Britain and Menorca in the eighteenth century

Thesis

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Chapter Eight.

The Defence of Menorca - Threats and Losses.

Oh my country! Oh Albion! I doubt thou art tottering on the brink of desolation this day! The nation is all in a foment upon account of losing dear Minorca.

This entry for 18 July 1756 in the diary of Thomas Turner, a Sussex shopkeeper, encapsulated the reaction of the British public to the news that Menorca had been lost to the French at a time when, such was the vaunted impregnability of Fort St. Philip, ordinary citizens were prepared to wager as much as £100 that the island would never be taken. But Turner's comments were a lament which might have been recorded in any of the years during which Menorca was British when, as in 1756, the garrison was denied the naval support without which the island was indefensible. Located at a sailing distance of only one day from France and two days from Spain - Britain's recurrent enemies in the eighteenth century - the island could never be regarded as a secure British possession. Spain's resentment at losing Menorca in 1713 persisted throughout the century, and its recovery was a recurrent objective in all the treaties between Spain and her allies. Consequently, even at times when Britain was not at war, any intelligence of a significant increase in military or naval activity in Spain or in the south of France was a cause of anxiety to the commanders in Menorca.

Philip V's recapture of Mallorca in 1715 and the undisguised ambition of Alberoni, his Chief Minister, to re-
establish Spain's influence in the western Mediterranean, gave rise to anxieties in the early years of British rule. Kane's leave was cancelled in 1715, when it was feared that the Jacobites might offer Gibraltar and Menorca to Spain in return for her support for the Pretender to regain the British crown, and while subsequently on leave in London, Kane warned the Secretary of State of the dangers of an attack from Mallorca. Lord Forbes, commanding in Menorca during Kane's absence, was reported to be 'vastly apprehensive of Spanish designs' and 'depending on being attacked' in July 1717. Although the fleet despatched to the Mediterranean under Admiral Byng brought troops to relieve the garrison regiments in Menorca before sailing on to defeat the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro in Sicily in August 1718, Forbes reported great consternation when another Spanish fleet (actually on its way to Sardinia), lay menacingly off the coast of Menorca for eight days in August 1719.

In the 1720s, of the two British Mediterranean possessions, Gibraltar was the focus of Spain's attention when two unsuccessful attempts to besiege the Rock were mounted (1720, 1727-1729), but it was Menorca which was the more threatened in the 1730s, years in which Spain adopted a more aggressive policy in her relations with Britain. In the New World, Spain attempted to re-establish the monopoly of trade which she had enjoyed before 1713, and set out to limit the abuses in trade which the Asiento concession had opened up to British merchants; in Spain economic reforms were introduced which discriminated against British trade and, in 1732, Spain recaptured Oran on the north African coast, where she established a naval base which threatened
British naval supremacy in the western Mediterranean. In 1730, Kane and Carpenter had secured the appointment of Samuel Scot as British vice-consul in Mallorca, specifically so that he could give 'timely warning' of any Spanish preparations which could have 'any design for surprise' against Menorca. Kane was, consequently, advised of the Spanish build-up to the expedition to Oran in 1732, and of the preparations for the Spanish expedition to Naples in 1733. Before the destinations of both expeditions were known, Kane was apprehensive that Menorca could be their objective but, despite his warnings to the ministry, no British naval force was despatched to the Mediterranean, and Kane was advised to seek help from Gibraltar if he considered Menorca to be threatened. No such application was made until 1738, when it became clear that the Spanish were mounting another expedition, the known objective of which was the capture of Menorca, and the Menorca garrison was strengthened by the arrival from Gibraltar of the 26th regiment.

Philip V was seriously contemplating an attack on Menorca as early as the Spring of 1738. By June 1738, the composition of the expeditionary force had been established, its commander appointed - the Duke of Montemar - and a detailed estimate of the cost had been produced. The campaign was expected to last three months and cost some ten million pesos. Montemar received a steady flow of intelligence from Menorca from a Spanish agent in the island, Juan Ballester. Ballester provided information on the disposition of the British troops, the poor state of the fortifications of St.Philip's, the low morale of the British troops (suggesting
some would desert if the Spanish achieved a landing, and many more would join them if offered an inducement of ten pesos and the promise of a free passage to the country of their choice. He even went so far as to suggest landing places for the expedition, to forecast that a siege of two to three weeks would suffice, and to produce a map of the attack on the fort as he envisaged it (Fig. 8.1). But with Ballester's information and plans came a warning that it would be wise to proceed with caution against an island belonging to a nation whose navy was considered to be 'superior' to the Spanish fleet. In the event caution did prevail, even after war had been officially declared in December 1739, helped by the fact that the British squadron in the Mediterranean under the command of Admiral Haddock, had increased in number from eight ships in April 1739 to nineteen in October 1739. But it was not until the Spanish expedition had been rerouted to northern Italy in the spring of 1741, that Haddock was confident of discounting the likelihood of an immediate attack on Menorca. Even though the Anglo-Spanish conflict subsequently merged with the War of the Austrian Succession and lasted until 1748, no other threats were posed to the security of the island in those years.

Although renewed British possession of Menorca after 1763, and the retention of Gibraltar made a genuine reconciliation between Spain and Britain impossible, during the second period of British rule only the Anglo-Spanish dispute over the Falkland Islands in 1770 threatened the security of Menorca until the demands of the War of American Independence sapped British naval and military resources to
Plano

de una porción de la Isla
de Menorca y Conocimiento del
Trayecto del Ataque de Pechpe

Explicación

A. Castillo de Pechpe con todas sus fortificaciones
B. Circunvalación de piedra seca
C. El Arrabal
D. Atrayente en que se propone desembarcar la
  Tropa para iniciar la
E. Campamento del Carro
F. Batallones para defender y facilitar la defensa
  al Carro
G. Batallones para embarcar los destinos a la
  Plana
H. Las ciudades del Carro y cuarteles Generales
I. Carro de artillería
J. Batallones p. Sube a los Batallones
  y Ataques
K. Campo Universal de los Batallones
L. Batallones Artilleros
M. Batallón de 24 Cañones para Batir a
  Baricha...
the extent that Gibraltar and Menorca, with weakened garrisons and very limited support, appeared achievable conquests to Spain and France. The Falklands dispute was serious enough for General Mostyn, the Governor, and all other absentee officers, to be ordered to their posts in Menorca, and for Johnston, commanding in Mostyn's absence, to send London warnings of the build-up of Spanish troops in Mallorcal and, even though he was apprehensive of an attack, he had sent two companies of artillery to strengthen the Gibraltar garrison. In the event no attack was mounted on either Gibraltar or Menorca and, although the British Ambassador in Madrid correctly discounted the possibility of an attack on Menorca in 1775, it was becoming increasingly obvious that both British possessions were far from secure. As early as March 1776, Murray sent the Secretary at War two possible scenarios of a Spanish attack on Menorca, together with his plans to thwart them.

Barrington replied that:

His Majesty's Ministers do not think the present situation of affairs makes it necessary or advisable that all absent officers should be ordered to join their corps in Minorca.

Nevertheless, Murray remained convinced that Menorca would be attacked and took prudent steps to put the island on a war footing, even to the extent of sending the 'female part' of his family out of the island, together with his 'Plate, Books, Pictures and best Furniture.'

The Loss of Menorca in 1756.

The Treaty of Aix la Chappelle which brought to an end the War of the Austrian Succession in 1748 gave Europe eight
years of uneasy peace, but more friendly relations with Spain encouraged Britain to reduce the Menorcan garrison to four regiments. However, territorial disputes between France and Britain in North America, and commercial rivalry between the two countries in India, were never likely to be confined to those two continents, and the prospect of another war in Europe was never far distant. It was the French invasion of Menorcan which brought this about.

The account of the failure of the British navy to relieve Menorcan and the conduct of the siege of Fort St. Philip were, understandably, the subject of much contemporary comment. Since then, the story has been recounted many times and, in this century, the standard accounts of events were, for long, to be found in J.W. Fortescue's History of the British Army, and in the account of naval activity in H.W. Richmond's Papers relating to the loss of Minorca. W.C.B. Tunstall and T.H. McGuffie subsequently brought additional information to bear before the publication in 1962 of At 12 Mr Byng was shot, by Dudley Pope. This remains the most comprehensive study of not only how, but also why, Menorcan was lost in 1756, and the following account relies heavily, but not exclusively, on Pope's findings.

At the time, Horace Walpole described the events surrounding the loss of Menorcan in 1756 as a 'perfect tragedy' played by a cast of a villain, a victim and a hero. The villain was considered to be the Duke of Newcastle (and his ministry), the victim, Admiral John Byng, and the hero General William Blakeney, but there were others in the cast who played a significant and influential part.
Newcastle has been rightly judged to have done too little too late to save Menorca, but, paradoxically, it can be argued that he did too much too soon to bring about the French attack. From the moment Newcastle succeeded his brother, Henry Pelham, at the head of government in March 1754, his foreign policy was provocative to the French. In October 1754, he defiantly sent General Braddock and additional troops to North America. and, in April 1755, Admiral Boscawen was ordered to attack the fleet bound for Canada carrying the French reinforcements intended to balance the increase in British troops. In July 1755, Admirals Hawke and Byng were sent to sea, the former to patrol off Brest, the latter in the Western Approaches, with orders to harry, attack and capture French ships - warships, privateers and merchantmen. They were very successful; in their five months of cruising, more than 300 French ships were taken. The French reaction to these aggressive actions could not be expected to be limited indefinitely to diplomatic protests, and yet Newcastle's military preparations for the inevitable conflict were negligible. He was active only on the diplomatic front, attempting by a series of treaties, pacts and subsidies to gain European allies against France, and to buttress Hanover in the event of war. Lord Waldegrave's observation was apt: 'We first engaged in a war, and then began to prepare ourselves'.

It was not that intelligence of French intentions did not reach Newcastle. He was warned of two possible courses of action - an invasion of Britain from the French channel ports, and an attack on Menorca - but he chose to place greater reliance on the former, even though the evidence of
the latter course of action was more concrete, and came not only from Blakeney as early as June 1754, but also, after February 1755, from a variety of dependable diplomatic and consular sources. Newcastle and Lord Anson (First Lord of the Admiralty) did not lack informants or information, merely the ability to read the signals correctly. As late as December 1755, Anson was convinced that any attack mounted by France would be directed at the British Isles, and Newcastle, haunted by recent memories of the near success of the Jacobite rebellion in 1745, was anxious to provide maximum protection in home waters. Newcastle's determination to place greater credence on reports of an invasion of Britain lasted until early March 1756 when, belatedly, the ministry was forced to admit that a threat to Menorca actually existed, and Byng was appointed to command a squadron of ten ships to go to the relief of the island.

The ministry's failure to act in time, and with a stronger naval force to ensure the security of a valuable yet vulnerable outpost, was inexcusable in the light of the intelligence it had received. The subsequent actions of both Newcastle and Anson to avoid responsibility for their misjudgement and inactivity, and to make Byng the scapegoat for the disaster, were dishonest and reprehensible. The mere loss of office which they suffered when the ministry was toppled in the aftermath of the fall of Menorca, was shamefully disproportionate to the fate of Byng.

The choice of Byng to command the Mediterranean squadron was understandable. He had thirty-eight years of sea experience, including three tours of duty in the Mediterranean, and he was second in seniority to Lord Anson.
But he was, by temperament, a cautious man and, while a proven competent sailor and commander, he lacked flair, tactical insight and flexibility. His acceptance of the command was unenthusiastic, but not without reason since the ships allocated to him lying at Portsmouth were in poor condition, and undermanned to the extent of some 700 sailors. Initially, Byng was not allowed to recruit from the other ships in the harbour and, even when this restriction was lifted, he sailed on 7 April carrying the 7th Foot instead of the marines he was promised, and his crews were still 300 short of complement. The squadron had a stormy passage and did not reach Gibraltar until 2 May, when Byng learned that the French had landed on Menorca on 17 April, and that the entire garrison had retired into St. Philip's which was under siege from vastly superior numbers. General Fowke, the Governor of Gibraltar, fearful of an attack upon the Rock and bolstered by the opinion of a Council of War which he had called, disobeyed orders and refused to send a battalion from the garrison with Byng, limiting his support from the garrison there to some 250 men to replace the marines who should have accompanied Byng from England. Byng was, however, able to add to his squadron the three ships under the command of Captain Edgcumbe which had, for the past year, constituted three-fifths of the total British naval presence in the Mediterranean.

Byng sailed from Gibraltar on 8 May, and arrived off Menorca eleven days later. He sighted the French fleet, of comparable size to his own, but superior in armament, construction and condition. The British flag was still flying over the St. Philip's, but from the bombardment taking place,
the siege was clearly well-established, with the French in control of the rest of the island. Calm weather prevented any closing of the two fleets on 19 May, but on 20 May, the wind freshened and Byng moved to engage the French fleet. The French, under instructions not to hazard the Menorca expedition by any rash act, stood on the defensive; the wind threw the British battle-line into confusion and enabled the French fleet to keep out of range of the British broadsides while, at the same time, inflicting considerable damage with their stern chase guns to the masts and rigging of the British ships, four of which were extensively damaged. Byng was unable to regroup his ships before nightfall, and the French fleet slipped away under cover of darkness.

In this engagement, for it cannot be called a battle, Byng's actions were governed by three factors: his conformist and unadventurous temperament, the reluctance of Galissionière, the French Admiral, to jeopardise the success of the attack on Menorca by engaging in a full-scale sea battle, but the most telling element was dictated by the Fighting Instructions by which all British Admirals were required to conduct a battle at sea, and which decreed that no attack was to be mounted until the whole of the fleet, van, centre and rear, was in line astern. The Instructions, in force since the last decade of the seventeenth century, had been challenged only once, by Admiral Mathews in the battle of Toulon in 1744, when he had attacked with the rear division of his own fleet out of line. Mathews' daring was not rewarded with a victory and, at his subsequent court-martial (at which Byng was the second most senior officer),
he was found guilty of violating the Instructions, and was sentenced to be cashiered.

When Byng moved to engage the French, he had achieved the requisite line-of-battle, but the ships in the van closed too quickly with the enemy, and Byng in the centre and the ships in the rear were hampered in their movements by the damage inflicted on the ships ahead of them. If Byng had broken the line-of-battle, he and the rear division could have closed with the French but, faithful to the Instructions, he did not do so and, after five hours, the engagement ended inconclusively, although the French, had inflicted greater damage on Byng's ships, and the British had suffered a greater number of casualties. Byng's intentions were to renew the combat, but the French fleet did not reappear until 23 May when, once again, no attempt was made to close with the British fleet. On the following day, Byng summoned a Council of War at which it was unanimously decided by the seventeen officers present that another attack on the French fleet would present no prospect of raising the siege and relieving Menorca, and the security of Gibraltar and the protection of British Mediterranean trade would be jeopardised if the British fleet suffered further damage. It was consequently resolved that His Majesty's service would be best served by the fleet proceeding immediately to Gibraltar.36

It cannot be doubted that the Council of War reached the conclusions that Byng himself had in mind, but Byng's lack of direction in the Council underlined his own indecisiveness, and the orthodoxy of his approach. Gibraltar was not under threat, nor could it be until Menorca was conquered; Richelieu's troops had already been on the island for a
month, and they were desperate for supplies; Galissionière was clearly more intent on safeguarding his fleet and preserving the lines of supply between Menorca and France than he was on risking a full-scale naval battle. Comparison has been made between the attitude of Byng with that of his father when Spain attacked Sicily in 1718. Then, as in 1756, the British fleet despatched to the Mediterranean had arrived to find that the attacking force had been landed and had invested the principal citadel, but Sir George Byng's attitude was that, since he had arrived too late to prevent the enemy landing, 'I intend to attack their fleet and render them useless from either covering their army or bringing succours to them'. But the comparison is unfair. In 1718 there was no question of landing troops from the fleet to relieve a besieged garrison, or remaining on station to protect the island, and the British fleet did not include ships and casualties which had been caused by earlier action against the enemy. In 1756 Admiral John Byng found himself in an impossible situation. Because the French held the heights to the north of Mahón harbour, he could not enter it to land the 7th Foot at any point with direct access to Fort St. Philip; to have landed the regiment at any other point in the island, however morale-boosting this might have been to the garrison, would have been sacrificial in the knowledge of the superiority in numbers of the French, and to have attempted to stay on station in order to cut the supply route from France to the island with a fleet containing severely disabled ships would, given the strength of the French fleet, have courted a naval disaster. Nevertheless, Byng's withdrawal to Gibraltar allowed Richelieu to receive the
supplies he needed to mount an increasingly effective bombardment and ultimately successful attack upon Fort St. Philip.

On arrival in Gibraltar Byng received orders from the Admiralty to strike his flag and return to Britain. In London his failure to relieve Menorca had been prejudged by the account of the naval engagement by Galissionière which was published before Byng's own despatch reached England. By the time that Byng reached Spithead on 26 July a campaign against him was in full swing. His despatch to the Admiralty accurately describing the action off Menorca had been prejudicially edited by the ministry before it was published in the Gazette, and Byng discovered that a hue and cry accusing him of cowardice was gaining irresistible momentum. He was arrested on arrival in England, and faced a court martial six months later where, although Byng was acquitted of cowardice, the unimamously verdict was that he was guilty under the 12th Article of the Articles of War in that 'he did not do his utmost to take or destroy every ship which it was his duty to engage'.

A guilty verdict under Article 12 allowed of only one sentence - death -, but Byng's judges most earnestly recommended him as a 'proper object of mercy'. Despite the efforts of friends in England and intervention from abroad - Richelieu wrote in December 1756:

\[\text{il n'y a jamais eu d'Injustice plus criante que celle qu'on voudroit faire à l'Amiral Byng, et tout homme d'honneur et tout militaire surtout doit s'y intéresser,}\]

but the King was not prepared to grant a reprieve, and Byng was shot on the quarter-deck of the Monarch in Portsmouth
harbour on 14 March 1757. The personal bravery and composure with which Byng faced his fate, contrasted strongly with the craven manner in which Newcastle, Anson and others, who gave evidence against Byng in his trial, sought to evade their responsibilities in the affair. If Byng had not done all that was humanly possible in the engagement off Menorca, it was certainly arguable that he had done what he could in the circumstances. Byng's epitaph recorded that 'He fell a Martyr to Political Persecution', and there were those at the time, and many subsequent commentators, in sympathy with Fortescue's judgement that 'The unfortunate Admiral was shot because Newcastle deserved to be hanged'.

The third protagonist in the drama of the loss of Menorca was the Lieutenant-Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General William Blakeney, who was elevated by popular opinion to the status of a hero - an opinion fanned by the Newcastle ministry intent on encouraging the public to find a praiseworthy distraction from its own responsibilities in the nationally humiliating debacle. But there is evidence to support the view that Blakeney, like Byng, failed 'to do his utmost' in his preparations for the French attack and in his conduct of the siege, and did not wholly deserve the plaudits and rewards he received. It is true that Blakeney had to face the challenge at some disadvantage. He was eighty-four years old, and not in the best of health; the physical geography of Menorca made it impossible for him to prevent an enemy force landing and establishing itself on the island; with only one stronghold, a siege was inevitable, and he faced this prospect with a garrison depleted to the extent of it being more than three
hundred rank-and-file short of establishment and, more importantly, with forty-one officers absent from their duties with the garrison. On 17 April when the French ships were sighted off Ciudadela - 12 ships of the line and 5 frigates escorting 49 troop transports carrying 25 battalions, and a further 137 transports carrying artillery, ammunition and provisions - Blakeney took the only course of action open to him, which, like the Spanish Commander, Dávila, more than fifty years before, was to withdraw all his troops into St. Philip's. As we have seen the defences of the fort were extensive and very demanding in respect of manpower, and its situation, structure, lay-out and armament had never inspired confidence in officers serving in the garrison. Nevertheless, it was an imposing obstacle to the French and, after being on the island for some six weeks, one of Richelieu's officers wrote:

the nearer we approach Fort St. Philip, the higher is opinion of its strength; and if its destruction is probable, it is not so near as we had hoped.

But, as in the siege of 1708, the progress of the attacking force was slowed, not so much by opposition and fire from the garrison, as by the terrain. The rock made tunnelling difficult, the shallow, gravel soil was unsuitable for mounting gun and mortar batteries, the ground offered no shelter for the troops and there was a lot of illness.

The story of the siege differs little in the various contemporary accounts. All the British troops had withdrawn to St. Philip's by 19 April. The French forward detachments, unopposed at any point in their march from Ciudadela, reached Mahón on 22 April, and the main body followed two days later,
when they encircled the fort on the land-side, and set about building batteries to the west and south of St. Philip's and on la Mola, dominating the fort from the north side of the harbour (Fig. 8.2). The first of these batteries opened fire on 8 May and, for the next week, firing was 'very smart' on both sides. The French fire then slackened, with Richelieu conserving his ammunition until he could be resupplied from Toulon, and it was during this period that Byng's fleet briefly appeared within sight of the garrison (19 May). Byng's disappearance, dispiriting to the garrison, allowed supplies to reach Richelieu in early June, and the French increased their bombardment by day and night. By 21 June, when the garrison had been put on reduced rations, the outer ramparts had been badly damaged and the subterraneans had been infiltrated, it was clear that a general assault on the fort itself was imminent. This was launched on the night of 27 June, and although stout resistance was offered, and the French suffered severe casualties in an unsuccessful attempt to take Fort Marlborough, by dawn of 28 June the Anstruther and Argyll Batteries and the Queen's Redoubt had fallen to the enemy, and Fort Marlborough had been abandoned. A parley was beaten, ostensibly to allow the French to recover their dead and wounded but, taking advantage of the lull in the fighting, they also introduced fresh troops into the outworks and the subterraneans to the extent that one account suggested that, as a result, the French had more men in the fortifications than the British. At this point, Blakeney summoned a Council of War which, acknowledging the shattered state of many of the embrasures and platforms, the unserviceable condition of most of the cannons, the numbers
of French who had infiltrated the outworks and the subterraneans, and the fatigue and low morale of the garrison, decided that another attack could not be repulsed. After a siege of seventy days the Council resolved to seek an honourable surrender, and Richelieu duly granted generous capitulation terms on 29 June. The French, anxious to get the garrison off the island before any relief could reach Menorca from England, wasted little time. On 7 July thirty-two merchant ships carried away to Gibraltar a total of 4,178 passengers - 132 officers, 3,167 soldiers, 38 officers' wives, 32 officers' children, 390 soldiers' wives, 351 soldiers' children, 53 Greeks and 15 Jews (71 wounded remained behind, too ill to travel).

While there is little dispute about the numbers of the French expeditionary force (excluding the artillery and support corps personnel) - the initial 25 battalions (12,000 men) were reinforced in June by a further 5 battalions (2,500 men) - there are difficulties in arriving at an accurate figure of the number of British troops actually in the fort during the siege. Tunstall could give only 'rough' figures, but McGuffie, basing his calculations on the journal of Major Cunninghame and its supplement, arrived at a total of 4,309 who were catered for in the fort. From this figure he subtracted a total of 827 British women and children to establish a total of 3,482 combatants. However, from a return by the Fort Major on 16 April, it is clear that McGuffie's figures must have included other non-combatant personnel - British civilians, Menorcan masons, millers, labourers and their families - for Major Henry Innes' figures for the actual number of combatants in the fort (including
108 artillery, 113 marines, 17 from a Gibraltar detachment, 125 sailors, 58 Greeks 'carrying arms' and 8 volunteers), totalled only 3,275. But, whatever the true figures were, they fell far short of the 8,000 which James Lind had estimated in 1748 would be the minimum force necessary to hold the fort in case of attack.

There are also discrepancies in the accounts of the siege of the casualties suffered. On the British side, the earliest published history of one of the garrison regiments, puts the figure as high as 89 dead, 23 died of wounds and 367 wounded, but other accounts are closer to Blakeney's own report of 71 killed, 23 died of wounds, 301 wounded; in addition he recorded 10 deaths from disease and reported 17 men 'missing'. The estimate of French casualties (killed and wounded) ranged from 2,000 suggested by Fortescue, Blakeney's figure of 3,400 (supported by a figure of 3,332 produced by an anonymous account in August 1756), to the absurd figure of 5,000 claimed by the author of a pamphlet written to answer criticisms of Blakeney's actions. Neither of the French sources consulted records the number of their casualties, but it is known that they admitted 200 dead and 150 wounded by the end of May, and in the final assault it was reckoned that a further 220 were killed and 450 wounded. These are figures which suggest that Fortescue's estimate might be a reasonable conjecture for the total of French battle casualties, while Blakeney's figures might well have included the many French who were known to have been incapacitated by disease.

For his part in the siege, Blakeney was made a Colonel of a Foot regiment, knighted and then raised to the Irish
peerage. No censure was made, and no questions were asked openly of his conduct until the publication of a Letter inquiring into the merit of his defence of Menorca. Although the author is unknown, the pamphlet contains many of the criticisms levelled at Blakeney in journals kept by two officers who served under him, Captain Augustus Hervey RN in the months leading up to the French landing, and Major William Cunninghame who, although on his way to another posting, returned to Menorca to serve as a volunteer when he heard of the French intention to capture the island. The Letter reiterated Hervey's complaints that, far from 'applying himself to every measure for the safety [of Menorca] with as much alacrity as integrity', as Blakeney had claimed to be doing, he was indolent, indecisive and guilty of passive tolerance of the Menorcans' lack of co-operation with the British. The Letter also voiced Cunninghame's criticisms of Blakeney's irresponsibility in allowing the fortifications to fall into disrepair, his failure to destroy the arrabal and open St. Philip's field of fire, and Blakeney was also accused of failing to garner sufficient stores for the siege, and of failing to destroy stores and wells which fell readily into enemy hands. The Letter also repeated Cunninghame's complaint that Blakeney had been an uninspiring and invisible commander during the siege:

nobody appeared from Headquarters except the Fort Major and Adjutant, and during the whole time it was impossible for either Friend or Foe to ferret them out of their Burrows.

A reply to the Letter was published, also anonymously, but obviously with Blakeney's backing and approval, but the
Answer\textsuperscript{72} which defended Blakeney's actions, maintaining that he had done what he could in the time available after the French landing to strengthen the defences and provision the fort, (to have demolished the arrabal and taken the Menorcans' supplies before the French had landed, would have been a precipitate and inflammatory action), and he had succeeded in demolishing the few houses recommended for destruction by the Chief Engineer, together with a denial that Blakeney was inaccessible or had proved an uninspiring Commander during the siege, did not ring true. For Richelieu, the two most important bonuses which he encountered after landing, were that the garrison was not stronger and more numerous, and that 'elle manque d'un chef'.\textsuperscript{73} With Byng shot for failing in his duty, General Fowke, dismissed and disgraced for disobeying an order to send a regiment with Byng on what was (by the time the order reached him) a predictably useless mission, one is left wondering, with the author of the \textit{Letter}, who concluded:

\begin{quote}
Not that I would suppose anything in your Lordship's behaviour which was criminal or punishable; all that is at present inquired is, what there was in it rewardable?
\end{quote}

The Loss of Menorca in 1782.

When the news of the clash between the American patriot militia and a British expeditionary force at Lexington in April 1775 reached London, the ministry recognised that it heralded a civil war on that continent which would entail an extensive military campaign. Additional troops would have to be sent to America. An immediate consequence was the
withdrawal of three British regiments from Menorca and their replacement by two Hanoverian regiments, and the Naval squadron in the Mediterranean remained depleted by the need for ships to mount a blockade of American ports and provide essential support for the British army in north America. France, whose help was anxiously sought by the colonists, gave them only financial support until the British surrender at Saratoga in October 1777 made it clear, not only that the Americans were capable of prolonging the war, but that the likely outcome would be an America independent of Britain. France recognised American independence in February 1778, and in July she entered the war against Britain. Despite French pressure, Spain, still smarting over the French refusal to support her in the dispute with Britain over the Falkland islands in 1770, was reluctant to join France in the war until she was confident that France would support her objectives. In April 1779, Spain received this assurance at the Convention of Aranjuez and, in June 1779, Spain entered the war alongside France, on the understanding that she would emerge with Menorca and Gibraltar restored to the Spanish crown.

Spain's first priority was to regain Gibraltar, which was besieged by land and sea in June 1779. The siege was to last three years, seven months and twelve days - the longest siege in modern history - and the fact that Gibraltar held out was a tribute to the resolution and stamina of the Governor and the garrison; also significant were the convoys from the British home fleet which miraculously defeated or evaded the Spanish blockading ships on three occasions (January 1780, April 1781 and October 1782), bringing with them vital relief
and supplies for the garrison. Frustrated in her immediate objective, and two years into the siege of Gibraltar, Spain moved to achieve her second objective - the capture of Menorca.

There are several explanations of why Spain mounted an attack on Menorca when she did. Militarily, she was stung into action to put an end to the supplies which were all too regularly reaching Gibraltar in ships sailing out of Mahón, and to end the damage to her Mediterranean commerce caused by Menorcan privateers; but the principal reason for her action was political. Frustrated in his attempt to achieve a quick victory in Gibraltar, Floridablanca, Spain's Chief Minister, was determined to acquire at least one important bargaining counter in any future peace settlement, and the spur to action was provided by the knowledge that Britain had offered to cede Menorca to the Empress of Russia in exchange for Russian support in the war.74

The idea of ceding Menorca to Russia had first been mooted by the British Envoy in St. Petersberg in November 1780, and it was a proposal which was initially attractive to the Russians. Britain had allowed a Russian fleet to use Mahón as a base during the Russo-Turkish war (1768-1774), and so Russia was well aware of Menorca's strategic and geopolitical importance. The ministry recommended the proposal to George III in January 1781,75 but the King refused to countenance the surrender of a British possession,76 until he was won over by the arguments of the Earl of Sandwich, the First Lord of the Admiralty, who pointed out that, with Russia as a firm and committed ally, Britain would continue to have access to Mahón without having to pay for the upkeep of the naval yard
or the maintainance of the garrison—indeed, there was even mention of a compensation payment by Russia of £2,000,000, the estimated value of the stores and artillery in the island which Britain would hand over. In the event, nothing came of the proposal. Britain wanted Russia's active participation as an ally in the war, but all that the Empress Catherine was prepared to concede was that she would act as a neutral mediator to bring about peace and, to ensure her neutrality, the British offer of Menorca was refused in March 1781.

Britain's reasons for not strengthening Menorca before the well-signposted war with France and Spain, and for not sending any substantial relief during the war, are not all immediately apparent. The most obvious explanation in both cases is that she had neither the ships nor the men to spare, but there were other considerations. The tactical offensive value of the island and the harbour of Mahon had lessened since wars between European powers were no longer confined to the continent of Europe; the Levant trade had declined appreciably since the middle of the century, it was now mostly carried in neutral ships, and since what trade there was, was with Turkey, Menorca no longer lay near the direct trade route; moreover, Menorca was a costly element in Britain's budget, and the island was scarcely more self-supporting or commercially more rewarding to Britain than it had been when it was first acquired.

