Britain and Menorca in the eighteenth century

Thesis

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Britain and Menorca in the Eighteenth Century

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Volume Two of Three

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At the end of the War of Spanish Succession, Britain acquired Menorca and Gibraltar from Spain, and Acadia (Nova Scotia) from France. In each case a condition of the acquisition was a guarantee that Roman Catholics in the ceded territories would be free to practise their faith, but the wording of the guarantees given by Britain in the Treaties of Utrecht was not uniform.

In Gibraltar, Britain undertook, without qualification, that the 'free exercise of their religion shall be indulged to the Roman Catholic inhabitants' and, although Britain was to dispute the spiritual authority of the Bishop of Cadiz over the Catholics on the Rock, it was a promise which was honoured.

In Acadia, the French settlers who chose to remain after 1713 were 'to enjoy the free exercise of their religion according to the usage of the Church of Rome, as far as the laws of Great Britain do allow the same.' Here the British, outnumbered by the French Catholic settlers to the extent of some three hundred and fifty to one, adopted for more than thirty years a 'live and let live' policy by which no penalising taxes were imposed, no tithes were sequestered,
and no determined effort was made to force the French to take an oath of allegiance to the British crown. Acadia remained a British colony very largely settled by the French until 1749, when the home government decided to found the colony of Halifax and people it with British emigrants. The influx of Britons did little to remedy the imbalance of numbers (by this stage the Catholic population had swollen from 2,500 in 1713 to 12,000) and, if the British expected forty years of religious tolerance to be reflected in a change of political allegiance, they were to be disappointed. As relations between France and Britain deteriorated and conflict loomed in North America, the loyalty of the Acadians had to be established. They were therefore required to take the oath of allegiance, and were told that those who refused would cease to be regarded as British subjects and would be deported. Most Acadians refused to take the oath. Some went into hiding, 2,000 slipped away to neighbouring French territories and, in 1755, the remaining recalcitrant 6,000 were forcibly expelled and transported to be distributed among the other British North American coastal colonies.

In respect of Menorca, Britain promised to 'allow the freedom to worship in the Roman Catholic faith', and added that 'for the protection of that religion, measures will be taken which will not be at variance with the civil government and laws of Great Britain'. As we have seen, this imprecise undertaking represented the limit of the religious tolerance Britain was prepared to concede, despite considerable Spanish pressure for more specific promises in the negotiations for peace, and the wording of the guarantee was not auspicious. It echoed, in essence, what had been promised to Irish
Catholics in the Treaty of Limerick in 1691, when the Crown had promised that it would 'endeavour to procure such farther security ... as may preserve them from any disturbance upon the account of their religion'. In the event, no such endeavours resulted, and the Crown had to yield to pressure to introduce legislation for the security of Protestants in Ireland which produced a series of penal laws which reduced the Irish Catholics to the status of second class citizens.

The various interpretations of Britain's several guarantees to allow freedom of worship to Roman Catholics in Britain and British territories, had their roots not in a phobia of doctrinal influence (even though anti-Catholicism was a consistent ideology in England from the 16th century to the 19th century), but in the threat posed by the loyalty of the Catholics to Rome, and their affinity with the political objectives of foreign Catholic powers. The British colonies in North America were far removed from the immediate influence of Rome and of other Catholic powers and, as in the case of Acadia, Britain was therefore content to adopt a laissez-faire approach to religious differences. In Gibraltar, no provocatively restrictive measures were introduced because the Catholic population was negligible and exercised no political influence. The situation in Ireland was different. The Catholics were in the majority, they had shown their support for the Jacobite cause, and the measures taken by Britain reflected her determination to nullify the political threat posed by the Irish Catholics close to British shores.

The circumstances of Menorca were unique. The island was not a secure possession; its cession to Protestant Britain had been resented in Spain and its recapture remained a
constant objective of the Catholic Powers throughout the eighteenth century; although it was nearer to Britain than the North American territories, it was still too far away for close control from London - a voyage of at least two months; the island was close to Rome, no distance from the coasts of Spain and France, and its spiritual leader was the Bishop in Mallorca, only twenty miles distant; there was no Protestant settlement from which to recruit a legislature, and the Catholic population was seven times greater than the numbers in the garrison. Although the home government, preoccupied as we have seen with other matters when a decision was needed on Menorcan affairs, did not formulate any regulations for the ecclesiastical government until mid-century, the first British Governor in the island took it upon himself to produce a framework by which freedom of worship could be permitted to the Menorcans, and by which the Roman Catholic church could function in a manner compatible with the British constitution and which would not endanger the security of Menorca.

Whatever the difficulties which arose out of the differing interpretations of Britain's Utrecht obligations to respect the Menorcans' civil fueros, they were never so fundamental nor so irreconcilable as the disputes which arose in the sphere of the ecclesiastical government of Menorca. Herein lay the primary reason why the Menorcans, despite being governed by Britain for most of the eighteenth century, never came wholly to regard themselves - or be regarded - as truly British subjects.

The Roman Catholic church in Menorca.
In 1713, Menorca formed part of the see of Mallorca in the Archdiocese of Valencia. The Bishop of Mallorca was expected to pay periodic visits to the island, primarily to conduct services of confirmation, but the day-to-day supervision of ecclesiastical matters was delegated to two senior secular clerics in Menorca (who were his appointments) - the Paborde and the Vicario General (Fig. 5.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paborde</th>
<th>Vicario General</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1709. Lorenzo Conila.</td>
<td>1702. Gabriel Sanxo.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1715. Cristóbal Rubí del Vilar.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1716. Miguel Barceló Monjo.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1763. Gabriel Roig Cardona.</td>
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<td>1778. Antoni Roig Rexach.</td>
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</table>

The office of Paborde (Provost) had originally been created to fulfil the role of the Bishop's coadjutor in Menorca. It was invariably filled by the parish priest of the church of Santa María in Ciudadela, and the incumbent had a seat in the diocesan synods in Mallorca, where he took precedence immediately after the Canons of Palma cathedral. The Paborde was not necessarily a native of the island, and it was not unknown for the emoluments of the office to be enjoyed by a Paborde in absentia. By the eighteenth century the office had become honorific, and ecclesiastical authority in Menorca, in the absence of the Bishop, had been assumed by
the Vicario General (Vicar General), who was invariably a Menorcan, but there were instances when one priest held the two offices simultaneously. The two principal benefices in the island, the parish churches of Santa María in Ciudadela and Mahón, were in the gift of the sovereign, and the Bishop of Mallorca was the patron of the remaining livings. The income derived from the principal parishes was not insignificant - Ciudadela enjoyed an annual income of £368, Mahón £376, Alayor £273, Mercadal £209 and Ferrerías £206\textsuperscript{14} - and would have placed the incumbents amongst the best remunerated of English parochial clergy in the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{15} While the secular clergy owed their allegiance to the Bishop, the regular clergy were subject to the authority of the Provincial or General of their Order outside the island.

There was no seminary in Menorca, and the comparatively affluent destined for the priesthood, as so often the case in the eighteenth century, the younger sons of families in the upper echelons of society, attended in the first instance classes in theology and philosophy in the Augustine or Franciscan monasteries on the island, before pursuing their studies in Mallorca, and going on to take their degrees at universities in mainland Spain, France or Italy. However, although nearly half (seventy) of the priests in Menorca in 1763 held doctorates,\textsuperscript{16} there is no reason to suppose that the lesser secular clergy were better educated than the lower clergy in Spain at that time, who possessed little more than a sketchy theological knowledge and a smattering of Latin, and whose ignorance and superstition were greatest where, as in Menorca, the resources of the smaller parishes were
limited to no more than ecclesiastical fees. In the circumstances, the superficially jingoistic remark of one contemporary English Protestant commentator that 'the very clergy, among whom Learning makes some Stand, are pitifully ignorant and stupid', may not have been very wide of the mark.18

There were two ecclesiastical courts in Menorca which were quite independent of the Governor and the civil courts of justice - the Curia eclesiástica and the Tribunal del Santo Oficio. The Curia eclesiástica (Ecclesiastical Court) sat in Ciudadela, and its judges were the Vicar General, who presided, an Asesor, a senior priest and the Abogado Fiscal and Procurador Fiscal (both qualified in civil and canon law). This court dealt with all matters of canon law, as well as hearing cases involving marital or domestic disputes, and all disputes between clergy and parishes. It also heard, much to the annoyance of the British authorities, both civil and criminal cases brought against anyone who enjoyed a 'fuero eclesiástico' (privilege of immunity from civil courts by virtue of having taken holy orders, however minor). The Tribunal of the Bishop of Mallorca acted as a court of appeal.19 Until the arrival of the British, the Tribunal del Santo Oficio (Inquisition) also sat in Ciudadela, and was concerned with prosecutions arising from matters of faith and morals. It seldom initiated proceedings, and a high proportion of its cases sprang from denunciations for blasphemy, ecclesiastical disrespect and witchcraft.20 It was presided over by a Commissioner sent from mainland Spain, and was totally independent of any other judicial authority in Menorca. There was no appeal against its verdicts.
Fig. 5.2. illustrates the number of places of worship in Menorca, and also the fluctuating numbers of secular and regular clergy and nuns during the first two periods of British rule in the island. Between 1713 and 1782, one new parish was created when the French built the town of San Luis to the south of Mahón during the period of their occupation of Menorca, and the parish church of Georgetown was built to replace the church at St. Philip's, which was demolished together with the arrabal in 1771. The table reveals that, while British initiatives and influence contributed to the fall in the number of nuns, down from eighty-five in 1713 to sixty-six in 1782, the numbers of secular and regular clergy increased in the period from seventy-five to one hundred and seventeen, and from one hundred and forty-six to one hundred and sixty-eight respectively, although in terms of the percentage of the clergy in the population this represents a drop from 1.9% in 1713 to 1.3% in 1782. Numbers of the secular clergy (one hundred and thirty-five) were at their greatest during the French occupation but, curiously, the regular clergy (whose presence was so often resented by British Governors), were at their most numerous (two hundred and forty-six) in 1750 towards the end of the first period of British rule, when the percentage of all the clergy peaked at 2.1% of the population. It is also worthy of note that for most of the period of British government in Menorca the percentage of the ecclesiastical population was greater than the 1.5% recorded for mainland Spain in the 18th century, and that, in 1787, four years after Menorca had been reincorporated into the kingdom of Spain, there had been no
### Fig. 5.2. Catholic Churches/Chapels/ Monasteries/Nunneries and Clergy Numbers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish Church</th>
<th>Monastery/Convent Church/Chap</th>
<th>Secular Clergy</th>
<th>Regular Clergy/Nuns</th>
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<td>1713.</td>
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<td>1763.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Churches.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciudadela</td>
<td>1 9 37 44 29 42 47 37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahón</td>
<td>1 6 23 38 20 45 48 52</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(San Luis, (1761)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alayor</td>
<td>1 5 12 10 10 17 21 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mercadel</td>
<td>1 2 1 1 2 4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferrerfas</td>
<td>1 1 1 1 3 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fumells</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>St.Philip's/Georgetown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 11 12 7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Monasteries.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ciudadela</td>
<td>Franciscan 1 27 27 43 40</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austin 1 31 34 23 55 40</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Antonine 1 8 8 9 12 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mahón</td>
<td>Franciscan 1 19 26 10 38 37</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>Carmelite 1 5 10 7 23 22 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alayor</td>
<td>Franciscan 1 19 19 15 27 22 7</td>
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<td>Austin (Mata Turu) 1</td>
<td>31 25 27 48 22 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nunneries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ciudadela</td>
<td>Clarist 1 54 55 7 53 42 42</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mahón</td>
<td>Conceptionist 1 31 32 3 38 32 24</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Clergy Numbers.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1713</td>
<td>75 146/85</td>
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<tr>
<td>1716</td>
<td>94 145/7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1722</td>
<td>84 156</td>
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<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>118 241/1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>135 277/4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1782</td>
<td>117 687</td>
<td></td>
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**Sources.**


1750. PRO CO 174/2, p.214. Blakeney, report to the Secretary of State, 14 January 1751.

1763. AM RG 142 - 2(2). Mánioile by Seguí y Sañó, October 1763.

1782. AGS/QM leg.3767. Census return, July 1782.
marked increase in the numbers of the clergy which rose by only 0.1% while the total population increased by 5.6%.22

Although there was a drop in numbers of both secular and regular clergy during the second period of British rule, it is clear, given the increasingly urban concentration of the Menorcan population, that there was always an adequate number of secular clergy to attend to the Menorcans' day-to-day spiritual needs. The drop in numbers, by 28% in the secular clergy and by 26% in the regular clergy, cannot be attributed to any specifically anti-Catholic regulations of the British, but it might reasonably be assumed that it came about as a reflection of the diminished status of the clergy, and the lessening of the attraction in the island of a career in the Catholic church in a territory of a Protestant power. What is incontestable is the resolute opposition of the Menorcan clergy to any measures which they considered constituted restrictions on, or innovations to, the traditions of Catholic worship in the island.

Kane's initial regulations.

In the same manner as the Jurats had presumed that the Duke of Argyll's assurance that Menorcans would enjoy the 'Continuance of all Rights and Privileges, whether Ecclesiastical or Civil',23 meant that there would be no changes in the civil government of the island, so the clergy imagined that the ecclesiastical government would continue unaffected by Menorca's cession to Britain. To Richard Kane, however, left to govern in Menorca after the signing of the treaty of Utrecht, there were features which were
incompatible with Menorca's altered status, and changes had to be introduced to uphold the authority of the British monarchy, to ensure the security of the island, and to safeguard the moral welfare of the garrison. In the light of Kane's background and experiences - he came from a Protestant family in Northern Ireland and had served in William III's Irish campaign 1689-1691, where he had fought in the battle of the Boyne and was well aware of the penalties subsequently imposed upon the Irish Catholics - it is remarkable that the measures which he introduced in Menorca were not more severe and restrictive.

To Kane it was inadmissible, in a territory belonging to Britain where the monarch was head of the church, that the Menorcan clergy should be subject to the spiritual authority of the Bishop of Mallorca, a foreigner. Accordingly, in April 1713, he forbade the clergy to recognise the authority of the Bishop and his tribunals, and he sequestrated, for the benefit of the royal patrimony, the revenue from the tithes collected in Menorca on behalf of the Bishop and Chapter of Mallorca. A year later, Kane issued the first of a series of regulations to the clergy to be implemented 'until Her Majesty's wishes be known'. On this occasion Kane was prompted to act because of the propaganda being broadcast by the priests that the English were not Christians, and he threatened to circulate Protestant religious books (written in Spanish) to counter the false rumour, if the priests did not abandon their anti-Protestant stance and work to produce a more harmonious atmosphere in the island. In the same order, for the greater security of Menorca, he banned the Inquisition, church sanctuary, and all foreign
missionaries. He proposed, in future, that no non-native Menorcan should be recruited to the secular or regular clergy, and he forbade the priests to interfere in actions in the civil courts, to talk of religious matters with members of the garrison, or to engage in any pastoral activity concerning them.

In the meantime, Dr. Manuel Mercader, Paborde and Vicar General of Menorca, had been one of the two Menorcans chosen by the Jurats, and approved by Kane, to go to London in 1714 to present the island's proposals for its future government under the British. The proposals concerning religion, which were first put to the Privy Council in 1716, and were subsequently considered by a committee chaired by the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1718, were uncompromising, and a number were totally unacceptable: 28 that the authority of the ecclesiastical tribunals in Mallorca be recognised; sanctuary in churches to be admitted, except in instances of murder, treason and highway robbery; no member of the clergy to be subject to any civil or military authority; no Catholic to be taught in a British school; no marriages to be countenanced between Catholics and Protestants; no Menorcan to be allowed to embrace any religion other than Catholicism; foreign missionaries and priests to be allowed free access to Menorca; no sequestration of ecclesiastical revenues and, in particular, that the Governor be required to swear in open court that he would 'keep, maintain and observe all the privileges, constitutions and customs, as well spiritual as temporal of the island'. Other proposals - a ban on the settlement of Jews and Moors in Menorca (an undertaking Britain had already given, but not observed, in the Treaty of
Utrecht); churches to be out of bounds to the garrison during services; co-habitation of Menorcan women and men of the garrison to be officially discouraged, and a ban on conversation between nuns and officers of the garrison, were not strongly opposed. A proposal that a separate Bishopric be established in Menorca was welcomed, and was seen by some, Kane among them, as the most likely key to the solution of the problems associated with the ecclesiastical government.

While Mercader was pressing Menorca's case in London, Kane's day-to-day problems with the clergy in Menorca had not diminished. Acting on instructions, Kane had restored to some leading Menorcan families the estates which had been confiscated because of their support for the Bourbon succession to the Spanish throne. Accordingly, he restored to Dr. Pedro Fortín the estates which he had lost, but he declined to approve Fortín's reinstatement as Rector of Mahón, because of his pronounced anti-British sentiments and his prolonged absence from the living. Kane's opinion was that, if Fortín were reappointed, the court of Spain would always have in him 'a faithful agent' in Menorca. Kane ordered the expulsion of seven Austin Friars in 1716 for insolence, disobedience and for being the 'plague of this place [Menorca].' and, alarmed by the influx of Catholic priests who had fled from Mallorca when it was reincorporated into the Spanish kingdom in 1715, he ordered their expulsion too. Wary of outside Catholic influence, Kane refused permission for the Austin Provincial to visit his monasteries in Menorca and, in May 1716, Kane expelled Dr. Cristóbal Rubí del Vilar, the acting Vicar General, because of his refusal to implement Kane's orders to expel foreign clergy,
and his opposition to Kane's orders to instruct the clergy to take an oath of allegiance to George I, and to offer prayers for him and the British royal family. Not surprisingly, opposition to Kane's regulations and to his treatment of the clergy grew in Menorca, together with a conviction that Mercader had become too much Kane's man to represent the island's case in London sufficiently independently and forcibly. Consequently, in April 1716, the Jurats of Menorca chose another Syndich to represent them, but their choice did not meet with Kane's approval, 35 and he refused to give Juan de Bayarte Ametller the necessary passport. It was not until May 1718, during Kane's absence in London, that Bayarte obtained permission to travel to England. Opposition to Kane's regulations was also growing in Mallorca, Spain and Rome, and the Curia was in regular correspondence with the Bishop of Mallorca and the court of Spain about Kane's apparent anti-Catholic and anti-clerical measures. 36 A list of complaints was compiled and sent from Madrid to the Marqués de Monteleón, the Spanish Ambassador in London, and he was instructed to make the strongest representations to the court of St. James. Kane was aware of the complaints and was anxious to go to London, where, as he wrote to the British Minister in Madrid in July 1716:

I hope I shall be able to give the right notions of what sort of government and limitations will be proper for the Romish church in this island. 37

It was not until the spring of 1717, that he was given leave to go to England and answer his critics, but Kane remained convinced that his defence was 'of force enough to baffle the attack'. 38
The attack was mounted by Monteleón in his memorial of complaints to the Secretary of State in July 1717, and his objective was to prove that aspects of Kane's government had been in breach of Britain's Utrecht undertakings, in particular the pledge of freedom of worship. The main thrust of the memorial was that Kane's 1714 regulations were anti-Catholic and anti-clerical, and Monteleón cited twenty-eight specific instances where the actions of Kane, or his British subordinates, had been injurious to the Catholic church, its priests or its worshippers.

Kane's rebuttal of the charges against him was vigorous and effective. As evidence of his good intent, he quoted one of the first orders that he had issued to the garrison early in 1713:

No soldier should go into a church in time of service; no person of the garrison should offer any offence to their [Menorcan] religion or to their services, and none to show any offence to their clergy.

He defended his regulations on the general grounds that they were designed to support a Catholic church in Menorca, the loyalty of which was dangerously divided between their rightful King and a Catholic Bishop who was a Spanish subject. The Bishop's tithes had been sequestrated for this reason. He justified his actions in respect of individual members of the clergy and, although he did not deny acts of misconduct on the part of the garrison, such as had been instanced by Monteleon, Kane maintained that none had sprung out of malice, nor had been inspired by anti-Catholicism. Finally, Kane insisted, as he had done in an earlier letter to the Bishop of Mallorca, that none of his actions or
regulations had prevented Menorcans from enjoying freedom of worship, nor could they be presented as a violation of Britain's Utrecht undertakings. The Privy Council having 'maturely examined and considered' the complaints, dismissed them as 'frivolous and ill-grounded', and Kane was honourably cleared of the charges.\textsuperscript{42}

Recommendations of the Royal Commission.

Although Monteleón's representations did not achieve the results hoped for by the Catholics inside and outside Menorca, it did prompt Westminster to consider introducing regulations for the government of the island and Royal Commissions were set up in 1718 to report on the various aspects of the issue. A committee of churchmen was set up, under the chairmanship of William Wake, the Archbishop of Canterbury, to examine the ecclesiastical government, and duly reported and recommended to George I that the Roman Catholic religion in Menorca should be regulated by ten articles:\textsuperscript{43}

1. That no Clergyman whatsoever, Regular or Secular, be hereafter admitted as a member of the Churches or Convents of Minorca, or have any Benefice there, or receive any Revenue from thence, but the Natives of the Island, who shall reside there and Own Your Majesty their Lawfull Sovereign.

2. That it will be for the Peace and Safety of the Island to be wholly discharged from the Government of the Bishop of Majorca and of the Archbishop of Valencia, and from all manner of Dependence upon either of them; And that the Convents in like manner be discharged from all Dependence upon and Obedience to any foreign Generals or Provincials.

3. That no Clergyman be admitted to preach, but the Natives of the Island who shall take an Oath of Fidelity to Your Majesty, and no foreign Clergyman be permitted to collect Money in the Island under the pretence of Charitable Uses in foreign Parts, but that all such Collections be made by Your Majesty's
Subjects only with Licence from the Governor.

4. That if any Missionary or other foreign Clergyman, Regular or Secular, shall come into the Island, the Heads of the Churches or Convents to which they shall come, be required to acquaint the Governor with their Names, Business, etc. and that, in case such Travellers be concealed, they be treated as Spies and those who concealed them to be punished with Banishment.

5. That no Inquisition or Office belonging to it be admitted on the Island, nor any such Court be held as that of Sancto Officio.

6. That no Sanctuary be given in Churches, Chappels, or Convents to any person to skreen them from the Justice of the Civil Law, nor to conceal any arms, Ammunition or Contraband Goods.

7. That the Clergy be not permitted to tamper with the Soldiers about Religion, nor to Marry, Baptize or Visit the Sick, nor Bury any of Your Majesty's British Subjects without leave from the Commander of the Garrison.

8. That of all Civil Crimes the Clergy be liable to be tried and Punished as other Subjects are.

9. That no Sentence of Capital Punishment be pronounced by any Ecclesiastical Court.

10. That no Native of the Island shall suffer as a consequence of embracing the Protestant Religion.

The committee also made some additional recommendations relating to the establishment and encouragement of the Church of England in Menorca (proposals which are examined below), and concluded:

As to Ecclesiastical Government [in Menorca], we are of the opinion that it should be Committed to the Care of some Archbishop or Bishop of England whom Your Majesty shall be pleased to appoint.

The recommendations of the Archbishop's committee were a vindication of Kane's actions to date for, in the main, they merely endorsed the regulations which he had introduced, but Kane disagreed with the committee's conclusion. He was convinced, and he was supported in this view by Carpenter, the Governor of Menorca, that only a Catholic appointment as Bishop would gain the support of the island's clergy. Ironically, the man Kane had in mind for the appointment, Dr. Manuel Mercader, fell outside the limits for ecclesiastical appointments in Menorca as defined by Article 1 of the
committee's recommendations, since he was not himself a native of the island. Nevertheless, for the next ten years, Kane was unswerving in his support of Mercader, with whom he claimed to have a 'perfect friendship'. It was a relationship which did little to lessen the concern felt by the clergy in Menorca that their Syndich in London was prepared to compromise on the issue of religious freedom, rather than hold out for no changes to be made. As if to confirm this view, Kane wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1719, pressing for Mercader's appointment as Bishop, writing that Mercader was a man of learning and quality, that he had always shown himself to be in the King's interest and that, as a result of his long stay in England 'his Bigotry seems pretty well worn off'.

Confirmation of Kane's open support for Mercader is to be found in the autobiography of Dr. Edmund Calamy, a leading contemporary Nonconformist, who wrote of meeting Kane in London in August 1717. Kane told Calamy that he had found someone that he intended to put forward as the Catholic Bishop of Menorca, who, 'though Papist enough, was yet a steady Whig, whom he had carried to the Archbishop at Lambeth who much approved of him'. Kane added that he was applying to the King and Council for a recommendation that the Emperor be asked to approach the Pope that he [Mercader] might be made Bishop (an approach by an intermediary was necessary at that time since Britain had no direct diplomatic link with the Pope). It struck Calamy that it was very odd for a True-Blue Presbyterian to be for making a Popish Bishop and carrying him in order to do it to the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Metropolitan of all England,

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but he admitted that Kane, in so doing, was 'well-employed and doing service for his country'.

Kane and Carpenter continued to press for Mercader's appointment, but, by 1728, Mercader had become disillusioned and was seeking preferment elsewhere, and Kane was recommending that George II might consider appointing 'one of his Hanoverian Catholique Subjects' to be Bishop of both Menorca and Gibraltar. In the event, and despite the fact that governors who succeeded Kane in Menorca also argued for the appointment of a Catholic Bishop, the British government never made a determined effort to bring this about. To some extent this may be attributed to a reluctance to upset Anglo-Spanish relations, but the most probable explanation is that Britain was aware of the Pope's opposition to the creation of a separate Bishopric of Menorca. However, it is arguable that the appointment of a Bishop in the early years of British rule might well have gone some way towards reconciling the differences encountered in the ecclesiastical government of Menorca, but it was ironic that, in the third period of British rule at the end of the century, by which time Menorca had an independent Bishopric, the British authorities found the Bishop of the day to be even more recalcitrant than the Vicars General with whom their predecessors had had to deal.

Despite the reluctance displayed by the home government to press for the appointment of a Catholic Bishop, no hesitation was shown in making appointments to the royal livings on the island. When Mercader died in 1739, George II issued warrants, which went unchallenged by the clergy in Menorca and by Catholic authorities outside the island, for Dr.
Gabriel Saura y Martorell to succeed Mercader as Paborde and parish priest of Santa María in Ciudadela, and for Dr. Francisco Vidal to take Saura's place as Rector of Mahón. In fact, the only challenge to a British clerical appointment in Menorca came in 1778, when George III's nominee for the post of Paborde, Dr. Gabriel Roig Cardona, was arraigned before the ecclesiastical court on a charge of simony, and the verdict was not reached before Menorca was lost to Spain in 1782.

Kane's plans for a Protestant Church.

Kane returned to Menorca in December 1719, encouraged by his vindication, but disappointed that the King had not acted on any of the recommendations of the Archbishop's committee. His disappointment was not confined to the measures dealing with the Catholic church, but extended to the absence of any enthusiasm in government circles in London to implement proposals he had put forward, supported by Carpenter, for the establishment of the Protestant Church on the island, proposals which had been endorsed by the committee and put forward as recommendations to the King. These were:

1. That there be two Churches built in the said Island, one at Mahon and another at Fort St. Philip for the use of Your Protestant Subjects.
2. That there be a settled Minister in each of those Churches, constantly residing, to officiate duly in the same.
3. That to encourage Men of Learning and Prudence to undertake the Service of those Churches, the Salary of those Ministers be not under £200 a year to each of them.
4. That there be another fixed Minister at Ciudadela, and one other between Alior(sic) and Fournelles (sic); and that the Salary of these two last mentioned Ministers be not under £150 a year each. All which several sums, we humbly conceive, will
be in great measure answered by what is now allowed yearly to the Governor's Chaplain and the Chaplains of the four Regiments to be quartered in that Island.

5. That a School be settled at Fort St. Philip to teach the Children of the Soldiers in Garrison to read, write and cast Accounts; and to instruct them in the Principles of the Christian Religion as professed in the Church of England; the salary of the said Schoolmasters to be £40 a year.

6. That a collection of Books be sent thither for the use of the Ministers and garrison, the care of which to be under the direction of the Governor.

These proposals, and an examination of Kane's correspondence with Wake and Henry Newman, the Secretary of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (SPCK), reveal that Kane was just as keen to encourage a Protestant settlement, establish a Protestant church and schools, and to 'fortify [the soldiers] against Popery', as he was to curb the political dangers arising out of the Menorcan clergy's ecclesiastical dependence upon Mallorca and Spain. Consequently, from the perspective of the Menorcan clergy, there was good reason for them to be both apprehensive and suspicious of Kane's initiatives in the sphere of ecclesiastical government. Nevertheless, it is significant that in none of the initiatives which Kane considered in connection with the establishment of a Protestant church was it ever envisaged that any of the costs were to be borne by the Menorcans.

Kane had considered establishing a Protestant element in Menorca as early as 1713. At that time there were some 10,000 troops on the island and Kane received orders, after the conclusion of the war, to reduce that number to 2,500, the number fixed upon for the permanent garrison. He suggested that, instead of returning all the surplus soldiers to Britain, some should be encouraged to stay in Menorca. The
intention was that the 'supernumerarys' should remain in a
civilian capacity, but could be recruited on the spot if the
garrison required to be strengthened.\textsuperscript{57} It was not a
suggestion which the home government even acknowledged and
Kane, himself, abandoned the proposal, having come to the
conclusion that the men (and their dependent women and
children) were unsuitable settlers, being little more than a
'notorious crew' and 'mere plunderers and strollers'.\textsuperscript{58}
Subsequently, in 1718, Kane urged unsuccessfully that
'encouragement be given to Protestants in Germany,
Switzerland, Piedmont, Geneva, Orange and Languedoc' to
settle in Menorca,\textsuperscript{59} and he wholeheartedly supported an
innovative scheme proposed by Carpenter to promote a
Protestant settlement. In an undated petition to the King,
Carpenter suggested that any officer, non-commissioned
officer or private soldier serving in Menorca who married a
native of the island, and was willing to settle there, should
be encouraged to do so by being released from military
duties, and yet receive a subsistence allowance for five
years, paid for out of the patrimony of Menorca. In the case
of non-commissioned officers and soldiers, a grant should be
made to settle them in a trade, and they should be issued
with replacement clothing at the same time as their serving
comrades.\textsuperscript{60} The scheme was unrealistic both on account of the
expense involved and, given the few marriages which had taken
place and the unpopularity of life in Menorca among the
soldiers, a predictable lack of volunteers.

From the SPCK, Kane sought, and received, support to get
'a good, Protestantly affected, Popish Bishop appointed over
the Clergy'.\textsuperscript{61} He requested, and was sent, religious works in
English to strengthen the soldiers' Protestant faith, and he prompted the Society to have works of scripture translated into Spanish, even into 'the Minorcan language,' but both these ventures were abortive - the Menorcans for whom the works in Menorquí were intended could not read, and the educated Menorcans who could read Spanish, would not read books from Protestant hands for fear of displeasing their clergy. Kane considered funding of the above publications would be 'easily defrayed by Contributors on a Subscription among the Nobility and Merchants', but both he, and the SPCK, were unsuccessful in obtaining financial backing to support two Spanish Catholic apostate priests, Antonio Gavin, and a former Chaplain in the Spanish embassy in London, de las Torres, to go to Menorca to act as missionaries.

Kane also had ambitious plans to found a Charity School, in which the pupils - children of the soldiers and the children of 'poor Spaniards' - were to be dressed in the 'King's livery' and, as an inducement to attend, were to be given a ration of bread each evening. He asked the Archbishop to send out a 'Creditable English master and Usher' and the necessary schoolbooks. He also requested 'for the Improvement and Amusing young Officers in a Place where there is so little Diversion', that a small library be formed, and that instructors in Mathematics and Modern Languages be appointed 'for the Crown of England is not possessed of any place that requires the knowledge of so many languages as Minorca.' Kane also asked for a printing press to be provided since he had found a young man in the Royal regiment of Ireland who had 'served his time to a printer'
whom he could put to good Christian use with the press.\textsuperscript{71}

Kane once again suggested that this scheme could be funded by a voluntary subscription in England and Ireland, while Newman attempted unsuccessfullly to persuade the Bishop of London to put the income of a bequest over which he had control towards the cost of maintaining schoolmasters in Menorca.\textsuperscript{72}

But Kane's most grandiose scheme for a Protestant presence in Menorca envisaged the building of two Anglican churches, one at St. Philip's and the other in Mahón. The church in Mahón was to be of moderate size, designed to accommodate 450-500 worshippers, but at St. Philip's he envisaged an impressive church of cathedral size, with two steeples 'as St. Paul's', capable of accommodating a congregation of 2,000. Kane hoped that funding for the building would be forthcoming from the fund set up to build fifty churches in England, from a parliamentary grant or, again, from voluntary subscriptions.\textsuperscript{73}

None of Kane's schemes to establish the Protestant religion in Menorca was ever seriously considered, let alone adopted, by the British government, and what the SPCK and Kane had fondly imagined might prove initiatives constituting a 'Monument of lasting honour to the British Nation'\textsuperscript{74} foundered almost from the moment of their conception.

Kane's Articles, 1721.

Kane returned to Menorca in 1719, at a time of great political uncertainty in the Mediterranean. He wrote to the Archbishop shortly after his return, to inform him that rumours were rife on the island, some forecasting that
Menorca was to be given to the Emperor, others that it was to be returned to Spain, and yet more that it was to be annexed to the British crown by Act of Parliament. Kane urged strongly that the island should remain British, and implored Wake to use all his influence to bring about a speedy resolution of a 'New Method of Government for Minorca' and, in particular, that part of it dealing with the 'Romish Church Government'. In this area, there had been only one development of significance during Kane's absence in London. In May 1719, a captured Spanish prize carrying the Catholic Bishop of Mazzara (Sicily) had been brought into Mahon harbour. The Menorcan clergy, with the approval of the interim Commander-in-Chief, Brigadier Petit, took advantage of the opportunity, and the Bishop confirmed all the Menorcans who had been denied full membership of the Catholic church since the last confirmation visit by the Bishop of Mallorca in 1695.

Kane spent the months from August 1720 until February 1721 in Gibraltar, but, on his return to Menorca, despairing of receiving instructions from London, and bolstered by the knowledge that the steps he had so far taken had met with approval, Kane decided, on his own initiative, to lay down clear rules for the ecclesiastical government of the island. In December 1721, Kane sent the Vicar General a decree containing seventeen regulatory Articles which he claimed were consistent with Britain's Utrecht undertakings, and were designed to uphold the authority of the British crown, and which contained no measure to hinder the free exercise of the Catholic religion in Menorca.
The Articles were, in the main, a reiteration of the regulations which he had already introduced, but they contained two new clauses, and two important concessions. The new regulations were that banishment was to be the fate of all clergy who opposed, or endeavoured to influence, judges in any civil or criminal case before the courts, and a similar fate awaited clergy who hindered Menorcans from sending their children to British schools or who prevented Menorcans from learning English. The concessions were to allow the clergy freely to seek spiritual advice and guidance from Rome (but not from elsewhere), and that, if the whole body of the clergy was opposed to the Articles, they were at liberty to send Syndichs to London to register any grievances and make representations.

