Britain and Menorca in the eighteenth century

Thesis

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An Abstract.

Title: Britain and Menorca in the Eighteenth Century.
Name: David W. Donaldson, MA (Cantab).
Degree: PhD.
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Menorca was a British possession for more than seventy years between 1708 and 1802.

This thesis traces British influence upon, and involvement with Menorca from the seventeenth century until Spain recovered the island in 1802. Eighteenth-century Menorcan history has been tackled specifically by only two British historians, Ella Murdie (1931) and Desmond Gregory (1990), but neither has drawn upon primary source material which is to be found outside Britain. The following study is based on British archives, on primary sources in Spain, Mallorca and Menorca, and on some hitherto untapped material in Britain and Canada.

Chapter one is an account of English interest in Menorca prior to 1708, and chapter two deals with the capture and early years of British de facto rule. The following three chapters analyse the Menorcan social structure, and the island's administrative, judicial and ecclesiastical institutions and organisation. Chapters six and seven examine the role of the military garrison and naval base. Chapter eight illustrates Menorca's vulnerability to attack; chapter nine assesses the impact of British de jure government, and chapter ten is an account of the final British occupation. The last chapter adds a coda to the British presence, and appraises the value of the island to Britain, and of Britain to Menorca.

Britain's determination to retain Menorca sprang more from pride than sound judgement. It soured relations with Spain; it ignored the island's poor intrinsic commercial potential, and that Menorca's defence demanded a priority in naval and military resources quite disproportionate to the island's political and strategic importance. Britain gained little from Menorca and lost much, but the reverse was true of the Menorcans. Despite the clash of religion, the generally tolerant British government gave scope for the Menorcans who so chose to benefit socially, culturally, commercially and materially from the British presence.
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Abbreviations.

AA Archivos de Alayor [Municipal Records].
AC Archivos de Ciudadela [Municipal Records].
AC/C Correspondence of the Universitat of Ciudadela.
AEE Archivo de la Embajada de España ante la Santa Sede, Madrid. [Records of the Spanish Embassy to the Holy See].
AGS Archivo General, Simancas, Spain. [Spanish Public Records].
AGS/E Estado. [State papers].
AGS/GM Guerra Moderna. [War Office Papers].
AGS/M Marina. [Navy Office Papers].
AHN Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid. [National Historical Records].
AHN/E Estado. [State Papers].
AM Archivo de Mahón. [Public Records].
AM/RG Real Gobernación. [Records of the Court of Royal Government].
AM/U Universitat. [Municipal records].
AM/U (A) Alojamientos. [Records of Garrison Quarters].
AM/U (D) Decretos. [Gubernatorial Decrees].
AM/U (Dip) Diputaciones. [Records of the Syndichs in their missions abroad].
AM/U (MC) Memoriales y Cartas. [Correspondence].
AM/U (PR) Proposiciones y Resoluciones. [Resolutions].
ASV/V Archivo Secreto Vaticano (Vescovi), Rome. (Secret Records of the Curia. Bishops' Correspondence).
BL British Library, London.
BL Add Mss Additional Manuscripts.
CCLO Christ Church Library, Oxford University.
DNB Dictionary of National Biography.
FRB Fontes Rerum Balearicum. [Occasional review devoted to the reproduction of original material relevant to the Balearic Islands].
GM Gentleman's Magazine.
HMC Historic Manuscripts' Commission.
JSAHR Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research.
KAO Kent Archive Office, Maidstone, Kent.
leg Legajo. [File].
NAC National Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Canada.
NRS Naval Records' Society.
PRO Public Record Office, London.
PRO ADM Admiralty Papers.
PRO CO Colonial Office Papers.
PRO HO Home Office Papers.
PRO PC Privy Council Papers.
PRO SP State Papers.
PRO T Treasury Papers.
PRO WO War Office Papers.
RM Revista de Menorca. [Quarterly journal of artistic, historical and scientific interest].
SPCK Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge.
Glossary

Abogado Fiscal Advocate Fiscal. (Crown Prosecutor and Judge.

Afforations Annual settlement of retail prices of essential foodstuffs.

Almotacén/ Superintendent of the markets, and of Mustasaf weights and measures.

Arrabal Suburb - used exclusively to refer to the garrison town of St. Philip's.


Bayle Stipendiary lay Magistrate.

Bayle general Senior stipendiary lay Magistrate.

Estanque Tax collected on the sale of brandy.

Fuero Locally binding inviolable civil or fiscal right or privilege, granted by the crown.

Insaculación Election/selection by ballot.

Jurat Generically refers to all elected members of an Universitat, but strictly refers to the three members of the Universitat's executive body.

Paborde Senior Catholic cleric.

Syndich Agent representing the island's interests abroad.

Término Administrative District.

Universitat Municipal and District Council.

Universitat General Council representative of all the General Menorcan Universitats.

Conventions

Dating

The convention by which the English New Year began on 25 March until the introduction of the Gregorian calendar in 1752, has been ignored. The New Year has always been taken to start on 1 January and, with the exception of English official documents cited prior to 1752, dates have been given according to the New Style calendar.

Proper Nouns

In the interests of uniformity (except in instances where it would have been inappropriate), Menorcan names (including the island itself) have been given in their Castilian and not Menorquí form. Wherever possible, Spanish and Menorcan surnames have been given in full in the first instance (paternal surname followed by maternal surname); subsequent references have been restricted to the paternal surname.

Quotations

Original spelling has been reproduced in quotations from original sources.
My initial interest in Menorca was linguistic, and dates from some forty years ago when I first visited the island with the intention of recording any remaining legacy of the English language in Menorquí, the Menorcan dialect of Catalan. Circumstances prevented this study from being completed until 1971, by which time my research, which had involved not only oral verification but also an examination of official records in the Menorcan archives, had led me to broaden my horizons with the ultimate aim of producing a comprehensive study of all aspects of Britain's relations with, and influence upon, Menorca during the seventy-one years in which the island was governed by Britain in the eighteenth century. The realisation of this objective has been delayed because, until recently, I have had no opportunity to undertake the essential scrutiny of relevant primary source material in this country and abroad which forms the basis of this thesis.

Surprisingly, in view of the number of years of British rule in Menorca and of the importance which Britain attached to its possession in the eighteenth century, only two English historians, Ella Murdie and Desmond Gregory, have specifically examined the years of British rule. Murdie's study took the form of an unpublished thesis in 1931,$^1$ and Gregory's book was published only in 1990,$^2$ when the bulk of the research for this thesis had been completed. Murdie's original research was based exclusively upon material in the
Colonial Office files on Menorca in the Public Record Office, together with information obtained from some manuscripts in the British Library, and her study was restricted to the years of British de jure government (1713-1756, 1763-1782). Gregory made full use of the sources previously consulted by Murdie, and he also found additional material in the Public Record Office in Admiralty, War Office, Home Office, Foreign Office, Privy Council and State papers; in the National Army Museum and in private papers housed in some provincial archives. However, Gregory's findings were not based upon any primary sources in Menorca, Spain or Mallorca. He excused this lacuna on grounds of lack of time and resources but, from his obvious unfamiliarity with the rules of Castilian orthography, manuscripts written in Spanish, and especially the island's records all written in Menorquí in the eighteenth century, would clearly have presented unaccustomed problems.

Moreover, Gregory's research did not uncover all the material relevant to Menorca in the Admiralty, War Office and Colonial Office files in the Public Record Office, nor did he refer to material to be found in the Leake, Mitchell, Strange, Wentworth, Robinson, Nelson, Whitefoord, Townshend, Pasley and Keene papers in the British Library. He did not draw upon sources to be found in London in the National Maritime Museum, in the libraries of the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, and in the Masonic United Grand Lodge. Elsewhere, manuscripts not consulted by Gregory are housed in the Scottish Record Office, the National Archives of Canada and in the following British provincial Record Offices: Bedfordshire, Clwyd, Gloucestershire,
Northamptonshire, Staffordshire, Suffolk, East Sussex and West Sussex. It has to be said that none of this material serves to contradict Gregory's overall conclusions, but much of it contributes to a fuller picture of British Menorca, and the records of the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge provide a greater insight into Britain's intentions in respect of religious tolerance in Menorca and the ecclesiastical government of the island.

Two French historians, Raoul de Cisternes and Edouard Guillon, consulted French archives to chronicle the short period of French rule, and a third, Irénée Lameire, also writing at the turn of this century, drew additionally upon archives in the island in his account of the foreign occupations of Menorca. But no Spanish historian has yet published a specific study of the years of British rule. Apart from a rather shallow and insubstantial monograph by the Menorcan-born novelist Mario Verdaguer, no such complete study has been undertaken by any Menorcan historian writing in Castilian or Catalan, although the years in question have been chronicled by a number of authors in the context of the overall history of the island. Most of these accounts reflect the findings expressed in the two seminal histories of Menorca written towards the end of the nineteenth century by the Menorcans Rafael Oleo y Quadrado and Pedro Riudavets y Tudury. Both Oleo and Riudavets, and also Francisco Hernández Sanz in his influential work on the history and geography of Menorca published in the first decade of this century, made use of material already researched and published by Menorcans – notably the monographs of two members of the Ramis family in the years 1787 to 1832. They
also had access to all the island's official archives, and to collections of papers in private hands. Regrettably, a sizeable proportion of this material is now missing or is no longer accessible, and of the notes supplied by these authors (following the conventions of the age in which they were writing), most were explanatory rather than indicative of the source.

Particular aspects or incidents of British Menorca have recently been chronicled by historians writing in Castilian or Menorquí. Most have relied upon secondary sources on which to base their accounts, but where primary sources have been consulted (except in the numerous articles and monographs by Fernando Martí Camps, who has brought a new dimension to bear in some of his work, by including material from the diocesan archives to which he, as librarian, has ready access), these have been found in archives on mainland Spain, Mallorca or elsewhere abroad, and it has to be admitted that the municipal archives in Menorca are no longer the rich and dependable source of material they once must have been. The records of the Universitats of Mercadal and Alayor are not now open to researchers, although there is an index (1915) of what the Alayor archives should contain. It is possible to consult the municipal archives in Ciudadela, but here the records are largely jumbled and unclassified, with only a part-time archivist battling against the odds to bring some order to bear. In Mahón, most of the municipal records are readily available, but many of the manuscripts are in poor condition and there are gaps in the records, with some material (notably all the records of the transactions of the vice-admiralty court) having gone missing in recent years.
Nevertheless, much of the material consulted in these archives has served to produce a better perspective of contentious issues during the British government of Menorca.

It is the aim of this thesis to produce a comprehensive study of all aspects of the years of British rule in Menorca, based principally upon primary sources of material. The Menorcan and Spanish archives have helped considerably to balance the arguments and, of the British official sources, the most rewarding have been the Colonial and War Office files. The most disappointing British material, given that the prime reason for acquiring Menorca was to provide the navy with a naval base in Mahón, has come from the Admiralty records, which are not complete and, while they provide a good account of the installations and workings of the base, in contrast with the War Office files, they offer little in the way of human and social interest. French archives have not been consulted, since their relevance falls largely outside the scope of this study; nor has reference been made to other archives in Spain, partly because of a lack of resources, but principally because the material to be found there is either duplicated in the various sections of the Archivo General in Simancas (which have been thoroughly examined), or has been faithfully copied and forms part of a collection of duplicates of original documents in other Spanish archives now held in the Biblioteca Bartomeu March in Palma, Mallorca. The collection was assembled forty years ago by Manuel Cencillo y de Pineda, Briones y Sánchez, Conde de Pernia, with the unrealised objective of writing a history of Menorca in the eighteenth century.
7. R. Oleo y Quadrado. *Historia de la isla de Menorca* 2 vols (Ciudadela, 1874, 1876).
8. F. Hernández Sanz. *Compendio de geografía e historia de la isla de Menorca* (Mahón, 1908), [hereafter Hernández, Compendio].
9. A. Ramis y Ramis. *Noticias relativas a la isla de Menorca* [hereafter Ramis, Noticias]:
   - no. 1 (Mahón, 1826), facsimile ed. (Ciudadela, 1979).
   - no. 2 (Mahón, 1820), facsimile ed. (Ciudadela, 1980).
   - no. 3 (Mahón, 1827), facsimile ed. (Ciudadela, 1981).
   - no. 4 (Mahón, 1829), facsimile ed. (Ciudadela, 1985).
   - no. 5 (Mahón, 1829), facsimile ed. (Ciudadela, 1985).
   - no. 6 (Mahón, 1829), Facsimile ed. (Ciudadela, 1980).
   - Fortificaciones antiguas de Menorca (Mahón, 1832), facsimile ed. (Ciudadela, 1980).

*Alquerías de Menorca en el año 1815* (Mahón, 1815), facsimile ed. (Ciudadela, 1989).

*Serie cronológica de los Gobernadores de Menorca* (Mahón, 1815), facsimile ed. (Ciudadela, 1980).

*Varones ilustres de Menorca* (Mahón, 1817).
Europe and the Mediterranean in the early eighteenth century.
Chapter One.

The island of Menorca and early English interest in it.

Geography.

Menorca lies on latitude 40, twenty miles north-east of Mallorca, and is the second largest of the Balearic Islands. Within a radius of two hundred miles lie the principal ports of eastern Spain, southern Spain and Algiers; the western Italian ports, the islands of Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and the ports of Tunisia lie within a four hundred mile radius (Fig. 1.1). Menorca is approximately thirty miles long, between eight to twelve miles wide and covers an area of two hundred and sixty square miles - one fifth of the size of Mallorca. In the eighteenth century, it was divided into four administrative términos (Fig. 1.2).

The island is split geologically into two unequal parts by a line running from Ciudadela in the west to Mahón in the east. The smaller, northern part is inhospitable, infertile and is largely made up of Devonian rock which is not found elsewhere in the Balearics, and suggests that Menorca is the oldest island in the group. The southern part (roughly two-thirds of the total area) has a limestone base and, despite a shallow depth of soil, the land is fertile in the centre of the island and in the valleys running down to the south coast. The northern region contains the only hill of
significance (Monte Toro, 1,175ft), while the southern region is an undulating plateau never rising above three hundred and fifty feet in height.

There are numerous freshwater springs which flow freely in the winter and dry up in the summer, but there are no rivers in Menorca, and the absence of hills leaves the island exposed to wind and the influence of the sea. This ensures that Menorca has a higher rainfall than the other Balearic islands, and helps to produce an average humidity of 70%. The force of the prevailing northerly wind, the Tramontana, which blows over the island for more than a third of the year, can be seen in the stunted forms and shaped incline of the trees, mostly pines, holm-oaks and wild olives, which lean to the south for protection. Tancas (stone dykes) are found throughout the island, and were constructed to give cattle and crops shelter from the winds. The climate is temperate - an average of 73.5°F in summer, and 52.8°F in winter - but examination of statistics for the late twentieth century reveals that temperatures in recent years are slightly lower than those recorded by an English army surgeon in the middle of the eighteenth century. The weather in the autumn and in the spring is often unsettled, and these are the seasons of most wind and rain.

There are four natural harbours - Ciudadela in the west, Fornells and Addaya in the north and Mahón in the east. Of these, the harbour of Ciudadela is small, narrow and unsuitable for all but fishing boats and small vessels. The harbour of Fornells is more capacious (5,500 yards long and 2,000 yards wide) but, like Addaya (3,800 yards long and 450 yards wide) it is narrow-necked, shallow and very exposed to
the prevailing north winds. The harbour of Mahón, although only 250 yards wide at its entrance, is deep, 6,000 yards long and between 500 and 1,000 yards wide. The sixteenth-century Genoese Admiral Andrea Doria is credited with the saying:

Junio, julio, agosto y Mahón
los mejores puertos del Mediterraneo son.
(Of all the ports in the Mediterranean, the best are June, July, August and Mahón).

but he merely made a jingle out of knowledge that had been widespread in the Mare Nostrum since time immemorial.

Early History.

The island of Menorca has guarded its early secrets well, even though traces still abound of the island's earliest culture. These take the form of primitive cave dwellings and megalithic structures, such as Talayots (tower-shaped constructions in stone, of which the solid base only now remains visible), Naus (upturned boat-shaped monuments believed to have served both as dwellings and as sites for secondary burials), and also a structure unique to Menorca, the Taula (a large T-shaped construction formed by two stone slabs standing in the midst of stone pillars in a walled enclosure and surrounded by caves). Nevertheless, despite the fact that there are hundreds of such remains on the island, and many theories have been advanced, as yet no completely authoritative account has been produced of Menorca's earliest inhabitants and their culture. To judge from the sites of the megalithic remains in Menorca - usually to be found inland and in the southern half of the island - it would
appear that the remainder of the island, including the natural harbours, held less appeal for the first settlers than it did for the Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines and Moors, all of whom occupied Menorca for greater or shorter periods, for commercial or strategic reasons, during the 2,500 years which followed the first Bronze Age settlement in third millenium B.C. In 1232, shortly after the capture of Mallorca from the Moors by James I of Aragon, Moorish Menorca became a tributary of the Aragonese crown until, in 1287, the island was conquered by Alfonso III of Aragon. From 1298 until 1343, Menorca formed part of the independent kingdom of Mallorca, before reverting to the crown of Aragon. In 1467, with the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile, Menorca became a part of the kingdom of Spain, and so it remained until the island was ceded to Britain in 1713. 

Post-conquest settlement.

It is impossible to establish the size of the population of Menorca at the time of the Aragonese conquest in 1287 but, if the figures (40,000) of a contemporary Catalan chronicler are to be believed, it must have been very much greater than it was to become for the next six centuries. What is known is that very few Menorcan Moors were either willing, able or allowed to stay on the island, except as slaves. Those who did remain either died out, or became assimilated with the Catalan settlers who came to Menorca. By the end of the fifteenth century, although Moorish place-names persisted -
and are still to be found today - there were no traces of inhabitants with names of Moorish origins.\textsuperscript{6}

Alfonso III was determined that Menorca should be settled with 'bona gent catalana'(good Catalan people) and, to this end, he was generous in his distribution and grants of land in Menorca to his subjects who had contributed to the conquest.\textsuperscript{7} However, it is evident from the accounts by Menorcan historians of the years which followed the conquest, that there were many territorial and financial disputes among the 'bona gent', there were poor crops and consequent famines, the Barbary Moors frequently attacked and pillaged the island, crime and banditry increased and the population of Menorca declined for one reason or another. The decline in numbers led to a second attempt, this time by Alfonso V of Aragon in 1427, to colonise Menorca with Catalans from the mainland. The settlement can have done little to lessen strife and unease, since the lure for settlers on this occasion was not land grants, but the remission of custodial prison sentences.\textsuperscript{8}

· In the sixteenth century, Menorca's vulnerability to persistent Moorish raids and attacks - the most devastating of which were those which destroyed Mahón in 1535 and Ciudadela in 1558, and resulted in the captivity and enslavement of more than a third of the island's population\textsuperscript{9} - caused Philip II of Spain to consider a plan in 1570 to evacuate the Menorcans to Mallorca and abandon Menorca.\textsuperscript{10} The plan was not, however, implemented, and some new immigrants were attracted to Menorca from Naples, Sicily, Mallorca and Catalonia in the second half of the sixteenth century by a promise of tax exemption for a period of ten years,\textsuperscript{11} and
numbers gradually built up from a low estimate of 6,000 in 1588 to 15,000 in 1708. Nevertheless, although the island suffered fewer and less damaging raids in the seventeenth century, an ever-present fear of attack from the sea (the last Moorish raid before the British occupation occurred as late as 1694), discouraged coastal settlements, and the population became concentrated in the 'mitjaníía' (middle strip) of the island, in and around the fortified towns of Mahón and Ciudadela, and the inland villages of Alayor, Mercadal and Ferrerías.

The population increase owed little to the immigration of non-Catalans. In the first half of the seventeenth century, only eight French, three Neapolitan and two Genoese families were recorded as residents in Ciutadella, according to the diocesan records. What influx there was to the island came, if not from 'bona gent', at least from 'gent catalana', principally from Mallorca, but also from Catalan Spain. But there were also some (soldiers sent to garrison duties in Menorca who subsequently settled), who came from other Spanish provinces.

Before the eighteenth century, there was little to attract immigrants to Menorca. The island had no significant natural resources, the economy was agriculturally based and geared to a level of bare subsistence for the majority. There were few trades and no industry. In addition, daily life in Menorca as late as the seventeenth century was far from tranquil and not lacking in hazard. Banditry was rife, and there were times when the island was infested with rats, cicadas and locusts; there were years of drought and famine; there were epidemics of plague and cholera, and there was even a minor earthquake
in 1654. The seventeenth century in Menorca was, according to one modern historian, a 'turbulent time of ungovernable tempers, rivalries in government and disputes between civil and religious authorities'.

Early English interest in the Mediterranean.

Good harbour this same upon Minork,  
For shipping very useful 'gainst the Turk.

These lines written by an ex-galley slave in 1671 epitomise what Menorca represented to the English in the seventeenth century - an island strategically placed in the western Mediterranean providing, in the port of Mahón, a large, natural harbour, safe from storm and attack, suitable to serve as a base from which a naval force could secure English commercial interests in the Straits and the Levant. On occasions, Mediterranean ports other than Mahón, more strategically and conveniently situated, were used to counter particular threats to English trade, but Mahón was most frequently chosen as the English naval base in the Straits during the seventeenth century.

Merchants in England began to trade indirectly with the Mediterranean in the early fourteenth century, taking advantage of the annual voyage of the fleet of Flanders galleys which, for two hundred years, called at Southampton and London on voyages between Antwerp and Venice. By the sixteenth century, Hakluyt recorded some direct trading with 'diverse tall ships of London, Southampton and Bristow' sailing with English cloth and leather to Crete, Cyprus and Syria, and returning with silk, spices, oils, wine, carpets
and mohair yarn. Later in the sixteenth century, the development of the trade route to India by sea (which contributed to the eclipse of Venice as the European entrepot for eastern merchandise), the decline of Antwerp's influence on English markets from the 1560s and the defeat of the Turkish fleet by the Spaniards at Lepanto, encouraged a substantial increase in the number of English ships sailing to trade directly in the Straits and with the Levant. The increase was marked by the grant of a royal patent to twelve English merchants to form the Turkey Company in 1581 with exclusive rights to trade with Turkey, followed by a patent granted in 1583 to fifty-three English merchants to form the Venice Company with a monopoly of trade with the Republic. The resulting overlap of interests led to the amalgamation of both companies to form the Levant Company in 1592. But, while the newly-formed Company was granted an initial monopoly of trade with Venice and Turkey, trade within the Straits was open to all, and such were the profits to be made, that many merchants began to trade with the Mediterranean ports of Spain, France and Italy, in particular with the Tuscan port of Leghorn, which was declared a free port in 1591.

English trade in the Mediterranean grew substantially in volume and value in the course of the seventeenth century. In the first quarter of the century, it was estimated that the Levant Company alone was exporting goods to the value of £250,000, and importing merchandise to the same value. By the end of the century, despite the growth in American and Asian markets, and the steady trade with northern Europe, the annual value of English exports to Turkey and southern Europe
had risen to £1,708,000, and the value of imports to £1,555,000 - both figures representing some 27% of English foreign trade.\textsuperscript{29} The Mediterranean had become an important trading market in which successful voyages brought high returns on investment, but it was also a high-risk trade.\textsuperscript{30} English traders faced fierce commercial competition from the French and the Dutch, wars closed trading outlets and exposed merchant ships to enemy attack, but the greatest recurrent threat to all nations trading in the Straits came from the 'Turk'.

The Turks (Moors), also known collectively in contemporary accounts as Algerines, were corsairs, nominally subjects of the Sultan of Turkey, who preyed indiscriminately on shipping and sailed out of ports in the Sultan's north African (Barbary coast) regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. Piracy had been prevalent in the Mediterranean for centuries and, although the heyday of the Barbary corsairs was the sixteenth century when, purportedly in the name of Islam, they plundered ships of all Christian nations, they continued to be a menace in the seventeenth century. In the early years of the century Salé, in Morocco, was added to the number of corsair ports and corsair activity was extended into the Atlantic as far north as the 'Narrow Seas',\textsuperscript{31} where the corsairs marauded the southern coast of England and, in 1625, even dared to occupy Lundy Island in the Bristol Channel.

Within the Straits, English losses to the corsairs were considerable - 466 ships were taken between 1609 and 1616\textsuperscript{32} and, in 1619, the Levant Company pressed parliament to seek redress for the capture of a further 150 vessels and the release of 1,000 English captives known to be enslaved in
Algiers alone. When diplomatic protests produced no result, parliament, prompted by a pledge of £8,000 from the Levant Company towards the cost, sought to obtain satisfaction by force. In 1620 a naval squadron was sent to the Straits under the command of Sir Robert Mansell, with orders to 'extirpate pirates'.

Mansell's expedition failed to achieve its objectives. No pirates were engaged, no damage was inflicted on the Barbary ports and only a few captives were ransomed, but the expedition had the virtue of introducing the English navy for the first time, in April 1621, to the harbour of Mahón, and Mansell's campaign had some impact abroad and at home. Abroad, it signalled to the Barbary States and other Mediterranean countries England's intentions to secure her interests in the Straits. At home, Mansell's expedition prompted thoughts of the advantages to be gained from a more regular protective naval presence in the Straits and, in 1625, Sir Henry Bruce suggested that an attempt be made to capture Gibraltar for use as a base for an English naval squadron. It was not, however, a proposal which commended itself to parliament and, with England's political preoccupations for the next quarter of a century almost exclusively domestic, the issue of an English naval presence in the Mediterranean did not resurface until the end of the Civil War. Decisions were then taken to provide escorts for convoys of merchantmen (1649), and to maintain a naval squadron of up to twelve ships permanently on station in the Straits (1652). These measures reflected the Commonwealth's objectives of protecting and encouraging trade, and of establishing English naval supremacy in the Mediterranean -
aims which were pursued after the Restoration. The extent to
which these objectives were realised can be measured in the
increase in volume and value of English trade, and by the
peace treaty signed with the Algerines in 1683 which,
unlike its precursors, proved enduring and, importantly,
included an Algerine pledge to allow unmolested passage to
English merchantmen upon production of a certificate under
admiralty seal - the so-called Mediterranean pass - attesting
to the fact that the ships were English-owned and English-
manned.40

The search for a naval base in the Straits.

A base where ships could be refitted and revictualled on
station was essential if the 1652 decision was to be
implemented. In 1656 a proposal that Gibraltar be captured
and used for that purpose was again considered, but Cromwell
rejected it following advice that the harbour, little more
than an open roadstead, provided inadequate shelter and,
ironically in the light of subsequent events in the 18th
century, it was thought to be insecure against an attack from
mainland Spain.41 Nevertheless, in the 1680s, once the threat
from corsair activity had moved from the Barbary coast to
Sale, Admiral Arthur Herbert found Gibraltar 'conveniently
seated'42 for his operations from 1680 to 1682, and from 1685
until his squadron was withdrawn to strengthen naval defences
in home waters in 1688.43

Hopes had been entertained that Tangier (an English
possession from 1661 to 1684), would provide the necessary
base but, although it was used in some campaigns, it failed
to match expectations. Despite expenditure in excess of £400,000, the mole was inadequate and the anchorage too shallow to admit high-rated ships.\textsuperscript{44} Tangier itself did not develop into an entrepot, consequently provisions and materials, all virtually unobtainable \textit{in situ} had to be sent there from England or elsewhere. Like Gibraltar, it was land-locked, militarily insecure and, as an Atlantic port, it was too far to the west to serve as a convenient base for either the protective or punitive roles carried out by the navy in the Straits.\textsuperscript{45}

Consequently England was forced to rely upon the goodwill of other European powers in the Mediterranean to allow her access to ports in which her ships could be serviced. In the years from 1651 to 1688, English ships used many ports in the Straits, the selection of which depended upon two factors: the size of the squadron - as few as five or six ships (1685-1688), and as many as thirty-five (1678-1679),\textsuperscript{46} - and the convenience of the port to the primary expeditionary task of the squadron at any particular time. On occasions, ships were detached to be serviced in Lisbon or Cadiz, both, like Tangier, Atlantic ports, but they were long-established, well-equipped and dependable naval service stations. However, whenever possible, ports within the Straits were used: Málaga, Alicante, Marseilles, Ferrajo and Longone on the island of Elba, Cagliari (Sardinia), Naples, Spezia, Messina (Sicily), Valetta (Malta) and, on one occasion Tetuán on the north African coast. The most useful revictualling port within the Straits proved to be Leghorn. Provisions and naval stores were usually readily available there, and it became the principal rendezvous for merchant convoys. However,
Leghorn was a free port so that England could not expect exclusive privileges. It was also easy to blockade, and too distant from the Barbary coast to be ideally suited as an operational base for most naval campaigns.

Mahón, like Tangier and Gibraltar, could provide few or none of the provisions, stores and materials which the navy needed, but it commended itself as a base because of its central position in the western Mediterranean, its capacious harbour and its safe, deep anchorage. Mahón's pivotal position had the additional advantage for the Admiralty of enabling naval commanders of the Mediterranean squadron to exercise greater control over the independent movement of ships' captains, and thereby reduce the temptation for the latter to neglect their cruising or escort duties in favour of calling at commercial ports to indulge in profitable freight carrying on their own account. Mahón was also a convenient location from which to police and control the activities of Spanish corsairs operating out of Mallorcan ports who, at one stage, were guilty of committing 'many insolencies' and causing significant disruption of English trade in the northern Mediterranean. For these principal reasons, Mahón became the most recurrently used base of the English Mediterranean squadron in the seventeenth century.

In January 1663 England's ambassador to Madrid was instructed to seek approval for English warships to make use of Spain's Mediterranean ports and, specifically, Mahón. Permission was granted, and successive Admirals - Sir John
The Approach to Mahón Harbour.
Grenville Collins, Master Mariner, 1678.

PRO MPI/28.

Fig.1.3.

Thus seeneth Porta Maon in the Island of Minorca, when the watch Tower at A beareth with about two leagues off, the Entrance of the Harbor is at D.

Thus seeneth Porta Maon, when the point at E beareth, and the Tower at B beareth N 10° E about two Miles off.

F the Harbor
G Mount Turo
H the Castle

Thus seeneth Porta Maon, when Mount Turo at K is over the Castle at L about one mile & a half from the Harbor's mouth, at which time you have a good Anchor ground in 15 fathoms water; from point E, the lyeth a Small low island bearing S 60° W about two legs, and the land to N 30° E of E Bar: the N 45° W about 3 leagues.
Lawson (1664), Sir Thomas Allin (1664-1665, 1668-1670) and Sir Edward Spragge (1670-1672) - took advantage of Mahón's availability. In 1669, the Admiralty designated Mahón 'the most convenient port in case of a Warre with Argier', as England's naval base in the Straits, and gave an undertaking that 'a plentifull supply of all Stores, Victualls, as well Beverage as other Provisions, shall always be in readiness in the port'. With this aim in view, the storeship Golden Hand and the depot ship Edward reached Mahón in September 1669 and, a year later, Richard Gibson, a former junior clerk in the Navy Office under Pepys, arrived in Menorca to act as Commissary of Stores and Agent/Victualler to the fleet.

Allin welcomed the safe, sheltered anchorage, but he found that the narrow harbour mouth and the prevailing northerly winds made entry and exit difficult (Fig. 1.3). Ships could leave harbour only one at a time, thereby running the risk of exposing themselves disadvantageously to any enemy blockading squadron and, in calm or contrary wind conditions, ships leaving or entering harbour frequently had to resort to warping, kedging or towing. Despite these shortcomings, and the fact that the harbour lacked a wharf or other dock facilities, there was a supply of brushwood to hand and the harbour was used for careening and repairing the fleet. Gibson reported that between October 1670 and May 1671, thirty-six ships had been careened, repaired and provisioned, with a stay in port varying between fourteen and one hundred and forty days.

The fleet commanded by Allin and, from July 1670, by Spragge, was the largest England had sent to the Mediterranean. Comprising eighteen ships of the line, three
fireships and two ketches, its total complement could have amounted to 3,800 seamen, though it was more likely to have been in the region of 2,500-3,000 men. As Agent/Victualler, Gibson's task of catering for the needs of the men and the fleet was unenviable.

Shortly before Gibson's arrival in Menorca, Spragge had instructed one of his captains, William Poole, to survey Mahón harbour and select a site near the town where ships could careen, and where huts could be built for provisions and materials 'now sent from England'. Poole's survey and map of the port (Fig.1.4) revealed how capacious the inner harbour was, and that it would be possible to create a wharf, 600 feet by 30 feet, on the southern shore below the town of Mahón, large enough to provide storage facilities and working space to careen as many as twenty third- and fourth- rated ships moored alongside in three and a half to five fathoms of water.

Gibson's first report to the Admiralty indicated that he had leased the wharf space which Poole had recommended, together with 'four rooms at the waterside', and one house in Mahón in which he proposed to place some of the four hundred tons of stores he had brought with him. But he complained that the house was 'as high as Westminster Abbey rooffe' above the landing place and that all provisions had to be carried there 'by strength of arme'. He had not succeeded in leasing any additional storage space in or near Mahón, and he had been forced to make use of caves in the cliff by the wharf not only for storage, but also to provide lodging for his workmen and an infirmary for the sick. He also reported that, while the authorities in Menorca were regulating prices for
the islanders, costs to the English for some commodities had as much as quadrupled and, for fear of a shortage in the island, the Jurats had banned the sale of fresh meat to the fleet at any price.65

Problems of supply of raw materials were one of Gibson's bugbears. In March 1671, he wrote to the Admiralty listing the stores he required. He requested that hard wood be sent out to construct two sheds in which to preserve provisions and secure stores from 'embezlment'. Because of the inadequate and unsatisfactory existing storage facilities, he urged that only the best quality provisions be sent to Menorca and that shipments should be evenly spaced to avoid rot and wastage.66 The storehouse sheds were built in April 1671, but their construction was resented. Permission to build them had been given by the Governor of Menorca, Juan de Bayarte, but the sheds had been represented as fortifications to the court of Madrid by the Governor of St. Philip's, a francophile according to Gibson, and no friend to Bayarte or to the English. Following instructions from Madrid, a demand was made for the buildings to be demolished, but Spragge refused, interpreting the demand as an act of hostility or a 'ruse to make us weary of the port'.67 Gibson, left in charge when Spragge sailed from Menorca, refused to comply with a repeated demand, and was outraged that a 'Coopers' yard full of rotten stakes' was being deemed a fortification.68 The bluff was successfully called but, although no further protest was made in respect of the storehouses, the Spanish authorities on the island subsequently made repeated attempts to monitor, control and even impede the movement of ships and the landing of supplies for the fleet.69
Two other issues caused Gibson and the English admirals some frustration. When Mahón had been chosen as his base, Allin had been apprehensive that the Governor of Menorca would be 'severe in point of praticue' (permission to dock and land personnel and cargo upon production of a clean bill of health). In fact, the Governor proved capricious in this respect. At times praticue was granted without delay, at other times, despite a clean bill of health, an arbitrary period of quarantine was imposed. Also, periodic attempts were made by the Governor to limit the number of English ships at anchor at any one time in the harbour, but such restrictions were usually of short duration and were withdrawn as a result of English protests or inducements.

