The Gujaratis of Bolton: the leaders and the led

Thesis

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THE GUJARATIS OF BOLTON:
THE LEADERS AND THE LED

by

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Social Anthropology (Edin),

Presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology at the Open University,
February 1993.
SUMMARY OF THESIS

This thesis is a study of local rather than national black politics. The participation of Gujaratis, who comprise the largest ethnic minority community in Bolton, in local politics is constrained by their loyalty to Gujarati identities and by racism within political parties.

The settlement patterns of Gujaratis in Bolton reflect in part the socio-economic constraints experienced by black immigrants in Britain generally, and in part their allegiance to faction, caste, sect and religious identities. On the basis of some of these social identities have developed organisations which respond to particular social, religious and political needs. These organisations provide the only opportunities for the development of black structures of support and leadership within this large community. Notions of racism are based upon a dialogue between white and Gujarati notions of what is common sense. These notions form the basis of Gujaratis’ perceptions of social distances that separate them from others.

The core of support for leaders is based upon personal social networks. The social characteristics of these social networks influence the patterns of close friendships between Gujaratis and members of other communities in the town. These patterns show that Gujaratis exclude Gujaratis who belong to other Gujarati religious communities and members of other ethnic communities, black and white, from close friendships. Friendships with those perceived to be social distant are of lower intensity, thus excluding these people from sharing in a common body of Gujarati knowledge.
In the context of Bolton these Gujaratis find themselves unable to participate within the formal political hierarchy and decision making arenas. The local Community Relations Council offers Gujarati and other black leaders of organisations a forum within which they can meet with some of the locally and nationally elected political representatives. The debate centres on events, involving Gujarati and other participants, which allow leaders of Gujarati organisations and politicians and other members of the CRC to negotiate the power relations between black and white. However, the consequence is that the Gujaratis are still relegated to the periphery of formal political decision-making arenas.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research for this thesis was made possible by a grant from the Social Science Research Council (now the Economic and Social Research Council). I am indebted to the Bolton Metropolitan Borough Education and Arts Department who paid the fees I incurred as a student of the Open University. Bolton Institute of Higher Education gave me a sabbatical year, so that I could complete the survey which forms the basis of this project. I would like to thank Cliff Stone, Computer Centre, University of Manchester, who helped with the processing of the data. I am grateful to Salford University for allowing me to run and to store my data on their computer.

Involvement with the Bolton Council for Community Relations (BCCR) enabled me to participate in many of the situations and contexts which are described in this thesis. I owe Bolton Council for Community Relations a debt of gratitude for the support that they have given me over many years. In particular I would like to thank Mr Tom Tootell, Community Relations Officer (CRO), now retired, who was the first to encourage my interests in the Asian communities. The present Community Relations Officer, Mr Raymond Halliwell, (SCRO) who has given me much of his time, encouragement, help, support with the writing up of the thesis. He also made available to me opportunities to learn about the many facets of the work of a Community Relations Council. Mr Dennis Eckersley (CRO) gave me time to talk through some of my ideas. Mr Yusuf Suleman (ACRO), now with this Council, contributed to this thesis as a friend, interpreter, informant and counsellor. Furthermore, I obtained through this involvement a wider understanding of race relations and appreciation for the work done by local CRCs in particular and the
Commission for Racial Equality in general.

This thesis could not have been written without the support of Bolton’s minority communities and the Gujaratis in particular. Members of these communities spent time explaining their view of race relations and their perceptions of the political positions of black people in Bolton and Britain. They gave freely of their time answering my questions and providing information. The Gujaratis, mainly men but also some women and Hindus and Muslims, contributed to the thesis both as informants and respondents. Many became friends of mine during the research and have remained so ever since. I would like to thank the Vishwa Hindu Parishad committee and members, who organised interviewers and carried out the task of interviewing most of the Hindu respondents for me. In particular, I would like to thank the late Mr Chaudray, Mr Ishwar Patel, Mr Thakorbhai Patel, Mr Uttambhai Mistry, Mr Ishwarbhai Patel, Mr Motala, Mr Yacoob Mank and Mr Pritpal Singh to name just a few.

I would like to thank Dr D. Boswell, who was my supervisor for a year or two before departing to take up a post in Malta, Dr Paul Baxter, University of Manchester, who drew my attention to a variety of pertinent issues. I would like to thank Dr. N. J. Hill, Bolton Institute of Higher Education, for rewriting the computer programme for the analysis of networks. Finally, I have been fortunate in having Dr Clyde Mitchell and Dr Peter Braham as both supervisors and friends; both have contributed to this thesis in many ways.
A note on Names used in the Thesis

Where names have been used, I have followed three different forms of usage: (1) where actual names have been used, they refer to people whose names have appeared in the local or national Press, such as those of the MPs. (2) In one instance I have used a fictitious name for a leader with the intention of making it easier for the reader to identify him. The name I chose was Mr Sandhu. No person with this name to my knowledge was a leader of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and has ever lived in Bolton. (3) all other people who are identified are referred to as Mr A. or Mr B., and the initials have been randomly chosen, so any correspondence with the names of living people is accidental.

ABBREVIATIONS

Bolton Evening News
Bolton Council for Community Relations
Commission for Racial Equality
Community Relations Council (i.e. BCCR)
Community Relations Officer
Assistant Community Relations Officer
Hindu Vishwa Parishad
Islamic Culture Centre
Minorities Joint Consultative Committee

BEN
BCCR
CRE
CRC
CRO
ACRO
VHP
ICC
MJCC
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INTRODUCTION

A survey of literature on the politics of race drew attention to three broad topic fields of interest: firstly immigration, legislation and administration; secondly, government policies for race relations; and thirdly, race relations pressure groups, in particular the ultra-right, anti-racist Asian and black organisations (Ben-Tovim and Gabriel, 1979:2). This thesis will focus attention on the third field, race relations pressure groups, and will look at ethnic leaders' attempts to influence local white political decision makers with the aim of obtaining what they believe to be a more equitable share of scarce resources.

This implies that participation in local politics goes beyond voting alone. With the exception of total alienation and withdrawal from political participation, if voting is taken as a baseline for political involvement, then to some degree most Gujaratis participated in local politics. It is, however, participation that involved Gujarati leaders in debates aimed at achieving political influence over the local white politicians through the deployment of ethnic alliances and "black" votes that is of central concern to this thesis. In particular the focus will be on ethnic organisations and their leaders attempts to participate in local politics mainly through one informal political arena, namely the local CRC. Although most of the political activity took place in this arena, its position in relation to the formal political arenas is critical. Though its position in theory could be close to the traditional formal political arenas, in practice its position is often marginalised. By bringing into political debate the importance of the position of the local CRC, Gujarati leaders by trying to influence the
white decision-makers raised the political tension between the participants in CRC arena and the white participants in the formal political arenas. Therefore, I shall argue that ethnic politics is a form of urban movement [1] (discussed below). Attention will be focused on a collection of such movements involving Gujaratis [2] living in Bolton, North West England, between 1973-1976, whose leaders set out to obtain for their grassroots supporters a share of local public resources to which they considered they had restricted access because of racism. In so doing they contributed to a change in the culture of the town.

The Introduction is set out in three parts: Part I will concentrate on theoretical issues of ethnic political participation at the local level, Part II will address some of the key issues associated with the collection of data, and Part III will set out the contents of the thesis.

Part I

In this Part I shall argue that ethnic politics in Bolton can be regarded as a confrontation between a mainly Gujarati minority as keen voters in formal political arenas, some as members of political parties, and a few as leaders seeking political recognition in informal political arenas and the white councillors and MPs. Arguments will stress the importance of ethnic politics in the local context in the 1970s for the following reasons: firstly, "many local governments in the 1970s behaved as if Asian and black people did not exist" (McKay,1977:96); secondly, there were opportunities for Gujaratis to participate in local politics which were not available to them in national politics; thirdly, the proximity of ethnic leaders to certain
informal political arenas made it possible for them to participate; fourthly, the local political structure could more readily than national political structures to accommodate grassroots participation; and fifthly, local governments were aware that under the 1976 Race Relations Act they might be charged with providing a balanced view. In a general sense such ethnic political activity which was to be found in Bolton is typical of that found in other towns and cities with large ethnic minority communities. However, it is appropriate to begin this discussion by setting the debate within the broader field of race relations beginning by distinguishing between the politics of race, ethnic politics and racism in politics.

Though the politics of race, Moore (1978:482) argues, may provide answers to some of the most pressing issues that face Britain's multiracial society, they have received comparatively little attention (Layton-Henry and Rich, 1986:6; Layton-Henry, 1984:xii; Ward, 1978:477). By this assertion Moore drew attention to the importance of racism in British society, and particularly to the extent to which racism had become an accepted element in British politics. Immigration is often taken as central to analyses which underlie the politics of race, because the tension between governmental control of immigration balanced by support for racial equality influences and is influenced by the political actions, in the broadest sense, of Asian, black [3] and white people in Britain (Layton-Henry, 1984; Miles, 1982; Layton-Henry and Rich, 1986). The phrase the 'politics of race' describes the way in which governments and politicians have politicised race; it emphasises "the role of successive post-war governments in institutionalising racism particularly through their policies on immigration" (Ben-Tovim et al., 1986:14). Studies of the politics of race encompass both national
and local issues, which include immigration, nationality, employment, education, housing, equality of opportunity, the activities of anti-racist organisations and racist bodies (Ben-Tovim et al., 1979:2). This classification tells us little about ethnic participation in politics. Layton-Henry (1986: 166-170) describe five forms of political participation; briefly these are integration, development of Asian and black organisations within and without the white political system, linkage of Asians and black people through buffer organisations to the political system, the development of links through a range of forms of participation, and finally alienation and withdrawal from all but minimal forms of participation.

These descriptive categories distinguish only roughly between the different forms of participation in local and national politics. Since white people were the chief participants in local party politics in the 1970s, Asians as supporters and members were marginalised. There were exceptions; for instance in a few of the London boroughs, Bradford and Blackburn some Asians had achieved positions within their political parties and within local formal political hierarchies. In most places where Asians lived, their participation in politics was limited to voting. As a form of participation, voting is the same whether the election is local or national. Therefore, the accessibility of ethnic leaders to, and participation in, an informal political arena, such as that provided the local CRC, allows for the development of a distinctively local form of political participation outside the political party system and the formal political structures. There is no parallel form of participation at the national level through the CRE. Thus the subject of this thesis lies within the field of local politics of race, and is concerned with ethnic politics and racism in local
Although the phrase the "politics of race" is used to describe political activity at the national and local levels (e.g. Ben-Tovim et al., 1986), the similarities and differences between ethnic community participation at the local and national levels are clear. Therefore a discussion of governmental control of immigration and support for racial equality is not central to this thesis, although clearly its effects on racism in local politics cannot be ignored. Studies of the politics of race take for granted that the impact on ethnic communities and their response to racism at the local and national levels will be similar (Yancey, Erickson and Julianni, 1976:392-399; see for instance Ben-Tovim et al., 1986; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979). For this reason this thesis argues that sociologists of race relations have neglected to study Asian (and black) minorities as active political agents, ethnic politics at a local level and the support structures through which they can exert influence. Many of them view local politics in terms of how local authorities respond to the demands from minority communities rather than in terms of how they might respond to local authorities (e.g. Ben-Tovim et al, 1986). The literature gives the impression that Asian and black people were, and still are, the passive recipients of support or the lack of it and that they made little effort to compete for more public resources than those allocated to them. Consequently there is a gap in our understanding of how minority groups mobilise support and develop structures of leadership (Layton-Henry and Rich, 1986:6) and support outside the political party system.

Local politics and racism studies have concentrated upon disadvantages arising from the allocation of resources to minority
communities (Gifford, 1989; Robinson, 1987, 1981, 1980, 1979; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Lawrence, 1974; Rex and Moore, 1971). Such research points to racial discrimination against Asian and black people in the contexts of key public services (Brown, 1984). As these studies set the protest within the national context of race relations, they overlook their local importance as a form of urban movement (discussed below). Generally, attention is drawn to the position of black minorities in the working class as being poor and disadvantaged (e.g. Miles, 1982; Townsend, 1979; Rex and Moore, 1971), but amongst the few who have recognised the possibility of a forceful response by the minorities are Rex and Tomlinson (1979: Chaps 8 and 9), who noted the possible formation of "adversarial ethnic units". The chief social characteristics that provide an indication of low social class position and disadvantage of Asian minorities are race and colour, a lack of appropriate or recognised educational and training qualifications, finding employment in generally low status and low paid work, and settlement in inner urban areas (Chap. 1). Responses to situations of social disadvantage can take many forms; these range from joining a political party, to ethnic politics, joining a militant Asian organisation, and participating in a protest movement or rioting.

Although Rex and Tomlinson (1979: Chaps. 8 and 9), see the formation of hostile and aggressive organisations as a response by Asian and black people to their social experiences, they wrongly, I believe, explain this in terms of white racism (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 243). Their analysis rightly points to the importance of the formation of political groups outside the formal political system. Any analysis of the formation of opposition by Asian and/or black minorities to their social situation needs to take account of their social standing in the wider
community, of the role of ethnic organisations, and of contact between their leaders and the political parties (Chaps. 2,3). During the 1970s one form of response that was probably more common than the literature suggests is ethnic politics (e.g. Katzenelson, 1973; Scott, 1972/73).

Research on ethnic politics during this period shows how political protest in Britain was contained and controlled politically by channelling demands by ethnic leaders through local CRCs (Katzenelson, 1973; Hill and Issacharoff, 1971). What is not explored is how in trying to contain ethnic movements local politicians gave ethnic leaders opportunities to express their political demands. Although inexperienced politically, they used such opportunities to persuade politicians to positively discriminate in their favour rather than to await their efforts to convince the wider electorate of the plight of a section of members, who claimed to be disadvantaged. This confrontation raised important questions about definitions of, access to, and decisions over the allocation of public resources in towns and cities, where these ethnic communities form a significant part of the population. These questions placed the responsibility on mainly white dominated local authorities to decide the extent to which they should achieve a more impartial distribution of public resources. Those asking for resources came from different cultural backgrounds to those controlling the resources (Chaps. 5-7).

Ethnic politics is concerned with the attempts by leaders of ethnic organisations developing alliances with other leaders and white local politicians in mainly informal political arenas to generate support to persuade, cajole or force them into making more favourable allocations of public resources. Though it forms an integral part of local politics,
the latter provides the context in which the former occurs. There are differences between ethnic and local politics. Firstly, ethnic politics provides opportunities for ethnic leaders to develop political alliances across ethnic organisations, in order to influence white political decision-makers within and without the formal political arenas. Their aim is to gain recognition as political representatives of ethnic communities in formal political arenas. However, the white politicians tend to see ethnic politics as support which they can utilise as democratically elected representatives. Therefore, the extent of the access to and influence over decision-making in formally recognised political arenas that politicians allow ethnic leaders forms the substance of racism in politics. Secondly, ethnic politics is a form of urban protest movement about the lack of access of ethnic communities to public resources, such as to positions of decision-making, housing, education, social welfare, and employment. Thirdly, the organisational bases of these movements are cross-cultural. These bases are linked to a membership through social, religious and community networks (discussed below; see Chaps.2,4). Fourthly, these movements are local and fifthly, they are concerned with changing the social meaning of common urban experience through conflict. In doing this ethnic leaders and politicians are redefining some of the central values of the local community (Chaps.4,7). Thus ethnic politics is an expression of urban conflict: Asians and black people use events to develop alliances which form bases for urban movements. These enable leaders to translate their social and political disadvantages into political terms, which allow for comparison between the perceived advantaged position of the white community and the disadvantaged position of the minority communities into relations of power and powerlessness (Chaps.6,7).
During the 1960s and 1970s urban movements existed and flourished (Katznelson, 1973; Bentley, 1972/73; Scott, 1972/73; Hill and Issacharoff, 1971; Beetham, 1970; John, 1969; also mentioned by Barot, 1980; Anwar, 1979; Ballards, 1977; Lawrence, 1974; Rex and Moore, 1971). Some sociologists dismiss them not recognizing them as vehicles for the development of urban movements (Lowe, 1986:73-76; Rex and Moore, 1971:17 [4]). This suggests that ethnic politics is disregarded as an urban movement because the form it takes is complex and because some forms of ethnic political activity are not connected with movements, e.g. riots. Reasons for this include a reluctance to accept that ethnic organisations are participants in urban movements [5], to recognize the importance of social networks as enhancing the structures of communication and support, to accept that a generalized aim can provide a focus for a complex of movements in a cross cultural situation and to accept that in some instances movements may have no clear beginning and end.

In part Lowe confronts this difficulty when he argues, using Rex and Moore’s analysis of Sparkbrook, that housing classes provide "the means by which special interests can be advanced" (Lowe, 1986:74; also 73-75, 100, 105). This argument misses the point, since it assumes that the establishment of a generalized aim such as equal opportunity for all in a political context is not a specific interest and as such cannot provide a focal point for urban movements. Therefore, it is not housing classes that provide bases for action but ethnic organisations. This misunderstanding arises from taking the view that an ethnic population forms a coherent community, whose members are prepared to forgo their ethnic identities. Evidence offered below (also Chap.2) shows that the Gujarati population consists of a collection of disparate communities.
which during the 1970s showed little inclination to unite to achieve a common goal.

Though ethnic politics was not a form of urban movement envisaged by Castells (1983), it shares many characteristics with urban social movements. Both Castells (1983) and Lowe (1986), who adhere to the idea of an urban social movement as a single effective movement occurring in one place, overlook the possibility of alliances between organisations in the same or different places at similar or different times with similar aims [6]. Although some have argued that the term urban social movement only applies "to groups that achieve social transformations" (cf. Pickvance, 1983, in Lowe (1986:5), Lowe himself defines the term as applying to "organisations standing outside the formal party system which bring people together to defend or challenge the provision of urban public services and to protect the local environment" (Lowe, 1986:3). Therefore I would argue that it is unsound regard an ethnic community or ethnic organisation as an urban movement per se [see footnote 5]. Rather it is the mobilisation of support, real or fictitious, between leaders of organisations with the aim of influencing political decision-makers by dominating the political space between communities within a community. The development of a community identity on the basis of alliances between ethnic organisations that share an aim, particular or general, in a political context can be regarded as a form of urban movement. Therefore, I shall extend Lowe's definition of urban movements recognising that (a) they can have a single general aim, such as to challenge racial inequality, (b) they can comprise a complex of micro-movements whose leaders may compete with one another in order to achieve this aim, (c) they have many bases and (d) they may continue to flourish over a period of time.
Critical to any urban movement is the distance between the leaders and the followers, their social identity, the context in which this identity is located, that is common sense racism (discussed below) in this instance, and the social relationships in which the movement is embedded, that is ethnic communities and social networks.

A distinction needs to be made between urban movements and ethnic organisations. The former are based upon alliances and therefore have no hierarchical structure, while the latter are structured to some degree. Elected representatives of ethnic organisations refer to themselves as leaders and to their supporters as members, and their structures tend to be non- or semi-hierarchical. On the one hand, many of the bureaucratic characteristics of hierarchical structures are absent. Those elected to offices may have to perform decision-making tasks, but they do not always choose to see themselves as leaders. On the other hand, it would also be correct to describe such organisations as having a partial hierarchy, since people are elected to positions in the organisations. Their members pay dues and the organisations have charters, which are recognised by outside bodies, such as CRCs and the Charities Commission. Thus they differ in this respect from the classic model of urban social movement. I shall refer to those who hold positions of chairperson in these organisations as leaders, as they perform the functions of leadership and choose to regard themselves as leaders. Thus the social and bureaucratic distances between these leaders and their members or supporters is small. In this sense ethnic politics involves leaders, mainly men [7], in grassroots movements.

An essential element in any urban movement is the establishment of a
social identity or identities which is (are) acceptable to participants, leaders and those in power. In the context of everyday urban experiences, the identities which set members of ethnic groups apart from others in the working class, who may also be in poverty, are their experiences of racism. The mobilisation of support behind social identities that are acceptable to members of ethnic communities who share these disadvantages lies at the roots of ethnic politics. Ethnic politics involves a conflict about the meaning of urban experiences and therefore about changes to a common culture, which incorporates ideas about inferiority, superiority, equality of opportunity, that is ideas embedded in common sense racism.

The roots of common sense racism can be traced to Britain's empire, where many of the ideas about relationships between white, black and Asian became accepted and after the dissolution of the empire have formed the foundations of common sense racism in Britain since the 1950s (CCCS,1983; Miles,1982; Hall,1981; Rex and Tomlinson,1979). This gave rise to a distinctive set of ideas, attitudes, values and beliefs which when taken together form a body of common sense racism (Lawrence, 1983; Hall,1981). This knowledge not only recognises the right of white people to exploit black people (cf. Walvin,1984:47; Miles,1982:119), but also provides individuals, media and governments with ideas about how to interpret the actions of Asian and black minority communities (cf.Lawrence,1983; Hall,1981). It provides the person-in-the-street with a set of social attitudes, values and prejudices about how to think and behave towards black and Asian people living here (Lawrence, 1983: 49). "As a way of thinking and in its immediacy, common sense is appropriate to 'the practical struggle of everyday life of the masses'" (Lawrence,1983:49). Just as white people draw upon this body of
knowledge, Asian and black people who have experienced racism have
developed responses to it which form part of a distinctive set of ideas
and reactions for coping with racism (Gifford et al., 1989).

Two important constraints define the extent of common sense racism:
the first is skin colour and the second are the social boundaries
surrounding ethnic communities. It is difficult to determine the extent
to which the former defines the positions of white, black and Asian
people. Some point to the "immutable fact of colour" (Walvin, 1984:19),
while others offer caution, arguing that the "association of colour with
conquered and therefore subordinate status" outweighs in sociological
terms the importance of the "association of colour with low social class
standing" (Braham, 1986:8). What is important is that in terms of common
sense racism Asian and black people are labelled as "black". In the
public mind three notions characterise this body of knowledge, they are
immigrant, black and inferior. The latter is defined on the one hand by
perceived differences in cultural patterns (e.g. dress) in association
with skin colour and attitudes to "black", and on the other hand by
religious beliefs, caste and faction membership and perceived social
disadvantages. These social symbols form the basis of a dialogue of
conflict between the leaders of ethnic movements and the politicians.
The dynamic emerges from the new social meanings based upon these two
sets of ideas that develop out of confrontations between Gujarati
leaders and white politicians over the allocation of public resources in
informal political arena of the CRC.

Therefore, I shall define common sense racism as a body of knowledge
comprising social attitudes, values and prejudices, derived from past
and present experiences with black and Asian peoples in Britain's one-
time colonies, which provide white people today with a shorthand guide to understanding the actions of their. This body of knowledge is an element in a wider body of common sense knowledge. Social relationships are reciprocal, that is they involve rights and duties. The reciprocal of white common sense racism is also a body of knowledge, which comprises social attitudes, values and prejudices, based upon past and present experiences with white people, that enable Asian and black people to select the appropriate roles when interacting with white people. This shorthand guide allows Asian and black people to cope with and manage their social, economic and political relationships with white people in daily life in a social environment in which racism is institutionalised.

Arguably, common sense racism shares some of the social characteristics associated with common sense knowledge, such as "knowledge of trustworthy recipes for interpreting the social world and for handling things or men in order to obtain the best results in every situation with a minimum of effort by avoiding undesirable consequences" (Schutz, 1976:103). It was from such a stock of recipes that Governments during the 1970s drew for their reactions to racial situations that were later likened to a "moral panic" (Hall, 1981:32-34), a panic based upon a British fear of alien cultures (Lawrence, 1983:47-49). As I have argued above, there are two reciprocal and changing bodies of common sense racism, one which is used by white people and one which is employed by Asian and black people. This is public knowledge. What adds to the dynamic of ethnic politics is a realisation that evidence of support for leaders is based upon the legitimacy of their claims of support. If they can draw explanations from the reservoir of common sense racism with which other leaders, supporters and white politicians can agree, its
acceptance will confer upon them influence. In a situation of conflict it is this knowledge which acquires social value. I shall argue that it is the interrelationship between this public knowledge and private bodies of knowledge, that is knowledge of Gujarati social organisation, that enables ethnic leaders to make claims for support and to manipulate social identities (Chap. 4). These debates are not just about attempts to bid for influence over white politicians, but also attempts to define the central values in an urban community.

This raises two issues: the first is concerned with the ethnic community being studied and the second is with the place of the research.

The coherence of urban movements involving ethnic minorities depends not only upon shared social situations and experiences, but also upon shared ideas. This implies that some form of transmission of culture exists through those social relationships which underpin ethnic communities. Therefore, the emphasis of this study is on the local context, local ethnic communities and those social relationships which provide underpin community social structures, namely social networks. The concept of community is central to the analysis of ethnic urban movements (cf. Castells, 1983: Chap. 1; Lowe, 1986: 5). Although the concept of community is difficult to define, three factors contribute towards an understanding of what is a community; these are territory, association and identity (Bell and Newby, 1975: 27-31). In this instance territory can be equated with an area of settlement of an ethnic community; social association is based upon relationships of friendship; and social identities emerge through the mobilisation of social and religious ethnic identities which form the bases for alliances in political arenas.
The notion of territory takes on a number of levels of meaning since Gujaratis comprise one of a number of Asian and black communities living in Bolton alongside a large white community. As the largest of these groups, Gujaratis have over time established their geographical territory through settlement, expansion of ethnic-based businesses and religious activities (see below and Chap.1). Furthermore, they themselves are separated into two religious collectivities, namely Hindus and Muslims, and within each there are a number of independent smaller communities. For the Gujaratis the term community only makes sense when they align themselves with some other tangible identity to which they can attribute social "belonging" (Cohen, 1982:9). To describe them as a community makes sense at three levels of interaction, that is their opposition to (a) the white community is expressed in terms of minority-majority or Asian/black-white, (b) other Asian and black communities is expressed in terms of a Gujarati identity and/or religious identities, and (c) other Gujaratis is expressed in terms of intra-Gujarati identities. There are a wide range of organisations to which Gujaratis belong and to which they claim allegiance when they refer to "my community". Thus, there is no single Gujarati community: there are many Gujarati communities and many levels of Gujarati social identities (Chaps. 2-4).

The structures of these communities are based upon social networks which link members within them to those outside them (Chap.3). Social networks provide a foundation for the structures of Muslim and Hindu communities (cf. Laumann, 1976; 1973). Mitchell (1979; 1973; 1971) has drawn attention to the importance of these social characteristics. The social
characteristics of Gujarati social networks can be expected to reflect differences in social and religious values between Muslim and Hindu communities, as well as making explicit the extent of and depth of friendship (intensity) between Gujaratis and members of other communities generally (Chap.3). Social networks have an important role in the development of urban social movements, since they link people across social class, and I shall argue ethnic communities, into movements that have no hierarchical structure (cf. Castells, 1983:19; Chap. 6). The social characteristics of the networks enhance or detract from the overall organisational structure of ethnic communities. Thus they not only underpin the social structures of Gujarati communities, but also provide Gujaratis with relationships through they can exchange knowledge and a means to control this knowledge. Moreover, through friendships Gujaratis develop a shared set of social perceptions about their own community, those of other Gujaratis, those of other minorities and the white community (Chap.4). I shall argue that the social differences in the structures of Gujarati social networks contribute to the seeming solidarity or fragmentary nature of the two large religious communities, namely that of the Hindus and the Muslims.

Embodied in these social networks are perceptions of social distances, which form the basis of a complex process of labelling and social identification (see Chap.4). The mechanics that underlies this process is based upon Gujarati perceptions of social distance. These perceptions enable Gujaratis to distinguish between their relationships to kin, close friends, ordinary friends and acquaintances, between those who belong to their community and those who do not, and between Gujarati and members of other communities. Thus they establish social boundaries within which or over which they allow knowledge to be exchanged and
social identities extended or curtailed. However, the boundaries of the "publicness of knowledge" (Emmett, 1982:207-209) are to an extent coterminous with the social boundaries of each community and between each community, thus providing a hierarchy of social identities (Cohen, 1982).

These social identities provide Gujarati leaders with a source of knowledge of communities, which they can draw upon when defining the social boundaries of their communities in relation to claims for support. A crucial part of defining social identity is the knowledge that others have of these social identities. Therefore boundary shifting is a process employed by Gujarati leaders when defining the social boundaries of their communities in order to generate alliances or "political" communities that can cope with the "exigencies of survival and the structure of opportunity" (Yancey, Erickson and Juliani, 1976:400) in a political world in which they have no access to formal political arenas (Chaps.5-7). With opportunities to achieve influence over politicians, other ethnic leaders and the possibility of gaining access to public resources, these leaders believe that they have power [8], that is they are an example of a "covert power elite" (Bell and Newby, 1975:24).

To have any effect the confirmation of power or the lack of it has to be expressed publicly, that is there needs to exist an arena in which claims to it or the lack of it can be made. Without access to formal local and national political arenas, the arena that is readily available to ethnic leaders is the informal political arena provided by the local CRC (now Racial Equality Council - REC). A recent study of local politics of race observed that local organisations not solely of
ethnic origin "provide forums for the identification of commonly acknowledged problems and the articulation of collective demands" (Ben-Tovim et al., 1986:65). Although this sounds reasonable, in practice organisations with little experience of racism are unlikely to publicise ethnic demands. Strangely, these authors also ignore the political role of local ethnic organisations to articulate political needs, but recognise their anti-racist function (Ben-Tovim et al., 1986:65 ff.). What gives the CRC arena a political character is the importance councillors and MPs attach to their relationships and debates with Gujarati leaders. Often this can be reduced to seeing those who are thought to be able to influence Asian (and black) votes (Anwar, 1986; 1984; 1980; Layton-Henry, 1984). An awareness of the Gujarati leaders of this concern has in turn given them a political asset: in return for votes they want political influence/recognition as representatives. Thus, the CRC became not just an arena in which the politicians sought to control and contain Gujarati demands, but it also an arena in which leaders could bargain for support with other leaders and the politicians for their demands. Consequently, the CRC acted as a buffer for the politicians and a pressure group for the leaders.

The assumption that Gujaratis must accept and recognise only white political parties as being the only organisations through which political views can be expressed in a multicultural society is misguided. Asians and black people cannot be adequately represented by a political selection system, which sets itself above the principle of equal opportunities on the grounds that democracy is the very essence of equal opportunities. If ethnic urban movements are to be successful, they should lead to some kind of change in the social meaning of democracy. Even if confrontation between the Gujarati leaders and the
white politicians did not produce any immediate change in opportunity on
the ground, it increased politicians' awareness of racism and the
disadvantages that flow from it.

Bolton shares certain characteristics with other places where studies
have identified the presence of ethnic politics (cf. Anwar,1979; Katznelson,1973; Hill and Issacharoff,1971). For instance the device by
which local political parties controlled ethnic political activity was
and still is the same as elsewhere, namely the local CRC (Katznelson,
1973; Hill and Issacharoff,1971) [9]. Descriptions of ethnic politics
in these and other studies suggests that the emergence of ethnic
politics here was and is similar to developments elsewhere. However,
there are certain differences, for instance, the pattern of settlement
of Gujaratis here differs from that in Blackburn, a neighbouring town,
in that Bolton attracted both Gujarati Muslims and Hindus, whereas
mainly Muslims settled in Blackburn (Chap.1).

Bolton is an appropriate place for such a study because it provided a
blend of shared and distinctive economic and political characteristics
which provided a fruitful ground for the development of ethnic politics.
In addition to the complex nature of the Gujarati community, two factors
contributed to making this context appropriate: firstly the rapid growth
of the ethnic population and secondly the pressure to meet the demands
of this population by politicians.

The strength of demand by ethnic leaders for greater political
recognition was matched by the rapid growth of the local ethnic
communities from comprising 2.9% of the total population in 1971 to 6.4%
in 1981 (District Trends, 1987). Figures show that by the end of the
research in 1977 these communities comprised 6.7% of the total population (Chap. 1). Such rapid growth of the ethnic communities led to a rise in demands by their members for a share of public resources, namely greater opportunities for education, employment, better housing and welfare benefits. Particular to the local situation is the expansion of different Gujarati ethnic communities under the broad umbrellas of Hinduism and Islam. Above all, this provided an ideal context for the development of ethnic politics. The wider social environment of Bolton set the scene with its declining textile and associated industries which allowed for the development of a situation in which competition between white and Asian and black people for employment, support for the low wage earner and the unemployed was destined to escalate. While welcoming a source of new votes, in the face of growing demands the white politicians showed signs of moral panic (cf. Hall, 1981). As in local politics there is greater scope, flexibility and accessibility for political participation by ethnic leaders than in national politics, Bolton provides an appropriate situation for research on ethnic politics.

Furthermore Bolton is typical of many towns of similar size that attracted Asian migrants. They were drawn to a thriving textile industry because it provided (a) a large number of low-paid and low skilled jobs required simple and cheap training, (b) jobs which were not in great demand from members of the white community, who were seeking higher status jobs and (c) employment in an industry in which many migrants had worked or of which they had some knowledge prior to coming here. Although the textile industry experienced a revival which lasted from the end of the Second World War through to the middle to late 1970s, it had experienced declines and recessions. This industry
experienced a recession before the Second World War, when British colonies began producing textiles and when the association between the adequate supply of water, coal and the particular weather conditions over Bolton no longer became critical for the survival of the industry (Joint Working on Structure Plans in Greater Manchester Employment Sub Group, 1972: Para. 2.2). After the Second World War it was not the recession alone which contributed to the decline of this industry, but the 1959 Cotton Act which accounted for the closure of three quarters of Bolton’s textile mills between 1959 and 1969. Nevertheless, this industry continued to dominate the town by being the largest employer of men and women through the years from 1959 to 1965 and then the second largest employer from 1965 to 1971. Although it remains one of the largest employers of Asians throughout the 1970s to the beginning of the 1990s, it was a declining industry. Therefore Gujaratis found themselves in a situation of increasing competition with growing numbers of unemployed white people, who were once again ready to accept any job. Since there was a reduction in jobs across the country, which can be attributed in part to competition from other countries, and in part to deskilling, the difficulties the Gujaratis experienced here finding housing and work and coping with increasing racism, suggest that Bolton was little different from other towns and cities in Britain (cf. Smith, 1989). Today the textile industry is recovering as new technology replaces manpower. Unfortunately, this changing industry does not attract many Asians, in part because they do not have appropriate qualifications and in part make no positive effort to obtain them.

Three factors set the scene in Bolton in the 1970s which raised the political awareness of the Gujaratis, the white politicians and the white community to racism. The first was the arrival of Ugandan Asians
in 1972-1973, which above all others served to make visible to the white community the presence of an expanding "black" community. The second factor was the emerging demands that the Gujaratis made for scarce resources, and the third factor was the politicians' awareness of a new source of political support. The political presence Asians needs to be seen against the political history of the town. From 1964 to 1970 the town was represented in Parliament by Labour MPs. In 1970 Bolton's vote swung in favour of the Conservatives, but in 1974 the majority was regained by the Labour Party. Politically Bolton was regarded as a marginal constituency. Against this background of political party competition for control, the major political parties began to compete for Gujarati support. The politicians' realisation of the value of this new source of votes coincided with the Gujaratis' demands for housing, jobs, places in schools, planning permission for buildings, for political influence and for local and national benefits. Typically, this awareness led to Labour Party victories in local and national elections as it did elsewhere (cf. Anwar and Kohler, 1975).

However, Bolton was different from other urban centres in so far as grassroots protest flourished and led to changes in the social and political understanding of multiculturalism. In particular the protest originated within a rich diversity of ethnic organisations distinguished by differences in caste and religious belief. To claim that ethnic politics was more advanced here than elsewhere would be difficult to substantiate, since there were few studies of ethnic politics. It is difficult to provide some measure of change, although political party recognition might act as such a benchmark. Doubt has been expressed about whether or not the party political system in Britain can represent the views of minorities (Hall, 1985; Stone, 1985; Rex and
Tomlinson, 1979). Possibly for this reason Hall (1985) drew attention to the need to consider ethnic politics within informal local political arenas. In recent local elections (1992) the Labour Party supported a second black candidate, but gave him an unwinnable seat. To some extent this signifies change (see Chaps. 5 and 7).

To conclude this section, Bolton shares both similarities and differences with from other urban centres where Asian settled. Because Gujarati leaders were given the freedom to develop politically, albeit temporarily, in the CRC, their protest against social and racial disadvantage gave the setting a difference, which cannot be found elsewhere. Two of the most important influences on the political behaviour of Gujarati and white communities are their economic statuses and the balance of political power between them. Although this may not determine the outcome of decision-making, any convincing model should take the economic, social and political power realities as a starting point (Stone, 1985:61). This thesis will take as a starting point the socio-economic position of Gujaratis in relation to other minority communities and the white community.
FOOTNOTES

1. Ethnic politics again became the focus of interest a decade or so later, when in the light of equal opportunities legislation attention moved to minority representation on local government bodies (Ball and Solomos, 1990; Ben-Tovim et al., 1986). Recently, it is claimed in passing that ethnic community protest in the 1980s can be seen as a form of urban movement, although no explanations are offered for this approach (Werbner and Anwar, 1991). Having made this point, the movements described appear to conform more to the definition of urban social movements offered by Castells than do those discussed below.

2. The second term that needs clarifying is Gujarati. In this thesis I shall normally use the terms Muslim and Hindu when referring to Gujarati Muslims and Hindus but exclude other Muslims, such as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. When I refer to both Muslims and Hindus in relation to Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, I shall use the term Gujarati. On occasions I shall refer to all Muslims, that is Gujarati Muslims, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and others. On other occasions I use the label Asian to include all people who live in Bolton who trace their origins to the Indian subcontinent. For the association between Gujarati and the label black see footnote 3.

3. First I need to clarify my usage of the term black. Much of the literature on race uses the word "black" to describe those who are the targets of racism. At one level I can accept this, since those who discriminate against members of certain minority communities do so on the grounds of perceiving them as black. However, from my experience the Afro-Caribbeans, Africans choose to call themselves black. Asians do not. I shall use the term black when referring to people perceived of by white people as black. However, this does not mean that those perceived as black, perceive themselves as black. The Gujaratis prefer not to refer to themselves as black; they are Gujaratis or Indians (Chaps. 3; also Modood, 1988; Westwood, 1984). Labels such as these form an important part of common sense racism (Allen and Macey, 1990: 376; Castles et al. 1984: 98-99, 194; Lawrence, 1983: Chap. 2), as I shall show these are only the more obvious labels.

4. Later Rex altered his view (1986, Chap. 5)

5. I do not consider that ethnic communities can functioning like urban social movements. For one thing, they are more permanent than movements and they do have some form of hierarchical structure. Ethnic communities and ethnic organisations do share similarities, in so far as the latter often represents the former. I consider that it detracts from the analysis by confusing to suggest that communities are similar to movements (cf. Gilroy, 1986: 235-236).

6. See discussion in Lowe, 1986: 38-48; also Chaps. 4-6.
7. Since all Gujaratis who participated in inter- and intra-Gujarati politics in Bolton without exception were men, all Gujaratis interviewed were male. Although I spoke to some of the women about various aspects of their lives, I did not include any of them in the survey. In Chapter One immigration figures for Bolton are given which indicate that a large proportion of Indian immigrants coming here were women. Gujarati men gave me the impression that their wives were withdrawn, unable to communicate in English, made no important decisions, could not go out unchaperoned and the home and kitchen were the places where women found satisfaction. Little was said about their work and their contribution to household income. Allen makes the point that not only do the immigration figures suggest that women are the dependents of their husbands (Allen, 1982: 129-130), but that in India and Pakistan there is evidence to suggest that women are far more independent as wives and decision-makers, as leaders and as employers than they are in Britain (Allen, 1982:135). "Their experience in Britain and their approach to this experience is therefore not to be equated in any simple way, to that of their sisters from India, Pakistan or Bangladesh" (Allen, 1982:135). In other words, an outsider’s impression of the role of Gujarati women as subordinate and submissive is nothing more than an impression created by Gujarati men.

The suggestion that many women work either in factories or at home and are the recipients of "appalling low rates of pay" and that even less is known about those who work in family businesses as unpaid workers (Allen, 1982:138) points to discrimination and double disadvantage. I would argue, however, that such data do not explain how Gujarati men (and other men from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) have achieved such a position of dominance over their wives, daughters and other female relatives. Although Allen does not explain how the immigration experience has enabled men to achieve such a position of dominance (Allen, 1982), I recognise this as an important issue and one worthy of deeper research. For further discussion see Appendix I.

8. Locally, as nationally, there are other spheres of power besides political ones, for instance social, religious, business and financial, and professional ones, through which Gujaratis could gain access to power, but these are not relevant to this thesis. During the 1970s it seemed as if the access of Gujaratis generally to positions within the formal political hierarchy was more difficult to achieve than it was for Asians and black people towards the end of the nineteenth century and the initial decades of this century. Although nationally a few Asians and black people achieved positions as councillors in Blackburn, Bradford, Leicester and some London Boroughs, generally positions in the national political hierarchy were closed to them. In Bolton since the 1970s Asians and black people have had little success in local or national elections.

9. This is one of the major criticisms made by Asian and black people of the CRE and RECs today (Sunday Telegraph, November, 1992:15).
Part II
Research Methodology

The aim of this Part is to clarify selected aspects of research methodology. Three issues in particular will be discussed: firstly, the general approach used including the extent to which this influences or is influenced by the researcher moving across cultures; secondly, the degree to which it impinges upon the understanding behind the usage of the concept of culture; and thirdly, how the above issues have effected and are modified by the collection and analysis of data. The first issue centres around a debate about which approach predominates - the social anthropological or sociological approach -, and therefore to what extent can this thesis be described as ethnographic. The second issue is concerned with the understanding of the concept of culture and how the cultures of ethnic minorities relate to British culture. The third issue focuses on a debate about the consequence of interpretation of data drawn from a cross-cultural situation. These three issues are intertwined and effect each other and the analysis of the data. Details of fieldwork and sampling are described in Appendix I, the questionnaire can be found in Appendix II and details of social network analysis in Appendix IV.

As this thesis focuses on an area of interest that is located at the interface between white British and Gujarati cultures within British society, it raises questions about research done across cultures. These include detailing the approach, issues raised when a researcher from one culture claims to record and analyse the views of those belonging to another culture. Whose views are recorded? To what extent do those recorded subscribe to the stated views? Can a person belonging to one
culture accurately record those of members belonging to another culture? Some of these latter concerns will be discussed below.

The subject of this thesis is how Gujaratis developed ethnic politics, so that they could exploit a gap between the grassroots and the local political party and formal political structure. By definition I do not claim to provide a total description of Gujarati culture or social life in Bolton. The thesis focuses on an area of political interaction in which both Gujarati leaders and members, white politicians and members of BCCR, the wider public and the Press participated. As the aim of this research is to demonstrate how Gujarati leaders sought to obtain access to public resources, the research needs to take account of their socio-economic position, the religious organisations which provide leaders with structures of leadership, their perceptions of community and social networks and their perceptions of political representation and participation in local politics. In presenting an analysis of the observable social actions of Gujaratis and the meanings that these actions were intended to provide for certain audiences, I am making explicit what they made explicit. I am interpreting their actions, meanings, beliefs that pertain to ethnic politics. This is an exercise to provide an in-depth understanding of their social world in so far as it impinges upon ethnic politics.

Discussion of research that involves crossing ethnic and/or cultural boundaries raises the questions about approaches and it is this which I shall discuss first.

In this research an anthropological approach is combined with a sociological one. An assumption is made that a major difference between
these disciplines lies in their approaches and subject matter. Today both disciplines utilise a wide range of approaches and study a wide range of subject matter. Since neither sociology nor anthropology has a monopoly of a particular approach to research, it would be simplistic to reduce the difference in the approaches of these disciplines to that of micro- and macro-approaches. In anthropological and sociological research qualitative and quantitative techniques have been combined (Bryman, 1988:147; Cicourel, 1981). There is no firm separation between the techniques used by one discipline and those employed by the other. Practitioners of both draw on a range of techniques of data collection and analysis appropriate to the subject studied.

Since this research project looked at ethnic politics from the Gujarati side; it would be incorrect to presume that therefore that this determined which approach would be used. In fact a range of approaches and techniques are used; the former include macro- and micro-approaches, and the latter include nonparticipant and participant observation, case studies and a questionnaire. Recognising the dangers of employing a micro-approach which "runs the risk of losing touch with social reality and imposing instead 'a fictional non-existing world constructed by the scientific observer'" (Bryman quoting Schutz, 1988: 52), I have locating this study within a macro-approach. Although much of the research concentrates upon the microcosm of actions that occurred within the arena provided by Bolton Council for Community Relations (BCCR), to make sense of this political activity the research draws upon the wider aspects of local social interaction and to an extent upon national events.

Another dimension of the debate about approaches revolves around the
issue of the extent to which research on another culture and what is loosely termed an anthropological content forms an ethnography. Since this thesis because it goes beyond description and focuses on general theoretical issues, it cannot be regarded as an ethnography (Mair, 1966:7). The aim of the study is not to provide a Gujarati view of Gujarati life, but to analyse Gujarati access to local political processes. In part by doing such research a view is provided of aspects of Gujarati social life. The emphasis is on the latter. In doing this, as an outsider, I am providing what in a relative sense is an insiders’ view of local politics, in particular ethnic politics. Most people who are involved in local politics have greater or lesser experience of ethnic politics, what they may be less familiar with is how aspects of Gujarati social organisation impinge upon ethnic politics.

From a different point of view this study may be described as ethnographic, since it involves both ethnography and analysis. I would argue that this approach is appropriate for a study of racism. To quote Willis: ‘The role of ethnography is to show the cultural viewpoint of the oppressed, their “hidden” knowledges and resistances as well as the basis on which entrapping “decisions” are taken in some sense of liberty, but which nevertheless help to produce “structure”’ (Willis, 1981:201-3, quoted in Marcus, 1986:179; see also Willis, 1979:119-126, 171-179). This approach is appropriate to a study of ethnic politics, since it makes explicit through ethnography the extent of institutional racism in local politics. In particular it raises an important issue about central values. If politics is concerned with the definition and maintenance of central social values, then the Gujaratis’ (and Asian and black) view that at least some of these values do not pertain to them, points to two issues. Firstly, central values can change but to share
these values cannot be achieved through a simple process of settlement and integration. Secondly, racism may prevent central values from becoming appropriate to members of minority communities living in a multicultural and multiracial society. Efforts by these minorities to change central values to accommodate their urban experiences are associated more often with protest, since racism prevents change through everyday social contact. If living in a multicultural society implies the existence of diverse communities, linked by a complex web of cultural similarities and differences, then the central values of the society should reflect the views of these communities. While this does not preclude the possibility that there are other interpretations, it makes no attempt to recognise that Gujaratis, members of other minorities and other white people might dispute the centrality of these values. At present racial unrest suggests that the views of minorities are not being taken into account by governments and politicians (cf. Gifford, 1989).

To summarise, in so far as this research presents a picture of selected aspects of Gujarati social and political life, some would argue that it could be regarded as an ethnography (cf. Bryman, 1988:45). Since this thesis goes beyond a description of Gujarati social and political life, it cannot be accepted as an ethnography, although parts of it may be ethnographic. It combines a sociological with an anthropological approach.

The second issue is concerned with the understanding of the concept of culture and its deployment in this thesis.

The approach taken here is that Gujaratis are part of British
Having made this point, there are still social boundaries to be crossed. This means that I as a researcher and Gujaratis as the subjects of the research are insiders. It also means that I am not concerned with their place of origin, be it Gujarat, Uganda or elsewhere, as a means to differentiate between cultures with the intention of arguing that Gujaratis have to cross from one culture to another to participate within this society. As a social attribute which distinguishes Gujaratis from those who are not Gujaratis, I employ it to make apparent differences, such as when distinguishing between differences in the pattern of Hindu and Muslim social association. However, there is an implication that people who are British and belong to different ethnic groups have cultures which are separate from British culture (cf. Cohen, 1982; 1986). This is a contentious view: it argues that relatively geographically, therefore socially, isolated communities have identities based upon cultural differences, although they still form part of a British culture. However, black and Asian Britons who are also isolated, socially and to a lesser extent geographically (e.g. Smith, 1989), have cultures and social identities which separate them from British culture, but are regarded them as not forming part of a British culture. This view I suggest upholds the theme of "between two cultures" (Watson, 1977). As such it is unhelpful for an analysis of ethnic politics, since ethnic politics involves a debate about central values, the assumption made in this thesis is that Gujaratis are part of British society and that their culture forms part of a British culture.

The argument behind this thesis is that Gujarati, Asian and black ethnic groups living here may have separate social identities, but that their cultures form part of British culture. In other words living here
does not require Gujaratis to give up social values and beliefs that they recognise as Gujarati and replace them with "British" values. Similarly white Britons do not need to accept Gujarati social values, unless they are in frequent contact with them through work, socially or through sharing religious beliefs. By recognising Gujarati values a Briton does not become a Gujarati. Furthermore, the social values Gujaratis recognise as Gujarati are not necessarily accepted and recognised as Gujarati by people living in Gujarat. Nevertheless, any research on people who do not belong to the researcher’s immediate social world, requires the researcher to learn about social meanings accepted by others. This is accepted by most sociologists without comment. Few choose to explain how they cross social divides, although there are some exceptions for instance Sacks (1985), Cicourel (1981), Schutz (1976), Garfinkel (1967), Becker (1963), and Goffman (1959). Generally sociologists presume that because they are members of the same society and understand that part of the culture accepted by the group in which they live, that they therefore can understand the social meanings and social actions of other groups and communities with whom they do not live. What is implied is that sociological understanding is possible within our society, irrespective of how far removed the group studied is from the experiences of the researcher. Sociologists who are interested in the sociology of everyday life have questioned this assumption.

It is simplistic to presume that the study of another ethnic group within British society involves a greater or lesser shift from the familiar to the unfamiliar than does the study of other groups within the "social" group to which the researcher belongs. It is accepted that to study other cultures, particularly those separated from British society by geographical distance, involves a major a shift by the
researcher from the familiar to the unfamiliar. Any attempt to plot the steps that link the familiar to the unfamiliar is an exercise in degree. As Sharrock and Anderson point out: "Once different monolithic cultures have been decomposed into cultural differences, the problem of understanding and its near relation - the problem of meaning - become a great deal more tractable" (1982:131). The approach adopted here needs to be distinguished from others employed in race relations research, since in studying ethnic politics I am studying a Gujarati view of a political process which both Gujaratis and white politicians accepted. That is the Gujaratis were not pressurising the politicians into creating, say a Gujarati or Indian political system in Bolton. Therefore the approach taken here is that ethnic politics is about ethnic differences and not about the clash or meeting of two monolithic cultures.

It is interesting to note that in the two works on British cultures referred to above, the Asian and Afro-Caribbean communities living here are ignored (Cohen, 1982; 1986). In Belonging attention is focused on rural communities. No mention is made even of the one island Asian community, that of the Pakistanis who live in Stornoway, Lewis, in the earlier volume. In its sequel, Symbolising Boundaries, which focuses on identity and diversity in urban British cultures, there is no mention of Asian and black cultures. The lack of inclusion of these cultures tacitly supports the argument that some anthropologists take the view that ethnic groups, whose members migrated to Britain, have cultures which are different from a British culture in the sense that they represent separate monolithic cultures. This suggests that the 1970s concept of "between two cultures" has not only survived to the present time, but that it is more strongly entrenched than ever. How "other" are
Asian and black British cultures? This is not a useful debate in part for the reasons given by Miles (1982:Chap.3), in part for the uncritical consequences of labelling (Introduction Part I above, Modood, 1988; Westwood, 1984), and in part because it reinforces the view that "black" people belong to hostile "non-British" cultures. Thus they are categorised as outsiders. However, a critical analysis of labelling which is grounded in social interaction is interesting and important in any study of a multiracial situation (Chap.3 below, also MacDonald Report, 1989:Chap.26).

Undoubtedly the debate about British society being a unitary society or a complex society consisting of multiple cultures is critical, since it determines the approach of governments, politicians, people and researchers to minorities within the society. The fragility of people and certainly governments accepting the latter view was highlighted recently by the Salman Rushdie incident, by an increase in racism as a result of the Gulf War, by concern expressed by politicians over the participation of Muslims canvassing for an independent Muslim political party in recent local elections, and by the establishment of a Muslim parliament in Britain. In the race relations context sociologists have debated the idea of describing British society as pluralistic or multicultural (discussed in Part I above), but the latter has come to be accepted as the more accurate and appropriate description of British society (cf. Rex, 1987; 1986). This notion takes on board the idea of British society being comprised of a number of cultures (multicultural) all of which are accorded equal freedom of expression within the private domain and a unitary set of institutions in the public domain (Rex, 1987:228). However, Rex observes that such a society as he describes is an ideal model and does not exist as yet. However, his model suggests
that a multicultural society is one consisting of communities the
cultural differences between whom are a matter of degree and not kind.

The third issue considers how the above approach and interpretation
of the concept of culture relate to the collection of data and the
analysis of data. The combination of approaches is reflected in the
range of methods of data collection and the range of techniques for data
analysis.

Aspects of the approach employed share much with symbolic
interactionism. An advantage of this is that it recognises the
importance for sociological analysis of the ordinary Gujaratis' interpretations of the everyday social and political world that underpinned their social actions and social meanings. It emphasises the political strategies and tactics which Gujaratis consider appropriate to ethnic politics, such as the importance of the role of social and religious organisations, labelling and social meanings embedded in Gujaratis' body of common sense racism. The concept of ethnicity draws attention to social boundaries which are based upon Gujarati perceptions of social identities in the social world as seen from their point of view.

To collect the data I had to cross cultural boundaries into Gujarati society, learn about aspects of Gujarati culture, and gain an understanding of their view of local politics, ethnic politics and racism in politics. This raises a number of important issues about the relationship between British culture and that of ethnic groups, like Gujaratis. The extremes of this debate suggest that on the one hand a researcher cannot cross culture boundaries, and on the other that total
immersion is possible. This presupposes that a monolithic culture exists in which a researcher can avoid becoming or can choose to become immersed. In Social Anthropology there is considerable debate about this issue (Clifford and Marcus, 1986), where researchers have been crossing boundaries to study cultures for much longer than in Sociology. Amongst the questions such a study raises is: what kind of a view and whose view does a researcher provide - that of the researcher or that of the subjects researched? To some degree this study presents a version of an outsider's view of insiders' views (cf. Sharrock and Anderson, 1982: 121). Where the approach used here diverges from that used by many anthropologists is that Gujarati actors are treated as "only interpretive actors" as opposed to "excavating the meanings that they have for the actions they take" (Sharrock and Anderson, 1982: 131).

The approach used in this study of ethnic politics and racism in local politics involved the use of both micro- and macro-methods for the collection of data. I had direct contact with the Gujaratis and a considerable amount of data was collected participant and nonparticipant observation. However, data were also collected by means of case studies and a questionnaire. Therefore, this study brings together data for qualitative and quantitative analysis. This made it possible to combine a qualitative analysis with a computer analysis of the data in general and with a highly formalised computer analysis of the data on social networks. Although this has been done before (Mitchell, 1967), it is still unusual in anthropological research but more common in sociological research. This research is a methodological experiment designed to combine the insight of direct observation with the stringent crosschecking that only carefully controlled numerical data can provide.
Firstly, regarding the general collection of data, working across cultures presented well established difficulties, such as the need to bridge the language gap through the use of an interpreter. Attempts to employ Gujarati interviewers to overcome some of these difficulties ended in frustration (see Appendix I for a discussion of this issue). The difficulties that I experienced trying to persuade Gujarati students to take on the job of interviewing suggested that being a Gujarati may have given a researcher some advantages, for instance access to the language; but it could be disadvantageous, for instance such a person might be seen to compromise Gujarati social values. A few Muslims who tried to complete some interviews for me, struggled even more than I did. The Hindu interviewers worked with the support of the VHP and this undoubtedly helped them overcome the difficulties faced by people within a community gaining access to information that some regarded as private.

Secondly, when I interviewed, with or without an interpreter, I could move from a Hindu to a Muslim respondent without offence being taken. Although respondents might have been suspicious of my motives, only time could prove them right or wrong. Furthermore, they could choose to conceal information from me without causing offence, knowing or believing that it would take me a long time to gain access to it. Had I been a Gujarati, this would not be true and I could gain access to it quickly. Since Gujaratis who belonged to this community would be seen as members of it first and foremost, it was more difficult for them to separate their roles as members from that of interviewers and have this recognised and accepted by members of the community. Therefore, I would argue being clearly not a Gujarati was an advantage when working in these close Gujarati communities. For instance there was an advantage in being able to make clear to respondents, whom I met for the first time,
that I was unaware of some critical piece of information.

Thirdly, the tangibility of cultural boundaries between Gujaratis and the white community provided for this study of social movements with social markers which provided a social constructed separation between grassroots protest and leadership, the established political structures and the cross-cultural dimension. Fourthly, two different methods were used to collect data on social background, marriage patterns, religious beliefs and membership of religious organisations, caste associations and communities, friendship and social association, social class position and employment, political allegiances and opinions. These are participant observation and a questionnaire; they reflect aspects of anthropological and sociological approaches. In terms of the material collected they support and enrich one another.

Fifthly, the collection and analysis of one set of data illustrates the combination of approaches well. The data are distinctive as it involves observation, the questionnaire and computer analysis. I have already made the point above that such data are not unique to social anthropology or sociology research. Observation allowed me to verify to an extent the complex and detailed data on patterns of social association, friendship and close friendship in particular which I collected by means of the questionnaire. On the one hand, the combination of methods of data collection and analysis enrich the data and give it a depth which sets it apart from the other data. On the other hand, these data in comparison with other data in the thesis are separated from it by virtue of the complexity and precision of computer analysis. If social networks are assumed to underpin the social structures of communities, then the collection of detailed data on
friendships becomes important. Furthermore, these data provided an important source of information about social identities. They provided concrete factual evidence which could be used to support data on perceptions of social distances between communities and ethnic groups. These data became the linchpin for the analysis of structures of leadership, because (a) they brought together diverse approaches, different methods of data collection with complex methods of data analysis, (b) they linked the overall analysis of the thesis, and (c) the collection of this data above other data required a crossing of cultures and an exchange of trust.

This research takes as its analytical starting point "the notion of a shared set of meanings and understandings", "what it seeks to demonstrate and not what it is predicated on" (Sharrock and Anderson, 1982:133). They go on to argue that a researcher should concentrate upon "those things which allow him to act". "The idea of the actor as an interpretative actor does not require the attribution of shared meanings" (Sharrock and Anderson, 1982:133), which need to emerge from the analysis. Therefore, no attempt is being made to understand the meanings the Gujaratis attach to social actions, but to treat them as interpretive actors (see above). What is attempted is to explain their view of participation in a shared political process rather than to treat their interpretations as a form of causal attribution. This requires some knowledge of their social organisations and culture as well as some knowledge of the social constraints which form part of their social world, but I do not offer an interpretation or description of their culture or social meanings associated with it. Social network analysis allowed me to meet these rigorous principles for the understanding and interpretation of the views of actors and analyst.
Chapter 1 describes how Gujaratis, with other immigrants from New Commonwealth countries, came to Britain in the 1950s in search of work, rewards and security. Those who settled in Bolton formed the beginning of what became the largest ethnic minority in the town. This Chapter begins by describing their pattern of migration and settlement. Their socio-economic position is defined by their qualifications, the jobs and social class position and by the housing that was available to them. Like many immigrants, they sought jobs in occupation sectors and moved into housing areas that were to disadvantage them as a group. Economic recessions in the textile industry, their reliance on white people for employment contributed to their low social class standing. Their vulnerability to racial discrimination was made more apparent when other people in the town began to suffer from similar disadvantages, such as unemployment. Thus, they became a poor and powerless minority within Bolton’s inner urban area. This Chapter sets the scene.

The aim of Chapter 2 is to analyse the socio-religious structure of this minority and to analyse the roles of the religious organisations whose leaders have taken on political functions, thus providing bases for grassroots movements. It is divided into two parts: the first describes the Muslim communities and the second the Hindu communities. The growth and development of ethnic organisations representing communities within the Hindu and Muslim populations was a consequence of an existing commitment to social values and beliefs based on membership of factions, caste association/communities and other religious organisations. In the 70s with the majority of Gujaratis
regarding communication as a barrier to participation in white political organisations, one alternative was for them to utilise their existing religious organisations as bases for political movements. The role of these organisations was to support social and religious values and beliefs, as well as to provide Gujaratis with ready-made structures of leadership and support. The changing role of the local CRC provided these leaders with access to an informal political arena in which they could develop their political skills and express opposition on behalf of their supporters to those in political control of the town.

Chapter 3 concentrates on the social relationships of Gujaratis within and without their communities. Social networks form the basis of the social structure of their communities and provide the links that relate the individual to his socio-religious organisations and through them to the wider urban community. As such they are a social resource in that on the one hand, they provide access to knowledge about Gujaratis which can be made available or restricted, and on the other hand, may provide or restrict Gujaratis’ access to members in other communities and through them to other scarce resources. The networks to which Gujaratis have any measurable access is not that of the networks of those in positions of power, political or financial, but their own personal social networks. Thus the emphasis is on friendship and particularly close friendship, because friendship is the one relationship which can cut across racial and social class divisions. As such it can reduce social differences. The analysis of close friends within social networks shows (1) to what extent Gujaratis are prepared to commit themselves to friendships with members of their own and other communities, and (2) to what extent they can obtain access to those with power in Bolton.
In Chapter 4 the idea that Gujaratis' knowledge of their own communities is a form of power is explored. Amongst Gujaratis cohesion depends upon two forms of social resources: the publicness of knowledge and the deployment of and access to this knowledge in the political arena. Knowledge of Gujarati organisations is recognised as important by Gujaratis who find themselves in the role of leaders, when they become aware of the political value of their vote to the white politicians and the increasing dependence of their supporters on local authority and national resources. They find themselves competing with disadvantaged and advantaged people from other communities for the same scarce public resources. One way for Gujarati leaders to control the balance between white politicians’ eagerness to influence Gujarati voters and the access of the latter to scarce resources is to restrict the politicians’ access to knowledge of Gujarati social organisation. This implies the management of perceptions of social distance. An analysis of perceptions of social distance reveals that it is not only ideas about whom a person can marry, who is acceptable as a close friend, ordinary friend or acquaintance, but it also leads to the definition of social boundaries between Gujarati communities, the us, and non-Gujaratis, the them. Using ideas within both white and their understanding of common sense racism (see definition in Part I above), Gujaratis and their leaders have established a broad set of strategies underpinning potential political alliances between themselves and leaders of other Asian and black communities. From the white political point of view essentially these beliefs are not political and should be given no political value. The aim of this Chapter is to analyse these perceptions, demonstrate how they have become embodied in a set of social labels, which in turn form a set of social identities that mark levels of meaning within a Gujarati
body of common sense racism.

Chapter 5 builds on the previous Chapters in that it examines the inadequacies of the links between Gujarati leaders of socio-religious organisations and the formally elected white politicians. Without access to representation in formal political arenas, because they are not perceived to be a political group or a group within a political party, the Gujaratis see themselves as politically powerless. However, on the one hand, the white politicians need the Gujarati votes and Gujaratis are also showing themselves to be more assiduous voters than are white voters, and on the other hand, these voters are more easily identifiable than the white floating voters. Thus the politicians are caught in a dilemma: to control Gujarati demands for a greater share of scarce resources including participation in politics, they use the informal arena of the CRC for political debates with Gujarati leaders; but to obtain Gujarati votes, they have to commit themselves to Gujarati demands. This chapter sets the scene for the negotiations that took place between Gujaratis and the politicians for resources.

Chapter 6 describes and analyses some of the events that bring Gujarati leaders and white politicians into confrontation. I use the term events to describe a series of grassroots movements which are based on changing alliances, real and fictitious, between Gujarati leaders and some times leaders of other minority communities with the express aim of defining support for claims to better access to scarce resources. These key events gave these leaders opportunities to make statements about the power relationship between themselves and their communities and the white politicians and the white community. The debates laid the basis for Gujaratis demands for resources and thus made political the needs of
this minority. It also demonstrates how through debate leaders and politicians negotiated definitions of the power relationship deploying the social identities of the participants in the events. The importance of Gujarati knowledge as a resource emerges as leaders bargain political support for access to resources. These movements taken together amount to an urban social movement.

Finally, Chapter 7 continues with the analysis the consequences of the process of negotiation arising from the events. I argue that the attempts by the white politicians to attempt to control the Gujarati leaders is translated into party political competition for Gujarati votes. Therefore, the decisions arrived at by the politicians reflect a reluctance to admit Gujarati leaders into party politics or into the formal political arenas. This reluctance I suggest is a form of racism in politics. This Chapter will form the conclusion drawing together the argument that Gujaratis will experience difficulties in attempting to sustain grassroots protests on socio-religious bases which have no direct or concrete relationship with a recognised political base.
 CHAPTER 1
MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT OF GUJARATIS IN BOLTON 1950 - 1976

The aim of this Chapter is to define the socio-economic position of Gujaratis in Bolton in the early to middle 1970s, that is to set the scene in which the participants in ethnic politics lived. The argument is that the pattern of arrival of the Gujaratis enhanced their tendency to form small exclusive communities divided along social and religious lines, which generally were invisible to outsiders. As a whole they were perceived by members of the white community to be part of one, growing and visible immigrant community in the town. The characteristics of visibility and exclusiveness were expressed through skin colour and patterns of migration, employment and settlement. Some of these shared social characteristics act as identities around which migrants can form movements to express their dissatisfaction. This Chapter argues that these characteristics set apart the Gujarati communities from the mainstream political parties and other communities in Bolton.

This Chapter is divided into three sections: the first deals briefly with the migration of Gujaratis, the second examines their pattern of employment and the third analyses their pattern of settlement.

Migration Patterns of Asians

A four-stage historical model of South Asian migration to Britain has tended to dominate descriptions of migration and settlement (Brah, 1982:12-26; Ballard, R and C, 1977:29-43). This model [1] distinguishes between four phases of settlement: firstly, settlement between the world wars; secondly, the demand for unskilled labour after the Second World
War; thirdly, consolidation of first generation migrant communities, and finally, the emergence of second generation British born children of migrants. The first phase saw the arrival of individual pioneers and pedlars who came here before and between the wars, the second phase begins with the end of the Second World War and the demand for unskilled labour, the third phase began about 1960 (for Sikhs) and saw the arrival of wives and children coming to join their husbands. The fourth phase began about 1970 and witnessed the emergence and growth of second generation British educated Asians moving away from inner urban areas into better housing areas (cf. Ballard R. and C,1977:21-22). By employing a diachronic model the aim is to convey an impression of change in the social, economic and political statuses of Sikh migrants, as they change from newly arrived migrants to English speaking settled people living in the outer urban housing areas. Although there is a tendency to endow this model with explanatory power, it simply offers a loose descriptive framework based on identifiable social characteristics associated with phases of settlement (cf.Reader,1964). For instance, the relationship between the growth of faction disputes and the phases of consolidation is associated with the third phase of settlement, since this was the period when ethnic organisations emerged alongside a growth in Asian community facilities and services (Ballard.R and C, 1977:39). However, with no clear guidelines exist on what to include and what to exclude, this model comprises a set of categories separated only by historical periods. To some extent it can be employed as evidence of the development of political awareness in minority communities (cf.Brah, 1982). I shall use this model to provide an historical framework for organising the data on the Gujaratis and to allow for some comparisons to be made between Gujaratis and other migrants.
The First and Second Phases of Settlement of Gujaratis in Bolton (1950s to 1960s)

Records of the First Phase of Asian settlements in Bolton are fragmentary. The West Indians who came before 1950 fought for Britain in the Second World War. One of the town’s first Asian families, the Deans, came from what is now Pakistan, arrived in the early 1930s. In the 1947 Census a family with an Asian name was registered as living at 5, Henry Street, Bolton. Gujaratis began arriving in Bolton in the middle 50s along with other Asian migrants. Few Asians came to Bolton prior to 1950, and the majority of those who did, appear to have been Pakistanis.

Therefore, I am concerned with the second phase when Asians came to towns like Bolton, North-West of England, to seek employment in what was then a thriving textile industry. Because the indigenous workers did not want these jobs (Brah, 1982:13), migrants experienced little difficulty finding work. Locally the textile industry had always been a large employer of women (Cohen & Jenner, 1981:112-113), now as employers wanted to maintain high rates of production and pay low wages, they employed Asians, who were prepared to work unsociable hours, with relatively few skills. Although I have no information on the jobs these Gujaratis found, research suggests that the characteristics of jobs found by other immigrants required low skills, involved unsocial hours of work, working conditions were poor, work was repetitive, wages were low and employees required little training (Allen et al., 1977; Bohning, 1981:33). Such jobs were typical of a semi-automated manufacturing industry such as textiles, which was able to utilise the skills offered by these migrants. Initially Asians settled in run-down and poor inner town areas close to the mills.
The 1961 Census provides scant information on migrants, as data on country of birth was not recorded, but it does provide some information on migrants who came from the ex-colonies. According to it the number of New Commonwealth immigrants living in Bolton comprised 534 men and 564 women (OPCS, Census, 1961). This does not tally with the information held by the Local Authority Housing Department, which appears to be conservative recording only some 67 Asian dwellings (Table 1.1). There is no indication as to whether or not these Asians were Gujaratis. Only a small number of the sample came here during this phase of settlement: two were Muslims and three were Hindus and they accounted for 2% of the total sample (Table 1.2).

Table 1.1: Dwellings occupied by Asians in Bolton 1956-71
(Housing Department, Bolton Local Authority)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dwellings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though this pattern of migration and settlement of Gujaratis sampled reflects national trends, there are some differences. There are grounds for claiming that Bolton’s nineteenth and early twentieth century trading links with India, based upon the import of raw cotton and later leather and the export of textiles and leather goods (Saxelby, 1971: 97), may account for it being selected by Gujaratis for settlement. Before the Second World War the textile industry experienced a recession brought about by a growth in the manufacture of textiles in Britain’s colonies; locally the industry experienced major changes. For instance the closure of the coal mines, which provided the mills with a source of energy, forced mills to look to other forms of power. Nevertheless between 1956-1959 the textile industry enjoyed a revival and was looking more for workers. In general the rate of unemployment in the town rose...
from 1% to 2.5%; although nationally it was slightly higher (Ogden, 1966: Diagram 4).

Towards the end of this phase the local textile industry experienced another and more sustained recession. The 1959 Cotton Act, which was intended to rationalise and revitalise this industry, set in motion the large scale closure of mills with outdated machinery (Joint Working on Structure Plans in Greater Manchester Employment Sub Group, 1972: Para. 2.2). The mills which survived this Act were encouraged to install new machinery at considerable expense. This Act resulted in the closure of over a fifth of the textile mills in Lancashire, and Bolton was particularly badly affected. It also affected other textile dependent industries. For instance many engineering firms that made textile machinery had to diversify and the surviving mills had to do likewise. Thus, for complex reasons there was no shortage of jobs in the town for a period of time (Ogden, 1966: 4).