Once France had entered the war against Britain in March 1778, Menorca was as vulnerable as it had been in 1756. Lord Sandwich drew the ministry's attention to Menorca's weak and exposed situation in October 1778. Prior to that, the ministry had not shared the Governor's concern for his
command. In a letter to the Secretary of State in 1776, Murray had stressed that the garrison numbers were insufficient to man adequately all the defences of Fort St. Philip, and that too many officers were absent from their regiments, but the ministry did not send reinforcements, nor did they think that the political situation made it necessary for the absent officers to be ordered to return. By January 1779 Murray described the two British garrison regiments as 'more like ghosts than soldiers' and he informed Weymouth that sickness had so debilitated the soldiers that he doubted that he could muster 1,400 rank-and-file fit for duty. When it became clear that Spain was about to enter the war, Murray made a formal request for the garrison regiments to be made up to establishment numbers, and for a fifth regiment to be sent, but he must have known that it was a request which the ministry, faced with pressing military demands elsewhere, could not then satisfy. It was not until February 1780 that a fleet under Admiral Rodney was despatched with the objective (en route to the West Indies), of getting supplies to the beleaguered garrison of Gibraltar, and Rodney also carried supplies for Menorca and a regiment (73rd Foot) to strengthen the island's garrison. But, once again, as in 1756, the Governor of Gibraltar deemed his own needs the more urgent, and General Elliot retained the regiment on the Rock. The seventeen transports carrying supplies, munitions and some recruits and returning officers, reached Menorca at the end of February 1780. Another supply convoy of thirteen transports reached the island in April 1781, at a time when an officer of the 51st regiment wrote that the rank-and-file were 'entirely worn out. I don't
suppose, were we in England now, that above fifty men of the whole regiment would be kept'. Nevertheless, Murray had still found it possible to allow ships to leave Menorca carrying fresh provisions for Gibraltar. The ministry made one final attempt to send 'considerable succours' to Murray but a delay caused by repairs to the ships and bad weather, did not allow the convoy carrying supplies and a regiment of Foot (97th) to sail until the beginning of February 1782, by which time Menorca had been lost.

In the absence of reinforcements, Murray did what he could to 'put the rotten, feeble old fort.in as good a state of defence as its situation would permit'. Murray was no more impressed with the masonry of the fortifications than earlier critics. He considered it to be 'perhaps the worst which was ever seen', and he reiterated earlier criticisms of the fact that the outworks were too extensive and not sufficiently mutually supportive, and that the fort was overlooked in all directions at 500 yards. In his opinion, an assault was bound to succeed, especially against such a small garrison, even 'were every man a Hercules'. Nevertheless he cleared the fort's field of fire by completing, in February 1777, the demolition of the arrabal and, by August 1779, he was sufficiently confident to report to Lord Despencer that:

My Castle of St. Philip's is in excellent order ....if we are invaded, be assured we will defend long enough and give you time to releave us.

He kept the garrison alert by encouraging rumours of impending attacks; he ordered all officers and non-commissioned officers to familiarise themselves thoroughly with the maze of the subterraneans, and he insisted that
all soldiers undergo training in firing the cannons in the fort. However, other measures which Murray adopted to improve the security of the island, did not find favour with the inhabitants. In February 1778 Murray wrote to the Jurats to stress how vulnerable Menorca was - he mentioned intelligence of fifteen ships of the line and 18,000 troops ready to be deployed at Toulon - and he defended the security measures he had taken. He attempted a further justification of his measures in reply to remonstrances from the Jurats in March 1780, when he deplored the poor response of the Menorcans to the threats of attack, stating 'When a Country is in danger of Invasion, even a Neutrality is a sort of high Treason'. He went on to warn:

If ever it should happen that you become the subjects of Spain then, indeed, with Justice may you Exclame, Unhappy Minorca! Unhappy any Country where the Inquisition and Tyrannical arbitrary Government is established and Commerce abolished.

The Jurats were not impressed and in September they appointed Francisco Ximenes as their Syndich in London to present a list of grievances about Murray's actions, alleging amongst other matters, that Murray would allow no freedom of assembly; all foreign mail was censored; new taxes and controls on corn and meat distribution had been imposed; there had been interference in the election of Jurats; Orders in Council concerning the cutting of wood and afforations had been disregarded; port dues had been increased, and higher fees exacted for Mediterranean passes; individual liberties had been abused, and all Menorcans suspected of disloyalty had been disarmed. Although Murray's secretary submitted a defence of the Governor's actions to the Privy Council in
April 1781, the invasion and subsequent surrender of Menorca, removed the need to answer the accusations in person, but Murray would not have been surprised to learn that Charles III, when contemplating the invasion of Spain was convinced that 'there are many on the Island who are loyal to me and wish to become my subjects'.

Denied reinforcements from Britain, Murray set out to recruit locally. In the light of the Jurats' attitude outlined above, it is hardly surprising that he had no success in persuading Menorcans to enlist in a militia or in a corps of artisans to work in the fort in the event of a siege. He had marginally more success in recruiting dissident Corsicans, opposed to the French occupation of their island, although by November 1781, only fifty of the 1,000 he had hoped would enlist had arrived in Menorca. Murray also looked to recruit Moors from north Africa, but only eighteen Algerians served in the siege, and his attempt to enlist Sclavonians (Albanians) was made too late to allow the forty-one volunteers to reach Menorca in time to take part in the siege. Finally, as a result of exchanges of prisoners, by August 1780, Murray had enlisted 300 British sailors (there were no naval ships available on which they could serve) to act as additional gunners in the fort. The little success Murray had in recruiting volunteers was dispiriting, and in August 1780, he wrote to the Secretary of State 'lamenting the weakness of our force' and, prophesying that 'another year will annihilate the two English regiments, as another summer will the Governor'. He was not far wrong in respect of the regiments, but he underestimated his own staying powers.
The Spanish expeditionary force, originally part of a 'great squadron' intended for America but diverted to Menorca in March 1781, after a second relief of the Gibraltar garrison had thwarted plans to achieve a quick capture of the Rock,\textsuperscript{112} sailed from Cadiz on 23 July 1781. It was composed of ten escort ships, and sixty-four other ships and transports carrying 396 officers and 8,546 soldiers.\textsuperscript{113} The expedition was under the command of the Duc de Crillon, a French nobleman who had offered his services to Spain. On 29 July, thirteen more Spanish ships carrying 2,000 soldiers joined the convoy off Cartagena, together with twenty-three French ships from the Brest fleet carrying an additional 3,900 French soldiers.\textsuperscript{114} The fleet arrived off the south-west coast of Menorca on 18 August, but bad weather scattered the ships to such an extent that the fleet was divided into three squadrons, each of which made landfalls at different points on the coast. Crillon himself, with the largest force, landed at Cala Mesquida to the north-east of Mahón on 19 August; the second largest contingent landed on 20 August at Cala Alcaufar to the south-east of Mahón, and the third group, the smallest, landed at Cala des Degollador near Ciudadela on the same day.

Crillon had relied upon surprising the garrison, and in this he was remarkably successful. His squadron of ships sailed past St. Philip's without a shot being fired at them, and Crillon was able to land his troops without opposition, and so speedily that he had captured Mahón by the evening of 19 August, effectively isolating Fort St. Philip within hours of his landing. In view of Murray's earlier vigilance, the ease with which Crillon was able to establish his force on
Menorca is, at first, puzzling, but there are extenuating circumstances. It is clear that Murray, as late as the early summer of 1780, had fully expected Menorca to be attacked. He wrote then of intelligence of a build-up of ships and troops in Mallorca and Barcelona which he was convinced was being carried out with an attack on Menorca in mind. But, by July, Murray wrote that: 'Both French and Spaniards have abandoned us... judging that Gibraltar and Minorca may be conquered in America', a view he also expressed to his brother:

We thought we were certainly to be attacked, or at least invested, till very lately. They have given up all thought of it at present... I imagine they do not think us worth the blood and treasure the conquest of this island would cost them.

Murray was also encouraged in his belief that the enemy had no intention of attacking Menorca by a total absence of intelligence of any such plans, and the fact that the expedition was fitted out, not in a Mediterranean port but in Cadiz, an Atlantic port more associated with transatlantic expeditions, added to the element of surprise. Finally, Crillon's ships had not been fired upon by the fort, because the garrison had assumed that the ships belonged to a neutral Russian fleet known to be in the vicinity.

Whatever the explanations, it is incontestable that Murray was unprepared for Crillon's arrival, even though the storm which had dispersed the Franco-Spanish fleet enabled Crillon, from the three separate landfalls, to make himself master of the island more quickly than had been envisaged from the planned single landing. Murray had succeeded in blocking the entrance to Mahón harbour by sinking three ships
and ten transports, and by stretching a chain across the mouth, but he did not have time to move the munitions and stores in the naval yard, nor the supplies in the harbour warehouses to the fort before the attackers had arrived in the area in numbers. The few troops at Ciudadela and the small garrison of St. Anthony were captured, as were seventy-seven soldiers and forty-four sailors in Mahón and the dockyard and, all together, more than 150 men were captured by Crillon's troops in the first two days after their landing. Murray only just had time, on the day the enemy landed, to send off his wife and infant daughter in a merchant ship to Leghorn, but the wives and families of some garrison officers had been trapped in Mahon and Georgetown by the swiftness of the enemy's advance. However, such were the courtesies of war that Crillon not only undertook to ship them to safety off the island, but he also offered to send them to his own estate near Avignon, where he pledged that his sister would look after them until they could move on to England or to Italy for the duration of the war. Two months later a total of seventy-six women and children left Menorca for Marseilles. What is more, Crillon agreed to send Murray his 'Linnen and other things' which Murray, in his haste to reach St.Philip's, had left with his washerwoman. A less honourable aspect of Crillon's behaviour was his offer, in October 1781, of a bribe to Murray to admit the hopelessness of his situation and surrender. The offer was contemptuously refused.

Earlier, Crillon's first objective had been to ensure smooth local government sympathetic to Spain and, to this end, he confirmed in office the Jurats demonstrably loyal to
Spain, dismissed or imprisoned others who were suspected anglophiles and, much to the satisfaction of the Menorcan clergy, within a week of his arrival, he expelled all Greeks and Jews who had not already fled the island or taken refuge in the fort. 129

In 1756, Richelieu, wary of support reaching Menorca from Britain, had set out to make an attacking siege of Fort St. Philip. Crillon, in the knowledge that the garrison was well under strength (only 2,760 instead of some 4,000130), and that there was little prospect of relief for the garrison, could afford to impose a blockade and wage a war of attrition. 131 Richelieu could count on receiving regular supplies of men, ammunition and provisions, and these he duly and regularly welcomed, so that by December the besiegers were well-provisioned, and numbered 15,279 officers and men (11,133 Spanish and 4,146 French). 132 The last of Crillon's siege artillery did not arrive until late November, and not all the batteries were dug in and fully supplied until the first days of January 1782. Until that time by far the bulk of the shots fired, and virtually all the attacking action had come from the garrison, who had made some telling and disruptive sorties, inflicting casualties and taking a number of prisoners. At the end of November, Colonel Pringle was able to write: 'the Enemy do not annoy us in the least', and he was convinced that they intended to starve the garrison out rather than besiege them. 133 But, from 6 January, once the siege works had been completed, the Fort was subjected to prolonged and heavy bombardment with the attackers firing as many as eighty bombs an hour and, in the course of the next seven days alone, the garrison suffered thirty-three dead and
forty-five wounded. Until the first week in January, Murray had succeeded in keeping open St. Stephen's creek (between St. Philip's and Fort Marlborough), by means of which he was able to receive a trickle of supplies from small boats which slipped through the blockade, but this was now effectively closed by fire from a battery overlooking Fort Marlborough, and Murray's situation, far from strong at the outset, made worse by battle casualties, the constant state of alert under which the garrison laboured and the unhealthy conditions in the subterraneans, deteriorated significantly from the middle of January as a result of an outbreak of scurvy. Murray's task was not made easier by the personal antipathy of his deputy, Sir William Draper, the Lieutenant-Governor of St. Philip's, who questioned Murray's judgement and authority on a number of occasions, and failed to give Murray the support to which he was entitled, and which the garrison deserved. Draper resented that, in the circumstances of the siege, he had no independent command of his own, and he bridled at what he considered to be Murray's interference in the disposition of the troops within the fort. For the greater part of the duration of the siege, the two men were not on speaking terms and communicated by letter or through Murray's aide-de-camp, Captain Don, until Murray finally felt obliged to relieve Draper of his command on 16 January 1782.

Murray had expected an assault to be made after the week of heavy bombardment which started on 7 January and, at that time, he had 1,913 officers and men fit for duty. By the end of the month, most members of Murray's Council of War were in favour of capitulation, but Murray persuaded them
to continue the fight until, on 3 February, he was forced to
tell the Council that, although the Fort's provisions were by
no means exhausted, the men were. Of the four garrison
regiments, only 741 men were fit to stand to arms, supported
by 389 marines and 95 artillerymen and, of this total of
1,225 men, the senior physician, Dr. George Monro, reported
that no fewer than 689 were suffering to a greater or lesser
extent from scurvy, and that it was impossible to contain the
disease. Consequently, on medical grounds alone, Murray
had little alternative but to seek an honourable surrender.
There were also other factors, not officially recorded, but
hinted at by the anonymous Englishman's diary of the siege,
which may well have influenced Murray's course of action.
Drunkenness among the garrison had become noticeable, one
sergeant had committed suicide, the number of desertions
had increased, and at least one incident of troops
refusing to obey orders was recorded. On the morning of 4
February, Murray sought, and obtained honourable and
acceptable capitulation terms, including a proviso for the
safe conduct out of the island of the Greeks, Corsicans and
Jews who had served in the Fort, and a guarantee that
four named Menorcans would be allowed to remain in the island
and not suffer persecution for their contribution to the
garrison's defence of Menorca. The battle casualties
suffered by both sides were not great. The British and
Hanoverians lost 59 killed and 149 wounded, the besiegers had
184 killed and 381 wounded. The attackers also suffered 54
deaths from illness, the garrison losses in this respect
amounted (at a conservative estimate) to 65 (with a further
687 seriously ill in hospital), and there were also 35
desertions from the garrison. However, from the official figures agreed between the two parties of the numbers in the garrison at the end of the siege - 172 officers and 2,481 rank-and-file (together with 43 civilians, 154 wives and 211 children), many more of the combatants than the number given by Monro on 3 February must already have been unfit to fight. After the capitulation the garrison marched to Alayor where they encamped, before boarding the transports to take them to England in the first week of March. The transports did not, however, leave immediately, and not until Murray had succeeded in convincing Crillon that the conditions under which the men would travel must be ameliorated - the men were too crowded, and had insufficient protection, provisions and clothing for the voyage. A shaming undertaking by Murray to pay himself for the extra expense, and a threat from him to 'publish to the world', and give full details of Crillon's inhumane treatment of the garrison to the Spanish and French governments, produced the necessary improvements, and the transports sailed for England on 25 March 1782.

Just as Blakeney's defence of Menorca had caught public imagination and earned royal approbation, so too did Murray's conduct but, like Blakeney, Murray was not without his critics among senior officers of the garrison. The anonymous diarist praised Murray for doing a 'wonderful job', 'visiting constantly', and for showing himself to be 'experienced, brave, sensible and noble'. Colonel Pringle, on the other hand, criticised Murray for keeping himself and his 'favourites snug in the Line Interieur' (the Fort itself), while exposing those not in favour to the greater dangers of the 'Line Exterieur' (the outworks). Pringle was also of
the opinion that Murray had been all too ready to be alarmist about the medical reports he had been given, and that Murray's surrender had been unnecessarily rapid and sudden. Moreover, Murray's decision to leave Pringle and Pringle's nephew, Lieutenant John Pringle, as hostages in Menorca after the capitulation, was deliberately intended to prevent Colonel Pringle from giving evidence in the inevitable inquiry into Murray's conduct which, according to Pringle had been 'most infamous', and that Murray was afraid that Pringle would join Sir William Draper 'in putting his [Murray's] behaviour in a true light, for in this respect he [Murray] has much deceived the world.154

The inquiry which Pringle anticipated, took the form of a Court Martial of Murray on his return to England on twenty-nine charges preferred against him by Draper. The charges were of a motley nature alleging, in addition to misconduct of the siege, waste of public money and stores, extortion, rapacity and cruelty. Murray was acquitted of all charges save two - interference with the auctions of prizes, and of issuing an order derogatory to an officer of Draper's rank and command - for which he was sentenced to be reprimanded. However, George III effectively cancelled the reprimand, when he made it known that he 'was pleased to approve the zeal, courage and firmness' with which Murray had conducted himself in Menorca. As for Draper, the King expressed his concern that an officer of Sir William's rank and distinguished character should have allowed his judgement to have become so perverted by any sense of personal grievance as to bring such frivolous and ill-founded charges against his superior.155
Murray became a full General in 1783, and was made Governor of Hull; Draper received no further promotion or recognition.

Crillon, newly created Duke of Mahón, left Menorca with the bulk of his troops at the end of March to assume command of the final, desperate but ultimately unsuccessful attack on Gibraltar in September 1782, but not before he had received orders from Madrid to destroy all the defences of Forts St. Philip and St. Anthony. Such a drastic and superficially incomprehensible step, since it left Menorca utterly defenceless, was decreed by Floridablanca, the Spanish Chief Minister, for precisely that reason as Terron Ponce has illustrated, so that it would lessen the likelihood of Britain seeking the restoration of the island in the forthcoming peace negotiations, either with a view to retaining the island herself, or recovering it merely to cede it to Russia in return for the Czarina's support for British interests elsewhere.

The destruction of the Forts was undertaken immediately by the Conde de Cifuentes, appointed Governor on Crillon's departure, and was completed in 1782, well in advance of the peace negotiations in Paris in 1783. The British negotiators did, indeed, try to recover Menorca, but it was never a sticking point. The island's diminished geopolitical role in British foreign policy at that time, its historical white elephant status and cost as a British possession and, as Floridablanca had envisaged, the enormous expense to which Britain would be put to restore the island's defences, all these reasons caused Menorca to slip down the list of British priorities in the negotiations. George III may have 'liked Minorca better than the proud Fortress
[Gibraltar],157 but it was not to be. Britain retained the Rock, and as Lord Shelburne predicted, anticipating the results of the peace negotiations as early as March 1782, 'only the Mediterranean merchants will cry up Minorca',158 there was no significant public protest at its loss. Menorca remained Spanish for the next fifteen years until a situation developed in Europe which made the island once again, albeit briefly, a possession essential to further British political and military aims.

2 Suffolk Record Office, Ms S1/13/6.1. Details of a wager between Thomas Mannock and others, 15 May 1756.
3 Treaty of Vienna, Spain and the Emperor, 30 April 1725.
   Treaty of Versailles, Spain and France, 4 February 1762. (Third Family Pact).
   Convention of Madrid, Spain and France, 29 January 1801.
4 HMC, Calendar of Stuart Papers vol.2, pp.348 et seq.
6 BL Egerton Mss 2175, f.34. Colonel Stanhope Cotton to Bubb, 14 July 1717.
7 Ibid., Forbes to Bubb, 4 September 1719.
8 BL Add MSS 32766, f.195. Kane and Carpenter to Newcastle, 19 February 1730.
9 PRO WO 1/294, f.5. Kane to Newcastle, 6 February 1732.
10 Ibid., ff.157 et seq. Kane to Newcastle, August 1733.
12 PRO WO 1/294, f.9. Newcastle to Kane, 16 March 1732.
13 Biblioteca Bartomeu March, Palma de Mallorca. A bundle of letters, as yet uncatalogued, from Juan Ballester to the Duke of Montemar, the first of which is dated 6 June 1738 and the last 7 February 1740.
14 PRO ADM 1/380, Return of the ships in the Mediterranean, 1739.
15 Ibid., Haddock to Burchett, May 1741.
16 PRO CO 174/6, f.106. Weymouth to Mostyn, 24 November 1770.
18 PRO CO 174/17, ff.33,34. Johnston to Barrington, 10 January 1771.
The following contemporary pamphlets have been consulted profitably:

- *An Appeal to the People, containing the Genuine and Entire Letter of Mr Byng to the Secretary of the Admiralty* (London, 1756).
- *A Letter wherein the Conduct of the Ministry with regard to Minorca is concerned* (London, 1756).
- *Considerations on Addresses to the King on the loss of Minorca in a Letter from a Noble Lord to an MP* (London, 1756).
- *General Blakeney's Account to His Majesty concerning the loss of Minorca* (London, 1756).
- 'An Authentic account of the Siege and Surrender of St. Philip's Fort in the Island of Minorca', *GM*, January 1757.
- *A Letter to the Rt. Hon. the Lord Blakeney, being an Inquiry into the Merit of his Defence of Minorca* (London, 1757). (Author Israel Mauduit ?).

Papers relating to the Loss of Minorca in 1756 (ed.)
- Papers relating to the Loss of Minorca, pp. 17-58, 99-147, cite intelligence reports received in London between February 1755 and April 1756 about French naval activity in Toulon and the build-up of troops in the surrounding area. The reports
were sent by Sir Benjamin Keene (Ambassador in Madrid), Lord Bristol (Minister in Turin) and from the following consuls: John Birtles (Genoa), Arthur Villettes (Bern), John Dick (Leghorn), Lewis Cabanis (Nice), James Banks (Cartagena) and James Miller (Barcelona). Intelligence reports were also sent to the Admiralty from Captains Edgecumbe, Harvey and Scrope.

35 BL Add Mss 35359, Anson to Hardwicke, 6 December 1755.
36 C. Fearn (Judge-Advocate of His Majesty's Fleet), The Trial of the Hon. Admiral John Byng (London, 1757), [hereafter Fearn, Trial], p. 12.
37 Papers relating to the Loss of Minorca, pp. xvii, xviii.
38 Ibid., citing Byng to Craggs, 18 July 1718.
39 Fearn, Trial, p. 125.
40 Ibid.
41 Political and Social Letters of a Lady of the 18th Century (ed.) E. F. Osborn (London, undated), p. 114, citing Richelieu to Voltaire, 26 December 1756. [The Lady to whom the title refers was the Hon. Sarah Osborne, Admiral Byng's sister].
43 Political and Social Letters, p. 124.
45 Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Ms Eng hist c 231, An Account of all such Officers of the Civil and Military Establishment of the Island of Minorca and of the Garrison of St. Philip's as were absent from their duty on 1 February 1756. Barrington's figures produced for the inquiry into the loss of Menorca, 19 April 1757.
46 Guillou, La France à Minorque, pp. 15-17.
47 CM, vol. XXVI (1756), p. 310. 'A Letter from a French Officer to his Friend in England, from Minorca, 31 May 1756.'
48 BL Add Mss 42520. Account of the siege of Minorca (n/s), ff. 34-37.
49 R. Cannon, The Historical Record of the 23rd, or Royal Welsh Fusiliers (London, 1850), p. 75. The garrison was allowed to march out 'firelocks on their shoulders, drums beating, colours flying'.
50 Cisternes, La Campagne de Minorque, (Paris, 1899), p. 293
51 Guillou, La France à Minorque, p. 16 and footnote.
53 NAM Ms 6807/226A, A Journal of the Siege of St. Philip's Castle and its supplement (Ms 6807/226B), compiled by Robert White (Acting Registrar in the vice-admiralty Court and, like Cunninghame, a volunteer combatant in the siege), completed and witnessed as a true record of events, 6 February 1757.
55 Ibid.
56 Royal Artillery Institution, Woolwich, The Siege of Minorca by an Officer who was present (Woolwich, 1893), p. 28. Detail of the Troops in the Garrison of St. Philip's, 16 April 1756.
58 Cannon, The Royal Welsh Fusiliers, p. 75.
59 Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Ms Eng hist c 231, ff. 23, 24. Blakeney to Barrington, 29 July 1756.
60 Fortescue, History of the British Army vol. 2, p. 300.
61 Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Ms Eng hist c 231, f. 24. Blakeney to Barrington, 29 July 1756.

A Full Answer to an Infamous Libel... (London, 1757).

Cisternes, La Campagne de Minorque; Guillon, La France à Minorque.


BL Add Mss 42520, f. 18. Diary of the Siege of St. Philip's (n.s.).

A Letter to the Right Hon the Lord Blakeney... (London, 1757).

Suffolk Record Office (Bury St. Edmunds), Hervey Papers 941/50/3. Augustus Hervey's Journal, ff. 213-240.

NAM Ms 6807/226/A & 6807/226/B. Cunninghame's Journal and supplement.

PRO CO 174/16, f. 278. Blakeney to Fox, 10 February 1756.

Cunninghame, Journal, p. 36.

A Full Answer to an Infamous Libel, (London, 1757).

Guillon, La France a Minorque, p. 55, citing Richelieu to Jean-Baptiste Machault d'Arnouville, (French Navy Minister), May 1756.

I. de Madariaga, Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 1780 (London, 1962), pp. 239-306, examines in detail this brief, but important, incident in the history of British Menorca.


Ibid., Digest of a speech by Sandwich to the Cabinet, 19 January 1781.


Madariaga, Armed Neutrality, pp. 298, 299, Empress Catherine's decision, 19 March 1781.


Mahon, The Life of Murray, p. 384, citing Murray to Weymouth, December 1776.


PRO CO 174/12, f. 23, no 60. Murray to Weymouth, 13 January 1779.

Ibid., f. 113. Murray to Weymouth, 16 May 1779.


M. Mata, Conquistas y reconquistas de Menorca (Barcelona, 1984), p. 201.


Scottish Record Office, Ms GD 21/629/7. Captain Archibald Cunningham to Peggy Cunningham, 17 June 1781.

Drinkwater, Gibraltar, pp. 54, 58, 65 and 74, refers to supplies from Mahon breaching the Spanish blockade to reach Gibraltar between September 1780 and April 1781. In particular, a convoy of twenty such ships which arrived on 27 April 1781, was described as very valuable, (p. 74.)


Drinkwater, Gibraltar, p. 107.
The Sentence of the Court Martial for the trial of the Honourable Lieutenant-General James Murray (London, 1783), pp. 81, 82.

Ibid., pp. 86, 87.

Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Dashwood Bucks Mss B 2/2/4A. Murray to Despencer, 2 August 1779.

Ibid.


AM/U (D) 160. Murray to Jurats, 27 February 1778.

AM/U (D) 161. Murray to Jurats, 23 March 1780.

AM/U (Dip) 378(i), f. 68. Appointment dated 24 August 1780.


PRO CO 174/18, f. 80. Sayer to the Privy Council, April 1781.

AGS/M leg. 481. Charles III to Crillon, 12 June 1781.

v. Chapter Three for an account of Murray's efforts in this respect.

Mahon, Murray, p. 393.


PRO CO 174/14, f. 7. Murray to Hillsborough, 12 November 1781.

PRO CO 174/12, f. 195. Murray to Hillsborough, 17 October 1779.

Gregory, Minorca, p. 185.

Ibid., p. 183.


Madariaga, Armed Neutrality, footnote p. 301 establishes that the decision to mount an attack on Menorca was taken on 13 March 1781.

AGS/GM leg. 3760. List of the ships chartered for the expedition together with the number of troops carried, 9 July 1781.

AGS/GM leg. 3765.

Mahon, Murray, p. 390, citing Murray to William Green, May 1780.

Ibid., citing Murray, 9 July 1780.

Ibid., p. 391, citing Murray to George Murray.

Sentence of the Court Martial, pp. 84-86.

Mata, Conquistas, p. 204.


AGS/GM leg. 3760. Return of the early captures of garrison troops, 25 August 1781.

AGS/M leg. 481. J. de Castejón, 'Relación de la Expedición hecha por España para la toma de la Isla de Menorca.'

After the death in 1779 of his wife of thirty-one years, Murray had married for the second time on 1 June 1780, Ann Whitham, the nineteen year old daughter of the British Consul in Mallorca, who gave birth to a daughter, Cordelia, in Menorca on 16 March 1781.

Mahon, Murray, p. 396.


AGS/GM leg. 3760. Return of the British women and children sent to Marseilles, 18 October 1781.

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Contemporary accounts of the siege are to be found in AGS/M leg. 481, and AGS/GM legajos 3760-3768 -of which a digest was made by J.G. Iturriaga, 'La Marina en la Reconquista de Menorca', RM (1983), pp.41-51; J. Seguí Rodríguez' translation of 'The diary of an Englishman present during the Siege of St. Philip's' RM (May 1890), pp.375-379, (the original is to be found in the Archivo de Denia, Spain), and Pringle, Papers (NAC Ms MG 18. L 8. Letter Book, 1781-1782), do not disagree on essentials, merely on the relative success of either side in the attacks, sorties and sallies undertaken during the siege. Fortescue, History of the British Army, vol.3, pp.416-419, relied on PRO CO 174/10-15 as a basis for his account, and Mata, Conquistas, pp.203-212, made use of both British and Spanish sources for her version. Useful material has also to be found in J. Segura y Salado, 'Documents inédits del darrer setge de Sant Felip', RM 1982, pp.141-180.

AGS/GM leg. 3765. Return of army numbers, Crillon to Muzquiz, 22 December 1781.


Segú, Denia Diary, entry for 14 January 1782.

Segura, Documents inédits, p.166. Murray to Draper, 16 January 1782.


Ibid., p.176. Minutes of the Council of War, 3 February 1782.

Ibid., p.180. Monro's report and Sick List, 3 February 1782, detailed the scorbutics as follows: 36 Artillery; 51st, 120; 61st, 111; Prince Ernst's, 153; Goldacker, 176, and 93 sailors.

Segú, Denia Diary. Entries for 16 and 21 January 1782.

Ibid. Entry for 26 January refers to the suicide of Sergent Mears(61st).

Ibid. Entries for 14,23,24, and 27 January 1782.

Ibid. Entry for 24 January.

AGS/GM leg. 3765. Terms of Surrender.

Ibid., Article Four.

Ibid., Article Eight. The Menorcans were: Pablo Serrard, Marcos Reure, Miguel Amengual and Luis Roca.

AGS/GM leg. 3760.

Segú, Denia Diary. Entries for 3 and 13 February 1782.

AGS/GM leg. 3760. Official list of the garrison numbers, 5 February 1782.

AGS/GM leg. 3761. Exchange of letters between Murray and Crillon, 6-11 March 1782.

Segú, Denia Diary. Entries for 10 and 12 January 1782.


Ibid.

Ibid., p.228, 26 March 1782.

DNB, entries for Draper and Murray.
157 Hills, Rock of Contention, p.352, citing the Correspondence of George III.
158 Bedfordshire Record Office, Robinson Mss L30/14/3061, Shelburne to Grantham, March 1782.
Chapter Nine.

The impact of the British presence in Menorca.