Allin had been content with the choice of Mahón as a base, finding the harbour 'as safe and convenient for careening as can be'. Initially Spragge, too, had high hopes of Menorca. Within a month of his arrival, however, Gibson was much less sanguine: 'He [Spragge] expects this island to find everything, which it will never do'. By May 1671, a disillusioned Spragge acknowledged Mahón's logistical shortcomings - supplies from England were irregular; methods of preservation of perishables were primitive and the duration of the voyage from home waters (at best some eight to ten weeks, and often much longer), led to a high incidence of wastage; storage facilities on land were inadequate and unsatisfactory, and the surplus stores had to be lodged in the hulk in the harbour which was worm-eaten, leaky and vermin-infested. Accordingly, he supported Gibson's proposal to seek to obtain victualling supplies from elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Since 'this island neither
affords Bread, Beverage, Wine, Oyle nor Rice', Spragge suggested that it would be profitable to obtain such supplies nearby - wine and bacon from Naples, rusks, beef, flour, fruit and figs from Leghorn and rice from Genoa - all readily obtainable from Levant Company ships which would have to deviate only ten leagues from their normal return route to call at Mahón. There were additional difficulties: the men were poorly clothed (shoes and slops were in very short supply), and many of the shore-based workers were succumbing to illness - 'agues', fever and smallpox - which he ascribed to the damp, unhealthy conditions of their cave dwellings.

When Spragge's fleet was recalled to home waters late in 1671 to strengthen the Channel fleet for the looming conflict with the Dutch, the navy's Agent in Mahón was also recalled. In the light of the difficulties under which he had been required to operate, it is not surprising to read that Richard Gibson left Menorca 'with as much satisfaction as any man.'

A squadron of fifteen ships returned to the Mediterranean in 1674 under the command of Sir John Narborough, with the task of conducting a campaign against Tripoli. A base at Mahón was too far to the west to be convenient, consequently Narborough used Leghorn as his revictualling port and proposed Malta as his refitting base 'providing all things necessary be lodged there as [previously] at Mahón.' In the event, supplies were even more wanting in Malta than they had been in Menorca, but Narborough's two-year campaign was successful, and he returned to command a fleet of thirty-five ships for a
campaign against Algiers in July 1677. It was intended that Tangier should serve as his base, but the inadequacy of the harbour there and the acute shortage of all manner of supplies and provisions, prompted Narborough to request that Cadiz and Mahón be made available to him. The Admiral's ships subsequently visited both ports, and Mahón was used both to refit and revictual. Narborough expected provisions to be forthcoming from England as in the past, but, on this occasion, ships at Mahón were serviced from supplies sent to Menorca from Leghorn by Sir Thomas Clutterbuck, naval Agent in the Tuscan port. This local arrangement proved less advantageous than anticipated and, although Narborough continued to use Mahon (fourteen of his ships were refitting there in January 1679), he complained that essential materials and craftsmen were still lacking. Moreover, provisions from Leghorn were so deficient that Clutterbuck was censured by the Navy Board in April 1679 for his failure to fulfil satisfactorily his supply contract.

After Narborough relinquished his command in May 1679 his successors made no use of Mahón for the remainder of the century. During those years the bases used by English ships were: Tangier (until it was abandoned by England in 1684), Gibraltar (1680-1682, 1685-1688) for a much reduced squadron of six ships, and Cadiz (1694-1696) where the navy established a dockyard administered and largely manned by English personnel and equipped to service Admiral Edward Russell's large Anglo-Dutch fleet. However, if admirals commanding in the Mediterranean had sound tactical reasons for not using Mahón, the Admiralty apparently remained convinced of the harbour's usefulness. In 1689, Mahón was
designated one of two ports in the Straits where 'victuals and naval stores may be lodged', and in 1693, Admiral Sir Francis Wheeler was urged to use Mahón for 'supplying ships with necessaries'. Moreover, in 1694, the Spanish government, allied to England and apprehensive of the threat to Spain posed by France's Toulon fleet, attempted to persuade Russell to make Mahón, and not Cadiz, his base, going as far as to offer to supply an experienced dockyard labour force in Menorca. While conceding that Mahón's harbour was sufficiently capacious and better situated strategically to monitor activity out of Toulon, Russell firmly maintained that the formidable logistics of servicing a fleet of seventy-two ships (with a total complement in excess of 20,000 men) with supplies to be sent from England, demanded a base more readily accessible from home waters than Mahón.

The year-round presence of a naval squadron in most years in the second half of the seventeenth century served primarily to protect English trade from the depredations of the Barbary corsairs, and Mahón was not always the most conveniently located base for the campaigns which were mounted against the corsairs. Menorca's geo-political importance emerged only in the early years of the eighteenth century when Britain's ambition to become a European power of the first rank emerged. Sailors remained aware that, apart from the capacious, secure harbour of Mahón, Menorca had few intrinsic virtues as a base and, among its known shortcomings, were Mahón's lack of any established dockyard facilities and the island's incapacity to provide the materials and supplies necessary to service a fleet.
Politicians, however, became convinced that Menorca's extrinsic values outweighed its intrinsic deficiencies. Strategically, Menorca's location made Mahon a convenient base from which activity in the ports of eastern Spain and southern France could be monitored in times of peace and blockaded in wartime: politically, possession of Menorca would enable Britain, for the first time, to influence events in Italy and, commercially, it was anticipated that Menorca would become an entrepot whereby Britain would substantially increase her share of Mediterranean trade. For these reasons Menorca became Britain's preferred base in the Mediterranean, and possession of the island became an essential element of British foreign policy for much of the eighteenth century.

2 Ibid.
4 D.H. Trump, The Prehistory of the Mediterranean (Harmondsworth, 1980), gives the most comprehensive account in English of the Prehistory of the Balearic Islands, but M.A. Murray, Cambridge Excavations in Minorca, 3 vols. (London, 1932,1934,1938), examines in detail and hypothesises convincingly about megalithic remains in Menorca at Sa Torreta and Trepucó.
5 R.Muntaner, Crónica [c.1330], (ed.) J.M. de Casacubierta, (Barcelona, 1962), Chapter CLXXII.
7 Muntaner, Crónica, chapter CLXXII.
8 Hernández, Compendio, p.189.
9 G.Pons, Historia de Menorca (Mahón, 1983) [hereafter Pons, Historia], p.46. Barbarossa took 800 captives in his attack on Mahón in 1535, and (p.50) Mustafa Piali carried away 3,495 captives from Menorca after the sack of Ciudadela in 1558.
10 C.Parpal y Marqués, Menorca en tiempo de Felipe II (Barcelona, 1913), p.15.
12 Hernández, Compendio, p.281.
13 Pons, Historia, p.56.
14 Martí, Historia, p.176, also Martí, Els Llinatges dels Menorquins [hereafter Martí, Llinatges], Quaderns del Folklore nos.39,44. (Ciudadela, 1990,1991), passim.
15 Martí, Llinatges, passim.
16 Ramis, Noticias no.3, pp.48-54.
17 Pons, Historia, p.62.
18 Martí, Historia, p.172.
20 Straits - a term commonly used to refer to the western Mediterranean.
24 Wood, Levant Company, p.11.
25 Ibid., p.18.
26 Ibid., p.20.
27 HMC, Calendar of Salisbury Mss, Part XVII (HMSO, 1930), p.566, lists Mediterranean ports visited, and exports and imports by non-Levant Company ships. Ports of call were: Tarifa, Málaga, Cartagena, Alicante, Denia, Valencia, Barcelona, Marseilles, Toulon, Genoa, Leghorn, Civita Vecchia, Naples, Messina, Palermo, Ancona, Ragusa, Malta, Mahón, Mallorca and Ibiza. Principal exports were: kerseys, cloth and fish, and imports included fruit, oil, salt and soap.
29 R. Davis, English Foreign Trade 1500-1700 (London, 1973), p.56, Table V.
30 Wood, Levant Company, passim, but particularly Chapter III 'Prosperity and Adversity'.
31 Narrow Seas - The English and Irish Channels.
32 Wood, Levant Company, p.66.
33 Ibid., p.61.
34 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p.125. Mansell's squadron anchored in the harbour and took on water and some provisions.
37 W. G. F. Jackson The Rock of the Gibraltarians (Grendon, 1986), p.82.
41 Hornstein, Restoration Navy, p. 184, citing Herbert to Secretary of the Navy, 24 April 1680.

43 Ibid.


45 Hornstein, Restoration Navy, pp. 205-208.

46 Ibid., pp. 265-266.


48 PRO SP 98/16, ff. 121, 127, 154. Robert Balle to Williamson, 8 April, 4 May and 27 July 1675.


50 PRO ADM 2/1734, f. 79. Admiralty instructions to Allin, 29 June 1669.

51 Ibid., f. 110. Admiralty instructions to Spragge, 14 July 1670.

52 PRO SP 29/286, f. 128. Gibson to Admiralty, 27 November 1670, gave his arrival date as 27 October 1670.


57 PRO SP 29/298, f. 48(i). Gibson to Admiralty, 16 May 1671.


60 PRO ADM 2/1734, ff. 150, 151. List of the Establishment of Ships' Crews of His Majesty's Navy.


62 PRO SP 29/286, f. 128(i). Spragge to Poole, (undated) 1670.

63 Ibid., f. 132(ii). Poole to Spragge, 1 November 1670.

64 Ibid., f. 128. Gibson to Admiralty, 27 November 1670.

65 Ibid., citing Jurats' order of 18 November 1670.

66 PRO SP 29/297, ff. 1-4. Gibson to Admiralty, 1 March 1671.

67 PRO SP 29/299, ff. 57, 58. Gibson to Admiralty, 26 July 1671.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 PRO SP 29/266, f. 175. Allin to Williamson, 23 October 1669.

71 Ibid., Allin to Williamson, 27 October 1669.

72 PRO SP 29/276, f. 252. Allin was restricted to eight ships in June 1670.

73 PRO SP 29/270, f. 224. Spragge was restricted to seven ships in June 1671.

74 PRO SP 29/299, f. 116. Gibson to Williamson, 18 August 1671, refers to a 'present' to the Governor of two firkins of butter, four Cheshire cheeses, two half-cases of spirits and two half-cases of knives.

75 PRO SP 29/266, f. 175. Allin to Williamson, 23 October 1669.

76 PRO SP 29/299, f. 116. Gibson to Admiralty, 18 August 1671.

77 Bodleian Library, Oxford University. Rawlinson Mss. A 174, p. 382. Spragge to Pepys, 10 May 1671.
78 PRO SP 29/297, ff.1-4, and 29/299, f.58. Gibson to Admiralty, 1 March 1671, 26 July 1671.
80 Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Rawlinson Mss. A 174, f.384. Gibson to Pepys, 26 January 1672.
81 Hornstein, Restoration Navy, p.265, Appendix A for a list of the ships.
82 PRO ADM 106/312, f.1. Narborough to Admiralty, 19 April 1675.
83 Ibid.
84 Hornstein, Restoration Navy, pp.160-166.
85 Ibid., p.265, Appendix A for a list of the ships.
86 PRO ADM 106/326, f.349. Narborough to Admiralty, 29 September 1677.
87 Hornstein, Restoration Navy, p.171.
88 Ibid., p.176.
90 PRO ADM 106/337, Box 2, ff.176-178. Narborough to Admiralty, 15 November 1678.
92 Hornstein, Restoration Navy, p.266, Appendix A for list of ships.
94 PRO HO Letter Book (Secretary) 2, f.3. Nottingham to Admiralty, 21 March 1689.
95 PRO HO Admiralty Entry Book 1, ff.87-91. Instructions to Sir Francis Wheler(sic), 20 November 1693.
96 Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, p.534, citing PRO SP 94/73, Alexander Stanhope to Shrewsbury, 19 September 1694, enclosing a memorandum from Alonso Carnero. Ehrman refers to Carnero as Spain's Foreign Minister - he was, in fact, Secretary(1694-1695) of the Despacho (the King of Spain's private office).
97 Ibid., pp.534,535.
Chapter Two.

The context of Britain's acquisition of Menorca.

The War of the Spanish Succession (1702 - 1713).

The more probable it became that the sickly Charles II of Spain would die childless, the more predictable it was that there would be a dispute between the two principal claimants for his throne, the French Bourbons and the Austrian Hapsburgs. By the end of the seventeenth century it was equally certain that the principal maritime powers, England and the Dutch, looking to preserve their commercial interests, would seek compensation from any outcome of the dispute which significantly shifted the balance of world power. Attempts by all the interested parties to reach a peaceful agreement on the partition of the Spanish Empire remained unresolved at the time of Charles' death in 1700. Charles' will nominated Philip, Duke of Anjou, Louis XIV's grandson, as his sole heir to an undivided empire, thereby pointing the way to a Bourbon hegemony unacceptable to the other European powers. War became inevitable when, in February 1701, Louis XIV, in a pre-emptive strike to seize the initiative to support his grandson (already proclaimed Philip V of Spain), expelled the Dutch from the barrier-towns in the Spanish Netherlands and installed French garrison troops in their stead. England's participation in the war was
guaranteed when, on the death of the exiled James II, Louis provocatively recognised his son James as the rightful King of Great Britain in September 1701. In the circumstances, England had no option but to support the Hapsburg pretender and a treaty of alliance was signed by Austria, England and Holland in September 1701, joined, in 1703, by Savoy and Portugal, both anxious to preserve their boundaries and identities as independent kingdoms. The outcome of the war left the Bourbon claimant on the throne of Spain but Britain, anticipating her allies by signing a preliminary peace treaty with France in 1711, obtained important territorial and commercial concessions (duly confirmed in the subsequent peace treaty of Utrecht in 1713) including the acquisition of Gibraltar and Menorca, possessions which made Britain the dominant Mediterranean power for much of the eighteenth century.

The principal theatre of war was in northern Europe, but there was also a major campaign fought in the Iberian peninsula,¹ where Portugal's entry into the war provided the Allies with a base (Lisbon) from which to attack Bourbon forces in Spain. In 1705 the Allied campaign spread to Catalonia when an army commanded by the Earl of Peterborough landed at Barcelona to support the Catalan uprising in favour of the Hapsburg pretender, Archduke Charles, now styled Charles III of Spain.

The opening of a second war front in Spain by the Allies had the predictable effect of forcing Louis XIV to divert French troops sorely needed for his northern campaigns, but it also had the unforeseen result of consolidating popular support for Philip V in most of the mainland provinces of
Spain. Government ministers in Madrid had welcomed the prospect of a Bourbon succession, believing that it would preserve intact the Spanish kingdoms and empire but, until fighting broke out in the peninsula, the people of Spain had been largely apathetic about the tussle for the throne. The participation of Portugal (from 1580 until 1640 a vassal state of Spain), the capture by the Allies of Gibraltar in 1704, the Catalán Carlist revolt in 1705, and the knowledge that Charles III's campaigns in Spain were being sustained by troops of a heretic nation, all combined to rally popular support in all the provinces of Spain, except Catalonia to the Bourbon cause.

There was no surprise in the hostility of the Catalan provinces to the French, since they had suffered grievously when they had been a battlefield in the previous war between France and Spain (1690-1697). There was also in Catalonia, and in other provinces of the former kingdom of Aragon, a fear that the establishment of a Bourbon on the Spanish throne would produce a more centralist administration and lead to the revocation of their fueros. But the Catalan parliament prudently waited to declare its support for Charles III, not only until it was assured of a sizeable allied army to support the revolt, but also until an undertaking was given to respect the Catalan fueros. The Catalans were reassured by Peterborough who, in the name of Queen Anne, ² (subsequently endorsed by Charles III), ³ promised to secure them:

a confirmation of their rights and liberties .... that they may be settled on a lasting foundation to them and their posterities.
A supply base for the Allied troops in Catalonia.

The Allied army in Catalonia could not be supplied by land and had to rely on the navy to bring it provisions and reinforcements. To maintain the necessary year-round support, the navy needed a base in a secure harbour close to the Catalan coast and near enough to Toulon to inhibit French naval activity. Of the harbours available to the Allies, Lisbon was too distant, and Gibraltar could not accommodate the fleet. Gunboat diplomacy by Admiral Sir John Leake induced Mallorca and Ibiza to declare for Charles in September 1706 but, although both islands were close to Catalonia and Toulon, neither possessed a harbour to suit the navy's needs. For a time (until 1707), the Spanish Mediterranean ports were open to the Allies, but their tenure was so insecure that they were never seriously considered as bases. In an attempt to solve at one stroke the dual problems of supply and enemy threat, an expedition was mounted to capture Toulon itself in August/September 1707, but it failed. It was not until June 1708 that the Admiralty, for all the preference it had shown for the port in the previous century, tardily came to the conclusion: 'We do not know of any port in the Mediterranean ... where twenty ships of war may safely winter unless Port Mahon'.

No contemporary commentator, nor any subsequent historian, has offered an explanation of why no attempt was made by the Allies before 1708 to capture the harbour of Mahón, the strategic value of which had long been appreciated. In 1698, before war broke out, William III had recognised Menorca's geo-political potential, and had attempted to secure
possession of Mahón - 'a very good port'\textsuperscript{5} - in his negotiations with Louis XIV for a peaceful partition of the territories belonging to the Spanish crown. William's negotiator, the Earl of Portland, had disingenuously (albeit somewhat prophetically) claimed that England's possession of Mahón and the island of Menorca would serve only to secure her Mediterranean trade but, in other respects, it would be 'a burden of no advantage'.\textsuperscript{6} But Louis refused to countenance the proposal, stating: 'He who had Port Mahon, being powerful at sea, would be master of the commerce of the Mediterranean',\textsuperscript{7} and that English possession of the port would 'absolutely exclude other nations from the commerce'.\textsuperscript{8} In 1704, two years after hostilities had broken out, the Allied fleet was empowered to mount an attack and attempt to secure either Cadiz or Menorca.\textsuperscript{9} No such attack was mounted but, after an ill-considered attempt to take Barcelona,\textsuperscript{10} Admiral Sir George Rooke captured Gibraltar in August 1704.\textsuperscript{11} The capture was easily achieved but, at that time, the smaller and more inexperienced garrison of Menorca would have offered even less resistance and an attack on the island would surely have given the Allies a more advantageous possession.\textsuperscript{12}

A project to capture Menorca did not lack advocates. Major General James Stanhope, on leave in London in 1705, had urged the Godolphin ministry to order an attack,\textsuperscript{13} and a pamphlet circulated in London some months later censured the ministry for not having made the acquisition of Mahón an early and primary military objective.\textsuperscript{14} In June 1706, Charles III urged Leake to capture the Balearic Islands 'particularly Port Mahon ... the most important for my interest and for the
Charles was convinced, such was the degree of support for him in the islands, that a mere show of force would suffice to win them over. He was proved right in respect of Ibiza and Mallorca which, upon sight of the Allied fleet, declared for the Carlist cause on 18 and 26 September 1706 respectively. But Charles had been misinformed about the strength of the garrison in Menorca. He had told Leake to expect no more than 'one hundred French soldiers', whereas the garrison numbers had, by this time, been considerably augmented. Louis XIV, aware of England's interest, had anticipated an attack upon the island. In 1702, at the start of the war, he sent artillery, ammunition and stores to Menorca; in 1703, he sent more provisions and engineers to make a 'draught' of Mahón harbour to plan greater protection at a time when it was thought the 'the English would come and take it'. He was instrumental in augmenting the garrison with 300 troops from Mallorca in 1704 and, in October 1705, he ordered 500 French marines to the island. In the circumstances Leake, whose request for additional troops to accompany the fleet in case he encountered unexpectedly strong opposition had been denied, held to his earlier belief that 'Port Mahon is not to be got with our Marines alone'. He did not, therefore, proceed from Mallorca to Menorca, but sailed for Lisbon and England on 3 October.

Leake's decision to sail out of the Mediterranean immediately after the surrender of Mallorca was precipitate. It is true that it must have been prompted by the intelligence he had gained of the increased strength of Menorca's garrison, but to have left the Balearics before attempting at least a reconnaissance off Menorca (the primary
target of his mission) was a tactical misjudgement. In Menorca the surrender of Ibiza and Mallorca had increased expectation of an Allied attack, and the authorities on the island loyal to Philip V (known in Menorca as Felipets) were equally apprehensive of a popular Carlist uprising on the island itself. In early October 1706 the Governor of Menorca, Diego Davila, reported to Madrid that such were the close ties between Mallorca and Menorca: 'I can't foresee that Ciudadela and the other towns will stand firm [for Philip V] and not follow in Mallorca's footsteps'. His fears were justified when an uprising occurred on 18 October 1706, and Carlist support in Menorca would surely have been declared earlier if Leake had delayed his departure long enough to appear off the island with the fleet.

Carlist support in Menorca

The revolt of the Menorcans was unique in that it was a protest against authority unparalleled in their history. They had, of course, rallied to the defence of the island when it was attacked by marauding Turks, but they had never taken up arms in any other cause. Mallorca's defection to Charles III was undoubtedly a major spark to the Menorcan revolt, but there were other contributory factors. Among these was a long-standing resentment of the neglect of the island and its affairs by the government in Madrid, and the often high-handed and unsympathetic treatment of the inhabitants by the island's Governors, not one of whom had been a native of Menorca. Also the recent imposition of Mallorcan, French and some Italian troops as part of the
garrison had proved economically draining and socially irksome, but the main thrust of the Menorcan protest stemmed, as in other Catalan territories, from a dread of being deprived of the island's fueros.

The instigator of the revolt was Juan Miguel Saura Morell, a member of a long-established noble family in Ciutadela, who had been promised the Governorship of Menorca by Charles III in the event of a successful Carlist uprising. Sauras fervour and dynamism induced all the island's Universitats to declare for Charles within three days, with the result that, by 21 October 1706, the Felipets remained in control only of Fort St. Philip, and Fort St. Anthony at the mouth of Fornells harbour, and the latter surrendered to the Carlists on 27 October. There can be little doubt (particularly in the light of Dávila's subsequent pusillanimous reaction to Stanhope's assault in 1708), that the appearance of the Allied fleet in Menorcan waters at this juncture, offering the prospect of support for the popular uprising, would have led to a bloodless outcome analogous to what had happened in Ibiza and Mallorca. The probability of such an outcome was increased by the unreliability of some of the garrison troops.

Of the 1,200 soldiers Dávila withdrew into Fort St. Philip at the start of the uprising, he could depend reliably only on the loyalty and discipline of the 500 experienced French marines. He could not rely on the conduct of the small detachment (64 soldiers) of the Milan regiment, and the loyalty of the 300 Mallorcans was in doubt as a result of Mallorca's defection to Charles. The remaining 350 soldiers were the core garrison, and they were a motley and amateur
collection. Of mainly Spanish, non-Catalan origin, most had come to consider themselves Menorcan since they were the descendants of the soldiers sent to garrison Fort St. Philip when it was built in the second half of the sixteenth century. The soldiers of the original garrison had never been relieved; officers and men had married and settled in Menorca, and their male descendants through the generations had assumed the role (and often the rank) of their forbears in the garrison. They were more versed in managing their smallholdings, working as day labourers or practising a trade - occupations they had been forced to turn to to supplement their meagre, irregular and often non-existent army pay - than they were in military duties. Not all possessed weapons, and few had uniforms. To these there had been added, over the years, criminals and Spanish soldiers who had been judged 'disaffected' on the mainland, and had been banished to the Menorca garrison.

Estimates of the numbers of Menorcans who rallied to Saura and the Carlist cause vary. The Spanish historian, Micaela Mata quotes the French commander's (de la Jonquières) estimate of 1,800, while she, herself, gives a more realistic total of 1,500, but in his account the Menorcan historian, José Luis Terrón Ponce, cites an officer in the garrison who put the number as improbably high as 2,800. Whatever the total, and Mata's estimate of 1,500 appears the most reliable, Saura's supporters were superior to Dávila's troops in number only. The Carlists had no military training, no artillery and possessed only the most primitive of weapons. Nevertheless, Saura attempted to press home his initial advantages of surprise and popular support and, placing his followers in a
cordon cutting off St. Philip's from Mahón, he called upon Dávila to surrender.\textsuperscript{31}

Dávila rejected Saura's demands and, for the next two months, there was an impasse. There were skirmishes between the two camps, but Dávila did not launch a serious attack upon the Carlists and they, sensibly, did not attempt to storm the fortress. Both sides were waiting for reinforcements but, despite urgent pleas to the authorities in Mallorca and Barcelona, Saura was sent only 150 soldiers. Dávila, on the other hand, on 1 January 1707, welcomed the arrival of a French naval squadron under the command of the Comte de Villars, which brought him not only much needed supplies, but also another battalion of 400 seasoned soldiers. The reinforcements made the outcome inevitable. Saura and his men did not lack courage, and they confronted the Felipet troops but, on 5 January, after a battle lasting four hours, the Felipets routed their opposition who sustained some 200 casualties (dead and wounded); the Felipets lost 12 dead and suffered 60 wounded.\textsuperscript{32} Mahón was occupied by the Felipets the following day and, on 12 January, de la Jonquière accepted, on Dávila's behalf, the terms of capitulation agreed by the Universitat General of Menorca.\textsuperscript{33} Saura, and those of his followers who could, fled to Mallorca.

Dávila initially exacted moderate retribution from the insurgents. He confiscated goods, rents and lands of known Carlists, imposed fines on some and exiled others.\textsuperscript{34} But, in March 1707, when he was informed of another Carlist conspiracy, Dávila's reaction was harsh. All the supposed conspirators were judged guilty without trial, and Dávila
spent a month crossing the island torturing and hanging all those who had been implicated, demolishing their houses and confiscating their possessions. In all, thirty-three men were hanged, six sentenced to the galleys and a further fourteen were exiled. The Menorcans' bitter resentment of such rough justice, together with their anger when Dávila repudiated the clauses of the capitulation which guaranteed the island's fueros, were made manifest in the welcome and help given by most Menorcans when Stanhope's troops landed on the island in September 1708.

In the eighteen months which followed the ruthless suppression of the conspiracy, Dávila, with a reduced garrison - the French battalion which Villars had brought to Menorca, the Mallorcan and Italian troops were all withdrawn in February 1707 - faced the uneasy task of maintaining the military dictatorship which he had imposed on a largely disaffected populace, knowing that he had barely sufficient resources to contain internal troubles, and not enough to withstand a determined attack from without Menorca. He repeatedly, but unsuccessfully sought reinforcements from France and Spain, and in Menorca he succeeded in recruiting only a militia of 250 men which he used to garrison Ciudadela.

The Defences of Menorca.

In 1708 Menorca's defences were adequate to repulse hit-and-run piratical raids, but they were orientated to cope with attacks from the sea on predictably vulnerable locations and, - Fort St. Philip apart - they were not sufficiently
strong in design, firepower or manpower to be able to resist investment or a determined attack by land. Of the fortified locations, Ciudadela (Fig. 2.1), still contained within its walls, was superficially protected from attack from all quarters, but its garrison numbers were minimal; Fort St. Anthony (Fig. 2.2) guarded the strategically important northern harbour of Fornells, but it was isolated and had only twelve light cannons and a minimal garrison of thirty-five. Mahón's defences had been neglected in favour of the fortifications at the mouth of the harbour and, by the late seventeenth century, its population had spilled beyond its walls. The only fortification which posed a serious challenge to an attacker was Fort St. Philip, (Fig. 2.2) but, even here, one military commentator of the day considered that the fort was too small, and that its all-round defensive capabilities were so limited that it did not merit the high reputation which it enjoyed in Europe.

The renown of St. Philip's sprang not from any proven defensive record, but from the impression it made on the approach and entry to Mahón harbour. It was, however, less impressive when viewed from the land. The fort was dominated by a ridge running west to south from the harbour to St. Stephen's Cove, and also by the high ground of La Mola, the promontory opposite the fort on the north side of the harbour. The fort had been built on solid rock, but this, in itself, had restricted the provision of bomb-proof subterranean accommodation, and the bulk of its firepower was immutably directed to the sea approach and the harbour mouth. A smaller fort, St. Charles, had been constructed nearer the sea to the east of St. Philip's, and a battery of guns had
The Defences of Ciutadella, 1680.
Figure 2.2.

Planta del castillo de Fornells.

Original Plans of Forts St. Philip (16th century) and St. Anthony, Fornells, (17th century) (ACS/Mar y Tierra, leg. 906)
been placed in a redoubt - rather grandly called Fort Felipet - on the tongue of land jutting out from the north side of the harbour facing St. Philip's, but the guns of these forts could not be brought to bear on any land attack launched upon the principal fortress. Moreover, St. Philip's own field of fire inland was severely restricted by its own arrabal (suburb), a shanty-town of some sixty dwellings which housed the families of the men in the garrison. Nevertheless, in the years immediately preceding the Allied expedition to Menorca, measures had been taken to improve the defences and self-sufficiency of St. Philip's. Ravelins had been added to all but the eastern outworks, the subterraneans had been expanded, the covered way widened and a new foodstore and hospital had been built within the fort; but the magazines were not damp-proof and the living quarters for the troops were dismal and unhealthy. The final improvement had been undertaken by Dávila in 1707 when, increasingly apprehensive of a land attack, he had ordered a dry-stone wall to be built, twelve feet high and fifteen inches thick, containing four towers each mounted with three light cannons, to enclose not only the fort, but also the arrabal in a line from the harbourside to St. Stephen's Cove. It was to prove a rudimentary and ineffectual first line of defence.

Accounts vary about the state of repair of St. Philip's defences immediately prior to Stanhope's siege. Two French sailors visiting Mahón in 1704 were favourably impressed by the solid structure of the fort; in 1705, de la Jonquière (the commander of the French marines) considered the fort to be 'admirably conserved', but an assessment in 1707 by the Captain of the grenadiers in St. Philip's was less sanguine.
Blas Giménez de Mendoza y Lillo reported that the defences were not in a good state of repair. The ditch was too narrow, the covered ways were open to enfilade fire and lacked adequate cover from the bastions and curtains, the firing platforms could accommodate too few men, the garrison quarters were leaky, unhealthy and morale-sapping, and he concluded that the fort would not be able to withstand a land attack. 46

The Capture of Menorca. 47

In May 1708, a naval Council of War in Barcelona recommended that Mahón must be taken for the Allies if the military campaign in Catalonia was to be sustained. 48 Admiral Leake in a letter to the Viceroy of Mallorca claimed that 'nothing would be more agreeable to me ... than the reduction of Port Mahon' 49 but, he maintained that he could not proceed with that objective without specific instructions from London. In June, the Admiralty endorsed the recommendation from Barcelona 50, and Marlborough wrote to Stanhope: 'I am so entirely convinced that nothing can be done effectively [in Spain] without the Fleet, that I conjure you ... to take Port Mahon'. 51 Marlborough's letter reached Stanhope with orders from Godolphin which made the ministry's intentions clear. Stanhope was to capture Mahón without delay so that 'measures can be taken for the wintering of sixteen to twenty ships there.' 52 When Stanhope received his orders in mid-August, Leake and the fleet were engaged in a successful attempt to capture Sardinia for the allies. On 24 August, Stanhope, anticipating Leake's co-operation, sent the
Admiral a despatch, giving details of his plans, and requesting a rendezvous off Menorca where he hoped the Admiral would spare him the marines and the additional guns and ammunition he badly needed. 53 In the meantime, and not without some difficulty, Stanhope persuaded the captains of the four English warships remaining in Barcelona roadstead to escort his expedition at least as far as Mallorca. 54 On 2 September Stanhope set sail with 700 Spanish and Neapolitan troops, 750 Portuguese and 600 English soldiers (Harrison's regiment, later 6th Foot, and two companies of Lord Raby's regiment of dragoons), together with as much siege equipment as he could gather in Catalonia. 55 Mallorca was reached on 6 September where 300 additional Spanish troops (soldiers and dragoons) were embarked together with more cannons, ammunition and some mules. Two days later Stanhope set sail and joined Leake off Menorca on 13 September.

Leake had arrived off the south-east coast of the island on 5 September, and had spent the next few days, until Stanhope kept his rendezvous, gathering intelligence and searching for a suitable landing place for Stanhope's force. At a Council of War on the day of Stanhope's arrival Leake made it clear that, while he would stay until the troops were landed, and would give Stanhope 700 marines and all the ammunition and supplies he could spare, he then intended to comply with Admiralty orders (issued the previous January), and return to England with fifteen ships of the line. 56 Leake's second in command, Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Whitaker, was to remain with a squadron of twenty-six ships (including fourteen ships of the line) to give 'all possible assistance' to Stanhope but, 'when that service is performed, or when the
Lieutenant-General is in a condition to carry on the siege without the assistance of the squadron', Whitaker's ships were to sail to Leghorn and Naples (on missions for Charles III), and then proceed to winter at Lisbon, leaving only four or five frigates to cruise off the coast of Catalonia. In the event of Stanhope's expedition being successful, Leake clearly had no immediate plans to use Mahón harbour. He wrote to Charles III on 17 September: 'As to what your Majesty is pleased to desire, that a squadron may winter at Port Mahon, I cannot possibly comply therewith without orders.' He further justified his decision by adding that Mahón could not serve as a base until it was equipped to service the fleet, and that such arrangements 'will take up some time'. Leake sailed for England the following day.