During this period of migration men came alone. Their aim was to accumulate sufficient money to return home and purchase a business or land. However, few achieved this aim and many who came alone brought over their wives and children a few years later. For those who came to save money the difficulty of earning sufficient money to save some, the changing value of money both in Britain and India and the expense of living here combined to change this ideal into a myth (cf. Anwar, 1979). Most failed to reckon on the pressures that make such a short term plan of migration difficult to execute (Bohning, 1981: 36-37). However, the "myth of return" far from being a temporary ideal associated with the first stage of migration, became an important and achievable goal for those who live here.
The Third Phase of Settlement (1960s to 1970s)

This is described as the period of consolidation, when migrants were joined by their wives and families (Ballard, R and C., 1977:35). The majority of Gujaratis came during this phase and the number of Asian dwellings in the town rose from 67 to over 808 (Table 1.1). This phase associates the growth of these communities with the emergence of ethnic identities in political arenas, education institutions and employment (Ballard, R and C., 1977). Over half (55.8%) of the sample came here in this period (Table 1.2) and the majority of them were able to find work in the mills. This suggests that firstly, jobs were available in the textile industry during the period between 1950 and 1960 for reasons given above (Introduction Part 1 above), and secondly jobs available a decade later still demanded little skill and little knowledge of English. Neither employers nor workers sought to increase the skills they looked for or improve those they offered.

Table 1.2: Analysis of Sample by Phase of Settlement*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-76 III</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28.85</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>50.65</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>41.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-69 II</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>68.27</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>55.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-59 I</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The fieldwork was completed in July 1976.

In the space of relatively short period the Asian population grew rapidly from a few hundred in the previous decade to over 3050 (OPCS, Sample Census, 1966). Although politicians assumed that migrants such as Gujaratis would assimilate into the white communities, the likelihood of this occurring diminished as they experienced secondary socialisation. A
reason for this is that they were still intent on returning home to Gujarat once they had saved enough money. As they gradually began to commit themselves to living permanently in Britain, they participated in the community activities that promoted the development of Gujarati social identities and social values (cf. Bohning, 1981:35). Over time they became aware of a new set of deprivations, such as the lack of a TV, and a car, which is a consequence of that "unsocial game between standard of living and the cost of living in a post-industrial society" (Bohning, 1981:35). Mr Jenkins, then Home Secretary, argued "against the notion of 'assimilation' but in favour of 'integration'" (Brah, 1982:15). Meanwhile Asian culture became established through the performance of religious rituals, availability of Asian foods, clothing and the consolidation of the family and social networks of friends (Brah, 1982:17; Ballard, R and C, 1977:37-39). Furthermore Asians began to discover for themselves the salience of ethnic solidarity. They became politically aware of the need to unionise through the efforts of the Indian Workers Association (John, 1969:135ff) and a number of industrial disputes served to reinforce this awareness, for instance strikes at Mansfield Hosiery and Imperial Typewriters.

The Fourth Phase of Settlement - 1970s to 1977

Between 1970 and 1977 some 3492 Asian migrants came to Bolton and 3422 (98%) of these came directly from Gujarat, North West India, which was and still remains one of the main migrant sending areas (Banton, 1972:137; Rose et al, 1969:57-58). From their names it is possible to identify the majority (93%) of them as Gujaratis. As they recognised a common social identity based upon a common origin, a common culture and language, they can be defined as an ethnic group (Wallman, 1979;
The pattern of migration of Gujaratis to Bolton can be likened to a steady stream with two high points: one in 1972 and one in 1976. Overall figures for new migrants who gave Bolton as their destination to immigration officials indicate that the numbers of male and female migrants rose slightly from 22% to 33% and from 34% to 51% respectively, but that the numbers of children declined from 42% to 15% (Table 1.3). These fluctuations should be seen against a background of an overall drop in the numbers of migrants entering Britain. Although this pattern of migration is in keeping with the fourth phase of migration which predicted a rise in the number of wives and children (Bohning, 1981:37), there is a local difference, namely the decrease in the number of children that came here. It is difficult to separate adults from children in migration records, but where it is possible data indicate that most migrants were adult men and women, children forming a small group of dependents. This suggests that most migrants who came were either single men in their late twenties to forties and women, who were either fiancees or wives coming to join husbands. Generally, this analysis confirms the view that migration offered them opportunities to re-establish themselves.

Table 1.3: New Migrants who gave Bolton as their Destination [2]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Arrival</th>
<th>Males %</th>
<th>Females %</th>
<th>Children [3] %</th>
<th>Totals %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1185</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>3492</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

63
These data show that Gujarati migrants were coming here mainly from the Indian subcontinent and in smaller numbers from other ex-British colonies. More detailed analysis reveals that many migrants who came from Uganda either before 1972 or during 1972, but who were not part of the process of resettlement, could settle wherever they chose. Those who came as part of the resettlement scheme were initially compulsorily settled. If the figures for migration are analysed in terms of the countries of last residence, then the data show that just over half of all migrants who gave Bolton as their destination at Heathrow came directly from India, the others coming from Uganda, the Rest of Africa and Pakistan (Table 1.4). In addition to Gujaratis, a number of those who came from Uganda and the rest of Africa included Pakistanis and Sikhs. The only year when the number of migrants emigrating from Uganda was greater than those from the other three countries was 1972, which was the year of mass migration of Ugandan Asians. Though these data do not take account of internal migration of Asians within Britain, they provide evidence that Bolton’s Asian population is predominantly of Indian and Gujarati origin.

Table 1.4: Migration of Asians by Country of Last Residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Arrival</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Rest of Africa</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India*</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>455</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>1791</td>
<td>3492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>13.03</td>
<td>19.96</td>
<td>15.72</td>
<td>51.29</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures include 17 migrants from Bangladesh as well as a few Gujarati migrants who came from Burma.
Some evidence of the religious composition of these refugees is reflected in the origins of the respondents: the majority were Hindus (60.4%) as compared to a minority (21.2%) of Muslims (Table 1.5). Although most of the Hindus in the sample came here between 1970 - 1976 (Table 1.2), it is difficult to separate the refugees who came in 1972 from others who fled Uganda either before or after this date. For those who came in 1972, the reception they received was hostile with the local media reporting the fears of the white community at being swamped (Chap.6). These data suggest that the Gujaratis who came here had a clear idea of where they intended to settle initially (immigration procedures required that migrants gave addresses of houses to which they would go). As regards the Ugandan Gujaratis this would appear to contradict the findings of Bristow (1979:206), but an explanation for this may be that Bolton was not singled out to provide for those being settled (see also Ward,1973: 374-376). With the economic recession deepening, a popular view which drew upon ideas that these migrants would take jobs away from white workers, be allocated housing intended for the needy, and the presence of their children in schools would adversely affect the level of educational attainment of white children (Brah,1982: 20), served to increase the level of racial hostility in the town and the country generally (cf.Moore,1975). From accounts in the national and local press the white response to the arrival of Asians here was little different to that which they received elsewhere. Locally, hostility was further exacerbated by the continuing recession in industry generally and the textile industry in particular, which in turn effected the prosperity of other associated industries reducing the number of jobs available to those looking for work with few skills and qualifications. Now those seeking work from all communities found themselves in competition for jobs and benefits.
Table 1.5: Countries from which Respondents came to the U.K.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.K.</th>
<th>Indian Subcontinent</th>
<th>African Continent</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>35.71</td>
<td>60.39</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>65.39</td>
<td>21.15</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>47.67</td>
<td>44.57</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two factors dominated this phase; firstly there was the emergence of a second generation in the Asian communities (Ballard.R and C, 1977:41), and secondly there were the measures taken to control immigration. The stringency of the latter were increased through the use of virginity testing, surveillance of couples in their first year of marriage and children being subjected to X-ray examinations to verify their ages (Brah, 1982). This sedulous application of immigration rules by the Home Office led not only to an increase in the numbers of kin of local families being detained at detention centres, to the separation of families and heart-rending cases of deportation, but it also reinforced the fears amongst local Gujaratis that they were viewed by the Government as visitors. With the politicians seeing the reduction of the numbers of immigrants entering the country as the political key to controlling the vote and racism (Brah, 1982:21; also Bohning, 1981), some local Gujarati observers interpreted this as indicating that their position here was not as secure as they had believed.

Origins of Gujarati Migrants

Of the three forms of migration neither bloc nor individual migration are self-perpetuating, the former is a once-in-a-time migration of a large group of people, such as the refugees from East
Africa, and the latter depends upon individuals migrating at will. The characteristics of chain migration, the third form, are by definition self-perpetuating. Bohning does not make clear that chain migration is self-perpetuating and when it is placed in conjunction with a demand by post-industrial society for low-wage labour, the causes of the self-perpetuation of the shortage of labour need to be separated from those that motivate the chain. When the labour shortage disappears, the chain will continue to deliver migrants into the country. Moreover, a chain can draw into its stream people who are related to members of the chain but who may have migrated at earlier times to other ex-colonies. Thus each chain has the potential to gather and disperse its members according to economic fortunes that determine its final points of deposition. A chain which brings particular individuals to Bolton may take some kin living in Africa to Canada and bring others from Burma back to Gujarat. Wherever the chain collects or deposits members, the identity of the members of the chain remains specific.

A model of migration argues that in a liberal capitalist country which is committed to a policy of full employment and high real growth policies, labour shortages are resolved by bringing migrant workers who can fill the low-wage insecure jobs that require few skills. The consequences of this are that it initiates an unending and self-feeding stream of migrants (Bohning, 1981:29). Although this model is used to explain polyannual migration to Britain from Europe, it has applicability to Gujarati migration. As Bohning points out the ideal form of migration that fits this model is chain migration (1981:34), which draws people from particular areas. He then points out that multiple chains form the self-feeding stream. The mechanics of chain migration have been described as a process by which one adult, usually a
male, migrates to a chosen country and town; establishes himself and then is joined by a brother, sister, wife, children or more distant kin (Watson, 1977:189-190; Banton, 1972:128-131; MacDonald and MacDonald, 1964:82). The chain is sustained by ties of kinship and marriage, which define the extent of the pool of potential migrants. In theory the chain ceases when there are no more kin to follow; in practice the chain is self-perpetuating. This model of migration can be used to explain Gujarati migration to Bolton.

A consequence of this form of migration was the formation of isolated groups of Hindus or Muslims who came from the same village and district belonging to the same caste and sect, choosing to live close together and to keep in touch with each other. These groups form the foundation in a hierarchy of Gujarati communities (Table:1.6). Each chain in the collection of chains that comprises the Gujarati population is an embryonic community. By virtue of the fact that some chains are larger than others, the larger ones can assert their superiority over others by by generating sufficient funds to purchase property for use as religious or community centres, just as the Kutchis, Surtis and Baruchis have done. The overwhelming majority of the sample of 258 respondents traced their origins to districts in Gujarat, spoke Gujarati, patronised Gujarati owned shops and chose to live in areas where Gujaratis had settled.

Hindus came from four main areas of Gujarat, namely Kutch, Kathiawar, Surat and Navsari: only four Patel families came from Petlad and Nadiad, and they describe themselves as "Charotar" Patels - the original elite group of Patels (Pocock, 1972:2). The few Hindu respondents (3%) who came from other states in India were educated men, most were marginal
men who avoided involvement in the Gujarati communities. One of them, the Sikh, became involved with the largest local Hindu organisation, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) (Chaps. 2,5-7). By contrast the Muslims trace their origins primarily to two districts, Broach and Surat, with a few coming from Kathiawar (Table 1.5). One Muslim preferred to trace his origins to South Africa. Generally, Muslims give the appearance of being a more tightly knit group than Hindus. The consequences of shallow or deep chains are not only important for the analysis of settlement patterns (see below), but they are important for the analysis of the social networks of the Gujarati respondents (Chap.3), since the former determine the social boundaries of the primary section of the latter.

Table 1.6: State and District of Origin of Respondents in Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>Kutch</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kathiawar</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ahmadabad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nadiad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Petlad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broach</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surat</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navsari</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gujarat*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mombasa*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharasra</td>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sholapur</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madya Pradesh</td>
<td>Indore</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andra Pradesh</td>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>Patna</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td></td>
<td>154</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.69%</td>
<td>40.31%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Districts of origin in Gujarat not specified by two respondents. (Hahlo,1983)
large bundle of chains. A more detailed analysis of the actual number of chains represented by this sample has not been done, since this is not directly relevant to this thesis. What is implied is that the relationships between members of chains are defined in terms of certain common social identities. At one extreme Muslims and Hindus are divided by the social identities that link them to villages and districts, and at the other extreme are divided and united by a different set of social identities, such as Muslim or Hindu, caste and sect membership, Gujarati, Indian, and immigrant. Their identity as Gujaratis is based upon their ability to trace their ancestry to this state. Many years ago Desai remarked upon the strength of the linguistic regional identity that unites Gujaratis (1963:10-18,34,56). It is this shared origin that has contributed to Gujaratis forming an intra-dependent group within the local immigrant community.

The change in their status from migrants to settlers locally coincided with the development of specific community identities and with the Gujaratis emerging as the dominant minority. Some indication of the stability of this Gujarati settlement can be ascertained from the length of time that the respondents had lived here [5]. Some 43% of the sample had lived here for nine or more years and 90% had lived here for two or more years (Table 1.7). The impression given is that they form an established community or rather, on closer observation, a collection of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Arrival</th>
<th>Length of Residence</th>
<th>No. of Respondents</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Cumulative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975--76</td>
<td>1 - present</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9.69</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971--74</td>
<td>5 - 2 years</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>27.13</td>
<td>90.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968--70</td>
<td>8 - 6 years</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>19.77</td>
<td>63.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962--67</td>
<td>14 - 9 years</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>37.98</td>
<td>43.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956--61</td>
<td>20 - 14 years</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td></td>
<td>258</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
communities. As their numbers grew in size, they attracted more Gujaratis to Bolton (Desai 1963:31-35). Thus sharing the experience of migration, a general social identity as an immigrant, a specific social identity as a member of a chain of migrants, contributed to Gujaratis translating their social identities into political realities through their search for work and housing (see below), facilities to practice their religions (Chap.2), develop social identities as communities (Chaps.3,4) and a political voice (Chaps.5-7).

Reasons for Coming to Bolton

The first step in the migration process is deciding to migrate and the second is to establish the purpose; one aim is to obtain a job, which, it is believed, will be an improvement on one's present job. Whilst there is some substance in the idea that migrants believe that they are migrating to a country where success is likely to be within their grasp (Dorson,1959), the realities of the practicalities of the immigration process require that they establish more concrete reasons for migrating, such as establishing a house to go to, learning from kin that housing and jobs are available, and believing that one's life style is likely to improve (White and Woods,1980:7; Anwar,1979:21). This implies that it is essential to maintain contact with kin resident in the receiving country who can provide the appropriate information. Decisions to migrate are not determined by such simple messages alone; the receiving country has to make explicit its demand for migrants. Therefore, a more structured approach to constructing a theory of migration might argue that a receiving society needs to have a liberal capitalist structure, be committed to full employment and high real
growth policies. Such a society will experience shortages of labour in socially undesirable and low-wage jobs, which it will try to meet by encouraging the migration of foreign workers. The consequence of this would be that no internal solution is found to resolve the labour shortages, which becomes part of the structure. Thus the migration chain becomes an unending and self-feeding process (Bohning, 1981:29).

Evidence in support of the argument for a self-feeding process of migration shows how Gujaratis continued to come here, even though the employment situation was worsening. The relationship between migration and unemployment is not as clear for Gujaratis as it is for West Indians (Peach, 1978/79:40-44). It has been suggested that for Gujaratis living in Blackburn an inverse relationship holds between in-migration and unemployment (Robinson, 1980). In Bolton the number of male migrants arriving matched the rise in unemployment generally and particularly in the minority itself. With the recession the attraction of potential job opportunities linked to a better style of life should have diminished. Table 1.8 shows how the numbers of Asian immigrants coming here between 1970-1977 increased as the percentage of gross unemployed rose. Though good employment prospects strengthen the attraction, poor prospects do not undermine them. This analysis shows how over a period of three years the self-feeding chains continued to draw people into Bolton, although the employment prospects for migrants worsened, unemployment becoming a feature of working life. This partly supports the argument that an existing Gujarati population attracts Gujaratis (Desai, 1963:17), irrespective of real employment prospects. It partly confirms Bohning's (1981) argument that only political legislation can stop the self-feeding processes of migration.
Table 1.8: Number of Asian Immigrants who gave Bolton as their Place of Destination in relation to Unemployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22.61</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>39.24</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>32.63</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>33.78</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.8 109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>36.71</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.0 232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>42.27</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.3 445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These numbers and percentages are taken from Table 1.2 above.

The Gujarati population expanded in size from approximately 3050 people in 1966 to about 14,000 by 1977 (Table 1.9) and by 1984 to about 20,000 (District Trends, 1984:10). Most researchers agree that the largest community comprises Gujaratis (Hahlo, 1980:296; Sherrington, n.d.; Hill, 1977:14,54 [8]). During the third phase of settlement this population more than trebled in size: Bolton had become a Gujarati centre. Without an accurate breakdown of the religious composition of the Gujarati population, a way to arrive at an idea of its composition is to bring together a number of sources of evidence: Census data, Heathrow immigration lists, BCCR Area Profiles, various small surveys (Sherrington n.d; Hill 1977), and the impressions of officers in the BCCR. Observers agree that Muslims outnumber Hindus. During the 1970s the former were estimated as comprising about 7,000 and the latter 6,000 individuals. Since then these numbers have increased and presently these two communities number about 9,000 and 8,000 people respectively.

Table 1.9: Population of Bolton Metropolitan Borough (Area Profile 1977, Bolton Council for Community Relations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Citizens (white)</td>
<td>250,950</td>
<td>93.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians (primarily Gujaratis)</td>
<td>13,000-14,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshis</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Indians</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals:</strong></td>
<td><strong>268,000 - 267,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Any analysis of Gujarati employment and housing needs to be done against this background of a population fed by the continuous arrival of new migrants either as migrants, fiancees, fiancés or children. As Bohning rightly observes that governmental legislation is one way in which these migration chains can be controlled (1981:34). Nevertheless, "over time, foreign workers become a more and more indispensable part of the labour force of post-industrial societies unless their employment is curtailed by political act" (Bohning, 1981: 34). Initially both male and female Gujaratis became an indispensable part of the local labour force along with white women. Yet some 20 years later the Gujaratis still depend upon low skilled, low-waged and undesirable jobs in a shrinking job market, while white women, irrespective of qualifications, search for jobs even though they are still low-paid and low skilled. After this research was completed the Government introduced further legislation to control immigration; to an extent this has reduced the self-feeding process of the chains.

For a chain to be self-feeding the implications are that, once the opportunities for jobs decreases, other motivating reasons for migrating will continue to attract prospective migrants, for instance knowledge of the availability, real or assumed, educational opportunities. These attractions add to the imagery of opportunity. Some 57% of Muslims and Hindus sampled were drawn to Bolton having been informed of possibly the availability of jobs, an improved style of life or the attractions of a growing Gujarati community (Table 1.10). They were not asked why they came to Britain, as this, I was informed, might have raised their suspicions about this research (see Appendix I).
However, a survey in nearby Blackburn revealed that for a predominantly Gujarati Muslim population, the main reason given for coming here was to improve their life-style and work opportunities. The main reason for choosing to settle in Blackburn was to join their families (Townson and Moorhouse, 1979:13, Tables A2 and A3). For Bolton’s Gujaratis joining their families who were living here (57%) was a greater priority than finding a job (19%).

Table 1.10: Reasons given by Respondents for Coming to Bolton

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Hindus %</th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kin &amp; family</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati Community</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Opportunities</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Opportunities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of Housing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No particular reason</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo,1983).

Some 50% of the Blackburn sample heard about their present jobs through friends (Townson and Moorhouse, 1979:21, Table A16) as compared with 32% of Gujaratis sampled who heard about them from kin or friends. The majority (37%) of the respondents heard about their present jobs through advertisements (Table 1.11) as compared with 5% in the Blackburn sample. For Gujaratis there were other attractions, such as joining an expanding Gujarati population, a belief in job opportunities and/or an improved life style. They were young with young families and therefore could look forward to a better life with good job prospects. The average mean age for the Hindu men was 32.6 years and for the Muslim men 38.6 years. Most of them came already married and keen to find work, so that they could bring over their families later on.
### Table 1.11: How Respondents found their Present Jobs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11.04</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close friends</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10.39</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary Friends</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.44</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertisements</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>34.41</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Exchange</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Went to Door</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>31.17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals:</strong></td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some arguments regarding occupations and employment of minorities assume that work is always available however low-paid, insecure or dirty. Others offer explanations as to why migrants cannot obtain jobs commensurate with their skills and qualifications, or why, once they have lived here for some time, they cannot improve their job opportunities (Braham, Pearn and Rhodes, 1981). Still others suggest that racism is part of the ideology of capitalism in Britain and that this accounts for immigrants only being able to find jobs that are poorly paid, insecure and rejected by white indigenous workers (Miles, 1982). These explanations recognise the low skills of immigrants and the characteristics of the jobs available to them. Most Asians came here with few skills or qualifications (Wright, 1968:34-5); and the Gujaratis who came here are no exception (Hahlo, 1980). Only 1.6% (4) Gujaratis sampled, all Hindus, claimed to have had no schooling. The majority of respondents (74.03%), that is 88.5% of Muslims and 64.3% of Hindus, had attended school but had no experience of education beyond secondary school level (Hahlo, 1980:304). A distinction needs to be drawn between the attraction of these workers to job shortages and the self-feeding properties of migration chains. Once the need for labour disappears, then the place of self-feeding chains bringing more migrants into the
job market has applicability only to Government legislation to control it. Any difficulties experienced by immigrants in finding jobs need to be explained by using other models, such as the dual labour market model, which shows how racial discrimination can become a device for allocating a reduced number of jobs to an increasing number of applicants (Blackburn and Mann, 1981a). During the 1950s when there was full employment, Gujaratis accepted jobs that others who were white or better qualified were not prepared to accept. Better jobs were not available to them, because employers discriminated against them (Cohen and Jenner, 1981:112-113,122). A decade or two later they compete for similar jobs, but now racial discrimination contributes to their not being offered them.

There is evidence to support these explanations. For instance the textile industry was the biggest employer of women in Bolton; some 38.4% of women were employed in the textile mills in 1959. Although this percentage was reduced by 1965 to 26% owing to the drastic closure of mills, the industry was still the largest employer of women. By 1971 the retail distributive business had become the biggest employer of women (19.4%) and only 15.04% were employed in the textile mills (Ogden, 1966: Tables 2, 3 and 4). Over the same period of time male employment in the mills was reduced from 19.94% in 1959 to 11.43% in 1965 and to 9.79% in 1971. The mills employed more women than men. Although the data does not distinguish between white and New Commonwealth women, it is probably reasonable to assume that most of these women were white.

In the 1970s white women and Gujarati men could still find employment in this industry, but the numbers of white male workers had decreased, suggesting that the work was no longer considered desirable. In part an
explanation for this can be attributed to the history of the industry, the monotony of the work, the conditions in which people worked, the poor pay and the increasing vulnerability of the industry to the effects of the local and national recessions. An explanation for the reduction in the numbers of women workers a decade later can be explained by the closure of mills and by a change of attitude which suggested that mill work for women was not seen as desirable. Thus, to a limited extent opportunities increased for Gujaratis to find unskilled and low skilled work in the mills. As women become less dependent upon this industry for employment, the offering of these jobs to Gujaratis by employers can be taken as an exercise in their preference for the next available source of reserve labour.

For Gujaratis their commitment to their chains and through them to their communities takes priority over market forces. Their commitment to their community identity takes precedence over other social identities (Chap.4). This emerges from the following analysis of their occupational mobility. An analysis of the occupations of respondents reflects the range of occupations they held (Table 1.12). The majority of the sample held jobs in the textile industry (49%); this being the industry that first offered them jobs and it was also the industry with

Table 1.12: Occupations of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>48.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students/Apprentices</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed/Retired</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>258</td>
<td><strong>100.01%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo,1983).
which they were most familiar. Gujarat had and has a developing textile industry. Five of sampled who held professional jobs were not Gujaratis, one was a Sikh, a lecturer, four who came from other states in India included three doctors and an engineer. Generally this pattern of employment is typical of Asian workers in other textile towns, for instance Bradford (Allen et al, 1977:58; Table 2.14).

For Gujaratis the mills offered night shift work as well as day shift work, some offering variations such as multi-shift and continental shift work. Apart from the familiarity of Gujaratis with this industry, work in the mills offered some positive advantages: firstly, night shift work was better paid than day shift work; secondly, Gujaratis could work with mainly Gujaratis and other Asians, such as Pakistanis, which meant that the majority of the workers could speak languages with which they were familiar; thirdly, they did not need to interact with certain others at work, particularly white workers, with the result that the most social important interactions occur outside the place of work; fourthly, the work itself required only minimal commitment, and finally, the work contracts were sufficiently simple and immediate, that to break a contract was as easy for the employer as it was for the employee. The combination of these features of work in this industry appealed to the Gujarati work ethic. Mill work allowed them to maintain the social ties which they valued most, that is to their kin and friends in Bolton, Britain and India. Mill work was viewed by white workers as no longer desirable, because it is associated with old ideas about working class work, long hours, poor conditions of work, low pay, little job security and few transferable skills. However, for Gujaratis its advantages balanced, if not outweighed, its disadvantages. The greatest advantage was that they could continue to maintain strong ties with their
communities at home and abroad.

This commitment to their communities may have overridden an incentive on their part to improve their job prospects. Racial discrimination may also account for such a commitment, since it provides Gujaratis with a way of coping and living with racism. When Gujaratis in the sample were questioned about their job prospects, they showed little inclination to express intentions to seek promotion, or to change their jobs for better ones (Table 1.13). Some 60% of the sample did not wish to change their jobs, even though many informed me that they experienced racism at work. Only 21.3% expressed a wish to change their jobs for other jobs and a further 12% said that they would like better jobs, but did not specify what these might be. The large percentage of respondents who expressed a preference for remaining in their jobs can be explained in part by the freedom it gives them to maintain community ties and in part by an adaptation to conditions in which they have learnt to avoid the worst effects of racism.

Table 1.13: Occupational Ambitions of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remain in same occupation</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>60.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change to a new specified occupation</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change to a better job (unspecified)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo, 1983).

The suggestion that Gujaratis who favour work in the textile industry might transfer to alternative but similar work in other industries, were it available, is unconvincing (Cohen and Jenner, 1981: 122). In part this has been and still is difficult, because there is little transferability of skills from the textile to other industries.
In part, and more importantly, the reason is that the characteristics of the work that the Gujaratis favoured were not related to the work itself but to the conditions of work. Such explanations as that offered by Cohen and Jenner take insufficient account of the individual's abilities to make decisions within the context of their own cultural values (Kosmin, 1979; Allen et al, 1977). Rather they tend to emphasise overall determining factors like racism. A more plausible explanation which does not contradict these arguments, but in the context offers a more satisfactory explanation, is that by 1976 Gujarati men were experiencing the effects of working in a declining industry. Their own preferred work ethic were best suited to a situation when redundancies and unemployment are uncommon occurrences for low paid unskilled workers. Initially the social characteristics of their work ethic were self-determined, but a decade later they became part of the way of working life in the industry experiencing a recession. The recession did not encourage them to acquire new skills. Rather the reverse; the trend amongst respondents was to remain in the same job (60%). Only 12% indicated a desire to move to another job, and they could not think of a job to which they would like to move. This suggests apathy or a sense of loss of control over their lives.

When those who expressed a desire to change their jobs were asked to explain why they would not achieve their ambitions, their replies suggested that the main single reason was a lack of training and racial discrimination (Table 1.14). A further 18% of replies implied that some combination of racism with a lack of training, spoken English or experience would explain their lack of success. Another 11% indicated that a lack of training in conjunction with a lack of experience or spoken English accounted for their lack of success. These data show that
Gujaratis are aware of racism and to an extent they are also aware of their own deficiencies in terms of skills within the job market. However they committed themselves to an industry that became increasingly vulnerable to the consequences of recessions, to jobs that remain low-paid and insecure, to a style of work that did not improve their employment prospects or careers, and if anything made them even more vulnerable to unemployment and poverty.

Table 1.14: Reasons given by Respondents for being unable to achieve the Jobs they desire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of training</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoken English</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial discrimination</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combinations:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of training and spoken English</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of training and experience</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of spoken English and experience</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of training and racial discrimination</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of spoken English and racial discrimination</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of experience and racial discrimination</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo, 1983).

Consequences of this work ethic were apparent by 1976. Gujaratis were prepared to accept being put at risk of poverty by breaking work contracts, when it was convenient to do so, such when visiting family in India. On their return they would wait until they could obtain another job in the mills. Being out of work meant that they became dependent upon the welfare system for support. As the decline in work opportunities in the North West increased, poverty and unemployment became common experiences for them. It ensured that they became major competitors for welfare benefits along with the growing numbers of indigenous workers and school leavers. Thus by 1976 Gujarati communities
had become familiar with the politics of poverty and powerlessness. Within the next decade they began experiencing particularly high rates of unemployment, for instance in August 1982 25% were registered as unemployed (District Trends, 1987: 13). Their social identity as immigrants and their place within the social class structure as defined by their occupations provided the Gujaratis with a firm social basis within Bolton society. All that they required to form a recognisable social movements was a spatial and political base spatially.

Residential Settlement Patterns of Gujaratis in Bolton

The aim of this section is to identify those factors effecting the Gujaratis' patterns of settlement, which increased their visible association with certain social and economic disadvantages. During the first stages of settlement the Gujaratis moved into inner town houses vacated by owners, moving to better housing further out of town. In response to the growing demand from immigrants for housing, these owners could rent or sell them at inflated prices. The demand for housing brought Gujaratis into the inner urban areas, and the pattern by which they purchased property contributed to their clustering in these neighbourhoods. Although initially they had to purchase property from white owners, those who came later preferred to buy or rent houses from Gujaratis (cf. Desai, 1963: 17, 34). Newly arrived immigrants went to houses owned by kin. Thus kinship obligations and social necessity contributed to the pooling resources to purchase the next family owned home. As more members of the chain arrived they could repeat the process, thus extending their ownership of property as a family. This preferential form of expansion together with availability of housing led to Gujaratis becoming the main inner town residents and home owners.
Initially, these Gujaratis acquired property as tenants or lodgers, but ownership was the preferred form of occupation. The pattern of occupation shows how strong was the desire of Gujaratis to possess their own homes. By the time the respondents had moved to the houses in which they were interviewed, a space of four to five years, the number of tenants/lodgers had dropped from 37.99% (Table 1.15) to 10.86% (Table 1.16) and owner occupiers had increased from 32.56% to 63.95%. The rise of 5% of Hindus and 9% of Muslims living with their families to 34% (Hindus) and 12% (Muslims) can be accounted for by the rising numbers of new dependents coming here. In Table 1.15 42.9% of Hindus were tenants/lodgers as compared with less than a third (30.8%) of Muslims. A possible explanation for this difference might be that the latter recognise their obligations to a wider group of kin than do the former.

Table 1.15: Type of Occupancy of Respondents in their previous Houses prior to the purchase of the present Homes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th></th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39.42</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>32.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of family</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodger/tenant</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30.77</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>37.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent not in UK[9]</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.58</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.62</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo, 1983).

Table 1.16: Type of Occupancy of Respondents in their Present Homes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th></th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>54.54</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>63.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of owner’s family</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>33.57</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>25.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodger/tenant (not Council)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11.69</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant-Council</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo, 1983).
In a survey carried out by Bolton Planning Department (1976), various wards in the Metropolitan Borough are ranked in terms of twenty-two indicators separated into nine broad areas: housing, health, race, education, culture, social crises, age structures, employment and mobility. On the basis of these indicators, the wards of the town could be compared and ranked into three categories: "average and above", "below average", and "poor". The poor wards are Bradford, Derby, Church, East, North, Farnworth North and South, which excluding Farnworth, are town centre wards (Map 1). The wards with below average scores are Darcy Lever-cum-Brightmet, Great Lever, Halliwell, Rumworth, Tonge (and Farnworth South East and South West). The remaining wards in the borough are ranked as average or above average on their scores. When the locations of the minority communities generally and the sample in particular are plotted, their findings demonstrate that the Gujaratis sampled had settled in the poor inner city wards. The social characteristics of these wards include not only a high ethnic minority population, but also a high number of elderly, single parents and unemployed. Here more houses lack facilities like baths, there is a high proportion of rented property, a high number of non-car owners and TB sufferers [10].

According to the 1974 Electoral Register [11] Gujaratis were concentrated in a few wards; little was known about their distribution other than that some wards were favoured by Muslims and others by Hindus, and that some were mixed Hindu and Muslim wards. If wards are classified according to the findings of the Planning Department survey, then it is possible to identify their pattern of settlement. Table 1.17 presents the wards into which and from which respondents moved until
they established themselves in the homes where they were interviewed. It shows how the majority of them lived and continue to live in the "poor" and the "below average" wards. Additionally, it demonstrates how incoming Gujaratis moved into these same "poor" wards.

Table 1.17: Bolton Wards in which respondents lived and live now

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Ward of First Residence</th>
<th>2 Ward of Previous Residence</th>
<th>3 Ward of Present Residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Derby</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>&quot;Poorest wards&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farnworth</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Totals:</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td><strong>141</strong></td>
<td><strong>183</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ward of First Residence %</strong></td>
<td><strong>55.1%</strong></td>
<td><strong>71.36%</strong></td>
<td><strong>70.93%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumworth</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lever</td>
<td>&quot;Below average wards&quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halliwell</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonge</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darcy Lever-cum-Breightmet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Totals:</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>70</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ward of Previous Residence %</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.61%</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.08%</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.13%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Lever</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hulton</td>
<td>&quot;Average and above wards&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deane-cum-Lostock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smithills</td>
<td>&quot;Average wards&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heaton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egerton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Totals:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.5%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.94%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolton (not specified)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS:</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>199</strong></td>
<td><strong>258</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ward of Present Residence %</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hahlo, 1983).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fact coincides with folklore: in Derby and Bradford wards in the early 1950s a triangular area bounded by two major thoroughfares namely Derby Street and Deane Road, the Gujaratis settled first. From this area they expanded their area of settlement in a circular fashion south-eastwards and north-eastwards around the town centre. This pincer movement continued as more of them settled here, until eventually the town centre was surrounded by wards in which most Gujaratis resided. In
the course of settlement the Gujaratis established businesses, shops, temples and mosques and community centres which became recognised as symbols of their presence and social identity (Desai, 1963:39,57,64). Underlying this expansion around the town is an undercurrent of residential mobility that gave them opportunities to select houses next to others belonging to their caste and religious community [12]. The exception to this settlement pattern are the Gujarati and other Asian professionals who prefer to live in middle class white areas.

The expansion of Gujarati occupation and ownership of houses from one small area to an area to surrounding the town centre can be explained only in terms of a commitment to home ownership and continuing access to either poor quality housing or council housing (cf. Smith, 1989). It is common knowledge amongst Gujaratis that, if they wish to raise money they approach kin. This way of raising funds partly supports the choice and constraint thesis by implying that banks and building societies may constrain Asian applicants by exercising power over their option to lend funds. It also partly undermines it, since obligations to kin for funds may constrain options in at least two ways: firstly in terms of the amount required and secondly by creating an obligation to return the favour. The decision to lend by normal lenders of funds may be constrained by racially discriminatory attitudes; equally the amount that can be raised by kin may exercise other constraints, such as kin having insufficient funds (cf. Robinson, 1979:390-396). I have no direct evidence for this. Indirect evidence of the clustering of Gujaratis around the town centre suggests that the resources to buy houses further out of town were not available whatever their source of funds, the desire to remove further out was not expressed and the decision to live close together was both positive and strong. This research and that of
others has stressed five factors: firstly, the high social value Gujaratis, like other Asians (Dahya, 1974), place upon home ownership; secondly, the lack of competition for this housing; thirdly, housing further out of town was both expensive and competition from those who were better off for it was much greater; fourthly, the loans they received from the Local Authority only extended their home ownership within the inner urban area; and finally, the value of the houses they owned was too low to enable them to generate sufficient funds to purchase housing in better areas. Thus Gujaratis became spatially separate from better off members of the white community. The combined effects of these processes on Gujaratis brought about social, economic and racial polarisation within and between segments of the housing system (cf. Smith, 1989:63-65).

The clustering of Gujaratis into this inner area allowed them to establish shops which specialised in Gujarati and Asian commodities ranging from clothes and food to musical instruments, records to videos and electronic goods. Such clustering in inner urban areas serves a number of purposes: firstly, it enables Gujaratis to create their own cultural and secure environment (Phillips, 1981; Smith, 1981; Desai, 1963); secondly, it encourages them to make demands for space in the form of property; thirdly, clustering increase their politically visibility; fourthly, it ensures that they lay claim to an area that politically symbolises poverty, deprivation and dependence on local and governmental welfare. By purchasing the houses most in need of repair and renovation in the inner city areas, the Gujaratis have placed themselves in the centre of an urban social, economic and political system. The position of settlement is ambiguous, on the one hand it symbolises the stark centrality of their powerlessness, on the other
hand it places them at the centre of a politico-economic system of resources.

One dynamic aspect arising from the availability of houses and the propensity of Gujaratis to purchase houses is that it has led to a clustering of Gujaratis from particular areas, that is those who share a social identity based upon a district of origin. The availability of houses within poor wards allowed them to move and buy houses frequently (Table 1.18), which gave them opportunities to move closer to the group with whom they shared a social identity. Hindu respondents moved house at least once every three years, whereas the Muslims moved house every four to five years on average. Not all who moved to new homes sold their old ones, many kept them to rent or sell another day.

Table 1.18: Length of Residence in Present and Previous Homes [14]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Bolton as first place of residence in UK</th>
<th>(2) Second or Third place of residence in UK</th>
<th>(3) One or two places of residence in UK prior</th>
<th>(4) Three or more places of residence in UK prior</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindus:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residence in Bolton:</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average years:</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residence Average years:</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residence in Bolton:</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average years:</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residence Average years:</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

90
The consequence of this process of social/residential identification is that small groups of Gujaratis sharing the same district of origin formed an enclave. Such enclaves formed the basis of factions [13]. An analysis of the residential movements of those sampled gives some indication of how clustering occurred along factional and religious lines with the consequence that some areas of the town are more "Muslim" than "Hindu" and some are mixed. The pattern of settlement shows that the majority of Muslims (Table 1.19) and Hindus (Table 1.20) lived on

Table 1.19: Residence Pattern of Muslim Respondents by Ward

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halliwell</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derby</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumworth</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lever</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farnworth</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| %                             | 46.16     | 46.15     | 6.37      | 0.96          | 100   |

Source: Hahlo 1983.

the southern side of the town with 38% Muslims and 25% of Hindus living on the northern side. As the area of first settlement was on the southern side in Derby and Bradford wards, both Hindus and Muslims established themselves here. Gradually, they have moved outwards and around the town, establishing similar facilities in other areas. The Muslims have established more mosques in the northern part than in the southern part. Each mosque represents faction interests based upon caste community identities (jamatbandi), as such some belong to the ICC and some are independent. The Hindus have fewer temples because these tend
to be organised by sect rather than by faction. The majority of Muslims from Broach district live in the northern section, while the majority of those from Surat district live in the southern section (Table 1.19). This residential separation of Muslims from these two districts is not only given symbolic expression in the perceptions Surtis and Baruchis have of each other in daily life, but it also reflects a power struggle between factions in the Islamic community for control of the mosques.

Table 1.20: Residence Pattern of Hindu Respondents by Ward

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wards</th>
<th>Central South</th>
<th>Gujarat Surat</th>
<th>Navsari</th>
<th>Other towns in North and West Gujarat</th>
<th>Bhuj Kutch</th>
<th>Kutch Province</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Halliwell</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 N</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 o</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smithills</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 r</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darcyiller-cum-Brightmet</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1* 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egerton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1* 1 (25%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deane-cum-Lostock</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derby</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7*</td>
<td>45 o</td>
<td></td>
<td>45 o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumworth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15 u</td>
<td></td>
<td>15 u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1* 35 t</td>
<td></td>
<td>35 t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lever</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1* 18 h</td>
<td></td>
<td>18 h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hulton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td></td>
<td>1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lever</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(75%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>20.13</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>29.87</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>11.05</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hahlo 1983.

* Others trace origins to: Ahmadabad 2, Petland 2, Nadiad 2, Gujarat 1, Daman 1, Patna (Bihar) 1, Calcutta (Bengal) 1, Indore (Andra Pradesh) 1, Bombay 2, Maharashtra 1, Punjab 1, Mombasa 1, and "not stated" 1.

While Muslims moved around the town centre, establishing themselves in streets and wards in relation to their faction and sect allegiances (Chap.2), the pattern of settlement of Hindus was slightly different.
Hindus have spread themselves across the town with most living in four wards. In terms of their places of origin, the greatest proportion of Hindus in the sample trace their origins to Surat and Navsari districts located in south-central Gujarat, Kutch, including Bhuj, and Kathiawar district in the north-west of Gujarat. If Bolton is divided into a northern and a southern section, the majority of Hindu respondents (75.3%) live in the southern section of the town and a minority (25.7%) live in the northern section (Table 1.20). Unlike the Muslims, the Hindus have contained their expansion to the western and eastern areas of the southern half of the town, thus creating some social and geographical distance between themselves and the Muslims.

The debate about housing restricting people's access to scarce resources, such as health and education does have bearing upon the geographical position of the Gujaratis. Although in 1973 many Gujaratis were purchasing houses, some were beginning to purchase additional houses for the purposes of generating wealth (Saunders, 1989:208; Hamnett, 1989). When the Local Authority first offered council houses for sale, Gujaratis took the opportunity to purchase them. When the opportunity was presented again later on, they purchased additional council houses. Thus their desire for houses goes beyond simple pride in ownership (cf. Dayha, 1974), it suggests that they regard purchasing houses as a way to generate wealth. The wealth is generated by their selling or renting these houses to kin, friends, other Gujaratis or, if the houses are in demolition areas, obtaining compensation from the Local Authority. Gujaratis see home ownership as a means by which they can accumulate capital in an environment in which they may not obtain access to wealth through other avenues, such as employment. With Gujaratis preferring to purchase homes from Gujaratis, they have a ready
This process of residential mobility has led to members of factions collecting together within a neighbourhood. However, the socio-geographical position of Gujaratis marked their low socio-economic and political position in Bolton society. The only bases on which Gujarati social identities could develop were on religious and community bases (Chap.2) and social networks (Chap.3). These provide Gujaratis with social and spatial identities that allow community differences to become the bases for the mobilisation of support, the development of ethnic identities within a racial context (Chap.4) and structures of political leadership outside formal political party structures (Chaps.5, 6 and 7).

This Chapter set out the economic and political situation in which Gujaratis established themselves. Their disadvantages, whether arising from a racial, economic or political cause, has its roots within the poverty and powerlessness which they experienced as visible inner city residents. In an effort to overcome this situation, they need to develop bases from which could mobilise support for grassroots movements. Faction, caste, and sect divisions provided them with such bases. The subject of the next Chapter is to identify the main organisations that participated in local ethnic political activities.
FOOTNOTES

1. There are other models which identify stages of migration and settlement, such as Bohning's four stage model (Bohning, 1981).

2. These data, supplied by immigration officials at Heathrow, are drawn from lists of migrants who gave Bolton as their destination.

3. I have arbitrarily identified children as being under ten years of age, because on these lists the age of the child is given. For children over ten years of age, often no age was specified, thus making it difficult to distinguish between children and adults. Dependents over the age of ten are identified as male or female and their ages are sometimes given. An adult's sex is given, the sex of a child is not usually stated. On occasions it is impossible to distinguish between an adult and a child/minor in the entry. These data show that a large number of Gujarati women migrated to Bolton with or without their husbands, that is as dependents.

4. There is little evidence which gives any indication of the speed at which Ugandan Asians, who were settled, moved to their preferred place of settlement.

5. At the time this survey was carried out, Gujaratis felt insecure answering questions on their length of stay in Britain. In some instances this could be calculated, in others it was impossible to establish.

6. These figures are based on Table 8.4, Central Statistics Office, No. 13, HMSO, 1977.

7. These percentages of unemployed members of ethnic minorities in Bolton were for the final month or next month for which figures were available (Manchester Council for Community Relations, 1982).

8. Hill's figures seem to be on the low side.

9. These respondents did not own or live in houses in Britain prior to their present homes.

10. These wards and their residents share the social characteristics that are typical of those living in inner city areas (Gans, 1969:99-103; Rex and Moore, 1971:272ff.; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 127-157; Gerrard, 1981:641-644). Post 1976, large areas were demolished, thus reducing the availability of poor quality old housing. The building of new Council housing led to inner city residents becoming even more dependent upon Local Authority and national welfare support.
11. According to the 1974 Electoral Register Gujaratis were concentrated in a few wards. After reorganisation of Local Authority boundaries in 1974, Farnworth, Little Lever, Egerton, Westhoughton and a number of other wards were incorporated into the Metropolitan Borough of Bolton. Since the survey a further reorganisation of the local political structure of the town has witnessed a reduction in the number of wards.

12. It is difficult to show how many Gujaratis could have moved into better areas of the town. What I have shown is how many respondents have remained in the poorer areas. In theory, on their second or third removal of residence, they had opportunities to move to better areas. I did not inquire as to why they did not take the opportunity to improve themselves or whether they lack the resources to do so, or experienced some form of constraint or direct or indirect discrimination and thus were prevented from doing so.

13. I have used the term faction in a particular way that distinguishes it from the accepted usage. Five characteristics are regarded as typical of factions: they are conflict groups, political groups, both corporate groups, recruited by a leader and recruited on the basis of diverse principles (Nicholas, 1965:28-29). The groups I describe as factions can under certain circumstances become corporate, for instance if they acquire property for usage as a mosque. They are viewed by the white politicians as politically destructive forces. Otherwise, they share the characteristics of other factions.

14. Where a resident lived for less than a year in a house, I have regarded this as being equivalent to half a year.

15. The Muslim who gave Uganda as his place of origin identified himself later on as a Baruchi Vohra.

16. Another Muslim, who gave his place of origin as Uganda, is a Memon and came from Kathiawar.
In this Chapter I shall concentrate on the development of religious organisations in the Muslim and Hindus communities, since their role is central to ethnic politics. Ethnic politics is concerned with grassroots ethnic protest outside the formal political party and hierarchy structures. I shall argue that Gujaratis as a whole cannot co-operate, because they are divided at a number of levels by faction, caste, sect and religious belief. At each of these levels exist organisations which have the potential to become bases for protest movements, since they combine both members who share enough in common to meet to discuss grievances with a simple structure of leadership. Each organisation provides its members with a social identity, which becomes part of a hierarchy of belonging. Taken together these social identities form a complex of belonging that fixes the social position of a Gujarati within the social world of Gujaratis and Bolton society.

The origins of Gujaratis are closely associated with the migration chains that brought them to Britain and Bolton. A consequence of chain migration is that each chain draws in individuals who are linked by marriage and kinship to a specific location. The Gujarati population in Bolton consists of a collection of members of chains of varying sizes and duration (manifest or latent), whose members initially shared the urge to migrate, the place to which they have migrated and an identity as Gujaratis. The experiences which they share include the process of migration, the difficulties of settlement, finding accommodation and work in a new country and racism. The most clearly definable social
values and commitments that most of the people in these chains share with some, but which separate them from others, are their religious beliefs. Thus they can be separated into Muslims and Hindus. This Chapter will analyse the faction, caste, sect and religious structures that unite and divide members of these chains. This Chapter is divided into two sections: the first is concerned with the Muslim communities and the second with the Hindu communities.

Muslims

For Muslims the pools from which they were drawn into migration chains share many social characteristics. Where Muslims come from the same village, or villages linked by marriage (ekada), they share membership of a district and membership of a caste community (jamatbandi). This implies that they also share the views of an Islamic school, a pathway and at the most general level a common social identity as Muslims. The faction, which comprises migrants who came from the same district but may have been members of different chains of migration, is usually too small to amass the funds needed to purchase a mosque. However the caste community, which may include more than one faction, may be able to raise this kind of money. Apart from this, the caste community is recognised by Muslims as the organisation comprising social equals [1], that is those who can marry and who share the same place of prayer. Thus the caste community is most likely to provide a basis for a Muslim organisation. Each community looks after the religious and social welfare of its own members (Misra, 1964:143). The link between the district of origin, the mosque and the caste community is a close one. In a sense the caste community reaches out beyond the mosque to include Muslims living elsewhere. Thus a mosque becomes a social, religious and
political symbol of a caste community, and symbolically represents the community's influence and wealth. At the root of the Muslim and Islamic communities lie three social identities which link together culture, religion, unity and conflict. These are the divisions between Surti and Baruchi Vohras, between those Muslims who follow the Deobandi and Berelewi schools, and thirdly those between Muslims and non-Muslim communities.

Most of the Muslim migrants traced their origins to three areas of Gujarat – Broach, Surat and Kathiawar –, and the majority came from the former two. There is no simple relationship between district of origin and membership of a caste community. Some caste communities are spread over two or more districts, while others seem to be restricted to one. I identified six Muslim caste communities (Table 2.1); these are Sunni Vohras, Daudi Bohra, Memon, Nagori, Khojah [2] and Miabhai [3]. The largest of these is the Sunni Vohra community. In Gujarat they were predominantly an agricultural people, who after migrating to Africa and other countries achieved success as businessmen (Tambs-Lyche, 1980:29 ff.; Mayer, 1973:3,28). An analysis of the pattern of settlement of the Muslims offers an indication of the numerical superiority of the caste communities.

The distribution of caste communities suggests that it was principally the Sunni Vohras [4] who migrated to Britain (Table 2.1); they comprise 90% of the sample. Some of them trace their origins to Surat, others to Broach. Confirmation of this divide are the labels Surti and Baruchi, which are employed as social identities. Evidence shows that there is one major caste community, the Vohras; the other
Table 2.1: Caste Communities and Districts of Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste Communities</th>
<th>Districts of Origin</th>
<th>Sunat</th>
<th>Broach</th>
<th>Kutch &amp; Kathiawar</th>
<th>Andra Pradesh</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Vohra</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>90.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memon</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagori</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miabhai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khojah</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daudi Bohra</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.96%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentages:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>46.15%</td>
<td>46.15%</td>
<td>6.73%</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hahlo 1983.

communities are small by comparison. Consequently this community dominates the local Gujarati communities.

Of the smaller caste communities the largest are the Memons. The smallest are represented by only a few families. The head of household of two were interviewed. They belong to the Nagori and Miabhai caste communities, who also trace their origins to the Broach and Surat districts respectively. All of these Muslim caste communities recognise Sunni Islam. The Khojah and Daudi Bohra communities, who are Shia Muslims, are similarly small in number. They attend prayers in the closest mosque. A Muslim from Hyderabad attends the Church of England, although he has neither formally renounced Islam nor officially been accepted into the church here. Muslims representing these latter three communities are onlookers in mosque struggles.

Under the umbrella of caste community membership are factions which are divided by the places of origin of chains and in theory, but not in practice, united by marriage. Muslims place great importance upon in-caste marriages and a preference for first cousin or cousin marriage. An effect of this is to emphasise the importance of the social relationships that link those come from the place of origin of a chain.
Social equality and social identities are given expression through the selection of spouses and the social commitment by families that accompanies approval of marriages. From what is theoretically a wide set of options, various overlapping preferences reduce the range of choice of spouse to what is a small pool. At its widest, Sunni Muslims can marry any Muslim outside the natal family, and even a non-believer who gives a commitment to convert to Islam. For the Shia Muslims the choice is restricted to Shia Muslims. However, from this theoretically wide choice, Gujarati Muslims prefer to marry spouses who are Gujarati Muslims, belong to the same caste community, faction and trace their origins to villages linked by marriage exchanges (ekada) (Pocock, 1972: 66; Misra, 1964:142), and ideally should also be first cousins (cf. Misra, 1964:152-153). This interrelationship of social identities serves to increase the social importance of the caste community in relation to other social identities. The high number of in-caste community marriages among those sampled reflects this. Most Muslim respondents (96%) married spouses who belonged to the same caste community as themselves (Tables 2.2). Of the four Muslims whose wives did not belong to their husbands' caste communities, the one, who had married the Muslim who came from Hyderabad, came from Hawick, Scotland; another, a Khojah woman, had married a Baruchi Vohra, and two Muslim women, who belonged to different caste communities which they did not identify, had married Surti Vohras.

Table 2.2: Caste Communities of Husbands and Wives in Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste Community</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Respondents Married</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same as husband</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>95.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different from husband</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>94.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hahlo 1983.
Three illustrations show what a high social value Muslims place upon caste community membership. The first is a preference for cousin marriages. A close examination of marriage choices shows that a third of Surti Vohras married kin, who came from the same villages as they did. While over a fifth (22%) of Baruchis married kin 22%, but most of them came from other villages than those of their husbands (Table 2.3). Overall a third of the Muslims had married cousins and most of these were first cousins [5]. An explanation for this preference is not to be found in Islam, or accounted for solely by the possession of property or wealth. It may also have originated with Muslims' need for protection in Gujarati villages where they live alongside Hindus. Whether or not this explanation is convincing, this preference ensures that Muslims maintain close relationships between their factions and caste communities. The pattern of selection of cousins revealed a further difference between Surtis and Baruchis. Most Surtis married cousins who came from the same villages as themselves, whereas the Baruchis married cousins who came from different villages. This would suggest that for Surtis the village caste community is more important than the faction, while the reverse holds for Baruchis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wives:</th>
<th>Kin</th>
<th>Non-Kin</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surti Vohra</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baruchi Vohra</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagori</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miabhaji</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khojah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daudi Bohra</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hahlo 1983.
The second illustrates the high personal value that Muslims attach to marriages within ekadas. A Vohra Baruchi, who arranged the marriages of his eldest son and daughter, said: "I wrote to my relatives in the five villages: Kapodra, Kosamri, Kandh, Mangrol, Dhamrod. They selected a brother and a sister and both marriages were celebrated in Bolton". Unfortunately, a few years later both ended in divorce. Now he blames his kin in these villages for having chosen a brother and a sister whose mother came from the city of Surat and therefore was a stranger to the five villages. Because of this he says: "She (his daughter-in-law) cooks differently, the food doesn’t taste the same as ours, and for this reason the marriage could never work". Apart from distrust being expressed in terms of "cooking", a cultural idiom by which the equal and unequal, friends and strangers, are identified and separated (Mayer, 1973:33-52; Dubois, 1959:183-186), this father committed himself to social and religious isolation to show his disgust for his kin and caste community, who arranged these marriages.

The final illustration is drawn from a Baruchi wedding I attended in Blackburn. The main guests invited traced their origins to villages within the district surrounding the village of the bridegroom. Although others might be invited, the members of the ekada expected to be invited and knew from their proximity to the marital couple, what the value of the present they gave should be.

At the moment there is little sign of these marriage preferences changing. By deliberately not giving their children this information, parents try to establish and maintain control over their children’s choice of marriage partners. A view of held by outsiders is that the desire of young Gujaratis to continue to uphold arranged in-caste
marriages will diminish as they become more anglicised. Evidence to support such a change is based more upon wishful thinking than upon fact. Most Muslims are reluctant to allow their children to marry out of the caste community. More Vohra Baruchi (81%) than Surti Vohras (64%) are of the opinion that their children should marry in-caste. The latter are more prepared to let their children marry any Sunni Muslim (28%) than are Baruchi Vohras (4%). Only four Muslims sampled recognised that their children might and could choose to marry anyone. All of them stated that caste community customs and values were of little importance here. One traces his origins to Broach district, one to Surat district, one to Hyderabad and one to South Africa. This evidence again points to the strength of these Muslims' commitment to in-caste community marriages and reinforces the argument that the link between faction and caste community is close and strong.

The social importance of membership of a faction and a caste community is that it provides Muslims with a specific social identity, that is a social location within a well defined set of social networks. Marriage enables Muslims to maintain ties with members of their caste communities irrespective of geographical and social distances. Thus they cannot easily tolerate a fellow Muslim's decision to allow his child to marry out of the caste community, since this may imply marrying out of the Islamic community. The consequences of chain migration and marriage preferences have made the maintenance of links between Bolton Muslims and their kin in Gujarat a basis for the mobilisation of larger structures of support.

As has been noted above (Chap.1), the settlement pattern of these Muslims shows that members of these communities have settled in
different parts of the town. The Baruchis favour the northern side of the town, while the Surtis favour the southern side. Thus these two social identities have become translated from a geographical context into physical and social opposition. This opposition emerges in struggles for the control of mosques and the Islamic Culture Centre (ICC), which controls most Muslim social and communal activities. Between these differences of location, social identities at caste community level are a further set of social and religious differences.

Crosscutting faction allegiances are Muslims' commitments to one of two Islamic sects, sometimes referred to as schools. Excluding Shia Muslims who play a minor role in community affairs, the majority of Muslims belong to either the Deobandi or Berelewi schools. The history and background of these schools suggest that they share a number of similarities, including their origins at a time when many Muslims in colonial India expressed anti-British feelings, and differences, such as their interpretation of certain aspects of Islamic procedure and prayer (Hardy, 1972:170,242,277-278; Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, 1963: vii, 75,96,170-171). Both schools established centres in the 1800s in Gujarat with the result that many Muslims who lived there accepted their teachings. Although today there is a degree of consensus on religious practices and preaching between the followers of these schools, there are some minor differences. One difference between them, I was informed, is that Berelewis read out salutations to the Prophet, whereas in Deobandi mosques they are read out by Muslim worshippers collectively.

An analysis of respondents' membership of these schools shows that generally Surtis and Baruchis accept the teachings of the Deobandi school, but a minority of Baruchis favour those of the Berelewi school.
Prior to 1969 the Surtis and Baruchis had to co-operate in order to survive as Muslims in a predominantly Christian environment. After 1969 the Islamic community expanded and this led to opportunities for supporters of each school to establish their social and religious differences. Now Baruchi Muslims began to oppose Surti control with vigour, and this opposition has dominated the Islamic community ever since (see Chap.6). When the Muslims settled in Bolton, the first mosque they established was Zakariah mosque, and the committee that controlled Muslim affairs met there. Informants stated that until 1972 most of the positions on committees controlling Zakariah mosque and the ICC were held by Surti Muslims. In this competition for control, it is these large communities which can support their members.

To an extent a small community like that of the Memons is the exception which proves the rule. The Memons who trace their origins to the north west of Gujarat support the Berelewi school. Two Memons interviewed did not identify the Islamic school they supported, or state in which mosque they prayed. As Muslims they can pray in any mosque, but at the time of the research tension between the followers of these two schools was high. This might account for them not identifying a mosque. With some Baruchis trying to establish a Berelewi mosque, these Memons supported the venture. Since they are a small community and live amongst Deobandi and Berelewi followers, they depended on them for support as Muslims and as Gujaratis. Thus they are in a vulnerable position. When they received little support from other Muslims, most left Bolton to live in Glasgow and London, where there are larger Memon communities (see Chap.3). While they lived here, they pledged support to Lena Street mosque which is located in the northern part.
Later as the larger Islamic communities expanded with new arrivals coming from India and Africa, new mosques were established. Between 1973 and 1976 the control of the day-to-day management of the mosques became separated from the overall control of Muslim religious affairs. The former responsibility was delegated to mosque committees, who lived close to and prayed at their mosque. The latter became the function of the Islamic Culture Centre, whose headquarters are at Zakariah mosque. By 1976 there were five mosques and a sixth was being planned by the Pakistani community; the five were Tayaibah in Cannon Street, Zakariah mosque in Peace Street, Church Street mosque, Makki mosque in Back Apple Terrace, and Lena Street mosque (Map 2). Excluding Zakariah mosque, all of the remaining four mosques are located in the northern part of the town.

An impression of the composition of the Islamic community suggests that Surtis comprise two-thirds and Baruchis a third. Evidence shows that the majority of Muslims are Deobandi, and that they control most of the mosques and the Islamic Culture Centre (ICC). The control of the Berelewi mosques is in the hands of mosque committees, who reject the authority of the ICC. There is a further cleavage within the Deobandi community between those who trace their origins to Surat or Broach districts (Table 2.4). The division between Surti and Baruchi is fundamental and underpins the other divisions within the Islamic community. Both of these communities are large enough to gain control of the ICC. Although members of both factions support the teachings of the Deobandi school, they are in competition for control of the Islamic community. Generally the trend has been for the Baruchis to be more politically active and eager to impose their attitudes to Islamic practice and authority on the Surtis.
MAP 2: LOCATIONS OF MOSQUES AND TEMPLES IN BOLTON (1976)

KEY
M2: Tayyabiah Mosque
M3: Prospect Street Mosque
   (In 1976 planned replacement for M2)
M4: Makki Mosque
M5: Church Street Mosque
M6: Zakariah Mosque
   (Peace Street)
M7: Fletcher Street Mosque
M8: Lena Street Mosque
T1: Vishwa Hindu Parish Temple
   (St. Barnabas Church)
T2: Mandhata Temple
   (Beverley Road)
T3: Shree Swaminarayan Temple
T4: Shree Kutch Swaminarayan Temple
T5: Odd Fellows Hall (Salubaba Temple)
Table 2.4: District and Islamic School Affiliations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islamic Schools</th>
<th>Surat</th>
<th>District Allegiances</th>
<th>Kutch &amp; Kathiwar</th>
<th>Andra Pradesh</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berelewi</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Shafii, Shia and Christian.
Source: Hahlo 1983.

The division along faction lines does not match the division along caste community lines. To some extent the sample reflected this; the majority of Surti and Baruchi Vohras are Deobandi and a minority (9.62%) are Berelewi (Table 2.5). Already having control over their own mosque committees, Baruchi Deobandis succeeded in gaining control over the ICC (see Chap.6). This meant that as the smaller of the two large Muslim communities, they achieved the maximum degree of control possible over Islamic affairs. Their support for this take-over came not from their identity as Deobandi or Berelewi, but from their social identity as Baruchis. Therefore, the division between the factions underlies the division between the caste communities and between Islamic schools.

Table 2.5: Caste Community Membership of Islamic Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste Community:</th>
<th>Islamic Schools:</th>
<th>Deobandi</th>
<th>Berelewi</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surti Vohra</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>97.87%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baruchi Vohra</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagori</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miabhai</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khojah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daudi Bohra</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Shafii; + Shia; @ Christian.
Source: Hahlo 1983.
The control of a mosque is central to control of faction and caste. Such control implies control of resources, funds, donations, applications for public funds, religious teachings, and appointments of imams and through them control of the community that prays in the mosque. Therefore, control by a faction is regarded as not only desirable, but essential if it is to create a congenial social and political environment for its members. Without this control a faction would have to accept the dictates of another faction in a religious setting and this implies that the members of the former would have their socially unequal position publicised. Since the Baruchis and Surtis share some wards but dominate others, competition for control of individual mosques and the ICC is not a foregone conclusion. This leaves the control of the ICC open to take-overs by politically active members and lies at the root of Muslim ethnic politics.

Although the Surti-Baruchi divide forms such an integral part of Muslim social and religious life, it remains to be explained how the Baruchis who are in the minority have achieved domination. As a group they have built up an image which emphasises their commitment to Islam compared with that of the Surtis, which stresses flexibility and understanding. Separated by marriage preferences and village alliances, Surtis and Baruchis distinguish between each other in social situations. Their separate social identities are expressed in terms of stereotypes. From the Surti Vohra point of view, a Baruchi is dull, narrow-minded, poorly educated, rigid in religious beliefs, aggressive and "they carry knives even in the mosque". Surtis see themselves as enlightened, educationally progressive, flexible in their approach to Islam, reasonable and peaceful. Thus Surtis believe that they have a
worldliness which their neighbouring Baruchis do not share. Meanwhile, Baruchis see themselves as the "pious ones", and they look down on Surtis as a people who flaunt the strict principles of Islam. These stereotypes point to the depth of the social division between these two communities.

The interconnection between these social and religious identities becomes apparent when the conflict between factions, castes and Islamic schools is translated into demands that impinge upon the white community. These are expressed in the form of a need for more facilities for Muslims, such as single sex schools, facilities to bury the dead within 24 hours, halal meat in schools, access to the coroner over weekends and holidays, and the right of Muslim children to wear Islamic symbols in school. Such demands give the impression that these Muslims are deeply committed to Islam. Indications of commitment include observing the taboo on the eating of pork, attendance of prayers on Fridays, the need to pray five times a day, the burial of the dead within 24 hours, and marriage to cousins. Although cousin marriage is not a religious but a social observance, it is only Gujarati and Pakistani Muslims who observe it. These six observances have become recognised as symbols which "stand for" the social identity of Islam and more specifically Sunni Vohra Muslims. Thus, the Muslims form a cohesive group who share a commitment to a common set of symbols in situations in which their beliefs are often seen by those around them, particularly white Boltonians, to be alien and threatening.

To obtain some indication of commitment, the Muslim respondents were asked to rank these observances in terms of their importance, that is, as very important, important and unimportant. Although it is to be
expected that Muslims might place similar value on all five of these observances, the value the respondents placed on them shows that there exists some degree of difference (Table 2.6). The sixth observance has more to do with in-caste community marriages than with Islam. The data in the Table is arranged according to membership of faction, caste community and Islamic School.

The only Muslims who are in any kind of agreement are those who traced their identities to Broach, supported the Berelewi school and represented the small communities. They are in total agreement on the importance of attendance at Friday prayers and on the taboo on pork. They are also in agreement on the importance of 24 hour burials and to a lesser extent upon the importance of cousin marriage and single sex

Table 2.6: Ranking of Selected Religious Observances by Muslim Respondents by School @

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surti Vohra Deobandi:</th>
<th>Observances</th>
<th>Taboo on Pork</th>
<th>Attend Prayers</th>
<th>Cousins Marriage</th>
<th>Pray 5/Day</th>
<th>Grow a Beard within 24 hours</th>
<th>Single Sex</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Important</td>
<td></td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>57.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unimportant</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baruchi Vohra Deobandi:</th>
<th>Observances</th>
<th>Taboo on Pork</th>
<th>Attend Prayers</th>
<th>Cousins Marriage</th>
<th>Pray 5/Day</th>
<th>Grow a Beard within 24 hours</th>
<th>Single Sex</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Very Important</td>
<td></td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unimportant</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2.7</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Baruchi Vohra Berelewji:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observances</th>
<th>Taboo Attend Pork on Friday</th>
<th>Cousin Pray on Marriage 5/Day</th>
<th>Grow a Beard</th>
<th>Burial within 24 hours</th>
<th>Single Sex</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Very Important</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Important</strong></td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unimportant</strong></td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes two Baruchis Vohras, a Miabhai and a Nagori.*

### Memons:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observances</th>
<th>Taboo Attend Pork on Friday</th>
<th>Cousin Pray on Marriage 5/Day</th>
<th>Grow a Beard</th>
<th>Burial within 24 hours</th>
<th>Single Sex</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Very Important</strong></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Important</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unimportant</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Answer</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

@ The Muslim who now attends church has been excluded, as he no longer observes any Islamic observances.
beards. The Surti and Baruchi Vohras who support the Deobandi school were not in agreement. The former consider attendance at Friday prayers and burial within 24 hours to be very important with the taboo on pork being of almost equal importance; next in order of rank is praying five times a day. Only just over half support the idea of single sex schools, 40% agreed with cousin marriage and only 25% think it very important for a Muslim to wear a beard. The latter think that praying five times a day is most important, and then in order of importance come attendance at prayers on Friday, the taboo on pork and burial within 24 hours. Just over 50 percent of Baruchis support single sex schooling, 44% think that wearing a beard is important (see Chap.6, the bearded schoolboy dispute) and 36% accept the importance of cousin marriage. Apart from suggesting that there is no absolute agreement on the importance of these observances to Muslims, it does suggest that the view that Baruchis are pious is appropriate if applied to those who are Berelewis.

The important issue that arises from this analysis is that the Baruchis who support the Deobandi school are not in agreement with the Surtis. Their respectively different opinions of what are important observances for Muslims confirm the divide between them. Thus struggle for control of the Deobandi mosques is located not only within the factions, but is also embedded in what each faction would consider the appropriate behaviour for a Muslim. The divide between these factions is further reinforced by the practice of tabligh [6], which is an evangelistic exercise supported particularly by members of the Deobandi school. The aim of it is to convert Hindus to Islam and to persuade lax Muslims to return to the fold. Some 49.4% of the respondents (41) participate in tabligh and most of them (55.6%) are Vohra Baruchis. This commitment endorses the stereotype of Baruchis as being the most pious.

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of the two factions. Therefore, in thought, in practice and in commitment Baruchis believe that they should have control of the mosques and the ICC. The Surtis would like to control these organisations, but they do not have the same conviction to gain control. Faction conflict dominates the social interaction between Muslims and as they dominate the local Islamic community, this division dominates community affairs.

These internal differences are partly submerged when there is a threat to the Islamic community from the non-Muslim communities. For instance, when Muslims were informed that they could not have 24 hour and seven days a week access to the cemetery to bury their dead, they united in their protest. However, when one Baruchi leader attempted to gain a position of influence by exploiting a political situation involving the white community, the Surtis refused to support him (see bearded school boy, Chap.6). At another level members of both factions accept the Sunni Hanafi pathway and follow the teachings of the Sunna, Shariah and Hadiths. Thus, they share a common and overriding religious identity irrespective of their place of origin, they are all Sunni Hanafi Muslims. Commitment to these observances is called into question when Islam or the social identity of Muslims is under threat or when the mere expression of it reinforces the identities of the believers as Muslims. In a Christian country like Britain, Muslims publicly adhere to these observances in word and deed, because they confirm their commitment to Islam.

At the centre of the active Muslim community lies the control of the mosques, as 'symbols and what they symbolise are fused' into a complex Islamic social identity (Evans-Pritchard, 1967:245-247; Firth, 1973: 415). The public expression of beliefs in Islam provides the Muslims
with both a symbol of Gujarati Islam as well as membership of the wider Muslim brotherhood. Thus, the Gujarati Muslims, both Sunni and Shia, are united in their acknowledgement of their religious identity. This common identity is given expression at funerals of fellow Muslims, Gujarati and Pakistani, which all Muslims are expected to attend and thereby to demonstrate their respect for the Islamic brotherhood.

The Muslim population interacts at three levels: firstly at the level of factions and caste communities (Diagram 1); secondly at the level of Islamic schools, namely as Deobandis or Berelewis; and thirdly at the level of a united Sunni Hanafi Islamic community. These three levels of interaction give Muslims the potential to unite or divide according to which social identity is appropriate to a social situation. At one level they can be opposed to one another at the level of factions, while at another level they can be opposed to all those who are not Muslims. It is this facility to detach and reattach that makes Muslims a potential threat locally or nationally, on religious or political grounds. Nationally the formation of an Islamic parliament drew attention to Muslims' potential to develop as a political force. For this reason the presence of Muslim candidates in a recent local election unnerved white candidates who opposed them. Selected aspects of this potential to detach and reattach are explored below in the local context (Chap.6). Of concern are the social structures which underpin the Islamic community, cutting across organisational divides, and thus providing bases for friendship and ethnic political support (Chaps. 3 and 4). More immediately the next section of this Chapter will look at Hindu organisations.
Diagram 1

Model of Muslim Respondents’ Spatial, Residential and Religious Allegiances.

