The experience of space in relation to architecture in the Homeric epics

Thesis

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THE EXPERIENCE OF SPACE IN RELATION TO
ARCHITECTURE IN THE HOMERIC EPICS

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE OPEN
UNIVERSITY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

Is there a concept of space ‘before’ philosophy? The thesis addresses a question which is relevant to contemporary architectural theory but it attempts an answer through the examination of the Homeric text. The general relevance of this is because the Homeric text may be said to be historical antecedent to the development of philosophy. Therefore it provides the possibility for a different understanding of space. What makes the Homeric text a kind of text-case is that it predates the concept of space itself – in the sense of Platonic chora ‘receptacle’, that is, space as container. Our reading of the Homeric text is governed by an attempt to reconstruct the possible experiences of spatial relations as they are conveyed by the Homeric discourse. The thesis concentrates upon central Homeric terms chore/οs, domos, thure, megaron and thalamos, in order to analyse them in terms of the experiences of which they were an element. This involves a close analysis of the Homeric text. But this reading faces two major obstacles in the attempt to restore the historical and specific character of the Homeric categories. These two obstacles are different sides of the coin ‘anachronism’. One major form of anachronism is to permit the philosophical definition of space and of architectural elements to define the Homeric relations whereas those relations actually predate and may be thought to be independent of philosophy. The second obstacle to this reading is aspects of philosophy which has systematically reduced the independence of the Homeric text by allowing terms to be defined by philosophy and then projected backwards as Homeric reading.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
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I am grateful to Dr. Eleftherios Ikonomou who organized the Research Degree Seminar during the academic year 1994-95, for my first drafts were presented and discussed in a friendly and critical environment. I am also grateful to my colleagues, Thomas Aaron, Bojana Komadina, Ivana Wingham and Isaac Lerner for their discussions, criticism and support. I also wish to thank Sue Blundell who attended several of my presentations in the seminar and encouraged my confidence as I was working in an area in which I was not a specialist; Rebecca Flemming who invited me to present work in progress to the Research Degree Seminar at the Institute of Classical Studies; Andrew Benjamin who read part of the work, and Gordana Korolijna my advisor, who provided always useful criticism and support in all the stages of my research.

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My heartfelt thanks goes to my family for the unwavering support and to my husband for his patience. Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my sweet children Konstantilenia and Yorgos-Apostolos.
INTRODUCTION

The object of the thesis is the Homeric text insofar as it can illuminate the category of space in the Homeric period. The project has two different kinds of sources. On the one hand there was a concern to understand the Homeric text, in the context of a historical project of reconstructing the Homeric experience of space, and on the other hand there was my interest as a practicing architect in understanding the nature and signification of space in different historical cultural contexts. The fact of being an architect I hope equips me with a quasi-intuitive approach to the issue of space, an issue that dominates the relation between architecture and philosophy within postmodern discourse, especially within the discourse of deconstruction. So although the topic of the thesis seems to be a historical project, it is indirectly related to contemporary architectural theory, insofar as the investigation of the cultural construction of space entails the study of such elements of architecture as ‘door’, or ‘room’, the distinction of ‘inside / outside’, the notions of ‘center’ and ‘construction / structure’, and even the category of ‘house’, all of which are normally considered to have an almost ‘natural’ status within architectural discipline. The study is concerned

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¹ Note that a well-known contemporary collaboration between architecture and philosophy, between Eisenman and Derrida, was developed on Derrida’s reading of the Platonic chora. On the relation between architecture and philosophy, see WIGLEY, M., 1995. The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida’s Haunt, MIT Press. B. Genocchio also argues that “...most contemporary theorisations of space are built around the assumption of a declining Cartesian spatial order. This is a spatiality associated with Western metaphysics and its tribe of grids, binaries, hierarchies and oppositions. As this conception of a fixed, ordered space begins to give way to views with ‘more flexible and equitable organizations’, so ‘postmodernist’ discourse has largely come to be associated with a critique of Cartesian space. When it comes, however, to considering its replacement, opinions are fundamentally diverse.” GENOCCHIO, B., 1995: “Heterotopia and its Limits,” Transition, Issue 41, pp. 33.
with distinguishing and differentiating how these elements are experienced in a different culture. Such an approach is also in line with the current concern within architectural theory with ways in which philosophical discourse has repressed differences in order to produce a universalized discourse on space. So antiquity has a privileged strategic status since it is marked by the intervention of 'philosophy'. The choice of the Homeric text as object of the research is thus not accidental. It is a text that 'predates' the advent of philosophy, but whose analysis has been massively dominated by post-Platonic interpretations and philosophical descriptions. The thesis tries to answer the question of what it felt like 'before'. But of course we can only approach the text if we are aware of all those concepts which run from Plato to ourselves and which we should not project back onto the analysis of the Homeric. Our investigation is thus both historical and conceptual.

The thesis, perhaps against initial appearances is essentially a contribution to architectural thought. This raises the question of its relation to classical studies. Obviously much of the material is taken from classical sources and obviously must be judged by conventional standards of classical scholarship. Nonetheless it does not pretend to be a contribution to classical studies. There is no attempt to reconstruct the

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2 E. Casey, in his study on the history of place, writes: "At work as well in the obscuration of place is the universalism inherent in western culture from the beginning. This universalism is most starkly evident in the search for ideas, usually labeled 'essences,' that obtain everywhere and for which a particular somewhere, a given place, is presumably irrelevant. Is it accidental that the obsession with space as something infinite and ubiquitous coincided with the spread of Christianity, a religion with universalist aspirations?" In contrast he argues that contemporary "...rediscoveries of the importance of place [share] a conviction that place itself is no fixed thing: it has no steadfast essence." CASEY, S.E., 1997: The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History, University of California Press, pp. xii, 286.

3 The notion of philosophy perhaps has a historical origin, that can be traced back to Plato. In any case it is from the work of J. Derrida that this notion of philosophy is drawn.
historical reality behind the Homeric text; nor is there even an attempt to provide an exhaustive analysis of the discourse of Homer. Had that been the aim, then all sorts of evidence from classical studies would have been relevant and would have formed a necessary part of the thesis. But in fact, the thesis is much more restricted than this and is governed not by the protocols of historical reconstruction, but by a series of questions within architectural theory. These questions are as it were the starting point but also the limitation of the scope of the thesis. Doubtless this will produce a form of argument and the use of evidence which will at times seem eccentric and perhaps insufficient if interpreted as historical claims about Homeric Greece. But this is not the object of the thesis.

Another clarification must be entered concerning the relation of the thesis to philosophical concepts. Clearly philosophical concepts have been influential in determining the concepts of most fields of humanistic inquiry. The problem presents itself in this thesis as this: if the attempt to reconstruct the Homeric categories requires the critique of interpretations derived from ‘philosophy’, how are we to identify the ‘philosophical’? Or put the other way, how does one identify the Homeric (those fragments which have been repressed by philosophy but not erased)? Throughout the thesis we argue against philosophical concepts while making continuous reference to ‘experience’. We need to clarify this point. By experience we do not mean something epistemologically related to sense data. This would inevitably reproduce a ‘philosophical’ distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, a distinction which strangely and for us decisively enough coincides with the invention of Platonic chora (χώρα) ‘receptacle’. The distinction between thinking and sensing – and ultimately between mind and body – is for us inextricably tied to a concept of space as container, a container that receives, informs and defines. What we call
experience is also a concept, of course. But we mean something definite by it – whatever describes the ‘specific’ character of the culture (at an empirical level) or whatever refuses to be generalized (at a theoretical level). In this thesis ‘experience’ describes the specific differences and manifestations of the ‘Homeric’ as opposed to Platonic and post-Platonic. Secondly, the status of deducing experience from a literary text constitutes an important problem for this research. Our argument does not depend upon the direct translation of the poem into an account of social reality. In this sense we have tried to avoid a sociology of experience in which ‘reality’ is read off from a poem.\(^4\) We adopt a more conditional position. We do assume that the categories of affects derived from the text did have some role in ancient Greece, but we make no strong claim as to their exclusiveness or even as to the social power of the affects identified. To put it more simply, we do not claim that the text reflects reality, but we do assume that the Homeric listeners made sense of the poems.

In analysing the text we try to avoid that form of philological analysis which is strongly governed by philosophy. There is a kind of Heideggerian approach which reconstructs historical experience by showing that the origin of the word encapsulates reality. Our aim is simply to test some hypothesis of architectural theory in a philological way. The particularity of the Homeric text, a text before philosophy, offers the possibility of investigating the relation of a non-philosophical language with ‘architecture’. Terms that later become part of the philosophical discourse, such

\(^4\) R. Finnegon in her study on oral poetry writes: “What is the relationship between poetry and society? Does oral poetry ‘reflect’ the society in which it exists?...Large questions of this sort – the typical concerns of the sociology of literature – are abstract and elusive. They cannot be avoided in any sociological approach to poetry, but to move only on the level of such abstract and vague questions can lead to frustration – or to tautology.” FINNEGAN, R., 1977: *Oral Poetry, its nature, significance and social context*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 214.
as *logos* and *choros*, we believe can be examined in a non-philosophical context, though only with great difficulty. In the case of the Homeric text its description is so much dominated by post-Platonic interpretations that the research into its category of space cannot really be started until it is freed from its previous anachronistic readings. Anachronism here is not just contained in subsequent interpretations but is itself very much an effect of *chora*, of space conceived as a container. To give just an example: that which according to our interpretation constitutes a difference at the level of experience between the Homeric term *choro* and the Platonic *chora*, is reduced within scholarship to a linguistic difference between the endings -e and -a, and assigned a spatial difference in their origins – Ionic or Attic, a difference which is rendered indifferent. Our analysis is philological but clearly in conflict with much contemporary scholarship and involves a critique of Emile Benveniste’s etymology. It is of course easy to accuse others of anachronism and there may be a blind spot of our own anachronisms. But we argue it is only through a critique of anachronism that we can approach and establish a relation with the Homeric text. Throughout the thesis we try to deconstruct and defamiliarize categories that have been rendered ‘natural’ or ‘self-evident’ in order to understand that they are culturally constructed and specific.\(^5\) As we try to identify what is unique in the Homeric experience of space, we come to face the anthropological problem of establishing the difference\(^6\) between the Homeric

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\(^6\) On the problem of identity and difference in anthropology see COUSINS, M., 1989: “In the Midst of Psychoanalysis,” *New Formations*, n. 7, pp. 84.
Greeks and us, or other cultures. It is not our aim to produce a comparative analysis, but to establish the minimum conditions of avoiding anachronism. Thus comparison is not conducted in a systematic way, for there is a need to establish only differences rather than elaborate wholesale historical comparisons. Each issue which we address is chosen as an arena of conflicting interpretations which may enable us to have a more differentiated understanding of the Homeric terms. Even when we argue in relation to a philosophical ‘before’ we are not interested in the issue of ‘before’ and ‘after’ as such, but in how the distinction might throw light on the nature of the Homeric categories of space. Comparison then is a means of clarification. Sometimes this involves a negative approach; we define not what something is, but what it is not, in order to reach a higher degree of clarification. This will also involve showing the possible associations that a reader can make and the traps of misunderstanding which can follow. In other words our ‘strategy’ is to alert the attention of the reader to his/her presuppositions which might form an obstacle to understanding the terms. This makes the reading an uncertain adventure rather than an exercise in the application of a method. For the fact is that our strategies of reading work upon more fronts than could be subsumed into a method. Nor does the thesis make any attempt – as one might have expected – to relate textual evidence and archeological remains. It is not the problem of Homeric dating which is the reason for this exclusion, so much

7 We believe that each historical period deserves to be studied for its own sake and not for the purpose of a comparison, but we also acknowledge that comparison is indeed inevitable.

8 “Yet, one is faced with the well-known problem: does Homer portray the institutions of his own period (late 8th c. BC, according to widespread opinion), those of the three preceding centuries (11th-9th/early 8th c. BC), those of the remote Mycenaean era (13th-12th c. BC), or lastly an amalgam of the institutions of all these periods? ...It is commonly assumed that the epics include elements and features of the Mycenean, Dark Age and 8th c. strata, and that they also contain later interpolations.” MAZARAKIS, A., 1987: From Rulers’ Dwellings to Temples: A Study of the Origins of Greek
as the fact that to use archeological evidence to control or validate the hypothesis of the thesis raises a mass of complicated theoretical and scholarly issues which have never been addressed critically. Indeed the ordinary sense of ‘archeological evidence’ is not directly relevant to our research. ‘Archeological evidence’ is not innocent and can never be an unproblematic corpus which validates or refutes hypotheses formulated elsewhere. In this sense ‘archeological evidence’ is not directly relevant to our research. ‘Archeological evidence’ is not simply ‘evidence’ but another text to be decoded. Archeology itself has a history, and has been conducted under anachronistic rubrics which identify spaces in the rediscovered remains of buildings, according to criteria which post-date those remains. In fact ‘archeological evidence’ is a 19th century construction, which still moves – in so far it concerns the representation of architectural remains – in accord with 19th century categories of the function of spaces and indeed the names of spaces. Briefly one might refer here to the persistent tendency of the 19th century archeology to identify rooms with archeological sites without inquiring whether the category of the ‘room’ is remotely historically appropriate. While we have not used ‘archeological evidence’

Religious Architecture in the Protogeometric and Geometric Periods, unpublished Ph.D. Univ. of London pp. 378. What matters in the present thesis however is whether the text predates the advent of philosophy, and in that sense the problem of its exact dating lies beyond our concerns.


10 Although there is an ongoing debate on the interpretation of evidence in archeology (see HODDER, I., 1986: Reading the Past: Current Approaches to Interpretation in Archeology, Cambridge University Press), we suggest that the representation of architectural remains – as is also the case with architectural representation in general – remains conventional and thus already entails a specific interpretation of the findings. However, it is interesting to note that Hodder’s excavations at Çatalhöyük (Neolithic settlement in Turkey) acknowledge this problem and are seeking to document the site not according to
to refute or validate our hypothesis, we might think that our arguments in fact could generate a new type of archeological classification. In the two last chapters of the thesis it becomes obvious that archeology not only adopts the conventional methods of architectural representation in order to produce its drawings, but in fact directly inherits categories from orthodox architectural theory, such as 'room' and 'house'—in order to interpret its findings. Thus another problem has to be confronted, which is the correspondence between language and architecture. A natural correspondence between terms such as thalamos, megaron, and specific locations within the Homeric house is not usually questioned within scholarship. However our investigation, instead of taking all these as given and attempting to validate both by reference to archeological remains, opens up a new area of inquiry whose implications concern the experience of the Homeric language and architecture. To explore this issue in more detail would be impossible in the context of the present Ph.D. But it is hoped that this thesis can open a new point of departure for research in a critical archeology, and it is one we would like to pursue.

A limited number of previous works which deal with our topic sharply differ from our approach. In R. Martienssen's book, *The Idea of Space in Ancient Greek Architecture*, "rooms", but according to human activity which occupied the space. The team of researchers who apply "micromorphology" to study the use of space, write: "Anthropological studies of the use of space have illustrated that space is defined by architectural units is endowed with meaning through practice, through the activities carried out in that space, which are both informed by, and therefore representative of, sociocultural behaviour and conceptual schemes...Analysis of microstratigraphic sequences enables study of the intended and actual uses of space by examination of the types of floors or surfaces, the impact of activities on those surfaces, the relationship between sediments, artefacts and organic remains in deposits, and post-depositional alterations." MATTHEWS, W., FRENCH, C., LAWRENCE, T.,
one can easily trace the influence of 19th century theories of space. C. Doxiades adopts a positivist – in the sense of being measurable – concept of space to analyse the so-called ‘exterior space’ via measurements and the theory of proportion. A. Antoniades is directly concerned with Homeric space in his book, but in fact what he does, as he describes it, is “...to read the building program in Homer and undertake a synthetic approach.” J. P. Vernant does discuss space before philosophy, but with no direct reference to the Homeric text. He writes on the mythological pair of Hestia and Hermes. He inscribes his distinction between mythical space and rationalized space within the distinction between the mythological and the rational. This distinction may well mark an advance in addressing the problem but the distinction that it employs is still itself a ‘philosophical’ distinction. Thus his mythological space is itself structured on pairs of oppositions that are considered natural, i.e., feminine/interior/private as opposed to masculine/exterior/public. These oppositions may have been valid for Greeks at a later period, but given the intervention of philosophy in constructing these oppositions, we cannot infer that they apply to the Homeric text as well.


14 VERNANT, J-P., 1983: “Hestia-Hermes: The religious Expression of Space and Movement in Ancient Greece,” Myth and Thought among the Greeks, Routledge, pp. 127-75. There is no reference to the goddess Hestia in the epics, but only of hestie (ιορίν) ‘hearth’. It would be interesting to investigate the kind of experience evoked by this term for it denotes an architectural element of the Homeric house. However, to take the identification of the hearth with the goddess Hestia for granted in order to follow Vernant’s argument, or to develop a discussion on religion, seems to us inappropriate for research which is mainly concerned with architectural theory.
The difference of our approach can be understood by presenting a brief synopsis of our research. The thesis includes six chapters; each one addresses a different Homeric term in order to illuminate the experience evoked by it within the text. Each term also introduces issues which involve both historical and theoretical problems. Each chapter inevitably entails a critique of a word's previous interpretations, while focusing upon its detailed textual analysis. New interpretations are thus produced. This helps to generate an understanding — at an anthropological level — of the difference between the Homeric Greeks and us or Plato, and also opens up a different perspective for architectural theory. The chapters are relatively autonomous and each has its own introduction and conclusion. Each term and its associated experience is presented in such a way as to add a piece to the mosaic of the Homeric experience. The thesis does not pretend to be exhaustive but indicates and proposes a new approach to the Homeric text, and a different understanding of the issue of space.

The first chapter is introductory; it addresses the complex relation between Homeric language and experience, and criticizes the way the Homeric text is conventionally located within the orality-literacy debate. The analysis of epos 'speech' is intended to displace a whole series of polarizing arguments such as the abstract and concrete nature of language, the distinction of form and content, as well as arguments about perception — conceived as a universal a priori category — that relates visual experience to distancing and opposes to it hearing, related to participation. In unraveling these theoretical arguments the chapter opens up an anthropological and historical hypothesis concerning the relation between speech and the body. This centers on the experience of what we call the 'multiple body', a body
in which the corporeal, mental and psychological are interwoven. As a result we can better understand that our distinction between the mind and the body is in fact a construct of our culture and neither natural nor universal. The chapter also introduces to us the play of 'distancing' as an effect of speech and the experience of hearing in the epics; this marks another difference between our concept of subjectivity and of Homeric individuality. In fact Homeric speaking was not experienced as an expression of a thinking subject. Homeric identity is indeed produced within the experience of speech but paradoxically as an effect of distancing. This is another reason why the Homeric text will not fit into the terms of the orality-literacy debate, where vision is considered as distancing and hearing as participation.

The second chapter analyses the Homeric experience of space evoked by two Homeric terms, the feminine chore and the masculine choros, where chore involves the experience of things, and choros that of events. Homeric 'space' is non-enduring and cannot be separated from the things and events that generate it. This rather awkward form is used in order to differentiate from the Platonic chora as well as from Newtonian and even post-structuralist conceptions of space as container of either things or events. This analysis also involves a central critique of the contemporary scholarship which anachronistically interprets the Homeric terms according to post-Platonic conceptions of space and place. Moreover it enables us to begin to understand the Homeric experience of things as being co-produced with their chore and may be attached to the 'multiple body' conferring its identity. The barbaric

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15 'Multiple body' is an ugly formulation that tries to establish in its awkwardness a literal form of distinguishing the difference between Homeric body and our concept of a divided body and mind. Unfortunately the formulation will have to reappear throughout the thesis as a reminder of the difference.
character of this definition is, at least in part, an effect of the difficulty of differentiating something from our habitual way of stating it. At stake here is an identity which is non-enduring and which will not fit into our concepts of subject-object and their relation, for that whole scene is a direct consequence of a conception of space as container.\textsuperscript{16}

The third chapter examines the relation between body and house indicated by the linguistic similarity of the Homeric terms \textit{demas} and \textit{domos}. We seek to show that the relation between body and building, where an ideal, mathematical and male body which serves as a model for architecture is reflected in the way scholarship (specifically Benveniste) interprets the relation between \textit{demas} and \textit{domos} as a linguistic relation based on a common Indo-European root meaning ‘construction’. Once we are aware that such a relation is not natural but historically constructed, then we are able to understand the relation of the Homeric terms which is established on the ‘paradoxical’ experience of ‘trans-fixity’. Both Homeric house and body are experienced as fixed and transformable simultaneously, and such experience cannot be separated from the experience of inclusion, feminine gender and control.

The three next chapters examine terms that are directly related to architecture, for they have always been interpreted as specific elements of the house. We have not attempted to examine in this thesis all the terms related to the Homeric house. But we have chosen those terms that seem relevant to the interpretation of the Homeric space, for they give us the opportunity to challenge the conventional approach of scholarship. The fourth chapter approaches the category of the door and the gate by examining the Homeric terms \textit{ture} and \textit{pule}. The contemporary conception of door

\textsuperscript{16} See chapter on \textit{chore-choros}, section 2.3.2.1., especially pp. 79-84.
and gate as functional objects or as symbols of separation between different spaces is again reflected in the way the scholarship interprets the two terms. By contrast we argue that such a conception indicates a repression of an anxiety that binds the experience of doors and gates and which can be detected through the detailed analysis of the Homeric terms. Indeed *thure* and *pule* are experienced not only as specific things but as the evocation of the experience of the transition from one category of experience to another and as such invest Homeric bodies with ambiguity when related to them.

The fifth and sixth chapter examine two more ‘architectural’ Homeric terms, *megaron* and *thalamos*. Both terms provide an opportunity to challenge the notion of a house as an ensemble of rooms where ‘room’ is a general concept specified through the notion of function. For both *megaron* and *thalamos* are conventionally interpreted within scholarship as rooms with specific functions and locations within the Homeric *domos*. *Megaron* is usually translated as the ‘central room of the house’ where domestic rituals such as hospitality, feasting and mourning are performed. Such a notion of ritual rests upon a concept of space in which it can be contained, or ‘take place’. If we consider this as an anachronism then we can understand that what we call Homeric ritual is in fact an experience of a controlled transformation, central to the survival of any *domos*, achieved through the repetitive movements of the Homeric bodies. And it is those bodies that produce the non-enduring Homeric space called *megaron*. *Thalamos*, which is conventionally variously and bafflingly interpreted as ‘store-room’, ‘women chamber’ and ‘bed-chamber’, evokes the experience of containment; an experience of immediate intimacy reserved for the members of the house, produced through sight, smell, sleep and intercourse. *Megaron* and *thalamos*
on this reading are not so much names of specific rooms within the Homeric house, but specific categories of experience.

This outline shows it is impossible to answer the issues raised within the thesis by considering them simply as historical problems of reconstruction. It is only by acknowledging the theoretical problems involved that we can open up a new field of inquiry. If we try to answer the anthropological question of how the Homeric experience of space differs from our concept of space and place we inevitably become more aware about our concepts and more importantly that ours are neither universal nor inevitable. In that sense our 'philological' approach to the terms through which we analyse the Homeric experience of space indeed refer us to issues of contemporary architectural theory, and generates a new perspective to consider not only the issue of space but also to rethink the categories of house, room, or door, together with the way that our gender and other identities are constructed. Our research tries to understand how the Homeric 'spatial' vocabulary works, but it cannot produce a new literary translation of the Homeric terms. Perhaps it can produce its effects in terms of architecture. As such, it might have an impact on the production of architecture, not in the sense that the theory provides the guidelines for

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17 On the relation between gender identification and space in contemporary architecture, A. Betsky notes: “starting in the 1980s...some designers thought that they needed to create spaces that would challenge those traditional distinctions between inside and outside, between the planned and the experienced, between artificial and natural, and between useful and pleasurable that had made the cultural stereotypes of men and women into real, lived experiences.” BETSKY, A., 1995: Building Sex: Men, Women, Architecture, and the Construction of Sexuality, William Morrow and Company, Inc. New York, pp. 176.

18 It proposes, however, an understanding of the so-called inconsistencies which are conventionally interpreted as a grammatical phenomenon. Incoherence in grammar indicates – according to our interpretation – a repression of inconsistencies at the level of experience.
the architectural practice, but because there is a relation between language and architecture, between the language of architecture and the architectural language. The thesis cannot propose a more appropriate concept of space for, to anticipate an unlikely conclusion, the very 'concept' of space might be the very mark of repression, and in fact the title of the research is profoundly and inevitably anachronistic.

For the Greek terms discussed within the text a transliterated form is used (always in italic, and without the definite article 'the') as well as the Homeric original in parenthesis, while the conventional translation (from the Homeric dictionary or Liddell-Scott) follows in inverted commas. To give an example: megaron (μηγαρόν) 'hall'. Only the translation of the Homeric quotations are in the main text, and it is always accompanied by the Homeric text in the footnote. The translation of R. Lattimore is used unless otherwise stated, while the additions of the author are enclosed in brackets. The exhaustive analysis of the Homeric terms was facilitated by the Ibycus program, but was always integrated with the examination of the broader context in which they occur.

19 "...unlike the unconscious, place is not so controversial or so intrusive or embarrassing as to require repression. On the contrary, just because place is so much with us, and we with it, it has been taken for granted, deemed not worthy of separate treatment. Also taken for granted is the fact that we implaced beings to begin with, that place is an a priori of our existence on earth. Just because we cannot choose in the matter, we believe we do not have to think about this basic facticity very much, if at all." CASEY, E.S., op. cit., pp. x. This is a conventional approach to the issue of space/place. We do not suggest that a repression is involved in space/place, but we argue instead, that the conception of space/place is in itself a mechanism of repression. See chapter on chore - choros.
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EPOS

‘SPEECH’ - EXPERIENCE AND DISTANCING
1.1. INTRODUCTION

What is the relation between language and experience within the Homeric text? This is not a question which can be given a direct answer. Indeed, to pose it opens onto a most complex area within the human sciences – complex because it lies in a space where unresolved theoretical questions meet historical investigation. That is to say, an answer would require us to have an adequate theoretical grasp of the relation¹ between language and experience before we investigated what the relation was in a particular historical text. But no such situation exists nor is any in prospect. It is not that there is no theory of the relation between language and experience, but that there are too many, each competing for our assent. Moreover, much of historical

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¹ On the difficulty of thinking the relation between two things, M. Heidegger writes: “We immediately conceive the relation in terms of the things which in the given instance are related. We little understand how, in what way, by what means, and from where the relation comes about, and what it properly is qua relation. ...It remains dark to us what determines their real relation, and from what source what we so casually call the ‘real’ really comes.” HEIDEGGER, M., 1971. “The Nature of Language,” On the Way to Language, Harper and Row, pp. 83.
investigation is unconsciously coded and determined by particular theories of the relation between language and experience. At the same time research cannot wait for the clarification of the theoretical issues and the researcher must adopt a strategy towards work which sits uneasily between philosophical accounts of language on the one hand and anthropological and historical linguistic analysis on the other hand. We find that the strategy of Jacques Derrida illuminating and helpful at this point. This is not a question of being for or against what is now called deconstruction; it is a matter of attending with great care to what we might think of a double register of inquiry – theoretical and historical – at the point where those two registers intersect. This requires a certain tack. In this thesis, we try to avoid coming to a view about the so-called concrete or abstract character of the Homeric language, just as we have tried to avoid confronting large ontological questions of the type: What belongs to language and what to experience in the Homeric text? These questions cannot adequately be resolved in the scope of this thesis. Rather we have adopted a strategy of attempting to avoid such questions in the service of putting new problems forward which in the end we hope will, if not resolve the general questions, at least produce a more adequate representation of them. A central plank of our strategy is to avoid anachronism at every level – both in our interpretations and as a ground for criticizing other interpretations. This involves an attempt to be as aware as possible of our own

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2 To work at the edge of philosophy and anthropology is not impossible given the existing contamination between the two. J. Derrida argues that while different domains of knowledge – anthropological, historical, etc. – cannot found themselves in any other way than on presuppositions that do not belong to their knowledge or their competence, and while these presuppositions therefore constitute a style of onto-phenomenological questioning, conversely this fundamental questioning cannot protect itself from a hidden – anthropological, historical, etc. – contamination. DERRIDA, J., 1993: Aporias, Stanford University Press, California.
categorial presuppositions concerning the general relation between language and experience and the particular meanings and translations we make of the Homeric text. To make things worse, the Homeric text is not just any kind of text. It is the first Greek literary product which, in the form that was handed to us, as J. Svenbro pointed out, "has the air of a transcription of a voice." It is this fact which situates the Homeric text not just as a text whose interpretation raises theoretical and historical problems. For these problems are compounded and over-determined by the fact that the Homeric text is the central text in the continuing debate over the distinction of orality and literacy. This debate has a tendency to polarize oral and written cultures in a differential, almost oppositional relation to the nature of language and perception. Scholarship dates the Homeric text in the 8th century BC, and C. Segal writes:

"By the end the eight century BC, the Greeks had developed the North Semitic syllabary into an alphabetic writing far better suited to their own language than the Mycenaean syllabary had been.

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5 A. Ford writes: "It is surely a delicate, even paradoxical business to define a genre of poetry that stands on the verge of orality and literacy, for closely attached to any literary description are notions of text, forms, and authors that may well be irrelevant to the 'song culture' of archaic Greece...". FORD, A., 1994: Homer: The Poetry of the Past, Cornell University Press, pp. 14.

Nevertheless, because of the preceding centuries of oral culture and the limited technology, the spoken (and sung) word continued to have a privileged place.\textsuperscript{7} 

Segal attributes to the Homeric text the supposed features of an oral culture. He distinguishes Ear-knowledge from Eye-knowledge, the former being related to orality, the second to literacy.\textsuperscript{8} Hence, models of oral cultures provide a theory from which to draw conclusions about both language, experience, and their mutual relation. Indeed, the orality-literacy debate is important for our research because it makes a connection between modalities of language: oral-written, and modalities of perception: acoustic-visual. But without ignoring or underestimating the importance of the debate, we shall need to understand its presuppositions, situating it within its own historical and theoretical context in order to step out of the mutually exclusive oppositions it proposes. For the debate severely limits the strategies of interpretation which we wish to employ and we would be reduced to repeating the opposition produced by the debate. In effect, we shall not adopt any theory of orality as a ready-made model to be applied within the study of the Homeric text. Our strategy will focus on destabilizing the conceptual order of the oppositional model: oral / form / concrete / acoustic / participatory - written / content / abstract / visual / distancing, through which Homeric language is usually approached. A number of classical scholars, in the context of literary criticism, have already done much to question the structuring of opposites that govern the original orality-literacy debate\textsuperscript{9} and their work on the Homeric text serves


\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{9} The traditional opposition between speech and writing has been challenged by Derrida in his reading of Plato. DERRIDA, J., 1981: "Plato's Pharmacy", Dissemination, University of Chicago Press. For a
as a basis for our argument. The difference of our approach is inscribed in the
different interest that an architect has in the Homeric text in contrast to a philologist.
In a cross-disciplinary project as this, one works more as a *bricoleur*. The research
– which is specifically concerned with the experience of the Homeric space – remains
focused on the relation between language and perception and not on the issue of
Homeric language as such. The destabilization of opposites will not produce a new
type about the relation between Homeric language and experience, but it will
produce specific effects. In fact, it will permit us to understand the kind of
experiences evoked by the Homeric ‘spatial vocabulary’ and to differentiate them
from our ‘architectural language’. It will also make us aware that as the Homeric
language shapes a specific experience of space, in a similar way, our architectural
language informs and determines our language of architecture. Thus the traditional
distinction between theory and practice in architecture becomes problematic.

In this chapter, however, we seek to investigate the way language was
experienced, and the mechanism through which language evokes experience within
the epics. This will identify two points; it will open up the complex relation between
speech and the body, and will introduce to us the play of ‘distancing’ as an effect of

similar approach to the Homeric text see LYNN-GEORGE, M., 1988: *Epos: Word, Narrative and the
Iliad*, Macmillan Press. An earlier draft of the thesis was criticized for the lack of reference to
contemporary scholarship within classical studies which dealt with the issue of the Homeric language.
This draft now incorporates a far more extensive reference to this literature and will be found distributed
through the chapter. For ease of reference I list their appearance here: FORD 1994: fn. 5, 36, 63, 76, 88,
107 / LYNN-GEORGE 1988: fn. 9, 20, 24, 89, 92, 94 / KAHANE 1994: fn. 12, 26 / FINNEGAN

Levi-Strauss describes the *bricoleur* as the one who constructs using the material at hand.
speech and the experience of hearing. But before we can do this we will have to address the way in which the Homeric epic is situated within the orality-literacy debate, in order to refuse the answer – which it gives us in the context of opposition between the oral and the written – to the question: what kind of language is the Homeric language and what is its relation to experience? This will involve dealing with two points in the orality-literacy theory in respect to the Homeric text; the form vs content as far as it concerns the modality of language, and the acoustic vs visual concerning the modality of perception.

1.2. THE HOMERIC TEXT WITHIN THE ORALITY-LITERACY DEBATE

In a recent book C. Calame summarizes what contemporary scholarship accepts about the Homeric text:

"The first Greek literary product for us consist of epic poems that display traits generally considered characteristic of oral poetry [formulas, typical scenes etc.]; but it is impossible to discount the intervention of writing in the process of composition, at least in the state in which these poems have been passed on to us. Moreover, they are in part the product of a society that had a knowledge of a system of writing [linear B], although it does not seem to have made use of it for literary purposes. Lastly, we can assert that the epic poems were communicated orally, given the descriptions of performances contained in them."\(^{11}\)

This statement not only indicates that the study of the epics is still inscribed within the debate, that started sixty years ago, but also indicates the reduction of the gulf between orality and literacy which originated the debate.\(^{12}\) The Homeric text


constituted the starting point of the debate and served as its paradigm of orality *par excellency*. This happened in 1928, when Milman Parry had written a dissertation which would revolutionize Homeric studies. 13 He put forward an hypothesis that stressed the dependence of the choice of words and word-forms on the shape of the hexameter line. “A single hexameter line is a relatively independent unit which usually coincides with a sentence or fairly self-contained phrase. Whole lines can thus be repeated in this ‘formulaic’ way, and this happens in the Homeric epics.” 14 The repetitions in the Homeric text have been noticed before, “but Parry took the further step of using this formulaic style to prove that the Homeric poems were ‘orally’ composed.” 15 Parry argued that there are great differences between written and oral texts in their essential qualities as well as in their origins. He advanced a theory about the genesis of the Homeric text, namely, that it is the product of a long tradition of singers, who compose their songs orally, each performance anew, with the aid of so-called formulas, combinations of words which are regularly used under the same metrical conditions. The question of the origins of the text determined its literary assessment. This implied for Parry that critics have no right to attach a specific, contextually determined significance to the fixed epithet. 16 If a given phrase is formulaic, it would appear to be used simply for metrical convenience and not for a calculated poetic effect in its context.

15 Ibid, pp. 60. Finnegans also writes that this approach “has a deep influence on Homeric studies; though not all scholars accept the theory *in toto*, few can ignore it... but the idea that oral composition was in some way involved in the creation of the epics is now widely accepted.” Ibid, pp. 66.
Formulaic systems under Parry’s analysis were what set oral poetry apart from literate poetry, in what rapidly grew into a binary contrast, consisting of two mutually exclusive opposites. A number of studies of Homeric language and meter have refined Parry’s conclusions and in particular have tended to question whether the formular system was as inflexible as Parry thought it. Other scholars have illuminated the debate by setting the assumptions involved in it against the historical background and intellectual movement in which they were formulated. R. Finnegan has clearly shown the connection of orality theory and its presuppositions concerning the artist, the work of art, and the notion of evolution with Romanticism. M. Lynn-George made evident Parry’s Homeric ‘system of language’ similarities and differences from de Saussure’s ‘language as system’ structural linguistics. The problem of semantics, meaning and context in relation to the Homeric text has also drawn the attention of scholars and is widely studied. W. Ong argues that meaning in

18 D. Shive gives an account of the relation between Parry and his predecessors as well as his successors, and notes that hardly any scholar remains a rigid Parryist today, but “Parry is the Gordian knot tying up oral poetry and Homeric studies.” SHIVE, D., 1987: *Naming Achilles*, Oxford University Press, pp. 124.
20 His illuminating critic of orality theory is based on Derrida’s discussion of the speech – writing dichotomy. He writes: “The history of Western literature is thus conceived as a linear development, and a development structured by the disposition of an antithesis. Whatever terms are selected to construct this schema – and Parry one finds the primitive / the sophisticated, the traditional / the original, the universal / the particular, the general / the individual, – the schema derives its plausibly from the fundamental opposition of speech and writing and the indisputable historical ‘evidence’ that one is added to the other only much later in time.” LYNN-GEORGE, M., op. cit., pp. 73.
21 The similarities have been noted by other scholars as well. E. Bakker, writes: “In fact, not long before Parry published his two French theses, Ferdinand de Saussure, the champion of structural linguistics, had presented an account of grammar and language to which Parry’s notion of formulaic systems bears a
an oral culture is situational\textsuperscript{22} and writes in relation to Parry's theory and the problem of meaning in Homeric epics:

"...in Parry's concept there is a deeper stratum of meaning not immediately apparent from his definition of the 'formula' a group of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a given 'essential idea.' This 'essential idea' in turn "is not subject to clear, straightforward formulation but is rather a kind of fictional complex held together largely in the unconscious."\textsuperscript{23}

This has a decisive consequence for the way in which the terms of the debate are set up. It models the distinction between oral and written upon the division of language in terms of form and content, in which orality is supposed to stress the form and literacy to stress the content. As against this, we are arguing -- as do contemporary scholars in Homeric literary criticism -- that the division form-content is itself an anachronism if it is used to buttress the distinction between orality and literacy. An

\textsuperscript{22} "Oral cultures of course have no dictionaries and few semantic discrepancies. The meaning of each word is controlled by what Goody and Watt call 'direct semantic ratification,' that is, by what the real-life situations in which the word is used here and now. The oral mind is uninterested in definitions. Words acquire meanings only from their always insistent habitat, which is not, as in a dictionary, simply other words, but includes also gestures, vocal inflections, facial expressions and the entire human, existential setting in which the real, spoken word always occurs...The late A. Amory-Parry made the same point about the epithet \textit{amymon} applied by Homer to Aegisthus: the epithet means not 'blameless,' a tidy abstraction with which literates have translated the term, but 'beautiful-in-the-way-a-warrior-ready-to-fight-is beautiful... The oral word...never exists in a simply verbal context, as a written word does. Spoken words are always modifications of a total existential situation, which always engages the body." ONG, W.J., op. cit., pp. 47, 49, 67. This is also true for our use of speech, and indicates the coexistence of the two modalities, although we tend not to recognize or to overestimate the literate one. A further indication lies in the very fact that we can approach oral cultures, even though in a literate way.

\textsuperscript{23} Ong quotes in this point D.E. Bynum, and his theory of 'clusters' as the organizing principles of the formulas. Ibid. pp. 25.
analytic distinction has become confused with the historical hypothesis. However the degree to which the form-content distinction still shadows the approach of the epics is shown by the fact that Homeric scholars still feel the need to set up their analysis implicitly or explicitly against this problem. Note, for instance the opening lines of Austin’s book: “Surface and depth, around these terms revolves the major task of Homeric literary criticism”, where surface and depth stands for form and content. To cite a few more authors:

“...oral-formulaic theory minimizes, or at least severely limits, the role of semantics and semantic-context sensitivity, while in the present study the greatest emphasis is placed on semantics and hence literary studies.”

“...the method of collecting all attestations...what a better tool than context could we want for adding content to form in our understanding of the traditional nature of Homeric phrases?”

“Parry’s theory has also been modified by the recognition that where thrift is not absolute, considerations of context or dramatic effect may govern the poet’s choice of which of two possible epithets to use.”

24 „Even before Parry invoked ‘the grand dichotomy’ his work was structured by a conventional dichotomy between language and thought, which was later to be distributed between the oral and the written.” LYNN-GEORGE, M., op. cit., pp. 61.
Now, we also feel the need to point out our objections to proposing an opposition which is no more than the reflection of a mode of analytical thinking about language and which may impede us in approaching the way that language was experienced as it is presented within the Homeric text. Moreover, because the text is a contaminated case – it is a written text which permitted the survival of an oral culture – we should be wary of thinking form and content separately. E. Havelock, who in a number of studies elaborated the effects of the introduction of writing in Ancient Greece,\(^29\) recognizes the singularity of epics. In his book entitle *The Muse Learns to Write*, he argues about the

"necessary revision of a previous simplistic view...present in Preface to Plato, that the two epics, though obviously written down (or we would not have them) were compositions of primary orality: that is, their textual existence and shape represent a faithful rendering of purely acoustic laws of composition as these governed not only style but content. This had always been the contention of firm oralists (M. Parry, Lord, Kirk).....The epics as we now know them are the result of some interlock between the oral and the literate: or, to vary the metaphor, the acoustic flow of language contrived by echo to hold the attention of the ear has been reshuffled into visual patterns created by the thoughtful attention of the eye.\(^30\)

The necessity for a more blurred line between orality-literacy in the case of the epics is now established within scholarship, and our research accepts in line with such a position.\(^31\) We propose an analysis within the semantic field of the text that will take

\(^{29}\) A collection of essays on this topic has been published in HAVELOCK, E., 1982: *The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences*, Princeton.


\(^{31}\) See THOMAS, R., 1992: *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece*, Cambridge, and LA MATINA, M., 1994: *Il Testo Antico: Per una Semiotica come Filologia Integrata*, Working Papers 1, pp. 154. La Mattina argues that the form and the semantics of the language are interrelated and stresses the need to integrate the analysis of the syntax in Havelock's theory of orality with an analysis within the semantic field of the Greek texts, either archaic or classic. "Sono persuaso che le considerazioni di Havelock circa la struttura della frase greca in un contesto orale debbano sollecitare una riformulazione della prospettiva
into account the manifestations of its mnemonic structure, in the sense that we have to take into account the fact that the text was meant to be recited or heard and not read. This has specific consequences on the structure of the language that cannot be reduced to a set of rules applied to all oral cultures such as W. Ong proposes. As we shall show in each of the following chapters the possibility of different Homeric terms to evoke distinct experiences lies in the fact that these experiences are embedded in both the 'content' of the terms and the 'form' of language. This combination is unique in relation to the Homeric text and might mark its difference from other texts.

But we need to return to the above quotation of Havelock, for it is important in our research, insofar as it introduces us to the second and more interesting argument of the orality-literacy debate, that is, the shift from modalities of language to modalities of perception. W. Ong, as well as Havelock does, argues that

"the shift from oral to written speech is essentially a shift from sound (acoustic space) to visual space...sight isolates, sound incorporates. Whereas sight situates the observer outside what he views, at a distance, sounds pours into ears...Vision dissects...By contrast with vision, the dissecting sense, sound is thus a unifying sense." He goes on introducing the notion of distancing as the effect of

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con cui i testi greci arcaico-classici vengono di solito trattati. Tale riformulazione dovrà tener conto sia dei fattori di una (ipotetica) sintassi orale (ritmo, frase asintattica, paratassi, ecc.), sia dei fattori di una (ipotetica) semantica orale (formato narrativo, personificazione, ecc.)".

32 ONG, W., op.cit.

33 "This is the theory particularly associated with Marshall McLuhan, about the significance of 'oral culture' and its differentiation from the 'visual' culture of the written word. McLuhan's basic theory postulates a crucial difference between the world of 'typographic man', whose universe depends on the visual written word, and that of 'oral' or 'auditory man', which includes both the culture of non-literate peoples, untouched by writing, and the 'post-literate' world, in which once again 'oral modes' flourish. In the view of McLuhan and its associates, crucial factors both in social organization and man's psychical make-up and perceptions, have to do with the technology of communications." FINNEGAN, R., op. cit., pp. 254-5.
writing: "The distancing which writing effects develops a new kind of precision in verbalization by removing it from the rich but chaotic existential context of much oral utterance." 34

Here another problem emerges; it is not just that the Homeric text falls between the categories of oral and written, and that hence we cannot simply treat it as oral with the consequences for experience that theories of orality insist upon. 35 It is rather that the Homeric text actually gives us the opportunity to deconstruct the presuppositions that underlie the distinction between sound as participation, corresponding to a more concrete language, and vision as distancing that corresponds to a language that permits abstraction. This distinction between visual and acoustic perception has remained unchallenged, but has even been reinforced in contemporary scholarship. 36

In a recent article C. Segal writes:

"But this encounter between the tangible and the distant is also an aspect of what Eric Havelock calls the 'literate revolution'... Ear-knowledge depends on the direct, personal contact, from speaker to listener, from tongue to ear. Eye-knowledge allows a more distanced, speculative, and impersonal relation to information, especially when this is transmitted through the written message of a speaker who is not physically present." 37

34 Ibid, pp. 117, 72, and 103.

35 W. J. Ong argues that "in a primary oral culture thought and expression tend to be of the following sorts: Additive rather than subordinative, Aggregative than analytic, Redundant or copious, Conservative or traditional, Close to the human lifeword, Agonistically toned, Empathetic and Participatory rather than objectively distanced, Homeostatic, and Situational rather than abstract." Ibid, passim.

36 A. Ford writes: "The works of Havelock and Ong aim to show that writing is not just a neutral technology but may effect a transformation of consciousness and create a new relationship between speaker and what is spoken..." Ford does not examines the kind of transformation, his concern focuses only on whether the transformation might be 'instantaneous'. FORD, A., op. cit., pp. 135.

What is taken for granted in such arguments is an idea of perception as fixed, simple, and universal.38 But if we are to argue that perception is itself at least in part culturally constructed, then the form and the status of hearing and vision are shaped within a culture, whose members speak and see in a specific way. To refer here to sound as inevitably involving participation, and vision as inevitably involving distancing in the context of the epics, is to essentialize those human attributes. We shall have to examine in detail the specific way that seeing was experienced in the text,39 as the collision between the seeing and the seen. J-P. Vernant40 has already presented this in an exemplary fashion, this experience of seeing, which is also reflected in the writings of Greek authors after Homer. Moreover, one can insist that perhaps in an oral culture not only sound but also vision may be participatory, and

38 "[Derrida's] startling remark, 'there never has been any perception.' This is, of course, not a rejection of any familiar everyday experience, but a rejection of a concept, a concept that is an idealized and, one might say, logicized abstraction from our common everyday experience. It is the concept of perception, not as the awareness of circumstances in which we live and move and have our being, but rather as the pure immediate awareness of a sensory content which, although complicated by retentions and protentions, has no intrinsic reference to any such actual circumstances." GARVER, N., 1972: "Preface," Speech and Phenomena, Northwestern University Press, pp. xxiii.

39 See chapter on Thure-Pule.

40 As J-P. Vernant puts it: "...instead of three distinct facts- physical reality, sensory organ, mental activity- there was, to explain vision, a sort of luminous arm like a tentacle, which through the eyes extended one's organism outside itself. By reason of the kinship between the three phenomena, which all consisted equally of a very pure fire giving light without burning, the optical arm combined with the light of day and with the rays emitted by objects. Blending with them, it formed a single body (soma), perfectly continuous and homogeneous, which belonged as a whole both to oneself and to the physical world. Thus one could touch, wherever and however far it might be, the external object by sending out an extensible bridge made of the same matter as the thing that was seen, as the one who was seeing, as the light that enable sight. One's gaze operated in the world where it found its place like a piece of that world." VERNANT, J-P. 1995: "Introduction," The Greeks, ed. J-P. Vernant, University of Chicago Press, pp. 14.
thus both sound and vision were experienced as participation especially in the context of the Homeric text. But this is something to be investigated rather than asserted.

If we do not accept the orality-literacy debate as the explanatory model and if we dispense the opposition at the level of perception that it proposes, then the whole issue will have to be viewed in different terms. Our analysis will in fact argue that 'distancing' is a feature of speech and hearing in the epics. This does not prevent us from recognizing that there is indeed a change with the introduction of writing in Greece. But that it remains to be clarified what this change exactly is. We may be able to think the effect of writing as the visualization of the distancing feature of speech; as the transformation of the experience of seeing (transformation of visual perception), and not as a transition from one global type of perception to another, that is, from hearing which is considered participatory to vision-as-distancing. But to demonstrate this we have to investigate speech and consequently hearing as presented in the text.

1.3. SPEECH EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE HOMERIC TEXT

Given the fact that epics were meant to be recited and not to be read, the language of Homeric text should be considered as transcribed speech, hence the title of the chapter Epos. Consequently, two areas of inquiry open up and permit us to consider a twofold aspect of the relation between speech and experience. Firstly, the indications provided within the vocabulary of speech in the text enable us to understand how speech was experienced, and secondly the context of epic performance, as it is

41 "At least one explicit reference to the use of writing (Z169) can be found in the Homeric poems; this allusion concerns the utilitarian production of a message, however, and not the use of writing in the literary domain." CALAME, C., op.cit., pp. 29.
described in the poems, shows in what way audience experienced epics, and hence illuminates the mechanism through which speech evokes experience.

1.3.1. SPEECH AND THE BODY

Let us pose the following question: What is different in the way speech was experienced within the context of Homeric epics? Because Greeks are both distant and familiar to us we need to clarify our ideas about speech in order to avoid anachronisms, even before start approaching the text. The current view declares that speech is the activation of the organs for sounding and hearing. We also conventionally distinguish between a speaker who emits sounds expressing his thoughts, feelings etc., and a listener who receives the sound, and makes sense of what he hears. Speech is then distinguished as sound, meaning and reception, that postulates a further distinction between a listener and a speaker. Of course the very possibility of these series of distinctions presupposes the existence of the category of consciousness. But if this subjectivity, and the interiority that becomes manifested by

42 "The Greeks are distant from us, from the ways we act, think, and feel, ways that are so familiar to us that they seem to be natural, to go without saying, but from which we must detach ourselves when we turn towards the Greeks; otherwise we shall find them in our way when we make that turn." VERNANT, J-P., op. cit., pp. 2.

43 "What does it means to speak? The current view declares that speech is the activation of the organs for sounding and hearing. Speech is the audible expression and communication of human feelings. These feelings are accompanied by thoughts. In such a characterization of language three points are taken for granted. First and foremost, speaking is expression. The idea of speech as an utterance is the most common. It already presupposes the idea of something internal that utters and externalizes itself. If we take language to be utterance, we give an external, surface notion of it at the very moment when we explain it by recourse to something internal. Secondly, human speech is regarded as an activity of man...Hence we cannot say 'Language speaks'...Finally, human expression is always a presentation and representation of the real and the unreal." HEIDEGGER, M., 1971: "Language," Poetry, Language, Thought, Harper and Row. pp. 192.
speech is a commonplace for us, there is no need to suppose that the situation was exactly the same in the context of the epics. Therefore let us shift our attention from the speaking subject to speech as it is presented in the text.

An obvious step to start such a study would be that of drawing up an inventory of verbs meaning ‘to speak’, all of which we translate simply as ‘say’. But we should be aware that the idea of an inventory and meaning and even the notion of word as a distinct entity, corresponds to the way we think and use the language. In the poems, words can not be separated from the rhythmic flow of the epic performance, and be treated as objects situated in a list, a dictionary, used as labels or carrier of meanings. Having in mind these limitations, we can make our list, use our dictionaries, always taking into consideration the context of the poem, where the word we analyse is situated.

Even though we already choose epos – because of its relation to epic – as the title of the chapter, this is not the only word in the text that refers to language as speech. Nor does it correspond to a term that unifies the experience of speech,

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44 W.J. Ong attributes to writing such 'use' of words: “Writing makes ‘words’ appear similar to things because we think of words as the visible marks signaling words to decoders. We can see and touch such inscribed ‘words’ in texts and books. Written words are residue. Oral tradition has no such residue or deposit. When an often-told oral story is not actually being told, all that exists of it is the potential in certain human beings to tell it...Even the concept of a ‘word’ as a discrete entity apart from a flow of speech seems somewhat text-based...The sense of individual words as significantly discrete items is fostered by writing, which here as elsewhere is diacretic, separative...Early manuscripts tend not to separate words clearly from each other, but to run them together...Chirographic and typographic folk tend to think of names as labels, written or printed tags imaginatively affixed to an object named...Print cultures have invented dictionaries in which the various meanings of a word as it occurs in datable texts can be recorded in formal definitions. Words thus are known to have layers of meanings. Dictionaries advertise semantic discrepancies.” ONG, W.J., op. cit., pp. 11, 31, 61, and 47.
because such term does not exist. 45 This reminds us the case of the category of body in the poems, where no term designates it as "an organic unity which supports the individual in the multiplicity of its vital and mental functions." 46 A variety of words are used instead, and each of them can refer to various domains, i.e., organic realities, vital forces, psychic activities, divine inspirations or influxes. Now we cannot be sure what the consequences are of this lack of a general functional term for 'speech' or the 'body' in our sense. 47 But it seems reasonable to assume that there are some consequences. This situation was also forced by B. Snell in respect to vision. 48 The case of speech is similar. We find ourselves in an odd situation as we attempt to

45 "The term 'speech' itself poses problems, since there is no uniform Greek designation for these instances of direct discourse, and the English equivalent carries associations with formal rhetoric that may not lie behind the poetic intent of the original. The scholarship on Homeric direct discourse, influenced by the entire rhetorical tradition of post-Homeric Greece, has neglected this fundamental distinction; it has not occurred to investigators that perhaps not all Homeric speeches are at the same level of importance." MARTIN, R., 1989: The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad, Ithaca and London, pp. 46.


47 The absence of the so-called general or abstract terms in oral cultures was interpreted by anthropologists but also by the authors of the orality and literacy debate as an indication of the concrete character of language in such societies, in contrast to abstraction as the main feature of language in literate ones.

48 SNELL, B., 1960: The Discovery of the Mind, Harper and Row, pp. 1-22. For a critic of Snell see AUSTIN, N., op. cit., pp. 83-5. He writes: "Although Snell avoids the distinction between abstract and concrete as being subject to question, he makes a similar distinction: between particular and general, between articulation and synthesis. Homer, Snell believes, knows the parts but not the whole; modes of vision but not vision; parts of the body but not body; parts of the soul but not soul". Austin proposes a way out by using the methods of structural anthropology. He argues: "[Snell's] assumption is that the only vehicle for concepts or categories is the individual word. We need rather to examine complexes of words to find ways in which they relate to each other, and thus to find in their relations the general concepts." In our research we are not interested in finding the general concept of speech in the epics, not because it also falls into the general-particular dichotomy but because this exceeds the scope of the thesis.
register the words that refer to speech in the text. The vocabulary of speech is so rich that it is difficult to enumerate, far more to investigate each single term in its context.\(^{49}\)

It is not possible to be exhaustive, or even to enlist the whole variety of forms that each word entails. Furthermore, this variety of terms is quite difficult to grasp and transcribe. Dictionaries, in order to differentiate one term from another, use them in opposition to each other or distinguish between metaphorical and literal meaning. We shall see further on, from where this difficulty arises. We are well aware that our research will remain partial, and indeed profoundly lacking in its analysis of the Homeric terms for speech. Given the focus of the thesis on the Homeric ‘spatial vocabulary’ our choice of speech-terms to be examined is strategic, but at least can give us a hint about the relation of speech and experience in the epics.

We can start with a well-known verb *legein* (λέγειν). This is a term that does not occur very often in Homer, and in that sense it would appear the least likely to take up. But we have already noted that this is a strategic choice. In fact, to give an adequate translation of *logos* (λόγος) – the noun that stems from it – would require an entire history of philosophy. A term that will become the ‘ground’ for philosophical discourse enables us to clearly differentiate its earlier conception. The opportunity of the Homeric text is that we can study the signification of *logos* (λόγος)\(^{50}\) and later on

\(^{49}\) To give an indication, the vocabulary that involves speech contains such distinct verbs that denote the utterance as: λέγει, εἴπειν, εἴρει, ἐργαί, μυθέωμαι, σφαίρα, φωνῆς, φηνής, φοινίκης, φιλάγγει, φράζω, φανεραίωσι, καλέω, νομάζω, βδέλι, ἄγορευο, ἀπομαίβομαι, ἀποφαλλοῦμαι, or verbs denoting the act of hearing speech as: ἀκούω, κλέω, ἀκούω. In addition each of the verbs presents a variety of related words. For instance, related words to the verb μυθέωμαι within the text, include μῦθος, ἀκροτόμος, πολύμυθος, μυθολογεῖσθαι, μυθολογείς, ἀκροτόμωμαι, προσυμφόρωμαι, παραμυθόμαι.

\(^{50}\) The noun *logos* occurs only in the plural once in Iliad (0393: ἔτερον λόγον) and once in the Odyssey (056: αἰεὶ δὲ μαλακοίσι καὶ αμυλάοισι λόγοισι θελεῖ). In both passages it evokes the pleasure (τερπεῖν) or the enchantment (ἰθηλέγει) that ‘words’ produce.
in the text, choro (χόρος) before philosophy, though as we shall see this ‘before’ brings with it theoretical problems. What is it to translate a text before philosophy where the very idea of ‘translation’ carries with it so much philosophical baggage?

We should not begin by asking what does logos-legein mean, as if there were an original, authentic meaning, an essence of the word that can be discovered in the Homeric text. For we face an immense difficulty, in that the philosophical conception of the relation between speech and that of a mental activity – what we call thinking, be it in the form of logic, syllogism, or dialectic, all this is so deeply rooted in us that it is difficult not to assume that it existed in Homer.

If we examine the passages where legein occurs in the text, in some of them can be translated with the verb ‘speak’, but there are also instances where it is obvious that the same form of verb should be translated as ‘collecting’. These are the passages where Homer refers to people collecting, gathering things that lie on the ground, such as pieces of wood to light a fire, cattle-gear (pieces) of armour, bones of a dead person, thorn-hedges to make a fence, or where it denotes the collection of people into a place to perform a specific action. In one passage lego
is used with the noun *arithmos* (ἄριθμος), usually translated as ‘number’—though not in the sense of a distinct entity—so the dictionaries give to it the meaning of enumerate, which is also applied to *lego* as narrate in the sense of collecting, recollecting, and enumerate. The connection has been made. Some might assume that speech in the case of *lego* is experienced as ‘collecting’. The next step would be to ask: Did Homeric Greeks experience speech as *logos* in a more concrete way, than we do? Did they experience words in a concrete way as things? We do not know. In fact we do not know for reasons which are not just scholarly ignorance. For the fact is that we do not have an agreed frame for agreeing about how we experience speech. In any case we should be suspicious of such hypothesis because of its similarity with the way we think the words as objects. To agree with the hypothesis is just as arbitrary as to suppose that they experienced the collecting of a piece of wood, or bones in an abstract way. We only know that they experienced both—speech as *lego* and the collection of what we call concrete things—in a similar way. Similarly, we can not say whether the experience should be called concrete or abstract, exactly for the terms concrete and abstract are part of a categorical separation which is ours and not theirs. We shall return to this below.

57 διέμενος (lekto) their number, and we were among the first he counted (lege); he had no idea of any treachery. Then he too lay down (lekto) among us (δέπα τον αριθμὸν. ἐν δὲ ἡμᾶς πρῶτος λέγει κῆπεσιν, οὐδὲ τι θυμῶ / ἥδον δόλων εἶναι ἐπειδή δὲ λέγει καὶ αὐξῶ). Note that in the passage the middle voice form lekto occurs twice, and is given two different translations. The fist one stems from *lego* and is translated as ‘count’, while the second from lecho and translated as ‘lay down’. This phenomenon is interpreted as homophony and occurs with other verbs as well. We propose to understand that homophony is not simply a grammatical phenomenon, but indicates a similarity at the level of experience. Thus, lekto evokes the experience of ‘count’ and ‘lay down’, as inseparable. However, we shall elaborate more on the phenomenon of homophony in the chapter on *Domas*. 
In Iliad B222, the only person in the poems who has a deformed body, legein (λέγειν) 'speaks' with a oxea (ὀξέα) 'piercing voice', oneidea (ονείδεα) 'reproachful words'.

He is aischistos (αἴσχιστος) 'disfigured', described as pholkos (φολκός), cholos (χολός), kurtos (κυρτός) and phoxos (φοξός), that is, bow-legged, lame, hunchback, with a sharp-pointed head with little hair on the top of it. He has in his phresin (φρέσιν) 'lungs', epea (ἐπεα) 'words' which are akosma (ἀκοσμα) 'shameful'.

The voice that comes out from this deformed body is also deformed. The fact that Thersites is making just accusations about Agamemnon is of no importance whatsoever. Odysseus beats him with a metal-studded rod, and the whole army is satisfied when he topples over in pain, his back bleeding.

This passage problematizes and once again, brings us back to the distinction, which is so common for us today, between the form and the content of speech. We

58 B212-224: Thersites of the endless speech, still scolded, who knew within his head many words, but disorderly, vain, and without decency, to quarrel with the princes with any word he thought might be amusing to the Argives. This was the ugliest man who came beneath Ilion. He was bandy-legged and went lame of one foot, with shoulders stooped and drawn together over his chest, and above this his skull went up to a point with the wool grown sparsely upon it... he, crying the words aloud, scolded Agamemnon. (θερσίτης δ’ ἦτα μιδῶνος ὀμετροεις ἑκολῶς, ὑδὲ ἐπεα φρέσιν ἤταν ἁκοσμὰ τε πολλὰ τε ἡδεῖ, ἡ μάγην, ἑτορ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, ἔρειζεν μὲν βασιλεύσειν. ὥλλ’ δ’ τι οἱ ἔρειστο γελοῖοι θρήσκευσιν ἢ ἐμεναί, αἰσχιστοῖς δὲ ἄνηρ ὑπὸ Ἰλιῶν ἥλπεν, φολκός ἦν, χολός δ’ ἔτερον τὸδε, τοῦ ἄτο σκοτός σωματικότερον αὐτὰρ ἔκαθεν, φοξέας ἀνὴρ κεφαλῆς, μεθύνη δ’ ἐπενήνυε λάχνην, ἂν...ὀξεὰ κεφαλῆς λέγ’ ονείδεα...κτύταρ δ’ μακρὰ βοῶν ἀγαμήμωνα νείκει μῦθῳ.