Despite, or perhaps because of, Leake's decision to leave the Mediterranean as soon as possible, Stanhope wasted no time in setting about his task. On 14 September, he landed unopposed with an advance party of troops in the Recó del Llexiu, a small cove between Cala Alcaufar and Punta Prima, five miles to the south-east of Fort St. Philip, and then marched inland towards the fort to establish his first camp. In the course of the next three days, his force of 3,000 soldiers, marines and dragoons, the artillery train and the provisions were also landed unopposed at Cala Alcaufar. Stanhope had not been best pleased with Leake's departure, but he was well served by Whitaker who detached sailors from the fleet to help to manhandle the artillery from the coast to Stanhope's camps. Whitaker also sent two ships of the line to reduce Fort St. Anthony at Fornells which, after suffering a four-hour bombardment, surrendered on 21 September, and
Whitaker was able to send the transports and bomb vessels to the shelter of Fornells harbour.\textsuperscript{62}

On 15 September, the Jurats of Mahón had approached Stanhope to 'say their obedience', and deliver up the keys of the town.\textsuperscript{63} Stanhope took possession of Mahón, garrisoned it with 100 men, and sent detachments across the island to the other towns. Within a week Alayor, Mercadal and Ciudadela declared for Charles III so that, by 22 September, Dávila retained control only of forts St. Charles and St. Philip, into which he had withdrawn all his remaining troops.\textsuperscript{64}

Stanhope's early reconnaissance, together with the intelligence he had gathered from the Menorcans, convinced him that an attack on St. Philip's, unsupported by artillery, would be foolhardy. Accordingly, he made his first priority the construction of a road from Cala Alcaufar over which his siege guns, mortars and cannons could be hauled to a position commanding the outer wall, the arrabal and the fort itself from the west. The terrain through which the road had to be made was rough and rocky; there were few draught animals available, so the guns had to be manhandled by soldiers and sailors, helped by a volunteer force of 500 Menorcans whom Stanhope found 'very zealous in their assistance'\textsuperscript{65} and who were armed by him and put under the command of Juan Saura, the leader of the 1706 uprising, who had joined Stanhope's expedition in Mallorca.\textsuperscript{66} By 23 September, after nine days of road-making and haulage, Stanhope had established his second, main camp (Fig. 2.3). A further five days were spent digging gun emplacements under sporadic, but largely harmless fire from the garrison. During this time Stanhope, according to his aide-de-camp, Cornet Cope, was indefatigable in the
example he set, encouraging the work, making personal reconnaissances and staying with the batteries until midnight. On the morning of 28 September, Stanhope's guns opened fire on the outer defences of the fort. Their fire was steady and accurate and, after an hour and a half, one of the towers in the line wall was silenced. Three hours later, another tower was so badly damaged that it was abandoned, and two sizeable breaches had been made in the wall. It had been Stanhope's intention to delay his ground assault until the next day, but the breaches proved irresistible to Brigadier Wade's grenadiers who advanced and penetrated them without waiting for orders. Stanhope was quick to react, and he launched an attack from the centre, supported by Lt-Colonel Lee and the marines to his left. Their combined efforts were successful in driving all the enemy forces ahead of them into Fort St. Philip. By the evening, Wade and his men were firmly lodged at the foot of the fortress glacis, and forward gun emplacements had been sited from which the fort itself was to be bombarded the next day.

However, on the morning of 29 September, Dávila beat a parley and, by 5p.m., he and de la Jonquière accepted terms of capitulation, thereby abandoning to Stanhope after only token resistance (according to Cornet Cope) a 'prodigious strong fortress' and the Mediterranean harbour essential for the Allied campaign in Catalonia. The readiness of the garrison to negotiate a surrender so soon after the first attack had been launched, and before the fortress itself had been bombarded, was unexpected by Stanhope, and explicable on only one jingoistic count to his aide de camp: 'Everybody may judge the Governeur was a Spaniard and an intolerable fellow
to deliver up such a place without one cannon shot against it. 71 Stanhope had lost fewer than fifty men, the garrison losses had been minimal, and the surrender had not been prompted by any lack of provisions or ammunition. 72 Dávila's decision to surrender, taken after a Council of War, was based on the belief of the senior garrison officers that no relief could be expected from Spain or France; the garrison numbers were too small, and too many troops were too inexperienced to be able to offer stern resistance; morale was low (there had been a number of desertions), and all feared the havoc that would be created by the bombardment of the fort - particularly the inevitable casualties among the families of the arrabal who had taken refuge in St. Philip's, and were as numerous as the garrison itself. 73

Stanhope's capitulation terms were generous. They provided for the repatriation of the garrison, their families and their belongings, and transport out of Menorca for any civilians unwilling to become subjects of Charles III. There was to be no victimisation of any Felipet who chose to stay on the island having changed his allegiance, and most of the 'Spanish' garrison availed themselves of this opportunity and opted to remain. Moreover, clergy who had shown Felipet sympathies were not to be prevented from returning to their livings or monasteries. 74

The reactions of the authorities in Spain and France to the loss of Menorca was predictably severe in the light of the barely token resistance offered to Stanhope's attack. Dávila was arrested and imprisoned but, such was the public outcry against him, he committed suicide before he could be brought to trial. 75 De la Jonquièrè was tried by court
martial, sentenced to a term of imprisonment and to be cashiered and dismissed the service. It was not to be the last occasion in the eighteenth century when, for largely political reasons, a commander with responsibility for Menorca was to be held culpably negligent for the loss of the island and suffer as a consequence.

Stanhope's conquest of Menorca was a major success for the Allies in the War of Spanish Succession, but he was, to an extent, favoured by fortune. If Dávila had held out for another forty-eight hours, the elements would have played a very significant role in his defence of St. Philip's. On 1 October, Menorca was hit by one of the worst storms ever experienced in the island. The Tramontana winds reached hurricane force and, for twenty-four hours, were accompanied by lightning, thunder and torrential rain. Stanhope's troops saw their makeshift tents disappear, their rations and provisions spoiled and their powder drenched. Soldiers were drowned in the flooding, sailors were washed overboard and lost, and ships were dispersed and damaged in the storm. In the circumstances, Stanhope would have found it impossible to launch an immediate attack and, with Leake's departure, it is improbable that the remainder of the fleet could have given him the fresh support and supplies he would have needed to succeed. Given the season of the year and Whitaker's orders to sail to winter at Lisbon, it is not inconceivable that Stanhope would have been forced to abandon his expedition.

Stanhope was grateful for the support and assistance he had received from Whitaker and his squadron, but his comment to the Earl of Sunderland after the capture of Menorca that, in the enterprise, he had encountered 'ten times more
difficulty with the sea than with the enemy', 78 was not unjustified. The Admiralty had shown no enthusiasm when he had first proposed an expedition to Mahón in 1705; Leake, having secured the bloodless submission of Ibiza and Mallorca in 1706, had not attempted to show the flag off Menorca; only the persuasive arguments of Philip Stanhope had ensured naval escorts for the troop transports from Barcelona; Leake's precipitate departure from Menorca before Fort St. Philip had been invested, and his instructions to Whitaker to leave Menorca, if necessary before the success of the expedition had been assured - all these factors combined to give Stanhope a sense of grievance.

The navy's lukewarm attitude to the capture of Menorca is nowhere explained in official records, and the reasons for it can only be a matter of conjecture. The memory may still have been fresh in the Admiralty of the supply difficulties and frustrations encountered a generation earlier when an attempt had been made to establish a naval base at Mahón; the attitude of Leake may have been tempered by his earlier experiences of sailing in the Mediterranean, and his awareness of the risks his ships would run if they were kept on station throughout the stormy winter months, and by a knowledge of the difficulties of manoeuvring a fleet in and out of Mahón harbour in adverse weather conditions. Whatever the reasons for the navy's lacklustre support, it is indisputable that, while monarchs, statesmen and soldiers were readily convinced of Menorca's and Mahón's geo-political and strategic importance, sailors remained sceptical.

The British garrison in Menorca 1708-1713.
Stanhope had conquered Menorca in the name of Charles III, but, from the outset, he was determined that the island 'which will give the law to the Mediterranean both in time of war and peace' should remain British. 'Let who will be King of Spain', he wrote 'we should not temporise in the matter, but have it [Menorca] absolutely yielded to us', and all Stanhope's actions in respect of Menorca were carried out with this aim in view. Charles III's right to appoint a Civil Governor was not disputed, but Stanhope appointed one of his own officers, Lewis Petit, an Engineer (a Colonel in the British army, but who held a Brigadier's commission from Charles), to be Military Governor with instructions to brook no interference from any of the civil powers in Menorca. In October 1708, Stanhope sent back to the front in Catalonia the bulk of his expeditionary force, retaining only Harrison's regiment and some marines to form the garrison. The ministry in London supported Stanhope's plans for the future of Menorca - Sunderland wrote in October of the advantages to be gained from British possession of the island 'both in War and Peace' and, in December, instructions were sent to Stanhope confirming Petit's appointment and stipulating that the Menorcan garrison should consist of 'our own Troops only and none else', adding that it was 'highly just and reasonable' that Britain should retain at least Port Mahón as 'security for all our expenses in the Peninsula'. Moreover, Stanhope was given plenary powers to negotiate with the court in Barcelona for the cession of Menorca to Britain.
Stanhope's hopes that Charles III would agree to cede Menorca were based on his awareness of the desperate need Charles had of British support for his campaign in Spain, and the naive expectation that Menorca was a price Charles would be prepared to pay to reward Britain for the men and money which had been committed to his cause. Stanhope's negotiations had to be kept secret. Not only had Charles sworn a coronation oath never to part with any portion of Spanish territory, but any hint of the cession of Menorca to Britain in advance of a general peace settlement would have contravened the terms of the alliance, and would have caused an outcry among Britain's allies, particularly the Dutch, whose Ambassador in London, Vryberg, was later to declare that Menorca in British hands would be as hazardous to the Dutch Republic as Ostend. Nevertheless, Stanhope attempted to force the issue and, in May 1709, delivered an ultimatum to Charles - either repay in full British loans and costs incurred in the Spanish campaign, or cede the sovereignty of Menorca until the debts were paid. In reply Charles fulsomely expressed his gratitude to Britain for the support he was receiving, but reminded Stanhope that the terms of the alliance excluded any re-allocation of territories in advance of a general armistice. However, he put forward a counter-proposal to the effect that he was prepared to use Menorca as temporary collateral for his debts to Britain (grossly underestimated at 200,000 pistoles - £160,000), and allow Britain to garrison the island. But this proposal, the first clause in a suggested Treaty of Port Mahón, was contingent upon Britain accepting sixteen further clauses. In so far as the Treaty concerned Menorca, Britain was
required to give assurances that the island would be closed to ships from Barbary, it would not be ceded to another power and that the Menorcans' religion and fueros would be respected - all conditions to which Britain subsequently subscribed in the Treaty of Utrecht. But there were other clauses deliberately designed to be unacceptable to Britain - a pact of mutual defence in the Mediterranean which required Britain to maintain a permanent squadron of twelve ships based at Mahón; a policy of non-aggression to Catholic powers; an undertaking not to support non-Catholic powers and a promise to support the integration into Catalonia of the French provinces of Roussillon and Cerdagne. 88

These clauses alone would have made it impossible for Britain to sign the treaty as proposed, but any prospect of further negotiations disappeared when, in mid-summer 1709, the Dutch learned of Stanhope's initiatives. 89 On 1 August 1709 the British ministry was reminded in the strongest diplomatic terms of its undertaking not to make any pact with Charles III without the prior approval of the States General, 90 and with Godolphin subsequently under instructions from Queen Anne to do 'nothing that shall be uneasy or displease the States', 91 the issue of the Treaty of Mahón was sidelined to such effect that, by the middle of September, the Earl of Portland wrote that it was accepted in London that the Treaty would come to nothing.

Portland's forecast was correct, but Stanhope's crusade had found powerful support in London, and Menorca became a key element in Britain's expectations in the eventual peace negotiations. Indeed, such was Britain's impatience to exercise sovereignty in Menorca, that Queen Anne
signed the Duke of Argyll's commission as Governor in June 1712, at a time when only preliminary armistice terms had been agreed between Britain and her allies and the French. Philip V of Spain did not accept the preliminary peace terms until 1 November, only one week before Argyll arrived in Menorca and raised the British flag there. Eventually, the definitive peace terms to end the War of Spanish Succession were agreed at Utrecht in April 1713, but it was not until 13 July that Spain signed the Treaty, clause eleven of which gave Britain de jure sovereignty over Menorca, thereby legalising the de facto rule it had exercised in the island for the previous eight months.

The secrecy and subterfuge which Stanhope used in his diplomatic negotiations with Charles III's court in Barcelona to secure Menorca for Britain were nowhere in evidence on the island itself, where the uniquely British garrison, and the obvious expenditure to strengthen the defences and create a naval base were unconcealed indications that Britain did not intend to share the island or to part with it.

Queen Anne's instructions to include no foreign troops in the garrison were strictly enforced. All the non-British troops who took part in the expedition to capture Menorca left the island immediately after it surrendered and, of the initial British garrison, the 192 marines were relieved in May 1709 by six companies of Col. Charles Dubourgay's regiment, and Harrison's men by Sir Charles Hotham's regiment in July 1709. These were, in turn, relieved by 573 men of Brigadier Thomas Whetham's regiment (later 27th Foot) in November 1709, together with 400 fusiliers (7th Foot) who were added to the garrison in April 1710. For the first
four years of the British presence in the island, the garrison, including an HQ staff of sixteen,99 mustered 1,000 until, with the withdrawal from Catalonia to Menorca of nine British regiments,100 numbers swelled to 3,800 in November 1712,101 and then to more than 6,000 in the first half of 1713.102

The costs involved were significant. Estimates for 1712 gave the outlay for the HQ staff (originally set at £1,645.10s. in October 1708) 103 as £4,884.18s.4d, and the pay for each regiment amounted to £16,266.8s.6d.104 In November 1712, there were five regiments (each of 760 men) in Menorca, making the total cost of the garrison (excluding the artillery train) in excess of £86,000 in pay alone, and this sum does not take into account the cost of the regiments which were drafted to Menorca from Catalonia from December 1712 until August 1713.

Expenditure on Ordnance was considerable. The proportion of the Ordnance budget destined for Menorca out of the amount allocated for the campaign in Catalonia cannot be quantified but, at the end of that campaign in July 1712, there is a record of materials 'Powder, Shott, Carriages etc.' costing £29,877.15s.4d. being sent from England to Menorca.105 There was, of course, the annual cost of the artillery train (at least £3,000 p.a.)106, but the financial outlay on repairs and improvements to the defences again cannot be reliably quantified. Essential repair work was instigated immediately after the capture of Menorca, and it is known that nearly £20,000 was earmarked for work on the fortifications in 1709,107 and that 1,200 workmen were brought to Menorca from Mallorca and Catalonia to assist in the work.108 In August
1709 Stanhope, having received an enthusiastic independent report on the work that had already been undertaken, instructed Petit and Col. Peter Durand (appointed Chief Engineer in Menorca) to start work on new defences – a battery to the north of St. Philip's, another bastion, additional curtains, ravelins, a barracks to house twelve companies of soldiers and five 'pavilions' for the officers. The estimated cost of this work was put at 336,514 dollars (£72,911), an amount which, in the context of Britain's total war commitment, must be considered disproportionately high for an island which was not certain to remain British and which, with the Allies in command of the sea, was under no threat of attack. When Britain's sovereignty in Menorca was all but assured, further expenditure of £68,295 was authorised by Argyll in 1712, of which £42,000 was to be spent on finishing work already started, and the remainder to go towards new works. Argyll also approved, in principle, a plan submitted by Durand to build a new fort (to be called St. Anne) on La Mola on the north side of the harbour, opposite St. Philip's. An undated, unsigned, but very detailed estimate of the cost of the proposed new fortification (including the provision of a barracks for 4,000 men), put the cost at £175,364.14s. Not surprisingly, the cost was considered to be prohibitively high, and although Durand's plan was never implemented, Staff officers were appointed and paid to carry out duties in the non-existent fort for at least the following forty years. At Fort St. Philip, it is difficult to establish what work was undertaken from 1708 until 1713, and what it cost. An 'Accompt of the Expenses at Mahon for years 1708, 1709 and
suggests that a maximum of £27,000 was allocated to improve the fortifications between October 1708 and July 1710, and, in February 1713, Petit submitted an account of the expense incurred by work on the fortifications which totalled £62,765. However this account is inadequately itemised, mathematically inaccurate and, as will be shown subsequently, unreliable.

Once the news of the capture of Menorca had reached London, the Admiralty reacted swiftly and positively. Admiral Sir George Byng was appointed to succeed Leake in command in the Mediterranean, and orders were sent to him at Lisbon in October 1708 to sail to Mahón and to use the port as a base from which to protect Allied trade and 'annoy the enemy'. Byng's squadron of sixteen ships, together with a hospital ship, a storeship and a hulk carrying the first naval stores for the dockyard he was to establish, reached Mahón on 12 January 1709, and Byng remained there until the end of March. The Victualling Board appointed Joseph Gascoigne as its Agent in Mahón, and the Board for the Sick and Hurt sent Pierce Griffyth to the island to establish a naval hospital 'as soon as may be, in some convenient position near the harbour mouth.' Both Agents had reached Menorca by the Spring of 1709; in May, Admiral Sir John Jennings arrived with more dockyard supplies and equipment and, by July, essential facilities and staff had been established and the dockyard was operational, albeit in an initially limited capacity.

On his arrival Byng found that the harbour facilities were no greater or better than when the navy had last used Mahón as a base a generation earlier, and he set out to improve
them. 'Soldiers of the garrison, seamen of the fleet, Spanish masons and 186 French prisoners'\textsuperscript{121} were set to work to clear the ground previously used by the navy as a wharf, to reface it at the water-side and to widen it by cutting back into the cliff on the land-side. But, while the site was suitable for a careening and landing quay, Byng was reluctant to build permanent storehouses and workshops on it, considering the site not sufficiently secure from 'surprise or insult from the enemy', or from 'the people of this island seizing or setting [the buildings] on fire upon any revolt'.\textsuperscript{122} His intentions were to erect all the main storehouses within the new fortifications under construction at St. Philip's, and build only 'little necessary stores' and a 'lodgement for the petty officers [shipwrights, carpenters and caulkers] that may attend duty there' on the wharf itself,\textsuperscript{123} and he subsequently sent the Admiralty plans of what he had in mind, estimating building costs on the wharf to amount to £920.11s.8d.\textsuperscript{124} The plans made no mention of the naval storehouses to be built within the precincts of St. Philip's (for which Byng had requested materials to be sent out from England\textsuperscript{125}), but there is a later reference to a powder magazine for the navy being enclosed within Fort Felipet.\textsuperscript{126}

Byng's development plans were sound only on the grounds of security, and the impracticality of having the naval stores dispersed and of manhandling the greater part up and down the slope from the town to the wharf, and then along a rough track to St.Philip's (which, in itself, had no adequate site for a landing stage), concerned the victualling Agent, Gascoigne, and the storekeeper, John Corfield. As a result of representations they made to him, Byng had changed his mind
The Harbour of Mahón, 1725.

BL K Top 74(19).

1. Careening Wharf.
2. Victualling Yard.
3. Naval Hospital.
by June 1709, and the naval and victualling stores and workshops were subsequently built on, or in the vicinity of, the wharf (Fig. 2.4).

On the wharf itself, the stores which Byng had originally envisaged as 'little' must have been expanded considerably if only to judge from two returns by the naval storekeepers in 1709 and 1712. The first, submitted by Corfield, listed the considerable amount of careening and repair equipment which had reached Mahón in the first six months of the dockyard's existence, and bemoaned the limited working and storage space available. The second account, submitted by George Atkins, Corfield's successor, indicated that little progress had been made in the provision of storage space for the bulkier items of naval stores. With his report Atkins put forward plans for improved and more permanent storehouses at an estimated cost of 7,600 pieces of eight (£1,520), but these were considered too expensive and no improvements were authorised until a more cost-effective plan was implemented four years later.

The victualling stores and the 'cooperidge' yard were established near the wharf, part way up the slope to the town and close to the Carmelite monastery in which the victualling clerks and coopers had their lodgings. Storeships in the harbour housed some provisions, but storage space on land must have been considerable, if only to judge by the provisions which Gascoigne reported that he had in store in July 1712. It is clear from the same report that the bakers whom Gascoigne had asked to be sent to Menorca from England had arrived, but, while new bakehouses were built,
the bulk of the remaining buildings used by the navy were leased from Menorcans.

Pierce Griffyth, the Agent sent to Menorca by the Commissioners of the Admiralty Sick and Hurt Board to establish a naval hospital in the island, set about his task immediately on arrival in Menorca in the Spring of 1709. At the outset, he hired accommodation for the sick seamen in the Franciscan monastery situated on the high ground on the then western outskirts of Mahón. A few months later Griffyth, through Byng, submitted a design of a hospital (since lost) to his Commissioners, together with an estimate of the building costs which, at £9,000, was clearly too grandiose and expensive to meet with their approval. Consequently no work was started and no progress was made until Byng's successor, Admiral Jennings, impatient with the delay, took it upon himself to authorise the construction of a revised design in 1711. The building now proposed was a more modest undertaking - a fact reflected in the projected cost of £3,600 - but it was to be built on the site originally selected by Griffyth, 'the great island in the harbour', the Illa des Rei (King's Island, but to be known by the British, no doubt with some justification, as Bloody Island), situated in mid-channel towards the mouth of the harbour. The island, open to the sea breezes, was considered a healthy site; it was accessible to ships, so that no seaman with a contagious illness would have to be landed on the mainland; it was removed from dissolute temptations readily accessible in Mahon, and it was a difficult place from which to desert.

Work on the hospital was started without Admiralty approval and, therefore, without Griffyth having the funds to
meet the bills. Jennings was obliged to fund some of the expense himself, and to borrow the outstanding amount from the officers of his fleet. When Jennings applied to be reimbursed, he justified his initiative by claiming that if he had not acted, he would have missed the opportunity of employing the skilled labour force imported to work on the fortifications at St. Philip's, who were about to be repatriated. The Admiralty were not impressed and, far from commending Jennings on his initiative and welcoming the greatly reduced cost of the building, the Navy Board refused to sanction any repayment, and Jennings was obliged to plead his case with the Lord Treasurer and petition the Queen before he and the others involved were reimbursed.

The hospital built in 1711 (Fig. 2.5) was a single storey building with projecting wings, catering for 336 patients in fourteen wards with twenty-four beds in each. Two storeyed houses with storerooms for the Agent, Surgeon and his Mates were built on the end of the wings, a chapel formed the central feature, and a bakery and a kitchen were situated at either end of the eight wards which ran north to south, four on either side of the chapel. Access to the wards was from a covered way which ran round three sides of the central 'piazza'. No provision was made for nurses or for a communal dining-room.

The hospital which Jennings authorised has a place in naval history. Not only was it the first hospital to be built in an overseas base, it was the navy's first purpose-built hospital, pre-dating Haslar in Portsmouth by some fifty years. Unfortunately, while Haslar hospital still stands, a price was paid for the haste and shoddy workmanship with
Fig. 2.5.

The Naval Hospital, 1711.

A - Site Chapel. B - Wards to contain 24 men in each.
C - Kitchen. D - Bakehouse. E - Gallery for communication to the wards.
which Mahón hospital was built. Within three years of its construction, Admiral Baker reported 'very great defects'\textsuperscript{140} in the structure, and the Admiralty was forced to authorise a major reconstruction of the building.

The land-based naval element in the garrison of Menorca was insignificant in comparison with the number of soldiers. In the years in question, the permanent staff of the dockyard can have numbered no more than fifty (shipwrights, carpenters, sawyers, caulkers and blacksmiths), with the semi-skilled and unskilled labour being supplied from the fleet or recruited from the local inhabitants, but that is not to imply that the creation of a dockyard did not have an effect on the island. Although all the equipment, stores and the bulk of the provisions had to be sent to Menorca from England and Ireland, or obtained elsewhere in the Mediterranean, and although the fleet was seldom in port in numbers,\textsuperscript{141} the needs of the navy, added to those of the rest of the garrison, helped to stimulate the Menorcan economy to provide a labour force and local supplies in the form of vegetables, fruit, wine, fresh meat and poultry.

The welcome extended to Stanhope and his forces when they captured Menorca was genuine, but it was given only in as far as the British were allies of Charles III and were acting in his name. For as long as the expectations of the Menorcans were that they would remain subjects of Charles III, they resigned themselves to the presence of a British garrison sanctioned by Charles, although their tolerance did not preclude protests at actions of the military commanders, nor did it prevent complaints being registered about excesses by the troops. But the Menorcans became increasingly alarmed by
political developments outside the island, and by military activity in Menorca itself. In 1711, the death of the Emperor in April, the coronation of Charles III as his successor in December and persistent rumours of a peace settlement favourable to Philip V and detrimental to Menorca, were matters of very real concern in the island - a concern that was increased by an awareness of the money being invested by the British in the military and naval installations in Menorca.

By March 1712, the concern of the Jurats had become so great that they wrote to Queen Isabel Cristina (whom Charles had empowered to act as his Regent in Catalonia) to pledge their continued loyalty to the monarch who had sworn to uphold their fueros, to express their alarm that the garrison officers were 'boasting' that Menorca would become British and to register their strong opposition to a peace agreement which would make them 'subjects of another prince who professes a contrary religion.'142 The reply from Barcelona was not encouraging. It advised the Menorcans to 'tolerate the present unhappy circumstances with prudent resignation' and, although it stated that it was quite 'irrational' that Menorca would become British, it offered no concrete reassurance about the island's fate.143 In September 1712, the Jurats made a last-ditch attempt to state their opposition to British rule and their determination to remain subjects of a Catholic monarch.144 They sent a cleric, Dr Cristóbal Rubí del Vilar to argue their case in Barcelona but, by then, Menorca's fate had been virtually sealed.

The Menorcans had been relieved when Stanhope renewed his Queen's promise to respect their religion and fueros,145 and
were additionally reassured when Charles appointed a Spanish Civil Governor, but they became increasingly disillusioned and resentful as it became clear that the authority of the Civil Governor was subservient to the British military commander, and that the latter was prepared often to pay only lip-service to their fueros and way of life. Undoubtedly, some Menorcans benefited from the increased business and labour opportunities created by the British presence, but, inevitably, there were numerous clashes between the civilians and the military, leading to protests about the behaviour and demands of the garrison. The protests took the form of accusations, often repeated, that soldiers deliberately provoked disturbances, showed disrespect to civilian authority, assaulted innocent civilians, and were guilty of theft. Other recurrent complaints related to the insensitive demands of the garrison in respect of requisitioning civilian houses for use as military quarters, and the excessive demands made upon the universitats to provide the troops with wood and oil. Petit paid scant heed to the protests and complaints, but his successor as Lt.-Governor of St. Philip's in 1711, Col. John Fermor, took action to curb some of the soldiers' worst excesses. Recognising that the conduct of the garrison had become 'so disorderly', he applied for, and was granted, permission to hold general courts martial in Menorca.

Ostensibly, Stanhope's choice of Lewis Petit des Etans as Governor of St. Philip's was astute. Petit was an Engineer, and Stanhope's priority after the capture of Menorca was to repair and reinforce the island's defences, a task in which Petit's expertise would be useful. Petit was also politically
acceptable to Charles III, having been given a Brigadier's commission by him as a reward for signal services in the sieges of Barcelona. But, whatever his professional military skills, Petit lacked tact, and his venal nature was not to endear him to the Menorcans nor, ultimately, to his superiors.

The Jurats resented Petit's high-handed attitude, his disregard for their fueros, his abrogation of their responsibilities to fix market prices, his unreasonable demands for the amount of wood, straw and oil to be supplied to the garrison, and his involvement with trade on his own account and for his own profit.

The Duke of Argyll, appointed in 1711 to succeed Stanhope as Ambassador to the court of Charles III and to be Commander-in-Chief of the British troops in Spain, did not, apparently, find fault with Petit's treatment of the Menorcans, but he did question Petit's loyalty, professional ability and honesty. In December 1711, Argyll wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth expressing disapproval of Petit's use of his Spanish rank of Brigadier, the flying of a Spanish and not British flag in Fort St. Philip, and complaining that Petit was, inexcusably, in direct correspondence with the court of Charles III. After a brief, secret visit to Menorca in January 1712 (a visit so brief and secret that it is nowhere recorded in the island's archives), Argyll again wrote to Dartmouth expressing the view that under Petit's command 'conditions on Minorca were contrary to Her Majesty's interests,' and he criticised Petit's professional judgement 'too much is begun and so little finished that the place is not in a much better posture of Defence than when it was
Argyll ordered Petit to give an account of the money which had been spent on the fortifications. Petit's account was investigated in 1712 by Andrew Archer who concluded that Petit (abetted by Col. Durand and Capt. Latham) had been guilty of malpractice, and had claimed more money than had been spent. Archer's findings were that of the 204,892 dollars (£44,393) claimed by Petit, the actual cost of the work done should have been no more than 108,888 dollars (£23,592), and he recommended that the difference should be recovered from the former Governor of the fort. Petit subsequently submitted an amended account of his expenses which was largely accepted by the Treasury in 1717, but, even then, there was an unjustified shortfall, and a final amount of £1,049.12s.6d. was recovered by the Treasury from Petit's widow after his death in 1720.

The Treaty of Utrecht.

Throughout the War of Spanish Succession, the policy of Queen Anne's ministries, in accordance with the terms of the alliance, had been to deny France control of the Spanish Netherlands, Spain's possessions in Italy and the Spanish Indies, and to respect the agreement that 'no peace shall be made unless jointly'. The rise to power of the Tories in the autumn of 1710, the death of the Emperor Joseph in April 1711 and the election in his place of Archduke Charles (until then the British-supported claimant to the throne of Spain as Charles III), brought about a change in policy but, even as early as the summer of 1710, British ministers had unilaterally opened negotiations with France to conclude the
war on the most favourable terms for Britain. In respect of Menorca, these terms were initially limited to the cession of the port of Mahón but, by the time Britain came to negotiate peace with Spain in addition to France in the autumn of 1712, Britain's expectations had expanded to include the entire island of Menorca.

Direct negotiations between Spain and Britain opened when Lord Lexington, the British envoy, arrived in Madrid in October 1712, and his Spanish counterpart, the Marqués de Monteleón, joined the Spanish Ambassador, the Marqués de Bedmar, in London at about the same time. On 19 October, Lexington presented a list of eleven pre-conditions on which Britain required satisfaction before agreeing to peace. At the head of the territorial demands on this list was that the island of Menorca be ceded to Britain. Philip V had expected to surrender Mahón, and agreed only reluctantly to the greater concession on the understanding that the Menorcans' fueros and their Catholic religion would be safeguarded, and Bedmar was instructed to achieve the maximum possible concessions in this respect.

In London Bedmar made the requisite representations, but it was made clear to him that, the island of Menorca having been conquered by force of arms, any concessions in the sphere of religious tolerance would be discretionary on Britain's part, and would not be acceptable to her as a binding pre-condition to the cession of the island. Britain was prepared to go so far as to undertake to allow 'free exercise of the Catholic religion', and to 'safeguard people, goods and privileges' on the island, but she would not be bound beyond that, since any greater concession
would have limited the Queen's 'absolute and independent sovereignty' over Menorca. Although these undertakings fell short of Spain's objectives, Monteleón advised the Spanish court to accept them and not to press for greater clarification, for he had little doubt that, if pressed for more specific and binding undertakings, Britain would withdraw what she had already conceded, and still insist on the cession of Menorca. Monteleón's advice was accepted and the final draft of Britain's obligations to the Menorcans read as follows:

Moreover the Queen of Great Britain promises that all the inhabitants of the said island, both ecclesiastic and secular, will safely enjoy all their goods, rights and privileges, even the freedom to worship in the Roman Catholic faith: and, for the protection of the said religion in that island, measures will be taken which will not be at variance with the civil government and laws of Great Britain.

On 13 July 1713, two months after the general terms of peace had been agreed in Utrecht, Philip V signed a separate Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Britain whereby he ceded to the crown of Great Britain 'the whole island of Menorca, transferring forever all rights and full dominion over the said island.'

No-one had worked more assiduously than Stanhope to secure Menorca as a British possession and, as the only soldier/statesman of his age with first-hand knowledge of Britain's newly acquired Mediterranean bases, his marked preference for Menorca over Gibraltar was to have a lasting effect on British Mediterranean foreign policy for much of the 18th century. It was not until 1783, by which time Menorca's geo-political importance had waned, that
Britain was constrained to cede the island to Spain. Until then, Britain had never contemplated giving up Menorca whereas, in return for a variety of concessions from Spain, an offer to return Gibraltar to Spain had been made on no fewer than five occasions.178

Of Stanhope's claims for Menorca, only his assessment of the island's geopolitical and strategic importance stood the test of time. 'Only a day's sail from Africa, Spain, France and Sardinia, almost contiguous to Mallorca and only two days sail from Italy',179 meant that British possession of Menorca ensured that no Mediterranean power would undertake any major military or diplomatic initiative in the area without considering Britain's likely reaction. But his belief that Mahón would rival Genoa and Leghorn as a Mediterranean entrepot was fanciful and unrealistic.180 Stanhope's other claims that Menorca could be made impregnable (at a cost of only £60,000),181 and that the annual maintenance cost of the island to Britain would be no more than £30,000, were both disproved - the latter claim almost at the same time as Stanhope made it, the former (after an expenditure greatly in excess of the amount Stanhope had in mind) on the only two occasions the defences of Menorca were tested in 1756 and 1781/2. How different the fate of Menorca might have been if the more cautionary advice of Brigadier Francis Palmes had prevailed over Stanhope's romantic vision. Palmes, the British Envoy in Vienna at the time of the Barrier Treaty negotiations, wrote prophetically to Marlborough in 1710 advising him, and the ministry, to be:

mindful of the exorbitant costs of fortifying a place [Menorca] which, when all is done, upon the breaking out of another war, the French, with good reason
will take it from us before we in England can have
news of its being besieged.

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25 Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, p. 30.
26 Ibid.
27 H. Kamen, Spain in the later seventeenth century
593/92, Viceroy of Valencia to King of Spain, 8 November 1689.
28 Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, p. 87.
29 Ibid., p. 90.
30 Terrón, Guerra de Sucesión, p.42, citing Real Academia de Historia, Salazar N-47. Account by Blas Gimenez de Mendoza y Lillo. Undated (c.1707).
31 Ibid., pp.44-46.
32 Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, pp.110-134 gives a full account of the battle.
33 Ibid., pp.129,130.
34 Terrón, Guerra de Sucesión, p.64.
35 Ibid., pp.66-75.
36 Ibid., pp.76-78.
37 Ibid., p.65.
38 Ibid., p.89.
39 Ibid., p.90.
40 Ibid., p.22.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., pp.175-177, citing Real Academia de Historia, Salazar N-47 pp.231-236, report by Gimenez de Mendoza.
43 Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, p.148.
44 Ibid., p.28, citing Bibliothèque National de Paris, Ms.21397, p.405, references in a letter from the brothers Arnoul, 1704.
45 Ibid., pp.27,28, citing report by de la Jonquière, November 1705.
47 The following articles have provided useful information:
48 Williams, Stanhope, p.73, referring to resolutions of the Naval Council of War, Barcelona 18 May 1708.
50 Owen, War at Sea, p.98.
51 Williams, Stanhope, p.72.
52 Leake, Life vol.2, pp.275,276.
53 KAO U 1590, 0138/2. Stanhope to Leake, 24 August 1708.
54 Leake, Life vol.2, pp.276,277, citing the minutes of a 'consultation' of the naval captains in Barcelona, 23 August 1708.
55 Williams, Stanhope, p.74.
56 BL Add Mss 5443, f.292. Minutes of a Council of War held on the Albemarle off Port Mahon, 3 September 1708.
59 Ibid.
60 Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, p.221.
61 KAO U 1590, 0140/41. Petit to Stanhope, 15 July 1710 refers.
63 BL Add. Mss. 22231, ff.81-84. Cornet (later Lt-General Sir John) Cope to Lord Raby, recounting the events of the siege, September 1708.
64 Ibid.
65 KAO U 1590, 0138/27. Stanhope to Sunderland, 22 September 1708.
66 BL Add. Mss. 22231, Cope's account.