Kane cannot have been surprised at the reaction of the Menorcan clergy. Since they had had no confirmation from their Syndich in London (Bayarte) that the Articles had been sanctioned by the King, they based their opposition on the assumption that Kane had acted without proper authority. The clergy met on 22 December 1721, and on 7 January wrote to Kane rejecting the Articles as being a violation of the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht and contrary to canon law, and they refused to be bound by them. Kane replied on 16 January, declining to discuss the matter further, and advising the clergy to send representatives to London to present their case, adding that only explicit instructions from the home government would cause him to modify or withdraw any of the articles. The clergy accordingly nominated Jose Casals, Ecónomo (Administrator) of the parish of Mahón, and Juan Faner, Rector of Alayor, to go to London.
via Rome to present their grievances. Kane granted the necessary passports without demur, and the Syndichs left for Rome in early February 1722. In the meantime, Kane obtained a detailed list of the island's clergy, which he sent to London accompanying a petition to the King stating his case, instancing the difficulties he was having with the clergy, and once again appealing that 'some Ecclesiastic of Moderation and known to be in Your Majesty's Interest may be established in Minorca as Head over the whole Clergy, as well Secular as Regular'.

The Menorcan Syndichs were received by the Pope and obtained his blessing on their mission. The Curia registered its objections to the Articles, cavilling, in particular, at the regulations which banned the Inquisition and forbade churches to provide sanctuary, made ecclesiastics liable to prosecution in civil courts and, not surprisingly, it objected to the regulation which left the nominations for the superiors of churches and monasteries in the hands of a Protestant King or his Lieutenant. The Curia also expressed concern that Catholics were to be encouraged to send their children to Protestant British schools, and it sought clarification on two points: the authority which was to replace the Bishop and Ecclesiastical Tribunals of Mallorca and the Provincials of the Regular Orders, and the implications of a new form of ecclesiastical government - by whom, and how, was it to be implemented and operate?

The Pope referred his objections and queries to the Emperor, his channel of diplomatic communication at that time with the Court of St. James, and Faner wrote to the Vicar General telling him that Casals had been granted an audience
with the Emperor on 14 May 1723, during which the Emperor had expressed his support for the Menorcan clergy's cause, and pledged to do what he could to improve their situation in the negotiations taking place at the Congress of Cambrai.\textsuperscript{81} George I accepted the Emperor's offer to mediate between Spain and Britain on the issues of Menorca and Gibraltar, but a second Treaty of Vienna, signed by Spain and the Emperor in November 1725, made it impossible for any such mediation to be impartial or acceptable to Britain.\textsuperscript{82}

Lord Carpenter arrived in Menorca in May 1726 to exercise his command as Governor, during another period in which Kane was ordered to command in Gibraltar (from August 1725 until March 1727), and he attempted to break the impasse by enlisting Menorcan support for the British proposal to create a separate bishopric for the island. The island's law officers were advised by the clergy that such a move could only be initiated in Rome, and so it was agreed, in view of the continuing unsettled state of the ecclesiastical government in Menorca and the prospect of hostilities breaking out once again between Spain and Britain, that an approach should be made by the clergy to the Pope.\textsuperscript{83} Pending the Pope's decision, Carpenter insisted that Kane's Articles be observed and, in the light of the hostile political situation which existed between Spain and Britain, he warned the Jurats and clergy that any further correspondence or dealings with Mallorca or Spain on this issue would be considered treasonable.\textsuperscript{84}

The next development occurred in France where, during the negotiations at the Congress of Soissons in 1727/1728, Cardinal Fleury, Chief Minister of France, presented Horace
Walpole, the British Ambassador to France, with a copy of Kane's Articles, together with a copy of the objections registered by the Curia. Walpole forwarded them to the Secretary of State, with the request to 'let me know His Majesty's sentiments and commands upon them.' Shortly afterwards, Carpenter, on his return from Menorca, also wrote to Newcastle in support of Kane's suggestion that the solution to the problems of ecclesiastical government might be produced by the appointment of one of George II's Hanoverian subjects as Bishop, although Carpenter admitted that it might not be easy to have the appointment confirmed by the Pope. This proved to be the outcome, for the Pope was influenced by Spain's view as expressed by her Chief Minister: 'If the British are successful in obtaining a Bishopric for Menorca, God knows what they will force him to do to the detriment of the poor Catholics on the island'. Diplomatic stalemate resulted and the issue of an independent see of Menorca was dropped. Indeed, although the proposal was revived during the second period of British rule, it was never again seriously supported by the British government which had come to realise that British possession of Menorca in itself was irritant enough for Spain, and any additional concession to a Protestant power in the sphere of religious authority would never be granted willingly.

Consequently, Kane's day-to-day problems with the clergy and with ecclesiastical affairs in Menorca did not diminish. He encountered instances of sanctuary still being afforded, foreign clergy were finding their way all too easily from Mallorca, and he was being subjected to persistent pressure from the Bishop of Mallorca, and from successive Spanish
Ambassaors in London, to release to the Bishop the funds which had accumulated as a result of the sequestration of the Bishop's tithes in 1713. Kane had originally held the money in trust, but, as he explained in a letter to Wake, he had used some of it to pay for 'charitable acts for the good of the people', and he also had it in mind to use some of the Bishop's former revenues for the construction of a pratique house in Mahon harbour. However altruistic Kane's motives, his actions in this instance were open to question since he had ordered the sequestration on his own initiative, and it was not until December 1725 that Joseph Gascoigne, the Receiver General for Menorca, received royal authorisation to withhold the Bishop's revenues and absorb them into the patrimony of the island.

Kane's final brush with the clergy concerned their liability to pay civil taxes. In 1662 and 1667, Charles II of Spain had issued decrees placing the Spanish clergy under the same obligation as his lay subjects to pay taxes, but these decrees had never been implemented in Menorca, where it was not uncommon for influential people to avoid paying taxes, either by taking minor ecclesiastical orders or by giving land to the church. Kane suggested to the Jurats that the seventeenth-century decrees should be enforced. He was advised by the law officers that there were sound legal grounds for implementing the decrees, but the clergy pointed out that a subsequent Papal Bull had laid down that Papal consent had to be sought before the clergy could be taxed. For four years (1732-1736), the controversy continued with argument and counter-argument, and Kane's last suggestion that the clergy should send a Syndich to Rome to consult the
Pope was still on the table when he died in December 1736. It was not an issue which any of Kane's successors pursued, and the matter was forgotten.\textsuperscript{90}

After Kane the relations between the governors in Menorca and the clergy were never easy and seldom cordial, but serious disputes arose only under Blakeney (1747-1756) and Johnston (1763-1774). All Kane's successors were in his debt for the efforts he had made and, if he did not succeed in resolving the problems of ecclesiastical government, at least he established a framework by which each side knew where the other stood. It is impossible to say whether the appointment of a Bishop of Menorca would have solved the problems - certainly Kane's own convictions in this respect were unshakeable, but it is open to doubt the extent of the loyalty which would have been commanded from the clergy of Menorca for a British sponsored appointee. But, in the absence of a Bishop of Menorca, Kane could not ignore the dangers, and potential damage to the island, of clerical loyalties divided between Church and State, and he believed that the measures he introduced were in the best interests of the crown, the Menorcan people and the Menorcan clergy - albeit in that order of priorities. He was not as intransigent or as intolerant as his critics in London and Menorca maintained, and his measures were concerned with the politics, not the simple daily practice of Catholicism in Menorca with which he did not interfere, and his orders to the garrison in this respect were explicit. Also, when it appeared that the parish church in Mahón was not large enough to accommodate its growing congregation, Kane readily offered the Rector a site on which to build a larger church,\textsuperscript{91} and he
was not unsympathetic to a request from the Franciscans to found another monastery. Both these instances, which arose in the aftermath of his 1721 Articles, must serve to give the lie to accusations of unreasonable intolerance in Kane's dealings with the clergy — indeed, he was even capable of writing in affectionate terms about an Augustine Father Provincial. But the fact remains that Kane would have been happier if he had been able to balance the religious arguments in the island with the vigorous presence of an established Protestant Church. Nevertheless, it says much for him that he earned the islanders' respect, to the extent that the Jurats of Mahón, in writing to the Jurats of the other términos, were able to speak of the 'high esteem' in which Kane was held, and the 'deep regret' with which they had learned of his death.

Philip Anstruther, Kane's successor as Governor in Menorca, found the 'the Inhabitants generally disaffected to the English .... occasioned chiefly by the Influence of the Friars', and he, like Johnston a generation later, was in favour of 'Shipping them [Friars] off'. But, in the main, Anstruther's problems in Menorca (and the Menorcans' disputes with him), lay in the spheres of civil and military government. John Wynyard, who commanded after Anstruther's departure in April 1745 until Blakeney's arrival in May 1748, made an unsuccessful attempt to prosecute some Antonine Friars from Ciudadela for offering bribes to soldiers of the garrison to escape to Mallorca, but the law officers supported the Friars' claim that they were immune from prosecution in civil criminal courts, and Wynyard was forced to abandon the prosecution. In 1747, Wynyard entered into a
dispute with more of the Regular clergy, on this occasion the Franciscans, who had applied direct to Rome, without first consulting him, for letters patent to appoint new superiors. The dispute had not been resolved by the time of Wynyard's departure from Menorca, and it was left to Blakeney to seek satisfaction. However, Anstruther, Wynyard and Blakeney all had to face a problem which had not arisen in Kane's time — the opposition of the Menorcan clergy to the settlement in the island of non-Catholic immigrants.

One of the advantages which Britain had hoped would accrue from the acquisition of Menorca, was that the island would become a major trading post in the Mediterranean. That this did not come about is explained in a later chapter, but the trading potential of Menorca did attract a sizeable number of commercially-minded immigrants, and their presence began to attract notice in the late 1730s and 1740s. From figures provided by the 1750 census, there were then 546 non-native residents (not including Britons) in the civilian population of 21,619.98 Further figures, gleaned from an incomplete count of the heads of families in Mahón in 1770,99 suggest that perhaps more than double that number of foreigners had, by then, become Menorcan residents. Some of the immigrants (the French and Spanish among them) were Catholics, but two sizeable non-Catholic communities became established and officially recognised under British rule — the Greeks in the 1740s and the Jews in the 1760s. There is also evidence that the Dutch, in an effort to recapture a greater share of the Mediterranean carrying trade, attempted to establish a colony in Menorca during the War of Austrian Succession. The Dutch were allowed a Consul in Mahón in 1747,100 but the
complaints that he made about the abuse suffered by the Dutch at the hands of the British, and the discrimination that he claimed was shown against the Dutch in a series of judgements in the vice-admiralty court, indicate that no-one in Menorca gave the Dutch any encouragement to settle - the Consul, Desaguliers, was unable even to purchase a house for himself. It is not surprising that they did not persevere. The 1770 survey mentioned above includes no-one of Dutch origin.

The Greek community.

By 1743, the Greek settlers in Menorca were sufficiently numerous to seek to establish their own church and install an Orthodox priest. Juan Jorge Cassara, a priest of the Greek colony in the then Genoese island of Corsica, was brought to Menorca in December 1743, and the leaders of the Greek community approached the Vicar General, Dr. Miguel Barceló, requesting that Father Cassara be recognised by him as a fit person to carry out the duties of priest to the 'Catholic Christian Community of the Greek Church'. The Vicar General refused to license Father Cassara claiming, correctly, that Cassara had left Corsica clandestinely without the permission of his Bishop, and therefore did not have the necessary authority within his own church to serve as a priest in Menorca. The Greeks then turned for support to Anstruther, who forwarded their petition to London where Prince Ivan Sherbatov, the Russian Ambassador and leading member of the Orthodox Church at the Court of St. James, took up the Greek cause. The issue of the status of the Greek
colony in Menorca was referred to the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, who, after hearing evidence from two Greek priests and from two British officers who had served in Menorca, all of whom spoke in favour of the petition, found that the Greeks were "Men of Substance and Credit who carried on a Considerable Trade," and recommended that the Greeks' petition be granted, a recommendation which the Privy Council adopted in November 1745. In January 1746, Wynyard, then commanding in Menorca, acknowledged receipt of the Order which granted

all the Greeks who should settle in this Place [Menorca], such Privileges, Libertys and Immunitys as His Majesty's Subjects now enjoy here, together with the Liberty of erecting a Church with a burying place annex'd, wherein a Priest of their own Communion may have full Power to Exercise his Priestly Functions according to the Rites of the said Greek Church.

When the Vicar General (by this time Dr. Miguel Morera had succeeded Barceló) was informed of the Order, he replied that, while he could not oppose the establishment of a Greek colony, nor their recognition as British subjects on a par with the Menorcans, he had no authority to countenance the building of a dissident church in the island without the Pope's permission. In the circumstances, he proposed to ask the Menorcan Syndich to the Curia (still Dr. Juan Faner) to raise the matter in Rome.

Nothing was heard from the Pope and, after a delay of nearly four years, the Greeks caused the matter to be raised once again in the Privy Council. In June 1749, the Council issued a strongly worded Order critical of the lack of cooperation of the Vicar General and clergy of Menorca, stating
that it was 'His Majesty's Determined Resolution that His Order in Council made on behalf of the Greek Inhabitants, shall be carried into Execution', and it warned that those who impeded the implementation of the Order in any way would 'incur His Majesty's highest Displeasure'. Blakeney communicated the King's wishes to the Vicar General and a congress of clergy and Jurats on 15 September 1749. He told them forcibly that the Vicar General's claim that the authority of the Pope was necessary before a Greek Orthodox Church could be built in a British territory was invalid, and that he would brook no further opposition. Land was then found and, despite strong rumours to the effect that any Menorcan who aided the Greeks in any way would be excommunicated, the foundations of the church were laid in November 1749. The church, and nine adjacent houses, were completed in 1754 at an estimated cost of more than £20,000.

When Britain lost Menorca to the French in 1756, the Greeks were expelled from the island, not specifically on religious grounds, but principally because they were evidently pro-British, and had helped substantially in the defence of the island. Most Greeks spent the seven years of the French occupation in Gibraltar, but returned with the British in 1763, to reclaim their property and business. From the returns made in the 1782 census of Menorca, when Britain once again lost the island, the Greeks continued to prosper, and their numbers to grow in the second period of British rule (although Hernández' estimate that the numbers had risen to more than 2,000 would appear to be excessive), and there was no further impediment to their
worship. However, one of the first actions of the Spanish commander after landing in Menorca in August 1781 (some five months before the island was surrendered), was to banish the Greeks once again, this time, no doubt to the satisfaction of the Menorcan clergy, on the grounds that their religion was 'intolerable to the true Catholic Church'. On this occasion, not all the Greeks left the island. Some, willing to be converted to Catholicism, were allowed to stay, and it will have been galling for them and their descendants to see their former church being used, first as a barracks for an Artillery company, then as a public dance-hall, before being reconsecrated as a Catholic church in the middle of the 19th century.

Blakeney's problems: the Nuns and the 1753 Regulations.

For ten years after Kane's death, disputes between the British authorities and the Menorcan clergy were comparatively insignificant, and it was not until Blakeney succeeded as Lieutenant-Governor that religious affairs once again became major contentious issues. Paradoxically, in those years in which religious disputes were not to the fore in the island, in London, Anstruther's examination before the House of Lords in 1742, and the Privy Council investigation of the complaints subsequently registered by Juan Mir Espineta, the Menorcan Syndich, of Anstruther's alleged malpractices in government, rekindled interest in the practical interpretation of Britain's broad-brush undertakings in respect of Menorca in the Treaty of Utrecht. In the debate which followed Anstruther's examination, the
former Governor of Menorca, the Duke of Argyll, supported by
the Earl of Chesterfield, regretted that more positive steps
had not been taken to persuade the Menorcans to become 'true
members of the Church of England', and so reinforce their
loyalty to the British Crown, and he reproached the Lords
Spiritual for not addressing the task with greater vigour and
determination.\textsuperscript{121} For the government, the Earl of Hardwicke
countered that any such steps would have been interpreted by
Spain as provocative, and in violation of Britain's treaty
obligations.\textsuperscript{122} There the matter rested until 1749, when
Blakeney was instructed to report upon the ecclesiastical
government of Menorca\textsuperscript{123} - an instruction which was issued in
the wake of the Anstruther inquiry findings, the
representations of the Greek community, the conduct of the
Franciscan Friars, the Vicar General's refusal to consult the
Governor before passing custodial sentences in the
Ecclesiastical court, the scandal of three nuns eloping to
marry British officers and repeated requests by the Bishop of
Mallorca to pay a pastoral visit to Menorca.

Blakeney's support for the Greeks has already been
chronicled. His expulsion in June 1748 of three Franciscan
Friars for obtaining and publishing letters patent to appoint
new Superiors without prior notification to the Governor, was
supported in London,\textsuperscript{124} although it was not until 1752 that
Father Raphael de Lugagno, the Franciscan General, accepted
Blakeney's decision to disqualify the Superiors originally
nominated and confirmed the appointment of the Superiors
approved by Blakeney.\textsuperscript{125} Also supported in London, were
Blakeney's refusal to allow the Vicar General to pass
custodial sentences in the Ecclesiastical court without his
consent,\textsuperscript{126} and his instructions to the Bayle General not to assist in the arrest of persons accused of offences to be tried in that court.\textsuperscript{127} And, much to the chagrin of the Menorcan clergy, Blakeney's judgement and actions in the scandal of the nuns, a cause celebre in London as well as in Menorca, was also commended.\textsuperscript{128}

Two nuns of St. Clare, Margarita Sintes and Margarita Gomila, having accepted proposals of marriage from two officers of the 22nd regiment, resolved to escape from their convent in Ciudadela and abjure the Catholic faith. They were aided and abetted in their escape on 19 January 1749 by the two officers concerned, Lieutenants George Kelly and Roger Schaak, and were joined in their escape by a third nun, Margarita Alberti, also desperate to flee the convent and renounce her vows. The nuns came from leading Ciudadelan families, and their relatives and the clergy raised an outcry at the outrage they considered had been perpetrated by the British officers. The nuns refused to return to their convent, and were all adamant that they wished to become Anglicans. The matter was referred to Blakeney, who took the view that the nuns had acted of their own volition, the officers had no dishonourable intent, and the nuns deserved to be protected by British law. However, Blakeney promised that, if it could be proved that the officers had trespassed on convent property or had committed any other offence in their part in the nuns' escape, the officers would be subject to the rigours of the same law.\textsuperscript{129} No such proof was forthcoming and, shortly afterwards, having been admitted into the Church of England, Margarita Sintes married George Kelly, Margarita Gomila married Roger Schaak and Margarita
Alberti was married to Lt. Christopher French of the same regiment. The incident simmered for some months, but the furore had subsided before the regiment left the Menorca garrison in May 1749.130

Although there was official approval for Blakeney's conduct and actions in all the above instances, his advice concerning a visit from the Bishop of Mallorca was not taken. Blakeney, like Kane, was convinced that permission for the Bishop to visit Menorca, however humanitarian the reason, would only serve to admit the Bishop's authority over the Catholics in the island, and strengthen the Menorcan clergy's resolve to look to him as their superior.131 Blakeney's reluctance to countenance a visit by the Bishop was not, however, immediately overruled. It took another six years before the visit was officially sanctioned, and it occurred in July 1755, at a time when Britain, with war against France a distinct possibility, was intent on appeasing Spain. Blakeney had to content himself with the assurance of the British Ambassador in Spain that the Bishop, Dr. Lorenzo Despuig y Cotoner, was not a man who would 'charge himself with any mean Intrigues and Artifices, unworthy of his Birth, his Manners and his Mitre.'132 The visit was politically uneventful, but, in the course of his short stay in Menorca, the Bishop confirmed 16,447 people,133 a figure which must have represented the total number of births in the island since the confirmations carried out by the Bishop of Mazzara in 1721, and which served to underline the extent to which the clergy had been successful in influencing the people to remain true to the Catholic faith throughout more than forty years of British rule.

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Blakeney experienced other brushes with the clergy. In a reverse situation of the escapade of the nuns, he banished the parish priest of Mahón, Dr. Francisco Coll, for refusing to surrender to the British authorities a young girl, Rosa Flander, said to be of British parentage but who, according to the priest, had become a professed Catholic and had taken refuge in the house of one of Coll's relatives. He also banished a Franciscan Friar because of the inflammatory nature and seditious content of his Lenten addresses. Blakeney's final clash with the clergy resulted from the publication of Regulations for the government of Menorca which the King in Council finally approved in 1752 and 1753, some forty years after the island had become British.

The 1753 Regulations.

The timing of the decision to promulgate the Regulations is significant. To some extent the ecclesiastical measures can be attributed to the attention of the home government having been drawn to the incidents mentioned above, but, to a greater extent, the Regulations were issued as a result of the Council's findings in its Anstruther inquiry in 1749, that many of the accusations of governmental malpractice in Menorca had been justified. But the Regulations were also issued at a time when conflict with France seemed to be imminent and inevitable and, as in Acadia, it was a time when Britain wished to be assured of the loyalty and support of her Catholic subjects. If, by the Regulations, this was an objective Britain hoped to achieve in Menorca, it has to be said that the British initiative was no more immediately
successful in the island than it had been in Acadia and, in the long term, an unsatisfactory situation remained unresolved and contentious.

The first set of Regulations, issued in May 1752,\textsuperscript{136} were concerned only with matters of civil and military government. When it transpired that these Regulations were unclear and capable of more than one interpretation, the Privy Council issued a fuller set of Regulations in August 1753,\textsuperscript{137} and reinforced them with detailed instructions to the Governor, Lord Tyrawley, in October 1753.\textsuperscript{138} These Regulations, in so far as they concerned the ecclesiastical government, largely encapsulated Kane's Articles, but there were three clauses to which the clergy took particular exception. Firstly, in the absence of any higher ecclesiastical authority in Menorca, when any religious 'difficulty' arose, the outcome was to be settled by the Governor in consultation with the Vicar General and other 'Chief Ecclesiastics', without appeal to any external authority. Secondly, and no doubt arising from the episode of the three nuns, no woman was to be allowed to take the veil before she reached the age of twenty-six and, even then, if it was proved that she had been coerced, the Governor was to have the power to discharge her from the convent and dispose of her dowry. The other major objection arose from the clause which forbade the young of the island to leave Menorca to go to another Catholic country to be educated.

After Blakeney had published the revised Regulations on 30 November 1753, the entire clergy registered their opposition to the ecclesiastical clauses in an eleven-page memorial, in which they they reiterated their steadfast interpretation of
religious freedom, and stated that they considered the new Regulations to be innovative and a violation of Britain's undertakings. 139 Blakeney replied in January 1754, defending the Regulations and his own conduct in past religious disputes, but he agreed that implementation of the clauses to which the clergy had registered particular objections should be delayed until the clergy's Syndichs could make representations to the Privy Council. 140

The Menorcan Syndichs 141 submitted their protest to the Privy Council on 23 July 1754, but they were not given the opportunity to plead their case in person. Instead, they had a lengthy, but informal, meeting with the Secretary of State, Sir William Robinson, who informed the Syndichs that the Menorcan protestations were unlikely to lead to any variation of the Regulations. According to Robinson, even stricter measures had been considered for the ecclesiastical government in 1714 and 1718, and he advised the Menorcans to 'think themselves happy in the Moderation of the present Times and the Regulations now issued.'142 Although the Syndichs persisted in their attempts to gain a hearing before the Privy Council - they made further applications in December 1754, January 1755 and March 1755143 - it was to no avail. The delay in decision-making in London was frustrating for both Blakeney and the clergy, but the visit of the Bishop of Mallorca in July 1755 did much to diffuse the situation, and Menorca was lost to the French before any reconsideration of the Regulations had been undertaken by the Privy Council.

The Treaty of Paris, 1763.

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In February 1763, the peace treaty bringing to an end the Seven Years' War was signed in Paris by Britain, France and Spain. By Article XII, France restored Menorca to Britain, and France also ceded to Britain Canada (Articles IV and XIV), and the West Indian island of Grenada (Article IX). By the same treaty Spain ceded Florida to Britain. In each case Britain made a promise to allow Roman Catholics in these territories the freedom to worship in their faith, and the wording of the promise was identical to Britain's undertaking relating to religious tolerance in Menorca in the Treaty of Utrecht.

In all these newly-acquired territories the majority - if not the totality - of the European settlers were Catholics and, with the Province of Quebec particularly in mind, the home government, in a manner reminiscent of an earlier Ministry in 1718, looked to form a 'Plan for the Establishment of Ecclesiastical [Roman Catholic] Affairs', and it turned to Menorca to 'see what was done upon the Subject of the Roman Catholick Religion'. But when it was discovered that all the papers relating to Menorca had gone missing from government offices, and that the island could provide no established precedents, the home government pursued a 'Plan' only in Quebec and, elsewhere, it adopted the same laissez-faire attitude it had followed for so many years in Menorca.

There were two reasons why some regulation of the ecclesiastical government of Canada was attempted. The first was the British fear that the Catholic religion would be used as a means of asserting the authority of the Church in political matters in the province, and as a channel of communication by which political ties could be maintained.
with France. The second reason was that, in a province in which there were initially 80,000 Catholics and only 200-300 British Protestants,\textsuperscript{147} it was necessary to grant political as well as religious concessions to the Catholics if they were to be discouraged from emigrating and won over to British rule, and if the province was to have a stable government and system of justice. The considerable political and citizenship concessions granted to the French Canadians based on the findings of the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General that 'they were not subject to the incapacities, disabilities and penalties to which Roman Catholics in this kingdom [Britain] are subject by the laws thereof\textsuperscript{148} are mentioned in an earlier chapter, and the concessions of religious freedom were no less remarkable. Although it was clearly established that no Pope and no foreign Bishop was to exercise any authority, spiritual or temporal, in Canada, and although the British Governor of Quebec was warned to watch the priests closely and remove any who 'shall attempt to go out of their sphere',\textsuperscript{149} the only other restriction was the recognition by the Catholics of the supremacy of the King. The clergy were allowed to receive their customary dues and tithes (but from members of their own faith only) and, by June 1766, the province had a Catholic Bishop in all but name. This appointment was a landmark in British colonial history, and came about as a result of connivance by the British government who allowed Auguste Briand to be secretly consecrated in France by the Bishop of Blois, but permitted the appointment only on condition that Briand did not style himself Bishop, but 'Superintendent of the Roman Church in Canada'.\textsuperscript{150} It was the height of irony that the man most
responsible for Briand's appointment, and for the tolerance shown to the Canadian Catholics, should have been James Murray, later to become Governor of Menorca where no satisfactory solution to ecclesiastical government was ever achieved.

In the other territories newly acquired by Britain in 1763, the religious problems were not so urgent. The European settlers there were also Catholic, but they were few in number. In Grenada, the spiritual jurisdiction of the Catholics was entrusted to the care of Bishop Challoner, Vicar-Apostolic of the London District in England who, in due course, appointed Father Benjamin Duhamel, a French Franciscan Friar known to be an Anglophile, as the Vicar General in the island. As in Canada, the priests were allowed to enjoy their tithes and the French Grenadians were admitted to the Legislature, and were exempted from the 'Test', but the instructions to the Governor clearly indicated that the gradual conversion of the Catholics to Protestantism was envisaged. The situation in Florida was even less acute with only a very small Catholic settlement at St. Augustine, and the home government and the British Governor adopted a 'live and let live' policy in the expectation that the number of Protestant immigrants would, in time, enable the colony to be run along lines quite in keeping with the British constitution. The fact that the first 1,500 immigrants were not Protestant, but largely came from Menorca and, although there were some members of the Greek Orthodox Church among them, by far the greatest proportion were Catholics who were accompanied by two Menorcan priests, licensed by the Pope to serve as
Apostolic missionaries in Florida, was overlooked on the grounds of expediency. The colony needed settlers and the faith of the colonisers was immaterial for as long as they recognised the supremacy of the British King. The Menorcan emigration to Florida is chronicled in a later chapter, but here it can be recorded that the immigrants were allowed to build a church and to worship unimpeded in the colony of New Smyrna.

When Menorca was restored to Britain, the home government failed to take the opportunity to resolve the unsatisfactory state of the ecclesiastical government in the island. No new initiatives were taken, and the instructions given to the Governor on the spot were identical to those issued to Lord Tyrawley ten years previously. No account had been taken of the fact that the Menorcan clergy had not accepted the religious clauses in the 1753 Regulations, or that the Privy Council had never answered the clergy's objections which had been tabled in 1754. As a result, the Governors in Menorca during the second period of British rule had to contend with the same uneasy and ill-defined relationship between the civil and ecclesiastical government of the island which had plagued their predecessors. The areas of dispute were predictable: the authority of the Bishop; the Vicar General's refusal to recognise any gubernatorial authority in church affairs; the independence of the Ecclesiastical court; the authority in Menorca of the Generals and provincials of the regular clergy, and the grievance felt by the clergy over the tolerance shown by the British to non-Catholic communities in the island.
The Jewish settlement in Menorca.

Contrary to the assertion of Desmond Gregory, Britain was bound by the Treaty of Utrecht to exclude Jews from Menorca but, as Jonathan Israel has shown, no other ethnic group in the western Mediterranean could match the Jews in the scope and range of their commercial operations, and it was not surprising that they were attracted to the trading potential of Menorca after the War of Spanish Succession. By 1718, Kane was sufficiently concerned with their activities in the island to seek guidance from the home government as to what action he should take with the Jews in Menorca. Needless to say, no advice was given, and Kane did not exclude them nor did he restrict their activities. Surprisingly, given the known aversion of the Catholics to the Jews, the presence of the latter in Menorca did not appear in any of the complaints registered by the Menorcan clergy against the British government during the first period of British rule, although it was used as a pretext for the Spanish attack upon Menorca in 1781.

Although it is known that more than 450 Jews were expelled from Menorca by the Spanish in 1781, it is not possible to guage the size of the Jewish community in the island at any stage prior to the end of the second period of British rule. Certainly they were sufficiently established to have bought houses or land on which to build houses, and to have had a 'room for their Devotions' during the first period of British rule, but they encountered concerted opposition from the Governor, the Jurats and the clergy when they attempted to establish a synagogue in 1766, after Menorca had been
restored to Britain. Johnston was of the opinion that the Jews in Menorca did little good, creating currency problems by hoarding specie, and that the establishment of a synagogue would only attract other Jews to the island.\textsuperscript{165} On this occasion the Governor was of a like mind with the Jurats and the clergy who also protested at the Jews' plans.\textsuperscript{166} The Menorcan Jews enlisted the help of the Jewish community in London, who were successful in persuading the Secretary of State to sanction the synagogue (one was already in existence in Gibraltar)\textsuperscript{167} on the understanding that the Jews would help to stimulate the local economy.\textsuperscript{168} This move was reinforced by the Jewish community in London, who wrote to the Jews in Menorca urging them to 'endeavour to render yourselves remarkable in your Obedience to Government, and in your Readiness to be serviceable in everything', and they were also warned to beware the 'natural odium that the Catholic Religion bears to ours'.\textsuperscript{169} There is no evidence to suggest that the Jews in Menorca did not heed the first bit of advice, but the community could not overcome the latter warning and, at the end of the second period of British rule, one of the first acts of the Duke of Crillon after invading Menorca in August 1781, was to order the expulsion of the Jews and the confiscation of all their goods and property.\textsuperscript{170}

Johnston's disputes with the clergy.

The Bishop of Mallorca's pastoral visit in 1755 (sanctioned despite the fact that the 1753 Regulations specifically denied his authority in Menorca), brought about
the very situation of which Blakeney had been so apprehensive. The visit, while it may have helped to save the souls of many of the islanders, served to strengthen the conviction of the clergy that the Bishop was their superior in all religious matters, particularly in those in which there were differences with the British authorities. The Bishop, also, interpreted official sanction for the visit as tacit recognition of his authority and, for example, saw no reason to consult or inform Johnston before renewing the commissions of the secular clergy in Menorca in 1766. Johnston objected, and wrote to the Bishop, quoting Article V of his Instructions:

His Majesty cannot allow or suffer the exercise of any spiritual or ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Our said Island, except such as shall be carried on or directed by Our Royal Authority. 171

The Bishop was unrepentant, and Johnston remained convinced that until the authority of the Bishop in Menorca was categorically denied by Britain and the clergy were made to accept this, the Bishop's influence would remain at the root of 'that innate spirit of aversion and contradiction which the Minorcans have always had against the British nation'. 172 Like Kane, Johnston argued for the creation of a separate Bishopric of Menorca, independent of Mallorca and Spain, 'the Method and Direction of which', he maintained, 'could be easily regulated'. 173 Johnston also proposed that all the livings in the island should be in the gift of the King who would be advised by the Governor and, citing the King of Spain's recent decision to 'extirpate the Order of Jesuits', 174 he suggested that 'it would not be amiss in
this Island, where the regular clergy are very useless, to take some measures for their expulsion'. On a practical note he added that if the Franciscans alone were banished, their annual income estimated at £700 would suffice to support a Bishopric, and that, at very little expense, the Carmelite monastery could become an 'excellent barrack for an English Regiment'. But Johnston's suggested initiatives were given as little consideration in London as Kane's proposals fifty years earlier. In the Secretary of State's office they were docketed under the heading 'Points relating to Minorca which do not seem to press'. No instructions were sent from London in respect of the Bishop of Mallorca's authority and, consequently, when the living of Ferrerias fell vacant in 1773, Johnston was faced with no alternative but to accept the nominee of the Bishop.

On his arrival in Menorca in 1763, Johnston had expressed concern at the number of secular clergy in the island - one hundred and thirty-five in contrast with one hundred and eighteen in 1750. He suggested to the Secretary of State that all the unbefitted clergy should be given the choice of becoming laymen or leaving the island, and he wrote to the Vicar-General, Dr. Gabriel Roig Cardona, informing him that no more clergymen were to be professed without his permission.

Johnston's relations with the Vicar-General were never easy or cordial. Roig's publication, without prior consultation or consent, of the Bishop of Mallorca's new commissions to the Menorcan clergy, infuriated Johnston who wrote in strong terms to the Secretary of State, protesting at such high-handed and insubordinate action, and suggesting
the Roig's actions rendered him unfit for his high office. Needless to say, no censure was forthcoming from London, and Roig continued in office until his death in 1778. General John Mostyn, the largely absentee Governor of Menorca, who briefly exercised his command in Menorca (January 1771-July 1772), also proposed a curb on the powers of the clergy, suggesting (like Johnston) that the patronage of all the benefices in Menorca should revert to the King; that the judge of the Ecclesiastical court should be a royal appointment, and that the regular clergy should be phased out by forbidding the Orders to recruit any novices, but no acknowledgement, let alone support, was forthcoming from London.

Johnston again clashed with the Vicar-General over the case of José Vilar, the priest of the parish of St. Philip's arrabal, who had been arrested by the British authorities in 1767, accused of a civil offence. Vilar was put under house arrest by Johnston, but the priest refused to appear before a civil court, and insisted upon his right to be tried by the ecclesiastical court. Fortified by the opinion of the Asesor and Abogado Fiscal that Vilar's request was legally correct, Roig supported Vilar, and further antagonised Johnston by calling a meeting of the clergy without the Governor's knowledge or consent, by sending a memorial of complaint direct to the Secretary of State, and by appealing, outrageously in Johnston's opinion, to the Courts of Spain, France and Rome for support for the Catholic cause in Menorca. Roig's petitions reiterated all the known arguments relating to the freedom of worship in Menorca but, on this occasion, he was able to strengthen his case by
quoting as a precedent the laissez-faire attitude which had been characteristic of the British government - if not of the Governors on the spot - in this area of ecclesiastical government during the years of British rule. Roig's actions were successful in securing the release of Vilar from custody, but, having commissioned Juan Pons y Andreu to act on behalf of the clergy as well as the Jurats as their Syndich in London, it proved a costly venture for the clergy, since Pons' expenses for acting on behalf of the clergy alone from January 1768 until June 1771, amounted to £866.3s.1d.¹⁸⁷ However, Roig's defiance of the Governor did not prompt the Secretary of State to take any action to reinforce the Governor's authority in the island.¹⁸⁸

The case of the priest of St. Philip's served to reinforce Johnston's views about the ecclesiastical court in Menorca. He was fundamentally opposed to its existence and functions on a number of counts: it was not constituted according to British law, and was outside its and his jurisdiction; its traditional claim to hear all charges against persons in Holy Orders implied that clerics were not subject to civil laws, and its appeal court was in Mallorca. In a memorandum to the Secretary of State in July 1767 Johnston advocated that the ecclesiastical court, if it were to exist at all, should be constituted on the same basis as the other courts in Menorca, and confine its hearings to matters of a purely religious nature.¹⁸⁹ He later recommended that the court should be held in Mahón and not Ciutadella, the centre of Catholic opposition to British influence and authority in the island.¹⁹⁰

Johnston's relations with the regular clergy were no more harmonious than they were with the secular clergy. In 1763
Johnston wrote to the General of the Franciscans in Rome, acknowledging the latter's authority over the members of his Order in Menorca but, in 1767, he issued orders for the Franciscans to sever all contact with Rome. He took this action after the Franciscan Provincial in Barcelona had authorised two Priors of monasteries outside Menorca to attend a Franciscan convention in Ciudadela in April 1767. Johnston refused to sanction their visit, and, shortly afterwards, he insisted that the nominations for the forthcoming elections of the Franciscan superiors on the island be submitted to him for approval before being forwarded to the Franciscan General. Suspecting that, in defiance of his orders, the Franciscans were engaged in a secret correspondence with Rome, he further authorised letters to the monks to be opened and read. For this action, he was censured by the Secretary of State, and his objections to the Franciscans' nominations overruled. Johnston did not subsequently enter the lists with the regular clergy.

