account. This suggests that between the telling of an account and the truth-claims arising from it, some kind of unexplained process has been undertaken (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996). And this move from individual women’s accounts of their experiences to ‘women’s experience’, as a ‘collective truth’ about what they say, is important to research, both feminist and non-feminist. Therefore, in this section I consider the differences between feminist and non-feminist accounts in order to elucidate what it is that renders feminist research ‘feminist’.

Of the many feminisms brought to government policy-making on domestic violence, standpoint theory is perhaps the most theoretically sophisticated in its explanation of how ‘women’s experience’ should be constituted. Here:-

“All experiences and knowledges are partial but it is only by understanding the totality of such insights that we can learn something about the true nature of oppression and the need to resist collectively without marginalising or compromising other disadvantaged voices or rights.” (Patel, 1999, p.81)

The underlying assumption of feminist standpoint theory is that “there is truth to social reality that can be known in its totality” (Hekman, 1999, p.23). This renders all knowledge as partial and situated and the standpoints from which these knowledges are produced as multiple (Hekman, 1999).

This raises a contradiction for standpoint as to how all knowledges can be situated and yet true (Hekman, 1999). Harding (1991) has attempted to address this question with the notion of ‘strong objectivity’. She sees objectivity as an important concept because it has a valuable political history, “a glorious intellectual history” and it promotes good feminist practice (Harding, 1991, p.160). In order to avoid the “fruitless and depressing choice between value-neutral objectivity and judgmental relativism” strong objectivity is required (1991, p.142). All knowledges are partial and perverse but it is oppression that allows the possibility of objectivity. The greater the oppression, the greater the objectivity. So Harding (1991) solves the problem of all knowledges being situated yet true by effectively asserting some knowledges as truer than others (Hekman, 1999). Although “Using women’s lives ... can decrease the partialities and distortions in the picture of nature and social life” (Harding, 1991, p.121) “experience itself is shaped by social relations” (p.123).
In this way, women's accounts of their experiences in and of themselves provide the grounding for 'real truth' but may themselves be distorted by the conditions of the oppression in which they were produced. Consequently, it is the work of feminist standpoint researchers to somehow convert these accounts of experience into the truth inherent in them.

This account of standpoint theory indicates two key features of the 'women's experience' that feminists are likely to take to policy-making. Firstly, it is a construction of feminism, in short a 'fiction' (Haraway, 1990). This suggests that "Experience has no inherent meaning" (Weedon, 1997, p.33). Rather it can be understood as a linguistic event that is constituted and negotiated in language (Scott, 1992). This is not to deny the suffering of women as has been suggested (e.g. Cain, 1993). Theorising an extra- or pre-discursive is not the same as denying women’s pain. Rather the claim that post-structuralism makes is that the retelling of an experience subjects it to change (Scott, 1992; Weedon, 1997). When feminists ‘validate’ women’s accounts (e.g. Kelly, 1996; Williamson, 2000) that process has become a co-constructed version. For example, Wood and Rennie (1994) discuss the dilemma they had when women interviewees asked them whether they thought that what had happened to them constituted rape. The researchers were worried about imposing their interpretations on women or shutting off ways of making meaning. Consequently, what emerges as ‘the truth’ from research is likely to have been influenced by the research context.

Secondly, as well as bearing "no natural or inevitable relationship to the experience of the members of the group" (Gill, 1998, p.29), a standpoint is actually a “political position” (Gill 1998, p.30, emphasis in the original). The truth-claims of standpoint feminisms are therefore grounded in a negotiated political truth of women’s accounts of their experiences. Although not problematic in and of itself this does have implications for feminists working in the policy-making field. Of most serious concern is the emphasis on the politics of the production of this truth in the absence of theorising about what may happen to it once it is unleashed into different environments. Specifically, there is a sense that once knowledge has been established as ‘true’, it will continue to be ‘the truth’ wherever it is taken (Smart, 1995).
Why this is problematic becomes clear when non-feminist research on 'women's experience' is considered. For example, Carolyn Hoyle (Hoyle, 1998; Hoyle & Sanders, 2000) combines a tradition within police studies to watch the police doing police-work (e.g. Banton, 1964; Faragher, 1985; Manning, 1977) with a tradition from feminist research of generating women's accounts of their experiences. Her specific focus is the policing of domestic violence. She is explicitly “not ... feminist” (Hoyle, 1998, p.ix) despite expressing aims to end violence in women's lives and to empower individual women. Indeed, she is highly critical of feminist attempts to change policing practice in the collective name of women's interests14, arguing that it is conceited and presumptive to claim to know what is best for all women (Hoyle & Sanders, 2000). Certainly Hoyle (1998) praises feminists for the domestic violence awareness that they have generated in the past. But she implicitly seems to be suggesting that feminism has done its work and is perhaps now obsolescent. Although she thanks those who “trusted me with their experiences” (Hoyle, 1998, p.x), she also appears to ride roughshod over them. This is particularly the case where she talked to women who were resident in a Women's Aid refuge. She says:-

“The data from these conversations were necessarily raw and the opinions prejudiced by the women's own experiences and their present environment. It is for these reasons that no attempt was made to generalize about abused women from this particular data set, but their comments provide some support for other aspects of the study.” (Hoyle, 1998, p.40, my emphasis)

For me, there are three aspects of Hoyle's account that I find disconcerting. Firstly, she singles out the accounts of women in Women's Aid refuges as 'less true' than those of victims who call the police to their homes. This appears to be suggesting that there is something 'better' about the truths produced by victims mobilised to call the police than those mobilised to seek services from feminist organisations. Secondly, her sense of working on women's telling of their experiences in order to extract 'truth' from them is, politics aside, very similar to Harding's (1991) account of what research should do. Thirdly, I am concerned at the ease with which she claims feminist-generated aims (women's empowerment and ending violence in their lives), adopts a counter political stance (non-feminist) and suggests feminism is no longer relevant. And this is seemingly sufficient for de-coupling feminist-generated aims from the politics of their production.

14 Her distinctions between whether this is some or all feminists working in the field are sometimes unclear.
Implicitly she seems to be arguing that feminist politics is not a necessary component for mobilising women to seek services or generating truth about women who experience domestic violence.

This comparison of feminist and non-feminist research as ways of knowing truth about women seems to indicate that what sets feminist research apart is 'the politics of knowledge production'. But the example of non-feminist research suggests that this 'doing' of feminism is not necessarily carried forward once feminist-generated truths pass into the mainstream. Further, these same truths, de-coupled from the politics of their production, can be used to undermine the very feminisms that produced them in the first place. Moreover, there is a sense that once these truths and their history of efficacy in mobilising women to seek services are detached from 'unnecessary' feminist 'doings' they might usefully be wedded to more 'appropriate' self-responsibilisation activity such as calling the police.

In many ways, this seems commensurate with how successive governments from 1990-2000 have understood the usefulness of feminisms. As I argued in Chapter One, feminist-generated knowledges with their history of mobilising women to seek services are deemed necessary for the governance of 'women experiencing domestic violence'; in short, they potentially render such 'women' governable (Watson, 2000). Both the Conservatives and New Labour appear to have made attempts to access the power of these knowledges without incurring the 'unnecessary' aspects of feminisms.

For example, each has appropriated feminist-generated ways of 'working together' at the local level and under the banner of crime. In this way, knowledges or parts of knowledges not conducive to crime reduction aims are rendered 'inappropriate' (Crawford, 1994). Further, participating in working together activities is not commensurate with equality and sharing on an equal footing (Coote, 1999; Patel, 1999, 2000). Indeed, being invited to take part is a useful device for eliding political differences (Newman, 2001). Rather than marginalising feminists as potential dissenters, a key government strategy in the 1980s (Foley, 1996), they can be brought inside where conditions of participation may be exacted (Gillespie, 1996; Scott, 1993; Newman, 2002). New Labour, in particular, can be seen as producing "a politics that manages dissent" (Franklin, 2000, p.17; Coote, 2000). Its emphasis on 'common-sense', consensus politics and partnership means that it "needs to
absorb troublesome women into the political mainstream" (Franklin, 2000, p.21). Thus inviting potential dissenters inside where dissent is rendered inappropriate could be an effective means of both accessing knowledges and silencing opposition (Patel, 1999, 2000).

In this section I have argued that what apparently sets feminist-generated knowledges aside from non-feminist truths resides in the politics of production. In non-feminist research and governmental activities it would seem that de-coupling feminism from the truth it produces, and thereby reformulating its politicised meanings, is readily accomplished. New Labour in particular seems adept at managing feminisms through forwarding 'working together' activities. In the next section I explore, after Kelly (1999), how feminists engaged in government policy-making might re-assert the relevance of feminisms.

2.2 Making feminism relevant to domestic violence policy participation 1990-2000

Kelly (1999; Kelly & Humphreys, 2000b) argues that a reduction of feminist politics is not a necessary outcome of feminist engagement in government policy-making activity. And other commentators express some cautious optimism (e.g. Newman, 2000; Perkins, 2000). Certainly she understands that inviting feminists to take part implies that participants should behave in a particular way (Kelly & Humphreys, 2000b). Indeed, the 'f-word' has become a dirty word (Kelly, 1999; Perkins, 2000). Also she notes that many feminists do capitulate in policy activities (Kelly, 1999). However, she argues that there is no need for this to happen. Rather, being heard by policy-makers is not the end of the feminist project but a beginning that offers new opportunities for feminist vigilance and activism in regard to government (Kelly & Humphreys, 2000b). The government may seem unlikely allies for feminists but all alliances need to be explored. Participating in policy-making is therefore an opportunity that, with care, could be converted to the benefit of feminisms15.

In line with what Kelly (1999) argues, I am concerned that feminists who do take part may be too ready to capitulate to what they see as 'the rules of engagement' because they underestimate both the value of their 'expertise' in governmental understandings and the

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15 The counter position is held by Patel(1999, 2000). She argues that by remaining outside government policy-making, Southall Black Sisters have been able to continue with feminist critique. I agree with her that leaving the arena (Pragna Patel was a participant in HASC 1992/3, see Chapter 6) sends a strong message to government. But, it does not place feminist expertise beyond the reach of governance. For example, Southall Black Sisters are extensively cited in government documents as 'good practice'(Home Office, 2000a; The Women's Unit, 1999); and, more recently, New Labour's White Paper on domestic violence states its intention to consult Southall Black Sisters on its proposals (Home Office, 2003b).
potential for 'doing' feminism. Consequently, contra Patel who claims that government-generated arenas are proven not conducive to feminisms (1999, 2000), I would argue that feminism is possibly not currently 'done' in government policy-making but may actually be 'do-able'.

Kelly (1999) suggests some ways that feminist politics might be accomplished during policy-making. Essentially, she is concerned with 'making feminism relevant to participation'. This would include not shrouding one's status as feminist but justifying it as a basis for taking part. Three of the 'doings' she forwards surround organisational naming, causes and competing feminist accounts.

2.2.1 Organisational naming
Kelly (1999) suggests that organisational names might be a way of rendering feminism relevant to participation in policy-making activities. For example, 'Southall Black Sisters' says something very different from 'Chiswick Family Rescue'. The former invokes a political stance in regard to women. The latter suggests the importance of saving families but in the absence of what they are to be rescued from, any political position is unclear.

Further, government, and New Labour in particular, has shown a tendency to name feminist organisations such as 'Women's Aid' and 'Southall Black Sisters' in its documents (e.g. Home Office, 2000a, 2003b; The Women's Unit, 1999). This means that organisational naming of this kind is permissible. However, the fact that New Labour do it means that the strategy in and of itself is not exclusively feminist, although the ways in which organisational names are mobilised may prove useful to feminist aims. What these accomplishments might be is absent from the academic literature.

2.2.2 Causes
Kelly (1999) further suggests that a key focus for feminists in policy-making should be drawing attention to the causes of violence against women. That is, it is important that issues such as domestic violence are discussed in terms of how they generate problems for women rather than being problems of women.

In Chapter One I argued that feminist campaigning for women's services and against 'corrective' interventions for violent men may have contributed to government
formulations of women as ‘the problem’ (see also Watson, 2000). I am not suggesting that every opportunity needs to be taken to render violent men visible and culpable. But I do think that it is important to emphasise the ‘doer of the deed’ and, if gender is mobilised in regard to ‘victims’ then a commensurate formulation of gendered ‘offenders’ needs to be considered in order to avoid constitutions which are permissive of women blaming. This may be particularly important under New Labour as the combination of their strategies to wed rights to responsibilities (Lund, 1999) and to generate the discrete policy category of ‘violence against women’ (see The Women’s Unit, 1999) suggests opportunities to increase the responsibility ascribed to women in order to manage their own risks.

2.2.3 Competing feminist accounts

The final suggestion that Kelly (1999, p.96) makes is that feminists occupying competing political positions should work together in policy-making activities and “resolve conflicts in private”. Her focus is multi-agency policy-making at the local level. But I am concerned that even a temporary strategy of a united feminist front at the national level, in government policy-making, could be detrimental to feminist aims. I have always seen feminism’s diversity as one of its strengths. Notions of ‘one true feminism’ are problematic (Bell, 2002); they risk eliding differences and may ‘undo’ feminism. To explain why that may be the case, this section compares two competing accounts of feminism both of which have been represented in the government domestic violence policy-making arena.

‘Refuge’\(^\text{16}\) and the ‘Women’s Aid Federation’ (WAF) were born out of a split in the original Women’s Aid refuge in the 1970s. They both continue to supply a range of refuge, advocacy and support services for women and children. The split occurred due to Erin Pizzey’s exploration of her own abuse as a child and her increasing reliance on understandings of ‘learned helplessness’ to explain violence in the home (Dobash & Dobash, 1979). In this formulation, there is an emphasis on how the psychological state of the individual contributes to the abuse they receive. The Chief Executive of Refuge, Sandra Horley (2002), has attempted to dilute this argument but she still presents an account of ‘battered women’ as both damaged and contributing to their situation. Having cited gender inequalities in society as ‘the problem’, Horley (2002) presents (albeit reluctantly) criminal justice sanctions as the only viable deterrent that can educate women, men, society and the next generation. For WAF, domestic violence is seen as rooted in “deep social assumptions

\(^{16}\) Refuge was formerly called Chiswick Family Rescue.
about relationships between men and women” (Harwin, 1999, p.45). In this account, criminal justice is only one of many services that women in domestic violence situations may require and select for themselves (Harwin, 2000)\(^{17}\). For WAF, women are ‘survivors’ never ‘victims’, never complicit and their access to safety and services is paramount\(^{18}\).

Despite the differences between these two practitioner organisations, two similarities stand out for me: subscribing to essential notions of gender; and a tendency not to critique each other publicly\(^{19}\).

The first similarity between Refuge and Women’s Aid concerns their theoretical understandings of gender. Both adopt an essentialist and realist approach. Consequently, notions of women as women and men as men are taken as largely self-evident and not interrogated. One problem with this approach is that representational politics necessarily produces a subject of that representation (Butler, 1992). Any feminist aim to produce a single coherent account of ‘women’ could inadvertently be “totalizing and imperialistic” (Haraway, 1990, p.199). Those women most likely to be excluded by such a position include women of colour (Adams, 1998; Alibhai-Brown, 2000; hooks, 1982; Huda, 2000; Snider, 1998; Weis, 2001), lesbian women (Kibblewhite, 2000) and older women (Whittaker, 1996). Within feminist literature on domestic violence this criticism of exclusion seems to lead to a move to globalism (e.g. Hester, 2000; Radford, 2000), presenting accounts of domestic violence in different countries, or what Butler (1990) flags up as lists of ‘etc.’ (race, class and disability) as a way of indicating inclusiveness but not engaging with the problem.

Within current government policy-making, this is potentially dangerous to the ‘expert’ status of feminisms. Feminists are present because they generate knowledges which have a history of mobilising women to seek services and government is concerned with ‘women

\(^{17}\) Although Horley (2000, 2002) does make a case for service provision she prioritises criminal justice in a way that WAF do not.

\(^{18}\) Other differences concern the way the organisations themselves are set up. Refuge has a Chief Executive in the person of Sandra Horley, it actively courts celebrity of women as diverse as Martine McCutcheon (an actor in a popular soap opera) and Cherie Blair (wife of the current prime minister) to the cause and Horley’s publications (e.g. 2002) tend to be in a somewhat popularist vein. WAF has a National Co-ordinator in the person of Nicola Harwin, it does not seek the support of the famous and its publishing record comprises practical guides (eg. The 1999 Gold Book) and academic liaison (Binney et al, 1981; Harwin, 1999). WAF does formulate a list of what it considers to be viable research in the domestic violence field (HASC, 1993b) but this seems to be born out of a perceived necessity as Harwin herself is saddened that research makes people sit up and take notice whilst it is telling women working “at the coal face” what they have known for years (Harwin, 2000).
experiencing domestic violence’ as a problem population in need of governance (see Chapter One). However, if feminists taking part in policy activity self-present as representing only a ‘generic woman’, they may risk undermining their feminist aims (Kelly, 1996).

For example, feminist and crime discourse may have contributed to the constitution of ‘women experiencing domestic violence’ as the population to be governed. But that does not mean that the governable population will remain constant. Advocates for lesbian women experiencing domestic violence (e.g. Kibblewhite, 2000), women of colour (e.g. Huda, 2000) and women with learning difficulties (e.g. Preston & Greig, 2000) are increasingly heard. And these advocates could well, in time, be included in policy-making activity (Kelly, 1996). They generate specific truth-claims about populations and, where they are also service providers, they have demonstrably mobilised women to seek help. Therefore, their knowledges are likely to be framed as ‘expertise’ by government. In short, feminist truth could be reduced in importance from its current position of ‘necessary’ to one of only many voices. And as I argued in Chapter One, New Labour in particular appear interested in disrupting the centrality of ‘female gender’ from domestic violence understandings.

I am not suggesting that it would be inappropriate for women of colour or women with disablement to represent themselves. Rather, if feminisms do not engage in diversity issues, they risk being excluded because they are exclusionary and possibly, ultimately re-marginalised (Coote, 2000; Kelly, 1996; Mouffe, 1992).

A further problem with gender essentialism is the risk of biological determinism particularly in regard to motherhood and children (Butler, 1992). Within domestic violence studies, the nurturing aspects of motherhood have been valorised and the base level vulnerability of women as mothers used as the basis of claims-making (e.g. in Harmer, 1996). Women are often linked with children but this usage may be inconsistent and used in the absence of an explanation about children’s mobilisation (e.g. in Radford & Stanko, 1996). Once these types of cultural feminisms are invoked, all the problems of biological

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19 A third similarity, but one I find less striking for the purposes of this thesis, seems to be ‘patriarchy’ as a way of understanding the causes of domestic violence as gendered violence. This too is problematic not least because it offers no theory of change (Pollert, 1996).
determinism, women's reproductive functioning and 'natural' difference are incurred (Alcoff, 1988).

The main danger is that understandings of gender as 'natural' difference could reify the very inequalities between women and men that feminisms seek to undermine. This is because any reliance on sexual difference closes down enquiry about how the category of 'women' is constructed (Butler, 1990; Riley, 1988; Smart, 1992; West & Zimmerman, 1987). The constitution of the “essential attributes” of women which formulate them as “lacking, marginal and powerless” can inadvertently support particular types of intervention (Watson, 2000, p.74). An emphasis on language keeps sexual difference and the subject in question (Squire, 1998). In this way, ‘women’ can be understood not just as something that women are at all times but a category that is constituted within discourse across specific times and contexts (Riley, 1988).

For example, as I argued in Chapter One, as well as constituting problems/solutions, policy also creates subject positions in regard to domestic violence. Women who experience this type of abuse do not simply sit outside of policy waiting to be encompassed within it. Rather, the language used literally brings them into being as ‘women’ within the context of specific documents (Smart, 1992, 1995). In my discussion of crime prevention literature for women (Chapter One), I argued that female gender could be used to problematise ‘being women’; and to mobilise subjects gendered as female.

However, women survivors are not the only subjects who may be gendered as female within policy on domestic violence. Women service providers and advocates, including feminists, will also be formulated within the text. Therefore, the responsibilisation ascribed to these members of the domestic violence policy-making community may also mobilise gender as a means of governing them. And New Labour's apparent emphasis on disrupting the centrality of 'female gender' around domestic violence could prove especially pertinent.

It occurs to me that fear of being negatively gendered as female could be quite a compelling reason for feminists working in policy-making to present a united front. Although Refuge and Women’s Aid occupy different political positions, they do not
counter each other in public. Certainly they present differing versions of the ‘truth’ but
they never mobilise rhetoric about the other’s potential ‘deficiency’. For example, they
simply do not reference each others work (e.g. Harwin, 1999; Horley, 2002). Also at a
recent international conference on domestic violence (MPS, 2000b) there was no evidence
of overt disagreement in the relevant presentations (Harwin, 2000; Horley, 2000) and yet,
the atmosphere between those working on the promotion stands for Refuge and WAF was
palpable. Feminist tensions over the ‘ownership’ of domestic violence are not uncommon
where different understandings of ‘the problem’ and ‘the solution’ are forwarded (Mann,
2000). But there seems to be a tacit agreement that it is inappropriate to wash this dirty
linen in public.

I can understand that feminists do not wish to be framed as ‘squabbling’, ‘unprofessional’
or ‘not knowing their own minds’. But for me one of the great strengths of feminism is its
diversity and its propensity for questioning itself. Bearing in mind government’s tendency
to pick and choose what suits its aims and what does not, simply forwarding different
versions could be treated as providing ‘options’. The presentation of competing accounts
does not mean that they will be adhered to equally, if at all. Therefore, it could be
beneficial within government policy-making to air some of the differences in ways that
problematise ‘easy options’ to govern women experiencing domestic violence.

To illustrate what I mean about ‘easy options’, it is worth considering what feminists
demand of the policing of domestic violence. For Horley (2000, 2002) the key word is
‘protection’ whilst for WAF women’s safety and helping them secure it for themselves is
crucial (Harwin, 1999, 2000). The notion of ‘protection’ invokes the sense of something
inherently vulnerable. Children and certain witnesses are said to need protection. There is
therefore something about their state that they should not have to or cannot do for
themselves. Further, it suggests weakness and passivity (Hanmer & Stanko, 1985; Stanko,
1985, 1994a, 1995) two things commonly associated with negative formulations of female
gender. From a New Labour perspective, women ascribed as needing protection could be
problematic as New Labour is not keen to exempt citizens from their ascribed
responsibilities (Lund, 1999). It suggests they deserve help and resources without having to
self-responsibilise. But it could be used to justify quite intrusive, ‘forcing’ rather than
‘responsibilising’, criminal justice interventions such as compelling them to give evidence

20 The other main reason would probably be a concern that their participation is premised on the same ‘expertise’ and
or prison sentences for non-compliance. That is, they may be framed as ‘hopeless cases’, those who have failed to respond to help to self-actualise (Hindess, 2001).

The WAF notion of safety and self-help is more in line with the governmental ideal of converting ‘bad citizens’ into ‘good citizens’ (see Chapter One) as it suggests that this population of women are ready to self-actualise but require some help to formulate and exercise choice. The woman of this discourse could be commensurate or at least be rendered commensurate with ‘the responsible woman’ of crime prevention literature (see Chapter One). Singly, these two formulations of ‘women experiencing domestic violence’ are not that helpful to government. But collectively, they provide government with potent opportunities to govern their target population. Domestic violence can be constituted as both a problem for and a problem of women. Women need help to self-actualise as women. But in cases of abject failure to self-responsibilise, the full power of the law can justifiably be mobilised against them as ‘bad citizens’. Therefore, if feminisms do not contest each other, they could inadvertently facilitate government’s governance of women experiencing domestic violence in ways not compatible with their feminist aims.

Consequently, competing feminist accounts are important to how I understand analysing the ‘doing’ of feminism but not strictly in the way Kelly (1999) suggests. I intend to explore the subjects of representation produced in HASC 1992/3 and the What Works? memoranda, looking at their (in)compatibility with each other and how (if at all) different positions and understandings are made relevant within the data.

In this section I have outlined (following Kelly, 1999) how I intend to interrogate ‘doing’ feminism in this thesis. In the chapter part summary I draw together my position from sections 2.1 and 2.2.

Summary
In this chapter half I have identified the interrogation of feminist activities in the government policy-making arena as an important but relatively unexplored site for study. My choice of data which comprise both feminist and non-feminist participants meant that I needed to consider who ‘does’ feminism beyond the simple assumption that what feminists ‘do’ equates to accomplishing feminism. Therefore, I began with a comparison of inconsistencies may be thought to undermine its expert status.
feminist/non-feminist research to establish what makes feminist-generated knowledges feminist. The answer would seem to be 'the politics of production' but this emphasis on 'doing' feminism appears to be easily de-coupled from the truths that it produces. Therefore, government is well placed to access the knowledges it seeks to govern 'women experiencing domestic violence' whilst simultaneously rendering 'inappropriate' political concerns, parts of knowledges and ways of participating which do not suit its aims.

Kelly (1999) proposes ways of 'doing' feminism in policy-making which make feminism relevant to participation. Following her, my focus will be on the activities of organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence which do not problematise 'being women' and the production of subjects of representation. Specifically, I am interested in how competing (feminist) accounts are managed (or not) and how the different 'rules of engagement' generated by the Conservatives in 1992/3 and New Labour in 2000 are dealt with (or not). Also there is the basis for a comparison between 1992/3 and 2000 whereby New Labour have invited feminists inside government policy-making processes and apparently seem concerned with increasing their governance of feminist organisations and destabilising the centrality of 'female gender' to domestic violence understandings.

In this chapter part I have concentrated on feminist 'doings'. In the overall chapter conclusion, which follows, I set out how my understandings of 'police realities' and 'doing' feminisms will shape analysis Chapters 5 and 6 respectively.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have looked at two possible sources of resistance to governmental exercisings of power around domestic violence; Chief Officers of police and feminists. In each case, I was concerned with fashioning a means of accounting for their various 'doings' in the domestic violence policy context which was commensurate with my post-structuralist position. Also I was interested in any differences in these 'doings' suggested by changes in political government from 1990-2000. The findings from this chapter underpin the format of two analysis chapters.

In Chapter 5 I focus on Chief Officer police realities. The data come from an oral evidence session at HASC 1992/3 where police representatives were present as witnesses and the
Metropolitan Police policy on domestic violence from 2000. The three activities which I trace in the accomplishment of their police realities are identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource. My expectations of Chief Officer police realities are threefold. Firstly, managerialist discourse is permissive to Chief Officers to self-present as ‘good managers’. And the warrant ‘ACPO’ is available to these police officers and may be useful for identity-work and truth-claims. Secondly, governmental notions of ‘professionalised police/responsibilised public’ are likely to influence Chief Officer understandings of non-police knowledge producers. In particular, in Conservative and New Labour imaginings of ‘crime’ and ‘community’ could be pertinent in boundary-work. Thirdly, New Labour seems to be attempting to disrupt the centrality of ‘female gender’ to domestic violence truths. Therefore, there might be an accompanying shift in how Chief Officers mobilise gender as a resource.

In Chapter 6 I am concerned with the ‘doing’ (or not) of feminisms. The early 1990s data come from an oral evidence session of HASC 1992/3 where the witnesses were all representatives of non-statutory service providers which, to a greater or lesser extent, counted ‘victims’ of domestic violence in their client group. The 2000 data are a series of What Works? memoranda authored by academics and published by the Home Office as policy guidance to practitioners at the local level. Although well known feminists took part in both, feminism is not a condition of participation. The three activities which I trace throughout the data, regardless of any a priori understanding of who ‘is’ or ‘is not’ feminist, are organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence and the production of subjects of representation.

There are two things that I would expect to see arising from my analysis. Firstly, the data are likely to produce competing (non)feminist accounts particularly around the subject(s) of representation. Secondly, it is probable that ‘doings’ of feminism will be different under New Labour in terms of the availability of power afforded to the positions from which feminists ‘speak’; an increase in organisational naming commensurate with New Labour’s approach; and more resistance to New Labour’s attempts to de-centralise ‘female gender’ in domestic violence understandings, maybe by asserting causes which make the ‘doer of the deed’ visible and/or are not permissive of woman blaming.
This chapter raises key questions for my analysis in Chapters 5 and 6. How are these accounts of ‘doing’ police realities and feminisms viable (or not) for the analytical work I wish to undertake? In what ways are notions of police culture and ‘doing’ feminism useful for unpacking policy activities? How in actual policy-making talk and text is the potential to resist governmental exercisings of power realised (or not)?

For this thesis, three series of ‘doings’ are important: ‘doing’ government in the activities of problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working together; ‘doing’ Chief Officer police realities in boundary-work, identity-work and mobilising gender as an occasional resource; and ‘doing’ feminism through organisational naming, asserting domestic violence causes and producing subjects of representation. In Chapters One and 2 I have identified these ‘doings’ as potentially viable means of enquiry. In the methodology chapter I illustrate how I intend to analyse these various ‘doings’ in actual policy-making talk and text.
Chapter 3:
‘Doing’ Discourse Analysis: how, what and why

Introduction

In Chapter One I set out my theoretical perspective as broadly Foucauldian in terms of discourse, subjectivity, ‘truth’ and exercisings of power/resistance. Also I delineated the site of this thesis as an interrogation of how the ‘doings’ of government, the police and women’s advocates are accomplished in the domestic violence policy-making context from 1990-2000. Further, I adopted a largely governmentalist approach to understanding the ‘doings’ of government. In particular, I identified as important the governmental activities of problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working together; and New Labour disjunctures around imaginings of crime, victims and partnership. In Chapter 2 I sought ways to interrogate the ‘doings’ of Chief Officers and feminists as potential resistances to these governmental exercisings of power around domestic violence. I made a conceptual move from police culture to police realities and formulated a means of investigating them. This comprised identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource. Moreover, following Kelly (1999), I explored ways that feminism might be ‘done’. And in this regard, I identified organisational naming, forwarding domestic violence causes which are not permissive of women blaming and producing subjects of representation.

The main questions arising from these chapters concerned how government, police realities and feminisms are accomplished as ‘doings’ in policy-making activities. In this chapter I detail the data that both formed and informed the analyses in Chapters 4 to 7; I delineate my discursive methodology as a synthesis of Foucauldian and Conversation Analytical forms; and in a reflexive narrative, I illustrate why this research and this approach is important.

In parts one and two I outline my synthetic approach to discourse analysis. Through worked examples of Foucauldian Analysis and Conversation Analysis, I explore issues of depth, dialogue and participants’ relevance. However, notions of ‘doing’ feminism produced different value-laden responses from me as a researcher from those of ‘doing’ government or police realities. Consequently, in part three I look at feminist reflexivity and how that has been important to what this thesis attempts to accomplish. Compared to the
how of ‘doing’ discourse analysis, I explore the what and why of data selection and thesis formulation as on-going and iterative processes.

In conclusion, I reprise my synthetic approach and set out a reader-map, for the chapters that follow.

1. Foucauldian Analysis: issues of depth
The synthetic analysis used in this thesis is largely indebted to Foucault both in terms of what is common to a wide range of discursive analyses and what is specific to a Foucauldian approach. Therefore, in this section I begin by reprising the theory from Chapter One and setting out the key tenets of Foucauldian Analysis. And I go on to present a worked example on an extract of government policy. Moreover, by using analytical ‘levers’ from Conversation Analysis and paying closer attention to detail in line with Discourse Analysis, I explore how an analysis can be deepened, providing a more accurate account of the ‘doing’ of government.

1.1 What is Foucauldian Analysis?
As I argued in Chapter One, for Foucault (1976, 1980, 1982, 1988, 1991) discourse is constitutive of subjects and power relations. All that is meaningful resides within discourses as they are historically specific ways of knowing ‘truth’. It is not that nothing exists outside of discourse, rather when we begin to make sense of things we bring them into discourse. Further, what is spoken can also be understood in terms of what could be said in a particular time and place, but is not (Foucault, 1976). Paradoxically, discourses need to be countered in order to thrive as their currency depends on their articulation (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). And challenges to discourses from counter-truths often provide opportunities for them to be reproduced. Thus strategies are often discernible in discourse even when contradictions are present. And power and knowledge networks can be shown to be operating through discourse in a variety of ways.

Consequently, it is not surprising that an account of Foucauldian Analysis (FA) understands discourse as constitutive and “uneven, contradictory and contested” (Carabine, 2001, p.280). Power is seen to circulate and operate at all levels. Formulating knowledge within discourse is one exercising of power. But normalising a specific truth is a far more
effective deployment of power. Further, what can be said and done with discourse is 'historically specific'. Therefore, the context in which talk and text is produced is paramount. FA looks for what categories are constituted in discourse and what is and is not said about them (Carabine, 2001). Through constant re-reading, discursive strategies can be identified. And with attention to context, the effects of how discourse, knowledge and power are deployed can be analysed. This includes discerning to whom the discourse is addressed and why, as all talk and text is assumed to have a presumed audience. The primary purpose of discourse is to make meaning. And constituting truth as 'true' will be contingent on who hears a particular version of reality. This is most important in terms of normalisation where the agreement of the audience, or at least the larger part of the audience, is necessary for the co-construction of 'generally known truth'.

In terms of data, FA casts its net far and wide. Its focus is generally large bodies of qualitative material. These may well be items of government discourse, particularly where there is an interest in governance, although that is not necessary. Indeed counters to government-formulated truth may also be collected (Carabine, 2001), both to identify discourses that attempt to undermine governmental exercisings of power and to explore how government takes account (or not) of these counter-truths.

### 1.2 Doing Foucauldian Analysis: themes, absences and context

Much of the data for this thesis comprises vast tracts of qualitative material. Around one third is government discourse (Chapters 4 and 6). All four documents are government policies on domestic violence; two from the Conservative administrations of the 1990s and two from New Labour’s first term. Within each pair there is one text on the policing of domestic violence and one text on multi-agency working and domestic violence. These data lend themselves to a Foucauldian approach as examples of government discourse around a matter rendered governable (see Chapter One) about which truths may be contested by policy-making partners (see Chapter 2). Therefore, below, I explore what FA can bring to this research.

The analysis that follows is Foucauldian, heavily influenced by Carabine's (2001, p.281) guide. Extract A comes from a New Labour document on domestic violence, first published in 1999 (Home Office, 2000c). Its purpose, prior to the production of actual policies to replace Conservative ones, seems to be to provide an overview of what
government generally has done and what this government specifically will do. It was not eventually included in the analysis chapters but along with other ‘possibles’ I did analyse it in the early stages of this study (see part two, this chapter).


1.1 The Government is committed to tackling domestic violence on every front. Domestic violence is unacceptable in itself. It also damages many areas of the lives of victims - housing, health, education and the freedom to live their life without fear and in the way they wish.

1.2 As the Government’s strategies on domestic violence and on violence against women are developed they will take full account of existing commitments to tackling crime in general, and to promoting equality and opportunity for women. Other policies, such as those on health, housing and community safety, will also form part of creating the conditions for a safer and healthier society.

**a) Themes**

Once a topic\(^1\) has been selected and the data re-read\(^2\) the analysis begins with the identification of themes (Carabine, 2001), that is to look for ways that are used to speak about domestic violence and how it is formulated as ‘a problem’. This is not dramatically different from many forms of discursive analysis (e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Widdicombe, 1998; Edley, 2001).

Drawing out what is ‘speak-able’ about domestic violence from Extract A indicates that:

- domestic violence is ubiquitous (“every front”, 1.2)
- it is bad (“unacceptable”, 1.2)
- it does “damages” (1.3)

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\(^1\) The first step is to select a topic (Carabine, 2001). As I have detailed above, my topic is ‘domestic violence’ and the data has been selected accordingly.

\(^2\) The next step in Foucauldian Analysis is to immerse oneself in the data (Carabine, 2001). It is difficult to convey how re-reading leads to any discursive analysis. I think the problem is that anyone who reads is trying to make sense of what is written and therefore we have a tendency to read for gist. Getting past that is a bit like learning to drive and not understanding how you will ever co-ordinate all the things you need to do. But it is more difficult than that because unlearning is required too. To date, the best metaphor that I have come up with concerns typing. It is like having built up a proficiency in two-fingered typing and then trying to learn to type like professionals do. It is frustrating because comfort and speed seem to be sacrificed. And when you stop doing it for any length of time, it is easy to revert to old habits.
• the damage it does is ubiquitous ("housing, health, education, and … freedom", 1.3-4)
• it is a matter “The Government is committed to tackling” (1.1)
• it is related to but not the same as “violence against women” (1.7)
• it draws the same government response as crime (“tackling”, 1.1 & 8)

Domestic violence is not the only object constituted in Extract A. There is also “The Government”, ascribed as actively “committed” and having “policies” and “strategies” on “every front” to tackle domestic violence. However, this is not descriptive work. The formulations of domestic violence and government literally bring them into being within the text. Therefore the categories are constituted and truths are ascribed to them. For example, whether or not it is ‘true’ that domestic violence is damaging is not the point. What is important to FA is how that ‘truth’ is deployed. In this case, the theme ‘domestic violence does ubiquitous damage’ is used to support arguments that domestic violence is both rightly a matter of government commitment and that the government response on “every front” is appropriate. And this type of discursive effect, as a mobilisation of power and knowledge, is important to FA.

b) Absences
A key consideration for FA is ‘absences’, that is what could be said but is not (Carabine, 2001). Such an emphasis would not be compatible with Conversation Analysis (CA) which is only concerned with what is present in the data (see section 1.2). Foucauldian analysts are careful to identify only those absences that can be shown to be instrumental in meaning-making. For example, “equality … for women” suggests equality on grounds of gender, therefore ‘men’ can be said to have been absented. Secondly, the text in Extract A suggests a relationship between domestic violence and crime, not just in that they both draw a “tackling” approach and commitment from government but also in the constitution of “victims”. Therefore ‘perpetrators’ of crime and domestic violence can be seen as absent too. Further, although crime and domestic violence are linked there is no explicit claim that ‘domestic violence is a crime’. The discursive effects of these absences can be explored through an understanding of the context in which they are produced.

c) Context
FA places emphasis on the historical context in which discourse is produced. In Chapter One I introduced the dual rationality of ‘doing’ government as producing ‘reflexive
government' and 'responsibilised others'. Therefore, what is important is the notion that the state recasts its role as "steering and regulating rather than rowing and providing" (Rose, 2000, p.324) whilst simultaneously ascribing responsibilities to others. In order to persuade other policy community members of the veracity of its truths, government attempts to govern the roles, responsibilities and rules of engagement for policy-making at a distance. As such this provides a lens (Carabine, 2001) for understanding what this discourse is doing. Conversation analysts tend not to explore exercisings of power even though there is no reason why they should not theoretically (Williams, 2002). Context is important but only to the transactional business in hand and how participants make them relevant (see section 1.2). Therefore, the roles, responsibilities and rules of engagement produced in government discourse would be acceptable to CA but using these as an analytical lens would be problematic.

From the FA perspective, the positioning of government in relation to domestic violence is important. Policies and strategies seem to be constituted as an effective means of reaching domestic violence on "every front". This formulates the "Government" 'at a distance' from any hands-on 'tacklings' of domestic violence, commensurate with a State that steers and guides the actions of others. Although "women" and "victims" are not directly responsibilised in this extract, they have been located as inactive objects next to "opportunity" and "wish" respectively. The neo-liberal ideal for responsible citizens is those who self-actualise and self-responsibilise by exercising choice and realising their potential. Therefore, it would not be surprising if having formulated women and victims as passive, the text then went on either to ascribe responsibility to them or to render them appropriate sites for responsibilisation by other policy community members. Indeed, the absence of men and perpetrators further suggests that women and victims are to be the citizens upon whom domestic violence policy will be enacted.

Another aspect of context is specific to the activities of policy-making. In Chapter One I argued that policy could be understood as a technology of governance (Shore & Wright, 1997). Within this framework, the notion of policy community members and influencing the knowledges they generate is important. Other than "Government", the key participants are the police and women's advocates. And their primary concerns are likely to be 'crime' and '(female) gender'. In Chapter One I also outlined working together as a key governmental strategy around domestic violence whereby the knowledges of women's
advocates could be harnessed in the service of crime prevention aims. It is apparent in Extract A that domestic violence is being linked more closely to crime than female gender, especially in terms of government strategies and commitments. But neither connection is explicitly formulated. Therefore, government could be understood to be managing the potentially conflicting interests of the police and women's advocates. To demonstrate this argument fully though, more text would be required.

In summary, FA employs an approach to discourse, looking for themes and their effects, which is common to a variety of discursive analyses. Its emphasis on absences and context does set it apart, particularly from CA. From Extract A, the main discursive strategy would seem to be generating 'the already responsible government'. Government is ascribed simultaneously with the responsibility to do something about domestic violence and with carrying out that 'appropriate' action. The constituted 'nature' of domestic violence as ubiquitously damaging is reflected in the many fronts on which "Government" attempts to tackle it. Further, there is a suggestion that women and victims, formulated as currently inactive, may be charged with their responsibilities at some point. Moreover, there is a possibility that the diverse interests of the police and women's advocates are being managed for the benefit of crime reduction aims. Therefore, instances of 'reflexive government' and 'responsibilised others' that could be interrogated in other data include definitions of 'the problem'; action that matches the defined problem; objects carrying out their responsibilities; objects not carrying out their responsibilities; objects not ascribed responsibilities; and attempts to formulate common purpose from competing versions of reality.

1.3 Towards synthesis: close analysis and 'doing' government

So far the account of FA given above, as looking for themes, effects and absences and exploring context, is largely how I do analysis. However, although I have distinguished some FA tenets, particularly absences and context issues, as not commensurate with CA, CA does still have something to add to the synthetic approach that I will be using in this thesis. And that concerns depth. The FA above suggests that women and victims might be responsibilised later in the text and that the policies/strategies are framed as 'appropriate' government at a distance activity. Therefore, these are two ways government may delimit its responsibilities. I would argue that by incorporating analytic levers, developed within CA, and by conducting closer analysis, associated with certain types of discourse analysis,
more ways in which government delimits its responsibilities can be identified from Extract A. Therefore, in this subsection I set out some of these analytical tools and show what they can add to an analysis.

Analytical 'levers' come in varied forms, including extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986), three-part lists (Jefferson, 1990), category entitlement (see section 2.3), and disclaimers (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975). They are mainly, but not exclusively, developed within the discipline of CA. What these devices have in common is that they have been demonstrated to regularly appear in argumentation as ways of 'doing' things with talk such as justifying, legitimising and privileging certain versions. CA would only consider talk-in- interaction (see section 1.2) but discourse analysts (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992) employ them on a range of texts, assuming as I do, that all discourse has a presumed audience and is therefore interactive. Two of these levers, extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) and three-part lists (Jefferson, 1990) appear in Extract A (and prove particularly common in government policy text).

The first extreme case formulation is at line 2, "every front". 'Every' is the extreme case because as an absolute it denies the possibility that there is a front on which the "Government" is not tackling domestic violence. Therefore, in claims-making it can be understood as defending against challenges (presumed or actual) that the "Government" is not taking domestic violence seriously enough or does not understand the problem. The second extreme case formulation is "unacceptable in itself", also in line 2. 'Unacceptable' is the absolute that attempts to close down opportunities to formulate anything acceptable about domestic violence. But the legitimising strategy is different from the one used on "every front". This time the extreme case formulation is used to propose that a phenomenon is 'in the object', that is, that unacceptability is both an objective assessment of domestic violence and an integral quality of domestic violence.

This is important when considering the impasse that FA met in trying to account for the introduction of 'crime' and 'female gender' in paragraph two. 'Female gender' is introduced as a way of dealing with domestic violence. Implicitly this suggests that it is relevant but there is no sense it is 'in the object' of domestic violence. But 'female gender' is constituted as 'in the object' of "violence against women", not through the use of an extreme case formulation this time but by formulating "women" as what sets this category
of violence aside from other violences. The promotion of “equality and opportunity for women” suggests there is a relationship between women’s lack of equality (with men) and their becoming the sites of violent acts. Therefore, “violence against women” is both a problem for and possibly a problem of being “women”. Domestic violence and “violence against women” are presented as separate but related categories (lines 6/7). And domestic violence and “crime” are similarly related through the shared response of “tackling” that they draw from government. Consequently, if women were more equal there would be less “violence against women”, less domestic violence and less crime. And yet, ‘female gender’ is not ascribed as ‘in the object’ of domestic violence.

The main benefit of such a formulation would seem to be disrupting the centrality of ‘female gender’ to domestic violence understandings. In this way, the absence of men and perpetrators in Extract A can also be seen as delimiting discourse about gender(ed) violence. There are no wrong-doers constituted other than domestic violence itself. Therefore, the ascription of women as lacking equality and being the sites of violence frames female gender, not gender relations, as part of the problem of domestic violence without incurring causal understandings of men’s violence to women. Consequently, the formulation is potentially permissive of women blaming and legitimising interventions upon ‘women’ in the name of crime reduction aims.

The second analytical ‘lever’ that can be used to break open the text is the three-part list (Jefferson, 1990). There are two in Extract A. In paragraph one there is “housing (1), health (2), education (3) and the freedom to live their life without fear and in the way they wish” (lines 3-5). In paragraph two this list is reformulated as “health (1), housing (2) and community safety (3)” (line 10). For reasons of brevity, I focus on only the first one. Although the first list seems to have four elements it is actually a three-part list with an add-on. A three-part list can work in many ways but here is seems to be being used to give a ‘comprehensive’ sense of ‘all’ the areas of victims’ lives that are damaged by domestic violence. That is, “housing, health, (and) education” are employed to argue for the ubiquity of domestic violence’s damage-doing and government’s awareness of its effects. But they are also ‘Government’ categories in that health, housing and education are colloquialisms for government departments which have ministers and spokespersons. Therefore, they are being constituted as different commodities from “freedom”, “fear” and “wish”.
Further, I would argue that this distinction is useful to government for delimiting its responsibilities in regard to domestic violence. The FA detailed above indicated that government's 'appropriate' activity of policies and strategies kept it at a distance from any 'hands-on' tackling of domestic violence. But I would add that the three-part list of housing, health and education is used to separate what a responsible government can and should tackle from freedom, fear and wish which, by comparison, are framed as issues for which government cannot and should not have sole responsibility.

Support for this argument also comes from government's stated aim of "creating the conditions for a safer and healthier society" (line.10/11). As with the present participles of "tackling" and "promoting", government's role is not formulated as ending domestic violence and crime or delivering equality or providing a safe and healthy society. Rather, there is a gap constituted between policies/strategies and a better society where victims live in freedom from fear, exercising choice and women convert opportunity and avoid violence. And this gap both absolves government of the sole responsibility for these changes and simultaneously ascribes some responsibility elsewhere. Victims and women are not directly responsibilised because although the need for them to self-actualise is implied, they are not likely to read a government policy on domestic violence. Therefore, the presumed audience to be responsibilised is more likely to be those policy community members who provide services to victims and women.

In this synthesised analysis, I have incorporated the central tenets of FA, the analytical levers of CA and attention to the closer analysis of discourse analysis more generally. My purpose has been to illustrate how much more discursive work is apparent than from a straight FA. FA identified similar themes and exercisings of power but because it lacks depth it could not account for how "women" were being linked to domestic violence. Nor could it argue, beyond policies and strategies, how government was simultaneously ascribing itself as responsible and delimiting its responsibilities. The synthetic discourse analysis showed how the legitimising strategy of an extreme case formulation led me to question other 'in the object' formulations within the text. In this way, I was able to demonstrate how female gender was being rendered pertinent to crime reduction. Also the three-part-list lever led me to question what the ascribed difference was between the many areas of victims' lives damaged by domestic violence. Consequently, I began to interrogate the boundaries this 'responsible government' was drawing between itself and others.
Because it looks at themes, absences and contexts, and is concerned with large bodies of qualitative (government) data, FA forms a useful starting point for me. The analytical levers of CA help me to delve deeper and pick up on the closer analysis usually associated with more general forms of discourse analysis. And this appears appropriate for exploring the ‘doing’ of government in terms of ‘reflexive government’ and ‘responsibilised others’. However, not all my data are government policies or even text. Some, particularly the police and women’s advocate contributions, are talk. Therefore, in the next section, in order to further my synthetic approach and to consider some of the differences between talk and text, I turn my attention to CA.

2. Conversation Analysis: issues of relevance
In the last section I looked at Foucauldian Analysis (FA) synthesised with rhetorical devices from Conversation Analysis (CA) and how it was suitable for the types of questions I wanted to ask of my government data. Attention to notions of themes, absences and context was useful for opening up a broad understanding of the activities of problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working together, and other exercisings of power that were being ‘done’ in regard to ‘reflexive government’ and ‘responsibilised others’. Although CA was instrumental in the analytical levers I used to deepen my analysis, I did point out that context, data selection and absences as forwarded by FA did present problems for a Conversation Analytical approach. I was also concerned that not all my data were government texts. Therefore, in this subsection I engage with some of these differences to explore what CA might add to a synthetic approach for analysing police talk.

2.1 What is Conversation Analysis?
CA\(^3\) stands at the opposite end of the micro/macro scale from FA in relation to the analysis of language. Its focus is talk and the flow of interaction as social action. It is concerned with how utterances are occasioned by what goes before and why a particular piece of talk is made at a specific point within an exchange. For CA, talk-in-interaction is where processes of meaning-making are enacted and utterances become consequential. A key project of CA is identifying sequences in talk that are both commonly used and display speaker competence in assessing an utterance’s contextual appropriateness (Heritage, 1984; Silverman, 1998; Wooffitt, 2001).

\(^3\) CA was developed as a distinct discipline through the work of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (Silverman, 1998).
An example would be the three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) exemplified in the last section. In talk, lists are normally constituted in three parts. Thus it is no accident that memorable lines often take this form, for example, ‘work, rest and play’ or ‘me, myself, I’. Even when a speaker can only produce two parts, a third part “generalized list completer” (Jefferson, 1990, p.66) such as ‘and so on’ or ‘and things like that’ will often be added. The delivery of the third part may indicate that an interactive turn has been completed and the next person can begin. Or the other participant with whom the interaction is being conducted may finish off the list. What this demonstrates is that both speakers demonstrate sensitivity to the normative forms of sequence in everyday talk.

Everyday talk as data is crucial to CA. This is because of the emphasis on exploring the interactional business in hand as demonstrable in how participants make things relevant within their talk. Therefore, in terms of data selection, CA rejects researcher-generated interviews and looks instead for “naturally occurring interaction” (Wooffitt, 2001, p.49). This has generated a key debate between Discourse Analysis and CA about whether participants’ relevance can be extracted from the researcher relevance inherent in research interviews (Billig, 1999a, 1999b; Schegloff, 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Wetherell, 1998). Discourse Analysts (i.e. Billig and Wetherell) argue that CA’s main concern, ‘participants’ relevance’, as well as researcher relevance is demonstrable in such data. However, the discipline relies heavily on generating interviews (e.g. Frewin & Tuffin, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and although some interrogate the role of the researcher (e.g. Widdicombe, 1993, 1998), many do not (as noted by Speer, 2002; Williams, 2002). For example, in Potter and Wetherell’s early work (1987) many of the interviewee responses are presented with the researcher’s talk absented, giving the impression that these data occur without researcher prompts (Bowers, 1988). And this format is largely reproduced in Wetherell and Potter (1992) as well (as noted by Williams, 2002).

CA argues that such interviews can never be free of researcher relevance (Schegloff, 1997). That is, the concerns of the researcher will always impact on the interactional talk that is produced. Quite simply, had the researcher not been there, that talk would not have been produced ‘naturally’ (Potter, 1995). Meaning is constituted in interaction, therefore the context in which talk is produced must have relevance for the participants. For example, it is hard to see how teenage boys in their school, being interviewed by someone with a tape-recorder, who is not a teacher and asking questions such as “What are feminists (.) what are
they after" (Edley, 2001, p.199) could understand this as anything other than a research situation.