Form of Islam

- Shia
- Sunni

Islamic Pathway
- Hanafi
- Deobandi
- Berelewi

Islamic School

Caste Community
- Khojah,
  - Daudi Bohra
  - Vohra Miabhai
  - Nagori Vohra
  - Memon

District of Origin in Gujarat
- Kutch
  - Kathiawar

Taluka in District

Faction

- Marginal
- Potential to Factionalise at Taluka level by detachment
- Central
- Marginal

Residential Location in Bolton

- Central
- Southern
- Northern

Line = ___ indicates spatial, residential and religious allegiances
Hindus

In this section of the Chapter I shall concentrate on the development of Hindu religious organisations and the divisions which separate them and allegiances which unite them.

The migration chains that brought Hindus here also separate them by origin, caste and sect into a collection of communities. Where the Hindus differ from the Muslims is in the greater range of social differences that separate the members of chains from each other. To what extent Hindus' participation in the migration process has some bearing on their positions within the caste system and within the occupational system in Gujarat lies outside the scope of this thesis. Undoubtedly the close relationship between caste position and occupation that is a characteristic of the caste system could not be sustained by migrants who chose to migrate to countries, where such relationships did not pertain. Undoubtedly migration has presented Hindus with opportunities to change their occupations, their fortunes and thus their status within the caste system. With few exceptions, the identity derived from the association between caste and occupation has fallen away and has given way to new opportunities to achieve upward social mobility. What is particularly important is that such mobility can bring as great rewards in the wider society as it can within the Hindu communities; upward social mobility is seen as important by both parents and their children. Therefore, the caste system as it operates here shares similarities with its parent system in India, but it is different. If nothing else, the experience of migration and the social situation in Britain are different. I shall discuss migration before I analyse the caste system.
The reasons for Hindus migrating are similar to those that motivated Muslims, but they possibly include the wish to escape from some of the constraints imposed by the caste system. The effect of chain migration on the Hindu population has been similar to that described for Muslims. It led to the development of a collection of large and small caste communities, whose members trace their origins to particular districts and towns or cities in Gujarat. Unlike Muslims shared origins have not lead to the emergence of factions. This might be explained by the Hindus’ confining the selection of spouses to ekadas but to an avoidance of cousin marriages. Thus the link between chains whose members look for spouses from an ekada does not lead to the formation of strong kin-based groups, as it does for Muslims. Consequently caste membership takes precedence over faction membership.

The Caste System

The most precise form of identification available to Hindus is that of caste. Although the caste system dominates the lives of Hindus living here, there are issues that point to a weakening of it, such as the link between varna and caste. Traditionally this system of social stratification is based on four varnas in a rigid hierarchy. "The principle of hierarchy is the attribution of a rank to each element in relation to the whole" (Dumont, 1972:131). What appears to be happening is that these Hindus are losing sight of the relationship between the framework provided by the varnas and the castes ranked within it. This suggests that the sharpness of the code of identification which the system once provided has become blunted through its lack of application to many aspects of life in Britain. When Hindus were asked to identify
their varnas, the majority (67.5%) of Hindus could not or chose not to do so. Only 32.5% of them identified a varna. They are clearly aware of the hierarchy of varnas, since they possess an idea of the rank position of their caste in relation to some other castes. Therefore the identification of varna can be taken as evidence of either a deliberate attempt to reduce the importance of caste ranking to outsiders or as evidence of the diminishing importance of caste as a form of social stratification in this community. In certain circumstances Hindus reveal an awareness of varna membership, such as when they refer to the social distance between themselves and their doctors, who happened to be Brahmins. The caste system is based upon a complex relationship between specialisation and interdependence of constituent groups. At one level specialisation entails separation of them, at another it demands cooperation if the needs of the whole are to be met. This relation to the whole links the division of labour to the hierarchy (Dumont, 1972:133). Thus, the unwillingness or inability of respondents to identify their varna is possibly an attempt to reduce its importance to outsiders. From discussions with Hindus I was later able to place most of the castes within what they believed to be the correct varnas (Table 2.7). I did not ask respondents to rank their caste in relation to other castes.

Individual caste membership has become now the key to social identification; every respondent was able to identify his caste (Table 2.7). The majority (92.8%) of Hindus interviewed belong to castes within the Vaishya varna. Six respondents who belong to the Solanki, Rohit Chauhan and Dhobi Rajput castes are looked down on, which suggests that their rank is perceived to be lower than that of most Hindus. Although none identified these castes as being in the Shudra varna, consensus suggests that they are Shudra. Thus the effect of chain migration has
been to accentuate the caste identities of those in a chain at the expense of an understanding of their place within the total Hindu society. Although this small population lacks the interdependence associated with Hindus living in larger communities, there are issues which point to the divisions between castes. For instance, a Mandhata Patel who worked for a Water Authority told me how he had instructed a Kutchi builder, whom he employed, to bring his own supply of water. The explanation he gave was that he did not want this Kutchi, whom he regarded as being of lower caste, to pollute his supply of water. This example confirms that caste identity remains an indelible mark by which some Hindus establish their social positions in relation to one another.

Table 2.7: Probable Varna and Caste Membership of Hindus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>Varna: Vaishya</th>
<th>Caste Varna: Brahman</th>
<th>Caste Varna: Kshatriya</th>
<th>Caste Varna: Shudra</th>
<th>Other: Ramgharia Sikh</th>
<th>Total: 154</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mistry</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Brahman 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumbar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lingayat 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parjapati Kumbar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bawa 1</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajput Rana</td>
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<td>Total: 4 2.6%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajput</td>
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<td>Total: 1 0.65%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Katri</td>
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<td>Kshatriya 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhar</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Total: 6 3.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lohana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Patels 111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bania</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Koli</td>
<td>11)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Mandhata Patel</td>
<td>14)</td>
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<td>Matia Patel</td>
<td>1)</td>
<td>Rajput Dhobi 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Leva Patel</td>
<td>44)</td>
<td>Total: 6 3.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Patidar Patel</td>
<td>7)</td>
<td>Other: Ramgharia Sikh</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadva Patel</td>
<td>4)</td>
<td>Sikh 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanbi Patel</td>
<td>18)</td>
<td>Total: 1 0.65%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leva Patidar Patel</td>
<td>6)</td>
<td>72.08%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leva Kanbi Patel</td>
<td>5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadva Patidar Patel</td>
<td>1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>92.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some 92% of Hindus belong to the Vaishya varna, the remainder are Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Shudras and Sikhs. Although twenty-eight different castes are represented in the sample, some castes are not represented in
the sample, for instance Soni, Mochi, Darji, Halpati, Thakkar, Parmar, Gohil and Valand. The majority (72%) of Hindus belong to one of the "patel" castes. Although the title patel superficially confers a degree of homogeneity on this group because they share a common name, they comprise a diverse collection of unrelated caste communities tracing their origins to different parts of Gujarat (see below). Not only does each caste name indicate a social difference, but those sharing the same name do not necessarily come from the same part of Gujarat. Therefore, they do not regard each other as social equals. One group of patels who are not clearly identified as patels are Kolis. They are included with the Patels, because today most of them prefer to be known as Mandhata Patels. Locally the Leva Patels and Mandhata Patels represent the largest of the caste communities.

By tradition members of different castes perform different occupational roles. The combination of occupation and religious notions of purity and pollution form the basis of the caste hierarchy. Migration to Britain has meant that Hindus have had to accept jobs which bear no relation to their positions within the caste system. Migration has created opportunities for Hindus to achieve upward social mobility by either maintaining occupations associated with their caste positions or, more likely, abandoning these for new occupations. If anything, chain migration has made it even more difficult for Hindus to establish occupational relationships with members of other castes (cf. Desai, 1963:57-58). The majority of Hindus in this sample have abandoned their caste related occupations in favour of typical urban-industrial jobs. It is possible for some Hindus to practise their traditional occupations, for instance jewellers and carpenters, but in practice this is not easily achievable for the majority. Though many
members of business and trading castes, such as patels, have succeeded in establishing thriving grocery businesses serving mainly Gujarati communities, only a few members of other castes have managed to follow their traditional occupations. One caste whose members have established themselves in this way are the Sonis, who manage much of the trade in Indian jewellery in the north-west of England. Most Hindus recognise that weddings, cremations and other rituals require the services of a Brahman; in 1976, there were two Brahmans who could perform the role and this they did as part-time occupations over and above their full-time jobs in mills. The remainder of the sample held jobs which are unrelated to their caste occupations.

Generally Hindus have accepted a wide range of jobs: 35.71% of them worked in textile mills, but the occupations of the majority (64.29%) were disassociated from mills. These included electricians, bus drivers, washing machine mechanics, builders, joiners and a few of the younger ones were students (12.99%). Only a few (5.19%) were unemployed or retired persons. Those who came from outside Gujarat held jobs which are classified as Class I. The Brahmans and the Kshatriyas were doctors who traced their origins to Calcutta (Bengal), Indore (Madya Pradesh), Maharasta and Patna (Bihar) respectively, and with the exception of one doctor. Three others, the Sikh, a Mistry and the Zarola Bania, also held jobs which placed them in Class I, namely lecturer, tax officer and accountant. Of these three, two are Gujaratis and the third is a Sikh who traced his origins to the Punjab in Pakistan. Thus, most Hindus had accepted low-paying and often insecure jobs, which placed them in the semiskilled and unskilled Manual Class (Class VII), while those who came from other states in India hold jobs which are the better paid and professional. The modern work environment has brought together members
of castes who in a traditional caste setting might have been separated by their interdependence of skills. Some can recreate interdependencies, like a few doctors who can force such relationships upon their colleagues and patients, or shopkeepers who can foster such relationships with customers (cf. Desai, 1963:57-60). For the majority, however, the work situation in an urban environment serves to undermine traditional caste relationships.

In one way the relationship between caste and occupation has become obscured through the process of migration; in another it has become more important than ever. Caste identity has become an important social identity that provides direction to certain social activities for Hindus, such as selecting spouses for their children, and being able to identify structures of social and financial support that are immediately accessible to them. As an identity it unites those who share it, but separates them from those who do not.

Caste and District of Origin

District of origin provides a guide to caste identity in so far as it locates castes within the wider geographical and social framework. Although its relevance in Bolton appears to be remote, on the one hand it provides Hindus with a shorthand guide to the identification of the social positions of related and unrelated castes. On the other hand, it provides a social identity which is based upon either a common social experience or a shared life-style.

The majority of respondents (Table 2.8) came from Surat district and many of these came from the Navsari area. Another large group of
Hindus traced their origins to Kutch district. Common origins provide social identities around which three caste communities have formed, these are Kutchi (32.5%), Surti (27.3%) and Mandhata Patels (21.4%). These factions are collections of patel castes, whose members perceive of each other as roughly socially equal. They have developed organisations, generally of a religious nature, which serve their social and religious needs. For instance the Kutchi Patels shared in the emergence of the Swaminarayan sects - the new face of Hinduism (Williams, 1984). The Surti Patels share in the older face of Hinduism and the Mandhata Patels come from an area around the city of Navsari and share in a move to elevate their status within their varna. Furthermore, common geographical locations provide these collections of castes with social identities. In addition, these identities unite each collection of patels, but divide them from the non-patel castes.

Table 2.8: Origin of Hindu Respondents by District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Castes</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surat</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navsari in Surat</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kathiawar</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kutch</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadabad</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>154</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These respondents did not state their district of origin in Gujarat, but they are Gujaratis and come from the districts that the majority of their caste originate from. The Rajput Rana came from Daman.

Usually, those who share such an identity can also share food, although they do not recognise equality in marriage. Geographical identities provide Hindus with a ready-made guide to a common sense model of a caste hierarchy based upon perceived social distance, which they express in terms of status differences; it enables them to define those who are socially equal from those who are socially unequal.
Without any common geographical base, it has proved to be difficult for members of different castes to develop a common social identity, irrespective of whether the identity was real or apparent. It is acceptable to argue that migration strips the migrants of their social identities, however it also needs to be recognised that migration allows migrants to create new identities and to claim new status within the caste hierarchy. There are three separate instances of castes or members of castes who experienced either upward or downward social mobility during the period of research. They reflect some of the opportunities for mobility that accompany the experience of migration. Furthermore, they highlight some of the issues underlying the establishment of social equality between different castes. The process of status change that Kanbis underwent before adopting the title Patidar (Pocock, 1972) is one example and the rise of the Kutchi Patels through the Swaminarayan movement is another (Williams, 1984).

One group of Patels who used migration to improve their caste position within their varna are the Mandhata Patels. When asked some Mandhata Patels referred to themselves as Koli Mandhata Patels; some professed to not knowing the name Koli, and others referred to themselves as Kolis. "The term Koli...refers to an assortment of people who owned little land and who were presumably of tribal origin" (Pocock, 1972:30; Mandelbaum, 1972:462). Mandelbaum describes them as low caste agriculturalists, or agricultural labourers who have 'Sanskritized' and 'Rajputized' themselves (1972:462-463). However, neither Mandelbaum (1972) nor Pocock (1972) make reference to a Mandhata
Patel caste; and Morris (1968) does not mention Mandhata Patels living in Uganda. The chairperson of the Mandhata Patel Caste Association gave the following explanation for the origin of their caste name: In Gujarat their caste name was Koli. Migration to East Africa gave Kolis the opportunity to improve themselves, and many became successful businessmen, teachers and doctors. The caste association established a fund to assist their members to obtain an education, training or to establish businesses. With the success of their members, they decided to change their caste name to Mandhata Patel. Today he asserts that his caste is the largest in Bolton and has high caste status. It would seem that here is an example of a caste whose members have used a recognised social process for raising their caste position in conjunction with the opportunities presented by migration.

Another caste which may have used a similar process to alter its status in the caste hierarchy are Mistry. In Gujarat they claim that they were known as Kumbar. Though I did not pursue the explanation for this change of caste name, it is interesting to note that both Mistry and Koli established strong caste associations in East Africa which they brought to Britain. Both caste associations took decisions to limit the amount of dowry to be paid, because members of both became aware of the large amounts of money that the grooms' families are expecting to have spent on them in the form of presents. A consequence of this expenditure was that the brides' families were often crippled financially. This only led to the impoverishment of the caste [7].

In the 70s such decisions by caste associations illustrated their concern to protect their caste position by changing names allied to bargaining for new and higher status, to controlling the size of dowry.
payments and to outcaste errant members. The maintenance of caste rules by members brings caste approval; the breaking of caste rules brings opprobrium and sometimes punishment. The decision to outcaste and to administer the decision is an indication of the strength or weakness of a caste association. For instance in 1975-76 a Bolton Hindu, whom I shall call Mr P, his family and those of his children were declared outcastes by their caste association, the Shree Sarvodaya Samaj (UK). The issue which led to his outcasteing revolved around his decision to marry a third wife. After his first wife’s death, his relatives helped him select a second wife. After living with her for a year, he sent her back to Gujarat to manage as best as she could without him. It was said that her family in Gujarat refused to look after her because they were too poor and she was no longer their responsibility as they had paid her dowry. As a result of the shock at being sent back to India and the treatment meted out to her as a single woman without a husband, she is reported to have become mentally ill. She died five years after being set back to Gujarat.

Although apparently not legally divorced from his second wife, Mr P decided to marry for a third time. His kin in Gujarat found him another partner. After the marriage was arranged, he discovered by chance that the woman had two sons by a previous marriage. When his two sons learned of the existence of their prospective stepmother’s two sons, they objected to the marriage. Their objection was made on the grounds that, according to Hindu custom, all males in a family share rights to the family estate and contribute to its upkeep. They realised that when their father married, their stepmother’s two sons would gain rights as males to property to which they had never contributed. Having got their father drunk one night, they persuaded him to sign a change of deeds in
their favour. Thus, they seized control of the family property and in a sense usurped their father's authority and power. They threatened to make this knowledge public, thus shaming him, if he went through with the marriage.

After making and breaking the arrangements for the marriage on numerous occasions over the period of a year, Mr P decided against the marriage even though he had fixed another date for the wedding. By now the woman was in Britain, living with her kin in Leicester awaiting his final decision. In an effort to encourage Mr P to make a positive decision, his caste association representatives offered him a compromise: he could go through with the marriage, thus giving this woman who came from a poor family the legal chance to live here. In return the association would support her and her sons socially and financially. The caste association made it clear that they would disapprove if he withdrew from the marriage, and that he and his family would be in danger of being outcaste. This implied that he and his family would be isolated from his kin and caste. Thus, the decision Mr P faced to all intents and purposes was a "Hobson's choice". If he married the woman as he intended, he would have the support of his caste association, but his sons would have control of the estate. They might shame him publicly as well as privately by revealing his inferior social status within his family, as well as making him aware of his insecure financial position. If he chose to withdraw from the marriage, then his sons apparently indicated that they would return the control of the estate to him. If he did not go through with the marriage, the officers of the association said that they would consider what sanctions the association should mete out to him and his family.
Mr P chose to withdraw from the marriage, and by coincidence this was followed by a Home Office order on his "wife-to-be" to leave the country. Both the men's and women's committees of his caste association decided to outcaste him and his family. A letter from the association was sent to all caste members (Appendix III) instructing them not to socialise with any member of the P family, unless they too wished to be outcaste. The outcasteing had other more immediate and unhappy consequences for Mr P's daughter who was to be married about this time. Few of the invited guests attended the wedding, because they had received the letter threatening them with outcasteing if they had anything to do with this family. The bridegroom, who came from Gujarat, only heard about the decision of the association after his marriage. He took his frustration and anger out on his wife, who after enduring a battering for several weeks appealed to the local Community Relations Officer (CRO) to force her husband to stop beating her. The CRO could do little except advise her to seek some kind of separation (see Chap.6).

An outcasteing of a Hindu by his own caste community is a certain sign of strength and control. This case illustrates the importance of caste community approval for Hindus. Not only do associations take on the role of community monitors, but they are also a resource offering their members a wide range of benefits, which include financial, social and psychological support. Efforts by caste members to maintain what they believe to be their appropriate social status reinforces the social importance of the caste hierarchy in the Hindu communities. However, the strength of Hindus' commitment to caste customs serves to divide rather than unite them. To obtain a measure of the strength of caste customs respondents were asked to rank seven customs which Hindus informed me are of great importance to them; these are to avoid eating meat, to

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marry within caste, to cremate the dead within 24 hours, to eat food cooked only by members of one's caste, to arrange marriages of daughters when they reach the age of sixteen, to maintain caste superiority, and to belong to one's caste association. The responses of the Hindus indicate that there is a reasonable degree of agreement on the need to cremate the dead within twenty-four hours; some 49% ranked this custom as being very important. Attitudes to marriage within caste and the avoidance of meat were ranked as being of generally lower importance, although neither of these two customs was ranked as convincingly unimportant. The attitude to the remaining four customs is that they are unimportant, though membership of one's caste association is regarded as more important than the other three.

Though the Hindus generally support social values and rules that enable them to maintain the endogamous boundaries of their castes, some of the same values are shared by members of different castes. The support of caste values divides castes at one level, at another forms the basis for the development of social identities and social organisations. To analyse the commitment of some Hindus to caste rules, I shall restrict the analysis to the patels who form the majority of the sample and the population.

The "Patels"

The title patel is claimed by Hindus (and Muslims) and they comprise the majority of Hindus in the local population. Although some Hindus and some Sunni Vohra Muslims (Misra, 1964:170) have taken the name Patel, the Hindus use it as if it is part of a caste name [8]. No Hindu refers to his caste as solely "patel" (cf. Pocock, 1972:56); usually some other
caste name is attached to it such as Leva Patel or Kanbi Patel. The best known of the patel castes comprise the Leva, Patidar, Kadva, Kanbi, Leva Patidar, Leva Kanbi and Kadva Patidar Patel communities, which form a complex set of inter-related castes (cf. Pocock, 1972:56). These castes can be separated into Kutchi and Surti Patels. Separate from them are another group of patels, namely the Mandhata Patels who come from Navsari and who were members of the Koli caste (see above and below). Only four respondents traced their origins to the Charotar area, and none came from the famous "six" Charotar villages (Pocock, 1972:2) [9].

Three Kutchi castes are represented in the sample, they are Leva Patels, Kanbi Patels and Leva Kanbi Patels [10]. Members of these castes perceive of themselves as equal, if not superior, to patels from Charotar and Surat districts. When these Kutchis were asked to rank in order of importance seven caste-related values and customs (Table 2.9), some 85% ranked as being very important cremation of the dead within twenty-four hours, 61% the avoidance of meat, and 48% marriage in-caste. Belonging to one’s caste association, eating food cooked only by members of one’s own caste and the maintenance of the superior position of one’s caste were considered to be of lesser importance. Yet it was a disagreement over the cooking of food that led to some of these patels to state that when in hospital, they would have to refuse all hospital food [11]. They are strict vegetarians avoiding eating meat and eggs, mushrooms, garlic and onions (cf. Dubois, 1959:189). They make use of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ categories for organising ingredients for meals, for diagnosing illness and for prescribing medicines. It would seem that for these patels the avoidance of meat can be linked to the rise of the new face of Hinduism (cf. Williams, 1984). The strict adherence to a vegetarian diet is a characteristic of one process of upward social
mobility, namely 'sanskiritization' (Mandelbaum, 1972).

Table 2.9: Ranking of Caste-related Customs regarded as Very Important by Kutchi, Surti and Mandhata Patels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Custom</th>
<th>Kutchi Patels</th>
<th>Surti Patels</th>
<th>Mandhata Patels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cremate dead within 24 hrs.</td>
<td>39 84.78</td>
<td>11 40.74</td>
<td>8 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid eating meat</td>
<td>28 60.87</td>
<td>7 25.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marry in-caste</td>
<td>22 47.83</td>
<td>11 40.74</td>
<td>6 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belong to one’s caste association</td>
<td>9 19.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eat food cooked by members of one’s own caste</td>
<td>5 10.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Where less than 10% have agreed that a custom is very important, I have not recorded it in this Table.

Surti Patels define themselves as being separate from the Kutchi and Mandhata Patels. Their commitment to caste customs suggests that they are less concerned with their caste status than are those from Kutch (Table 2.9). Few respondents from these castes consider as very important the observance of customs like in-caste marriage (41%), the avoidance of eating meat (26%), and none regarded eating food cooked by members of one’s own caste as very important. The majority of these respondents consider the avoidance of eating meat, membership of one’s caste association, eating food cooked by members of one’s caste, and the maintenance of the superiority of one’s caste’s position as unimportant. A possible explanation for these responses could be that no religious reforms took place in Surat district in recent times that might have united these castes in the way that the Swaminarayan movement brought together the Kutchi Patels. The order in which they ranked caste customs and values as being important reflects a less positive attitude to the
maintenance of caste status. Many Surti Patels eat meat and eat with friends who belong to other castes. They are widening the range of people with whom they associate, but in the process they are losing their basis for developing a caste identity amongst themselves. By doing this they are also in danger of separating themselves from other Hindu castes. Today they form the largest group of supporters of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a multi-caste based religious organisation.

In contrast to the Kutchi and Surti Patels, Mandhata/Koli Patels have achieved upward social mobility (see above). The aim of these patels to improve their caste status is part of an ongoing process. Thus the customs and values that they considered to be very important reflect a totally different set of opinions (Table 2.9). Members of virtually every caste ranked cremation of the dead within 24 hours as being very important, but only a third of these Patels considered it very important. In marked contrast to the other castes, they attached the least importance to the avoidance of eating meat. Rather than following the usual paths of upward social mobility within the caste hierarchy, such as changing their name, these Patels are relinquishing many of the normally accepted symbols of upward mobility.

These three groups of patels present a contrast between the Leva, Patidar and Kanbi Patel castes, who believe in their established high status within the caste system compared to other patels and other castes in the Vaishya varna; the Surti Patels whose commitment to caste values is either not as great as that of the Kutchis, and is possibly even diminishing; and the Mandhata Patels whose commitment to these same values is minimal. A consequence of such a varying pattern of commitment to caste values is that these Hindus are being increasingly separated by
them. Thus the shared title of "patel" may provide a common social identity, but other than that they comprise three disparate communities. These changes herald a breakdown in the caste system based upon a gradual weakening of ties between castes.

While opinion reflects an ideal, reality demands that these Hindus continue to adhere to their caste values and rules. Thus the divide between the castes is further cemented by in-caste marriages. Of those Hindu respondents who are married, some 95% married in-caste (Table 2.10); their wives belonging to the same castes as their husbands and tracing their origins to villages which are part of ekadas that included the villages of their husbands. Only 5% of the married respondents married wives who either did not belong to the same caste as themselves or are not Hindus.

Table 2.10: Marriages of Hindu Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Married:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in-caste</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>95.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>out of caste</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>65.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single:</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>34.42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hahlo 1983.

Existing marriages do not provide an indication of any changes in the overall pattern of marriage, although it is commonly believed that as Asian youngsters grow up in Britain they will set aside their "traditional" beliefs and adopt more Western habits. An analysis of marriage preferences suggests that attitudes may be changing. It is respondents in the higher castes, rather than those in the lower castes, who claim to accept the notion of free choice of spouse for their children (Table 2.11). The possibility of marriage to any Hindu implies that caste is no longer socially important, and 28 (18%) of Hindu
respondents opted for this preference. However, the majority of respondents prefer their children to marry in-caste (68%). The social importance of in-caste marriages to these respondents provides an indication of the continuing endogamous nature of castes.

Table 2.11: Respondents' Marriage Preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference for:</th>
<th>Brahmans</th>
<th>Kshatriya</th>
<th>Vaishya</th>
<th>Shudra</th>
<th>Sikh</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>marriaget</td>
<td>m s m s m s m s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-caste:</td>
<td>- - - 74 30 - 1 -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Patel caste:</td>
<td>- - - 1 - - -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Hindu:</td>
<td>- - - 12 14 - 2 -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anybody of their choice:</td>
<td>3 1 1 6 2 2* 1* 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know:</td>
<td>- - - 2 1 - - -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>3 1 1 94 48 2 4 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hahlo 1983.
+ m = married s = single
* These were the three Rohit Chauhan respondents, all of whom were outcaste by their caste association (see above, and Chap.7).

Just as the villages of the Kanbi and Patidar [12] Patels in Charotar district are linked together in marriage exchange circles (ekadas), so are the villages all over Gujarat. Therefore, it is not even considered feasible for a Leva Patel from Daisara near Bhuj, Kutch, to choose to marry a Leva Patel who comes from Pardi in Surat district. Chain migration, which has brought together Patels from the same varna and even the same caste, has also made the social divisions between them even more apparent.
Religious Organisations

It is under the umbrella of religious organisations that Hindus developed organisations with simple structures of leadership and support. Within some of these organisations Hindus belonging to different castes have come together to share certain goals, such as the establishment of a religious and community centre. The growth and establishment of Hinduism in Bolton can be linked to the development of these religious organisations and Hindu ethnic politics. Recruitment to these organisations is based either on common geographical origin and a firm commitment to caste values; or on a loose notion of geographical origin and an apparent lack of commitment to caste values (Table 2.12).

The combination of a common district of origin, and the maintenance of caste exclusiveness through a reinforcing set of religious beliefs has led to the development and growth of two Swaminarayan sects. They identify themselves as the Shree Kutch Satsang Swaminarayan and the Shree Swaminarayan Sects. They draw their followers primarily from the Kutchi Patels (Williams, 1984; Barot, 1980, 1972/3; see also Chaudhuri, 1979), although according to Williams (1984) their influence extends to castes elsewhere in Gujarat. Over 80% of Hindus who traced their origins to Kutch belonged to one or other of these sects. Furthermore, the majority of them are also members of the Shree Kutch Leva Patel Burial Society, which exclusively manages the cremations for these Patels. Swaminarayan beliefs allied to a social ideology of reform supported by values relating to caste exclusiveness make for a clear structure of leadership (Barot, 1980). However, this leadership survives by non-contact with and non-participation in the local CRC forum and in the wider political arena. Though this may give members of both Swaminarayan
sects social identities, it also serves to separate them from the other Hindus and to isolate them from the Gujarati and other minority communities.

Table 2.12: Religious Affiliations of Respondents by District of Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District or State</th>
<th>Shree Shree Narayan</th>
<th>Shree Narayan</th>
<th>Swami Saibaba</th>
<th>VHP[14]</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kutch</td>
<td>13 81.25</td>
<td>19 82.61</td>
<td>2 10.53</td>
<td>13 18.31</td>
<td>3 13.64</td>
<td>1 33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kathiawar</td>
<td>1 6.25</td>
<td>2 8.7</td>
<td>2 10.53</td>
<td>6 8.45</td>
<td>2 9.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadiad</td>
<td>2 12.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petlad</td>
<td>1 5.26</td>
<td>1 1.41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadabad</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 1.41</td>
<td>1 4.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surat</td>
<td>2 8.7</td>
<td>5 26.32</td>
<td>18 25.35</td>
<td>6 27.27</td>
<td>1 33.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navsari</td>
<td>8 42.11</td>
<td>27 38.03</td>
<td>6 27.27</td>
<td>1 33.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>1 1.41</td>
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In Bolton, which is a recognised centre for the Swaminarayans (Barot, 1972/3; 1980), there are two temples (Chap. 2, Muslims, Map. 2). Moreover, both Swaminarayan sects share the same founder, recruit adherents from the same districts of Gujarat and often even from the same families. Relations between their followers are occasionally marked by aggression, which is supported by tales of inhumanity related by members of one sect about the behaviour of those in the other. Stories are told of how children are enticed away from their families and taken by the Swami to

138
sects social identities, it also serves to separate them from the other Hindus and to isolate them from the Gujarati and other minority communities.

Table 2.12: Religious Affiliations of Respondents by District of Origin

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States:  
Gujarat 1 1.41  
Maharashtra 1 4.55  
Punjab 1 1.41  
Cities  
Bombay 2 2.82  
Calcutta 1 4.55  
Indore 1 4.55  
Patna 1 4.55  
Daman 1 5.26  

Other  
Mombasa 1 1.41  

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</table>

In Bolton, which is a recognised centre for the Swaminarayans (Barot, 1972/3; 1980), there are two temples (Chap.2, Muslims, Map.2). Moreover, both Swaminarayan sects share the same founder, recruit adherents from the same districts of Gujarat and often even from the same families. Relations between their followers are occasionally marked by aggression, which is supported by tales of inhumanity related by members of one sect about the behaviour of those in the other. Stories are told of how children are enticed away from their families and taken by the Swami to
Swaminarayan sects, this movement is modern and its leader, Saibaba, argues that his message should have universal appeal across continents, religions, nations and races. It is an eclectic belief system in the sense that, according to those adherents to whom I spoke, one can pray to one’s own god whoever he may be through Saibaba. As might be expected, the followers of Saibaba, who form a small group, are drawn from a wide range of districts and castes (Table 2.12). His claims to miraculous cures have added to the appeal of his movement. When his followers in Bolton celebrated the birth of Krishna, the worshippers included both Hindu and white believers. By establishing their independence by renting halls not owned or controlled by other Hindus, the followers of Saibaba have developed their own social identity - an identity separate from that of the VHP. Since 1976 this group has diminished in size after experiencing problems of leadership.

In a sense by definition Hinduism is caste based; however, the VHP claims to be a multi-caste based organisation. This means that its members are not drawn from specific castes or from particular districts. The VHP is an international organisation whose aim is the promotion of Hinduism. The VHP in Bolton was, and Hindus here claim that it still is, the largest single branch of this organisation of any in Britain (Hindu Vishwa, October 1974:21). As a registered charity, the VHP endeavours to provide for both the religious and community needs of all Hindus and of anyone else who chooses to join. Thus its membership is drawn from a wide range of states, districts and castes (Table 2.12).

Initially the VHP had no centre and its members hired halls to celebrate their festivals. Early in 1973, Mr Sandhu as I shall call him, a Sikh from East Africa, was elected chairperson. At the time he was
also a member of the local CRC. Prior to his taking up the position of chairman, his predecessors had unsuccessfully attempted to unite the membership of the VHP. The interests of castes, like that of a large caste such as the Mandhata Patels, led to conflicts over the control of money and space. Once part of the VHP, the Mandhata Patels separated complaining that they could not hold their festivals when it was convenient for them. Meanwhile members of smaller castes in the VHP argued that all castes should participate equally. Representatives of each caste on the committee were seen, rightly or wrongly, to favour where possible, the interests of their own castes. In 1972 it became clear that the VHP could not achieve its aim to become independent without a building of its own. While its members could not decide whether or not caste allegiance was more or less important than the establishment of a multi-caste Hindu organisation. Against this background of inter-caste rivalry, Mr Sandhu was elected chairman. As there are relatively few Sikhs in Bolton, Mr Sandhu was seen by VHP members to have no significant caste power base and therefore, he did not pose a threat to other caste representatives.

Under his leadership, the conflicts between various caste representatives were shelved and he launched the VHP on a campaign to raise £25,000 from the local Indian population for a building to be purchased for use as a community centre. In 1974 he began the negotiations for the purchase of St. Barnabas, which belonged to the Church of England. The negotiations were successful and the local and national media claimed that this marked the first sale by the Church to members of a non-Christian faith in England (BEN, 6/5/75, 13/5/75; Guardian, 7/5/75). Under his leadership, the VHP supported this purchase and its development into a multi-caste centre. On the ground floor,
which was the original sacred area, are the community facilities and on
the first floor is a place for worship. Here Hindus of every persuasion
can participate in community activities, religious festivals and worship
any Hindu god of their choice. Undoubtedly, the VHP was, and still is,
the most popular organisation if the responses of the Hindu sub-sample
are taken as a guide; some 46% of the Hindus are members of the VHP. The
largest proportion of these come from the Surat and Navsari districts.
As a multi-caste organisation, its members have an opportunity to
combine their commitment to Hinduism in a way that is convenient to them
and acceptable to the wider Hindu community.

Those respondents who did not belong to any religious organisations
can be divided into two sub-categories: firstly, those who accept the
general principles of Hinduism and caste membership but who do not wish
to be associated with any religious organisations; secondly, those who
are antagonistic to the VHP. Generally doctors, like many other
professional Indians, declared their belief in Hinduism to be a general
one. Some others, who are no longer socially and residentially linked
to the Gujaratis, made similar claims. Quite a few of them look upon
the VHP as a passive supporter of the caste system.

Mandhata Patels set out to demonstrate that their power lay in the
size of their community. Initially, they belonged to the VHP, but found
themselves in conflict with them over decisions about the timing and
place for holding festivals. They argued that their need for a
community centre was as great as that of the VHP, and expressed their
hostility towards the VHP publicly in the press and privately within the
confines of the Hindu community. At one point they argued publicly that
the VHP should not be given an urban aid grant of £40,000 for improving
their centre, as this would be detrimental to the interests of the whole "Indian" population. This protest illustrated the depth of the rivalry between this large caste and the other smaller castes. Finally in 1980 the Mandhata Patels bought a church which they converted into a temple. Unfortunately, a few years later it was damaged by arson. They repaired the damage and today are an established and thriving community.

Some evidence of a conflict of social identity can be seen in the commitment of Hindus to their castes associations and sects over and above their commitment to the VHP. This was reflected in a comment made by Mr Sandhu at the opening of the VHP community centre: it was there for the use of all Hindus, irrespective of caste or religious differences. Evidence for this commitment can be found in the wide range of statues and pictures of Hindu gods, including Saibaba, which are to be found in the temple. The pattern of donations to the VHP revealed some of the conflict that underlies the relations between various Hindu religious organisations. Members of the VHP make regular donations to it; but this does not prevent them from making donations to other religious organisations. It is not the commitment of Hindus to the VHP that is in question, but the commitment of those who belong to other religious organisations.

Some 54% of respondents who are committed to other religious organisations also make regular donations to the VHP. The majority of those who did not contribute belonged to the Shree Swaminarayan sect or declared themselves to be just Hindus. They gave the least to the VHP when it most needed support. In contrast over 80% of respondents who are members of the Shree Kutch Swaminarayan and Saibaba sect donated money to the VHP. In a sense, by deliberately not undermining caste values,
these latter two organisations support the notion of caste. With the VHP having the most effective leader of all minority organisations, Hindus from other castes and sects were attracted to the VHP. Nevertheless, the link between various Hindu organisations was tenuous and in the event of the Sikh resigning from the leadership of the VHP, the link would break. This happened in 1980 when he resigned. The Mandhata Patels and the Parjapati Kumbars broke away, the former established their Krishna temple and the latter their own organisation.

Finally, there are Hindus who do not belong to any of the existing religious organisations or caste associations. Generally they are well educated men who show little outward commitment to caste values. Occasionally they attend religious ceremonies at the VHP, but they rarely become involved in VHP activities. These individuals comprise a collection of Hindus with no links between them. They might support the VHP as the largest of the Hindu organisations, whose facilities they can use, with donations. These people are located on the margins of the Hindu communities.

To conclude this section, the Hindus are divided at one level by caste, at another into factions and at a third level by religious commitment. At each level new social identities emerge on the basis of new combinations of social equality between members. With no unifying structure they face a problem of developing a pan-Hindu social identity. Hindus comprise a bricolage of castes, tracing their origins to diverse districts in Gujarat. Some seek to maintain both by attitude and belief the exclusiveness of their castes; others take a more liberal attitude thereby developing new complex non-caste based social identities. Within Bolton’s Hindu population, the old and the new faces of Hinduism
clash with those of the old and new Hindu on the streets, in the temples, in community centres and in the political arena. Few of these religious organisations have appropriate bases from which they can launch a social movement. Of the four which are in a position to do so, that is the two Swaminarayan sects, the Mandhata Patels and the VHP, only the latter two have used the political arena of the CRC to make a protest or mount a campaign to influence politicians. The crux of the problem for the Hindus in their search for a common identity is that "religion .... was never separated from their general life" (Chaudhuri, 1979:299).

The Hindu community is segmented by food rules which stress comparative hierarchy, pollution and division. By contrast, Islam stresses the unity of Islam versus the rest of the world. Pork for Muslims is forbidden, for Hindus polluting. Commensality is a religious prescription for Muslims. Among Hindus the caste that handles pollutes rather than the food being polluting. Pollution is cumulative, that is cooked food, faeces, beef, blood and the castes associated with them are increasingly polluting. Commensality divides Hindus and unites Muslims. Where close friendship is reinforced by commensality, the development of structures of support follow lines of commensality. Where commensality divides individuals, structures of support follow lines of social and religious equality. Unity and commensality for Hindus are in opposition to inequality and close friendship. Unity and commensality for Muslims support equality and close friendship.

A number of issues come together which laid the basis for Gujarati ethnic politics and protest. For Hindus the social constraints of caste led to the establishment of independent organisations, which socially
separate Hindus from each other and Hindus from non-Hindu communities. Thus there is no link vertically or horizontally between these organisations. For them to become the social bases for movements of protest is difficult, since they have to reach across the social divides which underlie caste differences. For the Muslims religious differences are submerged beneath a common understanding of Islam. Thus able to separate and compete as factions and sects, they can unite behind both the ICC and in defence of Islam. Thus as bases for social movements the Islamic organisations are powerful, since their individual concerns are shared and the opposition to them by non-Muslim communities is also shared. For the Muslims greater unity placed greater constraints upon their leaders; for the Hindus disunity gave their leaders greater freedom.

Underlying the community structures of both Muslims and Hindus are social networks which provide the social relationships that link members of both religious communities across organisational divides. With organisations social networks allow members of organisations to unite or fragment as social and religious communities. The analysis of Muslim organisations points to their potential to unite; the analysis of Hindu organisations suggests that caste allegiances in particular cause disunity. This Chapter described and analysed the main organisational participants in local ethnic politics. Leadership in these organisations is addressed in Chapter 5. The concept of community as a social construction is central to ethnic politics, since debates about the relationships of members of organisations to communities helps leaders to define support. The underlying and underpinning the community are social networks; an analysis of these networks forms the subject of the next Chapter.
FOOTNOTES


2. The sizes of these communities today, according to Misra (1964:178), are Sunni Vohra - 65,000, Daudi Bohra - 21,000, Memon - 4,500, Nagori - c. 1,000, Khojah - c. 1000.

3. There is no record of a caste community of this name in Misra, 1964.


5. I am indebted to the late Prof. E.L. Peters for drawing my attention to his paper on this subject.

6. As a movement, tabligh originated in India in 1924, when the Deobandi Ulami were looking for greater political support from the Muslim community, the performance of tabligh offering a way to increase the size and the political commitment of the community (Hardy, 1972:208).

7. Today this decision has been forgotten and high dowries are now being paid by the father of the bride to protect her from abuse by her mother-in-law and other members of the family into which she marries.

8. The origin of the name goes back to Mogul times, when some Kanbis were appointed as assistant revenue officers. They became known by their titles as Desai, Amin and Patel. Desai ranked highest, the Amin second, the Patel third. The Patel was the head man of the village: he had most to do with the actual assessment of taxes, their collection and also administered justice (Pocock, 1972:57).

9. These six villages in Charotar District, Gujarat, became famous through their association with the rise of the wealthy and prestigious Patidar caste.

11. Representatives of the two Swaminarayan sects have argued that their members, when patients in the hospital, will always refuse to eat the food provided by the hospitals, even if the individual ingredients were acceptable. The only food they can eat is food prepared by members of their sects, that is castes.

12. Pocock has given one explanation for the origin of the caste term ‘patidar’ (1972:1,52,69ff). Leva Patidar Patel informants told me that the term ‘patidar’ was given to Patels whose job it was to weigh grain. Patidar means ‘weigher of grain’.

13. Two respondents were members of both the Shree Swaminarayan sect and the Shree Kutch Swaminarayan sect.

14. Anyone can belong to a sect and also be a member of the VHP; many were members of two organisations and donated money to both.
CHAPTER 3
COMMUNITIES AND CLOSE FRIENDS

In the previous Chapter attention was focused on social and religious organisations, which form the basis of structures of support and leadership. The aim of this Chapter is to explore the concept of community in terms social networks which provide the community with an underlying social structure. van den Berghe makes the point that the analysis of racial and ethnic relations should not be concentrated solely on cultural differences and acculturation between groups. He writes: "It is important to distinguish analytically the structural elements of ethnic relations from the cultural ones. The dynamics of group membership, solidarity, and conflict, and the network of structured relationships both within and between groups, are at least as essential to an understanding of ethnic relations as the cultural dynamics of group contact" (van den Berghe, 1970:150). If the social structure of a community is defined "as a persisting pattern of social relationships among social positions" (Laumann, 1973:3-4), an analysis of Gujarati social networks and particularly close friendship relationships should provide an understanding of the underlying structure of Gujarati communities and their social boundaries. Furthermore an analysis of close friendship will provide a measure of the extent to which Gujaratis are prepared to invest one of their valued social relationships, close friendship, in relationships with their social equals and unequals within and without their own communities.

All studies of the poor point to their having less access to scarce resources such as political and economic power, wealth and information, than those who are better off (Goldthorpe, 1980; Miles, 1982, Townsend,
One characteristic of such studies is that they stress the absence of social relationships between those in power and those without it (Lin, 1982; Laumann and Pappi, 1976). Without any clear base within the formal white political power structure for the development of political power in the 1970s (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979), the Hindus and Muslims have at least two options: they could develop their social networks into structures of support within their communities or they could extend their friendship to those with power belonging to other communities, namely the white politicians and businessmen. My argument is that they chose the former, because it enabled them to strengthen their existing power bases in social and religious organisations by controlling information (Chap. 6). Whereas to do the latter might strengthen them, but it would expose them to racism.

Community

When attributing a social identity to themselves, people describe themselves as being part of a community (Cohen, 1982). This implies a sharing of cultural background, social relations and sometimes a geographical boundary (Cohen, 1982: 3-7, 9-11). A shared identity as reflected in this use of the term community also implies that those who recognise it do so, because they either share in it or are excluded from sharing in it (Emmett, 1982: 207). The extent to which people can share in a social identity is dependent upon the social distance between themselves and those who identify or give expression to it in a social situation. If social identities are arranged in order of their exclusiveness-inclusiveness, Cohen argues that the arrangement provides in a deceptively simple sense a structure of social identities (Cohen, 1982: 10). I am suggesting that in a general sense all people who live in
Britain today can define their belonging in terms of labels which describe identities or communities. The exclusiveness or inclusiveness of social identities give some indication of the extent to which they are shared by others.

When Gujaratis refer to themselves as Gujaratis, as Hindus or Muslims, as members of a caste, as members of a village or faction, they speak of themselves as belonging to a community. The term community is used by Gujaratis to describe the social identities that are inclusive to themselves. At levels of ascending social interaction (inclusiveness) the definition of community becomes increasingly simplified and generalised, whereas at levels of descending interaction (exclusiveness) the definition of community increases in specificity. At one level, Hindus and Muslims use the term community (kom) when referring to the castes and caste communities. At another level, they use community when referring to Hindus or Muslims who attend their mosques or temples. For instance, the Muslims claim that their most specific identification is the label "Sunni Vohra". The term community as used by the Hindus shares certain similarities with the way Muslims use it, but there are differences. They also use caste labels to describe themselves. Only officers of Hindu and Muslim organisations like the VHP and ICC speak of the Hindu or the Muslim community.

The social importance of the notion of community to Gujaratis is that it has social and ideological relevance. For instance Desai (1963: 55ff) describes how Indian businessmen depend upon the support of their caste community. Where a Gujarati establishes a business, its success depends as much upon the support of his community as it does upon his knowledge of the business and the market he seeks to exploit. Those who establish
businesses without a community to support them face risk of failure. Shia Daudi Bohora, Khojah and Memon respondents all spoke of "not having" a community to support them. An number of instances illustrate this: firstly, a Leva Patel started a business selling vegetables and groceries. The particular customers he sought were other Leva and Kanbi Patels, Kutchi Swaminarayans, whose women have a reputation for being discerning buyers. By attracting these customers, he acquired a name for selling vegetables and spices that became recognised by women of other caste communities as being of good quality and fresh. Once he had obtained the support of these Patels, his success was assured. He prospered and his business expanded.

Another instance which highlighted this point arose in the context of competition between driving schools for customers. By 1974 many Gujaratis began looking for jobs outside the textile industry. A number established driving schools; these gave them the opportunity to become self-employed and to respond to a growing demand for driving lessons from Gujaratis. A Memon established a driving school which he believed to be supported by an increasing number of clients, Muslim, Hindu and white, who had been referred by his past pupils. Towards the end of 1979 his business suddenly declined. He attributed the decline to there not being a large Memon community to support him, but it could have been caused by competition from an increasing number of Gujarati and Pakistani owned schools which had sprung into existence. Shortly afterwards his business collapsed and he moved to Glasgow where there is a large Memon community. By contrast a Mandhata Patel's driving school business, which was established soon after that of the Memon, survived and prospered because he could draw on the support of his own large caste community. The community looks after its members.
The other contexts in which notions of community are crucial include arrangement of marriages, the acceptance of cooked food and water, whom one can touch and from whom one can receive help and on whom one can trust and rely. The community explanation has a more complex aetiology than is suggested by these examples. The awareness and experience of culture, as defined by the notion of community, is of sociological importance, and its importance lies in the interpretation and analysis of social interaction that is meaningful to the actors (cf. Willis, 1979). The action that is meaningful emerges through the establishment of social relationships, such as close friendship, supported by a dynamic culture which strengthens the ties between Gujaratis, between Gujaratis and other minorities and between Gujaratis and the white community. Although there are other such relationships, as between people in business, I shall concentrate upon close friendship.

Close Friendship: a strong tie

There are many social relationships which link Gujaratis to members of other communities. Some relationships are based upon social equality and one such is friendship. Friendship overrides differences of social inequality. Three characteristics are identifiable as being associated with friendship: autonomy (as opposed to ascription), unpredictability (as opposed to routinisation) and terminality (as opposed to open-endedness) (Paine, 1969:519). A kinship relationship differs from that of close friendship in that it is involuntary, public and ascribed. Close friendship differs from acquaintanceship in that the latter is neither a relationship of confidence or intimacy and therefore, is not terminal. Acquaintanceship may develop into friendship but it also may
not. Ordinary friendship I shall regard as a relationship in between close friendship and acquaintanceship. Furthermore, as I have defined close friendship, it is possible for ego to have as close friends, two individuals who dislike or even hate each other. What is important to this thesis is ego’s decision to have them as close friends, not their decisions to not have each other as close friends.

By the term friendship I mean individuals who are paired in the same role (friend/friend). Friendship is a voluntary role, which can occur within an ascribed role such as a kinship relationship, that is kin can be friends. As a voluntary role its affective content is dependent upon a "sense of worth" (Briggs in Paine, 1969). The implication is that friendships can cross social divides between social class and race. An assumption that underlies this argument is that those who share a similar set of deeply held social attitudes, values and beliefs are also those who share similar social positions in a society. "Similarities in status, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour facilitate the formation of intimate (or consensual) relationships among incumbents of social positions" (Laumann, 1979:386); stated simply, like attracts like.

This analysis will concentrate on the primary zone in social networks in which are to be found close friends (Chap.4). A social network is "a specific set of linkages among a defined set of persons, with the additional property that the characteristics of these linkages as a whole may be used to interpret the social behaviour of the persons involved" (Mitchell, 1971:2). From the actor’s point of view, the individuals in the social network are definable in such a manner that they are not confused with persons who lie outside it. It is this information that enables the actor to make abstractions about his
This is an egocentred social network in which social relations are organised around an anchor person (cf. Boissevain, 1974; 1968). Radiating out from the actor are direct, reciprocal relationships with a unique set of individuals whom he refers to as kin, close friends and friends of lesser degree, such as ordinary friends and acquaintances. In the sense that an actor creates his own social network both actor and observer can regard it as being a bounded group [1]. As a system it provides an individual with access to resources as well as acting as a channel for controlling incoming and outgoing information and ideas about what are appropriate attitudes, values, beliefs and forms of social behaviour. Therefore, social networks need to be analysed in terms of their social and structural characteristics; I shall analyse first the social and the structural characteristics. I shall begin by analysing the size of these networks.

Size

Size is the characteristic of zones which forms the basis for most network analyses. To avoid the problem of overloading a few ties, the number of possible close friends were restricted to ten, excluding anchor persons. This was done for the following reasons: (a) to avoid the lack of analytical continuity associated with too low numbers - such as in the case of three close friendships; (b) to recognise that people draw a distinction between their "best" and "close" friends [2]; (c) to allow for a variation in the number of close friendships between one and ten [3], and (d) to recognise that these close friends are the most likely of all friends to exercise control over an anchor point. Though
the number of close friends was limited to ten, most of them identified ten or fewer close friends (Table 3.1). A number claimed to have no close friends [4], but then identified ten close friends. Most Hindus claimed to have between three and six close friends, while most Muslims identified between three and five close friends. The mean sizes of these primary zones show that those of Hindus (5.56 persons) are slightly larger than those of Muslims (5.1 persons). Although a restriction was placed upon the overall number of close friends, in practice few respondents had more than ten close friends.

Table 3.1: Size of Primary Zones in Gujaratis’ Social Networks

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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>154</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.01</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean sizes of zones: Hindus = 5.56 persons and Muslims = 5.1 persons.

What is important about close friends is how they can help one another gain access to information, support, opportunities or resources. To analyse these aspects of the social characteristics of networks, I shall employ the concept of reachability. Reachability I define in terms of the accessibility of close friendships across community, geographical and class boundaries. Access to scarce resources, be they wealth, power, influence or information, can be gained through personal achievement or through ties with other persons who have access to them. Reachability can be evaluated in terms of knowledge passed on by
colleagues (Coleman, Katz and Menzel, 1977; Erbe, 1977) or skills at networking (Laumann and Pappi, 1976). Basically reachability depends upon frequency of contact, which depends to some extent upon geographical proximity and social standing. Reachability is a complex concept comprising a number of elements which facilitate or impede access to resources through others.

For instance an analysis of the ethnic identities of close friends will show to what extent Gujaratis have taken the opportunity to extend friendships across community boundaries. I shall define reachability in terms of homogeneity/heterogeneity, residential location, frequency of contact and freedom of association. Given the political climate of the 1970s, I shall argue that Gujaratis were able to transform their religious organisations into power bases, through investing in close friendships with people within their communities, who were residentially close to them, allowing for a high frequency of contact, but done at the expense of overriding the social rewards that might be brought by the freedom to associate with close friends belonging to different ethnic groups and different social classes. I shall analyse the concept of reachability beginning by looking at the ethnic background of close friends (homogeneity/heterogeneity), then their places of residence, frequency of contact and finally their social standing.

(a) Homogeneity/Heterogeneity

The concepts of homogeneity or heterogeneity are used to describe zones in terms of the ethnic membership of the close friends of respondents. Homogeneity will be used to describe zones in which all close friends of an anchor point belong to the same ethnic group and
accept the same religion. Heterogeneity will be used to describe zones which include one or more close friends who are Gujarati but accept a different set of beliefs to those held by the respondent and/or belong to other ethnic communities and/or the white community and the remaining close friends are Gujaratis who belong to the same ethnic group and accept the same beliefs as the anchor point.

The Gujarati population comprises 5.2% of the total population of Bolton; Muslims make up about 3% and Hindus 2.2% of it, with the smaller minorities, such as the Pakistanis and West Indians, comprising 0.3% the (see Chap.1). On the basis of the principle of homophily Gujaratis should establish most of their close friendships with Gujaratis on the grounds that they share similar racial and political disadvantages while also sharing the most positive social characteristics in common, such as membership of the same ethnic group, the same religion, elements of the same caste system or caste community. The corollary of the principle of homophily is that the greatest social distance should separate those who share the least in common: since they share the least in common with members of the white community, who are also those perceived to racially and politically disadvantage them, Gujaratis should have few white close friends. After investing in close friendships within their own religious communities, Hindus and Muslims should prefer establishing close friendships with those in other minorities, before establishing similarly intense friendships with members of the white community.

Altogether some 530 Muslim close friends are located within some 90 Muslim anchored zones and 857 Hindu close friends are to be found in 145 Hindu anchored zones. An analysis of close friends in primary zones of
social networks shows that the majority of close friends, Hindus (58%) and Muslims (65%), of Gujarati respondents belong to the same ethnic and religious groups as they do (Table 3.2). As a percentage of the total number of zones, 72% (65) of Muslim and 66% (96) of Hindu zones are comprised of only such close friends. Therefore, the majority of Gujarati anchored zones are homogeneous. This supports the hypothesis that like attracts like.

Table 3.2: Distribution of Close Friends in Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Network Zones*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Homogeneous Zones</th>
<th>Heterogeneous Zones</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondents</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>(65) 343 64.72%</td>
<td>(25) 187 35.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>(96) 498 58.11%</td>
<td>(49) 359 41.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>530 100%</td>
<td>857 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Muslims (14) and Hindus (9) who have no close friends have been excluded.

The remaining zones comprise various combinations of close friends belonging to the same communities as and different communities to the anchor points. Therefore, these zones are described as being heterogeneous. In terms of individuals, 35.3% of Muslim and 41.9% of Hindu close friends are anchored in these zones. These close friends are to be found in 27.8% of Muslim and 33.8% of Hindu anchored zones. Thus a third and less of zones anchored by respondents contain one or more close friends belonging to different communities. At first sight this suggests that a third of respondents are prepared to establish close friendships across ethnic communities. It also suggests that Hindus are more prepared to accept into close friendship members of other communities than are Muslims.
However, more detailed analysis of the social identities of close friends in these heterogeneous zones shows that the majority are Gujaratis who belong to the same religious communities as the respondents (Table 3.3). Some 54.5% of close friends in Muslim anchored zones are Muslims and some 69.6% of close friends in Hindu zones are Hindus. This contradicts the impression that Hindus are more likely than Muslims to accept as close friends members of other ethnic groups. Analysis of the ethnic identities of the remaining close friends of Muslims show that 17.7% of Muslim close friends are Gujarati Hindus, 15.5% are white people and a further 12.3% include Pakistanis (21), a West Indian and an African. In addition to the 69.6% of Hindus in Hindu anchored heterogeneous zones, they include 3.4% of Gujarati Muslims, 19.5% of white people, 7.4% of friends from other ethnic communities, Pakistanis (22), West Indians (2) and Parsee and a Sikh. This supports the above finding that Hindus are reluctant to accept as close friends people who are not Hindu, but it also shows that they are more ready to have white people than Muslims as close friends.

Table 3.3: Community Identities of Close Friends in Heterogeneous Zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nos. of Respondents:</th>
<th>Gujarati Muslim</th>
<th>Gujarati Hindu</th>
<th>Gujarati White</th>
<th>Pakistani (21)</th>
<th>West Indian (1)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim (25)</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54.54%</td>
<td>17.65%</td>
<td>15.51%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nos. of Respondents:</th>
<th>Gujarati Muslim</th>
<th>Gujarati Hindu</th>
<th>Gujarati White</th>
<th>Pakistani (22)</th>
<th>West Indian (2)</th>
<th>Parsee (1)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindu (49)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>349</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.44%</td>
<td>69.63%</td>
<td>19.48%</td>
<td>7.45%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh (1)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>359</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and that the Muslims are more prepared to have Hindus than Pakistanis or
white people as close friends. Even with a Sikh as chairperson of the VHP, only one Hindu respondent had a Sikh as a close friend. No respondent claimed to have a Chinese or Somali close friend, the latter being the larger of these two very small communities. Most of Mr Sandhu's close friends are Sikhs (8), but he has two Hindu close friends. It is their presence makes his zone of close friendship heterogeneous. These patterns of friendship suggest that this generation were unwilling to commit themselves to establishing strong ties, like that of close friendship, with members of other communities.

This confirms the hypothesis that Gujaratis are committed to close friendships with Gujaratis. It also lends support to the argument that the members of these two communities give the appearance of being two separate religious communities (Brooks and Singh, 1978/79:22). Analysis further shows that there is an even greater reluctance on the part of Gujaratis to establish strong ties with members of other minorities who share similar social disadvantages. Although the apparent probabilities of Gujaratis befriending white people is high, the actual chances of their doing so are low. Gujaratis would appear to consciously avoid strong ties with white people, possibly to avoid becoming involved in relationships which are likely to make them vulnerable to racial harassment and discrimination (cf. Smith, 1976:185).

While the inclusion of close friends from other communities is possible, the majority of zones comprised some combination of close friends who are Gujarati and members of other minority or majority communities. Only two zones can be identified as totally heterogeneous: one anchored to a doctor comprises only one close friend, a white shopkeeper, and the other is that of a student. Neither offers
convincing support for an argument that the fragmentary nature of this community allows for the establishment of close friendships with those who are not Gujarati Hindus. To establish close friendships with people who hold different beliefs and/or belong to other communities in such close communities, as these two Gujarati communities are, is difficult. Only two Muslims have a majority of close friends who are not Gujaratis; they comprise 90% and 70% of their primary zones. One is a qualified chemical engineer and his close friends belong to the same social class as he does. At the time of the survey the other had no job. An important social characteristic that would support this pattern of close friendship is their location.

(b) Geographical Range

An important factor that influences interaction between close friends is their geographical proximity. Two models of the such networks have become accepted. The first suggests that members of social networks who share the same geographical environment have increased opportunities for social contact at the expense of decreasing their range of access to scarce resources. By living in the same environment, they share similar social experiences drawn from the same pool of experiences. By sharing the same experiences they handicap themselves in that those contributing to the common pool of knowledge bring nothing new to it. When this is taken together with a high frequency of contact, the combination creates a social environment in which close friends exert a conforming influence upon one another (Hart, 1970/71:84-87; also Mayer, 1962). The second model suggests that members of social networks who are spread over a wide geographical area have opportunities to draw on a wider range of social experiences which are different, since they are located in different
social environments. Moreover, separated by geographical barriers, they do not meet sufficiently often to create a social environment in which friends can exert a conforming influence upon each other. Rather the reverse, this opens up individuals to being receptive to new influences and ideas. It can be argued that it would be to the advantage of members of a minority community to invest in social relationships within their own community, thereby increasing the strength of their ties to at least one major resource, namely political support (Lin, 1982: 134-135). Ideally, the most efficient social situation in which members of a community could strengthen their political commitment to each other and express a common interest to each other is by living reasonably close together. Other advantages that come from residential proximity include the development of a safe environment (Smith, 1984: 360).

The majority of close friends of the Hindus (76%) and Muslims (75%) live in Bolton; some 22% are resident in Britain and the remaining 2%-3% live overseas (Table 3.4). The pattern of residence of close friends shows that most are resident in Bolton. Excluding those close friends who live outside the Bolton Metropolitan boundary, the pattern of residence of those close friends who live in Bolton matches reasonably well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Bolton Metropolitan Borough (only)</th>
<th>UK Residents (excluding Bolton Metropolitan Borough)</th>
<th>Overseas</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindu (145)</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>22.29%</td>
<td>2.21%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>647</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim (90)</td>
<td>74.72%</td>
<td>22.45%</td>
<td>2.83%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>396</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:(235)</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>75.2%</td>
<td>22.35%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Nine Hindu and fourteen Muslim respondents stated that they had no close friends.
closely the pattern of residence of the respondents (Chap.1). Some 65% of close friends live in poor wards, 17% in below average wards and 5% in average and above wards; likewise the close friends of Muslims live in similar areas, 73% in poor wards, 17% in below average wards and 4% in average and above wards. Since these Gujaratis live in similar socio-economic areas as their close friends, their social experiences complement those of the respondents. This serves only to strengthen their view of their generally disadvantageous position.

Twenty-two per cent of close friends of Muslims and Hindus live in other towns and cities within Britain. This points to the existence of considerable contact between Gujaratis here and those living elsewhere in Britain. A detailed analysis of the place of residence of close friends of Muslims shows that over half of them live within fifty miles of Bolton, whereas over 70% of close friends of Hindus live over fifty miles away. The majority of close friends of Muslims are reachable and contact is maintained through visiting and attendance at various social functions, such as weddings, prayers and funerals. For the Hindus such contact is less easy to maintain, since most of their close friends live further away. Though there are large Hindu and Muslim communities in London, most of the Muslim communities are evenly spread across England with large communities in the north of England and Scotland, such as Dewsbury, Manchester, Preston, Colne, Blackburn, Nelson and Glasgow, Newcastle and Dundee. An analysis of locations of Hindu close friends living outside Bolton but within Britain provided an even wider spread of towns and cities than that of close friends of Muslims.

Although relatively recent settlers might be expected to maintain relationships with kin living overseas, only a minority of respondents
mentioned having close friends who lived overseas. Virtually as many close friends of Hindus (2.2%) as Muslims (2.8%) live overseas. Of these the majority live in India with smaller numbers living in Canada and the USA. Many Gujaratis migrated to Canada and the USA during the period of research, and a number spoke of their intention to visit kin in, or to migrate to, one of these countries. Where close friends live overseas they are separated from close friends here. Irrespective of the ethnic community to which they belong, their presence has no detectable effect on a person’s close friends here. In other words, such close friends are the exceptions which prove the rule that like attracts like. There is a close association between the place of residence of close friends and their frequency of contact. This association lies at the heart of social network analysis.

(c) Frequency of Contact

Frequency of contact is a characteristic of close friendship relationships which is in part linked to geographical proximity and in part to personal commitment. Undoubtedly, frequent meetings help friends exchange ideas, information and support. The number of times close friends meet will be analysed separately from the places where they meet. The term "multilocality" will be used when referring to the latter.

A majority (80%) of Muslims meet their Muslim close friends at least once a week, and 72% of them are Bolton residents (Table 3.5). Although most of the remaining close friends meet less often, only a quarter of them live outside Bolton. Muslims, belonging to the same caste community, belonging to the same sect, sharing the same approach to

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Islam, and sharing the same areas of residence, are likely to keep in close contact with their friends. They can do so through attending prayers in the same mosque, meeting at funerals as they are by their mores obliged to do, and by recognising the rulings of the same mosque committee, such as the ICC. Proximity of residence increases the opportunities for social contact. This is a typical pattern of contact for a Muslim community notwithstanding their strong ties with other similar communities elsewhere in Britain and overseas. It points to the formation of a close, if not closed, community.

Table 3.5: Frequency of Contact Between Muslims and their Close Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Contact</th>
<th>Residence of Close Friends Miles from Bolton</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At least once/week:</td>
<td>Bolton 10 25 50 100 150 200 Over-seas</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>380</td>
<td>16 22 4 3 2</td>
<td>80.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At most once/month:</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10 1 2 4 8</td>
<td>5.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>7 9 1 11 6</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once/year and less</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>often:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspond:</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>100.01%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The opportunity for Hindus to share in religious festivals and rituals as a single community is available, but caste differences and food taboos make participation in communal social activities more difficult. Despite these potential hindrances, some 73% of close friends of Hindus meet at least once a week and most of them are Bolton residents (Table 3.6). A quarter of their remaining friends live outside Bolton and meet less often. Even though the Hindus have much
less in common with each other than do the Muslims, they still meet as frequently. The Hindu pattern of contact points to communities which also keep in relatively close contact with each other. As a number of them do not recognise a single community centre, this implies that they meet at work, at home or in some other less public situation, that is in locations and situations where they are less likely to jeopardise their caste rulings. The frequency of contact between Hindus suggest that they too form a close, if not closed, community.

Table 3.6: Frequency of Contact Between Hindus and their Close Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Contact</th>
<th>Bolton 10</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>150</th>
<th>200</th>
<th>Overseas</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At least once/week:</td>
<td>603 19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>626 73.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At most once/month:</td>
<td>22 7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>69 8.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at least once in 10 mths:</td>
<td>21 7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>117 13.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once/year and less often:</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 3.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspond</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14 14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals: % 857 100%

These characteristics suggest that both Hindus and Muslims form part of two separate but close religious and social communities. The roles of the Hindu and Muslim social and religious institutions that form a central part of their lives are dissimilar and contrasting. The mosque holds a key position in the functioning of the Islamic community. Muslims go to mosque to pray, pay regular dues to it, the dead are brought to it to be prepared for the burial, which is organised by a mosque committee, views on what is or is not appropriate behaviour for Muslims are debated there, and it is in the mosque that most of the

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political decisions are taken. What is agreed by mosque committees is accepted by the people. For instance as Muslim men consider that they have an obligation to attend burials of members of their Islamic community, these are occasions when they can meet to express their community and Islamic solidarity. Attendance at prayer times allows Muslims to learn about new events, concerns, activities and gossip. Similarly, knowledge of any social behaviour by a member that is disapproved of can be rapidly disseminated through community social networks and communal disapproval can be formulated. Thus, the mosque is the place where Muslims meet and assess each others' actions and those of their families against a common set of values, which are located within Muslim and Islamic culture. Mosques provide a focal point for the Muslim community and the role of the mosque lies at its heart and at the heart of the community lies the family.

In contrast to the central role of the mosque, the role of the temple among Hindus is peripheral. With no overall religious structure to unite Hindus, most temples serve the socio-religious needs of the members of specific castes and sects. They enhance rather than diminish caste differences. Members of a temple may have frequent contact with members of their own castes and sects, but they have less contact with members of the wider Hindu community. This pattern of social contact possibly intensifies the social control that members of castes and sects exercise over members at the expense of the development of some form of wider unity. Though the aim of the founders of the VHP was to create a multi-caste facility, the strength of the commitment of Hindus to their caste identities has prevented it from becoming a focal point around which the members of this community can unite.
An analysis of the places where people meet (multilocality) is more likely to reflect the importance of the mosque and temple in the daily lives of Muslims and Hindus than does frequency of contact. My intention was to obtain an idea of the number of places where respondents meet their close friends (Table 3.7), the number of times they meet during a week in one specific place was not taken into account. For instance a Muslim may meet a friend at the mosque six times in one week, while an Hindu may only meet his friend once a week at the temple. The number of different places where respondents meet their close friends provides a broader picture of social life than does the number of times people meet in one place.

Table 3.7: Degree of Multilocality among Hindu and Muslim Close Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zones</th>
<th>Number of places where close friends meet</th>
<th>Muslim Respondents</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Hindu Respondents</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>0-0.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-1.9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32.22</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>41.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-2.9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23.33</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>39.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-3.9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-4.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5-5.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6-6.9</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To gain some measure of the range of places where Gujaratis meet their close friends, respondents were asked to state where they met their close friends. The analysis of multilocality is done by zone rather than by individuals, that is I have treated the zone as a social unit. An analysis of multilocality shows that (55%) of Muslims and (52%) of Hindus meet their close friends 2 to 3 times/place/week. The differences in patterns of contact between Muslims and Hindus and their close friends are highlighted by the pattern of contact of the remaining Muslims (45%) and Hindus (48%). Of the Hindus the majority (41%) meet
their close friends once a week in one place as compared with 11% of Muslims. Some 31% of the remaining Muslims meet their close friends four to five times in different places/week as compared with 5.5% of Hindus. These differences point to them having a much higher degree of contact with their close friends than do Hindus. The places where they meet them include the mosque, home, work, Asian cinemas and gatherings. Generally most of these places are frequented mainly, but not totally, by Muslims, particularly as many express disapproval of fellow Muslims who visit public houses and other public places of entertainment. Though opportunities for them to meet members of other ethnic groups are reduced, opportunities to meet fellow Muslims are increased. This is reflected in the high intensity of the relationships in their zones (see structural characteristics below). To meet close friends so frequently suggests that the social and religious activities of this community, its members and their families are closely enmeshed. Community social control and conformity can only be strengthened by such frequent contact.

In comparison, Hindu respondents have much less contact with their close friends. Caste differences and to a lesser extent religious differences ensure that there are few places where they can meet socially without jeopardising their caste status. This pattern of contact suggests that the social control by caste communities remains untouched, or if anything, it may be weakened, by Hindus not openly admitting to meeting members of other castes in private or public places. In a negative sense this may reflect on the strength of caste associations and some religious communities; but it suggests no overall Hindu community control.
(d) Social Standing and Freedom of Association

The high frequency of contact in a higher number of different places logically suggests that people with this pattern of contact should have a wide range of friends from different walks of life. Whereas the reverse implies a narrow range of contact thus limiting the possibilities of meeting friends from a narrow range of social backgrounds. However, what the evidence has shown so far is that neither pattern of contact has increased the close friendships between Muslims and Hindus and members of other non-Gujarati communities. Therefore, an analysis of the freedom of association should show to what extent the close friends these Gujaratis have in terms of their occupational experiences add to or replicate their experiences.

These Gujarati are encapsulated within the working class, disadvantaged by their "racial" visibility, their inability to communicate, their lack of qualifications, their low position in the class structure and their lack of formal political power (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979:120-126; Banton, 1972:72). From the point of view of improving their access to better jobs and to politically influential people, close friendship offers them a way of bridging social and occupational distances between themselves and people in occupations of high social standing within their own communities.

Social association is one of the more complex aspects of reachability. To a degree the aspects of reachability discussed above are consequences of occupation and the rewards that it brings. On the one hand, there is an implication that the higher an individual's position within the social class system, the higher are the social positions of his/her friends and therefore, the greater is his access
to information, power and wealth (cf. Lin, 1982:132-135; Blau, 1967:133-140). On the other hand, there is another implication: that Gujaratis who are located at the bottom of the social class structure have as close friends people who are in the same position as themselves. These close friends could be Gujaratis, members of other Asian and black minorities, white people or members from any one of these communities who hold higher social class positions.