When the British acquired Menorca, they found the island's economy exclusively agriculturally based, geared to subsistence level and, even then, it was not self-sufficient. Menorca had always had to import salt and oil, and all but essential consumer goods; there was little depth of soil in the island, and much of the cultivated land was arid and stony, so that only in years of bumper harvests was the cereal crop able to exceed the island's needs. The entail of large estates, the insecurity resulting from annually renewable farm tenancies, the disincentives of share-cropping and the high taxes payable on the sale and conveyance of land, all had served to constrain agricultural development and expansion. Consequently island exports exceeded home demand only in cheese and wool, exported respectively to Genoa and Barcelona, with only three or four small ships engaged in this export trade, and in the necessary importation of salt from Ibiza, oil from Mallorca and, in most years, cereals from Sardinia or Sicily. There were cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, donkeys and mules on the island, but poor pasture resulted in most animals being undersized. Lines of communication were poor, and were little more than rough and uneven tracks. Evidence of the existence of guilds at the end of the seventeenth century - smallholders, seamen, smiths, woolcombers, weavers, tailors, carpenters, shoemakers, candlemakers, masons, barbers, bakers and butchers - confirms that the manufacturing sector was small-
scale, artisanal, devoted to the production of essential consumer goods, and this was concentrated in Ciudadela and Mahon.2

The years during which Menorca was British saw profound social and economic changes take place, and historians are generally agreed that the influences exerted by the British were beneficial to the Menorcans. But John Armstrong, writing in the middle of the century, criticised the Menorcans' lack of response to the economic challenge provided by the British presence. He blamed the Menorcan landed gentry for not setting an example ("The Dons are above Trade")3, and he censured the unadventurous nature of the Menorcans in general who, in his opinion, were too 'contented to jog in the plain Track which their Fathers trod before them'.4 For all his jingoism and anti-Catholic prejudice, there is some justification for Armstrong's views up to the time he was writing (c.1740) - at least in respect of foreign markets - however, he conceded that there had been indications that some islanders had 'begun to apply themselves to trade',5 and there is ample evidence that, by then, the private sector of the Menorcan economy had adapted well to the new internal market, by way of increasing produce for provisions for the garrison and fleet. But it is true that it was only after 1740 that the islanders responded significantly to the challenge of the wider economic opportunities made possible by the British presence. Maritime trade and activity was boosted as islanders profited from the free port status granted to Mahon, the protection of the British flag, Britain's friendly relations with the Barbary States and, in time of war, the letters of marque issued to Menorcan
privateers. Output continued to increase in vineyards, in arable and stock farms, and the demand for market-garden produce was met. Communications were improved, service industries expanded and luxury trades were introduced. Further job vacancies occurred, and entrepreneurial initiatives were taken where the garrison and the navy were largely concentrated, a fact which accounted for the hugely disproportionate increase in the population of the termino of Mahon in the eighteenth century, in contrast with the other terminos in the island. More tangibly and lastingly, British design had an influence on vernacular architecture and domestic furnishings, and the British also left a legacy to some areas of the Menorquí lexicon. However, if the British presence in Menorca was generally beneficial, and was at the root of the growth of the private sector of the Menorcan economy, it proved to be a drain on the public sector purse.

Public sector finance.

The State of the Island is totally miserable... the Towns are in a Way of being almost disabled from supporting themselves, inasmuch as the increased Collections levied yearly upon the Inhabitants are insufficient to defray the Duties and Taxes, so that they go on increasing their debts.  

Such was the grim, but accurate picture of the Menorcan public sector economy painted at the outset of the British government of the island by the man appointed to be Surveyor of Menorca by Queen Anne. For some years before Menorca was ceded to Britain, the universitats had been unable to balance their budgets, primarily because of the inability of the island to be self-sufficient in all its needs, so that, by
1712, the island's Jurats admitted a collective debt of £2,985. By 1741, the amount had risen to £18,330 and, in 1781, Menorca's Asesor(Civil) calculated that the amount of debt had increased to £42,940.

The Asesor, Dr Francisco Segú y Sintes, identified a number of causes for the increase, two of which he attributed directly to the British presence and government: the costly burden of providing quarters and certain provisions for the garrison, and the expenses incurred in maintaining a Syndich almost constantly in London to represent the universitats' grievances against what they considered to be instances of misrule by the British Governors. Writing in 1781, Segú estimated that the annual cost to the universitats of garrison quarters and provisions amounted to £2,060 and that more than £15,000 had been spent on the maintenance of Syndichs in London over the years of British rule. But Segú was sufficiently objective in his assessment to recognise that the traditional system of local government, the poor intellectual calibre of the Jurats themselves, their lack of financial acumen and their persistent political conservatism, had contributed to the increased burden of debt.

Segú considered that the annual election of Jurats militated against long-term economic planning and stability and that the superficially democratic constitution of the universitats resulting, as it did, in the election of a majority of illiterate members, precluded any possibility of fiscal or economic initiative. Segú was of the opinion that annual elections had resulted in the Jurats in any one year indulging in an exercise in financial damage-
limitation, in which they were satisfied if the increase in debt in their year in office was limited to little more than the increase incurred in the previous year.\textsuperscript{14} He was critical of the fact that the only attempts which were made by the universitats to raise more income were to take out more loans from prosperous Menorcans at a fixed rate of 8\%, when he believed that it would have been possible to negotiate a lower rate of interest,\textsuperscript{15} and to raise the rate of tax on the talla (land tax) which was gradually increased from 7\% in 1712,\textsuperscript{16} to 25\% in the 1770s.\textsuperscript{17} Seguí regretted the reliance placed by the Jurats on income from the talla which, as in those other states where it was in operation in countries in the Ancien Régime, was inadequate, inequitable and, as illustrated in Chapter 4, open to abuse. He deplored the Jurats' lack of will to correct these abuses, their reluctance to raise revenue from a talla on the land-owning clergy (a seventeenth-century Spanish Royal Order subjecting the clergy to payment of this tax had never been implemented in Menorca), and their failure to introduce a tax on the new wealth which had been acquired by the merchant middle class, who were not required to contribute anything to the public purse, unless they sought to use some of their newly accumulated riches to increase their social status by purchasing an estate.\textsuperscript{18}

Another commentator on Menorca's economic condition, Christoph Lindemann, writing contemporaneously with Seguí,\textsuperscript{19} was less critical of the Menorcans' own efforts to improve the island's economy. He praised the individual efforts of the islanders, but blamed Britain for failing to provide the necessary stimulus to make the island the commercial
Mediterranean entrepot which had been one of Britain's early stated ambitions. He took Britain to task for failing to provide sufficient incentives to diversify and improve the island's agriculture; for not initiating the necessary commercial contacts and trading links; for not providing aid to build and equip ships, and for not seizing the opportunity to invest in internal and other external commercial ventures. But Lindemann misunderstood the nature of Britain's relations with her overseas territories in the eighteenth century. These were not acquired altruistically for any benefit which might accrue to the territory, but solely for the benefit that possession of the territory would bring to the mother country. In this respect, Menorca had nothing to offer materially in comparison with Britain's American or West Indian plantations, or even with the fur and fish which came from Canada. Menorca was a possession Britain prized for its geopolitical situation, and the investment she made in the island was restricted to the considerable sums spent on strengthening the military defences, and on maintaining a garrison and the naval base. There was no reason why Britain should have made an exception in her colonial policy in respect of Menorca or why, by adopting the measures suggested by Lindemann, she should have given a boost to the public sector economy which was given to none of her other colonies/plantations/territories in the eighteenth century. However, without creating a precedent, Britain could have reduced substantially one recurrent item in the expenditure of the Universitats. If the promise made in 1712 by the Duke of Argyll to build barracks within twelve months had been honoured, the annual cost to
the public purse of providing quarters for the troops would have been greatly reduced. It was not until some sixty years after Argyll's promise that barracks were built in Mahón and in the newly-created Georgetown but, even then, their construction did not entirely obviate the need for some quarters still to be provided.

There is nothing on record to suggest that the Menorcans expected the British presence in Menorca to be other than a drain on the island's public finances. Britain, however, from the moment of the cession of the island, had high hopes that Menorca would become a 'colony of real advantage', and a 'magazine of Trade in the Mediterranean'.

Menorca as an entrepot. The illusion and the reality.

England had first attempted to gain possession of Menorca in the diplomatic negotiations relating to the Partition Treaties of 1698 and 1700, but had been unsucccessful because of Louis XIV's belief that such a concession would lead to English domination of Mediterranean trade. By the end of the War of Spanish Succession, Queen Anne's Tory government, which initiated the peace negotiations, and the subsequent Whig administration, believed not only that possession of Menorca would ensure that Britain became the dominant trading power, but also, as Stanhope had extravagantly predicted, that Mahón would rival Genoa and Leghorn as a Mediterranean entrepot. There were a number of reasons why these expectations were never realised, of which the most obvious were: the effect of war and plague epidemics on trade; the unsatisfactory nature of the island's quarantine
regulations, and the lack of a lazaretto; the abuse of Mediterranean passes; the failure of Mahón's free port status to attract investors, merchants and merchandise; the inability of the island to produce any substantial or worthwhile export market of its own, and a falling-off in demand in the British market for Levant goods.

In the years spanning the first two periods of British rule in Menorca, Britain was at war with Spain on five occasions for a total of eighteen years (1718-1720, 1727-1729, 1739-1748, 1762-1763 and 1779-1783). She was also officially at war with France on three occasions for a total of twelve years (1744-1748, 1756-1763 and 1778-1783). Inevitably in these years of conflict, the protection which the navy was able to offer the merchant ships in the Mediterranean was either curtailed, as in the years from 1739 to 1748, or virtually non-existent, as in the years from 1778 to 1783. Deprived of naval protection and denied access to enemy trading ports, fewer ships were prepared to trade in the Mediterranean, and this is reflected in a falling-off in the trading figures for the Levant company in the relevant years. The value of the company's annual exports to Turkey, which had averaged £278,629 between 1724 and 1733, fell to £61,708 in 1741, and its annual imports, which had averaged £212,365 for the same decade, fell to only £7,498 in 1742.25 Again, when Britain was embattled with France and Spain after the outbreak of the War of American Independence, the value of the British export trade to the whole of southern Europe fell from a peak of £3,809,000 in 1775 to a low of £840,000 in 1781, and the value of imports also fell from £2,249,000 in 1776 to £667,000 in 1779.26 In the four years from 1779 to
1783, imports from Turkey averaged only £17,333 and exports £1,959 per annum respectively, and not a single British ship docked in Constantinople between May 1778 and February 1779.

Menorca was spared an outbreak of the plague, even though there were major epidemics in two of the ports with which the island had regular trading links (Marseilles in 1720 and Messina in 1743). However, Barbary coast ports - Algiers, Bougie, Bona, Bizerta and Tunis - ports in which the plague was not infrequently rife, were called upon to supply Menorca with grain in most years and, after 1740, many Menorcan ships were involved in an import and re-export grain trade with these ports. Consequently, the lack of a lazaretto and adequate storage facilities for suspect merchandise and the costly harbour dues in Mahón, compounded by the failure of the Jurats to enforce predictable, safe and equitable quarantine regulations, often led other Mediterranean ports to safeguard their own situation by imposing a discriminatory quarantine period on ships entering their harbours from Menorca, particularly when the ships were carrying re-export cargo.

Quarantine and the lack of a Lazaretto.

At the outset of British rule, Kane had understood that if Menorca was to attract trade, it was essential for the bills of health of ships emanating from Mahón to be beyond question or reproach. To this end, he reconstituted and strengthened the authority of the Junta de Sanidad (Chamber of Health). This body, formerly known as la Morbería, had been in existence in the island since a devastating plague epidemic
in the late fifteenth century, and its function was to oversee the general health needs of Menorca and, in particular, prevent the spread of contagious diseases. There were twelve members, all Menorcans: six professional, three doctors and three surgeons, and six lay members, the trio of executive Jurats from Mahón, plus three more Jurats with responsibility as 'morbers' (quarantine officers). Kane gave clear instructions that, in matters relating to quarantine regulations, the granting or refusal of pratique (permission for ships' passengers and crew to land and for cargo to be off-loaded), and the control and sale of imported goods which there was reason to suppose might be contaminated, the authority of the Junta was absolute, and was not to be challenged by any British official. It proved, however, to be a body whose authority was ignored by the British when, pleading the exigencies of war or the service, Admirals and Captains deemed it expedient, and the Junta's application of its discretionary powers in respect of quarantine was seen, at times, to be neither wise nor just. Nevertheless, a quarantine area was established for ships to anchor in the road to the north of Illa Planas (Quarantine Island), out of the main channel to the inner harbour. Goods were to be off-loaded and aired on the island, and cattle were to be landed and enclosed on the north shore of the harbour opposite the island. A daily quarantine charge of 11s. was established, and anchorage fees were fixed at between 3s 3d. and 13s. daily depending upon tonnage. Kane had decreed that the revenue derived from anchorage charges should be devoted to the construction and maintenance of a lazaretto providing 'proper and sufficient magazines', but the misappropriation
of the funds (like the profits from the estanque, a matter of bitter dispute between the Governors and the Jurats), delayed their construction on Quarantine Island until 1770\textsuperscript{32} and, even then, according to the Menorcan historian Riudavets, they amounted to nothing more than ten insubstantial lattice-work sheds.\textsuperscript{33}

Kane's intention that the Junta should be allowed to regulate quarantine without interference was also disregarded. A fundamental review of the quarantine regulations published in 1745, was issued by Wynyard (the interim Commander in Anstruther's absence) and Trefusis (the Naval Commissioner), albeit after consultation with the Jurats.\textsuperscript{34} The new regulations denied entry to all ships which had sailed from plague-infested ports; required ships with a doubtful bill of health to quarantine in Fornells harbour; allowed immediate pratique to crews and passengers of ships with a clean bill of health (their cargoes, depending upon content, to be subjected to a minimal, unspecified period of quarantine), but required grain cargoes from Barbary to be embargoed for a period of ten to twenty-four days, at the discretion of the Junta. The regulations also laid down the fees payable to the members of the Junta who were deputed to examine each vessel seeking quarantine in Mahón and in Fornells. These regulations were varied by an Order in Council in May 1752,\textsuperscript{35} which lifted all quarantine requirements on ships from Smyrna, and limited the period of quarantine for ships from other ports in the Levant to no more than twenty days.\textsuperscript{36} Since plague was at the time rife in Algiers, Blakeney took it upon himself not to implement this order, and there was no reference to quarantine in the
subsequent Order in Council in May 1753. But Blakeney was convinced that the administration of quarantine was inefficient, and that trade was suffering because of the high charges levied by the Junta, which were, he maintained, three times greater than those of the Mediterranean ports of France and Italy,\(^{37}\) and this was a view that was to persist in British Commanders. In 1765, Townshend reported that 'ships which used to come in [to Mahón] now never come but directly bound thither, owing to the exorbitant Port charges, especially Quarantine'.\(^{38}\) The 1745 regulations were further modified in June 1754, to the effect that the quarantine period for ships from the Barbary coast was to be twelve days; for ships from the Levant it was to be twenty days, but there was to be no fixed period of quarantine for ships coming direct from Smyrna.\(^{39}\) These regulations were reimposed when Menorca reverted to Britain in 1763,\(^ {40}\) and remained in force throughout the second period of British rule.\(^{41}\)

When plague and cholera were known to threaten Menorca, the Jurats were prepared to impose stringent regulations. This was the case during the plague epidemic in Marseilles in 1720, when even ships with a clean bill of health were subjected to a maximum period of forty days quarantine, and all passengers were required to wash thoroughly in lavender/rosemary scented water (to which had been added four flasks of Hungary oil), and change into fresh clothing.\(^ {42}\) However, from the statistics produced by Daniel Panzac in his study of quarantine in Europe, it is evident that, when danger did not threaten, the quarantine period imposed in Menorca was of shorter duration than the period imposed in neighbouring Mediterranean ports,\(^ {43}\) but there is also
evidence that quarantine periods were not always calculated by the Junta on grounds of health alone.

The years in which Britain was at war with Spain and France from 1739 to 1748 presented Menorcans with two new opportunities - to engage in privateering (which is discussed below), and to enter the maritime carrying trade to supply the Allied troops in Italy. The good relations which Britain sought to keep with the rulers of the Barbary States had, since 1713, allowed Menorca to make good any shortfall in the island's grain harvest by importing not only from its pre-British sources (Sardinia and Sicily), but, increasingly, from North Africa. In the war years, Menorcan ships began not only to import but also to re-export corn from Barbary to the armies in Italy. The re-export trade outlasted the war as Menorcan ships, with the frequent advantage of a shorter quarantine period in Mahón, sought by this means to gain a hold on the grain markets in the Mediterranean ports of France and Spain. But this trade was not helped when, at a time when corn was in short supply in the island, as in 1752, it was alleged in a complaint from the merchants to the Governor that the Junta had deliberately delayed in quarantine, supplies primarily intended for re-export, to allow the Jurats or their associates to sell their stockpiles of corn at an inflated price.44 A similar protest to Johnston in 1765, induced him to overstep his authority and disband the Junta, with the intention of replacing it with a more competent and dependable Chamber of Health.45 Johnston's action, although it received a degree of sympathy from Lord Weymouth, Secretary of State, was not supported by thePrivy Council, and he was ordered to reinstate the
Junta. Johnston continued to find unsatisfactory a situation which allowed 'Illiterate Minorquins to Lay on and Take off Quarantine wantonly'. Unusually, some Menorcans also shared his lack of confidence in and mistrust of the Junta. One ship's captain recorded in his diary for February 1777: 'Qué poca observancia tenen estos jurats de las lleyes de las Quarentinas' (What little regard these Jurats have for the quarantine regulations). But, despite several further requests for change, no action was authorised by Westminster.

Mediterranean passes.

With the cession of Menorca to Britain in 1713, Menorcan ships became eligible for Mediterranean passes which, in an extension of their original purpose, came to be regarded in time of peace as much a licence to trade unmolested in the Mediterranean, as a safeguard to shipping. As a result the passes were much sought after, and were often fraudulently obtained.

In 1715, Admiral Baker informed Stanhope that he had written to the Dey of Algiers to stress that Menorcans were 'in Every Respect Brittish Subjects', and were to be treated as such. He also made the status of the Menorcans clear to other Barbary rulers on visits to Tunis and Tripoli in 1716. The concession of Mediterranean passes served to increase the number of Menorcan ships engaged in trade from a handful in 1713, to some thirty in 1740. Some of the wealth acquired as a result of privateering activities in the years from 1740 to 1748 was reinvested in shipping; some forty
vessels of 100-150 tons were trading out of Mahón by the end of the War of Austrian Succession, and were primarily engaged in the import and re-export of grain from Barbary. These numbers fell to eighteen during the years of the French occupation, when Menorcan ships no longer enjoyed the benefits of a British pass, but in the last years of peace towards the end of the second period of British rule, the numbers had increased to sixty, and it has been calculated that, excluding owners and traders, the sea was supporting some 700 families.

Initially, great care had been taken to ensure that passes were issued only to ships owned, captained and crewed by Menorcans, but blossoming trade attracted foreigners - Genoese, Livornese, Maltese, Neapolitans, Greeks and Jews - to Menorca in the capacity both of merchants and also ships' captains. Some acquired Mediterranean passes quasi-legitimately by marrying a Menorcan wife (there is reference to this practice as early as 1718, and again in 1751, Blakeney reported that 'foreign Mariners frequently Marry with Natives...to become Denizens'). Others fraudulently obtained passes as a result of a token period of residence, after which they continued to trade out of their own foreign ports. This resulted in both British and Menorcan ships losing, particularly to Genoa and Leghorn, much of the coastal carrying trade which they had cornered during the war years. The fraudulent use of passes also gave rise to diplomatic incidents with the Barbary states who resented the deception, and occasionally took retaliatory action by seizing suspect shipping and confiscating cargoes. Complaints of ships trading with illegal passes were lodged
by British merchants in Menorca in 1750,\textsuperscript{63} and the acting Secretary of the Universitat of Mahón was dismissed by Blakeney in 1753 for perjury in his support of an application for a pass. Blakeney's successor, Johnston, was accused by the Jurats of selling passes to foreigners for personal profit - a charge of which he was subsequently exonerated\textsuperscript{64} - but perhaps the most telling and unbiased evidence of abuse came from a merchant, Thomas Hope, who visited Menorca in 1765. Hope reported that in three months sailing in the Mediterranean, he had encountered more than thirty ships flying 'full British colours' and armed with a pass, not one of which had a Briton or Menorcan on board.\textsuperscript{65} Abuses were brought to light;\textsuperscript{66} attempts were made in Menorca to correct them and prevent fraud; old passes were withdrawn, and some were not re-issued; ships found to be carrying contraband goods forfeited their pass for three years;\textsuperscript{67} the Abogado Fiscal was given the additional responsibility of scrutinising all applications;\textsuperscript{68} additional certificates of authentication were issued to \textit{bona fide} ships trading with the Barbary states\textsuperscript{69} and, as late as 1776, as a further deterrent to fraud, an Order in Council increased the value of the bond deposited by an applicant for a pass from £45 to £75.\textsuperscript{70} Less than a year later, Murray claimed that the issue of passes was under strict control (the Asesor and vice-admiralty judge had become additional scrutineers of applications), but he had to admit (like Blakeney before him\textsuperscript{71}) that, pragmatically, passes had been issued to both British and Menorcan-owned ships in which members of the crew were of foreign nationality.\textsuperscript{72} There can be no doubt that there was a substantial abuse of the British Mediterranean
pass system to the extent that, towards the end of the second period of British rule:

the real British navigation is declined, as the freight business from Genoa, Cadiz, Lisbon and in the Straights is chiefly carried on by foreign vessels with English colours.73

But it is also clear that most of the fraud had its origin in Gibraltar, and not Menorca, where it was reported that passes were usually issued with 'great caution'.74

Free port status.

One of the first actions of the Duke of Argyll when he visited Menorca in November/December 1712, was to decree that 'no Duty should be demanded' of goods entering or leaving the ports of Menorca, a move which he was sure would 'tend to the Advantage of Commerce'.75 Two subsequent decrees by Kane apparently strengthened Menorca's trading position. In 1716, it was stipulated that British and Menorcan traders were absolved from paying any re-export charges, and from quarantine charges if their ships had a clean bill of health,76 and in 1717, non-British subjects were forbidden to trade in corn or wine - the principal sources of island trade at that time.77 The grant of free port status was unprecedented in a British possession, and was not to be repeated until the Free Port Act of 1766, which granted similar status to some ports in the West Indies, but it was a move which was neither as altruistic as it appeared, nor was it as beneficial to the Menorcans as had been intended. In the first instance, it was a decision which significantly cut

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the cost of those supplies to the garrison (of both essentials and luxuries) which had to be imported. Secondly, a consequence of the decision was effectively to ruin the only manufacturing industry in Menorca - the tiny woollen textile industry. 78 With no duty payable on foreign goods, the Menorcan products could not compete in price or quality either with textiles sent from Britain, or with French products which were introduced even more economically from Marseilles. With no commodity in the island capable of being developed into a worthwhile export, and with the Jurats providing no incentives for commercial investment, Menorca did not become an essential port of call for British merchantmen in the Mediterranean, or for ships of other nations engaged in trade in the Straits and with the Levant. Even discounting the unforeseen falling-off of British trade in the Mediterranean in the eighteenth century, Stanhope's claims that Mahón had the entrepot potential to rival Genoa and Leghorn were as unfounded as his estimate of the annual cost of keeping Menorca as a British possession was grossly inaccurate, and the principal beneficiaries of Mahón's free port status were not the British nor the Menorcans, but the merchants in nearby foreign ports, Genoa, Leghorn and, particularly, Marseilles.

The decline of Britain's Mediterranean trade. 79

There was a very substantial rise in the value of British overseas exports and imports in the course of the eighteenth century, but the increase was most marked in trade with the West and East Indies, and with the Colonies and Plantations
British trade with the Mediterranean, in contrast, although it increased in value, dropped appreciably as a percentage of the total of British exports and imports, as illustrated in Tables 9.1 and 9.2, where figures have been given for the first years of peace after Menorca was ceded to Britain, and for the last years of peace before the island was lost to Spain early in 1782.

There were a number of reasons for the decline in trade with the Levant: changing fashions in Britain and Turkey; competition with growing traffic in exotic goods from the East India and Muscovy companies; the inability of British merchants to compete with the concessionary import duties granted to the French in Turkey, and a consequent failure to match French cloth in either price or variety. After 1753, there were delays and frustrations in respect of imports when the British government insisted that all goods from the Levant must be aired in a Mediterranean lazaretto en route to Britain. The suggested lazarettos were all foreign (Malta, Venice, Messina, Leghorn, Genoa, Marseilles), and the periods of quarantine varied considerably, producing an element of unpredictability in the length of a return voyage from Turkey which could have been more advantageously controlled if a lazaretto had been built, and sound and dependable quarantine regulations had been introduced in Mahón.

The falling-off in the percentage of trade in the Straits reflected the restrictive practices and discriminatory import duties in some Mediterranean ports (Algiers, Tripoli and Marseilles), and the loss to other nations of the supremacy the British enjoyed at the start of the century in the coastal carrying trade. Venice's share of trade increased
### Table 9.1. Destination of Exports (including re-exports) from England and Wales.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average annual values, 1711-1715, 1771-1775.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>% of Total British exports.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Straits. Italy. Turkey. Venice. Total.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711-1715 £367,000 £200,000 £195,000 £27,000 £789,000 11.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Med. Trade. 47% 25% 25% 3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1771-1775 £117,000 £841,000 £125,000 £85,000 £1,168,000 8.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Med. Trade. 10% 72% 11% 7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: E.B. Schumpeter, 'English Overseas Trade Structure, 1697-1808' (Oxford, 1960), Table V.

### Table 9.2. Source of Imports from the Mediterranean (excluding Mediterranean Spain).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average annual values, 1711-1715, 1771-1775.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>% of Total British imports.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Straits. Italy. Turkey. Venice. Total.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711-1715 £17,000 £280,000 £321,000 £48,000 £656,000 13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Med. Trade. 26% 43% 48% 7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1771-1775 £5,000 £708,000 £146,000 £80,000 £939,000 7.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Med. Trade. 0.5% 75% 15.5% 9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Schumpeter, 'English Overseas Trade Structure', Table VI.

### Table 9.3. Destination of Exports (including re-exports) from England and Wales.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average annual values, 1786-1800.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>% of Total British imports.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Straits. Italy. Turkey. Venice. Total.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1786-1790 £305,000 £729,000 £102,000 £20,000 £1,156,000 6.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Med. Trade. 26% 63% 9% 2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791-1795 £165,000 £775,000 £155,000 £20,000 £1,115,000 4.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Med. Trade. 15% 69% 14% 2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1796-1800 £208,000 £393,000 £127,000 £15,000 £743,000 2.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Med. Trade. 28% 53% 17% 2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Schumpeter, 'English Overseas Trade Structure', Table V.

### Table 9.4. Source of Imports from the Mediterranean (excluding Mediterranean Spain).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average annual values, 1786-1800.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>% of total British Imports.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Straits. Italy. Turkey. Venice. Total.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1786-1790 £15,000 £747,000 £194,000 £64,000 £1,020,000 6.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Med. Trade. 21% 72% 19% 61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791-1795 £13,000 £729,000 £212,000 £62,000 £1,016,000 6.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Med. Trade. 11% 72% 21% 61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1796-1800 £36,000 £208,000 £106,000 £42,000 £392,000 1.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Med. Trade. 9% 53% 27% 11%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
slightly from 1711 to 1775, but it was to the Italian ports, in particular Leghorn, to which British merchants turned to take advantage of the burgeoning markets they offered. Both the volume and the value of traffic to and from Italy increased very substantially as a result.

Menorca was lost to Spain in 1782, and Tables 9.3 and 9.4 are produced to show that the loss (at least until 1793, when war again distorted the picture) had no discernible effect on British trade in the Mediterranean, although it should be noted that, by 1796, Britain's trade figures revealed for the first time a deficit of imports over exports.

Menorcans' commercial initiatives.

For the above reasons, if Menorca had failed to become 'of great Value to the Mother Country,' and 'less of a Dead weight','81 and the public sector purse in Menorca had not benefited from the British presence, the private enterprise shown by Menorcans in response to the opportunities afforded by the British presence led to greater prosperity for many, and to the emergence of a commercially-minded middle class, who, by the end of the second period of British rule, had partly realised Bolingbroke's early stated ambition to make the Menorcans a 'rich and flourishing people'.82 In this respect initiatives were undertaken in three principal areas: agriculture, privateering and maritime trade.
Detailed statistics of agricultural development are neither complete, reliable nor readily available, but some idea of the expansion can be measured by three yardsticks. The first stems from Neal's 1713 survey in which he recorded the existence of 389 farms in the island. In 1737, the number recorded was 411 and, by 1782, the total had risen to 520, but it must not be concluded that farms which were added to the list were all farming previously barren land. An unidentifiable amount of new land was undoubtedly farmed for the first time, but the increase in the number of farms must, as previously noted in chapter three, be attributed to some extent to the fragmentation of existing farms. The second comparison, and probably a more reliable indicator, is to be found in the increase recorded in the 'real patrimonio' (crown revenue), which was derived in the main from tithes on agricultural output. In 1699, the revenue had amounted to some £1,500; by 1742, the amount averaged £4,290 and it remained at much the same level until 1782. Part of the increase (on average £1,100) was represented by the tithe income formerly paid to the Bishop and Chapter of Mallorca which was appropriated by the British government in 1713, and in some years, when the price of grain rose because of poor harvests, there was a corresponding increase in the amount of tithe exacted. However, even after taking these factors into consideration, and conceding that there is insufficient data to establish real as opposed to nominal values for tithe commodities, it is clear that there was an appreciable increase in agricultural output, which one Menorcan authority
put as high as 75% by the end of British rule in 1782.\textsuperscript{90} The third basis of comparison lies in the increases recorded in the official returns of livestock, as illustrated in Table 9.5.

Between 1713 and 1782 the population of Menorca rose by 66.3%, consequently the increased numbers of livestock reflected the greater demand of the home market as well as the needs of the British forces and, with increased production meeting the demands of the markets, there was little variation in prices in those years (Table 9.6). While the overall drop in the number of sheep and goats farmed in the Alayor término is inexplicable, the relatively poor showing of the Mahón término indicates that the farms in this district were increasingly geared to satisfy the needs of the garrison and the navy, not so much in meat, as in wine, poultry and market garden produce. But the figures for Mahón also serve to underline the drift in this district from employment on the land to employment in the town and at sea, an aspect of the British influence on the human geography of Menorca which is discussed later in this chapter.

In 1778, Lindemann estimated the number of animals slaughtered annually in Menorca to be 1,900 beef cattle, 14,000 sheep, 7,000 pigs and 6,000 goats (of which 600 cattle, 3,000 sheep and 4,000 pigs were killed for the garrison).\textsuperscript{91} Increases in the number of poultry and game cannot be established, but Armstrong suggested a five-fold increase in the first thirty years of British rule,\textsuperscript{92} and he stated that turkeys, geese, ducks, chickens and rabbits were readily available, and that a great variety of fish and 'Plenty of Roots, Greens and Fruit, all according to the
Table 9.5. Livestock totals and percentage increase 1726-1782.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep &amp; Goats</th>
<th>Pigs</th>
<th>Hormes &amp; Mules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1726</td>
<td>1727</td>
<td>1756</td>
<td>1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1564</td>
<td>1720</td>
<td>9418</td>
<td>9417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1726-82</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>-451</td>
<td>-71</td>
<td>-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>963</td>
<td>2083</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1313</td>
<td>2448</td>
<td>15680</td>
<td>1671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1726-82</td>
<td>-613</td>
<td>+613</td>
<td>-663</td>
<td>-663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1067</td>
<td>1496</td>
<td>8832</td>
<td>1215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>1462</td>
<td>7540</td>
<td>1616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1726-82</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>+661</td>
<td>+581</td>
<td>+581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3334</td>
<td>10246</td>
<td>18058</td>
<td>35781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1726-82</td>
<td>4614</td>
<td>33121</td>
<td>4774</td>
<td>6802</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:*
1726 Crofton 'Record', p.41.
1756 Suffolk Record Office, Ms 941/50/B Harvey Papers, p.218.
1782 NGS/CM log 3767, Census return for Menorca, 18 July 1782.

