The cultural context of the theories of Heinrich Schenker

Thesis

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The Cultural Context of the Theories of

HEINRICH SCHENKER

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The thesis presents Schenker's theory of musical structure as grounded in the (mainly pedagogic) music theory and practice of the eighteenth century, like the music of the period of German classicism to which it relates. It argues that Schenker was right to see his theory as having a wider significance than the strictly music-theoretical, and that the music-structural concept which he elaborated and codified is inseparable from the work as a whole. Set apart from the aesthetic and cultural outlook from which it emerged, the historical and critical studies of the repertory and of the theoretical literature, it may still be usable, but it is profoundly impoverished and loses the very particular meaning it had for Schenker.

The thesis proposes that while Schenker's formulation of his structural concept is unique, the concept itself is not, but was a cultural property which Schenker re-discovered and that it is in this re-discovery as much as in the thing itself that the significance of his work resides.

The view of Schenker as an eccentric is counterbalanced by a picture of a thinker moulded by experiences anything but unique to him, but, nevertheless unique to a particular historical phase. It is suggested that in the absence of a minimal degree of understanding of this phase and these experiences no judgement of Schenker as thinker, writer, even musician, can properly be made.
Chapter One gives a brief account of Schenker's career. Chapter Two attempts to define a context for his exploration of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century pedagogic theory. Chapter Three attempts to dispose of some mid-century shibboleths inhibiting understanding of Schenker. Chapter Four explores the radical changes in the character of musical scholarship taking place in Schenker's lifetime, relating these to developments in other fields, especially in philology, and considers their effect on him. Chapter Five considers Schenker's attitude towards aesthetic and scientific theories in circulation in his day and their contribution to the formulation of his music-structural concept and its development. The main focus of this chapter is the metaphysics of music of Schopenhauer. Chapter Six examines some of the problems arising from Schenker's historical-cultural situation and considers the enabling role played for him by the work of Nietzsche.
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Ruth has been among the most tireless and inspiring of the many friends who have shared their thoughts with me. But for her I would have remained ignorant of many things indispensable to an understanding of Schenker and his situation, and much more.

Surely the most selfless act of all was Margaret Dawson's scrutiny of the final text, the only reward for which was the pleasure of seeing so many double parentheses bite the dust.
Of the acres of print devoted to 'Schenkerian analysis' only a small proportion has been focused on Schenker's own work. Most of the secondary literature consists of accounts of systems extrapolated from his late writings with various degrees of faithfulness to his theoretical principles, and often little or none to his philosophical ones, and records of analyses of works employing these systems. Other approaches - attempts to trace theoretical antecedents, to consider the early work, to explore the cultural context in which the work was done, to consider his thought as a whole - remain peripheral and often tentative.

As for the theorist himself, he remains rather sketchily delineated, represented by a few gestures: querulous, vehement, intolerant, humourless, a Besserwisser. The only substantial biographical study seems at first glance unlikely to humanise this shadow, written as it is in a drily documentary style avoiding anything that cannot be referred to a letter or a diary entry, or some other written record.

But Schenker was a constitutional recorder. He hoarded notes, newspaper cuttings, letters, drafts of letters, and from his late twenties onwards, the minutiae of his day-to-day experience on the thousands of pages of his diaries. Even the most ascetically scholarly biographer,
merely by quoting from this material, as Federhofer does extensively, delivers, in spite of himself, a picture laden with detail, in a huge, rich, even fantastic perspective. Schenker is no longer a few lines pencilled on a blank sheet, but a figure in a landscape.

The following pages attempt to explore some aspects of this landscape in relation to this figure with the hope of contributing a little to the understanding of both. It seems premature to approach the work critically until the underlying assumptions and their origins are more fully considered. To be fruitful, such an approach would have to be very different from the rather arbitrarily judgemental treatment to which Schenker's output has been too often subjected on the one hand, and the assumption, on the other, that its supposed empirical purity automatically guarantees its validity. An essential precondition is the reduction of the mystification which has flourished because of the lack of an intelligible context. This context must include the theoretical history to which Schenker devoted so much time, the rise of modern musicology, against which phenomenon he had to work out his career, and the philosophical influences upon that development and upon alternative modes of thought such as Schenker's. It must also take cognisance of the historical circumstances impinging on the lives of musicians and musical scholars in his time, and of what he brought to his studies from his personal background.

Part of the mystification, however, has nothing to do with Schenker, but with the peculiar insularity of at least certain branches of mid-twentieth-century musical scholarship, which seem sometimes to have been better informed about the remote past than about their own recent history and more au fait with fashionable theories in other
fields than with some rather basic aspects of their own. These conditions have made Schenker more obscure than he need have been.

It is not self-evident that theories of music analysis are necessary. Nor is it obvious what they achieve, in particular, whether they benefit art. Of course analysis is not necessarily meant to benefit art. It is done perhaps for the benefit of the analyst, because it amuses him, or for its educative value, or for some other purpose quite external to the purposes of the art itself. Some analytic studies have been undertaken in order to make possible the formulation of rules of composition. Others have been more purely scientific in character, attempts to discover not so much the patterns the composers consciously weave into their work, as underlying patterns of which they may not be conscious, or which are not, at least in the first instance, the product of conscious contriving. Some analysts have seen themselves as working in a different way from the composer but in the same direction and towards the same end, namely the manifestation of universal laws of organisation. The composer, to use Schenker's word, 'divines', the analyst discovers. The work of art in this view is a means to an end, which is the refining and ultimate perfection of the art whose purpose is essentially revelatory.

It is this notion of the purpose of art, among other things, which has led some critics of Schenker to see him as attaching himself to out-of-date philosophical ideas. Attempts to salvage the usable parts of a theory thus tainted have tried to re-focus the analytic purpose, and Schenker's theory has lent itself to various re-interpretations which seek to accommodate it to a more
modern notion of science, ironically in view of Schenker's hostility to the scientising of music. But, in reality, the analysis of music is, by definition, scientific and has always considered itself so, not necessarily with less justification in 1618 or 1860 than in 1959 or 1977.

In its physical-mathematical aspect, music theory goes as far back as the history of rational thought, but from time immemorial, this same aspect of it has also been felt to have religious significance, and the two kinds of thought are often, indeed, until the eighteenth century, almost always, associated. Even the Enlightenment did not seriously disrupt this connection. An empirical approach to the discovery of laws of musical organisation, as Descartes had shown, was not incompatible with belief in God as the originator of those laws. Even the post-Newtonian search for a physical origin for them did little to reduce the mysteriousness of music. Indeed, it might have helped to keep the sense of mystery alive by its blatant lack of relation to artistic experience, a lack which sometimes made the theorists a laughing-stock among composers. Metaphysical accounts of the art continued to be influential well into the early years of the present century, making it possible to propose a quasi-religious interpretation of the origins of musical law, as Schenker did, without thereby necessarily losing intellectual credibility, except in certain quarters.

Unfortunately for Schenker these quarters soon came to include the domain of musicology. Schenker's frequent reference to the Divinity became one of the many causes for embarrassment he gave to his followers. It is also one of the things that makes the story interesting. How does it come about that a writer regarded as superstitious, irrational, out of touch with modernity, can have influenced
theorists reared in a system of thought so hostile to anything metaphysical that they cannot read him?

Schenker's real fame began only after his death. He died almost five years before the war, and his name began to be widely known outside the German speaking world - where it was already virtually forgotten - only a decade after it. The gap which separated him from his new public was difficult to bridge. He wrote in one language and the hoped-for public read another. The translation of the work has been slow. As independent reading of Schenker was thought to be positively harmful to the development of an orthodox Schenkerism, it was not a high priority.

In these circumstances, the myth of Schenker as a kind of scientific equivalent of the holy fool was easy to promulgate. Even those who could read German and lay hands on the rare copies of his works still extant were bewildered by his style of thinking and his personal and parochial theoretical jargons, which made comparison of his theory with the versions offered by his followers anything but straightforward.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the mid-century reaction to the reappearance of Schenker's theory is the inability of the critics to place Schenker's philosophical, historical, scientific, even his music-theoretical assumptions. The belief that these ideas, none of which was in the least extraordinary in its time and place, were idiosyncratic to the point of calling into question Schenker's mental stability, or were part of some pseudo-philosophy, deservedly defunct and buried beyond the reach of research, was all too obviously genuine.
While this ignorance facilitated the substitution for his philosophical rationale of alternatives more congenial to mid-century America, it also led to some serious misreadings of his strictly music-theoretical and music-pedagogic notions, notions which were crucial to his theory and at the heart of his motivation as a teacher and as a scholar.

It is surely only misunderstanding that can have led to the belief that a good preparation for the study of Schenker is a conventional training in 'harmony and counterpoint'. This would suggest that Schenker's theory, far from offering any challenge to conventional pedagogic programmes, is entirely compatible with them, even dependent upon them.

Schenker would have found this acquiescence in the institutional status quo profoundly depressing. All those years of poring over the pedagogic literature, arguing with the authors, comparing their rules with the practice of the composers, testing, reasoning, tracing the sources of their assumptions, the outpouring of effort which the text-book hacks of his day avoided by simply repeating what they had read in works of other hacks and adding a few refinements of their own...would seem to have been futile if at the end of it the student is still sent back to such sources for instruction in harmony and counterpoint before he is considered ready to be initiated into 'Schenkerian analysis'.

A non-musician could be forgiven for thinking that 'harmony and counterpoint' are the names of disciplines as clearly defined as - say - 'calculus' or 'meteorology'. This is not so. There is not, and never has been, any universally
agreed definition of 'harmony' either as an academic discipline or as a metaphysical entity. There are as many definitions as there are authors of text-books and the text-books are legion.

The case of counterpoint is, if possible, still more confused. For some people counterpoint means essentially 'species counterpoint'. For others it means exactly those parts of the curriculum which are not included in the species: motivic or imitative counterpoint, double, invertible, mirror counterpoints and other such techniques, and above all fugue. Schenker's hostility to this latter interpretation of the role of counterpoint in classical composition is rooted in the particularity of his experience as a part-time music student in late-nineteenth-century-Vienna. Very soon after his time at the Conservatory the counterpoint course he had attended no longer ran. Species counterpoint became an antiquarian-musicological property relinquished by the Conservatory pedagogues to the University theorists.

Theorists for whom counterpoint means primarily species counterpoint are further divided into those who feel that the species are inseparable from the ecclesiastical modes and those who favour a major-minor adaptation of the system. Fux belonged to the former group, Schenker very vociferously to the latter. It is therefore misleading to say without further qualification that 'in the Schenkerian tradition' the reference point is Fux. Yet 'another line of division' is one between those who, like Schenker (and, indeed, Bruckner, still in Schenker's time), distinguish the pedagogic from the analytic motivation of the species, and the style-analysts, who conflate them.
These discrepancies reflect the difficulty of defining counterpoint itself, the art in its various guises, as we find it in the works of those who were masters of it. There is no more agreement about the nature of this art than about counterpoint as an academic discipline, and authors of 'pedagogical works' who pretend that there is should be treated with the same caution as authors of harmony books who give us to understand that four-part harmony exercises written according to schemes worked out in terms of invertible triads, constructed upon scale steps identified by Roman numerals, and connected according to 'the two well-known guide-lines: ...1) preserve common tones or 2) move to the nearest note by step...subject to the prohibition of parallel perfect intervals', reflect the compositional procedure used by Bach in writing chorales.\(^8\)

Schenker's study of counterpoint is anything but a survey of the literature, merely. To begin with he ignores large areas of it entirely, focusing overwhelmingly, and minutely, on the species. This is, moreover, a particular version of the species, considered from a particular point of view. This kind of contrapuntal theory for Schenker is a Cartesian basket of apples 'some of which are bad'. What he does is 'to empty [the] basket completely and take out and test the apples one by one, in order to put the good ones back in [the] basket and throw away those that are not [good]'\(^9\). Whatever may ultimately be thought of his criteria, this was a monumental labour, too important to the development of his thought to be ignored, as it has tended to be by the systematisers, who could not extricate themselves from the musicological conventions, so hated by Schenker, to which they were anxious to make him appear to conform.
The patent lack of understanding between Schenker and some of his most widely read interpreters, their concern, indeed, to distance themselves from him, calls into question the authenticity of any theory extrapolated from his work which takes no account of his own guiding principles. Anyone who reads *Free Composition* must be struck by the striving for systematic consistency, the desire to leave no loopholes. It is inevitable that this should prompt caution in the reader, but it cannot justify the arbitrary selection of the most appealing features without reference to any comprehensive rationale. It is the principles to which the phenomena are required to conform that should be considered critically. This is a topic the present study attempts to prise a little wider open.
Notes

1. i. For a listing of the secondary literature see Beach, 1985.

ii. Literature addressing theoretical antecedents and of particular relevance to the present study includes Morgan 1978; Grave, 1980; Wason, 1983; Krebs, 1988.

iii. For a list of the philosophical literature see Pastille, 1985.

For further listings see Siegel, 1990, p. 2.


5. See e.g., Narmour, 1980, especially Ch. 3.


8. See op. cit., n. 6. p. 50.

Chapter 1

Heinrich Schenker

Heinrich Schenker was born on 19th June 1868 in Wisniowczyk, near Podhajce (Podgacy) in Galicia (now Ukrainia), where his father was a doctor. He attended a Gymnasium in Lemberg (Lvov) but took his Matura in Brzezhany (Berezhany) before going as a law student to Vienna in 1884. In 1887 he enrolled at the Conservatory, attending the harmony and counterpoint classes of Bruckner and studying piano with Ernst Ludwig. He received his doctorate in law in 1889 and embarked on a free-lance musical and journalistic career. Apart from holidays in the Tyrol he made only rare excursions out of Vienna, on one of which he re-visited Lemberg as accompanist to the Dutch bass singer Messchaert. From about 1900 he devoted his time almost exclusively to private teaching and writing, never holding any institutional appointment. After a long friendship, he married Jeanette Kornfeld (née Schiff) on her divorce in 1919. His health had been sufficiently precarious to exempt him from military service in 1914 when symptoms of diabetes began to appear. He became acutely ill on 4th January, 1935, and died ten days later. Jaenette Schenker died in Theresienstadt in 1945. There were no children.
The major problem in approaching Schenker's writings has been a cultural one. His wildly incorrect political views were an embarrassment to his emigré pupils and followers, and indeed remain so. His reactionary attitude appears everywhere in his writings. He prefaced his works with diatribes of extraordinary ferocity against progress in all its forms, against the dilettantism of an ignorant public and the irresponsibility of the commercialisers of art, the performers, publishers, entrepreneurs, teachers, institutions, who pander to its philistinism. He interspersed his texts with similar outbursts, sometimes astonishingly personalised, and never tired of making connections between his aesthetic interpretations and his elitist social and cultural ideas.

It was by no means only Modernism - a late manifestation of the cultural catastrophe he talked about in his preface to Counterpoint - which provoked him. The whole culture, he believed, had long been corrupt. But it is not at all easy to pinpoint the time at which he believed this corruption had set in, and it begins to seem that the culture he envisaged is not so much an historical reality as an ideal capable of realisation only through art, a fleeting glimpse of which was afforded by the brief flowering of the German classical revival, and whose fulfilment must await a future chastened by catastrophe.

His work also presented problems of style and of a more
specifically musicological-ideological nature. But it is hardly necessary to look much further than his hostility to the whole secularist, pluralist and materially oriented ethos of which musicology is so much a part, in order to understand the neglect of his writings and the reluctance to translate them, and to find a motive for the apologies and disclaimers that are their standard editorial accompaniment. This is the background against which the effort to carve out one portion of his work from the rest and to claim that this is both justifiable and beneficial should be considered. There may have been a certain truth in the latter claim, since the presentation of the works in their entirety to an intellectual community fastidious in the extreme about political correctness would have made the professional position of Schenkerians difficult and the continuation of interest in his thought doubtful. Even the survival of a body of work of enormous historical interest might have been at risk.

This embarrassment, however, reflects the difficulties of the émigrés and the political pressures on intellectuals in the Anglo-Saxon world since the war as clearly as Schenker's attitudes reflect his situation. Schenker's reactionariness was only part of the problem.

He is categorised by the New Grove as 'an Austrian theorist of Polish birth'. Another fact of his biography crucial to his career, as well as a potent influence on his outlook and even directly on his theorising, was either thought too insignificant to be worth mentioning, or felt to be some kind of embarrassment: the fact that, rather more than he was a Pole and at least as much as he was an Austrian, he was a Jew.
Of course, this can be regarded as insignificant if, in accordance with the superstition that an individual can be separated from his thought, we regard Schenker's experience in its entirety as insignificant, and if we are sufficiently ingenious about separating his abstract, 'scientific' activity from other aspects of his thought, so that the latter can be assigned to the irrelevant domain of the personal. But Schenker's affection for Judaism and his position as a Jew are indispensable keys to an understanding of his political-cultural attitudes. Contextless, as he and his work have so often been presented, these curious attitudes look like evidence of a character flaw, which — according to the received wisdom — mercifully did not impinge upon his analytic work, since this was purely empirical. The reality is more interesting.

* * *

Schenker was a particular kind of Jewish intellectual. It is not merely that he was a devout believer. A Jew who is assimilated in every other respect and carries his religion as lightly as a member of any other denomination, lightly enough for it to have no significant effect on his professional activity, is unexceptionable. But Schenker was patently not, in this sense, fully assimilated, even if, in point of manners and social behaviour, he was indistinguishable from the converts. It is not so much the fact that he allows specifically Jewish thought to interfere with his work, but that he entertains religious ideas at all on a plane generally considered entirely secular, which is, in a sense, a peculiarity of his kind of Jewishness. Worse, there is a streak of something suspiciously like
fundamentalism in his religious outlook, and this also shows through in his work in a way that is even more difficult for twentieth century scholarship to deal with. If his religion had not been de-mythologised it is not surprising that his resistance to the metaphysical was not as implacable as a well brought up positivist might wish.

The significance of his Jewishness would not have been so clear, except perhaps to fellow Jews, until relatively recently. Two developments have made it inescapably so. In the last decade there has been a spectacular growth of interest in pre-Holocaust Vienna and much study has been devoted to the Jewish contribution to the life of a city which is seen, in so many ways, as the cradle of twentieth century culture, artistic, philosophical and scientific. The focus has begun to broaden to take in the significance not only of the Viennese experience of an artistic-intellectual community which was largely immigrant, but also the provincial world from which the immigrants came. Schenker's cultural ambience, once a darkened stage on which ghostly figures shuffled meaninglessly about, is beginning to be illuminated.

In 1985 Hellmut Federhofer published an account of Schenker's life which does more than merely correct factual errors in older accounts. It is supplemented by quantities of material abstracted from Schenker's correspondence and his immensely detailed diaries. This study has transformed the picture of Schenker as a man and as a thinker.

From Federhofer's work it becomes obvious at once that Schenker was a typical example of a refugee from rural Judentum to the Habsburg metropolis, that his career is intelligible only in terms of the circumstances
characteristic of that situation, and that, to a considerable extent, his intellectual behaviour is the product of the tensions in the assimilee who cannot make the crucial move to complete his assimilation: who cannot convert. The problem is not a simple hostility to Christianity. Schenker's reflections on Christianity reveal a level of sympathy and understanding, even of information, far higher than is to be found among many nominal Christians. The problem is the impossibility of repudiating either Judaism or Judentum. Schenker the elitist demonstrates more loyalty towards and more fellow feeling for the Jewish masses than is to be found among many of the converts, as he bitterly reflected when, in the twenties, he was accused by some of them of being a Nazi sympathiser. It was they, not he, he pointed out, who had ostentatiously dissociated themselves from the stereotype, not only from the 'manners and gestures' of the 'typical Galician Jew', but from the faith which bore the taint of these things.

'Judaism' figures as one of the themes under which Federhofer discusses Schenker's Weltanschauung, distinguishing it, interestingly, from 'Religion'. But the evidence he presents makes it clear that Judaism was certainly not for Schenker merely another ideological or philosophical option. Even before the advent of systematic anti-Semitism, being or not being Jewish was never simply a matter of intellectual choice. If it had been as simple as that his bitterness would amount to nothing more than personal disillusion and disappointment. The impossibility of attaching himself with conviction to any strand of the social fabric in which he had to live except the pariah status of the practising Jew, which was the cause of this bitterness, would then appear to be merely an abstract dilemma; the emotional havoc he suffered and the spiritual
turmoil, which eventually became almost intolerable, would be reduced to the level of the 'annoyance' and irritation he so often arouses in others.

To present Schenker's career as more or less normal, and his behaviour as merely irascible and overbearing, is to treat as irrelevant the vast social trauma in which he found himself caught up at a particularly sensitive moment. This was the point at which the confrontation between the medieval world of quietist Judaism and post-Enlightenment, secular, technological civilisation was beginning to show its potential for catastrophe. In this encounter, the real alternatives open to provincial Jews in the Austrian metropolis were no longer easy even to identify, as Schenker's dilemmas, his hesitations, his false moves, his failures, illustrate by contrast with the success stories of an older generation. If opportunities were still great, choices were narrowing dramatically.

Schenker's time in Vienna began when a new, rationalised, organised form of hatred of the Jews was intensifying. The position of the Jews in Vienna had become precarious with the stock-exchange crash of 1873, for which they were held responsible by the Christian bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie. This calamity was followed by a wave of conversions among rich Jews. Jews 'had been the pace-setters of Viennese middle-class life during the Ausgleich period. When forces of conformity swept the immigrant Jews into accepting pseudo-aristocratic social values, aesthetic escapism and economic speculation as a way of life, the Christian world followed'. Christian bitterness after the crash was in proportion to Christian disappointment, and events outside Austria concentrated attention on the controversial situation of the Jews. In 1878 'anti-Semitism'
became a political slogan in the German Reich. In 1881 there were pogroms in Russia. In 1882 the Tisza-Eszlar ritual murder case breathed new life into ancient superstition and gave an atavistic impetus to the controversy. In the same year a new stock-exchange scandal occurred in Vienna. In 1884 Georg Schonerer was engaged in an openly anti-Semitic campaign for the nationalisation of the Nordbahn, the railway company founded by the still un-converted Rothschild family, which had opened up communication with Schenker's homeland, Galicia. This was the year Schenker entered the university. Alphonse Rothschild was to be his pupil and his 'Maecenas'. By 1895, when Schenker read a paper to the University Philosophical Society, anti-Semitism was in the process of being institutionalised in Viennese politics. In 1897 the anti-Semitic Christian Socialist Karl Lueger became mayor of the city. By 1900 many wealthy, assimilated Viennese Jews, in the sharpest contrast to their Ausgleich ancestors, were trying to avoid the suspicion of favouring other Jews economically, professionally or socially, were trying, indeed, to look as little Jewish as possible, sometimes even changing their names.

The convert Wittgenstein family typifies the new attitude. If it could not quite rival the wealth of the steadfastly unconverted Rothschilds, it far surpassed them in ostentation in conspicuously Viennese style. Ludwig Wittgenstein later recorded a series of observations about Jewish artists which give a sense of the intensity of the recoil of the 'second society' not only from the poor Jews of the Leopoldstadt but from other successful Jews, including baptised Jews who were, nevertheless, perfectly well known to be Jews. Jews, he claims, have talent but not genius; they are 'reproductive'; they lack creative 'courage' and integrity; they intellectualise art. Kraus's
drama is 'abstract', Mendelssohn is all 'arabesques', Mahler's music is 'worthless'. Bruckner, on the other hand is 'Alpine' and 'pure', Brahms above praise, Austrian art 'subtler than anything else'. Jews are like a disease, an anomaly in the body of other nations. Deeply influenced by Weininger, Wittgenstein expresses an attitude which, were it not for the false modesty with which he seeks to soften the crudity of his anti-Semitism, would be worthy of Wagner at his most Pharisaic.

The Wittgensteins were champions of Brahms, and it is presumably to this circumstance rather than to the repulsiveness of Wagner's Judeophobia that Wittgenstein's suspicion of Wagner is to be attributed. Schenker idolised Brahms and very much wanted to be, and to be considered, part of the magic circle around him. In 1912 he had occasion to approach the Wittgensteins for access to a Beethoven autograph. But he was never a habitué there. His letter of thanks to Rothschild on the publication of Counterpoint, which Rothschild had financed, suggests the difficulty he would have had in accommodating himself to that ambience.

Schenker's Jewishness is at least as relevant to the pattern of his career and to the development of his thought as any of the theories, musical, scientific, philosophical or political, which came his way. In describing him as Polish, however, the New Grove puts a finger on a feature of his life and thought which is as significant as the Jewishness with which it is so closely bound up: namely his difficulty in defining himself.

* * *

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At the age of ten, Schenker went to Lemberg, where, according to rather vague anecdotal evidence, he was inspired - possibly taught - by Mikuli.\textsuperscript{12} It is not inconceivable that he was sent there for that purpose and that the move to Brzeżany represents a change of direction in several senses.\textsuperscript{13} Karl Mikuli himself came from Cernovitz, which is about the same distance from Podhajce as Podhajce is from Lemberg. Whatever Mikuli's background (the New Grove says he was 'a Polish pianist of Moldavian origin') he assimilated to Polish culture via his connection with Chopin, to which his forty year dominance of the musical life of Lemberg was hardly unrelated. If, as it appears, he was Schenker's childhood idol, it would hardly be surprising if Schenker entertained the same ambition. The mere ambition, however, could not make him Polish, and if it existed, it was, either perforce or by choice, abandoned in favour of assimilation to the German language and culture represented by the education system of the Austrian state. Schenker, as everyone knows, became an ardent, even strident, devotee of German culture, and gradually lost interest in virtually all non-German music. His love of Chopin remained, however, and is poignant testimony to one of the many cultural tensions with which he had to live.

In western Galicia there had long been a close relationship between Poles and orthodox Jews.\textsuperscript{14} As the administrative language of the Cracow region was Polish, the Jewish merchants there had to trade in that language. In the revolution of 1848 Jewish leaders aligned themselves with the Poles. But Schenker came from eastern Galicia and even in 1848 many Jews there looked towards Vienna, partly for the same sort of reason - the administrative language in the east was German - but also because the population was largely Ruthenian and was beginning to assert itself.
politically in opposition to the Polish magnates. By the 1860s the enthusiasm for Polonisation had greatly diminished, especially among Jewish reformers. Soon it was virtually confined to Cracow. Polish anti-Semitism, and the rivalry between the Jews of the Haskalah and Jewish conservatives - in collusion with Catholic reactionaries to preserve the status quo - hastened its demise. Besides, while the Austrian education system offered an escape route from poverty and obscurity, the Poles had nothing to contribute to Jewish modernisation and no comparable route to assimilation for individuals.

In the 1870s the outcome of the struggle between the Orthodox alliance with the Poles and the Germanophile modernisers, who sometimes allied themselves with the Ruthenians against the Poles, was still unclear. The threat to the reformers from the obscurantism of the extreme conservatives in Galicia, where the power of the Hasidim was greater than anywhere else (except perhaps Bukovina), made the situation of Jews like Johann Schenker, with a modern education and occupying an official (Austrian) position, particularly delicate. It certainly cannot have been obvious to Schenker's family that the best way for their children to progress was to try to assimilate to Polish society. The magnetism of Mikuli was, therefore, inevitably a potential source of conflict. For whatever reason, Schenker was removed from this influence and made, or had made for him, the decisive choice of preparing for the Austrian matriculation examination, the Matura. At sixteen he was sent to Vienna to study law.

The ghost of Chopin, however, continued to haunt him and three years later he enrolled at the Conservatory as a student of piano. He was also composing, and already making
efforts, not without some success, to attract attention to
himself as a musician. He continued his law studies, clearly
feeling the weight of an obligation in that direction, but
on graduating, to paraphrase a remark of his own, 'converted
immediately...to the musical confession'.

This conversion cannot have pleased his family. At the
day of the same year - 1887 - his father died. His mother
and the children remaining with her, moved to Vienna where,
 according to Schenker's account, he had to help maintain
them by giving piano lessons. Whatever the reason for this,
it contributed to Schenker's uncertainty about his career.
On the one hand he was pushed into music as the only
available means of earning money, and on the other he was
expected, at all costs, to complete his law studies since
the material reward to be expected from a legal career must
far outstrip anything he could realistically hope to gain
from music.

However, this may not be how the situation presented
itself to him. While still a student he evinced not only a
monumental capacity for work but a certain acumen in
exploiting connections. He did not suffer from shyness and
his boldness brought him early, surprisingly easy, if small
rewards which may have fostered exaggerated optimism. His
decision to go free-lance may have been simply a gamble. If
so, although he survived comfortably enough, it was a gamble
which never paid off in material terms. This was surely not
due to lack of talent.

The social and political climate in the 1890s was
changing. The Jewish support network, with whose assistance
Schenker was able to get a start as a journalist, composer,
and performer, was in the process of breaking apart.
did, in fact, help to sustain him throughout his life, but with hand-outs, not the promotion he needed. A Jewish-dominated university music-department might have seemed a potential haven, but Adler, himself an outsider, was intent upon establishing the department's academic-scientific credentials. 'Academic', by now, in music, at least, meant something more specific than 'scholarly'. Schenker was recognisable as a scholar, potentially of some substance. A music academic he was not.19 Meanwhile, the other relevant institution, the Conservatory, was, despite its origins as part of Fanny von Arnstein's Gesellschaft, Christian in temper, its theoretical tradition harking back to church music through teachers nurtured in the ecclesiastical tradition which had been the obvious recruiting ground for the new pedagogic institutions in Fanny's time.20 Moreover a nexus between even this world and the world of journalism, to whose Jewish orientation Schenker's early success in that area must surely be attributed, was developing despite the long-standing hostility between the musical press, in the shape of Hanslick, and the grandee of the Christian pedagogic tradition, Bruckner.21 All the loopholes which had made possible the entry of people like Hanslick and Adler were being closed up.

It would appear that Schenker became trapped, at least psychologically, by the promise of success which never came. By 1895 probably, and by 1900 certainly, there was no obvious way forward and no way back to a 'normal' Jewish middle-class career.

Sixteen years later Schenker had occasion to justify his decision to make no direct use of his legal qualifications. In May, 1916, he was in conversation in the
Vindobona cafe with a Jewish textile manufacturer named Maiulik who expressed the opinion that it was unfortunate Schenker had not made better use of his share of the brains with which his family had been blessed. With his abilities, Maiulik opined, if he had gone in for advocacy, he could have been another Pressburger. Schenker professed to find this a risible example of unenlightened or half-enlightened eastern Jewish narrow mindedness, which prized education only in so far as it led to pecuniary advantage. But he took it seriously enough to argue with it. Maiulik himself, he pointed out, quoted Ebn Ezra and other heroes from Hebrew writings, who were not advocates but belonged to a spiritual world quite unlike that of Dr. Pressburger. Why should he not be allowed to follow the example of Ebn Ezra in music rather than in advocacy? Maiulik was not impressed by his logic, Schenker reports, for he lacked any sense of the value of culture (Bildung) for its own sake. In his diary he caustically observes that Maiulik had similarly turned his back on his professional training, but from the opposite motive: 'on the very day he qualified as a Rabbi in Breslau he went to Dresden and converted to the faith of the textile merchant'.

It has been suggested that the main cause of the bitterness of people like Schenker was a feeling that the German culture so prized by them was betrayed by the Germans. There was certainly a good deal of rhetoric to this effect, largely stemming from Nietzsche, and Schenker made his contribution to it. But it is surely a simplification both in itself and as an explanation of the alienation of the assimilee. There is in Schenker a hardly less strong sense of the betrayal of Jewish values by Jews only too eager to adopt the secular ethos, and betrayal of fellow Jews.
'I lie in business,' he quotes Maiulik as saying, 'but not outside it' and adds that this 'sums up the vocation of the businessman'. People like this are no credit to Judaism. Neither are they a reproach to it, any more than the manners and gesticulations of the poor Galician Jews, which they retain 'even when they have come into contact with better circles', are a reproach to it. Both these occasions for embarrassment stem from the same source. These Jews, Schenker says, have never had the mental space to think about their manners. 'Who lives so much from hand to mouth as they do, in the hardest conditions, hated, despised, outlawed, pursued, for the most part cursed with large families, their best qualities - for example, their education - unrecognised...?' To expect them to 'assimilate' is like taking soldiers from the field where, in the midst of devastation, they are struggling merely to stay alive, and asking them to imitate the manners of a man of the world. Even relatively successful men like Maiulik cannot shake off their preoccupation with the struggle for material survival.

And, admirer of German secular culture as he was, Schenker was far from being sycophantic towards the Germans.

'The superiority of the Prussian officer expresses not the superiority of his religious belief as against that of a Jew but the superiority of a man fully emancipated by his state, like the superiority of a rich man over a poor one. It is a self delusion when out of his sense of superiority the German invites the Jew to baptism. Better grant him civil rights, let him take part in the government of the state....'
It is clear from the material presented by Federhofer that Schenker's conservatism was rooted in something much more profound than mere intellectual arrogance, or the snobbery of the parvenu, or any kind of half-baked political philosophy. If the disappearance of the Habsburg monarchy seemed to him to be a catastrophe, it was because, for the Habsburg Jews, that was exactly what it was. Among other things it meant that the route which had brought him from Podhajce to Vienna was, for future generations of Jewish children, forever cut off. If he clung to an aristocratic ideal in matters artistic and intellectual as well as social, it was not because he had a pathological need to dissociate himself from the poor and the down-trodden. His hatred of Marxism was hatred of a system of thought which, as he saw it, elevated to the status of an ideal the spiritual impoverishment produced by poverty and oppression, and made it a crime even to wish to transcend this condition. If he saw genius as necessary to the spiritual vitality of a culture, his piety and its partial displacement onto art helps to explain this. If he saw it as in its nature exceptional, this is because all his experience, the whole pattern of his life and the lives of others from similar backgrounds, their emergence out of the dark hinterland of unenlightened Galician Jewry into the clear air, the spaciousness, the radiance of Goethean, Mozartian culture, made this conclusion seem to him inescapable.

It would be absurd to pretend that Schenker's bitterness had no component of personal disappointment, but even his disappointment was not a simple thing. His inability to gain an academic position in the early days was undoubtedly due to the mismatch between his formal qualifications and the demands of the institutional
situation at the time. Later, as Schoenberg's example illustrates, this problem could perhaps have been overcome had he been capable of compromising. Strange as it is to have to see Schoenberg as a man of compromise, compared with Schenker that is how he appears. As Federhofer points out, Schoenberg converted and then re-converted. In 1911 he published a book on harmony in which he made some threatening gestures in the direction of pedagogic convention, but he became the arch-upholder of that convention, gaining considerable kudos from his rigidity, which he managed to reconcile with his Modernism by feats of rationalisation about which Schenkerian scepticism is surely not altogether unfair. Schenker was not only psychologically incapable of this kind of adjustment, but could not have conformed to academic orthodoxy without undermining his entire theoretical rationale. It was possible for Schoenberg to keep separate his academic and his creative activity because they were essentially unrelated. Obviously Schenker could not. Even at the end of his life, when, if the kind of recognition which his friends sought for him had actually arrived, he would surely have been allowed to pursue his idiosyncratic path unmolested, his acceptance would have involved recognising the legitimacy of the regime, sailing under the flag of Adlerian musicology. It would have been like being baptised.

Why should he have to make such choices? This was, for Schenker, the real injustice. Towards the end, ill, weary, confused, his sense of the patent impossibility of fighting institutional orthodoxy made it seem pointless to make any further pretence of conformity. Free Composition, which has been presented as the culmination of his pure-scientific positivist endeavour, is in reality, as must be obvious to anyone who reads it, his final confession of faith.
Whether Schenker's attitude was justified, whether his faith was better or worse than that of the converts or the cradle-Christians, whether his theory was better founded than the faith of the musicologists, is not the main issue. Indeed such sharp separations, as the overlapping within Schenker's work of musicological and metaphysical elements suggests, are of limited validity. The issue to which the case of Schenker draws our attention most urgently is the need for a livelier awareness of the nature of our cultural assumptions and of the route by which we have come to them. The attempt to repudiate the human dimension in the study of art, which the scientists of art like to call their objectivity, is among the attitudes to which any open-minded study of Schenker must present a challenge.
Notes

1. All biographical data is taken from Federhofer, 1985.

2. See, for example, the attack on Riemann in Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1972.

3. The development of this interest is traced by Stephen Beller in the Introduction to his Book, Vienna and the Jews 1867-1938. (See Beller, 1989.) The work of William M. Johnston (see Johnston 1972) and of Carl Schorske (see Schorske, 1980) have been especially influential. Beller's own book and the rather differently focused A History of the Habsburg Jews, 1670-1918 by William O. McCagg are equally indispensable. (See McCagg, 1989.)


5. Ibid., Chapter V.


7. Ibid., p. 164. A similar case occurred in Bohemia in 1899.

8. Eduard Alphonse James Rothschild, 1868-1949. Alphonse's visit to Paris after passing his
Matura was one of the reasons for Schenker's writing to his elder brother to ask for money. Unless Alphonse took his Matura in his twenties, Schenker must have been teaching him at least by 1887. The two men seem to have remained lifelong friends. See Federhofer, 1985, p. 23, f.n. 43.

9. See Wittgenstein, 1989 and for a discussion, Lurie, 1989. Wittgenstein's fate has been as unlike Schenker's as possible. His fame as a philosopher ensures that whatever he said is taken as wisdom no matter how silly or offensive. However, his inclusion of himself in this 'critique' of the Jews perhaps does less to mitigate the disagreeable effect than his apologists might hope. What are we to make of someone who is so humble as to put himself on the same low level as Mendelssohn, who considers himself worthless in the way Mahler is worthless?


12. Ibid., p. 4.

13. 'Our fathers, seeing no escape...thought up a lottery...in the course of ten years or so our town supplied the concert platforms of the world with infant prodigies. From Odessa came Mischa Ellman, Zimbalist, Gabrilovitsch. Odessa witnessed the first steps of Jascha
Heifetz...Mr Zagursky ran a factory of infant prodigies, a factory of Jewish dwarfs in lace collars and patent leather pumps...[he] charted the first course, then they were shipped off to Professor Auer in St Petersburg...At dinner my father told another story about Jascha Heifetz...he had met Mendelssohn, Jascha's uncle. It appeared that the lad was getting eight hundred roubles a performance. Just work out how much that comes to at fifteen concerts a month.' Isaac Babel: 'Awakening' in Collected Stories. London: Penguin, 1961.

Presumably country music teachers drummed up candidates from the wilds of Galicia a generation earlier to be shipped off to Mikuli's private music school in Lemberg.


15. For conditions of life in Galicia, see ibid., especially pp. 115 ff..

From the Brody area in 1920, Babel writes of 'the Ukrainian village of not long ago [where]...poppies brightened the earth in patches, the ruins of churches gleamed on the hillocks...crouching at the feet of nobles' estates were lifeless little Jewish towns...Hidden away behind scattered huts a
synagogue squatted upon the barren soil — sightless, dented, round as a Hasidic hat. Narrow-chested Jews hung mournfully about... The image of the stout and jovial Jews of the south took shape in my memory, in sharp contrast to the bitter scorn inherent in those long bony backs, those tragic yellow beards. In these passionate, anguish-chiselled features there was... no warm pulsing of blood. The Jews of Volhynia and Galicia moved jerkily, in an uncontrolled way, but their capacity for suffering was full of a sombre greatness, and their unvoiced contempt for the Polish gentry unbounded. Watching them I understood the poignant history of this region...'. Babel, tr. Morrison, 1961: 'Discourse on Tachanka'.

For a more recent description of Lemberg, Zhitomir, Brody, see Dohrn, 1991.

16. Despite Schenker's complaint that he had been born in poverty it is clear that his family was part of the Jewish elite. Johann Schenker was Stadtarzt in Podhaje and the brothers of his wife Julia were also doctors. One of Heinrich's elder brothers, Marcus, was a lawyer, his other, Wilhelm, a doctor. (See Federhofer, 1985, p. 342 and pp. 3-4.) This does not mean that they were not poor. According to McCagg even the Polish nobility in Galicia were mostly poor. Schenker naturally did not compare his lot with that of the still poorer Ruthenian peasants, but
rather with his wealthy Viennese patrons.

17. Ibid., p.8. Schenker wrote to Max Kalbeck, 'Ich bereite mich eben zur erste Staatsprüfung vor. Spät Abends, so oft ich das göttliche "Römische Recht" von der Hand lege, gönne ich mir die reinste Freude, ein wenig musikalisch zu denken.' Schenker describes himself as 'alone', so the letter was presumably written before his mother's migration to Vienna in 1888 or 1889.


19. Guido Adler, who succeeded Hanslick as Professor of Music in 1898, had a background not altogether dissimilar to Schenker's, having taken a law degree before turning to music, but his material circumstances were more favourable. He radically transformed the atmosphere of the department, which had been distinctly dilettante. He wanted to make it scientific and professional in a sense quite new to music. His encyclopedic definition of musical scholarship excluded Schenker's synthetic approach, effectively isolating him.


21. Richard Heuberger was appointed to the Neue Freie Presse, apparently as assistant to Hanslick (see Federhofer, 1985, p. 14) and
later took over Hanslick's position. He also held an appointment at the Conservatory. As a leading light in the world of operetta he illustrates in his career the way in which the various branches of institutional musical life in Vienna were becoming ever more closely integrated, leaving less and less space for independent activity. Or perhaps it would be better to say 'leaving more and more space', full of the fresh air on which outsiders were left to survive.

22. Ibid., p. 313.

23. Ibid., p.315: 'Hat doch gleich er selbst am Tage nach Erwerbung des Rabbinatsgrades in Breslau sofort den Uebertritt zur Textilkonfession in Dresden vollzogen!'

24. Ibid., p. 313, n. 3: 'Im Geschäft luge ich...aber nicht ausserhalb des Geschäftes'.

Schenker's reflections on his conversation with Maïulik recall Kafka's 'Letter to His Father'. Kafka's father, also a successful merchant, had as much time for Bildung as Maïulik. Schenker's explanation of the origin of this philistinism in the struggle for survival is reflected in Kafka's remark that his father's constant reference to this struggle had 'positively worn grooves in my brain'. These references were remarks like, "When I was only seven I had to push the barrow from village to village"; "We all had
to sleep in one room"; "We were glad when we got potatoes"; "for years I had open sores on my legs from not having enough clothes to wear in the winter". The father could never forget these things or cease to 'boast' of them and use them to 'humiliate' his children or to excuse the difference between his outrageous manners and what he expected of them. (Franz Kafka: Wedding Preparations in the Country and other Stories. London: Penguin, 1978.)


26. Ibid., p. 315. 'In der Ueberlegenheit eines preussischen Offiziers drückt sich durchaus nicht die Ueberlegenheit seiner religiösen Gesinnung gegenüber der eines Juden, sondern nur die Ueberlegenheit eines in seinem Staate frei Waltenden Herrn aus, also gewissermassen die Ueberlegenheit eines reichen Mannes gegenüber einem armen. Es ist daher eine Selbsttäuschung, wenn aus dem Herrngefühl heraus der Deutsche den Juden zur Taufe einladet. Er räume dem Juden lieber alle öffentlichen Rechte ein, lasse auch ihn an der Herrschaft des Staates teilnehmen....'

Chapter 2

Writing the History of Music Theory

Part I

In 1618 a young philosopher decided to relieve the tedium of his military service by writing a book on music. It was written 'in the midst of turmoil and rough soldiers, by a man without occupation or office', and not intended for publication in the form in which he gave it to the friend for whom he wrote it. But we should not assume from the author's disclaimers that he did not consider his work highly significant. Showing clear signs of the 'haste' with which its 'fragmentary' thoughts had been put together, it is nevertheless a tour de force and the subsequent fame of its author ensured that it would emerge to influence writing on music for centuries to come by its contents and its form.

Descartes' Compendium Musicae is a summary of what the author recalled of music theory and the rules of composition he had read about in various treatises, and what he recalled from his own study of musical composition together with his reflections upon all this. These reflections take the form
of an exercise in rationalistic reduction. He clearly did not see himself at that point as in a position to reduce the whole of music to mathematical or quasi mathematical formulae, and had to limit himself to doing enough to show that this was a theoretical possibility, given all the relevant information, the details of compositional practice, tranquillity and time.

* * *

The Compendium is nowadays little regarded by musicians or musicologists. Its 'proofs' are dismissed as 'sleights of hand' or repetitions or elaborations of the kinds of calculations based on the division of strings which had been going on since antiquity, a working up of things taken from Zarlino and others, or 'anticipations' - a notion peculiarly cherished by music historians - of things to come. But these objections miss the point. Of course, the work is full of anticipations, among them that of the circle of fifths and a full-blown theory of modulation. But crucial to this concept is a modern notion of the division of the octave, a scale with 'steps' in a fixed intervallic sequence. The steps, their order and their tuning, become crucial in a music which shifts its harmonic focus. The concept runs ahead of the primitive physics; the ear must set its own conditions instead of being dictated to. Intuition demands to be liberated from the constraints of a system constructed phenomenally.

What was novel in the Compendium was the extension of the mathematical approach from supposedly pre-compositional
'structures' to compositional patterns and a shift from the reliance on calculations based on physical phenomena to purely mathematical ones appealing to configurations of pitches in composition. That is to say, Descartes shifts the focus from a physics of sound, supposedly independent of and prior to the art, to a mathematics of sound expressed as music and accessible only through the medium of the art. The patterns hitherto regarded as outside music, theoretically adduced from nature, and given to musicians to play with, he re-interprets as constructs derived from practice.

Descartes' notion that some intervals are the primary product of the division of the octave and some secondary—that is that they represent the 'difference' between the primary interval and the larger interval from which the primary interval has been subtracted, or the 'remainder', a notion which many historians find simply perverse, becomes intelligible if understood in the light of this re-orientation. The appropriate point of reference is his explanation of the 'steps', which is based not on the division of a string but on the practice of composers. The motive of this idea, and all the ideas in the Compendium are comparably motivated, is to provide a rationalisation of intervallic inversion, a compositional, not a pre-compositional concept, though Descartes' presentation in the traditional fashion, does rather invite the turning of it into a precompositional phenomenon, leading philosophically unsophisticated theorists to search for it in nature.

The same thing undoubtedly happened with his theory of 'mutation', or modulation, derived from 'the sequence of tones which', he tells us, 'the practical musicians call the "hand"'. This is a sequence of tones beginning on F which
can be given a different meaning by substituting B flat for B. There are, he says - again turning a practice into an axiom - only two possible ways of 'dividing the octave'. By this he means that the octave can be divided into the sequence tone-tone-semitone followed by the sequence tone-tone-tone-semitone, or the reverse. The effect of this limitation is to say that the only - workable - division is one which partitions the octave into a fifth and a fourth. Both patterns can be achieved by beginning on F, depending on whether B or B flat is selected. The 'hand', then, represents, conceptually, the principle of fifth division, or transposition, what Schenker was to call 'tonicisation'. Play F, G, A, B, C, and F is the fourth of the natural scale. Play F, G, A, B flat, C, and F is the tonic. Since there are only five tones through which the voice can move without 'fractions or movable pitches' a single set of names for identifying the intervallic pattern formed by these five tones divided by the semitone (ut re mi fa sol la) will enable the pitches of the scale to be rotated against it. Since the shift B flat to B causes Ut to move by a fifth, so all such shifts will move Ut by the distance of a fifth. The fifth transposition represented by the two versions of the 'hand' becomes, in his circular representation, the type of all such transpositions.

It is clear from his refutation of anticipated objections that Descartes' theory follows intellectually articulated practice at some distance and is an attempt not merely to codify it but to extrapolate a theory which will cover situations which appear haphazard and unconnected and others not yet discovered by practice. We could, he says, 'go on ad infinitum'. In saying so he is claiming to have located a law of organisation underlying the conscious practice of composers, a law of which they are unaware but
which nevertheless constrains them. Once fully worked out, the theory also came to seem to some theorists to stand for a phenomenal entity, something somehow existing in nature, which the musician is given, like a toy, to play with. For Descartes it is given only in the sense that it represents an organisational principle of which the musical patterns are the intuitively derived expression, and which the theory rationally interprets.

The work of Descartes is quite different from the theoretical treatises of practising musicians. Various rules of composition, he observes, are often broken. 'These things are based entirely on the usage and custom of composers,' and 'all kinds of subtle rules' can be deduced. This does not mean, however, that usage and custom are arbitrary. The rules are an attempt to capture the unconscious logic motivating these customs, and they do this sometimes more, sometimes less successfully. However, the rules of composition are not what matters. It is the organisational principle determining the behaviour of the composer, which the music articulates artistically and the rules attempt to articulate intellectually, which are of philosophical interest. Empirical observation of compositional behaviour must be a more reliable guide than the rules of music theorists. Nevertheless these rules are not to be dismissed lightly.

Descartes' empirical observation is not at all the same thing as the observations which lead to the prescriptive rules of music theorists such as the formulators of the contrapuntal 'species'. Nor is it the same as the simple inductivism of modern style-analytic theorists, whose generalisations are as arbitrary as they believe the rules of the composers to be. It proceeds from the assumption
that some rationally apprehensible and mathematically expressible organising principle exists prior to the musical organisation, but not in the sense that this organisation refers back to some other phenomenal one, or that the musical organisation is a mere manipulation of physical phenomena, bound, therefore, by the laws of physics. Nor does it assume that music has organising principles of its own, which are related to deeper-level principles of organisation only analogically, i.e., that music is a phenomenon like any other and will yield up its secrets inductively.

For Descartes his study of music is a way of demonstrating the fact that, in the words of Leibniz, 'the rational soul or mind...is...an image of the Deity' and 'not only has a perception of the works of God, but is even capable of producing something like them...in discovering the sciences in accordance with which God had regulated things...it imitates in its own sphere...what God performs in the great world.'\textsuperscript{5} For Leibniz, as for Descartes, 'Even the pleasures of the senses are in the last resort intellectual pleasures confusedly known. Music charms us although its beauty consists in the harmony of numbers, and in the account which we do not notice, but which the soul none the less takes, of the beating or vibration of sounding bodies which meet one another at certain intervals.' It is over this claim that nineteenth-century aesthetics bifurcates and we can see the sources of both the intellectualising and the metaphysical branches in Cartesian-Leibnizian aesthetics.

'The beauty of the universe...could be learnt in each soul could one unravel all its folds', which, of course, is possible only for God.\textsuperscript{6} But in music the soul seems to
capture intuitively, in microcosm, 'the universal harmony' and make it accessible to reason, which can, perhaps, 'unravel all its folds' and so get a glimpse of the beauty of the whole universe. The musician himself does not know how music does this and his rules are only crude and provisional representatives of the laws of organisation to which he can only gain access involuntarily, as in 'dreams, in which [he] invent[s] without effort (but also without will) things [he] could only discover after much thinking when awake.'

In moving the philosophical theoretical focus from the physics of sound to composed music, Descartes expanded the possible ways of thinking about music. There is an irony in the fact that his philosophical theory - his desire to demonstrate the independence of mental activity from material conditions - should move the study of music in an aesthetic direction, by making the artefact the centre of interest, since his interest is anything but aesthetic in the ordinary sense. He does not look at music to see whether it is beautiful, whether it corresponds to some ideal of beauty; he takes its beauty as given. If music is the universal harmony in microcosm it cannot but be beautiful. He is interested in uncovering the occult order which produces the beauty and not because the product is beautiful but because it furthers his grasp of the infinite. But in demonstrating, as he believed, that the order was to be found in the composed music and was not merely derived from a prior physical order, he was making available to aesthetics a field hitherto thought to belong to physical science, and making a different kind of connection between science and art.
Other major philosophers took up this reinterpretation of the significance of music. A line can be drawn from Descartes, through Leibniz, through Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to the one modern theorist who shares their vision of the musical work as a mirror of the universal harmony, different though their several interpretations of the universal harmony are. This vision has undergone many changes along this line. Descartes's belief that it was possible to 'unravel the folds' completely, given sufficient time and patience, is not put to the test by the leading philosophers - although Hegel takes it as given - not only because they lack the patience and the time. They lack also either the mathematical zeal coupled with detailed musical knowledge characteristic of philosophers up to the time of Descartes, but rarer afterwards - philosophers after his time began to be intimidated by the mystique - or his belief that the numerical relationships are, after all, the heart of the matter.

Indeed, Schopenhauer specifically denies the implication in the Cartesian-Leibnizian approach that the intuitions of the artist can all be reduced to intelligibility. This is true, he asserts, only of the outer skin of the music, that part of it which can be related to the phenomenal world, the world of 'sonorous bodies'. He embraces, by contrast, their belief that music is not an expression of the phenomenal, but of something prior to all phenomena and that it is in its compositional organisation that it expresses its significances, its comprehensive significance as the microcosmic representation of the world and its more specific meanings. He adopts also
the notion, everywhere implicit in Descartes and given an
expression in Leibniz so captivating in its eloquence that
he cannot resist borrowing it almost verbatim: the notion of
the artist as the medium through whom the truth is exhaled
like the air that rushes through the orifices of the
Euboean Rock.9

Between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the one hand and
Hegel on the other, a philosophical chasm opens. Hegel
believed that everything would become accessible to the
intellect, and that art, being ultimately fully reducible
to the intellectually apprenensible, could, therefore, in
the last analysis, be dispensed with. Following
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche saw this belief as nothing more
than a monumental and disastrous form of philistinism. Music
is at the heart of this nineteenth century philosophical
crisis because music involves both intellect and intuition
in a peculiar fashion. The notion of music as consisting of
nothing but scientifically categorisable patterns of sound,
which became dominant in music-aesthetics after the
mid-century, is clearly ultimately indebted to Descartes
- although it is noticeably unmathematical, indeed
un-technical, relying as it does on a vaguer, Hegelian
notion of the intellectual - in spite of priding itself on
the purity of its empiricism and anti-rationalism. But it
is arbitrary both in its lack of any conscious guiding
principle, music-theoretical, aesthetic or philosophical,
and in its assumption that the laws of organisation it
expects to be able to derive inductively will be a
sufficient end in themselves, for of course there is no
notion of a deity or anything metaphysical in this secular
aesthetic.

It is not surprising that the projected 'science of
music', consisting of a purely empirical examination of arrangements of 'groups of notes', never took shape (although some of Schenker's followers speak of his 'system' as if it were that science), nor that the aridity of this approach left the field wide open to those who saw music as either a peg upon which to hang their personal preoccupations, which they foisted onto the public in the form of quasi-hermeneutic interpretations, or a cryptic cultural record, mere data for sociological, psychological, above all art-historical enquiry. The search for a reductive principle, like music-aesthetics, became, with the rise of musicology, simply passé. It was left to the theorists, and by this time, they were for the most part dreary pedagogues whose main claim to respect was the fact that they dealt in a jargon whose capacity to intimidate was in inverse relation to its lucidity. The most modern, most 'scientific' branch of musicology, the one which would set the tone for the twentieth century, wanted as little as possible to do with it.

* * *

How had it come about that the ideas of geniuses had become entangled with the superstitions and confusions of pedants and pedagogues, and ended up in that great lumber room known as nineteenth-century theory, so chaotic that even the great Helmholtz could not make it seem worth the effort of sorting out? Riemann, who did venture in, emerged covered in cobwebs which did nothing for his musicological credibility and undoubtedly helped to clear the field for the more circumspect Adler. 10

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To understand this we have to go back again to the sixteenth century. Until the period in which Descartes was writing, music theory was hardly separable from philosophy and mathematics. In treatises it is often referred to as a science. Writers of such treatises, for example Agricola, Glaron, Vogelsang, Aaron, were not merely music-theorists but polymaths, scholars, often clerics, who wrote about music among other things. The same was true of Zarlino, although he eventually became maestro di cappella. Theorists of significance who were professional musicians and only that, like Cerone or Galilei, were exceptional. For Descartes himself, like his contemporary Mersenne, music was part of philosophy. But from this period onwards, a more or less independent music-theoretical tradition began to develop which was less concerned with philosophy and often conspicuously uninformed about it, and philosophy became less interested in the detailed pursuit of the mathematical implications of music.

After Mersenne theorists like Sauveur, whose primary concern was scientific, or like Brossard, who had begun by studying philosophy and only later become a professional musician, became the exception and the main focus of theory began to shift. Treatises began to appear which were more professionally biased, less speculative, rationalisations of working-practices such as Masson’s **Nouveau traité des règles pour la composition**, (1697-1738) Mattheson’s **Der vollkommene Capellmeister** (1739). Speculative theory continued to flourish but in a closer relationship with practice or theories of practice and at an increasing distance from the main-stream of philosophy. The work of Werkmeister, Heinechen, Cernoborsky and his pupil Tartini belong to this more specialised world as do the most famous of all music-theoretical treatises, Fux’s **Gradus** and Rameau's
Cartesian resonances continue through all this work. A theorist credited by some historians with 'anticipating' Rameau (or being the victim of Rameau's plagiarism) entitled one chapter of his treatise Réduction des Accords chiffrez aux Accords parfaits. Rameau's English translator, Phillip Gossett, insists that Saint-Lambert did not anticipate Rameau because his reductive idea was wholly practical in motivation while Rameau's reduction is conceptual. But this is perhaps to underestimate the power of ideas. It is not necessary to think in crude plagiaristic terms to see the remnant of the great Cartesian idea being passed to Rameau by Saint-Lambert, or, to put it another way, to see Rameau as the rationaliser of Saint-Lambert's - clearly rationally motivated - practical procedure. The extent to which music-theory had become esoteric can be judged from the willingness of d'Alembert, a major figure in the wider world of science and philosophy, to be influenced by the physicalist speculations of Rameau, even more than by his reference to Rameau's musical expertise as a source of authority. d'Alembert's motives were undoubtedly mixed. At this juncture the physicalist skeleton, which had been lurking in the music-theoretical cupboard all the while, was taken out and dusted. Assiduous efforts began to be made to re-animate it. All the old string measuring began again as if it were news, and was now supplemented by the counting of the vibrations of 'sonorous bodies'. Music theory was brought into line with Newtonian experimentalism by somewhat dubious means.

The aesthetic problem with these theories, and their consequent philosophical weakness and banality, was their myopia. To quote Leibniz again: '...it is unreasonable...to
give a judgement without inspecting the whole law. We have
knowledge of a tiny part of...eternity...yet out of so
little we rashly make judgements about the immeasurable and
the eternal...Look at the most lovely picture, and then
cover it up leaving uncovered...a tiny scrap. What else will
you see there, even if you look as closely as possible, and
the more so as you look from nearer and nearer at hand, but
a kind of confused medley of colours...without art. And yet
when you remove the covering and look upon the whole
picture from the proper place, you will see that...[it] was
in fact accomplished with the highest art by the author of
the work'.

The theorists who liked to think of themselves as
rational believed they could construct infallible systems of
composition, or, at least, infallible methods of teaching
people to compose, by looking at how a corner of the canvas
is filled in and extrapolating from it the process of
constructing the entire picture. Rameau's theory of chordal
inversion lent itself beautifully to the construction of
little exercises resembling the exercises of species
counterpoint without the trouble of learning all the rules,
but, despite its claim to be 'generative', it bore
essentially the same relation to the construction of works
of art as the game devised by Kirnberger in which pieces are
assembled from ready-made phrases selected by throwing
dice. A truly generative idea, like the Cartesian 'hand',
expands the scope of composition by facilitating access to
unexplored realms of possible music. Chordal inversion
merely explains something already fully exploited, long
surpassed, indeed, and could only have the effect of
narrowing down the scope of composition by confining the
exploitation of its possibilities to those which the
'system' can accommodate. The impossibility even for Rameau
himself, of explaining, much less constructing any musical
texture, however primitive, in fundamental bass terms,
without resorting to exceptions and to rules borrowed from
figured bass and species counterpoint is eloquent proof of
this. The very notion of trying to compose rationally is,
anyway, irrational, a perversion of reason. We might as well
think of rules to breathe by, or, better still, rules to
think by.