Furthermore, the social class position of these Gujaratis could have changed in a number of ways since they arrived in the early 1950s. The first occupations available to them were those of low status, little skill and low pay (cf. Palmer, 1977:249-251; Watson, 1977:191-197; Constantinides, 1977:279-282). Much of immigrant folklore is built around the notion of starting low and being able and free to rise to the top of the adopted society (Dorson, 1959:135-165). Thus occupations held by Gujaratis by the 1970s, some ten to fifteen years after coming here, provide a useful indication of their social standing in British society (Goldthorpe, 1981/82; 1980). An analysis of occupations of Gujaratis with those of their close friends provides a pattern of social association which shows the extent to which their close friendships cross community and social class boundaries.

As first generation migrants, these Gujaratis irrespective of age have achieved limited access to jobs of higher social standing. By relating age to social standing, it becomes clear that they are no different from other Asian and black workers: the majority hold jobs of low social standing with all attendant characteristics of low pay, insecurity, low prestige (Tables 3.8 and 3.9). A few Hindus (3.9%) as compared with one Muslim hold jobs in Social Class I. On the basis of
Table 3.8: Analysis of Age and Class Position of Muslims [5]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Respondents</th>
<th>16-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>25-29</th>
<th>30-34</th>
<th>35-39</th>
<th>40-44</th>
<th>45-49</th>
<th>50-54</th>
<th>55-64</th>
<th>N.A.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIIa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>66.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%:</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>9.62%</td>
<td>14.42%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11.54%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>8.65%</td>
<td>2.88%</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.9: Analysis of Age and Class Position of Hindus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Respondents</th>
<th>16-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>25-29</th>
<th>30-34</th>
<th>35-39</th>
<th>40-44</th>
<th>45-49</th>
<th>50-54</th>
<th>55-74</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVc</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIIa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%:</td>
<td>15.58%</td>
<td>22.08%</td>
<td>16.88%</td>
<td>10.39%</td>
<td>11.04%</td>
<td>12.34%</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

their present occupations the majority (71%) of Muslims and Hindus hold jobs which place them in Class VIIa and other. The jobs they hold are as manual wage workers employed mainly in the textile industry in semi- and
unskilled grades (cf. Goldthorpe, 1980:41). There is little difference in the social standing of the jobs the majority of them hold.

The evidence points to Gujaratis befriending people whose social standing is similar to their own, and the majority of these close friends are Gujaratis. The corollary of this is that Gujaratis reserve for friendships of lesser intensity for those who belong to other communities and other social classes. The data (Tables 3.10 a,b,c) on the social standing of the Muslims and all of their close friends shows that the majority of them (69.9%) and their close friends (60%) hold jobs of similar social standing in Classes VI, VII and Other. They have few close friends (15.5%) who are employed in jobs of higher social standing than themselves (Table 3.10b), but a third (39%) of their close friends have jobs of lower social standing. A few Muslims in Class VII have close friends in higher social classes, which suggests that close friendships have provided them with little access to people in higher social positions. As such it confirms the argument that close friendships make demands upon individuals that are difficult to sustain across classes (Paine, 1969). However, Muslims claimed that Islam is an

Table 3.10a: Social Standing of Muslims and their Close Friends*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Respondents:</th>
<th>Gujarati Close Friends</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class: No. %</td>
<td>I II III IV V VI VII Others Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 2 2.22</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II 1 1.11</td>
<td>2 10 8 5 9 12 46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III 8 8.89</td>
<td>1 10 14 45 9 79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV 14 15.56</td>
<td>1 1 6 14 49 12 83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V 2 2.22</td>
<td>4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI 1 1.11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII 57 63.33</td>
<td>7 4 10 27 207 36 291 60%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others 5 5.56</td>
<td>3 3 16 22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals: 90 100%</td>
<td>18 16 34 60 3 330 69 530</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* I have combined Classes IVa and IVc into one Class IV, following Goldthorpe, 1980.
Table 3.10b: Summary Analysis of Social Standing of Muslims and their Close Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Standing</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Above</th>
<th>Equal*</th>
<th>Below</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friends:</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15.47%</td>
<td>45.47%</td>
<td>39.06%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Equal class positions of Muslims and close friends are identified as lying along the diagonal across Table 3.10a, those in higher positions lie to the right and those in lower positions to the left.

Table 3.10c: Class Position of Muslims having no Close Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

egalitarian religion, which lays stress on social equality. Though there is some evidence which points to a belief that Islam can overcome class differences between fellow Muslims, class divisions in contemporary Islam are becoming, if anything, stronger rather than weaker (Gilsenan, 1979:265).

Like the Muslims, the majority of Hindus (82.6%) and their close friends (76.4%) hold jobs in Social Classes VI, VII and Others (Table 3.11a). An analysis of the social standing of their close friends shows that most of them belong to classes equivalent to (41.9%) or lower than (30.1%) those of the respondents (Table 3.11b). Amongst Hindus the social standing of their close friends appears to be evenly spread between those of higher, equal and lower standing. An explanation for this might be that in the sample there are more Hindus than Muslims who hold jobs of either high or low social standing. The pattern of occupations of respondents in Class VI offers some evidence that more Hindus than Muslims are learning new skills, such as moulding, fitting and turning. However, after obtaining the appropriate experience, they often opt to become self-employed. The potential success that owning a
business promises includes in part the possibility of being free of white and Asian employers and promises the possibility of the accumulation of wealth through personal effort. A common sense notion, which is difficult to disprove, suggests that for Gujaratis to befriend non-Gujaratis and particularly members of the white community is likely to bring rewards. However, analysis of heterogeneous zones indicated that such a notion needs to be approached with caution.

Table 3.11a: Social Standing of Hindus and their Close Friends*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Respondents</th>
<th>Gujarati Close Friends of:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>55.17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16.55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* I have combined Classes IVa, IVb and IVc into one Class IV, following Goldthorpe, 1980.

Table 3.11b: Summary Analysis of Social Standing of Hindus and their Close Friends*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Standing</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Above</th>
<th>Equal</th>
<th>Below</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friends:</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>28.24%</td>
<td>39.57%</td>
<td>32.19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See note below Table 3.10b.

Table 3.11c: Class Positions of Hindus having no Close Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An occupation favoured by Gujaratis is that of becoming self-employed running their own businesses. Both Hindus and Muslims aspire to
owning their own businesses, believing that it can bring them wealth and independence without the disadvantages of working with or being employed by people belonging to their own or other communities. It is difficult to estimate the number of Gujarati businesses in the communities. The most prominent self-employed people are shopkeepers, and my impression is that there are more Hindu than Muslim shopkeepers. This would be in keeping with the Hindu, and particularly Swaminarayan, work ethic that gave rise to the Swaminarayan sects in the previous century in Gujarat (cf. Williams, 1984). There are also a number of Gujaratis who own shops in Manchester, and some of these could be described as being wealthy. Not all businessmen are shopkeepers: it is more difficult to identify these people, because they are not so visible. In general the success of Asian businesses is itself mercurial and interesting, but it is not relevant to this thesis.

Social networks give those to whom they are anchored access through their close friends to information, power and influence that may be seen either to place constraints on them by channelling and controlling it, or increasing their opportunities to experience by exposing them to new influences. The presence of close friends from other communities in their networks implies that these Gujarati anchor points have access to resources and information that is not available to those anchoring homogeneous network zones. The presence of close friends from other communities suggests that some degree of social mobility through social association is occurring, and one indication of the extent to which it occurs can be gauged by an analysis of the social standing of close friends who belong to other communities.

There are at least three possible patterns of accessibility that can
be related to close friendship: firstly, there is investment in close friendships with Gujaratis irrespective of social standing, although most hold jobs of similar social standing. The majority of the Hindus and Muslims sampled did just this (see above). Secondly, there is the possibility is for Gujaratis to invest in close friendships with members of other minority communities, whose social, economic and political status is similar to their own. Thirdly, there is the possibility for Gujaratis to invest in close friendships with members of the white community, who might be perceived to have access to the resources to which they do not have access, or to belong to a higher social class and therefore have influence which those lower down do not have.

I shall first analyse the social standing of Gujaratis who have close friends who belong to other communities. Then I shall analyse the social standing of their Gujarati close friends, then their close friends from other minority communities and finally their white close friends.

The social standing of the sub-sample of Muslims (Table 3.12) who have close friends belonging to other communities shows that most of them are of slightly higher social standing than the total sample of Muslims (Table 3.10a above). Most of them hold jobs in Social Classes III to V (57.1%). A possible explanation for this difference in social standing might be that those holding such jobs are ambitious, are educated or have been more fortunate, and therefore are likely to be looking for friends who will give them access to social advantages. As Gujaratis comprise the majority of the close friends in these zones, the numbers of close friends who are not Gujaratis is small. All the Hindu close friends (28) of Muslims are to be found in heterogeneous zones, and an analysis of their social standing shows that the jobs they hold
Table 3.12: Social Standing of Muslims Anchoring Heterogeneous Zones*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classes</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>57.14</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excluding respondents who claimed to have no close friends.

are of lower social standing than those of the Muslim anchor points (Table 3.13). The social standing of the Muslim and Hindu close friends is generally lower (63.9%) than that of the Muslims' who anchor the zones. The social standing of the majority of close friends from the other minority communities (60.8%) is also lower than that of the Muslims anchoring the zones (Table 3.14). An analysis of the social standing of the few white close friends (Table 3.15) of these Muslims shows that most are of lower social standing than the Muslims (44.8%).

Table 3.13: Social Standing of Gujarati Close Friends of Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Close Friends</th>
<th>Above</th>
<th>Equal</th>
<th>Below</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>13.52</td>
<td>22.52</td>
<td>63.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* = includes 28 Hindu close friends

Table 3.14: Social Standing of Minority Community Close Friends of Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Close Friends</th>
<th>Above</th>
<th>Equal</th>
<th>Below</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17.39</td>
<td>21.74</td>
<td>60.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.15: Social Standing of White Close Friends of Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Close Friends</th>
<th>Above</th>
<th>Equal</th>
<th>Below</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>27.59%</td>
<td>27.59%</td>
<td>44.83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the pattern of social association of the majority of close
friends in heterogeneous zones shows that Muslim respondents establish close friendships with people of lower social standing than themselves rather than with those with higher social standing. Arguably this may enable them to protect their social values rather than to expose them to new and less easily resistible influences. However, the disadvantage of this pattern is that they do not gain access to sought after resources. The existence of close friendships between these Muslims and close friends from other communities and the white community in particular might be interpreted as suggesting that the impressions of Muslims' commitment to their social values or more narrowly to their Islamic values protects them from a process of anglicisation. It may also suggest that amongst them there exists a fear, real or unreal, that continuous exposure to non-Islamic social values might dilute their commitment to Islam. Then this pattern of close friendship would protect them and their commitment to Islam.

If close friendships with members of other communities are taken as an indication of their potential access to public resources, then it remains limited. Friendships of lesser intensity are used for such purposes. If anything, this pattern of close friendship suggests dissociation rather than association with any community that does not share an Islamic identity, irrespective of whether or not they share similar immigration, racial, social, economic or political experiences. This pattern of dissociation echoes the explanation given for the collapse of CARD (Heineman, 1972). However, it points to a potential benefit, namely the political power that is generated by a shared social identity, which emerged on the occasion when the Muslims demonstrated against the publication of The Satanic Verses. The trend amongst Muslims to establish close friendships with Muslims of similar
social standing leads to the development of a strong network of high intensity relationships based upon shared social characteristics which underpins the Muslim community. Thus the Muslims form a strong and cohesive community.

The majority of Hindus (78%) who have close friends from other communities hold jobs of low social standing in Social Classes VII or below (Table 3.16). More of these Hindus hold jobs of lower social standing than do those anchoring homogeneous zones. Although low social standing should not be taken as an indication of marginalisation, Hindus who have close friends from other communities are placing themselves at risk of having to reconcile commitments to their caste values with those to close friendship. Theoretically this need not pose any difficulty, in practice community pressure may persuade these Hindus to believe that they are marginal men.

Table 3.16: Social Standing of Hindus Anchoring Heterogeneous Zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classes</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV*</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>78.05</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* I have combined Classes IVa, IVb and IVc.

The pattern of association of Hindus anchoring heterogeneous zones is similar to that of Hindus generally, but it differs from that of the Muslims in one respect: the social standing of the majority of the Hindu and their close friends suggests greater perceived social equality (Table 3.17). Thus, the flow of information is mainly between close friends of similar social standing. There are other similarities in Hindu and Muslim patterns of close friendship: the Hindus have established few close friendships with members of the other minority and
the white communities. The majority of their Gujarati close friends are Hindu, but they include twelve Muslim close friends. Most (48%) of these close friends hold jobs of similar social standing to the respondents. This pattern of association is typical of the close friendships of these Hindus.

Table 3.17: Social Standing of Gujarati Close Friends of Hindus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Close Friends</th>
<th>Above</th>
<th>Equal</th>
<th>Below</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>24.12</td>
<td>48.24</td>
<td>27.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again close friendships with people from minority communities reveals a pattern of Hindus befriending people of similar social standing to themselves (Table 3.18). Furthermore, the low numbers of close friends from these communities suggests that the establishment of such friendships is not considered to provide access to scarce resources. Nevertheless these data hint at the possibility of Hindus establishing strong ties with people of similar social standing from other communities, and that such social association might offer some form of upward social mobility. A significant feature of Hindus' pattern of association as compared with that of Muslims is the divide that exists between those who belong to higher social classes and those who belong to lower social classes. Hindus whose jobs are of high social standing placing them in social classes I, II and III have as close friends people who belong in similarly high social classes. For instance Mr Sandhu, Social Class I, has close friends whose social class positions are similarly high. Two of his Hindu and Sikh close friends are in class I, two other Sikh close friends are in class II and the remaining four Sikh close friends are in class IV. There is some evidence that points to a social class divide within the Hindu communities.
The same pattern of social association that characterises Hindus' close friendships with other Gujaratis and members of other minority communities holds for their close friendships with white people. The majority of Hindus are of similar social standing to their white close friends (Table 3.19). This characteristic of social association distinguishes the Hindus' pattern of close friendship from that of the Muslims. While it appears to give Hindus opportunities to gain access to public resources, it may also lead to their stigmatisation and marginalisation within their own communities (Barth, 1970:30-32, 51ff). Although the theory of social exchange casts some doubt on the possibility of social exchanges between social equals, it is addressed to considering social exchanges between unequals. However, the probability of gaining through exchanges with social equals is greater than through social exchanges with people of unequal social standing. Exchanges with social equals can lead to greater losses than can exchanges with those who are unequals, since the temptation to gain may call for greater sacrifices than can be afforded. Thus the temptation to break caste rules can lead to outcasteing, but it is a sacrifice Hindus might consider worth making. This pattern of social association rather than binding Hindus into a close community divides them into fragments.

Table 3.19: Social Standing of White Close Friends of Hindus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Position</th>
<th>Close Friends</th>
<th>Above</th>
<th>Equal</th>
<th>Below</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>32.35%</td>
<td>36.76%</td>
<td>30.88%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Both Muslims and Hindus claimed to have more white close friends than close friends from other minority communities. This suggests the existence of an order of preference: fundamentally Muslims and Hindus preference is to establish strong ties with members of their own communities, then with members of the white community, and only then with members of other minority communities - a preference which is supported by the analysis of Gujaratis' perceptions of social distances. What also emerged is a strong disinclination on the part of Muslims and Hindus to welcome friendships with Gujaratis who do not share their beliefs. Not only are most of the primary zones of their social networks homogeneous in the sense that they prefer to establish close friendships with Gujaratis, but they are also restricted to those who share the same religious beliefs as they do.

Although the high social standing of some Gujarati Hindu respondents and their close friends in Classes I, II and III may be interpreted as pointing to the breaking down of a social class buffer or to the reducing constraints of a process of social closure, there are some grounds for being more cautious before offering such an explanation. Firstly, these data are applicable to only those respondents who have predominantly Gujaratis as close friends and secondly, it may point to the existence of buffers within and between the Muslim and Hindu communities. In particular social association may have a 'dissociative' effect (Goldthorpe, 1980:176) where Hindus and Muslims have established close friendships with people who belong to other communities. Low numbers of Gujaratis and their close friends in positions of high social standing lends some credence to the argument that a buffer separates Asian and black people from white people in Britain (Goldthorpe, 1980: 46ff; Katznelson, 1973).
These patterns of contact between Muslims and Hindus and their close friends conform to an ideal model of zone characteristics associated with one form of accessibility, namely investment in social relationships of high intensity within their own communities. The data show that leaders, who act as entrepreneurs or brokers, rely on relationships with members of other racial, ethnic and political groups, which are usually of lower intensity than close friendship. This would add support to the argument that those with power and/or wealth are unlikely to commit themselves to a relationship such as close friendship with people who do not share similar social status (cf. Lin, 1982:132-135; Blau, 1967:133-140). Members of the white community with power are unlikely to establish close friendships with Gujaratis. However, an analysis of their pattern of social association demonstrated that where they established close friendships with Gujaratis, these were between social equals. However, where close friends came from other communities, Muslim respondents established close friendships with those of lower social standing than themselves, whereas Hindus had as close friends those of similar social standing.

The argument is that where like attracts like the pattern of social relationships that develops out of such interaction will form the basis of a strong and cohesive community structure. Gujaratis prefer to establish close friendships with those with whom they share most in common, that is those who belong to the same community, accept similar religious beliefs, live close to them and hold jobs of similar social standing. These social characteristics point to an exclusiveness of these two communities at one level and at another to the closeness of the Muslim community compared to a closed but more fragmentary structure.
in the Hindu community. The analysis of structural characteristics of the primary zones will provide the step that links social characteristics of social networks to the social structures of these two religious communities.

Structural Characteristics of Zones

Two ideal types of social networks have been identified in the literature, namely those which are characterised by social closeness and are described as tightly-knit (Bott, 1971; Mayer, 1962) or completely interlocking (Laumann, 1973:113) and those which are loosely-knit (Bott, 1971; Mayer, 1962) or radial (Laumann, 1973:113). Some of the social consequences of these different network structures have been explored to show how those on whom the networks are anchored are receptive to or have blocked out new ideas (Leinhardt, 1977; McKinlay, 1973:275-292; Hart, 1970/71:84-87). The aim is to investigate the notions of tightly-knit and loosely-knit by analysing the density, intensity and connectedness of the structures of the primary zones of networks and secondly to draw from this discussion conclusions about the pattern of social relationships with underlie these two communities.

On the basis of the principle of homophily close friends in a zone who share the social characteristics are more likely to be acquainted with one another than are close friends who do not share them. Those Gujaratis who have close friends who are easily reachable share similar social activities and social values. Whereas those who are less easily reachable and usually belong to other communities are more likely to be isolated from those close friends who belong to either the Muslim or Hindu communities. The characteristics of a zone can reflect this
sharing of activities and values by social relationships that link the anchor to his close friends through a dense network of intense and closely connected relationships. Alternatively, the characteristics of a zone can show a lack of sharing of common activities and values amongst close friends by having a low density, comprising low intensity relationships and a low degree of connectedness. The extent to which close friends, whose social characteristics are same or different from those of the anchor point, form a unified group will give further indication of the strength or weakness of network zones. To analyse the structural characteristics of these primary zones of networks, I shall begin by analysing whether all close friends in a zone are acquainted, that is density/completeness; then I shall consider the intensity of the friendships between close friends, that is the intensity of the relationships, and finally I shall look at the internal mesh of these zones, that is the degree of connectedness.

(a) Density/Completeness

One way to test this hypothesis is by calculating the density of primary zones of Hindus and Muslims [6]. It is implied that a dense network produces a high degree of conformity (Bott, 1971: 208-210; Mayer, 1962: Chaps. 5 and 6). When the majority of close friends within a zone are homogeneous, that is are easily reachable and also are perceived to be acquainted with one another, this implies that the zone is complete and is bounded. It has a high density and promotes an all-Muslim or all-Hindu social environment that encapsulates the anchor points (cf. Mayer, 1962: Chaps. 5 and 6). In a zone where all or some close friends are not perceived to be acquainted with one another, the density will be low. Calculating the completeness of Hindu and Muslim zones on the basis of
the anchor point’s awareness of at least some degree of acquaintanceship of his close friends with each other, Muslims (72.6%) anchor a greater number of zones that are 100 per cent complete (Table 3.20) than do Hindus (54.2%) (Table 3.21).

Table 3.20: Density: Completeness of Muslim Anchored Zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Density: Degrees of Completeness</th>
<th>0- 10- 20- 30- 40- 50- 60- 70- 80- 90- 99.9 100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nos. of Close Friends</td>
<td>1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incomplete | Complete

* Zones comprising no, one close friend have been excluded, because they have no density.
+ The density of those with two friends is too low to provide a useful measure. Twenty respondents had such network zones.

Table 3.21: Density: Completeness of Hindu Anchored Zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Density: Degrees of Completeness</th>
<th>0- 10- 20- 30- 40- 50- 60- 70- 80- 90- 99.9 100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nos. of Close Friends</td>
<td>1+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>45.77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incomplete | Complete

* Zones comprising one close friend or no close friend have been excluded. Twelve Hindus had such networks.
+ All of these zones have a density of zero, that is they are primary stars.
++ One of these zones had a density of 6.67% and the other had a zero density.
The argument that less dense or loose-knit networks as opposed to highly dense or close-knit networks provide greater social advantages to those anchoring them has gained credence in the sociological literature (cf. Lin, 1982:134; Rushing, 1978; McKinlay, 1973; Bott, 1971:60). The notion of loose-knit networks is associated with the idea of greater dependence (emotional support) of a couple upon one another and therefore, by implication, their greater dependence upon their friends in the network (Bott, 1971:60). This led to an argument based on the characteristics of close-knit social networks, which associates density with a greater dependence upon others, particularly kin, less inclination to seek solutions to problems, an awareness of the benefits of conformity, a lack of access to new ideas and to resources. This argument implies that for a person to be enmeshed in such a zone can be socially disadvantageous. In comparison the characteristics of a low density zone include a greater dependence upon individuals to find solutions to their problems, and a greater dependence upon non-kin, whose main obligation to help might come from their own realisation of the help that they may in turn require from others. Thus the pressure on such an anchor person to conform is reduced, and social relationships become a resource for tapping new ideas and gaining access to new resources. This has led to an argument that to be enmeshed in a low density zone is socially advantageous. However, in certain social situations where enmeshment in high density zones is more advantageous than enmeshment in low density zones, the argument is that those in weak positions surround themselves with strong ties of support. The analysis of the densities of Hindu and Muslim zones suggests that the zones of the former are less dense than those of the latter, which points to a more loosely-knit community of Hindus and a more tightly-knit community of Muslims.
Predictably the interrelationship between homogeneity/heterogeneity and density of the primary zones shows that most complete zones (100% density) are homogeneous (Tables 3.22 and 3.23). The corollary of this is that more heterogeneous than homogeneous zones are incomplete. Where all close friends share social, religious and ethnic characteristics in common, they are also likely to be acquainted with each other. Where one or more close friends share less in common such as belonging to another ethnic or religious group, then they are more likely to be unacquainted with those who share more in common. A comparison of Muslim and Hindu respondents shows that the majority (85.7%) of former anchor zones in which their close friends are Muslims, and are likely to be

Table 3.22: Association between Zone Density and Heterogeneity in Muslim Anchored Zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of close friends</th>
<th>Density</th>
<th>Complete</th>
<th>Incomplete</th>
<th>Zones with less than five persons</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneous:</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.29%</td>
<td>85.71%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneous:</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72.22%</td>
<td>27.78%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.16%</td>
<td>72.84%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.23: Association between Zone Density and Heterogeneity in Hindu Anchored Zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of close friends</th>
<th>Density</th>
<th>Complete</th>
<th>Incomplete</th>
<th>Zones with less than five persons</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneous:</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36.27%</td>
<td>63.73%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneous:</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71.43%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45.26%</td>
<td>54.74%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

close friends of each other. Although the same pattern holds for Hindu
anchored zones (63.7%), a significant minority (36.3%) anchor zones in which one or more close friends are strangers, who may or may not be Hindu. In general like attracts like.

The similarities in the tendency of Hindus (71.4%) and Muslims (72.2%) to include non-Gujarati close friends in heterogeneous zones that are incomplete is striking. By doing this, those who are not Hindu or Muslim or Gujarati are likely to be located in zones where one or more close friends are perceived to be not known to others. The higher number of Hindu (45.3%) as compared with Muslim (27.2%) incomplete zones supports the view that Hindu close friends, who may or may not belong to other castes, are treated little differently from close friends who are not Hindu. This characteristic of the structure of Hindu anchored zones may make it easier for Hindus to establish close friendships with people who belong to different castes or are not Hindu. It also may account for an observation which has gained acceptance in Bolton among white people who work with the Gujaratis, which is that the Hindus appear to be more ready than the Muslims to accept the values of the white community. Though this conclusion may be unjustified, the fact that Hindu close friends are more often less well acquainted with each other than are Muslim close friends does lend some support to it.

(b) Intensity of Relationships in Primary Zones

Density is a measure of acquaintanceship which does not allow for distinctions to be made between different forms of friendships. For this purpose I shall use the notion of intensity. Respondents were asked to distinguish between those close friends whom they perceived to be kin, close friends, ordinary friends, acquaintances and strangers [7]. The
imprecision of the category stranger carries an inherent logical problem: on the one hand, all persons who are strangers to each other could comprise a single level of intensity in a zone [8]. On the other hand, such a collection of persons could be defined as comprising a complex set of levels, that is as many levels as there are degrees of stranger, including those who are perceived to dislike each other. Levels of friendship are ranked above that of stranger. The relationships of friendship can be ranked in order of levels of intensity from ascribed through to achieved ones with a residual category of strangers. If all of the relationships linking close friends in a zone are described as being similar, then this set of similar relationships forms a level of intensity, irrespective of the form that the friendship is perceived to take. For instance, where all close friends are described as being all close friends, then this is a single intensity level zone. Where more than one form of friendship are perceived by an anchor point to link close friends together, the zone will have as many levels of intensity as there are perceived forms of friendship.

The cohesiveness of Muslims is reflected in the high percentage of 100% dense homogeneous primary zones which they anchor, and is supported by the high percentage (68.3%) of zones which consist of one level of intensity (Table 3.24). Hindus anchor a much lower percentage (39.2%) of 100% dense zones comprising one level of intensity (Table 3.25). In comparison with these, Muslims and Hindus who anchored heterogeneous zones perceive of friendships between their close friends as being of different levels of intensity. The presence of different levels of intensity of friendships suggests that people band together friends who share certain social characteristics, like religious beliefs and ethnic
identity, and separate those who do not share them. Few Muslim (23.8\%)

Table 3.24: Levels of Intensity in Muslim Anchored Zones*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Homogeneous</th>
<th>Heterogeneous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>68.25</td>
<td>23.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of 2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>17.46</td>
<td>19.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of 3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of 4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>23.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of intensity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excluded from the Table are 14 respondents who have no close friends and 6 who have only one close friend, as in the former instance there are no levels of intensity and in the latter there is one.

Table 3.25: Levels of Intensity in Hindu Anchored Zones*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Homogeneous</th>
<th>Heterogeneous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>39.22</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of 2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>22.55</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of 3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>14.71</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of 4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>15.69</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of intensity</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>7.84</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excluded from the Table are 9 respondents who have no close friends and 3 who have only one close friend for reasons given above Table 3.10.

and Hindu (27.5\%) anchored heterogeneous zones are perceived as comprising one level of intensity. The clear difference between the structure of levels of intensity in Muslim and Hindu anchored homogeneous zones as compared with the relative similarity in the structure of their heterogeneous zones endorses the explanation that the Hindu community is more fragmentary as compared with the more cohesive Muslim community. This pattern of friendship suggests that it is difficult for Muslims particularly to integrate their Muslim close friends with close friends who belong to other communities. Whereas this superficially seems to be easier for Hindus.
What this analysis does not distinguish are forms of friendship within single level intensity zones, for instance the differences between best and good close friends. It is the single level zones which provide an important indication of social cohesiveness, since neither density or intensity alone enable these zones to be distinguished from one another. There is a difference between two zones where one consists of close friends who are all close friends of each other and one in which all are only acquaintances of each other. An analysis of zones consisting of one level of intensity provides a fine measure of the extent to which these two religious communities are socially cohesive. A detailed analysis of these zones shows that over 80% of Muslim anchored homogeneous and heterogeneous zones comprise close friends whom respondents perceived to be kin or close friends of each other (Table 3.26). Only 67.5% of Hindu anchored single level zones are of this kind and they anchored no single level heterogeneous zones of this level of intensity. This serves to reinforce the argument that ideologically Muslims prefer to perceive themselves as forming a close-knit community. In comparison the Hindus perceive of social differences dividing them and their close friends.

Table 3.26: Analysis of Zones of Single Levels of Intensity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents:</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Homogeneous</td>
<td>Heterogeneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>88.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close Friends</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary Friends</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquaintances</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strangers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

194
(c) Connectedness

Ideally two models of primary zones can be identified: the first comprises close friends who belong to the same communities and live close together, are close friends of one another and form a close-knit group. The second model consists of close friends who are less well-known to each other, live in different locations in Britain (and possibly overseas), belong to different communities and form a loose-knit group. The connectedness of primary zones of the Hindus and Muslims is a further measurement for establishing the social characteristics of the structures of network zones. Connectedness of a zone is defined in terms of the ease with which one close friend in a zone can contact another given the perceived similarity or dissimilarity of the intensity of the relationship connecting them. This notion of connectedness is similar to that of reachability (Mitchell, 1971:15-17), the difference is that the primary zones of Gujarati networks link them to existing community resources and to public resources, which may or may not be reachable. In this sense connectedness or connectability is a characteristic of the structure of the zone as a whole and is not a characteristic of the individuals who comprise it. To derive a measure of connectability, I use the concept of an optimum spanning tree (Deo, 1974:39). This measure of connectedness builds on the size, density and the intensity of the relationships which link together close friends in a zone. An optimum spanning tree (OST) is the sum of the lowest number of relationships of highest intensity which link all close friends together (Appendix IV).

In Tables 3.27 and 3.28 I have set out the size of the primary zones
of networks against the total weight of the optimum spanning tree [9]. An analysis of the connectedness of Muslim and Hindu anchored zones shows that those of the former are generally more closely connected than those anchored to the latter. Slightly more Muslim than Hindu anchored zones are connected by ties of the highest level of intensity, that is kin who are regarded as close friends. Moreover, over 60% of Muslim zones are connected by OST weights that fall within the close friend/kinship range as compared with 42% of Hindu zones. Higher numbers of Hindu than Muslim zones are more loosely connected by OST links of lower social intensity, that is close friends who are perceived to be connected by ties of ordinary friendship, acquaintanceship and/or are strangers. Only one (1.3%) Muslim anchored zone comprises close friends all of whom are perceived to be not to know one another as compared with seven (4.8%) Hindu anchored zones. Five of these include some close friends who are perceived to be strangers and in two zones all close friends are perceived to be strangers, that is they are totally unconnected. Thus, overall the Muslim anchored zones of close friends are more strongly connected than are Hindu anchored ones.

Table 3.27: Extent of Connectedness in Muslim Anchored Zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Zones</th>
<th>Close Connectedness</th>
<th>Loose Connectedness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close Range of Friends in Weight of Optimum Spanning Trees</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Cl.Frds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone: 1(2-9)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2(4-18)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3(6-27)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4(8-36)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5(10-45)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>59.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Zones comprising two or less people have no spanning tree, and are excluded from these Tables (see also Table 3.28).
Table 3.28: Extent of Connectedness in Hindu Anchored Zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Close Friends in Primary Kin</th>
<th>Weight of Optimum Spanning Tree</th>
<th>Total No. of Zones</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zone:</td>
<td>1(2-9) 2(4-18) 3(6-27) 4(8-36) 5(10-45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3+</td>
<td>10 6 1 2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3+</td>
<td>10 6 1 2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 13 6 2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2 9 11 5 2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6 12 2 1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1 4 4 1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1 2 2 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>9 17 3 2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>3 59 58 20 7</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>2.0 40.1 39.5 13.6 4.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the structure of a community is taken as a "persisting pattern of social relationships" (Laumann, 1973:3-4), then on the basis of this analysis the Muslims form a more closely connected community than do the Hindus. The inclusion of close friends from other communities in Muslim anchored zones has not altered appreciably the degree of connectedness of the zones. They remain closely connected. Hindu anchored zones are more loosely connected than are the Muslim ones. The inclusion of close friends from other communities may have contributed further to the already low degree of connectedness. This structural characteristic has made it easier for Hindus to include members of other communities amongst their close friends.

In conclusion, the findings show that Muslims generally perceive of their close friends being close friends of each other, that is they are all "brothers" in an Islamic community which stretches far beyond the boundaries of Bolton. Although Muslims may belong to different caste communities, sects and adhere to social identities that associate them with specific districts and factions, the ideology of brotherhood can
override these social differences. Furthermore, this ideology allows
them at one moment to express and generate unity on a wide range of
political issues, while at another to splinter or segment into sects or
mosque based communities. However, such strong ties act as a form of
social control by enmeshing individuals within a close-knit social and
religious community. Close friendships with members of the white
community and other ethnic minority groups are minimised. The
combination of a shared set of religious beliefs, reinforced by strong
ties of close friendship and bolstered by shared disadvantages of low
social standing provides this Muslim community with a source of power in
the form of a structure of support based upon an ideology of equality,
be it real or fictitious. Thus they give the impression of forming a
strong and cohesive political group which on the one hand potentially
could present a threat to the political parties, on the other hand
offers white politicians a visibly politically wooable group of voters.

The structural characteristics of the primary zones of Hindus show
that many are incomplete, comprise zones of lower level of intensity
relationships, and are loosely connected. These characteristics ideally
create a situation in which they can continue to support their caste
values without having to weigh their commitment to caste status against
their commitment to friendship. These social characteristics enable
Hindus to separate and compartmentalise their relationships with close
friendships who belong to other castes and communities. In practice,
this is not easily done, since the Hindu community as a whole is a small
one and an individual will still depend upon his caste equals for
support. Thus Hinduism provides a central set of values and beliefs
around which its adherents can rally, but in practice in supporting
these beliefs they separate rather than unite themselves into a complex
of caste communities. Thus the Hindus do not act as if or give the impression that they form a cohesive community. Consequently they are not seen politically as wooable as the Muslim community.

This Chapter has concentrated upon communities within a community and the way in which members of some of these communities define their social space through close friendship.

So far the generally social disadvantaged socio-economic position of Gujaratis has been defined (Chap.1), the bases for the organisation of social movements have been identified (Chap.2) and the underlying structures of the Muslim and Hindu communities which provide structures of support for leaders as well as acting as networks of communication have been described and analysed (Chap.3). The next essential element in the analysis is to define the social meanings of the political situation through the notions of social distance and labelling which formed the substance of ethnic political debates about support and power (Chap.4), so the political behaviour of the Gujarati leaders can be understood (Chaps.5, 6 and 7).
FOOTNOTES

1. This is a crucial definition. I use the term bounded in the sense that the actor perceives his close friends to form a bounded/exclusive group. The intensity of close friendships marks off close friends from less intense forms of acquaintance, such as ordinary friendship, and acquaintanceship.

2. La Gaipa distinguishes between best friends, close friends, good friends, social acquaintances and casual acquaintances (1977:251). These distinctions between friends are identified as ones which are in general used by Gujaratis (see Chap.3 and Appendix I, Question Nos. 56-66).

3. I restricted the number of close friends to ten, as this not only met La Gaipa’s estimated number of best/close friends, but it also was a convenient number with which to work. Any larger number would have increased the complexity of the calculations considerably.

4. I saw no good reason for following up these responses. I had to accept their answers as they were given. In other circumstances I might have delved more deeply into their reasons for having no close friends.

5. This version of the Hope-Goldthorpe scale is based upon a collapsed version of their more elaborate 36 class categories of "Social Standing" or "General Desirability of Occupations" (Goldthorpe, 1981/1982:9).

| I | Professional, administrative and managerial, higher. |
| II | Professional, administrative and managerial, lower. |
| III | Routine non-manual. |
| IVa | Proprietors & self-employed with employees. |
| IVb | Proprietors & self-employed without employees. |
| IVc | Farmers & smallholders. |
| V | Lower & technical supervisory. |
| VI | Skilled non-manual. |
| VII | Semi-skilled & unskilled manual. |
| Other | Unemployed, apprentices, students, retired. |

6. To determine completeness I used the formula for the calculation of density for undirected networks (Kapferer, 1973:96; Niemeijer, 1973:46): where Density = 100 x Na / 1/2 N(N-1) Na stands for the actual relations between close friends in the primary zone, excluding those between the respondent and his close friends; N stands for the number of close friends.
7. The weightings given are kin = 1, close friend = 2, ordinary friend = 3, acquaintance = 4 and not known = 5. These are arbitrarily attached weightings.

8. Two Hindu respondents described the relationships between some of their close friends in terms of levels of hostility. The hostility aspect was removed from the analysis of friendship, since only two respondents mentioned that a few of their close friends were hostile towards each other. I regard these relationships as being equivalent to "not known" for the purposes of analysis. Theoretically, the model of homogeneity and heterogeneity would not sustain the inclusion of "hostile" relationships between close friends, since it would be inconsistent with the basic principle of like attracting like.

9. "In its simplest form, a spanning tree algorithm yields one spanning tree in a given connected graph" (Deo, 1974:277). It is the weight of one, and only one, tree that I have plotted against the size of the zone. As the number of people in a zone decreases, so do the possible numbers of spanning trees that link them together. Zones comprising less than three people have no spanning trees. Wherever a zone includes relationships of different intensity, the algorithm will select a tree with the highest values (Appendix IV).
CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS AND COMMON SENSE RACISM

The aim of this Chapter is to explore the political space that separates some communities within a community through perceptions of social distance and the social meaning of labels. The identification and definition of this space is achieved through an analysis of social constructions of communities based upon perceptions of social distance and common sense racism, as it is symbolised through the process of labelling. The space lies between Gujaratis and white British constructions of social and political life. Two bodies of social knowledge bridge this space: the one is that of the Gujaratis, which I shall define as "private" and the other is white British, which I shall describe as "public" and includes common sense racism. There is a continuum of social relationships that can be arranged in terms of those which are perceived by Gujaratis as being socially close and those which are perceived as socially distant. The former include ideas about the social distances between kin, close friends, and friendships of lesser intensity, and the latter include ideas about distances between Hindus and Muslims, between Hindus or Muslims and Pakistanis, white people, West Indians and Sikhs. These notions of social distances as perceived by Gujaratis underlie their ideas about what is private and public knowledge. Common sense racism is part of the body of public knowledge. This Chapter explores the relationship between social distance and areas of knowledge through the labels Gujaratis use in public places.

The analyses of Gujaratis' social networks (Chap.3) showed that generally most of their close friends are Gujaratis, who belong to their factions, districts, castes, and belong to the same religious groups as
they do. Few of their close friends are not Gujaratis; however evidence showed that they are willing to accept people from other ethnic groups and white people in friendships of lower social intensity, such as acquaintances. Underlying these patterns of social relationships are ideas about social distances which are embodied in a hierarchy of social identities. A model of the hierarchy would be based upon the most intimate and specific social identities describing the family, faction, district, caste, and then become increasingly generalised, open and public describing religious beliefs and status through labels such as Muslim, Hindu, immigrant and alien.

Earlier I defined common sense racism as a set of recipes for the explanations for racism that Gujaratis use to make explicit their lack of access to public resources. Common sense racism is a defined body of knowledge comprising social attitudes, values and prejudices, based upon past and present experiences of racism, which provide both white and Asian (and black) people with a guide to managing their social interaction in a racialised society (see Introduction Part I). This implies that for racism to exist there need to be differences in power relationships based upon perceptions of peoples who are differentiated on the basis of skin colour and associated ideas. These differences are not only made explicit through social relationships, as the analyses of social network relationships demonstrated, but they are also made explicit through social identities. The pattern of the hierarchy of social identities is an arrangement based upon notions of power, not always hidden power (cf. Willis, 1979).

Gujaratis' commitment to investment in social relationships within their communities can be explained in part by their social and cultural
perceptions of social relations and their social position in Bolton. These sets of perceptions enable Hindus and Muslims to develop responses to white common sense racism. Exchange theory suggests that those in positions of power develop and establish friendships with those in similar social positions to themselves (Lin, 1982; Blau, 1967). However, their strong commitment to caste and religious organisations predispose Hindus and Muslims, who are politically, economically and socially in a weak position, to place a high social value on these relationships and therefore to invest in relationships within these communities rather than to establish friendships with those in other communities of similar or higher social status. This commitment is logical since these are also the people with whom Gujaratis associate most frequently (Chap.3).

This Chapter is separated into two sections: in the first section I shall analyse Gujarati perceptions of social community identities relating these to notions of kinship and friendship and in the second section I shall concentrate on the social meanings of selected labels which lie at the centre of common sense racism.

Kin, Caste and Community

Most people can identify three categories of friends, namely best or close friends, ordinary friends and acquaintances (La Gaipa, 1977). What varies in urban societies is the social value that is placed upon these categories of friendship. Gujaratis have terms to identify these categories and they are kas dost (close friend), dost (ordinary friend) and aurkhan or pichan (acquaintance). With the addition of kin, Gujaratis were asked to evaluate these relationships in terms of five
social attributes, which they associated with these relationships: (1) can rely on, (2) can trust, (3) can obtain help from, (4) receive respect from, and (5) receive sympathy from.

Although kin have a quite separate role from that of friends: as Gluckman reminds us, "blood is thicker than water" (1971: xxv), there is a difference in the social configuration of kin in these Hindu and Muslim communities (Table 4.1). Hindus perceive of kin and close friends as almost sharing attributes: 80% and over consider that both can be almost equally relied upon, kin are more trustworthy than close friends, but are slightly less helpful. They expect kin to show more respect and sympathy than close friends. What is striking about their perceptions is the dramatic distinction Hindus draw between, on the one hand, kin and close friends and, on the other hand, ordinary friends and acquaintances. Less than 15% regarded ordinary friends as reliable and trustworthy, although 40% thought that they could be helpful and over 60% believed that they would offer respect and sympathy. The distinction Hindus make between these friends and acquaintances shows that such relationships carry little immediate social value. An explanation for this pattern of perceptions lies in the pattern of relationships within caste communities. If these are the people with whom a Hindu can interact as a social equal, then it stands to reason that most of his friendships will be with them. Within this community are kin, affines and people who are not related to him by blood or marriage with whom he can establish friendships (cf. Mayer, 1973a:4). Friendship for Hindus can be established with any member of this community, whether they are kin, affines or neither. A close friend is a logical extension of kinship relationships within a Hindu's caste community.
### Table 4.1

**Social Attributes Associated with Categories of Friendship**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Respondents: Muslims</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Respondents: Muslims</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rely</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Help</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respect</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sympathy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kin</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Close</strong></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ordinary</strong></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acquaintances</strong></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The figures represent the percentage distribution of social attributes associated with different categories of friendship.
A few examples will illustrate points made above. It is kin who are obliged to help arrange marriages and, if they are able, financial help. For instance, many Hindus, like Mr P, who was eventually outcaste by his caste community (Chaps. 2, 6), rely on kin in Gujarat to find them acceptable wives. Although kin arrange marriages, the extent of this reliance on them emerges through the control the parents seek to gain over their children. Parents often withhold information about their caste membership, so that when their children reach marriageable age, they can be submerged into a state of dependence on kin from which it is difficult for them to escape (Taylor, 1976). Thus kin can be used as a form of social control in a way that close friends cannot.

Hindus rely upon their kin for financial support. A case which illustrates this is that of a Hindu, whom I shall call D. Patel, who looked to kin on both sides of his family for financial support to buy the rights to the management of a public house. His own brother could not help, as he could just support his family. When D. Patel wanted to borrow money, he asked his maternal cousin, who always seemed to have money. Then he approached his uncles and paternal cousins, some of whom lived in Bolton, some in Bilston in the Midlands and some in London. Only if he could not raise sufficient money from them, he informed me, would he turn to his close friends for help. On two occasions he referred to me as a close friend and then asked me if I could lend him a couple of hundred pounds.

Hindus are more dependent upon kin than close friends, because there exist social controls that can be employed to ensure that kin will comply with the expectations and obligations of kinship. This same Patel on one occasion borrowed £500 from his maternal cousin. I was told that
in the past D.Patel’s father, who lives in Gujarat, had borrowed money
from this cousin’s father. Months later, when D.Patel negotiated the
purchase of a post office (before his purchase of a public house), he
asked this cousin for money. The cousin told D.Patel that his father
would collect the money owed him by D.Patel’s father. By doing this, the
cousin threatened the social status of D.Patel’s father, since he knew
that he unable to pay back the money. Thus the cousin put pressure on
D.Patel to return the money that he and his father owed them. Such
negotiations are everyday occurrences, when it is realised that these
Gujaratis prefer to buy their homes outright and could not expect and
preferred not to receive support from banks and building societies
(Chap.1). Such complex negotiations can only exist in a society where
kinship relationships are well defined. The only major difference is
that kin are considered to be more likely to offer help than are close
friends, because kinship carries sanctions, reciprocal and moral, that
friendship does not (cf. Fortes,1970). Friendship is utilised where
kinship is not available or to supplement it.

These examples show that Hindus may perceive of an overlap between
the social obligations and expectations of kin and close friends, but
this should not be taken as evidence that they confuse the roles of
these two categories of people. Analysis of those they define as close
friends shows that Hindus include more kin as close friends than did
Muslims (Chap.3). Furthermore, these examples demonstrate that Hindus
can have pressure placed on them through the mobilisation of kin, but
this pressure cannot be extended to close friends. No man can afford to
risk alienating his kin.

The differences in social values attached to kinship and close
friendship are illustrated by this anecdote told by a Mandhata Patel, who attended the wedding of a son of a member of his caste association held in West Bromwich. Kin of both the bride’s and bridegroom’s families received invitations to the wedding. However some Mandhata Patels, who did not receive invitations but who came from villages linked by ekadas to those of the young couple, assumed that they too were invited to the occasion. Though they were expected to give the newly wedded couple gifts, the gifts were formalised, that is they gave token gifts of one pound, and their names were written down in a book containing the names of all the guests. The perceived overlap between kin and close friend relationships is so close among Hindus, that one would not expect to find many of them having close friends of whom their kin disapproved. Hindus perceive of a social closeness between kin and close friend, which points to members of caste communities being seen as being social close, that is close enough for social relationships between members to act as a form of social control. However, there are no similar social controls between people who are not kin or close friends, that is they are not necessarily perceived of as social equals. The expectations and obligations associated with ordinary friends and acquaintances is low and is reflected in the high degree of social distance which separates them from kin and close friends.

The Muslims’ perceptions of kinship and friendship are based upon a different perspective. Their relationships are not bound by caste communities and notions of social inequality. Since Muslims are members of factions and caste communities which are not organised around ascribed status and accept a religion which claims that all members are "brothers", their perceived patterns of kinship and friendship are likely to differ from those of the Hindus. The majority of Muslims
distinguish clearly between kin and close friends. The former are perceived to be more reliable, trustworthy, helpful, respectful and sympathetic than the latter. For instance a family will expect kin to help them find spouses for their children. With the preference among Muslims being for first cousin marriage, this means that kin have to negotiate with kin when arranging a marriage: therefore kin are expected to be allies. This gives added meaning to an often quoted adage: "Those whom we marry are those with whom we fight". However, Muslims' dependence on kin enables them to separate kin from close friends. This also separates Muslims from Hindus, since the latter do not marry kin or distinguish as clearly between kin and close friendship. Close friends of Muslims may, and usually do belong to the same factions, caste communities and sects, but they are not regarded as potential affines. Close friends are expected to provide social and political support, occasionally to help with financial transactions, to relay information and to give advice. Probably their most important social role is to act as go-betweens in family feuds.

Although the expectations and obligations associated with ordinary friends and acquaintances are seen by Muslims as being distinct from kinship and close friendship, they placed a higher value on these forms of friendships than did the Hindus. An explanation for this might be that as all Muslims are "brothers", they are obliged to help fellow Muslims. Both this philosophy and their social perceptions are in accord; this has enabled Muslims to develop a community that is to a degree united by belief and perception. This makes for a close, if not closed, community.

Two examples illustrate this overlap. On one occasion I attended the
wedding of the son of a teacher in Blackburn. Although the host referred to his guests as close friends, many were present as members of the ekada of the father of the bridegroom. The term 'close friend' was used here as a polite but blanket term to describe the relationship between the host, his kin, his potential affines and his friends. As used here it is synonymous with one meaning of the word for cousin (cf. Peters, 1976). The wedding guests included some totally unrelated friends, some of whom were Muslims from other parts of Gujarat and Pakistan, and a few white friends. The distinction between kin, close friends and other friends was clear; the former were invited to stay for the total duration of the wedding - three days -, the latter were invited for a meal on one day.

The second example relates to a funeral of a Muslim girl who had committed suicide. She was buried in Heaton Cemetery and only the men attended the burial. Some of them did not know the girl or her family personally, although they may have known of her father and brother. All some knew was how she had died. It was explained to me that Muslim men have a duty to attend funerals of members of the Muslim community. A funeral, irrespective of how the deceased died, becomes a public expression of unity. Taken in this way, all Muslims are acquaintances - brothers.

The social perceptions of Hindus and Muslims provide a guide to a cognitive social map of relationships and their associated expectations and obligations that form the basis for the establishment of friendships which extend beyond kin relations. These perceptions influence the number of friends that Hindus and Muslims claim to have (cf. La Gaipa, 1977:251) and allow individuals to share in common knowledge embedded
in a Gujarati cognitive map. The perceptions that link them to their communities are expressed in terms of the number of close and ordinary friends they claim they have. Precisely because the social values attributed to ordinary friends and acquaintances set them apart from close friends, Muslim and Hindus' estimates of the numbers of their close and ordinary friends give an indication of how they perceive of themselves fitting into their own communities (see below).

So far this analysis has implied that from an egocentred point of view the relationships which link an individual to his community radiate outwards from kin through the various forms of friendship to relations with strangers. Unlike Barnes (1971:55-57), rather than looking at the individual from the community inwards, I shall look at the community from the individual perspective. The importance of this for the analysis of social networks is that the model I am developing implies that individuals are surrounded by relationships of different levels of social intensity, that is in terms of relations with individuals in order of decreasing social expectations and obligations [1].

The number of kin surrounding an individual anchoring a network vary, but they are not of immediate concern. The reason is that these relationships are ascribed, and are not based upon the freedom of association. Of greater concern are the estimates of Hindus and Muslims of the numbers of close and ordinary friends they claimed to have (Table 4.2). These estimates show that 78% estimated that they have between one and twenty close friends, and slightly more Hindus (17.5%) than Muslims (11.5%) estimated that they had more than twenty close friends. Their estimates of the numbers of ordinary friends show that 37.7% of Hindus perceive that they have about the same number of close as ordinary
friends. Hindu replies suggest that perceptions of numbers of friends varies across the sample. However, the Muslim estimates show more clearly that most of them (54.8%) perceive that they had hundreds of ordinary friends. This would be expected given their perceptions of the differences between close and ordinary friends and their view of the Islamic community. Having said this, almost a third (27.9%) claimed to have about the same numbers of close as ordinary friends. In general the zone of close friendship comprises fewer friends than the zone of ordinary friends. In all likelihood the number of acquaintances that both Muslims and Hindus would claim to have would be even greater than their estimates for ordinary friends.

Table 4.2: Estimated Numbers of Close and Ordinary Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of friends</th>
<th>Hindu Respondents</th>
<th>Muslim Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Close Friends</td>
<td>Ordinary Friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 10</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>70.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 90</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100s</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be argued that as part of the urban experience, kinship relationships are giving way to more effective relationships of friendship. Since zones vary in size (La Gaipa, 1977:251), the
individual’s estimation of the sizes of the zones provides an indication of his perceived links with his community. On the basis of these perceived differences between various categories of friendship, it is possible to construct a model of a social network as a set of inter-related zones, that can be distinguished on the basis of differing expectations and obligations. An individual can be visualised as being at the centre of a social network surrounded by a first kin, then close friends, ordinary friends, acquaintances and finally by various categories of people of lesser acquaintance and strangers. In theory a zone incorporates more people as the social obligations and expectations connecting them directly with ego become weaker. The primary zone contains the most effective relationships with individuals upon whom ego can rely, trust, seek help from, obtain sympathy from and be given respect, which directly influence an individual’s freedom of association (Chap.3). The key to this model of zones within social networks lies in perceptions of social distances between kin and various categories of friends.

Social Distances and Social Boundaries

Observation and evidence suggests that generally people have fewer close friends than ordinary friends and fewer ordinary friends than acquaintances. An analysis of who Gujaratis befriend and the perceived intensity of the friendship should show where they perceive to be the social boundaries of their communities. The model of a social network should not only indicate differences in the intensity of the friendship, but also it should show with whom differing forms of friendship are considered to be appropriate. To reiterate a point made earlier, if Gujaratis are in a socially disadvantaged position, then
theory suggests that they should develop ties with those whom they perceive to be socially closest. Gujaratis share the same class niche as members of other disadvantaged minorities. In the circumstances, there are two possible arguments: (1) that the Gujaratis will perceive members of these minorities as being socially close, and therefore will develop friendships that cement ties that allow them to share common urban experiences; (2) that the Gujaratis will perceive of white people as being the most "desirable" of partners and allies, since their members have both the political power and are numerically the largest community. These two options underpin much of exchange theory (Blau, 1967) and social network theory (cf. Lin, 1982; Granovetter, 1973). Inherent in Gujaratis' cognitive map of their social relationships are notions of social distance and power relationships and imbalances.

To ascertain these aspects of their cognitive map, Gujaratis were asked whom they were prepared to accept as kin, close friends, ordinary friends and acquaintances. They also were asked to consider the possibilities of befriending people from particular minorities, namely Gujarati Hindus or Muslims, Pakistanis, West Indians (Afro-Caribbeans), Sikhs and white people (Table 4.3). With one or two exceptions, 97 per cent of Hindus and Muslims said that they would accept in marriage, as kin, a person who shared their cultural and religious background. The social constraints placed by Muslims on their members to marry Muslims have been taken to extremes with the express preference for first cousin marriage. However, during 1976 two cases of Muslims marrying non-believers in Islam were reported in the Press; in one case a Muslim married a Sikh in Huddersfield, Yorkshire, and in another case in Nelson, Lancashire, a Muslim girl brought home her European boyfriend. In the former instance, the Muslim community forced the couple to
separate by threatening to kill the Sikh; and in the latter case, the
girl’s father shot and wounded the boy. When I asked a past president of
the ICC and president of Tayaibah Mosque Committee, what would be the
community’s reaction if one of their members married a non-believer, he
replied, "We would force them to separate, and kill them if necessary".

Table 4.3: Perceptions of Social Distances

Hindu Respondents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accept as a:</th>
<th>Gujarati</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Paki-</th>
<th>Sikhs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kinsman:</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close friend:</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99.35%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary friend:</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99.35%</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquaintance:</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99.35%</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.65%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Muslim Respondents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accept as a:</th>
<th>Gujarati</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Paki-</th>
<th>Sikhs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kinsman:</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>97.1%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close friend:</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>98.1%</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary friend:</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84.6%</td>
<td>98.1%</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
<td>86.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquaintance:</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>94.2%</td>
<td>98.1%</td>
<td>93.4%</td>
<td>80.7%</td>
<td>93.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know:</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Two further instances illustrate the divide between Hindus and Muslims: firstly, a 16 year old Hindu girl was married to a husband of 45 years. He battered her and at first her parents refused to accept that the husband they had chosen was to blame. Eventually after being injured by him she took him to court, where he was found guilty of assault. She obtained a divorce, married a Muslim, and now lives in Blackburn. Her transition from her community to the Muslim one was uneventful and she was accepted as a Muslim. However, her family have outcaste her and she is no longer considered by her parents to be their daughter. Similarly a Leva Patidar Patel, who embraced the Islamic faith, was ostracised by his kin. By chance, I became well acquainted with his Hindu cousins, and when they were asked to name kin with whom they kept in touch in Bolton, this man was never mentioned.

Regarding the other forms of friendship, both Hindus and Muslims are prepared to accept people of their own background and religious persuasion. The minorities which Hindus perceived to be most acceptable as kin are Hindus (97.4%) and the Muslims' reaction to accepting Muslims was similar. With the remaining forms of friendship carrying lower obligations and expectations, both Hindus and Muslims were ready to accept one another in these relationships. These data provide further support for the view that Gujaratis comprise two major religious communities, namely Hindus and Muslims. At one extreme some have argued that these two religious groups have the status of ethnic groups (Brooks and Singh, 1978/79; Robinson, 1979; Banton, 1972), though I would not go so far as to make such a claim. Though Gujaratis recognise that they comprise two separate religious groups, in certain situations they act as a single group in relation to other groups, like Pakistanis or the

Perceived relations with other communities reveal a number of trends. Muslims are more prepared to accept Pakistanis (37.5%) in marriage than members of any other community. To some extent this readiness supports that often rehearsed phrase: all Muslims are brothers, so any Muslim can marry another Muslim. As kin white people are regarded as the most acceptable from the non-Islamic communities (18.3%). In comparison, the Hindus are more reluctant to accept members of other communities as kin. Some 16.2% said that they would accept white people and Sikhs as kin. As close friends both Hindus (57.8%) and Muslims (56.8%) are prepared to accept white people, in addition the former found Sikhs (50.6%) to be acceptable and the latter Pakistanis (58.7%). This pattern of acceptability applied to ordinary friendship and acquaintanceship, where white people and Sikhs or Pakistanis are preferred to members of other minorities. In general as the social obligations in a friendship ease, the readiness to accept those who are perceived to be socially different increases. For instance the token recognition of the possibility of white people marrying Hindus was given some credence by an impression that I gained that more Hindus than Muslims married out of their own religious groups. The following comment by a prominent member of the VHP may be taken as evidence of concern over this trend: an executive member of the VHP whose daughter married a white man, said, "The trouble with the white community is that it takes our girls, but does not give us any girls in return." The acceptability of Sikhs might be explained by the fact that Mr Sandhu, a Sikh, was chairperson of the VHP and therefore, the Hindu communities had, for a while at least, to recognise his leadership.
A number of anecdotes illustrate some of the intricacies of the social perceptions of social distances between these communities. One incident which illustrates the ambivalence that is part of weak relationships involved Hindus and the white community. A Kutchi family, whom I hardly knew, asked me to intervene in a dispute between a husband and a wife. The couple had separated; the husband lived alone, while his wife had gone to live with her parents or close relatives. The husband asked me to force the relatives to release her. When told that I had no power to do this, he said, "You can ask the police to go with you and then they will let my wife go." He assumed that, I as a white person, or any other white person, could use the police to put pressure on recalcitrant relatives who fear the power of the police or more likely a possible threat of deportation. Had I tried to involve the police in this family dispute, then all Hindus would have accused me of meddling in private family matters that they saw as none of my concern. As I learnt later, the Kutchi families involved in this dispute had a "bad" reputation among the other Kutchis. This was not an isolated instance. I came across a number of instances when Hindus and Muslims found themselves in intractable social situations over which nobody had social, economic, legal or political control. Into these they tried to draw others who were not Gujaratis, so that the blame for failure could be placed upon them. In other words, they would become scapegoats (cf. Frankenberg, 1957:19, 43-44, 66, 98).

An incident that occurred in 1972 demonstrates the complexity of social distance as perceived by a Muslim and a Pakistani. A Pakistani school teacher, took charge of a bus trip organised by the BCCR. He arranged the seating so that Hindus sat on one side and Muslims on the other. A Gujarati Muslim passenger argued that people should be allowed
to sit wherever they choose. If Muslims sat next to Hindus, then the aim of the trip to improve Hindu-Muslim relations might be seen to be achieved. However, the teacher insisted on separating the trippers. Later the Muslim argued that Mr K had acted against the aims of the BCCR and therefore should resign, which he did soon afterwards. The degree of social distance that separates these communities is fuelled by memories of the bitterness created by the Indo-Pakistani war and before that, by the partitioning of India in 1947. At a BCCR meeting (24/3/77), a young Pakistani said that "Pakistanis could not mix with Indians in religious places", this was said in response to a question about young Asians learning about other Asian religions. By the label "Pakistani", the Pakistani lad meant Muslim; by Indian he meant Hindu.

Of those members of communities perceived to be least acceptable as kin or as friends, the Hindus perceived the West Indians to be more acceptable than Pakistanis, while the Muslims are more ready to accept Pakistanis than West Indians or Sikhs. In general, both Hindus and Muslims perceive of little that they have in common with West Indians, other than possibly their general position in British society. Perceived differences between Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims were expressed in a dispute when Mr Sandhu advertised his intention to sell liquor in his shop, stating that Hindus and Muslims had indicated their willingness to support him. Representatives of both the Hindu and Muslim communities publicly took him to task for making such a claim, particularly since he had never sought their opinion. One Muslim asked Mr Sandhu if he was a Muslim or a Hindu; when he said no to both questions, the Muslim told him that as a Sikh he could not assume that he shared a common identity with these communities. For the Muslims this incident confirmed the distrust of Sikhs.
Another anecdote points to the tensions between Muslims and Afro-Caribbeans. There is little evidence to suggest that the distance between Gujaratis and West Indians is likely to decrease, an idealistic view taken by some (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979). The following example illustrates the depth of this division: in 1979 a seven year old West African Muslim child, whose father had come to Bolton to study, joined a class of Muslim children in a local primary school. She was labelled a West Indian. Even though she and her parents are Muslims, none of the children would play with her at school or in the street. When the children were asked why they did not play with her, they replied: "West Indians are black and dirty; we are not black, we are white [2]". Her parents likewise experienced racial discrimination from the local Muslims with the result that in the end they left the area and the town. In this instance "brother Muslims" are Asian and not Afro-Caribbean Muslims.

Exchange theory suggests that Hindus and Muslims should befriend those with power, but this analysis of social perceptions of distances between communities shows that firstly, these communities perceive of Gujaratis as being closer to them than any other community, and secondly, that Gujaratis show little positive inclination to place themselves closer to the white community or the other minority communities. Thus Gujaratis stand alone. Therefore, they establish their ethnic identities through social interaction with others, and this is explored through an analysis of selected social labels.
Common Sense Racism and Labelling

Gujaratis' daily lives require them to manage their social interactions through a range of social situations some of which involve Gujaratis alone, and others which involve members of other communities. In other words Gujaratis find themselves acting the roles of insiders and outsiders. In this section I shall concentrate attention upon the social meanings attached to commonly used labels that define the social boundaries of Gujarati communities within a community. Some of the social meanings are "private", that is are understood by Gujaratis, and some are public, they are shared by Gujaratis and members of other communities.

Both Lawrence (1983) and Hall (1981) offer descriptions of white Britons' body of common sense racism. It is described as "down-to-earth 'good sense'. It is thought to represent the distilled truths of centuries of practical experience... The contradictory nature of common sense means that it should not be thought of as constituting a unified body of knowledge. ...common sense is appropriate to 'the practical struggle of everyday life of the popular masses'" (Lawrence, 1983:48-50). Brewer correctly observes, in my view, that Lawrence's analysis of common sense racism is based on firstly information gleaned from the media and other secondary sources with particular political biases (Brewer, 1984:68); secondly that there is little empirical justification for the assertion that the racist maxims that he claims form part of this body of knowledge are in fact part of it; and thirdly, that he imposes the notion of common sense racism on white people by theoretical fiat (Brewer, 1984:71-72). I defined common sense racism as: comprising social attitudes, values and prejudices, derived from past and present
experiences of both Asian and white people in Britain and her ex-colonies, which today provide members of both communities with a shorthand guide to understanding the social actions of each other (see Introduction Part I above).

However, the idea that white people have constructed a body of knowledge which they employ to guide them in their social interaction with Asian and black people is important, since it contributes to Gujaratis' experiences of urban life. Common sense racism is part of a larger body of knowledge which includes not only how white Britons understand the role of Asian and black people, but also how Gujaratis (and other Asian and black people) understand the role and social behaviour of white people. Since this is an ongoing process, Gujaratis construct their response as part of an ongoing process to white common sense racism. To analyse the aspects of Gujaratis' common sense racism, I shall ground this analysis in a study of social identities, which are based upon Gujarati notions of social distance between them and others within and without the Gujarati communities. This means that firstly I shall treat common sense as an empirical issue (cf. Brewer, 1984:71). Secondly, I shall assume that Gujaratis who have come to live here have acquired this knowledge on the basis of their shared experiences passed down by their parents, as exploited peoples, as immigrants perceived as "black" people.

A recipe is a "precept for action", "a scheme of expression", and "a scheme of interpretation" (Schutz, 1976:103; Barth, 1969:15ff; Goffman, 1970:64ff). In urban racial situations such recipes through usage become associated with key or trigger words and function as labels. At a cognitive level labels mark social boundaries between communities.
within community (cf. Mitchell, 1974). In racial situations these labels are used by labellers and labelled to signal knowledge about social relationships between racial groups. They mark social boundaries between minority communities and between minority and the white communities. They function as if they are symbols. Labels not only identify some key characteristic, often of a discrediting nature (Goffman, 1970:14), that is associated with members of a category or group, but they also imply that the labelled are aware of their differences (Goffman, 1970:64ff). In racial situations Gujaratis and white participants use labels to describe one another, but their meanings and appropriateness are open to negotiation and debate. Unlike much of labelling theory which is concerned with more formal processes of labelling, the racial situation shares more in common with an informal situation in which people label others. The process of labelling between Gujarati and white is more akin to a process of secondary labelling (Lemert, 1972). What studies of labelling make clear is how labellers impose a label on a person or group of people, often choosing to ignore the labelled’s interpretation of the label and the applicability of the label. Thus debate about the applicability of the social meanings of labels set in motion a process of negotiation (cf. Cicourel, 1976) between Gujaratis and white people which crystallised around events that formed the core of ethnic politics. The labels which were in currency formed part of the culture which the Gujarati leaders and white politicians drew on in their efforts to negotiate social identities in relation to events that drew attention to the space between communities within a community (Chap. 6).

By analysing labels as if they are symbols, in a sense keys which can unlock different levels of meaning, they can be shown to be associated with Gujarati ideas about how to manage their social relationships in
conflict situations within and without their communities. If this system of labels is taken to represent a symbolic order of social identities, it is possible to analyse the social positions of the labelled by virtue of their perceived position in relation to the labellers. When this order of identities is related to perceived social distances between members of different ethnic groups, it is possible to construct a cognitive model of common sense perceptions of intra- and inter-racial relationships (cf. Mitchell, 1974). To a large extent, this cognitive model enables members of different ethnic groups to order their behaviour in face-to-face situations. Labels condense these social identities so that when they are used, they function as a process of categorisation, and also provide a structure of belonging [3].

It is possible to conceive of a hierarchy of social identities applicable to racial contexts as comprising labels which define specific social identities at one end and general ones at the other. The former are perceived to be socially closer to the labelled and the latter to be more distant. In formal and informal social situations labelling represents the outcome of a process of negotiation by publicly recognised and authorised people. Ordinary people, organisations, those in positions of authority and the media are labellers in everyday life. Social estimations of distance become associated with social identities through common usage. The Gujaratis (the labelled) and white people (the labellers) have each developed a set of labels, some of which they share (are public) and some of which are not shared (are private). These labels describe social identities, the meanings of which may be public or private, that is understood by members of more than one community or only one community. Continual public usage of these labels ensures their survival.
As such labels are not fixed; their positions in the hierarchy of social identities can be changed as the positions of communities are perceived by labellers and labelled to change. Labels have three major dimensions: firstly, they act as a cue to what is regarded as socially appropriate interaction as defined by labeller and accepted or rejected by the labelled; they are precepts for action. Secondly, they are directional, that is they act as a guide to the status positions in which the labelled perceive themselves to be in relation to the labellers and vice versa. Social interaction between labellers and labelled may be interpreted with a view to recognising or disputing meanings associated with these identities. Thirdly, the process of negotiation of the appropriateness of a label by labellers and labelled in public situations can support or undermine elements within the body of common sense knowledge and therefore lead to changes in social meaning. Evidence for this will be found in changes to the accepted hierarchy of labels.

As a consequence of their origins in India, the Gujaratis are associated with a group of people with a history that embodies a particular set of social characteristics (Lawrence, 1983:57-66; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979). Evidence of this is provided by the labels which the media and people generally used during the 1970s to describe Asians and black people. For instance a label that does so much more than any other to identify this collection of people is that of immigrant. If the structure which is embodied within the labels reflects a system of socially approved "proper" relations between individuals and groups, then the label "immigrant" not only categorises the Gujaratis along with other Asian and black people as visually identifiable newcomers, but it

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also invests them with a social identity that signifies their position in the local social system as people who do not have equal rights to public resources, such as local and national funds and services, access to space, to participation and influence over political decisions.

Although Enoch Powell talked about the "invisible enemy within" in his speech at Northfield during the 1970 election, the label immigrant identifies a highly visible "enemy" within British society. The context in which the "enemy within" is discussed is an historical one. It is closely allied to the 1970s and to the moral panic that characterised the implementation of often ill considered solutions to problems such as those posed by youths, immigrants and inner cities (Hall, 1981:32-33) and law and order (Solomos et al, 1983:21-26). Hall has taken this phrase which was originally used to describe how during periods of moral panic a condition, an episode, person or group of persons become defined as a threat to societal values and interests and applied it to governmental and establishment reactions to Asian and black people during the 1970s (Hall, 1981:32-33). The notion of a moral panic adequately conveys the idea of an establishment which was experiencing difficulties coping with and controlling immigration and settlement of Gujaratis and others here. The migrant, who became an immigrant, became seen as a threat to society. The label immigrant developed into an umbrella label which incorporates a range of lesser social identities that include Indian, Asian and Pakistani amongst others. This label probably above all others symbolises the moral panic that the establishment expressed in actions towards these Asian and black settlers.

Following in part Turner's (1962) analysis of levels of meaning possessed by symbols, I shall separate the analysis of labels into
operational, positional and negotiated. Underlying this analysis is one important social characteristic of symbols, namely their polysemous nature (Turner, 1962: 125).

The Label Immigrant: an Operational Definition

People who are labelled immigrant symbolise a threat to the white labellers and to their access to public resources. It also reflects a vulnerability and lack of access to resources of those so labelled. This label is used by white people to describe any person who is identifiable as foreign born by virtue of their having a darker skin colour, wearing a different style of clothing, having obvious difficulties with spoken English, and possessing certain diacritical cosmetic marks (cf. Brah, 1982). In the work context it is employed to describe workers who have dark skins and who tend to work night shifts. They may be divided by employers into two categories - "Pakistanis" and "Indians". One employer said: "I prefer to employ Indian immigrants, as Pakistanis cause too much trouble wanting time off to attend their religious festivals". The label Indian is used to identify Hindus as opposed to Muslims. The label Pakistani was inaccurately used to describe all Muslims as opposed to (Indians) Hindus without any realisation of the socially perceived differences that separate these communities. The label Indian was used by this employer to identify a particular religious group in terms of a white common sense understanding of the Asian communities in Bolton.