Table 9.6. Meat Prices (per lb).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre 1716</th>
<th>1716</th>
<th>1730</th>
<th>1742</th>
<th>1777</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>8d.</td>
<td>5d.</td>
<td>4d.</td>
<td>4d.</td>
<td>4d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veal</td>
<td>6d.</td>
<td>6d.</td>
<td>6d.</td>
<td>5d.</td>
<td>5d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutton</td>
<td>5d.</td>
<td>5d.</td>
<td>5d.</td>
<td>6d.</td>
<td>5d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goat</td>
<td>5d.</td>
<td>5d.</td>
<td>4d.</td>
<td>5d.</td>
<td>5d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:*
1 Riudavets, 'Historia'vol.2, p.1235
3 Crofton, 'Record', p.23.
4 Armstrong, 'History', p.245.
5 NAU (D) 160. Decree of 9 August: 1777.
Season' were regularly consumed by the garrison. The growing awareness of naval Captains (if not the Admiralty) in the eighteenth century of the health-giving qualities of fresh vegetables and fruit boosted the demand for such produce, and a scheme, prompted by Kane, to drain and irrigate the marshland at the head of Mahon harbour produced an area of market gardens which, in most years, was able to satisfy the needs of the navy and the garrison who, in the late 1770s were paying annually £3,600 for garden produce (£2,400 from the garrison and £1,200 from the navy).

Examination of other data sheds further light on the pattern of agricultural development, although no precise chart can be drawn because of the wide variety (and variable quantities) of measures quoted in the sources. One exception is the grain harvest where, almost in keeping with the percentage rise in population, the grain harvest rose by some 50%; from 115,000 bushels in 1713, to an average harvest of 152,400 bushels by 1740, and then to an average of 165,00 bushels from 1772 to 1782. The garrison's need of wheat to make bread influenced the percentage of wheat grown, which rose from 69% of the corn harvest in the early part of the century to 80% by 1782, leading to a corresponding reduction in the amount of barley. Nevertheless, despite this increase, in only one year, 1771, did output appreciably exceed demand, and average annual grain imports during the first period of British rule amounted to some 70,000 bushels, and to some 42,000 bushels in the years from 1763 to 1782. In addition to the bumper harvest recorded in 1771, good harvests were recorded in 1742, 1752 and 1764, but there were many more bad harvests: 1714-1718 (persistent
drought), 1724, 1725 (snow), 1732 (drought), 1765 and 1766, 1767, 1777 and 1778 (droughts). Moreover, it was not only the grain harvest which was affected by bad weather. The wine harvest suffered, and so too did the cattle, for they had little protection from the elements and no substitute fodder in years of drought. Some idea of the devastation which could occur can be obtained from the livestock losses sustained in the frost and snow of the winter of 1725/1726, when more than 17,000 animals perished, and a further 14,000 animals were lost during the prolonged drought of 1732.

Contemporary sources were agreed that the most financially rewarding crop to the small farmers was the grape harvest and the wine which they made from it. Although fine wines and spirits were imported, by far the bulk of the wine consumed was made on the island and, although there were already 1,478 vineyards (mostly very small) in 1720, the thirst of the garrison and the navy stimulated an increase in these numbers and in wine production. In 1740, Armstrong estimated that wine to an annual value of £32,082.15s. was being produced, but he subsequently reduced this figure by approximately £10,000. This reduced figure was more realistic and, given the steady increase in production which he forecast, tallies with Lindemann's estimate of more than £30,000 in the late 1770s. Armstrong's revised figure was based upon an annual production of 4,000 butts, an increase of 175% on the 1489 butts produced in 1728. By 1765 the Abogado Fiscal estimated that 4,500 tonneaux of wine were sold each year, and Lindemann's figures ten tears later were calculated on an annual output of 5,500 'big
Barrels', of which the garrison and the navy consumed 3,500 at a cost of £18,000. But George Cleghorn writing in the 1740s considered that the increase in the quantity of wine available had been achieved partly at the expense of quality. The wine consequently went sour more readily, and this was the reason that 'Dysenteries' had become more frequent and fatal in the garrison for, while the 'Peasants are remarkable for Temperance', the soldiers 'frequently lie abroad drunk'.

Wine prices were among those fixed by the Jurats at their annual afforations meeting held after the harvest, but Kane had foreseen that problems might arise as a result of increased production and ready availability, and he introduced regulations in an attempt to preserve the quality of the wine and to curb over-indulgence by the soldiers. His regulations governed the harvesting of the grapes, the seasonal variations in price, the prohibition of the sale of the vintage until 21 December each year (by which time the wine was deemed to be mature), the establishment of licensing hours whereby Menorcans were not allowed to sell wine to the soldiers before noon (1720), later amended to lla.m. (1735), and he decreed that a military guard must be present to 'prevent disorders' at every house where wine was sold. But 'too much wine available too cheaply' only partly explains the drunkenness of the soldiers so regularly criticised by commentators. Equally important was the consumption of the island brandy, roughly distilled from sour wine which was very potent, and cost as little as sixpence a quart. It is not possible to establish the quantity either produced or consumed but, unlike wine, brandy was taxed, and Armstrong
estimated that the tax alone swelled the crown revenue by an average of £945 annually from 1725 to 1738. Lindemann considered this figure to be an overestimate, since the tax had yielded only £900 in 1765, and in 1768 the sum involved was £808 17s. 6d, the bulk of which came from the heavily garrisoned terminus of Mahón (approximately £568 came from Mahón, £80 from Alayor, £73 from Ciudadela and £67 from Mercadal).

Neal's 1713 survey made no mention of island produce other than grain, but thirty years later, Armstrong's account of the Menorcan economy showed that, while production in all branches of agriculture had increased, only in wine, wool, cheese, honey and coarse salt did the island's product exceed its needs, and these five items constituted Menorca's only exports. Of these, in the early 1740s, wine brought in annually £16,000, wool £900, cheese £800, honey and salt £400—a total export revenue of £18,000. Armstrong estimated that the cost of imports came to £71,200, thereby creating an apparently huge balance of payments deficit. But the comprehensive list of imports compiled by Armstrong revealed only a very few necessary items for the consumption of the Menorcans, nearly all were destined for re-export or for sale to the garrison, thereby reducing considerably the superficial imbalance.

Armstrong's balance sheet of the Menorcan economy was confirmed in almost every detail by figures produced in 1765, and it had changed significantly in only two respects by 1777/1778, when Lindemann wrote his account. The export items remained constant but, whereas the revenue from wool and coarse salt was greater, the increase in the
consumption of wine in Menorca had diminished its export value to £2,000, a drop of 80% on Armstrong's figures; this reduced the total value of the island's exports to £8,340. But by 1777 this loss was more than compensated by the profits obtained from a greatly expanded re-export trade which brought in annually £24,140 towards a total export revenue of £32,480 - an improvement of nearly 80% on Armstrong's figures. Costs of imports had also risen by 1777, but only by 9% to £78,000, of which goods from Barbary accounted for £15,400, England £5,000, Genoa £5,000, Spain £3,000, Mallorca £11,000 and France £36,000. In the forty years since Armstrong's account, the balance of payments deficit had been cut by 14% to £45,520, a deficit which Lindemann was convinced was more than made up out of the £100,000 which he calculated the garrison put into circulation annually in Menorca.

Armstrong conceded in the early 1740s that some Menorcans had begun to engage in overseas trade, but, because of lack of capital, experience and contacts, the islanders had been slow to take advantage of the Mediterranean passes to which any ship of theirs would be entitled. 'Sa guerra de s'any coranta' (the war of 1740) against Spain, which was to develop into the War of Austrian Succession until 1748, provided not only the opportunity and impetus, but also the British encouragement to develop maritime activity. By granting letters of marque to Menorcan vessels the British opened a new avenue to prosperity for many of the islanders.
During the years in which Menorca was in British hands between 1708 and 1782, Britain waged war at sea with one or more of the other Mediterranean maritime powers for a total of twenty-four years (1708-12, 1739-48, 1756-63, 1778-82), and letters of marque licensing vessels privately owned by British subjects to seize enemy sea-borne property were issued in all the conflicts. No privateers were commissioned in Menorca during the War of the Spanish Succession, but, during the brief war with Spain from 1718 to 1720, although neither Admiral Byng nor Brigadier Petit (interim Commander-in-Chief in Kane's absence) considered they had the authority to accede to requests to commission Menorcan vessels, two privateers were licensed by the High Court of Admiralty in London on 8 May 1719. They were seventy-ton ships, *Prince Frederick Gally* and *St. Philip Castle*, with ten guns and a crew of fifty, and were owned respectively by the British merchants, Lewis Fontaine and John Carnfield. The Menorcan privateers were successful in capturing two prizes which were brought to Mahon to join the prizes captured by Byng's fleet. The fate of Byng's prizes subsequently engendered lengthy correspondence between the Spanish authorities and the British Agents for Prizes in Mahón, but the fate of the privateers' prizes does not appear to have been an issue.

The missing records of the vice-admiralty court in Mahon make it impossible to establish when or how many Menorcan vessels were commissioned as privateers from 1739 to 1748. From a letter written by Wynyard, the interim Commander-in-
Chief, to the Secretary of State in January 1746, it would appear that no licences had been issued before that date. He wrote of a French 'polacre' having been brought into Mahón on 8 January by 'two of our Island Vessels, not having the power to make captures'. If this interpretation is correct, it is possible that letters of marque were not issued until after Admiral Medley's misguided and unsuccessful attempt a month later to press 200 Menorcans to make up deficiencies in his fleet. None of the Menorcan historians who have written of this period, and who had the opportunity to consult the records of the vice-admiralty court, before they were lost, have given an initial date for the licensing, nor have they given any idea of the number of vessels commissioned as privateers, although Hernández states that many were captained by Greeks, but all are agreed that the vice-admiralty court recognised a total of 287 prizes taken during the war years, of which seventy-one were captured by Menorcan privateers. Again no estimate is given of the value of the prizes, merely that their cargoes served to supply the island's depleted markets. If the number of prizes captured by the Menorcan privateers is correct, it is improbable that so many could have been captured in the last two years of the war, and it must be assumed that letters of marque were granted to some Menorcan ships before 1746, and that the two ships to which Wynyard referred were not commissioned armed trading vessels.

Fortunately, there is more information available about Menorcan privateering in the years from 1778 to 1782. When France declared war on Britain in June 1778, Murray was determined not to lose the services of the many merchant
sailors who stood to lose their livelihood as a result of the war. Having failed to persuade them to go to Gibraltar to enlist in the navy (there being no significant British naval presence in Mahón at that time), in September 1778 he took it upon himself to secure their services by authorising the commissioning and arming of Menorcan privateers. Murray's initiative was supported by Westminster, but the government, anxious not to precipitate Spain's entry into the war, was insistent that only French ships should be attacked. Murray gave an undertaking that the privateers would 'do nothing to offend any of the Powers who are at Peace with His Majesty', but it is clear that, from the outset, Menorcan captures were indiscriminate.

By December 1778, twenty-five privateers had been commissioned and were operational. Most were of small tonnage (half were between six and fifteen tons), and only one exceeded one hundred tons. They were armed with carriage and swivel guns of light calibre, and 1,500 men were serving aboard in crews which numbered between seventeen and one hundred and thirty. Five ships had been fitted out by British merchants (and there were three British captains), one ship was owned by four senior Hanoverian officers, one by a Jewish merchant and one by a Greek. The remainder were owned and fitted out by a wide selection of Menorcan society. Three of the vessels had Ciudadela as their base, the rest sailed out of Mahón. By the end of the year, these privateers had taken eighteen prizes valued at £58,900, and in the course of the next three years, a total of fifty-five Menorcan privateers were armed and crewed by 3,000 sailors, and 268 prizes were captured with a total value in excess of
Among the Menorcans who were owners, agents and backers, Amador Mari Puig has traced noblemen (derogation notwithstanding), clergy, merchants, farmers, lawyers, other professional men and master craftsmen and, not surprisingly, members of the British and foreign business community also took the opportunity to enrich themselves. The French suffered most from the privateers, losing 115 ships with a value of £168,000; the Dutch lost 19 ships (£102,000); Sweden and Denmark 17 ships (£75,000); Genoa, Leghorn and Venice 30 ships (£53,000); Spain 80 ships (£38,000), and 7 ships of other nations were also taken with a value of £23,000. Spanish losses may not have been as great in value as those suffered by other nations, but they were the more keenly felt because they had been caused by her former subjects. The Viceroy of Mallorca was particularly incensed at the 'constant and pernicious' attacks of the Menorcan privateers, and he described Mahón as a 'nido de ladrones' (nest of robbers). Thwarted in her aim to reduce Gibraltar, the damage caused to Spanish shipping and to Spanish pride was undoubtedly a principal factor which caused Floridablanca, the Spanish Chief Minister, to order the attack upon Menorca in 1782.

Although the heyday of privateering in Menorca (from 1778 to 1782), brought the most immediate returns and richest rewards for many individuals, it was the activities of a previous war in the Mediterranean (1739-1748) into which Menorcans had been drawn, which encouraged a growth in the number of islanders involved in maritime trade, whether as a sailor or as an owner, trader or investor.
In 1739, at the start of the war with Spain, some thirty ships were trading out of Mahon, primarily engaged in the import and re-export of grain from Barbary, in trade with the other Balearic Islands and with the Italian ports of Genoa and Leghorn. Some vessels were British-owned, others were foreign-owned and sailing with a spurious Mediterranean pass, but a few were owned by Menorcans. Two contemporary Admiralty returns of 1742 and 1747 of shipping in and out of Mahón harbour would suggest that only British ships were trading there, but they are misleading, since they clearly take no account of the Menorcan armed trading vessels or the Menorcan shipping known to have been engaged in carrying grain to supply the allied armies in Italy, and in freighting other supplies to them. Another return in 1743, however, indicates that merchantmen in Mahón were not only bound for Mediterranean ports, but also for destinations as far afield as Boston and South Carolina. The number of Menorca-based ships trading out of Mahón rose to forty by the end of the war, and they began to trade with France and Spain in addition to their traditional markets in the Balearics, Italy and Barbary. In 1750, Thomas White, British Consul in Tripoli for the previous twelve years, reported to the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations that twenty to thirty Menorcan ships of between 100 to 150 tons traded annually with Barbary, but, by the end of the period of the French occupation of Menorca in 1756, the number of ships trading out of Mahón had dropped to eighteen, all of which,
given the circumstances prevailing, can only have been Menorcan-owned.162

Menorcan traders and ship-owners, having been won over by the monetary gain they had made in the 1740s, took greater advantage of sailing under British colours from 1763 to 1782. By the time war once again broke out in the Mediterranean in 1778 the size of the Menorcan merchant fleet had risen to eighty ships,163 of which half were engaged in the most profitable of trades, the import and re-export of grain.164 Lindemann estimated that traders could make a net profit of 8% on the sale of a cargo of grain brought to Menorca,165 and a 20% profit could be made on grain re-exported to Mallorca, Spain or Italy.166 Sailors rewards were good too. On a ship carrying a cargo of 3,000 quarteras (approximately 6,000 bushels) of wheat with a wholesale value of £1,650, freighting charges amounted to £225 which, after deducting harbour fees and expenses, would leave a profit of £160 - £80 for the owner, and £80 to be shared between the captain and crew. The captain and mate each received £8, and the remainder of the crew £3-£5 each according to seniority. The captain was also entitled to 4% of the sale price of the wheat, and so, in the above instance of a voyage from Tunis to Mahon, he would have earned a total of £74,167 almost the equivalent of a year's salary for a British army lieutenant. If the wheat were re-exported, the rewards would have been greater, and there would also have been the opportunity to earn even more with a share in any profits on the sale of goods carried on the return journey to Mahón. It is therefore not surprising to learn that farm labourers and artisans were tempted to leave their lowly paid jobs on the land for such

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prospects, nor that, by 1778, there were some 850 sailors manning ships out of Mahón, with employment for at least another 50 on shore.

But it was not only the labouring and semi-skilled workforce which was attracted by the rewards of maritime trade. The bourgeois farmers and landowners in the termino of Mahón in particular, richer as a result of supplying some of the victualling needs of the garrison over the years, began to look upon maritime trade as a source of investment for their surplus income. Joint-stock companies were formed, and a variety of individuals invested according to their means, and were rewarded out of the profit in proportion to their investment. Often the company remained in existence for only one voyage, but this arrangement provided wealth-creating opportunities for many, rather than a few, not directly concerned with day-to-day trading.

A detailed examination of the provenance and destination of shipping in the port of Mahón from May 1777 to May 1778, the last year of peace before the American war had repercussions in the Mediterranean, shows that, supply ships for the garrison from London, Ireland and Lisbon apart, the bulk of the trading in and out of Mahón was confined to Mediterranean waters: the Barbary ports of Alexandria, Algiers, Bizerta, Bona, Bougie, Oran, Tunis and Tripoli; the Italian ports of Ancona, Civita Vecchia, Genoa, Leghorn, Naples and Trieste; the islands of Malta, Sardinia and Sicily; the French ports of Marseilles and Toulon, and the Spanish ports of Alicante, Barcelona, Cartagena, Málaga and the Balearic Islands, but there was also traffic with Martinique, Russia and Sweden. Table 9.7 indicates the
### Provenance of Menorcan Imports. (1770s).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algiers</td>
<td>Corn, beans, oil, soap, wax, hides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>Wine, brandy, figs, nuts, fabrics, esparto, raisins, salt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>Beer, rum, butter, cheese, salted meat and fish, coal, china, ironmongery, cordage, flour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>Rice, tobacco, medicinal drugs, soap, spices, cordage, silks, pottery, panes of glass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibiza</td>
<td>Salt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Potatoes, butter, cheese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leghorn</td>
<td>Oil, cordage, canvas, silks, cotton, thread, fabrics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mallorca</td>
<td>Fruit, almonds, blankets, earthenware, brandy, wine, oil, esparto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marseilles</td>
<td>Wine, oil, brandy, cordage, cloth, linen, silks, calico, hats, ironmongery, china, braid, lace, medicinal supplies, canvas, masonry, pottery, leather, hides, tea, coffee, sugar, chocolate, silverware, jewellery, soap, candles, pomade, paper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naples</td>
<td>Cotton, canvas, fabrics, thread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Wood, iron, corn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>Corn, beans, tunnyfish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>Corn, beans, clay, barrel hoops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Wood, iron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Corn, beans, oil, wax, hides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>Corn, beans, oil, tunnyfish, soap, wax, hides.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Destination of Menorcan Exports. (1770s).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lindemann, 'Minorka'</td>
<td>pp.105-113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrón, 'Economía'</td>
<td>p.113 (Based on information contained in AHN Consejos leg 5385, Report of Mahón merchants, 30 September 1782.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
imports and exports to and from Mahón and its principal trading ports in the 1770s.

The merchant community.

The census of Menorca carried out in 1782 by the Conde de Cifuentes listed more than one hundred native-born merchants, but little is known about Menorcan trade or traders before the outbreak of the war with Spain in 1739, even though there is evidence that there was an increase in commercial traffic in the port of Mahón in the early years of British rule. However, the same evidence suggests that the trading initiative came not from the Menorcans, but from foreign nationals, principally Greeks, attempting to take advantage of a British Mediterranean pass. In breach of the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, and much to the displeasure of the Menorcan civil and religious authorities, Britain did nothing to discourage immigrants from the two nations with the oldest trading history in the Mediterranean, the Greeks and the Jews. As a result, representatives of both nations gradually established settlements, and their numbers were boosted by the commercial opportunities created in Menorca in the war years from 1739 to 1748, to the extent that they formed the bulk of the 546 'foreigners' (of whom 475 were resident in Mahón and St. Philip's) recorded in the census of 1750. Of this total, the Menorcan historian Hernández estimated 200 were Greeks, a credible figure, but his subsequent assertion that the Greek colony had increased in numbers to ten times that total by 1782 is exaggerated and is not borne out by the returns of the censuses of 1781.
and 1782.\textsuperscript{178} The size of the Jewish colony can be inferred only from the figure of 459 who were expelled, like the Greeks, in September 1781.\textsuperscript{179}

British merchants also came to Menorca from the outset of British rule. Some, like Samuel Scot, who had served in the Paymaster's branch with the army in Spain in the War of Spanish Succession,\textsuperscript{180} followed the regiments which were sent from Catalonia to form the Menorca garrison at the end of the war, others arrived speculatively in the expectation of being able to cater for some of the needs of the garrison, and they were also moderately successful in finding a market for British manufactured goods, principally woollen cloths.\textsuperscript{181} But, once again, little is known about this element of the merchant community until the second period of British rule, when there is evidence that more than thirty British merchants went to Mahón in 1763 'in hopes of the first of the Market'.\textsuperscript{182} At least two of the merchants, James Dick and Robert Wilkie, are known to have traded in Mahón before the loss of the island in 1756, but some, in the opinion of Lieutenant-Governor Johnston, were merely 'Second hand Traders from Gibraltar', others no more than 'Tavern and Wine-house-keepers', or 'travelling Merchants who have failed wherever they have tried their fortunes'.\textsuperscript{183}

The merchants arrived in Menorca to discover that foreign trade had become almost a monopoly of 'near fourscore French Families'.\textsuperscript{184} They found it difficult to rent houses, warehouses and shops, and it quickly emerged that British goods, although of superior quality, could not compete in price (in large part because of higher transport and insurance costs) with French goods, which could be shipped
quickly and safely from Marseilles to Menorca, where they could undersell British manufactured goods by as much as 10 percent. The British merchants resented the fact that, because of Mahón's free port status, no duties were levied upon French imported merchandise, whereas, in Marseilles (also designated a free port) the British were excluded from trading in those 'Articles which interfere with their own [French] Manufactorys'. The merchants petitioned the British authorities for steps to be taken to correct this discrimination, but although Colonel Lambert (commanding in Menorca until Johnston's arrival) ordered all French nationals to return to France by Michaelmas 1763, the order was rescinded by Westminster before that date. The French merchants were allowed to stay, and continued to dominate trade to the extent that in 1765 the annual importation of French goods amounted to not less than £100,000. In 1772, in 'Wearing Apparel' alone, imports from France were in excess of £50,000, compared with a mere £2,000 of British cloth, and in 1778, Lindemann estimated that 40% of all Menorca's imports came from France, compared with only 6.4% from Britain.

As Johnston had predicted, some British traders did go under and were 'obliged to seek Bread elsewhere', but others persevered and, from returns made when Spain recaptured the island, are known to have been trading in Menorca throughout the second period of British rule. Among the most prominent were Robert Wilkie's nephews, Adam and Patrick; the brothers Bayne (Alexander, John and Murdoch) and White (John and Thomas); Charles Baker, his son John Martin and his grandson, and James Niven who established two trading
companies, first with [John?] Robinson and subsequently with Arthur Gibbons. Some of the merchants were directly involved with garrison supplies - Adam Wilkie was Deputy Commissary of Stores and Provisions, Alexander Bayne was Deputy Commissary of Musters, his brother John was a garrison storekeeper, and George Gamble and Daniel McNeill were respectively described as distributors of spirits and salted meats - and six of the master craftsmen appointed to the civilian Ordnance staff in 1763, and who stayed in post until 1782, were also listed as merchants - Robert Adams (Mason), John Glass (Gunsmith), Francis Haynes (Armourer), William Oddy (Smith) and Thomas Watkins (Cooper).

It was accepted practice, and served as an incentive to service in overseas territories, that individuals took advantage of official positions to make profits wherever possible, and so there was nothing reprehensible in the actions of the civilian garrison officials-cum-merchants above mentioned. Indeed, until it was specifically prohibited as a result of Anstruther's malpractices in the 1740s, army officers in the garrison also attempted to make a profit through trading during their posting to Menorca. Kane, together with Carpenter, sought, but did not pursue, the patent for the salt that a M. de Soulies proposed to make in pans at Fornells, and Kane's military secretary, Major Henry Crofton, together with Colonel James Otway (who set out to take command of the 9th Foot in Menorca with the avowed intention of 'settling a Trade there') and Major Peter Dumas (Adjutant of Fort St. Philip), set up a company in December 1724 'for the Carrying on a General Trade in the Island of Minorca and all other Places and Ports in the
Mediterranean Sea'. The company was substantially capitalised at £6,000, but the officers chose as their business partner George Radcliffe, the least able and most unsuccessful member of a family of 'Turkey Merchants'. Correspondence between the partners suggests that the venture had little success - Otway, the driving force died in 1725, goods rotted in transit or in inadequate storage on shore, mulberry trees did not sell, and a project to build a brewery came to nothing. There is no record of the existence of the company after 1732, but it is clear that the partners, or at least Radcliffe, attempted unsuccessfully to influence Kane to allow the company to circumvent quarantine regulations in order to sell their merchandise in Menorca in good condition and at the top of the market.

No evidence has come to light of other trading companies in which there was British involvement, but it is clear, by the end of the second period of British rule, for those merchants who traded successfully, the rewards were not inconsiderable. One of the leading Greek merchants, Nicholas Alexiano, who also held the post of Captain of the Port of Mahón from 1769 to 1782 at an annual salary of £91.10s, and who was associated with some British merchants in trading ventures, claimed that he was worth 'upwards of Ten Thousand Pounds Sterling' when he was expelled by the Spanish from Menorca in 1782. Adam Wilkie could afford to allow his two sisters dowries of £500 each, and the petitions of John Martin Baker, James Niven and Arthur Gibbons to the Secretary of State seeking compensation, revealed that their losses had been substantial including, in Baker's case a brewery and a
great amount of merchandise, and Niven and Gibbons sought compensation for lost land, houses, warehouses and stores.\textsuperscript{203}

So far as is known, the merchants mentioned above were engaged in lawful trading, but, in all the years in which Menorca was British, there were also illicit profits to be made from smuggling. The principal commodity involved was tobacco, and it was thought that the smugglers were Menorcans who operated (with the connivance of the local Jurats) out of Ciudadela, the Menorcan port closest to Mallorca and Spain, the most constant destinations of the cargoes. All the British Governors attempted to suppress what the Viceroy of Mallorca described to Kane as the 'desordenado clandestino comercio' (the illegal, clandestine trade) carried out by the 'notorios contrabandistas' of Menorca,\textsuperscript{204} but neither Kane, nor any of his successors, had any marked degree of success. Smuggling reached its peak during the second period of British rule, and occasioned numerous protests from Mallorca between 1766 and 1777. In 1766 Johnston ordered that the crews of vessels caught smuggling were to be fined, the captains were to lose their Mediterranean pass and be banned from sailing for three years,\textsuperscript{205} and he reinforced his decree the following year.\textsuperscript{206} The last protest from the Viceroy of Mallorca occurred in 1777, when he demanded that known smugglers should be extradited to face trial in Spain. Murray, although sympathetic to the request, had to deny it for, as he explained, smuggling, in British law, was not an extraditable offence.\textsuperscript{207} The war against Spain which was declared the following year put an end to Spanish protests, but not, one suspects, to the smuggling.
Human Geography.

Population.

It was not until the nineteenth century that most European countries began to take censuses at regular intervals, and demographic data prior to the introduction of this practice is often incomplete and unreliable. Exceptionally, censuses were taken in Menorca with great frequency throughout the eighteenth century, and it is therefore possible to chart the effect of British rule on the population growth, the change in the distribution of the population and in the patterns of employment.

Demographic data for Menorca (v. Table 9.8) is provided from censuses taken when the island was British (1713, 1722, 1737, 1750, 1754, 1763, 1781), and from censuses carried out by the Spanish authorities in 1782 and 1785. Some historians have reproduced data attributed to censuses in 1717, 1784, but the statistics cited for these years merely reiterate data previously recorded in the censuses of 1713 and 1782 respectively. Some additional, but less reliable information can be gleaned from 'Padrones de cabezas de familia' (censuses of heads of families) in Menorcan archives, but these surveys, which were undertaken by términos by the Menorcan municipal authorities themselves, were irregularly-spaced and few have survived complete. The censuses are recorded in British, Menorcan or Spanish official archives, with the exception of data provided for 1754, 1763, 1781 and 1785. The 1754, 1763 and 1785 figures were first recorded in 1826 by one of Menorca's earliest historians Antonio Ramis, and it is probable that he obtained them from tax surveys which are no longer traceable for all the island
Table 9.8. The population of Menorca 1713 – 1785.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1713</td>
<td>16,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1722</td>
<td>16,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737</td>
<td>18,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>21,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754</td>
<td>23,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>24,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781</td>
<td>25,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782</td>
<td>25,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1785</td>
<td>26,781</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:

1. BL Add MS 17775, no.5, p.18. Neal’s Survey, 20 April 1713.
   A. Report by Jurats of Alayor, 12 September 1782.
8. AGS/CM leg 1767. Estado general de Menorca, 18 July 1782.
terminos. Ramis was also the first to produce statistics for 1763, but Riudavets, when he subsequently repeated them, claimed that they were drawn from a census ordered by Johnston when Britain recovered Menorca from France. However, there is no trace of this census in British archives, neither is there any information to be found there relating to a census of 1781 which, according to a report made by the Jurats of Mahón in 1782, was carried out by two British officers on Murray's orders. But, despite this apparent wealth of information, there are gaps - statistics relating to non-Catholics are only once recorded for the island (1750), and once for Mahón (1770) - and inconsistencies - notably the varying ages at which juveniles began to be classed as adults - which, together with inaccuracies attributable to human fallibility or poor arithmetic, render detailed comparisons often unreliable and sometimes impossible.

In a century in which most European countries experienced a substantial growth in population (Sweden 62%, England and Wales 57%, Spain 40% and France 32%), the increase in Menorca of 63.6% from 1713 to 1782 was remarkable - all the more so, when the increase is compared with the growth in neighbouring Mallorca, a larger, more fertile and self-supporting island, with long-established trading links, where population growth between 1667 and 1784 was a mere 38%, compared with an increase of 144% in Menorca. The ability of Menorca to sustain such a large population growth sprang, to some extent, from increased agricultural production, but more from the prosperity and generally higher living standards which resulted directly and indirectly from
was a feature throughout the years of British rule. By 1750, the population of the town of Mahón alone had increased by 81.9% (and St. Philip's by 79.6%), with the result that, before the end of the first period of British rule a pattern of population distribution had been set, and was to persist into the twentieth century, whereby 52% of the Menorcans were resident in the término of Mahón, while 23% of the population was in the término of Ciudadela, 15% in Alayor and 10% in Mercadal.