I agree with CA that researcher interviews are problematic and I have yet to be convinced that DA has solved the conundrum raised for it by CA. This debate became important to me when making data selection decisions. There is great pressure on PhD students to produce empirical data and consequently there is a temptation to generate interviews or focus groups. This is a way of ensuring that one’s study has an original component, it provides the basis for a methodology chapter and it looks like research. But when I was collecting data items I came across police and women’s advocates’ talk produced in the ‘doing’ of policy-making. What CA’s position on participants’ relevance added to this thesis was to convince me that what I already had was more viable than interviews for the types of questions I wanted to ask. In particular, ‘doing’ police realities and ‘doing’ feminism in the policy arena had more salience than police officers and feminists talking to me about what they do in the government policy-making context.

Further, the synthesised FA that I had begun to apply to text documents did not appear to be accounting for all that was happening in police and feminist talk. One specific problem was trying to demonstrate police realities in action. I knew these were police officers talking and I knew they were ‘doing’ police realities. But I could not seem to argue how they were ‘doing the being’ of being a police officer. Therefore, CA seemed to offer me something that other approaches did not.

2.2 Doing Conversation Analysis: sequence, interaction and participants’ relevance
A key feature of CA is the very short pieces of data that are used to illustrate particular points. Therefore, I use Extract B to demonstrate the CA concern of sequence in ‘adjacency pairs’ (Heritage, 1984) and to explore what the participants are ‘doing’. Unlike FA, there is no preamble to where this talk comes from and I have purposely removed the speakers names as for CA everything that is relevant to the interactional business-in-hand is present in the produced talk.

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4 Researcher-generated interviews would however constitute viable data for CA if the subject of study was the research interview itself.
Extract B: A & B

1 A: Could we have civilians in DVUs, trained?
2 B: In time, I am sure, there will be a place for that.
3 A: They would be less expensive.
4 B: Yes.

This talk is an example of an adjacency pair as it features a sequence of two or more utterances that are adjacent, produced by different speakers and ordered as first and second parts where the first part requires a particular second part (Heritage, 1984, p.246). This may seem a long description to account for a ‘question and answer’ pairing but it is important for understanding what is happening here.

A’s first utterance is a question. It has been transcribed as such ending with a question mark which may point to a rise in intonation which indicates to B that an answer is required. B complies but then A takes a third turn. From the transcription this is not identified as a question and therefore perhaps had falling intonation. But it is clear that B understands it requires a response. Therefore, one can say B’s first answer does not satisfy A. That is, the production of a third turn suggests that whatever A required from B as a preferred action was not fulfilled in the first response. However, B’s fourth turn (“Yes”) ends this conversation and this suggests that a simple, unmitigated affirmation of civilians working in DVUs was sought even if A had to ‘settle’ for this outcome on grounds of costs.

It is also possible to show that A is sensitive to the fact that “civilians in DVUs” is potentially contentious to B. This is because “trained” is uttered after a pause. In this way, A demonstrates that lack of training might be an argument within this context that could be used to justify saying ‘no’. Therefore, there is anticipated dissonance for B in connecting “civilians” with “DVUs”. The defining feature of these people for their presence in DVUs

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5 Transcription conventions are important to CA (Wooffitt, 2001). Their purpose is to convey to the reader as much information about the talk as possible. Therefore, pauses, the raising and lowering of intonation, overlapping talk and emphases, amongst other features will often be included in the transcription. Ideally, the reader should also have access to the original tape-recording. In practice, this is rarely possible. However, it is still apparent from the punctuation here that the transcriber has made some attempt to convey meaning. Question marks and commas probably infer rising intonation and pauses respectively. The key point about any transcript is that it is always highly stylised (Edwards & Potter, 1992) and there is no such thing as a ‘true’ written version. Although the transcription conventions here are limited and tend to marshal the talk into complete sentences, it would be a hard-hearted Conversation Analyst who would reject these data’s appropriateness as talk-in-interaction.

6 ‘DVUs’ has a specific contextual relevance that is explored in the analysis below. What it ‘means’ outside the context of this talk is not relevant at this point.
is their civilian status. In terms of a ‘paired-relational category’ (Silverman, 1998, p.82) the opposite of ‘military’ or at least ‘non civilian in uniform’ can be inferred. In this actual instance, DVUs are police domestic violence units. Consequently, A’s acknowledgement that civilians in DVUs is contentious to B suggests that B has some vested interest in keeping civilians out of police DVUs.

Another feature of the exchange that is interesting is A’s use of “we”. Despite acknowledging B’s vested interest, A is also claiming an interest, particularly in regard to cost. The sense that A and B are a “we” is further underpinned by the utterance “DVUs”. As an acronym it has institutional relevance. This is not to say that A is claiming the same interest, although that is possible. Rather, it indicates that A is demonstrating some shared knowledge to B which is used to warrant the appropriateness both of asking such a question and A’s vested interest in the topic. And B capitulates by not challenging A’s right to ask that question or claim that interest.

At this point, bearing in mind the nature of this thesis, the context and the participants of this talk-in-interaction are becoming clear without it being necessary to know who they actually are. A is a Conservative MP and B a police Chief Superintendent conducting government policy-making activity in 1992 when the Conservatives were in power (HASC, 1993b, p.161). At this time ‘civilianisation’, a strategy for cutting policing costs by assessing posts for civilian suitability, was rife (Loveday, 1993). The ‘business’ being conducted concerns a group of MPs examining the oral evidence of a group of police officers for the purpose of making recommendations to government about dealing with domestic violence.

The purpose of speaker anonymity at the start of this analysis was not about some kind of indulgent guessing game. I had a methodological point to make. That is, that according to CA the topic of civilianisation, the identities of the speakers and context of the exchange are all made relevant by the participants in their talk. Certainly there are no explicit police officer identity-claims. But the sensitivity displayed to the rules of engagement and the management of vested interests around police DVUs invokes the contextual relationship as it is understood by the two speakers. They both demonstrate their competence in assuming the “discourse identities” (Zimmerman, 1998, p.91) of questioner-answerer and the

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7 For a fuller discussion of Home Affairs Select Committees, their format and purpose, see section 3.3.

When I began my primary analysis, I looked at police discourse for patterns that police officers use and accounts of seeing realities that only someone occupying the subject position of ‘police officer’ would be likely to make. I had, in fact, missed the very point that I am making here. Just because they ‘are’ police officers does not mean that what comes out of their mouths is automatically ‘police realities’. A discursive approach allows an opportunity to ask different questions. If I wanted to show what police culture was or explain why they do it, I could have adopted the realist accounts that I critiqued in Chapter 2. Therefore, by asking what police officers ‘do’ I had ignored the analytical relevance of how police officers accomplish the ‘doing of being’ police officers as an integral part of constituting police realities. But CA insists on the application of that insight.

2.3 Towards synthesis: identity-work and ‘doing’ police realities

In Chapter 2 I argued that ‘doing’ police realities was likely to privilege police accounts of social reality through identity-work, boundary-work and mobilising gender as an occasional resource. Obviously with nearly 400 pages of analysis to conduct for this thesis, it would take too long to do CA. However, a heavily CA inspired form of Discourse Analysis (Widdicombe, 1993, 1998) with an emphasis on participants’ orientation to membership categorisation proved immensely useful. In this account, the competence that participants display is sensitivity to the inference rich nature of ‘categories’. And as will become apparent, much of the ‘doing’ of police realities seems to be grounded in identity-work of this kind.

The following extract comes from the same source as Extract B but the analysis that follows focuses solely on the identity-work done around the category ‘police officer’.

8 After selecting and analysing this extract, I consulted my notes on the MP participants only to find that John Greenway, MP for Ryedale, lists one of his former occupations as ‘policeman’ (The Guardian, 2001a). What is interesting is that he does not invoke this identity for himself as a warranting device. Many of the MP participants (e.g. Edward Garnier, Donald Anderson, Mike O’Brien) have backgrounds as QCs, advocates and lawyers. And they do invoke these as relevant to their understandings. What this seems to indicate is that the situational identities of ‘government evidence-seeker’ and ‘police witness’ somehow makes irrelevant Greenway’s previous police status as an appropriate warranting identity.

9 Also CA would not condone many of my data choices. The transcripts of the Home Affairs Committee, see Appendix 5, would probably be acceptable because they are talk and interactive. However, policies are not only not talk but in CA terms they are not deemed interactive. Unlike FA, CA does not assume a presumed audience.
Mr Anderson: We have seen that most officers, in terms of career formation, should ideally have some personal contact at some stage in their career, with the domestic violence units?

Ch. Supt. Thornton: That is not totally necessary but, as my colleague here has said several times, the whole service and the whole society we live in is going through these great changes. We are picking up on it as a police service. Just to take that a step further, in my force we have gone down the road of setting up these units and we are now finding, because of setting up the units, that we are unearthing the iceberg and seeing a lot of what is below.

Mr Anderson invokes the category ‘police officer’ in “most officers”. His claim that contact with DVUs is an ideal in terms of “career formation” is warranted on what he and others (“We”) have seen. Therefore he grounds his assertion in observational evidence that is agreed across witnesses10 and does not invoke the category ‘police officer’ for himself. However, he does ascribe ‘police officer’ with certain negative connotations. By constituting DVU contact as ‘ideal’ he uses an extreme case formulation to legitimise his argument that hands-on experience (“personal contact”) in a work capacity (“their career”) is the only way that a ‘police officer’ can fulfil their professional requirements (“career formation”). Consequently, the implicit suggestion is that a normative feature of being a ‘police officer’ comprises not dealing with or understanding domestic violence properly. And that is ‘the problem’.

This reading is supported by Thornton’s response. He begins by disclaiming the absolutist nature of Anderson’s ‘ideal’ with an extreme case formulation of his own (“totally”). And he reformulates the problem of ineffective police officers by transforming the category of ‘police officer’ in a variety of ways. Firstly, by invoking “my colleague”, a fellow senior officer, as a warrant for his version, it would seem that he is attempting to trump Anderson’s observational evidence. This is not simply on the basis of what another witness

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10 This is a common way of ‘truth’ telling, to invoke other people who share a view. It ascribes the speaker’s account as not just a lone case but something that others can corroborate (Edwards & Potter, 1992).
has said but also suggests category entitlement as a ‘senior police officer’. Secondly, he formulates “the whole service” as a pair with “the whole society we live in”. In this way, an integral feature of ‘police officer’ is furnished as members of society going through “great changes” like anyone else. So at this point he has undermined Anderson’s view as faulty and his focus on ‘police officers’ having problems with domestic violence as unfair.

Thirdly, he invokes “We ... as a police service” and “in my force”. Thus building on previous usage of ‘senior officers’ and ‘the police as members of society’, he demonstrates the flexibility of the category ‘police officer’ by constituting another variant of how it can be considered, in this case, as ‘my police service’. Using discourses which suggest responsible police engagement with domestic violence (“picking up on it”, “gone down the road”) he ascribes domestic violence itself as the problem, not those who police it. So, for him “most officers”, ‘fellow senior officers’, “the whole service” or “my force” are not at fault. Rather, the trouble is that when the police picked up domestic violence it turned out to be bigger than anyone expected (“iceberg”). Therefore, he has reformulated ‘a problem of the police’ into ‘a problem for the police’.

Extract C exemplifies a high concentration of identity-work around the category ‘police officer’. Primarily this indicates that ‘police officer’ is an ‘appropriate’ participant identity in this context. That is, because it forms the basis of why Thornton is present, he is able to use it as a warranting device. Another identity-category he invokes for himself as unproblematic is ‘member of society’. As well as identity-work, ‘police officer’ is also used for boundary-work. Thornton transforms the category across rank, all police and one force thereby displaying its flexible potential in this setting. And he uses rhetorical devices such as agreement across witnesses and category entitlement to privilege police versions of reality. Although gender understandings are not invoked in this extract, exploring sensitivity to category membership does appear to form a basis for the ‘doing’ of police realities. And this is explored further in Chapter 5.

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11 ‘Category entitlement’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p.160) is another ‘truth’ telling device. As it is used to warrant accounts based on some specialism, expert knowledge or skill that is formulated as restricted to members of a particular category.

12 A common refrain from the police officers present is the theme ‘if you (the government) want us to do more, we (the police) need more resources’. This is actually named twice by the MPs present (paragraphs: 195, 214). Although, this is not demonstrable from this extract, it is interesting that the Chairman intervened and changed the subject immediately after Thornton had spoken.
In this section, overall, I considered what CA had to offer to my synthetic approach. The FA from section 1.1 had been deepened by importing CA's analytical levers but it still presented problems for me when interrogating those items of my data which constituted talk rather than text. CA offered the opportunity to account for 'doings' specific to the talk-in-interaction context and to justify why police talk generated in the 'doing' of government policy-making was viable data in its own right. Further, CA and its insistence on participants' relevance helped me to move beyond considering police realities as what happens when police officers speak. Rather, it showed that the constitutive nature of interactive talk produced identities. Using Widdicombe's (1998) CA inspired Discourse Analysis, I explored how identity-work which attunes to categories can be a useful starting point for unpacking the 'doing' of police realities. Identity-work was made instrumental in boundary-work and truth claims. And this provided a sound basis for exploring police realities within this thesis.

Although FA and CA have both been major contributors to the synthetic analysis to be used in this study, neither address a further key analytical consideration of mine. In interrogating women's advocates' discourse, I found different considerations from exploring police talk. In particular, as a feminist, I was not comfortable with the idea of judging what was or was not 'doing' feminism. Rather than ignore these feelings, I decided to question them and use the products to inform my research methodology. Therefore, in the next section I turn to Discourse Analysis as it has a history of 'reflexivity' in order to explore the notion of researcher values.

3. Discourse Analysis: issues of researcher values

In sections one and 2 I set out a synthetic approach to discourse analysis. I demonstrated how I use Foucauldian understandings of discourse, themes, absences, dialogues and context as a broad analytical basis. And I illustrated how CA has contributed analytical levers, notions of consequential talk, ideas about participants' relevance and understandings of identity-work. Thus how I do my analysis has been fully explicated. But the what and why of this thesis is still in flux. Therefore, in this section I turn to Discourse Analysis (DA) and analytical forms which are neither strictly FA nor CA, but which have a tradition of examining (feminist) 'reflexivity'.
3.1 What are Discourse Analysis and reflexivity?

If FA and CA can be understood as holding up opposite ends of the macro/micro analytic spectrum, DA can be seen to occupy the terrain in between. But unlike FA and CA this is a very vast landscape. Some discourse analysts occupy a position very close to the CA boundary (e.g. Speer & Potter, 2000; Widdicombe, 1998). Others are more centrally placed (e.g. Wetherell, 1998; Edley, 2001). Sociology is represented (e.g. Gill, 1993, 1995b, 1998). And psychology, ranging from social psychology (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) to more psychodynamic versions (e.g. Hollway, 1996), is too. And many Discourse Analysts evolve their position as they progress (e.g. Edley & Wetherell, 2001; van Dijk, 2001). But they do have commonalities. And what sets them apart from other researchers who ‘analyse discourse’ generally (e.g. Brown & Heidensohn, 2000; Savage et al, 2001) is the way that their theoretical understandings of discourse are essential to their methodology. Thus Discourse Analysis is both a theory and a method.

From this body of work feminism has been rendered apposite in two ways. Firstly, how ‘the feminist’ is constituted in talk has been an analytical focus (Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 2001). However, as ‘feminist’ does not appear as a constitution in any of my data this is not a viable line of enquiry for this thesis. Secondly, there is an emphasis on feminist reflexivity as an on-going consideration throughout the research process (Gill, 1995a, 1998; Speer, 2002; Wilkinson, 1988). This concerns interrogating reasons for making methodological choices and data selections, as well as questioning personal ‘feelings’ about the analysis and using that to inform my work.

3.2 Doing feminist reflexivity

I realised that I needed to address reflexivity when it became apparent to me that ‘doing’ feminism was proving difficult to define and producing contradictions. As a feminist, I felt torn by the competing accounts of women’s advocates in policy-making talk and text. I found myself ‘doing’ identity-work, boundary-work and mobilising gender as an occasional resource. I got frustrated that I could not work out how I and others accomplished ‘doing’ feminism. It was even tempting to collapse the thesis down to just government and police discourse and hope that it continued to look ‘whole’. But eventually, I went back to the most basic of feminist principles. The reason I was doing this research as a feminist was to take my concern for women’s lives and my desire to shed light on how knowledges and truths about them are used to found claims in their interests. I
was concerned that government and the police might appropriate feminist-generated knowledges, so long important in the lives of women, and use them to render feminism redundant and as a means of blaming women who cannot or chose not to help themselves through the criminal justice system. Therefore, re-armed and re-focused, I began to work through issues of reflexivity.

Perhaps my key concern was who from my data, which were not government or police produced, were or were not feminist. Similar to the problem I met with police discourse, I started from the erroneous assumptions that only feminists ‘do’ feminism and that those who ‘are’ feminist accomplish feminism by generating talk and text. Following Kelly (1999), I had identified that ‘doing’ feminism was likely to be demonstrable in terms of organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence and producing certain subjects of representation. My non-statutory data comprised an oral evidence session of ‘non-statutory service providers’ from the Home Affairs Select Committee on domestic violence (HASC, 1993b) and twelve What Works? in reducing domestic violence memoranda published by the Home Office in 2000 (see Chapter 2), authored by ‘academic researchers’. Although in each case the majority of these participants were feminist, ‘being feminist’ was not made explicit as grounds for taking part. Therefore, rather than making a priori decisions about whose discourse to analyse, I analysed all of the data. From this perspective, I was able to show who was and was not ‘doing’ feminism; that ‘doing’ feminism was not necessarily a consistent accomplishment; and that not only feminists ‘do’ feminism (see Chapters 6 & 7).

3.3 Towards synthesis: thesis formulation and data selection

In the previous ‘Towards synthesis’ subsections I have demonstrated worked pieces of analysis. As sections one and 2 already cover how I approach my analysis, this subsection focuses on the what and why of data selection and thesis arrangement.

Within DA, data selection and thesis formulation are on-going, iterative processes (Meyer, 2001). In my case, my initial interest was policing domestic violence. But commensurate with my theoretical and methodological position, I needed data where the police were ‘doing’ the policing of domestic violence. As a Met Police civil staff employee at the time, I had the luxury of securing access through research proposals on several occasions only to miss out on funding and consequently the opportunity to pursue the access. I then
considered interrogating how the policing of domestic violence was contested between feminist and pro-police academic literature. DA has a long tradition of critiquing the way research is conducted (Condor, 1988; Gilbert & Mulkay, 1980, 1984; Squire, 1990; Woolgar, 1988). And ‘doing’ research about the policing of domestic violence was therefore a viable site of enquiry.

Having analysed a few texts and whilst considering how I could use them both as literature and data, I had one of those rare moments of luck. I was accompanying a colleague to the New Scotland Yard library where I found both volumes of the 1992/3 Home Affairs Select Committee on domestic violence. I was aware of them as they are often referenced and had made it onto one of my ‘references to pursue’ lists. But here, in these pages, I saw transcripts of feminists and police officers acting as witnesses in oral evidence sessions. I discovered memoranda from various police, government and voluntary organisations. In short, I had police and feminist talk and text in a government-generated space, in the interactional business of doing policy-making. The turning point was not just that I had found more interesting data but with the discovery of this discourse, texts were no longer a compensation for what might have been.

Since 1979, there have been 16 Select Committees in the UK. Their purpose is “to examine the expenditure, administration and policy” of “specified government departments and associated public bodies” (House of Commons, 1998, p.20). Therefore, they are restricted in how they investigate a topic by the relevance of ‘the problem’ to the possible remedies a department (e.g. Home Office, Foreign Office) can offer. Committee members tend to be back-benchers as they cannot be opposition spokespersons or hold government or parliamentary posts. The Committees report to government who are expected to reply within two months. And the report and the reply are normally debated in the House of Commons. Examination in oral evidence sessions of ministers and officials is normal practice and the Committee has the power to direct the relevant Minister of State to attend (House of Commons, 1998). Therefore, although Select Committees are policy-making arenas, they do not produce policies per se. Rather, they generate a topic for policy reform and the axes around which consequent debate should revolve.

The Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) of 1992/3 focused on domestic violence. The issue was chosen due to the publication of two reports: The Law Commission’s 1992
review of and proposals for injunctive legislation; and Victim Support’s 1992 report on inter-agency working. Memoranda were submitted by groups as diverse as Southall Black Sisters and Families Need Fathers. Oral evidence sessions included the Home Office, the police and ‘victim’ service providers. The memos preceded and informed the oral evidence sessions\(^{13}\). And the oral transcripts were sent to participants for review\(^{14}\). The Committee itself comprised eleven members at any one time (13 in all) of whom six were Conservative and five Labour\(^{15}\). The report was responded to by the Conservative government in June 1993 (Home Office, 1993) and debated in the Commons on 21\(^{st}\) July 1993 (Hansard, 1993).

As a policy-making process, HASC sat between the production of two government policies on domestic violence: Home Office Circular (HOC) 60/90, for policing, and HOC 19/2000, for inter-agency working. Getting hold of these documents proved near impossible\(^{16}\) as they had been superseded by, respectively, New Labour’s HOC 19/2000 and Multi-Agency Guidance (MAG 2000) which in comparison, were widely available through the Internet along with numerous other data items. In all, I collected and worked on 387 pages of discourse. Although this primary analysis informed the research findings, I had to make decisions about justifiable comparisons.

I realised that the grounding for these decisions should attune to policy and policy-making dialogues. The most obvious were the revisions of the Conservative Home Office Circulars by New Labour. Not only would these documents ‘speak’ to a target audience but the revisions were also likely to generate dialogue with their predecessors. Three of my key critiques of governmentalist academic literature concerned how changes in political government, domestic violence as a governable matter and (female) gender tend to be overlooked (see Chapter One). Therefore, in terms of exploring the governmental activities of problem formulation and constituting victims (Chapter 4) and forwarding working

\(^{13}\) It was apparent that initial memos were distributed to other memo senders as Southall Black Sisters submitted a supplementary memo in response to matters arising in the Home Office submission (HASC, 1993b). Also, it would seem that before the oral evidence sessions, Select Committee members did apply in writing to clarify certain points raised in initial memos which in turn generated secondary memos (HASC, 1993b).

\(^{14}\) Southall Black Sisters used this mechanism for linking the evidence of their memoranda to the arguments made in the oral sessions (e.g. HASC, 1993b, p.136 & p.140). One of the senior police officers used this opportunity to clarify the number of domestic violence refuges in his area (HASC, 1993b, p.163).

\(^{15}\) The Conservatives in particular had some older members who have since retired (e.g. Hartley Booth, Dame Jill Knight) and Labour some younger members who went on to greater things under New Labour’s first term (e.g. Mike O’Brien (junior minister in the Home Office), Barbara Roche (Minister of State, Home Office) (The Guardian, 2001b, 2001c).

\(^{16}\) I am indebted to ‘Mary’ at the Home Office who worked hard to find discarded copies of these for me.
together (Chapter 7), I was able to make final data selections for two of my analysis chapters.

The remaining chapters on police realities (Chapter 5) and feminisms (Chapter 6) were important to me as explorations of potential resistances to exercisings of governmental power; another common absence from governmentalist studies. In regard to police realities, I had become interested in how police culture had slipped from currency as a viable site of academic critique on the policing of domestic violence (see Chapter 2). Having secured police talk from HASC and adopted a discursive approach, I had the basis for exploring how police realities were accomplished and why they might be relevant to domestic violence policy-making as a policing activity; questions not previously asked of police discourse on domestic violence. From other discursive studies of the police, I had identified identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource as potentially apposite to ‘doing’ police cultures (see Chapter 2). Chief Officers, specifically, became the focus, partly because of space restrictions. But it also opened up an area not regularly investigated and proved useful in selecting police data from the year 2000.

I could find no Chief Officer discourse in government policy-making activities in that time period. However, this did not appear to deter Chief Officers from the Met making their own versions of domestic violence public. At their domestic violence ‘Enough is Enough’ conference (MPS, 2000b), copies of their domestic violence policy (MPS, 2000a) were widely distributed to government personnel, service providers and academics. Thus although the document has a primary audience of lower ranks, this exercising of power through distribution generated further dialogues with its recipients. As such, it was made relevant to mainstream understandings and I incorporated it as a key data item along with the HASC police oral evidence session in Chapter 5.

The other potential source of resistance to governmental exercisings of power was feminisms (Chapter 6). The HASC’s ‘victim’ service provider oral evidence session

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17 Other documents primarily analysed were: the Home Office oral evidence session at HASC and the Home Office memos submitted to HASC (HASC, 1993a & b); the Government reply to HASC (Home Office, 1993); the New Labour general policy on domestic violence (Home Office, 1999b); and, Living Without Fear (The Women’s Unit, 1999).

18 I also primarily analysed the Police Federation’s participation at HASC, in both oral and written form (HASC, 1993b). However, because police data from 2000 was difficult to secure and the police were not my only concern in this thesis, the comparisons between low and high ranked officers were not used in this study. Because of the richness of this particular data I have noted this as a viable area for future research in my overall conclusion.
produced immediate dialogues between feminists, non-feminists and MPs. Following Kelly (1999), I had identified organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence which were not permissive of women blaming and constituting certain subjects of representation as ways that feminism might be accomplished. And these data, combined with a discursive approach, provided the opportunity to explore ‘doing’ feminism in policy-making in a way not previously addressed.

However, by 2000, feminist participants were repositioned in the category ‘academic researchers’ as authors of What Works? in reducing the crime of domestic violence memoranda, published by the Home Office. Primary dialogues were now likely to be with local crime reduction initiatives to whom the memoranda were addressed and feminists were positioned where they could access governmental power. Seemingly, feminism had become ‘respectable’ and mainstream. But ever aware that power relationships work in mysterious ways, I was concerned with the implications of this participation both to feminisms and to the crucial knowledges that they have generated about women’s lives. Therefore, although the oral evidence session and the memoranda were different opportunities for ‘doing’ feminisms, as key data items they provided comparison opportunities for feminist comment in Chapter 6.

In this section, overall, I have considered the issues of reflexivity, researcher values and methodological/theoretical integrity raised by Discourse Analysis to explain the what and why of this research. This has included a reflexive account of my understandings of ‘doing’ feminism and a reflexive narrative of how my values were important in data selection and thesis formulation as on-going and iterative processes. In the chapter conclusion I reprise my methodological approach and provide a reader-map of key data items and analytical concerns, for clarity.

Conclusion

Commensurate with my Foucauldian and post-structuralist perspectives, I have selected and synthesised a methodology that is grounded in my theoretical position and affords opportunities to ask questions not previously addressed in academic research. Specifically,

19 Items of primary analysis, which informed this thesis but were not included as key data items comprised: five HASC memoranda from women’s service providers (HASC, 1993b) and Hanmer et al’s (1999) Home Office research on the policing of domestic violence.
these involve how ‘government’ and the potential resistances of ‘police realities’ and ‘feminisms’ are ‘done’ in domestic violence policy activities. Governmentalist studies provide a means for understanding ‘doings’ of government as exercisings of power. And FA with its emphasis on discourse, dialogue, truth and themes is apposite for exploring governmental ‘doings’ around ‘reflexive government’/‘responsibilised others’ formulations in activities such as problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working together. Analytical levers, developed mainly within CA, assist FA to a deeper level. CA also insists that participants’ relevance is taken seriously and this had led to my adopting a CA inspired form of DA to interrogate the identity-work, boundary-work and mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource in the ‘doing’ of Chief Officer police realities. Further, DA, with an emphasis on reflexivity and theoretical/methodological integrity, has contributed to my being self-reflexive in terms of what I wanted to achieve, how I have selected my data and why my thesis is formulated as it is.

The analysis chapters are arranged as follows:-

- Chapter 4 focuses on the ‘doing’ of government in successive government policies on the policing of domestic violence. The primary dialogue, in each case is with Chief Officers of police and I examine responsibilisation strategies and the activities of problem formulation and constituting victims. But I am also concerned in the dialogue that HOC 19/2000 has with its predecessor.

- Chapter 5 interrogates Chief Officer discourse from the HASC in 1992 and a Met Police domestic violence policy document from 2000. As a pair with Chapter 4, I investigate how this talk and text might be understood as resistance to exercisings of governmental power. I am also interested in the differences of ‘doing’ police realities in talk and text; how the context and readership dialogues might impact on meaning-making; and the activities of identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource.

- In Chapter 6 I turn my attention to ‘doing’ feminisms as organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence which are not permissive of women blaming and producing certain subjects of representation. Feminist policy-making in the government policy arena necessarily precedes the publication of the actual policies. Therefore, the investigation of resistances concerns how non-statutory participants interact with the ‘rules of engagement’. The HASC non-statutory service providers’ oral
evidence session from 1992 and the What Works? memoranda from 2000 provide opportunities for exploring differences in talk and text, and producing feminist comment on what participation may mean.

- Finally, Chapter 7 returns to government discourse, this time in the activity of forwarding working together. The documents used are HOC 1995 and MAG 2000 on cross-agency working. As a pair with Chapter 6, the emphasis on governmental exercisings of power is on the constitution of obligations to ‘work together’ and formulations of Women’s Aid.

In this chapter I have focused on methodological concerns. The next chapter, Chapter 4, marks the beginning of the research findings.
Chapter 4:  

Introduction

In the last chapter I delineated the methodology and the texts that would generate my analysis chapters. The method chosen was a synthesis between Foucauldian Analysis, ‘analytical levers’ from a range of discursive techniques, a Conversation Analysis inspired approach to identity and a feminist stance on reflexivity. Foucauldian understandings of discourse, truth and power were commensurate with my theoretical position overall and the elements from other discursive disciplines which I incorporated in my synthetic approach. Further, the analytical framework arising from this provided me with the means to explore both the themes and processes within data; regardless of whether this comprised talk or text and across explorations of ‘doing’ government, police realities and feminisms.

This chapter marks the beginning of the research findings. It focuses on two key documents: Home Office Circular number 60 of 1990 (HOC 60/90) and Home Office Circular number 19 of 2000 (HOC 19/2000), both for the policing of domestic violence. HOC 60/90 was the first government missive to the police on this topic. HOC 19/2000 is New Labour’s revision of it. These two texts form the site where I investigate the shifts between the Conservatives and New Labour in the ‘doing’ of government around domestic violence; in particular the governmental activities of problem formulation and constituting victims.

Initially, I reprise my account of ‘doing’ government, what that might comprise and how Conservative and New Labour domestic violence crime policies might be expected to differ. The main body of the chapter forms two parts. In Part One, I consider HOC 60/90. Section one explores problem formulation, identifies the discourses of “public concern”, ‘crime’ and “Research” and shows how these themes are used to found truth-claims including responsibilisations. Section 2 looks at constituting victims. In this activity, the themes of “support” and “protection” produce different women victims and opportunities for promoting interventions that delimit and/or override their choices. In Part Two, I consider HOC 19/2000. Section 3 focuses on problem formulation where the discrete categories of “domestic violence”, “violence against women” and “crime” are constituted.
Collectively these are used to relocate gender outside the policing of domestic violence; and to problematise ‘being women’ by de-gendering ‘the problem’ and re-gendering the blame (Berns, 2001). In section 4, ‘Constituting Victims’, I demonstrate how “needs” and “safety” are used to frame non-gendered but ethnically and sexually diverse victims with choices and rights. And in the discussion, I examine the key points of differentiation and continuation as well as summarising what is to be taken forward to other chapters.

Raising Questions for Analysis

The texts for analysis in this chapter are both government policy documents. From a governmentalist perspective, policy is a ‘technology of governance’ (Shore & Wright, 1997). That is, it is a means by which government can extend its exercisings of power over a variety of non-governmental activities through “steering and regulating” whilst remaining ‘at a distance’ (Rose, 2000, p.324; 1996). In recent times, this form of ‘hands-off’ governance has been conceptualised as ‘good’ and ‘appropriate’ government (e.g. Rose, 1993, 1999a, 1999b). Thus policy is likely to be a site where government discourse is used to produce various ‘doings’ of government, such as problematising activities which constitute a particular version of reality and what is required to correct it (Rose & Miller, 1992; Rose, 1993); constituting policy community members to be governed by the policy, including government itself (Rose & Miller, 1992; Shore & Wright, 1997); and formulating an inter-relationship dynamic between ‘reflexive government’ (Dean, 1999) and ‘responsibilised others’ (Rose & Miller, 1992).

Commensurate with the ethos that ‘less is more’ in the ‘doing’ of ‘good’ government (Rose, 1996), government policy of the period 1990-2000 is likely to rally others to its causes “by seeking to invest the individual with subjectivity” (Miller, 1986, p.29, my emphasis). Consequently, rather than forcing others to comply to policy’s bidding, it is probable that non-government policy community members will be offered subject positions which enable them to ‘choose’ the ‘right’ course of action; in short, policy aims to achieve its effects through “persuasions inherent in its truths” (Rose, 1999a, p.10) and by influencing “the way people construct themselves, their conduct and their social relations as free individuals” (Shore & Wright, 1997, p.5).

The people most likely to be responsibilised by government policy for the policing of domestic violence are the police and victims of crime. This is because ‘crime’ falls within
the professional remit of the police and ‘domestic violence as crime’ has been a useful formulation for both the Conservatives and New Labour (see Chapter One, section 3.1). Further, Home Office research, through notions of ‘situational crime prevention’ and ‘repeat victimisation’ (e.g. Clarke, 1997; Farrell et al, 2000), has influenced a victim intervention focus in reducing crime generally. Thus policy persuasions to the police may work on their understandings of professionalism and legitimacy; such as doing their job properly and serving the public. And policy persuasions for victims are likely to encourage the police to help victims to be ‘good citizens’; that is to self-responsibilise and self-actualise by managing their own risk (Rose, 1999a, 2000), possibly through using criminal justice processes ‘appropriately’.

However HOC 60/90 and HOC 19/2000 were produced by different political governments. Attending to shifts between the Conservatives and New Labour is a key focus of this thesis and one that is often overlooked in governmentalist studies (as noted by McLaughlin & Murji, 2001; Newman, 2001). Therefore, in Chapter One I explored some of the similarities and differences that might be expected between these administrations in regard to the governmental activities of problem formulation and constituting victims around domestic violence.

For both governments, problem formulation is likely to revolve around meanings ascribed to domestic violence, crime and gender. The Conservatives with their understandings of crime as the problem of individuals (Matthews & Pitts, 2001) and domestic violence being governable as crime (after Sherman & Berk, 1984; Berk & Newton, 1985), may well place emphasis on encouraging victims to use the criminal justice system and persuading the police to do their job properly. Feminist analyses of crime prevention literature from this period also indicates that there was precedence for invoking gender discourse to mobilise women victims of crime (e.g. Stanko, 1995, 1996, 1997). For New Labour, re-imaginings of the relationship between crime and community (Matthews & Pitts, 2001; Newman, 2001; and see Chapter One, section 3.1) may lead to a less central role for the police in dealing with domestic violence and an increased emphasis on citizen involvement. Additionally, the new category of ‘violence against women’ (e.g. The Women’s Unit, 1999), might indicate that attempts are being made to manage (female) gender out of domestic violence formulations.
In the governmental activity of constituting victims, it is probable that both governments will deal with (female) gender and notions of responsibility. The Conservatives, as argued above, already had a history of mobilising women as crime victims. But their inability to wed rights and responsibilities together fully may allow for formulations which exempt some victims from the responsibility to self-actualise (Lund, 1999). In contrast, New Labour are unlikely to allow anyone such an exemption (Lund, 1999). In addition, it is possible that alternative victim voices, such as those of minority ethnic women (e.g. Alibhai-Brown, 2000; hooks, 2000; Huda, 2000; Mama, 2000) and lesbian women and gay men (e.g. Haymes, 2000; Kibblewhite, 2000), may be invoked to help manage notions of gender(ed) violence and family violence out of ‘appropriate’ domestic violence understandings.

However, this is a macro level analysis based on over-arching shifts within government rationalities. In this analysis chapter, by interrogating actual domestic violence policies, I hope to demonstrate the ‘doing’ of government around domestic violence problem formulation and victim constitution. This is important because, traditionally, governmentalists have overlooked domestic violence as a distinct governable matter, the salience of gender, analyses of power and changes in political government. Therefore, the questions raised for my data are these: How can governments be seen to ‘do’ government in attempts to problematise and ascribe responsibilities for, domestic violence? What kinds of victims are constituted and to what effect? In what ways is gender made relevant in the governmental activities of problem formulation and constituting victims? What are the continuities and disjunctures between successive government policies on policing domestic violence?

**Part One: Home Office Circular No 60 of 1990**

In this chapter part, using extracts from HOC 60/90, I explore the ‘doings’ of government around the policing of domestic violence. This comprises problem formulation and constituting victims with an emphasis on how the ascription of ‘reflexive government’ and ‘responsibilised others’ is accomplished.
1. Problem Formulation: constituting and gendering the problem

This section aims to explore how the Conservative government of 1990 attempted to problematise and correct the policing of domestic violence. Therefore, I am interested in how truths, including responsibility ascription, are constituted and warranted in policy text.

1.1 Constituting the problem: “public concern” and ‘crime’

Extract One is the opening paragraph of HOC 60/90. As such it can be understood as stall-setting. Opening lines tend to highlight the main concerns of the author and set out what will be noteworthy in the rest of the document. The analysis below demonstrates how “public concern” and ‘crime’ are used to found truth-claims about domestic violence.

Extract 1 [HOC 60/90 (Opening paragraph)]:

1 Dear Chief Officer
2 Chief Officers of Police will be aware of public concern about
3 the incidence of domestic violence and the need to ensure the
4 proper protection of victims from physical attacks which take
5 place in the home. This concern has been reflected increasingly
6 by the police themselves, in the establishment of force policies
7 and, in some cases, special units to deal with domestic violence.
8 The Home Secretary regards a violent assault or brutal and
9 threatening behaviour over a period of time by a person to whom
10 the victim is married, or with whom the victim lives or has
11 lived, as seriously as a violent assault by a stranger. The
12 Government's view has been made clear in Parliament and the
13 purpose of this circular, which has been agreed with the
14 Association of Chief Police Officers, is to offer guidance to the
15 police on their response to the problem of domestic violence and
16 to encourage the development and publicising of force policy
17 statements and strategies to deal with it.

In the opening sentence, “public concern” (1.2) is formulated as rendering domestic violence a matter for the police. This is both in terms of its definition, as common (“incidence”) and comprising “physical attacks ... in the home”, and the “proper protection

1 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions.
of victims" as its prescription of what needs to be done about it. By being positioned as "aware" of this "public concern", "Chief Officers of Police" are framed as acknowledging the veracity of the claims that domestic violence is police business and that the public are justified in voicing their expectations about the policing of domestic violence. A denial of the former would entail arguing that "physical attacks" are the concern of some other agency. A denial of the latter would involve argumentation around the police mandate as public servants.

However, these potential challenges to the government account are closed down as options in the next sentence. Here, "the police themselves" (1.6) are constituted as having already reacted to "This concern" suggesting that, like Chief Officers, they too are aware that domestic violence is a police matter and that the police have a responsibility to respond to "public concern". Although this police-work is furnished with details, it would appear that the response is neither complete ("reflected increasingly") nor consistent across forces ("in some cases"). Therefore, there is a sense that "public concern" is not translating directly into action that ensures the "proper protection of victims" when the police act on their own volition.

It is at this point that a definition of domestic violence as 'crime', attributed to the Home Secretary, is given. And, this is used to reformulate the "public concern" definition of domestic violence from "physical attacks which take place in the home" to the crime categories of "assault" and "threatening behaviour" (1.9). This renders domestic violence a police matter on the grounds that it is crime, both physical and non-physical 'offences against the person'. And this implies that naming 'crime' as 'crime' is the responsibility of government not "public concern" and more importantly, not the police.

Moreover, "take place in the home" (1.4-5), is both peopled and expanded using a rhetorical device. The three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) of "by a person to whom the victim is married (1) ... lives (with) (2)... has lived (with) (3)" (1.9-11) is used to reconstitute what is "domestic" about "domestic violence" from the physical locale of the crimes to the intimate relationship of two adults. The list attempts to cover all eventualities of partner

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2 Further, the frequency of domestic violence is identified as "over a period of time" suggesting that the commonality of its occurrence can also be attributed to repeated crimes between the same people. The notion of 'repeat victimisation' is in its infancy in HOC 60/90 but is a key concern of HOC 19/2000. However, because of the many issues already covered in this chapter, 'repeat victimisation' had to be cut to keep the chapter within length.
violence, such as marriage, cohabiting and no longer living together. Although neither the "person" nor the "victim" are gendered, "married" suggests a heterosexual dynamic to the intimate partnerships where domestic violence occurs. Certainly in this current time the list may be understood to infer same-sex partners who cannot legally be married. However, the historical context of HOC 60/90 is such that government's previous attempt to address domestic violence concerned 'Violence in Marriage' (see MPS, 1975). That, added to the fact that same-sex relationships are not formulated in HOC 60/90, supports my reading of this list as relocating domestic violence in intimate personal relationships, not the "home" per se.

Finally, the Home Secretary's definition of domestic violence is concluded with a stance that seems to have a moral character. The formulation regarding domestic violence "as seriously as a violent assault by a stranger" (l.11, my emphasis) appears to suggest that someone does not take domestic violence as crime seriously enough. This is a government view, so government is not implicated. 'Public concern' formulated domestic violence as a police matter rather than crime specifically, therefore it is unlikely that the public are implicated. That leaves the police, already ascribed as providing an incomplete and uneven response to "public concern" and not having the responsibility to define crime. Therefore, they are the most likely target of this implied criticism. And yet, no direct blame is apportioned to them.

This raises questions about what the government definition of domestic violence is doing at this point in the text. Firstly, it can be understood as the simultaneous ascription and fulfilment of a government responsibility to respond to "public concern". It expands each point made in the "public concern" definition, indicating that each is taken seriously but does not go far enough. It neither challenges the public right to name a police matter nor its expectation that the police should ensure the "proper protection of victims". But it does exercise its responsibility to define 'crime' and make it relevant to domestic violence. Secondly, it implies that the incomplete police response to "public concern" is premised on the incomplete understandings of domestic violence forwarded by the "public concern" definition. Thus the fact that the police response to the "proper protection of victims" is framed as uneven could be suggesting that some of them are taking it upon themselves to define crime.

3 The three-part list (Jefferson, 1990), is a very common rhetorical device in government documents. See Chapter 3,
Therefore, the purpose of the Home Secretary's definition seems to be a way of persuading the police that although trying, some police are currently not fulfilling their responsibilities because they have not quite understood them properly. And, at the same time, it introduces a government which is ascribed as already meeting its own responsibilities, adept at identifying why the police response is askew and offering to help all police to ensure "the proper protection of victims". In this context, any direct blame might well undermine the persuasive process by generating challenges from the audience. Therefore, this can be seen as a shrewd rhetorical device.

In the final sentence (1.11-17), the proposed relationship between government and the police is made overt. "The Government's view has been made clear in Parliament" refers to the Home Secretary's definition and stance on domestic violence. It is also continues the theme of an appropriate government response to "public concern". It would seem that it is not sufficient to simply respond to the public. Rather, it is necessary, through the appropriate channels, to inform the public what one's response has been. This reading is supported by government's persuasion to the police that they should be "publicising ... force policy statements and strategies" (my emphasis). Further, the "purpose" of HOC 60/90 is stated as "to offer guidance" and "to encourage" the police in their responsibilities of "response" and "publicising". There is no sense of forcing or directing. Rather the emphasis is on helping them achieve what they should be doing. Moreover, a Chief Officer of Police audience could not accuse this government of having plucked solutions out of nowhere. Not only have they been made aware of their responsibilities arising from "public concern" and 'crime', but also HOC 60/90 has been "agreed with the Association of Chief Police Officers", the collective, representative body of senior officers.

In summary, "public concern" and 'crime' are used to counter potential challenges to government truths. Their purpose seems to be to seek the same agreement from individual Chief Officers as HOC 60/90 has apparently secured from ACPO. Thus they underpin moves, such as positioning Chief Officers as already aware of the same truths as government; persuading for future action rather than direct blaming for past action; formulating government and ACPO as of one mind; and the self-presentation of government as the body that can help the police meet their responsibilities. These themes are also invoked to ascribe responsibilities to both the police and government. The police
are credited with a response but one which is framed as incomplete, uneven and unpublicised. By contrast, the government is constituted as fulfilling all of its responsibilities, such as defining ‘crime’, responding to “public concern” and helping the police to do their job. The “public concern” aim for the policing of domestic violence as the “proper protection of victims” is not reformulated by government and may be assumed to be integral to the guidance that government will offer the police. Thus government has harnessed those aspects of “public concern” that render domestic violence governable as ‘crime’ and reformulated those that do not.

1.2 Gendering the problem: ‘crime’ and “Research”

Like “public concern” and ‘crime’, “Research” is an important theme for formulating truth-claims about domestic violence. Extract 2 is the second paragraph in HOC 60/90 and follows directly on from the Extract One where Chief Officers on the individual force level were encouraged to accept government’s account. Here, building on the ascription of government as an appropriate definer of ‘crime’ and reasonable provider of police help, “Research” seems to be used to blend understandings of domestic violence as ‘crime’ with understandings of gendered violence.

Extract 2 [HOC 60/90 (2: Nature and Extent of Problem)]:

18 Chief officers will be aware of the wide range of abuse which
19 is covered by the term ‘domestic violence’. It encompasses all
20 aspects of physical, sexual and emotional abuse, ranging from
21 threatening behaviour and minor assaults which lead to cuts and
22 bruises to serious injury, and sometimes even death. (In about
23 44% of homicide cases where the victim is a female the suspect
24 is or was married to or lived with her.) Research has shown that,
25 although the severity of the abuse varies, incidents of domestic
26 violence have several common characteristics. They are rarely
27 isolated occurrences. They tend to be repeated over a period of
28 time, often increasing in their severity, and are particularly
29 common during the woman’s pregnancy. They often extend beyond
30 the woman to children living within the home. The offender is
31 likely to come from a family in which violence was used against
32 women, but he may be in any stratum of society; domestic violence

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This paragraph can be understood to have two distinct sections. The first, from “Chief officers will be aware” to the end of the parenthesis at line 24, is concerned with working on knowledges about domestic violence that are already within Chief Officers’ realm of understanding. The second section, from “Research has shown” (l.24) to the end, claims truths largely grounded in gendered understandings of domestic violence and, presumably, not generally associated with things Chief Officers might be expected to be aware of.

Extract 2 opens with “Chief officers will be aware”. This is the same formulation used earlier in HOC 60/90 (see Extract One) and similarly it positions Chief Officers as already knowing the truths which follow; which in itself is a useful device for neutralising potential dissent. Three truths about domestic violence of which Chief Officers will “be aware” are forwarded, each in the form of a three-part list: “physical, sexual and emotional abuse” (l.20); “threatening behaviour … minor assaults” (l.21) and “homicide” (l.23); “cuts and bruises” (l.21-2), “serious injury” (l.22), “even death” (l.22).

The first truth, framing domestic violence as “abuse”, seems to be understood as not contentious. ‘Domestic violence’ is presented as all encompassing (“encompasses all”) “abuse”; neither a legal category of crime nor something that is necessarily visible. The three parts, “physical, sexual and emotional” are also positioned next to each other. The second and third truths, of domestic violence as crime and (visible) physical harm, are by contrast woven together. Consequently, this suggests that there may be some contention associated with government ascribing categories of crime and harm. However, in the previous extract it was clear that government claimed the responsibility for defining crime. Therefore, what appears to be happening here is a persuasion; one that does not contend notions of abuse but one which asserts physical harms as commensurate with crimes. Thus it is argued that despite encompassing a range of visible/non-visible abuse, domestic violence is crime and that is apparent in the injuries that it produces. Further, Chief Officers are credited with already knowing these facts. And as such the argument has a ring of ‘you already know it makes sense’.

Another ‘fact’ which Chief Officers are positioned as already knowing about is the female gender relevance of domestic violence. The third part of the list of physical harm is
"death". Whilst the third part of the list of crime categories is "homicide". In lines 22-24, death as both physical harm and crime is gendered as female. But there is also a formulation, albeit reluctant, of the suspect as male. 'Married' (1.24) renders the suspect male in instances of women's domestic violence fatality. And although with contemporary knowledge “lived with her” could also indicate same sex partnerships, that is not a theme of HOC 60/90 overall. Thus it is more likely to be a response to feminist claims that 'marriage' per se is not a pre-requisite of male against female gender relational domestic violence (e.g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Smith, 1989).

Having argued that Chief Officers are aware that domestic violence is crime with gender relevance, HOC 60/90 then moves to what "Research has shown" (1.24). Unsurprisingly, this introduces ‘facts’ from “Research”. What is most apparent is that the research truths about domestic violence have been influential in government’s earlier formulations of ‘abuse’ and ‘physical harm’. Constitutions such as “the severity of the abuse varies” (1.25), “rarely isolated occurrences” (1.26-7) and “increasing in their severity” (1.28) can be seen to reflect discursive work in formulations of what Chief Officers already know4. For example, the three-part list of “cuts and bruises (1) to serious injury (2), and sometimes even death(3)” (1.21-2) can now additionally be understood as incremental. Therefore, the knowledges produced by domestic violence research can be shown to have extensively informed government’s understandings of the issue. And this can be seen as a device by which the meanings of what Chief Officers already know can be reformulated.

At line 29, female gender is introduced in regard to “Research” truths with the phrase “particularly common during the woman’s pregnancy” (1.29). In Extract One and above, I argued that heterosexual intimate partners was a key determinant in government’s definition of domestic violence. The emphasis here on “pregnancy” (1.29), “children” (1.30) and “family” (1.31) suggests that this was a correct reading. But it also indicates that work is being done to frame women as worthy victims. Female gender is only mobilised when women are formulated as dead, pregnant, sharing their home with children or in a family. As the main responsibilisation strategy of HOC 60/90 so far appears to be to persuade the police to change their understandings of domestic violence, this implicitly suggests that they are not perceived as sympathetic to women victims.

4 And the notion that abuse is "repeated over a period of time" (1.27-8), reprises the earlier ascription of domestic violence as repeat crime (see Extract One and footnote 2).
The gendering of men as offenders is less consistent than the gendering of victims as women and this is apparent in the male/female imbalance in the pairings of doer and done to. These are “suspect ... married to ... her” (1.23-4)/“female” “victim” (1.23) and “The offender” (1.30)/“the woman” (1.30). Covertly, these relational pairings do gender the offender as male but “he” is not overtly gendered until social class is disclaimed (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975) as a domestic violence determinant at line 32. Further, there seems to be a readiness, almost an eagerness to gender victims as female and an accompanying reluctance to overtly gender offenders as male. The gendering of men as offenders is also implicitly suggested in the formulation of a heterosexual “family” where children are born and live and where the offender was raised. It is not possible to say why this reluctance to gender offenders as male is here other than to suggest that it may be to do with a primary focus on the “proper protection of victims” and the ascribed relevance of gender to ‘victimhood’ in particular.

However, it is possible to consider the implications of the overtly gendered victim as female and the partially gendered offender as male. Firstly, gendering women as worthy on the basis of their potential as mothers is always problematic (Butler, 1992; Smart, 1992, 1995); as is, founding worth in death. It allows for a hierarchy of worthiness with ‘dead mothers’ at the top and other women victims as less deserving. Secondly, gendering victims as women leads to a focus on their bodies as the sites where crimes are committed (Smart, 1992). And although no direct blame formulations are presented here, such blame is sanctioned (Hanmer & Stanko, 1985). HOC 60/90 frames women’s deaths as arising from domestic violence; heterosexual women’s partners as the people who commit domestic violence; and seeing violence against women in childhood as the reason why domestic violence is committed in adulthood (by men). Therefore, ‘being women’ is implicated in why domestic violence occurs and may go on to be implicated in how it is to be policed. Thirdly, despite expectations to the contrary (e.g. Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Itzin, 2000), violent men are rendered partially visible as men. But it is unclear whether or not their gender will be made relevant to what the police are asked to do about domestic violence.