74
George Wade (later Field Marshal), was Stanhope's second in command for the Menorca expedition.

Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, p.248. When Stanhope's troops entered St. Philip's, they found 106 cannons, 5 mortars, 2,500 barrels of powder, 20,000 cannon balls and large quantities of flour and other provisions.

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Williams, Stanhope, p.78, citing Stanhope to Sunderland, 30 September 1708.


Mr. Stanhope's Answer to the Report of the Commissioners sent into Spain (London,1714), p.9.

PRO SP 94/77. Instructions to Stanhope, 9 December 1708.

KAO U 1590, 0138/27. Sunderland to Stanhope, 10 December 1708.


Ibid., Charles III to Stanhope, 7 June 1709.

KAO U 1590, 0139/41. Preliminary Articles of a Treaty of Port Mahon... June 1709.

Ibid.

Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, p.144.

Geikie and Montgomery, Barrier Treaty, p.152.

Ibid., p.153, citing Godolphin to Marlborough, 12 September 1709.

PRO SP 44/173, f.253. Argyll's commission, 7 June 1712.

Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, p.365.

AM/U (MC) 80, leg 5, Cuaderno 3, ff.26,27. Argyll landed at Fort St. Philip on 8th November 1712.

Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, p.384.

PRO SP 54/77. Instructions to Stanhope, 9 December 1708.

PRO T 61. Disposition Book XX (1710), f.162. Payment for Dubourgay's regiment, 10 May 1710;

NMM Mss Section 6. JOD 22, Journal of Admiral Baker, 6 November 1709.

KAO U 1590, 0140/22. Benjamin Furley (Stanhope's Secretary) to Stanhope, 27 April 1710.

PRO WO 30/89. Establishment of HQ staff of Fort St. Philip, 19 November 1711.

101 Alnwick Ms. 640. H. Crofton, Record of Establishments, Regulations and Orders from the Hoisting of the British flag in Minorca in the Year 1712 (hereafter Crofton, Record), pp.2,3.

102 PRO WO 30/89, f.25, Kane to Argyll giving the State of the Garrison of Minorca, 31 August 1713.

103 KAO U 1590, 0138/37. Estimate of HQ staff at St. Philip's, 16 October 1708.

104 Crofton, Record, p.2. Estimate of the Garrison of Minorca 15 November 1712.


106 The true amount cannot be quantified because the numbers (and components) of the train fluctuated between 131 in January 1709 (BL Add Mss 5795, Establishment of the Ordnance in Port Mahon, 16 January 1709) and 105 later in the same year (KAO U 1590, 0123/2, Annual Charge of Train of Artillery in Mahon 1709). The cost varied accordingly from £4,544.5s.0d. to £3,248,10s.0d.

107 KAO U 1590, 0123/2. Account of the Expenses at Mahon 1709.

108 Ibid., 0140/60. Durand to Stanhope, 13 April 1710.

109 Ibid., Capt. Dupayez to Stanhope, 8 August 1709.

110 Ibid., 0139/43. Craggs report on Minorca Fortifications, 1709.

111 PRO CO 174/15, ff.89,90. Estimate of further Fortifications near St. Philip's, unsigned 1712.

112 PRO CO 174/15, ff.89-91. A Calculation of the Expenses of the Fortification to be done on the other side of the Entrance of the Port of Mahon over Against St. Philip's Castle. Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, p.347, misquotes the estimate as £75,364.

113 The Examination of Major-General Anstruther, Lt.-Governor of Minorca before the H.... of L...., 28 January 1742. (London, 1742), revealed that all the appointments -Fort Major, Adjutant, Surgeon and Surgeon's Mate - were still filled, but that only the Surgeon's Mate was in Menorca at the time of the inquiry.

114 KAO U 1590, 0123/2, July 1710.

115 PRO CO 174/15, ff.11,12. Petit's account, 14 February 1713.


117 Ibid., pp.297,325.


120 Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, p.289.

121 PRO CO 174/8, f.81. Navy Board to Admiralty, 18 May 1771, referring to the creation of the dockyard in 1709.

122 PRO ADM 1/376. Byng to Burchett, 24 May 1709.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid., Byng to Burchett, 28 July 1709, enclosing a 'survey and appraisement' carried out and signed by Paul Stigant (Master Shipwright), Robert Frost (Master Attendant) and John Corfield (Clerk of the Cheque).

125 Ibid., Byng to Burchett, 24 May 1709.
127 KAO U 1590, 0139/25. Petit to Stanhope, 13 June 1709.
128 PRO ADM 1/376. Account submitted by Corfield and Frost (Master Attendant), July 1709.
129 Ibid. Account submitted by Atkins, 19 August 1712.
130 PRO ADM 1/376. Baker to Burchett, 4 February 1716 refers.
131 Ibid. Return of the provisions in store in Mahón.
Gascoigne 8 July 1712, mentions 15,852 bushels of wheat, 275,1071bs of bread, 7,500 gallons of wine, 66,665 pieces of beef, 76,244 pieces of pork, 4,588 bushels of peas, 6,882 bushels of oatmeal and 6,422 gallons of oil.
132 Merriman, Queen Anne's Navy, pp.291,292, citing NMM ADM D/8, approving an establishment in Mahón of a Master Baker and four assistants.
133 J.G.Coad, Historical Architecture of the Royal Navy (London,1983), p.143, merely mentions a 'convent [monastery] among a great many suttling houses', but it is possible to identify the site.
134 PRO ADM 1/376. Byng to Burchett, 24 May 1709.
135 KAO U 1590, 0139/25. Petit to Stanhope, 13 June 1709.
136 Coad, The Royal Dockyards, p.335.
137 Ibid., p.334.
138 Ibid., p.335, citing PRO T/l/151, Jennings petition to Queen Anne, 12 August 1712.
139 Ibid. Coad has mistakenly described the hospital rebuilt in 1715 (PRO ADM 140/1321), and not Jennings' hospital built to a design by Captain Latham (an Engineer officer commanding the artificers in the garrison) in consultation with Griffyth in 1711 (PRO MPD/93).
140 PRO ADM 1/376. Baker to Burchett, 9 August 1715.
141 Ibid., Returns to the Admiralty 1709-1713, and NMM Mss. Sec.6 JOD 22. Admiral Baker's Journal, 15 March 1711, suggest that there were seldom more than four ships at any one time.
142 AC Consells generals. Jurats to Isabela Cristina, 10 March 1712.
143 Ibid. Marqués de Rialp to Jurats, 29 April 1712.
144 AC Caja 1700. Ruby's appointment as Syndich, undated.
145 AM/U (D) 158. Stanhope to Jurats, 17 October 1708.
146 The following served as Spanish Civil Governors of Menorca: José de Izagurri 29 November 1708-23 December 1709; Sebastián Suau de Ventemilla 24 December 1709-27 March 1711; Francisco Tomás 13 April-28 November 1712.
147 AM/U (MC) 80, Jurats of Mahón to Visitador Real (Charles III's Visitor to Menorca), 7 April 1710.
148 Ibid., Jurats to Petit, 6th December 1710, alleging an insult to the Bayle of Mahón.
149 Ibid., Jurats to Petit, 5 May 1712, refers to public whipping of three civilians by soldiers.
150 Ibid., Jurats to Petit, 5 April 1709, listing a series of thefts from houses in Mahón.
151 PRO SP 44/173, f.207. Fermor's commission dated 28 August 1711.
152 PRO CO 174/15. Fermor to the Earl of Barrymore, 6 April 1712.
153 AM/U (D) 158. Jurats' reaction to Petit's decree of 26 November 1709.
154 AC Caja 1700. Petit's imposition and retention of landing charges and import duties on oil, wine and spirits, 1708.
155 AM/U (D) 158, Petit's decree, 11 May 1709.
156 AC Caja 1700, repeated complaints 1709-1712.


159 PRO SP 94/230, f.120. Argyll to Dartmouth, 31 December 1711.


162 Ibid., p.314.


166 E. Gregg, Queen Anne (London, 1984), pp. 334, 335.

167 Mata, Guerra de Sucesión pp. 335-345 and 359-365, cites sources in the Correspondence Politique in the archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Paris), to chart the Anglo-French negotiations in 1711 and 1712.

168 AGS Estado, leg. 6820. Queen Anne's commission to Lexington, 28 September 1712.

169 Ibid., Lexington to Philip V, 19 October 1712.

170 Ibid., Grimaldo (Spanish First Minister) to Bedmar, 23 October 1712.

171 Ibid.

172 AGS Estado, leg. 6822, Monteleón to Grimaldo, 5th February 1713.

173 Ibid.

174 PRO SP 105/269, Dartmouth to Lexington, 19 May 1713.

175 PRO CO 389/56, ff. 161, 162. Translation of part of the 11th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht.

176 Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, p. 384. Extract of Article XI of the peace treaty between Spain and Great Britain, 13 July 1713.

177 KAO U 1590, 0141/10. Stanhope to Marlborough, 29 March 1709.


179 KAO U 1590, 0141/10. Stanhope to Marlborough, 29 March 1709.

180 Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, p. 275, citing Biblioteca Central de Barcelona, Col. Bonsons, 3009, p. 149.

181 KAO U 1590, 0141/10. Stanhope to Marlborough, 29 March 1709.

Chapter Three.

Menorcan Society in the Eighteenth Century.

At the time of the British acquisition of Menorca, the island's society was structured, settled and firmly rooted in the form and offices of local government, the fueros and the social classifications which had operated since the Aragonese conquest in the late thirteenth century. When Menorca was ceded to Britain, the Menorcans feared that the island's traditional way of life would be threatened, and it is ironic that the laissez-faire policy markedly adopted by the British authorities to the island's internal affairs, served to preserve many of Menorca's traditions into the nineteenth century, and was in sharp contrast to the interventionist and centralist policies of the Spanish government which, after the War of Spanish Succession, suppressed similar traditions and fueros in all the Catalan provinces. Britain did not set out deliberately to bring about changes, but her liberal attitude, and more than seventy years of a British presence in Menorca inevitably had a profound effect on Menorcan society. Nowhere was this more marked than in the prosperity resulting from the British presence which contributed to a population explosion (the number of inhabitants increased by nearly 92% in the course of the eighteenth century), the emergence of a bourgeoisie, and an opportunity for new money
to facilitate upward mobility at all levels in the traditionally static social strata.¹ (Fig. 3.1.)

Social divisions.

In common with other former Aragonese territories in the kingdom of Spain, the inhabitants of Menorca were classified socially in one of four estates (bracos) – nobility (militar), major (major), middle (mitja) and minor (menor)² – a classification by birth in the first group, and by the occupation of the head of the family in the remaining three divisions. The nobility comprised the island's aristocracy, but contained only one representative of the titled nobility (nobleza titulada), the head of the Cardona family, who had been created Baron of Lluriach in 1683.³ Although untitled,
other families enjoyed noble status. Some, like the Gomila, Olivar, Martorell and Sintes families were descended from the old nobility (nobleza vieja), who had settled in Menorca on estates granted to them by the King at the time of the island's conquest from the Moors; others, the new nobility (nobleza nueva), enjoyed noble status, having acquired it as a result of being granted noble blood (castizo) status by royal decree, or through marriage (noble status was inherited if either parent was noble by birth). In the seventeenth century, six Menorcan families were granted castizo status, and in his Llinatges dels Menorquíns, Fernando Martí cites examples of families improving social status and eventually acquiring noble status through marriage. Of these, the rise of the Portella family is typical. Descendants of a private soldier in the garrison of St. Philip's in the sixteenth century, the family had become weavers and tailors in the seventeenth century. In the early years of the eighteenth century, Josep Portella Andreu became an apothecary; his son became a doctor, and his grandson, Josep Portella Seguí, also a doctor, married into the noble Sancho family in 1768.

Ranking below those of noble blood, were the knights (caballeros/hidalgos), who had received a patent of nobility (hidalguía) from the King. They, too, were entitled to the noble prefix of 'don', but their status could be passed on only in the male line. In the seventeenth century, the heads of thirty-five Menorcan families were honoured in this manner, and in 1711, Charles III conferred an hidalguía on Vicente Alberti Mercadal as a reward for his services.

During the periods of British rule in Menorca no additions were made to the ranks of the island's aristocracy, other
than those which were achieved through marriage, although attempts were made by Governors to persuade the British government tangibly to recognise services rendered to the British crown by some Menorcans. In 1718, Kane urged that nobles, and in particular Juan Miguel Saura Morell, who had shown themselves well affected to Britain should be encouraged in their attitude and rewarded with a gold medal and chain,\(^9\) and in 1775/76, Murray recommended knighthoods for Dr. Mateo Mercadal and Diego Vidal Seguí, but none of these proposals was entertained in London. It was not until Spain regained control of Menorca (1782-1798), that a further three Menorcan families were ennobled (ironically including Diego Vidal), and the marquisate of Albranca was conferred upon the head of the Martorell family.\(^{10}\)

The noble estate was the least numerous of the four groupings in Menorcan society but, like the aristocracy elsewhere in Europe at the time, it was disproportionately influential, and it was not inclined to be pro-British in its outlook, for at least two reasons. The first sprang from its resentment of the preference shown by the British for Mahón over Ciudadela as Menorca's seat of government. Most noble families had their town houses in Ciudadela and resided there, and they deplored the diminished role in the island's affairs to which Ciudadela, its officials and its tribunals were relegated by the British. Secondly the British represented change, and the aristocracy (like the clergy) felt their authority and standing threatened by Britain's generally liberal regime of government in the island, and the change in the old order brought about by the commercial opportunities open to the Menorcans, which resulted in a
The remaining three social groupings had no intrinsic reasons for resenting British rule. The major estate contained some armigerous families, but lacking a patent of nobility they could not be classed as nobles. Also in this estate were prosperous farmers (payeses acomodados) with substantial leasehold properties, lawyers, notaries and doctors. The middle estate contained small farmers, tenant farmers and those professional people excluded from the major estate - surgeons, apothecaries. The minor estate constituted the largest grouping, and was made up of artisans, tradesmen, journeymen, mariners and farm labourers. Not only were the social groupings clearly divided, but for categories within the upper two estates in particular, appropriate titles and forms of address were punctiliously observed. Nobles and their children were addressed as 'don' or 'donzell'; the island's principal law officers were referred to as 'muy magníficos', a form of address also used for the councillors of Ciudadela. Provincial lay magistrates and the Jurats of Mahón, Alayor and Mercadal were known as 'magníficos', as were the district Amostacenes (officials controlling goods and prices in the markets). The Syndichs sent from Menorca to foreign courts were addressed as 'honorable'; notaries and lawyers were addressed as 'discret', and the remainder of the major estate were referred to as 'mossēn'. Minor land-owners were known as 'amo'(master), followed by the name of their property.

It is impossible to quantify the numbers represented in each of the groupings but, from census returns in the course
of the 18th century, the most socially informative of which are the figures available for Mahón in 1763, and for Menorca as a whole in 1782 and 1787, it is reasonable to conjecture that, calculated as percentages of the population, numbers of the aristocracy never exceeded 1%, and that numbers in the other estates were approximately: main 10%, middle 24% and minor 63%. The regular and secular clergy made up the remaining 2% in the census returns.

Wealth.

What wealth there was in Menorca at the start of the eighteenth century, came from the land and its produce. All land in the island belonged theoretically to the King by right of conquest from the Moors in 1287 but, in practice, large tracts of land were in the hands of a few families, notably Olives, Cardona, Martí, Saura, Gomila, Huguet, Guevara and Quart. Some estates had been acquired as 'cavallerías' (a royal grant, usually of some 100 acres), of which the recipients enjoyed the freehold. There were seventeen such fiefs. Other prominent families had been allocated estates with what amounted to a perpetual lease, which entitled them to the usufruct of the estate, although rent was payable on the land, and tithes on the produce to the royal patrimony. All such land grants were invariably entailed, and could be alienated only at great cost and after lengthy legal proceedings. Also the loss of the island's land registers in the sack of Ciudadela in the middle of the sixteenth century, had allowed some of these families, and others, to acquire apparently unclaimed land, the ownership
of which they justified subsequently under the heading of 'uninterrupted possession by the family over many years'. By the start of the eighteenth century, most major landowners lived in Ciudadela and not on their estates, which were leased (and even sub-leased) from year to year to tenant farmers who lived on the estates and farmed the land on a consequently insecure sharecropping basis.

In 1713, Henry Neal, Her Majesty's Surveyor in Menorca, drew up, by términos, 'an Account of all the Estates in the Island and the value at which they are rented in money and corn'. Neal listed 389 estates/farms (120 in Mahón, 94 in Ciudadela, 77 in Alayor and 98 in Mercadal), of which the total rent returns were given as £45,327 (£6,799) in money, and 7,177 quarteras (17,942 bushels) of cereals, worth an additional £2,142. The annual rentable value of most farms (290) was between £50 and £150, but there were thirty farms which produced less than £30 (£4.10s.), and only two, Torre de Vall (£470) on the south coast and Son Morell (£480) on the north-west coast which were rented at more than £450 (£67.10s.). Most farms (300) produced 10-30 quarteras of wheat as part of their rent, but only one, Son Morell, produced as much as 50 quarteras, which was worth an additional £100 (£15). Seventy years later, in 1784, Juan Ramis estimated that the number of farms in Menorca had increased to 520 (147 in Mahón, 131 in Ciudadela, 112 in Alayor and 130 in Mercadal), but Ramis listed no rental values.

The substantial increase recorded in the number of farms between 1713 and 1784 should not be taken necessarily as evidence of extensive land reclamation (although some was
undertaken) but, as a glance at a map of rural Menorca will show, rather that many estates had been fragmented - revealed by the suffixes upper(dalt), lower(baix), or old(vell) and new(nou) to previously existing farms. Even if Ramis had listed the rental values of the farms in 1784, a comparison with Neal's 1713 findings would be of doubtful benefit, because of the inconsistency (usually unchallenged by the universitats) of the proprietors' declarations in the capbrevación or catastro on which the land tax was calculated. The capbrevación (survey of royal property) and the catastro (survey of all property), required returns to be made periodically by landowners to the universitats of each término, in order that an assessment could be made of the talla (land tax), and diezmos (tithes) to be paid. But the figures so produced cannot be relied upon as an accurate record of the value or yield of any property since, as José Luis Terrón has shown in his comprehensive study of property in Menorca, the amounts submitted by landowners were invariably an underestimate - often of iceberg proportions with as much as seven-eighths of income undisclosed. 25

Land continued to be an indication of superior social status as well as a source of wealth in the 18th century when, in particular, demand for agricultural produce of all kinds increased substantially because of the needs of the garrison. But ownership of land in itself was not a reliable indicator of individual wealth. Returns for a catastro listed properties, but not their size or land value. Nor have the wills and testaments consulted proved a reliable barometer of financial standing. 26 Affluence can be gauged comparatively from the amount of money left to cover funeral expenses and
masses to be said for the deceased, the size of dowries, the allowances made for other surviving relations, and by the quality of the personal bequests of jewellery, furnishings and clothes, but it is not possible to calculate the net value of an estate.

In 1764 Menorca's Advocate Fiscal, in a memorial to the British government about the state of the island, claimed that 'the richest man [in Menorca] has an annual income of £400, but only two are possessed of this fortune'. This estimate may have been justified, based on the catastro returns available to the Advocate Fiscal but, while they are neither comprehensive, complete nor always dependably accurate, there are other sources which give some indication of the extent and spread of wealth in Menorca in the eighteenth century. These are: a list of the 'Principal Inhabitants of Minorca and what they were esteem'd to be worth in 1756' drawn up by Captain the Hon Augustus Hervey, the senior naval officer at Port Mahón immediately prior to the loss of the island to the French in 1756 (Fig. 3.2); statistics gleaned from an examination of Menorcan corsair activity 1778-1781, and inventories of the assets of two brothers submitted to the court of Madrid in 1782 in support of their application to be considered for promotion to the ranks of the aristocracy.

Hervey's estimate of individual wealth of some leading Menorcans in 1756 gives an indication of the increased prosperity in the island under British rule, a prosperity
which was particularly enjoyed by the inhabitants of Mahón. His list contains names that are badly misspelt, sometimes incomplete (which makes identification difficult and suggests that it was drawn up without Menorcan assistance), but it is worthy of close examination (Fig. 3.2.). Fifty-eight potential lenders were named in Hervey's list, of whom fifty-three were Menorcans. Ten of the eleven names from Ciutadella were nobles and great landowners. There were twenty-four individuals listed from Mahón, all, apart from one nobleman, from the main estate, professional men, merchants and prosperous farmers. In Alayor eight potential lenders were listed, lawyers, farmers and one 'very rich' butcher. In Mercadal it was thought that four farmers 'with much money' could make a contribution, and Hervey considered that a further loan might be forthcoming from six merchants and tradesmen in St.
Philip's. In addition, four Jews were listed as 'rich' potential lenders and one Greek merchant was expected to be able to make a substantial contribution. In all, Hervey expected loans, calculated 'at a Moderate Computation', to be forthcoming to the amount of 89,600 dollars (£19,533). In the event, only 11,627 dollars (£2,519) - 2,493 dollars from Ciudadela, 4,451 from Mahón, 283 from Alayor and 4,000 from the Jews - was pledged. No money was promised from Mercadal or St. Philip's, but there was a surprising pledge of 400 dollars (£87) from the clergy of Menorca.

The estimates of financial worth and loan capability which Hervey produced were in round numbers, and were clearly no more than rough estimates, but the list is interesting for its omission of foreigners (other than a handful of Jews) resident in the island. For example, the Greek community, which had reason to be greatly indebted to British support in Menorca, was represented by only one name, and yet forty members of the community had, between 1749 and 1754, found it possible to contribute 10,640p (£2,128) towards the construction of a Greek Orthodox church in Mahón.30 In addition, one of the community, Manuel Zifanti, reputedly the richest Greek colonist, had donated the money to buy the site on which the church was to be constructed,31 and Nicolás Alexiano, a subsequent leader of the Greek community and Captain of the Port of Mahón 1769 -1782, 32 is known to have made a personal contribution, in money and materials, of £775.33 At a later date, in 1782, Alexiano claimed to have 'Estates and Property in Land, Houses, Warehouses, Ships and Merchandize' to the value of 'upwards of Ten thousand Pounds sterling'.34 Although Hervey lists two French shopkeepers,
Mrs. Allion and Mr Flarde worth together some 70,000 dollars (£15,167), no loan was expected of them, and the loan capability of other French and English shops (not enumerated) were 'not yet reckon'd' in Hervey's account, and no reference was made to the possibility of a loan from the British merchant community which, to judge from the numbers who returned to Menorca in 1763, must have been in excess of thirty at that time.35

It is obvious that loan expectations from individuals was not directly related to their fortune - only 3,000 dollars was expected of Bernardo Ignacio Olives y Quart, worth 80,000 dollars, and yet a loan of 5,000 dollars was expected from Gabriel Saura y Vigo, worth only 45,000 dollars. This would suggest that more was expected of Menorcans of proven pro-British sympathies, like the Saura family, and would also account for the fact that the inhabitants of Mahón, where the economic benefits of the British presence in Menorca were most keenly appreciated, were expected to lend 23% of their estimated wealth, compared to 7% from Ciudadela.

Although the wider aspects of the economic benefits to the island of corsair activity are considered in a later chapter, it is germane at this point to examine the opportunities this activity gave to individuals to enrich themselves and, at the same time, register the extent to which it breached traditional social barriers and involved a wide cross-section of society.

Governor Murray's secretary remarked in 1778 that 'the Spirit these People have for Privateering is incredible',36 and this was borne out by results. Between September 1778 and August 1781, fifty-five Menorcan boats were armed and,
sailing as corsairs, captured 225 prizes, of which 179, together with their cargoes, were sold at public auction in Mahón at a gross value of 2m p9 (£400,000). Corsair activity involved buying or leasing boats, arming them with light calibre carriage or swivel guns and provisioning them for a cruise in the Mediterranean lasting for up to six months. To finance corsair cruises, it was customary to set up a company for each voyage, involving an agent, shipowners, and investors. The agent's responsibility was to arrange the financial backing and the eventual sale of any prizes, for which he was entitled to 5% of the gross profits, as was the ship's captain, while the investors shared in the gross profits in direct proportion to their investment. The net profits of the voyage were shared between the shipowners and the crew, the latter being paid at the fixed rate agreed when they signed on for the voyage. Agents were invariably Mahón lawyers, and most shipowners were Menorcan merchants from Mahón, although there were some foreign owners - Adam Wilkie and George Forbes (British), Salomon Cohen (Jew) and Nicolás Alexiano (a Greek to whom reference has already been made). Investors included immigrant traders (British, Greek, Jewish and Italian), but the majority were Menorcan and included aristocracy (derogation notwithstanding), merchants, members of the legal and medical professions, craftsmen, tradesmen, farmers and some women. Major investment - up to 70% of the capital - was usually provided by a small circle of foreign merchants, the aristocracy and the upper bourgeoisie in amounts ranging from 700p8 (£140) to 1,200p8 (£240), but for any voyage there could be as many as three dozen more investors pledging the remaining 30% in amounts ranging from
Many investors spread their risks by pledging small amounts to a number of voyages, and Amador Puig cites the example of a nobleman, Miguel Geroni Rubí y Squella, who invested a total of 550 p8 (£110) in six ventures between 1778 and 1780. Corsair activity was clearly an attractive and profitable venture for all involved, from the crews - as many as 3,000 sailors were estimated to be involved at the height of activity - to the shipowners, investors and agents, and the amount of money circulating in Menorca as a result of corsair activity permeated other spheres of the Menorcan economy, to the benefit of many other individuals. As Lindemann recorded, there was no-one who derived no profit from it,

the craftsmen earned money by equipping the privateer, the doctor and apothecary by providing medicine, the priest with consecration and intercession, the lawyers in recovering prize-money and in passing sentence.

The third illustration of an increase in individual wealth in the eighteenth century is limited to the example of the brothers Juan and Diego Vidal Seguí. It is representative of the practice described by Terrón of the burgeoning middle classes of Mahón who, while devoting themselves largely to commerce, used some of their earnings to purchase first the usufruct of leased estates, then the estates themselves before entailing them for their own families. The Vidal family, originally tenant farmers in the sixteenth century, came to be substantial landowners by the end of the second period of British rule. By that time, Juan Vidal owned five estates, the usufruct of another, two market-gardens, houses in Mahón, a warehouse and was earning interest on money
loaned to the Universitat of Mahón and to a number of individuals. He claimed to be worth £26,200.\textsuperscript{47} His brother, Diego, owned five estates, four vineyards, a market-garden, houses in Mahón and also earned interest on money loaned. He claimed to be worth £24,718.\textsuperscript{48} Both claims were made in 1782 when the brothers petitioned the King of Spain to be granted noble status, and were required to prove that they possessed the means to support the status to which they aspired and, on the evidence they produced, their petition was granted in 1783.\textsuperscript{49} They, like other successful members of the major estate in Mahón with a similar background - the Mercadals in the Plaza Conquista and the Solers in the Calle Anuncivay, for example - sought to underline their improved financial and social standing by building imposing town houses, in the case of the Vidals, in the Calle San Roque in Mahón,\textsuperscript{50} and Juan Vidal also built a substantial house in his principal country estate of Son Gall (Fig. 3.3).

At the other end of the social scale, there were many who, in a variety of trades, benefited from the British presence in Menorca. In the early years of British rule when work on the defences of St. Philip's was at its height, Menorcan overseers, craftsmen and labourers were employed by the British in considerable numbers. In 1720 the Menorcan labour force at St. Philip's amounted to 1,500 men,\textsuperscript{51} with daily wages of 1s.1d for overseers and master craftsmen, 9d. for craftsmen (masons, carpenters and stone-cutters), 7d. for miners and 6d. for muleteers and labourers.\textsuperscript{52} When these wages are compared to the daily pay of 8d. for a private soldier in the garrison,\textsuperscript{53} they must have represented riches indeed to the islanders. By 1750 this labour force had been
Casa Mercadal. Plaza Conquistta, Mahón.

Country House owned by Juan Vidal Seguí. Son Gall, Alayor.
reduced to a maintenance unit, one-tenth of the 1720 figures but, in the second period of British rule, more workmen were recruited to build barracks in Mahón (1765) and the creation of Georgetown from 1771. The navy, also, had need of skilled and unskilled labour in the dockyard. In April 1747, there were more than 150 Menorcans employed - 52 shipwrights and 32 caulkers on a daily wage of 1s.4d, 6 masons and 5 ropemakers at 1s.1d. and 62 labourers, boatmen and watchmen at a daily rate of 6d. In the second period of British rule, additional workmen were recruited to rebuild the hospital, to create the new dockyard facilities on Saffron Island and to service the fleet of corsairs.

Customs and Habits.

Apart from the first English assessment of the Menorcans by Richard Gibson in 1672, and subsequent occasional and incidental observations in official correspondence and in letters from officers serving in the garrison, there are six appraisals of Menorcan customs and habits which survive from the eighteenth century - three British, one German, one Spanish and one Menorcan. The British commentaries were made by John Armstrong, Engineer in Ordinary in Menorca 1738-1742, George Cleghorn, Surgeon to the 22nd regiment in Menorca 1744-1749, and by Major William Cunninghame, an officer in the Engineers writing in the late 1750s, but who had known Menorca since his first posting there in 1745. The German assessment was by Christophe Lindemann, Lutheran Chaplain to Prince Ernst's regiment, one of the two Hanoverian regiments in the garrison 1775-1782. The Spanish
account was written, at the request of the Spanish Admiralty after the reincorporation of Menorca into the Spanish kingdom in 1782, by a serving naval officer, José de Vargas Ponce, and the Menorcan account in 1787 was by Dr. Juan Ramis y Ramis, appointed Assessor of Menorca by Spain in 1782.

Of the English accounts, Gibson's is the slightest and most superficial; Armstrong's is the most comprehensive, but it is also the most subjective and jingoistic; Cleghorn's observations are original, but they are incidental to the medical theme of his work. Cunninghame's comments reveal that he was aware of Armstrong's work, and much of what he had to say echoed Armstrong's findings, but there are some independent and informative observations. Ramis' account is disappointingly slight, although it confirms much of what was objectively observed by the British authors but, not surprisingly, some of his conclusions run counter to the religious prejudice and jingoism of Armstrong. The section devoted to Menorca in Vargas' work owed much to the collaboration he received from Ramis, but he was also aware of Armstrong's account (which had been translated into Spanish in 1781), and he went out of his way to rebut many of Armstrong's conclusions and to question the Englishman's competence as an historian. Of all the accounts, Lindemann's is the most perceptively objective and, despite his obvious familiarity with Armstrong's views, he amply justifies his own conclusions.

Richard Gibson did not have a high opinion of the Menorcans. He described them as a 'Poore shuffling People' who were insolent and dishonest, but he was more critical of the 'Heads'(the Jurats and leading citizens) who 'mutter'd.'
at him, than he was of the 'poore and middle sort' of Menorcans whom he found 'courteous enough'. The accounts of the Menorcans dating from the eighteenth century were less censorious, and there was general agreement that the inhabitants were a clean-living, house-proud, demure, frugal and sober people who, despite the poverty of the majority, enjoyed a basically healthy, staple diet, although the foreigners found the food excessively flavoured with oil and garlic and disliked the manner in which, in all but the best houses, the meals were eaten in an atmosphere which reeked of home-grown tobacco. The nature of the Menorcans was impetuous and contentious, and this gave rise to excessive, and often very petty civil litigation. However, criminal offences were rare, and the Menorcans submitted resignedly to the taxes imposed upon them by their own authorities. There was no dispute in the accounts about the high degree of influence exerted by the Catholic priests but, while the accounts in English took the strict observance of the many holy days as evidence of the islanders' indolence, Ramis considered it to be a praiseworthy testament to the steadfastness of their faith, and he went out of his way to emphasise their hardworking nature, a feature which was also supported by Lindemann. All the commentators were agreed that, although the Menorcans were fond of music and dancing throughout the year, Menorca in carnival time was at its most cheerful and unrestrained - a season of 'outrageous mirth and jollity,' filled with processions, masks and feasts. There was no divergence of opinion about the physical appearance of the Menorcans (well-built, of middle stature and an olive complexion), the fact that they tended to age before their
Inhabitants of Minorca.
Education and Culture.

At the start of the eighteenth century, Menorca was as culturally barren as any neglected outlying province of Spain, but, by 1782, when the island was reincorporated into the Spanish kingdom, the substantial improvements in the islanders' standard of living had been accompanied by significant cultural advances. The mass of the Menorcans were still illiterate, but the small numbers of the literate aristocracy had been swollen by the burgeoning middle classes whose intellectual curiosity, freed from religious censorship, had been given every encouragement to develop by a culturally tolerant British government.