The census returns revealed that there was parity in numbers of the sexes in most términos, although in Mercadal the numbers of adult males consistently and puzzlingly exceeded the number of females (by an average of nearly 20% during the first period of British rule), whereas the reverse was true in St. Philip's, where the imbalance of adult females to males gradually increased from 1% in 1713, to as much as 40% in Blakeney's survey in 1750 - no doubt a reflection of the particular role women played in catering for the needs of the garrison.

By 1782, life expectancy of Menorcans at birth was 28.8 years (mirroring exactly the figure for France in the latter years of the century); the annual increase in population was in the region of 1.1%, and the number of children per family had risen from 4.6 in the first half of the century to 4.9. Females married at a younger age than males and tended to live longer, but there is nothing to confirm the assertions of Armstrong and Cleghorn that the islanders married often as young as the ages of thirteen or fourteen. The graphs of the birth-rate (Tables 9.9 and 9.10) reflect the years of good harvests and prosperity, and
Table 9.9. Baptismal numbers recorded in Menorcan parish records, 1708 - 1756.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Births</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.10. Baptismal numbers recorded in Menorcan parish records, 1757 - 1802.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Births</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1802</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: As above for Table 9.9.
also the bad years of epidemics and famine, but they fail to show that there were four years (1746, 1754, 1768, 1772) when deaths outnumbered births in Mahón, and that the infantile mortality rate rose as high as 85.2% in St. Philip's and 83.5% in Mahón in 1768 and 1746 respectively, and that it never dropped below 32% in Mahón and 38% in St. Philip's from 1741 to 1781.229

In one respect, the presence of the British did not add significantly to the growth in population — surprisingly in the light of the lengthy posting in the island of some of the garrison regiments — and this was in the number of children born as a consequence of licit or illicit liaisons between the garrison and the Menorcans, notwithstanding Armstrong's observation that:

[Menorcan] Women have a World of Vivacity and love Money, which are powerful Incentives to an Ilicit Correspondence with the Officers of the Troops.230

Not all the parishes in Menorca followed the same format for recording parental details in the parochial baptismal registers, and while no research has been done relating to the years from 1763 to 1782, Vicent Ortells and Xavier Campos have produced a comparative study of the registers in Mahón, Ciudadela, Alayor and St. Philip's for the years from 1708 to 1756.231 In those years, only fourteen children in Mahón, forty-two in Ciudadela, eight in Alayor and thirty-four in St. Philip's were registered as the offspring of British fathers and Menorcan mothers.232 During this period, an additional thirty-nine children in Mahón, one hundred and sixteen in Ciudadela, eleven in Alayor and sixty in St. Philip's were registered under the heading 'father unknown',
and it is reasonable to assume that a proportion of these births were children of British fathers, although Ortells and Camps estimate that less than half the total recorded in Ciudadela were the issue of Anglo-Menorcan liaisons. It is true that the above figures relate only to Catholic baptisms, but it is unlikely that children who were born and not registered as Catholics would add significantly to the number of births in Menorca.

There is no dispute that the British did not do anything to discourage foreigners from taking root in Menorca, but there are only two sketchy sources of information about foreign immigrants to the island. The census of 1750 disclosed (excluding the British), that 546 foreigners were resident in Menorca, but no further information (apart from the number resident in each término) was provided, and a survey, incidental to a 'padrón de cabezas de familia', carried out in the town of Mahón in 1770, recorded and listed by occupation (overwhelmingly the service sector of the economy), 364 foreign residents from twenty different places of origin. However, the survey cannot be considered either exhaustive or thorough, no Jews were listed, and only a dozen British names were recorded, when it is known from other sources that an appreciably greater number of Britons were resident in Mahón at that time.

British influence on the migration of Menorcans can only be inferred and not determined. Thomas Hope, in a report to the Secretary of State in 1765, claimed that the Menorcans were:

so miserably oppressed that no sooner than they have got just money enough to Transport themselves and family, than they leave the island.
but his claim was as exaggerated as his estimate of the population of the island (18,000) was underestimated. Lluisa Dubón postulates that 537 Menorcans emigrated between 1724 and 1749, and that a further 3,049 emigrated between 1764 and 1782, but the latter figure includes not only an unquantifiable number of anglophile Menorcans who left with the British in 1782, but also the sizeable contingent who emigrated to America in 1768. The exodus to the newly acquired territory of Florida was encouraged, but not instigated by the British authorities. A Scottish doctor, Andrew Turnbull, had been given a grant of 20,000 acres in Florida in 1766 on condition that at least a third of the land was settled within three years, and Turnbull, who had lived in the Levant, Turkey, Greece and Morocco, set out to recruit his settlers from the countries of the Mediterranean, in the belief that the similarities of the climate and conditions would make Mediterranean people ideal colonists. He made Mahón his base for recruitment and, by the time he sailed for America in April 1768, he had persuaded nearly 1,000 Menorcan men, women and children to form the bulk of the 1,403 volunteers he had contracted to enter into indentured service for a period of up to ten years in the colony of New Smyrna which he intended to found in Florida. However, pace Thomas Hope, it was not the oppressive rule of the British which prompted the Menorcans to emigrate, but three successive hard winters and failed harvests with the resultant poverty and starvation, together with the promise of land grants of 100 acres to each adult volunteer when their contract with Turnbull had been
fulfilled. It was to prove a tragic and disastrous venture; Turnbull was a perfidious and heartlessly exploitative employer; the conditions in Florida were harsh and unhealthy, and within ten years no fewer than 704 Menorcan adults and 260 children had perished from disease, undernourishment, illtreatment and overwork.

British rule in Menorca was not accompanied by any industrialisation in the island and, in 1782, the bulk of the working population was still engaged in the primary (agriculture/fishing) sector of the economy with the farming community determinedly resistant to British initiatives to introduce new methods and new crops. The British presence had little effect on the rural way of life, but the concentration of the garrison in the término of Mahón had led to a shift in the balance of the work-force, which was reflected in the greater proportions employed in the secondary (manufacturing) and tertiary (service) sectors of the economy, as illustrated in Table 9.11. However, the figures on which that table is based are drawn from the Cifuentes census in July 1782, and the high rate of unemployment in Mahón in contrast with the other términos (Table 9.12), must be seen in the context of the siege of St. Philip's, the resultant falling-away in maritime trade and privateering, and the withdrawal of the British garrison five months earlier.

Religious and Cultural Impact.

When Spain regained Menorca in 1782 there was concern about the effects on Menorcan morals, religious practices, culture and allegiance of a lengthy exposure to British
Table 9.11. Numbers employed in the Menorcan economy (by sectors), 1782.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mahón</th>
<th>Ciudadela</th>
<th>Alayor</th>
<th>Mercadal</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1150</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>750</td>
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<td>150</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.12. Numbers employed out of the possible labour force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mahón</th>
<th>Ciudadela</th>
<th>Alayor</th>
<th>Mercadal</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>5000</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

% of work force:

- Primary: 24.6, 61.5, 74.8, 86.4
- Secondary: 24.4, 14.3, 13.5, 4.2
- Tertiary: 50.8, 24.2, 11.9, 9.3
influence. In November 1781 the Bishop of Mallorca was warned that, under the British, the Menorcans had fallen from grace, many were no longer regular church-goers and were resistant to church teachings, greed and financial gain motivated the men, and the women had become immodest and vain.244 These lapses were addressed by a mission lasting eight months carried out by eight members of the Congregation of St. Vincent de Paul from Mallorca, culminating in a pastoral visit from the Bishop in 1782, but, contrary to the claims of Francisco Hernández245, repeated by Micaela Mata246 and Dolores Asián247, the Tribunal of the Inquisition was not reinstated in Menorca at that time. This programme of moral re-education was reinforced by a decision to curtail the hitherto unrestricted intellectual and cultural freedom enjoyed by the Societat de Cultura in Mahón, and the Society was eventually disbanded in 1785. As for the readiness with which the Menorcans would be prepared to switch their allegiance to the crown of Spain, there were good grounds for unease among the authorities in this respect. Only those Menorcans aged over seventy had been born Spanish subjects; there was uncertainty about whether Menorca would, once again, be used as a bargaining counter and not necessarily retained by Spain in a peace settlement and, even if it were retained by Spain, the islanders were concerned that their treasured fueros would not be respected and renewed by a centralist government in Madrid. Until the publication of Charles III's order confirming that there would be no change in the island's institutions or municipal laws,248 even the nobility in Ciudadela (so uncooperative with the British) showed nothing but indifference to the
Spanish authorities stationed there, and the local Spanish commander could name only two noblemen whom he could deem trustworthy.\textsuperscript{249} Charles III's order, and the Conde de Cifuentes' subsequent political acumen as Governor, did much to win Menorcans over, but Cifuentes' own prediction that it would take years before all anglophile sentiments could be eradicated\textsuperscript{250} was prescient in so far as, sixteen years later, it was reported that the islanders gave a 'very warm welcome' to the British when they re-occupied Menorca.\textsuperscript{251}

Micaela Mata\textsuperscript{252} and Fernando Martí\textsuperscript{253} claim that there is a lasting link with Britain in respect of some of the island's culinary dishes, children's games and folk dances, and Jean-Louis Colas\textsuperscript{254} and Desmond Gregory,\textsuperscript{255} among others, maintain that present-day Menorcan gin is a derivative of the English recipe for gin in the eighteenth century, but these claims are tenuous in comparison with the obvious British heritage in architecture, furniture and, to a lesser extent, a legacy of British words to the Menorquí lexicon.

Sir John Carr, a visitor to Mahón in 1809, described the very familiar British appearance of some of the architectural features there:

\begin{quote}
Sashed windows, the construction of the doors, steps to ascend them, knockers, scrapers, signs to public houses.\textsuperscript{256}
\end{quote}

The signs to the public houses have long since disappeared, but there is no mistaking the British Palladian influence still to be seen in the seignorial town and country houses built by those whose fortunes had improved in the eighteenth century. Even today, Menorcan architects still design sash and bow windows, and perpetuate the Georgian-inspired deep
red colour-wash of the façade in modern buildings. The influence of British designers and cabinetmakers was also pronounced in respect of furniture. Lorenzo Lafuente Vanrell wrote in 1922 of 'the abundance of English-style furniture' which reflected all the periods of British rule still to be found in the island, particularly in the houses of the leading families of Mahón and Villacarlos, the former Georgetown. He confirmed the existence of Queen Anne tables, chairs and clock-faces, mid-century mirrors, Hogarth chairs and Pembroke tables, and even more examples of the designs of Chippendale and Sheraton - tables, chairs, commodes, glass-fronted cabinets and bureaux, corner-cabinets, wardrobes and clock-cases. The popularity of these styles was such that Menorcan cabinet-makers were still reproducing Sheraton's designs in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The British eighteenth-century contribution to Menorquí (a dialect of Catalan, with a distinctive vocabulary and morphological and phonetic variations from standard Catalan), is limited in scope and, with the march of time, is less significant today than it was a generation ago, when most of the words were still recognisable to many Menorcans. A linguistic study of Menorquí presents certain difficulties, of which the principal is that it is essentially a spoken dialect since it is, and always has been, written by a very small proportion of the population. Unlike other Catalan-speaking regions, and unlike Mallorca, Menorca produced no authors for the flourishing mediaeval period of Catalan literature, nor has it subsequently produced any - with the exception of Angel Ruiz Pablo (1865-1927) - who have written
in Menorquí who can be regarded as possessing anything but purely insular standing. Consequently, until a resurgence in the present century, the written forms of Menorquí are to be found in very limited sources - diaries, correspondence and the island's records until 1802 (when it was decreed that all official business was to be conducted in Castilian) - and they are far from homogeneous.

The extent of the British legacy to Menorquí has aroused the interest of a number of authors, and the words listed in Appendix C represent an amalgam of their conclusions, but include only those words the authenticity of which has been attested by more than one authority. More than one hundred words are listed, and it is not surprising that the bulk fall into one of four groupings which reflect the principal areas of everyday contact between the British garrison and the islanders - craftwork and tools (twenty-five words); food and drink (eighteen words); children's games (sixteen words), and household and furnishings (thirteen words). The list does not include words such as: brandy, cellar, infant, mutton, oil(oil), sach(container) and taxsa(tax) which were used and understood in their English meaning in the eighteenth century, but which dropped out of use before the turn of the present century.

Although the British did not set out in any way deliberately to leave their imprint on Menorca - a matter of regret for some Governors and contemporary British commentators - it was inevitable that the presence of more than 3,000 Britons and more than sixty years of British government would leave some marks. But the legacy would have been appreciably greater (and conceivably the subsequent
history of the island would have been altered), if the reforms so forcefully instituted in the final, brief period of British rule had been introduced earlier in the century.

2 Martí, Síntesis, p.63.
3 Armstrong, History, p.122.
4 Ibid., p.128.
5 Ibid., p.112.
6 PRO CO 174/1, f.2. Memorandum on Minorca, [undated and unsigned, but almost certainly related to Henry Neal's survey of the island in 1713].
7 Ibid., f.1. Jurats to the Duke of Argyll, 5 December 1712.
9 Piña, Las instituciones, p.252. 'Memorial' of Francisco Seguí y Sintes to the Spanish Court, 15 December 1781.
10 Ibid., pp.252-259.
11 Ibid., pp.249-252.
12 Ibid., p.259.
13 Ibid., pp.255-256.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., pp.257-258.
16 BL Add Mss 17775, f.35. Surveyor Neal's report, 1713.
17 Piña, Las instituciones, pp.247-249. Seguí 'Memorial', 15 December 1781.
18 Ibid., pp.254-255.
19 Lindemann, Minorka.
20 Ibid, pp.116-118.
21 PRO CO 174/1, f.2. Argyll to Jurats, 5 December 1712.
22 PRO CO 389/54, Bolingbroke to Kane, 22 April 1714.
24 see chapter two.
26 P.Crowhurst, The Defence of British Trade, 1689-1815 (Folkestone, 1977), Table 2.3, p.65.
27 BL Add Mss 23638, f.15. Extract of General Orders by Kane, no.25, January 1721.
28 As, for example, in 1724, AM/U (MC) 82. Jurats to Kane, November 1724, and in 1743, PRO CO 174/16, pp.45-46 Jurats to Anstruther, 16 August 1743.
29 Crofton, Record, pp.141-142. Orders to the Coxswain of the King's Boat, initialled by Kane, January 1717.
30 Armstrong, History, p.114.
31 Hertfordshire Record Office, Radcliffe Papers Ms D/ER B 176/2. Henry Crofton to George Ratcliffe, 23 December 1725.
32 PRO CO 174/6, f.34. Johnston to Weymouth no.20, 21 April 1770.
33 Riudavets, Historia vol.3, pp.2151-2153.
34 PRO CO 174/1, ff.13-17. Arregloamiento ... sobre la Quarentena, 12 October 1745.
The reasons behind the Privy Council decision are not clear, but it could have been made as a result of pressure from merchants of the Levant Company.


PRO CO 174/19, f.20. Townshend to Halifax, 14 March 1765.

Biblioteca Bartomeu March, Palma, AHN/E leg.6955. Copy of quarantine regulations for Mahón dated June 1754.

Ibid., referred to in a letter from Marqués de la Mina to Grimaldi, 25 December 1763.

Lindemann, Minorka, p.116.

AM/U (NC) 82. Proclamation by Jurats, 8 December 1720.

D.Pansac, Quarantaines et Lazarets. L'Europe et la Peste d'Orient [XVII-XX siècles] (Aix-en-Provence, 1986), Tableau 2, p.46. The average minimum period of quarantine imposed in Marseilles, Genoa and Leghorn was 20 days for passengers and 27 days for merchandise.

PRO CO 174/6, ff.124,125. Johnston to Weymouth no.13, 27 August 1769.

PRO CO 174/6, ff.34-36. Johnston to Weymouth no.20, 21 April 1770.

see chapter one, p.19.


BL Egerton Ms 2173, f.29. Kane to Bubb, 29 September 1716.

Terrón, Economía, p.110.


Terrón, Economía, p.110.


AM/U (D) 158. Kane's proclamation, 30 November 1724.

Terrón, Economía, p.110.

BL Add Mss 23638, ff.73,74.

PRO CO 174/2, f.212. Blakeney to Bedford, 14 January 1751.

Ibid., ff.68,108. Blakeney to Bedford, 8 November 1748, 24 March 1749.


PRO CO 174/1, ff.51 et seq. Points relating to Minorca, undated and unsigned but c.1765.


PRO CO 174/1, ff.71-73. 'Information of abuses of Mediterranean passes from 1763-1766'.

PRO CO 174/19 f.36. Governor's decree, 12 July 1766.

PRO CO 174/1, f.69. Townshend to Halifax, 14 April 1765.

PRO CO 174/5, f.38. Shelburne to Johnston no.3, 8 July 1768.
In addition to sources specifically cited, I have based my conclusions in this section on information contained in the following works:

- Black, A System of Ambition?
- Crowhurst, The Defence of British Trade.
- Fisher, Lisbon, its English merchant community and the Mediterranean in the eighteenth century.
- Wood, Levant Company.

80 E.B. Schumpeter, English Overseas Trade Structure, 1697-1808 (Oxford, 1960), Tables V and VI.
81 PRO CO 174/3, f. 223. Thomas Hope to Conway, 30 July 1765.
82 PRO CO 389/54. Instructions to Argyll, 25 July 1712.
83 BL Add Mss 17775. Neal's Survey, 1713, no. 6. He recorded 122 farms in the término of Mahón, 93 in Ciudadela, 77 in Alayor and 97 in Mercadal.
84 Crofton, Record, p. 40, recorded an increase of 1 farm in Mahón, 10 in Ciudadela, 8 in Alayor and 3 in Mercadal.
85 Vargas Ponce, J. Descripciones de las islas pitiúas y baleares [hereafter Vargas, Descripciones] (Madrid, 1787), pp. 114-123. 147 farms were recorded in Mahón, 131 in Ciudadela, 112 in Alayor and 130 in Mercadal.
86 BL Add Mss 17775, Neal's Survey, p. 8.
89 Ibid.
90 Terrón, Economía, p. 114, citing AHN Consejos, leg. 5385, Testimony of F. Seguí y Sintes, February 1782.
91 Lindemann, Minorka, p. 114.
92 Armstrong, History, pp. 119, 120.
93 Ibid., p. 239.
94 Lindemann, Minorka, p. 114.
95 The Menorcan dry measures (muts, barceles and quarteras) can be reliably converted to British equivalents, but it is impossible to reconcile conversions in liquid measures where amounts were quoted in quartillos, barillons, cargos and...
bots (Menorcan), arrobas, cargas, cascos (Castilian),
tonneaux, bouteilles (French), fass (German), and English
hogsheads, butts, gallons, bottles, barrels and pipes.
96 BL Add Mss 17775, Neal's Survey, no.6, f.18. Figures
extrapolated from crown revenue returns, 1713.
97 Armstrong, History, p.125.
98 J. Ramis y Ramis, Resumen topográfico e histórico de
99 Vargas, Descripciones, p.132.
100 Ibid.
101 AA, no.IV, f.239.
103 AM/U (D) 158. Jurats to Kane, 29 July 1724.
104 Crofton, Record, p.40.
105 Ibid.
106 P.D.Rasico, Els menorquín's de la Florida
(Montserrat,1987), p.60.
107 AM/U (D) 160. Jurats to Johnston, 10 September 1767.
108 T. Vidal Bendito, 'Evolución de la agricultura y de la
propiedad rural en Menorca', RM 1969, p.98.
109 Crofton, Record, p.41. The total was made up of 800
cattle, 12,000 sheep, 1,800 goats and,2,600 pigs.
110 Ibid. 2,000 cattle, 10,300 sheep, 1243 goats and 1150
pigs.
112 Armstrong, History, p.185.
113 Ibid., Appendix p.260.
114 Ibid., p.185.
115 Lindemann, Minorka, p.114.
117 AM/RG 142-2(4), f.9. F.Seguí y Sancho, 'Mémoire des
Revenus de Minorque', 1765.
118 Lindemann, Minorka, p.114.
119 Cleghorn, Observations, p.15.
120 Ibid., p.73.
121 Crofton, Record, pp.101-106, Garrison Orders 12 July
122 AM/U (D) 158, Jurats to Carpenter, 29 July 1726.
123 Armstrong, History, p.127.
124 Ibid., p.113.
125 Lindemann, Minorka, p.109.
126 PRO CO 174/3, f.232. Townshend to Lyttelton, 20 August
1765.
127 PRO CO 174/5, f.25. Johnston to Shelburne no.17, 9 April
1768.
128 Armstrong, History, p.125.
129 Ibid., p.126.
130 Ibid., p.121.
131 AM/RG 142-2(4). Seguí, 'Etat des Productions de l'Isle de
Minorque et de son Commerce', 1765.
133 Ibid., p.113.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid., p.112.
136 Ibid., p.115, note 40.
137 Armstrong, History, p.115.
138 v. also chapter three pp.90-92.
139 PRO ADM 1/377. Byng to Burchett, 30 March 1719.
140 I am indebted to Dr. David Starkey of the University of
Exeter for providing me with this information.

AGS/E leg. 6850. Correspondence (1721-1725) between Domingo Justiniani and Alonso de Valbas (Spanish officials) and Thomas Revell and Henry Culey (British Agents for Prizes).


Riudavets, Historia, vol. 2, p. 1276
Hernández, Compendio, p. 312 note 3.

Terrón, Economía, p. 110.

Hernández, Compendio, p. 312, note 3.
Casanovas, Corsarios, p. 4.

PRO CO 174/11, f. 122. Murray to Weymouth no. 54, 16 September 1778.

Ibid., f. 194. The first commission was issued 14 September 1778.

PRO CO 174/12, ff. 4-6. List of Prizes and Privateers fitted out in Minorca, December 1778.

Ibid., f. 6.
Ibid., f. 4.

AM/U 284. Nota dels Corsaris armats en Menorca y de las Presas durant la Guerra, 1782.


Ibid., p. 203.


Terrón, Economía, p. 110.

PRO ADM 1/381. Account of the ships in Mahon harbour, February 1742.

PRO ADM 1/382. Return of merchantmen, 2 January 1747.

PRO ADM 1/381. Mathews to Corbett, 26 February 1743.

Terrón, Economía, p. 110.


Terrón, Economía, p. 110.


Lindemann, Minorka, p. 104.

Ibid.


Lindemann, Minorka, pp. 107, 108.


Lindemann, Minorka, p. 107.

Terrón, Economía, p. 112.

Information has been obtained from: Lindemann, Minorka, pp. 121, 122.
Terrón, Economía, p. 113.

J. Roca Vinent, 'Diari de Mahó, 1777-1778' RM 1896, pp. 26-47.
172 AGS/GM leg.3767. Estado de Menorca, 18 July 1782, lists 53 merchants in Mahón, 23 in Ciudadela, 24 in Alayor and 1 in Mercadal.

173 AM/U (D) 158. Decree by Kane relating to Mediterranean passes, 30 November 1724.

174 Terrón, Economistía, p.110.

175 PRO CO 174/2, f.216. State of the Natives and Inhabitants of Menorca, exclusive of Troops and other British Born Subjects, 1750. Blakeney to Bedford, 14 January 1751.

176 Hernández, La colonia griega, p.339.

177 Ibid., p.342.

178 The Greeks were expelled from Menorca in 1781, but the drop in the numbers of the population of Mahón was only 116 - from 14,018 in Murray's census of 1781 to 13,902 in Crillon's census of 1782.

179 AGS/GM leg.3761. List of the Jews expelled from Menorca, 13 September 1781.

180 R.Rosselló y Vaquer, Menorca davant la Inquisició (Mahón, 1982), p.68, citing AHN Inquisición leg.1716, no.29.


183 Ibid.

184 Ibid., f.28. Lambert to Halifax, 22 September 1763.

185 Ibid., f.223. Thomas Hope to Conway, 30 July 1765.

186 Ibid., f.28, Lambert to Halifax, 22 September 1763, enclosing merchants' petition.


188 Ibid., f.105. Merchants' petition to Lyttelton, 20 May 1764.

189 Ibid., f.175. Merchants' petition to Townshend, 14 March 1765.

190 Ibid.

191 PRO CO 174/1, f.283. Mostyn to Rochford no.2, 1 October 1772.

192 Lindemann, Minorka, p.112. Of the remaining imports, 20% came from the Barbary coast, 14% from Mallorca, 6.4% from Genoa, 4% from Spain and 3% from Sweden.

193 PRO CO 174/1, f.283. Mostyn to Rochford no.2, 1 October 1772.

194 AGS/GM leg.3760. Relación of 7 February 1782.

195 PRO CO 174/3, f.176. Signatories to the merchants' petition, 14 March 1765.

196 Army Lists 1763 - 1782, Ordnance personnel.

197 PRO CO 389/56. Order in Council, 28 May 1752. Regulation 4 in the Civil Branch decreed that 'Neither Governor or Casual Commandant nor their Secretaries or Servants nor any Judges nor Officers in the Army nor their servants be directly or indirectly concerned in any Trade, Commerce, Foreign or Domestic'.


200 Ibid., Ms D/ER B 329 no.39. Articles of partnership, 1 December 1724.

201 Ibid. Otway and Radcliffe each contributed £2,000, Crofton and Dumas £1,000 each.
198 Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire Square, p.17. George Radcliffe was mentally unstable and went mad in 1735. He died in 1741.
199 Hertfordshire Record Office, Ms D/ER B 176/1-176/3.
Correspondence 1725-1732.
200 Ibid., Ms D/ER B 193/9. Kane to Radcliffe, 28 October 1729: 'I cannot charge myself with anything that has made Port Mahon useless to the Natives in any Respect'.
201 PRO CO 174/1, f.312. Alexiano petition to Lord North for compensation for his losses, undated.
202 AM Protocols notorials, libro 70, ff.168-170. Will of Adam Wilkie, drawn up 16 April 1778.
204 AGS/E leg.6902. Reference in a letter from Patricio Laules (Viceroy of Mallorca) to Sebastián de la Quadra, 10 September 1737.
205 PRO CO 174/19, f.36. Johnston's decree, 12 July 1766.
206 PRO CO 174/4, f.190. Johnston to Shelburne no.8, 11 July 1767, enclosing copies of both orders.
207 PRO CO 174/10, f.142. Murray to Weymouth no.40, 19 October 1777.
208 BL Add Mss 23638, ff.38,39. 'Minorca 1717', a report by Kane repeated Neal's findings of 1713, but must have served as the basis for the figures produced by:
Ramis, Noticias no.1, pp.27-33.
209 Vargas, Descripciones, Appendix. Census dated 10 April 1784.
210 Ramis, Noticias no.1, pp.28-33.
213 PRO CO 174/2, f.216. Blakeney to Bedford, 14 January 1751.
214 AM/U 382. Jurats' record of foreigners resident in Mahón, 1770.
215 Sixteen in the censuses of 1713, 1722, 1737 and 1750. Fifteen in the census of 1763. Fourteen for boys and twelve for girls in the census of 1782.
217 A.Segura and J.Guau, 'Estudi de demografia mallorquina', Randa no.16 (Barcelona,1984), p.28.
221 BL Add Mss 23638, f.39. 'Minorca 1717', report by Kane.
222 M.L.Dubón y Pretus, 'Expansió i recesió demogràfica a Mac', des de 1741 a 1840' Treballs de Geografia no.38 (Palma,1980), pp.32-39, Quadres 1-5.

484
225 Wrigley, Population in History, p. 131.
226 Vidal and Gomila, Demografía, p. 81.
227 Vidal and Gomila, 'Tres segles d'evolució demogràfica', p. 20.
228 Armstrong, History, p. 209.
229 Clegorn, Observations, p. 60.6
230 Dubón y Pretus, 'Expansión i recesión demográfica a Maó des de 1741-1840', Quadre 1, p. 33.
232 Ibid., p. 28.
233 Ibid., p. 27.
234 PRO CO 174/2, f. 216. Blakeney to Bedford, 14 January 1751. 424 foreigners were listed as residents of Mahón, 51 of St. Philip's, 36 of Ciudadela, 26 of Alayor and 9 of Mercadal.
235 AM/U 382. Jurats of Mahón, list of resident foreigners, 1770.
236 PRO CO 174/3, f. 224. Hope to Conway, 30 July 1765.
237 Full accounts of the emigration to Florida, and of the Menorcan colony there are to be found in:
C. Doggett Corse, Dr Andrew Turnbull and the New Smyrna Colony of Florida (Florida, 1967).
J. Quinn, Minorcans in Florida (St Augustine, Florida, 1975).
P. D. Rasico, Els menorquins de la Florida (Abadia de Montserrat, 1987).
238 PRO CO 174/4. Shelburne to Johnston, 1 May 1767.
239 Rasico, Els menorquins de la Florida, p. 41.
240 PRO CO 174/5, f. 23. Johnston to Shelburne, 9 April 1768, reported that of Turnbull's colonists 'Near 1,100' were Menorcans.
241 Ibid., f. 59.
242 Panagopoulos, New Smyrna, p. 47.
243 Quinn, Minorcans in Florida, p. 25.
244 Martí, 'La jurisdicción eclesiástica' in Las instituciones (ed.) Piña, p. 277, citing Father Francesc Gelabert to Bishop, November 1781.
245 Hernández, Compendio, p. 363.
246 Mata, Conquistas, p. 213.
248 AGS/GM leg. 3768. Royal Order of 16 February 1782.
249 AGS/GM leg. 3761. Marqués de Aviles to Duque de Crillon, 19 October 1781.
250 AGS/GM leg. 3767. Cifuentes to Marqués de Muzquiz (Secretary of War), 8 July 1782.
251 Mata, Conquistas, p. 234.
252 Ibid.
255 Gregory, Minorca, p. 222.
258 Ibid., p. 180.
Chapter Ten.

The Final Years, 1798 - 1802.

By the summer of 1798, Britain had been at war with France for five years and with Spain for nearly two. In her war against France, Britain had succeeded in maintaining a naval and military presence in the western Mediterranean for the thirty months during which the island of Corsica had been a British possession, but rising republican sympathies among the Corsicans, the increasing threat posed to the island by French military successes in northern Italy, and Spain's entry into the war, combined to force Britain to abandon the Mediterranean in December 1796, and withdraw her troops and fleet to Lisbon where they would be well-placed to counter any Spanish aggression against Portugal, Britain's ally. Portugal was saved by this action, but a high price was paid for the withdrawal in the Mediterranean. In April 1797, Lombardy was ceded to France by Austria and, in October, France gained the Venetian fleet and the Ionian Islands, including the port of Corfu which commanded the entrance to the Adriatic. Bonaparte, emboldened by his success in Italy, and encouraged by the absence of British warships in the Mediterranean, then set out to realise his dream of a French empire in the East. In May 1798, a French army transported in a fleet of nearly four hundred vessels sailed from Toulon and, pausing only to receive the surrender of Malta,
Bonaparte landed in Egypt on 1 July. Two battles and three weeks later, he was its master.

