The Open UniversitySkip to content
 

More lives, better lives

Belshaw, Christopher (2003). More lives, better lives. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6(2) pp. 127–141.

DOI (Digital Object Identifier) Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1024416624499
Google Scholar: Look up in Google Scholar

Abstract

Although many people believe that more people would be better, arguments intended to show this are unconvincing. I consider one of Parfit's arguments for a related conclusion, that even when both are worth living, we ought to prefer the better of two lives. Were this argument successful, or so I claim, then it would follow that more people would be better. But there aren't reasons for preferring the better of two lives. Nor is an attempted rejoinder effective. We can agree that there aren't reasons for preferring the better of two lives, and yet still maintain there are reasons for improving lives.

Item Type: Journal Article
ISSN: 1386-2820
Keywords: consequentialism; future generations; obligation; Parfit; value
Academic Unit/Department: Arts > Philosophy
Item ID: 5765
Depositing User: Christopher Belshaw
Date Deposited: 08 Nov 2006
Last Modified: 02 Dec 2010 19:54
URI: http://oro.open.ac.uk/id/eprint/5765
Share this page:

Actions (login may be required)

View Item
Report issue / request change

Policies | Disclaimer

© The Open University   + 44 (0)870 333 4340   general-enquiries@open.ac.uk