Johnston's brusque manner and forthright ways did not endear him to the Menorcan clergy or, for that matter, to any of the Menorcan authorities. His support for the Greeks, the fact that the Jews achieved their synagogue during his time as Governor on the spot - even though Johnston himself was less than enthusiastic in this instance - and his fundamental opposition to ecclesiastical privileges, did nothing to improve the relationship between the Governor and the clergy in Menorca.
Murray's government 1774-1782.

After Johnston, command in Menorca devolved upon Lt-General the Hon James Murray who, though no better furnished with instructions or backing from London, succeeded in avoiding many of the confrontations with the clergy that his predecessors had either endured or provoked. Nevertheless, Murray did have to contend with a situation which had arisen only once before in Menorca during British rule, but was not then attended by the complications he had to face. The Paborde, Dr. Roig, died in 1778, and his office was in the gift of the King. When a similar vacancy occurred in 1739, there had been no rival to the nominee. On this occasion, three candidates were championed.

The absentee Governor, Mostyn, nominated Dr. Gabriel Olivar y Montaner; the Asesor(Criminal) of Menorca solicited the position for his son, Gabriel Mercadal y Seguí, and the British Ambassador in Spain favoured Antonio Vila y Camps, the son of the island's Procurator Fiscal. There were further complications. Murray wrote to the British Ambassador that, if Mostyn's nominee Olivar was unsuccessful, the latter would strongly support his own nephew for the position, and an added difficulty was that both Olivar's nephew and Vila had yet to attain their majority. Murray initially supported the candidature of Mercadal, but, having been assured that a minor was not debarred from holding office, he opted for Vila.

Olivar went to London to further his claims and there, through Murray's agent Ross, offered Murray £1,000 and the unencumbered use of a church in Mahón for the Protestant garrison, if he would support his candidature. Ross, in the
perplexing position of knowing that the Governor and the Lt-Governor supported different candidates, adopted a pragmatic solution. He divided the money between Mostyn and Murray, informed the Secretary of State that the post should be given to the Governor's nominee, and Olivar was duly given his commission in May 1778. Murray, on learning of Olivar's inducement, refused to be associated with simony, and he reported the facts to the recently appointed Vicar-General, Dr. Antonio Roig Rexach. He also sent Roig his £500 to be used by the Catholic church for charitable purposes. The Vicar-General was no more prepared to countenance simony than Murray, and Olivar was summoned to appear before the ecclesiastical court. There were unavoidable delays in bringing the case to court - evidence had to be gathered and sworn in England and Menorca - and, although there are references to litigation in the years that followed, no verdict is recorded. But, from an undated petition from Olivar to the King written shortly before Menorca was lost to Spain in 1782, there is good reason to suppose that Olivar was never recognised as Paborde by the British. For once, a British Governor and the Vicar-General were of a mind and acted in concert - ironically in a matter before the ecclesiastical court.

At the beginning of this century a Ciudadelan priest wrote an account of the ecclesiastical history of Menorca under British rule. According to Dr. Gabriel Vila y Anglada, it was only the 'tact, prudence and constancy' of the Menorcan clergy which preserved Catholicism in the island from the menace of the 'little British Caligulas, bent on compulsion and tyranny,' but Vila was selective in his
evidence, and he did less than justice to the tolerance shown by the British of the Menorcans' freedom to worship as they wished, and the respect demanded of the garrison troops for the rites, festivals and religious ceremonies of the Catholic Church. Despite Kane's ambition, and the proselytism plans of the SPCK in the early years of British rule, there was no doctrinal interference, and the charges levelled by Vila at the British Governors sprang essentially from the inability, and certainly the unwillingness, of the Menorcan clergy to admit the constitutional impossibility that the British could allow any foreigner, not specifically licensed by the King, to exercise authority in the island, or that they could recognise the civil proceedings of the ecclesiastical courts in respect of clerics. Apart from the three nuns, prior to their marriage to British officers in 1749, there is no record of other conversions of Catholics to the Protestant faith, and there is only one instance recorded of an Englishman converting to Catholicism.

The rosy picture painted by Vila of the steadfastness of the faith of the Menorcans in the eighteenth century obscures the fact that the Catholic authorities considered the prolonged exposure of the Menorcans to the moral turpitude and heresy of the British so insidious and detrimental to the Catholic faith that, no sooner had the British left Menorca in 1756 and 1782, than missionaries of the Congregation of St. Paul were called to the island to rekindle the Catholic faith. In the words of one priest in 1781, the legacy of British rule had been to leave Catholicism in Menorca 'lukewarm and weak'. Regrettably the same adjectives could
be used to qualify the British government's approach to the problems of the ecclesiastical government of Menorca.


2 The situation was made easier for Britain by the fact that the Catholic population left the Rock in the wake of the British conquest in 1704, and were slow to return. In 1725, the Spanish Catholic element represented only 36% of the civilian population (Hills, *Rock of Contention*, p. 235). Even by the end of the century the Catholic population represented no more than 63% - more than half of whom had come from Genoa and Italy (Howes, *The Gibraltarrian*, p. 40, citing 1791 census figures.

3 Coupland, *The Quebec Act*, p. 11, citing Article XIV of the Treaty between Britain and France, Utrecht, 11 April 1713.


8 see chapter two.


11 Martí, *Síntesis*, p. 80, mentions eleven such visits in the 17th century:

1605, 1612, 1620, 1627, 1638, 1647, 1658, 1666, 1674, 1686, and 1695.


13 Martí, *Síntesis*, p. 82.


15 Langford, *A Polite and Commercial People*, Table 1, p. 64, citing Social Structure according to Joseph Massie, 1759.

16 F. Martí Camps, 'La Jurisdicción eclesiástica' in Piña *Las Instituciones*, p. 273.


21 Callahan, 'The Spanish Church', p. 36.

22 AM/U 382. Estado general de la población de Menorca, census return, 1787.

23 PRO CO 174/1, f. 1. Argyll to Jurats, 5 December 1712.

24 Kane was born in County Antrim in 1666, and served under William III as a Lieutenant in the Royal Regiment of Ireland (18th Foot).
The income was estimated to be 700 pistoles (£560) at that time, Society for the Propagation of the Christian Gospel [hereafter SPCKWB 1, f.225, Lord Carpenter's petition to the King, 1721? By the end of the second period of British rule the estimated income had risen to £1,313, F. Seguí Sintes, Memorial to the court of Spain, 25 January 1782, in Piña Las Instituciones, p.293.

PRO CO 174/2, f.117. Blakeney to Bedford 5 July 1749, confirms the date and substance of Kane's order.

Biblioteca Bartomeu March, Palma, Mallorca, [hereafter BBM, copy of AHN/E, leg.4836, Kane to Vicar General, 17 May 1714.

Christ Church Library, Oxford University, [hereafter CCL] Wake Mss vol.24, f.150, Petition of Mercader and Sanxo to the Privy Council, 1716.

PRO CO 389/54. Bolingbroke to Neal, 22 April 1714.

BL Egerton Ms 2171, f.357. Kane to George Bubb, British Minister in Madrid, 22 May 1716.

Ibid.


Ibid., p.424. Kane to Menorcan clergy 30 May 1716.

There is some confusion about appointments to the posts of Paborde and Vicar General during the early years of British rule. Mercader, already Archdeacon of Valencia, was appointed Paborde and Vicar General of Menorca by Charles III's Regent in Catalonia in 1712 (CCL, Wake Mss vol.24, f.173). He was deprived of his Valencia appointment by the Pope in 1716 (Ibid.) and, during his prolonged absence in London, the Bishop of Mallorca nominated Rubí to serve as Vicar General (FRB vol.1, pp.423,424, citing ASV/V vol.127, pp.163,164, Bishop to Rubí, 4 February 1716). Rubí refused to be bound by Kane's 1714 and subsequent Regulations, and he was banished in May 1716. In June 1716, the Menorcan clergy obtained the approval of the Bishop and Kane for Dr. Miguel Barceló Monjo to serve as Vicar General in Mercader's absence (FRB vol.1, p.426, Bishop to Curia, 3 June 1716), and Barcelo acted in that capacity in Menorca until his death in 1745. The situation is further complicated by a claim that Mercader did not succeed Lorenzo Gomila as Paborde until 1723 (Marti, 'Estado de la Iglesia en Menorca en el Siglo XVIII' in Piña Las Instituciones p.272, but Mercader's own version of the date of his appointment would appear to be correct (PRO CO 174/15, f.24, Mercader's answer to Bayarte's challenge to his authority, 1718).

BL Egerton Ms 2172, f.272. Kane to Bubb, 5 September 1716.

FRB vol.1. pp.419-428, citing ASV/V vols.119,123,124, 127,128 &130, reproduces letters from the Bishop of Mallorca to the Curia dated: 6 December 1714, 10 December 1714, 23 January 1715, 1 January 1716, 4 February 1716, 3 June 1716, 20 June 1716 and 16 December 1717. Two letters from Menorca to the Bishop are included: from the senior clergy of Ciudadela, 1 June 1716, and from another Ciudadelan clergyman, Juan Antonio Sureeda, 20 November 1717.

FRB vol.II, pp.230-240 and 453-468, citing Archivo de la Embajada de España ante la Santa Sede, legajos 166,280,284 and 285, reproduces three letters from Rubí to Cardinal Giudice (Inquisitor General of Spain), 23 April 1716, 2 June 1716 and 11 June 1716, and also fifteen letters from the
Spanish Ambassadors to the Curia to the court of Madrid: 24 November 1716, 23 February 1717, 16 March 1717, 4 May 1717, 2 June 1717, 8 June 1717, 17 August 1717, 12 September 1717, 22 August 1722, 12 September 1722, 26 September 1722, 3 October 1722, 13 February 1723, 10 April 1723 and 21 August 1723.

37 BL Egerton Ms 2172, ff.115,116. Kane to Bubb, 6 July 1716.
38 BL Egerton Ms 2174, f.81. Kane to Bubb, 28 March 1717.
39 AM/U 383, no.11, f.2. Monteleón's memorial of complaints against Kane, 28 July 1717.
40 PRO CO 174/15, f.39. Kane to Sutherland, 23 September 1717.
41 FRB vol.1, pp.421,422, citing ASV/V vol.127, pp.165,166.
Kane to Bishop, 30 December 1716.
42 A Vindication of Colonel Kane against the Late Complaints made against him (London,1720), p.33. This is, in part, a report of the findings of the Privy Council and, in part, a refutation of the accusations levelled at Kane by Bayarte in an earlier pamphlet The Case of the Island of Minorca (London,1719).
43 CCLO, Wake Mss vol.24, ff.143-146.
44 Ibid., f.141. Carpenter's petition to the King, 1718.
45 AM/U 383. Kane to the clergy of Menorca, 30 May 1716.
46 CCLO, Wake Mss vol.24, f.151. Kane to Wake, 31 December 1719.
48 CCLO, Wake Mss vol.24, f.153, Kane to Wake, 17 February 1721; f.160, Carpenter to Wake, 26 February 1721; f.149, Kane's petition to the King, 1 January 1722;
p.173, Kane's petition to the King, undated(c.1725).
49 Ibid., f.175, Mercader's petition to the King, 1728, in which he begs to be considered for appointment to an Abbey or some such other dignity in Flanders.
50 BL Add Mss 32755, f.214. Carpenter's memorial to Newcastle (citing Kane's suggestion), 28 March 1728.
Acquaviva to the Abbot of Vicanco, 3 October 1722.
53 Ibid., ff.208-211. Warrant dated 1 July 1739.
54 CCLO Wake Mss vol.24, f.148. Kane to Wake, November 1719.
55 Ibid., f.146.
56 SPCK, CR 1.8, Abstract of letters, Newman to Kane, 28 August 1717.
57 PRO WO 30/89, f.29. State of the Garrison of Minorca... 31 August 1713.
59 BL Add Mss 23638, Kane's memorandum to the Archbishop's committee, 1718.
60 SPCK, WB 1, Papers of Moment (1708-1730), ff.229,230.
'Proposals most humbly submitted by the Lord Carpenter for securing a Protestant Interest on His Majesty's Island Minorca,'c.1722.
61 SPCK CS 2.7, Society letters, Newman to Kane, 2 May 1718; Ibid., 26 October 1718; CS 2.9, Newman to Wake, 23 January 1720; CS 2.12 Newman to Kane, 11 August 1722; Ibid, 24 October 1722 and 1 April 1723.
62 SPCK CR 1.5 Abstract of letters, Kane to Newman, 25 November 1713; Cr 1.8 Kane to Newman, 6 September 1717;
Ibid., 10 October 1717; CS 2.7 Society letters, Newman to Kane, 2 May 1718; Ibid., 26 October 1718; CR 1.10 Abstract of letters, Kane to Newman 28 April 1720 and 9 December 1720; CR 2.12 Newman to Kane 24 October 1722.

SPCK CR 1.8, Abstract of letters, Kane to Newman, 10 October 1717; CR 1.10, Kane to Newman, 28 April 1720 and 16 February 1721.


Ibid., p. 150.

SPCK CR 1.8 Abstract of letters, Kane to Newman, 6 September 1717.

SPCK CS 2.12, Society's letters, Newman to Carpenter, June 1722 and Newman to Kane 11 August 1722.

Cowie, Henry Newman, pp. 150, 151.

CCLO Wake Mss vol. 24, f. 148, para. 3. Kane's proposals to Wake, December 1719.

Ibid., para. 4.

SPCK CR 1.10, Abstract of letters, Kane to Newman, 16 February 1721.

SPCK CS 2.12, Society's letters, Newman to the Bishop of London, 23 June 1722 and 31 August 1722.

CCLO Wake Mss vol. 24, f. 148, conclusion.

SPCK CR 1.8, Abstract of letters, Kane to Newman, 6 September 1717.

CCLO Wake Mss vol. 24, f. 147. Kane to Wake, 30 April 1720.

BL Add Mss 32752, ff. 455-458. Kane to Vicar General, 1 December 1721.

CCLO Wake Mss vol. 24, f. 149.

Ibid., p. 150.

Ibid., f. 149.

BL Add Mss 32752, ff. 453 et seq.


CCLO Wake Mss vol. 24, f. 167.

AM/U 383. Unanimous opinion of the clergy expressed to the Aesor and Abogado Fiscal, 7 April 1727.

Ibid.

BL Add Mss 32752, ff. 455-458. Walpole to Newcastle, 18 November 1727.

BL Add Mss 32755, ff. 212, 213. Carpenter to Newcastle, 28 March 1728.

BBM copy of AEE vol. 3 leg. 291. Grimaldo to the Pope, 1728.

CCLO Wake Mss vol. 24, f. 162. Kane to Wake, 15 March 1722.

Clwyd Record Office, D/M/4314, Mostyn Mss. 'Memoranda Touching the Island of Minorca', 15 July 1730.

AM/U (PR) 50. Correspondence between Kane and the Jurats 20 March 1732; 26 and 27 June 1734; 18 April 1736 and 12 May 1736.

AM/U (D) 158. Kane to Dr. Domingo Roca, 7 April 1723.

CCLO Wake Mss vol. 24, f. 165. Kane to Capuchins, 29 November 1722.

BL Egerton Ms 2172, f. 116. Kane to Bubb, 6 July 1716.


PRO WO 1/294, f. 699. Anstruther to Newcastle, 4 March 1740.

Ibid.

98 PRO CO 174/2, f.216. 'State of Natives and Inhabitants of Minorca, exclusive of Troops and British born Subjects.' Blakeney to Bedford, 14 January 1751.

99 AM/U 382. Padrones vecinales, Mahón 1770.

100 PRO CO 389/56, f.2. Appointment of John Henry Desaguliers as Consul for the Republic of Holland, 8 January 1747.

101 PRO CO 174/2, ff.37,43,47-50,73. Desaguliers to the Secretary of State, complaints 1745-1750.

102 Hernández, La colonia griega, p.339, estimates that there were no less than 200 Greek families in 1740.

103 AM/U 390. Petition of the Greek merchants to the Vicar General, 9 December 1743.

104 Ibid., Barceló to the Greek merchants, 18 December 1743.

105 PRO CO 174/2, f.3. Sherbatov to the Secretary of State, 19 August 1744.

106 PRO CO 389/55, ff.390,391. Privy Council to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 6 September 1744.

107 Ibid., ff.392,393. Fathers Gregory Cassava and Bartholomew Cassano.

108 Ibid., f.393. Colonel William Pinfold, interim Commander in Menorca after Kane's death in 1736, and Captain Thomas Dunbar who had served in the island in the 18th Foot.

109 Ibid.


111 PRO CO 174/2, f.27. Wynyard to Newcastle, 25 January 1746.


113 PRO PC 2/101, f.282. Order in Council, 28 June 1749. In monetary terms, this displeasure was to amount to a fine of '£1,000 Gold Florins', PRO CO 174/16, p.203.


115 Ibid., f.160. Morera to Blakeney, 26 September 1749, denied the rumours.

116 Hernández, La colonia griega, pp.342,346.


118 Hernández, La colonia griega, p.342.


120 Hernández, La colonia griega, pp.367,368. The church was reconsecrated in 1867.

121 Proceedings of the House of Lords, 1742, pp.87,103.

122 Ibid., p.95.

123 PRO CO 174/1, f.8. Bedford to Blakeney, 24 April 1749.

124 PRO CO 174/2, f.77. Blakeney to Bedford, 29 January 1750.


126 Ibid., f.77. Morera to Blakeney, 14 December 1748.

127 Ibid., f.79.

128 Ibid., f.110. Blakeney to Bedford, 8 April 1749.

129 Ibid., ff.90-107,110,111. Blakeney to Bedford,, 31 January and 8 April 1749.

130 An interesting footnote is provided in an Obituary notice in the Gentleman's Magazine for December 1797: 'In Dawson Street, Dublin, Mrs. Margarita Kelly, and, a few hours after her in St. Andrew's Street, Mrs. French, widow of Colonel French. The two ladies had been nuns in the convent of St. Clare in Ciudadela at Minorca, where they were married to two officers of the 22nd Regiment.

131 BL Add Mss 35885, f.166. Blakeney to Newcastle, 5 July 1749.
132 PRO CO 174/2, ff.204,205. Keene to Newcastle, 19 October 1750.
133 Martí, 'La Jurisdicción eclesiástica', in Piña, Las Instituciones, p.274.
134 Riudavets, Historia vol.2, pp.1290,1291. The girl was eventually handed over.
135 Ibid., p.1292.
137 PRO CO 174/19, ff.2-6. Orders in Council, 11 August 1753.
138 PRO CO 389/56, ff.147-160. Instructions to Tyrawley, 8 October 1753.
139 AM/U 383. Clergy of Menorca to Blakeney, 20 December 1753.
140 Ibid., Blakeney to the Vicar General, 8 January 1754.
141 Dr. Juan Mercadal y Sanxo and Bernardo Olives y Olives.
143 PRO CO 174/16, f.53. Minorca Deputies to Robinson, 6 March 1755.
144 The definitive Treaty was signed 10 February 1763.
145 PRO CO 174/16, ff.300,301. Robert Walpole to Secretary of State, 12 November 1765.
146 PRO CO 174/1, f.54. Points relating to Minorca, undated and unsigned, but clearly in answer to the above.
148 Ibid., p.51.
149 Ibid., p.22.
150 Ibid., pp.52-54.
152 Ibid., p.35. The 'Test' was the oath denying transubstantiation which was then in force in Britain.
153 Ibid., p.38, citing PRO CO 101, Original Correspondence with Grenada, Instructions to Brigadier-General Melvill, 3 November 1763.
154 Pedro Camps y Janer, parish priest of Mercadal, and Bartolomé Casanovas, an Augustinian monk.
156 Ibid., pp.106,107.
157 PRO CO 174/3, ff.3,4. Instructions, Egremont to Johnston, 23 April 1763.
158 Murdie, Minorca. Chapter X contains useful information on some of these topics during the second period of British rule.
159 Gregory, Minorca, p.132.
161 BL Add Mss 23638 ff.32-83. Kane's Memorandum on the government of Menorca, Section 25, 'Admission of Jews', 1718.
162 AGS/GM leg. 3761. List of Jews expelled from Menorca, 13 September 1781, records 174 men, 128 women, 42 children over the age of ten, and 119 children under the age of ten.
163 PRO CO 174/2, p.37. Desagulliers (Dutch Consul) to Dutch Envoy in London, 9 August 1746.
164 PRO CO 174/1, f.157. Petition of Joseph Salvador, Moses da Costa and others to the Duke of Richmond, 1767.
165 PRO CO 174/4, f.37. Johnston to Conway, 7 April 1766.
166 AM/U (MC) 87. Correspondence of the Jurats with the Vicar General, August 1766.
167 PRO CO 174/1, f.157. Petition of Joseph Salvador and others to the Duke of Richmond, 1767.
168 PRO CO 174/4, f.37. Richmond to Johnston, 13 June 1766.
171 AGS/E leg.6968. Johnston to the Bishop of Mallorca, 31 December 1767.
172 PRO CO 174/4 no 10, Section 6, f.211. Johnston to Shelburne, 1 September 1767.
173 Ibid., Section 7, f.215.
174 The Jesuits were expelled from Spain in April 1767.
175 PRO CO 174/4, no 10, Section 7, f.215.
176 Ibid.
177 PRO CO 174/1, ff.49-63. 'Points relating to Minorca', undated memorandum but, almost certainly 1767/1768.
178 PRO CO 174/8, f.38. Johnston to Rochford, 16 April 1773.
180 PRO CO 174/4, ff.50-54. Johnston to Richmond, 5 July 1766.
181 PRO CO 174/1, f.280. Memorandum from Mostyn relative to ecclesiastical patrimony, October 1772.
182 PRO CO 174/4, no.13, f.228. Johnston to Shelburne, 8 December 1767.
183 Ibid., no 14, f.231. Johnston to Shelburne, 27 December 1767.
184 PRO CO 174/5, no 15, f.3. Johnston to Shelburne, 18 January 1768.
186 PRO CO 174/5, no.15, f.3. Johnston to Shelburne, 18 January 1768.
188 PRO CO 174/5, f.65. Shelburne to Johnston, 30 September 1768.
189 PRO CO 174/4, no.10, f.214. Johnston to Shelburne, 1 September 1767.
191 Murdie, Minorca, p.191.
192 Ibid.
193 PRO CO 174/1, f.54. Deposition by Bartolomé Deya, Secretary to the Court of Royal Government, 4 February 1768.
194 PRO CO 174/5, no.5, f.10. Shelburne to Johnstone, 30 September 1768.
195 BL Add Mss 24172, f.213. Murray to Grantham, 14 October 1778.
196 PRO CO 389/57, f.115. Olivar's commission, 2 May 1778.
197 PRO CO 174/1, ff.169,170. Olivar's petition to the King, undated but probably 1781.
198 G.Vila y Anglada, Heroísmo del Clero menorquín durante las dominaciones británicas (Ciudadela, 1912).
199 Ibid., p.129.
200 Ibid., p.285.
Article 5 of the first set of standing orders for the garrison, issued by Kane 1712/1713, stated 'No soldier to go into Churches in Time of Service, or show any Disrespect to the Priests or to their Profession'. This order was a constant in the standing orders for the garrison during the periods of British rule.

R. Rossello y Vaquer, Menorca davant la Inquisició (Mahón, 1982), pp. 68, 69, chronicles the 'spontaneous conversion' of Samuel Scott in 1758. Scott, by then eighty years of age, had been a trader in the Canaries, Lisbon and Catalonia before marrying a Catalan, Anna Martí, in 1715 and going to Menorca in 1718. He resided in Mahón from 1718-1732, when he went to act as British consul in Mallorca. He returned to Menorca from 1739 until 1753, when he resumed his post as consul in Mallorca.

Martí, 'La jurisdicció eclesiàstica', in Piñà, Las Instituciones, pp. 275, 276. Six missionaries visited Menorca from October 1757 until April 1758, and eight missionaries were on the island from July 1782 until March 1783.

Ibid., p. 277, citing a letter from a Franciscan monk, Francisco Gerabert, to the Bishop of Mallorca, November 1781.
Chapter Six.

The Military Garrison.

Unpalatable and morale-sapping maritime reverses in the Anglo-Dutch wars, a growing need, as overseas trade increased, to provide naval protection for merchantmen and their cargoes, together with an increase in traffic to and from the English Plantations in the New World - all combined in the latter half of the seventeenth century to point to the necessity of England possessing a permanent naval force. The inescapable fact that, as part of an island, England would always be open to attack from the sea, also served to make a permanent navy a charge to the Exchequer acceptable both to Parliament and to the people. At the same time, the concept of a standing army was viewed with antipathy and suspicion in Britain.

The antipathy of the people to the existence of a standing army was rooted in the happenings of the Civil War, and the subsequent rule of the Major-Generals. Parliament's suspicions, which were to manifest themselves throughout the eighteenth century (even in wartime) in the form of recurrent challenges and cheeseparing motions by the Opposition whenever army estimates were debated, sprang from a fear that the monarch would use a standing army to impose an autocratic
and militaristic regime. As a safeguard, after the overthrow of the Stuarts, Parliament insisted in the Bill of Rights (1689) that William III recognise that the existence of a standing army in time of peace was illegal without the consent of Parliament. Furthermore, in 1691, Parliament made itself responsible for financing the army by means of votes of supply and, by 1697, it required to know the size, composition and disposition of the army before the annual debate on the army estimates.1

In the reign of Charles II, the establishment of England's first overseas garrison in Tangier had been seen by some as an unnecessary expense, and an excuse for the King to build up a small, but regular, standing army. By 1712, however, the need for 'a certain number of troops for the defence of Her Majesty's Dominions beyond the seas' was admitted in the Mutiny Act of that year2 and, in 1713, Parliament approved the cost of maintaining seven regiments in the Mediterranean — four in Menorca and three in Gibraltar.3 Britain's determination to retain both Mediterranean outposts after the War of Spanish Succession was not without its critics. Reference has already been made to Brigadier Palmes' opinion expressed to Marlborough in 1710, that Menorca would be exorbitantly expensive to fortify and maintain, and would, ultimately, prove militarily indefensible.4 A pamphlet published in 1712 propounded the same arguments against the retention of Menorca and Gibraltar as had been made fifty years earlier in respect of Tangier5 and, in 1717, Marlborough was again advised that 'In time of Peace, they [Port Mahon and Gibraltar] are of no Service and, in time of War .... we should not long keep them'.6 Nevertheless, the
retention of Menorca and, to a lesser extent, Gibraltar, remained a priority in the foreign policy of successive ministries for much of the eighteenth century and, despite the expenditure of vast sums to secure both Mediterranean outposts, it was Gibraltar, considered to be the less valuable possession and more vulnerable to attack, which was to resist four sieges and remain British, while Menorca, the prized possession, never realised its commercial potential and it more than lived up to all Palmes' forebodings when it was lost to France in 1756 and to Spain in 1782.

The Defences of Menorca.

Menorca's greatly indented coastline, with many isolated coves and inlets providing opportunities for disembarkation, was indefensible. But, until the eighteenth century, when the harbour of Mahón became a priority possession for Britain, the island of Menorca had little intrinsic value for any other nation, Spain included. In 1570 Philip II, following two devastating raids on the island by the Turks, had seriously considered evacuating and abandoning it but, yielding to the pleas of the inhabitants, he allowed them to remain and set about strengthening the island's defences to the extent that they would be able to resist pillaging raids - the only threat then envisaged. No steps were taken in respect of the defences of the inland settlements of Alayor, Mercadal and Ferrerías, which were considered insignificant targets in themselves, and were further considered to be out of danger because of the difficult terrain between the 'mitjanía' (where they were situated) and the coast. The
walled fortifications of the two principal towns, Mahon and Ciudadela, were strengthened and given greater and more up-to-date fire-power, and the two most inviting landing-places, the harbours of Fornells and Mahón, were given protection from forts built at the mouth of the harbours. For nearly 150 years, Philip II's defence strategy for Menorca was successful. The forts of St. Philip and St. Anthony and the citadel of Ciudadela deterred any attack on the harbours they protected, and what piratical raids there were, amounted to little more than isolated incidents of little consequence, perpetrated by opportunist raiding parties of pillagers on the largely unoccupied coastal regions away from the fortifications. In 1708, however, Stanhope mounted no mere hit-and-run raid. His objective was the conquest of the island and, once his expeditionary force and its armaments had been landed, the sea-orientated defences of Menorca proved inadequate to resist, let alone repulse, a land-based attack.

Only the token stand taken by the garrison of St. Philip's prevented a bloodless conquest. No opposition to Stanhope's forces was encountered in any of the inland settlements; Mahon, no longer contained within its walls and deprived of all but fifteen pieces of artillery (the bulk having been removed to strengthen St. Philip's), offered no resistance, neither did Ciudadela, although the town was still contained within its walls which were fortified by seven bastions and some fifty cannons and mortars (although it must be recorded that not all of these were serviceable, and powder and shot were in short supply). Fort St. Anthony, the small, 100 feet square fortress with four bastions, each mounted with four
light cannons, at the mouth of Fornells harbour,\textsuperscript{10} resisted a bombardment from the sea for a few hours, but quickly succumbed to the greater fire-power of Admiral Whitaker's ships. Fort St. Philip was a star-shaped fortress with four bastions, two ravelins, surrounded by a deep ditch and protected by an outer dry-stone line wall containing four guard towers, each mounted with a battery of light cannons.\textsuperscript{11} The fort itself mounted more than 110 cannons and mortars, and was amply provided with powder, shot and other provisions.\textsuperscript{12} The Spanish commander's decision to yield the fort after only the line wall had been breached was as surprising to Stanhope as it was unpardonable to Davila's superiors, even taking into account the humanitarian grounds on which it was based.

Faced with greatly superior enemy numbers, the tactics adopted by Dávila in 1708 - to withdraw all available troops into St. Philip's in the hope of support reaching the garrison from outside the island - were to be mirrored in parallel circumstances by Blakeney in 1756, and by Murray in 1781. In each case the garrison, denied outside support and relief, was forced to surrender - Blakeney after a siege of two months, and Murray after an investment of nearly six months. The myth of Menorca's impregnability, created in the main by Stanhope, was based on the presumptions that St. Philip's would be strong enough to resist attack until help arrived, and that Britain's navy would always be able to guarantee the relief of the garrison. This proved to be the case in respect of Gibraltar, but, in respect of Menorca, on the two occasions when support was required, the navy arrived too late and in insufficient strength to prevent its loss in
1756, and British naval commitments elsewhere in 1781-1782 left Murray as abandoned as Dávila had been in 1708.

Fort St. Philip.

Antonio Ramis estimated that Spain spent approximately £25,000 in the first forty years of the construction of Fort St. Philip. In 1740, Brigadier Thomas Paget, commanding the 22nd regiment in Menorca, estimated that work at the fort had cost Britain 'betwixt 3 and 4 hundred thousand pounds' in the thirty years since the island had been captured from Spain. But neither Paget, nor Captain Charles Whitefoord, serving in Menorca in the 18th regiment and writing at the same time as Paget, believed that the money had been well spent.

Paget deplored the fact that the proven expertise of Dutch and German Engineers had not been employed, and that there had never been a 'regular plan' for the additional fortifications. These had been constructed at the whim of the British Chief Engineers of the day, who, according to Paget were both 'ignorant and greedy of gain', and although the works were deceptively 'shelled over and neat and pretty to look at', they had been constructed of 'loose and improper materials', and insufficient care had been taken to make the outworks more integrated and more mutually supportive. Whitefoord praised the subterranean works - mines, galleries and communications - as being 'exceedingly good' but, like Paget, he was critical of the works above ground, deeming them to be 'ill-contrived and faulty in execution'; he expressed concern that the barrack accommodation in the fort was too restricted, unsafe and unhealthy, that the glacis was
so steep that an enemy could establish a lodgement at the base without being exposed to fire from any of the fort’s cannons, and that the situation of the arrabal severely restricted the fort’s field of fire in any land attack. In a letter to a brother officer in 1739, Whitefoord was forthrightly pessimistic: 'as certain as we're attacked, we're taken ... our walls are in such a condition that we dare not fire our own cannon'. However, the fundamental criticism of both Paget and Whitefoord was that, since the site of St. Philip's was so evidently 'disadvantageous', the bulk of the money which had been expended, had been misspent in an attempt to make the fortress impregnable in itself. As Whitefoord pointed out, the high ground to the west of the fort and the heights of La Mola, the promontory on the northern side of the harbour, both dictated that

the Castle is overlooked and seen into in every way, many of the outworks in reverse, and most of the covered ways are enfiladed .... so that it is not possible to dispute them for any time.

Moreover, Paget specifically regretted that the once-projected plan to build a fort complementary to St. Philip on the more dominant site of La Mola, had never been adopted. He was convinced that, if the fort of St. Anne had been built, 'the whole power of France and Spain joined together' would not have been able to take the island of Menorca.

The plan to fortify both sides of Mahón harbour by strengthening Fort Felipet and constructing a new fort to be called St. Anne (Fig.6.1), had first been proposed by Colonel Durand, the Chief Engineer, in 1709. Initially, Stanhope had been of the opinion that Menorca could be made
EXPLANATION of ST. ANN'S TOWN

A. Half Bastion of the Town
B. The Middle Bastion
C. A Land Ravelin
D. Half Bastion of the Right
E. Half Bastion of the Left
F. The Bastion of the Sea Side
G. The Intrenchments round the Top of the Hill, in which every Man
H. Magazine for Provisions and Bakers' Houses
I. The Bastion
J. The Sea Gate
K. The Barracks
L. The Land Gate
M. Powder Magazine
N. The Arsenal
O. A Bastion, on the Top of the Hill. The Wall is made
P. A Ravelin, before the Bastion, the Wall and Stack almost finished
Q. A Battery of 2 Pieces of Cannon, to flank the Angle cut in the Rock
R. A Battery of 30 Pieces of Cannon, to flank the Angle cut in the Rock
S. A Detached Bastion to secure St. Phillips Cove and Command of St. Phillips's Town
T. Intrenchments round the Cove
U. The Royal Battery
V. A Low Ravelin to Close the Ground between the Mountain of the
W. Intrenchments for the same
X. Redoubt of the Right, and for the same
Y. A Curtain of Communication for the same
Z. The Redoubt
AA. Redoubt of the Right, almost inaccessible by its Situation
BB. Two Bastions that may be made for Landing of Stores in the Harbour, which shall be brought up by a Machine
impregnable solely by adding to the fortifications of St. Philip's at a cost of £60,000, but he subsequently supported Durand's proposals for Fort St. Anne, and they were, in turn, approved, in principle, by the Duke of Argyll in 1712. The proposals were no doubt presented once again for consideration by Durand in response to Bolingbroke's request for information about the defences of Menorca in 1714, and would also have been considered by the Master-General of the Ordnance (the Duke of Marlborough) and his committee constituted in 1718 to consider 'the better carrying on the Service in Minorca', but the estimated cost (£175,364.14s.) was prohibitive, and although an entrenchment was started, no more building was undertaken. Thirty years later, the site of Fort St. Anne contained no more than 'a broken Windmill and no House nor Cover for a Man to lie in'.