59 On the interpretation of phresin as ‘lungs’, see ONIANOS, R.B., 1994, The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate, Cambridge University Press, pp. 27.

60 Kosmos in the text denotes ‘order’, ‘arrangement’, and ‘ornament’.

61 The problem of form and content of language in the epics is, as we have already seen, complex. It can again be illustrated by the way dictionaries define the well-known word muthos (μυθος), a Homeric term that we shall not investigate. The problem that arises is the distinction between form and content of language that is implied in muthos intended as story, and opposed to logos, or epos. Chantraine gives the following definition: "μυθος: suite de parole qui ont un sens, propos, discours, associé a ἔννοι a qui désigne le mot, la parole, la forme, en s’en distinguant, contenu des parole, avis, intention, pensée,
do not want to argue that the form of speech is more important than the content in the poems. It is more a case of recognizing that the separation between content and form is in fact a separation between thought as content and speech as form. If we were to accept such a distinction, then we could talk about a discrepancy between the two – a right thought that is expressed in a wrong form – in the above passage, and try to explain it. We might say that what is wrong is that a soldier accuses a king.

However, what interests us here is the very fact that a deformed soldier has the ability to insult kings. We would do better to try to evade the distinction, and the text


R. Garland presupposes the distinction when he writes: “Thersites...is in fact the only Achaian who has the courage to articulate in public what the rest of the army has surely been thinking in private.” GARLAND, R., 1995: The Eye of the Beholder: Deformity and Disability in the Graeco-Roman World, Duckworth, pp. 80.

"True, Thersites' judgment of the warrior kings is not unlike the judgment we ourselves might want to pass on them... But the criticism is not done in the right way by the right person." AHL, F., 1984: "The Art of Safe Criticism in Greece and Rome", AJP 105, pp. 174. A similar assumption underlies the interesting analysis of Thalman, who attributes to Thersites the role of scapegoat and uses Marxist theory to discuss the ideology of a class society in the Homeric text. To support his argument he has to dismiss any possible relation between Thersites' deformed body and deformed speech. THALMANN, W.G., 1988: "Thersites: Comedy, Scapegoats, and Heroic Ideology in the Iliad", TAPA 118, pp. 15. On the other hand A. Ford argues: "Not only does Thersites threaten the political order by challenging Agamemnon, but the rabble-rouser is an aesthetic offense as well: ugly and misshapen, his speech is abundant but without order (ακοσμα epea, ou kata kosmon). The order he violates is at once political and aesthetic. His lack of measure in speech (ametroepes) and lack of distinctions (akritomuthes) threaten the hierarchies that make heroic action possible and the ordering that makes an account of that action possible." FORD, A., op. cit., pp. 86.
supports this. The deformed voice of the cripple Thersites,64 exhales with breathing, comes out from his lungs where phresi (φρεσί) ‘lungs’ are intended as both the organ, the seat of utterance, the seat of thought and the seat of feeling.65 How then one can talk about a form and content of speech where these two are coterminous?

The difficulty of avoiding such distinctions is manifested in the way dictionaries define phren (φρήν): “The meaning of the word phren stands midway between its literal and its figurative [metaphoric] sense; it means the heart and the parts about the heart, and signifies the seat of thought, will, feeling; mind, soul, heart, consciousness.”66 Dictionaries as we have already said, often have recourse to metaphor in order to deal with the complexities of the Homeric speech terms. But the proposed metaphorical meaning can be quite misleading. It might lead us to think that

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65 S.D. Sullivan in her study on phren argues that there is a “strong connection of phrenes with speech”. She also notes: “Phrenes...can denote ‘that which thinks’ and also ‘that which is thought’. Since this ambiguity exists, both meanings must be assumed to be present in the different passages where phrenes occur. Thus, in the description of phrenes as a faculty indeterminately corporeal, ‘faculty’ includes both that which acts and the action itself. Person and phrenes remain distinct, although joined in a close relationship.” SULLIVAN, S.D., 1988: Psychological Activity in Homer: A Study of Phren, Carleton University Press, Canada, pp. 186, 30.

66 AUTENRIETH, G. 1991: Homeric Dictionary, Duckworth, s.v. φρήν. Sullivan writes on the relation of consciousness with phren: “Was the awareness of phrenes...a part of [the Homeric man’s] notion of ‘self’, or was it separate? The relationship between these two types of awareness remains unclear.” SULLIVAN, S.D., op. cit., pp. 198.
the Homeric language is more concrete than ours, which is characterized by entailing many abstract concepts. Indeed metaphor itself does not exist as a term in the Homeric text, and this is obvious if we consider the philosophical dimension. Metaphor: to transfer and transform from abstract to concrete. Rather we should think metaphor as a tool to help us approach another and distant culture; as a vehicle to communicate the two registers: the corporeal: the concrete, and the mental or psychological: the abstract. The abstract and the concrete are only ontologically distinct for us, because they correspond to a further distinction between the mental and the corporeal. But what the Homeric language expresses it is not its concreteness — in the sense that words correspond to things and not to abstract concepts — but rather that speech does not exist independently from the body that speaks. The body twines the corporeal and the psychological. In this sense there is no distinction between a mental and a corporeal experience. Lego as collecting pieces of wood and *lego* as collecting memories is above all the activity of a ‘multiple’ body, one which is not as it is for us always already divided into body and mind. As P. Vivante notes

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68 H. Monsacré acknowledges the non distinction between mental and corporeal experience but attributes it to the concreteness of the Homeric language. She writes: “Par une étroite imbrication des phénomènes physiques et moraux, par la tendance générale du vocabulaire homérique à être plutôt concret qu’ abstrait, l’ expérience physique et spirituelle sont souvent confondues. L’ absence de cloisonnement rigide entre activités physiques et mentales est un trait assez typique de l’ épopée: les mots *thumos*, *etor*, *ker*, *kradie* — et dans une moindre mesure *phren* qui se rapporte assez souvent à la vie intellectuelle — signifient tantôt l’ organe, tantôt la fonction de l’ organe”. MONSACRÉ, H., op. cit., pp. 51-2.

69 The relation of speech and body is also manifested in the later Greek attitude to read aloud, interpreted by Svenbro as giving a voice, and thus a body to the written text. He argues: “The writer necessarily depends on the voice of the reader. At the moment of reading, the reader relinquishes his
"this is why Homer never opposes *ergon* (ἐργὸν) ‘deed’ to *epos* (ἐπός) ‘word’ – a commonplace of classical authors."\(^{70}\) Yet dictionaries do define *epos* as opposite to *ergon*. However, although we are contesting this opposition of terms, this does not indicates a sameness.\(^{71}\) It would be better to say that *ergon* and *epos* in the Homeric text, are distinct activities because performed by different parts of the ‘multiple’ body.\(^{72}\)

The unity of body, voice and deed, is explicitly manifested in the passage where Odysseus warns Thersites not to insult the kings again.\(^{73}\) His words should be...

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\(^{70}\) Vivante also notes: "Thus in the Homeric phrase ἐργὸν αἰτσιοτύχεις word and deed are not opposed to each other but form a kind of hendiadys expressing one sole idea: Il. 15.234, Od.11.346; cf. II.1.77, 108, 19.242, Od.2.272,3.99, 4.163, 15.375." VIVANTE, P., 1975: "On Homer's Winged Words," Classical Quarterly 25, pp. 11.

\(^{71}\) Martin notes that in the context of the speech-act theory "between the two terms no distinction is drawn. Both are performances. The poetry anticipates Austin and Searle in treating speech as act, part of an economy in which talk about one’s action is as important as deeds themselves, and in which no feat can survive without its afterword." MARTIN, R., op. cit., pp. 146.

\(^{72}\) Having said that, we might understand why such distinct categories of humans – heralds, prophets, doctors, bards, carpenters, strangers and suppliants – are called, in the text, *demiérogoi* (δημιerogoi) 'creators'. The difficulty arises because we associate creation with the production of a tangible, visible object.

\(^{73}\) B256-61: And this also will I tell you, and it will be a thing accomplished. If once more I find you playing the fool, as you are now, nevermore let the head of Odysseus sit on his shoulders, let me nevermore be called Telemachos' father, if I do not take you and strip away your personal clothing. (οὐλὰ έκ τοι ἐρήμων, το δὲ και τετελεσμένον ἔσται / εἰ κ' ἐτι σ' ἄφοραντα κιχάσομαι ἡς νο περ ἄδε. / μηκέτ' ἐπειτ'
considered as *tetelesmenon estai* (τετελεσμένον ἔσται) ‘being accomplished’. If not, i.e., if there is a separation between word and deed this would transform his body; the head of Odysseus would be separated from his shoulders. Not only that, Odysseus would not be called the father of Telemachos any more. This last consequence not only indicates that his relation with his son would be resolved. The separation of father and son is nothing more than the separation of the proper name (Odysseus) and the epithet (Telemachos). Odysseus would not be Telemachos ‘the one who fights away’, any more. He would become an-other. Speech as deed is inseparable from the body, but speech experience is also related to identity and difference, as we shall see in the third part of the present chapter. “Individual identity has two aspects: a name and a body.”

We can now investigate in more detail, how different voices, always intended as both content and form, correspond to different bodies, that utter them. The epic vocabulary is extremely rich in words involving the production of sounds (δοξα, ἔνοπτη, φθοργή, φωνή, αύθη, ὅσσα, ὴμφη, κληδόν...), all of which we translate as ‘voice’. We shall refer for this part our study to Jenny Clay’s article where she examines the different

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74 “In other words, the name of the son is an epithet for the father or the grandfather... That is a statement that should be taken absolutely literally... The epithet that is attached to [Odysseus] in the epic proclaims the same thing as the name of his son. The exploit of the father is summed up in a name, a name that may, on its own account, be developed in narrative.” Svendro, J., op. cit., pp. 70.

75 Vernant, J-P., Zone, op. cit., pp. 40.

76 H. Fournier distinguishes the words for voice that are related to verbs of saying and conveys the character of each term. His assumptions about language become evident as he classifies each term according to its physical, physiological, intellectual and expressive aspect. FOURNIER, H., op. cit., pp. 232. For a discussion on the terms that denote “the voice of song”, see Ford, A., op. cit., pp. 172-197.
terms for the voice in Homer. She writes that "aude (αῦδή) 'voice' "seems to be a distinguishing characteristic of human beings and differs both from animal noises and divine speech...a divinity may be called αῦδήσωσα when using human speech". She argues that in order to appear to mortals, a god needs to change not only his body, but his/her voice as well. She also suggests that there are two Homeric words for divine voice: ὀμφή and ὀσσα. P. Vivante adds another two φημις and κληδῶν. Ossa (ὀσσα) is often translated as 'rumour' or even 'divine rumour.' The close relation of voice and body, the need for a voice to have a body, is reflected in the personification of Ossa. Zeus, who never appears to mortals, sends his voice embodied in the form of the messenger-voice Ossa. Omphè (ὀμφή) is also sent by gods, and lingers about a person as the manifestation of an invisible divine body. The lack of a body that utters the voice is evident in the case of φημις and κληδῶν as well.

How can we approach this dissociation of divine voice and body? Does it indicate that gods do not have a body? As Vernant pointed out they do have a body, though a different one and consequently a different voice. A divine bodily presence

77 "The Shield of Achilles shows the gods to be both larger and more beautiful than men. Hence the assumption of a human form requires a diminution of their stature. But a complete metamorphosis also demands a concomitant change in voice or manner of speaking. The Homeric gods, then, differ from men not only in immortality and stature. A less obvious but equally important difference is the fact that the gods speak differently than men, and thus to appear as men and to speak like them, the gods must change both in demas and aude." CLAY, J. 1974: "Demas and Aude: The Nature of Divine Transformation in Homer", Hermes 102, pp. 136.

78 VIVANTE, P., op. cit., pp. 11.

79 B93-4: and Rumour walked blazing among them, Zeus' messenger, to hasten them along (μετὰ δὲ φημιν Οσσα δεδήι / ὀμφήσωσα ὑνίατι, Διὸς δῖγγελος.) See also α413, α282, β216.

80 B41: the divine voice drifting around him (θεὶν δὲ μὲν ὀμφήζοντ' ὀμφή), and also Υ129: [he] does not hear all this from god's voices (οἵ τοῖσα θείν εἰκ πεσάμενα ὀμφής).

81 "In many ways, the divine super-body evokes and touches upon the non-body. It points to it; it merges with it. If it were to swing to one side, to turn itself into the absence of body, the denial of body, it
is seen and recognized only with difficulty, and this might be attributed to the specific character of visual perception in Homer. Furthermore, for every recognition including that of mortals, bodily presence is never enough. This fact helps us to shift our investigation elsewhere. What interests us then is not the relation between the divine voice and body, but the very fact that divine voice is always perceived, heard and recognized as such, i.e., as something different. It will be this kind of research that introduces another way of experiencing speech, denoted by the term *phemi*, which will be examined further on in the chapter. The analysis of the Homeric words for voice will remain partial, nevertheless we can make a last remark to underline the relation of body and voice. A term such as *orthia* (όρθα) denotes the posture of the body, the voice that comes out from a body that stands in upright position, while *opa* (όπα) indicates its rhythmic movement.

In conclusion, Homeric speech is always an activity of a multiple but not divided body – not the expression of an inner self – by means of the organs of speech. In this case it would be anachronistic to use a number of our analytic distinctions as if they captured a phenomenological level of the experience of speech. Such analytical

would upset the very equilibrium of Greek polytheism in its constant, necessary tension between the darkness in which the visible human body is steeped and the radiant light with which the god’s invisible body shines.” VERNANT, J.-P., *Zone*, pp. 19-43.

See above note 40.


“*Opa* refers to vocal quality or timbre, especially a clear or shrill tone. Thus the Muses have *opa* as do Circe and Calypso when they sing, Odysseus as he delivers a speech, or Hecuba when she cries out at the sight of Hector slain.” CLAY, J. op.cit., pp. 135.
distinctions would include: form and content, thought and expression and the linguistic distinction – which Saussure made – between langue and parole. Again it should be emphasized that from the other side of the issue it is not a question of asserting that empirical Homeric reality destroys the validity of those distinctions but rather that those distinctions can never yield the form which experience took. The entire topography of speaking, thinking and sensation has to be thought in a quite different and specific relation. Speech is an action of the body, not something that can be divided – as we do – between meaning and sound.

1.3.2. SPEECH AS LISTENING AND DISTANCING

Central to Ong’s and Havelock’s works is the assertion that sound and hearing in oral cultures are intrinsically participatory. W. Ong writes:

“For an oral culture learning or knowing means achieving close, empathetic, communal identification with the known, getting with it. Writing separates the knower from the known and thus sets up conditions for ‘objectivity’, in the sense of personal disengagement or distancing.”

In this section we shall challenge this notion of participation and communal identification in Ong’s sense. By contrast, we shall argue that speech in the Homeric text can in fact be experienced as distancing, where distancing is understood as an interplay between differentiation and identification. In doing so we hope to displace the central opposition in which these two terms are treated within the orality-literacy debate; that is, orality/identification versus literacy/differentiation. In order to do so, we shall have to focus on the performance of the poems as depicted within the text, which describes the way that bards communicated experience to their audience. But,

85 ONG, W.J., op.cit., pp. 46.
before that, we need to consider one of the main terms that denotes speech in the text, which will illuminate another aspect of Homeric speech experience. We shall see how speech – in the sense of *phemi* – was always already experienced as a listening. The verb *phemi* (φημι) usually translated as ‘say’, was analysed in detail by the linguist E. Benveniste. Benveniste connects *phemi* with Latin terms such as *fas, fatus, fama, infans, fabula*, through the Indo-European root *bha-*, in order to explain how the general meaning ‘to speak’ came to be specialized in the sense *fas* ‘divine law’.

"What is the precise sense of ‘to speak’ with this verb? What particular features distinguish it from all the other expressions relating to speech?" And he argues: "the root *bha-* designates speech as something independent of the person uttering it, not in virtue of what it means but in virtue of its very existence. Thus what has been said, Lat. *fatum*, or what is being said *fama*, Gr. *pheme*, Hom. *demou phemis*, ‘vox populi’, is charged, as impersonal speech, with a positive religious value: *pheme* is itself a god (theos...is) (Hesiod, Works 764). He continues: "In the Odyssey there is frequent mention of the *demou phemis* ‘the rumour of the people, the voice of the people...the word [phemis] does not denote individual speech. . . *pheme* is an emanation of words, whether it refers to rumour, reputation, fame, or an oracle. Finally, the verb *phasthai...phato* is to taken literally not simply as ‘he said’ but ‘this utterance emanated from him’." 86

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86 Benveniste points the fact that the conjugation of *phemi, phato* is partly active and partly middle. Apart from *phemi* he examines other related terms such as "*pheme* ‘fame’, *phemis*, which has virtually the same sense ‘rumour, conversation, gossip’ and also *phatis* ‘word, rumour, report... thesphatos: athesphatos ‘limited (by destiny)’: ‘not limited.’" He argues: "We see why the root of *phemi...* came to indicate the manifestation of a divine saying: this is because it is always impersonal, because there is always something confused about it, always something mysterious just as the first beginnings of speech on the lips of a child [infant] are mysterious... This power of speech, cut off from its human source, and often of divine origin, can easily become a magic power...this root *bha-*, which in the vocabulary of Indo-European expressed this strange, extra-human power of the word, from its first awakening in the human infant to its collective manifestations, which were regarded as the expression of a divine voice." BENVENISTE, E. 1973: *Indo-European Language and Society*, Faber and Faber, pp. 407-15.
Benveniste’s point is that *phemí* indicates the “act of speech which is impersonal and not individualized”. In what sense can one speak about impersonal or individualized speech in the context of the epics? If self-consciousness is foreign to the culture depicted in the poems, what does the term ‘individual’ indicate? Nonetheless, Benveniste’s remarks still have a value. What seems promising is the connection of *phemí* with the divine in the sense that divine is recognized as something different, and there is massive textual evidence of such a recognition. We can approach then the problem of identity and difference as evoked by the experience of speaking as *phemí*, which in turn will relate as to the setting of Homeric performance.

*Phemios* is the bard in Odysseus’ palace, who escapes the slaughter. He says to Odysseus as he asks for mercy:

> I am taught by myself, but the god has inspired in me the song-ways of every kind.⁸⁷

E. Dodds argued that no contradiction is involved here because what the bard says is that he does not copy his songs but reworks what the god has taught him.⁸⁸ What seemed a contradiction to us initially, reveals the specific way that the experience of speech (in the form of song in this passage) for Phemios ‘the one who speaks in the

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⁸⁷ ἔμμου δέ μοι ἐν φρεσίν ὀμας / παντοιας ἐνέφρουσεν.

⁸⁸ "I am self-taught’ says Phemios, ‘it was a god who implanted all sorts of lays in my mind’. The two parts of his statement are not felt as contradictory; he means, I think, that he has not memorized the lays of other minstrels, but is a creative poet who relies on the hexameter phrases welling up spontaneously as he needs them out of some unknown and uncontrollable depth, he sings ‘out of the gods,’ as the best minstrels always do.” DODDS, E.R., 1951: *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley Press, Boston, pp. 10. For the form-content distinction that underlies this kind of approach, see FORD, A., op. cit., pp. 31-4.
The speaking subject is also subject to the word of others, himself spoken in his speaking. If Achilles almost assumes the role of bard for his own deeds, asserting (phemi) his achievements with an extended simile for his sufferings, he also cites the prior discourse (phesi) which has already traced the design of his destiny.” LYNN-GEORGE, M., op. cit., pp. 109.

"Similarly, it is the body that gives a subject his identity, by distinguishing him from all his peers through his appearance, his physiognomy, his clothing and his insignia.” VERNANT, J-P. Zone, op.cit., pp. 40.

89 "The speaking subject is also subject to the word of others, himself spoken in his speaking. If Achilles almost assumes the role of bard for his own deeds, asserting (phemi) his achievements with an extended simile for his sufferings, he also cites the prior discourse (phesi) which has already traced the design of his destiny." LYNN-GEORGE, M., op. cit., pp. 109.

90 "Similarly, it is the body that gives a subject his identity, by distinguishing him from all his peers through his appearance, his physiognomy, his clothing and his insignia." VERNANT, J-P. Zone, op.cit., pp. 40.

91 See above note 74.

92 Lynn-George notes that the Homeric culture is one of discourse “in which the subject, like everything else, is a construct of speech.” LYNN-GEORGE, M., op. cit., pp. 130. See also Goldhill who writes: “A/the man’ is ‘made up’ by the language in which he represents himself and is represented.”

Odysseus is not recognized by sight back in his home. His father, son, even his wife sees only a stranger. It is Eurukleia, his nurse, who identifies him. She recognizes him not though sight but by touching his scar, and because she is able to recollect a remote story about it.⁹³ Here it is within speech as listening (acoustic) — and not through vision — that identity and difference are produced within the Homeric text.⁹⁴

We can now return to Phemios, the bard. The god, recognized as the other, inspired him. Divine inspiration has nothing mysterious about it. What is translated and thus transformed as inspiration is described in the text as an act exercised on the body of the bard: the god blows the songs into his lungs. We need though to remember that body does not only designate the ‘organic’. To be able to sing is to be able to listen, for aio (ἀἰο) ‘to listen’, literally means ‘breathe in’.⁹⁵ Speaking in the context of performance, that is, reciting or singing, is thus always already listening. Thespesios ‘marvelous’, a term related to phemi, is applied to the songs of Sirens, and it is a term that denotes the divine origin of the song.⁹⁶ And Homer the poet of epics says in B484:

⁹³ τρικτες ἔγνω οὐσίαν τινα ποιζούν την ἑλκταλεικαῖον χώραν τοῦ Ὀδυσσείας
⁹⁴ K. Crotty argues: “The opaque narrative of the Odyssey, in more truly conveying the autonomous self, in turn reflects the listener’s self. The listener’s deepened awareness of his own autonomous self — a self that likens him to the hero who suffers, desires and understands — is the culmination, the telos, to which the Odyssey looks forward.” GROTTY, K., 1994: The Poetics of Supplication: Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, Cornell University Press, pp. 210. See in contrast “the aesthetics of anaesthetisation”, the indifference with which the original Homeric audience responded to the epic recitation, according to Parry’s theory of orality. LYNN-GEORGE, M., op. cit., pp. 78.
⁹⁶ BENVENISTE, E., op. cit., pp. 408.
Tell me now, you Muses who have your homes in Olympos. For you, who are goddesses, are there, and you know all things, and we have heard only the rumour of it and know nothing.97

What is translated as ‘rumour’ is *kleos* (κλέος) related to *kluo* (κλω) – that denotes hearing in the sense of hearing epos,98 and indicates sound in its sonority,99 as in the case of hearing songs. Conventionally this invocation of the muse by the bard, is explained in terms of the legitimization of what the bard sings.100 We propose instead, to understand that it is the experience of speech, as always already a listening (and related to the interplay of differentiation and identity), that characterizes epic recitation. The passage mentioned above is extremely valuable for our research as it makes clear that it is differentiation that locates. We usually think alterity in spatial terms. Something different is assigned a different place101 – the Muses as different from the mortals are located in a different place, in Mount Olympos. We even think that location itself produces differentiation. But it is the differentiation achieved...
within speech that produces locality and not the other way around. Nevertheless, the production of space within speech is experienced as a specific kind of space – space as container, in the sense of containing the alterity. In that sense distancing is experienced in relation to both identification and differentiation and also in relation to the space of the narrative which is always a space of containment. The experience of space within epics will be examined in the next chapter. Let us have a closer look now at the experience of distancing within epic recitation.

An epic performance is structured by the experience of speech as differentiation and identity, and within an interplay of distancing in many aspects. It is not only the differentiation of bard and god, the bard himself must be differentiated from his audience. There is evidence in the text as to how this can be achieved as a play of distancing. Firstly the bard is an outsider, he comes from elsewhere, he does not belong to the household, he is a xeinos. Secondly, he is usually blind. The blindness of bards is conventionally interpreted by J-P. Vernant as an indication of internal vision, insight. But this seems to us an anachronism and we propose that it can be understood as reinforcing distancing. Given the specific character of vision in the epics, the exchange of gazes between bard and audience would have as an effect

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102 "The separation of song from the active experience of life is represented at a more mundane level in the Odyssey by the social position of singers and singing. The singer, is a public figure, a demioergos like a seer or a physician (17.380-7), and as such he does not belong to the household for which he sings. It seems always to be an outsider (xeinos 17.382) less attached to his patrons than even a seer, for the gods are his audience as well as the source of his skill." WALSH, G.B., 1980: Yhe Varieties of Enchantment: Early Greek Views of the Nature and Function of Poetry, The University of North Carolina Press, pp. 15

103 This the case of Demodokus in 863 and Thamyris in B599.

the collision of seeing and the seen. Gazing at the body of a blind bard is what creates differentiation.

The play of distancing is also manifested within the song. Epic is about distancing. The bard recites a story about another place the past; this past also takes place in a remote location. Sometimes in the story within the story, different, extra-human beings – Kirke, Kuklops, Sirens, Skulla and Charubdis – are located in these remote places. This is due to the specific structure – in the sense of both form and content – of the epic narrative which produces space as the container of that which is both different and distant, as we have already pointed out. However, within Homeric scholarship the usual approach to this issue is to provide an explanation in relation to the so called ‘content’ of the epic. E. Havelock argues:

"Mycenean was the suit of clothes in which the tale had to be dressed to give a distance and dignity to certain institutions and attitudes which were contemporary..."

105 "In performance poetry, however, the fact that the audiences see the physical body of the real author (the poet) before them must be considered... When he performs, his body, his foot-beat and his voice all become part of the larger text; for example, his stature, whether or not he is blind, and his gender could affect an audience looking upon him." FELSON-RUBIN, N., 1994: Regarding Penelope: From Character to Poetics, Princeton, pp. 10, 149.


107 HAVELOCK, E., The Muse, op. cit., pp. 11. J. Redfield, on the other hand, approaches epic distance differently: "The epic distance...gives rise to a contrast between the themes of song and their effect...The bard sings of sorrow and death, but his songs give pleasure." J. REDFIELD, op. cit., pp. 39, see also A. FORD, op. cit., pp. 53-4. K. Crotty, who considers supplication "as a model for understanding the poetics of the Iliad and the Odyssey", writes: "Yet, in highly emotional situations (of the kind where supplication is likely to occur), the distancing serves a useful purpose, for it can enable the one afflicted to get out from under the immediate throes of emotion." CROTTY, K., op. cit., pp. 18.
This kind of explanation accords with a certain conception of the form and content of language. We have already argued about the anachronism of such approach in relation to the Homeric text. Nevertheless our argument about the play of distancing within the epic performance faces a major difficulty, when it confronts the usual interpretation of the way that relations between bard and audience are established. W. Ong writes:

"When a speaker is addressing an audience, the members of the audience normally become a unity, with themselves and with the speaker." 108

Segal also argues that

"the oral performance engages its audience in a total response, physical and emotional as well as intellectual. Poetry recited or sung in such circumstances involves an intensively personal rapport between bard and audience... scenes of involved narration and reception may perhaps be regarded as ideal analogies or models for the relation that the bard hopes to create between himself and his audience." 109

How do we deal with this apparently persuasive piece of common sense? Looking at the terms that describe performance within the text we can find clues to support our argument. Three terms euphrosune, thelksis and terpsis are related to both erotic and bardic contexts. There are mainly used to foster the interpretation of the relation between bard and audience as identification. Euphrosune (εὐφροσύνη), the effect produced whenever a bard delights all his listeners, is also associated with the effect a husband can have on his wife, or a wife on her husband. That is, like a bard, a spouse can effect euphrosune in a marriage-partner." 110

110 FELSON-RUBIN, N., op. cit., pp. 142.
When Penelope and Odysseus had enjoyed (*etarpelen*) their lovemaking they took pleasure (*terpesten*) in talking, each one telling his [or her] story.\(^{111}\)

Terpsis (τερψις) a germination of a form of terpo (τερπω) links the semantic domains of lovemaking and storytelling and underscores their correspondence.\(^{112}\) The partners experience both kinds of exchange, bardic and erotic. The term *thelksis* provides more evidence. N. Felson writes:

"The words *thelksis* (θηλκσίς) and *thelgein* (θηλγεῖν) occur fifteen times in the Odyssey in poetic or erotic contexts. Cumulatively, they tell Homer’s listeners to beware of enchantment. When Odysseus enchants his audience, he is after profit; the Sirens are destructive when they enthrall seafarers with the lure of knowledge. *Thelksis* is ambiguous in value. *Thelksis* is a form of domination by one side, the enchanter, who perpetrates his or her will on the enchanted. When the interaction works optimally, and the enchanted willingly complies, *euphrosune* results. Otherwise, the victim of *thelksis* is resentful."\(^{113}\)

*Thelksis* ‘enchantment’ is experienced as both danger and pleasure.\(^{114}\) *Thelksis* is this interplay of distancing: it is a mechanism of controlling differentiation and identification.\(^{115}\) Whenever identification takes over the audience, the performance

\(^{111}\) *Ερχόμενοι ὁμοίως* ἐθερπέτην ἐρατείνης, *εταρπούμενης*, πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐνέπνευσις.

\(^{112}\) "Love-making and narrative are alike the occasions for ‘delight’ [terpsis]...The philotes between Odysseus and Penelope ...is ultimately a model for the relationship between the poem and its listeners." CROTTY, K., op. cit., pp. 182-3.

\(^{113}\) FELSON-RUBIN, N., op. cit., pp. 183, note 53.

\(^{114}\) On *thelksis* see also GOLDHILL, S., op. cit., pp. 60-66.

\(^{115}\) For a similar approach see R. Martin, who argues: “The text of the *Iliad* contains such markers of narration (by which the audience is included in performance) as well, devices that have been seen as breaking the illusions of the narrative’s immediacy – deistic pronouns, rhetorical questions, tense shifts are some...of course, this does not ‘prove’, that the *Iliad* is an oral poem in any sense. It does, however, force us to rethink the relationship of contact and distance in the epic. Rather than being opposed, these features coexist...I suggest...that Homer uses an attested epic convention for both establishing contact
must stop. Thus, as the term *thelkis* help us to understand – epic performance is not a mechanism of simple identification of the audience with the bard. Within *domos* 'house' which evokes the experience of control – in *megaron* with the bard, or in *thalamos* with the spouse – *thelkis* controls distance, and insures a differentiation within identification. But in the unknown territory, where Sirens live, and which is nothing else but an unknown experience – the *thelkis* of their song is only a danger. Hence, there is a relation between *thelkis* and location, but where location belongs to the category of experience and not to the concept of space.

Had we adopted a theory of orality as an adequate model to be applied in the study of the Homeric language, we would have finished our research before it could started. For we would have had to accept the experience of speech simply as participation, and thus also to accept that identification is the only mechanism through which speech can evoke experience within the epics. Instead, by uncovering and refusing the presuppositions of the orality-literacy debate (i.e., the content versus form distinction of language, and the concept of perception as universal) we have discovered a rewarding area of investigation, which has permitted us to mark the difference and at the same time keeping distance between himself and the audience of the *Iliad*.” MARTIN, R., op. cit., pp. 233-5.

116 This occurs in Phaiakia, when Alkinoos stops the bard as soon as he notices Odysseus' grief. On this passage Walsh writes "Odysseus's grief seems as fresh and sharp as if he wept for something immediate and real, rather than a song about the past...no healing distance separates experience from its poetic representation." WALSH, G.B., op. cit., pp. 4. Thalmann also relates enchantment to the temporal distance; "temporal distance is what enables a narrative of even painful events to give pleasure." THALMANN, W.G., op.cit., pp. 127.

between the Homeric experience of speech and our concept of language. To summarize and inevitably simplify, now we have established that Homeric speech is always experienced as an activity of the ‘multiple’ body – an ungainly term which we use simply to mark that the corporeal, the psychological and the intellectual are all interwoven – which of course renders our usual distinction between mental and bodily experiences an impossibility. In effect, Homeric speech is experienced always as the audition and not as the expression of a thinking subject. Yet speech as listening is not experienced as ‘participation’ but rather as distancing, where distancing is the interplay of both differentiation and identification. In contrast we think of distancing as differentiation, and as the result of visual experience. Furthermore, Homeric identity and alterity are produced within the experience of speech as an effect of distancing, and not in relation to space with which we usually associate both.

Last but not least, Homeric speech can evoke experience, for in the Homeric text form and content of language cannot be dissociated. As we shall see in the following chapters, each term we examine in its context – i.e., in the flow of epic language – will uncover the mechanism through which a specific experience is evoked as a result of both the form and the content of Homeric language, and it is this combination that marks and makes unique the relation between Homeric language and experience.

118 For ease of exposition we will entail this meaning every time we refer to the Homeric body.
CHORE-CHOROS

SPACE AS EXPERIENCE
2.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a real difficulty in its exposition. The problem of trying to present the experience of space in the Homeric epics is overburdened with the fact that we inherit conceptual and linguistic conceptions about the nature of space and place which are extremely difficult to bracket off in the investigation of a text which we propose has a very different concept of space – indeed perhaps no concept of space – and where the linguistic terms used to designate spatial relations may have no equivalent in our conceptual usage and in the meaning of our words. Clearly this introduces the most complex issues of translation\(^1\) and of analysis. We must attempt to avoid the anachronism of imposing our usage upon the Homeric text. At the same time, freeing the Homeric text to represent its own ‘meanings’ is peculiarly difficult

since we may have no ready words or concepts with which to represent them. We are engaged in a double process in attempting to suspend our experience while representing an experience which is perhaps quite alien to us. Such an investigation is condemned to the status of a hypothesis that is unverifiable - a reading of the Homeric text in which one does not know whether one has brought too much or too little of one's understanding of space to the problem.

Our research does not try to give an account of the Greek concepts of space, or the Greek experience of space in general. It is only concerned with Homeric 'space', a space we might imagine to be outside the grasp of philosophy, given that the Homeric text predates Plato and therefore offers the possibility of a different understanding of space, different from that which has been made canonical by Platonic chora, that is, space as container or receptacle. Indeed, Platonic chora is used in the research in an absolutely paradigmatic way and is set against the Homeric chorelos. For Plato's concept of chora is now regarded as the origin of systematic thought about space in the West, and we attempt to identify what ideas of space may lie 'outside' philosophy, or, to put it temporally, 'before' philosophy. Chora - and especially its interpretation by Derrida - has dominated the recent discussion on space in architecture, but this research is not concerned with Homeric 'space' in general\(^2\) but is limited to those elements which are relevant to architectural discourse.

\(^2\)Classical scholarship clearly demonstrates that many of the references to 'space' in Homer involve landscape or indicate the significance of travel and navigation relevant to an experience of space cosmology. (AUSTIN, N., 1975: Archery at the Dark of the Moon: Poetic Problems in Homer's Odyssey, Berkeley, University of California Press, REDFIELD, J., 1975: Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector, Chicago, VIDAL-NAQUET, P. 1986: "Land and Sacrifice in the Odyssey: A Study of Religious and Mythical Meanings," The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World, J. Hopkins University Press.) The notion of landscape was invented in 19th century, and in that sense it would be anachronistic to use it in our analysis of Homer.
We can put our own argument in a brief summary. The terms that are conventionally translated as 'space' or 'place' in the text are the feminine chore (χώρη) and the masculine choros (χώρος). We shall argue that both these terms describe space as definite forms of experience, and that each term evokes a distinct field of experience. We argue that chore involves the experience of things, while choros involves the experience of events. In both cases these things and events cannot be separated from the 'space' they generate. From the beginning we have to understand that this implies a quite different experience of spatial matters from those of classical antiquity and still more from modernity. The category of space opened up by chore and choros is constitutively linked to the thing or event which 'occupies' it. Indeed it is co-extensive with the scale and the duration of the things and events. Clearly this is quite different from the Platonic concept of chora (χώρα) space as 'receptacle', and it is as far as possible from the modern Newtonian concept of space as infinite, homogeneous, and empty. Throughout this chapter it will be vital to continuously bear this in mind. We can only elaborate the Homeric usage if this difference is maintained.

The research differentiates chore-choros (a gender distinction) but also chore-chora (a distinction in dialect: Ionic-Attic). There is a linguistic convention that the gender of nouns does not affect their signification and that meaning is treated as indifferent in the case of the dialects; at the same time this does not preclude the possibility of further speculating upon the way concepts of gender and dialect are an effect of linguistics as a consequence of space as container.

Paradoxically, we could have included landscape, not because of its status as being relevant to the Homeric space, but because of the current importance attached to landscape in architecture and urbanism as an architectural element.
In order to develop our interpretation of how *choro* and *choros* were experienced within the Homeric text, a number of major issues will be raised:

1. The place/space distinction in relation to *choro* - *choros* within the epics,
2. The implications of the gender differentiation manifested in the two Homeric terms,
3. The relation between *epos* (*ἐπος*) ‘speech’ and *choros* (*χόρος*) ‘space’,
4. The question of identity and alterity - usually thought of as effects of space.

These will be the major areas in which we will attempt an alternative interpretation to that given in conventional scholarship. However, it is one thing to announce our interpretation but quite another to sustain it in the face of the influence, one might even say the force, of post-Homeric conceptions of space. Indeed our argument about the ‘meaning’ of the terms *choro* and *choros* is almost indistinguishable from a critique of contemporary scholarship – that it is anachronistically determined in its reading of the Homeric text by post-Homeric conceptions of space and place.

It may turn out that we in turn have insufficiently freed ourselves from those conceptions in this text but at least the direction of our research is clear – to free the reading of the Homeric text from subsequent meanings and concepts of space and place. The difficulty of this operation is not restricted to a substitution of other terms where others might find ‘space’ and ‘place’. It is not reducible to finding a better translation. It involves tracing out all the implications of the terms and thus will lead us into issues which at first seem considerably removed from issues of space and place – for example the question of identity and the way in which identity is

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3 The whole chapter evolves around the differences between Homeric terms and ‘space’. In that sense, we use the word ‘space’ as a mark of translation, that underscores a relation between the two, and which is not exclusively that of sameness.
constructed. Or the relation of the space of narrative in the epic, or the difference in gender between *chore* and *choros*. Yet each of these areas is transformed when we free the reading from anachronism.

These initial remarks on the Homeric text stress the power of the Platonic or Newtonian conceptions of space to govern our reading of the Homeric text, and the difficulty of breaking away from that influence. For this reason, before we go any further, we need to further clarify our understanding of the difference between the Homeric *chore/choros* on the one hand, and the Platonic *chora* and the Newtonian concept of space/place on the other. Indeed, we also need to glance at the post-structuralist theory of space as event, given its strange affinity and also its differentiation from our interpretation of Homeric *choros*. However we are not attempting a brief history of concepts of space here, but only their initial differentiation.

2.2. SPACE AS CONTAINER WITHIN DIFFERENT THEORIES

In a recent book K. Algra presents in detail a wide range of the concepts of space in Greek thought. But for the limited purpose of our research, we shall confine ourselves to the Platonic concept and specifically to Derrida’s interpretation of *chora*. Derrida’s text is important to us because it explores a suggestion, already advanced by Heidegger, that the very notion of a ‘concept’ of space might be an effect of Platonic philosophy. *Chora*, the Platonic ‘receptacle’, is related by Derrida to the

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4 ALGRA, K., 1995: Concepts of Space in Greek Thought, E. J. Brill.
6 “...the transformation of the barely apprehended essence of place (*topos*) and of *chora* into ‘space’ defined by extension was initiated by Platonic philosophy, i.e. in the interpretation of being as *idea*.
question of reception, conception\(^7\) and definition. *Chora* plays a crucial role not just in the manifest content of space, but in what might be thought of as the spatial relations of the conceptual order as such. This introduces a necessary dizziness in thinking about *chora*. In fact, *chora* is as much about the space of thinking as it is about the thought of space. In that sense the differentiation between Homeric and Platonic terms should be understood as a differentiation produced by the intervention, perhaps even the invention, of 'philosophy' as such. If this is so, we can now reformulate the problem as a question: How does the intervention of philosophy inflect the experience of space? Or: How does a theory of ideas generate a certain concept of space as container in the form of Platonic *chora*, and in what sense does Homeric experience of *chore-os* differ from it?

*Chora* is defined by Plato as a third kind of being, neither intelligible nor sensible but which is produced by necessity:

"Wherefore also we must acknowledge that one kind of being is the form [*eidos*] which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to intelligence only. And there is another nature of the same name with it, and like to it, perceived by sense [*aistheton*], created, always in motion, becoming in place [*topo*] and again vanishing out of place, which is apprehended by opinion jointly with sense. And there is a third nature, which is space [*chora*] and is eternal, and admits not of destruction and provides home for all created things, and is apprehended, when all sense is absent, by a kind of spurious reason, and is hardly real – which we, beholding as in a dream, say all of existence that it must of necessity be in some place [*en tini topo*] and occupy a space.

Might *chora* not mean: that which abstracts itself from every particular, that which withdraws, and in such a way precisely admits and 'makes place' for something else?" HEIDEGGER, M., 1959: *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim, New Haven, Yale University Press, pp. 66.

\(^7\)"It is difficult indeed, but perhaps we have not yet thought through what is meant by *to receive*, the receiving of the receptacle, what is said by *dechomai*, *dechomenon*. Perhaps it is from *khora* that we are beginning to learn it – to receive it, to receive from it what its name calls up. To receive it, if not to comprehend it, to conceive it." DERRIDA, J., “Khora”, op.cit., pp. 95-96.
Chora is produced by the separation between intelligible and sensible, between thinking and experience. According to the Platonic text, chora is that which does not belong to either of them, but that which marks or even produces the separation as such. Actually it is the theory of ideas as a realm separated from the realm of experience that necessitates a concept of space as enduring container – in order for the things to be defined – which is also neuter, though it seems feminine. It is also important that for Derrida chora should be understood as both an invested place (i.e., the place occupied by someone) and a general place (a place neutralized and unmarked), but not quite the same as abstract space, (the kind of space produced within Cartesian philosophy). Moreover, we can underline another distinction that

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9 We disagree in this point with A. Bergren’s criticism of Derrida’s interpretation. [BERGREN, A., 1992: “Architecture Gender Philosophy,” Strategies in Architectural Thinking, eds. J. Whiteman, J. Kipnis, R. Burdett, Chicago Institute for Architecture and Urbanism, MIT Press.] Derrida argues that chora should ‘not be attributed properties of a determinate existent’, that is, the female gender. Our understand is that chora though belonging to the female gender has to be produced as neutral within philosophy. In this way femininity can be defined in connection with proper place, exactly because place is considered neutral. In contrast to that, we shall argue that the experience of Homeric chore and femininity cannot be dissociated.

10 For on the one hand, the ordered polysemy of the word always includes the sense of political place or, more generally, of invested place, by opposition to abstract space. Khora ‘means’: place occupied by someone, country, inhabited place, marked place, rank, post, assigned position, territory or region. And in fact, khora will always already be occupied, invested, even as a general place, and even when it is
exists within the Platonic text, between *topos* as the specific location and *chora* as the abstract container. We can now see that this distinction is produced by the concept of space as a container and as a consequence is not appropriate distinction within the Homeric text. Derrida also addresses the relation of stories – mythic or ontological – and *chora*, where the later operates as the receptacle, which contains the former.

Under this light, we can understand why the questioning of space within philosophy is associated not only with ontology, but with cosmology as well.¹¹ From Aristotle to Kant, space is among the categories,¹² where the question of category (as Derrida showed¹³) cannot be dissociated from the question of Being.

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¹¹ Derrida’s essay criticizes the traditional readings that attempt to fit *chora* into the classical oppositions between *muthos* and *logos*, because he argues it exceeds opposition as such.

¹² Aristotle’s categories were: substance, quantity, quality, relation, time, place, posture, state, action, passion.” COLLINS, S., 1985: “Categories, concepts or predicaments?” *The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History*, ed. M. Carrithers, S. Collins, S. Lukes, Cambridge University Press, pp. 76, note 5. H. Lefebvre, presents in a clear way how the history of the concept of space is related to the notion of category. He writes: “The thinking of Descartes was viewed as the decisive point in the working-out of the concept of space, and the key to its mature form. According to most historians of Western thought, Descartes had brought to an end the Aristotelian tradition which held that space and time were among those *categories* which facilitated the naming and classing of the evidence of the senses. The status of such categories had hitherto remained unclear, for they could be looked upon either as simple empirical tools for ordering sense data or, alternatively, as generalities in some way superior to the evidence supplied by the body’s sensory organs. With the advent of Cartesian logic, however, space had entered the realm of absolute. As Object opposed to Subject, as *res extensa* opposed to, and present to, *res cogitans*, space came to dominate, by containing them, all senses and all
This concept of space as container has survived within philosophical discourse since Plato, though it has taken different forms. Newtonian space became "that homogeneous expanse, not distinguished at any of its possible places, equivalent towards each direction, but not perceptible with the senses". For Leibniz, it is "the sum total of the ordering relations that hold between physical entities". Both are still related to the concept of container. As Lefebvre notes: "...philosophical and scientific thought comes to conceive of a space without things or objects, a space which is somehow of a higher order than its contents, a means for them to exist or a medium in which they exist. Once detached from things, space understood as a form emerges either as substance (Descartes) or else, on the contrary, as 'pure a priori' (Kant)." For Kant, space is one of the conditions of experience. It cannot be grasped as such, but must be considered as the medium in which we experience the objects extended in it:

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14 "Space is, in Newton's view, essentially an absolute, independent, infinite, three-dimensional, eternal, fixed, uniform 'container' into which God 'placed' the material universe at the moment of creation." RAY, C., 1992: *Time, Space and Philosophy*, Routledge, pp. 99.

15 "In everyday speech this concept of space...has its counter-part in expressions conveying the location of particular things in terms of their surroundings, as in 'a fish is swimming in the water'..." ALGRA, K., op.cit., pp. 17.

...human experience results from two sources: intuitions and concepts. The human mind has a structure or form, which orders the material of sensation into intuitions and concepts; this structure or form is two-fold, the pure forms of intuition – space and time – and the pure forms of the understanding- the categories. None of these forms of ordering experience could arise from experience, since they must be presupposed if any recognizable experience can occur at all. Thus they are a priori.”

According to Kant’s theory of space, which is in a way an ungraspable ‘container’ of experience, our own investigation ‘on the experience of space’ would be logically impossible. What provides us, however, with the possibility of our investigation in the first place, is that we do not consider space as a basic a priori category of consciousness, with the consequence that there is nothing else to be said, but as an entirely problematic notion; an at least partly historical category to be deciphered within a particular culture. The space we are talking about then, seems to be similar to what is called anthropological place.

Since space as container seems to be produced ‘by necessity’ within philosophy, what kind of experience do the Homeric terms evoke and can we approach them without colonizing them under the flag of ‘container’? These are the problems that we shall confront in the following pages.

17 COLLINS, S., 1985: op.cit., pp. 55. Collins also notes: “In Kant, space and time are pure forms of intuition rather than categories for the following sorts of reason: they are not general concepts, admitting of a plurality of instances, like the concept blue being instantiated in various blue things, but are necessarily dimensions of a single and directly experiencable reality. We experience objects as extended in space and time, in a literal sense, whereas in the case of categories, causation for instance, we do not directly and literally experience one object or event causing another.” Ibid., pp. 77, note 36.

2.3. SPACE IN HOMER

Firstly we examine the ways in which scholarship approaches the Homeric terms. We try to show how philological accounts of chore/ós continue in fact to be deformed by subsequent philosophical theories. As a consequence, Homeric terms are being approached via and under the sign of the concept of the Platonic chora. Moreover, we suggest, it is this unintended philosophical force which determines the Homeric feminine form chore as a formal variation of chora, and thus it is taken for granted that the two share a common meaning. In fact, chore in dictionaries is always in brackets, or as we would argue repressed by the action of philosophical decision.

2.3.1. PHILOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF CHORE - CHOROS

Dictionaries distinguish between the feminine chora and the masculine choros even though their differentiation is unclear in the given definitions. Etymological theories eliminate any difference between masculine and feminine forms in favor of a neutral essence enclosed in an ‘original’ root. Space as chora/ós is produced as neutral in both philosophy and etymology. This is due to the ontological presuppositions of etymological theories, as manifested in their search for the original meaning of the words. Here we shall refer to two different theories of derivation.

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19 Chantraine for instance, writes that both chora and choros indicate in-placement though the former has more specific uses. CHANTRAINE, P., 1968: Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, Paris, s.v. χώρα. See also LIDDELL, G.H. and SCOTT, R., 1991: Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford, s.v. χώρα, χώρος.
Hofmann\textsuperscript{20} relates \textit{chora/os} with Hesiodic \textit{chaos}\textsuperscript{21} via the Indo-European root $^*ghei-$, which indicates ‘lack’, ‘gap’, ‘yawing’. It gives a cosmological and ontological interpretation of \textit{chora}. Chantraine, on the other hand, rejects the above etymology and proposes a possible connection with \textit{choros ($\chi\omega\rho\omicron\varsigma$)} ‘dance,’ because he argues, both \textit{choros ($\chi\omega\rho\omicron\varsigma$)} and \textit{choros ($\chi\omega\rho\omicron\varsigma$)}, denote a delimited space.\textsuperscript{22} In that way he accepts a common meaning of the two words, whose similarity, especially in their transliterated form is obvious. However, what makes such a relation possible is that which is not stated by Chantraine, namely the development of theories about space-time. This is evident in the adoption of his theory by Indra Kagis McEwen. She writes that in Iliad \textit{choros ($\chi\omega\rho\omicron\varsigma$)} is both the ‘dancing place’ and the ‘dance’ and that fact “reflects the tendency towards localization or spatialization of the purely temporal.”\textsuperscript{23} What is taken for granted in this temporality of dance, is a notion of time as the accumulation of distinct units. Movement can be divided and frozen\textsuperscript{24} and in that sense space is produced as a section at any distinct moment of a

\textsuperscript{20} HOFMANN, J.B., 1974: \textit{Etymologicshes Wörterbuch des Griechischen}, München 1950, Greek translation by A. Papanikolaou, Athens, s.v. $\chi\omega\rho\omicron\varsigma$.

\textsuperscript{21} The word \textit{chaos} does not occur in the Homeric text. Furthermore, the possibility of connecting \textit{chaos} to \textit{choros} presupposes the notion of \textit{kenon} ‘emptiness’ a term introduced by the Greek philosophers in their attempts to define \textit{choros} and \textit{topos}. (See ALGRA, K., op.cit., pp. 31-7.) In that sense, the above etymology is based on a philosophically conceived notion of \textit{chora}.

\textsuperscript{22} CHANTRAINE, P., op.cit., s.v. $\chi\omega\rho\omicron\varsigma$. He writes on the etymology of \textit{chora}: “En ce cas il faudrait plutôt chercher du côté de $\chi\omega\rho\omicron\varsigma$, qui désigne lui aussi un espace délimité. Très incertain de toute façon.”

\textsuperscript{23} She refers to Iliad 5590-605, and writes: “One of the many things this passage reveals is that \textit{choros} is not only dancing floor, or dancing place, but the dance itself. The word \textit{choros} (or one of its compounds) is used nine times in the Iliad, but only once,...does it appear, unequivocally, to mean a place for dancing and not the dance....in the later Odyssey, \textit{choros} continues to refer to the dance, but appears several times as dancing floor.” KAGIS McEWEN, I., 1993: \textit{Socrates' Ancestor: An Essay on Architectural Beginnings}, MIT Press, pp. 58.
movement.\textsuperscript{25} This very possibility of time's division merely reflect the way we think about time today.\textsuperscript{26} However, time as \textit{hore} (όρη) in the Homeric text denotes the 'right time' that something occurs,\textsuperscript{27} and as such cannot be constrained to produce space in the way described above. Nevertheless, what is important in this relation between \textit{choros} (χώρος) and \textit{choros} (χορός) is not any etymological derivation, but the very fact that \textit{choros} (χορός) in the Homeric text denotes both the dancing place, the dance and the group that dances.\textsuperscript{28} In that sense it brings together location, activity

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\textsuperscript{25} Note that in post-structuralist theories on space as event the production of space is similar. The notion of fragmented time differentiates our interpretation of \textit{choros} (χώρος) which presents certain affinities with post-structuralist theories as we shall see later on.

\textsuperscript{26} Heidegger notes that we conceive time as "the temporal sequence of 'nows' and space as the "spatial side-by-side (beside, in front, behind, above, below) of the points here and there". He continues: "To the calculating mind, space and time appear as parameters for the measurements of nearness and remoteness, and these in turn as static distances". HEIDEGGER, M. 1971: "The Nature of Language", \textit{On the Way to Language}, Harper and Row, pp. 102. We can understand better now the production of space as frozen moments of a movement. At the core of such conception of space is the possibility of measuring a static and enduring unit. It is this method that is applied in contemporary architectural theories of design. However the relation of architecture and space is another issue all together. We shall touch upon it below.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Hore} (όρη) occurs 4 times in Iliad (B468, 471, Z148, 11643), and 14 times in Odyssey (γ334, ε485, ς151, α330, 373, 379, ι407, ι394, ρ176, ι367, 1510, ι428, χ301). In all passages indicates the right or fitting time for something to occur: the right time for sleep, eating, telling stories, getting married etc. The plural \textit{horai} (όραι) is related to repetition and automatons, Horai being the guards of the gates of heaven. In no case has time in Homer any relation - in the sense that is not being experienced as divided in units - either to χορος or ςόρης and especially in the sense of producing space.

\textsuperscript{28} "\textit{Choros}, is not only dance and dancing place. \textit{Choros} is also the group that dances... is people doing something together, a group with a shared purpose." KAGIS McEWEN, I., op.cit., pp. 74.
and bodies and leads the way for an understanding of choros (χορός) as experience. We shall return to this later.

We would like also to remark on the variation of the feminine ending, -η(-η) instead of -α(-α), that is common to other words as well, and explained as a peculiarity of the Homeric dialect. In Plato the feminine form is chor-α (χορ-α), in Homer chor-η (χορ-η). The ending -η(-η) is considered to be an Ionic form of the Attic ending -α(-α). Here a formal difference is interpreted in terms of the location in which it is produced. But what underscores such an interpretation is a conception of space as container and thus producer of difference in the sense of separation. This separation we are supposed to accept as 'natural' between forms of language: Attic and Ionic. Overshadowing this is a non-stated separation between the form and content of language itself. A formal difference is interpreted simply in terms of the geographical place where it was produced. As such it seems to many philologists to be a simple and natural difference which needs no further explanation; Ionic form did one thing, Attic did another, but what they are doing is identical. The philologist is here Plato's victim; he repeats the philosophical distinction between form and content, while at the same time repeating the notion of space as container. In fact, the

29 Agore is another term that in Homer denotes both the gathering place, the speech (activity) delivered in the gathering, and the gathered men. It is interesting however, that in classical Athens agora becomes a fixed location in the polis, which contains activities (not only public debating, but all kinds of business), bodies, and things (agora means also things sold in the forum). It is also used as a mark of time: ἀγορά πληθον ἔστη indicates the forenoon, when the market-place was full. This occurs exactly because agora is meant as a fixed space that contains and gives identity.

30 "η is regularly found when, in Attic, α only would be admissible, e.g. ἄγωρα, ὁμή, περίφοιτομεν." AUTENRIETH, G., 1991: Homeric Dictionary, Duckworth, pp. xvii.

31 Ionia is Homer's homeland, or in any case the place where the epics were produced, whereas Attica is Plato's homeland. In the case of chore, chora, note also that a difference between "spatial" terms is given a "spatial" explanation, or is it not just a coincidence?
situation is much more complex. The conception of territory or culture as a container and producer of different dialects is related to a conception of language as the container of meaning. As a consequence, the form and content of language can be thought of independently, and in the case we are considering the variation of form is thought to leave the content, the meaning of words, intact. But this very assumption about language, about the separation of form and content is itself shadowed by the Platonic conception of the container. By contrast we are attempting to approach the Homeric distinctions without these assumptions. We can now understand why dictionaries merely note a difference of form between chore and chora, but we cannot accept this. What is marked by the variation of form might be a real difference in the experience that each term evokes. The dictionaries' reduction to localized formal difference might mark the repression of what is a difference at the level of experience. Put another way, the conventional distinction between the form and content of language might indicate a repression of language as experience.

If we reject these formal distinctions we must also reject the distinction which is drawn by K. Algra. He argues:

"...chora... is the one which appears earliest in the written sources. Its basic meaning seems to be 'land/region/ground'. When applied to a smaller piece of ground chora gets the meaning 'stretch/field/ground/place'...In Homer χώρα may also mean 'land/shore' as opposed to 'sea'...In those cases where chora should be translated 'place/space' the idea is always that of an extension, whether two- or three-dimensional, which is occupied or which can be occupied... [In] its original sense [chora]...is an extension which can be occupied (taken)."  

Clearly Algra approaches the Homeric chore through the philosophical concept of Platonic chora. He eliminates the formal difference by transforming the Ionic chore

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32 ALGRA, K., op. cit., pp. 33.
into the Attic form *chora*. He represses any trace of difference between experienced and conceived space, between *chore* as experience and *chora* as container. To the philosophical concept of *chora* as container, he simply adds an original Homeric term of meaning, without questioning what ‘meaning’ might mean in Homeric context, nor the presupposition that relates meaning, remoteness and originality. As a consequence and in line with his interpretation, Algra ignores the masculine *choros* in Homer, a term which cannot be formally connected with the Platonic concept.

We refer to Algra as an illustration of the confusion with which scholarship approaches the Homeric term. It is also worth noting that some scholars who privilege the study of the concept of space draw exclusively from philosophical texts. They either ignore Homeric *choros*, or they describe Homeric ‘space’ without questioning ‘space’ as such in Homer, that is, as *choros*. The bond forged by Plato between philosophy and *chora* is strong and radical and the way scholarship approaches – or does not approach – the Homeric terms in a post-Platonic fashion is more than an indication of the level of difficulty found in attempting to disrupt the

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34 When scholars describe Homeric ‘space’, they presuppose a concept of space as container of functions, or actions. D. Maronitis writes on the Homeric *Homilia*-space, ‘speech-space’: “The sense of *Homilia* requires that we distinguish between act and space where it occurs: the latter facilitates the former, while adding its own, complementary signs...In conclusion: Each theme has its own temporal and spatial ὑπάρξις [‘receptacle’].” Note that the word he uses ὑπάρξις ‘receptacle’, describes *par excellence*, the Platonic concept of *chora*. MARONITIS, D.N., 1990: “The Homilia-Space and its Signs: From the Iliad to the Odyssey”, *O Ομηρικός Οίκος: Από τα Πρακτικά του Ε’ Συνέδριον για την Οδύσσεια (11-14 Σεπτεμβρίου 1987)*, Εθνική, pp. 105-26. The same attitude also characterizes A. Antoniadis when he describes Epic Space. ANTONIADIS, A., 1992: *Epic Space*, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York.
established way of thinking of space as a container, in order to make the shift from space as a concept to choros/e as experience.

One important element is the feminine-masculine grammatical forms of Homeric terms. Insofar as this distinction is not completely ignored by the scholars, there is a tendency for the distinction to be treated in terms of the opposition of the specific-abstract nature of space. For example, Chantraine implies that choros is more generic than chora, which has more specific uses, while Indra Kagis McEwen takes the opposite stance, and proposes that the Homeric term choros is more “defined”, than chore. Both arguments are conditional upon an implicit acceptance of the place/space distinction, as it appears in terms of the opposition: specific-abstract.

Now, we have nothing to say here about the problematic debate on space/place as

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35 We have already argued at the beginning of the chapter that we intend to consider form and content of Homeric language simultaneously, and in that sense we refuse to interpret the use of feminine or masculine endings as accidental and depending on the form of the verse. Our hypothesis is that different words in Homer evoke different experiences.

36 See above note 19.

37 "In the Iliad chore, which is the Ionic form of chora, is a scant space (olige chore) between, such as that between a horse and a chariot...Choros, the masculine form of chora or chore, in general denotes a space that is somewhat more defined than the feminine chora...In the Odyssey, where the word more often than not appears in its masculine, choros, form, the tendency is for it to mean place as location, but also land, country, or territory." KAGIS McEWEN, I., op. cit., pp. 81-2. Indra Kagis McEwen interprets the Homeric terms according to Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of extension and container. As we shall see, it is no surprise that in such philosophical interpretation she makes use of the term 'place' in order to differentiate the two terms.

38 M. Augé writes: "The term 'space' is more abstract in itself than the term 'place'...It is applied in much the same way to an area, a distance between two things or points, or to a temporal distance. It is thus eminently abstract, and it is significant that it should be in systematic if still somewhat differentiated use today, in current speech and in the specific language of various institutions representative of our time." AUGÉ, M. op.cit., pp. 82. Even Yi-Fu Tuan, who investigates space and place from the point of view of their experience, seems to follow the same line of thought when he writes that place is security and space is freedom. TUAN, YI-FU, 1989: Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience, University of Minnesota Press.
such, nor with its presumed correspondence with *chora*/*topos*,\(^{39}\) since these debates far exceed the scope of this thesis. But we must point out that the distinction space/place can be drawn only on the basis of accepting a philosophical conception of space as a neutral container.\(^{40}\) The *chora*/*topos* distinction is one of a series of separations produced within the Platonic concept of receptacle. *Topos* is present, we can say ‘by necessity’, within the definition of *chora* in the Timaeus.\(^{41}\) Both *chora* and *topos*, are philosophical terms and therefore absent from the Homeric text. As a consequence any attempt to relate the distinction between *chora*/*choros*, and space/place, or *chora*/*topos*, will confuse our investigation. Furthermore when *chora*, as we have already discussed, is conceived as a neutral container, everything is given

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\(^{39}\) Algra criticizes “the ‘automatic’ translations often found in the scholarly literature, which assume a one-to-one correspondence between *topos* and ‘place’ and *chora* and ‘space’”. He adds: “The Greeks did not have a terminological distinction matching the conceptual distinction between place and space.” ALGRA, K., *op. cit.*, pp. 32.

