Social psychology and citizenship: a critical perspective

Journal Item

How to cite:

For guidance on citations see FAQs.

© 2019 John Wiley Sons Ltd.

Version: Accepted Manuscript

Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1111/spc3.12432

Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies page.
Social psychology and citizenship: a critical perspective

Eleni Andreouli
The Open University

Accepted for publication in Social and Personality Psychology Compass, December 2018

Abstract

The paper advances a critical social psychological approach to the study of citizenship. It builds upon recent social psychological work on the subject, particularly in discursive and rhetorical psychology but also other critical approaches such as social representations theory. The paper also borrows insights from the interdisciplinary field of citizenship studies in order to conceptualise citizenship in both its conventional (enacting well-established scripts of political action) and its transformative aspects (making rights claims that are disruptive of established scripts). The paper is divided in five sections. The first section considers the relationship between social psychology and citizenship; the second section offers a conceptualisation of citizenship that takes under consideration citizens’ practices from the ground up and constraints posed by existing norms and laws; the third section considers the value of adding citizenship into the social psychological conceptual toolkit. The fourth more substantive section advances a critical social psychological approach to citizenship which focuses on the study of the different ways that ‘ordinary’ political actors engage with political matters in the mundane practices of everyday life. The last section concludes the paper and makes some suggestions for future directions, such as the study of emerging forms of citizenship through a more nuanced examination of intersecting political affiliations.

1. The relationship between psychology and citizenship

There is a profound relationship between psychology and citizenship. In his 1989 book Governing the Soul, the sociologist of knowledge Nikolas Rose traced the role of ‘psy disciplines’ in producing human subjects, particularly the autonomous subject of choice and self-realisation of the end of the 20th century in liberal democracies. The critique that psychological theory and research, especially in its Anglo-Saxon tradition (Farr, 1996), has suffered from a tendency to psychologise social phenomena is well-established (e.g. De Vos, 2014). What is more, psychology itself has been consequential in producing the subject as an individual that is, first and foremost, a free and active agent. This has implications for how citizenship in modern liberal democracies is understood and enacted:

“The political subject is now less a social citizen with powers and obligations deriving from membership of a collective body, than an individual whose citizenship is to be manifested through the free exercise of personal choice among a variety of marketed options” (Rose, 1989/1999, p. 230).

More recently, the role of behavioural economics, drawing on the behavioural tradition of psychology, in technologies of governance (e.g. ‘behaviour change’ type policies) has also started to be examined (Jones, Pykett & Whitehead 2013). Isin’s (2004) ‘neurotic citizen’
further illustrates the role of psychoanalytic knowledge in producing a new political subject that is expected to self-govern by managing its affect.

The examples above illustrate not only the intimate links between the discipline of psychology and citizenship, through the psychologisation of society and the governmentality of the state, but also, more broadly, the necessity of exploring citizenship as a phenomenon that manifests itself both in societal norms, institutions and structures and in psychological subjectivities and intersubjective relations. This would suggest that social psychology is ideally placed to study citizenship. However, this has largely not been the case. As just one example, the 2017 896-page *Oxford Handbook of Citizenship* (Shachar et al., 2017) does not contain any social psychological contributions. Similarly, social psychology handbooks do not include citizenship as a topic of study and citizenship does not usually feature in their subject index (e.g. Deaux & Snyder, 2012; Kruglanski & Higgins, 2007; Hogg & Cooper, 2007). Nevertheless, there has historically been some social psychological work on the topic and, more recently, citizenship has emerged as a subject of renewed interest in the discipline.

In their review of social psychological literature on citizenship, Stevenson, Dixon, Hopkins and Luyt (2015) observe that citizenship research has early roots in social psychology (see also Loredo-Narciani & Castro-Tejerina, 2013), reflecting early scholars’ (such as Gordon Allport’s) interest in enhancing citizens’ democratic participation. While, in the context of the broader de-politicisation and individualisation of the discipline, these critical concerns did not flourish at the time, there has been some work on citizenship in the discipline. According to Stevenson et al. (2015), this has concentrated in three areas: organisational psychology (which studies issues such as citizenship behaviour in organisations), community psychology (with studies on active participation in community settings), and constructionist citizenship (which examines how citizenship is actively constructed in discourse).