Had Rameau's idea been applied only to the explanation
of textures it would have been impossible to quarrel with it
and it is in this role that Schenker resurrects it as a
component in a more plausibly generative theory. But this
kind of prescriptive theorising began to feed back,
eventually, into the truly esoteric area of musical
practice, the craft mystery, as much a mystery in its inner
motivation to those who practised and taught it as their
practices were to the world at large. Only faith in the
magical efficacy of these practices could keep them alive.
The impact of rationalist-physicalist theory on this closed
world in the latter part of the eighteenth century was
devastating because it destroyed this faith. Musicians like
the Bachs could see their world being torn apart by social
changes which threatened its exclusiveness and favoured
simplified, rationalistic approaches to musical education.
It was this trend which prompted the publication of
specifically pedagogic treatises whose motive was either to
resist the rationalist tide and defend the craft traditions
or to exploit the commercial opportunities newly open to
expertise of a kind which had never before been marketable
on such a scale. It was not long before these styles of
instruction were being simplified, 'rationalised',
re-interpreted in the light of modern 'acoustic' theory.
It was not music that was rationalised by post-Rameauvian theory but traditional non-rationalist theory. In the process the latter was, as a means of initiation into the art, effectively destroyed. For a period, formal music education consisted of training in performance. Theoretical education was rudimentary. It extended no further than was necessary for the student to be able to decipher scores. When 'composition' began to appear on the syllabuses of the music schools it was not something which any composer then or at any time previously would have recognised as having anything to do with his art. If Brahms is to be believed, anyone who emerged from one of these schools as a composer did so in spite of rather than because of the régime to which he had been subjected. When there was no-one left to teach the old skills composers had to work out their own salvation by studying the works of their predecessors. This, of course, composers have always done, but perhaps never with less awareness of the presuppositions of their mentors than those who began their studies after the death of Beethoven.
Part 2

'The music theory of the nineteenth century took its direction from the musical language and musical grammar of the Viennese classics. This was especially true of Viennese music theory which, founded on a particular local tradition, was able to demonstrate the change from figured bass to harmonic theory more clearly and directly than elsewhere.'

Ernst Tittel. 1

'...the masters simply had no knowledge of the theory which for a century has been learned and taught as the only practical one; not Bach, father and son, not Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven or Schubert [or] Mendelssohn knew anything of that kind of harmony-, thoroughbass- or formal-theory, and Brahms would not hear of it.'

Schenker. 2

'Schenker's interpretation of music history rarely demonstrated the same clear, rigorous thinking which is evident in much of his theoretical work.'

Allen Forte. 3

Schenker's remark in the 'Introduction' to Free Composition was a response to the charge that he attributed to composers behaviour of which they could not possibly be conscious. His reply was that this complaint demonstrated
the historical ignorance of his critics, for the classical composers knew no more about the theory taught in the conservatories than they knew about his concept of the Ursatz. Moreover, he never claimed that his theoretical concepts represented consciously constructed compositional patterns. It was the conventional theories which claimed to represent pre-compositional procedures and the means by which the great composers learned composition. Neither claim, Schenker believed, was valid.

His early American champions found Schenker's excursions into history an embarrassment. Unable to defend them, they judged it best to distance themselves and point out that Schenker was, after all, an artist at heart, not a musicologist. This view of Schenker has become the accepted one. Even people who are troubled by such a strange mixture of adulation and denigration tend to defer to it. Difficult as it is to interpret Schenker's history, especially from a modern musicological perspective, it is perhaps, not surprising that, for those who were not prepared to follow him as far as quarrelling with musicology, the simplest course seemed to be to find ahistorical ways of demonstrating the validity of the theory and to leave this aspect of his writings alone. But the fact remains that if the theory and historical orthodoxy are incompatible, they cannot both be true.

The point of the argument was the nature of the relationship of theory to practice. This is an historical issue, and it was on the historical level that Schenker took it up. The claim made on behalf of nineteenth-century theory was, as we see not just from Schenker's assertion, but from highly authoritative musicological accounts such as the source of the first of the quotations above, that it was
derived from classical practice. It is tempting to regret that he did not set out his case more fully and more clearly in conventional musicological terms, but the attempts of his pupil Oswald Jonas to do this demonstrate nothing so much as the wisdom of his reluctance to involve himself in that kind of thing.  

Schenker himself presents historical arguments in several places and in several forms, sometimes in extremely broad cultural terms, as in Free Composition, sometimes in much closer focus on particular historical issues, in Harmony, in Counterpoint, and in various shorter pieces, but always against the background of his generally consistent interpretation of the development of instrumental music after what Jonas calls "the epoch of vocal music". The lack of an historical survey of the kind that would have satisfied his musicologically oriented followers is clearly not due to incapacity for detailed scholarly investigation. It is due rather to the fact that Schenker approaches his history from the point of view of his theory, whereas the musicological attitude would require him to approach his theory from the point of view of history, musicology being, above all, historical in orientation and fundamentally hostile to theorising.

Schenker's attitude is not simply perverse, however. The first thing that has to be grasped by any present-day reader of Schenker is that while Schenkerian theory appeared in mid-century America (where currently dominant perceptions of his work originate) in the context of an entrenched and unchallengeable musicology, no such context existed at the time of its development. In Schenker's youth, musical scholarship was not synonymous with a particular definition of musicology. Many of the problems of interpreting Schenker
stem from the false assumption that what we now understand by musical scholarship is what has always been understood to be that, or that modes of study which did not conform to the musicological model were justly swept aside as essentially unscholarly.

Because the kind of historical work which characterises musicology at its best was in its infancy in Schenker's time, it was difficult for him to fill out his history with sufficient detail to make it a more obviously plausible challenge to the conventional version. It is plain enough now that nineteenth-century fundamental bass theory is not the same thing as the theory of Rameau, and that when Schenker said that the classical composers knew nothing about it, he could hardly be wrong. Had Schenker not challenged the accepted view, however, it is not at all certain that all the information which now makes it so obvious would have come to light. It is because of his intuitive genius that Schenker was able to construct a theory of music history which stands up to critical examination at least as well as many versions constructed much later and with the benefit of far more data; and it was his scrupulousness as a scholar which prevented him from attempting to turn his intuitive construct into a pseudo-musicological, 'objective' narrative. The least plausible aspects of his interpretation are not those which go against the grain of the conventional history of his time, but conventional assumptions which he was temperamentally unable to relinquish, most conspicuously his prejudice against modality.

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Oswald Jonas also 'scorn[ed] the term musicologist', according to Irene Schreier Scott. But he did present, in his 'Introduction' to Schenker's Harmony, and in his own Introduction to the Theory of Heinrich Schenker, interpretations of Schenker's historical viewpoint which are specific in areas where Schenker avoids detail, and in a manner which invites musicological scrutiny.

Jonas tells us that 'the study of theory was divided into two parts...strict counterpoint...and figured bass'. The rules of the former were derived from 'the epoch of vocal music' and were 'codified' by Fux. Fux's work was 'a study of the nature of intervals, a distinction between consonant and dissonant notes (sic), and a study of the use of the latter.' It was, he adds in passing, a study in voice-leading, but 'more than anything else [it was] a body of rules for training the ear', and in this role it had 'universal validity'. It was not, as Fux himself imagined, a means of teaching composition. Fux was mistaken because he was 'too deeply under the influence of the vocal epoch'.

Figured bass, meanwhile, 'remained a discipline of voice-leading and never degenerated into a mere juxtaposition of chords'. Consequently it was capable of being used as a training in composition.

This comfortable situation was suddenly threatened by the appearance of Rameau, to whom Jonas's attitude, like Schenker's own, is ambivalent. At first Rameau appears to be the bringer of necessary illumination. He 'revealed the function of harmonic steps and inversions [and] demonstrated that the harmony of a triad does not change when the root is transferred from the bass to another voice'. But he points out, as Schenkerians have never been able to resist doing,
the irrelevant fact that inversion of intervals was well-known to 'the school of counterpoint'. 'Rameau's concept was much too narrow'. He 'assumed the identity of chord and scale-step'. He 'did not even suspect... that voice-leading could be the means for the 'compositional unfolding' of wider harmonic areas'. The chord, formerly 'endowed by voice-leading with...contextual logic', now stood 'in isolation', and the bass line was 'weighted down' by the 'ground-bass' (fundamental bass) which inhibited and finally arrested its movement.\(^9\)

Then Jonas moves to a more detailed historical level. Rameau's theory was introduced to Germany by Marpurg, who translated d'Alembert's summary of his theory.\(^{10}\) Kirnberger is represented as the champion of the teaching style of J. S. Bach and the opponent of the introduction of Rameau's theory by Marpurg, his resistance supported by C. P. E. Bach.\(^{11}\) Haydn learned 'everything' from C. P. E. Bach and Fux, and their treatises were used by him and by Beethoven. Figured bass continued to be taught, but in a version falsified by the 'ground-bass' (fundamental bass). Brahms is his authority for the claim that from the time of Schumann, no-one could learn anything since they had nothing but 'incompetent textbooks' to refer to. The exception is Mendelssohn, who 'was instructed in the old style' since 'C. P. E. Bach and Quantz had left some traces of their work in Berlin.'

The trouble with this account is that it interprets literally insights arrived at often intuitively, on the basis of necessarily limited evidence. These insights, considered historically, are sometimes confirmed by subsequent research and sometimes require re-formulation or more radical modification in the light of it. Jonas was, in
this area, uniformly uncritical, with the result that his claims on Schenker's behalf made little impact on the general picture of Schenker as historically naive and prejudiced. Schenker did, of course, harbour some intense prejudices. Among the most damaging to his picture of history - although they were anything but damaging to his theorising - were his Francophobia, which flared up with renewed intensity in 1918, and his anti-clericalism, which made it impossible for him to consider the music of 'the vocal epoch' dispassionately, and distorted his view of Fux. This is among the causes of one apparent absurdity in Jonas's account: the assertion that species counterpoint is mainly about the abstract relations of tones and only incidentally about voice-leading.

The corresponding absurdity, the claim that figured bass is mainly about voice-leading and only incidentally about chords, is less simple in origin. The notion that figured bass 'preserved the voice-leading rules' is part of Viennese lore and it has a certain logic, even if only by being consistent in its absurdity. Figured bass presented chord types and specified procedures for connecting them. Remove the variety of chord types by treating all chords as variants of a single type, triads in 'root position' or in some state of 'inversion', and its role as a codifier of chord types becomes redundant. All that is left to distinguish it from 'harmony' is the residue of the rules for connecting chords and for constructing out of these connections the ripieno voices, which, of course, are quite different from the voices of polyphony, although this is not generally understood by people who speak about figured bass as the preserver of the voice-leading rules. These rules retain some validity even when the chords are reductively interpreted, but far fewer are needed and they no longer
relate to individual sonorities, since these are no longer recognised. Thus, although pitifully enfeebled, they are more recognisable as voices than anything that could possibly develop out of 'harmony' (fundamental bass) exercises; recognisable enough to keep faintly alive their relation to the baroque notion of inner voices developing out of the counterpointing of a melody and a bass.

The reason why figured bass seemed to Schenker a possible model for composition, while species counterpoint did not, is that it presupposes an elementary artistic structure, while the species model is a model of a learning process, not of a work of art. To produce the species, the work of art is analysed rationally. It is then reconstructed by reversing the process of analysis. For Schenker the original, modal, work could be pictured only very hazily and no work which would be its reconstitution could possibly be imagined. For him the species, therefore, could only be a means of examining the effect of combinations of tones systematically, by progressing from simple to more complex combinations.

Understood in Schenker's own terms, this approach is not only intelligible, but something we need to grasp if we are to understand the motivation of his theoretical thinking. This is a kind of thinking which springs from the stock of ideas and beliefs available to Schenker in his formative period. It has nothing to do with musicological investigation, even though a good deal of this went on alongside it. The role of the latter in relation to this thinking can only be to explain it. Reduced to history the theorising appears merely bizarre.

The interpretation of Fux given here takes on the air
of an historical rationalisation of the refusal to acknowledge the 'validity' of modal music. In this view, species counterpoint cannot, as Fux mistakenly believed, lead to composition of real works of art since the kind of music represented by vocal polyphony is an historical blind alley up which the unfortunate composers were led by their fixation on the church modes. Like the strange view of figured bass as having nothing to do with chords, this interpretation is not entirely an invention of Schenker, but an aspect of the conventional wisdom of his youth which had a particularly strong appeal for him. Far from being weaned away from this view by the accumulating evidence that Palestrina was not an embryonic manifestation, or worse still a still-birth, but the culmination of a monumental and opulent tradition, Schenker stubbornly persisted in his view, partly because it seems he believed his theory was in some way dependent on it and partly because of the more widely persistent prejudice against music tied to texts, the prejudice in favour of 'absolute music'.

Even if he had been more sympathetic to the music of 'the vocal epoch' he would still have found it impossible to see its structure in terms of the Fuxian pedagogy, and in this was perhaps less, rather than more, simple-minded than his style-analyst contemporaries. Attempts to revive modal composition by reviving the species only confirmed his belief that the system could not lead to the construction of works of art, since it failed to produce any such revival. The actual impact of modality on nineteenth and twentieth century music—in which, of course, he had no interest—was related not to the species, but to the psychological effect of exotic tonal relations. Moreover it should be emphasised that these curious beliefs about theoretical history, and the history of composed music were
by no means confined to Schenker; we demonstrate our own historical insensitivity if we insist on judging them in the light of the vastly different perspective which is the product of almost another century of intense historical activity.

But there are serious problems also with Jonas's account of Rameau. Leaving aside the anachronisms - Rameau's inability to anticipate Schenker's concepts - and the attempt to reduce his theory of chordal inversion to the theory of intervallic inversion, while at the same time employing the term 'root', as if the concept it represents had an independent existence, there are difficulties about the supposed means by which Rameauvian concepts were made available to German and Austrian theorists, and the use they made of them. Jonas's presentation of Kirnberger as the champion of J. S. Bach and Marpurg as the champion of Rameau is misleading. Such evidence as Schenker had access to no doubt made this interpretation of the Kirnberger-Marpurg controversy plausible. The research on which the current picture of the state of theory in the latter half of the eighteenth century is based is contemporaneous with Schenker's own work.\(^{12}\) According to Tittel it was Kirnberger, not Marpurg, who was the essential link in the chain between Rameau and Sechter,\(^{13}\) the father of Viennese fundamental bass theory, which is the theory referred to by Schenker in the quotation at the head of this chapter. Kirnberger's hostility to Rameau was only partial, and one remnant of his attitude of compromise is the often repeated view that Rameau 'went too far', or was 'too one-sided'. That such a view should emerge in a Viennese context is not surprising, since Albrechtsberger, a pillar of Viennese tradition in the classical period, established a pattern of theoretical accommodation and compromise, presenting
rationalist-reductive concepts side by side with traditional theories, with no apparent sense of their logical incompatibility, and adapting the Fuxian species to major and minor. Schenker's own theory, of course, represents a curious kind of reconciliation between Rameauvian reductivism and craft tradition. What the critics of Rameau overlook is that Rameau also readily modifies his reductivism when confronted by the exigencies of musical reality. Only nineteenth-century textbook 'harmony' refuses to be side-tracked by the irrationalities of the art.

Part of Jonas's motive in introducing the Kirnberger-Marpurg controversy is the desire to show that the great composers, including J. S. Bach, were uninfluenced by fundamental bass theory. C. P. E. Bach's assertion that his father was opposed to Rameau may seem to be important from this point of view. In fact, since Marpurg's translation of d'Alembert did not appear until 1757, that particular work can obviously have no relevance to J. S. Bach at all and even Marpurg's earliest attempt to promulgate Rameau dates only from 1749, the year before Bach's death. For the argument to have any life in it, we have to make the unlikely assumption of earlier independent access by J. S. Bach to Rameau's works. Even if evidence of such contact were to emerge, it would be a very uphill task to prove the influence of reductive thinking on Bach's music. Only the strength of the myth that the 'harmony' of the text books represented the practice of the composers could explain the need for this unnecessary debate.

That the classical composers were uninfluenced by nineteenth-century text-book harmony hardly needs to be argued. Whether or not they were influenced by Rameau in other ways was less easy to ascertain in Schenker's time.
than it is now. Since then various kinds of evidence have appeared which fully support Schenker's and Jonas's claim that Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven, despite having been educated in a post Rameauvian world, were instructed in counterpoint and figured bass. It is Mendelssohn who would appear to be the most risky of Schenker's witnesses.

But Jonas was substantially correct in saying that Mendelssohn was instructed in the old style - if the word style refers to the theory rather than to the manner of instruction - traces of which remained in Berlin. The main trace was Zelter. But Zelter's model appears to have been Kirnberger rather than C. P. E. Bach and his style of teaching to have been, probably as a consequence of this, much more theoretical than Bach's. Some of Mendelssohn's work-books have survived, and we can see from them that what had been for C. P. E. Bach a very practical discipline had become much more a pen and paper procedure by the time of Mendelssohn's youth. Nevertheless, the theoretical assumptions behind Zelter's exercises are those of the figured bass tradition uncorrupted by inversion theory, even though the fundamental bass was also taught by him to Mendelssohn. It may be that Mendelssohn had been taught figured bass in a more authentic manner before he worked the exercises which have survived, learning the chords individually at the keyboard, as specific sonorities with a particular hand-shape, as Bach deals with them in his treatise. But there is no way of knowing this. The evidence indicates a system of writing out and figuring a bass on paper and then realising the figures. This may suggest the influence of fundamental bass theory, merely because the bass is treated as a harmonic starting point, rather than as a counterpoint to the upper voice. But, of course, it does not imply that the figures were understood to indicate the
inversional status of triads rather than the traditional sonorities. The role of the fundamental bass (which is added afterwards, not allowed to determine the path of the bass as in nineteenth-century text-books) is to 'justify' the harmonies rationally. There is, as Jonas rightly says, no evidence of the pedagogic practices of the nineteenth-century conservatory in the Mendelssohn records.

The notion of rational justification of irrational artistic practice is the way in which Rameau's theory could be accommodated by, even supportive of, the craft tradition, which, in the Voltairean atmosphere of the Prussian court, needed to de-mystify itself.\textsuperscript{18} Far from superceding the tradition, it could be used to validate it. But the ambition to supercede the tradition makes fundamental bass so obviously threatening to it that it is not surprising to find Kirnberger, exactly because his attitude to rationalism appeared less subversive than Marpurg's, becoming the effective carrier of the Grundbass into the theorising of people who had not the faintest notion of the philosophical-scientific motives of Rameau and d'Alembert and were untouched by the Francophilism of the court of Frederick the Great.\textsuperscript{19}

Mendelssohn is often treated as an anomalous figure and in respect of his musical education, he was. Unmodified figured bass was out of fashion virtually everywhere except Berlin by the time he was being taught by Zelter and this instruction was seen by some of his contemporaries - Schumann, for example - as almost an unfair advantage. But its highly theoretical character, very different from the figured bass instruction given to Mozart and Beethoven, shows the craft tradition represented by the Bach family in an etiolated form, already tending towards a rationalised,
schoolroom pedagogy, as opposed to the process of initiation into a mystery, which the older way had been. This may partly account for characteristics which have led some critics to find Mendelssohn's brilliance more a matter of facility than of inspiration. Schenker did not join in the fashionable denigration of Mendelssohn of his time, but it is interesting that this composer provides a very small number of illustrations of his theory in *Free Composition*.

Finally there is Brahms. Brahms is Schenker's great authority in every respect but one: he could not go along with Brahms's desire to restore the modal version of species counterpoint. There is no doubt that Brahms did have very serious reservations about the harmonic theory, indeed about all the theory taught in the conservatories. Brahms's opposition, however, carried little weight against the overwhelming progress of the institutions and these procedures flourished. Although the composers of the late nineteenth century tended to resist - often bitterly - the pedagogic methods to which they were subjected, the historical picture was by then so clouded that resistance was all that was left to them. They no longer had any notion of an alternative. The difficulty of Schenker's struggle to recover the craft tradition is itself testimony to this. We need not, as Schenker did, draw the conclusion that the art would wither away unless the craft tradition could be restored, to see that the situation of composers of his generation was utterly different from the situation of Mozart, or even Mendelssohn, and must lead to a radically different approach to composition.

In his *Introduction to the Theory of Heinrich Schenker* Jonas presents more evidence in support of his interpretation of theoretical history. Here again he treats
Kirnberger, whose works, he tells us, were given to Beethoven by Neefe, as wholly anti-Rameauvian, and introduces the names of Vogler and Weber into the discussion. His own acquaintance with Kirnberger must have been too slight for him to see that he was here giving away part of his argument. If Beethoven had all the works of Kirnberger, he must have known about fundamental bass long before he met Vogler in Vienna and may not have shared the hostility of the older generation. Beethoven's attitude to Vogler was perhaps less negative than Mozart's. His admiration of Cherubini also suggests that 'theorist' was not necessarily a pejorative term for him. But even if Beethoven was interested in Vogler's kind of theoretical speculation, this is a very different matter from involvement with the 'harmony' of the conservatories which were being set up towards the end of his life.

Vogler is interesting to us as the originator of the system of supplying the fundamental bass to a composition by means of a sequence of Roman numerals set out below the composed bass. This notational system is more than mere shorthand. The numerals indicate not so much the triads implied by the composed bass as the steps of the scale upon which the triads are constructed. This concept was of crucial importance to Schenker.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Jonas's history of theory is that it skips from Weber to the 1920 edition of a book by Hermann Grabner, with no direct reference to the development through the nineteenth-century of the theory which is the focus of his, and Schenker's, critique. This is the more remarkable since this theory is Viennese in origin, and both Schenker and Jonas received their musical education in Vienna. This is the very area where they might be
expected to be more, rather than less specific. Perhaps it
required a degree of rashness of which even Schenker was
incapable to be as rude about Viennese orthodoxy as he felt
able to be about Riemann, Richter and Reger. But this should
not deceive us. It was his own school experience at the
hands of Bruckner, the faithful disciple of Sechter, against
which Schenker reacted. To learn the history of this theory,
however, we have to turn to musicology proper.

An authoritative account of the development of Viennese
theory is provided by the Austrian historian Ernst Tittel.23
In his 'Wiener Musiktheorie von Fux bis Schoenberg' he
surveys exactly the period left blank by Jonas. The
information he presents concerning the musical education of
Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven confirms the absence of any
trace of the kind of 'harmony' associated with the
nineteenth century text book. What he says about their own
teaching procedures confirms their faithfulness to the
traditions they inherited, their minimal interest in
pedagogy, and scant evidence of any deep involvement in
theorising of any sort. When he moves to theoretical history
itself, a story emerges which so strongly confirms
Schenker's claims about the nature of nineteenth-century
theory, that Schenkerian neglect of this period seems even
more curious.

According to Tittel the principal figures in
Viennese theory, from the classical period onwards, were
Albrechtsberger and Sechter. Albrechtsberger's work was made
famous far beyond Vienna by his pupil, Ignaz Ritter von
Seyfried, who published a compendium containing many
different kinds of theory in circulation at the beginning of
the nineteenth century.24 Sechter, by contrast, is
principally associated with the version of fundamental bass
theory which became the dominant pedagogic theory not only in Vienna but in many other centres as well, and, eventually, in one form or another, the 'single practical' one. This theory was universally taught, whatever else, if anything, was taught alongside it. In Vienna itself some etiolated form of figured bass, pseudo-Fuxian counterpoint and some kinds of motivic counterpoint continued to be taught up to the end of the century, but the core of the 'composition' course was, indeed still is, Sechter-style 'harmony'.

It is Sechter's 'harmony', which is the conflation of Fuxian counterpoint and Rameauvian fundamental bass, of which Schenker and Jonas complain. It was this which Schenker himself learned from Sechter's successor at the conservatory, Anton Bruckner. But according to Tittel Sechter acquired his knowledge of Rameauvian theory neither from Vogler nor from Marpurg, but from Kirnberger. From Marpurg, on the contrary, what he learned was the north German notion of counterpoint. No less important than the role of individual theorists in this history is the role - often deplored by Schenker - of the pedagogic institution. Tittel also follows through the history of the Conservatory, its teachers and their practices, from its founding in 1817 until its association with the University music department at the end of the century.

This history is interesting in several respects. The Conservatory was an off-shoot of the Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien and, as a secular institution established to meet the needs of the haute-bourgeoisie, in contradistinction to the court and the church, it could be expected to favour modern notions of theory and pedagogy. However it seems to have modelled itself on a kind of
institutional life in which, according to Tittel, just at that time, musical activity was diminishing. Before the founding of the conservatory, private tuition had filled the gaps left by institutions such as the k.k. Normalschule zu St Anna, and the Sängerknabenkonvikt. Sechter himself worked in a state educational institute (the k.u.k. Blindenerziehungsinstitut) before taking up his post at the Conservatory. Moreover, in Vienna, 'the relationship between "music-teacher" and "church-musician" had never been interrupted'. 27 In the theory books stemming from this tradition, the church modes were followed even in figured bass. It was teachers nurtured in this tradition from whom the new institution had to recruit its staff. This helps to explain not only its generally conservative atmosphere but the reason why a compromise theory like Sechter's, in which the Fuxian model was still a discernible influence - a theory, in fact, which was a continuation of the modernisation of Fux begun by Albrechtsberger - was more acceptable than the modernised versions of figured bass which it superceded. There were, of course, other factors to do with the nature of the institution which favoured Sechter's system.

Tittel confirms Schenker's observation that the dominant theory in Vienna was a version of fundamental bass theory - identifying this theory as the work of Sechter - and that this theory was the basis of other influential nineteenth-century theories. Attempts to find theoretical explanations of post-classical works were couched in terms of this theory, of which various modifications were proposed. Modifications made in the light of blatantly incompatible practice constitute the only possible claim of the theory to any sort of empirical content.
Nevertheless, the supposed association of the theory with the classical repertory and its entrenchment in highly authoritarian institutions gave crushing weight to any notion stemming from it. To query it in Schenker's time was to put oneself outside a tradition which was not merely a local phenomenon but a universally accepted idea of musical reality.

The theory in which Schenker, like all Viennese students then and now, was schooled was a product of the same time, place, and conditions as those in which the 'Viennese classics' themselves came into being. Claims of any other kind of association with the classics have to be treated with caution. The theories which proliferated in this period developed alongside the music of the time, neither deriving from it nor guiding it. Such cross influences as did occur are undoubtedly far more subtle than the bald statements of the official historians imply.

Schenker brought to bear upon the conventional theory ideas drawn from outside the pedagogic tradition. Some of these were technical, some philosophical both in the strict sense and in the sense of aesthetic notions and historical and cultural ideas. Some were the product of his individual approach to the works he studied, and this source became more important as time went on. But however much Schenker distrusted the theory he had been taught, however great his respect for Brahms and Brahms's dislike of theory and theorists, however low the esteem in which Bruckner was held in the circles in which Schenker found himself moving after his university days, he was acutely aware of the need to demonstrate his technical-theoretical competence. In what other terms could technical competence be demonstrated than in 'the only theory learned and taught' in the
conservatories? Even the most radical critique of the theory had to be at least initiated from within, since there simply existed no other position, notwithstanding the various attempts at extension and modification and antiquarian revivalism. None of these did, in fact, constitute a radical challenge to the tradition; they were rather elaborations or refinements or enrichments of it. It is the frustration generated by this situation which explains Schenker's often seemingly philosophically inconsistent reference to authorities, such as, for example, the Mozart letter since identified as a forgery.²⁸

Schenker's theory itself is, of course, an implicit critique of conventional theory and theoretical history. His explanations in Free Composition are often overtly historical and accompanied by many comments about the writing of history. The history of music should tell us, he argues, when and where the phenomena he isolates first occurred and how they developed. Free Composition could itself be read as such a history in outline. This history could be compared to the history of musical development implied by conventional histories of theory.

There are several reasons why a comparison of this kind would be premature. Yet the bulk of the existing secondary literature not least, ironically, Forte's essay cited above, is in effect an attempt to prove that Schenker provides a better account of the development of music than conventional theories. If he provides a better account of the development of individual works than that provided by any of the other widely canvassed theories he must be putting in doubt accounts of the historical development of compositional techniques which refer back to less reliable interpretations of these techniques.

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The means by which the adequacy of the interpretation of works has conventionally been tested has been to compare the explanation with the work. According to this criterion, if a sufficient degree of correspondence is found the explanation is appropriate. The problem here, of course, as with any allegedly empirical theory, is that of circularity. The explanation is seen to match the work when the work is seen in the light of the explanation. In just the same way, the formal theorist can claim that because his formal construct corresponds to phenomena demonstrable in the work it explains the work's structure, or the intervallic analysis of the works of Palestrina can claim that it explains their structure, and so on. To the unconvinced or the uninitiated, the devotee can only say that he finds the procedure more illuminating than theirs. But he can only convince them that it is so by teaching them to see in the same way. He cannot give them any reason why it should be so. This is the problem of reliance on the 'purely empirical' uncontaminated by thought, which Schenker reminds us, with his quotation from the Theory of Colour at the head of Chapter 1 of Free Composition does not exist.

A history of theory designed to provide logical justification by reinterpreting the conventional history as the diachronic aspect of the synchronic theory would be open to precisely the same logical objection as the empirical justification of the theory. The problem must be approached first from the opposite end. It is only by testing Schenker's underlying assumptions - embodied in his stated historical beliefs as expressed in his critique of conventional history - against conventional accounts of that history that we shall be in a position to provide - or deny - external support for the theory erected upon them. Only then would it be appropriate to consider the merits of
reconstructing theoretical history using Schenker's analytical insights as a guide.

* * * *

Schenker's critique is two-pronged. He attacks nineteenth century theory as theory, i.e., he questions the explanatory powers claimed for it, indeed its whole relationship with the music it is supposed to explain. But he attacks it also as a pedagogic system. It is the use of the fundamental bass as a system for teaching the rudiments of composition to which he takes the most serious exception.

In the third chapter of Harmony, Schenker criticises the conflation of species counterpoint with fundamental bass theory. He attacks also the inability of the (Conservatory) teacher 'to explain his own propositions' and the lack of discernible connection between the rules and the free composition from which the theory claims to be derived. 30

He focuses on the 'confusion between harmony and counterpoint' by taking an example from a standard harmony text-book, the Lehrbuch der Harmonie of Ernst Friedrich Richter (Leipzig 1853) whose twenty-fifth edition appeared in English as a Manual of Harmony in 1912, and asks, 'What does this mean?':

![Musical notation diagram]

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Schenker pretends to be genuinely puzzled. Is this a four-part species exercise? If so, is the bass voice supposed to be the *cantus firmus*? Surely not, for how can anything as musically meaningless as this really be a *cantus firmus*? Or perhaps the notes of the bass are just symbols of the scale steps of a real composition, not the actual sequence of tones appearing in the bass voice, but only the roots of the controlling harmonies. But this can hardly be right, for the parts really do look like the voices of a counterpoint exercise, an exercise in voice-leading, in which all the voices are real voices. What is the point of trying to teach voice-leading rules over a symbolic bass? Wouldn't it make more sense to use a real voice, a *cantus firmus*, to which to relate the other voices? It can be assumed that Schenker's contemporaries were not so stupid as to be unable to take his irony. If the system plodded on its way undisturbed by attacks of this kind it was not because there was a widespread faith in its logical consistency.

'Imagine now,' he exclaims at the end of all this, 'that the whole book is based on such nonsense,' of which the student 'cannot make head or tail'. He does not know whether he is being taught harmony or counterpoint, cannot even tell which is supposed to be which. And the text-books 'are all alike'. The force of 'the general tradition' is 'so irresistible that even artists like Tchaikovsky and Rimsky-Korsakov...fall into the same error in their text-books on harmony'. These composers may have been chosen by Schenker less for their artistic standing than for their geographical remoteness which indicated the extent of the plague.

Against this 'nonsense' Schenker counterpoises the old
figured bass tradition, choosing an example from J. S. Bach's Generalbassbüchlein whose instructions were directed to practical ends, to composition, improvisation and the performance of real music. 'It is impossible that every note of a true bass line should be a scale step and that the progression of the bass notes should be identical with the progression of the scale-steps,' he points out with reference to this example.

Schenker’s argument at this point does not end with quite the panache of its opening. It is easier to find fault with 'the general tradition' than to offer an alternative. Schenker's own alternative had not, at that stage, been worked out. As yet he shrank from advocating the reintroduction of full-blown figured bass teaching, conceding that it was out of date and having yet to grasp its implications for musical education, and this gives his chapter rather a lame ending. Indeed, although he does advocate it in principle in his last book he does not make it at all clear how such a programme could realistically be implemented in a modern music school. (Modern Schenkerians generally do not confront the issue, addressing it cursorily or not at all.) His consciousness that he cannot present an alternative teaching method tempts him into grandiloquence whose role is perhaps rather to quell his own uneasiness than to hide his vagueness.

But this in no way diminishes the validity of his case against the conservatory theory, namely that it conflates and debases the distinct traditions it displaces which had particular practical objectives, none of which can be fulfilled by the hybrid theory. The objectives may have changed. Perhaps performers really do not need to know much about the music they perform and it may be that the
separation between performance and composition is irreversible. Perhaps those who want to listen more insightfully really need not trouble their heads with figured bass and counterpoint. But in that case why put them through this meaningless form of torture, which is hardly less painful than the old procedures and infinitely less useful?

When Schenker criticises the theory of the fundamental bass, it is the Viennese teaching system founded on the use of the fundamental bass that he means. It is important to be clear about this because it is easy to misinterpret his hostility to the fundamental bass as a rejection of Rameau's most innovative and influential idea, namely that sonorities which may strike the eye as entirely disparate entities may seem to the ear merely a re-arrangement of the same tonal material and can rationally be interpreted as such. The attractiveness of this notion for the eighteenth century is that it accords with the idea of natural law, of hidden determinants which are the source of our sense of normality and appropriateness. If it were possible to demonstrate infallibly that the psychological laws of art and the physical laws of sound reflect one another in some necessary way we might discover whether or not our perceptions correspond to an objective reality. Whether or not Rameau's theory was truly scientific, as d'Alembert believed, remains an open question. 32

The theory of inversion is not only a rationalist theory but a theory of hearing. Rameau proposed writing with the principle of inversion consciously in mind because he believed that by doing so the composer could guarantee both the natural and psychological appropriateness of his music. If it obeys the rules the music will sound right because it
will be right. Whereas before the composer had to rely on his own sense of appropriateness, his taste, to guide him, without understanding what he was doing, now he can guarantee success. Even a composer with a relatively poor sense of musical appropriateness can produce tolerable music if he follows the rules. There were, of course, other, much cruder theories about how music could be mechanically assembled. Rameau is not unique in offering a short-cut and Schenker was just as contemptuous of the jig-saw puzzle approach of phrase juggling, filling in of outlines, motivic permutation and so on.

Understood in this way it is easy to see both how close Schenker is to Rameau and where he departs from him. The idea that the appearance of the text can belie the way the music is heard, that sonorities which appear unrelated are heard as related is crucial to Schenker. Rameau's notion of a sequence of understood sounds underlying the text putting constraints upon what can happen within it is also essential to Schenker's theorising. It is not unreasonable to see his theory in this sense as an extension of Rameau's. But a vital difference is that in Rameau's view of the thing the understood sequence is only understood. It is a purely psychological entity, rationally inferred from the known laws of sound, whereas for Schenker its constituents are real sounds. As a sequence, however, as an understood relationship of tones it is very much a psychological phenomenon. The hidden sequence has to be recomposed by the listener. He must find it intuitively, making the indispensable connections which will provide him with the desired sense of coherence. His finding and recognising it is what guarantees his sense of the music's appropriateness.

The fact that this happens without conscious effort is
of the essence. The magic of composition is the ability of the composer to satisfy the desire of the listener without either of them needing to know how or why this happens. To uncover the process may enhance the discernment of the listener but it could never lead to the formulation of infallible rules of composition, not because it is too complex - there would be too many rules - but because it would destroy the magic. The composer's freedom not to be wholly predictable and the listener's need for refreshment, which is as great as his desire for the satisfaction of his sense of appropriateness, would both be denied. Very great works bear repeated hearing not because they obey the rules, but because the resourcefulness with which they exploit their freedom makes it impossible to exhaust their freshness. Composition which is not free is not composition.

It could be said that the greatest virtue of Schenker's analytic procedure is its complexity since this demonstrates the nonsense of trying to write rules, however numerous and however refined, which will guarantee successful composition. It explodes the notion that art can be reduced to the rational. There is an irony in this because Schenker set out with the belief that he was going to simplify theory. There is a sense in which he did fulfil this aim, carrying the reductive programme of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century science-oriented theorists to its limit. But the effect is to make visible the vast realm of compositional freedom lying within the spaces articulated by the reductive structure. Schenker's word for this is Tonraum, musical space, an articulated space which becomes the composer's field of play. Within this his freedom is infinitely greater than conventional theory suspected. It is a startling thought that while Schoenberg, following the conventional historical interpretation, felt that dissonance
and chromaticism were disruptive forces, Schenker believed that no amount of dissonance or chromaticism would be unacceptable to an ear that could hear them in a coherent context.

If we contrast this with the compositional theory which Rameau saw as the logical consequence of his discovery its rationalism looks positively simple-minded. Four-part harmony is reductive in a different sense. It reduces composition to a set of formulae so that it ceases to be composition.33

If, like Sechter and so many of his contemporaries, we see the fundamental bass as the logical consequence of the theory of chordal inversion, and feel justified in turning this analytic procedure into a constructive principle, we might feel that Schenker is inconsistent in accepting the one and rejecting the other. But it is not a necessary consequence. Only habit makes it appear so. Schenker accepted the reductive implications of the inversion theory for the interpretation of chords but he did not share Rameau's very eighteenth century belief that every simultaneity was categorizable as a chord. For Schenker it was neither necessary nor possible to imagine a non-sounding 'bass' line, a dumb voice, marching in step with the actual bass.

Still less did it make sense to 'compose' a fundamental bass line. This would have seemed a nonsense to him, even if he had been prepared to analyse harmonic textures in Rameau's fashion, since he began from a different notion of the compositional process. What the paradigmatic system built on the fundamental bass did was to attempt, quite crudely, to construct compositional laws out of physically
derived 'harmonic' laws.

According to Jonas, Schenker's great contribution was the unravelling of fundamental bass from counterpoint with which nineteenth century theory had conflated it. In reality, his criticism went deeper. Neither species counterpoint nor fundamental bass could, in Schenker's view, lead to composition. The former provided a certain kind of valuable musical training while the second was mechanical and meaningless. But neither of these things could explain works of art. Any theory which sets out to do this must be an aesthetic theory. The principles it locates must be principles of art. Nineteenth-century technical theory was primarily concerned with something else: devising systems which could be taught. The gulf which opened up between composition and theory, which it was Schenker's declared ambition to bridge, did so because of this situation.

It is the educational system to which we must turn therefore, for insight into the external conditions which determined the direction taken by theory in the early years of the nineteenth century, and to see whether Schenker was justified in regarding these conditions as at best irrelevant and at worst inimical to art.

* * *

The nineteenth century certainly saw great changes in the way musicians were educated, in the shape of musical careers and in the notion of what a musician should be and what he should be able to do. A major feature of this change is the institutionalisation of musical education and the
rise of a pedagogic literature - very different from the pedagogic literature of the eighteenth century - the production of which expanded to industrial proportions by the end of the century. To see whether Schenker was right in attributing the confused state of theory to these conditions, and how far Rameauvian theory in one form or another contributed to it, and to see whether his view is more or less plausible than that of those who claim that nineteenth century Viennese theory 'oriented itself according to the musical language and grammar of the Viennese classics', it is necessary to have a picture of these changes, especially as they affected musical life in Vienna, since it was in Vienna that the theory which became standard in the academies was developed, and the Viennese classics with which it became associated.

This fact is itself quite remarkable, for at the time when the theory was taking shape it was still widely felt that the most progressive theories were French in origin and it was the supposedly scientific character of the enlightened French school which was felt to be the guarantee of its validity rather than any connection with contemporary composition. At the time when the theory taught by Bruckner began to be established at the Vienna Conservatory, the works which came to be regarded as classics were not the staple repertory they later became. The whole notion of a repertory - works to be repeated regularly, which formed the bread and butter of concert-life and which were eventually to be sanctified by this process - only began to take shape with the rise of the great orchestras, which it was the task of the Conservatories to man. Even in Schenker's youth, as we can see from his reviews, the almost total dominance of concert programmes by music of the past, which characterised concert life for most of the twentieth century, was still to
The Vienna Conservatory opened in 1817, five years after the founding of its parent institution the Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien, first as a choir school and later as a school for instrumentalists. According to Tittel, theoretical studies developed 'slowly and laboriously' since the teaching of composition was not felt to be either necessary or appropriate and the theoretical knowledge required by organists, singers, instrumentalists and even 'musical directors' was felt to be adequately catered for by rudimentary instruction. However, he says, 'things moved with the times' and in 1860 a composition class was established. He does not tell us what it was about 'the times' that prompted this change. Although it was not until 1860 that composition featured on the curriculum as a distinct discipline of that name, it had long been present as the standard 'harmony' course to which Generalbass had been reduced.

The first theory teacher, Gottfried Salzmann, was appointed in 1820. Simon Sechter was appointed in 1850, his pupil Preyer having taught at the Conservatory since 1839. Another Sechter pupil, Selmar Bagge, taught there from 1851-5 before becoming director of a music school in Basel. Bruckner, a very faithful pupil of Sechter, succeeded him. It requires no great insight to see that it was Simon Sechter whose ideas dominated the teaching of theory at the Conservatory at least from 1839 onwards, not too far from Schenker's 'century'.

From 1860 classes in 'elementary music-theory' and 'figured bass playing' under Karl Graedener, (whose son Hermann was much admired as a composer by Schenker), Karl
Pichier and Edward Koehler, were followed by courses in 'Harmony' and 'Composition'. Tittel speculates that the appointment of Court Music Director Otto-Desoff was intended as a counterweight to the style of 'old Sechter', but can give no information about Desoff's teaching methods. The remark is interesting, however, because it suggests the consciousness of a disjunction between the pedagogic style and musical practice in the secular world. Bruckner succeeded Sechter alongside Leopold Alexander Zellner, who was appointed in 1868, and Franz Krenn (1869). Bruckner was nearing the end of his career when Schenker became his pupil in 1887. By then a relationship had begun between the Conservatory and the University which was to further solidify the position of conventional theory.

The developments in Vienna were not unique. The establishment of a conservatory in Vienna was preceded by that of the Paris Conservatory in 1795. Five years after Vienna, London had its first institution of this kind, the Royal Academy, which opened in 1823. In the same period, i.e., the first half of the nineteenth century, such schools were set up as far apart as Lemberg and Dublin. As in Vienna, the setting up of the schools was related to the founding of the many orchestral societies which date from the same period and which they were intended to supply with players, as well, of course, as to produce the next generation of teachers.

Clearly, from the 1820s some method of theory instruction was called for which was more than rudimentary but suitable to the school situation and appropriate to a wider range of abilities than were the methods by which the children of Bach or the Mozart children had been instructed. It can hardly be coincidence that from just this time
'harmony' text-books produced expressly for instruction in what were understood to be the basics of composition began to be turned out in large numbers in German, French and English and in smaller numbers in other languages. These books were very often aimed at a specific market. Some were written for use in particular institutions, some were advertised as having been used by teachers in particular conservatories. Others claimed to be suited to self-instruction. Others again were meant for use in primary schools or for the enlightenment of teachers in such schools, or in the 'normal' schools in which they were trained, or for the benefit of church organists and choir-masters.

Certain clearly defined theoretical trends are discernible in the titles of these books. In the first two decades the lists are dominated by books dealing with figured bass. The word 'harmony' appears in their titles more often than not. This does not necessarily imply the 'harmony' of the 'fundamental bass' as it is found in the literature of later decades but it can not be assumed that the instruction offered under this heading was of the kind we now associate with C. P. E. Bach. A book of this period is just as likely to tell the reader how to figure a bass - according to principles of bass progression, inversion, preparation and resolution of 'chords' - as how to realise an accompaniment from a given figured bass, and least of all how to do this in improvisatory fashion in performance. The ubiquitous treatment of the figures as representing the inversional status of a triad, or seventh chord, or some derivative of these, is indicative of the same set of assumptions as those underlying the fundamental bass system promulgated by Sechter and others. It is only a short step from using the traditional figures to identify bass tones as
something other than the root tones of the chords of which they are supposed to be members to 'composing' the fundamental bass in some fashion.

In the third decade, books dealing with the theory of harmony begin to outnumber those dealing with figured bass. These books are certainly instructional books promulgating the 'new' system of harmony rather than new theoretical investigations.

It was in France that books presenting a 'modern' notion of harmony first appeared in any quantity, not surprisingly since the French Conservatory led the way and naturally took up an 'enlightened' attitude. The words 'new' and 'science' appear more frequently in the French titles as do 'rational' and 'system'. In Germany perhaps the most frequent adjective is 'easy' and, in the circumstances, the highly appropriate German expression for a means of negotiating the convolutions created by the stirring together of all manner of incompatible systems: leit-faden - 'guiding thread'. The amateur presumably constituted a significant proportion of the German market.

Speculative or scholarly works taking cognisance of French developments had been appearing in German since Marpurg's translation of d'Alembert, from Kirnberger's Die Wahren Grundsätze der Harmonie in 1773 to the Abbé Vogler's Handbuch zur Harmonielehre in 1802. Many of these were read by Sechter. He lists Marpurg, Kirnberger and Mattheson among the theorists whose works were known to him. (In later years he was to add Türk, Gottfried Weber, Reicha, Marx and Riepel to the list.) Vogler is as conspicuous by his absence from Sechter's list as Sechter is by his absence from Schenker's, but he was a prominent figure in musical and academic
circles during Sechter's life-time. It would be inconceivable that Sechter knew nothing of his ideas even if he had not advertised his acquaintance with them by using Vogler's Roman numerals to indicate scale steps in the Grundsätze. 38

Among the most prominent of Sechter's immediate predecessors in Viennese teaching theory and the most influential on future pedagogic methods was Johann Georg Albrechtsberger (1736-1809). It is impossible to be certain how much of the theoretical writings given out as Albrechtsberger's were in fact his, but it is perhaps significant that the books published in his life-time deal with Generalbass, accompaniment, the use of diminished and augmented intervals, 'strict composition' etc., i.e., traditional topics, while the version published after his death by Ignaz Ritter von Seyfried is entitled Albrechtsberger's sämtliche Schriften ueber Generalbass, Harmonielehre und Tonsetzkunst (1837). By 1837 'moving with the times' required that theory books had something to say about 'harmony'.

Tittel indicates that Albrechtsberger's work was based primarily on the Gradus but that he then 'modernised' it under the stimulus of C. P. E. Bach's Versuch, and the works of Marpurg and Kirnberger. In this way, he says, Albrechtsberger's work collects together all the theoretical tendencies of the classical era. Certainly Albrechtsberger shows the influence of the theoretical trends of his time, but to what extent he had understood them and whether his, or rather Seyfried's, compendium represents something more than an opportunistic compilation is a more complex question. Tittel seems to take the claims of Seyfried at face value, making no distinction between the purely
theoretical and the pedagogic significances of the 'modernisation' of Fux.

This distinction is crucial. The significance for music-education of Albrechtsberger's 'modernisation' can hardly be exaggerated. The assumption that a modal contrapuntal theory can be retained as a rational part of the preparation for the writing of tonal music through a simple modification is anything but self-evidently true. Even less self-evident is the relationship of this procedure to the processes which brought about the supposedly corresponding 'modernisation' of composition itself.

The real significance of Albrechtsberger's modernisation of Fuxian counterpoint was that it was the indispensable precondition for Sechter's further adaptation of the system. Before the principle of the fundamental bass could be applied to the contrapuntal species it was vital for the latter to be interpreted chordally and in terms of the major and minor scales.

* * *

Nothing could illustrate the difficulties confronting the conservatory teacher more vividly than the Seyfried compendium with its multitude of rules and examples, adapted, according to its optimistic subtitle, for self-instruction. To turn from Albrechtsberger to Sechter is to see at once what was the charm of the fundamental bass. This had very little to do with the interpretation of musical structures.

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Albrechtsberger, or rather, the compendium published under his name, straddles the great pedagogic divide, which is not between counterpoint and figured bass, but between, on the one hand, these two and various compromise or contributory harmonic theories, and on the other, the all-embracing fundamental bass. It tries to bridge the gap between the old craft mysteries which require either intensive and highly expert individual instruction - such as that received by the Bach children from their father or the Mozart children from theirs - and the situation in which large numbers of musicians have to be educated, mainly to perform other people's music, and/or to teach others again. For such students, the skills of the composer or the improvising accompanist are not only unnecessary, but impossible to provide for on the scale required.

The method of C. P. E. Bach required long, slow, patient, individual teaching. Johann Christian, for example, spent four years studying with his elder brother after his father's death. These studies were carried out at the keyboard. We can be sure of this not only from the consistently practical orientation of the instructions but also because C. P. E. Bach remarks on the importance of engaging the intellect as well as the fingers of the pupil. He acknowledges that it is possible to learn to realise figured bass effectively without understanding it 'theoretically' given a good enough ear. He probably would not have thought it possible to learn it theoretically without experiencing it practically and would hardly have approved of Zelter's procedure. Yet a 'theoretically' acquired skill is exactly what the producers of text-books offered. Bach insists on the need for repetition, for the teacher to question the pupil again and again to ensure that everything has been learned before new things are
introduced. We can be sure this questioning did not take the proxy form, characteristic of institutionalised education, of collecting in and marking paper exercises.

Teaching of this order was a very exclusive business indeed. C. P. E. Bach's satirical letters in *Der kritische Musicus an der Spree* indicate some of the difficulties of obtaining it, even of knowing what to look for. Bach himself insists that it can only be provided by a composer of the highest standing and much experience. What he is really inveighing against in these letters, whether or not he saw it in these terms, is not simply a lowering of standards, but new social conditions which led to the transformation of a craft mystery requiring a long apprenticeship into a pastime for the *nouveaux riches*. The Conservatories were the great engine of this movement to which C. P. E. Bach himself unwittingly contributed, as, to his dismay, he later realised. 'Compendia' appalled him. But nothing published in his life time can have been, from his point of view, quite as appalling as the Seyfried production.

At any one time there appears to have been a handful of teachers taking care of the theoretical education of the entire student body at the Vienna Conservatory. Bruckner's two year harmony and counterpoint course consisted of mass lectures and the working of paper exercises and there is no reason to suppose that this was abnormal.

That Albrechtsberger (or Seyfried) had taken on board Rameau's system of inversion but not all of its implications can be seen from the fact that he discriminates between situations where the notes of a chord other than the bass note may be inverted and situations where full chordal inversion may take place. That is to say, he sees the
interpretation of chords as triadic derivatives as optional. If he has any notion of underlying musical laws it is not the one that fuelled the Enlightenment search for a reductive principle. The fact that he distinguishes circumstances in which it is necessary to stick to the ecclesiastical modes and conditions in which major and minor may apply suggests the nature of the cloistered, Catholic tradition from which he came. Coming from such a world it is not surprising that the question of the logical justification for theoretical rules and interpretations which was to be such a burning issue in Schenker's time was of no interest to him. In appearing to be au fait with all the latest ideas, however, he, or Seyfried, at least, is deeply interested.

Simplification is clearly this author's aim. There are, he says, only five principal chords. This sounds quite encouraging, especially as C. P. E. Bach lists twenty. They are the triad, the seventh, ninth, eleventh and thirteenth chords. Then begin the exceptions and elaborations, the first of which is the perfect chord. A chord is only perfect when it has four parts. It is interesting that he seems to have no word for 'root'. A chord of three sounds 'is composed of a third and a fifth to which is added in four parts, the perfect octave...'. Each of the five kinds of chord can be subdivided and each sub-species can appear in various 'positions' or inversions. In the case of the triad there are four subspecies: perfect major, perfect minor, diminished and augmented. Within the chord, depending on the inversion, an interval may be consonant or dissonant. 'Sometimes' he says, 'only a sharp or a flat points out the quality of the third....This sharp, flat, or natural sign always relates to the third only.' He is speaking of course of the figuration of chromatic intervals in figured bass,
hardly relevant to the listing of chord types.

In the midst of this chordal taxonomy, he introduces the notion of chordal discords as non-chord notes, i.e., 'prolongations' of notes belonging to other chords not 'struck anew'. Eleventh and thirteenth chords are not constructed by adding thirds above the seventh but by adding a third, a fifth and a seventh below the seventh chord. One, two or three tones have, hardly surprisingly, to be omitted from these chords in four parts, making them, perhaps, somewhat difficult to recognise. This problem did not exist before since the 9/4 chord was a standard figured bass sonority. According to Wessely, Albrechtsberger/Seyfried is following Marpurg who is following Rameau. But in listing ninth and eleventh chords as if they were on the same level, either conceptually or in their role in composition, as the triad and seventh chord, he is following him at some distance. Rameau, who does not, in fact, construct them in this way, understands them as arising through suspension, just as everyone else did, the root being the root of the chord on which the suspended tones are superimposed. These sonorities exist in figured bass and therefore Rameau believes he has to account for them within the terms of his rational scheme. Failure to do so would leave him open to the charge that his system is inadequate. But he gives no grounds for thinking that his rationalisation of the chords is a prescription for constructing them. On the contrary, his instructions for using them are traditional. However they are explained, treated as integral structures they are anomalies within his system, not categories comparable to the others.

There are here several different notions of chord: the Rameauvian invertible triad and seventh; independent fixed
sonorities from the figured bass tradition; chords constructed by adding thirds above and below a triad; chords which include prolonged tones of preceding chords. The 'reductive' principle of triadic inversion has led not to a simplification of chord categorisation but to further proliferation of chord types and the actual dissolution of any consistent concept of 'chord'. A chord is no longer a specific collection of tones sounded simultaneously; it can include notes not sounded and notes sounded with it which do not belong to it. The only certain principle is that a chord is rarely what it seems. The confusion of the empirical with the conceptual is perfectly exemplified by Albrechtsberger/Seyfried's taxonomy of entities which exist half-way between the ear and the imagination.

If this already seems somewhat less than the promised simplification it is nothing compared with what is to come when Albrechtsberger/Seyfried embarks on the business of progression of chords. Apart from the sheer complexity of the explanations, he shifts back and forth between voice-leading rules governing the chordal progressions employed by the composer - whether written out or simply figured under a bass - and rules for performance or the interpretation of the figures. Moreover, he does this arbitrarily, and without acknowledging it. He seems to have no clear notion of what kind of musician is supposed to emerge from this experience. Rather, the objective seems to be simply to pass on the accumulated information of all the traditions to which he has been - in some instances perhaps somewhat tangentially - exposed. He does this in a form which tries by the use of headings and numbers to reduce its miscellaneousness to some kind of logical order. In this it prefigures the grand schemes of the musicologists a century later, in which the substance of the subject is determined
not by the skills the pupil will need to fulfil a clearly defined role but according to abstract criteria related to the content of a body of knowledge valued for its own sake. Pedagogic theory is beginning to resemble abstract theory and to take on a life of its own. A decade or two later the process of rationalisation of this theory will have to begin, for the connection between it and any of the skills demanded of the professional musician in practice will become less and less visible to the naked eye.

If we compare this with Bach's *Versuch* we see that while the complexity of the system is compensated for by the orderliness and pedagogic realism of the presentation no attempt is made to pretend that what has to be learned is simple, or to simplify it. On the contrary, it is accepted as difficult to learn and to teach, hence the high level of skill required by the teacher and a level of commitment to the pupil unimaginable by the producers of text-books. What was at stake for Bach when he took on responsibility for a pupil was the honour of the family name, doubly so when the pupil was also a member of the family. The real difference between the two books is that the Albrechtsberger/Seyfried book is a text-book in the modern sense. C. P. E. Bach's on the other hand, if it can be thought of as a text-book at all, is a text-book for the teacher, not for the pupil. Essentially, however, it is a record of Bach's practice as a teacher, not a mere compendium of his knowledge. Figured bass for Bach was not a theoretical system at all but a set of conventions, a device at the service of the artist, and modifiable by him. Modifications to the figuration were still being made in Bach's lifetime.

Neither of these approaches offered a way forward for institutional musical education without considerable
modification. Teaching of the kind proposed by C. P. E. Bach is clearly out of the question in such a context and also superfluous in strictly utilitarian terms. An orchestral player, even the modern equivalent of the Kapellmeister, was not likely to be called upon to provide accompaniments extempore from a figured bass, and if he had ambitions as a composer that was his own affair. By the end of the century composition was no longer the heart of his identity as a musician, but, with increasingly rare exceptions, had become something that a professional musician did off duty, if at all. This situation seemed the less absurd the more the notion of genius took hold. If artistic creativity was something that descended on the fortunate individual like the Holy Ghost the institutions need feel no sense of shame at failing to nurture it.

Albrechtsberger/Seyfried recognised that what was demanded was information rather than skill and skill in handling information rather than practical musical skill, which was to be increasingly confined to performance. However, this work was altogether too compendious, too miscellaneous and disorganised for satisfactory classroom use. It was, indeed, already out of date by the time it appeared. For by the late-thirties, Sechter's system was undoubtedly the one being taught in the Conservatory, if not until considerably later by Sechter himself.

Sechter's adoption of the fundamental bass puts his work in a quite different category from that of Albrechtsberger/Seyfried, although it is undoubtedly Albrechtsberger's conflation of the species system with modern harmonic assumptions and the version of the figured bass tradition resulting from its modification in accordance with these assumptions, which prompted Sechter to apply the
fundamental bass to the species.

The application of the notion of the fundamental bass, unlike the notion of inversion applied to individual chords, provides the basis of a rational system of progressing the voices from chord to chord. The difficulty with the older systems (species counterpoint and figured bass) is that they are not rational but intuitive. The voices progress according to rules which guarantee desired sonic effects. Whether these effects are thought of in terms of vocal lines or as movements between sonorites, there are distinct perceptions of the desired results and the means by which they are to be achieved. These effects have to be heard and the means of achieving them simply have to be learned. This process cannot be reduced to something purely theoretical and abstract.

Sechter's fundamental bass procedure offers to do exactly that, although not, of course, without cost. Complexity and subtlety, the richness of the older approaches, everything not reducible to the system, has to go. The inability of this system to interpret highly chromatic music, given by later writers as the reason why it was unable to explain Wagner and his successors, has nothing at all to do with any supposed differential rate of progress between theoretical and compositional development. Sechter's system is just as powerless in relation to older musical styles as in relation to Wagner. Indeed it is powerless to explain any kind of composition at all except the countless four-part harmony exercises produced under the conditions Schenker described as 'torment' in the conservatories. The system is unremittingly diatonic because only by being so can it remain internally consistent and simple enough to fulfil its pedagogic role.
Sechter, according to Zeleny, is in the tradition of J. S. Bach, since he begins, as Bach did, with four part writing and goes on to three and two part writing. But, he adds, 'Sechter's way forward does not lead, as with Kirnberger, to the figuring and variegation of the voices but through the harmonisation of a given voice, by way of strict counterpoint and the Fuxian species, to double counterpoint.' It would clearly be immensely flattering to Sechter, and to the Viennese tradition of which he became the centre, if he could be shown to be in the tradition of J. S. Bach, although it is doubtful whether Sechter himself would have felt this quite as strongly as we do. But the substance of Sechter's teaching makes nonsense of any such claim. It has in its favour only this single point of resemblance, which in fact proves nothing at all. It could equally well be said that Kirnberger, and therefore Sechter, follows Rameau in beginning with four parts and progressing to three, and two parts, since this is in fact what happens in Rameau's 'Principles of Composition'. This was undoubtedly the norm until Fux revived the older system, and continued to be so except where Fux was adopted. It is the Viennese situation which is the oddity, not the practice of Bach.