\(^{40}\) We would like to note that Michel de Certeau – who has an interesting approach to space – does not avoid the concept of container in distinguishing between space and place, even though for him it is place that seems to operate as the container. M. Augé comments on Certeau’s “*L’Invention du Quotidien*”: “Space, for him, is a ‘frequented place’, ‘an intersection of moving bodies’: it is the pedestrians who transform a street (geometrically defined as a place by town planners) into space. Thus place is seen as an assembly of elements coexisting in a certain order and the space as animation of these places by the motion of a moving body.” AUGÉ, M., *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80. E. S. Casey in an article entitled “Retrieving the Difference Between Place and Space”, gives a brief historical account of the debate. In order to denote his argument about the place/space distinction, he quotes Descartes: “All places are full of bodies” and Bergson: “Our space is empty and unlimited”. Besides any kind of difference denoted by the terms ‘full’ and ‘empty’, what struck us is the concept of container that underscores both terms in the above quotes. CASEY, E. S., 1989: “Retrieving the Difference Between Place and Space”, *Journal of Philosophy and the Visual Arts*, ed. A. Benjamin, pp. 54-57.

\(^{41}\) Note also that it is by necessity, according to Plato, that *chora* itself is produced; a necessity created by the theory of ideas, that is by the separation between sensible and intelligible. However, as the concept of *chora* is ‘difficult to grasp’, so is *topos*, and the distinction between the two remained an unresolved problem for Greek philosophers – who ‘by necessity’, had to bring the term *kenon* into their theories. On the distinction between the Greek terms see ALGRA, K., *op. cit.*
its place. This has two consequences if we interpret Homeric *chore/os* through the Platonic concept; it will lead us to ignore the gender distinction as such, because of the neutrality of *chora*, or it will lead us to attribute the gender distinction to the distinction of genders. We then have to describe *chore* as the feminine place, and *choros* as the masculine space, both of them deriving from the concept of *chora* as proper place as introduced by Plato. But in fact, Homeric *chore* (χώρη) - *choros* (χώρος) give us other choices to consider. We will delay our solution to the problem in order to consider each term in its Homeric context.

2.3.2. CHORE-CHOROS WITHIN THE HOMERIC TEXT

The word *chore* (χώρη) appears five times in Iliad and three in Odyssey, *choros* (χώρος) 16 and 17 times respectively. The co-presence of two grammatical types of different genders *chore* (feminine), and *choros* (masculine) is given two different but not quite distinct translations in the Homeric dictionaries.42 *Chore* is translated as 'place, space, regions, countries', *choros* as 'space, plot, spot, region'.

Our hypothesis is that the two terms evoke distinct experiences. The difference between the two cannot be accommodated within a translation that operates as definition because, as we have seen, such definition turns out to be a philosophical definition originating in Plato. In this sense we cannot decide, except on contemporary grounds, whether to translate either of them as space or place, because they predate the philosophical distinction between space and place.43 They describe

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42 AUTENRIETH, G., op. cit., s.v. χώρη, χώρος.

43 We can describe the transformation which occurred with the advent of Platonic *chora*, as the separation, the split, between intelligible and sensible (experience and thinking or *eidos* and thing), that produced the split between thing and its place, and also between space and place in the form of *topos*.
how space is produced and experienced, and they both exceed and fall short of any
definition. We shall limit ourselves to the description of chore as the effect of things,
and choros as the effect of events; whereas effect should be thought neither in terms
of cause, nor in terms of time. In doing so we are aware of a certain defeat since the
categories of ‘things’ and ‘events’ are not without their philosophical ancestry. We
can summarize the issues that the investigation of the Homeric text will open up;
these are:

- The relation between chore and things, where things are not so much situated in, but
produce the very possibility of ‘space/place’. This relation illustrates how a body
acquires identity as an effect of chore, as it opens it up. This marks a difference from
our concept of ‘space/place’ and the Platonic chora, both conceived of as containers
and thus producers of identity.

- The relation between choros and experience, where choros is not intended as the
container of experience but rather as co-produced with events. The fact that
experiencing bodies constitute the possibility of a non-enduring choros marks the
difference from our conception of space as infinite, homogenous and empty.

- Furthermore, Homeric chore/choros dissolve and do not withstand experience, they
survive as narrative within epos, where they are reproduced as distinct and enduring
entities. In that sense, the epic narration of Odyssey about choros anthropon (χώρας
and chora (chora intended as a container with specific locations in it). The status of all these entities has
remained unclear, and necessitates definition, conception and reception.

44 Note Heidegger’s approach to the Greek experience of space: “The Greeks had no word for ‘space.’
This is no accident; for they experienced the spatial on the basis not of extension but of place (topos);
they experienced it as chorō, which signifies neither place nor space but that which is occupied by what
stands there. The place belongs to the thing itself. Each of the various things has its place. That which
becomes is placed in this local ‘space’ and emerges from it...” HEIDEGGER, M., 1959: An
Introduction to Metaphysics, op.cit., pp. 66.
(νθρώπων) ‘countries of people’ will give us the opportunity to challenge the thinking of ‘spatial distance’ in terms of identity and the other, as we argue that identity is an effect of chore and alterity – as distancing\textsuperscript{45} – the effect of epos.

Having in mind all the above, we can proceed now with the investigation of the Homeric text. We shall start with:

2.3.2.1. CHORE (χώρη) : Things and Identity

“We would have to learn to recognize that things themselves are places and do not merely belong to a place.” HEIDEGGER, M., 1973: “Art and Space,” *Man and World: An International Philosophical Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1, February.

Of the eight occurrences of the word in epics, one passage in particular helps us to introduce our arguments. It is a well-known passage in Odyssey, where Odysseus provides the clinching evidence of his identity to his wife. His identity, as master of his house, is demonstrated by its connection with his bed as it ‘remains in place’.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{45} See chapter on Epos as distancing.

\textsuperscript{46} What man has put my bed in another place? But it would be difficult for even a very expert one, unless a god, coming to help in person, were easily to put it in another place... but of men there is no other living mortal, not even in the full strength of his youth, who could easily move it away, since a great mark is wrought into the artfully fashioned bed. It is I who made it and nobody else. There was the bole of an olive tree with long leaves growing in full flowering in the courtyard, and it was thick, like a column. I laid down my chamber around this, and built it, until I finished it, with close-set stones, and roofed it well over, and added the compacted doors, fitting closely together. Then I cut away the foliage of the long-leaved olive, and trimmed the trunk from the roots up, planing it with a brazen adze, well and expertly, and true’d it straight to a chalkline, making a bed post of it, and bored all holes with an auger. I began with this and built my bed, until it was finished, and skillfully embellished it with gold and silver and ivory. Then I lashed it with thongs of oxbide, dyed bright with purple. In this way I proclaim and make manifest the sign/token. But I do not know now whether the bed is still firmly in place, oh woman/wife or if some man has cut underneath the stump of the olive and moved it elsewhere.

\begin{verbatim}
ψ184-204: τις δε μου ἄλλον θύγατρα λέγεις: χαλεπον δε κεν εινα / και μαλλιαν ἐπιποτιμάντα, ὅτε μη θεος αὐτος ἐπέλθαν / ἄμηδας θελόν θεία ἄλλη ἐνι χώρῃ. / ἄνθρωποι δ' οὐ κέν τις ξώος βροτός, οὔθε μαλλιαν ἥθην, / ρεια μεταχλισειν, ἕπει μέγα σημα τέσσερα / ἐν λέγει άσκησιν το δ' ἐνι κόμων οὔθε τις ἄλλος. / θέμον ου πανοφόλλος ἐλείσθης ἐρετος ἐντός, / ἀκμην θαλάθων πάχετος δ' ἐν ἵπτε κόιν. / το δ' ἐνα αμφιβαλιν τῆλαμον δέμου, δερ' ἐτέλεσσα, / τικνήτην
\end{verbatim}
Many scholars have analysed this passage because of its importance as the scene of final recognition in Odyssey. We shall refer only to Froma Zeitlin’s recent paper, as one of the most sympathetic.\footnote{ZEITLIN, F.I. 1995: “Figuring Fidelity in Homer’s Odyssey,” The Distaff Side: Representing the Female in Homer’s Odyssey, ed. Beth Cohen, Oxford University Press, pp. 117-52.} She argues convincingly how the identity of Odysseus, and the fidelity of Penelope are both related to the bed, or as she writes: “through the device of an object that can be minutely described, located in space, and recalled to its functions and emblematic status through the opportunity given to Odysseus to reclaim it in the act of narrating how he first made it.” She concludes that the bed is a “sign-symbol of recognition...a mental construct, an image in the mind’s eye.”\footnote{Ibid, pp. 146.} What could be more natural? But our scepticism is that interpreting Homer according to criteria of what seems ‘natural’ for humans to do and think always runs the risk of anachronism. We would like to propose an interpretation which uncovers the presuppositions about place in order to open up the possibility of an understanding of the term \textit{chore} included in it.

There are a number of references to ‘the place of the bed’ in the translation, such as ‘put [the bed] in another place’, ‘moved it away’, ‘the bed is still firmly in place’, ‘moved it elsewhere’, although the term \textit{chore} occurs only once in the passage:

\begin{quote}
But it would be difficult for even a very expert one, unless a god, coming to help in person, were easily to \textit{put it in another place} (\textit{φιλοθείς θέλων θύλη ἄλλη ἐνι χώρῃ}).
\end{quote}
What is clearly taken for granted in the translation and thus in the interpretation is a category of place as enduring, of a location which is independent of a thing. The interpretation of space as a container is firmly in play in such translations. According to this view, the bed has a proper place where it should remain ‘firm’ empedon. This notion of the bed’s proper place opens up the logical possibility of dislocation, that is, the separation of place and thing. Both place and thing are enduring facts that can exist independently of each other. But if this is so, Odysseus’ anxiety is a puzzle. How can the displacement of a bed be the main feature of an anagnorisis? In order to answer this Zeitlin and others have recourse to the idea of symbolization. The stationary character of the bed ‘symbolizes’ both Odysseus’ identity, and Penelope’s fidelity. The bed is in the proper place and so guarantees the unbroken marital bond. The right thing in the right place symbolizes that the husband is indeed the husband and the wife has remained a wife. But recourse to the philosophical idea of a symbol requires the idea of space as container in order to produce within it that localization which we are calling the proper place of the bed.

In order to produce an alternative interpretation we should consider first the term thesmos (θεσμός). It is a term used once in the Homeric text, precisely in relation to Odysseus’ bed. It denotes both place and institution. This indicates that both place and institution are being produced and experienced simultaneously. The verb tithemi (τίθημι) is used repetitively in the passage of the anagnorisis, and translated as

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49 v296: They then gladly went together to bed, and their old ritual (οἱ μὲν ἐπεῖτο ἀνάπαυσιν λέγοντο πολλοὺς θεσμούς ἑκοντο)
50 During the classical period thesmos takes up exclusively the meaning of law, institution, ritual. This is follows the conception of Platonic chorai as container, where law and place can be thought of as separate entities.
'put'. However, *tithemi*, has not only the sense of to 'put' but also 'to create'. *Tithemi* denotes a foundational act, not in the sense that a thing is being 'put in a place' and from this an institution (*thesmos*) is being produced. We propose instead, that thing, place and institution are being experienced as inseparable. Their combination is unique and -- what seems more strange -- non-enduring.

Odysseus' bed is in fact a thing co-produced with its place. Indeed, the impossibility of moving the bed from its place is marked by the term *chore*. They exist in their conjunction. In the phrase in which *chore* is used, Odysseus states that only a god can move the bed. His fear is not that another man can remove the bed, for he knows this is impossible. The bed can only be cut off from the olive-tree of which it is an integral part. If that had happened his identity would have been shattered and with his identity, his marriage. His anxiety therefore, is literally about the bed and its *chore*. Nor is it about the bed and its place as a symbolic representation of the faithful character of his wife. This situation in which the question of the bed is also the question of Odysseus' identity exists because the *chore* is not an enduring container within which institutions and things have a place. Things, places and institutions have a relation which is more immediate and visceral than this. We should not be satisfied with the idea that a thing is just an 'object' that exists independently and at certain distance from a 'subject'. This is altogether too philosophical a way of describing the world. Odysseus' bed, or Achilleus armor or precious gifts are experienced as *thauma*

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51 Benveniste relates etymologically *tithemi* with the Indo-European root *dhe-*, and writes: "it designates the domain, the site and also the thing put." The Greek terms, *thesmos*: 'that which is laid down by law, ordinance' and *themethla*: a building term meaning 'base, foundation' derive according to him from the same root. BENVENISTE, E., 1973: *Indo-European Language and Society*, Faber and Faber, pp. 381.
idesthai (θαύμα ιδέσθαι) ‘a marvel to see’. This seeing is not a philosophical scene in which an object is visually perceived by a subject, a scene reduced to the formal properties of a little Cartesian event. There is an immediate collision: seeing smashes into the seen in a way that exceeds philosophical decorum. Seeing is an action, being seen is an event. We have to understand the whole passage in a way which respects the fact that place is not something which requires the idea of space as a container in which a thing has not settled into the philosophical destiny which accords it the attribute of enduring through time. Of course, chore, things and institutions evoke the experience of being immovable, but immovability is not only the physics of a thing in a place in space. How should we understand the immobility imposed on a woman by the institution of marriage, her status as a thing (to be exchanged) that is also a kind of thauma idesthai, and the feminine form of chore? We shall return to that.

We examine at this point another passage which refers to the place of Odysseus’ bow, which is of course another object of recognition. The identity of Odysseus is revealed because he is the only one able to use it. There is a special relation between Odysseus’ body and this thing, the bow. The combination of the two produces his identity. The bow enhances the power of his body to fight and kill the suitors. The bow produces its chore ‘place’. Once again the thing, the place, and the identity are all entangled in a way which is constitutive of the ‘meaning’ of chore. Two points should be made about the relation of identity to space. Space is normally thought of as neutral, objective and passive -a backdrop to our enduring identities.

52 Prier considers these things that are thauma idesthai as proto-phenomenological objects. PRIER, R.A., 1989: *Thauma Idesthai: The Phenomenology of Sight and Appearance in Archaic Greek*, Florida State University Press.

53 (p366: They spoke, and he took the bow and put it back where it had been. (δὲ κατακόμβη, ἄτροπος ὁ θηρὸς κατακόμβη ἐνὶ χώρῃ)
Against this we do not simply want to argue in contrast that specific identities\textsuperscript{54} are produced in specific places. This must also be questioned in the light of the Homeric term \textit{choros}. For is not only that identity is altered or achieved in respect to the space that contains a body, but that such space itself is non-enduring. The term \textit{choros} opens the possibility of understanding the construction of identity as a combination of body /'objects' relation. It opens the way to approach the category of 'objects' in the Homeric text. We need to bear in mind that identity is being experienced and produced in a variety of ways in Homer. In the chapter on \textit{Epos}, we described one of these modalities, that is, the way identity is produced within the experience of language.\textsuperscript{55} In the case of \textit{choros} identity is produced as a relation of the body to things, where things are being experienced as extensions or as supplements of the body. Thus, identity does not result from a difference, in the sense of a difference from something other, to an alterity, but is produced by the body's appropriation of an excess. It is generated by the experience of the things as the body's extensions. We might repeat at this point, that the subject within Cartesian philosophy is constituted by a relation with an object, where the object is always separated and distanced from the subject. It is worth noting that the constitution of the subject itself presupposes a certain concept of space – the Cartesian container. But Homeric individuality is produced within a body's relation to things. It is within such a relation that space as \textit{choros} is produced and experienced.

\textsuperscript{54}The term identity suits such conception of matching between bodies and places. We should note however, that it is misleading in the case of the Homeric text, where of course, there is no such term. In any case the notion of identity within Homeric text is problematic.

\textsuperscript{55}See section 1.3.2., especially pp. 49-50.
The difficulty of shifting our thinking from space as a container to chore as extended experience is further evidenced by our inability to propose a translation of the various passages that would evoke space as non-enduring experience. On the other hand, this difficulty can also indicate that the experience of chore is reproduced as an enduring entity within the mnemonic structure of the poem, and thus survives in language.\(^{56}\) Having that in mind, we approach the term chore in three other passages as the ‘space’ produced by bodies in a state of immobility and not as a location that exists independently and can be occupied by bodies. We refer to the sitting body of Nestor,\(^{57}\) – which as an old man’s body features restricted movement\(^{58}\) – and the bodies of Hektor\(^{59}\) and Amphinomos\(^{60}\) described at the moment where they start moving and thus when the relation between body and chore is being dissolved. We wish to clarify at this point, that there is another possible understanding of the above passages, one that we do not favour. One might argue that chore is produced when a body moves while being in the same spot; in the case of Nestor from the standing to the sitting position (εξετο), or in the other two cases, in the act of turning (στρέψθησαν/στρέψθείς). We reject such an approach because it again implies a concept of space-time.

\(^{56}\) It is interesting to note in relation to the shield of Achilleus – which is considered as the representation of space – how space as the narration of events becomes enduring space at the moment of its representation on a thing that is also part of Achilleus’ identity.

\(^{57}\) Ψ349: So spoke Nestor the son of Neleus, and turned back to his place and sat down. (Τοις εἶπεν Νέστορ Νελεοῦ τὸν ἐν χώρῃ / εξετο, ἐπεὶ δὲ πείδι έκάστου πάλαι τε έσπευ.)

\(^{58}\) In Ψ621-3, Achilleus tells Nestor: never again will you fight with your fists nor wrestle, nor enter again the field for the spear-throwing, nor race on your feet; since now the hardship of old age is upon you.

\(^{59}\) Ζ515: He came on brilliant Hektor, his brother, where he yet lingered before turning away from the place where he had talked with his lady) Ἐκτορα διόν ἐπεμεν ἄδελφαν εὗτ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἡμέλλε / στρέψθη έκ χώρας δὲ ὅσπερ γυναῖκι. / τὸν πρόπερος προσέθησεν Ἀλέξανδρος Θεοκίδης.)
The next three passages are far more confusing because of an adjective that indicates quantity. The common interpretation expressed in the way these passages are translated either accepts a notion of *chore* as an abstract entity that can be measured, or considers that the term denotes a stretch of land. In all three passages we should note the reference to the lack of space (*olige, ou polle*). We propose to interpret this lack, not in the sense of pure extension but in relation to the events described as 'taking or non-taking place within'. However, these passages can be further clarified only after we examine the other Homeric term, i.e., *choros*.

We saw that in the Homeric text *chore* is part of the experience of things whereas within Platonic philosophy the separation between thing and *chora* occurs. However, the status of *chora* in relation to things remains unclear, and it is treated as a thing. We would like to examine at this point the plural form of *chore, choros* which occurs only once in Odyssey in the expression *choras anthropon* (*χώρας ἀνθρώπων*) 'countries of people'.

2.3.2.2. **CHORAS ANTHROPON**: The Space of the Narrative

We do not intend to consider *choras* as just the plural form of the feminine *chore*, we shall argue that the term evokes a specific experience. The expression occurs as we

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61 π351: He had not yet said all before Amphinomos, turning from his place, saw the ship inside the depths of the harbor. (*οδί ποι πάν εἰς την ἕραν, ὅτε ἀπ' ἀμφίνομος ἑτε νήσοι/ στρατευθεὶς εἶς χώρας, λιμένος πολυβενθές ἐντος.*)

61 π367: and the others, the Argives, are bent back against the beach of the sea, holding only a narrow division of land (*οι δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ βάσιν θάλασσας/ κυκλισθέντι, χώρας ὀλίγην ἔτει μοῖραν ἐχοντες/ Ἀργείωι*), *Ρ394: so the men of both sides in a cramped space tugged at the body in both directions (οὶ οἱ γ′ ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα νέκουν ὀλίγη ἐνι χόρον/ ἐφεκτόν ὁμόφεροι*), *Ψ520: there is not much space between as he runs a great way over the flat land (οὐδὲ τι πολλή/ χόρον μεσοτής τοῦ πολέος πεδίοιο ἥθεντος.*)
have noted, only once; this is when the Phaiakian King Alkinoos asks Odysseus to narrate his adventures in Od. 8572-6.

So come now and tell me this and give me an accurate answer: Where you were driven off your course, what countries peopled by men (choras anthropon) you came to, the men themselves and their strong-founded cities, and which were savage and violent, and without justice, and which were hospitable and with a godly mind for strangers. 62

Scholarship distinguishes between a real and mythical world in Odyssey, the latter contained within the narration of Odysseus in Alkinous’s palace. In addition Phaiakian land is being considered as occupying “a strategic place at the junction of the two worlds.” 63 We shall not comment upon this distinction between the real and the mythic in general, for we are more interested in what way the mythic – constituted as otherness or alterity 64 – is introduced as a narrative within the narration of the Homeric text. We have already argued how identity is produced within the experience of chore, rather than in a relation to otherness. On the other hand the experience of

62 8572-6: ολ' ἄνει μοι τόδε εἴπε καὶ ἀτρεκέως κατάλεξον, / ὅτε παντοκάρδης τε καὶ ἡς τίνας ἴκεο χώρας / ἀνθρώπως, αὐτῶς τε πόλις τ' ἐν νεκταρίωσας, / ἡμῶν δοὺς χαλέπιοι τε ἑγρηχος οὐδε δίκαιοι, / οἷς τε φιλόξενοι καὶ σφιν νόσος ἄτοι θεοῦδης.

63 P. Vidal-Naquet writes: “In effect, as has often been recognized, the Odyssey contrasts a ‘real’ world, essentially the world of Ithaka, but also Sparta and Pylos to which Telemachos goes, with a mythical world that is roughly coterminal with that of the stories in Alcinous’s palace...Charles Segal has observed that the Phaeacians are “between the two worlds”: they are placed at the intersection of the world of the tales and the “real” world, and their main function in the poem is to transport Odysseus from the one to the other.” VIDAL-NAQUET, P. 1986: “Land and Sacrifice in the Odyssey: A Study of Religious and Mythical Meanings,” The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World, J. Hopkins University Press, pp. 18 and 26.

64 We do not intend to investigate how otherness or alterity is constituted within the Homeric text. Vidal-Naquet (Ibid.) argues that the differentiation is based on food. But we have argued in the chapter Epos about the Homeric experience of speech as hearing and distancing, i.e. as that which entails the experience of alterity (differentiation, otherness). In that sense we might say that epos already operates as a container – container of alterity – within which chore/os are re-produced as containers.
distancing and alterity is produced within the experience of speech. How should we approach the term *choras anthropon*, which seems to combine the experience of space and alterity, and, specifically, evoke the experience of space as container of alterity? The narration within narration that contains the description of alterity indicates a structure of *epos* as receptacle, where space as well operates as container, container of alterity. Space is produced as enduring in order to receive, and thus to keep alterity separate; the enduring *choras* is produced as such in fiction, as fictional, as is the other.\(^{65}\) In this sense, the interdependence of speech and space becomes obvious. What secures and reinforces the experience of alterity as separate is the experience of a container in the structure of the *epos* ‘speech’, that reproduces an experience of space as a container. The experience of a container is that which separates\(^{66}\) and gives rise to oppositions such as identity and alterity.

*Chore/os* can not be accommodated within a discourse which is regulated by such pairs of opposites as separation-relation, distance-proximity, and ultimately identity and alterity. This is because – as we have already argued – identity and alterity belong to distinct experiences in Homer. The experience of identity is evoked by *choros*, whereas that of alterity by *epos*. Only the appropriation of *choros* from *epos*, ‘speech’ and the mainly philosophical *logos* made it possible to theorize *chora* in terms of alterity-identity as a pair of opposites, both of them generated in the context of speaking or ultimately thinking about space. Within the Platonic text not

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\(^{65}\) In the text of ancient Greek geographers, alterity produced as fiction continue to be established on the acoustic experience. (See Herodotos)

\(^{66}\) "Any part of the container can receive anything. This indifference becomes separation, in that contents and container do not impinge upon one another in any way. An empty container accepts any collection of separable and separate items; separateness thus extends even to the contents’ component elements." LEFEBVRE, H., op. cit., pp. 170.
only is *chora* a receptacle, but the text itself becomes a receptacle, a receptacle of stories,
the central one being the narration of the mythic land of Atlantis. Furthermore, Okeanos, a mythic land in Homer, is considered by Plato as a container of ancient allegorical meanings. Okeanos the mythic land becomes itself the container of myths. Language and space become entangled, or perhaps language appropriates space?

*Choros anthropos* should be understood as evoking the experience of alterity and distance, because it is produced as such within a specific structure of the Homeric language. In that sense it differs both from *chore*, and *choros* which we shall examine next. However, we know that the Homeric Epics were compiled during the 6th century BC. How has this fact influenced the structure of *epos* as container – in the sense of assembling together in this part of the poem all the narration about ‘mythic

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67 “...each narrative content – fabulous, fictive, legendary or mythic, it doesn’t matter for the moment – becomes in its turn the content of a different tale. Each tale is thus the *receptacle* of another. There is nothing but receptacles of narrative receptacles, narrative receptacles of receptacles. Let us not forget that receptacle, place of reception or harbouring/lodging (*hypodokhe*), is the most insistent determination (let us say ‘essential’, for reasons which must already be obvious) of *khora*... A structure of inclusion makes of the *included* fiction in a sense the theme of the prior fiction which is its *including* form, its capable container, let us say its receptacle.” DERRIDA, J., “*Khora*”, op. cit., pp. 117. In that sense the experience of container is a possibility within the structure of language, and it is of no surprise that a language with a specific structure, i.e., the philosophical language of Timeaus (the Platonic text that contains the knowledge of the world’s creation) produced by ‘necessity’ the concept of space as container in the term *chora*.

68 “...Plato suggests that the ‘ancients’ had deliberately hidden allegorical meaning in entities like Ocean by a kind of encryption as if to keep their truths out of the reach of the unlitertate public.” ROMM, J.S., 1992: *The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought: Geography, Exploration, and Fiction*, Princeton University Press, pp. 177.

lands’ – and what would be the consequences for the passage – but even for the term itself – where the term _choras anthropon_ occurs?

2.3.2.3. **CHOROS (χώρος) : Event as Immobility**

"...does ...space exist independently of the experiencing body?" TSCHUMI, B., 1995: _Questions of Space_, AA Publications, pp. 34.

As we have mentioned, _choros_ occurs 16 times in Iliad, and 17 in the Odyssey. It is worth noting that in the majority of Iliadic passages (in 11 of them), the word _choros_ appears in the context of a fight. Twice, in A446 and Θ60, it is used in a formulaic way (the lines A446-51 and Θ60-5 are identical), to denote a fight as such.

Now as these advancing came to one place and encountered (_choron_), they dashed their shields together and their spears, and the strength of armored men in bronze, and the shields massive in the middle clashed against each other, and the sound grew huge of the fighting. There the screaming and the shouts of triumph rose up together of men killing and men killed and the ground ran blood.\(^{70}\)

The above translation of _choros_ as ‘place’, points towards its interpretation as the specific location where the clash between two armies occurs. It is natural for us to think of _choros_ as the ‘place’, where an action ‘takes place’, that is, as the receptacle of an action. This accords with our own conception of space as an abstract, homogeneous and empty container, where an event can ‘take place’, producing a differentiation (a place, a spot, a location) in otherwise undifferentiated space. It is also possible, _a propos_ of the above passage, to think of _choros_ as a field of relations, in the way Leibniz defined space. But once again, space is conceived as a preexisting entity, namely, that which provides the possibility of any relation. If we try to discard

\(^{70}\) A446-51 and Θ60-5: Οι δ’ ὁτε δὴ ὁ χώρον ἐνα ἔνα μελλόντες ἰκονον, / σὺν δ’ ἱ βολον μινοῖς, σὺν δ’ ἐγχει καὶ μένει ἄνδρων / χαλκοθεσίασιν ὅταν ὥστε ὁμολόγεσσαι / ἐκλητεν ἀλλήλης, πολίς δ’ ὀρυμαγγος ὀρόπει. / ἐνθα δ’ ἔμεν / οἰκήθη τε καὶ εὐχαριτία πέλερ ἄνδρων, / ὅλινων τε καὶ ὅλιμηνεν, ἢδε δ’ αἰματι γαία.
the concept of space as produced within philosophy, that is, as container, how we might approach choros in the above passage?

We might think that choros is produced by the clash itself, by the event itself, and endures as long as the event continues. Might not the experience of choros in Homer, be similar to a post-structuralist concept of space as event?71 We have already discussed this possible connection. Once more we repeat that what differentiates Homeric choros and post-structuralist space is the concept of space-time that underlines the latter. Our hypothesis is that not only is time experienced differently in Homer (for which there is substantial evidence72) but that the experience of choros as event is not associated with time at all. In that sense, we can say that choros and event are produced simultaneously, where simultaneity does not refer to time but to modality.

The very term ‘event’ is may be misleading because it seems to associate an action with the time within it unfolds. We experience an event in relation to time which has a duration, in the same way that space has an extension, because we

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71 See TSCHUMI, B., op. cit.
72 R.B. Onians writes: "In modern European thought there has prevailed the conception of time as a homogeneous medium analogous to empty space. Bergson and Einstein have from different angles helped to dethrone that concept. For the Homeric Greeks time was not homogeneous...The early Greeks felt that different portions of time had different quality and brought this change or that, favored this activity or that, ἀρχα...In II.xxii,209 ff. the ῥεῖμα is not the day of the month nor is it shared by others, it is the time, the destiny experienced by an individual, Hector; and it is time of a specified kind, 'fatal', 'of fate'...Homer is concerned with individual men and individual times, recognizing that time differs for different persons or collections of persons, even though they may be near together in space, e.g. victor and vanquished; for each it is colored with this or that, is experienced as this or that fate. Homer identifies the 'day' with the fate experienced... ῥεῖμα is the fate experienced by the individual, not the daylight universally shared, and it does not last just a day but is a phase of fortune of greater or less duration. ONIANNS, R.B., 1994: The Origins of European Thought About the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate, Cambridge University Press, pp. 411-14 passim. See also note 27.
conceive both as measurable entities in the context of our analytical thinking. But, what we call ‘event’ in the Homeric text is experienced not as a movement from one point of space to another – which presupposes space conceived as container – but as a state of immobility. This might sound strange, but in both passages there is an equilibrium of forces between the two armies, and neither is able to defeat the other. As long as the fighters remain entangled, the fight is without result and choros endures. Choros is thus experienced in relation to a state of immobility generated by an activity (action) which has no outcome. This is consistent with the experience of time as fate in Homer. As choros endures and the fight continues without an outcome, both armies share the same fate. The duration of time is indifferent, or we might say that as long as choros endures, time collapses. However, when time as the change of fate reasserts itself, choros vanishes. Choros, produced by the clash of the two armies, dissolves as a result of their separation. One army withdraws and the term used in the text is choreo. The verb choreo (κωρέω) ‘withdraw’, related etymologically to choros (κορός), occurs only in Iliad, 12 times, all of them in relation to

73 The fourth rhapsody ends describing the non-conclusiveness of the fight: Δ543-4: For on that day many men of the Achaians and Trojans lay sprawled in the dust face downward beside one another.

74 In θ88-88, it is time as fate that dissolves the choros of the collision between the two armies, as the Greeks are not able to stand against Trojans: θ88-88: But when the sun god stood bestriding the middle heaven, then the father balanced his golden scales, and in them he set two fateful portions of death, which lays men prostate, for Trojans, breakers of horses, and bronze-armored Achaians, and balanced it by the middle. The Achaians’ death-day was heaviest. There the fates of the Achaians settled down toward the bountiful earth, while those of the Trojans were lifted into the wide sky; and he himself crashed a great stroke from Ida, and a kindling flash shot over the people of the Achaians; seeing it they were stunned, and pale terror took hold of all of them. Then Idomeneous dared not stand his ground, nor Agamemnon...

75 See CHANTRAINE, P., op.cit., s.v. χὀρα.
fighting. It is worth noting that whereas in the Homeric text *choreo* denotes ‘withdrawal’, in later Greek writers it acquires the meaning of ‘contain’. This fact accentuates the interdependence of *choreo* and *choros*. For the conception of *choreo* as ‘contain’ follows the advent of the Platonic concept of *chora* as ‘receptacle’. Even within the Homeric text, *choreo* is usually attributed a philosophical interpretation. Homeric dictionaries assimilate the definition of ‘withdrawal’ to expressions such as ‘give place’, or ‘make room’. Nevertheless, this kind of interpretation presupposes that the concept of *kenon* (κενόν) ‘emptiness’ is synonymous with *chora* as ‘space’, and this conception is not foreign to Greek philosophy. As a consequence, we oppose the understanding of *choreo* within the Homeric text, as that ‘withdrawal’ that produces space by freeing, that is, by producing emptiness, and thus preparing space as neutral container that can receive whatever. We propose instead, that *choreo* indicates the non-enduring feature of the Homeric *choros*, as long as, it denotes the dissolution of *choros* resulting from the separation of bodies, that simultaneously experience and produce it.

We can interpret *choros* in a similar way in the three following Odyssean passages:

76 *A505, M406, N324, 724, O655, Π588, 592, 629, P101, 316, 533, Σ244*. In three of the above passages *choreo* occurs in the following formulaic phrase: *A505, Π592, P316*: The champions of Troy gave back then, and glorious Hektor...

77 See CHANTRAINE, P. op. cit, and LIDDELL, G.H. and SCOTT, R., op. cit, s.v. *χώρα*. Note that the related verbs hypo-*choreo* (ὑπο-χώρεω) and ana-*choreo* (_above χώρεω), denote ‘withdrawal’ in Homer as well as in later historical periods. The former occurs 3 times only in Iliad and in relation to fight (*2107, N476, X96*), whereas the later 12 times in Iliad (*I35, A305, E107, K210,411, Al89,440, N457, P30,729, Y196, 335*) and 3 times in Odyssey (*P453,461, ε270*).

78 Heidegger writes: “To empty a glass means: To gather the glass, as that which can contain something, into its having been freed. To empty the collected fruit in a basket means: To prepare for them this place.” HEIDEGGER, M., “The Art of Space”, op.cit., pp. 11.
v228: Dear friend, since you are the first I have met with in this country (ὁ φίλ’, ἐκεί σε πρῶτα καὶ καίνῳ
πᾶν ἐνὶ χώρῳ.)

o260: Dear friend, since I have found you in this place, making sacrifice (ὁ φίλ’, ἐκεί σε θῶντα καὶ καίνῳ πᾶν ἐνὶ χώρῳ.)

κ271: Eurylochos, you may stay here (Εὐρυλόχ’, ἤ τοι μὲν συ μὲν’ σπέτο πᾶν ἐνὶ χώρῳ)

In the first two, what is translated as ‘in this place’ or ‘in this country’, is not a
preexisting location but the choros which is produced and experienced by the events
of the two bodies’ meeting. In the third one, ‘here’ denotes in a similar way, the
choros produced and experienced by the standing bodies.

Having argued for the non-enduring quality of choros, how we should
understand the two passages where Odysseus and Hector ‘measured off the distance
first ’(χώρον μὲν πρῶτον διαμετρεῖον : 1315) in which the duel between Alexandros and
Menelaos will ‘take place’?

Now when these two were armed on either side of the battle, they strode into the space between (ἐς
messon) the Achaians and Trojans, looking terror at each other; and amazement seized the beholders,
Trojans, breakers of horses, and strong-greaved Achaians. They took their stand in the measured space
(diametretō eni chorō) not far from each other raging each at the other man and shaking their
spearshafta.79

The translation clearly implies a concept of space as that which can be measured into
units. Now we should not only understand the act of measuring or the measured
space in the context of that abstract thinking that relates geometry and arithmetic.
Dia-metreo in Homer indicates the act of passing over; it is an activity of the body,
which measures and experiences at the same time. Moreover the duel between
Menelaos and Alexandros is a ritual; they fight on behalf of their armies and the

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79 Ε340-5: Οί δ’ ἐκεῖ οὗν ἐκάτερθεν ὁμήλῳ θερῃχθέντα, ἐς μέσσον Τριῶν καὶ Ἀχαιῶν ἑστιχόντο / δεινῶν
dεκαδομένοιν δ’ ἔχεν εἰσοδώντας / Τριῶν δ’ ἵπποδημός καὶ ἑδενήμενος Ἀχαιός, / καὶ ἤγες στῆθιν
dιαμετρεῖον ἐνὶ χώρῳ / σεῖοντες ἕγχειας ἀλλήλων κοτόνται.
measuring is the demarcation of a territory in which the ritual will be performed.\textsuperscript{80}

Thus the question concerns the relation between ritual and choros. Not only why space is so important in the context of ritual, but why space is produced as the container of a ritualistic performance? A full answer to these questions, would require a detailed analysis that exceeds the scope of this chapter. But we shall try to indicate a possible answer. It is well known that ritual ensures repetition. In a ritualistic performance there are rules which govern the gestures, the body postures, and the movement of the bodies. As we have argued, in Homer bodies both produce and experience a non-enduring ‘space’. When these bodies repeat the actions over and over again in the ritual, the same non-enduring space is produced. The demarcation of a territory is an inversion of the process where the attempt to create a space that is enduring is a way to control the repetition of bodies’ actions that will ensure the success of the ritual.\textsuperscript{81} So in the Homeric passage the duel fails, because Aphrodite’s divine intervention removes Alexandros from the marked ritualistic territory to the perfumed \textit{thalamos}.\textsuperscript{82} We might say that it is fear of the unpredictable that constructs

\textsuperscript{80} If one reads the whole passage, one would see the series of rules that must be followed in the duel. In the same way, that is, as the marked space of ritual we can possibly understand two more Iliadic passages, which are formulaic and refer to the choros of the \textit{agore} (\textit{άγορη}) ‘assembly’ the first, and of the \textit{boule} (\textit{βουλή}) ‘council of nobles’ the second. See also above note 29.

\textsuperscript{81} In this light we might say that what we call ‘organization of space’ in ritual architecture is the control of bodies movement in it. But is this only a characteristic of ritual architecture, or of architecture in general?

\textsuperscript{82} 1-380-2. In 1446-50, Alexandros enjoys lovemaking, while the deranged Menelaos is still looking for him in the marked space.
space as enduring. Furthermore, in an enduring space enduring identities are produced as a repression of the inherited elusiveness of both space and identity.  

As far as metron (μέτρον) ‘measure’ is concerned it is worth pointing out the connection between the metron of space and the metre of language. Homeric poetry is interpreted in later Greek periods as being constituted by metric units, which are called pous ‘foot’. (Pous, the ‘foot’ of prosody and the foot as a measure of length both exist in later Greek but not in Homer.) Can we speak – in this case of the metre of language – about a spatial metaphor? We do not intend to examine here the context that produced the metric theory. However, such a connection gives us the opportunity to examine the relation between epos ‘speech’ and choros ‘space’ in Homer. We argue that space is re-produced as an enduring entity in the mnemonic structure of language. In this light, we can understand why within the later metric theories meter and pous ‘foot’ constitute nothing more or less than the enduring features of a mnemonic structure.

In three passages, one in Iliad and two in Odyssey, choros appears as an enduring entity within speech. The term indicates a location specified in the act of speaking, it is the choros that Achilleus, Kirke or Athena describe and produce by speech.  

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83 The demarcation of the territory is the foundational act at the creation of every town, which will ‘contain’ the specific behavior and identity of its inhabitants. AUGÉ, M., op. cit., pp. 45.

84 138: When these had come to the place Achilleus had spoken of to them (Oι δ’ ὃς χώρον ἱκανόν ὅθι οφισίν ποὺροικίας Ἀχιλλείου) λ21: and ourselves walked along by the stream of the Ocean until we came to the place of which Circe had spoken (ἀντοι δ’ ἄπει παρα βόου Σικελιοῦ / ἔσων, διν’ ἐκ χώρου ἀμφίκοσμῃ, ἐν φράσει Κύρκα) ἤ1-2: But Odysseus himself left the harbor and ascended a rugged path, through wooden country along the heights, where Athene had indicated. (Ἄντιν οδ’ ἐκ λίμνης προέβη τριχείλαν ἀπαραγόν / ἡ χώραν ἄν’ ὀλέμνα τι δι’ ἄρτιας, ἥ οί Αθηνῆ / πόλλαδε)
should be considered simultaneously. This permitted us to suggest that choros as an enduring entity that ‘contains’ specific features is produced in a narration ‘contained’ within the narration. In other words, choros becomes a container when language touches on the structure of a container. The same observation is valid for a number of passages where the term choros occurs in the context of a simile.\(^5\) We propose to consider similes as interrupting or better as being contained within the narration. Moreover, most of these contained similes refer to the other, the alterity, namely the animal.\(^6\) Thus, the term choros within the similes becomes a container,\(^7\) and specifically a container of alterity. Furthermore, choros acquires specific characteristics by the adjectives that accompany it. We would like to note that adjectives are attached only to the masculine form of choros and contribute to producing it as enduring.

We have no way of approaching a number of passages in which one adjective or a series is attached to choros.\(^8\) However, these are not the only passages that

Note the use of verb phrazein in the three passages that Svenbro translates as ‘show’ and points out that in some cases “denotes the action of transmitting a message by means of a dumb show.” SVENBRO, J., 1993: Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient Greece, Cornell University Press, pp. 16. Also CHANTRAINE, P., op. cit., s.v. φραζεῖν writes: “faire comprendre, indiquer par des signes ou par la parole”. This is interesting as it accentuates the body’s relationship with both speech and space.

\(^5\) There are five passages all of them in Iliad, and in the context of a fight. K362, M423, N473, P54, D262.

\(^6\) We won’t address here the extremely interesting issue of identity as produced within animal similes. We shall only refer to a book by SCHNAPP-GOURBEILLON, A., 1981: Lion, Héros, Masques: Les représentations de l’Animal chez Homère, François Maspero, Textes à l’ Appui. Here, we would like to make only one remark relevant to our investigation, namely, that action, place and identity should be thought of as co-produced.

\(^7\) What can be the relation of similes – understood in that way – and rhetorikoi topoi in the context of Greek philosophy?

\(^8\) 441-3: but when he came, swimming along, to the mouth of a sweet-running river, this at last seemed to him the best place, being bare of rocks, and there was even shelter from the wind there (οὐκ ἔστιν...
present a difficulty, and we have no other choice but to understand them according to the concept of an enduring container. There is also one passage in which the experience evoked by masculine choros seems similar to that of the feminine chore; it is the choros produced by the immobility of a corpse. How we should interpret these contradictions? Do they constitute a problem for our research? We suggest that they indicate the plurality with which space as chore/os is experienced within the Homeric text, and possibly our present inability to understand them. After all, chore/os in the Homeric text denote experiences, they are not concepts; experiences

ποταμοῖο κατὰ στόμα καλλιρούον / ἱξε νέαν, τῇ δὲ οἱ ἐκέστο ὁχός ἄριστος, / λείος πετρῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ σκέπας ἦν ἄνεμῳ

η278-82: but there, had I tried to set foot on the land, the rough wave would have dashed me against tall rocks in a place that was cheerless, so I backed away and swam again, until I came to a river, and this at last seemed to him the best place, being bare of rocks, and there was even shelter from the wind there (ἦνεσ τῇ ¸ μέτα αὐτῶν νυστὸ ἐπὶ χερού, / πέτρης πρὸς μεγάλης βαλόν καὶ ἀπερή ὁχός / ἀλλ' ἀνεοχαισσάμενος νίχον πάλιν, ἄρος ἐπλήθων / ἐς ποταμόν, τῇ δὲ μοί ἐκέστο ὁχός ἄριστος, / λείος πετρῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ σκέπας ἦν ἄνεμῳ)

λ224 come here, to look on dead men, and this place without pleasure ἀδικεῖς, ὀφρα ἐδή νέκυος καὶ ἀπερή ὁχός

η122-4: There also he has a vineyard planted that gives abundant produce, some of it a warm area on the level ground where the grapes are left to dry in the sun, but elsewhere they are gathering others (ἦνεσ τῇ ὁ πολύκαρπος οὐρή ἐρίζεται, / τῆς ἑτερον μὲν θείλόπεδον λευρῷ ἐνὶ χόροι / τέρεται ἡλίῳ, ἀπέτρε τῇ τρυγόσωσιν)

In the following passages, we can only note a relation between choros and sight, and ask: how is it possible for a non-enduring choros to be seen? Or, to invert the question: how an enduring choros can be produced within the experience of seeing?

κ282 ignorant of the land-lay (χορόν ὀδήρες ταύν)

τ181: But when we had arrived at the place, which was nearby, there at the edge of the land we saw the cave (ὄλλο 'ίτι δέ τον χόρον ὁμικόμεθ' ἑγγός ένοπα, / ἐνὶ δέ ἐκ τὴν ἐκοινωνίας δύο μοι ἐγκατέστησε) K520 When he saw the place left empty where the fast horses had been standing (ὡς ἦν χόρον ἄρημον, δόθη διαστατών ἄκες ἐπαύσατο, / ἀνδρός τ' ἀπειράτους ἐν κοιλάθεις φονήσατο)

Ψ188: and Phoibos Apollo brought down a darkening mist about him from the sky to the plain, and covered with it all the space that was taken by the dead man (ὥς δ' ἐπὶ κατόν τού νέκυος ἠγάλης Φοίβος Ἀπαλλάων / σφανθῶν πελάνων, κάλλυν οὐχ χόρον ἀπαντά / χορόν ἀπαντά / χορόν ἄρημον / ἐξήρητεν ὀφρα, βέβαυν δε χόρον ἀπαντά).

The following passage seems also similar: Ψ420: there was a break in the ground where the winter water had gathered and broken out of the road, and made a sunken place all about (ὡς μεσός ἐν γαῖς, ἡ κεφαλίου ἐλευθή / εξήρητεν ὀφρα, βέβαυν δε χόρον ἀπαντά).
can be contradictory, whereas concepts – because they are related to definitions – cannot be, or at least, we expect them not to be.

In the passages examined so far, choros is not related to ‘architecture’ or to any kind of construction or domestic environment. However, there are five more to consider, and before we move on to examine the relation between choros and construction evoked within the above passages we would like to make a few concluding remarks on the gender distinction of the Homeric terms.

2.3.3. GENDER DISTINCTION

What should be questioned, in the context of the present chapter on chore-os, is not how gender distinction is constructed via space, but what a gender distinction – which is systematically ignored – indicates. We argue that both chore and femininity are experienced simultaneously, and this produces a similar experience of woman and things. The immobility of both supplements masculine identity, and their experience as excess makes their exchange possible. The question of space as producing feminine identities in the sense of ‘the proper place assigned to her’, is related to the concept of space as container: the proper place to contain and thus to delimit femininity. Moreover it presupposes that chore and femininity are experienced as separate.

As far as choros, the masculine term, is concerned we do not propose an understanding of masculinity as the space of action in the sense of events.\footnote{See for instance, the instructions for the proper place of the proper housewife in Xenophon’s \textit{Oeconomicus}.}

\footnote{Note Mumford’s argument on the masculine and feminine space of the cities, as combination of movement and immobility. \textit{MUMFORD, L. 1961: The City in History}, Penguin. However, we explore how the experience of a biological difference is related to the experience of chore-os in the Homeric
Nevertheless, masculinity and choros as event are experienced as co-produced, but this is not to say that there is a space that can contain and thus inform masculinity, as occurs in later Greek writers. The fact that the distinction masculine-feminine in relation to the two Homeric terms is usually ignored accords with the concept of space as neutral container, which exactly because it is neutral can inform whatever it contains, without being informed by it. A neutral container can also contain locations with specific features, i.e., feminine or masculine. Furthermore, the question in the Homeric text, of specific locations within the house assigned to women, or the production of man’s identity as master of the house, does not partake of the experience of chore-os, but that of domos and domestic experience whose relation with chore-os is a specific one.

2.3.4. CHOROS AND THE DOMESTIC

Choros occurs in four passages in Homer referring to ‘domestic’ environment, and once in relation to a ‘domestic’ activity. Within the four occurrences the term is presented in a formulaic way (περισσέως ἐνὶ χώρῳ) in connection with Telemachos’ thalamos ‘bedchamber’, Kirke’s domata ‘house’ and Eumaios’ aule ‘enclosure’. In no way do we want to advance a theory where anatomy is considered destiny, as Mumford does, attributing the problems of the cities to the disappearance of neat sex separation. Nonetheless, we have no intention of explaining space which is culturally constructed in terms of biology.

93 victor 141: Take your turns in order from left to right, my companions all, beginning from the place where the wine is served out. ('ὅρνοςθ' ἔχεις ἐπιδέξας πάντις ἑαυτῷ; ἀρξάμενοι τοῦ χόρου, δὲν τὲ περ
οίνουςεῖν.) In this case choros is produced by the activity of wine-pouring.
94 o425: Telemachos went where, off the splendid courtyard, a lofty bedchamber had been built for him, in a sheltered corner. There he went to go to bed (τὴν κόμας δ’, δεῖ τι θάλαμος περικάλλος οὐλής / ὑπῆλες δέδημο, περισσέως ἐνὶ χώρῳ, / ἐνθ’ ἐβην εἰς εὖνην)
κ210: In the forest glen they came on the house of Circe. It was in an open place, and put together from stones, well polished, and all about it there were lions (ἐδρόν δ’ ἐν ἰδρομένον δώματα Κίρκης / ἐξοπλισθήν κάσσαι, περισσέως ἐνὶ χώρῳ, / ὀμηρί δὲ)
The phrase *periskepto eni choro* (περισκέπτω ἐνὶ χῶρῳ) is given different translations in the above passages. It is translated as 'a sheltered corner', 'an open place, or as 'a place with view on all sides'.

The difficulty of translation arises because it takes into account a conception of *choros* 'space' as an enduring entity. In this context the term *periskepto* (περισκέπτω) seems to specify a portion of a preexisting space which has a distinct feature; it can be either a conspicuous, open or protected site which is chosen for a *thalamos*, a *domos* or an *aule* to be constructed. Such an interpretation of space as a preexisting, enduring entity is perceived as what sets apart, producing difference.

*Choros* in Homer is not related to separation, or distinction between, for instance, inside – outside or open – closed. However, this separation and differentiation can be related to the verb *demo* 'to construct', which evokes the experience of both

The following two quotes refer to Eumaios' *aule* 'enclosure':

κ262: And found a fine house in the glen. It was in an open place, and put together from stones, well polished. (έθρομεν ἐν βήσεσι στενομένα δώματα καλά / ἡσσοῦσιν λάξεος, περισκέπτω ἐνὶ χώρῳ / ἐν δὲ τις)
ξ6: He found him sitting in front, on the porch, where the lofty enclosure had been built, in a place with a view on all sides, both large and handsome, cleared all about, and it was the swineherd himself who had built it, to hold the pigs of his absent master, far from his mistress and from aged Laertes. He made it with stones from the field, and topped it off with shrubbery. Outside he had driven posts in a full circle, to close it on all sides, set close together and thick, and dark of the oak, split out from the logs. Inside the enclosure made twelve pig pens next to each other, for his sows to sleep, in each of them fifty pigs who sleep on the ground were confined. These were the breeding females, but the males lay outside...

According to dictionaries, *periskepto* (περισκέπτω) means 'covered, shut in on all sides' (σκέπασ 'cover, shelter, against the wind', and σκέπωσι (σκέπωσι) 'ward off'). It is related etymologically by some scholars to *skeptomai*, that denotes sight, and in that case it is given the meaning of 'conspicious'. This etymology is discarded by Chantraine. Lattimore in his translation uses both meanings.
construction and structure, and is related to damno ‘to tame’, and the production of fixed identities. Choros in all the four passages is related not simply to the ‘domestic’, environment but to the construction of the ‘domestic’ as the verbs demo and teuco indicate. In one of them, a story about the construction of Eumaios’ aule is narrated which includes the description of inside-outside produced by the construction as such. Choros is not the space where the construction ‘takes place’, choros indicates the structure which is co-produced with construction. However, it seems that as speech can appropriate space, reproducing it as enduring, there is another mechanism through which construction, in the experience of demo, appropriates choros, reproducing it as enduring. Nonetheless an expression of the type ‘the space of the house’ would be impossible in the context of the Homeric text. Such an expression is related to a conception of construction based on the form and function distinction where both are conceived as neutral and highly abstract components of architecture. The experience that domos ‘house’ evokes within the Homeric text will be addressed in the next chapter.

To conclude the present chapter we will try to mark the differences between our concept of space as container and the Homeric experience of choros. Obviously possibilities of interpretation should remain open and uncertain given that for the first

96 "[Heidegger's] rejection of the familiar sense that a building is produced in space, as distinct from producing space (Raum), or, more precisely, place (Ort). For Heidegger, this sense is seen to be sustained by the basic claim of metaphysics inaugurated by Plato that material objects stand in a preexisting space, offering surfaces to the eye of a subject who also occupies that space, an 'outward appearance' that presents an immaterial idea. The degeneration of philosophy is seen to begin with its ancient account of space." WIGLEY, M., 1995: The Architecture of Deconstruction: Derrida's Haunt, MIT Press, pp. 112.
time the Homeric terms are approached for their own sake and not through the filter of later philosophical concepts. What provides us with the possibility of understanding the Homeric ‘space as experience’ is the fact that chore/os are part of our own experience which is repressed, in favour of more abstract thinking about space. What is repressed is the fear of the unpredictability of whatsoever does not endure, be that identities, institutions, or events.97 The major difference, at an anthropological level, between us and Homeric Greeks might be thought of as manifested in the difference between an experience of chore/os and the concept of space/place, which in turn can be described as the degree of toleration for what is fugitive and hence, less controlled relations and actions. The uniqueness of the Homeric case consists of the peculiar effect when non-enduring experiences are produced as enduring within the epic narrative. This provides us with the possibility of both understanding and marking the differences (but probably makes us unable to propose a better literary translation) between:

1. Our subject-object conception which presupposes the Cartesian concept of space as container, a container within which every-one and every-thing can be safely contained because accurately defined; and the non-enduring Homeric identities produced each time anew through a relation of intimacy between bodies, things and chore, where things are not placed in, but co-produced with their chore.

2. The importance of time, which actually secures our concept of space as ‘event’, by providing the possibility of its re-production/re-presentation through calculation; and the dissociation of time from the Homeric choros, as ‘event’, where ‘event’ must be understood as a fatal state of balanced immobility.

97 Note that the contemporary concept of event is secured by the concept of time.
3. Our gendered places which of course are spatial containers of gender, and the linguistic gender distinction of *choros* which actually evokes the experience of the Homeric distinction of genders, and

4. Our definition of otherness as a territorial confinement; and the Homeric invention of alterity within the ‘space’ of the epic narrative.

All this may seem at first glance to be far removed from the issue of space and place, but is in fact inextricably connected with it, for a different understanding of space produces a different approach to the issues of identity, alterity, and gender. Moreover, what the above series of differentiation indicates is the plurality of experiences that Homeric *choros* evoked. The main difference from our concept of space/place, at a theoretical level, is the impossibility of defining a so-called ‘Homeric space’, for the very concept of space is the mark of the philosophical concept of definition. We can only approach *choros* if we free ourselves from this philosophical anachronism, though we may not always succeed in the attempt.
DEMAS-DOMOS

‘BODY’ - ‘HOUSE’
ON STRUCTURE
3.1. Introduction

3.2. The ‘Body and the Building’ Relation within Architectural and Linguistic Theories

3.3. Demas - Domos Relation within the Homeric Epics

3.3.1. Demas / ‘The build of the body’: Structure as Trans-fixed Appearance

3.3.2. Domos / ‘House’: Con-structure as Trans-fixity

3.3.2.1. Dedmemenos / ‘Constructed - Tamed’

3.3.2.2. Endon / ‘Inside’ as Structure

3.1. INTRODUCTION

"...we must carve up the lexical conglomeration which figures in our etymological dictionaries under *dem- “construct; house” into three distinct and irreducible units: *doma-: to do violence; to tame, (Lat. domare, Gr. damao); *dem(-): construct (Gr. demo and its derivatives, [i.e., demas: form, physical appearance, structure- domos: house qua construction]); *dem-: house, family [Lat. domus].

We dissociate, therefore, in the common Indo-European period, the term *dem- ‘family’ from all verbal connections. There is nothing more than homophony between *dem- ‘family’ and *dem(-) ‘construct’. But it cannot be denied that contaminations came about between the forms issuing from these two roots, as for instance in Homeric Greek between do(m) ‘house qua family’ and domos ‘house qua construction’. This is due to a tendency in all the terms of the series to identity social groups with material habitat.” (BENVENISTE, E. 1973: Indo-European Language and Society, Faber and Faber, pp.251.)

Benveniste makes the distinction here between house as construction and house as familial structure. If that is so, how we should approach the relation between demas ‘body structure’ and domos ‘house construction’, given that these are the terms that appear in Homer? Benveniste attempts an etymological analysis which will draw different and separate meanings together in the root *dem-. The question, however, arises in whether his use of the root *dem- as construction was an earlier meaning or whether its appearance in his list is the imposition of a later or more logically
developed category whose function is to hold the other terms together in a kind of etymological corset. This question can only be answered in the course of a detailed analysis. But it can also only be answered by reference to a theoretical problem. For the problem has to be answered both at an etymological level and at the level of language of theory. We must avoid imposing upon the word a later or more logically coherent meaning, for that would mean that we abolish the problem philosophically where we should be trying to answer it historically. The problem of giving an analysis of demas-domos is that it requires a description of the structure of the category at the point where the category of structure is the very object of investigation. This sets up a problem which is both theoretical and practical. Indeed it is symptomatic of the type of problem which is investigated throughout this thesis, albeit one which confronts it in a indirect and most confusing way. In effect we are trying to put ourselves ‘before’ the category, as if the category could be described in a neutral and innocent way, but this is impossible to do without borrowing elements of the very category which we are trying to describe. This is the symptom which Derrida identified in his analysis of Benveniste entitled “Philosophy before Linguistics”. Nevertheless, the use of the term ‘structure’ should be understood as a methodological tool, and as we shall investigate the Homeric terms with apparent similarity, we shall unfold a variety of experiences which – we will argue – revolve around that which we call the experience of ‘structure’.

2 Within etymological theories the connection between demas and domos is made via the concept of ‘structure’, supposedly present in the common root *dem-. We use ‘structure’ as a provisional term to name the relation.
The words brought together within linguistic theories to structure the Indo-European root *dem- ‘construct, house’ include the following Homeric terms:

do/domos (δόδομος) ‘house/construction’, prodomos (προδομος) ‘vestibule’, demo (Δεμο) ‘to build’, eudmetos (ευδμετος) ‘well built’, theodmetos (θεόδμετος) ‘god-built’, mesodme (μεσοδμη) ‘central beam’, demas (Δμας) ‘built of the body’, damnemi (δαμνημι) ‘to tame’, dedmemenos (δεδμμενος) ‘tamed/constructed’, admes (αδμης) ‘untamed’, damar (δαμαρ) ‘wife’, despoina (δεσποινα) ‘mistress of the house’, dmos (δμος) ‘male slave’, dmoe (δμωη) ‘female servant’, and endon (ενδον) ‘inside’. Before we enter upon the examination of the above words, which will help us to understand the way that the demas-domos relation was experienced in the epics, it is useful to present the ways in which the body and the building relation are conceived within architectural and linguistic theories. Thus we can at least be aware of our presuppositions, when we confront the Homeric terms. The possibilities of anachronistic projections are therefore minimized and any differences between our way of thinking and the Homeric experience can be marked.

3.2. THE ‘BODY AND THE BUILDING’ RELATION WITHIN ARCHITECTURAL AND LINGUISTIC THEORIES

The relation of the body and the building is always seen as evident. Nothing is more clear in architectural theories than the supposed connection between the body and building. From Vitruvius and Leonardo to Le Corbusier’s modulor, the body in its integrity and fixity serves as a basis for measurement and proportion, as a model for Architecture: the art of building. But note that it is a body of a particular kind. Firstly it is a male body, secondly it is a body which itself is modeled on the ideality of
mathematical proportion. Anthony Vidler writes on this analogical relation between body and building:

“In classical theory the (idealized) body was, so to speak, directly projected onto the building, which both stood for it and represented its ideal perfection. The building derived its authority, proportional and compositional, from this body, and, in a complementary way, the building then acted to confirm and establish the body – social and individual – in the world. The principles of Vitruvius traced the origins of proportion to the Greek canons of bodily mathematics, to be incorporated by the architect-sculptor in the column and in the relations of the different parts of the order to the whole, and thence to the building; his ideal of unity was described by the celebrated figure of a man with arms outstretched inscribed within a square and a circle, navel at the center. The theorist of the Renaissance from Alberti to Francesco di Giorgio, Filarete, and Leonardo subscribed to this analogy...The attraction of these formulations lasted well into the eighteen century- and even, in the sheltered enclave of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts, much longer. The body, its balance, standards of proportions, symmetry, and functioning, mingling elegance and strength, was the foundation myth of building.”

What Vidler’s account implies is that it is not the body as such, but a perfect male body which is the image of proportion. Mark Wigley elaborates this by reversing the analogy:

“It is not that the building is being thought of as a body with the classical analogy. Rather, the body is thought of as a building... The first treatise on the interior of the body, which is to say, the treatise that gave the body an interior, written by Henri De Mondeville in the fourteenth century, argues that the body is a house, the house of the soul, which like any house can only be maintained as such by constant

3 Vidler also distinguishes a second moment in the body-building relation established in the eighteenth century and based on the idea that “the building embodies states of the body or, more importantly, states of mind based on bodily sensation.” He writes: “But beginning in the eighteen century, there emerged a second and more extended form of bodily projection in architecture...Here, the building no longer simply represented a part or whole of the body but was rather seen as objectifying the various states of the body, physical and mental. Edmund Burke, followed by Kant and the romantics, described buildings not so much in terms of their fixed attributes of beauty but rather in their capacities to evoke emotions of terror and fear.” Regarding postmodern architecture, Vidler argues, it establishes a relation with a specific kind of body, “a body in disintegration.” VIDLER, A., 1994: The Architectural Uncanny, MIT Press, pp. 71.
surveillance of its openings. The woman's body is seen as an inadequate enclosure because its boundaries are convoluted... Consequently, she must always occupy a second house, to protect her soul... The material of the body, considered as a house, is seen as feminine but its physiological structure is male. Maleness is the structuring of the body.”