In summary, “Research” can be shown to have informed government’s understandings of domestic violence, particularly in definitions of domestic violence as incrementally serious.

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5 This is an assertion that is highly contentious (Morley & Mullender, 1994).
and producing women victims. The "Research" truths are also demonstrable in how government has attempted to ascribe different meanings to the 'facts' about which Chief Officers are already aware. Further, these knowledges are invoked to render women as worthy victims of police attention and to frame domestic violence as male against female gendered violence. But this is done in a way that allows for a hierarchy of female worth and constitutes women's bodies as the sites where crimes are committed. Further, it is not clear how the eagerness to gender victims as female and the reluctance to gender offenders as male might impact on government guidance for specific policing activities around domestic violence. Therefore, in the next section I turn my attention to how victims are constituted.

2. Constituting Victims: "support" and "protection"

In the previous section I showed that the "proper protection of victims" was legitimised as the aim of policing domestic violence. Also female gender was readily ascribed as integral to domestic violence victims, but although offenders are gendered as male, there seemed to be reluctance to press this point. I suggested that this may be attributable to a primary concern with responding to women victims. Therefore, in this section I consider how gender is used (or not) to constitute victims and government's attempts to shape how they are policed. The two themes that came to fore in this regard were "support" and "protection".

2.1 "support"

Extracts 3 to 5 are all concerned with the police "support" of women victims.

Extract 3 [HOC 60/90 (10: Role of the Police and Other Agencies)]:

116 (...) In some forces dedicated domestic violence units with
117 specially trained officers have been established which are able
118 to perform a more active role in supporting and reassuring the
119 victim and helping her to make reasoned decisions (...)

Extract 4 [HOC 60/90 (18: Action after the incident)]:

248 (...) Many women will be in a state of shock when the
249 police first arrive, and unable to contemplate the prospect of
a court case. With proper support, however, they may gain in
confidence and, following discussion of all the aspects of their
case, they may well come to recognise that prosecution is in
their own interest. (…)

Extract 5 [HOC 60/90 (24: Withdrawal of victim’s complaint)]:

This underlines the need to give
close support to the victim during the pre-trial period, so that
she will feel sufficiently self-confident to give evidence.

Collectively, these extracts ascribe the aim and ‘nature’ of police “support”. The aim is constituted as getting the victims to understand that “prosecution is in their own interest” (I.252-3) and “to give evidence” (I.345). The ‘nature’ of police “support” is formulated as time-consuming and on-going. It requires “supporting ... reassuring ... and helping” (I.118-9, my emphases), “discussion of all aspects of their case” (I.251-2, my emphasis) and to be carried on “during the pre-trial period” (I.344, my emphasis). Therefore, “support” is framed as something which the police need to do continuously and thoroughly in order to get the victim to court. Consequently, HOC 60/90 responsibilises the police for the presence of the victim at trial.

However, the victim is consistently gendered as female. Before the police application of “support” she is constituted as “in a state of shock” (I.248), unable “to make reasoned decisions” (I.119), not knowing what is in her “own interest” (I.253) and not “sufficiently self-confident” (I.345). Not knowing one’s own mind and lacking confidence are commonly formulated negative representations of women (Smart, 1992; Williams, 2002). Therefore, what she is ascribed as temporarily unable to do for herself is being attributed not to her positioning as a victim but as a woman victim. Thus female gender is made relevant to the policing “support” activities of helping domestic violence victims.

Further, this appears to be a classic neo-liberal formulation of help and citizenship. Police “support” work is encouraged to reconstruct her will so that she herself, with that ‘expert’ help, can overcome her lack of self-confidence and reason to act in her own interest. In short, at least until the court case, she is to be autonomised by the police to help her to help herself to “active citizenship” (Rose, 2000, p.329). In this way, she is constituted as a
temporarily “failed”, or at least failing, citizen (Rose, 2000, p.331). There is a key implication here. The police are responsibilised to provide “proper support”, but they are also positioned to undermine any account from a woman victim who expresses a choice not to go to court. Consequently, a woman choosing not to pursue prosecution may find that the police treat her version of the truth as unreasoned.

In summary, the victim and the ‘appropriate’ policing of domestic violence produced by discourses of police “support” are both overtly and covertly gendered as female. The purpose of “support” is to help the victim to overcome the problems of her female victimhood and to self-actualise as a responsible citizen by going to court. Although the police are charged with the responsibility to “support” women victims properly, this formulation still allows opportunities for the police to ascribe failure to her if she chooses not to go to court.

2.2 “protection”

However, “support” is not the only theme associated with the constitution of victims. Extracts 6 and 7 exemplify how “protection” produces a different subject position for understanding the victim. And as I argued in section one, HOC 60/90 legitimises the “proper protection of victims” as a primary policing domestic violence aim.

Extract 6 [HOC 60/90 (8: Role of the Police and Other Agencies)]:

92 It is the immediate duty of police officers who are called
93 to a domestic violence incident to secure the protection of the
94 victim and any children from further abuse and then to consider
95 what action should be taken against the offender. The immediate
96 protection of the victim may involve the police in referring or
97 taking her to a shelter or in liaising with statutory or
98 voluntary agencies who can supply longer-term help and support.
99 Such agencies include (…)

Extract 7 [HOC 60/90 (30: Summary)]:

381 Chief officers are asked to ensure that all police officers
382 involved in the investigation of cases of domestic violence
regard as their overriding priority the protection of the victim

and the apprehension of the offender.

(...)

In particular,

chief officers are invited to:

(i) liaise with other agencies and voluntary bodies
to establish arrangements for referring victims
to sources of long-term support (...)

Although “protection” is not the only “immediate duty” (1.92)/“overriding priority” (1.383) with which the police are responsibilised, it is consistently positioned before action on the “offender” (1.95 & 384). And there is also an explicit sense (“and then”, 1.94, my emphasis) that “protection” comes first. It is hard to account from the text why this should be the case. But my feeling is that it is related to the police’s ‘new’ duties of victim intervention. The police have always had responsibility for dealing with domestic violence offenders, regardless of how poorly that might have been carried out (e.g. Buzawa & Buzawa, 1993; Southall Black Sisters, 1989; Wright, 1995). A new policy, which normally marks changes, is therefore likely to position first that which it seeks to draw particular attention to.

However, an argument that can be made from these extracts is that gender is not rendered relevant to the policing of domestic violence offenders. Thus “action” (1.95) and “apprehension” (1.384) do not overtly formulate a male offender. Nor do they covertly suggest gendering activity. By contrast, the victims produced by discourses of “protection”, although not consistently gendered overtly, are covertly gendered as female. Women’s overriding need to be protected (often along with their children) is a commonly reproduced negative femininity ascription (Ahmed, 1995). And this, like the ‘self-confidence’ and ‘reason’ response encouraged with “support”, implicitly genders domestic violence police-work with female victims. Therefore, it is not just victimhood that the police are being asked to deal with but specifically women victims.

6 In Extract 6, what the police should do with offenders is formulated in vague terms: “consider what action should be taken against the offender” (1.94-5). Vagary is a way of avoiding rebuttal (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p.162). Therefore, one can assume that the use of “apprehension” (1.384) at this stage would be perceived as drawing forth a challenge from a police audience. The vague formulation renders some thought about the offender as necessary. But at this stage police discretion is not delimited any further.

7 Putting victims before offenders is consistent with HOC 60/90 as a whole where the first appearance of “victims” is at line three and the first “offender” is constituted at line thirty (see Extracts One and 2).
But there are also differences in the victims constituted by “support” and “protection”. In regard to “support”, the woman victim is formulated as having an active, if constrained, role in her self-actualisation. Here the victim is framed as passive; a common occurrence when “protection” is encouraged (Hanmer & Stanko, 1985; Stanko, 1985, 1994a, 1995). Therefore, whilst “support” is ascribed as something the police do with women victims, “protection” is presented as something the police do to women victims. The implications of such a victim formulation are twofold. Whilst the police are being responsibilised to take the “proper protection of victims” seriously, they are also positioned to override any choices that the victim may make. Yet, as many feminists have argued (e.g. Stanko, 1994a), a woman may have insight into what keeps her safe. And this potential resource is not legitimised by HOC 60/90. Consequently, any move from “support” to “protection” can be understood as commensurate with a lessening of ascribed active person-hood.

This reading is supported by what police are responsibilised to do once “immediate duty” (1.92)/“overriding priority” (1.383) have been attended to. This is formulated as “referring” (1.96 & 390) or “taking” (1.97) the victim to “other agencies” (1.389), both statutory and voluntary, for “long(er)-term (help and) support” (1.98 & 391). This suggests two things. Firstly, she is rendered a non-person, almost a commodity to be transferred from one place of safe-keeping to another. Secondly, it inscribes the police responsibilities of “support” and “protection” as ‘short-term’. Consequently, this passing of the victim to other agencies formulates boundaries of police responsibilities. Certainly the suggestion is made to “liaise” and “to establish arrangements” (1.389-391) with others for this transfer. But this is advised rather than required (“invited to”, 1.388). HOC 60/90 predates government’s forwarding of inter-agency working around domestic violence, therefore, the purposes ascribed to other agencies are likely to be limited. The implication of this, is that other agencies can be understood either as a ‘resource’ for the police to ensure “the proper protection of victims” or as a repository for victims once police responsibilities to them are terminated. Either way, there is a sense that some boundary-work between the police and other agencies is being attempted.

In summary, “protection” is formulated as one of the police’s overriding duties which possibly takes precedence over action with the offender. What is clear, is that “protection”, like “support”, genders the policing of domestic violence victims in the absence of gendering police-work with offenders. Unlike “support”, “protection” constitutes a passive
woman with no responsibilities and no role to play, upon whom the police can act accordingly. Her “protection” therefore is ascribed as outweighing all other concerns. The main implication of this is that the police are positioned to overrule her choices and any account she may offer in regard to her own safety. When she is passed over to others for safe-keeping, the responsibility for her “protection” crosses a notional boundary from the police to other agencies. Thus like a commodity, her removal from place to place is sanctioned.

The main implications of this constituting victims activity are considered in the chapter part conclusion below.

Part One Conclusion
This analysis of extracts from HOC 60/90 demonstrates that policy is being used as a technology of governance to exercise power over the police. Firstly, a particular version of truth about domestic violence is constituted and privileged over competing accounts. “Research”, “public concern” and police knowledges are harnessed and delimited into the service of ‘crime’ formulations. Thus the veracity of ‘domestic violence’, as a subset of crime committed against women by their former or current partners, is founded in the ascribed inappropriateness of other ways of knowing about it. The persuasion for accepting this truth is the promise of achieving the policing aim of “the proper protection of victims”; offering the rewards of moral worthiness to those police who embrace government’s definition and follow its guidance. This problematising activity, presenting a version of reality which needs correcting in a specific way is what, from a governmentalist perspective (e.g. Rose & Miller, 1992; Rose, 1993), one might have predicted.

Secondly, the dynamic of ‘reflexive government’ and ‘responsibilised others’ is apparent in formulations of policy community members to be governed. The former is accomplished by self-presentation as a government which has analysed the problem of policing domestic violence and taken appropriate steps to remedy it. This concerns responding appropriately to “public concern”, sifting through relevant knowledges and, with the agreement of ACPO, guiding and steering the police through the HOC 60/90 policy document. The effect of this is that government is framed as ‘already responsible’, having identified and met all its responsibilities, leaving it nothing more to do. However, this accomplishment is
also dependent on formulating the police as ‘responsibilised others’. This is founded on the dual truth-claims that some police already respond appropriately to government guidance and that “the proper protection of victims” is not currently being achieved. The effect of this is that the responsibility for all remaining action to secure victim protection is ascribed to the police.

Thus the ‘doing’ of government in terms of problem formulation can be seen as undermining competing versions of the problem and producing responsibility claims and ascription around formulations of ‘reflexive government’ and ‘responsibilised others’; again this is in line with a governmentalist account. And it also produces an emphasis on the police policing domestic violence ‘properly’; a likely focus of Conservative crime policy which I identified in Chapter One.

Thirdly, in regard to constituting victims, there does seem to be a victim intervention focus. The themes of “protection” and “support” make female gender relevant to the policing of domestic victims and problematise ‘being women’. By contrast, men as offenders are only partially made visible as gendered subjects and gender does not seem to be mobilised in persuasions to the police to act upon them. Neither of these findings would surprise feminists who have critiqued government crime prevention literature from this period (e.g. Stanko, 1995, 1996, 1997). Although “support” produces a woman victim as a citizen in need of help to self-actualise and self-responsibilise, “protection” generates a woman victim with no responsibilities. The effect of “support” is to delimit victims’ rights to going to court. The effect of “protection” is to claim a victim’s overriding right to protection, at the expense of other rights, including whether or not protection is wanted.

Consequently, the ‘doing’ of government in the activity of constituting victims can be seen as framing ‘women experiencing domestic violence’ as the population to be governed. And this is commensurate with what one might have expected from a Conservative government of this time. That is, not wedding rights and responsibilities thoroughly has enabled formulations of victims exempted from self-actualisation (Lund, 1999).

The main implication arising from this analysis is that the ‘doing’ of government around the policing of domestic violence seems to be quite accomplished in reformulating truths, ascribing responsibility and pitching persuasion at a level that might well be appropriate to
police understandings. Whether Chief Officers respond to this guidance ‘accordingly’ is explored in Chapter 5. Another key implication is that HOC 60/90’s formulations of women victims generate opportunities to blame women for what happens to them and to justify action with them and upon them that overrides their rights and choices.

In Part One, I have focused on HOC 60/90. In Part Two, I explore the activities of problem formulation and constituting victims in HOC 19/2000 in order to facilitate a continuities and disjunctures discussion.

**Part Two: Home Office Circular No 19 of 2000**

In this chapter part, using extracts from HOC 19/2000, I explore the ‘doings’ of government around the policing of domestic violence. This comprises problem formulation and constituting victims with a focus on how ‘reflexive government’ and ‘responsible others’ are accomplished.

3. Problem Formulation: de-gendering the problem and re-gendering the blame

In this section I explore how the New Labour government of 2000 attempted to problematise the policing of domestic violence in HOC 19/2000.

3.1 De-gendering the problem: “violence against women”, “crime” and “domestic violence”

Extract 8 provides the opening three paragraphs from the covering memo of HOC 19/2000. As opening lines, a great deal of definition work is being undertaken to formulate categories and ascribe meaning to them.

*Extract 8 [HOC 19/2000 (Covering Memo paragraphs 1-3)]*

1. Dear Colleague
2. In March 2000, the Deputy Home Secretary, the Rt Hon Paul Boateng MP, launched the *Multi-agency Guidance for Addressing Domestic Violence* (file size 331 Kb), as part of the Government’s “Living Without Fear” campaign to tackle violence against women.

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8 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions.
In this country, two women a week are killed by a current or former partner, around 25% of women experience domestic violence at some point in their lives; and domestic violence is the most common single type of violence against women, accounting for about a quarter of all recorded violent crime.

The Government is clear that one's home should be a place of safety and that domestic violence therefore involves a serious breach of trust. Domestic violence involves crimes of violence which are serious in themselves, but they are often aggravated further by that serious breach of trust. That is why the Government is taking such strong action against them. It must not be forgotten that exactly the same considerations apply when women are the perpetrators and men the victims, and in same sex relationships.

The key to understanding these categories and the work being done here can be seen in the moves between paragraphs. Thus in paragraph one the emphasis is on “Domestic Violence” (1.3/4) and “violence against women” (1.5). In paragraph two, the concern is “domestic violence” (1.7 & 8), “violence against women” (1.9) and “crime” (1.10). In paragraph three, the focus is “domestic violence” (1.12 & 13) and “crime” (1.13). Therefore, even before a deeper analysis is presented below, there is a sense from the outset that government is managing the category of “domestic violence”, particularly around understandings of “violence against women” and “crime”.

The first paragraph ascribes a relationship between “domestic violence” and “violence against women”. What the government is formulated as having done about “domestic violence” is “part of” (1.4, my emphasis) an existing “campaign to tackle violence against women” (1.5). This suggests that there is “violence against women” that is not “domestic violence” but that “violence against women” is relevant to this government’s strategies. Further, it indicates that women’s “Fear” (1.5) is understood as what binds the category “violence against women”.

Another accomplishment of this paragraph concerns the self-presentation of government. Collectively, the verbs “launched” (1.3), “Addressing” (1.3) and “tackle” (1.5) imply a busy
government actively engaged in dealing with the problem. The details of action already taken are very specific: the date of the launch; the minister responsible; his name; a gateway to the full text of the Multi-Agency Guidance (MAG); and how this fits into an existing campaign, the name of that campaign and what it is for are all provided. And I think that this is attempting two moves. The first concerns constituting government's actions as strategic. This government knows what it is doing and how its work is integrated. The second appears to be dealing with 'openness'. The reader is given truths about what MAG is and what it is for as well as the means of accessing it. It is almost as if the reader is being invited to check the veracity of the government's truth-claims. The overall sense is that government is not simply active and organised but also open, truthful and, probably, responsible.

The second paragraph opens with "In this country" (1.6). The implication is that the truth-claims that follow are not about a foreign country or some uncivilised part of the world but what is happening on 'our' doorstep. In this way, government is setting up a justification for why it is taking the action it is. And it is making an appeal to the audience that this problem concerns them too.

The second paragraph as a whole is actually a three-part list, with the third part marking a shift of topic from "violence against women" to "crime". The first part of the list comprises "two women a week are killed by a current or former partner" (1.6-7) and suggests an example where "domestic violence" and "violence against women" overlap. There is no crime discourse in this phrase; no 'homicide' or 'murder', words that would indicate these women's deaths as being understood as crime. But "women" "killed" suggests "violence against women". And the incidence as "two ... a week" and the violence-doer formulation of "current or former partner" can be understood to pertain to the category of "domestic violence". Consequently, in the absence of a gendered violence-doer, "violence against women" is simply that; acts of violence bound by the gender of those to whom violence is done. And "domestic violence" is framed as common, inter-partner violence whilst notions of "crime" are played down.

However, category definition is not the only discursive work being done here. As an extreme case "killed" is being legitimised in the text as something that cannot, physically, and should not, morally, be denied; a classic 'death and furniture' argument (Edwards et al,
1995). It would seem therefore that it is being presented as a bottom line argument, a truth-claim building on "In this country" as justification for why government and the perceived audience should not ignore it.

The second part of the list comprises "around 25% of women experience domestic violence at some point in their lives" (l.7-8) as another example of when "domestic violence" and "violence against women" overlap. By contrast with the first part, "around" and "at some point" render this a systematically vague formulation. And vagary too is a means by which potential challenges to the veracity of truth-claims can be undermined (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Therefore, albeit differently, there is persuasion being undertaken for the reader to accept this part of the account as true.

The third part of the list marks the change of topic to crime and comprises "domestic violence is the most common single type of violence against women, accounting for a quarter of all recorded violent crime" (l.8-10). Once again an ascription is made whereby "domestic violence" and "violence against women" overlap. However, the extreme case formulation "most common single type" is not simply arguing that the two can manifest in the same action. Rather, it is additionally countering potential claims that "domestic violence" and "violence against women" are one and the same thing. Therefore, although in all three parts of the list "domestic violence" is constituted as often being "violence against women" as well, "domestic violence" is not "violence against women" per se.

The final claim that "domestic violence" accounts for "about a quarter of all recorded violent crime" denotes the topic shift. This time the extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986)9, "all recorded violent crime" (my emphasis), is used to suggest that "crime", unlike "violence against women", is 'in the object' of "domestic violence". That is, "crime" is framed as the appropriate way for understanding "domestic violence" and certain instances of "violence against women". Initially this seems to contradict government's stance in paragraph one where "violence against women" was positioned as the primary concern for publishing the Multi-Agency Guidance. However, the shift of topic from "violence against women" to "crime" accomplished by the third part of the list implies that both are important and the emphasis is determined by the specific matter in hand. The suggestion is therefore that the government has two chief concerns, "violence against women" and
"crime". The implication is that in some instances, "violence against women" will be the 'appropriate way' to understand and deal with domestic violence. But when the focus is on police-work, the 'appropriate way' to understand domestic violence truth is through "crime". Consequently, whilst the government is and the police should be aware of, "violence against women", for the purposes of policing, the primary concern is "crime".

This reading is supported by paragraph three where "violence against women" is absent and notions of gendered and heterosexual partner violence are undermined. By stating that "The Government is clear that one's home should be a place of safety and that domestic violence involves a serious breach of trust" (1.11-12), government presents its stance as open and straightforward ("is clear"). It also provides a moral tone which combines the notion of the adage that 'an Englishman's home is his castle' with a sense that personal relationships are near-sacred and under threat from "a serious breach of trust". The morality associated with 'seriousness' is extended into the next two sentences: "Domestic violence involves crimes of violence which are serious in themselves, but they are often aggravated further by that serious breach of trust. That is why the Government is taking such strong action against them" (1.13-16). Although "crimes of violence" are framed as serious, this is disclaimed ("but") as the only source of seriousness in "domestic violence". And this seriousness is used to justify ("That is why") government's stance and legitimise "taking such strong action" as the moral high-ground.

In the final sentence, notions of (gendered) "violence against women" are undermined: "It must not be forgotten that exactly the same considerations apply when women are the perpetrators and the men the victims, and in same sex relationships" (1.16-18). The first thing that is interesting about this formulation is that there is an imperative ("must") rather than persuasion. This imperative is part of a bottom line argument (Edwards et al, 1995), suggesting it cannot, physically, and should not, morally, be denied that "exactly the same considerations apply" (my emphasis), regardless of gender.

The ascription of "women ... (as) ... perpetrators" is important because despite discourse about "domestic violence", "crime" and "violence against women" in the extract, this is the only time that the term used for the violence-doer encompasses the meaning of wrongdoing. Further, the constitution of "men ... (as) ... victims" is remarkable as it is the only

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9 Extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) are very common, therefore for full explication and credit see Chapter 3
place in the whole of HOC 19/2000 where victims are directly gendered. Moreover, “same sex relationships”, framed as a place where “domestic violence” also occurs, undermines any remaining notion that “domestic violence” is gendered, male against female, violence. Therefore, the “crime” and the “breach of trust” involved in “domestic violence” and which render it serious are framed as in no way founded in gender. And this supports my argument that the government is primarily concerned with organising understandings of “domestic violence” around “crime” for the purposes of its policing.

In summary, the opening lines of HOC 19/2000 constitute two ways of understanding and addressing “domestic violence”. ‘Violence against women’ is framed as acts of violence, often “domestic violence” and sometimes “crime” where the common feature is the female gender of the recipient. There are also suggestions that women’s fear is integral to what happens to them and that “violence against women” could be ‘an appropriate way’ for organising action in some unnamed context. But “crime” is framed as serious and a matter for the police. Although it may arise from “domestic violence”, some of which will also be “violence against women”, it is ultimately a gender-free concept. When the context of action to address “domestic violence” concerns its policing, “crime” is formulated as ‘the more appropriate way’ of understanding domestic violence and steering government and police action accordingly. “Domestic violence” itself is framed as frequently occurring inter-partner violence, regardless of gender, which is serious by virtue of involving crimes of violence and serious breaches of trust.

The first implication arising from these formulations concerns what types of victims will be constituted if female gender is managed out of the “domestic violence” category. And that is addressed in section 4. The second implication involves the way that “violence against women” is separated off from “crime” and policing matters. Although it is framed here as a potentially ‘appropriate way’ of addressing domestic violence in some context, the only other named context here is multi-agency working and those forums too tend to be engaged in reducing crime (Crawford, 1994). Therefore, whether or not “violence against women” will ever be prioritised over “crime” is debatable. And this issue is explored in Chapter 7.

section 1.3.
A further key feature of HOC 19/2000’s opening lines is the way the themes of “violence against women” and “crime” are used to ascribe responsibilities and constitute government as already responsible. Firstly, the detail provided to formulate the relationship between “violence against women” and “domestic violence” founds claims that government is responsible, strategic and organised. Secondly, in separating “violence against women” from “crime” and “domestic violence”, government claims the moral high-ground for itself.

Thirdly, the justifications for separating out the various categories are quite aggressive. Instead of using simple extreme cases to fend off potential challenges it forms bottom line arguments. Thus it directly challenges the reader to deny the veracity of dead women on their doorstep and “domestic violence” that is not gendered male to female violence. The implication of this is that this government is not simply engaged in artful persuasion. Rather, it is prepared to pull out ‘bigger guns’ where necessary and bring considerable pressure to bear. New Labour self-presents as a lean, mean fighting machine that should not and does not wait for stragglers. But this is still persuasion, perhaps ‘with attitude’, because the rewards for compliance (e.g. being aligned with the responsible government and sharing its moral high-ground) are inherent in the truths which it formulates.

3.2 Re-gendering the blame: “women are more likely ...”

In the last subsection I argued that “crime” as a theme is framed as ‘the appropriate way’ of understanding “domestic violence” for the purposes of its policing. And I suggested that the category “violence against women” was useful for delimiting truths about gendered violence, including notions of dead women. In Extract 9 below, I pursue these two arguments further, looking for how the disproportionate instances of male against female partner-violence are accounted for.


83 A quarter of all reported violent crime is domestic violence. However, 84 there is still a large amount of under reporting of this type of crime to 85 the police. Domestic violence occurs regardless of the victim’s class, 86 religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity. It is experienced by both 87 women and men. The majority of violent and repetitive assaults are 88 however perpetrated by men against their female partners. By
comparison with men, women are more likely to suffer domestic violence over a lifetime, more likely to suffer repeat victimisation, more likely to be injured and seek medical help, more likely to receive frightening threats and more likely to be frightened and upset. (…)

The extract begins by repeating a formulation presented in HOC 19/2000's opening lines (see Extract 8). That is, through the extreme case formulation of “all” (1.83), “crime” is constituted as ‘in the object’ of “domestic violence”. The ascription that it is only “A quarter” is disclaimed by suggesting there is more “crime” which is currently under-reported (“However”). This is an important constitution because it frames “crime” as pre-existing any police intervention. And this is counter to police understandings that it is they who, for all practical purposes, define crime at the point of investigation (Waddington, 1993, 1999).

The next line also contains a disclaimer (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975). The employment of “regardless” (1.85) undermines understandings of “domestic violence” that do not accommodate “the victim's class, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity (1.85-6)”. The key category here is “sexual orientation”, as it specifically disclaims formulations that rely on notions of gendered violence. And that move is repeated in the next line where, “It is experienced by both women and men” (1.86-7); although the positioning of “women” before “men”, an ordering which jars for fluent English speakers, may be understood to be making a concession to “The majority of violent and repetitive assaults” (1.87). Indeed, the shared experience of women and men is disclaimed (“however”) in favour of “perpetrated by men against their female partners” (1.88).

What is pertinent to my argument about separating gender off from understandings of “crime” is clear here. The primary classification of “domestic violence” as “crime” for policing purposes is not undermined; neither, is the list of possible differences between people, including “sexual orientation”. Therefore, notions of “domestic violence” as gendered violence have already been undermined before the shared experience of women and men is disclaimed. Consequently, the theme of “violence against women” in the context of heterosexual relationships is being discussed only once “crime” and “domestic violence” have been fenced off as separate categories.
In subsection 3.1 I argued that the feature highlighted as binding together incidents of "violence against women" was the gender of the recipient, not who was doing the violence, not how serious the violence was and not where it was occurring. In addition, the government campaign for tackling "violence against women" was called "Living Without Fear". And I suggested that women's fear was being framed as somehow integral to violences committed against them. The list arising from what "women are more likely" to experience infers that it is more than just fear that is being ascribed as rendering them the sites where violences are enacted. It includes, "to suffer domestic violence over a lifetime" (1.89-90), "to suffer repeat victimisation" (1.90), "to be injured" (1.91), to "seek medical help" (1.91), "to receive frightening threats" (1.91-2), and "to be frightened and upset" (1.92).

Representations of women as physically inferior to men and as having heightened fearfulness and emotionality are very common and pervasive discourses of negative femininity (Marcus, 1992; Smart, 1992, 1995). Therefore, this extract is re-inscribing derogatory understandings of women. And by implicating 'being women' as a means for accounting for why violence is carried out upon them they are implicitly being blamed for what happens to them.

In summary, the category of "violence against women" is not just a way of delimiting understandings of "domestic violence" which are inconvenient to "crime" formulations. Rather, as the theme "women are more likely" illustrates, it provides opportunities to de-gender the problem and re-gender the blame (Berns, 2001). The main implication of this is that female gender becomes a separate consideration from "domestic violence" victimhood. This is likely to be reflected in how the policing of "domestic violence" is guided and any role or responsibilities ascribed to the victim. And this is further explored in section 4.

4. Constituting Victims

In this section I explore how victims are constituted in HOC 19/2000. In section 3, by way of discourses such as "crime" and "women are more likely", HOC 19/2000 ushered the gender of women victims of domestic violence into a discrete category of "violence against women". Therefore, although it was deemed that "women were more likely" to be the sites of violence that was accounted for in terms of their 'womanhood' rather than domestic
violence. In particular ‘fearfulness’ was constituted as a feature of ‘womanhood’. Moreover, the only direct gendering of domestic violence victims was as male and ‘sexual orientation’ was invoked to challenge the moral high-ground position of those understanding domestic violence as gendered violence. Therefore, it is unlikely that HOC 19/2000 will constitute domestic violence victims as female. The key themes arising from victim constitutions within HOC 19/2000 were “needs” and “safety”.

4.1 “needs”

Extract 10 exemplifies how “needs” are formulated in HOC 19/2000.

Extract 10 [HOC 19/2000 (Nature & Extent of Problem: 15th paragraph)]:

151 (…) Even when there is enough evidence to
152 charge a person, the victim has many needs. These may include:
153 access to safe temporary and permanent housing; arranging a change
154 of schooling; financial assistance; obtaining civil injunctions; and,
155 having people to share their fears/problems with. Where the alleged
156 offender is not charged, these needs may be greater.

The first point of note is that the “victim” (l.152) is not explicitly gendered. Certainly it could be said to have a ‘gender flavour’ as “safe ... housing; ... schooling ... (and) ... financial assistance” (l.153-4) as victims’ needs can be read as inferring women’s vulnerability, economic dependence and childcare responsibilities. But gender is not made overtly relevant. Moreover, “fears” (l.155) reproduces a discourse about what ‘women’ are, that is prevalent in HOC 19/2000 (see Extracts 8 & 9). And this could be seen as the a further implicit gendering of victims in Extract 10. But the way it is presented, as “fears/problems” (l.155), undoes that potential. ‘Fears’ as something women have are qualified with ‘problems’, something not ascribed gender relevance. Consequently, the suggestion is that “needs” per se are varied but not necessarily gender relevant.

Secondly, the police are ascribed some responsibility in regard to “needs”. The list of possible victim needs is sandwiched between police ‘charging’ (l.152 & 156) activities. And it is claimed that whether or not the police charge offenders, “needs” do not go away and in some cases may actually increase. Therefore, it is argued that charging offenders does not fulfil police responsibilities in regard to victims’ “needs”. This would be
commensurate with a victim interventions focus. However, it is unlikely that the police are being persuaded to meet all of these “needs” themselves. They could reasonably be asked to help with “access to” safe housing, help with “injunctions” and maybe even, listening to problems and fears. But financial assistance and changes of schooling are outside their remit. In this way, the police responsibility is positioned somewhere between doing nothing about “needs” and meeting all of them. Thus what I think is being accomplished here is a blurring of the boundaries of responsibility for “needs”.

So victims’ “needs” are formulated as varied and multiple, possibly with occasional female gender relevance and within the responsibility remit ascribed to the police. And these truth-claims about “needs” are reproduced when minority status is invoked around victims.

Extract 11 [HOC 19/2000 (Support for the Victim: 6th-8th paragraphs]:

419 Minority Groups
420 All victims of crime should be treated according to their individual needs. Investigating officers should avoid making assumptions regarding the nature of those needs.
423 Minority ethnic and religious groups
430 There are a number of voluntary organisations that have specific expertise in dealing with domestic violence in particular communities.
432 Officers should consider this resource when investigating such offences.
436 Gay and Lesbian Relationships
437 When dealing with domestic incidents involving people in same sex relationships, it is important that the police investigate the allegation without making any stereotypical assumptions regarding the relationship.

The most notable feature concerns the relationship framed between victims and their “individual needs” (1.420-1). “All victims” (1.420, my emphasis) is an extreme case formulation. As such, victims are constituted as ‘in the object’ of their “individual needs”.
Therefore, the suggestion is that all victims should be understood through the sum of their individual needs not through "assumptions" about need founded in a 'generic victim' who is white and heterosexual. This has two effects. The victim is not undermined as 'needy' in a pejorative sense, therefore, it is not victims but the police response to them and their needs which is problematised. Also "victims of crime" (1.420) locates victims in the police domain. Thus prioritising "needs" as the way to understand victims, particularly where the variety of those needs cannot be met by the police, allows for formulations of shared responsibilities between agencies.

The police are responsibilised to see individual victims in terms of their needs, treat those needs as 'real' and not try to reformulate them on the basis of assumptions. This is exemplified in two ways in Extract 11. Firstly, in regard to minority ethnicity, the notion of "specific expertise" (1.430-1) suggests the possibility of erroneous assumptions due to a lack of knowledges about "particular communities" (1.431). But it is also implied ("Officers should consider", 1.432) that this "specific expertise" will not be appropriate in all cases. Therefore, commensurate with formulations of victims as the sum of their individual needs, "specific expertise" is forwarded as a relevant option rather than an imperative. And once again, there is a sense that "needs" cannot and should not be met by the police alone. Secondly, in regard to sexual orientation, "stereotypical assumptions" (1.439) names the possibility of the police prejudging the "relationship" (1.440). In this case, a focus on the sum of the victim's individual needs would detract from trying to fit the victim into any generic understanding of, perhaps worthy, victimhood. Thus the police are responsibilised to respect individuality arising from "needs" by accepting the value of non-police expertise and not falling prey to any prejudices they may have.

In summary, the theme "needs" produces victims of whom the majority are white and heterosexual. These victims can only be understood in the sum of their individual needs, which are 'real' and may be shaped by minority group membership and, to a lesser extent, female gender. The problems for policing come from not considering the impact of police-work on "needs" and erroneous assumptions about victims and what they need. The police are ascribed the responsibility not to ride roughshod over victims' "needs" but the responsibility to meet the multiplicity of those "needs" seems to transcend the boundaries of separate agencies.
4.2 "safety"

Another theme given primacy in the HOC 19/2000 text on victims is "safety" which is ascribed as "paramount".

Extract 12 [HOC 19/2000 (Problem Solving: only paragraph)]:

(...)

508 The safety of the victim is paramount. Every effort should be made to
509 ensure that the victim is not subjected to further abuse. (...)

Extract 13 [HOC 19/2000 (Summary: 1st paragraph)]:

536 (...) The safety of the victim is of paramount importance
537 but officers should not lose sight of their responsibility to investigate
538 the matter thoroughly. (...)

The police are charged with orientating to the "paramount" concern of victim safety. They are responsibilised with doing all that they can ("Every effort") rather than actually securing it. But it is disclaimed ("but", 1.537) as a substitute for other aspects of policing; concerns for the safety of the victim should not override a thorough investigation. The victim is neither explicitly nor implicitly gendered. 'Safety' does not invoke gender relevance. And ensuring "the victim is not subjected to further abuse" and investigating "the matter thoroughly" do not gender the policing of domestic violence.

However, working towards victim "safety" is not framed as a police monopoly. The victim too is ascribed an interest in the matter.

Extract 14 [HOC 19/2000 (Reports to the Crown Prosecution Service: 1st paragraph)]:

350 (...) Information that is of
351 use includes:
352 (...)
363 • victims' views on their own and their children's personal safety
364 if a prosecution does/does not follow.

Even though "victim's views" are positioned last on the list of information to go into reports to the Crown Prosecution Service, it is still framed as "of use". This suggests that
their understandings of their “safety” have at least some value in, and something to add to, the prosecution decision-making process. And it frames the victim as capable of producing an account that could be relevant.

Another instance, where victims are constituted as having a stake in their “safety” concerns police action ‘at the scene’:-

*Extract 15 [HOC 19/2000 (Action at the Scene: 4th paragraph)]:*

783 If it is not possible to secure the safety of victims in their home,
784 consideration should be given to removing them to a place of safety
785 with their consent (eg a refuge or relatives).

However, this time rights discourse appears to be interacting with “safety” discourse. I have already argued that it is a police responsibility to do all they can to ensure victim “safety” rather than actually achieve it. The potential barrier to victim “safety” formulated here is “their consent”. But their right to choose non-safety and relieve the police of their responsibility is not contested. No role is presented for the victim; no responsibility is being ascribed to them; and, no blame is being apportioned either. Therefore, the victim is being constituted as a functioning person with the right to remove themselves from police interventions, regardless of any consequences. The main implication of this is that the police are not licensed to act upon victims as if they were non-persons or commodities. ‘Safety’ may be “paramount” but it does not override victims’ choices.

Moreover, the victim is consistently not gendered. Within the UK, “refuge” (l.785) does imply a place where women escaping domestic violence may go. But “refuge” is qualified by “or relatives”, and this disrupts any sense that victims, in general, are women10.

In summary, “safety” produces victims who are not gendered, have something to contribute to prosecution decisions and whose choices must be respected. Consequently, female gender is not made relevant to the policing of domestic violence and the police are ascribed a responsibility to listen to victims. Victim “safety” is of paramount importance to policing. But it is not a substitute for other police duties. Neither, does it override victim’s

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10 This is similar to the “fears/problems” formulation in Extract 10.
rights to choose. 'Safety' is, therefore, difficult to ensure, partly because victims are under no obligation to attain or accept it.

The implications arising from "safety" and "needs" discourse are considered in the chapter part conclusion below.

**Part Two Conclusion**

The analysis of extracts from HOC 19/2000 indicates that policy is being employed as a technology of governance to exercise power over the police. Firstly, the truth of "crime" as 'the appropriate way' for governing the policing of "domestic violence" is founded at the expense of understandings of gender(ed) violence. 'Violence against women' is formulated as a separate, although overlapping issue, which through the discourse "women are more likely", implicates the 'nature' of 'being women' in the harm that is done to them and the reason why it should not be a police matter per se. Thus de-gendering the problem and re-gendering the blame (Berns, 2001), founds the persuasion to accept the veracity of this account; namely that there is a share in the moral high-ground for those accepting the seriousness of non-gendered domestic violences. In this way, part of the governmental problematising activity includes undermining competing versions of reality where domestic violence and gender(ed) violence are more closely associated. This is commensurate with a governmentalist perspective on 'doing government' (e.g. Rose & Miller, 1992) and my predictions for New Labour's problem formulation around domestic violence.

Secondly, as also might have been expected from a governmentalist account, the dual rationality of 'reflexive government' and 'responsibilised others' is demonstrable in discourse which formulates those to be governed (Rose & Miller, 1992). This government self-presents as dynamic, busy and strategic. It is ascribed as looking at problems, sorting out their relatedness and rallying others to the cause. Implicitly there is a suggestion that this work is never done but there do not appear to be any gaps in government's responsibilities that it has not already fulfilled through the publication of HOC 19/2000 and other policy documents. Thus New Labour is framed as an 'already responsible' government.
However, 'responsibilised others' is more discreetly accomplished. There are no direct responsibilisations of the police or anyone else in the opening paragraphs but a dialogue with others is suggested by the amount of persuasion. This implies that readers who understand domestic violence as gender(ed) violence and do not take crime involving serious breaches of trust seriously are not very responsible. And this would appear to be in line with New Labour's re-imaginings of crime and community (Matthews & Pitts, 2001; Newman, 2001). That is, even though this is a policing domestic violence policy, the first audience appears wider than 'just' the police; implicitly suggesting a less central role for the police in the overall management of domestic violence.

In regard to the activity of constituting victims, many of the findings are commensurate with what one might have expected. Firstly, "needs" and "safety" formulations suggest that their importance transcends occupational boundaries; again suggesting a less central role for the police. Secondly, the themes of "needs" and "safety" produce victims of diverse ethnicity and sexuality who have rights and choices. And this is accompanied by a minimisation of the relevance of female gender to domestic violence victimhood which is accomplished through "violence against women" and "women are more likely". Thus there is a sense that female gender is being managed out of domestic violence formulations. However, after Lund (1999), I had expected that New Labour's thorough wedding of rights and responsibilities would manifest in an increase of victim mobilisation discourse. But domestic violence victims in HOC 19/2000 are ascribed rights without responsibilities. Also there is no sense that it is a police responsibility to mobilise victims to self-actualise.

The first implication arising from this analysis is that the 'doing' of government around the issue of policing domestic violence seems most accomplished in promoting 'crime' understandings of domestic violence by undermining gendered understandings of domestic violence. The amount of activity undertaken to relocate gender relevance outside policing issues is important. On the face of it, the primary dialogue of this document is with police officers. But as a revision of HOC 60/90, it can also be read as a dialogue with its predecessor. There, domestic violence was framed as a subset of crime with women victims. Here, definition work can be seen to be directly reformulating and undermining those claims. And this also has implications for feminists working in the field. Certainly no-one would argue that being inclusive around issues of ethnicity and sexuality is problematic in and of itself. However, truths about ethnic and sexual diversity within HOC
19/2000 are founded at the expense of ‘just women’ discourse. As argued by feminists (Coote, 2000; Kelly, 1996; Mouffe, 1992), this was always a danger for those feminists who did not engage effectively with difference. But, and perhaps most worryingly, in HOC 19/2000 the notion of ‘not just women’ appears to problematise and implicate ‘being women’ in occurrences of violence.

Secondly, HOC 19/2000 apparently misses an opportunity to mobilise victims or, at least, have them mobilised. Whether this responsibility has been displaced and multi-agency partnerships or other agencies are implicated is explored in Chapter 7.

In the chapter’s discussion I summarise the key continuities and disjunctures between HOC 60/90 and HOC 19/2000 in regard to problem formulation and constituting victims. And I identify the implications arising from these shifts and indicate those that are to be taken forward to other chapters.

Chapter Discussion

In this chapter I have explored two aspects of ‘doing’ government in policy for the policing of domestic violence. These were problem formulation and constituting victims with an additional concern of how responsibilisations for policy community members, specifically ‘reflexive government’ and ‘responsibilised others’, were accomplished.

A comparison between HOC 60/90 and HOC 19/2000 produces three key continuities across the decade. Firstly, both governments produce and manage competing ways of understanding domestic violence in order to produce a definition for the purposes of its policing. HOC 60/90 blends “public concern”, ‘crime’ and ‘research’ to argue what domestic violence is. HOC 19/2000 juxtaposes “crime” and “violence against women” to argue what “domestic violence” is and is not. Secondly, both implicate ‘being women’ in why violence occurs. HOC 60/90 does this mainly through its readiness to gender victims as female and its reluctance to gender perpetrators as men. HOC 19/2000 accomplishes this by ushering female gender into the discrete category of “violence against women” and making the ascription that “women are likely” to experience domestic violence; thus it de-genders the problem and re-genders the blame (Berns, 2001).
Thirdly, each government ascribes itself as already fulfilling its responsibilities. Thus the ‘already responsible’ government is left no more to do by these policies. HOC 60/90 self-presents as responding to “public concern”, defining domestic violence appropriately and helping the police to do their job. HOC 19/2000 constitutes itself as strategic, straightforward and actively engaged in tackling the moral and criminal wrongs of domestic violence.

The main implication arising from these similarities is that competing versions of reality about domestic violence appear to provide fodder to HOC formulations. That is counter-truths are either cannibalised and/or framed as inappropriate to found government truth-claims. This suggests that the ‘already responsible’ government is quite a formidable and accomplished opponent, particularly when it self-presents as beyond reproach. Also it is rather depressing that changing how domestic violence is understood has not disrupted notions of ‘women’ as problematic and blameworthy. The idea that ‘womanhood’ needs correcting is still dominant.

A contrast also identifies four main disjunctures. Firstly, the relationship between “crime” and domestic violence is formulated differently. For HOC 60/90, domestic violence is a subset of “crime”. For HOC 19/2000, “crime”, as a separate category, overlaps with domestic violence. But it is ‘the more appropriate way’ for understanding domestic violence and taking action against it in the context of policing even where this reduces the centrality afforded to the police role. Secondly, the inter-relatedness of gender and domestic violence is contested, particularly around definition-work and constitutions of victims. In HOC 60/90, domestic violence is gender(ed) violence commensurate with violence against women. Female gender is made relevant to victims and the policing they receive through the themes of “support” and “protection”. In HOC 19/2000, domestic violence is not gendered. ‘Violence against women’ is legitimised as a viable way of understanding domestic violence but one that is inappropriate in the context of policing. The themes of “needs” and “safety” are further used to negate the relevance of gender to victims. And a wider spectrum of victims, in terms of ethnicity and sexual orientation, are produced.

Thirdly, persuasion is accomplished through very different styles. In HOC 60/90’s definition-work, Chief Officers are positioned as being already aware of truths and
responsibilities. These understandings are then exposed as incomplete and reworked in line with government's account of domestic violence. Additionally, "public concern" invokes the police public servant mandate and the proper "protection" of victims is framed as the aim and the reward of policing. In HOC 19/2000's definition-work, the police are absent. The discursive work on "violence against women" and "crime" as incompatible understandings of domestic violence seems to indicate a dialogue with HOC 60/90 as its predecessor or possibly any reader embracing gender understandings of domestic violence. The reward for accepting "crime" as the 'more appropriate way' of understanding domestic violence in the context of policing is a share of the moral high-ground where domestic violence is not seen as about 'just women'.

Finally, the roles and responsibilisations formulated around victims have shifted. In HOC 60/90, "support" frames a victim with an active role in her self-actualisation as a woman who will go to court. And the police are to work with her. 'Protection' overrides victims' autonomy and exempts them from responsibilities by generating a non-person woman victim whom the police are to work upon. And in the long-term, the responsibility for her "protection" is to be passed across notional organisational boundaries to other agencies. In HOC 19/2000, the victims appear to have no responsibilities although "safety" produces a fully functioning person with choices and rights. Further, "safety", although paramount, is not a substitute for other police duties and does not sanction them to override victims' wishes. Likewise, individual victims' "needs" are defended from the police, specifically from assumptions founded in ignorance and generalising prejudice. Moreover, there is a sense that "needs" blur and possibly transcend occupational boundaries.

The main implication arising from these shifts seems to be that gender(ed) understandings of domestic violence have been relegated from a key position in government understandings of domestic violence. In the formulation of diverse victims, New Labour appear to have attuned to claims from diverse populations about how domestic violence should be policed (e.g. Haymes, 2000; Kibblewhite, 2000; Mama, 2000). But there is also a sense in the way that gender has apparently been managed out of the domestic violence category, that gender politics, including those traditionally forwarded by feminists, have become "yesterday's politics" (Coote, 2000, p.3). Whilst this was always a threat for feminisms which failed to take full account of diversity (as noted by Kelly, 1996; Mouffe, 1992), it seems problematic to found truths about the rights and needs of diverse
populations in the ascribed inadequacies of 'being women'. How these government-generated truths are managed in discourse around working together, where feminist organisations are likely to be constituted, is pursued in Chapter 7.

A further implication is that from a governmentalist perspective, victims ascribed as having rights and choices are being constituted as ripe for responsibilisation. However, where that mobilisation takes place and who is positioned as appropriate for doing it is not apparent in HOC 19/2000. This seems dissonant for a New Labour government concerned with wedding rights and responsibilities (Lund, 1999) and increasing its emphasis on 'responsibilised citizenry' (Matthews & Pitts, 2001; Newman, 2001). These aspects are also pursued in Chapter 7.

Overall, the implications for the police are that they are responsibilised to accept government's definition of domestic violence for the purposes of policing and treat it seriously. This includes both how they understand the problem, their role with victims and the boundaries of their responsibilities. Consequently, in the next chapter I focus on Chief Officer policy discourse to explore how, as subjected to HOC 60/90 and HOC 19/2000, Chief Officers resist (or not) the truth-claims therein.
Chapter 5: Reformulating Government Truth-Claims for Policing Domestic Violence: Chief Officer ‘police realities’ in 1992 and 2000

Introduction

In the last chapter I contrasted a government policy for the policing of domestic violence with its revision from a decade later. HOC 60/90 presented an account of domestic violence as crime committed upon heterosexual women by their current or former partners. It ascribed Government as fulfilling its responsibilities in regard to this problem and suggested that the police might take it more seriously as crime. The text produced two victims, both gendered as female. One was formulated as a classic neo-liberal failing citizen needing help to self-actualise although this was delimited to the activity of her going to court. The other was framed as inactive with no responsibilities and this was used to legitimise her being moved across notional organisational (and responsibility) boundaries. By contrast, HOC 19/2000 presented an account of crime as the most ‘appropriate’ way of understanding domestic violence which simultaneously ushered female gender into a separate category. The high instance of women experiencing domestic violence was attributed to their physical inferiority and heightened emotionality compared to men. And ethnically and sexually diverse victims of domestic violence were produced. Thus the problem was de-gendered and the blame re-gendered as female. Discursive work was also done to defend victims’ individuality, choices and rights from police interventions.

In this chapter I explore Chief Officer policy talk and text on domestic violence in 1992 and 2000, that is at times when each Home Office Circular was in currency. My purpose is to investigate how, if at all, Chief Officers orient to the guidance by which they have each been made subject. The data for HOC 60/90 are an oral evidence session from 1992 which formed part of the Home Affairs Select Committee on domestic violence (HASC, 1993a, 1993b). This event set in motion a Parliamentary process which led to the publication of an inter-agency policy on domestic violence in 1995 (Home Office, 1995, see Chapter 6). The “witnesses” on 22nd November 1992 were all representatives of formal police associations. With an emphasis on Chief Officers, I focus on the talk of ACPO1 ranked officers. The data for HOC 19/2000 are a Metropolitan Police policy text published in July 2000 (MPS, 140
Initially, I reprise arguments from Chapter 2 by presenting an account of the ‘doing’ of police realities. From Chapter One, I summarise Foucauldian understandings of resistance. And from Chapter 3, I note the methodological implications for exploring exercisings of power in the talk and text items I have selected. The main body of the chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I present extracts from the oral evidence in 1992 (HASC, 1993b). And I argue that the ‘doing’ of police realities in dialogue is very clear. One participant can be seen to be orienting to truth-claims forwarded by HOC 60/90. But in the main, the knowledges that are reformulated to support a Chief Officer account of reality have a more immediate source in that they are produced in the local interaction.

In the second part, I present extracts from the Metropolitan Police policy document for the investigation of racist, domestic violence and homophobic incidents (MPS, 2000a). Here the ‘doing’ of police realities and the dialogue are less clear. And yet, identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource which support Chief Officer accounts of reality are accomplished. HOC 19/2000 is invoked in terms of rendering female gender irrelevant to the policing of domestic violence. However, there is evidence that wider understandings are being managed and attuned to. In the chapter discussion I draw together the key differences for analysing Chief Officer police realities talk rather than text. Further, I consider the implications for government guidance on the policing of domestic violence arising from the ‘doing’ of Chief Officer police realities at the policy level.