Durand's plans for the security of Menorca envisaged not only the fortification of both sides of Mahón harbour, but also the strengthening of Fort St. Anthony at Fornells (the other harbour in Menorca capable of accommodating an enemy fleet), the destruction of the walls of Ciudadela (the only town in Menorca which had the potential to be made into a stronghold by an invading enemy), and the demolition of the arrabal of St. Philip's (the houses of which severely restricted the fort's field of fire, and would serve to give cover to an attacking force). Durand's tactical assessment was based upon the following suppositions: Menorca would sooner or later be the object of a French or Spanish, or a combined French/Spanish attack; the garrison could not survive without naval support; the garrison would not be
strong enough to prevent an enemy landing; the likelihood that the Menorcans would not rally to the British in the defence of the island—'the most we can expect is that they won't declare against us before the landing of the enemy'—and, after an enemy landing, the concentration of the garrison in the island's only defensible positions at the mouth of Mahón harbour where, without a fort on La Mola, St. Philip's would be vulnerable to enemy fire and support from the sea could not be guaranteed.

Most of Durand's assessments were prophetically accurate: Menorca was attacked by France in 1756 and by France and Spain in 1782; the arrabal of St. Philip's (which was not demolished until 1771) allowed the French to install telling batteries in the 1756 siege, and the failure to fortify the heights of La Mola gave the enemy the opportunity to overlook and fire unchallenged into the fortifications of St. Philip's in 1756 and 1781/1782. However, Durand's assessments were disregarded—Fort St. Anthony was repaired but not strengthened, the walls of Ciudadela were not pulled down, the arrabal of St. Philip's was not then demolished, and the enemy was able to take advantage of the heights of La Mola to overlook St. Philip's—and throughout the British occupation of Menorca the money that was spent on the island's defences was concentrated on the fortifications of St. Philip's and the south side of the harbour, which were developed very much along the lines outlined in Durand's 1709 plan (Fig. 6.2).

Reference has already been made to the work (costing almost £63,000) which had been undertaken in the years 1708-1712. After Menorca was formally ceded to Britain a further sum of £68,295.10s. was immediately requested to enable work
EXPLANATION

of

St. Phillip's Castle

The Bridge of the Castle
A. Exit by the Harbour
B. Black Bastion in the Harbour
C. Middle Bastion of St. Carlos's Side
D. North of St. Carlos Side
E. Counterguard of St. Stephen's Cove
F. Little Half-moon with a Calmatoe for 3 Pieces of Cannon each Side to defend the Pieces of the Counterguards E & H.
G. A Half-moon of the Same Side
H. Counterguard of the Windmill
I. Little Half-moon towards the Ravall with a Calmatoe for 3 Pieces of Cannon to defend the Pieces of the Counterguard H.
J. A Half-moon with a Calmatoe with 6 Pieces of Cannon and a Gallery men with Cremas to defend the Order of the Branch of the Hornwork N.
K. A Half-Bastion of the Hornwork of the Harbour Side
L. A Half-moon of the Harbour Side
M. A Half-moon to Cover the Great Bastion
N. A Half-moon to Cover the Great Bastion
O. A Half-moon of the Laid Hornwork
P. Counterguard on the Water Side
Q. A Lunette
R. A Lunette by the Windmill
S. Place of Arms Intrenched
T. A Lunette of St. Stephen's Cove
U. St. Carlos Lunette
V. St. Carlos Fort, where the Barracks are to be Built
X. Little Half-moon, where there will be a Battery cut in the Rock
Y. A Battery of 10 Guns
Z. The Great Magazine
A. A Detached Bastion on a Rising Ground
B. Hornwork on the highest Ground about the Castle
C. A Half-moon before the Curtain
D. A Detached Bastion by the Governor's Garden
E. Tour de la Reine's Intrenchment
F. The South for the Garrison
G. The Barracks for the Train
H. The Towers of the Old Line with 3 Pieces of Cannon each and Calmatoes
I. The Old Line made with a dry Wall

Note. That in each Flank of the Body of the Castle, there is one Tower Cannon.
to proceed - £42,010.15s. to finish work already started, and £26,284.15s. to provide new magazines, barracks, hornwork and fifteen lunettes,\textsuperscript{31} - but it was now peacetime, and parliament was slow to authorise the expense. In 1716 and 1717, Lord Forbes, the Lt-Governor of St.Philip's, wrote to General Carpenter (who had succeeded Argyll as Governor of Menorca): deploring the rotten state of the timbers and the porous nature of the limestone construction of the storerooms and accommodation within the fort.\textsuperscript{32} He forecast that, if funds were not speedily forthcoming, St.Philip's 'will tumble about our Ears'.\textsuperscript{33} In 1718, when Spain's Mediterranean policy posed a threat to Menorca, Kane urged that the 'Fund for the Fortifications be early Demanded [in parliament], some Magazines of Provisions be always kept there [in Menorcal and barracks be built within St. Philip's.\textsuperscript{34} The barracks were never built, but Ordnance records show that work proceeded on new fortifications above and below ground until the end of the War of Austrian Succession. The work was carried out under the direction of three Engineers: Captain James Moore (1716-1718), Captain John Petit, Brigadier Petit's son, (1718-1721) and, from 1721, Captain William Horneck. By 1725, the area of the fort had been enlarged with the construction of counterguards, ravelins, redoubts and lunettes, each protected with its own glacis and ditch, and new batteries had been installed (Fig.6.3). In addition, the subterranean works of the fort had been greatly extended, with galleries sunk from the main courtyard connecting with the outworks (Fig.6.4). Although further work was undertaken in the subterraneans, no more fortifications were built above ground after the War of Austrian Succession, and the fort as drawn
in 1756 (Figs. 6.5 and 6.6), together with the sectional view (Fig. 6.7) differed from the fort as it appeared in 1780 (Fig. 6.8), only in as much as its field of fire inland had been greatly improved with the demolition of the arrabal in 1771.

Ordnance costs. (Table 6.1.).

Records are too incomplete and unspecific for a full tally of the expenses incurred by the Board of Ordnance in respect of Menorca to be made, and the relevant Bill Books reveal only the amount of the payments made in the island itself. These payments were made to cover local labour costs and locally purchased materials, and were understandably at their greatest in the early years of construction, and on the occasions when the security of Menorca was threatened but, when there was no imminent danger, the small amounts indicate that little more than low maintenance and running repairs were undertaken.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1. Ordnance expenses (excluding pay).</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1716 - Dec 1717</td>
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<td>Nov 1718 - Sep 1719</td>
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<td>Jan 1770 - Dec 1770</td>
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<td>Jan 1780 - Dec 1780</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 1781 - Dec 1781</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
References of Several works of St. Philip's Castle.

Royal Counterguard
St. George's Counterguard
Hannover Counterguard
Welsh Counterguard
Weihelmina Ravelin
Charlotte Ravelin
Prince Frederick Ravelin
Prince William's Ravelin
Princess Ann's Ravelin
Princess Amelia's Ravelin
A Place of Arms
West Lunett
Uppytuer
S.W. Lunett
S. Lunett
St. Carolus
Marlborough Redoubt
Cadogan Redoubt
Royal Battery

Plan of the Subterraneans of St. Philip's Castle in Minorca, 1712.

Explanation:

a. Entrance of the Sally Port Underneath the Principal Fort. ein
b. Magazine for Wine and Oil in time of a Siege.
c. Store Rooms in Feet lower than the Terre-plain of the Body of the Castle.
d. Kitcning Communicating to the well and Store Rooms.
e. Stairs going from the Governor's house to all the Store Rooms.
f. The Place where Mr. Stanhope Lies.
g. Other Store Rooms on the same Level of the Main Ditch.
h. A door by the Foot into the main ditch, and Opposite to the Inner S.W. Ravelin.
i. Gallery from the N.W. Curtain to the S.E. Curtain.
k. A Powder Magazine Built in the main ditch.
l. Gallery from the main ditch to the Covert way before the Welsh Counterguard and to the S. Lunett.
m. Stairs from the main ditch into the Inner S.W. Ravelin.
n. Gallery to the upper and lower works of the S.W. Lunett.
o. Mines before the S.W. Lunett.
q. Gallery from the main ditch to the Caponiere before the Hannover Counterguard and up to the Covert way before Do.
r. Cannon Cellar in the Charlotte Ravelin.
s. Communication from the main ditch into Prince William's Ravelin, with a Gallery from Do. into the Cannon Cellar and up to the Covert way before the Charlotte Ravelin.
t. Gallery round the Cadogan Ditch.
u. Gallery from the Terre-plain of the Cadogan Redoubt within the communicating Parapet, which is from the Gorge of Do. to the place of Arms before St. George's Counterguard.
w. Mines before St. George's Counterguard and Horn-work.
x. Sally port to the Sea.
y. Gyle Magazine, with a communication to the Terre-plain of Prince Frederick Ravelin.
1. Caponiers to Flank the Ditches.
2. Stairs from the Terre-plain of the Horn-work into the main Ditch.
3. Dry Ditches.
5. Gallery round the Ditch of Do. Redoubt.
6. Communication from the Gallery to the Bridge of Pontoon.
7. Wells of Fresh Water.
8. The prick lines is the Exterior and Interior Covert-ways of the Upper works.
A. The Keep
B. N. Bastion Containing on the platform
C. E. Bastion 1 mortar battery along the
D. S. Bastion curtain from the S.E. and
E. W. Bastion thirteen cannons
F. H. Half-Bastion
G. E. Half-Bastion Hornwork
H. E. Half-Hoorn
I. S.E. Half-Hoorn
J. S.E. Counter-guard
K. S. Counter-guard
L. S.W. Half-Hoorn
M. S.W. Counter-guard
N. H. W. Counterguard
O. H.W. Half-Hoorn
P. N.W. Counterguard
Q. S. Charles Fort
R. Marlborough Fort
S. S. Lunette
T. S. Lunette
U. Caroline Lunette
V. H. Lunette
W. Kent Lunette
X. Queen's Redoubt
Y. Anstruther Lunette
Z. Argyll Lunette
a. Royal Battery
b. Magazine Battery
c. Torre Battery
d. Hospital Battery
e. S. Counterguard, Battery in covered way
f. S. W. Counterguard, Battery
Cannon-ball store
h. S. W. Counterguard (covered way) Battery
i. S. W. Lunette, new Battery in salient
j. Caroline Lunette, new Battery in salient
k. Caroline Lunette, new Battery in salient
l. W. Lunette, magazine new covered way Battery
m. Kent Lunette (covered way) Battery
n. Anstruther Lunette Battery
o. Battery in the Hornwork ditch

Legend (Trans. from French):
P. Crested keeps in the parade grounds in the covered way
q. Entrenchment between the Queen's Redoubt and the Kent Lunette
r. Entrance to the Mine Gallery
s. Stairs linking the Galleries & Ditches
t. Underground link with the sea
u. Quay for the boat to Fort Marlborough
v. Powder magazine in the ditch of the Keep
w. Powder magazine in the defile of the Queen's Redoubt
x. Laboratory for the Artillery & Engineers
y. Laboratory for the Artillery & Engineers
z. Passage to the Glacis
a. Gun carriages
b. Guard-rooms
c. Quay for the sloops
d. General store
f. Artillery store
g. Defence works' store
h. Ironsmith's forge
i. Bread store
j. Carpenters' shop
k. Heels
l. Bog-houses
m. St. Stephen's Hospital
n. Old Kitchens
o. Stone Quarry
p. Limetins
q. Cannon-ball store
r. Entrance to subterraneans
s. Link with Fort St. Charles

Total numbers of cannons: 305
Figure 6.7.

Sectional view of Fort St. Philip.

A. Fortress Rampart.
B. Upper Rampart.
C. Covered Way and Traverse.
D. Counterscarp Gallery.
E. Ditch.
F. Demi-Lune Gallery.
G. Demi-Lune Rampart.
H. Traverse.
I. Demi-Lune Upper Rampart.
A PLAN
of
St. PHILIP'S
CASTLE
and
FORTIFICATIONS
in the Island of
MINORCA.

Engraved by Wm. Foden
1780

Scale of Yards

References.

a. Royal or East
b. St. George's or North
c. Hanover or West
d. Prince of Wales or South
e. King William's or South West
f. Queen Charlotte's or North West
g. Prince Frederick's or North East
h. Princess Amelia's or South East
i. Princess Anne's
k. Prince William's
l. New Lunette or Kane's Redoubt
m. West Lunette
n. South West Lunette
o. South Lunette
p. Carolina's Redoubt
q. Queen's Redoubt
r. Argyle's
s. Anstruther's Redoubts
t. Argyle's Battery
u. Cumberland Battery
v. Castle or Main Guard
Extrapolation of the above figures (which do not include the pay of the British military and civilian members of the Ordnance in Menorca, or the cost of armaments, stores and materials sent from Britain), suggest that the Board of Ordnance spent at least £300,000 in Menorca on local labour and materials. The amount of supplies sent to Menorca is not known, but incidental correspondence suggest that, although they may have been considerable, they were often inadequate and not readily authorised. For instance, at the start of the War of Austrian Succession, at a time when Menorca was under threat of attack from Spain, Captain Horneck had to wait for more than two years for replacements for thirty-three cannons which he had found to be defective\textsuperscript{36} and, in the siege of 1781-1782, no fewer than 127 of the cannons, ships' guns, mortars and howitzers mounted at St. Philip's were unserviceable.\textsuperscript{37}

The annual cost of the Ordnance personnel varied from time to time, according to the numbers on the establishment (Table 6.2), ranging from £3,250 in 1709,\textsuperscript{38} to approximately £5,500 in the late 1760s.\textsuperscript{39} The appreciable increase in numbers recorded in 1767, can be related to a King's Warrant, issued in March 1756, for the Ordnance to be augmented by a company of miners, 208 strong and costing £7,406.9s.2d. per annum.\textsuperscript{40} Half the company was quickly recruited, but sailed too late to reach Menorca before the French were in control of the island. However, the Warrant authorising the increase in the Ordnance establishment must clearly still have been in force after Britain regained Menorca in 1763. Also, in times
## Garrison Establishment - Ordnance

### i. Artillery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank and Position</th>
<th>1714</th>
<th>1726</th>
<th>1732</th>
<th>1742</th>
<th>1756</th>
<th>1764</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>120</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sub-total: 69 80 79 109 225 147

- Storekeeper/Paymaster: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
- Barrack Master: 1
- Book-keeper: 1
- Clerks of the Works: 1 1 6 2 1 1 1 1 1
- " " Survey: 1 1 1 1 1 1
- " " Cheque: 1 1 1 1 1 1
- Extraordinary: 2 1 1 1
- Surgeon: 1 1 1 1 1
- Nurse: 1
- Draughtsman: 1
- Carpenter: 3 2
- Mason: 1 1 1
- Smith: 2 1 1 1
- Cooper: 2 2 2 2
- Wheelwright: 2 6 1 1 1 1
- Armourer: 2 2 1 1
- Plumber: 1
- Turner: 1
- Gunsmith: 1 1
- Locksmith: 1 1

Sub-total: 18 14 19 17 (17) 17 (17)

Grand Total: 87 93 103 128 (242) (164)

### ii. Engineers

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Rank and Position</th>
<th>1782</th>
</tr>
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<td>Major</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
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<td>Sergeant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Privates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artificers</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 2 5 7 9 20 40

1. BL Add Mss 22616, p.309. 'Establishment proposed by the Board of Ordnance for Port Mahon for 1713', 13 April 1714.
3. PRO WD 1/294, p.19. 'Effective Officers and Men as within the Ordnance service in Minorca,1732'.
7. PRO WD 17/2236. Ordnance Muster returns from Minorca, December 1767.
9. AGS/Nlej.3760. Returns of the British garrison at the surrender of St. Philip's, 5 February 1782.
of crisis, as in the winter of 1720, there was an additional element of expense when soldiers of the garrison were employed (for an extra 6d. per diem) in work on the fortifications, but, even discounting such periodic excesses, the pay for the Ordnance personnel in Menorca during the first two periods of British rule can have amounted to no less than £300,000.

The Garrison.

The maintenance of the large British garrison (varying between in numbers from one fifth to one tenth of the total population) posed problems for both the British and the Menorcans. For the British, Menorca was an unattractive posting tainted, in the early years, with the 'despair of never returning home'; differences in language and religion restricted social intercourse with the Menorcans; garrison life was tedious and, apart from two occasions, untaxing and uneventful; too many officers absented themselves from duty, and recruitment, impossible on the island, was very costly from Britain. For the Menorcans, the benefits which accrued from the presence of the garrison - the money spent and in circulation, and the employment created - had to be balanced against the disadvantages - the quarters required, the draining exactment of supplies of wood and oil, and the acts of indiscipline by the troops.

There was an establishment of headquarters' staff for Menorca, for Fort St. Philip and, for thirty years, four officers held staff appointments in the non-existent Fort St. Anne (Table 6.3). During the first period of British rule,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per annum</th>
<th>Per annum</th>
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<tr>
<td>£. s. d.</td>
<td>£. s. d.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### i. Headquarters
- **Governor**: 730. 0. 0.
- **Lt-Governor**: 730. 0. 0.
- **Secretary**: 182. 10. 0.
- **Chaplain**: 121. 13. 4.
- **Commissary of Stores and Provisions**: 730. 0. 0.

### ii. Fort St. Philip
- **Lt-Governor**: 730. 0. 0.
- **Fort Major**: 91. 5. 0.
- **Fort Adjutant**: 54. 15. 0.
- **Surgeon**: 91. 5. 0.
- **Surgeon's Mate**: 45. 12. 6.
- **Total**: £1012. 17. 6.

### iii. Fort St. Anne
- **Fort Major**: 91. 5. 0.
- **Fort Adjutant**: 54. 15. 0.
- **Surgeon**: 91. 5. 0.
- **Surgeon's Mate**: 45. 12. 6.
- **Total**: £282. 17. 6.

- **First appointment was made in 1735.**

The total charge for the Staff in Menorca:

- 1713-1735 = £6154. 18s. 4d.
- 1735-1743 = £6246. 3. 4d.
- 1743-1756 = £5963. 5. 10d.
- 1763-1783 = £5953. 5. 10d.

*First appointment was made in 1735.* The Fort was never built, but appointments were made, and salaries paid for at least the first 30 years of British rule.

---

1 Crofton, Record pp.1,2. Establishment of the Staff of Minorca, July 1712.
four infantry regiments made up the garrison, apart from the years 1736-1746, when a fifth regiment was sent to Menorca to counter the Spanish threat (Table 6.4). When Britain regained Menorca in 1763, six regiments formed the garrison for the next six years, five regiments then garrisoned the island from 1769 until 1775 and, for the final six years, there were four regiments in garrison - two British and two Hanoverian (Table 6.5).

The total cost of the staff in Menorca, since it was not subject to annual variations, can be reasonably calculated to have been in excess of £375,000. It is also possible to give at least a conservative estimate of the total cost of the pay of the infantry regiments, even though the annual cost was not constant because of fluctuations in the numbers laid down for the regimental establishments (Table 6.6). Between 1713 and 1756, the pay of the garrison troops can have amounted to no less than £2,400,000, and further costs of just over £1m. were incurred from 1763-1782 (Table 6.7). In addition, Britain also paid for the two Hanoverian regiments which formed part of the garrison of Menorca 1775-1782, at an estimated cost of £30,000 per annum. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the expense of maintaining garrison regiments in Menorca during the first two periods of British rule exceeded £3,500,000.

A comparison of the cost of maintaining the garrisons in Britain's two eighteenth-century Mediterranean possessions serves to underline the degree to which Gibraltar had surpassed Menorca in importance to Britain by the end of the second period of British rule in the island. In 1713, there were three garrison regiments on the Rock at a cost of
Table 6.4. Garrison Regiments 1713 - 1756.

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<th>Year</th>
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* In garrison from June 1712.  † In garrison from December 1710.
( ) enclose probable, but unconfirmed dates.
### Table 6.6. Garrison Establishment - Regiments of Foot.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Companies</th>
<th>Regimental establishment</th>
<th>Number of Regiments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1713</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>625</td>
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<td>1718</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>560</td>
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<td>529</td>
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<td>477</td>
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### Table 6.7. The cost of the garrison regiments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1713</td>
<td>£47,760.5s.0d.</td>
<td>(4 Regiments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718</td>
<td>£51,398.12s.0d.</td>
<td>(4 Regiments)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1729</td>
<td>£51,136.10s.0d.</td>
<td>(4 Regiments)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1739</td>
<td>£61,036.12s.0d.</td>
<td>(5 Regiments)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1741</td>
<td>£69,841.2s.6d.</td>
<td>(5 Regiments)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1749</td>
<td>£60,869.16s.8d.</td>
<td>(4 Regiments)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>£68,328.0s.0d.</td>
<td>(6 Regiments)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1771</td>
<td>£54,704.3s.6d.</td>
<td>(5 Regiments)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1781</td>
<td>£38,578.19s.7d.</td>
<td>(2 Regiments)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excluding 2 Hanoverian Regiments.

Sources:

1. Crofton, Record, p.11.
£34,856.14s.9d. \(^{44}\) (£13,000 less than the charge for Menorca) but, by 1781, the annual cost of the Gibraltar garrison (five regiments) had risen to £114,575.15s.7d. \(^{45}\) -some £56,000 more than the cost of the troops in Menorca.

From the outset, Britain's intention was that her two Mediterranean possessions would be militarily interdependent and mutually supportive\(^{46}\) - Kane wrote that he regarded them as twins\(^{47}\) - but, while the Menorca garrison never failed to support Gibraltar when the Rock was under threat, the Governors of Gibraltar proved less willing to come to the aid of the island. Kane was ordered to Gibraltar to command in 1720 and 1725 taking with him, on each occasion, troops from Menorca and, in 1780, Murray, although unable to support Gibraltar with troops, succeeded in sending much-needed supplies to the Rock through the Spanish naval blockade. The 26th regiment was sent from Gibraltar to strengthen the Menorca garrison in 1738 when Menorca, and not the Rock, was under threat from Spain, but, in 1756, General Fowke disobeyed an order to send a regiment from Gibraltar to the relief of Menorca and, in 1780, a subsequent Governor of the Rock, General Elliott, retained in Gibraltar the 73rd regiment which was en route to Menorca, thereby adding more than 1,000 fresh troops to his garrison of 5,400 and depriving Menorca's meagre garrison of 3,000 of desperately needed reinforcements. \(^{48}\) However, British strategy, in the event of an attack on Menorca, was based on the belief that the garrison would be able to 'render the place absolutely defensible for three months', \(^{49}\) sufficient time, it was thought, for a relief expedition to be mounted and reach Menorca from Britain. On the two occasions on which this
strategy was put to the test, St. Philip's was adequately provisioned for a siege (enough rations were stored to feed 2,000 men for 180 days), but relief reached Menorca too late in 1756 and, in 1781/1782, no rescue operation was mounted from Britain.

Garrison numbers.

The number of regiments in the garrison (all foot regiments) varied from four to six, and the regimental establishment at any particular time resulted in garrison infantry numbers ranging from less than 2,400 (1771-1775) to more than 4,000 (1739-1746). But these were paper numbers, and the numbers actually mustered on the island only occasionally matched those in the army estimates. These occasions occurred in 1713 and 1763, when regimental establishments were reduced from a war to a peace footing, or as in 1718, 1725, 1749, 1771 and 1775, years in which more than one regiment in Menorca was relieved, when numbers in the incoming regiments were bolstered by men drafted (not always voluntarily) from the regiments which were being relieved. But, in most years, numbers of officers and men mustered in the garrison fell short of the allotted establishment.

Six months before a relief occurred in August 1725, there was a shortfall of seven field officers and 128 rank-and-file; in 1732, five field officers and 244 men were wanting. An injection of recruits then took place, but 164 men were still wanting in 1734. The shortfall assumed alarming proportions during the war with Spain and the War of
Austrian Succession when, in 1741, the garrison regiments were short of 7 field officers and 689 men;\textsuperscript{54} a year later six field officers had yet to return to their duties, and the regiments were short of 790 men\textsuperscript{55} and, by 1745, the shortfall in the numbers of the rank and file had reached 907.\textsuperscript{56} After the War of Austrian Succession, although the programme of regimental relief for overseas garrisons enabled the numbers of the rank-and-file to be more often closer to establishment figures, it did nothing to curb officer absenteeism to the extent that, when the French attacked Menorca in 1756, no fewer than thirty-four regimental and staff officers were absent from their duties, including the Lt-Governor of St. Philip's and the Colonels of all four garrison regiments.

During the second period of British rule, the more regular relief of regiments again went some way towards ensuring that fewer rank and file were wanting but, even so, the shortfall in the 67th regiment was 170 in 1767\textsuperscript{57} and 200 in 1770,\textsuperscript{58} and this was at a time when Johnston, supported by his engineer officers was maintaining that he needed at least 2,000 more garrison troops to mount a successful defence of St. Philip's.\textsuperscript{59} Moreover, the problem of officer absenteeism had not been overcome.

Leave of Absence.

The rank-and-file of the Menorca garrison had neither the means nor the opportunity to take home leave; the officers who had both, were granted periods of leave ranging from six to eighteen months,\textsuperscript{60} but it was a privilege which was often abused. 'The frequent Leave of Absence given to Officers and
to such Numbers at a time,' resulting in a 'manifest Prejudice of the publick Service' had come to light in 1742 in the course of a censure debate in the House of Lords on the poor state of preparedness of the island of Menorca, when it emerged that of the nineteen officers of the garrison staff, only five were attending their duties in the island. The Lords strongly advised George II to order that stricter control be exercised over the granting of leave of absence to officers to ensure that a sufficient number of 'Principal and other Officers' were always resident in Menorca to enable the garrison to fulfil its defensive role. But, as Scouller has remarked, the absenteeism of army officers from garrison duties was not so much a military offence as a tradition. Although Scouller was writing about the army of Queen Anne, it was a tradition which persisted throughout the eighteenth century.

No sooner had Britain regained Menorca after the Seven Years' War than Johnston was writing to the Secretary at War complaining of the number of officers absent from the garrison regiments. In October 1769, he wrote again informing the Secretary at War that the 67th regiment had been without field officers for more than a year and that, in particular, Major Callander had been absent for 'upwards of eighteen months'. He added 'I think it is time he should be ordered to return'.

Major Callander's own memoirs of his time in Menorca confirm the ease and frequency with which it continued to be possible for officers to obtain leave of absence from garrison duties. Callander was away from his regiment from March 1768 until autumn 1769, and from February 1770 until
the end of the summer 1770 (spending much of this latter period aboard a ship of the Russian fleet which was campaigning in the Mediterranean against the Turks). Shortly after his return to Menorca, he set out for Britain, and returned to his regiment only just before it was relieved in May 1771. As Callander himself wrote:

> The duty of the garrison, although sufficiently irksome when it became necessary to attend to it in all its details, was happily not of such a continuous and permanent nature as to be inconsistent with occasional leaves of absence of considerable duration.68

But it was not only officers of Callander's seniority who were granted extended leave. Ensign Thomas Shairp of the 67th regiment had barely arrived in Menorca before he applied for, and was granted, ten months leave, ostensibly to attend a military academy in France 'to be master of the French, Mathamaticks and Fortification.'69 Shairp was absent from his regiment from March 1768 until at least October 1769, and from the expenses he incurred it would appear that his stay in France furthered his social, rather than his military, education.70

Periodically orders were issued from London for absentee officers to return to their posts in overseas garrisons (as in the case of Menorca in 1742). and, in 1770, a period of strained relations with Spain because of the Falklands Islands' dispute, it was decreed that officers who overstayed their leave were to be subjected to courts martial;71 the Chaplain of the 3rd regiment in Menorca was superseded as a consequence of this order.72 But the same order admitted the general 'Inutility of Orders given for stricter
Attendance',\textsuperscript{73} and not all of the complaints received by the Secretary at War about officer absenteeism were supported. When Murray raised the issue in 1776, Lord Barrington replied that the ministry did not think that the political situation made it either 'necessary or advisable' that all absent officers be ordered to join their regiments in Menorca.\textsuperscript{74}

Recruitment.

When the 17th and 22nd regiments embarked for Menorca in 1725, surprise was expressed that both regiments were almost up to establishment numbers, 'it being very disagreeable to the common soldier to go into garrison abroad, which in consequence entails much desertion'.\textsuperscript{75} A tour of duty in Menorca was no more attractive to the majority of officers, although there were a few who actively sought a posting there, either in the hope that the Mediterranean climate would prove beneficial to their health,\textsuperscript{76} or in the expectation of military action.\textsuperscript{77} But there cannot have been many with experience of garrison life in Menorca who will have disagreed with the Duke of Argyll who, in 1742, described a long tour of duty there as comparable to one of the most severe punishments of the Romans, \textit{relegatio in insulam}. Argyll expressed surprise that there had been no incidence of mutiny among the soldiers because of the neglect they had suffered,\textsuperscript{78} and the despair of the rank and file of ever returning home which had given rise to

\begin{quote}
a good many Instances of Soldiers ... shooting off their hands and some of them shooting off their Feet, and some shooting themselves through the Head, of those that have been longest there.\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}
Although there were worse instances of military relegation, the Menorca garrison had good reason to consider themselves neglected. At the time of Argyll's comments, the 9th and 18th regiments had already served in Menorca for twenty-four years, and the 17th and 22nd regiments for seventeen years - the 18th was, coincidentally, relieved in the same year, the 9th after four more years in 1746, but the 17th and 22nd had to wait a further seven years for their relief in 1749.

In reply to Argyll, the Lord Chancellor was unrepentant. He denied ministerial neglect of the Menorca garrison, and defended the long tours of duty on the grounds of savings to the Exchequer. He further argued that soldiers must expect to serve for as long as required wherever they were sent, since it was 'an established maxim, that every man that enlists is patiently to submit to his lot'.

Once again, morale and efficiency were sacrificed to cost-cutting, as they had been in 1730 when, as a result of a report from a Board of General Officers, the ministry had examined (and rejected) a recommendation to institute a 'rotation [of regiments] for foreign service'. It was not until 1749 that the Duke of Cumberland's proposals for the relief of the Mediterranean garrisons were accepted and implemented, and it was found that the cost of relieving a regiment in Menorca amounted to £6,131.3s.6d.

After the Seven Years' War, the Secretary at War attempted to maintain a rotation of garrison regiments in overseas stations, even to the extent of establishing the best months for the relief to take place for each garrison. For
Menorca, the 'most eligible time for landing' was deemed to be from December until March; April and May were 'too near the hot months'; November was 'improper', and the months from June to October were 'absolutely improper' but, as illustrated in Table 6.5, reliefs were not always achieved in the optimum months. Orders were also issued to encourage good discipline and better health in the regiments in transit to Menorca. During the daytime, as many men as possible were to be kept on deck; berths and bedding were to be cleaned and aired daily; smoking between decks and all gaming was prohibited and no-one was permitted to 'vend drams and spiritous liquors'.

The greater the length of a tour of duty in an overseas garrison, the more a regiment suffered from the effects of tedious, repetitive routine, and 'distance, mismanagement, disease, privation, dispersal and a dearth of recruits'. Of these handicaps, the Menorcan garrison regiments certainly suffered from distance, some mismanagement resulting from the absence of field officers, and troops succumbed to climate-related diseases, but, in the main, the principal sources of any lack of efficiency and low morale were the dearth of recruits and the tedium of garrison routine.

The religion of the Menorcans made it impossible for them to be a source of recruits, and the cost of bringing recruits to the island was high. As a consequence, and to maintain numbers, garrison regiments were forced to retain men who, in Britain, would have been discharged as unfit for service, and they had to accept sub-standard recruits who had been inveigled to enlist or had been drafted unwillingly for service in Menorca. In his evidence to the House of Lords in
1742, Anstruther maintained that it was 'utterly impossible' to keep the garrison regiments up to strength.\textsuperscript{89} He cited an extreme example in which it had cost one Captain as much as £40 per recruit for his company in Menorca, and he claimed that 'an Officer in England can have a man for ten shillings, which would cost a Captain in the island ten or fifteen pounds',\textsuperscript{90} an expense which included not only transportation costs but also an added bounty to make enlistment for Menorca more appealing.

No evidence has come to light to support Anstruther's extremely high figure, but a letter from Captain William Congreve (22nd), and the papers of Captain Edmund Bond (9th), confirm that the cost of recruitment for Menorca was significantly higher than for a home-based regiment.\textsuperscript{91} In 1740, Congreve reported that, as a result of a series of natural deaths, drownings and desertions, the latest batch of recruits for his regiment would cost the Captains 'from £15 to £20 a man'.\textsuperscript{92} Four years later, in the summer of 1744, Bond was on a recruiting mission in England, primarily for his own regiment, but also for other regiments in the garrison. Early in June, he collected forty-five recruits from a holding company in Dover Castle and, having marched them to Portsmouth, he took charge there of another thirty-nine recruits before sailing for Menorca on 26th June. His expenditure to this juncture amounted to £54.7s.41/2d,\textsuperscript{93} which was made up of expenditure on 'necessaries' (shirts, shoes, stockings, coats and breeches) and 'luxuries' (beer, tobacco and 'sope'), but also included medical expenses and the cost of burial of two of the recruits. Bond did not reach Gibraltar until 24 September and, for the duration of the
voyage, he had to pay the purser of the Shrewsbury seven pence per day for each of the recruits to cover the cost of their berths and victuals, and there were more medical expenses to be paid to the ship's surgeon. Bond was delayed for a month in Gibraltar, during which time he incurred expenses in excess of £100 for victuals, medical treatment and the cost of burying six more of his recruits. He eventually reached Menorca on 14 November 1744, with a total of sixty-one recruits for the garrison regiments. Of these, nineteen were destined for the 43rd regiment, and nine for the 27th regiment. Of the fifty-seven recruits Bond had started out with for his own regiment, only thirty-three reached Menorca - there had been eight deaths and others, too sick to travel, had been left behind in Portsmouth and Gibraltar. In all, Bond's expenditure, solely in respect of recruits for his own regiment, amounted to some £250, and represented a cost in excess of £7.10s. per man - exclusive of the original bounty paid to each individual. 94

But it was not only the scarcity of recruits which caused problems. The quality of many of the men recruited also caused concern. At the outset of British rule, Kane complained of the 'miserable condition' of the troops in Menorca, 95 and many of the subsequent recruits were poor physical specimens, 96 others were drafted unwillingly to make up numbers, 97 and some were undesirable and unwelcome additions, like the mutineers of the 43rd regiment sent to Menorca as a punishment in 1743. 98 In the same year, agents for the regiments in Menorca were casting about for criminals to be drafted to the garrison regiments, primarily because the government intended to pay regimental Colonels £5. for
every prisoner so drafted. But, even before difficulties in recruiting suitable men for service with British regiments in the War of Austrian Succession had arisen, Brigadier Paget, writing in 1740, deplored the 'vermin' which was being sent to Menorca including 'Highwaymen, Housebreakers and Pickpockets', and resulted in many 'hardened, desperate and incorrigible wretches being dispersed in all the regiments'. Interestingly, both Whitefoord and Paget referred to Irish soldiers among the recruits. Whitefoord wrote of his 'Ireish draughts' which cost him £7 per man, and Paget criticised the great numbers of recruits who were 'Irish Papists', the recruitment of whom was not officially sanctioned until the 1770s.