What schooling there was in Menorca in the early eighteenth century was centred in the monasteries, where the curriculum was usually limited to reading, writing, Latin grammar and some basic arithmetic. Some elements of theology and philosophy were sometimes included, but this never became a regularly established practice. Armstrong, in mid-century, had a poor opinion of such schools and, together with Lindemann, was scornful of the intellectual ability of the teachers. By 1782, 'grammar' schools had been in existence for some time in Mahón, Ciudadela and Alayor, with the schoolmasters' salaries being paid by the universitats. In Alayor two additional schools were recorded in which music was taught - one devoted to singing and instrumental music and, in the other, pupils were taught to play the organ and, in Mahón in the 1770s when maritime activity was at its height, ships' captains are known to have given tuition in mathematics and navigation. British policy
had always been to encourage Menorcans to send their children to British schools set up in the garrison towns to acquire a basic education and a knowledge of English, but this initiative was always strongly opposed by the Menorcan clergy who, despite being expressly forbidden to do so, used their considerable pastoral influence to dissuade their parishioners from exposing their children to the dangers of Protestant indoctrination. 78

That not all Menorcans heeded this advice is illustrated by the fact that, during the second period of British rule, an Englishman, Ernest Cook, established an academy in Mahón in which children of the prosperous middle classes were taught not only English, but also mathematics, experimental physics, logic and natural history. 79 One of the pupils, Mateo Orfila y Rotger, later to gain international fame in the field of medicine, became so proficient and fluent in English that it was said that he spoke it like a native. 80 Lindemann reported that there were scholars to be found among the middle classes, well-read in French and Italian literature, but classical scholarship was a rare phenomenon. 81 In an island where much of the new prosperity was springing from trade and privateering, a knowledge of foreign languages was essential for lawyers and merchants. If few matched the ability of Pedro Ramis y Ramis, Doctor of Civil and Canon Law, who mastered Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, Spanish, French, English, Italian and German, 82 many merchants had a good knowledge of Spanish, French and English, and a working knowledge of Arabic and Italian. Nevertheless, if the tolerance of the British government encouraged intellectual development, most of the cultural
influences - British architecture and furniture apart - came from France. It was to France that most of the Menorcans who were in a position to do so went to finish their education, (there was no provision for secondary education and no seminary in Menorca, although both were to be found in Mallorca), and to the universities of Montpellier and Avignon in particular. But such opportunities were open only to the privileged and the affluent and, despite the assertion of Juan Ramis y Ramis that 'reading, writing and arithmetic were common accomplishments of the Menorcans', the level of education of the mass of the population remained low. In 1782, Francisco Seguí Sintes, a contemporary of Ramis, reported that, of the sixteen members of the Universitat of Ciutadella, half were illiterate; two-thirds of the universitats of Mahón and Alayor could neither read nor write, and it was rare for anyone serving in the Universitat of Mercadal to be literate. Menorcan women had even less opportunity to learn, very few could read or write and, according to Lindemann, they took no interest in cultural pursuits. Even a generation after Menorca's final reincorporation into the Spanish kingdom, a visitor staying in the home of one of the island's leading families (Squella) in Ciutadella, found the lady of the house unable to speak any language but Menorquí.

One indication of cultural advance was the installation of the first printing-press on the island in 1750. This was imported from London by Juan Fábregas y Sora, and was an acquisition which enabled a number of authors, notably Juan Ramis y Ramis, to play a significant part in maintaining Catalan/Menorquí as a living force in literature. Also,
painters and sculptors were listed in the 1782 census. Of the sculptors nothing is known, other than a reference by Armstrong praising the work of a Menorcan sculptor at work in Alayor in the 1740s, but the leading painters are well documented and many of their paintings survive, mostly in Menorca, but there are some in Britain. The doyen of the painters was Giuseppe Chiesa who settled in Mahón from Leghorn in 1728. He was renowned for his portraits, and as a pictorial chronicler of events on the island. Two of his sons were also painters and, like their father, set out to portray the society and countryside of Menorca. The Chiesa family remained in Menorca, but Giuseppe Chiesa's protege, Pascual Calbo y Caldes, went to study in Italy in 1767 and then to work in Vienna as court painter and Director of the Imperial Gallery, before returning to Menorca in 1790. Like Chiesa, his forte was portrait painting, but he was also a remarkable depicter of customs.

Of all the indications of cultural advance, perhaps the two most telling were the opening of a public theatre in Mahon in 1776 with a performance of a French play, Le Sourcier et Le Sabatier, and the foundation in 1778 of the Societat mahonesa de Cultura (Cultural Society of Mahón), the object of which was to further, by translations into Menorquí and by discussions, debates and lectures, cultural advances in Menorca in the linguistic, historical, literary and scientific fields. As far as is known, the society had no contact with cultural societies outside the island, but relied upon its own members to read papers and lead discussions, and since this was all conducted in Menorquí, it is worthy of note that two of the society's founder members
were members of the garrison, and that two more officers were subsequently enrolled as members. Its liberal outlook at odds with the authorities after the Spanish reconquest, the society flourished for only seven years, and was disbanded in 1785.

Allegiance and Identity.

For all but a few Menorcans the pragmatic approach they adopted in most areas of the British government of the island never extended to consideration of themselves as British subjects. The islanders never completely lost the resentment they had begun to feel during the period of British de facto administration of Menorca 1708-1713 when, after they had stirred themselves to remain subjects of a Catholic King of Spain who had pledged to respect their fueros, they found that they had to sustain an occupying force which was alien in every respect. For many the resentment was subsequently fuelled (as will be illustrated in succeeding chapters) by the fact that, in their opinion, Britain failed to honour her Utrecht obligations with regard to the civil and religious government of the island. The polarised positions of a Catholic people and a Protestant government which encouraged foreign settlers (the Jews and Greeks were particularly resented) restricted the full participation of the garrison in the life of the island, prevented all but a few mixed marriages, discouraged any substantial British civilian settlement and caused the Menorcans, hardly any of whom had been born Spanish subjects, passively to accept Menorca's reincorporation into the kingdom of Spain in 1782.
The British authorities put the political loyalty of the Menorcans to the test on four occasions. The first occurred in 1717, when it was thought that plans by Alberoni (Philip V's Chief Minister) to recoup some of Spain's former glory posed a threat to Menorca. Lord George Forbes (interim Commander-in-Chief in Menorca during Kane's absence in London) appealed to the Jurats of the island for support in the event of an attack, and this was promised in full. The Jurats, describing themselves as 'buenos y fieles vassallos' (good and faithful vassals), offered financial support and even pledged to die fighting ('hasta sacrificar nuestras vidas') in defence of 'nuestro Rey y nuestra Patria' (our King and country). In the event, the Menorcans were not called upon to demonstrate their support. Spain mounted no attack in 1717, the garrison was relieved and strengthened in 1718 and, with Byng's defeat of the Spanish navy off Cape Passero in Sicily in August 1718, the threat was removed.

The second rallying call to the Menorcans was made in November 1741 by Brigadier Richard O'Farrell (once more an interim Commander-in-Chief during Anstruther's absence in London) during the war with Spain (the so-called War of Jenkin's Ear), which preceded the large-scale War of Austrian Succession (1744-1748). On this occasion, O'Farrell, advised that a Spanish expedition was being mounted in Mallorca to attack Menorca, wrote to the Jurats calling for volunteers to serve in the garrison in the event of an invasion. A list, containing seventy names was drawn up by the Jurats of Mahón and sent to O'Farrell. Of the names, thirteen were priests who pledged moral support and prayers; six were noblemen, of whom two pledged active support; of the thirty-five leading
members of the 'brac mitja', twenty-six volunteered their services and fourteen of the seventeen members listed from the 'brac menor' also answered the call positively. Age, indisposition and travel abroad on business accounted for the refusal of the remainder to rally to the cause. The response from the other términos is not known, but it is unlikely to have been less disappointing than the paltry returns from Mahón. Once again, the volunteers were not required to serve since Spain, in the wake of the death of the Austrian Emperor Charles VI, the former Hapsburg contender for the Spanish throne, turned its acquisitive intentions to the Austrian territories in Italy.

The next test of Menorcan support for the British crown occurred in February 1756 when all intelligence for months before had pointed to an imminent French attack upon the island. On this occasion, the Lt-Governor, Lt-General William Blakeney, appealed not only to the Jurats but also to the 'Cabezas y Principales del Pueblo' (Heads and principal members of the community) to use their influence to persuade all the inhabitants to do all that was necessary for the service of the King. He reminded them of the benefits they had enjoyed under British rule and asked for their support in men and money. Reference has already been made to the poor response to the appeal for money which produced only £2,519 of the hoped-for total of £19,413, a sum which represented, according to Augustus Hervey, 'Indecent trifling with the Crown'. The response to the call for volunteers to serve in the garrison was even more disappointing. Only twenty-one names were forthcoming, a total which Hervey cynically claimed 'exceeded expectations'. In the event, some eighty
Menorcans (masons, miners, labourers, millers and bakers) supported the garrison in St. Philip's during the siege of the fort, but the French must subsequently have accepted that their participation had been coerced and non-combative, since none suffered for their co-operation after Blakeney surrendered to the French in June 1756.102

The final test of the Menorcans' political allegiance to Britain came in the late 1770s, when it became increasingly apparent that Spain intended to take advantage of Britain's preoccupation with the War of American Independence to attempt to recover her former Mediterranean possessions of Menorca and Gibraltar. In 1776, the Governor of Menorca, Lt-General the Hon James Murray, approached the noblemen of the island with a proposal to form a 'Corps of Militia' or Defence Corps, to be called into service in the event of an attack upon Menorca.103 The proposal was welcomed in London104, the more so since it was suggested that the cost would be covered from the patrimony of the island and at no cost to London,105 and, after some modification, the proposals were considered by the 'Cavaliers' (noblemen) of Menorca. The suggestion envisaged a militia of battalion strength, with five hundred Menorcan rank-and-file commanded by officers drawn from 'Gentlemen of the first and second rank' in the island.106 All were to be clothed, quartered and paid on the same basis as British soldiers, together with an entitlement to the benefits of Chelsea Hospital for those maimed in combat. The militia was to serve only in Menorca, and was to be allowed its own Catholic Chaplain and chapel in St. Philip's. The proposals were not rejected out of hand, but serious objections were raised in some areas.107 Murray
proposed to pay the militia only for an annual period of six weeks training and when they were called into service. The Menorcans wanted a retainer incentive amounting to one third of full annual pay; a disablement pension was thought to be more appropriate than Chelsea Hospital for the maimed; they were unhappy about being subject to British Articles of War which would expose them to the possibility of corporal punishment, a sentence explicitly forbidden by one of their fueros; they felt that no Catholic Chaplain would be willing to serve in the fort in the event of a siege and there was great concern about the fate of the militiamen if the island should be lost to a foreign power. Although further discussions took place, and some enlistments occurred, no solution or compromise to these concerns satisfactory to both sides was found, and the militia was never officially constituted.

Concurrently with his efforts to raise a militia, Murray also attempted to recruit a body of Menorcan artisans and labourers to be called upon to serve in St. Philip's in a siege. He proposed a labour force of five hundred (60 masons, 120 carpenters, 50 smiths, 20 miners and 250 labourers), should be constituted in gangs of twenty working under twenty-five Menorcan supervisors. Unlike the militiamen, they were not to be subject to the Articles of War but, like them, were to serve only in Menorca and be entitled, if maimed, to the benefits of Chelsea Hospital. The reward for those who emerged unscathed was to be a guarantee of work on a permanent basis in the garrison. Even though the financial incentive was attractive (a bounty of £2 on entering the fort and 9d. for every day spent in St. Philip's), Menorcans
responded with even less enthusiasm to this initiative and, in Article 8 of the capitulation signed by Murray in 1782, he felt obliged to claim immunity for only four Menorcans who had rallied to the British garrison. A Spanish source names a further eleven Menorcans, mostly corsair captains, who had their goods and property confiscated by the Spanish because of their active support for the British.

Nevertheless, some Menorcans are known to have enlisted and served with the British armed forces. Two, at least, served in the navy: Pedro Castillo from 1733 until at least 1742, and another, unnamed, was serving (unpressed) afloat at the end of the century. Three young noblemen enlisted for service with the Menorcan militia, Rafael Carreras and the brothers Antonio and José Pasqueda Olives. When the militia project came to nothing, Carreras served for two years on attachment to the 51st regiment in the garrison, but the Pasqueda brothers applied for, and were granted, commissions in the 60th (Royal American) regiment. The most distinguished Menorcan volunteer to the British army dates from the final period of British rule in the island. Lorenzo Arguimbau Mercadal, the son of Narcís Arguimbau Panedas, was commissioned into the 1st regiment of Foot in 1801, and ended his career as a Major General and Colonel of the 80th regiment before he died in 1854. Lorenzo Arguimbau's brothers, Juan-Narcís and José, also served briefly in the British army, but not with any distinction.

From a British standpoint, the Menorcans were found wanting when their political allegiance as British subjects came to be tested, and their attitude would appear to
reinforce the view expressed by one British Governor in Menorca that 'The Inhabitants of this Island are generally disaffected to the English'. Among the British authorities in Menorca, Anstruther was not alone in his view, but it begged the question of what might have been if, in Menorcan eyes, Britain had been seen to implement her Utrecht undertakings, not only in the most sensitive area of ecclesiastical government, but also in the sphere of civil government. In 1713, Neal had sensed the Menorcans' resentment of being treated not as British subjects but as a conquered people. In a letter to a friend, he was more explicit: 'As to the people in general they are well inclined to the Queen, and are willing to submit to any Laws she shall think proper for them to live by, except a Military Power.' For all Neal's optimism it is unlikely that Britain, given her history of colonial government in the 18th century, could have introduced reforms which would have won over the Menorcan aristocracy or clergy. As it was, on the two occasions when Britain most needed Menorcan support, in 1756 and 1781, the principal families gave no lead and, for the clergy, no amount of material benefit under British rule could offset the spiritual advantages of the government reverting to a Catholic power.

Contacts with the garrison.

A first examination of the few contemporary sources available suggest that, with both language and religion as barriers, there was little regular social contact between Menorcans and the garrison. Lindemann's observation that the
Menorcans 'do not have any parties, assemblies or coffee-visits,' is supported by the absence of any mention of such occasions in the incidental references to the islanders and their customs contained in the correspondence, journals and papers of some officers who served in the Menorca garrison. Of these, Captains Bond, Whitefoord and Congreve, Major Callander and Ensign Moore made no reference to any social intercourse with the Menorcans. Congreve lamented the fact that his association with the opposite sex was limited to 'a few officers' wives and daughters', and Whitefoord's social activity was constrained to being 'an Assembly man and playing at Quadrille with the ladies[of the garrison].' Lieutenant Colborne, writing at the end of the century, was unequivocal, '[Menorcan] Female society we have none'. Consequently he wrote to his sister, 'I have no chance of marrying here'. Lt-Colonel Pringle is the exception. He wrote of his Menorcan friends, Mr. Olivar, and the Soler family of Mahón and, on his departure from Menorca in April 1782, he made a present of the 'remains of my Chateau and my ground at Georgetown' to [Juan] Soler. What is more, Pringle created an 'Apollo' (Pleasure garden) near the barracks in Mahón, which he allowed the inhabitants to frequent and enjoy. Although James Lind, the most celebrated of British naval physicians in the eighteenth century, writing in the late 1740s, criticised the British in Menorca for their unwillingness to socialise with the inhabitants, Armstrong had earlier illustrated that individual social contacts were not taboo 'Cavaliers seldom make Entertainments and are no great Visitors' yet, in Carnival time, 'it is common with us to join in their
Diversions, and we are treated with the utmost Courtesy and Distinction'. The British guests were 'seated in the Upper Part of the room', given refreshments, and 'the Woman of the House takes us out to dance'.

We also know from the gatherings of the 'Societat de Cultura de Mahó' of a meeting of minds between some of the garrison officers and the leading Menorcan intellectuals, and Cleghorn spoke of his admiration of the expertise of his medical friends Dr. Font of Ciudadela and Dr. Seguí of Mahón, with whom he had discussions and consultations about island diseases and their treatment. Moreover it is equally clear that Cleghorn did not confine his medical practice to his regiment or even the garrison soldiers, since he also treated Menorcan civilians.

Lindemann suggests that when Menorcans 'gave a luncheon' for the officers of the garrison, 'the ladies are kept prudently away', but there were obviously occasions when officers were able to meet Menorcan women, if only to judge by Anglo-Menorcan marriages which took place. These were few in number, and certainly not representative of the total, since Anglo-Catholic marriages were not sanctioned in Catholic churches and therefore no records are to be found in the diocesan registers. Moreover, regimental chaplains' records and the registers of the church of San José in Mahón, used for Anglican worship during the British periods of government, have not survived. Consequently, we know of only eight Anglo-Menorcan marriages, four of which caused a scandal. One because it was found to be bigamous, and another three because the brides were professing nuns. However, the marriages of Rafaela Delgado Valls to Thomas
Morgan in 1776,141 and, after his death, to Captain William Boothby in 1781,142 and the marriages of Margarita Saura Carreras to Major Simon Fraser in 1800,143 and of Eulalia Briones Creus to Alexander Dickson Collingwood, an English naval officer in 1802,144 gave rise to no recorded protestations.

Bearing in mind that Menorca had a British garrison for seventy years and that, in the first and longest period of British rule, four regiments were stationed on the island without relief for more than twenty years,145 it is inconceivable that there were not more liaisons, licit and illicit, between officers and men of the garrison and the civilian population. While the total number of these relationships must now remain a matter of conjecture, a study by Vicent Ortells and Xavier Camps of eighteenth-century Menorcan parish baptismal records suggests that they were not as many as might have been suspected.146 In cases where the mother was Catholic, registered the father as British, and had her children baptised in her faith, the records for the period 1708-1756 show that such marriages/liaisons produced only 14 children in Mahón (0.1% of the total births), 42 in Ciutadela (0.4%), 8 in Alayor (0.1%) and 34 children in St. Philip's (0.5%). The disproportionately high number of registered births in Ciutadela, given the concentration of the garrison in Mahón and St. Philip's, should be understood as more indicative of the strength, rather than a weakness, of Catholicism in its stronghold in the island. However, it must be a reasonable assumption that some children registered under another heading of 'father unknown', were fathered by men of the garrison. In this category, for the same period, a
further 39 births were recorded in Mahón, 11 in Alayor, 60 in St. Philip's and 125 in Ciudadela - but, of the Ciudadela total, Ortells and Campos do not reckon that Anglo-Menorcan unions made a major contribution.147 It is worthy of note that Ortells and Campos also recorded two births issuing from unions between Menorcan men and English women.148 Parish records also exist for the periods of British rule 1763-1782 and 1798-1802, but, while no comparable statistics have been compiled, the drop in numbers of births registered from Anglo-Menorcan unions would suggest that fewer liaisons were formed during those years.

Freemasonry.

The existence of a masonic lodge in Mahón, founded during the French occupation 1756-1763, lodge No.158, 'Amigos de la Humanidad' (Friends of Humanity), and once claimed as the oldest masonic lodge in Spain149 (since disproved),150 and the foundation of no fewer than eight British lodges in Menorca,151 provided a further possibility of social contact between the garrison and the Menorcans, given the close relationships presumed to exist between lodges in Freemasonry. Unfortunately no evidence has survived of the activities of any of the lodges nor, in most cases of the membership. However, an entry in Augustus Hervey's Journal for 1753 suggests that membership of at least one of the four original British lodges was open to civilians as well as officers of the army and navy, and may well have been little more than a convivial dining club.152 A membership list of lodge No.173 for 1781 included British military and civilian personnel, and also officers from the two Hanoverian
regiments in the garrison, but there is nowhere any mention of Menorcan masons.

Menorcan society, for all the material benefits it enjoyed during the periods of British government, was consistently more conscious of the burdens it had to bear because of the garrison imposed upon it and, at best, the Menorcans tolerated rather than welcomed the British presence. There was clearly no established regular social intercourse between the garrison and the islanders, but this did not prevent individual initiatives in this respect. In general, the nobles remained aloof, the clergy distrustful and the mass of the populace indifferent. Only the inhabitants of Mahon, the greatest beneficiaries under British rule, were appreciative, but even here, the superior attitude of the British authorities, their Protestant religion and their open encouragement of Jewish and Greek settlers, mitigated against unqualified acceptance of British rule in the island.

1 The effect of British rule on the human geography and the economy of Menorca is examined in chapter nine.
3 Ibid., p. 312.
4 Ibid., pp. 300, 302.
5 Ibid., pp. 321, 322. The families concerned were: Squella (1610), Martí (1635), Olives (1636), Quart (1638), Sancho (1640) and Mercadal (1660).
6 Martí, Llinatges, nos. 39, 44, passim.
7 Ibid., No. 44, p. 27.
8 Martí, Heráldica, pp. 310, 311, 323.
9 PRO CO 174/15, ff. 169, 171. Kane to Craggs, 4 June and 17 June 1718.
10 Martí, Heráldica, pp. 311, 313.
12 Hernández, Compendio, p. 200.
Ibid.
14 Asesor, Abogado Fiscal and the Bayle General.
15 Ramis, Noticias no.5, pp.46-49.
16 AM U 384, Padrones vecinales, Cabezas de familia, 1763.
17 AGS/GM, leg.3767. Estado general de Menorca, 18 July 1782.
18 AGS (Libros) 5278, no. XXVIII. Censo de Florida blanca, 1787.
19 J.L. Terrón Ponce, Origen, Desarrollo y Consolidación de la Propiedad inmueble en la Isla de Menorca, 1287-1837 [hereafter Terrón, Propiedad] (Mahón, 1990), pp.100-164, examines in detail the accumulation of properties by leading Menorcan families in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
20 AM/RG 142 - 2(4), f.6. Juan Seguí y Sancho, 'Memoire sur l'Etat actuel .... de Minorque'[Hereafter Mémoire], 1764.
21 Terrón, Propiedad, p.216.
23 £(M) was the equivalent of 3 shillings. For a full list of sterling currency equivalents v. Appendix A.
25 Terrón, Propiedad, pp.126,162.
26 AM Protocols notorials, particularly libros 70, 89, 581 and 583.
27 AM/RG 142 - 2(2). Seguí, Mémoire.
28 P. Langford. A Polite and Commercial People. England 1727-1783 (Oxford, 1989), p.64, reproduces Massie's social classifications of English society in the 18th century, based on income. This survey would have placed the Menorcans to whom Seguí referred among the 12,000 richest families in England.
29 Suffolk Record Office, (Bury St. Edmunds). Hervey Papers, 941/50/3, Hervey's Journal, ff.237-240. 'Acc't of what the Principal Inhabitants of Minorca were esteem'd worth in 1756, when called upon to lend some Money to Government for the Defence of the Island', 14 March 1756.
31 Ibid., p.232.
32 PRO CO 174/1, ff.312,313. Memorial of Nicholas Alexiano to Lord North, undated, but c.1782/3.
33 Hernández, La colonia griega, p.235.
34 PRO CO 174/1, f.312, Alexiano memorial.
36 PRO WO 72/10, Appendix Mem. Richard Johnston to John Raleigh(secretary to the Governor of Gibraltar), 3 December 1778.
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50 V.L.Jordi,-E.Taltavull,-J.J.Gomila, Arquitectura de Menorça (Madrid,1980), p.135 fig.156, Casa Vidal; p.139 fig. 165, Casa Soler.
53 Alnwick Ms.640. Crofton,Record, p.2.
54 PRO WO 53/496. Ordnance Bill Book 1750.
55 PRO ADM 42/2346. Wages for Mahon Dockyard 1742-1747.
56 Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Rawlinson Ms. A 174, pp.372,384. Gibson to Pepys, 17 August 1671 and 26 January 1672.
58 Cleghorn, Observations, pp.59-73.
60 Lindemann, Minorka, pp.62-73 and 123.
61 J.de Vargas Ponce, Descripciones de las Islas Pithiusas y Baleares, (Madrid,1787), pp.114-158 and Appendix.
64 Lindemann, Minorca, p.63.
66 Cleghorn, Observations, p.59.
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68 Cunninghame, Journal.
69 Ibid.
70 R.Piñá Homs, La Reincorporación de Menorca a la Corona española (Palma,1983) [hereafter Piñá, La Reincorporación], p.126.
72 Lindemann, Minorca, p.64.
73 Piñá, La Reincorporación, p.126. The teacher in Mahón was paid £(M)36 p.a.
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75 AA Inventario no.1V. 'Respuestas de los Jurados a las preguntas de la Junta de Gobernación de Menorca', Section 18, p.237, 12 September 1782.
76 Ibid.
77 Lindemann, Minorca, p.67.
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115
81 Lindemann, Minorka, pp.68,69.
82 M.D. Asian Román, La influencia francesa en la isla de Menorca (siglos XVIII & XIX) (Barcelona, 1983), p.86.
83 Ibid., pp.77-93.
84 J. Ramis y Ramis, Varías piezas relativas a la Topografía e Historia de Menorca, cited by J. Cotrina in 'Datos sobre la instrucción publica en Menorca, siglo XVIII', RM (Mahón, 1929) p.166.
85 Piña, Las Instituciones, p.124. Memorial to the Spanish government by Francisco Seguí Sintes, 12 July 1782.
86 Lindemann, Minorka, p.69.
87 R. Floris, Letter to his parents, Ciudadela, 29 September 1830. Cited by permission of Mr. J. Boddenham, a descendant.
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89 Armstrong, History, p.46.
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91 Anon. Giuseppe Chiesa y el seu temps (Mahón, 1985), passim.
92 Hernández, Compendio, p.431.
93 J. Roca Vinent, 'Diari de Mahó' in RM (1896), p.15.
95 Piña, Las instituciones, p.21.
96 AM/U (PR) 47, f.43. Jurats of Menorca to Forbes, 12 July 1717.
97 AM/U (PR) 54, f.50. O'Farrell to Jurats, 8 November 1741.
98 Ibid., ff.51,52. Jurats to O'Farrell, 10 November 1741.
100 Suffolk Record Office, (Bury St. Edmunds), Hervey Papers, Hervey's Journal, f.236.
101 Ibid., f.237.
102 NAM 6807 - 227/B. Supplement to the Siege of St. Philip's Castle, Menorca, 1756, p.90.
103 PRO CO 174/17, f.66. Murray to Weymouth, 15 January 1777.
104 PRO CO 174/11, ff.95,96. Lt-Gen. Skinner to Lord Amherst and reply, 3 July 1778.
105 PRO CO 174/17, f.166, undated.
107 Ibid., ff.166-170.
108 PRO WO 1/299, ff.687-689. Retrospective petition of Don Rafael Carreras re service in the Menorcan militia, 31 May 1801.
109 Ibid.
110 PRO CO 174/11, ff.61-64, Murray to Weymouth, 26 April 1778.
111 PRO WO 72/10, Appendix Xx. Murray's proclamation, 3 August 1779.
112 AGS/GM, leg.3765. Articles of Capitulation, 4 March 1782.
113 AGS/GM, leg.3760.
114 PRO ADM 1/1478. Boscawen to Secretary of the Admiralty, 8 March 1742, refers.
116 PRO WO 1/299, ff.687-689, Carreras' Memorial refers to his attachment to the 51st Foot from 1778 until 1780.
117 NAM. Army Lists. José Pasqueda died, still on the active list, c.1790, but Antonio Pasqueda served in the 60th Foot, in an Invalid Company, and as Fort Major of Sheerness (1787-
1811), before being allowed to retire on the full-pay of a Lieutenant in 1818 at the age of seventy-five.

118 Ibid. Narcís Arguimbau Panedas was appointed Captain of the Port of Mahón by the British in 1802, and continued to receive a salary (equivalent to the half-pay of an Ensign from 1807) for this post until his death in 1829.

119 Ibid. In the course of his career, Lorenzo Arguimbau was awarded the Waterloo Medal, was appointed Commander of the Order of the Bath in 1715, and was given a 'Reward for Distinguished Service' in 1849.

120 Martí, Llinatges vol.1, p.21.

121 PRO WO 1/294. Anstruther to Newcastle, 4 March 1740.

122 BL Add Mss 17775, Neal's report, p.38.

123 BL Add Mss 32556, f.89. Neal to Dr Cox Macro, 22 June 1713.

124 Lindemann, Minorka, p.71.

125 Gloucestershire Record Office, D 2026 X35 - X44. Correspondence and Papers of Edmund Bond, Captain in 9th Foot, (served in Menorca 1735-1746).


Staffordshire Record Office D 1057/M/1/3/2 [hereafter Congreve, Letters]. Letters of William Congreve, Captain in the 22nd Foot, who served in Menorca 1738-1742.

J.Campbell, The Memoirs of Sir James Campbell of Ardkinglass (London,1832) [hereafter Campbell, Memoirs]. Major James Callander who served with the 67th Foot in Menorca 1767-1771, assumed the name Campbell on coming into his Ardkinglass inheritance.

NAC, MG 18, 118. Letter Book and Record of Regimental Orders of Henry Pringle [hereafter Pringle, Papers]. Pringle was Lt-Colonel commanding the 51st Foot in Menorca 1771-1782.


126 Congreve, Letters, William to Richard Congreve (brother), 8 October 1738.


129 Pringle, Papers, p.228. 26 March 1782.

130 Ibid., p.232, 28 March 1782.

131 Ibid.


133 Armstrong, History, p.201.

134 Ibid., p.253.

135 Cleghorn, Observations, p.286.

136 Ibid., p.302.

137 Ibid., p.304.

138 Lindemann, Minorka, p.71.

139 BL Egerton Ms 2174, ff.158,159. The bigamous marriage of Captain Henry Cope (27th Foot) to Eulalia Morell was one of the Heads of Complaint made against Kane's command in Menorca by Alberoni in 1717.
The outrage caused by the actions of three officers in the 22nd Foot in abducting and marrying the three nuns is chronicled in the following Chapter.

The marriage took place on 28 July 1776.

Marriage took place on 14 May 1781. (Information supplied to Glamorgan Record Office by Fernando Martí, 25 May 1985).

Boothby subsequently succeeded as Sir William, 8th Baronet.

Marriage took place on 3 May 1800, and Fraser and his wife subsequently lived both in Menorca and in England. Their eldest daughter Elisabeth married Marc Carreras Vigo in 1822 and settled in Ciudadela.

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Chapter Four.

Civil Government.

The seventeenth and early eighteenth-century expansion of the British Empire, principally in North America and the West Indies, was achieved by settlement rather than by conquest. The colonists brought British laws and institutions to the territories they settled, and claimed the same fundamental civil rights enjoyed by their countrymen in the homeland. In the civil government of these colonies, the Governor, nominated councils and elected assemblies of colonists mirrored the King, Lords and Commons in Britain, but the British government looked upon colonial government institutions as local bodies levying local taxes, legislating by bye-laws and, in every respect, ultimately subservient to the Crown and the legislative powers of parliament. The circumstances and terms under which Britain acquired Menorca dictated that it could not be governed in like manner.

Although Menorca had been acquired de facto by conquest in 1708, the island was ceded de jure to Britain five years later by the Treaty of Utrecht in which the British crown gave an undertaking not only to allow the Menorcans the freedom to worship in the Catholic faith, but also to allow the inhabitants to 'enjoy safely their rights and privileges.' The vague nature of the undertaking, left deliberately imprecise by the British negotiators, was not
clarified in the subsequent peace treaty signed between Spain and Britain three months later. In this, notwithstanding Britain's earlier undertaking (which was reiterated in this separate treaty), Philip V ceded Menorca to the crown of Great Britain together with 'all rights and full dominion over the said island'. Inevitably the ambivalent wording gave rise to differing interpretations of Britain's obligations to the Menorcans. The considerable difficulties encountered in the sphere of ecclesiastical government by a Protestant power governing a Catholic people are examined in the following chapter, but British reluctance clearly to define the parameters of authority of the Governor in Menorca in civil, as distinct from military, matters made the civil government of the island under the British a no less constant source of friction.

The acquisition of Menorca in 1713 presented Britain with an unprecedented situation. The island was a European and not a New World territory; unlike Gibraltar, where a mass exodus of the Spanish population after the British took the Rock reduced the civilian population to little more than thirty families, all but a few Menorcans remained on the island; Menorca had a well-developed, superficially representative form of local government and a tried legal system, and the Menorcans enjoyed some long-established fueros. There were also differences in language and social customs, but these, in themselves, were to pose few problems. It could be argued that Britain's reluctance to redefine and clarify the areas of responsibility in the civil government of Menorca was induced by a wish to abide by the spirit, as well as the
letter, of her Utrecht undertaking, but such an argument would be superficial and would discount more influential factors.

Initially, hopes had been entertained in Britain that Menorca would become an entrepot of Mediterranean trade. These hopes were boosted by the early decision of the Oxford ministry to grant Mahón free port status in 1712, but subsequent ministries did little to further this aim, or to protect merchants in Menorca from unfair competition from France, and the fact that all the British Governors of Menorca were army officers (Fig. 4.1), supports the view that the British government looked upon the island primarily as a military outpost and naval base, and not as a commercially attractive or rewarding possession. Secondly, unlike the British New World territories, Menorca never attracted British immigrants. Some British merchants resided on the island to carry out their business, but none bought land or settled in the conventional sense. Consequently there was no pressure upon the British government to introduce reforms to the island's institutions to cater for such an eventuality. Finally, the Menorcans themselves posed no threat to the British government on the island. The islanders tolerated British rule, although the Jurats were zealous in their protests in Menorca (and in London through their Syndichs) against the affronts, the injustices, the unwarranted interference in their affairs and the acts of despotism which they persistently claimed to have suffered at the hands of the Governors in Menorca. Some of the allegations were petty, others were serious and justified, but the Jurats' protests tended to be critical of individual actions of particular Governors, rather than a criticism of Britain's failure to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>Interim C-in-C</th>
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<tr>
<td>1716</td>
<td>5 July</td>
<td>Lt-Gen George Carpenter, Baron Carpenter</td>
<td>July. Col. Charles O'Way.</td>
</tr>
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2 PRO SP 44/173, p. 253.
3 PRO WO 25/12, p. 4.
6 PRO CO 389/55, p. 81.
7 PRO CO 389/55, p. 82.
8 PRO CO 389/55, p. 82.
9 PRO WO 25/20, p. 158.
11 PRO WO 25/30, p. 23.
13 PRO WO 25/31, p. 22.
14 PRO WO 25/31, p. 22.
15 PRO WO 25/31, p. 22.
17 PRO WO 25/34, p. 189.
18 PRO WO 25/34, p. 189.
make known its interpretation of the extent of the Governor's authority in civil matters, not only to the Jurats, but also to the military commanders appointed to govern in Menorca, to whom no guidance was given in their royal commissions as Governor other than to expect obedience from 'all our Ministers, Officers and loving Subjects'. The Menorcan Jurats, however, considered that Britain's pledge in the Treaty of Utrecht gave the Governor no more authority to interfere in the island's local government and administration of justice than had been the case before the island became British, and that his role was part of the following pre-1713 pattern of civil government and administration of justice in Menorca which Britain had undertaken to respect.

The role of the Governor.

Under Spanish rule, the Governor had military, civil and judicial responsibilities. Invariably a military man, and never a Menorcan, he was responsible for the security of the island, its defences and the conduct of the garrison. In the civil and judicial spheres, his role was largely supervisory. In civil matters he was required to hold a watching brief over weights and measures and the supply and prices charged for foodstuffs. He presided over (but could not influence) the annual selection of the Jurats in Menorca, and, although he was informed of the decisions of the universitat general, he had no authority to summon, nor to be present at a meeting of that body, and he had no control over local government finances. In judicial matters he was required to rubber stamp the decisions reached by Menorca's two principal judges, but
he had a casting vote in the verdict if the judges disagreed. The Governor had a salary of £(M)600 (£90), plus expenses of £(M)300 (£45), paid out of the royal patrimony of the island. (It is not surprising to learn that Spanish Governors were frustrated to have their authority so circumscribed, and that their interventions in the seventeenth-century politics of Menorca were probably as frequent, and certainly as much resented by the Jurats, as the actions of the British Governors in the eighteenth century).

Local government.