In her oft-cited 2011 introduction to a special issue on social psychology and citizenship, Condor made a case for developing a social psychology of citizenship. Condor argued that longstanding social psychological interests and concepts (such as group conflict, social cohesion, and identity, to name a few) are very relevant to the concept of citizenship and that a social psychology that studies “the tensions inherent in everyday understandings and experiences of citizenship in concrete social encounters” (p. 197) is a fruitful avenue of research. Condor’s was not the first special issue on the topic (see Sanchez-Mazas & Klein, 2003), but it did seem to spark a growing interest in the social psychological study of citizenship. It is telling that two more social psychological special issues on citizenship have since been published (Stevenson et al., 2015; Xenitidou & Sapoutzis, 2018). Papers in these special issues range a variety of topics, but identity construction and exclusionary practices (for example, in contexts of immigration and inter-cultural and inter-ethnic relations), have been at the forefront.

This more recent work in the social psychology of citizenship, inspired by Condor (2011) and also Haste’s (2004) earlier work, generally falls under a constructionist approach. This approach studies the contested nature of the meanings and practices of citizenship from the perspectives of citizens themselves. This will be the focus of this paper and it will be elaborated in the fourth section of this paper. In the third section, I explain why citizenship
might be usefully incorporated into the conceptual toolkit of social psychology. In the second section that follows, I consider what is meant by citizenship, focusing on the dynamics between convention and transformation.

2. Conceptualising citizenship: conventional and transformative aspects

Citizenship does not have an agreed upon definition. The debates surrounding the definition of citizenship have been helpfully summarised by Condor (2011) in terms of four axes: boundaries of citizenship (its relation to other related concepts), dimensions of citizenship (e.g. civil, political and social citizenship rights, as in Marshall’s (1964) well-known work), models of citizenship (e.g. liberal and communitarian definitions), and criteria of membership of the polity (e.g. *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*).

What most theorisations of citizenship share is a focus on the nation-state. Citizenship is routinely seen as citizenship of the nation-state and it is studied in terms of the state institutions that support it. This is not surprising given the ‘banality’ (Billig, 1995) of considering the nation as a natural form of community and the nation-state as the ultimate form of political organisation. This is however problematic for several reasons. Firstly, nation-states are in reality multi-national and multi-ethnic, so equating citizenship with national citizenship reproduces the myth of the homogeneous nation that is neatly aligned with the body politic (Cohen, 1999). Also, while it is true that many struggles over citizenship have to do with contests over the definitions of national membership (e.g. in immigration politics), the national/non-national distinction is not the only source of political exclusion nor the only stake in citizenship rights struggles. Some examples of differentiated forms of citizenship (Young, 1989) are sexual citizenship, ecological citizenship and multicultural citizenship, each of which corresponds to a different set of rights claims and a different nexus of political interests as well as different sites of political struggle (e.g. in the intimate sphere in sexual citizenship; see Lister, 2007). Finally, a state-centred approach to citizenship places undue emphasis on state actors and tends to neglect other political actors, most notably, citizens themselves (Andreouli, Kadianaki & Xenitidou, 2016). This latter point is particularly important for social psychology whose raison d’être, in all its contested variants, is precisely to study phenomena at the intersection of the social and individual levels of analysis. Ultimately, top-down approaches are better for explaining how political arrangements are maintained rather than how they might change from the ground up.

