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|DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link:||http://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00169|
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A linguistic theory is correct exactly to the extent that it is the explicit statement of a body of knowledge possessed by a designated language-user. This popular psychological conception of the goal of linguistic theorizing is commonly paired with a preference for idiolectal over social languages, where it seems to be in the nature of idiolects that the beliefs one holds about one's own are ipso facto correct. Unfortunately, it is also plausible that the correctness of a genuine belief cannot consist merely in that belief's being held. This paper considers how best to eliminate this tension.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Extra Information:||The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com|
|Keywords:||idiolects; philosophy of language; philosophy of linguistics; epistemology of language; objectivity of knowledge|
|Academic Unit/Department:||Arts > Philosophy
|Depositing User:||Alexander Barber|
|Date Deposited:||20 Nov 2006|
|Last Modified:||23 Feb 2016 20:58|
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