This usage suggests that this employer's understanding of the term Indian is based on a misunderstanding. Of itself this is important, but it is also important to recognise that his application of the term as a white employer has enabled him to impose this interpretation of the
label upon Gujaratis and other Asians irrespective of its inaccuracies. The Gujaratis have learnt to recognise this usage, and as such has become part of Gujaratis' and the white community's body of common sense knowledge. Thus, in racial situations the social situation in which labels are used and the positions of the participants fix their meanings within a hierarchy of social identities that form part of common sense racism. Like any symbol, the label immigrant also stands for other labels such as Indian and Pakistani.

Gujaratis meet fewer white people on night shifts work than on day shifts, and those white workers who have contact with them are employed in supervisory positions. Depending on the shift system used by a mill, be it the English, multi- or continental shift system, Gujaratis may or may not come into contact with the white labour force. This formalised but limited contact means that reliance on visible characteristics is at a premium, and for the sake of identifying who works where, when and in what position with what skills, the skin colour of the Gujarati worker becomes an essential sign. On the basis of this sign, white workers use the label immigrant to describe all of their Asian co-workers, thereby conflating social identities of Gujarati Hindus and Muslims, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Sikhs into one single identity - immigrant - or into two related identities, Indian and Muslim.

The importance of labelling in the work situation is illustrated by the following examples. An occupational advantage is gained by Gujaratis being classified by an employer as Indian rather than Pakistani. The latter are people who have become identified as those who tend to put their faith before their jobs. For instance, there is no general agreement between the members of the two Muslim sects, Deobandis and
Berelewis, and between them and Pakistanis exactly on which day *eid* falls, heralding the end of Ramadan. The decision on which day to end Ramadan rests with each group. Deobandis tend to accept the decisions made by Islamic authorities in Morocco, while the Berelewis and Pakistanis prefer to wait twelve hours. The former choose to take one day off work to celebrate the end of Ramadan and the latter choose to take the following day. Therefore employers, who know little about these sects, have to negotiate directly with the workers. Alternatively, the latter make their own arrangements and the employers are left to cope with an insufficient labour force without advance warning.

Another factor which encourages employers to rely on such simple identification is that Gujaratis give an impression of being more committed to their families and religion than to their work in a way that the employers find difficult to associate with their own career values (see Chap.1). This work behaviour gives employers the impression that Indians (Hindus) as opposed to Pakistanis (Muslims) are not committed to their jobs. This apparent indifference to their jobs has not enabled them to construct a set of values in which their white colleagues could share. If anything, it divides them along a colour-ethnic line. It provides grounds for the white employers' and workers' belief in the inadequacy and unreliability of their Asian co-workers. As the white union managers recognise the same body of common sense knowledge, they are reluctant to support their Gujarati members' calls for strikes. The result of this is that the unions are accused of racism by the Gujarati workers.

For Gujaratis the application of the label immigrant in the work situation implies little chance of promotion, job insecurity, night
shift work, and difficulty in understanding white co-workers. Outside work hours Gujaratis have little contact with their white employers and white fellow union members. The kind of issues which arise in the work situation centre on promotion, pay, and religious holidays, issues which, with the general problem of language (Braham and Rhodes, 1985:24-31; Brown, 1984) have become specific to immigrants. A typical comment made by a Hindu engineering mill worker was: "When we attend union meetings to discuss promotion, the white workers speak with a broad Lancashire accent. We cannot understand and then a white man gets promotion". As few employers choose to antagonise the union to which the majority of his white workers belong for the sake of a worker from a minority, they tend to turn a blind eye to racism at work. The employer's response is directed towards the label rather than towards the workers.

In the 1970s most white Boltonians described immigrants as black people, who dressed differently, had different customs, lived in certain areas of the town, could not speak English, and worked in the mills. The label to which most white Boltonians responded was immigrant; many local councillors spoke of helping immigrants. At local elections, politicians spoke of capturing the immigrant vote. For instance, before the Derby Ward local election in 1974, a Conservative councillor with Asian connections went out specifically to capture the votes of immigrants. This meant going from door to door until the councillor found an Asian who had received help in the past. Then in return for this favour the councillor suggested that he should vote Conservative and persuade his friends to do likewise. After all, if the councillor and family, who had the interests of Indians at heart, could vote for the Conservatives, it showed that the Conservative Party was aware of and working towards
recognising the interests of Indians. Then the councillor informed party colleagues that all Indians in the Deane Road area of Derby Ward would vote Conservative. As it happened, most of this man's Hindu friends lived in Bradford Ward. Those who lived in Deane Ward never received the message; at least half of those living in the ward were Muslims and therefore did not know him. Anyhow most of the Muslims at this time supported the Labour Party, which won the seat. What is interesting about the event is that, again, the inaccurate usage of the label Indian by councillor separated him from the Gujaratis, whose vote was sought.

The application of the label immigrant implies that those so labelled deviate in certain respects from what the labellers, white people, perceive to be English culture. By referring to them as immigrants, white people show that they perceive of Gujaratis as different. The label serves to encourage white people to maintain social distance between themselves and Gujaratis. As for the Gujaratis, this only reinforces their belief that their position in Bolton (and Britain) is insecure and that they too are separated from the white community by social distance.

Under certain circumstances white Boltonians respond to the label immigrant as they would respond to people who need help but whose help is not wanted in return. White people's response to the label is to adopt the role of a patron. Having become aware of this meaning, Gujaratis use it to their advantage when they require help or have made some kind of mistake. A successful Muslim butcher who owns two large businesses in Bolton, said to me, "When I need help, I tell people (meaning white people) that I am an immigrant. Then they help me". The Gujarati response to being labelled immigrant is to either ignore it, to
verbally reject it as inappropriate or even insulting or to turn it to their advantage to obtain help. On another occasion at an annual general meeting of the BCCR held during Ramadan, the Chief Constable was the guest and had just risen to speak. When a Muslim (who had a degree from a British university) stood up and asked the guest speaker to excuse his poor English, as it was not his first language. He then proceeded in flawless English to explain why all the Muslims present had to leave the meeting to attend to their prayers. For those present who knew this man, he was quite deliberately taking everybody to task for having held the AGM during Ramadan. For those who did not know him, his speech could be taken at face value for providing a genuine explanation for why the Muslims had to leave.

When Gujaratis go for help with housing, educational, social welfare or employment matters to white officials, they provide as much information as they believe is required by white officials unless asked for more. Often this is inadequate. However, the tendency among white officials is to refrain from inquiring too deeply into Gujarati affairs, partly because they take the view that Gujaratis being immigrants cannot understand or speak English, that they would be unable to select the relevant details to mention, and that they do not know or are unable to comprehend the complexities of issues. The outcome of such interaction is that they rarely discover the real issues that lie behind problems. This gap in communication serves only to bolster stereotyped attitudes that are associated with labels, such as "they never tell you the whole story".

For the Gujarati community the label immigrant not only allows them to plead ignorance but also, of greater importance for them, it implies
that their status is that of temporary settlers. As such, Gujaratis take
the view that the less white people know about them and their social,
religious, economic and political affairs, the better they can protect
themselves against this insecurity. Most Gujaratis observed during the
research that they had noticed an increase in the level of racial
discrimination against Asian and black people. They control information
about themselves, which is the only information that they can control as
immigrants, since it enables them to conceal that part of their lives
which is of the most value to them. This part comprises the personal
side of their lives, their village relationships, village factions,
caste associations and communities, sects and some aspects of Islam and
Hinduism. To protect this side of their lives from white scrutiny, they
provide as little information about themselves and their communities as
possible, so as not to make their perceived insecurity any worse. This
is the area of "private knowledge" that is accessible only to those who
know and are part of its creation (cf. Emmett, 1982: 207-209) [4].

The Label Immigrant: a Positional Analysis

The label immigrant is part of a complex of symbols which is used by
various groups of people to describe Gujaratis and other minority
communities. The labels most commonly used include immigrant, foreigner,
Indian, Asian, Paki, Coloured and Blackie. Occasionally, the labels
migrant, Hindu and Muslim are also used; rarely is the term Gujarati
used. This list of labels shows that the more specific and accurate
labels are avoided. Hindus and Muslims respondents ranked seven of the
more commonly used labels in terms of acceptable, unacceptable and
insulting (Table 4.4). Both Hindus and Muslims are in general agreement
on the meaning of most of these social identities. The labels Indian and
Asian are considered to be acceptable; Paki and Coloured are unacceptable, and Blackie is regarded as insulting. A difference occurred in the evaluation of the labels foreigner and immigrant. Hindus regarded the former as unacceptable and the latter as insulting, while the Muslims could accept both. Possibly Hindus believed themselves to be closer to Britain and therefore preferred not to be seen as foreigners but as British, many having come from and regarded themselves as British while living in East Africa. The Muslims who saw themselves in the 1970s living in a country that was anti-Islamic preferred to accept this view as being in accord with the Islamic view of non-Islamic countries.

Table 4.4: Acceptability of Social Identities by Hindus and Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acceptable to:</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian Asian</td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>Indian Immigrant</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreigner</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unacceptable:</th>
<th>Foreigner</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th></th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insulting:</th>
<th>Paki</th>
<th>Paki</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>Blackie</td>
</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

The labels like Asian, Indian and Pakistani are acceptable and any misapplication is not taken as an insult; it is just seen as misidentification. The neutrality of these labels became apparent when I asked Hindus and Muslims what they thought of the label Paki; a number replied, "I am not a Pakistani, so why should I be insulted?". Then they usually added, "When I am called Paki by a white person, I feel insulted." Similarly, Blackie and Coloured are considered to be insulting by all. Gujaratis would not normally use labels like Paki, Coloured or Blackie when speaking to other Gujaratis; the exception
occurs when young Hindus call Muslims Pakis. Then it becomes extremely insulting, since it can imply that Muslims are being allowed to live in India only by permission of Hindus.

In other spheres of social life, the problem of teasing out the meanings of the label immigrant produces further associations. Reliance on outward visible identification was given a twist when a chairperson of BCCR said in his parting speech posed the question: "When we speak of immigrants, we mean black or dark-skinned people, so why not say black people?" (Minutes of BCCR Annual General Meeting, 1976). The question of whether to acknowledge immigrants as black and therefore, as different from white, or to say that they are the same as everyone else but are recognised as immigrants, goes unanswered, although these connotations are subsumed under the label immigrant. Migrants are people who move to another country, but immigrants are people who are perceived as black who have settled in Britain. In the sociological literature some persist in using the label black as a blanket term for all coloured minorities (see Ball and Solomos, 1990). Some of the people to whom this label is applied, such as Gujaratis, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to name a few, do not as the above analysis shows consider themselves to be black (cf. also Modood, 1988). Such a usage of the label black amounts to an insult, since it presumes that the labellers know more about the labelled than the labelled know about themselves. Such misapplications point to deeper more complex issues: firstly, this misapplication of the label is indicative of how some can perpetuate a misunderstanding from a position of superiority. Secondly, it can act as a politically emotive label to Asians and black people when used by black people in a political context. Thirdly, when used by white people in a political context it can point to the political space between
communities within a community. Finally, it is worth noting that the 1991 Census places as much value, if not more, on skin colour in the question on ethnicity as any census did previously.

A label, like a stereotype, defines a set of often disparaging characteristics which are associated with a particular group of people. When a label is used by labelled and labellers it may become associated with a set of social characteristics some of which may be factually inaccurate in a number of ways. Much of the literature on labelling is oriented towards demonstrating how such false beliefs survive despite their factual inaccuracy and form the bases of bodies of common sense knowledge upon which many people depend for survival [5]. For example, a black person who has lived in Britain for twenty years and is a British citizen has now to categorise himself as a Black African or a Black-Caribbean, and an Asian has still to identify himself as an Asian, that is an Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and so on (Census 1991: User Consultation, Topic Statistics, March 1990, Ethnic group and Country of Birth Proposals, OPCS, Paper TS4). What I am arguing is that when influential people accept such labels, they not only reinforce the inaccuracy of them with the result that they take on new meanings, but that they and their meanings become part of white and Gujarati common sense knowledge. However, white people’s and Gujaratis’ understanding of the labels in common sense racism is often different and the cues that labels alert participants to may be different.

If Gujaratis wish to conceal their own differences, they will use labels which can be applied to themselves collectively, and which may also be recognised and accepted by members of other minorities. Although the usefulness of certain commonly accepted labels, such as black or
immigrant, as devices for recruiting black political support at a national level has been demonstrated to fail (Heineman, 1972:79ff, 136-137), these labels were used with some success by local Gujarati leaders to recruit support on local issues (Chaps. 6 and 7). A final instance of the acceptance of those in authority of a label, knowing it to be inaccurate, demonstrates how the possibility of negotiating its meaning can be conditioned by the social situation. I attended a hearing at an Industrial Tribunal Court in Manchester in 1975 at which a manager and two foremen from a local textile mill, referred to their Muslim workers as Pakistanis. The court accepted the label as correct. A couple of the Muslims in the court spoke and understood English, but none made any attempt to correct their employers. When asked why they did not correct their employers, they said, "Why bother; there is no need for them to know." Although the label Paki is recognised to be an insult, the label Pakistani is perceived by Muslims to be a misapplication which carries no overtones of an insult. Occasionally the label Pakistani is used to describe Muslims with no distinction being made between Gujarati Muslims and Pakistani Muslims.

Labels and the Process of Negotiation

It is part of the social process of interaction that participants in a social situation can dispute the appropriateness of labels used. Both the meaning given and the directional characteristics are open to debate and dispute by the participants. One individual's common sense perception of social position is not that possessed by another. "The actor within the social world, however, experiences it primarily as a field of his actual and possible acts and only secondly as an object of his thinking" (Schutz, 1976:101). Agreement between participants on the
appropriateness of a label implies that they also accept and recognise a meaning as well as the implied relationship. Here I shall consider the general aspects of negotiation and how it contributes to the construction of Gujaratis' common sense knowledge of the social world in which they live.

Amongst themselves Gujaratis avoid using the label immigrant, unless they speak to white Boltonians. When this label is used by Gujaratis amongst themselves, immigrant means "illegal immigrant". Many Gujaratis consider that they are no longer immigrants, they are British citizens. For instance, a friend whom I shall call Mr KL and I met a Muslim friend in the town precinct; Mr KL's opening words were, "Let us talk to this immigrant". As all three of us were friends; Mr S accepted this form of address as a gibe. However, another Muslim I interviewed asked me if the purpose of my research was to obtain the addresses of immigrants. By this use of the term he meant "illegal immigrants" [6]. When Muslims use the word immigrant in a joking manner amongst themselves, they imply that some person is an "illegal immigrant". If they do not use it jokingly, then they usually know or have good reason to believe that a person is an illegal immigrant. Once I was accepted by these Muslims, I could not refer to them as immigrants without insulting them, as I was regarded as sharing some access to their "private" social world. With Gujaratis, Pakistanis and Sikhs, whom I did not know personally, I could use the word immigrant without causing offence. Thus, the term immigrant as used by Gujaratis is rich in social meanings, meanings that are quite different from those given to it by white people outside these communities.

Labels used by Gujaratis within the context of their own communities
define social relationships between and within caste communities, factions, sects and religious groups. The most obvious of these is that between Hindus and Muslims. Members of these two religious groups mingle in daily life, but they rarely go into each other's homes unless they are close friends and this seems to be rare. Hindus refer to Muslims and Pakistanis as Musula (Muslims). This label carries no insult, but when cause is found to give insult, then a Hindu will address a Muslim as bandia (circumcised). Likewise, Muslims refer to Hindus as Patels or Kutchis; again there is little scope for insult since Muslims may be Patels or Kutchis. If insult is given, then Muslims will address a Hindu as kanda (onions). Reference is made here to the bad smell onions give off. Though many Hindus do not eat onions, they can still be said to smell as bad as onions - a double insult. Reference has been made above to Muslims' usage of the label Paki, but in certain contexts it carries no insult, since only a distinction is being made between two groups within the same Islamic community.

Though most Hindus know that Muslims come from two different districts in Gujarat, they cannot identify them visually and therefore, they do not use district names as a form of address. A Sikh, when speaking jokingly to Mr KL, whom he had known for a long time said, "You Baruchi or Surti or whatever..."; but I have not heard a Hindu or Sikh address a Muslim whom he did not know well in this manner. Similarly, Muslims will rarely use a caste name when addressing a Hindu. A Muslim shopkeeper allowed a Hindu lady to take some goods she wanted, but for which she had insufficient money to pay. When I asked him how he could be sure that she would return with the money, he said, "I can trust her; her caste are honest". The Hindu was a Mandhata Patel. He believed that she was honest, although he, being a Baruchi, would be less willing to
trust a Surti Muslim.

The most specific labels are those which are used by members of one community to describe differences between their own members; these take the form of caste and district names. Among the Muslims the terms Surti and Baruchi are most commonly used to describe Muslims (Chap.2). The labels are also used jokingly as when my Surti interpreter threatened to castrate a Baruchi if he did not answer the questions in my schedule. What my interpreter implied was, do not be stubborn and stupid like other Muslims from your district. He knew that this respondent was a university graduate and therefore, should know better than to think that I was a police or Home Office informer. Even more specific labels than these are used. For instance Muslims speak of Naroli Muslims as having a reputation for being aggressive.

Hindus use caste names as labels when they refer to Hindus as Mandhatas, Mistrys, Levas and Kanbis. Since caste labels are in a general sense neutral, it is the usage in exceptional situations that is of interest. I came across two such situations. The first was when a Hindu of higher caste implied that a Hindu of lower caste was untrustworthy or dirty. A Leva Patidar Patel complained to his Hindu drinking companions in a public house that he had on the previous day lent a Valand (barber) money to buy a bottle of whisky and a bottle of rum. The man promised to repay the money the next day, however, he did not appear. So the Leva Patidar Patel said to an audience of Patels, "What can you expect of a Valand?". On another occasion a Leva Patidar Patel pointed to a Mandhata Patel, who was playing darts in a public house. He said that the Mandhatas were really Kolis (Chap.2). When I asked the Mandhata Patel if he was a Koli he replied that he had never
heard of them. Some Mandhata Patels are aware that their caste name was once Koli, but they would never admit to this publicly. The application of a low caste name to Hindus whose caste has achieved higher status is a form of insult.

To quote "these identities are categorical and are in fact a labelling process which relates primarily to expectations of behaviour in the public place rather than to basic customs, beliefs and practices" (Mitchell, 1974:19). The label immigrant comprises a range of social identities that only become apparent in social situations, when participants debate and negotiate the meaning they are prepared to recognise. The complexity of meanings of a label like immigrant goes beyond its superficial meaning, its meaning in a situation involving white and Asian participants is quite different to that given to it in an all-Asian situation. Most white people are unaware of the meanings that Gujaratis attach to it, but Gujaratis are usually aware of the meanings that the whites associate with it. The perceived social distance between participants to some extent determines which range of meanings might be appropriate in a situation.

By arranging social identities hierarchically in terms of generality and specificity and social closeness and social distance, it is possible to construct a model of social identities (Diagram 2). Thus the relationships between the labels symbolise the negotiable social boundaries between Gujaratis and the white community. The applicability of these labels formed the content of the debates between leaders and politicians about events involving either Muslims and Hindus or Muslims, Hindus and white people (Chap.6). These labels defined the political space between the Gujaratis and the white political structures.
### A Simplified Model of Gujarati Social Identities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Distance</th>
<th>Close to Gujaratis</th>
<th>Distant from Gujaratis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Identities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific</td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Village</td>
<td>Pakistani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Faction</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caste</td>
<td>Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalised</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Immigrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Foreigner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>Paki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>Black(ie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boltonian</td>
<td>Non-British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These labels, as symbols, are located within Gujarati experiences of white racism and incorporate ideas about how they manage their social relationships with other Gujaratis as well as with white people. Taken together the hierarchy of symbols represents a cognitive map of Gujarati political attempts to gain control of the space between their communities, the white community and wider British society. This is a Gujarati constructed cognitive map comprising a set of social identities that are negotiable and which literally and metaphorically can be redrawn in accordance with new social experiences. This body of knowledge provides Gujaratis with a guide to and explanations for the appropriate social behaviour in intra- and inter-community situations, they experience it as a "field of actual and possible acts" (Schutz, 1976:101). As the product of social interaction in an urban situation within a multicultural society, it comprises experiences which through protest can lead to changes in social meanings and this is the subject of the remaining Chapters.
1. In a social network, a first order star, an individual is surrounded, metaphorically, a set of dyadic relationships which can be arranged in terms of levels of intensity into a number of zones (cf. Barnes, 1971:58-60).

2. This highlights an assumption in Milner's analysis of children's misidentification of colour (1975, Chap. 4). He argues that 92 per cent of Asian children said that they "would rather be white" (Milner, 1975:135). Although only 24 per cent of Asian children chose the white doll in an actual identity test, some 65% did so in a theoretical situation (Milner, 1975:134). On the basis of this evidence, he suggests that Asian children, along with West Indian children, have to resolve a conflict between their own identity, as black people, and social reality in which white people have power. I would argue that Milner appears to be unaware that Asian children, particularly Gujarati children, do not think of themselves as being black; they think of themselves as being white or brown, but not black. For them, the obvious choice is the white doll.

3. Although Cohen recognises the possible existence of hierarchies of social identities (1982:10), he does not explore the complexity of meanings of labels nor the potential for developing new meanings and new labels. Emmett explores the hierarchy of social identities but does not recognise their position within a body of common sense knowledge (1982:205-209).

4. To some extent sociologists and social anthropologists have shown that it is possible to penetrate such social barriers with the support of the participant actors (see Drucker-Brown, 1984; Goode and Hatt, 1952).

5. In a totally different context see the research done on the mentally disabled in the community e.g. Flynn, 1989, Edgerton, 1971; Goffman, 1970.

6. Although Mr KL was with me, this Gujarati Muslim refused to provide the names of the streets where his close friends lived. Later, I learnt that a number of these close friends were illegal immigrants.
CHAPTER 5

LEADERS AND POLITICS

Having established that the Gujaratis have defined through settlement and employment (Chap.1), religious beliefs and organisations (Chap.2), social ties and friendships (Chap.3) and ideological beliefs about racism (Chap.4) some aspects of the space between their communities and the white community and British society, in this Chapter I shall look at the political space between these communities. As Lawrence observes, the question of power is crucial to an analysis of the relationship between the "ethnic minorities" and the majority community but is one which is rarely explored (1983:115). In these final Chapters I shall explore power by grounding the study of race within a political framework (cf. Solomos et al,1983:13). The failure of the philosophy and policy of integration as a political end ensured that the Gujaratis and other minorities had opportunities to express their ethnicity, socially and politically. Not all recognised or, if they did, accepted these opportunities. Some did, and it bore fruits a decade or so later.

This Chapter sets the political scene through describing and analysing political leadership of Muslim and Hindu organisations, that is the principal participants in ethnic local political activities. The arena in which ethnic political debates occurred was an informal one provided by the BCCR. It gave men in positions of leadership and influence opportunities to explore the space between formal political structures and the lack of any kind of political structure through which ethnic communities could achieve political recognition without having to loose their ethnic identities. Therefore, the role of the BCCR, which provided an informal political arena, was more than that of a buffer.
(Katznelson, 1973), it facilitated the participation of Muslim and Hindu leaders in local processes of decision-making without detracting from their ethnic identities.

To understand the emergence of ethnic leaders, one needs to understand the background of racism in the 1970s, which has been described as "the result of the combined effect of economic, political, ideological and cultural processes" (Solomos et al, 1983:11) in Britain generally. "... indigenous racism of the 60s and 70s is significantly different, in form and effect, from the racism of the 'high' colonial period. It is racism 'at home', not abroad; it is racism, not of a dominant but of a declining social formation" (Hall, 1981:26). This is symptomatic of the crisis arising from the reaction to the shift by the State from its emphasis on integration and more indirect forms of control to more direct forms of State control (Solomos et al, 1983:17). For instance the emphasis in race relations legislation changed from being on integration to control (Solomos et al, 1983:17-21). Against the background of the 1970s the emergence of Gujarati leaders seeking participation in local government amounted to another crisis to which local and national politicians reacted as if it was not a policy of integration but a problem of control.

Since the time of their arrival in Britain, Gujaratis achieved positions of leadership either on the basis of their social standing in their communities and from their positions in social and religious organisations. They did not hold formally recognised political positions, but found themselves having access to informal arenas in which they had opportunities to achieve influence over the councillors. During the early 1970s the issues which Gujaratis faced in the community
shifted from the problems of immigration, nationality and settlement to poverty, unemployment, housing and education. With no link between the ethnic organisations and the formal political machinery, the rank and file Gujaratis found themselves unable to communicate their views to councillors and MPs, unless they did so through their white elected representatives. From their point of view a political vacuum existed: there was no elected Muslim or Hindu who could represent their views in formal political arenas. From the point of view of the politicians there was no vacuum, since the electoral system which brought them to power gave them the right to act as decision-makers on behalf of the electorate.

At the beginning of the 1970s few Asian and black people held positions in national political arenas. There were Asian and black councillors in Blackburn, Bradford and some of the London boroughs, but there were no MPs from these minority communities. In Bolton with the exception of two councillors, an Asian and a West Indian, who were committed to representing their political parties, the councillors and MPs were white. These two men took the view that their responsibility was to represent their constituents and not their communities. In 1970 the Asian councillor lost his seat. The black councillor later lost and regained his seat, which he has held ever since. Although he too was committed to supporting his political party, he has consistently argued for equal opportunities for minority communities. Thus Gujarati leaders found themselves under increasing pressure to fill a political vacuum, which separated the growing Gujarati communities from political participation. Opportunities existed for those who took on this political function, to combine it with their existing roles as social, business or religious leaders. Therefore, to argue that CRCs functioned
as buffers to control Asian and black political demands is important, but what is more important is that these buffers supported the vacuum separating Gujaratis from the elected politicians and thereby created an environment in which ethnic politics could flourish. This gave ethnic leaders opportunities to establish relationships with the politicians and to begin a political dialogue. Though the argument that CRCs acted as buffers containing the demands of the minority communities is accepted, the local CRC by offering services as well as access to political arena far from controlling Hindu and Muslim demands provided opportunities for political participation, where none were supposed to exist. The process of containment through buffering served to encourage leaders to exploit the opportunities they had not had before. It ensured that ethnic politics was firmly on the local government agenda.

Therefore in this Chapter I shall consider firstly, the CRC which provided the arena which gave ethnic leaders opportunities to participate as representatives, secondly, the development of leadership and two types of leaders, insider and outsider leaders, thirdly, the relationships between supporters and leaders, finally, participation in local formal political structures.

The racism of the 1960s and early 1970s was marked by debates about the status of immigrants, repatriation, control of numbers of people from New Commonwealth countries immigrating to Britain, and their access to public resources, namely housing, work, schooling for their children and political participation. Although these issues may be seen as precursors to the riots and disturbances of the early 1980s in Brixton and Toxteth, most sociological commentators on these events have ignored the development of grassroots urban social movements within the minority
communities in favour of grounding explanations for unrest in poverty and urban renewal - the trappings of disadvantaged access to public resources. For instance many pay lip service to the importance of black political participation in local and national government, but few concentrate on the political exclusion or marginalisation of ethnic leaders (e.g. Benyon and Solomos, (eds.) 1987: Chaps. 1-3, 15, 19 and 20). Most of the contributors to this debate explain the riots in terms of unemployment, poverty, housing, policing, racial disadvantage and discrimination.

Therefore, my aim is to focus attention on the importance of grassroots politics, which some have rather derogatorily described as factionalism (Rex and Moore, 1971:117). The argument offered is that the 70s witnessed an emergence of micro-social movements associated with events that provided opportunities for the development of ethnic leadership. Without any formalised structures of support, social networks functioned as the vehicles of social communication between supporters and leaders. The development of a view of the quality of living as part of Gujaratis' urban experiences led to leaders protesting about the social disadvantages which they believed existed for Asians and black people resident in Bolton. Without any access to the formal political hierarchy other than through a white controlled political party system, these Gujarati leaders expressed the view that their people could not be adequately represented by white politicians, whose knowledge of the Gujarati communities was minimal. With no connection with the political party system, these leaders emerged as spokesmen for their community organisations. They came to be regarded and often were treated as leaders by the white politicians, officers and members of organisations who worked with members of these communities. The scene is
set by the dilemmas that faced the local (and other) CRCs, which was the main organisation offering ethnic minorities participation and being concerned with their interests and welfare.

Bolton Council for Community Relations

In most respects the racism experienced by Asian and black people elsewhere in Britain was no different from that experienced by Gujaratis here. Initially the role of the local CRC was to respond to racism by promoting harmony and goodwill. The CRC could achieve this in a number of ways through three broad but interrelated, policies: integration (Hill and Issacharoff, 1971:164), equality (Gay and Young, 1988:17) and the elimination of racial discrimination. The first involved the development from the work of the welfare oriented organisations established to care for refugees and immigrants who came to settle in Britain in the decade after the war (Hill and Issacharoff, 1971:1). The policy of equality owes much to the 1976 Race Relations Act and the third policy is a consequence of the recent review of CRC roles and objectives carried out on behalf of the CRE (Gay and Young, 1988). It is with the second that I shall be concerned. Whatever CRCs did or did not achieve, one important aspect of their role, which now no longer seems to be crucial (Gay and Young, 1988:33), was the opportunity which they inadvertently gave to leaders of minorities to channel their protest into informal political arenas. These arenas developed in political importance as Asian and black leaders became aware that they offered them opportunities to contribute politically. CRCs were central to the development of ethnic politics, but in the 1980s the importance of CRCs was diminished through the promotion of equal opportunities which led to the development of Asian and black caucuses. This development was
stifled politically (cf. Hall, 1985).

In 1976 the advantages of a minority organisation joining the BCCR included gaining access to funding through the charitable status of CRC; benefiting from access to funds allocated by the CRE through the BCCR for special projects; having contact with Local Authorities; having a voice in an informal but semi-political arena; and working with an organisation whose aims were and still are to eliminate racial discrimination and promote equality of opportunity [1]. The issues that beset local CRCs, including the CRC in Bolton, have been well documented (Hill and Issacharoff, 1971). An organisation could become an affiliated member of the BCCR Council, if it could produce a constitution, an annual report and a written undertaking to support the objects of the Council (Hill and Issacharoff, 1971:86). Not all members of the Council could become members of the Executive committee. The number of places on this committee were fixed by locally determined constitutions (later on this was fixed by a nationally determined constitution). Nevertheless, the chief weaknesses of the BCCR, like those of other CRCs (and Racial Equality Councils and Local Authorities today), were and still are: how can a representative cross section of ethnic community interests be obtained from organisations ranging from community organisations and religious organisations to ad hoc organisations comprising a collection of ethnic individuals? Should the selection comprise only organisations or organisations and individuals? What process of selection or election should be employed to achieve an acceptable representation of interests? Since the BCCR provided an arena in which leaders of organisations and communities could meet with representatives of the Local Authority as well as with each other, these men had the opportunity to represent the interests of their supporters with a view to influencing political
decisions. The argument has been made that as such arenas were used as buffers to constrain the political demands of black people (Katznelson, 1973), their role was that of devices for the indirect social control (Hill and Issacharoff, 1971:203). Therefore, the policy of integration could be construed as a negative device of social control: integration would bring acceptance, while maintenance of ethnic identities would bring rejection.

Locally the failure of this "hidden" policy came with the expansion in the demands for greater representation from Gujarati, other Asian and black communities and organisations. For instance in 1970 - 1975 a total population of 13,000 Gujaratis were represented by two Hindus and two Muslims, while two small minority communities, the Pakistanis and West Indians, were each represented by three members - an organisational representative, an elected officer and by an additional member elected or co-opted to the Council. This bias in representation in conjunction with haphazard selection and actual participation led to growing dissatisfaction with the representation of organisations and communities on the Council and its committees. This profile of membership changed drastically in the following year, when the representation of these small communities were reduced, the Muslims flooded the BCCR with representative and the Hindus slightly increased their representation. Over the next few years the population rose to 20,000 and the number of ethnic organisations almost doubled. These changes served to the question about the extent to which Gujarati executive members were representative of their communities - a question which remains unanswered (cf. Hill and Issacharoff, 1971:143) [2].

Thus BCCR, like its counterparts elsewhere, was and is bedevilled by
a lack recognition by the formal political hierarchy and by a selection process which has never been clarified. Its effectiveness depended upon objectives which combined a mix of vagueness and precision (Hill and Issacharoff, 1971:163-164), and which could not and still cannot be translated easily into practical action (John, 1969:37-38). This only served to reinforce the importance of its role in responding to individual cases arising from immigration and nationality difficulties, which in turn detracted from its ability to "conduct arguments about policy and practice" (Gay and Young, 1988:117) and to evaluate its role within the "framework of local voluntary social action" (Gay and Young, 1988:121). In part this difficulty was made more apparent by the imbalance between the work CRCs had to conduct through the medium of meetings and that which had to be done outside meetings. This gave rise to a view that the subject matter of meetings which involved decision-making and procedural matters could be best coped with by those members who were "educated, confident and urbane" (Hill and Issacharoff, 1971:283). However, it was during the early 1970s that the representatives of communities, such as the Indian and Pakistan societies, rather than ethnic organisations, withdrew from participation in the BCCR in the face of growing dissatisfaction from their members. This opened the way for the development of religious and social organisations with representatives committed to anti-racism and the maintenance of their ethnic identities to demand political recognition. Although the BCCR did not lose sight of issues connected with immigration and issues of nationality, attention was focused now on new issues which influenced the daily lives of Gujaratis, in particular poverty, unemployment, racism, crime, homelessness, underachievement in education, health and the role of the police (Howe, 1988; Whitehead, 1987; Dalton and Daghlian, 1989; Hann, 1988; 1987; Scarman, 1981). These issues served to highlight
on the one hand, the importance of local and ethnic politics and on the other hand, the importance of the ethnic vote and national politics (Layton-Henry, 1984: 148; Anwar, 1984; 1980; Anwar and Kohler, 1975).

The BCCR found itself unable to cope with the sudden appearance of competing Muslim and Hindu leaders. By 1976 there were as many Muslim and Hindu leaders as there were organisations and associations in the Gujarati communities. Each organisation had elected officers who competed to perform the functions of leadership. Most of them sought membership on the BCCR, but did not always obtain it. This served to increase competition between ethnic representatives and to increase the political importance of representation on the CRC. Consequently, the selection of organisations into membership on the BCCR became a critical issue with those who were accepted but not always being recognised as leaders by those inside or outside their organisations. While the BCCR recognised all the organisational members as representatives, the local politicians were trying to establish who were and who were not leaders, so that they could target them for recruiting votes. Since most Muslim and Hindu organisations chose to seek membership on the executive committee of the BCCR, but only some of these won it, there were always some leaders whose organisations were not represented on the BCCR.

Therefore, competition between the Gujarati leaders for a place on the executive committee and an opportunity to achieve political influence over the white politicians contributed to the emergence of ethnic identities. This often fierce exposure of ethnic interests led to the emergence within the BCCR of a group of members who were assumed to support the policies of the establishment, and an opposition group who were committed to Gujarati and minority representation in all spheres of
local government. Thus Muslim and Hindu leaders became aware that their commitment to the maintenance of their ethnic identities was interpreted by white politicians as a rejection of the policy of integration and as attack upon the establishment. Thus the scene was set for the BCCR to provide a forum in which these leaders could compete with each other for funds and support for their organisations, could debate local and national government policies and could assert their ethnic identities within a political context. The key issues that faced both the Muslim and Hindu communities, BCCR and politicians included: who were the leaders? What kind of politically acceptable relationships could be developed between them? How could the politicians make political space for demands from the Gujarati leaders for political representation?

Leadership in the Gujarati Communities

In the context of race relations most work on leadership focuses attention on professional, business oriented and educated middle-class individuals (Anwar, 1979; Werbner, 1979). To gain an understanding of Gujarati leadership and their relationships with the politicians, it is necessary to recognise that, as a transformation took place amongst the Gujarati (and black) leadership the political arena provided by the BCCR increased in importance. This saw the removal of leaders who were "confident, educated and urbane" and their replacement by men who had jobs often of low social standing, if they had jobs at all, lived amongst their people, and above all placed great importance upon social friendships and religious and ethnic identities.

Anwar distinguishes between three types of leaders: formal, integrationist and traditional. Formal leaders depend upon their
occupation and status in British society" and "their role is mainly in inter-ethnic situations" (Anwar, 1979:172, 183). Integrationists are men mainly involved in forms of community work, have often experienced a longer period of education, have an urban background and wish to integrate with the white community (Anwar, 1979:173). Traditional leaders are the biraderi elders who depend for their support upon "age, length of stay in Britain, and the number of relatives sponsored and patronised" (Anwar, 1979:173-174). Their power derives from their kinship groups. These criteria are unhelpful when trying to identify Gujarati leaders, since he provides little information about leaders' political relationships with their community. The characteristics of formal leaders and integrationists, as described by Anwar, are little different from those distinguishing formal leaders from traditional leaders. The differences between these two types of leaders is that formal leaders and integrationists have weaker ties with those whose support they claim, but stronger ties with those they seek to join, the white middle class. The traditional leaders have strong ties with their kin groups but weaker ties with other potential supporters and with the white politicians. This means that another type of leader can be identified, who has strong ties with members of his community - a wider group than just kin - and weaker ties with other leaders and white politicians. I would argue that this typology is not useful, since the development of ethnic politics depends upon non-kin based structures of support and upon changing functions of leadership.

However, Anwar argues that "the question of leadership cannot be understood unless the divisions within the Pakistani population are grasped" (1979:171). With this I concur, since the same can be said about the Gujaratis. Without an understanding of the monolithic
structure of the ICC and Islam generally as compared with the more fragmentary, divided structure of the Hindu communities, it is difficult to understand the positions leaders occupy and their relationships within and without their Gujarati communities. Therefore, any analysis of Gujarati leadership needs to take account of the social identities of each community. To understand the change in the character of ethnic leaders of organisations, it makes sense to begin with an analysis of the leaders of ethnic organisations from the 1950s onwards, the second phase of settlement. By relating the development of ethnic organisations to the three phases (excluding the first) of settlement (Chap.1), it is possible to analyse the development of ethnic leadership in terms of an evolution in the functions of leadership rather than in terms of an evolution of types of leadership.

First and Second Phases of Settlement: Men of Influence or Integrationists

Bearing in mind that the first phase of settlement is pre-war, I am more concerned with the second phase. Gujaratis came to Bolton seeking a better life. Linked by their membership to particular communities, they supported each other in what was an alien environment. Initially, individuals who had abilities to communicate with these settlers and those in official positions quickly rose to positions of influence, since the people looked to them for help with finding accommodation, jobs and dealing with Local Authority Departments, the Home Office and the police. Such people were usually prominent doctors, teachers and businessmen. By social standing many were middle class and adopted the social trappings of a middle class life style (Anwar, 1979:173; Hill and Issacharoff, 1971:146). Some who were educated were looked up to and
became men of influence by virtue of the respect they received from their fellow Gujaratis and white colleagues. Others achieved positions of high standing by establishing businesses upon which many Gujaratis depended for essential ethnic items, like food and clothing. For instance they included an eye specialist, a teacher, two businessmen, and ACRO in the BCCR. Not only did Gujaratis seek help from them, but Asians belonging to other minority communities also sought their help, advice and support. The eye specialist chaired the first Indian Association, whose members were mainly Hindus. Since they were able to speak English and claimed to speak for Asians, they were treated by white Boltonians as if they were leaders.

These men shared the view that most Asians experienced similar disadvantages, that is they lacked essential information about the society they had just joined, they could not speak English adequately and their support for their ethnic and religious identities would only impede their absorption into British society. Furthermore, they also held the opinion that Gujaratis coming to or already living in Bolton should and would become increasingly integrated with the passage of time. They interpreted their role of leadership in terms of assisting their fellows through this process of change by helping them to find jobs, send money home, cope with problems of communication and settlement. In this spirit they devoted time, effort and money to establish associations, like the Pakistani and Indian Associations. They did not regard it as necessary to be informed about the opinions of the people whose support they claimed, nor were they interested in finding out what these were. Their main and overriding aim was to promote integration. Whether or not they were structurally in the most effective positions to do so is not relevant (Anwar, 1979:171) or important. There
is no evidence that they believed themselves able to do this and it was not their aim. The answer to the question: did they assist the process of integration of individual immigrants is in the affirmative. Paradoxically, they proved to be unable to perform or even to convince the members of the organisations they represented that integration was a useful goal, if a goal at all.

An important question is: how relevant was their role to the development of ethnic politics as a force in local politics? By having social standing in both their communities and in the white community, they became members of BCCR and found themselves assuming some of the functions of leadership. Some of them were entrepreneurs who hoped to gain clients, business or support from their communities in return for rendering what they considered to be a social service. However, in return they were being asked to take on the promotion of ethnic identities. Others were motivated by simply the desire to help their fellow countrymen. As these concerns gave way to new and more immediate ones, like unemployment, housing and poverty, the realisation that they were not interested in filling what was becoming an increasingly political function, only persuaded these men that they had failed as integrationists. Furthermore, Gujaratis were becoming aware that they lacked ethnic political representation.

Dissatisfaction with the integrationist leaders grew as the supporters rejected the philosophy of these leaders, which for most Gujaratis involved aims which were unrealistic, and failed to convey the problems and difficulties that they faced in their everyday lives. Most Gujaratis shared little in common with these so-called leaders. As the belief that integration might lead to a decline and disappearance of
that strong social, religious and political identities needed to be more closely related to the ideals of the Gujarati-in-the-street (cf. *The Empire Strikes Back*, CCCS, 1983). Thus the very social and religious identities that were antagonistic to the policy of integration now became important to the newly emerging Muslim and Hindu leaders of social and religious organisations. This change of view led to the downfall of the integrationists, who over time have become absorbed into the white community, only to be disowned and forgotten by their own communities. The personal difficulties which led to the development of relationships of dependence of Gujaratis upon them have been likened to that of patron or broker, which are reminiscent of that between *jajman* and *kamin* (Desai, 1963:57-60). Generally, few of these old style leaders chose to concentrate on issues that emphasised ethnic identities, such as halal food in the schools, cremation or burial of the dead within 24 hours. However, it was these issues which became increasingly important as members of these communities no longer saw their futures here in terms of a return to "home". Home was Britain.

The integrationists paved the way for the more politically acute members of minorities to gain political experience. As the ethnic vote became an important issue in local politics, the Local Authority had to confront the growing criticism of racism from Gujaratis. This gave local politicians the opportunity to seek votes by purporting to give leaders of Gujarati organisations access to political discussions about access to public resources. These discussions could only take place in the informal arena provided by the BCCR. These changes heralded the rise of a new style of leader, one of whose functions of leadership were regarded by supporter and politician as being overtly political.
Muslim and Hindu leaders took this opportunity to exploit the ethnic and religious differences between themselves to force upon local politicians an awareness of the importance of Gujarati participation in local politics.

The Third and Fourth Phases of Settlement: Alternative Leaders: Imams and Priests

In Bolton the third and fourth phases of settlement are more distinctive than the second. The second phase of settlement was a period of consolidation which witnessed the emergence and establishment of religious organisations (R. and C. Ballard, 1977: 35ff) that did not represent the interests of a single Islamic community, but rather of one of a number of Islamic communities. The same process took place amongst the Hindu organisations. Now community has a particular focus on a faction, caste or sect (see Chaps. 2 and 4). By the end of this phase a number of the Hindu and Muslim communities were looking for suitable buildings to use as temples and mosques. The Muslims had established their base at Zakariah (Peace Street) Mosque as well as at a number of other mosques, but the Hindus were struggling to find suitable places. Where suitable places could not be found, religious worship took place in private homes or rented halls. Most of the religious developments amongst the Hindus and Muslims took place during the third phase settlement. During this phase cultural differences were beginning to be valued. This view was in sympathy with the approach that was being taken nationally to education, to religious beliefs, and to political participation of minorities generally.

Before discussing the rise of the ethnic leader, there were other men who held positions in organisations and thus in theory had the potential
to fulfil the functions of leadership. Although a Brahmin doctor might seem to be the obvious choice as a leader, none have chosen to take on this role since the eye specialist did so in the 1950s and 1960s. A reason for their lack of involvement could be that they do not wish to establish a patron-client type relationship with people in various castes and religious communities.

Superficially, religious leaders held positions of authority and therefore, were in a good position to perform some of the functions of leadership. Within the Muslim and Hindu communities, the positions held by imams and priests potentially incorporate some aspects of leadership. Since imams in particular pronounce on the acceptability of social and religious behaviour, it is often assumed by white persons that they function as leaders. However, in the Muslim community, imams are the employees of individual mosque committees. Unless they have exceptional ability, they cannot take on the functions of community leadership. The appointment of persons with religious qualifications to positions in mosques (or temples) used to be regarded as a sufficient ground for the Home Office to give them permission to enter Britain without going through the full immigration process [3]. A religious leader’s permission to reside in this country was to a large extent dependent upon his continuing employment by a religious community. For instance the position of the imam in relation to the mosque committee and members was and is that of a servant to the congregation. Like a Baptist minister, an imam must lead his congregation in prayer. For an imam to lead socially or politically, he needs to possess or develop qualities that go beyond those required for imam-ship [4].

With such power mosque committees could pay their imams a bare
minimum. By doing this they not only saved themselves the cost of a living wage, but they also forced imams to seek employment outside the mosque. The net effect of this form of contract was that imams were at the mercy of their mosque committees. Consequently, there was little opportunity for them to rise to positions of leadership outside their rigidly interpreted role as prayer leaders. No imam in Bolton, with one exception, has succeeded in rising to a position of leadership, religious or political. The one man who managed to achieve a position of religious influence was the founder and principal of the darul-ul-loom at Ramsbottom. Infighting between Baruchis and Surtis drove him from the position of imam at Peace Street Mosque to establish his own religious school. Since it is located outside Bolton, his influence over local Muslims has decreased (see Chap.6). Though I met, spoke to and interviewed a number of imams, I met only two visiting swamis during the period of research. During this time no full-time priests were resident in town. One priest to whom I spoke, worked in a local paper mill and performed the appropriate rituals when called upon to do so for a fee. My impression was that priests played a small part in the political affairs of the Hindu communities. All of these organisations invited priests to spend time at and provided facilities for them to live in their temples. Two of these organisations later employed a full-time priest, but the others cannot afford to support such an appointment and usually their priests have stayed here for short periods. As priests were also employees of their communities, there was little likelihood of them taking on the role of political leader.

Both the Muslim and Hindu religious leaders had and have opportunities to establish strong ties with their religious communities, but the formal trappings of the employer-employee
relationship ensure that such a development of social ties could not easily occur. This relationship distances them from those who might become their supporters. Therefore, neither of these religious leaders was likely to become a political leader, unless they assumed the role of a charismatic leader. In general, opportunities for leadership fall to the temple and mosque committee members, since they have the power to control the imams and priests, and the opportunities to influence the views, attitudes and values of their members who depended upon them for a range of religious, social and community services. It is to such leaders that I wish to turn attention.

The Emergence of the Ethnic Leader in Local Politics

The emergence of ethnic leaders in the Hindu and Muslim communities owes much to the proliferation and consolidation of socio-religious organisations. Men were elected to positions in these organisations which gave them power to control priests or imams and to influence the attitudes and social values of their members. Since their positions were not religious but politically determined, the additional demand upon them to perform the function of leadership was a simple extension to their existing offices. Moreover, the existence of the informal political arena provided by the CRC to which they had access made the assumption of this function straightforward. Hereafter, when I use the term leader I shall mean an officer of an ethnic organisation who has in addition to his other responsibilities has taken on some of the functions of leadership. This raises a number of questions: one is to what extent could officers who represented an organisation chose to take on this function? Some like the Swaminarayans and the followers of Saibaba chose neither to seek positions on the BCCR nor to participate
in political debates. Another is: could any elected officer other than
the chairperson take on the functions of leadership? The answer to this
is that they did, if they believed that the situation warranted it and
they could profit by doing so. A further issue is were these so-called
leaders insiders or outsiders?

Leaders and officers of organisations which chose not to be
represented on the BCCR by choice excluded themselves and their
organisations from participation in ethnic politics. Those who sought
participation but were excluded on the grounds of belonging to factions
were less satisfied and often their officers found other ways of gaining
access to the BCCR. The proliferation of factions, castes and sects
that was taking place in the Hindu and Muslim communities (Chap.2
above) found a sympathetic ear in the BCCR, since it was taken as evidence of
integration. Therefore, the men who were accepted as representatives on
the CRC belonged to organisations which, the officers and members of
BCCR believed, represented community interests as opposed to factional
interests. Any person who was elected to a recognised position in such
an organisation and volunteered to act as a representative for it on the
BCCR gained access to this political arena. Without any formally
recognised system of selection of leaders from the ethnic communities or
operated by the CRC, the distinction drawn between the acceptable
leaders and those not considered acceptable was both a fine one and one
open to dispute. Unless a Gujarati could be accepted as a formally
recognised councillor or MP there was and still is no way in which
leaders from the ethnic communities can be identified other than by
haphazard and idiosyncratic selection systems.

Without repeating the argument about competition between leaders for
places on the BCCR, this created a situation in which representatives of organisations and individuals found themselves competing with one another and with no recognised means for resolving it within the BCCR or externally (see above). This system provided an underlying dynamic that matched the emergence of factions, mosques, sects and caste organisations. The issue of representation on CRCs, which was critical before 1970 (Hill and Issacharoff, 1971: Chap. 6) became much more contentious after 1970, since not only were the majority of Hindu and Muslim organisations seeking representation on the BCCR, but also the Bolton West Indian Society, Bangladeshis, Pakistani Association, Somalis and Kashmiri Workers Association were demanding places. The decision on whom to admit depended upon the professional judgement of the CRO and the existing members of the CRC, whose knowledge of ethnic organisations varied greatly. This dilemma over selection or election of representatives and organisations ensured that Gujarati leaders would become committed to competing for influence in the BCCR, with its members and with one another.

Officers of organisations considered representation on the BCCR as desirable for at least four reasons: firstly, it could help them obtain funding, directly or indirectly, for community projects. Secondly, it could provide them with access to a much sought after resource - a political arena. Thirdly, recognition by the BCCR implied recognition by some other organisations, such as the Local Authority. Fourthly, it provided them with a source of advice and help for a wide range of problems. Not being able to provide such assistance for themselves, the demand for representation on the CRC seemed to give those who had it an advantage. Therefore, officers from organisations representing different sects or castes or mosques belonging to the same religious community
could swamp the CRC. To create this situation was advantageous. Being aware of this, it made it all the more important for those who had representatives to win places for more representatives from their religious community. Since no one organisation could have more than two representatives, the way to increase representatives was to create new organisations whose officers would owe allegiance to the umbrella organisation.

One community whose leaders understood the dynamics and deployed it to advantage were the Muslims. The already existing factions, caste communities and sects, initially under the umbrella of the ICC, could separate into smaller units through a process of proliferation, or more precisely detachment. Detachment is a process by which a larger organisation can split into a number of smaller ones whose relationship to the larger one can range from co-operation to competition [5]. At one level these organisations share a common social/religious identity; at another they can develop their own identities. Depending upon the situation, leaders and members can opt for one of a number of possible social identities. Evidence of detachment can be seen in the structure of the Islamic community (Chap.2, Diagram 1). As the officers in charge of each mosque demanded representation on the BCCR, a situation developed in which there were more mosque representatives looking for more places on the BCCR than existed. In other words, the Muslims could have taken over the CRC. Within the monolithic structure of the ICC the facility of detachment allows for the proliferation of mosques without endangering the unity of the host organisation. If anything, this process strengthened the position of the ICC.

Although this process of detachment could be seen to operate in other
communities, such as the Hindu community, they were unable to make as good use of it as did the Muslims. An explanation for this is that there was no unitary structure around which the Hindus could unite. Another is that they had a strong leader in the form of Mr Sandhu, who dominated Hindu participation in the CRC without seemingly having to look for support from smaller Hindu organisations. The process of detachment works well when the community using it is a large one, ideally with members sharing a common set of beliefs. For small communities, such as the Pakistanis and West Indians, the process of detachment was of little use, since they were too small to accommodate more than one organisation. However, the Pakistanis and other small Islamic communities could be drawn into the process of detachment or unification through immersing their social identity under the umbrella identity of Islam. On the one hand, the weaknesses of this form of representation is that it provides an opportunity for a leader to become a "big man", an idea which all Gujaratis seemed to reject as unacceptable. On the other hand, detachment is a particularly suitable form of representation for the Muslim and Hindu communities, since as a process it opens the way for a religious community to segment into many parts and thereby exploit the process of democracy by swamping the CRC with their men.

I have claimed that the social characteristics of the men who functioned as leaders are similar to those of their supporters. Such a process of detachment would not work well unless those acting as leaders were similarly entrenched within their communities. However, it might also be argued that for leaders from different religious communities to co-operate, similarity of social background is not an advantage. An analysis of the social characteristics of leaders should enable me to distinguish between the different kinds of leaders.
Social Characteristics of Gujarati Leaders

In the course of the survey, I collected completed schedules from forty men who had been or were officers in Gujarati organisations. Twenty-five of them were Hindu and fifteen were Muslim. The majority of them had acted as representatives for their organisations on the Executive Committee of the BCCR.

In an urban society, race provides a way of expressing ideologies about economic and political relationships in such a way that they encapsulate a self-justifying circle of explanations about conditions, problems and contradictions faced by Asian, black and white people (Hall, 1981:35). Though the recession in the textile industry and related industries on which many Gujaratis depended for livelihoods was experiencing a crisis, it forced leaders to assess their interdependence upon one another and this encouraged the development of ethnic identities. To concretise their ethnic identities each community sought to establish a visible symbol of community togetherness, namely a mosque or temple. Competition for space became more intense than competition for jobs. This meant finding funds to purchase land and buildings, which led to even greater demand for the services of, and therefore access to, the arena provided by the BCCR. Gujarati leaders required a public and political arena in which to represent the needs of their supporters, and to compete with one another and the white community for public resources.

The aim of Hindu and Muslim leaders to establish the ethnic identities of their communities in a wider political arena in one sense
stood in direct opposition to the policies of integration, in another sense it was a logical step towards integration. From a white perspective integration implied the recognition and acceptance of cultural differences but with the acceptance by the Gujaratis of British political processes and goals. From the Gujarati point of view such acceptance meant a relegation of Gujarati social and religious identities to non-political arenas. That is there was no room for a Gujarati (or brown or black) identity within the local political processes and structures. This created a political vacuum or space between the Gujaratis and the white political hierarchy. It was into this space that these ethnic leaders stepped and the arena in which they could do so was that provided by the local CRC. Thus the ethnic leaders found themselves in a new political environment which militated against the philosophy and policy of integration, but which lent towards ethnic politics. While the integrationists stood outside the communities they represented, these ethnic leaders had to be deeply embedded in the social, economic and religious fabric of their communities in order to understand the needs and ethnic identities of their supporters. Their social characteristics were different to those of the integrationists. These men were responsible for the property and funds owned by their community, for any personnel they might employ, for decisions about certain essential services upon which their members depended, such as the quick release of a dead body by the coroner, the washing and preparation of bodies for burial, the burial or cremation itself, access to burial grounds, religious tuition for children of members, a place where social and religious gatherings of the community could take place. Competition for public resources to enable their organisations to support these commitments placed these leaders in positions where they had to become political.
One aspect of ethnic leadership is that political activity in the space between their communities and the white community does not necessarily separate these men from their communities. To be community based could be of greater advantage than to have close friends in the white community. Therefore, it is important to examine the social and structural characteristics of their networks to assess the extent to which they are similar to those of their supporters. An analysis of the structures of the primary zones of networks of leaders showed that they are similar to those of the people to whom they look for support. The average size of the zones of these Muslim and Hindu leaders are larger (7.6 and 7.08) than those of the total sample of Muslims and Hindus (5.1 and 5.6). A higher percentage (86.67%) of Muslim leaders' zones are complete compared to those of Muslim respondents (73%) generally. Whereas slightly fewer Hindu leaders' zones are complete (48%) as compared with those of the Hindu sample (54%) as a whole. Hindu leaders' zones include fewer (68%) homogeneous close friends than do those of the Hindus sampled, whereas more zones (80%) of Muslim leaders are homogeneous than are those (76.6%) of the Muslims sampled. The characteristics of these zones of Muslim and Hindu leaders enable them to better utilise ties between their members or to cross caste and ethnic boundaries than can their respective supporters. The characteristics of the Muslim leaders' zones suggest that they were at least as deeply entrenched, if not more so, than their supporters within the Muslim community. In other words they were in good positions to benefit most from the ideology of all Muslims being brothers. They could establish or lay claim to having strong ties with their supporters. In a different way the Hindu leaders, given the loose-knittedness of their primary zones, could establish more wide ranging and stronger
relationships with Hindus across caste boundaries than could their members.

To maintain strong relationships with supporters leaders have to meet them frequently. The average number of places where Hindu leaders meet their close friends (2.49) is above the average for that of the Hindu sample (2.12), and the same holds for the Muslim leaders (3.3, for sample = 2.84). A comparison of levels of intensity of zones of close friends of leaders shows that the proportion of Muslim leaders (73%) anchoring zones comprising a single level relationship is markedly higher than that for the Muslim sample as a whole (57.14%). However, only 36% of Hindu leaders anchored such zones, which is identical to that of the sample as a whole (35.92%). Further analysis of leaders' zones of one level of intensity shows that all Muslim leaders

Table 5.1: Degree of Connectedness of Leaders' Zones

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<td>8</td>
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<th>Close Friends</th>
<th>Ordinary Acquain-</th>
<th>Stranger Friends</th>
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<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%:</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
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<th>Closely Kin Close Friends</th>
<th>Close Friends</th>
<th>Ordinary Acquain-</th>
<th>Stranger Friends</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loosely connectedness</td>
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interviewed perceived of their close friends being linked by either ties of kinship or close friendship (100%) as compared with a lower percentage for the sample as a whole (87.5%). A higher proportion of Hindu leaders anchored strong single level zones (55.6%) as compared with a lower proportion of respondents in the sample as a whole (52.9%). The degrees of connectedness of leaders’ zones as measured by the weight of the optimum spanning trees indicated that more Muslim leaders’ zones are closely connected than are those of the Muslim sample as a whole (see Tables 5.1 and 4.29). Generally the connectedness of the Hindu leaders’ zones are similar to that of the Hindu sample as a whole, except that more zones anchored by leaders’ zones are loosely connected (see Tables 5.1 and 4.30).

The social standing of these men is of a similar range to those of the sample as a whole. Most of them are employed in jobs that fall within Class VII, that is "semiskilled and unskilled manual". These data bear out what has been said above about the characteristics of leaders and their close friends: the majority (60%) of the Muslim leaders are employed in similar occupations to those of their close friends (81.3%) (Tables 5.2a and 5.2b). More Hindu leaders belong to lower social classes (64%) than do their close friends (56%). These data are

Table 5.2a: Social Standing of Muslim Leaders and their Close Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of and No. of Respondents:</th>
<th>Class of Close Friends</th>
<th>Mean Class</th>
<th>Resp. %</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>10.71</td>
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<td>81.25</td>
<td>100</td>
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273
confirmed by the analysis of the social standing of leaders in relation to their close friends (Tables 5.3a and 5.3b). Above I suggested that

Table 5.3a: Social Standing of Hindu Leaders and their Close Friends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of and No. of Respondents:</th>
<th>Class of Close Friends</th>
<th>Class of Close Friends</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Resp. % 2</td>
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<td>III</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>6.78</td>
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Table 5.3b: Summary Analysis of Table 5.3a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Close Friends:</th>
<th>Above 177</th>
<th>Equal 51</th>
<th>Below 65</th>
<th>Respondents 61</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>28.81%</td>
<td>36.72%</td>
<td>34.47%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

the traditional leader whose support is kin-based is atypical of Muslim and Hindu leaders. Rather these leaders share with their close friends similar social standing within and without their communities. They are not seeking to join the white middle class, they are rejecting such aims in favour of aligning themselves with the grassroots in their own communities. This pattern of a return to grassroots to awaken religious and ethnic identities is the opposite of what one might expect. However, the change in the pattern of leadership between the 1960s and the 1970s can be explained partly as a reaction to the integrationists, partly a reaction to the new hardships of the 70s and partly as a return to grassroots politics as a consequence of their shared urban experience. From this analysis it is clear that the social characteristics of Mr Sandhu’s social network are different to those of the other ethnic
leaders. At the time he was the only outsider leader, and as such shared this characteristic with the integrationist leaders.

An Outsider as Leader

The search for identities gave rise to the emergence of a variety of ethnic organisations. Their members looked for men who would assume the functions of leadership without becoming "big men". The majority of Muslim and Hindu leaders were not "big men", although some aspired to being "big men". This allows for at least two extreme types of leaders to take on the role of leadership as opposed to the function of leadership: the one is the insider who becomes a dominant leader; the other is the outsider who is recruited to a position of leadership, because he is recognised as having certain qualities. Both Muslim and Hindu organisations can accommodate such individuals, but some can accommodate them more easily than others. It fell to the VHP to elect one such person to a position of leadership.

For some years before 1972 Mr Sandhu, a member of the BCCR, had spoken on behalf of the Hindus. He was the most prominent Sikh, a Punjabi, from a largely hidden small group of Sikhs. Although he lectured at a Manchester college, he lived in Bolton. Unlike most leaders of the day who moved into a Gujarati area of the town, where they remained, he moved from such an area to a white area, Darcy Lever-cum-Breightmet. His occupation gave him high social standing and as an articulate and well educated man, he was accepted as a leader by members of the BCCR, leaders of other Asian and black communities, local councillors and MPs. He was quickly elected vice-chairperson of BCCR. In this position he rose to prominence through his involvement in helping
Ugandan Asian refugees settle in Bolton. In 1973 he was invited to join the VHP, whose committee members stated that they wished to meet the needs of all Indians. He was elected to the position of chairperson; a position he held until 1979.

The election of Mr Sandhu brought a temporary cessation to the inter-caste rivalry that had bedevilled relationships between VHP members. As a Sikh, he could not be identified with a particular caste, although he was identifiable as an Asian. Of his ten close friends, only two were Hindus, the remaining eight being Sikhs. He maintained that his close friends were unacquainted with each other. In terms of connectedness, the primary zone he anchored was exceptional: it had an optimum spanning tree weight of 45. This made it the largest and most loosely connected zone of all in the sample. Like the leaders he replaced, he got on well with white politicians. However, a weakness was that he could not associate himself with caste issues. Some of those who elected him, such as the Mandhata Patels, found it difficult to reconcile his general approach to supporting the VHP with his inability to identify with caste issues. To the white politicians, he fitted their notion of what a leader should be: well spoken, politically acute, tactful and hostile as appropriate.

As chairperson of the VHP, Mr Sandhu was called upon to play a prominent part in many activities and projects. One of the most notable achievements being the uniting of members from disparate castes to generate sufficient funds and commitment to purchase and establish a community centre. In 1973 the VHP required a leader who could handle the complex negotiations between themselves and whoever had property to sell which might meet their needs for a community centre. As events
transpired, one building they favoured was St. Barnabas Church, owned by the Church of England. These negotiations brought Mr Sandhu into contact with white representatives of the Church and Charity Commission. They also brought him face-to-face with the public face of racism, through the public opposition he experienced to the purchase of the building from local people and a local vicar (see Chap.6). He persuaded the Church of England to sell St. Barnabas to the VHP, and in 1976 the building was purchased. The Press claimed that it was the first ever sold to Hindus by the Church of England. A few years later, it was opened with due pomp and circumstance before invited guests, who included the local MPs, the Mayor, councillors and many other prominent persons. During this time, he probably received more publicity in the local press than any other Asian or black leader before or after him. Consequently, he became the most respected and widely known Asian leader in Bolton.

Although it would seem to be difficult for a person who was not a Hindu to become a leader of a Hindu organisation, the VHP, of all the Hindu organisations in Bolton, was the one which could have accepted most easily an outsider as a leader. It claimed to be a multi-caste organisation. Although Mr Sandhu and his wife had personal contacts with members of the VHP, these were insufficient to provide him with the kind of support he required to overcome the inter-caste disputes that existed. He was fortunate in having the support and close friendship of the vice-chairperson, who was a well educated man holding a job of high social standing and a member of the largest caste in Bolton, the Mandhata Patels. He could provide the kind of support which was essential to Mr Sandhu, if he was to succeed as a leader of the VHP. They made a good team.
There were advantages and disadvantages to be gained by the VHP electing an outsider as chairperson. The main advantage was that they could hand-pick their leader; the main disadvantage was that without being tied to a caste he could develop the role of leader into something greater than just that linked to one ethnic organisation. This is precisely what he did later on. The position of leader of all Gujaratis or all Muslims or Hindus is one to which some leaders aspire. However, such a leader would attract criticism and hostility on the grounds that he wanted to be "big man". In this respect Mr Sandhu was no exception: he wanted to be recognised as a "big man". Eventually, some influential members of the VHP began to turn caste support away from him by criticising his handling of VHP matters, such as his management of issues arising out of a visit the VHP members made to the Isle of Man (Chap.6). This also gave some members the opportunity to allege that he might have misappropriated funds, an accusation which was never proved. He alone of all the minority leaders tried to form an association of leaders - a forerunner of today's Minorities Joint Consultative Committee (MJCC) -, but they were suspicious of his motives and failed to give him the support he required to become a leader of leaders. The result was predictable; he severed his links with the VHP in 1979 and moved away.

The Muslim organisations could also have chosen an outsider as a leader, but in practice they were reluctant to do so. When they do accept advice from an outsider, they are quick to disown or blame him for their misfortunes. Although during my period of research no such person emerged as a leader, in 1983 a Bangladeshi doctor began to play a prominent part in the Bangladeshi Association and as a representative of Muslims generally on the BCCR and in the local Labour Party. However, at
the 1989 annual general meeting of the BCCR he lost his seat, because the Gujarati Muslim representatives chose to vote against him. He believed that as a Muslim and a doctor holding a respected position in Bolton, his quest for overall leadership of the Muslim community would be unopposed. For an outsider who has no roots in a community to become a successful leader, he has to dominate the organisation and the community that chose him. This doctor assumed that deference to his position was sufficient to attract the support he sought.

For men, like Mr Sandhu and the Muslim doctor, who set out to be leaders without ties other than those that bind a voter to his/her candidate, support is determined solely by a tenuous thread which supporters can recognise or break at will. For leaders with ties in their communities the freedom to achieve success is limited by the constraints exercised by supporters through these same ties. In the 1970s the adage that most Gujarati leaders quoted was: "big men are bad". It revealed their deep distrust of other ethnic leaders and a recognition of the temptation on the part of leaders who aspire to being "big men" to be drawn away from their communities and towards the white community. To some extent these attitudes are supported by an analysis of the relationships between leaders and some their supporters.

Relationships between Gujaratis and their Leaders

I need to sound a word of caution. Those in this sample may or may not include one or more supporters of a leader. In the analysis to follow, the depth of support for a leader will not be reflected in the analysis. What the analysis will give is an indication of Gujaratis' knowledge of and readiness to support their and other ethnic leaders. In
theory leadership could take a number of forms. For instance it is feasible to recognise three kinds of leaders: a pan-Gujarati leader, a leader of the Muslims and the Hindus, or leaders of various community organisations. These kinds of leaders could coexist or one or two kinds could predominate. So far the analysis has shown that only the third kind of lead exists. One explanation for this is that "big men" are distrusted. Another explanation lies in the attitudes of supporters who themselves could not accept a leader who does not come from their community. Therefore, before concentrating on a detailed analysis of the relationships between leaders and supporters, I shall briefly discuss these other kinds of leaders beginning with the pan-Gujarati leader.

Generally, the leader who recognised the constraints of the ties within which he operated could remain in a position of authority in his ethnic organisation for a considerable time. The skills of leadership seemed to rest with the ability to administer to the needs of ethnic organisations and to function as leaders within the wider arena of the BCCR and the local political community. To replace a leader was a simple process, since in part the effectiveness of his removal depended upon the depths of his roots in his community. Muslims and Hindus believe that they can control leaders through social relationships. Implicit in their beliefs is the opinion that successful big men cannot be controlled through kinship and social ties. Such men achieved a prominence that enables them to rise above such control, since their support is drawn from a wider circle of people than those of their community. Thus leaders came and went, many hoping that events might bring them into prominence, a few seeking to work for the benefit of their own communities. Since neither the Gujaratis as a totality, nor their organisations, individually or together, are recognised as a
political entity, there was no political sense in establishing a pan-Gujarati leader. Furthermore, there was no political process available by which a pan-Gujarati leader could be elected.

Consequently, as a minority community they have no single leader and no single Hindu and/or Muslim leader. They are hydra-headed in the sense that there is no single identifiable structure of leadership, but rather a number of leaders competing for recognition as leaders. Gujarati leadership has been characterised by the rapid turnover of leaders since their arrival here to the present day. A number of the present leaders who were in positions of leadership in 1976, disappeared and later returned to prominence. As the political arena in which they strove for influence over the white politicians was an informal and developing one, their strength lay in the relationships between themselves and their supporters, between each other, and between themselves and the formally elected white politicians. Two factors increased the chances of becoming known: firstly, the size of their organisation and secondly, their presence on the BCCR. The larger the organisation and the broader its basis for recruitment, the more opportunity its leader had to raise issues of political interest to supporters and politicians. An attraction for the politician who took up a cause for a leader was the potential reward that might accrue in the form of support.

Competition between Muslim and Hindu organisations for public resources implied competition between leaders for support and for influence over those who controlled them. The supporters' ideas of how they and their organisations could obtain such resources were dependent upon their relationships with and knowledge of their elected officers.
Since the organisations developed initially in response to the social, cultural and religious needs of their members, elected officers had control over their members and the resources of the organisations. In theory and to some extent in practice they could control the social values and attitudes and beliefs of members of their communities. For instance, the leader of a caste association could try to control dowry payments, and with support he could outcaste members who failed to accept caste values (Chap.6). The ICC provided a range of facilities that formed a central part of the lives of its members, such as facilities for burial, control of a burial ground for Muslims, facilities for the young to learn the Koran, and appointment of imams. Likewise the VHP also endeavoured to offer a similarly large range of facilities and services, including a library, at one time certain health services for women and children, a place where its members could hold private functions, and employed a priest to look after the religious needs of the community. Thus elected leaders had considerable influence over the lives of their members.

The above analysis of the social characteristics of elected leaders showed that most, with the exception of Mr Sandhu, were more deeply entrenched within the social fabrics of their communities than were many of their supporters. They recognised the importance of having deep kinship and friendship roots within their communities to their holding on to positions in their organisations. Thus supporters' knowledge of leaders is an important indicator of their social standing as leaders.

The absence of a pan-Gujarati leader or leader of Muslims or Hindus can be explained by firstly, Gujaratis deep distrust of such men, secondly, by the absence of any kind of recognised electoral or
selection process, and thirdly, by Gujaratis commitment of support to their own communities. A detailed analysis of respondents’ acquaintance with and knowledge of their leaders supports this conclusion. A high percentage of Muslims claimed some form of acquaintance with chairperson (75.28%) and vice-chairperson (64.04%) of the ICC. Well over half of the Muslim respondents (65%) did not know the other Muslim leaders of organisations. Many had not heard of the chairperson of the Pakistani Association, who received as much press coverage during 1972-76 as did Mr Sandhu. As the manager of the first Muslim bank to be established in Bolton, his picture appeared in the local newspaper where his bank and its services were advertised. Yet 74 per cent of the sample had not heard of him. Only a small number of respondents (32%) had heard of the chairperson of Lena Street Mosque. He was the least well known of the Muslim leaders to Muslims and yet became one of the best known to the white politicians and BCCR (Chap.6). This bears out a point made above that generally the majority of leaders of Asian organisations are known only to members of their organisations.