Considering these issues, citizenship can be understood as relating to both the conventional (citizenship as enacting one’s status by conforming to rules and norms) and the transgressive/transformative (citizenship as engaging in political acts which seek to challenge the status quo). The former refers to the normative and legal framework that defines who is a citizen (the criteria of membership in a polity) and what rights stem from that status (the ‘contents’ of citizenship). This framework can be understood as a citizenship regime\(^1\). Citizenship regimes are embedded in political histories and ideological traditions which can make them very hard to challenge. For example, the UK’s laws on citizenship and

---

\(^1\) Citizenship regimes can be defined as: “institutionalized systems of formal and informal norms that define access to membership, as well as rights and duties associated with membership, within a polity” (Vink, 2017, p.222).
integration can be traced back to the country’s imperial roots (Favell, 1998). At a ‘lived’ level, from the perspectives of citizens, conventional citizenship takes the form of habitus (Isin, 2009). It refers to enacting one’s status in an established political field by acting out already existing scripts of political behaviour, for example, participating as a citizen by voting in elections.

But, citizenship is both about invoking and about breaking conventions (Isin, 2017; Saward, 2013). Citizens do not just obey the rules; they can, and they do, contest them. They also make claims about the meanings and scope of the rights they hold (e.g. extending marriage rights to gay couples) and about new rights they want established (e.g. the ‘right to be forgotten’ in the digital age). As Isin (2017) observes, “citizenship is practiced not only by exercising [given] rights, but also by claiming them” (p. 501). In that sense, citizenship can take the form of acts, which are disruptive events that challenge existing scripts (Isin, 2009).

An example of acts of citizenship are acts of civil disobedience. Through acts of civil disobedience, citizens disrupt established scripts of citizenship behaviour, which entail abiding to the law. By making new claims about their rights as citizens, they ultimately, contest and renegotiate the meanings of citizenship itself. One such case is the ‘I don’t pay movement’ in Greece whereby citizens refused to pay tolls as a means of protesting against austerity measures implemented during the country’s economic crisis. Not paying tolls can be seen as an act of citizenship in that it challenges the norm of the tax-paying citizen as the ‘good citizen’ and instead puts forward a vision of citizenship that is based on an anti-austerity agenda. Citizenship in this sense is performative (Isin, 2017): it is about the very act of making rights claims, not the condition of holding a citizenship status. In other words, it is acting as a citizen that constitutes one as a political subject, rather than one’s status. Individuals and groups who are not formally recognised as citizens can act as such by engaging in acts of citizenship. An example are undocumented migrants who organise themselves politically to demand more rights (e.g. the sans-papiers movement in the 1990s) and, in that process, they challenge and transform the status quo that marginalises them as non-citizens. Through these acts of citizenship, migrants constitute themselves as citizens, that is, as subjects who have the right to claim rights (Isin, 2009).

3. Adding citizenship to the conceptual toolkit of social psychology

Citizenship can be a valuable concept for social psychologists who want to explore the complex dynamics of political struggles as enacted by citizens themselves operating within and against the constraints of an existing political field. To be fair, social psychology has a history of studying political matters (Andreouli & Figgou, 2019). For example, the study of intergroup relations (Tajfel, 1982), obedience to authority (e.g. Milgram, 1974), and social influence (e.g. Moscovici, 1976) are just a few research traditions that have sought to provide solutions to important political questions, such as the rise of fascism in the first half of the 20th century. Perhaps social identity is the closest social psychological term to citizenship, not least because (national of other) identity can function as the ‘glue’ linking together individuals belonging in a (national or other) political community. This is certainly a fruitful area of research along with many others in social psychology. Nevertheless, citizenship, as a concept that allows us to theorise how social agents engage with political struggles, can broaden the field of vision of social psychology by bringing to focus the study of political action and subjectivity as a field of study in its own right. Instead of ‘stretching’
social psychological concepts to do the work of citizenship, we can instead explore the intersections between citizenship and related social psychological concepts (for example, identity; see Isin & Wood, 1999; Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011).