Although the garrison regiments were relieved with greater frequency in the second period of British rule, Menorca was still not considered an attractive posting and, in 1763, excessive bounties were offered for suitable recruits to make up numbers for the 3rd regiment. Initially, £3.10s. was offered for a 'Granadier', and £3. for a 'Battalion man', amounts which were subsequently increased to five guineas for grenadiers, four guineas for men 5ft.7ins.-5ft.9ins and three guineas for men 5ft.5ins.-5ft.7ins. in height. By 1771, the garrison had to be bolstered by a draft of 400 men from British-based Invalid companies (composed for the most part of elderly and infirm men), and by the inclusion of Catholics from Ireland, the recruitment of whom was now officially sanctioned (despite their religion), because of the shortage of suitable recruits.
Garrison Routine.

In 1712, Argyll promised that the garrison troops would not be 'dispersed about the island', but would be housed within a year in barracks to be built within the fortifications at St. Philip's. But no barracks were built anywhere in Menorca until the second period of British rule and, even then, troops continued to be dispersed about the island.

For the majority of the time that Menorca was British, four regiments formed the garrison. Of these, one was accommodated in St. Philip's, together with the Ordnance and the Artillery; one regiment was billeted in Mahón, one in Ciudadela (with a small detachment of twelve to twenty men at Ferrerías), and the remaining regiment had eight or nine companies quartered in Alayor, with one company on detachment to man Fort St. Anthony at Fornells. A fifth regiment, which was added to the garrison from 1738 until 1746 was housed in St. Philip's and its arrabal, as was a sixth regiment from 1763 until 1768; overcrowding in St. Philip's was not eliminated until the completion of the barracks in Georgetown in 1774. Throughout British rule in Menorca, regiments changed station every year in April or May. This annual change of quarters had been instituted by Kane in an attempt to introduce some variety into the monotony of garrison life, but it was an initiative which had its critics. James Lind wrote in 1748, that it would serve many good purposes if the regiments,

were to continue in the same quarters as long as they staid in the Island; it would encourage the soldiers to industry, and the officers to purchase lands.
and make improvements, by which they might have
by degrees a considerable property in the Island,
and facilitate an acquaintance with the natives,
which would more and more reconcile them to us.\textsuperscript{109}

Not many of the officers of the garrison regiments would have
subscribed to Lind's philosophy of fraternisation and
settlement, but more would have supported plans to remain on
station for longer than one year. It was expensive and
hazardous to move possessions, since there were no waggons,
carts or horses in Menorca, and only a few officers had
'chaises'.\textsuperscript{110} Mules, donkeys and muleteers had to be hired at
some expense to individuals,\textsuperscript{111} and baggage too bulky to be
transported on the backs of the animals was sent by sea to
and from Mahón, Ciudadela and Fornells.\textsuperscript{112} Some officers,
Whitefoord and Paget among them, finding the quarters
allocated to them unsuitable, either paid more for a more
spacious quarter (as in Whitefoord's case),\textsuperscript{113} or chose to
build their own houses which they rented or sold to brother
officers when they were posted\textsuperscript{114} - Paget even went to the
extent of creating a 'fine Lawn' in the front of the house he
had built near Alayor\textsuperscript{115} - but most accounts support the
view expressed by Captain Congreve who found the expense of
furnishing and 'housekeeping' his quarters far beyond his
reckoning.\textsuperscript{116}

The attractions of the various garrison posts varied.
Whitefoord found Ciudadela the 'quietest and cheapest';\textsuperscript{117}
Armstrong also reported the general opinion that a posting to
Ciudadela was the best in the island.\textsuperscript{118} Armstrong
considered that there was little wrong with the officers'
houses and barracks in Alayor, where 'provisions are plenty
and the duty easy.'\textsuperscript{119} Of the other postings, Mahón was the
most expensive but least monotonous, Fornells and Ferrerías were isolated and undesirable, and St. Philip's was where, as Tables 6.8 and 6.9 illustrate, regiments bore the brunt of garrison guard duties.

The rank-and-file of the regiments stationed in Mahón and Ciudadela were quartered in squads within company areas of the towns, in clusters of houses requisitioned from the 'lesser Burghers', which were converted into barracks for their use.\textsuperscript{120} The general orders for the garrison required that non-commissioned officers be assigned to live in each of these barracks, to keep the men in good order, and to prevent:

their gameing, drinking, Swearing and bringing any Idle women to the Barracks, and take care that neither bedding, Doores, Windows, Shutters, or anything else belonging to the Barracks be Imbezild.\textsuperscript{121}

In addition, in 1727, Lord Carpenter decreed that a weekly report be made on the state and condition of all the barracks, and a check made on the personal hygiene, food and kit of the soldiers, who were to be issued with one pair of clean sheets per month.\textsuperscript{122} A Regimental Order of the 51st regiment in 1771 reveals that this was not an individual issue, since it was common practice for two men to share a bed. The authorities drew a line only when overcrowding threatened to place three men in a bed, in which eventuality it was decreed that 'all the women of that company shall be turned out of the Barracks.'\textsuperscript{123}

For all the troops, each day began with Reveille at daybreak, followed by morning Tattoo at 7a.m. in the summer months (April-October), and at 9 a.m. for the remainder of the year. The roll was then called, and any specific orders
### Table 6.9.

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*Gloucestershire Record Office, Ms D 2026 X39, Bond Papers.*

1. 9th Regiment.
2. 17th Regiment.
3. 22nd Regiment.
for the day were given out. Those not required for duty were
dismissed, but soldiers mounting guard were then exercised
every morning, weather permitting, according to the Drill
Regulations in force at the time. Initially, these were the
Manual Exercises which were laid down by Marlborough in
Flanders,\textsuperscript{124} with particular emphasis on the 'Exercise of the
Firelock and Bayonette with so much of the Match Lock
Exercise as is necessary to be known for the defence of a
Place Besieged'.\textsuperscript{125} The Regulations were amended in 1728, 1748
and 1764 and the changes were implemented by the garrison
regiments, but Regulations introduced in England in 1778 were
not adopted in Menorca before the island was lost in 1782.

Apart from those detailed for night sentry duties, the
working day finished for the soldiers when Retreat was beaten
half an hour before sunset, and the second roll call of the
day took place. The troops were then free, but had to return
to barracks before evening Tattoo was sounded at 9 p.m. in
the winter and 10 p.m. in the summer.

Sentry duty was, therefore, the most onerous and the most
regular duty which the garrison troops were called upon to
perform but, in a situation in which the local population
posed no threat to military security, it was a routine which
was unexciting and unappealing, and the duty was not always
carried out conscientiously either by the guards or the guard
commanders. This laxity was particularly noted towards the
end of British rule, when Murray had cause to reprehend the
'Indecent and unsoldierlike Behaviour' of the sentries, and
caused orders to be issued reminding them that they must not
whistle, sing, sit down, drink alcohol or talk to

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'passengers' while on duty,\textsuperscript{126} and the Governor warned that 'any delinquency in this situation is unpardonable'.\textsuperscript{127}

In the light of the untaxing nature of the working day for the majority of the garrison troops, it is surprising that reports of their low morale did not extend to greater criticism of the troops' military efficiency - particularly during the first period of British rule when regiments went unrelieved for such long periods. The answer here may be found in the interest shown by Kane\textsuperscript{128} and Blakeney\textsuperscript{129} in the Drill Regulations, for it is inconceivable that they did not insist upon a high standard of performance in the Manual Exercises when the garrison regiments were on parade, or were being reviewed. Few records have survived of the annual regimental reviews, but of those which exist from the second period of British rule, reports on the 3rd, 51st and 61st regiments reveal that the Commander-in-Chief in the island was satisfied with the military efficiency of the troops, and a report on the 33rd regiment, which was reviewed in England in 1769 immediately on its return after a six year tour of duty in Menorca, stated that the regiment was in an excellent state of training.\textsuperscript{130} But, if the reports of the annual reviews confirm that Commanders in Menorca were generally satisfied that the garrison regiments contained disciplined men of war, other sources reveal that no such reliance could be placed on the off-duty standard of discipline of the troops they commanded.

Garrison Discipline.
In all the British overseas garrisons in the eighteenth century military law prevailed, and soldiers (and their women) were subject to the Articles of War and the Mutiny Act which was reviewed and renewed annually by parliament. In Menorca, Garrison Orders decreed that the relevant Articles be 'fixt up in the Barrack of each Company', and they were to be read regularly to all ranks - usually on the occasions of the two-monthly regimental musters. In accordance with the Articles, all ranks could be dealt with either summarily by a company or battalion commander or by court martial.

From the outset, the indiscipline of the garrison troops gave commanders cause for concern. After a duel had taken place in 1710, an attempt was made by Admiral Norris to allow the 'Justices of the Island' to sit in judgement in the trial of Captain O'Brien (Captain of the hospital ship in Mahon), who was accused of killing Major Symes, but O'Brien, supported by the officers of the garrison, refused to recognise the authority of the Menorcan courts, and the matter was dealt with by a naval tribunal. In 1712 Colonel John Fermor sought authorisation to hold general courts martial in Menorca because 'the Soldiers are so disorderly'. The authorisation was given and, in 1724, the Attorney General, deeming Menorca to be a frontier garrison, further clarified the powers of the Commander-in-Chief by ruling that, even in capital cases, sentences approved by him could be carried out in the island without reference to any higher authority in Britain. Courts martial were either regimental or general. The former dealt 'in house' as it were, with less serious offences, commonly those committed
within the garrison or regiment, and general courts martial dealt with serious dereliction of duties and all serious criminal acts committed against soldiers or civilians. Unfortunately, records of courts martial, both general and regimental, are too incomplete to produce a reliable tally of the offences and lapses in discipline committed by soldiers of the garrison. There were instances of murder, robbery, rape, assault, desertion, self-mutilation and serious insubordination, but there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the incidence of these crimes in the Menorca garrison (with the exception of self-mutilation), was any greater than it was elsewhere in the British army - if anything, the contrary would appear to be more probable, certainly in respect of the number of desertions. The variety and likely incidence of petty crimes and misdemeanours can be deduced to a degree from the injunctions contained in Garrison and Regimental Orders but, here again, these were offences common to all regiments and garrisons at the time - profanity, brawling, gambling, selling equipment, uniform or rations, theft, unauthorised debt, entertaining prostitutes in barracks and drunkenness.

According to the few records which have survived, there was considerable variety in the sentences meted out by regimental courts martial, ranging from verbal reprimands to corporal punishment. Some punishments for minor offences such as being slovenly dressed or breaking bounds, were designed to reform offenders by humiliating them, forcing them to wear distinctive caps, wear their overcoat turned inside out, or be chained to a log in full view on the parade ground; additional stoppages of pay or fines were imposed on those
guilty of a first offence of drunkenness, losing or damaging army property, running into debt, or failing to disclose the contraction of venereal disease; other comparatively trivial offences of conduct prejudicial to good military discipline merited confinement to barracks, additional guard duty, extra drills and inclusion on the Black Strap list (a list of those to be put to general barrack or garrison fatigue duties), or a spell in the Black Hole on a diet of bread and water. Corporal punishment was meted out for repeated drunkenness (60 lashes), absenting from work without permission (100 lashes) and for insubordination (300 lashes). Those found guilty of offences by general courts martial suffered proportionally greater sentences - 1,000 lashes for attempted desertion, death by firing squad in front of the regiment for sentries guilty of deserting their posts, and death by public hanging for those found guilty of theft and of murder.

Of these offences, the most prevalent and the most damaging to discipline in the army as a whole was drunkenness and this was particularly true in Menorca where excessive drinking (with wine costing no more than one penny or three half-pence a bottle, and cheap brandy also readily available), not only proved the principal cause of indiscipline, but was also very damaging to the image of the garrison in the eyes of the Menorcans. Armstrong wrote that 'such a Quantity of Wine is daily swallowed down [by the troops], as would stagger Credulity itself to be told of it'; Major Cunningham recorded the Menorcans were treated to the 'daily example of Sogers lying drunk on the road'.

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and Garrison Orders in 1775 acknowledged that 'Drunkenness and all the abuses which are derived from it' had been prevalent in the garrison for some years.\textsuperscript{153} But drunkenness was a vice common to all classes of society in the 18th century, and there is evidence that officers of the garrison succumbed to temptation to over-imbibe as readily as the men under their command. Brigadier Paget wrote that some of his officers had become 'useless' to him on this account.\textsuperscript{154} Captain Whitefoorde freely confessed that he over-indulged,\textsuperscript{155} and one of the first acts of Lt-Colonel Henry Pringle after his arrival in Menorca in 1771 was to lay down twenty-five dozen bottles of vintage wine at the princely cost of £1.16s.\textsuperscript{156} But in defence of all ranks in Menorca, it can be argued that three factors contributed to drive them to drink: boredom, resulting from untaxing, unrewarding and thoroughly predictable routine duties; little prospect of promotion and none of improving their lot financially, and, particularly for the rank and file, a sense of isolation and abandonment.

Reference has already been made to the undemanding nature of the garrison regimen in which Armstrong found that:

One undergoes more Hardship and Fatigue in one Day's shooting, which we call a Diversion, than in three Weeks of the Strictest Duty an Officer is put to in the common Course of our Service.\textsuperscript{157}

It often allowed officers to 'read, write or draw until noon, walk or make a party at cards'\textsuperscript{158} or, like Captain Whitefoorde, become an 'Assembly man and play at Quadrille with the Ladies'\textsuperscript{159} in the afternoon. The regimen did not make them conscientious. Whitefoorde, when detailed for guard
duty, obeyed but only after a protest, typical of 'Minorca Discipline'. Major Callander, appointed to inspect the quality of the wood and oil supplied to the garrison with additional pay of £1 per diem, appointed a deputy at a salary of five shillings, and 'performed my part of the duty as I fear is generally done [here] by Government officers - I never looked at the wood, nor tasted the oil'. The only variations of routine which occurred for some officers and men of the garrison occurred in 1720 and 1725, when detachments were sent to support the garrison of Gibraltar, and from 1741-1744 when detachments of 400-500 officers and men at one time served for spells as marines on board the Mediterranean fleet. Except for a period in the early 1740s, when officers of the 22nd regiment unjustly incurred Anstruther's wrath for inexplicable reasons, and were prohibited from moving freely about the island, no restrictions were placed on the movement of officers. For the rank-and-file, unless granted furlough or a pass for a specific reason, they were restricted to the immediate environs of their barracks. For them, time dragged heavily. Most could not read or even write their names, and their resourcefulness for self-entertainment was limited.

The eighteenth century was an age in which promotion for officers at home or in an overseas garrison, general officers excepted, was achieved more by influence and purchase than by seniority or merit. Captain Stephen Gillman of the 18th regiment was one who was promoted to Major while serving in Menorca, but his subsequent attempt to improve the efficiency of the regiment, backed by fourteen brother officers and Governor Kane with pledges totalling £80, to buy a commission.
for Sergeant Millner to 'discharge the duty of Adjutant', was unsuccessful, even though there was no person 'so proper' to fill the post which Millner was prepared to do without the additional salary attached to the post.  But the lack of prospects for officers without patronage or money is perhaps best illustrated in Gillman's next letter to his Colonel, Major-General Armstrong, in which he informed him of the death of Lieutenant John Dalbos, who had gained his commission in 1706, and who died in January 1737 at the age of seventy-five, still not having attained the status of senior subaltern in the regiment. An even more extreme case of promotion stagnation is cited in the records of the 51st regiment in the form of an anonymous letter to an unknown peer:

My Lord,

I was a Lieutenant when General Stanhope took Minorca, for which he was made a Lord. I was a Lieutenant when General Blakeney lost Minorca, for which he was made a Lord. I am a Lieutenant still.

Yours etc.,

For the rank-and-file prospects were almost as forlorn, since they could expect promotion only when corporals or sergeants were broken or died, and opportunities were further restricted when promotion to non-commissioned rank was restricted to those who were literate and able to make out their reports in a satisfactory manner.

Pay and the cost of living.

The rates of pay remained constant for all ranks throughout the periods in which Britain garrisoned Menorca,
and they were not generous (Table 6.10). Brigadier Paget complained of the expense to which he was put for 'keeping a table and that constantly'; proprietary Captains saw the profits they could make out of their companies substantially eroded by the cost of recruitment, and they were, at times, forced to incur debts to raise subsistence money to pay their companies when pay for the regiment failed to reach Menorca in time. In the second period of British rule, this was a regular and not an occasional grievance. Subalterns, even bachelors like Ensign Thomas Shairp eating in messes, could not expect to make ends meet without private means. In 1769, an English doctor visiting Menorca found the cost of living there double the amount he had been paying while taking his degree at Montpellier University, and his 'eating, drinking and lodging' cost him more than fifty guineas for the twenty-three weeks he spent on the island — nearly as much as an Ensign's total annual pay.

The pay for the garrison was authorised annually by parliament and, as in other overseas garrisons, it was administered by a deputy to the Paymaster General. The Deputy Paymastership for Menorca was a sinecure, and the holder expected to make a profit from the difference he could obtain from the rate of exchange of the dollar in London with its lesser exchange value in the island. One annual account, dating from the first period of British rule, shows that a profit of £1,682.19s.9d. was achieved, but a balance sheet for 1740-1741 records a loss of £625. Nevertheless, the post was generally financially advantageous for, when Sir Francis Poole, the Deputy Paymaster for some years previously, was forced to vacate it in 1743, he was granted
Table 6.14.

Establishment of Full Pay and Regulations of Subsistence for the Regiments in the Garrison in the Island of Minorca.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay</th>
<th>Subsistence</th>
<th>Full Pay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>per diem</td>
<td>per diem</td>
<td>per annum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£.  s.  d.</td>
<td>£.  s.  d.</td>
<td>£.  s.  d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Colonel (cap) 1. 4. 0.1 18. 0. 438. 0. 0.
Lt-Colonel (cap) 17. 0.2 13. 0. 310. 5. 0.
Major (cap) 15. 0.3 11. 6. 273. 15. 0.
Chaplain 6. 8. 5. 0. 121. 13. 4.
Adjutant 4. 0. 3. 0. 73. 0. 0.
Quartermaster 4. 0. 3. 0. 73. 0. 0.
Surgeon 4. 0. 3. 0. 73. 0. 0.
Surgeon's Mate 2. 6. 2. 0. 45. 2. 6.

Captain 10. 0. 4 7. 6. 182. 10. 0.
Lieutenant 4. 8. 5 3. 6. 85. 3. 4.
Ensign 3. 8. 6 3. 0. 66. 18. 4.

Sergeant 1. 6. 1. 0. 22. 7. 6.
Corporal 1. 0. 8. 18. 5. 0.
Drummer 1. 0. 8. 18. 5. 0.
Private 8. 6. 12. 3. 4.

* Crofton, Record p.2. Orders of 15 November 1712.

1 12s. as Colonel, 8s. as Captain and 4s. in lieu of servants.
2 7s. as Lt-Colonel, 8s. as Captain and 2s. in lieu of servants.
3 5s. as Major, 8s. as Captain and 2s. in lieu of servants.
4 8s. as Captain and 2s. in lieu of servants.
5 4s. as Lieutenant and 8d. in lieu of servants.
6 3s. as Ensign and 8d in lieu of servants.
compensation of an annual pension from the secret service fund of £200 rising to £300 up to the time of his death twenty years later. Moreover, his son, Henry, who succeeded as Deputy Paymaster from 1747-1756, received compensation totalling £1,325 for the loss of his emoluments during the French occupation of Menorca. Payment ceased only with the fall from power in May 1762 of the Duke of Newcastle, the Poole family's patron. 177

The pay which reached the garrison was calculated on a weekly basis in sterling, but was paid in coin in the island in Menorcan currency. The troops, however, did not receive the full amount of pay each week, merely a lesser subsistence allowance, with stoppages or deductions made from the full amount of pay to cover basic rations and certain regimental overhead charges. Adjustments were made every two months, and any arrears of pay were paid at the time of the regimental muster. In the early years of British rule (1712-1730), the private soldier received his subsistence allowance (nominally 3s.6d.) in two equal portions, paid on Tuesdays and Fridays, but stoppages were deducted: 9d.-1ld. for 5 1/2 rations of bread, 6d.-8d. for a weekly ration of 4lbs. of beef and 3 3/4d.-4 3/4d. for his regimental necessaries - shoes, stockings, gaiters, medicine, shaving and mending of arms. 178

In theory, this left each private soldier with weekly disposable pay of 1s.6d - 2s. to pay for food to supplement his diet, drink, tobacco, the cost of necessaries not included in the regimental stoppage, and the maintenance of his personal clothing (washing, repairs and periodic replacement). 179 In practice the men received less than that amount in coin, since most incurred debts to the company
commander under a variety of headings (borrowing, fines for damage caused or drunkenness), and these were recovered over a period of time by means of additional stoppages. By 1771, the actual disposable weekly pay of a private soldier in Menorca (discounting additional stoppages) had dropped to 4d. but, by that time, stoppages for rations (1s.10d.) included provisions of fresh bread and meat, vegetables and 'roots', and regimental stoppages included all necessaries to the extent of including hair powder and the washing of two shirts per week. 180 Apart from the cost of wine already mentioned, the price of comestibles, varied little in the course of the century. In the 1740s, fish was plentiful and cheap, 181 beef cost 4d. and veal and mutton 6d. per pound and one quarter of a sheep 1s. 182 Poultry was readily available, turkeys cost 3s.6d, geese 1s.3d, ducks 10d. or 1s. and chickens 5d. 183 - prices which were virtually unchanged in 1778 184 - and Armstrong suggested that prices became inflated only when the fleet was in harbour in numbers. 185

There was little opportunity for members of the Menorca garrison to increase their income. For officers this was limited to an appointment to a staff post which paid an additional salary - Fort Majors or Adjutants, Secretary to the Governor, Deputy Judge Advocate and Commissary of Musters. But, in the second period of British rule, the Secretary at War became opposed to the plurality of appointments, and objected to officers serving in the garrison holding other posts which were essentially civilian employments. 186

After regimental stoppages, Sergeants could find themselves with a subsistence allowance of as much as 6s. per
week, but their rank brought additional expenses and financial liability. While the 51st regiment was in garrison in Menorca, Sergeants were required to pay for their own surtout coat and buff gloves,¹⁸⁷ and they were also liable to be held responsible for payment for the loss of necessaries or equipment by soldiers in their squad.¹⁸⁸ But it was also possible for Sergeants to supplement their income by undertaking other remunerative duties within the regiment — instructing newly-joined junior officers in the Manual of Exercises (as much as 3s. per hour); teaching in the regimental school (7s. for two 2 hour lessons per week), or by acting as foremen of pioneer parties detailed for work on the island's fortifications (an extra 9d. per day), but it was rare for them to be allowed to seek paid work outside the garrison.¹⁸⁹

Corporals and Drummers, who were not in arrears, could enjoy a weekly subsistence allowance of 3s. - 3s.2d but, as with Sergeants, expenses were incurred in maintaining an exemplary standard of turn-out. They were seldom given permission to undertake non-military paid work, but Corporals could supplement their income by assisting the drill Sergeant in the tuition of young officers on the parade ground, and in teaching in the regimental school. Drummers could also earn a bonus by assisting on the parade ground.¹⁹⁰

There were a number of ways in which a private soldier could earn extra money. If he was literate, he could act as clerk to the Quartermaster or Adjutant, or act as an amanuensis for his fellows; a number of men in each company were employed as officers' servants and enjoyed extra pay (as much as 1s. per week)¹⁹¹; those who had been cobblers,
barbers or tailors\textsuperscript{192} by trade before enlistment could expect to be employed 'in house' by regiments at fixed rates of extra pay and, if detailed for a pioneer working party, soldiers could expect to earn an extra 6d. per day as labourers, more if they were skilled artificers.\textsuperscript{193} It was common practice in the eighteenth-century army for private soldiers who were off duty, or who were officially excused duties, to seek outside employment. The first garrison troops in Menorca followed this practice, but their impact on the limited labour market on the island 'occasioned Complaints by injuring the Country', and the Garrison Orders of 1720 temporarily banned the practice.\textsuperscript{194} But, such was the necessity for the private soldier to supplement his pittance of pay, the practice was soon revived and, by 1771, it was well established and accepted, as a Regimental order of the 51st regiment illustrates:

\begin{quote}
Every Soldier that is permitted to work shall not be obliged to make good his Guards but, as the Wages in this Island are very high, he must pay out of the money he earns, 2s. every week to the Adjutant to be disposed of for the use of the Regiment.\textsuperscript{195}
\end{quote}

The only restrictions imposed by the regiment were that permission was not to be granted to 'offenders' to be 'working men';\textsuperscript{196} those to whom permission was granted were to wear 'such cloathes as is proper', and not uniform, for the job for which they had been hired.\textsuperscript{197} There is nowhere a list of the sort of activities on which the working men were employed, but the only restriction which seems to have been in force was that working men were not permitted to be 'so mean as to carry things about the Street to sell for any Person whatsoever', under pain of a sentence to the Black

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Strap for a month. 198 Some work will have been seasonal, like harvesting, other jobs will have been more regularly available like general labouring or acting as stevedores on the commercial quay in the harbour. It is possible that some were more permanent - Armstrong wrote that the stallage or inn at Alayor was usually kept by a soldier,199 and Augustus Hervey, in his journal, recorded that he lodged in a tavern in Mahón, also kept by a soldier.200

Women and children.

Army policy in the eighteenth century did not encourage young officers or other ranks to marry, and they were forbidden to do so without the permission of their Commanding Officer. If they married, officers had to meet the living and travelling expenses of a wife, both considerable items for an officer in the Menorca garrison. Most senior officers looked upon the wives of other ranks as excess baggage, likely to debauch the troops and spread venereal disease.201 Nevertheless, it was accepted that it was not realistic for the army to be composed entirely of single men, and it was usual for a regiment to allow, on average, four soldiers per company to be accompanied by a wife, but no concessions were made, even for the 'recognised' wives - those whose marriages were legal and had been officially sanctioned.202

No official returns were made of the number of women and children attached to the garrison in Menorca, and the picture which can be painted from irregular and incidental references to them, is patchy. At the end of the War of Spanish Succession, when all the British regiments in Catalonia were
temporarily withdrawn to Menorca, Kane complained of the number of 'plunderers and strollers that belong to no regiment' who had followed the troops to Menorca, but he was able to ship most of these camp followers out of the island at the same time as the soldiers supernumerary to the reduced garrison numbers established in June 1713. Twenty years later, in 1734, Kane reported that there were 306 women and children attached to the garrison, but, by 1756, the number had risen to 448 women and 379 children. Of these, 410 women and 347 children belonged to other ranks, which resulted from each of the four garrison regiments having, on average, a total of women two and a half times greater than the generally allowed limit of forty per regiment. No protest was made from Menorca about excessive numbers of women and children until Johnston wrote to the Secretary at War in 1770, to complain that the 25th regiment had brought 86 wives and 78 children into garrison with them when they had arrived the previous year. Johnston considered this number excessive, and he urged Lord Barrington to put a ceiling on the numbers of wives permitted per regiment. He added that there was insufficient work in Menorca for so many women, even if they were willing to undertake it, and he thought that many of the women were 'too lazy and good for nothing to earn their livelihood'.

When the 67th regiment was recalled to Britain in 1771, after eight years service in Menorca, no mention was made of the number of women accompanying the troops, but Major Callander was shocked to discover that he had to arrange passage for 'upwards of forty children, offspring of deceased soldiers of the corps'. In 1775, the Secretary at War wrote
to Murray, drawing his attention to the fact that regiments were improperly seeking compensation for the cost of passage and victualling of the families of discharged soldiers. The indulgence, he wrote, was intended to be granted only to widows and orphans, 'others have in husbands and fathers a support still remaining'. The last available figures for the garrison show that a total of 318 British women and children were repatriated after the siege in 1782. Of these, 45 were wives and 42 children of the artillery company, and the two garrison regiments had only 90 wives and 139 children between them - a figure very much more in line with the officially approved number of four wives per company.

It is more difficult to establish how many officers' wives followed their husbands to Menorca. Of the Governors, only Johnston and Murray were accompanied. Captain Congreve wrote in 1738 that there were 'only a few Officers Wives' on the island, but Captain Cunningham in 1781 reported that 'all Captains but three' in the garrison had their wives with them. The number of officers' wives present at the time of both sieges - thirty-eight in 1756 and twelve in 1782 - reflects only those who had not left the island in anticipation of an enemy attack, and the total clearly falls short of the numbers who would otherwise have been on the island with their husbands.

Among the other ranks it will never be known how many of them were 'recognised' wives and how many were common-law wives or camp followers but, if the numbers accompanying the 25th regiment when it was drafted to Menorca are taken as a guide, many women must have come openly with their men to the island. Because of religious taboos on both sides, no
marriages are known to have taken place between other ranks and Menorcans and, apart from wives who may have come from the few Protestant civilian families, or from widows or children of other servicemen, only one other source was possible. The Gibraltar Garrison Order Book for 1728 recorded: '7th February, Came in a ship from Ireland laden with women'.\textsuperscript{216} It is surely not without the bounds of possibility that some of these camp followers will have journeyed on to Menorca.

Senior officers made no distinction between recognised wives and camp followers.\textsuperscript{217} Some married men were allowed to sleep out of barracks (a privilege that could be withdrawn as a punishment), but other couples (and their children) were expected to share barrack space with single soldiers, and no women or children were victualled at the expense of the regiment. In common with women in other garrisons, the women of the regiments in Menorca had to earn their own livelihood to support themselves and any children, and they did so by working as laundresses, cooks, seamstresses, barrack cleaners,\textsuperscript{218} and, in the 51st regiment, they were expected to act as nurses in the hospital, and to care for the sick in barracks.\textsuperscript{219} Some worked legitimately, others unofficially, as sutlers, some as servants to officers' families, and a few were permitted to 'hire out to the Inhabitants'.\textsuperscript{220} The women and children of the 51st regiment were treated free of charge by the Surgeon and the Apothecary, and medicine was paid for by the regiment,\textsuperscript{221} but any woman who failed to disclose that she was suffering from venereal disease, was liable to be drummed out,\textsuperscript{222} and no woman could get a passage out of the Mediterranean garrisons without being in possession of a
certificate from the Surgeon to the effect that she was 'neither Poxed nor Clapped'. The regiment was also more sympathetic than most to the plight of 'Distressed Families', and several Regimental Orders record collections being taken up on their behalf, and donations of clothing and food being made to the desperately needy. In return, all women were not only called upon to act as nurses, but also to undertake other work as the need arose - as in the siege of 1781 when they were put to work making 'Saucissons and Powder bags' for the artillery.

Army wives and camp followers in overseas garrisons in territories where British civil justice was not in force, were usually subject, like their men, to the Articles of War and the Mutiny Act. Women guilty of minor crimes could be merely cautioned, persistent offenders could be dealt with summarily by the Provost Marshal, flogged or drummed out of the regiment on the orders of the commanding officer, or they could be dealt with by courts martial. The entries in the Gibraltar Garrison Order Book confirm that punishments meted out to women transgressors were every bit as severe as those meted out to soldiers, but the treatment of women in the Menorca garrison differed in one respect. In 1765 two soldiers and the wife of one of them were tried by court martial and sentenced to death for robbery and murder. The two men were hanged, but Colonel Townshend, the interim Commander-in-Chief, wrote to the Secretary of State to solicit a King's pardon for the woman, Mary Rogers. Halifax's reply was terse:

in the trial of the Soldiers you may have acted regularly; but with respect to the Woman, or any Person not Military, a Court Martial has no competent
Jurisdiction; and therefore your Trying her was totally Irregular.228

In the circumstances, Mary Rogers was pardoned, but no subsequent clarification can be traced of the system of justice to which the women of the garrison and the British civilian population were considered to be subject.

A case has been made that, until the middle of the 19th century, the work performed by the women of the regiments was of vital support for the British army.229 While conceding that the soldiers of the Menorca garrison will have appreciated the creature comforts afforded by the women in the garrison, they were in no other way indispensable. The soldiers were expected to be self-sufficient with regard to cooking, cleaning, laundering and repairing their own clothes and, in most regiments they provided the nursing orderlies for the sick. As Paul Kopperman has stated, an army, by definition, must be composed of soldiers, but many senior officers in the eighteenth century (among whom must be numbered General Johnston) considered that the army could do without the military support work of the women of the regiment, whose presence they regarded as an unnecessary expense and detrimental to military discipline and efficiency.230

Regimental and Garrison Orders.

Regimental Orders reflected the standards of competence and behaviour expected of individual regiments, whereas Garrison Orders were the general orders by which a uniform standard of military discipline was regulated for all the
troops. Consequently, while Regimental Orders not only contained prohibitions and admonitions which supplemented or particularised General Orders - as, for example, in respect of sentry duty, or causing offence to Menorcans during Carnival time - they also contained directives designed to safeguard and improve the efficiency of the regiment. The Regimental Orders of the 51st regiment, for instance, reflected the concern felt for the health of the troops in the Menorcan climate: sentries were to keep in the shade as much as possible, and to keep a piece of paper inside their hats as 'some defence against the Sun'; soldiers were warned against drinking water which had not been boiled, and they were excused Parade and Roll Call if it was raining heavily; soldiers were ordered not to 'Bath themselves' after troop Beating in the morning or before Retreat in the evening, nor to lie down in the grass or in the sunshine since those practices produced 'Agues, Pleurisies and other Disorders'.

Garrison Orders not only reiterated relevant Articles of War, and regulated the standard of discipline required of soldiers on and off duty in garrison or barracks (and particular care was taken to avoid disputes when two Hanoverian regiments made up the garrison from 1775), but they also decreed the obligations of all ranks of the garrison in respect of the Menorcans: no offence was to be given to the clergy or civil magistrates; there was to be no interference with the island's quarantine regulations; trespass on private land was forbidden; no services were to be exacted from the Menorcans without due payment; only quarters essential to requirements were to be requisitioned.
from civilians, and officers were required to share quarters wherever possible; supplies of wood and oil, as regulated, were intended for individual consumption and were not to be disposed of for profit; soldiers were forbidden to roam the countryside, and officers were not to shoot during the birds' breeding season. 238

But, for all the care that was taken to avoid giving the Menorcans' cause for complaint against the military government and the conduct of the garrison, it was inevitable that incidents should occur and, in some instances, abuses recur, which led to acrimonious disputes and discontent on both sides. Records chronicle incidents which illustrate the mutual distrust of the military and the Menorcans, and question both the assiduity of the investigations into offences, and the vigour of the prosecutions which took place under the respective judicial systems.

The Menorcan authorities failed to identify or to punish any of the murderers of at least ten soldiers killed during the first period of British rule, 239 whereas, as has already been mentioned, the British could claim to have executed soldiers found guilty of the murder of civilians. In order to demonstrate the extent to which he was determined to establish good discipline in the garrison, Kane went so far as to promise any soldier a reward - and the promise of a discharge and a passage home, if he so desired - for information leading to the conviction of any member of the garrison accused of serious assault, rape or murder. 240 But, in 1753, when two Menorcans, found guilty of an assault on soldiers, were sentenced merely to a fine of less than £8, Blakeney was outraged and, taking the law into his own hands,
he imprisoned the culprits for eight months until the Secretary of State ordered their release. In 1764, Johnston exceeded his authority by decreeing that any Menorcan found guilty of cutting down trees without permission must be sentenced to six months labour without pay in the King's service. And, in 1780, Murray was accused of over-reacting and usurping the authority of the magistrates when, exasperated by a lack of co-operation, he ordered armed parties of soldiers and sailors to scour the island and 'search every House, Convents and Nunneries not excluded' to look for Samuel Hamilton, a deserter from the 61st regiment.