Hindu respondents were relatively unacquainted with their leaders. The majority (63%) of them knew or knew of Mr Sandhu, which is not surprising given his prominence as a leader of the VHP and the one leader who received the most publicity. Under fifty per cent of respondents were acquainted with his vice-chairperson and they were barely acquainted with the other leaders of prominent Hindu organisations. Only 24 per cent of respondents claimed acquaintance with the chairperson of the Saibaba movement, even fewer knew of the officers of the Mandhata Patel Association (24%), the Shree Kutch Swaminarayan (21%) and Shree Swaminarayan Mandir (18%). Hindus knew the leaders of their organisations and a few had heard of the other Hindu
leaders.

Knowledge of leaders across religious groups was even poorer. No leader was as widely known to both Hindus and Muslims as Mr Sandhu, 10 per cent of Muslims knew of him as compared with less than 5 per cent of Hindus who knew of chairperson of Lena Street Mosque, the best known of the Muslim leaders. Most of the sample had not heard of the remaining Hindu and Muslim leaders, which points to many leaders having little contact with Gujaratis outside their organisations.

When respondents were asked whether they would be prepared to accept a leader from one of the four ethnic minority communities, most respondents expressed a preference for a member of their religious community. Thus the majority of Muslim respondents expressed a clear preference for a Gujarati Muslim as a leader as opposed to a Pakistani leader. Their lack of willingness to accept a Hindu was matched by an equally great reluctance to accept a Pakistani. This reinforces findings referred to above (Chaps.3 and 4), that Gujarati Muslims perceive themselves as being different from Pakistanis. The Muslims gave the impression that they would rather have anyone but a Sikh. Those who knew Mr Sandhu considered him to be anti-Muslim, a reputation he acquired when he expressed his opinion in the BCCR on how the Lena Street Mosque community should view the Local Authority’s order to close their mosque (Chap.6). Even those Muslims who did not support the chairperson of Lena Street Mosque regarded Mr Sandhu’s behaviour as evidence of his duplicity and were not prepared to accept him as a pan-Gujarati leader.

A minority of Hindus expressed a willingness to accept a Hindu as a leader. Generally Hindus gave the impression of not being committed to

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having a Hindu as an overall leader, which suggests that for most Hindus the basis of support is confined to their caste and sect communities. For instance this was reflected in the views of members of the Mandhata Patel Association, who were unwilling to join the VHP in a combined venture to establish a religious and community centre. With each one of these organisations having a considerable membership, together they could have generated sufficient funds and manpower to establish a centre. However, separately they had to approach the BCCR or other funding bodies for support. Therefore, when the VHP took the decision to buy a building for use as a temple and community centre, it made sense to chose an outsider for chairperson.

Leaders who represented their organisations on BCCR came to see themselves as an elite. As such to some extent they became acquainted with each other and with the politicians and others in positions of influence in the Local Authority. They were asked how well they knew the chairpersons and secretaries of eight prominent Hindu and Muslim and Pakistani organisations. Eight organisations were selected because, firstly, they are independent of each other; secondly, the chairpersons and secretaries with one exception live in Bolton. The vice-chairperson of the VHP lives in Blackburn, but had and still has roots in Bolton. The findings suggest that generally the Muslim leaders are better acquainted with other Muslim leaders than Hindu leaders are acquainted with other Hindu leaders. Most Hindu leaders (80%) for instance had not heard of the chairperson of the Shree Kutch Swaminarayan Mandir and 92 per cent had not heard of the chairperson of the Shree Swaminarayan Mandir. Furthermore, few Hindu leaders are acquainted with Muslim leaders, but almost a third of the Muslim leaders had heard of Mr Sandhu. Since these leaders had so little knowledge of each other, there
was little co-operation between them, even though their organisations shared similar interests, such as burial within 24 hours. Common interests brought the Muslim leaders together: they represented organisations which shared the same religious needs, and most of whom shared a common identity as members of the ICC and as Muslims. The strong ties of close friendship which linked them to their communities enabled them to develop weak ties with those who did not belong to their organisations and communities, that is with leaders and members of other Gujarati and Pakistani organisations as well as with white politicians and other white people holding positions of influence, such as those in the BCCR. The strength of these weak ties lay in the ease and little commitment with which leaders could establish them and then break them.

In practice, neither the Hindus nor the Muslims have a politically acceptable procedure by which they can elect a leader to represent them as Hindus or Muslims or as Gujaratis. This has proved to be the most difficult obstacle they have faced in their attempts to develop a structure of leadership. In effect, there exist as many structures of leadership as there are ethnic organisations. A difficulty that lies at the root of this issue of leadership is the view that no CRC could define or oversee an election system by which ethnic communities elected leaders. Communities have to devise their own electoral systems. Election to the BCCR involved a separate process which was not to select a leader but rather to select from amongst a collection of organisations a set of representatives. The decision to help ethnic organisations develop an electoral system would fall outside the responsibilities of a CRC. No political party wished to participate in this exercise, because it could lead to the creation of separate political units outside the party system, that is in the political space between these communities.
party system, that is in the political space between these communities within a community. The boundaries of this space can be inferred from the extent of Gujaratis' participation in recognised political processes.

Participation in Local Politics

The element of elitism derives from weak links that leaders established with the two MPs and local councillors. Direct access to councillors and their officers was viewed by Gujaratis as a desirable asset that should be possessed by their leaders. Though access to MPs and councillors within the forum provided by the BCCR did not guarantee that a leader's views would be heard, it did provide opportunities for leaders to negotiate with politicians. Thus an analysis of leaders' views of their relationships with the two MPs is instructive. Fourteen (92%) of the fifteen Muslim leaders questioned had heard of Mrs A. Taylor, and all had heard of Mr D. Young, then MPs for Bolton. Nine considered themselves to be acquaintances or ordinary friends of these two MPs. Whereas 76% (19) of Hindu leaders had at least heard of Mrs Taylor MP, but only 44% (11) had heard of Mr Young. Only eight Hindu leaders claimed acquaintance with Mrs Taylor and three claimed acquaintance with Mr Young. In 1976 an explanation for greater personal acquaintance of the Muslim than Hindu leaders with these MPs was that (a) they had called upon them at their surgeries more often for help than had the Hindus, (b) the MPs were always being invited to visit mosques and (c) after the Lena Street Mosque event (see Chap. 6), the Muslims believed that these two MPs were more ready to support them than were the Conservative councillors.
Muslim and Hindu opinions about Conservative and Labour Party policies may have been based upon misapprehensions; but broadly speaking they were similar: they supported the Labour Party, believing that it was sympathetic to their cause. Most respondents gave two major reasons for supporting this Party: first that the Conservatives had been against India becoming independent in 1947. The second reason was that many believed that the Labour Party was not opposed to immigration and was not responsible for the immigration laws (Layton-Henry, 1984:152-156; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979:87; Lawrence, 1974:138-140). This latter reason was the most commonly given one for their dislike of the Conservatives.

As the ethnic vote became increasingly important (Layton-Henry and Rich, 1986:104; Anwar, 1986:Chap.5; Layton-Henry, 1984:146; Anwar, 1980:14-15; Anwar and Kohler, 1975:10), the political parties not only sought to capture this vote, but some also supported Asian and black candidates in an effort to win ethnic votes. The power of the ethnic minority vote was felt for the first time in the 1974 election. In many towns where Asians voted, their votes swung control away from the Conservative Party to the Labour Party (Anwar and Kohler, 1975). Bolton experienced a similar swing which saw the Labour Party wrest control of the town from the Conservatives. It brought to the political scene Mrs A. Taylor MP and Mr D. Young MP, each of whom contested and won a seat in the two elections held during 1974, which they held until the constituency boundaries were redrawn in 1983.

Evidence of the respondents' support for political parties and the reasons given for voting show that these Muslims and Hindus voted Labour, a trend which they shared with Asian and black voters elsewhere (Anwar, 1984; Lawrence, 1974:138). This was borne out by the main survey:
the majority of respondents stated that they supported the Labour Party (Table 5.4). By 1976 both Hindus and Muslims supported the Labour Party.

Table 5.4: Political Party Allegiances of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Party</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total No. of Respondents</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo, 1983).

Generally, voting is a form of political participation available to all British citizens. In contrast to the large percentages of "don't know" and "do not vote" answers given by candidates to a Conservative Party canvasser in the 1974 election in Bradford Ward [6], the majority of Muslims and Hindus sampled said that they had voted in the General Election of December 1974. High percentages of both Muslims (81.7%) and Hindus (77.9%) sampled claimed to have voted in this General Election (Table 5.5). This commitment to political participation is reflected in a survey of electors of Asian origin carried out recently (Bolton Racial Equality Council, 1990, Bolton Metropolitan Borough: Survey of the 1990/91 Electoral Registers for Electors of Asian Origin). The commitment of this sample to voting in elections was comparable with

Table 5.5: Respondents who voted in the Second 1974 General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Hindus %</th>
<th>Muslims %</th>
<th>Totals %</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't vote</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just arrived</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo, 1983).

that of white electors. The number of respondents who did not vote was
small - Muslims (12.5%) and Hindus (20.8%) - and even fewer could not vote. This bears out the conclusion that Gujaratis' commitment to vote was (and still is) strong.

The Labour and Conservative Parties made concerted efforts to capture these votes. The problem they had was to find arguments to persuade Gujaratis to vote for them, while not alienating their white supporters. It is a trite observation that political parties depend heavily upon the involvement of their supporters, paid and unpaid, for their success in local and national elections. The involvement of Muslims and Hindus in political parties in 1976 had not led to the election of a Gujarati MP, although the Conservative Party had supported two Gujarati candidates in local elections (see below and Chap.7). Reference has been made earlier to two councillors, an Asian and Afro-Caribbean, who had been successfully elected (see above). Dr S had been elected in 1967 as a councillor in Little Lever, Bolton. He had stood as an independent, but in the 1973 local elections he stood as a Liberal. As events turned out, he lost the contest to a Conservative candidate. Since his success no Asian has stood successfully in any election in the town. The town has had only one other minority black councillor, Mr CB, a West Indian. Although he lost his seat during the early 1970s, he regained it and has served as a councillor ever since. Neither of these men represented minority communities, they represented their political parties.

Political parties were, and still are, reluctant to nominate Gujarati candidates in local elections. When they did, they put them into wards with established opposition majorities. Since 1972, the Conservatives have nominated two candidates, a Hindu man and a Muslim
woman. The lady and her family have been staunch members of the Conservative Party and have participated in party activities. For instance, they regularly canvassed for the Party in wards that had high numbers of Asian residents. Although the lady in question participated in BCCR activities, she was not directly linked to any Muslim organisation. Her work as a nurse and her attitudes towards the local Muslim communities separated her from them. She spoke English better than most of the men; attached little importance to notions of caste community membership, arranged marriage, the customary role of women and purdah, relationships between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, dowry, cousin marriage, and she was opposed to Islamic attitudes towards contraception. However, she regarded herself as a much stricter and better Muslim than most local Muslims. Thus, she was unlikely to attract the Muslim male and female voter, both of whom were committed to these social values and beliefs. Moreover, she was unlikely to pose a threat to other Conservative councillors, since she stood little chance of winning a seat in a ward in which the majority consistently voted Labour. Nevertheless, her nomination by the Conservative Party was both interesting, unusual and innovative.

The Labour Party has not nominated a single Gujarati to stand in an election, although it has provided financial and political support for Gujarati organisations. The Conservative Party has offered little direct support to these organisations, but it has provided opportunities for Gujarati candidates to stand in local elections. Overall there is little support for Gujaratis within the white dominated structures of these parties, therefore it is not surprising that the majority of them considered that they were "not strong supporters" of any party (Table 5.6). The data show that more Muslims than Hindus were "strong
Table 5.6: Respondents' Support for Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would you call yourself a:</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong supporter</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not strong supporter</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals:</strong></td>
<td><strong>154</strong></td>
<td><strong>104</strong></td>
<td><strong>258</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo, 1983).

supporters". To some extent this has been explained by the belief of Muslims in the Labour Party and the support they had received from it. Whereas the Hindus, possibly by coincidence, were not involved in events which could have been turned by either Party to political advantage.

Another form of political involvement open to them was as unpaid party workers. No more than 10 per cent of the sample stated that they were willing to be publicly associated with a specific party and only 3.9 per cent were willing to contribute to the work in a party office (Table 5.7). The difference between the kind of involvement of Hindus and Muslims is important; more Hindus than Muslims were involved in party offices, but more Muslims than Hindus identified with a particular party. The Conservative Party relied on them to use their personal influence to bring them votes in return for supporting two candidates in local elections. The Labour Party depended for support on the goodwill that their councillors and MPs could win through resolving personal problems and organisational difficulties.

The importance respondents attached to personal contact with MPs and councillors can be gauged from their responses to a question asking whom they would contact or what they would do if dissatisfied with a locally taken political decision (Table 5.8). Both Muslims and Hindus took the
Table 5.7: Respondents' Form of Political Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HINDUS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wear a rosette</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>put a poster in a window of house</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attend party meetings</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canvass &amp; campaign for candidates</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work part-time in the party office</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MUSLIMS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wear a rosette</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>put a poster in a window of house</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attend party meetings</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canvass &amp; campaign for candidates</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work part-time in the party office</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

opportunity to attend the surgeries of Mrs A.Taylor MP [7] and Mr D. Young MP. The majority of Muslims stated that, if they had a problem, they would contact the MPs first (79.8%) and then the local councillors (78.8%). It is significant that between 40 and 50 per cent of Muslims were willing to consider attending protest meetings and marches, campaigning against candidates and refusing to obey the law. If dissatisfied they were willing to become politically active and believed that they could count on a reasonably wide degree of agreement amongst themselves, as they are more ready than Hindus to consider positive forms of political protest [8].

An explanation for the lower percentage of Hindus who were prepared to contact their councillors (61.7%) and MPs (55.8%) should recognise that they had less contact with these politicians (Table 5.9). Unlike the Muslims, the Hindus have not chosen to confront local politicians.
Table 5.8: Dissatisfaction with a Locally taken Political Decision

MUSLIMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action:</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Depends</th>
<th>Dis-approve</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact MPs</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Councillors</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take part in protest meetings</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and marches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign against candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse to obey the law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

over decisions taken by the Local Authority. Most of their planning applications succeeded without requiring additional political support or the need to mobilise political opposition. However, many still experienced some feelings of insecurity, since coming here as refugees from Uganda, which may account for their reluctance to take a more positive political view.

Table 5.9: Dissatisfaction with a Locally taken Political Decision

HINDUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action:</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Depends</th>
<th>Dis-approve</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact MPs</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Councillors</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take part in protest meetings</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and marches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign against candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse to obey the law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To influence locally taken political decisions, Gujarati leaders had to establish personal relationships with local councillors and MPs. In general, the degree of contact between MPs and their Gujarati
constituents was low, this restricted the knowledge that the former had of the latter. The leaders and the led had commitments with which the politicians were unfamiliar. For instance some Hindu caste associations expressed a need for separate religious and community facilities from those of the VHP. This was interpreted as an example of factionalism by the politicians. Some Muslims expressed the view that the town ought to provide them with a community centre. This was dismissed as wishful thinking by the councillors. Many respondents expressed a need to have their own political representatives in local government. The response to this was that they had elected their representatives, mainly white councillors. When the respondents were asked if they considered the representation of their interests by local councillors to be adequate, the majority stated that they were inadequately represented, and most of these were Hindus (Table 5.10). These findings suggest that the Hindus, who give the appearance of being less involved with local politicians, are acutely aware of political issues. A small percentage (21% and 11%) of Muslims and Hindus thought that the councillors performed their jobs adequately and an almost similar percentage had no opinion to offer on the performance of the councillors. Both the Muslims and Hindus recognised their political disadvantages.

Table 5.10: Adequacy of Representation by Elected Councillors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representation:</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.04%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td>67.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer/Don't know</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.23%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo, 1983).

That the Muslims and Hindus were aware of their political position is borne out by their response to the form of representation that they considered acceptable. When respondents were asked to comment on the
form of representation they would like, their response rate was low (Table 5.11). If the "don't know" and "no answer" categories are combined, then between 42 per cent and 54 per cent of Hindus and Muslims respectively did not know, were not aware of or were uninterested in their achieving some form of positive representation in local politics. However, a significant number of Hindus (33.8%) and Muslims (34.6%) believed that co-opted Gujarati representatives would provide a solution to representation on local committees.

Table 5.11: Political Representation on Local Authority Committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian elected</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>councillors</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian co-opted</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>members</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo, 1983).

The election of one person to represent all Gujaratis, all Asians or all Asian and black people presented an insurmountable problem. Gujaratis could not accept a Gujarati who belonged to a different religious group nor a person who was not a Gujarati as a leader or representative. Gujaratis could not win representation in an election, since they did not dominate the voting in any ward. They also could not be considered for co-optation which was politically possible, because neither the Labour nor the Conservative Parties were willing to support such a tactic on the grounds that they were unwilling to give anyone a political advantage without their having to contest it democratically. The political party leaders resolved this dilemma by arguing that to co-opt a Gujarati would undoubtedly encourage factionalism. Barred from representation by the accepted political process and prevented from
selecting their own representatives for co-option, the Gujaratis were rendered politically ineffective. A solution to this situation lay in the implementation of the equal opportunity policy of the 80s and 90s. This only exacerbated the problems of representation, since it focused attention upon appointments and representation within Local Authorities, but failed to provide the minorities with political representation, power or even an agreed process for the selection of representatives.

The majority (62%) of Gujaratis expressed the view that they were inadequately represented nationally by MPs (Table 5.12), but a minority (21.3%) took the opposite view. More Muslims (31%) than Hindus (14)

Table 5.12: Adequate National Political Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representation</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>154</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo, 1983).

considered that they were adequately represented by the MPs. The greater use the Muslims had made of the MPs would explain this. When asked to give the reason why they thought that representation was inadequate, the majority of respondents did not answer the question (Table 5.13).

Table 5.13: Reasons for Inadequate Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons:</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of choice to vote for anyone</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No representation, discrimination</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language problems</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>154</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo, 1983).
reasons: "No Asian Members of Parliament", "They - Members of Parliament don't listen", "They only come when they want votes", "Different laws apply to us ", "Members of Parliament discriminate" and "They are prejudiced and misguided".

The Political Dilemma

During this decade changes occurred in the pattern of leadership of the Muslim and Hindu communities which saw the emergence of leaders who supported the promotion of the social and political identities of their organisations. This led to an increase in the demands made by Gujarati organisations, singly and collectively, for a greater share of public resources at a time when, on the one hand, racism was becoming more overt through the policies of the Government and Local Authorities, the activities of the National Front, and on the other hand, when the new concerns about poverty, inner urban renewal, underachievement and unemployment were being associated with the presence of Asian and black communities. Furthermore, politicians were actively looking for Gujarati and other minority community votes and there was a recognised shortage of funds for community projects.

The buffer that prevented Muslim and Hindu leaders from becoming more active participants in the local political process was provided by the BCCR. Politicians regarded ethnic leaders on the CRC as representing the social, religious and economic interests of their communities; they considered the community organisations to be non-political. The issues with which these men were concerned were political. Although they were in the best position to represent ethnic political interests, they could not gain access to a formal political arena, other than through white
councillors. However, the MPs and councillors who were less familiar with the concerns of the Gujarati communities had access to the appropriate political arenas. Gujaratis considered this representation to be unsatisfactory at the local and national levels, but they could find no acceptable alternative. There was no possibility of the Gujaratis, alone or together with other Asian and black minority communities, marshalling sufficient support for a candidate of their choice in an election, local or national. Therefore, those Gujaratis who had thought about this difficulty could only suggest co-option as a solution.

Thus the only access Gujaratis had to positions in the formal local political hierarchies was through local political parties. One consequence of this for these ethnic leaders and organisations would be a submerging of their ethnic identities and replacing them with white British political identities. Another would be the exclusion of their organisations and leaders from the formal political process. To expose the political space between ethnic organisations and local politically recognised structures, Gujarati leaders had to find issues which made explicit their exclusion from political activities. These issues were derived from events that involved members of the Gujarati communities. These events form the subject of Chapter 6. Debates about political responsibility for these events enabled Gujarati leaders to expose the political space between the formal white British political structures and the informal ethnic political structures of the Gujaratis: these debates form the essence of ethnic politics. In a sense they became micro-social movements, since in many instance those opposing a decision or seeking influence mobilised movements, real and fictitious, based upon alliances between leaders and supporters.
FOOTNOTES

1. The MJCC functions just like a buffer, but having the advantage of appearing to give minority representatives more direct representation.

2. Such issues as these encourage the militancy of Asian and black leaders then and since then. The equal opportunities legislation has done little to resolve this difficulty. Although recognition of inequalities by members of Asian and black communities have continued, the kinds of leaders who are emerging today are different from those of the 1970s and 1980s.

3. Within the last few years the Home Office has changed its position on the requirements laid down for the processing of applications from religious persons immigrating to Britain. Previously, a religious community could identify their particular religious need and a person possessing the appropriate qualifications. The Home Office would agree to the person’s entry, so long as he remained in the employment of the community that had requested him. Now such religious persons have to go through the same immigration procedures as other prospective immigrants.

4. The qualifications for imam-ship comprise a demonstrable ability to recite the Koran by heart. They have no need of additional qualifications, such as a knowledge of Islamic law or philosophy and are not required to hold a teaching qualification. Every adult Muslim should be able to recite passages from the Koran. Thus the skills of the imam are little different from those of any other adult Muslim, except that they they have chosen to teach children the Koran.

5. I prefer the term detachment to factionalism. Factions have been defined as possessing five characteristics: they are conflict groups, political groups, not corporate groups, recruited by a leader and recruited on the basis of diverse principles (Nicholas, 1965:28-29). I use the term detachment to describe organisations that in establishing their social identities develop an organisational structure, are corporate, are not necessarily political but could become so, are not conflict groups and are not recruited by a leader and are not recruited on the basis of diverse principles.

A number of CRCs experienced disruption as a result of factions attempting to take control of them by establishing representatives from their detached organisations as members, and thus gaining majority control on Executive Committees and Councils. CRCs that were disrupted include Rochdale, Sheffield and Brent; Local Authorities threatened others like Liverpool, Scunthorpe, Tower Hamlets and Cleveland with a withdrawal of their funding unless particular ethnic organisations ceased attempting to gain control of the CRC. The proposed new partnership between the CRE and
CRCs attempt to side step this issue by placing the onus of giving minorities greater opportunities for political participation on the political parties and other appropriate organisations by making the monitoring of such progress a duty of CRCs (Commission for Racial Equality, Community Relations Group of MSF and National Association of Community Relations Councils, A New Partnership for Racial Equality, 1989). Evidence that the new partnership has avoided this issue is to be found in Bury, Lancashire, where a chairperson has refused to stand down, having been voted off the committee, and now Bury REC has two chairpersons and two executive committees. The funding for this REC is due to be withdrawn shortly.

6. In the first 1974 General Election, during the fieldwork period, the voting intentions of Asians as compared with white voters in Bradford Ward (Table 5.14), a Labour-held ward, indicated that more intended to support the Conservative Party (22%) than the Labour Party (16.2%). However, these figures were collected by a Conservative Party canvasser; I have no comparable figures of voting intentions collected by a Labour Party canvasser. What is interesting about these figures is the large number of "don't knows" and "do not vote" responses, which is slightly below a similarly high set of responses received by a Marplan survey in Birmingham in 1977 (Layton-Henry, 1984:146). As in this by-election, the Asian voters in Bradford Ward were in a position to influence the outcome of the election. The canvassers took the view that the large number of undecided Asians pointed to a body of floating votes ready for capture. In the end, Bradford Ward remained firmly held by Labour.

Table 5.14: Voting Intentions of Europeans and Asians in Bradford Ward

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cons.</th>
<th>Lab.</th>
<th>Lib.</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>Do not vote</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Euro-</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1258</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>4418</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hahlo, 1983).
Source: Conservative Party Records of Returns

7. Mrs A. Taylor MP kept records of persons who attended her surgeries to get her advice and obtain her support. She estimated that during the year 1975-76, she held thirty surgeries and that of the average number of twenty persons who attended them, six were Asians (personal communication).

8. Recently the Muslims in Britain have shown that this is precisely the way they are prepared to act, if they do not agree with a decision, such as in their opposition to Rushdie's The Satanic Verses.
CHAPTER 6

LEADERS, LABELS AND EVENTS

In the first Chapter I began by arguing that Gujaratis established themselves in geographical space by settling in particular areas of the town and in British society through finding work mainly in the textile industry. In the next Chapter I show how they establish separate religious communities and extend their domination of the space in which they resided by purchasing buildings for religious and community purposes. In the third Chapter I argue that socially they have not extended their more intense relationships beyond their religious communities. However, I suggest that they reserve friendships of lower intensity for relationships with other Gujarati religious communities and for non-Gujaratis. In the fourth Chapter I argue that underlying these friendships are social perceptions of distances which enable Gujaratis to define who is a member of and who is not a member of their community. The concept of community as it is used here applies to a particular group of people who share the same place of origin (faction), a wider place of origin but the same religious beliefs (sect) or membership of the same caste (caste community/association). In the previous Chapter I mapped out the extent of Gujarati participation in local politics suggesting that they were politically stifled by having their political activities confined to an arena (BCCR) which could be deployed by the white politicians as a buffer. Thus they were separated from the recognised political arenas. However, in this Chapter I shall argue that this gave them an opportunity to develop ethnic politics in the space that separated their Gujarati communities from the wider community. This was one way in which their leaders could begin to establish themselves in the political space between these communities.
The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the events that provided the essence of ethnic politics which enabled Muslims and Hindu leaders to develop a political dialogue between themselves and the politicians. Events as used here are linked to occurrences that took place within the Gujarati communities and/or between Gujaratis and members of the white and other minority communities. It is not just what happened but also how the occurrence was debated by Gujarati leaders, the councillors, officers and other members of the BCCR and the Local Authority and other key people. It is the content of the debates that are critical to the analyses of events, because the content reflects perceptions of power and powerlessness. As such it points to the way that Gujarati leaders were seen to be trying to change social meanings. That is they were protesting about their lack or unequal access to public resources. The dialogue drew upon the language and symbolism of racism, open or closed, which was typical of the period between 1972 and 1976.

Katzenelson rightly observes: "It is at the local level that the newcomers, individually and collectively, have attempted to fashion new economic, social and political relationships that affect their lives directly" (1973:152). For too long the effects of racism in local level politics have been ignored or interpreted in terms of national level politics. Local authorities have succeeded in concealing ethnic politics within the wider political context, thus by implication devaluing the contribution and demands of local Gujarati leaders and the Asian vote on local issues. In the 60s local authorities were powerful organisations controlling vast resources and employing large labour forces. Those who made decisions on how these resources were to be apportioned to local residents had considerable power. The consequences
of decisions made by councillors had to be borne by these residents. Though such decisions were typical of all towns and cities in Britain, the decisions made by one town or city council effected only those who lived in its area. Therefore this Chapter is concerned with events that affected the everyday lives of Gujaratis, and were typical of events effecting Asian and black people in towns and cities elsewhere.

The question needs to be asked: to what extent are these events typical or untypical of Asian or black populations living in other British towns? By typical I mean that these events serve as a representative example of a particular type of response by a minority to decisions made by a white councillors representing the majority of an electoral community. Many of the concerns raised by these events are shared by Asian and black Britons generally. Connotations associated with the participants and/or their motives in some of the events are typically racist. The events involving Gujarati communities point to how they become targets for racism and how the language and labels associated with them symbolise racist notions about their social and political standing in the wider society. Typical, therefore, is a relative term and has levels of applicability. To what degree the "typical" events are unique to this Gujarati population is difficult to say without adequate comparative data. However, the kind of issues that provided the content of events seem to be similar to those that have been described by Gifford (1989), Ben-Tovim et al, (1986), Katznelson (1973), Beetham (1970) and those reported in the media, such as conflicts over planning permission for mosques, the single school debate, and halal food in schools. The events are centred on protest against local decisions, about unequal access to local public resources and to local power positions.
Furthermore, concentrating on local events meets the criticism that an analysis of racial and ethnic divisions firstly needs to be grounded and secondly needs to be located within a political economy framework (Solomos et al, 1983:12-13). By relating the analysis of racial and ethnic divisions to the negotiation of social identities and the allocation of political responsibility based upon local events, I am grounding this analysis in a political economy framework.

In Hall's view the features of "moral panic" that accompanied the experiences of British society, reacting to the problems of youth during the decades of 50s and 60s, could be extended into the 70s to account for the emergence of racism (1981:33-34). "...the moral panic crystallises popular fears and anxieties which have a real basis and by providing them with a simple, concrete, identifiable, simple, social object, seeks to resolve them" (Hall,1981:33). The language that was used to identify Gujaratis reflected some of the meanings associated with this panic and were given credence by the mass media and others who "man the moral barricades". What is not clear from Hall's analysis is that labels imposed by the white community had to be accepted, however willingly or reluctantly, by the Gujaratis. The time was right for Gujarati leaders to challenge the definitions of white common sense racism by asserting their political presence on the space between their communities and the wider political community. Since their politics did not take the accepted form of party politics, it is best described as ethnic politics.

On the one hand as a buffer separating the white politicians from the political demands being made by Gujarati leaders, and on the other hand
providing an arena in which politicians could debate these demands, the BCCR opened the way for leaders to challenge the power relationship between Gujarati and white and to argue that racism provided an explanation for their lack of access to public resources. Thus the extent of the politicians' involvement in these events is used by leaders to debate the degree of public commitment to the elimination of racism. As the critical position of the Gujarati vote in local and national politics became increasingly recognised as important, the leaders were able to exert influence over the politicians. Thus the logistics of the situation are that the politicians recognised a definable source of support, while the leaders became aware of their potential to "develop their own politics of resistance" (Hall, Guardian, 15/7/85). The relationship between the white politicians and their supporters could alter: to give too much support to Gujarati demands could lead to their alienating their white supporters and giving too little support to Gujarati demands might attract accusations of racism and lead to a loss of Gujarati support. Since there were no guidelines or policies or even a political wish which might have produced some commitment to involving minority representatives in local government, the debate about the allocation of political responsibility set parameters for the exclusion of ethnic leaders in local politics.

In addition to bidding for greater participation, local events allowed leaders to express the political needs of their organisations. Although national events stimulated thought and action, generally they bore little relevance to issues which highlighted the political needs of local ethnic organisations. National events made manifest racial issues with which most Asians and black people could sympathise and agree, for instance those associated with immigration and nationality. Local events
made manifest the imbalance in power relations.

The events themselves were not formalised in the sense of specific groups of people being invited to a public political event such as those described by Scott (1972/3:39). These occurred in the community and were brought to CRC meetings, because they raised issues of concern both at a practical and political level. Importantly, no national political decision could be taken to resolve them, they demanded some form of local decision. It is this locally arrived at decision that is of crucial importance, since it reveals an underlying pattern of racism that characterised Gujarati-white relations in Bolton. Irrespective of what local politicians said, the political decisions made by them showed that most favoured the white section of the community, even though at times councillors from one or other party may have given the impression of supporting the Asian and black section of the community.

The events selected illustrate four contexts of interaction to which Gujaratis attached importance in their negotiations over the allocation of power, at the root of which lie definitions about social and political boundaries (see Chap.4, Diagram 2). These boundaries are associated with social identities, those which are internal to the Gujarati communities and those which are external to them. The former relate to specific Gujarati social identities, and the latter relate to general social identities applicable to many minority communities. The second aspect of social identity is concern with a distinction between Gujaratis' conception of their community and the conceptions of others of minority communities - the "us" and "them" (Wallman, 1978:207; also Chap.4). These boundaries can be arranged conceptually along the two dimensions: namely perceived social distance in terms of specificity/
generality and community/minority. Thus four conceptual contexts emerge
whose social boundaries divide or unite Muslims with Muslims, Hindus
with Hindus, Muslims and Hindus (Gujaratis), Gujaratis with other
minority communities (as black people) and with the white community (as
Boltonians or Britons). What links these contexts together are ascending
and descending orders of social identities.

Symbolically, these contexts provide leaders and politicians with a
framework for interpreting and labelling events with a view to
allocating political responsibility. The intersection of these two
continua creates a model comprising four categories (Diagram 2 above).
In the first context are communities perceived by Muslims and Hindus
respectively as both socially close and sharing identities that are
specific - the "us". In ascending order in the second context are
communities which are perceived to be socially close but whose
identities are more generalised - the "us". In the third context are
communities which are perceived as being socially more distant but whose
social identities are perceived to be specific by others - the "them".
Finally, in the fourth context are communities that are perceived by
others to be socially distant and generalised - the "them"; in a sense
these are not really communities but racial targets - minorities. In
terms of these contexts details about families and family names, and
village, district, caste and sect organisations are regarded by
Gujaratis to be a private world of their own - the "us". These labels
indicate a level of community interaction to which only Muslims and
Hindus who are "in the know" have access. Muslims and Hindus do not have
access to knowledge about factions, castes and sects to which they do
not belong. Outsiders' access to knowledge about various communities
increases the contexts change from the "us" to the "them", that is
ascending the order of social identities from the specific/community to the general/minority.

One of the characteristics of common sense bodies of knowledge is that they comprise a language and labels which have a directional function. They carry implicit meanings about the social standing of those perceived to be Asian and black in relation to other minority and white communities. This knowledge provides participants in social situations with cues about the perceived dominant role of white people and the inferior role of those perceived to be black. If this view of power relations is to be challenged, the direction of change needs to redefine the language and labels. Since labels are attached to participants in public everyday situations, to change their directional content or meaning of a label, someone has to challenge and define them in a public arena, such as that provided by the BCCR. Since the BCCR was recognised and used by politicians as a buffer to control and contain the political demands of the leaders, this was also the appropriate arena in which to challenge labels that formed part of the trappings of social and political control [1].

A set of events were chosen because they involved Gujarati leaders and to a greater or lesser extent other Asian, black and white participants. Some events that attracted the attention of the media failed to attract the attention of leaders, others did not achieve media attention but found enthusiastic advocates amongst the leaders. Those events which the leaders championed were ones which they believed gave them opportunities to define power relationships. These events allowed leaders to marshal support, real or fictitious, of other leaders and other supporters. In this sense they were micro-movements within a much
larger political movement by Gujaratis to obtain political recognition. Thus, I have selected events for analysis on the basis of the following criteria:

i) they were public,

ii) their interpretation provided opportunities for the public definition of the power relationship between white and black,

iii) they provided Gujarati leaders with opportunities to challenge these interpretations and to negotiate for new identities,

iv) the aim was to allocate political responsibility.

During the period of the research a number of events occurred which failed to attract the attention of the leaders and white politicians. For instance a number of rape, assault and drug cases involving Asians and whites were publicised, but, apart from some leaders and politicians expressing feelings of condemnation, they attracted little attention. Some of the events which leaders and politicians debated made the headlines in the local press, and a few even made the national press. Fifteen events were selected which illustrate the range of negotiations of leaders in their attempts to challenge power relationships. The dynamic element in these contexts is the process of negotiation of labels that enabled Muslim and Hindu leaders and white politicians to define the political space between them and their relative political statuses (cf.Miles, 1982:60).

This political space is not neutral; it carries a high value based upon the experiences of Gujaratis and white peoples' ideas about common sense racism. The role of the buffer organisation is to devalue Gujarati ethnic politics and to stress the value of the recognised political system. Therefore, as a model for analysis I shall argue that the space
closest to the Gujarati communities carries the lowest political value (community/specific) and the space closest to the white community carries the highest value (minority/general). I shall analyse these events beginning with those that the leaders perceived to be closest to them, that is community/specific and shall conclude with those that raised concerns about racism which leaders believed were shared by other black communities, namely those that are minority/general.

(1) Community/Specific Events

Four events occurred during the period of fieldwork that were perceived by leaders to be matters to be resolved internally within the respective communities that few, if any, politicians heard of. Nevertheless, they all required outsiders to participate in the process of negotiation which led to their resolutions. They are as follows:-

Context: Community/Specific - "us"

(i) Baruchi vs. Surti take-over of Peace Street Mosque (1969-76).
(ii) Burial of a Hindu girl in Muslim part of Heaton Cemetery (1975).
(iii) The Outcasteing of Mr P (1975, 1976).

Baruchi vs. Surti take-over of Peace Street Mosque:

Much of the background to this dispute has been discussed (Chap.2: Muslims). The Deobandi Surtis sought to wrest control of all mosques under the authority of the ICC from the Deobandi Baruchis by gaining control of Peace Street Mosque (Zakariah). The position of Zakariah mosque was particularly important since it was both the first to be established in Bolton and the one which became the headquarters of the ICC. With individual mosques being controlled by either Baruchis or Surtis, whoever was in the majority in the area, Peace Street Mosque was
the only one which was not clearly controlled by either one of these factions. Therefore, the control of this mosque and the ICC implied control of Islamic affairs. Each faction sought to impose its will upon the management of affairs. For instance, with Baruchis supporting their view of how prayers should be conducted, who should lead the prayers and who and how their children should be taught Islam, control of the ICC became of vital importance. Surtis took a slightly different view of these matters. As each faction gained control of a particular mosque committee, they would remove the incumbent and invite an imam of their choice to take office.

Conflict between these factions goes back, at least to my knowledge, to 1969 if not earlier. Mr MD was the first imam of Zakariah Mosque appointed by a Surti committee. A year later open conflict erupted in the mosque between members of these factions and culminated in assaults, broken windows and the take-over of the mosque committee by Baruchis. Mr MD was denounced by the Baruchis and was removed from his position as imam. With the control of the mosque in the hands of the Baruchis, the Surtis were removed from positions of control on the ICC.

In 1976 the conflict between these factions again became the focus for a dispute which concerned the appointment of a Surti as an assistant imam to Peace Street Mosque. He was the nephew of a prominent local Surti, Mr Y.P. It began with a seemingly unrelated incident in which Mr L, a member of the Surti Muslim community, who came from the same village as Mr Y.P, was caught by the husband of a woman, it was claimed, he intended to rape. It was known to this community that he had had a long standing affair with her. It was reported that the husband of the woman found Mr L in his house and made him walk home without his
trousers. The husband, who also came from the same village as Mr Y.P and was a friend of his, was the paternal uncle of the prospective imam. The accusation of rape and the public humiliation of Mr L was interpreted by other Surtis as a way of settling an old feud between Mr L and Mr Y.P. The Surtis argued that by being with this woman, Mr L had hoped to bring dishonour upon Mr Y.P and to besmirch the character and credentials of his nephew, thus blocking his appointment to the position of assistant imam. This would have made him unacceptable as an imam in the eyes of the appointing Baruchi mosque committee.

To endorse their view of this imam's undesirability a few Baruchi members of the mosque committee wrote to the Home Office and the local CRC, with the intention of involving them as unwitting outsiders in the dispute. However, neither the Home Office nor the CRC responded to the letter. The CRC stated that this matter was an internal mosque affair and that the Baruchis and Surtis would have to settle it. The efforts of faction leaders to involve the Home Office, the CRC in their dispute failed, because in part the Home Office and the CRC had sufficient experience to avoid being drawn into such disputes, and in part the groups involved were recognised by the CRC (and possibly the Home Office too) as factions, and in part the CRC was aware that they would be blamed by the faction that lost the decision.

In his description of a similar dispute, Anwar observes that no solution satisfactory to both sides was found (1979:163-165). Both descriptions of disputes point to weaknesses in the conditions of employment of imams (see Chap.6; and Anwar,1979:164), who are at the beck and call of the mosque committee that appoints them. He also notes that outsiders like the CRC and police were involved. The crucial
difference between the course of the event in Rochdale and that described above is that in the former instance the mosque leaders were educated men with the knowledge and financial support to go to court (Anwar, 1979:164), whereas in the latter they were leaders with little education, unable to speak, read and write English fluently, with little financial support, but socially deeply entrenched within the social fabric of their communities. They appealed to no one person or organisation for a final decision, rather they endeavoured to manipulate influential outsiders into taking up a specific position. In this they failed.

This conflict continued into the 1980s when the ICC chairman, who first held the position of chairman in 1976, decided to charge Surtis £25 for funeral services while making them free to Baruchis. This prompted some Muslim factions and sects to dissociate themselves from the ICC on the grounds that the wording on the board that identified the Muslim part of the cemetery implied that the ICC had sole authority to decide who could be buried there. They argued that the words referring to the ICC should be removed from the board. Since no agreement could be reached within the ICC, this issue was brought to the BCCR to resolve. In debate this matter was referred to the ICC representative who reluctantly conceded that the ICC did not control burials in the cemetery. It was agreed by the ICC representatives to remove the offending words. However, the reluctance of the Muslims to settle this matter amongst themselves lends support to the argument that without any recognisable structure for political leadership, the laying of blame for such disputes on others - scapegoating - offered the only reasonable solution.
More recently, these two factions clashed again in the ICC over the election of officers to manage Makki Mosque. Not unlike the event described above, the police and CRC were involved initially at the invitation of members of one or other faction. Both organisations withdrew when they became aware of how they were being deployed. For reasons set out above, the imams were and are the least influential participants, although some have tried to take on role of peacemaker without success. When an ICC representative was invited to comment on this dispute in the CRC, he merely expressed his shame at the behaviour of his fellow Muslims. He indicated, however, that he would make no make attempt to help resolve the issue. As a Baruchi, he had led the debate to force Surtis to pay for burials, had participated in other faction disputes in the ICC, including the one at Makki mosque, and if anything, had helped to maintain disputes rather than seeking to resolve them.

The involvement of outsiders in these community/specific events has became a recognised tactic amongst both Muslims and Hindus, since in the space closest to the Gujaratis there are no internal or external community or political controls, such as an overall Muslim or Hindu or Gujarati political structure of leadership. Therefore leaders try to involve outsiders in such events, such as the local CRC, the police, the Local Authority and the Home Office.

(ii) The Burial of a Hindu Girl in the Muslim Part of the Cemetery:

This event was not unlike the previous one; it highlighted the lack of political controls within and between the Gujarati communities and leaders shifting such decisions on to outsiders in positions of influence. In 1975 funeral arrangements made by a firm of undertakers
for the burial of a stillborn Hindu child resulted in her being buried in the Muslim part of Heaton cemetery. The mistake came to light some six months later. Mr C.P, a member of the mosque funeral committee, protested that their part of the cemetery had been desecrated by this burial. He demanded that the body be exhumed and buried elsewhere. The Swaminarayan leaders responsible for the burial pointed out that nothing would be left of the child to exhume as the body had been buried in a sheet. When the parents of the child were told of the demands made by the Muslims, the mother collapsed with grief. Then Mr C.P threatened to use violence unless his demands were met. The Swaminarayan leaders suggested that as the child was stillborn, it was no more a Hindu than a Muslim. If the Muslims felt so strongly, to avoid causing grief to the parents and relatives, the child could be accepted into the Islamic faith without anyone being the wiser.

This event also never reached the open agenda of the BCCR or any other decision-making body. The BCCR mediated between the Swaminarayan leaders and the Muslims, primarily Mr C.P, and eventually brought about a reconciliation. The understanding was that the corpse would stay buried and treated as if it were that of a Muslim. The blame was placed on the undertakers. To prevent a recurrence of such an event, the CRO invited both parties to visit the cemetery to ensure that the signboards clearly demarcate the boundaries between Hindu and Muslim areas. No solution was found to satisfy both the Swaminarayans and the Muslims and no decision was taken by the BCCR or the politicians. Both the CRO and the white politicians considered that an aspect of the role of the BCCR was the prevention of and control of intra-Muslim and Hindu conflict. In performing this role the BCCR acted as a semi-political decision-making body.

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(iii) The Outcasteing of Mr P:

This event involving a caste association reached a climax during the period 1975-76. It can be separated into three stages - first, the decision of Mr P to separate from his second wife, and to marry for a third time; secondly, the family conflict that was set off by this decision, and thirdly, his decision not to go through with the third marriage, followed by the decision of the caste association to outcaste him and his family. The first and second stages have been discussed (Chap.2:Hindus), so the discussion will be confined to the third stage.

By the third stage Mr P had decided to withdraw from the marriage, but knew that his caste association, Shree Sarvodaya Samaj (UK), on learning of his decision not to marry this woman would outcaste him. In an attempt to avoid this he approached a variety of people for help, such as Mr Sandhu, who told him that the VHP could not influence a decision made by Mr P’s caste association. Mr P approached the chairperson of the ICC, but the latter declared that as a Muslim he could not interfere in the affairs of an Hindu caste association. By this time, overtaken by events, his caste association had outcaste him and his family. The letter sent by the caste association (Appendix III) instructing caste members to avoid contact with him and his family. In the opinion of a Pakistani barrister, to whom Mr P was referred by the chairperson of the ICC, the letter was libellous, but he chose to take no further interest in the case. Finally Mr P approached the CRO, who sent him to a local solicitor. The solicitor decided that the letter was libellous, but Mr P decided not to proceed with the case. He left the country for India in despair.
This event illustrates a number of pertinent issues. Firstly, it shows how a dispute between members of a caste community was seen by other Hindus and Muslims to be no concern of theirs. Secondly, this lack of willingness on the part of others to become involved points again to a lack of political controls, in this instance within the Hindu communities. Thirdly, it illustrates how outsiders were drawn into the dispute, so that they could be cast in the role of scapegoats. Finally it illustrates how a caste association attempted to exercise some control of the political space between communities. Like the previous event this one was not debated in the CRC, as it fell outside its remit. To resolve it the man and his daughter involved outsiders. This event is typical of others in this context. They are community/ specific events which cannot be settled by any organisation inside or outside the Gujarati communities or the white community. Instead disputants invite outsiders to impose a settlement favourable to them, so that the former might become unwittingly scapegoats. Frequently, such participants are kept in a state of ignorance, so that the Gujaratis can manoeuvred them into positions of support. Without any politically acceptable leader who or ethnic political structure for making political decisions, Gujaratis cannot resolve such disputes themselves.

(iv) The Lena Street Mosque Issue:

In 1973, the Planning Committee of the Local Authority considered a request from the Secretary, Mr A, of the Anjuman - E Islamma branch of the Muslim faith, to use a house in Ulleswater Street for the purposes of prayer until they could find suitable land on which to build a mosque [2]. The members of this group, who belonged to the Berelewi Sect,
wished to separate themselves from the Deobandi Muslims and become independent of the ICC. Till now they had attended for prayers at Tayaibah Mosque, a Deobandi mosque. Their application for planning permission was made, they claimed, in an effort to resolve growing conflict between the two sects who had to share the mosque. At their first attempt, the Planning Committee refused their request (BEN, 24/3/73) and this decision was upheld by the Bolton Corporation (Council after 1974) (BEN, 5/4/73). The sect reapplied for permission to use a house in December 1973, and again planning permission was refused.

In some towns Muslims have been allowed to use houses as prayer centres, but Bolton Corporation resisted this trend. Embittered, Mr A left town and Mr C took over responsibility for these Berelewis. Now known as the Anjumane-Ahle-Sunnat-W-Jumat and numbering about 200, they again sought planning permission to use a house as a mosque. This was again refused, so Mr C, who owned an old 'Co-op' store at the corner of Ulleswater Street and Lena Street, proposed that his sect should use it as a mosque. When he applied for permission for change of use of the property, the Planning Committee rejected his application. The sect were told to find other premises (BEN, 13/8/74). In defiance of the decision of the Planning Committee, these Muslims continued to use the Co-op premises, which now became known as Lena Street Mosque. Bolton Council served notice on Mr C to close these premises in Lena Street (BCCR Minutes, 23/8/74).

Now others became involved; the local white residents protested about the cars, noise and broken bottles in the area surrounding the mosque. In December 1974 an enforcement notice to close the mosque was served by the Council; the effect of which was that the sect had 56 days in which
to find alternative premises. Apparently, the Council should have served this notice on Mr C in August, 1974, but they were uncertain as to who owned the premises. Thus it was not served on him until December 1974. The penalty for ignoring it could be the imposition of heavy fines. Mr C said, "We are prepared to move to another building, if the Corporation will find us one" (BEN, 8/1/75). A few weeks later, Granada TV filmed the mosque and publicised the plight of Mr C and his sect (BEN, 23/1/75). The Conservative Chairperson of the Planning Committee criticised Granada for showing this film on their local evening news slot. What had begun as a community/specific issue had escalated into a major political event involving the Local Authority, the politicians, political parties, the sect and the residents.

The Conservative Council were politically embarrassed by the issue of Lena Street Mosque. Finally, when they served an enforcement notice on the sect, Mr C was advised by his growing band of supporters, who included the Labour MPs and councillors, to lodge an appeal against the order with the Department of the Environment. This had the effect of staying the order until a public inquiry could be held which could take a year or more. With help the sect effectively placed legal and political constraints on the Local Council. Thus a small powerless Muslim sect had defied the might of the Council.

Then the Trades Council joined in arguing that the sect ought to be allowed to stay in the Lena Street premises. They gave as a reason a letter they claimed to have received from Muslims suggesting that it was the National Front who were stirring up opposition amongst white residents living in the neighbourhood (BEN, 20/2/75). By now the dispute was three years old. The issues had become clear-cut: as one councillor
put it, "Can a minority of the immigrant community do just what they please?" and "Do planning regulations apply equally to members of all sections of the community?" (BEN, 6/3/75). Towards the middle of 1975, the Housing Committee were authorised to negotiate with the sect over the terms of the lease for a plot of land nearby on which they could build a mosque. The sect agreed to these terms, but it took a further five years before they had collected sufficient funds to begin the construction of the mosque. The building of the mosque was completed some five or more years later during which time they continued to use the "co-op" as a mosque.

The Lena Street Mosque event demonstrates how an event that began as a community/specific issue can blow up into a racial issue with political implications for the Muslims, the politicians, the Local Authority and the residents of the neighbourhood. Like other events in this context, the solution in part lay with the sect, and in part with outsiders. In this event it became clear early on that political intervention by the Local Corporation, councillors and MPs was unavoidable. Above all this event showed how ethnic politics can overlap with local politics. All the events required involvement by the CRC, which in a sense is part of the local political structure. In this instance no solution was possible without Local Council intervention. In the other events mentioned outside involvement was necessary, even though it did not always lead to a resolution. These events lie on the border of ethnic and local politics.

(2) Community/General Events

Unlike the events described above, the overlap of ethnic politics and
local politics in the resolution of events in this context was often necessary and often invited by the leaders. These events lay further away from the Gujarati communities in that community specific identities were submerged within more general religious identities. These events involved what from the white political point of view were recognisable organisations with some structure of leadership. On the one hand they appealed to the white politicians as organisations they could tap for votes; on the other hand they held a political threat for the politicians. Any move towards unity across a religious community, such as the Islamic or Hindu community, could provide ethnic leaders with a powerful structure of support. No politician wished to encourage such a move. Therefore, these events lie in the middle of this political vacuum between communities within a community. Five events which occurred are as follows:-

Context: Community/General - "Us"

(ix) The establishment of a Darul Uloom Al Arabiya Al Islamiya at Ramsbottom (1973, 1974).

(i) The Issue of Ramadan:

In the textile industry employers have to recognise that not all of their workforce accept the same religious holidays. The presence of a considerable number of Muslim employees means that they recognise holidays which were not part of the British calendar. The most important of these are the holidays associated with Ramadan. The difficulty with the fast of Ramadan arises from the interrelationship of firstly, the desire on the part of Deobandis and Berelewis to establish their separate religious identities. Secondly, as Ramadan is fixed by
means of a lunar calendar, the date of the beginning of the fast changes each year, and therefore, the date of the end of the fast varies accordingly. Finally, the days when they celebrate the end of Ramadan are particularly important and these take precedence over other activities. These holidays they take in addition to those fixed by their employers in accordance with local traditions and a Christian calendar. However, Deobandis and Berelewis cannot agree on the precise moment when Eid-u-Fitr begins. Berelewi workers prefer not to identify beforehand the day or hour when Eid-u-Fitr will begin, while the Deobandis accept the word of authorities in Morocco as to when Ramadan ended. The Berelewis claim that to be sure that the new moon had been sighted they should wait a further twelve hours before recognising the end to their fast. In effect this means that from the employers' point of view that on two consecutive working days a lower than normal rate of production will be achieved as a consequence of the observance of the same holiday by apparently the same group of people.

This issue should have involved the trade unions as much as if not more so than the employers. However, the unions keep themselves aloof from such issues, following a policy of non-involvement, although most of their Asian workers were members. The effect of this is that discussions about issues connected with Muslim workers have been treated by management and unions as unrelated to work. This strategy was perceived by leaders to be a form of racism. Thus the resolution of issues concerned with Ramadan have involved management, union officers, sometimes the CRC and the Muslim workers.

In 1977 and 1987 the CRO was again drawn into discussions with some mill managers over Muslim observances of Ramadan (BEN, 4/6/77) and on
neither occasion received support from the unions. A Muslim worker who had taken time off to pray during Ramadan in 1987 was sacked from his job and discussions failed to bring about his reinstatement. Thus, the situation of Muslim workers in the mills has changed little since 1974, when Mr Jim Browning, President of the United Textile Factory Workers Association, said in his opening speech of Pakistanis when they walked out en masse: "They are operating as a union within a union" (BEN, 26/4/74). Both councillors and MPs were involved in the discussions with the management of the mill who had sacked the Muslim worker in 1987. By excluding the Muslim workers from discussions about religious holidays, the management and the unions rejected the idea of Muslim-worker participation and have imposed their ideas about what is appropriate behaviour during working hours. Though the issue regarding Ramadan is raised each year, the mill employers have steadfastly refused to accede to the Muslims' demands. Muslims' protestations about the treatment they receive from mill employers have gone largely unheeded. In a climate where work is difficult to find, workers cannot afford to throw away their jobs. For the present there is little that these Muslim workers can do.

(ii) Muslims' request for facilities for 24 hour burials:

This event was initially of concern to the Muslims, but as it developed the Hindus, other Asian communities, the white community and the white controlled Local Authority were drawn into the debate. Although the Muslims made the demands, they shared an interest in obtaining a favourable decision with the Pakistanis, other Muslims and most Hindu sects, The Holy Prophet (peace be unto him) strongly urged Muslims to bury (Muslim Burials, CRC, 1975:6) or, if Hindu cremate, the
dead within twenty-four hours of death. During the week facilities for burying the dead within twenty-four hours are available, but this service does not function over weekends. Thus it is difficult for Muslims to meet this religious requirement. This prompted them to request facilities for burials to be extended over weekends.

In 1974 the Parks and Recreation Committee received a letter from the ICC requesting facilities throughout the week for twenty-four hour burials according to the requirements of their faith (BEN,24/4/74). Two factors influenced the decision made by this committee; firstly they were under pressure to economise on the service, and secondly they were providing over weekends a forty-eight hour burial service, which seemed to meet the needs of most people. No decision was reached at this meeting.

At their next meeting the Parks and Recreation Committee decided by a 6-5 majority to support in part the Muslim request by allowing burials to take place until 12.30 p.m. on Saturday. They decided to extend this facility to all religions (BEN,29/5/74). However, two months later, the same committee ignoring the protestations of a Labour councillor reversed their decision to allow Saturday burials (BEN,17/7/74). It was argued that this facility would add a further £4,000 to the ratepayers' bill. In support of the decision a Conservative councillor argued that industry was reducing its working week and not lengthening it. The vote overturning their decision in favour of Saturday burials was supported by a vote of 8 to 5. A month later, this decision was upheld by a Conservative controlled Bolton Council stating that they could not afford to add £4,000 to the rates bill (BEN,15/8/74). Most of the votes supporting the Muslims were cast by Labour councillors. Such
patterns of voting led Muslims to believe that the Labour councillors supported them, while the Conservatives were opposed to them.

A year later the CRC published a paper which advocated that local councils accept the additional cost and provide Muslims (and other religious groups) with Saturday burials (Muslim Burials, CRC, 1975). This policy paper also suggested that local authorities should employ a Muslim on their staff at cemeteries as well as giving Muslims a separate burial plot. Bolton Council provided the Muslims and Hindus with separate plots, but adhered to its decision not to provide Saturday burials and has not as yet employed a Muslim on its staff of gravediggers. The Muslims in Britain were interpreting unfavourable decisions such as the one made by Bolton Council as an "example of white prejudice and discrimination" (BEN, 13/3/75). The Council interpreted their decision as ensuring that the majority Christian community received the same facilities as the Asian one.

(iii) The Bearded Schoolboy:

This event involved a Muslim student in the final year of his CSEs who grew a beard as a sign of his intention to become an imam. Although the headmaster drew his attention to an unwritten rule prohibiting young men from wearing beards, at his father's behest the young man left his beard untrimmed. Then the headmaster asked him to trim his beard to what was described as scissors depth. With the young man's permission, the headmaster demonstrated what he meant by this. This act the boy's father's adviser, Mr. C, construed as assault and argued that the headmaster ought to be charged accordingly. Though the boy was agreeable to removing his beard, on Mr. C's advice his father refused to allow him
to do so.

The headmaster asked the father to provide written evidence that the student had to be allowed to wear a beard as a sign of his intention to become an imam. On receipt of this evidence he then agreed to allow the young man to return to school wearing a beard. If the evidence could not be provided, then the boy could return to school only after shaving it off. As conclusive written evidence could not be produced and as the boy was not allowed by his father to shave his beard off, a confrontation situation developed between the boy, his father, his father’s advisers, the headmaster and his advisers from the Local Authority Education Department and the BCCR.

Acting as adviser to the boy’s father, Mr C used this event to draw on the support of a local MP and a few Labour councillors to condemn the decision of the headmaster as being intolerant and discriminatory. Mr C sought the support of all Muslims arguing that the headmaster’s decision was anti-Muslim and proposed that the Muslims should hold a public demonstration against the decision outside the local Education Offices. Because he could not provide conclusive written evidence in support of his argument, and he received neither the support he wanted from the politicians nor that which he sought from the Muslim communities, the event fizzled out. Some three or four months later, the boy’s father was persuaded to send his son without a beard back to school to complete his schooling.

For both Muslims and headmasters the question remains unanswered: what should they do if a Muslim schoolboy chooses to wear a beard contrary to the rules of the school? In the above instance had the
headmaster agreed to the boy wearing a beard, under school rules he would have discriminated against white boys who were not allowed to wear beards. At a meeting of headmasters held in 1975, they established a ruling which left headmasters to deal with each case on its own merits. It did not satisfy the Muslim minority, who in turn were perceived by the headmasters, BCCR and politicians to be seeking rights over and above those of the white Christian community.

This event reached the BCCR committee agenda on three occasions and the religious subcommittee's agenda on two. The CRO, acting as mediator, intended to control the event so that it should not develop into a political issue. None of the councillors or MPs, who were drawn into this dispute, supported either the headmaster, the father or Mr C. The BCCR supported the headmaster in so far as recognising his right to make the appropriate decision. Furthermore, the mosque committee were aware that what Mr C intended was to develop this event into an anti-Muslim issue to show how the Local Authority Education Department imposed their ideas upon a Muslim minority. Furthermore, he had hoped to label the BCCR as being anti-Muslim and racist by their refusal to become involved in the dispute. This was the only dispute which reached the stage of becoming a protest march, albeit a small one.

(iv) The Purchase of St. Barnabas Church by Hindus:

The Bolton branch of the VHP was established in the early 1970s at a time when the Hindus had no centre of any kind in the town. Until 1974 they hired the Spinners Hall and other large halls for celebrations of social and religious occasions. As the Hindu population expanded the VHP expressed the need for a community centre, so they began their
search for a suitable building to convert into a community centre. Thus began the negotiations for St. Barnabas Church have been described above (Chap.2, Hindus).

The VHP planned to use the building for social, community and religious purposes. Later, Mr A, a founder and trustee of the VHP in Britain, was quoted as saying that he hoped the building would be used by other faiths as well (Guardian, 7/5/75). A week later a canon in a neighbouring parish sent a strong objection to the Church Commissioners, arguing that the church was a consecrated building. If the Hindus were allowed to use it for worship of their deities, doubt would be thrown upon the principles of the "absolute supremacy of Jesus Christ as God the Son" (BEN, 13/5/75). In the same newspaper Mr Sandhu is quoted as saying that the purchase of the church could only "promote racial integration and racial harmony in Bolton" (BEN, 13/5/75). A day later a white teacher criticised the views of the canon (BEN, 14/5/75). In June the building was sold to the Hindus and the Guardian newspaper hailed the event as setting a precedent for the Church of England (Guardian, 27/6/75).

The following year the VHP with the support of the BCCR obtained a grant of £10,000 from the Job Creation Scheme to improve the building (BEN, 24/6/76). Criticisms continued. Some objected to "immigrants" being given money to develop their religions; others complained of the noise, litter and parked cars, which were a nuisance whenever festivities were held there (BEN, 2/10/76). Finally after the alterations had been done, invitations were sent to councillors and MPs, heads of schools, members of other organisations and friends to attend the official opening by the Mayor on 23rd October 1976. Supporters and
critics of the scheme were publicly invited to attend the opening (BEN, 4/8/76).

In his welcoming speech Mr Sandhu talked about the position of the Hindus in Britain. "As a Boltonian today," he said, "I am very proud that my community, the Hindus, have contributed to the social and the cultural life of Bolton. Now we are in a position "to contribute more to the way of life of the town". We are prepared to "offer the services of this centre to Boltonians for integration which is so badly needed". We are "not here to assimilate" but to "integrate into the British way of life". By an "assimilationist" he meant an "immigrant" who "knows his place and is a "Yes, sir, thank you sir" person. He then went on to say that the building would be used for the same purpose for which it was originally built. However, he said, the "Church Commissioners had missed a chance to donate this building to us, we had to pay for it". Later he said, "This country is a haven, we are not carbon copies of assimilationists but we are integrationists. Give us a chance to show you what we stand for and are proud of". In his speech he described an "integrationist" as a person who keeps his own ethnic identity, but who through this Community Centre can contribute to the general social and cultural enrichment of the life of the people of Bolton.

What is interesting about these comments is that they show how Mr Sandhu stood as an outsider in the VHP and how he saw Hindus in relation to the white community. He referred to "my community", meaning the Hindus including Sikhs. By using the phrase "we as Boltonians" or "as a Boltonian", he was endeavouring to close the gap between the Hindus and the white Boltonians. The complaints about noise and cars at weekends prompted him to stress that Hindus were no different from any other
people. He referred to the complaints and said, "We are human beings, and we are learning to live in this centre."

Nevertheless, Mr Sandhu argued that there was a need for Hindus to establish their rights and their role. They could do this through integration. To assist Hindus through this process, those with property and wealth should help those who have nothing. He drew attention to the status/wealth gap with his remark that the building should have been given to them. It was not a sign of tolerance on the Commissioners' part to allow the Hindus to purchase the building, it would have shown tolerance had they made a gift of it. Similar views to those expressed by Mr Sandhu were also shared by Muslims, for they too believed that the town ought to have provided them with a building which they could use as a community centre and possibly as a mosque. In the eyes of the Hindus the relationship between immigrant and whites is one between unequals, in which the whites hold all the wealth and power and the Hindus and Muslims perceive of themselves as poor and powerless. However, none of the politicians or other representatives of the white community accepted this interpretation. They argued that all were equal and that the white community was not so well off as to be able to afford to give community centres to the Gujaratis.

This event involved an interest group, the VHP, with which councillors politicians and the CRC could sympathise. All could understand the need of the Hindus for better social and religious facilities. However, Mr Sandhu pointed to the changing position of the immigrant in British society and also stressed the differences in wealth between Hindus and the white community. However, the only opposition at the time came from local residents, who lived close to the
building and racists who lived elsewhere. Unfortunately the racists had a target now which they could attack; it suffered a series of arson attacks.

(v) The Establishment of Darul Uloom Khaleeliya Rasheediyaa:

This event had its roots in the struggle between Baruchi and Surti factions for control of Zakariah Mosque and the ICC (see above). When the Baruchis took control of Peace Street Mosque, the senior Imam, Mr M, a Surti, resigned. With the support of the Chief Imam of Manchester he and some others worked on the idea of establishing a school to train imams. At first he approached Bolton Council for a site on which to build a school, Darul Uloom Khaleeliya Rasheediyaa, but they were unable to provide a site (BEN, 21/12/72). A year later the Muslims found a suitable site: the old Aitken Sanatorium above the village of Holcombe, Bury, which was surrounded by lovely grounds on the edge of a desirable residential area, some ten miles outside Bolton. They found themselves in competition with people looking for housing on the edge of the countryside. The situation was set for a conflict of interests: the Muslims wanted a building nobody else wanted to use as a religious school, people looking for housing. Other participants included Lancashire County Council who were looking for a buyer for the sanatorium, and local councillors who were looking for votes for a local election and the National Front were looking for an opportunity to express their racist views. The Council approved the scheme and the Sanatorium was sold to the Muslims for a reported £115,000 (BEN, 18/12/73).

Before the sale could be ratified, a Bury councillor collected
signatures on a petition protesting against the sale of the hospital. The efforts of this councillor were matched by the National Front, whose members distributed pamphlets describing the sale as bringing a "Plague on Holcombe Brook" (BEN, 10/1/74). The Muslims replied to these allegations through the press by suggesting that the National Front should concentrate their attention on the vandals who were destroying their new premises (BEN, 18/1/74). An inquiry was called for over the price being asked for the hospital. It was claimed that had the sanatorium been sold publicly and not to a private buyer the price might have been considerably higher. Neither the petition of the above mentioned councillor, nor the activities of the National Front, nor a request for an inquiry into the methods used by the DHSS (DSS) to value its property held up the sale of the Sanatorium to the Muslims.

The National Front claimed that the presence of and demands by Asians had become a political issue. With national elections being held early in 1974, they made much of their racist stance to gain the support of voters' (cf. Le Lohe, 1976). Meanwhile, the Muslims obtained a building for the purposes of establishing a darul uloom, having successfully negotiated the purchase of a property for religious purposes. The fact that the sale went through suggests that many residents in the area chose not to support the National Front or the councillor who petitioned against the Muslims. The County Council and Health Authority who sold the property had no other interested buyers. By acting quickly they enabled the Muslims to purchase the property before local opposition could be mobilised. Many residents who were asked to protest lived some distance from the sanatorium; thus they were indifferent to it.

This event illustrates how the County Council, Health Authority and
many of the local politicians chose not to impede the process of the sale. An important factor was the desire on the part of the Council and Authority to sell the building. Having said this, Muslims united in an effort to see that the deal was successfully concluded. The event brought together all Muslims.

(3) Minority/Specific Events - "Them"

These events fall into the space that is even further removed from the minority communities. It is associated with community identities that are vague, and includes labels like Gujarati and Asian. It lies closer to the white community but carries neither the ethnic nor racist connotations associated with the space closest to the white community, such as the minority/general (see below). During the period 1972 to 1976 two events occurred which required Gujaratis and Muslims in particular to consider their positions within the wider society. These also caused some sections of the white community to assess their positions in relation to Gujaratis and Muslims. The two events are as follows:-

Context: Minority/Specific - "Them"


(i) The Asian Grocers' Dispute:

This dispute arose among the customers of a number of Hindu owned grocers' shops, who claimed that the shopkeepers were profiteering by raising their prices on rice and oil, two foods which are consumed by the majority of Asians. The prices had soared far beyond the rate of inflation by as much as 400%. Muslim customers wrote letters of complaint to the press (BEN,7/1/74), and formed themselves into an Asian

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Consumers Watch-dog Committee (BEN, 7/1/74; Guardian, 8/1/74). The shopkeepers responded by forming themselves into the Association of Asian Traders (BEN, 24/1/74). The accusation of price-raising by Asian shopkeepers was taken up by Asians all over Britain; here it took the form of Muslim accusing Hindu. The matter was brought to the BCCR and the members of the Asian Watch-dog Committee were advised to contact the Prices Commission in Manchester. Subsequently, the Asian Watch-dog Committee wrote a letter to the Prices Commission; a copy appeared in the local press. A month later the CRO reported to the committee that he had sent a letter on this matter to the Consumer Protection Committee in Greater Manchester Council.

It was decided to elect a Gujarati to represent the CRC on the Consumer Protection Committee, so that he could bring complaints from the Asian Watch-dog Committee to them. The intention was to advise Asians complaining of exorbitant prices on rice and cooking oil to write to the Consumer Protection Committee. This was done, but no letters were ever received by the Committee. Without letters from consumers, the Committee could do nothing and the issue faded away. This illustrates an event, which involved Gujarati complaining against Gujarati and which could be settled by an outside body, the Consumer Protection Committee. However, this intervention fizzled out, because the Gujaratis did not wish an internal matter to be resolved by an external body. The matter was dropped by both Gujarati and white and in time forgotten.

(ii) Children Playing in the Grounds of a Mosque:

An event which revealed the difficulties in labelling and defining of the socio-political positions of white and Muslim was an incident that
occurred at Zakariah Mosque in 1974. White children played cricket in
the grounds of the mosque and some windows were broken. Mr C, a member
of the mosque committee, had remonstrated with the children and
complained to some of their parents and the police. The police ignored
his complaints. So one day he took hold of a boy and attempted to remove
him from the grounds when the boy’s mother attacked him. This time the
police went to the boy’s home. Nothing further happened, as the police
were reluctant to become involved in conflicts between the white
residents, the mosque committee and the Muslim worshippers.

The problem was that by playing cricket in the grounds of the mosque
the children might intentionally or unintentionally damage the mosque.
The question was who would be liable for damages. The Muslims said that
the mosque was not insured for damage as it is God’s house. When this
issue was raised in the BCCR no decision was reached by the executive
committee, the mosque committee or the ICC. Other than the total
exclusion of white children from the grounds of the mosque, no other
suggestion seemed to be acceptable to the Muslims. Although this event
involved Muslim and white participants in a power struggle, the argument
that a mosque could not be insured seemed to put this debate into the
realms of ethnic politics. It was difficult for the Muslims to establish
that the onus for repairs for damages rested with the parents.
At the same time it was difficult for the executive committee or
councillors to grasp the idea of property that cannot be insured. Having
reached a stalemate all participants lost interest in the event and no
decision about recouping damages was reached or pursuit of the
accusation of assault followed up.
This final set of events fell within the space closest to the white community and the space most loaded with values associated with common sense racism. This was also the area that lay furthest away from the Gujarati communities and over which they had the least social and political control. By comparison the white community had the greatest social and political control over this space, which lay closest to this community. Four events can be identified as being initially labelled "immigrant". All of them raised issues about the definition of the power relationship between the Gujaratis and the white community. They are important since they highlight the link between the labels of immigrant, black, and the social identity of minorities and racism. These are:-

(xii) In-Company Language Training Scheme (1974).
(xiv) The Vishwa Hindu Parishad trip to the Isle of Man (1975).
(xv) "Farnworth girl paid to marry immigrants" (1976).