The study of citizenship and the engagement with interdisciplinary work will further enable social psychologists to reflect on our own disciplinary assumptions, particularly our understanding of the ‘social’. The meaning of the ‘social’ in social psychology has taken many forms, and it is often the subject of heated debate in the discipline. For example, part of the 1970s ‘crisis’ in social psychology were debates about the discipline’s lack of consideration of the macro social context (see Faye, 2012). In addition to the symbolic field of culture and ideology, I am also referring here to the importance of including political structures and institutions in social psychological analyses, which were described in Section 2 above as citizenship regimes. Paradoxically perhaps, given the very subject matter of social psychology, social psychologists often neglect to incorporate in their analyses a serious consideration of the more structural level, which inevitably comes into play in the study of citizenship (Andreouli, Kadianaki & Xenitidou, 2016). A side-effect of this neglect is inadvertently perpetuating the assumption that state citizenship policies and practices are somehow neutral or rational.

Some recent social psychological work has explored the institutional dimension of citizenship. For instance, Andreouli and Howarth (2013), in their study of migrants’ experiences of naturalisation in the UK, have shown that social recognition is not only a matter of symbolic representations of ‘us’ and ‘them’ but also a matter of the very tangible ways that boundaries are constructed through policies and practices of naturalisation. For example, the mandatory citizenship ceremony where new citizens are presented with their naturalisation certificates can be perceived by long-term residents as paternalistic and condescending so that it puts to question their belonging. This shows how institutional and symbolic boundaries can intersect but also be in tension with one another. Similarly, the citizenship test, intended to promote integration, can have the adverse effect of positioning would-be citizens as ‘novices’ in British culture (Gray & Griffin, 2014). Research on citizenship will invite social psychologists to analyse in more detail the role of institutions in how citizenship is defined, enacted and lived.

There is also a more ‘practical’ reason for engaging social psychologically with citizenship. As observed already in 1994 by Kymlicka and Norman (see also Condor, 2011), there has been an explosion of research on citizenship in the political sciences, from which social psychology can draw upon and contribute to. The call for the study of citizenship in social psychology is not simply a strategic call for elevating the position of social psychology in the academy. The ‘explosion’ of citizenship-related work in the social sciences reflects the increased relevance of the concept in ‘real life’. We seem to be living in an ‘era of citizenship’ (Andreouli & Figgou, 2019) where political struggles are played out as struggles over citizenship. Understanding the different ways in which citizenship is understood, contested and enacted is crucial at times when politics are particularly volatile and shifting against established trends (such as following the election of Trump in the USA, the 5-Star movement in Italy and Bolsonaro in Brazil).
4. A critical social psychological perspective: everyday life and the politics of common-sense

In this section, I consider what a critical social psychological approach can contribute to citizenship studies. I argue that this has to do with studying the different ways that ‘ordinary’ political actors, i.e. citizens themselves, engage with political matters in the ‘mundane’ practices and interactions of everyday life. I first explain (i) why this focus on everyday citizenship is needed, and then (ii) discuss relevant critical social psychological contributions.

With regards to the first point, as discussed in the previous section, political struggles are increasingly played out in diverse settings that are outside the field of formal state politics, as work on sexual, gender and multicultural citizenship, for example, show. Gender, sexual and intercultural relations have, of course, to do with institutional recognition of rights but, crucially, they also relate to intersubjective relations that are developed, managed and lived in the mundane settings of everyday life. Citizenship in our current times is very much a lived practice: citizenship rights are not just the rights that are enshrined in law but ‘living rights’ that have relevance for people’s everyday realities and, as such, they are mobilised, claimed and enacted in everyday life (Sanghera, Botterill, Hopkins & Arshad, 2018).

The politicisation of everyday life also relates to the fact that, under neoliberalism, individual citizens are called upon to self-manage while the state becomes less and less involved in their welfare. An example of this is social citizenship. In the UK, for example, welfare become increasingly a matter of personal responsibility and less so a matter of state provision. Recipients of welfare benefits, recast as clients, are expected to be individually responsible for managing their wellbeing without the intervention of the state (Clarke, 2005; Stenner & Taylor, 2008), ultimately producing new forms of health inequalities (Sparke, 2017).