Thus, the relation is complicated; it is not only that the ideal male body provides the rules for an ideal construction. It is that only the ideal body provides rules for an ideal construction. The fact that a woman, even an ideal woman, cannot provide such rules raises the question of the difference between the inside and outside of the ideal body. That is, the body in question for architecture is one which is determined both by mathematics and by gender. This whole problem is complicated by the fact that the body and building analogy becomes a paradigmatic image for architectural theory, where the so-called materiality of the body becomes as if it were the site for the embodiment of ideas. This equips architecture with the conviction that the materiality of the house can realize the ideas of the architect. We can begin to understand from this point of view a fundamental characteristic of architectural theory. Apparently obvious and natural oppositions such as inside/outside, male/female, material/immaterial, and ultimately construction/structure, are in effect produced by a certain philosophical operation. At one level, it appears that the proper structure of a building has been derived from the human body, as if it were a case of simple material analogy. But in fact this 'body' has been subjected to at least two exclusions: firstly the exclusion of the feminine body and secondly the transformation of the physical male body into a mathematical object. An apparently physical and natural analogy turns out to be no such thing but rather the effect of a powerful and specific philosophical intervention which conceals itself. This concealment is infinitely

extended in that whenever the oppositions re-appear it is assumed that to be a debt which philosophy owes to architecture.

The body-house relation then is not an original ‘natural’ association but a relation through which philosophy produces a notion of structure while concealing the exclusions through which that concept has been produced. But this concept and its repressions continue to reverberate in linguistic theories which make an etymological connection between domos ‘house’ and demas ‘structure of the body’ via the root \*dem- ‘construct, house’. The interpretation of this root, which confers the essence of its meaning, is produced by the inclusion of terms related to the house and the ‘build’ of the body\(^5\) as much as to inclusion (endon), gender (damar, despoina), and control (damnemi, admes). Benveniste, on the other hand, by separating the question of control from the construction of the house and the structure of the family, remains entangled within later philosophical distinctions. That is to say, he accepts the idea of pairs of binary oppositions inasmuch as he establishes the etymological relation between body and house, where both are intended as the materiality that houses something immaterial. Furthermore, when he considers the question of the structure of the family it is always produced as interior. He writes: “...the Homeric form do...parallel with Latin domi, domum [where the Latin term, for him, designates not an edifice, but the ‘home’ as a social entity]\(^6\), conveys the notion of the house as ‘inside’.”\(^7\) This way of thinking is perpetuated by Liddell-Scott in defining demas as

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\(^5\) We use the term ‘build’ here in the sense of the ‘someone of his build’.

\(^6\) It should be noted that the relation between the construction and the family is not metaphoric in the Homeric text as in Roman times, where domus alternatively can be used as a genealogical signifier for the family lineage. By that time the term domus was used as a metaphor, but here is not metaphoric.

\(^7\) BENVENISTE, E., op. cit., pp. 249.
the male body;\(^8\) an interpretation which is based upon architectural theories. But this cannot be the case in the Homeric text, since demas transgresses the categories not only of gender (male-female), but that of mortals and immortals and of humans and animals. Not only that, but demas cannot simply be understood as the ‘body’, for no such general term exists in Homeric Greece.\(^9\) In sum, demas cannot be synonymous with the materiality of the mathematical male body conceived of as a totality. Given that, what is the relation between demas-domos, in the Homeric experience? After all we have established that the body could not serve as an abstract ideal model to provide the rules for the building. On the other hand, we will establish that demo (δίευμα) ‘to build’ has a non-strict technical sense, and that domos is not experienced as the fixed and autonomous product of Architecture.

We shall argue that indeed there is a relation between demas and domos and even between the rest of the terms brought together by linguistic theories. It can be established by a connection at the level of the experience which these terms evoked. But what these terms evoked was an experience of contradiction, a contradiction in which each of these terms is experienced as something that is fixed and transformable


\(^9\) The use of the term ‘body’ is inappropriate, but as in the case of the term ‘structure’ we keep it, having always in mind the difference between the Homeric experience of what we conceive of as ‘body’. When we translate demas as the build of the body, we immediately, in the act of translation, project our concept of ‘body’. We assume that there is a coherent whole which we call ‘body’ and which has different features such as an exterior (the skin, the visual aspect), an interior (the organic, psychological and cognitive qualities), and a structure (in the sense of being assembled from different parts to form a coherent whole). But it is widely accepted that Homeric Greek does not have a term to designate body as a whole. As J-P. Vernant writes "there is no term that designates the body as an organic unity which supports the individual in the multiplicity of his vital and mental functions." VERNANT, J-P., 1989: “Dim Body, Dazzling Body,” Zone: Fragments for a History of the Human Body, Part I, ed. M. Feher, pp. 21.
simultaneously. This may be seem an insult to rational thought, but the experience of contradiction as such is perfectly possible. There is but one experience in perceiving a contradiction, but obviously its analysis has to be given in two parts, together with the means whereby these are yoked together. The house may have a tamed female inside and the untamed male outside, where the distinction is secured by the material construction that produces the structure of the family. In such a network of relations the body as a fixed entity can be related to the building as a fixed entity. But as we shall see examining the Homeric text, neither demas nor domos can be experienced as fixed entities. Thus 'structure' in the Homeric text should be understood as the co-experience of fixity and transformation, that is, as the experience of a contradiction. This contradiction was selected and made into poetic formulas where signs of permanence (formulas) signify transience.

3.3. DEMAS - DOMOS RELATION WITHIN THE HOMERIC EPICS

We need to shift from a rationalized way of thinking in order to approach the terms in the Homeric poem and attempt to understand the experience evoked by the terms demas, demo, mesodme, prodemos, and domos that – as Benveniste argues – stem from the IE “root *dem-, which, according to the technique involved, had the sense of

10 The use of the term contradiction here is prosaic and common sense rather than any philosophical notion of contradiction. Historically of course this is also related to the fact that the Homeric text predates the first philosophical formulation of contradiction. However we do not want our use of the term contradiction to fall back into the general use of the term contradiction as used by anthropologists such as Levi-Bruhl, who uses the tolerance for contradiction as one of the distinctive criteria for the distinction between primitive and civilized mentality.

11 "...the house is involved in the production of the gender division it appears to merely secure." WIGLEY, M., 1992, op.cit., pp. 336.
‘construct in tiers’ for masonry, and ‘construct by joinery’ for timber construction.”

Benveniste writes:

“In Homer, domos is accompanied by descriptive epithets; the house is great, high, well constructed, wide, etc. That is to say, it has the characteristics of a construction; the domos includes a vestibule, which is called prodomos, ‘the front part of domos’... The noun domos... applies to buildings: ‘house’, ‘temple’ and also ‘a room’, and sometimes ‘nest’. Herodotus takes it in the sense of ‘an arrangement of stones or bricks’ serving for the construction of a wall, or of a house. It is exclusively to construction that mesodme ‘the large transverse beam’ of a building refers... Finally, there is a primary verb demo ‘construct’, which governs objects such as teikhos ‘wall’ and oikos ‘house’. We add here the noun demas ‘physical shape, stature, appearance’ which was used adverbially as ‘in the manner of’, literally ‘according to the appearance, the form of...’.”

We shall start with demas, the term which will introduce to us the two shifts we need to make in order to understand that the Homeric ‘structure’ firstly has always the quality of appearance, and secondly, that the appearance is simultaneously that of fixity and transformation. We shall call it the appearance of trans-fixity.

3.3.1. DEMAS
‘The build of the body’ : Structure as Trans-fixed Appearance.

The word demas (δέμας) occurs 42 times in the Homeric text, 13 in Iliad and 29 in Odyssey. It denotes the ‘body’ – both masculine and feminine – of gods, humans, and animals. Because of the etymological relation with the verb of construction demo ‘to build’, it is widely accepted that it refers to a specific quality of the ‘body’, that is, its ‘structure, build’. J-P. Vernant accredits Benveniste’s etymology when he writes:

“The term demas in the accusative, designates not the body but an individual’s stature, his size, his build up of assembled pieces (the verb demo signifies the erecting of a construction through superimposed

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rows, as in a brick wall). It is often used in connection with eidos and phue: the visible aspect, the carriage, the imposing appearance of what has grown well."

Dictionaries distinguish between two forms of the term which correspond to different meanings. As a noun it means the (stature of the) ‘body’, whereas as an adverb it means ‘in form or fashion like...’. The so-called adverbial form occurs four times in a formulaic way in the context of battle in Iliad. The verse goes as follows: “So they fought on in the likeness of blazing fire.” In all the four passages demas is translated as ‘in the likeness of’. We propose instead to understand that it is the appearance of the ‘body’ as demas, that is assimilated to fire. As the exposition of the rest of the passages tries to show, demas evokes that quality of the body that makes it always already assimilated to something else. Needless to say, demas should not be understood as a kind of mask, intended as something added, a surface under which something else lies. Even if we accept a relation between demas and ‘structure’, ‘structure’ should not be understood as what lies underneath, but as a visible quality of the body. Furthermore, if we consider the translation of demas as ‘the build of the body’ in the technical sense of ‘assembling together’, then the way different parts are assembled in an active individual is always different and changing. Demas is experienced as an always changing assemblage that only death fixes. Dead people do not have a demas, demas is a quality of life, but it is not only the attribute of the mortal body that inevitably changes as a consequence of its mortality. The demas of immortal gods evokes their inherent ability to change and being transformed.

14 LIDDELL, G.H., and SCOTT, R., op.cit., s.v. δήμας.
15 Α596, Ν673, Ρ366, Σ1.
16 Ἡς οἱ μὲν μάριντο δήμας πιρός αἱ θομένοι.
The term occurs 15 times in the context of gods' transformation. Their *dema* and voice – when they have to speak\(^{17}\) – are transformed and assimilated to that of a mortal individual in order to present themselves to humans. It is not our concern here to ask why gods change in order to appear,\(^{18}\) but to examine their transformation as such. The gods' similarity with mortals is denoted by terms such as *eisamenos/e* (εἰςάμενος/η), *eidomenos/e* (εἰδόμενος/η), *eoikos/uiia* (εοικός/υία), all of them denoting the visual experience. The change of their *dema* is the change of appearance. Apollo changes his demas to that of Periphas in order to encourage Aineas (P323: Apollo stirred on Aineias; he had assumed the *form* of Periphas),\(^{19}\) Poseidon changes both *dema* and voice to that of Kalchas to address the Argives (N44-5: Poseidon...stir on the Argives... likening himself in *form* and weariless voice to Kalchas),\(^{20}\) and both Poseidon and Athena assimilate their *dema* to that of mortal men (Φ285: Poseidon and Athena...with their *shapes* in the likeness of mortals).\(^{21}\) In the other 13 passages it is Athena who appears with a different *dema*, usually of a man (10 times)\(^{22}\) and only

\(^{17}\) On the change of voice see chapter on *epos*.

\(^{18}\) On this topic as well as on the difference between mortal and immortal body, see VERNANT, J-P., op.cit.

\(^{19}\) P323: Απόλλων / Αἰνέας δικαιονυμάδαμα Περιφαραντει οὐκικος.

\(^{20}\) N44-5: Ποσειδοςν...Ἀργείοις δικαιονυμάδαμα εἰςάμενος Κάλχαντε θείας καί ἑτερήτας φωνήν.

\(^{21}\) Φ285: Ποσειδον καί Αθηνή...δῆμας δὲ ἄνδρεσιν ἔκτην.

\(^{22}\) P555: [Athena...stirring] likened herself in *form* and weariless voice to Phoenix (Ἀθηνή...ἐπαφρόνουσας' εἰςάμενη Φοίνικι δημας καί ἑτερήτας φωνήν), X227: likened herself in *form* and weariless voice to Deiphobos (Δηιφόβοι εἰκονα δημας καί ἑτερήτας φωνήν), 9194: likening herself in *form* to a man (ἀνδρὶ δημας εἰκονα), ν222-3: likening herself in *form* to a young man, a herdsman of sheep, a delicate boy, such as the children of *kings are*, (ἀνδρὶ δημας εἰκονα νέος, ἐπιστροφὸι μῆλαν / πανανάλα, οἱοὶ τε ἄνδρας παιδίς ἔστε). In repetition five times ι208, 401, χ206, ας03, 548: likening herself to Mentor in voice and appearance (Μέντορι εἰδομένη ἡμᾶν δημας ἄνδρες καὶ εἰκονα), and also in Φ285 (see above note 21).
three times of a woman. In all three passages Athena appears with the demas of a woman to Odysseus. This is not the place to explain why she appears as a man or a woman, we are concerned only to point out that she is the only one able to do so, that is, to change gender, by changing her demas.

Demas is an attribute of both men and women. Hence, gender in relation to demas is established at the level of appearance and not as a biological differentiation, as with domos. The quality of demas as appearance is further reinforced in a passage where Athene made an image, and likened it to Iphthimi. Hence, demas is a feature of eidolon (εἰδολον) ‘that which has the appearance of...’ to look like, i.e., to be assimilated. Athena is also involved in the transformation of Odysseus’ appearance. He is transformed by her touch, where not only his demas, his bodily features, are changed, but also his clothing.

π172-6: So spoke Athene, and with her golden wand she tapped him. First she made the mantle and the tunic that covered his chest turn bright and clean; she increased his strength and stature. His dark color came back to him again, his jaws firmed, and the beard that grew about his chin turned black.

23 It occurs in the formulaic phrase: δήμος δ’ εἴδολο τούτοις in ν288-9, π157-8: ‘likened to a woman beautiful and tall, and skilled in glorious handiwork (δήμος δ’ εἴδολο τούτοις / καλὴ τε μεγάλη καὶ θυμωλὴ ἐργα ἰδοῦν), ν31: Athene...wore the shape of a lady (Ἀθηνὴ...δήμος δ’ εἴδολο τούτοις).

24 This can probably considered in relation to her paradoxical birth and her status as a virgin. Athena was born not ‘of woman’ but ‘of man’: she sprang from the head of Zeus, he ‘gave birth’ to Athena only after he had swallowed whole the body of his pregnant wife.

25 “Gender in ancient Greece is independent of anatomy and produced on the external surfaces of the body, which are closely monitored for signs of eye movement, grooming, shaving, posture, gait etc.” WIGLEY, M., 1992, op. cit., pp. 356.

26 8796: Αθηνή / εἴδωλον ποίησε, δήμος δ’ εἴδολο τούτοις / ἔφεσεν.

27 π172-6: Ἡ ἐκ τῆς χαλκῆς ἐξεσπάσατο Ἀθηνή. / φόρος μὲν οἱ πρῶτοι ἐπυλομένοι ἦδε χαλκῆς / θῆκ’ ὁμοί οὐθέκος, δήμος δ’ ὀψαλλε καὶ θην. / ὧν δὲ μελαιχροινή γένεστα, γναθοῖοι δὲ τάνυσθεν, / κυάνεια δ’ ἐγένετο ἔθειροδης ὁμοί γένειον.
She also intervenes in ψ156-163, enhancing the transformation acquired by bathing and clothing of body. After her intervention Odysseus demas is homoios (ὁμοιος) ‘similar’ to that of a god. However, the transformability of demas is not restricted to divine intervention. Bathing can have the same result, as when the daughter of Nestor bathes Telemachos.

γ466-8: when she had bathed Telemachos and anointed him sleekly with olive oil, she threw a splendid mantle and a tunic about him, and he came out from the bath looking like an immortal.

Even without being transformed by a bath or by a god, a mortal demas can be similar to that of immortals, as with Telemachos who is “looking like an immortal.” A woman, Kastaneira, has also the demas ‘the appearance’ of a goddess. Nevertheless, the difference between mortal and immortal demas is stated explicitly in two passages, where the goddess Calypso compares herself with Penelope and when Odysseus replies to Alkinoos who sees him as a god. The above passage poses questions about the difference between the mortal and immortal demas and about the

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28 ψ163: then, looking like an immortal, he strode forth from the bath (ἐκ δ' ὁσαμίθου βὴ δήμως ἀθανάτωσιν ὁμοίος).
29 Twice in a formulaic way Penelope attributes the ruination of her demas to the gods: σ251-2, ε124: all my excellence, my beauty and figure, were ruined by the immortals (ἡ τοι ἐμὴν ορετὴν εἶδος τε δήμως τε / ἄλλοις ἀθάνατοι).
30 γ466-8: Τηλέμαχον...παρ' ἐκεῖ λύσασθαι κεῖ καὶ ἤργον λίθ' ἐλαίῳ, / ἐμφαὶ δὲ μὴ φάρος καλὸν βάλεν ἢδὲ χιτώμα, / ἐκ δ' ὁσαμίθεν βὴ δήμως ἀθανάτωσιν ὁμοίος.
31 814: δήμως ἀθανάτωσιν ὁμοίος. It should be noted that the phrase δήμως ἀθανάτωσιν ὁμοίος occurs in all the three previous mentioned passages in a formulaic way.
32 ἔστοι: lovely Kastaneira with the form of goddess (καλὴ Καστανέιρα δήμως ἐκνεύριος θεᾶτη).
33 ε212-3: mortal women can challenge the goddesses for built and beauty (οὐ μὲν θην κείνης γε γεφυραῖς ἐξουμαί εἶναι / οὐ δήμοις οἴοθε φυϊν, ἐπεὶ οὐ πος οἴοθε ἄλλο θυρησις ἀθανάτηται δήμως καὶ εἶδος ἐρήξεν). η209-10: I am not in any way like the immortals who hold the wide heaven, neither in build nor stature, but only to men who are mortal (οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ γε / ἀθανάτωσιν δοκῶ, τοι ὀφεινὸν εὖριν ἔχουσίν, / οὐ δήμως οἴοθε φυϊν, ἀλλὰ θυρησὶς βροτοῖσιν).
transformation. But, as we have already pointed out, this is not our problem. We are concerned not with the issue of transformation as such, but with the relation of *demas* to transformation. What is important to us is the experience of the term *demas*, which, as the passages demonstrate, is experienced as the capacity of the ‘body’ to be transformed. In a number of passages *demas* occurs in the context of comparison between humans. Other features of the body, and not only *demas*, are being compared such as *eidos phue, phren* etc. It should be remembered that the Homeric body cannot be defined as such but only described in its multiple manifestations. The Homeric body is experienced as multiple in the sense that the corporeal, the psychological and the mental are interwoven, and do not correspond to different domains in the sense of bodily topography. With this in mind we can consider a series of passages that seem to suggest a split between *demas* – the exteriority of an always changing appearance – and something else that appears internal and enduring.

Humans might look like other humans, but in two passages Odysseus looks like (ἔοικε -ας) himself. Odysseus can not be recognized because his *demas* is

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34 Agamemnon compares his wife Klytaimnemstra with his mistress Chryseis who in Α114-5: is in no way inferior, neither in *build* nor stature, nor wit, nor in accomplishment (ἐὰν ὁδε έστι χειρέων / ὁδο ᾠδης οὕτε φυσίν, οὕτε ἐφ άρηνας οὕτε τι ἐργα). See also the following passages: Ω376: [a god] who sent such a wayfarer as you to meet me, an omen of good, for such you are by your form, your admired beauty and the wisdom in your mind (ὅς μοι τοιών’ ἦκεν ὀδοιπόρον ἀντιβοληστεί / αἰσθεν, οίος δὴ σο δήμας καὶ εἴδος ἵππος, / πένθοι τε νόπο). ξ176-7: and I thought he would be among the men one not inferior to his dear father, admirable for *build* and beauty (καὶ μὴν ἐσεσθηκαί ἐν ἀνδράσιν ὁ τι χρητεία / πατρός ὦν ἑλίκιοι, δήμας καὶ εἴδος ἵππον), θ116-7: Naubolos, he was best of all the Phaiakians in *build* and beauty, only except for stately Laodamas (Ναυβολίδης, δς ἄριστος ἐπὶ εἴδος τε δήμας τε / πάντων θεοικῶν μετ’ οὐσίων Λαοδώμαντα), λ469-70, ν16-7: and the soul of Aias, who for beauty and *stature* was greatest of all the Danaans, next to the stately son of Peleus (Ἀιαντός θ’, δς ἄριστος ἐπὶ εἴδος τε δήμας τε / τῶν ἄλλων Δαναών μετ’ οὐσίων Πηλείωνα). 35 ε381: as like as you are to Odysseus, both as to your feet, and voice and appearance (ὡς σο δήμας φανήν τε πόδας τ’ Ὅδυσσῃ ἔοικας), υ194: he is like a king and a lord in appearance (ἣ τε έοικε δήμας βασιλῆς ἑνακτί).
experienced as always changing and not because there is a split between the
exteriority of his appearance and the interiority of something else like his ‘self’. This
becomes all more apparent in two other passages. The first one is a well-known
Iliadic passage:

E 800-1.: ‘Tydeus got him a son who is little enough like him, since Tydeus was a small man for stature,
but he was a fighter.36

Dictionaries refer to it in order to reinforce the meaning of the term demas as the
’stature’ of the body. This is possible because ‘small’ refers to the size of the body,
and reflects the way we associate structure with measurement. But even in this case
the term is used in the context of a comparison, assimilation (εικόνα)37 between
Tydeus and his son. However, we should not understand the ‘size’ of demas as an
attribute of the corporeality of the body where a relation of opposition with the ability
to fight, can be established. Mikros to demas alla machetes ‘small for stature but
fighter’, should not be understood as a split between psychic strength and visual
appearance. Alla (άλλα) ‘but, yet’, is used not only in contrasted clauses but in
subjoining additional circumstances as well.38 In fact, the phrase underlines the fact
that the body is ‘multiple’ and that all its manifestations should be considered; its
appearance and its fighting ability cannot be separated. They are in a relation of

36 E 800-1: ἦ δέλταν οἱ παιδια ἐοικότα γείνατο Τυδεῦς / Τυδεῦς τοι μικρὸς μὲν ἐν τιν δέμας, ἄλλα μαχητῆς.
37 It is interesting that in later times the term eoika, which in Homer indicates the visual experience,
assumes a moral and intellectual value. Chantraine writes on eoika: ‘Ainsi de la notion d’ image, de
ressemblance issu un group semantique relative au monde intellectuel et moral εἰκόνα = δικαίως / εἰκόν.
εἰκόν = semblable / μένος μένο-εικός = desiderable.’ CHANTRAINE, P., op. cit., s.v. έοικα.
complementarity, not of opposition. Moreover, *demas* the appearance, is experienced as being transformed as a result of an action, in this case fighting.

*Demas* is not only a human attribute, it can apply to animals as well.\(^{39}\) The second passage refers to the *demas* of a dog. Odysseus, pretending that he does not recognize his dog, asks Eumaios: p307-8: The *shape* of him is splendid, and yet I cannot be certain whether he had the running speed to go with this beauty.\(^{40}\) Eumaios reassures him: p313: He was such, in *build* and performance.\(^{41}\) Once again in this passage *demas* and running speed should be understood in a relation of complementarity. The experience of the animal’s *demas*, like that of the human’s *demas*, involves the experience of a multiple body always changing – in performance. However, when Circe transforms the human *demas* of Odysseus’ companions to that of pigs, the split between changeable appearance and enduring mental attributes is stated explicitly:

κ237-40: When she had given them this and they had drunk it down, next thing she struck them with her wand and drove them into her pig pens, and they took the *look* of pigs, with the head and voices and bristles of pigs, but the minds within them stayed as they had been before.\(^{42}\)

\(^{39}\) J. Clay notes that *demas* is used of animals only for Odysseus’ dog and Odysseus’ men turned into pigs, and thus she writes that the term is “largely restricted” to humans. (CLAY, J., 1974: “Demas and Aude: The Nature of Divine Transformation in Homer”, *Hermes* 102, pp. 129). Other scholars argue that when the term is applied to animals indicates anthropomorphism. (see GOLDHILL, S., 1988. “Reading differences: the Odyssey and juxtaposition”, *Ramus* 17.1, pp. 14). The question of anthropomorphism – and the assumptions that underlay it – is not relevant to our research; it does not contradict, however, our interpretation of *demas* as a term that evokes the experience of likeness.

\(^{40}\) ρ307-8: καλὸς μὲν δὲμας ἦσαν, ἀμέρ τὸ ᾦ γ’ οὕτω σώφρον ῥίδα, / ἢ δ’ ὑπ’ θαρρὸς ἔστοι ἐπεί ἐπὶ εἶδεν τοῦτο.

\(^{41}\) ρ313 : εἷς θύος’ εἶ ἡμέν δὲμας ἢδε καὶ ἐργά.

\(^{42}\) κ237-40: αὐτὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίων τε καὶ ἐκτινών, αὐτίκ’ ἐπείτα / ῥάβδῳ πεπληγμένα κατὰ συφοίστιν ἐργά. / οἱ δὲ σωμάτων μὲν ἔχον κεφαλαῖς φωνῆν τε ἑρμίς τε / καὶ δὲμας, αὐτάρ νοὸς ἦ ἐμπεδος ὡς τὸ πάρος πέρ.
Transformed by a witch, humans acquired the appearance of pigs but retained their ability to think. Nevertheless this is an exception, the split between appearance and thinking is the specific result of witchcraft. Our thesis remains that the non-separation between an exterior changing appearance and internal enduring attributes is the common experience. In fact, having established that *demas* evokes the experience of transformation and assimilation, produced by the body of an active individual, and where there is no split between an exterior appearance and internal fixed attributes, we must note that in all the passages *demas* has always a referent, it is the *demas* of someone and in that sense it is also experienced as the fixed appearance of a specific individual. *Demas* 'the build of the body' introduced us to the experience of a multiple assimilated and transformed body; this is the experience of the active and alive body. *Demas* is always the *demas* of someone, it has a name and in that sense is fixed. Nevertheless it is *demas* that evokes the experience of likeness as such. In that sense *demas* is experienced simultaneously as fixed and transformable. *Demas* evokes the experience of a trans-fixed appearance.

At the moment of death the appearance of the body is fixed, even the clothes remain the same.⁴³ The dead body becomes *soma* (σῶμα) 'corpse' before being transformed to *sema* (σῆμα)⁴⁴: a memorial with eternal visible fixity via the 'erection'

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⁴³ "The great importance of the moment of death is very much apparent in the description of the appearance of the dead with wounds exactly as they received them just before they died. Homer describes the warriors at the entrance to Hades still dressed in their bloody armor (Od.11.41)." BREMMER, I., 1983: *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul*, Princeton University Press, pp. 83.

⁴⁴ On the two senses of the word *sema*, i.e. an exceptional mark or aspect in its own right and as a sign or token of something else, see ZEITLIN, F. 1995: "Figuring Fidelity in Homer's Odyssey", *The Distaff Side: Representing the Female in Homer's Odyssey*, ed. B. Cohen, Oxford University Press, pp. 118.
(cheuo) of the tomb. Elpenor’s *sema* is marked with a thing put on the top, which should be understood as the extension of the body that survives after death, and not just as a symbol. The fixed body then is a dead body, a *soma*; as such it disappears by being buried or burned, and gives rise to the construction of the tomb. What remains of the individual, his *psyche*, enters a house, the *domos* of Hades, still having an appearance but not a *demas*. Dead people have a fixed appearance, they are *eidola*. Within the poems the *domos* of Hades occurs 27 times and evokes a state of fixity, the fixity of death, which cannot be separated from a specific construct: the ‘house’ of Hades. Furthermore, the term *dmethenta* (διηθέντα) ‘be prevailed upon, be tamed’ occurs twice in Iliad in relation to death, and denotes the conditions under which a body enters the house of Hades. Another term *dedmemenos* (δεδμημένος) ‘tamed’

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45 Elpenor whose *soma* lays unburied (σώμα δόμασιν, λ.53) asks Odysseus not only to bury him but to raise a *sema* as well: λόγῳ τε μοι χειρὶ σωμάτω, ἀνάθει μοι τῇ δομή αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκομμένῳ πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν, ταῦτα τε μοι τελέσαι πέτρης τ’ ἐπὶ τοίμῳ δρυμῶν, τ’ ἕως καὶ διὸς ἔρε σαν ἐν αὐτ’ ἐξουσία ἐπάρασιν). T. Vidler quotes from J. P. Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness*, “The body is not a screen between things and ourselves; it manifests only the individuality and the contingency of our original relation to instrumental-things... This is why my body always extends across the tool which it utilizes: it is at the end of the cane on which I lean against the earth; it is at the end of the telescope which shows me the stars; it is on the chair, in the whole house; for it is my adaptation to these tools.” VIDLER, T., op. cit., pp. 81.

46 It is in this direction that we propose to think of the experience of the relations between body and things within the poems.

47 Most of the passages where δόμον Ἀιδός εἶσαι, εἴν’ Ἀιδόσ δόμοισιν, Ἀιδόσ δόμως occur are formulaic. The 27 passages that refer to the house of Hades are: 1322, Η131, Α263, Ε457, Σ441, Σ52, 482, Ψ19, .103, 179, Ω246, 8834, ι524, ε175, 491, 512, 564, 169, 150, 627, ε208, ο350, υ208, ψ252, 322, ω204, 264.

48 ο99: struck down by your arrow, and laid on the sorrowful corpse-fire (οὗ βελέω θυμήτων παρθενή εκβάντε οἰκετεῖν), Β.66. But beaten down by my hands will pass through the gates of Hades (οὐλ’ ὑπ’ ἐμοί θυμήνων παίλεις Ἀιδόσ περῆσεσιν).
also indicates in σ236-8, the taming of the body in relation to death.\(^{49}\) Thus a certain connection – denied by Benveniste – between structure, construction and body taming seems to be in operation within the Homeric experience of the domos ‘house’ of Hades. But what about other houses?

3.3.2. **DOMOS**

‘House’ : Con-structure as Trans-fixity

Domos (δόμος) ‘house’ occurs 156 times in the Homeric text, 46 of them in Iliad, and 110 in Odyssey.\(^{50}\) Domos is fixed because – as demas does – it has always a name; it is always the house of someone, usually a man. Rarely the names of both a man and woman are used.\(^{51}\) The fixity that the name confers should be understood not only at the level of family structure but also at that of construction. In Priam’s domos description the building and the structure of his family cannot be separated.

\[\text{Z242-50: Now he entered the wonderfully built palace of Priam. This was fashioned with smooth-stone cloister walks, and within it were embodied fifty sleeping chambers of smoothed stone built so as to connect with each other, and within these slept each beside his own wedded wife, the sons of Priam. In the same inner court on the opposite side, to face these, lay the twelve close smooth-stone sleeping}\]

\(^{49}\) σ236-8: if only in our house, in such a manner, the suitors could be defeated and bow their heads, some in the courtyard and some inside the house, and the limbs be unstrung in each of them (οἶνοι νὲν μνησθῆρεν ἐν ἰμετέρωι δόμῳ / νεότοις κεφαλὰς δεμιμελοῦν, οἱ μὲν ἐν αὐλῇ, / οἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ δόμῳ, ἔλειψαν δὲ γυνὰ κεδάσαν).

\(^{50}\) We will not examine the term do (δῶ) – according to Benveniste – ‘house qua structure’, even though it would be interesting, it would be too lengthy. Besides, it is sufficient to show that domos is not experienced just as construction in order to uncover the philosophical presuppositions that underlie Benveniste’s distinction.

\(^{51}\) Of Hades and Persephone in ν491,564 / of Okeanos and Tethun in ξ202,303/ of Penelope and Telemachos in σ223,236.
chambers of his daughters built so as to connect with each other, and within these slept, each by his own modest wife, the lords of the daughters of Priam.\textsuperscript{52}

Usually the building construction is presented as securing the family structure which is housed within it. We propose instead that the experience of construction cannot be separated from that of ‘structure’. In fact, we invent a neologism here to name the paradoxical experience of domos as the experience of con-structure. We shall also argue that in the case of domos fixity and transformation are experienced simultaneously. The two terms are usually considered antithetical in relation to the experience of the house, and are divided in order to be accommodated within temporality (before-after), or topography (inside-outside). In order to mark the simultaneity of time and place which characterizes the Homeric experience of transformation and fixity, we shall name it – using another neologism – the experience of trans-fixity.

We need to clarify at this point that we are not concerned here to give an account of domos in order to understand the full range of references to the concept of ‘house’ in the epics. If that were the case, we would have to examine other Homeric terms such as oikos and consequently to include questions relevant to the mode of production or the social structure that supports the ‘house’.\textsuperscript{53} Our research on domos in no way exhausts the issue of the Homeric house. Rather, we are concerned to

\textsuperscript{52} Z242-50: ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ Πριάμου δόμοι περικαλλέ· ἰσσα ἢ ἔξοπτος αἰθούσης τετυμημένον· οὔσα ἐν ἀυτῇ παντὶ ἐνεστὶν θάλαμοι ἐξεστοὶ λίθοιο / πλησίον ἄλληλων δεδημμέναι, ἐνδέκα παιδεῖς / κοιμῶντο Πριάμου παρά μνησθής ἀλόχοισιν, / καπάνδροι δ' ἔτρεθθην ἐναντίοι ἐνδιδεθν' ἀείδης / δίδεκα' ἔσον τέγες θάλαμοι ἐξεστοὶ λίθοιο / πλησίον ἄλληλων δεδημμέναι, ἐνδέκα δὲ γαμβροί / κοιμῶντο Πριάμου παρ' αἰθούσῆς ἀλόχοισιν. Αὐτὸ πρέπει ὡς ἡ στροφή τῆς ἄλυπτης κατὰ τοὺς δομοὺς ἀλληλοί. Τοῦτο σηματικόν τοῦ τῶν γενέσεως ἀλογιστικόν. Καίνυ σηματικόν τοῦ τῶν γενέσεως ἀλογιστικόν. Εἰτὶ τὸν τῷ ἀγαθὸν τῆς ἀγαθῆς ἀλόχοισιν. Αὐτὸ μὲν τῆς ἀγαθῆς ἀλόχοισιν. Αὐτὸ δὴ τῆς ἀγαθῆς ἀλόχοισιν. Αὐτὸ τῆς ἀγαθῆς ἀλόχοισιν.

\textsuperscript{53} In this case, one of course has to examine the assumptions that underscore our general concept of ‘house’ and not to take it for granted and apply it to the Homeric text.
examine how the construction of the concept of 'house' arises out of the problem of construction. Ultimately, we restrict the research to the references which currently count as architectural elements. To do so we shall follow a specific strategy in approaching the term *domos*. Instead of examining all the 156 citations, we shall consider the passages where *domos* occurs, in the context of the other Homeric terms brought together under the common root *dem-*. Firstly we shall examine the terms which Benveniste uses in order to support his argument about *domos* as construction. We argue that this provides the evidence that the experience of construction and structure cannot be separated. It will also provide some indications in regard to the experience evoked by house understood as con-structure. These indications will be further explored in relation to the terms that – according to Benveniste – belong to the *dem-* 'house as familial structure'. Benveniste sustains his assumption about *domos* as construction by establishing an etymological relation with the verb of construction *demo* 'to build'. What we shall challenge is not the relation as such, but something never questioned because it seems 'natural' and hence taken for granted by Benveniste and others,54 that is, the strict technical sense of the verb *demo*. In fact, the kind of experience that *demo* evokes within the Homeric text constitutes the starting point of our inquiry on *domos*.

54 F. Adrados although he criticizes Benveniste's distinction between *domos* as construction and *domus* as familial structure, assumes the technical sense of *demo*. He writes: "I am aware that Benveniste separates Gr. δώμω from Lat. *domus* which he referred to the 'family', and that this has been accepted by, for example Chantraine, S.V. δώμω. Only this word would come from δεμω. This is impossible for there is total coincidence in the form and the reference to the inhabitants or wealth of the house as we have seen is normal in all these words." ADRADOS, F.R. 1990: "The Semantics of Oikos in the Odyssey", Ο Οικικός Οίκος: Από τά Πρακτικά τού Ε' Συνεδρίου γιά την Οδόσσεια, Ιθάκη, pp. 23.
‘To build’: Construction as Trans-fixity

Demo (δέμα) ‘to build’ occurs seven times in the poems, five in the active voice in Iliad and two in middle voice in Odyssey. All the passages in Iliad, with demo in the active voice, refer to the construction of fortifications, walls and towers which protect either the Greek camp or the city of Troy. Around the tomb where the dead bodies of the warriors lay, the Greeks built a wall to protect themselves from the enemy.

In all five passages there is no mention of the means of construction, but the construction is intended as eilar (εἶλαρ) ‘defense’ for the camp, or that which will keep the city arrektos (Ἀρρήκτος) ‘firm, indestructible’. Poseidon, the builder of Troy’s wall says: “Then I built a wall for the Trojans about their city, wide, and very splendid, so none could break into their city”. Thus the construction of a wall or a tower seems to fix the city or the camp, and protect it from destruction and dissolution. But the construction is experienced as also transformable, in the event by destruction. We can now better understand the term pukinos, (πῦκινος) ‘firm, compact, firmly put together’. The term occurs five times as an adjective attached to domos, and cannot be intended in a technical sense. In all the quotations, domos is

55 H435-440: (τείχος ἔθημαν πύργους θ' ὑψηλοῦς), 1349: (τείχος ἔθημεν), 332: (τείχος ἔθημεν).
56 H335-440: τῷμβον 8' ἄμφι πυρήν ένα χειροκτόνου εἴσαγαγόντες / ἄκριτων ἐκ πεδίων πολεί 8' αὐνόν δεῖσσαιν ἐκα / πύργους ὑψηλοὺς εἴλαρ νηῶν τε καὶ αὐνῶν.
57 In σαβα σον (θεοδιήμαν ἐκτο πυργον) the towers of Troy are been called theodmetoi ‘god-built’. The term occurs only once.
58 Ὑφαῖνους πολίν πέρι τείχος ἔθημα / εὑρέ τε καὶ μύλα καλόν, ἰν αὐνήκπους πόλις εἶν.
characterized as *pukinos* at the very moment that someone breaks in,\(^{59}\) at the very moment that its strength is broken. In conclusion, given the above-mentioned passages where *demo* occurs, there is no evidence of an experience of *demo* in a technical sense, but rather of trans-fixity. To see if this is always the case, and before we proceed to the examination of the middle voice, we will investigate some so called ‘technical’ terms such as *eudmetos* and *mesodme*.

**EUDMETOS / ‘well built’: Construction as Endurance**

*Eudmetos* (εὐδμετός) ‘well built’ occurs 11 times: in Iliad six times in relation to elements of the fortifications – *teichos* (τείχος) ‘wall’\(^{60}\) or *purgo* (πύργος) ‘tower’\(^{61}\) – and once to *bomos* (βομός) ‘altar’.\(^{62}\) In Odyssey it refers three times to the well-built *toichous* (τοίχοις) ‘walls’ of a house\(^{63}\) and once to a *bomos* (βομός) ‘stand for statues’.\(^{64}\) As far as fortifications are concerned, they are *eudmetoi* inasmuch as they survive the assaults of the enemy. Not all the walls of a house are *eudmetoi*. The walls of Odysseus’ house are so in a very specific context, for *eudmetoi* are the walls of Odysseus’ *megaron*. The suitors are trapped inside, with no chance to escape from these ‘well-built’ walls. The term is not an aesthetic term and we should understand it in its relation to *bomos* (βομός), the word that denotes both the ‘altar’ of sacrifice and

\(^{59}\) K267: breaking into the close-built house (τευξίνων βόμου ἀντιπαρθένος). Also in M301 and ζ134, occurs in the context of a simile that refers to the ‘breaking’ (προσπαθησα) of a wall. In η88, it refers to Alkinos’ house when Odysseus is about to break in with the help of Athena, and in η81 refers to Athena entering (θωρ) Erecheus’ house.

\(^{60}\) M36, 137, Φ516.

\(^{61}\) M154, Π700,Χ195.

\(^{62}\) A448.

\(^{63}\) υ302, χ24, 126.

\(^{64}\) η100.
the ‘stand’ for statues. It is the quality of bomos to secure the immobility of statues or the fixity of the ritual. Bomos is related to baino (βαίνω) ‘to go’, that not only indicates movement but also in the perfect tense (βεβηκα) has the sense of ‘being in a place’ and (ε ϑηκεναι) ‘stand fast’.

One might object that it is because of the technique of construction that the fortification, the house’s walls or the bomos produce the effects of endurance, stability or immobility. This is a ‘natural’ assumption for us to make, but even when there is evidence of the technique of construction – as we shall see later on – we cannot separate the technical aspect of a construction from the effects that it produces. Nonetheless, eudmetos ‘well-built’ in the Homeric context is not related to the aesthetic category of beautiful, but to the experience of fixity and endurance. In effect, eudmetos evokes the fixity of the construction experienced as that which produces effects of endurance: the durability of fortifications, the trapping of the suitors, the ritual of sacrifice, the immobility of the statues. But how can we understand, if not as a structural element in a technical sense, another Homeric term, related to the same I.E. root *dem-:

MESODME /‘central beam’ : Structural as Transformable Appearance

Mesodme (μεσόδιμη), occurs four times and only in Odyssey, twice in relation to the ship, and twice in relation to house. Benveniste argues that the term “designates the central beam that joins together two uprights, two pillars in the interior of the house.”65 Liddell-Scott on the other hand assigns to it two meanings: “1.properly something built in between; hence the part between two upright beams, a panel 2.the

cross plank of a ship, with a pole through it, for the mast.\textsuperscript{66} We cannot understand from the textual evidence what \textit{mesodme} should be. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the two formulaic passages which refer to the ship that \textit{mesodme} is an important element, because the mast is fitted to it.\textsuperscript{67} We must be careful not to project any distinction between structural and non-structural elements of a construction, as we do not know if there was such distinction, and further whether it corresponds to ours.\textsuperscript{68} The other two passages in Odyssey, where the term is presented in a formulaic way (τά7, ν.354: τοῖχοι καλαί τε μεσόδματα) give us the opportunity to understand \textit{mesodme} as one element among others in the ‘structure’ of \textit{domos}. In both passages, it involves an uncanny visual experience; the second actually being a vision. In τά7 Telemachos and Odysseus remove the weapons from \textit{megaron} during the night. Meanwhile Athena, unseen by Telemachos, illuminates the place with a lamp. Suddenly Telemachos says:

Father here is a great wonder that my eyes look on. Always it seems that the chamber walls, the handsome \textit{bases} and roof timbers of fit and tall columns sustaining them, shine in my eyes as if a fire were blazing (\textit{pyros aithomenoi}).\textsuperscript{69} There must be surely a god here\textsuperscript{70}

In \textit{δ}345-57 a seer foresees the slaughter of the suitors:

\textsuperscript{66} LIDDELL, G.H., and SCOTT, R., op. cit., s.v. \textit{μεσόδμη}.

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{φ}243, ε289: raising the mast pole made of fir, they set it upright in the hollow hole in the \textit{box} (ισον \textit{δ' eιλατείνων κολύς \textit{μεσόδμης} / στήριν υλεροκεντεί}).

\textsuperscript{68} The example of the Athenian trireme can highlight our point. For us today, the structure of a ship is constituted by the wooden beams on which subsequently the planks are fitted. The reconstruction of the Athenian trireme has shown, however that the planks were fitted together first and thus constituted what we call the structural part; this is in accordance with the Homeric description of a ship’s construction in Odyssey \textit{ε}241-61. See MORRISON, J., 1986: \textit{The Athenian trireme: the history and reconstruction of an ancient Greek warship}, J.S. Morrison, J.F. Coates eds., Cambridge University Press.

\textsuperscript{69} The same phrase occurs in the formulaic use of \textit{demas}.

\textsuperscript{70} τά6-40: \textit{δ' πάτερ, ἢ μέγα θάκυμα τοῦθ' ὄρθολυμοιτιν ὄρθομαι} / ἡμιης μοι τοῖχοι μεγάρων καλαί τε μεσόδματα / εἰλατέναι τε δοκοὶ καὶ κύκοις ὑψίοις ἔχοντες / φαίνοντε· ὄρθολυμοις ὡς εἰ πορὸς αἰθομένοι. / ἢ μάλα τες Ὑδόν.
In the suitors Pallas Athene stirred uncontrollable laughter, and addled their thinking. Now they laughed with jaws that were no longer their own. The meat they ate was a mess of blood, their eyes were bursting full of tears, and their laughter sounded like lamentation. Godlike Theoklymenos now spoke out among them. ‘Poor wretches, what evil has come on you? Your heads and faces and the knees underneath you are shrouded in night and darkness; a sound of wailing has broken out, your cheeks are covered with tears, and the walls bleed, and the fine supporting pillars. All the forecourt is huddled with ghosts, the yard is full of them as they flock down to the underworld and the darkness. The sun has perished out of the sky, and a foul mist has come over.’

Thus both passages where mesodme occurs describe a paradoxical experience in a domestic context. Something familiar and of a fixed appearance appears transformed, foreign, and uncanny.

71 οη345-57: μηνητρησθε δε Παλλας Αθηνη / αβσεστον γελης όρας, παρεπλυσθης δε νομης. / οι δ’ ήθη γνωθοισι γελαιων ἄλλωστεν, / αἰμομορφοται δε δη κρέας θησιον. ουτε δ’ ἄρα σφαλων δεκαροιφιν σπαλαντο, γιον δ’ ἄτετο θυμος. τοιος δε και μετεητει θεοκλημενος θεοειδης / ἀδειωι, τι κακον τοδε πάσχεται; γυ κε πεν ομαι / ελλυσατη κεφαλαι τε προσπατα τε νεφει τε γοινα, / αἰμωγη δε δεθη, διδακρυνται δε παρειαι, / αματη δ’ ἀρράβαται τοιχοι καλαι τε μεσόδιαι / ειδολων δε πλουν πρόθυρον, πλειη δε και απλη, / ιεμενων ἡρεμοδε υπο ζωφων ἡλιους δε / οφρανοθ ἐξαπόλαλε, καθη δ’ ἐπιδιδρομεν αγχος. Note that in both passages it is Athena who produces these phenomena, but the presence of a god has no metaphysical implications. We can probably connect Athena’s paradoxical birth, her transformations and her role as the god who has the knowledge of the art of construction. Consequently, Athena’s paradoxical status is related to the experience of construction as paradox.

72 It is well known that Freud situated the phenomenon of the uncanny – interpreting it as the return of the repressed – in the domestic and homely domain. A. Vidler, in a section of his book The Architectural Uncanny, entitle “Unhomely Houses”, traces the relation of the uncanny to the spatial and environmental by referring to nineteenth-century writings. He connects the manifestations of the uncanny as “a lurking unease...a sense of something new, foreign, and hostile invading an old, familiar customary world... eyes that see beyond appearance... an ambiguity between real world and dream...the presence of smoke, which makes obscure what otherwise would have seemed too clear” with “the role of architecture in staging the sensation and in acting as an instrument for its narrative and spatial manifestations”. Hence, the uncanny in these narratives is always a spatial uncanny, where temporality and spatiality collapse. VIDLER, A., op.cit., pp. 17-44. It is interesting that the Homeric uncanny – if we can name it thus without committing an anachronism – occurs in relation to what we call the paradoxical experience of ‘construction’ as con-structure and trans-fixity.
Mesodme is not experienced as a structural element, in the technical sense. However, it is a ‘structural’ element of the domos in the sense that it evokes the experience of something which appears both as fixed and transformable. We can then understand in the Homeric context a phrase which would otherwise be illogical: Mesodme is a structural element that is experienced as having a transformable appearance. In fact, a ‘purely technical’ term such as mesodme unravels the possibility of likeness and transformation experienced as uncanniness in relation to the structural elements of the house. Furthermore, it renders explicit the fact that fixity and endurance in relation to domos are produced as apparent, have the quality of appearance, inasmuch as the possibility of a transformation always remains also a visual experience. We can return now to the middle voice of the verb demo.

DEIMATO / ‘To Build’ : Construction and Structure

The term occurs only twice and only in Odyssey. In 9 there is a description of the foundation of the city of Phaikia by Nausithoos.

9: and driven a wall about the city, and built the houses, and made the temple of the gods, allotted the holdings. 73

The verb edeimato in the middle voice is not used in the above passage with the construction of the city’s wall – as it was the case with demo – but with the term oikos, the ‘household’, a term which has a wider extension. 74 The use of the verb

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73 9: ἠμφὶ δὲ τὸ Χρὸς ἐλαίσσε πόλει καὶ εἶδειματο ὀικος καὶ νησὶς στήσει θείων καὶ ἔδαφος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.
**dem**o in this case has to be understood as evoking the con-structuring of households including both the construction of the actual houses and the family structure. The other passage refers also to a kind of ‘building’. The use of the middle voice not only indicates a specific relation between building and builder, but evokes the experience of the con-structure.

**γ5-16**: He found him sitting in front, on the porch (prodomo), where the lofty enclosure had been built (dedmeto), in a place with a view on all sides, both large and handsome, cleared all about, and it was the swineherd himself who had built it (deimato), to hold the pigs of his absent master, far from his mistress and from aged Laertes. He made it with stones from the field, and topped it off with shrubbery. Outside he had driven posts in a full circle, to close it on all sides, set close together and thick, and dark of the oak, split out from the logs. **Inside (entosthen)** the enclosure made twelve pig pens next to each other, for his sows to sleep, in each of them fifty pigs who sleep on the ground were confined. These were the breeding females (theleiai), but the males (arsenes) lay outside (ektos). 76

In the above passage a technical description of **dem**o is presented. However, by constructing the enclosure, Eumaios simultaneously produces a structure. 77

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75 It is accepted within scholarship that “the middle voice express a connection between the subject and the action of the verb. Theoretically the middle involves the whole subject in the verb’s action and expresses the subject in some special relationship to himself... The middle voice has various meanings, the prevailing idea being self-advantage, that is, the subject of the verb is also the recipient or remoter object. Thus the chief uses are: 1. to do a thing for one’s-self, 2. To get a thing done for one’s-self 3. to do a thing to one’s-self.” ABBOTT, E. -MANSFIELD, E. D., 1982: A primer of Greek Grammar, Duckworth, pp. 65. In the case of deimato, the builder - who is always a man - is producing a construction and a structure to which he cannot be detached. See more further on.

76 **γ5-16**: Τὸν δ' ἦρ' ἐνὶ προδόμῳ ἔδρα ἤπεν, ἑνθα οἱ αὐλῆι / ὑπὴρε δείματο, περισχέτω ἐνὶ χώρᾳ, / καλὴ τε / μεγάλῃ τε, περιβρομοὶ  ἔνα με συμβεῖ / εὐτὸς δείμαθ' ἔστην ἀποχυμένου ἄνωκτος, / νόσφιν δεμπόλης καὶ / λαμπρατα ᾑραντος, / ἰσοτελεῖν ἑκάστου καὶ ἠθηρίκοις ἀείρεις ἐνθα καὶ ἑνθα / πυκνοὶοι καὶ ἑβερεταὶ, το μέλαν ἄδος ἀμυκεῖον, / ἐν τοιοῦτον ἐν τοιὴθ' αὐλῆι σφικοῖς διοκαθήκα τοίς / πληγάς ἄλληνι, εὐνοίας τοῖς ἐν ἐκάστῳ / παράκεντα στόιες χαματευνάδες ἐργαστώντο, / ἡθελει άκιδες τοίς δ' / ἀφενεῖς ἄτοχος ἔταυ.

77 It is worth noting that even a descriptive (in a technical sense) adjective such as koilos, ‘hollow’, when applied to domos, relates to its structure as much as to its construction. The term occurs once in relation to the domos of bees, who in M169-70: will not abandon the hollow house they have made, but stand up to men who come to destroy them, and fight for the sake of their children (οθ' ἀπολείπουσιν koilos βίων).
Construction produces a split between inside and outside which is gender-loaded. The exterior is masculine, while the interior becomes the scene of reproduction. This passage therefore illustrates that construction cannot be taken separately from structure. On the other hand the structure of the split between a female inside and a male outside appears to be produced by the construction. The passage does not give any means of challenging the naturalness of the distinction, or its apparent fixity. It should be noted that topography in general seems to secure and fix the structure. But we elaborate more on that later.

We move on now to examine another term of the same root, *prodomos* (πρόδομος) 'vestibule'. Benveniste argues that it is 'the front part of the domos', whereas *domos* is intended as a material construction. *Prodomos* accordingly, being a part of that construction, should be understood in a topographical sense as a specific location within the construction. However, *prodomos* evokes the experience of a specific modality, and secures a specifically *domestic* structure. The term occurs eight times, two in Iliad and six in Odyssey. Six of them are associated with sleep. Nonetheless, the people who sleep there are not the members of the *domos*, but visitors in a state of non-domestication. But we do not know if *prodomos* simply corresponds to a location within the house. Just because this is the way we link a

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άλλα μένοντες / ἅνδρας θηρητήρας ὀμόνονται περὶ τέκνων). From a similar point of view – and not as a descriptive technical adjective – the term υψηλός 'high' should be considered in relation to *domos*. 

71473, Ω673, 8302, ο5, υ1,143, two of which are formulae: Ω673, 8302: πρόδομο δόμον αυτόν κοιμήσατο. Note that the members of the house sleep in *thalamos*. The other two are Ξ5, and 0466. The first occurs in the above mentioned passage in connection with the construction of Eumaios' enclosure, whereas the second is associated with men's feasting, and is related to the status of feasting in Homer that it is examined in detail in the chapter on *Megaron*. It goes as follows: 0466-7: There in the forecourt she came upon the cups and the tables of men who had been feasting, associates of my father (ἐδει δ' ἐνι πρόδομῳ θησαυρὸς τῆς τραπέζας / ἄνδρεν δειτισμόνων, οί μεν πατέρ' ἑμφασένων).
name and a location in architecture today, it would be an anachronism to take it for
promised for the Homeric context. However, we do know that prodomos evokes a
specific condition, that of a sleeping body, a body which is dedmemeno 'tamed' by
sleep, and which although being inside the construction of domos does not belong to
its structure. If construction and structure cannot be separated in the Homeric text,
then prodomos denotes the state of fixity and transience, the modality through which
a sleeping (dedmemenos) visitor experiences the Homeric domos.

We can examine at this point another term from the root *dem- which is
conventionally interpreted as a case of homophony and related to both house and
body, construction and taming.

3.3.2.1. DEDMEMENOS

'Constructed - Tamed'

Dedmemenos (δεδμεμένος) is a passive participle interpreted, according to the context,
either as 'constructed' from the verb demo or as 'tamed' from damnemi. It occurs ten
times, five in Iliad and five in Odyssey. In two of them it occurs in the context of the
house and is translated as constructed, while in the rest it refers to the body which is
tamed by sleep, death or fatigue. Now in a grammatical system a verb has a nucleus
of meaning, and different forms such as tenses, voices, modes etc. But formal
grammar is an invention for the ordering of language, and it is obvious that grammar
is a system imposed upon the Homeric language. Although grammar is a successful
system of classification, there are always blind spots where language seems to exceed

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79 It is around this problem that the investigation of thalamos and megaron will revolve.
80 The term will be examined also in the chapter on thalamos because of its connection with sleep.
the system of classification imposed upon it, and so imply other possibilities. The case of homophony that we are discussing might well be one of them and might indicate that language can be something in excess of that which is described by formal grammatical description. If language can be thought of as establishing experience, rather than just representing it, then this homophony might indicate that the experience evoked by *dedmemenemos* is that of a state of fixity, which can be a result either of taming or of constructing. Certainly experience is constructed in language in ways which exceed the idea of words as elements of grammar and as bearers of signification. Moreover, there is another passive form *dedmeto* which also represents a case of homophony. It occurs five times in Odyssey. In three of them it is related to a domestic construction and in the other two to the taming of the body by death or under the power of a ruler.

Hence, in the Homeric context, being built was perhaps experienced as the same as being tamed. In the above forms *dedmemenemos* and *dedmeto*, the two verbs — *demo* and *damnemi* — seem to collapse or collide in Homeric Greek, though we still need two verbs when we translate them, even in modern Greek. We suppose that a construction is being built, whereas a body is being tamed. This is because we make a

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81 1184-5: there was a fenced yard *built* around with a high wall of grubbed-out boulders (απετέ δ’ αὐλή / ὑψηλά ἁλαμπρότερα καταρακτέσσοντα λίθοινα), 11425-6: a lofty bedchamber had been *built* for him, in a sheltered corner (θάλαμος περικολλός αὐλῆς / ὑψηλάς ἁλαμπρότερα περισκέπτα ἐνι χώρᾳ), 1136-7: the lofty [enclosure] had been *built*, in a place with view on all sides (αὐλή ὑψηλὰ ἁλαμπρότερα περισκέπτα ἐνι χώρᾳ).

82 11445-7: Now he flexed both knees and his ponderous hands; his very heart was *sick* with salt water, and all his flesh was swollen, and the sea water crusted stiffly in his mouth and nostrils, and with a terrible weariness fallen upon him he lay unable to breath or speak in his weakness (ὅτ’ ἔρεθεν ἁμωρόν γωνόντ’ ἐκάμψε / κεφάλας τε σπείρας, ὡλὶ γαρ ἁλαμπρότερα φιλόν κέρα / ὅδε δὲ χρόνο πάντα, θάλασσα δὲ κήποιε πόλη / ἐν στόμα τε βίναις ὅτ’ ὅ’ ἀπεισσοῦτος καὶ ἑναισθός / κεῖτ’ ὀλιγυππέλλαν, κάματος δὲ μιν αἰνος [ικανον]).

83 113304-5: Seven years he lived as lord over golden Mykene, after he killed Areteides, with the people *subjected* beneath him (ἐπτάτες δ’ ἤνασσον πολιοχρόσου Μυκήνης / κτείνας Ἀτρείδην, ἁλαμπρότερα χλως ὀπετανώ).
differentiation at the level of meaning, not at the level of experience. The experience of a state of fixity which is the result of taming or constructing can only be recovered through the invention of a common root, *dem-. Benveniste on the other hand refuses to see any relation at all between demo and damnemi, and expels taming outside 'civilization', when he writes:

“We must recognize another and quite different group. These are the noun forms or verbal forms of a root signifying 'to tame', Lat. domare, Gr. damao, a-damatos 'indomitable', etc. The sense has no connection with the idea of house, but with a quite different notion, and by a much more satisfactory link. Hittite presents a present tense damas- 'to do violence, to oppress, to subject'. It is from this sense that the meaning 'to tame' develops by specialization, and we know that the Gr. verb damao at first referred to taming of horses as practiced by equestrian people, a technical development of sense at first limited to a dialectal area, which cannot be attributed to the Indo-European period.”

Not only does Benveniste dismiss any connection with the idea of house (read ideal house) but he also refutes any relation with the Indo-European whatsoever. Taming is not appropriate to civilization, and thus must be construed as its 'outside'. But there is no 'outside' outside civilization; civilization produces the outside.

In sum, the verb demo 'to construct' should not be understood in a technical sense as 'putting one row over the top of another'. Furthermore, the forms of the active-middle-passive voice evoke different fields of experience in relation to the act of constructing. It is the middle voice which is used to denote the construction of the house, evoking a specific and inevitable relation, that of 'con-structuring', that is, the constructing and structuring simultaneously which creates no possibility of a dissociation between domos qua construction and domos qua structure. Deimato in relation to the house constitutes an institutional act, where the material construct can

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84 BENVENISTE, E., op.cit., pp. 250-1.
not be dissociated from the structure that it produces, whereas *eudmetos* and *mesodme* enable us to understand the structural fixity and transformation as undivided and related to appearance. The homophony of the passive forms *dedmemenos* and *dedmeto*, on the other hand, evoke the repressed relation of body, con-structure and taming, which appears to be experienced as a state of fixity.

*Damnemi* within Homeric text denotes the taming of the body, in the sense that refers to the conditions under which a body is overpowered in the context of a fight, weakened by fatigue or wine, or subjected to control of any kind. Does this mean that the transformability of the body is annihilated by taming, hence the body is being experienced in a state of fixity? This is the question to be confronted next. However, we shall not examine all the quotes in which *damnemi* occurs, but we shall restrict our research to the Homeric terms which relate to the female and the domestic, to disclose once again the paradoxical experience evoked by such term as *admes*.

**ADMES** / ‘The Untamed’ :- Tameable Female

Three terms within the Homeric epic, designate the ‘untamed’; *adamastos* *admeten*, and *admes*. The first occur only once and refers to Hades. Once again, we may note the relation between death, body and taming. Death, which makes a human body tamed (*dedmemenos*), remains itself *adamastos* (*αδάμαστος*) ‘untamed’. It is also

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85 Terms such as ἔδωκα, ἔδωκαν, ἔδωκασσα, ἔδωκαμεν, δεμόσιας, διμετίς, etc., occur 43 times in the epics in the above mentioned context.

86 1157-9: Let him give way. For Hades gives not way, and is pitiless, and therefore he among all the gods is most hateful to mortals (διὰ τής τοις ομοίων ἡ διάδομος τοίς διατριβήσεως). The term occurs in the context of a comparison. Agamemnon suggests that Achilles
worth noting that Night — associated with Sleep, who is pandamator (πανδαματωρ) ‘all-subduer’, ‘he who tames all bodies, mortal and immortal’; is called dmeitera (διμητερος) ‘tamer’.88

The second term admeten (αδμητην) ‘untamed’ occurs in relation to cows90 mares,91 and jennies.91 It is quite interesting that all the animals are of female gender, and presented as gifts to gods, or as prizes for the winners of games (agon) — always of male gender. The state of being untamed makes these animals precious. They are called untamed right to the very moment when they will be tamed by the winner, or sacrificed to gods. The term admeten always already entails the dmesin (δησιν) ‘taming’, a male affair, and implies a force exercised upon the body.

should give way (δμηθετο) his anger because only death is untamed. Achilles then should be tamed under the power of Agamemnon who is not only a king but elder as well.

87 Sleep is called pandamator twice: Ω5, i373: sleep who subdues all come[s] over him (δανος θρει πανδαματωρ)

88 It occurs only once in ά259, where Night exercised her power on Zeus to rescue Sleep. Note that both Sleep and Hades are masculine, whereas Night is feminine.

89 k292-3 and γ382-3: and I will sacrifice you a yearling cow, with wide forehead, unbroken, one no man has ever led under the yoke yet. (και δ' οδ έργα λεξι βοών ην ιν ευρωμέσας, / αδμητην, ήν οδ και οπο θην ήγεσεν ηνήρ).
90 ι265-6: and for the second [prize] he set forth a six-year-old unbroken mare who carried a mule foal within her. (και πα τό δευτέρο ἑπτάνυν δήκεν / εξέτει' αδμητην βρέφος ημιονον κυκλύσαν). Reproductive ability makes females precious and tameable.