But, if the military had some cause for complaint about the 'defect in the [Menorcan] laws and the partiality shown [to the Menorcans] in trials', the bulk of the evidence suggests that the Menorcans had greater reason to feel aggrieved that justice (in their eyes) was not always seen to be done by the findings of the military tribunals. This was particularly evident in the cases which arose out of the alleged abduction and rape of Menorcan women. In 1716 the Jurats commissioned their Syndich, Juan de Bayarte, to make representations to the British government not only of the 'Thefts, Robberies and Murders' perpetrated by the garrison, but also to highlight the attacks on Francesca Cabeda, who was abducted and 'forced and enjoyed all night' by some officers in the Fornells garrison; Margarita Pons, who was 'forced in the open fields' by a soldier, and the attack on a widow, sexually assaulted by an Adjutant and two other persons, who, rather than live with her dishonour, threw herself from an upstairs window and later died.
Subsequently, the Menorcans were outraged when Blakeney refused to take any punitive action against officers involved in the affair of the eloping nuns in 1749. In 1767 Johnston instituted no criminal proceedings against a sergeant in the artillery, who was accused of molesting women in Mahón and of wounding two Menorcans who came to their rescue, nor did he take action against some officers who had entered, uninvited, a house in Mahón and forced their attentions upon the women in it, dismissing the complainants as a 'parcel of Scoundrels'. Finally, Murray summarily rejected the petition of Bernat Ferra, who submitted that the court martial of Lieutenant John Lloyd of the 61st regiment for the rape of his daughter, Francina, had been farcical, and Lloyd's acquittal iniquitous in the light of well-attested evidence. Although courts martial found soldiers guilty of theft, assault, and murder of male Menorcans, it is remarkable that, throughout the years in which Menorca was garrisoned by British troops, there is no record of a successful prosecution of a charge of rape.

Other instances could be cited in which soldiers or the military authorities stood accused of infringing the civil rights of individuals - the most notorious of which was Wynyard's ill-judged and ill-fated decision to allow Admiral Medley to press among the Menorcans for sailors for the fleet in 1745 - but the most recurrent accusations of abuse by the military government in Menorca concerned the burdens imposed upon the Universitats in the obligation to provide the garrison with supplies and quarters.

Garrison Supplies.
The British expected the Universitats of Menorca to ensure that the garrison was provided with meat throughout the year, and to pay for the cost of wood (for heating) and oil (for candles) for the troops during the winter months (1 November–31 March). The weekly provision of meat is known to have been twelve 'black cattle' and ninety sheep per regiment in 1730, when the regimental establishment totalled 615,247 but it will have increased proportionately when regimental numbers were augmented to wartime establishments. The garrison paid farmers nominated by the Universitats the regulated price for the cattle and sheep provided, and problems arose only in the years when drought killed cattle, or when the presence of the fleet in port placed excessive demands on the market.

Even before the British conquest of Menorca, the Universitats had been required to contribute equally towards the cost of the provision of wood and oil for the garrison of St. Philip's, but the garrison numbers before 1708 were small, and the cost to the Universitats was of 'little consequence'.248 Under the British, the garrison numbers were doubled from 1708 until 1712, and were at least five times greater than the numbers of the Spanish garrison of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries throughout the years of British rule, consequently the provision of wood and oil made considerably greater inroads to the island's resources and finances. In December 1712, Argyll laid down - calculated on the basis of an allowance corresponding to rank or appointment - the monthly amounts to be provided by the Universitats. These amounted to 197 quintals249 of wood and 420 pounds of oil per regiment, plus 16 quintals of wood and
14 pounds of oil for the Artillery and 53 quintals of wood and 56 pounds of oil for the garrison staff. These amounts were increased in 1735 and 1739 and 1741, when they totalled 620 quintals of wood and 408 pounds of oil per regiment, and, in 1744 the garrison of St. Philip's alone was supplied with 2,000 quintals of wood but, even so, Armstrong estimated that a subaltern's allowance of oil was sufficient only for one lamp for a week, and his allowance of wood would stretch only to boiling his kettle on two mornings a week. There was some reduction in the amounts required when the garrison regiments reverted to peacetime establishments after the War of Austrian Succession, but demand increased after 1763 until in 1771, the Jurats successfully petitioned to have the allocation restored to the allowances in force in 'General Blakeney's time'. In 1777, a further petition by the Jurats persuaded the British government to make an adjustment to the allowances, but the savings to the Universitats was comparatively insignificant - £162.5s. in a total outlay of £1,256.16s.3d in 1777. The system was, of course, open to abuse. Regimental butchers took bribes not to select prime animals, staff officers improperly took the allowance of wood and oil allocated to the staff appointment in addition to the allowance made to them in their regimental rank, and one of the many complaints made by the Menorcans against Anstruther was that he, and his secretary, had demanded an excessive amount of these supplies and had sold the surplus for profit. But the principal recurrent grievance of the Menorcans, individuals and Jurats, sprang from the abuse of
quartering troops in civilian houses in the towns in the island.

Quarters for the garrison.

Although the Jurats had been assured in 1712 that quartering in private houses would be a temporary measure, troops continued to occupy civilian houses throughout the years in which Menorca was British - even after the construction of barracks in Mahón in 1772, and in Georgetown in 1775/1776. There are no records which can establish the extent to which houses were requisitioned in towns other than Mahón, although it is known that as many as 200 houses were used by British troops at one time or another in Ciudadela. Records of the houses requisitioned in Mahón are far from complete but, in 1720, 1727, and 1737, forty houses were required for officers or staff officials. In the early years of the second period of British rule, between sixty-four and seventy houses were required for officers, and a further twenty-four were needed for the rank and file, including one large property specifically designated for 'soldats casats'(married soldiers). The houses designated as barracks for the troops accommodated from six to forty-two soldiers and non-commissioned officers, bachelor subalterns (and sometimes Captains) were, at times, required to share a billet, but field officers had a house to themselves. However, as late as 1781, Captain Archibald Cunninghame wrote that all the officers of the 51st regiment had 'very tolerable Quarters', with every officer allocated a house to himself in Mahón.
The quartering of troops was open to abuse on both sides. The Jurats' recurrent complaints were that the army retained quarters which were unoccupied (usually when officers left Menorca on leave); quarters were requisitioned for people not eligible to be housed by the Universitats (in 1728 two houses were known to be occupied by 'English Ladies', and a letter from Dorothea, widow of Captain Crisp, to the Jurats in 1739, revealed that because of her large family and great misfortune she had been allowed to occupy a quarter rent free for some years past) and, in 1771, the Jurats protested that shore billets for naval officers were not a fair charge upon the Universitats. Instances were cited of brutality and heartless treatment by the military when commandeering quarters, as in the case of an Alayor family summarily turned out of their house, and their furniture and belongings dumped in the street, even though the wife had given birth only days before, and the Jurats felt strongly that they should not bear all the costs of the repairs of a house that had been used as a quarter or a barrack.

The British Governors, to whom these complaints were addressed, all issued regulations governing the use of civilian quarters by the army, but only Mostyn, during his short stay in Menorca in 1771-1772, tackled the associated problems with any marked degree of determination and, much to the satisfaction of the Jurats, issued a series of orders which were successful in curbing some of the abuses of which the Jurats had complained - unnecessary retention of quarters, ineligible tenants - and he established a shared responsibility for damage to structure and fixtures during tenancy. But most Governors, while not going as far as
Johnston, who dismissed the Jurats' protestations as 'frivolous and unjust complaints by a parcel of turbulent Spirits', answered the Jurats with complaints of their own. They accused the Jurats of being uncooperative, causing unnecessary delays in providing quarters, and of selecting unsuitable and unacceptable houses for use as quarters. The Jurats were also accused by their fellow Menorcans of bias in the selection of properties, and of being niggardly in the compensation paid to some owners for the houses chosen. Bias by the Jurats in favour of their friends was to be found in the selection of a dilapidated house, the repairs of which would then become a charge on the public purse, and bias against those not in favour with the Jurats could be seen in the deliberate selection of a house, the loss of which would predictably cause great hardship to the owner and his family.

In some instances, the army did not requisition an entire house, merely a room or rooms where a junior officer would lodge under the same roof as the house-owner and his family. In these circumstances, the rate of annual compensation to the owner was £(M)4. per room, but it was more usual for whole houses to be requisitioned, and the rate of compensation here ranged from £(M)15. to £(M)40. per annum in the early years of British rule, and generally from £(M)22 to £(M)65 in the last years of the British garrison, although during this period the rental compensation for the house occupied by the commander of the Mahón-based regiment was £(M)100, and the quarters allocated to the 'soldats casats' cost the Universitat £(M)134. The total compensation paid by the Universitat of Mahón for the forty
houses requisitioned for officers each year from 1713-1739 was £(M)1,356,286 but the number of houses needed by the garrison had risen to nearly seventy by 1775, and the annual cost to the Universitat had increased to £(M)2,051.287 The increased expenditure arose from the greater number of houses requisitioned, and not from the rate of compensation per house, which remained almost constant while the British were in garrison, and which, in most instances, represented a financial loss to the house-owner.

While it can be shown that the presence of the British garrison generated commercial opportunities for many Menorcans, and helped to raise the living standards of most inhabitants with the labour market it created and the money it brought into circulation, the requirement to house and supply the garrison made heavy demands on the public funds of the Universitats. In a memorial to the Spanish court in 1781 outlining the parlous state of Menorca's public finances, Dr Francisco Seguí Sintes contended that the primary cause of the Universitats' debts lay in the expenditure for quarters and supplies for the garrison. He estimated that the annual cost 'communibus annis' of the garrison to the Universitats amounted to nearly 42% (£(M)13,800) of their annual income of £(M)33,200.288 Paradoxically, the building of barracks in Mahon and the creation of Georgetown did little to lessen the burden.

Barracks.

The promise made to the Jurats in 1712 that barracks would be built within a year, was made on the assumption that
Durand's plans for the fortifications would be approved. In the event, only some of Durand's proposals were adopted, and these did not include new barracks for the troops; consequently the Universitats remained responsible for finding quarters for the out-garrisons (troops not accommodated in St. Philip's and its arrabal). The Universitats did not respond to Kane's suggestion in 1713 that it would be in their financial best interests to pay for the construction of barracks from public funds, and it was not until 1751 or 1752 (after they had experienced garrison numbers rising to double the 1713 establishment of 2,500 during the War of Austrian Succession), that the Jurats of Mahón put forward plans to build barracks on the eastern fringe of the town. Agreement was reached with Blakeney on a site bordering the newly enlarged parade-ground - land beyond marks 5 and 6 in Figure 6.9 - but Blakeney disapproved of the Jurats' design, describing it to the Secretary at War as an 'awkward improper pile of a building', and the Jurats, in turn, declined to incorporate the alterations proposed by Major Cunninghame, Blakeney's Engineer in Ordinary. The political confusion resulting from the ill-defined respective authority of the Governor and the Jurats produced by the 1752 and 1753 Regulations halted further developments before Menorca was lost in 1756. But, although the increased numbers of the French garrison made even greater demands on the Universitats' resources, - two regiments, not one, a total of 1,600 officers and men, were stationed in Ciudadela, and elsewhere the French called upon the Jurats to accommodate as many as eighty rank-and-file under a single civilian roof - the Jurats did not proceed with their building project,
and it was not revived until the British resumed control in 1763.

Shortly after Johnston arrived to assume his command, he was presented with a petition from all the Universitats which, among other requests, asked for the profits of the estanque to be allocated to them in order that they could be used to build barracks for the out-garrison troops. Johnston refused the Jurats' request, but during his absence in London, one of his successors as Commander-in-Chief, Lt-Colonel Thomas Townshend, reversed this decision in 1765, and allowed the estanque money to be used to repair roads and to start work on the construction of barracks in Mahón on the site already agreed upon by Blakeney. The design of the barracks is illustrated in Figure 6.10, and Townshend estimated that building costs to the Universitat would amount to £6,000. By August 1765, the first floor of the soldiers' barracks had been built and, by mortgaging the future profits of the estanque, Townshend reported that he hoped the barracks would be finished in time for the annual change of quarters in the Spring of 1766. However, Townshend was reprimanded by the ministry for exceeding his authority in respect of the estanque funds and, when Johnston returned to Menorca in December 1765, he suspended all work on the new barracks. Moreover, Johnston refused to pay for the land on which the barracks were being built. Pending the outcome of the Privy Council inquiry into Johnston's governorship (one charge concerned the allocation and use of estanque money), work remained at a standstill until the Council decreed in February 1770 that the profits were to be shared between the Governor and the
Jurats, and were to be devoted to paying for public services. The Jurats of Mahón once again applied their share towards the costs of the barracks which, by March 1772, were finished to the extent that twenty-four barrack-rooms were able to accommodate six hundred men and twenty-four sergeants, but the design plans for the barracks were never fully completed since no quarters for officers were built and the Jurats still had to provide accommodation for them in houses adjacent to the parade-ground. Three years later, when Murray decided, for reasons of military security to withdraw one regiment from Mahón to the new barracks at Georgetown, the Jurats of Mahón were understandably aggrieved that they had been put to unnecessary expense in the construction of the barracks, and they protested to the British government not only on this count, but also because of the loss of trade and revenue represented by the transfer of the troops.

While quarters for the out-garrisons in Menorca were a charge upon the Universitats, the barracks at St. Philip's and its arrabal were the responsibility of the British government. They were never considered to be either desirable or satisfactory quarters, particularly the houses used in the arrabal and, in 1764, Colonel Mackellar, the Chief Engineer, submitted proposals to demolish the arrabal and rebuild the town and new barracks for two regiments at Cala Font, a mile distant from the fort, a site chosen because its situation was 'healthy and pleasant', and it was 'an easy distance from duty at St. Philip's'. Mackellar was also under the impression that site was crown land and would therefore not lead to any purchasing expense, but in this he was mistaken since, in 1771, compensation totalling £1,477.7s.9d. was
shared between the five proprietors whose land was requisitioned. Two arguments prompted Mackellar's suggestions. For years it had been predicted, in the event of an enemy attack on the fort, that the buildings of the arrabal would restrict the fort's field of fire and would give cover to the attacking troops (Figure 6.11). This proved to be the case in 1756 when, even though the houses closest to the fort had been demolished in 1741-1742, when Menorca was under threat of attack from Spain, the remaining houses were considered 'obnoxious to the fortifications', and limited the effectiveness of the canons of the fort which 'bore to the land.' The second reason was that the houses of the arrabal had suffered badly during the 1756 bombardments and many which still had to be used as officers' quarters and as barracks for the troops were structurally unsound, unhealthy and 'fit only for the poor who built them'. In Mackellar's opinion it was more expensive to repair the houses than to build new barracks at Cala Font, the cost of which he initially estimated as £2,660 for accommodation for the rank and file, and £3,833.4s. for officers' quarters per regiment, a total expenditure of £12,986.8s. for two regiments. For two years after the proposals were first put forward in 1764, no further representations were made in order that they would not 'retard the necessary Work on the Repairs of the Fortifications', but by January 1766, Johnston considered it 'absolutely necessary' to revive Mackellar's proposals, and he sent a further report from the Chief Engineer, supported by the commanding officers of the artillery and the
11th and 13th regiments, urging the implementation of the plans to build the new town and barracks at Cala Font. 314

It took another four years and a final representation of the 'absolute necessity for the Security and Defence' of Menorca, 315 for the necessary authorisation to be given for the creation of Georgetown at Cala Font. Part of the reason for the delay was that, in addition to the expense of the new barracks, there was also the matter of the compensation which would have to be made to the owners of the houses to be demolished in the arrabal. In response to an inquiry by the Secretary of State, 316 Mackellar submitted a report in June 1771, in which he estimated that, of the 1,047 houses in the arrabal, 105 were in such a ruinous state as to not merit compensation, and that the maximum compensation (at an average of £30 per house) would amount to £27,260. However, Mackellar stressed that, since the new inhabitants of Georgetown were to be given land free, they should be allowed only a third or a quarter of the above amount, and that compensation should be paid only to those who undertook to rebuild houses in Georgetown. 317 Mostyn further clarified discriminatory payments for owners of the houses in the arrabal, establishing that full compensation be paid only to those owners who had remained in situ during the siege of 1756, a third of the value should be paid to those owners known to have supported the British at that time, and only a quarter of the value of the property be paid to those who had come into ownership since 1756. 318

However, before the arrangements for compensation had been established, the Falkland Islands' crisis and the prospect of war with Spain had forced Mostyn, in February 1771, to
accelerate the demolition of the arrabal, and he issued orders for the houses to be evacuated within three weeks, but he urged the ministry to pay interim compensation to the homeowners for the distress which would inevitably ensue. This request was sympathetically received, in principle, by the home government, but money for compensation was not readily forthcoming. By December 1776 only £818.12s.2d. had been paid, and it was not until October 1778, that the total amount of compensation (paid in accordance with the scales established by Mostyn) was received by the homeowners of the former arrabal. In the meantime, Georgetown was taking shape (Figure 6.12). The barracks, built to the same design as the barracks in Mahón and at a total cost of £12,998.9s.4d, were fit to receive soldiers by 1775, and by March 1777, it was reported that nearly 500 houses had been built in the new town. The demolition of the last remaining houses owned by civilians in the arrabal was completed a month earlier, in February 1777, but seventy-four houses were retained at a cost of £1,630, to be used as quarters for the officers of the regiment in garrison in the fort, although Murray was unhappy at the prospect of the officers being 'shut out' of the fort and the men 'left to themselves' within it.

There is no reference in British archives to the construction of other barracks in Menorca, nor are the island archives any more informative, since the records of the Universitats other than Mahón are either disorganised and largely unclassified (Ciudadela), or inaccessible (Alayor and Mercadal), but a French visitor to Menorca in 1804 suggested that more barracks were built during the second period of
British rule. Saint Sauveur stated that a barracks for 200-225 men was built in Alayor, a barracks for 200 men and a 'petit pavillon' for officers had been built in Mercadal, a barracks for 60 men, a 30-40 bed hospital and a lodging for the commander and officers had been built in Fornells, and barracks for 200 men had been constructed in Ferrerías, but, while these buildings may have been constructed during the second period of British rule, they were not, as Saint Sauveur implied, either built by the British or with British money. Saint Sauveur also mentioned four barracks in Ciudadela capable of accommodating 470 infantrymen and 30 cavalry men, but these barracks were almost certainly built under Spanish rule (1783-1798), since the British military presence in the former capital declined from regiment strength in 1763, to no more than three companies in 1776.

Few British overseas garrisons offered attractive postings to officers, even fewer were congenial to the rank-and-file, and Menorca was no exception. In peacetime the garrison often contained as many regiments of Foot as there were in England, with the result that there were too many soldiers on the island with too little to do. Yet, paradoxically, on the two occasions they were called upon to justify their raison d'etre, there were too few soldiers to do all that had to be done. It was a garrison which the authorities at home neglected in peacetime, and forsook when Menorca was threatened or attacked.


*Concordia Discors: or an Argument to Prove that the Possession of Dunkirk, Port Mahon, Gibraltar and Other Places by the English may be of Worse Consequence ...* (London, 1712).

HMC Reports, *Stuart Papers* vol. V. Charles Caesar to Marlborough, 14 December 1717.


Ibid., p. 54.

Real Academia de Historia, Col. Salazar N-47, pp. 231-236.

Georges de Salazar to HMC, 30 October 1708.


Ramis, *Fortificaciones*, pp. 58, 59. Table of annual expenditure on St. Philip's 1558-1596.

PRO WO 1/294, f. 711. Extract from a letter from Paget to Corbiere (information conveyed to the Duke of Newcastle), 2 February 1740.

Ibid., ff. 727-729. Whitefoord to Hardwicke, 11 April 1740.

Ibid., ff. 711, 712.

Ibid., ff. 728, 729.

Whitefoord Papers, p. 10. Whitefoord to Captain John Dalrymple, 12 April 1739.

PRO WO 1/294, f. 712.

PRO WO 1/728.

PRO WO 1/727, 728, 713.

KAO U 1590 0140/60, 'Project for the Security of the Island of Minorca'. This plan has been dated 1715 in the Kent Archives, but the project clearly predates this, since it received Stanhope's approval in August 1709 (KAO U 1590 0139/43, Stanhope to Petit, 17 August 1709).

KAO U 1590 0141/10, Stanhope to Marlborough, 29 March 1709.

PRO CO 174/15, ff. 89-91. 'A Calculation of the Expenses of the Fortifications to be done on the other side of the Entrance of the Port of Mahon over Against St. Philip's Castle,' unsigned, 1712.

PRO CO 389/54, Bolingbroke to Durand, 22 April 1714. There is no record of Durand's reply.

PRO CO 389/54. Marlborough's committee was one of seven inquiries instituted by James Craggs in relation to the government of Menorca, 21 June 1718. PRO WO 1/295, f. 303 refers to a report of Marlborough's findings and recommendations submitted to the Privy Council by a Board of General Officers in response to Craggs' request on 18 March 1719, but the report itself is not to be traced.

HMC, *Various Collections* vol. 55, no VIII, p. 363. Flothard to Hon. John Molesworth, 6 September 1723, suggests that the
foundations of St. Anne's were not developed for two reasons: political crises in Europe and the self-interests of the Engineers 'who would not have been so long employed as at St. Philip's'.

28 The Examination of Major-General Anstruther, Lt.-Governor of Minorca, before the H---- of L---- (London, 1742), p. 20.

29 KAO U 1590 0140/60, Durand's Project, op. cit.

30 see chapter two.

31 PRO CO 174/15, ff. 89, 90. 'Estimate of further Fortifications near St. Philip's'. Unsigned and undated, but almost certainly late 1713 or early 1714 at the latest.


33 Ibid., Forbes to Carpenter, 6 January 1717.

34 PRO CO 174/15, f. 188. Kane to Carpenter, 20 October 1718.


36 PRO SP 41/36, f. 195. Montagu (Master-General of the Ordnance) to Newcastle, 29 June 1742.

37 PRO WO 72/10, Appendix Ss. 'State of the Guns and Mortars etc. on the several Batteries at St. Philip's Castle', 5 February 1782.

38 KAO U 1590 0123/12. Annual Charge of the Artillery in Minorca, 1709.


40 Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Ms. Eng hist c. 231 f. 32. King's Warrant for a Company of Miners to be formed for the Garrison of Minorca (1 Captain, 1 Captain/Lieutenant, 2 Lieutenants, 2 Second Lieutenants, 2 Lieutenant Miners, 10 Sergeants, 10 Corporals, 4 drummers and 176 Miners), 30 March 1756.

41 PRO WO 53/455 records that as many as 300 soldiers were so employed in October/November of that year.


43 The Correspondence of King George The Third vol. 3: From 1760 to December 1783 (ed.) J.W. Fortescue (London, 1928), p. 313. George III to Lord North, 9 August 1775, makes it clear that the Hanoverian troops were to receive the same pay as British troops. But, while the total numbers of officers, men and staff for each regiment are known, the ranks are not, consequently the cost of each regiment can only be estimated at £15,000 p.a.


45 PRO WO 17/2236, Muster Roll 1780-1781.

46 PRO WO 1/294, f. 9. Newcastle to Kane, 16 March 1732.


49 PRO Calendar of Home Office Papers of the reign of King George III 1760-1765, p. 1660. Granby to Halifax, 6 March 1765.

50 BL Add Mss 23638, ff. 26, 27. 'An Abstract of the Species and Quantities of Provisions Required [in the event of a siege] for 2,000 Men'. Unsigned and undated, but c. 1741-42. The provisions were calculated on the basis of a daily ration to each man of 4 oz oil, 1/4 oz salt, 1/2 oz tobacco, 1/4 pint brandy, 1 pint wine and a weekly allocation of 6 rations of bread and 4 lbs of beef.
54 Ibid., f.809. State of the Regiments in Minorca, 22 April 1741.
55 BL Add Mss 35452, f.42. State of the Regiments in Minorca, 1 May 1742.
57 PRO WO 17/2236. Muster Returns, 1 December 1767.
58 Scottish Record Office, Ms GD 30/1590/10. Ensign Shairp to his grandfather, 7 June 1770.
59 PRO CO 174/6, f.88. Johnson to Weymouth, No.29, 20 October 1770.
60 PRO WO 4/332, f.30.
61 Proceedings of the House of Lords, 1742, pp.80-104. An Examination of the State and Condition of Minorca.
62 Examination of Major-General Anstruther, p.31. In addition to the Governor, the Lt-Governor and the Lt-Governor of St.Philip's, the following were also absent: The Commissary General of Stores and Provisions, the Deputy Judge Advocate and Commissary of Musters, the Joint Secretary to the Governor, the Governor's Chaplain, the Captain of the Ports, the Fort Major of St. Philip's, the Surgeon of St.Philip's and all the staff officers of the non-existent Fort St. Anne - Fort Major, Adjutant, Surgeon and Surgeon's Mate.
63 Ibid., p.30.
64 Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne, p.274.
66 Ibid., f.120. Johnston to Barrington, 9 October 1769.
68 Ibid., pp.219,220.
70 Scottish Record Office, Ms GD/30/1894. Melchior Cherb and Co. to Walter Shairp (Thomas Shairp's father), 25 September 1769, lists expenses to a tailor, to a coffee-house, a hatter and a fencing-master among others, but there is no mention of any payment to a military academy.
76 Staffordshire Record Office, Ms D 1057/M/I/3/2. Captain William Congreve to his brother Richard, 8 October 1738.
77 Whitefoord Papers, p.xvi. Captain Charles Whitefoord exchanged into the 18th regiment in the garrison in 1738 at a time when it appeared likely that Spain would attack Menorca but, when he saw no prospect of active service in the Mediterranean, Whitefoord exchanged again and went to the
West Indies as aide-de-camp to his uncle, Lord Cathcart, in 1740/1741.

78 Proceedings of the House of Lords, 1742, pp. 82, 83. Censure debate on the state of Minorca, January 1742.
79 The Examination of Major-General Anstruther, p. 13.
80 The 40th regiment was left to garrison Newfoundland and Nova Scotia from 1717 until 1765, and the 38th regiment rotted in the West Indies for forty-nine years (1716-1765).
84 Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline, p. 117 note 19. The cost of relieving a regiment at Gibraltar was £4,297.18s.0d.
86 Ibid., f. 444.
89 The Examination of Major-General Anstruther, p. 14.
90 Ibid., p. 24.
91 Gloucestershire Record Office, Ms D. 2026, X35-X44. The papers of Captain Edmund Bond.
92 Staffordshire Record Office, Ms D 1057/M/I/3/16, 18 December 1740.
93 Ibid., D. 2026, X38.
94 Ibid.
96 G. le M. Gretton, The Campaigns and History of the Royal Irish Regiment (Edinburgh, 1911), p. 70. Major Stephen Gillman to Major-General John Armstrong (Colonel of the regiment), 1729, described a recent draft of sixteen men as the worst he had ever seen, and it included one man 'wanting above half his right foot'.
97 F. L. Petrie, The History of the Norfolk Regiment (Norwich, 1924), p. 60 cites PRO WO order of 20 May 1718, by which the two youngest companies of the 27th (consisting of 74 Soldiers, 4 Sergeants, 4 Corporals, 4 Drummers and the 2 youngest Captains, Lieutenants and Ensigns) were drafted compulsorily into the relieving regiment, the 9th Foot. An additional 28 men and a Quartermaster were also chosen by lot and drafted into the 9th regiment.
99 Ibid., p. 85.
100 PRO WO 1/294, f. 714. Paget to Corbiere, 2 February 1740.
101 Ibid.
102 Whitefoord Papers, p. 4. Charles Whitefoord to his brother, Hugh, 15 December 1738.
103 PRO WO 1/294, f. 714. Paget to Corbiere, 2 February 1740.
104 Knight, The Historical Record of the Buffs, p. 212, citing PRO SP 1/165, ff. 805-813.
105 BL Add Mss 38212, f. 310. Jenkinson to Amherst, 21 December 1779.
In 1771, there were 110 Irishmen in the 61st regiment, nominally Protestant, but almost certainly mostly Catholic.

The daily rates of 1s. for a mule and 9d. for a donkey were fixed c. 1718. From Mahon to Ciudadela, the hire of a mule cost £4s. and a donkey £3s.

There were a total of twenty-two Regimental orders relating to sentry duty from 1771-1777.

Author of The Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne from 1689 to 1712. Also A New System of Military Discipline for a Battalion of Foot in Action'. This work was written before 1736, but not published in London until 1741.

Author of The New Manual Exercise. To which is added the Evolutions of General Bland (Philadelphia, 1746).


Crofton, Record. General Orders for the Garrison, no 42, 1720.

Ibid., no 38.

KAO U 1590 0140/41. Petit to Stanhope, 1 November 1710.


PRO CO 389/54. Yorke to the Secretary at War, 22 May 1724 and Newcastle to Kane, 25 May 1724.


NAC, Ms MG 18.L 8. Pringle Papers, Regimental Orders 51st regiment, 13 June 1771.

Ibid., Regimental Order 20 May 1771.

Gloucestershire Record Office, Ms D2026 X41(ii), Bond Papers, November 1745.
140 NAC, Ms MG 18.L 8. Pringle Papers, Regimental Order 51st regiment, 19 September 1777.
141 Ibid., Regimental Order 4 May 1777.
142 Ibid., Regimental Order 7 June 1771, 19 June 1771, 7 August 1771
143 Ibid., Regimental Order 14 October 1771.
144 Ibid., Regimental Order 16 October 1771.
145 Ibid., Regimental Order 14 October 1771.
148 PRO CO 174/3, Halifax to Townshend, 15 March 1765 refers.
149 Steppler, The Common Soldier, pp.124,125.
150 In 1740, wine cost 1 1/2d. a bottle (PRO WO 1/294, p.714. Paget to Corbière, 2 February 1740). In 1771 the cost dropped to 1d. (NAC, Ms MG 18. L 8. Pringle Letter Book, f.142).
151 Armstrong, History, pp.251,252.
154 PRO WO 1/294, f.714. Paget to Corbière, 2 February 1740.
155 Whitefoord, Papers, p.11. Whitefoorde to Dalrymple, 12 April 1739.
158 Ibid., p.238.
159 Whitefoorde Papers, p.11. Whitefoorde to Dalrymple, 12 April 1739.
161 Campbell, Memoirs, p.181.
162 PRO WO 1/294, f.789. Orders to Col. O'Farrell (interim C-in-C), for troops to serve as marines, 14 May 1741.
163 Staffordshire Record Office, Ms D 1057/M/I/3/27, Congreve Letters, 30 July 1742.
164 Seasonable and Affecting Observations on the Mutiny Bill, Articles of War and Use and Abuse of a Standing Army. In a Letter from an M.P. to a Noble Lord (London,1750), p.37, refers to a restriction of movement, of more than two miles from Ciudadela.
165 Gloucestershire Record Office, Mss D 2026 X41, X42, Bond Papers. Muster Rolls for Captain Bond's company of the 9th regiment show, surprisingly in view of the general restriction of movement of the rank and file, that from five to eight men were 'absent by leave' (discounting those serving as marines) for each of the musters extant from 25 October 1744 until 24 April 1746. A total number of fifteen privates appear to have been granted leave for periods of four to eight weeks.
166 Ibid., X41(i). On 2 March 1745, Captain Bond paid his company arrears of pay. His three sergeants signed in a firm round hand, but most of the other signatures were poorly formed, and two corporals and more than a third of his men could do no more than make their mark.
167 le Gretton, The Campaigns and History of the Royal Irish Regiment, pp.71,72.
170 PRO WO 1/294, ff.735-744. Paget to Corbiere, 10 February and 22 March 1741.
171 Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline*, p.64. A Captain could normally expect to add at least £18.5s. to his annual income - the cost of the subsistence of two warrant men.
172 H. Everett, *The History of the Somerset Light Infantry* (London, 1934), pp.102,103, citing Johnston to Barrington, 9 October 1769. A letter prompted by complaints of the Commanding Officers of the 3rd, 11th, 25th and 67th regiments in Menorca, deploring the 'unaccountable mismanagement with regard to pay since 1763'.
173 Scottish Record Office, Ms GD 30/1590/3. Shairpe to his grandfather, Thomas Shairpe, 3 December 1767.
174 Wiltshire Record Office, Ms MIM/MISC 6/242. Dr. William Batt to his uncle, Oliver Culley, 18 August 1769.
175 Lincolnshire Archive Office, Ms MON 13/2/18b, Monson Papers. An Estimate of the profit arising by Remittances of money for payment of the Troops at Minorca and Gibraltar, undated but c.1740. For the same year a profit of £3,304.2.31/2d. was made from payments to the Gibraltar garrison.
176 Ibid., Ms 13/2/18a. The Gibraltar profits amounted to £1,546.17s.6d. for the same year.
177 J. Brent, 'The Poolee of Chailey and Lewes', *Sussex Archaeological Collections* vol.114, 1976, pp.72,73.
178 PRO WO 33/51. Royal Warrant defining necessaries, 29 April 1732.
179 Crofton, *Record*. Pay and Subsistence for the Garrison in Minorca, pp.4,5, 15 November 1712; p.14, 1721; p.16, 7 May 1728 and p.21, February 1730.
182 Ibid., p.153.
183 Ibid., pp.244,245.
184 AM/U (D) 160. Jurats to Murray, 9 August 1778, giving the retail price of meat.
185 Armstrong, *History*, p.245.
188 Ibid. Regimental Order, 23 April 1773.
190 Ibid., pp.95-100.
192 Ibid. Regimental Order, 18 June 1771. Regimental tailors were to be paid every three months at the following rates; 2s. for making a Watchcoat; 8 1/2d. for Drawers; 9d. for a Jacquet; 4d. for a Waistcoat; 2d. for a Forrage cap; 5 1/2d. for Long Gaiters and 4d. for Short Gaiters.
193 PRO WO 53/455, 1720; PRO WO 53/508, 1764. Both sources quote 6d. per day as the rate of pay for labourers recruited from the private soldiers in the Menorca garrison regiments Sergeants/Foremen earned 9d.
194 Crofton, *Record* p.82. Garrison order No.19. 1720.
236 Ibid. RO 9 May 1771.
238 Crofton, Record, pp. 79-86. Original General Orders for the Minorca Garrison, February 1720.
239 AM/U 80 (MC). Jurats to Visitador Real, 7 April 1710, refers to the death of one soldier.
240 AC/Cartas 1713-1720. Kane to Jurats 9 August 1713 refers to the murder of three soldiers in the region of the Albufera.

Ibid. Kane to Jurats, 25 March 1720 refers to the deaths, in separate incidents, of Sgt. Rogers and Privates Patrick Collins, Amos Gooding and George Pindar.
242 AM/RG 116, f. 47, refers to the murder of John Robertson in August 1744.
243 AM/U 46 (PR), f. 8. Kane to Jurats, 21 June 1714.
244 AM/U 160 (D). Johnston to Jurats, 29 February 1764.
245 AM/U 161 (D). Murray's orders of 29 January, 30 January and 1 February 1780.
246 AC/Cartas. Kane to Jurats, 16 September 1713.
247 The Case of the Island of Minorca; being the instructions of the Jurats to Don Juan de Bayarte, 24 April 1716 (London, 1717).
248 PRO CO 174/1, f. 123. Deposition of Francisco Antonio Sans, 20 November 1767.
249 PRO CO 174/12, ff. 15, 16. Petition of Bernat Ferra and Murray's reply, 4 December 1779.
250 Crofton, Record, pp. 33, 34. 'Regulation of Butchers Meat to be provided for the Garrison of Minorca', 8 June 1730.
251 PRO CO 174/1, f. 2. Argyll to Jurats, 5 December 1712.
252 Ibid., Regulations, 16 May 1735.
253 AM/U 50 (PR). Regulations, 16 May 1735.
255 AM/U 55 (PR). Correspondence of the Jurats, 8 February 1744.
256 Armstrong, History, p. 16.
257 PRO CO 174/1, f. 162. Memorandum by Richard Sutton, May 1771.
258 PRO CO 174/10, f. 133. Abstract of the Distribution of Wood and Oil, undated but c1777.
259 PRO CO 174/17, ff. 83, 84. Monthly Distribution of the Wood and Oil for the Troops Garrisoned in the Island of Minorca, 16 May 1777.
261 NMM Ms 6807/225, Articles 4 and 7. Complaints against the Lt-Governor, 1744.
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Scottish Record Office, Ms GD 21/629/7. Cunninghame to his sister Peggy, 19 June 1781.