Given this emphasis on self-management that places political matters (such as welfare) into the realm of everyday life, it is perhaps paradoxical that the ideology of neoliberalism at the same time contains the assumption that we live in a post-political world (Andreouli & Figgou, 2019; Glaser, 2018). This is a world where political decisions are supposedly made on the basis of neutral cost-benefit calculations instead of ideological considerations. An example is the rhetoric of David Cameron, UK Prime Minister from 2010 until 2017. During his premiership, and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, Cameron implemented a series of severe austerity policies to reduce the UK’s deficit. In defending these policies, Cameron invoked the idea that the “the only way out of a debt crisis is to deal with your debts” drawing a parallel with the ‘common-sense’ of lay citizens and household economics. ‘Common-sense’ knowledge is thus portrayed as neutral and uncomplicated and it is co-opted by politicians concealing the ideological foundations of their politics (see also, Weltman & Billig, 2001). Whilst citizens are being increasingly enrolled into politics by governmental strategies that encourage self-regulation and ‘active citizenship’ (Neveu, 2014), at the same time, they are de-politicised (Clarke, 2010). These supposedly consensual and post-ideological politics mask antagonisms and limit plurality (Glaser, 2018; Mouffe, 1998).
Coming on to the second point above (the value and relevance of a social psychological contribution), it is crucial in this context that social scientists take everyday common-sense seriously as a topic of study. Indeed, calls to extend the scope of citizenship studies to the study of the ordinary have been made by citizenship studies scholars themselves (Neveu, 2014, 2015). Social psychology can contribute substantially towards that goal through interdisciplinary engagement with citizenship studies.

Tileagă and Byford (2014) argue that interdisciplinarity should be transformative rather than confirmatory. They argue against selective cherry-picking of ideas and evidence from other disciplines for the purpose of confirming existing work within a discipline. Interdisciplinarity should encourage us to work harder with our concepts and to complicate them rather than simplify them. This is what Tileagă and Byford (2014) call ‘conceptual reflexivity’: the process through which we revisit and reflect on the value, scope and use of existing concepts in light of insights from other disciplines.

Taking this under consideration, it is suggested here that a key social psychological contribution to citizenship studies is to complicate the concept of citizenship to include the sphere of everyday practice, as an arena where citizenship is performed in different ways both contestatory and confirmatory. This has two important implications for citizenship studies: firstly, it urges citizenship scholars to pay attention to citizens’ own practices of claims making which emanate from the ground up (contrary to the traditional focus on the state), and, secondly, it urges them to not just study citizenship as the performance of ‘extraordinary’ acts (as more recent citizen-oriented approaches have very fruitfully theorised and explored) but also more mundane practices through which citizenship is defined, claimed and contested. Ultimately, this is about extending the field of the political to include practices widely assumed to be non-ideological and non-political.

A superficial reading of this argument would suggest that social psychology’s role in citizenship studies is to conduct public opinion research to uncover what citizens think about political issues. After all, attitudes have been one of the most prolific areas of social psychological research. Nevertheless, public opinion research, whilst very useful in mapping attitudes across large populations, does not fully do justice to the approach advocated here. Public opinion research, like much of social cognition, is based on a ‘deficit model’ of lay knowledge (Condor, 2016). This model is predicated on assumption that politics constitute a distinct domain that requires competences that are not available to (most) lay people (Condor, 2016). The ideal democratic citizen is someone who is well-informed and ideologically consistent (Tileagă, 2013) and, as this ideal is hardly reached, citizens are very often seen as ‘not up to the task’ of politics.

Social psychology, particularly its more critical variants (such as the theory of social representations and critical discursive psychology), has challenged this assumption and has sought to ‘rehabilitate’ common-sense as a type of knowledge (Jovchelovitch, 2008). From dismissing it as a form of knowing that is prone to error, but also ‘innocent’ and a-political, social psychologists have studied common-sense as an everyday ‘practical’ form of reasoning that enables people to render their social world meaningful and to relate with others on the basis of a collectively elaborated system of ideas and values, such as social representations (Moscovici & Duveen, 2000). Like social representations scholars, critical
discursive psychologists, more geared to the study of language and power, have consistently argued for the detailed study of common-sense – both the ways that it works rhetorically in micro-interactions as well as its ideological underpinnings and functions in perpetuating and challenging cultural-ideological traditions (Billig et al., 1988; Wetherell, 1998).