(i) The Arrival of the Ugandan Asians:

In 1972 Britain was faced with the prospect of receiving an estimated 30,000 Asian refugees, many holding British passports, from Uganda (Bristow, 1975:155-157). The political reaction to this ranged from hysteria to little more than a "defensive squeak" (Bristow, 1976:265). The policy for the reception of these migrants by the British Government has been summed up as comprising two opposing ideas: "no privileges but equal rights" and "stand on your own feet as soon as possible" (Ward, 1973:374). Other than providing settlement camps with some language support, the British Government offered little support to these refugees (Ward, 1973:372-375, 377-378).
Once here the intention was that these refugees would settle in towns with low concentrations of Asians and not in towns with high ethnic concentrations designated "red areas" (Ward, 1973:376). The Government’s policy implied that once the refugees left the settlement camps, they were on their own. "The problem", as Mr D. Lane the Minister responsible for the Ugandan Asian Relief Operation remarked, "is now in the community" (quote by Ward, 1973:377). The responsibility for settlement was passed onto Local Councils and local communities (Ward, 1973:376-377). Any help offered by Local Councils was welcomed, but this ranged from "fear of racial reprisals" and the inability of Local Councils in "red areas" to varying offers of support in "green 1 and 2" areas (Bristow, 1976:274-276). Time demonstrated that this policy of dispersal of refugees to Green areas was an unattainable ideal particularly as suitable housing was not available (Bristow, 1976:276). Although Bolton had an Asian population, it was classified as a Green 1 area (Bristow, 1976:274-276). So it could expect to receive refugees.

The white racist feeling in Bolton crystallised when someone set fire to a house that had been prepared for a Ugandan family. Together with a hoax letter (see below), this arson attack confirmed for some the real threat of white racism. This response was typical of that in many towns and cities and of many people from all walks of life (Bristow, 1976:267-270), supported by the activities of the National Front (Le Lohe, 1976). A former Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Arthur Bottomley, was reported as saying that Britain could not be expected to continue to accept refugees (BEN, 18/1/72) and in neighbouring Blackburn the National Front invited families to join a family march to protest against the decision to allow Ugandan Asians to come to Britain (BEN, 29/9/72).
Bearing in mind that the textile industry was experiencing a recession, the influx of more people in search of work only served to feed fears on greater hardships to come. It came as no surprise when the local Trades Council expressed the belief that the town could not accommodate more people (BEN, 27/9/72). Like similar fears expressed by councillors and MPs elsewhere (Bristow, 1976:269), the issues which worried white Boltonians were clarified in a letter to the local press (BEN, 22/9/72): there was no space, no accommodation and no jobs and, above all, Boltonians not the Government should be allowed to choose who should or should not come here.

Letters to the local Press raised questions ranging from why Bolton had not been designated a "red" area because it already had a large Asian community (BEN, 20/9/72), to those like that from the chairperson of the BCCR who argued that Bolton should lead the way by welcoming these refugees (BEN, 23/9/72). One person who signed himself "another Ex-Tory" suggested that these published letters revealed strong support for Powell MP's views (BEN, 21/10/72). Bolton Corporation stated that only 30 refugees had arrived by the beginning of October (BEN, 2/10/72). A week later the CRO reported that 60 had arrived (BEN, 7/10/72), and ten days later it was reported that this figure had passed the hundred mark (BEN, 17/10/72). In February of the following year it was reported that over 300 refugees had come to Bolton (BEN, 1/2/73) and the last family had arrived towards the end of the month (BEN 21/2/73). Attention has been drawn to the role of the Press in keeping racial issues on the public agenda (cf. Troyna, 1981). Here the Press played an important role in maintaining the public's awareness of racial issues by publishing reports (BEN, 7/10/72; 13/10/72; 17/10/72; 24/10/72; 7/11/72; 14/11/72;
24/11/72; 1/2/73) on the numbers of refugees arriving here. After the arrival of the last refugee family (BEN, 21/2/73), the interest of the Press declined suggesting that matters to do with these refugees were no longer newsworthy.

The resident Gujaratis welcomed these refugees: at a BCCR meeting Mr Sandhu offered to show refugees round the town. He made a plea for help and clothing, and invited local politicians to show a positive approach to the refugees by welcoming them. The question of assimilation of the refugees raised no fears amongst the Gujaratis, as they made it clear that they were no different from themselves. Most of the refugees were Gujaratis and many of these were Hindus (Chap.1; Bristow, 1975: 160). Language tuition classes were organised for them, and members of local Muslim and Hindu organisations helped refugees become acquainted with the town.

During this time an incident which involved two individuals bringing some refugees to Bolton and the conflict over housing served to maintain racist feelings. An apparently unique decision was made by a Muslim, Mr Suleman, and his friend, Mr Pomfret, who on their own initiative collected twenty-two Asians from a Resettlement Camp at RAF Stradishall, Suffolk, and brought them to Bolton (BEN, 26/9/72). These two men pleaded that they thought Bolton was ready to provide accommodation and that in their eyes it would be "a good deed". The following day the Borough Solicitor stated that Bolton would tolerate no more surprises. Both of the Conservative MPs stated publicly that no such occurrences would be tolerated. One MP asked the police to investigate the affair and the other asked Mr Carr, then Home Secretary, what he was going to do to stop the unauthorised entry of Asians into cities and towns
(BEN, 18/10/72). Both MPs were perceived by the public to have the interests of the white and not the Gujarati voters.

The quite extraordinary decision by Mr Suleman and Mr Pomfret - described as "another man" (BEN, 18/10/72) - forcibly raised questions about the power relationship between Gujarati and white. This event showed clearly how public debate led to the labelling of Mr Suleman, but not Mr Pomfret, as the culprit. It was unthinkable that two individuals could act on behalf of a town without consulting anybody, and that they could presume to confront the Government was even more astounding. One letter to the Press talked of "our immigrant friends" (BEN, 29/9/72), although one was a white person. The police at the request of one MP investigated Messrs Suleman's and Pomfret's actions with a view to prosecuting them, but the charge was dropped on a legal technicality (BEN, 18/10/72). Mr D. Lane, Parliamentary Secretary at the Home Office, assured Redmond MP, when asked in Parliament on whether or not individuals could take refugees from these camps on their own initiative, gave a detailed answer "making clear just what he thought of this irresponsible behaviour" (BEN, 18/10/72).

Although these two individuals removed at their whim some refugees from a resettlement camp - a decision which was technically one which only the Government could make -, the refugees could not be asked or ordered to return to the camp or directed to settle elsewhere. This showed that the Government had not prepared plans for settlement of the refugees and that here black Robin Hoods were not acceptable. It served to remind the minority communities that not only did many white people see Asians as subordinate and inferior, but also that their apparent acceptance was superficial and reversible. The Government chose not to
become embroiled in this affair and the perpetrators of this act were neither reprimanded officially nor prosecuted.

This event above others pin-pointed the space between communities within a community. It demonstrated how two individuals, the Gujarati being the man remembered for the deed, made a decision on behalf of the white community, the town and Parliament by going to a settlement camp and bringing to Bolton, an area not identified as a reception area by the Government, some Ugandan refugees. This served to force the politicians to face the reality that Gujaratis were part of the local population and wanted a say in decisions and to an extent this action also gave notice of Gujaratis lack of acceptance of the existing political structures of representation. Like with the three other areas of space between communities, nobody had direct control over this space. This event made apparent the weakness.

Racism surfaced when the CRO and the Local Housing Department began identifying suitable housing. It was the shortage of suitable housing that made local racism manifest: white Boltonians were on lists awaiting council housing but the refugees were going to be given preference without having to queue for months. The outcry from those white people waiting for housing provided racists with ammunition. One form of racism which fed on these fears was that of a hoax letter sent to the Withers, a family who lived in Breightmet. The letter purported to be from the Asian Resettlement Board and Local Housing Department informing them that they were to provide accommodation in their home for an Asian family consisting of three adults (two parents and a grandmother) and two children. If they refused to comply, the letter threatened that "proceedings will be instituted under the Race Relations Act" (BEN,
16/9/72). The family were frightened and eventually approached the Press for advice. This letter turned out to be a hoax and was apparently intended as a joke (BEN, 20/8/72). As the real name of the hoax letter writer never became known, it was assumed that a racist was responsible. None the less, it was symptomatic of the fear felt by many people and to which few gave expression: that Bolton was going to be swamped with black refugees against the wishes of the majority of the residents (cf. Lawrence, 1983: Chap. 2; Bristow, 1976: 267).

While some houses were made available immediately to refugees, many had to wait their turn in housing queues. Frequent reports appeared on the decisions of neighbouring local authorities on the availability of housing. A climax was reached in December 1972, when Asians were accused of harassing old folk in order to force them to sell their homes. Mr Redmond MP (Bolton West) was reported in the Press as saying that Asians were "waving wads of notes under the noses of old people in an effort to persuade them to sell their homes" (BEN, 1/12/72). In an attempt to substantiate the claim the CRO searched for an old person who had been pressurised into selling his/her house; none was found. Two leaders, who were asked to comment on the MP's statement, condemned it. Both Mr Sandhu and Mr M (ICC) argued that it branded "Asians as old folk harassers" and as such could only harm white-Asian relations (BEN, 7/12/72). Both made public statements saying that if they learnt of such behaviour, they would use their influence to stop it (BEN, 7/12/72). This issue gave leaders opportunities to become publicly involved in the debate over the refugees, since it labelled the Gujaratis as exploiters of the weak. By siding publicly with the white voters and the racist vote the two Conservative MPs damaged their personal and party image in the eyes of the Gujarati voters, who sympathised with the
refugees. The consequence of this was that in the first General Election held in 1974 Reed MP lost his seat to a Labour Party candidate. Mr Redmond's hold with a majority of 603 votes on his constituency was tenuous. He had taken a strong line in the accusation of Asians' harassment of old folk, and his constituency included four large Asian wards, Derby, Halliwell, West Ward and Rumworth. At the second General Election in 1974 he lost his seat to A.Taylor, a Labour Party candidate, and Bolton became Labour represented at Westminster.

An outcome of the arrival of these refugees was that Bolton remained Labour controlled nationally until 1981. When after another local government reorganisation, Bolton was reorganised into three constituencies, one being a safe Labour seat and the other two supported new Conservative MPs. At one time it appeared that the two Conservative MPs lost Gujarati and white support whenever they responded to racial issues. However, the pattern of support is changing and now the Conservatives are attracting both white and Gujarati support, which suggests that the pattern of voting in the Asian and black communities is changing. From a class perspective, certain changes in the pattern of voting can be traced to an upward trend in home ownership and privatisation of health and education in the white, Asian and black communities (cf. Hamnett, 1989:209; Saunders, 1989; Harloe and Paris, 1989). For many years Asians have been committed to home ownership (Dahya, 1974; Desai, 1963) and give the impression of being committed to a similar philosophy in their attitude to private education for their children.
(ii) The In-Company Language Training Scheme:

In 1974 an event occurred which highlighted the Gujaratis' hostility to decisions that associated them with the status of "black immigrants". A discussion was held at a BCCR meeting on the proposal of the textile industry to mount what became known as the In-Company Language Training Scheme. The scheme was intended to provide English tuition for Asian workers in their time. They were assumed to be unable to speak English and therefore to require tuition in English. The complexity of the event was compounded by the participation of leaders from the Gujarati, the Pakistani and Afro-Caribbean communities. The labels that were used by these leaders in the discussion were politically oriented towards defining the political status of Asians and black people in terms of their powerlessness.

On learning of the scheme, the leaders protested because it supported their experiences that white employers assumed that they knew what was best for their workers. Implicit in the debate was the assumption that all those who were not fluent in English could be labelled immigrants and as such were perceived as black, inferior, uneducated and should be grateful for all the help and the support the white community offered whatever the price. The debate began with Mr F, a West Indian and vice-chairperson of the BCCR introducing the issue of representation:

"The textile industry is discussing the possibility of offering classes in English to immigrants in their own time. The industry is not interested in involving the religious organisations in these discussions."

Mr Sandhu: "Why haven't the management approached us about this scheme? The Indian and the Pakistani communities are the people to go to."
The employers' perception of Asians did not include discussing the scheme with them or their representatives. Mr Sandhu made the point that, if these employers wanted to discuss schemes that concerned Asians, even if they were regarded as workers with little knowledge of English, they would still have to deal directly with them. The attitude of the employers was a positive indication of the low standing in which they held these workers. He rightly assumed that no employer would be keen to approach Asian organisations, because firstly, they were not part of the work situation, secondly this would not involve union representation and thirdly, this would place the discussions outside a trade union framework. Locally, many Gujaratis spoke of how the unions and employers worked together against them. While the unions reaped the benefits of Gujarati membership, they ensured that their views would be represented by white officers. Thus employers continued to discriminate against these workers, since a non-union organisation could not come between management and unions. At the same time this strategy placed organisations whose role it was to represent the interests of Gujaratis and Pakistanis, such as ethnic religious organisations and the BCCR, on the outside of the work situation. The political implications of this management strategy were that by not recognising leaders of different community and religious organisations, employers forced those working for them into joining unions and thereby coming under the control of the unions.

Both Mr F and Mr Sandhu suggested that the view held by workers was that their trade union would represent their interests, while management would oppose them. However, the trade unions were seen by most Gujaratis to side with management against them. Therefore to accept this proposed language scheme would be tantamount to accepting racism as practised by
the management but through the offices of unions. As Mr F made clear: these employers were prepared to involve and recognise the CRC, which they saw as a white organisation with no influence in the work context, but they were not prepared to approach the Asian workers' organisations.

The BCCR was asked to select two Asians to sit on the committee that would manage the training scheme. This raised the question "Why should the BCCR be seen to be responsible for selecting Asians to represent workers from the Gujarati and Pakistani communities on a committee to manage a scheme designed by white employers?"

Mr Sandhu: "Who are they? Who will select them? They will be just rubber stamps. They represent nothing."

The idea of two Asians representing the interests of all the Asian communities was unacceptable (see also Chap.5). No leader could accept the idea that another leader could represent the interests of a community to which he did not belong (Chap.6). Above all, the idea of one Gujarati leader or representative representing all Gujaratis was totally unacceptable.

Mr Sandhu reiterated what other leaders had said: "Big men are not good. No Asian can represent the interests of all Asians and even those, such as himself, cannot adequately represent the members of the organisation who elect him. This underlines another recurrent theme which is that Gujaratis and other ethnic minority groups cannot be adequately represented by white politicians, locally or nationally."

The independence of various ethnic minority groups from each other and the CRC was recognised by the following comment:

Mr C.P and Mr Smith: "Immigrant communities go their own separate ways."

It was decided that the selection of the two representatives should be passed back to the employers. The employers were sent a list of
addresses of Asian organisations, so that they would contact the very organisations they were endeavouring to avoid.

Mr F's next question about the composition of the committee reaffirmed Mr Sandhu's point: would the Asian representatives just become rubber stamps? If these two did not represent workers from the Asian communities, what would be their role on the committee?

Mr W (white) and a West Indian: "Are all the other members on the committee to organise the scheme white? Send them the addresses of the various Asian organisations in town."

Then Mr F asked the questions that most of the leaders present at the debate might also have asked:

"Why are there no Indian foremen?"
"Why are there no immigrant representatives on management?"

These questions reiterated what everyone present knew: the majority of employers and unions would not accept the appointment of an Asian or black person as a foreman, manager or union representative. They recognised this as an area in which racism was institutionalised. The debate had the effect of confirming publicly that the BCCR would not support these employers without recognising the racism that they accepted and practised, even though the project sounded like a good idea.

The debate now moved to a discussion of leaders' understanding of employers' views of the status of Asians generally. The employers were suggesting that Asian workers should attend classes in their own time and not during working hours. The implication of this was incorporated in Mr Sandhu's next remark:
"The training should be in the firm's time, not in that of the immigrants. Why shouldn't the firms pay for this training?"

He went on to say that if the employers wished their workers to have training, then whether or not they were immigrants, the firms should have to pay. It would be to their benefit if their workers could speak English. If the role of the unions was to oppose management on behalf of the workers, why had not the unions opposed this scheme which was taking advantage of the inferior position of the black workers? This issue had already been touched on.

Mr W and Mr Sandhu: "We should see the management as in the role of the opposition and the unions in the role of benefactors".

Mr F went on to dissociate the BCCR from the stance taken by the textile managers and to make an important point about how these white employers might conceive of the Asian worker:

"English is just a charity commodity. It would not be offered for the sake of the immigrants but for the management's convenience."

This drew a remark from one of the Muslim leaders, who observed that he could survive within the confines of his community without any need to use English.

Mr M: "Why should I learn English? I can manage my job and shopping without it. So why worry about English".

The question about English being treated as a charity commodity made the point that the status of the givers was superior to that of the receivers. Employers considered Asian workers to be of such low status, that they could be seen as recipients of charity. This highlighted for the leaders the difference in socio-political status between white and
Asian and black as understood by employers who were seen as racists. This was taken by the leaders to be the ultimate insult.

Now the leaders addressed the issue of their response to the offer by the employers. Mr W argued that any negative response by immigrants to a white designed scheme would be interpreted unfavourably as a rejection rather than as an invitation to be treated as equals. He went on to observe: "Were immigrants to fail to respond to the scheme, they would be considered to be uninterested by management. It is a white scheme". In other words Asian workers who are perceived as being black are not regarded by employers as sharing the same rights as white workers, since it was expected that their response to a white employer-led initiative should be to treat it as a favour.

It was left to the VHP leader to make two highly significant remarks. He was the first and only person to point out that Asian women worked in the mills and that they might benefit from such a scheme.

Mr Sandhu made a further observation: "What about women? They would also benefit from such a scheme. It is a better life for those people who can speak English than those who can't".

Nobody had thus far made any reference to women. He went on to suggest that the lives led by those who could not speak English might be as satisfying, if not more so, than the lives lived by those who could speak English. With no women representatives present and no other leader who was willing to take up the concern expressed about women workers, their point of view was not voiced and Mr Sandhu's concern for them did not endear him to the other Asian leaders.

His next observation summarised the sentiments of all those present:
patronisation works best when the patronised can express their gratitude in a language that is understood, English.

Mr Sandhu: (very angry) "The scheme was produced because we immigrants can't speak English. There is a fair representation of immigrants in the community who can't just say, "Yes, sir; thank you, sir".

He was in favour of the scheme only if it was paid for by employers in terms of time and cost and would be made available to women. At the same time he regarded it as an attempt by employers to belittle Asians by placing the onus on them to commit themselves in their time and with their money to learning English. Then they could demonstrate their subservience through their presumably inadequate usage of the language. Mr Sandhu's sentiments were endorsed by all of the other leaders.

The final resolution accepted by the committee took account of this view and it also contained the following suggestions: that all language training be given during a period of induction; that any language training given to workers already employed should be given in the firm's time; that the minorities should be adequately represented - names and addresses of all organisations be attached to this resolution -; and finally, that Asian women working in industry should also be included in the scheme.

The employers accepted some of the opinions expressed by these leaders and the scheme was brought into being. The workers could attend during work hours and it was financed in part by employers with the Local Authority Education Department providing premises for the staff. Once in operation it was held up as one of the best in the country. It still exists and offers appropriate language tuition to both men and
women within and without the firm's time but funded by them. In addition, it offers cross-cultural communication and anti-racist training courses to managers and supervisors. A further development has been business courses offered to Asian and Chinese businessmen. This was one of the first of such schemes to take their teaching to the factory floor.

To reiterate, all the leaders were intent upon making clear their views on the strategy employed by the employers. Therefore, some leaders used labels like black or immigrant or Asian to describe the workers. Had more specific labels been used, the discussion might have led to a fragmentation of support.

(iii) The Vishwa Hindu Parishad Trip to the Isle of Man:

This event relates to an accusation of racism that was made against the Isle of Man police arising out of an incident that occurred on a trip members of the VHP made there in 1975. Among places visited by the Hindus on the island was a church in which there was a statuette. After the Hindus had left the church on their way to another place, the statuette was discovered to be missing. When the party of Hindus arrived at the quayside to board the ferry, they were "searched" by the police looking for this statuette.

Mr G and Mr A, who led this party of six hundred Hindus, gave the police permission to search the party and told them that they would assist wherever possible. Mr G reported later that the search was carried out with everyone's agreement. When it was concluded, he asked the constable in charge of the search for a letter stating that the
The statuette had not been found. On the 30th of June, 1975, Mr G and Mr A received copies of a letter containing the required statement and thanking them for their co-operation. At a meeting of the VHP committee, Mr Sandhu was told by these men that they were satisfied with the conduct of the police. Mr G said, "The police are all powerful, so why resist?" However, Mr Sandhu (who did not go on this trip) rejected this explanation and took up the issue of the police search at a BCCR meeting.

At a July 1975 meeting, Mr Sandhu complained that a party of Hindus had been searched by the police, but that the white couriers and other European visitors, who were also there, were not searched. "This was therefore a blatant instance of discrimination." The CRO suggested that Mr Sandhu make a complaint in writing to the Chief Constable of the Isle of Man. This he did sending copies of the letter to the BCCR, the MPs, councillors, the Mayor and the Home Office. In it he argued that the search of the Hindus was not only racially discriminatory, but that it was also an insult to Boltonians. This argument persuaded the councillors at the meeting to support him; they too felt insulted by the conduct of the Isle of Man police. "After all," he said, "the women and children were searched by the police in full view of everyone on the pier". He regarded the search to be an insult to himself, to the women and to any self-respecting person. So he persuaded the meeting to instruct the BCCR to send letters in support of his protestations to the Governor-General and Chief Constable of the Isle of Man.

This event also needs to be seen in terms of tensions in the leadership of the VHP. The course of action proposed by Mr Sandhu contradicted that of the two men in charge of the excursion. Mr G hinted
at this when he said that Mr Sandhu's wish to make an issue of it was an indication that he was not prepared to listen any longer to the members of the VHP. Mr G took this opportunity to express the view that the VHP were becoming dissatisfied with Mr Sandhu's leadership. He also claimed to have visited a Lohana member of the VHP committee to discuss how they could combine to remove Mr Sandhu from the chair. "After all," said Mr G, "he is a Sikh, he is not a Hindu. His religion is different from ours. So we shall let him buy the temple (St. Barnabas Church) for us and then we shall remove him". After Mr Sandhu had negotiated the purchase of St. Barnabas for use as a community centre, he resigned from the position of chairperson voluntarily. A few years later, he left town and went to live elsewhere. He had served the Hindus well.

Mr Sandhu's management of this event is both complex and his tactics ensured that the councillors and BCCR would support him. His quest for decisions which underlined the inferior-superior power relationship between Gujaratis and white people was a form of protest. Suffice it to say that this event, like the previous one, raised issues with which most of the leaders could agree. As an outsider leader Mr Sandhu's use of labels and identities was different to those of leaders who shared identities with their supporters.

(iv) "Farnworth Girl Paid to Marry Immigrants":

This event focused the attention of all of the leaders and the white members of the BCCR on immigration and all that it symbolised in common sense racism. From the point of view of the Asians immigration control is associated with queuing and hardships for the families concerned. For the white community immigration is linked to ideas of control of the
immigration of Asians to Britain. This event associated ideas of control with local fears of large numbers of Asian migrants waiting to come to Bolton. Thus it served to rekindle these fears.

In 1976, an emotive headline appeared in the local press, which read: "I was paid to wed immigrant - girl" (BEN, 7/4/76). It was reported that a white girl in Farnworth was being paid to marry immigrants, so that they could establish their right to remain in Britain. This was followed by another story on a local Pakistani, who stated in court that he had paid £1,000 to obtain a passport to provide him with entry into Britain (BEN, 15/6/76). Although these reports were mentioned at CRC meetings, they were not discussed and no comment was made by the politicians or leaders. Both events might have provided opportunities for leaders to protest against establishment racism. Had they done so, they might have been in danger of confirming white fears that the entry of Asians into Britain was not being effectively controlled. It served no useful purpose to heighten people's awareness of attempts being made by some migrants to avoid immigration controls and to enter the country illegally. Therefore the leaders avoided all discussion of such events. Had some identifiable hardship been mentioned, then their reaction might have been different.

Any discussion of these events by the politicians could only serve one of two ends: firstly, it could result in their becoming identified as racists and secondly, it could show them up as representatives of the people who are prepared to overlook irregularities, which might have antagonised their white supporters. Therefore, no one could profit from a debate on these two events. This held for many events that involved immigration to Britain and the conduct of the Home Office and its staff.
The uncertainty of the outcome of events in this context was highlighted in 1976 when leaders and BCCR members debated what a Mr F. Patel, a Muslim, was reported in the press as having said. He stated that "immigration should be stopped, because there are not enough jobs to go round" (BEN, 28/5/76). It was reported that he favoured a reduction in the numbers of immigrants coming into Britain, so that those already here might experience greater security. This would clarify the position as to who is a migrant and who is British. "If immigration were allowed to continue", he was reported to have said, "racial clashes could result and resentment would arise between the employed and the unemployed. There were not enough jobs to go around and he was in agreement with some of the things Enoch Powell MP had said" (BEN,28/5/76).

Most leaders' attitudes to Mr Patel can be summed up by Mr Sandhu's comment: "Mr Patel has a choice. He can pack his bags and leave and give other people a chance. People from East Africa holding British passports have nowhere to go except here. At least the people from India and Pakistan have a choice. We must allow Asians in even if it means cutting down immigration from other countries". Mr Patel was cast in the role of virtually a traitor to his people. Other leaders, including Mr M (ICC), joined Mr Sandhu in criticising Mr Patel. It was reported that he was threatened with assault by Muslims if he ever repeated such statements. Not one of the white councillors participated in this debate, because the leaders were in effect criticising one of their own people for making statements that echoed those of racists.

Events, Contexts and Decision-Making

These events are a collection of apt illustrations of a number of
small protest movements by Gujarati leaders of various organisations about their lack of access to public resources as a consequence of their being excluded from positions of political control. The dimensions of this debate can crudely be separated into events which highlighted the space between Gujarati communities within a community. This space can be separated in relation to the labels used by Gujaratis and white politicians into four areas, two which are closer to the Gujarati communities and two which are closer to the white community. Nobody has any political control over this space and therefore it invites intrusion by ethnic leaders. As such it offers scope for ethnic politics and places a political emphasis on "us" and "them".

"Ethnicity is the recognition of significant difference between 'them' and 'us' " (Wallman, 1979:3). Such apparently simple notion of a complex symbolic system of identity when associated with a notion of boundary generates further apparently simple notions of boundaries between two social systems (cf. Wallman, 1979:6). If this notion of social boundary, or of any boundary, is followed through to a logical conclusion, then it should surround an entity, be it a social system or a group of people or a body of knowledge. In this sense the social boundary separates those who share a system, community and body of knowledge from those who do not. A further implication of the concept of social boundary is, Wallman suggests, "subjective in that it inheres in the experience of participants" (1979:6). She argues that these experiences arise from interaction involving those who are located on both sides of a boundary (1979:7). The labelling process involves at least two sets of participants and two bodies of common sense knowledge. Labels enable leaders and politicians to concentrate upon the interrelationship between their social identities and their experiences.
The urban experience of Gujaratis has underlined the political separation of their organisations from those in formal political hierarchy. This in turn reinforces their awareness of powerlessness in relation to the power of the white community. Thus any protest by people perceived of as black which avoided the creation of a negative image had to take place within a closed and informal political arena, such as that provided by the BCCR. The constraints of this arena ensured that protest marches and demonstrations were difficult to stage, but controlled protest about the ways in which Gujaratis found themselves treated could be made. Ethnic politics is not just about riots, but about peaceful debate which is aimed at changing social meanings in the public sphere. Thus the events elected highlight different aspects of protest over issues that are beyond the control of Gujarati leaders and politicians to those which lie within their remit as well as that of the MPs and the Government.

The aim of the final Chapter is to consider how Gujarati protests have been constrained by their community organisations, by the local political hierarchy and to what extent this has led to changes of meaning of common sense racism.
FOOTNOTES

1. The contexts of events presuppose that there are internal and external labels. The internal ones are used mainly by Gujaratis and others who are in "the know"; the external labels are used mainly by members of the white community. Over time and through friendship or knowledge an outsider can become acquainted with labels used by Gujaratis. Such knowledge is shown through the correct usage of labels.

2. Bolton Corporation did not approve of sects or religious groups using private premises for religious gatherings and worship. Therefore, they did not approve the use of the house in Ulleswater Street as a mosque and insisted that the sect find either more suitable premises or land suitable for the building of such premises.
CHAPTER 7
ETHNIC POLITICS, PARTY POLITICS AND RACISM

The aim of this Chapter is to provide a conclusion to the previous Chapter and the thesis. I shall treat these two aspects of the conclusion as one. I shall take the view that the strategies adopted by various Gujarati leaders were in part constrained by their own ethnic organisations, in part by the existing political structure, in part by the BCCR and in part by their initiative and lack of political experience. The events described above (Chap. 6) are the culminations of a number of grassroots protest movements by Gujaratis which separated them from the political parties by virtue of their colour and culture, their lack of participation as party members, and their commitment to their own ethnic organisations. A difficulty with grassroots movements is assessing their success; analysing the strategies used by leaders forms part of this assessment. Therefore I shall begin this Chapter by analysing the strategies of Gujarati leaders, and then consider the wider aspects of the social constraints imposed upon them by their own organisations, perceptions, social networks and the general political situation.

Events represent grassroots protest movements in microcosm: they began with an incident which sparked off a debate about power in terms of some aspect of social control. Thus in part these debates can be regarded as learning experiences (Firth, 1957) of Gujarati leaders and in part an astute testing of the power relationship between white and Gujarati by Gujaratis. As a consequence of these debates some Gujarati leaders removed themselves from the debate and debating arena, e.g. the chairs of the ICC and Saibaba; while others thrust themselves into the
political limelight, e.g. Mr Sandhu and Mr C. An analysis of the strategies of these leaders shows how the Muslims and Hindus differed in their approaches to protest.

Protest within a multiethnic society about power relationships between white and those often labelled as "black" invariably hinges upon an essential element, that is the ability of protesters to focus on the asymmetry of power. In this case a protest movement involves labelling by the protesters as well as those against whom the protests are made. As in any labelling context, labels take on the qualities of status for labellers and labelled. Since the context is a political one, the purpose of labelling is to make apparent an imbalance in power, to make claims for support and to obtain access to public resources. Separated by colour and culture from other Boltonians, the Gujaratis have to submerge their social identity as Gujaratis when participating in a white protest movement. They would share a common aim with the other protesters, such as they might with white anti-poll tax payers. In a society such as this one which claims to be racially tolerant, but where evidence continues to show that racial discrimination in its diverse forms is widespread, perceived racial differences remain an important element separating those who are labelled "black" with no or little power from those who are white and hold power.

Therefore, the labels in ascending or descending order which describe Gujarati factions, sects, organisations and communities define not only the specificity and generality of groups, but also implicitly identify their potential relationships with groups in the Gujarati population and white community as a whole through varying degrees of social distance. Some labels divide Gujaratis from members of other
minority communities, from white people, other labels divide Gujarati from Gujarati along social and/or religious lines. Thus the strategies employed by leaders vary with the size of their organisations, their positions in them and their perceptions of support.

In debates about participants in events in terms of Asian-white relationships in the CRC, the dynamic is provided by the flexibility of claims of attachment to a social identity from a range of identities that could lead, at least in theory, to the mobilisation of support for a protest movement. The strength and duration of the protest would depend upon the size of the claimed support for it. What is particular to this period of ethnic politics is that Gujarati leaders were (and still are) able to make claims for support without having to produce politically acceptable evidence for it. In part this is a consequence of a political system that is unwilling to recognise the political role of ethnic leaders who are not part of the formal political structure. In part this is a consequence of absence of Asian and black sections within political parties. Therefore, the negotiations for influence arising from events involve claims by leaders of racial discrimination as a consequence of their lack of power and representation in formal political structures. Thus the success or failure of these depend upon the extent to which leaders could claim support from within and without the Gujarati communities. The task facing these leaders is to make the social values that are questioned in events the property of as wide a body of supporters as possible. These events are essentially protest movements in microcosm which depend upon support, which was not political in origin or character, although it is political in terms of its expression. During the decade of the 1970s, a period marked by the emergence of a form of British racism that was different from that of
the ‘high’ colonial period (Hall, 1981:26), the mobilisation of support might well have had the opposite effect to that sought, in other words the actualisation of a protest could have attracted even more white hostility than it did. The reason that it did not attract such hostility was that the form the protest took could be controlled and limited to an informal arena where the audience was generally anti-racist.

The strategies of the leaders of these movements varied with the social constraints imposed by the social characteristics of the structure of belonging of their communities, their ability to communicate their concerns, their social perceptions of distances between their and other organisations and communities, and the social characteristics of their social networks. These factors contributed to the differences in the way in which Muslim and Hindu leaders sought to maximise their claims for support.

Strategies of Gujarati Leaders

(1) Muslim Leaders:

The leaders of factions and other small organisations, such as Lena Street Mosque, drew their support initially from small Muslim communities. The events involved members of factions, caste communities and sects (community/specific), that is they highlighted areas over which nobody seemed to have control. They involved issues which Muslims regarded as pertaining to their culture and therefore as being separate from the predominantly white culture of the town. Difficulties highlighted by these events could not be resolved within the Muslim communities, thus the leaders looked outside their communities for
solutions. As these events were usually specific to a faction, caste community or community, some Muslims could identify with them and most could not. The absence of rules governing relationships between such organisations and between them and the white community meant that no leader had authority to resolve these events. They were transformed by leaders into protests about their lack of control over issues which they considered should be resolved by others. The politicians regarded these small organisations as "factions" in the worst political sense of the term. Since the events highlighted areas of culture conflict, no one chose to take responsibility to resolve them.

The strategy of leaders was to identify an appropriate outsider, such as a white person, an official in Local Authority, police or BCCR officer, as a scapegoat. Then the frustration at not being able to find solutions could be shifted on to a person outside the Gujarati population. Examples of such events were the burial of the stillborn Hindu child, the Baruchi-Surti conflict or the outcasteining of Mr P and his family. This was the least rewarding strategy, since it failed to extend the influence of the leaders over their supporters and politicians. Furthermore, it showed up areas over which they had no control. This is precisely what happened in the event of the burial of the child. It was too late to exhume the body, the undertaker having made a mistake, but equally Mr P was restrained from taking action against the parents of the child on the grounds that they too could do nothing. Mr P was looking for support, but failed to get it. Thus he lost influence with his own supporters, before losing the support of the politicians.

Where an event was restricted initially to members of a small...
organisation, the involvement of others politically was often restricted by circumstances. Thus no one could become involved in the Baruchi-Surti conflicts for control of the mosques, unless they belonged to one or other of these factions. To involve others meant that leaders had to redefine events in terms of broader political issues. Generally, events which were resolved by identifying a scapegoat, remained where they had started as community/specific. The onus of resolution was left with leaders, since they affected nobody else.

Leaders' strategies varied for extending commitment to issues. Much of their success depended upon whether an issue could be developed into one belonging to other communities. Two such events were Lena Street Mosque and the "bearded schoolboy". A comparison of the way in which Mr C managed the Lena Street Mosque event and Mr P the "bearded schoolboy" event reveal two strategies for amplifying events, so that they drew in a wider group of people than those immediately involved. In the bearded schoolboy event Mr P tried to cast the headmaster in the role of aggressor and then use this as a pretext for turning the event into an anti-Muslim one, believing that this would bring out Muslims in protest against the Education Department. His strategy was to move an event which initially concerned only Gujarati Muslims (community/ general) to a wider context (minority/ specific), where it could become the concern of all Muslims. The drawback was that most of the Muslim members of the ICC labelled the event as Baruchi (community/specific), since they saw Mr P's thrust for leadership in terms of the Baruchi-Surti conflict. Thus he failed to persuade his fellow Muslims to have some ownership in the event and was left politically isolated. He is a good example of a leader who had ambitions to become a big man, but was constrained by the lack of support from his potential supporters.
Like most events involving competition between factions for control of mosques and access to public resources, "The Lena Street Mosque Event" began with a faction, Berelewis, attempting to detach themselves from Deobandis' control of Tayaibah Mosque. The Berelewi community is Baruchi in origin, but most Baruchis were Deobandi (Chap.2). At first sight Mr C stood to lose in his tussle with the Corporation for permission to use the co-op, since his community were one of the smallest. His first concern was to build up support and this he did by placing the onus for resolving the difficulty on the Corporation. He had identified a scapegoat. His strategy was no different from that of other small organisation leaders. However, his fortunes changed when the Labour councillors realised that this confrontation offered them the chance to support Muslims against a Conservative controlled Corporation (Local Council). Thus they spoke of the need for Muslims (minority/specific) to be able to fulfil their religious requirements. The objections by the local white residents provided a racial dimension which confirmed the applicability of wider ownership by all Muslims in the outcome of this event. The social identity of the small community was submerged within that of all Muslims. This allowed Mr C to argue that the refusal of the Council to their plea amounted to discrimination against and victimisation of Muslims.

The result of this event was that with positive support from the Labour politicians, this small Muslim sect achieved more than it bargained for. The Council found them an alternative site for a new mosque, approved planning permission and allowed them to continue using the co-op until their new mosque was built. The interrelationship of ethnic and local politics had produced a political situation in which a
Muslim leader was able to influence the white political decision-makers and obtain access to public resources. The Labour politicians gained the support of all Muslims. They countered local white opposition by grounding the event in an issue over religious tolerance and made it look as if the Conservative Council were unable to stop a small sect disobeying them. They also made it appear as if the opposition of the Conservative Party to the usage of the co-op as a mosque was symptomatic of their general opposition to Muslims. At the next local election the Labour Party won this ward.

The strategies used by most Muslim leaders were initially applied to Gujarati Muslim (community/general) and not all Muslims, since they were associated with the largest Muslim organisation, the ICC. Events like 24 hour burials, Ramadan, and the establishment of the darul uloom concerned all Muslims, since they all lacked these facilities. The strategies used by the Muslim leaders in these events were similar, they claimed support from all Muslims (minority/specific). In the instance of the 24 hour burial event, Labour politicians supported the Muslims as they were in the minority in the Council. The point about this event was that neither the Muslims nor the Labour politicians realised that the Hindus were equally interested in this facility. Had the strategy of the Muslim leaders been to label the event as Gujarati, thus involving the Hindus, total Gujarati opposition to the Council might have changed the balance of the votes particularly as the Conservatives believed that the Hindus supported them.

The event concerning Ramadan was pursued unsuccessfully, mainly because the key decision-makers were not politicians but employers, who could not be drawn into a public arena. No Conservative politicians
wanted to alienate the support of businessmen. In the event involving children damaging the mosque, the political ramifications were too obscure for it to attract wider political attention. The strategies of Muslim leaders in the In-Company Language Training Scheme, the Arrival of Ugandan Asians, and the Girl Who Married Immigrants did not carry sufficient political weight to dominate these debates. For instance, in the debate about the language scheme none of the Muslim leaders commented on the possibility of women not benefiting from the scheme or supported Mr Sandhu’s argument that the women should also benefit. No Muslim leader supported Mr Sandhu, partly because the strategy he suggested Mr C use in the Lena Street Mosque event was regarded as unacceptable, partly because he was the leader of the largest Hindu organisation, and partly because his style of leadership proved him to be the most effective politician of all the leaders.

An inspection by the local Fire Division resulted in the building being pronounced a fire hazard. The question was raised in debate in the BCCR as to whether the sect should abandon the building. Mr Sandhu suggested to Mr C that he ought to be seen to put the welfare of the children attending his mosque before the structure of the building.

Mr Sandhu asked: "What about the children who attend mosque in the building?"

Mr C: "You argue like an Englishman. None of us can alter at will a building. We cannot get permission to alter the building. We cannot obtain the use of classrooms in the local school."

Mr Sandhu: "Children, whatever their colour, culture or religion, are children."

Mr C: "Beggars can’t be choosers."

Mr Sandhu then suggested that any person could put a match to the building, even a white person, given the hostility of the residents.
"Is it worth losing lives of children for continuing resistance to the Local Authority?" asked Mr Sandhu. This question Mr C interpreted as implying that he should accept the ruling of the Local Authority. He never forgave Mr Sandhu for this and other Muslims learned of Mr Sandhu's apparent support for the views of the white community. Even those Muslims who did not support Mr C regarded Mr Sandhu's behaviour as evidence of his duplicity.

(2) Hindu Leaders:

Only a few Hindu leaders of small organisations joined the BCCR. Some chose not to join the BCCR because they were not sufficiently fluent in English to feel confident enough to participate. Others let Mr Sandhu speak for all of them. For instance members of the two Swaminarayan and Saibaba sects made use of the services offered by the BCCR, but only the leader of one Swaminarayan sect sought membership of it. One event in which leaders of Shree Kutch Swaminarayan sect were involved was that of the burial of the stillborn Hindu child. Even then they remained in the background and accepted the lead given by BCCR officers. Decisions on the outcasteiong of Mr P were confined by the leaders of his caste association to the association alone. Mr P failed to persuade any other organisation or individual to become involved. The decision by his association leaders separated the event from the concern of other associations and thus preserved their social identity and authority. This strategy is the opposite to scapegoating employed by most faction and sect leaders. Generally the strategies used by these Hindu leaders were the same as those adopted by Muslim leaders of small organisations.

At this time only one Hindu leader of a large organisation was active.
on the BCCR and this was Mr Sandhu. His leadership and strategies dominated Hindu ethnic politics. Therefore, an analysis of his strategies of leadership amount to an analysis of Hindu leadership. Being a leader of a large organisation, he rarely became involved with small organisations. The event of the burial of the child did not concern him and he accepted the final resolution. The outcasteing of Mr P did involve him since Mr P sought help from him, but he pointed out that the VHP could not be involved. The event for which he was elected to a position of leadership was the purchase of St. Barnabas. Within the VHP Mr Sandhu had to cope with inter-caste rivalry between members, while he himself had no such support. His success as a leader depended upon his ability to convince these representatives, who had the support of their castes, of the wisdom of his strategies to promote the interests of VHP over and above those of the caste associations and sects which they represented. If he failed to achieve what some of the VHP committee members considered to be adequate results, he was in danger of being accused of being an outsider with an outsider’s interests. Thus he trod a narrow path between the "manager" and the outsider with nothing in between the two.

His strategies were to argue for all Hindus and in particular for the rights of members of all minority communities. By doing this he hoped to unite not only the members of the VHP committee irrespective of caste membership and support, but he also hoped to attract wider support from the other Asian and black communities, such as Sikhs, Gujaratis, Pakistanis and West Indians. At the opening of St. Barnabas, he spoke of the Hindu community and of Hindus as part of Bolton society. He shifted the social identity of Hindus from being Gujaratis (community/general) to that of Boltonians (minority/specific). Thus he avoided making
reference to Hindu castes whose members either belonged to the VHP or were opposed to it. He could state that Hindus were Boltonians and should be accepted as such, so bridging the gap between those perceived as black and the white community.

Four events gave Mr Sandhu opportunities to exploit the connections between ethnic and local politics. These were the arrival of the Ugandan refugees, the In-Company Language Training Scheme, the VHP trip to the Isle of Man and the Girl Who Married Immigrants. At the time of the arrival of the Ugandan Asian refugees he publicly asked the questions which the politicians were unwilling to ask, let alone answer. His first question invited Boltonians to compare their relatively comfortable existence with the hardships experienced by the Ugandan refugees. Then he asked them to consider how those who were better off could help those who were less well off. Meanwhile Boltonians were asking themselves how they could manage to survive at a time when opportunities for employment were diminishing due to the recession in the textile industry, and still have to accept newcomers who would only increase the numbers competing for them? Mr Sandhu’s approach called for generosity and tolerance from Boltonians for the refugees at a time when the political parties could not offer a clear lead.

Another event which gave Mr Sandhu an opportunity to bridge the divide between ethnic and local politics was in the debate about the In-Company Language Training Scheme. The points he made were firstly that employers should deal directly with the Indian and Pakistani communities to which their workers belonged, rather than dealing through white people whom the employers regarded as the spokesmen for them. The political importance of this point went far beyond this debate with
echoes deep in colonial history. The idea of white people speaking for Asian and black people is part of the corner-stone of colonialism. His second point was that two representatives could not represent the various communities. Neither the Muslims, Hindus nor Pakistanis could agree on one leader, let alone one for each community. All leaders participating knew this. Therefore, he rightly asked the question: who will select them? If selected, who will they represent? In ethnic politics there was no agreed electoral system by which these communities could elect representatives. He said in the debate: "Big men are not good. No Asian can represent the interests of all Asians." Thus his point that if two representatives could be found, all they could do would be to rubber stamp decisions on behalf of the employers.

Thirdly, he identified an attitude held by the employers which led them to suggest that all training should be in the workers' time. Had they been white workers the training would have been in the firm's time. Because employers regarded Asian workers as inferior, the implication was that their time was of little value. Furthermore, he pointed out that the unions, who should be helping workers, were noticeable by their absence. When he stated that the Asian women workers could also benefit from this scheme, he lost the support of the Muslim leaders who rarely spoke up for the rights of women. By doing so Mr Sandhu indicated that he was aware of the disadvantages which Asian women experienced. He won this point and it was included in the resolutions that were sent to the employers.

His final observation that the Asian communities were seen by employers as immigrants who were only sufficiently educated to say "Yes, sir; thank you, sir." This remark summed up the debate, which was
about patronisation. It made obvious the differences in the power relationship between the powerless Asian worker and the powerful white employer. However, it also pointed to the overlap between ethnic politics and aspects of local politics which went beyond the narrow purview of local government and racism. His strategy throughout was to bridge the differences between the Asians by stressing their shared powerlessness as immigrants in the white controlled sphere of work. The resolutions to this debate brought real changes to Gujarati and other Asian and black workers, by providing them with tuition in English at work during work time.

In the event of the trip to the Isle of Man he took this strategy to its limits, when he first questioned the right of the police to search the women in a manner that implied disrespect to them as women and as people. This observation implied that the men who led the trip had failed to safeguard the respect of the women. Secondly, he argued that the Hindus had been treated in this way, because they were regarded as immigrants. This action could be expected of a police force who had made an error of judgement. The Hindus had become their scapegoat. The final insult he claimed was that they were not immigrants but Boltonians. So the manner of conduct of the police was an insult to Boltonians. None of the councillors could find fault with this argument and so letters from Bolton Council and BCCR were dispatched to the Governor General and Chief of Police on the Isle of Man protesting about the conduct of the police.

Mr Sandhu took every opportunity to make the point that if the politicians claim that all Boltonians are equal, then they must show they are treated as equals. This is precisely what local politicians did
not do. This strategy submerged the social identity of Hindus within a
general identity of Boltonian. However, by doing this he lost sight of
the interests of the VHP, which was interpreted by some of his opponents
as an attempt to make himself more important than he was. In other
words, he was trying to become a "big man". This observation by one of
the leaders of the expedition to the island suggested that there were
underlying tensions in the VHP leadership.

In the debate about the Farnworth girl who married immigrants to give
them the opportunity to come to Britain, mention was made of a Muslim
Patel who was reported in the Press as saying that the immigration of
Asians should be stopped, as this would both make Asians living here
feel more secure and it would reduce competition for the jobs that were
still to be had. This gave Mr Sandhu the opportunity to say that Asians
from the subcontinent had a choice, they could stay where they were or
they could go to another country. Those in East Africa had no choice,
they had to leave. They should be allowed into Britain even if it meant
restricting immigration from other countries. By now Mr Sandhu was
confident enough to suggest strategies which linked local ethnic
politics to local and national politics.

His strategies often showed political insight, such as when he
emphasised his disgust for the white opposition to the usage of the
premises as a mosque, while accepting the fire risk as being real and
important. He argued that Mr C should be seen to value the safety of the
Muslim children who attend mosque, over and above the racial antagonism
of the complaining white residents. What he began to see as politically
important was a united Asian and black leadership. He held a meeting for
all leaders and tried to persuade them to form a committee and to elect
one of their number as chairman. He saw that a gap existed between the organisations that represented the minorities and the political parties and thus proposed the development of a new ethnic organisation with a decision making role to play in local politics. At the time no other ethnic leader shared this view. Some twenty years later Asian and black representatives are endeavouring to establish the very all Asian and black caucus that Mr Sandhu struggled to develop. He was ahead of time in his appreciation of racism and local politics, his perception of a political role for Asian and black leaders within the local formal political structures, and above all he was a particularly adroit political operator. Having said this, due to his impatience with the politicians, he occasionally went too far making political statements calling for support but without the formal backing of a political organisation.

Strategies, Ethnic Politics and Local Politics

An analysis of the strategies of ethnic leaders and politicians produces a map of areas of activity which shows that on some occasions leaders will define certain activities as political, while on other occasions politicians will describe them as non-political. Ethnic politics is not only about achieving representation on local government bodies, but is also about influencing decisions which involve access to public resources. Leaders see decisions about Ramadan as political issues: if Muslims have a right to live here and to practice Islam, they also have a right to observe the recognised Islamic religious days. Employers have an obligation to accept these observances, since the right of people to practice Islam is accepted. The same argument surrounds the issue of access to 24 hour burials. What the ethnic
leaders challenged was the notion of cultural normality, and the only way in which they could do this was through ethnic politics.

The analysis of strategies used by leaders and politicians identifies four decisions which were associated with these events and marked the space between communities within a community, that is the divide between ethnic politics and formal Party politics (Diagram 3). Where issues appear to confined to organisations and groups that individual members could not resolve, and which lay outside the experience of the politicians, the only two options they had were to identify a scapegoat or to accept the consequences. Issues concerning large organisations, like the ICC and VHP, lay at the centre of ethnic politics and on the borderline of local politics. In this context major matters about political control of large organisations and authority over members were contested by the leaders. Therefore, the politicians viewed such debates as politically profitable, some involvement could produce political support. However, the issues lay outside the scope of local politics, because by implication the aims and ideals behind them were not shared by Muslims or Hindus. Where minority communities could be treated as one by submerging individual social identities, the politicians believed that they were supporting the political aims of an equal opportunity community. Since there was no structure of leadership behind which this disparate collection of minorities could unite, the decisions made and access offered were irrelevant and ineffective. The final context of events brought out extreme categorisation: all the minority communities were defined as outsiders or the leaders used it to define themselves as powerless victims, patronised or discriminated against.
### Diagram 3

**Ethnic and Local Political Options for Decision-Making**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Restricted to: Solution</th>
<th>Issue Restricted to: Solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition between:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pakistani</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>us</td>
<td><strong>indifference</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohesion across:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Asian</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>them</td>
<td><strong>irrelevance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Faction</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indian</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Caste</strong></td>
<td><strong>ineffective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sect</strong></td>
<td><strong>scapegoating</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hindu</strong></td>
<td><strong>co-operation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslim</strong></td>
<td><strong>reciprocity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gujarati</strong></td>
<td><strong>Immigrant</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>discrimination</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Foreigner</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>patronisation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Black(ie)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>victimisation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Paki</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Coloured</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not one of these options allowed for the development of ethnic structures of leadership and ethnic politics. The overriding political aim was to submerge ethnic differences within the wider political aims of society, but there was also a commitment to recognising and tolerating ethnic differences. So long as ethnic differences are accepted, there is no way in which politics and politicians can ignore them. The efforts of politicians to suppress ethnic political activity served to feed on their own fears of the emergence of Asian sections within or without political parties. Gujarati leaders challenged the central political values of the white politicians, and in doing so they created grounds for the development of racism which fed upon these fears. Thus politicians from both of the major political parties argued that it was their duty to resist the development of black sections in the name of democracy. The notion of multiculturalism implies a sharing of central values and the Gujarati leaders through ethnic politics opened up these values to scrutiny and debate. In this these leaders were far ahead of their time.
The Strategies of the Labour and Conservative Parties:

Events I have argued are embryo urban social movements. To reiterate, they do not meet all the criteria that Castells suggests need to be present for them to be described as successful urban social movements. They do not "connect three dimensions: goals of collective consumption, goals of political self management expressed through attempts to build local political autonomy and goals of cultural identity" (Castells, 1985:3-4; Lowe, 1986:47). Characteristics which these events do not share with urban social movements include a clearly defined arena and a tacit acceptance of the existence of supporters of leaders. However, they do share many of the other characteristics. Cultural identity lies at the grassroots of these movements and the goals of political self management are recognised as desired outcomes by the leaders. The cross-cultural aspect of these movements is self-evident; many politicians believed that this aspect could be controlled through the medium of the BCCR. The goal of most movements is to achieve change, motivated by those in the movement believing that their urban experiences are not shared by others in the community. Gujarati leaders of all organisations believed that the wider community did not share or understand the consequences of being seen as racially different, subject to racial discrimination and in a position of powerlessness. Castells (1985:10) makes the point that change occurs in the twilight zone between parties and movements. This thesis and other research has shown that politicians courted the Asian and black votes, but that rather than opening up political opportunities to members of these minorities or even creating Asian and black parties within political parties, most white politicians used CRCs as buffers. The argument in this section is that some change did occur in Bolton and
that this change had as much to do with the politicians as with the Gujarati leadership.

Any recognised participation by Gujaratis in local politics had to be conducted within the constraints of the established political machinery. This meant that Gujaratis as individuals could participate as electors and party workers. For Gujarati leaders to participate as politically recognised leaders, they had to work within the constraints imposed by the political structure. To win political recognition they had to receive party support to be selected to stand, they had to be allocated a ward to fight, and finally they had to win an election to gain recognition as councillors (or as MPs). Without going through this process, they could not muster sufficient support within a ward to win it as independents. Located on the fringes of political parties Gujarati leaders could be a political threat or provide considerable support. The establishment of an Asian or black caucus within or without one or both major political parties was regarded as unacceptable by the politicians. Thus ethnic politics was (and still is) perceived by politicians contrary to the interests of the local and national politics, since it symbolises the interests of a minority within a majority community.

Nevertheless, leaders acted as if they were participants in local politics. They behaved as if political decisions could be taken as a result of debates in the BCCR. They also acted as if they were supported by a body of supporters and that their support could be regarded as politically viable and made politically visible. The interplay between the emergence of ethnic politics and the constraints of local politics provided a forum for debate which enabled them to define the power
relationship between those perceived as Asian, black and those perceived as white. This debate also identified an area of cultural conflict over which no one was prepared to accept political responsibility. Seen as a provider of services and an arena the BCCR was placed in an ambiguous position: it could be seen either to act as a buffer or as a pressure group. The politicians favoured the former role and the leaders the latter. Although the strategies employed by politicians from the two major parties to achieve this end were different, together they created a political buffer that went beyond the role and remit of the BCCR. These two perspectives of local politics brought the leaders and local politicians into confrontation and produced some change.

Labour Party:

The strategies of the local Labour politicians differed from those of the Conservatives, primarily because at the time this research was done they were the opposition party. Furthermore, the support they received from Gujaratis can be traced to a belief held by the latter, like Asians elsewhere, that this political party favoured a reduction in immigration controls (Layton-Henry, 1984:170: Chaps.10 and 11). Thus their strategy was to attack decisions made by the then controlling Conservatives. From the events that Muslim and Hindu leaders brought to debate, Labour politicians selected those which brought them the greatest political rewards. For instance the Lena Street Mosque event gave Labour politicians the opportunity to show how a powerful Council could take advantage of a small and powerless sect by refusing to help them, implying that they preferred to respond to local white pressure than to support Muslims. This strategy suggested that they considered it politically profitable to work to attract Asian voters rather than to
try to identify white floating voters or to persuade those voting Conservative to vote for the Labour Party. This strategy served to alienate the supporters of the Conservatives. The interest shown by Granada Television helped to publicise the plight of the sect, the supportive role of the Labour politicians and the unhelpful role taken by the Conservatives. The result was that Muslims became convinced that Labour politicians supported them. Such a strategy in all likelihood lost them some of their entrenched white supporters as well as those who supported the Conservative Party, but who possibly withdrew their support on being persuaded of the ineffectiveness of the Conservative Party. Such white voters could become disillusioned with the efforts of both the major parties but for different reasons. For them the options included becoming floating voters or joining peripheral racist organisations, such as the National Front.

As the opposition party, Labour politicians did not have to find reasons for rejecting decisions precipitated by events. They could restrict their involvement to events which in their judgement would produce the greatest political profit. They restricted their involvement to events which would produce the least antagonism from all sections of Bolton society. They hoped to capture Gujarati votes but also to persuade the anti-racist middle class voter to support them. Their strategy was to avoid taking sides where events involved the larger organisations and communities, and particularly those with clear religious identities. They opted for strategies which led to decisions that favoured amorphous groups like Asians, Gujaratis and Indians. For this reason these politicians could accept Mr Sandhu’s proposed role of St. Barnabas as providing a base from which Hindus could make a contribution to Bolton life.
However, these politicians found themselves having to face the view that they too were regarded as taking advantage of Gujaratis and black people or allowing others to do so, when Mr Sandhu described their strategies as exploiting the position of Asian and black communities in formal local politics. To emphasise his point he would describe Asians and black people as immigrants or foreigners. In other words the Labour politicians were little different to the Conservatives. He described the strategy of this Party as racist. Thus he was able to persuade them to support him in his complaint against the Isle of Man police, in his plea for help for the Ugandan refugees and for an In-Company Language Training scheme to help all Asian workers. A number of years later a Labour controlled Council tried to close down this training scheme. This was precisely the kind of ethnic politics which these politicians did not want and wished to control. Therefore, they invariably supported events which promoted co-operation between major religious organisations or groups which were ineffective. In so doing they had to accept the dangers of being cast in the role of discriminators, patronisers and victimisers.

The strategies of Labour politicians were to manipulate social identities which combined the Hindus and Muslims with other Asians thus separating them from the white community and from their own organisations. By doing this they treated them as if they were no different from any other interest group. Consequently they could stand on the political and racial fence from which position they could condemn racism while not actively supporting anti-racism. Their support for this strategy suggests that they believed that it could attract political support without openly antagonising their ethnic or white supporters. It can be inferred that the continuing local support for the
Conservative Party was due in some part to the defection of white supporters from the Labour Party. To minimise such defection, Labour politicians were ready to establish personal relationships with Gujaratis, while not committing themselves politically. Their closest relationships were with Muslims, whom they believed to be more united than Hindus and therefore more politically dangerous. Evidence for such beliefs were based on the readiness of Muslims to protest, as in the case of the bearded schoolboy, or their opposition to the Conservative Council's decision to close down Lena Street Mosque. More tangible evidence emerged during the late 1980s when in a local election the Muslims fielded candidates. The most concern was shown by the Labour candidates in whose wards these Muslims stood. Thus they had no intention of encouraging the development of a politically powerful Muslim section within or without their Party. The willingness of the Party to include Muslims (and Hindus) is not in question. What is questioned are the grounds on which the Party refused to support Gujarati candidates. Possibly, these politicians feared that to encourage such a candidate might precipitate the formation of a Gujarati, Asian and/or black political section.

The preferred decision-making options of the Labour politicians were those which submerged individual social identities and implied unity across the various Asian communities which was of little political worth to Gujarati leaders. From the point of view of this Party their strategy was calculated to divide these communities while supporting a false unity and keeping the leaders outside the political party structure. However, this Party's awareness of the need to capture the Gujarati vote and of some of the racial issues that accompanied events suggests that some change had occurred.
Conservative Party:

Much of what has been said about the Labour Party applies to the Conservative Party politicians. Like the former, the latter were made aware of the importance of the Asian votes at the time of the arrival of the refugees from Uganda and at the two general elections of 1974. Furthermore, in 1976 the Lena Street Mosque event had made apparent some of the difficulties faced by a controlling Council who were expected by a Muslim minority to find solutions to their problems. Since they argued that they did not have the power or resources to resolve these difficulties, they were seen as racist and anti-Muslim in particular. Between 1972 and 1976 the Conservatives did not encourage or support any demand made by Gujarati leaders on the one hand for fear of encouraging factionalism within the Gujarati communities, and on the other hand for fear of losing white support if they made decisions which resulted in increases in the rates. Their lack of support for the ICC was based upon a belief that were a Muslim candidate to be successful, he might use the position to advance his personal career at the expense of the Party. This unspoken threat was tacitly accepted by Party members as a reason for not supporting a Muslim as a candidate.

Likewise when Mr Sandhu raised the matter of unequal treatment of Hindus and Gujaratis generally in the Isle of Man and In-Company Language Training Scheme respectively, their representatives on the BCCR could do little but agree with him. If they, as the controlling Party on the Council, agreed to any of the demands made by these leaders, they had much more to lose than the Labour Party. To have publicly supported the Gujarati leaders would have alienated many of
their white supporters, thus reducing their majority and probably losing for them their control of Bolton. [Almost two decades later the Labour Party controls the Local Authority. They follow similar fence-sitting tactics now to those employed by the Conservatives in 1976. They are unsupportive of the efforts of Asians and black people to develop a politically meaningful arena in which the latter can participate.]

Consequently, they studiously avoided supporting the leaders in the debates over Ramadan, burial facilities, the bearded schoolboy. Thus they too preferred strategies which submerged the social identities of Gujaratis within more neutral ones which linked them to Asians or Indians.

The need to counteract their negative image and the attraction of Gujarati votes was considered by some Conservative politicians to be sufficiently important for them to consider a more radical strategy. This strategy was to support Gujarati candidates in two separate local elections with the express aim of courting the Gujarati and Asian vote. In doing this they were following the example set by a London based branch of their Party who supported a Major Saroop, a Kensington and Chelsea councillor, in the establishment of an Anglo-Indian society with the intention of "wooing the Asian vote" (The Sunday Observer, 18/8/76; Layton-Henry, 1984:148). The difficulty which faced the local Party was not just the nomination of a Gujarati as a candidate, but from which community to select a candidate and to assess the risk of this person not supporting the Party line. Aware of their lack of support amongst the Muslims, they selected first a Hindu on the grounds that he was a member of a minority Gujarati community, that did not show obvious support for the Labour Party.
The Conservative Party selected Mr L, a Kutchi Swaminarayan who was also a member of the VHP and BCCR, to stand in Bradford Ward, which was and still is a traditional Labour stronghold. The results of the election showed that the Labour candidate received 86% of the votes, Mr L received 9.8% (165 votes) and the Social Unity candidate received 4.22% out of a total of 1,687 votes cast (Table 7.1). Basically, the strategy appeared to be workable: an Asian candidate standing in a ward with a 20% Asian vote should have dented the support given to the established Labour candidate. Although the strategy appeared to be sound on two grounds: first that a local major political party was openly supporting an Asian candidate, and secondly that a large number of Asians lived in the ward. It failed here because it alienated Hindu, Muslim and white voters, just as it did a few years later in the national elections of 1979 (cf. Layton-Henry, 1984:152).

It is difficult to ascertain accurately to which ethnic communities the 18% of Conservative voters belonged who took their votes away from Mr L. The ward in which he stood comprised white, Hindu and Muslim voters. As a Hindu he was unlikely to attract Muslim votes and as a Conservative unlikely to draw Labour votes. He was also unlikely to attract the white vote because of the hostility Asians experienced when they moved into the ward. The Hindu vote which he hoped to draw failed to materialise: some Hindus chose not to support him because he was a Swaminarayan; others claimed that he was not a member of the sect. Some members of his caste and sect said that, because he did not pay them a personal visit, he had not fulfilled the social obligations which political support required (cf. Mayer, 1966). For a number of reasons he failed to attract the votes his Party needed. Possibly he also stood little chance of succeeding, since he stood for a Party which most
Gujaratis considered to be in favour of the control of immigration. Although by supporting an Asian candidate, they provided him with an opportunity to achieve a position in the formal political hierarchy and thereby publicly claimed that they were anti-racist.

Table 7.1: Results of Three Elections in Bradford Ward

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Type</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Metropolitan</td>
<td>Labour won 3 seats with votes:-</td>
<td>Labour re-elected Votes:-</td>
<td>Labour re-elected Votes:-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borough Election</td>
<td>1,119 77.3% 1,046 76.3% 1,011 77.5%</td>
<td>1,205 68.5%</td>
<td>1,451 86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Election</td>
<td>Conservatives obtained votes:-</td>
<td>Conservatives gained votes:-</td>
<td>Conservatives: Mr L:-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>329 22.7% 325 23.7% 294 22.5%</td>
<td>498 28.83%</td>
<td>votes:165 9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Election</td>
<td>Independent Socialist votes:-</td>
<td>Social Unity votes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>56 3.2%</td>
<td>71 4.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In local elections a year or two later the Party selected a Muslim woman to stand as a candidate in the same ward. She too polled a small number of votes. While in one sense this was a bold choice; it also showed a lack of understanding of ethnic politics, which at this time was dominated by men. Being a woman and a professional she shared little in common with Gujarati voters and was perceived as "black" by white voters. Clearly the voters were not ready to accept a Muslim woman as a councillor. In a sense she was doubly, if not triply, disadvantaged. Consequently she fared a little better than the Hindu candidate. Although she trebled the vote for the Party, she still received only a small number of votes. These strategies show that this Party recognised
the need to take a positive view of Gujarati, other Asian and black members of the wider political community. However, by giving such candidates unwinnable seats the Party ensured that they had all to win and little to lose. Their fears about such candidates using their positions to promote their own careers remained untested. Thus to some extent that this Party supported two Gujarati candidates can be taken as evidence of change. Neither political party was committed to supporting Gujarati, Asian or black candidates. One West Indian candidate [he consistently argues that he is not an Afro-Caribbean] who did succeed as a Labour Party candidate later experienced racial abuse from the members of his own Labour Club members.

To conclude this section. Successful movements die as a result of their success. These Gujarati movements did not die, because they failed to create sufficient space for the development of a Gujarati, Asian or black caucus. The demands of these Gujarati leaders for political recognition were not granted, because neither political party was prepared to support Gujarati candidates or willing to facilitate the development of a Gujarati/Asian and black caucus within or between the parties. Thus these communities and their leaders have continued to exist.

The next and final section of this Chapter shall provide a conclusion and consider how ethnic politics laid the basis for contemporary racism and for the demise of the concept of ethnicity.

Conclusion: Ethnic Organisation to Political Power

The aim of this thesis is to relate the migration and settlement of
Gujaratis in Bolton in the 1950s to the development of a Gujarati community and its response to racism in the 1970s through the mobilisation of political leadership and support (ethnic politics) in an informal political arena (the local CRC).

The period between 1950 and the present can be separated into two broad periods, the first covering the period from 1950 to 1970 and the second covering time from 1970 to the present. This thesis falls between the two. The first period was one of intense immigration and the second is associated with recessions (cf. Sarre, 1989:125). The majority of Gujaratis came here during the first period and their ethnic political activities including urban movements fall within the period of recession. In particular the years of the research fell between the first major recession in 1974 and 1979 when the second major recession occurred. In part this gives this study both an individuality which is not to be found in other research and a commonality which is found in other research, such as Katznelson (1973) and Rex and Tomlinson (1979). Most of those sampled came here during the period of immigration, when citizens of the Commonwealth could enter Britain with relatively freedom. Political pressure for control on immigration was met by the passing of the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962, which restricted to "former colonial citizens whose skills and/or qualifications were needed" (Sarre, 1989:134). From now on immigration was increasingly controlled, thus reducing the flow of migrants into the country.

A decade later the Gujaratis were reacting to these controls by voicing fears about their insecure position here (see Appendix I). Against this background they settled in Bolton’s inner area, moving into houses vacated by white landlords. Gujarati migration did not fluctuate
with changes in employment in Bolton or Britain; it increased until it was curtailed by various immigration controls. The two-up and two-down housing, so characteristic of northern industrial towns, provided these settlers with a flexible form of housing. It lent itself to alterations that met their needs: these houses could be adapted to the requirements of nuclear or extended families, to usage as shops, offices, mosques and temples. These settlers changed their immediate environment by establishing services which met their needs, namely shops which specialised in Gujarati foodstuffs, household goods, clothing and culture (music, books, religious items), and in religious and community centres. As their surroundings changed and more migrants joined the community, they moved into neighbouring areas looking for housing and buildings which they could purchase, change and adapt. Their increasing physical visibility matched their spatial expansion and within a few years they had surrounded the town centre (see Chap.1, Map.1). This expansion was accompanied by requests for planning permission for new shops, temples and mosques, by demands for places in schools for their children, for support for their children to become equal achievers alongside other pupils in schools and for better and more focused health services. As Smith observes: "residential segregation is a medium for the reproduction of racial inequality" (1989:105).

Gujaratis can be defined as a population living in a particular territory, housing and outwardly sharing a similar life style. Their pattern of settlement epitomised that of other migrants from the Indian subcontinent. Like these others, Gujaratis were able to find employment mainly in the textile industry; most of their jobs were semi- or unskilled, of low social standing, low paying, and insecure. In 1976 most of those sampled were employed with only a few being unemployed.
Their socio-economic position placed them within the working class. Though I do not address the question of the relationship between class and race (see for instance Sarre, 1989), their work careers (see Chap.1) ensured that most would stay in this social class and continue to accept whatever manual work was available to them. They formed a racialised group within the working class, partly because they gave the impression of placing their commitments to their kith and kin, living here and abroad, above those to their jobs. With an apparent lack of motivation to acquire higher skills and/or qualifications in association with the gradual disappearance of manual jobs, these Gujaratis held jobs that over time would become vulnerable to the effects of recessions. Time and recessions did put them, and others like them, at risk of unemployment and today they comprise a group experiencing one of the highest rates of unemployment (District Trends, 1990:13; see also Sarre, 1989). To some extent they exercised their own form of status group closure. This seems to support the argument that they form a racialised class fraction (Miles, 1982). Since they contribute to their formation as a status group, this would suggest that race under these circumstances predominates over class. Rather than being the victims of a class closure strategy (Parkin, 1979), they could be regarded as participants in the closure process. At this point in their settlement in Bolton, I would argue that together with other Asian and black ethnic groups, they could not be regarded as forming an underclass (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979). The reason for this being that Rex and Tomlinson’s approach ignores the interactionist perspective which would take account of the racial division that separates Asian from black person, and Asian and black person from the poor white. The concept of the underclass also suggests that those in it formed some degree of cohesion. These authors make it clear that the reactions of these ethnic groups to racism could take
different forms (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979:Chap.8). This implies a sharing of racial, economic and political experiences across ethnic groups, which was not apparent in 1976. Since they share jobs of similar social standing, a similar life style, similar housing and participate in the closure of their group within the working class, I would argue that Gujaratis form a racialised status group.