Menorca was divided into four administrative districts - the términos of Ciudadela, Mahón, Alayor and Mercadal (including the district of Ferrerías). Each was governed by its own Universitat, a council composed of Jurats and Consellers who served in office for a year, and were representative of the four estates in the island. The Universitat of Ciudadela was composed of four Jurats (one representative from each of the estates), and twelve Consellers (two from the nobility, four each from the major and middle and two from the minor estates); the Universitats of Mahón and Alayor consisted of three Jurats (one representative from the major, middle and minor estates) and twelve Consellers, (four representatives from each of the three lesser estates), and the Universitat of Mercadal had two Jurats (middle estate) and twelve Consellers (minor estate). In each instance, the Jurats formed the executive of the Universitat.
There was also a Universitat General (council for the whole island of Menorca), which was made up of the entire Universitat of Ciudadela, plus five delegates from the Universitat of Mahón and three delegates each from Alayor and from Mercadal.

To be eligible to serve on any of the Universitats, candidates had to be natives of Menorca, male, Catholic, married or a widower, a houseowner and to be at least twenty-five years of age. Candidates were not eligible if their father, son or brother was to hold office in the same council in the same year. Also disqualified were those who were considered too old or infirm, those serving in the armed forces, criminals and council debtors or those involved in civil litigation with their Universitat.

The selection of the Jurats and Consellers which took place annually in the week preceding Whitsunday, was by insaculación (ballot), a haphazard method which operated in Menorca with no variation for four centuries until 1814. The names of those considered eligible to serve as representatives of their estate were submitted to the Governor, as the King's representative, some six months before the date of the ballot. The Governor had the power, at this stage, to make additions or deletions, and the names, when finalised, were written on slips of paper and sealed in boxes. On the appointed day, the boxes were opened in the presence of the Governor and the candidates, and a boy of not more than seven years of age drew out the names for the posts which were to be filled.

The function of the Universitat General, founded in 1301, was to oversee the well-being of the island as a whole, and
to consider matters of government and economy on an island as opposed to a district level. To this end it met annually in October to decide upon 'afforations'—the assizes or prices at which wheat, oats, cheese and wool were to be sold in the ensuing year. It had no tax-raising capacity in itself, but it was responsible for allocating money or labour raised by the districts to improve the defences. It was also the body which convened whenever necessary to consider governmental malpractices in the island, and it represented the islanders' grievances to the Governor. However, the preponderance of Ciudadelan members in this body led to that término being favoured, often at the expense of the other terminos, and certainly to their increasing dissatisfaction, in the seventeenth century.

The Universitat in each término, (Ciudadela established in 1301, Mahón in 1398, Alayor and Mercadal both in 1439), effectively regulated the internal economic government, for they calculated the level of tax necessary to balance the Universitat's annual budget. They made their own afforations to fix the prices for wine, meat, fish and vegetables in their término, and were responsible for ensuring that local markets were supplied with provisions and at fair prices. This was the responsibility of the 'almotacén' or 'mustasaf', the annually elected superintendant of markets and of weights and measures. Each Universitat allocated specific areas of responsibility to its members (council finance, tax assessment, auditing of accounts, public health and quarantine), others assumed responsibility for the hospital, the guilds, alms-collection, care of the mentally-handicapped and the foundlings, and there were, in addition, a number of
salaried posts from secretary/archivist to town-crier. Each University had the right to bypass the Universitat General to represent local grievances to the Governor.

Taxation.

No taxes were levied on an island basis, and the district Universitats sought to balance their annual expenditure - the salaries of council officials, municipal expenditure on hospitals, foundlings, the destitute, and on entertainment expenses incurred on major local festivities - by income derived from the talla and the nitxol. The nitxol was a flat-rate tax levied on each household, but it raised an insignificant sum, since it was levied at only an annual rate of 1s.2d in 1713, and was still described as 'muy modica' (very moderate) in 1781. The talla (land tax) was paid only by property owners, and was based on a catastro, a quinquennial assessment of the rental value of land in both money and crops, on which a percentage was levied calculated at a level to balance the books. The five-yearly review and the inaccuracy of the landowners' returns made an inequitable tax quite unsatisfactory and so ineffective that, by the end of the seventeenth century, a sizeable amount of the annual expenditure of each universitat was taken up by payment of interest on loans taken out to balance the books in earlier years.

The Administration of Justice.
Before Menorca was ceded to Britain there were ten courts which dispensed justice on the island. Two were ecclesiastical tribunals based on canon law and will be examined in chapter five, but in the remainder justice was based on Roman law and the common law of Aragon. This meant that there was no trial by jury, torture was employed when evidence was lacking in capital offences, and accused, accusers and witnesses never faced each other in court (all judgements were made on the basis of written statements). However, particular attention was paid to the fueros enjoyed by the Menorcans, and where these were at variance with Roman or Aragonese law, the fueros took precedence. The fueros were royal privileges or concessions granted to the Menorcans over the years since the island's conquest from the Moors. There were many fueros, mostly protecting human rights and, of these, the right of the Universitats to send Syndichs (Agents/Representatives) to represent their grievances to the King with or without the approval of the Governor (granted in 1392), Jurats' exemption from prosecution during their year of office (1390), prohibition of any sentence of corporal punishment (1403) and the fuero forbidding trespass (1356) were to be contentious issues under British rule. But the bed-rock of the Menorcans rights was the first fuero granted in 1287, which stated that 'No order to be admissible or obeyed in Menorca which flouts any of the fueros of the island'.

Figure 4.2. Principal Law Officers.

Asesor. The Governor's principal legal adviser, senior judge and qualified in both civil and canon law. In civil cases, his verdict was binding but, in criminal cases, the Abogado Fiscal had an equal say in the verdict. A crown appointment.
Abogado Fiscal. (Advocate Fiscal). Qualified in civil and canon law, he represented the interests of the crown, and also acted as a judge in criminal proceedings. A crown appointment.

Procurador Fiscal. ([Scottish] Procurator Fiscal). A qualified civil lawyer, he was responsible for the investigation of charges, and for pressing prosecution. He had to be present to see the sentences of the criminal court were carried out, and that all payments owed to the crown were made. A Governor's appointment.

Bayle General. ([Scottish] Baillie of Menorca). The senior lay magistrate, elected annually from the ranks of the brac militar who took precedence as the first citizen of Menorca (after the Governor), during his year in office. He was advised in his judgements by an Asesor (a qualified civil lawyer elected biannually).

All the above officials were native Menorcans and were paid a salary from the royal patrimony of Menorca; Asesor (£74.15s.), Abogado Fiscal (£47.5s.), Procurador Fiscal (£5), the Bayle General and his Asesor (£5.12s.) each.

Fig. 4.3. Appointments of Asesor and Abogado Fiscal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asesor (Criminal)</th>
<th>Asesor (Civil)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1715. 22 Sep. Francisco Sanxo.</td>
<td>1712. Rafael Alberti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1734. 4 June. Juan Font y Llabias.</td>
<td>1723. Lorenzo Beltrán y Costabella.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Dec. Francisco Seguí Sintes.</td>
<td>1771. 6 May. Francisco Seguí Sintes.</td>
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Courts of Justice (Fig. 4.4).

Tribunal de Real Gobernación. (Court of Royal Government).

This was the principal court of justice in Menorca. In civil cases, it acted as a court of appeal against judgements in lower civil courts (those of the Bayle General and the district Bayles) and it heard, in the first instance, all inter-Universitat disputes, and disputes between officials of the Universitats. In criminal matters, it heard all cases in the first instance. It was also the court for coroners' inquests.

The President of the court in both civil and criminal cases was the Governor, but he had limited power. In civil cases he was obliged to endorse the verdict of the Asesor, and, in criminal cases, he had no say in the judgement unless the Asesor and the Abogado Fiscal disagreed, in which eventuality he had the casting vote.

In civil cases, if judgements led to fines in excess of £160, further appeal could be made to the Tribunal de Real Audiencia (Appeal court) in Mallorca, but for judgements involving sums of less than that amount, its verdict was final. In most criminal cases the judgement of the court was final, but appeal could be made to Mallorca if the sentence involved a fine in excess of £80, or decreed the death penalty, mutilation of limbs or a sentence to the galleys.
(1) Civil cases involving less than £(M)5.
(2) All maritime and external trade disputes.
(3) Civil cases involving more than £(M)5.
(4) All cases involving crown revenue, tithes and all property disputes.
(5) Inter-universitatis disputes; Coroner inquests; appeals from inferior Bayle courts.
(6) All criminal cases.
(7) Appeal Tribunal for courts of the Bales Consules.
(8) Appeal Tribunal for Court of Patrimony.

Court of Royal Government (Civil) for judgments involving more than £(M)1072.

Court of Royal Government (Criminal) for sentences of death, mutilation or a galley sentence.
Tribunal del Real Patrimonio. (Royal Patrimony/Crown Revenue).

This court was independent of the Tribunal de Real Gobernación, and held exclusive jurisdiction in all matters relating to the finances of the crown - taxes, ground rents, tithes, transfer of property and entails.

The President of the court was the Procurador Real (Receiver General), appointed by the Receiver General of Mallorça and he was paid a salary of £21. Like the Governor in the Tribunal de Real Gobernación, he had no say in the verdicts unless there was a disagreement between the Asesor and the Abogado Fiscal who also officiated in this court.

In judgements involving less than £160, the decision of the court was binding, but after judgements involving sums greater than this amount, an appeal could be made to Mallorça.

Tribunales de los Bayles Consules. (Admiralty courts in Ciudadela and Mahón).

These courts heard all disputes concerning the sea and maritime trade which were judged according to the maritime laws of Aragon.

The Presidents were the Bayles of Ciudadela and Mahón, assisted by two honorary lay councillors. The Presidents were in receipt of salaries of £3.15s. and 15s. respectively from the royal patrimony for this office (in addition to their salary from their Universitat in their capacity of district Bayles).
Appeal against judgements was possible to the Consulat de Mar (Marine Consulate) of Aragon, in Barcelona.

Tribunal del Bayle General. (Chief Magistrate's court).

This court normally sat in Ciudadela, but it could sit elsewhere on the island and take precedence over the local Bayle's court in other términos.

It heard all civil cases when the monies involved exceeded £(M)5, all cases involving minors and others who, because of infirmity, could not manage their affairs, and it had the power to appoint guardians and grant powers of attorney where necessary.

The Bayle General was elected annually from nominees from the nobility. He was required to attend all the hearings in his court, but was obliged to accept the verdict of his Asesor.

The Asesor to the Bayle General was a qualified civil lawyer elected biannually from the ranks of the braç major. Both Bayle and Asesor enjoyed a salary of £5.15s. each, paid from the revenue of the royal patrimony.

Tribunales de los Bayles. (District Magistrates courts).

There was a magistrate's court in each of the island términos, and it dealt with civil cases in which the monies involved did not exceed £(M)5 (15s.). However, if both parties were in agreement, the court was allowed to hear cases involving greater sums.
Bayles were stipendiary lay magistrates and were elected annually from nominees from the major estate. They had to be literate (except in the término of Mercadal), married and be more than twenty-eight years old. Their salaries were paid by their respective Universitats as follows: Ciudadela, Alayor and Mercadal, £2.5s., and Mahón £7.10s.

The Bayles presided in court with the assistance of two 'prohombres' (upright citizens), non-stipendiary lay colleagues who were selected from a panel of eight and sat in court on a rota of two per week. The prohombres pronounced judgement, the Bayle having only a casting vote in the event of a disagreement between the prohombres.

Appeals against judgements were allowed to the Tribunal de Real Gobernación.

Such were the institutions and practices of the civil government of Menorca when Britain assumed the sovereignty of the island in 1713. Some changes thereafter were inevitable. For example, it was inconceivable that appeals from the island's courts should continue to be heard in Mallorca, and neither the competence of the Bayles Consules nor the maritime laws of Aragon were equal to the volume and complexity of actions arising from the increase in merchant and naval activity - a matter brought to a head by the capture of Spanish prizes in the war against Spain (1718-1720). Consequently, the high court of appeal for the Menorcans came to be the Privy Council, and a vice-admiralty court was established in Mahón by Kane in 1720, in which the judgements were made according to British maritime law,
although the Judge Commissary appointed to preside was a Menorcan lawyer.\textsuperscript{14}

There were, of course, other anomalies between the laws and constitution of Great Britain and the 'Privileges, Immunities, municipal Laws and the ancient, established, unalterable Custom and Practice of the Island',\textsuperscript{15} which needed to be resolved. The Menorcans were apprehensive of any change, and campaigned to preserve the pre-1713 status quo, but Westminster was urged by successive Governors, and by other interested Britons, to resolve the situation and 'frame some new model of Government... whereby the Governor may know how to act'.\textsuperscript{16} Unfortunately, on too many occasions when the Privy Council appeared to be about to address the problem of the government of Menorca, it was at a time when the British government became preoccupied with other matters and 'the affairs of Great Britain did not permit that work to go forward.'\textsuperscript{17}

Proposed reforms (1713-1752).

In his survey of Menorca in 1713 Henry Neal reported the British military government was treating the Menorcans not as 'Subjects of our Lady the Queen, but as a Conquered People',\textsuperscript{18} as a result, he confided to a friend, matters would improve only 'once a Civil Magistracy is settled'.\textsuperscript{19} It appeared that the ministry in London, in the light of Neal's report presented in April 1714,\textsuperscript{20} was also keen to resolve the situation, and Bolingbroke, the Secretary of State, wrote to Neal,\textsuperscript{21} Kane\textsuperscript{22}, Brigadier Durand\textsuperscript{23} and Admiral Sir James Wishart\textsuperscript{24} in the same month to say that it was intended to
'settle the Military, Civil and Ecclesiastical Government of Minorca this summer,' and seeking their expert advice in their respective spheres of responsibility. In a further letter to Kane, Bolingbroke conveyed the Queen's command that two representatives 'of the best skill and knowledge in the Laws and Customs of the Country' be sent to London from the island to be lodged in London at the crown's expense to be 'upon the spot' for consultation. But it was not to be. The Syndichs chosen by the Universitat General, and approved by Kane, Dr. Manuel Mercader (Paborde and Vicar-General), and Dr. Francisco Sanxo (a leading lawyer soon to be appointed Asesor), did not reach London until August 1714, shortly after the death of Queen Anne, at a time when the resolution of Menorca's problems by the home government (for all that it was now a Whig ministry with Stanhope as Secretary of State), paled before the problems associated with the Hanoverian succession and the Jacobite rebellion of 1715, and was consequently not then considered.

Without the benefit of political guidelines, Kane resorted to a pragmatic approach to government in Menorca, but this led to protests about his autocratic rule, and to allegations of a variety of abuses perpetrated by the soldiers of the garrison. The bulk of the twenty-eight articles of complaint, contained in a memorial presented to the Court of St. James by the Spanish Ambassador in April 1717, related to the restrictions Kane had introduced to limit the liber usus of the Catholic religion, and to the lack of discipline in the soldiers under Kane's command, and are examined elsewhere in the relevant chapters of this thesis. But Kane was also accused of infringing the Menorcans' fueros by seizing the
official papers of the Universitat General, and by denying a passport to travel to London to its elected Syndich, Juan de Bayarte Ametller. Kane attempted to justify his actions to George Bubb, British Ambassador to Spain, claiming that the papers were 'a parcel of notorious Falcities', and that Bayarte (the son of the Governor who had blown hot and cold in his dealings with the English in Menorca 1670-1672) was an 'Incinuating Gentleman ...in the Interest of Spain,' who had formerly held a Captain's commission in Philip V's army. Superficially, Kane's actions may appear intrusive and autocratic, but it should be borne in mind that, in 1716, Spain's attitude towards Menorca was seen to be threatening, and that Kane genuinely believed that:

the most minute action here [in Menorca] will reach the court of Madrid, and keep up the spirit in the people that they may still expect to be restored to the Crown [of Spain].

Mercader and Sanxo, Menorca's first Syndichs to the court of St. James, did succeed in gaining an audience with the King in 1715, when they presented a memorial of seventeen articles concerning the government of Menorca. All but one dealt with ecclesiastical matters, but no decisions were reached. Sanxo was allowed to return to Menorca on appointment as the island's Asesor, but Mercader remained in London as Menorca's accredited representative, and was granted a royal pension of £300 per annum.

The election of Bayarte by the Universitat General to supercede Mercader as Menorca's 'Lawful Deputy to the Crown of England' in April 1716, complicated matters. His election was disputed in Menorca, not officially recognised by the British government but, when he reached London in 1718
having secured a passport from Col. Gervase Parker, interim
Commander-in-Chief during Kane's absence in May 1718), he
nevertheless succeeded in putting his case to the British
public in print, and in gaining a hearing in the House of
Commons. Despite the fact that Bayarte was informed as
eyearly as December 1718, that the King attached no blame to
Kane for his conduct in Menorca, and that Bayarte's presence
in England was not required, he remained in London for a
number of years. He was in London to submit a further
petition 'des Griefs des Habitants' in 1723, and he
prolonged his stay even after the Universitats of Menorca had
ceased to pay his expenses in February 1728. According to
one account, Bayarte did not return to Menorca until 1748.

The charges of maladministration and abuse of power
brought against Kane by the Spanish Ambassador, and
subsequently by Bayarte, were considered by the Privy Council
in 1717 and 1718, and by the House of Commons in 1720. They
were dismissed as 'frivolous and ill-grounded,' and Kane was
'honorably cleared' of all the allegations. Nevertheless,
the complaints had revealed grey areas in the government of
Menorca and, at the suggestion of Lord Carpenter, the
Governor, these were examined by seven committees set up by
the King's command in June 1718. The Archbishop of
Canterbury, the Lord Chancellor, the Secretary at War and the
Master General of Ordnance were charged respectively with
reports on ecclesiastical government, civil government and
laws, military government and the island's fortifications,
while matters relating to Menorca's revenues, naval affairs
and trade and commerce were to be examined by the Lords
Commissioners of the Treasury, Admiralty and Trade. Kane
received orders to lay before the committees 'papers proper for their purpose', and was directed to attend the committees as required to give 'what further lights and explanations shall be thought requisite'. Of the reports subsequently produced, only the recommendations for the ecclesiastical government can now be traced, but a draft of Kane's submissions to the committees survives.

Kane's submissions were contained in a memorandum of thirty sections, some of which gave an account of existing practices in Menorca, and the remainder suggested alterations and innovations. All indicate his grasp of island affairs, and a desire to put the government of the island on a more manageable footing more in keeping with British civil administration, and he challenged the view that Britain was bound to preserve the laws and customs of Menorca as firmly and unalterably as the Menorcans maintained. Incorporated into the draft memorandum were considerations of Kane's proposals by an (anonymous) 'Gentleman who has read Civil Law in Spain, and is well acquainted with the Constitution and Temper of the People of Minorca'. The anonymous comments served to temper some of Kane's more extravagant suggestions; the extent to which they may have been incorporated into Kane's final submissions is not known, but it is of little consequence since, once again, the affairs of Menorca were relegated to obscurity in the face of the delicate political situation in the Mediterranean 1718-1720, and of the South Sea Bubble scandal at home. No reforms other than the establishment of the vice-admiralty court were implemented.

In the light of the Bayarte episode, Kane was unhappy that meetings of the Universitat General were outside the
Governor's control or influence, and he proposed that the Governor, or his representative, should be present at all meetings, and that all members of the Universitats be required to swear an unqualified oath of allegiance to the crown. He proposed no changes to the constitution of the district Universitats, except that their exclusive right to make afforations should be limited, but he did raise (but not answer) the question of British non-military residents being allowed to play a role in local government, and whether they should be subject to British, Menorcan or military law (Kane favoured military law). He proposed the establishment of a Supreme Council to consist of nine members - Governor, Lt-Governor, Lt-Governor of St. Philip's, Asesor, Abogado Fiscal, together with 'one gentleman of the best fortune and learning' from each término - with powers to alter old laws, privileges and customs, to create new sources of revenue, to hear all grievances from the Universitats and be the only body in the island to raise money for extraordinary reasons. In the sphere of justice, Kane suggested that a court of appeal should be set up in Menorca (with a final right of appeal to the Privy Council); some elements of English common law should be introduced, punishments reviewed and brought more in line with sentences meted out in British courts. However, such was his lack of faith in the sanctity of an oath taken by a Catholic subject, he made an exception in the case of perjury where he advocated that anyone found guilty of that crime should suffer the loss of his ears. In the civil courts he sought to introduce an element of arbitration to cut down the number of cases which reached the courts and to speed up settlement.
of those which did, and he urged that agreement be reached
with Spain and the Viceroy of Mallorca to bring to an end the
age-old practice whereby criminals from one island sought
sanctuary in the other. Kane was also opposed to religious
discrimination which discouraged settlement in Menorca (here
he had Jews particularly in mind), provided that all settlers
swore an oath of allegiance to the British crown. Finally,
among his proposals relevant to this chapter, to encourage
settlement and to increase prosperity in Menorca, Kane
proposed changes to the custom of land tenure. He believed
that the system in force by which there were no fixed terms
for leases, and the land was farmed on the basis of
sharecropping, offered the tenant no security and little
incentive to develop the land to its full potential. Moreover,
Menorcan landowners would sell only to native-born
islanders. Kane advocated the introduction of fixed term,
renewable leases, and that proprietors should be compelled to
sell land which they had no intention of cultivating or
farming.

Before he left Menorca for London in April 1717, Kane had
shown that, in the absence of specific guidelines and
authority, he was prepared to use his initiative and act if
he considered there was good reason. He had compelled the
Universitats to provide unpaid labour for the construction of
the new road from St. Philip's to Ciudadela; he infringed
the civil liberties of the Menorcans when he reimposed the
ban on the carrying or possession of arms, and compounded
this action by making the penalty for this offence, and for
any act of stoning the troops, a public whipping, a
punishment from which the Menorcans were specifically exempt
according to one of their fueros; Kane banned gaming houses, made the Universitats provide a House of Correction for the vagabonds in each termino, and ordered the Universitat of Mahón to confine known prostitutes to one outlying district of the town. He had also usurped the responsibilities of the Jurats in 1716 by imposing regulations for the import of cattle and sheep; by fixing sale prices for all meat, poultry, game and fish; by laying down arbitrarily the rates for hire of beasts of burden, and by imposing standardised weights and measures throughout the island.

Richard Kane returned to Menorça in December 1719, exonerated from the charges which had been levelled against him, but with no more clearly defined authority as Civil Governor of the island than he had had when he left for London, but, for the remaining sixteen years of his governorship, he continued to govern by decree, undeterred by the opposition he encountered from the Jurats in the island and the complaints which they sent to London about his autocratic behaviour.

He had authority from the Admiralty to establish a vice-admiralty court, which he set up in 1720 with himself appointed Vice-Admiral but, without authority, he transferred the principal law courts from Ciudadela to Mahón in 1722, summoned the Universitat General to meet in Mahón and not Ciudadela in October of the same year, and in 1728 he decreed that the annual 'insaculacion' would take place in Mahón - all acts which effectively lessened the importance of Ciudadela, diminished the influence of the Universitat General (no meetings were held after 1730), and effectively made Mahón the capital of Menorca - and in 1734 Kane took it
upon himself to resolve disputes of precedence between the Jurats. 68

Other decrees by Kane which bypassed the authority of the Jurats were those issued to reinforce the standardisation of weights and measures, 69 to eliminate counterfeit money in circulation, 70 and to establish a firm rate of exchange in the various currencies in circulation; 71 he also legislated on the afforations of wheat, oats, cheese and wool, 72 the cutting of wood 73 and the sale of wine, 74 and in 1733 he decreed that all civil disputes involving sums of less than £(M)20 (£3) were to be settled by arbitration, and that cases unresolved after three months were to be referred to the Governor for adjudication. 75

In 1724 Kane introduced two important fiscal measures by re-imposing the 'estanque'(tax on the sale of brandy), 76 and an anchorage duty to be paid by all foreign trading vessels entering Mahon harbour. 77 The revenues of the estanque were designed to produce a fund from which the Jurats could pay for the cost of maintaining and repairing public buildings and roads, and the anchorage duty was destined for a fund to pay for the construction of a lazaretto in the harbour of Mahon.

All Kane's legislation in the sphere of civil government was carried out without a Governor's authority to act in these matters ever being defined, and it was consistently challenged by the Jurats on these grounds. But, for all the accusations of despotism levelled at him, it was never Kane's wish that his civil powers should remain undefined. He repeatedly urged Westminster to draft regulations for Menorca in which the various areas and the extent of the Governor's
authority would be clarified. He made a final attempt to achieve this objective while he was on leave in London for the last time 1728-1730. Kane, together with Lord Carpenter, one of the few Governors to carry out his responsibilities in Menorca (May 1726-December 1727), raised the issue with the King and Privy Council in 1730, but once again, with an advantageous peace treaty having just been concluded with Spain (November 1729), the moment was not right. Walpole's ministry, fearful of Spanish and foreign Catholic opposition, fought shy of introducing reforms in Menorca which it was certain would be interpreted as a violation of Britain's Utrecht undertakings, and it was not until 1752, after a determined prosecution by the Menorcan Universitats of the malpractices of Kane's successor, Philip Anstruther, that Westminster eventually drew up some regulations for the government of Menorca.

After Kane's death in 1736, the remaining twenty years of the first period of British rule in Menorca saw no improvement in the relations between the Governor in the island and the Jurats. The principal difficulty continued to be the contrast between the Jurats' belief that Britain's Utrecht undertakings did not give the Governor any authority to interfere in matters of civil government, and the stance of the Governors or interim Commanders-in-Chief, who saw it as their duty to intervene if they considered it to be in the interest of 'His Majesty's service'.

As in Kane's governorship, some of the disputes - quarters, supplies, garrison indiscipline - arose from alleged misuse of the Governors' military authority as Commander-in-Chief, and are dealt with elsewhere, as are the
numerous complaints about interference in ecclesiastical matters. But, in addition to grievances about isolated actions of particular Governors, there were recurrent heads of complaint about Kane's successors meddling, and acting without due authority in matters of civil government in Menorca, and these formed the basis of a series of petitions to the Privy Council seeking redress from actions of Lt-Col. Pinfold, Maj-Gen. Anstruther and Lt-Gen. Blakeney. The recurrent heads of complaint can be grouped as follows:

Harassment and prosecution of law officers, officials and Syndics.

Pinfold was accused of condoning, in November 1737, the malicious prosecution of Antonio Rubí, the farmer of the royal tithes of corn, for selling wheat at above the afforation price (which he was, by tradition, allowed to do), and for approving an excessively severe sentence of two years' exile and a fine of 200 dollars. He was further accused of summarily dismissing from office the Asesor (Dr. Font), the Abogado Fiscal (Dr. Pons) and the Secretary of the Court of Patrimony (Rafael Febrer) on charges that they had usurped his authority by ordering a house to house search for hoarded grain, of exacting exorbitant fees from litigants and imposing unjust sentences, and for spreading false and alarming rumours. All three officials dismissed by Pinfold were replaced with his own placemen, but on appeal to the Privy Council, the officials were exonerated, reinstated and recompensed.
Anstruther also dismissed from office and imprisoned five Jurats/Syndichs - Dr. Juan Company (Pinfold's choice as Asesor to replace Dr. Font), Dr. Olivar y Cardona (Ciudadela), Dr. Francisco Caules (Mahón), Bartolomé Mascaró (Alayor) and Tomás Castel (Mercadal). They appealed to the Privy Council and, as a result, all were liberated, but although Company and Caules came to London personally to press for damages against Anstruther, they were ultimately (after more than ten years of lobbying and waiting) unsuccessful.

Blakeney imprisoned Dr. Raymundo Ballester, Syndich of the Universitat of Mahón, and prosecuted him for conducting a campaign of civil rights, and he dismissed from office both Dr. Andreu, the Abogado Fiscal, on a charge of fomenting dissension and Juan Pons y Andreu, the Secretary of the Universitat of Mahón (later to become the Syndich in London 1765-1771), on a charge of dishonesty.90

Treatment of Jurats, and abuse of the insaculación.

The Jurats resented Pinfold's allegation that they were all 'codiciosos y falsos' (greedy and perfidious), and that the three Jurats from Ciudadela who had written to the Earl of Hertford (the absentee Governor) criticising his conduct were 'traidores sediciosos' (seditious traitors). Although Pinfold started criminal proceedings against the latter, they were dropped when Pinfold was superceded by Anstruther.

The Jurats complained that Anstruther had substituted his own placemen (including a non-native Menorcan) for properly nominated candidates in the insaculación, he had compelled Jurats to sign and approve documents against their will and
better judgement; he had prosecuted and imprisoned Jurats who had opposed him, and he had resolutely refused to reply to any memorials from the Jurats which were critical of his administration.

Blakeney was also accused of interfering in the insaculacion, and of uttering threats and menaces to the Jurats.

Peculation, Trade, Estanque and Anchorage dues.

Pinfold introduced new taxes, imposed fines and forbade trade with Mallorca for his own personal gain, but these were all measures which were condemned by Anstruther and were rescinded by him after he assumed command in Menorca.

Ironically, in the light of his reaction to Pinfold's activities, some of the most bitter criticisms of Anstruther were related to his ill-concealed ambition for personal financial gain. He stood accused of trading with Spain at a time when that country was an enemy, of confiscating estates of suspected Spanish sympathisers and pocketing the proceeds, and of retaining the entire proceeds of the estanque and anchorage dues. He also had to answer charges that he had monopolised the wine trade by buying, through his agents, as much wine as he could, to re-sell it at a higher price, and that he stockpiled wine, wood, oil and tobacco to sell at inflated prices in times of shortage.

Individual liberties.
The Jurats accused Anstruther of intercepting private correspondence,\textsuperscript{107} of refusing to grant passports to Menorcans who had shown themselves in any way critical of his administration,\textsuperscript{108} and of causing his troops to trespass to cut an excessive amount of wood.\textsuperscript{109}

Although General Wynyard, during his period in command as interim Commander-in-Chief from April 1745 until Blakeney's arrival in June 1748, escaped many of the criticisms levelled at other British commanders, he was guilty of lack of judgement and displayed an ignorance of the islanders' fueros when, in 1745, he authorised Admiral Medley to send out sailors to press Menorcans into service on board the fleet. Wynyard foresaw that it might cause 'some little Noyse' in the island, but he underestimated the furore and the opposition.\textsuperscript{110} In what became known to the Menorcans as 's'any de ses pedradas'(the year of the stonings), the islanders (men and women) resisted the press gang with sticks and stones and with such vigour that few Menorcans were pressed on land, and only a few at sea.\textsuperscript{111}

Among the accusations levelled at Blakeney were that he, too, sanctioned trespass, and that he unlawfully detained and imprisoned individuals.\textsuperscript{112}

There were, of course, more individual allegations of abuse of power. Pinfold was accused of victimising seafarers with additional taxes, and of hounding Menorcans who had found favour with Kane;\textsuperscript{113} Anstruther's hypocrisy in banning hunting for others while he himself continued to hunt was criticised,\textsuperscript{114} as was Wynyard's encouragement of Greek settlers,\textsuperscript{115} and Blakeney's determination to 'clear the streets of Mahón of Hogs' and to 'extirpate almost the whole
species of Dogs' in Menorca (without compensation), was bitterly resented.\textsuperscript{116}

The petition against Anstruther which contained the most telling allegations of mismanagement and abuse of power, was assiduously promoted by the Syndich, Juan Mir y Espineta. He first presented the petition to the Privy Council in August 1743 but, because of the delay in obtaining depositions from witnesses in Menorca and the labour of translating statements from Menorqui into English, it was not considered by the Council until March 1748. Even then, daunted by the work-load of examining all the twenty-five allegations, the Council limited consideration to eight complaints which they asked Mir to select. Mir was astute in his choice. He did not select necessarily the charges which had caused most outrage in Menorca, but concentrated on those which, if proven, would confirm Anstruther's abuse of his civil powers, and the personal pecuniary advantages he had gained from his arbitrary actions.\textsuperscript{117} The Council's verdict was damning:

\begin{quote}
General Anstruther ... hath, in many Instances, acted in an Arbitrary and unwarrantable Manner, to the great injury and Oppression of many of Your Majesty's Subjects[in Menorca], in breach of his Duty ... and contrary to the Constitution of the Island.\textsuperscript{118}
\end{quote}

The Council was resolved that Anstruther's conduct was such as to have merited his removal from office in Menorca (he had, in fact, been replaced by Blakeney in August 1747), and it recommended that Anstruther should be required not only to make reparation to all injured parties in Menorca, but that he should also bear the entire costs of the inquiry - the sum was never clearly stated, but was thought to be in the region
Moreover the Council recommended, in the light of the complaints against Anstruther and of 'other petitions of Complaint pending', that to forestall any such proceedings in the future it would be advisable to draw up some 'Regulations for the better Guidance and Conduct' for the Governors of Menorca.

Mir's petition on behalf of the Universitats of Menorca was remarkable, not only because of its successful prosecution of Anstruther, but also because it ended with some three dozen recommendations about the future government of Menorca under British rule, some of which indicated a more moderate and pragmatic approach to problems of government by the Universitats. Some constants, of course, remained: recognition and respect for the island's fueros, no interference with the responsibilities of the Jurats, no restriction on the islanders' rights to represent grievances to the King in Council, nor on the freedom of the Menorcans to trade and come and go as they pleased, but there were also recommendations that the Governor (and not his Lieutenant) should be required to reside in Menorca, that a Civil Governor be appointed and required to answer all memorials from the Jurats, there should be no censorship of private correspondence, the income from the estanque and anchorage dues should be administered by the Universitats, and that an Appeal Court should be established in the island.

The Privy Council had taken four years to hear the petition of complaints against Anstruther, it took a further four years before it produced the Regulations it had undertaken to draw up. These were approved in May 1752.
but, in so far as they addressed civil government, they served only to create greater conflict between the Governor and the Jurats.

The Regulations of 1752.

In the 'Civil Branch' of the Regulations, the Universitats were to be free to make afforations for all the island's produce and to be responsible for the provision of meat for the garrison, the Governor was to have no power to prevent Menorcans leaving the island for some 'lawful cause', the Universitat of Mahón was to be responsible for devoting the proceeds of anchorage dues to the building of a 'Pratique Haven', all the revenue of the estanque was to go to the Universitats to be used for the upkeep and repair of public buildings and services, and the Governor and British officers and officials were forbidden to engage in trade.

The Regulations, the first attempt in forty years of British rule to allocate responsibilities in the civil government of Menorca, were inadequate and unsatisfactory. Too many contentious areas remained undefined and, while the Jurats rejoiced in the official recognition of some of their customary rights, for Blakeney the restrictions imposed upon his authority made an already taxing situation even more fraught after the Regulations came into force in Menorca in August 1752.