**Raising Questions for Analysis**

In 1970s and 1980s, the ‘canteen culture’ of the rank and file was considered an important site for research in understanding the policing of domestic violence (e.g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; Southall Black Sisters, 1989). But more recently, commentators have placed a greater emphasis on attempting to change the structures in which police culture operates by lobbying for legal and policy changes (e.g. Ganapathy, 1987). This document is attributed to an ACPO ranked officer. And as part of an international conference in 2000 (MPS, 2000b) it was widely distributed to other police, practitioners and academics. The choices underpinning the selection of these two very different sources of discourse are discussed in ‘Raising Questions for Analysis’ below.

1 Association of Chief Police Officers.
2002; Stanko, 1994b). And this has seemingly led to police culture slipping from academic currency. I do see realist accounts of ‘canteen culture’ as problematic (see also Manning 1977; Holdaway, 1983; Waddington, 1999); but I am also concerned that opportunities are being missed to critique the policing of domestic violence by focusing on Chief Officers’ police cultural accomplishments.

Post-structuralist accounts of language understand talk as action and the site where social realities and subjectivities are accomplished (Weedon, 1997). But discourse is contradictory and produces “competing ways of giving meaning to the world” (Weedon, 1997, p.21). Therefore, struggles to accomplish and maintain versions of reality, including identities, are constant. Also discourse is historically and geographically specific and so delimits what can be spoken in a particular time and place (Ramazanoglu, 1993). Thus ‘ways of knowing’ and ‘ways of being’ that suggest ‘ways of doing’ are further circumscribed by historical context and the subject positions available to a particular officer (Shearing & Ericson, 1991). From this perspective, the ‘doing of being a police officer’ is neither the preserve of junior officers nor restricted to street level police-work. And there is no reason why Chief Officers should not ‘do’ police cultures whilst engaged in policy-making; or that interrogations of police culture at this level should not prove as viable a site of enquiry as ‘canteen culture’ did in the 1970s and 1980s.

Moreover, organisational ‘culture’ can be seen as a ‘verb’ (Street, 1993); a ‘doing’ that is repeatedly produced, reproduced and kept current through a range of processes (Wright, 1994). Such processes include constituting the boundaries of the organisation itself (Foucault, 1982; Wright, 1994) and ‘recontextualising’ non-police knowledges that come into that domain (Agar, 1985; Linell, 1998). Indeed, there is evidence that the police are adept at reformulating non-police understandings to privilege police versions of reality (McNulty, 1994; Tracey & Anderson, 1999; Whalen & Zimmerman, 1990), particularly around identity-work (Fletcher, 1991). However, this is not to say that ‘police realities’, as I have termed them, rely exclusively on internal systems of meaning-making. Certain wider discourses, specifically negative representations of women, may be useful in certain transactional business (see Auburn et al, 1995; Wowk, 1984). In these instances, truths appear to be ‘allowed’ through organisational boundaries with little or no reformulation. Thus the ‘doing’ of police realities, as identity-work, boundary-work and invoking female gender as an occasional resource should be discernible in Chief Officer policy discourse.
Exercisings of power around the formulation and countering of truths are a key concern of Foucauldian Analysis (Carabine, 2001). Power and resistance are equally important as the tensions between the two is how truth is produced and kept current. But it is also the site of struggle that can lead to new or counter truths becoming dominant (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982; Foucault, 1976, 1980). When governmentalists, notably Rose (1993, 1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2000), interrogate the 'doing' of government, they tend to overlook the role played by resistances (Kemshall & Maguire, 2001; Miller, 2001; Stenson, 2000). There is therefore, an erroneous sense that power moves unilaterally. Consequently, considering the production of Chief Officer police realities as potential resistances to government responsibilisations could be important.

However, methodologically, this generates a problem of its own. For Conversation Analysts, talk-in-interaction, that is the local and immediate production of discourse, is all that can be considered in claiming that the constitution of a truth is consequential upon another truth. (e.g. Heritage, 1984; Silverman, 1998; Wooffitt, 2001). But Foucauldian Analysis allows for the consideration of historically specific counter-discourse, provided that the claims founded on it are careful and well-considered (Carabine, 2001). Therefore, in the analysis of talk, resistances and reformulations should be readily identifiable. And in text, one needs to be more circumspect about drawing conclusions of inter-relatedness.

As well as one being talk and one being text, the two documents selected for comparison analysis seem a dissonant match. But they reflect the differences in the roles played by Chief Officers in domestic violence policy activity in 1992 and 2000. The HASC on domestic violence (1993a, 1993b) involved ACPO ranked officers in a government policymaking process. The police oral evidence session was conducted in the public domain and as such ACPO was positioned as a representative, policy appropriate and professional police body. However, since 1997, ACPO's mandate for operation has changed in that it has become a company (Savage et al, 2001). This means that it can still lobby but it also highlights accountability issues. Other than its membership, ACPO is accountable to no-one. And there has been a move in recent years to play down the lobbyist role, thereby giving ACPO a lower public profile in order to retain its privileged position and not draw too much attention to its accountability anomalies (Savage et al, 2001). Thus it is perhaps not surprising that by 2000 ACPO is not performing as a representative body in the public domain as it was in 1992.
However, ACPO has another contradiction and that is the Metropolitan Police (Savage et al., 2001). As the largest police force in the country, the Met has more representatives in ACPO than any other police service. But within ACPO, Met Police members tend to carve their own role. There has always been a sense that the Met is separate and it has often positioned itself as cutting edge and the pioneer of changes to policing. Therefore, at a time when ACPO is busy lowering its profile, the Met, through their ‘Enough is Enough’ domestic violence conference in 2000 were raising theirs (MPS, 2000b). Additionally, they took the opportunity that had been generated to distribute their current domestic violence policy (MPS, 2000a) to a range of national and international government personnel, practitioners and academics. Consequently, the Chief Officer discourse in the domestic violence public domain in 2000 was actually Met Police Chief Officer discourse. Certainly the primary audience for this policy text was junior Met officers. But the exercising of power in promoting this version of reality produces a secondary and wider readership. As such, a comparison with Chief Officer talk from HASC in 1992 is viable as an interrogation of the dominant Chief Officer police realities in the public domain for the two periods.

Much literature on the police frames ‘police culture’ as a rank and file activity. But this raises questions about Chief Officers’ ‘doings’ of police realities that may be pertinent to policy activities around domestic violence. Governmentalist research tends to overlook the potential of such resistances to exercisings of governance. Although resistance is likely to be readily apparent in talk, different considerations need to be made in interrogating text. Therefore, the questions that guide the analysis in this chapter are: How can Chief Officers be seen to be ‘doing’ policies realities in terms of identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource? In what ways do they invoke and resist Home Office guidance? How do they manage other non-police-generated knowledges and to what effect? What are the similarities and differences in Chief Officer police realities produced in talk rather than text?

Part One: Home Affairs Select Committee 1992/3
The Conservative government policy for the policing of domestic violence which was in currency in 1992/3 was HOC 60/90 (see Chapter 4). This document defined domestic violence for the purposes of policing as crime committed upon heterosexual women by
Within this chapter part I consider the 'doing' of Chief Officer police realities in their historical context through extracts from HASC 1992/3.

1. Formulating barriers to fulfilling responsibilities

The police speaker in all of the extracts that follow is Mr Pacey, the then Chief Constable of Gloucestershire. He was one of two ACPO representatives at HASC but the other officer spoke only once. Other participants were from the Police Federation and the Superintendents' Association. Although I do not present their talk, for the purposes of analysis it is necessary to know that they were there with potentially different interests. Within this section Mr Pacey's talk is used to demonstrate how he formulates barriers to fulfilling responsibilities.

1.1 "public expectation"

The conversation leading up to Extract One has concerned what resources Mr Pacey has given to domestic violence and, if he treats it as a priority, how he has redistributed his resources accordingly. The Metropolitan Police (the Met) have been forwarded as an example of where priority and resource reallocation has led to the establishment of domestic violence units (DVUs). Mrs Roche has just asked Mr Pacey exactly what he, himself, has done and he has fudged around notions of domestic violence liaison officers and ordinary patrol duties. Perhaps unsatisfied with that answer, Mrs Roche pursues the issue.
Mrs Roche: So you are saying, Mr Pacey, that you would like to have the additional resources to complement those liaison officers?

Mr Pacey: That is the answer. If domestic violence units are the answer, then yes, we need additional officers for that purpose. But every Chief Constable in this country needs additional officers for a whole range of different purposes. We are talking about domestic violence today, tomorrow I will be talking about drugs and people saying 'Why do you not give more police officers to this problem of drugs', because that also is an iceberg with its tip above the water. I could put a lot more resources into the fight against the drug problem, as an example. The same applies with the burglary problem - I could put more resources into that. So for Chief Constables there are always competing demands of trying to balance out what you want to do, having regard to priorities, pressures, and trying to keep in touch with what the public expect. There is a growing public expectation at present, certainly, in respect of domestic violence, and a willingness on our part to try to do something about it.

She frames Mr Pacey's previous answer as a plea for resources so that he can assign them to domestic violence. Initially, he affirms but he qualifies his response by reformulating two aspects of Mrs Roche's question. Firstly, his affirmation is made contingent on "If domestic violence units are the answer" (my emphasis). This suggests that the wrong question is being asked. That is, those forwarding the idea of DVUs have a faulty understanding of the resource problem as "domestic violence". This reading is supported by Mr Pacey's disclaimer ("But", 1.241) of domestic violence in favour of "a whole range of different purposes" and his second reformulation. Mrs Roche has specifically asked
what “you”, Mr Pacey, “would like”. But he recontextualises this as “every Chief Constable in this country”\(^4\). The extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) (“every”) legitimises a claim that his circumstances are no different from all his peers. Thus he invokes the category of “Chief Constable” to counter the veracity of domestic violence as the resource problem and to disrupt personal criticism in a move from the particular (himself) to the general (Chief Constables everywhere).

However, he then goes on to make a move back from the general (“We”, 1.243) to the particular (“I”, 1.244, 248 & 251). This suggests that having aligned himself with the category Chief Constable he is now speaking on their behalf with examples from his own experience which exemplify the ‘real’ problem. There are two facets to his problem formulation; the “people” (1.245) who make demands on the police and the “iceberg” (1.247) ‘nature’ of what he faces. There is a sense that these “people” are fickle in their demands as “today, tomorrow” (1.244) implies that they cannot make up their minds from one day to the next about what they want the police to treat as the priority. What is challenged is their unrealistic expectation not their right to expect. By comparison, Mr Pacey self-presents as seeing the bigger and truer picture. As a Chief Constable, he understands the problems of drugs and burglary, and implicitly domestic violence, beyond ‘the tip of their icebergs’. The suggestion is therefore, that “people” found their inconsistent and unrealistic demands on the police on the perception of ‘iceberg tips’ which they perceive as the whole problem. And this also implies that domestic violence might not feature large on Mr Pacey’s own priorities for resource allocation.

At line 252, Mr Pacey shifts back to the general category of “Chief Constables” by way of a reiterative summary of what he has just claimed (“So”, 1.251). In this way, having argued what he sees as important, that is drugs and burglary, he draws once again on the category of Chief Constable as a collective agreement across witnesses. That is, he takes what he, as a Chief Constable, ‘knows’ and warrants it as what all Chief Constables ‘know’. At this point the full effect of this move is not clear. What is clearer is the work of the extreme case “there are always competing demands of trying to balance out what you want to do” (1.252-4, my emphasis). It can be seen as legitimising claims that the Chief Constables’ role encompasses the unenviable and ongoing task of balancing “priorities” and

\(^3\) Also for Mr Pacey, “resources” is commensurate with “additional”/“more police officers”.

\(^4\) This also undermines the Met’s DVU ‘panacea’ as the Met is only one of two police services in England and Wales that has a Commissioner rather than a Chief Constable.
“pressures”, regardless of public expectation and regardless of domestic violence as a ‘problem of the moment’.

At the beginning of his talk, Mr Pacey framed ‘domestic violence’ as the wrong question. The right question for Chief Constables was warranted as “a whole range of different” resource allocation possibilities. For Mr Pacey, that meant drugs and burglary. Here, it is suggested that other Chief Constables would agree that setting priorities within resources is difficult enough without the added complication of “public expectation” about domestic violence. And this is repeated in the closing sentence (1.255-8). ‘Public expectation’ in respect of domestic violence is undermined as “growing” and “at present”. This explicitly acknowledges domestic violence as a police priority arising from “public expectation”. And it simultaneously undermines domestic violence as a ‘problem of the moment’. But the right of the public to expect is legitimised as something Chief Constables need to heed. They must try “to keep in touch” with it and have consequently displayed “a willingness on our part to try to do something about it”. In this way, “public expectation”, regardless of how faulty it may be, is ascribed as something that Chief Constables should and do take into consideration; although, it is implied, that if Mr Pacey and others were left to their own devices, they might well not prioritise domestic violence.

In summary, Mr Pacey formulates “public expectation”, possibly including that of HASC, as problematic to the ‘real’ Chief Officer responsibilities of balancing priorities and allocating resources. He accomplishes the doing of police realities in several ways. All his warrants are founded on category membership as a Chief Constable. He recontextualises Mrs Roche’s question and the HASC’s support of DVUs to a Chief Constable perspective thus privileging claims that domestic violence is the wrong question when considering the allocation of police resources. He ascribes drugs, burglary and domestic violence as ‘iceberg problems’ for Chief Constables, eating away at resources but he relegates domestic violence to an ‘of the moment’ “public expectation”. And he undermines, as inconsistent and unrealistic, the way that the public exercise their right to expectation. By comparison, Chief Constables are framed as seeing the bigger picture and having a difficult job, made more difficult by meeting their responsibility to respond to the public.
1.2 “attitudes” and “organisations”

Two paragraphs later the topic has moved on a little. Mr Greenway, whose question was two lines longer than the response it generated, is speaking. He has apparently come to Mr Pacey’s defence, suggesting that domestic violence units (DVUs) are not viable for “rural” areas. And he has attempted to claim common ground with Mr Pacey by saying that he too represents a “rural” domain. The alternative to DVUs that he offers in order to ensure that domestic violence is policed properly is “training”:

Extract 2 [HASC 1993b: 193]:

**Mr Greenway:** (…)

297  Is not training of all officers in rural forces really the
298  key to this?

299  **Mr Pacey:** I agree with that. We have made
300  enormous progress in that respect. It is included in
301  the probationer training programme but that of
302  course needs time to feed through. But most
303  organisations take their time from the top and if the
304  top man shows it as a priority, and I can only speak
305  for my own police force, but I establish priority
306  objectives every year and domestic violence is one of
307  them - so the officers have to report back to me and
308  to my policy group on their progress on domestic
309  violence. So that trickles down through the
310  organisation, whereby people in the organisation
311  recognise that the top part of the body expects the
312  problem of domestic violence to be addressed: we
313  address it as best we can through training and
314  attitude training too. Attitudes do, of course take
315  time to change, and there has been substantial
316  change in the police forces around the country in
317  that respect.
Mr Greenway’s question is almost rhetorical, in that he appears to understand that he has ‘solved’ the problem himself. It contains two extreme case formulations; “all officers” (my emphasis) and “key”. Collectively they are framed to discourage challenges that training, in this instance, is a panacea.

Initially, Mr Pacey affirms and realises the opportunity provided by “training” to make claims of “enormous progress” for “We”, the Gloucestershire police. By furnishing this with “probationer training programme”, he invokes a form of training that currently reaches all (new) officers and is already in place thereby not requiring any further action by his police force. However, this appears to present a difficulty for him as he immediately disclaims this with “but that of course needs time to feed through” (my emphasis). Therefore, the trouble with his initial answer seems to be that in terms of progress he had claimed that Gloucestershire had addressed the policing domestic violence problem for which Mr Greenway is offering a panacea. That might have left him open to contradiction as the disclaimer retains the truth-claim that the training issue has been addressed but undermines the ‘nature’ of training on the grounds that it takes time to feed through. Consequently, he wards off potential challenges that more training allocation is required in order to ensure that domestic violence is policed properly.

But in turn that undermines “training” as a panacea, potentially leaving him open to suggestions of other non-training remedies. Therefore, he has made and takes the opportunity to DISCLAIM his disclaimer about “training” and instead he re-ascribes the problem of “needs time to feed through” to the ‘nature’ of organisations. This provides a further opportunity, this time to make explicit claims about how training provision is founded in Mr Pacey’s own responsible acts. The identity-work he does here concerns positioning himself in the category of rational “top man” showing and establishing priorities. But again he produces a double disclaimer. “I can only speak for my own police force” (1.304-5, my emphasis) disclaims his category entitlement to ‘Chief Constable’. And yet he immediately disclaims that with “but I establish priority objectives every year and domestic violence is one of them” (1.305-7, my emphasis). I think what he is doing is positioning himself as ‘a Chief Constable’ without invoking the warrant that he is speaking for all ‘Chief Constables’. Therefore, having already argued that his force is making “enormous progress” (1.300) he claims that as being consequential (“so”, 1.307; “So”, 1.309) of his personally being a responsible “top man”.

150
From lines 309-312, having ascribed the slowness of training to the nature of organisations and the "enormous progress" of Gloucestershire to himself, he repeats the argument. But this time he has absented himself from it. From the text, it is not clear why. It could be that it facilitates another police category shift at line 312: "we address it as best we can through training and attitude training too" (my emphasis). So far, his moves in this regard have been "We", Gloucestershire Constabulary; "I", the top man; and "I"/"me", a Chief Constable. By contrast, the "we" at line 312 is very vague. It could be 'Gloucestershire', 'me and my policy group', 'Chief Constables' or even 'police forces around the country'.

But it is used to found three truth-claims. Firstly, whoever "we" are, we are addressing the problem of domestic violence "as best we can" (l.313, my emphasis). The extreme case formulation fends off potential challenges that anything more can be done. And this seems to reflect Mr Pacey's earlier attempts to close the matter down without requiring any further action from Gloucestershire. Although as a representative of ACPO, he could be claiming for that whole category what he has already claimed for himself. Secondly, the 'nature' of "attitudes", like organisations, is ascribed as taking "time to change" (l.315). This is warranted on "of course" suggesting that this is something that everyone knows. Thirdly, the truth-claim is made that attitudes in "police forces around the country" have undergone "substantial change". This substantial truth would be unsubstantiated if it were not warranted on the "we" who are doing the best we can. Therefore, I think that Mr Pacey is probably reformulating his police category membership to 'police forces around the country'. And this demonstrates the flexibility of police category membership in this context.

In summary, the barriers to the fulfilment of the responsibility to police domestic violence appropriately are formulated as the respective 'natures' of "organisations" and "attitudes". Whether he might have blamed the rank and file for their attitudes, had their representatives not been present, cannot be argued from the talk. Mr Pacey, 'does' police realities in a variety of ways. He reformulates his police category membership through Gloucestershire Constabulary, a Chief Constable and police forces around the country. He also invokes a non-police category entitlement as 'the responsible top man' of an organisation. And he warrants truth-claims on these identities to support the arguments that the police, and especially himself, are doing all they can to address the problem of
domestic violence. The only opportunities for challenges from outsider knowledges to this account come from his own talk which he opens and closes with double disclaimers.

In general, in regard to formulating barriers to fulfilling responsibilities, Mr Pacey ascribes "public expectation", "organisations" and "attitudes" as problematic. He accomplishes police realities through identity-work around the membership category of police officer, particularly as 'Chief Constable'. Although he does render other categories relevant at times, his main identity activity seems to be constituting himself and others in his group as seeing the bigger picture, being realistic and meeting responsibilities. The implications arising from sections 1.1 and 1.2 are discussed in the main chapter part summary.

2. Constituting responsibility boundaries
In this section I explore more of Mr Pacey's HASC 1992/3 talk. In particular, I am interested in how boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource are accomplished in his constitution of police realities. Therefore, I now consider the theme of "other agencies" that he generates, including the specific discourse "a matter for them" as it has the added benefit of producing victim formulations.

2.1 "other agencies"
In Extract 3, the questioner is Mrs Roche. The Chairman has just handed her the floor to introduce a new topic for discussion, hence her opening acknowledgement to him.

Extract 3 [HASC 1993b: 240]:

1212 Mrs Roche: Yes, thank you. Paragraph 16 of the
1213 evidence we have had from the Metropolitan Police
1214 refers to psychological abuse and mental cruelty as
1215 examples of domestic violence. Everybody would
1216 agree that such behaviour is reprehensible, but what
1217 role does or should the police have in its prevention?

1218 Mr Pacey: This is a very difficult area indeed, if
1219 I may say so, because trying to identify
1220 psychological abuse is not easy. How does one
identify the symptoms of it? I do not know. A policeman goes to a domestic violence dispute, as we often seem to call them, and finds a traumatic situation. There is heightened tension there: how can he be expected to be able to discover whether or not the woman is suffering from psychological abuse? The police would find that very difficult indeed. It is other agencies to whom the case should be referred who can see the woman in the cold grey light of day and make that kind of judgment (sic) later. People who do that need to be able to identify the symptoms of psychological abuse.

Mrs Roche presents her question in a syllogistic rhetorical argument. In the first part, she presents a police truth, referring to written evidence submitted to the HASC committee by the Metropolitan Police in advance of the oral evidence sessions. In the second part, she frames an outsider knowledge but it is in the form of a universal truth-claim: “Everyone would agree that such behaviour is reprehensible” (my emphasis). As such it is hard to undermine. In the third part, in which one would normally rationalise the conclusion from the first two parts, she actually disclaims (“but”) their compatibility by ascribing the police role as the “prevention” of domestic violence. The implicit suggestion is therefore, that the Met’s formulation of “psychological abuse and mental cruelty” is incompatible with, and perhaps not being accomplished by, the Met’s policing of domestic violence.

From lines 1218-21, there is a sense that this question is a troubling one. Mr Pacey acknowledges the veracity of the conundrum Mrs Roche has produced (“This is a very difficult area indeed”, my emphasis); then apparently seeks permission to present that opinion (“if I may say so”, my emphasis); before naming the problem as “identify” and reformulating Mrs Roche’s “psychological abuse and mental cruelty” as “psychological abuse”. He then asks, “How does one identify the symptoms of it?”, which renders “symptoms” relevant to the identification of “psychological abuse”. But it is also a

Part of Mr Pacey’s ‘trouble’ with this question may be attributable, although not demonstrably so, to the tensions between the Met Police and ACPO (see Savage et al, 2001). As an ACPO officer he is present as a representative of all Chief Officers. But the Met has a history of ploughing its own furrow and claiming to be ground-breaking. Thus Mr Pacey could be understood to be managing the contradiction generated by the Met position without undermining his
rhetorical question, one that does not require an answer. Therefore, its meaning is not to seek information but to ascribe “one”, a depersonalised and all-encompassing ‘someone’, as somebody who does not and should not be expected to know about symptoms. Thus when he answers this rhetorical question, (“I do not know”), he is producing himself as “one” whom no reasonable person would expect to be able to identify symptoms.

Notably, the identity-work Mr Pacey engages in does not directly invoke police category membership. And I think this is the point. By re-framing the problem as identifying the “symptoms” of “psychological abuse”, he appears to have constituted a realm of medical understanding. Therefore, his apparent permission seeking and his self-presentation as someone who could not and should not be asked to identify symptoms, frames him as ‘not a medical expert’ but ‘an objective police commentator’. This ‘non-police’ police identity is suggested as it is needed to substantiate the truth-claims about what happens at a domestic violence incident, which follows on in the talk.

In the narrative about the police perspective of attending the scene (l.1221-26), Mr Pacey juxtaposes a policeman with a woman possibly “suffering from psychological abuse” in “a traumatic situation” where “There is heightened tension”. And this is a fine example of sexist talk as the gendering binary of male/female is not necessary for founding the claim that police officers are not medical experts. But it is clear that Mr Pacey understands this gendering activity as supporting his case. Negative representations of women as highly emotional compared to men circulate commonly in wider discourse (Smart, 1992). Therefore, discovering if a woman “is suffering from psychological abuse” (my emphases) may suggest that such a distinction is made more difficult by her gender. Positive representations of men as logical and dispassionate also circulate widely in mainstream discourse (Smart, 1992). Therefore, a police officer gendered as male may indicate a truth-claim that he is ‘naturally’ rational. Consequently, the rhetorical question; “how can he be expected to be able to discover whether or not the woman is suffering from psychological abuse?” (l.1224-26, my emphases), formulates ‘a reasonable man’ in an extreme situation being asked to diagnose whether a woman’s (hysterical?) trauma is ‘normal’ or a mental health problem.
The sexism of this talk is also thrown into sharp relief by Mr Pacey’s disclaimer of the term “domestic violence dispute” (1.1222). By qualifying this with “as we often seem to call them” he indicates that “dispute” may be understood as contentious by his audience and challenged as an inappropriate term. However, he does not problematise the gendering of “policeman” and the consequent normalising of the gender of police officers as male at all.

In the final section of his talk (1.1227-32), Mr Pacey invokes the category “The police” in a move from the specific “policeman” to the general case. Therefore, the truth-claim that this is “very difficult indeed” (my emphasis) is that this policeman’s experience is common to all police. And this marks the beginning of explicit boundary-work between “The police” and “other agencies”. ‘Other agencies’ are framed as the appropriate repositories for such cases (“should be referred”, my emphasis). The “woman in the cold light of day” is a contrast with ‘the woman in trauma in a tense situation’. Therefore, it is not that “other agencies” should be at the domestic violence incident instead of the police. Rather, the ‘appropriate’ time for other agencies’ judgement is “later”, when the tension and trauma have receded. This would still leave opportunities to claim that once the incident has abated, the police might be able to discover “psychological abuse”. But this ‘option’ is closed down by “People who do that need to be able to identify the symptoms of psychological abuse”; which once again alludes to the professional medical expertise of other agencies.

In summary, “other agencies”, as a theme, constitutes professional expertise which is ascribed as lying outside what the police can reasonably be expected to do. And this is accomplished by identity-work and boundary-work. In terms of police realities, the formulations are a generic “policeman” and a general “The police”. There is no sense that Mr Pacey is a Chief Officer. Rather, he is framed as ‘a non-medical specialist’ and an ‘objective commentator on policing’. The boundary-work is founded on the reformulation of “psychological abuse and mental cruelty” as a mental health matter particularly in regard to women. And this supports the argument that (specialist) medical, perhaps even psychiatric, expertise is necessary to unpack the problem. The mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource to accomplish specific transactional business is also apparent. The gendering of the police officer as ‘male’ forms a contrast with “the woman” which renders masculine gender relevant to reason and female gender relevant to emotionality. This is
then used to absolve the police officer from making certain judgements and to position the woman in the domain of mental health.

2.2 “a matter for them”

The theme “other agencies” intersected with gendering activity. My argument is that gender is invoked as an occasional resource when useful to specific transactional business. Therefore in Extract 4, I explore Chief Officer talk which resists the invocation of gender. The discourse which is exemplified, “a matter for them”, comes under the rubric of the theme “other agencies”. The talk itself comes towards the end of a discussion of ‘difficulties’ in mounting prosecutions attributed to the ACPO written evidence submitted before the oral evidence session. Mr Anderson has taken up the case:-

*Extract 4 [HASC 1993b: 237]:*

1172 Mr Anderson: There is another possibility where a woman
1173 who might fear repercussions might be protected. If
1174 there are cases where (1) one has the medical
1175 evidence of the injury, and (2) one has sufficient
1176 corroborative evidence of the assault from cogent
1177 witnesses, would it be your policy, or would you
1178 favour in such circumstances, proceeding without
1179 the victim?

1180 Mr Pacey: It depends how much evidence there
1181 is, but it would be a possibility. In the courts it is a
1182 very unusual case which succeeds without the victim
1183 giving evidence. It can be done and Parliament has
1184 allowed for it in allowing evidence to be read and so
1185 on. It could be done, but the final decision is one for
1186 the Crown Prosecution Service and not for the
1187 police. We would be very content to present the
1188 papers and the file with all the circumstances. I am
1189 quite certain there would be a long consideration
1190 and perhaps a discussion about it, but whether or
1191 not they would take it would be a matter for them.
Mr Anderson’s question formulates the police role as the ‘protection’ of “a woman” in “fear” by “proceeding” to court. Heightened fear and the need for protection are widely available discourses of negative femininity (Ahmed, 1995; Marcus, 1992; Smart, 1992). And as such, they render ‘womanhood’ problematic and seemingly negate the necessity to found this claim in evidential truths. The account of getting cases to trial is, by comparison, ungendered and evidentially founded. The first condition of evidence is “medical evidence”, suggesting an unquestionable and non-police truth. The second condition is constituted as witness evidence of crime, although the quality (“sufficient” & “corroborative evidence of assault”) of the testimony and the competence (“cogent”) of the witness are all qualified. The suggestion is that he is fending off potential challenges from a listener who may question these aspects of the evidence. But the talk demonstrates no anticipated challenges around the fearful “woman” to “be protected”. And because of that, the sense is that the notion of women in need of protection is being used as a warrant to claim that the police are duty or honour bound to protect women any way they can.

Further, Mr Anderson makes a move from the general case (“one”, 1.1174 & 1175) to the particular (“your” & “you”, 1.1177). This is also a shift from the implicit invocation of the general group category ‘the police’ (protecting women, having “evidence”) to the specific case of “you”, as a Chief Officer (having “policy”). Moreover, the qualifier, “or would you favour in such circumstances”, implies that “policy” is somehow inappropriate. My feeling is that “policy” is understood as ambiguous in the context of Chief Officer because “favour” personalises the question. Mr Pacey is not being asked what his (formal) “policy” is, as the question is presented in terms of the hypothetical (“possibility”, 1.1172; “If”, 1.1173; “would”, 1.1177; “in such circumstances”, 1.1178). Rather, the inquiry is whether or not Mr Pacey supports the idea of “proceeding without the victim” (1.1178-79) where the evidence is unquestionable and “sufficient”.

The first notable feature of Mr Pacey’s response is that it does not gender the victim nor engage in talk about protecting women by proceeding to trial without her. The transactional business seems to be more concerned with undermining Mr Anderson’s and Parliament’s hypotheticals with ‘reality’; ascribing the responsibility for proceeding to trial without the victim to the Crown Prosecution Service; and presenting the police as not responsible for such decisions. Therefore, it can be argued that female gender ascription is not useful to the work being done and consequently, it is not made relevant.
Mr Pacey begins by undermining Mr Anderson's 'evidence' formulation not on its medical expertise, its quality nor the competence of the witness, but on grounds of "how much" (l.1180) evidence there is. But he immediately disclaims the whole scenario ("but") as hypothetical ("possibility"). This reading is supported by his next utterance: "In the courts it is a very unusual case which succeeds without the victim giving evidence" (l.1181-83). The "it is" is a reality claim which counters the relevance of possibility. And "succeeds" frames the reason of going to court as 'winning'. Therefore, the suggestion is that there is not much point going to court if the case cannot be won.

This version of reality is then put to further use. Mr Pacey produces a three-part list of why proceeding without the victim "can be done": "Parliament has allowed for it (1) in allowing evidence to be read (2) and so on (3)". The third part ("and so on") is a 'generalised list completer' suggesting other numerous 'mentionables' in this regard (Jefferson, 1990). The overall effect seems to be twofold. Parliament is ascribed as responsible (and possibly blamed) for generating this 'no win' situation and Mr Pacey is framed as understanding all that Parliament has allowed. Consequently, both Mr Anderson and Parliament are framed as supporting a hypothetical ideal which does not work in reality. And Mr Pacey is constituted as knowing the truth.

At line 1185, proceeding without the victim is once again presented as a possibility: "It could be done". This time, however, it is undermined as not a matter "for the police". "It could be done" is disclaimed ("but", l.1185) in favour of "the final decision" (my emphasis). This is an extreme case formulation that does multiple work. Firstly, it has an 'end of the day' quality about it. This implies that whatever might be possible, the truth of the matter is overriding. Secondly, in terms of boundary-work, the responsibility for transforming the hypothetical ideal to the real is ascribed to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). Thirdly, in terms of boundary-work and identity-work, the group category "police" is absolved from responsibility.

At this point, Mr Pacey, positions himself in the group category membership of "the police": "We would be very content to present the papers and the file with all the circumstances" (l.1187-88, my emphasis). There is also a sense that Mr Anderson's question is now being ridiculed. Mr Pacey's formulation is hypothetical ("would"). It reformulates "would you (as a Chief Officer) favour" (l.1177-78) as "We" (the police)
“would be very content”. And having ascribed the decision to proceed to court without the victim as a CPS responsibility, the police role is framed as presenting “papers and the file with all the circumstances” (my emphasis). The extreme case of “all” further suggests that “We” the police would do our job thoroughly.

This trivialising of Mr Anderson’s question continues in the last sentence: “I am quite certain there would be a long consideration and perhaps a discussion about it” (l.1188-1190). Mr Pacey shifts his group category identification from “We” to “I”. This move from the general to the specific allows another opportunity to repeat arguments already made but on a different warrant. There is a juxtaposition of a truth-claim (“I am quite certain”) with a hypothetical (“would be”/“perhaps”). But the identity-work done with “I”, as a police officer hypothesising about what the CPS would do, is rendered ironic by the disclaimer that follows: “but whether or not they would take it would be a matter for them” (l.1190-91, my emphasis). Consequently, Mr Pacey’s opinion is rendered irrelevant to what the CPS, in exercising their responsibility, decide to do.

In summary, the “other agencies” theme of Mr Pacey’s talk is produced in Extract 4 as the discourse “a matter for them”. As such it constitutes expertise and responsibility outside the remit of the police through a variety of identity-work and boundary-work. In terms of police realities, the majority of Mr Pacey’s talk is not directly warranted. The truth-claims about what happens in court, what Parliament has allowed and who has the final decision are therefore presented as ‘reality’ that anyone can see, not the view of a Chief Officer. A general police identity is invoked to reformulate the police role and present them as doing their job properly. A specific police identity is mobilised to accomplish boundary-work around who should answer for and be responsible for CPS duties. The questioner makes female gender relevant to ‘victimhood’. But commensurate with my understanding of police realities mobilising gender relevance as an occasional resource to do specific transactional business, the opportunity is resisted as it is not integral to the matter in hand.

The implications arising from the analysis in section 2 are discussed in the chapter part conclusion which follows.
Part One Conclusion

The primary purpose of this chapter part was to demonstrate the 'doing' of Chief Officer police realities in government policy-making talk. Police realities was understood as identity-work, boundary-work, the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource and the recontextualising of non-police knowledges. Identity-work is apparent in the invocation of the group category membership of 'police officer'. This proves to be a very flexible category: a Chief Constable/all Chief Constables; a police force/all police forces; policeman/the police; and 'the police' as We/I. And it is notable that these formulations always appear in pairs whether their use is to claim 'being responsible'; render an individual example relevant to the whole; warrant the whole as relevant to the individual; or, to generate another opportunity to repeat the same argument. In general though, 'police officer' warrants are used to support versions of the truth which claim what the police should do and how they do it. By comparison, boundary-work is mainly accomplished through 'non-policed' category identity-work. Formulations of 'top man' and 'non-medical specialist' are used to normalise what happens in police organisations and separate off responsibilities for action. 'The objective commentator' is used to found claims that what lies outside the police remit is 'the truth', plain for all to see.

Female gender is mobilised as an occasional resource when it is useful to the transactional business being undertaken. Thus associations of negative femininity are useful for rendering women's mental health difficult to identify but not useful in the matter of ascribing responsibility to the Crown Prosecution Service. The recontextualisation of knowledges is more varied. Domestic violence is framed as the wrong starting point from which Chief Constables should allocate resources; the police responsibility to "public expectation" is mediated by the unrealistic and capricious 'nature' ascribed to that expectation; the slow impact of training is attributed to the 'nature' of "attitudes" and "organisations"; and the difficulty of policing non-physical domestic violence is repackaged as a problem of 'women' for mental health professionals. The implication arising from all of these, is that Chief Officer police realities are constituted in ways that make them extremely difficult to undermine.

Taking this idea further, my other concern was to consider if it were possible to understand Chief Officer police realities in terms of resistance to the context of 1992, from both HOC 60/90 and more general government strategies that were in currency. The most important
point here is that nothing in the Chief Officer’s talk is unaccountable from the local context. That is, it could be argued that constitutions of women as highly emotional is common to both Chief Officer talk and HOC 60/90. But this is a widely available discourse and it is not possible to demonstrate that one is consequent upon the other. That said, one of the questions asked by an HASC committee member framed the protection of women victims as integral to police-work and used it to warrant what the police should be doing. Again it is not directly demonstrable that Mr Anderson (see Extract 4) is orienting to HOC 60/90 but it is likely that he is.

Other examples of being careful about grounding claims for the analysis arising from historical context concern ‘the public’, ‘inter-agency’ and ‘good managers’. Firstly, in HOC 60/90, “public concern” was framed as an occasional resource to ascribe responsibilities and found claims of fulfilling them. Chief Officer talk at HASC put “public expectation” to much the same work. What this indicates is a general orientation to the police’s ‘public servant’ mandate and that ‘the public’ can be a rather useful notion for warranting responsibility discourse for both government and the police. But I do not see using the public as a warrant as commensurate with positioning ‘community’ as an under-used police resource. That ethos (see Goldstein, 1990) requires that the public be allowed to influence police priorities. By contrast, Mr Pacey founds his claims in the ascribed ignorance of “public expectation”. Thus he invokes a common police discourse that “We, the police, are ‘in the know’; the rest, the public, are not in touch with reality” (Adlam, 2002, p.29). And there is also a sense in Extract 4 that Mr Anderson and Parliament are similar subjects of disdain.

Secondly, in HOC 60/90, notional boundaries between the police and other agencies were formulated in discourse about victims. In HASC, Chief Officer talk engages in explicit boundary-work. Therefore, ‘inter-agency’ working does not appear to be a concern of either. Certainly these data pre-date government attempts to forward working together around domestic violence. But in the context of Mr Pacey’s talk here, the police are being examined as witnesses. As such there may be, in line with the British legal system, an adversarial atmosphere which impacts on attempts to build boundaries around the police as a single agency.
Finally, HOC 60/90 presented Government as 'already responsible' and challenged the police to take domestic violence seriously. And in HASC, the discursive work of Chief Officer talk seems largely engaged in producing 'responsible police', particularly Chief Constables, and disclaiming that any additional action is necessary. Consequently, 'the already responsible self' seems to be a common formulation around domestic violence policy. But there is no sense that the 'good manager' Mr Pacey constitutes for himself is drawing directly on managerialist discourse.

However, the implications from Chief Officer talk are the danger that 'good management' becomes the objective of policing in itself is not disrupted; Chief Officers appear adept at, and accustomed to, mobilising 'the public' as a police realities resource; and Chief Officers seem experienced at ascribing domestic violence responsibilities to other agencies.

In this chapter part I have focused on police realities in Chief Officer policy-making talk in the public realm at a time when HOC 60/90 was current. In the second chapter part I explore Chief Officer policy text in the public realm, but this time, when HOC 19/2000 was in currency.

**Part Two: Metropolitan Police Policy Document 2000**

The New Labour government policy for the policing of domestic violence which was in currency when MPS 2000a was published was HOC 19/2000 (see Chapter 4). This document formulated 'crime' as the most appropriate way of understanding domestic violence in the context of policing. Loosely, domestic violence was defined as violence between intimates in the home. And the major concern seemed to be to relocate gender relevance into a separate category of 'violence against women'. Indeed, much discursive work was done to negate the relevance of (female) gender to domestic violence. HOC 19/2000 produced gender-free victims as diverse in terms of ethnicity and sexual orientation. 'Safety' was framed as paramount but not at the expense of victims' rights and the police doing their job properly. 'Needs' was forwarded as a means for understanding victims as individuals and defending them from police assumptions grounded on ignorance or prejudice.
Within this chapter part I consider the ‘doing’ of Chief Officer police realities in this historical context through extracts from MPS 2000a. The authorship of this document is credited to Ian Blair, the then Deputy Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.

3. Reformulating the problem: “hate crime” and “domestic violence”
One of my key concerns in this chapter is to explore the potential of police realities as resistances to responsibilisations from government guidance. HOC 19/2000 constituted separate but related categories of “domestic violence”, “violence against women” and “crime”. Therefore, perhaps the most notable feature of MPS 2000a is that “hate crime” and “domestic violence” are constituted as the important considerations:

Extract 5 [MPS 2000a (Initial investigation: p.6, 2nd paragraph)]:

(...) Hate crime and domestic violence victims and their families may experience a terrifying and traumatic effect. (…)

Extract 6 [MPS 2000a (Community Safety Units: p.14, 1st paragraph)]:

• (…) The CAD7 is checked daily for any incidents involving hate crime/domestic violence (…)

Extract 7 [MPS 2000a (Performance management: p.16, 2nd paragraph)]:

(…)
• clear up rates for hate/domestic crimes;
• hate/domestic arrests;
(…)

But it is not until Annex A (pages 22-4) that the distinction between the two is explicitly furnished. The document as a whole covers ‘The investigation of racist, domestic violence and homophobic incidents’ (MPS, 2000a). And it would seem that domestic violence is not understood as a hate crime.

The title “Hate crime” and the opening phrase “Hate crime is” (my emphasis) are important because they formulate “hate crime” as a real entity in its own right. And yet, there is no legal crime category with such a name (see Savage & Nash, 2001). The Crime

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6 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions.
and Disorder Act 1998 does constitute new crimes of 'racially aggravated' assault and criminal damage but 'hate crime' is not a truth in legal discourse. Therefore, particularly as there is a preponderance for coining the term in police discourse (e.g. ACPO, 2000; Avon & Somerset Constabulary, 2003; Cheshire Police, 2003; Humberside Police, 2003) it can be assumed that its production is understood as advantageous to police versions of reality.

Extract 8 [MPS 2000a (Annex A: opening paragraph)]:

1/1 Hate crime
1/2 Hate crime is where the perpetrator's prejudice against any identifiable group of people is a factor in determining who is victimised.
1/3 This is a broad and exclusive definition developed by ACPO. It is worth noting that a victim of hate crime does not have to be either a member of a minority or someone who is generally considered to be a 'vulnerable' person. For example, the friends of a visible minority ethnic person, lesbian or refugee may be victimised because of their association. In other cases a person entirely unconnected with the hate motivation may be victimised if the perpetrator is mistaken in perceiving an association. So, there are circumstances where anyone can be a victim of a hate crime.

From this extract it is clear that the conditions of "hate crime" are as follows: (1) "the perpetrator's prejudice"/"hate motivation", (2) grounded in understandings of "identifiable group"/"perceiving an association" which (3) leads to members of certain categories and their (perceived) associates being "victimised". But although ethnicity, sexuality and émigré status are named as groups, gender as a means for founding prejudice and victimisation is notable by its absence.

The absence of gender is commensurate with the document as a whole. There are only four instances in MPS 2000a where gender is rendered explicitly opposite to victims and all of these concern sexual orientation. Thus "lesbian" although indexing female gender does so only in terms of its intersection with sexuality. And this would appear to be a similar formulation to one in gay/lesbian identity politics, whereby gender and sexuality issues are

7 Computer Aided Dispatch: a computerised system for recording 999 calls and police responses to them.
often elided (see Cooper, 1992/3). Further, "identifiable group" reifies visibility as the basis for group category membership. And again this highlights the absence of ‘women’ who are likely to be ‘identifiable’ and who have been subject to ‘group’ attacks grounded in misogyny (see Eglin, 2002).

In addition, there is a phrase in Extract 8 that may be a euphemism for female gender: “someone who is generally considered to be a ‘vulnerable’ person” but is not a “member of a minority” (l.1/7-8). Women are not a numerical minority in the UK as they make up 51% of the population (although politically they are ‘minoritised’). And ‘vulnerability’ in mainstream discourse is commonly associated with negative femininity ascription (e.g. Ahmed, 1995; Marcus, 1992; Smart, 1992). Therefore, women may well be implied in this definition but they are not made overtly relevant. Indeed if gender is understood as an ‘omnirelevance’ (West & Zimmerman, 1987), one that is essentially hard to avoid, then its ‘absence’ here in supporting the claim that “anyone can be a victim of hate crime” (l.1/12-3), seems particularly problematic.

This brings me back to what the category of “hate crime” is accomplishing in this version of police reality. And that necessitates some contextual understanding. The Met’s domestic violence units (DVUs) of the 1980s (see Sheptycki, 1993) were reformulated as Community Safety Units (CSUs) for the investigation of hate crime and domestic violence after the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Therefore, although this document is addressed to all police staff, it probably has particular resonance for those officers once working in DVUs but now in CSUs. As such, “hate crime” can be seen as instrumental in how racist and homophobic crime are being talked up, albeit at the possible expense of gender(ed) understandings. This becomes more apparent in Extract 9 which follows directly on:-

Extract 9 [MPS 2000a (Annex A: 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} paragraphs)]:

2/1 Racist incident
2/2 Any incident, which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person.

\textsuperscript{8} The emboldened text in Extracts 8-10 is reproduced from the original.
In Extract 8, the “hate crime” definition was warranted on “ACPO”. In Extract 9, the racist incident definition is warranted on the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report. And the definition of a homophobic incident is warranted through its similarity in formulation to the definition which proceeds it.

These warrants are interesting because despite apparent dissonance between ACPO and the Chief Officers of the Met (Savage et al, 2001), ACPO seems to be the warrant of warrants. That is, it stands almost as the extreme case formulation as the highest authority by which such truths can be told. Of course this does not mean that Met Chief Officers necessarily see ACPO that way, but it does demonstrate understanding of the potential authority of ACPO to a police audience. Therefore, it can be seen as an occasional resource, mobilised when useful and absent when it is not. This is particularly the case where the ACPO definition of hate crime (which has no ethnicity or sexual orientation in it) is used to found extrapolated claims that racist and homophobic incidents are justifiable matters for the Met Police.

It is likely, but not demonstrable, that lobbying from lesbian and gay pressure groups both from inside (through LAGPA⁹) and outside (e.g. Haymes, 2001; Kibblewhite, 2001) the police have resulted in these policy inclusions. Whilst this is laudable, I am still disconcerted by how gender, particularly female gender, relevance is delimited. Extract 9 produces a list; “lesbians, gay men, and bisexual or transgender people” (3/4-5). Most lists in discourse are actually three-part lists (Jefferson, 1990). Therefore “lesbians, gay men” can be seen as comprising the first part of such a list. And what this highlights is that each item in the list formulates gender as a binary. Thus “lesbians, gay men” underlines female/male; “bisexual” indexes two genders; and “transgender people” implies movement in both directions across the gender divide. But this is accomplished without naming ‘women’. Certainly “lesbians” means women but it is not a commensurate term with “gay

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⁹ Lesbian and Gay Police Association.
men'; that would have been 'gays'. Consequently, whilst "gay men" renders both sexual orientation and gendered person-hood overtly relevantly relevant, "lesbians", in this usage, seems to collapse the two.

Although "hate crime" is used as a constitution to support arguments that crime underpinned by understandings of ethnicity and sexual orientation are Met Police matters, it is also used to absent the relevance of (female) gender to policing. And that becomes eminently clear in the final definition. Extract 10, follows directly on.

Extract 10 [MPS 2000a (Annex A: 4th paragraph)]:

4/1 Domestic violence
4/2 Domestic violence is any incident of threatening behaviour,
4/3 violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or
4/4 emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners
4/5 or family members, regardless of gender
4/6 (ACPO definition)

Like 'hate crime', 'domestic violence' is not a legal category of crime. However, unlike 'hate crime' it has been subject to specific government policies (see Chapter 4). Therefore, there is a sense that the Met Police have not made it their 'own' in quite the same way. And that may be indicative of how succinct and relatively unqualifed the domestic violence definition is.

Although only four lines in length, the definition itself comprises an extreme case formulation, three lists (two of them three-part lists) and a disclaimer. Firstly, "any" seems to be the extreme case in these MPS 2000a definitions which renders the category 'broad'. And this is demonstrated in the list "threatening behaviour, violence or abuse". However, this list can be seen to change the topic from 'threatening behaviour' (a legal category of crime) to 'abuse'. In turn, 'abuse' is credited with five possible variations. The effect of this is to blur distinctions between crime ascription and the manifestations of domestic violence. The suggestion is, therefore, that domestic violence is a 'mixed-bag' of harm but there is some crime in there. The final list of those 'who are' (1), 'have been intimate partners' (2) or 'family members' (3) suggests breadth again. But this time the delimitation made relevant comprises 'adulthood' and 'close personal relationship'.
However, the two most interesting facets for me are in the last two lines. Firstly, "regardless of gender" is a disclaimer. It explicitly counters gender relevance as integral to domestic violence for the purposes of its policing. This suggests that someone reading this document may find that contentious. Even if "intimate partners" assumes heterosexual relationships no direction to the violence has been claimed. Also "family members" does not invoke gender meanings at all. Therefore, "regardless of gender" makes no sense unless a competing account of domestic violence that pays regard to the 'normality' of gender-relational violence in a particular direction is assumed. Therefore, in the business of defining domestic violence, MPS 2000a can be understood to be actively de-gendering. Secondly, this definition, like the one for hate crime, is warranted on the membership group category of Chief Officer ("ACPO definition"). This time the authority afforded to ACPO is not expanded. It is literally left 'to speak for itself'. This suggests that in this instance, it is understood as a sufficient warrant to counter non-police or junior police understandings.

In summary, "hate crime" seems to be formulated as a means for founding claims about the importance of racist and homophobic incidents to the Met Police. Collectively these emphasise the perceptions of doers, ‘done-tos’ and witnesses. And they work to render female gender irrelevant as a police matter. ‘Domestic violence’ is ascribed as a wide variety of harms occurring in the context of a current or former close personal relationship, some of which are crimes. Any suggestion that gender might be relevant is explicitly disclaimed. In terms of police realities some category entitlement founded on the group membership of ACPO is apparent. This implies that these definitions are appropriate for the purposes of policing because they have been produced by Chief Officers. There is also an example of the recontextualisation of knowledges in that understandings of domestic violence as gender(ed) violence are invoked and disclaimed within a definition for the purpose of policing. And this may also be working at a local level where employees find themselves in CSUs rather than DVUs. Finally, there are instances where gender is mobilised as an occasional resource for specific transactional aims. The category ‘lesbian’ is invoked in a way that renders female gender relevant to “hate crime” only where it is elided with sexual orientation.
4. Constituting responsibility boundaries: "needs"

A key theme produced in MPS 2000a, particularly around text constituting victims, is "needs". And it frequently underpins a responsibility ascription.

Extract 11 [MPS 2000a (Initial investigation: p.6, 2nd paragraph)]:

(…) All staff must be sensitive to their individual needs at this time. (…)

Extract 12 [MPS 2000a (Initial investigation: p.8, 4th paragraph)]:

Staff must consider referral to other agencies to support victims according to their needs. (…)

Extract 13 [MPS 2000a (Crime Manager: p.18, 1st paragraph)]:

(…) At every contact with the victim, their needs and risks should be reassessed to give the appropriate level of support.

As might be expected from section 3, victims are consistently not gendered. However, there is an interesting facet to the responsibilisations arising from "needs" discourse. Although Extracts 11-13 are directed at specific staff for particular duties, the Foreword produces distinctions between police group category memberships that appear to underpin the 'doing' of police realities. Extract 14 forms the concluding paragraphs of the Foreword:-

Extract 14 [MPS 2000a (Foreword paragraphs 8/9)]:

8/1 This policy ensures that all Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) staff
8/2 are accountable to victims, communities, colleagues and supervisors.
8/3 It has a series of common supportive strategies that run throughout
8/4 such as community intelligence, incisive investigation, family liaison
8/5 and sensitivity to victims (sic) needs.