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Ibid.

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Segui, memorial cited in Piña Instituciones, pp.241-249.

AM/U (D) 158. Kane to Jurats, 1 May 1713.

BL Add Mss 35885, f.186. Blakeney to Fox, 3 January 1753.

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Translation of Cunninghame's proposals.

PRO CO 174/3, f.77. Johnston to Halifax, 17 February 1764.

Guillon, La France à Minorque, p.70.

PRO CO 174/3, ff.44 et seq. Johnston to Halifax, 16 December 1763, enclosing Jurats' petition.

Ibid.

Ibid., f.177. Townshend to Halifax, 25 March 1765.


Ibid., f.232. Townshend to Lyttelton, 20 August 1765.

Ibid., f.223. Conway to Townshend, 23 August 1765.


PRO CO 174/6, f.12. Order in Council, 14 February 1770.

AM/U (A) 277, f.3. Mostyn's Orders relative to Quarters in Minorca, 23 March 1772.
A G. de Saint Sauveur, Voyages dans les Iles Baléares

Ibid.

AM/U (PR) 65. Jurats to Rochford, 12 December 1775 and
February 1776.

PRO WO 1/295, ff. 5-21. Johnston to the Secretary at War,
9 January 1764, enclosing Mackellar's proposals.

PRO CO 174/7, f. 123. Mackellar to Mostyn, 23 October
1771.

Armstrong, History, p. 31.

PRO CO 174/4, f. 5. Extract of a letter from Mackellar to
the Board of Ordnance, 28 May 1766.

NAM MS 6807/226B, W. Cunninghame, Supplement to A Journal
of the Siege of Minorca, 1756,' recorded that of 240 canons
in Fort St. Philip, 80 bore to the sea and harbour and 160
bore to the land.

PRO WO 1/295, ff. 5-21. Johnston to the Secretary at War.

PRO CO 174/4, ff. 59, 61. Estimate of a Pile of Barracks
[for Men and Officers] to be built at Cala Font, 28 May 1766.

Ibid., p. 59.

PRO WO 4/78, ff. 491-494. Johnston to Barrington (copy to
the Master general of the Ordnance) with enclosures, 29
January 1766.

PRO CO 174/6, f. 102. The Office of Ordnance to the
Secretary of State, 23 November 1770.

PRO CO 174/7, f. 86, refers to inquiry made by Rochford,
17 May 1771.

Ibid. 'A General Estimate...of the Relief proper to be
given to the Inhabitants of the Arraval of St. Philip's'.

Report by Mackellar, 13 June 1771.

PRO CO 174/1, ff. 263 et seq. Mostyn to Secretary of
State, undated, (? October 1771).

PRO CO 174/7, ff. 27, 28. Mostyn to Rochford no 2, 4
February 1771.

PRO CO 174/10, f. 26. 'General State of Cash allowed by
Parliament for purchasing the Lands, and building of Barracks
at George Town .... from 20 December 1770 to 31 December
1776.' Report by William Alcock, Storekeeper and Paymaster,
Office of Ordnance, Minorca, 14 January 1777.

PRO CO 174/11, f. 182. Murray to Weymouth, 7 October 1778.


PRO WO 72/10, Appendix G Al(no 1). Murray to Barrington,
14 March 1776.

J. Roca, 'Diarí de Mahó' RM (1896), p. 20, 21 March 1777.

PRO CO 174/10, f. 58. Murray to Weymouth, March 1777.

Ibid., f. 32. Report by William Alcock, Storekeeper, 9
January 1777.

PRO WO 72/10, Appendix G Al(no. 1). Murray to Barrington,
14 March 1776.

Saint Sauveur, Voyages dans les Iles Baléares, pp. 188 et
seq.

Ibid., p. 188.

Ibid., p. 198.

Ibid., p. 203.

Ibid., p. 198.

AM/U (PR) 65. Jurats to Rochford, February 1776.

Menorca was attacked and captured by Britain in 1708 so that the harbour of Mahón could serve as a base from which a naval squadron could provide more than seasonal support for the Allied armies in Catalonia. At the same time, British politicians were not slow to realise that Menorca possessed a geo-political potential for a role in peace as well as war. From Mahón, a permanently based squadron could achieve all the objectives required of it by Britain's European foreign policy - the division of France's navy, the monitoring of naval activity at Toulon and in the Spanish Mediterranean ports, the protection of British trade in the Straits and with the Levant, the co-operation of the Barbary States, the protection of Austrian possessions in Italy, and the neutralisation of potential enemies among Italian Princes.¹ With these objectives in mind, Britain pressed strongly and successfully to retain Menorca by the Treaty of Utrecht and, even before the negotiations had started, had signalled her intentions in the number of naval installations which were constructed in the harbour in the years 1708-1712. But, like the military defences of Menorca, the naval facilities in Mahón harbour were costly to maintain, they were under-used in peacetime and proved deficient when tested by the needs
and requirements of the large Mediterranean fleet based in the harbour during the War of Austrian Succession.

Until the eighteenth century, it was unusual for the navy to keep ships at sea in overseas waters for any prolonged period, but there were occasions when this proved either unavoidable or necessary. In these instances, ships were relied upon to be self-sufficient to the extent of being able to careen and carry out running repairs in a suitably sheltered harbour or cove - ships all carried basic materials for repairs, and the crews included carpenters, caulkers and sailmakers with the necessary expertise - but, for major repairs, the navy had to rely upon the facilities provided in a dockyard of a friendly nation or, as in Mahón (1670-1672) and Cadiz (1694-1696), the navy was granted permission to establish and administer its own repair and refitting yards in a foreign port.

The emergence of Britain as a first-class power after the War of Spanish Succession and the foreign policies adopted to preserve that status, brought about a fundamental change in naval strategy. The navy was now expected to be large enough and sufficiently flexible to perform four tasks: to defeat enemy battlefleets, to protect British commerce, to disrupt and wreck enemy maritime trade and to provide support for Britain's overseas colonies and military garrisons. In order to meet these objectives, the navy was required to keep an all-year-round presence in the Mediterranean, the West Indies and subsequently in north American waters, and the squadrons so deployed required permanent local bases which could offer not only careening and repair facilities, but
also house naval stores, victuals and provide a shore-based hospital.

At the end of the War of the Spanish Succession Mahón was established as Britain's first naval base in sovereign territory overseas. Mahón's only rival to this claim (apart from an abortive experiment in Tangier during the reign of Charles II), was Port Royal in Jamaica, which had been used as a naval outpost in the West Indies since the English capture of the island in 1655, but naval facilities at Port Royal were not designed to cope with more than cruising ships until it was developed as a naval base after the War of the Austrian Succession in the mid-eighteenth century. Other British overseas bases were to be established in the colonies in the course of the century, principally English Harbour (Antigua, Leeward Islands) in the 1720s, Halifax (Nova Scotia) in 1759, when the British ships which first began to frequent American waters north of the Caribbean were required to be maintained on station, and, at the end of the century, Ireland Island (Bermuda), when it became clear that the former colonial eastern seaboard ports of America had been lost. But, while Menorca was in British hands, none of the naval facilities in these stations matched those which were provided from the outset in Mahón. In the Mediterranean it might be argued that Gibraltar, conquered four years before the capture of Menorca, could stake a prior claim to be considered as Britain's first overseas naval base but, as Jonathan Coad has shown, for as long as Menorca was British, Gibraltar was looked upon as little more than a 'useful sentry box and observation post at the mouth of the Mediterranean', which was made use of as a staging post and
supply depot for the fleet, but its role was secondary in importance to the part played by Mahón. Mahón's pre-eminence as a naval base in the first half of the eighteenth century was emphasised, not only by the extent of the provision of dockyard and victualling facilities, but also by the fact that the first purpose-built naval hospital was built there, and it was in Mahón that the British established a vice-admiralty court.

The vice-admiralty court was remarkable in at least two respects. In the first instance, it represented the only change instituted by Britain in the long-established system of civil justice in Menorca, whereby the issues before the court were judged by British maritime law and not, as they had been for centuries, by the laws of the Aragonese Consolat de Mar, based in Barcelona. Secondly, the court came into being without protest from the traditionally conservative Menorcans, and there were times when the judgements of the court and the arbitrary actions of the judge united in opposition parties who were otherwise often at loggerheads - the Governor in the island, the Jurats and the merchants (native and foreign). Details of the transactions of the court are sketchy - references in British files are incidental to other matters, and there is now little of relevance in Menorcan archives since the disappearance in recent years of the eleven manuscript volumes containing the full record of the court proceedings - but there is enough material available to establish the functions of the court,

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its independence of any authority other than the Admiralty, and the accusations of corruption and abuse to which this independence gave rise.

The date of the establishment of the court of vice-admiralty is variously reported as 1718 or 1720, but it was instituted unquestionably to deal with prizes captured in the Mediterranean in the war with Spain 1718-1720. Before this time all disputes concerning maritime law - shipwrecks, storm damage, insurance of lost cargo - had been heard by the Bayles of Mahón and Ciudadela. The court established by Kane, acting upon instructions from the Admiralty, removed this authority from the Bayles and also required the new court to hear issues concerning prizes, letters of marque, and Mediterranean passes. The officials of the court were a judge commissary, a registrar and a bailiff. They were not salaried, but received emoluments related to the business transacted in court. In the case of the judge, he received a percentage of the total sum in civil disputes (2.5% in cases settled in court, 1% in cases which came before him, but which were settled out of court), a fee of 6s.8d for registering statements submitted to the court and, in time of war, he received a fee of £10 for prizes over 100 tons and £7.10s for ships under 100 tons. The registrar of the court received £5 and £2.10s depending (as in the case of the judge) upon the tonnage of prizes, and further fees ranging from 2s.5d to 7s.10d for documents which he was either required to draw up or to serve. The bailiff was entitled to a share in some of the emoluments of the registrar. In wartime the Vice-Admiral of Menorca was also entitled to half
half the total of the auction fees which were fixed at 1.5% of the value of the prizes auctioned.10

In 1720 Kane appointed his cousin, Captain William Sharman, already in Menorca acting as Deputy to Viscount Irwin, the Commissary General for Stores and Provisions, to be the first judge of the vice-admiralty court. But Sharman, not being sufficiently versed in the Laws and Customs [of Menorca], did never exercise the said Employment, but substituted a Minorquin Advocate in his room.11

In fact, only two judges officiated in the vice-admiralty court during the first two periods of British rule - Dr. Gabriel Olivar y Pardo (1720-1756), and James Sutherland, a Scottish lawyer (1763-1780). Neither found much favour with the merchant community (native, British or foreign), nor with the Governors in the island. Complaints of prejudice against Olivar reached London from Menorca in 1746,12 and these were closely followed by accusations by the merchant community of biassed judgements in favour of Olivar's own trading interests.13 By 1755 the complaints had reached such a pitch that Blakeney suspended Olivar from office,14 only to be informed by the Admiralty that he had exceeded his authority, and Olivar was reinstated.

Although Olivar died before British rule returned to Menorca in 1763, his successor as judge commissary was no less the target of complaints by the merchants and the Governor in the island. The former complained bitterly about the arbitrary and exorbitant increase in fees imposed by Sutherland - all fees in civil cases were increased and, for the first time, fees of £2 to the judge and £1 to the registrar were charged for interviews preliminary to any
charge being brought - with the result that many litigants could not afford to press their case, however legitimate it was. Johnston, the Governor in Menorca, was concerned with the independent authority of a judge answerable only to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, who was making arrests and imprisoning individuals without reference to him or to any other court - actions which were particularly alarming in the case of Menorcans, since they lacked the protection of a writ of habeus corpus.

Johnston wrote to the Admiralty in 1764 asking for the authority of the judge to be defined, and he also applied to the Secretary of State on at least three occasions requesting the appointment of Vice-Admiral of Menorca, in order that he would be in a position to be a 'Check on Mr. Sutherland, who is very arbitrary'. However, the merchants complaints were disregarded in London, Johnston was denied the office of Vice-Admiral, and Sutherland did not reduce his fees nor alter his ways. While Johnston had found Sutherland an 'exceedingly troublesome man', and had unsuccessfully sought to have him removed from office, his successor, Murray, was initially supportive of the judge, deeming him to be a 'Gentleman of very good education, excellent parts, and a very zealous, Loyal Servant.' But, in March 1778, when Sutherland quite properly dismissed a case which had been prosecuted in his court at Murray's instigation, the latter, now, unlike Johnston holding the appointment of Vice-Admiral, true to his temper, did not forgive him. There was a series of contretemps between the two men in the course of the following two years, which culminated in Murray suspending Sutherland in August 1780 on
the grounds of seditious behaviour, justifying his action to
the Secretary of State by saying that 'if Mr. Sutherland is
continued the nominal Judge, a fire will only be smothered
for a little time, to blaze out afterwards with greater
fury.' 22 Although Murray received official approval for his
action in suspending the judge, 23 Sutherland subsequently
brought a successful civil action against Murray for wrongful
dismissal. In January 1785, he won his case and was awarded
the very substantial sum of £5,000 damages, but Murray was
not required to foot the bill. The House of Commons,
impressed by 'Old Minorca's' defence of the island in the
siege of 1781-1782, voted to pay Murray's costs and damages
out of public funds. 24

The amount of damages awarded to Sutherland serves to
indicate that the office of judge commissary was well
rewarded financially, and this is further borne out by the
fact that, at a time when the British government was slow to
honour its financial promises in the 1770s, Sutherland was in
a position to lend the Governor a total of £3,250 (£2,167
before 1777, 25 and a further sum of £1,083 in August 177726),
to enable him to make compensation payments to householders
in St. Philip's when the arrabal was demolished. These
illustrations in themselves do not prove that the fees
charged by the officials of the vice-admiralty court were
extortionate, but they cannot have helped to answer the
belief generally held in the island that they were excessive.
There were also suspicions that proceedings were
unnecessarily prolonged (and therefore more expensive), that
vested financial interests swayed verdicts, and there was
general dissatisfaction (shared by the Governor, Jurats and
merchants) that the judge was not answerable to any other authority in Menorca, and that appeals from the court could not be heard other than in London.

The development of the naval base, 1713-1756.

The speed with which a naval refitting base had been established at Mahón during the period of British de facto rule of Menorca from 1708 to 1712 had been commendable, particularly since Menorca could provide - apart from 'no want of brushwood' for careening\(^{27}\) - none of the basic materials of naval stores. There were no oaks, pines, nor elms; no canvas, hemp nor metals (iron, lead, brass, copper); no cordage, glass, tallow nor tar. Even what little leather the island could produce proved unsuitable since it became 'like tripe' when wet.\(^{28}\) All naval stores had therefore to be sent from English dockyards, entailing both added expense and delay. But, with the coming of peace, the momentum in the building of the naval base provided by Admirals Byng and Jennings slackened. The home government, preoccupied by problems associated with the Hanoverian succession, was no longer in a position to give the Mediterranean the priority which it had been accorded in wartime and, by the time Admiral John Baker, appointed to command in the Mediterranean, arrived in Mahón in 1715, the lack of investment in the maintenance of the facilities which had been provided was having a telling effect. Baker brought about some improvements, but subsequently facilities and stores were reduced to a minimal peacetime footing at the end of the war with Spain in 1720; only sufficient manpower
stores were left at Mahón 'proper for cleaning and supplying the ships [two] ordered to remain on station, with allowance for others that may accidentally call in there'. Dockyard facilities remained adequate to cope with demand until the War of Austrian Succession, when a large fleet was based on Mahon. In 1742, the Admiralty appointed Edward Falkingham to Mahón 'for the Superintendence of Naval affairs in the Mediterranean' (the first resident Commissioner to be appointed to an overseas dockyard), the number of British skilled craftsmen in Mahón was greatly increased, and a building programme initiated to improve the dockyard's capability and efficiency.

The dockyard.

Baker (no stranger to Mahón, having served under Byng), reported in 1715 that the careening wharf was in a ruinous state. Part of it had been washed away, and it was in danger of being 'rendered entirely useless in a short time'. Although lacking 'positive authority', he took steps to repair the wharf and to increase its length and width. He extended the wharf from 660 feet to 1,400 feet, and doubled its width by cutting thirty feet further back into the hill on the land side, and by pushing the edge of the wharf out into the inner harbour until the depth of water allowed second-rated ships to approach within six feet. At that depth, a platform of large, square stones, weighing from two to six tons each was laid, on top of which masons built a stone wall to a height of five feet as the facing to the wharf. The space behind the wall was filled with earth and
rubble, and then levelled. As most of the work was carried out by seamen, Baker considered that the work would cost no more than £160-£180 but, at the same time, the Admiral made a request for the seamen to be paid extra for their 'very hard service', working on short rations and often waist-deep in water for long periods. He proposed that carpenters and caulkers working out of their ships should receive extra wages at a daily rate of one shilling, and that the seamen similarly employed should receive an extra sixpence per day for their labour, but this was a precedent the Navy Board was not prepared to concede at the time, although it became standard practice in overseas yards not many years later.

Baker's plans were approved by the Navy Board, principally because the cost was very much cheaper than the plans put forward earlier in 1711 (£1,520), and by Admiral Wishart in 1714 (£340), but Baker's savings were achieved not only by employing naval seamen and artisans, but also because he did not envisage building the storehouses on the wharf which had been part of the earlier plans. In August 1715, Baker wrote to Byng (by then one of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty) that there was sufficient space for the amount of peacetime naval stores to be accommodated in part of the hospital on Bloody Island in the harbour. Moreover, he was of the opinion that if war should again break out and additional storehouses were required 'it would be best building them upon that island'. However, he conceded that it would be necessary to build 'a few sheds in proper places' on the wharf to keep stores secure and dry and this, in turn, would prevent 'the spoiling of our sails for building of tents', the only existing protection for some of the stores at that
Six months later, the Mediterranean squadron had been reduced to eight ships, the repairs to the hospital structure had been effected, and Baker was able to report that there were sufficient naval stores in Mahón and space enough to house them in the hospital, with an annual saving to the Naval Board of some £87, representing the sum paid as rent for some civilian houses and storehouses near the wharf and in Mahón, and which would become, as a result, surplus to requirements. Whether naval stores were ever lodged on Bloody Island is not known, certainly no storehouses were built when war once again broke out. Lodged there, the stores would not have been readily or speedily available to ships careening at the wharf, and it is unlikely that any stores needed to be lodged in the hospital building when the number of ships based at Mahón was reduced to two in 1721. Armstrong, writing in 1740, made no mention of naval stores when he described the hospital, but did refer to 'all manner of naval stores deposited in convenient magazines...in constant readiness [on the wharf]'.

In the 1720s and 1730s, periodic returns to the Admiralty about the 'State and Condition of His Majesty's Ships in and about the Mediterranean' reveal that most ships on station were careened annually at Mahón, but the demands made upon the dockyard were not great. The peacetime footing to which Mahón had been reduced was unable to cope with the demands of the squadron of twelve ships sent to the Mediterranean in 1738 to counter a possible threat from the navies of France and Spain after the signing of a Franco-Spanish alliance. For the next ten years, until the end of the War of Austrian Succession in 1748, the number of British ships in the
Mediterranean increased until there were more than thirty in most years, and they were dependent upon Mahon for repair and refitting. In 1742, Admiral Thomas Mathews, who had succeeded Haddock, wrote that he was desperate for supplies, particularly canvas and cordage, and he 'dreaded the consequence' if they did not soon reach Mahón. Clearly, if the navy was to fulfil the role expected of it in the Mediterranean, improvements to the dockyard facilities at Mahon were imperative. Commissioner Falkingham was appointed with this aim in view, but, even then, he was constrained 'to provide no more than is absolutely necessary'.

In advance of Falkingham's arrival in Mahón, the Navy Board had authorised Admiral Mathews to build storehouses to 'secure from weather the careening gear and the stores which will come frequently from England'. Mathews ordered Captain Cornwall to carry out a survey to identify suitable sites and he, together with the other Captains of Mathews' fleet then in harbour in Mahón, submitted a report in December 1742. They found that Mr. Sims, the Naval Officer, exceeding his authority, had already started to build near the mastyard (established, together with a rope walk, some years before on the north side of the harbour), but they considered the site too damp for a store, and recommended that the building should be converted into a workhouse, the loft space being used to store non-perishable materials constantly needed in the boatyard. The masthouse would be adequate, once repairs to the roof had been carried out and the slipway improved, but the report recommended that masts only should be stored there, and that another store should be
built adjacent to the smiths' shop on the north side to house all the stores with which the masthouse was then cluttered.

On the south side of the harbour, the report recommended clearing the careening wharf of all rubble and stones, the construction of an additional smiths' shop and a large magazine at the western end beyond the 'great drain', the loft of which might be used to house all the stores not lodged on the north side of the harbour. The construction of a further large building to protect the careening gear and serve as a sail loft was also proposed. Finally, on the area cleared of rubble, it was suggested that a number of smaller permanent buildings be constructed to house stores belonging to the boatswain, purser and carpenters, (the bulk of which was still stored under tents), and that a cave be dug into the rock on the land side to store pitch, tar and turpentine. Among the plans subsequently drawn up, the design of the carpenters' shop and sail loft (Fig. 7.1), suggest that the buildings were intended to be substantial and imposing.

The Commissioner arrived in Mahón shortly after the Captains had presented their report. Falkingham's initial appreciation of the situation was to develop the dockyard on the south side of the harbour by incorporating the area occupied by the victualling yard but, even before the Admiralty ruled against his proposals, Falkingham had changed his mind. The biggest problem confronting the dockyard when careening was taking place, was congestion. At most five ships at a time could be accommodated on the existing wharf and, because of the necessity to preserve access to the town of Mahón, not only for naval personnel, but also for the garrison troops, congestion would have been increased by the
incorporation of the victualling yard into the dockyard. Accordingly, Falkingham decided to develop dockyard facilities on the north side of the harbour.

By December 1744, 'without putting the Government to any further expense than that of a few tools and a little powder to blow up rocks', 46 wharves had been created on the north side of the harbour where up to seven ships at a time could off-load prior to being moved to the careening wharf to be cleaned and repaired. James Montresor, Engineer in Ordinary in the garrison, surveyed the area behind the new wharves and drew up a plan for further development which Thomas Trefusis, Falkingham's successor as Commissioner, submitted to the Admiralty in 1745 (Fig.7.2). The Admiralty did not authorise all the building in Montresor's design - the houses for the Commissioner, Storekeeper, Master Craftsmen and Artificers were never built - and it restricted construction on the careening wharf on the south side of the harbour to buildings solely associated with the careening process. (A survey in 1763 listed only housing for the capstans and crane, a pitch shed, a shed for the watch and some smaller storage huts built of stone). 47 The wharf on the north side having been completed by June 1745, work then began on conveniently adjacent 'boathouses, saw-pits and additional workshops.' 48 A 'ropery' was also provided adjacent to the masthouse. 49 The new buildings were not completed until after the end of the war in 1748, and the workmanship was sufficiently shoddy to require substantial repairs in 1755 as part of the preparations for the impending attack of the French upon Menorca. 50 Fig.7.3, although dating from 1764, shows the
extent of the development on the north side of the harbour before the end of the first period of British rule.

Figure 7.3. Prospective View of the Naval Yard on the North Side

The victualling yard.

The Commissioners of the Victualling Board were responsible to the Admiralty for ensuring that ships of the navy were regularly supplied with basic provisions (beef, pork, peas, butter, cheese, oatmeal/biscuits and beer/brandy/wine) for the crews, according to the prescribed diet and rations. There were, inevitably, factors which impeded the Board's ability always fully to discharge its responsibilities. For the Board's officers at Mahón the principal problems were: communications, spoilage of victuals on the voyage from England or Ireland, storage facilities in Mahón, and the inability of the island of Menorca dependably to provide any quantity of basic provisions.
Communications with the Mediterranean clearly did not pose such serious problems of supply as they did with a squadron on station in the West Indies, but a voyage to or from Menorca could take six weeks in good conditions and, in adverse weather, a further three or four weeks was not unexceptional. The Caribbean climate caused greater spoilage of victuals, but even in the Mediterranean, crude methods of salting meat, and the difficulty of preventing casked beer going sour, led to waste and shortages. There were also problems for the Victualling Board in estimating the quantity of supplies required and, for its agents on station, the provision of adequate storage facilities. The Board, through its regular contractors, attempted to supply as many of the provisions as possible from the home market. Consequently, if an unexpected emergency arose - natural, in the event of a bad harvest, or political, when a greater number of ships than forecast had to be deployed overseas - it took time for the Board to adapt to the emergency. In such circumstances, when the overseas yards had no reserves on which to draw, or when a supply convoy failed to arrive on time, ships' companies were put on 'short allowance' when rations for four men had to be eked out to serve six men. In the Mediterranean, however, when circumstances demanded and opportunities existed, it was possible for some supplies - meat, vegetables and wine - to be obtained through 'victualling correspondents', most frequently the British Consuls in Genoa and Leghorn. This occurred in 1718 for Byng's fleet, and in 1744 when the victualling convoy was delayed by over three months and Mathews was desperate for supplies. But, in order to honour its contracts with its
suppliers in the home market, the Board refused to allow this practice (except in the case of wine) to become routine, and it critically scrutinised any such purchases. If Menorca had been, or could have been developed as, a major provider of essential victuals, other arrangements might have been made but, even in a good year, Menorca could barely produce enough grain and meat for the needs of the inhabitants and the military garrison.

Until the War of Austrian Succession the victualling yard, established immediately after the British capture of Menorca, remained unchanged, sited part-way up the slope from the wharf to the town of Mahón, close to the Carmelite monastery in which the victualling clerks, coopers and bakers had their lodgings. Although Admiral Haddock warned the Admiralty in 1738 that the yard would prove inadequate 'in the event of a general war', no initiatives were undertaken until the arrival of Commissioner Falkingham in 1743. The Commissioner's plans for the victualling yard were drastic. He suggested that the yard (bakehouses and granary excepted) should be relocated in Dutch Cove, half a mile to the East on the same side of the harbour, where a new wharf could be built and there was space for storehouses to be constructed. He envisaged that the space vacated in the existing victualling yard would be devoted to naval stores, and he estimated that the total cost of his proposals would amount to £5,611.19s.

The Victualling Board strongly opposed the Commissioner's proposals. It argued that the victualling yard had been sited by a 'very great Officer who once presided at their Lordships' Board' (Admiral Byng, later Viscount Torrington),
and that their activities on the existing victualling wharf had never impeded nor curtailed the functions of the adjacent careening wharf. It further argued that, at Dutch Cove, the cooperage yard would be too restricted, there was insufficient space to build storehouses even to contain 'quantities supposed reasonable and necessary to lie at all time in store at Mahon', quite apart from the added capacity required in an emergency. Great inconvenience would be caused by having the bakehouses and the granary on a different site, and greater expense would be incurred in demurrage and in the hire of additional storehouses. If any reallocation of sites were to be undertaken, the Victualling Board suggested that the Navy Board should remove its repair yard to Dutch Cove. 

In a further letter to the Admiralty, the Victualling Board referred to its earlier suggestion that adequate storage facilities would be provided on its existing site by the purchase of a warehouse belonging to the widow of Domingo Roca, the cost of which, together with some necessary alterations to the structure would amount to no more than £900 - a sum appreciably less than the amount which would be incurred in time by the hire of other storage space, or if the proposal to move the victualling yard to Dutch Cove was implemented.

The land at Dutch Cove (about one and a half acres) was requisitioned by Falkingham 'without consideration for its owner', as Commodore Keppel was to discover in 1751, when the matter had to be settled in the island's Court of Royal Patrimony. But, apart from establishing a watering place there, neither the Victualling Board nor the Navy Board made any use of the land. Whether the Admiralty was persuaded by
the arguments of the Victualling Board, or whether it baulked at the cost of Falkingham's proposals is not known, but when the Commissioner came to the conclusion that the south side of the harbour was unsuitable for the dockyard developments which he deemed necessary, the victualling yard was allowed to remain undisturbed. Fig. 7.4 illustrates both the existing lay-out and development plans for the victualling yard in the mid-1740s, but the extent of the development which took place is not clear. It is, however, known that no authority was forthcoming for the purchase of the Roca warehouse (D in Fig. 7.4), and it may be, as an almost indecipherable note on the plan suggests, that increased storage space was achieved merely by building a second storey on existing buildings.

The naval hospital.

The speed with which Admiral Jennings had caused the hospital to be built in 1711 was achieved at the expense of slapdash workmanship by a largely foreign work force impatient to leave Menorca, but there can be little doubt that there were also faults in Captain Latham's design. By 1714, structural shortcomings were such that a report on essential repairs and an amended design were submitted to Admiral Sir James Wishart, then in command in the Mediterranean. Wishart referred the report to the Admiralty who, in turn, instructed Wishart's successor, Admiral John Baker, to carry out a survey. Baker reported that he found the defects in the structure of the hospital to be 'very great'; the walls were too insubstantial to support the weight they had to hold; the arches and the pillars of the
Figure 7.4. Plan of the Victualling Magazines at Mahon

Keys:
A. Magazine for provisions
B. Victualling Office yard
C. Part of the Corneting store
D. Large store belonging to Widow Rose
E. Water port
F. Door from road to lat. floor
G. Door to bed floor
H. A Chancel
I. House between Magazine & chapel
J. Proper for latrine belonging to Widow Rose
K. House if pulled down would make a good entrance to back yard
L. Retaining wall
M. New design for bake house
N. The oven
O. Bread magazine, flume left over
P. Lodging for bakers, make stairs over
Q. Bread yard
R. Water channel
S. Lord Forbes old house

The Harbour of Mahon
north wing had collapsed, and there were gaping holes in the walls of the wards. He recommended that local builders be employed to carry out immediate repairs and some improvements, the total cost of which he estimated would amount to no more than £220. In fact, in the contract which Baker signed with Antonio Seguí of Mahón, the costs were cut to £175, and the work was to be finished within three months. George Atkins, the Naval Officer, was to supervise the work and Seguí undertook to make good any faults discovered within a year of the work being finished. The saving in costs had been brought about by Baker's undertaking to use naval boats to transport materials to Bloody Island and to assign some seamen to work on the project. Baker requisitioned and rented part of the Franciscan monastery on the outskirts of Mahón to serve as accommodation for the sick seamen while the work was in progress, and part of the reason for a time limit being imposed upon Seguí was that Baker was keen to get the patients away from Mahón and returned to the hospital before they succumbed to the temptation to 'drink the new wines soon after the vintage, which is always found to be prejudicial to their health'.

Dissatisfied with the previous arrangements, Baker appointed a new contractor, William Corbett, to care for the patients on the basis of an allowance of thirteen pence per invalid per day. Out of this amount Corbett not only had to supply food, but also 'firing, candles, water, washing for the sick, dishes, plates, spoons and careful nurses.' (Beds/cradles and bedding were, at this time, furnished by the Admiralty). Seguí, having fulfilled his contract satisfactorily was retained at a small annual allowance to
keep the hospital in repair for a 'term of years', and Baker was able to report to the Admiralty in February 1716, that the sick had been back in the hospital for three months where 'they seem to recover their health better than at the Convent [the Franciscan monastery]'.

The design to which Seguí worked is illustrated pictorially in Fig. 7.5, details are given in Fig. 7.6, and the building, with beds for 460 patients, was to stand for fifty years before any further major work was done to it. In common with the dockyard and victualling provision in Mahón, there is no record that the hospital was unable to cater for the demands made upon it from 1716 until the war with Spain in 1739 substantially increased the number of ships reliant upon Mahón as their station base. For example, in April 1729 there were only twenty-nine patients in the hospital out of a total complement of 990 in the four ships in the squadron based at Mahón and, in July 1738, ninety-seven seamen were in hospital out of a total complement of 4,517 in the eleven ships in Admiral Haddock's squadron.

The hospital and its site made a favourable impression on John Armstrong, who, in 1740, described the building as 'capacious', incorporating as it then did lodgings for the Naval Officer, Surgeon and others, and a 'decent apartment' for the Admiral. He judged it a 'comfortable residence' in the summer and potentially 'one of the most delightful Retirements for a contemplative Mind in this Part of the World'. This was not an opinion held two years later by Admiral Mathews, who wrote that the patients in the hospital were 'in Summer scorched to death and in Winter drowned'.

It was at this time that the vastly increased naval presence
in the Mediterranean - Daniel Baugh estimates that there were 18,000 men in the fleet in 1742 and 1743, and in October 1744, Admiral Rowley's fleet in Mahón harbour was composed of thirty-four ships of the line, one galley, one storeship, two fireships which, excluding the twenty-four merchant ships and two tenders, produced a total complement in excess of 16,000 men - resulted in numbers of sick seamen greatly beyond the capacity of the hospital (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1. Admissions of sick seamen to Mahón hospital.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1742</th>
<th>1743</th>
<th>1744</th>
<th>1745</th>
<th>1746</th>
<th>1747</th>
<th>1748</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute Hospital Capacity: 460. 590. 590. 590. 590. 590. 590.*

* Excluding numbers for 1748, when few ships visited Mahon in the first six months, and from July the fleet was greatly reduced.
+ Additional beds created in 1743 by converting the Surgeon's quarters into wards.
Admissions to the hospital were at their greatest in the winter months, for two reasons. Predictably bad weather conditions made sailing in that season in the Mediterranean hazardous for all shipping, and the fleet was generally kept in port except for ships engaged on essential cruising duties. Consequently, there was usually a greater concentration of ships and men in harbour from November until March, and as much repair work as possible was undertaken in those months. Secondly, as the army surgeon George Cleghorn noted in his contemporary account, two debilitating and often fatal diseases—dysentry and pleurisy—regularly broke out in Menorca in the winter months. Cleghorn's records for the winters of 1744-1745 and 1745-1746, revealed that 'incredible Havoc was made by these Distempers among the Soldiers, and Sailors of the Fleet'. From April to October, the bulk of the fleet was at sea, and this, to some extent, explains the drop in the number of hospital admissions for most of those months. However, in the summers of 1744 and 1747, virulent outbreaks of tertian fever laid low many soldiers and sailors, and caused 'great Mortality'. On the other hand, the abnormally high numbers of admissions in the early months of 1742 were attributable less to diseases contracted in Menorca, than to sickness in the ships that sailed to join the Mediterranean fleet at that time. In June 1740, Admiral Haddock reported that ships recently arrived in the Mediterranean were 'exceeding Sickly', and that the 'Fever was pretty general and commonly called Gaol-Sickness'[typhus]. Also, the Neptune reached Mahón from England on 1 February 1742, with 250 sick on board and having buried fifty-four of the crew during the voyage. The most
prevalent disease in these ships (often at sea for as many as ten weeks in the voyage from home waters, or cruising for as many weeks away from port) was scurvy, and the rapid fall in the number of patients in the hospital in 1742 bears out Cleghorn's claim that:

the Herb [fruit and vegetable] Market of Mahon has been as useful to the British Fleet in restoring the Health of the Sailors as the harbour in refitting the Ships. 81

Finally, the comparatively low number of admissions in some months in 1745 and 1746, can be attributed to the fact that one of the principal tasks of the fleet in that period was to cover the movements of the Spanish navy in Cartagena and Cadiz, consequently greater use was made of Gibraltar, where a newly-built naval hospital providing 1,000 beds was finished in 1746. 82 Also, very few ships of the fleet used Mahón from July 1747 until July 1748 (when the bulk of the fleet was recalled to home waters), since the task at that time was to blockade Genoa, and British ships used the nearby port of Leghorn rather than Mahón for repairs, a journey which would have entailed a round voyage of more than 600 miles to get back on station. 83

Some of the hospital admissions during the time under review must surely have been as a result of contracting some of the other diseases mentioned by Cleghorn - cholera (of which there were outbreaks in most years, but never of epidemic proportions) and the two major epidemics of smallpox from March to July 1742, 84 and from December 1745 until April 1746 85 - but Cleghorn's records showed that the Menorcan succumbed to these diseases more readily than the
British. It is impossible to substantiate Cleghorn's opinion either from other records of the naval hospital or from Menorcan sources, since none appears to exist, but Cleghorn's findings would seem to be borne out, at least as far as fatalities were concerned, by figures which have been published (as part of a demographic study of Mahón), of the deaths which occurred in the years 1742 to 1749, in the parishes of Santa María in Mahón and in the arrabal of St. Philip's.