Sechter's practice in moving from four parts to two rather than the reverse resembles what Kirnberger says was Bach's only in that it presupposes the existence of given chord forms, but they are not the chord forms known to Bach. Indeed they are not forms at all in the sense of the sonorities represented by the signatures, but ideas. The sonorous qualities of the various realisations of these ideas are of relatively little concern to Sechter, while these qualities were just what gave the chords of the
figured bass their character, their identity. Composition consisted, as far as the accompaniment was concerned, and in other kinds of galant music, in relating these sonorites. Voice-leading meant doing this in a way that was pleasing melodically, minimally, by avoiding disturbing effects, by conforming to the expectations cultivated by the conventions, and, at a higher level, inventively, with 'beauty, daring and novelty'.

While the logic of a four-part compositional model is the relating of complex sonorities rather than the compatible movement of melodies, this is not what motivates Sechter's use of it. He uses it because he wants to derive constructive voice-leading principles - as opposed to prohibitions - from the chords, a system of harmonically rationalised voice-leading. But there can be no such thing as rational voice-leading. There can only be more or less consistent ways of producing and avoiding certain effects. Reason has nothing to contribute to the question of preference for one kind of effect rather than another, although to judge from the arguments adduced in favour of and against parallels in Schenker's time it would appear that it was widely felt that it ought to have. Sechter has to presume that certain effects are desirable or undesirable and work towards them or their avoidance, although if he could rationalise an effect he felt to be aesthetically unacceptable his aesthetic conscience seems to have been remarkably yielding. Or, to put it more realistically, he seems to have had little grasp of the philosophical problem posed by the attempt to marry reason with taste. The Austrian tradition, a Catholic tradition, simply had not been a rationalist one. The pressure to rationalise was external and pedagogic.
The progression of the fundamental bass is designed to produce the best conditions to promote inoffensive voice-leading effects while at the same time producing a quasi-musical texture. A succession must be provided for if the propaedeutic aim of the model is to be credible. But a figured bass can only be composed on the assumption of a succession of given sonorities with all their voice-leading implications. These are exactly what Sechter like Rameau wants to avoid. The existing alternative way of providing for a succession is the cantus firmus. But to begin from the cantus firmus and work upwards towards four parts is to build in the voice-leading conventions assumed by the figured bass which, again, it is the whole objective of the rational system to avoid.

In 'composing' a fundamental bass, Sechter, like Rameau, is adopting a feature of the species system, by contrast to the figured bass, but a feature which separates the function from the character that gives it meaning. What Sechter does is to treat the fundamental bass as an ideal cantus firmus. Hence a melodic starting point is provided, but it is a notional one, a notational representation of a set of arithmetical relations, not even the realisation of an idea. Whether or not or however it is notated, it must be assumed to be present and determining everything else. The voice-leading problems can be reduced to a minimum by writing prior rules for the fundamental bass which guarantee this. If the fundamental bass is only permitted to progress by thirds and fifths upwards and sixths and fourths downwards a procedure for the connection of the chords can be devised which is almost infallible, and, above all, simple.

Albrechtsberger requires sixty four pages to set out
his rules for the progression of chords. Rameau sets out his in twelve and these twelve contain a quantity of rationalisation as well as the enunciation of the rules themselves. The crucial paragraph reads as follows:

'Since the fundamental bass can proceed only by consonant intervals...it imposes a certain diatonic progression on the upper parts from which almost all rules about these consonances can be derived. If we do not say absolutely all the rules this is only because dissonance introduces certain liberties. We shall always find the principal rules however...' 42

Turning to 'Principles of Composition' we see these rules in action. On p. 208 Rameau lists four rules, the fourth of which includes the rest. This rule reads:

'...it is enough to remember that the only three ways in which each of these [upper] parts can form one of the intervals of the perfect chord are: by remaining on the same note or the same degree, by ascending diatonically, or by descending diatonically. This is irrespective of the path taken by the bass. Thus, if a note in one of the parts can form the third, the fifth or the octave without changing its position, it should remain where it is. If none of these intervals can occur in this manner, however, we shall find one of them without fail by making the note ascend or descend diatonically.'

Anyone familiar with Schoenberg's method of teaching harmony will immediately recognise the source of his chord tabulations and his 'guidelines': 'Which tone is the root? Which is the common tone? Which tones are still missing?','

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and so on. 43 And anyone familiar with C. P. E. Bach will know that these rules for the progression of common chords were familiar to him too, whether after Rameau or independently. The point is that Rameau had reduced - or liked to believe he had - all sonorities apart from the seventh chord to this status, making these simple procedures basic to all chordal progression and therefore to all composition.

Rameau kindly allows the 'beginner' to 'compose any bass they desire' in much the way that Henry Ford allowed his customer to choose any colour of car he desired. It must begin and end on Do, the last Do preceded by a note a fifth above it, and it must move only by thirds and fifths or their inversions. Such a bass is assembled rather than composed and the constraint of the purely diatonic progression of the upper parts means that they, too, are put together mechanically. All the problems associated with actual composition are cleared out of the way.

Schoenberg seems to have imagined that by getting his pupils to construct chord sequences rather than harmonising a bass he is getting closer to the realities of composition. In fact his chord tables inescapably prescribe a Rameauvian fundamental bass. Even this, in Schoenberg's procedure, is not allowed the semblance of a melodic character. It is all done by numbers, or, rather, Roman numerals. In this way he strips the fundamental bass system of its last pretence of being a form of composition, hence the lengths he has to go to to justify its propaedeutic use.

On p. 209 Rameau says: '...whatever direction the bass takes, the first interval a part forms with this bass, whether it be 3, 5, or 8, indicates the interval it should
form with the following bass note and so on in succession until the end.

In his section on two part counterpoint Sechter writes at length about 'diagonal' relationships and makes them into various kinds of chains. The problem arises because it is impossible to imagine a two part composition in which the voices obey the rules given above. If the lower voice (the bass) proceeds by step the chordal voice-leading principles cannot be applied. Instead of exclusively consonant intervals between adjacent chords dissonant relationships enter. Sechter gets around the problem by introducing a silent chord between the two dissonant chords which will enable the diagonal dissonance to resolve. What would J. S. Bach or C. P. E. Bach have made of silent chords?

Sechter was very fond of chains of connection because these provided paradigms for the construction of an infinity of exercises. He frequently ends a section with the remark that the student can construct his own examples along the lines of those provided. This, of course, is important for the secondary role of the text-book, namely to provide for the autodidactic amateur. What an amateur of Sechter's period, even a highly cultivated one expected from a text-book can be guessed from Grillparzer's account of his study of figured bass and counterpoint. He embarked on it to distract himself from the politicking surrounding the production of König Ottokars Glück und Ende and found that it served the purpose admirably. C. P. E. Bach would have found his learning curve surprising.

While the old rules were designed to lead to desired effects, effects which are not aesthetically undesirable now become rationally unacceptable and rational ways of
rendering them tolerable have to be found. Of course, Rameau could not really escape these problems, and even with the seventh chord which he counts as a fundamental structure, he has to resort to the old formulations - preparation and resolution through voice-leading procedures prior to his rational rules - in order to provide for its use. On p. 217, he says, 'The sharp we placed next to the Fa need not concern us yet, since beginners do not have to use sharps and flats until they understand them better'. This sounds a little bit like not being allowed to enter the water until one has learned to swim. When he does come to the matter of chromaticism he resorts to figured bass conventions and explanations. How else is the beginner to learn to deal with anything not diatonic? Certainly it cannot be by means of the rational system, which has to resort to artistic license as an explanation for such things.

While the function of the fundamental bass is to preclude problems, the function of the cantus firmus is to generate them. It is a succession of tones constructed on principles wholly independent of harmonic assumptions, i.e., on melodic principles. It is the friction between the waywardness of melody and the constraints imposed by the perceived needs of harmony which create the subtlety and richness of polyphonic music which the species system seeks to codify and capture. But if you assume with Rameau that melody is the product of harmony then there seems to be no objection to stipulating the harmonies and constructing melodies in conformity with them. The result is a texture whose blandness then calls for the conscious superimposition of complexity thought of as chromaticism and dissonance. Chromaticism and dissonance, then appear to be elaborations and a pseudo history grows up, according to which music
begins by being harmonically simple and bland and grows more complex and subtle with the passage of time.

The marriage of the fundamental bass with the inverted species scheme produced a system whose attractiveness to educational institutions is obvious. It provides what Rameau and his contemporaries tried and failed to provide, a practicable, systematic, unfigured bass, a realistic alternative to the figured bass. Not realistic in terms of the education of an eighteenth century musician, but highly acceptable to the conservatory where theory meant, precisely, the opposite of practice. Within a couple of decades, what remained of the old systems had vanished completely enough from the curriculum to make attempts at their revival seem startlingly radical. Thus by the 1860s Bellerman was able to create a considerable stir by proposing a return to Fux, and by the end of the century C. P. E. Bach's book had become an historical curiosity.45

It is not a matter of coincidence that Generalbass declined in the face of the peculiarly Austrian form of 'harmony' instruction. Harmony was bound to take over, but figured bass instruction was not as fruitful a way forward for it, for obvious reasons, as the species vehicle prepared by Albrechtsberger. If we look at Rameau's own work we can see the practical problems of basing a system of compositional instruction on the theory of the fundamental bass. The idea of a fundamental bass presupposes a composition, just as the notion of inversion presupposes an existing sonority waiting to be interpreted in a manner different from the one in which it presents itself to the ear. Interpreting an existing figured bass in terms of the fundamental bass is one thing. 'Composing' a fundamental bass is another. Rameau's 'principles of composition' have
no more to do with the realities of writing a piece of performable eighteenth century music than late nineteenth century 'academic counterpoint' had to do with the compositions of Brahms. These 'principles' embody ideas arrived at reductively, and are not the elementary stages in the compositional process which Rameau tries to make them into.

Schenker does not object to the use of elementary schematic musical constructs in instruction. Species exercises are useful, he believes, even indispensable, as means of cultivating aural sensibility. But for that, the rationalist fundamental bass is worse than superfluous. It distracts from the essential purpose of the exercise, reducing it to a piece of arithmetic, just as the paper realisation of figured bass does. Having nothing to do with 'free composition' it also loses its point as a means of developing the skills composition presupposes, in composing melodies and interweaving them. As for 'harmony', it teaches a mechanical process of chord connection which has nothing to do either with the traditional rules of voice-leading or the transformation of the elementary harmonic material into melody and composed harmonies. Instead, one uncomposed harmony is tacked onto another with the occasional special 'chord' thrown in to relieve the dullness.

Schenker wanted to make clear how the concept of the fundamental bass, having no musical reality of its own, had batten onto species counterpoint, becoming nothing more than a debased form of the latter, hopelessly inferior to the real thing as a system of musical education and failing to provide the insight into the role of harmony in composition which it claimed to teach. In the process it
drove out the old system which familiarised the ear of the musician with an array of sonorities and gave him a means to make use of them, at worst musically, and at best artistically.

Rameau himself, when he comes to apply the notion of the fundamental bass to the creation of compositions, begins from the presuppositions shared by species counterpoint. His use of the figures familiar from figured bass practice should not deceive us about this. Although he talks about 'the succession of chords' what he actually describes is a set of voice-leading rules, no matter how much these rules differ from the traditional ones. The progress of the voices is constrained by the fact that they may only move to tones predetermined by the meaning assigned to the note in the fundamental bass, but the only way of expressing the notion of musical composition, even for Rameau, is in terms of melodic successions interrelated harmonically.

Equally important is the fact that what Rameau is describing is an ideal model of composition, not performable music, again in the tradition of species counterpoint, a point to which Schenker returns in his discussion of counterpoint.

While there is no question that Rameau was fully familiar with contrapuntal theory as well as with the harmonic speculation of Zarlino, Descartes, Mersenne and others, and was undoubtedly aware of the idea of 'species' - he gives advice on writing in two, three and four parts as well as 'How to compose a basso continuo below a treble', etc., - he did not have the convenient and thoroughly established instructional codification which Fux was at the same time working out and which, appropriately modified by
Albrechtsberger, provided Sechter with a ready-made, well-accepted and congenial pedagogic model to which to apply the assumptions of the fundamental bass.

Viennese theory was dominated by the notion of the fundamental bass from the time of Sechter until Schenker and Schoenberg in their different ways challenged it, although Schoenberg's challenge was not, of course, as Schenker's was, primarily to the interpretation of existing music. It is abundantly clear that this notion came into Austrian theory, by however circuitous a route, from French rationalist theory. The significance of the arguments about the *corps sonore* was much greater for scientists than for musicians. Sechter, with Vogler's work available to him, did not need experimental evidence in order to adopt the implication of the theory of chordal inversion and the fundamental bass. The fundamental bass appealed to him for reasons unconnected with theories of sound. Nor is there any evidence that he was greatly interested in the compositional justification of Rameauvian theory. It was a system of instruction which interested him.

There is nothing in this sequence of events - the pedagogic systematisation of species counterpoint by Fux, Albrechtsberger's modification of the Fuxian system, Sechter's conflation of this with fundamental bass, together with the simultaneous inversional modification and eventual absorption in the ubiquitous 'four-part harmony' of the old system of instruction in the realisation of figured bass - to give the faintest shadow of support to the contention that 'nineteenth century theory orientated itself according to the musical language...of the Viennese classics.' Schenker's counter-assertion, however, that the classical composers and the Bach family simply did not possess the
theoretical concepts systematically presented to music students, from the middle of the nineteenth century to his own time, as derived from their works appears to be wholly justified.

The idea that Sechter's four-part harmony in some sense reflects the practice of Bach, and that in doing so it is the theoretical counterpart of a supposed synthesis of the laws of polyphony with the laws of harmony whose achievement is the crowning glory of Bach's art, is obviously very enticing to the defenders of the system. These mutually justifying interpretations of theoretical and compositional history mesh satisfyingly with the belief that the history of music is best understood in terms of discrete periods characterised by differences of style. The great charm of this is that it does away with the need for an explanation of the transition from one style to another.
Notes to Part 1


4. Ibid., p. 35 ff..


6. Ibid., p. 201.


10. Schenker's discussion of Riemann's
'undertone' theory in his 'Preface' to Harmony (see Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1954) - the whole of which is worth careful study - illustrates the state of theoretical debate in 1906. Musicology showed little interest in such theories in later years. This is one respect in which it is possible to say that it was Adler's, rather than Riemann's, model of musicology which became the standard notion of musicology.

Guido Adler (1855-1941) succeeded Hanslick as Professor of Music at Vienna University in 1898. He revolutionised musicology, first presenting a detailed survey of its projected domain in the manner of the great philologist F. A. Wolf, and then presiding over the first stages of its implementation on his appointment to Vienna where the academic atmosphere gave him ideal support. His philological orientation meant that harmonic speculation was rigorously excluded in favour of what was meant to be strictly factual theoretical history and empirical observation. The theory taught at the Conservatory, which was already part of the University curriculum when Adler took over, presented a problem which the claim that it was derived empirically from the music of the classical era would appear to have been designed to solve.


15. A system proposed by Kirnberger in Der allezeit fertige Polonaisen-und Menuettenkomponist, 1757.


2. '...die Meister gerade von der Lehre nichts wussten, die seit einem Jahrhundert als die einzig praktische gelehrt und gelernt wird; nicht Bach Vater und Sohn, nicht Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven oder Schubert, Mendelssohn haben etwas von einer solchen Harmonie-, einer solchen Generalbass- und einer solchen Formenlehre gewusst, und Brahms wollte davon nichts wissen.' Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1956, p. 16.


See Schenker, tr. Oster, 1979. The introduction is obviously one such place, but there are many others, e.g.,

Part 1, Chapter 1, section 2; section 4; Part 11, Chapter 1, section 51; Part 111, Chapter 3, sections 254, 266.

Commenting on Schenker's observations in the Introduction, Forte remarks on the lack of specific references on Schenker's part and suggests a few himself, namely A. B. Marx, Gottfried Weber, Simon Sechter from 'the early part of the 19th century' and adds that Schenker 'would surely have included Hugo Riemann'. As Riemann was born in 1849, he would hardly have included him in a group whose last survivor died in 1867 at the age of 79. Forte says that it was Riemann's 'Rameau-influenced theory of harmony' which 'dominated instruction in German institutions at the time Schenker completed Der Freie Satz'. Is this the relevant date?

Schenker's remarks here are not an isolated outbreak. His unequivocal public criticisms of 'conventional theory' date from 1906. Moreover it is important to beware of the assumption that Austria was a musical colony of Germany in the period to which his criticism refers, i.e., the 'almost a century' up to 1935. During the early decades of the nineteenth century no German centre could
rival Vienna. It was because Zelter represented a backward-looking enclave in Berlin that Mendelssohn's experience was unusual.

In *Harmony* Schenker could hardly be more specific about the pedagogic system he is attacking. This is a system conflating Fuxian pedagogic counterpoint, a Viennese product, and Rameauvian fundamental bass, a system which became known as 'four-part harmony'. In *Free Composition*, he extends it to modified figured bass in which the figures are treated as indicators of the inversionsal status of triads, and formal theories which displaced the structural assumptions implicit in the figured bass compositional model. The 'harmony' system of instruction was well-established in Vienna and beyond when Riemann was born. It was this system which Bruckner had been teaching for almost twenty years by the time Riemann's theory of harmony was published (1887). Moreover, Schenker's references to Riemann in *Harmony* are positively emollient compared with his attack on Richter, or even his aside against Bruckner. The anonymity of the book would have concealed its Viennese provenance from no-one who read this dialect quotation in 1906. (In the English edition, p. 177, f.n. 2.)

Tittel (Tittel, 1966) sees the elements of the functional theory of harmony already in
Sechter's theory, and refers to Riemann as one of many theorists who sought to expand or modify the latter. No late-nineteenth century theory of harmony instruction could fail to be influenced by, or even exist without Viennese fundamental bass theory. Schenker certainly developed a detestation for Riemann, as editor and encyclopedic musicologist as much as in his capacity as a theorist. In so far as he is included in the critique of pedagogy it can be, logically, only as one of those who promulgated a version of the 'conventional theory' and whose prominence helped perpetuate it.

6. See Schenker, tr. Mann Borgese, 1954. The whole book is, in a sense historical, trying to uncover the process of development which led to tonal music. But it is a highly speculative Spencerian kind of history more in the mood of the nineties in which its ideas were conceived than of the new musicology. Most explicitly historical are the discussions of the ecclesiastical modes. See, e.g., p. 163.

7. See Schenker, tr. Rothgeb, 1982. The whole project has, again, a strongly historical orientation, being a study of the works Schenker believed to be behind the counterpoint he had been taught by Bruckner. Schenker is most explicitly historical in his Prefaces to the two volumes.
One problem with Schenker's history is that its focus constantly shifts. He can move from the level of the epoch to that of the individual composer on the same page, and he frequently challenges the philological-style history of Bellerman. Such ideological untidiness is very disturbing to the modern reader.


10. See Marpurg, 1757.


1893; 'Neues zur Beethovens Lehrjahren bei Haydn' by F. v. Reinöhl in Neues Beethoven-Jahrbuch VI, 1935. For Schubert the sources are Vetter, 1934 and Orel, 1939.

Other sources are available: Between 1965 and 1978 Alfred Mann published studies of theoretical documents relating to Handel, Haydn, Beethoven, Schubert and Mozart. (The Haydn and Beethoven studies are in English.) Of the sources, only those relating to Handel are not referred to by Tittel.

Invaluable informal records from Bruckner's time include Schwanzara, 1950 and Klose, 1927. There is abundant (German) material on this period. (See Tittel, 1966.)

Information on Mendelssohn is to be found in Todd, 1983. This study is based on material housed in the Bodleian library. Todd does not detail its provenance, but it seems unlikely that Schenker could have seen it. He may have relied on information from Brahms or drawn his own conclusions from the well known fact that Mendelssohn's teacher was Zelter.

Besides Tittel's own work which includes a study of Austrian church music (1961) and a dissertation on Sechter (1935), other Viennese work on the history of Austrian theory and its institutionalisation includes Walter Zeleny's dissertation, Die historischen Grundlagen des Theorie Systems von Simon
Sechter of 1938 (see Zeleny, 1979), and the Geschichte der Staatsakademie und Hochschule für Musik und Darstellende Kunst in Wien by Robert Lach (1927).

This research stems from the department founded by Adler and later joined by Lach, and reflects its ethos. Typically data are meticulously presented but conclusions sometimes seem to reflect prior assumptions rather than the logic of the information. Nevertheless, the attempt of these Viennese historians to construct a context in which individual sources - such as those identified by Nottebohm - can be placed intelligibly, is a vital contribution. If they do not always correctly delineate the paths by which theories were transmitted, they at least recognise the need to try to understand these processes.

13. Sechter contributed an autobiographical piece to the Wiener Allgemeine Musikzeitung in 1845 in which he listed his own theoretical reading. This included works by Marpurg, Kirnberger, C. P. E. Bach, Albrechtsberger, Mattheson, Türk, Gottfried Weber, Reicha, Marx and Riepel. The work by Marpurg was not the translation of d'Alembert, but the Abhandlung von der Fuge. It is for this reason that Tittel attributes Sechter's knowledge of Rameau's theory to his reading of Kirnberger.
This, however, seems dubious logically and historically. The logical problem is that Sechter's use of the fundamental bass, and even his term for it, is closer to Rameau than to Kirnberger. We would have to assume, therefore, that Sechter was not only inventive in his conflation of theories, but an original theoretical thinker and that the result of his originality was to reverse the tendency of Kirnberger's (already second- or even third-hand) reading of Rameau.

The historical problem is that precedents for Sechter's particular approach to Rameau existed and were well known in Vienna before he wrote his treatise. Indeed we can deduce that some elements of Rameauvian theory could have been in circulation in Vienna much earlier from the fact that it was considered appropriate for Mozart to take lessons from Giovanni Martini. As the translator of Rameau into Italian, Martini was far better acquainted with his work than Kirnberger, and any Rameauvian concepts which filtered through to Vienna from this source would be unlikely to be any less authentic than those coming via Berlin. That they did filter through is now well-established, and the emphasis on the Berlin connection appears to be attributable to two kinds of bias, one in favour of a prestigious connection (however indirect) with J. S. Bach, the other against a far less prestigious figure, the Abbé Vogler. (See n. 21 below.) Mozart's much
quoted hostility to Vogler may have had something to do with his less than stimulating encounter with Martini. Vogler had studied with a fellow Italian theorist, Vallotti, who, like Martini, was well-versed in Rameau's theories and the controversies surrounding them, and certainly made use of them.

14. The relevant work is not, strictly speaking, by Albrechtsberger, but by his pupil Ignaz Ritter von Seyfried who appeared as editor of a book entitled Albrechtsberger's sämtliche Schriften über Generalbass, Harmonielehre und Tonsetzkunst in 1837.


18. Frederick the Great's preference for all things French had an enormous cultural influence. The secularism of an 'Enlightened' aristocracy undoubtedly facilitated, among other things, a very different kind of Jewish assimilation from that found in Catholic
Vienna. Why the old pedagogic style persisted longer there than in Vienna is a complex question. The fact that it was part of a more unified native tradition is surely relevant. The tradition 'native' to Vienna was, outside the cloister, defunct. Fashionable music was far more deeply at odds with the ecclesiastical style in Vienna than the music of the Prussian court with the music of the Lutheran church. This is not obvious from standard musical histories which present Bach as backward-looking. In reality, seen in progressive-historical terms, his music was still light years ahead of that of the Catholic church composers in Vienna fifty years after his death.

19. Further study of this area is required. See n. 13.


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spite of himself when he says, 'After the _
the next strongest tone is g, because it
occurs earlier in the series...'. (Schoenberg,
tr. Carter, 1983, p. 23.) His acoustic
notions are, of course, hardly less bizarre
than Schenker's, undoubtedly for the same
historical reasons.

personal reputation there is no doubt that he
was capable of making a powerful impact and
could not be ignored. In his diary
Grillparzer describes a dinner party at which
Vogler began to improvise. Eventually the
guests, who included Cherubini and many other
celebrities, one by one left the room. The
guest who lingered longest was Beethoven.
Browning wrote an ecstatic poem about Vogler
the improviser fifty years after Vogler's
death. One line suggests that he was less
familiar with Vogler the theorist. The poem
attributes to Vogler the architectonic
notions of musical structure in the air at
the time of writing. (Dramatis Personae was
written in 1864.)

22. It is misleading to cast Vogler simply as
a follower of Rameau. He was a student
of Francesco Antonio Vallotti (1697-1780), a
scientifically oriented Paduan theorist. His
harmonic derivations from cadential patterns
do not require a theory of partial vibrations
of a single sonorous body but are based on
mechanically divided strings. This fact
reflects Vallotti's belief that chordal inversion had been 'discovered' by his teacher, Antonio Caligeri, before Rameau and his 'experiments' with the *corps sonore*. The presence of Rameauvian concepts in Viennese theory in the absence of any interest in acoustic justification is less likely to indicate an empirical approach, as Tittel suggests, than an Italian, as opposed to an - enlightened - Berlin influence.

The similarities between Sechter's emphasis on the falling fifth and his construction of a scale from this (see Wessely, 1979 and also Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1956 sections 16-18) and similar things in Vogler are striking. In true Rameauvian style, Vogler proposes a distinction between harmonic theory 'Tonwissenschaft' and applied harmony, *Tonsetzkunst*, (See Grave, 1980) which is the separation proposed by Schenker in the 'Preface' to his book on harmony. With the exception of voice-leading rules, which Schenker excludes altogether, the subject matter is shared out in the same way. All three writers have a notion of a kind of musical 'raw material', *Urstoff*, or *Urelemente* out of which compositions grow by a process of progressive embellishment.

The most conspicuous evidence of Vogler's influence on Sechter's work is the use of Roman numerals to indicate scale-steps. (See again Grave, 1980.) Sechter's silence about
Vogler is no great mystery. Vogler was a notoriously controversial figure.

23. See n. 1.


26. Ibid., p. 192.

27. Ibid., p. 175.


29. Ibid., p. 3. The source of the quotation is the Preface to Goethe's Theory of Colour, a translation of which is to be found in Goethe, tr. Miller, 1988, p. 159.


31. See: Forte & Gilbert, 1982. Figured bass they say is "...a mode of notation. We are not concerned with the performance practice of "realising" figured basses". Thus they revert to the kind of paper version of
figured bass which Schenker considered inauthentic. Their treatment of counterpoint similarly pays scant regard to Schenker's insistence on hearing the effect of combinations of tones. These things are indicative of basic differences of attitude between these authors and Schenker.

32. See: Christensen, 1989. Christensen points out that a Cartesian, mathematical, non-experimental methodology yielded vital results in hydrodynamics, statics, astronomy and optics in the eighteenth century. d'Alembert's 'disdain for experimental physics' was, therefore not only not unique, but not necessarily fatal. His validation of Rameau's theory was, of course, crucial to its success.

33. Some Schenker supporters, in their eagerness to cut Rameau down to size, boast of being unable to see that inversion involving the root of a triad is more than an obvious extension of the notion of inversion of the constituents of a triad over a root anchored in the bass. This is a relic of Schenker's illogical attitude which hardened as he was carried away by his own polemic. This grew more heated under the influence of war and post-war Francophobia. Through this potent medium an old Viennese prejudice has been perpetuated. This was itself a curious mixture of prejudices, a prejudice against the Rameauavian Vogler, and Vogler's own
prejudice, passed on together with his Rameauian concepts to Sechter. Vogler's teacher Vallotti was probably the first to make the dubious claim that chordal inversion had been discovered before Rameau, thus justifying the use of Rameauian concepts while denigrating Rameau, the encyclopaedists, the Enlightenment and everything French, something whose appeal was even greater for Schenker's generation than for Viennese Catholics in the wake of the revolution. For a hint of a change see Krebs, 1988, p. 59.

34. See Federhofer, 1990.

35. Bruckner was appointed Lektor für Harmonielehre und Kontrapunkt at the University in 1878. It was presumably this connection which made it possible for university students like Schenker to opt for a conservatory course as part of their programme.

36. Works of this kind date from the 1790s, e.g., a Traité d'Harmonie by Jean-Baptiste Rey, which, according to the author is based on the principles of Rameau and 'se rapportant au dictionnaire de J. J. Rousseau'; a Traité by Langle of 1798 calls itself a treatise of 'la base sur le chant'. Marmigny's Cours complet d'harmonie (1806) refers to 'principes incontestables, puisés dans la nature...'. Other famous contributors to the
genre were Cherubini, Cheron, Fétis, Gossec, Halévy, and Reicha among many others less well-known.

37. Publications using the words Selbstunterricht, Selbstbelehrung, or destined for Dilettanten or calling themselves Leitfaden include books by Goröldt (1825), Lachmeyer (1823), Lindner (1840), Schärtlich (1837). More famous names, among many others whose work was not necessarily oriented toward this market are Vogler, Marx, Koch, Krause, Türk, Jacob Gottfried Weber. Later the number of such books was added to by teachers at the various conservatories and countless others. In the context of the huge outpouring of 'harmony' books from the thirties onwards it is impossible to pick on any individual, even one as prominent as Riemann and hold him uniquely responsible for the theory taught in the music-schools. Procedures undoubtedly varied from place to place and from time to time under the influence of fashion, but the Rameauvian assumptions became, with the institutionalisation of four-part harmony, universal and unshakeable.

38. See Grave, 1980.


41. Zeleny, 1979, p. 448. This is older than the publication date implies. It was written in 1938, as Zeleny's dissertation for the philosophical faculty of the University of Vienna. One of those who assessed the dissertation was Robert Lach, Adler's successor, of whom Schenker remarked, 'The professor in the innocence of his ignorance called himself a connoisseur of music...'('Der Professor gab sich in der Unschuld seiner Unwissenheit für einen Kenner der Musik aus...'). See Federhofer, 1985, p. 53. n. 7.

42. See Rameau, tr. Gossett, 1971, p. 142.


44. See Grillparzer, ed. Schreyvogel, 1958, p. 553.

45. Gottfried Heinrich Bellermann (1832-1903). His treatise on counterpoint was published in 1862. He restored the modal system to the species. Schenker discusses his ideas at length in his own book on counterpoint.
Chapter 3

Philosophies of Science and the Study of Music.

'...Erfahrungen solle man ohne Irgend ein theoretisches Band vortragen...'
Goethe. ¹

These words appear in the quotation from the Preface to Goethe's Theory of Colour, placed by Schenker at the head of the first section of Free Composition. Ernst Oster translates them as follows:

'one should present experiences and perceptions without recourse to any kind of theoretical framework'. ²

Miller translates the same words as:

'empirical data should be presented without any theoretical context'. ³

Translated literally, Goethe's words would read:

'experiences should be presented without any kind of

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These differences in the interpretation of Goethe illustrate what has been one of the difficulties in understanding Schenker. He writes not only in a different language from the one spoken by the bulk of his readers, but in the terms of a culture historically and geographically remote from them.

Miller's is the language of twentieth-century physical science. Oster's is that of the psychologically oriented philosophy of science which was characteristic of the artistic-intellectual atmosphere in inter-war Vienna. Neither vocabulary is entirely appropriate to the thought of Goethe or perfectly in touch with the vanished world in which Schenker was educated.

By interpreting 'experience' as 'empirical data' Miller anticipates Goethe's distinction, in the sentence which follows, between mere looking-at and scientific observation. 'Data' might mean 'that which is given to experience' or 'that which is given through experience'. Goethe argues that 'that which is given to experience' cannot count as scientific evidence. Blankly passive looking-at what is 'given' will never lead to understanding. What he wants to set in opposition to experimentally controlled observation is an active observation, also controlled but by a more subtle and flexible mechanism than experimental apparatus, namely, scientific self-criticism.

Similarly he believes that the product of scientific observation cannot count as unmediated data. When this product is experimentally mediated, it is not more but less raw, since the experimental conditions, and the
presuppositions determining them, must be added to the reflection inherent in the observation. To treat what is derived from these procedures as given by nature is to delude oneself and others. It is hardly surprising that Schenker's reference to this debate did not bring instant illumination to his new readers, but tended, at first, to add to their perplexity.

Goethe wrote about the problem of scientific observation in an essay entitled *The Experiment as Mediator between Subject and Object*, in which he considers the efficacy of the kinds of experimental controls employed by the physical scientists to guard against fallacious interpretation. By means of the kind of devices described by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, guaranteeing the replicability of the relevant experiences, the physicists sought to give them universality. Goethe treated these efforts with respect but was nervous about the claims made for them, fearing that the experimenter's faith in the experimental apparatus might blind him to the possibility that his controlled experiences were illusions. The assumptions lying behind the construction of the apparatus could determine not only the way the object was experienced but even the object itself. The best safeguard in any scientific presentation, Goethe thought, was precisely the one the experimentalists (the Newtonians) shunned, namely, the clear statement of the scientist's theoretical presuppositions, in so far as he was able to bring them before his consciousness, something he should endeavour to do by constant self-criticism. The Newtonians' assertion that the facts should be allowed to speak for themselves was, he believed, less a sign of theoretical purity than an arrogant presumption of an objectivity which was in no way proven.
Experimental apparatus, which could never be more than an extension of the scientist's human powers, was absurdly elevated above these powers. Where ordinary experience conflicted with the experience engineered by the controlled experiment, the conclusion drawn was not that there existed two sets of evidence to be considered, but that, since the latter must be correct, the former must be wrong. A whole array of evidence could be invalidated on the basis of a single experimentum crucis, the feat upon which the Enlightenment belief in the superiority of physical science over all other forms of human endeavour was founded. The withholding of the rationale behind the experiment was, Goethe felt, anything but a guarantee of 'objectivity'. It was merely a means of suppressing argument.

Schenker's intense interest in this debate was understandable. He had spent years uncovering - excavating, as he put it - the assumptions underlying theories which claimed to be based on observation of musical work when the truth was that the observations were based on the theories. Moreover, these theories were false, hence the absurdity of the conclusions drawn from them. But the assumptions were so deeply ingrained that they were taken to be 'neutral', 'given', and were therefore beyond the reach of criticism. He stood in relation to music-theoretical orthodoxy, he felt, exactly as Goethe had done in relation to Newtonian orthodoxy.

At the same time, he himself had a theory to offer and he had to confront a situation in which a new lease of life had been given to the idea here criticised by Goethe, the idea that the scientist - the scholar - should present his findings unburdened by any theoretical connection. This new
version of empiricism was particularly associated with Vienna. 7 By the time of Free Composition the scientists now known as the Vienna Circle, aided and abetted by Freud (ironically in view of their mutual hostility), having freed themselves from the hated intrusion of philosophy into their territories, had begun the process of marginalising German classical philosophy, a process which naturally met with much less resistance when the new doctrines were transferred to America (they were already well entrenched in England before the war) since the native tradition was less influential and intrinsically less resistant to them. 8

It would be hard to exaggerate the hostility of scientists in Vienna, from Mach onwards, to German philosophy. The feeling was intensified by the impossibility of wholly escaping its influence. 9 As a young man Schenker had come under the influence of Mach, and shown some positivist leanings. By the time of Free Composition, however, he had come to think of the people whose ambition was The Elimination of Metaphysics as vandals. 10 But the attitudes imported into America by Carnap and others of like mind, and the influence of psycho-analysis and gestaltism, were too pervasive to be ignored when Schenker's highly problematic writings had, somehow, to begin to be presented in English. Oster's translation problems are only one symptom of the difficulty of making Schenker's deeply-dyed Schopenhauerian theorising and his Nietzschean polemic tolerable to an American public.

* * *

Anything which connects Schenker to twentieth-century
scientific discourse has been seen as enhancing his reputation, while any connection with nineteenth Century German philosophy has tended to cause nervousness. Champions of Schenker's analytic theory have tried to present it as compatible with the ideals of modern science and to push to one side the philosophical aspects of his writings. Allen Forte, for example, says that Schenker's work 'may be likened to a particular kind of high-level achievement in science.' He wants to make 'a distinction between Schenker [the] theorist and Schenker [the] philosopher-historian'.

More recently, Schenker's writing has begun to be looked at as a coherent body of work in which it is impossible to distinguish two diametrically opposed modes of thought, a modern and acceptable 'scientific' mode and a regressive 'metaphysical' one. But this change is only partial. The philosophical links which have been the object of the most intensive investigation have been eighteenth-rather than nineteenth-century ones. The paucity of information about Schenker's nineteenth-century and twentieth-century background did not encourage exploration. Moreover, the connection with the morphological theories of Goethe became so clear that it seemed quite possible that the relationship was direct and no intermediaries need be looked for.

The surmise made by Eugene Narmour, on the other hand, that Hegel was a significant influence on Schenker has not been taken up by Schenkerians. Narmour's remarks themselves are too generalised to be illuminating; no specific reference is made to Hegel's writings on music, for example, and Schenker's supporters have not felt pressed to explore a connection which, if it existed, would further
undermine his credibility from the scientific and the political point of view, his virulent anti-Marxism notwithstanding. The mid-century tendency to divide all debate into Marxist and anti-Marxist was bound to lead to difficulty in interpreting Schenker, who cannot be categorised in these terms.

Another reason for neglecting 'Schenker's immediate environment would appear to have been a philosophical preference for the eighteenth century. Kevyn Korsyn, for example, says that 'since Kant is the forerunner of many fashionable trends in current thought ('a precursor of structuralism, an ancestor of Freud, and a starting-point for Heidegger's philosophy') to 'connect him to Kant also indirectly link[s] Schenker to some of the most radical and still viable trends in twentieth-century thought.' Whether or not these connections are entirely advantageous, they are perhaps unnecessarily convoluted, especially the one with his almost exact contemporary, fellow Jew and fellow Viennese, Sigmund Freud. The assumption remains that Schenker must prove that he can accommodate himself to our way of thinking before we can decide whether to pay attention to him. 'If a theorist cannot speak to our future, let us leave him to the antiquarians.'

Although these more recent critics refer Schenker's work to a broader spectrum of ideas, they offer no direct challenge to the view that the 'viability' of the theory depends on the extent to which it can be accommodated to the norms of mid- and late-twentieth-century ideologies and certainly do not present Schenker as offering a sustainable challenge to these ideologies. Moreover the attempt to decipher his outlook as opposed to apologising for it, or
explaining it away, has been tolerated rather than enthusiastically supported by the majority of Schenkerians.

*  *  *

The history of the reception of Schenker's theory is a curious one. The theory was by no means unknown in Europe before the war. Schenker had been a public figure from his early twenties, very well known in musical circles in Vienna and by no means unknown outside it. The belief that his theory is intelligible only when explained personally by himself or by one of his pupils, does not tally with the facts of the reception of the books when they first appeared, or with their continuing ability to interest German-speaking readers to whom the Anglo-American construct 'Schenkerian analysis' is wholly unknown. The situation which developed in America, therefore, and subsequently also in England, in which it appeared that Schenker's literary output was inherently incapable of an independent existence, its content wrapped in a cloak of impenetrable obscurity, was a false situation.

As time passed conditions deteriorated. While the secondary literature proliferated the primary sources remained difficult of access, or wholly inaccessible, and the myth of unintelligibility flourished. By the time the primary sources began to appear the assumption that they would be impossible to interpret and perhaps were not worth the effort had taken root much too firmly to be easily shaken.

The first book to become easily accessible in English
was not calculated to counteract this feeling.¹⁶ Some of the most readable work is still not available in English after more than thirty years of intense scholarly activity in the field of Schenker studies mostly carried out in that language.

Recent developments, however, have begun to change this situation. The presentation of Schenker as an isolate, an eccentric whose work is a mass of mostly unintelligible speculation, pseudo-philosophical mud from which the grains of analytical gold have had to be laboriously panned out by experts schooled to know what to look for, is no longer felt to be feasible.¹⁷

From the mass of evidence now available it is clear that Schenker's philosophical eclecticism, the simultaneous presence in his thinking of things which seemed to the mid-twentieth-century mind to be mutually exclusive, instead of marking him as an oddity, show him to be not untypical of his place and time.

Before turning to this new information, however, it is useful to recall the conventional view of the man and his work which the new evidence challenges.

* * *

There has been general agreement that if the theory is to be taken seriously it must be in some sense scientific. The question is how seriously the analytic theory is damaged by the un- or anti-scientific features of the œuvre in which it is embedded, assuming an agreed
definition of the scientific.

Allen Forte's early discussion of Schenker, in the then newly established *Journal of Music Theory*, probably still represents the most widely held view of Schenker. He referred to 'a general trend in thinking which has taken place during the last quarter century...heavily influenced by the accelerated development of science' by which 'even music has been affected'. 'We can now regard the late eighteenth century concept of "modulation",' he wrote by way of example, 'merely as a verbal inaccuracy'. Theories dependent on the notion of 'what was "in the composer's mind"' had, by the same trend, been so conclusively disposed of that no further attention need be paid to them.

Schenker's work, he said, 'may be likened to a particular kind of high-level achievement in science: the discovery or development of a fundamental principle which then opens the way for the disclosure of further new relationships, new meanings'. He compared this principle to Freud's 'discovery' that 'overt behaviour is controlled by certain underlying factors'. Schenker made the 'discovery' that 'surface events' in a musical composition are 'related...to a fundamental organisation'.

Forte went on to 'emphasise' that 'Schenker consistently derived his theoretical formulations from aural experiences with actual musical compositions, and verified them at the same source'. His discovery owed nothing to prior theorising, 'abstruse speculation', 'acoustical or metaphysical formulations'. Schenker 'was not averse' to such things, but, we are left to infer, his taste for them played no part in his analytic theorising.
From his observation that, as in science - where the 'acceleration' referred to earlier had led to the overburdening of the curriculum - the music student was confronted by an overwhelming quantity of material to be learned, it appears that the main impulse behind Forte's consideration of Schenker's work was academic. 'In order to relieve this situation we would do well to emulate science education where, thanks to the continual refinement of concepts, students cover traditional material more and more efficiently.' Here is a distant echo of Schenker's own remarks about the simplification of the conservatory curriculum through his approach, made in his 1895 essay. Forte listed the following areas where Schenker's theory had, in his view, a contribution to make in this respect:


2. Determining the sources and development of triadic tonality.

3. Gaining information about compositional technique.

4. Improving theory instruction.

5. Understanding the structure of problematic modern works'.

He summed up his intellectual characterisation of Schenker as a 'unique, original and highly gifted person' who combined 'the artist's traits of courage and perseverance' with 'the intellect and insight (which we also associate with the true scientist)'. The characteristics of the scientist which Forte saw in Schenker were 'insight', as
opposed to 'vision', 'intellect' and a capacity for 'clear, rigorous thinking'.

The concern that Forte was not so much responding to what he experienced in reading Schenker as endeavouring to accommodate him to the prejudices of the modern music academic would probably not be very strenuously denied. Schenkerians have long been ready to admit that their hero is, from the point of view of the American academy at least, seriously flawed.

The question which now concerns us, however, is not whether this interpretation of Schenker is, in the circumstances, understandable, but whether it makes sufficient scientific-philosophical sense and has enough connection with the realities of Schenker's work to allow it to continue to stand between that work and potential readers long after the need which gave rise to it has ceased to exist.

Forte's view of science embraces a number of ideas. The first to appear is the idea of certainty. Science can give us conclusive answers and lead cumulatively to a body of established facts. Beside facts there are also principles. A 'fundamental principle' should be scientifically productive, leading to the discovery of new facts: the 'disclosure of further new relationships'. Neither speculation nor 'metaphysics' should play any part in the process by means of which accumulated facts are transformed into principles. Prior theorising or hypothesising is unscientific.

To satisfy these criteria of the scientific, Schenker would have had to approach music with no prior theoretical
concepts of any kind. This, however is so obviously nonsensical that we must assume that Forte considers some theoretical concepts - say, 'interval', 'triad', 'tonality', 'melody' - as given.

It could perhaps - with some difficulty - be argued that, if music is a system of conventions and the theoretical tradition is the intellectual articulation of these conventions, any investigation of music must treat as part of the data the concepts employed in this tradition. This, however, Schenker was by no means prepared to do, often rejecting or modifying traditional concepts, and doing so on empirical grounds. Moreover, Forte endorses his rejection, for example, of the concept of 'modulation'.

There seems to be no way out of this dilemma. If we treat as given concepts such as 'inversion', 'root', 'scale step', must we not treat the whole theoretical apparatus which Schenker inherited as given, including such concepts as 'fundamental bass', and 'modulation'? And if we exclude this last because we have discovered that it is 'a verbal inaccuracy' how do we know that this is not also true of all the others and that we simply have not yet discovered the evidence?

Forte's remark that the only 'experience' Schenker made use of was 'aural' experience is puzzling also in another respect. This would have been such a strange restriction for Schenker to have imposed upon himself while developing a highly visually-oriented tool for the use of others.

However, if the claim that Schenker's theory was worked out entirely empirically is not sustainable, this does not prove that the theory is not scientific. All it proves is
that pure empiricism, as the criterion for scientific validity, is equally incompatible with the claim that the theory is scientific and with Forte's own - pragmatic - view of the scientific. For if we may speculate about how Schenker's theory might be used as a starting point for the construction of new theories and how it could lead to the 'understanding [of] the structure of problematic modern works', it is clear that speculation is not, after all, excluded from the definition of the scientific. No more is prior theorising.

The notion of science to which Schenker is required to accommodate himself here is, plainly, a cultural phenomenon, hardly less arbitrary, hardly more logical than Schenker's own.

* * * *

While Forte's picture of Schenker is the most familiar positive interpretation, the most widely read negative critique must be that of Eugene Narmour. Although Narmour regards Schenker's theory as having a significant contribution to make, he is convinced of its ultimate inadequacy, and sees this as having much to do with its underlying philosophical assumptions. He examines Schenkerian and 'neo-Schenkerian' theory in relation to a number of scientific or quasi-scientific theories, among them Chomskian linguistic theory and gestalt psychology. His purpose is not so much to indicate the points of comparison between these theories as to show that they are all flawed, and for the same reason: they make similar use of erroneous prior theories.

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If it is true that a theory can be proved wrong simply by showing that it makes use of a theory which at a later date can be shown to have been flawed, theories can only be constructed safely by purely empirical means. Narmour might seem, then, to belong to much the same school of thought as Forte. But, in fact, he aligns himself very specifically with Karl Popper according to whom scientific progress consists of refining the body of scientific knowledge by 'falsifying' existing theories. 20

Narmour's idea of the scientific, like Forte's, is not at all easy to characterise. In his critique of gestaltism, for example, he says on the one hand that there 'is simply...no evidence...to suggest that a given whole is anything more than its parts working together' and yet on the other hand, that it 'remains an empirical truth' that 'the whole has a character significantly different from the sum of its parts'. 21 Seeming here to endorse the view that positive evidence is the test of the scientific, he goes on to say that 'the argument that Schenkerian analysis is based on perception...is no argument at all. For we now know that theories organise facts, not vice versa.'

'We now know' is an odd way of prefacing a remark which seems to propose a view offered in the eighteenth-century work quoted in Free Composition. But Narmour's meaning is perhaps not quite the same as Goethe's. Goethe did not imagine a set of neutral facts which may be 'organised' into a theory according to whatever prior theory the organiser prefers. Much as he detested the Newtonians, Goethe would never have accused them of anything as crude as this. His concern was that the perception of the data may be inadvertently influenced by the unconscious theoretical
presuppositions of the observer. Namour, however, seems to accept the validity of the empirical observations leading to Schenker's theory. His problem is simply that he does not care for the particular attitude which - in his belief - Schenker brought to bear on the results of these observations.

Unfortunately, he gives little indication of the nature of his objection to this attitude, seeming to assume that merely naming it will be sufficient to revolt the reader as he is revolted. 'Regardless of its empirical origin,' he writes, 'the logical formulation of the theory is idealistic, and... its use in analysis is heavily rationalistic.'

Some readers might indeed be steered away from Schenker by these revelations. Others might be bewildered. There are, unquestionably, rationalistic elements in the theory, that is to say, concepts derived from reductive theories rationally motivated, but is this what Namour means by 'rationalistic use' of the theory? The Ursatz may, perhaps, be regarded as an 'idea' in the sense in which, according to Schiller, Goethe's plant-archetype was an idea. But if it is an idea, it cannot also be 'a logical formulation'. 'Idealistic' and 'rationalistic' even as pejorative terms, seem to be curious bedfellows.

A footnote directing the reader to Karl Popper offers hope of illumination. Popper held that while a theory can never be verified by empirical instances it can be falsified by a single such instance.

Namour gives a musical illustration. He seeks to show that Schenker's theory forces upon us an exclusive
interpretation of data which are open to a variety of interpretations and therefore that it is false. He presents the opening of the second Trio in Beethoven's Quintet Op.4, to show that it is possible to hear simultaneously two separate types of 'structure' one of which he describes as 'axial' and the other 'linear', and argues that Schenker's 'reductive' procedure compels a preference for one or the other. He goes on to say that 'we can readily hear either...pattern...or both simultaneously depending on our...theoretical beliefs' and he compares this situation with the famous rabbit/duck image.

This instance is fraught with problems. To begin with, it is not at all clear what role he understands belief to play in the interpretation of the duck/rabbit image. Belief seems to be the wrong process to invoke. What is relevant to the interpretation is not prior belief but prior experience. Someone who has never seen a rabbit is not very likely to interpret the image as a rabbit. This does not imply anything about his theoretical beliefs.

In the case of the musical illustration, Narmour does not tell us what belief would lead to the 'axial' interpretation or what other belief would lead to the 'linear' one, nor, if the hearing of both patterns simultaneously depends on a third belief, what the third belief is.

Here we can see the disabling power of Popper's theory at work. If one of the interpretations is invoked as justification of the theory, the theory is unsatisfactory because no theory can ever be validated by empirical data. If, instead, the interpretation is selected on the basis of the theory, the theory is wrong because an empirical
instance - the alternative interpretation - is incompatible with it. The acceptance of both is logically impossible in a system which - allegedly - compels the choice of one or the other.

In Narmour's view, the choice is compelled by the need to decide which elements are retained in the next level of the analysis. The objection seems to be impossible to argue with because the acceptance of one as correct rules out the other, while the acceptance of the other rules out the first.

But Narmour has not, in fact, demonstrated that Schenker's system imposes on him the need to descend on either horn of this dilemma. The theory need only leave us perplexed in this instance if Schenker actually proposed the kind of choice Narmour wishes on him. If that were true, his graphing procedure would consist not of the progressive identification of deeper levels of determination of phenomena, but progressive elimination of phenomena. He would then, presumably, be proposing the substitution of the Ursatz for the work.

What is demonstrated here is a phenomenal problem. The two patterns represent not two sets of data but a single set of data simultaneously presenting more than one pattern. Schenker's theory fully acknowledges the possibility of the simultaneous presence of discrete patterns in the same set of data, and interprets them as existing in a clearly intelligible relation with one another. This relationship - the kind presented by a simple interval elaborated by means of auxiliary and passing notes - can easily be explained without recourse to any elaborate theorising.
The notion that there are notes of differing structural significance is by no means exclusive to Schenker. The conventional terms 'auxiliary note' and 'passing note' imply this differential status. So do the ornament signs which indicate conventionalised uses of these notes. The ability to hear some notes as elaborating others does, of course, require a particular 'cognitive set'. It helps if the observer is familiar with the idea of ornamentation in music and even more if he knows the conventions governing its use. Armed with these concepts he will have no difficulty in hearing a relatively small pattern within a relatively large one.

It is precisely through the device of differentiating 'levels' that Schenker is able to accommodate more than one perceptual interpretation of the same data simultaneously. On one level are the notes undergoing elaboration; on another are the notes representing the elaboration. Some notes appear at both levels. The convention adopted by the theory is that those notes which appear at only one level mark that level as structurally more superficial than those which appear at both levels. Notes which remain when all notes which can possibly be regarded as elaborating some other notes have been assigned to other levels mark the least superficial level. By the time this final level has been reached, there will be many simultaneously presented patterns.

We can see even from Narmour's fifteen bars that the 'axial' pattern contains and is contained by 'linear' patterns and the larger linear pattern by the 'triadic' pattern in which some of the tones of the 'linear' pattern function as passing notes. Each successive stage is capable of accommodating more than one of the kinds of pattern
appearing in the previous stages. Thus the descending linear pattern embraces not one axial pattern but five and the triadic pattern embraces both the descending linear pattern and the 'axial' patterns with their internal ascending linear patterns. There could be said to be a broader 'axial' pattern embracing all this, which consists of the simultaneous appearance of ascending and descending lines, the ascending ones becoming weaker and the descending ones clearer, with a point of temporary equilibrium in bars 9-11. The precise significance of this pattern cannot be discerned without looking at wider spans and deeper levels.

Far from compelling reductive choices which eliminate what might appear to be contrary interpretations, differentiation in terms of levels permits the conceptualisation of the complex within which the phenomena occur, the manifold which is grasped intuitively with such ease but rendered transparent to the understanding with difficulty. It is not easy to imagine a neater, more economical way of doing this than by means of the notion of levels. It is curious that Narmour, who joins the chorus of criticism about the slighting of the temporal dimension, and has harsh words to say about 'synchronic' interpretations of structures, should accuse Schenker of being unable to cope with what appears to be the simultaneous manifestation of different entities, the impression of more than one object occupying the same place, i.e., of ambiguity. This is the thing such an interpretation does par excellence.

Narmour's illustration certainly exemplifies the difficulty of making sense of complex musical phenomena without prior musical experience. But, equally certainly, it fails to demonstrate that Schenker's theory falsifies either the experience or the phenomena. It is hard to see how it
could. At the most, assuming that Schenker's procedure compelled the elimination of one of Narmour's alternatives, it could assert that this choice was the wrong one, in which case any theory proposed in support of the alternative would be falsifiable in the same way. Narmour wants to show that the making of the choice is the thing that is wrong, but this particular choice is proposed only by him.

Narmour's approach to biological science is similarly confusing. He equates 'organic' with 'biological', although it had a much wider meaning in the culture in which Schenker's thought took shape. He is, of course, able to find plenty of remarks from the part of Schenker's œuvre on which his critique is based which seem in isolation to indicate that Schenker also understood 'organic' to mean 'biological', and that when he referred to 'Nature' he meant the world of living organisms exclusively. But it is his own interpretation that Narmour finds in Schenker's writings.

It is presumably because of this limitation that he sees Darwin's theory of evolution as capable of invalidating Schenker's theory of music. The theory of music is organic; organic theories are biological; biological theory equals evolutionary theory; the only valid evolutionary theory is Darwin's; Schenker's theory is not Darwinian, therefore it is invalid as a theory of music.

Criticising Schenker for treating the musical work of art as comparable to a living organism he says, 'Nature's work and man's, after all, are not directly comparable'. Yet he himself seems to accept some sort of theory of music as an evolutionary organism: as an historical genus which has developed over time and as an individual work which reflects this historical development in its own structural
evolution. His criticism of what he sees as Schenker's teleological interpretation of this entity, which means that it cannot explain the musical equivalent of species (styles), seems to indicate that it is Schenker's interpretation of the model rather than the model itself which he finds objectionable.

When he comes to explain the way in which Schenker's theory is pre-Darwinian, it is not at all clear why he finds it so offensive. He remarks that 'our retrospective knowledge of what actually does come to pass can never account completely for what was implied'. If this means that a single work cannot realise all the possibilities inherent in a given compositional system it is not clear why he thinks Schenker would have disputed this. The word 'implied', however, has a disadvantage from the point of view of Narmour's argument. A set of conditions may contain a host of possibilities some of which may be realised and some not, but an implication is a necessity not a possibility. The teleology to which he objects in Schenker seems to be surreptitiously at work in his own thinking.

Another kind of logical issue works in much the same way for Narmour as his beliefs about organicism and teleology. That is to say, he assumes that he differs from Schenker in a very simple way: he is enlightened, Schenker was benighted, because he is up-to-date and Schenker was out-of-date. Schenker committed the logical fallacy known as 'affirming the consequent...in its most blatant form', he observes, as if this formulation represented a universally accepted prohibition, rather than one of the oldest bones of contention known to philosophy. 'What starts out as a working hypothesis (the Ursatz) ends up being the evidence of the structure itself.'

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Whether or not the Ursatz is an axiom, whether or not the theory affirms the consequent may be of burning interest to logicians, especially those of the positivist/negativist persuasion, but they have little bearing on the specific cultural orientation of Schenker's thought and the pursuit of them does little to help us in approaching it.

Both Forte and Narmour believed that, between the time when Schenker's outlook was taking shape and their own time, a change had taken place in the nature of scientific enquiry which was unlike any change that had occurred before. This was not just a question of the rapidity of the accumulation of knowledge to which Forte refers, but an irreversible philosophical transformation, the final unchallengeable establishment of a particular notion of what science was, together with the belief that only a kind of thinking which was in accord with this notion of science was evidence of a normally functioning intelligence.

The confidence with which the claims to superiority were made for this idea of the scientific was not matched by the clarity of the idea itself. While there was general agreement that there was such a thing as a modern scientific way of thinking applicable to all fields of enquiry there was no agreement among musical scientists about its precise character. To say that it was empirical and anti-metaphysical is not to say anything very revealing since various philosophies of science could be defined in that way. Besides, the advocates of this 'modern scientific'
outlook were anything but consistently empirical and un-metaphysical. Value judgements abounded in their commentaries and the objectivity which they regarded as the hallmark of the scientific was honoured more often in the breach than in the observance. Narmour's quasi-moral objections to Schenker's teleology and other features of his thinking which he disliked are a striking illustration of this.

It is all too tempting to adopt the same condescending attitude towards the 'scientific' theorists of the mid-century as they adopted to the 'unscientific' Schenker, the more so as our picture of Schenker's cultural resources becomes fuller. By comparison with the energy and intensity of intellectual life in Schenker's youth, that of the post-war period seems derivative, pale, dreary and anxious. To criticise Schenker's scientific naivete while knowing little of nineteenth-century science; to accuse him of being Hegelian while having little awareness of the nature of the Hegelian aesthetic; to write the 'intellectual history' of his theory by 'conjecture', could happen only in a period that liked to think it knew best about everything, and that anything from the past, like 'Schenkerism', was, by definition, good only in so far as it anticipated modern ways of thinking.28

This confidence turned out to be fragile. The gradual recovery of information about a past which had for so long been too painful to think deeply about made it necessary to reconsider progressivist assumptions. Certainty began to crumble, a creeping disillusionment set in, not least with science, and a sense of the aridity of a culture dominated by it.
Schenker's level of culture far exceeded that of his critics, and yet he felt that he had had to fight to educate himself, and that, in spite of all his efforts, he had no hope of aspiring to the level of the generation of Goethe and Mozart. He was undoubtedly right. How much less entitled to intellectual complacency are his apologists and critics?