9/1 I maintain the view that society will be judged on how it treats its
9/2 most vulnerable and isolated citizens. This Special Notice will help
9/3 lead and direct all our staff accordingly.
The extract opens with a truth-claim about the efficacy of “This policy”. It frames this policy as reaching “all” staff and rendering each one “accountable” to a whole range of others. The extreme case formulation (“all”) and the list (“victims” to “supervisors”) support the argument that “This policy” is comprehensive as well as efficacious. The policy is also presented as coherent and strategic having “common ... strategies that run throughout” (my emphasis). Again, the extreme case infers that there is no part of this policy that can be challenged on the grounds that it falls short. And again, a list is used to suggest the comprehensive reach of the document. But this time it is a three-part list: “community intelligence, incisive investigation, family liaison”. These three items differ from “sensitivity to victims needs” in that the MPS has local intelligence officers, investigating officers and family liaison officers. There is no victims’ sensitivity officer. Therefore, I think “sensitivity to victims needs” is being forwarded as either relevant to all the items on the three-part list; or relevant to police-work not encapsulated by the list; or both. Regardless, it is framed as having a wide applicability.

Thus “This policy” is presented as most efficacious in every way. And it is almost as if the policy is being personified. It is the only actor in paragraph 8 and no-one is ascribed as having authored it at this point. Importantly, the suggestion is that its very existence and its comprehensive ‘nature’ are sufficient to render all staff accountable. For example, this is not simply a case of being responsibilised with the job of being sensitive to victims’ needs. Rather, the sense is that all staff will have to answer to their fulfilment (or not) of that responsibility on a range on levels. And Ian Blair gives his answer now.

Paragraph 9 opens with “I”, as “Ian Blair, Deputy Commissioner”. So a contrast with “all ... MPS staff” is made. And this founds Mr Blair’s claims for himself as an exemplification of ‘being accountable’ and ‘being sensitive’. The phrase “maintain the view” suggests that this view, “that society will be judged on how it treats its most vulnerable and isolated citizens” (1.9/1-2), is ‘real’, pre-existing Mr Blair’s holding of it and therefore shared by others. This has advantages over claiming ‘I believe’ which does not invoke an agreement across (implicit) witnesses and could be undermined as a personal flight of fancy. Also “society will be judged” (my emphasis), places this view outside
police versions of reality. Therefore, by invoking it, Mr Blair is positioned as a Chief Officer seeing 'the bigger picture' and the MPS are positioned as integral to the judgement of society. The sense is that the MPS in its treatment of society’s “most vulnerable and isolated citizens” has the opportunity to render the whole of society subject to favourable judgement. These “vulnerable and isolated citizens” are framed as worthy if unfortunate, consequently, it is unlikely that the meaning extends to perpetrators. Thus it would seem that the treatment of victims is being constituted as a key for, and integral to, MPS police-work.

This sense of the potential moral worth of policing\(^\text{10}\) is carried forward to the next sentence: “This Special Notice will help lead and direct all our staff accordingly” (1.9/2-3, my emphasis). At this point, Mr Blair claims a relationship between “I” and “This Special Notice” and a distinction between “I” and “all our staff”. Thus the moral good the police could do, outlined in the view Mr Blair maintains, is linked to the ascribed effects of “This Special Notice”. And Mr Blair is separated from “all our staff” whom the Notice helps to “lead and direct”. Consequently, it is Mr Blair who is positioned as helping to lead and direct staff accordingly through the Special Notice. The word “help” is ambiguous. As “This policy” has already been formulated as beyond reproach, the suggestion is that “This Special Notice” is only one of the ways in which all staff are led and directed. Also it could imply the difference between being rendered ‘accountable’ and fulfilling that ‘responsibility’. That is, the Special Notice is framed as doing everything that could be expected of it in regard to rendering staff accountable. But whether or not all staff respond accordingly is down to them. Either way, the implication is that Mr Blair, through this policy, stands accountable in the moral high-ground and has fulfilled his responsibility to lead and direct staff appropriately.

In summary, “needs”, especially those ascribed to victims, are used to found responsibility claims and ascription. Sensitivity to those “needs” is further framed as an important policing matter, one that potentially affords the MPS the moral high-ground. In terms of police realities, two group membership categories around police officer are invoked, ‘all staff’ and ‘I, the Deputy Commissioner’. The contrasts between these two are used to ascribe the Chief Officer as already fulfilling his responsibilities through the production of policy. And as such, all staff are positioned as provided with the opportunity to fulfil theirs.

\(^{10}\) It is a common police discourse that the police should be seen as moral crusaders (Adlam, 2002).
There is also a claim to have recontextualised an outsider knowledge in the form of a view of society from a non-police perspective. However, the transactional business of this discourse is to frame the Chief Officer as competent. Therefore, rather than a recontextualisation per se, I see this as further identity-work but constituting 'one who sees the bigger picture' rather than a police identity.

The implications of this analysis are considered in the overall chapter part conclusion.

**Part Two Conclusion**

My main aim in analysing extracts of MPS 2000a was to explore how Chief Officers 'do' police realities in policy text for the policing of domestic violence where police realities was understood as identity-work, boundary-work and invocation of gender as an occasional resource. Firstly, the group category membership of 'police officer' was mobilised in two ways. There was category entitlement warranting on 'ACPO' as an appropriate body for defining issues for the purposes of their policing, in terms of countering both non-police and junior police potential truths. And further, an identity pair was produced in 'I, Deputy Commissioner/all staff). This was used to form contrasts and draw boundaries between who was and who was not fulfilling their responsibilities. Further, there was one instance of a non-police identity used to found a truth-claim that the Deputy Commissioner could see 'the bigger picture'. Secondly, gender was mobilised in ways that could be understood as persuading both CSU staff and a wider audience that female gender is not relevant to policing. There was a strong sense that gender, particularly gender(ed) understandings of domestic violence and prejudice, needed to be managed.

My secondary concern was to consider how responsibilisations and truths arising from HOC 19/2000 were reformulated. In MPS 2000a, there are two possibilities; the management of gender, especially female gender; and how 'individual needs' came to be such a key concern of police-work. And broadly, these are commensurate with what might have been expected in terms of the impact of New Labour's re-imaginings of domestic violence; and the crime/community relationship (Crawford, 2001; Newman, 2001).

Firstly, the victims of hate crime were delimited to group classifications on the basis of ethnicity, sexual orientation and émigré status. And gender relevance was explicitly
disclaimed in the context of domestic violence. This is reminiscent of HOC 19/2000’s approach to the category ‘violence against women’ whereby female gender was disclaimed as relevant and steered into its own category. Therefore, it would seem that MPS 2000a is orienting to the guidance in HOC 19/2000; although de-gendering the problem is not, in this instance, accompanied by a re-gendering of the blame (see Berns, 2001). However, it would be problematic to claim that the Met uses de-gendering simply because New Labour does. Rather, it is important to consider the usefulness of these formulations to MPS police realities at this time. Here, the emphasis appears to be on undermining gender understandings in order to promote ethnicity and sexual orientation. And this may well have more to do with justifying the reformulation of DVUs into CSUs in the wake of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Thus New Labour’s position is permissive of de-gendered domestic violence ascription and the Met can be seen to have mobilised this as a resource to support their own transactional business.

Secondly, MPS 2000a formulates ‘needs’ as the primary issue for governing police work. This is different from HOC 19/2000 where ‘safety’ was rendered paramount although “needs” were constituted as in danger from police assumptions. But this still does not explain how ‘needs’ became so important in MPS 2000a. Therefore, it is worth considering how and in what ways “needs” might be useful to the MPS in this historical context. Most obviously, the attention to “needs” claimed in MPS 2000a seems to undermine HOC 19/2000’s subject positions for the police as ignorant/prejudiced if they do not consider “needs”. Again, there is resonance from the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry where the Met’s generalised assumptions about people of colour were implicated.

In addition, HOC 19/2000 suggested that “safety” was not a police monopoly; victims were afforded a role (although no responsibilities) in managing their own risk. I think that weakens any potential police claim to govern safety. By contrast, it has been suggested that “needs” is an insidious discourse which can be manipulated to problematise the ‘riskiness’ of individuals and therefore be mobilised as a means of governing them (Hannah-Moffat, 1999 quoted in Matthews & Pitts, 2001)11. Thus the choice enacted in placing emphasis on “needs” rather than “safety” could be seen as the Met selectively tapping the resources provided by HOC 19/2000.

11 There may also be Human Rights’ implications (HRA, 1998, section 6) around the onus it puts on public servants to preserve individual freedoms. But again, this could probably be accounted for as a potentially useful occasional resource.
The implications arising from Chief Officer policy text are that Chief Officer police realities appear to be quite formidable; they can produce responsible ‘good managers’, anticipate and ward off potential challenges; and government guidance is apparently a resource from which the useful can be warranted and the un-useful reformulated or discarded.

In the chapter discussion I compare the findings of this chapter part with the ‘doing’ of Chief Officer police realities in the 1992 policy-making talk.

Chapter Discussion

Chief Officer talk and text in the policy arena both ‘do’ police realities. But there are key differences which can be accounted for in terms of the transactional business in hand and/or the ‘nature’ of the spoken and written word. The majority of the ‘doings’ of Chief Officer police realities is accomplished through identity-work. In terms of invoking group category memberships around ‘police officer’, identity pairs are mobilised to produce truth-claims of ‘being responsible’. In policy-making talk, this is most apparent in shifts from the general to the particular or vice versa. In policy text, it can be seen as boundary-work between police groups. These differences can be understood as due to the business in hand. That is, in HASC the context comprises immediate challenges and outsider knowledges that are managed as they arise. Whilst, in MPS 2000a, the primary dialogue is between a Chief Officer and other ranks. Further, both types of discourse produce non-police identities. In 1992, these ‘do’ organisational boundary-work. In 2000, they found a truth-claim that the Chief Officer sees ‘the bigger picture’. Again, these disjunctures can be attributed to dialogic differences.

Both sets of discourse accomplish resistances. However, Chief Officer talk produces many that are local in that they are explicable as immediate. In HASC, there is nothing in the Chief Officer talk in terms of reformulations that cannot be accounted for by local resistances. By contrast, in Chief Officer text, they are few and require wider context understandings in order to make sense; such as prioritising victims’ “needs” over “safety” and undermining understandings of domestic violence as gender(ed) violence. This is

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12 MPS 2000a does engage in some boundary-work between the police and ‘the public’ and ‘other agencies’. But it did not produce a key theme or priority. Therefore, these extracts were not used in the analysis.
indicative of the different 'natures' of spoken and written discourse. Thus talk is immediate and text is more 'considered', often subjected to redrafting and corrections. But neither formulation of Chief Officer discourse demonstrably engages with the HOC guidance as a key steer of their understandings.

A similar assessment can be made of the way that both HASC and MPS 2000a mobilise gender as an occasional resource. Certainly gendering as female was 'allowed' by HOC 60/90. But in 1992 talk, the mobilisation supports a specific piece of organisational boundary-work. By contrast, HOC 19/2000 worked hard to de-gender domestic violence. And in MPS 2000a, de-gendering activity appears to be part of a wider 'strategy' to manage the irrelevance of (female) gender which in turn supports the reformulation of DVUs to CSUs. Thus in both Chief Officer talk and text, the usefulness of available government-generated truths about domestic violence is drawn upon to facilitate context-specific transactional business.

In conclusion Chief Officer police realities prove to be formidable, flexible and persuasive around the topic of policing domestic violence. They variably accommodate, reformulate and undermine non-police-generated knowledges, putting them to work as resources to produce and reproduce police versions of reality. Home Office guidance is therefore, treated as just that, guidance. The implication is that Chief Officers are strongly positioned to counter missives emanating from government. And I believe this undoubtedly indicates that interrogating 'police culture/realities' at the level of Chief Officers is as viable a site of domestic violence research as 'canteen culture' was in the 70s and 80s.

Taken together Chapter 4 and this chapter, Chapter 5, explored 'doing' government and 'doing' Chief Officer police realities around the policing of domestic violence. Chapters 6 and 7 also form a pair, but this time to focus on exercisings of power by government and women's advocates in the area of agencies 'working together'.
Chapter 6:

Introduction
In the last chapter I interrogated the ‘doing’ of Chief Officer police realities within their 1992 and 2000 policy discourse with an emphasis on identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource. A key feature of these ‘doings’ was the formulation of identity-pairs invoking the group membership category of ‘police officer’; for example ‘I, the Chief Constable/all Chief Constables’. This was used for a variety of accomplishments, but mainly responsibility claiming and ascription; and boundary-work between police/non-police, senior officers/junior officers. Also gender was mobilised as an occasional resource when it was useful to specific transactional aims such as problematising women’s mental health and negating the relevance of gender to police-work. There were differences between the ways police realities were sustained in talk and text. Specifically, in policy-making talk, resistances could be accounted for locally. Whilst in text, the versions of reality being countered required some understanding of wider discourses in order to make sense. Overall, Chief Officer accounts of police reality proved formidable means of truth-telling. And Home Office circulars on the policing of domestic violence did not appear to be the primary steer to their truth-claims.

In this chapter I interrogate the ‘doing’ of feminism in the government policy-making context. I look at multiple versions of women’s advocates’ truth-telling around domestic violence. The data for 1992 are an oral evidence session from the Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC, 1993a, 1993b). Four witnesses were present, each of whom represented a service provider whose client group included those experiencing domestic violence. Two agencies, Women’s Aid and Southall Black Sisters, are explicitly feminist whereas Victim Support is a general victim charity. Chiswick Family Rescue¹ is an agency for women and children which sees domestic violence as arising from societal gender inequalities but its position on feminism is not explicit (Horley, 2002). The data for 2000 mark a shift in participants from practitioners to academic researchers. The texts analysed

¹ Chiswick Family Rescue has since reformulated as ‘Refuge’ (Refuge, undated).
are twelve What Works? in reducing domestic violence memoranda cited as literature reviews and produced as part of government guidance to local crime reduction projects (Home Office, 2000d-f). Most are authored by well-known feminists specialising in this area. My emphasis is not on what feminists do in policy-making but how feminism is accomplished and by whom. The chosen texts present the basis of a comparison between the ‘doings’ of feminism in policy activities under the Conservatives and New Labour.

Initially, I reprise arguments from Chapter 2 by presenting an account of how ‘doing feminism’ might be accomplished and analysed. Also from Chapter One, I consider Foucauldian understandings of truth/power and resistance that might be pertinent to how women’s advocates formulate truth and guidance. The main body of the chapter is set out in two parts. In the first, I use extracts from the oral evidence in 1992 (HASC, 1993b) arguing that the ‘doing’ of feminism in dialogue is eminently demonstrable as organisational naming, forwarding causes and producing a subject of representation. Truths about domestic violence are contested between participants. And some aspects of warranting truth-claims are rendered inappropriate by committee members. In the second part, I present extracts from the What Works? memoranda (see footnote 2). The multiple authorship of these renders the ‘doing’ of different kinds of feminism quite clear. There are also apparent attempts to govern statutory agencies commensurate with the ‘government guidance’ status of these documents.

In the chapter discussion I draw together the continuities and disjunctures of ‘doing’ feminism from different policy-making positions and through different discursive media. And I consider their implications.

**Raising questions for analysis**

Many accounts of ‘doing’ feminism concern the research context (e.g. Harding, 1991; Kelly, 1996; Williamson, 2000). There is an emphasis on finding the truths inherent in the spoken experiences of women and enabling these to be heard by a wider audience. Thus the ‘women’s experience’ forwarded by feminists constitutes a version of reality (Haraway, 1990; Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 1996). But that in itself does not constitute feminism. Non-feminists, and even anti-feminists, have a history of founding truth-claims in the accounts.

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2 The full list of these memos is: Crisp & Stanko, 2000; Davidson et al, 2000; Edwards 2000a, 2000b; Hague, 2000; Hanmer & Griffiths, 2000; Kelly & Humphreys, 2000a; Levison & Harwin, 2000; Mullender, 2000; Mullender & Burton, 2000; Mullender & Hague, 2000; Walby & Myhill, 2000.
of women research participants who have experienced domestic violence (e.g. Bourlet, 1990; Lloyd et al, 1994; Hoyle, 1998). Therefore, what renders feminist research qualitatively different is the political stance that underpins the way those truths are created (Gill, 1998).

However, the notion of these truth-claims as political knowledges is often obscured (Gill, 1998). This is problematic because an important part of what they ‘are’ may be lost. And it makes assumptions about the ‘nature’ of truth, namely that what is true will remain true regardless of the context (Smart, 1995). This has specific implications when the context of ‘doing’ feminism is policy-making rather than research activities. In this arena, it has been noted that feminists tend to underplay the political significance of their positionings (Abrar et al, 2000; Kelly, 1999). Indeed, in engagements with the government/the law, feminists regularly seem to underestimate the power relationships therein (Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Patel, 1999; Smart, 1989, 1995).

From a post-structuralist perspective, ‘truth’ and power relations are inextricably linked (Foucault, 1976, 1980, 1982). To be heard as ‘true’, knowledges are dependent on the power that they and those who forward them can mobilise. Foucault (1976) describes truth/power networks as capillary in form. Thus they spread out in a multitude of ways and the locations of power are not always obvious. Also power is not something that is held. Rather, there are positions within networks that afford more opportunities to access it. One of the key ways that power is mobilised and truths kept current is through resistance. Dominant discourses need resistance from competing versions in order to be reiterated and retain their currency. But although such encounters may reinforce what is already understood as true, they also expose truth to the possibility of being undermined. Thus in the context of government policy-making there is a dilemma for feminists. Certainly Government has more obvious access to power and ‘does’ truth in a particular way. And feminists, producing non-dominant discourses can be seen as a source of potential resistance. The question is therefore, whether to avoid ‘feeding’ government truths or attempt to realise the potential to reformulate them.

Patel (1999) and Kelly (1999) are not post-structuralists but they formulate feminist participation in government policy-making in terms of exercisings of power. For Patel (1999) government has demonstrated usages of feminist knowledges that devalue them and
put them in the service of aims counter to feminisms. Therefore, the exercising of power she forwards involves leaving the arena. By contrast, Kelly (1999; Kelly & Humphreys, 2000b) recognises these dangers but she also sees opportunities. She argues that when feminists take part they often do not fulfil the potential of feminism. Her suggestions are that feminism is made relevant to participation in a way that links politics to the business in hand. This would include naming organisations, both literally and in choosing names that invoke the stance of the participants. For example, 'Southall Black Sisters' conveys political meaning that is not apparent in 'Victim Support'. Also she argues that causes of domestic violence, important to feminists, are too readily absented from multi-agency forums. Re-asserting causes potentially renders the doer of the deed visible; keeps talk about gender relational violence on the agenda; and resists formulations which are permissive of women blaming. Finally, she encourages feminists to resolve their differences in private.

Whilst I see organisational naming and keeping 'causes' current as potentially beneficial to 'doing' feminism, I am less convinced by the emphasis on the united front. I understand that Kelly is talking about the local level and there is always a danger that theoretical differences between feminist groups may be understood as women squabbling (Mann, 2000). However, those deemed appropriate women's advocates at the national level might not be feminist. Therefore, notions of disagreement around service provision are not exclusively a feminist concern and competing versions may still be produced. Further, for me, one of feminisms great strengths is its diversity. And hiding that in public is problematic because it renders 'feminism' a single body of knowledge. As such, it is potentially easier to undermine. Moreover, different and irreconcilable 'subjects of representation' may be produced (Butler, 1992). Inadvertently then, in regard to a united feminist front, Kelly might be encouraging the type of lowest common denominator politics that she seeks to undermine (Kelly, 1999). Consequently, my focus for the analysis of 'doing' feminism will incorporate naming organisations and forwarding causes. But the third part of my analysis will be interrogating the 'subject of representation'.

Another factor that seems important is the shift in context of feminist participation in government policy-making from 1992 to 2000. In 1992, feminist practitioners were "witnesses" at a Home Affairs Select Committee on domestic violence (HASC, 1993a & b). In 2000, feminist academics comprised the majority of authors in Home Office
memoranda to guide local crime reduction initiatives (see footnote 2). Thus the grounds, positioning and access to power of feminists, have changed quite dramatically. Once again, post-structuralist theory is useful for conceptualising what this might mean.

Policy can be understood as constitutive of problems, solutions and policy community members (Shore & Wright, 1997). That is, it generates a realm of reality which delimits understandings of people and things that can be deemed appropriate and true. A key component to the efficacy and economy of policy is “indigenous knowledge” (Shore & Wright, 1997, p.15). These comprise the truths and expertise of local people or voluntary groups, those who do not usually come under the remit of, or have value ascribed to them by, government. These knowledges are important because they are understood as the means by which ‘problem populations’ can be mobilised to self-actualise thereby requiring less input of government resources. The notion is that in exchange for validation, government anticipates that non-statutory bodies will ‘police’ local issues in line with government aims; either by doing work themselves or informing those charged with statutory responsibilities. However, such knowledges have temporal relevance (Shore & Wright, 1997). The idea is that once ‘official’ agencies can manage their new responsibilities, indigenous knowledges become less relevant.

The positioning of feminists giving evidence at HASC can be understood in this way. HASC is a strange way of ‘doing government’ (see Chapter 3). Committee members choose a topic for policy amendment, invite written submissions, select witnesses and write recommendations for government. Government responds and the response is debated in Parliament. Eventually, through a further committee process policy is produced. Therefore, the distance between feminist witnesses and the policy product is quite vast. Also the committee’s own agenda delimits the truths that will be heard. Patel’s (1999) criticism of the HOC 1995 arising from HASC is that it ignores important feminist knowledges about funding, service provision and changes to the civil law. But perhaps this was unsurprising as the HASC’s chief concern was how far criminal law could go to solve problems of domestic violence (HASC, 1993b). Thus as policy community members, feminist practitioners could present a variety of truths, but the committee only ‘heard as true’ those which supported its aims.
However, those with indigenous knowledges about domestic violence populations were still deemed relevant in 2000; to the extent that they were promoted from mere policy community members to 'government guidance-givers'. It is clear that some attempts were made to steer these published truths as each memorandum is subtitled 'What Works? in reducing domestic violence'; they were published under the 'Policing and Crime Reduction' unit; and all the documents are roughly the same length (averaging three to four pages with references). But government's stated purpose for these texts is that they are 'literature reviews' which should be used as guidance by those working to reduce crime at the local level (Home Office, 2000d-f). Therefore, feminists engaged in this activity, potentially have access to more power, even if this is in the short term. That is, the government endorsement, and possibly ownership, of these knowledges positions feminists where they can attempt to govern the conduct of statutory agencies. Consequently, the "problematizing activity" of governance (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.181) falls, albeit temporarily and circumscribed, to feminists.

It has been claimed that as feminists are afforded a more central position in government policy-making, feminism itself slips into abeyance (Bagguley, 2002). That is, feminists reduce the activisms with which they are generally associated. However, with an understanding of 'doing' feminism as naming organisations, rendering causes relevant and producing subjects of representation, I believe that the government policy-making context does present opportunities to 'do' feminism. Therefore, in the absence of academic literature which addresses these concerns, this chapter raises certain questions: How and to what effect can feminisms be seen to be 'done' in women's advocates' policy-making talk and text? And what are the methodological implications of investigating these activities? When positioned as government guidance-givers, what attempts are made to govern statutory agencies? What are the differences and similarities between talk produced under the Conservatives and text produced under New Labour?

Part One: Home Affairs Select Committee 1992/3

This chapter part is divided into two sections, each containing one extended run of data. The purpose of this is to present 'a feel' for the exchanges within the talk. In the first section I consider how three of the four participants warrant their knowledges and how these accounts contest or support one another. In the second, I focus on a committee
member’s question, the response of two women participants and his assessment of the answers he receives. The four women’s service providers are: Nicola Harwin from Women’s Aid; Sandra Horley, from Chiswick Family Rescue; Pragna Patel from Southall Black Sisters; and Anne Viney from Victim Support. I interrogate how each one does, or does not, ‘do’ feminism in terms of organisational naming, rendering causes relevant and producing subjects of representation. And I look at warrants, truth-claims and responsibilisations.

1. Competing accounts: “research”, “women working in refuges and shelters” and “our experience”

Extracts 1-4 present a continuous piece of talk which occurs quite early in the evidence session. The Chair, Mrs Viney and Mrs Horley have spoken at some length (text not included). Ms Harwin and Miss Patel have yet to speak. Mrs Horley made her stance clear, particularly around the issue of the compellability of women who report domestic violence to the police. As the extract opens, Mr Butler is questioning the efficacy of compellability.

Extract 1 [HASC (4)]:

207 Mr Butler: (...) In other words, instead of
208 making a complaint but subsequently thinking
209 perhaps not, the victim will not make the complaint
210 in the first place and therefore the whole problem
211 will be driven even further underground than it is at
212 present?

213 Mrs Horley: They have the same anxiety in
214 Canada but the research does not bear that out.

Mr Butler presents a contrast. In the first part, the “victim” makes a complaint and subsequently ‘thinks better of it’. ‘Thinking perhaps not’ suggests choice on the part of the victim, a direct contrast with ‘compellability’. In the second part, an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) is used: “in the first place”. This legitimises his claim that compellability will lead to ‘no choice’ for victims. The consequence of this is framed as “the whole problem will be driven even further underground than it is at present” (1.210-

3 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions.
12). And the extreme case “whole problem” is a further claim for the absolutist nature of the outcome. The contrast, “even further underground than it is at present” acknowledges that the current situation is not perfect. But it frames the distinctiveness of enforcing compellability as qualitatively worse. Thus Mr Butler's question is rhetorical in that it answers itself: compellability eradicates victims' choices, disables criminal justice solutions and makes matters very much worse.

Mrs Horley's response is to ascribe Mr Butler's 'factual' fait accompli as an "anxiety" (1.213) and one that “They” “in Canada” also have. Thus his position is simultaneously acknowledged as not unusual and reformulated as worry. The veracity of that position is disclaimed (“but”) in favour of a truth-claim founded in "research" which “does not bear that out”. Therefore, Mr Butler's rhetorical truth is undermined as not based in reality. In this way, she constitutes "research" as something that produces facts that are not readily apparent. Although her argument appears to be effective in closing Mr Butler down, it also provides an opportunity for Ms Harwin, who undeterred by "research" and "Canada" truths, positions herself in disagreement with Mrs Horley.

Extract 2 [HASC (4)]:

215 Ms Harwin: I would disagree on that
216 because I have had some communication from
217 women working in refuges and shelters in Canada
218 that they do believe that in areas, specifically where
219 there is no adequate support and particularly
220 adequate shelters, there is some evidence that
221 women there are failing to report. I think there is a
222 problem and there certainly is a problem in this
223 country at the current time when there is not enough
224 support available to women that the time that it
225 takes to go to court often leaves some women very
226 vulnerable. Often it is not always possible to get bail
227 conditions attached which means that men will have
228 to leave the house. We are in a situation here where
229 if we pursue proper arrest and prosecution policies
230 without adequately putting in place all the
provisions which need to be made to support women, then we may put women at further risk.

Ms Harwin counters Mrs Horley’s version of reality with “some evidence that women are failing to report” (1.220-1) “in Canada” (1.217). This claim is founded in “some communication” she has had with “women working in refuges and shelters in Canada” (1.217). ‘Some evidence’ and “some communication” are vague formulations and therefore difficult to undermine. What is not vague are the category entitlements she is affording “women working in refuges and shelters” to supply appropriate evidence for herself to represent their truths. Thus implicitly she aligns herself to them but without explicitly invoking that identity for herself. Further, she shifts the axis of the topic of debate. Mr Butler and Mrs Horley were engaged in contesting compellability and criminal justice processes. Ms Harwin retains criminal justice (“failing to report”, 1.221) but sets it in relation to “adequate support” (1.219) and “adequate shelters” (1.220). This too is justified on the grounds of what “women working in refuges and shelters” believe.

Ms Harwin’s apparent reluctance to directly invoke the organisation she represents is demonstrated in the next sentence. She begins with “I think there is a problem and there certainly is a problem in this country at the current time” (1.221-3). It is almost as if she is correcting herself in that what “I think” is framed as not an adequate warrant for the veracity of her account. So, “there certainly is a problem” works as a reality-claim that founds what she thinks. And having used “Canada” to formulate “no adequate support” (1.219) as the problem, she relocates the relevance of “not enough support available to women” (1.223-4) in the UK and in the present. She also reproduces her support/criminal justice relation by juxtaposing “support available” (1.224) with “the time that it takes to go to court” (1.224-5). The suggestion is that, at the current time, in the UK, support and justice are out of kilter because they leave “some women very vulnerable” (1.225-6).

This gender constitution does not render women inevitably or innately vulnerable, as it is not ascribed to all women. However, there is a sense that it is not a favourable production of “women” as the next sentence (l. 226-8) qualifies the source of that vulnerability as “men” in “the house”. And the argument about the support and crime interventions relationship is furthered. The time taken to get to court and the elusiveness of “bail conditions” position women in the home with the men that they have made complaints
against. Consequently, the criminal justice system is ascribed as generating the need for support.

In the final sentence, this support/crime inter-relatedness is repeated and used to found a responsibility ascription: "We are in a situation here where if we pursue proper arrest and prosecution policies without adequately putting in place all the provisions which need to be made to support women, then we may put women at further risk" (1.228-232). "We" infers criminal justice policy-makers and providers of women's support services. But the use of "we" blurs the boundaries of where one responsibility begins and the other ends. Therefore, the joint responsibilisation not to put women at further risk founds claims for adequate support, alignment of crime and support services and working together. Consequently, Ms Harwin accomplishes, by the narrowest of margins, a category entitlement for herself as a women's service provider.

In terms of 'doing' feminism, there seems to be reluctance in Ms Harwin's account to explicitly warrant an identity for herself as a woman who works in refuges and shelters. Mrs Horley generated the opportunity to talk about "Canada" and Ms Harwin used this to found truths about "women working in refuges and shelters" in Canada. But she still problematises what "I think" and only finally claims a category entitlement tentatively. The causes of domestic violence are not made explicit but a gender relation of men rendering women vulnerable and at risk is formulated. Therefore, again implicitly, potential causes are suggested which render men visible as doers of the deed and are not permissive of women blaming. The main subject of representation is "women working in refuges and shelters". This is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, it makes gender relevant to service providers. Secondly, it formulates women service providers as viable truth-tellers.

The truths Ms Harwin presents are picked up and reformulated by Mrs Horley. She attunes to the women focus, the support/criminal justice system relationship and 'we' as service providers and crime policy-makers.

Extract 3 [HOAC (4)]:

233 Mrs Horley: This was precisely my point that
234 they have to have support. Compellability is a last
235 resort, but I feel we have to deliver a strong public
Mrs Horley's first move seems to be to claim Ms Harwin's position as her own through the extreme case "precisely my point". Like Ms Harwin she formulates a "support" and criminal justice relation ("Compellability", "assaulting", "criminal offence"). But unlike, Ms Harwin she prioritises crime responses over support provision. She frames compellability as a "last resort". This is an extreme case, and I think this is an attempt to fend off challenges that she is in disagreement with Ms Harwin. However, there is an immediate disclaimer ("but") that delimiting the importance of compellability should also delimit the importance of criminal justice interventions. Thus "we have to deliver a strong public message that assaulting a woman in the home is a criminal offence" (1.235-7) stands as a bottom line argument. Regardless of the need for support and the potential benefits of compellability, the key issue is stopping the violence happening in the first place. And as she understands it, that can be accomplished through using the criminal law to tell the public it is wrong and will be punished. The "we" (1.235) seems to be a replication of Ms Harwin's framing of women service providers and crime policy-makers. Thus it could be read as a plea to all present to see and accept this view.

Despite having initially rendered "Compellability" less relevant, in the final sentence she once again ascribes it value. The negative and passive form of "If victims are allowed not to give evidence" (1.237-8) suggests that compellability is understood as contentious. And the outcome of allowing this to happen is constituted as "the abuser walks out of the court scot free" (1.238-9). This is interesting for three reasons. Firstly, "scot free" is another extreme case which within an understanding of the law's capacity to stop violence by saying it is wrong, is being framed as the 'worst case scenario'. Secondly, she has made a shift from "woman" to "victims". Thus at the point that she justifies acting upon "victims" again their will, she renders their gender irrelevant. Thirdly, gender is not made apposite to the "abuser". And this suggests either that she sees domestic violence as violence against women not gendered violence; or, for the purposes of this argument a gendered abuser is not deemed useful. I think it is the latter because Mrs Horley displays a tendency to make violent men visible (see Extract 6). Accordingly, the advantages of not gendering here are
to de-personalise the “victims” to be compelled; and to argue for the potential of the ungendered criminal law deterrent for correcting gender(ed) moral wrongs.

There appears to be little evidence from Extracts one and 3 that Mrs Horley is ‘doing’ feminism in this piece of talk. With “we” (1.235) she very obliquely positions herself in the gamut of women’s service providers and crime policy-makers. But it is unclear where she locates herself within that claim. Secondly, the ‘causes’ formulations in Mrs Horley’s account are problematic. Certainly she makes the doer of the deed visible with “abuser”. But in making female gender relevant to compellability she constitutes a justification which is permissive of women blaming. Further, her subject of representation is unclear. She formulates “women” needing support but she argues for their autonomy to be sacrificed. Therefore, I think her representative politics are to be found in her bottom line argument. That is, the primary necessity of “a strong public message” (1.235-6) implies that it is society as a whole which is at fault and needs correcting through the state’s mobilisation of the law. Interestingly, she is calling for a united front but one that requires overriding victims’ choices and freedoms in favour of ‘the greater good’.

Extract 4 follows straight on. And here Miss Patel speaks for the first time. She opens with a direct claim to represent “My organisation’s view” (1.240) which produces the warrant “our experience” (1.243) which in turn is threaded throughout her account (1.247, 254, 264).

Extract 4 [HOAC (4)]:

240 Miss Patel: My organisation’s view is that we
241 need to find a balance in how the criminal justice
242 system deals with the issue of domestic violence. Our
243 problem is, and certainly from our experience what
244 we find is that the police are not doing enough to
245 encourage women to use the criminal justice system
246 as a way of dealing with domestic violence. Certainly
247 in our experience what we find is that the police are
248 deterring women by, for example, adopting delaying
249 tactics, by suggesting that the Crown Prosecution
250 Service is unlikely to take their complaint seriously
251 and in doing that they are deterring women from
using the criminal justice system. We do not think that blanket arrests are appropriate in all cases, but our experience shows that the police and the Crown Prosecution Service are not doing enough to encourage women to use the criminal justice system as a way of dealing with domestic violence. We also feel that all the initiatives that have been taken on domestic violence by the police have tended to distract from the focus on the criminal justice system to what other agencies and other procedures can be followed by women to deal with domestic violence rather than focus on the criminal justice system itself. That has been our experience.

Miss Patel positions Southall Black Sisters as promoting "balance in how the criminal justice system deals with the issue of domestic violence" (1.241-2). This suggests that balance is not currently accomplished and it can be understood as a counter-claim to Mrs Horley’s version about the importance of legal measures. Although Miss Patel does not name her organisation she does invoke it and justifies "our experience" (my emphasis) as a way of telling truths. This justification is founded in what “we find” (1.244 & 247). Again, this can be seen as countering Mrs Horley’s “research” truths and greater good assertions.

The phrase “the police are not doing enough to encourage women to use the criminal justice system as a way of dealing with domestic violence” (1.244-6) is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, Ms Harwin problematised the criminal justice system and Mrs Horley questioned society and the state’s position on criminal justice. By contrast, Miss Patel focuses on the police as responsible for their own wrong doing. Secondly, she formulates their role as facilitating “use (of) the criminal justice system”. Therefore by “not doing enough” they are presented as failing in their duty. Thirdly, “women” are constituted as a gender distinct group who are currently disadvantaged by poor police practice. In addition the formulation “a way of dealing with domestic violence” frames these women as capable of choosing how they deal with domestic violence and criminal justice as something they should have a right to choose. Consequently, what marks these women is not that they are experiencing domestic violence but they are actively dealing with it and
their choices are being circumscribed by the police. This is quite a powerful responsibilisation.

Moreover, she takes this further by naming what the police do as “deterring women” (1.248 & 251). Again, she founds this “in our experience what we find” (1.247). And again their gender is made relevant to what the police do to them. Miss Patel exemplifies this with “adopting delaying tactics by suggesting that the Crown Prosecution service is unlikely to take their complaint seriously” (1.248-250). The “adopting delaying tactics” reformulates something Ms Harwin said earlier. In Extract 2, she implicates “the time that it takes to go to court” (1.224-5) in rendering women vulnerable. She made no ascription as to why the time-scale was so long. Here, Miss Patel is explicit about who is responsible and directly blames the police. Not only do they adopt delaying tactics but they also formulate the Crown Prosecution Service as ‘the problem’. And the repetition of “deterring” (1.251) is possibly another reference to Mrs Horley’s account. She understands the mandatory arrest of offenders as a deterrent. Miss Patel sees the deterrent effect in the police treatment of those offended against. Implicitly, the police are being framed as sexist.

At line 252, Miss Patel again undermines Mrs Horley’s account. “We do not think blanket arrests are appropriate in all cases” (my emphases) contains two extreme case formulations. And I think this double absolute works to delimit the importance of an ‘arrest at all costs focus’ such as the one forwarded by Mrs Horley. Thus it is not that Southall Black Sisters are against arrest per se, indeed there is a strong sense that criminal justice is important. Rather, it is how the criminal justice system as “a way of dealing with domestic violence” is accessed, or not, that is problematised. Thus mandatory versus non-mandatory arrest is disclaimed as the key issue when “the police and the Crown Prosecution Service are not doing enough to encourage women” (1.254-6). This suggests that women entering criminal justice processes need encouragement to stay there. But it also suggests that women should still have choices. Consequently, not taking complaints seriously and compellability are implied as the two ends of poor police practice. Each delimits women’s choices and does not facilitate their usage of the criminal justice system.

At line 257, in a further example of this deterrence/lack of encouragement, Miss Patel claims that the police response to domestic violence has been to try and do other agencies’ work rather than their own. The “focus on the criminal justice system” (1.260 & 263) is framed as what the police should be doing. But “all the initiatives” they are doing concern
“what other agencies and other procedures can be followed by women to deal with domestic violence” (1.261-2). Therefore, Southall Black Sisters are positioned as unimpressed with a police response to domestic violence that side-steps criminal justice issues. The claim is that they should do their job and do it properly. And this is again founded in “our experience” (1.264).

In terms of ‘doing’ feminism, Miss Patel’s strongest move is framing herself as an organisational representative, invoking Southall Black Sisters and rendering “our experience” as a viable way of telling truths. This is because each time she warrants an argument, she renders the politics of ethnicity and gender relevant to the process of giving evidence as an expert witness. Her subject of representation is very clearly the organisation. But she does formulate a population of women as active, choosing and dealing with domestic violence. However, female gender is rendered apposite to the police practice of delimiting women’s criminal justice options in a way which implies that police treatment of these women is underpinned by sexism. Miss Patel does not invoke causes of domestic violence per se but in this account police practice is formulated as ‘the problem’. Thus the doers of the deed whom she renders visible are the police. And although only gendering women she accomplishes police blaming which is not permissive of the reallocation of that blame. In terms of interacting with competing accounts, she actively undermines Mrs Horley’s account as extreme, out of balance and missing the key point. By contrast, Ms Harwin’s version is used to found a responsibility ascription about criminal justice time-scales and delaying tactics.

In summary, Miss Patel and Ms Harwin, to a much lesser extent, can be seen to be ‘doing’ feminism in terms of organisational warranting. Both produce their respective agency as the main subject of representation. The effects of this include rendering gender and ‘race’ relevant and claiming a ‘working together’ role with crime policy-makers. Mrs Horley does not ‘do’ feminism here as she founds claims in “research” veracity and argues for the greater good of society at the expense of individual women. Ms Harwin and Mrs Horley constitute passive women, although Ms Harwin does gender assailants as male and is not permissive of women blaming. Miss Patel frames active women attempting to deal with domestic violence and makes their gender relevant to police sexism. Methodologically, it seems advantageous to present long extracts of talk as the moves that are consequential upon each other become clearer.
In this section I was concerned primarily with ‘doing’ and not ‘doing’ feminism. This necessitated using an extract with different voices. As such, women practitioners are demonstrated as attuning to each other. Therefore, in the next section I focus on talk where interaction with a Committee member is more explicit.

2. Delimiting truth: the rules of engagement

Extracts 5-7 comprise a question from Mr Booth about “police attitudes”, answers from Mrs Viney and Mrs Horley and a further prompt from Mr Booth. Immediately prior to Extract 5, the Chair has halted discussion on the preceding topic and handed the floor to Mr Booth. He explicitly chooses Mrs Viney from Victim Support to answer his question (text not included); and after an exchange with her (text not included) claims “some links” (1.391) with her organisation.

Extract 5 [HASC (13-14)]:

391 Mr Booth: I have some links with that. Can you tell
392 the Committee whether in your view police attitudes
393 are either improved or have they become worse?
394 What is the position with police attitudes towards
395 domestic violence and bringing of prosecutions?

396 Mrs Viney: As you will have seen from our
397 report, the Association of Chief Police officers was
398 represented on our working party. There was a great
399 deal of frankness among all the practitioners about
400 difficulties in respective agencies. There was no
401 quarrel with the fact that historically domestic
402 violence has been regarded as not being quite a
403 crime, that police have been reluctant to intervene in
404 what they have seen as domestic disputes. Gradually
405 there has been a change of attitudes. There has been
406 a change of policy that has culminated in
407 circular 60/90, where police are encouraged to
408 regard it very much as a crime. From a broad
409 victim’s point of view we would like all criminal
justice personnel to have training in victim
awareness and in domestic violence particularly.
That is not just the police. I do not think they should
be singled out in this respect. That would go through
the police, the CPS, magistrates, judges and lawyers.

Mr Booth sets up a relation between himself having links with Victim Support, “the Committee” and “in your view”. And this positioning potentially relegates any answer he may receive to a personal opinion before it is uttered. The question he formulates is a ‘forced choice’ one. That is, he delimits possible appropriate answers to whether “police attitudes” have “improved” or “become worse”. A police responsibility around domestic violence is constituted as the “bringing of prosecutions”. Therefore, “police attitudes” are being ascribed as the potential facilitation of, or barrier to, the fulfilment of police duties.

It seems possible that Mrs Viney has understood “in your view” as detrimental to her account as she engages in warranting activity. She begins by warranting “our report” (1.396-7) and the presence of “the Association of Chief Police officers” (ACPO, 1.397) at “our working party” (1.398). Through “our”, she accomplishes an agreement across witnesses which frames her as representing a collective endeavour rather than her own interests. And possibly, this is also an attempt to disrupt Mr Booth’s claim to links with Victim Support. The report she refers to has been cited in the Chair’s opening address as one of the key reasons that HASC is being held at all (paragraph 1, text not included). So, she is invoking a category entitlement for her organisation which has been founded in the talk of the Chairman of “the Committee”. Further, ACPO can be seen as working as another warrant. ACPO represents the most senior police officers in the UK. Therefore, constituting them here is part of the truth-claim that legitimises her as someone who can answer Mr Booth’s question with justifiable authority on the subject.

She goes on to say that there “was a great deal of frankness among all the practitioners” (1.398-9). The extreme case “all” seems to render “frankness” as an integral feature of the working party discussions. But it could also be suggesting that the police were no exception. Either way, her argument is that she knows the truth about “difficulties in respective agencies” (1.400) from ‘the horse’s mouth’.
Mrs Viney then presents a three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) which changes the subject from 'attitudes' to "a change of (government) policy" (1.406). In the first part, she argues that "There was no quarrel with the fact that historically domestic violence has been regarded as being not quite a crime, that the police have been reluctant to intervene in what they have seen as domestic disputes" (1.400-4). The warrant for the veracity of this statement draws on the frankness of the working party participants who had "no quarrel" with the claim she is about to make. Within this sentence, she makes a move from the general to the particular case of the police. The formulation of the police being "reluctant to intervene" and viewing domestic violence negatively as "domestic disputes" invokes Mr Booth's constitutions of police responsibility and police attitudes. But Mrs Viney's general case does not name the police. Indeed, regarding domestic violence "as not quite a crime" is not ascribed an actor. Consequently, this suggests that a wider understanding of domestic violence's status, not just a police one, was "historically" important. Thus she attunes to Mr Booth's 'truth' but repositions it in a wider context.

In the second part, the time frame has been brought forward: "Gradually there has been a change in attitudes" (1.404-5). The suggestion from "Gradually" is that change has taken some time. And the passive form, "has been", again implies that attitudes are not the sole preserve of the police. In the third part, Mrs Viney asserts that "There has been a change in policy that has culminated in circular 60/90, where police are encouraged to regard it very much as a crime" (1.405-8). Therefore, she formulates "a change in policy" as a significant measure of a change in attitudes. But "circular 60/90" is a government policy and consequently the important change in attitudes is ascribed to government. Whilst she endorses Mr Booth's constitution of domestic violence as a police matter ("very much a crime"), and police attitudes as a potential barrier to the execution of their duty, her responsibility ascription is to government to direct the police.

Overall, the effect of this topic-changing list formation is to set the problem that Mr Booth has formulated into a wider context of the government/police relationship. Thus she has undermined his question and the way it was asked, but simultaneously she has engaged directly with the points he has made. Also she has presented government as responsible for attitudes whilst repositioning the police away from the single focus of possible blame. And she continues in this vein.
At line 408 she introduces a new dimension to her Victim Support category entitlement. The warrant “From a broad victim’s point of view” is used to found a request of what “we would like” (from government) (1.408-9). And the object of this request is “training” “for all criminal justice personnel” (1.409-10). As might have been expected from an organisation which represents a range of victims, this training is framed as for “victim awareness” (1.410-1) generally and “domestic violence particularly” (1.411). This move from the general to the specific positions domestic violence as important to, but not the starting point of, Victim Support’s concerns. Further, the extreme case “all” (1.409) criminal justice personnel is an attempt to legitimise the argument that it is “not just the police” (1.412) who need it. This is additionally supported in the closing lines with a claim that they should not “be singled out in this respect” (1.413) and a comprehensive five-part list of appropriate criminal justice personnel (1.414).

It is clear in this extract that Mrs Viney is not ‘doing’ feminism. Her subjects of representation are ‘Victim Support’, which although invoking an organisation does not convey any feminist politics, and a “broad victim”. There is no gender in her formulations, no sense of causes and no doer of the deed is made visible. However, she does do some interesting discursive work to undermine the question she was asked and the way it was asked. She positions herself as a viable opinion-giver, founding this in notions of Victim Support’s status as a valued ‘knower of truths’ in this context and a bona fide representative of victims generally. Also she ascribes responsibility to government for police attitudes as part of the means for asking for training for all criminal justice personnel. Thus she has conformed to the rules of engagement whilst simultaneously subverting the circumscription of the question asked.

Extract 6 follows directly on with Mrs Horley interjecting:-

Extract 6 [HASC (13)]:

415 Mrs Horley: I just wanted to try to get back to
416 the main point here, which is that this is an issue of
417 basic human rights, an issue of social justice and the
418 costs of domestic violence are very, very high. We
419 should not be treating it differently from any other
420 crime of violence. The costs are high in terms of the
children's needs, in terms of physical, psychological and emotional abuse, as well as the quality of women's lives. It is not uncommon for women who have suffered frequent assaults over a number of years to result (sic) to alcohol, drugs or even suicide. A significant number of women are murdered by their partners. It is also recognised by the Canadian Government that women who are abused represent a significant loss to the work force. There are other costs: more repeated calls for the police, women on social security, women going into casualty wards. It is a drain on housing and social services. In the long term it is in the public interest to arrest and charge violent men because we know it acts as a deterrent.

The main warrant for the veracity of her account is forwarded as "costs" (1.418, 420 & 430). This is framed as "the main point" (1.416) and furnished in a three-part list. The list "basic human rights, an issue of social justice and the costs of domestic violence" (1.417-8) is comprehensive. But that only becomes apparent as the paragraph unfolds. That is, "costs" are presented as financial but also as exacting a price from "basic human rights" and "social justice". Therefore, she is mobilising both a moral and practical argument around "costs". Morality is invoked in "We should" (1.418-9) which suggests moral obligation. "We" seems to refer to 'we, as a society' as the persuasion is to accept "crime of violence" (1.420) as 'in the object' of domestic violence. This is accomplished through the extreme case formulation "any other" (1.419).

At line 420, Mrs Horley makes explicit claims about "costs". She juxtaposes "children's needs" (1.421) in terms of "abuse" with "the quality of women's lives" (1.422-3). Therefore, the "costs" paid by children and women are framed as socially unjust costs to their basic human rights. Further, the three-part list of "physical, psychological and emotional abuse" (1.421-2) to children works as an emotive descriptor. Children are often positioned as the ultimate example of innocence. Thus locating them here next to women can be understood as an attempt to ascribe moral worthiness to both the children and the women who pay the
costs of domestic violence with their basic human rights. This reading is supported by her move to specific costs to women and the disappearance of children.

Women are constituted as often resorting to “alcohol, drugs or even suicide” (l.425). This is an ascending three-part list implying escalating costs to women and culminating in the extreme case “suicide”, as the ultimate cost one can exact from oneself. However, the effect is not to blame women as self-harming. Rather, within the framework of society’s responsibility to address “the main point”, “suffered frequent assaults over a number of years” (l.424-5) again mobilises understandings of basic human rights and social injustice.

At line 425, she asserts that “A significant number of women are murdered by their partners”. This is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, “significant number” implies statistical truth but no ‘research’ or specific warrant is made explicit in support of this claim. Secondly, “murdered” is an extreme case. As such, it fits the “main point” framework as the ultimate cost exacted by another, a social injustice and contravening the most basic of human rights, the right to life. Thirdly, the constitutions “women” and “partners” are unequal. Thus she is formulating violence against women rather than gendered violence.

At this point, she introduces a further warrant in the form of “It is also recognised by the Canadian Government that women who are abused represent a significant loss to the work force” (l.427-9). And I think the move she is making here is to do with ascribing a direct responsibility. Back at line 418 there was an invocation “We” as a society with a moral duty. But here, she makes a Government, and perhaps more appositely ‘the state’, relevant to financial costs incurred by organisations. I read this as a responsibilisation of the UK Government. The sense is that the Canadian Government have seen domestic violence in this way, therefore there is precedence for the UK Government to follow suit.

From line 429, Mrs Horley formulates further costs: “more repeated calls to the police, women on social security, women going into casualty wards”. And she frames domestic violence as “a drain on housing and social services” (l.432). I see these two formations as a three-part list changing the topic from organisational costs, through costs for women, to costs for society. Therefore, it would seem that by means of organisational costs, the responsibility of ‘the state’ is still being implicated.
In the final sentence, Mrs Horley claims “In the long term it is in the public interest to arrest and charge violent men because we know it acts as a deterrent” (1.432-4). There is much to unpack here. Firstly, with “in the public interest to arrest and charge” she renders domestic violence a matter of crime and criminal justice as the appropriate means of dealing with it. ‘Public interest’ also invokes a responsibility of the establishment to act on society’s behalf. Secondly, “violent men” names the doers of the deeds and makes male gender relevant. Therefore, in addition to her production of women as morally worthy (1.420-27), she implicitly constitutes domestic violence as a gender relational problem and men as generating all these costs. Thirdly, “deterrent” suggests that domestic violence can be stopped quite easily. Put simply, this is a ‘what works’ discourse. Interestingly, despite having mobilised “research” to make the same argument earlier (see Extract One), she does not realise that opportunity here. And I think this is because “deterrent” for Mrs Horley is the bottom line argument. That is, it is the truth of all truths, something “we (all) know”.