In a series of letters to the Secretary of State, Blakeney complained that the measures taken by the Jurats to regulate the prices of provisions on the island, to control
the imports, and to enforce longer (and therefore more costly) periods of quarantine, had resulted in shortages, increased prices, and had discriminated against British and foreign merchants trading from Menorca.\textsuperscript{139} Blakeney drew attention to the fact that the Regulations superceded a decree of the Court of Spain in 1666, whereby the Governor was charged with the ultimate responsibility to ensure that in the area of afforations and provisions 'everything that was for the common benefit was duly executed'.\textsuperscript{140} Blakeney accused the Jurats of monopolising the sale of brandy, of refusing to introduce licensing hours for the sale and consumption of brandy and wine (thereby causing an increase in the incidence of drunkenness in the garrison),\textsuperscript{141} and of using the revenues of the estanque, the anchorage dues and the land tax for purposes for which they were not intended.\textsuperscript{142} He warned that the new powers granted to the Jurats of Mahón had 'so intoxicated' them that inter-Universitat rivalry had been created in Menorca - particularly between Mahón and Ciudadela - a dispute which Blakeney considered could become 'very troublesome'.\textsuperscript{143} Blakeney further complained of the 'arrogance and insolence' of the people of Mahón,\textsuperscript{144} the 'great partiality' shown by native judges to their countrymen in disputes with the British,\textsuperscript{145} and he sought approval for his dismissal from office of one of the judges, Dr. Jaime Andreu y Costabella, the Abogado Fiscal, whom he considered guilty of 'fomenting all Broils and encouraging a Spirit of Opposition to the Government'.\textsuperscript{146}

After the introduction of the Regulations, the attitude of the Jurats to the Governor became more confrontational. In
addition to specific complaints to which reference has already been made, they alleged that Blakeney's 'arbitrary and usurped authority' had resulted in many instances of oppression'; he had acted unlawfully in dismissing the Abogado Fiscal for doing no less than his duty in defending the Menorcans' fueros and, his decision to increase the guard in Mahón and mount two cannons to protect the warehouses against any action that might have arisen out of the 'arrogance and insubordination of the natives,' led to an accusation of resorting to 'terror as the main engine of government'.

The position of the Governor in Menorca had not been easy before the 1752 Regulations came into force, and their introduction undoubtedly made it more difficult. Although there was no suggestion by the Jurats that any of Blakeney's actions were venal, there was clearly some personal animosity which arose from Blakeney's lack of tact and discretion, and as a result of his short temper – on one occasion he gave way to a public display of fury at the Abogado fiscal, 'putting his fist to his face and calling him a Villain and a Traytor'. But not only was Blakeney inexperienced as a Colonial Governor, it was his misfortune to have no British subordinate, naval or military, with any knowledge of the island to whom he could turn for advice. Within a year of Blakeney's arrival in Menorca, the end of the War of Austrian Succession led to a reduction of the naval presence, and all the regiments in the garrison had been relieved by troops new to the island.

The government in London misinterpreted Blakeney's incessant complaints as an implicit request to be relieved of
his command in Menorca, and he was informed in May 1753 of his appointment as Governor of Gibraltar, to be assumed as soon as Lord Tyrawley, the Governor, arrived in Menorca. Although the appointment to Gibraltar would have constituted a promotion, Blakeney protested that a mistake had been made, and insisted that 'no Feuds or Animosities, no Dangers or Difficulties' would ever induce him to wish to be removed from any command with which he had been honoured.

The Regulations of 1753.

Blakeney's reports, together with the representations of the Jurats, led the Lords Justices, in May 1753, to consider a further report from the Privy Council proposing clarification of the 1752 Regulations, because of the 'confusion which has arisen in the island'. A copy of the Privy Council recommendations was sent for comment to the Governor of Menorca, James O'Hara, Lord Tyrawley. Of all the British Governors, Tyrawley was unique in that he had had direct contact with the island before his appointment for, as Colonel of the 7th Foot, he had served in Menorca from 1713 until 1715. His reaction to the proposed revised Regulations were recorded in a letter to the Secretary at War in May 1753:

As to these new Regulations in general as far as my memory serves me, they seem to be very different from those when Brigadier Kane commanded there, whose conduct I have always understood was approved of, and I heard no complaint either on the part of the garrison or the inhabitants during the two years that I was there under his command.
Tyrawley's consideration of the proposals was coloured by his recollection that the Menorcans were little more than a 'rabble of beggars and banditti', and he stressed that, if he was to govern in the island, he would expect to be invested with 'absolute power'.

Tyrawley's suggestions for the powers to be vested in the Governor of Menorca were sent to the Privy Council in July 1753. In the sphere of civil government, he recommended that the Governor be nominated the supreme judge in the island to allow such laws of the land to stand 'where Britain's service is not obstructed by them', to ensure that there was no partiality in judgements and that punishments fitted the crime and, while not admitting to any British obligation under the Treaty of Utrecht to preserve Menorcan fueros, yet to govern the island with justice, equity and lenity. The Governor was to take the Jurats to task for their 'malevolent disposition' to the British authorities, and disqualify them from holding office if they were obstructive. The Governor should institute an inquiry into the improper and illegal use of the revenues of the estanque, the anchorage dues and the land tax, and the Governor must be empowered to control supplies of provisions and to make afforations.

The revised Regulations which were approved in August 1753 were less conciliatory towards the Jurats and did much to strengthen the Governor's authority. The Governor was now authorised to make afforations if the Jurats proved unreasonable in this respect, and he was empowered to make the afforations 'equal and general', but any future dispute on this issue was to be referred directly to the Privy Council.
Council. The Jurats were no longer to manage the revenues from the estanque and anchorage dues. In future these were to be collected by a Receiver appointed by the Governor and charged with the responsibility of ensuring that they were devoted to the purposes for which they were originally intended - the revenue of the former to go towards the provision and upkeep of public buildings and works, and the anchorage dues towards the building of a Lazaretto in Mahón harbour. But, in addition to the revised Regulations, measures even more unpalatable to the Jurats were contained in a new set of instructions issued to the Governor and Lt-Governor in August 1753. In these, the Governor in Menorca was granted 'divers Powers of Civil and Military Government, adapted to the Situation and Circumstances of Our Island'. The Jurats were to be reminded of the benefits the island had enjoyed under British rule (free trade, greater economic wellbeing, removal of the threat of attack from Barbary), and admonished for their recent 'contemptuous attitude'. Appeals to the Crown were to be permitted only when the sum involved exceeded 800 dollars in civil cases in the Court of Royal government, and 400 dollars in cases of misdemeanour; exemplary punishments were to be inflicted on those found guilty of assaults on members of the garrison and, to avoid 'frivolous and vexatious representations', grievances could be carried to London only by Menorcans who were 'persons of reputation in the island. Allegations concerning the misapplication of the land tax were to be investigated, the inter-Universitat disputes were to be examined, and the Governor was given
the authority to disarm the Menorcans if he 'judged it necessary'.

The 1753 Regulations and, particularly, the additional Instructions, embodied virtually all the powers which Tyrwhistle had demanded to be invested in the Governor of Menorca. But, while he had been granted what amounted to a free hand in the civil government of the island, he showed no urgency about taking up his command in Menorca, and he had not even set out for the island before it was lost to the French in 1756. Consequently it was left to Blakeney to carry out the Instructions and implement the Regulations. It proved a thankless and frustrating task. On 30 November 1753, Blakeney convened a meeting of the Jurats of Menorca to make them aware of the new Regulations, and to read them his Instructions. Not surprisingly, the Jurats were dismayed by the revised Regulations and resented the accompanying Instructions, and Blakeney found that they persisted regardless in 'wicked designs to oppose His Majesty's Orders and harass the Commander-in-Chief'. The Jurats were radically opposed to the new pattern of government, which they considered to be a contravention of Britain's Utrecht undertakings, and they sought, at least, a return to the 1752 Regulations. They suggested that the source of the inter-Universitat disputes lay in the pre-eminence which the British had given to the Universitat and town of Mahón, and they pressed for the return to Ciudadela of the principal courts of justice and for the revival of the Universitat General. They conceded that Mahón, because of the port and the fortress would continue to enjoy disproportionate benefits from the British presence in Menorca, but pleaded
that the término of Mahón should make a correspondingly greater contribution to the island's internal economy. They pressed for the appointment of a Civil Governor in Menorca with authority independent of the Military Governor, and they objected to Blakeney's choice of Charles Williams as Receiver of the estanque revenue and anchorage dues, maintaining that the appointment, if it had to be made, should have been given to a Menorcan and not to an Irishman trading out of Mahón. 175

Blakeney dismissed the Jurats' objections and turned down all their proposals except one, which requested the appointment of an additional Asesor to deal with criminal cases in the Court of Royal Government. To press their case the Jurats sent two Syndichs to London in the summer of 1754. The Syndichs, Bernardo Olives y Olives and Dr. Mateo Mercadal y Sanxo, presented a comprehensive petition to the Privy Council in September 1754, 176 but did not obtain a hearing before the Council, and had to be content with a meeting in October with the Secretary of State. Sir Thomas Robinson dismissed the Syndichs' arguments, and bluntly told them that Menorca was British by conquest, consequently the Menorcans should 'felicitate themselves that the [1753] Orders had gone no further', and they should not 'entertain any false hopes of obtaining either by clamour or importunity either a suspension or a variation of the Regulations'. 177

Although Olives and Mercadal remained in London for a further six months attempting to obtain a hearing before the Privy Council, they were unsuccessful and they returned, frustrated and disillusioned to inform the Jurats that Britain regarded the Menorcans not as free subjects, but as a conquered people. In the circumstances, and bearing in mind
that the 1753 Regulations also contained measures relating to the military and ecclesiastical government of the island to which the Menorcans strongly objected,\textsuperscript{178} it is hardly surprising that when Blakeney, faced with an impending attack from France, appealed to the loyalty of the Menorcans to the British crown for support, the response was minimal.

The French Government of Menorca, 1756-1763.

The French were proved correct in their assessment that Menorca would be an easy conquest but, even before the Duc de Richelieu's expedition had set sail, it was clear that they entertained no expectations that the island would become a permanent French territorial acquisition. The French Minister for War was advised in March 1756: 'Soit que nous le gardions [Port Mahon] actuellement, soit que nous le remettions à l'Espagne, il retournera bientôt aux Anglais'.\textsuperscript{179} Nevertheless, it emerged from the very first days of the French occupation that, while Menorca remained in French hands, it was to be governed in the same manner as all other provinces of mainland France. If the Jurats expected the 'joye inexprimable',\textsuperscript{180} with which they claimed to have welcomed the prospect of French rule to be confirmed by a more benign and less intrusive regime of civil government, they were to be disappointed.

Like the British before and after them, the French found Menorca a

\begin{quote}
\textit{singulier pays où on ne pouvait faire un pas sans se heurter à un privilège, remuer une pierre sans troubler une coutume, ouvrir un chemin sans attenter à un droit}.\textsuperscript{181}
\end{quote}
However, the Menorcans welcomed the French without 'ill-will', and although Louis XV confirmed the 'lois, coutumes, stile et usages' of the island as readily as Queen Anne had done in 1712, the French authorities' disregard for the island's fueros was more blatant than their British predecessors. The functions and status of the Jurats were undermined from the outset by the appointment of a. French Intendant (Civil Governor), subordinate to the Military Governor, whose responsibilities included the regulation and collection of taxes, the supply and afforations of provisions and the auditing of the balance sheets of the Universitats. Meetings of the Universitats were permitted only with the prior permission of the Governor, and the French authorities appropriated the profit of the estanque and the anchorage dues. Moreover, France expected the island to support garrison numbers vastly in excess of those which had caused the island such hardship during the first period of British rule.

Not surprisingly, the remonstrances of the Jurats to the French authorities became as frequent and as plaintive as they had been to the British. Quite apart from the regular flow of complaints to Antoine de Causan, the Intendant, in the first four years of French rule there were nine petitions to the Governor, and a further eight petitions to Ministers in Paris. For the most part, the petitions elicited as little sympathy and as little response as earlier complaints to British Governors and to London. A typically dismissive reply from the Comte de Lannion, the Governor, suggested that the Jurats ought to be grateful, and not resentful of the control exercised by the French in the island's civil
government in view of the chaotic way in which the
Universitats had long managed their affairs. 187

The period of French rule brought about some changes in
the island: legal processes were speeded up by the
appointment of two Asesors, one to deal with criminal
offences, the other with civil cases; appeals were heard by
the Council of Roussillon in Perpignan, a more readily
accessible venue, and therefore a less expensive process;
communications within the island were improved by the
construction of some ninety kilometres of new roads radial to
Kane's east-west arterial road, and a new road, the Cami des
Cavalls (horse road), was constructed around the island's
coastline. 188 Trade links were established with France to
compensate for the loss of markets in the Levant and in
Barbary, and the town of San Luis sprang up to the South of
Mahón. Most importantly for the islanders, the spiritual
authority of the Bishop of Mallorca was restored in Menorca,
but there can be little doubt that the French authorities
relied heavily upon the islanders' gratitude for their return
to an unfettered profession of their Catholic faith to offset
the discontent aroused by the increased burdens the island
had to bear during their period of government in Menorca. 189

The restoration of British rule, 1763.

For all the Menorcans' affinity with the religion and
culture of the French, there were some, 'affectionés aux
Anglais', 190 who welcomed the return of the British to the
island in 1763, if only for commercial reasons. For the
Jurats, however, the second period of British rule gave them
no less cause to complain of the British Governors, and for much the same reasons as before - arbitrary gubernatorial decisions and actions; lack of respect for the Jurats and usurpation of their responsibilities; infringements of personal liberties and misappropriation of funds. But it was also a period in which some leading Menorcans, notably the principal law officers, recognised that improvements could be made in the civil government and in the economic well-being of the island. Their proposals for reform were largely supported by the British Governors (not necessarily for altruistic reasons), who also put forward some ideas of their own. However, very little was accomplished, partly because the Jurats, suspicious of change, did not back the initiatives, but primarily because the British government, with an insouciance characteristic of its eighteenth-century handling of colonial affairs, failed to live up to its responsibilities, and did little or nothing to resolve the problems in the island, although it was repeatedly alerted to them.

In the circumstances, it was ironic that the British government should have looked to Menorca for guidance to govern Canada when that province was ceded by France to Britain in 1763 - an irony heightened by the fact that when the relevant papers were sought, such was the neglect of Menorcan affairs in Westminster, that it was revealed that the 'Minorca correspondence for a number of years is not to be found in the Secretary of State's Office, the Paper Office or the [Privy] Council'. The common ground for comparison was that both Canada (native Indians excepted) and Menorca were populated by non-English-speaking Catholics, accustomed
to a legal system and an established form of government radically different from the British, but there was a fundamental difference. Part of Canada (Acadia/Nova Scotia) had already been settled by Britons, and it was the clear intention of the home government to encourage British settlers to colonise the newly-acquired territory in substantial numbers, whereas no initiative was ever taken to encourage British settlement in Menorca.

A 'Plan for settling the Island of Minorca with a Sett of Substantial and Industrious Inhabitants' had been proposed in the early years of the first period of British rule by a Colonel Daubuis, who had served under Stanhope, but it had not been pursued 'for fear of disoblidding some of our Foreign Friends'. The plan was revived at the start of the second period of British rule by Colonel Daubuis' son-in-law, who proposed that a 'numerous Colony of Substantial and Industrious Protestants [British and Foreign] be encouraged to settle in Menorca (which will cost but a Trifle),' to make the most of the island's largely untapped agricultural potential and, in due course, fill 'all the places and offices' in the island. Another scheme for encouraging settlers in Menorca was put forward by Thomas Hope who visited the island in 1764/65, who considered that Menorca, the population of which he estimated to be 18,000, could support more than ten times that number. He advocated that 'All encouragement be given to New Settlers by a Naturalizataton Bill, Immunities, Privileges (unspecified) etc.' Westminster remained unconvinced and did nothing to further any of the schemes.
Consequently, whereas British policy in Menorca was persistently indeterminate, in Canada it was conciliatory and, with the passing of the Quebec Act in 1774, purposeful and decisive. From the outset of British government in Canada, an attempt was made to influence the French Canadian settlers to become willing subjects, loyal to the British crown. Compromise government was sought whereby the French Canadians could retain some of their former institutions and be persuaded to accept some constitutional changes more in line with the British traditions. The vexed problem of ecclesiastical government was solved by the British tacit recognition of the authority of 'Superintendent' (Bishop in all but name) Briand in 1766; Canadian Catholics were granted civil liberties which were not extended to their British counterparts for a further thirty years, and a compromise was reached in establishing the laws by which the new colony was to be governed. None of these achievements was mirrored in Menorca, and nothing was done to win the support of the islanders - indeed a judgement by the Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas in an action brought by the Menorcan secretary of the vice-admiralty court against the Lieutenant-Governor and the Abogado Fiscal in 1765, ruled that the Menorcans' decision in 1712 not to be governed by the British constitution, excluded them from seeking redress for grievances in the British courts, except in criminal cases. This judgement was reversed by the Lord Chief Justice ten years later in another action brought by a Menorcan (to which reference is made later in this chapter) but, by then, the feeling among many Menorcans that they were
unequal and insignificant British subjects had become entrenched.

In 1713, Britain's negotiators in the Treaty of Utrecht had failed clearly to establish the parameters of British and Menorcan authority in all aspects of the government of the island, and the failure was compounded in the Treaty of Paris which concluded the Seven Years' War. Article Two of the Treaty restored Menorca to Britain, and Britain promised to confirm all the Menorcans' rights and privileges as they had stood in 1756. To Britain, this meant government by the 1753 Regulations, but these had never been accepted by the Menorcans, who considered them to be a violation of Britain's Utrecht undertakings, and their opposition to the Regulations had been registered, but not considered by the Privy Council, before the island was lost to the French. A chasm existed between the Menorcans' interpretation of Britain's obligations as one of total non-interference in the island's internal government, and the British standpoint that they were bound to interfere if the measures taken by the Menorcan authorities were 'at a variance with the civil government and the laws of Great Britain'. It was a chasm which was not to be bridged while Menorca was British, and the inevitable irreconcilable differences ensured that the second period of British rule was quite as contentious as the first.

Of the Britons appointed to command in Menorca from 1763-1782, Sir Richard Lyttelton (Governor 1763-1766) and Lieutenant-General George Howard (Governor 1766-1768) never visited the island, and Lieutenant-General John Mostyn (Governor 1768-1779) exercised his command in Menorca for only eighteen months (January 1771-July 1772). For most of
the period, the government of Menorca was the responsibility of two men - Colonel (later Major-General) James Johnston (Lieutenant-Governor 1763-1774) and Lieutenant-General the Hon James Murray (Lieutenant-Governor 1774-1779, and Governor 1779-1782). Johnston, Murray and, to a lesser extent, Mostyn, all faced challenges to their authority in Menorca. Some confrontations undoubtedly arose as a result of their own dispositions, but more stemmed from a lack of understanding, support and guidance from Westminster.

The government of James Johnston (1763-1770, 1772-1774).

The choice of Johnston to command in Menorca was not ideal, for, while he was a good soldier and came to be regarded as a conscientious if, at times, over-zealous administrator by his masters in London, the Menorcans resented his blunt, autocratic approach, devoid as it was of any tact or subtlety. He was an unpopular Governor on the island, and his wife, Lady Cecily, the first lady to reside in Government House, was also disliked because of her haughty demeanour, her anti-Catholic prejudice and the strong influence she was alleged to have over her husband (one commentator has gone as far as to describe her as 'the real Governor'). But Johnston's reputation has suffered unfairly at the hands of many Menorcan historians, notably Oleo, Riudavets, Hernández, Verdaguer and Mata. In their assessment they have dwelt upon the faults in Johnston's character, and have chosen to overlook facts which indicate that the initiatives which he proposed were quite as radical and forward-looking as those which had been suggested by Kane (uniformly in
favour with the same historians). It is true that not all the reforms he suggested were devoid of an element of self-interest, but most would have improved the economic well-being of the island as well as increasing the royal patrimony.

Much of the Menorcan antipathy to Johnston resulted from his first official communication to the island's Jurats soon after his arrival in October 1763. He wrote to them stating that all the 1753 Regulations were to be implemented, but he overstepped his instructions (identical to those issued to Tyrawley and Blakeney ten years earlier), by adding, injudiciously, that in future Britain's guarantee of the island's fueros would be dependent upon the good behaviour and co-operation of the Menorcans. The Jurats immediately protested, and although Johnston attempted to justify his point to the Secretary of State by stressing how 'troublesome' the Jurats were, and that 'some severities will not be improper', he was instructed by Halifax to inform the Jurats that Britain's undertaking to respect the Menorcan fueros remained unchanged.

Johnston's relations with the Jurats never recovered from this initial faux pas. However genuine his subsequent motives, his actions were disputed and their altruism questioned. Consequently when he urged that the wild olive trees which abounded on the island should be grafted and made fruit-bearing, that goats (which damaged the trees) should be banned and replaced with sheep, and that the quality of meat would be improved by the castration of lambs not needed for breeding - suggestions at least worthy of consideration - he was accused of exceeding his authority, and was opposed by
the Jurats on principle, rather than for any practical reason. Johnston incensed the Jurats by his appropriation of the estanque profit and the anchorage dues; his increase in the fees charged for Mediterranean passes; his appointment of a Greek and not a Menorcan to the lucrative post of receiver of weights and measures;\textsuperscript{212} his attempt to commandeer the hospital in Mahón (a Catholic foundation) as a garrison hospital;\textsuperscript{213} his use of one of the Catholic churches in Mahón for Protestant worship, and by depriving the Jurats of their responsibility for administering Public Health and Quarantine regulations.\textsuperscript{214} On only one issue were Johnston and the Jurats of one mind; that was in criticism of the conduct of the judge of the vice-admiralty court, James Sutherland. Both parties sought greater control over the judge's independence, but Johnston's solution - to seek to be appointed Vice-Admiral (a position traditionally held by the Governor) - was misinterpreted by the Jurats as further evidence of ambition and cupidity, even though the perquisites of the post in times of peace were negligible.

The result of Johnston's actions in the first few months of his command was a decision by the Jurats to send Juan Pons y Andreu as their Syndich to London to lay their complaints before the Privy Council.\textsuperscript{215} In June 1764, after less than a year in Menorca, Johnston was recalled to London to answer charges brought against him that he had misappropriated the estanque profits and anchorage dues, and that he had profited personally from the sale of corn at a time of shortage in the island.\textsuperscript{216}

As in the case of the Anstruther inquiry in the 1740s, the investigation of the charges against Johnston took time.
Depositions had to be taken in Menorca and in London, translations made and then further depositions in answer to Johnston's refutation of the charges, and it was not until 1770 that the Privy Council judgement was delivered. In the meantime, pending the outcome of the inquiry, Johnston was authorised to return to his command in December 1765.

Johnston returned to Menorca to find that, in his absence, Lt-Colonel Thomas Townshend, the interim Governor for the previous year, had used the entire profits of the estanque to finance the start of the building of a barracks in Mahón, and was proposing to mortgage future profits to see the project finished by the spring of 1765. The Jurats of Mahon considered Townshend's initiative 'the most useful work for the relief of the Universitat', but Johnston's immediate reaction was to suspend building work (by then the barracks were more than a third complete), and to refuse to pay for the site which had been requisitioned for the building. Johnston's actions arose partly out of pique at Townshend's initiative, partly because Townshend had no authority to build the barracks (he was censured by the Secretary of State for his actions), but also because a share of the profits of the estanque had become part of the perquisites of the Governor in Menorca, and he felt cheated. This element of the Governor's emoluments had always been disputed by the Jurats, and although Johnston was to propose that he should forego it and be paid an annual supplement of £365 to his salary in lieu, the situation was never satisfactorily resolved even though Murray, Johnston's successor, again made an issue in 1774 of the Governor's pay and perquisites (Fig. 4.5). Johnston's refusal to continue with the building of the
### Establishment and salaries of the principal staff officers in Menorca:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governor</strong> (including £350 from the patronym of Menorca)</td>
<td>£1,095</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lt-Governor</strong></td>
<td>£1,095</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Perquisites of the Governor/Lt-Governor/C-In-C)</strong></td>
<td>£1,700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commissary of Stores and Provisions</strong></td>
<td>£730</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Receiver of the Patrimony</strong></td>
<td>£182.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commissary of Musters and Deputy Judge Advocate</strong></td>
<td>£182.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deputy Paymaster</strong></td>
<td>£121.13.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secretary to the Governor</strong></td>
<td>£365</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chaplain to the Governor</strong></td>
<td>£91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physician</strong></td>
<td>£73.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Captain of the Port</strong></td>
<td>£18.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provoost Marshal</strong></td>
<td>£730.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Signalman</strong></td>
<td>£5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lt-Governor of St. Philip's</strong></td>
<td>£730.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fort Major</strong></td>
<td>£91.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fort Adjutant</strong></td>
<td>£54.15.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surgeon</strong></td>
<td>£91.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surgeon's Mate</strong></td>
<td>£63.17.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, from 1712 until at least 1742, the following salaries were paid for posts in the non-existent Fort St. Anne:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fort Major</strong></td>
<td>£91.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fort Adjutant</strong></td>
<td>£54.15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surgeon</strong></td>
<td>£91.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surgeon's Mate</strong></td>
<td>£45.12.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. Table compiled from BL Add Ms 44314, p.105, 'State of Employment in Minorca with the Incomes and Emoluments of Each as they stood in 1756', and from Army Lists.

2. Payable in Menorca to whoever was in command in the island. The sum was made up of savings from the Governor's contingency fund, fees charged on trading licences, Mediterranean passes and passports, half the profit on the estanque, a third of the profit on the bread contract for the garrison, sales and fines in St. Philip's/Georgetown and (when appropriate) in the Vice-Admiralty court, and from other minor sources. By 1774, Murray estimated that the perquisites had risen in value to £1,970. (PRO CO 174/17, p.51, Murray to R. Rigby (Paymaster General), 25 November 1774).

3. According to BL Add Ms 38332, p.105, the salary was never published, and was disclosed only to the Treasury and the Auditors. However, a 'Memorandum Touching the Island of Minorca', (D/H/4314, unsigned but dated 15 July 1730), in the Mostyn Ms in the Clwyd Record Office, reveals that Joseph Gascoigne was appointed the first Receiver in December 1712, at a salary of 10s. per diem. An additional allowance of 10s. per diem was granted in 1722, and a 'farther(sic) additional Allowance' of 10s. per diem was paid from 1725. The salary and allowances would therefore have amounted to an annual payment to the Receiver of £547. 10s.

4. Salary not disclosed, but in 1743, when Sir Francis Poole was required under the Place Act to vacate this post, he was awarded an annual pension of £200, subsequently increased to £300, until his death in 1763. His son, Henry Poole, held the post from 1747 until Menorca was lost in 1756 and, between December 1758 and March 1761, he received compensation of £1,325 for the loss of his post. (J. Brent, 'The Poole of Chailey and Lewes' in Sussex Archaeological Collections Vol.114, 1976, p.72.)
barracks infuriated the Jurats, and they sent another petition of grievance to the King.\textsuperscript{222}

Meanwhile, in response to an earlier petition, the Jurats had obtained an Order in Council returning to their control the management of health and quarantine, and Johnston had been instructed not to interfere in the annual election of the Jurats.\textsuperscript{223} The Jurats also provided material highly critical of Johnston's conduct which was published in the form of a pamphlet in London in 1766.\textsuperscript{224} The pamphlet was published anonymously, but the author was almost certainly Juan Pons y Andreu, the Menorcan Syndich in London. The pamphlet listed Johnston's alleged public crimes and personal spites. The author was particularly bitter that the posts of Receiver of Weights and Measures and Captain of the Port of Mahón should have been given to a Greek, and that the services of the island's Asesor were to be summarily dispensed with after more than thirty years' loyal service. He allowed that Johnston may have been a good army commander, but maintained that he was the worst of the British governors of Menorca. This attack provoked a vigorous defence of Johnston in a pamphlet published by his Chaplain and Secretary, the Revd Edward Clarke, who, in addition to refuting the charges, went out of his way to decry the mean status of the Jurats, and to pour scorn on their incompetence to manage the island's internal affairs. Clarke also took the opportunity to undermine the standing and authority of Pons, suggesting that a proven perjurer was not a fit person to represent Menorca\textsuperscript{225} and that he had been chosen Syndich only after two Menorcans 'of worth and credit' had both refused to undertake 'so dirty a job.'\textsuperscript{226}
Fit person or not, Pons represented his own interest (he was still seeking compensation for wrongful dismissal by Blakeney in 1753), and presented in London a series of grievances from the Jurats from 1764 until 1770, and from 1768 until 1770, he also represented in London the interests of the Menorcan clergy. In his final petition to the King in 1770, Pons claimed to have pressed his employers' grievances with 'unremitting activity, diligence, circumspection and fidelity,' but added that he was so badly out of pocket, and had been kept so short of funds from Menorca that he had even been arrested for debt as a consequence. He had received £4,797.8s.2d. from the Jurats and £210 from the clergy towards his expenses and costs, but he petitioned the King to order further payment of £5,056.5s.8d. by the Jurats, and £826.1s.3d. by the clergy so that their obligation to him could be discharged. These were exorbitant sums which were never paid, and which, considering the lack of censure in the Privy Council's findings in the inquiry into Johnston's conduct in February 1770, were totally disproportionate to any success Pons' activities had achieved.

During the years in which Pons, in London, had been persistently presenting complaints about the Lt-Governor's conduct, Johnston, in Menorca, had not been idle. Despite his initial opposition, the building of the barracks was restarted and completed in 1772; estanque accounts submitted to the Secretary of State showed that the profits had been legitimately shared and the correct portion spent on public works, also £800 had accrued in the anchorage fund and was earmarked for the construction of a lazaretto.
Johnston had also sent the Secretary of State a series of proposals for reforms in Menorca which were fundamental, forward-looking and far-reaching. The extent to which the reforms proposed represented Johnston's own ideas or largely reflected the opinions of Juan Seguí y Sanxo, the Abogado Fiscal, is not always clear, but it is evident that both men were of much the same mind in respect of reforms in the civil government and administration of justice in Menorca. Johnston proposed a restructuring of the constitution of the Universitats; all members should be literate and numerate and serve for a period of three years; representatives of the middle and minor estates should no longer be eligible for office:

the one being brought up to labour the ground, the other to mechanical arts and the greater part of them very poor and consequently the less interested in contributing to the public burdens.

The existing offices of Jurat and Conseller should be replaced by Regidores (Aldermen) - six in Mahón and Ciudadela, four in Alayor and three in Mercadal; the Regidores should be salaried officials with annual earnings of approximately £20 in Mahón and Ciudadela, £16 in Alayor and £10 in Mercadal, but candidates for office could be considered only if they possessed a personal fortune in excess of £800 in Mahón and Ciudadela, £400 in Alayor and £200 in Mercadal; the method of election by ballot should be abolished and replaced by a system of nomination by the Regidores themselves, and the Governor or his representative should have the right of attendance at meetings of the Universitats, if he so wished. Johnston also advocated the
creation of a Chamber of Health with authority independent of the Universitats. Both Johnston and Seguí argued for the appointment of an Asesor in the criminal court to speed up the process of justice, and Seguí proposed the appointment of an Asesor in the court of Royal Patrimony for the same reasons. Seguí also suggested that a sovereign court of appeal be created in Menorca and the the court of the Bayle General in Ciudadela should be abolished and replaced by a court in Mahón presided over by a Judge Ordinary.

Both Johnston and Seguí put forward proposals to improve the economic state of the island and thereby the King's revenue and the well-being of the inhabitants, and Johnston had some very firm views about changes in the ecclesiastical government of Menorca, but neither advocated the diminution or clear delineation of the Governor's civil powers. In contrast, Thomas Hope who represented the views of the British merchants in Menorca to the British government in 1765, and gave incidentally his own assessment of the situation on the island, and the author of the 'Plan for Settling the Island of Minorca...'

(probably produced at about the same time), were in no doubt that the establishment of a civil government in the island was a priority. It is the first measure proposed by the former, and for the latter it was a 'conditio sine qua non ' that a civil government be established forthwith, maintaining that:

a Military Government is inconsistent with the Libertys of the Subjects, it is in its nature despotick and when the Civil Power is joined to it, it soon becomes tyrannical.
All these proposals and opinions, together with the Menorcan Syndich's repeated pleas for the 1752 Regulations to be reinstated, were submitted to the Privy Council, which considered them under three headings: 'Points that seem to require dispatch; Points that do not seem to require delay, and Points which do not seem to press'. For all the priorities given, in the sphere of civil government only one decision resulted - the appointment of an Asesor (Criminal), and even then, a warrant for the appointment was not issued until three years later in 1771.

In the meantime, any hope that the Privy Council inquiry into Johnston's conduct in Menorca would result in a clearer definition of the Governor's civil powers had been dashed. In its judgement issued in February 1770, the Council accepted that Johnston had unjustifiably raised anchorage dues and fees for Mediterranean passes, and it was ordered that these should be revised in their original amounts. Johnston was instructed not to interfere with the Jurats' management of the health and quarantine regulations, and he was to adhere strictly to the 1753 Regulations dividing the profit of the estanque equally between the Governor and the Jurats. In this respect, Johnston was ordered to refund any balance outstanding to the Jurats since 1763. Charges that Johnston had abused the right of the Jurats to make afforations, and that he had discriminated unfairly in the issue of Mediterranean passes were dismissed. The overall conclusion of the Council was that the bulk of the charges against the Lt-Governor were 'not made out in proof', and that his conduct had not proceeded from any corrupt motive, and it concluded that there was no cause for 'recall or censure'.

172
After the Privy Council had concluded its inquiry, Johnston continued in command in Menorca until Mostyn's arrival in the island in January 1771, and then, after Mostyn's departure, for a further eighteen months from December 1772 until November 1774. During these periods he seems to have heeded the advice he was given by the Secretary of State not to be:

provoked by the impertinent and vexatious but contemptible opposition you meet within the discharge of your duty into any hasty and mistaken exercise of power. 240

It was not that the Jurats ceased to complain, but the grievances were now largely concerned with alleged abuses by Johnston of his powers as Military and not Civil Governor (although the apportionment of the profits of the estanque remained a contentious issue), 241 and they made no impression on Johnston and provoked no reaction in London. Johnston continued to suggest reforms and economic improvements in Menorca, but the home government, preoccupied with affairs elsewhere, gave them no consideration and Johnston's last proposals were not even acknowledged. 242

The government of John Mostyn in Menorca, 1771 -1772.