* * *

A third commentator, viewing Schenker from a different angle and rather more distantly than either his followers or his analytic rivals, Joseph Kerman, sees Schenker as himself a positivist. Kerman's concern is not primarily analysis but musical scholarship as a whole. He criticises Schenker, along with analysts generally, for his 'dogged concentration on internal relationships within the single work of art' since this is 'ultimately subversive as far as any reasonably complete view of music is concerned.' He goes on: 'Along with the preoccupation with structure goes the neglect of...the whole historical complex' and 'everything that makes music affective, moving, emotional, expressive.' Schenker, having been chided for being insufficiently single-minded, is now chided for being 'myopic'. Having been accused of being 'embarrassingly metaphysical' he is now blamed for a positivistic narrowness and coldness.

Kerman's remarks are part of a general complaint against the influence of positivism on the study of music since the war mainly in America but also in England. The consequences of this influence he sees as a narrowing of the scope of musicology, assisted by the cult of objectivity in theory and analysis. Schenker he sees as a strong
contributor to this narrowing of focus since Schenker's analytic ideas, as he understands them, not only fit very comfortably into what he calls the American neo-positivist ideology, but constitute 'a true underground link between American neo-positivism in music and the original nineteenth-century German movement'.

On the one hand, Kerman seems to accept as given that analysis is a self-contained discipline, outside the main musicological domain, yet on the other, he criticises the analyst for neglecting other things. In fact, Schenker's analytic work had to be torn rather messily out of his oeuvre because of this arbitrary academic barrier and in order to make him conform to the positivist ideology for which Kerman wants to burden him with some degree of responsibility.

Writing in 1983 Kerman did not, of course, have the benefit of more recent research which would have helped him to differentiate Schenker from his American interpreters. He could not have known, for example, that Schenker himself voiced an objection strikingly similar to his own to the positivism of Hanslick. But it is disappointing that he found nothing in Harmony or Free Composition to alert him to the enormous discrepancies between their message and 'American neo-positivist' interpretations like Forte's and Narmour's and incline him to recruit Schenker to his cause. The Beethoven editions which he regards as evidence that 'Schenker had no quarrel with positivist musicology', and which clearly do conform to some of the principles generally - but incorrectly - understood to be the exclusive property of musicology, are in fact overflowing with evidence of Schenker's distrust of musicological compartmentalism and aesthetic obtuseness, a feeling often expressed with
ferocious intensity, utterly indifferent to bloodless notions of scholarly propriety.

In the Preliminary Remarks to his edition of Beethoven's Op. 110, Schenker gives clear expression to his sense of the vital links between textual research, editing for performance, compositional theory and history, and of the evil effects of separating these studies in such a way that they cannot contribute to a coherent approach to the interpretation of works of art. Schenker attacks not only the baneful tradition of the commercially motivated performing edition prepared by the virtuoso, full of editorial 'improvements', but the hardly less dismal state of a species of scholarship whose impoverished artistic vision substitutes one form of progressivism for another. Riemann is as great a sinner as any ignorant and mercenary publisher. Because his emendations are based on scholarship they are even more dangerously insidious. Riemann misreads because his expertise in matters of notation is not matched by musical insight. Even this expertise is, in Schenker's view, worthless since it approaches Beethoven's notation (Notenbilder) as an abstract system severed from the artistic content. Does Riemann really believe, Schenker asks, that Beethoven's scores, which have inspired composers from Schubert to Brahms, can convey artistic truth only with the aid of his corrections?

Riemann exemplifies just the same sort of problem as that presented by Reisenauer's fingering of Brahms's Op. 24, 'which never once evinces any inner relationship to Brahms'. Schenker would have been just as willing to apply the question to himself. Why should he be trusted? Because he was a scientist, an empiricist, a positivist? Not at all. He could be trusted only because of his 'inner relationship'
Whether Schenker's belief about himself was justified or not does not affect the issue. It is not a question of empiricism versus historicism or idealism, but something quite different: a question of art as a living entity on the one hand and as the mere object of abstract theorising on the other. Art and scholarship can be separated only at great cost to both, possibly at the cost of the very life of the former.

Schenker, despite his contributions to musical scholarship, cannot be considered representative of orthodox German musicology. Rather he is representative of a quite different 'underground' tendency, a tradition of dissidence harshly critical of academic institutions, their ideologies and their exclusiveness, indeed of the whole tendency of the study of an area of human activity to become more important than the activity itself, even to replace it, to render it obsolete by defining it as the object of historical study. For Schenker, study of art which is not in the service of art is an unforgivable betrayal of genius. The fact, however, that his own work, like musicology, was oriented in so many respects by assumptions of philological origin - philology having severed its own connection with living art long before - sets up tremendous philosophical tensions. To these are attributable many of the features of his writing which make its interpretation difficult for readers unaware of the conflicts underlying the artistic-intellectual turmoil of his period.

In his remark in passing that 'the re-discovery of Schenker at Princeton and Yale in the 1950s represents a true underground link between American neo-positivism in
music and the original nineteenth century German movement' - presumably the movement he has in mind is that which led to the academic establishment of Musikwissenschaft - Kerman nevertheless raises two very important questions: to what extent was Musikwissenschaft a positivist movement and what was Schenker's relationship to it? 36

There are two possible senses in which Viennese Musikwissenschaft, at least, could be said to be positivist, one general and the other specific. Its methodological orientation is empirical-inductive, which is in keeping with the approach advocated by the positivists. 37 But this in itself cannot imply the influence of post Comtean positivism, since empiricism and inductivism are much older than this, as are many other important attributes of Musikwissenschaft. What it suggests instead is that Musikwissenschaft and German, or, more precisely, Viennese positivism were parallel developments.

But the possibility of direct influence upon the particular definition and practice of musicology in Vienna nevertheless seems to be strong. Adler had written his essay on the science of music in 1885 and established the Vierteljahrschrift für Musikwissenschaft, together with Spitta and Chrysander, in 1884, while Mach, the great Viennese representative of positivism, became active in Vienna only from 1895. Mach and Adler had earlier held professorships in Prague, however. 38 The setting up of a department of Musikwissenschaft at the University of Vienna only occurred in 1898 when Adler was appointed to the professorship originally created for Hanslick, but Adler had been Privatdozent for Musikwissenschaft in Vienna from his habilitation in 1882 until his Prague appointment in 1885.
The demarcation lines between disciplines were far less rigid than later became the norm, as we can see from the definitions of appointments, the titles of dissertations, and so on. Indeed, it is ironic that the attempt to confine philosophy to a field which in no way impinged on any other discipline was only a feasible pursuit in a situation where disciplines were so loosely defined that a physicist could lecture on philosophy, a philologist or a lawyer or a physiologist on music, a philosopher on psychology and so on. It did not seem at all strange for Schenker to refer his music-theoretical ideas to Mach, who, in turn, referred him to Richard Wallascheck. The latter, Federhofer tells us, was at that time preparing his habilitation for the faculty of 'Psychology and Aesthetics of Music' under Mach and Friedrich Jodl. This was in 1896. If the connection remained anything like as close as this after 1898, methodological similarities between Mach's area and Adler's would not be surprising.

Whatever the relationship between Mach's advocacy of his version of positivism and the implementation of Adler's programme it could not warrant the description of Musikwissenschaft as simply positivist, either in the Machean or in any other sense, even though there are certain characteristics of Musikwissenschaft which give the description a superficial plausibility. Musikwissenschaft selected certain areas of traditional musical scholarship because of their suitability for empirical treatment, areas such as textual research, notation, the collection of facts about composers, their lives, the times in which they lived and so on. Works of music were examined from the point of view of the characteristics which would enable them to be placed historically and to be assigned a provenance. The music-analytic approach favoured by Musikwissenschaft was
oriented towards a historicist notion of style, a supposedly empirical 'morphological' approach purporting to be theory-free but leaning methodologically on Goethe and theoretically on the Viennese pedagogic tradition. At the same time it excluded or assigned to subordinate positions areas deemed less susceptible of empirical treatment, such as harmonic theory, which came to be routinely designated as 'speculative', aesthetics, hermeneutics and other kinds of analysis. All this is, of course, very much in keeping with the positivist hostility to metaphysics.

There are also certain points of comparison between Mach's scientific philosophising and Musikwissenschaft which may be more than coincidental. The treatment of harmony as something outside the main concerns of Musikwissenschaft could be just a historical accident, the relic of the peculiar relationship which existed between the University and the Conservatory, the former dealing with matters historical and the latter with matters practical. But it would have been open to Adler to change this, and there did exist strong precedents for the inclusion of harmony in any scheme for the study of music which called itself scientific. Adler's preference for the history of harmony - the topic he chose for his habilitation - over the study of harmony itself may be a conscious rejection of the scientific philosophical orientation of Helmholtz, comparable to Mach's similar rejection of Helmholtz's realist philosophy of science, but it is much more likely that it reflected the historicist tendencies in the humanities generally.

The teaching of a set of harmonic conventions which remained - anomalously in ideological terms - part of the university programme, made it necessary to assert an
empirical basis for these conventions, a continuing feature of musicological accounts of Viennese theory, a fiction which Schenker did not endear himself to the academics by denouncing. Schenker's own radical historical approach to harmony and to counterpoint reflects the nineteenth century tendency to precede the critical examination of any cultural phenomenon by an account of its origins and historical development, but, again, this is a tendency emulated by Musikwissenschaft, not initiated by it, and one which was later to be modified under the influence of specialisation.

Kerman's drawing of a parallel between Musikwissenschaft and nineteenth century positivism on the one hand and musicology and 'American neo-positivism' on the other certainly raises interesting issues. The outlook he describes as 'American neo-positivism in music' is unquestionably connected with the positivism of Mach, whose emigré followers took the theory to America where it acquired almost the status of a religion, complete with the kind of ethical overtones which vibrate through the writing of Narmour. And it is true that American musicology is deeply indebted to Viennese Musikwissenschaft. This suggests a nexus involving all four phenomena.

Schenker was tangentially involved in the circumstances leading to the establishment of Musikwissenschaft as the central music-academic discipline at the University of Vienna at the close of the last century, and was in some kind of relationship to Musikwissenschaft until his death. In those early years he was actively involved in the business of giving definition, in an academic setting, to a modern, 'scientific', all-embracing musical scholarship. His lecture to the Philosophical Society of the University in 1895, the year of Mach's appointment to a newly created
chair in 'The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences' (a title which indicates the the way the academic wind was then blowing) is an example of this kind of endeavour, if very different from Adler's far more systematic 1885 essay. With Hanslick's retirement the situation was fluid for a time. Had Schenker taken a more positivistic line in his lecture, or had the nature of Mach's appointment not recently put the seal of official approval on inductivism, making the metaphysical tendencies exhibited in the essay deeply unfashionable in the relevant quarters, it might have led to his being drawn into the academic fold in one way or another, and the direction, not to say the tone, of his subsequent work might have been different. As it was, he was driven back on sources of support - moral, intellectual and material - outside the institutional-academic system, subsequently adopting the role of critical outsider, a thorn in the flesh of the establishment. If there had been any prospect of an academic appointment for Schenker, Adler's arrival, the year after Brahms's death, must have greatly diminished it.

Kerman's belief that Schenker was favourably disposed towards musicology, and indeed indulged in musicological practices himself (to better effect, Kerman implies, than when he was delving into internal structures) seems on the face of it obvious and irrefutable. If this were indeed true, it would not be unreasonable to see him as representative of the positivistic trend in musical scholarship. In reality, however, this is simply not the case. It can appear so only because of our habit of thinking of musicology and its satellites, the other off-shoots of Musikwissenschaft, as the only possible type of musical scholarship. But the scholarly activities Kerman alludes to are neither exclusively musicological nor exclusively
positivist. They were representative of existing types of research from among which Adler chose those to be included in his scheme for an all-embracing science of music, but were in no way dependent upon this scheme or its rationale. It is quite mistaken to see Schenker's editorial and historical studies merely as contributions - even though one of them has this word in its title - to a collective endeavour to accumulate knowledge for its own sake.

It is conceivable that the Beitrag zur Ornamentik began as an attempt on Schenker's part to reconcile himself to the new situation. Its historical orientation, its connection with the style of a particular period, its narrow focus on a relatively obscure segment of an already specialised topic, suggest a musicological motivation. But it is not necessary to propose such a motive. Schenker's music-philosophical outlook, from the time of the publication of his first essay - which already contains a dig at the musicologists' historicising zealotry which could not wait for Brahms's death before periodising his oeuvre - was formed by Brahms and his circle. Schenker's attitudes in very many ways echo the attitudes of Brahms, sometimes rather stridently. They are not always immediately recognisable as emanating from the composer whose humour Schenker was less able to emulate than his asperity, and his taciturnity not at all. He idolised Brahms and found himself on the fringes of the Brahms circle just at the time when it was breaking up and its influence on musical life waning. Brahms died in 1897. From 1894 Hanslick no longer occupied either of his two positions of influence, having retired also from the Neue Freie Presse, where his place had been taken by Heuberger, to Schenker's disappointment since he had had ambitions of his own in that direction. Schenker remained faithful to the Brahmsian ethos, continuing to associate himself with
the survivors of the circle, among them Kalbeck, Brahms's biographer, and Mandieczewsky, a successor to Nottebohm as archivist to the Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien. In later life he came to see himself as the sole surviving representative of the values it had championed.

Mandieczewski and Kalbeck represented traditions of musical scholarship older than musicology. It was from this direction that Schenker's interest in and knowledge about autographs and sketches came, not from Adler or the University. Representatives of the scholarly tradition like Nottebohm, Forkel, the Spittas, the Bellerian family and Adler himself, sought to emulate not positivism, a derivative of the French Enlightenment, its science and its rationalism, but the example of German classical scholarship. By contrast, two figures whose role was more public, Hanslick who came from the romantic tradition of musical journalism and popular theorising, and Helmholtz, who came directly from physical science, had different agendas.46

German musical scholarship's preoccupation with the comparison and authentication of texts, with the interpretation of antique notations etc., reflected the central activity of philology. Musikwissenschaft's fascination with what lay beyond the great divide separating music written according to organising principles which could be traced back to antiquity from the music of the major-minor system, and its passion for making such distinctions in terms of sharply demarcated historical periods, are indications of the overwhelming sense that true scholarship was classical scholarship in its modern historicist form. The interest in musical forms that began to displace the scientifically motivated taxonomies
and the exploration of systems which had been the great preoccupation of the eighteenth century, is attributable to the same German influence. (In France the acoustic-scientific emphasis remained paramount for longer.) The focus of modern philology was the artefact, the object and the cultural information it carried. From about the time when philology began to exert its decisive influence on German musical scholarship, interest in other kinds of significance in the artwork within philology itself sharply declined.

All the characteristics of musicology which Kerman finds regrettable and which Schenker deplored - its tendency to fragmentation, to the isolation of various areas of study, to ever more refined specialisation; its aesthetic indifference; its neglect of the intrinsic significance of works of art - were characteristics of the new philology which was its model. Similarly, its egotism, its sense that the things it neglected were left out of consideration because of their insignificance, even their unreality, and not because of the limitations of its approach, had its origins in an attitude which undoubtedly welcomed the additional rationalisation of such behaviour provided by positivism, but which did not originate in that. Nevertheless the coincidence of the academic entrenchment of Musikwissenschaft with the academic sanctification of positivism helped Viennese Musikwissenschaft to dispense with any pretence to the kind of connection to current artistic activity from which philology had taken a century to free itself, and to establish itself at the outset as an autonomous scientific enterprise.

In the work of Nottebohm and Bellerman there is still a belief that the study of the texts is justified by the
aesthetic value of their contents, that the significant truth is the inner truth of the work and that the scholarly task was to render the medium of transmission as transparent as possible so that this truth was accessible. They had not succumbed to the species of scientific disinterestedness and the accompanying aesthetic relativism according to which the establishing of a pure text is an end in itself, but, of course, their work was inevitably a contribution to the development of this outlook.

The common assumption that musicology was a natural growth out of earlier forms of musical study, the systematisation and professionalising of what had before been desultory and amateur, that it could not have been otherwise, although perhaps the emphasis might have been different, ignores the noisiest artistic-scholarly conflicts of the nineteenth century. To understand how it was possible for Schenker at one and the same time to cling - with great fervour - to the textual-empirical principles derived from philology and yet have an attitude to the work of art antithetical to that of the musicologists it is essential to take into account this central nineteenth century music-cultural argument.
Notes


2. Schenker, tr. Oster, 1979, p. 3.


4. Where Oster helped edit Der Dreiklang before fleeing to America.

5. Goethe, tr. Miller, 1988, p. 11.


7. See Magee, 1978, p. 119, ff..

8. For an instance of intellectual history still influenced by these doctrines yet concerned to re-establish traditional connections, see Berthold-Bond, 1989, p. 247. Strangely, while Berthold-Bond points out some of the anomalies in Freud's attitude, he nevertheless 'situate[s] him within the tradition of German philosophy beginning with
Kant's endeavour to "trim the wings of metaphysics" and including Nietzsche who 'cautioned against...the excesses of metaphysics'. Such interpretations are hard to reconcile with the writings of the authors referred to. For example, Kant (see p. 11 Kant, tr. Meiklejohn, 1988) says, '[Metaphysics] is the oldest of the sciences, and would still survive, even if all the rest were to be swallowed up in the abyss of an all destroying barbarism'. Nietzsche (see Nietzsche, tr. Kaufmann, 1967, p. 120) says, 'Let us recollect further that Kant and Schopenhauer made it possible for the spirit of German philosophy...to destroy scientific Socratism's complacent delight in existence by establishing its boundaries'. People interpret Kant as setting the bounds of science or as setting the bounds of metaphysics according to their own metaphysical inclinations. While the arrogance of metaphysics may have been the main problem in Kant's day, this was hardly the case in the nineteenth century, and is still less so in the twentieth. With Freud, as with the original logical positivists, few of whom were philosophers, the argument is less philosophical than defensive and ideological.

Berthold-Bond's attitude to Freud seems to be similar to Kevyn Korsyn's to Schenker. See n. 14.
9. Ernst Mach, Professor of Inductive Sciences in Vienna from 1898, was a figure of formidable and wide-ranging influence, a precursor of Einstein, a populariser of science through his public lectures, a philosopher of science who prepared the way for logical positivism, which originated in the department he founded under his successor Schlick. He reviewed the history of mechanics, with epoch-making consequences, and of optics including Goethe's contribution to the latter. His theory of knowledge is reminiscent of Locke's.

10. The Elimination of Metaphysics was the title of a paper by Rudolf Carnap and of the first chapter of Ayer, 1952. Kant and Schopenhauer both anticipated this. Kant says, 'Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style...unavoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions which they profess to regard with such contempt.' See Kant, tr. Meiklejohn, 1991, p. 2. Schopenhauer regarded it as a sign of progress to be capable of recognising what was going on when a new philosopher 'behaves like the new Sultan, whose first act is the execution of his brothers' ('macht wie jeder neue Sultan, dessen erster Akt die Hinrichtung seiner Brüder ist') declaring the work of his predecessors 'null and void and starting anew as if nothing had ever happened.


13. Narmour, 1977, p. 31, ff..


15. Ibid.

16. Elizabeth Mann Borgese's translation of the Harmonielehre actually appeared five years before Forte's paper. (See n. 12 above). Edited by Oswald Jonas, it was presumably meant to be the beginning of a more extensive presentation of Schenker's work to the English speaking public. The next volume of the magnum opus did not appear, however, for another thirty three years. It was not until after the publication of Beyond Schenkerism that Harmony became as easily accessible as Narmour's attack on it, that is in a relatively inexpensive edition.

17. A summary of the change of emphasis in Schenker studies in English from Forte onwards is to be found in Pastille, 1985. See pp. ix-xiv.


22. Ibid., p. 24.

23. Ibid., p. 25, n. 22.

24. See appendix.

25. Narmour borrows this from Gombrich, who got it from Wittgenstein who used it in his lectures in Cambridge in 1947, having got it from Kohler (Gestalt Psychology, 1929) who in turn refers to Goethe, not for the image, but for moral support. Wittgenstein, according to Ray Monk, (Monk, 1990) relates the image to Goethe's notion of an Urphänomen. There are all sorts of irony here. A notion taking its inspiration from the same source as the Ursatz is used to demonstrate the backwardness of the concept. Narmour, who is dismissive of Gestaltism, appears not to be aware that this is a Gestaltist device. Gombrich attributes the trick to Wittgenstein — surprisingly since he knew Kohler. The interconnections — theoretical and personal — make the whole area an intellectual
mine-field. Gombrich, Wittgenstein, Popper, were all part of the Viennese intellectual élite, to which Schenker had belonged, and which was fragmented by the events culminating in the Anschluss. The ideological demarcation lines are not nearly so clearly drawn as the epigones sometimes assume.


27. Ibid., p. 29, n. 27.

28. See Hegel, tr. Knox, 1975. The 'Introduction' above all is essential reading for an understanding of nineteenth-century developments in the study of the arts, for which it provided a powerfully enabling rationale. Hegel represents a pivotal point between the aesthetics of the classical period in Germany and the very differently oriented academic study of the arts of the nineteenth-century. It is in the 'Introduction' that Hegel pronounces art 'a thing of the past' and proclaims the future of art to be the science of art. The section on music shows him to share the tonal presumptions lying behind all subsequent theories. Music is conceived of as a temporal extension of the content of chords. 'Identity' is possible only as 'a dispersal...in time...a succession' and the 'return to the triad' is the 'return of identity into itself'.

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30. Ibid., p. 73. See also pp. 74-100.

31. Ibid.

32. See Federhofer, 1990, pp. 280-1.


34. Ibid., see 'Vorbemerkung zur Einführung', p. 10. 'Eine noch viel scharfere Zurückweisung gebührt Herrn Professor Riemann. Unter sämtlichen Herausgebern ist er der einzige, der die traurige Überhebung hatte (und noch hat) auch die Notenbilder des Meisters in tiefgreifender Weise zu verändern, nur um sie den eigenen Theorien anzupassen.'

(Professor Riemann deserves even sharper reproof. Of all the editors he is the only one who had (indeed still has) the woeful presumptuousness to make far-reaching changes even to the Master's notation, solely in order to make it correspond to his own theories.)

35. Ibid., see p. 6. '...so würde denn also vor unseren Augen der Fingersatz eines Pianisten, dessen innere Beziehung zu Brahms gar nicht einmal erwiesen sind auch schon in die platte eingefugt.' This is not a gratuitous attack on Reisenauer, but a protest at Simrock's announced intention to introduce onto the
original plates of Brahms's Op. 24 the fingering of Reisenauer, so creating confusion most of all among those whose need for clarity is greatest. Schenker's objection is two-fold, first to the corruption of the original plates by any inauthentic fingering, and secondly to the choice of Reisenauer whose fingering style is manifestly not Brahms's. The first could be considered the 'musicological' objection. The other is less simple. It is musicological to the extent that the simplest level of evidence for the judgement is the dissimilarity of Riesener's fingering to Brahms's own. But far beyond this is Schenker's feeling that the way the music is, so to speak, held in the hand, is emblematic of the degree of imaginative sympathy between the performer and the composer, something which cannot be reduced to 'scholarship'. The role of scholarship is to clear obstacles out of the performer's way. It cannot do more. Moreover, even the scholarly endeavour can be successful only to the extent that it is founded on this imaginative sympathy. Hence the objection to Riemann.

36. Translated literally Musikwissenschaft is 'the science of Music' or 'music-science'. The German word is kept here to distinguish what Kerman calls 'the original German movement' from the corresponding discipline in English and American universities. Both are distinguished from 'musical scholarship'.
since the latter embraces the former but is not encompassed by it. Musical 'scholarship' is very much older than Musikwissenschaft/musicology; it does not imply any ideological commitment, connection with or dependence on institutions of learning.

37. 'Positivism' here refers not simply to a metaphysical outlook, but to an ideological movement. The roots of this movement undoubtedly lie in seventeenth century English and Scottish empiricism but it took on a different character at the end of the eighteenth century especially in France and therefore inevitably exerted pressure on German thought, meshing with secularising tendencies already at work. In the nineteenth century, science began not only to challenge religion but to compete with it. It is ironic that the most passionate resistance to what was perceived here as the religion of Mammon was manifested first, not as Nietzsche believed in 1871 (the date of publication of The Birth of Tragedy), but much earlier in England, when it came home to roost in the form of the Industrial Revolution, whose evils were associated by the (Germanophile) English romantics rather too exclusively with French rationalism. An almost inquisitorial fervour characterised positivism's most extreme and highly abstract form, which was, of course, Viennese. It cooled a little in
crossing the Atlantic, but remained fiercely dogmatic and intolerant of other ways of thinking, which tended until quite recently to be defined in pathological terms.

38. Julius August Spitta, (1841-1894). A philologist who, in 1875 became Professor of Music in Leipzig, then Director of the Musikhochschule in Berlin, he was an editor (notably of Buxtehude and Schutz) and a biographer of Bach.

Friedrich Chrysander (1826-1901) was the biographer of Handel. Before collaborating with Adler and Spitta he contributed to the Jahrbuch für musikalische Wissenschaft, (1863-7).

Guido Adler (1855-1941) attended the Vienna Conservatory, left to matriculate, took a doctorate in law and then reverted to music, attending Hanslick's lectures. He 'habilitated' in 1882 and became Privatdozent in Musikwissenschaft, a novel subject of which he gave a detailed definition in 1885 in the paper he established to further its aims. In 1885 he became Professor in Prague and in 1895 succeeded Hanslick in Vienna. As well as being a copious writer he was a great organiser. Relations between him and Schenker became increasingly strained, having begun cordially. See Federhofer, 1985, p. 49, ff..

39. Schenker was briefly in correspondence with

40. The morphological tendency is undoubtedly most directly related to Hanslick's association with Robert Zimmerman to whom Vom Musikalisch-Schönen is dedicated. Zimmerman, Hanslick's colleague as Professor of Philosophy at Vienna University, wrote a book entitled Die allgemeine Aesthetic als Formwissenschaft, in which, according to Hanslick he 'applied the morphological principle with strict logical consistency...to music'.

The widespread belief that Goethe's scientific writings sank into oblivion at his death where they would have remained had not Schenker researchers stumbled upon them, can only be a symptom of the cultural hiatus referred to elsewhere in this study. (English suspicion of a detractor of Newton, especially one who wrote in German, is hardly surprising.) How far this is from the truth can be seen, for example, in Amrine, 1987. The ceaseless flow of literature and its sheer volume alone belie this view. Anyone who reads the aesthetic, scientific and philosophical literature of the nineteenth century encounters Goethe's scientific ideas at every turn. But it was not only outside mainstream science that he was influential. Mendel, Darwin, Helmholtz, Mach all studied Goethe.
**41.** For a recent discussion of Mach's philosophical outlook see Hamilton, 1990, p. 117.

**42.** This lecture was published later as Der Geist der musikalischen Technik. See Federhofer, 1990, p.139. An English version by William Pastille is to be found in Theoria, Volume 3, 1988, p. 86, entitled, 'The Spirit of Musical Technique'.


**44.** See Federhofer, 1990, p. 2.

**45.** Richard Heuberger, composer of Der Opernball, succeeded Hanslick at the Neue Freie Presse.

**46.** Max Kalbeck (1850-1921), studied law, then philosophy before music. Journalist, biographer of Brahms and editor of his correspondence, at one time a Wagnerian, he was taken under the wing of Hanslick, had two of his poems set by Brahms and wrote in 1896 a book with the - for Schenkerians - fascinating title Humoresquen und Phantasien. Schenker determinedly cultivated him, eventually to some effect. See Federhofer, 1985, p. 8 and p. 15, ff..

Mendieczewski (1857-1929). Archivist from
1897, editor of Schubert, Haydn and Brahms.

Nottebohm (1817-1882) is noted mainly for his recognition of the significance of Beethoven's sketches but also compiled thematic catalogues. The philological influence is unmistakable.

Forkel (1774-1818) studied with Humboldt, Schlegel and Tieck. He was, according to Meyers Taschenlexicon Musik, 'the first representative of the Musikwissenschaft which developed out of the protestant musical writings of the eighteenth century'.

Johann Joachim Bellerman (1754-1842) was an early ethnomusicologist, writing about Russian music. His son Johann Friedrich (1795-1874), writing on Greek music, illustrates the way musical scholarship of his period can be thought of as part of philology, i.e., a contribution to the recovery of antiquity. His son, Gottfried Heinrich (1832-1903), reverts, as philology was doing in his time, to the oldest of philological preoccupations, the notation of old - in this case medieval - texts. His interest in Palestrina and the revival of Fuxian species counterpoint is clearly related to this but also shows the persistence of the idea - paramount in Fux as it had been in Winckelmann - that the purpose of the recovery of the art of the past was to revivify that of the present. It is this characteristic which gives his counterpoint
book the old-fashioned air from which the more positively historicist Jeppeson's up-dated version of the species is free. It is the occasion also of much argument with Schenker - speaking figuratively, of course. There is no apparent evidence that the two ever met.
...history ...degenerates from the moment it is no longer animated and inspired by the fresh life of the present. Its piety withers away, the habit of scholarliness continues without it and rotates in egoistic self-satisfaction around its own axis. Then there appears the repulsive spectacle of a blind rage for collecting, a restless raking together of everything that has ever existed. Man is encased in the stench of must and mould...he succeeds in reducing even a more creative disposition, a nobler desire, to an insatiable thirst for novelty, or rather for antiquity and for all and everything; often he sinks so low that in the end he is content to gobble down any food whatever, even the dust of bibliographical minutiae.'

Nietzsche.
centuries or more' when there had been hardly anything worthy of the name of scholarship at all. Classic texts were known and treasured as objects during those centuries, but with little interest in their contents and less insight. 'What the middle ages bestowed upon classic texts' writes a British scholar of Schenker's time, 'was not appreciative study but mechanical labour'. The revival was therefore far more than the recovery of an historical object. It was the revival of the life of the mind after a long torpor in which it had been 'fettered by rigid dogma'.

The revival and continuation of classical learning, as philologists themselves understood it, was always associated with light, enlightenment, freedom from dogma, from intellectual and political despotism, in short, with humanism, and therefore by authorities, especially ecclesiastical ones, with subversion. Yet somehow, by Nietzsche's time, it had managed to become an intellectual despotism in itself, with its own dogma which blighted instead of illuminating intellectual life. This in spite of its key contribution to the achievements of the eighteenth century, a great flowering of free thought which had seemed capable of dissolving the deepest divisions, inspiring toleration in the most unlikely quarters, embracing Hebrew scholars and setting in motion a parallel enlightenment among the Jews. This blight was a deadening, mechanical historicism, without any motivation beyond itself, a means which had become an end. So, at least, Nietzsche, a philologist of distinction himself, had come to believe.

For traditional philologists of Hardie's generation, going their way unruffled by Nietzsche's fulminations, the source of illumination had always been Greece. Rome, he tells us, had never ceased to exist in the memory of

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Italians. For Dante, Virgil was still 'the poet of poets', but it is with Petrarch 'who knew some Greek in his old age' that Hardie saw the breaking of the new dawn. If the impulse was Greek, however, the focus was Rome and the next two and a half centuries saw the loving study and imitation of much freshly unearthed Latin literature. 'A renewal of ecclesiastical restrictions' arrested classical studies in Italy but they flourished until the end of the sixteenth century in Protestant France where they became less 'the object of taste' and more 'the object of science'. Interest in the contents rather than the style of the classics turned enthusiasm into 'learning'. When the French endeavour was once again interrupted by ecclesiastical pressure, forcing scholars like Scaliger and Casaubon to flee to Holland and England, a 'critical and grammatical' period began, lasting until the end of the eighteenth century. Textual exegesis became the core of philological activity. It was 'more scientific', it strove for 'clear and exact canons of idiom...laws of metre', and it 'discriminated the spurious and authentic'. Manuscripts were now compared and interrogated in the light of knowledge - especially of metre - and a rational approach to their contents.

In 'the fourth and last period' Germany was supreme and the supreme representative of the German phase was, by common consent, Friedrich August Wolf. What distinguishes this last phase is that, for the first time, philology saw itself not as the type of the intellectual life, as 'scholarship' tout court, but as one kind of scholarship. Others, all, in their modern manifestation - philosophy, the physical sciences, medicine, history, art-history, literary criticism - ultimately its offspring, had developed an independent existence and were now jockeying for position not only with one another but with their illustrious parent.
Philology - through Wolf - saw the necessity, as philosophy had already done through Kant, of taking 'cognisance of the alarmingly successful procedures of their main rival, physical science. German philology now became scientific in this new sense not just in style, but systematically. The Wissenschaft in Altertumswissenschaft was not mere 'knowledge', not simply 'learning'. It was knowledge of the kind characterised by the certainty which was the consequence of the manner in which it had been acquired. The method, not the content, defined the discipline. The crucial effect of the metamorphosis of scholarship into science was the accommodation of the content to the method. What could not be known 'with certainty' began to be marginalised.

German philology was to be the pattern for the new humanistic disciplines. As the first exponent of the systematic application in an institutional setting to a field outside the natural sciences of principles of enquiry derived from that source, philology became the carrier of these principles into all the new disciplines then beginning to define themselves. The importance of the new philology in determining the future style of scholarship generally was hardly exceeded by science itself, especially as the scientific models so highly regarded by German thinkers, as Kant describes them, were not directly applicable to other fields. In no field was the philological example more closely followed than in the new science of music which began to take shape in the 1830s and which, fifty years later, was given its determinate definition clearly modelled on Wolf's synopsis of the science of antiquity.

Wolf was a Homer scholar, and it is his orientation which partly accounts for Hardie's sense that the soul of philology was Greek. But there was another, older, far more
glamorous influence working towards the Greek emphasis in German scholarship. Hardie’s silence about this is eloquent of the insularity which led to the conditions so bitterly criticised by Nietzsche, and to philology’s eventual displacement from the centre of intellectual life. This influence originated with Johann Joachim Winckelmann.6

Winckelmann stirred enthusiasm for the art of antiquity to new levels, within and outside the scholarly fraternity, in the shape of the notion of a German renaissance, deriving its inspiration from the civilisation of the Greeks, and his work was followed by a sudden and spectacular flowering of German art. The success of the German brand of academic classicism in the nineteenth century owed an incalculable debt to the success of German classical art, not least music. German scholarship, German culture in general, had always before lagged behind French science and French culture and this situation could hardly have been transformed by the efforts of German scholars alone.

Winckelmann disrupts Hardie’s narrative, which presents a steady evolution from the aesthetic to the scientific, as he disrupted philology itself by reverting to the Petrarchan mode. If he was himself no Petrarch, he was the spiritual father of a generation of Petrarchs, striving for Hellenic grace as Petrarch had striven for Roman elegance, not by direct imitation of Greek models, but inspired by what they understood – from Winckelmann above all others – as the Greek spirit. This new renaissance manifested itself less splendidly in the plastic arts, which were the main focus of Winckelmann’s studies, than in philosophy, poetry, drama, science and – this perhaps as important as it was the least to be expected, since antiquity provided no accessible precedent for it – music.
In bringing German culture to centre stage and keeping it there through the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, even the mighty Goethe, Schiller and Kant were hardly more responsible than Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven. The pre-eminence of German scholarship from the end of the eighteenth century was a cultural, rather than simply an academic phenomenon.

Winckelmann is most remembered for his characterisation of the beauty of antique art as 'noble simplicity and quiet grandeur', and in the weaker significance given to it by Lessing.  It was not only this notion which made Winckelmann revolutionary. Far more boldly opposed to the dryness of the philology of his day was his emphasis on the freedom of the artist, the liveliness, the joy, the energy of Greek art which he relates to the conditions of Greek life. He may have been inconsistent in this as in many other respects, for example, in referring to Sparta in his explanation of Greek vitality when his theme is ostensibly freedom. But the contrast he makes between the hygienic regulations of the Spartans and the 'stiffening habit' and 'squeezing stays', which reflected the 'narrow-spirited formality' of the militaristic Prussian world in which he grew up, has its validity. 'Art claims liberty,' he proclaimed; 'truth springs from the feelings of the heart'. As Lorenz Eitner remarks, these sayings are 'as revolutionary in [their] implications as Rousseau's fantasy of a primitive state of natural virtue' and the two 'fantasies' have not a little in common. These words come from Winckelmann's early pamphlet: Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Works of Painting and Sculpture which has rather little to do with the realities of Greek art and much more to do with idealist 'fantasies'.  His more strictly historical contribution, helping to revolutionise eighteenth-century philology,
contributed greatly to its consolidation as the leading academic discipline in the nineteenth.

It is obviously wrong to give Winckelmann exclusive credit for these changes in the orientation of classical studies. It can hardly be the case that it was Germany, through Winckelmann, which 'initiated a quite new passion for the Greek world', since a preference for Greek architecture, and the perception of Roman architecture as imitative of the Greek and debasing rather than perfecting it, was expressed by Cordemoy a decade before Winckelmann was born. This view was taken up by French and English contemporaries of Winckelmann. Nor can it be Winckelmann alone who was responsible for the shift of emphasis from the text to the artefact, since such a shift must be implied by the great excavations which began seventeen years before the composition of Thoughts. Winckelmann's significance must rather be that he brought together the Hellenism and the enthusiasm for the artefact, capitalising, so to speak, on the excavations, to prise German philology away from the exclusiveness of its preoccupation with texts, and, at the same time, directing its gaze towards Greece.

Winckelmann's Hellenic emphasis accounts for the importance attached to Wolf's Homeric studies, and probably for Wolf's orientation itself; his systematising activity, culminating in his History of Ancient Art, creates the conditions in which Wolf's systematisation of philology itself could seem a desirable project. Eitner writes that this history 'eclipsed all the antiquarian researches that had preceded it'. Winckelmann's superiority rested in two main achievements. 'He was the first to put into systematic order the bewildering accumulation of sculptures, frescoes, decorative fragments, gems and coins, by bringing to bear on
it not only his knowledge of literature, but also his powers of disciplined observation and critical comparison' - the characteristics of philology of Hardie's 'third period'. 'More important still, he was able to gather the separate monuments and individual artists into one developmental sequence, the guiding principle of which was the progressive unfolding of a style. This he saw as an irreversible and regular process, the typical main stages of which were most evident in the history of Greek art.'

The significance of this as a model not only for Wolf, but for philosophy in its historical and aesthetic modes - Hegel springs to mind as the most obvious example - can hardly be exaggerated, and it is easy to see why Winckelmann was, at the same time, the architect of the artistic culture which, Nietzsche believed, truly contained the possibility of a new Hellas, and an unwitting force behind the fatal separation between philology and living art, which Nietzsche found so calamitous for both movements.

The memory of the revivifying effect on German art of the new Hellenic movement, its values largely oriented by Winckelmann, pervades German cultural writings throughout the nineteenth century. However, criticism of the scientistic-historicist outlook began to appear quite soon, often revolving around the philosophy of Kant, whose influence was as contradictory as it was powerful. The combination of the scientising tendency, which took its cue from Kant, and the historicist impetus of the resurgence of interest in Greece, fed by the arguments about the relative merits of Greek and Roman civilisation which were an inevitable consequence of the aesthetic claims made by Winckelmann and others on behalf of Greek art, came together in a particularly potent, and peculiarly German, mixture.
With rare exceptions, every aspect of post-Kantian artistic and intellectual activity, from romantic excess to the 'objectivity' of the new scholarship, claimed Kant as its authority. It was this tendency to penetrate everything and to introduce self-consciousness and, at least in the hands of his admirers, to run to extremes, which Goethe found alarming in Kant and which provoked his resistance.  

The English romantics, bitter critics of the effects of scientific secularism, and of its offspring, the Industrial Revolution, saw the source of the intellectual disease in the work of the French Encyclopaedists. German neo-classicism was for them the antithesis of this soul-less rationalism. This sense of antithesis also appears in German writing in the nineteenth century and continues to surface much later in writings such as Schenker's after Versailles.

This kind of interpretation is present in the early work of Nietzsche, who still believed the artistic energy of Germany capable of overcoming the debilitating influence of an institutionalised, industrialised scholarship, a faith he later lost. But this antithesis is more than an over-simplification. There may have been specifically French impulses behind German classicism, but a desire to assert independence from French culture was far more conspicuously present. The notion of a comprehensive science of antiquity is certainly encyclopaedic, and the style of the new disciplines is more rationalist than experimental, for obvious reasons. It might be possible to argue a case for Altertumswissenschaft as a lapse into Francophile rationalism after the surge of German creativity had spent itself. But that could not be the whole story. Schenker's perception of these matters is excessively influenced by his
preoccupation with Rameau, who is burdened, in his account, not only with his own sins but with those of his German imitators. Just as the French element in nineteenth-century fundamental bass theory is overlaid by a mass of Germanic and Austrian accretions which have nothing to do with him, so the rationalist element in the various branches of German scholarship are overlaid by a characteristically German style of systematising. Musikwissenschaft, whose scope is determined by German or Austrian conditions and attitudes, is a prime example. The complex inter-relationship between French and German scholastic thought in the early years of the nineteenth century is particularly evident in music theory, where, just at the point where the old German and Austrian practices were finally responding, in their peculiarly irrational way, to French rationalist theory, Viennese theory was exported to France by the Italian Cherubini.18

It was under the impression of the controversy surrounding the publication of his first book that Nietzsche launched his direct attacks on German classical scholarship and its influence, not least on education, in, among other writings, the Untimely Meditations, attacks which were an inspiration, if not the inspiration for Schenker's anti-scientific, anti-institutional polemic.19 Nietzsche's deeply negative assessment of the scholarship of his time provides powerful support for Schenker's attacks on musicology; if Nietzsche's criticisms are considered worthy of being taken seriously, Schenker's cannot be dismissed out of hand.

Nietzsche sees in the scholar - not only the classical scholar - of his time the following characteristics: 'Firstly, probity...[a] very worthy thing provided
[it] is something more than...lack of practice in dissimulation, for which, after all a certain amount of wit is needed....Secondly, sharpsightedness for things close up, combined with great myopia for distant things and for what is universal.... Thirdly...sobriety and conventionality.... Fourthly poverty of feeling and aridity. It makes him capable even of vivisection.... Fifthly, low self-esteem.... Though confined to a wretched little corner, [scholars] feel no sense of being sacrificed or wasted.... Sixth, loyalty towards their teachers and leaders...for it is only through them that they have gained entry to the worthy halls of science, which they would never have been able to do on their own.... Seventh...a conception of truth determined by unthinking subjection to an acquired habit.'

Nietzsche's description indicates the intensity of the distrust the nineteenth century scholar was able to arouse, and focuses on kinds of behaviour which might have been harmless enough in individuals like the pre-Enlightenment lovers of antiquity who pursued their interests much as others pursue fishing or any other private amusement, but become altogether more problematic when their activities are institutionalised, taken up by the state, and begin to acquire a near-monopoly of intellectual life. Most, though not all, of the characteristics on Nietzsche's list are characteristics of institutionalised scholarship rather than of the scholar per se: the dominance of conventional ideas of truth; the slavish pursuit of information for its own sake; the absence of any criteria by which to judge what is worth pursuing and what is not; the 'unthinking subjection to acquired habit'; the seeking and conferring of approval related to the seeking and conferring of appointments. None of these is a necessary feature of scholarship but any or all of them can become characteristic of institutions and
networks of institutions such as those which constituted the educational systems of nineteenth-century Europe.

Worst of all, perhaps, is the fragmentation of study which reduces the individual scholar to the status of a cog in the machine, not only unable to see the broader objective to which his mite is a contribution, still less to evaluate it, but increasingly unconscious of any need for a broader perspective. When all scholarship is conducted on this myopic level no-one is in a position to evaluate it. Nietzsche imagines the scholar as a mole: 'secure against any artificial or extravagant hypotheses; if he sticks at it he will dig out all the commonplace motives that inform the past', but he is not good at differentiating between these commonplace things and what is 'rare, great and uncommon', indeed makes a point of not discriminating in this way. The scholar who no longer feels a 'sense of being sacrificed' by being 'confined to a wretched little corner' bears very little resemblance to the species of scholar to which Winckelmann or Lessing or Herder or Goethe belonged. He is more like the factory worker, except that the factory worker is at least allowed his resentment. Scholarship had its division of labour, its Taylorism before Taylor, and this phenomenon, with the endless possibilities for abuse inherent in its incitement to the repudiation of individual responsibility, Nietzsche saw, prophetically, for what it was. It was another century before the reduction of the role of the scholar to that of mere research worker, obediently pursuing goals determined by his commercial or political masters began to cause serious and widespread concern.

It was the combination of the historicist ambitions of the philologists with the notion, inspired by Kant, of applying the modern - that is to say post-Newtonian -
concept of the scientific to the techniques for the recovery of the past which lay behind Wolf's systematis-
ation of philology and its transformation into Altertumswissenschaft, which presupposed an institutional application and a division of labour vividly reminiscent of the factory system springing up at the same time. Institutionalised scholarship was, in effect, a kind of industrialisation of the intellect.

Wolf's project was to work out 'a systematic description of the vast fabric that he called by the name of Altertumswissenschaft', and 'to arrange and review its component parts and to point to a perfect knowledge of the many-sided life of the ancient Greeks and Romans as the final goal of the modern study of the ancient world'. So his plan is described by the historian of classical scholarship, J. E. Sandys. Wolf was following Winckelmann's lead. But there are very important differences between what he projected and what Winckelmann had done. To begin with, there is a basic difference between a projection and an achievement. If Winckelmann's first pamphlet about Greek art contained an element of fantasy, it could hardly compare with the fantasy of creating some vast intellectual construction mirroring the Greek world in its entirety. Winckelmann's history of Greek art may have been based on less than complete knowledge and a less than comprehensive range of instances, but it was, nevertheless, the product of observation and therefore quite different in kind from any scheme outlining knowledge desired but not yet possessed.

Writing about the same time as Hardie, Sandys says that Wolf raised 'the study of the ancient world to the rank of a single comprehensive and independent science'. It is this
independence, the 'new autonomy' of the new 'science', which was, according to M. S. Silk and J. P. Stern, 'its most decisive innovation of all', since it led to '...an ever widening gulf between classics as a study and the creative art and life of the time'. But to speak of autonomy implies a previous state of dependence and it is hard to see how philology, the mother and father of modern secular scholarship, can have been thought of as dependent on anything but the ancient cultures which were its object, least of all contemporary art. To say that it gained from its connection with the art of its own times a vitality and a relevance it would otherwise have lacked is not the same as saying that it was dependent. Sandys's phrase, 'independent science', to which 'rank' philology had been 'raised', suggests rather that philology had fallen into a sense of its own inferiority vis à vis physical science. Certainly, by the Weimar period, it had been upstaged by the doyens of that court and their philosopher-hero, the 'sage of Königsberg'. By making itself 'single and comprehensive' it was undoubtedly hoping to recapture renegade activities like archaeology, and art history. Winckelmann had already made the latter more glamorous than palaeography, the central philological discipline. This was the one to which philologists perhaps felt themselves in danger of being confined. It is in these notions of philological independence as new, and of its having to drag itself up to the level of science, that we can see the source of the pusillanimity mocked by Nietzsche. Scholarly amour propre and an urge to 'realise' had replaced the passion for Greece and the desire to emulate.

Wolf's work makes him, according to Sandys, the 'hero of all the long line of later scholars'. Not only classical scholars. Guido Adler's similarly
systematic description of a science of music was clearly inspired by Altertumswissenschaft, whose name it imitated. If we substitute the word Musikwissenschaft for Altertumswissenschaft, we can see that his project to give 'a systematic description of the vast fabric that he called by the name of Musikwissenschaft,' and 'to arrange and review its component parts and to point to a perfect knowledge [of it]' meant exactly the same thing in relation to music, as Wolf's scheme meant to antiquity, except that the object of musicology was not the music of antiquity but the music of the past as a whole. This means that the gulf which opened up no less dramatically here was not between 'the art and life of the [present] time' and the art of a far distant past, but between contemporary music and the music of fifty years before, i.e., before the death of Beethoven. Musicology's problem with phenomena such as Wagner or Brahms was solved not by recognising that it had nothing to say about the art of the present, since it could only function in an historical mode, but to historicise them. As it could hardly do this by seizing them and carrying them across the ravine separating the historically real from the contemporary unreal, in order to subject them to musicological treatment, it was forced to move the ravine, by bringing 'the past' closer and closer to the present, so close that it threatened to swallow it up altogether. Composers were historicised, their work periodised within their life-times. It thus became every composer's ambition to compose not the music of the future but a music which could be absorbed into the past, to become as quickly as possible an historical figure. No art - musical, literary or graphic - is so aesthetically aberrant or trivial that it cannot be reified historically. Achieving the status of an historical phenomenon becomes an end in itself, quite different from the aesthetic ends of
art free of historical self-consciousness. In this way the Hegelian prophecy of the death of art fulfils itself.  

The application of science to areas of human activity not obviously amenable to it was nothing new. Because of its acoustic dimension, music has always been vulnerable to the encroachment of science. The attempt to extend the scope of physical-mathematical explanation into the realm of art had been pursued by a long line of theorists whose work culminated in the collaboration of Rameau and d'Alembert. 27 In the nineteenth century, this endeavour achieved a level of academic recognition beyond the wildest dreams of its originators, then quickly descending into something more like military training than scholarship and becoming ossified. Its influence was soon confined to its ability to operate as a stumbling block in the way of art, which became so agonisingly self-conscious that it dare not innovate without at the same time being able to produce some more or less plausible rationalisation of its activity in terms of academic theory. There was no future for modern scholarship in this model.

Philosophy too had come under the very specific influence of experimental science in the work of Kant. Kant announced his project to be to give to philosophy the certainty enjoyed by the natural sciences in their modern guise. Kant's influence on the scientising of the humanities was a profound irony, however, for his work was as much the product of a triumphant individualism as - say - Faust and was about equally capable of systematic extension and routine imitation. What happened in philosophy after Kant was not unlike what happens in art. In just the way that Mozart engages in a dialogue with Haydn through the medium of the string quartet, or Beethoven with Mozart through that
of the piano concerto, Schopenhauer engages in a dialogue with Kant, Nietzsche with Schopenhauer. Philosophy could only become scientific in the style set by nineteenth-century philology, on the other hand, by confining its activities within the bounds of a rigidly defined empiricism. This wasting process led almost to its disappearance, an outcome contemplated with undisguised satisfaction by many people, among them not a few who called themselves philosophers. This, too, was hardly a way forward for disciplines with dreams of expansion and colonisation—often of the areas left vacant by philosophy.

The prestige of philology, on the other hand, knew no bounds. This might seem strange in a scientific age. What has modern science to do with, for example, the scene depicted on a Grecian urn? The answer is two-fold. In the first place, modern science determines the mode in which the modern philologist contemplates such a scene, and in the second, it provides him with the wherewithal to pursue this mode of contemplation in relation to this kind of object. The mode of contemplation in question is the antithesis of the artistic, the aesthetic, the mode of a Winckelmann or a Lessing. The eighteenth-century mode is one in which the object is contemplated without a consciously predetermined purpose. It is ironic that the modern philologists, like all scientistic thinkers, claim to have replaced the artistic involvement of people like Winckelmann with scientific objectivity, ascribed to the influence of Kant. Yet Kant's own perception of science was that it had been successful precisely to the extent that it had been pursued with the most exactly defined, indeed measured and therefore perfectly replicable, set of conditions directed towards a previously determined objective. If Winckelmann approached antique art with his own particular predilections, cultural,
aesthetic, idiosyncratic, his successors would approach it with a far more precise set of questions to which they required a very precise set of answers. Nor were these questions necessarily anything whatsoever to do with the conscious or unconscious motivation of the artist. They were, thus, doing to the remnants of antiquity what, according to Kant, Toricelli did when he 'caused the air to sustain a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite column of water'.

Nothing could be clearer than Kant's own explanation of this new 'objectivity'. With these experiments, Kant remarks,

'[...] a light broke upon all natural philosophers. They learned that reason only perceives that which it produces after its own design; that it must not be content to follow, as it were, in the leading strings of nature, but must proceed in advance with principles of judgement according to unvarying laws, and compel nature to reply to its questions.'

This inquisitorial approach, strenuously opposed by Goethe, indeed caricatured by him as the science of the torture chamber, was adopted by researchers into antiquity who now looked at the art of antiquity not as the occult bearer of universal truths accessible only to an imagination attuned to their aesthetic, but simple, if cryptic, containers of ordinary information accessible to anybody who knew the - eminently teachable - devices for decoding them. The teachability of these devices was a crucial factor in the institutionalisation of philology which had formerly
been a rather private pursuit. Now it was possible to train an army of researchers, to divide up the work of gathering, ordering and decoding the data, and to conceive of the possibility of recovering antiquity in detail, and therefore of understanding it. The understanding thus envisaged was not at all of the kind the dreamers of a German Hellenic renaissance had had in mind, a recapturing of the spirit of ancient art and its revivification through a new German art, but an assertively common-sense understanding, banality elevated to the level of a principle, from whose standpoint the feeling and imagination of the artist could be laughed out of court, the court of scholarship, at least, where it could no longer be a judge, hardly even a witness. Only the art of the past was admissible and then only as a silent witness, an exhibit, an evidential object.

The encounter between the Hellenism represented by German classical art and the Hellenism of the new philology was acted out on a personal level in the 1870s in the dispute between Nietzsche and Williamowitz, with Rhode, so to say, playing Laertes to Nietzsche's Hamlet. Williamowitz's position was that the use of imagination in the attempt to divine the nature of Greek tragedy was nothing more than 'bad scholarship' and he expended a good deal of venom in identifying instances of this in the flights of imaginative divination in The Birth of Tragedy.

It would be beside the point to say that The Birth of Tragedy is, quite simply, an inappropriate target for this kind of critique. This is true to the extent that Nietzsche's book is not intended to be a work of scholarship in the sense in which Williamowitz understood the word. But it is also true that it is far from being simply a work of
the imagination. It proposes, in fact, a kind of scholarship which harnesses the imagination, not in order to fill holes in the research, but in order to make connections, to perceive significant relationships, to arrive at a level of understanding that is more than a platitudinous assemblage of facts gathered together around some arbitrarily selected point of reference, in short a kind of scholarship which is the antithesis of the historicist, scientistic dessication deplored by Nietzsche in his essays 'On the uses and disadvantages of history for life' and 'Schopenhauer the Educator'.

Williamowitz's objection to the making of connections between the present and the past, of interpreting the past in the light of present experience, or vice-versa, goes to the heart of the difference between the attitude of the founders of German classicism and the modern philology. To interpret the past in its own terms may be a laudably objective aim, but baldly presented as a simple imperative it is merely naive. Few things require more imaginative exertion than the attempt to rid oneself of one's own assumptions and to accommodate a quite different set of assumptions. In the first place, one has to be able to isolate one's own assumptions and view them objectively. What tends to happen instead, as we can now see quite clearly in the nineteenth-century demythologisers - David Strauss, for example - is that the prejudices of the scholar are substituted for those he seeks to reduce to what he calls rationality, namely, his own way of thinking.32 The whole attempt to reduce Hellenic, Hebraic or Christian irrationalities to nineteenth-century common sense now seems rather like the obtuseness of the disciple who asked Jesus for a route-map to heaven.
Of all nineteenth-century writers Nietzsche is surely the one most able to distance himself from the prejudices built in to his education, the distinction of his scholarship being only one of the prerequisites for such an extraordinary achievement, which the Williamowitzes thought was all a matter of drawing the obvious conclusions from facts assembled through conscientious toil. For Nietzsche, as for Winckelmann, Goethe, Schopenhauer, and indeed Kant, honest toil carried out with the utmost meticulousness and conscientiousness guarantees nothing. 'Reason,' said Kant, 'must approach nature with a view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge...'. It is only 'the principles of reason' which 'can give to concordant phenomena the validity of laws'. This saying can be turned against the naive rationalisers, since it contains also the implication that the scholar must recognise his conclusions as judgements and take responsibility for them.

But in fact interpretation became less and less the goal, the mere assembling of information becoming more and more a sufficient objective. Styles of scholarship almost as old as antiquity itself were revived as modern and scientific because they were supposedly more objective than the aesthetically motivated activity of Winckelmann and the Weimar classicists. Thus the accumulation of objects - texts, artefacts, their classification, dating, and interrogation for the information they carried about the life of the place and time in which they originated - supplanted the attempt to recover the spirit of Greek art, to locate and tap the source of its creative energy. The art of antiquity, in this new climate, ceased to be thought of
as part of a continuity, the creative effort of the human race as a whole, and became instead an historical entity, partly a source of historical evidence, partly something itself to be treated historically, in the manner set out by Hegel in his Aesthetics. Aesthetics itself had to be re-defined, given a new role.

Hegel's view of aesthetics before his own time is indicative of the distance between his generation and Winckelmann's. He sees the aesthetic tradition as prescriptive. This is how he interprets the attempt of the philosopher to explain the effect of art, to define it, even simply to praise it. Because Winckelmann and his followers inspired a new burgeoning of art, it seemed to Hegel that the role of such writers was to tell the artist how to make art. This role no longer had any purpose. There was a value in studying art but not in order, as he puts it, to 'make art again', but in order to know what art is and to extract from it information about the people of the past which, because of their intellectual under-development, they could only express through art and religion and which therefore cannot be known about except through these media. The judgement of art, which, strictly speaking, had not been what the older aesthetics had been about, according to the new philology, must be in the terms of the culture of which it is part. The philosophical difficulties in the way of the fulfilment of this notion only became apparent with hindsight and undoubtedly are part of the explanation for the distance philology increasingly put between itself and aesthetics, aesthetics meanwhile also being gradually historicised. Hegel's misrepresentation of eighteenth-century aesthetics seems to have more to do with the judgemental 'criticism' characteristic of his own time, which, ironically, increasingly took on just the
prescriptive character he believed 'scientific' aesthetics had outgrown, most shamelessly of all in music.

The implications of this changed outlook both for contemporary culture and for the study of the arts were far-reaching. In the long term, relativism in art history and criticism had the effect of making available new sources of inspiration to art, sources which would eventually play a role in loosening the strait-jacket into which historicism itself was busy confining it. Johann Joachim Bellermann, grandfather of the more famous Heinrich, is an early fore-runner of ethnomusicology. Ethnomusicology could be seen either as the product of the modern treatment of art as an historical object, or as a remnant or revival in a musical context of the literary-aesthetics of Herder, in which the notion of folk-art as the source at which the contemporary artist could seek refreshment, as the artists of antiquity had done, was of such importance. The idea of a folk-art lies, after all, as potently behind the notion of a specifically German culture - conceived in opposition to French sophistication, and continuing to be thought of in that way up to The Birth of Tragedy - as it does behind the other nationalisms which defined themselves through it in opposition to German claims to universality, especially in music. Bellermann's interest was in Russian music, which makes him perhaps the first shy harbinger of a new artistic spring, working under the very nose of the grandiloquent prophet of the doom of art.

But the immediate effect was rather the isolation of the contemporary artist from the art of the past. The new academic scholarship, instead of bringing the ancient and contemporary artist into closer relationship as that of Winckelmann and his successors had sought to do, interposes...
between them its notion of culture as an historically specific phenomenon which renders the artist's sense of affinity unreal. Ancient art's potential for the cultural regeneration of the modern world evaporated as suddenly as it appeared as the scientific enterprise overtook the wider cultural one.