Overall, the sense of the paragraph becomes clearest in that final word. Society has a moral duty to recognise the crime of domestic violence which exacts costs from the economy, social justice and human rights. Women (and children) pay most of these costs. Employers and society pay financial costs. Men commit this crime (against women) and the criminal justice system can stop them. Therefore, like the Canadian Government before it, the UK Government needs to recognise society’s moral duty and act in its interests. In relation to Mr Booth’s question about “police attitudes”, her suggestion is that they are irrelevant and this could be seen as implicitly forwarding the notion that arrest should be mandatory, therefore bypassing any need to engage with police attitudes.

In terms of ‘doing’ feminism, there seems to be a strong case in regard to ‘causes’ for arguing that Mrs Horley is accomplishing just that. She doesn’t name the organisation she represents or found any claims in the status that that may afford her in this context. Rather, there is a sense that she is an objective social commentator presenting facts that are plain for all to see; a voice of reason. And this impacts on the subject of representation she does formulate. Certainly she constitutes morally worthy women who pay the bulk of the costs arising from domestic violence caused by violent men; subjects conducive to many feminisms. But commensurate with her talk in Extract 3, her more direct subject of representation appears to be ‘the greater good’ of society. And that potentially subverts the grounds on which she is present, as a practitioner of women’s service provision. Finally,
and most importantly, she names "violent men" as the cause of domestic violence and renders it a gender relational matter. Therefore, although inconsistent in her genderings, she does not capitulate to a victim intervention focus which can render domestic violence a problem of women. In addition, she accomplishes a responsibilisation of government (and perhaps of society as well) for allowing the conditions that support domestic violence.

However, despite Mrs Horley taking more liberties with the rules of engagement than Mrs Viney and generating opportunities to 'do' feminism, her account suffers a similar fate. In Extract 7, Mr Booth, the initial questioner, responds to what both have said. His utterance is presented in its entirety.

Extract 7 [HASC (14)]:

435  **Mr Booth:** You very helpfully said in answer to my
436  question that you think perhaps police training
437  could be improved. Are there any other suggestions
438  that any of you have that would improve police
439  attitudes and contact in this area?

Mr Booth's talk can be read as an attempt to reassert the rules of engagement which frame the committee members as the appropriate parties to set the agenda. Mrs Viney undermined his question and the way he asked it. Here, he reasserts "my question" about "police attitudes" (twice) and summarises her argument as "you think perhaps police training could be improved" (1.436-7). This renders irrelevant her responsibilisation of government and her request for training for all criminal justice personnel not just the police. But also, through "perhaps", he introduces some vagary to the training that is needed which might be an attempt to hide his rudeness at ignoring her. Indeed, "very helpfully" suggests that he is positioning himself as grateful for her contribution despite undermining her account. If anything, Mrs Horley fares worse; it is as if she has not even spoken. In his final sentence Mr Booth uses the extreme case "any" twice. 'Any other suggestions that any of you have' (1.437-8) is used to legitimise his claim that the improvement of police training is the only (appropriate) suggestion he has received and that Mrs Viney is the only person to forward a suggestion. Thus Mrs Horley, her 'doing' of feminism and her claim of 'what works' in reducing domestic violence are made invisible.
In summary, what Mr Booth hears as true is delimited by his rules of engagement in terms of the question he has asked. Both Mrs Viney and Mrs Horley attempt to undermine his question and pay similar prices for doing so. Mrs Viney does not ‘do’ feminism. She works hard to present her category entitlement to speak and to relocate the relevance of his question about police attitudes into the wider context of a government/police dynamic. And she founds claims for training for all criminal justice personnel not just the police. Therefore, despite attuning to the rules of engagement, her version is delimited in its ascribed relevance to “police training”. By contrast, Mrs Horley ‘does’ feminism and pays little heed to the rules of engagement. Like Mrs Viney she formulates an indirect responsibilisation of government and positions her account in regard to criminal justice. But in so doing, she renders “police attitudes”, and therefore Mr Booth’s question, irrelevant. Mr Booth treats her version as if it has never been uttered.

The upshot of this is that regardless of whether or not feminism is ‘done’ in government policy-making, whoever is positioned to influence the rules of engagement, in this case committee members, has more immediate access to power. But that is not commensurate with arguing that ‘doing’ feminism in this context is always doomed before it begins. Rather, it indicates that, in this instance, the ‘doing’ of feminism was enacted inside the policy arena but outside the rules of engagement. Therefore, it was neither an external critique nor a realisation of the opportunities generated and circumscribed by the event. The implications of this analysis are considered in the chapter part conclusion.

**Part One Conclusion**

In this chapter part I have interrogated the talk of the four service providers at HASC. The aim was to identify the ‘doing’ of feminism in terms of organisational naming, invoking causes and producing a subject of representation, and how that was used to found truth-claims and responsibilisations.

Invoking organisational names was one way in which ‘doing’ feminism is accomplished. Miss Patel particularly, through the discourse of “our experience”, renders the ethnic and gender politics encapsulated in ‘Southall Black Sisters’ relevant to her opening truth-claims. By contrast, there is an apparent reluctance in the other two participants who ‘do’ feminism to invoke their organisations directly. Ms Harwin claims an indirect allegiance to
“women working in refuges and shelters” and implicitly responsibilises crime policymakers to work together with them. Mrs Horley founds her arguments in “research” and the ‘facts’ of moral/legal obligations, directly responsibilising those in a position to change society. Mrs Viney, who does not ‘do’ feminism at all, does invoke her organisation to responsibilise government to provide criminal justice training. But ‘Victim Support’ does not convey political meaning. Consequently, organisational naming per se does not constitute ‘doing’ feminism but invoking a politicised agency name, or to a lesser extent rendering female gender relevant to service providers, can be seen as such.

The causes of domestic violence are invoked by Ms Harwin who frames women’s risk and vulnerability as emanating from men in the home. And they are rendered explicit by Mrs Horley who constitutes a society where assaulting women is not seen as criminal and names “violent men” as the people who do domestic violence. Mrs Viney does not formulate causes. One of the problems of constituting ‘violence against women’ in the absence of a gendered perpetrator is that, potentially, it can make gender relevant to interventions only and it can be used to support women blaming (see Chapter 4). Miss Patel avoids that dilemma by rendering female gender relevant to sexism in police service provision. Thus she positions gendered power relations in domestic violence’s career path and ‘names and shames’ the responsible parties. Consequently, forwarding causes of domestic violence is not the only way that gender relations can be implicated in the policymaking arena.

Mrs Viney constitutes “a broad victim” as her subject of representation. By contrast, Miss Patel positions herself as representing Southall Black Sisters; for Ms Harwin it is “women working in refuges and shelters”; and for Mrs Horley it is “research” and ‘the greater good’ of society. Consequently, for the three women who ‘do’ feminism, the subject of representation does not comprise those who experience domestic violence. However, it is hard to see how those who ‘do’ feminism could present a united feminist front. Mrs Horley constitutes essentially passive women who incur the costs of domestic violence. And at the point of criminal justice interventions they become de-personalised and de-gendered “victims” upon whom others should act for the greater good. Ms Harwin too formulates passive women in need of support. Miss Patel generates a potentially active, choosing woman attempting to deal with domestic violence who is being discriminated against, and having her choices limited, by the police. Only Mrs Horley makes an appeal for a united
stance and Miss Patel undermines that version as out of balance, wrongly focused and extreme.

Methodologically there are limitations to this analysis. Firstly, it is difficult to account for why Miss Patel readily founds claims in Southall Black Sisters and Ms Harwin seems reluctant to invoke Women’s Aid. This could be seen as the former understanding the rules of engagement to ascribe value to practitioners’ views. But it can also be read as an enactment of standpoint feminism. From that perspective, The Truth is made up of partial and interested truths (Patel, 1999). Mainstream understandings are incomplete because they do not incorporate the truths of marginalised groups (e.g. Harding, 1991). So, the standpoint feminist project is making these accounts known more widely and organisational warranting is a viable way of truth-telling, regardless of the context. Secondly, whether or not truths are heard as true can only be assessed from the immediate context. Thus Mrs Viney’s appeal for criminal justice training appears to fall on deaf ears, despite the fact she works hard to conform to the rules of engagement. Also Miss Patel’s responsibilisation of the Crown Prosecution Service brings forth no response. And yet, in the Government’s reply to HASC, the Crown Prosecution Service is abjectly criticised and rendered in need of training (Home Office, 1993).

The implications arising from what can be analysed are as follows. Some participants, notably Miss Patel, ‘do’ more feminism than others. That is, they render politics and gendered power relationships relevant in the context of government policy-making. Also ‘doing’ feminism in a way that contravenes the rules of engagement, such as Mrs Horley does, can result in whole arguments being immediately dismissed as irrelevant. Moreover, the participants whom government deems appropriate to take part may have different political positions. And this can be used, as it is to some extent by Ms Harwin and Miss Patel, to problematise points of differentiation.

In this chapter part I have concentrated on ‘doing’ feminism in practitioners’ talk in the government policy-making context. In the next chapter part I focus on ‘doing’ feminism in researchers’ texts in government policy-making guidance in order to facilitate the basis of a comparison.

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4 Also more recently, formulations of costs/causes similar to those Mrs Horley forwards here, seem to have found favour with New Labour (see Home Office, 2003b).

The twelve What Works? in reducing domestic violence memoranda, authored in the main by key feminists working around domestic violence and published under the Home Office's Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, form the data for this chapter part (see footnote 2). Their ascribed purpose is to be literature reviews to inform and guide local crime reduction projects (Home Office, 2000d-f). As might be expected from such a government policy-making activity, there is a strong emphasis on 'research' veracity. And the appropriateness of the participants is founded in their status as academic researchers. The purpose of this chapter part is to demonstrate the 'doing' of feminism in this context. But I am also interested, given the positioning of these texts, in attempts to govern the conduct of statutory agencies. In section 3 I consider the warrant 'research' and how it is used to found claims about what women say and to ascribe relevance to the causes of domestic violence. In section 4 I explore some usages to which the organisational naming of "Women's Aid" is put.

3. Warranting 'research'

As might have been expected, all twelve What Works? memoranda warrant "research" as a way of telling truths. Ten of the documents found truth-claims about women's accounts in the warrant of 'research' veracity. For example:-

Extract 8 [What Works? Health (Davidson et al, 2000)]:

64 (...) Women’s
65 expectations and views of health care have been
66 described and some studies of the attitudes of care-
67 givers are also available. (…)

Extract 9 [What Works? Perpetrator Programmes (Mullender & Burton, 2000)]:

117 (...) Most women respondents felt
118 better off and safer; (…)

But even in just these few lines, it would appear that something different is being accomplished in the two documents. In Extract 8, the reporting of 'research' does not frame the research participants ("Women" and "care-givers") as active meaning-makers.

5 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions.
Their "expectations and views" are "described" and their "attitudes" are "available". Thus implicitly, 'research' is constituted as the truth-teller. By contrast, in Extract 9, "women respondents" are formulated as the producers of knowledges. What they feel is ascribed value. So the difference is between presenting 'women' as the objects or meaning-makers of research. Certainly research can be manipulated in the production and presentation of its truths (Condor, 1988). I am not arguing that this use of research is a 'doing' of feminism as there is no indication that this is feminist research; no causes of domestic violence are invoked; and because of the brevity of the extracts there is no sense of the claims these warrants are used to found and no clear subject of representation. Rather, across the twelve What Works? memoranda those who 'do' feminism tend to formulate research participants and not the research per se as truth-tellers. Although not exclusively a feminist preserve, that is consistent with a feminist approach (e.g. Kelly, 1996; Williamson, 2000).

Extracts 10 and 11 demonstrate another, but related, difference between the ways that research warrants are mobilised: how and to what effect subjects of representation are constituted. Extract 10, comes from the What Works? on Civil Law memorandum. The whole document is set up as a piece of research in its own right (1.42-56, text not included). Therefore, all the claims are founded in research veracity. The text presented below comes from the 'Conclusions and recommendations'.

Extract 10 [What Works? Civil Law (Edwards (2000b))]:

179  • The police and courts are making good use of the
180      FLA. The intervention of the civil law in providing
181      injunctive protection and exclusion order protection
182      for both women and children could provide an
183      important deterrent to abusers, providing early
184      intervention in domestic violence and reinforcing
185      the message that domestic violence will not be
186      tolerated.

This bullet point presents an account of the features of injunctions which are ascribed positive value. The first sentence forms praise for "The police and courts" in the way they
use "FLA"\(^6\). The remainder formulates civil law's provision potential in a three-part list of: "providing" "protection" for "women and children"; "could provide" a "deterrent to abusers"; "providing early intervention" (my emphases). And an extra benefit is formulated as "reinforcing the message that domestic violence will not be tolerated".

In the first part of the list (1.180-2), the appropriate intervention is framed as "protection" and its objects as "women and children". This relational pairing infers that the "women" are the mothers of these children (Sacks, 1974). And mothers coupled with children forms an emotive descriptor to support the argument that they need "protection". Women's need to be protected (often with their children) is a commonly produced negative femininity ascription (Ahmed, 1995). And such formulations are often accompanied by framing the recipient of protection as passive (Hammer & Stanko, 1985). And this appears to be the case here. Also founding claims for women's worthiness in their motherhood status is always problematic. It allows for hierarchies of women's worth to be forwarded and it provides additional discursive opportunities to ascribe blame (Butler, 1992; Smart, 1992, 1995). But in terms of 'doing' feminism it potentially infers causes of domestic violence as the relational dynamic of 'mother and child' implies the absence of a father. Protection is not sought for him, neither is he responsibilised to protect. Therefore, in the context of research on 'family law' ("FLA"), this could be read as implicating gendered violence.

However, in the second part (1.182-3), gender is not made relevant to "abusers". Thus the opportunity generated by "women and children" to render the gender of abusers apposite is not capitalised. And this means that 'doing' feminism is not really accomplished. The other interesting point about this part of the list is the conditional form of "could provide" (my emphasis). This suggests that the outcome of "deterrent" is less of a certainty than "protection". It can be seen as the author demonstrating understanding that this claim might be contentious to the readership and thereby invokes competing accounts. In the third part (1.183-6), there is no named object of the "early intervention". But if the three-part list is read as comprehensive the discursive work of this third part is to reprise the two previous parts. Thus the objects of "early intervention" are "women and children" and "abusers". And "intervention" is framed as a dual movement of "protection" and "deterrent".

\(^6\) The "FLA" referred to is the Family Law Act 1996, which was developed by the Conservatives and enacted under New Labour. Section IV, which involved consultation with Women's Aid, encompasses civil legislation about non-molestation and occupation orders to keep violent persons away from those they have abused and out of their homes if that has been the site of their violences (Harwin & Barron, 2000).
Consequently, the argument founded in research veracity is that “civil law” facilitates a complete response to domestic violence.

The subject of representation is not obvious. Certainly “women and children” are positioned as benefiting from “protection” and the “deterrent” of the abuser. But they are framed as passive objects of intervention arising from “civil law”. Therefore, it is the “civil law” which is constituted as the actor, “The police and courts” as its agents and women, children and abusers as its current ‘participants’. And “reinforcing the message that domestic violence will not be tolerated” is not framed as an intervention per se. Rather, it is an add-on to the ascribed comprehensive reach of “civil law”. Thus the subject of representation is the “civil law” which delivers a complete response to domestic violence including sending a message to its other objects, that is, to the wider society.

By contrast, it is “Women” as “service users” in Extract 11, who are forwarded as the subject of representation. “DVM” refers to the pilot research study ‘Domestic violence matters’ (Kelly et al, 1999). Therefore, the bullet point here is part of a summary of those research findings.

*Extract 11 [What Works? Policing (Hanmer & Griffiths, 2000):*

114 3. DVM
115 • Following up calls for police assistance within 24 hours was effective with service users at the time.
116 Women valued: the practical support; the emotional support; the legal advice; the assurance that the violence was not the women’s fault; the emphasis on women’s right to something better; the naming of the men’s behaviour as violence; and the referrals to other agencies.

The two sentences in this extract form a move from the general to the particular. In the general case, there is vagary and ambiguity. What “Following up calls” entailed is not detailed. Nor is the measure used for “effective” made clear. Further, “at the time” is ambiguous. It could mean that efficacy was only measured at the time the follow up calls were made. It could mean that this practice no longer persists. Or it could mean that
subsequent service users do not share the same view. As is usual with vague and ambiguous formulations, these truths are hard to undermine because what is being claimed is hard to pin down. Or rather, in this case the claim for the importance of service users’ assessment of services is clear, but the truths on which this is founded are obscure. So, this can be read as an attempt to counter potential challenges that service user evaluation is the key measure of service provision. Consequently, the subject of representation is “service users” in general and “Women” in particular.

At line 117, a specific case of what “Women valued” is presented. At first glance it looks like a seven part list indicating that women valued a wide variety of outcomes from the follow up calls. This could be read as a straight endorsement of the follow up calls. However, on closer inspection more discursive work is afoot. The items in the list fit one of two categories, “practical support” or “emotional support”. Thus “legal advice” and “referrals to other agencies” can be seen as two examples of “practical support” sandwiched around a three-part list of “emotional support”. Consequently, issues of practical and emotional support can be seen to be intrinsically linked as part of the whole that women, as service users, value.

The three-part list changes the topic from “women’s fault” to “men’s” “violence” through rights discourse (“women’s right”). This frames domestic violence as men contravening women’s rights with their violence. Thus it ‘does’ feminism by invoking causes and repositioning blame.

However, feminism is also potentially ‘undone’. ‘Emotional support’ is made relevant to “Women” service users. Heightened emotionality in women is a widely circulating negative femininity discourse (Marcus 1992; Smart, 1992, 1995). Even though it is used here in the ‘doing’ of feminism, it re-inscribes a mainstream understanding which is unlikely to be so easily disrupted or reformulated. Therefore, despite attempts to guard against challenges for the veracity of what “Women value”, women themselves are undermined.

In summary, interrogating ‘research’ in the ‘doing’ of feminism appears to suggest certain things. There is a danger of warranting ‘research’ itself as the truth-teller rather than those whose accounts the study purports to represent. Although forming women subjects of
representation does not in and of itself constitute ‘doing’ feminism, it is more likely to do so than producing inanimate subjects such as the “civil law”. Formulating ‘women and children’ as a pair is also problematic. It could be argued that this is a ‘doing’ of feminism because it implies men. But if that is the case it justifies rendering violent men invisible and it is hard to see how that benefits feminism. Generating and realising opportunities to make the gender of abusers relevant can, however, make for powerful arguments. Finally, the risk from mainstream discourses of negative femininity is omnipresent. And it is easy to slip into everyday usages which can serve to undermine the ‘doing’ of feminism.

In the next section I consider a further aspect of ‘doing’ feminism within the 2000 What Works? Memoranda, specifically organisational naming.

4. Naming “Women’s Aid”

Across the 12 memoranda, five name “Women’s Aid”. As organisational naming is an important part of how I, following Kelly (1999), understand feminism to be accomplished, I use this section to explore how and to what ends “Women’s Aid” is mobilised. “Women’s Aid”, like ‘Women’s Institute’ and ‘WRVS’, suggests the gender of those who take part in its activities. And like ‘Woman’s Realm’ and ‘Wellwoman’, it implies a female gendered target population. Therefore, it can be seen to do double gendering work.

Extract 12 comes from the ‘Conclusions and recommendations’ section of the memorandum on multi-agency working, under the sub-heading ‘Difficulties of multi-agency working’. The bullet points that follow have been set up as what local initiatives need to do to counter “power differences between agencies” (1.191-2, text not included), particularly in terms of the “more objectively powerful agencies such as the police and local authority” (1.202-4, text not included).


207 • Women’s Aid is accepted as the lead national
208 agency for women and children experiencing
209 domestic violence. A variety of initiatives have built
210 creative and profitable relations between other
211 agencies and refuges, and, in some areas,
Women's Aid takes a leading role in inter-agency initiatives (sometimes, however, at the expense of other parts of their workload). Recommended ways forward include Women's Aid and women's services always being consulted, taking the chair, or occupying a reserved position on the management of the initiative.

Extract 12 begins with an agreement across witnesses, "is accepted" (l.207), and an extreme case formulation, "lead national agency" (l.207-8), both of which serve to legitimise the claims made on behalf of "Women's Aid". The sense is that Women's Aid's ascribed status "for women and children experiencing domestic violence" (l.208-9) is agreed and incontestable. The next sentence offers the readership rewards in terms of "profitable relations between other agencies and refuges" (l.210-11). These are framed as having been accomplished by "A variety of initiatives" (l.209) already, suggesting they are achievable. But they are framed as "built" (l.209) and "creative" (l.210). This implies, therefore, that a lot of work and thought is required by local initiatives in order to secure these rewards.

There is then a move from the general case of "A variety of initiatives" (l.209) to the specific case of what happens "in inter-agency initiatives" (l.212) "in some areas" (l.211). There, "Women's Aid takes a leading role" (l.212). The repetition of "lead" re-inscribes Women's Aid's standing. And I think the implication is that "profitable relations" can be even more profitable where "the lead national agency" is "leading". But this situation is disclaimed ("however") as sometimes detrimental to "other parts of their workload" (l.214). Initially, I thought that the argument was to present Women's Aid as selfless or to formulate Women's Aid as the lead agency but inter-agency working as not their main task. On reflection, within the context of a persuasion to address power differentials, I can see a different reading. That is, "Women's Aid takes a leading role" (my emphasis), frames the agency as choosing and autonomous. Thus the disclaimer works to undermine potential counter-claims that Women's Aid as the national leader and catalyst for more profitable relations has an obligation to always take the lead.
This reading is supported by the final sentence which lists "Recommended ways forward" (1.214-5). These are presented as a three-part list: “Women’s Aid and women’s services (1) always being consulted, (2) taking the chair, or (3) occupying a reserved position on the management of the initiative” (1.215-8). The list both ascends and descends. It ascends in terms of ‘consultation’ and ‘chairing’ being less integrated in power structures than “a reserved position” in management. But it descends in that “always being consulted” (my emphasis) is an extreme case formulation. This positions consultation with “Women’s Aid and women’s services” as in the object of “ways forward”. That is, there is no progress without this action. Thus taking “a leading role” is not essential. The formulation “Women’s Aid and women’s services” prioritises Women’s Aid commensurate with its status as “lead national agency” but it also frames them as only one of the appropriate “women’s services” to be consulted. Therefore, it is female gender in service providers and service users, in line with the population “women and children experiencing domestic violence” (1.208-9) which is being made relevant to appropriate consultation.

This extract demonstrates a ‘doing’ of feminism. In terms of organisational naming, “Women’s Aid” is used to found claims for the importance of that agency, the potential rewards of acting upon that importance and the essentiality of women’s service provision (users and providers) in progressive inter-agency working arrangements. But it is also mobilised to defend against challenges that Women’s Aid has an obligation to lead inter-agency initiatives. Therefore, its usage attempts to influence power relations between Women’s Aid and other women’s services and local initiatives. In the context of Crime and Disorder partnerships (CDA, 1998, section 5) whereby the police and local authorities have to consult local groups, this formulation of Women’s Aid can be seen as invoking that responsibility, steering it in terms of women’s service providers but retaining an autonomy for those voluntary bodies. Thus because this document speaks from its positioning within Home Office guidance, governance is exercised on statutory organisations but not on voluntary agencies.

In regard to causes, “women and children” indirectly implies the absence of a male parent. As I argued in section 3 above, there are problems in grounding cause claims in this formulation. The subject of representation is clearly “Women’s Aid” itself and other women’s services.
In Extract 13, the transactional business is different but the subject of representation is the same. The memorandum as a whole is concerned with highlighting the importance of outreach and advocacy services in the response to domestic violence. Here, the topic is "Helplines".

Extract 13 [What Works? Outreach and Advocacy (Kelly & Humphreys, 2000a)]:

195 Helplines
196 These are proving to be a key outreach initiative and the
197 high level of demand exceeds currently available
198 resources. These are currently provided by Women's
199 Aid National Domestic Violence Crisis Line, Refuge 24
200 Hour National Crisis Line, Victim Supportline and
201 Childline, and local helplines such as South Devon
202 Women's Aid.

Helplines are framed as "proving to be a key outreach initiative" (l.196). The notion of "proving" suggests that there is evidence that this is the case. But that evidence is not presented, so the vagary of "proving" makes this claim difficult to undermine. And as an extreme case formulation, "key" counters potential challenges that helplines are not useful and justifies the argument for more "resources". The other warrant for founding the resource claim is "the high level of demand" (l.197). Thus service users are mobilised to support the critique of helpline service provision as under-resourced.

Current service providers are framed in a three-part list: (1) "Women's Aid", (2) "Refuge" and (3) "Victim Supportline and Childline" (l.198-201). Had the text stopped at this point, this list would probably be readable as comprehensive; that is covering a full range of helpline services. However, there is an add-on in the form of "local helplines such as South Devon Women's Aid" (l.201-2). This is not part of the list per se because it is presented as qualitatively different in terms of a local/national divide. But it has the effect of sandwiching non-Women's Aid services between Women's Aid helplines and making female gender apposite to this type of service provision. Thus the three-part list can be understood as descending. The names "Victim" and "Childline" do not mobilise gender. "Refuge" may imply gender indirectly if considered in the context of what refuge provision means within the UK. But explicitly "Women's Aid" is afforded poll-position and this is
founded in the ascribed relevance of female gender to service providers and the service user population.

In terms of ‘doing’ feminism, the organisational naming of “Women’s Aid” is mobilised to make distinctions between the relevance of helpline service providers. Thus the claim for more resources is underpinned by the persuasion that “Women’s Aid” best meets the population producing “high levels of demand”. Although children are invoked they are positioned at a distance from women. The effect is to disrupt the job-lot of ‘women and children’ but if read as invoking causes it still incurs the penalties of invoking motherhood (see section 3). The subject of representation, is once again “Women’s Aid” and as such, this organisation is rendered most apposite in this type of service provision and most worthy of additional resources.

The summary of this analysis is presented in the chapter part conclusion.

Part Two Conclusion

In this chapter part I have investigated text from six of the 2000 What Works? memoranda with an analysis informed by all twelve documents. The purpose was to demonstrate the ‘doing’ of feminism in terms of organisational naming, invoking causes and producing a subject of representation, and how that was used to found truth-claims and responsibilisations.

In terms of organisational naming, “Women’s Aid” is formulated as a viable warrant within the context of the What Works? memoranda. It is used to found claims for resources and to ascribe responsibility to statutory agencies. It is used to promote the relevance of female gender in general and the agency of “Women’s Aid” in particular to domestic violence service users. As such, this type of ‘doing’ feminism combines organisational naming and the formulation of a subject of representation. The downside of these constitutions is that their veracity is dependent on the context. Certainly an attempt to govern statutory agencies (and possibly government resource allocation) is exercised. But this opportunity is dependent on participation which in turn is governed by rules of
engagement. And that may well impact on why Women’s Aid is never directly named as a ‘feminist’ organisation or explicitly named as a ‘by women for women’ agency.

Warrants of ‘research’ and “Women’s Aid” both produced the formulation ‘women and children’. Whilst this might be understood to invoke the causes of domestic violence, I have argued that it can be seen as a justification for rendering violent men invisible. And mobilising ‘children’ does not seem to be separable from the disadvantages of framing women as mothers. Therefore, as it generates additional opportunities to reproduce negative femininity discourse, I see it as ‘undoing’ feminism. There are other ways of making causes relevant to how domestic violence is understood without resorting to ‘children’. Through a ‘research’ warrant, Hanmer and Griffiths (2000, Extract 11) frame a very strong argument for the gender relational dynamics of domestic violence which ascribes blame to men.

The subjects of representation vary widely in the What Works? memoranda. As detailed above “Women’s Aid” is one such subject used to accomplish the ‘doing’ of feminism. But ‘research’ also facilitates claims to represent ‘research’ itself and the “civil law”. These constitutions produce passive women and found claims to act upon them in their own (and possibly society’s) interests. Even when ‘research’ is used to position women as active truth-tellers, the ‘doing’ of feminism is not secured. The uses to which these moves are put and the implications of slippage into the everyday language of negative femininity ascription need to be explored.

Methodologically, there is an apposite point here. The What Works? memoranda produced twelve accounts of domestic violence. Although there were similarities and differences between them, each was engaged in slightly different transactional business by subject topic. Thus as part of a comparison, which necessarily restricts the space available, only a small percentage of what was analysed could be presented in a chapter of this kind.

In the chapter discussion I draw together the findings from HASC and the What Works? memoranda. This is in order to explore the differences in ‘doing’ feminism in government policy-making activity between 1992 and 2000 and to consider the implications of these changes.

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7 How “Women’s Aid” is presented in government discourse is a key concern of Chapter 7.
Chapter Discussion

The aim of this chapter has been to explore the 'doing' of feminism in government policy-making activities. Interrogating not 'doing’ and ‘undoing' feminism has also been a viable means for unpacking the activities of naming organisations, invoking the causes of domestic violence and forwarding subjects of representation. The purpose of this discussion is to consider similarities and differences between the doing of feminism in policy-making talk in 1992 and policy-making text in 2000.

Organisational naming does not appear to be a feminist preserve but it has been key to the 'doing' of feminism in both 1992 and 2000. At HASC, Miss Patel invoked Southall Black Sisters to ascribe responsibility to the police, make gender relevant to their (sexist) service provision and to found claims (to government) that non-policing police tasks were inappropriate. In the What Works? memoranda, “Women's Aid” is directly named to support arguments for resource funding (from government), ascribe responsibility to statutory agencies about possible abuses of power and to promote the relevance of female gender to service provision. Consequently, this ‘doing’ of feminism has not fundamentally changed. What is different is naming a feminist organisation rather than just invoking it and the power available to the account afforded by the position from which it is delivered. Thus, as might have been expected under New Labour, it would seem that warranting organisations, at least Women's Aid, has become an appropriate means of telling truths; and that a version of reality founded in the warrant “Women's Aid” can be understood as more authoritative with a status of government guidance rather than a witness testimony in a policy-making process.

Further, Women's Aid allows for an additional comparison. In 1992, Ms Harwin was present at HASC as a representative of Women's Aid. In 2000, Women's Aid was frequently used as a warrant. Ms Harwin produces “women working in refuges and shelters” as her subject of representation. Through this she rendered female gender relevant to both service users and service providers. In the What Works? memoranda, Women's Aid was formulated as a subject of representation in its own right. Again this points to a difference in the appropriateness of naming organisations in 2000, particularly if that agency is Women's Aid.
However, other changes have occurred. Firstly, although female gender is rendered explicitly apposite to service provision, the relevance of female gender to service providers seems to have become implicit through organisational naming. It may be that those formulating Women’s Aid understand that they provide services ‘by women for women’. But that meaning, like ‘Women’s Institute’, is politically indeterminate. Unlike ‘Southall Black Sisters’ where the political emphasis on gendering and racialisation is overt, ‘Women’s Aid’ could be read as just ‘women who aid other women’. Alternatively, it could be seen as a capitulation to the rules of engagement. Women’s Aid is not named as a feminist organisation in 2000 and that could be pertinent. Secondly, Women’s Aid is framed as the lead agency of its kind. Certainly that affords them access to more power. But it might incur resistances from other women’s service providers. And it seems to necessitate defending Women’s Aid against potential counter-challenges to its status.

Interestingly, organisational naming is not commonly produced at the same time as ‘research’ warrants. Indeed, in both 1992 and 2000, it is sometimes rendered the subject of representation in accounts where feminism is not ‘done’. Thus ‘research’ discourse is not a feminist preserve. But it appears to have become, in 2000, a key means of supporting arguments. The difference between feminist and non-feminist accounting is whether or not it is used to position “women” as the truth-tellers. The main implication, unsurprisingly in government literature reviews, is that ‘research’ has become an appropriate knowledge producer. The potential downside for feminisms is that this extends the privilege of viable meaning-making to a wider population than service providers or feminists. Also although producing women research participants as subjects of representation currently seems to be a reliable indicator of feminist accounts, it is not necessarily an option restricted to feminist practice.

Invoking the causes of domestic violence is another aspect of ‘doing’ feminism that was explored. The main way this was accomplished in both 1992 and 2000 was through implicitly or explicitly framing gender relational dynamics between those who commit and those who experience domestic violence. In 1992, there were overt constitutions of violent men. One encouraged crime policy-makers to work together with women working in refuges and shelters; the other positioned criminal justice as the primary intervention of a responsible government. Although these are very different usages, both constitute ‘doing’
feminism. The implication of this, is that affording criminal justice a poll-position is not a point of differentiation between ‘doing’ and not ‘doing’ feminism.

In 2000, the formulation ‘women and children’ was common to both feminist and non-feminist versions. It was used to frame “civil law” as a subject of representation and to frame the client population of Women’s Aid services. I argued that this was more likely to be an ‘undoing’ of feminism rather than a feminist accomplishment. Despite implying an absent male parent, it works as a justification to render men invisible which, in turn, could be permissive of women blaming. And through invoking motherhood, it sanctions the use of more negative femininity discourse. It is possible to ‘do’ feminism by constituting gendered power relations as relevant to domestic violence (Miss Patel with police sexism and Hanmer & Griffiths in repositioning blame from women to men). Therefore, there are suitable alternatives to ‘women and children’. But there seems to be a perennial problem for mobilising ‘children’ around Women’s Aid as it is likely to invoke ‘motherhood’ and all that entails.

The subjects of representation produced at HASC and in the What Works? memoranda are varied. In 1992, they comprise research, women in refuges and shelters, Southall Black Sisters and the ‘greater good’ of society (governed by law). In 2000, they comprise research, civil law (possibly society), women research participants and Women’s Aid. Therefore, the basic categories of representation have not changed although there are differences in their ascribed importance as discussed above. Another way of investigating the ‘doing’ of feminism is to consider how those experiencing domestic violence are presented. In 1992 and 2000, there were constitutions of both active and passive women. However, contrary to what might have been expected this does not mark a divide between ‘doing’ and not ‘doing’ feminism. Rather, passive women were a feature of both feminist and non-feminist accounting. The differentiation came in the uses to which these formulations were put. In feminist versions, passive women were mobilised to support arguments framed as in their interests. In non-feminist accounting, passive women were used to justify interventions being acted out upon them.

The implications are twofold. Firstly, I think it is problematic for feminisms to encourage the founding of claims in formulations of passive women. It seems a short step to sanctioning the passivity of women. Secondly, slippage into mainstream discourse about
women is an omnipresent danger. Even where active women were constituted, the arguments made were threatened by the use of the discourse “emotional” and thus the negative femininity ascription that that entails. Thus ‘being’ a feminist or ‘doing’ some feminist accounting does not ensure that feminism will consistently be accomplished.

From the analysis as a whole the main indicators of ‘doing’ feminism were formulating feminist organisations as the subject of representation; using ‘research’ to found claims of women as truth-tellers; explicit constitutions of violent men and women who experience the enactment of that violence; making female gender relevant to service providers; and invoking power relations such as police sexism. Features of talk and text which might have been expected to mark boundaries between ‘doing’ and not ‘doing’ feminism but which, in practice, did not, comprised formulations of ‘women and children’; promoting the primacy of criminal justice interventions; and generating passive women.

There are also some similarities and differences between 1992 and 2000 that are methodologically relevant. One continuity is that the accomplishment or failure to achieve ‘feminism’ is delimited to the discourse in which it is produced. That is, it cannot be argued that a ‘doing’ of feminism in the government policy-making context ensures that that version of reality will be heard and acted upon. Also the space in a comparison chapter of this kind cannot give a full picture of what happens. The disjuncture is that the activities of talk are qualitatively different from those of text. With text, I can juxtapose extracts to demonstrate points of differentiation. But within talk, those types of arguments are produced as resistances and reformulations at the point at which the discourse is uttered. So, whilst talk allows opportunities for accounts to be immediately undermined, it also has benefits for ‘doing’ feminism. That is, what is contested between competing accounts is made relevant within the encounter and the argumentation. And that could be a way of ‘doing’ feminism not currently realised in feminist policy-making text.

In this chapter I have focused on the ‘doing’ of feminism in different government policy-making contexts. HASC and the What Works? memoranda were generated and published as policy-making processes and guidance prior to the production of government policies on cross-agency working. In the next chapter I interrogate Home Office Circular 1995 on the Inter-Agency approach to domestic violence and the Multi-Agency Guidance from 2000. Points of particular interest arising from the findings here include how Women’s Aid is
formulated, how gender is made relevant to service providers and what power relationships are constituted between potential participants.
Chapter 7: ‘Working Together’ on Domestic Violence in 1995 and 2000: shifts in government policy discourse on ‘local crime’ and “Women’s Aid”

Introduction
In the last chapter I considered the ‘doing’ of feminism in the government policy-making context where this is understood as organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence and constituting a subject of representation. I argued that between 1992 and 2000 there was a shift in grounds for participation from practitioners of services for women to researchers. The medium for policy-making had also shifted from an HASC to a series of twelve What Works? in reducing domestic violence memoranda. This appeared to have some impact on the ‘doing’ of feminism particularly in terms of warranting ‘research’ and attempts to govern statutory agencies. But ‘causes’ formulations and subjects of representation per se were fairly constant. The key difference appeared to be naming organisations rather than just invoking them. This seems to indicate that naming “Women’s Aid” especially has become an appropriate way of telling truths in this context.

In this chapter I interrogate ‘local crime’ formulations and persuasions invoking voluntary sector practitioners in successive government policies. Whilst Chapter 4 was concerned with the governmental activities of problem formulation and constituting victims, the primary focus here is ‘working together’. The Home Office Circular of 1995 (HOC 1995) was the first government missive on domestic violence and inter-agency working. In 2000, this document was revised and replaced by New Labour’s Multi-Agency Guidance (MAG, 2000). As a ‘pair’, they form the basis for exploring shifts in governing ‘at a distance’ and the management of service providers, particularly Women’s Aid.

Initially, I reprise arguments from Chapters One, 2 and 4 concerning the governmentality thesis and feminist participation in government policy-making on domestic violence. The main body of the chapter is divided into two parts. Firstly, I focus on HOC 1995 and argue that notions of “crime” and “local” are used to forward working together as a logical, moral obligation. “Women’s Aid” is constituted as the exemplar of the voluntary organisation. But their relevance is heavily circumscribed. Secondly, MAG 2000 is the site of enquiry. Here, notions of ‘crime’, “local” and “partnership” are woven through with truths about
legal obligation. This is accompanied by multiple attempts to govern "Women’s Aid"; all of which mobilise organisational status, crime/law and the target population in this regard.

In the chapter discussion I consider the implications of these findings, specifically, that despite mobilising the power of the law, New Labour still engages in what is essentially persuasion; and that both New Labour and the Conservatives, to a lesser extent, seem to have appropriated and reformulated certain ‘doings’ of feminism.

**Raising Questions for Analysis**

For governmentalists, the ‘doing’ of government concerns formulating ‘problems’ and setting out what those who govern should do in regard to these problem formulations (Rose & Miller, 1992; Rose, 1993). Therefore, government discourse constitutes a version of reality to be analysed and corrected. From the Home Office Circulars on the policing of domestic violence (HOC 60/90, HOC 19/2000), it is apparent that the problem of domestic violence is framed as one of ‘crime’. And the strategies presented to correct this trouble involve government, the police and relevant others taking it seriously as crime. This illustrates another aspect of governing, namely generating an account of those to be governed in terms of roles and responsibilities ascribed to them (Rose & Miller, 1992). ‘The Government’ itself is not exempt from such responsibilisations. Indeed presentations of ‘reflexive government’ as playing a “steering and regulating” role are common in government discourse (Dean, 1999; Rose, 2000, p.323). And a major accomplishment of ‘doing’ government in this way is the constitution of an ‘already responsible government’ as having no responsibilities left to fulfil.

A key medium for channelling government responsibility ascription is policy. As a ‘technology of governance’, policy is highly suitable for governing at a distance (Shore & Wright, 1997). It constitutes policy community members, rendering who and what they are ‘real’ within the problematised version of reality being presented. And it achieves its greatest impact by positioning ‘responsibilised others’ next to ‘the right choice’ but leaves them to make that ‘choice’ (Shore & Wright, 1997). The rewards for ‘doing the right thing’ may range from being seen to do one’s job properly (HOC 60/90) to achieving a share in the moral high-ground (HOC 19/2000).
One government activity that has not been explored yet in this thesis concerns the forwarding of working together as part of the solution to the problem of domestic violence. Working together has been a theme in the governance of domestic violence since the mid-nineties. The premise is that clients' services often overlap and a collaborative approach by service providers means that those working in similar areas can avoid counteracting each other and provide the best for their shared client group (Hughes, 1998). Even radical thinkers support the basic idea (e.g. Patel, 1999). And there have been lauded feminist success stories, specifically in Leeds and Hammersmith & Fulham (Abrar et al, 2000; Kelly, 1999). The key difference between how John Major’s administration and New Labour’s first term approached multi-agency working around domestic violence concerns the Crime and Disorder Act (CDA 1998); whereby New Labour made police and local authority partnerships with local groups mandatory.

In terms of using the law to underpin government policy guidance, there is debate between governmentalists (e.g. Rose & Valverde, 1998) and David Garland (1996, 2001). Both subscribe to the responsibilisation thesis. For governmentalists (e.g. Barry et al, 1993; Rose, 1999a), responsibilisation indicates a shift in the form of power being exercised; governmental power works on individuals’ understandings of themselves having replaced the primacy of sovereign power as a means of governance. Sovereign power has not actually gone anywhere, but remains a potential resource to be tapped (Foucault, 1980; Rose & Valverde, 1998). Thus mobialisations of ‘the law’, such as New Labour with CDA 1998, can be understood in this way. For Garland (1996, 2001), sovereign power has always been the key mode of government operations. From this perspective, responsibilisation is simply a strategy which when it fails to accomplish its aims leads to overt legal muscle-flexing by government and reveals the ‘true’ source of all the power being exercised. But neither Rose nor Garland interrogate New Labour discourse where ‘the law’ is invoked to ‘encourage’ working together.

My second analytical concern in this chapter revolves around how feminist organisations as voluntary sector participants are positioned in government policies promoting working together. In particular Women’s Aid, is the most frequently cited feminist voluntary agency in both HOC 1995 and MAG 2000. As a non-statutory organisation, it is unlikely to be a direct addressee of such policy. But Women’s Aid may well be positioned in a ‘professionalised police and responsibilised public’ dynamic which ascribes it a lesser
standing (O'Malley, 1997). Also working together founded in primary understandings of ‘domestic violence as crime’ could lead to the undermining of non-crime knowledges (Crawford, 1994). And there is a danger that “indigenous knowledge”, the truths and expertise of non-statutory agencies, is likely to be valued only insofar as it is useful to the aims of statutory agencies (Shore & Wright, 1997, p.33). Therefore, in governance terms, voluntary agencies with knowledges that government wants become part of the problem. That is, they are likely to be problematised in ways that attempt to extract ‘the truths’ that are useful and delimit the potential influence of those that are not.

In terms of potential political shifts, the Conservatives have a precedence for mobilising managerialist discourse in order to exercise control over feminist organisations (see Foley, 1996). And through HOC 1995, they can be understood to have attempted to formalise feminist-generated inter-agency working practices (Patel, 1999). In Chapter One I argued that New Labour had apparently generated more means by which to govern feminist organisations, particularly around diversity issues (as demonstrated in Chapter 4); by locating feminist working practices firmly in the ‘responsibilised public’ domain through lauding them as ‘good citizenry’ success stories (see Newman, 2001); and maximising the potential of ‘partnership’ discourse as a means of governance (Crawford, 2001; Newman, 2001). Thus it would seem that there are dangers to Women’s Aid, but, to date, how these are constituted within specific domestic violence policies has not been explored.

Consequently, this raises questions for my analysis: How, and to what effect, do successive governments render domestic violence a local crime issue in multi-agency policies? How is Women’s Aid and its role constituted? In what ways is gender made relevant to service provision? And what attempts are made to persuade the audience of Women’s Aid’s ascribed value? What are the continuities and disjunctures between Conservative and New Labour formulations and responsibilisations?

**Part One: Home Office Circular 1995**

In this chapter part I focus on the Home Office Circular for inter-agency working around domestic violence from 1995 (HOC 1995). This document was a product of the HASC 1992/3 and the first policy of its kind in regard to domestic violence. In HOC 60/90, the then current policy for the policing of domestic violence, notions of working with other
agencies were used primarily for drawing boundaries around police responsibilities. Victims were consistently gendered as female which was used to found claims about their need for protection and ways in which they could and should be mobilised (see Chapter 4). As HOC 60/90 was not repealed with the publication of HOC 1995, some continuities of organisational boundary-work and gendering might well be expected.

Chapter 4 also demonstrated some aspects of governing domestic violence at a distance as ‘crime’. Government was repeatedly presented as already fulfilling all of its responsibilities at the same time as the target audience was implied as falling short of its ascribed ‘appropriate’ role. Therefore, I am interested in how persuasions and responsibilisations for working together are formulated around notions of ‘crime’; including the role of the ‘reflexive government’ and ‘responsibilised others’. My specific focus is on non-police organisations, particularly Women’s Aid as a voluntary sector feminist agency. Thus I am concerned with what HOC 1995 offers feminists.

1. Governing at a distance: the logic of moral obligation

The first extract is from section 4 of HOC 1995 entitled ‘The Government’s Approach’. Perhaps its most important aspect is its overall three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) structure which shifts the focus from “Government”/“crime” to “local preventative strategies”.


235 4.2 The Government’s approach is based on the
236 premise that domestic violence is a serious crime
237 which must not be tolerated. The priority must be to
238 stop the violence occurring and services should be
239 provided on that basis. Effective action undoubtedly
240 requires the commitment and involvement of local
241 agencies, working together to provide help and
242 support to those experiencing domestic violence,
243 and to develop local preventative strategies.

In the first part, “The Government’s approach” (1.235) is framed as having a rationale. This “premise” that domestic violence is a “serious” crime is used to support the argument that

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1 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions.
it “must not be tolerated” (1.237). ‘Must not be tolerated’ is an imperative and as such it is an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) which closes down the possibility that there are any circumstances under which serious crime is tolerable. Thus intolerability is being framed as ‘in the object’ of serious crime. And the government’s stance is therefore presented as rational, appropriate and, possibly, moral.

In the second part, another imperative is used. Here, “The priority must be to stop the violence occurring” (1.237-8, my emphasis) claims that ‘stopping violence’ is in the object of not tolerating domestic violence. And this gives rise to services which “should” be provided on the basis of this priority. ‘Should’ is not an imperative but it does suggest duty and moral obligation. Therefore, government is formulated as taking a clear and absolute stand, including flagging up the moral responsibilities of service providers.

In the third part, what renders practitioner action “Effective” (1.239) for stopping domestic violence is constituted as “the commitment and involvement of local agencies” (1.240-1). This is founded in another extreme case formulation, “undoubtedly”, which fends off potential counter claims that there are other more effective ways to stop violence. The pairing of “commitment and involvement” suggests that commitment alone is not sufficient at the local level. And this contrasts with government’s moral stance and persuasions, rendering them appropriate at the national level. The “local agencies” are distanced from central government as the ‘right thing’ for them to do, both morally and logically, is framed as “working together” (1.241); not with government but with each other.

The ascribed purpose of this collaboration is formulated in an ascending three-part list: “to provide help (1) and support (2) to those experiencing domestic violence, and to develop (3) local preventative strategies” (1.241-3). The list is ascending because the business it is engaged in is the same as the paragraph as a whole. That is, both list formations culminate in “local preventative strategies” in moves from government’s rational and moral position at the national level and from the helping and supporting they already do with those experiencing domestic violence.

In interim summary, the extract demonstrates a ‘reflexive government’ and ‘responsible others’ pairing. As might be expected (see Chapter 4), government is presented as already fulfilling its responsibilities. In this case, these comprise taking a rational and moral stance
on domestic violence at the national level and persuading local service providers to show their committed involvement by working together and engaging in the new responsibility of “local preventative strategies”. The two discourses that facilitate the argument of “working together” are “crime” and “local”. ‘Crime’ is framed as why domestic violence must be taken seriously. And “local” founds claims both of where responsibilities are currently not being met and what is the appropriate level for intervention.

Discourses of ‘working together’ organised around understandings of ‘crime’ and ‘local’ continue in section 5 of HOC 1995, “Inter-Agency Co-ordination to Enhance the Local Response to Domestic Violence”. Extracts 2 and 3 follow directly on from one another within the same paragraph, providing a contrast between what is ascribed as having happened “For some time” (Extract 2, 1.295) with “More recent initiatives” (Extract 3, 1.301).

Extract 2 [HOC 1995 (5): “Inter-Agency Co-ordination to Enhance the Local Response to Domestic Violence”]:

5.1 For some time, agencies coming into contact with women who experience domestic violence have liaised to improve the services they provide.

But often this liaison has been piecemeal and has not been able to overcome the fragmentation of services. No one agency can meet the needs of those who experience domestic violence. (…)

The key descriptor of the “agencies” being formulated here is their “coming into contact with women who experience domestic violence” (1.295-6, my emphasis). Certainly this gendering activity could be suggesting that those who experience domestic violence are “women” and thereby implicating all agencies who come into contact with them. But I think specific organisations may be being implied. ‘Agencies’ is not qualified by ‘many’ or ‘most’ or ‘a variety’. All that designates them is their contact with women. Therefore, it could be that agencies which only deal with women are being constituted. The sense is that these agencies understand both the need for liaison and “to improve the services they provide”. However this “liaison” is disclaimed (“But”, 1.298), and consequently
undermined, as both "piecemeal" and failing "to overcome the fragmentation of services" (1.299-300). In short, it is ascribed as insufficient and ineffective.

"No one agency can meet the needs of those who experience domestic violence" (1.300-1) is a bottom line argument. Two aspects of it are important. Firstly, "No one agency" undermines understandings of "liaison" as 'working together'. As such it frames "liaison" as little more than 'a bit of contact' which does not disrupt notions of a single agency attempting to meet the needs of their client group. Secondly, "women who experience domestic violence" (1.296) has been reformulated here as "those who experience domestic violence" (1.301). The de-gendering of who experiences domestic violence lends support to my argument that it is agencies which only deal with women who are being constituted and undermined. The suggestion is that women are not the only people who experience domestic violence and that those agencies defined by their contact with 'just' women cannot, by definition, be 'the agency' to meet everyone's needs.

The historical context of this text is also persuasive of this reading. Prior to HOC 1995, there were many informal working arrangements between the police and local refuge groups (Abrar et al, 2000). These were developed on the initiative of women's service providers and were, in the main, instigated specifically by feminists under feminist aims (Kelly, 1999). Therefore the acknowledgement of what has been happening "For some time" combined with the undermining of 'just' women agency liaison with others can be understood as rendering feminist approaches problematic.

Further evidence that "liaison" is being framed as inappropriate comes in Extract 3 which follows on directly from Extract 2. Here, notions of 'crime' (implied by "the police", 1.303) and "local" (1.303 & 312) are woven with discourses of 'working together' (appropriately): "co-ordination" (1.303); "inter-agency work" (1.305); and "integrated approach" (1.307).

Extract 3 [HOC 1995 (5): "Inter-Agency Co-ordination to Enhance the Local Response to Domestic Violence"]:

301    (...) More
302    recent initiatives, particularly those involving
303    co-ordination between the police, local authorities
304    and voluntary agencies point to the importance of
inter-agency work as potentially a more effective way of addressing domestic violence through an integrated approach, focused on the provision of direct services. The assessment of whether current liaison arrangements are satisfactory in maintaining women and children’s safety, and where they need to be extended is a matter for local decision. (...)