If further losses and reverses were to be avoided and a coalition of opposition to French territorial expansion encouraged, it was imperative that Britain should take the initiative by regaining the command of the Mediterranean sea. In the prevailing political circumstances, the tactical reasons for recapturing Menorca for use as a sovereign base were even stronger than those which had prompted the conquest ninety years earlier for, in addition to the tasks traditionally carried out by warships based in Mahón—monitoring and blockading of enemy ports, protection of British trade routes and disruption of the trade of the enemy—Menorca was ideally located to enable Britain to achieve the added 1798 objectives of supporting the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, encouraging Austrian opposition to French expansion in Italy, and preventing the relief or rescue of Bonaparte's army which was stranded in Egypt after Nelson's annihilation of the French fleet in Aboukir Bay in August 1798. Accordingly, an expedition to attack Menorca was mounted and, after a short, but spectacularly successful, campaign led by Lieutenant-General the Hon Charles Stuart, the island fell once again into British hands on 15 November 1798. It remained a British possession until June 1802, when it was returned to Spain under the terms of the Treaty of Amiens.

Although Menorca was only a de facto British possession during this time, and it was made clear to Stuart, (appointed Governor after his successful conquest¹), that Britain had no firm intention of retaining the island after the war,² within
six months of the capture more radical changes were made in
the various spheres of government than had ever been
introduced in more than sixty years of British de jure
possession - civil government was reformed, municipal
administration was restructured, fiscal changes were
introduced, and ecclesiastical authority was subjected to
tighter British control. The reforms were not initiated by
the British government in Westminster (who expressed no
greater interest in Menorcan affairs at this time than had
been shown hitherto) nor were the reforms dictated by any
need to undo changes introduced by Spain. They were
authorised by Stuart on his own initiative, and the urgency
with which they were introduced was more indicative of
Stuart's own character and conception of his role as Governor
than it was a reflection of any more compelling need for
change than had existed during earlier periods of British
government.

The Spanish Occupation, 1782-1798.

In the light of Menorca's opposition to the Bourbon
succession to the throne of Spain, and the island's exposure
to foreign influence for most of the eighteenth century, it
might have been expected that Menorca's reintegration into
the Spanish kingdom in 1782 would have been accompanied by
the imposition of the sort of restrictive and centralist
controls designed to destroy provincial identity which Philip
V had introduced after the War of the Spanish Succession in
the provinces which, like Menorca, had supported his Hapsburg
rival. In the event, the changes implemented by Spain in Menorca were, ironically, not as radical nor as progressive as at least one Menorcan would have wished. Between September 1781 and July 1782, Francisco Seguí y Sintes, the Asesor (Civil), submitted seven memorials to the court of Madrid, in which he advocated the retention of much of the format of Menorca's traditional civil and judicial government, but he also proposed reforms designed to bring about more efficient administration in civil, fiscal, judicial, ecclesiastical, and municipal matters. The Jurats of Mahón and Ciudadela also proposed changes, but the Spanish government paid as little heed to these proposals as the British government had done to earlier suggestions of constitutional reform.

Some changes did take place: all non-Catholic residents were banished; free port status was withdrawn, tariffs introduced and some restrictions placed on imports and exports, and the British-constituted vice-admiralty court was replaced by a 'maritime and commerce' tribunal. But Menorquí was not replaced by Castilian as the official language, the Menorcan fueros were recognised — although now as a mark of royal indulgence and no longer as inalienable rights — and, to compensate for the loss of free port status, the Menorcans were allowed to trade with the Spanish American colonies. The only measure to which the Menorcans took great exception (and caused some to emigrate), was an attempt to put the islanders on the same footing as other Spanish subjects in respect of a liability to be conscripted for military service. Because of the opposition, and as a
result of sympathetic support from the Conde de Cifuentes, the first Spanish Governor, the measure was not enforced.

The Spanish authorities did, however, register the concern expressed about the harmful effect that exposure to years of British rule had had upon the faith and morals of the islanders. Seguí argued that Menorca needed its own Bishop to rekindle and strengthen religious belief, and he demonstrated that sufficient funds could be generated from church tithes and rents to support a Bishopric. Seguí's proposal was strongly supported by a report on the ecclesiastical state of the island by Dionisio Muñoz y Nadale, the senior army chaplain on the island, but the Bishop of Mallorca (not exactly a disinterested party since he stood to lose income from the church tithes in Menorca), did not support the proposal, claiming that the need for a separate bishopric 'had been much exaggerated'. The matter was finally resolved when, on 23 July 1795, the Pope issued a Bull reconstituting the see of Menorca, with the episcopal residence in Ciudadela rather than Mahón - the latter town acknowledged to have more inhabitants, but the former deemed to have more 'souls'. The first Bishop, Dr Antonio Vila y Camps, who was the son of a Ciudadelan lawyer, was consecrated in Madrid in March 1798, and was installed in the newly-designated cathedral church of Santa María in Ciudadela on 7 September 1798.

Spain's support for the restoration of a Bishopric in Menorca was undoubtedly given with the spiritual welfare of the islanders in mind, but the decision to demolish the island's principal defence works took no account of the possible consequences for the Menorcans, and was the outcome
of a political 'dog-in-the-manger' strategy of the Spanish government.

Of Spain's twin objectives in the Mediterranean during the war against Britain from 1779 to 1783, she would have preferred to repossess Gibraltar rather than Menorca. The reacquisition of Menorca was, nevertheless, much celebrated and yet, within days of the surrender of the British garrison, orders were sent from Madrid which were intended to neutralise the tactical attractions which had made the island such a prized British possession. Spain had no use for Menorca; it brought nothing to the national economy and, well provided with naval bases on her eastern Mediterranean coastline, the harbour of Mahón held no attraction for Spain, merely the prospect of additional expense. As a matter of national pride, Spain intended to retain Menorca, but if it had to be returned to Britain or to another power after the war, Floridablanca, the Spanish First Minister, was determined that the island's tactical value would be greatly reduced.

The speed with which the defences were dismantled and destroyed in 1782 was indicative of Floridablanca's resolve. Murray surrendered on 4 February 1782; on 16 February unequivocal orders were sent from Madrid to demolish the fortress of St.Philip, Fort St.Anthony at Fornells, and to leave standing in the ports and on the coastline only such towers and batteries which would be necessary to give warning and initial protection to Spanish shipping; surplus artillery, ammunition and stores were to be sent to Barcelona. The demolition of St.Philip's was completed by early August; St.Anthony was destroyed by the end of
November, and the crumbling walls of the citadel of Ciudadela (reprieved by Royal Order in September) remained as the only defensive curtain left standing in the island.\textsuperscript{15} In addition, Floridablanca had intended to 'inutilizar' (render useless) the harbour of Mahón.\textsuperscript{16} This step, which would have involved the evacuation of all the naval stores and equipment, the destruction of the dockyard facilities, and the scuttling of ships to block the entrance to the harbour, undoubtedly had as part of its objective the aim of making Mahon less attractive to the British, but there are good grounds to assume that it was also contemplated partly as a punitive measure against the Menorcan privateers who had wreaked so much havoc upon Spanish shipping.\textsuperscript{17} Fortunately for Menorca, the Spanish government, having been made fully aware of the facilities of the dockyard, and of the dependence of so many Menorcans upon sea-faring activities,\textsuperscript{18} relented and decided to keep the harbour open, maintain the facilities and also to allow the Menorcans to trade with Spanish America. A naval architect, Juan Real, was sent to the island in 1783,\textsuperscript{19} shipbuilding supplies were also sent to Mahón and, in the course of the next sixteen years, the yard not only serviced Spanish men-of-war (notably the fleet assembled for an attack on the Barbary coast in 1785\textsuperscript{20}), but also built twelve ships - four frigates of 34 guns, two xebecs of 34 and 26 guns, three brigs of 18, 16 and 14 guns and two smaller vessels of 3 guns.\textsuperscript{21}
The British Reconquest.

The British assault in November 1798 came as no surprise to the Spanish Governor, Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada. Not only was Quesada apprised of Britain's immediate intention three weeks before the event, but he, and his predecessor in command, had expected an attack on Menorca even before Spain's entry into the war in October 1796. But, notwithstanding the predictability of an attack, and the two years' grace before it was launched, the Spanish government, having drastically reduced Menorca's defence capabilities in 1782, was not in a position to do more than send one additional regiment to the island in answer to Quesada's urgent and repeated appeals for reinforcements. Nor could it provide the naval support and protection without which, as history had shown, no defence of Menorca could be prolonged. Consequently, the total force which Quesada could call upon to resist any attack amounted to no more than 3,650 infantry (1,350 in the Valencia regiment commanded by Colonel Luis Fernández de Córdoba y Pimentel, and 1,150 in each of two regiments of inexperienced and ill-disciplined Swiss mercenaries, commanded respectively by Colonel Cristóbal de Rutiman and Colonel Carlos Yann). To support the infantry Quesada had a detachment of eighty dragoons, and an artillery company one hundred strong - a quite inadequate number to man the one hundred and sixteen cannons (not all of which were serviceable, and none was of greater calibre than thirty-two pounders), which were dispersed about the island in twenty-four coastal defence batteries. Moreover, Quesada could not depend upon the support of the Menorcans who had shown that
they were quite as determined not to take up arms for Spain as they had been not to fight for Britain in 1756 and 1781.28

The plan to recapture Menorca was the brainchild of Stuart and he submitted it to Henry Dundas, the Secretary of State for War, in June 1798.29 Stuart's brief experience as military commander in Corsica had convinced him not only of the value of a British naval base in the western Mediterranean, but also of the tactical need for a land base which could serve as an assembly point for troops, and from which expeditions could be launched to curb French aggression in the area of the Mediterranean. In Stuart's opinion, the recapture of Menorca would pose fewer problems than its subsequent retention,30 but in the Secretary of State's letter giving Stuart the command of the expedition, Dundas assured Stuart of 'complete protection by the Naval Department' for as long as would be necessary for the security of the island.31

Stuart's plan had been approved by Dundas in July, but it was not until September that orders reached General O'Hara, the Governor of Gibraltar, to hold four regiments and one company of artillery in readiness to embark at a moment's notice.32 On 20 October, Commodore John Duckworth, the naval commander of the expedition, received his final orders from the Admiralty.33 He sailed immediately with seven ships of the line, four frigates/sloops, and eight transports carrying General Stuart, the 28th, 42nd, 58th and 90th Regiments and one company of artillery; the convoy was sighted off the north coast of Menorca at daybreak on 7 November. Duckworth's report to his Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Lord St.Vincent, suggested that Fornells had been the
Figure 10.1. Stuart's Assault, 7 - 14 November 1798.
landing-place Stuart originally had in mind, but the wind was contrary, and the Spanish batteries guarding the mouth of the harbour were clearly manned and seemingly prepared to resist. Consequently, Stuart determined to attempt a landing in the bay of Addaya, a little further to the East. It was not an ideal choice. The entrance to the bay was too narrow and shallow to accommodate the line of battle ships, and the approach to the most readily accessible creek in the bay, Cala Moli, was guarded by a battery of four 9 pounders. The frigate Argo was ordered to give covering fire and superintend the landing of the troops, and this was accomplished with greater ease than expected since the Spanish battery, having fired only one ineffectual round, was then blown up and abandoned by the gunners. By 11 o'clock 800 troops had been landed, and the 28th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Edward Paget, had taken up a position on the heights of the rocky hillside above the disembarkation point to give cover while the remainder of the troops and some of the artillery were brought on shore.

In the interval between learning of the British intention to attack Menorca and the sighting of the expedition off the island, Quesada had taken steps to prepare for the assault. He had made a final urgent appeal for help; he had prepared a boom with which to block the mouth of Mahón harbour; he had centralised his stores and provisions in Mercadal, and he had dispersed his troops in such a manner that they could, in theory, rapidly respond to an assault on the most likely of the many possible landing-places. However, Quesada was denied any reinforcements from Mallorca or mainland Spain, and his tactical plan to oppose an enemy landing was
frustrated by the irresolution and incompetence of his subordinate commanders. When the sighting of the British ships was signalled to Quesada from the watch-tower on Monte Toro shortly after daybreak on 7 November, he immediately gave orders for the boom to be placed across Mahón harbour, and ordered the Valencia Regiment, stationed in Mahón, Rutiman's Regiment in Villacarlos, and 400 troops from Mercadal and Ferrerías to march with all speed to Addaya. But there were delays before the troops set off and, unaccountably, they did so without adequate provisions and ammunition, so that, when they approached Addaya, they were forced to halt short of their objective by the protective fire from the Argos and by the small arms fire of Colonel Paget's Regiment. If Rutiman had forced the issue, and had determinedly attacked the British position, his superior numbers might have dislodged Paget's men and disrupted and delayed the disembarkation. But the Spanish troops, and his regiment in particular, arrived unevenly and in some disorder, and those who engaged the British received no orders to attack, merely to contain the assault. Moreover, some of Rutiman's men had shown their reluctance to fight by dragging their feet on the march, and others (initially about one hundred) deserted to the British immediately on arrival at Addaya. Consequently, after an afternoon of intermittent and ineffective fire, the Spanish, tired, hungry and short of ammunition began to retreat at nightfall, and fell back upon Alayor and Mercadal before supplies could reach them, together with Quesada's orders to defend their ground 'to the last', and if compelled, to cede it only 'inch by inch'. 
Apart from a more accurate assessment of the enemy numbers he faced, Stuart did not gain much intelligence from the deserters, but when the Spanish forces opposing him melted away in the night, he resolved to press home the surprising advantage he had gained. He was undoubtedly encouraged to do so by the knowledge that the Spanish batteries at Fornells had also been spiked and abandoned under the threat of the ships of the line which Duckworth had instructed to cruise off the port. Stuart therefore ordered Colonel Thomas Graham with 600 men to press ahead overnight to capture Mercadal in order to sever the main Menorcan arterial communication route. This was achieved by the early morning of 8 November, Graham's push having been supported by 250 sailors released by Duckworth in order to manhandle supporting artillery pieces. From the prisoners captured by Graham, it was learned that Mahón was virtually defenceless and Stuart, once he had brought the remainder of his troops to Mercadal on 9 November, despatched Colonel Paget to secure the capital, which was accomplished later that day. The next day (10th), Paget removed the boom across the harbour, thereby allowing the frigates Cormorant and Aurora to enter the harbour. He then returned, with half his force to rejoin Stuart in Mercadal. In the meantime, Duckworth had taken possession of Fornells, and with it a more secure and sheltered harbour in which to anchor the transports which were still exposed to the elements off Addaya. The transports were moved to Fornells on 10 November, where Duckworth was able to land the rest of the artillery - three 12 pounders and three 5 1/2 inch howitzers - together with ninety marines he released to drag the pieces to Stuart in Mercadal. Duckworth then gave
unsuccessful chase to four Spanish ships which had been sighted off Menorca, before returning to stand off Ciutadella with the bulk of his squadron on 14 November. In the meantime, Quesada, faced with the knowledge that Stuart's troops had been landed largely unopposed at Addaya, had taken the decision to fall back upon Ciutadella (which, since the destruction of Fort St. Philip in 1782, had been looked upon as the last line of defence in the event of an enemy attack), in order to present a single front to the British land forces, and in the forlorn hope of keeping open a port through which support might reach the island from Spain or Mallorca. Accordingly, the Spanish troops abandoned Mercadal for Ciutadella at four o'clock on the morning of 8 November, and a line of defence was established outside the city walls by midday 9 November.

Stuart, after a pause to regroup his forces and assemble his artillery, set out from Mercadal for Ciutadella on 12 November. He ordered the main body of troops to advance along Kane's road, where it spent the night of 12 November at Alputze, before halting at Aljups the next day. Lt-Colonel George Moncrieff, with a detachment of the 90th Regiment was sent to Ferrerias and then along the old, more southerly road, on a parallel line to camp at Mala Garaba, level with the main force at Aljups. The same evening (13th), Stuart sent a small detachment of the 42nd regiment, commanded by Captain Muter, to capture the dominant farm of Torre d'en Quart on the old, more northerly road from Ciutadella to Fornells. By so doing, Stuart gave the impression that the British were attacking Ciutadella in three columns, and in numbers.
By this stage, the number of deserters to the British from
the Spanish regiments was approaching 1,000, and Stuart had a
much clearer idea of the size of the garrison and of their
plans. Quesada, on the other hand, had no idea of the
strength of Stuart's force, which was variously estimated to
be between 8,000 and 13,000,44 (actually no more than 3,000).
At the approach of the British forces, Quesada summoned a
Council of War on 12 November, the opinion of which was that
the hastily constructed Spanish defences outside the walls of
Ciudadela were too exposed to be effective against what was
clearly understood to be superior numbers, and the decision
was taken to withdraw into Ciudadela, and make a stand from
within its feeble walls.45 But if the military were prepared
to be besieged and attacked in Ciudadela, neither the Jurats
nor the Bishop were prepared to see the city sacrificed in
what appeared to them to be a futile undertaking, and they
separately petitioned Quesada not to put Ciudadela and its
inhabitants at risk.46

The next day (14th), Stuart's forces advanced to within
half a mile of the walls of Ciudadela to occupy the defences
vacated by Quesada's troops. Stuart's men were spread very
thinly along a four mile front, but the activity generated by
them suggested strength in depth, and when Stuart set up
three very visible artillery batteries (two of three 12
pounders and one of three 5 1/2 inch howitzers - he had no
siege guns), his intimidating ploy worked. Although Quesada
rejected Stuart's first summons to surrender and fired one
token, but totally ineffectual, cannonade of resistance, he
had become convinced of the superiority of numbers investing
Ciudadela, and he capitulated in the evening of 15 November.
Stuart was magnanimous in victory, and he granted the Spanish more honourable capitulation terms than their lack of resistance deserved, but such generosity did not hoodwink the Spanish government. On their return to Spain, the principal officers of the garrison were placed under arrest, and a Council of War appointed to examine the facts relating to the surrender. Ironically, the findings of the Council were not announced until 10 June 1802, by which time Menorca had once again reverted to Spain. Quesada, who had died before judgement was pronounced, was held principally responsible for the loss of the island and, in wording reminiscent of the charge laid against Byng, he was found guilty of not doing his utmost to take the fight to the enemy; but for his death, he would have been sentenced to be cashiered and dismissed the service. Three of the four colonels in the garrison, and some more junior officers were found guilty on the same count, but to a lesser degree. They were reprimanded, but were thought to have been sufficiently punished by the time they had spent under arrest. Incomprehensibly, Rutiman, although his regiment was disbanded because of its shameful conduct in the face of the enemy, was exonerated of all charges, as was Lieutenant Arebol, the officer commanding the Fornells detachment who had ordered the guns to be spiked, and had thereby allowed Duckworth easy access to safe anchorage on the first, critical day of Stuart's assault.47

The Defences of Menorca and the Garrison.

The ease with which Stuart had captured Menorca had exceeded even his own optimistic forecast, but it made him
all the more aware of the island's vulnerability to attack, and his immediate concern after his victory was to strengthen Menorca's defences. He had every reason to expect that the Spanish would make an early riposte and, given Britain's other preoccupations in the Mediterranean - the blockades of Valetta and Egypt, the incursion of the French fleet under Admiral Bruix and the protection of the Kingdom of Naples - he ordered work to be undertaken at a feverish pace so that he would be in a position to contain any Spanish attack until the support of the navy (of which he had been assured by Dundas) would be forthcoming. Stuart's fears of Spanish reaction were well founded. By April 1799, Spanish forces in Mallorca had been increased to six regiments of infantry and one of artillery (some 7,000 men), and they were concentrated in the north-east corner of the island around the Mallorcan port closest to Menorca. On 15 April, the Marqués de la Romana was appointed to command an expedition to recapture Menorca, and on 10 May, Admiral José de Mazaredo was ordered to sail from Cadiz to Mallorca with a fleet of twenty-four ships of the line to transport and escort de la Romana's troops. Mazaredo's fleet set sail, but encountered such violent storms after passing through the Straits of Gibraltar that it had to run for shelter in Cartagena, where it arrived on 20 May with twelve of its ships dismasted, and none without some damage, and in no state to proceed quickly to support de la Romana. In Cartagena Mazaredo also learned that the British fleet had escaped the storms and was bound for Mahón. In the circumstances, the immediate danger of a Spanish attack was over, and although the concentration of Spanish troops in Mallorca constituted a threat which
persisted until peace was signed, the defence works which Stuart and his successors threw up, the build-up of British troops in Menorca and the determination of British naval commanders to protect the island, all combined to deter the Spanish from mounting or even contemplating another attack.

Within a month of the capitulation of the Spanish garrison, Stuart was able to write to Dundas that reconstruction work had been started on some of the ruined fortifications of St. Philip's, with the aim of providing the British troops with a protected area from which it could resist an attack for up to two weeks until help was forthcoming. By 7 February, Colonel Graham considered that the garrison would be able to resist all but a regular siege, and work on the defences continued throughout the British occupation. But General Sir Ralph Abercromby, who succeeded Stuart as Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, and who paid two visits to Menorca in 1800, was of the opinion that the defences were little more than token works which would not stand for even three days against artillery, and he advised Dundas 'if we shall keep the Island, all the fortifications must be reconstructed'.

Stuart did not stay long in command in Menorca. He left in May 1799 shortly after returning from an expedition to Sicily where, in March/April, in response to a plea from Nelson, he had taken two British regiments (30th and 89th) to strengthen the garrison of Messina, which was under threat from the French in Naples. Before he left Menorca, however, Stuart had seen to it that in Fort George (a partial reconstruction of Fort Marlborough, the Queen's and Kane's Redoubts and the West and Caroline Lunettes of the former
Fort St. Philip), and new defence towers on la Mola and the site of Fort Felipet, there was once again some protection for the mouth of Mahon harbour, and he had set about building a series of defence towers at strategic points on the coastline. Nevertheless, Stuart maintained that the garrison numbers were some 2,000 short of the strength required to provide an adequate defence for the island, and he clearly had a more grandiose conception than his political masters in Westminster of the tactical value of Menorca as a base from which to launch offensives against the French in the Mediterranean. Stuart pressed his case forcibly on his return to England, but when his plea for 20,000 troops to be based in Menorca was rejected, he declined the command of a smaller expeditionary force, and Abercromby was appointed in his place.

On Stuart's departure for England, command in Menorca devolved upon Major-General Sir James St. Clair Erskine until the arrival, in November, of Lieutenant-General the Hon Edward Fox, who had been appointed Lieutenant-Governor the previous July. Both Erskine and Fox showed as much concern for the island defences as Stuart, and they were fortunate to have as their Chief Engineer Captain Robert D'Arcy, who was no stranger to the island having served in the siege of 1781/1782. Although D'Arcy's plans to rebuild much of the demolished outworks of Fort St. Philip to ensure:

- the Security of the Naval Arsenal, safe anchorage for Ships that arrive with Supplies, and to exclude an Enemy's Land Batteries from commanding the entrance of the harbour,
were rejected on the grounds of expense he, like Stuart, was an advocate of coastal towers as effective detached works of defence, and he was allowed to proceed with this less costly work. Fox, confessing his own shortcomings in the sphere of fortifications, gave D'Arcy his full support, and the latter, in addition to building the rather makeshift Fort George at the mouth of Mahón harbour, repairing Kane's road, improving and widening the coastal defence road (camí des cavalls) and carrying out repairs to two towers built by the Spanish (San Nicolás at Ciutadella and at Alcaufar on the south-east coast), also constructed eleven additional defence towers at strategic points guarding possible anchorages round the coast (Figure 10.2). The towers, subsequently called Martello towers, were round, built of mortar and stone blocks and were cannon-proof (Figure 10.3). They had three levels: the lowest, situated over a well, was divided into compartments to store provisions, arms and powder; the middle floor constituted the living quarters for the troops, and entry was at this level by means of an exterior, retractable ladder; the top level had a protective parapet, and one or more cannons (usually twenty-four pounders) were mounted on swivels to give a maximum field of fire. The number of troops manning the towers varied from a Sergeant and twelve men to a Subaltern and twenty men, and the towers were supplied with enough provisions and ammunition to last for ten days in the event of an attack.

By the time Britain abandoned Menorca in June 1802, the island's coastal defences, linked to the long-standing atalayas (unarmed watch-towers) and with better routes of inter-communication, were much improved, but Menorca was
Figure 10.2. Defence Towers erected 1799 - 1802.
Plan of a Tower Erected at Adaya for a Traversing Gun, to receive a Garrison of Eighteen Men and Stores & Provisions for them for One Month Erected in 1803.

Figure 10.3.

(Journal of the late Campaign in Egypt, T. Walsh [London, 1803, p. 16, Plate 7].)
ultimately no more capable of withstanding a prolonged and
determined investment than it had been in 1708, 1756 or 1781.
Abercromby was of the opinion that however great the
convenience of Menorca and the harbour of Mahón to the
British to enable them to control the naval power of France
and Spain, 'no skill of the ablest Engineer' could ensure the
protection of the island and the harbour,66 and D'Arcy
himself had to concede that it was impossible to give 'intire
security' to the island, and that an 'effectual invasion' by
an enemy could be discounted only for as long as 'the British
fleet is superior to the Enemy'.67

For all but the last year of this period of British
occupation, the number of regiments in the island garrison
was greater than at any other period of British rule (Table
10.1). In addition there were, at times, other troops who
were in transit, and for whom the island was merely an
assembly point for one of the several British expeditions
launched in or from the Mediterranean in this period. The
presence of so many troops and their fluctuating numbers
posed logistical problems for both the British and the
Menorcans (Table 10.2). The garrison regiments, and some of
the additional long-stay troops were accommodated in the
barracks at Georgetown/Villacarlos and Mahón, in Fort George
as it was rebuilt and in the habitable part of the new
lazaretto (building had started in 1793 but it was
incomplete and only partly habitable), and, as in the past,
there were troops based in Ciutadella, Alayor and Fornells.
The rest of the troops either stayed aboard their transports
in the harbour or occupied tented accommodation at Fort
George or at San Pons, an encampment which grew up just
Table 10.1. Garrison Regiments, 1798 - 1802.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rqts.</th>
<th>8th</th>
<th>12th</th>
<th>20th</th>
<th>28th</th>
<th>31st</th>
<th>36th</th>
<th>42nd</th>
<th>58th</th>
<th>82nd</th>
<th>90th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Feb 1799</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1799</td>
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<td>Aug 1799</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 1800</td>
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<td>Mar 1800</td>
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<td>May 1800</td>
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<td>Jul 1800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 1801</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 1802</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.2. Army numbers in Minorca, November 1798 - June 1802.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rqts.</th>
<th>11,000</th>
<th>11,777</th>
<th>6,504</th>
<th>8,513</th>
<th>5,535</th>
<th>6,799</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov/98</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr/99</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun/99</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug/99</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov/99</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>May/00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar/01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul/01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun/02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total numbers (military, naval and civilian) of British personnel evacuated.

2 PRO CO 174/20, p.48. Stuart to Dundas, 5 May 1799.
3 Ibid, p.60. Erskine to Dundas, 17 June 1799.
5 Ibid, p.79. Erskine to Dundas, 17 November 1799.
7 Buckinghamshire Record Office, Hobart Papers, D/MI/Bundle J, L69. Return of the Forces serving in Minorca, 1 March 1801.
8 PRO No1/300, p.285. State of the Forces in Minorca, 8 September 1801.
9 PRO ADM 1/406. no.41. Saumarez to Keith, 12 June 1802.
outside Mahón on the road to Alayor. But, as in the past, the
Jurats were required to provide additional quarters. In
Mahón, the immediate requirement in November 1798 was for 254
houses,\(^6^8\) but in the summer of 1800 when numbers were at
their peak, the Jurats protested that they could not provide
any more private houses for use as quarters, and were forced
to convert the storehouses in the vegetable market to billet
the 575 troops that Fox had asked them to accommodate.\(^6^9\) At
the same time Fox was obliged to requisition the Carmelite
monastery for use as a military hospital.\(^7^0\)

The Navy.

The navy welcomed the re-acquisition of Mahón. St. Vincent
had as strongly supported the objective of Stuart's
expedition as he had been enthusiastic about the choice of
commander, and he considered that British possession of
Menorca would 'in some measure countervail Malta in the hands
of the French.'\(^7^1\) Commodore Duckworth could not have been
more cooperative in the execution of the mission itself, and
Admiral Lord Keith, St. Vincent's successor as naval
Commander-in-Chief, familiar with Mahón from an earlier
posting to the Mediterranean (1772-1774) when he was in
command of the sloop Scorpion, wrote to Stuart to express his
'real pleasure' at the capture.\(^7^2\) The promise given to Stuart
by Dundas that 'complete protection shall be given to you by
the Naval Department',\(^7^3\) was faithfully carried out by
St. Vincent and Keith to the extent that some historians,
notably A.T. Mahan,\(^7^4\) have criticised them, and Keith in
particular, for giving undue priority to the security of
Menorca at the expense of finding and engaging the French fleet under Admiral Bruix. But the criticism discounted the very real threat to Menorca of a Spanish attack in 1799, and the fact that, until the surrender of Malta in September 1800, British naval strategy in the Mediterranean depended upon a secure base at Mahón. Of the naval commanders in the area only Nelson discounted the importance of Mahón. When he learned of Stuart's success, Nelson had described Mahón as an 'invaluable acquisition', but eight months later he deliberately disobeyed Keith's order to send ships to protect Menorca, maintaining that it was 'better to save the Kingdom of Naples and risk Minorca, than risk the Kingdom of Naples to save Minorca'. This opinion was formed at a time in Nelson's life when his obsessive preoccupation with Neapolitan affairs distorted his overall strategic judgement - for example he attached no value to Malta (then part of the Kingdom of Naples), claiming that its possession would be a 'useless expense to England' - and Nelson's conduct prompted a comment from St. Clair Erskine that it had:

hazarded the safety of Minorca, sacrificed alike obedience to his commanding officer, the general service of England and her good relations with her allies for the sake of a couple of worthless women.

Nelson eventually sent ships to Menorca, but it is worthy of note that he visited the island for a total of only ten days (12-18 August and 13-18 October 1799) from the time of the capture of the island until he struck his flag in the Mediterranean in June 1800.

For at least the first two years of the last period of British rule in Menorca, the navy used the harbour of Mahón
to an extent not experienced since the height of naval operations in the Mediterranean during the War of Austrian Succession, more than fifty years earlier. In June 1799, for example, Keith anchored a fleet of thirty-two ships of the line and twelve frigates in the harbour, and these ships, together with all those which visited the harbour at other times, sought in Menorca some of their essential provisions, particularly fresh fruit and vegetables.79 But if the presence of the fleet added to the strain on the island's economy, it also ensured that provisions could safely be brought into Menorca, and it served to protect and encourage maritime traffic to and from the island to the extent that, in 1801, it was reckoned that more than 1,100 ships of sizeable tonnage visited the harbour.80 Moreover, further naval activity (and Menorcan prosperity) arose out of the issue, once again, of letters of marque to Menorcan vessels. Twelve were licensed by Stuart and were operating by February 1799;81 a further eighteen were licensed by St. Clair Erskine four months later.82 The missing records of the Vice-Admiralty court make it impossible to establish the number of privateers licensed or the number of prizes taken in the years 1798-1802, but records of the Court of Royal Patrimony show that receipts from the Vice-Admiralty Court from December 1798 until June 1801 totalled £7,175.2s. (£3,492.3s. in fees, and £3,682.19s. from proceeds of prize auctions).83 The increase in traffic in the harbour itself is illustrated by the need for the Jurats of Mahón to establish new rates for journeys to the many ferry points in the harbour.84

In November 1798, the navy found the dockyard installations and facilities much as they had been left in
1782, but an additional slipway had been introduced and the workforce had expanded. In December 1798 there were employed:
a master clerk, one hundred and twenty shipwrights, forty-three caulkers, twenty-one carpenters, thirty-five sawyers, twenty-nine blacksmiths, fifteen locksmiths, nineteen riggers, fourteen masons, two blockmakers, one cooper, tinner, painter, pitch-boiler, toolkeeper and fireman. There were also twelve watchmen and five boatmen, making a total of two hundred and eleven, all of whom were retained by the British. A Commissioner (Sir Isaac Coffin) was appointed to 'regulate the Dockyard', and British master craftsmen and artificers were added in the course of 1799. More local workmen were recruited, the rates of pay were increased, and the total cost to Britain of wages in the dockyard from December 1798 until June 1801 was in excess of £27,000, with the monthly bill varying from £298.11s.0d in December 1798, to as much as £938.15s.1ld. in July 1800, and it was reckoned that some £600 per annum was spent on maintenance. Although a xebec, which was on the stocks when the British captured the harbour, was completed and launched as the brig Port Mahon in October 1799, no further shipbuilding took place, and the dockyard reverted to its essential role under the British of servicing the fleet.