The separation applied not only to ancient art. Historicism and scientism became characteristic of the study of all art, that of the recent past, indeed even the present, as much as that of the remote past. The sense of a gulf was felt by artists themselves as well as commentators on their work. What Hegel described as the fatally disruptive interference of thought in the creative process was a re-working of Schiller's notion of the reflective element in the 'sentimental' art of modern times as opposed to the 'naive' art of the ancients. The difference between the original idea and Hegel's use of it is that while Schiller simply tries to identify what distinguishes modern from ancient art, Hegel regards this change as fatal to art. Art, in his view, represents one kind of process by which the human mind expresses itself. This process consists of the material embodiment of concerns of the human spirit to which the spirit cannot give direct intellectual expression. It cannot simply explain itself, therefore it draws pictures using the images of nature, or clothes itself in imitations of action. As soon as the artist begins to mix explanation with this imaginative concretisation of the movements of the spirit, art is corrupted.

Hegel contrasted the work of Schiller himself with that of Goethe in terms of artistic self-consciousness or reflection. Both careers constituted marriages of intellect and imagination in the spirit of the German renaissance. But
in Schiller's case the poise was less perfect. His art is 'infected', to use Hegel's word, by reflection. Up to this point in the argument, we are dealing with aesthetic judgement, if of a highly intellectualised kind, a judgement in which Hegel is by no means alone. But he suddenly takes off in a flight of historicist speculation which has nothing to do with aesthetics. By the 1830s, he avers, this 'infection' had become an epidemic. There simply no longer existed, he believed, any place where the artist could escape the insidious influence of reflection. His imagination could not operate without the constant interference of thought. As a result, art 'in its highest vocation' was no longer possible. 36

This idea of the fatal corruption of art is supported also from another theoretical angle. Science, according to Hegel, consists of the unfolding of the inner necessity of an object, the laws which govern its being. This idea of law, which is a much stronger notion than the law of the inductivists, entails the notion that an entity (being) which ceases to operate according to its intrinsic law ceases to be itself. Art is such an entity, and its departure from the law which constitutes its inner necessity is the beginning of its dissolution. The argument, of course, is circular. It is meaningless to speak of a thing being, but not being itself. This is the arrogance of science carried to the extreme where, if the object does not conform to the laws we have 'discovered' for it, it is deemed to be not true to itself.

Hegel's pathological terminology is symptomatic of his deeply uneasy attitude to what he saw as an inevitable stage in a process of human development, which was one of progressive amelioration. His account of the effect of this
process on the arts is profoundly nostalgic. Trapped by his own definitions, he was compelled to bury the arts by the inescapable evidence that the age of reason, incompatible with the finest artistic activity had, by the 1820s, arrived. The deaths in close succession of Beethoven and Goethe were a gift of fate to what was bound to be, in the prevailing circumstances, a highly infectious and debilitating notion. What could be more paradoxical than a theory of progress which leads to what even Hegel felt to be a culturally pessimistic conclusion? His perplexity is apparent at the end of the Introduction to the 1820s lectures, where, turning the normal view of these matters on its head, he speaks of the 'poetry of the imagination' being 'transcended by the prose of thought'.

But Hegel has a way of interpreting the situation, in the light of his optimistic philosophy, which makes the loss tolerable. The death of art, depressing as it is, is more than compensated for by the birth of the new science of art, which has a double richness. First, it represents that higher stage of spiritual development in the human race in which thought is capable of everything, in which there are no concerns of the spirit inaccessible to the intellect, and, in addition, it sets before us the whole world of the art of the past which it is capable of illuminating for us in such a way that we can read through it those central and deeply significant things which former cultures could not transmit in any other way. Art, to put it crudely, was only a temporary makeshift, pending the coming of age of the intellect, and art's true significance is as a conduit for information otherwise incommunicable. If it is no longer possible it is also no longer necessary. Thought transcends art; at the same time art history preserves for us the art of the past and the science of art reveals its meaning.
Historicist's notion of the ancient artist seems to be no longer of someone holding out the hand of fellowship, but of a tortured, inarticulate soul, dumbly gesturing across the centuries in the hope that his message will finally be deciphered.

* * *

It is not easy to determine the extent to which theories like Hegel's were more significant as rationalisations of existing situations - whether or not these were accurately interpreted - or as instrumental in the development of those situations. They reflect much more convincingly the conditions of scholarship - the increasing influence of academic institutions, the increasing institutionalisation of activities hitherto conducted informally, domestically, privately - than the conditions of the creative arts themselves. To say in the 1820s that art was 'a thing of the past' seems indecently premature. Hegel's escape clause, however, is crucial. Art 'in its highest vocation' only was what he meant. Art as entertainment, adornment, pass-time, would of course continue, perhaps even flourish more profusely in the absence of the genuine thing.

This idea was extremely potent precisely because it was so flexible, giving limitless scope to the critic to whose level the noble tradition of aesthetics was quickly reduced, since invidious comparisons couched in a lively journalistic invective naturally had more appeal to the new public than the philosophical reflections of a Longinus or even a Schiller, for these latter were assimilable only by an elite. The line marking the end of high art could be drawn in all sorts of different ways. As far as music was
concerned, for some, following Grillparzer, the decisive marker was the grave of Beethoven, though for Grillparzer himself Beethoven had already transgressed the boundary of an art wholly faithful to itself, and for many people the Ninth Symphony stood on one or other side of this imaginary boundary. For others it was much more fluid, even elastic enough to take in Brahms, while excluding much of what was composed between Beethoven's death and the death of Brahms. Nothing could better demonstrate the absurdity of this kind of historicist theorising than the convolutions resorted to by its exponents in order to explain the stubbornly anomalous Brahms. The Wagnerian idea of an altogether new kind of music was the only possible response to the notion that music, as it had hitherto existed, came to an end with Beethoven and that anyone who wanted to write music thereafter must begin again at the beginning - a piece of eulogistic hyperbole in Grillparzer, seized upon and taken literally by those of an Hegelian inclination. For the first time composers had to write manifestos, not to compete with other composers, not to defend one taste against another, but to establish the possibility of their work being considered as art. Wagner's ploy became standard practice. Art henceforward had to be presented under a rubric which would exempt it from the Hegelian ban.

To respond to Hegel by pointing out that the music of the nineteenth century displays a richness altogether incompatible with the idea of the artist striving to find a quiet corner in which to be himself and failing is useless. Hegel would reply that these people - Berlioz, Schubert, Chopin, Schumann, Liszt, the Russians the Bohemians, the Italians, were not practitioners of art 'in its highest vocation'. Pressed on the criteria for assigning composers to one side or the other of this line Hegel would have
given not an aesthetic but a culture-historical answer. These composers could not be artists in the highest sense because they lived in a time of reflection, the era of science. This does not mean that their work is worthless, any more than Schiller's thought-infected dramas were worthless. It simply was not, could not be, wholly authentic. It represented art in its death throes.

The artist might have replied that it was not his inability to be true to art, not the interference of thought with imagination in the head of the artist which was threatening to the very existence of art, but the much more concrete phenomenon of the interference of scholarship with artistic activity. Long before the nineteenth-century 'crisis' Goethe saw the effects of a conscious application to art of Kant's aesthetic theory without in any way feeling obliged to experience the inevitability of the corruption of creativity by reason in his own case. The use of Kant's theoretical elevation of the human mind above nature to justify the romantic cult of excess struck him with particular force on his return from his journey to Italy. This journey had made the art of antiquity live for him by placing it in a landscape, not a historical context but a living one: the concrete continuity of nature. Goethe's response to theoretical perversity was to withdraw into one of those places which, according to Hegel, scarcely existed any longer, where the noise of theory could not reach him, there to compose his Roman Elegies. Domesticity was perhaps one of the few remaining retreats, not from contemplation, to which Goethe was no stranger, but from academicism.

Hegel's promulgation of the idea that art is no longer necessary is itself an instance of the interference of
scholarship in art, not in the mind of the artist, though the demoralising effect on that could be devastating, but in the world of academic politics and the construction of careers, of the material support for artistic activities, which is so crucially affected by art sponsors' perceptions of cultural value. The most conspicuous feature of artistic life in the early years of the nineteenth century was the transfer of energy, resources and esteem from creative to academic activity, and the parallel development of the notion of authenticity in art, of a genuine article which could be certificated, so that the sponsor or the public need not exercise judgement or taste before making up their minds about it. By the time of Schenker and Schoenberg the notion of art as fixed in the past, something the artist had to learn the right way of doing from experts who were rarely artists of any significance themselves, and often not artists at all, was pervasive enough to bring about a potential or actual artistic paralysis. They perceived their own situations as composers as intrinsically unstable, historically anomalous and either wholly unsustainable or sustainable only with the assistance of theoretical props. These are surely not solely the effects of subjective 'reflection' or the exhaustion of music, proposed by Grillparzer and repeated ad nauseam ever since.

* * *

What was the role in all this of the nineteenth-century movement, presumably stemming from Conte, which Kerman has in mind when he refers to positivism? This is a difficult topic to deal with because of the vagueness with which the term is habitually used. In most accounts of positivism its
ancestry is traced to earlier empiricist and inductive theories. But if nineteenth-century positivism really was no more than another version of inductivism it could hardly have made the impact that it did. Goethe, after all, had been unable to gain any wide acceptance for his work on colour precisely because it relied too heavily on empirical observation rather than experiment of the Newtonian kind, and actually dared to challenge experimental results from the standpoint of observation of phenomena in normal conditions.42

Nineteenth-century positivism was very far from being only a philosophy of science. It was rather a scientising of philosophy and a theory of human development in many ways similar to Hegel's and benefiting from exactly the same cultural conditions as those which gave plausibility to Hegel's aesthetic theories. It undoubtedly profited also from the success of philology in establishing inductive criteria as the criteria for scholarship in areas of study where the experimentation of the hard sciences was impracticable, in historicising and scientising the study of culture and of human development. Latter-day positivists ought - though it seems they rarely do - to find the metaphysics of Comte at least as 'embarrassing' as Hegel's (or Schenker's). Comte wanted to found a religion on the belief, based on much the same kind of speculative reasoning as Hegel's, that the human race has reached a stage where it no longer needs any kind of mental activity other than the rational. Comte was part of a procession of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century social theorists, from Hegel to Spengler, who saw human development in terms of historical stratification, differing only in the kinds of strata they identified and the meaning they attributed to the particular progression represented by them.43 There is little reason to
see Musikwissenschaft as in any need of this species of positivism to provide it with a methodological rationale, but what positivism could do was to assist musicology, like all other cultural 'sciences', to consolidate its social and academic status vis-à-vis the living art whose survival it had no great interest in assisting.

The character of musicology and its institutionalisation at the end of the nineteenth century was certainly not hindered by the enthusiasm for some version of French positivism in some quarters in Germany, and the process which led to its rise to academic power shows tendencies comparable with those which led to positivism itself. Both developments had their roots in the Enlightenment. But there is no possibility of accounting for musicology as nothing more than positivism applied to music. The origin of Musikwissenschaft and its motivation is, without question, German, its model philology and its rationale rooted in the German Enlightenment and German philosophy. The latter-day contribution of French positivism was undoubtedly of considerable academic-political significance. Ideologically it could be no more than a confirmation of certain tendencies already thoroughly entrenched.

Schenker was, of course, not untouched by nineteenth-century developments in musical scholarship, but he was, for a number of largely biographical reasons, more conservative than Adler, and was much more strongly influenced than the musicologists by other tendencies. These other tendencies were by no means insignificant. Powerful as academic musicology eventually became, it is easy to exaggerate the ease with which other attitudes and practices gave way to it.
By no means everyone accepted the outlook of the new scholarship. Nietzsche's was not the only voice crying in the scientific wilderness. But the voices of protesters undoubtedly became, as his did, more strident, occasionally bordering on the hysterical. Those inspired by his final outpourings sometimes descended into vulgarity, as they were driven more deeply into their internal exile by the triumphs of technology, and by the scientism on which it conferred, for most people, overwhelming conviction. But older, calmer habits of mind, like art itself, had never been without philosophical champions. A figure of crucial importance to the development of Nietzsche's outlook, and those who followed him, giving powerful support to belief in the continued necessity of art, was Schopenhauer, whose work, undoubtedly partly as a consequence of Nietzsche's ever-growing fame, began to gain a new following in the early years of the twentieth century, in an atmosphere at first sight as inhospitable to his ideas as could be imagined. While Schenker shows very clearly a Hegelian tendency - indeed, the very notion of a theory of music analysis is deeply Hegelian - it is to the philosophical tradition represented by Schopenhauer, in contradistinction to that represented by Hegel, that we have to look for the sources of Schenker's most innovative ideas, rather than the empiricist exclusiveness of a science of music modelled on philology, which saw itself, in Hegelian fashion, as in a transcendent relationship to music.
Notes


2. See Hardie, 1903, Chapter IX.

3. Religious toleration - or indifference - in Prussia under Frederick I and Frederick the Great, and the interest of the latter in philosophy and the arts, aided the German Enlightenment and its diffusion, in spite of the militaristic ethos and Frederick's preference for French culture. It was in Berlin that the friendship of Lessing and Moses Mendelssohn flourished, and the salons of Jewish women such as Rahel Varnhagen, who was a model for Fanny von Arnstein when she went to Vienna. F. A. Wolf was among those who frequented Rahel's salon. Of course, religious toleration was neither complete, nor exclusively the product of humanistic learning; it also had to do with the self-interest of the 'enlightened' despots. The interrelationship between enlightenment and political and economic conditions in Germany as in the rest of Europe is, of course, just as important as the internal history of scholarship and the Aufklärer have to be distinguished from, sometimes contrasted with, the classical revivalists. A good source for Germany in the Eighteenth Century: The Social Background of the Literary Revival by W. H. Bruford.

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Cambridge: C.U.P., 1959. Bruford quotes on his title page the following remark of Goethe: '...die schöne Literatur einer Nation nicht erkannt noch empfunden werden kann, ohne dass man den Komplex ihres ganzen Zustandes sich zugleich vergegenwärtigt'. This is surely true not only of 'schöne Literatur'.

4.

1759-1824. In their account of Wolf's career Silk and Stern (M. S. Silk & J. P. Stern, 1981, p. 13) say that when Wolf went to Gottingen 'there was no such "subject" as classics, but that a generation later philology had become 'a discontinuous academic subject' and was 'institutionalised as such'. Previously 'for the educated classes' the classics 'constituted a natural part of experience'. (Sic.)

In the Protestant education system, instituted under Luther's aegis by Melanchthon, classical education, which was the foundation of all education, culminated in the master's degree, which preceded entry to one of the senior faculties in the university. This degree conferred little status on the scholar and no clearly defined social role. Only if he went on to study theology, medicine or law was there a clear career path for him. Tutoring, schoolmastering, even teaching in the university were only stop-gaps, although many scholars never progressed to the more prestigious and lucrative legal, medical or clerical careers, and some of the most illustrious names in German letters are among them - Winckelmann, for
example. So the issue is perhaps one of status. But the transformation of this situation was not the work of Wolf. Göttingen was a centre of classical studies of great renown and widespread influence long before Wolf, first under the leadership of J. M. Gesner, then under Christian Gottlieb Heyne (1729-1812) 'the founder of classical archaeology'. Heyne was at Göttingen from 1763, so it is a mystery why Wolf would have to 'fight to be allowed' to study philology there in 1777. Halle, on the other hand, remained a relatively philistine, very Prussian establishment, a suitable home, some would say, for a systematiser like Wolf. Indeed, while assisting in and profiting from the rise in the 'institutional-academic' status of philology (from Bruford we learn that Wolf was paid twice as much per sheet by the publisher Goschen for his edition of Homer as Goethe was paid for his Collected Works), his re-definition of philology led to a breed of scholar - the research worker pilloried by Nietzsche - hardly more exalted than the arts and philosophy men who had had to tutor to survive: Jean Paul, Kant, Voss, Fichte, Hegel, Hölderlin, Schleiermacher...

5. **Altertumswissenschaft**: the science of antiquity.

6. Winckelmann (1717-1768) was one of those who never got as far as one of the senior faculties in the university. His career was the product of the limitation on his progress imposed, presumably, by his poverty, and is a fascinating illustration of the social consequences of the
Prussian education system. His frustration at the contrast between the ideals he had imbibed from his classical studies and the realities of 'life in the backwoods of Protestant Germany' where schoolmastering provided a poor outlet for his intellectual energy, was channelled by his fortunate contact with the art collections of Dresden. He was a classicist because he could not be anything else, but was able to make that a mission, part of the 'new humanism', very much the work of schoolmasters like himself, Gesner and Heyne among them.

7. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781). Lessing's is a significant influence not only on aesthetics but on the consolidation of 'the new humanism' and the propagation of its ideals. Nathan der Weise, takes his friend Moses Mendelssohn as the model of the enlightened Jew.

8. Winckelmann grew up in the Prussia of the militaristic Friedrich Wilhelm I. He was twenty-four when Frederick the Great came to the throne and thirty-eight when he wrote the pamphlet that made him famous - in Dresden where he had become the librarian of Count Bunau of Nöthnitz, and was befriended by Oeser, a painter who later befriended Goethe.


10. Gedanke über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst, 1755.


13. The excavation of Herculaneum was begun in 1738 and of Pompeii in 1748.

14. Published in 1764, it was the product of nine years' study of antique objects in Rome, Naples and Herculaneum.


17. See Schenker, 1930, 'Rameau oder Beethoven'.

18. Cherubini produced his opera Faniska in Vienna in 1806. He met Beethoven and subsequently produced a French - major-minor - version of Fux, rivalling Albrechtsberger's. This became the counterpoint textbook at the Paris Conservatory and returned to Vienna and was in use there still in 1895, to judge from a remark of Schenker in Der Geist der musikalischen Technik. It was much translated and used in other conservatories and was thus a force in the dissemination of Viennese theory. Cherubini's reputation as an operatic composer, and as an influence on Fidelio, helps to explain the association of his version of Viennese theory with the Viennese
classics. His conservatism in his role as director of the conservatory in Paris led to many clashes, notably with Berlioz, who, if the latter's account is to be believed, positively baited him. (See Berlioz, tr. Cairns, 1981.) This would do no harm to his standing in Hanslickian Vienna, Hanslick having fallen out with Berlioz, to whose appearance in Prague, when Hanslick was a law student there, Hanslick owed the start of his career as a musical journalist.

19. His first book was *The Birth of Tragedy*, 1872.

20. See 'Schopenhauer as Educator' in *Untimely Meditations*, p. 170, ff.. (Nietzsche, tr. Hollingdale, 1990.)

21. J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, 111, Cambridge, 1908. Quoted in n. 12, on p. 381 of M. S. Silk & J. P. Stern, 1981. N. 13 refers to Heyne, in a manner relevant to the remarks in n. 4 of the present chapter. But Heyne was not merely a forerunner of Wolf. His ethos is closer to the aesthetic, idealistic side of Winckelmann, Wolf's to the historicist, systematising side, which, in him, of course, runs to an extreme wholly antithetical to the spirit of Winckelmann. Moreover Heyne's role is no recent discovery. See, e.g., Bruford, 1959, p. 245.
M. S. Silk & J. P. Stern, 1981, p. 12. This account differs consistently with Hardie (Hardie, 1903,) for whom the first 'scientific' phase of philology, characterised by the comparison of texts and their rational evaluation in the light of historical knowledge, and the examination of manuscripts, did not follow, as Silk and Stern believe (p. 13), but preceded the phase ushered in by Wolf, whose contribution was a more systematic collation of information drawn from a far wider range of sources. Textual and especially manuscript study, aided by archaeological progress, was undoubtedly more systematically scientific in the nineteenth century, but the Wolfian tendency, building on aspects of the work of Heyne and Winckelmann, was away from exclusive focus on texts.

These matters are of significance not merely from the point of view of the Nietzschean caricature of scholarship, but because the reorientation of philology under Wolf was as crucial to the dissolution of the artistically productive relationship between history and life which Nietzsche felt so grievously, as it was for the character and art-suffocating potency of art history in all its forms in the nineteenth century and since. 'Schenkerian analysis', especially in its posthumous guise, is inconceivable without the prior displacement of philology by an 'institutionalised' and 'academic'
Altertumswissenschaft. Yet such systematising as a substitute for creativity by no means automatically follows from archaeology or even German classical aesthetic theorising - as a reading of Hegel might suggest.

23. See M. S. Silk & J. P. Stern, 1981, p. 11. To 'realise' the antique world is surely the fantasy to end all fantasies!

24. See n. 38 of Chapter 3 above.


27. See Christensen, 1989.


29. Goethe speaks in many places about the reliance of modern science on instruments and its tendency to forget that 'man himself is the best and most exact scientific instrument'. 'Nature will reveal nothing under torture,' he says, and predicts, 'Someday someone will write a pathology of experimental physics.' For a selection of the scientific writings in English see Goethe, tr. Miller, 1988. Goethe's critique of experimental science remains controversial. See, e.g., Amrine, 1987. His attitude is reflected in Nietzsche. In a remark which
makes a neat link between Kant, Goethe and Schenker (see Federhofer, 1990), using Kant's own words, he says: 'There are people who believe that German music could have a transforming and reforming effect on the Germans: they are angered, and consider it an injustice when they see such men as Beethoven and Mozart already engulfed by all the learned dust of biography and compelled by the torture instruments of historical criticism to answer a thousand impertinent questions'. See Hollingdale, 1983, p. 97.

30. For a detailed account of this controversy see M. S. Silk & J. P. Stern, 1981, Chapter 5.


34. J.J. Bellerman, 1754-1842. For Heinrich see n. 46 of Chapter 3 above.


36. See Hegel, tr. Knox, 1975, p. 11. '...art,
considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past'. It 'invites us to intellectual consideration, and that not for the purpose of creating art again, but for knowing philosophically what art is'.

37. This was the period of the Holy Alliance which 'muzzled intellectual life in Germany' by means of Metternich's system of censorship and his secret police. Grillparzer was one of the victims of this régime. Social changes since the end of the eighteenth century had also radically changed the conditions of artistic life, especially in music, not necessarily in favour of the appearance of figures such as Beethoven.

38. It was Grillparzer who read the eulogy at Beethoven's funeral.


40. The Roman Elegies were also an expression of the spirit of German Hellenism, Roman as they were - the connection between contemporary art and antiquity. They remained unpublished until years later. See, 'A fortunate Encounter' in Goethe, tr, Miller, 1988, p.18.

42. See 'The Experiment as Mediator between Subject and Object' and the Preface to the 'Theory of Colour' in Goethe, tr. Miller, 1988.

43. Oswald Spengler. See Johnston, 1972 for his influence on Austrian thought in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
'A single thought, however comprehensive it may be, must preserve the most perfect integrity. Even if, for the purposes of communication, it is broken up into parts, the coherence of these parts must remain organic, i.e., one in which each part preserves the whole just as it is contained in the whole. None is the first, none the last. The whole thought gains clarity through each of the parts and even the smallest part cannot be completely understood unless the whole is first understood.'

Schopenhauer.

'Music...is the melody to which the world is the text', writes Schopenhauer in his *Metaphysics of the Beautiful*.

Schopenhauer distinguishes music's 'husk' (*Schale*) and its 'external significance' from its 'quite other far deeper and more serious significance'. In relation to the first he accepts Leibniz's observation that 'music is an unconscious exercise in arithmetic in which the spirit is not aware that it is counting'. But the second is a kind of 'significance in respect of which the complex of numerical
relationships into which music may be analysed, cannot
remain as the signified, but is itself no more than the sign. 3

Like Hegel, Schopenhauer believes that music is
governed by laws, but whereas these laws, for Hegel, are at
the heart of music, for Schopenhauer they are strictly
confined to its outer skin, its carapace, its container. The
form of this 'container', he says, can be traced 'through
quite precise numerically expressible rules, from which it
cannot deviate without ceasing to be music'. But the sense
in which music is related to the world, just as the other
arts are, as the copy to the model, remains deeply hidden
beyond these laws. Music, he asserts, is 'the copy of a
model which can never itself be brought before the
imagination.' 4

Schopenhauer believes that the reader who is at one
with his philosophy in general and has often listened to
music in the spirit of this philosophy will have no
difficulty in understanding his interpretation of the inner
significance of music. Our world is nothing other than
the objectification of the will, through the ideas, in
the bewildering multiplicity of phenomena. 5 The purpose of
the arts is to make the ideas recognisable in the phenomena
by means of the principle of individuation. But since the
phenomena which objectify the will do so only indirectly,
through the medium of the ideas, the arts, which represent
phenomena, are even more indirectly related to it. Music, on
the other hand, because it goes beyond the ideas, is
completely independent of the world of appearances, simply
has nothing to do with this world, could equally well exist
if the (phenomenal) world itself did not exist. Music,
unlike the other arts, is not the representation of the

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ideas but the representation of the will itself. The will objectifies itself in one way through the ideas and in another through music. Music is not a likeness of the ideas but is analogous to them, parallels them.

Nothing is alien to music, Schopenhauer says. It gives a voice to everything. It 'makes accessible the most secret meaning of every scene [of the opera as of human life or of unfathomed nature] and is the truest and clearest commentary upon it.' This is why it is possible to set a poem to music, why opera is possible. Music gives the deepest and most inward illumination; as continual commentary on all that presents itself on the stage, it exposes the innermost soul of the drama - and of life itself.

The constant universal significance of melody means that one melody can correspond to various equally arbitrarily chosen situations. It expresses unchangingly the inner essence underlying all phenomena, while the phenomena express this inner essence variously. Thus the same melody can be used for a series of strophes. That a relationship is possible between a musical composition and a poem or a dramatic presentation originates in the fact that the two are alternative expressions of the same inner essence of the world.

* * *

This account of Schopenhauer's music-aesthetic ideas is based on Chapter 17 of the 'Metaphysics of the Beautiful', the third part of the Philosophical Lectures delivered by Schopenhauer at the University of Berlin in 1820. It is
taken from the 1985 edition of the lectures first edited by Franz Mockrauer as part of the Deussen edition of the collected works. This version of the metaphysics of music differs substantially from those referred to by the writers whose work is discussed in this chapter. The differences are significant enough to raise doubts about the date at which some passages in these versions were written. The dating is, of course, crucial to the interpretation of the music-theoretical concepts of which Schopenhauer makes use, and therefore to any discussion of the relationship between his metaphysics of music and Schenker's theory. It is obviously relevant, too, to the question of the confusion which so many readers find in Schopenhauer's musical explanations.

The 'didactic' version of the metaphysics of music is distinctly more consistent in terms of its music-theoretical content than any of these other versions. The surge of interest in Schopenhauer discernible about 1913 can hardly be unconnected with the appearance of Deussen's edition, and the radical change in attitude exhibited by Schenker between the first and second volumes of Counterpoint makes it not unreasonable to suppose that this text - unquestionably superior from a musical and literary point of view - was known to him.

The first edition of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung in 1819 consisted of a single volume. When it appeared in its second edition in 1844 it was accompanied by a second volume containing the later reflections of the philosopher on the topics treated in the first. On the publication of the second edition Schopenhauer insisted that he had altered nothing in the original work and that the publication of the afterthoughts in a separate volume was intended to avoid
'spoiling the work of my earlier years with the carping criticisms of old age.' Whether or not this was true of the 1844 production it does not appear to be true of the versions read by any of the writers discussed here, from Nietzsche onwards, with the possible exception of Schenker.

A third edition appeared in 1859. This is would appear to be the one referred to by Nietzsche and Wagner, at least until the Frauenstadt edition appeared in 1873. Hanslick and Helmholtz may have read earlier editions.

In 1873 Schopenhauer's literary executor, Frauenstadt, published a collected edition and this was unchallenged until Griesbach published a rival version in 1890 and, indeed, kept on reappearing, not only after Griesbach but also after the much later Deussen edition. Frauenstadt claimed to represent the author's intentions, revealed in sketches prepared just before Schopenhauer's death, for an edition of his collected writings, but Griesbach disputed this, only to be accused of inaccuracy in his turn. In 1911 the first two volumes of an eleven-volume edition by Paul Deussen appeared. These were the two volumes of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. The volume containing the version of the metaphysics of music referred to at the head of this chapter, Volume VIII, appeared, according to Volker Spierling, the editor of the 1985 production, in 1913.

Volume VIII of Deussen's edition was something quite new to the public, namely the content of the Berlin lectures of 1820, and found in the Berlin Library among Schopenhauer's literary remains, which went there after Frauenstadt's death. This volume had been a talking point for some years before its appearance. In a book which also reached the press in 1913, the French writer, Fauconnet,
warmly praised the extant volumes of the Deussen edition and spoke of the constraints imposed on writing about Schopenhauer when the unknown Berlin material remained pending. In 1937 Arthur Hubscher published another edition which made use of manuscript material not available to the Deussen team. It did not, however, include the 1820 lectures.

The differences between the Mockrauer version of the metaphysics of music and the one appearing in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung make it surprising that German writers on music who deal with the subject, notably Dahlhaus, show no interest in it. This is presumably explained by the fact that the Hubscher edition has pushed the Deussen edition aside. That English commentators are not aware of it is understandable as no English translation exists and mention of it is omitted by Payne in his survey of the history of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung in the introduction to the current English version. This is unfortunate, because, if the lectures date from only one year after the first appearance of the book, and they have not been, as that work has, subjected to many layers of revision, beginning with Schopenhauer's own, they would seem likely to be closer to the original than any other text, except the authentic, unrevised manuscript from which the 1819 publication was prepared.

Payne's own source is Hubscher, who undertook an examination of the original manuscripts of 'most of' the works, to which he was the first to have access. It ought to be possible to assume that an edition collated with an authenticated manuscript is beyond reproach, and, presumably for this reason, Payne did not feel the need to compare the text he chose to translate with Deussen. But Schopenhauer's
manuscripts present a host of problems. The anomalies in the Hubscher-Payne version identified here may be a symptom of wider problems, or they may be confined to the musical section. For people with an interest in the musical theory, however, they are crucial, since they seriously affect not only its logical consistency, giving rise to accusations of music-theoretical ignorance on Schopenhauer's part, but even its intelligibility.

That part of the authentic manuscript of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung dealing with the metaphysics of music, would seem not to have been examined in detail by Hubscher, at least from a musicological point of view. On the basis of music-theoretical and music-historical evidence, it seems clear that the text of the lectures must be older than any but the first edition of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, antedating Schopenhauer's own emendations, as might logically be expected. Certainly there are anachronisms in Payne's version of which the version found in the lectures is free.

Of the two blatantly anachronistic passages in The World as Will and Representation, the first refers to a rule about the progression of the bass which belongs to a nineteenth century version of fundamental bass theory. According to the English translation of the Hubscher version, Schopenhauer writes:

'The deep bass moves most ponderously...its rising and falling occur only in large intervals, in thirds, fourths or fifths, never by one tone, unless it be a bass transposed by double counterpoint'.

This passage constitutes a departure from the musical
model which provides the basis for the chapter as a whole. In the later versions of the work this departure can be explained in relation to the gradual displacement of figured bass by a form of fundamental bass in the teaching of composition, beginning its spread in the decade preceding the appearance of the second edition of *The World as Will and Representation*. In 1818 it is much more difficult to explain, not because Schopenhauer was not aware of fundamental bass theory, but because the prescriptive use of the theory referred to here was not part of any established music-pedagogic practice until much later. Even the originator of the theory had no such rule for fundamental bass progression as the one referred to here, nor does the secondary source claimed by historians of the theory for the instructional system - the system developed by Sechter, adhered to by Bruckner and passed on to Mahler and Wolf and countless others, including, of course, Schenker and, indirectly, Schoenberg - in which it does appear.

Ironically, the fact that Schopenhauer did possess and make use of the concept of a fundamental bass in his original work is not clear from the English version because of the mistranslation of *Grundbass*. His use of this term shows his theoretical source to have been Prussian rather than Viennese. *Grundbass* is the term used by the eighteenth-century Berlin theorists for 'fundamental bass'. The connection proposed by Viennese historians between Kirnberger and Viennese theory tends to blur the distinction, which is a crucial one, between Kirnberger's attitude to fundamental bass and that of the nineteenth century pedagogues. Mendelssohn's notebooks, containing exercises worked under the supervision of Zelter, show that the German attitude to the fundamental bass was quite different from Sechter's. The concept had minimal effect
on their methods of instruction or their approach to composition. The role of the fundamental bass was not to prescribe, but to 'justify' the traditional procedures rationally and not in any way to displace them. It was a means of proving the authenticity of traditional concepts and rules. The nature of the authority to which the reductive construct appealed would depend upon the metaphysical outlook of the theorist. It might be human reason, natural law or divine law, or Schopenhauer's universal will.

Seen from this standpoint, the Grundbass is the rational validation of the practice of Bach. As a constructive, prescriptive theory it is incompatible with that practice and contributed to its destruction. This, rather than quibbles over the precise interpretation of individual clusters of pitches, which were symptoms of Kirnberger's deeper uneasiness rather than the reason for it, is the real point of the Kirnberger-Marpurg controversy. The pedagogic-compositional application of the theory is something quite separate from the theory itself, involving exactly the same kind of illogicality as the attempt to re-construct Palestrina-like works interval by interval. That the marriage between two such illogicalities took place in Catholic Vienna rather than enlightened Berlin is hardly surprising. Nineteenth century 'harmony' was an accident of history, not an 'organic' growth.

Schopenhauer's source of inspiration was the eighteenth-century Berlin tradition, not nineteenth-century Vienna. After his father's death, Schopenhauer's mother moved to Weimar where she held a salon at which Goethe was sometimes a guest. Among Goethe's scientific interests was music, on which he took advice from Mendelssohn's teacher,
Zelter. Schopenhauer was a passionate admirer of Goethe, defending his scientific attitude against the 'Newtonians'. Schopenhauer himself studied in Berlin from 1811-1814. Zelter was then director of the Singakademie and the Ripienschule, in which the Bach tradition was fostered and where theoretical debate was very much alive. The probability is that Schopenhauer, who adored music, derived infinitely more from his musical experiences in Berlin than from the lectures of Fichte, which were the ostensible reason for his presence there. Influences on his thought are said to have been few. Goethe was certainly one of them, and the resemblance between Goethe's theories of biological development and Schopenhauer's picture of the growth of musical structure, which, for him, is an analogue for the world, suggests that he was a profound one. There is no doubt about Schopenhauer's music-theoretical orientation or about the attractiveness of this orientation to the Viennese dissident, Schenker. The problem with the versions of Schopenhauer's musical theory available to Schenker before 1913 was one of intelligibility.

The second much more glaring anachronism in later versions of The World as Will and Representation is a reference to Rossini. This is so startlingly out of place that it requires no esoteric musical knowledge to spot it. Whether the appearance of this reference in the first volume in Payne is attributable to Schopenhauer's own revision, or to editorial confusion, it is clearly anomalous. Schopenhauer's remark that 'no-one has kept so free of this mistake as Rossini' has so distinctly retrospective a tone that he would seem unlikely to have intended it to appear in the first volume of the later editions without some indication that it was an afterthought. To interpolate it in such a way as to make it appear part of the original would
be at odds with his declared intention not to 'spoil' his early work.

Although Rossini had his first success in Venice in 1813, his international reputation was not established until 1822, four years after the completion of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. Even if Schopenhauer himself already knew Rossini's music (he lived in Dresden from 1814-18, but Rossini was well known in Italy from the time of *Tancredi* in 1813) he could hardly have assumed that his example would mean much to German readers at the time of writing (1814-1818), but rather would have had to introduce this new music to them. But the remark clearly reflects a consideration of a body of work with which the (musical) reader is supposed to be familiar.

These anomalies are highlighted when the version of the chapter on music in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* is compared with the 1820 version, for neither passage appears in the latter. If Hubscher had examined the lectures text of this chapter therefore, he must at least have wondered whether there might be other material appearing in the various versions of Volume I which does not really belong there. If he had examined the section on music in the authentic manuscript of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* he must surely have found it to correspond more closely to the version in the lectures than to any later text in at least these two crucial instances, even if the difference between figured bass and fundamental bass theories meant little to him.

Of the two English translations of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, the one by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, entitled *The World as Will and Idea* was made before the
exhumation of the text of the lectures. The more recent
(The World as Will and Representation) by E. F. J. Payne, is
based on an edition which was produced after the publication
of the lectures but does not include them. English readers
relying on Payne are therefore likely to be unaware that
this text is doubly problematic: first in that it is based
on admittedly controversial material (although, of course,
according to Payne, Hubscher has at last got it right), as
all two-volume versions of Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung are, and secondly because its editor has not
considered one of the major sources of evidence.

The English version presents the original work,
together with the 1844 supplement, as a single work. This is
quite proper, as Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung appeared
twice in this format in Schopenhauer's lifetime. However,
the supplementary volume cannot really be considered part
of the original work and the music sections make this
particularly clear. Payne recounts the history of the text,
but, rather than impressing upon the reader the differences
between the original work and the commentary in Volume II,
he emphasises the consistency of Schopenhauer's basic
philosophical ideas, which, it is true, remained in essence
unchanged to the end of his life.

But it is no less true that the Schopenhauer of the
supplement is a very different writer from the author of the
original version of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.
Moreover, musical life had undergone a transformation since
the decade in which it was written. It is not difficult to
understand Schopenhauer's fear that his music-metaphysical
theory might, without adaptation, be unintelligible to
people for whom the baroque model, on which it was based,
was a thing of the past, and a past that had vanished

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almost without trace. How well founded such a fear would have been can be seen from almost all subsequent commentaries on the technical aspects of the metaphysics of music. The temptation, therefore, to revise, despite his wish not to 'spoil' the original, can nowhere have been harder to resist than here. The issue, of course, is not whether he revised his interpretation. He certainly did this. The question is whether he intended his revisions - contained in the interleaved notes - to be substituted for or added to the corresponding material in the original or to be confined to the supplementary volume, and, even if he intended the former, whether such an intention is historically and philosophically appropriate.

The changes which music theory underwent in the years between the writing of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung and the publication of the supplement show up sharply in Schopenhauer, yet it is rare to find a commentator who sees any danger in conflating material from the two volumes. Whether this is acceptable practice in relation to the other topics is a question for the philosophers. In the case of music it is bound to lead to confusion. English-speaking commentators on Schenker, who are in the best position to notice these differences, just like their musicological counterparts of all backgrounds, and like aestheticians and philosophers who are not experts on music, let alone on Schenker, move back and forth between the treatment of music in the 1819 volume, and that in the 1844/59 supplement, as if they contained a single continuous argument, illustrated by a single coherent set of theoretical concepts. This is clearly not the case.

For reasons discussed at length earlier in this study it is not altogether surprising that these dates do not
themselves alert readers, even the musicologists among them, to possible changes in theoretical outlook, and still less to the meaning of such changes. But since a great part of Schenker's effort was directed towards the illumination of the crucial transformation of music theory which took place between Schopenhauer's youth and his later years, when his problem (and it was clearly a problem) was how to maintain the logical consistency of his interpretation in the light of the, by then, ubiquitous Viennese version of fundamental bass theory, it is ironic that this transformation should be ignored in discussions of Schenker's relationship to Schopenhauer. Nothing, in fact, could better illustrate the importance of reading Schenker in context in order to appreciate the significance for cultural history of what he has to say.

To have any hope of being fully understood, and for any sense to be made of the relationships of observations stemming from widely different periods of his life, Schopenhauer's metaphysics of music must be set in the context of the state of music theory at the time when it was formulated and the changes it underwent during the philosopher's career. This in turn must now be considered in the light of Schenker's critique of nineteenth century theory.

Schopenhauer's musical ideas of 1814-18, as is to be expected, were derived from eighteenth-century traditions. It is certainly not a pedagogic exercise which he takes as his aesthetic counterpart to 'the world'. It is clear from the Spierling edition that his interpretation of the nature of the musical work of art is based empirically on a notion of structure derived from the compositional practice of what we now think of as the 'figured-bass' tradition. The model
for this is a piece of music in which a melody and a bass are fully composed but the inner parts only sketched by the composer in the form of figures written under the bass indicating specific harmonic sonorities which it is left to the continuo player to realise and to connect according to convention. While during the later baroque it became more and more common, and eventually standard practice, for the inner parts even of keyboard accompaniments to be supplied by the composer, the structural assumptions remained unchanged and the notion of harmony and of harmonic progression assumed by composers was the one presupposed by this tradition. This remained the case at least until the middle of the nineteenth century and, indeed, it was not until well into the century that this concept of harmony began to be displaced, even in textbooks, by the new theory. Even the new chord concepts were at first absorbed into the familiar conventions, their reductive implications being ignored, e.g., by Albrechtsberger. Only when applied to the species system did they begin to motivate a new pedagogic model in which the schematic bass, with the peculiar character of its Rameauvian progression, was substituted for the cantus firmus as the basis of the compositional exercise.

The rule referred to in Payne, however, relates to Simon Sechter's Fundamentalschritte (fundamental bass progression), which is not found in Zelter or Kirnberger. For Kirnberger, the relevant succession is a succession of specific 'chords' conceived in terms of the figured bass tradition, not a succession of roots. The only word Schopenhauer uses which is associated with nineteenth-century harmony is Stufe (step). He uses this in a pre-compositional context and, in reference to composition, in a sense much closer to Schenker's concept of...
structural level - level of elaboration or differentiation - than to Sechter's schematic bass progression, of which, in 1818, he is highly unlikely to have had any knowledge.

In later years Schopenhauer was not alone in confusing this schematic bass with the bass voice of a composition. His confusion is obvious in Volume II where he tries to reconcile the two notions of bass and entangles himself in invertible counterpoint and secondary 'accompanying' basses, and still more so in the Parerga and Parellipomena. This confusion illustrates the extent to which his thinking had been affected by the all-powerful prescriptive version of fundamental bass theory. Yet it is interesting that he does not completely succumb to the modern theory, still insisting that melody is the essence of music and that harmony is given too much importance. Here he is not only true to his own theory but to the musical tradition in which his taste was educated.

There is nothing of this confusion in the musical chapter of the text of the 1820 lectures whose supreme philosophical confidence presupposes an equal confidence about the nature of the art which is its subject. The whole beauty of the piece is this serene simplicity and sureness of touch.

There is no question that the Deussen text of the metaphysics of music, as it appears in Spierling's edition, is incomparably superior to the text translated by Payne. While the latter creates an impression of prolixity, music-theoretical vagueness and repetitiveness, the former is entirely coherent and fully lives up to the reputation for 'beauty of style...power' and lucidity of expression' to which Payne refers. From the Spierling edition
Schopenhauer's ideas emerge with marvellously persuasive simplicity. The poetic quality of the writing is not undermined, as in *The World as Will and Representation*, by metaphorical inconsistencies arising from a clash of music-theoretical concepts. There is a single concept of musical structure, derived not from abstract theory but from works of art, and this is presented with vividness and precision.

We cannot know, of course, which version of Schopenhauer Schenker read or preferred. What is highly suggestive, however, is the fact that his attitude to Schopenhauer underwent a marked change and that this change occurred between the publication of the two volumes of his book on counterpoint. This is not simply something to be inferred from the development of his theorising, but quite explicit. In Book I of *Counterpoint* he is dismissive of Schopenhauer. In Book II he quotes him as an authority in just the fashion that he quotes Goethe. It was in this period that Deussen's edition of the complete works of Schopenhauer, containing the 1820 lectures, appeared. The novelty of Schopenhauer's conception of the musical work of art - which would surprise no-one when it first appeared, but, like C. P. E. Bach's Versuch, would almost have ceased to be intelligible by the late nineteenth century - viewed from the perspective of 1913, when the patent moribundity of nineteenth-century theory had left a theoretical vacuum, is striking. The crucial stimulus to Schenker's radical re-thinking of the nature of musical structure, must have been Schopenhauer's picture of the musical work. There is no doubt that this picture had the capacity to give coherence to the various strands of Schenker's theoretical investigations, a coherence which, up to that point, they certainly lacked. Yet it seems unlikely that any sudden
flash of illumination could have come from the convoluted text upon which the English version of the chapter containing the metaphysics of music is based, as the confusions of commentators on that text testify.

The central part of Schopenhauer's theory of music is developed only in Schenker. Even Nietzsche shows no awareness of it. It seems reasonable then to assume that Schenker knew this clearer version. The notion of musical structure found in it is therefore taken, in the following discussion, to be definitively the one Schopenhauer held in 1818, and to be the one to which Schenker's theory essentially relates.

*   *   *

Payne writes: 'more than any other philosopher of modern times [Schopenhauer] had to contend with fractious contemporaries who were ever ready to denigrate and denounce him, to secrete and suppress his works by the simple expedient of silence, and who did not scruple to misquote him blatantly and unblushingly from his own writings'.

However, it would be a mistake to assume that no-one read Schopenhauer, even before 1853, when he became famous overnight through a series of accidents, or that his influence among those who did read him was confined to the thoughts contained in the unattributed quotations Payne refers to. He was widely read after 1853, and ultimately far more widely read than philosophers usually are, partly because - and this is always surprising to readers of English versions of his work - 'no German philosopher had written so
well and so readably before'. The lucidity of his prose made 'the problems of metaphysics...comprehensible to the non-specialist reader'. Schopenhauer was enormously widely read from the closing decades of the last century until well into the present one.

There are few writers on the aesthetics of music of any significance after Schopenhauer who do not show his influence, either directly or in some modified form. Among nineteenth century writers relevant to Schenker are major figures from many fields of intellectual activity and no less prominent figures from the arts: Hegel from philosophy, Helmholtz from the physical sciences, Nietzsche from philology, besides Wagner and a writer from a future world of mass circulation journalism and music-academicism, Eduard Hanslick.

However, it was not his notion of musical structure as an analogy for the world, which interested these writers but other aspects of his theory which fitted better the music-aesthetic preoccupations of the period. Some of these Schopenhauer himself had taken up and refined. Among them was his idea of the musical genius as medium. Another was the notion that genuine music was not imitative of phenomena or words, but spoke a language of its own, capable of giving expression to universal human feeling, defining a choric role for music in relation to stage illusion and dialogue. Given sufficient ingenuity, he could be interpreted as supporting almost any of the music-aesthetic theories in circulation in the nineteenth century.

His notion of the technical shell of music as containing a deeper meaning is turned by Hegel into the idea of art as concrete clothing of the spiritual essence, an idea
Nietzsche's notion of the Dionysian unity achieving individuation in Apolline form, hidden Dionysian reality manifesting itself through Apolline illusion, is clearly related to this aspect of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of music, and many other ideas in The Birth of Tragedy are related to the Schopenhauerian aesthetic. Wagner coined the term 'absolute music' directly or indirectly under the influence of Schopenhauer's insistence that music spoke a language of its own, and yet he was also able to derive from the metaphysics justification for his use of music to express the secret meaning of the drama, in a way that was anything but 'absolute'. Harmslick also seized on the idea of an autonomous musical language and used it as a stick with which to beat the affect-theorists and composers of programme music, such as his one-time-hero, Berlioz. Helmholtz struggled with the relationship between the technical 'shell' and the inner, affective significance of music in a way that assumed the truth of Schopenhauer's notion of the derivation of musical-acoustic phenomena from a single sound. Yet, sophisticated as he was in dealing with isolated musical phenomena, and convinced of the character of the over-all structural complex as the elaboration of material derived from a single undifferentiated sound, Helmholtz seems to have had no interest in the nature of the structural connection of 'every note' in the 'mass of sound' and the single 'tonic' from which they all came and to which they all returned. Yet he must have been aware that formal schemata do not address this relationship. If he did not pursue the morphological process, the Goethean concept of structural development applied to music by Schopenhauer, this was very likely because the music-structural model on which Schopenhauer relied had been buried under the quasi-rationalist theorising which had swamped the traditions still surviving in Berlin in
Schopenhauer's youth, and it was impossible simply to invent a new one. This vagueness about structure continued through all the tonal theorising of the nineteenth century, despite the conscious application to music history of morphological theory.

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Hanslick was one of a number of people whose interest Schenker tried to engage in his various projects between 1890 and 1900. In February 1894 Schenker was proposing to write a history of melody which Hanslick promised to discuss with him. In August of the same year, he acceded to Schenker's request that he should recommend an essay on Smetana to the Neue Freie Presse, but he was either unable or unwilling to persuade Bacher to take him on as music-critic. Schenker was familiar with Hanslick's work and esteemed him as a member of the Brahms circle as much as because he was music critic of the Neue Freie Presse and Professor of the History of Music, but he had doubts even in 1895, when he wrote a rather strange piece on the occasion of Hanslick's seventieth birthday. In this he compares Hanslick's Negation (Schenker's word), his denial of the expressive capability of music, to an 'ice-field' and quotes at length Helmholtz's criticism of Hanslick's point of view. This back-handed tribute may owe something to Schenker's disappointment that Hanslick was not more useful to him, but it has more than curiosity-value. It enables us to focus precisely on the state of the music-aesthetic debate and the texts relevant to Schenker and at least for some of the readers of Die Zeit, in 1895. It also illustrates a means of indirect access to the ideas of Schopenhauer.
Although Hanslick was undoubtedly familiar with some vaguely Schopenhauerian ideas before he wrote *The Beautiful in Music* the date of its appearance, its emphasis on music's autonomy, and even its title, point to the newly celebrated author - thrust suddenly into prominence in 1853 - of a chapter entitled 'On the Metaphysics of Music', as a crucial, if poorly understood influence.29 No-one writing on the aesthetics of music in 1854 could pretend ignorance of Schopenhauer, and even if Hanslick saw *The World as Will and Representation* at first hand for the first time only in the course of writing he could hardly have failed to recognise the source of the long familiar ideas, however modified, of which he was making use. It would be tempting to see *The Beautiful in Music* as a kind of layman's metaphysics of music - a metaphysics of music without the metaphysics - except that every aspect of the discussion is impoverished in Hanslick's book, in spite of its much greater length. Schopenhauer's concept of a musical work of art, a coherent structure fashioned out of the steps of the scale, collapses into a notion of music as fragments of sound passing over the ear of the listener in an apparently chaotic flux. Any underlying coherence could consist only of some mysterious relationship among the patterns into which they may be perceived to fall, patterns which have to be read off the surface, inductively, to reveal the underlying laws, as if they were natural phenomena rather than features of a work of art.

The reasons for Hanslick's approach are not far to seek. He is listener-oriented because he sees himself as the representative of the listener with whom he allies himself in the role of judge. Judgement, which was only a part, and a relatively insignificant part, of traditional aesthetics, is
the *raison d'être* of the musical journalist. Because he can conceive of no other point of view, Hanslick does not discriminate between perception and conception. This is the crucial element in the reduction of aesthetics to criticism. Because he only reads off the surface, he has no interest in any idea of what may underlie that surface, not even a Leibnizian formal idea deriving from acoustic-mathematical determinants analogous to the mechanical determinants of architectural forms, and much less to Schopenhauer's idea of a 'signified' of which this form is only the 'sign'. Nor can he distinguish between 'signified' and 'intended' because he does not understand Schopenhauer's notion of genius.

In this he resembles Hegel, whose adaptation of so many of Schopenhauer's ideas to his historicist theory went before Schopenhauer's own work into the public domain and continued to hang about it like a miasma. 

The world of music, indeed of the arts altogether, and the whole of European culture, changed so radically between 1814 and 1853 that Schopenhauer's work could not possibly be read then as it would have been in the twenties. For Hegel the idea of the artist as the medium for some significance beyond himself is reduced to the prosaic, psychologicist notion of the artist as a kind of automaton, an empty vessel into which the *Zeitgeist* pours itself. He signifies what he represents. In similar fashion, Hanslick reduces the idea of the non-mimetic character of music to a notion of music as - literally - insignificant. This is, of course, the inevitable consequence of phenomenalism. If nothing beyond the phenomena can be apprehended then any significance behind the phenomenon, even if its existence could be imagined, might as well not exist. The meaning of the notes is the notes. For Schopenhauer the uniqueness of music lies in the fact that, exactly because it is not tied to phenomena, it is capable, as no other art is,
of making that which lies beyond the phenomenal directly accessible to consciousness, even if consciousness is not capable of reflecting what it receives in any but analogical terms.

Hanslick's focus on the musical surface, conceived of not in the sense Schopenhauer attributes to Leibniz, but as data flowing across the ear, has been more influential than has been generally recognised. Its main contribution was almost to eliminate the notion of music as a work of art constructed out of sound, and to substitute instead a notion of sound patterns as phenomena of perception. This new way of thinking about music had the field almost to itself for reasons quite external to aesthetic theory. Musical scholarship generally was shifting anyway from consideration of music as work of art, to matters not even of the surface of the work, but of the representation of the work, and the work's historical - Hegelian - significance, towards, that is, the art-historical.

One of Hanslick's contributions was to sterilise music-aesthetics, among other things by driving the mystery of acoustics, which had fascinated the best minds for millennia, into the enclave of the pedant and the dogmatic pedagogue and rendering it, ultimately, a joke. It is as a consequence of this that Schenker's preoccupation with this mystery makes his followers writhe with embarrassment and seize with unseemly glee upon his diatribes against Rameau. Another was to make it possible to conflate any notion of music as 'a language of the soul' with the lowest form of the 'hermeneutic', the amateurish, journalistic programme note. These are the consequences of the famous Hanslickian coolness and elegance, the smiling dismissiveness of everything that the long list of musicians, from whose writings he quotes in
order to mock them, believed they had been doing from time immemorial, and of their attempts to articulate their intuitions about it.\textsuperscript{32}

The rise of journalism was a crucial factor in the transformation of musical scholarship in the nineteenth century. Hanslick cannot be considered simply as a successor to the tradition represented by Schiller or Schumann. Unlike his romantic predecessors, Hanslick was primarily a journalist and he was to be followed by a vast army of people who were primarily or even only scholars. We are now so used to this that we are puzzled by Schenker's insistence that he wrote from the point of view of an artist, and we can no longer easily see the difference between an aesthetic-philosopher - if such an animal any longer exists - and a music critic.

Its indebtedness to metaphysics notwithstanding, Hanslick's notion of music was propounded with a lofty disdain for the spiritual. This disdain seems to come from a belief that the grandeur of the philosophical conception is mere inflation which needs dispersing by means of a healthy dose of scientific common sense. It is in this respect that Hanslick and his successors are the modern counterparts to the 'Euripidean' tendency in Greek artistic life as Nietzsche describes it in \textit{The Birth of Tragedy}. Euripides, Nietzsche explains ironically, 'liberated tragic art from its pompous corpulancy...the spectator now actually saw and heard his own double on the...stage and rejoiced that he could speak so well. But this joy was not all: one could even learn from Euripides how to speak oneself...from him the people have learned how to observe, debate and draw conclusions from the laws of art with the cleverest sophistication.'\textsuperscript{33}
In similar fashion, as Nietzsche observed, criticism in the nineteenth century became a substitute for aesthetics. The critic became what the philosopher could never have been: the representative of the spectator, the public, whose tastes became the standards of art. Hanslick's writings had enough of a philosophical air about them to impress Nietzsche for a time, but his real role was to narrow the gap between the philosophy of aesthetics and the public, partly by initiating the public into the niceties of the notion of aesthetic debate current in sophisticated circles at the time, but more by assisting in the reduction of aesthetics to the question of beauty understood as that which is pleasing to an 'educated' taste. Hanslick's influence on Schenker was, despite Schenker's contrary instincts, hard to resist and long-lasting. Perhaps he never altogether escaped it. It is hard, indeed, to stand out against the opinions of a well-drilled public. Schenker did eventually take up Nietzsche's theme of 'civic mediocrity' but he saw himself initially as being limited to the choice between Hanslick's belief that music was about notes and nothing but notes, and Helmholtz's that it expresses 'states of mind'.

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It is intriguing that it should be not the artistically inclined and literary-minded lawyer Hanslick, his enthusiasm for music fed by the excitement of contact with great romantic artists such as Berlioz, Schumann and Wagner, but the physical scientist (physiologist and physicist), Hermann von Helmholtz, who clung to the 'unscientific' belief that music, while not a mimetic art, is still an expressive one. While Helmholtz's approach is strictly and inevitably
sensationalist, his enquiries focusing on the physical means of making music, and the physical explanations of its audibility, only once in The Sensations of Tone does he fall into the trap of attempting to explain music’s significance directly in terms of its sensational effects.\(^{35}\) It is clearly Helmholtz Hanslick has in mind when he derides the attempt to cross the ‘mysterious bridge’ between the body and the mind.

On one level, of course, Hanslick is right. Helmholtz does leave himself open to the charge that he is trying to construct a route from sensation to emotion such that the latter would seem in some vague way to be a product of the former. The art of music, in this interpretation, would be no more than a cold-blooded harnessing of the devices known by experience to stimulate – physiologically – the desired responses, by acting on the nervous system to evoke feelings associated by the hearer with moods previously evoked by other stimuli, so that it will seem to him to be ‘expressing’ these moods, or even the conditions giving rise to them. Something suspiciously like such an interpretation, but deeply confused, appears in the passage from which Schenker takes the quotation he uses in his seventieth birthday ‘tribute’ to Hanslick.\(^{36}\)

But Hanslick, not uncharacteristically, while taking to task Helmholtz and his fellow physicalists for their philosophical obtuseness in treating the mind as a mere extension of the nervous system, gives himself away: ‘...how the excitation of the auditory nerve...is transformed into...an emotion...lies beyond the bridge that no philosopher has ever crossed. It is the one great problem...the connection between mind and body. This Sphinx will never throw herself into the sea’.\(^{37}\) Although this is
splendidly put, it does not really challenge sensationalism at all, since it assumes, actually much more blandly than Helmholtz does, that the connection exists, that it is uni-directional and that we know what the direction is. So much conceded, it seems hardly worth denying the hope that the one remaining unknown, the nature of the path, is in principle discoverable.

In general Helmholtz seems to recognise that while he can offer acoustic/psychological explanations, such as the one he gives for the notion of dissonance, when it comes to the expressive use made of given sound-combinations he can do no better than any of his predecessors, and is compelled to fall back on poetic affective language. But his appeal to the theory of association, in the attempt to understand why music is experienced as expressive of particular emotions, results in an explanation which is, on the one hand, circular and, on the other, so individualistic - the associations in question being arbitrary - as to be culturally, and certainly scientifically, meaningless.

He believes, for example, that the association of successions of extremely consonant sound combinations with a feeling of ethereal calm is universal, at least within the culture defined by the western tonal system. But simple, random associationism contradicts this. According to this interpretation the connections people make do not follow from any supposed universal - neuro/logical or neuro/psychological - response to particular stimuli, but from what was happening internally or externally when they heard such sounds before. Yet affect theory, which is clearly Helmholtz's starting point, assumes that, at least within a given culture, everyone who hears the same thing will put approximately the same affective interpretation
It is exactly the fact that this is not the case that Hanslick uses to mock affect theory. His most extreme example is the section from the Overture to The Magic Flute 'changed into a vocal quartet of quarrelling Jewish pedlars'. The absurdity, however, is not so much in the theory he derides as in his choice of illustration, which suggests an inability to appreciate the nature of parody, where the laughter is generated precisely by the incongruity of the elements juxtaposed. This is, of course, treacherous terrain, and Hanslick actually falls into the error - if indeed it is an error - for which he castigates others, in the very act of laughing at them. Rousseau, he remarks, was 'moved to tears by the air from Orpheus - 'J'ai perdu mon Euridyce...'. The music, he points out, would sound just as fitting if the words were 'J'ai trouve mon Euridyce'. He adds, incautiously, 'We are not entirely of the opinion that in this case the composer is quite blameless, for music most certainly possesses far more appropriate tones for the expression of anguish'. More subtly, he does not see the difference between saying that the music can be heard as expressive of Orpheus's grief and that it can only be heard as that. This however did not prevent his remarks from being ideologically effective. No-one wanted to be thought to belong to the affective school of thought, however destitute of alternatives its critics were.