The opening line, “More recent initiatives” sets up what follows as a contrast with what has been happening “For some time”. There, “liaison” was presented as “piecemeal” and not able “to overcome the fragmentation of services”. Here, “inter-agency work” is framed as potentially “more effective” because of its “integrated approach” (l.307) and being “focused on the provision of direct services” (l.307-8). As such, it is forwarded as having the means to overcome the deficiencies of what has happened “For some time”. An exemplar (“particularly”, l.302) of inter-agency work’s potential is formulated as “coordination between the police, local authorities and voluntary agencies” (l.303-4). This appears to be a descending three-part list. What apparently marked the agencies failing to work together appropriately was their exclusive female client group. I have argued above that this implied feminist voluntary agencies. What marks the success potential for working together appropriately in this example is ‘crime’ (“the police”) and “local”. Therefore, if this list is understood as descending and part of the contrast, then success is being premised on models of working together that place “voluntary agencies” last, not first.

The final sentence of Extract 3 invokes the role of government at a national level and at a distance from local inter-agency working. Having already undermined “liaison” in favour of “an integrated approach”, HOC 1995 now renders the responsibility to assess “current liaison arrangements” (l.309) as “a matter for local decision” (l.311-2). The use of “satisfactory” (l.309) seems to weaken any viability ascribed to voluntary-led liaison. A second gendering activity is also enacted here. The purpose of working together appropriately is formulated as “maintaining women and children’s safety” (l.310). This constitution of “women and children” can be seen as an emotive descriptor as in the adage ‘women and children first’. It suggests innate vulnerability and moral duty to protect. Consequently, “satisfactory” is rather disingenuous. And those who would forward liaison
as appropriate are further discredited. Government may be seen to be passing the responsibility to assess current practices to police and local authority-led initiatives. But simultaneously it makes its understandings of the lesser worth of voluntary agency-led liaison (most probably feminist) quite clear. Thus it potentially empowers those charged with local crime responsibilities to undermine the voluntary sector.

In summary, this section illustrates how discourses of working together, woven with understandings of domestic violence as a "local" "crime" issue, are used in HOC 1995 to formulate 'the problem' and ascribe responsibility for solutions. Government is positioned at a national level identifying the moral worthiness of, and new, rational strategies for dealing with trouble. As such it is presented as a 'reflexive government' fulfilling its responsibilities at a distance from local initiatives. The 'responsibilised others' of this pairing are local agencies who are guided and persuaded to follow government's bidding in the local context and work together. However, the proposed participants of these collaborations are not framed to be of equal worth. Liaison led by voluntary, women only service providers is deemed inappropriate and possibly impeding the safety of women and children. The best potential for success is forwarded as police and local authority-led inter-agency co-ordinations. The main implication of this is that the police are empowered to override current informal working practices; which were traditionally instigated by feminists for feminist aims (Abrar et al, 2000; Kelly, 1999).

Gendering those experiencing domestic violence as female was used to two specific ends. Firstly, agencies providing services solely to women as the client group were undermined in their lack of potential to meet the needs of all those who experience domestic violence. Secondly, "women and children's safety" was employed as an emotive descriptor to found claims of the moral worthiness of addressing domestic violence effectively and to weaken the case for modes of working together ascribed as inferior to government's ideal. Collectively, it would seem that these formulations indicate that 'women's agencies' are being problematised. Therefore, in the next section I focus specifically on formulations of "Women's Aid".

2. Formulating "Women's Aid": as an exemplar of a voluntary organisation

The conclusion of HOC 1995 comes in its sixth section. But it still has a further twenty-two pages of annexes. Annex A is titled 'The roles and responsibilities of statutory and
voluntary agencies’. Section 8 deals with ‘Voluntary Agencies’. And it opens with a substantial account of Women’s Aid which is nearly two pages long.

Extract 4 [HOC 1995 (8): “Voluntary Agencies”]:

1162 8.1 Women’s Aid
1163 8.1.1 Women’s Aid is a key voluntary agency for
1164 women (and their children) who experience
1165 physical, emotional, and sexual violence and abuse.
1166 Women’s Aid groups provide emergency and
1167 temporary accommodation, advice, information and
1168 support. (...)

In the first paragraph about Women’s Aid, it is apparent that value is being ascribed to the organisation. It is framed as “a key voluntary agency” (1.1163). Although this is not an extreme case of ‘the key’ agency, what follows furnishes why Women’s Aid is being afforded some status. The client group is constituted as “women (and their children)”3. And Women’s Aid’s alignment with this group is being made relevant. Also these people are formulated as representative of domestic violence populations by way of a three-part list of the violence and abuse they experience: “physical, emotional, and sexual” (1.1165). Further, the services that Women’s Aid provides are rendered comprehensive by the use of another list: “emergency and temporary accommodation, advice, information and support”4 (1.1166-8). Thus claims for Women’s Aid’s “key” position are founded in the scope of their ‘appropriate’ client group and the range of services they provide.

In the next paragraph, the “four main principles” (1.1173-4) ascribed as the basis of “Women’s Aid services” are constituted.

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2 Five lines on the history of the separate Women’s Aid national bodies omitted for reasons of brevity.
3 I think that “children” are placed in parenthesis here for a reason. The list of “physical, emotional and sexual violence” (my emphases) could place what happens to ‘children’ outside the remit of ‘domestic violence’. By bracketing the children, HOC 1995 retains the ‘job lot’ population of ‘women and children’ that it seeks to govern whilst attempting to avoid invocations of ‘child abuse’ as a separate category.
4 Jefferson (1990) argues that most lists are of the three-part variety despite initial appearances to the contrary. The formulation “emergency and temporary accommodation, advice, information and support” can be understood in this way. ‘Accommodation’ can be seen as a different commodity from “advice, information and support”. Thus “emergency and temporary accommodation” can be read as a pairing that precedes the rhetorical device of a three-part list which is accomplishing the sense of ‘comprehensive services’.
Extract 5 [HOC 1995 (8): "Voluntary Agencies"]:  
1173 8.1.2 Women’s Aid services are based on four  
1174 main principles:  
1175 • the central importance of the abused  
1176 woman’s perspective in the provision of  
1177 support services  
1178 • the need to empower women and enable  
1179 them to regain control of their own lives -  
1180 Women’s Aid services are provided by  
1181 women and for women  
1182 • the value of the mutual support of other  
1183 women who have similar experiences  
1184 • a commitment to caring for the emotional,  
1185 developmental and educational needs of  
1186 children affected by domestic violence.

One of the ways that HOC 1995 undermined informal inter-agency working practices and problematised ‘women only services’ was to point to the target population’s ‘needs’ not being met (see Extract 2). Therefore, “the abused woman’s perspective in the provision of support services” (l.1175-7) can be understood as an ascription of value. That is, a sensitivity to clients’ views is being presented as a positive principle. The second bullet point appears to formulate an active woman. The “need to empower women and enable them to regain control of their lives” (l.1178-9) seems to produce a classic neo-liberal self-actualising ‘good citizen’. Here, the ‘good citizen’ is one who, with the help of experts, can take responsibility for their own safety and maximise their potential (Rose, 2000). Therefore, praise is being ascribed to the practice of mobilising women to help themselves. And implicitly Women’s Aid seems to be being afforded a level of expert status.

However, the phrase “Women’s Aid services are provided by women for women” (l.1180-1) is notable because it is the only instance that I have found in the four government policies on domestic violence. “Women’s Aid”, like ‘Women’s Institute’ and ‘WRVS’, suggests the gender of those who take part in its activities, despite its political ambiguity (see Chapter 6). And like ‘Woman’s Realm’ and ‘Wellwoman’, it implies a female gendered target population. Here, “by women for women” makes this dual potential
explicit and relevant. That this occurs in a constitution of women helping themselves is perhaps no accident. As such, it can be read as an extension of a generic category, or even community, of ‘women’ engaging in autonomous self-help. As such, this would undermine any ascription of ‘expert’ status for Women’s Aid.

This reading becomes more viable when Extracts 4-6 are viewed as a whole. Despite the positive formulations of Women’s Aid, there is a distinct absence of terms such as ‘expertise’, ‘proficiency’, ‘professional’ and ‘specialist’. Consequently, it would seem that O’Malley’s (1997) argument about ‘responsibilised public’ is being demonstrated here. That is, although what Women’s Aid does and how it does it is subject to praise, this ‘very good’ appears to be qualified by ‘for a voluntary organisation’.

The third bullet point in Extract 5 continues the theme of women helping themselves. So, it makes “the value of the mutual support of other women who have similar experiences” (1.1182-3) relevant. The final bullet point reprises “children”. It seems pertinent that “a commitment to caring for … children affected by domestic violence” (1.1184-6) should be placed last in this account of Women’s Aid. This is because the first three points have framed a ‘community’ of self-helping women. Here, Women’s Aid service provision for children is presented as comprehensively meeting their needs by way of yet another three-part list: “emotional, developmental and educational needs” (1.1184-5).

Extract 6 follows directly on from Extract 5. Paragraph 8.1.3 formulates how the underlying principles of Women’s Aid are made relevant to the work that they do.

*Extract 6 [HOC 1995 (8): “Voluntary Agencies”]:*

1187 8.1.3 The work and standards of nearly 200
1188 Women’s Aid groups who affiliate to the four
1189 Federations are bound by policy statements and
1190 Codes of Good Practice which encompass these
1191 principles.

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5 And in keeping with the theme of bracketed children, it would probably have been inappropriate to talk about child services any earlier.

6 There are two additional paragraphs on Women’s Aid. One covers locally based autonomous projects and the other deals with what they do at the national level. Although this provides further scope for exploring how and why Women’s Aid are rendered “a key” service provider, for reasons of brevity they have been excluded.
This extract lends further support to my argument that Women's Aid is not being presented as a professional body. Certainly they are attributed with "work ... standards", "policy statements" and "Codes of Good Practice" which "encompass" the organisation's "principles"; key terms in managerialist discourse (Crawford, 2001; Matthews & Pitts, 2001). But although there is a sense that this is good and 'appropriate' practice for any organisation, there is no explicit reference to 'professionalism' or 'expertise'. Thus I read this as Women's Aid being forwarded as an exemplar of good practice for a voluntary sector organisation. The context in a government policy document, suggests that the general readership is being persuaded of Women's Aid credibility but that its relevance is circumscribed.

One way that the importance of Women's Aid is delimited occurs immediately after the organisation has been lauded. Section 8.2 outlines 'The role of local women's groups and refuges'. There appear to be two important shifts from the preceding transactional business of ascribing Women's Aid value: an object of responsibilisation is formulated; and the gender relevance of women's service providers gives way to the non-gender specific 'refuges'.

Extract 7 [HOC 1995 (8): "Voluntary Agencies"]:

1254 8.2.1 Inter-agency initiatives on domestic violence should recognise the role of local women's groups and refuge support services, including those which are not affiliated to Women's Aid. Local refuge projects, who have many years experience of providing advocacy and support to abused women and children, should be given the opportunity to participate fully in such initiatives.

1263 8.2.2 Refuge-based services have a role to play in the provision of independent advocacy and support to abused women and children in the process of getting free from violence. Refuges are primarily hostels, but in addition to
accommodation, they offer a comprehensive package of emergency support, outreach work, aftercare, and work with children, to all women whether resident or not, as well as having a public awareness role.

The 90 lines in praise of Women's Aid had no explicit audience and even gave the sense of being Women's Aid's own promotional discourse. Here, the section opens with a suggestion of moral obligation ("should") for a readership comprising "Inter-agency initiatives on domestic violence" (l.1254-5). What they are urged to recognise is "the role" of certain service providers. The suggestion is, through a comprehensive three-part list (l.1256-8), that "women's groups", "refuge support services" and "Women's Aid" fulfil the same single role; regardless of the gender of service providers; and regardless of Women's Aid affiliation. Collectively, they are reformulated as "Local refuge projects" (l.1258). Therefore, what is rendered apposite to their participation is framed as their 'local' positioning, their "refuge" status and their "many years experience of providing advocacy and support to abused women and children" (l.1259-60). Consequently, the female gender of such service providers in general and Women's Aid in particular is rendered not relevant.

As might have been expected from the text on Women's Aid, the key population sought for inter-agency initiatives is "women and children" (l.1260 & 1265). In this context they appear to be an inseparable 'job lot'. Further, local refuge projects are credited with "experience" (l.1259) with this group. But this is not 'expertise'. Therefore, there is a sense that this is what they do, which no-one else has done for many years rather than being 'experts' per se. What they have done with this group is also made relevant in terms of "advocacy and support". Consequently both helping and speaking up for women and children are framed as useful for inter-agency initiatives. And local refuge projects are positioned as ready made representatives of, and service providers to, the target population.

However, despite their ascribed suitability, there is no sense that local refuge projects have to participate or have to be made to participate. Instead a moral obligation ("should", (l.1261)) is placed on inter-agency initiatives to give them "the opportunity" to take part "fully". As an extreme case formulation, "fully" (l.1262) renders completeness in the
object of participation. That is, taking part is framed as not really participating unless it is done in a complete way. Thus inter-agency initiatives are being persuaded of the benefits to them of working with these projects and positioned as the appropriate body at the local level to generate genuine opportunities.

The constitution of de-gendered service providers continues in paragraph 8.2.2. There is also a series of reformulations: “Refuge-based services” (l.1263) replaces “Local refuge projects” (l.1258); “advocacy and support” (l.1259-60) becomes “independent advocacy and support” (l.1264-5); and “abused women and children” (l.1260) are qualified with being “in the process of getting free from violence” (l.1265-6). Thus there seems to be repetition. But the key to these differences is the shift from “the role” (l.1255) to “a role” (l.1263). In the previous paragraph inter-agency initiatives were persuaded of the appropriateness of these practitioners to take part based on their collective “role”. Here, similar arguments are made in regard to “a role” they have to play. And as part of the ongoing persuasion, I read this as their part in the collective role of inter-agency initiatives if they participate fully.

Consequently, “Refuge-based services” (l.1263) frames refuges as not just “accommodation”, an important part of the argument that follows. The loss of “Local” can be seen as more problematic because inter-agency initiatives are integrally ‘local’ and ‘crime’ orientated. Thus the omission of both terms in this context is remarkable. Secondly, “independent advocacy and support” (l.1264-5, my emphasis) could be framing ‘refuges’ as self-governing and thereby an implicit warning to inter-agency initiatives, commensurate with full participation, not to try to override them. Thirdly, “women and children in the process of getting free from violence” (l.1265-6) renders them a more viable population in governmental terms; as they are already active, ‘good citizens’ seeking help to avoid risk (Rose, 2000). Consequently, ‘refuges’, their work and their client population are all constituted as even more relevant than they were in paragraph 8.2.1. And this marks a shift from what they do now and what inter-agency initiatives should recognise to what they could bring to the initiatives themselves. But it also implies that what is supposed to happen in inter-agency initiatives might be contentious to someone.

The following claim that “Refuges are primarily hostels” (l.1266-7) is immediately followed by a disclaimer (“but”). But what is being disclaimed is that their only worth is
"accommodation". This does not disrupt the sense that at base level they are primarily hostels. The reason for this is not clear from this extract (see below). However, the accommodation disclaimer is further supported by a comprehensive three-part list ("emergency support, outreach work, aftercare", l.1269-70) within another comprehensive three-part list ("comprehensive package", "work with children" and "all women resident or not", l.1268-71). And as an add-on, a "public awareness role" (l.1271-2) is made relevant. The effect of all of this is to found the truth-claim that the work of "Refuges" goes beyond accommodation and their residents and it is why they are important to inter-agency working but these functions have been constituted as only additional to the primary function as hostels.

This primacy of refuges as hostels and the further delimiting of Women's Aid's ascribed value as gendered service providers becomes more obvious when guidance to individual statutory agencies is considered. Extracts 8 and 9 demonstrate the two instances where "refuges" are formulated as apposite to non-inter-agency organisational activities; female gender is made relevant to the client group but Women's Aid is not named.

Extract 8 [HOC 1995 (7): "Statutory Agencies"]:

677 It is the immediate duty of police officers
678 who are called to a domestic violence incident to
679 secure the immediate protection of the victim and
680 any children from further abuse and then to
681 consider what action should be taken against the
682 offender. The immediate protection of the victim
683 may involve the police in referring or taking her
684 to a refuge or in liaising with statutory or
685 voluntary agencies who can supply longer-term
686 help and support. (...)

Extract 8 is almost identical to a passage in HOC 60/90 (see Chapter 4, Extract 6). The only difference is the additional "immediate" at line 679. Immediacy is an important theme in this extract as it forms a contrast with "longer-term" (l.685). And this distinction extends to the police and 'refuges' on one side and "statutory and voluntary agencies" on the other. As such refuges are framed as a short-term, immediate measure. 'Protection' (l.679 & 682)
and "help and support" (l.686) are also made relevant to this divide, with refuges being positioned as a means by which the police can secure protection for women. But there is no sense that the police should be "liaising" with refuges, here they are constituted as simply "referring or taking" (l.683) women there. Consequently, refuges are formulated as a short-term protective repository for women.

Although the gender of the client population is made relevant, gendered service providers are not. Arguably, "protection" which is often framed as a negative femininity ascription (Ahmed, 1995), genders the 'protective' interventions of the police and refuges. But it does not make gender relevant to the people who deliver that protection. Neither is the gendering within the paragraph consistent. A relation of "victim", "children" and "offender" is presented (l.679-82) and then the victim is gendered as female at line 683 ("her"). Thus there is an apparent reluctance to constitute violent men commensurate with the female gendered victim focus in HOC 60/90.

What is important for my argument is that refuges are primarily framed as hostels, albeit a protective environment for women. The other work they do in service provision, lauded in the inter-agency context, is not made relevant here. Neither is Women's Aid invoked. And despite the same client population of women and children experiencing domestic violence, the effect is that gender is made apposite to them not those who provide services. The persuasion to the police is that refuges are a viable short-term protection repository for women. They are framed as a way that the police can meet their immediate duty to protect and as a responsibility boundary between the police and others. There is no explicit guidance for working together with refuges.

A different formulation occurs in Extract 9. Here, the addressee is local housing authorities. The preceding text has named a document called 'Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities'. And the passage opens with reference to that document ("It", l.894).

Extract 9 [HOC 1995 (7): "Statutory Agencies"]:

(…) 7.7.2 (…)  
894  It emphasises that local authorities should be alert  
895  to the need for quick action where household
896 members are at risk from violence or abuse, and
897 it encourages local authorities to develop good
898 links with local refuges.

899 • authorities should secure, wherever
900 possible, that accommodation is available
901 for women without children who have
902 suffered violence at home or are at risk of
903 further violence if they return home;
904 • refuges play an important role in
905 providing immediate shelter from violence
906 and local authorities are encouraged to
907 develop good links with their local
908 refuges;

909 • many women will also need, eventually,
910 to be rehoused into permanent
911 accommodation.

A similarity with the police extract is the notion of immediacy ("quick action", 1.895). But
this is framed as a moral obligation ("should be", 1.894) rather than a duty. And the
language attributed to the document ("emphasises" and "encourages", 1.894 & 897)
constitute this as guidance not orders. At this point gender is not made relevant either to
those "household members (who) are at risk from violence and abuse" (1.895-6) or the
"local refuges" (1.898) with whom local authorities are encouraged to "develop good links"
(1.897-8). However, there is a sense that need for quickness in action generated by the
problem makes refuges apposite to the solution. Consequently, as with the persuasions to
the police, there is a suggestion that refuges are a viable, short-term, protective
accommodation measure commensurate with appropriate individual agency responses.

The first bullet point (1.899-903) continues the notion of guidance infused with moral
obligation. Thus what authorities "should" do is tempered by "wherever possible". But
there are two interesting features here. Firstly, domestic violence is not named (anywhere
in this whole paragraph) as it was in the police extract. This could be because the emphasis
is on homeless populations rather than domestic violence populations per se. Thus housing authorities are being asked to deal with the problem of homelessness not domestic violence. Secondly, this reading is somewhat borne out by the formulation "women without children" (1.901). As has been apparent from the other HOC 1995 extracts, the target population of domestic violence intervention is "women and children". Children are not framed as the concern of housing authorities. Therefore, the persuasion is for local authorities to deal with the problem of homeless women arising from the discrete problem of domestic violence.

However, the second bullet point (1.904-8) whilst making "refuges" relevant to housing issues seems reluctant to invoke gender. And I think this is part of the contradiction between the populations refuges serve (i.e. "women and children") and the ones served by local housing (i.e. adults, including women rendered homeless by domestic violence). Again, notions of the immediacy of accommodation ("immediate shelter", 1.905) and guidance ("are encouraged to", 1.906) are present. Therefore, refuges are ascribed value to housing authorities on the basis of their short-term hostel status.

In the third bullet point (1.909-10), "women" reappear. Once again there is moral obligation rather than duty ("will also need", 1.909); and the sense that refuges are immediate and short-term ("eventually" and "permanent accommodation", 1.909 & 910-11). Thus the additional usefulness of refuges to local authorities is that they are a viable means of deferring organisational obligations to permanently rehouse homeless women.

Consequently, the key difference between persuasions to the police and to local authorities are threefold. Firstly, the duty of the police is to deal with domestic violence whilst for local authorities the moral obligation is to deal with homelessness. Secondly, putting women in refuges marks the end of an organisational responsibility for the police but for housing authorities they provide a temporary deferment of obligation. Thirdly, there is no sense that the police need to work together with refuges to secure this arrangement. By contrast, local housing authorities are encouraged to "develop good links with (their) local refuges". The sense is that their arrangements with refuges are qualitatively different and need to be worked at. And this is explicable in terms of the notion of 'accommodation'. That is, local authorities and refuges are ascribed as being in the same business whereas the
police and refuges are not. But ultimately the usefulness of refuges to each of these individual agencies is that they are “primarily hostels” for women.

In summary, much value is ascribed to Women’s Aid in terms of the work it does and the organised way in which it carries out its work with the key client group of women and children. However, Women’s Aid is not presented as a professional body and the way it is undermined as a community of self-helping women locates it firmly in the realm of key agency for a voluntary enterprise. When inter-agency initiatives are persuaded of the viability of working with women’s services there is still a sense that they are not professionals and that their worth is founded in their already doing with the target population what inter-agency initiatives should seek to do (i.e. speaking on their behalf and serving them). Also, and perhaps more importantly, the relevance of Women’s Aid as ‘by women for women’ service providers is absented. Thus as an exemplar, it is used to warrant how good the voluntary sector can be and once that is accomplished Women’s Aid is discarded. This suggests that ‘by women for women’ is appropriate to voluntary concerns but not in the professional world of inter-agency working.

Indeed, the gender of service providers is not made apposite on the two occasions that individual agencies are persuaded of the usefulness of ‘refuges’. The populations for police and housing interventions both comprise “women”. For the police this includes children, avoiding formulations of violent men. For local housing authorities, children are absented. But this is not commensurate with any argument that female gender is relevant to refuge workers. In the context of inter-agency initiatives, refuges are framed as “primarily hostels” but the other work they do is rendered appropriate for inter-agency working. But this is somewhat oblique as the potentially key terms of ‘local and ‘crime’ are not made explicit. In terms of individual agencies, their benefits are formulated as viable, immediate, short-term, safe accommodation for women. And the persuasions to the police and housing authorities are to use them in line with their different responsibilities. However, only housing providers are directly encouraged to work together with refuges in their individual agency capacity.

The implications of this analysis and the issues arising from section one are discussed in the chapter part conclusion which follows.
Part One Conclusion

Within this chapter part I was concerned with interrogating HOC 1995’s problem formulations and responsibilisations, around the activity of forwarding modes of working together. I was interested in general persuasions about ‘crime’ in the ‘local’ context and specific constitutions of voluntary sector women’s groups, particularly Women’s Aid.

Truth-claims that domestic violence is a local crime issue are founded on notions of moral high-ground, logic and moral obligation. Thus government lays claim to the moral high-ground by seeing domestic violence as a serious crime that must not be tolerated; logically, inter-agency working is already happening at the local level and is thus recognised by local agencies as the way forward; but logically, the police should lead local ‘crime’ initiatives which work better anyway; and we all have a moral obligation to keep women and children safe. There are three effects of this. Firstly, ‘women only groups’ involved in current informal inter-agency practices and lone crusades are problematised. Secondly, government positions itself in a ‘reflexive government’ and ‘responsibilised others’ dynamic whereby it occupies a central role, emanating guidance to the local level. Thus it is ascribed as already fulfilling its responsibilities. Thirdly, the voluntary sector are positioned in another responsibility dynamic, one of ‘professionalised police’ and ‘responsibilised public’ (O’Malley, 1997). Consequently, the most that voluntary groups, including feminists, might aspire to is ‘best practice for non-statutory agencies’.

The main implication arising from this analysis is that local agencies are ‘on their honour’ to do government’s bidding. The rewards for compliance are a share in the moral high-ground and being logical. Another implication is that the viability of informal voluntary-led working practices already in existence is weakened in favour of new police-led initiatives. This directly undermines feminist action and is accomplished through dismissing their concerns about ‘just women’. A further implication concerns the victim intervention focus on ‘women and children’. This renders violent men as the perpetrators of domestic violence at best peripheral although, commensurate with domestic violence formulations in HOC 60/90 (see Chapter 4) it does still, just, allow for violent men to be constituted (see Chapter 6). Also it reduces the need to provide additional or extra services to children as a separate client group. Moreover, it is always problematic to invoke motherhood as it allows for hierarchies of female worth and opportunities to undermine mothers who are deemed to have failed in their ‘natural’ responsibilities (Butler, 1992).
Women's Aid is formulated as a key agency as it provides comprehensive services, it has underlying principles and codes of practice and it works with and mobilises government's target domestic violence population of 'women and children'. However, the notion that it is a 'by women for women' organisation is used to undermine it as a self-helping community of women in a way that locates it firmly as not professional and in the voluntary sector. Praise for Women's Aid is positioned in its own discrete section. But when inter-agency initiatives and the individual agencies of the police and housing authorities are addressed, the female gender of service providers is absented. Thus "refuges" becomes the preferred term. In inter-agency persuasions, the target population is 'women and children' and what "refuges" can bring is framed as "experience". In police guidance, the client group is again 'women and children' and "refuges" can provide a short-term repository for their protection which marks the boundaries of police responsibilities. In housing authorities' guidance the clientele is 'women' and "refuges" are formulated as a short-term accommodation resource to defer long-term organisational responsibility. Unlike persuasion to the police, housing authorities are encouraged to work together with "refuges" to secure this resource.

The effects of this are threefold. Firstly, the gender of service providers is not made relevant except to undermine Women's Aid as a voluntary organisation. Secondly, working together at the individual agency level seems dependent on an overlap of core business; in this case, accommodation. Thirdly, what Women's Aid is praised for is not uniformly replicated in the usefulness ascribed to "refuges". Consequently, comprehensive services, working with the target population and accommodation provision are all made relevant. But Women's Aid's underlying principles and codes of practice are not made relevant to other "refuges". Thus much of the managerialist talking up of Women's Aid is seemingly undermined by 'community' notions of self-helping women; and it goes nowhere except perhaps to found claims for the credibility of non-gendered "refuges" in general.

However, the most interesting omission is the mobilisation of self-helping women. And that highlights two things about constitutions of inter-agency working: crime is not made explicit to these inter-agency initiatives; and the potential contribution of refuges is the vague formulation "experience". Thus what these working arrangements are, and should do with refuges' experience, is left oblique.
The main implication is that Women's Aid is being managed by HOC 1995, indicating that it has been problematised. But there is a sense that it is not being managed that well. Praise for Women's Aid generates opportunities to invoke their worth around individual and collective agency guidance which are not realised. Although that is detrimental to Women's Aid, HOC 1995 almost undermines itself by leaving very obvious gaps between women service user populations and women service providers' experience with that group. A further implication is that what refuges' experience is to be used for is veiled. Thus it would seem that the uses to which these knowledges might be put could be understood as contentious.

In this chapter part I have concentrated on HOC 1995. In Part 2, I turn my attention to New Labour's Multi-Agency Guidance (MAG 2000) to form the basis for a continuities and disjunctures comparison.

**Part Two: Multi-Agency Guidance 2000**

In this chapter part I interrogate New Labour's Multi-Agency Guidance for domestic violence (MAG 2000). This text was produced as part of a wider government strategy to tackle 'violence against women'. And it directly replaced HOC 1995 as its forerunner. It predates HOC 19/2000, the policy for the policing of domestic violence, by three months (see Chapter 4). HOC 19/2000 worked hard to render female gender irrelevant to understandings of crime, although it suggested that 'violence against women' might be an appropriate way of understanding domestic violence in some unnamed context. The police were not encouraged to mobilise crime victims even though victims were ascribed rights. I argued that this seemed dissonant for a government concerned with wedding rights and responsibilities. And I speculated about who might be responsibilised to help victims to self-actualise in MAG 2000 and whether or not gender would be made relevant to victimhood. In more general terms, domestic violence was problematised as 'crime' and a 'reflexive government' (ascribed as already fulfilling its responsibilities) and 'responsible others' dynamic was constituted. As MAG 2000 and HOC 19/2000 are products of the same government strategy, it is unlikely that those understandings will differ in these respects.
There may, however, be a point of differentiation. My analysis of the twelve 'What Works? in reducing domestic violence' memoranda (see Chapter 6) seemed to indicate that naming "Women's Aid" had become an appropriate warrant in government guidance by 2000. Consequently, as well as being concerned with how persuasion and responsibility ascription for working together are framed around notions of 'crime', I am also interested in how MAG 2000 positions and problematises women's service providers; especially Women's Aid.

3. Governing at a distance: legal obligations

Extracts 10 to 12 come from MAG 2000's introduction. They are located in a subsection entitled 'This publication and its purpose' and they follow directly on from one another. The opening paragraph of this subsection (text not included) has stated that MAG 2000 replaces HOC 1995 and it lists nine government departments that have had a hand in preparing and publishing this text. It also points out that the document relates to England and Wales only which, within the UK, implicitly flags legal relevancy. Extract 10 begins by formulating this publication's aims.

Extract 10 [MAG 2000 (1): Introduction, paragraph 1.2]:

107 The publication aims to raise awareness with all agencies falling within the
108 policy remit of the Departments concerned. It sets out some of the general
109 issues that they all should bear in mind along with some of the ways in
110 which together and individually they might address domestic violence
111 effectively. It seeks to give a background and framework for carrying out
112 this work, rather than giving detailed operational guidance. Part 4 of the
113 publication gives details of some further sources of information.

The first sentence (1.107-8) constitutes an audience specific purpose. The text claims to be trying to "raise awareness". This suggests that the knowledges being forwarded are pertinent to "all agencies". 'All' is an extreme case formulation which defends against potential counter challenges that there are apposite agencies for whom this awareness raising is not significant. There is no sense that the publication is forcing them to do anything. These agencies are qualified as "falling within the policy remit of the Departments concerned". And this frames them as statutory agencies. Certainly there may

7 See Appendix 2 for extract conventions.
be duties and obligations between Departments and agencies but these relationships are not being positioned in the forefront here. The emphasis seems to be on persuading the target audience that MAG 2000 is helpful and an appropriate teller of truths. And therein lies a responsibilisation. The notion of 'helping' someone suggests that the one being helped already has responsibilities with which they need assistance.  

This theme of responsibility and the relationship between author and audience is continued throughout the paragraph. The truth-claim is made that the document “sets out some of the general issues that they all should bear in mind” (1.108-9). It is clear, therefore, that MAG 2000 is not being framed as the only source of relevant information (“some”). But it is also suggested through “should” that agencies are under some moral duty or obligation to “bear in mind” the “general issues”. Therefore, once again, responsibility is constituted as pre-existing the help forthcoming from MAG 2000. In addition, the text claims to set out “some of the ways in which together and individually they might address domestic violence effectively” (1.109-11). ‘Some of the ways’ continues the notion that MAG 2000 is not the sole possible source of help. ‘Together and individually’ suggests there may be times when collaborations are appropriate for addressing domestic violence effectively. ‘They might’ implies ability, possibility and choice. The suggestion is therefore, that these agencies are able to address domestic violence effectively but choices need to be made in how this is done. What is clear is that regardless of how they choose to do it, agencies already have a responsibility to do something about domestic violence.

Further MAG 2000 self-presents its role as “seeks to give a background and framework for carrying out this work, rather than giving detailed operational guidance” (1.111-12). This phrase is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, “seeks” suggests that giving “background and framework” is not as straightforward as simply providing information. Secondly, “carrying out this work” reiterates that the responsibility of these agencies to do this work pre-exists the publication of MAG 2000. Thirdly, a contrast is drawn (“rather than”) between “background and framework” and “detailed operational guidance”. Although both are framed as forms of guidance, the contrast is pitched in terms of general versus specific. This is commensurate with the sense that agencies have choices in how they do this work but not in terms of whether or not they do it; a key feature of New

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8 The classic example is understandings of men ‘helping around the house’. This suggests that it is women who are actually responsible for house-work (Grint, 1991).
Labour governance (Matthews & Pitts, 2001). And the message is that MAG 2000 can help.

In the final sentence, the readership is directed to “Part 4 of the publication (which) gives details of some further sources of information” (1.112-13). This sheds light on the earlier formulations that MAG 2000 is not the only source of help and that the giving of ‘guidance’ is not accomplished simply by writing it down. Thus it encourages agencies to look further afield for information to furnish the choices they do have. And it implies that achieving ‘guidance’ is dependent on both guides and the guided. That is, information from the truth-teller needs to be realised by its audience.

In interim summary, a relationship between the author and the readership is constituted. This relation comprises an audience framed as already having responsibilities to address domestic violence and MAG 2000 as an appropriate guide who can help with how those responsibilities are enacted. It is further suggested that ‘guidance’ is always the proper mode of address between government policy and statutory agencies; and that to be realised, ‘guidance’ requires non-passive recipients.

Extract 11 follows directly on. It picks up the “together and individually” (1.110) of the previous paragraph by naming “Partnership” (1.114). And it introduces a truth-claim format that is repeated in extract 12. That is, a ‘fact’ of knowledge is presented as undeniable and it is followed by how that ‘truth’ pertains to MAG 2000.

**Extract 11 [MAG 2000 (1): Introduction, paragraph 1.3]:**

114 Partnership working is essential to providing a comprehensive response
115 to the wide range of needs that domestic violence survivors may have.
116 This document therefore sets out to encourage and support effective
117 multi-agency working as well as addressing specific statutory agencies.

The ‘fact’ that opens paragraph 1.3 concerns the ‘nature’ of “Partnership”. ‘Essential’ is an extreme case formulation which sites essentiality in the object of “Partnership” for “providing a comprehensive response” (1.114). ‘Comprehensive response’ is a further absolute. And this one is used to counter potential claims that “the wide range of needs that domestic violence survivors may have” demands anything less than a “comprehensive
response”. It can therefore be assumed, even at this early stage that “Partnership” is a key discourse for MAG 2000.

This truth about “Partnership” is made relevant to “This document” (“therefore”) forwarding “multi-agency working” (l.116-17). The guidance role of MAG 2000 is reiterated in “encourage and support”. And the readership of “statutory agencies” is made explicit. The use of “addressing” is ambiguous. At first glance it seems to go beyond guiding, when “addressing” is understood as ‘dealing with’. But there is a rhetorical device here that undermines that reading. ‘Specific’ highlights a move from the general to the particular. Here, encouraging and supporting “effective multi-agency working” forms the general case. And “addressing specific statutory agencies” is the particular case. Therefore, it would seem that “addressing” is being used in the ‘talking to’ sense. Thus appropriate guidance is furnished with different layers, both information that is applicable to all circumstances and knowledges that have single agency resonance.

Extract 12 follows on immediately. Here, the ‘fact’ and MAG 2000 relevance claims concern the ‘nature’ of “local circumstances” (l.118-19) and “principles of good practice” (l.119).

Extract 12 [MAG 2000 (1): Introduction, paragraph 1.4]:

118 The success of any strategy or initiative will be affected by local
119 circumstances. While over-all principles of good practice remain the same,
120 what works well in one area may not be so effective somewhere else.
121 The “good practice” examples in this guidance are not definitive ways of
122 working. Instead they are examples of current practice where particular
123 consideration has been given to how best to tackle domestic violence.
124 They feature as a source of material and ideas for others, who can learn
125 from their lessons and modify them as appropriate for local conditions.

Once again, two extreme case formulations are used to argue for the veracity of ‘facts’ being presented. Firstly, “local circumstances” are claimed to be in the object of “any” successful “strategy or initiatives”. Secondly, the fundamental relevance (“over-all”) of “principles of good practice” is presented as being constant, regardless of location (“one
area” versus “somewhere else”, 1.120). In this way, “local circumstances” and “principles of good practice” are ascribed omni-relevance.

These truths are rendered pertinent to the “good practice” “examples in this guidance” in that they are said to be “not definitive ways of working” (1.121-2). This formulation allows for local variation in working practices and complies with MAG 2000’s notion of ‘guidance’ as not spoon-feeding. The next sentence frames what is deemed laudable about these examples. They illustrate “current practice” (1.122) which suggests they are practicable. They have arisen from “particular consideration” (1.122-3) which implies that thought has been applied to their construction. They have emerged as “how best to tackle domestic violence” (1.123). This gives a sense that other possibilities were rejected as lesser entities (“best”) and that these practices engage head-on with (“tackle”) the problem of domestic violence. The final sentence demonstrates how MAG 2000 envisages agencies using these examples. It is presented as a three-part list which changes the subject from “a source of material and ideas” to “modify them as appropriate for local conditions” (1.124-5). Therefore, the readership is being responsibilised to “learn from their lessons” and actively adapt them in line with their knowledges about “local conditions”. Implicitly, the reward for compliance is the production of their own examples of “good practice”.

So far, the responsibilisation strategy of MAG 2000 is to self-present as fulfilling the role of appropriate guidance giver. It frames responsibilities that statutory agencies already have and offers information for the effective execution of those duties. This is accomplished through providing relevant ‘facts’ about “Partnership”, “local circumstances” and “principles of good practice” and pointing to other sources of information and how they can be useful. Further, the effective addressing of domestic violence is formulated as something that requires action from the readership. “Partnership”, “local circumstances” and “principles of good practice” cannot be attained or managed by the passive receipt of guidance.

However, in line with how one might have expected this argumentation to develop, there seems to be an absence, namely ‘crime’. Discourse about ‘crime’ does not appear until two paragraphs later. And it appears to found the ‘pre-existent’ responsibility ascription to statutory agencies to which MAG 2000 has been alluding.
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 has placed a requirement on local authorities and the police to form local crime and disorder reduction partnerships, and the Government has made it clear that it expects these to address domestic violence in their local audits and the strategies derived from them. (...)

These data mark the introduction within the main body of MAG 2000 of "crime", "the Government" and a stronger tone than informing and guiding. However, although these debuts are simultaneous there also seems to be discursive work to render them separate but related entities. "The Crime and Disorder Act 1998" (CDA, 1998) is personified. It is CDA 1998 and not the government which is ascribed as having generated "a requirement on local authorities and the police" (l.134-5). Thus CDA 1998 is framed as making demands that must be met concerning "local crime and disorder reduction partnerships" (l.135-6), "local audits and the strategies derived from them" (l.137-8). By contrast "the Government" claims and fulfils responsibility for defining domestic violence as 'crime' and locating it within the structures already required by the law. From Extracts 10 and 11 it is apparent that the government is in alignment with CDA 1998's drive to arrange strategies around "partnerships" and the "local". But it is almost as if CDA 1998 just happened, has to be obeyed and government has realised the opportunity to make a strong case for domestic violence.

This formulation of government as an object of the law for whom it is appropriate to have expectations of statutory agencies' legal responsibilities is repeated in Extract 14.

Ministers have made it clear that the Government expects the partnerships set up under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to identify the level of domestic violence in their area and to develop a strategy for addressing it as part of their wider crime reduction strategy.

Again, and perhaps more explicitly here, CDA 1998 is presented as that which pre-exists Ministers' clarity and government's expectations. What government expects at the local
level ("in their area") is framed as domestic violence identification and strategy development arising from CDA 1998. There is no sense that government has expressed its expectation through CDA 1998.

This analysis makes a contribution to the academic debate between governmentalists (especially Rose & Valverde, 1998) who claim that mobilising the power of the law can be seen as an extension of 'governing at a distance'; and those who claim that government resorts to the sovereign power of the law when persuasion alone fails to work (Garland, 1996, 2001). Certainly generating a new law constitutes tapping the sovereign power therein. And the responsibilisation MAG 2000 uses on its statutory agency readership is made more authoritative when directly founded in the pre-requisites of the law.

However, despite the fact that this "Government" has generated the CDA 1998, no claim is made to that effect in its persuasions. The sense is that laws exist and everyone, including government, is made subject to that. Government is presented as meeting its obligations by rendering domestic violence as 'crime' and therefore an apposite category for what the law requires from local partnerships. Thus MAG 2000 constitutes a 'reflexive government' and 'responsibilised others' dynamic where the former is ascribed as already fulfilling its responsibilities, including steering the latter 'appropriately'. The invocation of the law founds a stronger tone of responsibilisation, but they are still formulated as persuasions. Consequently, mobilising the law allows central government to extend its reach to the local level. But it retains the economy one would associate with 'governing at a distance'. To claim that government has simply reverted to exercising sovereign power is, therefore, too simplistic an account of what is being accomplished in the 'doing' of government here.

In summary, the government's position within MAG 2000 is framed as in accord with the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 which in turn is not ascribed an author. Through MAG 2000, government self-presents as an appropriate giver of guidance to statutory agencies. It argues for the 'innate' efficacy potential of "partnerships" and ascribes value to "local considerations" although this is delimited by understandings of "principles of good practice". Government also suggests that statutory agencies already have a responsibility for addressing domestic violence which they can fulfil through converting guidance and information into appropriate action. CDA 1998 is credited with understanding similar

9 CDA 1998 does not make domestic violence partnerships compulsory, but this has been floated for a consultation topic...
truths about "local considerations" and "partnerships" as organising principles of strategic action. But the emphasis is on reducing "crime". Government asserts domestic violence as crime and thus locates it within the legal framework demanded by CDA 1998. It does not claim any part in the production of CDA 1998. Thus the sense of a 'reflexive government' and 'responsibilised others' dynamic is retained. And despite mobilising the power of the law to increase the level of its persuasions, government formulates itself as an object of the law, specifically one that is already meeting its own responsibilities.

In this section I have explored New Labour's attempts to govern at a distance through multi-agency policy. It is apparent that the readership being responsibilised is constituted as statutory agencies. But I am also concerned with how voluntary agencies, particularly feminist ones, are constituted in regard to discourses of working together. Therefore, in the next section I focus on "Women's Aid".

4. Formulating "Women's Aid": around crime/law, 'victim' population and organisational status

The four extracts in this section appear in the order that they are presented within MAG 2000. What becomes apparent is that Women's Aid's relevance is framed and delimited around notions of crime/law, 'victim' population and organisational status. Between extracts this produces some contradictions which are explicable in terms of the transactional business in hand. But across extracts, there is a consistency in how "Women's Aid" is managed. In Extract 15, the topic and the addressees are Crime and Disorder partnerships.

Extract 15 [MAG 2000 (2a): Statutory CDA Partnerships, paragraph 2a.5]:

327 Domestic violence survivors also frequently turn to non-statutory
328 agencies such as Women’s Aid and other refuge services, Victim Support,
329 and other voluntary sector service providers. In taking forward their
330 strategies, partnerships will need to work closely and sensitively with
331 non-statutory groups specialising in this area and to liaise with
332 representative organisations whose knowledge can be a valuable
333 resource. This is particularly important with organisations serving and
334 representing specific groups within the local community, including ethnic

under the recent White Paper (Home Office, 2003b).
Female gender is only rendered apposite to “Survivors” through “Women’s Aid” (1.327-8). But implicitly, “turn to” invokes emotionality, a condition often negatively associated with women (Marcus, 1992; Smart, 1992, 1995). And in the same vein “closely and sensitively” (1.330) seems to suggest women. As such, the relevance of female gender to service users and providers is reduced as the paragraph progresses, particularly through the use of two three-part lists.

The first of these comprises: “Women’s Aid and other refuge services (1), Victim Support (2), and other voluntary sector service providers (3)” (1.328-9). This could be read as descending with “Women’s Aid” in poll-position leading to “other voluntary sector service providers” as a “generalized list completer” (Jefferson, 1990, p.66) suggesting there are many other nameable items. But it can simultaneously be read as a change of topic. In the first part, the survivor population is gendered and positioned as seeking refuge. In the second part, non-gendered victims of crime needing support are framed. And in the vagary of the final part neither gender nor crime are invoked to service users or service providers. The notion that there are some survivors who turn to some other voluntary agencies is very difficult to undermine because of the vague formulation. Consequently, the relationship between survivors and female gender is undermined as ‘just women’ in terms of its possible relevance for partnerships. And “Women’s Aid” is used to found a claim that they are not the sole service providers of importance in this context.

The concurrent talking up and delimiting of Women’s Aid continues in the second three-part list. This is set up as beneficial to “partnerships” in terms of what they “will need” to do in order to attain “taking forward their strategies”. And it comprises: “to work closely (1) and sensitively (2) with non-statutory groups specialising in this area and to liaise (3) with representative organisations whose knowledge can be a valuable resource” (1.330-3). Again, the list appears to be changing the subject from female gender relevance to the detriment of Women’s Aid. ‘Closely and sensitively’ invokes emotionality for the service providers and this gives a sense of female gender relevance. But they are framed as “groups”, which in contrast with “organisations” suggests informal working arrangements, possibly even unofficial self-helping women. Further, these “groups” are “specialising in this area”. There is no suggestion that they are ‘specialists’. Rather, the invocation is that
“this area” is what they do, indeed, all they do. Consequently, working with Women’s Aid is formulated as necessary but not the whole picture.

This ‘deficiency’ is supplemented by “liaise with representative organisations whose knowledge can be a valuable resource” (l.331-3). ‘Liaise’ implies qualitatively different engagement from that with self-helping women’s groups, and one that is not gendered. ‘Representative organisations’ suggests more formal, perhaps professional standing. And it is they who are credited with the potential to be “a valuable resource” compared to those with a circumscribed service population. The general case of “representative organisations” then shifts to the particular case of “organisations serving and representing specific groups within the local community, including ethnic minority and faith organisations” (l.333-5). There is no sense that Women’s Aid ‘serve and represent’. And “groups” is used to indicate non-professional incidences of people.

Overall, it is clear that representative organisations grounded in ethnicity and religion are being talked up as women’s groups are being talked down in terms of the limits to their service users and their non-professional standing. However, it is not clear that representative organisations are being positioned as better or more apposite than women’s groups including Women’s Aid. Rather, the work done to undermine female gender suggests that it is already understood by the readership as the key issue. Thus the transactional business seems to be to disrupt notions of ‘just women’ as the only relevance. But the effect to Women’s Aid is that its ascribed importance is firmly delimited.

In Extract 16, the addressees are the police as an individual agency. That is, the guidance is pitched to them outside of any partnership responsibilities they may have. The roles framed here for Women’s Aid are as “local voluntary sector support groups” and professional knowledge-keepers. At different levels, both mark responsibility boundaries for the police.

Extract 16 [MAG 2000 (2c): The Police, paragraph 2b.iii.4]:

538 It is essential that the work of the DVOs and DVUs\textsuperscript{10} is properly understood
539 and supported by the rest of the force. There must be no suggestion

\textsuperscript{10} The distinction between Domestic Violence Officers (DVOs) and Domestic Violence Units (DVUs) normally indicates a rural/urban divide (HASC, 1993b). Thus where populations are dense, a domestic violence unit represents an effective use of resources. But where communities are scattered over a wider geographical area, a mobile officer with responsibility for domestic violence is seen as more apposite.
that dealing with domestic violence is in any sense "second-class" police work. It is also important for such units and officers to maintain close links with other units within Forces that deal with related issues such as "child protection" and with other relevant local agencies. To address domestic violence effectively and provide real help for those who experience it the issue must be addressed holistically. This requires the different agencies to work together. Survivors of domestic violence will also benefit if, when they report an incident, police officers are able to supply information about voluntary sector support groups, such as Women's Aid and Victim Support. The Women's Aid Federation England produces The Gold Book, a useful U.K-wide directory of domestic violence refuge and helpline services.

The first three lines comprise persuasion for all police to work together internally. Thus "essential", "properly understood and supported" and the extreme cases of "no" and "any" all counter potential challenges that domestic violence is not 'real' police work. At line 541, the persuasion focus shifts to "such units and officers". Interestingly, "the force" is reformulated here as "within Forces" and I think this capitalisation indicates the move from working together internally ("other units", 1.542) to externally ("other relevant local agencies", 1.543). Thus the police are afforded a more formal standing when non-police agencies are invoked. Also internal "related issues" are exemplified with "child protection" whilst what maintaining "close links" with outsiders can contribute is left vague.

The next stage in the text is the presentation of a bottom line argument. This begins within an infinitive, "To address domestic violence effectively and provide real help" (1.543-4). This sets it up to be understood like an adage, such as 'to err is human'. And the imperative, "must be addressed holistically" (my emphasis, 1.545), seems to prioritise the truth-claim rather than a direct responsibilisation. And this reading is supported by its positioning immediately after the invocation of non-police agencies and the use of "holistically"; both of which imply relevance for this truth beyond the police. Indeed, the truth-claim is followed by another 'truth' which is framed as consequent upon it; in this case, that "different agencies" are 'required' to "work together". Thus it is the implied 'nature' of domestic violence, not government which is constituted as demanding a particular response.
From lines 546 to the end, the roles formulated for Women’s Aid within this working together framework become clear. Firstly, “Survivors of domestic violence” who report to the police are framed as in need of “information about voluntary sector groups, such as Women’s Aid and Victim Support” (1.548-9). This partially genders them as female and partially constitutes them as non-gendered victims of crime. Women’s Aid and Victim Support appeared side by side in Extract 15 on crime and disorder partnerships. Therefore, “Victim Support” can be seen as a resource invoked to delimit the relevance of female gendered support and increase the appropriateness of crime support. Further, “Survivors” is again used in the vicinity of “Women’s Aid”. Certainly ‘survivors’ is an important concept in feminist discourse (Kelly, 1996; Skinner, 2000). But here as a non-gendered term it is used to undermine Women’s Aid which supplies the only female gender relevance to the term “Survivors”.

Also, like Extract 15, Women’s Aid is presented as “groups”. This provides a contrast with both “Forces” (1.542) and “other relevant local agencies” (1.543); both of which imply formal organisational bodies, not commensurate with the meaning conveyed by “groups”. Thus the ascribed relation between the police and Women’s Aid of “supply information about” is out of professional balance and cannot be seen as forwarding working together. This reading is borne out by the “also” at line 541. This positions maintaining “close links with”, “other relevant local agencies”, “holistically” and “work together” as qualitatively different from “supply information about”. Consequently, Women’s Aid is not invoked in discourses of working together when the police are being addressed on an individual agency basis.

This formulation continues in the final sentence (1.549-51). However, there is a shift from “Women’s Aid” to “The Women’s Aid Federation England” (WAFE). And this switch in local/national constitutions apparently denotes an upward turn in ascribing credibility to Women’s Aid. The full title of WAFE indicates a formal organisational name unlike “groups”. The Gold Book is called a “useful U.K-wide directory”. So its usefulness to the police as listing “domestic violence and refuge helpline services” is made explicit. “U.K-wide” works as an extreme case formulation to counter potential challenges that there are any police forces to whom this publication is not relevant. And “directory” implies a formal, professional organisation document. It is not, for example, ‘a listing’. But
simultaneously the shorthand name “Women’s Aid” is instrumental in how MAG 2000 undermines that agency’s relevance at the local level.

Overall, the role of Women’s Aid’s ascribed importance is circumscribed by notions of female gender, crime and organisational standing. Specifically, at the level of individual agency advice to the police, Women’s Aid is delimited to a knowledge-keeper and the object of some information that benefits survivors. There is no sense of working together between the police and Women’s Aid in the day-to-day business of doing police-work.