91 ι654-5: [He set forth the prizes] and tethered there a hard-working six-year-old unbroken jenny, the kind that is hardest to break (ἐμίονον ταλαγρόν δην χαπαδης' εν δηνον / εξέτε' αδμητην, ή τ' αλγήσῃ δωμασασαθαι).
6636-7: I have a dozen horses, mares, and suckling from them hard-working unbroken [jennies]; I would like to break one in, taking it from the others (δδεκα θηλειοι, οι δ' ημιοι ταλαγροι / αδμητες, κεν τιν' ελασομένους δωμασασαθην).
92 Occurs only once in relation to horses’ taming by men in ι476.
The third term *admes* (ἀδμης) ‘untamed’ is used in relation to a young virgin, Nausika, at the moment that she seeks a husband, that is, to be tamed. 93 Young females are considered wild, in need of the male taming. Klytaimnæstra is not a young virgin, though Aigisthos needs to ‘tame’ (damnai: δαμηναί) her in order to ‘take her into his domos’. 94 Damnemi (δαμνημι) ‘to tame’ is a presupposition for the structure of domos, in the sense that there is no domos without a marriage, so much so that damnemi becomes synonymous with to ‘give as wife’. 95 However it is in the context of marriage, that is in the context of structuring domos, that women are experienced as untamed. Admes therefore evokes the experience of paradox, where women are experienced simultaneously as untamed / unfixed and capable of transformation / amenable to fixity. Woman’s experience as admes entails her appearance

93 Nausika is called parthenos admes (παρθενὸς ἀδμης) ‘untamed virgin’ twice (ξ109 and 228), in the context of meeting Odysseus, whom she considers a possible husband. The same approach to virginity continues in later times as H. King argues: “Children, for the Greeks, are by nature wild (Plato). In particular, the ‘parthenos’, ‘childless, unmarried, yet of the age of marriage’, is untamed (admes) and must be domesticated before it is even possible for a man to carry on a conversation with her (Xenophon Oeconomicus, 7,10: use of tithaseuein). A girl’s upbringing is represented as the “taming” or “breaking in” of a filly, and marriage is the end of this process; marriage also opens the process of submission to the yoke of Aphrodite.” pp. 111. KING, H. 1993: “Bound to Bleed: Artemis and Greek Women”, Images of Women in Antiquity, eds. A. Cameron and A. Kuhrt, Routledge, pp. 109-27.

94 γ264-71: ἀνήγεται ὡς δῆμονδε. Only when Klytaimnæstra agrees to follow him, is Aigisthos able to eliminate the guardian that her husband had appointed to watch on her. This a sign that taming can have the woman’s consent. In that sense it is not always experienced by women as an act of violence in relation to marriage in Homer. Consider the possibility that males accentuate the role of taming, to balance the power that women acquire by structuring the family.

95 Τὸ: ὄνοις δ' ἐλεύθεροι διαμένε. In the above passages it is implied that the women do not consent to the taming and are rather forced to it, in the first instance by enemies, whereas in the second Thetis explicitly states that it was against her will and she was forced by Zeus to marry a mortal.
simultaneously as changeable and fixable, untamed and tameable, in the domestic context.

_Damar_ and _Despoina_ – the two terms that we shall examine next – name the woman as wife, and according to Benveniste stem from the root *dem-* that denotes the familial structure. This will give us the opportunity to explore the kind of experience evoked by the relationship between woman and house, i.e., that of woman as housed.

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**DAMAR - DESPOINA / 'Wife - Mistress of the house': Supplement as Structural**

"In social terms, women can be put under the control of men, being assigned a specific space within male culture and society where they can give birth, weave and cook, while being excluded from economic and political spheres. The Greek word for woman _gyne_, is also the word for 'wife', and it was a wife and mother that woman was most fully brought into male culture. Her domestication could be so complete that she would express and enforce the male model of society, including the reason for her own entry into it, yet even here the risk that she would remain wild remains...The Greeks saw the woman as a contrast between the undisciplined threat to social order and the controlled, reproductive _gyne_. The presentation of female maturation as a movement from the first to the second expresses the hope that women can safely incorporated into society in order to reproduce it."

In the above quote, typical of the way scholarship approaches the housing of gender, a topography of the domestic outside-inside, seems to secure and even produce the distinction between outside: untamed-inside: tamed. The female⁹⁷ is called _admes_ outside or _damar despoina_ inside the domestic. However, as in the case of _admes_, we shall show that _despoina_ and _damar_ evoke the experience of the contradictions in

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⁹⁶ KING, H., _op. cit._, pp. 110 and 124.

⁹⁷ We probably need to restate here that gender is experienced differently in different contexts. There is no unified experience of the female, but gender is produced differently in relation to _epos, choros/e, domos, thalamos, megaron and thure._
relation to the female gender which is produced as fixed by the topographical distinctions.

**DESPOINA**

Benveniste relates the terms despotes (δεσπότης) ‘master of the house’ and despoina (δεσποίνα) ‘mistress of the house’ with the root *dem that denotes “the house qua family”. However, the masculine form despotes (δεσπότης) ‘master of the house’ is nowhere used in the poems. The term anax (αναξ) ‘master, ruler’ is used instead, which designates the holder of absolute power, in a sense that is not related to a topographical or other domain. A man can be the anax of his army, as much as of his domos. The mastery, the masculine power over the house, is linguistically detached from domos. That is to say, man does not partake in the experience of contradictions structuring the domestic. His mastery is always experienced as fixed,

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98 “These two Greek compounds were no longer analyzable in historical times, but the elements are easily recognizable, and their combinations also occur elsewhere: -potes (-πότης) and -poina (-ποίνα) respectively the ancient masculine form *poti ‘master’ and the ancient, archaic feminine *potnya ‘mistress’... Now this archaic compound *dem(s)-poti- ‘master of the house’ refers in the first component to ‘the house qua family and not to the ‘house qua construction’.” BENVENISTE, E., op. cit., pp. 242, 249.

99 Benveniste writes: “It is true that the sense of ‘master of the house’ has been effaced, or at least weakened, in Greek, where despotes signified at an early date ‘master’ in general, and not only of the house, so much so that in the New Testament it was felt necessary to create oiko-despotes to express ‘master of the house’. This was because in despotes the word for ‘house’ was not felt any more. As early as Attic prose we find phrases like oikos, or oikia δεσπότης ‘despotes of the oikos, the oikia’, when he exercises his authority within the house.” Ibid, pp. 248-9.

100 According to Benveniste “the title of wanaks denotes an absolute quality” in both Mycenaean and the Homeric epic : “the wanaks is regarded as the holder of royal power, even we cannot define the extend of his territory...wanaks is also a divine qualification reserved for the highest of gods...The feminine (w)anassa is the epithet of goddesses like Demeter and Athena. Further, when Ulysses sees Nausicaa for the first time he addresses her thus, believing her to be a goddess.” BENVENISTE, E., op.cit., pp. 319, 20.
and has no need to be secured by topographical distinctions. He is the *anax* even when far away. In that sense, whereas he is able to move freely out of the house, he can never be separated from it. Furthermore, he is the one that provides *domos* with fixity by giving it his name. *Domos* – as much as *demas* – has always a name, but this name is always the name of its *anax*, who is the possessor and the ruler.

A woman on the other hand can only be a mistress of her house. Thus, *despoina* seems to designate a relation of fixity and supplementarity between wife and *domos*. But is it only so? The feminine term *despoina* occurs in Odyssey only nine times and shows what kind of mastery is attributed to a wife. The term is applied six times to Penelope, twice to Arete and once to the wife of Nestor. In the absence of Odysseus it is Penelope, his wife, who controls the house. Penelope is called *despoina* four times in relation to Eumaios, the swine-herd. In all of them her mastery over Odysseus’ *domos* is undermined. Eumaios is only a ‘slave’, but takes advantage of the absence of his *anax* and despite the presence of his *despoina* not only constructs a shelter for his pigs, but acquires property, and buys a slave for himself. So the presence of the mistress does not prevent a male slave becoming a master himself, in the sense of constructing and possessing. In three other passages, Eumaios points out

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101 In fact, it is the man that is immobile, fixed to the house – in the sense of both family and building. The woman is mobile. Her ‘natural’ immobility in the interior is enforced in the face of her mobility between houses. The apparent mobility of the man is produced by the confinement of the woman, who is, as Ann Carson argues, at once necessary to the maintenance of the house and the greatest threat to it.” WIGLEY, M., “Untitled: The Housing of Gender”, op. cit., pp. 336.

102 The two passages are formulaic: 8-9: [it was Eumaios] who had built it, to hold the pigs of his absent master, far from his mistress and from aged Laertes ([Ἐμαίος] δὲ ἑαυτῷ δοκοὶκομμένον ἀνάκτος / νόσφαιν δεκατοικός καὶ Ἀδρίαπο γέροντος], 450-1: [a man whom the swineherd] owned himself by himself and apart from his absent master, and independently of his mistress and aged Laertes (ἐν τῷ συμβώσις ὁ ἀνάκτος κτήσεω οἷς ἀναμοίρῳ ἀνάκτος, / νόσφαιν δεκατοικός καὶ Ἀδρίαπο γέροντος). Eumaios bought Μεσαῖος [the name of the servant] with his own money (κτέσσασιν ἐκσυν).
her weakness and undermines her ability to act as a proper master within the domos. However, for a female slave such as Eurekleia, Penelope is a despoina, and Odysseus himself recognizes the power of his wife as despoina over the female slaves of the domos, in his absence. Nevertheless, he is the one who will punish them after the slaughter of the suitors. Penelope as despoina appears to supplementing (not very successfully in this case) the power of the husband, when he is away.

Let us see now the other three passages. We do not know anything about Nestor’s wife, but Arete is presented in the poem as having equal or even more power than her husband. We learn from the passage that she comes from the same family as her husband and actually is his niece. However, both Alkinoos’ and Nestor’s wives are called despoina in two formulaic passages, in the context of sharing the bed with their husbands. The passages go like this:

103 4127: and any vagrant who makes his way to the land of Ithaka goes to my mistress and babbles his lies to her, and she then receives him well and entertains him and takes him everything (δς δε κ’ ἄλλης τοις θάκης ἐς δήμων ἱκται, ἐς δεποινών ἐμην ὀποτήπερ βάζειν / ἡ δ’ ἐδεξαμένη φιλεῖ καὶ ἐκαστα μεταλλη, o374-7: but there is no sweet occasion now to hear from my mistress in word or fact, since the evil has fallen upon my our household, these overbearing men, and greatly the serving people miss the talk in their mistress’ presence (ἐκ δ’ ἄρα δεποινῆς οὖ μετίλλον ἐστίν ἀκούσαι / οὕτ’ ἐτος ὡς τι ἐργον, ἐπὶ κακόν ἐμασκόν οἶκα, ἐνδήρες ὑπερθνον μέγα δὲ δήμῳς κυρέουσιν / ἀντία δεποινῆς φάσθαι ).

104 ψ1-2: The old woman, laughing loudly, went to the upper chamber to tell her mistress that her beloved husband was inside the house (Γρηγός δ’ εἰς ὑπερή οἰκεί· ἀνεβήσετο καυχαλόωσα, / δεποινή ἐρέσεσα φιλόν πόσιν ἐνδόν ἐδωται).

105 ρ83: [woman] beware of your mistress, who may grow angry with you and hate you. Or Odysseus may come back (γόνατ... μὴ πάς τοι δεποινῆς κοσμοσμένη χαλεπήν / ἢ Ὀδύσσεως ἐλην).

106 ρ53-5: First of all you will find the mistress there in her palace. Arete is the name she is called, and she comes of the same forebears as in fact produced the king Alkinoos (δεποινῶν μὲν πρῶτα κιρχάει ἐν μεγάρισιν / Ἀρρη θ’ ὄνομ’ ἐστίν ἐκάλυμον, ἐς δε τοις / τὰν αὐτὰν, οἱ περ τέκνον ἀλκίνων βασιλῆ). The passage continues and exposes in detail their genealogical relation.
Alkinoos went to bed in the inner room of the high house, and at his side the lady his wife served as bedfellow.\textsuperscript{107}

Nestor himself slept in the inner room of the high house, and at his side the lady his wife served as bedfellow.\textsuperscript{108}

The term used for ‘bed’ is \textit{lechos (λέχος)} while the word \textit{despoina} is accompanied by \textit{alochos (αλοχος)} ‘wife’. F. Zeitlin writes:

“\textit{lechos} has an institutional meaning. The \textit{lechos} is the basis of a woman’s legitimate status as a wife... She is her husband’s \textit{alochos}, one who shares the same bed... Loraux, correctly argues for the relation between \textit{lechos} and \textit{lochos} (of childbirth), as signifying the connection between sex and reproduction in legitimating the status of the wife (\textit{alochos}).”\textsuperscript{109}

Thus, the woman as wife acquires power by her relation to reproduction, since reproduction forms the basis for the institution of marriage. Moreover, marriage constitutes the presupposition for the construction and the structure of any \textit{domos}. In this context, \textit{despoina} evokes the experience of the supplementarity that is also structural. \textit{Despoina} ‘the mistress of the house’ appears simultaneously as supplement to and producer of power. \textit{Despoina} partakes of the experience of \textit{domos} in the sense that both terms evoke the simultaneous experience of a ‘contradiction’, in the sense that the relation between \textit{despoina} and \textit{domos} can never be that of fixity.

\textit{Despoina} evokes the experience of a feminine mastery that appears both to structure and supplement \textit{domos}. As a supplement it can be detached from the \textit{domos} but as structural must remain fixed. That leads us to the second term for the wife, \textit{damar}. \textit{Damar} will provide us with more clues to understand the experience of fixity and transience of the wife in relation to \textit{domos}.

\textsuperscript{107} \texttt{η347.8: Αλκίνοος δ’ ἔρησε λέχος δύτων ὁμήλιον, πάρ δὲ γυνὴ δέσποινα λέχος πόρσυνε καὶ εἰνήν.}

\textsuperscript{108} \texttt{γ402.4: Νέστωρ... δ’ ἀυτὸ καθεδέε μνῆμον ὁμήλιον, το δ’ ἀλόχος δέσποινα λέχος πόρσυνε καὶ εἰνήν.}

\textsuperscript{109} \texttt{ZEITLIN, F., op. cit., pp.125 and 148/n.25.}
DAMAR

For Benveniste “not only despotes but also damar is no longer analysable in Greek itself, a word which denotes ‘she who administers the house’. ”\textsuperscript{110} He argues that it stems from the same root *dem- which denotes the house as family. He writes: “It is generally accepted that damar (δαμαρ) ‘legitimate wife’ belongs to the same word-family and is analyzed into dam- ‘house’, and -ar from the root of ἀρασκεύω ‘to order, to arrange’.”\textsuperscript{111} Hoffman\textsuperscript{112} and Chantraine accept Benveniste’s etymology. Chantraine notes that in Homer the term that denotes the legitimate wife is always accompanied by the name of the husband.\textsuperscript{113} For Hesychius the term designates the woman who has a husband.\textsuperscript{114} Liddell-Scott\textsuperscript{115} on the other hand as well as the Homeric dictionary\textsuperscript{116} proposes a connection with damnemi ‘to tame’. We do not intend to arbitrate between the etymologies; though it should be noted that, as an examination of the passages shows, there is no indication whatsoever in the Homeric text of damar as ‘she who administers the house’. Benveniste’s etymology might apply to the wife as depicted within Xenophon’s Oeconomicus. If there is any relation

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid, pp. 249.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid, pp. 242.

\textsuperscript{112} HOFMANN, J.B., 1950: Eymologishes Wörterbuch des Griechischen, München, Greek translation by A. Papanikolaou, Athens, 1974, s.v. δαμαρ.

\textsuperscript{113} CHANTRAINE, P., op.cit., s.v. δαμαρ: “Terme archaïque qui désigne l’ épouse légitime, toujours accompagné du nom du mari chez Hom.”

\textsuperscript{114} HESYCHIUS, 1953: Alexadrimi Lexicon, Hauniae, Ejnar Munksgaard, s.v. δαμαρ: γυνΗ... ξονοσα δνος (Ξ 503)”

\textsuperscript{115} LIDDELL, G.H., and SCOTT, R., op.cit., s.v. δαμαρ.

\textsuperscript{116} AUTENRIETH, G., op.cit., s.v. δαμαρ, δωκ.”
to the Homeric use of *ararisko* as ‘to fit together’¹¹⁷ then *damar* should be understood not as ‘she who arranges domos’¹¹⁸ but rather: ‘she who is fitted to it’.

*Damar* occurs two times in the Iliad and three in the Odyssey. In all passages the term *damar* is always accompanied by the name of the husband. She is always the wife of someone, and seems to have the status of being a possession. In Γ122-4, not only the name of the husband but also the name of the father is mentioned as well.

Γ122-4: the wife of Antenor’s son, whom strong Helikaon wed, the son of Antenor, Laodike, loveliest looking of all the daughters of Priam.¹¹⁹

It should be noted that: “Marriage itself was seen as the giving of the woman by one lord, her father, to another, her husband; here [in Homer] as in Athens in the classical period the woman was the passive object of the marriage, something exchanged between two lords.”¹²⁰ Her status as possession is reinforced when *damar* is mentioned in the context of the possessions of *domos*¹²¹ in δ126-7: Alkandre, the wife of Polybos, who lived in Egyptian Thebes, where the greatest number of goods are

¹¹⁷ See LIDDELL, G.H., and SCOTT, R., also AUTENRIETH, G., op.cit., s.v. άραρίσκω.

¹¹⁸ The closest to a sense of ordering *domos* in Homer is evoked by the term *diakosmeo* ‘put in order’. It occurs only once (ξ1440) in relation to *domos* it is the task of female servants and not of the wife. The context to which the term occurs is interesting because it is by ‘got all the house back in order’ (πάντας δόμους διακοσμήσασθαι) that any the traces of the suitors’ slaughter within Odysseus *domos* is being eliminated.

¹¹⁹ Γ122-4: Αντινορίδου δικαρτή, την Αντινορίδης εἶχε κρείαν Ἐλλικήν / Λαοδίκην, Πριάμου θυγατρῶν εἶδος ἄδηστην.

¹²⁰ BOOTH, W.J. op.cit., pp. 18.

¹²¹ In seven passages – three in Iliad and four in Odyssey – *domos* is related to the wealth and specifically to *Kiemata* ‘possession’ Ι382, 8127, § 291. and *keimeilia* ‘possessions which were stored in chests’, Α132, Σ390, or just to property that ‘lays’ *keitai* ι254, 257. For more on this kind of property see chapter on *thalamos*.
stored in the houses.\textsuperscript{122} In the case of the husband’s death \textit{damar} is mentioned in relation to her parents in law:

\textsuperscript{122} 8126-7: Αλκάνθρη, Πολύβοιο δάμαρ, δε ένατ' ενι θήβης / Αγιοτήτης, δή πλείστα δόμωις εν κτήματα κείται.

\textsuperscript{123} \textsuperscript{125} Domos hemiteles occurs only once: B700-1 whose wife (alochos), cheeks torn from grief, was left behind in Phylake and marriage half completed; a Dardanian man had killed him (τον δ' και ἀμφιδροφ languors φυλάκη ἔλεητο / και δόμος ἡμιτελής, τόν δ' ἐκτανε Δάρδανος ἄνηρ).

\textsuperscript{126} The ‘bringing up’ \textit{trepho} (τρέφω) of the children is always implied but never stated in relation to \textit{domos} except of the cases of ‘anomaly’ that is when children are being raised in another \textit{domos} from which they originate and sometimes are being incorporated to reinforce this new \textit{domos} via marriage. \textit{Trepho} occurs in relation to \textit{domos} within the following passages: Λ223, Ν466, Ε202,\textsuperscript{303}, Ο479, Ψ84.

\textsuperscript{127} 8288-90: Κτῆσιςπος... / δ' δ' τοι κτέτεσσι πεποίθος πατρός ξόλο / μισσετ' 'Οδυσσῆς δήν οἰχομένου \textit{δήμαρτα}.  

\textit{Damar} forms part of the fixed structure of \textit{domos}, a structure that under such circumstances, such as the death of the master, would be dissolved. With the death of the husband \textit{domos} becomes \textit{hemiteles} (ἡμιτελής) ‘half-complete, desolate’, there is now no possibility of reproduction\textsuperscript{124} and thus survival.\textsuperscript{125}

The remain two passages are formulaic and refer to Penelope. The context of both is the courting of Penelope by the suitors: \textsuperscript{126} We were courting the \textit{wife} of Odysseus, who had been long gone.\textsuperscript{126} The richest of the suitors Ktesippos, who hopes to acquire her:

\textsuperscript{126} u288-90: Ktesippos...in the confidence of his amazing possessions, courted the \textit{wife} of Odysseus, who had been so long absent.
In effect, Penelope is called Odysseus’ *damar*, fitted to his *domos* – as his property is – in the very context of becoming the wife of someone else. In that sense *damar* evokes the experience of wife as both fitted to the structure of her husband’s *domos*, and as that which would transform the structure of his *domos*. Once again the wife is experienced as both supplementing and structuring of *domos*. We shall proceed now to another term that applies to the servants within *domos*:

**DMOS/DMOE**: ‘He/she that belongs [as both member and property] to the house.’

According to Benveniste the two terms: “…*dmos* (διώκε) ‘the servant, the slave’, *dmoe* (διώκη) ‘the female servant’, that is those who form part of the household”, are associated with the root *dem* ‘house qua family’. Chantraine does not discard Benveniste’s etymology but considers the possibility of a connection with *damnemi* ‘to tame’, since as he argues, it fits better in certain Homeric formulas. He refers to the α397-8, Σ398 passages where the term *λήψας το ‘carry off as booty’* is used, and includes the acquisition of servants. We can also add here the formulaic verse in which the status of slaves as property in relation to the house (*doma*) appears.

However, our problem is not to choose between Benveniste’s and Chantraine’s approaches but to understand the pitfalls of a ‘rational way’ of thinking when dealing with the experience of paradox.

128 We can mention here two passages in which two wives undo the structure of *domos* by having sexual intercourse [even giving birth B512] in secret (θ268) – not of course with their husbands though within his *domos*.

129 BENVENISTE, E., op.cit., pp. 249.

130 CHANTRAINE, P., op.cit., s.v. διώκε.

131 Τ333, η225, ε526: κτήσιν ἐμὴν διμῶς τε και ὑπηρεφές μέγα δώμα.
We shall not examine the passages in detail where the terms occur. We shall only refer to a secondary source. W. J. Booth writes on the relation between master and servants in Homer:

“To be such a lord meant to rule over possessions but as well over the persons, free and unfree of the household... Odysseus without mercy, put to death twelve of the servants who had shared his household. Those unfree servants or slaves are property... Though they were considered as property to be given away, for example, as a prize for winning a race (Iliad 23.262) - it would be wrong to think that they were therefore considered as mere things, radically inferior in their person to the free household members... This [is] to us [a] so paradoxical combination of the treatment of slaves as property and the recognition of them as persons... To be a member of a household, then, is to be enmeshed in a philia, to belong to and to recognize this community as one’s own and to have a place in the oikos hierarchy.”

What Booth refers to as paradoxical combination is the experience that the term domos\(e\) evokes, that is, the experience of slaves that appear to be both exchangeable and fixed, fixed in the sense of belonging to the domestic. It is worth recalling that to be philos of someone should be understood in the sense of being an extension of another body, without acquiring the status of property. We should understand the experience of domos\(e\) as involving slaves both as members and belongings of the domos, where being a member of the household is to be a member of the master’s or the mistress’s own body. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to separate the contradictory experience of the slaves via the ‘inside-outside’ topography. Hence, a

132 Though it would be very interesting it would exceed the purpose of the chapter. We shall make only one remark that is relevant to our research. Among the duties of the domoi is to wash and cloth the body of others. (Ω841 and in a formulaic repetition in Ω2586, 849, 8454, p88: τὸν δ’ ἐπει ὁδὸν ὁμοίως λαθοσι καὶ κρίθην ἐλαίον / ἄμφοτέρων καὶ μὲν χρίσαντος καὶ καλύνει τὸν ἄλον ὡς χιτῶνος) Hence, they are involved in the transformation of the body because as we have seen washing is a means of transforming the body sometimes beyond recognition.

133 BOOTH, W.J., op. cit., pp. 18, 19, 20.

134 See chapter on megaron.
slave within *domos* should be considered as a member, whereas he becomes exchangeable property when moved outside, to be sold or given away. However, the terms *domos/e* as such evokes the experience of the contradiction, which seems to be split by the ‘separation’ effect of topographical distinction inside/outside.

3.3.2.2. ENDON

‘Inside’ as Structure

Benveniste argues that the opposition inside-outside is produced within the term *domus* which designates “home as a social entity.” Although he does not refer to the Homeric term *endon* translated either as ‘inside’ or as ‘in the house, at home’, he considers that the Homeric term *do* ‘house qua familial structure’, designates the house as interior. Benveniste’s distinction between construction and structure, enables him to consider the structure always as interior, which is produced by the construction. As we shall see, it is only within a definite philosophical operation, that structure comes to be identified with interiority and in a relation of opposition to an outside. It would seem indeed that the philosophical concept of ‘structure’ produces the topographical distinction of inside-outside, where the interior is conceived as the domain of fixity, hence proper to the feminine taming. Is the experience of

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135 “We must therefore separate Gr. *domos* ‘building, house’ and Lat. *domus*, which designates not an edifice, but the ‘home’ as a social entity, whose incarnation is the *dominus*. Consequently, *domus* entered into contrasting pairs, the second term of which designates what is outside the circle of the home: *domi militiaeque, domi: peregre, domesticus; rusticus*, the couple *domi; foris* ‘home-outside’ shows that the word *dhwur-* ‘door’ designated the frontier, seen from inside, between the inside and the outside world. BENVENISTE, E., op.cit., pp. 239.
‘interior’ within the Homeric text actually different from this? We shall argue that whereas in philosophy, ‘structure’ is conceived as interior in a topographical sense, in the Homeric text, *endon* is experienced as ‘structure’, i.e., as paradox, in the sense that is experienced as trans-fixity. Hence *endon* does not denote the ‘inside’ as topography but it evokes the experience of ‘inside’ as trans-fixity, in relation to both Homeric house and ‘body’.

*Endon* (ἐνδόν) ‘inside’, occurs 54 times in the Homeric text, 16 of them in Iliad and 38 in Odyssey. In most there is a reference to the ‘inside’ of a dwelling, being that a house, Eumaios’ hut or Kuklop’s cave. However, nine passages relate to the ‘inside’ of the ‘body’, in particular to *phrenes* (φρένας) ‘lungs’, *k radie* (κραδίη) ‘heart’, and *enkephalos* (ἐγκέφαλος) ‘brain’. Might it be then that in the Homeric text, the ‘body’ is experienced as having an interior other than the organic? We have already argued in relation to *phrenes* ‘lungs’, how the mental, the psychological and the organic are interwoven and as such constitute the experience of what we call

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136 We translate *endon* as interior, and we do not include in our examination other Homeric terms such as, *entos* (ἐντός) ‘inside’ or *entosthen* (ἐντοσθέν) ‘from within’, which are usually in the text in relation to *ektos* (ἐκτός) ‘out of’, *ektosthen* (ἐκτοσθέν) ‘from without’.

137 Note that the related terms *endothi* (ἐνδόθι) ‘within’ and *endothen* (ἐνδόθεν) ‘from within’ refer to both house and body as well.

138 ἀπεικόνισεν γὰρ τὴν ζωὴν τοῦ κυρίου σοῦ γιὰ ἅπαν τὸν χαράξοντα πρὸς τὸν πνεῦμα τοῦ κυρίου σοῦ (κραδίη) τοῖς εὐδοκοὶ καὶ τῷ μυαλῷ σοῦ ἐν μνεία καὶ κατὰ τὸν χώρον τοῦ κυρίου σοῦ (κραδίη) τοῖς εὐδοκοὶ καὶ τῷ μυαλῷ σοῦ (κραδίη).

139 Occurs twice in a simile in vii-16: the heart was growling within him (ἐπὶ τὸ καρδιὰ πέπλυκτον καὶ καταβίβάσθηκεν μὲν μέμακτον).

140 Occurs three times in a formulaic way in A97-8, M185-6, Y399-400: and the inward brain was all spattered forth. So he beat him down in his fury (ἐγκέφαλος ἐπὶ ἐνδόν ἐπάχακτον νάμασθαι δε μὲν μεμακτείν).

141 J. Redfield writes: “the interior I is none other that the organic I.” REDFIELD, J. *Le Sentiment Homerique du Moi*, pp. 100.
the multiple body.\textsuperscript{142} The same is valid for \textit{kradie} ‘heart’.\textsuperscript{143} The third term \textit{enkephalos} ‘brain’ occurs in relation to the body’s taming (\textit{damasse}). It is always the scattering of the brain that brings the fixity of death, so the brain is clearly related to the changing feature of life. Nonetheless, the body is always experienced as multiple and transfixed when alive. In fact, we have to understand that the category of the organic is not a relevant category in relation to the Homeric body, and that \textit{endon} does not designate the interior as topography.

If a body is alive, \textit{endon} is experienced as its multiplicity and trans-fixity. This is difficult for us to apprehend. For we distinguish an interior of the body, constituted on the one hand by the organic which is enduring, and feelings and thoughts that are transformable one the other. Moreover, because of the conception of interior as fixed, organic, psychological and mental are being conceived as that which constitutes the fixity of the Self, which can represent itself in a variety of ways in the outside. So whereas our concept of the interior of the body presupposes the topographical split between its inside and outside; \textit{endon} in relation to the Homeric body is experienced as the trans-fixity of being alive, which does not necessitate any split between a fixed interior Self and a transformable outward representation.

Moreover, it is the experience of \textit{domos} as trans-fixity that reverberates in the Homeric experience of \textit{endon} in relation to house.\textsuperscript{144} We are not going to examine the

\textsuperscript{142} In the Homeric dictionary \textit{phren} is defined as the lungs, i.e., organ, but also the seat of thought, will, feeling, mind, soul, heart, consciousness, even life. AUTENRIETH, G., op.cit., s.v. \textit{φρέν}. See also the chapter on \textit{Epos}.

\textsuperscript{143} In the Homeric dictionary \textit{kradie} is defined “as center of circulation: life, as seat of emotion, of thought, reason.” Ibid, s.v. \textit{κραδίη}.

\textsuperscript{144} On the relation between house and interior, Wigley writes: [Heidegger] always describes the home as a kind of interior...From his earliest texts, Heidegger always insists that the fundamental sense of the word ‘in’ is not spatial in the sense of the occupation of a ‘spatial container (room, building)’ but is the
relevant passages here, but we would like to make an observation. It is surprising to notice that the term endon, accompanied by the participle of the of the verb 'to be', occurs in a formulaic way 20 times in the text. The form endon eonton in particular, occurs six times and it refers to the things existing in the house, be that food or objects. Food and objects are stored — remaining in a state of fixity — within thalamos. Food is brought to megaron to be cooked (transformed) and subsequently consumed, or an object which lays in thalamos is brought in to use. However, we tend to ignore the consequent experience of food or objects within the house as that of trans-fixity and we privilege the fixity as the prevailing modality of whatever 'is' in the house. In effect, we acknowledge that whatever 'is' in the house, 'is' in a specific modality. Hence it becomes quite obvious why 'is' will become entangled with the philosophical concept of 'structure'. To put it another way, the question of being as essence always already evolves around interiority and cannot be thought independently of the structure of philosophy. It is quite clear now why the house becomes a metaphor for philosophy, for the question of structure's interiority and essence cannot be separated. What is repressed however in this philosophical concept of 'structure' as interior is the contradiction evoked by the interior experienced as 'trans-fixity'.


145 η166: and let the housekeeper from her stores give the stranger a supper (δόθην δέ ιείνω τοιμή δότα δύνω δότην ἐλάσων), 077, 94: I tell the woman to prepare a dinner out of what we have here in abundance (εἶπα δὲ γυναῖξι / δέννων ἕνι μεγάρου παρακεῖτο ἀλλις ἔμην ἐλάσων), T 320: and my heart starved for meat and drink, though they are here beside me (σέντρα ἐμῶν κηρ / ἄκμηνον πόσιος καὶ ἔδηπτος ἔμην ἐλάσων).

146 φ178, 183: and bring out from the inside stores a great wheel of tallow (ἐκ δὲ στέατος ἐνεικὲ μέγα τροχίν ἔμην ἐλάσω).
When Benveniste establishes the relation of opposition between familial structure as interior, and the door as its exterior, he does so through a philosophical operation, within which the material construction is conceived as that which separates the two sides of a contradiction. The door becomes the boundary between the interior and exterior. As we shall show in the following chapters, thure 'door' in the Homeric text, evokes the experience of the paradoxical trans-fixity as unbearable, and as such this experience of trans-fixity splits. But it is not split into an outside and an inside but into thalamos and megaron. In the following chapters will shall try to show that thalamos evokes the experience of fixity, and megaron that of transformation. In that sense thure, megaron and thalamos can not be experienced, but only in their relation to domos as con-structure. However, unlike the way we conceive them as always being locations within the house, they evoke specific experiences without necessarily corresponding to specific places.

We hope that the detailed examination of the Homeric terms has shown the relation between what Benveniste wants to present as distinct notions, that is, construction, structure and taming. We have tried to established that what is interpreted as a linguistic similarity between terms is in fact a similarity produced at the level of experience. The Homeric terms we have examined in fact evoke the experience of 'structure' which can be described as the experience of contradictions that is always at the level of appearance. That is to say, contradiction is not established between an appearance that is exterior and transformable, and a structure that is interior and fixed. 'Structure', in the Homeric context, is the experience of a paradox in the sense

\[147\] See above note 135.
that always evokes the experience of an appearance that is both transformable and fixed. A similarity then at the level of experience generated the invention of a common root *dem-; the experience of 'structure' was transformed to a linguistic category.

The chapter also challenges the 'naturalness' of the so-called 'purely technical' terms in the Homeric text. As for the relation between the specific manifestation of the Homeric 'body' called demas and the experience of the Homeric 'house' called domos, we have established that it is not a metaphorical one. Both terms evoke a similar experience and neither operates as a model for the other. Demas is a gendered body which, even though it is experienced as the body of a specific individual, can be transformed or assimilated to another body. The experience of demas is that of an always changing body of an active and alive individual. A similar experience is that of domos. Although it is a specific construct it is always experienced as changing, for it cannot be dissociated from the issues of both familial structure and 'taming'. The experience of the 'trans-fixed' however, can not be defined; thus with the advent of philosophy, and the wish for definition, not only space was conceived as a container but also the house itself became a container of the family; a material construct that contains the familial structure. In such context the body also becomes a container; a body construct that contains the self. This wish for definition and fixity also generated the concept of prototype, the ideal. Instead of a multiple and gendered body, maleness and mathematics become ideals for the body in a context of oppositions (male-female, rational-irrational). As for the house, the ideal of architecture is produced as a set of rules for construction. A new relation is
established between the ideal body and the ideal architecture to substitute for the relation between demas and domos.

Now the root *dem- loosely holds together the common experience evoked by the terms examined. What Benveniste does however, is to separate them into distinct units of meaning, in order that they accord with the series of binary oppositions produced by philosophy. Had we accepted Benveniste’s interpretation our research could only reinstate and project once more the philosophical distinctions back to the Homeric text. At least we have tried to avoid this anachronism. Of course we may not be aware of our own anachronisms and which can perhaps be detected in the fact that we still want to establish a relation between body and building. Throughout the thesis the body is the category through which we try to understand the experience of ‘space’ and ‘house’. But in our case it is a multiple, always transformed and gendered, body. We try to recognize that any relation between body and building is not naturally derived but culturally constructed, and by investigating the relation we can mark the differences between Homeric experience of domos and our concept of architecture. In the next chapters we shall see how the categories through which we think architecture are constructs of our culture\textsuperscript{148} and cannot be applied to the Homeric experience of the house.

\textsuperscript{148} Throughout this thesis we have contrasted the world of the Homeric text with something else, sometimes ‘our culture’, sometimes with the rise of philosophy. We do not feel compelled in the thesis to elaborate these distinctions or to place chronological definitions upon them, for we consider this thesis to be not a work of historiography but an attempt to recover as far as possible specific Homeric meanings which have been lost through the application of retrospective readings, whatever we take the point from which that retrospective applies to be.
THURE-PULE

BEING AT THE 'DOOR' - BEING AT THE 'GATE'
AMBIGUOUS BODIES AND DISEMBODIED VISION
4.1. INTRODUCTION

Doors and gates are usually thought of as functional objects even when considered as symbols of separation between two domains; for separation is conceived as the function they fulfill. Moreover, they are either described in terms of their form and function, or inscribed in the domains they separate. In fact, doors or gates are mainly discussed in relation to the outside-inside opposition where this opposition is conceived as natural. But we cannot rely upon these conventional certainties. Our analysis of the Homeric *thure* (θώρη) ‘door’ and *pule* (πόλη) ‘gate’ cannot rely on notions of function or symbol any more than we accept as ‘natural’ the inside-outside distinction without committing an anachronism. For as we shall see, these categories are a contemporary construction and therefore we can not read them back into the Homeric text. We must pursue a different analysis. We will argue that the terms *thure* and *pule* evoke an experience of transition within the Homeric text. But the transition in question is of a specific kind. ‘Transition’ is the transition from one category of
experience to another which is not reducible to the question of space or place. We shall elaborate more on this point later, but we would like to make clear that it is not what comes before or after the transition – in temporal and spatial terms – that concerns us primarily. For such an analysis would abolish the experience of transition par excellence. In fact, our task is to uncover the variety of phenomena evoked by the terms thure or pule in order to understand the effects that the experience of transition has on the 'multiple' Homeric body. We are not attempting to assimilate thure and pule to the contemporary post-modern category of 'transitional spaces or non-place'. For the terms thure/pule belong to definite categories of experience and are not merely locations of a specific kind, or functional objects. Nonetheless, thure/pule involve the experience of specific things – what we call door/gate – and as such are experienced as being co-produced with their space (in the sense of chore) and their connection with the body produces specific types of identities which as we shall show, belong to the order of ambiguity. This means that the Homeric experience of transition is bounded with a certain fear. 'Time' and 'sight' become devices for controlling ambiguity while insuring the change from one category of experience to another. This change always affects the Homeric body, and leads to a paradoxical 'literal' disembodiment of vision. Our approach to these issues breaks with the way the Homeric terms are discussed within scholarship, and we shall try to explain why.

1 M. Augé defines in an anthropological analysis, the 'non-place' as the contemporary place in which we are in transit, such as the shopping mall, the motorway or the airport lounge. AUGÉ, M., 1995: Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity, Verso.
4.2. **THURE - PULE WITHIN LINGUISTIC THEORIES**

A passage by Emile Benveniste involves a series of assumptions which are common to the way the Homeric term *thure* is approached within scholarship. Benveniste argues that in Indo-European languages the word for the door establishes a relation of opposition with the word for the house that stems from the root *dem-*.

He writes:

"We have here, on closer examination, an opposition which could not have been foreseen, and which contrasts two terms that are not by nature antithetical, because one is the word for 'house' and the other the word for 'door'. Here a notion came into play with lexical consequences, that of 'door'... The Indo-European form is *dhwer-, in the reduced grade *dhur, Greek thura (θύρα), generally in the plural, because it seems that the door was conceived of as having various elements. *dhwer- is an unanalysable term by itself, which cannot be attached to any verbal root, and its etymological signification escapes us; but it is possible that we have here a term for a material object which owes its name to the function which it fulfills... What is important to stress is the concordance of the adverbial usages of *dhwer- in Latin and in other languages... Greek thura 'door' and thuraze (θύραιο 'outside'... We have here an adverbial form which was fixed at a very early date and became independent, so much so that thuraze, having lost in Homeric times its connection with thura 'door' (of the house), it was possible to say ἄσπες θύραιο 'out from the sea' in the Odyssey (5,510; cf II. 16,408)... Such correlations, the antiquity of which is evident, explain the nature of the idea. The 'door', *dhwer-, is seen from the inside of the house: it is only for the person inside the house that 'at the door' can signify outside'. The whole of the phenomenology of the 'door' proceeds from this formal relation. For the person who lives inside, *dhwer- marks the limit of the house conceived as an interior and which protects the inside from the menacing outside... This door, according to whether is open or shut, becomes the symbol for separation from, or communication between, one world and the other. It is through the door that the dominus..."

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2 It should be noted that *thure* is considered the ionic form of the attic *thura*. According to our hypothesis stated in the chapter on *chora/choros*, the variation of form indicates a variation of experience. As a consequence in classical Athens *thura* might be experienced differently, and we already know from vase painting and written sources, the close relation between women and *thura*, whereas in the Homeric text women are usually kept away from *thure*. As with the case of *chora-choros*, dictionaries only state the variation of form between the ionic *thure* and the attic *thura*. Benveniste and others do not make any distinction between the two terms.
opens on an extraneous and often hostile world... The rites of passage through the door, the mythology of the door, give a religious symbolism to this idea.\textsuperscript{3}

In order to establish the opposition between house and door – two terms which as he writes “are not by nature antithetical” – Benveniste has to refer to a ‘natural’ opposition, that of the inside-outside, by contrasting the house as the inside and the door as its outside. He does not question the nature of this opposition any more than he does his assumption that the interior is secure and the exterior is hostile. But as we have argued in the chapter on domos, it is through a philosophical operation that the idea of a house in which the interior is safe because considered fixed, is contrasted to an exterior which is dangerous because contingent, open as it were to any event. The situation is further complicated in so far as the interior and the exterior are not only conventionally conceived as specific sites but also acknowledged – within anthropology – as recognized cultural topographies within which humans acquire specific identities. Anthropologically any place ‘in-between’ is considered as a passage of transition, and whatever is placed there acquires an ambivalent status and so is invested with ‘symbolic’ value.\textsuperscript{4} There is of course a rich literature on the


\textsuperscript{4} V. Turner writes : “...transitional beings...may even be nowhere [in terms of any recognized cultural topography], and are at least ‘betwixt and between’ all the recognized fixed points in space-time of structural classification.” TURNER, V., 1970: The Forest of Symbols, Cornell University Press, pp. 97.

In that sense, a transitional role is a dangerous one, for it entails the non-fixity, the non-categorization of social roles and thus a certain degree of unpredictability. The creation of a strict code of passage from one social role to another which usually involves the ritual of crossing the door, is as an attempt to control a fearful situation. We have discussed, in the chapter on choros, the specific relation of space and ritual, namely how space – in the sense of choros – is produced as enduring, to contain and thus insure the process of ritual.
symbolic function of door/gate, and the rites of passages through the door. The door, conceived as that which separates the inside from the outside, becomes the space of a transition which provokes a certain 'cultural' fear. This is the assumption that underlies Benveniste's consideration of the door as a symbol of separation, and also communication. Now, Benveniste attempts first to eliminate and secondly to rationalize this fear in a double movement within his arguments. On the one hand he dissociates the door from transition by nominating the door 'the outside'. In doing so he eliminates transition and thus the fear. On the other hand he recognizes the door as the symbol of separation or communication and so for him the door is either a material object with a specific function or it is a symbol. But none of these comes about by 'nature'. It is only within a specific conception of an object that it can exist both in its materiality and as a symbol. The material and symbolic sides of an object are not in opposition, but are both produced by, and both share and sustain, the same conceptual or philosophical assumptions about their 'nature'. Symbol and material object belong to the same philosophical register. The very notion of 'function' rationalizes the whole issue of the door by embracing it as both symbol and material object. It may be that the symbolic function and the actual function of an object seem

5 The Dutch anthropologist Arnold van Gennep, who introduced the notion of transition as one stage of the 'life crises' ceremonies, writes: "It seems important to me that the passage from one social position to another is identified with a territorial passage, such as the entrance into a village, or a house, the movement from one room to another, or the crossing of streets and squares. This identification explains why the passage from one group to another is so often ritually expressed by passage under a portal or by an 'opening of the doors'. These phrases and events are seldom meant as 'symbols'; for the semicivilized the passage is actually a territorial passage. In fact, the spatial separation of distinct groups is an aspect of social organization...In short a change of social categories involves a change of residence, and in fact is expressed by the rites of passage in their various forms." VAN GENNEP, A., 1960: The Rites of Passage, trans. M.B. Vizedom and G. L. Caffe, Routledge, pp. 192.
to separate again two different domains: the mythological, or religious on the one hand, and the rational on the other. But this distinction has nothing 'natural' about it. When the door is seen as belonging to these domains then the fear of transition is interpreted as a mythological or religious fear which invests nothing more than an object with a specific function. We can see now why we cannot use notions as 'functional object' or 'symbol' unproblematically in respect to the Homeric terms without committing an anachronism. We propose instead that thure/pule were experienced as things, in the sense that there is no positive reason to make a separation between the material and the symbolic. As far as the inside-outside distinction in relation to thure, we do not argue that the distinction between inside-outside does not exist in the Homeric language, but that thure was not experienced in terms of this distinction and still less was synonymous – as Benveniste argues – with one of its parts, that is, 'the outside'. The question that arises for us can be formulated as follows: Is there any relation between Homeric domos and thure apart from that which is established by the philosophical opposition of the inside-outside proposed by Benveniste? We argue that indeed there is. If house as domos evoked the experience of contradiction – as we have already shown in the chapter on domos – thure evoked the effects that contradictions had on the Homeric body. In fact, our analysis will represent the variety with which these effects are manifested within the Homeric text.

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6 There is in fact a passage in which the term ektos (ἐκτὸς) 'outside' occurs in relation to both thure and domos, and this reinforces our view that thure is not simply synonymous with the outside. The passage goes like this ἐκ τῆς [and great Odysseus himself came from the house to join them. But after they were out of the way of the doors and the courtyard (ἐκ δ' αὐτῶς μετὰ τοὺς δόμους ἠλύθε διὸς Ὀδυσσέας. ᾿Αλλ' ὅτε ἐδὴ δὴ ἐκτὸς θυρῶν ἔκαψ ἡδὲ κατ' αὐλῆς)
Benveniste's proposed relation between *domos-thure* produces another relation, that between 'geographical space' and *pule* 'gate'. In fact, after discussing the house-door relation he establishes another opposition, that of domestic-geographic. Although Benveniste does not refer to *pule* in his text, it has a direct influence on the way the domestic/geographic opposition – one which seems to be considered as 'natural' within literature – overshadows the interpretation of *thure/pule* relation. Here is an example. P. Chantraine notes that *thure* is distinguished from *pule*, inasmuch as the first denotes the door of a house and is based on the idea of the outside, while the second denotes the door of a city and, as it often indicates the entrance into the countryside, has a geographical value. The proposed differentiation is based on the idea that both door and gate are specific objects in specific locations. The difference of location confers the different names and may also generate different formal configurations of the object. But if the difference is produced by locality, why is the distinction between house and geography not marked? Indeed the distinction is conventionally thought of in a relation of opposition which is reflected upon the *thure-pule* distinction. Now we are

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7 Benveniste notes: "...an ancient relationship: the uncultivated ground, the waste land, as opposed to the inhabited area. Outside this physical community, which constitutes the family or tribal habitat, stretches the waste land. This is where the extraneous world begins, and what is strange is necessarily hostile. The Greek adjective derived from *agros* 'field', is *agrios*, which means ‘wild’, ‘savage’, and so gives us more or less the counterpart of what is called in Latin *domesticus*, which brings us back to *domus.*" BENVENISTE, E., op. cit., pp. 256-7.


9 We have already seen how Benveniste defines *thura* as a material object. Insofar as *pule* is concerned Chantraine notes – as does Hofmann (HOFMANN J.B., *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Griechischen*, München 1950, Greek translation by A. Papanikolaou, Athens 1974) – that the etymology of the term is unknown, and then he adds: "Frisk pense que ce serait en emprunt dans la vocabulaire technique de la construction". Thus *pule* is considered as a 'technical' term that corresponds to a specific object. CHANTRAINE P., op.cit., s. v. πύλη.
not able in this text to analyse what may fall under the category of – that which we anachronistically\(^\text{10}\) call – ‘geographic’, within the Homeric text, and which can bring light to the distinction house-country and consequently to that of thure-pule. However, what is important for our research is that both thure and pule – whether the door of domos or the gate of Hades – denote a transition. Our analysis is not aimed at defining the difference between them. Rather we attempt to displace the analysis from the question of difference between one object and another, to the question of transition, which we think more relevant in the Homeric text. Indeed, what marks the difference of our approach in relation to thure/pule, is that we intend to analyse the experience of transition as such, while the conventional analysis focuses on the domains separated by the door/gate.\(^\text{11}\) Such an approach may well reflect the way we think about doors and gates today, and is inappropriate for the analysis of the Homeric terms.

Benveniste’s interpretation that thure is “a term for a material object which owes its name to the function which it fulfills” reveals the contemporary conception of the door which he maintains. For us doors fulfill a general function: that is, to

\(^\text{10}\)The term geographia (\(\gamma\varepsilon\omega\rho\pi\alpha\alpha\iota\) ‘geography’ is not an Homeric but a later Greek term.

\(^\text{11}\)S. Goldhill, discussing the “animal-guarded doorways”, writes: “The boundaries of the civilized order of the oikos are defined in part by opposition to the outside world of the wild, the uncivilized, the uncultivated.” GOLDHILL, S., 1991: The Poet’s Voice: Essays on Poetics and Greek Literature, Cambridge University Press, pp. 12. Although Goldhill “builds on Redfield’s” distinction between Nature and Culture (REDFIELD, J., 1975: Nature and Culture in the Iliad: The Tragedy of Hector, Chicago), he is also well-aware of the inherent restrictions of such interpretative scheme. He argues: “...how can ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ be regarded simply as a ‘grid’ of oppositions for producing the answers to the text’s significance? For their construction in the continuing process of reading leads always to further, constitutive aspects. ‘The grid’ cannot, finally, exhaust (the reading of) the text. In other words, treating ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ as absolute, predetermined values may undermine their value as heuristic devices for the interpretation of the Odyssey.” GOLDHILL, S., 1988: “Reading differences: juxtaposition and the Odyssey”, Ramus 17.1, 1-31, pp.18-19.
separate two distinct spaces. We move from one to the other without thinking that by
crossing them any change of what we call 'ourselves' occurs, for the 'self' is
considered as an enduring unlocalized category. Even if we have to adapt our
behavior to the change of location, this change is apprehended as a change at the level
of appearance, where the split between an outward changing appearance and an
internal enduring self is not a problem. What occurs during the transition however, is
never thought of. But we need to imagine the consequences that the experience of
transition may produce in the context of the Homeric text, where there is no evidence
for such a concept of self. In this light Benveniste's statement that this notion of the
door is so "deeply and enduringly inscribed in the Indo-European languages" that
even today we refer to the door as the boundary between inside-outside, may reveal
repression — inaugurated by philosophy — of the experience of the door, as an
experience of transition. Of course his assumptions about the inside-outside
distinction are standard in the way the Homeric terms thure and pule are confronted
within scholarship. In so far as thure is concerned it is interpreted either as entrance,
access, or as exit. Pule on the other hand is considered — as we have already seen
— by Chantraine as entrance. This seems like the contemporary separation of exits
and entrances, or even the division of a door with one wing for entrance and one for
exit. Such a separation might be interpreted as an attempt to alleviate an ambivalent

12 BENVENISTE E., ibid.
13 AUTENRIETH G., 1991: Homeric Dictionary, Duckworth, s.v. ὅρα, and LIDDELL, G.H. and
14 CHANTRAINE P., op.cit., s.v. ὅρα. Chantraine, who accepts Benveniste's theory writes: "Le radical
de ὅρα ... s'est prêté à la constitution de nombreuse formes adverbiales important, expriment
notamment l' idée d' 'au dehors'... Comme dans l' autres langues indo-européennes ce nom de la porte a
formi des adverbes de sens 'dehors'."
situation, and create a neutral space where points of tension vanish. But there is no
evidence within the Homeric text of such an entrance-exit distinction and such
definitions of thure/pule are no more than contemporary projections. We shall argue
that the ambiguity evoked by the term thure/pule can be detected within the context in
which the terms occur in the Homeric text. In fact the acknowledgment of ambiguity
is what differentiates the Homeric experience of thure/pule from the contemporary
conception of door/gate as functional objects, a conception which represses and
ignores any signs of ambivalence and contradiction.

We have already anticipated in the introduction that transition within the
Homeric experience should be understood as a transition from one category of
experience to another. But it is necessary to remember that when we refer to
experience this should be understood as the way the body in its multiple
manifestations (mental, psychological, corporeal) is connected with whatever
surrounds it, where body and surrounding objects inform each other. In that sense, any
change of experience is a change to the body. This is an important point that marks
the difference between the experience of the Homeric thure/pule and the
contemporary conception of door/gate, and also differentiates the way we use the
notion of transition – as a transition at the level of experience – in our analysis of the
Homeric terms.

4.3. THURE - PULE WITHIN THE HOMERIC TEXT

Thure occurs 15 times in Iliad, and 55 in Odyssey, while pule, 60 in Iliad, and four in
Odyssey. In the Homeric text, thure (ὑπολή) – generally in plural 15 – denotes the

15 The term appears in the singular form thuren only 8 times, in Ὠ316,453, Ὠ155,157,201,258,275,394.
‘door’,\textsuperscript{16} while \textit{pule} (πύλη) – also usually in plural\textsuperscript{17} – the ‘gate’.\textsuperscript{18} Quite often there is a detailed description of the way the door/gate was locked, and also reference to parts of the construction such as the threshold and the posts. We would like to make two remarks, one in relation to the plural form and another in relation to the name attached to both. We cannot decide from the textual evidence if the plural has to be understood – as Benveniste suggests – in relation to a formal feature of the door/gate, i.e., namely that they are made from different elements or that they have two wings. We have to discard the first because all doors/gates are made from various elements but the plural form is not always used. We could always have recourse to Parry’s theory of orality to propose that the choice of the specific form corresponds to metric purposes. But we have already shown in detail in the chapter on \textit{Epos} our position in relation to the orality-literacy debate. It is quite interesting to note that in two instances the same door is in the singular form when closed and in plural when opened.\textsuperscript{19} We might say that when the door is closed it is perceived as one piece – if we accept that most Homeric doors have two wings, which of course we do not know from the textual evidence – whereas when it is opened is perceived as made up of

\begin{itemize}
\item The term occurs in the singular form \textit{pules} only twice in I466, I1712.
\item 0453-455: The [door] was secured by a single door-piece of pine, and three Achaians could ram it home in its socket and three could pull back and open the huge [bar of the doors] (θύρην δ’ ἔς μοῦνος ἐπιβλῆς εἰλάτινος, / τὸν τρεῖς μὲν ἐπιρρήσασκον ἀχοιολ, / τρεῖς δ’ ἀναίγοσκον μεγάλην κλήτιδα θυράνων), χ394-399: {he knocked at} the door...she opened the doors (κινήσως δὲ θύρην...ἐξεῖδὲ κε θύρας).\end{itemize}
more than one element. Then again, we might note that the singular is used when it refers to a closed door, that is, when transition is blocked. But there is another way of thinking this through, namely the relation of the plural grammatical form of *thuré/pule* and its relation to the experience of transition. Such an analysis can only exist as a suggestion for we can not decide definitively on the textual evidence how the plural should be understood.

Gates and doors have always a name, the gates of Heaven, of Dreams, of Hades, of Troy, the door of *megaron*, of *thalamos* etc. Such names are conventionally interpreted as an indication that the door/gate belongs to the specific location that confers its name. But the above names evoke categories of experiences and do not simply correspond to specific locations, and so we propose a different approach. In fact, the name of the door/gate does not indicate the border of a distinct space but rather the sort of changes required for the transition, that is, for the change to the category of experience that the term *thalamos, megaron, Hades*, etc., evoke. Before we proceed to the examination of the terms in their Homeric context, we would like to repeat that *thuré/pule* evoke the transition from one field of experience to another, and thus constitute the experience of being in a state of change which implies changes of the experiencing body. These changes involve the whole phenomenology of the Homeric body and include change of status, gestures, body postures, and even change of shape.

Our analysis of the Homeric text is divided into three parts; the first approaches the act of crossing the door/gate and the changes of the body that accompany it, the second revolves around the ambiguity produced as an effect of a prolonged sojourn at *thuré/pule*; the third examines the devices that control and insure
the change from one category of experience to another. We shall start with the implications of crossing thure/pule.

4.3.1. THE CROSSING OF THURE/PULE AS CHANGE OF EXPERIENCE

In the contemporary context 'going through' doors/gates is considered as a change of place. We go from one room to another within our house, in or out of the house, and this has little or no consequences. We open and close these objects, whose 'function' is to separate distinct spaces. But for the Homeric Greeks the crossing of thure/pule was not experienced as a change of place, but as a change of experience and as such had effects on the Homeric body. Though, we shall refer to thure/pule as the place of change throughout the text, that place is as co-produced with the specific things called thure/pule and hence place and thing can not be separated. To understand the change better at the level of experience that the crossing of thure/pule entails we shall refer to the Homeric term oudos (οὐδός) 'threshold'.

The etymological connection of oudos with hodos (ὁδός) 'way, journey, path, road', pointed out by Chantraine, is reinforced by the description of the gates' construction in H338, 435:

"And let us built into these walls gates strongly fitted that there may be a way though them for the driving of horses."

However, being on hodos, implies a condition of continuous change. The need for Odysseus' recognition, upon his return, can be inscribed in the experience of the

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20 The other term Homeric term for the threshold, belos (βῆλος), will be examined further on in the text.
21 CHANTRAINE P., op.cit., s.v. ὅδος
22 H338-40: πόροις ὑπηλόγας εἶχαν νεῖν τε καὶ αὐτῶν, / ἐν δὲ αὐτῶι πάλαι ποιήσαμεν ἑαυτοὺς. / ἔφη δὲ αὐτῶιν ἡπιλάσθη ὅδος εἴη. See also H435. The term oudos occurs 45 times in the epics.
journey as a process of change, for both status and the body. In this way, the Homeric expression geraos oudos (γῆραος οὐδός), in 196, can be interpreted either as 'the path', or as 'the threshold of old age', because both denote a state of transition and change – that of becoming old. Transition itself is experienced as the stepping over the threshold. The above mentioned quotation regarding the gates' construction, further instructs us that the epithet eurus (εὐρός) 'broad, wide' should not be understood as a word denoting an abstract concept of width associated with a number (i.e. the width of the door is 1.00m), but as a level of experience, where the width of the gate is related to the movement of bodies. It is in relation to the body that crosses it that thure/pule is experienced as wide or narrow in σ385-6:

the gates of the house, although they are wide, would suddenly be too narrow as you took flight to escape from the forecourt.

The change of experience that the crossing entails involves the change of social status. This social status is manifested through a complex code of body postures and gestures, and in that sense we may say that the change of social status involves bodily changes. An example illustrates our point. As we shall see in the chapter on

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24 σ385-6: τὰ θύρατα, καὶ εὐρέα περ μᾶλ' ἔδονε, / φεύγοντι στείνοι τίς προθύροι θύραζε. See also ψ74: Hades' house of the wide gates (εὐρύτερας Λιδος και). The same 'kinesthetic' experience is expressed in the use of adjectives related to the height of the door which occur in a number of passages: θ644: gate-towering Ilion (ὁψαλλον Τροιτην), ζ416: Thebe of the towering gates (ὁψαλλον θῆβην), ζ274: and the great gateways, and the long, smooth-planed, close-joined gate timbers that close to fit them shall defend our city (ὠφηλαι τε πολλα σανιδες τε ἐπι τῆς ἀκραίασι / μακροι ἐξειστοι ἐξειογενεῖται εἰρύσσονσιν.)

megaron, the crossing of the door is part of the ritual of hospitality, and entails a change of social status. The stranger (xeinos) – whose status is ambiguous while standing at the door, being both a potential enemy and friend – undergoes a ritualized crossing of the thure to erase his ambiguity and consolidate his role as a friend of the house, inside the house. The gifts that are given to him at his departure, operate as tokens of friendship and alliance, for it is possible that otherwise as he changes his role and place, he might become an enemy. The door then is experienced as the place of change, where the change of social status is achieved through a complex code of gestures and body postures.\textsuperscript{26} It is worth noting that members of the house do not have to undergo any ritual every time they cross the thure, for the repetition of the first crossing has a decreasing importance.\textsuperscript{27} However not all members cross, or are related to the different doors of the house in the same way, as we shall see below.

The changes to the body that the act of crossing involves are clearly revealed in an extreme case of transition. In the Homeric text the phrase “to cross’ perao (περάω), the gates of Hades” is equivalent to dying.\textsuperscript{28} However the condition of perao

\textsuperscript{26} For a detail analysis of gestures and body postures in the context of hospitality, see chapter on megaron.

\textsuperscript{27} From later sources we know that in the context of ancient Greek marriage, the bride has to undergo a ritualized threshold crossing in her new home. For A. Van Gennep such a ritual belongs to the “Rites of the first time: these rites are simply rites of entry from one domain or situation into another, and it is natural that, once the new domain or situation has been entered, the repetition of the first act has a decreasing importance. Furthermore, psychologically, the second act no longer presents anything new: it marks the beginning of habituation. VAN GENNEP A., op. cit., pp. 177.

\textsuperscript{28} Ἐδώς: but beaten down by my hands will pass through the gates of Hades (ἐξ ἡμῶν διηθέντα τῶλας Λύκου περάων). The Homeric phrase that occurs twice – ξ.156, 1312: For as I detest the doorways of Hades (ἐνθρός γὰρ μοι κέλνος διάκεις Λύκου πύλης) – is inscribed to the conception of the gates of Hades as equivalent to death.
(περαίω) 'passing through, penetrate, traverse' the gates, is not the simple act of dying. Although Patroklos and Helpenor are already dead they cannot cross the gates of Hades. They appear to their companions — Patroklos to Achilles, and Elpenor to Odysseus— and ask to be buried. Burial ensures that the body will be transformed, that it will become invisible to the living, and this transformation is the condition of entering the territory of Hades where invisibility reigns. "The very name of the god of the underworld, Hades, Λιδίης may be an alpha-privative form, from the verb of seeing...idein (ιδεῖν). His place is that of unseen and the unseeable." To stay at the gate of Hades without crossing it tachista (τάχιστα) 'very quickly', — to be dead and still have a body visible in its corporeality even if it be nothing more than a soma 'corpse'— implies an ambiguous and intolerable situation. Moreover, the transformation of the body, necessary for the change of place, does not lead to its complete disappearance. Dead people become eidola. They still have the visual

29 It is worth noting the etymological connection — proposed by Hofmann — of peraio (περαίω) with the Greek terms: peirο (πείρο) 'pierce through, poros (πόρος) 'ford, path', porthmos (πορθμός) 'strait', and the Latin portus 'port, door'. HOFMANN J.B., op. cit., s. v. περαίω. The underline connection between them could well be, the conception of water as a boundary. In the Homeric text the river Ocean is the boundary between the world of living and the world of dead (κτιλι). On the relation between water and threshold, see TRUMBULL H.C., 1896: The Threshold Covenant, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, pp. 135.