The problem of variable interpretations of the emotional significance of the same music was clearly a much discussed topic long before either The Beautiful in Music or The Sensations of Tone. It was a problem just because it conflicted with a widespread and deeply held belief. Hanslick was either unaware of or did not understand
Schopenhauer's solution to the problem. Helmholtz was undoubtedly aware of it, but while the question Schopenhauer poses to the affect theorist - the categorical rejection of the idea of music as phenomenally derived - was taken, Schopenhauer's solution - that the phenomena invoked are analogical interpretations supplied by the hearer - is, for him, no solution. On the contrary, his attempt to adapt it to his own needs shows it to be a trap for him.

Helmholtz's approach to the problem seems to have been prompted by Hanslick, but his attempt to extricate himself from the conclusion Hanslick draws from it - which would render his entire enterprise aesthetically redundant - drives him to Schopenhauer. Unlike Hanslick he does not want to see inconsistent interpretative behaviour as proof that all such interpretations are equally invalid. On the contrary, he prefers to grant them equal validity, as Schopenhauer does, while, also like Schopenhauer, distancing himself from the affect theorists by avoiding - in principle, at least: in practice he does it all the time - attaching any specific meaning to any specific constellation of musical tones.

He is thus compelled to propose something on a higher level of generality than the 'outward circumstances' described by listeners in their efforts to convey 'the impression of instrumental music', but he is barred from Schopenhauer's solution by the impossibility, for him, of the notion of something underlying the empirical, of which the empirical is the expression or the objectification. The compromise entity he proposes therefore is the 'state of mind', itself an adaptation of Schopenhauer.

As in Schopenhauer, music only seems to express the
'scenes of life'. But whereas with Schopenhauer the seeming lies in the fact that the 'scenes' are themselves mere phenomena, and our impression that music refers to them arises only by way of analogy, with Helmholtz the 'scenes' are connected to states of mind by association. The 'scenes' are not the expression of the state of mind, nor the music the expression of the 'scenes'. But the state of mind can only be rendered intelligible to the observer (including the introspective observer) by way of association with 'outward circumstances' which he has previously observed to accompany these states of mind. The music, by recalling them evokes the 'corresponding' states of mind. 'Words', says Helmholtz, clearly referring to the remarks in the 1844/59 'Metaphysics of Music', 'can represent the cause of the frame of mind, the object to which it refers and the feeling which lies at its root, while music expresses the kind of mental transition which is due to the feeling.' This 'kind of mental transition' is the 'frame' or 'state of mind'.41

The philosophical problems presented by this convoluted attempt to rationalise the irrational are manifold. If we cannot describe a mental state, how can we know that this mental state is what music expresses, rather than the corresponding circumstances, or the feeling, which we can describe? How can we know that this mental state exists? If there were such a thing as a state of mind, transitional between feeling and the word, act or outward appearance to which the feeling gives rise, what could it be other than a disposition towards the word, act or feeling, a watered down version of the will, perhaps? If so it is very dilute indeed, since it is an externally motivated will, which is hardly will at all.

Why music can express this (indescribable) 'kind of
mental transition which is due to the feeling' but not the (describable) feeling itself remains wholly unexplained and can therefore only be regarded as an arbitrary judgement on Helmholtz's part. Either he has not understood Schopenhauer, or, while accepting the existence of an entity which Schopenhauer understands as a subjectivity capable of expressing itself musically, he can recognise this entity only as the object of some other subject. Only as an object (albeit incapable of being described) can it be observed, and only by observation can it be known. Subjectivity is, to adapt a remark of Nietzsche's, 'the unscientific par excellence'. The subjective, for the physical scientist, equals the unreliable. Anything known only subjectively is not known. It can at best be hypothetical and must be tested objectively before it can acquire the status of the real.

Yet Schopenhauer's musical theory is founded entirely on his belief that subjective knowledge is not only possible but is the only direct knowledge of the real, of that which is not 'my representation'. For Schopenhauer, this belief in no way brings him into conflict with science, whose realm is the world of representation and by whose means alone the will can be known through its phenomenal objectification. The conflict only arises when the scientist either denies the existence of anything beyond this world, claiming that the world of representation is the only reality, or when he accepts that there is a reality beyond the phenomenal but claims the power to gain direct access to it by the same means that he employs to investigate the world of representation - claims, that is, that by pursuing these means to the limit of the phenomenal he will force the ultimate mystery to reveal itself.

By proposing a kind of subjective knowing, however,
Schopenhauer does not mean to propose the arbitrary 'subjectivity' we have seen Helmholtz trying to rationalise as a mental 'state' which can be an object of observation, either externally or internally oriented. What Schopenhauer proposes is the subject's non-reflective, involuntary awareness of self. The importance of his musical theory is that the 'self' to which the composer, under inspiration, gives expression, is not his individual self but the universal self. He speaks, that is, not for his arbitrary self, not about his accidentally conditioned emotions, but for all selves, for emotion itself, the fundamental desire for existence. This alone can explain the sense of the listener that music articulates his own soul, whose agitations he cannot himself express. The music, he feels, does it for him, and when he tries to explain this process his explanation naturally falls far short of the universality of the music, is broken down into fragments as he grasps at this or that emotion from the flux of his feelings, or this or that experience, with which a particular feeling is associated for him. This is not to say that the music does not express what it seems to him to express. It does, but its expressive scope is not circumscribed by the emotional or imaginative range of an ordinary individual. 'I know my will not as a whole, not as a unity, not completely according to its nature, but only in its individual acts and hence in time,' Schopenhauer says.

This is the condition of the individual's apprehension of will. But the composer, inspired, is no longer an individual, least of all an individual, and what he 'knows' in this condition is not the 'individual acts' of the will, not events occurring in time, but 'the will...as a whole,...as a unity,...completely according to its nature'. His music is, therefore, expressive of everything, including whatever each individual finds in it.
In Helmholtz's interpretation the universality is thrown away as the thing expressed becomes, once again, the experience of an individual. The whole argument loses its point. The metaphysical cannot be reconciled with the psychological, since the latter is inescapably tied to the phenomenal, yet music, as Helmholtz is vividly aware, cannot be tied to the phenomenal.

Further, if the 'subjectivity' which music is capable of expressing is conceived of as object, i.e., as the (indirectly) observable condition of a subject, like the symptom of a disease, considered either introspectively or as the (indirect) object of another observing subject, and therefore phenomenal, it is illogical not to allow music to express other sorts of phenomena. Similarly, it is hard to see how, if states of mind, because of their relative empirical inaccessibility, are less objectionable than 'outward circumstances' as the things which music may be allowed to express, feelings, which offer no access at all to the external observer, should be any more so. What is gained, in short, by substituting 'state of mind' for 'feeling'?

One answer is that the accusation of adopting the 'corrupt emotional theory of aesthetics' might possibly, by this means, be avoided. In the atmosphere created by Hanslick this was not an insignificant consideration. Fashion is hardly less despotic in musical scholarship than in science. But to avoid this - which in recent times even Schopenhauer has not succeeded in doing - by enlisting the Schopenhauerian concept of the will would have been unthinkable for an empirical scientist by 1862.
Yet when it comes to music, the notion of the elimination of the subjective becomes patently absurd. If music is not a representative art, not representative of the external world, and not expressive of an interior one, what is it? Is it just an abstract play of numbers for their own sake, not even a Cartesian reflection of the universal order in microcosm, but quite meaningless? Again and again, Hanslick comes perilously close to saying that it is, but always shies off. It is too much even for him to swallow and he recognises the futility of trying to force it down the throats of his readers. He therefore allows the listener to respond emotionally, since he is hardly in a position to prevent it, but tries to argue that this emotional response in no way implies an emotional correlative in the music.

For Helmholtz this is too illogical and counter-intuitive. But he cannot bring himself to say simply that music expresses emotion, and the logic of Schopenhauer's philosophy is not available to him. He cannot therefore say that our sense of music's emotional content is analogical, because this would imply a duality, a subject of which this outward expression is the objectification.

The 'state of mind' may sound like an abstraction and be empirically difficult to pin down, but logically it is acceptable to the realist as 'will' is not, because it refers - theoretically - to an objective condition of an objective entity: mind, not intuition of self, and prior to all objectivity, but itself object, not the source of all phenomena, but itself a phenomenon, an aspect of the body. States of mind are therefore effects of physical stimulation, as are the emotions to which these effects give rise. One such stimulation is music. In this way Helmholtz is able, so to speak, to have it all ways. Music does not
emotion as such. But it is still expressive. Yet what it expresses is not pure subjectivity but the objective state of mind induced by emotions and stimulated by causes which may be such circumstances as those imagined by the listener to the music. What is more, since these states and their stimuli are arbitrary, whatever one listener imagines is as valid as whatever is imagined by any other listener.

What Helmholtz says amounts to little more than a confession that he experiences music as in some sense the expression of feeling and that he believes that others do so too and is not prepared to dismiss this experience as trivial or invalid. He really cannot afford to do so since so many of his best insights depend on the assumption of an effect on the hearer which it is impossible to characterise except in terms of feeling. For example, he cannot explain the effect of the 'favourable' and 'unfavourable' dispositions of chord tones - i.e., from the point of view of the generation of 'false combinational' tones - except in terms of the feeling evoked by their use in music. In his observations on Mozart's Ave Verum Corpus, for instance, he finds himself describing the effect of the contrast between the first and second 'clauses' of the piece in terms of the different emotions suggested first by a succession of chords whose disposition is calculated to produce the minimum of such tones and then by the use of 'many...minor chords, which, as well as the major chords scattered among them, are for the most part brought into unfavourable positions'. The effect of the first 'clause' is of 'perfect harmoniousness' and of the second of a 'veiled, longing, and mystical' effect as the music 'laboriously modulates through bolder transitions and harsher discords', a clear echo of Schopenhauer's description of 'the long journeys, straying
far from the tonic, the great, noble striving after a
distant goal, and its final achievement, which disdains all
trivial pleasures' which characterises the Allegro Maestoso
of a great work. 45

All this tends to the conclusion that the elaborate
experimental work undertaken by the acousticians, and the
physiological investigations of the ear, in the end offer us
no more than a description of the physical conditions for
the production of the mixtures of vibrations which make upon
us such and such effects and the physiological process by
which we become aware of them as sounds. When it comes to
describing the effects themselves these investigations
contribute nothing new. Still less do they tell us why we
experience certain kinds of sounds - or rather successions
of sounds, since it is only in composition that these
effects occur - as 'laborious' or 'veiled' or 'bold'.
Helmholtz accepts that what he has discovered Mozart already
knew by 'instinct'. But this still gives Mozart too little
credit, for without musical compositions Helmholtz would
have had no object for his investigations into what produces
the harmoniousness of harmonious sounds or the harshness of
harsh sounds, for these concepts are music-aesthetic
concepts applied to acoustic phenomena, not acoustic
concepts applied to musical phenomena. That is to say that
they can only exist, as musical effects, in a musical
context.

The fact that a physical scientist found himself unable
to articulate his experimental findings without recourse to
the vocabulary of the emotions might have been expected to
temper the haughtiness of music-critics in their treatment
of Schopenhauer. Not so, however. It merely wrong-footed the
scientist. By the time of the the first edition of The

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Sensations of Tone the terms of the academic and journalistic aesthetic-critical debate had been established by Hanslick.

A further level of irony is that while the aesthetic implications of Helmholtz's work were ignored, the support his acoustic investigations seemed to give to fundamental bass theory, and to the structural and formal theories derived from it, was taken to confer the seal of scientific approval on the official dogma.

On the structural level, in spite of the fact that Helmholtz's picture of the musical work arising out of a single tone is clearly taken from Schopenhauer's theory, according to which the development of the work is a process of progressive division, his notion of the work is of an aggregate of individuals, whose origin in the tone is unexplained, and whose relationship to it appears to be arbitrary. Thus, while Schopenhauer equates the undifferentiated tone with the 'raw mass' of matter from which individuals emerge, Helmholtz applies the term 'mass' to the sum of all the sounds which make up a piece of music.46

It is not difficult to see how, initially, Schenker's interest in Helmholtz was bound to stand in the way of full accord with Schopenhauer, just as his inability to resist the spell of Schopenhauer's artistic concept, together with his lack of interest in the fine detail of Helmholtz's physiological and acoustic investigations, was bound to make it impossible for him to stay within Helmholtz's orbit. But it is equally easy to see how very much more Helmholtz had to offer him than the 'negative' Hanslick. Schenker's term is precise, for Hanslick negates not only affect theory, not
only hermeneutics, not only psychological and physiological approaches, even taking delight in ridiculing the idea of music's therapeutic possibilities, but analogical attempts to understand music - comparisons with architecture or with speech - as well. Nothing escapes the supercilious frigidity.

This would be less dispiriting if anything were offered in its place other than the wholly unsupported and not even properly articulated assumption that musical works can be examined empirically like natural phenomena. It is as if the laws they mysteriously obey owed nothing to anything outside themselves, neither the known laws of acoustics nor the unknown 'laws' of art, and certainly not the will of the artist, either his own or that of the Hegelian 'spirit'. Nor is music the expression of Schopenhauer's universal striving for existence - the will - speaking through the artist, nor the divine patterning of the universe in microcosm seen in it by Leibniz or Descartes. It is merely a series of dots arranged in arabesque-like patterns, audible ice-crystals from his emotional Arctic, like the tintinabulations of his own word-play, all hollow virtuosity.

* * * *

The German musicologist Carl Dahlhaus makes the large claim that Schopenhauer's 'aesthetic philosophy...owed its pre-eminence in the later nineteenth-century entirely to its adoption by Wagner'.

Wagner's attention was drawn to Schopenhauer when the latter's 'discovery' by Oxenford made him suddenly very famous. It was 1853 that a translation of Oxenford's
crucial review appeared in the Vossische Zeitung. It was 'in the later half of the nineteenth century' that Schopenhauer was least in danger of sinking into obscurity. It seems more likely that Wagner's association with Schopenhauer was a factor in Wagner's enormous influence on music-aesthetic debate and in the seriousness with which his own ideas were taken, for example by Nietzsche.

It is impossible, of course, to know to what extent the influence of Wagner and Nietzsche kept in view some notion of a Schopenhauerian aesthetic which would otherwise have disappeared. What is certain is that Wagner's peculiar interpretation has been responsible for widespread misunderstanding of Schopenhauer.

The argument in which Wagner was most deeply involved — the question of the inter-relationships of the various aspects of opera (words, music, stage-action) — was peripheral to Schopenhauer's. The issue which preoccupied so many exclusively musical-writers: music versus words, appears only very briefly in Schopenhauer's first essay and only becomes problematic, like other reflections of the music-aesthetic turmoil of the twenties and thirties, focused by the Ninth Symphony, in the revisions. There is little need for protracted discussion in the early piece since Schopenhauer's starting point is the belief that what music expresses is not only prior to words but to the phenomenal world in its entirety. The contest between music and words is, for early Schopenhauer at least, no contest. As a problematic issue, it cannot seriously arise. For Wagner, on the other hand, the issue would not rest. Schopenhauer notwithstanding, the debate was stirred up again and again, notably by Hanslick.
One of the grosser discrepancies between Wagner's thought and Schopenhauer's appears again in Nietzsche, and later again in Schenker. It is part of a theory of culture which harks back to Hegel and to Herder and plays a vital role in Nietzsche's notion of a revival of tragedy through German music and even in his interpretation of Greek tragedy in itself. This is the idea of the role played in German music by the Lutheran chorale. This topic is important enough in both the Nietzschean and the Schenkerian contexts (the former having a relevance for the latter which will emerge in due course) to justify a digression.

Wagner writes a history of music which goes as follows. The essence of antique music was in the tunes accompanying the dances which were part of pagan ceremonies, their melodies governed by the rhythm of the dance. Dance being anathema to the early Christians, the music they took over from the Greeks was purified of all traces of the rhythmic vitality of the dance. Harmony was invented to provide the expression of which the melody had been robbed by the suppression of its rhythmic character. In Italian secular music we see a lapse back into paganism with the revival of rhythmic melody applied to verse and a complete collapse of the Christian harmonic-polyphonic tradition. In Germany, by contrast, church music was itself secularised, re-vitalised by the introduction of 'rhythmic primitive melody' which instead of ousting harmony, was combined with it to produce a 'rhythmic melody' whose 'lyrical impulse...seems to surge through an ocean of harmonic waves'.49

The Wagnerian 'history' may well lie behind the discussions of the contrast between the cantus firmus and the chorale melody in the first part of Counterpoint and all the arguments about modality and tonality woven around it.50
But Schenker's return to this specifically historical interpretation in *Free Composition*, with its direct reference to Luther and the Protestant tradition clearly indicates the presence of the admired Nietzsche in his thinking. We need look no further than this - than *The Birth of Tragedy* and Nietzsche's polemical writings - for an explanation of Schenker's sense of musical issues as philosophical and cultural issues, and his scorn for the academic compartmentalists and scientistic exclusivists.

But we need only recall Schopenhauer's distaste for Protestantism to see that Wagner was no short-cut to the Schopenhauerian aesthetic. On the contrary, all this stentorian profundity, all this German depth and solemnity is belied by Schopenhauer's musical tastes which are distinctly Latin-oriented, in spite, it is tempting to say, of his Berlin experience. But it may have been because of that experience. His tastes were formed before the era of the great orchestras, grand opera, the *Ninth Symphony*, the symphonic poem, formed, in fact, on music designed for the smaller ensembles of the *galant* era, and on revivals of the baroque. Even Haydn's large-scale works gave him problems.

Nevertheless, there are similarities between Wagner's quasi-Schopenhauerian thinking and certain passages in Schenker which might tend to suggest that, for some musicians at least, reading Wagner's interpretation of Schopenhauer was a substitute for reading Schopenhauer. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Schenker presents a typically Wagnerian amalgam of two Schopenhauerian notions in *Harmony*, at a time when he still had a high regard for Wagner. The reference to the musical 'motif' by Schenker shows that whatever else he had been reading when he wrote the first chapter of *Harmony* he had certainly been reading
'The sonata represents the motifs in ever changing situations in which their characters are revealed, just as human beings are represented in a drama'.

Schenker's reference point is undoubtedly the passage in Wagner's Beethoven essay of 1870, which illustrates Wagner's continuing attempt to reconcile the rival claims of music and dramatic action.

'Of itself, music includes drama entirely within itself, since drama in turn expresses the only idea of the world which is commensurate with music.'

But then Wagner tries another approach, that of making music analogous to drama. Here he makes use of Schopenhauer's observations on drama to turn upside-down this judgement of musical priority.

'Just as drama does not depict human characters, but enables them to present themselves directly, so a piece of music, in its motives, gives us the character of all the phenomena of the world in their innermost essence.'

The 'innermost essence' comes, as we know, from Schopenhauer's musical theory. But the characters of the drama who now become the model for the musical motive come from somewhere else. A page or two before the chapter on music Schopenhauer is writing about tragedy and he says - developing an insight of Goethe's:

'...in the novel, the epic and the drama, the objective
of the manifestation of the ideas is achieved especially by two means: true and deeply conceived presentations of significant characters and the invention of significant situations through which these unfold themselves. 54

The role of the musical motif is explained by Wagner as derivative, analogous with the characters in a drama, and the implication of a relationship between the motif and phenomena comparable to that between the dramatic character and human beings is difficult to avoid. At best, Wagner is playing with Schopenhauer's ideas in a way which suggests ambiguities which do not exist in Schopenhauer's presentation of them.

In fact there can be no doubt that, despite his own muddled perception of Schopenhauer's thought, Wagner did influence the use Nietzsche made of the Schopenhauerian aesthetic, if only by influencing the framing of the questions to which Nietzsche sought a Schopenhauerian answer. To this extent, and no doubt in other ways, Wagner can be thought of as helping to sustain interest in Schopenhauer. Yet, while Schenker fairly certainly encountered this derivative of Schopenhauer's thought in Wagner, and was sufficiently struck by it to incorporate it into his own writing, this very instance demonstrates that he, at least, did not arrive at an understanding of Schopenhauer with Wagner's assistance. On the contrary, he had to get rid of the Wagnerian confusion before Schopenhauer could become intelligible to him. It was only when he abandoned the notion of the motif as the primary element in the musical work of art and began to construct a theory on the notion of the scale-step, that his work began to develop coherence. 55 The Wagnerian adaptation of the
dramatic analogy may have contributed something to Schenker's elaboration of his theory of structure but it contributed nothing to his arrival at that theory. The Schopenhauerian inspiration was of a quite different kind, one which Wagner could not have mediated since he did not himself fully understand it.

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Schopenhauer's neglect in the nineteenth century has been surpassed in the present one by the denigration he has suffered from writers so sure of their public that they felt no need to adduce any evidence of the evil influence they attributed to him. The prejudices which made life difficult for the advocates of Schenker were the same as those that made Schopenhauer unreadable.

Post-war German intellectuals, not least those who were refugees, were confronted with a very difficult problem. They desperately needed to salvage as much as possible of their cultural heritage but, in the face of universal suspicion of everything German, many of them seem to have felt that this could only be done at the cost of energetically dissociating themselves from anything likely to feed this suspicion. What was suspect was to some extent a matter of chance. Schopenhauer was a natural victim of this process since he was an object of particular loathing to the highly influential émigré positivists, whose attitudes were much more in tune with the intellectual environment of the dominant culture of the post-war world - the American - than those of people faithful to the ethos of German classical literature and philosophy.

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The desire to posit two kinds of Germanness, one including aspects of German culture capable of accommodation to Anglo-Saxon attitudes, and another which consists of anything that might be construed, however remotely, as being implicated in the rise of National Socialism, reflects the two sides of the problem facing the émigrés: the need, on the one hand, to preserve some sense of cultural identity, and, on the other, to make that identity as inoffensive as possible. The problem was naturally especially severe for intellectuals.

In Germany itself the same problem had to be confronted from a different angle. What, for example, did a post-war German cultural historian say about Wagner? He could hardly discard him, but he did not want to be associated with some of the things with which the name of Wagner had come to be associated. The response was much the same: whatever was to be salvaged had somehow to be sanitised, detached, as far as possible, from whatever was beyond redemption. Into the latter category fell ideas and theories which were considered 'metaphysical' or 'spiritual': 'organicism,' 'transcendentalism,' 'idealism,' theories which might be considered 'teleological,' 'pre-Darwinian' evolutionary theories.

It is against this background that we have to read the advice of Nietzsche's translator, Walter Kaufmann, not to read the last third of The Birth of Tragedy, a work of no small importance to the study of Schenker. Kaufmann's extraordinary advice is ostensibly based on aesthetic judgement, and on the fact that Nietzsche added this section after having intended to present the book without it. Thus he combines the journalistic criticism and the trappings of philology denounced by Nietzsche to justify
dismissing a vital part of Nietzsche\'s project, namely to celebrate the German renaissance and to suggest a way forward for German culture. Not surprisingly, his other concern is to rid that book of the \textit{\'cadaverous odour\} of Schopenhauer.

"What is of lasting importance \cite{footnote_57} in The Birth of Tragedy is not the contrast of the Apollinian (sic) and Dionysian as such: that smacks of Schopenhauer\'s contrast of the world as representation and the world as will; and playing off two concepts against each other like that is rarely very fruitful, though it has been a popular pastime among German scholars.\cite{footnote_57}

It is depressing to find a similar, albeit less intense, prejudice against Schopenhauer still at work in England in 1981 in a book about The Birth of Tragedy which seeks to remove prejudice against Nietzsche.

\textit{Nietzsche...offers discussion on a metaphysical level, much of it (§§ 5-6, 16) unashamedly Schopenhauerian in vocabulary and hardly calculated to impress the uncommitted reader.}\cite{footnote_58}

From this one might suppose that the realm of the metaphysical and the language of Schopenhauer are peripheral to the work of Nietzsche, even to The Birth of Tragedy, when, of course, they are central. Such cursory consideration of a source openly advertised by Nietzsche, not hinted at by his \textit{\'vocabulary\} but set out with chapter and verse, and, in reality even more particular, more pervasive than Nietzsche himself confesses, is curious. It can only be supposed that advocates of Nietzsche fail to see the extent of his involvement with Schopenhauer not because
they do not bother to read him, but because their reading is
hampered by their unwillingness to recognise something which
is at odds with the impression of Nietzsche they wish to
present. The similarity with the post-war reception of
Schenker is hardly coincidental.

The climate of philosophy itself, of course, hardly
promotes unprejudiced reading of these writers, indeed
hardly encourages reading them at all. When he is not
ignored, Schopenhauer is consistently presented as
incomprehensible. D. W. Hamlyn, for example, remarks that
Schopenhauer's notion of what music represents is 'not
altogether clear' but that he 'seems to have in mind the
idea that aspects of music express in a universal or general
form what lies behind the generality that conceptual
thinking abstracts from phenomena'. Schopenhauer could
hardly make it clearer that music does not express anything
conceptual, either anything abstracted from phenomena, or
any idea of which the phenomena are the objectification.

In another study of Schopenhauer's aesthetics Israel
Knox complains that Schopenhauer overdoes the idea of
inspiration and the notion that the artist can 'seize and
communicate...the qualities of nature without 'knowledge' -
an idea with which even a physical scientist such as
Helmholtz had no difficulty. But at least he does not fall
into the species of perplexity exemplified by Hamlyn. He
writes: 'The very consolation of music, the very thing that
explains its universal appeal...is the fact that it allows,
as no other art does, the recipient to become a creator, to
invest the feeling-pattern of music with the immediate,
irrefragable content of his own mood, of his own
being...'. Knox, at least, has arrived at Nietzsche's
point of departure.

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For the German musicologist Karl Dahlhaus, on the other hand, it is not Nietzsche in whose defence Schopenhauer has to be slighted. His concern is Wagner. At first sight, he seems to be happy to acknowledge Wagner's debt to Schopenhauer. He develops the thesis that Nietzsche worked out a theory of absolute music which he used against Wagner by means of concepts derived from Wagner's own thought. Nietzsche 'demolishes' the theory developed in Wagner's *Opera and Drama*,

'...by the use of critical categories based on Schopenhauer's metaphysics of music, that is on an aesthetic philosophy which owed its pre-eminence in the later nineteenth century entirely to its adoption by Wagner....Thus the fragment 'On Music and Words' contains the elements of a critique of Wagner which Nietzsche, by adroit, selective emphasis, was able to derive directly from Wagner's own aesthetic theory and the two-fold truth it contained'.

This is a complicated picture. Wagner builds an aesthetic theory which, it is conceded, owes something to the stimulus of reading Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's own theory, meanwhile, would have passed into oblivion had not Wagner 'adopted' it. Nietzsche, it seems to be implied, would have been one of those who remained ignorant of this aesthetic philosophy but for Wagner. Having acquired Schopenhauer's 'critical categories' from Wagner, he turns them against Wagner. Thus, while Schopenhauer's influence is admitted, it is reduced, and we have to infer that Wagner, in his innocence, was unaware of the sinister elements in it. The cunning Nietzsche, by contrast, unerringly locates the poison, and uses it against his benefactor.
It would hardly be possible to construct such a story were there not some element of truth in it. It is undoubtedly true that Wagner and Nietzsche read different things in Schopenhauer and that while Nietzsche knew exactly what Wagner read in him Wagner had no idea how Nietzsche read him. Nietzsche was certainly far more philosophically sophisticated than Wagner and was deeply troubled by the differences of perception and understanding between himself and Wagner, so much so that he was compelled, eventually, to bring the friendship to an end. Moreover, Nietzsche can fairly be accused of biting the hands that fed him, including both Schopenhauer's and Wagner's. This is perhaps his least remarkable characteristic. It is the contrast between the vividness of Nietzsche’s enthusiasms and the generosity with which he acknowledges influence, on the one hand, and the vehemence of his repudiations, on the other, which draws our attention to a kind of behaviour which is almost universal.

However, Dahlhaus's interpretation of this situation is tendentious. There is nothing in the known facts of the situation that compels the imputation of dishonourable motives to Nietzsche. But the facts are presented less than clearly. We are left to infer that Nietzsche learned his Schopenhauer from Wagner, which is not the case. Similarly Dahlhaus's attribution to Nietzsche of the idea that 'music is not the likeness...of an emotion' but 'the emotion is a metaphor for the music', and, at least by implication, to Wagner of the origin of the formulation 'deeds of music', are simply incorrect. The first is entirely Schopenhauer's and the second is an adaptation of Goethe's 'deeds of light' although probably derived from Schopenhauer's adaptation of it, 'deeds of water'. Perhaps Dahlhaus's acquaintance with Schopenhauer's aesthetic writings, as is the case with
so many of his detractors, was not intimate. But this does not explain the depth of his hostility. He accuses Schopenhauer, astonishingly, of 'corruption'. In comparing him unfavourably with Hanslick, whose 'sobriety' he praises, he demonstrates the preference for the dilettante over the philosopher characteristic of a philosophically arid and philistine period.

All these writers, from Hanslick to Knox, are preoccupied by the problem of musical significance as in some sense related to emotion. For Schopenhauer, the significance of music as a parallel objectification of the will and an analogue for the phenomenal world is expressed primarily by its artistic structure and only secondarily, even almost as a side-effect, by its relation to feeling. This location of the significance in the structure is hardly noticed until Schenker's theoretical model re-presents it, and by very few thereafter, despite Schenker's promptings.

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That Schopenhauer and Goethe - as scientist - were eventually recognised as influences on Schenker is remarkable in view of the depth of the prejudices against them and the difficulty of gaining access to their ideas. We are fortunate in now possessing an accessible German text of Schopenhauer's major essay on music and a clear and readable English version of a substantial proportion of the scientific writings of Goethe, including many long-neglected, but vital pieces. These good things make it all the more regrettable that both the second German edition
and the English translation of Der Freie Satz cut and shuffle the text, and that the translator's preference for abstraction, by contrast with Schenker's love of the concrete, conveys such a curious impression of his style.\textsuperscript{63} Schenker is in even greater need than Schopenhauer of translation that proceeds, to adapt a saying of his own, from an inner relationship with his thought, and which is not ashamed of itself. It is, as much as anything, to the continuing remoteness of Schenker's own work that one of the crucial sources of his inspiration remains largely unrecognised and little understood.

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A decade has passed since Jamie Croy Kassler's path-breaking essay identifying Schopenhauer and Goethe as crucial influences on Schenker.\textsuperscript{64} This essay is a more substantial and unbiased examination of Schenker's non-technical sources than anything preceding it and has set a new tone for Schenker studies. It contains some extraordinary insights which have been the most significant stimulus to the exploration of the wider significance of Schenker's work.

The most important of these explorations is William Pastille's study of the similarity of Schenker's structural ideas to Goethe's morphological theory. Pastille's study leaves no doubt that Schenker's notion of the process of transformation, without which the structural model would have remained frozen, is derived from Goethe's theory of morphology. His insights are all the more remarkable since they do not rely on the intermediate layer represented by
Schopenhauer's metaphysics of music. There is no given musical model to which to apply the notion of transformation, and such a model has to be inferred with the aid of the botanical model alone. In the light of this implied model, Schenker's account of the inner workings of the structure has to be examined.65

Kassler does not propose a line of development from Goethe through Schopenhauer to Schenker. Although she is aware of Goethe's influence on Schopenhauer and discusses both Goethe's theory of plant development and Schopenhauer's presentation of musical structure as analogue for the world, itself clearly indebted to Goethe's theory, she presents Schopenhauer and Goethe as parallel influences on Schenker. The difficulty under which she labours is partly to do with the Ursatz itself. This in turn arises from lack of familiarity with the model of musical structure to which Schopenhauer refers. So obscure is this model that she assumes, as most readers do, that Schopenhauer invented it. It appears to occur to no-one what a fantastic feat of imagination such an invention would have been; yet instead of wonder, Schopenhauer arouses only criticism for making rather a poor job of it. Kassler is not guilty of this, and her recognition, in spite of this lack, that 'Schopenhauer provided the outline of a text to which Schenker supplies the technical details' is all the more remarkable.

She relates the Ursatz to 'the lowest grade of the will's objectification in the phenomenal world.' This is a technical as much as a philosophical misunderstanding. The misunderstanding leads to misreadings of both the Schopenhauerian model and the Schenkerian response to it. It consists in failure to distinguish between the tone, which corresponds to the 'raw matter', and the contrapuntal...
structure ('einen kontrapunktischen Satz') which corresponds in Schopenhauer's explanation, to the work of art as analogue for the world, not to the tone, nor to the scale which is merely the abstract articulation of the tone. The Ursatz is not a reduction, but 'that upon which is inscribed the work as a whole' ('er ist es, der dem Stuck als Ganzen auf die Stirn geschrieben ist'), in just the same way that Schopenhauer's picture of music is a picture of 'the world'.

It is this false relationship which leads to the supposition that the Ursatz is a general musical archetype rather than the archetype of a particular music.

Schenker's connection with Schopenhauer is not primarily a philosophical or scientific one, in the shape of a morphological model of the phenomenal world, strained to form a picture of music, a picture whose technical inadequacy drove Schenker to formulate a better model of the musical work. On the contrary it was precisely the music-structural model, interpreted in this fashion by Schopenhauer in the light of Goethe's morphological theory, which focused Schenker's theoretical work.

Modern commentators fail to see this model in Schopenhauer for the same reason that Schenker's contemporaries and Schopenhauer's editors and translators failed to see it. They could not think of Schopenhauer as being in full and intelligent possession of a clearly defined, widely understood model of musical structure and therefore could not recognise it. Musical structure, as opposed to musical form, is still thought of as something deeply mysterious which only a dogged researcher and tenacious thinker like Schenker could 'discover', whereas what Schopenhauer
presents is blindingly simple, something all musicians up to
his time took for granted. The composers would no more have
thought of subjecting it to scientific investigation than a
shoemaker would have thought of researching the structure of
a shoe. Yet by Schenker's time, indeed long before, this
model had disappeared from view. Schenker discovered it not
in the sense that a scientist discovers a phenomenon
hitherto unknown, but in the sense that an archaeologist
disCOVERS somETHING that has been buried. He discovered the
fact that this model was still operative in the work of the
classics and that it succumbed much later than might be
supposed to the process of attrition which was the result of
the substitution of pseudo-rationalist theory for the craft
tradition in the education of composers.

Why Schenker could recognize this musical model when
neither his contemporaries nor his later readers could, in
spite of his constant references to it, is indeed a
pertinent question, for scarcely anything in the character
of musical scholarship in Schenker's time would have been
likely to suggest this model of musical structure, still
less the particular biological analogy to be found in
Goethe, which, with such startling imaginative insight,
Schopenhauer had applied to it, something Goethe himself had
not thought of doing. Yet without Schopenhauer we would have
to suppose that it was Schenker, not Schopenhauer, who
performed the feat of making the connection between Goethe's
model and the structure of music. Further, we would have to
propose the even more staggering feat of inventing a model
of musical-structure by analogy with Goethe's model. This
would have meant his doing something comparable with what
Goethe had done in his study of the growth of the date-palm,
but under the restriction that he was allowed to examine
only the equivalent of the full-grown plant.
The unlikelihood of this is clear. The observation of the visible development of an object in nature is a totally different matter from the divination of the wholly invisible process of development of a work of art from the appearance of its final form, which is complete, fixed, unchanging. This process, moreover, is not even the same as the process of composition. However strictly empirical the analyst is, he cannot observe the process of the formation of the structure, since it does not take place under his observation in the manner that that of the plant took place under Goethe's. He can only attempt to deduce the process from the fully developed structure. Yet it is precisely this process of development that Schenker seeks to depict. That he understood the nature of the difficulty can be seen from his interest in compositional sketches, and the magnitude of the difficulty under which he laboured by comparison with the natural scientist can be judged from the importance he attached to the minute amount of evidence such documents could furnish. Moreover, the invention of such a model is not only unlikely but would, in fact, have been superfluous. Such a model already existed. It was the work of generations of composers. How absurd to try to better it theoretically.

Schenker had two clearly defined existing models, a musical and a scientific, which it was only necessary to bring into relationship. Schenker had to begin by reconstructing the relevant model of musical structure from scattered pieces of historical evidence before it was possible even to recognise it in Schopenhauer's description. This in itself is no mean feat, as we can see not only from the perplexity of commentators on Schopenhauer but from the hardly less serious puzzlement of commentators on Schenker's relation to him. It was not an easy connection even for
Schenker to make, much as he needed to make it. However, it was there for him to make, for the model was there for him to recognise, to help him complete his reconstruction, like a picture of an ancient vase which validates the reconstruction of the original from the shards into which it had been shattered.

Schenker's use of the model, in the light of the morphological analogy, to delineate the precise nature of the quasi-morphological processes in actual works, is wonderful enough. It is not necessary to ascribe super-human powers to him.

* * *

From one problem Schopenhauer was not able to save Schenker. It is not a problem that in any way harms his theory, rearing its head only in his commentaries on it. But it has led to much confusion among commentators. Schopenhauer is partly to blame for it, since the problem is present in his own writing, not, of course, in the original metaphysics of music, but in the supplementary volume. The theoretical confusion arises when the commentator fails to distinguish between the theory understood as a theory of structure and the theory understood as a theory of perception. Schenker's frequent failure to spell out this distinction, leads to a multitude of problems for his readers and interpreters.

Meaningless sound developing coherence through levels of progressively refined articulation and differentiation can hardly culminate in chaos. But Schenker often equates
surface with chaos, and, in the comments on the metaphysics of music in Volume II of *The World as Will and Representation* there is something resembling this notion. It occurs in Schopenhauer's remarks on Beethoven.

'Now if we glance at purely instrumental music, a symphony of Beethoven presents us with the greatest confusion which yet has the most perfect order at its foundation.'\(^\text{68}\)

But if this is taken to mean that the surface of Beethoven's music really is confused, it is at odds with Schopenhauer's own notion of musical structure as he described it in 1820. In the light of that description we should be cautious about how we interpret this remark. What Schopenhauer is saying is that Beethoven's music *seems* chaotic but that he believes it, nevertheless, to be ordered. The order is difficult to grasp not because of confusion in the music but because of the listener's confusion which arises from the novelty and unfamiliarity of the idiom. If we hear a conversation in a language we do not fully understand, we will find it confusing, although we can readily believe in the grammatical coherence of the language. But we would not, on the basis of such an experience, formulate a theory of language in which language is coherent only in its underlying structure and chaotic on the conversational level.

Schopenhauer has two notions which might be considered notions of surface. One is the Leibnizian notion of form. This is anything but chaotic. It is, on the contrary, that aspect of the musical work which is governed by the most precisely definable laws, truly laws in the sense that the breaking of them constitutes departure from music.
altogether. Schopenhauer puts it better: '...its form allows itself to be traced to entirely precise numerically expressible laws, from which it cannot deviate without ceasing to be music'. Unlike the essence of music, then, these laws will respond to rational inquiry. The other idea of surface is of the culminating level of the progressive individuation of sound: melody, whose special meaning Schenker eventually, and apparently uniquely, understood. Far from being equated with chaos this level corresponds to 'the highest level of objectification of the Will, the steady flow of human life at its sanest'.

The Beethoven reference, nevertheless, is of some importance because of its influence on the musical thought of Nietzsche, and there can be little doubt of its influence on Schenker. It is highly likely that the problem - a serious one for some commentators on Schenker - of where the coherence of the structure is understood to be, whether it is a function of the perfection of articulation at what Schenker calls the surface of the music, or of the primitive form, should be referred back to this moment in Schopenhauer.

The problem is to do with the point of view from which the art work is approached. Even Schopenhauer, in later years, begins to write about music as if from the point of view not of the philosopher who concerns himself with the essences of the things he studies, but of the public, as a member of the audience, a critic. For the spectator the surface of a work is that which presents itself immediately to his senses. This, of course, is not what Schopenhauer means by surface in his 'Metaphysics of the Beautiful'. To confuse the two is to confuse the world and our representation of it, the most fundamental of all.
confusions, the escape from which is the dawning, as Schopenhauer puts it, of 'philosophical discernment'. The recognition that one can not know 'a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels the earth', is Schopenhauer's point of departure.71

What is true of the sun and the earth is true of a Beethoven symphony. The musical structure considered as object - by a member of an audience seeking to be entertained, or a critic required to produce an instant judgement - may seem incoherent on the surface. Considered as subject, on the other hand, its coherence depends on its integrity, the faithfulness with which it represents the whole. To this coherence we can never gain access by pondering the processes of our perception, however fascinating these may be. We must employ another mode of apprehension.

Much more important than the perceived problem in Schenker's structural theory, however, is the potency of the original Schopenhauerian model.

* * *

Kassler's account of Schopenhauer's picture of musical structure is rather a meagre basis for judging its technical sufficiency, or indeed for making sense of it at all, yet without a clear impression of this picture any reliable judgement of its role in the formation of Schenker's theory is clearly impossible. We must return, therefore, to Schopenhauer himself.
Schopenhauer presents his analogy in two forms, in one of which music is a set of pre-compositional acoustic phenomena and in the other a work of art. The second is in a sense an elaboration of the first, but it is more than that. In the first there can really be no question of musical structure, but only the technical prerequisites for the structure of the musical work of art, even if these are seen as having a structure which is a primitive analogy for the musical structure which evolves out of them. In the second the concepts are quite definitely structural. The structure envisaged is layered, emergent, and autonomous and is conceived with reference to an existing musical model, not, it should be emphasised, a formal model. This is just what makes Schopenhauer so useful to Schenker. It does, however, presuppose a notion of tonal unity. The notion of a single sound out of which the structure arises and to which it returns is the motivation of the whole analogical rationale.

Schopenhauer understands the artistic structure as an elaborated copy of the acoustic phenomenon. This has two levels. First there is the fundamental tone with its partials as the most abstract analogy for the levels of objectification of the will in the phenomenal world; then there is the scale, the 'ladder of tones' whose steps [Stufen] parallel these levels more clearly; finally there are the voices of a musical composition which articulate the levels of objectification in a far more complex fashion. The process of progressive individuation by whose means they come into being implies movement. Through this movement relationships develop within and between levels mirroring the drama of strife and reconciliation which is the world. These voices articulate a structure of a quite different order from the 'tone' with its 'overtones' and the scale.
with its precise divisions of pitch, divisions which have to be modified in order to make the tonal, modulatory, aesthetic structure possible. The voices become an aesthetic structure, a work of art.

It is important to make this distinction, because it is only when we reach the stage of the work of art as analogy for the world that we reach a model which can be of any use to Schenker. Neither the tone nor the scale can provide an intelligible model. They are merely its indispensable preconditions. It is only in the voices which are the prolongations of the registral levels articulated by the scale that we have something that can function as an artistic archetype. The work of art arises not directly out of the tone, but, as Schenker never tired of reiterating, out of the relationship of the voices, out of counterpoint. That is the significance of the Ursatz as opposed to Helmholtz's single tone, Fétis's tonic, or any comparable concept. If the work of art arose directly out of the tone we would not need the Ursatz. This is what Schenker already dimly knew when, in Harmony, he spoke about the difference between nature and art and played about with motivic theory, which is a move in the direction of a structural concept, but, as he later came to believe, a false move. 73

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Schopenhauer stands on the dividing line between empirical and rationalist theories of music, which is exactly where we should expect to find someone dealing with his topic between 1814 and 1820. He began Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung in 1814, the year in which the Abbé Vogler
died. Albrechtsberger had died only five years before that. It would hardly have been possible to guess in 1814 that Vogler and Albrechtsberger were to be crucial figures in the development of a new nineteenth century Austrian theory which would sweep away all other theories and methods of teaching composition, and establish itself, with a fixity only surpassed by the absurdity of its claims, as the theoretical aspect of classical composition. It was only after this time that Cherubini published the work on which his reputation as a theorist rests, and this was a version of the old Fuxian theory, if with an admixture of the rationalist harmonic ideas which had begun to infiltrate Austrian theory at the beginning of the century. It was in the 1830s that the famous Albrechtsberger/Seyfried book appeared, a compendium of old and new theories, and only in the 1850s that Sechter published his major work containing the theoretical principles which had begun to be established in the Conservatory some years before. Clearly, in 1814–19, it was not possible for Schopenhauer to have any premonition of the state into which music-theory would settle by the mid-century. Any departure from eighteenth century notions of musical structure could only be hints of what was to come. The transformation of theory after this time was partly institutional in origin, and the most influential institution - the centre of the musical world by the 1800s being indubitably Vienna - was Viennese. But the Vienna Conservatory was the offspring of the Society of the Friends of Music which was itself formed only two years before Schopenhauer began the writing of his major work.

Music theory was certainly already in a state of flux and this is reflected in Schopenhauer's terminology, but it had not settled into its familiar and, later, universal nineteenth century Viennese guise and did not do so until
much later. The significance of this, for Schenker's relationship to Schopenhauer is vital. Schenker's interest in pre-nineteenth-century theory had been aroused by his work on C.P.E. Bach, in whom he saw the last representative of an empirical-pragmatic tradition gradually eroded and occluded in the late years of the eighteenth century by Rameauian and other rationalist-pedagogic theories and finally swept away or distorted out of all recognition by the Austrian version of fundamental bass theory. That Schopenhauer's musical habits of thought had been formed in the old tradition not only made him attractive to Schenker when he once properly read him, but intelligible in a way he could hardly be to theorists whose own musical habits of thought were completely determined by nineteenth century assumptions, into which category, of course, most modern writers on music inevitably fall.

If, as appears to be the case, Schenker turned back to Schopenhauer between the writing of the first and second volumes of Counterpoint, he came to him at a time when he had a need which only Schopenhauer could meet. It was a time when he was perhaps uniquely able to understand Schopenhauer's music-aesthetic theory because, like Schopenhauer and unlike most, if not all of his contemporaries, he was familiar with, and sensitive to, the notion of music still current, among composers at least, in the period of German classicism. In a certain sense the very fact that Schopenhauer was a musical amateur and not a professional musician gave his perceptions of theory greater conviction. Schopenhauer's interpretation of the significance of music is highly original but his view of the character of musical works is trustworthy precisely because it is not original at all. His discussion of musical structure (in its unmodified form) is couched entirely in
the technical language of the late baroque, its practice or
the theory developed during that period. Schopenhauer shows
no interest in species counterpoint, no evidence that it
played a part in his thinking. Yet he speaks continually in
terms of voices. This is of the greatest significance for
Schenker. Voice means either upper voice, or bass voice, or
\textit{ripieno} voice, the first two through-composed, the latter
fragmentary, fillers, 'stuffing', to translate the term
literally, bulking out the form. Very important stuffing, of
course, but structurally secondary to the two outer voices.
The equality, the complete and independent development of
all the voices in the model referred to by species
counterpoint, is characteristic of a totally different kind
of structure.

Schenker recognised, as his contemporaries failed to
do, that the voices in classical composition are no more
the voices of polyphony than they are the ciphers of
fundamental bass chordal progressions. The concept of
voice-leading employed by the classical composers is that to
be found in figured bass theory, which is not a theory in
the sense that fundamental bass theory is, not a rationalist
concept, but only an abstraction from practice. As these
voice-leading rules in no way presupposed the need to
construct continuous parallel voices but related only to the
connection of specific sonorities, they gave rise,
inevitably, to the kind of fragmentary inner-voice and
multiple-voice melodic structures which are characteristic
of classical music, the only completely coherent melodic
structure being found in one single emergent melody, the one
which presents itself most accessibly to the ear, which is,
of course, not confined to a single vocal register in the
polyphonic sense. If in classical music this emergent melody
is not always in a high register, it is sufficiently often
so, especially in early classical music, to make Schopenhauer's characterisation of the structure intelligible. This characterisation derives, as classical music itself does, from the practice of the baroque - not from harmony exercises or exercises based on a cantus firmus.

Early classical music, music contemporaneous with other manifestations of the German classical revival, is, like the music of the baroque, constructed on the assumption of two principal, fully-articulated voices, an upper and a lower, between which lie the ripieno voices which fill out the harmony implied by the relationship of the upper voice and the bass. These ripieno voices never have the fullness of articulation of the other two, nor of the inner voices of a polyphonic texture, not even, as Schenker insisted - mostly in vain, it appears - in Bach. Bach's counterpoint is not merely a tonal translation of Palestrina's. It is something different in kind.

Schopenhauer was crucial to Schenker because it was through Schopenhauer that he came to the vital insight that classical music, which he already knew to have nothing whatsoever to do with fundamental bass theory and to be incompatible in any direct application, even with the much more acceptable species counterpoint, was the natural sequel to the basic structural model of the baroque. This model consists of the basso continuo, the concertante voice or voices and the ripieno voices which are the realisation of the conventional figuration. This insight, so obvious and simple after the event, rendered the whole convoluted nineteenth century debate about form and the relationship between form and structure, between harmony and form, to say nothing of the idea of 'contrapuntal forms', simply
redundant for him.

It is not difficult to see how such notions fitted in with the post-romantic idea of the identity of form and content, nor how this idea, thus reinforced, could lead to the endless and inevitably arid debates about the nature of musical content, the gradual crushing of any concept of a content having a significance beyond itself, and the proliferation of schematic pseudo-mathematical (geometrical, architectonic) notions of the constitution of works of music. The ubiquity of scientism and thus of the elevation of the idea of 'objectivity', of the elimination of the subject, was bound to make this notion preferable to anything humane. Seen in a narrow way - the way Hanslick chose to see it - the Schopenhauerian idea of music as independent of the phenomenal in a way the other arts - except architecture - could not be, seems to add weight to this notion of music as non-expressive, as having no meaning beyond the internal relationships of its acoustic components. Equally, if Schopenhauer is understood as - say - Dahlhaus understands him, he can be dismissed as a mere affect theorist out of his time or a giver of aid and comfort to the despised popularist 'hermeneutical' writers. Schopenhauer, of course, gives support to neither of these species of theory and it is only by wilfully misreading him that he can be regarded as doing so. It is precisely because he is no latter-day simple-minded affect theorist nor a proponent of the various kinds of arid schematicism, so hollow as to collapse under any attempt to give them intelligible definition, that he is able to offer a resolution to the problem with which Schenker had grappled for so long: the problem of musical significance and its relation to musical structure.
With hindsight it is obvious that the possibility of a meshing of Schenker's theoretical ideas with Schopenhauer's philosophical interpretation of music existed from the beginning of his career as a theorist. Schenker, as everyone knows, developed a theory of levels. Before this theory was fully worked out, he expanded a merely mechanical feature of traditional Viennese theory into something with a quasi-philosophical significance. This was the notion of the 'scale-step', a concept, as we have seen, which not only existed long before Schenker, but long before its appearance in Sechter's version of fundamental bass theory.

In nineteenth century theory, a scale-step is simply that member of the given scale on which a triad is constructed in a harmony exercise. It is indicated by a Roman numeral under the bass-line of a fundamental-bass exercise. Certain prescribed sequences of scale-steps determine the harmonic progression of which the exercise consists. Sometimes, because of the hybrid character of the theory, voice-leading rules still in operation conflict with the rules governing the progression of scale steps, and in some situations a given scale step has to cover tones which cannot be part of the triad constructed upon it. Thus the role of the scale-step is compelled to expand by the voice-leading assumptions upon which the theory is no less dependent than the rationalist notion of chordal inversion.

Schenker observed that the compromises forced upon the harmonic theory by the voice-leading theory corresponded to phenomena in composed music, i.e., to situations in which a
single triad, not any triad, of course, but the scale-step appropriate to a predetermined harmonic sequence, seemed to contain within its ambit not only individual tones, such as passing tones, auxiliary notes, appogiaturas and suspensions, but motifs, apparently independent chords, even sequences of chords. Later he began to feel that entire modulatory passages could be considered as chromatic elaborations of a single harmony. The scale-step, the Stufe, thus became the germ of the idea of levels of harmonic control, levels of determination, levels of structural significance.

Schopenhauer uses the term Stufe to signify progressive levels of differentiation from the 'rawest matter' to the 'idea', the purest objectification of the will. No-one familiar with Schenker's writings could fail to be struck by Schopenhauer's use of this term. His perception of the development of musical structure as analogous to the progressive individuation out of the undifferentiated mass of raw matter through the whole of the evolutionary progression to the highest level of human consciousness, is charted in a fashion which, in spite of certain crucial dissimilarities, no-one familiar with Schenker's work could think of as other than proto-Schenkerian. In music the analogous quasi-evolutionary progression is described as follows.

'The deepest bass is to us in harmony what in the world is unorganised nature, the rawest mass out of which everything originates and develops. Furthermore the whole texture of the inner voices, (Ripienstimmen), which fill out the harmony, which lie between the bass and the leading, the melodic voice, are in music what,
in the phenomenal world, constitute the progressive steps through which the will objectifies itself. The voices lying nearer the bass correspond to the lower of these steps, the still inorganic, but already severally expressed bodies: the higher of these voices representing the world of plants and animals.'76

Schopenhauer's idea of progressive differentiation clothes itself in the shape of the concerto grosso for the good reason that, before 1818, there did not exist any coherent theory of post-baroque music, certainly no coherent structural theory. All theory which was not based on the polyphonic model was based on baroque models. For Schenker this model was highly congenial precisely because it referred to older theories not implicated in the nineteenth century Viennese theory to which he had such strong objections and which he certainly did not regard as representing theoretically the changes in practice that distinguished classical from baroque composition.

Schopenhauer's vision of musical structure is already radically different from any theory of composition existing even in Schenker's time, since the voices, as he understands them, correspond neither to polyphonic 'democracy', nor to homophonic melody and chord-block-accompaniment theories. Students of Schenker will recognise this characteristic as the thing that distinguishes Schenkerian theory from either traditional contrapuntal or traditional harmonic theories, or modern versions of them in the work of such people as Kurth on the one hand and Riemann or Schoenberg on the other, and, in this difference, will recognise the reason why Schenker can explain the entire texture while others can only explain aspects of it.
Schopenhauer's use of the term Ripienstimmen places his model. The ripieno voices are the orchestral voices which alternate antiphonally with the concertante voices in the concerto grosso. Schenker would at once have recognised in Schopenhauer's terminology a style of musical thinking which, even in Schopenhauer's youth, was rapidly becoming out of date. For Schenker this would be a very strong positive recommendation. It is in terms of the baroque concerto grosso that Schopenhauer's notion of musical structure has to be understood. He sees music as three-layered: the basso continuo, the Ripienstimmen and the Concertante voices or the Hauptstimme, (compare Schenker's Oberstimme) the principal voice. The significance of the appendage of Stimmen (voices) to ripieno is that while these voices are understood as 'filling out the harmony' they are nevertheless voices, they have some kind of identity expressed in some kind of continuity, of connectedness, however fragmentary, fleeting, unfulfilled. (This, again, is lost in Payne's translation of Ripienstimmen merely as ripienos.) The incomplete development, the inability of any individual ripieno voice to differentiate itself from the texture, to become a concertante voice is what makes it an appropriate analogy for a member of that order of being which is striving towards full individuation but has not yet achieved it. But the inner voice, however remote from full articulation, is still, analogically speaking, such a striving being, it is not the mechanically placed cipher of fundamental bass theory which has nothing to do with composition but is rationally determined before the compositional process begins.

Strongly as Schopenhauer's ideas contrast with the theory which began to gain dominance only after the time
when he was writing *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, he shares with the post Rameauian theorists a sense of the primacy of the bass voice. This idea, of course, is derivable from figured bass theory, but only by a kind of role-reversal: the accompaniment has to be more important than that which it accompanies. It is the eighteenth century attempt to reduce musical textures scientifically which brings about this aesthetic somersault. Nevertheless, in Schopenhauer - and in Schenker too, and this is the condition which makes possible the concept of the *Ursatz* - the primacy of the bass voice is balanced by the high significance attached to the upper voice, and it is this sense of a form-creating relationship between treble and bass which links Schenker to eighteenth century aesthetic theory. This theory concerns works of art, as distinct from what Schenker called the theory of the French Enlightenment, eighteenth century scientific, or quasi-scientific, theory of music. This is in keeping with his affection for C. P. E. Bach and his dislike of Rameau, and with his identification with German classicism.

Schenker's theory resembles the baroque in treating the outer voices, the highest (Schopenhauer's *Hauptstimme*, Schenker's *Oberstimme*) and the lowest (Schopenhauer's *Bassstimme* [sic], Schenker's *Unterstimme*) as the only articulated voices in the structural outline. The other voices develop out of the relationships of these two. But this does not mean that the highest 'melody singing' voice does not also develop in his conception as in Schopenhauer's, or that it develops independently of the inner voices. The two given, embryonic voices merely mark the boundaries of the structure. They mark them in a manner already heavily weighted with implications. From a technical point of view, what is remarkable in Schopenhauer's
conception, by contrast with nineteenth century 'thematic' theories, is that he too sees the principal voice as emerging, not given, or given only ideally, in spite of the high level of articulation of this voice in baroque instrumental music. But here again, Schopenhauer demonstrates an understanding of the baroque scheme sensitive to the realities of the baroque tradition. However fully the upper voice is realised by the composer, the distinction between the melodic outline and its elaboration - a distinction whose importance for Schenker needs no spelling out - remains, just as the distinction between the bass voice and the inner voices, whether realised improvisationally by the continuo player or composed-out in the form of a ripieno by the composer, remains one between a given - obligatory - outline and a variable elaboration. Still more remarkable is a notion of the melody as emergent - because of its incorporation of the harmonic dimension - technically more complex and musically subtler than any of the motivic theories, however dressed-up as organic, with which Schenker's theory is often inappropriately compared. Schenker's Ursatz would lose much of its inscrutability if it were to be seen as a logical reduction of the baroque two-voiced outline in which the whole texture, including the full articulation of these two voices themselves, grows from their contrapuntal-harmonic relationship.

Into this one idea so many notions are compressed, not least importantly, a clearly intelligible notion of a work of art which is conceptually independent, as the thing itself is actually independent of any other kind of art. There is nothing in Hanslick - whose influence on Schenker at a superficial level is not in dispute - out of which so rich a theory could develop.
Schopenhauer further elaborates his analogy in a manner familiar to us from the Ursatz. In his diagram of the first level of individuation of the tones of the tonic, Schenker's Oberstimme is distinguished from his Unterstimme by the fluidity of its movement as opposed to the slower, more ponderous movement of the bass. The reason for this is the presence in the upper voice of 'passing-notes', the peculiarly melodic phenomena which, in Schenker's theory are the origin of all connectedness in music. The relevant passage in Schopenhauer reads as follows.

'All these bass and inner (Ripienstimmen) voices that constitute the harmony, lack that connectedness (Zusammenhang) in their progression, of the highest, the melody-singing voice, which, again alone, moves swiftly and lightly in [coherent] passages (Laufen [for Schenker Züge]) and modulations. While all the others move more slowly without having any individual coherence. Most laborious of all is the movement of the deepest bass, the representative of the rawest matter:...Quicker, yet without melodic coherence (Zusammenhang) and logically connected progression, flow the higher of the inner voices (höhere Ripienstimmen) which run in parallel with the animal world. The incoherent progress (unzusammenhängende Gang) and rule-dependency of all the inner voices is the analogue of the absence in everything in the entire irrational world, from crystal to the most perfect animal, of any succession of spiritual development, of any self-fulfilment through education, of any coherently systematic course of life; instead everything remains unchanged throughout time, in accordance with its type, determined by ineluctable laws. Finally in melody, singing in the logically
directed, uninterrupted, lofty connectedness of a thought, from beginning to end, a fully articulated principle voice (Hauptstimme), we recognise the highest level of the objectification of the Will, the rational living and striving of mankind.\textsuperscript{77}

Compare this with Schenker.