In Extract 17, the addressees are local housing authorities. Here, those who experience domestic violence are gendered as female in their own right and Women’s Aid is afforded credibility at both the local and national levels.

**Extract 17 [MAG 2000 (2c): Housing, paragraph 2ciii.1]:**

731 Local authority homelessness and housing allocation officers have an
732 important role in giving women who are escaping domestic violence
733 access to alternative accommodation. Officers should have a detailed
734 knowledge of housing legislation and statutory guidance and how this
735 applies to people fleeing domestic violence. A knowledge of what
736 information and help is available to domestic violence survivors is also
737 essential. Local Women’s Aid Groups can be useful sources of advice.
738 The Women’s Aid Federation England produces *The Gold Book*, a
739 U.K.-wide directory of domestic violence refuge and helpline services.
740 Welsh Women’s Aid can provide specialist information on refuge,
741 outreach and other support services throughout Wales.

What is interesting about the opening sentence is that it is not a direct responsibilisation. There is no sense that it is either the responsibility or the duty of local housing authorities to provide “alternative accommodation” (1.733). Rather, they are ascribed an “important role” (1.732) and the emotive descriptor “women who are escaping domestic violence” (1.732) is suggestive of a moral argument. That is, women who are in danger at home need somewhere to live and local authorities are positioned to do something about this. The moral obligation of officers continues in regard to the professional knowledges they “should” have. These are presented as a three-part list: “housing legislation (1) and
statutory guidance (2) and how (3) this applies to people fleeing domestic violence” (I.734-5). The comprehensive sense invoked by the list suggests that officers should know these knowledges and their applications inside out. But a distinction is made between “housing legislation” and “statutory guidance” and “women” has been reformulated here as “people fleeing domestic violence” (my emphasis). This seems to indicate that “housing legislation” has somehow necessitated the de-gendering of those who experience domestic violence as moral obligation gives way to legal obligation. And that would be commensurate with much legal discourse.

The next sentence (I.735-7), frames a qualitatively different type of “knowledge” about “what information and help is available”. But although different, it is not constituted as lesser. The extreme case, “also essential”, locates essentiality in the object of this knowledge. Once again the intervention population of “survivors” is formulated as gender-free. And this marks a move towards naming “Women’s Aid”. Indeed their ascribed client group through Extracts 15 to 17 is “survivors”. I argued above that as a resource for MAG 2000, “survivors” was useful for locating female gender relevance primarily in service provision rather than service users. But here “women” have been formulated in their own right as a worthy intervention population, regardless of who delivers services to them. Therefore, I think it has another benefit. ‘Women who are escaping domestic violence’, “people fleeing domestic violence” and “domestic violence survivors” all share the sense that those who are at risk from domestic violence are actively doing something about it. Whether, “escaping”, “fleeing” or ‘surviving’ they can be seen to be managing the risks that they face. As such, they can be understood as ‘good citizens’ in the process of self-actualisation but requiring help from experts (Rose, 2000).

In Chapter 4 I drew attention to the fact that in the HOC 19/2000 policing domestic violence policy, the police were not charged with mobilising those who experience domestic violence. Neither was there any sense that those victims had responsibilities despite being ascribed rights. And that seemed dissonant with New Labour’s ‘rights and responsibilities’ imperative (e.g. Giddens, 1998). Despite MAG 2000’s simultaneous attempts to talk up and delimit the credibility of Women’s Aid there are no explicit claims for how Women’s Aid’s information and knowledges are beneficial to “survivors”. The suggestion is that individual agencies knowing about them and passing that on to “survivors” is commensurate with “survivors” being helped and guided. But in talk around
Women's Aid, there is an absence in explicating that process. This thought is pursued further in the analysis of Extract 18.

The closing lines of Extract 17 form a three-part list of knowledges about "what information and help is available to domestic violence survivors" (l.735-6). Each part invokes Women's Aid in some form suggesting that organisationally they are comprehensive knowledge-keepers. In the first part, "Local Women's Aid Groups" (my emphasis, l.737) is an unusual formulation as the capitalisation of "G" seems to raise the credibility of Women's Aid at the local level. Thus there is a sense, unlike the police as an individual agency, that in the day-to-day workings of housing authorities, Women's Aid is important. Indeed, they are framed as "can be useful sources of advice" (l.737). The conditional, "can be", implicitly invokes a two-way dynamic. The quality of the knowledge to be passed over is not in doubt. Therefore, converting the potential of the "advice" becomes the responsibility of housing authorities. That is, essential Women's Aid knowledge is there but it is up to housing personnel to access it. This suggests, albeit implicitly, some form of working together, not present in persuasions to the police.

The second part, names "Women's Aid Federation" and its "U.K-wide directory" (l.739). As in Extract 16, this is talking up the credibility of Women's Aid at its national level. Unlike Extract 16, the word "useful" is omitted. Initially, I thought that this indicated that the police were understood to need more explicit persuasion to value The Gold Book. But on reflection, I think that less persuasion on this particular item is mobilised here, simply because of its positioning in a five line, three-part list doing persuasive work and the word "useful" has already been used in the preceding sentence. In the third part, there is an interesting development. "Welsh Women's Aid" is framed as distinct from WAFE. Originally, I thought this was just another part of ascribing value. But having considered what other benefits combining 'England and Wales' could bring, I was drawn back to "housing legislation" (my emphasis). Within the UK, England and Wales are subject to the same law. Thus Wales, does not attract the national distinctions of Scotland and Northern Ireland. Therefore, within the persuasion about the veracity of Women’s Aid’s knowledges, housing authorities’ legal obligations are invoked. In addition, the ascription of "specialist" status, the three-part list of "refuge, outreach and other support services" (l.740-1) and the extreme case formulation, "throughout", all serve to justify Women’s Aid’s knowledges as "essential".

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Overall, the talking up and delimitation of Women’s Aid is organised around the axes of law, female gender and organisational status. Firstly, the absence of Victim Support as a relevant agency and the presence of the formulation ‘England and Wales’ locate the arguments made here in ‘the law’ rather than ‘crime’. And the credibility of Women’s Aid’s knowledges is founded in its geographical legal relevance. Secondly, the population “women” is rendered apposite as part of a moral obligation not dependent on the services delivered by Women’s Aid. However, a legal population of “people” is mobilised to de-gender “survivors” as the client group of Women’s Aid. This repositions female gender relevance in the name “Women’s Aid” and possibly promotes legal understandings as key. Also “survivors” suggests already self-actualising populations which sanctions an absence about mobilisation discourse. Thirdly, Groups, WAFE and Welsh Women’s Aid as ways of organisational naming all impact upon a category entitlement for the essentiality of Women’s Aid’s knowledges. Unlike, persuasions to the police as an individual agency, housing authorities are encouraged to work together with Women’s Aid around their day-to-day business at both the local and national levels.

However, the usage of “survivors” around discourse on Women’s Aid and how that impacts on meanings of female gender and self-actualisation is, up to this point, an unproved notion on my part. Therefore, in Extract 18, I demonstrate the exception that proves the rule. The addressees are local social services. And the three key points of note are: a shift in the way the problem population is formulated; the absence of Women’s Aid, female gender and “survivors”; and the only instance in MAG 2000 of victim self-actualisation discourse.

Extract 18 [MAG 2000 (2c): Local Government Departments, paragraph 2c.iv.4]:

809 Social services departments should not see domestic violence as just
810 another discrete risk from which they must protect children and other
811 vulnerable people. A holistic approach, including the provision of family
812 support services and other measures to enable all the abused members of
813 the family to make themselves safe may be a more effective intervention.
814 This will include support, where appropriate, after the violence has ended,
815 in terms of helping victims re-build their lives. Departments should also
816 recognise that the involvement of domestic violence experts, such as
817 experienced workers within the voluntary sector, can lead to better
decision making. They can help ensure a comprehensive assessment of needs, risks, and protective steps which can be taken.

The target population is framed as “children and other vulnerable people” (1.810-11) and “all abused members of the family” (1.812-3). Thus female gender is not made relevant, and one might say this passage appears to go out of its way not to gender, either service providers or service users. With a vague ‘victim’ formulation, “protect” might well invoke female gender (Ahmed, 1995). But here the objects of protection are explicitly furnished.

Further “risk” is named (1.810). In other passages, notably Extract 17, it is invoked in the activities of “survivors” but it is not made explicit. Here, the social services are being persuaded of the efficacy of ‘enabling’ people “to make themselves safe” (1.813) and “helping victims re-build their lives” (1.815). These are classic neo-liberal ‘good citizen’ formulations of self-actualisation (Rose, 2000); an aspect of political discourse that was only implied around talk about “survivors”. But it is still persuasion. There is some moral obligation, “should”, around child protection issues; what is forwarded “may be a more effective intervention” (my emphasis, 1.813); and “where appropriate” (1.814) is vague, suggesting that social services can classify appropriateness within their professional realm.

At line 815, another moral obligation persuasion begins, “Departments should also recognise” (my emphasis), which concerns, “the involvement of domestic violence experts”. This forms a contrast with domestic violence as “just another discrete risk” (1.809-10) which suggests that domestic violence although coming under the auspices of social services is not their area of expertise. ‘Experts’ are framed as “experienced workers within the voluntary sector” (1.817). In Extracts 15 and 16, “such as” was followed by “Women’s Aid” as the poll-position example. As a voluntary sector agency, already lauded in this document, Women’s Aid, is therefore, notable by its absence. What is interesting is that the working arrangements of the “experts” in this extract is founded in their individuality, not their collective membership of a group, agency or organisation. Their status is made explicit and therefore not in doubt. But this seems to be founded on their individual expertise as “workers”.

What they can contribute is framed in terms of possibility: “can lead to better decision making” and “can help ensure a comprehensive assessment” (my emphases, 1.817-8). This
accomplishes two things. Firstly, it suggests that decision making and comprehensive assessments are the responsibility of social services even where they involve outside experts. Secondly, it implies that straight "involvement" does not produce the potential benefits. This seems to indicate, as in Extract 17, that the onus is on the addressee to convert potential into real benefits. Finally, the "comprehensive assessment" potential of domestic violence experts is talked up in a comprehensive three-part list of "needs, risks, and protective steps" (1.819). This further suggests that outside experts can be useful to social services across the full range of domestic violence issues.

Overall, Extract 18, demonstrates the exception to prove the rule about the ways in which "survivors" and "Women's Aid" are invoked. Firstly, the intervention target population of MAG 2000 shifts depending on the addressee of a specific piece of guidance. For crime and disorder partnerships, the police and housing authorities, it is "survivors". Although these are partially gendered as female through the invocation of Women's Aid, it is only for housing that "women" are temporarily made relevant in their own right. For social services, the key population includes children, vulnerable family members and victims. Gender is not made relevant and "survivors" and "Women's Aid" are not formulated. Secondly, another part of the justification for not naming Women's Aid in this context is the location of expertise in individuals. From MAG 2000 it is clear that organisations are afforded a higher professional status above groups, but that continuum is not rendered apposite around social services. Thirdly, "survivors" would appear to warrant the exclusion of self-actualisation discourse. The effect of this is that the potential usefulness of Women's Aid's knowledges to individual and collective statutory agencies in mobilising populations of women to help themselves is never made explicit.

The summary and implications arising from the analysis in section 4 are discussed more fully in the chapter part conclusion below.

Part Two Conclusion
Within this chapter part I was interested in investigating MAG 2000's truth-claims and responsibilisations, in promoting notions of working together. This comprised a focus on domestic violence as crime and constitutions of Women's Aid.
MAG 2000 renders domestic violence a local crime issue by framing government and its audience as objects of the law. The law made relevant is the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA). And this is positioned in its own right as requiring local crime reduction partnerships. MAG 2000 invokes the legal obligations arising from CDA, framing the readership as needing to convert the potential of guidance and the government as an appropriate giver of that guidance. Further, it asserts domestic violence as a crime thus locating it within CDA’s ‘pre-existent’ framework. The effect of this is that government is located in a ‘reflexive government’ and ‘responsibilised others’ dynamic with statutory agencies in a way that presents it as already fulfilling all of its responsibilities. The implication seems to be that understandings of New Labour flexing its sovereign power muscles through the law when persuasion alone fails (Garland, 1996, 2000) are oversimplistic. It would appear, commensurate with a Foucauldian account (Foucault, 1980; also, Rose & Valverde, 1998), that the sovereign power of the law is mobilised as an occasional resource within this governance responsibilisation strategy on domestic violence.

Formulations of Women’s Aid vary according to the specific addressee of a piece of text and are orientated around three axes: the population to be governed, crime/the law and organisational standing. Firstly, Women’s Aid’s client population is framed as ‘women’ and this is most often accomplished through naming the agency. The importance of Women’s Aid is talked up and/or delimited depending on the ascribed target population of the specific readership. Thus most relevance is afforded to Women’s Aid in regard to housing where ‘women’ appear as apposite regardless of the presence or absence of Women’s Aid. At the other end of the scale, ‘women’ and Women’s Aid are not invoked around social services where the clientele is constituted as children, family members and victims. Additionally, “survivors” is commonly formulated in discourse about Women’s Aid. And it would seem that this term is understood to encapsulate ‘already self-actualising citizens’ in a way that renders text about mobilisation, and using Women’s Aid knowledges to mobilise, unnecessary.

Secondly, in guidance to CDA partnerships and the police, ‘crime’ is invoked through the constitution of Victim Support. This is used to disrupt notions of ‘just women’ service users and the effect is to circumscribe the credibility of Women’s Aid in crime contexts. Further, in text on housing, where Women’s Aid is most lauded, its reach across the
geographical legal domain of ‘England and Wales’ is implied as part of the working together persuasion at the individual agency level. Thirdly, distinctions between groups, agencies and organisations are employed to curb and/or ascribe value to Women’s Aid. For example, in CDA partnership text “groups” undermines Women’s Aid’s position in relation to ethnic and faith ‘representative organisations’. And in police guidance, “groups” contrasts with agencies and Women’s Aid Federation England (WAFE) to delimit the relevance of Women’s Aid to day-to-day police-work. But in persuasion to housing authorities, where Women’s Aid is most praised, “groups” is given a capital “G”. ‘WAFE’ is used to talk up formal, professional organisational standing. For example, it founds claims to persuade police forces and housing authorities of the usefulness of The Gold Book. And moreover, housing authorities are guided to recognise the specialist status of Welsh Women’s Aid’s knowledges.

The main implication arising from this analysis is that there is a strong sense that Women’s Aid is important but being managed. This is a double-edged position. Certainly as the most named voluntary agency and the subject of government ‘handling’, they have prominence. But each time an argument is made to counter understandings of the key population as ‘just women’, this is accomplished at the expense of Women’s Aid. Thus attempts to locate the agency in its appropriate setting are often detrimental. Another implication concerns the primary gendering of survivors as female through naming Women’s Aid. The ambiguity allows for female gender to be understood as apposite to both service users and service providers. But explicitly, the former is used sparingly and the latter not at all. Therefore, one could ask how the discourse would be different if ‘Refuge’ were the key voluntary agency. It might be that gender would become less apparent, a move that could persuade Women’s Aid to remain in government policy-making arena. Or, it could necessitate more overt female gender formulations.

Moreover, I noted in Chapter 6 that it might be problematic to position ‘Women’s Aid’ next to ‘children’ because it potentially invokes ‘mother and child’ meanings. Therefore, MAG 2000’s emphasis on client populations, for example ‘local housing authorities and women’ and ‘social services and children and families’, seems to avoid invoking ‘women and children’ and all that entails. A further implication is that “survivors” seems to stand in for self-actualisation and mobilisation discourse. Thus it would seem that a feminist term
has been appropriated and used on feminists to render the uses to which their lauded knowledges might be put oblique.

In the chapter discussion I compare and contrast the findings from the HOC 1995 and MAG 2000 analyses, and consider the implications of the continuities and disjunctures.

**Chapter Discussion**

Both HOC 1995 and MAG 2000 formulate domestic violence as a local crime issue. In so doing, government is set in a ‘reflexive government’ and ‘responsibilised others’ dynamic with its readership and framed as already fulfilling all of its responsibilities. The key shift is from warranting this version in ‘moral obligation’ to ‘legal obligation’. This is perhaps unsurprising bearing in mind New Labour’s strategy of generating statutory responsibilities under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. However, what is surprising is how the persuasion to statutory agencies is still pitched in terms of responsibilisation and governing at a distance. One might argue that obligation-invoking guidance is not enough. But equally, one might argue that ‘the law’ is not enough. MAG 2000 expends a great deal of discursive work founding claims that government is an object of the law and a guidance-giver. Again, this could be dismissed as ‘sugaring the pill’. But if sovereign power is absolute it seems wasteful and unnecessary. Therefore, I read this as mobilising the power of the law in the service of the governance framework (after Rose & Valverde, 1998). The implication seems to be that accounts which point to the invocation of the law as indicating the demise of governmentality (Garland, 1996, 2000) are probably over-simplified.

In regard to Women’s Aid, both documents problematise and manage the agency’s credibility. Each uses female gender to undermine Women’s Aid; each manipulates the ascribed value of the voluntary sector across different readership contexts; and each is oblique about the uses to which Women’s Aid’s knowledges might be put. Perhaps the key implication from these continuities is the way in which the implied discourse of ‘just women’ is used to the detriment of Women’s Aid. It indicates the opportunities generated by female gendering activity to constitute negative femininity ascription. In particular, in MAG 2000, survivors afforded group category membership in terms of ethnicity and faith serve to disrupt the importance of those who support ‘just women’. And in HOC 1995, ‘just women’ is used to discredit feminist-led, informal, inter-agency practices.
The key shift appears to be around the consistency (or not) of how Women’s Aid’s worth is simultaneously talked up and delimited. HOC 1995’s approach seems relatively haphazard; this is perhaps because it generates a contradiction for itself with a ‘managerialist’ account of Women’s Aid’s working practices and a ‘community’ account of self-helping women. But New Labour’s management around crime/the law, organisational status and client group formulations appears more considered. In comparing the two approaches it has become apparent that what New Labour is possibly better at than the Conservatives is ‘doing’ feminism. In Chapter 6 I demonstrated the ‘doing’ of feminism as organisational naming, producing certain subjects of representation and asserting the causes of domestic violence. Attention seems to be paid to each of these three activities in both government policies where Women’s Aid is formulated.

Firstly, an attempt is made in HOC 1995 to appropriate and reformulate feminist-generated ways of working together at the local level by undermining ‘just women’ and suggesting that logically the police should be in charge. In terms of organisational naming, HOC 1995 uses what is probably Women’s Aid’s own promotional discourse for warranting the importance of the organisation. But in so doing, it generates Women’s Aid as a particular subject of representation to inter-agency initiatives; namely a politically relevant ‘by women for women’ agency which it cannot then manage. Further, the population to be governed by inter-agency working is framed as ‘women and children’; the same target population ascribed to Women’s Aid. Thus it implies the absence of a male parent and, although I have argued in Chapter 6 that this is not a very good way of ‘doing’ feminism, potentially invokes gender relational causes of domestic violence.

By comparison, New Labour’s appropriation of ‘doing’ feminism appears far more effective than that accomplished by the Conservatives. It too continues to promote the feminist-generated ways of working together at the local level but reformulated under ‘crime’; commensurate with Crawford’s (1994) account. When it names the organisation ‘Women’s Aid’, New Labour does not invoke any political dimension of meaning. Thus it elides political differences as might have been expected (see Newman, 2001). But also by manipulating Women’s Aid’s standing through variation in the way it is named, MAG 2000 exerts more control over Women’s Aid than HOC 1995 did. Further, Women’s Aid is produced as a government subject of representation to statutory agencies. It is represented to statutory bodies as valuable to their work and often crime/the law is used to shape the
relevance of Women’s Aid’s importance. Finally, notions of causes are quashed through the constitution of target populations. No children are formulated in the vicinity of Women’s Aid. Where they do appear in text to social services, Women’s Aid are absent. Additionally, “survivors” is a non-gender specific term; female gender relevance is only ascribed to it by its proximity to formulations of ‘Women’s Aid’ and where the addressee is housing authorities. Thus female gender is made apposite to agency client groups rather than domestic violence per se. And male gender is neither present nor implied.

Consequently, New Labour is seemingly accomplishing ‘doings’ of feminism to ‘undo’ feminism not only in adopting feminist-generated modes of working together and formulating “survivors”, but also through organisational naming, producing Women’s Aid as a subject of representation and managing the causes of domestic violence. On the surface, it seems like feminist discourse is being ascribed value and Women’s Aid is being rendered credible. But their political relevance is consistently delimited. Therefore, it is almost as if Women’s Aid and its ways of making meaning have been appropriated, reformulated and used upon them as modes of governance.

In the thesis conclusion which follows, I draw together the findings and implications across the four analysis chapters of the various policy discourse ‘doings’ of government, police realities and feminism.
Conclusion

This thesis has used a discursive approach to interrogate exercisings of power, including responsibilisations and truth-claims, within policy-making activities around domestic violence during the decade 1990-2000. Of specific interest have been the ‘doings’ of government, Chief Officer police realities and feminisms.

I have identified how government in producing responsibilisations of ‘reflexive government’/‘responsibilised others’ constitutes itself as ‘already responsible’. And in formulating dynamics of ‘professionalised police’/‘responsible public’, government is consistently positioned ‘at a distance’ from crime concerns ascribed as ‘local’. Variations between Conservatives and New Labour apparently do not detract from a primary rationale of mobilising governmental power to persuade rather than force. Three strategies seem key to the governance of domestic violence: problem formulation, constituting victims and forwarding working together. The main shifts across the decade point to New Labour prioritising ‘crime’ as the most ‘appropriate’ way of understanding domestic violence rather than simply rendering domestic violence a subset of crime; repositioning female gender in a discrete category of ‘violence against women’; and invoking legal rather than moral obligations for statutory agencies to work together combined with a more consistent management of Women’s Aid through notions of crime/law, ‘victim’ populations and organisational status. This would seem to indicate that ‘doings’ of government around domestic violence and female gender and across changes in political government are more worthy of note than is readily apparent in governmentalist literature.

Additionally, I have shown that within policy activities, Chief Officers of police also frame themselves as ‘already responsible’. ‘Doings’ of these police realities are accomplished, in the main, through identity-work; especially the invocation of police category membership identity pairs. Thus truth-claims and responsibilisations are located in the ascribed similarities and differences between pairings such as a Chief Constable/all Chief Constables or Chief Officers/other police staff. This device is present in both government policy-making talk in 1992 and police policy text in 2000. Thus despite contextual, discursive and audience variations, it is a common feature of Chief Officer police realities in terms of identity-work and boundary-work between police personnel and in the formulation of police/non-police divides. By contrast, the application of gender as an
occasional resource demonstrates marked differences across the decade. In 1992, female gender is mobilised when understandings of gendered violence are useful for specific transactional aims. In 2000, (female) gender is generally mobilised to undermine gender(ed) violence understandings of domestic violence. This suggests that police realities mobilise government guidance as a resource and that 'police culture' is a current viable site for interrogating the policing of domestic violence.

Further, I have demonstrated that feminist accounting in government policy activities seems less distinct than 'doing' government or police realities in that 'feminism' tends not to be rendered overtly apposite to founding truth-claims. 'Doing' feminism is, however, apparent in the activities of organisational naming, ascribing causes to domestic violence and producing subjects of representation. Some features of text and talk, such as constituting feminist organisations as the subject of representation, were indicative of accounts where feminism was 'done'. By contrast, features of talk and text which might have been expected to be indicative of non-feminist accounts, such as formulating passive women, were not a point of differentiation between 'doing' and not 'doing' feminism. The main differences between policy-making talk in 1992 and text in 2000 appear to reflect the change in position from which feminists speak. Therefore, warrants founded in women's service providers' truths give way to 'research' veracity and some exercisings of governmental power, commensurate with talking from the vantage point of government guidance, are apparent. However, 'doing' feminism is not exclusive to feminists to the extent that governments can be seen to 'do' a form of feminism too; but as a means of governing feminisms. This implies that concern about feminist participation in the government policy-making arena is well-founded.

I began with an initial exploration of how government carries out the activities of problem formulation and constituting victims within successive government policies for the policing of domestic violence (Home Office, 1990, 2000a). In terms of problem formulation, HOC 60/90 founds claims of domestic violence as gender(ed) 'crime' in truths about "public concern" and 'research'. Thus obligatory and non-police 'factual' knowledges are mobilised to persuade the police of the veracity of government's account. Domestic violence is framed as a subset of crime, one which is typified by violence against women in the home. Although offenders are gendered as male there seems a reluctance to do so consistently. Further, the government and the police are positioned in a responsibility
dynamic of ‘reflexive government’/‘responsible others’ whereby the ‘already responsible’ government’s role is formulated as ‘at a distance’ steering and guiding.

By contrast, HOC 19/2000 attempts to tell truths about ‘domestic violence as crime’ as distinct from understandings of gender(ed) violence. Themes such as “violence against women” and “women are more likely” are used to ‘de-gender the problem and re-gender the blame’ (Berns, 2001). Moral argumentation is employed to suggest that gender(ed) violence may be a viable way of understanding domestic violence but not in the crime context where it undermines the seriousness of what happens to male and same sex partner victims. When viewed as a dialogue with HOC 60/90 as its predecessor, HOC 19/2000 can be seen to be countering previous government persuasions to the police about domestic violence. Thus this government, presented as more ‘reflexive’ and more thoroughly ‘already responsible’, does set itself in a responsibility dynamic with the police as ‘responsible others’. But this relation is indirectly invoked in a persuasion, the key transactional business of which seems to be to undermine the government of 1990 not the police per se.

In regard to constituting victims, the competing accounts of female gender enshrined in each document are furthered. The key themes from HOC 60/90 for guiding police intervention with victims are “support” and “protection”. Each generates women, either as active and in need of help to self-actualise by going to court or as passive and free from responsibilities but upon whom protective interventions are justified. In HOC 19/2000, the key themes are “needs” and “safety”. These are used to generate ethnically and sexually diverse victims with choices and rights not to be delimited by criminal justice system aims and, apparently, without responsibilities for their self-actualisation.

To some extent these finding are commensurate with what one might expect from a governmental approach. Policy does appear to be employed as a technology of governance (Shore & Wright, 1997) as its key strategy for governing ‘at a distance’ seems to be persuasion (Miller, 1986; Rose, 1999a, 2000); it frames ‘good government’ as a problematising and correcting activity which includes an account of those to be governed (Rose & Miller, 1992); and ‘reflexive government’ is an important formulation as ascribing and claiming responsibility (Dean, 1999). However, these findings also indicate more. Firstly, the theme of ‘the already responsible government’ is strong and seems to found
claims that 'doing' policy practically fulfils government's responsibility to 'do' government. In examining shifts between political governments it is clear that New Labour is more adept at tying up the loose ends that might facilitate countering its version of 'good government'.

Secondly, the domestic violence "support" victims of HOC 60/90 comply with a governmentalist account of 'bad' or 'failing' citizens in need of expert help in order to self-actualise (Rose, 2000). But the "protection" victims undermine governmentalist expectation (Rose, 2000) that citizens will be required to take responsibility for their own risk. By contrast, the victims of HOC 19/2000, through "safety" discourse, are positioned as able to exercise choice and play a part in managing their own risk. But although ascribed rights, there is an apparent absence of accompanying responsibilisation and/or experts to assist in their self-actualisation. Whether these victim formulations are peculiar to the domestic violence context or similar to those of other crime policies is beyond the scope of this research. Thirdly, female gendering has only recently been named as a governmentalist concern (Rose & Valverde, 1998). Yet, these findings indicate that female gender is an important contested terrain in governmental attempts to problematise and correct domestic violence through its policing.

From a feminist perspective, this analysis underlines the importance of inclusive feminist politics (Butler, 1992; Coote, 2000; Kelly, 1996; Mouffe, 1992). New Labour have associated individuality of need with diversity of bona fide victimhood. Thus accounts that see domestic violence as 'just' gender(ed) violence are positioned in a moral low ground that ignores the real sufferings of others. It is not problematic in and of itself for New Labour to formulate victims who are not exclusively women. Indeed it can be read as a responsible response to claims that other victims have needs not previously attended to by the police (Haymes, 2000; Kibblewhite, 2000). And it can be seen as an improvement that victims have been afforded rights and autonomies. However, the way diverse victims are talked up is accomplished to the detriment of gendered understandings of domestic violence and those who forward them in 'inappropriate' contexts. Thus there seems to be a real danger, as suggested by Kelly (1996) and Mouffe (1992), that feminists, having seemingly gained status for their knowledges and their work, could once more be marginalised if their political stances are understood as exclusionary.
Moreover, “violence against women” is not commensurate with accounts of gender relational violence. It renders violent men invisible (Dobash & Dobash, 2000; Itzin, 2000) and formulates women’s bodies as the sites where violences are committed (Smart, 1992). Thus it generates opportunities to blame women for what happens to them and/or to frame ‘being’ women as ‘the problem’. Consequently, in New Labour’s rendering of female gender as problematic and its absences of victim responsibilisation and police responsibility to help them self-actualise, there is space for some other experts to do corrective work with women as women. And this may indicate the role government envisages for feminists.

A further problem that I had with governmentalist approaches was the absence of any accounts of resistances to exercisings of governmental power (Kemshall & Maguire, 2001; Miller, 2001; Stenson, 2000). This can give the impression that ‘doing’ government is a fait accompli (O’Malley, 2001). Therefore, it seemed appropriate to explore police policy discourse on domestic violence which was contemporary to the government guidance of HOC 60/90 and HOC 19/2000. Chief Officers, for whom policy is a key policing activity, were present at HASC in 1992 but no public domain account of consultation with them in 2000 was produced by government. I have argued that the national and international dissemination by the Met Police of their 2000 domestic violence policy (MPS 2000a) can be understood as Chief Officers positioning the Met as national, and possibly world, leaders in the matter; an action counter to ACPO’s current attempts to keep a low profile (Savage et al, 2001). As such, it is an exercising of power, laying claim to expertise and generating secondary audiences for the document. Consequently, like HASC it affords opportunities to ‘do’ Chief Officer police realities around domestic violence policy. Theoretically and methodologically, I considered police realities as ‘doings’ that would be demonstrable in identity-work, boundary-work and the mobilisation of gender as an occasional resource.

The majority of police realities’ work in both talk and text is accomplished through invoking a variety of identities; sometimes these are non-police related such as ‘a reasonable man’ or someone who ‘sees the bigger picture’; but more common is the formulation of police officer category membership pairs within which are located claims to being ‘already responsible’. For example, juxtapositionings of ‘Chief Constable’ and ‘all Chief Constables’ are formulated to argue why activities and understandings are ‘correct’.
In policy-making talk these usages can be seen to be managing immediate challenges from a non-police audience although they may also have resonance for the junior officers present. In policy text, the primary dialogue concerns warranting the authority of the account to other ranks, although a wider non-police audience may experience the performative effects of ‘already responsible’ managers. Thus this Chief Officer rhetorical device combines identity-work and boundary-work through category entitlement, agreement across witnesses, contrast and general/particular shifts in terms of who is positioned as the best person to tell the truth.

Boundary-work does appear to be a major orientation of Chief Officer talk and text. Chief Officer talk in 1992 seemed most concerned with formulating barriers to the Chief Officer fulfilment of their responsibilities. Themes such as “public expectation” and the nature of “attitudes” and “organisations” were used to claim that Chief Officers were doing all they could in the face of such impediments. Further, police responsibilities were fenced off from “other agencies” and as “a matter for them”. The primary transactional business of MPS 2000a was problem formulation; specifically the constitution of the discrete categories of “domestic violence” and “hate crime”. This document too drew organisational responsibility boundaries, although by contrast, “needs” was used to argue what did come within the police remit rather than as an exclusionary device per se. Further, the mobilisation of gender as an occasionally useful resource was demonstrable in boundary-work. Thus in 1992, arguments that delimited what the police could reasonably be expected to do mobilised notions of women’s mental health but resisted notions of women’s protection. And in 2000, “lesbian” was used to make female gender relevant to “hate crime” only in terms of sexuality and “regardless of gender” was used to undermine understandings of “domestic violence” as gender(ed) violence.

In regard to resistances to, and recontextualisations of, government guidance, there is a key difference between policy talk and text. In HASC, the Chief Officer can be seen to be raising local and immediate resistance to the questions asked. Thus commensurate with Conversation Analytic understandings (e.g. Wooffitt, 2001), everything that occurs in this talk-in-interaction is accountable for in terms of what is physically there. Certainly the possible effects for the junior officers present and comparisons to truths claimed in HOC 60/90 might be explored but they are neither directly demonstrable nor necessary for analysing the talk. By contrast, the MPS 2000a text produces versions that integrally make
no sense unless wider discourses are considered. And Conversation Analysts would argue that that is why talk is, and text is not, appropriate data material. Therefore, unpacking non-literal dialogues requires subscription to Foucauldian understandings of discourse (e.g. Carabine, 2001). From this perspective, MPS 2000a can be seen to engage with HOC 19/2000 victim formulations and accounts of domestic violence as gender(ed). But perhaps most interestingly, these too are treated as occasional resources rather than strict guiding principles.

Consequently, Chief Officer police realities can be seen as formidable truth-making machines. This would perhaps come as no surprise to those who have conducted research on the police (e.g. Stanko, 1989, 1994b; Waddington, 1993, 1999). But typically police culture has been reified (Chatterton, 1983; Reiner, 1992; Waddington, 1999); rather than unpacked as a 'verb' (Street, 1993). Police realities seem to constitute and shore up the organisation itself (Foucault, 1982; Wright, 1994); notional boundaries are 'policed' (McLaughlin & Murji, 1997; Tracy & Anderson, 1999; Whalen & Zimmerman, 1990); identity-work is used to undermine competing versions (Fletcher, 1991); and gender politics is accomplished (Auburn et al, 1995; Wowk, 1984). These aspects of 'doing' police realities are demonstrable in the main because of the influence of Conversation Analysis on participants' relevance to categories in identity-work (Widdicombe, 1993, 1998). Consequently, instead of looking for culture in what the police say, I started from the point of considering how 'being' police officers is made relevant to truth-claims and responsibilisations.

From a feminist perspective, there are two considerations arising from this analysis. Firstly, in the 1970s and 1980s, feminist critique of police culture and its relationship to the policing of domestic violence was common (e.g. Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Dunhill, 1989; Southall Black Sisters, 1989). As domestic violence became a distinct government policy domain (Home Office, 1990) and feminists became government domestic violence policy-making participants (HASC, 1993b), this site of enquiry seems to have slipped from academic currency. Based on the findings of this thesis, I would argue that overlooking police realities in this way is problematic. Secondly, the key strength of both 'doing' government and 'doing' police realities seems to be accomplished in 'reflexive government' and identity-work. Positioning the relevance and entitlement of the speaker within accounts seems to found boundary-work, including the constitution of categories,
victims and truths. Therefore, in the project of making feminism relevant to participation (Kelly, 1999), some form of self-presentation as feminist may be important to mobilising power in the service of feminist aims.

However, an exploration of potentially feminist policy-making talk in 1992 and text, under the rubric of government policy-making guidance, in 2000, seems to indicate that feminist identity-work is at best implicit. ‘Doing’ feminism is most apparent in organisational naming, forwarding causes of domestic violence which are not permissive of women blaming and formulating certain subjects of representation. Likely indicators that feminism was being accomplished comprised mobilising ‘research’ to found claims of women as truth-tellers; explicit formulations of male against female gender relational violence; rendering female gender apposite to service providers; producing feminist organisations as the subject of representation; and invoking power relations such as police sexism. Discursive features that might have been expected to indicate whether or not feminism was being ‘done’, but which, in practice, did not, were constitutions of ‘women and children’, promoting the primacy of criminal justice interventions and generating passive women.

The people whose talk and text were analysed in this regard were neither exclusively women nor feminists. Participation in the 1992 HASC oral evidence session was dependent on the category entitlement of ‘non-statutory service providers’. By contrast, the qualification for participation in the What Works? memoranda of 2000, seems to be ‘academic researchers’. Thus despite the majority of participants ‘being’ feminist, feminism did not constitute the grounds for taking part. Whether this led to a reluctance to render feminism overtly relevant to proceedings is unclear. As might have been expected from such a shift, ‘research’ became a primary warrant in 2000. This seems to have produced some benefits and disadvantages in terms of ‘doing’ feminism. The advantages appear to be that directly naming feminist organisations, especially Women’s Aid, and founding claims in the accounts of women survivors have become legitimised ways of telling truths in the government policy-making arena. The main disbenefit is that the relevance of ‘by women for women’ service provision has become increasingly implicit. Thus although “Women’s Aid” suggests ‘women helping women’ it neither explicitly warrants “women working in refuges and shelters” nor invokes the political dimension of “our experience” as produced by a representative of Southall Black Sisters.
Another difference in ‘doing’ feminism across the decade appears to concern abiding by the ‘rules of engagement’ as set by the contextual positioning of the speakers. This is apparent in three features of the talk and text. Firstly, in HASC there are occasions where the witnesses attempt to subvert the line of questioning and appropriate it for specific truth-telling activity. Although in 1992, Mrs Horley, in particular, is rendered immediately invisible for her ‘digression’, it remains part of the public record. If such subversions occur in the What Works? memoranda they are less obvious. Secondly, the 2000 documents all have the same main heading and are circumscribed in length which gives an overall impression of uniformity despite the different truths emanating from them. In HASC both Mrs Horley and Miss Patel draw attention to how their accounts differ from the others being presented. And I think that de-stabilising notions of a united feminist front in this way, renders ‘feminism’ less manageable to governmental exercisings of power.

Thirdly, the What Works? memoranda position feminists as givers of government guidance to local crime prevention initiatives. Consequently, they have access to, and some demonstrate the exercising of, the governmental power which that position affords. The positive aspect of this is that feminist truths are lent a certain authority. The downside, as I see it, is that ‘lent’ is the operative word. At this moment in historical and geographical time and place, government renders ‘academic researchers’ who will say What Works? in reducing the crime of domestic violence ‘appropriate’ givers of guidance in the government’s name. But ‘feminist’ participation in future activities is not assured as it is not presented as a condition of, or having relevance to, taking part. Further, as is apparent from both government and Chief Officer discourse in 2000, (female) gender is increasingly being undermined as apposite to domestic violence. Consequently, the governmentalist suggestion that ‘indigenous knowledges’, particularly those of non-statutory participants, may well have a ‘shelf-life’ in policy activities (Shore & Wright, 1997), seems to me a real danger for feminisms.

This concern also seems to be somewhat borne out by an interrogation of government policies for ‘working together’. Both the Conservatives and New Labour framed domestic violence as a local crime issue in this regard. Home Office Circular 1995 and MAG 2000 produce the responsibility dynamic of ‘reflexive government’ and ‘responsible others’ whereby government is positioned as already fulfilling all of its responsibilities. The key shift for warranting this version of reality, reflected in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998,
was from moral obligation to legal obligation on the part of statutory agencies. Thus the Conservative government is framed as occupying the moral high-ground and New Labour is formulated as a 'good' subject of the law as the main category entitlement for their appropriateness as guidance givers. From a governmentalist perspective, it is interesting how New Labour mobilises the power of the law (Rose & Valverde, 1998). New Labour seems overly concerned with retaining the sense that they are persuading rather than forcing statutory agencies to comply. Indeed, the Crime and Disorder Act is presented as having appeared from nowhere and subjecting all statutory bodies to legal obligations. Thus Garland’s account (1996, 2001) of governmental power as sovereign power with a benign facade may be over-simplistic.

Both documents problematise and attempt to manage “Women’s Aid”. In HOC 1995, Women’s Aid is lauded as a well-organised and appropriate ‘by women for women’ agency. But these same formulations are used to locate it firmly in the non-professional voluntary sector. When inter-agency initiatives are forwarded, the gender of women’s service providers is framed as not relevant and the purpose of their participation is made oblique. Individual guidance to the police and housing authorities positions non-gendered “refuges” as short-term, protection repositories for women. For the police, this produces an organisational responsibility boundary and for housing authorities this produces respite from their long-term responsibilities. Overall, there is a sense that talking up “Women’s Aid” with ‘professional’ discourse has necessitated a clumsy correction of the ‘professionalised police/responsibilised public’ dynamic. By comparison, MAG 2000, has a consistent set of rationales for managing the relevance of “Women’s Aid”. Notions of crime/law, organisational status and ‘victim’ populations are manipulated to position “Women’s Aid” differently in dynamics with multi-agency initiatives, individual agencies and various tasks with the same statutory agency. But like HOC 1995, the uses to which Women’s Aid’s knowledges might be put is not always made explicit.

From a feminist perspective, the shifts in New Labour’s formulations of “Women’s Aid” are cause for concern. The additions in 2000 are an increase in the organisational naming of “Women’s Aid” and the preferred term of “survivors” in proximity to “Women’s Aid”. But the absences from 1995 comprise warranting Women’s Aid on its principles, structure and the relevance of its ‘by women for women’ empowerment ethic; and the consistent gendering of the population to be governed as female. The additions led me to consider
whether or not governments in producing a feminist organisation and an active population as its subjects of representation were ‘doing’ feminism. The absences seemed to indicate that governmental power may be appropriating feminist ‘doings’ to ‘undo’ feminism and govern Women’s Aid in line with government aims.

For both governments, feminist-generated ways of working together at the local level have been adopted. The suggestion that they may have been appropriated and reformulated in line with ‘crime’ aims (Radford, 2003) is supported by the evidence from HOC 1995 in the way it attempts to undermine ‘just women’ and position the police in charge. MAG 2000 continues these notions of crime-orientated multi-agency working arrangements. But there is also a sense that ‘doing’ feminism, in terms of organisational naming, producing (feminist) subjects of representation and attuning to gender(ed) understandings of the causes of domestic violence, is accomplished.

HOC 1995 names Women’s Aid frequently, but mainly in one place where the text, including framing Women’s Aid as a ‘by women for women’ organisation, seems to come from Women’s Aid promotional literature. As a politicised and professionalised subject of representation this formulation of Women’s Aid proves problematic and it and the female gender of service providers are absented in inter-agency, police and housing authority persuasions where “refuges” is the preferred term. Also in constituting the population to be governed as ‘women and children’, HOC 1995 ‘does’ a form of feminism, albeit an inadvisable one, in that it implies an absent male parent and allows for understandings of gendered violence.

By comparison, MAG 2000 names Women’s Aid regularly around a variety of single and joint agency activities. But Women’s Aid, other than the implied gender of service providers and users is not elucidated. Thus as a subject of representation it is not politicised only gendered. There is also some evidence that understandings of causes are being managed. Thus no children are constituted in text near Women’s Aid. Where children are present in text on social services, Women’s Aid is absent. Also “survivors” as a non-gendered term means that female gender is made relevant to it only through the client group concerns of Women’s Aid and housing authorities. Consequently, female gender is rendered apposite to agencies not domestic violence per se.
The implications for feminisms are twofold. Firstly, ‘doing’ feminism in terms of organisational naming, producing (feminist) subjects of representation and attuning to the (gendered) causes of domestic violence are not bounded to feminism. That is the activities that can be used to ‘do’ feminism can equally be used to ‘undo’ it. This suggests that New Labour’s attempts to elide political differences (Newman, 2001) are facilitated by the current ‘doing’ of feminism. Secondly, MAG 2000 does not address its persuasions directly to the voluntary sector but as prospective participants ascribed value, they can be assumed as anticipated readers. Therefore, the gendering of “survivors” through organisational client groups, could indirectly be a persuasion to Women’s Aid to remain in the multi-agency arena in order to keep female gender relevant.

Within this thesis, I was concerned with exploring the ‘doing’ of government as exercisings of power in conjunction with the ‘doings’ of Chief Officer police realities and feminisms as potential resistances. Because of this three-part focus and an interest in shifts across the decade 1990-2000, some absences have necessarily been incurred, either due to restrictions in space or questions that the selected data simply could not address. Therefore in the final part of this conclusion, I outline some of the possible further directions for research arising from this study.

Firstly, the absence I most regret concerns the ‘doing’ of feminism around diverse subjects of representation. Butler (1990, 1992) poses key questions for feminists about how representation and inclusion can be satisfactorily managed; particularly as designating who is ‘in’ necessarily incurs designating who is ‘out’. I did look at how variations in victim formulations by government and the police potentially threaten to marginalise those who are not inclusive with their representational politics (Coote, 2000; Kelly, 1996; Mouffe, 1992). And I looked at differences in active/passive women formulations (Chapter 6). But diversity in terms of sexuality and ethnicity did appear in both HASC and the What Works? memoranda. Thus there were data to pursue this question but the three-part focus and the primacy of themes arising from the texts meant that this important area was under-interrogated.

Secondly, although this research looks at shifts between policy activities across changes in political government, a single government focus would have produced different emphases. Therefore, a prospect for future research would be to trace a discrete policy-making process
from start to finish. For example, HASC 1992/3, its written and oral submissions, the
government response, the consequent debate in parliament and the final production of
HOC 1995 would have satisfied such an approach. This would generate an opportunity to
trace the progression of key themes, such as ‘domestic violence as crime’ and ‘domestic
violence as gender(ed) violence’, over a three year period but within the same transactional
business. And it would allow for government talk rather than just text to be considered.
Alternatively, the focus could be on New Labour’s second term as domestic violence has
continued to evolve as a governable matter (Home Office, 2003b).

Thirdly, I had significantly more findings on police talk and text than could be
accommodated in this work. Their written submissions to, and oral evidence session
before, HASC 1992/3 could have supported a whole thesis in their own right. I focused on
ACPO-ranked Chief Officers but representatives of The Superintendents’ Association and
The Police Federation participated too. Thus competing versions of police realities were
actively (sometimes bitterly) contested with the Chair of the Committee keeping order and
fuelling the conflict in equal parts. Whilst these are exciting data to interrogate there is a
very serious point to be made. Waddington (1993) argues that despite appearances to the
contrary, it is rank and file officers, those who do patrol duties and who are represented by
The Police Federation who actually make policy on the street. Thus negotiations and
contestations between police accounts of reality is likely to have something important to
contribute to policy debates.

Finally, much feminist critique of multi-agency working explores power struggles between
the police and feminists at the local level (Gregory & Lees, 1999; Grace, 1999; Hague,
1999). Detailed work has been conducted in this regard (Abrar et al, 2000; Kelly, 1999;
Kelly et al, 1999). But discursive work has not. In this thesis, I have identified ways that
police realities and feminisms are accomplished and demonstrable. Whilst this approach
has not produced much in the way of good news for feminisms it has elucidated some of
the pitfalls they may face. Thus I believe that discursive enquiry into local multi-agency
activities could be useful to feminists who participate.
## Glossary

Although referenced within the main text, this list provides a full account of the most commonly used acronyms within this thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Conversation Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Crime and Disorder Act 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Discourse Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVU</td>
<td>Domestic violence unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Foucauldian Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>HASC</td>
<td>Home Affairs Select Committee</td>
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<td>HOC</td>
<td>Home Office Circular</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRA</td>
<td>Human Rights Act 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSPU</td>
<td>London Strategic Policy Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG 2000</td>
<td>Multi-agency Guidance (Home Office, 2000a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Also ‘the Met’ and ‘Met Police’, the Metropolitan Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBS</td>
<td>Southall Black Sisters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAF (E)</td>
<td>Women’s Aid Federation (of England)</td>
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Appendix 2

Extract Conventions

1. General

Some conventions are common to the presentation of all extracts. Thus:-

- The Extract Number refers to the chronological positioning of the extract within the chapter as a whole, regardless of chapter part, section, subsection or source document.
- (...) at the beginning and/or the end of an extract indicates that the paragraph from which the data are extracted has not been included in its entirety. Where extracts follow directly on from one another this is made clear in the accompanying text. Where absences between extracts are due to concerns of brevity, this is made explicit.
- The line numbering starts from line one at the beginning of the document. It is meant to be useful for analytical reference but also to give the reader some indication of where the data appear in the text in relation to each other.
- (sic) indicates a typing error in the original.

2. Home Office Circulars and MAG 2000 variations

a) HOC 60/90:

Extract 4 [HOC 60/90 (18: Action after the incident)]:

248 (…) Many women will be in a state of shock when the
249 police first arrive, and unable to contemplate the prospect of
250 a court case. (…)

- (18: Action after the incident) reproduces the paragraph number and the relevant subheading that appears in the document.

b) HOC 19/2000

Extract 10 [HOC 19/2000 (Nature & Extent of Problem, 6th paragraph)]:

92 (…) The
93 practical consequences for women, in terms of accommodation,
94 finances and childcare responsibilities are also likely to be more
95 serious.
• The main difference concerns more detailed location information, e.g. (Nature & Extent of Problem, 6th paragraph). HOC 19/2000 is considerably longer than its predecessor. Therefore, information in addition to the subheading is provided for the reader to locate the text in situ.

c) HOC 1995


235 4.2 The Government’s approach is based on the
236 premise that domestic violence is a serious crime
237 which must not be tolerated. (…)

• The only additional remarkable feature of HOC 1995 is that all paragraphs are numbered within the original. Thus ‘4.2’ is a faithful reproduction. And (4) indicates the main subheading as numbered (and named) in the actual document.

d) MAG 2000

Extract 11 [MAG 2000 (1): Introduction, paragraph 1.3]:

114 Partnership working is essential to providing a comprehensive response
115 to the wide range of needs that domestic violence survivors may have. (…)

• Again all conventions are consistent with the thesis presentation. The main difference concerns the page width of the actual document.

3. Home Affairs Select Committee oral evidence sessions

Extract 3 [HASC 1993b: 240]:

1212 Mrs Roche: Yes, thank you. Paragraph 16 of the
1213 evidence we have had from the Metropolitan Police
1214 refers to psychological abuse and mental cruelty as
1215 examples of domestic violence. (…)

• [HASC 1993b: 240] reproduces the paragraph number (240) allocated within the original. Within HASC 1993b, the paragraph numbers run consecutively through all the
oral sessions as a whole. Thus there is only one ‘240’ and the police session begins at paragraph 178.

- Names of participants are not emboldened in the original. This has been added by me for presentational clarity.

**Transcription conventions**

It is apparent that this talk has been ‘tidied up’ into sentences. Heavy use of the comma is used to accomplish this, rather than indicating pauses per se. The question mark is also frequently used and may be understood as rising intonation. A unique feature seem to be a long hyphen. On occasion this marks an interruption in mid-sentence. At other times, it appears to demonstrate a means of keeping a sentence structured as a sentence, not unlike the use of the comma.

4. Metropolitan Police policy document (MPS, 2000a)

*Extract 9 [MPS 2000a (Annex A: 4th paragraph)]:*

4/1 Domestic violence
4/2 Domestic violence is any incident of threatening behaviour,
4/3 violence or abuse (…)

*Extract 12 [MPS 2000a (Crime Manager: p.18, 1st paragraph)]:*

(….) At every contact with the victim, their needs and risks should be reassessed to give the appropriate level of support.

The main difference is that this text is printed in a very wide format. Thus its lines do not fit onto the line allowance of A4 paper. Thus:-

- The line numbering (e.g. 4/2) is fictitious. The ‘4’ indicates the paragraph position under its relevant heading. But the ‘6’ is simply the sixth line this paragraph produces when I put it into the widest format that my paper space allows. I did consider presenting each line of the text on a line and a half of A4 but it jarred visually.
- Where extracts were very small and the line numbers were not likely to be referenced within the analysis, they were omitted to eradicate confusion around the line numbering system.
5. What Works? memoranda

Extract 10 [What Works? Civil Law (Edwards (2000b)):

179  • The police and courts are making good use of the
180     FLA. (...) 

• Bullet points are a common feature of the documents and are reproduced accordingly.
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