30 Ψ71: Bury me as quickly as may be, let me pass through the gates of Hades. The souls, the images of dead men, hold me at a distance, and will not let me cross the river and mingle among them, but I wander as I am by Hades' house of the wide gates (θόμπε με ὅτι τάχιστα πόλες Λίδια σπέρην. / ήλια με εϊργοντι νακαε ειδολα κυμάντων, / οδόθ με πω μάγγεσεάν τοποφ ποταμολ ἄκατον, / ἄλλ. στάσες ἀκάλλημαι αν' εὑροτυλες Λίδος δε)

31 λ51: But first there came the soul of my companion, Elpenor, for he had not yet been buried (Πρίθη δε νακη ἐλπηνορις ἐλιθεν ἑκατερον / χό σερ πω κτήβατεν). Elpenor says to Odysseus in λ73-4: and do not go and leave me behind unwept, unburied, when you leave...but burn me (μη μ' ἀκλατοτον ἄκατον ἰδων ἀκηθοθ ταυτελεις / ἄλλ. με κακηθαι)


33 See above note 30.
'aspect' *eidos* of the living person, although they lack the vital force and the very corporeality of the body.

The importance of the door or gate is constituted by the act of crossing, because the crossing implies a change of experience that always involves a change of the body. Now these changes of the body give to *thure/pule* their importance, but bind them with a certain fear as well. In fact, the fear refers to the permanent imprint of signs of ambiguity on the body - or to what we might call the acquisition of a monstrous body - as a result of a prolonged sojourn at the place of change.

4.3.2. BEING AT *THURE/PULE* : ON AMBIGUITY

The Homeric text testifies that dwelling at *thure/pule* generates monstrosity. Thus at *thure/pule* remain creatures with improper bodily forms, or humans in a 'limbo’ state. These bodily effects of ambiguity are unbearable, and as a consequence, a mechanism of control is put in place. Indeed, we shall argue that the Homeric terms *thure/pule* not only evoke the ambiguity that frames the experience of transition but also its control. Before we examine the devices of control we shall present the ambiguity which – as we have just said – is generated not by crossing but by tarrying at *thure/pule*.

4.3.2.1. AMBIGUOUS BODIES

Humans who sit at *thure/pule* never present corporeal deformities, but both state and status have effects on their body. On the other hand, corporeal monstrosity is a common feature of Homeric monsters, such as Gorgo, Skulla, or Kuklops. All of them
sit either at *thure*, or *pule* but in the context of what is anachronistically called 'geographical space'. We propose however to call this space, 'the space of narrative' – in the sense of the specific narrative structure of the spatial container. In fact, this is further evidence that the distinction between the experience of *thure* and *pule* must be something different from what is commonly thought of, i.e., as a difference simply corresponding to the taken for granted domestic-geographic distinction. But we are not able to provide an answer on this issue, as we have already pointed out; so let us proceed to examine first, what kind of creatures dwell at doors or gates, and how ambiguity is imprinted in their appearance.

The very god Hades does not cross the gates of his territory. He is characterized in the text, as *pulartao kraterio* (πυλάρταο κρατεροῖο) 'he who fastens the gates firmly'. His head is covered with the *Aidos kunee* (Αίδος κυνέην) 'the cap of Hades', which renders invisible the person who wears it. Kunee indicates in the text the 'soldier’s cap’, that can be made of different materials, kunee aigeie (κυνέη αίγειε) for instance, indicates the cap made of 'a goat-skin.’ But, kunee is related to the word *kuon* (κῦων) ‘dog’ and dogs are pre-eminently the guardians of the doors. Hades then, as 'he who fastens the gates firmly’, sojourns at this place of ambiguity, covering his head with a dog-skin; the mask of a dog does acquire an ambiguous appearance: a human body and an animal head. Two other creatures guard his gates. The dog Kerberos (Κέρβερος) and the Head of Gorgo (Γοργείη κεφαλή). Although

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34 Occurs twice, in N415: as he goes down to Hades of the gates, the strong one (εἰς Ἀιδός περ ἱόντα πυλάρταο κρατεροῖο), and in λ277: while she went down to Hades of the gates, the strong one (ἡ δ’ ἐβη εἰς Ἀιδός πυλάρταο κρατεροῖο)
35 E845.
Homer refers to the dog of Hades, the name Kerberos is never mentioned in the text. Hesiod in Theogony (311) describes him as having 50 heads. Thus Kerberos does not fit into the category of dog, it is a dog-monster. The Head of Gorgo is an extraordinary creature, a *pelor* (πέλωρ) ‘monster’ with a terrifying gaze. However, it is not only the gates of Hades that is a place of horror; every gate or door is a potentially horrifying place. *Skulle* and *Charubdis* safeguard a narrow passage of the sea. *Skulle* – her name is etymologically connected to *kuon* (κύων) ‘dog’ – is also a *pelor* (πέλωρ) ‘monster. Her extraordinary body is inside a cave while her six heads are outside, and at this location of between, at the *thure* of the cave, she devours the raw flesh of her victims.

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36 Θ367-8: [when Herakles] was sent down to Hades of the Gates, to hale back from the kingdom of the dark the hound of the grisly death god (εἷς Αἰδώς πολύραυξ προσθαμένει / εἷς Ἐρέβιεις ἄξοντα κύων στυγεροῦ Αἰδώος)
37 λ633: and green fear took hold of me with the thought that proud Persephone might send up against me some gorgonish head of a terrible monster up out of Hades (ἐμὲ δὲ χλωρὸν δῶς ῥεῖε, / μῆ μοι Γοργείην κεφαλὴν δεινοῖο πελόρου / εἷς Αἰδώς πέμψειν ἄγκες Περσεφόνετα)
38 μ256: right in her doorway she ate them up (ἐν αυτῶ δ’ εἶνι θόρρησε κατήθησε κεκληγότας)
39 μ85-94 and 118-9: ἐνθὰ δ’ ἐνι Σκύλλη ναίτε δεινῶν λεκακοῦ. / τῆς ἡ τοι φωνὴ μὲν δοσ σκύλακος νευγγιλῆς / γίγνεται, αὐτῇ δ’ αὐτὲ πελώρ κακῶν οὐδὲ κέ τις μῖν / γιγνέσαντι ἱδὼν, οὐδ’ εἰ θεος διηνίσκετο. / τῆς ἡ τοι πόδες εἰσι δοξάδικα πάντες ἀνδροι, ἥδε δὲ τοί δειμνα περιμήνεσι, ἐν δὲ ἐκάστη / σμερδαλατή κεφαλή, ἐν δὲ τριστούχοι ὀδόντες. / πυκνοὶ καὶ θεμέλες, πλαύοι μέλανος θεοκάτο. / μέσης μὲν τε κατά σπείρας κακὸς δεδουκεν / ἕξω δ’ ἐξεσχη κεφαλέας δεινοῖο βερέθρου... ἢ δὲ τοι τι ὀθνητι, ᾤλι’ ὀδάνατον κακῶν ἔστι, / δεινῶν τ’ ἀργιλλαν τε κατ’ ᾨρινον οὐδὲ μαχτιν.
Kuklops (Κύκλωπ) 'he who has a round eye,' is another pelor (πέλορ) 'monster', who sits at the thure of his cave to prevent the escape of Odysseus, who blinded him and made him powerless. In the Iliad, at the gates of the camp of Greeks, two fighters, sons of Lapithai, resist the attack of the Trojans. However they are not ordinary humans. Lapithai fought and defeated the Centaurs, creatures that are half horse and half human. In the Homeric text Centaurs are called (φηρότης φρεκτάωσι) 'wild beasts of the mountains.' Moreover, the name of one of the Lapithai is (Λεοντής) 'Lion'.

It is only at gates, doors and passages of the unknown and fictional territory of 'geography' that extraordinary creatures dwell and it is clear that the fear does not refer to what lies beyond the gate, the door or the passage, for the danger is always at this place of transition, which should consequently be crossed quickly. Moreover, each of the above 'in-between' creatures is unique as it is related to the experience of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{40}}\text{1428: the monstrous Cyclopes (Κύκλωπ ... πέλορ)}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{41}}\text{1417: and sat down in the entrance himself, spreading his arms wide (αὐτοὺς δὲ εἰνὶ θύρῃς καθίζετο χεῖρε πετάοντας)}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{42}}\text{M127: since in the gates they found two men of the bravest, high-hearted sons of the spear-fighting Lapithai (ἐν δὲ πόλης δὸν ἄνερας εἰρὸν ἄριστος νόμας ὑπερθόμενος Λαπιθάνων αἰχμάτων)}\]

"The Centaurs were beings on the threshold between human and equine nature; they marked the limit between animal and human being, between anthropos and therion. The Centaur appears first on Kassite boundary stones as a guardian of limits." DU BOIS P., 1991: Centaurs and Amazons: Women and the Pre-History of the Great-Chain of Being, University of Michigan Press, pp. 27.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{44}}\text{A268. "Pher/ ther (φηρ/ θήρ) means a wild beast, but indicates any monster, such as Centaurs (Hom.), the sphinx or the satyrs". See HOFMANN J.B., op. cit., s.v. θήρ. Dogs in Homer are called thereteres (θηρητήρες) 'hunters of the wild beasts'. The ability of hunting is never apart from the ability of the hunter to share the attributes of his victim.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{45}}\text{M130.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{46}}\text{On geography as fiction see ROMM, J.S. 1992: The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought: Geography, Exploration, and Fiction, Princeton University Press.}\]
the place it dwells. Their very presence at pulai (or thure of caves) expresses the ambiguity and the fear en-framing the experience of transition. This ambiguity gives shape to their bodies. The continuous movement of the snakes on the head of the Gorgo, or the many heads of Skulle and Kerberos marks the continuous, unpredictable and fearful change which occurs at the point of transition. The acquisition of a body 'in-between', a monstrous body, is the result of dwelling in a place of transition, of an 'in-between'; a place where categories of species roles are no longer distinct. Given this, is it possible for humans to dwell at thure or pule, and with what consequences? As we shall see, humans can stay close to the door/gate, but very rarely do humans remain eini thuresi/ eini pulesi (εἰνὶ θόρυσι/εἰνὶ πόλησι) 'at the door/at the gate', at the very point of transition, and if they do it involves an ambiguity of his/her state or status.

In 8809, while Penelope sleeps and dreams, she stays at the gates of Dreams. In the Homeric text sleep is very similar to death. It is a condition of 'in-between' life and death. The body of the sleeping person lies motionless and shares features of both a live 'body' and that of a soma 'corpse'. Penelope is not just sleeping but dreaming as well. We should not think of dreaming as just a 'mental' activity for as we have argued, we can not project our dualistic distinction between mind and body

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47 R. Brilliant writes: “The hybrid monster exemplifies the very fact of the transgression of boundaries, of a transition not yet accomplished, still frozen in place, and, as such, even more to be feared because of its palpable deformation of the natural categories of being. Whether such creatures are born monstrous, as was the Minotaur, or subsequently made that way through magic, they retain the power to shock us, to shake our sense of what is right in the world.” BRILLIANT, R., 1995: “Kirke’s Men: Swine and Sweethearts”, The Distaff Side: Representing the Female in Homer’s Odyssey, Oxford University Press, pp. 168.

48 8809: Penelope, sleeping very sweetly in the dreams' gateway (Πηνελόπους, ἕδυ μάλα κνίσονοος ἐν ὀνειρείσθαι πόλησι)

49 Sleep is the twin brother of death.
back onto the Homeric Greeks. Dreaming was understood as an action of the body. This reinforces the experience of a sleeping and dreaming body as a body with ambiguous features. A body 'in-between' action and death. Being in this state of 'in-between' Penelope dwells — not metaphorically but literally en oneireiesin pulesin Oneiron (ἐν ὀνειρεῖσιν πολέμιν) 'at the gates of Dreams' — evoking the 'in-between' location of the gates.

In π530 the suitors are sitting at the door of Odysseus' palace. Their social status is ambivalent. Awaiting Penelope's decision that will make one of them a member of the household, they are all in a status of transition. Each one is a member of his own oikos but they all come to eat at Odysseus' house without having yet been accepted as friends of his oikos. Their position at the thure thereby expresses the ambiguity of their status, which is invested with anxiety. Penelope characterizes them as the are (ἀρη) 'curse' of her house. When Odysseus arrives, he dislocates them from the thure, and traps them inside the megaron, where megaron is not just a room of the Homeric house but a term that evokes the experience of controlled transformation; he closes the doors. The whole fight with the suitors takes place

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50 A. Amory also relates Homeric dreams with action though in a different way, when she writes: "In Homer dreams are regularly omens demanding some action." AMORY A., 1966: "The Gates of Horn and Ivory", Yale Classical Studies 20, pp. 30.

51 π530: these people sit by the doors and play their games (οὗτοι δὲ θήρησι καθήμενοι εγγυατάσθησιν) and also π344: and there in front of the palace gates they held an assembly (προσάραξεν θυρίαν ἐθρόλεουσα). π538.

52 A closed door entails always already the possibility of the opening. It never establishes a definitive distinction between spaces. It provides security and danger at the same time. It would be interesting however to analyze in detail the consequences that the closing or the opening of the door has in relation to the experience of transition and not in relation to the separation of spaces, especially because the locking of the doors is mentioned quite often in the Homeric text. This could also throw light on the issue, discussed above in this text, of the plural grammatical form of thure/pule.
about the *thure*. Yet it is Odysseus this time who stands in front of the closed
doors,\(^{54}\) strong, fearful and still in an ambiguous status. He will remain there as long
as the fight continues and until his role as the master of the house is restored after
killing the suitors.

Like the suitors, another ambiguous category is that of beggars who are also
located *thuraze* ‘at the door’.\(^{55}\) Even when accepted in *megaron* they sit on the
threshold facing towards the interior.\(^{56}\) We shall examine in more detail the category
of beggars and their social status in the chapter on *megaron*.

### 4.3.2.2. AMBIGUITY AND POWER

One important attribute of ambiguity is power. In B788 old and young men are holding
an *agore* (ἀγορή) ‘assembly’ at the doors of Priam.\(^{57}\) This passage seems

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\(^{54}\) In the following quotes Odysseus gives instructions for the closing of the doors, as this is the most
important part of his plan: p236: bar the tightly fitted doors that close the hall (κλείσαι μεγάρων θώρας
πυκνώς άραρείας), p240: your task is to make fast the courtyard door with the bolt, and tie the fastening
quickly upon it (θώρας ἐπιτέλεσμα σύλλιπες κλείσαι κλείσαι, θοῖκ δ᾿ ἐπὶ δεσμόν ἠλλαῖο). The suitors will try to
remove him from the doors: χ76: try to push him back from the doors and the threshold (εἴ κε μὴν οὐδὸν
ἀπόστησαν ήδὲ θώραν), χ91: he might be forced to give way from the doors (εἴ πάς οἱ ἔλεγει θώραν), χ107:
while I am alone, they might force me from the doorway (μὴ μὲν ἀπεκκινήσας θώρας μοῦνὸν ἑνταύτα). In sum,
the whole fight between Odysseus and the suitors as described in φ126-399, evolves about the doors.

\(^{55}\) Note that *thuraze* is always translated as outside by Lattimore p276: if they drag me by the feet through
the palace to throw me out of it (διὰ δῆμα ποδῶν ἔλεξει θώραξ), ε58-9: Take yourself out of the door, you
wretch, and be well satisfied with your feast, or you may be forced to get out, with a torch thrown at
you (ἄλλα ἐξελθει θώραξ, τόλμαν, καὶ διατός ὄνησο: ἡ τόχεα καὶ διάλευ βεβλημένος εἰσία θώραξ), ω179: will you
take yourself outside? (οὐκ ἐξετισάθα θώραξ).

\(^{56}\) p339: he sat down then on the ashwood threshold, inside the doorway (ἵλε δ᾿ ἐπὶ μέλινον οὐδὸν ἕνσεκε
θώραν)

\(^{57}\) B788-9: these were holding assembly in front of the doors of Priam gathered together in one place, the
elders and the young men (οὐ δ᾿ ἀγορὰς ἐγόρεον ἐπὶ Πριάμου θύρησι / πάντες ὀμηρεῖς ἥμεν νέοι ἥδε
γεροντες), also Π345-6: there was an assembly...before the doors of Priam (ἀγορὴ γένετ...παρὰ Πριάμου
θύρησι)
contradictory, but the door is the place of contradiction. In the passages previously examined, it is obvious that the presence of extraordinary creatures at this location is evidence of the fear of the ambiguous status (or in a terminology of ritual, a liminal role) which attaches to this place of transition. But what is fearful is also powerful. Whoever can remain at the condition of ‘between’ acquires power. One aspect of this power is the power of speech. In the Homeric context it is the agore at the door, in the context of Athenian democracy the actual bema (βῆμα) ‘a pace, step, footsteps, a place to set foot on,’ at the agora, where the speaker stands in order to address his audience. Both Athenian bema (βῆμα) and the Homeric belos (βῆλος) ‘threshold’ stem from the verb baino (βαίνω) ‘to go, walk, step’. Of the three Homeric references to belos, two depict Zeus exercising his power. He stands on the belos of his palace in Heaven and throws other gods down to the earth. In the third, the goddess Iris stands at the belos of the god’s Zephyros palace to announce a message. All three passages communicate an experience of belos as the location – where location is co-produced with the thing, in this case the threshold – of power and speech.

Indeed, power can be related to the capacity to construct a door or a gate. The difficulties of making doors and gates require special skills in order to balance the weights and make the door and thus the whole structure stand. Statmos (σταθμός) is both ‘the weights in balance,’ ‘the posts,’ and ‘the shelter for men and beast.’ Being a key point of the whole construction, the door is the object of ‘special care’, and is

58 A.591: he caught me by the foot and threw me from the magic threshold (φίλε ποδός τετεχνών ἀπὸ βῆλον ἑσπερίδοιο), O23: throw him from the threshold (φάτουσκον τετεχνών ἀπὸ βῆλον)
59 Ψ201-4: Iris stood on the stone doorsill...and spoke her word to them (Θεώσσα δὲ ἤρεσ ἐπάνω βῆλῳ ἐκ λαθός...εἶπε δὲ μῦθον).
60 In the text the reference to the construction of the door is repetitive. The carpenter, the material and the mode of construction are mentioned: ρ340: the doorpost of cypress wood, which the carpenter once
considered as an element, the foundation of the house. In the Homeric text Agamemnon expresses his wish to sack the city of Troy, by saying that he will set light to the door of Priam’s palace.\textsuperscript{61} This association between the master of the house and the door of the house was quite usual.\textsuperscript{62} If staying at the door is dangerous for others, the master of the house exercises his power there, by being at the strongest part of the house. The door where agore is held in the Homeric text is not any door, but the thure of Priam, the king of Troy. By staying at his door Priam is doubly a master: master of the house, master of the city.

In two instances in the text, the door/gate appears as simultaneously the locus of power and ambiguity and is split into two distinct doors/gates. The door/gate of power and the door/gate of ambiguity mark the status of those who cross them. In ν109, the cave of the Naiades in Ithake has two thurai with different entrances, one

\begin{quote}
had expertly planed, and drawn it true to a chalkline (στοιχημα κυ κο πιστοσπριαι, ον ποτε τεχναι πίοσεν ἐπιστυμελος και ἐπὶ στόμην θυνε), τεθανειν τον ποτε τεχναι πιοσεν ἐπιστυμελος και ἐπὶ στόμην θυνε, ἐν δε στοιχιω δρατε, θωρας δ᾿ ἔπεθεκε φοινικας). Σ167,338: Hephaistos closed the leaves in the door-posts snugly (Ὑφαιστος, πυκνως δε θωρας σταυμασιν ἐπηρος). We should also relate to that the myths of human sacrifice at the door to secure the foundation of a construction. See TRUMBULL H.C., op.cit., pp. 53.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{61} B415: lit the castle gates with the flames’ destruction (ορυσσαι δε πυρος δημοσιω θηρετα).

\textsuperscript{62} “The gates are equivalent to the power of whose are within the gates. Thus also, when the overthrow of a city is foretold in prophesy, it is said, that ‘the gate is smitten with destruction,” TRUMBULL H.C., op. cit., pp. 15. The identification is common in different cultural contexts: Jesus’ identification with the door as a locus of justice, and the ‘High Gate’ denoting the Sultan as judge at the gate of his palace. It is also worth noting the power of the heroes who are able to stay at the door/gate, to confront and destroy the monsters, i.e. Herakles, Perseus etc. We might also interpret the contemporary marks of individuality at the door – the most common being the inscription of owner’s name – as a sign of identification between the owner and the main door of the house, where it is the ownership that confers the power.
Thure - Pule

for the powerful mortals and the other for immortals. While gods may retain their powerful status when crossing the door of a divine cave, mortals cannot enter it without experiencing fear. In a different context, in v109-12, Penelope describes the distinction between the two gates of dreams, a distinction further accentuated by the use of different materials for their construction:

Stranger, truly dreams are by nature perplexing and full of messages which are hard to interpret; nor by any means will everything [in them] come true for mortals. For there are two gates of insubstantial dreams; one [pair] is wrought of horn and one of ivory. Of these, [the dreams] which come through [the gate of] sawn ivory are dangerous to believe, for bring messages which will not issue in deeds; but [the dreams] which come forth through [the gate of] polished horn, these have power in reality, whenever any mortal sees them.

Thus staying eini thuresi/eini pulesi (eiiθηρησι/εινί πάλησι), should be not understood in a purely topographical sense. The ‘phrase’ also evokes a specific ‘status’ acquired by those who sojourn in this place. But we need always remember that this occurs not because thure/pule constitute a specific location, but inasmuch as they are experienced as things which are co-produced with their place (in the sense of chore) and which generate specific identities within the bodies that are related to them. This enables us to understand why thuraze (θώραξε) should not be translated...
in a simple topographical sense – as Benveniste suggests and other scholars accept, that is, as ‘outside’. The term occurs in relation to the house, but also in different contexts such as the holes of the axes, a ship, body, river, and the sea. It is the last instance that Benveniste uses as an example to reinforce his arguments about the thure and the concept of ‘outside’. We are not necessarily proposing a different translation, since our language probably does not possess a term that corresponds to the Homeric experience of transition, as described in this chapter. But what thure and thuraze have in common is that both evoke the experience of transition within the Homeric text. This is true; however they differ because thure evokes the experience of a specific thing we call ‘door’ from which thuraze appears – at least in the quotations that do not refer to the house – dissociated. To think both thure and thuraze only through the concept of ‘outside’ would be to erase any trace of the experience of transition and with it anxiety that crisscrosses the Homeric text.

location and coming into being as co-existent with place and thing, 2. That the experience influences the identity of a body which falls within the relation.

To rehearse briefly his line of thought: if in the above quote thuraze can only be translated as ‘outside’, given the linguistic relation with the word for the door, thure was also conceived as ‘outside’. See above pp. 161.

66 Є: 3 τού δή θάραξε ἐγραμμένα...1418 εἰ τινὰ που μετ’ ἑσοτέρω λάθητα στείχοντα θάραξε, 1444 ἄτοιχε τὸ θάραξε, 1461 ημέρα θάραξε, μ254 ἐφίλημε θάραξε, μ62 δί το θάραξε, κ176 ποθῶν ἐλλακτικόθεν θάραξε, α738, β299 δί εἰς προθόρου θάραξε, τ58-9 ἐξελθέθεν θάραξε...εἰσαθα θάραξε, τ556 ἐλθόν θάραξε, υ16 ἅπε θάραξε φέραν, ι179 εἰς ἑξίσοθα θάραξε...χ90 ἢ θάραξε κλαίετον ἐξελθόντε, Σ215 βή δὲ θάραξε, ο451 ἢ τομαφύνενα θάραξε, χ375 ἐξελθόντες μεγάλων ἐξεσθαί θάραξε ἐκ φόνου εἰς αὐλήν, ο465 δώμων ἐβῇρε θάραξε, τ1361 δόμου ἐκπέμμασθε θάραξε, τ367 τοῖς ἐξεκι κάθεθα θάραξε, τ1456 τοί δ' ἔδρακεν ὅμως, τίθεναν δὲ θάραξε, ψ387 εἴ οἴκου Φιλιτίττου ἄλτο θάραξε... Ω572 Ημελέθης δ' οἴκου λέων ἐς ἄλτο θάραξε... Σ29 δομαὶ... ἐκ δε θάραξε ἐδράμον.

67 Φ420-3: ἢ κε δ' ὅπων / ἢντα τιτυποκείμενος, πελάκεως δ' οὐκ ἡμίφοροτα δάντινων ἀριστήσα στειλείς, δια δ' ἀμπέρες ἧλθε θάραξε / λός σαλαβιαρῆς.

68 Σ447: οὔδε θάραξε εἰλαν ἐξείναι.

69 Ε994: ἢ κε δ' ὅπων οἱ μητρὸς δόρω μελίνον ὧν πεί θάραξε.

70 Φ29: πατσιμοιο, τοιο ἔχδῃ θάραξε, Φ237

71 Π407: ἢ κε δ' πότων θάραξε, Ε410: ἀλός πολύνοι.

72 To rehearse briefly his line of thought: if in the above quote thuraze can only be translated as ‘outside’, given the linguistic relation with the word for the door, thure was also conceived as ‘outside’. See above pp. 161.
4.3.3. *HORAI AND HORAN*: ‘TIME’ AND ‘SIGHT’ AS CONTROL MECHANISMS

The experience of transition that *thure/pule* evokes induced a double anxiety in the Homeric Greeks. One the one hand – as we have just showed – a prolonged sojourn at the door/gate generates a fearful ambiguity. On the other hand, there is an anxiety that crossing of *thure/pule* will not result in the appropriate transformation and that this will destroy the established order of experience named *thalamos*, *megaron*, Hades, etc. Homeric Greeks responded to this double fear by setting up mechanisms of control, in order to guarantee the appropriate passage. These mechanisms involve the experience of ‘time’ and ‘sight’. It would be interesting to analyse the general relation between fear and ambiguity in the Homeric context, but this is beyond the scope of the thesis. We will restrict ourselves to examining the specific mechanisms whereby ambiguity is eliminated, at least as this is presented in the text.

The mechanism exists as what might be described as a ‘compression of time’. *Thure* and *pule*, being ‘places’ of transition, must be crossed quickly. In receiving the stranger, the host quickly approaches the door as soon as he sees him.\(^{73}\) In α119,\(^{74}\) Homer explicitly states that it is improper to let a visitor wait at the *thure, detha (δηθώ)* ‘for long’. In other passages verbs used to denote the crossing of doors\(^{75}\) or gates,\(^{76}\)

\(^{73}\) ζ34: *came hurrying to him across the porch (ἔσωντ' ἐνὶ πρόθυροιν), δ37: the men hurried through the hall (μέγαρου διήλθον) κ230,312: at once she opened the shining doors, and came out (αἰών' ἐξέλθοσσα θύρας ἀδέξε φαθείναι).\(^{74}\) α119-20: [Telemachos] saw Athene and went straight to the forecourt, the heart within him scandalized that a guest should still be standing at the doors (*Πελείαμαχος* ἔτι ὁθήνην, / βή δ' ἵθις προθύροιο, νεμεσοθή θ' ἑνὶ θυμὶ / ἔπεινον δὴθα θύρῃσιν εὑρεσάμεν) \(^{75}\) υ387: Philoitios sprang to his feet and went outside the house (ἐξ οἴκου Φίλοιτίος ἄλτο θύραξ), Ω572: the son of Peleus bounded to the door of the house like a lion (*Πελείαμαχος* δ' ὁ τοῦ θύραξ, ο191: drove them out the front door (ἔλασαν προθύροιο), Ο123: sprang up and out through the forecourt (ἀντω δέκε προθύροι).
underline this speed: *seuo* (σεύο) ‘set in violent motion, chase’ / *elauno* (ἐλαύνο) ‘to thrust, drive through’ / *ornumi* (ὀρνομί) ‘rouse, spring up’ / *allomai* (ἀλλομαί) ‘leap, spring’ / *memaa* (μέμαα) ‘press forward, eager, quick’. Because crossing of the threshold should be quick, we can refer to a ‘compression of time’, which operates to speed the transition and thus minimize the ambiguity and fear that accompanies it. However, it should be remembered that Homeric experience of time does not easily fit our concept of time, that is, a thing which can be divided into units of measurement. By contrast, the Homeric experience of time as the term *hore* (ὄρη) indicates, is related to the ‘right time’ within something occurs. It is illuminating that the *Horai* (ὢραι) ‘Hours’, the personification of *hore*, are the guards at the Gates of Heaven, whereas these Gates are *automata* (αὐτόματα) ‘they move of themselves’.77 Thus a repetitive – always the same – opening and closing of the gates is achieved through a mechanical device which controls the time of crossing and eliminating – or we might better say repressing – any fear of ambiguity.

We might as well say that the ‘compression of time’, manifested at the *thure/pule*, announces a compression of ‘space’, in the sense that the experience of being at the door/gate is virtually eliminated. An example comes from the myth of the Labyrinth. The space of the Labyrinth is the experience of ambiguity and anxiety that the prolonged crossing of the *thure/pule* produces. Moreover, two ambiguous

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76 Β808: all the gates were opened and the people swept through them (*πώςαν δ' ὁλέγνυντο πύλαι, ἐκ δ' ἐσσαυν ὁ λαῷ*), Η1: Hektor the glorious swept on through the gates (*πύλαιν ἐξηροῦντο φαΐδμον Ἱκτηρ*), Χ413: storming out of the Dardanian gates (*ἐξεκαθένια μεμαίωσε πύλαιν Δαρδαγίων*).

77 E749-51, Θ393-5: and moving of themselves groaned the gates of the sky that the Hours guarded, those Hours to whose charge is given the huge sky and Olympos, to open up the dense darkness or again to close it. (*αὐτόμαται δ' πύλαι μέγικον οὐρανοῦ δις ἔχων Ὀραι, ἡς ἐπετείρατο μέγις οὐρανος Ολυμπός τε / ἡμῶν ἀνακέλαται πυκνὸν νέφος ἡ δ' ἐπιθείναι*)
creatures are related to it, a woman, Ariadne, and a monster, the Minotaur. To return to the Homeric text, we may note that to compensate for the compression, another ‘space’ in front of the door has been developed. In the majority of Homeric passage related to thure, action ‘takes place’ at the prothoron (πρόθορον).78 Benveniste argues:

"...On the other hand, the material sense of *dhwer- is reflected in certain ancient derivatives connected with architecture, like Greek pro-thuron (πρόθορον) ‘vestibule’ (literally what is in front of the door)"79

However, prothuron should not be understood merely in relation to architectural topography. The term does not signify simply the ‘space before’ the door, but evokes the anticipation of the experience of the thure. Prothuron evokes a state of preparation for the changes that the crossing necessitates. To insure the change, a mechanism of control is set up, which includes mainly horan (ὁραν), a visual activity, the guarding of thure/pule. The already established relation of the Homeric experience of vision with ambiguity and aggressiveness not only establishes vision as an appropriate mechanism of control, but generates its ‘disembodiment’ as well. This disembodiment of vision is imprinted on the configurations of the thure/pule.80 Every door/gate has two surfaces with different configuration, for the crossing is done from both directions, and the changes required are of a different kind. Between these

78 It is worth noting that: "... tragedy happens in a prothuron, a space before a door. The characteristic tragic settings is some kind of boundary, usually a gate or door...and stage action often focuses on the door" PADEL, R., 1990: "Making Space Speak," Nothing to Do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama In Its Social Context, eds. J. Winkler, F. Zeitlin, Princeton University Press, pp. 355.

79 BENVENISTE, E., op.cit. pp. 256.

80 This category of the disembodiment of vision is spell out in more detail below, on section 4.3.3.2.
different 'facades' there it is the 'collapsed space' of the transition. In the
Homeric text only one 'facade' is usually described, that which we might call
'entrance', because it involves the direction of crossing that necessitates major
changes, and it is this the very same surface that becomes the site of 'disembodied
vision'.

Let us see now the description of such a surface, the king Alkinoos' palace
main door, so vividly presented in the Odyssey. Because this is the door of domos,
the description refers to the surface facing towards the 'outside' which should be
experienced as 'entrance' for the visitors.

118 1-94: But now Odysseus came to the famous house of Alkinoos, but the heart pondered much in him as
he stood before coming to the bronze threshold. For as from the sun the light goes or from the moon,
such was the glory on the high-roofed house of great-hearted Alkinoos. Brazen were the walls run about
it in either direction from the inner room to the door, with a cobalt frieze encircling, and golden were the
doors that guarded the close of the palace, and silver were the pillars set in the brazen threshold, and
there was a silver lintel above, and a golden handle, and dogs made out of gold and silver were on each

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81 In Roman times Janus, the god with the double face was a gate-god, see TRUMBULL H.C., op.cit.,
p. 97.

82 In contemporary horror films, from this collapsed space of the threshold extraordinary creatures come
into the world. It is also worth noting that the door, sight and monsters are related in films of this genre.
C. Clover writes: "[In] Cronenberg's Scanners... Revok... drills a small hole in his forehead, just at the
bridge of his nose, to let the 'people' out, and then covers it over with a bandage on which he paints an
eye. A 'door,' he explains to Dr. Ruth, 'I put an eye on the door so they won't know it's a door, and
they can't get back in because they see the eye.' What appears to be an eye, in other words, is in fact a
mask—and not only a mask, but a secondary, counter defective mask, designed and installed after the fact
to protect a natural and original vulnerability. ...To keep... [the 'people'] out, he must establish an
appearance of awareness and vigilance (the 'eye'). Thus is established the notion of seeing as a weapon-
awareness as an aggressive tool. Revok the monster scanner, using the 'eye' in his head to control and
destroy others." CLOVER, C. 1992: Men, Women and the Chain saws: Gender in the modern horror
film, BFI publishing, pp. 192.
side of it, fashioned by Hephaistos in his craftsmanship and cunning, to watch over the palace of great-hearted Alkinoos, being themselves immortal, and all their days they are ageless. 83

Odysseus has only one choice in front of this glorious entrance: to cross it quickly and unseen, for else he will be subjected to the laws of hospitality. 85 Athena wraps him in a deep mist while he is passing by the Phaiakians to reach the queen. However, he can cross the threshold without being seen in the first place, because the guards do not see him. Silver and golden dogs \textit{phulasso (φυλάσσω)} 'watch over' the palace. They are \textit{phulakes (φύλακες)} 'guards', whereas 'real' dogs are \textit{thuraoroi (θυραωροί)} 'guards of the thure}. The very fact however that silver and golden dogs can substitute for live ones is a result of what we calling the disembodiment of vision. Before elaborating these issues we shall present the different kinds of watching over the \textit{thurē/pule} in the epics.

In the Homeric text four terms are used to denote the guards: \textit{thuraoros (θυραωρός)} 'guard of the \textit{thure}', \textit{pulaoros (πολαωρός)} 'guard of the \textit{pule}', \textit{phulax (φύλαξ)} 'guard',

83 ή81-94: οὖν παρ’ Ὀδυσσείας / Ἀλκινόου πρὸς δόματα· ιε κλυτα; πολλα δὲ οἱ κηρὸ/ ὅρμειν· ἵσταμεν, πρὸν χάλκεων οὐδῶν ἰκεσθαι. / ὡς τε γὰρ ἡλίου αἰγίλη πέλεν ἑν ςελήνης / δῶμα καθ’ ὅπερπεφές μεγαλήτουρος Ἀλκινόοιο. / χάλκεοι μὲν γὰρ τοὐχτι ἐλθάτε/ ἑνθα καὶ ἑνθα, / ἐς μυχὸν ἐς οὐδοῦ, περὶ θρήγκος θυάνους; / χρύσεωι δὲ θάραι πυκνοῖν δόμων ἑντὸς ἑργάν’ / ἠγρύρει δὲ σταθμοῖν ἐν χαλκέω ἠτιασαν οὐδοῖ, / ἠγρύρειν δ’ ὅ’ ὑπὲρθόριον, χρυσή δὲ κορώνη. / χρύσει δ’ ἐκάτερθε καὶ ἠγρύρει κόνες ἡπόν, / οὗς Ἰηρασσα ἐποτε ἠνυῖσθα προπίδεσσοι / δῶμα φύλασσομενει μεγαλήτουρος Ἀλκινόοιο, / ἑβεκάντος οὖντας καὶ ἀγήρος ἡματα πάντα.

84 π135: lightly (quickly) he stepped over the threshold and went on into the palace (καρπαλίμας ὀπέρ οὐδῶν ἐβῆσεν δῷματος εἰςα). Lattimore translates \textit{karpalimos} as 'lightly', but in fact the term has the meaning of 'swift, quick' and it is used as an epithet of feet.

85 See chapter on \textit{megaron}. It is interesting also to note "...the custom in Greece of welcoming a victor in the Olympian games into the city through a breach in the walls, instead of causing him to enter by the gates, with its implied subjection to all the laws of hospitality." TRUMBULL H.C., op.cit., pp. 7.

86 π139-40: but now long-suffering great Odysseus went on through the house, wearing still the deep mist Athene had drifted about him (οὔτερ δ’ ὅθ’ διὰ δῶμα πολλάκτας δίος Ὀδυσσείας πολλὴν ἤξο’ ἑρω, ἓν οἱ περίχευς Αθηνῆ).
and skopos (σκόπος) ‘watcher’. Each of the above terms differentiates the guards not only by the places they guard, but also by the senses through which they perceive when in action. With the exception of phulax the other three are related to sight.

Thuraoros (θυρωρός) is literally he who horan (ὁράν) ‘watches’ over the thure. The term occurs only once in the text (X64) and refers to the dogs. But, the fact that “a newly arrived stranger confronts a guard dog at the door” and nobody else, is evidence that only dogs were regularly employed as guards en protesi thuresin (ἐν πρώτῃ θύρῃ) ‘at the first door’ of the house. The ambivalent role of the dog as faithful but possibly hostile to its master situates it at the thure. Priam denotes this fear when he says:

X66-71: “my dogs in front of my doorway will rip me raw, after some man with stroke of the sharp bronze spear, or with spearcast, has torn the life out of my body; those dogs I raised in my halls to be at my table, to guard my gates, who will lap my blood in the savagery of their anger and then lie down in my courts.”

87 “This motif occurs five times in the Odyssey in a variety of forms...The immortal gold and silver dogs, the work of Hephaistus, that guard the palace of the Phaeacian king Alkinous (η91-94)... The eerie reception of Odysseus’ men by the enchanted wolves and mountain lions surroundings Circe’s palace, which fawn on the men and wag their tails at them like dogs greeting their master (κ212-19)... The four dogs of Eumaeus, which like wild beasts, attack Odysseus and force him to sit helplessly on the ground (ξ21)... Later upon the arrival of Telemachus, these same dogs do not bark but with fawning and tail-wagging welcome a master whom they recognize (κ4-10)... [while] these same dogs, upon the arrival of Athena, cower, with a whimper, to the other side of the steadying (κ162-63... Odysseus’ reception by his old dog Argus (ο291-327).” REECE, S., 1993: The Stranger’s Welcome: Oral theory and the Aesthetics of the Homeric Hospitality Scene, The University of Michigan Press, pp. 14-5.

88 Χ66-71: οὖν δ’ ἐν πύλῃ κυνῆς πρόσπησε θύρῃσιν ὁμοίως ἐρώσθησιν, ἐπεὶ κρίες δὲ ὑπὲρ χελῶν μετὰ ἔμφασιν ἐπιτηδεύουσι, / οὐ δὲ τρέφον ἐν μεγάροις τραπεζῆς θυρωροῦς, / οὕτω δὲν αἵμα πιόντες ἐνδώσαντες περὶ θημάτ’ ἐκάστου τεθρόνος.

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For its savagery the dog is considered an ambivalent animal, characterized as *lusseter* (λοσσετής) 'one who rages'; a term related etymologically to *lukos* (λύκος) 'wolf' the 'symbol' of blood-thirstiness in the text.\(^{89}\) The ever present possibility of becoming a wild beast again – even though the dog has been tamed and rendered obedient to his master – invests the dog with ambiguity,\(^{90}\) and puts it at the door. Odysseus addresses the suitors – another ambivalent category – as ‘dogs’.\(^{91}\) In the text, the term dog also denotes shame, and is mainly applied to women.\(^{92}\) In \(\lambda.441-56\), the ghost of Agamemnon – killed by his wife – advises Odysseus not to share with his wife everything he knows. “Tell her part of it but let the rest be hidden in silence,”\(^{93}\) for, he explains “there is no trusting in women.”\(^{94}\) In this phrase the fear of the unpredictable ‘nature’ of women is evident. But although women are an ambiguous category, and so comparable to dogs, a woman’s place is certainly not at the door and especially not at the front door. A woman’s place is where she will preserve her domesticated status: in *thalamos*; where the term *thalamos* evokes a field of experiences which is dictated by the reproduction of fixity. Though it constitutes part of the experience of *domos*, *thalmos* may or may not correspond to a specific location within the Homeric house. The only woman in the epics who opens the door

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\(^{89}\) See \(\lambda.471, \lambda.720.\)


\(^{91}\) \(\chi.35: \varepsilon κόνες.\)

\(^{92}\) \(\zeta.344, \tau.91.\)

\(^{93}\) \(\lambda.441: \tauον \muη \ποιε και \sigma γυναικε περ ηπιος ειλαι / μηδ' οι δαπανα πιερασκεψενυ, δεν κ' εδο ειδης, / αλλα το μεν φαινει, το δε και κεκρουμενον ειλαι."\)

\(^{94}\) \(\lambda.456: \varepsilonπι ευθεί τοπος γυναιξιν.\)
is Circe and she is of course a witch. The case of Klytaimnestra is used by Homer only as an excuse for the mistrust of the women.95

The second term *pulaoros* (πυλαωρός) is literally he who *horan* 'watches' over the *pulai* and occurs only twice in the text. In Φ530 *pulaoroi* open and close the gates of Troy,96 and in Ω681 where Hermes tries to escort Priam from the Greek camp without being seen by the guards.97 They are characterized as *agakleitoi* (ἄγακλειτοι) ‘illustrious, glorious’, in the first occurrence, and *hieroi* (ἱεροὶ) ‘strong, mighty, holy, sacred’, in the second.

The *phulax* can stand either in front of a *thure* or of a *pule*.98 What distinguishes him from the guard proper of these locations i.e. *thuraoros* and *pulaoros*, is that he guards during the night. The danger of falling asleep,99 or of ‘failing to perceive’ *lanthanein* (λανθάνειν) 100 during a ‘very dark night’(νύξ...

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95 In Λ432, Agamemnon says that “she with thoughts surpassingly grisly splashed the shame on herself and her sex, on women still to come, even on the one whose acts are virtuous.” (ἡ δ' ἔξοχα λογρά ἱδοια / οἱ θεᾶς εἴχεν καὶ ἑσυχασμένησθαι οἴσισθαι / θηλυκέροι γνακείζει, καὶ η κ' ἔφεργος ἔριν.)
96 Φ530-2: [Priam] beside the wall set in motion the glorious guards of the gateway; ‘Hold the gates wide open in your hands, so that our people in their flight can get inside the city...” (Πρίαμος... ὃ τρόπων παρά τείχος ἀγακλείτους πυλαωροὺς, / "κατασταμάτην ἐν χερι πύλας ἔχετ' εἰς δ' ἐκ λαοὶ / ἔλθησας προτέτοι ἤτοι καρποτοίτες).
97 Ω680-1: how to escort King Priam from the ships and not be seen by the devoted gate-guards (ὅπες Πρίαμον βασιλῆς / νησίν ἐκπέμψει λαόν ιεροῦ πυλαωροὺς).
98 K127: with the sentries before the gates (πρὸ πυλῶν ἐν φυλάκεσσι) also 1477 in relation to *thure*, see note 99.
99 K181-2: they found the leaders of the pickets by no means asleep but all of them were awake, and sat by their weapons (οἴδε μὲν εὔδοντας φυλάκους ἄντεκτος εἶχον ἃ ἄλλ.' ἔγησαν τοὺς τεύχοντας ἥσυχον πάντες). Ω4444-7: there were sentries, who had just begun to make their dinner, but about these the courier Argeiphontes drifted sleep, on all, and quickly opened the gate, and shoved back the door-bars, and brought in Priam (οἱ δὲ νεόν κορι δόρπαι φυλακτήρες παρενόην, / τοίς δὲ δρῦς ἔσεθον εἴχεν διάκτορος Ἀργείφοντης / πάσιν, ἀμφαρ δ' ἔδεξε πύλας καὶ ἀπώκην ψηφίας, / ἐς δ' ἔγινεν Πρίαμον).
100 1474-7: but when the night had come to me in its darkness, then I broke the close-compacted doors of the chamber and got away...unnoticed by the guarding men (ἐπῆλθε νῦς ἐβεβεβήν / καὶ τὸν ἐγὼ θαλαμοῦ ἔδεξεν πυκνὸς ἄρατος / ἔξων ἐξελύσον... / λαθὼν φυλάκων τ' ἄνδρας), Ω566: he could not get by the pickets (οἴδε γάρ ἐν φυλάκοις λάθοιν). *Lanthano* (λανθάνον) in the Homeric text has the meaning of ‘escape notice
The skopos (σκόπος) watches the ‘geographical’ space, or the interior of the house. In both cases he/she does not remain in a place all the time, as the other guards do. In the case of geographical space, it is always a man that skopiazein (σκοπιάζειν) ‘spies from a high place’ as he stays at skopie (σκοπίη) ‘look-out place’, on a rock or mountain. He must be confident in the speed of his feet in order to run and inform the others of what he saw. In the context of the house, the text inform us that skopos of the house is a woman, though an ‘aged one’ greus (γερής). Eurukleia, an old woman, is the skopos of the female servants in Odysseus’ megaron. Aged women enjoy freedom of movement and in the context of the epics men trust them. Both Telemachos and Odysseus made Eurukleia their confidante, unlike Penelope.
Eurukleia is *periphron* (περίφρον) ‘very sensible,’ and she calls other servants *kunes* (κόνες) ‘bitches’. This freedom of movement may well be attributed to their special status. Old women had outlived their biological usefulness. Having lost their fertility and their femininity they belong to a category between male and female. As such they become persons who are proper door and key-keepers inside the house, though they can not watch over the main door. Eurukleia controls — opens and locks but also stays behind closed doors spying on the house. Her ability to watch and keep her mouth shut make her a *skopos*. No ‘winged words’ escapes the

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106 r353-7: I do have one old woman, whose thoughts are prudent...circumspect Eurekleia (ἐστι δὲ μοι γυνῆς ποικίλα φρεσκ ὑδείς ἐχοσσα... περίφρον Εὐρύκλεια). It is as a result of being ‘full of years’ [γυνὴ δὲ μὲν εἰκὼνα παλαιγενέτ (1386, γυνη παλαιγενές χ395, παλαιή τ348]. That old women are considered wise within the text [τ346: not unless there is some aged and virtuous woman whose heart has had to endure as many troubles as mine has (εἰ μὴ τις γυνῆς ἐστι παλαιή, καθαρὰ ὑδια, ἢ τις δὴ τέκτηκε τόσο φρεσίν οὐσία τ᾽ ἐγὼ περ)].

107 τ372.

108 J. Bremmer argues that “Women existed in order to serve the males whether for sexual pleasure or the higher interest of producing an heir. An old women resembled an object that had passed its usefulness and could now be discarded.” BREMNER J., op.cit., pp. 203.

109 In the Homeric text there is no evidence of old women or even men, opening or guarding the main door of the house. This role is attributed to dogs. However in classical times the situation is different: “For the male Athenians it was totally unthinkable that a decent women who had not yet reached the menopause would open the door and in this way expose herself to a perfect stranger. In his Characters (28.3), Theophrastos stresses that only courtesans would open the door in person. A decent female porter therefore had to be an *old* woman. It even looks as if old women were indeed regularly employed as door-keepers, since in Euripides’ Troiades (194f ) Hekabe dolefully wonders whether, now that she is a prisoner of war, she will have to keep watch in the hall...In the mythological tradition, this custom is most probably reflected in the story that the Graai (Old Women) were custodians of the Gorgones.” BREMNER J., Ibid, pp. 193.

110 α441-2: [Eurekleia] went out of the room, and pulled the door to behind her with a silver hook, and with a strap drew home the door bolt ([Ευρύκλεια]... βῆ τρ’ ἵππον καὶ κελάματι, θόρυβον δ’ ἐπέρριπσε κυρὸν / ἀργυρῇ, ἕκκε δὲ κηλίῳ ἐπάνοιον ἱμάντει). The role of *skopos* as spy can be seen also in the case where Hephaisostos uses Sun to spy on his unfaithful wife Aphrodite. The Sun tells him about the meeting of the lovers and thus Hephaisostos is able to trap them [9302: for Helios watch for him, and told him the story (’Ἡλίος γὰρ οἱ σκοπιήν ἔχεν εἶναι τε μισθήν)].
‘fence of her teeth’, her words are ‘without wings’ and remain inside her. Skepesthai (σκέπτεσθαι), a verb related to skopos, means in later Greek ‘to think.’ In the Homeric text skeptesthai indicate not only a prying gaze, “a shooting phenomenon, that surveys and irrevocably grasps its object once found,” but also the ability to keep secret the knowledge she has gained. Although Eurukleia has no power of action, she becomes powerful by conveying to her master the secrets of the house that she alone knows. Odysseus orders her to speak and identify the female servants who dishonored him and who therefore deserve to die. Their lives are in her hands and she promises she will speak the ‘truth’ aletheie (ἀληθεία). Truth thus denotes a continuous surveillance, an alertness of the senses, from which nothing escapes lanthanein, and includes the ability to keep the information acquired concealed as it were in lethe – until the moment of its revelation. If for the phulax it is very easy to lanthanein ‘to escape notice’, the skopos – being in

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112 Χ398: she had no winged words for an answer (τὴ δ’ ἀπεργός ἐπιέλατο μήθος).

113 The occurrence of this verb are few (three) in Homer, but nevertheless extremely interesting. In Odyssey,... between Scylla and Charybdis Odysseus and his crew look suddenly (idomen) with terror at Charibdis as Scylla snatches away six men. ‘Throwing a sharp, spying glance into the ship [skepsamenos δ’ εσ’ ένα] and at the same time after my companions [meth’ hetairous], at that moment” says Odysseus, “I grasped with my noos their feet and hands above as there were being raised aloft” (μ.245-9). [In 11:161 ] Hector ‘spies out’ the sources of danger. His experience consists of a personal, almost physical ‘thrust’ aimed at the sources of danger, whether they be sound or the direct sight of oncoming spears. His experience is a synaesthetic one. It makes no complete distinction between sound and sight. His ‘spying’... is something more than in what we designate as visual perception... Skepesthai [as] kind of bold, snatching hiddeness... the accustomed duty of sitting sentinel (skopos hire). B792 To snatch information and run. And it is not just any piece of information; it is true and sure.” PRIER R.A., 1989: Theta Idesthai: The Phenomenology of Sight and Appearance in Archaic Greek, Florida State University Press, pp. 33.

114 Χ420: I will tell you the whole truth (ἀληθείαν καταλέξαμ).

115 Note the experiential quality of truth in Homer in relation to later metaphysical speculations.
continuous alertness, perceiving and keeping his knowledge – is able to speak true.
Interestingly enough lethe (λήθη B33) ‘forgetfulness’, is related to the gates: Lethos is
the son of Puleos (B843, P288) and “the name of the son is an epithet for his father.”

However it is not only the sight of the guards which is located at the thure or the pule.
When Hephaistos, with the help of the penetrating sight/light of the skopos sun,
discovers his wife with her lover, the gods come and stand in front of the door
laughing, as they ‘gaze upon’ (eis-oran) the trapped lovers. This is not a spectacle for
the women, and all goddesses should remain in their homes instead.

In Γ149, old men sit at the gates of Troy, discussing and watching the fight that
takes place outside the walls. Priam invites Helen to look (ἴθη). The verb used is again
horan (ὁράω). From the same place Priam and Hekabe watch the death of their son. In
Χ25, Priam (ἴδεν ὄφθαλμοισι) ‘watched with his eyes’ Achilles coming to kill his son,
and both he and his wife try to persuade Hektor to enter the gates, where he could be
safe. Hekuba in despair, shows her bare breast as a last resort to persuade him.
Women’s breasts can be their compensation for their un-powered gaze, as we shall
see later on.

116 Hence the conception that the truth is hidden in the body, made torture a means to recover it. See
117 SVENBRO J., 1993: Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient Greece, Cornell
University Press, pp. 78.
118 ὃς-24: θηλότεραι δ' θεια μὲν οὖν αἰδοί οίκοι ἐκάστη. ἡ ἔστιν ὃς ἐν προθήροις θείοι, δυτήρες ἔσαν ἀ δοκέστους
8' ἔρ' ἐνάφρον γέλος μακάριοι θείοι ἡ τέχνης εἰοράκι τοιοῦτος ἡφαίστεοι. Note that εἰοράω means
‘look upon, gaze upon steadily, behold, endure the sight, look on with admiration, revere, respect’.
119 Χ80-3. Note that: “Anthropologists tell us that iconographically pictures of eyes and pictures of breasts
are identical.” DE FOREST, M., 1993: “Clytemnestra’s Breast and the Evil Eye”, Woman’s Power,
4.3.3.1. THE AMBIGUITY AND AGGRESSIVENESS OF SIGHT

J-P. Vernant presents in an exemplary way the Greek experience of vision, when he writes:

"...for the Greeks, vision was only possible if there existed a total reciprocity between what was seen and the one who saw, conveying if not a complete identity between the two, then at least a very close kinship. Because the sun in the sky illuminated all things, it, too, was an eye that saw everything; and if one’s eye saw, it was because it radiated a sort of light comparable to that of the sun. The ray of light that emanated from the object and made it visible was of the same nature as the optical ray that issued from the eye and enabled it to see. The emitting object and the receiving subject, the light rays and the optical rays, belonged to the same category of reality, about which we can say that the physical-psychic opposition was foreign to it, or that it was both on physical and psychic order. Light was vision, and vision was luminous...the language itself testified to this ambivalence. The verbs that describe the acts of seeing and watching, blepein, derkesthai, leussein, used as direct objects not only the thing the gaze focused on, but also the igneous-luminous substance projected by the eye just as one might throw a projectile. And these rays of fire, which we would call physical, carried with them the feelings, passions, and conditions of the soul, which we call psychic, of the one who was looking. The same verbs also use as grammatical objects terms denoting terror, savagery, murdering fury. The gaze, when it reached the object, transmitted to it what the viewer, upon seeing it, experienced." 120

On one hand, it is the specific relation, described by Vernant, a quasi-identification between the seeing and the seen that invests sight with ambiguity. On the other it is the relation between light and sight that makes vision harmful and also permits what we are calling ‘disembodiment of vision’. This ambiguity and aggressiveness binds together sight and the experience of the thure/pule by establishing vision as an adequate mechanism of control. The vocabulary of watching over thure/pule testifies to that. Skopos not only denotes the person who gazes, but also the target, the object

on which one fixes one's eye. The reciprocity between the seeing and the seen, the
gazing and the gazed at, is illuminating. The contest that Penelope sets the suitors in
φ75-6, is to take Odysseus' bow to string it "with the greatest ease, and send an arrow
clean through all the twelve axes", i.e., to shoot though the holes of the axes so as the
arrow would 'come out' thuraze (θώραξε) – literally at the door. During the battle
the warrior has to see a chink in the shining armor and shoot the arrow through it, in
order to wound a rival. The sight denoted by the word skopos is a sight that pierces, a
penetrating stare. This way of seeing makes the 'subject' and the 'object' collide. The
sight of the skopos of the house penetrates all the openings of the house. Ope,
opaia122 is both the sight and the opening.123 The eye and the door become identical,
by way of the verb horao that indicates a "durative, intense, lengthy regard." The
site of the sight is the opening of the door or the gate, the point of transition, the place
of change. Furthermore, the person who sees, the way of seeing, the place from which
he sees, and what he sees are never apart: Scopos -scopiazein - scopie - scopos.

Moreover, the aggressiveness of sight is due to the relation between sight and
light. The phrase "glancing and shooting fire from his eyes (πήρ ζ' ὄφωλμοισι
δεδορκώς τ446), describe in the epics, the experience of sight, as light emitted from the
eyes.125 In the context of the battle many linguistic expressions reveal the
aggressiveness of the sight/light. R.A Prier writes:

121 Φ420-3: ἥκε δ' ὀφαίον / ἄντα τυπεχόμενος, πελάκεων δ' οὐκ ἔμπροτε πάνων / πρώτης στειλέης, διὰ δ' ἄμμερες
ἥλιεν θύραζε ἕς χαλκομαρής.
122 Opea – which stems from the verb of seeing (opopa) – denotes in the Homeric text, an opening, a
hole, while peri-ope the look-out place.
123 CHANTRAINE P., op.cit., s.v. ὅαη.
125 "The Greeks believed that the glance had power, mainly power to harm. According to popular optic
tility, the eyes emitted rays, which made vision possible. Plutarch (Quaestiones Convivales 682f-683a)
"As Achilles shows himself without armor to the Trojans in Iliad 1205-14, Athena throws her aegis about him and pours around his head a cloud of gold: 'she fired from him an all appearing blaze (phlōga pamphanoosan), and as signal fires burn after the setting of the sun, so the beam blazed up for all to behold themselves'. The hero actually emits, or more exactly 'appears as', a beam of light. His power lies in his armor. From his shield appears afar a gleam/beam (selas) like the moon (T374). Homer compares this far-reaching gleam to that of a burning fire (selas kaiomeno pyros). His helmet, waving with golden plumes, is like a star in appearance (T38-2). His eyes among these arms appeared forth terribly under their lids as if beams of light (T16-7). Achilles is not only reflecting light by or in his armor (we are not dealing here essentially with any kind of physical principle of reflection), he also actually is seen to emit light from his body. He is light incarnate. Achilles then becomes light himself and as such he is powerful that no other man dare look upon face to face (anten eisidein)." Prier also argues in relation to derkesthai the verb that "describes the glance of light and terror. This particular linguistic experience entails the dashing, sharp and deadly glance of a snake (drakon) and, if one wishes to bring etymology to bear, also a connection with light itself: the streaming of light from the eyes. There is moreover, specific evidence in the Iliad (M202-9) of a close relationship between drakon and teras (marvel, portent), the "power of sight" and appearance that experientially links the glancing "that" to the perceiving "this". It is justifiable, therefore, to regard as identical the flashing fury of the archaic hero (deinon paptainon: o)179) and the terror of a Gorgon on a hero’s shield (deinon derkomene A37). Sight and light become one."126

Eyes and shining surfaces both project light, they are both aggressive and can harm an enemy in battle. The bright shields (sakeon phaeinon), blind the enemy in N340-2. In a different context another term opis (δπις) 'sight' also denotes harm. It refers to the gives a scientific basis for belief in the evil eye by adapting Democritus’ theory of simulacra, emanations from the eye (Diels 77). The English language reveals the prevalence of this notion. words for light (flash, flare, gleam, glow) are also used to describe the glance. Moreover, the rays emitted by the eye had physical force in that they could transmit the observer’s feelings. That is, the glance had the power to foster or harm the person or object observed. Consequently, a glance charged with envy and malice would naturally hurt what was viewed. For this reason, Plutarch likened φωωος to poisoned arrows (Quaestiones Convivales 681e). “pp.132...Zeus’ thunderbolt, his traditional weapon, is hurled not by his powerful hand, but from his eyes (Ag.469-70)... Seeing involves both power and danger.” DE FOREST M., op.cit., pp. 141.