'Even in the fundamental structure, the fundamental line presents its arpeggiation filled in with seconds, whereas the bass presents its arpeggiation bare. This is because of the general difference between high and low register...Because of its low register the bass diminution always remains more restricted than that of the other voice.\textsuperscript{78}

Nor is this, from the technical point of view, a simple idea in which the melody is, so to speak, precipitated out of the harmony, leaving the harmony behind. On the contrary. 'A plain moral philosophy, without the illumination of nature, such as Socrates proposed, is analogous to a melody without harmony, which Rousseau wanted; the converse of this, plain natural philosophy, pure physics and metaphysics without ethical context is like mere harmony without melody.' The higher levels of objectification of the will presuppose the lower and cannot exist without them. Similarly in music. 'The high leading voice of the melody...needs, in order to make its complete impression, the accompaniment of all the other voices, downwards to the deepest bass, which is to be understood as the origin (Ursprung) of all the others.'\textsuperscript{79}

This is the sense in which music, as music, parallels
the world as a revelatory commentary upon it in the manner that the music parallels the words of a song, or the action of an opera. It arises not in imitation of these empirical entities but in the same way that they do as a parallel objectification of the will.

There are two concepts working in analogical relation to one another in Schopenhauer's explanation: the notion of quasi-temporal emergence of an articulated surface from the musical raw material, understood as the uncomposed harmonic root, and the notion of a statically perceived structure, picturing this process. This structure can be apprehended in another temporal mode, since its 'melody' - in the special Schopenhauerian-Schenkerian sense of the word ('a melody of a far higher order than a 'melody' or 'idea' [in the 'conventional' sense]') can be read like a story, or like the history of the will illuminated by consciousness. Schenker's theory encompasses both concepts and works them out in a fashion that is no less impressive as a feat of imagination than as one of technical subtlety.

In view of his earlier misperceptions of Schopenhauer's meaning, the closeness of Schenker's mature theory to Schopenhauer's is very striking, signifying a change of direction of great moment, or, rather, the final discovery, as it must have seemed to him, of the right direction, one which not only made sense of all his previous researches, but enabled him to follow his own artistic impulses, his own intuitive inclinations, if not to the extent of abandoning his project - clearly a psychological impossibility - to make music intelligible, nevertheless significantly modifying the conception of the nature of its possible intelligibility. Understanding becomes much less an aridly
intellectual thing and much more a question of hearing and feeling, of the cultivation in the hearer of the same kinds of sensibility to be found in the creative artist himself.

Schopenhauer's famous remark about the intellectual incomprehensibility of music - at which Schenker at first ignorantly demurred, for which piece of philistinism he surely made more than ample amends - has, of course, a significance beyond the aesthetic. It has a vital cultural significance. If music speaks of things eternally inaccessible to reason, Hegel's idea that a science of art can make the things spoken of by art directly accessible to intellectual contemplation, and that the poetry of the imagination can therefore be transcended, put plainly, made redundant, by the prose of thought, is mistaken. Art - music at least - can never be replaced by science.
Ein einziger Gedanke muss so umfassend er auch sein mag, die vollkommenste Einheit bewahren. Lässt er dennoch, um Behuf seiner Mittheilung, sich in Theile zerlgen; so muss doch wieder der Zusammenhang dieser Theile ein orgnischer, d.h. ein solcher seyn, wo jeder Theil eben so sehr das Ganze erhält, als er vom Ganzen gehalten wird, keiner der erste und keiner der letzte ist, der ganze Gedanke durch jeden Theil an Deutlichkeit gewinnt und auch der kleinste Theil nicht völlig verstanden—werden kann, ohne dass schon das Ganze vorher verstanden sei.' Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, V. I, p. 7. Quoted in Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1986, V. I, p. 17.

In this chapter Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung refers to the German text of which there are currently two versions available, one in the Sämtliche Werke edited by Arthur Hubscher, in seven volumes, Wiesbaden, 1972; the other in the Sämtliche Werke edited by Wolfgang Frhr. von Lohneysen; in five volumes, Stuttgart/Frankfurt am Main, 1960.

The World as Will and Representation, refers to the current English version by E. F. J.
Payne, in two volumes. New York, 1965. It is only in V. II of this work that a chapter entitled 'On the Metaphysics of Music' appears. References to the metaphysics of music relate to this chapter only when that fact is indicated. Otherwise they relate to Schopenhauer's metaphysical theory of music in general.

References to the lectures relate to the text of the lectures delivered in Berlin in 1820 as they appear in the Philosophische Vorlesungen aus dem handschriftlichen Nachlass, ed. Volker Spierling in four volumes, Munich, 1984-1986. The volume containing the section on music is V. III: Metaphysic des Schonen; the chapter on music is Chapter 17: 'Von der Musik', p. 214, ff..

2. '...die Musik im Ganzen ist die Melodie zu der die Welt der Text ist.' Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1986, V. III, p. 222.

3. 'die Musik... eine ganz andre viel ernstere und tiefere Bedeutung haben muss, eine Bedeutung in Hinsicht auf welche die Zahlenverhaltnisse in die die Musik sich auflösen lässt, sich nicht verhalten als das Bezeichnete, sondern selbst erst als das Zeichen.' Ibid., p. 215.

4. Ibid., p. 215, ff.

5. Schopenhauer's philosophical system is based
on the notion of a universal will to existence, which is the source of everything: 'Sieh dich doch um! Was da ruft "Ich, ich, ich will das yen". Das bist du nicht allein, sondern Alles, durchaus Alles, was nur ein Spur von Bewusstseyn hat'. ('Look about you! That which cries, 'I, I, I, will exist' is not only you, but everything, absolutely everything that has even a trace of consciousness.') See Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1986, V. I, p. 23. The world of phenomena, 'the object of experience and of science' is one aspect of the objectification of this will. Music is another. Spierling, in his introduction to the lectures, points to Goethe's influence on Schopenhauer, while Payne emphasises that of Kant. Payne gives a list of works on Schopenhauer in German and English.

Although Schopenhauer was right to insist that parts of his work - the section on music is very much a case in point - cannot be understood without some degree of insight into the whole, a high level of philosophical expertise is much less important, at least in this instance, than imagination, and freedom from the literal-mindedness that so often accompanies the attempt to be 'scientific'. Reading Schopenhauer in translation can be dispiriting, but for anyone with basic competence in German the Schopenhauer of 'Von der Musik' is wonderfully direct and transparent, far easier to read than most.

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commentators and greatly refreshing after the
dreariness of so much of the technical
literature. If there could be such a thing as
a legitimate short-cut to the philosophy of
Schopenhauer it would surely be his
metaphysics of music - in its original form.

III, p. 222: 'So eröffnet sie den
geheimnisten Sinn jener scene und ist ihr
richtigster und deutlichster Kommentar.'

7. See n. 1.

8. See Schopenhauer, tr. Payne, 1969,
'Translator's Introduction'.

9. Ibid., p. xxii.

10. See Fauconnet, 1913.


12. Ibid., p. 259. The section from 'its rising'
to 'counterpoint' appears to be an
interpolation since it is missing from the
lectures text:

'Am schwerfalligsten bewegt sich der tiefe
Bass, der Repräsentant der rohsten Masse;
diese langsame Bewegung ist ihm
wesentlich...' ("Most ponderous of all is the
movement of the deep bass, the representative
of the rawest mass; this slow movement is

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The contrasting omission in Payne of the footnote included in Spierling (p. 219) strengthens the impression that Schopenhauer wanted to get rid of references to the out-of-date baroque compositional model and substitute the 'modern' fundamental bass model for his mid-century readers. Many of the differences between the text of the lectures and the English text referred to by commentators on Schenker are less substantial, consisting of the omission or addition of a word, a few words, a sentence. These subtler changes are hardly less damaging because they disturb the balance and rhythm of Schopenhauer's prose, which is so important a part of the neatness of the argument, and they absolutely demolish its poetry. The writer of the former text is scarcely recognisable in the latter. One example will have to suffice.

Payne: 'I recognise, however, that it is essentially impossible to demonstrate this explanation, for it assumes and establishes a relation of music as a representation to that which of its essence can never itself be representation, and claims to regard music as the copy of an original that can itself never be directly represented.'

Schopenhauer:
'...allein dieser Aufschluss is von der Art, dass er nie bewiesen werden kann, weil er ein Verhältniss annimmt und feststellt zwischen der Musik, die doch immer in Gebiete der Vorstellung liegt und dem was wesentlich nie Vorstellung werden kann, dem Ding an sich selbst, dem Willen selbst: sonach stellt mein Aufschluss der Musik dar als Nachbild eines Vorbildes, welches nie vor die Vorstellung gebracht werden kann.'

('...only this explanation is of a kind that can never be proved, because it supposes and traces a relationship between music - which of course dwells forever in the realm of the imagination - and something which, of its nature, can never be imagined: the thing in itself, the will itself. Thus my explanation presents music as the copy of a model which can never be brought before the imagination."

Particularly irritating is the substitution of 'I' for 'we': 'I recognise' for 'we recognise' ('erkennen wir') and even for the impersonal form, which gives the writing a dogmatic, even slightly bombastic air wholly foreign to the early text.

13. Grundbass means fundamental bass, but is translated by Payne as 'ground bass' which means something entirely different. Amazingly, the same mis-
translation appears in the English version of Schenker's 'Harmony, in the 'Introduction', p. xi. Other commentators have also followed Payne.


16. See Schopenhauer, tr. Hollingdale, 1970, p. 26, ff...

17. See Schopenhauer, tr. Payne, 1969, p. 261. The passage beginning, 'Therefore music does not express', and ending with the reference to Rossini is absent from the text of the lectures.

18. See Kirnberger, tr. Beach & Thym, 1982, Chapter 6, especially section 92.

19. See Schopenhauer, tr. Payne, 1974. It is surely not insignificant that Rameau is mentioned by name in the Parerga but not in the lectures, and in a fashion which leaves no doubt that we are reading an adumbration of an adumbration. Here, too, Rossini appears alongside Mozart (p. 438). A long discussion of opera follows. It is clearly to this period that the up-dating of the harmonic-theoretical passages belongs.

21. See Schenker, tr. Rothgeb, 1987, p. 16, of Book I and p. xvii of Book II. It is interesting that Schenker's complaint about Schopenhauer's 'lack of clarity' follows the quotation from a passage in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung which is simultaneously an interpolation into and a garbling of the text as it appears in the lectures. Schenker (in Rothgeb's translation) quotes, 'represents the innermost core preceding all creativity, or the heart of things'. Payne gives, 'the innermost kernel preceding all form, or the heart of things' in a passage (Schopenhauer, tr. Payne, 1969, p. 263) beginning, 'For to a certain extent... and ending, 'universalia in re', which is not found in the Spierling edition. (See, Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1990, V. III, p. 223: '...blosser Form aussagt. Umgekehrt...').


23. See Schopenhauer, tr. Hollingdale, 1970, p. 34, ff..


25. For the origin of the term 'absolute' applied to music, see Dahlhaus tr. Whittall, 1980, p. 32.


27. See Federhofer, 1985, p.12.
28. See Federhofer, 1990, p. 280, ff..


30. The relationship with Hegel is obscure. According to Spierling, Schopenhauer's habilitation took place in Berlin in 1820, 'with Hegel's co-operation' ('unter Mitwirkung Hegels'). Hollingdale recounts how Schopenhauer chose to deliver his lectures at 'the precise hours at which Hegel...delivered his principal course'. He lectured to an empty room and preferred to abandon his career rather than change his time. (Schopenhauer, tr. Hollingdale, 1970, p. 24.) If this story is more than mere anecdote, Schopenhauer's quarrel with Hegel must have begun during, or immediately after the 'Mitwirkung'. Schopenhauer certainly came to hate everything for which Hegel stood. This might be connected with the problem to which Payne refers in his introduction to the Parerga and Pareligomena. Hegel's own lectures on aesthetics were delivered after Schopenhauer's. The 'Introduction' and the musical section are full of distorted echoes of Schopenhauer but make no reference to his work. Hegel's 'co-operation' can only have been formal, since the work Schopenhauer offered for his habilitation in 1820 had already been published, but it put him in a unique position to make use of the work of
the young unknown. Schopenhauer's anger is the more justified by the use to which Hegel put his ideas in the service of an aesthetic theory which is, in effect, hostile to art.


32. Hanslick, 1990. Chapter 1 concludes in bizarre fashion with a list of quotations from works ranging from Mattheson to Wagner, all sharing the notion of music as expressive. He contrasts their attitude with that of Herbart, who turns Schopenhauer's explanation of the external and internal significances of music inside out. For Herbart the inner being ('innere Wesen') of music is the formal-numerical: fugue, simple and double counterpoint. The 'meanings' (Bedeutungen) are associated with 'outward appearance' ('aussern Schein').

The curious thing is that Herbart offers as his authority the technical expertise of the 'artists'. But who can these technical wizards have been if they were not such as Mattheson, Kirnberger, Koch, Marpurg, Gottfried Weber? Hanslick is quite happy to be on the wrong side not only of these susceptible double contrapuntists but also of Schumann, Wagner and Bellini, preferring Hegel, Vischer and Zimmermann.

Schopenhauer says, 'There is more to be learned from each page of David Hume than
from the collected philosophical works of Hegel, Herbart, and Schleiermacher taken together'. Perhaps he knew something Hanslick did not know.


34. See Helmholtz, tr. Ellis, 1930, p. 250 ff.

35. Ibid.

36. See n. 28.


38. Ibid., p. 40.

39. Ibid., p. 39: 'Wir sind zwar durchaus nicht der Meinung, dass in diesem Falle der Komponist ganz freizusprechen sei, indem der Musik für den Asudruck schmerzlichster Traurigkeit gewiss weit bestimmtere Töne besitzt.'


41. Ibid.

42. See Dahlhaus, tr. Whittall, 1980, Appendix, p.110.


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44. See n. 34.


46. Helmholtz, tr. Ellis, 1930, p. 249.


48. See n. 22.


52. Dahlhaus, tr. Whittall, 1980, p. 35.

53. Ibid.


55. This insight, of which further use is made in this chapter, is developed by William Pastille. See Pastille, 1984.


57. Ibid., p. 10, ff.


60. See, Fox, 1980. For a picture of the philosophical ethos of this period in general and the problems it generated for the reading of Schopenhauer and others of his time, there can hardly be a better introduction than 'Dialogues' 6 and 7 in Magee, 1978. Ayer's account of the Vienna Circle (p. 118, ff.) is particularly useful.


62. See n. 54. Schopenhauer's choice of water to illustrate this notion of the objectification of the idea of man in drama links it with Goethe's 'colours are the deeds of light'. See Goethe, tr. Miller, 1988, p. 158.

63. The restoration of some of the excised passages in an appendix is to be welcomed, but it can hardly fail to highlight the strangeness of the whole situation in which Schenker is treated like a distinguished, but unfortunately slightly demented relative, on whom, in order to avoid serious embarrassment all round, it is necessary to keep a careful eye.

64. See Kassler, 1983.

65. See Siegel, 1990. In the original version of
his study (Pastille, 1985, p. 133) the author remarks, 'Unfortunately there is very little evidence in Schenker's published writings to support...[the belief] that Schenker's ontology accords with Goethe's'. Nevertheless he believes this to be the case, as he argues, entirely convincingly, in the succeeding pages. However, the splitting of theories into their epistemological and ontological aspects seems to complicate the issues rather than to illuminate them. The central importance of Goethe's morphological theory must be development, rather than the philosophy of science implicit in his theorising about his theory. Unlike the latter, his morphological theory made a tremendous impact and finds echoes, not only in science, but in all fields of study in the nineteenth century. Schenker would not need to spell out his acknowledgement of morphology. Everybody had a morphological theory of some sort. What is particular about Schenker's, as opposed to other music-morphological theories, is that it evinces a genuine affinity with the original theory. Hopefully the evidence of connection presented here is 'solid' enough to provide further support for Pastille's belief.

Another writer who takes up ideas suggested by Kassler, the Schopenhauerian as well as the Goethean, is Nicholas Cook. (See Cook, 1989). Cook asserts that 'if we want to understand Schenker's thinking about music
in his terms...we should not discount...the polemical and quasi-philosophical nature of his writings' but concedes that it is possible to 'apply Schenker's theories to technical issues in music without much consideration of the philosophical and historical background from which these theories emerged'. But he does not concede that ignorance is a good thing and the rest of the study is just such a 'consideration', raising many of the doubts any careful examination of the issues must prompt. But is Schenker's imagined opinion of the use made of his theory really of any more than sentimental interest? The limiting effect of our narrowness on our own thinking is surely more important. We should perhaps beware of historicising Schenker as the critics of his day historicised Brahms. We need to know about his world not as collectors of information but in order to understand him better, to make better use of him, to understand our thought, our quasi-philosophy, our polemic. For the attacks on Schenker's 'quasi-philosophising' have been a long sustained polemic.


70. See n. 68.

71. See Schopenhauer, tr. Payne, 1959, V. I, p. 3.


73. See Schenker, tr. Mann Borgese, p. 4, ff..

74. See Chapter 2, Part 2 above.

75. See n. 55.

76. See Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1986, V. III, p. 217, ff..

77. Ibid., p. 219.

78. See Schenker, tr. Oster, 1979, p. 15, section 20 (p. 45 in the German edition). This is of great importance to Schenker's theory. He develops the point in the sections he refers to: 53, 64, 185, 210, and 257. See also section 251. This notion may also explain why Schopenhauer was seduced by the prohibition of bass progression by step in fundamental bass theory.

Chapter Six

Renewal Through Fire

'...in our day of greatest affliction, you have returned. Welcome, Zarathustra! You will tell us what to do, you will lead us. You will save us from this greatest of all perils.'
Hermann Hesse.¹

In October 1917 Otto Vrieslander wrote to Schenker that he had once read an unpublished piece by the young Nietzsche, entitled Über Ton und Wort,² which contained the following sentence.

'Whoever takes feelings to be the effects of music, makes of them, so to speak, an intermediate world of symbols which can give him a foretaste of music but at the same time shuts him out of its inmost sanctuary.'³

Vrieslander commented that this was not only a blow against hermeneutics but proof that, in spite of himself, even while under the spell of Wagner, Nietzsche's artistic instincts compelled his thought into modes which were essentially anti-Wagnerian. The premises of The Birth of
Tragedy itself, Vrieslander added, were, properly understood, so completely against Wagner that the Wagnerian panegyric had to be based on forced and oblique conclusions.

Schenker replied with great warmth. 'You are so very right in your observations about Nietzsche! A pity that you do not get them into print.' He had never had any doubt, he said, that it was only because of his ignorance of the craft of music that Nietzsche had such a poor grasp of it. What a tragedy that he had to turn for help to people like Bizet and Peter Gast. How different his life might have been had he responded to Wagner in a more realistic fashion. Ah, if only, we can almost hear Schenker thinking, if only he had had a Heinrich Schenker to turn to!

For this is still the Schenker who thought that Schopenhauer would have been a better philosopher if he had done some counterpoint. Similarly he thought that his piano teacher, Ernst Ludwig, would have been a happier man if time could have run backwards so that he could have had Schenker for his teacher.

It is not so much that Schenker considered himself cleverer than Schopenhauer, Nietzsche or even Ludwig, but that he imagined himself, because of his historical position and his musical insight, to be in possession of something they did not have, namely, the truth, and that this gave him the right, indeed the duty, to pass judgement even on those whose achievements he acknowledged he could never hope to match. He spoke not for himself but for this truth. For his readers, however, it seems that, in spite of believing he had 'outgrown' the world of journalism, he had never really lost the reviewer's sense that what is required above all...
is an opinion. Even at this moment, when Vrieslander had offered him, so to speak, a permission to admire Nietzsche, a way of having Nietzsche on his side, what comes to the surface first is his sense of Nietzsche's shortcomings.

If we compare his response to Nietzsche with Nietzsche's response to his heroes, to Schopenhauer, for example, ('our Dürer Knight'), or Wagner's to Schopenhauer ('a gift from heaven'), or Schopenhauer's to his 'marvellous Kant' there is a strange contrast. These writers' capacity for polemic ferocity is balanced by an equal capacity for whole-hearted assent to the insights of another. When they depart from the views of their heroes there is a sense of development, of the new ideas growing out of the old. Even Nietzsche's wild tearing-up of his intellectual heritage at the end of his creative life can be set against the strength of his earlier affirmations. We rarely find such unstinting, generously articulated affirmations in Schenker. Even his praise somehow manages all too often to take on a negative tone. When he argues with his heroes he is apt to give the impression of quibbling and these quibbles are sometimes simply philistine. The flirtations with the ecclesiastical modes of Beethoven and J. S. Bach, and even Brahms, for example, perplexed him deeply. He might have been expected to think again about an issue on which so much genius was ranged against him. But he could not get beyond seeing these things as ideological lapses which it was, unfortunately, impossible to overlook. The theory had become more important than the art, and certainly than its creator. Fear of the taint of the 'hermeneutic' made it desperately important not to betray just the kind of profoundly personal involvement so characteristic of the artistic temperament.
For Nietzsche, on the other hand, spiritual intimacy was a great enrichment which it would not have occurred to him to repudiate. 'I strove,' he writes with reference to Schopenhauer, '...to see through the book and imagine the living man...', and later, 'to understand the picture one must divine the painter'. This is the very opposite of the kind of scholarliness in which Schenker found himself enmeshed. When he admits a personal involvement, as for example with Bruckner, he sees it as something he must set aside in the service of truth. Personal regard, admiration, even affection, must not be allowed to stay the hand of the scrupulous critic. Scholarly values are elevated above human ones. Where Nietzsche praises what he admires, Schenker holds up as an example what he approves of. Similarly, when he speaks of what he dislikes, he adopts a tone of moralistic denunciation. Where Nietzsche rages he merely rails. His early writings make it clear that this was not simply a matter of temperament, an incapacity for enthusiasm, or even the fault of a narrow education. It was rather the way he came to feel himself called upon to behave.

He was, of course, far from unique. The atmosphere one breathes in Schenker is characterised by Elias Canetti in his essay on Karl Kraus. Kraus has become a kind of icon of Viennese Modernism and it is rare to find any account of him which does not see him rather as he saw himself, the scourge of all that was false, slovenly, self-deluded. But Kraus was, like many lesser negative thinkers, of which Austria was as full in Schenker's time as Schopenhauer's Germany had been of philosophers, if not actually 'incapable of formulating a position except to denounce specific abuses', apt to leave that impression. He cannot have helped encouraging a joy in denunciation for its own sake.
among members of his huge audiences, a joy which undoubtedly seemed to them to be Nietzschean. Canetti describes Kraus as engaged in the construction of a wall, a cultural Great Wall of China. It is a wall 'built with ...judgements'.

'The sentry had become addicted to judgements. The production of his ashlars and the construction of his wall, which never stopped, required more and more judgements, and he procured them at the expense of his own empire. He sucked out what he was supposed to guard: for his high goals, to be sure, but everything around him became emptier and emptier; and eventually, one could readily fear that the erection of this indestructible wall of judgements had become the true purpose of life.'

Such was the effect of this wall of judgements that Canetti records with gratitude that Kraus was not much interested in fiction and he was therefore able to indulge his love of novels without guilt. One of the benefits of his experience of living under the intellectual 'dictatorship' of Kraus, Canetti says, was that it 'forever ruined for me the deplorable custom of accusing others'. Canetti's essay is, of course, ambivalent. He is full of praise for Kraus's 'high goals' and for his incomparable eloquence, and clearly admires many things in him. But his own judgement is nevertheless and inevitably severe. Under the influence of Kraus, he recalls:

'I had my 'Jews' - people whom I snubbed when passing them in restaurants or on the street, whom I did not deign to look at, whose lives did not concern me, who were outlawed and banished for me, whose touch would have sullied me, whom I quite earnestly did not count as
part of humanity: the victims and enemies of Karl Kraus'.

Many years before, Nietzsche had observed that such was the state of cultural life that the torch was now carried by journalists. By Schenker's day, he might have felt the flame had been reduced to a plume of bitter black smoke. Schenker's generation reaped the fruits of this appropriation of aesthetics by journalism, its narrowing into critical judgement, which was the inevitable consequence of the journalist's role, the forming of opinion.

In such an atmosphere we should not be surprised if Schenker's joy, even relief, in finding a justification for his love of Nietzsche, expresses itself in the shape of a regret: the seemingly almost laughably irrelevant regret that Nietzsche was hampered by technical incompetence in music. In fact it is neither laughable nor irrelevant.

* * *

In Schenker's view, technical expertise in music places the individual who possesses it on a higher plane than that of ordinary mortals, certainly than that of any mere philosophising amateur, even if that amateur happens to be Nietzsche. He goes so far as to compare it - distantly, at least - to artistic genius. But the context in which he does this suggests that what seems to be an excess of self-confidence is, in fact, exactly the opposite.

'Unintelligent people who lack the competence to deduce
effects from particular causes mistakenly treat their incompetence as an advantage whenever they come up against someone who possesses this ability. The incompetent quickly transforms his lack into a supposed competence for life...and...the capability of the other [into] something pathological, a vulnerability. In this, in microcosm, is reflected the picture which the practical man, with his eternal sturdiness, has of the supposedly vulnerable genius.  

Here we can catch a hint not only of Schenker's problem but also of his eventual solution to it, and of the source of this solution, even in the expression of the problem. For there is here more than the suggestion of an echo of something in The Birth of Tragedy. In describing the medieval celebrations of St. John and St. Vitus, Nietzsche remarks:

'Some people, either through lack of experience or through obtuseness, turn away in pity or contempt from phenomena such as these as from "folk diseases", bolstered by a sense of their own sanity; these poor creatures have no idea how blighted and ghostly this 'sanity' of theirs sounds when the glowing life of Dionysian revellers thunders past them'.

Schenker's problem was to find a definition for himself which did not merely satisfy his own criteria of cultural value but also commanded the respect of others. But the criteria of value he proposed were not those that did this. The things that did were money, fame and prestigious appointments. People like Schenker's old acquaintance Maiulik were not much concerned with whether these things were well-earned. Schenker could not claim respect on any
of these grounds, nor could he brush his failure aside by pretending that worldly success did not matter to him. His only recourse was to persuade himself and his followers that he was misunderstood, misinterpreted, wrongly judged in the same way that the greatest geniuses were, if only 'in microcosm', and to hope that at some future date the higher values to which he had dedicated his life would be shared by a better, less philistine public. In the meantime he craved reassurance.

Kraus's appeal could not have been so great if there had not been a large reservoir of people, more or less able, sometimes highly gifted, who felt themselves shut out and denied recognition by the cultural monopoly of official institutions. This was the inevitable consequence of a competitive education system which held up as ideals ways of living more appropriate to tiny and enlightened principalities than to a sprawling empire sinking under the weight of its own bureaucracy, and at the same time continuing to behave like the myopic oligarchy it actually was, a system which cultivated hopes on a scale on which the state had no possibility of fulfilling them.

Recent writers have pointed to the peculiar vulnerability of Jews to cultural disappointment in this situation because of the systematic exclusions which worked specifically against them. The role played by secular education in Jewish modernisation was bound to produce such disappointments. But this can hardly have been an exclusively Jewish experience. It could be argued that Jews had two sets of possibilities: the official careers which many of them pursued with great success, and the unofficial network - which of course, meshed in all sorts of ways with the official one - which arose precisely out of Jewish
Schenker's career illustrates the way in which a young Jewish intellectual could fall between these two 'cultures', voluntarily rejecting the legal career for which he was trained yet finding the unofficial culture, if still capable of providing him with the possibility of survival while he pursued the interests which his education had fostered, incapable either of providing the opportunity to build a prestigious career on these interests or, in an increasingly unfavourable political climate, of enabling him to penetrate the official culture. Like so many others, therefore, Schenker was compelled to construct his own value-system, cultivate his own public, create his own prestige.

The dangers in this situation are obvious. Lacking any kind of external confirmation, any individual, no matter how self-sufficient and strong willed, is at risk from the suspicion that his perspective is in some way flawed, that he is the victim of some social or individual sickness or inadequacy, and is always in danger of falling into despair. The louder Schenker protests the more clearly we can hear the murmurings of doubt, about the point of pursuing his work, about his cultural role. Occasionally he gave these doubts direct expression; more frequently his frustration showed itself in anger. 

In one sense Schenker's problem was eased by the notion of the death of art, in another made more difficult. The position of the artist was now deeply uneasy. It was not so much that the role of the artist had changed as that it had disappeared. There was, of course, a need for art as the gilt on the gingerbread of life. But this need could be met increasingly by the art which already existed, by dead artists, above all in the case of music. It was with this
vast army of the dead, ever growing as more and more of the forgotten were resurrected by the musicologists, as well as with each other, that artists now had to compete. Schenker gradually came to the conclusion that in this race he was simply not a runner, and he opted out of the role of performer, in which increasingly specialised field the competition was hardly less daunting. It was the easier to do this without loss of self-esteem in a climate where art-criticism was valued at least as highly as any but the highest art. Such behaviour, therefore, need not lead to the conclusion - as it would have done in earlier times - that the individual was a failure. In Bach's day, even Beethoven's, indeed even Brahms's, the idea of a non-practising musician would have been as bizarre as the idea of a non-practising butcher or a non-practising baker. But now the artist's need was not so much to please the patron as to satisfy the critic, without whose pronouncement the amorphous patron did not know whether to be pleased or not. Thus there was an opening for the expert who was expert not in practice but in judgement. In fact many of the critics, like Schenker, possessed a level of practical competence which, in former times, would have enabled them to survive as part of the anonymous body of work-a-day players and composers in whom history had - as yet - no great interest. But the new patron, who had swallowed up all the others, demanded only the best and this patron knew - Hegel's pronouncement on the death of art had reached its ears - that the best were dead.

This was not quite how Schenker explained the situation to himself. He could have said, along with Hegel, that the artist could no longer function in a society where the constant and ubiquitous hum of 'thought', of 'reflection' had made it impossible for him to find a quiet corner
in which to listen to his intuitions, to escape self-consciousness. As Federhofer describes it, his position seems more straightforward. He felt that he could not compete with the great geniuses. But this should not necessarily be taken for mere modesty. He believed that his critical judgement outstripped his creative ability and was so refined as to be able to tolerate nothing but the product of genius. He preferred to align himself as critic with the geniuses rather than as composer with the composers of the present, who were, he believed, 'average' composers for the 'average' man.

As critic one sets oneself up by implication in some sense, above even the creative genius. This is possible without incurring the charge of personal arrogance for those who subscribe to the Hegelian aesthetic. According to this, 'thought' - the function of the intellect - is a higher level activity than imagination, and imagination - creative-artistic activity - is no more than the dumb striving of intuitions towards the condition of thought. But if that is true, as soon as intellect has developed to the point where it can articulate everything, new art becomes superfluous. The art of the past, however, remains as the repository of all those things which were merely felt by the people of the past, things which they were incapable of putting into the language of the intellect. It remains as a bottomless reservoir from which the art-historian can draw sustenance for his activity, his translation of art out of the poetic language of the imagination into the fully articulate 'prose of thought', for evermore.

It is exactly this claim that Forte makes on Schenker's behalf: that Schenker is like a great scientist, who in turn is comparable to and at least the equivalent of the
artistic genius. Appropriately enough, for this is at first the unspoken, perhaps even unadmitted, assumption underlying Schenker's thinking, but one which surfaces in a fashion which it is hard to think of as anything but forlorn in Free Composition. Here Schenker looks alarmingly like the kind of 'scientist of art' Hegel's theory proposes. In such a scientist we would not expect to find the unrestrained enthusiasm of Nietzsche's or Wagner's praise of Schopenhauer. Rather, we look for that remote disinterestedness, the famous objectivity of the scientist, the sense of occupying a position altogether hors de combat, the position of a spectator on life who, like the audience at a Greek tragedy, can judge as if he were God.

Schenker's irresistible urge to judge is indicative of the role he perceived for himself. That role was one which Nietzsche helped to define for him and to justify, but also to modify in a way that was to transform his work, to make it more constructive, to enable it to employ the residue of that impulse to create, to be artistic, which had originally been so strong and which had almost been swallowed up by the notion of scholarship. Schenker was not content with the role of scholar, and not simply because in this role, too, he had failed to make any great impact. He detested the world of official scholarship even as he was half-seduced by it, in a fashion only Nietzsche was capable of articulating. But he was dissatisfied with the modern notion of scholarship altogether, and Nietzsche did more than simply explain to him the nature of his own dissatisfaction: he helped him to see a possible escape from it.

We should not be misled by the apparently negative assessment of Nietzsche's competence to contribute anything to the study of music, therefore, into thinking that...
Schenker's enthusiasm is no more than a formality, a desire to be on the side of the the great and the good. There is no doubt that Schenker read Nietzsche with an intensity of involvement of which his exclamation to Vrieslander is a sign.

* * *

As a philosopher Nietzsche was at the centre of the aesthetic debate in which music played at least as important a part in the nineteenth-century as the plastic arts and literature had done in the eighteenth. The work of a philologist whose claims about the place of music in modern German culture were combined with a critique of 'scientific' philology clearly had relevance for musical scholarship, especially at the very moment when the latter was being transformed into Musikwissenschaft, in direct imitation of philology.

But while Nietzsche's cultural critique has great relevance for Musikwissenschaft, Musikwissenschaft was unlikely to pay heed to it. By 1898, when Nietzsche's real fame began, 'main-stream' musical scholarship was no longer capable of dealing with the cultural-aesthetic issues Nietzsche raised, or even perhaps of recognising the relevance to itself of his complaint about philology's treatment of antiquity as a closed historical entity severed from current life and art. The reasons for this are exactly the reasons for Schenker's distrust of Musikwissenschaft, namely specialisation, timidity, aesthetic indifference, coldness, ideological inertia.
The musicologists, much as they might individually enthuse over Zarathustra or Nietzsche's iconoclasm in general, could not afford to take on board officially his critique of modern scholarship, and this was among the reasons why Schenker was bound to find this critique deeply satisfying. As a scholar and writer on culture, working against the grain of institutionalised learning, Nietzsche provided a model for Schenker. He helped him to orient himself intellectually, and cleared the way to a better understanding of Schopenhauer. Schenker was able to follow Nietzsche's retreat from the Hanslickian, positivist aesthetic back to a relationship with music more congenial to his temperament and one which would be intellectually liberating, in contrast to the deeply inhibiting Hanslickian negativity. More specifically, Nietzsche opened the way to a theoretical synthesis.

Self-definition, an intelligible cultural role, and a constructive - as opposed to a critical- aesthetic, were so important that they might seem to be enough. But Nietzsche offered still more: he offered a contextual rationale. That is to say, he provided a picture of the German cultural situation in which the role he offered Schenker, and the cultural-theoretical synthesis which he helped him to work out, were of central significance. In Nietzsche's interpretation culture - the whole life of society - is intelligible only in aesthetic terms; conversely aesthetics is a cultural concern, not the property of academic or journalistic coteries interested only in compiling pecking orders of artists. It simplified matters for Schenker that neither Nietzsche nor Schopenhauer attached their theories to any living religion, but it was equally important that neither was a champion of secularism. Nietzsche, indeed, saw
the secularizing, de-mythologising tendency as one of the causes of the cultural debility of modern Germany and this was a main theme of the book which was undoubtedly a source of inspiration and comfort to Schenker.27

* * * *

The Birth of Tragedy which appeared in 1872 is an essay on culture, not merely an aesthetic-historical enquiry; it is not only about about the birth of tragedy, but also about its death and regeneration.28 In so far as it can be considered philological in motivation, it is so in the sense that Nietzsche uses philological material as the basis of his cultural theory. Conversely, he uses his cultural theory as an implicit critique of philology through a reinterpretation of philological data.

Nietzsche's account of the death of Greek tragedy, which provides the rationale for his diagnosis of the state of nineteenth-century culture, echoes several characteristics of earlier accounts of the death of art. Like Hegel, he sees the desire for knowledge as leading to the demise of art, but far from sharing Hegel's belief in the superiority of the intellectual over all other modes, and in its triumph as the sign of a higher level of culture, he sees the seeds of cultural catastrophe in the scholarly obsession with the accumulation of arid and unconnected facts.

He proposes two solutions to the problem faced by contemporary culture. One is the revival of tragedy, which for him means something much more significant than the
revival of a theatrical genre, and the other is a rather vaguely defined reconciliation between the scholar and the artist. The two visions are aspects of the same thing, since the revival of tragedy presupposes the kind of scholarship without which Nietzsche would not have been in a position to formulate his theory. But in this theory the justification for scholarship is its role as midwife at the birth of this new tragic art. The other kind of reconciliation, represented by the prosaic art of the novel, is one in which, according to Nietzsche's own diagnosis, scholarly values, Socratic values, triumph over the irrational values of art, taming them and producing a species of art which is domesticated and compatible with science.

This second idea clearly owes much to Nietzsche's own situation as a writer, and specifically as the writer of *The Birth of Tragedy*, which is, as every commentator has observed, a peculiar one, one to which it is difficult even to give a name.\(^{29}\) Nietzsche's own formulation is perhaps the only name for its author: the 'Socratic' artist. The Socratic artist is certainly not a purely Nietzschean invention, but rather Nietzsche's interpretation of the situation of people with a strong artistic impulse but for whom 'naive', unreflective art is impossible and who find their artistic impulses compelled into modes of activity which are to a greater or lesser extent intellectual, either into 'sentimental' (in the Schillerian sense) art, or into art-critical or art-historical activity. In one sense, Nietzsche's notion might be regarded as an acknowledgement of the creative element in the work of people like Winckelmann, and indeed, of the creative element in all constructive theorising. The notion of the Socratic artist represents, perhaps a refusal to pretend that the constructive drive in the writing of history, of philosophy,
of aesthetics, even of physical science, is merely the end-product of induction. Nietzsche in fact is being Goethean. Nietzsche in fact is being Goethean. There is another sense in which he is giving—perhaps unwillingly—a kind of approval to Hegel's notion of the dissolution of pure art under the pressure of contemplation, which is somewhat at odds with his belief in the possibility of a new tragic culture.

As Peter Sloterdijk says, the conflict is a biographical one. Nietzsche did not want to be, did not feel himself to be nothing but Wagner's acolyte. But he could not at that stage think of himself as a creative artist in the Wagnerian sense. As a musician he had enough talent to enable him to recognise Wagner's genius. He had much ground to cover before he could consider himself a poet. Yet he could only with difficulty disguise from himself his intellectual superiority. To put it in his own terms, he was nearer to Socrates than to Sophocles. The ostensible purpose of the project which culminated in The Birth of Tragedy was to establish his credentials as a philosopher. This ambition is indicated in the opening sentence of the book in which Nietzsche announces it as an essay in aesthetics rather than an essay in philology.

The relevance of this dilemma to Schenker hardly requires elaboration. Without any suggestion that Schenker's philosophical talent approaches Nietzsche's, it is easy enough to see how his sense of superiority to other music-critical, music-historical writers was grounded in his sense of the power and urgency of his creative impulse, which enabled him to empathise with composers in a manner he considered indispensable, but which is quite alien to the self-consciously self-effacing 'scientist' of music.
But this is only one of the attractions of *The Birth of Tragedy* for Schenker. Another, hardly less obvious, is Nietzsche's high estimation of the role of music in culture and its defining, originating position in the tragic culture which is its highest form. Music's centrality to the health of culture - culture understood as the coherent life of a society, not merely its decorative or intellectual surface - confers the highest status on those involved in it, a quasi-religious status, confirming Schenker's sense of his calling as comparable to that of Ebn Ezra, and helping him to defend himself from the philistinism of people like Maiulik. Music, in this view, is so important that the study of it cannot be considered less dignified than science and must be recognised as infinitely more so than the vulgar pursuit of wealth.

Nietzsche gives a significance to music which exalts it above the science to which the Hegelian aesthetic had threatened to reduce it, and, indeed, above any other form of art, by making it the unique carrier of a truth by comparison with whose profundity the 'probity' of science - which too often in practice consists of little more than 'lack of practice in dissimulation' - is merely banal, a basic decency, not a moral consummation.33

Nietzsche thus satisfies two of Schenker's deepest needs: the need for a defence against the charge that he had thrown away his worldly opportunities out of dilettantism and the need for inner reassurance, for confirmation of the sense of the seriousness of a devotion to art that did not issue in artistic production in the conventional sense, which was scientific without being merely scientific. As Peter Sloterdijk remarks, Nietzsche had committed 'suicide as a scholar'.34 Yet, by Schenker's time, he was hugely
celebrated. Schenker, who had committed suicide as a lawyer, and failed to resurrect himself as a musicologist, just as Nietzsche had failed to gain his chair in philosophy, could find here some justification for hope of the recognition for which he waited with Schopenhauerian stubbornness.

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Long before 1917 indications appear in Schenker's correspondence and in his diary entries of his interest in Nietzsche. In 1912, writing about what he believed to be a tendency among artists to turn to older styles with increasing age, he remarked in parenthesis, 'All this can be understood from the chorus in Greek tragedy and also from the voice-leading principles of older music....That we no longer employ a chorus and in music work in scale-steps does not cancel out the validity of the antique chorus and voice-leading principles'. 35 But there is little evidence in this - supposing it was inspired by reading Nietzsche rather than Wagner - that he had understood the import of the The Birth of Tragedy, or perceived in it the particular significance it might have for him. It appears rather to be a straining of any ideas he found vaguely congenial to try to make them fit in with his current preoccupations. By 1917 he had moved on in many respects, and Vrieslander's letter is a marker of the more fruitful approach to Nietzsche which had begun to take shape in the meantime and which Vrieslander's 'discovery' now sanctioned.

It is not difficult to see why, Wagner notwithstanding, The Birth of Tragedy should be capable of exerting a powerful influence on Schenker's thought. Although Nietzsche
is, as Vrieslander points out, anti-hermeneutic, a sine qua non for Schenker's approval, he was as far removed as possible from the 'ice-coldness' which the young Schenker had found so repellent in Hanslick. No-one who has read any of Schenker's writings can doubt the passionate intensity of his feelings about art, or fail to be somewhat perplexed by the suspiciousness of emotionally oriented explanations of music to be found in his middle period writings. In fact, his hostility to interpretations in terms of feeling was by no means as rigid as some advocates of his system would have us believe, and at the very end of his life he reverted unequivocally to the notion of music as expression. From the start there was a dilemma at the heart of Schenker's attitude to music. Nietzsche provided a means of solving this dilemma, partly through his own ideas and partly by making Schopenhauer accessible and his theory usable, which it had clearly not been in 1910. Schenker's final understanding of Schopenhauer's aesthetics of music is closer to Nietzsche's understanding than to that of most modern readers.

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The Birth of Tragedy remains a deeply controversial book and gives rise to vastly different interpretations. Even the familiar Nietzschean opposition—between the Apolline and the Dionysian—is regarded in very different ways by different commentators and the nature of Nietzsche's relationships to Schopenhauer and to Wagner are an endless source of argument. But the controversies over The Birth of Tragedy concern us here less than the particular

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significance of the book for Schenker.37

The opening pages, with their biological imagery, the notion of art being born out of the mating of contrary impulses, and the association of one of these impulses with form and the other with feeling, are full of things to capture Schenker's interest. No less engaging will have been the notion that these two artistic powers 'spring from nature itself, without the mediation of the human artist'.38

The idea of the highest art being not merely beautiful, static, unresponsive, but imbued with the profoundest seriousness and an energy derived from life itself will have had great appeal for him.39

Nietzsche goes on to describe the relationship between the Apolline and Dionysian tendencies in a manner which Schenker's later writings again and again recall. 'In order to understand this' he says, 'we must level down, stone by stone, as it were, the elaborate construction of Apolline culture until we can see its underlying foundations'.40 Underlying the Apolline illusion lies 'the mysterious foundation of our being whose phenomena we are', the 'primal Oneness' which needs the illusion 'for its constant redemption: an illusion that we, utterly caught up in it - as a continuous becoming in time, space and causality, in other words - are required to see as empirical reality'. In Harmony, rather than including human beings in the fabric of illusion, Schenker accords vitality to musical tones.41 It comes to much the same thing: what we share with the musical sounds is our 'continuous becoming in time [and] space'.42

The Apolline tendency is primarily the tendency towards
individuation, to separation, the describing and maintenance of boundaries, while that of the Dionysian is back towards the 'primal Onenness'.

It seems almost vulgar - like quibbling with Nietzsche's idea of Greek harmony - to draw a comparison between his poetic flights and Helmholtz's observation that a piece of (tonal) music arises out of a single sound and that every note of it relates back to that sound. It is inconceivable, however, that this comparison did not strike Schenker. Nietzsche's thought greatly enriches Helmholtz's by giving it a deeper aesthetic significance and relating it to the nature and meaning of human existence.

Nietzsche's idea of music as an expression of the 'universal Oneness' centres his whole cultural theory and gives a single focus to a number of theories which might seem to have little in common but which were all among the offspring of the marriage between two of the great monotheistic religions and the science of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, a marriage which grew out of the rediscovery of the science of antiquity. The resemblance between Helmholtz's claim that every note of a piece of music arises out of a single sound and must return to it and Newton's theory of colour is not fortuitous. Newton himself doggedly pursued a way of expressing the spectral divisions of light as precise as the harmonic series to which he felt it to be comparable. The similarities between Schopenhauer's universal will, out of which all individual wills arise, and the will which is the creative impulse of a unique god is obvious. Schopenhauer's atheism is heavily dependent on the prior proposition of a single creator. His universal will is not a concept one can imagine occurring to an Attic thinker.
The Goethe-inspired evolutionist picture he paints of the development of musical structure resembles the Hebrew creation myth, in which the world is filled with the objects of the imagination of God beginning with inert matter and ending with conscious humanity; similarly, it resembles the Darwinian theory which its proposition of progressive refinement, through conflict and competition for space, seems to anticipate. It stands as a point of balance between the two, a hint of how far the latter was from total emancipation from its cultural conditioning. And it has a similar role in relation to Nietzsche's theory of tragedy. Nietzsche later said that this book was anti-Christian, and much of what it contains certainly runs counter to the ethos of Christianity as he characterises it, but there are clear enough resemblances on the mythical level in Nietzsche's interpretation to make the passionate references to Lutheran chorale less startling than they ought, perhaps, to be. And if Nietzsche rejects Christian morality as enfeebling, he rejects no less what had become the stereotypical and exclusive notion of Greek art, the too often repeated 'noble simplicity and quiet grandeur' which Winckelmann saw in the Laocoön, by making central to his interpretation of tragedy the oriental myth of God dismembered but finally re-integrated, restoring to pre-eminence the power of depth and seriousness which it is the purpose of the noble quietude to contain.

The notion of the form-creating potential of a single generative sound had been slow to develop because of two long-standing assumptions. The first was that music took its form from other arts, from dance patterns, military manoeuvres, verse metres, verbal cadence, strophic recurrence and so on; the second, related, assumption was that it derived its form by means of imitation of phenomena. About
the latter belief Nietzsche is emphatic. For him imitative music was 'counterfeit' art, music which 'has been utterly robbed of its mythopoetic power'. He characterises it as neither Dionysian nor Apolline but Socratic. 'Tone-painting' is not just another sort of music. It is 'the very opposite of true music'. If music attempts to imitate phenomena it forfeits its right to be considered as art since it is merely an imitator of other art. It is not a question of the possibility of employing musical means to imitate phenomena. That is possible but it is not the way art is made. To become art music must go back beyond the words or the imagined picture, even though these may be the immediate stimulus which stirs the composer's creative impulse into activity, and speak directly of the impulse from which these words and images arise.

When the concept of a generative tonic did enter into analytic thought it was preceded by mechanistic analogies which were completely incompatible with it. Functional harmonic theories confine the function of sound to the articulation of predetermined forms conceived either in accordance with the traditional analogies or some version of the mechanical one. Nietzsche's category of the Apolline as illusion loosens the notion of form from the forms of objects already existing by generalising it to the appearance of whatever object constitutes its content. Nietzsche was indebted to Kant for this distinction between appearance and underlying reality upon which he imposes his own mythical meaning. But there is also a debt to Goethe, whom Nietzsche, like Schopenhauer, revered not only as artist but also as thinker. For Goethe, unlike Kant, did not believe that the gulf between the two was unbridgeable, only that some different quality of insight was needed if the bridge were to be crossed. Yet Goethe's angle of approach,
like the one proposed by Nietzsche, and unlike Schopenhauer's, is essentially empirical and inductive, a gradual levelling down of the phenomenal structure. But then what? Does the levelling down process of itself reveal the truth? According to Goethe it is the necessary preparation for the leap of imagination he calls apperception. Nietzsche explains it in a different, but related way.

The search for the truth is a kind of hunt, like the hunting by King Midas of Silenus, whose capture brings only the appalling revelation that 'the best of all things is ...not to be born' and the second best 'is to die soon'. 'Now,' says Nietzsche, 'the Olympian magic mountain opens up before us revealing all its roots'. The truth, that is to say, is accessible only through myth and myth is about a kind of knowing that comes only through intuition. 'The Greeks knew and felt the fears and horrors of existence.' The subjective-objective debate is not only about art, but about ways of knowing.

Nietzsche's Goethean, Kantian, Schopenhauerian vision is thoroughly German, rooted in the German Enlightenment, which never lost touch with the metaphysical, as opposed to the mechanistic theories of art which are imbued with the rationalistic, secular atmosphere of the French Enlightenment. He illuminates a path back into the heartland of the culture which the mechanistically inclined scientists felt to be an embarrassment. In doing so he incidentally provides, for those who need it, and Schenker had great need of it, a justification for devoting life to this effort to 'level down, stone by stone, the elaborate construction[s]' of art 'until we can see its underlying foundations'. Nietzsche offers to this dubious 'science of art' the possibility of 'redemption' by making it a way of
understanding existence, by making it philosophical.

The relationship might not be so obvious if Nietzsche had not chosen to explicate his notion of tragedy in such overtly musical terms. It is the fashion in which he does this that opens the way to Schopenhauer, for it is the Nietzschean-Schopenhauerian solution to the problem of subjectivity in art out of which Nietzsche constructs his theory of tragedy.

Nietzsche begins his approach to 'the true goal of our enquiry' by investigating yet another opposition, that between Homer, the father of epic, and Archilocus, the lyric poet, the objective and the subjective artist respectively. So the conventions of modern aesthetics would have us categorise them. These categories, Nietzsche says, are unhelpful to us, first because they do not allow us to acknowledge the lyric poet as a true artist at all since subjective art is, by definition, 'bad art', and secondly because the lyric poet is, of all artists, the least appropriate to whom to apply this description, since being identical with the musician, 'as a Dionysiac artist he has been thoroughly united with the primal Oneness'. Thus he 'has already abandoned his subjectivity in the Dionysiac process'. This 'process' Nietzsche describes as follows.

'When Archilocus...proclaims his raging love and at the same time his contempt for the daughters of Lycambes, it is not his passion that dances before us in orgiastic frenzy; we see Dionysus and the Maenads, we see the intoxicated reveller Archilocus sunk in sleep - as Euripides describes it in the Bacchae, asleep in a high mountain pasture in the midday sun - and now Apollo comes up to him and touches him with the laurel.
The Dionysiac musical enchantment of the sleeping man now sends out sparks of images, lyric poems which, at the peak of their evolution, will bear the name of tragedies and dithyrambs.\textsuperscript{47}

The lyric poet is 'the moving centre of the world. Archilocus the man...is only a vision of the genius who has already ceased to be Archilocus and instead becomes the world genius...'. Elsewhere Nietzsche says, 'The individual who wills and furthers his own egoistic purposes, can be considered only the adversary...of art. But in so far as the subject is an artist, he is already liberated from his individual will and has become a medium through which the only truly existent subject celebrates his redemption through illusion'.

This is Nietzsche's alternative to the solution offered by Schopenhauer, the alternation of self as subject and self as object.

'It is the...singer's own willing that fills his consciousness...always as emotion, passion, an agitated state of mind. Besides this, however, and simultaneously with it, the singer, through the sight of surrounding nature, becomes conscious of himself as the subject of pure, willless (\textit{sic}) knowing...The feeling of this...alternate play is really what is expressed in the whole of the song, and what in general constitutes the lyrical state....The genuine song is the expression or copy of the whole of this mingled and divided state of mind.' \textsuperscript{48}

Schopenhauer's solution is unsatisfying to Nietzsche because it leaves lyric poetry as 'an incompletely achieved
art'. But the sense in which his own formulation is offered, 'according to [Schopenhauer's] spirit and in his honour' is not at this point spelled out, and the next section refers to him only in passing. It is only much later when Nietzsche quotes Schopenhauer again in section sixteen of *The Birth of Tragedy* that we catch a glimpse of the characteristic of the musical genius upon which his definition of the lyric poet is based.49 This characteristic is a responsiveness to 'the inner nature of the world', Nietzsche's Dionysian, which involves no rational mediation. The real source however is that point in the chapter on music in which Schopenhauer describes the composer as a sleep-walker.

"The invention of melody, its uncovering of all the deepest secrets of human desire and feeling is the work of genius, whose action...has nothing to do with reflection and conscious intention and could be called an inspiration....The composer reveals the innermost nature of the world and expresses the deepest wisdom in a language that his intellect does not understand, as a medium under hypnosis speaks about things of which, waking, she has no notion. For this reason, the man and the artist are quite different and separate, more so in the composer than in any other artist." 50

But this is the idea which actually dominates section six. Nietzsche does not merely develop his argument from this point in terms of the Schopenhauerian vocabulary, as some commentators suggest. Section six is entirely derived from Schopenhauer's musical theory. Every item here comes from the chapters on music and poetry in *The World as Will and Representation*, sometimes in the shape of paraphrase and sometimes in near-quotation: the primacy and universality
of melody; the explanation of strophic poetry as series of images, alternative objectifications of the significance of the music; the reference to Des Knaben Wunderhorn; words as analogous to music; the interpreting of Beethoven symphonies; music as will, the one thing Nietzsche directly attributes to Schopenhauer; the claim that 'music cannot be exhaustively interpreted through language', that language cannot 'uncover the innermost core of music'; because music relates to a sphere 'beyond and prior to all phenomena'. Moreover, the penultimate paragraph of section six, where the lyric poet is depicted in the Schopenhauerian image of the man in the boat who 'sees...his own desire [which]...become[s] a symbol with which he interprets music to himself', approaches Schopenhauer's alternation between contemplation and self-absorption a little too closely for comfort.

Anyone familiar with Schopenhauer's metaphysics of music must find it difficult not to see the development of Nietzsche's argument from this point onwards as a synthesis of the Schopenhauerian theory and Nietzsche's philological material, an interpretation of that material in the light of the Schopenhauerian metaphysics of music. This impression remains even if Nietzsche's interpretation leads him to an un-Schopenhauerian, an un-resigned conclusion, and even if, in a sense certainly not intended by Nietzsche, it is a contradiction of Schopenhauer's deepest insight about music, which is exactly that the content of music cannot adequately be discharged in words and images. We must see Greek tragedy, Nietzsche says, 'as the Dionysiac chorus, continually discharging itself in an Apolline world of images. These choric sections which recur throughout the tragedy are
therefore, so to speak, the womb of what is called the dialogue...this primal ground of tragedy radiates that vision of the drama which is entirely dream phenomenon and thus epic in nature, but, on the other hand, as the objectification of a Dionysiac state, it is not Apolline redemption through illusion but rather a representation of the fragmentation of the individual and his unification with the primal being'.

The chorus, being 'Dionysiac', is, by definition, musical. The 'primal ground' corresponds to Schopenhauer's will. The music is the expression of this will, through the amorphous unity, the un-individuated communal being, the chorus. The tragic action and dialogue correspond to those 'sparks of images', 'lyric poems' sent out by the musical enchantment of 'the sleeping man' Archilocus, touched by the laurel of Apollo. They are the objectifications of the musical content through form, individuation, illusion.

It is easy to see why Schenker was overjoyed at the thought that he could read *The Birth of Tragedy* without having to feel that he was giving a vote of confidence to Wagner. But it is not difficult to see also why *The Birth of Tragedy* was not sufficient in itself. For Nietzsche music might be the heart of everything, the source of all art, but, by itself it seems to be incapable of being a complete, a perfected art, like tragedy. It may be that the dialogue of the tragedy is secondary to the music, but it is also hard to escape the feeling, Nietzsche's disclaimers notwithstanding, that it is only by means of 'discharge' into images that the 'primal ground' can express itself fully. Music is not capable of articulating the will in itself. Indeed, here there is just the trace of an Hegelian sense that while language cannot fully represent the
significance of the music, it is, at any rate, better at doing so than the music. Why else would the enchantment of the music issue in images, in illusions of people, action, dialogue? Nietzsche's objection to Schopenhauer's interpretation of lyric poetry seems to apply to his own interpretation of music.

That the argument of The Birth of Tragedy culminates in the Wagnerian idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk, the Greek tragedy in its new guise, as, apparently, a higher form of art than music itself, inevitably presents a difficulty to Schenker. From his point of view, Nietzsche's application of Schopenhauer's aesthetics of music to the problem of the origin of Greek drama and to the solution of the problem of a declining 'Socratic' culture, such as Nietzsche's Germany, is not an aesthetic advance, but a regression, despite its extreme usefulness as the basis of a cultural polemic of tremendous power and appeal.

Nevertheless, Nietzsche's notion of music as primary, arising out of a unity - the inarticulate cry referred to by Schenker in Der Geist der Musikalischen Technik - which, to become art, must become Apolline, individuated, formed, beautiful, corresponds satisfyingly, and perhaps not by accident, to the already familiar idea of the 'tonic' as the source of all the sounds making up a piece of music. But it allows that idea to expand to accommodate the significance of the primal cry and creates the possibility that the individuated forms can themselves be not merely forms, but the expressions of that significance, not less authentic than images and words, but more so. Meanwhile, the notion of the Apolline, once the imagination, the capacity to dream, ceases to be limited to the visual, as Nietzsche seems to limit it, provides a notion of the phenomenal in which the
musical substance can find objectification—definition, articulation, beauty, clarity, in a word, take shape, 'become', without resorting to the imitation of other phenomena. This notion, in addition, has nothing to do with the 'scientific' notion of the patterns into which the musical structure can be analysed, but has everything to do with that kind of science which proposes a kinship between nature and art, namely Goethean science, which was so powerful an influence on Schopenhauer's thought and therefore—and undoubtedly also directly—on Nietzsche's.61

Clearly Schenker had several incentives and several routes to a notion of a generative impulse at work in nature and in art, and the similarities are far more profound than notions picked up in passing merely as part of the Zeitgeist. Goethe the scientist is the great inspiration, the great energiser of the creative, as opposed to the aridly critical-analytic side of nineteenth-century aesthetics, and much more. His rejection and neglect is a monument to the philistinism which issued in that most deadening of twentieth-century orthodoxies, the thought-policing which forbids us to speak of that which we do not know with certainty. The consequence of this kind of inhibition is perfectly exemplified by a work like The Beautiful in Music which consists of the progressive elimination of every possible way of thinking about music, outside the art-historical, which contains any trace of illumination or joy.

In Schopenhauer, as we have seen, this notion of a representation of the will consisting of the interplay of articulated forms in pure sound preceded Nietzsche's notion of its discharge into images and words. But it may have
taken the stimulus of The Birth of Tragedy to bring home to Schenker its full significance, and, no less important, its essential simplicity. For Schopenhauer, far from inventing a notion of musical structure, merely describes an existing one, which no one had done in such a way before, because those who understood it well enough were lying asleep in the midday sun under the twin spells of Dionysian enchantment and Apollo's laurel, emanating divine sparks.