But for the Falklands Islands dispute with Spain, it is probable that Mostyn, like his immediate predecessors Howard and Lyttelton, would have chosen to remain in England and allowed the command in Menorca to devolve upon his Lieutenant. The prospect of war induced the home government to strengthen its overseas bases which were likely targets
for Spanish attacks and, with this in mind, Mostyn was informed in November 1770 that it was the 'King's pleasure that you do repair to your Government of Minorca without loss of time'. Mostyn immediately complied with the royal command, arriving in Menorca in January 1771, and he remained on the island for eighteen months until July 1772.

Of the three British Governors in the island with whom the Menorcans had to deal during the second period of British rule, Mostyn attracted the least criticism. He avoided any major contretemps with the Jurats in the sphere of civil government and, indeed, earned their approval as a military governor by the way in which he set out to correct abuses in the quartering of troops, and in the sympathetic manner in which he tackled the problems arising out of the decision to demolish the arrabal of St. Philip's and construct a new town, Georgetown, a few miles away at Cala Font.

Mostyn might well have returned to England with a happier memory of Menorca, had it not been for one incident which was to cost him dearly, and led him to say that he would never return - not even if he were offered the fee simple of the island. In September 1771, Mostyn ordered the arrest, imprisonment and then banishment of Antonio Fábrigas on a charge of seditious behaviour. It was not a decision which Mostyn took hastily or lightly - he consulted the island's law officers and was supported in his action by the opinions of his field officers - but it as a decision which Mostyn was called upon to justify when Fábrigas was encouraged to bring a civil action in the English courts, seeking damages for false imprisonment and banishment.
Fábrigas, variously described in court as a 'gentleman of the island of Minorca of as good condition as any inhabitant'\(^{247}\) by counsel for the plaintiff, and as 'Red Toney, a troublesome, drunken, shuffling fellow'\(^{248}\) by Colonel Mackellar, the Chief Engineer in Menorca, had applied to the Almotacén of St. Philip's to sell wine in the arrabal, but his request had been rejected on the grounds that licences were issued in order, and he was told that he would have to wait his turn on the roster. Fábrigas appealed to Mostyn, alleging bias on the part of the Almotacén, who was also a wineseller. Mostyn rejected the appeal, whereupon Fábrigas presented a petition to the Governor accusing the Almotacén on twelve counts of misconduct and prejudice. Mostyn took legal advice, which was that the accusations could not be substantiated, but that it was open to Fábrigas to pursue his case in the court of Royal Government, and Fábrigas was so advised. Fábrigas' reaction was to write again to Mostyn, stating that he intended to return in twenty-four hours, together with a band of supporters at which time he expected his petition to be granted.\(^{249}\) Faced with this challenge to his authority as governor, Mostyn decided to 'lay hold of the man and send him out of the island'.\(^{250}\) It emerged at the trial that this was done in a rather brutal manner and that Fábrigas, during his five days of imprisonment in the island, was held under maximum security and was refused permission even to see his family.

The essential facts in the case were not in dispute in court, although precise dates and times, the number of supporters intended to bring with him for his confrontation with Mostyn, and the reliability of the Menorcan interpreters
were, at various times, called into question. The plaintiff's case was that Mostyn had exceeded his authority by imprisoning him and banishing him without trial. Mostyn's defence was that the arrabal of St. Philip's was a 'royalty' - a district outside the jurisdiction of the island's courts in which he, by virtue of his Letters Patent as Governor, had 'absolute government' – and that the seditious nature of the plaintiff's conduct and its mutinous implications justified his actions. In November 1773, the jury found for Fábrigas, exonerating him of sedition and mutiny, and awarded him damages of £3,000 and ordered Mostyn to pay all the costs of the action.

The verdict was remarkable and surprising in that it ran contrary to the judgement of the Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas in 1765, in which he had ruled that a civil action for damages brought by a Menorcan was inadmissible in an English court. Mostyn appealed against the sentence of the court, partly on these grounds, but he was again unsuccessful. In January 1775, Lord Chief Justice Mansfield and his fellow judges upheld the verdict, and ruled that Fábrigas, as a subject of King George III, had as good a right as any British-born subject to apply for justice in England, and that the offence was committed in Menorca was no bar to the case being heard in England. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that Mostyn did not return to his command in Menorca.

The government of the Hon James Murray, 1774-1782.

Could they [French Canadians] be indulged with a few privileges which the laws of England deny Roman Catholics at home, they would soon get the better
of every natural antipathy to their conquerors and become the most faithful and useful set of men. 254

Such was the philosophy with which Lt-General the Hon James Murray, Johnston’s successor as Lt-Governor in Menorca in 1774, had approached his task as Governor of Quebec, and in the short period of his government there he did his best to implement it. He persuaded the home government to sanction the appointment of a Bishop (in all but name) to minister to the spiritual needs of the Catholic population, 255 he substituted English for French criminal law, and he allowed Catholics to practise as lawyers and to sit on juries. But his conciliatory approach had progressed too quickly for some politicians at home, and certainly for the small but disproportionately influential group of British settlers in Canada (they were initially outnumbered by some three hundred and fifty to one), 256 and Murray was recalled to England in 1766 to face an inquiry into his administration. In April 1767, an Order in Council dismissed the charges against him as ‘groundless’, 257 but he did not return to Canada, and his next active command was in Menorca.

It was a command which Murray, uniquely among the British commanders in Menorca, deliberately sought. His regiment (13th Foot) had been one of the regiments sent to Menorca to strengthen the garrison at the time of the Falklands crisis, and in 1774, he requested permission to join it there and exchange the post of Governor of Quebec (a post he still held as an absentee), for the Lieutenant-Governorship of Menorca. The offer proved attractive to Johnston, particularly since Murray undertook to compensate Johnston for the rest of his life with the difference in salary between the two posts. 258
The exchange received royal approval, and Murray and Johnston received their respective warrants in November 1774.259

It might have been expected that the appointment of Murray, the first British governor in Menorca to have had the experience of civil government of a predominantly Catholic British colony, who took pride, even after his recall from Quebec, in having been accused of:

warmth and firmness in protecting the King's French Canadian subjects, and of doing the utmost in my power to gain my royal master the affections of that brave, hardy people,260

would have been well-suited to command in Menorca, but it was not to be. Whether it was that Murray's appointment came too late for the Jurats to overcome their long-standing mistrust of British rule, or whether Murray's sympathies and admiration for the Canadians did not immediately extend towards the Menorcans - he was, in time, to consider them a 'turbulent people',261 - the civil government of Menorca under Murray was no less fraught with disputes than it had been in the past. Furthermore, Murray had, by his own admission, a 'temper as quick as lightning and combustible like gunpowders',262 and it was a temper which was sorely tried by the tenacious manner in which the Jurats clung to traditional ways, and were accustomed to 'pout at the King's orders and harass his Ministers and Governors upon every trifling occasion'.263

Murray assumed command in Menorca shortly before the outbreak of the American War of Independence, and at a time when Britain's other overseas possessions were potentially under threat from her traditional 18th century adversaries,
France and Spain. Murray's prime responsibility was to ensure the security of the island and his efforts to achieve this military objective occasioned most of the petitions of grievance which he received from the Jurats. Nevertheless, protests about Murray's actions in the strictly civil sphere of his administration were not lacking. The Jurats strongly resented his ban on any assembly of the universities which he had not sanctioned, and his insistence that his representatives must be present at any such meeting; he was accused of interfering in the elections and of exceeding his authority in dismissing the Secretary of the Universitat of Mahón. There were accusations that he had censored letters leaving Menorca, that he had interfered in the afforations, ignored the laws of trespass and individual liberty, and had instituted new criminal laws and caused illegal punishments to be inflicted.

Although Murray, at an early stage of his command, unsuccessfully recommended that knighthoods be conferred upon two prominent Menorcan anglophiles, Mateo Mercadal and Diego Vidal y Seguí, whatever inclination he may have had initially to conciliate the Menorcans did not persist for long, and he became convinced that Britain's retention of Menorca (and, incidentally, Gibraltar) was 'a prodigious expense', and economically unjustifiable. Nevertheless, this did not prevent him from urging upon the home government reforms in the government of the island. By the second year of his command, he had become convinced that fundamental changes were necessary. He wrote to the Secretary of State in April 1776, urging a thorough revision of the Menorcan constitution, drawing attention to the fact that some of the
laws and fueros dated, unchanged, from the early fourteenth century, when the population was insignificant, the people ignorant and the economy geared to day-to-day survival. Under British rule, the population had increased substantially, the people were more knowledgeable and less insular in their outlook and the economic well-being of the island had improved immeasurably. But, he contended, the affairs of the Universitats, particularly their finances, would continue to be lamentably unsatisfactory until control of them was vested in the 'opulent and instructed' classes of the community, and not entrusted to 'mechanicks, farmers and a very small proportion of citizens', and Murray urged stricter control of the finances of the Universitats by subjecting their accounts to annual scrutiny by the court of Royal Government. There was little novelty in Murray's proposed constitutional reforms - Johnston had argued along the same lines ten years earlier, and they embodied many of Kane's suggestions - but their timing was unfortunate. As on other occasions, the recommendations reached the home government at a time when it was preoccupied with other matters (on this occasion, the war in America), and no serious consideration was given to them. Murray was left to govern in the same pragmatic manner as his predecessors, and this, inevitably, led to yet another Syndich, Francisco Ximenes, being sent to London by the Jurats in 1780 to present the accumulation of grievances against Murray to which reference has already been made. Ximenes presented the petition (which Murray sarcastically described as a 'panegyric' on his administration, to the Privy Council in the Spring of 1781, but before any inquiry was instituted,
it was overtaken by events. Spain invaded Menorca in August 1781, and with the island's loss to Spain in February 1782, the inquiry became pointless.

The Spanish acquisition of Menorca pre-empted the need for Murray to answer the Jurats' complaints, but, on his return to England, it did not prevent him from having to face a court martial and a civil action for damages, both relating to his conduct in Menorca, and arising from "those tempestuous passions for which he is too frequently remarkable".272 The court martial took place as a result of twenty-nine charges of misconduct made against Murray by his deputy in Menorca, Lt-General Sir William Draper. Some of the charges echoed complaints listed by the Jurats in their petition, others were of a military nature, relating to Murray's conduct of the siege of St. Philip's.273 In January 1783, he was acquitted of all but two charges - undue interference with auction fees, and of issuing an order derogatory to the standing of his Lt-Governor.274 Murray was sentenced to be reprimanded on the two charges of which he had been found guilty, but George III overruled the verdict. Draper was ordered to apologise to Murray, and a month after the trial Murray was promoted to the rank of General.275

The civil action against Murray was brought in 1783 by James Sutherland, whom Murray had suspended from his post as judge of the vice-admiralty court for alleged seditious behaviour. Here again there is evidence of a clash of personalities and of vigorous reactions by Murray to some of Sutherland's decisions. George III, to whom the matter had been referred in 1780, had confirmed Murray's action, but Sutherland pursued his case in court where, notwithstanding
the King's known views, the jury found for Sutherland, and awarded him damages of £5,000 (plus costs) for unfair dismissal. However, such was the public standing of 'Old Minorca' as Murray was popularly known, the House of Commons voted on 6 May 1785 that Murray's fine and legal costs should be paid out of public funds. 276

Britain's failure to establish a civil government in Menorca, even to the extent of defining the Governor's jurisdiction, created confusion. In the circumstances, it is understandable that the Jurats chose to interpret Britain's repeated undertaking to respect their fueros in the most literal manner. The Jurats saw a clear distinction between civil and military government, and between their authority and the limits of the Governors' civil jurisdiction, and they were frustrated when what they considered to be unwarranted gubernatorial intervention in their affairs was justified by the Governors on the grounds of the exigencies of His Majesty's service. But the Jurats protested too much, and too often about comparatively trivial matters. They must also stand accused of intransigence. By the second period of British rule, some Menorcans, principally the emerging business class and those in permanent administrative government posts, were aware that the age-old system of election to the Universitats by ballot from the four estates, was out of date. Whatever the democratic virtues of the system, it placed the running of the island's internal affairs in the hands of too many who were inexperienced in financial management, and who were intellectually ill-equipped to cope with all the problems of government. The annual election of Jurats militated against the introduction
of any innovative measures, and the objectives of the Jurats
during their year in office were limited to a persistent
determination to retain their authority independent of the
Governor, and to an exercise in financial damage limitation.

The British Governors must also bear their share of blame
for their consistently confrontational approach to the issues
of civil government. Without exception the Governors were
senior army officers who were accustomed to having their
orders carried out without delay or question and, lacking any
clear directives, the Governors failed either dependably or
consistently to distinguish between their civil and military
authority. This resulted in what the Jurats considered to be
ill-disguised, autocratic military rule, under which the
Menorcans were not respected as British subjects, and were
treated as natives of an occupied territory, whose rights and
privileges were disregarded at will. All the British
Governors in Menorca were criticised by the Jurats for their
conduct in this context, and most were accused of extortion.
This was most clearly illustrated in the long-running
disputes about the apportionment of the profits of the
estanque and the anchorage dues, but accusations were also
periodically levelled that the Governors abused their
authority by charging excessive licensing fees, and were
guilty of profiteering at the expense of the Menorcans.
Mostyn was excluded from criticism on this count (although it
will be shown that he was not above accepting a bribe), and so, curiously, was Kane who undoubtedly used his position
to increase his emoluments. Although nothing seems to have
come of the venture, Kane sought, and together with
Carpenter, was granted in 1718 a royal patent for the
manufacture of salt in Menorca, and, in 1724, when the estanque was established, Kane reached an agreement with the Jurats that half the profit should be 'a Perquisite to the Governor for his concurrence in laying on that Duty'. It was also Kane who negotiated the first contracts for the supply of bread to the garrison (in 1714, 1728, and 1735), by which one third of the profits accrued to the Governor. But it was ironic and unjust that Murray should have been accused of cupidity (not only by the Jurats but also by Menorcan historians), for he had long considered the emoluments attached to a Governorship to be distasteful. In his Governorship in Quebec, he had deliberately chosen to forego £4,000 of fees which could legitimately have been considered part of his perquisites, and on his appointment to Menorca, he suggested to the Paymaster General, with the support of the Secretary at War, that all the money which the Governor received from perquisites should be made over to the Pay Office, and the Governor should be paid a fixed salary of £3,000 p.a. (equivalent to the total of pay plus perquisites), in order that:

the Governor or Lt-Governor on the spot may preserve his dignity and authority, which is impossible for him to do if his income is made up of perquisites to be taken and demanded on his authority.

Murray's suggestion was approved in principle, but was never implemented because lesser officials were unwilling to sacrifice their perquisites for a fixed salary. It should also be noted that Murray, unlike Mostyn, rejected the bribe that he was offered to promote a candidate for the post of
Paborde in 1778.\textsuperscript{285} He explained his action to the Secretary of State, writing that 'making money is not my passion'.\textsuperscript{286}

The majority of the civil actions taken or measures introduced by British Governors were reasonable - or at least justifiable because of the inaction of the Jurats - some were undoubtedly dictated by self-interest, and others were the result of intemperate reaction to opposition from the Jurats. But, in the final analysis, the explanation of the mutual mistrust of motives which was characteristic of the civil government of Menorca under British rule cannot be dissociated from the religious differences between the Governors and the governed. The Menorcans' Catholic heritage preserved a tie between them and Mallorca and Spain, and their loyalty to their Church was stronger than the allegiance they were called upon to give to a Protestant King. It was a factor of which the British Governors were well aware, and all of them, without exception, considered it to be implicitly at the root of most of the problems they encountered in every sphere of their administration, although it surfaced openly only in the opposition they encountered to the control they exerted over the island's ecclesiastical affairs.

1 PRO CO 174/1, f.43. Extract from Article XI of the Treaty of Utrecht, April 1713.
2 Mata, Guerra de Sucesión, p.384. Extract from the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Britain and Spain, 13 July 1713.
4 PRO CO 174/1, f.1. Argyll to Jurats, 5 December 1712.
5 PRO CO 174/3, ff.223,224. Proposals of Thomas Hope to Secretary of State concerning Menorca, 30 July 1765, contain an impartial assessment of the disadvantages under which the Menorcan merchants traded.
6 PRO CO 389/55, f.81. Extract from Kane's commission as Governor, 5 June 1733, but the wording is common to all the commissions of those appointed to govern in Menorca.

7 Riudavets, Historia vol.2, p.1137.

8 Martí, Síntesis, pp.33-37.

9 The contemporary primary sources of information upon which this, and the following sections are based are:

   BL Add Mss 23638, Tyrawley Papers, ff.32-86. Kane's 'Minutes on the Laws and Constitution of Minorca to be taken into consideration', c.1718.
   PRO CO 174/3, ff.54-59. J.Segui y Sancho (Abogado Fiscal), Mémoire sur l'Administration actuelle de la Justice dans l'Isle de Minorque. Enclosure No 3 from Johnston to Secretary of State, 11 October 1763.
   AM RG 142 - 2(2). J.Seguí y Sancho, Mémoire sur l'Administration actuelle de la Justice dans l'Isle Minorque avec les observations de ce qu'il conviendroit d'y changer, October 1763. An expanded version of PRO CO 174/3 pp.54-59 above.
   .AM RG 142 - 2(4), ff.1-15. J.Seguí y' Sancho, Mémoire sur l'Etat actuel de l'Administration de la Justice Civile et Criminel dans l'Isle de Miniore; du Gouvernement Municipal et Economique des Universités; du Revenu de sa Majesté; des Productions de l'Isle et son commerce; des moyens qu'il y auroit a prendre pour augmenter les Productions des Terres, qui, en même temps, fairoient une augmentation du Revenu de sa Majesté, le bien des Habitants de Minorque et l'Avantage du Commerce. This is a rough draft, and appears (from a comment on p.10) to have been written in the Autumn/Winter 1765, when Segui was in London as a defendant in the civil action brought by Pons y Ballaster.
   PRO CO 174/1, ff.240-243. J.Pons y Andreu [Menorcan Syndich in London], Constitution of the Civil and Economical Government of His Majesty's Island of Minorca.... as it was carried on until the year 1712. Memorial submitted to the Privy Council, 24 March 1768.
   .PRO CO 174/3, ff.61-63. J.Seguí y Sancho, Relation de l'ancien et actuel etat de l'administration de Justice civil et criminel dans l'Isle de Minorque depuis l'année 1370 jusqu'en 1757, et les changements faits par le Roy de France en l'année 1757. Enclosure No.4 from Johnston to Secretary of State, 16 December 1769.
   J.Ramis y Ramis, Resumen topográfico e histórico de Menorca, (Ms,1787). Published, (ed.) J.Gella Iturriaga, by the Real Academia de Historia (Madrid, 1989), pp.69-80, 101-125, 127-144.

Useful secondary information has been found in:

   Riudavets, Historia vol.2, pp.1133-1138.
   P.Vinent i Barceló, 'Proces de Desnaturalizació i Abolició de la Universitat General de Menorca' in RM 1964, pp.9-94.

10 AM/U (PR) 49 records that the yearly allocation of specific responsibilities took place at the first meeting of the newly elected universitat - usually in the first week of June.
11 KAO U 1590, 0138/37. The Situation of the Island of Minorca, undated and unsigned commentary c.1713.
12 Piña, Las instituciones, p.254. 'Memorial' of F.Segú y Sintes to the Court of Madrid, 15 December 1781.
14 Dr. Gabriel Olivar y Pardo.
15 PRO CO 174/16, ff.253-259. Abstract of the Constitution and Government of Minorca presented to the Secretary of State by Mateo Mercadal y Sanxo and Bernardo Olives y Olives (Syndichs), 6 March 1755.
16 PRO CO 389/54. Governor Carpenter's petition to the King, 1718.
17 Ibid.
18 BL Add Mss 17775, f.38. Neal's survey 1713.
19 BL Add Mss 32556, f.89. Neal to Dr. Cox Macro, 22 June 1713.
20 PRO Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations,1714, p.176. Mr. John Roop presented Mr. Neal's account of the Island of Minorca, 13 April 1714.
21 PRO CO 389/54. Bolingbroke to Neal, 22 April 1714.
22 Ibid., Bolingbroke to Kane, 22 April 1714.
23 Ibid., Bolingbroke to Durand(Chief Engineer), 22 April 1714.
24 Ibid., Bolingbroke to Wishart, 22 April 1714.
25 Ibid., Bolingbroke to Kane, 27 April 1714.
27 A Humble Representation of several Grievances and Hardships of His Majesty's most faithful Subjects, the Inhabitants of Minorca (London,1717), p.5.
28 BL Egerton Ms 2172, f.201. Kane to Bubb, 10 August 1716.
29 Ibid., ff.115,116. Kane to Bubb, 6 July 1716.
31 PRO SP 104, f.136. Sanxo's commission,22 September1715.
32 CCLO Wake Papers, p.173
33 PRO CO 174/15, ff.157,158. Juan Miguel Saura to Lord Carpenter, 31 May 1718.
34 PRO CO 174/15, f.207. Craggs to Bayarte 2 December 1718, ordering him to return to Menorca.
35 The Distress'd Condition of Minorca (London, 1720), passim.
36 Ibid., p.6. Petition of Don Jean(sic) de Bayarte to the House of Commons, 12 February 1720.
37 PRO CO 174/15, f.207. Craggs to Bayarte, 2 December 1718.
38 PRO CO 389/54. 'Abrege d'une partie des Griefls des Habitants de l'Isle de Minorque'. Bayarte to Lord Carteret,Secretary of State, Undated, but almost certainly 1723.
39 B.Laurie,'Richard Kane y su Mundo' in RM 1979,p.238.
41 A Vindication of Colonel Kane, Lt-Governor of Minorca, against the late Complaints made against him by the Inhabitants of that Island (London,1720), p.33.
42 PRO CO 389/54. Carpenter's memorial to the King, May/June 1718.
43 Ibid., Letters to the several committee chairmen from Secretary of State, all dated 21 June 1718.
44 Ibid., and also Craggs to Kane, 21 June 1718.
45 CCLO Wake Papers, f.146.
46 BL Add Mss 23638, ff.32-83. Minutes on the Laws and Constitution of Minorca to be taken into consideration.
Undated, but almost certainly second half of 1718.
47 Ibid., f.36.
48 Ibid., ff.80-83.
49 Ibid., sections 8,9.
50 Ibid., section 7.
51 Ibid., section 10.
52 Ibid., section 16.
53 Ibid., section 15.
54 Ibid., section 22.
55 Ibid., section 14.
56 Ibid., section 28.
57 Ibid., sections 24,25
58 Ibid., sections 3,4.
59 A. Victory, 'El Gobierno de Sir (sic) Richard Kane en Menorca' [hereafter Victory, Kane] in RM(1924), p.376. The road was started in 1713 and finally completed in 1720.
60 Fuero granted to all freemen of Menorca in 1403.
61 Victory, Kane, p.341.
62 Ibid.
63 Riudavets, Historia vol.2, pp.1234-1239.
64 PRO CO 174/3, f.55. Mémoire from Seguí to Johnston, 11 October 1763, dates the Admiralty's authorisation as 23 February 1718.
65 Victory, Kane, pp.357,358.
66 Ibid.
67 AM/U (D) 158. Kane to Jurats, 12 July 1728.
68 Ibid., Kane to Jurats, 11 June 1734.
69 Ibid., Kane to Jurats, 6 August 1724.
70 Ibid., Kane to Jurats, 2 April 1725.
71 Ibid., Kane to Jurats, 12 July 1728.
72 Ibid.
73 Riudavets, Historia vol.2, p.1239.
74 AM/U (D) 158, Kane to Jurats, 29 July 1728.
75 Victory, Kane, pp.350-356. Order dated 22 September 1733.
76 AM/U (D) 158, Kane to Jurats, 26 September, 24 October and 27 October 1724.
77 Ibid.
78 BL Add Mss 35885, f.162. Carpenter and Kane to the King in Council, 1730.
79 PRO CO 389/54. Carpenter's petition to the King, May/June 1718.
80 AM/U (PR) 52, ff.245-249. Complaints of the universitats about Pinfold's behaviour while Governor.
81 AM/U (Dip) 373. Petition of Juan Mir y Espineta (Syndich) to the Privy Council, 11 August 1743.
82 AM/U (Dip) 373. Petition of Joseph de Melis (Syndich) to the Privy Council, 1753.
83 AM/U (PR) 52, f.72, August 1738.
84 Ibid., Complaints against Pinfold.
85 PRO PC 2/95, ff.198-201. Decision of 2 June 1739.
86 AM/U (Dip) 370, leg.16. Petition of Dr. Simon Olivar y Cardona, Dr. Francisco Caules, Bartolomé Mascaro and Tomás Castel to the Privy Council, 26 July 1739.

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88 AM/U (Dip) 373. Complaints against Blakeney.
89 Ibid.
90 AM/U (PR) 59, ff.30,31. Blakeney to Jurats, 1753.
91 AM/U (PR) 52. Complaints against Pinfold, no.2, p.248.
92 Ibid., no.9.
93 PRO WO 1/294, f.633. Anstruther to Newcastle, 2 June 1739.
94 AM/U (Dip) 373. Complaints against Anstruther, nos. 17,18.
95 Ibid., no.21.
96 Ibid., no.20.
97 Ibid., no.24.
98 Ibid. Complaints against Blakeney,
99 AM/U (PR) 52. Complaints against Pinfold, f.248, nos. 5,6.
100 PRO WO 1/294, f.633. Anstruther to Newcastle, 2 June 1739.
101 AM/U (Dip) 373. Complaints against Anstruther, no.3.
102 Ibid., no.4.
103 Ibid., no.9.
104 Ibid., no.14.
105 Ibid., no.11.
106 Ibid., nos.1,12.
107 Ibid., no.15.
108 Ibid., no.16.
109 Ibid., no.6.
110 PRO CO 174/2, f.27. Wynyard to Newcastle, 25 January 1746.
112 AM/U (Dip) 373. Complaints against Blakeney.
113 AM/U (PR) 52. Complaints against Pinfold, p.248.
114 AM/U (Dip) 373. Complaints against Anstruther, no.19.
115 Hernández, 'La Colonia griega', p.332.
116 AM/U (Dip) 373. Complaints against Blakeney,
117 Ibid. Privy Council report, 16 March 1748. The Council limited consideration to allegations Nos.1,3,5,6,11,14,15 and 17.
118 Ibid.
119 Hernández, Compendio, p.311.
120 AM/U (Dip) 373, Privy Council report, 16 March 1748.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid., Recommendation no.1.
123 Ibid., no.2.
124 Ibid., no.3.
125 Ibid., nos.20,31.
126 Ibid., no.33.
127 Ibid., nos.32,29.
128 Ibid., no.26.
129 Ibid., nos. 22,25.
130 Ibid., no.34.
132 Ibid., Article no.1.
133 Ibid., Article no.6.
134 Ibid., Article no.2.
135 Ibid., Article no.3.
136 Ibid., Article no.5.
137 Ibid., Article no.4.
138 PRO CO 174/16, ff.55-63. 'Abstract of several Letters and Papers from General Blakeney, Lt-Governor of Minorca in 1752 and 1753'.
139 Ibid., ff.55,56. Blakeney to Holderness, 21 October 1752.
140 Ibid., f.57.
114 Ibid., f. 79. Major Hart to Blakeney, 7 June 1753.
115 Ibid., ff. 56, 57. Blakeney to Holderness, 21 October 1752.
116 Ibid., ff. 57, 58. Blakeney to Holderness, 6 November 1752.
117 Ibid., f. 60. Blakeney to Holderness, 11 January 1753.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., ff. 60, 61.
120 AM/U (Dip) 373, f. 2. Petition of the Jurats to the King in Council, (undated, but early 1753).
121 Ibid., f. 6.
123 AM/U (Dip) 373, f. 3. Petition of the Jurats to the King in Council (1753).
124 PRO CO 174/16, f. 61. Blakeney to Holderness, citing Andreul's complaint, 7 February 1753.
125 Ibid., f. 74. Sir Humphrey Bland to Blakeney, 29 May 1753.
126 Ibid., Blakeney to Bland, 14 July 1753.
127 Ibid., ff. 68–71. Privy Council's draft report, 8 May 1753.
128 BL Add Mss 23638, f. 95. Tyrawley to Secretary of State, 23 May 1753.
129 Ibid., f. 102.
130 Ibid.
131 PRO CO 174/16, ff. 94–104. Considerations on the Heads of Instructions to the Governor of Minorca, 29 July 1753.
132 Ibid., f. 96.
133 Ibid., f. 102
134 Ibid., f. 96.
135 Ibid., f. 97.
136 Ibid., ff. 98, 99.
137 AM/U 374. Recommendations of the Lords Justices, 10 August 1753.
138 PRO CO 389/56, ff. 147–162. 'Instructions for Our Right Trusty and Wellbeloved James, Lord Tyrawley, Governor in Our Island of Minorca, and in his Absence for Our Lieutenant Governor', 8 October 1753.
139 Ibid., Article 4.
140 Ibid., Article 3.
141 Ibid., Article 7.
142 Ibid., Article 8.
143 Ibid., Article 10.
144 Ibid., Article 13.
145 Ibid., Article 14.
146 Ibid., Article 12.
148 Ibid.
149 AM/U (MC) 86, ff. 10, 11. Jurats to the King in Council, 7 September 1754.
150 PRO CO 174/1, ff. 23–28. Brief Heads of Conference between Sir Thomas Robinson and the Deputies or Agents of the Island of Minorca, October 1754.
151 To be examined in subsequent chapters.
153 AM/U (MC) 86, Petition of the Jurats to the Duc de BelleisJlle, 19 July 1758.
The French garrison initially numbered 12,000, and although it was subsequently reduced to some 6,000, this was double the number of the maximum British garrison of 3,000.
221 PRO CO 174/4, f.128. Johnston to Shelburne, 20 April 1767, and
  PRO CO 174/5, f.23. Johnston to Shelburne, 9 April 1768.
222 AM/U 386, Pons petition to the King in Council, July 1766.
223 PRO CO 174/4, f.15. Order in Council, 22 March 1766.
224 The Deplorable State of the Island of Minorca and of the many Injuries inflicted upon the Inhabitants under Lt-
Governor Johnston (London, 1766).
225 E. Clarke, A Defence of the Conduct of the Lt-Governor of the Island of Minorca (London, 1767), pp.4,5.
226 Ibid., p.5. Dr. Mateo Mercadal and Juan Vidal refused the post of Syndich prior to Pons' appointment.
227 PRO CO 174/1, ff.1-8,12,16. Pons' petition, November 1770.
228 Ibid., f.10.
230 AM/U (A) 277. Various orders relating to Quarters, 16 November 1771 - March 1772.
231 PRO CO 174/5, ff.24,25. Johnston to Shelburne, 9 April 1768. Works undertaken included the building of new markets
and reconstruction work on the parish church in Mahon, and repairs to the church at Mercadal.
232 Ibid.
233 PRO CO 174/4, ff.206-215. 'Minutes of some Regulations proper to be made for the better Government of the Island of
Minorca in its different Branches'. Johnston to Shelburne, 1 September 1767.
234 v. Note 9 above. Seguí was the author of three significant 'mémories'.
236 PRO CO 174/1, ff.65-67.
237 Ibid., f.66.
238 Ibid., ff.49-51.
239 PRO CO 174/6, ff.12-22. Judgement of the Privy Council, 4 February 1770.
240 Ibid., ff.5-11. Weymouth to Johnston, 7 March 1770.
241 AM/U (MC) 88. Petitions of the Jurats to Johnston, 3 July and 3 August 1770.
242 PRO CO 174/8, ff.23,24. Minutes relating to different articles in Minorca, No.6, Johnston to Rochford, 20 May 1773.
243 PRO CO 174/4, f.106. Weymouth to Mostyn, 24 November 1770.
244 PRO CO 174/17, f.116. Murray to Weymouth (quoting Mostyn), 26 May 1778.
245 Gregory, Minorca, p.86, states that the encouragement came from Lord George Henry Lennox as an act of retaliation
against Mostyn who had had him removed from command of the 25th Foot in Menorca in 1772.
246 State Trials, vol. XX, pp.82-238, Fábregas v Mostyn gives a full account of the action in the Court of Common Pleas and
before the King's Bench 1773-1775.
247 Ibid., p.86.
248 Ibid., pp.136,172.
249 Ibid. The number of supporters mentioned in the trial varied between 100 and 250.
250 Ibid., p.114.
251 Ibid., p.172.
252 Ibid., p.176.
253 Ibid., pp.232-236.
254 Coupland, *The Quebec Act*, pp. 24, 25, citing Murray to the Lords Commissioners of Trade, 29 October 1764.
255 *Ibid.*, p. 53. The official title of the appointment was 'Superintendent of the Roman Church in Canada'.
258 R.H. Mahon, *The Life of General the Hon. James Murray* (London, 1921), p. 379, and PRO WO 1/295, ff. 409, 415, 427. Johnston to Barrington, 3 October and 6 November 1774 also refer. The annual salary of the Governor of Quebec was £365, and that of the Lt-Governor was £1,095 — excluding perquisites in both instances. However, Murray's biographer maintains that the yearly sum Murray contracted to pay Johnston was £300. (Mahon, Murray, p. 436).
261 PRO CO 174/18, f. 80. Henry Sayer (Murray's Secretary) to Privy Council, April 1781.
262 Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Dashwood Mss, Bucks, B2/2/4A. Murray to Lord Despencer, 2 August 1779.
264 AM/U 378 no. 1, f. 18. Jurats to Hillsborough, 6 March 1780.
265 PRO CO 174/17, f. 112. Petition of 'Britannick and Minorqueen Gentlemen' to Murray, March 1777.
266 PRO CO 174/18, ff. 68-78. Memorial of complaints by Jurats against Murray, 18 April 1781.
267 PRO CO 174/9, f. 99. Murray to Rochford, 4 September 1775.
269 PRO CO 174/9, No. 23, f. 168. Murray to Weymouth, 8 April 1776.
270 *Ibid*.
274 J. Segura y Salado, 'Documents inédits del darrer setge de Sant Felip,' *RM* 1982, pp. 142-180, traces the stormy relationship between Murray and Draper during the siege.
276 *DNB*. Entry for Murray.
277 £500 from Dr. Gabriel Olivar y Pardo to promote Olivar's candidacy for the post of Paborde of Menorca in 1778. The incident is examined in the next chapter.
278 *PRO Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations*, March 1715 - October 1718 (London, 1924), p. 395. The patent was granted 10 June 1718.
279 PRO CO 174/1, ff. 151, 152. Memorandum on the estanque, unsigned and undated but c. 1770.
280 Crofton, *Record*, pp. 46-48, 1 August (?) 1714.
282 PRO CO 389/55, ff. 125-131, 1 August 1735.
284 PRO CO 174/9, f. 194. Copy of Treasury minutes to the Privy Council, 26 April 1776.
285 see note 275, above.