Table 7.2. Deaths recorded 1742-1749.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sta María</th>
<th>Arrabal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1742</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1745</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1742 the lack of bed-space in the hospital forced Admiral Haddock to hire merchant ships in which to isolate the scorbutic, and to convert one of his own fleet into a hospital ship. Later in the same year Admiral Mathews created space for an additional one hundred and thirty beds in the hospital by moving the surgeon into the quarters vacated by the Naval Officer, and converting the surgeon's quarters into additional wards. Despite this increase in capacity, Admiral Rowley again had to provide a hospital ship to cope with the numbers of the sick in the winter of 1744-1745. The hospital was well able to cope with the demands of the much reduced British presence in the Mediterranean after the end of the war and, although no further construction work took place, some minor repairs were carried out in 1755.
The development of the naval base, 1763-1782.

A French expedition was launched to capture Menorca in 1756 for three reasons. In the war against Britain which, by May of that year, was both imminent and inevitable, France was looking for a telling military and psychological success with which to open her campaign. Secondly France sought to deny Britain the naval base which would undoubtedly have been used in the war to inhibit the activity of the Toulon fleet, and thirdly because possession of the island gave France the opportunity to cede it to Spain in return for Spanish support in the war, or failing that eventuality, possession would give France a strong bargaining counter in the territorial realignments to which, win or lose, France would be party when the war was concluded. The French had no other use for the island of Menorca, and they certainly did not need Mahón, as the British did, as a naval base. It is true that a small French naval staff was initially installed in Mahón, but the proximity of Toulon obviated any need for naval use to be made of the harbour, and the French officials were withdrawn in 1760. Consequently, the history of the French occupation of Menorca is one of neglect in respect of all the naval facilities established by Britain in the harbour of Mahón.

The dockyard.

Admiral Sir Percy Brett was in command of the squadron which brought the first of the British garrison troops back to Menorca in June 1763. He ordered an immediate survey of
all the naval installations to be carried out, and the subsequent report on the survey made depressing reading. The south yard had suffered most damage, with none of the careening gear in working order and most of the buildings were in a ruinous condition. The description of conditions in the north yard was more encouraging but, here too, extensive repairs were necessary. The total cost of essential repairs was put at £2,381.7s.6d, and work was started immediately. Although the old careening wharf was retained on the south side of the harbour, it was decided to concentrate all the remaining installations on the north side of the harbour, as had originally been proposed by Commissioner Falkingham in the mid-1740s. Dockyard records show that repairs were started to old buildings in September 1763, and that the first new building, a braziers' shop, was started in November. By 1765, the facilities provided were as shown in Fig. 7.7. In the following year, work began to level Illa Pinta, known to the British as Saffron Island, and to join it to the north yard. The plan was to shape the edges of the island to form an octagon with eight wharves 200 feet long, and build storehouses and install the facilities as illustrated in Fig. 7.8. The cost was estimated at £6,348.

By June 1766, a bridge connecting Saffron island to the shore had been built, No.1 wharf had been constructed and the first capstan installed, but, in comparison with the speed with which the rest of the development had been completed in the north yard, progress on Saffron Island was slow. In part this was because of the difficulties encountered in mining and levelling, but work was also held up because of the financial restraints placed upon the Naval Officer, Milbourne
Warren, by the Navy Board. He was allowed an annual budget of only £1,200 for all the expense involved; it was a constraint which prompted Commodore Robert Spry to suggest to the Admiralty in 1767 that if Warren was given a free hand to employ local labour cheaply, the project could be finished in two years. If Warren were forced to remain within his allotted budget, Spry estimated that work on Saffron Island would take a further five years and, he added

tis a great pity so necessary and noble an undertaking, which, when finished, will far exceed anything in Europe should meet with the least obstruction or delay. 99

He urged the Admiralty to allow Warren to employ more Menorcan labour, but the Admiralty was not to be moved. Spry was reprimanded for interference, and Warren was forced to continue to work within his budget so that it took even longer than Spry's forecast, with the last of the paving not being laid until August 1774, for the harbour to look as it did in Figure 7.9.

Figure 7.8.
Figure 7.9.

Navy Office. A Plan of part of Mahon Harbour in the Island of Minorca shewing the Situation, May 1774, of His Majesty's Naval Yard and Wharfs etc there.
It was ironic, when work on the north yard and Saffron Island had been completed at a cost of some £10,000,100 (although Fig.7.10, a Spanish plan of the dockyard in 1782, reveals that not all the building work at first envisaged had been undertaken), and Mahón had become an overseas base second to none - capable even of building a launch in 1778, and an eighteen gun frigate in 1779101 - that the dockyard was denied the opportunity to repay the investment. The demands made upon the Admiralty by the outbreak of the war in America (1775), and the subsequent war with France (1777), Spain (1779) and Holland (1780), forced the government, lacking as it did any European allies, to reduce the British naval presence based in Mahón to a token ship in 1778, and subsequently to no ship at all.102 However, the dockyard facilities were put to good use from 1778 until 1781 to arm and service the fifty-five Menorcan privateers which Murray licensed with letters of marque. When war was declared against France, among the measures Governor Murray took to strengthen the defences of Menorca, was the construction of an enclosure wall for the dockyard, incorporating six guard-towers, with a tall watch-tower nearby,103 as illustrated in Fig.7.10, but such was the speed and strength of the enemy invasion in August 1781, that the dockyard was deemed indefensible and was abandoned with only a minimum amount of stores salvaged and transferred across the harbour to St.Philip's,104 and with the loss of four crippled ships and one half-built privateer.105
The victualling yard.

The 1763 survey of naval facilities in Mahón revealed that the storehouses, offices and bakehouse of the victualling yard were in 'tolerable good repair', but doors, windows and shutters were missing, and repairs were needed to the roofs. The cooperage and smaller storage sheds were, however, in a very bad condition and the stone-work of the victualling wharf and the enclosure wall had crumbled. No stores remained in the warehouses.\textsuperscript{106} The French had had such little use for the yard that they had allowed a Menorcan merchant, Josep Soli, to construct two buildings within the victualling compound. One of these buildings constituted a fire risk, since it abutted a smiths' shop, and Soli was ordered to demolish both houses in January 1764, the Admiralty paying him £100 compensation.\textsuperscript{107} But, when the buildings had been demolished and the enclosure wall was rebuilt, there were protests from the Menorcans that the public were then denied the free access to the south shore of the harbour to which they had become accustomed during the French occupation. This led to a dispute between the Governor and the Admiralty, and subsequently to litigation in the court of Royal Patrimony in 1774.\textsuperscript{108} The dispute was eventually settled in favour of the Admiralty; the enclosure wall remained and access to the wharves was restricted. Meanwhile, in addition to the repair of the wall, other essential work was undertaken immediately in the wake of the report submitted to Admiral Brett and, by the time Commodore Thomas Harrison arrived to command in November 1763, he found the yard 'in as good repair as could be expected in the time available'.\textsuperscript{109} No additional
facilities were deemed necessary in the victualling yard, and none were provided during the second period of British rule, as illustrated in Fig.7.11, which shows no change in the layout or provision in the yard since the mid-1740s.

The naval hospital.

The 1763 survey of the hospital revealed that:

the building in general very much out of repair, some part thereof being likely to fall down. The doors, windows and frames are part taken away. Some of the wards with a small repair may be made fit for service; the wharf for landing the sick is a little out of repair. Necessaries and stores are found none of any kind.110

Only small repairs were made to the hospital - to patch the roof and 'fit up' the fourteen wards in May 1765,111 to the Surgeon's quarters in May 1768,112 and again to some wards in December 1769113 - and the Admiralty ignored persistent warnings from the Naval Officer about the deteriorating state of the building.114 The continued neglect duly led to structural collapse. On 2 February 1770, fifty-eight feet of the southern wing of the hospital were blown down and, in the opinion of the master mason, only two of the remaining wards were safe to be used, the rest was in such a ruinous state as to be 'utterly irreparable'.115 Commodore Charles Proby wrote to the Admiralty seeking authority to rebuild the hospital, and he subsequently submitted two proposals. The first was to reconstruct the hospital 'upon its present plan' with a patient capacity of 550; the second proposal was to add an upper floor to the structure, thereby increasing the capacity to 1,200.116 In November 1770, he again wrote
enclosing detailed plans, together with an estimated cost of £5,503.18s.0d. for the two-storeyed building. The Admiralty initially approved Proby's plans for the larger hospital, but the Commissioners for the Sick and Hurt queried the need for the greater capacity, pointing out that, during the Seven Years' War (when Menorca was in French hands) the 1,000 bed hospital at Gibraltar had never had more than 900 beds occupied, and they strongly advised rebuilding a single-storey hospital.

In January 1771, Proby had again written to the Admiralty urging action, and strengthening his arguments for an upper storey on health grounds, the surgeon being of the opinion that patients at ground level 'reduced by other illnesses were liable to agues'. In May 1771, Rear-Admiral Sir Peter Denis was appointed to succeed Proby with orders to proceed with the building of the larger hospital, and duly contracted with a Menorca mason to build the hospital at a cost of £4,500 (£3,000 for the ground floor and £1,500 for the upper storey). The Commissioners for the Sick and Hurt, while relieved that Denis had succeeded in reducing the building costs (as estimated by Proby) by more than £1,000, remained unconvinced that the expense of the larger hospital was justified. They sent the Admiralty records of the admissions to the hospital during the war with Spain, and the War of Austrian Succession to show that in only thirteen of the eighty-four months between January 1742 and December 1748 had demand exceeded the capacity of the hospital (Table 7.1). The arguments of the Commissioners for the Sick and Hurt were enough on this occasion to persuade the Admiralty to send orders to Sir Peter Denis in January 1772, 'desiring him to
cause the building of a second story to be suspended'. But it was too late. The foundation stone of the hospital had been laid on 30 October 1771 and, by the time Denis received the Admiralty's revised instructions in April/May 1772, the whole of the ground floor and a considerable portion of the first floor had been built, and the expense of demolishing the upper storey would have been equal to the cost of finishing the two-storey building as originally planned. Moreover, if the upper floor was to be removed, the Menorcan mason, Poly, would expect compensation for breach of contract. It was almost a fait accompli, and construction of the two-storeyed building went ahead and was finished in January 1773. No plans of the new hospital have been traced in British archives, but Fig. 7.12 illustrates the hospital as the Spanish found it in 1782. With the diminishing British naval presence in the Mediterranean in the 1770s, the arguments of the Commissioners for the Sick and Hurt were amply justified, and the hospital was greatly underused for the remaining years of British rule. It was, nevertheless, ironic that the new hospital was not in existence in 1770 when, for lack of accommodation, 500-600 sick seamen of the visiting Danish fleet had to be housed in tents on Bloody Island.

Naval staff and the labour force.

The bulk of the labour required to carry out routine maintenance, involving careening, graving and tallowing ships, was provided by ships' companies, and a limit to the
Figure 7.12.

Plan, Profile & Elevation of the two floors of the Hospital situated in the Isla del Rey in the Harbour of Mahon.
numbers so employed daily was laid down by the Admiralty (Table 7.3) to avoid unnecessary expense and to prevent embezzlement by the Clerks of the Cheque.

Table 7.3. Limit of numbers for ships' cleaning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of ship. Men for a day.</th>
<th>Rate of ship. Men for a day.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>570. Fourth(50guns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>500. Fifth(40guns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third(80guns)</td>
<td>440. Fifth(30guns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third(70guns)</td>
<td>308. Sixth(20guns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth(60guns)</td>
<td>252. Sloops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, a nucleus of shore-based naval staff and craftsmen was permanently maintained in overseas bases to supervise the work, and to ensure that there were sufficient stores, installations and materials for routine refitting to be carried out at any time. In wartime, the nucleus was enlarged, although recruitment was never easy. In the 1740s, when Menorca's need was at its greatest, not even a limited three-year contract, an overseas allowance, a free passage and a guarantee of employment in a home dockyard at the end of the contract, was enough to induce enough volunteers from England. The Commissioner in the Plymouth yard wrote to the Navy Board in 1742, that he had 'endeavoured, but not prevailed upon any shipwrights, caulkers or blacksmiths to serve at Port Mahon'.

Naval staff.

When the naval base was first established at Mahón (1709), the three principal shore-based officials were, in order of precedence, the Master Shipwright, responsible for all the
dockyard installations, and the repair and refitting work; the Storekeeper/Clerk of the Cheque/Survey, responsible for all naval stores, for mustering and paying the workmen and for all dockyard accounts, and the Master Attendant, responsible for all movement in the harbour, and for the transport of stores and workmen to the ships. 128 Similar appointments were made when Mahón was a centre of naval activity from 1718 to 1720, and from 1739 to 1749 and, exceptionally, from 1742 until 1749, a resident Commissioner was appointed with overall responsibility for all the shore-based naval work. 129 But, in times of peace, all the above dockyard responsibilities devolved upon one official, styled the Naval Officer. The victualling yard was managed by the Victualling Board's Agent in Mahón, 130 and the surgeon of the hospital was responsible not only for the treatment of the sick, but also for the general hospital administration (victualling apart).

Labour force.

In 1713, the shore-based dockyard labour force consisted of one Master Shipwright, one Master Caulker, two blacksmiths, two bricklayers, two sawyers and twenty-one shipwrights/caulkers. 131 By January 1720, the only workmen listed were twenty-nine shipwrights/caulkers, of whom only nine were fit for duty. 132 A year later, a Naval Officer was appointed, the Storekeeper/Clerk of the Cheque/Survey was sent to Gibraltar, the nucleus of workmen was reduced to seven shipwrights and fifteen caulkers, 133 and the surplus men were sent home to England. 134 It was a small number, not
always capable of carrying out the dockyard's function expeditiously, as at least one Admiral complained to the Admiralty in 1729, but it had to suffice until the menace of a war with Spain again put the base at Mahon on a war footing.

A full quota of dockyard officials was appointed in 1739, and the workmen were reinforced. Despite the recruitment difficulties already mentioned in Plymouth, some volunteers were forthcoming from other yards in England, and some artisans were recruited locally, not only in Menorca but also from Genoa, Leghorn and Villefranche. In the years from 1742 to 1746, the Navy Board employed a British workforce of, on average, forty-six shipwrights, ten caulkers, ten blacksmiths, twenty-eight house carpenters, five sawyers, two ropemakers, and two bricklayers. This was in addition to foreign workers (an unquantifiable number), and the local island labour; this latter, in April 1747, included fifty-two shipwrights, thirty-five caulkers, five ropemakers, six masons, twenty-five general labourers, nine boatmen and nine watchmen. After the recall of the bulk of the British fleet from the Mediterranean in July 1748, the Commissioner was recalled, and the nucleus of staff and workmen reverted to its peacetime establishment. No statistics have come to light in respect of the shore-based dockyard establishment in the years 1763 - 1782, but it is unlikely that the three Naval Officers in charge of the dockyard in those years (M. Marsh, 1763-1764, M. Warren, 1764-1780 and C.H. Harris, 1780-1782), will have had at their disposal a workforce larger than their peacetime predecessors.
The British labour force in the victualling yard was represented by the Master Baker, Master Cooper and their assistants (in 1747 there were three bakers, ten coopers and five clerks), but nothing is known about the staffing of the hospital where there was peacetime provision for a surgeon, his mate, a clerk and an unspecified number of nurses. It is unclear how an increase in the numbers of medical staff was achieved to meet the increased demands in wartime, (it is evident from Cleghorn's account that no army surgeons in the garrison were called upon), and it is only to be presumed that ships' surgeons and nurses were seconded from the fleet.

The cost of the naval base.

The records of the expenses incurred by the various authorities involved in administering the naval base - Navy Board, Victualling Board, Commissioners for the Sick and Hurt and the Board of Ordnance - are too intermittent and insufficiently itemised for any coherent picture to be produced of the total cost. However, it is possible to give some idea of labour costs. The annual salary of the Commissioner was £500, the Naval Officer/Storekeeper/Clerk of the Cheque/Survey received £200, as did the Master Shipwright, and the Master Attendant was paid £100. The shore-based workmen were paid an overseas allowance of £19.4s.0d p.a. plus 2s.6d for every day worked in Mahon. Sailors employed in refitting were paid 1s.0d. per diem for working on their own ships, and 1s.6d. per diem for working out of their ships. The annual wages bill for the dockyard
workers came to £884 in 1715, then dropped to £620 in 1721, before rising to an average of £1,185 in the years from 1742 to 1746 (excluding a known annual cost of £225 for lodgings and offices for the artificers) - and these figures take no account of the Menorcan and foreign labour employed. The rates of pay for non-British workers varied, since the Clerk of the Cheque was instructed to recruit them 'at the cheapest rates'. In 1747, these rates ranged from 6d. per diem for boatmen, watchmen and yard labourers, to 1s.4d. per diem for shipwrights and caulkers. No figures have come to light to cost dockyard labour in the years from 1763 to 1782.

In 1715, the annual cost of wages and rented accommodation of the victualling yard amounted to £1,703 - more than similar costs in any home yard - but it was an amount which was not to rise significantly, even at the height of the War of Austrian Succession, when Mahón was at its busiest. In 1747, the wages bill of the victualling yard, with a staff and labour force of twenty men, came to £1,822. The annual pay of the Agent was £250, five clerks were each paid £35, ten coopers earned £39, the Master Furner(Baker) was paid £50, and three bakers £35 each. Rent, demurrage and boatage amounted annually to £650. Of all the victualling yards then in existence, only Chatham (£1,200), Gibraltar (£581) and Kinsale (£352), cost less to administer.

In respect of the expense of the naval hospital, Jonathan Coad records that, by 1742, it was costing £13,154.5s.0d. to run. The annual salary of the surgeon was initially £100, but was raised to £125, and he was paid 6s.8d. for every sick seaman cured and returned to duty.
Possession of the harbour of Mahón was a *sine qua non* of British European foreign policy for most of the eighteenth century, but only when the navy was based there in strength was Britain able to achieve the political objectives outlined at the start of this chapter. The obvious attractions of the Menorca's geo-political potential, the renown of the harbour, together with a jingoistic conviction that Britain would always rule the waves, blinded many British politicians from Stanhope onwards to the inexpediencies of maintaining a naval base in the island. The security of the base and the safety of the garrison could be guaranteed only if the navy could provide protection; at a sailing distance from England of two months or more, no swift response could be made to any threat or attack nor, if war broke out could the facilities of the yards be quickly upgraded; the island had little to offer in the way of materials or provisions, by far the bulk of which had to sent from England, and the enormous cost of maintaining the naval base and its protective garrison could be justified only intangibly and not by concrete achievements.

It is true that reinforcements sent to Haddock in 1740 prevented Spain from mounting a long-planned attack on Menorca, but the presence of the fleet did not impede a large Spanish army from being transported to Italy in 1741, nor did the British naval presence in Mahón deter France from garrisoning Corsican ports in 1764, or from assuming sovereignty over that island in 1768. Moreover, the only
naval battle which could be said to have been fought out of Mahon (Toulon, 1744), was indecisive. It was only when the war in America stretched Britain's naval and military resources to breaking point, and proof had been provided for the fourth time that Gibraltar was siege-resistant while Menorca succumbed yet again, that retention of the naval base of Mahon was put into true political perspective. In the peace negotiations of 1782/1783, Britain made little more than half-hearted attempts to regain the island, and there was no public outcry when this was denied. Moreover, when Britain next required a base in the Mediterranean, she turned to Corsica from 1793 to 1797 before, for reasons of military as well as naval strategy, regaining Menorca by conquest in 1798.

For British sailors, a tour of duty in the Mediterranean carried mixed blessings. Despite the incidence of scurvy, typhus and smallpox, it was a healthier station than the West Indies, although, in wartime, the latter station was to be preferred in respect of the greater rewards available in prize money. Nevertheless, there were rich pickings also to be had in the Mediterranean, and there was a profitable trade for ships' captains carrying bullion in, and to and from the Mediterranean. Augustus Hervey's rewards during two tours in the Mediterranean are illustrative of what a fortunate captain could obtain. As a result of cruising to capture merchantmen sailing to and from Marseilles, Naples and the Levant in 1747, Hervey was able to bank at least £6,850 in prize money, to which he added a further £800 in freight money for bullion carried from Lisbon to England in 1748. In his second, peacetime, tour of duty from 1752 to
1756, Hervey, whose annual pay as Captain of the *Phoenix* was £110, earned an average of £1,000 a year from freighting charges. But, cruising opportunities apart, Mahón held little attraction for sailors in harbour, and a posting there was as uncongenial to shore-based artificers as it was to the troops of the garrison who were all trapped ‘with little hazard they should run away’. In Mahón in 1746 there were reports of ‘mutinous behaviour of the greatest part of the artificers sent from England’, which was not quelled until an additional sixpence a day had been added to their wages, and the Navy board had undertaken (where requested) to transport wives to Mahón free of charge. Some sailors proved equally recalcitrant, and Byng informed the Admiralty in 1747 of ‘mutinous behaviour in the *Royal Oak’s* people’, when they refused to obey orders in harbour at Mahón, adding ‘I am told by Captains abroad here that this has frequently been the practice of many ships’ companies at that place.’ It is difficult not to sympathise with the men’s actions. In the instances quoted, the artificers’ behaviour resulted from the Admiralty’s refusal to bring them home at the end of their three year contract, and the rebellious attitude of the crew of the *Royal Oak* (and no doubt of other crews to which reference was made), was a protest by the seamen who had lived on short allowance for a lengthy period without being paid on station the money to which they were entitled in lieu of full rations.

Although Captain Hervey was pleased to meet up with friends among the officers in the garrison, and was made welcome by them, relations between the army and the navy were often strained in the years in which the navy was in
port in numbers. On those occasions, the navy was accused of improperly enlisting soldiers to serve as seamen in the fleet; 167 Anstruther complained of the 'Misunderstanding betwixt the Troops and the Seamen', and attributed the increase in 'Thefts, Robberys and Irregularitys to the presence of large numbers of sailors on shore. He also reported that:

the Sea officers attack Sentries with their drawn Swords, tho' posted to prevent the Sailors Plundering and Robbing the Gardens, which furnish the Fleet as well as the Troops with all manner of Greens. 168

There was friction about quarters because 'the Sea Officers incline to lye on shore', 169 and they sought to take over houses allocated as quarters for the garrison officers. 170 There were quarrels about food supplies when, in 1742 171 and 1743, 172 Anstruther issued decrees which made it virtually impossible for the navy to purchase fresh meat for the crews of the ships, or even for the sick in the naval hospital.

The naval base also brought mixed blessings to the Menorcans. It created job opportunities; it helped to stimulate growth in market gardening and in the economy in general; houses and warehouses near the harbour were leased at a good profit, and the presence of British warships in the western Mediterranean offered increased security for the Menorcan merchantmen. Some Menorcans became privateers in the war years from 1740 to 1748 and from 1778 to 1781, others volunteered to serve in the fleet - Haddock reported in April 1740, that he had already 'paid to Sundry Minorquin Volunteers the two months Advance Wages by which Encouragement many others are daily coming in'. 173 - but many
who did so, found the conditions of service with the fleet unbearable, and deserted when ships returned to port. The first dozen deserters, when they were recaptured, had all their goods and properties confiscated, and subsequent deserters were threatened with a fine of fifty pesos (£10) and banishment.

But, if the existence of the naval base and the presence of the fleet were, on balance, generally beneficial, the Menorcans did experience a downside. The navy was often high-handed and unscrupulous when it needed land. Although Saffron Island was legally and properly purchased in December 1765 before work began to make it part of the dockyard, compensation (£115) for the land at Dutch Cove, requisitioned by Falkingham in 1743, was not paid until 1751. The dispute over the navy’s enforced enclosure of the victualling yard which started in 1764, was not settled until ten years later, and compensation (£256.6s.2d.) for the naval appropriation of Bloody Island (where the hospital was first built in 1711) was not paid until 1779.

There were also some social problems. Shore leave granted to crews of the ships in harbour led to drunkenness, brawls and an increase in crime - assault, theft and robbery and, during the war years from 1740 to 1748, some 300 Menorcans were unlawfully pressed into service with the fleet. Impressing ran contrary to one of the Menorcans most cherished fueros which absolved the islanders from any form of conscription. Consequently, on the one occasion in February 1746, when Admiral Medley ‘tired with fruitless Promises from the Magistrates to procure Men themselves’, and with the ill-considered backing of General Wynyard, the
Commander-in-Chief, ordered gangs of seamen abroad in the island to press men into service with the fleet, it brought about the one instance of open revolt by the Menorcans against British authority. The sailors were set upon by mobs of men and women, some seamen were killed, others wounded, and the order was withdrawn.  

2 Careening was a process by which a ship was off-loaded and then hauled over so that first one side and then the other side of the hull was exposed to be scraped, cleaned and patched.  
4 Coad, The Royal Dockyards, p. 365.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid., p. 315.  
7 These volumes were known to be in existence in 1971, but had vanished without trace by 1989.  
8 PRO CO 174/3, f. 55. J. Seguí y Sancho, 'Mémoire sur l'Administration actuelle de l'Ile de Minorque', 16 December 1763, gave the year as 1718, but in a subsequent Mémoire, AM(RG) 142-2(2), Seguí gave the year as 1720, and this is the year which subsequent historians have adopted as the date when the court first came into operation.  
9 AM/RG 142-2(2), Seguí Mémoire, 1764. Full details of the fees charged from 1720 to 1756 are listed.  
10 The actual figure is nowhere cited, but has been calculated from PRO WO 72/10 Q9, 'Auction Accounts to be settled with the General', October 1779–March 1780. The amount of the Vice-Admiral's perquisite is confirmed in Mahon, Life of Murray, p. 429.  
11 PRO CO 174/3, f. 132. Memorial of the principal Traders of Mahon to the Jurats, 26 May 1764.  
12 PRO CO 174/2, f. 43. Desagulliers (Dutch Consul) to Newcastle, 3 September 1746.  
15 AM/RG 142-2(2), Seguí Mémoire, 1764, cited examples of tenfold increases in some instances.  
16 PRO CO 174/3, f. 96. Johnstone to Halifax, 22 May 1764.  
19 PRO CO 174/6, no. 13, f. 120. Weymouth to Johnston 14 December 1770.
BL K Top 74 22(i). Note M in the legend gives the date of purchase as May 1751.

PRO ADM 140/1323. 'Plan of the Victualling Magazines at Maon', c.1745.

PRO ADM 1/376. Baker to Burchett, 9 August 1715, refers.

Ibid.

Ibid.

AM/U (MC) 81. Jurats to Kane, 15 May 1716, refers.

PRO ADM 1/376. Baker to Burchett, 9 August 1715.

Ibid.

Baker to Corbett, 16 July 1715.

Coad, The Royal Dockyards, p.336.

PRO ADM 1/376. Baker to Burchett, 4 February 1716.

Ibid.

Ibid. Cavendish to Burchett, 23 April 1729.

PRO ADM 1/380. Haddock to Burchett, July 1738.


PRO ADM 1/381. Mathews to Corbett, 17 September 1742.


PRO ADM 98/120, ff.317-322. Sick and Hurt Board to Stephens, 6 December 1771, refers.

Cleghorn, Observations.

Ibid., pp.136,137,261.

Ibid., pp.133,136,142.

PRO ADM 1/380. Haddock to Burchett, 3 June 1740.

Cleghorn Observations, p.18. The author then lists the considerable range and variety of fruit, vegetables and medicinal herbs readily obtainable in Menorca.

Coad, The Royal Dockyards, pp.319-321.

Erskine, Augustus Hervey's Journal (London,1953), pp.52-77. Captain Hervey did not put in to Mahon during the last thirteen months of his tour in the Mediterranean.

Cleghorn, Observations, pp.292,293.

Ibid., pp.296,297.


PRO ADM 1/381. Archibald Christie (Surgeon of the hospital) to Mathews, 23 October 1742, refers.

PRO ADM 1/380. Haddock to Corbett, 1 February 1742.

PRO ADM 1/382. Rowley to Corbett, 16 December 1744.

PRO ADM 42/2348. List of the repairs to the hospital, November 1755.

Guillon, La France à Minorque, pp.65-66.


PRO ADM 1/384. Brett to Cleveland, 4 June 1763.


Coad, The Royal Dockyards, p.331, citing ADM/B/173, 11 January 1764.

PRO ADM 42/2349. List of repair and building work undertaken September-December 1763.

Coad, The Royal Dockyards, p.331, citing ADM/B/175, 1 October 1764.

PRO ADM 42/2349, no.93, lists building progress on Saffron Island.

PRO ADM 1/385. Spry to Stephens, 5 March 1767.

PRO CO 174/8, f.82. Navy Board to Admiralty, 18 May 1774.

PRO ADM 42/2352. The twenty-eight foot launch for use as a 'passage boat' was launched 30 September, and the frigate
Minorca (two years in the building) was launched 4 September 1779.


103 J. Riera y Alemany, El Arsenal de Mahón (Madrid, 1899), p. 91. The work was carried out by a Menorcan mason, Jaume Ros, and the completed construction was inspected by Murray 18 October 1778.

104 PRO WO 72/10, Appendix W no. 29. Report by Captain Hugh Lawson RN, relative to the Stores saved from the Yard at Mahon.

105 AGS/M, leg. 481. Admiral Moreno to Marqués de Castejón, 26 August 1781, gives a detailed list of the stores captured and a description of the dockyard installations.

106 PRO ADM 1/384. Brett to Cleveland, 4 June 1763.

107 PRO CO 174/8, ff. 78-90. Victualling Board to Navy Board, 20 May 1774.

108 Ibid.


110 PRO ADM 1/384. Brett to Cleveland, 4 June 1763.

111 PRO ADM 42/2349, no 291. 31 May 1765.

112 PRO ADM 42/2350, no 435. 28 May 1768.

113 Ibid., no. 651. 30 December 1769.

114 PRO ADM 1/386. Proby to Stephens, 27 August 1770 refers to Warren's reports of 1764, 1765, 1766, May 1768 and January 1770.

115 Ibid., Proby to Stephens, 30 April and 27 August 1770.

116 Ibid., 27 August 1770.

117 The plans are not now traceable.

118 Ibid. Proby to Stephens, 6 November 1770, enclosing the costings made by the Naval Officer.

119 ADM 98/10, ff. 286-288. Commissioners for the Sick and Hurt to Stephens, 1 January 1771.

120 Ibid., f. 318 Commissioners to Stephens, 6 December 1771, refers to Proby's letter of January 1771.

121 Ibid., f. 319.

122 PRO ADM 98/10, f. 359. Commissioners for the Sick and Hurt to Stephens, 22 May 1772, refers to orders to Denis dated 8 January 1772.

123 Ibid., ff. 359-363, refers to further correspondence with Denis.


125 PRO ADM 98/10, f. 283. McNeill (hospital surgeon) to Commissioners for the Sick and Hurt, 13 August 1770.


127 I am indebted to Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, pp. 99-108, for the details of the duties and responsibilities of the naval dockyard officers.

128 PRO ADM 1/376. Correspondence from Mahon in 1709 reveals that the three appointments were held respectively by Paul Stigant, John Corfield and Robert Frost.

129 PRO ADM 7/638, ff. 35-40. Admiralty appointment of Edward Falkingham as Commissioner, 10 December 1742.

130 Joseph Gascoigne was appointed in 1709 and he was succeeded by Thomas Revell who was Agent from 1716 until succeeded by his son Russell during the war of Austrian Succession, (PRO ADM 1/381 confirms).

131 PRO ADM 42/2343. Dockyard workmen as listed, 1 July 1713.
PRO ADM 1/377. Byng to Burchett, 13 January 1720.

PRO ADM 42/2355. Dockyard list, 1721.

Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, p.333, citing Navy Board to Burchett, 4 January 1721.

PRO ADM 1/379. Cavendish to Burchett, 23 April 1729.

PRO ADM 1/380. Haddock to Burchett, 20 February 1741, mentions the recruitment of eleven caulkers from Leghorn, and PRO ADM 106/979, 5 December 1742, refers to contracts signed with twenty-six artisans from Genoa and Villefranche.

PRO ADM 42/2346. Pay list for wages due 24 September 1742 - 30 September 1746.

Ibid. Pay list for Menorcan workers, April 1747.

PRO ADM 42/2349, resuming the post to which he had been appointed in June 1755.

Ibid. Appointment dated September 1764.

PRO ADM 42/2352. Appointment dated September 1780.

Baugh, Naval Administration in the age of Walpole, pp.356,357, citing PRO ADM 110/15, 28 January 1747.

Cleghorn, Observations, passim.

The Board of Ordnance supplied the navy's guns and munitions which were not a charge on the Admiralty.

GM, December 1742, p.659.

PRO ADM 1/3634. Navy Board to Admiralty, 4 January 1721.

Baugh, Naval Administration in the age of Walpole, p.362.

PRO ADM 7/638, f.111. Admiralty Instructions to Storekeeper/Clerk of the Cheque, 31 October 1739.

PRO ADM 42/2334. Wages bill for the shipwrights/caulkers in Mahon, 1714-1715.

PRO ADM 42/2355. Wages bill for shipwrights/caulkers in Mahon, 1720-1721.


Ibid., Cost of lodgings hired, March 1747.

PRO ADM 7/638, f.110. Admiralty Instructions to Francis Gregson, 31 October 1739.

PRO ADM 42/2346. Pay list for Minorcan workers, April 1747.

PRO ADM 110/7, ff.42-52.

Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, p.404.

Baugh, Naval Administration in the age of Walpole, pp.56,57.

Coad, The Royal Dockyards, p.336, citing PRO ADM 1/3529, 9 September and 16 September 1742.

The entire ship's crew shared in the prize money. One eighth went to the Flag Officer, one quarter to the Captain, one eighth was shared by the Lieutenants, one quarter by Warrant and Petty Officers, and the remaining quarter share went to the rest of the crew.

The average freight allowance paid to Captains was 1% of the value of the bullion carried.

Erskine, Augustus Hervey's, Journal, p.52.

Ibid. Introduction, p.xx.

Lind, Three Letters, p.123.

Baugh, Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole, p.363, citing PRO ADM 106/2182, 19 November 1746.

PRO ADM 1/382. Byng to Corbett, 3 October 1747.

Suffolk Record Office, Hervey Papers Ms 941/50/3, Augustus Hervey's Journal, pp.146,147, May 1753.


Ibid.
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