126 PRIER R.A., op.cit., passim.
sight of the Gods, and the Gods’ gaze always entails punishment.\textsuperscript{127} We would suggest a further recognition of the aggression of sight – this time in relation to the veil. We now want to propose a different approach to the issue of veil and the feminine gaze in Homer, an issue not unrelated to this analysis. The following quotation can be described as the conventional approach to veil and femininity within scholarship:

“Women live relatively secluded lives inside their homes and are veiled and/or chaperoned when they go out...In the epics both married and unmarried women are veiled in public and are accompanied by female servants (Ι141, α331, ξ100, σ182). Even Kalypso, together with Odysseus, is veiled (ε232), and in an absolute crisis Andromache and Hekabe do not appear unveiled on the walls of Troy (Χ406, 468). When they do leave the inner apartments, they should not expose themselves fully to the view of unknown and potentially dangerous men. When Homeretas speaks of the beauties of the female face he speaks of hidden charms.”\textsuperscript{128}

Furthermore, within the context of ritual the veil is interpreted as a means, and symbol of separation between the woman and whatever lies outside. The normal interpretation is that this separation protects the woman from the gaze of others (usually men). But given the aggressiveness of the gaze we might think differently. A veil that covers the eyes negates the female gaze. The light that flashes from the eyes is impeded, does not reach the other and thus is neutralized; it is unable to harm. A

\textsuperscript{127}Π385-8: when Zeus sends down the most violent water in deep rage against mortals...because they care nothing for what the gods think (οτε λαβρόστατον χέρι δδερ / Ζηνής, οτε δε η' άνδρος ατι κοτοινάμενος χαλέπην, / σι... θείων δεδήν οίκοι (Ωμύρνη). It is interesting that Lattimore replaces the Gods’ gaze with Gods’ thinking because contemporary conceptions consider the two activities as separate and corresponding to different parts of a divided body. Note also the fear that the gaze entails, but again Lattimore translates it as ‘regarded’ which has to be understood literally and not only as a mental activity - thinking: Γ8 there falls strong fear of how they may be regarded (νοίς διάδος κρατερον δεος ἐν φρεσι νίττε).\textsuperscript{128}NAEREBOUNT, F.G., 1987: “Male-Female Relationships in the Homeric Epics”, \textit{Sexual Asymmetry: Studies in Ancient Society}, eds. J. Blok, P. Mason, Amsterdam, pp. 119.
A veiled woman is only partially protected, since the gaze of others can reach her, and there is no evidence that the gaze’s capacity to harm is limited to catching the other’s eye. But what is more important is that the veiled woman has been divested of her power to harm with her gaze. It was not just that women were considered vulnerable, but rather that they were considered to exercise with their eyes a powerful fascination. This indicates the ambivalence with which femininity was understood.129

In battle the shining shield was not only defensive but indeed, an aggressive weapon, to blind the enemy. When Hektor considers surrendering himself to Achilles, of laying aside his shield and his weapons, he compares his naked self to a woman.130 When the extra-eye, the extra shining harmful gaze of the Gorgo on his shield is removed, he becomes powerless, like the women who are deprived of the power of their gaze. The speculation that “anthropos (ἄνθρωπος) ‘human’, is the aner (ἀνήρ) ‘man’ with ops (όψ) ‘face/sight’”,131 is revealing. The veiled women, with hidden face/sight, can be assimilated to animals.132 They become kunes ‘dogs’. When a woman dares to gaze she is kunopis, ‘has the face/sight of a dog’; disaster will occur, the existing social order will be overturned. Unfaithful wives Aphrodite, Helen and Klytemnestra, all them have the dog’s the gaze (kunopis). The veil then constitutes a surface, a protective facade not for the woman who wears it, but for

129 “Women and children seem to have been accounted by all as the most liable to injury, while also some women were held to be the most powerful fascinators” ELWORTHY, T.F., 1895: The Evil Eye, J. Murray, London, pp. 14.
130 X124-5: but he kill me naked so, as if I were a woman, once I stripped my armour from me (καινέτο δέ με γυμνών ἐδένετα αῆμας δέ τε γυναῖκας, ἐπεὶ κ’ ἀπὸ τέφρας δῶμον)131 PRIER R.A., op. cit., pp. 71.
132 “Women who are to be exchanged between men as a marker of that culture, approach the status of the other within. Men’s hope is that women will remain silent possession, token of exchange....A civilization which excluded women from humanness and made them both invisible and analogous to animals.” DU BOIS P., Centaurs and Amazons, op. cit., pp. 104.
those who might otherwise be looked at by her. The armor of the warrior, the surface of the *thure/pule* with the gleaming precious metals become sites of disembodied vision and thus a mechanism of control, or to be more accurate a device of defense.

### 4.3.3.2. DISEMBODIED VISION

Given the assimilation of sight and light, gleaming golden and silver dogs can be as effective guards as the live dogs. In the description of the front door in Alkinoos’ palace, the shining surface of the door has the aggression of a gaze. In the context of battle, the shield is the site of another gaze, that of the Gorgo. The figure of the Gorgo on the surface of the shield is doubly effective. Not only does it possess a terrifying gaze but it shines too. The story of Persus who cut off Gorgo’s head, can be interpreted as the transformation of the Gorgo into a mask. Already in Homer the severed head of the Gorgo guards Hades. Within the head dwells a shining surface: the place of a disembodied gaze. *Thureos* (τὸ υρεός), in the Homeric text, indicates the stone that closes the opening of a cave. In later times it denotes the shield – with all the representations of monsters on it – that is situated above the door, upon the opening of the relieving arch. The image of Gorgo is used to guard the entrance of various buildings, temples, as well as houses.¹³³

The shining ‘exterior’ surfaces of a door/gate are the site of a ‘disembodied vision’; the sight of the guards is substituted by the shining surface – the *glene* (γληνή) ‘the pupil of the eye’ is replaced by the *glenea* (γληνεα) ‘shining objects’. As the light blinds, the shining door/gate, like the shield, becomes a device of defense.

¹³³ In Athens, images of Gorgons stood on the rooftops and repelled the invader with their sharp teeth and bulging eyes... Dogs were used quite loosely for monsters.... the role of protective guardian shared by dog and Gorgon” DE FOREST M., op.cit., pp. 135.
The precious materials upon the front door of a palace represent the power of the king, not because of their monetary value, but because of their blazing power to harm and thus defend their owner. The gaze of the guards and the disembodied gaze of the shining surface can defend because they are aggressive. The experience of thure/pule entails aggression as a mechanism to insure the change that the crossing always necessitates. This can be illustrated with a final example which presents the consequences of a violent crossing, that is one without a change. It is the passage where Hector eliminates the defense and destroys the gate of the Greek camp:

M460-71: and the gates groaned deep, and the door-bars could not hold, but the leaves were smashed to a wreckage of splinters under the stone’s impact. Then glorious Hektor burst in with dark face like sudden night, but he shone with the ghastly glitter of bronze that girded his skin, and carried two spears in his hands. None could have stood up against him, and stopped him, except the gods, when he burst in the gates; and his eyes flashed fire. Whirling, he called out across the battle to the Trojans to climb over the wall, and they obeyed his urgency. Immediately some swarmed over the wall, while others swept in through the wrought gateways, and the Dannans scattered in terror among their hollow ships, and clamor incessant rose up.

Hektor has changed ‘places’, but without changing his role, so that the normal distinction between the two spaces established by the gate, is violently obliterated. Hektor, bursting through the gates, becomes light itself. He has become the shining


\[135\] M460-71: μέγα δ’ ἀμφι πύλαι μύκον, οὐδ’ ἄρ’ ὀχής / ἄσχητης, σοφίδες δε διέπασσαν ἄλλως ἄλλη λίθος ἀποφής, ὅ ἄρ’ ἀσθορεψαν ἁθαμάζον τὸν ἄσθοτο. Οὐκ ἕστη ἄγαθόν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔμετρη πάλιν τοῖς ἀστήριοι καθ’ ὄμμαν / τείχος ὑπερβαίνει τόο δ’ ὅφιστοι πάλαις παρι δ’ ὅσε δεξιῆ ἀπήκουσαν, οἱ δ’ κατ’ αὔστας / κοινάς ἐς ἐκάκτωσαν ὅσοι νεῶν ἅνα γλασφόρας, δεινοῖς δ’ ἀλκούντος ἐγκάθη.

\[136\] His eyes shoot fire that blinds, and thus darkens the eyes of who sees him. Hence the shining Hektor is also dark like the night.
surface of the defense. The two facades of the gate have become one. There is no
space in-between the two for the gate itself has been breached. The Dannans flee –
phobos (φόβος) is both the fleeing and the fear – as they have lost their place, they
have lost their role. The destruction of the gate has destroyed the order of normality.

We hope that what constitutes the major difference between the Homeric experience
of the thure/pule and the contemporary concept of door/gate is reflected in our mode
of analysis. The particularity of the Homeric experience of the door/gate is that the
terms thure/pule evoke both a category of experience, and the experience of a specific
thing. The experience is that of the transition from one category of experience to
another. Ambiguity and anxiety are unleashed by this transition and thus mechanisms
of control such as time and sight are set up to eliminate ambiguity and insure change.
By contrast, previous approaches to the topic reflect contemporary conceptions of
door/gate, and discussed them in terms of separation, function and symbol. This
ignores the issue of transition as such. We believe this to be an indication of a
repression, a sign of the anxiety with which the experience of door/gate is still linked.
5

MEGARON

'HALL'
TRANSFORMATION AS CENTER
5.1. INTRODUCTION

The problem which we examine in this chapter is the examination of a term which is always thought of as an architectural term, in the sense that it corresponds to a specific 'room' of the Homeric house. Such an understanding of megaron (μεγαρόν) has never been challenged and whole archeological theories have been 'build up' upon a major assumption – that the megaron is a room. From the early attempts at its reconstruction, to its identification with any (central) regular shape in early Greek archeological remains, to the theories which viewed it as the early form of the Greek temple, it is as if there were a simple relation between language and architecture – megaron is a word for a room. However, the correspondence between names and rooms, where each room has a name that corresponds to its function, should be understood not as a natural relation but as the consequence of the complex combination of contemporary conceptions of language, architectural theories, and architectural representation. Indeed, it is within archeological representation (that is,
drawings of buildings) that this correspondence became conventional. Clearly we are dealing not with the problem of translation but with an architectural problem and aspects of archeological representation. We do not have to examine the use of names as 'labels' in architectural and archeological drawings in great detail to understand the problem involved in such a practice. It involves a profound anachronism in both the conception of the relation between language and architecture (megaron equals room), and the relation between language and drawings (this is a room). But behind these there is another anachronism which uses a contemporary projection to determine the conventional approach to megaron. This is the assumption – never questioned within scholarship – that a house is an assemblage of rooms, where 'room' is the general concept which is specified through the notion of function. And yet there is no Homeric term that corresponds to the term 'room'. Instead we have terms such as megaron, and thalamos, which we can not simply nominate as 'rooms' without repeating the anachronism.

We will argue here that megaron (and thalamos) indeed constituted part of the Homeric house in that it partakes of the experience of domos. But if the experience of domos is, as we have tried to show, that of a series of contradictions, in the sense of trans-fixity, megaron evokes the fields of experience within domos that involve this transformation. Moreover, if megaron is usually interpreted as the central part around which the Homeric house develops, we would like to point out that the center in question is not a matter of geometry. The center is determined by the category of experience which governs the experience of the house and might or might not correspond to a geometrical center. It is in fact, the experience of transformation that

\[\text{megaron}\]

\[\text{thalamos}\]

\[\text{domos}\]

\[\text{trans-fixity}\]

\[\text{transformation}\]

\[\text{central}\]

\[\text{experience}\]

\[\text{geometrical center}\]

\[\text{pp. 155.}\]
the Homeric term *megaron* evokes which creates the experience of ‘center’. Reference to ‘architectural elements’ (columns, walls, hearth, etc.) in the text, gave rise to reconstruction and still reinforces the conviction that *megaron* corresponds to a specific room. We argue, however, that what we call ‘architectural elements’, were in fact experienced as things which as such are not specific locations within *megaron*, but produced their place (in the sense of *chora*) inasmuch as they produced specific identities for the bodies connected with them. The production of identities is central to the experience of *megaron*, to the transformation we refer to, and involves the transformation and reinstatement of identities. In fact, the text describes in connection with *megaron*, a series of activities usually interpreted as rituals, such as hospitality, feasting, or mourning, all of which, as we shall see, involve important transformations.

5.2. *MEGARON AND THE HOMERIC RITUALS*

According to the Homeric dictionary⁴ *megaron* is related to the architectonic, and is defined as a ‘hall, large room’. More specifically it refers to: men’s dining-hall, chief room of the house, women’s apartment, housekeeper’s apartment in upper story, the sleeping-apartment and in a wider signification, the house itself. In the wider signification of house, *megaron* is considered as denoting ‘either a man’s house or

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² For fuller statement of this formula see chapter on *Chore-choros*, pp. 79-84.
palace, or (rarely) a god’s, even a tent. As far as the etymology is concerned, no relationship to a verb is proposed either by Hofmann, or by Chantraine.

In these definitions the term megaron appears confusingly to have more than one meaning and thus appears to correspond to different parts of the house. What is taken for granted though, is that the meaning itself corresponds not to a place as such, but to an activity, which is ‘contained’ within a specific room, which in turn is contained somewhere within the Homeric house. The appearance of a rather random plurality of references stems from the assumption that a room should only contain one major function. Indeed when a specific function cannot be attached to the term then megaron cannot be a specific room and has to be attributed to a ‘wider’ signification - ‘the house’. Thus a spatial conception of containment underscores the very concept of reference. It would be anachronistic – according to what we have said in relation to chore/os – if we were to read this or indeed any Homeric term unproblematically via the concept of containment. We shall propose an analysis of the term megaron in relation to the activities to which the Homeric term is related, but would wish to drop the previous assumptions about room, function, reference and ultimately containment. We hope that a more adequate interpretation will emerge. We are not so much looking for a definition of megaron, but for the kind of experiences it evokes within the Homeric text.

In both Iliad and Odyssey the term megaron occurs 299 times. This is too large a number of quotations to analyse one by one. Instead we will examine the

activities related to it, activities which include guest-reception, feasting, and mourning, for the light they throw on the field of experiences that the term *megaron* evokes. They all involve a strict code of performance: a succession of events, gestures, postures in so far as a kind of transformation in relation to the participants occurs at some stage of their performance. During hospitality a stranger is transformed into a friend, by feasting together the members of the family and friends are incorporated again and again into the group, and when a death occurs, it is through mourning that the members re-constitute their roles and hence their *domos*. In fact these activities are so central to the survival of *domos* that they are usually interpreted as rituals. But we find the category of ritual is itself problematic. We propose instead that the repetitive movement of bodies be characterized as producing a non-enduring space, named *megaron*. Now the only way to reconstruct this non-

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7 It is worth noting that the term *megara* is used in relation to the ritual of *thesmophoria*: “At the end of each spring, [women] took slaughtered pigs down into pits, or *megara*, dug into the ground; here the dead animals were left to putrefy.” SENNET, R., 1994: *Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization*, Faber and Faber, pp. 71.

8 The problem of the definition of ritual is addressed by Ian Morris: “Ritual is one of those words where we all know what it means but no one can define it. Most would agree that ritual involves action, and is governed by rules of who should do what. It should be repeatable, but ritual and custom are not the same. Nor is just any regularized behavior ritual, although all activity may be said to have ritual aspects...” MORRIS, I., 1992: *Death-Ritual and Social Structure in Classical Antiquity*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 8. Rituals are usually related to place, they are referred to as ‘taking place’, and it is probably the presupposed relation between ritual space and religion that give rise to the theories that *megaron* is the first form of the Greek temple. As Rathje argues: “In Greece it is difficult to distinguish between domestic and sacred buildings in this period. New theories see the “temples” as converted houses or dining-halls; in fact the earliest sacred buildings had the function of providing a setting for sacrifices and sacred meals (Drerup (1969), 123-8).” RATHJE, A., 1990: “The Adoption of the Homeric Banquet in Central Italy in the Orientalizing period,” *Symposion: a Symposium on the Symposium*, ed. Oswyn Murray, Oxford, pp. 286. Thus again the term ritual brings with it a concept of place as containment. We put forward an hypothesis in the chapter on *chore/s* that the demarcation of
enduring space is by studying in detail the gestures and postures of the bodies that produced it. For the body is the charter of a social code, and “to interpret and account for a gesture is to unlock the whole social and cultural system of which it is a part.”

By understanding the code we can understand how transformation was achieved and therefore apprehend the category of experience that the term megaron evoked for the Homeric Greeks.

5.2.1. HOSPITALITY AS A PROCESS OF TRANSFORMATION

Xenie (ξενίη), the term that denotes ‘hospitality’, is related to megaron in the Homeric epic. In Iliad 207, Antenor, referring to Menelaos and Odysseus, says that he hosted (exeinissa) them and made them friends (philesa) in megaron, and observed the stature (phuen) and the thoughts (medea) of both. But what he actually learnt, as he describes in detail, is a series of body postures and gestures of both when seated or standing addressing the Trojans. He says:

I207-224: To both these I gave in my halls kind entertainment and I learned the natural way of both, and their close counsels. Now when these were set before the Trojans assembled and stood up, Menelaos was bigger by his shoulders but Odysseus was the more lordly when both were seated. Now before all when both of them spun their speech and their counsels, Menelaos indeed spoke rapidly, in few words but exceedingly lucid, since he was no long speaker nor one who wasted his words though he was only a young man. But when that other drove to his feet, resourceful Odysseus, he would just stand and stare down, eyes fixed on the ground beneath him, nor would he gesture with the staff backward and forward, but hold it clutched hard in front of him, like any man who knows nothing. Yes, you would call him a

territory can insure the repetition of body movements and thus insure the ritual. In fact, the relation between ritual and space is quite complicated, but we shall not elaborate more on this.


10 ξεινίη: ενι μεγάροισιν. γ353: παίδες ενι μεγάροισι λειχανάιες ξεινίης ξεινιζειν. η139: ξεινίν ενι μεγάροις ξεινίσσομεν, 841: ξεινίν ενι μεγάροις φιλάμεν, etc.
sullen man, and a fool likewise. But when he let the great voice go from his chest, and the words came drifting down like the winter snows, then no other mortal man beside could stand up against Odysseus.

Then we wondered less beholding Odysseus’ outward appearance. 11

The ritual of hospitality actually constitutes a series of body postures and gestures, as we shall show.

The term xeinos (ξείνος) means stranger and/or guest, and this is usually interpreted to reflect the basic ambivalence 12 of archaic society towards strangers, a dubious class who could prove to be either friendly or hostile. 13 This conventional

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11 F207-224: οἰς δὲ ἐγώ ἔξενισα καὶ ἐν μεγάροις φίλησα, / ἀμφιτέρων δὲ φωνὴ ἐδόθη καὶ μῆθεα πικνά. / ἄλλ' ὅτε δὲ Ἰακόπτεσπτον ἐν ἄγγομένοισιν ἔμεινεν στάντων μὲν Μενέλαος ὑπερέιχεν εὐρῆς ὁμος, / ὁμοὶ δὲ ξειμένων γεφαρίστερος ἦν Ὀδυσσέας. / ἄλλ' ὅτε δὲ μέφος καὶ μῆθεα πάσιν ὑπενετίν, / ἴπτε μὲν Μενέλαος ἑπταεράδον ἐγόρευς, / ποιμα μὲν ἄλλα μόλα λιγέως, ἐπεὶ οὐ πολλοῦνθος / οὐδὲ ἀφαγορασπῆσθαι, ἥ καὶ γένει δυτερος ἦν. / ἄλλ' ὅτε δὲ πολλοῖς ἄνεξεν ἔξενους / στάσκεν, ὑπατί δὲ ἴδεσκε κατὰ χρόνον ὁμειτά ἰδύμας. / σχέσεων δὲ ὁπ' ὅπτε ὅπερ ὄντος προφητικής ἐνώμας, / ἄλλ' σταυροῖς ἐξεκένεν ἀδόξης φωτὶ υἱκαία. / φαῖς κε ζῶκοτόν τε τίν’ ἐμεναι ἀλλονά τ' ἀνθοι. / ἄλλ' ὅτε δὲ ὅπτε τι μεγάλων ἐκ στήθεος εἴη, / καὶ ἔπαι τυράδεσσιν ἐνοικώτα χεμερίσθησιν, / οὐκ ὅπτε ἐκεῖν’ Ὀδυσσῆς ἐξέστη μερός ἄλλος, / οὐ δότη γ' ὁδ’ Ὀδυσσῆς ἀγαμασόμεθ’ εἴδος ἰδόντες.

12 "This ambivalence is encapsulated in the term ξείνος, which has a broad semantic range, from “a guest-friend from a foreign country, who is to be treated with all the respect of an ‘insider’” (a φίλος), to “a potentially hostile stranger, who is outside one’s own social group” (a non-φίλος)." REECE, S., 1993: The Stranger’s Welcome: Oral Theory and the Aesthetics of the Homeric Hospitality Scene, The University of Michigan Press, pp. 19. This ambivalence put the xeinos under the protection of Zeus, in this case called Xenios Zeus.

13 E. Benveniste writes: “In Greek xenos designates the ‘stranger’ and the verb xeinizo refers to ‘hospitable behavior’. This cannot be understood except by starting from the idea that the stranger is of necessity an enemy and correlative that the enemy is necessarily a stranger. It is always because a man born elsewhere is a priori an enemy that a mutual bond is necessary to establish between him and the EGO relations of hospitality, which would be inconceivable within the community itself. This dialectic ‘friend-foe’, as we have seen, is already operative in the notion of philos: an enemy, even one’s adversary in battle, may become temporarily a philos, as the result of a pact concluded according to the rites and customary pledges...Rites, agreements and treaties thus interrupted this permanent situation of mutual hostility which existed between people or cities. Under the protection of solemn conventions and by means of exchange arrangements, human relationships could develop, and as a result the words for agreements or legal status came to denote sentiments.” BENVENISTE, E., 1973: Indo-European Language and Society, Faber and Faber, pp. 294.
way in which scholarship approaches the term, is through the notion of meaning and the play of opposites. We propose by contrast to understand the term *xeinos* not in terms of opposites, but as indicating a process of becoming, a space of transformation. *Xeinos* does not ‘mean’ enemy, or friend, but evokes a specific state in which someone is in a process of becoming either enemy, stranger or friend. The categories should not be understood in opposition to each other or as mutually exclusive. It is through hospitality that this process of becoming, this space of transformation, is established, whereby a stranger becomes a guest and may be transformed into a friend *philos* (φιλός) of *oikos*. This transformation can be made, but only if certain rules are respected on the part of both guest and host.\(^1^4\) A strict succession of events, gestures, and body postures, as well as the contact with specific things produce the non-enduring space, called *megaron*, and also prescribe and insure the outcome of the transformation, namely the becoming *philos*.\(^1^5\) But before we go any further we would like to see the implications which being *philos* ‘friend’ entail. S. von Reden writes:

"The semantic field of this key term of the Greek language ranges in the epics from ‘beloved’ to ‘one’s own’. The heart, limbs, clothes, treasures, wives, husbands, compatriots, guest-friends and the fatherland all belong to the repertoire of *philos* objects, being at once beloved and owned. The qualities which distinguish a warrior are not just personal qualities but objects attached to his body or belonging to his household as well as friends and kin."\(^1^6\)

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\(^{1^4}\) Note the well-known Spartans’ hospitality violation, by the most notorious guest, Paris, who had seized his host’s wife, Helen.

\(^{1^5}\) For description of non-enduring space see chapter on *Chore - Choros*.

Something that is very close can be considered as one’s own and consequently acceptable and pleasing. To become *philos* must be thought of as becoming an extension of another’s body, in the sense of all bodily manifestations, the corporeal, the mental and the psychological. The servants accompany the lady of the house when she enters *megaron*. They are extensions of her body, a human shield, to reinforce her in the presence of men – or even to protect men from her power. It is very important for a host to have many friends, not only for the actual extension of his body, but also because even when they are far away, there is always the possibility of re-attachment. The ‘network’ of friends marks the ‘geographical space’ and endows power to an *oikos*. Odysseus will continue to be Alkinoos’ friend even when he is far away in his homeland.

Within a succession of events, becoming *philos* occurs in the sense of being incorporated by another body. According to S. Reece – who described Homeric hospitality in detail – the ritual entails the following stages: arrival, reception, seating, feasting, identification, bedding down, bathing, gift giving, and departure. During what is described as the three first stages of the ritual, that is, between arrival and seating, the increasing intimacy between guest and host occurs as the stranger moves from the *prothuron* to the heart of *megaron*. This is not a simple case of moving, but a change from one category of experience to another; the stranger moves from the

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17 Benveniste presupposes a distinction between an emotive and possessive signification of *philos* when argues against the second, but such a distinction would be anachronistic in respect to the Homeric text. BENVENISTE, E., op. cit., pp. 273-88.

18 ἢν ὑμῖν ξένως ἡμεῖς καὶ ἐνδύμασθε νότιον. Our description of hospitality is mainly based on S. Reece’s book (see above note 12), which includes an exhaustive reference to the relative Homeric passages, only a small part of which is quoted here.
preparation for the change (prothuron) to the transformation as such (megaron). This move is manifested in a series of gestures and body postures that accompany every change of experience.

On arrival the visitor must wait in the area ‘in front of the doorway’ until the host, who is the master of the house, notices him and either offers hospitality or sends him away. If the visitor is a social equal, coming as an angelos (αγγελός) ‘messenger’ or a xeinos (ξένος) ‘guest’, he histemi (ἱστήμη) ‘stands’\(^{20}\) at the doorway. Histemi, denotes ‘standing firmly and erect’, that is in an ‘upright posture’. But to have an upright posture, to be orthos (ὀρθός), indicates strength: by standing straight, the body becomes bigger and this has consequences for the quality of its voice. Orthia (ὀρθία), is the ‘high-pitched, loud, shrill, clear voice’, a strengthened voice, inasmuch as the erect body facilitates the raising of the voice. In fact, to stand upright and firmly makes possible a strong voice, and is interrelated with a certain social status. By contrast, if the visitor is socially inferior, coming as a ‘beggar’ ptochos (πτοχός) or a ‘suppliant’ heketes (ἱκέτης), he ‘sits’ izo (ἰσζω)\(^{21}\) at the doorway in a posture that indicates submission and helplessness. The very term ptochos (πτοχός) ‘beggar’, stems from the verb ptesso (πτέσσω) ‘bend with fear, terrify’ (πεττηκός ‘cowering, crouching’/πτόξε ‘timid, hare’). Ptochos then indicates the posture in which the body is bent. A beggar is also called aletes (αλέτης) ‘person that roams about’ (αλή ‘roaming without knowledge, nor hope of rest, ceaseless wandering’). A ‘suppliant’, hiketes (ἱκέτης) – a term stemming from the verb hiko (ἱκω) to arrive’ – also has a bent posture, the posture

\(^{20}\) στή...ἐκι προθόροις...οὐδόθ ἐκ’ αὐξλέων (α103-104) / ἐν προθύροισι δόμων...στήσαν (δ20-22) / ἔνα νοσ. στάς (e75) / ἵπταμένα εἰς τὸν χώρον οὐδόν ἱκάλαθοι (ηθ3) / ἔνα νοσ. στάς...ὑπὲρ οὐδόν ἱκάλαθον δόμωνς εἰςα (ηθ133-35) / ἐσται δ’ ἐν προθύροισι (κ220) / ἔσται δ’ εἶνι θύρας...ἐνδέ στάς (κ310-11) / ἔστη ἐνι προθύροισι (ε12) / στήσαν ἐρχομένα (ρ261) / στάς δὲ πρὸς ὅτι οὖτι (ι193) / στήσαν εἰς προθύροις (Α777).

\(^{21}\) παρά σταθμοῖσιν ἐκ’ οὐδόθ ἐξίσιεθο (κ62-63) / ἐξίσιο...ἐνθα κεν ὁ ἄρα στάθμος (ζ31-32) / ἡξ ἐκ’ εἰς μελίνου οὐδοῦ ἐντοσεθε θυράς, κλινάμενος στάθμος (ρ339-40).
of supplication. A beggar is someone who has lost his property and wanders around with nowhere to stay. A suppliant on the other hand is someone who arrives because he cannot stay where he was before. Neither can remain firm, and this has a direct effect on their bodies in the adoption of a bent posture.

Waiting at the ‘threshold’ oudos (οὐδός), is considered as the first stage of the ritual: waiting at a boundary, waiting for a transformation to occur through the act of crossing the boundary. At this point the visitor must declare his social status by adopting the appropriate body posture, for his social status will determine the proceedings of the ritual. To remain, however, in a place where the members or the friends of the oikos are not intended to stay – they just cross it – is also to declare his wish to be transformed, to become a guest by the act of his movement from the doorway to the main hall. As we have pointed out this translation has to be understood as a change at the level of experience, and not simply in terms of topography.

The next stage is the reception. “A host’s reception of a visitor follows a conventional sequence: the host catches sight of the visitor, hesitates at first to offer hospitality,

22 Odysseus he himself disguised as a beggar gives us the depiction of beggars as he responds to the servant who wants him out of megaron. He says in τ71-80: “I wander, why do you hold such an angry grudge against me? Is it because I am dirty, and wear foul clothing upon me, and go about as a public beggar? The need is on me, for such is the lot of vagabonds and men who are homeless. I too was one who lived in my own house among people, prospering in wealth, and often I gave to a wanderer according to what he was and wanted when he came to me; and I had serving men by thousands, and many another good thing, by which men live well and are called prosperous, only Zeus, son of Kronos, spoiled it all - somehow he wished to...” (δειμονίη, τι μοι ἄδει ἐπέχεις κεκοπηρήθη θεῶν, ἡ δὲ δὴ ῥοπόω, κακὰ δὲ χροῆ εἴρηται ἐλέεια, ἐπαγγελεία γὰρ ἐπέτης τοιοῦτοι παροικοὶ καὶ ἀδέλφους ἄνδρες ἀστει. καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ποτὲ οἶκον ἐν ἐνθρόφωσιν ἔναιαν ὀλίβους ἀφεῖν ὁμοίους καὶ πολλάκις ὕδατα ἀλήτη τοιαῦτα ὡς ἀλήτη τοιαῦτα καὶ ὧν καὶ ἁρματικὸς ἔλθων ἑκατονταῖον ἐν οἰκίας ἡδὺς μᾶλλον μαρτύριον ἄλλα τὰ πολλά, οἷον τὸ εὖ ἀξιόν καὶ ὀφειλεῖτο καλέσοντα. ὄλλα Ζεὺς ὀλισαμηθεὶς Κρόνων, θελεῖ γὰρ τὸν...
then rises from his seat, approaches him, attends to his horses, takes him by the hand, bids him welcome, relieves him of his spear, and leads him into *megaron*".23 At this stage the host’s and guest’s bodies come closer. The ‘approach’ involves sight and touch. The first contact between the host and the guest – from the Homeric experience of sight as collision between the seeing and the seen – is the actual sighting of the visitor, and is usually denoted by a form of the verb *horao* (ὁρῶ) ‘to see’;24 Then the host rises from his seat; the verb is usually *anorouse* (ἀνόρουσε) ‘spring up’,25 alternatively *aneste* (ἀνέστη) ‘to rise up’.26 Since it is improper to let a visitor wait at the door – as we have show in the chapter on *thure* – the proper host approaches quickly.27 The host is now the first to make the second contact with the visitor by ‘grasping’ *haireo* (αἱρέω) one or both of his hands; only the right hand is specified, never the left.28 The verb *haireo* is given the following meanings in the dictionaries: ‘to take with the hand, grasp, seize/ to take away/ to get into one’s power, conquer, overpower’. This contact of the hands implies both the host’s power

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24 ἀνάρουσε (α112-1193-Λ777).
25 ἀνέστη (1195).
26 An investigation of the different ways of walking and its interrelation to social roles would be interesting in the context of the Homeric text. Sennet writes: “Greek culture made walking and standing expressions of character. Walking with long strides appeared manly; Homer wrote admiringly of Hector, “The Trojans drove forward in close throng, and Hector led them, advancing with long strides” (0306-10). Whereas “when the goddesses Hera and Athena appeared before Troy to help the Greeks, they [according to Homer] resembled “in their steps the timorous doves”- exactly the opposite of the striding heroes”. SENNET, R., op. cit., pp. 49.
over the passive visitor and his will to accept responsibility for him.\textsuperscript{29} There is a rule of exchange in the giving and controlling; the host offers hospitality but submits the visitor to his control. Sometimes a host greets a visitor with a formal speech,\textsuperscript{30} and relieves him of his spear\textsuperscript{31} (disarming) before he enters the house. Finally the two bodies are moving together as the host leads the visitor from the \textit{prothuron} to \textit{megaron}. But the host ‘leads’ \textit{hegeomai} (ἀγω, ἤγεομαι) and the visitor ‘follows’ \textit{hepomai} (ἐπομαι).\textsuperscript{32} Even after the visitor becomes friend the hierarchy is not abandoned.

The reception of Odysseus in Alkinoos’ \textit{megaron} is an example of the reception of the visitor. The shipwrecked Odysseus meets princess Nausicaa, who assists him and directs him to her father’s palace.\textsuperscript{33} She advises him to insure his reception by transgressing the code of hospitality, that is, not to wait at \textit{prothuron}, but to walk quickly towards the center of \textit{megaron}, and reach the queen. Athena wraps him with mist to make him invisible so that he traverses \textit{megaron} unseen. Odysseus avoids the first contact, that is the eye contact with his host, and thus does not submit himself to the aggression of his host’s sight. The Phaiakians and the king see him suddenly as he touches the queen’s knees. His crouching position communicates his subordination. But at the same time it is he who touches first, not the hand but the

\textsuperscript{29} Not all touching of hands has the same implications: Achilles holds the right hand of the king Priam, to encourage him. In this case the verb used is λαμβάνω, and not αἰτῆω. Οὐδὲ ἰδεῖν φανήσας ἐπὶ κορμῷ χείρα γέρωντος / ἐλαλεῖ δεμτερήν, μὴ παντὸς δεμείτ’ ἐνι ἀποσι. The clasping of hands between two friends is interpreted as a sign of non-aggression by HERMAN, G., op.cit., pp. 51.

\textsuperscript{30} Χαίρε, ξείνε (α125) / χαίρετον (660-1197).
\textsuperscript{31} ἐδέξατο σῆλκεν ἔρχος (α121-π40-π282).
\textsuperscript{32} ἡγεῖθ’, ἕ ο’ ἐπέπευ (α125) / εἰσῆγεν (643)/ ἐπεί προσέρχεται (ε91-ε387) / ἐπείγοντα (κ231) / εἰσαγαγοῦσα (κ233,314) / ἐπέςμεν (κ313)/ ἐπεί (δ48) / εἰσαγαγόν (κ49) / πρόσερχε τευχεῖ (1199)/ ἕ ο’ δεῦτε (λ778) / πρόσερχε τευχεῖ (λ778).
\textsuperscript{33} ξ110-322.
knees of the queen. This gesture immobilizes the queen, impedes her movement, and puts her in a passive role. Knees (gounata) in the context of the Homeric text, are related to strength, to such a degree that the phrase luein tinos gounata (κλέειν τινὸς γούνατα) becomes synonymous with ‘to slay him’. In this posture Odysseus address the queen as a suppliant. Then he sits on the ashes at the hearth of megaron, thereby acquiring a specific identity which is produced through the connection of his body with the hearth. A detailed investigation is needed to establish the way ‘hearth’ was experienced within the Homeric text if we want to understand the kind of identity that such a connection generates. He crouches in the ashes. Putting ashes on his body might be interpreted as a wish to become incorporated as a friend of the house. Even if he has violated the code, even if he stands in the middle of megaron, by crouching in the ashes he declares himself to be a suppliant under the control of the king, who now has to decide whether he will grant him the role of guest. Indeed, Alkinoos takes him by the hand, anastesas ‘restoring Odysseus’ upright posture’, and leads him to sit close to him in the place of honor, on the chair of his beloved son. Odysseus washes his hands, and the feasting starts.

After the initial reception of the guest and the contact of the bodies the next stage of the ritual is seating. “Once inside the house, a host’s first provision for a visitor is a seat. A proper host offers a seat at the place of honor: [either offers his own seat, or

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34 ἐν αὐτῷ: So he spoke, and sat down beside the hearth in the ashes next the fire (Ὣς εἶπεν κατ’ ἄρ’ ἐξὲ ἐκ’ ἐκχάρη ἐν κατής ἐπ’ πορφυρ).
the seat beside him). The actual seating is signified by a form of the verbs ἔζωμαι, ἔδρα, ἔστο, καθίστο... Niceties of etiquette may be observed in the types of seats offered to visitors: ἑρῶν, κλησμός, δίφρος. The thronos (ἕρων), a chair with upright back and armrests, is usually reserved for gods, nobles, and for guests who are invited to take the seat of honor, but is never used by women. The klismos (κλησμός), a chair with a reclined back, is used by men when feasting or relaxing and by women. The diphros (δίφρος), a stool, is used especially by subordinates and servants. In fact, while a chair is just a chair, it changes the status of whoever sits upon it. Seats create a state of differentiation, and indicate a hierarchy. “Upon his homecoming Odysseus’ own elevation in stature from beggar to master is visualized concretely by his change in seats from a diphros δίφρος, (τ97,101,506-φ243,420) to a thronos ἑρῶν (ψ164).” This transformation is a change from one category of experience to another, from the threshold (σί110), to the center of megaron (ψ90). All sitting however, implies submission of some kind, it imposes a role of passivity upon all the participants, and announces the next stage of the ritual. The intimacy of bodies is succeeded by another kind of intimacy: incorporation. The time for feasting has come.

35...great social significance is seen in the fact that people of rank are placed beside the host and provided with tables and couches while others sit on hides on the floor. (p169-1199,215-21, Ω475)...A hierarchy and etiquette, or rather a law is established.” RATHJE A., op.cit., pp. 281.
36REECE S., op.cit, pp. 22.
37REECE S., ibid.
38As the historian Jan Bremmer points out, “sitting carried as much value in Greek culture as did standing and walking, but more ambivalent value. By the time of Pericles, the gods were often sculpted in sitting positions, for instance, during feasts of the gods. Yet to sit was also to submit, as when a young girl came to the house of her new husband and signified her submission to his rule in a ritual which made her sit for the first time by his hearth. Vase paintings depict urban slaves also, performing their tasks either sitting or crouching down”. BREMMER, J., 1991: “Walking, Standing and Sitting in Ancient Greek Culture”, A Cultural History of Gesture, eds. Jan Bremmer and Herman Roodenburg, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, pp. 25-26.
5.2.2. FEASTING AND INCORPORATION

Eating and drinking is a ritual in the sense that strict rules apply and are repeated. It is also logically prior to all the other rituals performed since it creates through incorporation the minimum sense of community within the group without which there would be no ritual. By eating, the participants incorporate the same animal (food), and are therefore themselves incorporated into the group. A transformation is achieved through communal feasting. Eating the beloved or enemy, should be understood as an attempt to attach and preserve them within one's one body. But the two bodies, the eating and the eaten never quite become one and there is always the possibility of fission. This is true also of the group. If participants always retain


40 Incorporation is a term used in psychoanalysis. “Incorporation... is present in daily life not only when we devour something in the literal sense in order to compensate for stress, but also of course in the figurative sense and in different forms of the system of oral symbolism which are omnipresent in groups, such as the communion belonging to fusion phenomena, cannibalistic phantasies (devouring, suction, imbibing) or in the oral rituals marking the stages of life in a system of social relationships. ROUCHY, J.C., “Archaic Processes and Transference in Group Analysis,” The Journal of Group Analysis, pp. 245.

41 “Early Greek society possessed a relatively homogeneous social structure, without a formal priestly caste or a centralised power structure. Its rites of consumption may therefore be characterized as forms of commensality, rituals of eating and drinking together, as equals and as expression and reinforcement of community values.” MURRAY O., 1990: “Symptotic History,” Syntopical History: a symposium on the Symposium, ed. Oswyn Murray, Oxford, pp. 5.

42 This interpretation is in line with the way the term incorporation is defined – within the psychoanalytical work of M. Torok – in opposition to introjection. ROUCHY, J. C., op.cit., pp. 244.
their autonomy within the group, the regular repetition of the communal meal will be central to the survival of the community.

Eating and drinking have been interpreted as reflecting and reinforcing social organization. It is here that the distinction between the Raw and the Cooked is established. In the Odyssey the Kuklops are uncivilized, they have no *agore*, or communal feasts, and therefore are cannibals. Oswyn Murray notes: “we may say that just society “inhibits” or “problematizes” sexual relations in order to control them, so it “problematizes” another of man’s most basic pleasures, that of eating and drinking, in order to create and support its socio-cultural structures.” In the Homeric text, with the exception of the term *ariston* (ἀριστόν) ‘breakfast’—which is related to a verb denoting the act of eating (*esthio*)—the other terms referring to the banquet indicate a diversity of values beyond that of nourishment. Dais (δαίς), the most common term for the banquet in Homer, means ‘portion’, ‘share’, and indicates the distribution of food. However not all participants (Δαινιμόνες), acquire equal shares. Geras (γέρας) honor is the privilege of meat, reserved for the host and elders.

Feasting is a men’s affair. Women, with the exception of the lady of the house, are excluded from the banquet. Moreover only men can assume the role of strangers. Even the goddess Athena takes the appearance of a man (Mentor) in order to enter Odysseus’ palace as a stranger in 105. The exclusion of women from these activities can be highlighted by the research on their relation to *thalamos*. Women servants enter megaron to accompany their mistress, and for the preparation of the feast. The

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44 MURRAY, O., op.cit., pp. 4.
handmaid provides water for handwashing and prepares the table, while the 
housekeeper serves the bread and other food. The handmaid also cleans up at the 
end of the banquet, a task that is probably related to the relation of woman and 
impurity in general. The housekeeper, an old woman in the case of Eurukleia, is the 
person that keeps the key of *thalamos*, where food and precious objects are stored. 
The food that is secured and preserved in *thalamos* — the ‘place’ for preservation — is 
brought to *megaron* — the ‘place’ for transformation, to be consumed and 
transformed.

Sons participate in the banquet. Children sit on their father’s knees. 
Andromache is worried for her son’s future, for an orphan does not have a father to sit 
on, and therefore is excluded from the banquet. Adolescents act as wine-pourers, 
standing by the participants. Other adults sit at their seats with the tables in front of 
them. Beggars sit on the ground, at the threshold of *megaron*, and they fail to keep a 
firm place during the banquet, as will see below. When everyone is settled, eating and 
drinking can start. The repetitiveness of the feasting ritual is evoked through the 
repetitive (formulaic) way with which the feasting is described.

In fact, as Bruit argues: “the ritual aspect of the food derives from its insertion 
into a complex of gestures and patterns of behavior, and not from its intrinsic value

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46 αι136,140-852,56-η172,176-κ368,372-ο135,139-ρ91,95. However, it is a man, the carver, who serves the 
platters of meat, and the herald who pours the wine: α141,143-857,58-ο140,141.

47 In the Odyssey Menelaos’ son acted as a wine-pourer during his father’s meal (Α470-1175-Υ234-ο48-γ339- 
o141-φ271). A girl, Hebe, poured nectar for the gods.

48 Ι199-Ω126,437-α130-γ32-ο136.

49 ὁ δ’ ἐκ’ ὅνειρον ἐστάλει τὴν ἐκπεύχθη τὴν καθαρά ἄλλον (α149-867,218-ε200-971,484-ξ453-ο142-α54-ρ98-ο256-191,221- 
Ω627) / δεύνοντι, οὐδὲ τι θυμός ἔκδιδε τίνι διότι ἔσθη (π479-τ425-Α468,602-Β431-Ι320-956). The feast ends when 
everyone feels the pleasure (τάρκερον) of being sated (κορεσσόμενοι, πλησσόμενοι), with food and drink.
Feasting is an activity related to *megaron*, which involves a kind of transformation central to the survival of a group. Hence we might say that the term *megaron* itself evoked this experience of transformation that was also understood as central for the Homeric *domos*. Within the text, feasting is mainly depicted in the context of hospitality. Reece writes: “The sharing of a feast is one of the most intimate means by which a stranger is welcomed into a home, for the banquet is the primary locus for participation in *xenia*; significantly, the term *ζευγία, ζευνία* may specifically denote the food offered to a guest.”51 In the process of rapprochement, the host can offer his own portion of honor, the *geras*, as he offers his own seat to his guest.52 Bruit writes:

“Communal consumption, or consuming the same type of food, constitutes another mode of communication, which is nearer to the exchange necessarily implied by the *xenia*. To eat together, to eat at the same table, is to belong to the same element; it is as we have seen, to enter, though symbolically and in a precarious way, into a common status... Further the term *xenia* describes in itself a type of relation founded on mutual recognition and reciprocity. Hospitality in fact supposes...that those who practice it recognize each other in some way similar, in worship, rites, or language. *Xenos*, then designates not any stranger, but another Greek from a different city.”53

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51 This occurs in 833-ε91-A779-80-2387,408. REECE S., op. cit. pp. 22.

52 “A truly generous host may “bestow great honor” (γέφυρας ζ435,441-Ι321) on his guest by relinquishing his own “designated portion” (γέφυρας ζ66), the fatty “chine” (βίτενος) of the cow, pig, sheep, or goat (ζ66-6474,483-ζ437,441-Ι321,322-1206,208).” Ibid, pp. 23.

Due to the incorporation achieved through eating and drinking together, guest and host are both transformed and can now be identified as members of the same community, though not as equals. Communal feasting supposes a certain relation between a basic equality at the same time that it establishes hierarchy. But once the transformation is achieved then the guest, this other Greek, can speak. The mouth is not only the organ for eating but for speech. Speech is related to food: "Plutarch informs us that it was a Greek custom from Homer onwards to combine eating and drinking with "spiritual food" (Quaest. Conv. 79), and he refers to the feeling at the time of Homer that it was well to eat and drink before talking (I 83-95)." However, the expression 'spiritual food' does not describe the Homeric experience of speech, for – as we have shown in the chapter on epos – speech is an activity of the multiple Homeric body, a body, that is, where no distinction between spiritual and corporeal is drawn, and the mouth was more than just an organ. Although we cannot investigate the general relation between food and speech we can at least establish a connection between the two in the context of communal feasting, and hence with megaron. If for us today a topographical relation can be established between eating and speaking, namely taking ‘in’ and pulling ‘out’ of the mouth, for the Homeric Greeks this is not so. For them the distinction between eating and speaking was experienced as the relation between incorporation and differentiation –

54 Schmitt-Pantel argues that the feast of hospitality is ambivalent, for on one the one hand it belongs to the register of gift, a gift given by the host, and thus marks a social hierarchy, on the other hand the communal consumption necessitates a certain degree of equality. Thus the tension is constant between the two opposite but closely connected aspects of the feast of hospitality: the equality and the hierarchy. SCHMITT-PANTEL P., op.cit., pp. 56-57.

which is not a relation of opposition. Following the incorporation (which forms the group) through eating, there comes the revelation of the guest’s identity (as member of the group), through speech.

Reece describes the ritualistic formality through which the identity of the guest is revealed: “The stranger is to remain anonymous throughout the meal. On his arrival, the host assures him that he will not inquire into his identity or business until after the meal. Blame is attached to those who breach this convention. The manner in which a guest’s name is requested and revealed takes on a ritualistic formality. The inquiry entails a request for information about a stranger’s homeland and parentage, his means of transportation and business in the land. The host often expresses great concern that the stranger answer truthfully and accurately. In turn, the stranger’s revelation of his identity and business is often preceded by assurances that this information will be true and accurate. The information provided may include the stranger’s name, parentage, homeland, means of transportation, and business”.56

During the exchange of speech both host and guest remain seated, both have a passive stance. No description of their postures and gestures is given in the text. The terms related to the act of listening is akouo (ἀκούω) ‘listen, learn of by hearsay, give ear to, obey’. The exchange of speech during the banquet is a reciprocal obeisance.

Feasting includes story-telling. The narrator can be the guest, or other participants of the feast. Sometimes story-telling is performed by a professional bard with the accompaniment of a lyre. In this the bard (aoidos) sits in the center and leans against a column.57 Both bard and listeners remain seated and still, in a reciprocal

57 ὕδρα: μέσον δειτομόνων, πρὸς κίονα μακρὸν ἔρεισας.
passivity during the performance. Story-telling is experienced as *thelksis* (θελξίς) ‘enchantment’, that is – as we have seen in the chapter on *epos* – as an interplay between differentiation and identification. Story-telling is a mechanism of incorporation into a group. We might understand another kind of ‘entertainment’, which is characterized by its aggressiveness, as an effect of a group formation: it is the ‘entertainment’ provided by beggars at a banquet. A beggar, we have seen, is a man with a bent posture. The adjectives used to characterize him are: (πανδήμιος) ‘begging in all the places’, (ἀνιηρός) ‘trouble-some’, (κακοε imprimir) ‘ill-clad’, (κακός) ‘ugly in appearance’, (λευγαλέος) ‘wretched, shameful, ruinous, poor’. The beggar has a deformed body, with which he can entertain the audience. The suitors laugh when two such deformed bodies, two beggars, Odysseus and Iros, are fighting. As for the voice which issues from such bent a body, it is not worth listening to, and provokes anger and violence. This happens when Odysseus, disguised as an ugly old beggar, speaks to the suitors. Beggars also exhibit an inability to stay still. Once accepted in *megaron* they usually stay by the door, but entertain others by moving around, and it is possible for them to be thrown out at any moment. We might think of beggars at the banquet as the ‘scapegoats’ that any community needs, to restore or guarantee its unity.

*Megaron* is also considered as the ‘place’ for the instruction of male youth. Sons remain silent beside their fathers, eating and listening to debates and stories, with which their fathers instructed them in ‘public’. The *megaron* must be inscribed

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58 Referring to theatre R. Sennet observes: “The theatre put this aspect of sitting to use in tragedy: the seated audience was literally in a position to empathize with a vulnerable protagonist, for both the spectators’ and the actors’ bodies were placed in a “humble, submissive position to higher law.”

SENNET, R., op. cit., pp. 60.

59 ἀνιηρός ‘be disgusted of, weary of’ / ἀνιηδό ‘be annoyed’ / ἀνίη ‘burden, weariness’.
in the process of transformation to adulthood. On the other hand, the lady of the house enters *megaron*, dressed in the appropriate way and accompanied by her servants. Once there, she stands or sits by an architectural element of the house, a column, the hearth, *stathmos*, or a wall. It is possible to speak about the 'appropriate place' for the lady of the house in relation to the symbolic meaning of the elements themselves. But we have argued consistently in previous chapters against such an approach to the Homeric text. And we have tried to show how what we call 'objects' were experienced as things co-produced with their *chore*. In this sense the column, the wall, etc., are not objects in a specific place where the lady may stand; they are things which produce their *chore* and when the lady touches them she acquires a specific identity. These things become extensions of her body. And it would be worth investigating what different kinds of identities the different things produced. In the context of this chapter however it is enough to bear in mind just this relation between things and identity. *Megaron* evokes the experience of transformation, and this involves the transformation or the reinstatement of identities achieved *via* incorporation, speech and the body’s connection with specific things. Standing by the *stathmos*, column, etc., the lady of the house reinstates her identity and her status. She usually sits facing her husband, whom she addresses only when spoken to. Because of the experience of sight as collision we might interpret this as an identification

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60 σ182-184.  
61 ψ88-91: But then, when she came in and stepped over the stone threshold, she sat across from him in the firelight, facing Odysseus, by the opposite wall, while he was seated by the tall pillar looking downward (ἡ δ’ ἐπὶ εἰσῆλθεν καὶ ὑπέρθη λαίνον οὐδόν, ἐξετ' ἐπὶ τ’ Ὀδυσσῆσ' ἐναντίον, ἐν πυρὸς ὀμή, τοῦ ἐξετ' ὡς ἄρα πρὸς κλίνα μακρινή ἢτο κέκτω ὄρθων.)
between the two. In fact, Penelope can not look at Odysseus' face before his final recognition.\textsuperscript{62}

Two women in the text, Arete and Helen, can be story-tellers among men, in megaron. The norm is that speech is a male attribute. To some extent the voiceless compensate for their enforced silence. Megara gunaikon 'women's megaron', are where women speak. But it is another kind of speech. In \textit{\Gamma}125 Helen uphaine (δεφαίνε) 'was weaving' and thus enepasse (ἐνέπασσε) 'narrating' battle stories onto the cloth.\textsuperscript{63} Ladies, when in the main megaron among men, have always their spindle with them. Weaving then can be interpreted as a form of speech. On the other hand, \textit{medea} (μηδεα) 'thoughts' and \textit{muthos} (μῦθος) 'speech' can both be (δεφαίνω) 'woven' as in the case of Menelaos and Odysseus in \textit{\Gamma}212.\textsuperscript{64} A. Bergren argues: "...early Greek thought draws an analogy between woven fabric, poetry, and \textit{metis} by making each the object of a verb 'to sew' or 'to weave'\textsuperscript{65}\" But it is not a matter of analogy; what a grammatical phenomenon reveals is an indication at the level of experience, namely that speaking was experienced as an activity of the Homeric body, and the lady of the house in megaron transforms the narration of words to a narration of images.

When the entertainment ends everyone goes to sleep. \textit{Thalamos} is usually where the members of the house sleep. For the guest a bed is placed either in megaron or in the portico immediately outside it, at the \textit{aithousa}\textsuperscript{66} or \textit{prodomos}.\textsuperscript{67} If \textit{thalamos}

\textsuperscript{62}WI 07: R cannot look him strait in the face (οὐδὲ εἰς ἄκον ἑξήκοντα ἑναντίον).  
\textsuperscript{63}Γ125: she came on Helen in the chamber; she was weaving a great web, a red fording robe, and working into it the numerous struggles (ἐν τοῖς δὲ ἐνφαίνετο ἐν μεγάρῳ, ἢ δὲ μέγαν ιστον δεφαίνε / δισπασσά πορφυρῆν, πολλὰς δὲ ἐνέπασσεν ὁδήλως).  
\textsuperscript{64}Γ212: when both of them spun their speech and counsels (ἄλλα ὑπὲρ μῦθος καὶ μηδεα πόσιν δεφαίνων).  
\textsuperscript{65}BERGREN, A., 1983: "Language and the Female in Early Greek Thought," \textit{Arethousa} 16, 1-2, pp. 73.  
\textsuperscript{66}υτ' αἰθουσα γ 399-8297-η 336.345-Ω2644.
is the ‘place’ to secure and preserve the status of the members of the house, to sleep in *megaron* denotes the status of the guest: a friend of the house, who can always be transformed into its enemy.

5.3. MOURNING AND THE RE-CONSTITUTION OF DOMOS

When Achilles delivers the corpse of Hektor to his father, Priam asks him:

Ω660-67: ‘If you are willing that we accomplish a complete funeral for Hektor, this, Achilleus, is what you could do and give me pleasure...Nine days we would keep him in our palace (*megarois*) and mourn him, and bury him on the tenth day, and the people feast by him, and on the eleventh day we would make the grave-barrow for him, and on the twelfth day fight again; if so we must do.’

In fact, what Priam describes is a funeral ritual. Again *megaron* appears to be related to an experience of transformation within the Homeric house, which as such

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67 ἐν κρόδῳ με θέλεις τελέσαι τάφον ἔκτοτε διώ, / ὅσε κέ μοι θέλων, άχιλέω, κομαρίσμένα θείς...ἐνήμερον μὲν κ’ αὐτόν ἐνι μεγάροις γοῦνοι, / τῇ δεκάτῃ δὲ κέ βάπτομεν δαιννότω τε λαός, / ἐνδεκάτη δὲ κέ τύμβον ἐπ’ αὐτῷ πολιορκοῦν, / τῇ δέ διωδέκατῃ πολεμίζομεν, εἰ περ ἀνάγκη.’

68 Jan Morris includes death among the rites of passage. He writes: ‘...Rite of passage: The biological death of an individual sets off a more prolonged social process of dying. The first stage, the “rite of separation,” is a ceremony which moves those involved out of their normal conditions of life into the second stage, a liminal status. Some of the survivors take on the role of mourners, while the deceased moves from being a person to a corpse and some kind of soul is usually liberated from the body. These transitions may happen at the moment death is announced, or at some later point; all at once, or more gradually. The actors are often secluded and polluted, and reverse much of their normal behavior. The mourners may wear very formal clothing, or may be disheveled; they may be solemnly silent, or they cry hysterically; they may combine all these acts. In some places these statuses last only moments; in others, years. Their length and intensity vary according to who is involved. The third stage, the ‘rite of aggregation,’ restores normalcy. The mourners return to social life, but without the deceased; the corpse is finally laid to rest; and the soul joins the ancestors. This tripartite rite-of-passage sequence is prominent in ancient descriptions of funerals, and the rituals effecting these changes in status repeatedly remind all involved of the relationships they are involved in, through the inversion and affirmation of norms.” MORRIS I., op.cit, pp. 10.
necessitates a strict code of rules, always involving the multiple manifestations of the body. The transformation we are talking about is a transformation related to a deceased inasmuch as to Homeric domos. It is Andromache, the wife of Hektor who announces the consequences of her husband’s death. The transformation of her status from wife to widow is related once more to megaron when she says:

\( \omega 25-32: " \text{My husband, you were lost young from life, and have left me a widow in your house (megaroi), and the boy is only a baby who was born to you and me, the unhappy. I think he will never come to age, for before then head to heel this city will be sacked, for you, its defender, are gone, you who guarded the city, and the grave wives, and the innocent children, wives who before long must go away in the hollow ships, and among them I shall also go..."
\)

The changes that the death brings have bodily effects on the mourners. As Patroklos lies dead, Achilles refuses to eat.

\( \tau 319-20: \text{But now you lie here torn before me, and my heart goes starved for meat and drink, though they are here beside me, by reason of longing you}
\)

P. Pucci writes: “Mourning ... mimes death and its effects; accordingly the mourner refuses food, the source and support of life.” Patroklos can survive through Achilles, but we are not talking here of the mental activity of memory, and the pothos (πόθος) ‘desire’ of Achilles is merely a specific feeling. The body in its multiplicity – that is, as a fusion of the corporeal, mental, psychic – has to accommodate another

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70 \( \omega 275-32: \) ‘\( \text{ανεπ, απ’ αίσθησιν νέος άλωκο, καδ’ ἔμε με χήρην / λείτεις ἐν μεγάροις, παῖς Ἰ ἐτὶ νήπιος αὕτως, / ἐν τέκνοις σοὶ ἐνεῳ τῇ δυσάμοροι, οὐδεὶ μὴν ἄλωκο ἐξάθη, πρὸν γὰρ πόλις ἦδε καὶ ἥς ἱππος / πάρειται, ἢ γὰρ ἀλώκους ἐπίσκοπος, ὃς τέ μὴν αὕτην / βίάζει, ἔχει δ’ ἀλώκος κεδνάς καὶ νήπια τέκνα, / αἱ δ’ τοῖς τάχα νησίων ὀχυρώθησι, καὶ μὲν ἔγο μετὰ τῆς...}

71 \( \tau 319-20: \) ‘\( \text{νόν δὲ σύ μὲν κεισαὶ διδασκαλίνας, αὐτάρ ἐμὼν κῆρ / ἄκηρυγήν πότιος καὶ ἔδητος ἐνὸν ἕοντων / στὶ ταῦθῃ...}

body, and nothing is allowed to interrupt this process, not even hunger. Athena
prevents hunger by dropping divine food to Achilles.73 Men while mourning make
their body dirty. Mourning Priam says:

Δ639-40: I have been grieving and brooding over my numberless sorrows and wallowed in the muck
about my courtyard’s enclosure 74

Dirt is interpreted as matter out of place:75 hence, in the context of ritual, becoming
dirty becomes equivalent to being out of place, and thus out of social role; mourners
are considered as being in a liminal stage.76 But this approach still presupposes the
specific conception of place as containing and even producing the social roles, which
we have argued against. We argue instead, that to become dirty, which entails one’s

73 T353-4: she dropped the delicate ambrosia and the nectar inside the breast of Achilleus softly, so no sad
weakness of hunger would come on his knees (τῇ δ’ αἰληθί / νέκταρ ἐνὶ στήθεσι καὶ ὑμβροσίῃ ἐρατείνην /
στᾶς, ἵνα μὴ μιν λίμος ἄτερ τῆς γούναθ’ ἵκοντα)
74 οὖν καὶ στενάχω καὶ κηδεία μαρτία πένσω / σῶλος ἐν χόρτοις κυλινδομένος κατὰ κόσμον.
75 DOUGLAS, M., 1966: Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo,
New York, Pantheon Books.
76 "Liminality is a term borrowed from Arnold van Gennep’s formulation of rites de passage, “transition
rites” – which accompany every change of state or social position, or certain points in age. These are
marked by three phases: separation, margin (or limen – the Latin for threshold, signifying the great
importance of real or symbolic thresholds at this middle period of the rites, through cunicular, “being in
a tunnel,” would better describe the quality of this phase in many cases, its hidden nature, its mysterious
darkness), and reaggregation. The first phase, separation, comprises symbolic behavior signifying the
detachment of the individual or the group from either an early fixed point in the social structure or from
an established set of cultural conditions (a state). During the intervening liminal period, the state of the
ritual subject (the “passenger,” or “liminal”), becomes ambiguous, neither here nor there, betwixt and
between all fixed points of classification; he passes through symbolic domain that has few or none of the
attributes of his past or coming state. In the third phase the passage is consummated and the ritual
subject, the neophyte or initiate reenters the social structure, often, but not always at a higher status
level.” TURNER, V., 1990: Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic action in Human Society,
Cornell University Press, pp. 231-2.
own body becoming covered with matter, might rather be an attempt to incorporate the dead body. In this light we can better understand the bathing and the cutting of hair that marks the end of the funeral – the cremation of the corpse\textsuperscript{77} – as the inverse process, that is, the dissociation from the diseased which marks the end of mourning. When the heralds try

\textsuperscript{Ψ}40-6: to persuade the son of Peleus to wash away the filth of the bloodstains, he denied them stubbornly and swore an oath on it: ‘No, before Zeus, who is greatest of gods and the highest, there is no right in letting water come near my head, until I have laid Patroklos on the burning pyre, and heaped the mound over him, and cut my hair for him.

Women take care of the dead body.\textsuperscript{78} F. Zeitlin argues:

"Bodiliness is what most defines [the woman] in the cultural system that associates her with the physical process of birth and death... Thus it is women who most often tend the bodies of others, washing the surface of the body or laying it out for its funeral. Theirs is the task of supplying the clothing that covers the body and they have a storehouse of robes which may encircle the male victim in textured folds... She seems to know, whether consciously or not, how vulnerable, how open—how mortal in fact— is the human body."\textsuperscript{79}

Because women come into direct contact with the corpse, it is not necessary for them to have recourse to the masculine ways of incorporation described above. After preparation, the body of the deceased is laid on a bed\textsuperscript{80} and is displayed in megaron.

\textsuperscript{77} έι πεπιθοιεν Πηλείδην λούονται άπ’ ψρόν αιματόλειτα. / αὐτὰρ δὲ γ’ ἤρεντο στερεός, ἐπὶ δὲ ὅρκον ὁμοσσέν τ’ Ὥδη γινομένη. / ὁμνὸν μᾶ δὴ Ζήν’, ὅς τίς τε θεῶν δακτύλος καί δρόμος, τ’ ὥθησις δέ τει κυρίτως καρπητός ὁσσόν ἱκέσθαι / πρὶν γ’ ἐνι Πάτροκλον θέμεναι πυρὶ σημά τε χέρας / κεφασθεῖ τε κόμην.

\textsuperscript{78} Ω582: Then Achilleus called out to his serving-maids to wash the body and anoint it all over (διακος δ’ ἐκκαλέσας λούσει κέλευτ’ ὁμοί’ τ’ ὀλέψει). \textsuperscript{79} ZEITLIN F., op. cit., pp. 74.