The rhetorical social psychological approach is particularly useful in the social psychology of citizenship. This approach conceives of citizens as argumentative thinkers (Billig, 1987), who, instead of being oriented towards closure and balance, are capable of thinking through arguments and counter-arguments. The supposed incoherence and ambiguity of lay knowledge, which is traditionally seen by social psychologists as a flaw, is seen by rhetorical psychologists as the basis for debate and dialogue and, thus, as the seed for producing novel ideas (see also, Marková, 2003). Furthermore, from this perspective, common-sense thinking is inherently ideological. It is imbued with ideologies – these can be understood as ‘lived’ ideologies to differentiate them from the ‘intellectual’ ideologies of ‘expert thinkers’ (Billig, et al., 1988). Lived ideologies are dilemmatic containing themes and counter-themes. An example is ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995), which contains the themes of both particularism (that ‘our’ nation is unique) and universalism (that ‘our’ nation exists within an international system of nation-states). Another example are the dilemmatic tensions between social responsibility and individual self-interest in (neo)liberal ideology (Condor & Gibson, 2007; Hall & O’Shea, 2015). The ordinary person, therefore: “is not a blind dupe, whose mind has been filled by outside forces and who reacts unthinkingly. The subject of ideology is a rhetorical being who thinks and argues with ideology” (Billig, 1991, p. 2).

Considering everyday common-sense as a culturally and ideologically embedded system of ideas that can be argued upon, debated and change, allows us to study citizenship as a contested practice (Condor, 2011). Taking this theoretical stance, we can conceptualise citizenship as an everyday practice of invoking one’s rights and making rights claims that position oneself and others as (legitimate) political subjects but which may also exclude others from political life. Citizenship, from a critical social psychological perspective, is therefore about how ‘ordinary’ political actors make sense of, negotiate, contest and enact their positions as rights bearers vis-à-vis others.

The social psychological study of citizenship advocated here focuses on the dynamics of claims-making practices (Andreouli, Kadianaki & Xenitidou, 2016). As Barnes, Auburn and Lea (2004, p. 189) argue: “It is something of an oversimplification to assume that certain entitlements unproblematically flow from establishing oneself as a citizen... what really matters is the very process of negotiation, contestation and dialogue in which these claims and identities are mobilised.” This approach chimes with recent performative approaches to citizenship (Isin, 2017), because they both conceive of citizenship as something we actively ‘do’ through claiming and disclaiming rights for us and for others, not just something we have. Importantly, however, and as noted above, a critical social psychological angle offers a much-needed focus on the sphere of the everyday. Citizenship studies, being substantially informed by politics and sociology, tend to focus on activism when considering the bottom-up transformative aspects of citizenship, and on governance institutions, when they consider the more conventional aspects of citizenship. The ‘ordinary’, ‘mundane’ and ‘everyday’ remain therefore underexplored (Neveu, 2015). This is a key reason why social psychology can provide a fresh perspective: because it studies how everyday life itself is not
just the field of the conventional, but also a domain where political struggles play out (Howarth and Andreouli, 2016). Studying citizenship from this perspective means exploring political struggles as struggles over meaning. The politics of everyday common-sense are about the discursive struggles over who has the power to institute meaning over others.

Kadianaki and Andreouli (2015) have, for example, studied how citizenship is discursively constructed in online public debates about a new (more civically-oriented) citizenship law in Greece. They showed that both Greek citizens and migrants living in Greece, whilst developing different lines of argument, both drew on an essentialist social representation of citizenship. In that sense, becoming a citizen was about being ethnically Greek and/or being fully immersed into the Greek culture in a way that ‘compensates’ for migrants’ lack of ethnic ties with the country. Another example of critical social psychological work in the field is social citizenship. Gibson (2009), in his analysis of online discussions around welfare in the UK, found that welfare is constructed through an effortfulness repertoire which assesses welfare recipients on the basis of their level of individual effort. This work as a whole shows the workings of political ideology “in process” (Haste, 2004, p. 415). It shows how ideologies (for example, liberal individualism) play out in the discursive practices of lay interactions and the broader consequences and functions of these ‘mundane’ practices such as (de-)legitimating political inequalities and supporting or challenging political projects.