There are two points that I would make about class, the first is that insufficient attention has been given to black peoples’ career aspirations (I have used the term black in its widest sense to include Asians and Afro-Caribbeans). Observation suggests that even Gujaratis who are successful do not always choose to alter their life styles to show their new found wealth. Secondly, some Gujaratis remain committed to pursuing paths that confine them to manual work (also Sarre, 1989:147-149). Racism may support such career trajectories and it may also increase the difficulties faced by young black people who live in inner towns and cities looking for work (Sarre, 1989:144-147). In these early years of the second period, a few Gujaratis moved into white areas and into white businesses. A decade or two later these Asians and more like them were being described as forming a new group of entrepreneurs (Waldinger et al, 1990), but the signs of change were present in the 1970s. The lack of change in Gujaratis’ life styles with or without changes in their occupations suggests that there is a cleavage between their position as a racialised status group and their class. It is this cleavage which provided the bases for religious and political collective action. One advantage of this notion of a status group is that it allows account to be taken of ethnic differences without losing sight of black groups’ responses collectively or singly against racism.
Set apart by their skin colour, their style of life, their occupations, housing and culture, Gujaratis experienced in the early 1970s a period of intense ethnic identification. This was brought about by on the one hand, competition between themselves for scarce resources to meet their own community needs, and on the other hand, an awareness of the importance of their vote to white politicians. I define a community as a group of people who share the same place of origin, belief in the same religion and membership of the same faction, caste or sect, and live within the same area of town. Competition between communities for scarce resources, such as space, planning permission, and bids for funds for community projects intensified the development of separate social identities between Gujaratis and between Gujaratis and members of other ethnic communities (ethnicity). A complex of communities came into being within the Muslim and Hindu populations; each one was committed to meeting the social and religious needs of its members. Within a short period of three or so years, two organisations emerged as being larger and better resourced, and better led than others; these were the ICC and the VHP. Some of the smaller organisations each representing a community flourished, because their members here and abroad supported their development into real estate. Others that could not muster such support either disappeared or joined a larger organisation. Each community became aware of its social similarities to and differences from other communities within the resident Gujarati population.

Underlying and underpinning these communities are social networks of friends, that is "persisting patterns of social relationships" (Laumann, 1973:3-4). The social distances between these communities were embedded in social perceptions of Gujaratis of themselves and members of
other communities, Asian, black and white. Based upon these perceptions, Gujaratis in theory were prepared to include or exclude members of different Gujarati, Asian black and white communities. In practice, the principle of homophily, "like attracts like", held for close friendships and therefore the primary zone of social networks were comprised of friends belonging to the same ethnic and religious communities as the anchor points. The social and structural characteristics of Muslim anchored zones allowed for greater cohesion of Muslim organisations and the Islamic community. The characteristics of Hindu zones contributed to the fragmentation of Hindu organisations and the Hindu community. What also became apparent was that less intense relationships, such as ordinary friendship and acquaintanceship, were reserved for relationships with people from communities that were separated from the Gujaratis by greater social distances, such as white people, Africans and West Indians. These social networks comprising a core of Gujaratis surrounded by zones of relationships of lesser intensity with people who were perceived as being socially distant served to concentrate community and ethnic social identities, social commitment and support into the Gujarati communities (Chap.3). The effect of this was to define more clearly than their class position their separation from others. The argument that those in weak positions establish exchange relationships with those in strong positions does not hold for this minority group in a racialised society. Gujaratis invested in their own communities rather than weaken their position by investing in strong relationships with those in more powerful positions than themselves (Lin, 1982).

This awareness of their ethnicity took the form of separating the 'us' from the 'them' (Wallman, 1979; 1978) with the result that the
Gujarati population was reducible to a 'bricolage' of communities (Chap.3). One important consequence of this competition and conflict for survival was the effect it had upon community leaders (see below). Another consequence of this schism between communities was the development of a hierarchy of social belonging. Individual Gujaratis identified with members of their immediate family, with the community in which were their kin, with larger communities within which their community could be submerged, with the largest of the religious communities of Muslims or Hindus, and finally with others who shared their skin colour and racial experiences. The advantage of this hierarchy of belonging was that ethnic leaders could use it to mobilise or reduce support in relation to individualised or shared ethnic and racial experiences. I draw distinctions between community, ethnic group and ethnicity. Where two Gujarati communities distinguish between themselves in terms of 'us' and 'them', they are establishing their social identities. Where this process occurs between Gujaratis and members of other Asian or black minority communities, I would refer to the definition of social identities as ethnicity. The reason for this is in the former instance the process of definition occurs within the ethnic group; in the latter instance it occurs between ethnic groups. The labels associated with social and ethnic identities are merged into a hierarchy of belonging which has become part of the vocabulary of common sense racism (Chap.4).

With such a growing population of potential voters without any established or formalised commitment to a political party, politicians from different parties competed for their votes. The politicisation of immigration encouraged such competition, since it gave politicians opportunities to claim or disclaim responsibility for their party either
increasing or reducing controls on immigration or supporting or undermining better race relations in Britain. Aware of their strategic importance, the Gujaratis discovered that there was a discrepancy in how they viewed themselves and how the politicians saw them. Gujaratis saw themselves as at least comprising two religious communities with sufficient members to warrant political representation in formal political arenas. The politicians viewed the Gujaratis as at best a collection of religious interest communities and at worst a collection of voters. This generated a feeling of dissatisfaction with politicians and their representation of the concerns of Gujaratis, evidence for which was found in the views of those sampled (Chap. 5). These views were formed through debates in the only arena accessible to Gujaratis, namely that of the local CRC. Furthermore, such debate made Gujaratis aware of the need for them to have representatives in the formally recognised political arenas of the Local Authority.

As the importance of representation became apparent and became linked to Gujarati demands for a range of local services (Chap. 6) to meet their needs, the functions of representatives of Gujarati organisations took on a political character that was missing from the roles of earlier leaders. Unable to establish a presence in either of the main political parties, they had to rely upon their own ethnic organisations adopting a more political role than they had previously done. Thus the political space between these communities and the white community in which events occurred became value loaded, that is events that could be located within this political space were linked to racism, political powerlessness and disorder. The identification of participants in these events ranged from the less familiar labels of factions, castes and sects to the more familiar ones of Muslim, Hindu, Paki, Blackie and
immigrant. These events gave ethnic leaders opportunities to define the political relationship between Gujaratis and the white community in terms of powerlessness and power. As the largest of the local ethnic communities with the most leaders, it stands to reason that many of the events involved Gujaratis. Such events involved conflict between factions in the mosque, Ramadan and facilities for twenty-four hour burials. Where interest went beyond the confines of this ethnic group, other communities and ethnic groups participated. For instance, Muslims, Hindus and West Indians participated in the debate on the In-Company Language Training Scheme in which all were being labelled as "immigrants", with all that this implied (Chap.6). Therefore, ethnic politics in the middle 1970s showed how leaders from different ethnic communities could form alliances against white politicians in informal political arenas in a way that suggests that they were ready to share racial experiences and an embryonic common culture. This was the forerunner of a more complex culture which is shared today by Asians, West Indians and Africans living in Britain, USA, West Indies and Africa (cf. Gilroy, 1987: Chap.5).

These alliances could not be regarded as communities (cf. Gilroy, 1987:235-236), because the identities the Gujaratis shared with members of other ethnic communities was political. I do accept that such alliances signified not just a distinctive political ideology but a particular set of values and norms in everyday life: mutuality, cooperation, identification and symbiosis (Gilroy, 1987:234). Gujaratis still ensured and continue to ensure that they retain their Gujarati culture and individuality. These alliances contributed to the protestations of black people about their political position and to their experiences of racism. The decisions that were reached on events
showed that both the major political parties were intent upon muzzling the ethnic leaders by using the local CRC as a buffer. The overall effect of this strategy on ethnic communities has been to coerce them into uniting as a black caucus without giving the ethnic leaders opportunities to achieve political recognition. This strategy has also had the effect of separating the political functions of leadership from leadership of the religious organisations. This has reduced religious organisations to interest groups and in the process has eroded all forms of ethnic politics, leaving the black communities in Bolton with no opportunities for political participation other than as non-ethnic members of political parties.

Therefore, this study draws attention to the importance of ethnic politics in contributing to the development of contemporary racism and ethnicity. What started as a mainly Gujarati ethnic political activity was widened to include other local ethnic minorities. Although by the 1970s the broadening of political interests was not achieved, even though one leader, Mr Sandhu, had attempted to establish a council of ethnic leaders, the foundations for such an alliance were laid. A decade or so later such a council was formed. Thus this study falls in between those of Katznelson (1973), Rex and Tomlinson (1979) and Gilroy (1987). The importance of ethnic politics remains: black people do not have equal access to local or national political arenas. The political system does not allow for a black party, a black caucus or any representation based on colour. The cleavages between race and class, race and politics, race and government, and race and democracy remain. This allows political parties and governments to continue to politicise race.
The aim of this Appendix is to provide additional background information on the methods and difficulties experienced collecting data, and in particular to focus attention on the construction of the questionnaire. In doing this certain biases arising from the research methods used become clear. The subject matter of this Appendix should be linked to the section on methodology (Introduction, Part II), thereby providing an overall view of the collection of data. It brings together the way in which knowledge of the communities and people gained through participant and nonparticipant observation supported and constrained the construction of the questionnaire. This report will address firstly selection of the sample, secondly construction of the questionnaire, thirdly piloting of the questionnaire, fourthly recruitment of interviewers, fifthly difficulties interviewing, sixthly research issues and finally representativeness, reliability and validity.

Methods used to collected data involved micro- and macro-techniques, namely participant and nonparticipant observation and use of a questionnaire (Introduction, Part II). Both forms of observation were employed as techniques to become acquainted with Gujaratis and to collect data. The information gathered by observation gave direction and substance to the collection of data on case studies on decision-making events and to the questions that formed the questionnaire. The questionnaire was used to collect data on ethnic background, faction, caste and sect membership, family structure, friendship networks, occupations and occupational history of employment, education, political involvement and commitment, and leadership. This had the virtue of
allowing for the collection of more formal data, as opposed to informal data collected by participant observation. By using participant and semi-participant observation first, Gujaratis had an opportunity to become aware of the research project and acquainted with the researcher. Secondly, it provided crucial information for the construction and the administration of the questionnaire. The combination of techniques of observation with the case study and survey enabled me to enrich the data collected in a way that the survey method alone cannot offer (Goode and Hatt, 1952: 121).

The research project was carried out in two overlapping stages: the first stage involved the use of nonparticipant observation (1971-76) and in the second a survey (1975-76). Time was spent with Gujaratis in their homes, temples and mosques, shops, businesses, in some of the schools their children attended, political meetings, electioneering, weddings, funerals and other social events. Data were collected on social, economic, religious and political relationships within and without the Gujarati communities, using the case study method to collect data on particular political events and on leaders.

1. The Selection of the Sample

Initially, I selected randomly from the electoral register 400 addresses of people with Asian names with the intention of interviewing 200 Hindus and 200 Muslims distributed residentially across the town. This did not guarantee that all 400 were Gujaratis, since some Gujarati names are similar to names of people from Pakistan and some other Indian states. For reasons given below this proposed sample could not be achieved. The final sample comprised 258 adult men, the majority being
over the age of eighteen; a minority of seven were aged sixteen (2) and seventeen (5) and one Muslim, who was older than eighteen, refused to give his age. The sample comprised 104 Muslims and 154 Hindus. The majority of Hindus were Gujaratis; four came from other parts of India, one was a Sikh, chairperson of the VHP during the time of the research. All but two of the Muslims were Gujaratis. Thus this is a study of Gujaratis and no attempt was made to include other minorities. The size of the final sample was determined partly by the difficulties I experienced recruiting interviewers, partly by the constraints of time and costs and partly by the physical impossibility of one interviewer carrying out a random sample alone.

A sample of 258 schedules out of a sample universe of an estimated 8,000 households is a 3.23% sample. At the time no adequate population lists were available. Cross-checking the circulation of lists of members of Gujarati organisations with the electoral register would have been a long and difficult task. Some organisations did not wish to make their lists of members available to me, and some individuals belonged to more than one organisation. Although I cannot for statistical reasons argue for randomness, this sample can at least be regarded as an aggregate. Statements can be made about the Bolton community, which would bear generalisation.

This study of ethnic politics involved only men, since no women at that time held positions in social and religious organisations which might have brought them into prominence and into informal or formal political arenas (Introduction, Part I, footnote 2). Therefore, little mention is made of women; this is a bias in the sample. In the 1970s men held all the key positions in political organisations and women
appeared to be disinterested or were constrained by men from becoming more involved. Although I came across the odd woman teacher in a mosque, she has had no influence in mosque politics. Hindu women held positions within caste associations, sects and the VHP, but few were in prominent positions in Bolton. In Gujarati communities here there was and still is no evidence of the emergence of voluntary and self-help groups, which in other parts of Britain have given women opportunities to play more public roles. Given the social values surrounding the role of women in Gujarati society, as a man, I could not have gained access to the views of the women. Furthermore, by the time the interviewing began I still knew too little about women's involvement in community affairs. Later I learnt that Hindu women belonging to certain caste organisations had their own committees, elected their own chairpersons and that they joined the men's caste association committees when taking decisions on caste matters. Unfortunately none of these women lived in Bolton, so they could not be interviewed, but this does not mean that they are not prominent in Asian communities elsewhere in Britain. Indeed, recent literature points to the roles played by Asian women in industrial disputes, in work, business, self-help organisations and in local politics.

2. Construction of Questionnaire

The questionnaire was based upon data collected by participant and nonparticipant observation, and has allowed much of the observed data to be presented in a more structured form. Not only does this mean that quantitative and qualitative data could be brought together, but also it meant that this made possible a formal analysis of data which, at first sight, might appear unstructured. For instance a formal analysis of
Gujarati social networks is to be found alongside an analysis of data based on nonparticipant observation, such as that on ethnic political events. The blending of qualitative and quantitative analysis occurs in many parts of the thesis, such as in the analysis of religious organisations, perceptions of social distance, friendship, and ethnic politics.

Taking one of these areas as an example, it is possible to show how each approach supported the other. For instance Gujaratis' ideas about friendship, communities and common sense racism depended upon the collection of data that could be analysed by both formal and informal processes. Data on the qualitative aspects of friendship were formalised through the use of a questionnaire, thus making it accessible to quantitative and formalised network analysis. Data on who has access to social information, where they meet, how frequently they meet and who is excluded from sharing "public knowledge" was initially obtained using micro-techniques. Then it was formalised into questions that appeared on the questionnaire. Data such as that on perceived social equivalence of knowledge, and the deployment of this knowledge in the context of the political arena by leaders could not be formalised. Nor was it possible to formalise the collection of data on negotiations which took place in the BCCR. This was part of a co-operative process which led to the creation of an oral history that in turn gave depth and complexity to community life (Emmett, 1982:208).

The questions for the questionnaire were based on the knowledge I acquired during the first two years research, which was carried out during evenings and weekends when I learnt about the communities and their members. The construction of the questionnaire became closely
associated with the selection of interviewers. Individuals and organisations, whom I approached for help with interviewing, sought to have questions they did not approve of modified or deleted, before they were willing to assist with the interviewing. The process of modification became closely linked to a process of approval, because using an anthropological approach the balance between community acceptance and totally independent inquiry is open to negotiation. This process formed the pilot stage. The questionnaire was modified on at least four occasions before it was administered. A pilot survey was carried out in October 1975, and as a result certain questions were modified. Then, having discussed the schedule with Dr Abrams [1], it was again modified. He estimated that it would take about an hour to administer; trials proved that it took three to four hours to complete. It was destined to take even longer to complete with Gujaratis who spoke no English.

The first people whom I approached for help with interviewing were some Muslim acquaintances from Blackburn, one was a teacher, one a radio announcer, and one the secretary of the Indian Workers' Association. They objected to questions on nationality, length of residence in Britain, questions which too obviously distinguished between Hindus and Muslims, and questions which went too deeply into political involvement. The reasons they gave were that some of the questions would elicit the kind of information, which many believed could be used against them. Asians, they argued, felt insecure in Britain, since they were not being accorded equal rights: "If we ask for what are regarded as general rights, white people at us as if we have demanded special rights. We are not asking for favourable treatment, just for fair and equal treatment." One cited the case of an Asian drug smuggler that had
appeared in a local newspaper: "Not only was he sentenced to four years’ imprisonment but he was also to be deported. Had he been white, he would only have been sent to prison for a couple of years. When an Asian breaks a law like any other Briton might, he is dealt with more harshly than the transgression warrants" [2]. It later became apparent that their fears were shared by other Muslims and Hindus.

In their opinion the questions should reflect general opinions and not those of particular Asian communities. Not long after these discussions, in the North West some 200 Asians had been arrested by the police on the grounds that they were illegal immigrants. Such occurrences continued to support Asians’ fears about their insecurity in Britain and served to make them even more wary of answering questions about their backgrounds and political opinions. Generally they were unhappy about answering questions and many who answered the questions on my schedule believed that there would be repercussions. There was no way in which I could alleviate their fears and suspicions.

It was noteworthy that the vice-chairperson (VHP) and a committee member (VHP) criticised the same questions and for the same reasons as had the three Muslims. However, the former criticised a number of other questions: any question which appeared to reflect differences in caste and religion among Hindus had to be eliminated. Questions which implied that members of different castes could or would not support members of other castes had to be deleted. These Hindus adhered to the principle that the VHP, as a multi-caste organisation, could not support the view that social differences between castes was important. Other VHP committee members thought that the questions were important. These concerns reflected the vice-chairperson’s support for a Sikh as
chairperson of the VHP and his awareness of the potential destructiveness of caste identities for both his support of a Sikh and the VHP as a multi-caste organisation (Chaps. 2, 5, 6). The evidence has shown that Hindus still attach great importance to caste differences.

One question that was singled out as problematic was that on the length of time a person had lived here. In the opinion of those Hindus and Muslims I consulted, respondents would not give such information. They argued that illegal immigrants and their relatives and friends would not wish to be identified. Any Gujarati could believe that by answering a question on length of residence in Britain, he was providing the police with the relevant information about his status in this country, albeit through an alternative channel. Those Gujaratis who knew me and knew of my research were prepared to answer this question. These Hindus stressed that the less educated Gujarati might not be able to understand the purpose of a survey, and might refuse to accept any assurances about confidentiality that I might give. Moreover, no Gujarati organisation was prepared initially to accept responsibility for confidentiality on my behalf. Therefore, however valuable the question was on length of residence, it had to be deleted. The omission of this question has detracted from the analysis of settlement patterns.

Another question to pose problems was that relating to information about the home village. Although most respondents answered it, many expressed fears about answering it. Some feared that this information would find its way to the Indian Government, which would check on ownership of property in the villages. They said that the Government had the right to seize property owned by Indians living here, who were British nationals. Some Gujaratis answering this question feared that by
giving the names of their villages, their families in India might be made to suffer. The question was asked and was answered.

Further questions which raised fears were on close friends (No.65 and 66). The majority of the respondents argued that to give this information was being too personal. Although they acknowledged that I did not ask for the names or initials of friends or exact addresses, they felt that all close friends could be traced. This could be taken as a measure of the closeness of these Muslim and Hindu communities. They also felt uneasy about answering some of the questions on politics, such as (no. 122) Do you think that people like you have too much political power, too little or about the right amount? Certain parts of the following question (no.123) were condemned for the same reason. All the questions were subjected to intensive scrutiny and as a result many were modified and in a few instances parts were deleted. To my knowledge these fears turned out to be groundless.

This did not mean that I altered the questionnaire, rather it pointed to the importance of making apparent the differences between Hindus and Muslims, between friends and acquaintances and information. The questions about villages remained in the questionnaire. However, ignoring their criticism of the questions on length of stay and nationality could have proved to be insensitive and given their fears it was tactful to modify them [3].

3. Piloting of the Questionnaire

Two Muslim friends came from Blackburn to help me pilot the questionnaire. We did one interview, but this highlighted some of the
major difficulties: firstly, I learnt how difficult it was to translate some of the questions into Gujarati, and secondly, after shortening the questionnaire, how it could still take three hours to complete. It took this length of time to complete even in the hands of an interviewer, who understood the questions, and an interviewee who was not suspicious about how the information might be used. This interview proved to be instructive in other ways; the issues it raised were typical of the problems that I met throughout the duration of the survey.

For instance from the addresses I had drawn on my random sample, they selected the addresses of one's brother-in-law and the other's brother-in-law's brother-in-law. They explained to me that they felt happier interviewing people who were related to them, came from the same village, from the wife's village, or villages of close friends. This meant that respondents could trust them with answers to personal questions [4]. These respondents could not ask the interviewers to leave the house, if they did not wish to continue with the interview. The point was made that a Muslim interviewer would not voluntarily go into the house of any Muslim with whom he could not establish a social link.

The implication of this was that I should have identified every family selected and then found interviewers who knew them. This was impossible, since I could never be certain that I could match an interviewer with a family selected in terms of similar religious beliefs and acquaintanceship. This required a depth of knowledge of the community which I did not possess. Thus it became apparent that a random survey would fail. Consequently, one solution was that I interview as many Hindus and Muslims as possible. The other solution lay in trying to obtain support from Gujarati organisations to assist with interviewing.
In the end I settled for both of these solutions, but it meant abandoning the idea of a random sample [5].

4. Recruitment of Interviewers

Recruiting interviewers is supposed to be a simple task; the problem is to train them. In this instance recruitment of interviewers presented the biggest problem. Initially I found a group of 'O' and 'A' level Gujarati students at Bolton Technical College (now Bolton Metropolitan College), who said that they were willing to interview. When they saw the questionnaire they began to express doubts. Initially, they said little, a few indicated that they had never heard of some of the caste groups. Payment was discussed along the lines suggested to me by the Social Science Research Council Survey Unit. The students said that their lecturer would inform me of their decision. Some weeks later I received a message stating that the students were unwilling to help, but no reasons were given. Then I learned that some thought that I should be offering £2/ questionnaire instead of 50-60 pence. Later a few students informed me that they had refused, because they were unwilling to ask people whom they did not know and who were older than themselves questions, which they considered to be too personal. The question of the rate of pay was just a way of saying that they were not prepared to do the interviewing [6].

At this stage I had drawn a random sample from the electoral register. I had also seen lists, such as that of members of the VHP, the Mandhata Patel Samaj and some mosques. The addresses of all respondents were ready for handing over to the interviewers. The refusal of the students to do the interviewing ensured that I would have to do
most of the interviewing myself and would not have the time, manpower or finance to carry out a random sample. To an extent another issue was resolved: when I knew that I would have to do the bulk of the interviewing, I decided against translating the questions into Gujarati and/or Urdu. Apart from this, some of the questions proved to be difficult to translate and had to be simplified.

After the refusal of the students to help, the search for other interviewers raised a new set of difficulties with regard to the construction of the questionnaire. I approached some Muslim friends and members of the VHP for help and support, in particular to act as referees for me. Before, they would help with the interviewing, they examined each question. As a result further questions were modified, changed or removed from the questionnaire. I approached the VHP for help, when I realised that I could not complete a survey of 200 Hindu heads of households without assistance and community support. Three influential members agreed to help, they included the vice-chairperson (VHP), a national organiser of the VHP, and two members of the executive committee. One was vice-chairperson of the Mandhata Patel Association and the other was a supervisor at a local mill, whose father was an influential Kanbi in the Kutch community. He had links with the three sections of the Hindu community, including through the VHP with people who did not come from Kutch, with Leva Kanbis through his mother and late father and with Kadva Kanbis through his uncle and a distant cousin. These men proposed that the VHP would do the interviewing. Once the questionnaire was edited to their and my satisfaction, a proposal was put to the VHP that I would pay the interviewers £1/ questionnaire and that the interviewers would donate the money to the VHP. The proposal was accepted.
They outlined the problems of interviewing: no Hindu interviewer can interview a Muslim; no Hindu interviewer of student age can ask anyone but his father to answer personal questions about home village, caste and subcaste membership, religious affiliations and politics; no Hindu student is likely to know the answers to these questions, as his parents will not have told him; no Hindu of student age can ask Hindus who are both unrelated and also his seniors such questions; and no Hindu would feel happy asking his close friends such questions. Given these parameters of social distance, logically no Hindu could interview anyone but members of his own family of his own age with any predictable degree of success. As the VHP supported the venture, at least I was assured of some success. The VHP Committee gave Mr K the task of organising the interviewers and interviewing, and he recruited younger members to do the interviewing [7]. He gave questionnaires to interviewers who represented the range of Hindu organisations, castes and religious communities, so that householders who were not members of the VHP could also be interviewed [8].

Judging, however, from the range of questionnaires completed by Hindus, they give the appearance of having drawn on a wide range of Hindus from wide range of backgrounds, castes, sects and beliefs. Where it can be demonstrated to be non-random is in the selection of respondents in relation to the area in which they live. The majority of the Hindus who completed questionnaires live in areas surrounding the town centre. I attempted to remedy this by interviewing Hindus who lived in some of the other areas of the town, most of them were usually doctors or successful businessmen and they would, as Mr K observed, refuse to complete the questionnaire, particularly if the interviewer
belonged to a lower caste and/or was less educated than themselves.

A total of 130 schedules were returned to me by the VHP in June 1976; about 108 were complete and the remainder were in a state of incompleteness. It took them almost five months to do this. When I interviewed Mr Sandhu, the Chairperson of the VHP, he said that the questionnaire was innocuous and that he could easily interview 250 people on his own. When I gave him three questionnaires to complete, he never even attempted to complete them. A possible explanation may be that he was more of an outsider in the Hindu communities than was apparent from his position of leadership.

On one occasion Mr K and I together approached the secretary of the Shree Kutch Swaminarayan Mandir organisation to obtain help. I was acquainted with their secretary, and had also interviewed him. He and Mr K came from the same village in Kutch, so we thought that he might feel obligated to help. However, he made it clear that he wanted nothing to do with Mr K and he refused to do anything for me too. Nevertheless, later on members of his organisation did complete some of the questionnaires. The reason for his refusal emerged later on, he was opposed to the VHP and to Mr Sandhu. Unlike the VHP, the Swaminarayans and Shree Kutch Swaminarayans were committed to maintain differences of caste and sect.

In comparison with the VHP, the Muslim organisations large and small made no offer to help with the interviewing. If anything they obstructed it. Thinking that I could follow a similar strategy, in February 1976 I arranged a meeting with four influential Muslim members of the ICC to ask them for support, these were Mr AD, Mr B, Mr S and Mr A.R.. I
thought that I had convinced one of the four; however, I learnt later
that I had been unsuccessful. They represented the views of those most
opposed to my research. At a meeting in Mr AD’s house I gave my reasons
for conducting a survey and for wishing to interview Muslims. I also
told them that a few questions had been deleted or modified. I also
mentioned that Mr M, a past president, and Mr U, the president of the
ICC supported me. Four issues crystallised as the discussion progressed,
but they were never resolved. After looking through the schedule, Mr A.R
said: "When we left India, we left it behind us. Now we are British, we
have British passports. There is no point in asking us about Baruchi and
Surti and our differences. We live here". These very differences that I
later found divided the Muslim community, these men argued were
irrelevant to their lives in Bolton [9].

An issue arose from my stating that I should interview as many
Muslims as possible, if I intended my survey to be scientifically
acceptable. The idea of my interviewing individuals was rejected. Mr B
said: "We can tell you all about Indians, you don’t need to interview
them". Later on when I attempted to interview him, he was loathe to
answer the questions and refused to name the streets in which his close
friends lived. He also argued that his answers would become data and
that this would be later used against him and the Muslim community. Mr
B argued that I was getting information from the Muslims, but what were
the respondents getting in return? Although the respondents were helping
me, I could do nothing for them. Later on a Muslim ‘A’ level student
refused to complete a schedule for this very reason. He turned around an
old adage: "one man’s poison is another man’s profit".

Related to this issue was another: who would take responsibility for
the survey if they agreed to help me? I aimed my request at these four men as individuals and as members of the ICC. Following the discussion about why I should interview as large a number of Muslims as possible, Mr A.R said "We can ask Mr AD to take responsibility for the decision to interview the community". Although all four men were old friends, Mr A.R picked on the one man who came from a different district to the others; Mr AD was a Surti while the other three were Baruchis. It was interesting to reflect on the first words that Mr AD spoke at the beginning of this meeting, he said: "We four are old friends. We organised the purchase of the first mosque in Bolton. Although we have had our bitter differences, we have remained friends". In reply to Mr A.R's question about who would take responsibility, Mr AD said: "No, I can't do that. We must ask all of the members of the ICC committee to support us". Though all four then agreed to being interviewed, none volunteered to be interviewed and they never put their request for support for my project to the ICC committee. It was weeks later that through another Muslim friend I was able to persuade Mr AD to agree to an interview and months before I again met Mr B and Mr S. Mr B refused to complete a questionnaire. The ICC refused to co-operate, although I did later receive help from a few individual members. This placed the bulk of interviewing of Muslims on me.

5. Problems with Interviewing

Gujaratis were reluctant to answer questions on their personal and political life, and to overcome this reluctance was not easy. With the VHP taking over some of the interviewing, these fears were to some extent diminished. Nevertheless, the questions which were incomplete were the ones thought to be too personal, such as the one on close
friends. Some respondents wrote on the questionnaires: this question is too personal. The only way that I as an interviewer could allay peoples' fears was by referring them to someone whom they knew, and whom I had already interviewed. This was not always possible, since it depended upon my knowledge of the interviewee prior to interviewing them. An element of luck became associated with the exercise: if I could mention the name of a person the interviewee respected, then he might agree; if not, he was likely to refuse. It also meant that I had to find an interpreter to enable me to interview the Muslims. Help came in part from Gujaratis' personal knowledge of me, since this gave some of them confidence to answer the questions and me the knowledge of who might prove to be of the greatest help with a particular interviewee. The two years I spent as a participant observer proved to be invaluable.

Of the 104 Muslims interviewed, 16 were interviewed by Muslims who had offered to help. Mr M, a prominent member of the ICC [10], interviewed 5 and then refused to do more, because he said that he could not ask his friends to complete some of the personal questions, such as the one on close friends. He too reiterated the problems which the two Blackburn friends had mentioned to me, no Muslim will or can ask friends or strangers to answer personal questions. Mr Y, whose family I knew well, completed five interviews at work, and Mr S.K, an 'A' level sociology student, completed six schedules. The difficulties that beset this survey were again made explicit by the strategy adopted by Mr S.K. His family who came from the village of Barbodhan, Surat, were amongst some 150 members of this village who lived here. Of the 35 houses of relations and co-villagers that Mr S.K visited in the hope of completing some interviews, only one person said that he required time to consider the request. The rest refused outright. An explanation for this would
need to take account of his being too young to be given the personal answers by his elders to some questions.

Help also came from my choice of interpreter. It was easy for me to interview persons whom I knew. However, I was told and found out that to enter the houses of people who did not know me or had a mutual friend whom I could identify, resulted in being rejected. This occurred with one family who spoke fluent English but with whom I could not establish a link. After talking to a friend, Mr G, about these problems, he agreed to help me. Both of us were members of the BCCR. It was Mr G who told Mr AD after Friday prayers at mosque that he should stop playing and should complete a questionnaire. Mr AD completed one soon afterwards and he also gave me some names and addresses of relatives whom he thought would probably agree to being interviewed.

I interviewed the remaining 83 interviewees with support from Mr G. He accompanied me to about 70 houses. He also took me to Hindu families who were opposed to the VHP, so I did in practice cross the divide. As an interpreter, he was able to communicate with respondents; he knew exactly when and how to joke with them and how to phrase the questions in Gujarati. Furthermore, he was well known to Muslims for two reasons: first, he was a prominent member of the Muslim community and a member of the BCCR. Secondly, he spent time helping Muslims and Hindus with their personal and immigration problems. Consequently, with his support I was able to obtain answers to all of my questions; in fact, I could even have asked those questions which I had to delete.

Generally, my experience showed that the few Muslim interviewers, who helped me with the interviewing of Muslims, experienced far more
difficulty persuading Muslims to answer these questions than I did (see Footnote 3). This provides some indication of the difficulties that a Gujarati researcher might encounter doing research on Gujaratis. Being a Gujarati and carrying out research in his/her own community is not necessarily an advantage. Sometimes being quite different and easily distinguishable is more of an advantage. At least then people can hide their views without being placed in compromising positions [11].

6. Research Issues

The issues raised by difficulties I encountered bring into question certain fundamental assumptions that most sociologists make who use surveys or questionnaires to obtain data. The first assumption is that respondents can trust the author of a survey with their answers. However often the word confidential may appear in a covering letter, it still remains to be demonstrated that confidentiality can be maintained. Trust is a notion open to many interpretations and where this does not occur, answers may be tailored by respondents to protect themselves. There is no easy way to overcome such fears, except where a major organisation is prepared to support the project, as in the case of the VHP, and to a lesser extent among the Muslims where one or a number of individuals will stand surety for an interviewer/researcher [12].

Though having trained interviewers is highly desirable, they should be seen to be sufficiently detached from the community to be above personal gain and yet, as members of it, still be able to engender trust. Possibly, in conducting a survey in a small, tight-knit community such as this one, strangers, including a Gujarati who belongs to a different caste or sect to that of the interviewee, would be regarded
with suspicion. Even those Hindus and Muslims who assisted me came under suspicion within their communities. There was no solution to this dilemma. Consequently, a community supported project was the solution the VHP accepted and, under the circumstances, I believe it was the only way that I could carry out the interviewing of Hindus. Many of the answers Hindus gave to questions about caste are more "accurate" and "realistic" than might generally be expected, since the interviewees knew that they had the protection of the VHP. The Hindus turned my project into one from which they could all benefit; the money they received was used to improve their community centre. They also intended asking me to provide them with information about themselves, but as yet they have not done so.

Confidentiality is impossible to demonstrate. Although during the period of the survey nobody who was arrested in Bolton as an illegal immigrant could trace links to me, the fear that I might divulge information was strong. I told all respondents that the questionnaires would be destroyed. They agreed that this should be done. The second aspect of the problem of confidentiality was that when I began the project, people raised the issue of confidentiality. When I stopped interviewing, Gujaratis wanted to know why I had ceased interviewing. In other words, if I had continued with the survey, this would have proved to them that I was trustworthy. The cessation of interviewing proved that I was untrustworthy. By just breaking all my contacts with them, I was breaking their hold over me. I had to promise Mr G that I would continue interviewing, otherwise both his and my standing in the community was endangered.
7. Representativeness, Reliability and Validity

I obtained questionnaires from a broad section of the Gujarati population. Though it is possible to carry out a random sample in an Asian population, it requires a considerable financial outlay [13]. Therefore, arising out of the non-randomness of the sample are certain biases. Possibly the sample reflects the opinions of young Hindus as opposed to older Hindu heads of households. However, this is balanced by a sample of Muslims who were predominantly older heads of households.

Generally I would argue that anyone who anthropological fieldwork techniques could obtain the similar answers to the same questions as I did. Reliability depended more upon my relationship with Gujaratis than it did upon their interpretation of questions. A further problem was that my relationship with the Gujaratis became closer and my knowledge of them increased noticeably at the time when the questionnaire was produced. Consequently, there were certain errors in questions which I was unable to rectify, such as the question about valued attributes of a job and the lack of questions about whom respondents go to for help. Most respondents, to my knowledge, endeavoured to give the most truthful answers that they could.

The validity of the questions varies from question to question. Answers to questions about personal details are, I believe, valid since the fear of giving such details was to a large extent overcome by the VHP and personal sureties given in support of the project. Questions of a generally accepted type comprised the majority of questions on the schedule. Some questions like that on valued attributes of jobs (No.111) are probably less valid than other questions, since they were not really
applicable to persons who held jobs other than those in mills. The validity of answers to questions in which general scales were used, such as a lot, some, not much, none, or more often, regularly, less than once a week, or generally satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied and generally dissatisfied are difficult to assess, since such measures provide individuals with some freedom for interpretation. The responses to questions on political issues appear to be valid in that the answers were apparently truthful. To some questions about attitudes some respondents gave behavioural answers: for example, to the question "Could you accept a West Indian as a close friend?", they replied, "I have none." To some extent this could be interpreted as a form of cultural dissonance. Those respondents who understood the assumptions made by interviewers often replied that they trusted everybody; in practice, they only trusted their own kin. To assess the validity of individual questions raises such issues which can only be resolved by a discussion of reliability of the schedule. In general, questions aimed at eliciting an opinion are less valid than questions which demanded answers about social behaviour.
FOOTNOTES

1. I discussed the survey with Dr Abrams, then Director of Social Science Research Council Survey Unit before finalising the schedule.

2. Research shows that generally black people who break the law receive harsher sentences than those received by white offenders for similar crimes (Hudson, 1989).


4. The argument that interviewees are often more reticent with people they know, because the answers are 'on the record' in the community no doubt holds in certain circumstances. However, as Barley shows, even when a person is known to the interviewer this may inhibit responses, because the respondent may be placed in the position of a gatekeeper, who has to consider whether or not to give the interviewer access to knowledge that is not normally accessible to him/her (1986). The difficulty arises from the interviewer being attributed by the interviewee or attributing a position to him/herself, that the interviewee considers to be outside his/her social world. This is the more common experience and was the one which applied to this research project.

5. Reliance on paid volunteers from outside the Gujarati communities may have helped me overcome some of the interviewing problems. However, my finance was limited and I could not afford to employ interviewers from outside the area and communities. This is not always an answer.

6. Students may be diffident and then turn out to be good interviewers. However, in this instance they had to overcome certain social barriers which formed part of their own upbringing and could also have compromised them as members of the communities of which the respondents were members. As insiders they believed that they might be seen as flouting community rules.

7. Most of the interviewers recruited were adults who could be regarded as social equals by the respondents as opposed to students who would be seen as socially inferior in communities in which the older members believe that age should be revered.

8. This may have created a bias in so far as I targeted those Hindus who were members of organisations but would not pick up those who did not belong. At the time of the research I believe that the majority of Hindus and Muslims belonged to organisations.
9. Though I did not rely on respondents to specify how the survey should be done, to have done the survey with no knowledge of the communities would have resulted in my not knowing about many of the social distinctions which proved to be sociologically important, such as caste and sect differences, the importance of village identities, and perceptions of friendship. In the Introduction Part II I argue that I cannot speak for Gujaratis; therefore to have ignored what potential respondents told me would have drawn accusations of tactlessness, if not, racism.

10. He was invited to weddings to read poems he had written praising the bride, the bridegroom and their families.

11. I must reiterate the point that I did not rely on what potential respondents thought, rather experience proved that to ignore the social divisions which potential respondents brought to my attention, would have been foolhardy and irresponsible. Then nobody would have co-operated with this project.

12. Though using the wrong guarantors can make matters worse, selecting guarantors may be a matter of trial and error.

13. See the Open University research on Asians in Bedford.
APPENDIX II

QUESTIONNAIRE

To be completed for all households and occupants selected in the sample. All information given by respondents will be treated as confidential.

Date of interview . . . .
Time of interview . . . .
Recalls . . . . . . . . .

Street . . . . . . . .
Ward . . . . . . . . .

It is important for the purpose of my research that only Indians answer the questions.

Every adult Indian male over the age of 16 years should complete a schedule.

Topic 1

I would like to ask you for some information about yourself and your family.

1. How many persons, adults and children of all ages, live in this house at the moment?

2. How many persons, who usually live here, are away at this moment?

3. How many families and/or persons as well as you/your family live here? 0 or 1 2 3 more 0 or 1 2 3 more

(Interview the heads of these families and mark the schedule, so that the information on one household can be kept together)

4. Are you the owner of this house?
   Yes  
   No
   i. Are you a member of the owner’s family?
   ii. Are you a tenant?
   iii. Are you a guest (paying)?
   iv. Are you a guest (non-paying)?
   v. Are you a lodger?

5. Are you the head of this household?
   Yes
   No
   i. Are you a member of the owner’s family?
   ii. Are you a relative?
   iii. Are you a friend?
   iv. Are you a guest?
6. If you are a relative or a member of the owner's family, what is your relationship to the head of the household?

Symbols for relationships: Father - F; Mother - M; Brother - B; Sister - Z; Daughter - D; Son - S; Wife - W; Parents - P.

Instructions:
Use any combination of symbols to describe a relationship.

7. In which year were you born?

8. Where is your home village (India)?

9. What is the name of the nearest large town or city?

10. In which state is your village?


12. In which year was your wife born?

13. Where is your wife's home village (India)?

14. What is the nearest large town or city?

15. In which state is your wife's village?

16. Is your wife a relative of yours? Yes No Use Symbols below: Father - F; Mother - M; Brother - B; Sister - Z; Son - S; Daughter - D. What is the relationship?

17. What languages does your wife speak? English 1 2 3 Gujarati 1 2 3 Urdu 1 2 3 Hindi 1 2 3 Punjabi 1 2 3 Swahili 1 2 3 Other (specify) 1 2 3

18. How many years did your wife spend at school? (years)

19. In which country(ies) was your wife educated? i. U.K. ii. India. iii. East Africa. iv. Other (specify).
20. What qualification(s) did she obtain?  
   i. None.  
   ii. SSC.  
   iii. Matric.  
   iv. "O" Levels.  
   v. "A" Levels.  
   vi. Other (specify).

21. Did your wife go to college, university or take any kind of educational or industrial course(s) after she left school?  
   Yes  
   What course(s) did she take?  
   Where did she take the course(s)?  
   What qualification(s) did she obtain?  
   No

22. How long has she lived in Britain?

23. Did she come to Bolton straight from:  
   i. Another British town. (specify)  
   ii. India.  
   iii. Kenya.  
   iv. Uganda.  
   v. Tanzania.  
   vi. Other (specify).

24. As well as housekeeping, does your wife do a job?  
   Yes  
   What is the job? (description or specific name of job)  
   Where does she work?  
   No

I would like to ask you the same questions.

25. What languages do you speak? read? write?  
   English 1 2 3  
   Gujarati 1 2 3  
   Urdu 1 2 3  
   Hindi 1 2 3  
   Punjabi 1 2 3  
   Swahili 1 2 3  
   Other (specify) 1 2 3

26. How many years did you spend at school? (years)

27. In which country(ies) were you educated?  
   i. U.K.  
   ii. India.  
   iii. East Africa.  
   iv. Other (specify).

28. What qualification(s) did you obtain?  
   i. None.  
   ii. SSC.  
   iii. Matric.  
   iv. "O" Levels.  
   v. "A" Levels.  
   vi. Other (specify).
29. Did you go to college, university or take any kind of educational or industrial course(s) after leaving school?
   Yes  No
   What course(s) did you take?
   Where did you take the course(s)?
   What qualification(s) did you obtain?

30. How long have you lived in Bolton?

31. Did you come to Bolton straight from: i. Another British town. (specify)
   ii. India.
   iii. Kenya.
   iv. Uganda.
   v. Tanzania.
   vi. Other (specify).

32. What job do you normally do? (Get exact name of job)

33. Where do you do this job?

34. Are you employed at the moment?
   Yes  No
   For how long have you been unemployed?

35. Are there any children living in this house?
   Yes  No
   How many are boys?
   What are the ages of the boys?
   How many are girls?
   What are the ages of the girls?
   Are any of your children living elsewhere?

36. School-going children:
   Which schools do they attend?

37. Children who are no longer at school:
   At what age did they leave school?
   What qualifications did the child(ren) obtain?
   What is(are) the child(ren) doing at this moment?
   (obtain exact title and place of job or, if unemployed, for how long?)
38. Now that you live in Bolton, do you feel that caste differences (Hindus) or district customs (Muslims) are worth keeping?
   Yes  No

   Can you give a reason?

39. Hindus only

   To which castes do you belong?
   Brahmin  Mistry
   Kshatriya  Lohana
   Vaishya  Tailor (Darji)
   Shudra  Halpati
   Don’t Know  Solanki
   Valand
   Harijan
   Kumbar
   Luhar
   Amin
   Rajput
   Patel : only for Patels: Leva  Matia  Kadva
   Kanbi  Charotar
   Mandhata  Koli
   Other (specify)
   Other (specify)

40. Into which of these castes would you approve of members of your own caste marrying?
   Patel  If a Patel  Leva  Patidar
   Mistry  then also  Kadva  Matia
   Lohana
   Tailor (Darji)
   Halpati
   Solanki
   Other (specify)
   Other (specify)

41. Muslims only

   To which caste community do you belong?
   Vohra
   Khojah
   Memon
   Miabhai
   Nagori
   Daudi Bohra
   Other (specify)

42a. Do you regard yourself as a Baruchi Muslim or Surti Muslim?

   b. Into which of these caste communities would you approve of your own people marrying?
   Vohra  Memon  Miabhai
   Khojah  Nagori  Daudi Bohra  Other (specify)
For all persons who are or were married

43. Does your wife belong to the same caste or caste community as you?
   Yes
   No
   If no, which one does she belong to?

Topic 2.

I would like to ask you some questions about Bolton, your neighbourhood and neighbours.

44. Who or what persuaded you to come to Bolton?
   i. Relatives.
   ii. Friends.
   iii. Gujarati Community.
   iv. Job Opportunities.
   v. Other (specify).

45. Who or what persuaded you to live in this neighbourhood?
   i. Relatives.
   ii. Friends.
   iii. Gujarati Community.
   iv. Job Opportunities.
   v. Other (specify).

46. How long have you lived in this house?

House Owners and Tenants.

47. Where did you live before you moved into this house?

48. Were you the owner, lodger or tenant?

49. Before this, where did you live?
   i. Bolton (specify area).
   ii. Britain (specify town/city).
   iii. India.
   iv. East Africa.
   v. Other (specify).

50. Generally speaking, would you agree that: It is better to live among your own community than to live in parts of the town that are strange to you?
   strongly agree   agree   disagree   strongly disagree
   Give reasons:

Topic 3

I would like to ask you about your neighbours and friends.

51. How many neighbours do you know well enough to visit?
   0.
   1 - 3.
   4 - 6.
   7 - 9.
   10 and over.

428
52. How many of these neighbours are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indian Muslims</th>
<th>Few</th>
<th>Half</th>
<th>Most</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian Hindus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Persons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53. (a) Can you name the different religious and cultural groups to which people with whom you work belong?

(b) Can you name the different cultural groups to which people with whom you pray in church/temple/mosque/guru dwara belong?

(c) Do you meet people who belong to different religious and cultural groups to your own as a member of any other organisation or in any other place, such as a social or political club, a pub, at a sporting or holiday club, or as a member of some educational committee?

Yes

No

As a member of which organisations?

or in what places?

To which religious, cultural or racial groups do these people belong?

(d) Do you have as ordinary friends persons who belong to different religious and cultural groups?

Yes

No

To which religious and cultural groups do they belong?

54. Can you identify a maximum of five relatives living outside Britain with whom you keep in touch?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>How often do you visit them?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father - F</td>
<td>Village/Town - if</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother - M</td>
<td>Village/Town - if</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents - P</td>
<td>Village/Town - if</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother - B</td>
<td>India, then also</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sister - Z</td>
<td>largest town in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daughter - D</td>
<td>district</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son - S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
55. Can you identify a maximum of five relatives living in Bolton and Britain whom you see most often?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>How often do you visit them?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father - F</td>
<td>in Bolton:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother - M</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents - P</td>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother - B</td>
<td>Town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sister - Z</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daughter - D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son - S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

56. Are you the kind of person who thinks of himself as having a few really close friends or as having a large number of persons with whom you are close and friendly?

A few  
A large number

57. How many really close friends do you think you have, including relatives?

58. Taking a guess, how many ordinary friends do you think you have?

59. Where do the majority of your friends come from?

i. Kutch.
ii. Kathiawar.
iii. Broach.
iv. Surat.
v. Navsari.
vi. Other (specify).

60. How do you tell the difference between your close friends and your ordinary friends?

61. During the past two weeks, how often have you visited friends or been visited by friends?

i. 0 times.
ii. 1 - 3 times.
iii. 4 - 6 times.
iv. 7 - 9 times.
v. 10 and more times.

62. relative a close friend an ordinary friend an aurkhan or pichan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>can you: rely on a:</th>
<th>trust in a:</th>
<th>expect respect from a:</th>
<th>expect sympathy from a:</th>
<th>expect help from a:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
63. Can you accept as:
   a relative: ..........................................................
   a close friend: ..................................................
   an ordinary friend: .............................................
   an aurkhan or pichan: ...........................................

64. (a) Generally speaking, would you say that: It is best to have close friends who belong to your own cultural and religious community?

   Yes  No

   (b) How strongly do you agree with this?

   strongly agree  agree  disagree  strongly disagree

65. Information about a maximum of ten close friends:

   Name, initials, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

   symbols: ..........................................................

   Address (if Bolton): .............................................
   if elsewhere (town or city)
   Sex male/female: ..............................................
   Related(R)/unrelated(N): .....................................

   Where do you usually meet? at home: .....................
   at work: ......................................................
   at the cinema: ..............................................
   at church/temple/mosque: ...................................
   in a pub: .....................................................
   at sports/hobby: ............................................
   at Islamic Culture Centre: ..................................
   at Vishwa Hindu Parishad: ..................................
   at Hindu Sevak Sangh: ......................................
   at clubs/social gatherings: ..................................
   other places (specify): ....................................

   Are they:
   Gujarati Muslim: .............................................
   Hindu: .........................................................
   Pakistani: ...................................................
   White: ......................................................
   West Indian: ................................................
   Sikh: .......................................................
   Other (specify): ...........................................

   What jobs do they do? ........................................
   (if possible exact name of job)
   How often do you see them? ................................
   (daily, weekly etc.)
66. Close friends:

Copy out list of a maximum of ten initials given in Question 65 in the same order along row A and down column B.

A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

B
1 . . . . . . . . .
2 . . . . . . . . .
3 . . . . . . . . .
4 . . . . . . . . .
5 . . . . . . . . .
6 . . . . . . . . .
7 . . . . . . . . .
8 . . . . . . . . .
9 . . . . . . . . .
10 . . . . . . . . .

(Can you please tell me how well your friends in your opinion know one another using the following values to indicate the appropriate relationship:

Relative  Close  Ordinary  Just  Does not  Unfriendly  Hostile
Friend  Friend  Know  Know

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Topic 4

I would like to ask you some questions about your own interests in the political affairs of the Asian community in Bolton.

67. I would like you to select one problem which in your opinion would require attention, if Asians are going to continue living peacefully in Bolton.

68. Who in your opinion can handle this problem?

Bolton Council for Local Authority Community Relations (Town Hall)
Commission for Government Racial Equality

69. What would you like to see this organisation do about it?

70. How likely do you think it is that this organisation will do what you want about the problem?

very likely  quite likely  unlikely

71. Just how strongly do you feel about this problem?

very concerned  fairly concerned  a little concerned  unconcerned
72. Now I would like to ask you how satisfied you are with some of the main services the Local Authority and Government provide for the residents of Bolton.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Generally Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Generally Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cemetery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Protection</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Coroner's Office</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection from</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Housing for</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent or Purchase</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

73. Thinking about these services, do you think that Asians get better, about the same, or poorer services than most people living in the town?

better   about the same   poorer

If poorer, why do you think this is?

74. Do you agree that Asians living in Bolton are adequately represented on Local Authority committees by the elected representatives?

Yes

No

Can you give reasons? Who do you think should represent the interests of the Asian people on these committees?

Elected councillors

Co-opted members

Other (specify)

Whom should these Asians represent?

All Asians

Own Religious groups

How do you think all Asians should select their representatives?
75. On which Local Authority committees would you like to see an Asian representative?

76. Do you agree that Asians living in Britain are adequately represented in British politics?

Yes
No
Can you give reasons?

77. Have you heard of any of the following persons who are regarded as leaders?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandhata Patels</th>
<th>Saibaba</th>
<th>Lena Street Mosque</th>
<th>Vishwa Hindu Parishad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Mr Mehta</td>
<td>(2) Mr Sharma</td>
<td>(3) Mr Chadat</td>
<td>(5) Mr Sandhu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Mr Ibrahim</td>
<td>(6) Mr Anand Patel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaminarayan</td>
<td>Shree Kutch Swaminarayan</td>
<td>Islamic Culture</td>
<td>Pakistani Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Deane Rd.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Mr Darji</td>
<td>(8) Mr Tailor</td>
<td>(9) Mr U.Patel</td>
<td>(11) Mr Atcha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Mr Ahmed</td>
<td>(12) Mr Chana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs</td>
<td>(13) Mrs A.Taylor</td>
<td>(14) Mr D.Young</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) If any of these persons are relatives of yours, can you name them and describe the relationship?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

(b) If any of these persons are close friends of yours, can you name them?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

(c) If any of these persons are ordinary friends of yours, can you name them?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

(d) If you are not friends with any of them, who do you just know?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

78. Are there any persons whom you know who you think should have been included in this list?

Yes
No
Who are they? Why should they have been included? Go to next Question.
79. Have you ever approached any of the above for help or advice?
   Yes  No
   Whom have you approached?  Go to next Question.
   (names)

   Can you tell me very briefly what help or advice you required?

80. There are many ways for people to show their dissatisfaction or disagreement with Local Authority policies and decisions. I am going to read to you some ways and you can tell me whether you approve or disapprove of each way.

   Approve  Disapprove  Depends  Don’t Know
   (a) Contacting Local Councillors by writing to them or meeting with them: ...
   (b) Contacting Members of Parliament by writing or meeting with them: ...
   (c) Taking part in protest meetings or marches: ...
   (d) Campaigning against certain political candidates up for election: ...
   (e) Refusing to obey a law one thinks is unjust: ...

81. Do you ever listen to political talks or news of public affairs on TV?
   Yes  No

82. Here is a list of daily newspapers which are available in Bolton. Do you ever read any of them daily, occasionally, never?

   Daily  Occasionally  Never
   Guardian  ...
   Bolton Evening News  ...
   Times  ...
   Daily Telegraph  ...
   Bolton Journal  ...
   Sun  ...
   Daily Mirror  ...
   Daily Mail  ...
   Asian newspapers (Milap)  ...
   Others (specify)  ...

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83. Now I am going to name some organisations. Do you belong to any organisation concerned with:

Race Relations? Yes No Go to next question.
To which organisation(s)?
Do you sit on any committees?

84. Sport and other leisure time activities?
Yes No Go to next question.
Which ones?
Do you sit on any committees?

85. Are you a member of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad?
Yes No
Do you sit on any committees? Did you sit on any committees in the past?
also
Yes No Yes No
On which committees do you sit? On which committees did you sit? Go to next question.
Are you chairman, secretary or treasurer?
also and when?
Were you chairman, secretary or treasurer?

86. Are you a member of the Islamic Culture Centre?
Yes No
Do you sit on any committees? Did you sit on any committees in the past?
also
Yes No Yes No
On which committees do you sit? On which committees did you sit? Go to next question.
Are you chairman, secretary or treasurer?
also and when?
Were you chairman, secretary or treasurer?
87. Do you belong to any youth organisation or other voluntary groups, such as the Hindu Sevak Sangh?

Yes No

Which ones?
Do you sit on any committees?

Yes No

Which ones?

88. Which religion do you believe in?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Christian 1 (specify denomination)</th>
<th>Islam 2 Sunni 1</th>
<th>Hinduism 3 Sikhism 1</th>
<th>Other 4 (specify)</th>
<th>None 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam 2 Sunni 1</td>
<td>Hinduism 3 Sikhism 1</td>
<td>Other 4 (specify)</td>
<td>None 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia 2</td>
<td>Sufi 3</td>
<td>Sama 1</td>
<td>Aryan 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufi 3</td>
<td>Sama 1</td>
<td>Aryan 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahai 4</td>
<td>Other 5 (specify)</td>
<td>Jain 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 5 (specify)</td>
<td>Jain 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tableeg 1</td>
<td>Saibaba 1</td>
<td>Deobandi 2 Other 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deobandi 2 Other 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berelewi 3 (specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 4 (specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

89. Would you say that you go to church/temple/mosque:

more than once a week once a week seldom never

90. At which church/temple/mosque do you normally attend prayers?

Deane Rd. (Swaminarayan) 1.
Adelaide St. (Shree Kutch Swaminarayan) 2.
Chorley Old Rd. (Mandir/VHP) 3.
Odd Fellows Hall (Saibaba) 4.
Gloster St. (Mandhata Patels) 5.
Zakariah Mosque 6.
Medina Mosque 7.
Tayaibah Mosque 8.
Lena St. Mosque 9.
Other (Specify) 10.

91. Do your children receive religious instruction?

Yes No Too Young
92. Do you donate money to:

- the Mandir (VHP)? Yes No
- the temple where you pray? Yes No
- the mosque’s monthly collection? Yes No
- a mosque fund? Yes No
- another temple’s fund? Yes No

93. Who collects your donation to this fund?

- A committee member? Is the member:
  0 self?
  1 a close relative?
  2 a close friend?
  3 an ordinary friend?
  4 an aurkhan/pichan?
- Other (specify)

94. Over the past two years, how often did you attend an election and vote for committee members of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vishwa Hindu Parishad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Culture Centre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandhata Patel Mandel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shree Kutch Swaminarayan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaminarayan (Deane Rd.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lena Street Mosque</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistry Society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

95. Do you belong to a village society, district society, caste association?

- Yes
- No

Which ones? Go to next question.

Are you a committee member?

- Yes
- No

On which committees do you sit?

96. Do you belong to a burial society?

- Yes
- No

Which one? Go to next question.

Are you a committee member?

- Yes
- No

97. Whom do you feel you could more easily accept as a leader of the Asian community in Bolton?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accept</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Sikh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Gujarati Hindu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Gujarati Muslim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Pakistani</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
98. How important do you feel that it is for a:

**Muslim to:**
- avoid eating bacon or ham?
- attend Friday afternoon prayers at the mosque?
- organise the marriages of one's daughters as soon as they complete their schooling?
- say prayers five times a day?
- grow a beard?
- bury the dead within 24 hours?
- send children to single sex schools?

**Hindu to:**
- avoid eating meat?
- marry within one's own caste?
- cremate the dead within 24 hours?
- eat food cooked only by one's own caste?
- organise the marriages of one's daughters as soon as they complete their schooling?
- for members of each caste to maintain their superior position of their caste over other castes?
- belong to one's own caste association?

99. When you talk to your friends, do you talk about political problems, such as what is happening in Bolton? in Britain? in East Africa? and in India?

Bolton Britain East Africa India

100. Some people say that the leaders of the Islamic Culture Centre, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Sri Sathya Sai Baba, Shree Kutch Swaminarayan, Swaminarayan (Deane Rd.) and Lena Street Mosque should work together for the benefit of all Asians living in Bolton. Others say that their organisations should look only after their own people. What do you think? Should these leaders make a great effort to work together? make some effort? or make no effort?

great effort some effort no effort

439
Topi 5

I would like to get your opinion on some national, political and racial issues.

101. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a supporter of the:
   - Labour Party
   - Conservative Party
   - Liberal Party
   - Other (specify)

102. Would you call yourself a strong supporter or not a strong supporter?

103. Did you vote at the last national election? Yes No
     Did your wife vote at the last national election? Yes No

104. How important to you are the following national issues?

   very important | unimportant | not interested | don't know
   important      | unimportant | interested    |

   Our relations with
   with Common Market
   Countries? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

   Political
   Decentralisation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

   Price of Oil?

   Future of the
   National Health
   Service? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

   Unemployment and
   inflation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

   Our relations with
   India? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

105. During the past three years have you done any of the following:

   (a) Worn a party rosette, hung a political poster in your window, attended a party meeting? Yes No

   (b) Worked actively in a political campaign, canvassed etc.? Yes No

   (c) Worked part-time in a local political party office? Yes No
106. Many different terms are used by white people to describe Indians, some are acceptable, some unacceptable and some insulting. Can you rank the following terms into those which you consider to be acceptable, those which are unacceptable and those which are insulting.

(Instructions: show card to respondent)
Acceptable = A Unacceptable = U Insulting = I

Foreigner Asian Immigrant Indian Paki Coloured Blackie

107. In the last year we heard a lot about equality and colour, equality of opportunity, equality of wages and equality of political rights and justice. How much real change do you think there has been in the position of Asians in Britain over the last few years?

a lot some not much none don’t know

Topic 6

I would like to ask you a few questions about your work.

108. Can you tell me roughly how much you normally earn, that is the basic wage you bring home each week or month (where relevant):

£20 £30 £40 £50 £60 £70 £80 £90 £100 and over

109. What hours do you normally work? day.... evening .... night....

110. Do you belong to a union?

Yes

No

To which union do you belong? Go to next question

Do you attend union meetings?

regularly sometimes rarely never

111. Can you select from the following criteria three which you value most:

i. Job security.

ii. Availability of overtime work.

iii. Job is interesting.

iv. Working with members of your own religious community.

v. Working with other Asians.

vi. Possibility to move on to a more responsible and better paying job.

vii. Working under an Asian supervisor.

112. Taking into consideration all things about your usual job, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with it?

very satisfied satisfied dissatisfied very dissatisfied
113. How did you find your present job?

heard from relatives heard from close friend a friend advertisement other (specify)

114. Is this your first job in Britain?

Yes

Go to next question.

No

What was your previous job?
Where did you work?
What job did you do before this one?
Where did you work?
If in Bolton, for whom did you work?
If elsewhere, what is the name of town?

115. What sort of job would you like to have?

116. If different from your present job, do you feel that you stand a chance of getting such a job?

Yes

No

How likely is it that you would get this kind of job?

Lack of training
Lack of English
Lack of experience
Racial discrimination
Other (specify)

117. Do you think that your children have a good chance of getting a better job than you have?

Yes

No

No Children

Can you give a reason for this?

118. Have you found a job(s) for a relative or friend within the last 6 months?

Yes

No

For whom did you find a job?

relative close ordinary other

friend friend (specify)
119. Are you self-employed?
Yes No
Do you employ other persons? Go to next question.
Yes No
Are they full-time or part-time helpers?
How many employees do you have?
full-time ........
part-time ........

120. How many of your employees are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>relatives</th>
<th>close friends</th>
<th>ordinary friends</th>
<th>other (specify)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>full-time</td>
<td>........</td>
<td>......</td>
<td>.....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>part-time</td>
<td>........</td>
<td>......</td>
<td>.....</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

121. There is a lot of talk these days about social class. Some say that they belong to the middle class or working class. Do you ever think of yourself as belonging to a class?
Yes No Don’t Know Other (specify)
To which class do you feel you belong? If you had to make a choice, in which class would you put yourself?

122. Here are 20 cards on which are written the names of 20 jobs.

- bus driver
- nurse
- shop assistant
- doctor (GP)
- butcher
- clerk
- civil engineer
- bricklayer
- (own shop)
- postman
- shopkeeper
- textile worker
- solicitor
- carpenter (own shop)
- primary school teacher
- high school teacher (man)
- supervisor in a mill
- waiter in an Asian-owned restaurant
- labourer in a factory
- driving school instructor (own school)

Can you rank these jobs in order:

(a) from highest to lowest in terms of standard of living;

(b) from highest to lowest in terms of value to society;

(c) put the cards in order of those jobs:
   i. you consider to be equal to yours and available to you;
   ii. you consider to be above you, that is out of your reach because you lack the training and experience;
   iii. those jobs you consider to be unobtainable on the grounds of racial discrimination;
   iv. those jobs which you consider to be inferior to your job.
Uncorporate with Evil

Dear Brothers and Sisters,

Undoubtedly you are all aware of the burning social issue that has been so much talked about for the past two years.

Mr P of Bolton (of Bardoli, India) called Miss C (of Lilapore, India) with the promise of joining her in matrimony. Miss C had lived with him since 28 April 1973 as his wife. However for one reason or another Mr P has not kept his promise to transform this relationship into the registered marriage. Eventually, since 19th February 1974, she has been left bereft by him.

Not stopping at that, Mr P even plotted to have her returned to India after handing her passport to the Police. After hearing of the dastardly deed, the representatives of the various branches of the community met on 23rd February 1974 in Bolton and tried to settle this matter amicably. However, Mr P’s stubbornness forced the Committee to arrange for Miss C to stay at Mr I’s house, Leicester.

To date unending efforts have been made to make Mr P and his relatives to see the sense in this matter. To this end, the Community has had to spend a fair amount of money and make numerous trips between Bolton and Leicester.

During these personal meetings Mr P has acknowledged his errors and has consented to marry Miss C but later when was advised against this by...
someone the Community hoped that there would be kindled within his heart some flicker of kindness. However this hope proved to be pious.

Finally we called a general meeting of the whole Community on the 3rd and 4th of May 1975 in Bolton. (We)[1] failed to resolve this matter. He even refused to meet the honourable members of the community.

It is essential to maintain a continuing vigilance against such evil acts. After giving considerable thought to the future implications of such acts, it has been decided to outcaste (excommunicate) Mr P’s family. Every member of the community should not maintain any relationship with his family. He should be neither invited to any social functions nor should we accept his invitation. After considerable pondering, the executive committee has had to make the regretful decision. We had no alternative but to resort to this course of action and we feel duty-bound to inform you of this decision. There is no doubt that all you brothers and sisters will co-operate to ensure that success of this action.

WE HAVE BEEN LEFT WITH ONLY ONE WEAPON TO SUPPRESS THIS SORT OF EVIL IN THE COMMUNITY. IT IS IN YOUR HANDS TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THE COMMUNITY. IF WE FAIL IN THIS, THEN THE COMMUNITY AS WE KNOW (IT)[2] WILL CEASE TO EXIST.

It is hoped that all of you brothers and sisters will with mind and soul strengthen the hands of the community by not co-operating with Mr P’s family.

The Executive Committee of Shree Parmir Samaj (UK).
FOOTNOTES

1. My insertion to make the text read easily.
2. My insertion to make the text read easily.
There are a number of ways of analysing social networks; cluster analysis is one way. An alternative to these has been developed in this thesis. This entails developing a measure which summarises density, intensity and clusterability. The method reduces the links in a social network to the optimum spanning tree(s) (OST). Although this is not a new idea (see Deo, 1974), its application to social networks was relatively new at the time when this research was done. Later on others drew attention to the application of algorithms to network analysis (Mitchell, 1979). Since social networks comprise a mass of links between close friends of an anchor point (respondent), the mass of links is reduced to a minimum set of links which link every individual in the network only once to one other individual. The anchor point’s (respondent’s) relationships with each close friend is by definition of the same value, therefore in this instance it can be ignored within the calculation. It is the social relationships between close friends that is of interest.

In graph theory where a defined set of minimum links are defined as the optimum links between individuals, the resultant tree is referred to as the optimum spanning tree. Weightings were attached to different levels of intensity of friendship between individuals. To close friendship between kin, a value of one was given, to close friendship between non-kin in a network a value of two was given, a value of three was given to ordinary friendship, a value of four to just know and a value of five to don’t know relationships. Using Kruskal’s algorithm for identifying optimum spanning trees, the computer plotted the optimum...
spanning trees for every respondent anchoring social networks with four or more close friends. The optimum link is taken to be the most trustworthy, reliable and helpful possible between any two individuals, that is close friends of the respondent.

From data collected on the close friends of respondents (question nos.65 and 66, see Appendix II), it is possible to reproduce a matrix consisting of a maximum of 90 possible links for each ten person social network. At the time of the research a network of ten close friends was regarded as generating as many individual links as local computers could analyse; today this no longer correct. The difficulty that had to be overcome was to find a way of analysing two to three hundred social networks quickly and simply. The optimum spanning tree analysis is one such solution.

The analysis was aimed at analysing the optimum links between the number of close friends identified by respondents. Some respondents claimed that all of their close friends were close friends of one another, in which instance the optimum spanning tree would be the same irrespective of which point it started. This pattern of analysis would be similar if a respondent claimed that all his close friends were kin, close friends, ordinary friends, acquaintances or strangers. The distinctions are made by weighting each of these forms of friendship or otherwise according to the intensity of the relationship (Chap.4). Where a social network of close friends comprises a mixture of relations of two or more different levels of intensity, the possible number of optimum spanning trees become more unique. The result is that different trees will have different total scores and different patterns. The vaguer the relationship and the lower the intensity of the friendship,
the greater number of possible trees that can be generated.

One of the products of this form of analysis is a score which is calculated from the total value of each branch that makes up the final tree (Table A4 (i) and (ii)). Another feature of this form of analysis is that clusters of close friends within a social network can be identified.

I have set out below the programme details I used to analyse the optimum spanning trees of respondents' social networks.

**Computer Program For Network Analysis**

10 DATA sample no, weightings of relationships in order by row.
20 DIM A(9,10),M(45),Y(45),L(45),IA(45)
30 READ SAMNO,NOFDS
40 PRINT SAMNO;NOFDS;
50 I=0
60 FOR II= NOFDS-1 TO 1 STEP -1
70 FOR JJ=II TO NOFDS-1
80 I=I+1
90 READ IA(I)
100 PRINT IA(I);
110 NEXT JJ
120 NEXT II
130 IF NOFDS<4 GOTO 30
140 REM
150 FOR II=1 TO 9
160 FOR JJ=1 TO 10
170 A(II,JJ)=0!
180 NEXT JJ
190 NEXT II
200 REM
210 LL=0
220 IJ=0
230 PRINT
240 FOR JJ=2 TO 10
250 IJ=IJ+1
260 FOR II=1 TO IJ
270 LL=LL+1
280 A(II,JJ)=IA(LL)
290 NEXT II
300 NEXT JJ
310 FOR I=1 TO 9
320 FOR J=1 TO 10
330 PRINT A(I,J);
340 NEXT J
350 PRINT
360 NEXT I
370 REM
380 REM
390 REM
400 N=NOFDS
410 T1=0
420 K=1
430 I=1
440 J=2
450 M(K)=A(I,J)
460 X(K)=I
470 Y(K)=J
480 J=J+1
490 IF J=(N+1) GOTO 530
500 REM PRINT I,J,K,A(I,J)
510 IF A(I,J)<M(K) GOTO 450
520 GOTO 480
530 I=I+1
540 J=I+1
550 IF I=N GOTO 570
560 GOTO 490
570 PRINT M(K),X(K),Y(K)
580 S=X(K)
590 T=Y(K)
600 A(S,T)=1000
610 IF(K=N*(N-1)/2) GOTO 640
620 K=K+1
630 GOTO 430
640 K=1
650 FOR II=1 TO N
660 L(II)=II
670 NEXT II
680 S=X(K)
690 T=Y(K)
700 IF L(S)=L(T) GOTO 840
710 IF L(S)<L(T) GOTO 770
720 P=L(S)
730 FOR II=1 TO N
740 IF (L(II)=P) L(II)=L(T)
750 NEXT II
760 GOTO 810
770 Q=L(T)
780 FOR II=1 TO N
790 IF L(II)=Q THEN L(II)=L(S)
800 NEXT II
810 PRINT M(K),X(K),Y(K),L(S),L(T)
820 T1=T1+M(K)
830 PRINT T1
840 K=K+1
850 IF K=N*(N-1)/2 GOTO 870
860 GOTO 680
870 GOTO 30
880 END
Five close friends: (5) 4 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
This is the matrix 4 2 5 5
as it appears as 0 5 5 5
completed in the 0 0 5 5
schedule. 0 0 0 5

Weightings are in 2 1 3
near columns; 4 1 2
the middle and 5 1 5
far columns identify 5 2 3
are attached to which relationship 5 2 4
the weightings 5 2 5
these are ranked by 5 3 4
are these ranked by 5 3 5
weight. 5 4 5

The optimum spanning 2 1 3 1 1
is constructed in 2
terms of the lowest 4 1 2 1 1
weighted relationship 6
11
Total weight of = 5 1 5 1 1
OST 16
Optimum Spanning Tree Analysis: No.29

Six close friends: (6) 3 5 2 5 2 5 1 2 4 5 3 2 4 2

3 5 5 5 5
0 2 5 1 3
0 0 2 2 2
0 0 0 4 4
0 0 0 0 2
1 2 5
2 2 3
2 3 4
2 3 5
2 3 6
2 5 6
3 1 2
3 2 6
4 4 5
4 4 6
5 1 3
5 1 4
5 1 5
5 1 6
5 2 4 4
1 2 5 2 2
1
1 2 3 2 2
3
2 3 4 2 2
5
2 3 6 2 2
7
3 1 2 1 1
10