\textsuperscript{80} When Achilles delivers the corpse of Hektor to his father he says: Ω599: your son is given back to you, aged sir, as you asked it. He lies on a bier (υἱὸς μὲν δὴ τοι ἐλλότατα γέρον ὡς ξέλαιας, κείται δ’ ἐν λεύχεσσ’). In the funeral representations of the Greek Geometric art, the bed is depicted as a bier on which a dead
The funeral bed is not a specific bed but one removed from *thalamos* – a term which does not just correspond to the 'place for sleep' but evokes the experience of fixity. Even if the body posture remains the same, a member of *domos* lies in *thalamos* when living and in *megaron* when dead. What is conventionally interpreted here as a change of location, from *thalamos* to *megaron*, must be understood as a change from one category of experience to another, from fixity to transformation. For the transformation of the deceased, from living being to corpse, involves the transformation of the *domos*, which has to be re-constituted at the end of the funeral. The deceased remains in *megaron* in the process of his transformation from a dweller in the house to a dweller in Hades. His *demas* (δέμας) ‘the build of his body’ will be transformed to *skie* (σκία) ‘a shadow’ in the *skioenta* (σκιοέντα) ‘shadowed’ *megara* in the process of leaving *domos* ‘the house’ for ever. Around the corpse the women sit, and raise the funeral song. The wife, the mother, and other women, close relatives of the deceased, start speaking.

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body is displayed in the *prothesis* or carried to funeral in the *ekphora*. On the form of the high-legged bed as depicted in the Greek Geometric art, J. Boardman, argues “we can but speculate whether its construction did not deliberately allow for other than sleeping- as a status symbol, for the display of the living, and ultimately for the display of the dead”. BOARDMAN J., 1990: “Sympotic Furniture”, *Sympotica: a symposium on the Symposion*, ed. Os. Murray, Oxford, pp. 123.

81 This is valid in the context of the Homeric text, whereas in later times reclining in beds becomes a well known feature of *symposion*.

82 The phrase *megara skioenta* occurs quite often in the text. It is usually interpreted as an indication that *megaron* was a room with no openings and thus dark. But we just want to point out the relation of darkness with ritual and transformation in general. Note that the repetitive phrase (formula) *skioento te passai aguai* (σκιόεντο τε πάσαι άγκαι) ‘all the journeying ways were darkened’ in the Homeric text, denotes the end of the day. It is in the darkness that everything is transformed and all movement has to stop.
During funerals, women have the privilege of speech in *megaron*. However, they address their speech to someone actually absent, for they speak to the dead. But as we have already shown speech permits differentiation and is experienced as distancing. So in addressing the dead, women set off the process of differentiation, and distancing from the deceased. This inverse process culminates with the funeral feasting after the burial which actually signals the return to normality. The mourners, that is, the members of *domos*, can eat because the dead is no longer the only thing that can be attached to their body. By eating together they reconstitute their *domos*. *Megaron* is not the setting that contains the ritual of mourning, *megaron* evokes this experience of mourning, that is, an experience of transformation, which is central to the reconstitution of any *domos*.

We can now understand better the relation of *megaron* and death, not in the case of mourning but of murder. We refer to the killing of the suitors by Odysseus, and the slaughter of Agamemnon by Aigisthos. The question is not that of *megaron* as the appropriate or not place for a murder, as conventionally the issue is treated. The fact is that both the killing of the suitors and the murder of Agamemnon involve a transformation related to their house; Odysseus’ *domos* is re-constituted, whereas

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83 *Ωτην ᾄτητα / τητοίς ἐν λεχέσει θέσαν, παρὰ δὶ εἶσαν ἀδικοῖς / ἥμεν ἐξάρχους, οἱ τε στανόςαν ὁδήν / οἱ μὲν ἀρ᾽ ἐξηθένεον, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναῖκες. / ήσιν δὲ Ἀνδρομάχη θεουκαλένος ἤρχε γόος. / Εκτορὸς ἀνδροφόνοι κάρη μετὰ χερσίν ἔχοσα.*

84 "Murder at a banquet? We can only say that as literature these scenes draw their strength from the background of peaceful fellowship against which the act of cruelty is set." SLATER, W.J., “Symptic Ethics in the Odyssey,” *Symptica: a symposium on the Symposium*, ed. Os. Murray, Oxford, pp. 216.
Agamemnon’s is actually destroyed. It is worth noting however, that the killing of Odysseus’ unfaithful female servants occurs not in megaron but in aule (αυλή) ‘courtyard’, and is also another kind of death; hanging, a non-pure death as Telemachos says.85

In sum, megaron evokes the experience of transformations; transformations which are central to the Homeric domos: a stranger is transformed into friend; members of the domos affirm their incorporation again and again, or its re-constitution is achieved following a death. These transformations however need to be controlled, so that the outcome is insured. This is achieved through a strict code which includes a repetitive movement of bodies that produces the experience of a non-enduring space, called megaron. This does not necessarily correspond to a specific location within domos and this conception of megaron is far away from that of a specific room of the Homeric house which contains the domestic rituals. Such an interpretation can only be produced by the anachronistic conception of a house as an assemblage of rooms which ‘contain’ different functions, and as such cannot be the appropriate methodological tool with which to approach the Homeric experience of megaron. In fact, the difference between the term megaron and its translation ‘hall’ is that

85 κατέληξα μετά της καθαρίζουσας πολιορκίας. This kind of death is considered appropriate given that it is intended as the punishment of their sexuality “Strangulation, for the Greeks, meant shedding no blood... As a form of human death, strangulation or hanging evoked horror, but as a means of suicide it can be again related to shedding no blood. To avoid the bloodshed of rape or unwanted defloration a bloodless suicide is appropriate... Strangulation can therefore be culturally opposed to unwanted sex, the avoidance of the latter may be appropriately achieved through the former, although it may be carried out after the event... The real parthenos does not bleed... becoming a gyne involves a series of bleeding.” KING, H., 1993: “Bound to Bleed: Artemis and Greek Women”, Images of Women in Antiquity, ed. A. Cameron and A. Kuhrt, Routledge, pp. 119.
megaron evokes an experience of transformation, while we always think of the ‘hall’ as a room.
6

THALAMOS

‘STORE-ROOM, WOMEN’S-CHAMBER, BEDCHAMBER’
CONTAINMENT - DANGER - FIXITY
6.1. Introduction
6.2. Thalamos as Container
6.2.1. Things and Containment
6.2.2. Immediate Intimacy and Danger
6.2.3. Fixity and Locking

6.1. INTRODUCTION

With *thalamos* (θάλαμος) we must once again – as in the case of *megaron* – discard the accepted correspondence between a word and a room, where room is the general concept specified through the notion of function, or rather intended as the container of a function. But this time we are in a peculiar situation; for *thalamos* in fact does evoke the experience of containment without being conceived as a room. This seems like a paradox. But, as we shall see, the difference between the conventional definition of *thalamos* and the experience evoked by it is inscribed in the difference between a general concept of container through which a word is defined, and the experience of containment evoked by the word itself.

It is accepted within scholarship that *thalamos* is related to architecture in constituting an important part of the Homeric house, in corresponding to a series of rooms such as the ‘store-room’ the ‘women’s-chamber’, and the ‘bedchamber’. By contrast we will argue that these things are indeed thought of as rooms in the sense of
containers not because they belong to a general and universal class of ‘rooms’ which are necessarily contained, but because the containment we refer to here is a direct experience of the object named by this word and is directly evoked by the Homeric language. This experience of containment is the effect not of belonging to a general class of ‘room’ but because of what we will call an ‘immediate proximity’, an intimacy achieved in a variety of ways. These include visual and olfactory stimulation, the immediate contact of bodies in sexual intercourse, and the close encounter of the sleeping multiple Homeric body with its dreams. This immediate and uncontrolled proximity constitutes a danger and has to be reserved only for the members of the house – which are already in a relation of intimacy – through the device of the locked door that isolates and re-produces as fixed this specific category of experience, the experience of containment, i.e., thalamos. Our approach here seeks to challenge both the established definition of thalamos, but also of femininity, for thalamos is mainly referred to in the literature as a container of femininity. Women and things stored are assimilated, and both interpreted through the concept of container. Femininity and container appear intermingled. But we are not interested here in the history of philosophical phantasies but in the way experiences are generated within the Homeric text.

The usual approach to thalamos is to treat sexual difference as a binary opposition, in which case this ‘natural’ opposition between male and female, is made to reflect a difference in the spatial organization of the Homeric house: male is to megaron as female is to thalamos. But thalamos is not so much the place for women and objects but the experience of an intimacy which is not defined by womanhood; nor is megaron exclusively and constitutively related to males. This way of thinking
of gender as a binary opposition runs parallel with thinking of space as the container of gender. This is very clear in the well known distinction between public and private space, where megaron equals male and public, and thalamos female and private. Nor could discussions about public and private domains in the context of Athenian democracy be relevant, for there is a scholarly recognition that the very distinction is not valid in the case of Homeric epics. The fact is that binary oppositions themselves can only be deployed in a logical space which in effect is a container. Indeed the logicians' orthodox definition of binary opposition as one whose terms are 'mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive' is in fact a figure which requires a spatial containment so that no other possible logical case can escape from the container of proposition. It may indeed be that the proposition together with the denial of its opposite is the figure which at the level of philosophy most encourages the idea of space as a container. To speak of containing the proposition that 'if p then not q', is one of the most important elements of the notion of space as container. But we

1 "The house, let us now observe, is the property of the male and his family line. The oikos is the visual symbol of paternal heredity which entitles sons to succeed their fathers as proprietors of its wealth and movable goods and as rulers over its inhabitants... Yet the house, as we know, is primarily the proper domain of the woman, to which the social rules of the culture assign her, while its men go forth into the outside world to pursue manly accomplishments in war and politics." ZEITLIN, F., 1990: "Playing the Other: Theatre, Theatricality, and the Feminine in Greek Drama," Nothing to Do with Dionysos?: Athenian Drama in its Social Context, eds. J. Winkler, F. Zeitlin, Princeton University Press, pp. 76. On the relation between the emergence of Greek city-state, democracy and the public-private distinction see REDFIELD, J., 1995: "Homo Domesticus," The Greeks, ed. J-P. Vernant, The University of Chicago Press.

2 A. Rathje writes: "In Homer too the public and private spheres seems to be rather interchangeable." RATHJE, A., 1990: "The Adoption of the Homeric Banquet in Central Italy in the Orientalizing period," Sympotica: a Symposium on the Symposion, ed. Os. Murray, Oxford, pp. 286. We argue of course that the distinction itself is not valid for the Homeric text, for it presupposes a certain concept of space, that of container.
propose that *thalamos* and *megaron* cannot be reduced to binary oppositions, but rather exist as complementary experiences that in fact structure the experience of trans-fixity, i.e., of the Homeric *domos*. By refusing to accept that *thalamos* is simply the proper place of female gender and objects, we open up a field of inquiry on the specific, and non-philosophized experience of containment and interiority within the Homeric epic. And in order to understand *thalamos* in its context, visual and olfactory experience will be investigated as will themes regarding women, marriage, sexual intercourse, sleep, dreams, storage, and locking.

6.2. *THALAMOS* AS CONTAINER

In the Homeric dictionary *thalamos* is given the following definition: “room (opp. large hall, *μέγαρον*, *δωμα*), hence the rooms of the rear portion of the house, e.g., women’s chamber, room for weapons, store-room, bedchamber.”

The dictionary also refers to a reconstruction drawing of Odysseus’ house, where different rooms which bear the name *thalamos* are been located in the rear portion of the house. What is obvious in the above definition is that *thalamos* is treated in the same way as *megaron*, that is, governed by the presupposition of the correspondence between names, rooms and archeological representation. Furthermore, etymological dictionaries are no more illuminating, not only because of the limits of etymology which is itself an interpretation to be deciphered in its own historical context, but also because both Hofmann⁴ and Chantraine⁵ regard the etymology of *thalamos* as

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uncertain. For both however, *thalamos* corresponds to an interior room.\(^6\) Room and ‘interior’ of course are synonymous, but what they are talking about is a degree of interiority, which can only be determined by the domestic topography. Indeed it is considered that *thalamos* as a store-room might be located underground, and as a bedroom or the women’s chamber in the upper part of the house. In fact location and function are absolutely necessary for the definition-specification of the otherwise general concept of room. It is conventional to define a room by saying: it is a bedroom on the first floor, because this corresponds to our category of a building. But we should not project our categories on the Homeric text unquestionably. We can only illuminate the problem by a careful reading of the text itself.

In the Iliad and Odyssey the term occurs 71 times, 31 of them in relation to women, marriage or intercourse, 11 in relation to sleep and 29 in relation to ‘storage’. Indeed *domos* is unthinkable without women, marriage, reproduction, the storage of food and treasures, and as a ‘place’ that men can rest and sleep in safety. All these ‘activities’ constitute an integral part of the Homeric house, and they are usually interpreted as that which confers fixity upon the Homeric *domos*. There is a specific relation between the structure of *domos* and these activities. Not only are they thought of as being performed in the house but they also reinforce the conception of house as interior, for such activities need to be conducted in the very interior of the house, in a kind of secret zone. Our difficulty lies in disentangling and distinguishing the way we approach *thalamos*, which does involve the experience of a container, from the general and in our view erroneous use of the category of container by using an *a*

\(^6\) Chantraine defines *thalamos* as “chambre intérieure de la maison, chambre de la maîtresse de maison, chambre où l’on enferme les provisions et les objets précieux”. Ibid
priori concept of space from which also depends the categories of house and rooms. At the level of translation it is true we have no other real term in our language to call it other than 'room'. But theoretically we are seeking to differentiate the specific room-like quality of thalamos from the a priori room which is imposed upon us by philosophy. In order to do this we should first see the ways thalamos is conceived as container within scholarship, and seek to mark the difference of our approach.

As far as thalamos as a store-room is concerned, the idea of a chamber with specific features, a store-room in which precious objects are under lock and key, has never been challenged. But what interests us is the specific relation between the stored things and thalamos, a relation which is usually reduced to the contained and container in which the existence of container is necessarily thought of independently of the contained. Under such an interpretation the container is always prior to any contained thing; indeed any-thing can be defined as that which is been contained within a prior-existing container. It is obvious that such an approach involves a concept of the container which determines the definition of what is contained. We have argued that such concept is foreign in the Homeric text. But then how is it that a specific experience of 'containment' is produced? We shall argue that there is a specific relation between things and thalamos manifested in the Homeric text which will provide us with the possibility of understanding the text without a general concept of container. We postpone this for a moment in order to see the conventional way that scholarship approaches the relation of femininity and thalamos. For when thalamos is defined as the women’s chamber, it is actually understood as the room which contains femininity. It is taken for granted that thalamos is a container, and that femininity is that which needs to be contained and restricted. We could say that the
concept of femininity presupposes the concept of container. For it is indeed through later Greek texts – especially those of medical writers which discuss feminine physiology – that scholars argue successfully about the feminine need for containment. Because women are considered wet they require a place to contain them. Because of their wetness women share the attributes of the liquids, have no solid shape, hence may leak and invade others' 'space'. Moreover women are not capable of self-restraint and must have boundaries imposed upon them. A. Carson writes:

“In such a society, individuals who are regarded as especially lacking in control of their own boundaries, or as possessing special talents and opportunities for confounding the boundaries of others, evoke fear and controlling action from the rest of society. Woman are so regarded by men in ancient Greek society, along with suppliants, strangers, guests, and other intruders. But the threat which woman pose is not only greater in degree than that presented by other transgressors of boundaries; it is different in kind”.

Of course we can interpret the Homeric text in relation to this danger of the transgression of boundaries, understood as the overturning of an established social

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7 Pinault writes in relation to women: “Another factor that established women as colder than men was a deeply rooted system of analogies and polarities, which are evidenced in Greek literature and philosophy dating back to Homer and the Presocratics, and which portrayed the superior quality of body and mind as warm and dry and early on associated these qualities with men. Women, by the habit of thinking in terms of binary pairs, were wetter and colder...We can see this cultural pattern associating fat with cold, wet, female, barbarian, and infertility in a very interesting fifth-century Hippocratic work: Airs, Waters, Places.” PINAULT, J. R., 1993: “Women, Fat, and Fertility: Hippocratic Theorizing and Treatment” Woman's Power, Man's Game, ed. M. De Forest, Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, pp. 81. But how can we presuppose that the thinking in pairs of opposites or polarities characteristic of the fifth-century Greek thought, can also be valid for the Homeric text? On this issue see LLOYD, G.E.R., 1966: Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought, Cambridge.

order. But this is not enough. Of course we could say, for example, that in the Iliad the Trojan war is presented as the result of a woman’s stepping out from her house, while in the Odyssey Penelope keeps the order as long as she remains confined within her thalamos. But such an approach obviously presupposes the general concept of house and rooms as containers and thus forces us into a reading of the Homeric text which is anachronistic. If there is an experience of ‘containment’ within the Homeric text, we have to understand how it is specifically produced rather than deduced from some a priori relation. This is not a purely logical exercise, for it can help us to understand the relation between femininity and thalamos. We shall argue below that in fact femininity is produced not as a consequence of some general category of ‘being feminine’ but as an effect of the relation between the body and things, a relation, which is attained with the immediate proximity, the intimacy which is called thalamos. As far as thalamos as bedroom is concerned, it is normally understood as a room with the specific function of sleep. But the sleep of the male members of the household is an integral part of the con-structure of the Homeric domos.

6.2.1. THINGS AND CONTAINMENT

There are a number of passages where thalamos is described as what might be interpreted simply as a store-room, for in 29 passages it is mentioned in relation to things contained in it. In β337, Telemachos enters his father’s thalamos, where precious objects as well as foods are ‘contained’:

β337-43: he went down into his father’s high-roofed and wide storeroom, where gold and bronze were lying piled up, and abundant clothing in the bins, and fragrant olive oil, and in it jars of wine, sweet to

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9 Δ143, Z228, 316, 321, Ω191, 275, 317, β337, 348, γ441, ξ74, θ439, φ99, π285, τ17, 53, ϖ8,42, ρ109, 140, 143, 155, 157, 161, 166, 174, 179,180, φ166.
drink, aged, were standing, keeping the unmixed divine drink inside them, lined up in order close to the wall, for the day Odysseus might come home even after laboring through many hardships.\textsuperscript{10}

Another description of Odysseus \textit{thalamos} is given when his wife Penelope enters it to fetch his bow for the contest of the suitors:

\textit{φαινόμενα...} \textit{εἴδωλην...} \textit{ηδύπόσιον...} \textit{στοήρα...}

If we made an inventory of things stored in \textit{thalamos}, the textual evidence shows that it would include various objects made of precious metals – armour and weaponry included – food, clothing\textsuperscript{12} and even the precious color purple.\textsuperscript{13} All of them might be given as gifts to guests, and are usually interpreted as ‘status symbols’.\textsuperscript{14} We have

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{10} βσσ7-43: δ’ ὡθόροφοιν θάλαμον κατεβήσετο πατρός, / εὐφόροιν, δὲι νητός χρυσός καὶ χαλκός ἔκειτο / ἐσθής τ’ ἐν χαλώσιν ἄλλ’ τ’ εὐοδές, εἰαν. / ἐν δὲ πίθοι οἶνον παλαιον ἐνδυόσιον / ἐστασαν, ἀκηρύκτον θεῖον ποτὸν ἐντὸς ἔχοντες, / ἐξεῖτο ποτὶ τοῖχον ἄρρητος, \textit{εἰ ποτ’ ὁδοιπόντος, \textit{οἰκεῖα} νοστήσεις καὶ ὄλη πολλὰ μογήσας.}
\item \textsuperscript{11} φσ-15-20...51-2: ἡ καληθής θαλαμωδείς σοὶ ἀμφιπόλωισι γυναιξίν / ἐστασαν, ἔνθα ἐκείμηλα τα κειμήλια κέιτο δικατός, / χαλκός τε χρυσός τε παλάκεμπτος τε σιθήρος. / ἔνθα δὲ τόξον κατάλησαν ἰδέα φαρέτη / ἰσόκος, πολλαὶ δ’ ἐνεσαν στοονοντες διστοί, / ἰδόρα τά... δ’ ἦρ’ ἦρ’ ὑψηλής σανίδος βῆ, ἔνθα δὲ χηλοί / ἐστασαν, ἐν δ’ ἰδρα τῆς θυάδεα ἐῖματ’ ἐκεῖτο.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ζ338-9: [Hekabe] descended into the fragrant store-chamber. There lay the elaborate wrought robes, the work of Sidonian women (αὐτή δ’ ὡθόμον κατεβήσετο κηρέντα, / ἐνθ’ ἔσαν οἱ περιτόι πομποῖκελα ἑργα γυναικών / Σιδωνίων). \textit{ήτ’}: the girl brought the bright clothing out from the inner chamber \textit{kοῦρη θ’ ἐκ θαλάμων φόρετ’ θυάδεα φαρεγγήν}, also \textit{φ52} (see above note 11).
\item \textsuperscript{13} It is mentioned only once in: \textit{Δια43-4}: it lies away in the inner room, and many a rider longs to have it, but it is laid up to be a king’s treasure \textit{κεῖτασ δ’ ἐν θαλάμῳ, πολλαὶς τέ μὲν ἡρακλειον / ἱκτής φορεῖν, βασιλῇ δὲ κεῖται θυάλαμῳ.}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Rathje defines the \textit{keimelia} as ‘status symbols’. He writes: They are prestige objects and represent the status of the owner. Some may even have a premonetary value...they were probably placed in the \textit{thalamos} of the house but taken out and used at particular occasions...Imported wine was a status
already discussed our opposition to such an approach to the Homeric text.\textsuperscript{15} To consider that an object is a symbol implies that it has a double existence as an object \textit{per se} and as a symbol. This is inevitably connected with a specific conception of language, in which a word both corresponds to a ‘real’ object and to its symbolic meaning. In contrast, we are just interested in the experience that a term evokes within the Homeric text. We are not interested in defining the general class of things stored, but how they were experienced. The text informs us that these were experienced as \textit{keimelia} (κειμέλια), that is, things that \textit{keitai} (κείται) ‘lie’. E. Benveniste writes:

"In Homeric society wealth was a composite thing with a broad distinction on two different levels, between \textit{keimelia} and \textit{probata}... The opposition \textit{keimelia/probasis} [Od.2, 75: \textit{keimelia te probasin te}] refers to possessions of two different categories, a distinction which seems to be essential in the economy of Homeric world: Immovable or ‘lying (\textit{keimelia} from κείμεται ‘I lie’), i.e. immovable property and movable property (\textit{hosaprobainet}). All that ‘lies’ (\textit{keitai}), \textit{keimelia}, precious metals in ingots, gold, copper and iron, is opposed to \textit{ta probata}, property on the hoof, consisting of the herds and live-stock in general." \textsuperscript{16}

The status of immobility in the sense of \textit{keitai} also characterizes the \textit{ktetemata} (κτηματα) ‘possession, property\textsuperscript{17} – (\textit{ktasthai} (κτάσθαι) ‘acquire for one’s self’,
possess property, servants, wife’) – and is related to domos. However, what keitai ‘lies’ and thus might be stored is not characterized merely by immobility, for it might be carried out of domos. \( K\text{temata} \) in fact, accompany Helen when she moves from Menelaos’ to Alexandros’ house and vice versa. What is more important from our point of view is not the opposition between movable and immovable property, which has the teleological character of becoming the authoritative categories within Roman property law, but the fact that although categories of possession appear to be described as immovable-fixed, they are in fact that which is movable \emph{par excellence}. Such mobility of the \emph{keimeilia} and \emph{ktemata} is in line with our interpretation of domos as the experience of trans-fixity, but is conventionally interpreted in the context of exchange. It is not only the exchange of gifts, but within the Homeric text, possessions which can be exchanged for living and dead humans captured by the enemy. What makes this exchange possible however is not only, as we might think, the similar status of ‘immobility’ that characterizes both the captured body and the possessions. What actually makes exchange possible is the specific relation that

\[\text{18}\] 1382, 8127: Thebes of Egypt, where the greatest possessions lie up in the houses (\texttt{οθηβας λιγντιας, θεὶ κλείστα δόμως εν κτήματα κείται})

\[\text{291}\]: Phoenicia, where lay this man’s house and possessions (\texttt{φοινίκεις, θεὶ τὸῦ γε δῶμοι καὶ κτήματ᾽ έκείνο})

\[\text{A131-3}\]: Take us alive, son of Atreus, and take appropriate ransom. In the house of Antimachos the treasures lie piled in abundance, bronze is there, and gold, and difficult[\textti{ly} wrouught iron (\texttt{ζἀγρεί λαρύς νιν, στι δ᾽ αδεία δεξια δημοῖα / πολλά δ᾽ εν αντιμάχου δόμως κεμήλία κεῖται / χαλκός τε χρυσός τε πολύκμητος τε σιδηρος})

\[\text{Σ290}\]: the lovely treasures that lay away in our houses have vanished (\texttt{εξαιπόλαξ δῶμαν κεμήλία καλά})

\[\text{19}\] 0254-7: bring ...the clear-voiced lyre, which must have been set down somewhere in our palace...the herald rose up to bring the hollowed lyre out of the king’s house (\texttt{κεισιν φόρμιμιγον λύγειον / οίδεια, ἂς που κεῖται εν ἱμιτρόποι δάμως / ἄρτος δὲ κήρος / οἴκους φόρμιμιγγα γλαυμφρήν δόμων ἐκ βασιλίρου})

\[\text{20}\] Η350: give back Helen of Argos and all her possessions (\texttt{ἄγετ Ἀργείνη Ελενήν καὶ κτήμαθ᾽ ωί κατη})

\[\text{21}\] Priam exchanges possessions that lie in his \textit{thalamos} for the corpse of his son Hektor in 0275-6: Then they carried out [of \textit{thalamos}] and piled into the smooth-polished mule wagon all the unnumbered spoils
every-body might have with some-thing, or with another-body. Things as well as bodies can be attached to a specific body, experienced as its extensions, and provide it with a specific identity. The kind of intimacy achieved between things and bodies is very important in order to understand the experience of thalamos as store-room.

Odysseus gives a first sign for his recognition by describing the clothes he was wearing when he left his domos, and which were stored in his thalamos. Penelope says:

τ255-7: I myself gave him this clothing, as we describe it. I folded it in my chamber, and I too attached the shining pin, to his adornment.

He gives the second sign of his identity through another thing of his possessions, his bow, again stored in his thalamos. But it is the final recognition of his identity produced via another thing of his thalamos, his bed, that gives us the first clue that things are not simply contained within, but in fact produce the experience of containment, i.e., thalamos. Odysseus’ bed is literally rooted on the ground as he made it by cutting the upper part of an olive tree. This thing, his bed, is not contained within his thalamos, but rather it is the bed, the thing itself that literally constructs around it the thalamos, the experience of containment. He says:

to be given for the head of Hektor (ἐκ θαλάμου δὲ φέροντες έξώλυσης ἐκ' ἀκίνης / νῆον Ε-κτόρος κεφαλῆς ἐκπερινί' ἐποίον.). As far as the exchange of captives with possessions from thalamos see below note 27.

22 The captive-body might be attached to a master-body and become a slave. See our approach to domos in the chapter on domos.

22 ς255-7: κατή γάρ τάδε εἴμαι· ἐγὼ πόρον, οί τῇ ἀεροίης, / πτύχας· ἐκ θαλάμου, περόνην τῷ ἐκλείπῃς φαεινήν / κείνης ἐπαραῖτε· ἤμεναι.

24 φ4-52. See above note 11.
§192-4: I laid down my chamber around this, and built it, until I finished it, with close-set stones, and roofed it well over, and added the compacted doors, fitting closely together.  

This specific relation between things and thalamos, which we name the experience of containment -for lack of a better term- is evoked in the Homeric language by the use of a series of epithets, applied to both. These are: polukmetos, poludaidalos, euodes and theodes.

Thalamos is called polukmetos (πολύκμητος) ‘well-wrought’ only once.  

Polukmetos however is an epithet used five more times but only in the formulaic phrase chalkos te chrusos te polukmetos sideros (χαλκὸς τε χρυσὸς τε πολύκμητος τε σίδηρος) ‘bronze, and gold and difficult[ly] wrought iron’. These are referred to in the respective passages as keimelia or ktemata and as such are things stored in thalamos.  

The case of poludaidalos (πολυδαιδαλός) ‘cunningly wrought’ is similar.

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25 §192-4: τὸ δ’ ἐγὼ ἐμφιλαῖον θάλαμον ἰόμον ὑφὶ, ὄρρ’ ἑπέλεεσα, / πυκνήσας λιθάδεσσι, καὶ εὖ κυανόπερθεν ἔρεξα, / κολλητὰς δ’ ἑπέθηκα θόρας, πυκνῶς ἀφαρωγίας.

26 §178: but sat down on the floor of her own well-wrought bedchamber ὅλλ’ ἀρ’ ἔτ’ οὖσον ἱζε πολύκμητον θαλάμοιο.

27 Thalamos is mentioned only in one (φι, see above note 11) of the five instances. In §323-6 the term used is megaron, for the keimeilia do not belong to the master of the house but he keeps them until his friend Odysseus - to whom these precious objects belong- takes them in his own house. As the keimealia are in the process of being transferred, they belong to the experience of megaron and not to that of thalamos. The passage goes like this §323-6: and he showed me all the possessions gathered in by Odysseus, bronze, and gold and difficult[ly] wrought iron...such are the treasures stored for him in the house of the great king. (καὶ μοι κτῆματ’ ἐδείξεν δοὺς ζυγογειροὺς Οδυσσεῖς/χαλκὸν τε χρυσὸν τε πολύκμητον τε σίδηρον...τόσα οἱ ἐν μεγάρῳς κεμβλαὶ κεῖτο ἀνακτῶς). In the remaining 3 passages domos and endon indicate the storage, and it is worth noting that in all of them, these keimeilia can be exchanged for a living person. Z45-8: Take me alive, son of Atreus, and take appropriate ransom. In my rich father’s house the treasures lie piled in abundance; bronze, and gold and difficult[ly] wrought iron (ζηρὴν, θερίζει, υπεροκό, καὶ, σοὶ δ’ ἐξει ἐξαίτιον/πολλὰ δ’ ἐν ἀρνητου πατρός κεμβλαὶ κεῖται / χαλκὸς τε χρυσὸς τε πολύκμητος τε σίδηρος), K378-9: Take me alive, and I will pay my ransom: in my house there is bronze, and gold and difficult wrought iron (ζηρὴν τ’ αὐτὸν ἔως ἐμὲ λύσιαμι/ ἄμι γὰρ ἐνδόν / χαλκὸς τε χρυσὸς τε πολύκμητος τε σίδηρος), Λ132–5: In the house of Antimachos the treasures lie up in abundance, bronze, and gold and difficult wrought iron, and our father would make you glad with abundant repayment were he to hear we
The adjective is used only once with thalamos, but seven times in relation to skillfully wrought things usually stored in it and once applies to the ‘skilled Sidonian craftsmen’ that wrought a mixing-bowl of silver, that is, another precious object.

The use of these two epithets might be interpreted as referring to two kinds of constructs, thalamos on the one hand and crafted objects on the other, where both have the same attributes. However we propose that they indicate that the things stored confer their features upon the experience evoked by the term thalamos. The ‘contained’ produces the experience of containment and is not merely contained inside a pre-existing though similar container.

The same may be said for the next two epithets euodes (ἐυώδης) and theodes (θηώδης), which refer to smell. Both are translated as ‘fragrant’. Theodes occurs three times, twice in relation to clothing stored in thalamos, and once to thalamos itself. Euodes also occurs three times in the text. In β339 applies to the euodes elaion (ἐυώδες ἐλάϊον) ‘fragrant oil’ stored in Odysseus thalamos whereas in Γ381 euodes is...
Alexandros’ *thalamos*[^34] where he, shining in his raiment, will seduce Helen. In ε64 *euodes* is the smell of the cypress around the cavern of Kalypso, a cavern from whence seductive perfumes spread all over the island, where Odysseus is detained by the nymph.[^35] As the perfumed *thalamos* does, this perfumed island evokes the experience of confinement.[^36] This experience of smell introduces us to another effect of *thalamos*: that of intimacy.

### 6.2.2. IMMEDIATE INTIMACY AND DANGER

If *megaron* evokes the experience of transformation, and entails the ritualized and controlled proximity of bodies by which strangers are incorporated albeit temporarily in *domos*, then *thalamos* evokes the experience of a containment which is an effect of an immediate and uncontrolled proximity which is reserved for members of the house. The ways through which this intimacy occurs include visual and olfactory stimulation, sexual intercourse and dreaming.

In Ω191 Priam descends into his fragrant, cedar, high-roofed *thalamos*, which contains many precious things (*glenea*).[^37] The term *glenea* (γλήνεα) denotes ‘gleaming objects’. Different passages inform us that gold and bronze objects are

[^34]:382: and set him down again in his own perfumed bedchamber (καθ δ’ εἶδον εἰς θαλάμῳ εὐώδει κηρύγματι.)

[^35]: ε59-64: There was a great fire blazing on the hearth, and the smell of cedar split in billets, and sweetwood burning, spread all over the island...There was a growth of grove around the cavern, flourishing, alder was there and the black poplar, and fragrant cypress (τὸν μὲν ἐπ’ ἐσχαρόφιν μέγα κατεστραμμένον τὴν δ’ ἄρσιν ὑψάτην οἰδόδει / δαπατοῦσάν: ἄληθεν δὲ σπόρος ἄμφοτερος τῆς ἰδιότητος καταράσοντος.)

[^36]: In two passages (see further on in the text) *thalamos* is experienced as a prison. It is quite interesting that this occurs in relation to men.

[^37]: Ω191-2: he himself went into the storeroom, which was fragrant and of cedar, and high-ceilinged, with many bright treasures inside it. (καθ δ’ εἰς θάλαμον καταπληκτο σχόλει / καθρίζον ὑψόροφον, δ’ γλήνεα κολλά κεχάνοντες.)
among the many things contained in *thalamos* intended as a store-room. We may therefore assume that *glenea* refers to such objects. Another term of the Homeric text is *glene* (γληνη) and denotes the ‘pupil of the eye’. The linguistic proximity between the gleam in the eye and the object implies a proximity between the two. The gleaming eye and the gleaming object are connected by the act of seeing and by the light which springs from both. These objects are precious not for their monetary value, but because they can be worn on the body and produce the power of both aggression and seduction. The weapons stored in *thalamos* are just such dangerous gleaming objects that spring light and wound the enemy. But we have already shown that the Homeric experience of sight entails the collision of seeing and the seen. The dazzling effect of *glenea* or *daidala*, generates the intimacy between such things and the Homeric bodies that experience them. Hera wears a robe with *daidala polla* (δαιδαλα πολλα) so that her husband will be seduced on seeing it. A gleaming object can produce such intimacy. Hence such objects should be normally kept out of sight and used only to achieve this proximity, as in the context of hospitality or sexual intercourse, or of course in battle. In a number of passages the term *thalamos* occurs in relation to the gifts given to or by friends in the context of *xenia*. Now a gift of

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38 B337, 0439.
39 I390, 0164.
40 Among the objects stored in *thalamos* are included crafted pieces of work and called *daidala* (δαιδαλα) and as such are experienced as *thauma idesthai* ‘a wonder to behold’. As we have seen *thalamos* itself is called *poludaidalos*. For a detailed study on *daidala* see FRONTISI-DUCROUX, F., 1975: *Dédale: Mythologie de l’Artisan en Grèce Ancienne*, Paris.
41 Σ179. See also further on in the text.
42 Note that gifts are stored and locked in *thalamos*, to be secured and preserved. They are removed to *megaron*, to be transferred into the guest’s property. Arete fetch from *thalamos* the gifts for Odysseus in 0438-40: Meanwhile Arete brought from out of her chamber the splendid chest for the stranger, and in it laid the beautiful presents, the clothing and the gold which the Phaiakians had given ἑρήν.
hospitality is conventionally interpreted as the “material symbol of friendship.” By contrast, we suggest that they be understood as generating a literal and immediate intimacy between guest and host, an intimacy that long outlasts the departure of the guest, as long as he continues to have the gift in his possession. It is through such a thing that the guest’s identity can be recognized, and this feature of such objects, that they confer identity upon Homeric bodies, creates the need for them to be kept fixed and stored behind the locked doors of the *thalamos*. It is this experience that produces the experience of *thalamos* as a closed container. If a guest achieves proximity in this way in order to become a *philos* ‘friend’, this is because members of the house have already been stamped by this intimacy. Indeed is not only humans that they are called *philoi*, but also food or clothes. Whatever is in *thalamos*, shall be *philoi*. This is an indication of the intimacy between body and things, as well as between bodies themselves. *Philotesia erga* denotes sexual intercourse within the Homeric text and is

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43 “Gifts (*εξενία, δώρα, δοσίνη*) are offered by a host to a guest, never vice versa, as a material symbol of their bond of friendship. In return, the host expects the guest to remember him (μμνημένος 8592-8431, μμνημεται 054, μμνήμα o126), and as a purely practical consideration, to reciprocate with an equally valuable gift sometime in the future (δμυθής o318, δμωνυμένος o285).” REECE, S., 1993: *The Stranger’s Welcome: Oral theory and the Aesthetics of the Homeric Hospitality Scene*, The University of Michigan Press, pp. 35.
usually translated as 'love's delights'. But intercourse occurs in *thalamos*, and Zeitlin writes:

"Merely to enter the bedroom is to gain access to the innermost region of the house, its protected core. This is the domain the woman inhabits, once she has been brought into the household as the lawfully wedded wife, and whose benefits she enjoys because of her relationship with her husband that is symbolized, above all, in her sharing of his bed...The bed, of course, is the place for sex and therefore the central and virtually indispensable feature of any description of sexual activity in Homeric narrative...An invitation to lovemaking may or may not begin with a formal move to the bedchamber (*es thalamon t' ienai*), but a constant feature of such scenes is an explicit mention of mounting a bed (*eune*: e.g., 10.333-34, *noi d' epeita eunes hemeteres epibesomen*), followed by some version of the formulaic expression "they mingled together in" *eune* and *philotes*: (*ophra migente eune kai philoteti*, 10.340, 334-35). Claude Calame translates this phrase to mean "unite in amorous exchange in a bed" and suggests that each term is properly placed to designate the three components of the sexual act: a bed (*eune*), commerce or exchange (*meignumi*), and a fiduciary aspect (*philotes*) that signifies the reciprocal nature of the erotic relationship."  

Thus the intimacy of intercourse is always achieved through a thing, the bed. However the immediate intimacy can be dangerous if conducted without the previous ritualized proximity of marriage. Circe asks Odysseus to lie in bed together (*migente eune kai philoteti*) so that they may have trust and faith in each other. But he

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45 Vernant interprets erotic relationship in terms of limits and the experience of the ‘other’. Though this can be valid in later times, we can not project unproblematically the notion of ‘otherness’ to the Homeric Greeks. He writes: "The sexual dichotomy or duality of roles in an erotic relationship forces each partner to experience his own incompleteness in the impulse towards the other. That relationship is evidence of the individual’s inability to remains within his limits, to be satisfied with what he is...to accept himself in his uniqueness, without seeking to duplicate himself in and through the other, the object of his amorous desire". VERNANT, J-P., 1990: “One...two...three...Eros”, *Before sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in Ancient Greek World*, eds. D. Halperin, J. Winkler, F. Zeitlin, Princeton, pp. 465-479.
would not go into her thalamos unless she swears a great oath that she would not hurt him:

κ399-41: You treacherously ask me to go into your chamber, and go to bed with you, so that when I am naked you can make me a weakling, unmanned. I would not be willing to go to bed with you unless you can bring yourself, O goddess, to swear me a great oath that there is no other evil hurt you devise against me.

_Thalamos_ describes the relation of woman to marriage. Helen depicts the quitting of her marriage to Menelaos as a coming out of _thalamos_. A direct connection between marriage and _thalamos_ is made in a number of passages:

_Α226-7:_ Kisseus detained him there and gave him his daughter. Married he went away from the bride chamber, looking for glory.

Women do not wear their veil when in _thalamos_. Their gaze, the dazzling clothes, scintillating jewelry, and the perfume that wraps their bodies produces the experience of femininity. This femininity is itself produced in relation to the _thalamos_; we do not mean restricted to _thalamos_ but produced. Homeric femininity is defined by sight and smell within a physical intimacy, an intimacy which operates as a mechanism of

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46 κ399-41: δειλοροσσόσια κειλείνως / ἐκ θάλαμον τ' ἔναι καὶ σης ἐπιβήμεναι εὔνης. / ὑπὸ μὲ γυμνωθέντα κακόν καὶ ἀνήγορα θῆς.

47 _Thalamos_ in later times keeps the meaning of the ‘bride-room’ _nymphikos oikos_ (νυμφικός οἶκος) while Aphrodite is called ‘thalamos’ queen’ _thalamon anassa_ (θαλάμων ἀνασσα). See HESYCHIUS, 1953: _Alexadrini Lexicon_, Hanuiae, Ejnar Munksgaard, s.v. θάλαμος.

48 Ἄ174-5: I came hither following your son, forsaking my chamber, my kinsmen, my grown child, and the loveliness of girls of my own age. (οὗτός σφ ἐπάσην θάλαμον γυμνοῦς τε λιπασσά / παιδα τε τηλιγένειν καὶ ὁμηλετέην ἔρατε νανιν).

49 Α226-7: αὐτὰ μὲν κατέρρυκα, δίδοο δ' ἴν τε θυγατέρα ἴν / γῆμας δ' ἐκ θαλάμῳ μετὰ κλέος ικετ. Ἀλὸ Ρ6 ὀρασος δ' ἡ γυναῖκα μορφὴ θαλάμου νέος, Σ492: νόμφας δ' ἐκ θαλάμων, η6 θαλάμους κεραίζομένους, δε6 νοσφισισμένην θάλαμον τε πόσιν τε
seduction. We have only to read the passages that describes women emerging from their *thalamos*. Both Helen and Penelope come out from their fragrant 'rooms' glittering like gold and comparable to goddesses. But the text gives us a detailed description of how this experience of femininity is produced as an actual placing of things on the body, perfume that penetrates everywhere and shining objects which provoke the collision of sight with the things stored in *thalamos*. Hera enters her *thalamos* and does not emerge from it before making all the necessary attachments for the seduction of Zeus.

Ξ166-88 and Ξ331-40: She went into her chamber, which her beloved son Hephaistos had built for her, and closed the leaves of the shining door, then first from her adorable body washed away all stains with ambrosia, and next anointed herself with ambrosial sweet olive oil, which stood there in its fragrance beside her, and from which, stirred in the house of Zeus by the golden pavement, a fragrance was shaken forever forth, on earth and in heaven. When with this she had anointed her delicate body and combed her hair, next with her hands she arranged the shining and lovely and ambrosial curls along her immortal head, and dressed in an ambrosial robe that Athene had made her carefully, smooth, and with many figures upon it, and pinned it across her breast with a golden brooch, and circled her waist about with a zone that floated a hundred tassels, and in the lobes of her carefully pierced ears she put rings with triple drops in mulberry clusters, radiant with beauty, and, lovely among goddesses, she veiled her head downward with a sweet flesh veil that glimmered pale like the sunlight. Underneath her shining feet she bound on the fair sandals. Now, when she had clothed her body in all this loveliness, she went out from the chamber... She also tries to persuade her husband to enter *thalamos* for intercourse: If now your great desire is to lie in love together here on the peaks of Ida, everything can be seen. Then

50 8121: Helen came out of her fragrant high-roofed bedchamber, looking like Artemis of the golden distaff (ἐκ Ἑλένῃ θαλάμῳ θεάδες ψηφόροσι τὸν ἴλιθθεν Αρτέμιδι χρυσηπλακάτο κλωττα).  
51 p36, 53: But now circumspect Penelope came down from her chamber, looking like Artemis, or like golden Aphrodite (Ἡ Πενελόπη ἐκ θαλάμῳ χερίαρεν Πηνελόπην, Ἀρτέμιδι ἴκλη ἢς χρυσῆ Αφροδίτη).  
52 The immediate proximity achieved by smell made it the medium of communication between mortals and immortals in the context of Homeric sacrifice. M. Detienne writes: "In that the perfume of the spices burned on the altars establishes a vertical line of communication between men and gods, its role is apparently similar to that of the pungent smoke from the fatty meat burned in honor of the Olympians." He also points out the seductive power of perfume DETIENNE, M., 1977: *The Garden of Adonis: Spices in Greek Mythology*, The Harvester Press, pp. 39.
what would happen if some one of the gods everlasting saw us sleeping, and went and told all the other immortals of it? I would not simply rise out of bed and go back again into your house, and such a thing would be shameful. No, if this is your heart’s desire, if this is your wish, then there is my chamber, which my beloved son Hephaistos has built for me, and closed the leaves in the door-posts snugly. We can go back there and lie down, since bed is your pleasure.\footnote{277-8: he went to his chamber where his own dear bed lay, and spun his fastenings around the posts from every direction\footnote{277-8: he went to his chamber where his own dear bed lay, and spun his fastenings around the posts from every direction}}

Zeus does not enters the thalamos but uses another trick to hide from the view of others. The sight of intercourse is actually a punishment used by Hephaistos for his unfaithful wife:

The lovers, Aphrodite and Ares will be trapped on the bed and Hephaistos will open the doors of thalamos to invite the gods to the threshold and look upon them. What should remain hidden from view, behind the closed doors of thalamos will become a spectacle. However, we are not able to grasp fully why this is a punishment. We might understand that the intimacy of intercourse is reserved for the married couple which has already undergone a ritualized proximity. The involvement of others – for

\footnote{277-8: he went to his chamber where his own dear bed lay, and spun his fastenings around the posts from every direction}
seeing is a collision, and thus an involvement – will interfere and disrupt their immediate intimacy.

Seduction is not a monopoly of women. For what we are calling manifestations of femininity can be attached to the body of a man as well. Aphrodite sends Alexandros into his perfumed thalamos, and attaches to his body shinning objects to seduce Helen. She also forces Helen to meet him, by saying:

\[\text{\textit{Γ391-2}}: \text{he is in his chamber now, in the bed with its circled pattern, shining in his raiment and his own beauty.} \text{\textit{Γ391-2}}: \text{Thus she accompanies her and: when they had come to Alexandros' splendidly wrought house...} \text{\textit{Γ391-2}}: \text{she, shining among women, went to the high-vaulted bedchamber.} \text{\textit{Γ391-2}}: \]

There Helen refuses to look upon him\(^57\) for she fears the immediate intimacy of sight, and Alexandros has to use another device to persuade her: speech\(^58\). As we have shown, the \textit{thelksis} of the speech is the interplay of differentiation and identification. Finally Helen can resist no more and follows him to bed.\(^59\)

\textit{Thalamos} is also the ‘place’ for sleep. As we have noted, the sleeping body encounters its dreams. Since the Homeric body is multiple and the corporeal,
psychological and mental are all intermingled. Homeric dreams are not experienced as the products simply of mental activity; they have a corporeal register. The body of the dream and the body of the dreamer are intimately connected but unregulated.

Joseph: [Athena] went into the ornate chamber, in which a girl was sleeping, like the immortal goddesses for stature and beauty, Nausikaa, the daughter of great-hearted Alkinoons, and beside her two handmaidens with beauty given from the Graces slept on either side of the post with the shining doors closed. She drifted in like a breath of wind to where the girl slept, and came and stood above her head and spoke a word to her, likening herself to the daughter of Dymas.60

Sleep is a state of vulnerability where the body comes in contact with eidola and ghosts. This unregulated intimacy cannot be avoided, since even a locked door cannot keep dreams out of thalamos. In 8802 Penelope is sleeping in her thalamos and Athena sends her a dream. A dream is an eidolon, in that it has the appearance of a person but lacks its vital force. Eidolon enters thalamos through the key-hole, sits by the head of sleeping person, and talks. During sleep the body is naked or almost naked,61 and a body without its attachments, its philē eimata, is a vulnerable body.

Thalamos evokes this experience of immediate intimacy. For this reason it is also dangerous and is reserved for members of the house. It has to be re-produced as contained, fixed, in the interior of domos behind closed doors, and we should

60 ζ14: θ& δ' ἵπτεν ἐκ θάλαμον πολυδαίδαλον, ὡ εἰς κοῦρη / κοιμήτης θανάτης φοινικός καὶ εἰδώλας θεαί. Ναυσικαία, θυγάτηρ μεγαλήτερος Ἀλκινόον, / παρε ή δ' ὁμφατόλοι, Χαράτου ἕπε κάλλιος ἔχουσα, / σταθμώσεων ἐκάστερος, / θάρας δ' ἐπέκειντο φανείναι. / θυγάτηρ δ' ἐνάρμον ὡς πνεύμη ἐκσάστευος δείμνη κοῦρης. / στή δ' ἠπειρέσσεται καὶ μὴν πρὸς μέθοδον πέψαν / εἰθομάνη κοῦρη ναυσικειοτοῦ Δύμαντος.

61 α431. See below note 67.
remember that a closed thure is experienced as that which separates and isolates categories of different experiences.

6.2.3. FIXITY AND THE LOCKED DOOR

In β337 a description of Odysseus' thalamos, where precious objects and foods are kept is given. His thalamos is locked. The person that is responsible for “locking” is a woman, but an aged one, and we have already shown the relation of the aged woman to the doors of the Homeric domos. It is true that in φ4-52, Penelope also holds the key to her husband’s thalamos and an extended description of its opening is given:

φ4-5...42-50: in her solid hand took up the beautiful, brazen and artfully curved key, with an ivory handle upon it...When she, shining among women, had come to the chamber, and had come to the oaken threshold, which the carpenter once had expertly planed and drawn it true to a chalkline, and fitted the door posts to it and joined on the shining door leaves, first she quickly set the fastening free of the hook, then she inserted the key and knocked the bolt upward, pushing the key straight in, and the door bellowed aloud, as a bull does, when he feeds in his pasture; such was the noise the splendid doors made, stuck with the key, and now they quickly spread open. 63

The closed door of thalamos contributes to the experience of thalamos as containment and fixity, which confers fixity to domos. A series of passages refer to

62 β345-7: To close it there were double doors that fitted together with two halves, and there by night and day was a woman in charge who, with intelligent care, watched over all this, Eurukleia the daughter of Ops the son of Peisenor. In later times aged women (graiai) keep the keys of thesauroi.

63 φ4-5...42-50: ἐπειδὴ δὲ κλειδὶ εὐκομμᾶτι χειρὶ ποιήσει, ἐν δὲ καλή θυλάξει, καὶ ἐκεῖ ἐκλεξαμενος ἔπιθεν. ...Πι δ᾽ ὅτε δὴ θάλαμον τὸν ἄριστον δίδακεν ἐν τῷ καλῷ ποιήσατο, τὸν ποτὲ τέκτων ξύλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἐπὶ σταθμὸν θυνεν, ἐν δὲ σταθμὸς δροε, θύρας δ᾽ ἐπέθηκεν φαεινας: ἐν δὲ καλῇ ἐκεῖ. θυράς δ᾽ ἐνεκόστεν ὡθῆσαι, τὰ δὲ ἀνέβραχαν ἤπνε τάφρος, βοσκομένος λεμένη, τότε ἔξωκε καλὰ θύρας ἐν τῇ κλείδει, κατάστησαν δὲ οἱ ἑκεῖ.

64 There are a lot of passages in which the door of thalamos is mentioned. We quote here a passage in which the door is used in a simile Ω317: as big as the build of the door to a towering chamber in the
the weapons of Odysseus locked in *thalamos*, and this is an important fact in his plan to kill the suitors and reconstitute his *domos*. The failure to safeguard the closed door jeopardizes the whole enterprise.\(^{65}\) *Thalamos* is also referred to in 3 passages as a kind of prison, as a place of confinement, due to its closed doors:

1473-5: one [watcher was] in the ante-chamber before the doors of the bedroom. But when the tenth night had come to me in its darkness, then I broke the close-compacted doors of the chamber and got away.\(^{66}\)

*Thalamos* is also a locked ‘room’ where men as well as women sleep. Telemachos’ *thalamos* is in fact mentioned several times. But sleeping in *thalamos* evokes the fixity of *domos*, as it is only reserved for its members. The suitors spend their day eating and entertaining themselves in Odysseus’ house but when it is time for sleep they go to their homes, whereas Telemachos goes to his *thalamos*:

\(\alpha 423-42: \) and the black night came on as they were taking their pleasure. Then they went home to go to bed, each to his own house, but Telemachos went there, off the splendid courtyard, a lofty bedchamber had been built for him, in a sheltered corner. There he went to go to bed, his heart full of problems, and devoted Eurekleia went with him... He opened the doors of the close-compacted bedchamber, and sat down on the bed and took it off his soft tunic and put it into the hands of the sagacious old woman, and she in turn folded the tunic, and took care of it for him, and hung it up on a peg beside the corded bedstead. Then she went out of the room, and pulled the door to behind her with a silver hook, and with a strap drew home the door bolt.\(^{67}\)

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\(^{65}\) p285, t17,109, 140, 143, 155, 157, 161, 174, 179, 180, w166.

\(^{66}\) 1473-5: *ένι προδόμω πρόσθεσθε θαλάμω το σπίτι ή χώρα, ἂν δὴ δεκτήτοι ἔπιθυσθεν νὰ ἱππόθηκα, / καὶ τὸ τῇ θάλαμῳ ὥραν ποικίλως ἀφαίρεσθα.*

\(^{67}\) α423-42: τοίτι δὲ τήρησαν τόια μέλας ἐστὶ ἐπετρικά ἡμέρα / δὴ τοῦτο κακόσεντες ἦσαν οἴκονδε ἑκατον / Τηλέμαχος δὲ, ὅτι οἱ θάλαμοι περίκολλος αὐλῆς / ὑψηλὸς δῆμοιτο, περισκόπησαν ἐνί χώρα, / ἐνθ’ ἐβη εἰς εὐνῆν πολλὰ φροσημιτίζειν. / τῷ δ’ ἔδρ’ ἦμ’ αἰθομένας δαίδας φέρε καθά δεῦτον / Εὐρυκλεία... ἤδηζεν δὲ τρόπος θαλάμων πώς καίσειτο, / ἐξετάζον δὲ ἐν ἱέρι, μελακόν δ’ ἐκδόθη χτισάνα... / καὶ τὸν μὲν γραφή ποικιλότερος ἐμβαλε χειρὶν. / ἢ μὲν τὸν πτέμασα καὶ ἀσκήσασα χτισάνα, / πασσόλῳ ἀγκρεμάσασα παρὰ τρητοῖς λέγετο, βὴ ἢ ἢ μὲν ἐκ θαλάμῳ, θυρίν δ’ ἐπέρροσε κορόναν, / ἄργος, ἐστὶ δὲ κληθ’ ἐπένοσαν ἤμεντε.
And even when guests sleep in the house of the host they never sleep in thalamos, for thalamos is reserved to members of the household. In a way thalamos and sleep structure the experience of domos, generating the effect of fixity. The structure of Nestor’s domos is denoted through the experience of thalamos when his sons “coming out of their chambers gathered in a cluster about him.”

We can better understand this relation through another Homeric term dedmenenos (δεδμημένος), a term that can be translated either as ‘tamed’ or ‘constructed’. As we have argued in the chapter on domos, dedmenenos evokes an experience of fixity, and is related to sleep, death, and the tiredness of the body. The term occurs ten times, five in Iliad and five in Odyssey; eight of them relate to sleep, one to death and one to tiredness. Most interesting for our research are the two formulaic passages where it denotes the construction of Priam’s thalamoi:

2242-50: Now he entered the wonderfully built palace of Priam. This was fashioned with smooth-stone cloister walks, and within it were embodied fifty sleeping chambers of smoothed stone built (dedmenenoi) so as to connect with each other; and within these slept each beside his own wedded wife, the sons of Priam. In the same inner court on the opposite side, to face these, lay the twelve close smooth-stone sleeping chambers of his daughters built so as to connect with each other; and within these slept, each by his own modest wife, the lords of the daughters of Priam.
The above passage describes the domos of Priam, and describes its construction and its structure at both the level of the material and the corresponding structure of the family. Dedmemones is not simply 'built', but fixed in a specific way, and this fixity is evoked by thalamos, in its relation to sleep and marriage. There are 5 passages in which in a formulaic way the expression dedmemono hupno (δεδμημένον ὕπνο) occurs. However this time sleep is related to death. Death is the twin brother of sleep (Σ231), for in both the body is in a state of immobility and fixity. Tiredness also produces this effect of immobility. Dedmemones then evokes the experience of fixity of both the body and thalamos.

71 K1-3: Now beside their ships the other great men of the Achaians slept night long, with the soft bondage of slumber upon them; but the son of Atreus, Agamemnon, shepherd of the people, was held by no sweet sleep as he pondered deeply within him (Ἀλλ' ον παρά νησίν ἄρτους Παναχειάων / ἔδωκαν παννόχοι μιαλακῶ δεδμημένοι θάνει'. / ὀλλ', οὐκ ἄρεθδὴν Ἁγαμήμονον ποιμένα λαῶν / ὅπως ἔχῃ γλυκερός πολλάκις ὀρεσίν ὀρμαίνοντα)

Ω677-8: Now the rest of the gods and men who were lord of chariots slept nightlong, with the easy bondage of slumber upon them, only sleep had not caught Hermes the kind god, who pondered now in his heart (Ἀλλ' ον μὲν ἑδον τε καὶ ἄνεφες ὑποκοριστάται / ἔδωκαν παννόχοι μιαλακῶ δεδμημένοι θάνει'. / ὀλλ', οὐχ' Ἔρμης ἐρείπιοντον θανός ἄμαρτα / ὀρμαίνοντες ὀνὰ θυμόν)

ο4-7: She found Telemachos there with the glorious son of Nestor, sleeping in the forecourt of worshipful Menelaos. Indeed, the son of Nestor was held fast in the softening sleep, but the sweet sleep was not on Telemachos, wakeful with anxious thoughts (ὥρῃ δὲ Τηλέμαχον καὶ Νέστορος ἀγλαῶν νύν / ἐδοντ᾽ ἐν προδόδῳ Μενελάου κυκλάμιοι., ἀ τοῖς Νεστορίδην μιαλακῶ δεδμημένον ἄνει / Τηλέμαχον δ' οὖς δανός ἄρη γλυκείς, ὀλλ', ἐκθαμμῷ)

η318: until which time giving way to slumber you may rest, and they will...bring you back to your...house (τῆμος δὲ σὺ μὲν δεδμημένος θάνει λέξεις...δῶμαι)

ν119: set him down on the sand, he was still bound fast in sleep (ὅτι ἐμαθὼθα θεσσαν δεδμημένον διάνοι)

72 Σ482: you must sometimes die, as this man did. Think how Promachos sleeps among you, beaten down under my spear (ἄλλα κοι ὀδό κοπτακτενέσθε καὶ ἄμεσα / φραξίσθη ὡς ὅμων Πρόμαχος δεδμημένος οἴοι / ἐγχει ἔμω)

73 In later times thalamos is related to death. Sappho refers to thalamos once in her poems. A young girl who died before getting married will be accepted by Persephone in her kuanos thalamos: 002.7.489.1: Τίκεος ὅδε κόνις, τὰν δὴ πρὸ γάμων θάνοσαν / δέξητας Φεσεφόνας κυκλίν θάλαμος.
Marriage as well as sexual intercourse within marriage contributes to the production and re-production as of the fixity of domos. We know that both are related to the experience of thalamos. The marital bed in thalamos produces the institution of marriage. Odysseus in order to secure his marriage has a bed rooted in the earth. He uses the trunk of a big olive tree (olive tree in the text is euodes), to make his bed, and then he builds his thalamos around this tree-bed. When Penelope in order to test him, asks the servants to move this bed out of thalamos, Odysseus is in despair since this would mean that someone had destroyed the one thing through which he can reclaim his identity. The recognition of Odysseus’ identity is achieved through an object in his thalamos, and his reunion – read intimacy – with his wife is achieved by sexual intercourse; the fixity of his domos is re-produced behind the sealed doors of his thalamos.

The relation between things, thalamos, marriage and the structure of domos is also revealed in a passage when Helen offers a guest-gift to Telemachos; she says to him:

I too give this gift, dear child: something to remember from Helen’s hands, for your wife to wear at the lovely occasion of your marriage. Until that time let it lie away in your palace (megaron), in your dear mother’s keeping.

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74 Antoniades interprets the above passage, producing a drawing of Odysseus’ bedchamber with an olive tree in the middle. ANTONIADES, A., 1992: Epic Space, Van Nostrand Reinhold, N.Y.

75 When she had brought them to the chamber she went back. They then gladly went together to bed, and their old ritual (ες θαλάμων δ’ ἄγεσθαι πάλιν κείν. οἴ μὲν ἔσεται / ὁσπάστοι λέκτρου παλατίου θεσμον [κοντο])

76 ὅπως τοι καὶ ἐγώ, τέκνων φίλε, τούτο διότι, μὲν ἔλεν ἡγερών, πολυπρόποι εἰς γόμον ἄρην, / σῇ ἀλλόχως φορέσαν, τειος δὲ φίλη παρὰ μητρὶ κελέσκει ἕνι μεγάρῳ.
The term used here is not *thalamos* but *megaron*, because the gift is to be transferred, it no longer belongs to Odysseus' *domos*, is not part of his *thalamos*; but it will lie in Telemachos' *thalamos* only when he constructs and structures his own *domos*.

The term *thalamos* evokes the experience of containment, which is generated by the things contained. It is through the shining precious metals, the glittering works of woven clothing, armory, weaponry, the smell of food, perfumed oils, and the vulnerable naked sleeping and dreaming body, that an experience of seduction and danger is produced. It is an experience of immediate intimacy, of sight, smell, or intercourse. Only members of the *domos* are permitted to have such an intimacy, for they have already acquired it by becoming members of the house. Moreover, it is by 'attaching' to their bodies the things 'stored' in *thalamos* that members of the house produce their identities, and it is very important in order to keep the identity to keep the things fixed. A closed and locked door delimits this dangerous experience; this is an experience which is quite different from a conventional understanding of *thalamos* as the name for a series of specific rooms that contain different functions, and in a relation of opposition to *megaron*. The difference lies between the conception of *thalamos* as a room, that is, as a specific container, and the experience of containment evoked by it. What makes it difficult to describe this difference, however, is that we do not have a more appropriate contemporary term to name this experience.


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