Everyday citizenship is also placed and embodied. Di Masso (2015), in his research on public space in Barcelona, has studied ‘locational’ acts of citizenship. Di Masso has argued that the use of public space in everyday life involves norms of what constitutes appropriate citizenship behaviour and this, in turn, involves power differentials between those who are socially advantaged and disadvantaged (e.g. rough sleepers). The (mis-)use of public space can thus be conceived as a political act which can invoke and support citizenship norms, but it can also transgress and challenge the social-political order. This can be seen, for instance, in the Occupy movement and other occupations of public spaces it has inspired since, which challenge neoliberal capitalism and advance alternative visions of political organisation. Another example is the ‘burkini ban’ in South French towns in 2016. It can be argued that that the ban crystallised the French political principle of laïcité onto the very bodies of its citizens. In this way, enforcing the ban invoked a certain model of the French citizen and wearing the burkini in protest challenged this model and advanced a ‘differentiated’ type of French citizenship (c.f. Young, 1989).

To conclude, this section has showed that social psychological research can provide a fresh perspective to the study of citizenship by relating it to the politics of common-sense in everyday micro-interactions. Critical social psychology, in particular, shows that everyday life is a domain where we can observe in mundane, concrete practices the dynamics between the habitual and transformative dimensions of citizenship.

5. Conclusions

The paper has suggested that the perspectives of citizens have been routinely absent from analyses of citizenship, with the effect of overlooking the ideological underpinnings of common-sense and depoliticising lay political actors. The depoliticization of everyday
common-sense can become a political tool for demagogic rhetoric and can serve to conceal the ideological foundations of politics. But a critical social psychological approach does not see common-sense as an a-political, neutral form of knowing; it sees it as a socially elaborated and contested symbolic resource which fuels everyday politics. This is a valuable contribution to citizenship studies which have recently started to question state-centred approaches and to engage with the study of citizenship from the perspectives of citizens themselves. The study of citizenship can also benefit social psychology by steering it towards an explicit emphasis on the political dimensions of social psychological phenomena. At a more fundamental level, social psychology would benefit from revising its understandings of the ‘social’ to consider social structures, institutions and political regimes alongside more symbolic aspects of social contexts.

Considering possible directions for the critical social psychology of citizenship, a promising way forward is the study of emerging citizenships, in other words, the study of new political claims and struggles. ‘Inspired’ from disruptive political events, such as the election of Trump, Brexit, and the rise of the extreme right in Europe and beyond, scholars have started to study the decline of the existing political order (such as neoliberal capitalism) and the emergence of novel political configurations and cleavages. This changing landscape has given rise to a series of ‘unravellings’ (Andreouli, Kaposi & Stenner, 2018) whereby established ideological positions (like the political centre) have lost their certainty, while other previously marginal positions have gathered momentum, such as those of the far right and left. In this process, political values become rearticulated in new and unanticipated ways. For example, representing the working classes against the interests of elites has become a key feature of far-right rhetoric. In these movements, the language of the left has become appropriated and forged into a new political vision. Here, the concept of intersectionality can prove quite useful as it points to the complex overlaps, intersections and tensions of political positions. A fruitful area of research is, more broadly, the study of emerging political subjectivities and ideologies. As discussed in previous work in the context of the UK (Andreouli, Kaposi & Stenner, 2018), the politics of Brexit have brought to the fore and emboldened the ‘affective citizen’, who is impassioned and conflictual, against the ‘rational citizen’ who is oriented towards consensus and detached calculation. These two logics are not just a matter of difference of opinions; they reflect two modes of engaging with the political and acting as a political agent. Critical social psychology can explore in more detail the new political narratives that emerge from the ‘cracks’ of the current system as they are manifested in everyday practices and new political subjectivities.

References