Little is known of the demands made upon the naval hospital at this time, except that, in June 1799, when the number of ships in the harbour was at its greatest, it could not accommodate all the sick, and Dr Weir, the Physician to the Fleet and Comptroller of the hospital, was granted the Dolphin to serve as an 'overflow'. No more is known of the activities of the Victualling Yard, other than that James Yeo
was appointed Agent/Victualler in June 1799, and that, in 1800, he employed an interpreter, a porter, fourteen labourers, eleven coopers, three butchers and a number of apprentice coopers at an annual cost of approximately £850.94

Civil Government.

If the swift and bloodless manner in which he had accomplished his mission led Stuart to be unexpectedly generous in the capitulation terms offered to the Spanish garrison, he was more restrained and cautious when asked, like Stanhope, Argyll and Johnston before him, to guarantee unreservedly the Menorcans' fueros and religious freedom. Stuart refused to accept the sections dealing with these matters which Quesada had proposed should form part of the capitulation terms, judging that they did not 'properly belong to the Capitulation', but he went as far as to undertake that 'due care will be taken to secure the peaceable Inhabitants in the enjoyment of their Religion and Property'.95 His intentions were made clear in a letter to Dundas written three days after the capitulation:

I have freed you entirely from the political and religious agreements which so continuously shackled the British Government, and occasioned such perpetual disputes when the Island was before in our possession.96

But Stuart went further, even though he was given no reason to believe that Menorca was to remain British for long. On his own initiative without prior consultation with his political masters in Westminster, he radically reorganised the island's civil administration. He did so partly in
response to pleas for reform which were made to him by the Jurats of Mahón, partly because he judged that the Jurats were, in the main, not 'men of fortune, character or ability', whose fiscal policy was 'arbitrary, partial and secret', and 'highly prejudicial to the general Interests of the Country', and partly because in Nicolás Orfila y Guardia whom he had appointed Asesor Civil, he found an enthusiastic advocate for many of the reforms which had been previously suggested to Johnston in 1767 by the Abogado Fiscal, Juan Seguí y Sanxo, most of which had been repeated in proposals put to the Spanish Court in 1781/1782 in a series of memorials by the then Asesor Civil, Francisco Seguí y Sintes. The details of the reforms were undoubtedly the work of Orfila, but the principles by which the civil government of the island was to be regulated, owed much to the experience Stuart had gained in the unhappy and unsuccessful British attempt to govern Corsica from 1794 until 1796.

The reforms introduced by Stuart came into effect in April 1799 in a decree which was signed 'Charles Stuart, General, and fully authorized by His Majesty to direct the Civil Affairs of the island of Minorca.' The Tribunal of the Bayle General was abolished, as was the Universitat General (a body which had not convened officially under British rule since Mahón had become the island capital), and the office of Almotacén/Mustasaf was suppressed. The lesser grade of Conseller in the Universitats was abolished, with all the members becoming Jurats. Eligibility for election to the Universitats still required candidates to be more than twenty-five years of age, but candidates were no longer
restricted on grounds of old age, infirmity, religious conviction, marital status or ownership of property, although relations of close sanguinity were still debarred from serving at the same time, as were those in debt to, or in litigation with, the Universitats. Tenure of office was extended from one to three years, thereby allowing Jurats to be more accountable for their actions and to plan for longer than the short-term, and eligibility from the four enfranchised estates was to depend upon substance, ranging from an annual income of £(M)600 for candidates from the first estate, to £(M)25 in the fourth estate. No salary was to be attached to the office of Jurat, but the administrative staff of the Universitats were to be paid. The reformed composition of the Universitats was as follows:

Table 10.3. Constituent members of the Universitats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estates</th>
<th>1st.</th>
<th>2nd.</th>
<th>3rd.</th>
<th>4th.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mahón</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciudadela</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alayor</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercadal</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and, in addition to any emergency sessions which could be called by any one of the Jurats, the Universitats were to meet regularly twice each week. To ensure greater continuity of policy and greater accountability, no more than one third of the Jurats were to retire in any one year and, to effect some savings many of the minor sinecures (for example the office of Collector of rents) were abolished. Stuart, with the advice of Orfila, chose all the Jurats who took office in 1799, but thereafter elections followed the traditional form of insaculación.
The principal courts in the island were to function as before, but Stuart appointed two new Asesors (Juan Triay became Asesor Criminal and Patrimonial), an English President of the Court of Royal Patrimony (The Revd F.H.Neve), Juan Font was confirmed as Abogado Fiscal and the vice-admiralty Court was reconstituted with the officials receiving a salary and not dependent, as before, on commissions paid on the work they carried out.106 One Board of Health was constituted to legislate for the whole island, and quarantine regulations were firmly established:

Table 10.4. Quarantine Regulations.107

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships' Provenance</th>
<th>Number of days in Quarantine.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levant and Barbary</td>
<td>18-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania and Venice</td>
<td>15-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men-Of-War.</td>
<td>12-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Privateers</td>
<td>8-12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In one respect Stuart disappointed the Menorcans, for he failed to constitute a High Court in the island, and this meant that all appeals (as in earlier periods of British rule) had to be referred to Courts in London with all the delay and expense which that involved.

Afforations were to be made annually after consultation with the Governor, and taxes were to be based on a valuation of property to be carried out every three years. They were to be fixed annually at a level which would not only meet a Universitat's expected expenditure, but would also include an amount (Mahon-£(M)3,000, Ciudadela-£(M)1,500, Alayor-£(M)700, Mercadal £(M)500), to be put towards reducing the public debts of the Universitats which amounted to £36,636

513
(Mahón-£17,656, Ciudadel-£11,775, Alayor-£3,262, Mercadal-£3,933), but, with the abolition of the Universitat General, all debts to it were written off. For the first time, the clergy (but not the nobility) were to pay taxes; the income from anchorage dues was to be devoted solely to the upkeep of the lazaretto; the Estanque was to be farmed out with half the profits going (as before) towards the cost of public building works and maintenance, but the other half was now to be paid into a sinking fund for the repayment of public debts; the Estanque and anchorage accounts, and the accounts of the Universitats and the Court of Royal Patrimony were to be subject to annual inspection and audit. Finally Stuart trimmed the numbers on Menorca's civil list by suppressing a number of minor salaried sinecures, but he raised the salaries of the officials retained on the list. 108

Administrative restructuring took place in the towns, which were divided into 'barrios' (wards/districts) with a leading citizen appointed in each with responsibility for law, order and cleanliness. 109 All the streets were to be named and the houses numbered. In the same manner, the country districts were subdivided into 'capitanías' (captaincies) with a major landowner responsible for each sub-division.

If the fact that Stuart introduced his reforms without either approval or censure from London is remarkable, it is even more astonishing, given the Menorcans well-chronicled earlier reactions to what they considered to be British interference in their own internal affairs, that the reforms occasioned no protest from the islanders to the Governor or to the Privy Council. It must be assumed that the proof of
the pudding was in the eating for, within a year of the introduction of the measures, Orfila was able to report that the Universitats had not only redeemed their debts, but had succeeded in cutting their rate of taxes on individuals - Mahón by one quarter, Ciudadela by three eighths, Alayor by one third and Mercadal by one fifth.\textsuperscript{110}

Ecclesiastical Government.

It will be remembered that Kane, and several of his successors as Governors, had thought that the key to successful and harmonious ecclesiastical government was to be found in the appointment of a Bishop of Menorca. At the time of Stuart's conquest, the first Bishop to be consecrated since the see of Menorca had been subsumed into the diocese of Mallorca in the fifth century, had been in residence in the island for a mere three months. Bishop Antonio Vila y Camps was not only native-born, he had, ironically, been born a British subject in Ciudadela in 1747, and Stuart was optimistic that 'many advantages' would result.\textsuperscript{111} The first signs were promising. In January 1799, the Bishop swore an Oath of Allegiance to the British throne; he accepted that, in future, his spiritual guidance would come direct from Rome and not from the Archbishop of Valencia (to whom he was a Suffragan); he agreed to submit verdicts of the Ecclesiastical Court for the approval of the Governor and, initially, he expressed himself prepared to reside in Mahón and not Ciudadela.\textsuperscript{112}

The harmony and cooperation were, however, shortlived. The Bishop, having been put in a position to concede more
authority than he would have wished, resented the Governor's interference in the recruitment of clergy and in the appointments to livings. Stuart, on the other hand, wrote to Dundas complaining of the Bishop whom he was obliged to control 'both on account of his high spirit and the disputes he is entering into with his clergy'. The disputes between the British governors in the island and the clergy increased after Stuart's departure. St. Clair Erskine and, particularly, Fox had to confront issues which involved unapproved custodial sentences in the Ecclesiastical Court, tax evasion by the Bishop and clergy, encouragement from the Bishop to the clergy not to be bound by some civil legislation, threats of clerical intimidation of litigants in civil law cases, the excommunication of the island's principal law officers for supporting the King's authority over the clergy, and clerical appointments made without reference to, or gubernatorial approval. In the end, in spite of an 'earnest desire to carry on the government of this island with all possible delicacy to the clergy of the Roman Catholic religion', Fox ran out of patience and, having been particularly aggravated by the Bishop's refusal to admit and recognise the primacy of civil justice, he suspended the Bishop from office on 21 April 1800. A period of stalemate then ensued. Fox refused to grant the Bishop a passport to go to Rome and then to London to present his case and for as long as the Bishop remained in Menorca the clergy continued to look upon him as the ecclesiastical authority on the island, and the Bishop continued to exercise his office. Fox retaliated in December 1800 by banishing the Vicar General; the following month he forbade the Bishop to
leave Mahón and, in February 1801, Fox ordered the sequestration of part of the Bishop's temporalities. Finally, in an attempt to solve the deadlock, Fox was instructed by the Secretary of State for War to allow the Bishop to leave Menorca for Rome and London. Fox was glad to see him go and wrote to Hobart that recently the Bishop had 'conducted himself with more violence than before' and, in his sermons, had 'endeavoured to stir up a spirit of Disobedience and Dissatisfaction to the British Government'. For his part, the Bishop left telling his flock of the 'Oppression suffered by my Holy Church, my clergy and my sacred dignity', and of the need to go to London to seek 'the preservation of the sacred Immunities of the Ecclesiastical State'. The costs of the journey were met from contributions which the Bishop had solicited from all classes of Menorcan society, but the response revealed that Vila did not have the total support which might have been expected. The Jurats of Mercadal offered prayers but no money, and the Vicar of Georgetown, Jaime Pelegrí, challenged the purpose of the Bishop's journey, commenting that 'the exercise of our Holy Religion is perfectly free ... and not in danger in any part of the island'.

By the time Bishop Vila reached London, peace negotiations were at an advanced stage, and he was advised that, while the British government would not consider his complaints, he was quite at liberty to pursue his grievance against Fox by bringing an action in the English civil courts. However, in the same letter Vila was warned that any such action would be prolonged, costly and ultimately pointless since 'nous avons tous à croire que l'île de Minorque sera rendue à sa
Majesté Catholique par le Traité définitif qu'on attend ‘à
tous moments’. The peace of Amiens was signed on 27 March
and Spain thereby regained possession of Menorca. Vila,
however, did not return to the island, and was translated to
the mainland see of Albarracin, where he died in 1807. He
did not pursue a civil action against Fox which, in some
respects is regrettable, for it would have been an action
without precedent.

The disputes arising in the sphere of ecclesiastical
government were no less fundamental or bitter than they had
been in the first two periods of British rule, but they
appear more intense because of the speed with which they
occurred, and the intransigeance of those involved.
Nevertheless, although the clergy clearly continued to resent
being the subjects of a Protestant monarch, for the first
time one of their number was generous enough to admit that
British rule presented no danger to the free exercise of
Catholicism in the island.

The forty-three months from November 1798 until June 1802
constituted the shortest period of British rule in Menorca
and yet, in many respects, it was the most significant. In the
military sphere, the Mediterranean fleet consisted of more
ships than at any time since the 1740s, and greater use was
made of the harbour of Mahón and its improved dockyard
facilities. But the frequent ships' movements revived old
disputes about quarantine regulations. From the outset, the
Jurats accused the navy of flouting them with impunity, and there were counter-claims from ships' captains that the
Jurats were over-zealous in their enforcement of quarantine,
leading to frustration and unnecessary delay, and a belief in one British Captain that the regulations were 'rules established by well-wishers of France'. The island was required to accommodate a fluctuating number of soldiers, but always an appreciably greater number than at any stage in earlier British occupations, and this again raised difficulties and led to complaints to the Governor about abuses in the allocation of quarters. Predictably the very large military presence gave rise to disputes and confrontations between the islanders and the troops, and to drunkenness and brawls between the troops themselves. The Jurats of Ciudaddela complained that the soldiers in garrison there were no better than thieves and robbers, and that their officers were unruly. A subaltern of the 42nd Foot carried off a nun, but was compelled to return her to her convent 'in faded splendour wan', and the Jurats of Mahón, who had allowed a military ball to be held in the Town Hall complained of the appallingly bad behaviour of the officers who had thrown ink at the walls, emptied a stoolpot on the floor, and had treated a crucifix with 'scorn and derision'. However, it must be said that the island's archives do not reveal the large increase in incidents of misbehaviour by the troops which might reasonably have been expected from such greatly increased numbers.

In the sphere of civil government, long-advocated constitutional reforms were introduced, and fiscal changes brought about a state of administrative solvency never before experienced. But, for all the more enlightened tolerance of Catholics in Britain and the colonies, it was still apparent that a satisfactory solution had not been found for the
ecclesiastical government of a totally Catholic territory in which the very largely illiterate and unsophisticated inhabitants, very much under the sway of their priests, steadfastly owed their primary allegiance to the church and not the state. The division between the few (the merchants and some of the professional classes who collaborated and prospered under British rule) and the church and the bulk of the inhabitants intensified as it became more evident that Menorca was unlikely to remain British for long.

As early as October 1801, there was a rumour circulating in the island that Menorca was to be ceded to Russia, but although this proved to be false, it became increasingly likely that the island would revert to Spain. There was concern among anglophile Menorcans about the fate that would await them in this eventuality, and it was a concern which was shared by the British authorities. Major-General Clephane, who commanded in Menorca after Fox left for Malta in August 1801, wrote of his fears that 'several individuals will suffer for their attachment to the British', and both he and Fox, who was still Lieutenant-Governor of Menorca even though he had transferred his headquarters to Malta, wrote in support of a petition submitted by Orfila to the British government pleading for it to intercede on his behalf with the government in Spain. Fox, St. Clair Erskine and Clephane also wrote urging the government to intercede on behalf of Carlos Viale, Secretary of the Court of Royal Government, Narcís Arguimbau, Captain of the Port of Mahón, and Juan Roca who occupied a prominent and responsible position in the 'Commissariat Department'. But if British ministers did intercede on their behalf (and it is
by no means certain that any such steps were taken), it had no effect. When Spain recovered Menorca, Viale, Roca and Arguimbau were forced to leave the island (although Arguimbau continued to be paid a salary by the British until 1829); Orfila and Juan Font, the Advocate Fiscal, were arrested, deported and imprisoned, and did not return to Menorca until after the end of the War of Spanish independence. It is quite probable that other citizens who had willingly collaborated with the British were also harshly treated, but their fate is nowhere recorded.

The great numbers of the British occupying forces clearly produced problems and inconveniences for the Menorcans, but the British presence also created employment and stimulated the island economy - in the first eighteen months it was reckoned that it received an injection of more than £1,375,000 of British money - and the return to prosperous times was recorded in a couplet of a contemporary (1800) poem:

Ja hem perduda la pobresa
també el captar.
(Gone is our poverty and the need to beg for bread)

It must also have been a time of boredom and frustration for most of the British in Menorca, but there were at least two Britons for whom the island provided attractions. The Reverend Cooper Willyams, Domestic Chaplain to Earl St.Vincent, paid only a brief visit to the island (September/October 1799), but he 'passed his time very pleasantly'. He enjoyed the partridge shoots, the frequent band concerts and balls, at which he found the sombre nun-like dress of the Menorcan ladies contrasted
strongly with the more elegant and colourful appearance of the English ladies. John Colborne, then a Subaltern in the 20th Foot, but later to become a Field Marshal, cannot have attended any of these functions during his ten-month stay in Menorca (September 1800 – June 1801), for he wrote to his sister 'female society we have none'. Nevertheless, he claimed to prefer Menorca to England, since he could live there on his pay, afford good lodgings, and use his spare time to make up for lost opportunities by taking lessons from an unnamed Menorcan in French, Italian and Drawing. His observation that 'My time in Minprca was a very happy one', was unique among the records which have survived of British officers who served in Menorca.

1 PRO WO 25/49, f.144. Stuart's commission as Governor, 28 January 1799.
2 PRO WO 1/297, f.133. Dundas to Stuart no.1, 5 January 1799.
3 Piña, Las instituciones, transcribes all the memorials (here listed in chronological order). Pp.68-96 (27 September 1781); pp.138-182 (30 October 1781); pp.215-259 (15 December 1781); pp.105-115 (18 January 1782); pp.280-295 (25 January 17820; pp.192-202 (3 April 1782); pp.118-127 (12 July 1782).
4 AGS/GM leg.3768. Cifuentes decree, 13 May 1782.
5 Ramis, Resumen topográfico e histórico de Menorca, pp.137,138.
6 AGS/GM leg.3768. Royal Order, 16 February 1782.
7 AGS/GM leg.3766. Report by the Junta de Gobierno, 8 April 1782.
10 Ibid., pp.121,122, citing Bishop of Mallorca to the Conde de Valdellano (Spanish Secretary of State), 21 November 1787.
11 Hernández, Compendio, p.368, citing Cifuentes' opinion.
12 J.L.Terrón Ponce, 'Menorca en el contexto de la política internacional española durante la guerra contra Inglaterra de 1779-1783' Meloussa no.1(Mahón,1988), p.146, citing AHN/E leg.4079, Aranda (Spanish Ambassador to France) to Floridablanca (Spanish First Minister), 19 August 1782.
13 AGS/GM leg.3760. Muzquiz (Minister of War) to Crillon, 16 February 1782.
14 Ibid., Zappino to Cifuentes, 2 August 1782.
15 S.Gual Truyol, Ultima pérdida de Menorca y el intento de reconquista, 1797-1802 [hereafter Gual, Ultima pérdida] (Palma, 1990), pp. 27, 28.
16 AGS/GM leg. 3760. Muzquiz to Crillon, 16 February 1782.
18 AGS/GM leg. 3766. Representations of the Governing Council of Menorca to the Court of Madrid, 8 April 1782, and reply 30 April 1782.
19 Riera y Alemany, El arsenal de Mahón, p. 10.
20 Ibid., p. 11.
21 Ibid., p. 13.
22 J. Cotrina Ferrer, El desastre de 1798: pérdida de la isla de Menorca [hereafter Cotrina, Desastre] (Mahón, 1936), p. 58. Quesada was informed officially of the British expedition on 18 October.
23 Ibid., p. 28. Quesada's predecessor as Governor, Colonel Antonio de Anunciavay, had warned the Spanish government of the likelihood of a British attack, when he requested help for the garrison in March 1798, six months before hostilities began.
24 Gual, Ultima pérdida, pp. 47-55, cites five appeals made by Quesada in January, February, May and two in October 1798.
25 C.T. Atkinson, 'Foreign Regiments in the British Army, 1793-1802', JSAHR, vol. XXII (1943), p. 137. These troops, always referred to as 'Swiss' or 'German' by both British and Spanish historians, were mostly Austrian or Hungarian, captured from the Austrians in Italy by the French and subsequently sold to Spain at two dollars a head to recruit her foreign regiments.
26 Gual, Ultima pérdida, pp. 49-52.
27 Cotrina, Desastre, pp. 48, 49.
28 Ibid., pp. 23, 39.
29 E. Stuart Wortley (ed.), A Prime Minister and his Son. From the Correspondence of the 3rd Earl of Bute and of Lt-Gen the Hon Sir Charles Stuart [hereafter Wortley, Correspondence] (London, 1925), p. 284, citing Stuart to Dundas, 27 June 1798.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 285, citing Dundas to Stuart, July 1798.
32 Ibid., p. 286, citing O'Hara to St. Vincent, 24 September 1798.
33 PRO ADM 1/398, f. 1. Duckworth to St. Vincent, 19 November 1798.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid. Duckworth's report had them as 12 pounders but this is incorrect.
36 Ibid., f. 2.
37 Gual, Ultima pérdida, pp. 55-57.
38 Ibid., p. 58.
39 Cotrina, Desastre, p. 113, citing Quesada's orders to Rutiman, 8pm 7 November 1798.
40 Unless otherwise attributed, the details of Stuart's campaign are taken from his dispatch to Dundas, PRO WO 1/297, ff. 97 et seq, which was reproduced in GM, vol. LXVIII, pp. 1136-1137.
41 PRO ADM 1/398, f. 4.
42 Ibid., ff. 4-7.
43 Gual, Ultima pérdida, pp. 64-66.
44 Cotrina, Desastre, p. 94.
45 Gual, Ultima pérdida, p. 70.
46 Cotrina, Desastre, pp.116,117, citing letters from the Jurats and the Bishop, 13 November 1798.
48 Gual, Ultima pérdida, p.84.
49 Ibid., pp.90,171-173.
50 Ibid., p.102.
51 PRO WO 1/297, f.181. Stuart to Dundas, 12 December 1798.
53 PRO WO 1/622, f.239. Abercromby to Brownrigg, 17 August 1800.
54 PRO WO 1/344, f.570. Abercromby to Dundas, 9 December 1800.
56 Wortley, Correspondence, p.311, citing Stuart to Dundas, 15 April 1799.
57 PRO WO 1/297, ff.182,183. Stuart to Dundas, 12 December 1798.
60 PRO WO 55/901 contains D'Arcy's plans and correspondence relating to the defence of Menorca over a period of two years (May 1799 - April 1801), but also included is an overall defence assessment by D'Arcy dated May 1805.
62 S.G.P. Ward, 'Defence Works in Britain, 1803-1805', JASHR, vol. XXVII (1949), p.28. The towers were modelled upon and named after a tower at Mortella Point in San Fiorenzo Bay, Corsica, which had withstood two bombardments from the navy and a determined land assault when British forces attacked it in 1794.
64 C. Willyams, A Voyage up the Mediterranean in HMS Swiftsure (London, 1802), p.270.
65 PRO WO 1/297, f.183. Stuart to Dundas, 12 December 1798.
66 PRO WO 1/344, f.570. Abercromby to Dundas, 9 December 1800.
68 AM/U (A) 278. Llista de las Casas ocupadas... November 1798.
69 AM/U (PR) 69. Jurats to Fox, 8 August 1800.
70 Ibid., Fox to Jurats, 13 August 1800.
71 Wortley, Correspondence, p.284.
72 Ibid., p.292, citing Keith to Stuart, 23 December 1798.
73 Ibid., p.285, citing Dundas to Stuart, July 1798.
75 Wortley, Correspondence, p.291, citing Nelson to Stuart, 6 December 1798.
77 Ibid., p.233. Nelson to Spencer, 6 April 1799.

Hernández, Compendio, p. 378.

PRO WO 1/297, f. 409. Stuart to Dundas, 24 February 1799.


PRO WO 1/300, f. 521. Accounts of the Patrimonial Court, December 1798-June 1801.

AM/U (MC) 93. Tarifa de Botes, 18 October 1799.

PRO ADM 42/2453. Pay list for Mahón Dockyard, December 1798.

PRO ADM 1/399, no. 2. St. Vincent to Nepean, 1 January 1799.

Ibid., nos. 2 and 104, St. Vincent to Nepean, 1 January and 17 June 1799. Coffin was in post from January - June 1799, when he retired through ill-health. The administration of the yard then devolved upon the Master Attendant (Robert Chieve) and the Master Shipwright (Edward Churchill), who came to Mahón from Lisbon.

Ibid., no. 104.

Ibid., no. 58. St. Vincent to Nepean, 17 March 1799, listing the numbers employed, trades and rates of pay.

PRO ADM 42/2453. Wages Bills for Mahón Dockyard 1798-1802.


Willyams, A Voyage up the Mediterranean, p. 275.

PRO ADM 1/400, no. 153. Keith to Nepean, 11 July 1799.

PRO ADM 112/47. Agent/Victualler's accounts for 1800.

PRO ADM 1/398. Terms of the Capitulation, requests contained in Articles 11, 12 and 13, and Stuart's reply, 15 November 1798.

PRO WO 1/297, f. 153. Stuart to Dundas, 18 November 1798.


Ibid., f. 188. Stuart to Dundas, 12 December 1798.

Ibid., f. 185.

Orfila became known in Menorca by the sobriquet 'Es Deuet' (little God), considered perjoratively apt because of his small stature, the influence he exerted, and the autocratic manner in which he discharged his duties.

see chapter four, pp. 170-172.

see note 3, above.

D. Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock (London, 1985), passim, but particularly chapters five and six.

AM Papeles sueltos (decrets). Disposiciones para la corrección de abusos en Menorca (Measures for the correction of abuses in Menorca), 24 April 1799.

Ibid. The Secretaries of the Universitats of Mahón and Ciudadela were paid an annual salary of £300; the Secretaries in Alayor and Mercadal received £250, and the Treasurers were paid the following annual amounts: Mahón - £200, Ciudadela - £150, Alayor and Mercadal - £100.

PRO WO 1/297, f. 189. Stuart to Dundas, 12 December 1798.

PRO WO 1/298, f. 175. Fox to Dundas 3 March 1800.

PRO WO 1/296, ff. 1-34. Stuart to Dundas, 5 May 1799.

AM Papeles sueltos (decrets), 6 February 1799, lists twelve wards in Mahón.

AM Papeles sueltos. Relación que manifiesta las ventajas de las disposiciones desde 24 abril 1799 hasta 24 abril 1800. Memorandum by Orfila on the advantages gained by Stuart's reforms.
PRO WO 1/297, ff.185,186. Stuart to Dundas, 12 December 1798.

PRO CO 174/20, f.16. Stuart to Dundas, 12 December 1798.

Buckinghamshire Record Office, Mss D/MH/H Bundle J, Hobart Papers L63. Stuart to Bishop 29 April 1799.

PRO CO 174/20, f.25. Stuart to Dundas, 24 January 1799.

Buckinghamshire Record Office, Hobart Papers L62, 'Statement of the Conduct of the Illustrious Bishop of Minorca' (containing seventeen allegations of misconduct), 25 February 1801; and L63 'Abstract of Papers regarding the Bishop of Minorca', detailing correspondence -fifty-two letters- relevant to the Bishop's conduct from 1 January 1799 until 25 February 1801.

Ibid., L61. Fox to Hobart, 28 February 1801.

Ibid., L63. Viale (Fox's secretary) to Pujol (Vicar General), 19 December 1800.

Ibid., L63. Fox to Bishop, 21 January 1801.

Ibid., L63. Viale to Neve, 25 February 1801.

PRO WO 1/299, f.467. Hobart to Fox no.3, 4 June 1801.

PRO CO 174/21, ff.33,34. Fox to Hobart, 18 July 1801.

PRO WO 1/300, f.81. Bishop to Rectors, Vicars and Parishes of Menorca, 8 July 1801.

PRO CO 174/21, f.34. Fox to Hobart, 18 July 1801.


Ibid., f.89. Pelegrí to Bishop, July 1801.

Buckinghamshire Record Office, Hobart Papers L68. Sir John Hippisley (former British envoy to Rome) to Bishop, 23 March 1802.

Ibid.

Martí Camps, *La restitución de la diócesis de Menorca*, p.118.

see note 126 above.

AM/U (MC) 92, f.558. Jurats to Stuart, 12 December 1798.

PRO WO 1/298, f.767. Louis to Fox, 10 October 1800.

AM/U (MC) 93, ff.355. Jurats to Fox, 12 July 1801, protesting that wives of army officers were occupying houses after their husbands had been sent out of the island.


PRO CO 174/21, f.48. Fox to Hobart, 17 October 1801.

Ibid., f.53. Clephane to Fox, 23 January 1802.

PRO WO 1/301. Orfila to Fox, 3 March 1802.

Buckinghamshire Record Office, Hobart Papers L69. Viale to Fox, 17 January 1801.


PRO WO 1/300, ff.399-403. Fox to Hobart, 23 October 1801.

PRO WO 1/300, ff.117-119. Fox to Hobart (undated). Narcís Arguimbau Panedas was the father of Lorenzo Arguimbau Mercadal who enlisted in the British army in 1800 and rose to the rank of lieutenant-general in 1854.


Army Lists 1802-1829. Arguimbau received full pay as Captain of the Port until 1807, when he was put on an Ensign's half-pay until his death twenty-two years later.

146 Willyams, *A Voyage up the Mediterranean*, p.274.
Epilogue and Conclusion.

Epilogue.

The British evacuation of Menorca, superintended by Rear-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, was completed by 16 June 1802. It was a sizeable undertaking for, in addition to the ships in Saumarez' squadron, forty-four transports were needed to remove 6,709 British service and civilian personnel, nearly 4,500 tons of military stores and 3,000 tons of stores from the naval and victualling yards, but there was a feeling that the island had been given up too readily.

In October 1804, Nelson was receiving intelligence from Mahón urging the reacquisition of the island in the event of a further war with Spain, and drawing his attention to the destruction by the Spanish of the recently built fortifications at the mouth of the harbour, and to the fact that the Spanish garrison was so undisciplined and discontented that 'a resistance would be of short duration'. But, whereas Nelson had revised his judgement of the strategic value of Malta (the possession of which he now considered essential since it was the 'most important outwork to India'), he had not reconsidered the low opinion he held of Mahón.