For Schopenhauer there is no problem about music's expressive capacity. Its ability to express, to speak, is supreme, far exceeding that of any other art. Nor is there anything false about our sense that what it expresses is related to our deepest feelings, and he removed the problem for Schenker, who speaks in highly Schopenhauerian fashion about this in Free Composition. Only, Schopenhauer reminds us, and here his emphasis is different from Nietzsche's in a way that is significant for Schenker, we should not imagine that when we tell ourselves stories about what the music is saying, these are either necessarily or exclusively the stories the music is trying to tell us and which, because of its inadequacy, we have to supply for ourselves. It is because our intellectual faculty is incapable of understanding the language of music that we feel a need to reinterpret it in the language of images and words. Nevertheless, these re-interpretations are analogical representations, faute de mieux. They are not translations.

It is, of course, only some listeners who propose visual or conceptual illusions to themselves as they listen. Many find this way of listening a block to full engagement with the 'inner significance' of the music. This is not to say that such listeners are therefore confined to listening to the markers of the music's mathematically expressible
structure, any more than the reader of a novel has to choose between reading the story and reading the syntax.

It should not surprise us that Nietzsche the philologist - while he does not deny that music is fully capable of 'discharging' its own meanings by means of its own language, and says that the meaning of myth cannot be fully discharged in images - could not escape implying by his theory of words and images emerging from the music that this is the only way in which these meanings can be made accessible to us. It is this implied denial of the possibility of music as an autonomous art and the apparent elevation of drama over music, despite the ascription of priority to music, with which Schenker was bound to dissent.

Nietzsche's theory, however, helps to illuminate what appears to be a strange contradiction in Schenker: the notion that music began by imitating words, that before music existed as an independent art it existed as an art which took its form from words.\(^{63}\) An idea of such a pre-Dionysian music also exists in Nietzsche.

In Nietzsche's description, pre-Dionysian Apolline music has two characteristics which, again, could have been derived from Schopenhauer. One of these is abstraction. This must be the 'empty generality of abstraction' which Schopenhauer contrasts with the abstraction of musical form which is comparable to geometrical figures and numbers, precise as well as universal, observable as the 'forms of all possible objects of experience'.\(^{64}\) It cannot be the latter because that is autonomous, and Apolline music is, by definition, externally determined. The other characteristic is the 'conscious intentionality of conceptually mediated imitation'.\(^{65}\) The historical entity - pre-Dionysian music -
is thus the close relative of all 'imitative, pictorial music', but it is not identical with it. Pre-Dionysian music imitates feelings and pictures no more than it expresses the will. The object of its imitation is not the content of the words but the form of the utterance.

The same is true of Schenker's music 'of the prehistoric era'. Before music had developed its own rationale it was 'dominated by the needs of the word, the march, the dance', Nietzsche's 'Apolline states'. 'The word alone was the generator of tone successions.' A 'tone succession' is not a melody. A melody has its own 'rationale'. 'In melody,' says Schopenhauer, 'proceeding in the exalted, singing, directed, uninterrupted, meaningful coherence of a thought from beginning to end...we recognise the highest level of the objectification of the will...'.

We do not recognise this in a 'succession of tones' determined by the needs of the word. What Schenker has in mind, what he recognises clearly in Nietzsche, is the musical imitation not of the significance of the words but of their rhetorical gestures. He is talking about a kind of music typified by what we know as recitative, as he had already indicated in the passage in *Harmony* to which this passage is closely related, and which is not, as we might be tempted to think, one of those conventions, like the theory of modulation, which he later jettisoned.

Because he says that 'the emotional power of the tone' is excluded in Apolline music we cannot assume that Nietzsche is identifying Apolline music with the aesthetic category of restraint. If this is part of his meaning it is so in a very particular way. For what he is saying is that there is nothing to restrain. The emotional potential is not restrained, not balanced by Apolline form, it is simply
excluded altogether. There is no independent musical form because there is no content. Thus the idea of an aesthetic category - a category of works - which could be called Apolline is meaningless. Works of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may have Apolline music in them and they may tend towards the Apolline but there can be no such thing as an Apolline work, still less an Apolline genre.

Schenker says that this word-determined music 'continued even for a considerable time into the historical age of counterpoint, of monody, and in the newly found vocal forms which, without modification were transferred to instruments'. He is proposing a kind of historical scenario in which the Dionysian substance tries to enter the hollow Apolline rhetorical forms, in which musical patterns, which in their origin are wholly determined by the cadences of speech, gradually take on a life of their own. There is a constant struggle between the needs of the music and the needs of the word. This is not a simple history in which there was first word-dominated music and then absolute music. The recognition that there could be music which was wholly independent of the word came very late, although the reality of the superior expressive power of music had long been so well understood that it had often provoked a determination to suppress it. He goes on to explain how the Italian technique of diminution suggested the possibility of forms determined by the musical impulse rather than by the gestures of the language, and then he introduces his nationalistic note. Italian diminution did not fulfil its potential precisely because it could not finally break away from the word. It was German music which achieved this. And what does Schenker see as the great liberating force in German music, which enabled it to develop diminutional techniques which would give rise to autonomous musical
forms, to works which were wholly musical?

The answer to this brings us full circle, back to Nietzsche’s idea of the source of tragedy as the spirit of music as it expresses itself in lyrical poetry, the poetry which, like folk-song, is an attempt to embody in the Apolline - words, images - that which the music expresses directly. For the great well-spring of German music is the Lutheran chorale, this being the expression of German-ness, German Protestantism, German depth, German intensity of feeling, German seriousness. For the Lutheran chorale is the marriage of the music of German folk-song and Christian mythology, which is thus rescued from ecclesiastical abstraction and restored to the folk. If, at this point we were to turn back to Counterpoint, we would find Schenker strenuously demonstrating the difference between a chorale melody and a mere 'succession of tones' known as the cantus firmus. Everything comes together for Schenker as for Nietzsche: Dionysus, myth, music, Germany.

'[We] might...congratulate ourselves that this so questionable culture of ours has as yet nothing in common with the noble core of our people's character. On the contrary, all our hopes stretch out lovingly towards the perception that...there is concealed a glorious, intrinsically healthy, primordial power...It is from this abyss that the German Reformation came forth: and in its chorales the future tune of German music resounded for the first time. So deep, courageous and spiritual, so exuberantly good and tender did this chorale of Luther sound - as the first Dionysian luring call breaking forth from dense thickets at the approach of spring. And, in competing echoes the solemnly exuberant procession of Dionysian revellers responded,
Nietzsche's theory of the priority of music is unthinkable without Schopenhauer's but the intelligibility of the musical significance of Schopenhauer's theory is not, in the end, enhanced by Nietzsche's. While Schopenhauer stresses the absence of any relationship of necessity between music and the words of a song or of an opera, its independence of any phenomenal manifestation, or any secondary representation, Nietzsche reinstates, or at least is in danger of seeming to reinstate, just such a relation of necessity, if in the opposite direction from the one usually understood. The verbalisation and image-making which occur in a musical context are wholly motivated by and dependent upon the music. They are the Apolline forms by means of which the listener and the poet alike attempt to give phenomenal or quasi-phenomenal shape to the music's content, its (Schopenhauerian) 'deeper significance'. However, the supreme status Nietzsche accords to tragedy cannot help leaving us with the impression that these phenomenal forms are indispensable to the articulation of the meaning of the music, that it can never articulate its own meanings.

The importance of Nietzsche's idea for Schenker is not, however, to do with image-making, but with the notion that musical content is prior to and determines artistic form. With the superiority of his musical insight, which is not invalidated by his tendency to boast about it, Schenker can take this idea and replace the Nietzschean notion of the
Apolline as visual with the concept of a form which may be represented visually by analogy, but in itself is the antithesis of the visual, a purely auditory, a purely musical form. In this way he was able to solve the problem that paralysed Hanslick. In his early writings, like Hanslick, he took content to be configurations of notes. He called them motifs. But motifs are forms not contents. Eventually Schenker abandoned this idea in favour of a notion of form as something which can only be perceived as the space occupied by the content. The creative force - whatever we understand that to be - gives rise to a sonic entity which emerges from undifferentiated sound, develops and makes room for itself, takes shape. Form is not imposed from without as in the imitative arts which assume the forms of natural phenomena, but is articulated gradually from within.

Schenker's image for the initiation of the process is of an original space-creating gesture which consists of the first differentiation of the tones of the triad, and the first melodic line, their expansion into a space which they articulate by means of their expansion. From there, through the processes of elaboration whose exegesis requires the technical understanding of composition (the Leibnizian arithmetic) won through years of Socratic - better Goethean - 'calm contemplation', Schenker traces the gradual expression of the musical will as it takes on its Apolline form and emerges into the phenomenal world as a fully articulated work of art.

Now it is possible to see what Schenker had in mind when he regretted Nietzsche's lack of technical knowledge. It is not just the disgruntlement of the expert at the interference of the philosopher, as his earlier similar
remark about Schopenhauer had been, but a sense that Nietzsche glossed over a level of his own theory because he did not have the technical insight to explore it or even to suspect its existence. This lack, moreover, was not merely a personal one, but the result of the dissemination of the false theoretical notions which Schenker was continually struggling to eradicate. Schenker's remark is a comment on the state of culture very much in tune with Nietzsche's own. Schenker's theory develops Nietzsche's expansion of Schopenhauer's notion of music by filling it out with the 'thoroughgoing precise particularity' of music itself.

If we are determined to read Schenker in literal-minded fashion, we will not get very far. The rhapsodic, poetic expression of his last book is partly the product of his growing recognition that the attempt to express these ideas fully in purely literal terms is, by definition, impossible, hence his increasing reliance on graphic exposition. He had become less Socratic and more artistic, taking the point which Hanslick himself had failed to take of his own Schopenhauerian dictum that 'music is a language which cannot be translated', and demanding that the reader make an effort of imagination.

* * *

Our consideration of The Birth of Tragedy could, from the point of view of its contribution to Schenker's theoretical synthesis, stop at this point if Schenker's interest in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in the second decade of the century had been purely theoretical. The theoretical
significance to his work of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, which had been there all along, undoubtedly presented itself more clearly, partly because of the stage of development his own thinking had reached, partly because of the appearance of the new edition of Schopenhauer and partly because of the political situation. Schenker's personal circumstances - he was now middle-aged, his health was not good and his hopes of ever gaining an institutional appointment were becoming ever more remote - must have given the anti-institutional polemics of both men particular piquancy for him, and, as has already been observed, The Birth of Tragedy is far more than an exercise in philology, if it is that at all. The cultural critique which constitutes the last third of the book depends more on Nietzsche's account of the development and decline of the tragedy than the account of its origins which is of the most direct relevance to Schenker's theoretical concerns. As it cannot be understood without this context, the context must briefly be examined.

Nietzsche begins his account of the development of the dramatic character of the tragedy by defending Schiller's 'pseudo-idealism' against the naturalism of his own day. The stage on which the drama was enacted represents an 'ideal' place, comparable to that ideal place which the Greeks called 'Olympus', and it was as real to them as Olympus was, without being real in the sense in which daily life is real. On the contrary, just as civilisation is 'annulled' by music 'as lamplight is annulled by the light of day' so the social and political realities of Greek life were annulled by the 'satyr chorus...living ineradicably behind all civilisation...'. The danger in this is that on returning to the everyday the tragic spectator is struck by a debilitating sense of its absurdity and may sink into a
Hamlet-like lethargy. It is, however, not 'reflection', the Hegelian contemplation, which paralyses him, but understanding which has been given him through the chorus, 'in a single glimpse'. What saves him from this paralysis is art. But this art, tragic art - which alone possesses this redeeming power - has nothing to do with the pastoral idyll of the cultural masquerade. Much later, in section nineteen, Nietzsche elaborates on the cultural 'lie' of the pastoral in an attack on the first attempt to revive Greek drama, Italian opera: this is a topic which Schenker takes up in his comparison of Italian and German 'diminution' in Free Composition.

We have already seen how Nietzsche understands the dramatic dialogue, personae and action as the Apolline distillation of the Dionysian truth into the imagery of the dream, which veils reality, making it endurable. The Dionysian lyric inspiration is condensed in epic forms. And these forms have healing power. Nietzsche writes in a way that tells us he has been reading Goethe on the subject of light. When we look into the sun and turn away we see patches of darkness. When we look into the terrible darkness of the dithyrambic abyss and turn away we see patches of healing, consoling light. These light-patches are the Apolline masks of the Sophoclean and Aeschylean heroes. This is the sense in which art restores the spectator's courage to go on with life. This is the real meaning of 'Greek cheerfulness', not the 'untroubled contentment' of the complacent spectator of the merely beautiful. The consolation of art lies in its Promethean challenge to the gods, its defiant rivalry in creativity.

Two developments led to the demise of tragedy. One was the loss of the sense of myth as myth and its substitution.
by the notion of myth as cult-validating history, the second was the related phenomenon of dramatic realism, the representation of the ordinary individual in all the 'bourgeois mediocrity' of his ordinariness, with his 'mundane, commonplace everyday-life', on the stage. Euripides 'brought the spectator onto the stage', taught him to philosophise, enlightened him, made him shrewd and entertained him with images of cunning and guile.74 'The pleasure of the moment, wit, whimsy and caprice', the characteristics of the slave mentality, 'came into their own' with Euripides.

What also came into its own was critical aesthetics, judgement, which demanded intelligibility above all. Euripides ensures this by means of his prologue, which provides all the information the spectator requires to understand the story. But he also makes the drama intelligible in another sense. It is no longer a series of incomprehensible happenings to which the mythic protagonists, the 'patches of light' respond with incomprehensible lamentations and exultations, but the actions of ordinary individuals with ordinary individual emotions. To express this in Schopenhauerian terms we might say that the feelings read into music by the listener in his attempt to interpret it are no longer merely analogous to the cosmic ecstasy of the Dionysian will, but correspond to all that is actually to be found in the Euripidean drama.

Euripides himself is the archetype of the sceptical spectator, but there is, Nietzsche says, a second spectator, so sceptical as to be incapable of acknowledging the validity of art at all. This spectator is Socrates.

Socrates demanded intelligibility not merely on
aesthetic but also on moral grounds. He abhorred the irrational, the instinctive. For him the tragedy was senseless, it did not 'tell what's true', that is, what is ascertainable as a matter of fact, and it served no practical purpose. He was, says Nietzsche, 'the opponent of Dionysus' who was forced to flee 'into the depths of the sea'. But his poetry escaped total destruction when the Platonic 'life-boat', that genre which was a compendium of all genres, the Platonic dialogue, 'crammed them into its narrow space' and carried them into a new world where they found a home in a new art-form: the novel. The drama, however, took a 'death-leap into bourgeois theatre'.

The crucial factor in the death of tragedy is the abolition of the chorus. What has gone before makes it sufficiently clear why tragedy cannot survive without the chorus and why the chorus could not survive in a drama which sought to replace action with dialectic, divine ecstasy with individual emotion, epic with schematic narrative, in order to be rational, representative, intelligible.

But Socrates, just before his death, in response to a dream in which he was admonished 'Socrates, make music', wrote a hymn to Apollo. This inconsistent act prompts Nietzsche to envisage Socrates asking himself, 'Might there be a realm of wisdom from which the logician is excluded? Might art even be a necessary correlative and supplement to science?'.

At this point Nietzsche moves to a consideration of the nature of the Socratic, the 'theoretical man', which strictly speaking can have little to do with his theme, the origin of tragedy. But it turns out to have everything to do with his theme of its re-birth. For the re-birth of tragedy
is the solution to the problem of a senescent Socratic culture such as Nietzsche believed he found himself born into. The significance of the Socratic music-making now becomes apparent: Socrates's valedictory hymn is a reaction to the excess of the theoretical in himself, and his future role will be to provoke such reactions by just that excess. Socrates 'established a common network of rational thought across the globe'. It is impossible to overestimate the power, the beneficial effect on human life, the joy of that achievement. But it is capable of excess. It 'rushes to its boundaries' where 'the gifted man' finds himself facing the 'ineffable' where logic and empirical knowledge cannot help him, where he comes to a new knowledge, tragic knowledge, which only art can make bearable. Will there come now a 'music-making Socrates'? 77

What comes here is a long critique of the Socratic excess of the optimistic 'Alexandrian' culture in which knowledge, science, is elevated above everything, a critique to which he recruits Kant and Schopenhauer, whose insight that the phenomenal world is a 'veil of Maya' ushers in a new tragic culture. Meanwhile, art languishes. Enmeshed in philology and art-history, timid theoretical man sees life as an icy river along whose banks he runs up and down afraid to jump in. He becomes a 'critic' a 'librarian', a 'corrector of proofs', than which epithets Nietzsche has few more scathing. The art of this culture is 'the culture of opera' which passed itself off as the re-birth of Greek drama with that travesty of tragic locution, the recitative. Nietzsche mocks the delusion of the Florentine aesthetes that they had re-discovered, with their effete and optimistic pastoral, the art of the Greeks. This opera, says Nietzsche, is the offspring of 'the critical layman'. 78 'It was truly un-musical listeners who demanded that the words
should be understood above all else... Opera is the expression of amateurism in art.' It springs from the belief that 'anyone capable of emotion is an artist'. This pastoral optimism has managed to 'divest music of its Dionysiac cosmic significance, and to turn it into a formally playful entertainment'.

But a new 'daemon rises from the bottomless depths', from 'the Dionysiac soil of the German spirit... terrifying and inexplicable, powerful and hostile - German music... in its mighty sun-cycle from Bach to Beethoven, from Beethoven to Wagner'. But the critics fail to recognise the significance of this phenomenon and can talk of nothing but 'beauty'. 'While the critic held sway in the theatre and the concert hall, the journalist in the schools and the press in society, art degenerated into an entertainment of the lowest kind, and aesthetic criticism became the catalyst for a vain, distracted, selfish... social companionability...'.

What we must hope for is 'the rebirth of German myth' in the same fashion that the Lutheran chorale emerged from the abyss at the time of the Reformation, for tragedy is impossible without myth. A German tragedy must be founded on German myth which must be recovered along with 'all things German' and the 'inner necessity' which must be sought 'in the ambition to be worthy of our sublime predecessors, Luther as well as our great artists and poets'.

One last musical observation concerns the meaning of dissonance: the pleasure of dissonance is the Dionysiac pleasure 'experienced even in pain'. It is, to put it another way, part of the tragic seriousness.
It was in October 1917 that Vrieslander wrote the letter which crammed the genie, Wagner, back into the bottle and made Nietzsche, and through Nietzsche Schopenhauer, more fully accessible. At that point, the German army was secure in the 'massively fortified and comfortable trenches of the Hindenberg Line' while the British wallowed in 'the shell-churned mud of the Ypres salient'. That October had seen an apparent easing of the state of siege which Austria had been suffering. It saw the moving forward of the Italian front from the Isonzo to the Tagliamento, and by November the fifteenth, when Schenker wrote his reply, the front had been pushed as far as the Piave. The Italians had almost been driven out of the Alps. Venice, Treviso, Castelfranco, Verona seemed under threat. The attack, planned in August in sheer desperation and carried out with the aid of six German divisions withdrawn from the Russian front, had succeeded beyond all expectations.

These military facts might seem to have given reason for some satisfaction on the side of the Central Powers. For their populations, however, satisfaction was in very short supply. It would take more than the pushing forward of a front line to soothe the horror of the war. 'The earth,' wrote Hesse in the previous August, was 'littered with the dead and dying, so ravaged and shattered, so charred and desecrated...[that]...the voices of the wounded, the screams of the mad, the accusing plaints of mothers and fathers, sweethearts and sisters, the people's cry of hunger...' demanded only one response: the end of the war.
If there was no mood of jubilation in Vienna in the autumn of 1917 the reason can be guessed from the joy of General Lecquis, a German divisional commander on the Italian front, at the capture of a few chickens and pigs. The Italian supply depots, not the Italian army, checked the advance. Food was a greater need than territory, or even victory. By the following June, the front line was still the Piave, and Austria's condition was so enfeebled that all the Italians needed to do was to wait for hunger to crush her. A year after the forward push, Austria fell. The misery and starvation had merely been prolonged.

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It was important to be able to read Nietzsche without a bad conscience in 1917. He might have been writing for 1917, just as he might have been writing for Schenker as one of those readers 'who is not easy to find', an artist with analytic abilities. There were many other things in The Birth of Tragedy and in the Attempt at a Self-Criticism which must have seemed vividly, urgently relevant to Schenker. The Birth of Tragedy, as Nietzsche tells us, was written 'while the thunders of...battle...rolled away over Europe'. He speaks of a peace under debate at Versailles. What a different peace, what a different resonance that name would have for Schenker.

Nietzsche sanctions pessimism, which is Schenker's characteristic state of mind, yet he scorns resignation, romantic resignation, Schopenhauerian resignation, most of all Christian resignation, and since resignation, a resigned
and anti-artistic morality is, in his belief, the hallmark of Christianity, he characterises his own book as 'anti-Christian'. It is hardly necessary to labour the moral support offered to a thinker who had resolutely resisted the lure of Christian consolation by a work so celebrated, so fearless, in which his refusal is represented as an affirmation of life and of art.

Nietzsche offers support to two further aspects of Schenker's own outlook which seem to be contradictory but which are in fact complementary: his high hopes of German culture and the depth of his disappointment in it, especially in German music. This support is hardly affected by the fact that Nietzsche goes too far for Schenker by saying, in the Attempt at a Self-Criticism, that German music is decadent and romantic in origin as well as in fact. Schenker would hardly be disturbed by this, since the one area in which he did not feel any need to regard Nietzsche as authoritative was music.

When we come to Nietzsche's diagnosis of the causes of Greek decline, we can see how apt this diagnosis must have seemed to Schenker's own time: the empty optimism, the shallow modesty, the cheerfulness and the overweening ambition of science, and the corresponding craving for distraction, for trivial amusement, for beauty, all of which had proved so fragile. If ever the cheerful optimism of science was out of place it must have been where Schenker was standing in 1917. Decadence was not a threat but a reality. The Empire to which he owed his intellectual existence had gone, and its heartland was under siege. It seemed the veil of Maya had been rent asunder in an orgy to end all orgies. If pessimism was not sufficiently justified then, it would find fresh justification in the horrors still
to come. And had not this state of affairs been preceded by
a period in which triviality had been elevated to the level
of a philosophy of life, almost a religion, when the mere
suggestion that anything serious might underlie the glossy
surface of existence had either been felt to be in bad
taste, or was absorbed as part of the entertainment, a spice
to enliven the blandness? The veil was not so much a veil as
a padded wall which no cry could penetrate.

At the beginning of his career as a serious theoretical
writer we see Schenker dabbling in everything, in a climate
in which such dabbling with theories, with ideas, was very
much the fashion. Everybody had his theory, and not even the
most jejune, the most nonsensical, the most vicious went
without followers. On the one hand there were the optimists
who had cracked the 'riddle of the universe' and were ready
to reconstruct the world rationally, having first cut
themselves free of that ball and chain known as
metaphysics. On the other were the histrionic despairers
who sometimes followed up their diagnoses of catastrophe
with suicide. New fields of inquiry, of whose possibility
no-one had had any suspicion a century before, were being
discovered by the day, new pasts, new species, new places,
new worlds, and new explanations, new theoretical
relationships, new intellectual partitions. The academic
world was a maelstrom, in which the great thing was to spot
the strongest theory, seize it and hang on to it for dear
life. But this was also the age of the amateur, Nietzsche's
'layman', and the age of every species of superstition. It
was not always easy to distinguish the crackpot from the
genius, the great healer from the quack, or even to be sure
to which category one rightly, oneself, belonged.

By 1917 the enthusiasms and the denunciations of 1895

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must have seemed equally trivial and the argument of The Birth of Tragedy, which had struck Nietzsche's contemporaries as merely disruptive, now presented itself as revelatory, salutary, even sober, but above all vivid, courageous and full of the radiance of its subject which contrasted so sharply with the grey chaos, the squalor of daily life and the spiritual helplessness of everyone caught up in it.

Schenker's intellectual experience had been a curious one. Beginning from a position of eclecticism bordering on the indiscriminate he had gradually narrowed and refined his theoretical focus until, by 1917, he had become extreme in his exclusiveness. But his exclusiveness was very different from that of the 'specialist'. Unlike the conventional musicologist he needed a cultural frame of reference, a human standpoint, which would give his focus validity, one that convinced him personally, not a mere ideology with which to align himself. What he now needed, therefore, was no longer intellectual stimulation, but confirmation. Schopenhauer's musical theory was one supreme confirmation, not a discovery but an independent endorsement, a literary-artistic framework, a philosophical definition for all his best insights. Nietzsche's cultural theory gave him the moral support he needed, the confirmation of the value of the endeavour, the affirmation of self-worth necessary for him to pursue these insights as far as they would take him. It was a peculiarly lonely path on which he needed the example of such figures, in the magnificence of their own loneliness, to sustain him.
The impact of Nietzsche on fin de siècle cultural debate, however variously his work was interpreted and however little The Birth of Tragedy was understood, was clearly enormous. Nietzsche's themes are the familiar themes of the period of the initiation of Modernism. The efflorescence of pseudo religions is one indication of the extent of the cultural disorientation of the time. Some of these panaceas purported to be scientific, and some versions of science offered to take the place of religion. Both science and art did become substitute religions for many people. A descent into barbarism accompanied by failed attempts at a new art as a replacement for the moribund faiths of the past, or by scientised versions of them, was, perhaps, the interpretation of culture which best fitted the day to day experience of those living through the social and technological turmoil of the turn of the century. This would explain the popularity of theories such as those offered by Nordau and Spengler as well as the appeal of a figure like Karl Kraus.

Nietzsche offered an intellectually challenging and supremely eloquent diagnosis of this situation, not compromised, as so many such interpretations were, by complicity with the mythology they were examining. Only perhaps in his references to the Lutheran chorale does Nietzsche betray an emotional involvement beyond the reach of his critical consciousness. Most important of all, at least in his early work, he brings plausible hope of release from the cultural paralysis which seemed to be the inevitable effect of this situation. That this release was to be through art made his message a deeply consoling one for the artists, who were perhaps the most conscious of the artisans for whom the technological age had use only as providers of nostalgic decoration.
The idea of a 'new Socrates' answers to a need for some sort of saviour of the cultural situation and to the need of individuals who found it impossible, for one reason or another, to pursue the traditional path of the artist of the past - that of maker whose work was constructed on the firm foundation of a craft tradition - but who were, nevertheless, so strongly imbued with the impulse to be artists that they could not be anything else. The role of the artist became an expression of the impossibility of acquiescing in the cultural situation, yet a tormenting sense of the impossibility of the artist's position was the experience of most of the major artists of the period. Very few were able to adopt the role in the unselfconscious fashion of a Goethe or a Mozart.

Nietzsche's analysis of the state of modern culture makes Schenker's cultural pessimism intelligible. Following Nietzsche, Schenker sees the fate of culture and the fate of music inextricably intertwined. Schenker's writing, from the late nineties onwards, treats these beliefs as given. Having come to Nietzsche first as a young Wissenschaftler, he returned to him as a disillusioned middle-aged writer and teacher in search of a rationale and professional self-definition, something the institutionalisation of musical scholarship and his own exclusion from the institutions denied him. Nietzsche offered two things which promised to make this situation more bearable: an example of a life combining the scholarly with the creative outside the institutions of learning, and just such a cultural rationale.

It is impossible to know whether Schenker consciously adopted Nietzsche's conception of a 'Socratic artist' -
whether as a model for, or a rationalisation of, his own life - but the life presents just the characteristics one would expect to see if this had been the case. Caught between the scientific and the artistic in a potentially paralysing way, he found in Nietzsche a convincing interpretation of the cultural conditions responsible for his predicament. This interpretation was both calming and liberating.

The title of Schenker's magnum opus, Neue Musikalische Theorien und Phantasien, is a puzzle. 'Theories and ...' what? Fantasies, imaginings, inventions, visions? However we translate Phantasien it must present an antithesis to, and at the same time a reconciliation with, Theorien, and the reconciled antithesis is exactly that contained in the idea of a 'musical Socrates'. This is not the kind of title anyone would choose if his object was to establish his scientific credentials. The Nietzschean formulation provides an intelligible context for Schenker's determination to find a way of reconciling the theorist and the artist in himself. This reconciliation clearly could not be achieved through encyclopaedic Musikwissenschaft, but rather through a 'synthetic' theory which parallels the synthesis which Schenker believed to be the process of the creation of works of art.

Many things in Schenker are prefigured in Nietzsche: his suspicion of the 'mass', its philistinism and the commercialisation of art associated with it; his contempt for programme music and the hermeneutic writers who pander to this philistinism; his devotion to the idea of a German culture, to seriousness in art; his distrust of science and of institutions whose raison d'etre was to further its aims; his contempt for theorists, Nietzsche's 'theoretical man',

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and the intellectualisation of art, despite his own involvement in it; his sense of impending catastrophe; his feeling of intellectual and artistic isolation. Both Nietzschean struggle and Schopenhauerian quietism are part of his constitution, the former manifesting itself in his polemical writing, the latter in his contemplation of the classical masterpieces.

Schenker was not immune to the ubiquitous influence of the positivist ethos which was particularly strong in Vienna at the turn of the century, but he was no positivist. Preoccupation with the conflict between intellect and 'instinct' in art, reason and feeling, is Schiller's theme, a theme of the 1790s, not a twentieth-century discovery. It is a conflict in which fin de siècle positivism takes sides, not one originating with it. From Schiller to Nietzsche the notion of a reconciliation between art and intellect, between the external significance capable of rational consideration, and the inner significance capable of expression only through art, Hegel's notion of a transcendent art, Schopenhauer's of a modern Pythagorean philosophy, Nietzsche's of a Socratic artist, keep appearing, interwoven with the notion of art as 'a thing of the past', or a new art of the future, or an art which begins again from the beginning.

The preoccupations of the students of the arts at the time Schenker's work appeared in America were far removed from these. It was not that the questions which concerned Schenker's generation were no longer of interest, but that the way in which these questions were approached had undergone a radical shift. The new approaches were already being practised in Schenker's Vienna. Indeed it is impossible to draw any sharp line separating modern from a
pre-modern theories of art. The separation of the world of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer from that of Forte and Narmour was brought about by no sudden dawning of the light but by historical events with which the older traditions are peculiarly intermingled in post-war intellectual history. That is to say, the causes of the historical events which brought about the cultural fissure across which Schenker's thought had somehow to be transferred are, in the writings of their immediate aftermath, often associated with these older intellectual traditions whose representatives came to be seen as bogey-men. The prophets of doom were regarded as the contrivers of the doom. It was believed that by preaching catastrophe they had brought it about. The idea of German culture, the notion of a restoration of an age of glory, had been the intellectual alibi of the National-Socialists. The horrors they perpetrated were seen as a consequence of the abuse of social theories deriving ultimately from a notion of historical inevitability peculiarly associated in the Anglo-Saxon mind with German idealism, strangely, in view of the origins of the twentieth-century version of positivism so often set in opposition to this tradition.

It is not surprising that the emigré intellectual above all would want to dissociate himself from this tradition, or that those exiles who were already active in the demolition of the tradition - the very people whom Schenker and those like him, of whom there were not a few, regarded as the wreckers of Western culture - should have had everything their own way. The cold war heaped yet more opprobrium on the German philosophical tradition which came to be seen as the origin not only of Nazism but also of Stalinism. In such a climate it was only necessary to shout 'Hegel!' to make the Schenkerians run for cover.
Bit by bit 'Herculaneum and Pompei' - for Schenker's image turns out to be more appropriate than he could have imagined - have begun to be excavated, a little of the rubble gingerly cleared away. The heirs of Wittgenstein discover that, far from being more positivist that the positivists, he was a closet Spenglerian, under the spell of Schopenhauer. Modernism turns out to be complicit with the aesthetics of catastrophe as propounded by Karl Kraus among others. It has been noticed that many of those who were in the greatest danger from the cataclysm were among the most vociferous of those allegedly working it up. It begins to seem perverse to accuse the people crying from the windows of the burning house of being responsible for the conflagration. It becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish the effects of the critique of science from the effects of science on the development of the popular ideologies which dominated the first half of the century. Things are not as simple as they seemed. Certainty no longer seems a convincing posture.

'We now know', to use an expression as characteristic of the mood of the middle of our own century in the English speaking world as it was of the popular science of the closing decades of the last, that we need to know much more before we can pass judgement on 'Schenker the philosopher-historian'. It is not simply a question of being fair to Schenker, of applying the 'principle of historical justice that phenomena should be measured by their own standards, not alien ones', with which presumably Schenker's modern critics would concur, although musical scholarship's treatment of Schenker is a sorry demonstration of what happens when this principle is put to the test. Before this process can even be begun we have to attempt to establish what these 'standards' were. This, as we have
seen, is no easy task. It is not even clear that anything corresponding to the idea of a 'standard' - a generally accepted criterion for the scientific - will ever be identified in the intellectual climate in which Schenker worked. On the contrary, everything suggests a state of turmoil in which profoundly different views were equally strongly held by significant proportions of the intellectual élite. But this is only part of our difficulty. More disturbing is the realisation that an examination of the cultural pre-suppositions of Schenker's era is, in effect, an examination of the roots of our own. These may turn out, after all, not to be, as positivism would have us believe, in the tidy and antiseptic domain of physical science and its accompanying rationale, but in highly speculative theories of culture, theories of history: ultimately in the metaphysics to which the positivists thought they had put an end.
Notes

1. Hesse, 1985, 'Zarathustra's Return', p. 79. This essay first appeared in the Neue Züricher Nachrichten in 1919. Hesse called Nietzsche 'the last great vehicle of the German spirit... that did not express [itself] in the uproar of the herd or in mass enthusiasm'. He believed 'the German mind had degenerated long before the war' and that Nietzsche represented the point to which it was necessary to return, a feeling shared by people in Schenker's circle. Walter Dahms (Federhofer, 1895, p. 89) wrote to Schenker in 1919, 'I escape from the misery of Germany into the pure world of counterpoint and experience hours of joy with Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, and see afresh with awe how tremendously right were these noble souls together with Schopenhauer and other great men...'. ('Ich rette mich aus den Deutschen Elend in die reine Welt des Kontrapunktes und erlebe Feststunden in Nietzsche und Kierkegaard und sehe wiederum mit Entsetzen, wie ungeheuer recht dieser erläuchnten Geister im Verein mit Schopenhauer und anderen Grössen gehabt haben...'). Hesse's remarks about 'the herd' and 'mass enthusiasm' suggest the context in which Schenker's anti-democratic diatribes in the second book of Counterpoint should be read. The animus is absent in Hesse, who can even respect the Spartacists. But Spartacus 'did not transform slaves into men'. The masses, as masses, could not represent anything but a political weapon. The whole concept of a human
'mass' has quite different resonances for readers of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer than for those who think in historical-political terms alone. Schenker's attitude was hardened by the sense of betrayal engendered by the lack of resistance of the democrats to the crippling concessions and reparations demanded by the allies. Zarathustra, Hesse suggests, would have reproached him, 'Is it our mission to keep up this loud lamentation...?'

2. This is the fragment On Music and Words. See Dahlhaus, tr. Whittall, 1980, p. 106.


4. Ibid., p. 290-1.

5. See Schenker, tr. Rothgeb, 1987, p. 15, ff..

6. Federhofer, 1985, p. 7: 'On the day of his death I cannot suppress the seemingly paradoxical observation how much happier L.'s life would have been, with his desire for recognition, if instead of encountering teachers like Jadassohn and Graedner, he had had me as his guide to [the world of] art! But how can one ask nature, which has fixed the order of the generations as it has, to turn them backwards?' (‘Am Tage seines Todes kann ich die scheinbar paradoxe Bemerkung nicht unterdrücken, L. wäre weit glücklicher im Leben gewesen, wenn er bei seiner Neigung zur Erkenntnis, statt auf Lehrer wie Jadassohn, Graedner zu stossen, mich zum Führer in der Kunst gehabt hätte! Aber wie soll man der Natur, die die
Reihe der Generationen so...festgesetzt hat, darin gerade eine retrograde Richtung vorschreiben wollen.

7. See Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1954, pp. 60-63. This conclusion is inescapable in this instance. His refusal to allow himself to hear Beethoven's message can only be the consequence of an emotional block. Nothing in his theory depends on the denial of the 'validity' of the modes, whatever that means. To acknowledge the historical role of modality would not even commit him to pluralism. His antipathy has more to do with the ecclesiastical character of modal music and the clerical influence on Viennese institutions than with musical or historical logic. It leads to the curious impression among the tedious point-scoring over theoretical details in Counterpoint of someone hunting for treasure with the aid of conflicting maps on an island which he thinks is not the one to which they, or some of them, refer.

As Bruckner's student it was this kind of counterpoint Schenker had learned, and it was the Viennese tradition he wished to reform. His desire to detach it from its source in the theoretical tradition associated with polyphonic vocal music distorts his otherwise insightful historical enquiries. Instead of providing the motivation he believes any valid rule must be able to demonstrate, he makes the rules refer back to music justified on the basis of the rules. Where he sees a mismatch, he either modifies the rule or
denounces the music.

What he really needed to do was to pursue the role of the contrapuntal heritage in classical music, which is what he does in *Free Composition* and in the best parts of *Counterpoint*, but he was caught up in the nature of his project which involved the writing of a text-book on counterpoint. Moreover he needed to go through the critical process his counterpoint books embody. But these are essentially private meditations, preparatory to the main task. If his project had been differently conceived, that is what they might have remained. As it was, the polemical habit encouraged the prejudice against which even the most minute attention to the musical and historical evidence was powerless.

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9. See Federhofer, 1982. The 'scholarly' attitude which contrasts so sharply with Nietzsche's can be seen in Adler's remark in the foreword to his essay on Mahler that 'any discussion of... personal relations was excluded on the ground that my intention was to view the picture on a higher plane'. (See 'Mahler and Guido Adler' by Edward R. Reilly in *Musical Quarterly*, July, 1972.) This 'higher plane' was the 'scientific' study of music history.


11. See Johnston, 1972, p. 204. This is unfair to
Kraus. Canetti speaks not only of Kraus's 'wrath, his scorn, his bitterness, his loathing', 'his murderous courage in pursuing the powerful', his 'arrogance', but also 'his worship in regard to love and women', 'his compassion and tenderness' and 'his ever active veneration for his gods, which included such diverse beings as Shakespeare, Claudius, Goethe, Nestroy, Offenbach'. Moreover, these negative 'affects', as Canetti describes them, make Kraus 'the opposite of the...huge majority of writers, who butter people up in order to be loved and lauded by them'. In this, at least, Schenker resembles him! See Canetti, 1987, p. 32.


13. Ibid., p. 37.

14. See Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993, p. 97: 'The cultural power of our academies has never been lower than at the present; the 'journalist', the paper-slave of the day, has emerged victorious over the academic in all cultural spheres...'. This is, of course, part of Nietzsche's wider critique of the reduction of art to a kind of spectator sport, ultimately the Euripidean reduction of tragedy to mere theatre.

15. See Federhofer, 1985, p. 302: 'Unklüge Menschen, denen die Fähigkeit mangelt, aus bestimmten Ursachen ihre Wirkungen zu deduzieren, halten sich missverständlicher Weise die Unfähigkeit zugute, sobald sie jemand[em] gegenüberstehen, der diese
Fähigkeit besitzt. Flugs verwandelt der Unfähige seinen Mangel in eine angebliche Lebensrobustheit, die er selbst zu preisen, nicht müde wird und der er in herabsetzender Weise die vorausschauender Kraft des Anderen nur als etwas Krankhaftendes, als eine Empfindlichkeit, gegenüberstellt. Darin spiegelt sich übrigens wie in einem Microcosmos das Bild jener Praktiken, mit denen die allzeit Robusten die angeblichen empfindlichen Genies bedenken.'


18. Several of the leading members of what became known as the Second Viennese School, for example, who fell into this category, were fanatical followers of Kraus.

19. See, for example, Beller, 1989. It is in part to this exclusion that Beller attributes the Jewish contribution - which he considers crucial - to the rise of Viennese Modernism. In music, however, this idea seems doubtful. The Second Viennese School had various kinds of institutional connections, some of which were arguably more accessible to the Jews among them than to the non-Jews, and in so far as they were accessible to the latter it was often by way of the former. The connections with Mahler, with Busoni, and with Adler are cases in point. It is not easy to separate Viennese cultural life into a Christian (Catholic) institutionalised philistine.
conservatism on the one hand and a radical Modernism which was the property of a group of Jewish outsiders on the other. Two of the three leading lights of the Second Viennese School, after all, were not Jewish, and the only academic musical institution whose ethos could be considered in any way Catholic was the Conservatory, which was an off-shoot of a society whose founder was Fanny von Arnstein. The attitudes of Jews were anything but stereotypical, as we can see from the conservatism of Schenker, a Jew and hostile to Modernism, from the hardly less conservative attitude of the Jewish Modernist, Schoenberg, and, among many other things, from the fact that the prime target of Karl Kraus's rage against the abuse of language was a press which Beller grants was dominated by Jews. The idea of musical Modernism as a Jewish movement is sustainable only if the definition is extended to include Viennese musicology and Schenkerian theory. If there did exist a sharp dividing line between Jews and others, formal institutions do not seem to define it with any clarity. The exclusions which operated against Jews were, as Schenker pointed out, legal and political, rather than institutional in this broader sense.


21. We can see this network in action throughout Schenker's career. He could hardly have survived without it, from his access as a student to the newspaper magnate Harden onwards. Schenker
perhaps put too much faith in its powers at a time when they were diminishing. Institutions founded earlier in the century with the aid of Jewish wealth, such as the Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde in Wien, had been anything but underground or alternative, in the sense, for instance, of the private performing society set up by Schoenberg a century later. The earlier institutions were parallel to and often successful rivals of, existing cultural institutions to which, at the same time, Jews were making a vital contribution. Indeed, the Jewish contribution to the development of 'enlightened' culture and to its institutionalisation was hardly less than its contribution to the Modernism which challenged the ethos of institutional culture. By Schenker's time such overt participation was no longer so welcome, because of bourgeois rather than aristocratic resistance. As McCagg points out, many assimilated families, rather than encouraging upward mobility among newer immigrants as earlier waves had done, were becoming wary of being seen to favour fellow Jews, or of being associated with them at all.

22. See Federhofer, 1985, p. 44: 'Die Not, in die ich hineingeboren würde, die mich stets begleitet hat und mir bis heute treu geblieben ist, zwang mich, mit allen erdenklichen Opfern um den Lebensunterhalt zu sorgen und zu bangen. Diesen nun gerade durch meine neue Lehre verdienen zu wollen, war ein tragisches Unterfangen: Einer Menschheit, die dieser Lehre nicht braucht, richtiger, nicht gebrauchen kann (in Schule, Betrieb usw.), die Lebensgroschen abringen zu wollen, war Wahnsinn,
und ich musste Opfer bringen, um die Schüler zu finden und zu halten.' ('The need into which I was born and which has kept faith with me to this day, compelled me, in spite of every imaginable sacrifice, to worry about and fear for my livelihood. To attempt to provide for this directly through my new theory would have been a tragic undertaking: to try to extract an income from people who have no use for my theory, indeed cannot make use of it (in schools, in commerce, etc.), madness, so I had to make sacrifices in order to find pupils and keep them. ')

23. Ibid., p. 21: '...ich selbst war mir aber klar dass ich keinen Meister erreiche, geschweige übertreffe....' ('...it was, however, clear to me that I could never match, much less surpass, any of the masters....')


26. See Schenker, tr. Oster, 1979, pp. xxii-xiii. It is depressing that Schenker felt the need, at this stage, to justify his monumental project as a substitute for the art to which he had felt he could not aspire, and to propose, in bitter, almost dog-in-the-manger terms, its use for the same dismal purpose for young musicians. It is still more dispiriting that these sentiments, whose pusillanimity is belied by the substance of the book, have been seized upon as a pretext for reducing his theory to a 'system' acceptable to
the academies whose ethos he spent his life resisting. These thoughts, once again, have nothing to do with the philosophy of music and everything to do with Schenker's situation, as the quotation in n. 22 makes clear.

27. The crucial text is, of course, the essay on David Strauss in the Untimely Meditations. See Nietzsche, tr. Hollingdale, 1990.

28. An accessible German version appears in the Insel Taschenbuch series. (See Nietzsche, 1987.) The standard English version has been Nietzsche, tr. Kaufmann, 1967. A new English version has recently appeared. (See Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993.)


30. 'Why should it not also hold true in the intellectual area that through an intuitive perception of eternally creative nature we may become worthy of participating spiritually in its creative processes?' Goethe on 'Judgement through Intuitive Perception'. See Goethe, tr. Miller, 1988, p. 31. Many other passages in Goethe's scientific writings could be cited in which this view of science as either actually or ideally a synthetic as well as an analytic activity is expressed. A perceptive discussion of their relevance to Schenker's thought is to be found in 'Music and Morphology: Goethe's influence on Schenker's Thought', by William Pastille, in Siegel, 1990. The influence of Goethe's scientific
writings on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is everywhere apparent. Schopenhauer energetically defends him in his struggle against the Newtonians. Helmholtz also read him with a kind of uneasy awe. (See Amrine, 1987, p. 45, ff.) His tonal concept evokes the aphorism in which Goethe describes nature as 'simple in essence and manifold in appearance', as do Schopenhauer's musical and Nietzsche's tragic theories, and, obviously, Schenker's theory.

31. See Nietzsche, 1987, p. 192, ff..

32. See Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993, p. 14: 'We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics when we have succeeded in perceiving directly, and not only through logical reasoning, that art derives its continuous development from the duality of the Apolline and the Dionysiac; just as the reproduction of the species depends on the duality of the sexes...the Greeks...revealed the profound mysteries of their artistic doctrines to the discerning mind, not in concepts but in the vividly clear forms of their deities...'.


34. See Nietzsche, 1987, p. 193. 'Es war nicht weniger als ein wissenschaftlicher Selbstmord.'

35. See Federhofer, 1985, p. 303: 'All das ist auch vom Chor der griechischen Tragödie zu verstehen und auch vom stimmführungs Principien der alteren Music....Dass wir heute Chöre nicht mehr
gebrauchen und in der Musik mit Stufen arbeiten, hebt die Wahrheit der antiken Chor und Stimmeführung nicht auf.' From a diary entry of 1912.

36. See Schenker, tr. Oster, 1979, p. 5: 'As the image of our life motion music...may...express different meanings...'. This passage is not quite pure Schopenhauer, since there remains a trace of Hanslick, but it patently derives, like much more on these pages, from that source.

37. These controversies are examined at length in Silk and Stern, 1981.


39. The first Chapter of Harmony is full of related ideas, some obviously Nietzschean, such as the remarks about Greek music on p. 3. (Compare Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993, p. 81.) Whether this indicates an insightful reading of The Birth of Tragedy however, is doubtful. The plethora of ideas in Schenker's early writings is symptomatic of the intellectual ethos of fin de siècle Vienna in which fashionable ideas from literature, philosophy, popular science and technology were freely associated.

40. See Schenker, tr. Oster, 1979, p. 27 for the clearest parallel: 'I recommend that everyone take the trouble to feel his way from the foreground to the middleground and background...so he will
arrive at shorter and shorter versions, and finally the shortest, the fundamental structure. The presentation in *Free Composition* is, of course, as in *The Birth of Tragedy* itself, in the opposite direction, logically enough, since Schenker, like Nietzsche, sees his theory as a theory of synthesis not a theory of analysis. Analysis is no more than the process of 'level[ling] down, stone by stone' or in this case, tone by tone, by whose means the synthetic process is discovered. Schenker recommends his readers to test independently his claim that by using the familiar concepts of ornamentation and diminution to peel away levels of elaboration, they will find simpler and simpler patterns, still coherent, still recognisably musical, and see for themselves the feasibility of his basic argument about the nature of musical structure. However naively they do this, they are likely to be as a result more receptive, more sympathetic to his vastly more sophisticated detailed procedure, developed over a long period of time, and more patient with the difficulties attending the verbal formulations of the theoretical generalisations arising from it.

Felix Saltzer demurred at Schenker's suggestion that any musically educated person can do this. But if this were not the case his theory would depend on a circularity: it could only be tested in relation to the work conceived in terms of the theory. Schenker always maintained that his theory was simpler than other theories. The complexity of the details of the theory do not nullify the
simplicity of the approach in its essentials. The advice given to readers by the editors of the English version of his last book invites them to follow Schenker through the maze of his particular detailed concepts and jargon without first gaining an insight into these simple essentials. This is less obviously unacceptable than the editorial practice of excising whole passages from the works, but it suggests a lingering reluctance to trust Schenker with the reader and the reader with Schenker.

41. See Schenker, ed. Jonas, 1954, p. 6: 'We should get accustomed to seeing tones as creatures'. In a philosophical void this is bound to seem a very strange idea, but in the preceding paragraph Schenker can be seen struggling with the Schopenhauerian notion of music as parallel objectification of the will, apparently as yet without benefit of a clear understanding of the analogy. He sees, for example, the general 'concept' - Schopenhauer's 'idea' - following rather than preceding the individual who objectifies it, and his notion of a 'procreative urge' owes more to biological theories in which the gene is more important than the individual carrier rather than to Schopenhauer's notion of the egoism of the individual.

42. A confusion between 'continuous becoming', which is a positive concept, and 'continuous present', which is a negative one, creeps into the translation of Free Composition. On p. 3 Schenker
refers to the Schopenhauerian concept of a 'continuous present without connection, unwinding chaotically in empty animal fashion', ('ein ewige Gegenwart, ohne Zusammenhang, in blankem Tierwesen chaotisch abrollend') although he relates this to the foreground in a way which, like Schopenhauer's remarks on Beethoven, fails to make clear that it refers not to the actual foreground of the music, which in both theories must be the perfection of the coherence in which it is grounded, but to the confused perception of the uninitiated listener.

On p. 18, Oster uses almost the same expression, 'continual present', to denote the role of the fundamental structure as guardian angel, guaranteeing the coherence of the foreground. It is not necessary, however, to translate Gleichzeitigkeit (contemporaneity) in this way. 'Continuous presence' (could this be what Oster meant?) would have been a little closer to Schenker's meaning but would still have had the disadvantage of risking the invocation of the negative concept employed earlier to denote incoherence. Schenker's own attempt to explain his concept - which is, after all, perfectly simple - is already unnecessarily complicated. The 'contemporaneity' of the Ursatz and the transformations, i.e., the non-temporal nature of their relationship, should present no difficulty to a reader who has grasped the analogy between (large-scale) transformation and (small-scale) ornamentation. Having presented this idea clearly Schenker then mystifies it, first by saying - bewilderingly - that the structural relationships cannot be presented graphically, then by...
introducing a quite inappropriate analogy. The notion of the meeting of past, present and future in a point of time is about the worst possible idea to raise just where he wishes to emphasise the a-temporal character of the relationships between structural levels.

The alleged spatial-temporal confusion found by some commentators in Schenker's structural model is undoubtedly partly attributable to Schenker's inability to leave well alone, and to the compounding of the resulting confusion in translation. There are, of course, no such confusions in the concepts themselves, only sometimes in their expression.


44. Ibid., p. 35. The paragraph beginning, 'Throughout this discussion I have relied...' is Nietzsche's Schopenhauerian 'resolution' of the 'problem' contained in Schopenhauer's explanation of lyric. To readers who have not previously read Schopenhauer, just how very Schopenhauerian this solution is becomes clear only on pp. 77-78. This must be the excuse for those readers who rejoice in finding, along with the ungracious and - to put it kindly - forgetful Nietzsche of Ecce Homo, that the The Birth of Tragedy 'is only in a few formulas infected with the cadaverous perfume of Schopenhauer'.

45. For a discussion of Goethe's notion in relation to Schenker see Pastille, 1985 p. 81 ff.

47. Ibid., p. 29.

48. Ibid., p. 31.

49. Ibid., p. 77. See also n. 44.


51. Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1990, V. III, p. 216. '...so ist die Musik...von der erscheinenden Welt ganz unabhangig...'.

52. Ibid., p. 223. '...daher taugt dieselbe Komposition fur viele Strophen'.

53. Ibid., p. 198.


56. See n. 51.


58. Ibid., p. 34.
59. As we can see from p. 81 (ibid.).

60. Ibid., p. 43.

61. See ibid., p. 76-7, for Nietzsche's dismissal of Hanslick: '...a false aesthetic, hand in hand with a misdirected and degenerate art, has grown used to demanding, on the basis of the concept of beauty that prevails in the world of the visual arts, that music should provide an effect similar to that of works in the visual arts - the arousal of pleasure in beautiful forms'. Of course, Nietzsche has in his sights much more than Vom Musikalisch Schönen: art-history as a model for musicology, the reduction of aesthetics to a question of beauty, the confining of musical significance to the Leibnizean 'surface' and the denial of musical meaning, the whole Socratic-critical, journalistic-academic ethos of nineteenth century music aesthetics.

62. See Schenker, tr Oster, 1985, p.5. 'As an image of our life-motion...'. In the light of this passage, and many others, so plainly indebted to Schopenhauer, Schenker's objection to 'metaphysics' in the next section (in a passage which appears only in an appendix in the English version), is as strange as its equation with 'objectivity'. A possible explanation lies in the religious tone of the passage, and of several earlier ones. It is as if Schenker is saying that Schopenhauer's explanation is right except in one respect: the Will is not original and unmotivated,
nor is it a negative force. There is a loving God guiding it towards the coherence which is its goal. Kassler, again uniquely, is aware of this problem, but her solution seems to conjure away the difference rather than to confront it. Like many things in Schenker's last work, this is one of the problems that remains unresolved, a piece of unfinished business. That there is a genuine problem is clear. On the one hand, Schenker is enamoured of the Schopenhauerian metaphysics, but, on the other, he believes in God. He is also very conscious that life is a struggle in which the godly do not always triumph.

A simpler explanation for what could be merely a moment of confusion might lie in the conditions of extreme mental and physical stress under which the book was composed, conditions described so painfully in one of the last diary entries. (See Federhofer, 1985 p. 44.) A simpler one still is that he was behaving in the manner of the Nietzsche of Ecce Homo, but this seems the least likely.

63. Ibid., p. 93. 'The word alone was the generator of tone successions...'.

64. See Schopenhauer, ed. Spierling, 1990, V. III, 221-2. '...die allgemeinen Formen aller möglichen Objekte der Erfahrung...'

65. Ibid., p. 223. '"und darf nich mit bewusster Absichtlichkeit durch Begriffe vermittelte Nachahmung sein..'


69. See Nietzsche, tr. Whiteside, 1993, p. 110-111. Here, however, Kaufmann's version has been retained. In spite of his declared lack of sympathy with this part of the work, his translation of this passage conveys Nietzsche's exalted, poetic utterance better than the new version.


74. Ibid., p. 55.

75. Ibid., p. 69.

76. Ibid., p. 71.

77. Ibid., p. 75.

78. The layman who sets himself up as critic (Schenker uses the same word as Nietzsche, der Laie.
although this, yet again, is concealed by translation) is the butt of Schenker's scorn, for example, in the 'Introduction' to Counterpoint. The tracing of this phenomenon to the Italian Renaissance, the setting up in opposition to it of the German Reformation, and the treatment of the Lutheran chorale (exempt from the objections to Christianity in general) as the bearer of the Dionysian seriousness, the spirit of truth and nature which flowers in sudden miraculous Apolline splendour in classical music - hints and elements of which can be found in German aesthetic literature from Winckelmann onwards - are brought together in this particular constellation only by Nietzsche and Schenker. The inference is clear.

Again, compare the 'Introduction' to Counterpoint with the passage beginning, 'Even under the most favourable conditions...', and the paragraph which follows it beginning with the reference to Kant and Schopenhauer. Schenker would have been surprised by the claim of the editor of the latest English version of The Birth of Tragedy that 'Few of its readers can give much of an account of its detailed contents'. He describes three ways in which it should not be read, the last of which is 'the least misleading way of mistreating BT'. But why 'mistreat' BT? Why not read it as an essay in aesthetics, the imaginative meditation on the role of art in life that it manifestly is? (Yet again Schopenhauer is held responsible for Nietzsche's alleged shortcomings and is accused of 'vagueness', which is not a criticism that can fairly be levelled against the original version of

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the metaphysics of music, whatever the merits of the rest of his work.)

80. Schenker's concurrence with Nietzsche's judgement of the significance of Luther stands in striking contrast to his implacable hostility to the church modes and his fixed determination to reduce counterpoint to a way of learning about tonal relationships. The two things are undoubtedly related. Even Palestrina's music is regarded, still, in *Free Composition*, as embryonic. (See p. 128.)

A perceived affinity between the Judaic ethos and Lutheran Protestantism has been remarked on by Stephen Beller. See *Beller, 1989*, p. 153. Although Schenker did not convert, he certainly flirted with Christianity in his twenties, and all the indications are that if he had done so it would have been, as in Schoenberg's case, and in the cases of the others referred to by Beller, to some Protestant form of Christianity rather than to Austrian-Roman-Catholicism, which was felt to be hostile to German culture. Only in speaking of Bruckner's piety, which he said reminded him of his father's, did Schenker show anything but hostility to the Catholic church.


82. See, 'To a Cabinet Minister', *Hesse, 1985*, p.21.

Ernst Haekel published in 1899 a book entitled *Die Weltratsel*, (literally, the 'world-riddle', the solution to which was, of course, Darwin's theory of natural selection). It sold 100,000 copies in a year, and as many again in an English edition. (See Chadwick, 1990, p. 176, ff.) Chadwick's account of German science in the nineteenth century omits any mention of Helmholtz, or, perhaps less surprisingly, of Goethe, although he refers to Haeckel's book on morphology. Similarly symptomatic is his remark that Haeckel 'descended from science into...metaphysics'. This remark is the more curious since it is followed by a quotation from Haekel, in which an early instance of the expression 'We now know' appears: 'We now know that the soul [is] a sum of plasma movements in the ganglion-cells'. This must be the kind of metaphysics at which those 'philosophers' who think they have disposed of 'the first of all the sciences' arrive in spite of themselves.

A number of influences on late nineteenth-century German intellectual attitudes appear here, but in a highly arbitrary fashion, with no sense of a centre, a core of shared assumptions against which such aberrant manifestations as *Die Weltratsel* worked. If one looked here for such a core, it would have to be Hegel, with a glance over the shoulder at Kant, a dash of Feuerbach, a little Lamarck...and so on. The cultural world of Schenker seen in this kind of perspective can only be bewildering.

The best known instance is Otto Weininger whose
fame is generally attributed to the manner, as much as to the fact, of his suicide. The éclat with which Weininger's book appeared, however, could not entirely account for its reception.

86. The most famous sufferer from this dilemma was surely Siegmund Freud in his association with Wilhelm Fliess. The criminal idiocy of Fliess's activities are startling enough in themselves. That they could be taken so seriously suggests a very peculiar set of intellectual-social conditions. The reception of Fliess and Weininger was a very strange phenomenon in a supposedly scientific age, indicative of much more than passing indiscretions on the part of an otherwise solid scientist and a public temporarily caught up in an affecting drama. It suggests a profound insecurity about what was real and what was not, an insecurity not only related to the general de-stabilisation of culture represented by political upheavals, the reduction of imperial pageantry to a kind of real-life operetta, the substitution of sentimentality for deference, but also to such things as the de-mythologising of religion, the systematic assault on the philosophical tradition and the alienation from the concerns of the state of so large a part of its intellectual leadership.

87. See Dahlhaus, tr. Whittall, 1980, p. 86.
Appendix

See p. 143, n. 24

The opening of the second Trio of Beethoven's
Quintet op. 4.
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