The following year, war having again broken out with Spain, Pitt sought 'the opinions of persons acquainted with the subject' for information respecting the 'utility of the different naval stations in the Mediterranean'. Admiral
Keith preferred Mahón to Porto Longone and Porto Ferrajo in Elba, and to Cagliari in Sardinia, but he favoured Valetta over Mahón - the harbour-mouth was wider and more accessible to ships, the harbour itself was more capacious, it was strongly fortified and the arsenals, hospitals and storehouses were on 'a great scale', and Malta could cope with a larger fleet than Mahón, the capacity of which (according to Keith), was 'twelve sail of the line and frigates in proportion'. Keith's judgement confirmed the opinions expressed five years earlier by Captain Sir Alexander Ball, the first British Governor of Malta, who considered Menorca had the advantage of Malta only in respect of its closer proximity to Toulon and the Mediterranean coasts of France and Spain. Ball maintained that Malta, unlike Menorca, was impregnable to blockade and attack from the sea; fewer troops were required to secure it, since the garrison could be supplemented in wartime by a trustworthy Maltese militia (whereas the Menorcans had 'always refused to take part in the defence of their island'); moreover, Malta would prove a less costly station to maintain since the island was appreciably more self-sufficient in basic produce and provisions than Menorca. Pitt also sought the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert D'Arcy, who had been Chief Engineer in Menorca from 1799 to 1802. D'Arcy subscribed to the opinion expressed by General Sir Ralph Abercromby that 'no skill of the ablest Engineer could protect it [Menorca] and the Dockyard', and that it would 'always be in the power of France and Spain to invade and take it from us', and D'Arcy informed Pitt that it was impossible to give 'intire security to the harbour of Mahon.' In the light of these first-hand
opinions, no plans were made to recapture Menorca and, as well as retaining Malta, Britain turned to bases in Sicily from 1806 to 1815 and the Ionian Isles from 1809 to 1814 to ensure that France was excluded from the Mediterranean. However, it has to be recorded that a party of British seamen from the frigate Imperieuse commanded by Lord Thomas Cochrane, landed on Menorca in April 1808 in search of fresh supplies and, when they were fired upon, Cochrane retaliated by destroying the Torre de Son Bou, the only defence tower on the south coast.10

Spain became allied to Britain after the declaration of Spanish independence from France in May 1808, and from then until the end of the Peninsular War in 1814, the British again used Mahón as a base for their large Mediterranean fleet which, led successively by Admirals Martin, Collingwood, Cotton and Pellew, numbered as many as thirty ships of the line, twenty-two frigates and twenty-seven sloops and brigs in 1810.11 It had, as its primary duty, the blockade of Toulon, and was serviced in Mahón, as in the past, by a British and Menorcan dockyard staff.12

However, even with the presence of the British fleet, there was concern for the security of Menorca during the Peninsular War. The political situation on the island was far from stable; there was a division of loyalties between the Menorcans who supported the Spanish uprising against the French, and the 'strong French party' which existed in the island;13 there was discontent arising from the increased fiscal burdens imposed on the Menorcans by the Spanish government; there was anxiety about the ability of the small Spanish garrison (a mere 800 in 1810) to defend the island.14
or even to control the large number of French prisoners of war imprisoned in the lazaretto and in Villacarlos, but it was a Spanish government proposal to subject Menorcans to military service which generated the most heat, and led to a minor rebellion in March 1810. A claim has been made that Admiral Collingwood was approached by some islanders not only to support the rebellion, but also to take advantage of the circumstances to raise once again the British flag over the island, but this is nowhere corroborated in British sources, and it is recorded only that Collingwood acceded to a request from the Jurats of Mahón, to mount an effective guard over the French prisoners. Nevertheless, the prospect of a return to British rule was still very much in the mind of some Menorcans in 1811 for, as Lord Valentia reported to Wellington, he had been asked to let it be known to the British government that the islanders:

owned that the freedom they had once enjoyed under British protection had changed their national character and that now it ill assimilated with the Spanish.

Valentia was further assured by his contacts that the Menorcans would raise a militia of 4,000-5,000 men to support a British take-over of the island which, with the British fleet, 'would place the island in safety'. With Spain as Britain's ally, such a course of action was unthinkable. A few months later, the Spanish garrison on Menorca had been reinforced, the leaders of the rebellion had been apprehended, the new Spanish constitution had been proclaimed on the island and, as a consequence, Menorca lost its fueros and the individual identity which, ironically, it had preserved throughout all the years of British rule.
Conclusion.

In the War of the Spanish Succession, Gibraltar had been captured incidentally, whereas Menorca was taken intentionally but, after the war, both were retained by Britain to protect her strategic and commercial interests in the Western Mediterranean, and to enable her to have a 'part of the influence in the general affairs of Europe'. Their loss was bitterly resented by Spain and, at the time, Philip V predicted:

Con espinas en los pies habremos de vivir los españoles mientras Menorca y Gibraltar contindén en poder de Inglaterra.²¹
(We Spanish will live with thorns in our feet for as long as Menorca and Gibraltar remain British).

It was an attitude which was reflected in Spain's persistent and frequent attempts to regain her lost possessions, and it was an issue which soured Anglo-Spanish relations throughout the eighteenth century.

Contemporary opinion in Britain did not unanimously approve of the retention of the Mediterranean outposts. Opposition was voiced by those who saw an alarming and costly precedent in the large garrisons needed to defend them;²² there was concern at the isolation of the outposts and their vulnerability to enemy attack;²³ some were convinced that their return to Spain would result in a greater British share of trade with Spain and with her American colonies,²⁴ and an early economist argued that:
neither of these expensive garrisons was ever in the smallest degree necessary for the purpose for which they were originally dismembered from the Spanish monarchy.\textsuperscript{25}

But, while there were (as recorded earlier) several occasions when the restoration of Gibraltar to Spain was seriously considered by the British government, until the 1770s at least, the consensus of British public and political opinion echoed Stanhope's view that 'England ought never to part with this island',\textsuperscript{26} and with the judgement of James Lind who wrote that, of the two outposts, Menorca was strategically 'by much the more valuable', and also less aggravating diplomatically, since its possession by Britain 'gave less umbrage to Spain'.\textsuperscript{27}

However, by 1783 the relative standings of Gibraltar and Menorca had been reversed in both political thought and in public opinion. In the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Versailles, a London merchant wrote to the Secretary of State that: 'the Bulk of the Kingdom will not think anything an Equivalent for Gibraltar',\textsuperscript{28} while Shelburne himself had already decided that if Britain was forced to restore the island, 'only the Mediterranean merchants will cry up Minorca'.\textsuperscript{29} In the circumstances, Britain, not negotiating from a position of strength, but still anxious to preserve an outpost and some influence in the Mediterranean, settled to retain Gibraltar which she had successfully defended, in preference to Menorca already lost to the Spanish, the tactical value of which had been drastically reduced by the demolition of the island's principal defences.

Neither Gibraltar nor Menorca had lived up to early expectations. Both failed to become entrepots, and proved to be of limited commercial value, with local trade devoted
almost exclusively to supplies for the garrisons until some import/re-export trade was developed after the War of Austrian Succession. The deficiencies of Gibraltar as a naval base were such that little attempt was made to improve them until Menorca was lost for the second time, and the naval installations in Mahón were greatly underused in peacetime, overstretched when the navy was in the Mediterranean in numbers, and were indefensible when the island itself was attacked. Moreover, the role played by the navy as escorts for merchant convoys had diminished in proportion to the drop in the volume of British trade in the Straits and with the Levant. It had also become evident that it was not the fact that Britain had acquired bases in the Mediterranean which impressed the Barbary States, but the presence of ships of the fleet, and when the presence could not be maintained, the most practised trading solution was to ship British goods in neutral bottoms.

Quite apart from the Rock's obvious advantages over Menorca - its proven impregnability and its situation which made it possible to 'divide France from France and Spain from Spain' - there were other, less obvious benefits. British Gibraltar had always been controlled by a military government and, although the arbitrary rule and peculation of successive Governors had made it a byword for bad colonial administration, for which, according to one commentator, there was 'no parallel in the other domains of England', it had not been attended by the constant disputes arising from the civil and ecclesiastical government and the sacrosanctity of the fueros which had bedevilled Anglo-Menorcan relations. The few Spanish families who chose not to leave Gibraltar
after its capture in 1704 (no more than thirty), enjoyed no fueros; those who settled subsequently came knowingly into a colony administered by a military government, and the comparatively small number of native Roman Catholics in the civilian population in the eighteenth century (less than 900 as late as 1791), made the liber usus of their religion (guaranteed in Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht), much less of a contentious issue on the Rock than it was in Menorca.

Early British expectations that Menorca would become a 'Colony of real advantage', and that the Menorcans would become 'a rich and flourishing people' were not realised. It would be an over-simplification to maintain that these objectives were not achieved because the British government offered too little assistance in the first instance and, in the second, because the Menorcans themselves did too little to improve their lot, but there are grounds for such an hypothesis.

There can be no doubt that Westminster's decisions to give Menorca free port status (a major concession at the time), to allow the island's vessels to sail under the protection of Mediterranean passes and the British flag, to allow the Menorcans to profit from Britain's friendly relations with the Barbary states by trading in the corn market there, and to issue letters of marque in the two wars in the Mediterranean, gave great encouragement to Menorcans to trade and to develop maritime activity. The presence of the garrison created employment opportunities and circulated a great deal of foreign currency which provided the specie essential for Menorcan purchases abroad. Nevertheless, it
must be accepted that Westminster never looked upon Menorca as anything but a strategic military outpost, and any expenditure authorised on the island was made with this in mind. Menorca was not regarded as a colony, and no attempt was made to make land grants (theoretically possible since all land belonged to the crown), or to encourage settlement despite various schemes with this objective being put to the government. Britain's failure to establish a civil government in which a part could be played by non-native British subjects also served as a disincentive to permanent settlement, and did little to persuade the Menorcans that Britain's possession of the island was other than a temporary politico-military expedient and, as such, Menorca was no more than an occupied territory. However, if Britain did nothing to encourage British settlement, it equally did nothing (contrary to the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht) to discourage the settlement of Jews and Greeks who, much to the resentment of the Menorcans, had established thriving trading communities by mid-century. Finally, the British government provided no incentives, nor any inducement to stimulate economic development, but this was in keeping with its colonial policy elsewhere, and is all the more understandable since Menorca was incapable of producing anything which Britain might have needed.

It is, however, true that individual Governors in Menorca took practical steps to further economic progress. Kane standardised the island's weights and measures; he regulated the prices of commodities outside the Jurats' afforation jurisdiction; he improved the quality and instigated an increase in the quantity of livestock, and he is reliably...
credited with the introduction of new plants and trees and a greater variety of game. In an even more tangible manner the new road from St. Philip's to Ciudadela, the construction of which was begun in 1713 on Kane's orders, not only improved communications, but resulted in the draining of the marshes at the head of the harbour beyond Mahon, and these became the richest and most productive market gardens in Menorca.

It is largely because of such initiatives that Kane has gone down in Menorcan history as the most benevolent and sympathetic of British Governors. Townshend, briefly in charge in 1765, is scarcely mentioned, and yet he tried to stimulate the economy by importing cotton seed and mulberry trees, and he sent a skein of silk made on the island to Sir Richard Lyttelton (the absentee Governor) to prove that a silk industry would be a viable venture. In contrast, Johnston has been universally reviled by Menorcan historians, but, for all his too obvious self-interest, no Governor, not even Kane, produced more ideas more persistently for economic development which, together with other reforms he proposed, were sadly categorised by Westminster as 'points which do not seem to press'. Like Kane, Johnston advocated the abolition of entail to allow land to pass into the hands of those who would cultivate them to the full; he supported the planting of mulberry trees and the manufacture of silk, and he promoted the grafting of wild olive trees to make the island self-sufficient in the oil it needed. He attempted, unsuccessfully, to establish a woollen industry by bringing over from Mallorca (at his own expense) craftsmen to teach the Menorcans, and he proposed that foreign wine and all
luxury goods should be subjected to taxes high enough to
discourage imports and stimulate manufacture in Menorca.\textsuperscript{47} It
must be acknowledged that few of Johnston's proposals were
original. They stemmed, in the main, from initiatives
suggested in a series of \textit{mémoires} submitted by Juan Seguí y
Sancho, the Abogado Fiscal during Johnston's tenure of
office, which are remarkable in so far as Seguí was the first
Menorcan to go on record to suggest that changes should be
made in the agricultural economy of the island, as much
because of the Menorcans' 'faute de lumières' as because of
their 'faute de moyens'.\textsuperscript{48} Although, Seguí was at pains to
point out that his reforms would result, in time, in an
increase in crown revenue, the fact that their introduction
presupposed British financial incentives and premiums, did
not appeal to Westminster, nor did Johnston's backing of the
proposals appeal to the ingrained opposition of the Menorcans
who were, as always, (but on this occasion unjustifiably)
suspicious of Johnston's motives, consequently no innovative
changes were introduced.

Seguí was under no illusions. His assessment that:

\begin{quote}
On ne peut pas se flatter que le Produit de Minorque
puisse jamais devenir un objet equivalent à la dépense
que la couronne d'Angleterre fait pour la garder,\textsuperscript{49}
\end{quote}

was sound. Under British rule, the volume of Menorca's
traditional produce had increased, some of it by a
substantial margin, but no new methods or products had been
introduced. Craftsmen (masons, carpenters, shipwrights) were
in greater demand and had increased in numbers, but no
manufacturing industry had been established. There was
greater wealth on the island, but it was largely concentrated
in the término of Mahón and relied too heavily on the free port status of Mahón for the re-export trade, and much had been gained by a few as a result of wartime opportunism in privateering. It was not a lasting basis for prosperity, and so it was to prove after Spain finally recovered the island in 1802 when, to quote one historian: 'Menorca pasó de la más profunda actividad al más profundo marasmo'50 (Menorca, from being a hive of activity became a slough of despond).

By the terms of Article XI of the Treaty of Utrecht, the crown of Spain ceded Menorca to the crown of Great Britain, transferring 'forever all rights and full dominion' over the island. In return, Britain promised to 'take measures not at variance with the civil government and laws of Great Britain to ensure that the Menorcans would continue to enjoy their rights and privileges and freedom to worship in the Roman Catholic religion.' Britain also promised that Spain would be offered the opportunity to reclaim Menorca, if ever Britain chose to give up the island. But the wording of the Article represented the compromise reached by both governments, and reflected the minimum loss of face by Spain and the minimum obligations by Britain, and it concealed the underlying attitude and intentions of both countries.

Spain never considered that Menorca had been lost 'forever', and Britain never chose to exercise 'full dominion' over the island, since no legislation was introduced to authorise the promised measures, and a laissez-faire attitude was adopted to Menorcan affairs with the British government relying on the pragmatism of the Governors on the spot to resolve most contentious issues. The reluctance of Britain to address and resolve the problems of
civil government did nothing to convince the Menorcans that a new era had arrived and to persuade them that they were now British, and not Spanish, subjects, and the reversion clause in the Treaty did not help in this respect. Moreover the attitude of successive Governors did little to endear the Menorcans to their new masters.

Kane, (pace the harmonious picture of Kane's relations with the Menorcans painted in Bruce Laurie's recent biography), considered the Menorcans 'naturally turbulent and barbarous in theyr Natures'; Anstruther was in no doubt that the Menorcans' loyalty was questionable, and that they were Spaniards at heart; Blakeney complained of the 'insupportable insolence' and the 'arrogance and hostility of the people'; Tyrawley recalled that the islanders were little more than a 'rabble of beggars and banditti'; Johnston considered the Jurats troublesome and incompetent, and Murray found it difficult to deal with 'such ignorant people, assisted by the chicanery of lawyers and influenced by the artifice of the Roman Catholic priesthood'. Even at the end of the century, when there was evidence of greater Menorcan goodwill towards the British, Stuart's unflattering view of the Menorcans was that he could place 'no dependance' upon them, and that they were 'indolent and effeminate, neither to be considered as Friends or Enemies, but perfectly passive in all cases like the Sheep of the Country.'

But, above all, it was Britain's unwillingness to tackle the problems of ecclesiastical government, and somehow reconcile the Catholic church in the island to Protestant rule, which served to distance the Menorcans from the British, and prevented them from ever considering themselves...
truly British subjects. It might have been a very different story if a separate Bishopric for Menorca had been created when Kane first suggested it, particularly if the appointee then had been the Paborde, Manuel Mercader, with whom Kane claimed to have a 'perfect friendship'. If such a solution had then been found, it might have been possible to engender the same degree of loyalty to Britain in the Menorcan Catholics as was achieved among the Canadian Catholics later in the century at the time of the War of American Independence. As it was, the Menorcans were never wholly reconciled to British rule, and the status of the island was never clearly defined within the British Empire. Menorca was not a plantation, nor was it a colony, but even as simply a military outpost, it is difficult to disagree with Murray's verdict in 1780 that it was a possession which, for Britain, was 'calculated more for pomp and ostentation than utility'.

1 PRO ADM 1/406 no.113. Saumarez to Keith, 16 June 1802.
2 Ibid., no.41. Keith to Nepean, 19 February 1802.
3 BL Add Mss 34926, ff.92,93. Blanckley to Nelson, 18 October 1804.
7 PRO ADM 1/402, no.370. Keith to Nepean, 17 December 1800, enclosing Ball's report on Malta.
8 PRO WO 1/344; f.570. Abercromby to Dundas, 9 December 1800.
10 F. Fornals Villalonga, La torre de Son Bou (Museo militar de Menorca, Mahón,1982), passim.
13 BL Add Mss 37292, f.262. Admiral Sir Charles Cotton to Rt Hon Charles Yorke, 7 January 1811.
Ibid., f.260. Cotton to Yorke, 26 December 1810.  
16. Ibid., p.83.  
17. AM/U (MC) 95. Jurats to Collingwood, 2 March 1810.  
19. Ibid.  
22. Concordia Discors.  
29. Thomas Garbett to Shelburne, December 1782.  
30. Bedfordshire Record Office, Robinson Mss. L30/14/306/1 Shelburne to Grantham, March 1782.  
31. see chapter nine, Tables 9.1-9.4.  
33. Ibid., p.163.  
34. Ibid., p.262, citing Shelburne Mss vol.83. John Sinclair to Shelburne, 17 July 1782. The implication was the separation of the French fleets at Brest and Toulon, and the Spanish fleets of Cadiz and Cartagena.  
35. National Prejudice, Opposed to the National Interest, passim.  
38. Ibid., p.40.  
39. PRO CO 389/54. Bolingbroke to Kane, 22 April 1714.  
40. Ibid. Instructions to Argyll, 25 July 1712.  
41. BL Add Mss 23638, f.73, section 20. Kane's Memorial to the King, undated but c.1718.  
The Importance of the Island of Minorca and the Harbour of Mahon (London,1756), pp.61-63.
PRO CO 174/1, ff.65-68. A Plan for settling the Island of Minorca with a Sett of Substantial and Industrious Inhabitants, unsigned and undated but c.1763.

PRO CO 174/3, f.223, measure 2. Hope to Conway 30 July 1765.

42 AM/U (D) 158. Kane's decree of 23 July 1716 stipulated regulations for the importation of cattle, sheep and pigs, and it fixed prices for meat, poultry, game and fish.


45 PRO CO 174/1, ff.49-51. Considerations of initiatives proposed by Johnston, undated but c.1768.


47 PRO CO 174/8, ff.23,24. Minutes relative to different Articles in the Island of Minorca proper and necessary to be taxed. Johnston to Rochford, 20 May 1773.

48 AM/RG 142-2(4), f.11. Memoire sur l'Etat actuel de l'Isle de Minorque, Seguí (undated but c.1765).

49 Ibid., f.8.


51 B.Laurie, The Life of Richard Kane (Cranbury, New Jersey, 1994).

52 BL Add Mss 23638, f.32. Introduction to Kane's memorial to George I, undated but almost certainly 1717/1718.

53 The Examination of Major-General Anstruther, p.11.

54 BL Add Mss 35885, ff.170-173,183. Blakeney to Holderness, 6 November 1752, 10 February 1753.

55 BL Add Mss 23638, f.95. Tyrawley to Secretary of State, 23 May 1753.

56 PRO CO 174/3, f.44. Johnston to Halifax, 24 November 1763.


59 AM/U 383. Kane to the clergy of Menorca, 30 May 1716.

60 Mahon, Life of Murray, p.390.
### Appendix A.  
**Currency.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sterling.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£. s. d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>### 1. Menorcan. 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 diners = 1 sou</td>
<td>= 1.8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 sous = 1 lliura [£(M)]</td>
<td>= 3.0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£(M)6.7 [6 lliuras, 13 sous, 4 diners]</td>
<td>= 1.0.0.0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>### 2. Spanish. 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 doblero</td>
<td>= .35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 dobleros = 1 real de vellón</td>
<td>= 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 reales de vellón = 1 real de plata</td>
<td>= 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 reales de vellón = 1 peso</td>
<td>= 4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>### 3. French. 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 livre tournoise</td>
<td>= 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 piastre</td>
<td>= 4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 pistole</td>
<td>= 16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>### 4. British. 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 piece of eight (p$^e$)</td>
<td>= 4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 dollar</td>
<td>= 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>### 5. Portuguese. 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 moidore</td>
<td>= 1.7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 johannes</td>
<td>= 3.16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>### 6. Hanoverian. 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 reichsthaler</td>
<td>= 4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Armstrong, History, p.115.
3 AM/RG 142 - 2(2), Mémoire by J. Seguí y Sanxo, 1765.
4 Kamen, Spanish Succession, p.398.
5 AM/RG 142 - 2(2), Seguí Mémoire.
6 Of all the currency exchange rates, none fluctuated more than the dollar.
The rate quoted is the mean for the century, gleaned from the following sources—
(PRO WO 53/448 - 515), unless otherwise stated.
1708/9 - 4s. 8d. 1750 - 3s. 10d.
1710-13 - 4s. 9d. 1756 - 4s. 0d.*
1719 - 4s. 6d. 1763 - 4s. 1d.
1720 - 4s. 6d. 1770 - 3s. 11d.
1741 - 4s. 3d. 1778 - 4s. 0d.*
1801 - 5s. 0d.  
* Suffolk Record Office, Hervey Papers, 941/50/3 p.239.
+ Lindenmann, Minorka, p.114.
8 PRO ADM 106/3212. Dockyard Affairs, Mahón 1801.

8 Lindenmann, Minorka, p.115.
Appendix B

Holders of major public offices to whom reference is made in the text or in the notes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Ministers</th>
<th>Secretaries at War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(First Lords of the Treasury)</td>
<td>1713 Aug.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1714 Oct.</td>
<td>Earl of Halifax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1715 May.</td>
<td>Earl of Carlisle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1715 Oct.</td>
<td>Robert Walpole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1717 Apr.</td>
<td>James Stanhope (Earl Stanhope)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718 Mar.</td>
<td>Earl of Sunderland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721 Apr.</td>
<td>Sir Robert Walpole (Earl of Orford)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1724 Feb.</td>
<td>Earl of Willington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743 Aug.</td>
<td>Henry Pelham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754 Mar.</td>
<td>Duke of Newcastle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763 Apr.</td>
<td>George Grenville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1765 Jul.</td>
<td>Marquess of Rockingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1766 Jul.</td>
<td>Earl of Chatham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1768 Oct.</td>
<td>Duke of Grafton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770 Jan.</td>
<td>Lord North (Earl of Guildford)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782 Mar.</td>
<td>Marquess of Rockingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782 Jul.</td>
<td>Earl of Shelburne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1783 Apr.</td>
<td>Duke of Portland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1783 Dec.</td>
<td>William Pitt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801 Mar.</td>
<td>Henry Addington (Viscount Sidmouth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1714 Sep.</td>
<td>William Pulteney (Earl of Bath)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1717 Apr.</td>
<td>James Craggs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718 May.</td>
<td>Robert Pringle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718 Dec.</td>
<td>George Treby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1724 Apr.</td>
<td>Henry Pelham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1730 May.</td>
<td>Sir William Strickland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1735 May.</td>
<td>Sir William Yonge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746 Jul.</td>
<td>Henry Fox (Lord Holland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755 Nov.</td>
<td>Viscount Barrington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1762 Dec.</td>
<td>Welbore Ellis (Lord Mendip)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1765 Jul.</td>
<td>Viscount Barrington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778 Dec.</td>
<td>Charles Jenkinson (Earl of Liverpool)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782 Mar.</td>
<td>Thomas Townshend</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secretaries of State for the Southern Department</th>
<th>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1713 Aug.</td>
<td>Henry St. John (Viscount Bolingbroke)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1714 Sep.</td>
<td>James Stanhope (Earl Stanhope)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1716 Jun.</td>
<td>Paul Methuen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1717 Apr.</td>
<td>Joseph Addison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718 Mar.</td>
<td>James Craggs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721 Mar.</td>
<td>Lord Carteret (Earl Granville)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1724 Apr.</td>
<td>Duke of Newcastle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748 Feb.</td>
<td>Duke of Bedford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751 Jun.</td>
<td>Earl of Holderness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754 Mar.</td>
<td>Sir Thomas Robinson (Lord Grantham)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755 Nov.</td>
<td>Henry Fox (Lord Holland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763 Sep.</td>
<td>Earl of Halifax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1765 Jul.</td>
<td>Henry Seymour Conway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1766 May.</td>
<td>Duke of Richmond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1766 Jul.</td>
<td>Lord Wycombe (Marquess of Lansdowne)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1768 Oct.</td>
<td>Viscount Weymouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770 Dec.</td>
<td>Earl of Rochford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775 Nov.</td>
<td>Viscount Weymouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1779 Nov.</td>
<td>Earl of Hillsborough (Marquess of Downshire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791 Jun.</td>
<td>Lord Grenville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801 Feb.</td>
<td>Lord Havestbury (Earl of Liverpool)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C. English words in Menorquí.

(Words marked * were recognisable a generation ago, but are now considered archaic).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>avavol</td>
<td>even all</td>
<td>implies that scores are level in a game of marbles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>balenbal</td>
<td>by and by</td>
<td>Later, soon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bec</td>
<td>back</td>
<td>back (of a chair).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>becastem</td>
<td>back stamp</td>
<td>a slap on the back.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bèquer</td>
<td>beggar</td>
<td>as in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bixres</td>
<td>barracks</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>berguin</td>
<td>bargain</td>
<td>1. Used originally in the sense of a contract between ferryman and passenger for a trip by boat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>berguiner</td>
<td>bargainer</td>
<td>2. Used with 'fer' (to make), to make a journey by ferryboat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>berious</td>
<td>barrack house</td>
<td>3. To agree a sum of money with a prostitute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bèteta</td>
<td>batten</td>
<td>ferryman/boatman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bifí</td>
<td>beef</td>
<td>rowdy/disorderly noise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bicol</td>
<td>big</td>
<td>plank of wood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bit</td>
<td>bit</td>
<td>1. Simpleton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>biber</td>
<td>bitter</td>
<td>2. Weak-willed person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bledol</td>
<td>black ball</td>
<td>3. Someone who has 'carr de bifí' is thick-skinned/insensitive to pain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blec</td>
<td>black</td>
<td>tall person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blecull</td>
<td>&quot; varnish</td>
<td>carpenter's chisel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bőxrem</td>
<td>bottom</td>
<td>as in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bol</td>
<td>boy</td>
<td>shoe-blacking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bolinder</td>
<td>bow window</td>
<td>as in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bord</td>
<td>board</td>
<td>black eye.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bòtil</td>
<td>bottle</td>
<td>tar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bred</td>
<td>brad</td>
<td>leather for the sole of shoes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bricbarca</td>
<td>brigantine/barque</td>
<td>as in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bull</td>
<td>bully</td>
<td>strong man who stands out in a group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chebot</td>
<td>shake/shove off</td>
<td>get rid of something unwanted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chel</td>
<td>shell</td>
<td>coach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>devils</td>
<td>devil</td>
<td>'du es devils' is said of someone psychiatrically disturbed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enclóver</td>
<td>clover</td>
<td>introduced in Kane's time as an ornamental plant, but subsequently developed as fodder for cattle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>esclòquins</td>
<td>clogs</td>
<td>wooden, but also canvas-soled footwear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>escrep</td>
<td>scrap</td>
<td>leather sole of shoes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>escrèpel</td>
<td>scraper</td>
<td>carpenter's rasp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>escrú</td>
<td>screw</td>
<td>screwwall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>escurar</td>
<td>sour</td>
<td>as in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>esquica</td>
<td>kick</td>
<td>term used in game of marbles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>estanfés</td>
<td>stand and face</td>
<td>carpenter's tool.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>estec</td>
<td>stick</td>
<td>as in English, but also used to describe a billiard cue.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
estepel — staple
estic — stick
estanx — stance
estocafix — stock fish
estop — stop
eut — out
flítim — fighting
flor — floor
fulettop — full to the top
galip — gallipot
gin — gin
grevi — gravy
grog — grog
guènc — gang
guètes — gaiters
heveresac — haversack
in — in
jac — jack
jan — John

jacèr — Jack man
lesi — lazy
let — lathe
màlter — mitre
men — man
mèrvels — marbles
miliadi — my lady
milord. — my lord

mitjamen — midshipman
nac — mug
nòquinini — mahogany
nebera — neighbour
nèpel — apple

neverse (prunes de) — never saw
nòquel — knuckle
nig — ox
pènel — panel
peni — penny
pepelsmen — peppermint
pinc — pink
pinxa — pilchard
pinxar — pinch
písquels — pickle
pìe — play
plis — please

bolt, latch.
carpenter’s bone used for shoe-blacking.
term used in game of marbles.
fish dried in the sun without being salted.
term used in marbles.
a fight/beating.
parquet flooring.
trimful.
clay pipe.
as in English.
task involving heavy labour.
as in English.
huntsman’s rucksack.
term used in marbles.
carpenter’s jack-plane.
Foreigner/stranger. Originally referred to British soldiers/sailors; persists today in the sayings ‘quatre jans i un boi’ (four men and a boy i.e. ver few people), ‘vermell com un jan’ (red-faced), and ‘en temps des jans’ (during the British occupation).
someone or other.
as in English.
joint of two pieces of wood.
in the saying ‘es moln men per fer-lo’ (he is just the man for the job).
children’s game, but also slang for testicles.
a fair-complexioned and high-spirited woman.
‘sa volta des milords’ (the gentlemen’s tour) refers to a tour on Menorca – Mahón – San Clemente – San Luis – Villacarlos – Mahón.
a poor man whopretends to be rich.
pitcher.
as in English.
1. any small round mass.
2. slang for testicle.
derived from saying attributed to Kane, ‘I never saw (such plums)’.
term used in marbles.
shouted at cattle to make them move.
as in English door panel.
coin of smallest value.
as in English.
term used in marbles.
as in English, and in the saying ‘estar com a pinxes’ (to be packed like sardines).
take a pinch of snuff.
as in English (preserve).
game.
term used in marbles.
pudding cake made of a thick mixture and resembling an English Christmas pudding.

as in English alcoholic beverage.

container used by masons for holding water.

apples introduced to Menorca by Kane.

small, fast ship.

'jugar a quic' (to play hide and seek).

as in English.

stretcher of a chair.

as on a shirt front.

builder's measure of three palms.

as in English alcoholic beverage.

as in English.

carpenter's vise.

1. long seat with a back.

2. small chair.

carpenter's tool.

child's spinning top.

serving tray.

as in English.

as in English.

as in English.

as in English.

shelish.

as in English animal joint.

as in English.

as in English.

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